cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia i disordered civil societies and ethnic hierarchies james goodman university of technology, sydney civil society is best understood as a process rather than a ‘thing’. its existence rests on institutions, especially non-governmental institutions. but it is not constituted by these institutions. the essence of civil society lies in the practices of its players, as they engage in the process of social change. such practices are self-constitutive, and herein lies the creative power of civil societies. the first two papers in this issue offer new approaches to interpreting and understanding the development of civil societies, as a complex, disordered process. jenny onyx and melissa edwards chart a research paradigm for civil societies that embraces their complexity as mobilising networks. the self-organising dynamics of community mobilisation direct attention to the complexities of ‘adaptive’ leadership within networks. onyx and edwards deploy this approach across three distinct sites and practices – community sustainability in a small town in australia, eco-tourism in a peruvian village, and cooperative ‘eldercare’ in a swedish village. jonathan marshall takes the analysis one step further, by suggesting that civil societies are at their best when they are disordered. if we accept that civil society is a creative social process, then it is necessarily disorderly. such disorder is often discounted, and assessed to be a negative attribute, to be overcome by the more orderly, and more ordering effects of civil society institutionalisation. marshall inverts this order-disorder nexus, exploring disordered civil society as a process necessary to democratic life. the following three papers in this issue focus on the relationship between civil societies and ethnic hierarchy. all, in various ways, insist on the fluidity of ethnic identification, and on the importance of how ethnic categories are defined and mobilised in civil societies. carol reid addresses the australian ethnic order through a discussion of educational initiatives in the aftermath of the 1995 cronulla beach riots. there has been much discussion of the origins of the riots, which saw a large number of people attempt to close a major sydney beach to ‘nonwhites’. reid focuses on the responses, discussing inter-cultural initiatives and ‘values education’ in local schools. reid argues these tended to solidify ethnic blocs and obscure ethnic hierarchy. instead she argues for an approach that uses recognition of diversity to question underlying causes of hierarchy and social injustice. walter lalich echoes the theme of civil society as a process by focusing on the self-organised ‘voluntary collective actions’ of migrant communities in sydney. here, migrant communities constitute themselves, and their ethnic identities, by appropriating communal spaces to meet religious, educational, recreational and welfare needs. lalich documents 386 such spaces, half in ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 the sphere of religion, and discusses the extent to which these spaces enable a sense of belonging for participants, and embody a recognition of cultural diversity. pooja sawrikar and ilan katz conclude this issue with a powerful argument against the racialisation of anti-racism. rejecting cultural reductionism, they address racism as a phenomenon that is constituted in the process of exerting power and prejudice. they argue that our focus should be on how this nexus operates, rather than on one or other side of the equations. in doing so, they outline a ‘cultural competency’ approach to racism for social service providers, that embraces difference but at the same time de-centres ‘sameness’. overall, the issue offers a range of new and reinvigorated approaches, both to understanding civil societies and addressing ethnic hierarchies, that injects a much-needed fluidity to our concepts and models, and to our practice. cosmopolitan civility: understanding power and difference the 4 rs conference at the university of technology sydney in october 2008 took place less than a year after the election of the rudd labor government. the moment is important to capture – the government had been swept into office on a wave of hostility to the howard conservatives, but it did not have a mandate for radical reform. its promises had carefully targeted key constituencies – skilled workers, small business, the urban “chattering” classes, people in education, in health and in the arts (to a small extent). the government was committed to fiscal discipline with a more humane face, its great vision summarised under the rubric of “social inclusion”. already at the 300 day mark after the election (a major keynote panel at the conference with sharron burrow, robert manne and laurie ferguson carried that reference http://www.themonthly.com.au/taxonomy/term/84?page=5), there was growing unease about the pace and direction of reform. despite the apology to the stolen generation, the intervention in the northern territory continued, with little to show except articulate and angry indigenous spokespeople. the three hundred participants in the 4rs conference engaged with many of these issues, from indigenous rights to legal protest in the p r china, from social inclusion to racism, from the environmental crisis to feminism in islam. the articles that we have included in this issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies ejournal have been chosen to reflect the diversity of the conference, its themes and the debate that took place there. the eight pieces traverse the space from the legality of the establishment of the colonies in australia, the attempts to reconcile australians of indigenous and nonindigenous heritage, through the building of social capital in localities, to educational strategies in diverse communities, to democratic opportunities in the largest country in the world. there is a meta-narrative that we can extract from these papers, an understanding more or less clearly articulated that social cohesion requires ultimately a recognitional politics, where power and difference face each other and decide to reach an accommodation based on civility. francesca dominello opens this conversation in her discussion from a socio-legal perspective of the underpinnings of european colonisation of australia. she argues that, through the mabo case, indigenous people from the torres strait challenged the taken-for-granted jurisprudence of australia that had underpinned white hegemony for two centuries. she notes that mabo broke a deadlock, by opening up the possibility of legal equality from a position of difference, rather than uniformity. yet the case may have produced only a shortterm outcome that conservative and homogenising forces have sought to suppress, or have reinterpreted in ways that reinforce their material, political and ideological interests. andrew gunstone then addresses the legacy of the story that mabo has drawn from the shadows, the tensions implicit in the whole discourse of reconciliation. he points to the failure of the greatly-touted reconciliation process, from its emergence as an alternative to effective land rights, and as a disguise for the real struggles over power and selfdetermination that occurred in the backstage of australian political theatre for the decade of reconciliation. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 i http://www.themonthly.com.au/taxonomy/term/84?page=5 nahid kabir focuses our attention on a contemporary manifestation of the politics of recognition, that moment of intergenerational complexity where adolescent young australian women of muslim faith try to build an identity that balances the competing forces they experience – from parents and home, religious authorities, school and peer-group. kabir argues that the girls perform according to different scripts at home with family and in religious environments, compared to their immersion in school and peer networks. these tensions, she argues, can fragment the fragile personal identity of the young person, leaving her open to quite severe emotional distress. in order to protect them somewhat kabir argues for a greater social involvement in these issues, through a social movement model. nina burridge and her colleagues explore the way in which schools respond to the presence of the newcomers. they critically review how “multiculturalism” is operationalised, arguing that schools take very different perspectives on diversity, depending on their local communities. policy may promote educational strategies of diversity but the school responds in part through how executives manage their relations with their surrounding populations. should policy be more pro-active, building capacity to ensure students are more cosmopolitan in their social capacities? the interface between the individual and the group, between primary and secondary associations, and between long-established “locals” and newly settled arrivals, forms the basis for rob garbutt’s testing of the concept of social inclusion. the inclusion/exclusion nexus is not solely about formal group membership, but rather is an everyday experiential issue, played out in the relations that people have with each other, the active sense of belonging (or not) that underpins the drier policy concepts. garbutt uses critical language theory to reflect on the meanings of being “local” as they are expressed in media about lismore and cronulla. he shows how in lismore the boundaries are directed in two directions – towards aborigines and at hippies, while in cronulla the language draws a line between “australians” and people from the middle east. he then looks at a number of local projects designed to bridge such barriers through shared telling of personal narratives of survival. personal and communal engagement requires institutional forms, susan mcclean and jenny onyx argue in their exploration of community housing options in adelaide. the third way – between the rampant inequities of the capitalist market and the bureaucratic strictures of state provision – could provide a solution for affordable housing provision. eco-cities address issues of both environmental and social sustainability, even though they face enormous barriers from both the state and the market. christie walk, an adelaide ecocommunity, has developed through the socio-political commitment of its participants, and mobilisation of their social capital to hold this communal collaboration together. is the individual or even small-group communal focus sufficient to engage with climate change and the necessary changes in social arrangements that environmental crisis demands of contemporary citizens? jennifer kent argues that the individualisation of climate change responsibilities that typify neo-liberal government mobilisation strategies seriously harm the capacity of society to cope with the changes afoot. rather there needs to be a concerted effort focussed on citizen-action initiatives, even though these are not in favour with governments. behavioural change requires societal infra-structural change, without which the individual will be swamped by the environmental challenges that really exist behind the rhetoric. ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 iii sometimes though the societal challenges appear just too huge, the entrenched resistance of the state too embedded, the vested interests too powerful. feng chongyi tackles exactly this problem in his examination of the rise of defence lawyers in the peoples’ republic of china. he shows how discourses of human rights have flourished as china’s modernisation progresses, even through the painful repression around tiananmen and the attacks on democratic activists. feng proposes that the concept of rights has become more widely accepted in china, accelerated both by local protests against oppressive or corrupt government actions, and by a rising stratum of legal representatives willing to defend the interests of those being oppressed. while the state controls traditional media, the internet has become a flourishing site for the communication of rights and the celebration of small victories. we can talk then quite usefully of the widespread value of the notion of cosmopolitan civility. it rests on a theoretical engagement with the politics of recognition and reciprocity, and a practical scholarly commitment to the use of knowledge for social change. the rise of the discourse of social inclusion, promoted by the australian government as the basis of its “attack” on social disadvantage, has placed many of these questions at the heart of debates about social policy. two major questions are revealed by the sorts of arguments that this issue of the journal covers. the first must be the relation between social inclusion and social inequality and whether the rubric of social inclusion requires significant changes in the levels of social inequality, which have grown in australia over recent decades. concern for marginalisation is not the same as concern for equity – the former is about social control and cohesion, that latter addresses the far more complex issues of social justice and the unequal distribution of power. the second question reflects the silence in much of government rhetoric about cultural diversity – either in relation to indigenous people or to ethnic and refugee communities. social inclusion has political, cultural, social and economic dimensions, even in its most limited and conservative reading. as yet there are few signs that the diversity dimensions have gained any purchase on the public debate and the direction of government policy priorities. we welcome your feedback and commentary on the articles, and the ongoing participation of our readership in forming the directions for the ccs ejournal. andrew jakubowicz 192 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 winning on our issues with power1 amanda tattersall abstract social movement organisations need to have a pragmatic understanding of our current weaknesses and challenge ourselves to be much more adventurous for how to build social power and transformative change. this article considers three core weaknesses of our activist organisations, including how our issue agenda is often reactive, our disconnection from place and our poor track record on collaboration. it then suggests that the hope for stronger social change lies with a proactive issue agenda, strong reciprocal coalitions and the ability to move campaigns at multiple scales (locally, regionally, nationally, globally). the article includes a variety of examples that suggest how this stronger kind of organising is possible. social movements and progressive organizations need to take stock of where we are at, and consider three fundamental changes to how we work to build our power. firstly, to be successful social movements need to organise around and inside of a clear moral vision and a set of goals for the society that we want. secondly, we need to significantly rebuild the power of our organisations and recognise that currently our social movement organisations are debilitated and weak. and thirdly, in that rebuilding process, we need to rebuild our movement from the base up. when i say ‘the base up’ i would stress the importance of locally scaled politics, in particular the power of building participation and new activists, to create new members in our social movements and organisations. taking stock of where we are at but before we look to answers, we need to make an honest assessment of where we are. these reflections are based on my experience. i won’t speak for others in different social movements, and i’m sure all people’s perceptions are different. but i think we have fundamental weaknesses in our social movements, at three levels: the types of issues we work on our connection to place and local participation our organisations 1 this paper is not refereed. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 193 issues lots of progressive politics is a politics of abstraction. as social movements, we tend to talk in high-level concepts, rather than attempt to connect what are abstract concepts to what are people’s day-to-day life experience. for instance, nina burridge’s paper discussed how social movements are often values movements that are centred on the middle class [see paper by nina burridge in the rights section of this volume]. i think that there’s a real gap in the way that we are trying to speak about the concerns that we raise as social movements, we often speak to a set of values rather than connecting values with people’s interests. an example may illustrate this. in the environment movement when we’re talking about climate change, we talk about targets and that australia and the world needs to set big and bold targets. but we are not talking in sydney about a major concrete environmental issue that links directly to climate change, and that is public transport (and particularly a sustained campaign to fix it). our city is congested and clogged with commuter nightmares, particularly if you live in western sydney, south western sydney, or the central coast. it is not exceptional to commute for over two hours a day, yet there is no functional campaign to deal with the issue. instead, those of us who are part of the environmental movement, and i see myself as part of this (and struggling with the difficulty of this), we often avoid building campaigns around these day-to-day concerns. we stick to a conversation about targets and abstract terms. this is a weakness and keeps our movements isolated from those who are not already privy to what ‘targets’, for instance, mean. additionally, our movements tend to be reactive when building issue campaigns. this means that we have our battles picked for us, by politicians and employers. we are very good at saying no, and not very good at saying what we want. it is virtually impossible to effectively set an agenda when saying ‘no’. it leaves us miles away from achieving systemic change. an example is the significant battle around electricity privatisation. while this is an important and challenging campaign, it faces almost impossible hurdles. 194 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 a key weakness is that it is a battle that picked us. the cruel irony of this campaign is that even if we ‘win’ and electricity privatisation is stopped, our victory is standing still. we haven’t actually built any proactive social change around this issue, for instance gains around energy efficiency, green jobs or renewable energy. our tendency to consistently run reactive campaigns – no war, no corporate globalisation, no higher education fees – leaves us with the best option being that we are standing still on our agenda. indeed, we are not articulating a clear agenda when we are articulating our social movement goals. this is a real problem. place the second significant gap is around place. our social movements and many of our organisations have become de-linked from the local. the organising base of social movement activists is the inner city, and even within in the inner city we see turf wars. part of what this panel was asked to speak about is electoral politics, and if we are to be honest we have to recognise that there are wasteful turf wars in the inner city between the green and the labor-left. two of our major progressive forces battle it out between each other, contest each other in elections, and yet the majority of sydney residents are often left outside of these discussions and outside of any engagement with organisational politics. this needs to be fixed. and the strategy to fix it has to be bolder and braver than beginning with a blame game. and while this continues we have a lot of wasted progressive politics de-linked from where the majority of sydney lives – outside of the inner city. in contrast, the rights at work campaign which set up 22 local rank and file activist groups in marginal seats across the country is a step towards the strategy that must be built. this was about locally engaged politics and it was about building activists out of people who’d never been activists before. yet a question remains even for the rights at work campaign, or for get up! meet-ups, or the climate change networks that were set up by the nature conservation council, what happens after the election? all these movements organised around the 2007 election and were very successful, were very grass roots, but what happens now? where are these movements? what resources do they cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 195 have? what agenda are they building? what co-ordination exists? are we going to continue to focus on local ‘place-base’ building – where we engage new people in politics, or was that a strategy just for the last election which will end with it. our organisations thirdly, progressive organisations face major challenges. we struggle to collaborate and build coalitions amongst ourselves. in particular, there is a lack of trust across both social movement organisations and more established traditional organisations. even when there’s not a lack of trust, there is a lack of time invested in building strong relationships. we have ad-hoc coalitions where someone knocks on the door and asks for a favour, requests a person to come and talk at a particular rally, or requests we be involved in an event at the last minute. this is not how long term sustainable, social movement relationships are built. it does not allow us to understand each other’s interests and form relationships together based on what we have in common. additionally, we have weak organizations, so many of our ngos (through no fault of their own) are absolutely hamstrung by the funding agreements that come from the nsw and federal government. the effect has been insidious, where many ngos have been forced to focus on service delivery rather than advocacy – the advocacy role is being deliberately cut away. this is a major attack on our civil society organisations that we have not yet grappled with. we have identified the problem, for instance there is lots of research explaining how migrant resource centres could not talk about refugees under our last government, but we don’t have a strategy or plan to turn it around, and nor can we expect a change of government to change this problem for us. moreover, i don’t think we have a strong focus on growing the size and participation in our social movements and ngo organizations, or what i would call organising. i think we often assume that coming to a rally will automatically politicise people. as social movements we do not take enough responsibility for political development and awareness raising. i always like to ask people to think back to the first time they got involved in social movements, and how accidental it was. and how important individual 196 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 mentors were along the way. i worry that our movements do not invest in a program of mentoring and developing new people. i think we to often gloss over the levels of development that we need to take our people through in order to prepare and produce a much stronger movement. yet, if we are not doing that we are not going to produce the pool of activists, networks, organisations and new leaders that we’re going to need to achieve social change. moving forward of course it is not all doom and gloom. i think that there are three answers to our weaknesses. these will help us to win power, and win on our issues. firstly, we need an agenda. while i don’t think this is controversial, i think we can’t understate how difficult it is to develop an agreed program. regardless, it is essential that we have a clear broad base agenda about where we need to be going and that has to be an essential part of how we organise. i recently spent some time in chicago where the unions were organising a campaign against wal-mart. wal-mart is a terrible employer, the largest employer in america and pays a minimal wage. the unions in chicago initially ran a campaign in chicago to try and stop wal-mart from opening. the slogan was ‘no wal-mart’. the key spokespeople were white male union leaders. but wal-mart was very clever. they cultivated relationships amongst african american churches where wal-mart was going to build its store. the issue became a turf battle between poor african-american communities who wanted cheap goods from wal-mart and established unions. the union leaders were portrayed as trying to deny jobs to african americans. the ‘no wal-mart’ frame was incapable of winning anything on that issue. so, some community organisers decided to shift how they approached the campaign. in the united states there is a long tradition of living wage campaigning, rooted in the churches and the catholic social tradition. the campaign sought to rekindle the idea of a living wage, and instead of arguing for ‘no wal-mart’, they ran a living wage campaign cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 197 for all retail workers. this campaign frame helped bridge the divide and rule politics that had been wedged between the african-american community, the religious community and the union movement. instead of being against something, the unions and community organizations were for something. it was about setting a new standard for employees in chicago. against the daly democratic machine, they won a majority of the counsellors in support of a living wage campaign. the campaign set a new standard in chicago. unfortunately three months later the decision was vetoed, but six months after that that the council was transformed with a series of hostile alderman turfed out by a progressive electoral coalition. that social movement around living wages changed the political climate in chicago. we can learn about the power of agenda campaigning from this. we can take these lessons to the electricity campaign. one of the best outcomes from this campaign could be a recognition in the union movement that it needs to take steps toward the environment movement. how we going to deal with the demands for electricity in this state, in a way that is cognisant of the pressures of climate change? similarly, a win would be where the environment movement recognises the power of coming to an alliance with the union movement, and not simply fighting each other with the things we disagree on but the things that we do agree on. this would be a hopeful agenda. instead of everyone saying no, we started saying yes. there is a lot of agenda building politics happening. i even see this created by the hope of the rudd government. i don’t think the rudd government is going to be the cause of change, but i think that the shift in government means that people can start thinking optimistically about what we can move forward to achieve rather than just defending our own. i see it in particular in a campaign we are running at unions nsw for 6 months paid maternity leave. of course, the fact we need this campaign is an indictment on australia, that australia and the united states are the only industrialised countries to not have maternity leave. even tanzania has 14 weeks paid maternity leave. but there has been an innovative approach in this campaign i think. we’ve decided to link our campaign with 198 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the health standards around what length of time women need to be able to breastfeed their children and to form strong bonds of attachment to support child development. we think that that’s a really great way to be able to move forward with a new agenda. moreover, we don’t see it as just paid maternity leave and winning on a single issue. instead we see that an agenda for work and family balance is part of establishing a industrial relations system for the 21st century. this broader plan is an attempt to carry an agenda based politics. we also need to rebuild the power of our organisations. i am committed to reworking the power of our organizations and our ability to collaborate by helping to build a coalition called the sydney alliance. this project aims to work over the next 4 years with organisations, including religious, union and community organisations, to transform their power. before we start campaigning on issues, the alliance is committed to working to rebuild our organisations and how we can work together. after all, in order to win on an agenda no organisation can win the sort of change we need to achieve on its own. collaboration is key to successful social change. in working together, i also think we need multi-scaled coalitions. think of the ‘your rights at work’ campaign, where it had unions working together nationally, at a state level and also local committees in marginal seats where individuals could participate. it was both central and local, and it provided an opportunity for how we can balance new participation and activist development at the same time as trying to influence and shape decision makers. multi-scaled coalitions that engage and develop new volunteers, activists and campaigners are essential. local organising, propelling a progressive agenda, can have a global effect on decision makers and create a lasting social change. this is how we can rebuild our power to win on our issues. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the australian constitution and the aid/watch case george williams university of new south wales abstract the australian constitution played a significant role in underpinning the result in the aid/watch case. it was invoked by the majority to support their conclusion that a body can be a ‘charitable institution’ despite engaging in political activities. the use of the constitution in this way came as a surprise. the case extended an existing constitutional principle relating to freedom of political communication from its electoral base into the protection of the political activities of non-government organisations. this may have future ramifications for those organisations in other areas, as well as further implications for the development of what it means to be a charity in australia. this article examines the use of the australian constitution in the aid/watch case. it explains how the high court was able to invoke the constitution in defining what it means to be a ‘charitable institution’. it also examines the implications of that reasoning for the development of charitable law in australia. introduction the australian constitution played a significant role in underpinning the result in the aid/watch case.1 it was invoked by the majority to support their conclusion that a body can be a ‘charitable institution’ despite engaging in political activities. the use of the constitution in this way came as a surprise. the case extended an existing constitutional principle relating to freedom of political communication from its electoral base into the protection of the political activities of non-government organisations. this may have future ramifications for those organisations in other areas, as well as further implications for the development of what it means to be a charity in australia. this article examines the use of the australian constitution in the aid/watch case. it explains how the high court was able to invoke the constitution in defining what it means to be a ‘charitable institution’. it also examines the implications of that reasoning for the development of charitable law in australia. 1 aid/watch inc v commission of taxation (2010) 272 alr 417. 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special; issue), 2011 political activities and ‘charitable institutions’ in contrast to the modern practice of parliaments seeking to define key terms with often extraordinary precision, ‘charitable institution’ is not at all defined in australia’s key tax laws, such as the income tax assessment act 1997 (cth). the term is mentioned merely by way of indicating a type of entity that is entitled to significant tax concessions. this leaves the courts with the task of filling in what has proved to be an enormous gap in the law. they must determine the characteristics of a ‘charitable institution’, including questions such as whether such institutions can engage in political activities. current law on what is a ‘charitable institution’ can be traced back to the preamble to the english parliament’s 1601 statute of charitable uses (also known as the statute of elizabeth). the ‘modern’ starting point for applying these words lies in the 1891 decision of lord macnaghten in the united kingdom house of lords in commissioners for special purposes of income tax v pemsel.2 he classified charities into four divisions: ‘charity’ in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads. subsequent decisions in the united kingdom have found that a body cannot fall into any of these categories if it engages in political activities. hence, in the leading case of bowman v secular society ltd3 in 1917, lord parker of waddington in the house of lords stated: a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid, not because it is illegal, for every one is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful means a change in the law, but because the court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable gift. this decision has led to recognition in the united kingdom that a body cannot be a charity if it has a ‘political object’, such as to promote change in the law or government policy. in 2006, for example, in hanchett-stamford v attorney-general4 , lewison j recognised ‘the fundamental principle that if one of the objects or purposes of an organisation is to change the law, it cannot be charitable’. 2 [1891] ac 531 at 583. 3 [1917] ac 406 at 442. 4[2009] ch 173 at 181-182. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 3 at the time of the aid/watch case, the australian high court had not yet determined whether to follow this british line of reasoning. as a matter of common law, or judge-made law, the matter was open for determination. it is also open to the high court to apply australian constitutional doctrine in reaching its decision. ultimately, a majority of the high court decided not to follow the british line of reasoning stemming from bowman. they held that a body can be a ‘charitable institution’ and still engage in political activities. in large part, this rested upon their development of the common law. however, the decision also relied upon principles derived from the australian constitution. indeed, in deciding not to follow the united kingdom path, the majority stated: the starting point must be that the remarks of lord parker in bowman were not directed to the australian system of government established and maintained by the constitution itself. that circumstance, as explained in what follows, provides a significant consideration in deciding the content of the common law of australia respecting trusts for ‘political objects’.5 australia’s constitution does not contain a bill of rights6, nor even any express recognition of freedom of speech. however, beginning in 1992 at the time of the mason court with the decisions in nationwide news pty ltd v wills7 and australian capital television pty ltd v commonwealth,8 the high court has recognised that the constitution implies that australian parliaments cannot pass laws that unduly interfere with the ability of australians to communicate about political matters. the freedom is an indispensable part of the requirement in sections 7 and 24 of the constitution that the members of the federal parliament must be ‘directly chosen by the people’. the implied freedom takes precedence over statute and common law, and so is the most powerful form of legal authority. if it can be shown that the freedom applies, it trumps everything else. the freedom can also be used in a less direct sense in assisting courts with the development of the common law. for example, in the area of defamation law it has been used by the high court to help shape the common law in regard to the defences that are appropriate in dealing with speech about political figures.9 5 aid/watch inc v commission of taxation (2010) 272 alr 417 at 427.. 6 george williams, a charter of rights for australia (unsw press, 2007). 7 (1992) 177 clr 1. 8 (1992) 177 clr 106. 9 lange v australian broadcasting commission (1997) 189 clr 520. 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special; issue), 2011 the implied freedom may be powerful, but it has been rarely used. it has often been narrowly construed and judges have tended to be reluctant to apply it in other contexts, such as in the development of the common law. it was surprising then to see the freedom used as it was in the aid/watch case. it was recognised in the aid/watch case that aid/watch is a self-described ‘activist’ group concerned with the relief of international poverty. the organisation seeks to achieve its goals through unorthodox means for a charity. rather than raising money for or engaging directly in anti-poverty initiatives, it campaigns for improvements in the delivery of australia’s overseas aid. it has been sharply critical of government, and has not been shy in proposing major reforms to australian aid policy. the primary question was whether the public advocacy of aid/watch could permit the entity to fall within the fourth category of the definition of a charity: that is, could it be classed as a body concerned with ‘other purposes beneficial to the community’. a majority of the high court held that aid/watch did fit within this definition. the judges were fortified in this conclusion by the australian constitution and the implied freedom of political communication. in this respect, the joint majority judgment of chief justice french and justices gummow, hayne, crennan and bell reasoned in the following steps:10 1. the foundation of the australia’s system of law is supplied by the constitution. 2. the provisions of the constitution mandate a system of representative and responsible government with a universal adult franchise, including a system for amendment of the constitution in which the proposed law to effect the amendment is to be submitted to the electors. 3. communication between electors and legislators and the officers of the executive, and between electors themselves, on matters of government and politics is ‘an indispensable incident’ of that constitutional system. 4. thus, the system of law which applies in australia postulates for its operation ‘agitation’ for legislative and political changes. 5. while personal rights of action are not by these means bestowed upon individuals, the constitution informs the development of the common law. 6. in this case, the common law should develop so as to recognise that bodies can both possess charitable status and ‘agitate’ for legislative and political changes. 10 aid/watch inc v commission of taxation (2010) 272 alr 417 at 428-429. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 5 the majority concluded: the system of law which applies in australia thus postulates for its operation ... ‘agitation’ for legislative and political changes ... [i]t is the operation of these constitutional processes which contributes to the public welfare. a court administering a charitable trust for that purpose is not called upon to adjudicate the merits of any particular course of legislative or executive action or inaction which is the subject of advocacy or disputation within those processes. tucked away towards the end of the majority judgment, this reasoning may well have proved decisive. the recognition of political ‘agitation’ as a source of protected communication informed the development of the common law such that the political ‘agitation’ could be seen as being for the public welfare. the result was that ‘in australia there is no general doctrine which excludes from charitable purposes “political objects”’,11 and thus that charitable status is not inconsistent with freedom of speech by non-government organisations about matters of government and public policy. in the specific case of aid/watch, the majority held that the ‘generation by lawful means of public debate ... concerning the efficiency of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty ... is a purpose beneficial to the community within the fourth head in pemsel’.12 implications the aid/watch case demonstrates how the constitution and implications drawn from it can exert a powerful influence on the law in other areas. all such law must ultimately be referable to the constitution, and the constitution can play a major role in its development. in aid/watch, it was significant that the implied freedom was used in a case not about the rights of electors, but those of a non-government organisation. it was an extension to take freedom from its electoral context as provided by sections 7 and 24 of the constitution into the charitable realm. indeed, it may well be that the constitution can play a like role in other areas where the non-government sector seeks protection or recognition of its role in engaging in political debate. should a statute seek to close down public advocacy or ‘agitation’ for legislative and political changes by such organisations, there may be good grounds to argue that this breaches the constitution. 11 aid/watch inc v commission of taxation (2010) 272 alr 417 at 429. 12 aid/watch inc v commission of taxation (2010) 272 alr 417 at 429. 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special; issue), 2011 the use of the constitution in the aid/watch case also suggests paths for the future development of what it means to be a ‘charitable institution’. first, the use of the constitution implies limits upon the power of australian parliaments to narrow the definition of what it means to be a charity, such as by seeking to legislate to exclude bodies engaged in political activities from that definition. the aid/watch case was an interpretation of federal tax legislation in light of the common law definition of what it means to be a charity. this would normally mean that parliament can change that legislation so as to narrow the definition. however, the high court’s reliance upon the constitution may prove to be a barrier. if the definition of a charity was altered to prevent bodies from engaging in public debate about matters of government and public policy, this could run foul of the constitutional freedom of political communication and be struck down13. such considerations also apply in the event of an australian parliament seeking to enact a new, comprehensive definition of charities for taxation or other laws.14 any such definition must also comply with the implied freedom of political communication. second, the constitution may assist with resolving questions left after the aid/watch case about whether other bodies engaged in political activities can be classed as a ‘charitable institution’. these questions might be answered by the courts in an open-ended way purely by reference to the common law, but it is possible that the constitution may be again used. in so far as the constitution is applied, it would support the protection, and thus the classification as a ‘beneficial purpose’, of ‘agitation’ directed at matters such as the criticism of government policy and attempts to change the law. such matters lie at the heart of the implied freedom of political communication because they go to the discussion of matters that affect the choice made by electors under sections 7 and 24 of the constitution. the high court did not set out in detail what it means by ‘agitation’ in this context, but it would seem clear that it extends to matters such as the publication of critical comment or the provocation of public debate with a view to generating support for legal and policy change. 13 for analogous reasoning, see lange v australian broadcasting commission (1997) 189 clr 520. 14 see generally i f sheppard, robert fitzgerald and david gonski, report of the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisations (june 2001). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 7 the use of the constitution in this way may also suggest to a court restrictions upon which bodies may be recognised as a charity. this limited form of protected ‘agitation’ was made clear by the fact that in describing ‘agitation’ as something in which a charity may engage, the majority of the high court was careful to only ever use the phrase ‘“agitation”’ for legislative and political changes’. this reflects the limited scope of the constitutional freedom. the implied freedom only extends to protection of ‘agitation’ relating to political matters that affect the choice of electors at the ballot box. it does not relate to other forms of speech, such as matters of artistic freedom or commercial speech that do not have a electoral/political element. for example, it may be that bodies that advocate change directed at purely corporate interests (perhaps criticism of the overseas operations of australian business interests) would not fall under the umbrella of constitutional protection, and thus charitable status. more generally, bodies which criticise or engage in advocacy about matters outside of the parliamentary and governmental realm, such as in regard to the medical profession or medical research, would not gain the protection of the constitution and so may not be recognised as being charitable. again, it must be remembered that the high court majority did not speak about ‘agitation’ in general as being protected by the constitution, but only ‘“agitation” for legislative and political change’.15 conclusion the aid/watch case represents a good outcome for australian democracy. it means that a range of charitable organisations can take part in public debate with greater freedom and confidence. these and other bodies promise to make an important contribution. organisations dedicated to fighting poverty will be able to criticise governments where federal and state policies are inadequate in areas like dental care, mental health and homelessness. in these and other areas, such bodies can contribute a longer term, non-party political perspective on what needs to be done to remedy major problems and policy challenges. these bodies should not be muzzled by the threat that playing such a public role could threaten their status as a charity. the fact that the constitution underpinned this result is of undoubted significance. it implies a level of protection for such organisations that puts ‘agitation’ by them for legislative and 15 aid/watch inc v commission of taxation (2010) 272 alr 417 at 429. 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special; issue), 2011 political change beyond the scope of parliamentary override. the use of the constitution also represents recognition by the high court of the value of the public activities of these nongovernment organisations. it suggests a broadly conceived civil society in which robust advocacy and criticism of government laws and policies is something that is protected under the name of ensuring that the australian public can cast an informed vote at the ballot box. 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 lessons to be learned: reviving advocacy organisations after the neo-con men sarah maddison abstract the article assesses the impact of the howard years on non-government advocacy organisations in australia. it stresses the importance of advocacy in civil society, and in representative democracy. it outlines how this role was undermined, including with regard to the manipulation of contracting-out arrangements. it argues that to regain their former role advocacy organisations will need to reassess their relationships with government—including their funding relationships—and reassert their role as independent analysts and legitimate critics of government power and policy. introduction if a week is a long time in politics then eleven and a half years is an eternity. for australian advocacy organisations the eternity of the howard era will have lasting and detrimental consequences. to regain their former voice and political status advocacy organisations will need to reassess their relationships with government—including their funding relationships—and reassert their role as independent analysts and legitimate critics of government power and policy. a change of government alone will not achieve this aim. over the term of the howard government non-government advocacy organisations—like many other institutions of australian democracy—were systematically eroded by a form of authoritarianism that depicted extra-parliamentary representatives as illegitimate participants in the democratic policy process (see hamilton & maddison 2007). this marginalising of non-government voices had both structural and cultural impacts upon organisational capacity that will take time and effort to overcome. what lessons from the howard era will help in this project of revitalisation? cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 19 the role of organisations in democracy progressive social movements have long used organisations to structure and mobilise dissent. movements often grow through organisational membership. organisations provide connections and contacts, create capacity for coalition, and facilitate communication among members (minkoff 1997; della porta & diani 1999, p.163; staggenborg 1998). organisations are often also seen as the most useful vehicle by which movements can engage with the state. a close relationship with government is often seen as a strategic goal for many movement organisations and it is true that in many ways a close engagement with the state can bring rewards: a seat at the policy table; project and organisational funding; and an increase in public profile and organisational status. by contrast, organisations that remain detached in their relationships with government are often seen as ‘outsiders’, and may find themselves with little in the way or funding or direct influence (maddison & edgar 2008, p.188). advocacy organisations are important in the production of good public policy that is based on knowledge of real people’s lives and experiences. sometimes this knowledge will come to government attention via public criticism of government policy and programs, and such criticism itself has an important role to play in the democratic policy process as it acts to stimulate public discussion and debate through the dissemination of alternate points of view. governments can only know of problems or inadequacies in the development and implementation of their policies and programs if they are prepared to listen to critical advice and commentary. where governments are prepared to listen, criticism and advice from those organisations closest to the problem can help governments provide the best services and develop the best policies for all members of a society. organisations provide ‘democratic legitimacy’ when they are involved in public policy processes that see citizens as central to solving community problems’ (rawsthorne 2004, p.4) and they enhance public accountability and participation through opening up state administration to a 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 democratically conceived ‘citizen-based community’ (yeatman 1998, p. 3). clearly then, organisations are—or at least should be—recognised as important and beneficial to government. perhaps perversely, however, i find myself increasingly of the view that close relationships with government are of greatest benefit to government and may be decidedly detrimental for organisations and movements. in contrast to the view that democratic governments need social movement organisations i would argue that, over time, a close relationship with government may pose a threat to organisational relevance and even survival. this threat is manifest in four key ways. organisations with a close engagement with government risk a loss of legitimacy, a loss of independence, a loss of organisational resources, and a loss of vision. an historical view suggests that organisations should be cautious in negotiating relationships with government (see maddison & edgar 2008, pp.188-9). the hostility directed towards the non-government organisation sector during the term of the howard government illustrates this argument clearly. the damage done over the past decade many have pointed out the extent to which social movement organisations have become marginalised as ‘special interest groups’ that allegedly make illegitimate claims upon the australian ‘mainstream’ (sawer 2002, maddison et al 2004, maddison & denniss 2005 inter alia). this rhetoric reflects the howard government’s acceptance of public choice theory as a guide for working with the public (see staples 2006). it has also been an effective mechanism for ensuring that criticism of the government is not heard. marian sawer has outlined the various mechanisms by which organisations have been marginalised, constrained and silenced, including; cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 21 i. the change from operational funding for representational roles, to project funding attached to outcomes supporting government aims; ii. the requirement for approved organisational models, specifically, a corporate structure; iii. an increased reliance on competitive tendering; iv. government pressure for groups to amalgamate; v. pressure to reduce government criticism through disciplinary measures, such as the exclusion of dissident organisations from major advisory boards, and through de-funding said dissidents; vi. contracts requiring forewarning of media comment by ngos; vii. funding agreements including confidentiality clauses, and viii. the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisation, which considered stripping charities with strong advocacy roles of their charity status (sawer 2002, p. 42-43). the unprecedented attack upon advocacy organisations during the howard years, most particularly upon those organisations that represented issues, groups or points of view towards which the government was hostile, represented a distinct departure from previous modes of government-ngo engagement. the attacks came both from key figures within government itself and from close allies such as the institute of public affairs (ipa). questions were raised publicly about the capacity of advocacy organisations to be representative of their members and accountable for their funding and donation income. further challenges were issued with regard to their charitable status and to their standing as policy advocates. the ipa decried advocacy organisations as ‘selfish and self-serving’ interest groups with little representative 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 legitimacy. advocates, service providers and activists within these organisations were seen as groups of professional stirrers who were not really interested in the welfare of those they claimed to represent, but as wanting only to feather their own nests, keeping their salaries and building their power bases (d’cruz & johns 2004, fox 2006). the view advocated by the ipa and the howard government was one largely informed by public choice theory (see staples 2006). in the public choice paradigm, actions such as policy advocacy, participation and consultation are seen as deceptive strategies designed to disguise the self-interested motives of the ‘well-organised minorities’ (sawer & jupp 1996, p.84) who dominate australian advocacy organisations, and whose true motivation is really what is known disparagingly as ‘rent-seeking’, or the seeking of additional funding and greater power and influence for their members (orchard 1998, p.114). these views were echoed publicly by the prime minister himself who spoke of a ‘frustrated mainstream’ in australia that resented any perception that government decision-making might be influenced by a the ‘powerful vested interests’ that apparently dominated advocacy organisations (howard 1995). howard later made the claim that he would not allow ‘the politically articulate’ to ‘dominate at the expense of the unorganised mainstream of australian society’ (howard 2006). indeed, far from allowing advocacy organisations to ‘dominate’ public debate the howard years saw such organisations pushed further and further to the margins of legitimate public participation. the accompanying changes in funding and taxation regimes further influenced many organisations to retreat to their roles as service providers rather than risk the loss of necessary income or charitable status. as a result many also lost capacity and expertise with regard to lobbying and advocacy. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 23 the challenges of service provision organisations involved in service provision have faced specific challenges to their advocacy role. since colonial times, australia has relied heavily on the voluntary or non-government sector for the provision of social welfare services. over time, governments have provided varying degrees of funding and other support to enable this work, encouraging a wide range of community-based initiatives and drawing an array of non-government into the government fold while still allowing them considerable independence and autonomy in relation to their programs and operations (industry commission 1995; brennan 1998). over time, the role of the nongovernment sector evolved from a focus purely on charitable welfare provision to a more professionalised network of service provision organisations that considered policy advocacy to be an important part of their role. in the 1970s public sector reforms saw an increased emphasis on the importance of communication between government and community, particularly though enhanced consultation with nongovernment organisations (brennan 1998, p.125). since the 1990s, however, neo-liberal reforms have emphasised the need for ‘smaller’, more efficient government. as a result many services that traditionally had been provided by government were increasingly contracted out to the community sector. for some organisations, taking on the role of service provider has meant substantial additional funding, often accompanied by a closer connection to government. in the process, however, these organisations have risked losing their legitimacy among other advocacy organisations in their field; they have risked losing their independence from government when seduced by high levels of funding; they have risked losing resources as governments exploit divisions between insiders and outsiders, and ultimately they have risked losing their vision and sense of purpose. in these circumstances organisations become tamed or captured (maddison & edgar 2008, pp.207-8). 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 for many organisations this situation has left them between a rock and a hard place. while some recognise the constraints on advocacy that come with government funding—the view that they should not ‘bite the hand that feeds them—they are simultaneously frustrated by their lack of voice. organisations fear losing the funding with which they provide essential services to marginalised groups. they fear the fate of their clients were this funding to disappear, recognising that in a restricted welfare state they have become the only remaining safety net for vulnerable groups and individuals. for many such organisations, the decision has been to stay silent about structural inequalities and ineffective policies and programs rather than risk their funding and thus their ability to provide a service. for these organisations, particularly small organisations, the choice of rejecting government funding has often seemed like no choice at all. over the period of the howard government a clear division emerged between favoured organisations, which were well-funded and gained representation on various influential public bodies, and those on the outer because they were seen as critical of government. it was evident that the philosophies of favoured organisations tended to be closely aligned with the philosophies of the government. over time, however, even these favoured organisations began to find their relationships with government increasingly challenging. in 2006 several faith-based service-provider organisations including catholic welfare australia, the st vincent de paul society and the uniting church, which had previously been close to the howard government, with whom they shared a conservative worldview, elected to pull out of their contracts to deliver the government’s controversial welfare-to-work reforms. the new regime of governmentfunded ‘service provision’ would see sole parents and those on disability pensions stripped of benefits for eight weeks should they fail to comply with onerous work cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 25 tests. the organisations pulling out of their contracts with government described the reforms as ‘dangerous’ and ‘humiliating’. several charities refused to take up, or later withdrew, from contracts to provide the financial case management services required under the new provisions for fear of compromising their relationships with vulnerable clients (abc 2006, catholic news 2006). however, large, multi-site organisations such as these, which also enjoy the backing of a large church, are in a different situation to small, single-site and community based organisations. small organisations are often dependent on government contracts and project funding for their very survival. these organisations—often closest to the ‘coal face’ in terms of being able to document and report on the impact of government services—may well have been forced to close were they to pull out of their government funding contracts. in such cases organisations were effectively silenced, forced to retreat to a more timid and marginal position in which they were unable to speak up about the injustices they observed. the need for independence how, then, should non-government advocacy organisations imagine and plan for their futures after the neo-con men? one lesson concerns the need to take a long-term view of working closely with government. exploiting opportunities and becoming close to government, including through a dependency on government funding, may be effective in the short term, and along the way there may be benefits in terms of certain policy outcomes. in the longer term, however, those organisations that are close to, or dependent upon, government risk losing their skills as effective critics of government policies and programs. without an effective and critical voice, organisations risk further marginalisation. 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 a more cautious perspective on future relationships with government is particularly important in the context of a new government that is promising a revitalisation of the relationship between government and the non-government sector. in its first year in office the rudd government has announced the removal of the so-called ‘gag clauses’ that during the howard era were frequently included in government contracts with government-funded organisations. the removal of the gag clauses allows organisations to once again make public comment without first clearing their statements with the relevant minister or department. in announcing the removal of the gag clauses rudd’s deputy prime minister, julia gillard, acknowledged that nongovernment organisations had been living in what she called a ‘climate of fear’ during the howard years. gillard went on to argue that the rudd government did not want to ‘stifle debate’ arguing that the new government wanted to: … ensure that this country ends up with the best possible policy. this requires us to get the gag off and listen to those who know what’s going on…we want to make sure that [non-government organisations] can have their say and still be treated fairly by governments … you only get the best possible public policy if you have the debate. the former government took the view that silence was better. we take the view that debate and hearing everybody’s voices is much better (quoted in franklin & lunn 2008). this rhetoric is certainly promising, and one proposed tonic for reviving the relationship between government and the non-government sector is the ‘national compact’ that has been suggested by the rudd government. compacts are nonbinding agreements between governments and non-government organisations that provide a framework for allowing both parties to work together productively and for ‘mutual benefit’ (casey et al 2008, p.3). the rudd government has specifically proposed such an agreement as a means of renewing their relationship with the nongovernment advocacy sector in australia, a suggestion that has been welcomed by many. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 27 however recent work by gemma edgar (2008) suggests that advocacy organisations should approach such a proposal with great caution, primarily because compacts themselves are unable to guarantee the enduring legitimacy of non-government advocacy. considering both international and australian evidence edgar concludes that compacts cannot be relied upon to ensure an effective and respectful long-term relationship between government and ngos and suggests that advocacy organisations should instead direct their energies towards achieving greater public recognition for their important independent role as advocates in public policy debates (edgar 2008, p.41). such advice is timely. there can be little doubt that the rudd government will seek a stronger and more engaged relationship with the non-government sector than did their predecessors; indeed it could hardly be otherwise. however the trials of the howard government should serve as an ongoing reminder that governments come and go, and that what matters in the long run is the capacity of non-government advocacy organisations to survive and thrive in bad times as well as good. references australian broadcasting corporation 2006, ‘major charities believe new welfare rules are unfair’, the world today, abc radio, 30 june, <http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2006/s1675802.htm>. brennan, d. 1998, ‘government and civil society: restructuring community services’, in b. cass & p. smyth (eds), contesting the australian way: states, markets and civil society, cambridge university press, melbourne, pp. 124137. casey, j., dalton, b., onyx, j. and melville, r. 2008, ‘advocacy in the age of compacts: regulating government-community sector relations: international experiences’, centre for australian community organisations and management, working paper series no. 76, february. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 catholic news 2006, ‘new welfare-to-work rules spell disaster: catholic social services’, 3 july, <http://www.cathnews.com/news/ 607/3.php>. d’cruz, d. & johns, g. 2004, ‘green charities and partisan political campaigning’, ipa review, vol. 56, no. 2. della porta, d. & diani, m. 1999, social movements: an introduction, basil blackwell, oxford. edgar, g. 2008, agreeing to disagree: maintaining dissent in the ngo sector, discussion paper no. 100, the australia institute, canberra. fox, r. 2006, ‘promoting freedom and community: civil society organisations in australia’, ipa backgrounder, vol.18, no.2. franklin, m. & lunn, s. 2008, ‘critics in ‘climate of fear’: gillard’, the australian, 9 january. <www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/ 0,25197,23025956601,00.html> hamilton, c. & maddison, s. (2007), (eds), silencing dissent: how the australian government is controlling public opinion and stifling debate, allen and unwin, sydney. howard, j. 2006, ‘taxation: keeping faith with australian families’, transcript of the prime minister the hon john howard mp, address to the menzies research centre, great hall, parliament house, 18 april 2006. howard, j. 1995, ‘the role of government: a modern liberal approach’, the menzies research centre 1995 national lecture series, 6 june. industry commission 1995, ‘charitable organisations in australia’, report 45, australian government publishing service, melbourne. maddison, s., denniss, r. & hamilton, c. 2004, silencing dissent: nongovernment organisations and australian democracy, discussion paper no. 65, the australia institute, canberra. maddison, s. & denniss, r. (2005), ‘democratic constraint and embrace: implications for progressive non-government advocacy organizations in australia’, australian journal of political science, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 373-390. maddison, s. & edgar, g. 2008, ‘into the lion’s den: challenges for nfps in their relationships with government’, in barraket, j. (ed) strategic issues in the not for profit sector, unsw press, sydney. minkoff, d. 1997, ‘producing social capital: national social movements and civil society’, american behavioural scientist, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 606-619. orchard, l. 1998, ‘public sector reform and the australian way’, in b. cass & p. smyth (eds) contesting the australian way: states, markets and civil society, cambridge university press, melbourne. rawsthorne, m. 2004, ‘government/non-government partnerships: towards deliberative democracy in policy making?’ a discussion paper for the western sydney community forum, inc. sawer, m. 2002, ‘governing for the mainstream: implications for community representation’, australian journal of public administration, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 39-49. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 29 sawer, m. & jupp, j. 1998, ‘the two-way street: government shaping of communitybased advocacy’, australian journal of public administration, vol. 5, no. 54, pp. 82-99. staggenborg, s. 1998, ‘social movement communities and cycles of protest: the emergence and maintenance of a local women’s movement’, social problems, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 180-204. staples, j. 2006, ‘ngos out in the cold: the howard government policy towards ngos’, discussion paper 19/06, june 2006, democratic audit of australia, canberra. yeatman, a. 1998, activism and the policy process, allen & unwin, sydney. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 129 human rights and indigenous peoples garth nettheim abstract the paper begins by noting the low level of reference to indigenous australians in the commonwealth constitution at the start of federation, and goes on to discuss the limits to what was achieved by the 1967 amendments. the situation represents a marked contrast with the usa and canada in terms of treaties and constitutional recognition. in australia, particularly during the period of the ‘reconciliation’ process in the 1990s, important steps were taken by indigenous australians to identify items of ‘unfinished business’ in a ‘statement of indigenous rights’. however, there has been limited progress to meet these aspirations, and australian law still lacks a tradition of recognition of human rights generally, let alone indigenous rights. international law, too, largely lacked recognition of human rights prior to the adoption in 1945 of the charter of the united nations. the brief references in the charter were subsequently developed in a range of declarations and of treaties. these applied to people generally, with scant reference to indigenous peoples. but, since the 1970s, there has been growing international recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples under existing declarations and treaties. since the 1990s, in particular, the un system has established specific mechanisms for addressing such issues. on 13 september 2007, the general assembly finally adopted a declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples. indigenous australians and the commonwealth constitution in 2007 australia marked the 40th anniversary of the 1967 referendum, which was, indeed, an event worth celebrating. of the 44 proposals that have been put to the electors to amend the commonwealth constitution, and of the eight of those 44 that actually got up, the 1967 referendum was the most successful. it involved some ten years of effective activism by faith bandler and other members of fcaatsi and their supporters before being accepted by 91% of the voters (bandler 1989). however, important as it was, it did not frame rights. all it did was remove a limitation on commonwealth legislative power. constitution s. 51 as it came into operation in 1901 listed the topics on which the commonwealth parliament may legislate as including: (xxvi) the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any state, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws. 130 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the referendum deleted the words ‘other than the aboriginal race in any state’. it also deleted s.127 which had provided: ‘in reckoning the numbers of the people of the commonwealth, or of a state or other part of the commonwealth, aboriginal natives shall not be counted’. the commonwealth parliament could now pass laws for aboriginal people in the states. it was widely expected that it would be more benevolent to them than state governments, such as that of queensland in the days of premier bjelke-petersen, and that it would override restrictive state laws. the validity of queensland legislation was challenged in koowarta v bjelke-petersen (1982) 153 clr 168 on the basis (under constitution s. 109) that the state legislation was inconsistent with a commonwealth act the racial discrimination act 1975 (cth) (the rda). in response the queensland government challenged the validity of the rda itself. however, the high court held that it was valid on the basis, not of the races power (s. 51 (xxvi)), but the external affairs power. this was because the rda had been enacted to implement in australian law the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination which australia had ratified. one year later the high court did uphold the validity of commonwealth legislation on the basis of the races power in commonwealth v tasmania (the tasmanian dam case) (1983) 158 clr 1 sections of the legislation authorised protection of aboriginal sites. and a wide interpretation of the power was also given by the high court in western australia v commonwealth (native title case) (1995) 183 clr 373. these decisions involved commonwealth legislation which was in fact beneficial to aboriginal people. the question remained whether the races power might be used to their disadvantage. a partial answer was given by the high court in kartinyeri v commonwealth (1998) 195 clr 337. the commonwealth parliament had enacted the hindmarsh island bridge act 1997 (cth) which removed the area of the proposed bridge from the protection available under an earlier commonwealth act, the aboriginal and torres strait islander heritage protection act 1984 (cth). five out of six of the high court justices (kirby j dissenting) held that the races power was not limited to legislating for the benefit of indigenous australians, at least where the commonwealth was exercising the power in order to repeal or amend its own prior legislation. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 131 so in 2005 there was no impediment to the commonwealth parliament repealing the aboriginal and torres strait islander commission act 1989, thus abolishing atsic, the national voice for indigenous australians. there was also no suggestion that various criticised features of the northern territory emergency response act 2007 and associated legislation were beyond the power of the commonwealth by reason of section 51 (xxvi). so, while the 1967 amendment removed a restriction on commonwealth legislative power, it fell short of conferring a right. north american contrasts one may ask why, in the first place, the framers of the constitution had inserted the initial restriction on the legislative power of the federal parliament. to find a reason, one may consider by way of contrast the constitutions of the usa and canada. in these two otherwise comparable nations, we find federal constitutions which, from the start, gave primary legislative power for indigenous peoples to the federal level of government. the 1901 australian constitution left primary law-making power with the states. one reason has to be that in north america the british had negotiated treaties since the beginning of contact with indigenous peoples. they did not do so in all parts of what became the usa and canada. nor did they always abide by the treaty commitments which they did take on. but such treaties did serve to recognise the sovereignty and territorial rights of the particular people they were dealing with as a basis for british settlement, and as a basis for the relationship thereafter. by contrast, no such treaties were negotiated at the onset of british settlement in the australian colonies, in spite of instructions issued to cook in 1768 that he should seek ‘the consent of the natives’. the reasons for this departure from prior colonial practice – and, indeed, later practice in new zealand – are various (mcrae et al. 2009). this treaty legacy in north america must have been influential in the formulation of constitutional provisions when federal constitutions were adopted for the usa and for canada. the us constitution treats indian nations as separate entities in the legislative power assigned to congress in art.1, s. 8: 3. to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the indian tribes’. 132 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 in a series of cases in the us supreme court, notably worcester v state of georgia 31 us 350; 6 pet 515 (1832), chief justice marshall characterised the indian peoples as ‘nations’ but of a particular type, namely ‘domestic dependent nations’, which retain their inherent sovereignty but are under the protection of the federal government of the us. the court’s acknowledgement, in this case, and other cases of the period, of indian title and a degree of indian sovereignty have been fundamental in later us jurisprudence. (nonetheless there has been some erosion by congress of indian sovereignty and indian title, and of the powers of tribal governments and tribal courts.) the british north america act 1867 (uk) for canada’s federation likewise gave primary lawmaking power with respect to indians to the federal government, as does the current constitution act 1982. and s. 35 of the constitution now specifically recognizes and affirms existing aboriginal and treaty rights. in australia, as noted, indigenous peoples were left from the start at the mercy of the several colonial governments as they were established. this situation was preserved at federation, with legislative power merely being shared from 1967. there was no spelling out of rights of aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples in the commonwealth constitution or state constitutions. further, the various calls for a treaty – or treaties – since 1901 have not yet produced a result (brennan et al. 2005). michael detmold in 1985 wrote: ‘no entry has been made by aborigines into the new legal order. . . the australian commonwealth will not be a just commonwealth until the nature of the aboriginal entry and its legal consequences are recognised’. on this analysis the ‘constituting’ of the australian nation remains incomplete. this discussion about treaties focuses on the highest level of relations between indigenous australians as a collectivity (or collectivities) and australia. however, at other levels there has increasingly been a range of agreements made between particular indigenous peoples and governments, and sometimes with other parties such as mining companies (langton et al. 2004). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 133 the agenda at the national level, one can reasonably ask what are the issues of ‘unfinished business’ that indigenous australians might wish to have addressed and resolved, possibly by means of a treaty or some other forms of agreement? these have been discussed over the years in a variety of contexts including the context of the ‘reconciliation’ process through the 1990s and in late 1999 were formulated into an agenda. in september of that year, atsic convened a meeting of some 60 indigenous leaders to discuss future developments. a list of items of “unfinished business” was developed as a statement of indigenous rights, and the leaders sought to have this embodied in an agreement with governments. the list of matters is as follows: • equality • distinct characteristics and identity • self-determination • law • culture • spiritual and religious traditions • language • participation and partnerships • economic and social development • “special measures” • education and training • land and resources • resource development • self-government • constitutional recognition • treaties and agreement • legislation (macrae 2009, p. 694). such an agenda can be said to represent aspirations – matters which indigenous australians wish to be addressed. 134 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 yet the question remains, do these matters represent rights? and more broadly, does australian law recognise rights at a fundamental level? generally speaking, it does not. under our constitutions people do have rights such as the right to vote for members of parliament. it is the case that people do have important rights under law. however, to a considerable extent our commonwealth and state parliaments are free to override such rights. in other words, australia does not have a constitutional bill of rights on the us model either at federal or state level. in the last few years we have indeed seen the enactment of ‘bill of rights’ measures in the act and victoria, as ordinary non-constitutional legislation, but such rights can be overridden by the respective parliaments. canada adopted a legislative bill of rights in 1960 and followed up in 1982 with the enactment of a revised constitution which includes a charter of rights and freedoms. apart from that charter, s. 35 of the canadian constitution provides: (1) the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. (2) in this act, ‘aboriginal peoples of canada’ includes the indian, inuit and metis peoples of canada. (3) for greater certainty, in sub-section (1) ‘treaty rights’ includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired. (4) notwithstanding any other provisions of this act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in sub-section (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons. indigenous rights and human rights one of the signal features of the charter of the united nations, adopted in 1945, is that it specifically recognises human rights. it does not define them beyond references, as in article 1, to the ‘principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ and the need for ‘respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’. human rights were subsequently set out in the universal declaration of human rights, adopted in 1948, and they were spelled out in treaty form in 1966 in two instruments: the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 135 international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (icescr), and the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr). australia has ratified both covenants and is therefore bound by their terms in international law. it has also ratified other human rights treaties such as the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, the international convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, the convention on the rights of the child, and the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. in terms of domestic law, we have legislated against discrimination on the basis of race and gender (and on other bases) at state and federal levels. the national human rights and equal opportunity commission (hreoc) – now known as the australian human rights commission (ahrc) – includes commissioners with responsibility for human rights generally, race discrimination, sex discrimination, age discrimination, disability discrimination and the aboriginal and torres strait islander social justice commissioner. this raises the question of how these human rights standards at international level relate to indigenous peoples? international human rights law and indigenous peoples1 for the most part the key multilateral treaties and other international instruments have not referred to indigenous peoples at all. the first acknowledged breakthrough came from the international labour organisation which had, as long ago as 1921, begun to adopt a series of conventions dealing with indigenous workers. in 1957 it adopted a more comprehensive ilo convention concerning the protection and integration of indigenous and other tribal and semitribal populations in independent countries (no 107). in 1989 the organisation adopted a revised instrument, the ilo convention concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries (no 169). 1 this section draws from garth nettheim, 2007, ‘human rights and indigenous reconciliation in australia’, 10 the flinders journal of law reform, vol.10, pp. 170-171. 136 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 by contrast, the united nations, starting in 1982, took much longer to develop an instrument relating comprehensively to the rights of indigenous peoples. indeed this process can be traced further back, to a 1971 decision of the sub-commission on the prevention of discrimination and the protection of minorities to commission a study of the problems of the world’s indigenous populations. this study, known as the martinez cobo study, was eventually published in 1984: study of the problem of discrimination against indigenous populations. the un process of developing an instrument was initially vested in the five-member expert working group on indigenous populations (wgip), working over the years with growing input from indigenous peoples from around the world. however, the un’s ‘core’ human rights instruments have been invoked with some success by indigenous peoples over the years. note, in particular, article 27 of the iccpr: in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language. one of the ‘core’ human rights treaties extends this wording specifically to indigenous peoples in article 30 of the 1989 convention on the rights of the child. among the other core instruments, i single out the 1965 international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. article 5 spells out the categories of rights which are to be enjoyed without discrimination on the basis of race (etc), including: (d)(v) the right to own property alone as well as in association with others; (vi) the right to inherit; . . . australia, in 1975, ratified the convention, and the commonwealth parliament enacted the racial discrimination act, 1975 (cth) to implement the convention’s requirements in australian law. the above provision played a critical role in the continuation and the ultimate success of the mabo litigation (nettheim 1999). in the period since the enactment of 1998 amendments to the native title act 1993 (cth) the committee on the elimination of racial discrimination has cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 137 criticised australia for breach of its obligations under the convention. generally speaking, the ‘core’ human rights treaties have been interpreted by their treaty committees and others as applicable to indigenous peoples’ interests and concerns (anaya 2004). declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples the un’s draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples was eventually approved in june 2006 by the human rights council. subsequently, on 13 september 2007, it was approved by majority vote of the un’s general assembly. four states voted against adoption and these were australia, canada, new zealand and the usa. however, on 3 april 2009 the australian government announced that it now supports the declaration. one of the fascinating dimensions to the process of developing the declaration was the extent to which representatives of the world’s indigenous peoples (said to number over 300 million) were able to agree on the issues that affect them and on the appropriate language in which to assert their rights and interests. megan davis (2007) provides a valuable account of the process leading to the adoption of the declaration, and of its content and significance. content of the declaration the declaration is broadly divided into themes: self-determination and its exercise; threats to the survival of indigenous peoples; cultural, religious, spiritual and linguistic identity; education and public information; participatory rights; and lands and resources. articles 1-6 recognise general principles and rights to nationality, self-determination, equality and freedom from adverse discrimination. article 3 recognises the indigenous right to self-determination, consistent with common article 1 of the iccpr and the icescr. ‘indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. by virtue of this right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’. 138 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 articles 7-10 deal with rights to life, integrity and security. some states had difficulties in passing these articles in the context of emergencies and argued that they do not have to gain indigenous consent prior to removal or relocation in circumstances of emergency. articles 11-13 codify rights pertaining to culture, spirituality and linguistic identity, including the right to practice and revitalise cultural traditions and customs as well as the right to maintain, protect and develop past, present and future manifestations of indigenous culture. this includes archaelogical and historical sites, artefacts, performing arts or literature. these sections also highlight the right to maintain and protect and have access in privacy to religious and cultural sites and the right to repatriation of human remains. articles 14-17 deal with specific rights pertaining to education, information and labour rights, including the right of all children to all levels and forms of education, including the right of indigenous people to establish and control their own educational systems and institutions. this body of rights also includes the right of indigenous children living outside their community to be provided with access to education in their own culture and language. articles 18-23 are participatory rights elaborating development and other economic and social rights. this extends to indigenous people participating fully at all levels of decision-making in relation to matters that affect their own lives. this section empowers indigenous people with the right to special measures for immediate, effective and continuing improvement of their economic and social conditions, including in the areas of employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security. importantly, the declaration also provides that states shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to ensure that indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees against all forms of violence and discrimination. articles 24-30 deal with lands, territories and resources. this is the most controversial section of the declaration. article 26 states that indigenous peoples have the right to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 139 own, develop, control and use lands and territories. this encompasses rights to the total environment of such lands, therefore comprising air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice, flora and fauna and other resources which indigenous people have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used. this includes the right to the full recognition of their laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure systems and institutions for the development and management of resources, and the right to effective measures by states to prevent any interference with, alienation of or encroachment upon these rights. articles 31-36 explain how the right to self-determination can be exercised, including matters relating to internal local affairs such as culture, education, information, media, housing, employment, social welfare, economic activities, land and resources, and the environment. this section also deals with matters of citizenship and the capacity to determine one’s own citizenship in accordance with customs and tradition. it enables indigenous people to promote and maintain traditional judicial customs, procedures and practices. article 37 contains the right to conclude treaties, agreements or other constructive arrangements with states. article 38 provides that the state, in cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take appropriate measures including legislative measures to achieve the ends of the declaration and article 39 states that indigenous people have the right of access to financial and technical assistance from states for the enjoyment of rights in the declaration. articles 40-46 are implementation rights expounding the role of the state and international organisations in recognising the rights provided in the declaration (davis 2007, pp. 60-61). davis makes the point that the declaration does not constitute formal international law, let alone national law. ‘however, as it is increasingly utilised and practised it may be that the declaration will contribute to a growing body of customary international law’ davis 2007, p. 59). further, she notes that it has already influenced at least one national court in belize in recognising mayan customary land tenure (davis 2007, p. 61, nettheim 2008, p. 25). 140 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 victoria tauli-corpuz, chair of the un permanent forum on indigenous issues, made a statement on the occasion of the adoption of the declaration and included a comment on its potential influence on international law (tauli-corpuz 2007, p. 2). for the un permanent forum on indigenous issues, the declaration will become the major foundation and framework in implementing its mandate to advise members of the economic and social council and the un agencies, programmes and funds on indigenous peoples’ human rights and development. it is a key instrument and tool for raising awareness on and monitoring progress of indigenous peoples’ situations and the protection, respect and fulfillment of indigenous peoples’ rights. it will further enflesh and facilitate the operationalization of the human rights-based approach to development as it applies to indigenous peoples. it will be the guide for states, the un system, indigenous peoples and civil society in making the theme of the second decade of the world’s indigenous peoples, ‘partnership for action and dignity’, a reality. the united nations permanent forum on indigenous issues is explicitly asked in article 42 of the declaration to promote respect for and full application of the provisions of the declaration and follow-up the effectiveness of the declaration. on behalf of the permanent forum on indigenous issues, i commit the forum’s devotion to this duty. this is a declaration which sets the minimum international standards for the protection and promotion of the rights of indigenous peoples. therefore, existing and future laws, policies, and programs on indigenous peoples will have to be redesigned and shaped to be consistent with this standard. conclusion we have come a long way. at the level of nation states there has been some recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples through the medium of treaties and, in some cases, constitutional recognition of rights. australia has been an exception to this. there has also been, in countries comparable to australia, some recognition of the human rights of peoples generally. australia has been an exception to this, too, subject to the very recent statutory recognition provided in the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 141 act in 2004 and in victoria in 2006. at the international level, recognition of human rights generally has been a feature of the united nations system since its inception in the 1940s. such recognition has been capable of extending to the particular concerns of indigenous peoples, and over the years, there has been a steady accretion of decisions of treaty committees, courts and other bodies to the effect that it does so extend, in some areas at least. since the 1970s work has proceeded in the un system to develop indigenous-specific standards. the new declaration represents a landmark in that development, reinforced by the establishment of particular institutions such as the permanent forum on indigenous issues, the special rapporteur on human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, and the expert mechanism on the rights of indigenous peoples. these international developments can, and should, influence the trend within australian law towards stronger recognition of the rights of aboriginal peoples and torres strait islanders. although it remains to be seen, through them we may even achieve reconciliation. bibliography anaya, s. j. 2004, indigenous peoples in international law (2nd ed), oxford university press, new york. bandler, f. 1989, turning the tide, canberra, aboriginal studies press, canberra. brennan, s., behrendt, l., strelein, l. & williams,g. 2005, treaty the federation press, sydney. davis, m. 2007, ‘the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples’ australian indigenous law review, vol.11, no. 3, p. 55 detmold, m. 1985, the australian commonwealth: a fundamental analysis of its constitution, lbc information services, sydney, pp. 62-66. langton,m., tehan, m., palmer, l. & shain, k. (eds) 2004, honour among nations? treaties and agreements with indigenous people, melbourne university press, melbourne. nettheim,g. 1999, ‘ ‘retreat from injustice’: the high court of australia and nativetitle’ in gibney, m. & frankowski, s. (eds) judicial protection of human rights. myth or reality? praeger, westport, ct., pp. 163-174. nettheim,g. 2007, ‘human rights and indigenous reconciliation in australia’, 10 the flinders journal of law reform, vol.10, pp. 170-171. nettheim, g. 2008, ‘the maya land rights case’ indigenous law bulletin vol. 7, no. 2, p.25 nettheim, g. in mcrae, h. et al. 2009, indigenous legal issues: commentary and materials (4th ed), thomson reuters, pyrmont, chapters 3 and 13. tauli-corpuz, v. 2007, ‘statement on the occasion of the adoption of the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples’, (2007) 11(3) australian indigenous law review vol. 11, no.3, p. 2. 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the right to rebel: social movements and civil disobedience sergio fiedler "those who profess to favor freedom, yet deprecate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. they want rain without thunder and lightening. they want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. this struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one; or it may be both moral and physical; but it must be a struggle. power concedes nothing without a demand. it never did and it never will." frederick douglass, african-american abolitionist abstract a fundamental dimension of contemporary social movements is the use of civil disobedience, as means of both exerting mass pressure on the political system and as a process through which the participants of a social movement perceive and construct an alternative and autonomous democratic power. this article attempts to develop a political and ethical reflection about the transformative dimension and collective potential of civil disobedience drawing on the notions of the right to rebel and the performative. as i write these pages, news reports from peru announce that the government of that latin american country has retreated from its attempt to pass laws authorizing transnational companies to exploit the riches of the amazonia region, after local indigenous people organized a general strike and blockaded roads protesting against the potential negative impact on their communities1. these events are certainly part of a global trend where collective action and civil disobedience are having a key impact on government policies. in fact, the passage to the twenty-first century has been marked by the reemergence of mass social movements, whose actions and powerful critique of the market economy has had profound effects on the political imaginary of a new generation of activists, opening the road to significant political and social reforms in an important number of countries. without any doubt, the mass protest against the world trade organization in seattle in 1999, followed by the anti-summit protests in davos, toronto, melbourne and genoa among others, signaled the appearance of an anti-corporate movement whose militancy and carnivalesque diversity made a major contribution to the break up of the neoliberal cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 43 consensus around the world (juris 2008, pp. 61-97). although the conservative turn provoked by 9/11 and the “war against terror” undermined severely political possibilities, the rapid development of public opposition to the us invasion of iraq meant a rapid return to mass political action, this time under the banner of anti-war activism, laying the ground for the weakening of neo-conservative hegemony in washington. in the south, particularly latin america, the wave of change unleashed by social movements has been even more profound and radical. after decades of military dictatorship, neo-liberal economics and half-hearted transitions to liberal democracy, there have emerged reformist governments that to varying degrees maintain a close connection with the urban social movements that brought them to power. although the implementation of social reforms in venezuela, argentina, bolivia, uruguay, brazil, ecuador, nicaragua and el salvador has not been exempt from new conflicts and antagonisms, including the development of mass movements by conservative forces in opposition to these reforms, latin america seems to be definitively breaking-away from neo-liberalism. instead, a new continental social democracy has emerged, that combines a greater presence of the state in economic decisions with the militant mobilization of a popular mass base, as illustrated by the urban movement that halted the military coup attempt to oust hugo chavez from power in 2002 (robinson 2004, pp. 135-53). the extent to which this reemergence of mass social movements generates a radical reshaping of the world capitalist order is still an open question. from the academic world, there have emerged a number of analyses and debates about characteristics and potentialities in this respect. while hardt and negri (2004) discuss them in terms of the notion of “multitude” and the formation of a “counter-empire”, ernesto laclau (2007) prefers to speak of new forms of “populist interpellation”.2 the transnational scope of these movements in the context of globalization also prompted neo-gramscian scholars to sustain the idea of an emerging global historic bloc contesting the “washington consensus” (rupert 2005). others, following a deleuzian perspective, see these collective processes as instances of radical multiplicity, lines of flight, and nomadism (silva & browne 2006). despite the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, they all seem to overlook the logics of social action by which these movements become the political inflection of a social 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 antagonism. such action centres on civil disobedience, as means of both exerting mass pressure on the political system and as a process through which the participants of a movement perceive and construct an alternative and autonomous democratic power. it is possible to approach this question of civil disobedience from a number of perspectives. within the liberal-democratic tradition, as pointed out by the classical essay on the subject written in 1849 by henry david thoreau, civil disobedience can be considered as a fundamental part of the right to rebel against unfair laws and tyrannical government. according to thoreau, participation in the constitutional political process is often insufficient to prevent the application of unjust laws by governments, and disobeying the law becomes then a duty and a right as a form of exercising the freedom of the individual citizen as against the corrupting power of government (marshall 1993, pp. 184-88). in his book theory of justice (1978), john rawls defines civil disobedience as non-violent public act that is against the law but is carried out with the goal of changing laws or the government program. softening thoreau´s combative individualism, rawls outlines three conditions under which civil disobedience can be considered a legitimate public action in the context of the liberal-democratic contract. in the first place, it is strictly necessary that all avenues of legal and institutional action are exhausted. secondly, civil disobedience should be only used in explicit and concrete cases of injustice such as when liberal principles, like equality before the law, are under attack, and not simply in response to any type of unjust law or government practice. finally, the act of civil disobedience should always be proportional to the transgression, and should never reach a point where it poses a threat to the functioning of the constitutional order (rawls 1978, p. 405). while jürgen habermas (1985, pp. 95-116) tends to agree with rawls in regard to these conditions, he gives civil disobedience a more central role in promoting public participation in the context of the intrinsic imperfections of liberal democracy.3 by giving a radical twist to these authors’ liberal-democratic formulations, it is possible to argue that civil disobedience, as a dimension of the right to rebel against oppression, is not for him, civil disobedience is part of the process of rational deliberation and communication by which an argument or statement is put forward in the public sphere with the purpose of appealing to society´s sense of justice, creating more legitimate legislation and modes of rational governance. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 45 only a fundamental human right, but the most important human right we have. in fact, without acknowledging the existence of the right to rebel embodied in civil disobedience, the very idea of human rights ceases to make any sense. we need to remember that the dominant discourse of human rights emerged out of the mass rebellions of the american and french revolutions. within modern society, it was the exercise of the right to rebel as constitutive moment of a democratic subjectivity that opened the possibility for us today to contemplate the very notion of human rights as juridical principles organizing the political system. the right to rebel underwrites and creates the collective and political foundation for every human right to exist, its full exercise therefore becoming the only effective avenue of democratic defense when those rights are under attack. certainly, in the context of the attacks on human rights often embedded in free trade agreements, the prosecution of the “war on terror” and torture, and when transnational military and economic organizations make decisions affecting the vast majority of people on the planet without creating avenues of public consultation (and in fact suppressing democracy and civil liberties), the right to rebel and civil disobedience becomes a central feature of mass social movements struggling for global justice. the examples, in this respect, are countless over the last decade: the ongoing mobilization of zapatistas communities in chiapas against military occupation, the disruption of economic summits by anti-corporate activists in different countries of the north, the occupation of highways and roads by bolivian peasants against the privatization of water, and the mass occupation of high schools by students in chile during may and june of 2006, among others. in contrast to the conception of civil disobedience developed originally by thoreau, the adversary to be targeted by these acts of disobedience and rebellion is not simply a national government or law, but emerging forms of global sovereignty connecting and articulating the power of private corporation, global economic institutions (imf, world bank, and wto) and the national state (goodman 2002). in this respect, it is necessary to recognize the inadequacies and limitations of the liberaldemocratic perspective on civil disobedience. by focusing on individual human rights within the context of the nation-state, liberal-democratic approaches often tend to obscure the fact that "unfair" and "unjust" laws function to benefit a transnational corporate elites seeking to control vital economic resources. it also fails to recognize that a complex network of institutions and ideologies politically support these "unfair" laws. to make 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 sense of civil disobedience, not simply as an expression of liberal moral outrage, "unfair" laws need therefore to be understood in terms of the social antagonisms and power relations providing the structural foundation of their legal existence. they also need to be understood in terms of the institutions and ideologies designed to create the impression that we live in a peaceful and democratic society without fissures, contradictions or inequalities. here the logic of civil disobedience is not simply about breaking the law and limiting the power of government, but deploying collective power in order to make the antagonisms that may be obscured and hidden within society, visible and legible to the population. in 2002 hundreds of demonstrators blockaded the sydney headquarters of australian correctional management, a company contracted by the australian federal government to run refugee detention centres. the demonstrators denied people entry to the main building, but were not promoting violence so much as signifying, in both a physical and symbolic way, the violence of mandatory detention suffered by thousands of asylum seekers. their action was aimed at highlighting, for a brief moment, the reality of the detention camps administered by this transnational company, in the "respectable" space of sydney’s cbd. moreover, acts of civil disobedience like this become real schools of political science. by making social antagonism and injustice visible before the eyes of broader society, people learn about their ability and power to work together and enact change collectively, as well as about the role of the official media, the police and government in managing or suppressing dissent. although making the antagonism between an oppressive social order and the multitude visible might not end up in a revolution, it might have important social and political repercussions. as verity burgmann argues (1993, p. 262), even the success of moderate demands and actions depends on groups of activists making "unreasonable" proposals. civil disobedience is, therefore, about being realistic by demanding the impossible. as zizek argues, what is truly real always lies within the impossible (zizek 1999, p. 199). civil disobedience is the radical gesture of bending the stick; "when the stick is bent in the wrong way –as it is the case todayit is necessary, in order to put the world back on track, to hold it and bend it in the opposite direction until the stick is right" (althusser 1990, p. 210). from this point of view, civil disobedience is a political act which does not operate within the frame of the existing relation of forces, but as collective and subjective force which attempts to modify and subvert the very frame within which those relations of forces cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 47 operate. civil disobedience is to make a point by standing on the performative power of the outrageous, where the most unreasonable position becomes the only guarantee for the survival of the ethical act. drawing on j.l. austin (1976, p. 40) distinction between the constative and the performative dimensions of the speech act, it is possible to argue that the effectiveness of civil disobedience depends, first, on the ability to state demands or report a political situation of injustice to an audience (the constative), but also, second, and more important, an ability to perform an utterance that impels a political effect, changing the field of meaning of what is considered possible, so that the corporate and political elite in power is no longer perceived as undefeatable.4 in this respect, the new anti-corporate activist should perhaps draw inspiration from the figure of the refugee and the performativity of her collective disobedience. the refugee engages in a double act of civil disobedience. the first act of civil disobedience is refusing to submit to a situation of poverty and oppression by escaping the power of her own nationstate. in the age of terror and globalisation, mass migration in this respect has become a fundamental tool of resistance. but, for this act of rebellion to be politically meaningful, it needs to be completed by a second act of civil disobedience: demanding a more inclusive global system by challenging the borders and the privileges of the nation-states of the first world such as united states and australia. refugees and undocumented migrants, therefore, are not simply the passive victims of a system of exclusion; they are a truly democratic force constituting a new social landscape. their suffering and their resistance form a clear example of civil disobedience: a globalisation from below by an undocumented multitude that, in its escape from the political and economic enclosures created by global capitalism, challenges the ideology of the nation-state by moving across national borders independently of state intervention and approval. what a profound act of dignity and civility it was to bring down the fences of the refugee detention camp in woomera, in middle of desert in the easter holiday of 2002, when dozens of the refuges in detention stormed out of the place with the assistance of demonstrators from outside.5 this action was extraordinary because it was the encounter of two vastly distinct and multiple cultural worlds creating a third space for intercultural communication that was far more legitimate and effective than the bland discourse of 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 official multiculturalism. on the hand, there were the detainees; most of them men, women and children from muslim background, who arrived to australian coasts in overloaded boats after a long overland journey to indonesia from the middle east (diken 2004). on the other hand, there were the young and cosmopolitan australian activists from the inner city neighborhoods of adelaide, melbourne, sydney and brisbane, arriving to woomera to show their support and solidarity with the asylum seekers. here civil disobedience provided the communicative and democratic ground for an encounter among “others” separated not only by a national border but also by drastically different beliefs and lifestyles; and yet “others” who were capable of connecting at the margin by means of the acceptance and mutual recognition of the alterity and singularity of each in the struggle (monson 2003). the bodies looked, talked and touched each other, breaking down the apparent unbridgeable barriers that separated them. what woomera 2002 highlighted, in this regard, is one of the most important dimensions of civil disobedience within the anti-corporate and anti war movement in different countries of the world: opening the possibility for the "enacted utopia" of the anti-statist and anticapitalist public sphere. following slavoj zizek, it is possible to argue that civil disobedience is the radical political act where a world inclusive of many worlds is not simply a distant promise, but the suspension of the oppressive temporality of the existing social order through which the possibility of that new world manifests itself in the actual moment of civil disobedience. civil disobedience is "the short circuit between the present and the future" where we are for a moment of our lives "allowed to act as if the utopian future were already at hand, just there to be grab" (zizek 2002, pp. 558 59). in contrast to the serialized daily routines within a consumer society, civil disobedience is not another form of hardship or sacrifice that we need to undergo in order to achieve a "good" and "moral" society at the end of the road. certainly, as it is often the case, civil disobedience exposes demonstrators to the violence of the state, involving a profound sense of collective responsibility, self-sacrifice and hardship, where what is dearest to us our bodiesbecome weapons of resistance. however, unlike the corporeal self-sacrifice of the worker in the assembly line or the fundamentalist suicide-bomber for that matter, the hardship of civil disobedience is a sacrifice over which a living future of freedom and happiness already cast its shadow. civil disobedience is the opportunity to open a space for communication with cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 49 each other, to develop and forge political and social relations that are based on solidarity, collective reciprocity and absolute democracy, and not competition and greed. civil disobedience is not about violence, but the gentleness and tenderness of a multitude that gathers before a common danger. in a society where we have to routinely commute between work and home in packed trains and buses without talking to each other, a collective act like this is a true moment of grace. after reading the often theological arguments of walter benjamin (1999) about social change, it becomes almost impossible not to see civil disobedience as some form of messianic and redemptive revolutionary event, where the action is not the lineal and causal result of an historical process, but an instant where time -as we know itcomes to stop and those oppressed are called to establish the reign of justice on earth. the use of civil disobedience by the social movements marking the passage to the new century has facilitated a profound a moment of rupture within the global neoliberal order. in a global context where the political is reduced to technical decision making, the performing bodies and affects involved in civil disobedience propel the formation of politics “proper”. according to ranciere (2001), politics “proper” has to do with the irruption of the demos, the politization of those excluded from participation so that they become the general representatives of society as whole, destabilizing the functional and normative order of a social structure based on inequality and injustice.6 what civil disobedience marks thereby, as a moment of crisis through which the excluded obtains the hegemonic leadership of society, is the radical rupture between a terrain of politics limited to showing obedience for the law (including technical decision making) and the actual politics of democracy as an ongoing process of social change. from there that civil disobedience cannot be understood in terms of an action carried out by a rented crowd full of resentment. civil disobedience is a democratic act carried out by a group of individuals inspired and radicalized by the possibilities of emancipation expressed in their own collective action. that is the reason why the disobedient is, even if only for a brief moment, already free while fighting for freedom. 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 bibliography agamben, g. 1995, homo sacer: sovereign power and bare life, stanford university, stanford. althusser, l. 1990, ‘it is simple to be a marxist in philosophy’, philosophy and the spontaneous philosophy of the scientists and other essays, verso, london. austin, j.l. 1976, how to do things with words, oxford university press, oxford. benjamin, w. 1999, the arcades project, harvard university press, cambridge. burgmann, v. 1993, power and protest: movements for change in australian society, allen & unwin, st leonards, n.s.w. diken, b. 2004, ‘from refugee camps to gated communities: biopolitics and the end of the city’, citizenship studies, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 83–106. goodman, j. 2002, protest and globalisation: prospects for transnational solidarity, pluto press australia, annadale. habermas, j. 1985, ‘civil disobedience: litmus test for the democratic constitutional state’, berkeley journal of sociology, no. 30, pp. 95-116. hardt, m. & antonio negri 2004, multitude: war and democracy in the age of empire, penguin press, new york. juris, j.s. 2008, ‘performing politics: image, embodiment, and affective solidarity during anti-corporate globalization protests’, ethnography, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 61–97. laclau, e. 2001, ‘can inmanence explain social struggles?’ diacritics, vol. 31, no 4, pp. 310. laclau, e. 2007, la razón populista, fondo de cultura económica, buenos aires. marshall, p. 1993, demanding the impossible: a history of anarchism, fontana press, london. monson, d. 2003, ‘woomera 2002 festival of freedoms: experiencing community in tragic recognition of the other’, journal of australian studies, no. 77, pp. 15-22. ranciere, j. 2001, ten theses on politics, theory and event, vol. 5, no. 3, pp.1-10. rawls, j. 1978, a theory of justice, fondo de cultura económica, méxico. robinson, w. 2004, ‘global crisis and latin america”, bulletin of latin american research, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 135–153. rupert, m. 2005, ‘reading gramsci in an era of globalising capitalism’, critical review of international social and political philosophy, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 483–4 scalmer, s. 2002, dissent events: protest, the media and the political gimmick in australia, unsw press, sydney. silva echeto, v. & r. browne sartori 2007, antropofagias: las indisciplinas de la comunicación, biblioteca nueva, madrid. thomassen, l. 2006, ‘within the limits of deliberative reason alone: habermas, civil disobedience and constitutional democracy’ australian political science association proceedings. zizek, s. 2002, ‘a plea for leninist intolerance’, critical inquiry, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 55859. zizek, s. 1999, the ticklish subject: the absent centre of political ontology, verso, london. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 51 endnotes 1 ‘el gobierno cede ante los indígenas’, june 16, 2009 , http://www.elcomercio.com 2 for an interesting critique on the notion of multitude developed by hardt and negri, see laclau 2001. 3 in his discussion on the subject in his book between norms and facts, habermas sustains that: “the justification of civil disobedience relies on a dynamic understanding of the constitution as an unfinished project. from this long-term perspective, the constitutional state does not represent a finished structure but a delicate and sensitive – above all fallible and revisable – enterprise, whose purpose is to realize the system of rights anew in changing circumstances, that is, to interpret the system of rights better, to institutionalize it more appropriately, and to draw out its contents more radically. this is the perspective of citizens who are actively engaged in realizing the system of rights. aware of, and referring to, changed contexts, such citizens want to overcome in practice the tension between social facticity and validity”. cited in thomassen, 2006. 4 for more on the politics of performative protest see scalmer, 2002. 5 drawing on agamben´s notion of the homo sacer, diken describes the situation in woomera as follows: “enter the camp woomera, the infamous detention center in australia. a detainee says: ‘when we came first to woomera, we didn’t believe we were in australia … because the things that happened—they wouldn’t happen in australia. it must be another country’ (quoted in campbell, 2002:26). ‘woomera is another country’, adds campbell, commenting on his interviewee’s utterance. however, the point is rather that woomera, established and run by australian authorities alone, is effectively a frustrating zone of indistinction between inside (law) and outside (unlaw), a space in which the link between localization and order breaks down, a space that can materialize only when exception becomes the rule. it is the location of the unlaw within law in the form of an exception that turns woomera into an unbounded space. hence the confusion whether it is inside or outside australia” (campbell, 2002:26). 6 from this perspective, ranciere argues that “to identify politics with the exercise of, and struggle to possess, power is to do away with politics. but we also reduce the scope of politics as a mode of thinking if we conceive of it merely as a theory of power or as an investigation into the grounds of its legitimacy. if there is something specific about politics that makes it something other than a more capacious mode of grouping or a form of power characterized by its mode of legitimation, it is that it involves a distinctive kind of subject considered, and it involves this subject in the form of a mode of relation that is its own” (raciere 2001). 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 cross-cultural collaboration: opportunities and challenges christina ho abstract in the era of the ‘clash of civilisations’, culture has taken centre stage in both global and local politics. for the neo-cons, a supposed cultural clash is at the heart of the ‘war on terror’, being fought against terrorists both abroad and the ‘home-grown’ variety. post-9/11 nationalisms are increasingly aggressive and suspicious of cultural minorities. in australia and elsewhere, muslims and arabs have been particularly vilified as threats to social cohesion and national security. this led to a widespread backlash against multiculturalism under howard, whose government replaced multiculturalism with the concept of integration in policies and public discourse. so far, the rudd government has done little to restore a public valuing of cultural diversity. this section explores how social movements can respond, and in particular, the challenges facing activists working across cultural difference on some of the most important political work of our time, involving anti-war, anti-racist, feminist, and civil liberties activism. analysis of social movements in these arenas is crucial because responding to neo-conservative cultural politics is not a simple or straightforward process. each possible path comes with its own underlying politics. yet there is surprisingly little research on the effectiveness and political implications of different activist approaches. as bonnett (2000: 2) notes, there is a large body of research on racism, but anti-racism is mainly seen as simply a ‘cause’, ‘fit only for platitudes of support or denouncement’. in the era of the ‘clash of civilisations’, culture has taken centre stage in both global and local politics. since september 11, 2001, inter-cultural relations have been powerfully recast, in much policy and popular debate, in terms of an underlying cultural – or ‘civilisational’ (huntington 2002) conflict between the values of the ‘west’ and ‘islam’. for the neo-cons, this supposed clash is at the heart of the war on terror, being fought against terrorists both abroad and the ‘home-grown’ variety. post-9/11 nationalisms are increasingly aggressive and suspicious of cultural minorities. in australia and elsewhere, muslims and arabs have been particularly vilified as threats to social cohesion and national security. this led to a widespread backlash against multiculturalism under john howard, whose government (19962007) replaced multiculturalism with the concept of integration in policies and public discourse. so far, the government of kevin rudd has done little to restore a public valuing of cultural diversity. this section explores how social movements can respond, and in particular, examines the challenges facing activists working across cultural difference on some of the most important political work of our time, involving anti-war, anti-racist, feminist, and civil liberties cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 53 activism. analysis of social movements in these arenas is crucial because responding to neoconservative cultural politics is not a simple or straightforward process. each possible path comes with its own underlying politics. yet there is surprisingly little research on the effectiveness and political implications of different activist approaches. as bonnett (2000: 2) notes, there is a large body of research on racism, but anti-racism is mainly seen as simply a ‘cause’, ‘fit only for platitudes of support or denouncement’. but first, some historical context: under the howard government, australia went through a series of ‘moral panics’ about race, culture and ethnicity, focused squarely on muslims and arabs. from the middle eastern asylum seekers who were demonised as queue-jumpers and locked away in detention centres, to the ‘ethnic gang rapists’ who were allegedly terrorising ‘aussie women’, just as muslim women were ‘oppressed’ by their barbaric faith and community, muslim and arab communities in australia were targeted as jeopardising the social fabric of the nation and harbouring backward and ‘un-australian’ values. this anxiety arguably culminated in the cronulla riots of 2005, which saw thousands of largely angloaustralians gathering to ‘take back’ the beach from the ‘lebs’, in the process hunting down and violently attacking anyone of ‘middle eastern appearance’ (these ‘moral panics’ have been extensively documented, e.g. poynting et al 2004; dreher and ho 2009; noble forthcoming). of course racism is not new in australia, a nation whose very foundation rested on the attempted genocide of the indigenous people. and each new wave of immigrants to the country has experienced its own upsurge of hostility. however, since the introduction of multiculturalism in the 1970s, race-based hostilities have never enjoyed the level of official support as they did under the howard government.1 particularly after september 11, 2001, local enmities came to directly mirror global hostilities, flamed by political leaders viewing inter-cultural relations through the lens of a dangerous and simplistic ‘clash of civilisations’. the backlash against multiculturalism is particularly visible in two shifts in public policy and discourse under the howard government. the first is what lentin (2008: 313) describes as the ‘positive turn’, in which the ‘negativity’ of anti-racism is replaced with a much less 1 for example, see fear 2007 and manning 2004 on the howard government’s ‘dog-whistle politics’, in which code words were deployed in political speeches to appeal to racist elements of the electorate despite the avoidance of explicitly racist language. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 oppositional ‘celebration of diversity’. this is the politics of the supposedly post-racial age (goldberg 2002). in australia, this celebratory approach to cultural difference is epitomised in the evolution of official multicultural policy, which has seen all references to racism gradually eradicated from policy and public discourse, replaced by notions such as ‘living in harmony’ (diac 2008). official programs have increasingly encouraged community projects that emphasise and celebrate ‘what we have in common’, rather than critical initiatives that seek to explore the continuation of inter-communal or institutionalised racism (ho and dreher 2006, ho 2007). the second shift, coexisting alongside the first, is a ‘securitisation’ of multicultural policy, which has seen a growing focus on the surveillance of minority communities, in particular, scouring muslim communities for potential threats to national security, monitoring religious leaders, and ‘de-radicalising’ young muslim men (bergin et al 2007, jakubowicz 2008). this policy direction has continued under the rudd government. clearly, constructions of culture, race and religion are at the heart of the security agenda that now justifies all manner of draconian policies. ideas about inevitable cultural ‘clashes’ and the milder ‘cultural incompatibilities’ are viewed via the lens of national security and therefore come to justify crackdowns on minority communities that pave the way for restrictions on other potential ‘threats’ to security, even peace activists – as witnessed in the deportation of us peace activist scott parkin in 2005 (abc 2005). how have activists responded to this new era of islamophobia and racism? on some fronts, progressive campaigns have had a great deal of success. mobilisations against the detention of asylum seekers, for example, succeeded in closing some of the harshest detention centres and ended the incarceration of women and children. public hostility towards asylum seekers has also largely eased since the early 2000s.2 more broadly though, there has been little response to the attacks on multiculturalism.3 2 for example, in 2009, liberal party parliamentarians were unable to create the same level of popular fear and hostility towards asylum seekers arriving by boat as existed in the early 2000s. while official multiculturalism has always been an imperfect vehicle for minority rights and social justice, the erasure of the ‘m’ word from public policy has allowed much more conservative concepts such as ‘integration’ and ‘social 3 perhaps with the exception of ‘professional multiculturalists’, government-funded peak bodies representing ethnic community organisations. however, these peak bodies have also lost much of their critical capacity, reflecting the decline of the sector as a whole. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 55 cohesion’ to define debates. in spite of its faults, the absence of any substantial attempts to politically defend multiculturalism has been striking. what explains this weak response from the grassroots? historically, progressive movements in australia have tended to be anglo-dominated, with a relatively weak record of working with people from other backgrounds. the traditional monoculturalism of australian labour, feminist and other movements has been well documented (e.g. ang 1995, bulbeck 1998, ho 2008, kaplan 1996). post-war migrants often had comparatively high levels of unionisation (alcorso 1993), but unions were mostly unreceptive to their issues, particularly those of migrant women. nor have migrant women been particularly welcome in the largely white, middle class feminist movement. and even when efforts have been made to diversify women’s organisations, their definitions of women’s liberation have not always appealed to those from other cultural backgrounds. this means that activists who now wish to work cross-culturally have few models to follow (although some environmentalist-indigenous collaborations may provide examples). religion poses another barrier, with many secular activists lacking the inclination or experience in working with faith-based groups, and muslims in particular. at a deeper level, most progressive ideologies, whether based on variants of marxism, social democracy or libertarianism, have been defined in secular, and even anti-religious terms. notwithstanding the strategic alliances with some catholic and other christian groups on issues such as peace and poverty, most progressive activists are suspicious of, if not hostile toward religion, and resistant to any expansion of religious discourse or identity in public politics. this is an awkward position from which to respond to the rise of islamophobia. ideologically, the lack of activism also reflects the complex status of issues relating to culture and ethnicity in traditional progressive movements. on one level, the traditional leftist emphasis on class conflict marginalises race and culture. racism is seen as an epiphenomenon of social divisions that are ultimately class-based. minorities working on anti-racist politics have been viewed almost as victims of false consciousness, racialising and segregating themselves (lentin 2008: 321), at the cost of a strong and coherent progressive political agenda. along with gender and sexuality, issues around cultural diversity have 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 always sat uneasily within leftist agendas, traditionally seen as potentially undermining political solidarity, and distractions from the main game of class-based inequality. on a more practical level, the preoccupation with political unity has created a tendency for leftists to attempt to incorporate anti-racist activity within broader political movements, including assuming leadership of anti-racist movements. this has then led to charges of the re-colonisation of marginalised communities by larger, and usually white-dominated political movements. in the uk, the socialist workers party’s leadership of the anti-nazi league attracted this sort of criticism (dawson 2005). ultimately, the fear of being perceived as ‘interfering’ or ‘taking over’ anti-racist movements has produced a form of passivity or avoidance on the part of some progressive movements. non-action is seen as the most appropriate response in order to respect minority communities’ autonomy and integrity. goodall (2005: 69-69) has documented a similar phenomenon in relation to working with indigenous communities in australia. but this avoidance can also lead to a resistance to acknowledging the legitimacy of racism as a ‘mainstream’ political issue. for example, in the midst of the 2007 federal election, leah ginnivan (2007) responded to an online opinion piece on the absence of multiculturalism from the debates, writing that bringing up multiculturalism was possibly divisive, and that ‘every time race is brought up as an issue that needs to be debated, it seems to set back progressive causes’. kevin dunn et al (2009) characterise this as ‘an emerging form of political correctness that proscribes the discussion of racism’, with activists drawing attention to racism accused of ‘playing the race card’. the politics of avoidance contributes to the perception that anti-racism belongs exclusively to cultural minorities, with no legitimate role for activists from the mainstream culture. partly as a result, many minority groups have turned to a politics of identity to pursue their cause, anchoring their political voice in their membership of a particular ethnic or cultural community (other reasons for this tendency are explored below). this form of anti-racism can easily become overly defensive, whereby ethnic communities targeted as the ‘outgroup’ at any one time respond by defending their communities from attack, in isolation from any broader political critique of the social structures of racism and inequality. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 57 additionally, an anti-racism built on a defensive community-based response, amidst silence from ‘mainstream’ progressives, is often profoundly anti-democratic, and can lead to the further marginalisation of the least powerful within minority communities. migrant organisations in australia have usually been dominated by unelected conservative men, some of whom came to virtually monopolise government funding and patronage over decades of official multiculturalism. women, young people and those with progressive values have generally been excluded from positions of influence within such organisations (see poynting et al 2004; tabar et al 2003; vasta 2004). saeed khan, for example, has commented on the dominance of conservative religious leaders in the australian muslim community, stating, ‘our problem is that the community’s leadership has been set up on the basis of religious institutions and islamic councils… [however] from my experience, the majority of the people are not very religious at all’ (cited in wainwright 2005). in this way, muslim community leaders and organisations may be quite unrepresentative of the diversity of australian muslims, a situation mirrored in many other australian ethnic communities. in addition, again largely because of the history of government funding of the ‘ethnic sector’, the majority of migrant community organisations are ethno-specific, representing one ethnic group (and sometimes in reality only one subset of a group), leaving little space for those who might wish to pursue a more broadly defined agenda. tabar et al (2003: 273) trace this back to the whitlam labor government in the 1970s, who they argue, ‘ethnicised’ migrants by recognising ‘ethnic communities’ as ‘disadvantaged’ groups. consequently, ethnicity became a ‘valorised cultural element’ and an object of struggle by members of the ‘ethnic community’. in order to receive government funding and recognition, community organisations had to demonstrate that they represented a coherent and unified ethnic ‘community’. maintaining these definitions of community then became essential for consolidating the legitimacy and influence of these organisations and their leaders. this means that although some of these organisations do espouse an anti-racism agenda, it is often defensive and self-serving, devoid of a larger vision for social justice. there is a strikingly low level of cross-ethnic solidarity among migrant community groups, as seen, for example, in the lack of support for asylum seekers from those who prided themselves on not 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 having ‘queue-jumped’ into the country. some attempts to defend a cultural minority have been otherwise spectacularly regressive, for example, the then mufti of australia, sheik taj el-din al hilaly, in 2006 defending muslim men by characterising immodestly dressed women as ‘uncovered meat’ inviting sexual assault (kerbaj 2006). in this era of islamophobia, muslim community organisations have often become extremely defensive, responding to hostility by defending islam at all costs. all too often this has led to essentialist and conservative definitions of islam which do not provide strong foundations for a progressive anti-racist agenda. for example, as shakira hussein (2007) has shown, many muslim women’s organisations have responded to attacks on the hijab by mobilising a simplistic and essentialist discourse of the hijab as liberatory. this entraps debates into a dangerous ‘force’ vs ‘choice’ dichotomy that fails to capture the realities of negotiation and multiple meanings of hijab wearing. with all of these complexities surrounding the politics of ethnic community organisations, there is a real danger that uncritical collaboration may end up consolidating the power of conservatives within minority communities, further marginalising those who are less powerful within these communities. this point was made compellingly by shakira hussein and alia imtoual in their address to the beyond the neo-con men conference last year. hussein and imtoual challenged the tendency of anti-racists (among others) to search for ‘real muslims’ who represent the ‘mainstream muslim community’, invariably stereotyped as socially conservative. ironically, they argued, ‘some of the most conservative elements of muslim communities have received validation in the form of recognition conferred by socially progressive nonmuslims’ (hussein and imtoual 2008). activists often allied themselves with people or organisations with whom they had little in common, all the while suppressing their misgivings about their new partners’ sometimes ‘unedifying opinions’, particularly relating to gender and sexuality, ‘because the goal of building anti-racist alliances seems more pressing than the goal of understanding islam as having diverse expressions’ (hussein and imtoual 2008). this means that muslims with progressive political values can be overlooked, as they are seen as atypical or inauthentic muslims. hussein and imtoual recounted how they had cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 59 themselves experienced this, being ‘bypassed by those who share our broad political outlook, because they believe that this viewpoint does not represent the typical muslim’. but the category of the ‘typical muslim’ is as meaningless as that of the ‘typical australian’. sadly though, when the stereotype of muslims being inherently socially conservative informs activists’ search for allies, this can become a self-fulfilling prophecy (hussein and imtoual 2008). tara povey’s paper in this volume examines some of these issues with particular reference to muslim and arab women, showing how stereotypes of these women as passive victims in need of ‘rescuing’, which can be traced to colonial times, continue to frame activist strategies. in the post-cold war era, a ‘politics of pity’ has replaced political resistance and solidarity more generally, she argues. in documenting the activist work of women in iran and afghanistan, for example, establishing independent schools focusing on girls’ education, povey challenges the image of the powerless and oppressed muslim woman. ironically though, in western countries such as australia and the us, societies that have trumpeted their gender equality as a mark of cultural superiority over islamic societies, there is much less space for muslim women’s activism. since 9/11, muslim women in the west have been living under a form of islamophobia that defines them as both oppressed and potential threats to national security. consequently, the scope for muslim women’s activism is dramatically reduced, and political activity can become quite individualised, for example, in the simple act of wearing a headscarf. povey’s paper reminds activists seeking cross-cultural alliances to first seek an understanding of the complex material and political circumstances of muslims and arabs living in the west. like hussein and imtoual, povey points to the difficulties of such alliances in an era of rampant islamophobia. in his paper, dinesh wadiwel takes this note of caution further, posing some provocative questions about whether solidarity is in fact possible at all. while cross-cultural solidarity and alliances are generally seen as inherently desirable, wadiwel argues that uncritical statements of solidarity can hide an underlying reality of conflict and even a state of war. he explores the notion that perhaps ‘we don’t have any common ground; that our starting point suggests 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 we have no reason to work with each other; that we have no natural affiliations, perhaps no common enemy. indeed you and i might be considered enemies’. in a profound critique of liberal ideals of civil society and inter-personal dialogue and friendship as tools for equality and democracy, wadiwel shows that the public sphere is often not civil at all, and expressions of solidarity can have the effect of preventing recognition of continuing conflict. he uses the example of the widespread practice at public events of acknowledging indigenous ownership of land: an acknowledgement of prior sovereignty hides the truth of war within it: the fact that i stand on this land because war has occurred, and continues to this day… really i should acknowledge that a war has occurred, a war that continues today, a war that i am inescapably part of, because i stand here. against the prevailing assumptions that solidarity comprises natural relationships of easy friendship, wadiwel retorts that such relationships are almost never symmetrical, and that some parties always benefit more than others. failure to recognise this reality can mean that activist collaborations simply ‘intensify war’ between people unequally positioned in a society marked by division. the final paper in this section, by james arvanitakis, also challenges the idea that a ‘natural’ community can emerge from those ‘with a shared experience of hurt’. the assumption that all who have experienced racism have a common interest can be dangerous when the reality of collaboration entails exclusion and even betrayal. this can happen when ‘those with the greatest hurt can claim to be an exclusive group based on their distance from whiteness: they become the “gatekeepers” who refuse to allow others the same status’. as an ‘almost white’ male, arvanitakis asks whether his claims of being hurt by racism can be recognised by those who may have experienced greater hurt, and how this shapes the possibilities for collaboration. ultimately, arvanitakis calls for activists to move away from this kind of thinking altogether, as he argues, communities based on a ‘hierarchy of hurt’ simply reinforce the very logic of whiteness that anti-racists are trying to eradicate. activists need to resist the urge to seek out people ‘like us’ for collaboration, and build communities based on a sharing of difference. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 61 overall, the papers in this section provide a range of perspectives on the question of crosscultural activist collaboration. all show the challenges and complexity of working across difference, and point to various strategies to avoid the negative unintended consequences of uncritical solidarity, which can lead to new relationships of exclusion. exposing these challenges is not intended to discourage cross-cultural collaboration, but rather to provide activists with some 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http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,20646437-601,00.html� ho, c. 2008, ‘diversifying feminism: migrant women's activism in australia’, signs: journal of women in culture and society, vol.33, no.4, pp. 777–784. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 63 islamophobia and arab and muslim women’s activism tara povey abstract this paper will discuss the impact of islamophobia and racism on arab and muslim women’s activism. arab and muslim women living in diaspora in muslim majority countries such as iran face many difficulties as activists yet they have successfully challenged patriarchal readings of islamic religious texts and fought for legislative and political change. in western countries and australia, arab and muslim women activists are playing a role in opposing poverty, war and neo-liberalism, in building communities and ensuring community survival. they have also struggled for a diasporic identity that reflects their diverse positions and resists notions of australia as exclusively white and christian. however arab and muslim women’s activism in australia in recent years has occurred in the context of the australian government’s attempt to shore up public support for the continuance of the ‘war on terror’ through domestic policy and language which marginalises and de-humanises people of islamic cultures. therefore this paper argues that in australia, arab and muslim women face significant obstacles to their activism. foremost among these are the experience of racism and islamophobia and the resurgence of the politics of assimilation in australia. introduction this paper will discuss the impact of islamophobia on arab and muslim women’s activism. arab and muslim women in australia are from a wide variety of different backgrounds and their experience varies in terms of age, class, ethnicity, religious background and beliefs, profession, education and family relationships. they are active in a number of different ways, in anti-poverty programs, in anti-war and antiracist movements, union movements and in welfare and community organisations. in the second section, i will discuss my methodology and conceptual framework. a critical theme that runs through this paper is that contemporary debates around arab and muslim women are essentialising. by this i mean that debates which focus on abstract questions such as the symbolic meaning of the hijab assume that the experience of arab and muslim women is uniform and unchanging and has no relation to the material conditions of their lives. these perspectives therefore fail to consider the ways in which structures such as class, ethnicity, age and gender intersect in women’s lives to create a complex lived experience, which, i argue, gives rise to their strategies of resistance. in this second section, i will also discuss theoretical approaches to diaspora, class, identity, racism, islamophobia, gender and the politics 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009 of assimilation. i argue in order to capture the complexity and dynamism of women’s activism a critical approach is needed which takes on essentialist and racist arguments about the role of arab and muslim women. in the third section, i will discuss the use of international comparative frameworks to examine the material conditions of women’s lives in diaspora in muslim majority countries and in western countries, with reference to afghan women, (2007) by elaheh rostami-povey. in the fourth section, i will present my empirical research, which is based on in-depth interviews with three activists in sydney carried out in 2008. using quotes from these interviews, i will demonstrate three points: firstly that despite views of arab and muslim communities as ‘insular’ and conservative’, arab and muslim activists have high levels of involvement in political movements and community welfare organisations. secondly that they are articulating an australian-diasporic identity that is based on their actual experience and challenges notions of ‘white australia’ from which they are excluded. thirdly, that their task is being made much harder by the level of racism and islamophobia that is directed to them and by the resurgence of the politics of assimilation in australia. methodology and conceptual framework my research methodology is based on qualitative participatory research approaches which have the benefit of allowing the researcher to learn from the knowledge and experience of women and to use that experience as a means of empowerment (cook and kothari, 2001; laws et al., 2003). a critical theme that runs through this paper is that contemporary debates about arabs, muslims and islam fail to capture the dynamism, diversity and complexity of actual lived experience. therefore, despite the criticisms of this approach as being too subjectivist, i believe that it is important to hear women speak in their own words (rostami-povey, 2007; khalili, 2007). the aim was not to provide a representative sample of the views of all australian women who identify as either arab and/or muslim but to learn from the participant’s specialised knowledge, although each of the participants felt that their experience was shared in the wider community. therefore the aim is to produce qualitative data that can be understood in the contemporary australian political context and can be used for the purpose of theory development. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 65 diaspora, groups and identity this paper is about arab and muslim women’s activism in australia and so terms such as ‘diaspora’, ‘identity’ and ‘community’ are important yet problematic concepts. the term ‘diaspora’ is associated with the mass migration of a population who have suffered the traumatic experience of loss of homeland (gilroy, 1993). in more recent literature the meaning of the term has broadened to encompass second, third and fourth generation descendents of migrants and those not associated with specific ethno-cultural groups. however, as its meaning has proliferated, it has become harder to define what constitutes ‘diaspora’ and arguably this has led to a loss in the conceptual coherence of the term (brubaker, 2005). in this paper i use ‘diaspora’ as brubaker suggests as a claim rather than an entity (2005, p.12). i also argue that the ‘claim’ diaspora is intimately connected to the lived experience of women and involves a complex process of positive political identification rather than the more negative ‘boundary maintenance’ strategies that brubaker describes (2005, p. 6). it is important to recognise, as edward said argues, that ‘identities’ are not fixed, permanent and immutable (said, 1996) but that in fact all identities are hybrid, involve processes of making claims and are “political interventions and constructions of social reality” (anthias, 2001, p. 619). one of the problematic aspects of how antiracism has been conceptualised and written about in academic and policy making circles has been the reification of static concepts of ‘ethnicity’, ‘community’ and ‘groupness’ (anthias and yuval-davis, 1992). however, anthias (2001) argues that arguments that paint a picture in which identity is a choice and hybridity a product of a new transnational age often disregard the uneven and unequal access to power and resources among individuals in society and in global capitalism. in doing so, they fall into the same trap as the essentialist approaches that they rightly criticise (2001, p. 637). in this paper i argue that while all identities are fluid and hybrid, the space in which their fluidity and hybridity is expressed and lived is not a level playing field, but is one that is constrained by unequal access to economic, social and political power. using this theoretical approach allows analysis of how structures such as class, ethnicity, gender and age intersect in women’s lives with discourses of religion, race, assimilation and sexism and play an important role in the construction of hybrid identities. 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009 islamophobia and racism in this paper i argue that islamophobia is a form of contemporary racism which impacts on women’s experiences of activism. however the meaning of the term ‘islamophobia’ and the nature of its relationship to racism are contested. miles (2003) argues that islamophobia intersects with racism by defining muslims as a racialised group as well as a religious ‘other’ and islam as homogenous, essentially different from the west and inferior (miles, 2003, p. 165). halliday (1999) criticises those who use the term ‘islamophobia’ as putting forward the idea of a pure and authentic islam which is under attack. however, miles defends the use of the term arguing that the non-existence of a pure and authentic islam does not nullify the presence of islamophobia just as the non-existence of race as a phenomenon does not nullify the existence of racism (2003, p. 165). in fact halliday has confused islam with islamophobia, an ideology which involves the essentialising and homogenising of people of diverse ethnic, linguistic and cultural backgrounds. in the australian context, racism against muslims is certainly not a new phenomenon and racialised coverage of arabs and muslims has been present in the australian media since the 1980s (manning, 2006, pp. 22-23). poynting et al. (2004) argue that homogenising, essentialising discourses which blur the lines between ethnicity, religion and culture serve a specific purpose in contemporary australian society which intersects with racism. they argue that discourses around arabs and muslims in australia are not simply racialised, i.e. reduced to a set of essentialised ‘racial’ characteristics, but racialised in order to construct them as the ‘other’ and as less human and evil (2004, p. 45). in this paper i argue that islamophobia and racism towards muslims are more than a series of lies or myths which can be blown away to reveal the truth (said, 1995, p. 6). the ideology of islamophobia reveals the very real and concrete powerrelationships that persist in contemporary western states, including australia. these are ‘security states’, in that they are states in which the domestic population is subjected to unprecedented surveillance, search and detention powers by the police and security organisations in the name of ‘national security’. islamophobia is therefore intimately connected with the political and economic interests of contemporary states, in which any form of activism, dissent and difference, be it ethnic, religious or sexual difference, is equated with terror and a threat to national security (young, 2003, p. 8). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 67 gender and the politics of assimilation ideas of ‘civilising the orient’ which were used as a pretext for colonial rule in the 19th and 20th centuries were gendered in that they posited that arabs and muslims were both unable to govern their own countries and unwilling to protect ‘their’ women. (young, 2003; bahramitash, 2005; rostami-povey, 2007). in the post-cold war era the idea of non-westerners and particularly women as passive victims in need of rescue has gained further impetus through the rise of humanitarian and human rights discourses. laleh khalili argues that human rights discourses transformed the politics of resistance; revolution and liberation, which were products of the mass movements of the 1960s and 1970s, into a humanitarian project of securing aid for the countless, nameless and objectified victims of hunger, war and conflict worldwide. this shift, which occurred in the context of the us’s rise in status to the world’s only remaining superpower, has she states, de-politicised issues of war, conflict and hunger and in turn produced a “politics of pity”, which denies the possibility of agency and the capacity and necessity of resistance (khalili, 2007, p. 36). in more recent years discourses in which muslim and arab women are presented as passive and oppressed have interconnected with ‘feminist orientalism’ an ideology which parvin paydar argues uses the language of women’s liberation to justify military action in arab and muslim majority countries (paydar, 1995). this situation has been worsened by the failure of western feminism to take up issues of war and racism. stanley and wise argue that the lack of a women’s movement in western countries combined with the institutionalisation of academic feminism, has allowed women’s liberation to be used in a way that has at best, failed to oppose war and racism and at worst, colluded with the neo-conservatives and supported assimilationist policies (stanley and wise, 2000). sherene razack (2008) argues when gender is relied on to support the politics of assimilation, a choice is presented to muslim women: “either we take the cure (the bombs on our heads and the camps), or we endure patriarchal violence” (2008, p. 18). the ‘choice’ that is set up here between oppression and assimilation is problematic as it assumes that western women are liberated. secondly arguments which fail to criticise the essentialist ‘cultural-religious’ framework through which debates around arab and muslim women are conducted and present assimilation as a ‘choice’ end up supporting essentialist notions of culture and white racial superiority (fekete, 2008, p. 10). 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009 international comparative frameworks in recent years a number of studies have been conducted which utilise international comparative frameworks in an effort to go beyond essentialising discourses and focus on the material conditions of women’s lives (rostami-povey 2007; sadig al ali 2007). in afghan women (2007) elaheh rostami-povey argues that afghan women living in iran and pakistan have resisted both the taliban and the us invading forces by organising within their communities and establishing schools, healthcare facilities, orphanages and ngos. for example, in iran, afghan women have set up madarese khodgaran (self-run schools) with an emphasis on those focussing on the education of girls (2007: 86). rostami-povey argues that afghan women through their own efforts have created a space in which they are active agents in organising and leading their own communities. this struggle for community survival in diaspora has extended to the struggle for women’s rights and has had an effect on how they and their communities perceive gender relations and gender equality (2007, p.107). although it does not specifically refer to activism, this important analysis provides a very different picture to prevailing views of women in muslim majority countries as passive victims of male oppression and allows us to question the common idea that political activism and resistance to patriarchy is easier for women in western ‘liberal democratic’ countries such as australia. more research needs to be conducted in order to develop fully a comparative framework which discusses activism in iran and in australia. however, my initial research, based on interviews with iranian activists carried out in december-january 2008-2009 and australian activists in 2008, supports rostami-povey’s findings. women activists living in muslim majority countries such as iran have faced numerous difficulties as activists, yet they have been able to construct their own ‘emancipatory frameworks’ based on their interaction with the changing meaning of their faith, their cultures, their national, community and personal histories and their struggle for gender equality. in iran the creation of this space has been strengthened by the fact that women in iran have more rights than in neighbouring us backed states. they have a strong presence in the workforce, in politics, are highly educated and make up 65% of all students entering university (bahramitash, 2005; rostami-povey, 2007). contrary to popular views of the country, the united nations development programme’s ‘human development report’ for 2007/8 ranks iran as slightly above the usa in terms of overall gender cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 69 equality.1 there is also a large and active women’s movement in iran which has articulated critiques of patriarchal readings of islamic religious texts, campaigned against discriminatory laws and won significant victories (mir-hosseini and tapper, 2006). in an interview conducted in tehran in 2008, iranian ngo leader nahid ashrafi described the successful campaign of the women’s movement against laws that restrict the passing on of citizenship by mothers to their children: we were able to argue in the sixth parliament that iranian women who married afghan men (or any other foreign men) should be able to pass on their citizenship rights and nationality rights to their children. this was a great step forward. 2 the active and visible participation of women in politics has a long history in iran, from resistance to european colonialism in the 19th century to the mass participation of iranian women in the revolution of 1979. this historical experience has enabled women to challenge restrictive gender relations within their own communities from within the framework of an islamic culture. however, the experience of arab and muslim women in the west is more complex. in australia and in western countries, hostility towards islam and the prevalence of islamophobic discourses means that it is much more difficult for arab and muslim women to use islamic frameworks to argue for their rights. they are constantly having to defend their cultures and their communities, not just from racist ideas but from an ideology that justifies support for military action in muslim majority countries and maintenance of the contemporary security states. activism in australia in august 2008 i spoke with three women activists based in sydney. they were from diverse backgrounds in terms of class, age and ethnicity, had differing political affiliations and were involved in different campaigns. sabrine elkhodr is an activist 1 undp human development report 2007/8 lists gdi (gender disparity index) as a percentage of hdi (human development index). the lower the gdi as a percentage of hdi, the greater the indicators of gender inequality. iran’s gdi as percentage of hdi is 98.8% while the usa is listed at 98.5%. the undp ranks iran 95th in its list of nations in terms of gender equality and the us as 107th. http://hdrstats.undp.org, accessed 13/04/08. 2 interview with nahid ashrafi in tehran, wednesday 31 january 2008, nahid ashrafi is the director of hami ngo (in support of afghan women and children refugees in iran). she has recently set up a school of afghan children in khayrabad near tehran called kamal school. 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009 who works with global anti-poverty campaigns and has been involved in anti-war and anti-racist campaigns. sevgi yildiz is a community welfare activist currently working with the feza foundation in sydney with young migrants from turkey and other islamic countries and communities. councillor malikeh michaels is a greens activist and councillor in auburn. despite their differences, a number of common themes emerged from my conversations with these activists. they rejected the notion that they are passive victims of male domination or that their marginalisation in diaspora is due to ‘cultural’ factors outside of the political arena. sabrine elkhodr argues that very real problems facing muslim communities in australia have been neglected in favour of a type of public discourse that consists of essentialist pronouncements on issues such women’s oppression and the hijab: …people tend to focus so much on what’s going on overseas or for example, such and such a person has been talking about polygamy, lets bash them up, or this person’s talking about the hijab. we focus so much on those types of issues, and there is so much public discourse on those issues that, the issue of community welfare is neglected. she argued that what was important in terms of ‘community welfare’ was access to health, education and employment. problems in the community she argued were perceived to be a result of inherent problems within muslim or arab culture were actually a result of social and economic marginalisation: i read a statistic that there is probably a higher unemployment rate within certain islamic communities in sydney than there is in the rest of australia, you have to ask yourself why is that? why is that happening? it’s certainly not something which is inherent within that culture. however, sabrine argued that muslim and arab women were not simply passively accepting marginalisation but were fighting to oppose racism and to strengthen their communities. this contradicts common perceptions of the muslim community in australia as being homogenous, conservative and insular: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 71 i hate to sound clichéd but the media have drummed it in to the australian community over the last few years that the muslim community is very isolated and very insular and anyone who happens to have a muslim name or wear a scarf, its assumed that they can’t speak english, they’re not educated, they don’t know what they’re talking about. you do want you want and leave us be, its that kind of an attitude, and then when they realize that you actually are educated, that you want to engage with them, they’re surprised. sabrine stated that cross-cultural collaboration in movements was essential to their success particularly in challenging racism and war and in fighting for community welfare: if you are living as a community, you can’t be split up into groups of us and them or you and me, if you are working for a cause and you’re working for society, you have to work as a cohesive whole otherwise anything that you do is going to disintegrate or be attacked by someone else and that would be pointless, at the end of the day. the three participants argued that through their activism they are creating identities that challenge ideas of australian white christian exclusivity which they felt constitutes islam as the threatening ‘other’ and uses this construction to justify war and social exclusion. in opposing this, they felt that they were not rejecting notions of australian-ness or acting as the ‘long distance nationalists’ that brubaker (2005: 2) describes but articulating positive ideas of australian-ness based on their political identifications, experiences and engagement in society. sevgi yildiz describes her work with a turkish community welfare foundation as helping young migrants from turkey and other islamic communities and countries discover and create an australian-turkish-muslim identity: what we do is basically teach children how to become better social beings, help them with their studies and at the same time teach them social morals, australian morals. because they’re mainly turkish students, they’re brought up by their parents who are from turkey. so we help them understand what australian-ness is. how they don’t have to be what their parents want them to be all the time, they can create their own identity as an australian muslim, as a turkish muslim. 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009 councillor malikeh michaels is a greens councillor for auburn who describes herself as an ‘anglo convert’. she describes how she has forged an australian muslim identity that challenges views of muslims as un-australian: …what i do by wearing a scarf and presenting myself as a muslim, is saying, hey i’m an aussie, i’m from queensland, from north of brisbane, you couldn’t get anymore aussie than me, and i can sit down and have a yarn on any topic and speak in all the slang and lingo, of country australia. no one can take that away from me, no one can deny that, no one can say you’re not really an australian and it doesn’t matter then what religion i practice. in constructing identities that reflected their experience, these activists stressed that they were not accepting assimilation which they saw as problematic and racist. sabrine distinguished between the ideas of ‘living ‘peacefully’ and assimilation: you can’t just kind of sweep it under the rug and say, if they don’t like it here, chuck them overseas, because members of the muslim community have chosen to come here, they want to live here, they want to live here peacefully, but that doesn’t mean that you ignore the fact that we also have specific needs that we’d like met, that doesn’t mean that we’re against australian society or against australian values. however, the participants argued that this work is made much harder by islamophobia and the resurgence of the politics of assimilation in australia. activism, by its very nature involves acts of imagining and advocating difference as activists articulate ideas and strategies for social transformation. sevgi argued that in a society where even imagining difference has not been tolerated, at least by the political mainstream, the creation of identity becomes an increasingly difficult task as the rejection of assimilation becomes equated with a rejection of australian-ness: in australia we’ve had the white australia policy and then assimilation and then multi-cultural australia, that was our culture for a while, but now the attack is on, whatever is different is not welcome because it’s perceived as a threat. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 73 she described how the forging of australian-muslim identities is hard for the young muslim migrants she works with not because of anything that is inherent in their culture but due to the hostility they feel directed to them by mainstream views of australia as exclusively white and christian: even though they are 18, they can get stuck in the idea that i have to keep hold of my culture. they are holding on to it so tightly because they feel that everyone is attacking them. what happens is that they can’t make friends and all that sort of stuff because everything is so weird to them. they don’t want to embrace or they can’t embrace australia and they don’t feel that they will be welcome either. they have issues finding jobs, when i say why don’t you go for a job here and there they say, no they wouldn’t want me, because i’m not this or that or i don’t look a certain way, i say you’ll be fine, just go, but they feel that they’re never going to be able to mold into australia. the politics of assimilation, malikeh argued, was a major characteristic of the howard years and has had a lasting impact on activism in australia: the howard era was the era of fearing anybody different and very much the ‘us and them’ attitude…” “when i think about islamic activists, i think people are scared, because of the last ten years of hysteria and xenophobia so i think people are very fearful of being seen as activists because they might be seen as being stirrers or troublemakers, as un-australian.” malikeh criticised perspectives that fail to recognise that arab and muslim women’s expressions of faith are complex and multi-layered. the wearing of hijab, for example can have a number of different meanings which can include expressions of opposition to war and cultural imperialism. like a number of muslim women, malikeh describes choosing to wear the hijab after september 11 2001, as an expression of her faith and also partly as a political act, a way of identifying with the ‘other’ and of expressing her opposition to the attacks on muslim countries: september 11 2001 brought up a resurgence of islamic identity, which i became a part of because i’m a muslim, i’m not a bad person and i’m going to show the world 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009 that i’m proud to be a muslim.” “so, i put the scarf on and that was a major act of activism. conclusion a comparative analysis of women’s resistance has the strength of being able to focus on the political context in which that resistance occurs. in this paper i have argued that women in muslim majority countries have been able to use islamic frameworks as vehicles through which they have successfully argued for their civil and gender rights. contrary to views that assume that activism is easier for women in western ‘liberal democratic’ countries such as australia, i argue that it has been easier for women in iran to construct frameworks and identities through which they resist patriarchy, war and neo-liberalism. arab muslim women living in western countries and australia are also resisting ethnic stereotypes, challenging war and neo-liberal attacks on their communities. they have resisted the construction of their identities by the dominant culture and have put forward a view of australian-ness that is based on their participation in society and their experiences of how class, gender and ethnicity intersect in their lives. however, their task is being made much harder by the level of racism and hostility directed at arab and muslim communities. women’s activism needs to be contextualised, i.e. seen within the context of the actual material conditions in which women live. responses to these material conditions and to oppression need to be recognised in their complexity. if we want to change the way in which women respond to the material conditions in which they find themselves, i argue that we should focus, as activists on changing the material conditions themselves rather than seeking to change women’s responses after the fact. arguments that focus purely on the symbolic meaning of women’s responses without addressing the political context in which these responses occur run the risk of falling in to the trap of accepting assimilationist discourses that are based on notions of passivity, clash of cultures and cultural exclusivity. therefore, ‘after the neo-con men’, building broad movements that oppose war, racism and islamophobia remains essential for activists and is part of an international movement which can connect into and strengthen the struggles of arab and muslim women. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 75 acknowledgements i would like to thank sabrine elkhodr, christina ho, malikeh michaels, sevgi yildiz and the anonymous reviewers for their advice, knowledge and ideas, all of which greatly contributed to this paper. references anthias, f. 2001, ‘new hybridities, old concepts: the limits of “culture”’, ethnic and racial studies, vol.24 no.4, pp. 619-641. anthias, f. & yuval-davis, n. 1992, racialized boundaries routledge, london. bahramitash, r. 2005, ‘the war on terror, feminist orientalism and oriental feminism: case studies of two north american bestsellers’ critique: critical middle eastern studies, vol. 14 no. 2 pp. 223-237. brubaker, r. 2005, ‘the ‘diaspora’ diaspora’, ethnic and racial studies, vol. 28 no.1, pp. 1-19. cook, b. & kothari, u. 2001, participation: the new tyranny? zed books, london. fekete, l. 2008, integration, islamophobia and civil rights in europe, institute of race relations, london. gilroy, p. 1993, the black atlantic, harvard university press, cambridge, mass.. halliday, f. 1999, ‘”islamophobia” reconsidered’ ethnic and racial studies, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 892-902. khalili, l. 2007, heroes and martyrs of palestine, the politics of national commemoration, cambridge university press, cambridge. laws, s., harper, c. and marcus, r. 2003, research for development, a practical guide, sage, london. manning, p. 2006, us and them, a journalist’s investigation of media, muslims and the middle east, random house, sydney. miles, r. 2003, racism, routledge, london. mir-hosseini, z. & tapper, r. 2006, islam and democracy in iran: eshkevari and the quest for. reform, i. b. tauris, london. paydar, p. 1995, women in the political process in twentieth century iran, cambridge university press, cambridge. poya, m. 1999, women, work and islamism, ideology and resistance in iran, zed books, london. poynting, s., noble, g., tabar, p., collins, j. 2004, bin laden in the suburbs, criminalising the arab other sydney institute of criminology, sydney. razack, s. 2008, casting out, the eviction of muslims from western law and politics, university of toronto press, toronto. rostami-povey, e. 2007, afghan women: identity and invasion, zed books, london. sadig al-ali, n. 2007, iraqi women, untold stories from 1948 to the present, zed books, london. said, e. 1996, representations of the intellectual, vintage, new york. said, e. 1995, orientalism penguin, london. 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009 stanley, l. and wise, s. 2000, ‘but the empress has no clothes! some awkward questions about the ‘missing revolution’ in feminist theory’, feminist theory, vol. 1, pp. 261-88. young, i. m. 2003, ‘the logic of masculinist protection: reflections on the current security state’, signs: journal of women in culture and society, vol.29 no.11, pp. 1-25. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia sporting chance: indigenous participation in australian sport history sean gorman curtin university, western australia abstract for many non-indigenous australians the only time they have any engagement with indigenous peoples, history or issues is through watching sport on television or being at a football match at ground like the mcg. this general myopia and indifference by settler australians with indigenous australians manifests itself in many ways, but perhaps most obscenely in the simple fact that indigenous australians die nearly 20 years younger than the rest of australia’s citizens. many non-indigenous australians do not know this. sport in many ways has offered indigenous australians a platform from which to begin the slow, hard process for social justice and equity to be actualised. this paper will discuss the participation of indigenous australians in sport and show how it has enabled indigenous australians to create a space so that they can speak out against the injustices they have experienced and to improve race relations going into the future. the central contention is that through sport all australians can begin a process of engaging with indigenous history as a means to improve race relations between the two groups. sport has been our greatest ally (michael long 19/5/2009). background history has shown us that many relationships, friendships or unions between first australians and settlers has been fraught with danger, and in many cases doomed. consider, for example, the ramifications of the 1905 aborigines act in western australia. anna haebich notes that this legislation was originally designed out of the concerns of the chief protector of aborigines, mr henry charles prinsep, who sought to “make provision for the better protection and care of the aboriginal inhabitants of western australia” (haebich 1988, p.83). prinsep was “particularly concerned at the growing number of aboriginal children of mixed decent growing up in ‘native camps’. in his opinion, they learned only ‘laziness and vice’ and left to their own devices they would grow up to be ‘vagrants and outcast’ and ‘not only a disgrace but a menace to society’” (haebich 1988, p. 57). officially, the 1905 act promoted education, medical and housing concerns as specific provisions for indigenous western australians. as haebich has argued, however, in reality this legislation cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 13 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia laid the basis for the development of repressive and coercive state control over the state’s aboriginal population ... [the] act drove a wedge between them and the wider community and served to hamper efforts [for them] to make their own way of life. (haebich 1988, p. 83). this type of paternalism has led directly to aboriginal disempowerment and remains a grave concern in contemporary australia where nearly all of the socio-economic indicators as provided by the australian bureau of statistics show that to be born an indigenous australian means one enters a life of hardship, economic uncertainty, disease and early death. as basic health, welfare, housing and education are the inalienable rights of all australian citizens it is indigenous australians who are suffering third world experiences and being left behind in the modern australia. in this paper i would like to summarise some of the historical moments whereby indigenous australians have overcome great injustice, adversity and hardship to play elite sport in australia. in doing so i consider the incredibly important role that sport has played in australian history to show how some indigenous australians have struggled against great adversity to achieve success. in doing so my aim is to argue the case for a wider appreciation of the role of sport in aboriginal lives. it is through indigenous sporting narratives one can begin to reconsider other areas where indigenous people have enriched and contributed to australian society. for me the ‘light-bulb’ moment came when i was interviewing renowned australian football league (afl) and essendon past player michael long for a research project. his quote, which appears at the top of this paper ‘sport has been our greatest ally’ drove home to me that without sport perhaps the predicament for indigenous peoples’ welfare and wellbeing might indeed be worse than it currently is. this, for me, is a powerful statement, because long himself had to stand firm amongst great public criticism, some of which came from essendon football club itself, to enable better conditions in the afl, not just for indigenous australians but for all. he reflects: it was a very hard thing to do because i didn’t have all the answers or solutions and i didn’t get support until later on. for some of the other players i reckon it was a hard thing because they’d be asking ‘what’s he going on about?’ (long 19/5/2009). in many respects the indigenous struggle on the football field is the one that many aboriginal and torres strait islander australians experience in the everyday, and so the struggle of indigenous australian athletes could be characterised as long and arduous, but one that has 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia had very real consequences for enabling understanding and change (tatz in headon 2001; tatz & tatz 2000). the struggle could be epitomised by the indelible image of nicky winmar and his silent, dignified reply to the hostile collingwood crowd in 1993 (klugman & osmond 2009). or michael long’s stand when he was vilified in the first anzac day game that eventually ushered in the racial and religious vilification laws (rule 30). in 1995, this enabled australia, as a nation, to look at racism at the individual and societal level through the prism of sport (gardiner 1997; warren & tsaousis 1997). but there have also been less notable struggles. for example, back in the 1920s, doug (later sir douglas) nicholls was refused a jumper at carlton as it was claimed his ‘smell’ was intolerable to players and trainers alike. then there is the fact jim krakouer was suspended for a total of 25 games, over a season’s worth, due to retaliating against the racialised verbal and physical attention that was shown to him and his younger brother phil (gorman 2005). further, during their playing careers west coast eagles players chris lewis and teammate troy ugle received anonymous death threats and hate mail. the vitriol was so disturbing that the west coast eagles sought counselling in order to help these players cope (wilson 25/8/1991, p. 6). the struggle, in many respects, has come down to what the colour of one’s skin has represented, as the history of indigenous and non-indigenous relations has a long and difficult past; it is a past that we are still grappling with today. as colin tatz explains, this is a matter of history and our perceptions of it: the phrase from ‘plantation to playing field’ expresses the history of black american sport...aboriginal history has been the reverse. they went from relative freedom, albeit in an era of genocide, to the isolated and segregated settlements and missions which were created to save them (tatz & tatz 2000, p. 8). at afl matches across the country today, huge electronic screens broadcast a warning to all patrons that racial vilification at the ground will not be tolerated and will result in a substantial fine and ejection from the arena. however, it does not seem that long ago when indigenous players were able to be abused for the colour of their skin. since 1990, when the victorian football league (vfl) became the national australian football league (afl), the game has had many challenges, but racial vilification presented itself differently to the myriad financial and administrative issues that the new, expanded national competition cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 15 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia faced. the reason for this is that vilification was seen as an intrinsic part of the game that was used in the psychological struggle with one’s opponent. for the afl rule 30 states: no person subject to these rules shall act towards or speak to any other person in a manner, or engage in any other conduct which threatens, disparages, vilifies or insults another on the basis of that person’s race, religion, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin (afl, p.1). with the introduction of rule 30 in 1995 many said the game was going ‘soft’. in a number of the interviews that i did for the book brotherboys, michael long was seen by some nonindigenous people as nothing more than a trouble maker, a ‘jumped up’ darkie who did not know his place. for many of the elder statesmen of the game, the ethos was ‘what was said on the field stayed on the field.’ it was used simply to get an edge over indigenous opponents. if aboriginal players could not take it they were ‘weak’. this notion today is preposterous as racist behaviour has no place in sport or the broader society. to try and get some measure on what this means one should try and imagine what the sporting landscape would be in australia if indigenous australians did not play australian football. not that they did not exist; rather, that they did not play football in the same way that indigenous participation in international cricket is virtually non-existent.1 because of australian football and indigenous australians’ love of for it indigenous participation in football has become a highly celebrated aspect of the australian game. it is because of players like nicky winmar, barry cable, michael long, chris lewis, byron pickett, polly farmer and the krakouer brothers that football is a space where one can investigate both positive and negative historical issues regarding race relations in australia. in this way football ceases to be just a game but becomes a teacher, and through its lessons we may become, as australians, a better team. sport, history and politics for many indigenous australians, sport, history and politics have become intertwined due to issues concerning wider societal struggles and the oppression of aboriginal people. many indigenous athletes have had to adapt to politics and policy in order to survive, as financial 1 jason gillespie is the only male test cricketer to have played for australia who identifies as being indigenous kaurna from south australia. 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia and social self-determination were not accessible. both haebich and tatz have shown that in the late 1800s and early to mid 1900s, rations, curfews and reserve life created massive everyday hardship and poverty. for tatz, those who displayed ability in sport were able to supplement their seasonal incomes and rations with semi-professional foot races or boxing matches to survive. hence these people were able to become more socially mobile and gain some begrudging acceptance in the broader community, which then afforded them some degree of status (bearing in mind that most indigenous australians prior to the 1967 referendum came under various state and territory acts which made many of them feel like native fauna). as tatz suggests, this does not just focus on one historical period but many: the lives of aboriginal sportspersons, at any period of australian history, help illustrate the discriminations faced by all aborigines living at that period. (tatz & tatz 2000, p. 9). this rich historical vein of sport, race and history, is not adequately appreciated by many non-indigenous australians, which is surprising given the status in which sport is held in australia. this is in contrast to americans, many of whom are quite aware of african americans (like baseballer jackie robinson) and their valuable social and historical input to the desegregation of baseball, basketball and american football, and the rise to prominence of african americans in these sports (lapchick 2008). in this way sport enables us to see the many over-lapping themes of sport, politics, race and history. tatz, for example, looks at key incidents, such as cathy freeman cloaking herself in the aboriginal flag at the 1994 commonwealth games. this created a furore in the australian media as many commentators claimed that freeman should have refrained, because aboriginal australia is not recognised as a sovereign nation. however, as tatz responded, “those who deplored her “un-australian” behaviour have no understanding of aboriginal history” (tatz in headon 2001, p. 554). what he meant is that media commentators equally failed to acknowledge that no indigenous australian has ever formally signed an agreement that they have ‘given up’ their land to anyone. to put this another way, the mabo decision in 1992 proves in law that indigenous peoples and societies were established in australia before 1788, and thus the notion of terra nullius is a fraud. for many non-indigenous australians this is a concept that they do not or cannot acknowledge, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 17 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia and so indifference becomes the way of handling that (un)reality. as syd jackson opined in an interview i had with him in 2008: i know a lot of my aboriginal brothers and sisters became isolated, lonely and discriminated against because they had no attachment and lived lonely lives… i think the challenge we face is trying to get to the top level of work and acceptance because general society don’t want to see them (indigenous australians). (jackson, 25 sept, 2008, my emphasis). in terms of overt racism, discrimination has not just come from opponents requiring an “edge” but from the sporting institutions themselves. as previously mentioned, doug nichols, fitzroy football club’s champion and later governor of south australia, was declined a guernsey at carlton in the 1920 because it was thought he smelt. in other words, he smelt because it was an accepted ‘truth’ amongst non-indigenous australians that aboriginals were dirty and chose to live in squalid conditions. for many ‘blackfellas’, they had no choice in these matters as the local tip or sewerage depot were the only places they were allowed to live (haebich 1988). other examples of this type of treatment include cricketer eddie gilbert and tennis ace evonne goolagong. eddie gilbert, a devastatingly fast bowler and one of the few to bowl bradman for a duck, spent his last years in a brisbane sanatorium because of the “great mental concern” that racism had caused him during his time playing cricket, and being institutionalised in places like cherbourg (colman & edwards 2002, p.144). gilbert was on many occasions made to take his meals away from the team whilst on tour with the queensland state side. some of gilbert’s team mates even refused to shake his hand after he had taken a wicket. furthermore, gilbert was unfairly branded a “chucker,” the worst possible accusation for a bowler, costing him greater acceptance and recognition within cricketing circles. evonne goolagong, perhaps the most internationally famous indigenous sportsperson in australia before cathy freeman, also experienced racism. during the 1980 wimbeldon tournament a senior victorian politician at the time said he hoped she “wouldn’t go walkabout like some old boong” (tatz & tatz 2000, p. 29). it seems incredible by today’s standards that such a thing would ever be uttered and hopefully measures to penalise vilification within sport can help break down these attitudes elsewhere. 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia football and history for many years it has been believed that the first indigenous player was joe johnson, a 55 game defender who played in fitzroy’s 1904-05 premiership team in the vfl. however, this assumption has proven to be incorrect as albert ‘pompey’ austin played for geelong in 1872, debuting against carlton after arriving from framlingham mission (ruddell 2008). in many ways it was not just austin or johnson who can be seen as the indigenous pioneers of the game. the reason why this is suggested is that since the 1930s the game has only seen a few indigenous players in the vfl in each era: doug nicholls (fitzroy: 1932-37), norm mcdonald (essendon: 1947-53), polly farmer (geelong: 1962-67) and syd jackson (carlton: 1969-1976). in a sense, then, these players were all pioneers as they each created a space so that others might follow. today this sees cohorts of indigenous players on all afl lists. these numbers are increasing every year. it was not, however, until the early 1980s that the vfl/afl saw an influx of indigenous players with the arrival of the krakouers to north melbourne and maurice rioli at richmond, which added to the playing stocks of phil egan (richmond), robbie muir (st kilda) and kevin taylor (south melbourne). more significantly it was not until the advent of the west coast eagles in 1987 with the likes of phil narkle, wally matera and chris lewis did the ‘racial’ complexion of the afl really start to change. with this also came stereotypical media reportage concerning ‘black magic’ and the explaining away of indigenous players’ ‘skills’ as ‘natural’ without due recognition of the hours of training and application that they had endured. this attention brought with it more supporter hostility and culminated in the famous round four fixture between st kilda and collingwood in 1993, when nicky winmar raised his jumper, thereby revealing his black skin, to a hostile collingwood football crowd. at the time winmar could not have conceived what the outcome of his action would have been. the collingwood president allan mcalister said at the time that winmar and team mate gilbert mcadam would be respected “as long as they conducted themselves like white people on and off the field” (tatz, 2001, p.557). for the broader community it began the process of sparking great debate about racism in football and society. the reason that winmar’s stance has transcended the realm of sport and football and the fact that we are still talking about it is the power of its message: “you cannot ignore me anymore”, it silently screams. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 19 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia then in 1995 came the michael long incident when collingwood ruckman damian monkhorst, who was being tackled by long, implored that “someone should get this black c..t off me”. long refused to let the media spotlight on this incident drop, and he pursued the afl on its lack of racism protocols, which eventually led to the introduction of the afl’s racial and religious vilification laws: rule 30. now, because of long, all who play the game are protected from racial and religious abuse and the players undergo diversity education and cultural awareness programs as part of being a professional sportsperson. indigenous participation in the afl in 2010 for both rookie and senior lists is just on 11%. rule 30 could then be seen as a very important initiative not only for aboriginal players but also for those players from minority backgrounds, like the irish and african players, but also such islamic afl footballers like bhachar houli at essendon. can one imagine for a moment what the status of houli’s welfare would have been given the anti-muslim sentiment following the terrorists attacks in a australia post 9-11?2 it has taken these and other problematic moments concerned with racism in the afl to reconsider the way we think about race and ethnicity in australia and how it relates to sport and society more broadly. yet this could only be done if one viewed not just the game differently but also the space on which it was played. with increased sponsorships and professionalism, the mcg ceased to simply be an oval where sport was played and, with the introduction of rule 30, it became a workplace. in this way vilification was seen differently because one is looking at it through a different prism. a hint that australian society is perhaps slowly coming to understand the issue of racism more holistically was witnessed in 2005 when the popular commentator rex hunt referred to collingwood’s indigenous player leon davis playing ability as being “as black as a dog”. hunt made frequent use of slang and colloquialisms, but this was beyond the pale – as he recognised by apologising on air immediately after he had vilified davis. “i stopped in my tracks because i knew” hunt conceded (hogan 19/7/2005). however, the counterargument to this occurred only recently when ex richmond player and father to current day hawthorn player campbell brown, mal brown, jokingly described past indigenous players as ‘cannibals’, sparking a furore in the media (gorman 18/6/2010). 2 bachar houli is a player for the essendon bombers and a devout practicing muslim who has a prayer mat at the essendon football club so that he may undertake his prayers at certain times of the day. 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia one of the biggest challenges that the afl currently faces is how they will deal with the projected influx of indigenous players into the game, especially those that come from remote areas like austin wonemaerri, liam jurrah and ross tungatalum.3 in the next 5 to 10 years it is expected that indigenous players will make up between 20 and 25 percent of all player lists. there will be many positive outcomes from this if that happens. specifically, the afl will become the single biggest corporate employer of indigenous people per capita in australia. however, for people like koori elder and president of rumbalara in shepparton, paul briggs, it is felt that the afl needs to do more: “i still don’t think the system is strong enough to handle [certain] cases. there needs to be a far more professional approach and strong case management of what these boys need. once they take their footy jumper off and put their street clothes on its just too hard for them” (wilson sport 17/11/2007, p. 1). many would say that the solution for indigenous footballers to succeed beyond the playing field is simple. stay off alcohol and drugs, get an education and work hard. but there also needs to be some work done by the broader society to ensure that when young indigenous footballers fall by the wayside we don’t just point to the colour of their skin and suggest racial logic as the cause of failure. to put this simply: to understand an indigenous footballer one needs to understand where they have come from, not just geographically but socially, historically, economically, politically and culturally. to fail to acknowledge these primary aspects is to fundamentally miss the point of indigenous peoples’ experiences in australian history. perhaps also we need to ask ourselves some other very simple questions. why are there no indigenous commentators, coaches, administrators, team managers, umpires or journalists working within mainstream afl circles? where are they? as che cockatoo collins ruminated, i ask the question, where are those coaches? where are those board members? where are those commissioners? and as much stick as the nrl had been given over the last few years, i mean, they’ve actually got a commissioner, an aboriginal commissioner, gordon tallis, and how come we [the afl] don’t? and by putting people in roles like that, i think you change the landscape. (cockatoo-collins, 15/9/2009). conclusion 3 all these players are from remote areas of australia and have strong traditional backgrounds. for example english for liam jurrah is his fourth language. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 21 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the steps that the afl has taken to stamp out racism in football are something that should be commended by all members of the community. what has followed on from 1995 and the introduction of rule 30 is also something that the afl and the broader football public should recognise as a celebration, but also a recognition that something needed to change. since then there has been a range of other positive outcomes for indigenous people in the afl and the broader community. for example, indigenous sporting achievement and culture is recognised in games like ‘dreamtime at the g’. the afl also has the sportsready program, which helps to identify and develop job skills and pathways for indigenous footballers during and after their careers. qantas is in partnership with the afl funding the kickstart program directed towards indigenous youth between the ages of 5-15, promoting healthy lifestyles and physical activity. in the broader community, the clontarf foundation in western australia, the brain-child of former afl coach gerard neesham, is a proactive franchise that combines football and education to take ‘at risk’ indigenous youth and turn their lives around. similarly, rumbalara in shepparton has participated in both the goulburn valley and murray football leagues since 1997, and has fostered many education and social initiatives to engender greater involvement between the local koori and town community. on a personal level, working in this field for nearly 20 years has enabled me to sit down and talk with some of australian football’s most famous indigenous players. what i have come to understand is that we should all be grateful that football is part of our lives as it enables us to see how far as a community we have come. as tatz says: sport is a mirror of many things. it reflects political, social, economic and legal systems. it also reflects the aboriginal experience…there has been much adversity – including the genocidal impulses of settler society, physical isolation, legal separation, removal of children, social segregation and racial discrimination in all of its forms…for aborigines and islanders, there has been exclusion from competition, discrimination within it, and at times gross inequality of chances, choices and facilities (tatz & tatz 2000, p. 7). football and our appreciation of it can and does assist in developing a greater awareness about the spectrum of people who come to the game and the contributions they can make. in some small way we can watch television or go to a football game on any weekend during winter and we can come to a greater appreciation of what football means to indigenous and non-indigenous australians alike. this then can lead to greater engagements and 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia appreciations on other levels and the spirit of coexistence in australia can take root. in a postapology australia, and in a country that loves its sport, this seems a fitting path to take. references australian football league. one game for all australians: how australian football has acted to counteract racial and religious abuse. retrieved october 10, 2008, from www.afl.com.au/portals/0/afl_docs/afl_hq/policies/racialreligious_lr.pdf cockatoo-collins, c. 2009, ‘force for good: how indigenous australians have enriched football.’ national museum of australia. canberra. retrieved january 18, 2010. from http://www.nma.gov.au/audio/transcripts/nma_force_for_good_20090915.html colman, m., & edwards, k. 2002), eddie gilbert: the true story of an aboriginal cricketing legend, abc books, sydney. gardiner, g. 1997, football and racism: the afl’s racial and religious vilification rule, discussion paper, no.6. koori reserch centre, monash university, melbourne. gorman, s. 2010, “ignorance lies at the heart of ‘innocent’ racist gibes.” retrieved june 30, 2010 from http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/ignorance-lies-at-the-heart-ofinnocent-racist-gibes-20100617-yjpv.html gorman, s. 2005, brotherboys: the story of jim and phillip krakouer, allen & unwin, melbourne. haebich, a. 1988, for their own good. aborigines and government in the south west of western australia 1900-1940, nedlands university of western australia press. hogan, j. 2005, “hunt apologises for racial ‘stuff up’.” retrieved 22 july, 2005 age. from http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/07/19/1121538946296.html jackson, s. 2008, personal interview melbourne, 25/9/2008. klugman, m., & osmond. g. 2009, ‘that picture – nicky winmar and the history of an image’. australian aboriginal studies. no. 2, pp. 80 – 91. lapchick. r. 2008, 100 pioneers: african-americans who broke color barriers in sport, fitness information technology. long, m. 2009, personal interview melbourne, 19/5/2009. ruddell, t. 2008, 'albert "pompey" austin: the first aborigine to play senior football', in peter burke and june senyard (eds), behind the play: football in australia, maribyrnong press, melbourne. tatz, c. 1995, obstacle race: aborigines in sport, university of nsw press, sydney. tatz, c. 2001, “the dark side of australian sport”. in d. headon (ed.), the best ever australian sports writing: a 200 year collection, black inc, melbourne. tatz, c., & tatz, p. 2000, black gold: the aboriginal and islander sports hall of fame, aboriginal studies press, canberra. warren, i., & tsaousis 1997, ‘racism and the law in australian rules football: a critical analysis’, sporting traditions vol.14, no. 1, pp. 27-53. wilson, c. 2007, the age sport, 17 november, p. 1. wilson, c. 1991, ‘racism on the field – afl football’s shameful secret’, the sunday age 25 august p. 6. http://www.afl.com.au/portals/0/afl_docs/afl_hq/policies/racialreligious_lr.pdf� http://www.nma.gov.au/audio/transcripts/nma_force_for_good_20090915.html� http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/ignorance-lies-at-the-heart-of-innocent-racist-gibes-20100617-yjpv.html� http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/ignorance-lies-at-the-heart-of-innocent-racist-gibes-20100617-yjpv.html� http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/07/19/1121538946296.html� 166 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 thinking and theorising about activism: who and how? elizabeth humphrys abstract this article overviews the following three papers, which arise from the 2008 conference other worlds 2: after the neo-con men. the article responds to an issue raised across the papers regarding social movement knowledge and theory: what is the tension between analysis produced inside the academy and that which arises from within movements. and how can theory can be developed in a way that both takes into account the viewpoint and needs of the historical players whose activity is shaping the future (social movement actors) and the wider social forces that give rise to and shape the struggles those players are involved in. it is argued that the new movements around globalisation and global justice have reasserted 'activism' as a key component of social movement analysis, challenging academics to engage with social movements in a more direct way and to ensure their output is relevant to that audience. it is argued that the concept of the ‘organic intellectuals’, outlined by italian marxist philosopher antonio gramsci, has particular utility. late in the evening on september 11 2001 i was back in my childhood bed. my life was a whirlwind of activity as i had just quit my job, was about to vacate my house and was preparing to move from melbourne to sydney for the second time in my life. the latter is never an easy task for a victorian. i was slightly nervous and distracted in the middle of these changes, but i was at relative peace with the world personally and politically. the global justice movement was gathering momentum in australia in the wake of the seattle alter-globalisation protests and the protests on s11 at the crown casino in melbourne1 , and i was working hard organising a gay and lesbian contingent to the protest against the upcoming commonwealth heads of government meeting in brisbane in october. although my brother and i had left the family home some time ago, we were both staying at the house while our mother was away. up late watching soccer, my brother was the first of us to see the collapsing twin towers on news broadcast. in a dazed state he came to wake me and for some 1 on september 11, 12 and 13 2001 an estimated 20 thousand people protested at the world economic forum held at crown casino in melbourne. commonly known as the s11 protests, activists formed a human barrier to the conference venue and were successful on the first day of the forum in stopping a number of delegates from attending. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 167 time we sat together, stunned, watching incredible images beamed from new york city to a suburban melbourne house. very little was said. then the phone calls began. that night i must have spoken to a dozen activists about the attacks, including what they might mean for both us-middle east relations and the global justice movement. the phone calls were our first attempt to re-theorise our social movement activity in light of what would be considerably altered circumstances. what would happen to the movement? what was now the key issue to campaign over given the likely military retaliation from the us? how had our personal views of the world and how to change it been challenged or altered? while the circumstances of these calls were unusual, the process underway was not. theorising and conceptualising movement activism is bread and butter for many social movement activists, who constantly need to assess and reassess their activity in light of the wider economic and political context. this theorising is either within movements themselves or within left political organisations, or in a more public way carried on through blogs (such as capitald17 based in the uk or againstthegrain or adbusters based in the us), magazines (left turn: notes from the global intafada and counterpunch) and political commentary facilities within electronic infrastructure such as indymedia. academic analysis is of course mostly published within academic journals. despite the constant debate and dialogue within and between movements, many portray them as amorphous masses where there is little dialogue and questioning. in analysing global justice movement events in australia for example, the mainstream media has often sought to explain the mass struggle as being the work of a few individuals who manipulate the wider group for their own (often hidden) agenda. while most activists see their efforts as involving both activity to achieve aims, and taking part in a discursive and dialogical process that articulates and theorises what needs to be done in the current circumstances, this nuance finds difficulty in making its way onto the front page of the sydney morning herald or the age. activists of course ‘do’ things, but they also strategise how to do them and envisage a different future. 168 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 when first thinking about the conference other words 2: beyond the neo-con men, i wanted the event to be a place where activists and academics could come together to discuss a number of common concerns and issues. while activists and academics are not divided physically, and many individuals encompass both those roles, the world of theoretical development can be separated into research done within the academy and outside it. in australia there are a few publications that seek to straddle these worlds – the journal overland being one such example – and a number of academics have sought to publish works regarding social movements that are accessible and jump the language barrier. verity burgmann’s book power, profit and protest (2003) is perhaps the best example of this. for this reason, the panel beyond activism and the keynote address to the conference heard from people who inhabit both the worlds of activism and academia. they have divergent views and prosecute differing strategies regarding social movement activity. all have been involved in campaigns, many as leading members and spokespeople. a number of the speakers have been central to a particular social movement, including the campaign to end mandatory detention of refugees and the your rights at work campaign. a number are also members of political parties – from the revolutionary to the reformist, and from the small to the mass based. one of the key questions asked by each of these speakers is what is politics? beyond activism the status quo assumes passivity and deference, it downplays human agency and counsels against action. yet it is impossible to imagine social movements without activists and activism – people and their actions that create, energise and shape struggles for justice, rights and a better world. the emergence of movements for another globalisation – another world – over the last decade have once again brought questions of activism to the fore of debate (cockburn and st. clair 2000; bello 2001; callinicos 2003; bevington and dixon 2005). in australia this movement was at its strongest at the s11 protests at crown casino (iveson and scamler 2000), but could also be seen in the vibrancy of the no borders movement against the mandatory detention of asylum seekers (maksimovic and barnes 2002; stead 2002) and alternative media initiatives such as cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 169 indymedia (meikle 2003). alongside the movements for another globalisation have been significant mobilisations and campaigns over the iraq war and australian guantanamo bay detainee david hicks. the strength of these new struggles has often been their spontaneity and autonomy, taking the corridors of power by surprise and disrupting them. for example, when the big business and institutional delegates to the word economic forum meeting in melbourne arrived at the crown casino on that september morning 2000, they found their very ability to access the building blocked by thousands of protesters. many delegates did not make it past the blockade. despite the success of the north american activists in blocking access to the world trade organisation meeting in seattle in 1999, politicians and business leaders alike seemed perplexed that similar events could occur in the central business district of melbourne. new agendas of resistance and alternatives have been thrust upon the mainstream debate, and for while, it appeared every young student activist had a copy of empire (hardt and negri 2001) weighing down their book bag. everywhere activists have been drawn to extolling the virtues of network politics and decentralised organisation (klein 2001; hardt and negri 2004), and centralising projects and programmatic debate have been dismissed as authoritarian and antidemocratic, with many activists rejecting parties outright. naomi klein has spoken of the new movements being like a ‘swarm’ (klein 2000) rather then resembling the political organisations of the past, and in its founding charter the world social forum even excluded political parties from participating (world social forum international council 2001). in this volume, damien lawson offers a consideration of this political trajectory. after the s11 protest many also argued to focus attention on local campaigns, in order to build a more coherent and organised left, even if this was at the expense of being involved in the wider movement critical of globalisation or protests directed at international institutions such as the world bank and international monetary fund. others argued that progress would be made through the accumulation of victories on key specific issues. in this vein many activists threw themselves at the challenge posed by the howard government’s workchoices legislation, and gave birth to a highly organised campaign around working people’s rights. centralised planning, national advertising, highly crafted media strategy 170 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 and funded local organisers in marginal seats were some of the hallmarks. ultimately, these campaigns delivered to kevin rudd and the australian labor party (alp) a most convincing federal election win in november 2007 even if the ‘alp did not publicly credit the…campaign as playing a significant – or even any – role in their victory’ (muir 2008). but are such polarised positions – the centralised or decentralised social movement strategy – sufficient in the present conjuncture? and what is the role of activists themselves in generating political theory both specific to australia and global in its appreciation and context? clearly the events on september 11 2001 opened the possibility for an unholy alliance of free market globalisers and us neo-conservative militarists to promulgate their own version of globalisation through the barrel of a gun. wars were launched against afghanistan and iraq in order to promote the interests of the world’s largest capitalist economy, the united states. at the same time they once again stepped on to the front foot with their drive to open up markets in the pursuit of those same interests. while the advancement of the neo-cons in this context initially wrong-footed the burgeoning global justice movement, resistance to their agenda soon erupted in another form across the world. the movement against the iraq war saw the largest street protests in world history in early 20032 , as well as ongoing campaigning as the united states’ imperial project began to come apart at the seams. in the process of reconstructing the global justice movement in and around the movement against the iraq war, the activists involved in the protests at crown casino had to rethink goals and methods, and more broadly activists and intellectuals were forced to confront difficult theoretical and practical questions. despite the decline of the bush, blair and howard regimes, the need for campaigners to further clarify their positions and trajectories has not diminished. even in an era ‘after the neo-cons’ (and more recently ‘after the neo-liberals’) the need for progressive thinkers to sharpen their intellectual armoury is as relevant as ever. 2 the combined numbers of protesters on street demonstrations between 3 january and 12 april 2003 is estimated at 36 million by french academic dominic reynie, according to callinicos (2003b). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 171 the beyond activism panel at the after the neo-con men conference in april 2008 looked at the question of the role of campaigns, movements and manifestos in achieving social change. the character of each of these was considered – sometimes in isolation, sometimes in their relevance to each other on a continuum – through questions such as ‘how do campaigns on single issues relate to wider movements for change?’ and ‘what role is there for manifestos of political programs within activist activity?’. a key concern of those presenting was how activists, campaigns and movements might effectively move beyond oppositionalism, beyond activism, to both theorise and implement agendas for change. the panel also examined the re-emergence of strategic and political questions within and around movements and struggles. in developing their papers the panel were asked to consider the following three areas of activist work and theory development: the limits of activism: how do activists relate to movements and campaigns? how do they seek to engage with wider debates and communities? how do they mobilise to achieve change and what stands in the way of their goals? how do they relate to parties and politicians? spatial dialectics of struggle: movements are often born locally but how do they strive for national or global reach? what visions connect the particular struggle to a wider movement? how do activists reconcile the tension between a global agenda for change and the national boundaries of official politics? what happens when movements and states come into conflict? the return of politics: when do activists feel the limits of movement politics? what is the logic of political representation: an active or passive process? do manifestos help or hinder struggles? what happens when parties compete for hegemony within movements? how can strategy be formulated, debated and implemented? can movements outsmart their opponents in power and, if so, how? if we're going to change the world, do we really need to take power? movement relevant theory this panel of the conference was envisaged as a place where activists and academics could meet to discuss social movements in contemporary australia. while it is not always a clear distinction 172 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 – who is an activist and who is an academic – in recent years a growing number of theorists have questioned the role played by social movement research within the academy (goodwin and jasper 1999; bevington and dixon 2005; maddison and scalmer 2006), and in part sought to plot a new course to reengage these two spheres of analysis. amongst these academics, there have been two arguments in particular prosecuted about the role of social movement research. firstly, it has been argued that social movement research has a history of being abstracted from the real questions that face social movements and that the research conducted makes only a limited contribution to the networks and movements it analyses (ibid 1999 and 2005). secondly, it has been argued that it is possible to re-imagine social movement research as movement-relevant and movement-engaged through a different methodological approach (ibid 2005). douglas bevington and chris dixon outline in their article ‘movement-relevant theory: rethinking social movement scholarship and activism’ (2005) a new methodological framework that might begin to deal with how we arrived at a disjuncture between social movement research and movement concerns. in effect, they argue for theory that is more ‘ground up’. they propose a new research process, which involves ‘direct engagement with movements in the formulation, production, refinement, and application of the research’ (ibid). rather than seeking some form of constructed ‘distance’ from movements, it is the ‘researcher’s connection to the movement [which] provides important incentives to produce more accurate information, regardless of whether the researcher is studying a favoured movement or its opponents’. it is through such direct engagement that theories can be refined and reflected on. additionally, the research is not simply informed by the movement but accountable to it. while in some aspects this approach may be similar to participatory action research, it differs in that the results and findings are not arrived at ‘together’. while direct engagement with movements is necessary, activists are not co-researchers and do not control the direction of and final product of the research in that way. these authors outline a number of factors in creating movement-relevant research: locating the issues and questions of importance to movement participants; creating a dialogue with movement cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 173 participants; and having research read by movement activists and incorporated into movement strategising. it is through direct contact with movements, and an examination of the debates and dialogue occurring within a particular movement, that key issues and questions can be identified. as has been discussed by social movement researchers like the authors of activist wisdom (maddison and scalmer 2006), it is not only within the academy that social movement theory and analysis takes place. movements themselves perform this task, albeit often in their own language and in terms that might appear idiosyncratic to an ‘outsider’. activist wisdom was a particularly appealing read for social movement activists, as they saw themselves as the active (and respected) subject in a widely distributed publication from a significant academic publishing house. while clearly a sympathetic audience, maddison and scalmer seek to place activists, their skills and political analysis at the centre of social movement thinking in australia. the approach of authors like those of activist wisdom is a breath of fresh air compared with many of their colleagues in the academic world who conduct research without a dialogue with movement participants. with a similar outlook to that suggested by bevington and dixon, maddison and scalmer explore key questions activists confront at this time. this is not to say, however, that the acceptance without critique of the views of activists is the aim or indeed appropriate. a key concern is that by accepting the standpoint of activists without a critical analysis, the framework in which movement participants find themselves may come to colour and skew researchers’ ability to achieve theoretical insights that have relevance beyond the movement’s bounds. indeed, because social movements are by definition partial features of the historical process rather than encompassing the totality of human experience, important insights about the social substrate on which movements develop may be lost if seen only from the prism of participants. how then can someone theorise in a way that both takes into account the viewpoint and needs of the historical players whose activity is shaping the future, and the wider social forces that give rise to and shape the struggles those players are involved in? on the one hand academics are 174 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 being criticised for being distant and disengaged, their work lacking relevance or use to those researched. on the other activists can be, and in my experience often are, prone to seeing only a partial view of a wider political dynamic. it is here that a concept famously outlined by italian marxist philosopher antonio gramsci in his prison notebooks (1971) has particular utility. gramsci argues that for the working class movement to challenge the hegemony of the ruling class there needs to be the creation of a stratum of ‘organic intellectuals’ from within its ranks. these are workers who have a clear conception of the world and the aims of their movement, not just one or the other. he distinguishes this group from the common understanding of intellectuals as abstract thinkers or academics, and instead compares it with the organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie like judges, lawyers, engineers and economists (gramsci 1971; molyneux 1978). while gramsci believes that the recruitment of a layer of non-proletarian intellectuals to the working class movement is an important factor in the struggle for hegemony, this is not the key. rather, it is to develop ‘intellectuals of a new type which arise directly out of the masses, but remain in contact with them to become, as it were, the whalebone in the corset’ (gramsci 1971; quoted in molyneux 1978). he goes on to argue that political parties are the natural expression of this process, the way by which such a stratum coheres itself within the wider movement or class: ‘the political party for some social groups is nothing other than their specific way or elaborating their own category of organic intellectuals directly in the political and philosophical field…’ (gramsci 1971). in gramsci’s view, then, the solution to the problem of how to theorise movement practice without either separation from the movement or reduction to its lowest common denominator is solved through the intertwining of two processes. first, the creation of a layer of activists developing theory but also remaining firmly rooted within the movement. second, their agglomeration in an organisation in which they can discuss and debate ideas in the process of leading movement struggles. contrary to the views of many activists who explicitly reject ideas of party organisation as inherently authoritarian (hardt and negri 2001; sentas 2002; hardt and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 175 negri 2004), gramsci sees such organisation as vital to strengthening the intellectual forces of oppositional movements and classes fighting for liberty. in the current situation, this concept of the organic intellectual is useful as it allows us to appreciate how the development of ideas can occur not only from within movements and from their point of view but also articulating a broader vision not reducible to the movements or their participants. these individuals are ‘of’ the social movement, but also have horizons beyond it. they are able to both fight for the broadest and largest movement possible, but also able to fight for their own political vision within it. the presentations and papers while academics like bevington and dixon suggest a ‘direct engagement’ process for academic work, they do not propose a political or historical framework in which their findings will be analysed. it is here that each social movement researcher or activist must wade in – and this is indeed what each of the conference participants appearing in this section of the journal did. not only did they bring insights about their own activism, but also their views of the world around them and where the movements they are enmeshed in sit within that wider frame. each of the presenters asked the audience to consider that changes were needed to how social movements do their business – how campaigns are run, how movements and networks form and coalesce, and what the role of organised parties and political organisations should be. in assessing these questions our writers here seek to critique the theoretical perspectives and activity they believe are dominant in australian social movements at present. in this way, each of the papers differs by focusing on a particular aspect of this question. each paper was also a call to activists to do better, and to be better. the papers urge activists to involve themselves in social movement planning over the medium and longer term in a more significant way. the keynote address opening the conference was from australian services union secretary sally mcmanus. mcmanus presented to the audience her analysis of the your rights at work 176 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 campaign, arguing that a totalising view of the campaign is necessary in order to understand how the movement built. she urges activists not to seek the key tactic that won the day, almost as if there is a silver bullet, but to understand that each movement has many tactics and strategies that take it forward in particular circumstances. mcmanus noted the ability of the your rights at work national campaign leadership to debate issues intensely, but then agree on a strategy and implement it in a united way. she also wanted to make clear that the movement could not have been successful without the bottom up organising of the local your rights at work groups, and in the spirit of gramsci pointing out that the local organisers were the organic intellectuals that took each group in each town forward in those particular local circumstances. in opening the panel, amanda tattersall looked at a number of local and global movements – from the your rights at work campaign and get up! more locally, to a campaign against walmart in north america. tattersall feels there are three key messages for movement organisers in australia at present. she believes that movement organisations are debilitated and weak, and that they need to be rebuilt. importantly, she argues that there is a particular framework in which this rebuilding needs to occur, in that these organisations must be reconstructed from the bottom up. politically, tattersall argues that an unambiguous moral vision is urgently needed where activists set and fight for clear goals. at the present conjuncture, tattersall believes progressive movements fall too easily into abstraction and propaganda rather than seeing that political argument and movement building are things that work hand in hand. involved in organising the sydney alliance3 , a coalition of community groups, faith organisations and unions that has come together to shape the quality of urban life in sydney, these are the questions that tattersall hopes to address in practice over the next four years. jess whyte stood back from the practicalities of any one campaign or movement, and looked at the question of political organising in a different way. the paper she has provided for this issue traverses the rise of the neo-cons and the fall of the berlin wall in addressing the question of how we arrived ‘here’. she implores activists to ‘rethink the fundamental assumptions of liberalism, and of a political practice centred on progress, sovereignty and right[s]’. in picking up a theme from a previous panel, whyte contemplates whether a focus on ‘rights’ has indeed 3 see ncoss.org.au/projects/enews/downloads/sydney_alliance_article_ncoss.pdf for more information. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 177 limited what we, as activists, believe is possible. she wonders whether in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in new york and washington we are now trapped, as conservatives call for the ‘right to security’ and ‘right to democracy’. like tattersall, whyte demands we do more and be more – but she also articulately demands that we re-imagine what it is we desire and believe is possible; that we, in fact, demand the impossible under capitalism. the final part of our panel was a paper jointly written and delivered by rick kuhn and diane fields, which does not appear in this volume. both kuhn and fields are activists and academics, and their talk and paper argued for a revival of the marxist approach to social movement analysis. they argued the importance of a political party in taking social movement objectives forward. they suggested that the new imaginings of those arguing for network based politics over party based organising, something that was also discussed in the first panel regarding movement ‘vehicles’ for change, are in fact old ideas remade. it is these ideas, they believe, that have repeatedly held back progressive movements in the past. kuhn and fields assert that we must not only assess what is happening now, but that we must appreciate the history of social movement struggle in order to inform activity today. in considering the papers presented in this journal and reflecting on what each of the presenters argued, it is clear that a number of positions and discussions emerge as to how movements develop. for tattersall it is the process of outreach and community strengthening that will allow common political agendas to be forged. for whyte, it is the primacy of articulating a radically transformative politics that constantly points in a direction beyond the limits self imposed by movements for reform. and for mcmanus the key is perhaps the solidarity and unity that can be forged in struggle, in order both tackle individual political questions but also to rebuild solidarity within a broader movement. of course a panel is only one part of a conference session, and written papers only one phase of a journal. after the final panel members had spoken, a lively discussion ensued with old wounds and new dreams both present. it is your turn now. after reading these papers we hope the dialogue we commenced on that day continues with you and amongst your friends and colleagues. the real change that we must achieve will come not simply from the bright ideas 178 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 spoken from the front of a conference room, but from the dialogue and practice that comes out of that. the next step is in your hands as we enter a period analogous to that gramsci was discussing when he stated that: a crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. this exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves ... and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making every effort to cure them (1971, p 178). as certain forces look to cure old ills, others, and in particular social movements, look to remake the world anew along a new path. references bello, w. 2001, '2000: the year of global protest', international socialism journal, vol.2, no. 90, pp. 171-76. bevington, d. and c. dixon 2005, 'movement-relevant theory: rethinking social movement scholarship and activism', social movement studies, vol.4, no. 2, pp. 185-208. burgmann, v. 2003, power, profit and protest: australian social movements and globalisation, crows nest, allen & unwin. callinicos, a. 2003a, an anti-capitalist manifesto, cambridge, polity. callinicos, a. 2003b, 'war under attack', socialist review, april 2003. callinicos, a. 2005, 'anti-war protests do make the difference', socialist worker, london, 1943. cockburn, a. and j. st. clair 2000, 5 days that shook the world, london, verso. goodwin, j. and j. jasper 1999, 'caught in a winding, snarling vine: the structural bias of political process theory', sociological forum, vol.14, no. 1, pp. 27-54. gramsci, a. 1971, selections from the prisons notebooks, london, lawrence and wishart. hardt, m. and a. negri 2001, empire, cambridge, harvard university press. hardt, m. and a. negri 2004, multitude, new york, the penguin press. iveson, k. and s. scamler 2000, 'contesting the 'inevitable': notes on s11', overland, no. 161 pp. 4-13. klein, n. 2000, 'the vision thing', the nation. klein, n. 2001, 'reclaiming the commons', new left review, vol.2, no. 9, pp. 81-89. maddison, s. and s. scalmer 2006, activist wisdom, sydney, university of new south wales press. maksimovic, a. and t. barnes 2002, 'woomera2002', counteraction, vol.1, pp. 28-29. meikle, g. 2003, 'indymedia and the new net news', m/c journal,vol.6, no. 2. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 179 molyneux, j. 1978, marxism and the party, london, pluto press. muir, k. 2008, worth fighting for: inside the your rights at work campaign, sydney, unsw press. sentas, v. 2002, 'the social centre experiment: (or, sketches of a decentralised matrix of liberation!)', counteraction, vol.1, pp. 20-22. stead, v. 2002, 'no one is illegal', counteraction, vol.1, pp.32. world social forum international council 2001, 'world social forum charter of principles, retrieved 4 march 2008, from http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=4&cd_language=2. http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=4&cd_language=2� 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia finding the limits of aid/watch matthew harding university of melbourne abstract commissioner of taxation v aid/watch incorporated is the latest of a series of recent cases in which the high court of australia has exhibited what might be described as a ‘generosity of spirit’ to would-be taxpayers whose charitable status has been called into question. in aid/watch, the court ruled that an organisation formed to monitor and evaluate the delivery of foreign aid by australian government agencies was a charity even though it was engaged, consistently with its objects, in the sorts of political activities that traditionally have been regarded as anathema to charity. this article considers where we might feasibly locate the boundaries of the high court’s reasoning in aid/watch, in light of charity law as a whole. in other words, as a matter of charity law, what are the limits of aid/watch? thinking about this question demands: (a) some understanding of what the high court in aid/watch said with certainty; and (b) a wider review of charity law to see which of its rules and principles may bear upon cases about political purposes now that aid/watch has been decided. introduction charity law is in many ways the centrepiece of civil society regulation in australia. but at the same time as our understanding of civil society has deepened, and the political, social, economic and cultural setting in which civil society activity is undertaken has changed, charity law in australia has remained largely the same as it was in the late nineteenth century. even as significant reform of charity law has been achieved in england and wales, scotland, northern ireland, the republic of ireland and new zealand, the australian legal landscape with respect to charity has been left mostly untouched. much of the blame for this situation must be laid at the feet of successive governments, which for many years have talked about, but failed to achieve, substantive reform of charity law. against this backdrop of longstanding government inaction, recent judicial generosity to charities in australia is worthy of note. in a trio of cases decided over the past few years, the high court of australia has exhibited what might be described as a ‘generosity of spirit’ to would-be taxpayers whose charitable status has been called into question. in central bayside general practice association ltd v commissioner of state revenue,1 1 (2006) 228 clr 168 (‘central bayside’). the court held that a corporation remained a charity notwithstanding that, over time, it had come to be almost wholly reliant on government for its funding. in commissioner of taxation v word cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 35 investments ltd,2 the court confirmed the charitable status of a corporation that operated a business but applied the profits of its business to charitable purposes.3 and in aid/watch v incorporated commissioner of taxation,4 the court ruled that an organisation formed to monitor and evaluate the delivery of foreign aid by australian government agencies was a charity even though it was engaged, consistently with its objects, in the sorts of political activities that traditionally have been regarded as anathema to charity. in each of central bayside, word investments, and aid/watch, the court was asked by a would-be taxpayer to review and relax charity law with an eye to social and economic developments, and in each case the court responded to that challenge by expanding the range of the charitable in australian law. whether or not judicial interventions like those in central bayside, word investments, and aid/watch are to be welcomed depends on the answers to a variety of questions, many of which have little to do with the content of charity law and everything to do with the proper role of courts in a liberal democracy and the appropriate design of the tax and transfer system with considerations such as distributive justice and the provision of public goods in view. for present purposes, such large questions may be put to one side. instead, i take a narrow focus, examining only aid/watch and asking just one question with respect to that case: where might we feasibly locate the boundaries of the high court’s reasoning in aid/watch, in light of charity law as a whole? in other words, as a matter of charity law, what are the limits of aid/watch?5 thinking about this question demands: (a) some understanding of what the high court in aid/watch said with certainty; and (b) a wider review of charity law to see which of its rules and principles may bear upon cases about political purposes now that aid/watch has been decided. aid/watch to begin with, then, what did the high court in aid/watch say with certainty? it seems to me that the court said at least two things with certainty. first, to the extent that there was, prior to aid/watch, a rule in australian law stating that political purposes may not be charitable, 2 (2008) 236 clr 204 (‘word investments’). 3 the federal government has recently announced its intention to introduce legislative amendments to provide clarity in respect of cases like word investments: see commonwealth of australia, budget paper no 2 (budget, 2011-2012) 36, available at http://budget.australia.gov.au/2011-12/content/download/bp2.pdf. 4 [2010] hca 42 (‘aid/watch’). 5 this narrow focus excludes consideration of the constitutional implications of aid/watch, which are discussed by george williams in his contribution to this symposium. 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 that rule was repealed in aid/watch.6 the majority, consisting of french cj, gummow, hayne, crennan and bell jj, put the matter beyond any doubt, stating that ‘[w]hat … this appeal should decide is that in australia there is no general doctrine which excludes from charitable purposes “political objects”’.7 and in her dissenting judgment, even kiefel j rejected the proposition that ‘the political nature of an organisation’s main purpose should mean its outright disqualification from charitable status’.8 only heydon j, who also dissented, refused to express an opinion on the validity of the rule against political purposes in australian law.9 in clearly repealing the rule against political purposes, the high court in aid/watch has put australian law out of alignment with the law of the united kingdom, new zealand and canada, where a rule against political purposes is still recognised.10 the second clear ruling in aid/watch was the narrow ruling that determined the dispute between the commissioner of taxation and aid/watch: according to the majority, ‘the generation by lawful means of public debate … concerning the efficacy of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty’ is a charitable purpose.11 while this purpose did not meet the description of ‘relief of poverty’, ‘advancement of education’ or ‘advancement of religion’, the majority in aid/watch thought that it was nonetheless a purpose ‘beneficial to the community’12 in the sense necessary to bring it within the four-fold taxonomy of types of charitable purpose referred to by lord macnaghten in the celebrated case of commissioners for special purposes of income tax v pemsel.13 6 that there was such a rule in australian law prior to aid/watch appears to be beyond doubt: see royal north shore hospital of sydney v attorney general of new south wales (1938) 60 clr 396 (hca), but note the judgment of santow j in public trustee v attorney-general of new south wales (1997) 42 nswlr 600, recognising qualifications to the rule. in his dissenting judgment, heydon j was not prepared to accept the proposition that generating public debate about poverty relief is a 7 [2010] hca 42, [48]. 8 [2010] hca 42, [69]. 9 [2010] hca 42, [51] and [63]. 10 united kingdom: bowman v secular society ltd [1917] ac 406 (hl); mcgovern v attorney-general [1982] ch 321 (slade j); southwood v attorney-general [2000] wtlr 1199 (ca). new zealand: molloy v commissioner of inland revenue [1981] 1 nzlr 688 (ca); re collier (deceased) [1988] 1 nzlr 81 (hammond j); in re draco foundation (nz) charitable trust hc wellington civ 2010-485-1275, 15 february 2011 (ronald young j); in re greenpeace of new zealand incorporated hc wellington civ 2010-485-829, 6 may 2011 (heath j). note, however, that in this last case, heath j was reluctant to apply the rule against political purposes, stating (at [59]) that ‘[i]n modern times, there is much to be said for the majority judgment in aid/watch.’ canada: re positive action against pornography and minister of national revenue (1988) 49 dlr (4th) 74 (fca); human life international in canada inc v minister of national revenue [1998] 3 fc 202 (fca); vancouver society of immigrant and visible minority women v minister of national revenue [1999] 1 scr 10 (scc); action by christians for the abolition of torture v canada (2002) 225 dlr (4th) 99 (fca). 11 [2010] hca 42, [47]. 12 [2010] hca 42, [47]. 13 [1891] ac 531 (hl) (‘pemsel’), 583. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 37 charitable purpose;14 moreover, as i will discuss below, heydon j took a narrower view than the majority did of what is entailed in generating public debate.15 and kiefel j’s dissenting judgment appeared to equivocate on the question whether or not generating public debate about poverty relief could be charitable in the absence of some element of education.16 but notwithstanding the doubts of the dissenting judges, the majority’s narrow ruling was clearly stated and must now be regarded as part of the law of australia. somewhere between the proposition that there is no longer a rule against political purposes in australian law, and the proposition that generating public debate about the delivery of foreign aid directed at the relief of poverty is charitable, the limits of aid/watch are to be found. it is important that courts in future cases – and now also those charged with introducing the longawaited statutory definition of charity into commonwealth law17 – identify and monitor those limits, so that charities, taxing authorities, and the soon-to-be-created regulator of charities18 may act with confidence as to what the law requires. to a degree, guidance on finding the limits of aid/watch may be found in the judgments of the majority and the dissenters in that case. however, courts that are called upon to determine future cases about political purposes, and legislators required to fashion a statutory definition of charity, may now have to look further than aid/watch, to other rules and principles of charity law, in working out the implications of aid/watch. as i see it, at least two questions may arise for consideration. public debate about governmental activities the first of these questions relates to the narrow proposition that the majority in aid/watch endorsed, which was the proposition that generating public debate about the efficacy of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty is a charitable purpose. the question is this: in light of aid/watch, in what circumstances will generating public debate about governmental activities other than the delivery of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty be a charitable purpose? the judgment of the majority provided some guidance on this matter. recall that in pemsel lord macnaghten referred to a four-fold taxonomy of types of charitable purpose, a 14 at one point in his reasons, heydon j proceeded on the assumption that generating public debate about poverty relief is charitable: [2010] hca 42, [58]. however, he nowhere indicated whether or not he accepted that assumption. 15 [2010] hca 42, [58]-[59]. 16 [2010] hca 42, [69], [73] and [86]. 17 see commonwealth of australia, above n 4, 37, stating the government’s intention to legislate for a statutory definition to take effect from 1 july 2013. 18 see ibid, at 322-323, referring to the establishment of an australian charities and not-for-profits commission from 1 july 2012. 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 taxonomy that sets out what are typically described as the ‘heads’ of charity. these are ‘relief of poverty’, ‘advancement of education’, ‘advancement of religion’ and ‘other purposes beneficial to the community’. in aid/watch, the majority had this to say:19 [t]he generation … of public debate … concerning the efficacy of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty … is a purpose beneficial to the community within the fourth head in pemsel. … it … is unnecessary for this appeal to determine whether the fourth head encompasses the encouragement of public debate respecting activities of government which lie beyond the first three heads (or the balance of the fourth head) identified in pemsel and, if so, the range of these activities. there are several points to make about this passage. first, the majority appeared to accept that generating public debate about governmental activities falling under any of the four heads of charity – ‘relief of poverty’, ‘advancement of education’, ‘advancement of religion’, and ‘other purposes beneficial to the community’ – can be a charitable purpose. this means that entities that seek to contribute to public discussion of governmental activities as diverse as the provision of social welfare, the funding of non-government schools, and state sponsorship of faith-based organisations should feel confident that they are within the realms of the charitable in light of aid/watch. but secondly, the majority expressed caution about endorsing as charitable contributions to public debate about governmental activities that are not themselves charitable within the taxonomy laid out in pemsel. this leads to a third point, which is best expressed as a question. assuming that the caution exhibited by the majority in the passage quoted above is well-founded, how is a distinction to be drawn between governmental activities that are charitable within lord macnaghten’s taxonomy, and governmental activities that are not so charitable? the answer to this question turns, of course, on the scope of the ‘fourth head’ of charity, ‘other purposes beneficial to the community’. the scope of the ‘fourth head’ is famously obscure. on the one hand, there is authority for the proposition that a purpose may be charitable under the ‘fourth head’ only where it is analogous to an established charitable purpose, or even only where it is analogous to a purpose listed in the preamble to the statute of charitable uses of 1601, the fons et origo of modern charity law.20 19 [2010] hca 42, [47]-[48]. on the other hand, many classes of purpose have been recognised as charitable under the ‘fourth head’ even though they have not been analogous to established 20 see scottish burial reform and cremation society v glasgow corporation [1968] ac 138 (hl); royal national agricultural and industrial association v chester (1974) 48 aljr 304 (hca). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 39 charitable purposes: purposes to do with animal welfare are possibly the best-known.21 and to complicate matters further, there is a line of authority that supports the proposition that the purposes of government, whatever their precise character, may constitute such a class.22 this line of authority has not gone unchallenged, and in at least one victorian case a gift to a government department for its general purposes was held not to be charitable.23 however, in my view the question whether or not the purposes of government are always charitable under the ‘fourth head’ is not settled in australian law, and it may arise for consideration in future cases where the limits of the narrow ruling of the majority in aid/watch are tested. a fourth and final point about the narrow ruling of the majority in aid/watch: the caution expressed by the majority, as to whether or not generating public debate about governmental activities is always charitable, might not have been well-founded. in this regard, it is worth noting that the majority clearly did not think that generating public debate about governmental activities is charitable because of any direct or indirect effect it might have on those activities themselves. thus, for the majority, where a charity’s purpose is to agitate for law reform, a court need not concern itself with the merits or otherwise of the law reform in question before determining that the purpose is a charitable one.24 in this aspect of its reasoning, the majority in aid/watch departed both from the traditional rule against political purposes, founded on the notion that it is impossible for a court to determine the public benefit of law reform,25 and from national anti-vivisection society v inland revenue commissioners,26 a political purposes case in which the house of lords did assess the merits of a proposed law reform and made a finding that the public benefit test was not satisfied on the evidence. arguably, courts have in the past invoked the rule against political purposes to avoid having to determine the public benefit of law reform in cases raising controversial social issues.27 21 see, eg, re cranston [1898] 1 ir 431 (ca); in re wedgwood [1915] 1 ch 113 (ca). by finding that the public benefit test may be applied in political purposes 22 i discuss these cases in matthew harding, ‘distinguishing government from charity in australian law’ (2009) 31 sydney law review 559, 563-566. 23 in re cain (dec’d) [1950] vlr 382 (dean j). 24 [2010] hca 42, [45]: ‘a court administering a charitable trust for [the purpose of seeking law reform] is not called upon to adjudicate the merits of any particular course of legislative or executive action or inaction which is the subject of advocacy or disputation.’ 25 bowman v secular society ltd [1917] ac 406, 442 (lord parker of waddington): ‘a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid, not because it is illegal, for every one is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful means a change in the law, but because the court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit’. 26 [1948] ac 31 (hl). 27 molloy v commissioner of inland revenue [1981] 1 nzlr 688 (ca), re positive action against pornography and minister of national revenue (1988) 49 dlr (4th) 74, human life international in canada 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 cases without considering the merits or otherwise of law reform, the majority in aid/watch has ensured that courts may continue to steer clear of such controversy notwithstanding that the rule against political purposes has been repealed. rather than taking the view that generating public debate about governmental activities is charitable because of any effect it might have on those activities, the majority in aid/watch considered that generating public debate about governmental activities is apt to produce public benefit because of its effects on the political culture of liberal democracy in australia. so much was clear from the majority’s discussion of the importance of freedom of political expression to the system of government established under the commonwealth constitution.28 if it is the effects of public debate on political culture, and not on governmental activities, that matter, then it is difficult to see why courts in cases like aid/watch ought to be concerned about the character of the governmental activities that are subject to public debate when determining whether or not generating the public debate in question is a charitable purpose. and this is why, in aid/watch, the majority’s caution about the scope of its narrow ruling might have been misplaced. public debate and public benefit to find the limits of aid/watch, then, it is necessary to consider the possible effects that public debate about governmental activities might have on political culture, which leads to the second question that i think may arise for consideration in the future in light of aid/watch. the second question is this: in what circumstances will generating public debate about governmental activities satisfy the ‘public benefit’ test that is applied to all purposes falling within the ‘fourth head’ of charity as outlined in pemsel? the public benefit test applies differently to purposes falling under the different ‘heads’ of charity. in the case of purposes answering the description of ‘relief of poverty’, benefit to the public as opposed to a private class need not be demonstrated,29 while in the case of purposes under the ‘head’ of ‘advancement of education’, courts do demand evidence that benefit is not confined to a private class.30 inc v minister of national revenue [1998] 3 fc 202 and action by christians for the abolition of torture v canada (2002) 225 dlr (4th) 99 may have been cases of this type. in cases about purposes under the ‘head’ of ‘advancement of religion’, courts usually presume public benefit but sometimes demand that it be established on the 28 [2010] hca 42, [44]-[45]. 29 see, eg, re compton [1945] ch 123 (ca); dingle v turner [1972] ac 601 (hl). 30 oppenheim v tobacco securities trust co ltd [1951] ac 297 (hl). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 41 evidence.31 in the case of purposes under the ‘fourth head’ of charity – and, after aid/watch, we know that the purpose of generating public debate about governmental activities is such a purpose – public benefit must always be demonstrated on the evidence.32 consequently, in future cases where entities argue that they are charitable in law because their purpose is to generate public debate about governmental activities, they will have to satisfy courts, adducing evidence as they go, that the public will benefit as a result of that purpose. at this point, the various possible cases might be sorted into four groups. first, there are cases in which an entity has the purpose of facilitating public debate about governmental activities, perhaps by sponsoring conferences, seminars or meetings at which such debate might be conducted. it is highly likely that an entity with this type of purpose is a charity in light of aid/watch; the view may be attributed fairly to the majority and the two dissenting judges in that case that facilitating public debate about governmental activities is for the public benefit. however, it is worth pointing out that a strong argument can be made that an entity with the purpose of facilitating public debate about governmental activities probably satisfied the legal definition of charity even before aid/watch was decided, because facilitating public debate about governmental activities very likely was not a political purpose according to the pre-aid/watch law, and instead probably amounted to a type of ‘advancement of education’ that satisfied the public benefit test.33 to my mind, this indicates the possibility that the majority in aid/watch thought that the public benefit test can be satisfied by purposes entailing the generation of public debate about governmental activities other than by facilitating such debate. but if i am wrong, and the majority did not think this, then aid/watch may amount to little more than an illustration of the settled proposition that purposes meeting the description of the ‘advancement of education’ are charitable where they have a public character. that the majority in aid/watch did think that the public benefit test may be satisfied by purposes entailing the generation of public debate about governmental activities other than by facilitating it may be seen more clearly by dwelling on a second type of case. this is the case where an entity has the purpose of contributing to public debate on governmental activities, by making and criticising arguments and assertions in the public sphere, with the aim of 31 see the cases discussed in matthew harding, ‘trusts for religious purposes and the question of public benefit’ (2008) 71 modern law review 159. 32 national anti-vivisection society v inland revenue commissioners [1948] ac 31. 33 for the relevant principles, see gino dal pont, law of charity (lexisnexis butterworths, chatswood, 2010) chapter 9. 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 informing, persuading, or even browbeating others. aid/watch was itself an entity with such a purpose: it regarded itself, and was regarded by the high court, as a ‘campaigning’ or ‘activist’ group prosecuting a certain agenda with respect to australia’s foreign aid delivery.34 the court was divided as to the circumstances in which the purpose of contributing to public debate on governmental activities may benefit the public. heydon j did not address the question of public benefit in his dissenting judgment, but his reasons rested in large measure on the conceptual point that an entity cannot ‘generate public debate’ by seeking to impose its view on others, as opposed to contributing to public debate in a discursive way, by inviting or joining a public conversation.35 in light of this conceptual analysis, it is reasonable to attribute to heydon j the view that the public benefit test is met only in circumstances where an entity has the purpose of contributing to public debate in a way that does not entail ‘campaigning’ or ‘activism’. the other dissenter, kiefel j, addressed the question of public benefit squarely: for kiefel j, ‘reaching a conclusion of public benefit may be difficult where the activities of an organisation largely involve the assertion of its views’.36 this does not rule out a finding of public benefit in respect of a purpose of ‘campaigning’ or ‘activism’ about governmental activities, but it certainly expresses considerable scepticism about the possibility of such a finding. in contrast, the majority in aid/watch was prepared to recognise ‘campaigning’ and ‘activism’ about governmental activities as contributions to public debate that are capable of satisfying the public benefit test of charity law. in my view, the majority expressed this quite clearly. the majority referred to the view of dixon j, set out in the earlier case of royal north shore hospital of sydney v attorney-general for new south wales, that ‘when the main purpose of a trust is agitation for legislative or political change, it is difficult for the law to find the necessary tendency to the public welfare’.37 the majority went on to discuss the freedom of political expression that is instrumental to the operation of the system of government established by the commonwealth constitution,38 before making the following statement.39 34 for aid/watch’s view of itself as a ‘campaigning’ organisation, see http://www.aidwatch.org.au 35 [2010] hca 42, [58]-[59]. 36 [2010] hca 42, [69]. 37 (1938) 60 clr 396, 426, quoted at [2010] hca 42, [42]. 38 [2010] hca 42, [44]. 39 [2010] hca 42, [45]. http://www.aidwatch.org.au/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 43 the system of law which applies in australia thus postulates for its operation the very ‘agitation’ for legislative and political changes of which dixon j spoke in royal north shore hospital. … [i]t is the operation of these constitutional processes which contributes to the public welfare. i believe that this part of the majority’s reasoning reveals that the majority clearly accepted that contributions to public debate about governmental activities, answering the description of ‘agitation’, may satisfy the public benefit test. and ‘agitation’ seems to contemplate precisely the ‘campaigning’ and ‘activism’ that so bothered heydon j and kiefel j. when it comes to future cases in which entities have the purpose of contributing to public debate about governmental activities, the limits of aid/watch will ultimately turn on what the judges deciding those cases, and the legislators crafting a statutory definition of charity for commonwealth law, think about the value, in a liberal democracy, of political expression taking the form of ‘campaigning’ or ‘activism’. this question has troubled even political philosophers,40 so there is no reason to think that judges or legislators will find it easy to answer, or that all judges and legislators will answer it in the same way.41 that said, as i noted above there is considerable support in the judgment of the majority in aid/watch for an expansive view of the range of contributions to public debate that might satisfy the public benefit test, even where those contributions are characterised by what heydon j described as ‘rancour and asperity’.42 a third type of case is the case where an entity has the purpose of lobbying government with respect to governmental activities. it is highly unlikely that such a purpose is charitable in law, even in light of aid/watch, because lobbying, as opposed to facilitating or contributing to public debate, is highly unlikely to satisfy the public benefit test. of course, a distinction must be drawn between an entity that has the purpose of lobbying government, and an entity that has a charitable purpose (say, ‘advancement of religion’) and engages in lobbying in a 40 see, eg, ronald dworkin, sovereign virtue: the theory and practice of equality (harvard university press, cambridge ma, 2000) chapter 10, especially the discussion of john stuart mill’s ‘epistemic argument’ at 380381. 41 for discussion of the issue, see: elias clark, ‘the limitation on political activities: a discordant note in the law of charities’ (1960) 46 virginia law review 439; rbm cotterrell, ‘charity and politics’ (1975) 38 modern law review 471; cef rickett, ‘charity and politics’ (1982) 10 new zealand universities law review 168; perri 6 and anita randon, liberty, charity and politics: non-profit law and freedom of speech (dartmouth, aldershot, 1995) especially chapter 8; gfk santow, ‘charity in its political voice – a tinkling cymbal or a sounding brass?’ (1999) 18 australian bar review 225; adam parachin, ‘distinguishing charity and politics: the judicial thinking behind the doctrine of political purposes’ (2008) 45 alberta law review 871. 42 [2010] hca 42, [59]. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 way that is ancillary to that charitable purpose. the latter type of case has never presented a problem, even where the rule against political purposes has been applied, because, as a matter of charity law, charities have always been free to engage in political activities in support of charitable purposes.43 i say, ‘as a matter of charity law’, because there may well be public policy considerations against permitting even such ancillary lobbying, considerations that have to do with maintaining and strengthening democratic institutions and practices.44 however, those considerations, which are not specific to lobbying by charities, are for another day. for the moment, i simply wish to note that in the former type of case – the case where an entity’s primary purpose is lobbying government – it is difficult to see how the public benefit test could be satisfied given that the purpose entails private communications between the entity in question and government. finally, consider a fourth type of case. this is the case where an entity has the purpose of forming or supporting a political party. although the case law reveals that courts have occasionally tolerated such a purpose, the prevailing view has been that party political purposes cannot be charitable.45 this view has probably survived aid/watch, but it is not entirely clear on what basis it might rest now that the rule against political purposes has been repealed. to my mind, there are two possibilities. first, it might be thought that the purpose of forming or supporting a political party does not satisfy the public benefit test, because the aim of a political party is to acquire power through forming or participating in government. this proposition lacks attraction. putting simplistic cynical impressions of party politics to one side, if the most that could be said about political parties in australia were that the aim of such parties is to acquire power, our political system would be sadly broken. surely political parties are formed and maintained for a variety of purposes, including facilitating political expression and participation and contributing to public debate on a range of matters relating to government. arguably, then, in a post-aid/watch world, forming or supporting a political party may satisfy the public benefit test of charity law because it is a purpose that either answers the description of ‘generating public debate about the activities of government’ or is analogous to purposes of that description such that it too satisfies the public benefit test.46 43 mcgovern v attorney-general [1982] ch 321; public trustee v attorney-general of new south wales (1997) 42 nswlr 600. 44 see joo-cheong tham, money and politics: the democracy we can’t afford (unsw press, sydney, 2010). 45 see the excellent discussion in la sheridan, ‘charity versus politics’ (1973) 2 anglo-american law review 47. for the prevailing view, see royal north shore hospital of sydney v attorney general of new south wales (1938) 60 clr 396, 426 (dixon j). 46 see rickett, above n 42, 173: ‘of course political parties are essential to the well-being of society’. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 45 a second possibility is that forming or supporting a political party is not a charitable purpose in australian law even if it yields public benefit, on public policy grounds. i am not sure what those grounds might be: indeed, at a time when encouraging political participation is one of the great challenges that face liberal democratic states, it might be thought that the policy considerations militate in favour of viewing the formation or support of political parties as charitable. but whatever the policy grounds for the persistence of a rule against party politics in charity law, courts in future cases, as well as legislators, may have to grapple with them now that the rule against political purposes has been repealed. interestingly, the status of party political purposes was raised during argument in aid/watch, and some members of the court seemed far from convinced that because of public policy considerations such purposes cannot be charitable.47 however, no trace of this line of thinking survived in the judgments of the court. conclusion the long days of government inaction on the reform of charity law may finally be drawing to a close. firm government commitments have now been made to establish an independent regulator of charities and to introduce a statutory definition of charity into commonwealth law. judicial innovations like those in central bayside, word investments, and aid/watch may no longer be so urgently required to ensure that charity law keeps pace with social and economic developments. but in respect of aid/watch, careful reflection on the implications of the high court’s repeal of the rule against political purposes will still be necessary, if only because the new statutory definition of charity will have to take aid/watch into account. the reasoning of the judges in aid/watch itself, viewed in the setting of charity law as a whole, will be of considerable assistance in finding limits to the recent judicial generosity towards political purposes. but that assistance will not suffice. the limits of aid/watch will be fully revealed only in light of ongoing deliberation on some of the more difficult questions of political philosophy, questions about individual freedom, the common good, and the relationship between citizens and their government in a liberal democratic state. and that is a burden that government bears as it moves towards the implementation of statutory reform of australian charity law. acknowledgements my thanks to joyce chia, fiona martin and ann o’connell for comments on a draft. 47 see [2010] hcatrans 154, 143-203. 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 dealing with difference: building culturally responsive classrooms nina burridge, john buchanan and andrew chodkiewicz abstract australia continues to develop as a multicultural society with levels of immigration increasing significantly in recent years. the current financial turmoil, continuing threats from terrorism and environmental concerns, have all intensified the challenges of dealing with difference in our society. in response, schools continue to face the challenges of the impact of a range of different cultures, languages and religions among their student and school communities. how effectively schools deal with difference and how well they are supported in their endeavours to build culturally responsive classrooms is a perennial issue for policy makers, teachers and teacher educators. a major challenge for teachers in particular, is to at a minimum, understand cultural differences as they manifest in their particular school settings. also to draw on approaches that support student learning in culturally appropriate ways so to assist them to better realise their full potential. in this paper we will consider cultural diversity in the context of current school policies, and highlight a number of frameworks for addressing cultural diversity in the classroom. we draw on the findings from a recent qualitative study of representations of cultural diversity in a number of sydney schools to discuss the need for greater resource and policy support for progressive and innovative teaching approaches that will support the development of inclusive communities. introduction australia continues to develop as a multicultural society, and schools continue to experience to varying degrees, the opportunities and challenges of accommodating a range of different cultures, languages and religions among their student and school communities. this again raises the need to support schools and teachers in their endeavours to acknowledge and address cultural difference in positive ways and to build more culturally responsive classrooms. levels of immigration have increased significantly over recent years as a result of government policies, with 2006-07 the highest year on record. migration has continued to be the main contributor to the growth of australia’s population (abs 2008, p.9). at the same time, australia has emerged from a period of marginalisation of the policies of multiculturalism (jakubowicz 2006), during which time there was a major focus on notions of social cohesion through an emphasis on ‘australian values’. as australia, and indeed the world, has moved into a period of financial turmoil, with continuing threats from terrorism and climate change, the challenges of dealing with difference in schools and classrooms remain key issues for both teachers and educators. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 69 a major challenge continues to be for schools and teachers to, at a minimum, recognise the cultural diversity of our society and in their particular school settings to draw on approaches that support student learning in culturally appropriate ways to assist them to better realise their full potential. it is important to once again focus the efforts of educators to build more culturally responsive classrooms across the many different school and community settings. in part this means continuing to build on the work of teacher educators in australia (kalantzis & cope 1999; noble & poynting 2000) and overseas (banks & mcgee 1993; banks 2003; gorski 2006) who since the 1970s have been seeking to implement more progressive and creative strategies that support the emergence of a more tolerant and inclusive multicultural society. in this paper we will consider cultural diversity in the context of recent school policies, using as a reference point a number of frameworks for addressing cultural diversity in the classroom (kalantzis & cope 1999; hickling-hudson 2003), and draw on a qualitative study of cultural representations in a number of sydney metropolitan schools (burridge & chodkiewicz 2008). cultural diversity and countering racism what do we mean by cultural diversity in educational settings? definitions and approaches are often influenced by context, including history, location, and the nature of the school, its population and teacher commitment to various policies. in terms of policy formulation, identity markers for diversity include factors related to culture, language, religion and access to citizenship. one example of how education policy makers define diversity is the nsw government’s community diversity and community relations policy. it refers to the need for schools to respond to and reflect ‘cultural, linguistic and religious diversity’ (nsw det 2005a). at the same time the policy sees difference in terms of enabling students from a variety of backgrounds to access learning and to become active citizens. this means giving students ‘the opportunity to fully participate, achieve equitable outcomes, and develop skills and knowledge to be active citizens’ (nsw det 2005a). 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 in setting out the principal objectives for schools, the nsw department of education and training (nsw det) policy focused on a number of overall goals, such as promoting community harmony, countering racism and intolerance, and enabling students from all cultures to identify as australians. for teachers it meant ensuring that their teaching practices were more inclusive and that students whose first language wasn’t english were being supported to learn english. at the same time there was also an ongoing focus on countering racism included in the department’s policy framework. this was at a time, as shown by a number of recent australian studies (dunn et al. 2004; dreher 2006; browning & jakubowicz 2004), when the community experienced an increase in racist incidents, following the 2001 new york twin towers attack. the need to address racism within local communities was affirmed in a recent study by forrest and dunn (2007) that demonstrated the way that racist attitudes were concentrated in particular areas, including in some parts of sydney. the distinctive geography of racial intolerance across sydney identified by forrest and dunn suggested that efforts by schools to deal with diversity and counter racism needed to be designed so that they addressed the specific community contexts of intolerance. diversity in new south wales the nature of the diversity of communities in nsw can be seen from 2006 census data (abs, 2007), which presents diversity in terms of country of origin, languages spoken other than english and religion. notably 21% of nsw residents were born overseas, 20% spoke a language other than english at home, and among the fastest growing religions were hinduism, islam, and buddhism. it is also important to note that the cultural, linguistic and religious mix across nsw, and particularly across sydney, is ever changing over time, as new communities arrive and settle. the impact on schools of changing community diversity is also evident. data on the language background of government school students shows that more than one in four, or 26%, of students in government schools in nsw were students from language background other than english (lbote). most of these students were located in only three sydney school regions south western, sydney and western sydney (nsw det 2005, p.5). among the main languages other than english spoken at home by nsw government school students in 2004 were 36,168 (18%) students with chinese; 25, 092 (12.5%) arabic; 11,819 (5.9%) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 71 vietnamese; 11,082 (5.6%) pacific communities (samoan, tongan, fijian); 7,423 (3.7%) tagalog and 6,980 (3.5%) hindi. educating for cultural diversity the importance of teachers educating for cultural diversity and including it as a key part of their work in the classroom was emphasised by noble and poynting (2000) who argued that part of the rationale for multicultural education was about the removal of disadvantage, the recognition of the value of cultural pluralism, the need for social cohesion and the benefit of drawing on the language and cultural resources of immigrants. discourses are also important. allard & santoro (2004) identified three cultural diversity discourses impacting on teachers. one was around the failure of students to achieve, another around the pressures of globalisation and a third arose from the growing mismatch between the backgrounds of teachers and the increasingly diverse student populations they taught. the failure of a significant proportion of students from some cultural backgrounds, together with students from lower socio-economic backgrounds and indigenous students, remain major challenges for educators. a way of addressing these challenges was for teachers to develop better understandings of the ways students in these groups could be more effectively engaged in learning and make sense of new knowledge, without negating the cultural knowledge that they brought to their classrooms (allard & santoro 2004). the pressures of globalisation were also highly influential. as allard and santoro (2004, p.2) stated ‘the need to prepare students to take their place in a world that will be vastly different from that which we know today’ demands of teachers the ability to work productively within increasingly diverse contexts and ‘to recognise different ways of knowing and being’. the teaching profession the teaching profession in australia is overwhelmingly representative of the mainstream community. a comprehensive national survey of over 10,000 teachers in government and non-government schools published in 2001 noted that ‘four out of five teachers reported australia as their country of birth, with another 7.6% united kingdom or ireland… almost ninety percent (89.4%) of the respondents came from english speaking backgrounds’ (ace 2001, p.2). while some changes to the composition of the teaching profession will have 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 occurred since the survey, it is unlikely that that these figures will have altered significantly from that time. if as educators we take these factors and discourses into account it means that teachers should be being better prepared to become professionally skilled in understanding the pedagogy and learning issues related to cultural diversity. a 2005 report by a victorian parliamentary education and training committee included the recommendation that all teachers must be equipped to meet the needs of ‘a diverse student population, of which migrant and refugee young people are an essential part’ (allard 2007). the business council of australia noted in 2003 that cultural cohesiveness was a necessity for australia’s economic future. to achieve this, sufficient resources, adequate training and professional development were required (osler & vincent 2003, p. 47). while educational policies have reinforced the need for teachers to understand and respond to the ways in which a range of factors, including culture and ethnicity, shape the learning experience of their students, the support being provided for their implementation is often limited and fragmented. much of what is being done is short term and reactive to events in the broader community. representations of cultural diversity in schools among the challenges facing educators as allard and santoro (2004, p.7) suggested, was how to ‘rethink our teachereducation curriculum so that we might more actively engage with our students in examining taken-for-granted discourses around difference and identity.’ a starting point continues to be educating teachers about ways of positively engaging with difference in the classroom. this remains crucial, because as has been noted earlier, teachers as a group are drawn from what are largely middle class, anglo-australian backgrounds (allard & santoro 2004, p.4). this prompts the question: if teachers generally reflect the values and beliefs of the dominant class, how well are we preparing our teachers to meet the challenges of cultural diversity in our classrooms? in order to gain some insight into this question we present a brief outline of findings from a research project conducted by two of the authors in 2007 and 2008. these findings provide the evidence for the recommendations noted in the final sections of the paper ways forward. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 73 findings about representations of cultural diversity a study of representations of cultural diversity in schools by burridge and chodkiewicz (2008) cited three case studies that reflected a number of different school and community settings. they ranged from a culturally homogenous or largely monocultural community with a small number of new emerging communities, a monocultural community with a range of many smaller established communities, and a third with a very mixed and culturally diverse community. in researching schools in three different regions in sydney the study found: pockets of the south/eastern suburbs and northern suburbs of sydney, including the northern beaches, present themselves as ‘clusters of whiteness’. there is little focus on multicultural programs both in schools and in the community settings of some of these areas – particularly at the secondary level. young people commented on the insularity of some of the attitudes of members of those communities (burridge & chodkiewicz, 2008, p. 38). the findings, together with haviland (2008), have pointed to a need, especially in largely mono-cultural areas or what have been described as clusters of ‘whiteness’, for cultural diversity to be treated as an important issue for both teachers and students. the study also found that while there were a number of excellent programs in place, generally they were limited and often marginal to what was being taught in the classroom. the study identified a number of different approaches to cultural diversity which could broadly be described as, one, ‘taking a reactive’ approach; two, the ‘showing no interest’ approach; or three, taking an ‘integrative, whole-school’ approach. in one area, where a high school had experienced a critical incident, that event became a major motivator for the school to take action to address cultural diversity. in that case the school reacted after it saw the impact of the cronulla beach riots on its school population. it initiated an inter-school program of cultural exchange as a way of starting to address cultural diversity across the school. the program was seen as an effective way of increasing the level of understanding of other cultures among both students and teachers. it was also a way for students to develop relationships with other students from very different backgrounds to their own. 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 in another area where the high school saw itself and its community as being monocultural, because there were only a few small emerging non english speaking communities, the school did not see a need to address any cultural diversity issues, apart from considering the english language needs of a small number of students. this meant providing esl classes to help students to learn or to improve their english. in the same area a primary school has focused on one of the area’s emerging refugee communities, because some refugee children were starting to enroll at the school. the school reacted positively to the change in its school community and even decided to take on a support role with a number of refugee families. in the third area, which had a highly mixed and culturally diverse community with many recent arrivals, one primary school adopted what could be described as a ‘integrative wholeschool’ approach. the school said that aspects of cultural diversity were being acknowledged across the school, students of all backgrounds were being included and asked to share their culture at school, and the school worked on being welcoming to parents. the study noted that only a small number of cultural diversity programs and activities were being implemented in the schools and most were celebration days or cultural exchanges. celebrations of designated days like harmony day, which provided an opportunity to recognise a range of different cultures at a school, were carried out to varying degrees. in addition, it was only in schools that had a significant number of different cultural communities, that a number of national days were also celebrated. even so, schools reported that they were only able to effectively focus on a few of their largest cultural or linguistic communities. inter-school cultural exchanges were seen as a positive way for students and teachers in a school to directly gain experience of other cultures. for one high school it was clear that unless the exchanges had been initiated by the school, neither students nor teachers were likely to have made contact with or gained any direct experience of those cultures during their years at school. community partnerships, where schools reached out to parents and local community organisations to develop an ongoing relationship, were not evident in the study. there were examples of a number of schools trying to develop better relations with parents in their school community. primary schools were the most likely to invite parents from various cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 75 cultural backgrounds into school and to try to make them feel more welcome. efforts were also being made to communicate more effectively with parents from the largest non-english speaking communities. this was generally done by having documents translated and sending out information about school activities in a newsletter or circular in the main community languages. young muslim voices the study also highlighted the struggles students faced with their identity. in particular since 2001, students from muslim backgrounds reported how they felt they were being forced to struggle between two very different worlds. they said that they had to work through their feelings of having multiple belongings and of feeling that they were being excluded from the mainstream. their comments showed how they were being forced to question their australian-ness as a result of their many negative experiences. girls who wore the hijab said they were being stereotyped and made to feel they were no longer accepted as australians. for others the colour of their skin had become a major issue. ways forward the findings of the burridge and chodkiewicz (2008) study suggested that there were a number of ways to better support efforts by teachers to build more culturally responsive schools and classrooms. these included a re-evaluation by policy makers of the cultural diversity frameworks that currently informed school and community based policies and programs across school education sectors. approaches in capitalising on what has already been achieved by multicultural education programs to date, while seeking to respond to the existing realities of cultural diversity across school communities, it is useful to consider possible frameworks in planning policies and strategies in educating for cultural diversity. one approach that could be used to inform policy makers, as outlined by kalantzis and cope (1999) argued for the need to move towards a more progressive critical approach to cultural diversity, rather than taking an assimilationist or a pluralist approach. they focused on what they saw as the need to ‘transform the mainstream’ by implementing ‘an explicit pedagogy of inclusion and access’ (kalantzis & cope 1999, p. 253). among the general principles they 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 developed were transforming the core culture by developing multilayered allegiances between groups and communities, transforming the mainstream curriculum in response to cultural and linguistic diversity, and the placement of diversity as a core issue within the curriculum (p.273). another approach, developed by anne hickling-hudson (2003, set out to address the contesting discourses of cultural diversity and move beyond just the promotion of contact with other cultures, food and festivals. arguing for the development of an interculturally proactive school, her approach aimed to develop a school where ‘most teachers are constantly active in designing and implementing programs and strategies to promote intercultural understanding and inter-relationships’ (p.2). among the main strategies outlined were liaison between teachers and parents drawn from the different communities at the school, critical socio-cultural studies located within the curriculum, and support and promotion for students to study and learn their home language. with these frameworks in mind, the use of appropriate pedagogical practices in the classroom are needed as a key way to implement change in how schools approach cultural diversity. this implies implementing change at the practical level with in-class strategies, as well as at the theoretical level with professional development activities to ensure that what develops is a deeper understanding of teaching and learning practices in the context of a culturally diverse classroom. educational institutions, including schools and universities, need to engage with the debates about representations of ethno-cultural diversity, nationhood and identity. indeed their contributions can help to shape these discourses. professional educators in schools need to focus their attention on the roles they play in converting the challenges of cultural diversity into opportunities for all children and young people and to see cultural differences as assets not as a deficit in their students or their community. as schools address diversity, at the pedagogical curriculum related level, teachers must be supported to better meet the learning needs of students from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds. these teachers should be professionally skilled to understand the issues related to links between cultural maintenance and educational outcomes – including first language teaching. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 77 the charge of supporting teachers in their roles as leaders and shapers of the discourse in their schools and their communities is a challenging task. this is especially the case for beginning teachers, dealing as they are with putting into practice a multiple set of skills, often under difficult circumstances, in a new school environment. this means there is a need for a renewed program of teacher education about various aspects of cultural diversity. this includes increasing the understanding and awareness of teachers about the new policies and approaches to cultural diversity in schools. most importantly it means underscoring this with real action in schools, so that the policies are not just seen as window dressing. it is important to offer more support for professional development, both at the pre-service teacher level and in schools, and for it to include all teachers, not just to limit the training to language and esl teachers. tackling the curriculum a major challenge is how to achieve meaningful change in the school curriculum. this means addressing what is emphasized and how responsive and reflective of difference the curriculum is. change is needed in both the curriculum content and how it is taught. in researching the strategies and methods of experienced teachers allard and santoro (2004) emphasised the need to find out and communicate what has been found to have worked in classroom settings, and the ways in which teachers could be encouraged and supported to address difference so that they could build more culturally responsive classrooms. while this relates back to the nature of our pre and in-service teacher education, it also points to a lack of conviction by policy makers to move from the rhetoric of policy to actual implementation. one example of this policy rhetoric relates to the introduction of a new curriculum initiative by the former nsw premier morris iemma in 2006. citing ‘a fundamental lack of respect for authority’ as a cause of the cronulla beach riots, he introduced a number of initiatives promoting values education under the respect and responsibility program. respect was defined as ‘having regards for yourself and others, lawful and just authority and diversity within australian society and accepting the right of others to hold different or opposing views’ (bos nsw 2007). the main activities schools were asked to focus on were cultural awareness (meaning that diversity within schools and communities was to be celebrated), inter-school programs, cultural exchange, and community partnerships. from the findings 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 presented by burridge and chodkiewicz (2008) it appears that for many schools the new program has not been translated into a greater concentration of activities on cultural awareness. another important area of need is the provision of more curriculum resources to support culturally responsive teaching practices in schools. although schools have generally been well served with multicultural resources in the past, the findings by burridge and chodkiewicz (2008) pointed to the need for better and more updated resources, including ones that addressed religious diversity. in particular there was an urgent need for more resources to help with developing a better understanding of islam. school events and cultural exchanges celebrating cultural diversity in schools through the staging of an annual event has been a feature of school responses to multiculturalism over many years. the annual carnivale day celebration were a major focus and more recently harmony day has provided at least one day in the school year to focus on and celebrate cultural difference. these celebrations are positive expressions of diversity, at least at a symbolic level. in many schools they often affirm a school’s approach, where cultural diversity is seen and treated as separate to the school’s identity, rather than being something that is an integral part of a school’s learning. at the same time celebrations can often provide children and parents from migrant backgrounds their only opportunity over a year to celebrate their heritage, language and culture and get actively involved in their school. organising awareness programs or cultural exchanges have been seen as effective ways for schools to provide students with opportunities to meet and interact with fellow students from other cultures. some schools have been also linking up with other schools internationally by using various web and communication technologies. it is important to remember that staff face many competing pressures in any school day. issues of cultural diversity often compete for attention with other social and learning issues. as we suggest school events and cultural exchanges are often viewed as of marginal interest cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 79 to the operation of a school, and there is a need to find ways to link these activities back into particular key curriculum and learning areas. counter-racism strategies for teachers the importance of effective counter-racism teaching and learning strategies in both preservice and in-service contexts can scarcely be overstated. given the demographic profile of teachers, teacher education institutions could also be considered as examples of ‘clusters of whiteness’ as referred to earlier by burridge and chodkiewicz (2008, p. 38). this can contribute to what sunstein (2007, p. 273) identified as ‘ideological amplification’, where people with similar views tend to associate, mutually echoing and thereby amplifying and normalising, rather than interrogating, their presumptions about social and cultural propriety. the phenomenon operates in both the real and virtual worlds. this circumstance ‘only adds to the imperative for programmes that promote sustained and transformative white engagement with anti-racist pedagogies’ (haviland, 2008: 51, emphasis added). this situation may be further complicated by the fact that teachers are quite likely to be deployed initially to difficult-to-staff schools (allard & santoro, 2004). these schools are often characterised by student populations that are ethnically and socioeconomically quite different to the background of the teacher. as we mentioned above according to the australian college of education survey, 88 % of teachers identified australia, the united kingdom or ireland as their country of birth, with about nine in every ten being from english speaking backgrounds (ace 2001, p.2). given that catholic and independent schools are characterised by greater ethnic and linguistic diversity, the numbers of non-english speaking teachers in the state system is likely to be even lower. this stands in stark contrast to the ethnic and linguistic profile of diversity we outlined across nsw schools, and in particular, of the diversity of many of the schools where these teachers will begin their careers. school – community links developing links with key local community organisations also continues to be a challenge for many schools. schools at both primary and secondary levels need to recognise the value of seeing learning in a broader, more culturally inclusive way that includes their wider community. it means devoting more time and staff resources to reach out and involve parents, groups and associations from the wider community. 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 this is one area where government support could extend school involvement through the provision of dedicated funding to support the development of partnerships or through targeted community grants programs. providing grants for schools and communities to organise activities that bring young people together from different cultural backgrounds can further help to bridge the cultural divide. school involvement with the philanthropy sector, by approaches to foundations and other non-profit funds, is another avenue for schools to access community grants to support their work with cultural diversity. conclusion it is important to acknowledge that there continue to be strongly contested views about how to approach cultural diversity within schools and classrooms. few studies appear to have been conducted to date on the related strategies adopted by teacher education institutions, and on their outcomes and effectiveness. the environment for the beginning teacher may be quite ‘foreign’ in a number of respects, for new teachers, it may be the first time that they have had the experience of being, in a local context, part of a cultural minority. allard and santoro (2004, p. 17) pointed to the need for more research into the ways teachers could be supported in developing their own insights into diversity and difference. they emphasised that teachers had to be supported in enabling students to explore and challenge many taken for granted ‘truths’ about cultural difference. one way of refocusing and building on what has been achieved in multicultural education is to move towards more critical, culturally responsive, progressive approaches to cultural diversity in schools. this implies a redirection of energy and thought towards a genuine commitment by policy makers and teachers to multicultural education. this requires teachers and policy makers to challenge prevailing views that have dominated our public discourse over recent years which see diversity as being a threat to community harmony and national unity. supporting a more progressive approach means that policy makers, teacher education institutions, schools and teachers place a greater emphasis on: • reflecting and representing the existing cultural, linguistic and religious diversity in schools and engaging in community debates about cultural diversity; cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 81 • developing culturally responsive curriculum ideas and strategies that reflect australia’s new migration trends: • ensuring there is a major focus on linking activities to the curriculum so that programs are embedded into mainstream subjects; • engaging in the application of innovative web based interactive technologies to curriculum strategies that can be used to link global communities; • providing more opportunities for students from lbote to draw on their cultural backgrounds as part of their school curriculum and school learning activities; • providing opportunities for students to discuss issues of belonging and identity; and • building relationships with their local communities including parents, cultural community associations and other key local organisations. in particular the relationships between schools and their local community should have more depth and involve more than just having guest speakers or celebrations on special days, such as harmony day. they should be built on real connections that involve parents, local cultural groups, the local council, as well as the local business community. in this sense the school should become a central point of connection with the community, one that helps to better cement the social fabric of the community. there are good reasons to be optimistic about these efforts, because as marginson notes: regardless of the homogenising intentions of governments and the techniques of official programs, it is a safe bet that migrants will increasingly pluralise multiculturalism and multicultural 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[online] white paper. edchange publications. haviland, v. 2008, ‘“things get glossed over”: rearticulating the silencing power of whiteness in education’ journal of teacher education, vol. 59, no. 1, pp.40-54. hickling-hudson, a. 2003, ‘towards the interculturally proactive school’, [online] curriculum leadership, january, pp.1-9. http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/school_education/publications_resources/other_publications/teachers_in_australian_schools.htm� http://www.dest.gov.au/sectors/school_education/publications_resources/other_publications/teachers_in_australian_schools.htm� http://www.aare.edu.au/04pap/all04561.pdf� http://www.boardofstudies.nsw.edu.au/respect/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 83 jakubowicz, a. 2006, ‘anglo-multiculturalism: contradictions in the politics of cultural diversity as risk’[online] international journal of media and cultural politics, vol. 2, no. 3. kalantzis, m. and cope, b. 1999, multicultural education: transforming the mainstream, in s. may (ed) critical multiculturalism: rethinking multiculturalism and anti-racism education. falmer press, london, pp.245-276. mansouri, f. and trembath, a. 2005, ‘multicultural education and racism: the case for arabaustralian students in contemporary australia’, international education journal, vol. 6, no. 4, pp.516-529. marginson, s. 2004, ‘they still call australia home: migration language and education in australia’, paper at the multicultural futures conference, 22 -23 september, monash university, melbourne. martin, j., tett, l. and kay, h. 1999, ‘developing collaborative partnerships: limits and possibilities for schools, parents and community education’, international studies in sociology of education, vol. 9, no. 1, pp.59-75. noble, g. and poynting, s. 2000, multicultural education and intercultural understanding: ethnicity, culture and schooling, in s. dinham and c. scott (eds) teaching in context, australian council for educational research, camberwell, vic., pp.56-81. nsw department of education and training 2005, statistical bulletin: schools and students in new south wales, 2004, planning and innovation, department of education & training, sydney: nsw. nsw department of education and training 2005a, cultural diversity and community relations policy: multicultural education in schools, [online] nsw department of education & training, sydney. https://www.det.nsw.edu.au/policies/student_serv/equity/comm_rela/pd20050234.shtml osler, a. and vincent, k. 2003, girls and exclusion: rethinking the agenda, routledge falmer, london. sunstein, c. 2007, ‘ideological amplification’, constellations: an international journal of critical and democratic theory, vol. 14, no. 2, pp.273-279. https://www.det.nsw.edu.au/policies/student_serv/equity/comm_rela/pd20050234.shtml� 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 the 2rs – respect and responsibility: the case of australian muslim girls nahid afrose kabir abstract the citizenship debate involves respect and responsibility, and these can be achieved through collective action. though many members of disadvantaged groups sympathise with the goals of social movements fighting injustice against their in-group (own community) or out-group (wider society) often only a small percentage of them actually participate in collective activities staged to realise these goals (louis 2009; sturmer and simon 2009). in this paper i discuss the case of australian muslims girls who in their home environment respect the family values and carry out certain responsibilities assigned to them. by family values, i mean respect for elders, performing religious duties, for example, offering prayers, and fasting during the month of ramadan, helping mother in the kitchen and looking after their siblings. in the wider society, muslim girls attend schools, do part-time jobs and obey australian values of fair-go, tolerance and multiculturalism ceremoniously (see kabir 2008). however, i question in this paper, whether their family and the wider society are working collectively to fulfil their responsibility towards these girls. i discuss the interview responses of 39 muslim girls (15-18 years) living in sydney and perth. i examine pertinent cases within the framework of relevant academic literature, and argue within the social, religious and cultural context. the issues within the family domain are inter-twined within islamic religious-cultural arguments, whereas the issues in the public domain are argued on cultural conflict between the muslims and the wider society. with both arguments i show how some muslim girls negotiate their identity, and suggest their bicultural identity is assisting them to keep a positive attitude in their everyday life. finally, i advocate that collective action from both the muslim and the wider community is vital for the well-being of these girls. introduction individuals, families, and communities must take collective responsibility for their own well-being. children are expected to respect the values of their families, schools, and wider community, and parents are responsible for ensuring that their children attend schools and are supported in their learning. in the broader context, citizens are expected to support each other irrespective of their ethnic background and religion. my research on muslims in australia since late 1998 shows that in general muslims and non-muslims have respected each other. in this paper i discuss certain gender issues pertaining to both muslims and the wider community, which is gender specific. i observe that if we address the issues collectively as one australian community more respect and responsibility can cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 53 be achieved. i have framed the paper within the context of private and public domains. by private domain, i mean that there are certain issues that young women face within their cultural and religious boundaries, while public domain is more specific to the wider society that addresses majority-minority relations. in the next sections, first, i examine some literature relevant to this paper. second, i outline the research methodology. third, i discuss certain cultural restrictions in the private domain. fourth, i consider the societal resistance in the public domain. finally, in the conclusion, i put forward some suggestions on our collective responsibility. literature review there is a burgeoning literature on this topic, however, i am discussing that literature (and media discussions) that has specifically pointed out muslim women’s dilemma both in private and public domain. for example, in a canadian study, khan identifies two factors – family and community pressures ─ that muslim women have to deal with in the private domain. muslim women usually live in extended families, where all children respect their elders, and where women live under the unquestioning authority of their religion (khan 2002: 14-15). muslim women are also expected to adhere to male community leadership. khan points out some women do resist sexism and male domination; at the same time they are aware that their resistance could strain or damage their relationships with families and communities, leaving them vulnerable in a society where they face not only sexism but also racism (khan 2002: 14-15). khan (2002: 14-15) observes that although frequently the structure of a canadian muslim family is patriarchal and conservative, community spaces are important, for they tend to replicate and replace the kinship networks many immigrants have left behind. some male and female members uphold conservative ideals of a religious patriarchal community. yet for other women, the communities have become prisons where the security of these communities blocks opportunities available in the larger society, such as education, employment and more freedom. however, if women move toward those perceived freedoms, there is a price to pay: they often face exclusion from their communities as well as discrimination from the mainstream. in other words, if they stay within their 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 communities, they endure increasingly less control over their mobility and sexuality. although the muslim communities in western nations are diverse racially and culturally, the heterogeneous and, at times, contradictory voices get subsumed under the rubric “the muslim community” (khan 2002: 19). in the british case, in the private domain tomlinson (1984: 28) finds that the majority of pakistani and bangladeshi settlers in britain are muslims, and conflicts between the muslims and mainstream british do arise. arguably this is more so in 2008, with a worldwide resurgence of islamic traditions challenging western secular values. tomlinson (1984: 28) points out that the major points of conflict concern the education of girls, the place of women in society, and the ways muslim girls are expected to behave. the issue of arranged marriages, particularly, has provoked anxiety and often criticisms from nonmuslims. in the australian context, bouma and grace-govan (2000: 163) note that some newlyarrived migrant muslim women felt the impact of immigration quite keenly. while men had to go out and learn enough english to get jobs, “some women, felt isolated, unable to deal with the strange language and strange ways of australia”. the lack of language and friends left them confused, frightened to go out in public and feeling disorientated. on the other hand, yasmeen (2002) observes that migrant muslim women with good english skills and professional experience, who occupied senior managerial positions in their countries of origin, often have found it difficult to secure equivalent jobs in australia. their overseas experience was not recognised by the australian labour market. both muslim men and women have either resigned themselves to living on the stipend provided by the social security system or opted for jobs that are unrelated to their professional qualifications. the ensuing frustration has obviously created economic problems and sometimes domestic violence in the family, where women suffer the most. also in the australian context, northcote et al. (2006) examined 38 refugee women of iraqi, afghan and sudanese backgrounds in perth, and conclude that both internal ‘ethnic’ factors (cultural restrictions, domestic violence) and external societal factors (discrimination, racism) are jointly involved in perpetuating a cycle of isolation for cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 55 muslim refugee women. moreover, in the private domain, joumanah el matrah, the manager of the islamic women’s welfare council of victoria notes that though some women remain victims of sexual violence in muslim communities, they keep silent. el matrah states (abc 2005): i think it’s politically dangerous in the sense that one always risks the possibility of being completely alienated from the community, and having one’s political power undermined. is it dangerous in a physical way? i’m not sure yet. we haven’t had any examples of that at all, but there are plenty of examples where women have been isolated from the general community of community leaders, if you like. that strategy is still used by muslim men. similarly, in the public domain el matrah (abc 2008) observes that some muslim women faced racism but the wider society was slow to respond to their call: ....women have talked about ringing the police for assistance when they've been assaulted, and the police haven't shown up, and clearly the police should have shown up. and i'm not entirely sure we can do anything about it, other than improve community awareness and keep doing anti-racism work and those sorts of strategies, because it's not reasonable, and indeed many muslim women don't have the view that the police should come and hunt down that sort of perpetrator. but it does nonetheless leave them to kind of deal with those assaults on their own. various studies in western democratic countries (haddad et al. 2006; poynting and mason 2006; kabir 2007a; human rights and equal opportunity commission, 2004; 2008) suggest that the needs and concerns of muslim migrants have become more acute than other migrants, particularly since 2001 when extremist militant muslims have embarked on acts of terrorism and evoked widespread xenophobia in western societies. respect for muslim women and the collective responsibility of the communities towards these women is the theme of this paper. therefore, it is important that muslim women needs are addressed through a collective effort, both by the muslim and the wider community. 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 the research methodology the data for this study comprise responses from in-depth, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews of 39 muslim female students (15-18 years old) of diverse backgrounds who attended two schools in sydney and one school in perth in the period 2006-2007. the participants were: 10 australian-born girls and 15 overseas-born girls in sydney; 2 australian-born girls and 12 overseas-born girls in perth. i asked the participants about their lives, including early school memories, family members, parents’ work status, students’ part-time work, sporting activities, music, entertainment and cultural interests, together with their hopes, ambitions and dreams. there were 30 questions relating to their life story. for example, i asked them about their early memory of school, and the best memories of school. what were their hobbies? how they used their leisure time? did they watch sports? and were they fond of music? i asked them if music contributed positively to youth development. i also asked them if they had friends and whether they had boyfriends. i asked them about their cultural and religious celebrations, and how they would define their identity/national identity or their sense of belonging. there were questions such as what was meant by “an australian” and “un-australian”. i also asked whether as muslims they experienced any challenges since 9/11 and the 7/7 london tragedy. if so, could they give any example. finally, i asked them about their hopes and dreams and how would they contribute to the society. i have employed the grounded theory method (glaser and strauss 1967). grounded theory is a type of qualitative method. it is a non-statistical method which describes a methodological approach that is about “letting the data speak” and not imposing preformed hypotheses. the goal of this research was to gain a better understanding of the participants through their life stories, their hopes and aspirations. most importantly, it was designed to allow respondents to speak issues important to them. i have employed the constructivist method of interpretation (charmaz 2006). constructivism is defined as an educational approach that emphasises the researcher’s unique ability to make their own meaning out of information (interviews). so through the participants’ interviews, i have contextualised their need, concerns, stress, identity, hopes and aspirations. i then cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 57 tried to access the roles and responsibility of the community as a whole toward these young women. table 1 below shows the pattern of the students’ daily lives. it shows all participants both overseas and australian-born students in sydney and perth enjoyed music, sports, and their traditional cultural and religious celebrations. only 5 girls (2 australian-born and 3 overseas-born) in sydney had a part-time job. in perth, only 1 australian-born girl had a part-time job. having a boyfriend was considered a “taboo” by the participants. however, 4 sydney girls (2 australian-born and 2 overseas-born) confessed that they had boyfriends, while 2 girls (1 australia-born and 1 overseas-born) girls in perth spoke of their boyfriends. on the topic of racism, all girls believed that visible muslim women who wore the hijab were vulnerable to racism, while 2 girls in sydney and 1 in perth encountered racism. it was encouraging to see all participants were hopeful of their future in australia. table 1: summary of responses questions responses responses responses responses brief life stories 10 australianborn sydney girls 2 australianborn perth girls 15 overseas-born sydney girls 12 overseas-born perth girls practice of religion, culture and tradition. ramadan and eid celebrations & traditional celebration & music ramadan and eid celebrations & traditional celebration & music ramadan and eid celebrations & traditional celebration & music ramadan and eid celebrations & traditional celebration & music opposite sex friends not allowed to have opposite sex friends. 2 girls have boyfriends not allowed to have opposite sex friends. 1 girl has a boyfriend. not allowed to have opposite sex friends. 2 girls have boyfriends. not allowed to have opposite sex friends. 1 girl has a boyfriend. work/parttime job 1 worked in dad’s shop, 1 worked at department store 1 girl worked in a restaurant 1 girl worked in a restaurant, 1 in customer service.1 worked at the hair dresser none 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 music rap, hip hop, james blunt, west life, heavy metal, rock matchbox 20 r & b, shakira, mariah carey, delta goodrem, backstreet boys chris brown, nelly furtado, james blunt, r&b, pop, sports soccer, running, basket ball soccer and basket ball badminton, volley ball volley ball racism all said that the hijab women are vulnerable to vilification all participants were critical of unbalanced media reporting all said that the hijab women are vulnerable to vilification all participants were critical of unbalanced media reporting all said that the hijab women are vulnerable to vilification. 2 girls who wear hijab encountered racism all participants were critical of unbalanced media reporting all said that the hijab women are vulnerable to vilification. 1 girl encountered hijab discrimination all participants were critical of unbalanced media reporting hopes and aspirations doctor, chef, forensic scientist, journalist, history teacher, computer work, hairdressing, child care, uni teacher nurse, cartoonist, interior decorator hair dresser, interior decorator, multimedia developer, accounting, business, engineering, modelling, lawyer fashion designer, pharmacist, health sciences, medicine, lawyer in the next section, i discuss the participants’ experience in their private domain. i examine their cultural values, and some of the constraints faced by them. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 59 private domain: cultural values in the american context, haddad et al. (2006:14) state that a primary challenge facing muslim women and their families is that of raising children. irrespective of the patriarchal society, both mother and father have the same concern of raising their children in the islamic way. they struggle with issues such as keeping their children insulated from what the parents perceive to be dangerous western secular values; at the same time they acknowledge their children’s citizenship in the west and want to prepare them to be able to live their lives in a western culture. in germany (blaschke and sabanovic 2004: 59) a survey shows that generally muslim women accept the following rules: women are not allowed to break up a marriage; pre-marital sex is prohibited; the females should be covered down to the ankles and a headscarf should cover their hair; and women should avoid engaging in the public realm of life. in this study, all participants understood their family expectations and respected their family values. of the 25 sydney girls, two girls’ parents were divorced, 12 fathers were unemployed, one father was deceased, and the other 12 fathers had blue-collared jobs; but only one mother was employed. of the 14 perth participants, three parents were divorced, three fathers had white-collared jobs, four fathers had blue-collared jobs and the other 7 fathers were unemployed; here two mothers were employed. some parents also had ill-health. the newly arrived overseas-born refugee girls in both locations appeared to be engaged more with home duties, for example, cooking, washing, ironing, looking after their siblings, and one was a bread winner as her both parents were ill. these girls were also struggling in the schools to achieve well with their relatively limited english skills. as one girl commented, “new people, new language, new studying stuff...i have science which i haven’t studied for 3 years, and my mum she expects me to become first in everything”. from my research work i have noticed that the general expectation of home duties from daughters is common among the new arrivals. however, sometimes, the old immigrants, particularly from the working class prefer to keep their daughters occupied in home duties so that after their marriage they could give a good name to their family. and the 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 pressure from parents that their children achieve high in school is generally common in the asian families (both muslim and non-muslims). for this study, when we discussed cultural values and traditions, all participants said that they observed the month of fasting (ramadan), enjoyed muslim religious festivals, eid ul fitr and eid ul azha and their traditional cultural celebrations, especially weddings. as discussed earlier, the topic of boyfriend is considered a “taboo” in the muslim families. since my research was on young australian muslim identity, i had to ask question on friends/friendship/boyfriends which is a part of youth culture. with the exception of six girls, all abided by their family expectation that having a boyfriend was unacceptable. as a somalian-born girl, sufia commented: no, that’s haram (forbidden in islam). you’re not allowed to have boyfriends. and again why do you want to have a boyfriend? you know we have to study to get to university and after you become something you can think of you know, having someone, but not now. an australian-born student of syrian origin mehjabeen said: actually, it’s not actually a boyfriend, but i told my mum that i like this person, and he likes me as well, and he will come and ask for my hand or engagement so she agrees, but as for going out with him without engagement or anything, it’s not in our culture. a couple of girls said that they had boyfriends but they were secretive about it because it was not permitted by the parents. an australian girl of lebanese background, safa, said about her family’s reaction if she had a boyfriend: my friends have boyfriends. they know it’s wrong and acknowledged that it’s wrong but i think it’s part of today’s society. people are easily influenced. however, i don’t have a boyfriend. i’d be out living on the street i think! i wouldn’t have parents; they’d disown me! an australian-born muslim student, rabia, commented about her religion and the need to be secretive when it comes to non-muslim boyfriends: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 61 well i’m muslim, but only by name, i mean by blood, or name, whatever… it’s confusing. yeah but (boyfriends), it’s still against my religion. you’re maybe meant to look at it in an indirect direction. like i talk to them (muslim boys) and go out with them, it’s really bad. my parents know, but my older brothers took it harsh, like really bad. they don’t know all my movements! very tough time, but i rarely get caught. a pakistan-born girl, bilkis, said that she can’t marry the boy she loves even though he is a pakistani muslim but he belongs to a different caste. she fears: i am from the jat caste and my boyfriend is from the rajput caste. my father would get angry. if i have any relation with any guys he won’t like it; i think because of the culture. my father wants me to marry his nephew instead and wants to bring him to sydney. in the british context, jacobson (1998) finds some pakistani muslims are keen to arrange the marriage of their children with their cousins. otherwise, the marriage within the caste remains a priority. however, marrying a cousin is not exclusively a pakistani practice. it is prevalent among other muslim ethnic groups, but it is not widely practiced. in australia (harris 2005, p.1), official reports have confirmed that a dozen girls, all aged under 18, have approached the australian embassy in beirut for help. they had been sent against their wishes to lebanon. a 14 year-old australian girl said that she was promised a holiday in lebanon by her father, but was forced to marry an older man who imprisoned her in his home (harris 2005, p.1). the victorian arabic social services manager in melbourne, leila alloush, says many arranged marriages, especially among older couples, are loving and successful. but if they break down, the suffering can extend beyond the couple in question. families on both sides, often friends beforehand, are torn apart in communities that frown on divorce (harris 2005, p.1). thus, within the concept of 2rs (respect and responsibility), some muslim girls tend to override the expectations of not having a boyfriend. on the other hand, some parents ignore the complication of forced marriages and the fact that excessive home duties would be detrimental to the children’s progress in schools. 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 public domain: societal resistance almost all the 39 students in this study said that the world has changed for the muslims since september 11, 2001. some girls who do not look visibly different from mainstream australians (that is who do not wear hijabs) said they personally did not encounter any vilification from the wider society but their friends and relatives who wear the hijabs have been vilified in their presence. an australian girl of lebanese background, safa, commented: there has been an instance, i can’t recall with my family, but i remember my friend, she comes to this school, she wears the hijab (headscarf), she said...well she’s walking past i think, someone that was drinking beer, and he swore at her and chucked a bottle of beer at her! a pakistani-born girl, nargis, thought that the hijab was a barrier to obtaining work: i had an interview at a fast food shop in sydney and like me and the other girl, and she wasn’t wearing scarf, and they just gave her job. maybe, i don’t know, but i felt they didn’t give me maybe because of scarf. but i think for the job or for the money, i’m not going to take off my scarf. a muslim girl of bangladeshi origin, shoma, said: i had an interview at a fast food shop in perth. i was asked if i would take off my hijab at work. my answer was “no”. so i did not get the job. i also gave a job interview for a position at a departmental store. i did not get a job. these jobs do not need any special skills. still i did not get the job. this is very stressful. shoma thought the lack of balanced journalistic reporting is creating such tension in the society: i find that a lot of the things that i come across on tv, or on a newspaper, they are not only negative, but they do in a way contribute to the negativity that some muslims face in the community. one of the biggest challenges cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 63 they face today is to take it as a responsibility in fair reporting in the media. and most of the times it’s very important to be careful of what sort of image we are broadcasting to the public because at the end of the day they do have a very big impact on the public....what we need to realise, especially journalists when they are reporting, that as australians our differences are not there to divide us, they’re there to make our society and our community a stronger one. australia has experienced an upsurge of racially and culturally based attacks on visible muslims, particularly women who wear the hijab. a survey of 186 arab and muslim australians in sydney and melbourne conducted in 2003 recorded that 87 per cent of muslim respondents had experienced racism, abuse or racist violence since 9/11, with three-quarters stating that they have experienced “a bit more” than prior to 9/11 and 37 per cent “a lot more”. after 9/11, the report ismaع (hreoc 2004) found that people identifiable as arab or muslim by their dress, language, name or appearance were abused, threatened, spatted on, attacked with eggs, bottles, cans and rocks, punched and bitten. drivers were run off the road and pedestrians were run down on footpaths and in car parks. people reported being fired from their jobs or refused employment or promotion because of their race or religion. children were bullied in school yards. women have been assaulted in shopping centres. private homes, places of worship and schools were vandalised and burnt. muslim and arab-australians were labeled as “terrorist” “dirty arab” “bloody muslim” “bin-laden”, and “illegal immigrant”(see human rights and equal opportunity commission 2004,p. iii; poynting and mason: 2006, pp.365-391, see also kabir 2005; kabir 2007a; kabir 2007b). hijab has been unacceptable to some members of the wider community, but the niqab (face veil) is rejected by most members of the wider community. in perth, a muslim mother of six children who wore a niqab was repeatedly punched and slapped while her young children slept nearby when several men crashed through the front door of her house. the men could not be charged under the new racial hate laws because the attack happened in a home, not a public place (lampathakis 2005, p. 7). apparently, the woman has now abandoned her niqab. 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 in the job market, many australian-born muslim women are disadvantaged. in 2006, 12.1 per cent australian-born muslim women were unemployed compared to 4.2 per cent of their christian female counterparts (abs). it is not known whether muslim women prefer home duties, or whether their visibility (islamic attire) or muslim names are barriers to employment. in this study, out of 39 mothers, only three were employed. in another publication (kabir 2007b), i found that most muslim women were home makers. conclusion a report on muslim women in australia (hreoc 2008) found that the generation gap between young people and their parents has been widened due to external factors. the younger generation often internalise their feelings of resentment at the wider society’s treatment towards their mothers and sisters. consequently, these young muslims find it difficult to help their mothers cope. also the mothers try to protect their daughters from vilification of the wider society and therefore, impose more restrictions on their daughters’ movement. on some instances, parents ask their sons to be protective of their daughters when they go out. this over-protectiveness could lead to increasing passivity in women who appeared increasingly as the “other” both in the private and public domain. this then creates tensions between mothers and daughters (hreoc 2008, p. 20). in this study, of the 39 muslim participants, some are newly arrived refugees who are still coping with adjusting to the new environment, home duties and english skills. the islamic values of not having opposite sex friends or relationships are accepted by most of the participants. the experience of racism and unbalanced media reporting were expressed by all students (see table 1; also see shoma’s interview). these youth are in a period of transition to adulthood, which is influenced by social, cultural and economic surroundings. in the case of australian muslims, youth are influenced by ethnic, islamic and western surroundings. economically, most of these students belonged to the blue-collar group. with the exception of three women, all the participants’ mothers were housewives, and some fathers were unemployed. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 65 a common characteristic of the muslim girls was that they maintained a bicultural identity (table 1). they defined themselves as lebanese-australians, or bangladeshiaustralians or muslim-australians. but they were mostly fond of western music. for example, they listened to r&b, tupac, mariah carey, usher, west life, missy higgins and delta goodrem. some read books by authors such as james patterson. some loved their school studies. only one student was involved in debating and a few loved sports in school. a few students who worked in mainstream stores or shops appeared to have integrated well into the wider society and were confident in both cultures. therefore, in spite of the concerns of home, school and society, the participants spoke about their connections to music, reading, sports, debate and work. perhaps, through these connecting factors they are in the process of negotiating a balance within their cultural identity and family expectations. by upholding the views of the participants of this study i aimed to emphasise collective action. as discussed, young muslim girls encountered stress both in the private and public domain. newly arrived migrant girls appeared to have more duties at home, and more expectations from parents and schools for high achievement. therefore, it should be the responsibility of the school staff members and youth workers to be aware of the cultural circumstances of muslim girls. they need to boost the students’ confidence by improving their communication skills. a youth forum hosted by muslim female youth workers would unveil some of the issues the muslim students are confronting. there needs to be more dialogue within the muslim community addressing issues such as forced marriages. there should more conversation between the parents and children, particularly mother and daughters to avoid hostility in the family. australia has brought in tough laws that could see people who traffic in young girls overseas for forced marriages jailed for up to 25 years (mercer 2005). however, there is also a need for some tough state and federal religious vilification laws to provide protection for muslim women who wear hijabs. muslim families should encourage higher education for women. muslim female social workers should work at the grass root levels to reach the diasporic community. the high unemployment of the australian 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 muslim girls should also be addressed by both the muslim community and the wider community. if a woman wants to remain a homemaker her wish should be respected. but if she wants to seek outside employment, opportunities should be provided both by the family members and the society. acknowledgement i express my sincere gratitude to all the interviewees for this study. i thank the principals and staff of the schools for making this survey possible. i convey my thanks to the reviewers for their constructive comments. this research has been funded by the edith cowan university. references abc radio national 2005, the religion report: “muslim women in australia”, 26 january. online http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/relrpt/stories/s1290321.htm accessed 12 november 2009. abc radio national 2008, the religion report: “muslim women and racism in victoria”, 17 december, online, http://www.abc.net.au/rn/religionreport /stories/2008/2447404.htm accessed 12 november 2009. australian bureau of statistics, census of population and housing, 2006. blaschke, j. and sabanovic, s. 2004, “multi-level discrimination of muslim women in germany”, in blaschke, j. ed., multi-level discrimination of muslim women in europe, 2nd revised edition, edition parabolis, berlin. bouma, g. and brace-govan, j. 2000, “gender and religious settlement: families, hijabs and identity, journal of intercultural studies, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 159-175. charmaz, k. 2006, constructing grounded theory: a practical guide through qualitative analysis, sage publications, london. glaser, b. and strauss, a. 1967, the discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative research, aldine, chicago. jacobson, j. 1998, islam in transition: religion and identity among british pakistan youth, routledge curzon, london. haddad, y., smith j. and moore, k. 2006, muslim women in america: the challenge of islamic identity today, oxford university press, oxford. harris, t. 2005, “australia: early and forced marriages”, 2 august, http://www.wluml. org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5b157%5d=x-157-308734 accessed 3 june 2008. http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/relrpt/stories/s1290321.htm%20accessed%2012%20november%202009� http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/relrpt/stories/s1290321.htm%20accessed%2012%20november%202009� http://www.abc.net.au/rn/religionreport%20/stories/2008/2447404.htm� http://www.abc.net.au/rn/religionreport%20/stories/2008/2447404.htm� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 67 human rights and equal opportunity commission hreoc 2004, ismaع listen: national consultations on eliminating prejudice against arab and muslim australians, hreoc, sydney. human rights and equal opportunity commission, hreoc 2008, living spirit: a dialogue on human rights and responsibilities, hreoc, sydney. kabir, n. 2005, muslims in australia: immigration, race relations and cultural history, routledge, london. kabir, n. 2007a, “the predicament of australian muslim women in the pre-and post 9/11 era”, islamic studies, vol. 46, no.2, pp. 241-264. kabir, n. 2007b, “what does it mean to be un-australian: views of australian muslim students in 2006”, people and place, vol.15, no. 1, pp. 62-79. kabir, n. 2008, “are young muslims adopting australian values”, australian journal of education, vol. 52, no.3, pp. 229-241. khan, s. 2002, aversion and desire: negotiating muslim female identity in the diaspora, women’s press, toronto. lampathakis, p. 2005, “muslim family’s terror in race attack”, the sunday times, 30 october, p. 7. louis, w. r. 2009, “collective action—and then what?”, journal of social issues, vol. 65, no. 4, pp.727-748. mercer, p. 2005, “australia acts on forced marriage”, bbc news, 3 august, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4740871.stm, accessed 3 june 2008. northcote, j. hancock, p. and casimiro, s. 2006, “breaking the isolation cycle: the experience of muslim refugee women in australia”, asian and pacific migration journal, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 177-199. poynting, s. and mason, v. 2006, “tolerance, freedom, justice and peace? britain, australia and anti-muslim racism since 11 september 2001”, journal of intercultural studies, vol. 27, no.4, pp. 365-391. stürmer, s. and simon, b. 2009, “pathways to collective protest: calculation, identification, or emotion? a critical analysis of the role of group-based anger in social movement participation”, journal of social issues, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 681705. tomlinson, s. 1984, home and school in multicultural britain, batsford academic and educational, london. yasmeen, s. 2002, “muslim women as citizens in australia: perth as a case study”, in y haddad and j. smith eds, muslim minorities in the west: visible and invisible, altamira press, walnut creek, ca, pp. 217-232. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4740871.stm� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 1 organising for power: solidarities and transformation james goodman abstract political and social movements are both empowering and power-seeking: they seek both to mobilize civil society and overwhelm state institutions. as organisations they mobilize collective power, generating solidarities and transforming social structures. as such, political organisations both challenge power and exercise power. this article addresses organizational vehicles for political change in australia, drawing out limits and possibilities. three organizational forms are discussed the political party, the non-government organization (ngo), and the social movement in terms of their capacity and limits. the social solidarities and social structures that frame political organization are debated, highlighting the impact of political conflicts over ecological change. the article ends with a discussion of the proceeding three articles, drawing out shared themes and implications in terms of the relationships post-howard, between the australian state, political parties, ngos and movements. organization is the precondition for any sustained challenge to the status quo. for social and political movements, the challenge is to create the structures that can generate and express collective solidarities, producing and channeling collective power. this collective agency of movements is always conditioned by the structural power of capitalism, that in large part reproduces subordination through consent. capitalism is in this sense a system of self-subjection, albeit buttressed by a coercive apparatus. as antonio gramsci argued, capitalist hegemony is the product both of coercive ‘political society’ and consensual ‘civil society’ (gramsci 1971). power is thereby exercised through the populace, as well as over it. organising for power requires recognition of this double-sided character of capitalist society. challenges to the existing order must be generative, in terms of creating the capacity to transform capitalist social relations from within. they must also be insurrectional, in terms of the capacity to take power over coercive structures. any transformation beyond dominant power relations involves asserting a process of de-linking from capitalist values and structures. in this vein, for instance, john holloway argues that instead of exercising power over others, movements must grasp the power to transform people’s lives beyond commodification (holloway 2002). in doing so movements must reject the idea of ‘taking’ power, he argues, and instead directly dissolve and supersede power structures in everyday life. the social 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 movement here centres on civil society, becoming the vehicle for a transformation of social relations and social attitudes. clearly, though, struggles against capitalist hegemony cannot be confined to civil society. liberation from social power structures may be the key aspiration, but to be realized movements must, at one moment or another, address political structures: indeed, any violation of capitalist order, whether in the ‘everyday’ or not, invites coercive intervention. in gramscian terms, the transformation of civil society requires the capture of political society. since the earliest days of capitalism the political structures of accumulation have been the central barrier to social transformation. if anything, these structures are more central today, under late capitalist neo-liberalism. paradoxically, state power is vital to the process of maintaining, extending and enforcing market rule, and for maintaining social order in the face of resulting volatilities. as david harvey has argued, the driving dynamic of profit-taking today proceeds primarily through a process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’, where peoples are literally disinherited and displaced (harvey 2003). while markets may exert decentred structural power, an ‘empire’ perhaps, they are embedded in the highly-centred power of sovereign authority (as indeed amply demonstrated by neo-conservativism). movements must address these political structures: ‘organizing for power’ is embedded in existing power relations and must seek power over such structures. it necessarily involves creating formations that will be most effective within the prevailing political conditions. movement organizations are thus double-sided, in both affirming and transforming social contexts: they are embedded in social relations, but at the same time reach out beyond them, to envisage and construct new possibilities. that is to say, organizing for power cannot happen in the abstract: it has to happen ‘on the ground’. the resulting praxis of reflective action, where movements act-on the categories that constitute them, is at the core of social change organizations as reflexive actors that literally remake society. debates about the organization of collective power very clearly expose these dynamics. for these various reasons, this special issue takes organisation as the first step in its dialogue for alternatives, beyond neo-conservativism. this article introduces the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 3 section with a survey of organizational concerns within the australian political context. it begins by conceptualizing the broad field of social change organizations in terms of organizational categories, drawing-out the primary features of the three kinds of organization that are prevalent in the australian context – the political party, the non-government organization and the social or political movement. discussion in the second and third sections moves beyond the three-part typology to address the question of social solidarity and social change, asking how emergent social forces and attendant structures influence the logic of organization. in the final section, some specific questions of social change organization in australia, in the light of australia’s ‘extended state’ and related social and ecological structures, are addressed, drawing out themes for the ensuing four chapters. organisational categories debates about organization centre on organizational form, on a spectrum from most hierarchic to most diffuse. the quintessentially hierarchic organization – the military insurgency – demands absolute obedience on pain of death. the most diffuse organizations may collapse the movement into expressions of subjecthood and individual experience. we may then imagine a continuum from military insurgencies, to religious cults, political parties, political movements, community and nongovernment organisations, social movements, movement networks and affinity groups, extending to the most diffuse attitudinal or affective phenomena, such as what walgrave and verhulst call ‘emotional movements’ (2006), or what mcdonald calls ‘experience’ movements (2006). conflicts and disputes over political organization are played-out along this continuum: anti-colonial struggles were fraught with conflicts between insurgent and electoral approaches; the first communist international divided between between centralism and voluntarism; current movements are patterned by divisions between institutionalism and autonomism (fominaya 2007; juris 2008). the question of which organization is most effective may be understood as a question of 'form' rather than 'content', a tactical rather than a strategic issue. choice of organizational form may simply hinge on the question of what kind of change is being sought, and what kind of power is being mobilized, and thus what organizational vehicle is required. within late-capitalist societies discussion of vehicles for social 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 change revolves around three main organisational forms the political party, the ngo and the social movement, each if which has its own limits and possibilities. clearly if the objective is to deliver votes at a ballot box then forming a political party will be the priority; if the aim is to mobilise informational power we might expect an emphasis on constituting expert status, such as through think-tank ngos; in contrast, a more participatory social movement model would be needed to deliver popular mobilization and more broad-based social transformation. as summarised in table 1, each organisational form targets a specific power source and entails a particular set of assumptions about organizational structure, the meaning of democracy, the nature of the political process and the role of ideology. table 1: parties, ngos, movements: contrasting themes source of power structure model of democracy political engagement ideological stance political party electoral / legislature hierarchy representative partisan holistic, state-centred nongovernment organisation information / status elitist deliberative bipartisan ngoist / extended state social movement popular mobilisation diffuse, horizontal participatory meta-political sectoralist / state antagonist clearly, political parties seek electoral support by presenting manifestos for government. their electoral powerbase is founded on the representative model of democracy. as a consequence their organizational structure is hierarchic, often with a membership base that in formal terms is required to endorse its leadership. party leaders then engage in partisan contestation to garner electoral support and ultimately, to exercise governmental power. not surprisingly, political parties are explicitly statecentric, and generally produce all-encompassing holistic programs for government. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 5 non-government organizations, by contrast, rely on informational power and their resulting expert status to gain leverage. their power is channeled though deliberation rather than representation: accordingly, their structures are more elitist than hierarchic. in the political sphere, ngos present their priorities as bipartisan, above the fray of party politics. as non-government entities, they express an ideological commitment to non-governmental realms of ‘civil society’, what some have dubbed ‘ngoism’. beyond this, there is great variety. a small number of ngos play a key role in social movements, as ‘social movement ngos’; others act as interest groups, for instance as business or professional associations. ngos may value their autonomy but have an intimate relationship with the state, and inadvertently (or otherwise) operate as semi-state agencies extending state power into wider society. social movements have a more diffuse organizational form. movements can encompass ngos and political parties, but nonetheless have their own distinct dynamic. in the first instance, the powerbase of a social movement is popular mobilization: rather than creating structures for representation or deliberation, social movements seek to generate participation. this imposes an imperative for relatively flat horizontal structures to maximize popular involvement: informal exclusion or entrenched hierarchy can flourish, but in principle are self-defeating. rather than forging manifestos, or presenting policy proposals, movements address the underlying operating frameworks of society: they engage in ‘meta-politics’ rather than more immediate partisan or bipartisan contestations. as alaine touraine has insisted, social movements must, by definition, challenge the underlying historicity of society (touraine 1978). partly as a consequence, social movements are antagonists of state power, although they can be confined or corralled into specific sectoral concerns. these categorizations can beg more questions than they answer. if understood as ideal types, they can be used to illuminate political tensions within as well as between organizations, and within collective action. for organizations that straddle the logic of party, ngo, or movement, some of the resulting internal tensions can be particularly difficult, but also creative (one example is the world social forum). beyond the question of categories, we may speculate what kinds of social power are most effective in particular contexts, and thus what kinds of organization are most needed, and how this may change over time. underlying these debates is the two-way 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 relationship between social solidarity and social structure. social forces generate imperatives for political organization, and enable the solidarities that drive movements. movements reorder and transform political structures and, in turn, generate new social forces. the schematic typologies of organizational form are embedded in these social dynamics and antagonisms. organisation and social solidarity when understood as schematic ‘form’ rather than ‘content’, organization is interpreted instrumentally, as the medium for the message. the question of organization is thereby reduced to tactical consideration of pros and cons given the prevailing power play. we may then be agnostic, or even complacent, on the question of organization. but organisation is not simply an expression of prevailing power structures. the demands of the movement do not of themselves deliver political traction: it is the embedding of these demands in social and political praxis, through organisational structures, that achieves this. organisation expresses the power of agency, and is inseparable from the broader strategic process of collective mobilization that defines the content of movement demands. insofar as organization produces collectivity and solidarity, to re-coin marshall macluhan’s quip on the media, the medium is indeed the message. organisation shapes and expresses movement solidarity, framing movement agendas. political organisation must therefore reflect movement values: to claim legitimacy for social change, the movement’s organizational practices must be in accord with its values. put simply, movements must ‘practice what they preach’. organisations are not empty shells, they are ‘social laboratories’ that prefigure aspirations. movement organisations produce movement agendas, are in this sense the crucible for movement values and solidarities. unlike more embedded or systemic solidarities, movement solidarities have to be consciously generated to produce social change, and organization plays a key role in this. the self-conscious process of movement solidarity is generative – it builds political community. as expounded by ‘classical’ sociologists, systemic solidarities may emerge from the relationships between ‘traditional’ structures and ‘modernising’ systems, responding to emergent modes of production, divisions of labour, or cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 7 rationalization pressures. these existing forms of solidarity enable social structures to be adapted and reproduced. self-conscious solidarities, in contrast, arise from deliberate affiliation, and are distinct as they create new forms of identification, association and mobilization. it is these self-consciously constructed affiliations that generate transformative collective action, from within the social formation (bamyeh 2007). they spring from existing solidarities, but in the process gain an autonomy which transforms and supersedes systemic practices. in this respect, movements are agents of change, rather than symptoms of change: but they are not free agents: paradoxically, they act on society from within society. the problem for movement solidarities is thus a problem of emergence – how can movements generate the solidarities to produce the required value shift? the answer to this question lies within the dynamic relationships between structural conflicts and movement agency. given that we live under capitalist social relations, it is capitalism’s structural conflicts that set the stage for movement agency: understood historically, those conflicts change over time, generating contrasting modes of movement and organisation. organisation and social structure specific forms of capitalism have very different social effects, and set the framework for different forms of movement organization. at the same time, movements act-on and transform capitalist relations, framing the conditions of emergence for succeeding forms of accumulation. following the dutch political economist, kees van der pijl, we can argue that industrial accumulation channeled movements into class-based solidarities, particularly through trade unions (van der pijl 1998). the revolt against labourism and social democracy in the later decades of the twentieth century, from the so-called ‘new social movements’, then prefigures more ‘flexible’ intensive modes of informational capitalism and neo-liberal globalism. the crises of social and ecological 'exhaustion’ that arise under intensive accumulation now see the emergence of survival-centred movements for the social and ecological ‘commons’, movements that construct and assert the existence of common normative foundations for survival. such movements force new mutations in accumulation, although still in formation, as perhaps most clearly (and astoundingly) played out in the emergence global carbon trading, set to become the world’s largest commodity market. 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the new dispensation raises qualitatively different problems, and possibilities. industrial accumulation centres on the contradiction between capital and labour, and creates a ‘realisation problem’, of how to sell more commodities while constraining the income of workers. intensive accumulation, by contrast, centres on a capitalnature contradiction, and presents the problem of how to manufacture more products with less ecological impact. as james o’connor argues, this ‘second contradiction’ is now dominant, forcing new eco-centric frameworks into view (o’connor 1998). as the conflict between capital and nature comes to pattern society as a whole, all social issues become unavoidably ecological issues. the point is made most clear by the example of climate change, where all possibilities of social development and social justice, in all contexts worldwide, hinge on the capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. notwithstanding a continued faith in ‘climate-proofed’ development, if certain not-so-far-off tipping points are breached we have to expect nothing less than planetary developmental collapse. as van der pijl argues, the social is now unalterably subsumed into the ecological. possibilities for survival under this ‘intensive’ capitalism hinge on the movement’s capacity to generate solidarities and to construct and enact the required values. global interconnectedness arising from ecological crisis creates new imperatives for reflexivity, which create new forms of ecological solidarity. just as industrial capitalism created new sets of interchangeable roles, what ernest gellner called the ‘musical chairs society’, so today we see ‘intensive’ or informational capitalism forcing the emergence of new solidarities. where gellner saw nationalism as providing the industrial identity-fix, so today various observers, ulrich beck and anthony giddens among them, argue that modes of precautionary self-regulation emerge in response to increased exposure to global flows and ecological risk (see beck, giddens and lash 1994). reflexive modernity, in this reading, forces peoples to live with regard to their ‘side-effects’, and in the process, by necessity, solidarities become less fixed to territory and much more fluid and contingent. as the principal carrier of collective reflection and action, the movement moves to the core of reflexive modernity, generating the values and affiliations that underpin solidarities. in the process, as mohamed bamyeh argues, the emergent movements cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 9 recombine existing ‘primary values’ – whether material, universal, spiritual, humanist or emancipatory – to produce the new solidarities and organizations capable of enacting them (2007). for some, the imperative for fluid affiliations supersedes solidarity. kevin mcdonald for instance argues that solidarity requires a single focus for affiliation, and cannot express the capacity to move across identifications that has emerged at the core of movement politics. he argues the imperative for ‘fluidarity’, not solidarity, centres the movement on affinity and experience. it dictates diffuse movement organization with loose horizontally-aligned networks that allow for convergence of shared values rather than coordination or control. here, the very notion of a movement that expresses a singular ‘collective identity’ is redundant: identification is meshed across a range of affiliations and is enacted not so much through movement organizations as through embodied and affective experience in movement actions, what mcdonald calls the ‘public experience of self’ (mcdonald 2002; 2006). to a significant degree, though, these modes of political mobilization are not new. as calhoun notes, movements have historically combined affective or expressive forms of mobilization with cognitive and instrumental politics: movements of the early nineteenth century in britain, such as the chartists, were no less identity-centred and expressive than current-day movements (calhoun 2000). there is change in these continuities though, not least as capitalism’s freedoms and society’s aspirations conflict and react to produce new dispensations. with ‘neo-capitalism’ breaking the constraints of accumulation in a new wave of intensive commodification, counterscripts in the form of social movement critiques force new agendas into view. in the search for legitimation we see a ‘new spirit of capitalism’ emergent, which creates new ways to justify the prevailing globalised and networked order. for boltanski abd chiapello these new ‘mechanisms of justice’ are dispersed but city-centred, where agglomerations of social agency can gain traction (boltanski and chiapello 2005: 519). similar formulations are advanced in hardt and negri’s concept of ‘multitude’, which (paradoxically) agglomerates mass individual reflexivity into revolutionary agency. the multitude, they argue, is a ‘distributed network’, where ‘each struggle remains singular and tied to its local conditions but at the same time is immersed in the 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 common web’, where the extension of a common field strengthens rather than undermines the singularities of its participants (hardt and negri 2004: 217). as with the universalist ‘empire’ that it challenges, the multitude has no centre: instead it is diffused across social life, taking root wherever peoples assert self-rule and wrest control of their own means of social reproduction. there is no overarching metaframe for political change – only the liberation of social time from capital accumulation. the new model is presented as a synthesis of unity and difference, combining the commonalities expressed in centralised movement hierarchies with the affective engagement of autonomous difference politics; in doing so, ‘the new network model of the multitude displaces both these options’ (2004: 217). these various treatments posit a dichotomy between relatively fixed political categorizations associated with modern class and state hierarchies, with more fluid formations prevalent in late modernity. the age of global reflexivity is said to be the age of contingency, and therefore, of agency. movement organizations have little to do in these scenarios: they are submerged by the social impulses said to overwhelm structures of rule. the result may be, as frank furedi has argued, a collapse into episodic expressions of public outrage, a personalization of protest where movements become an outlet for individual expression (furedi 2004a; 2004b). such ‘emotional movements’ may themselves be aligned with rather than against authorities, in generating as impulse to reaction rather than transformation (walgrave and verhulst 2006). indeed, periods of rapid change have historically offered opportunities for forces of reaction as well as forces for transformation. as karl polanyi highlighted, the great depression of the 1930s laid the basis for a socialization process that gave rise to fascist as well as social democratic forces (polanyi 1944). these histories may now have direct lessons for the present as we enter what in 2009 the imf began calling the ‘great recession’ (strauss-kahn 2009). movements are not automatically driven by systemic structures to progressive, transformative agendas: in periods of capitalist crisis, ideology and political strategy become if anything more important. more fundamentally, though, the very idea of distributed networks and unorganised fluidarity is in direct conflict with the notion that we are living under ecological crisis. instead of disaggregating movement identities, the advancing crisis of global warming is undoubtedly more totalizing than any of the preceding crises of modernity. in its cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 11 wake, the crisis literally subsumes all other political agendas. indeed, there is nothing contingent about global warming. in this respect, we can predict, and perhaps witness, a growing global alignment of movements under the singularity of climate crisis. that is not to say there is a uniform response: there are multiple ways of addressing the crisis, and multiple possibilities for social change arising from it. significantly, though, just as class has done in the past, climate is likely to, over time, emerge as a central fulcrum on which solidarities emerge and converge. emergent climate action movements are already constructing deep roots. in the first instance they build on a deep-seated affective crisis – an epistemological crisis perhaps. where touraine addressed the counter-cultures of the 1960s and 70s in confrontation with the conformity of ‘programmed’ societies, the current climate action movements address a societal contradiction that literally pits capital against life itself. in this context, given the scale and imminence of the problem, a deeply transformative and affective response is to be expected. as with movements of the past, though, such responses rest on a shared cognitive interpretation, of the causes and effects of climate change. global warming thereby generates a shared and now globalised political frame, albeit inflected with different perspectives. the effects of that reframing can be profound: on the question of democracy for instance, the crisis of survival produces a new demos that extends across generations, and across species. the priorities of the present are now weighed against the developmental survival of future generations and the intrinsic responsibility to avert species extinction. addressing climate change thus means reinventing democracy, embedding it in new ethical frameworks for existence. if global warming creates a new global meta-frame for movements, it also forces a direct confrontation with dominant paradigms of growth and accumulation. given there is no possibility of adaptation to climate change, it must be directly mitigated ‘at source’. such mitigation, to be effective, forces us beyond consumer capitalism: even the most optimistic scenarios for reducing carbon intensity signal the need to curtail global growth rates (li 2008). to use the categories developed by boaventura de sousa santos, there is no ‘sub-paradigmatic’ pathway: only a paradigmatic transition can address the crisis (sousa santos 1995). unlike the social democrats who a century ago sought ‘evolutionary socialism’ (see bernstein 1961), there is no scope 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 for a long march through the institutions. while the welfare state could to a degree socialize class division, offering an evolutionary pathway for socialists, it is increasingly difficult to lend credence to evolutionary ecologism. even if that were possible, time has run out. indeed, the abject failure of existing institutional orientations, beholden in the first and last instance to vested interests, is already forcing new forms of ecological transformation, indeed, revolution, onto the agenda (goodman 2009). we are faced with a profound clash of paradigms, and one that is irresistible, driven by ‘nature’s revenge’ on capitalism, as engels put it (see anderson 2006). that ‘revenge’ cannot be managed or displaced, and as it intensifies unabated it is giving new traction to movements, generating new visions and possibilities for revolutionary change. social and ecological change in australia’s ‘extended state’ new movement organizations are built to challenge new configurations of power and exploit new possibilities of mobilisation. in this sense, movement organisations could be understood more as processes than institutions: they are relational, constituted in the dynamics of contestation. with this in mind, how can we approach the question of organising power in australia, in the post-howard era? as noted, public political activity in australia is channeled into parties, ngos and movements. most political players in the australian context either fit closely into one or other category, or explicitly sit across two of the categories. as outlined in lee rhiannon’s chapter for this section, environmental organizations are represented across all three categories. the relationship between the resulting organisational imperatives can be crucial in shaping ecological outcomes. where, for instance, movement and party are in alignment, there can be considerable rewards; alternatively, ngo and movement can come into contradiction, with, for instance, ngos actively displacing environment movements. in different circumstances, tendencies to expressive movement actions can be complemented by ngo discursive interventions. more centrally, as lee rhiannon argues, links between the political party and social movements are an absolute imperative if green party, indeed any progressive party, is to withstand pressures to electoral bloc-formation. for political parties dedicated to transformative social change – whether revolutionary or not – linkages to social movements are not an option, they are a necessity. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 13 organisations themselves change over time, across organisational categories. a political movement may for instance create a political party that then takes on a life of its own, autonomous of the movement. social-democratic parties, for instance, many of them established by trade unions, have often sought to sever organizational links with affiliated trade unions, enabling a shift to a more social-liberal party orientation. the divorce between trade unions and ‘their’ party or government can be initiated by either side: in nsw for instance in 2007, it was the trade union movement, represented through unions nsw, that led a broad-based labour movement mobilization against the nsw labor government’s proposal to privatize electricity. demonstrating the possibilities of relatively autonomous union mobilization, in this instance in collaboration with environmental organizations, along with overwhelming support from the 2008 nsw alp conference, the campaign was remarkably successful. with all alp mps voting in defiance of labor conference, a sharp divide was opened up between party and government, dissolving the assumption of ‘policy consent’ that dated back to the 1940’s (kelly 2008). an internal coup followed, the party installed a new premier, privatization of electricity generation and distribution was shelved, with privatisaton of electricity retail, and provision for new private power stations, quietly brought forward (kruse 2008). in other contexts, the organization itself may move across categories. there are many examples of movement organizations becoming institutionalized, to become ngos: this is especially prevalent in the australian context given the historical intermeshing of state power and civil society organization. federal and state departments are peculiarly ‘extended’ into civil society, through various contracting-out and other funding mechanisms, creating grey-zones of semi-stateness where ngos operate as informal extensions of state power. australia’s extended state operates across multiple fields, transforming feminist, indigenous, migrant, lesbian and gay, welfare, and other movement organisations into ngo service providers dependent on government funding. as outlined in sarah madison’s chapter for this section, ngos in australia, as a consequence, face a series of dilemmas and imperatives in maintaining their autonomy. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 there are direct political consequences: given their privileged relationship with government, ngos, may, advertently or otherwise, find themselves marginalizing and policing movements. relatively disaggregated environmental ngos, for instance, actively compete with one another and with movements to capture political space: ngos often deliberately position themselves as the ‘reasonable’ voice on an issue, to capture the middle ground in a policy debate, and in the process de-fang environmental movements that may compete for media exposure or membership. an important illustration of this process is the debate over climate change, where a number of environmental ngos have deliberately taken positions that are known to be unsustainable, simply to gain an entré into the public debate. in such circumstances the ngo operates as a ‘minesweeper’ for the government, clearing the pathway of ideological obstacles, enabling the maintenance of a clearly non-viable status quo. another important aspect of policing, and of the extended state, is the imposition of specific government regulations that delimit political categories, one from the other. such regulations can directly shape the actions of potential players: in the case of the very large charitable sector for instance, there are very clear injunctions against what are deemed by the australian tax office to be unacceptable ‘political activities’. as sarah madison outlines in their chapter for this section, these regulations have a powerful ‘chilling effect’ as charities self-police in order to retain their financial status. australia does not have a strong tradition of sustained autonomous movement organization based on membership income: in most sectors, except the trade union sector and some cases in human rights advocacy and development assistance, organizations either directly rely on government funds or else are dependent on charitable status to gain access to charitable foundations and tax-deductible donations. policing is especially pervasive in the trade union sector, where employers have the right to sue unions and penalize individual employees if they take industrial action that is ‘unprotected’. unions can take protected industrial action during periods of collective bargaining, but only if they are registered: there is no right to strike for unregistered unions. the industrial muscle of the australian labour movement is thereby contained within a highly restricted field of protected industrial activity. in the context of ‘enterprise’-based collective bargaining, unions have often become defined as interest groups, primarily acting to provide a service for their membership cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 15 rather than as part of a movement that seeks to transform broader social relations. trade unions have sought to counteract this tendency through internal transformation on the industrial front into member-based ‘organising’ unions rather than expertbased ‘servicing’ unions. externally they have sought broader reorientations, away from close reliance on a social partnership with government, to new forms of community and social movement unionism (as for instance outlined in amanda tattersall’s article in section 1), and to modes of political unionism, such as in the landmark ‘your rights at work’ campaign (as discussed by sally mcmanus, also in section 1). the effects of political regulation, though, are double-sided. the act of policing itself betrays a vulnerability, as the resort to coercion signals a failure of legitimation. the spectacle of coercive power, displayed for political effect, demonstrates the extent to which an issue has been contested and politicized. this, in itself, can be a key achievement of social movements, in forcing public attention and deliberation. as sergio fiedler highlights in his chapter for this section, social movements most clearly deploy their autonomous power when they engage in mass civil disobedience, forcing the authorities to act. where the response is coercive, the movement may be no less effective. the process of provoking and confronting coercion in the name of collective goals can have a powerful resonance, and historically has been central to the extension of political rights, of social provision, and of cultural recognition. the two great ‘anti-systemic’ social movements of the last two centuries that were identified by immanuel wallerstein – the movement for social democracy and the movement against colonialism – depended on such approaches (wallerstein 2003). fiedler argues that current globalizing forces now position refugees at the cuttingedge of political subjectivity, in forging and claiming new forms of agency. the extension of political community across borders, whether through migration or otherwise, has been a central question for social movements, although one that has often been deferred. that deferral now unravels in the face of cross-national flows: we now see the same phenomenon across multiple sites, including, as emphasised here, the issue of ecological survival. in these contexts where the meta-political framework, society’s historicity, comes under challenge, the social movement organisation becomes most necessary, and effective. 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 conclusion organisation sits at the centre of social and political change. movement organisations transform latent potential into a social and political force capable of transformative action. social change organisations thereby take on a constitutive role in terms of selfconsciously crystalising movement solidarities. organisational questions are thus both tactical and strategic questions, entailing the creation of alternative agendas as well as a means of enacting them. as argued here, such movements paradoxically act-on society from within: by acting on society they confront immediate structures, politicizing and delegitimising power holders; by acting within society they create the power to transform social relations, making society anew. in the current period, where we sit on the cusp of a new social order forced into place by ecological exhaustion and climate change, we can expect movement organizations to move to centre stage. as existing institutions fail in the face of mounting crisis, the creative praxis of movement organisations offers us the best foundation for the revolutionary transformations that are so urgently required. bibliography bamyeh, m. 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(1998) transnational classes and international relations, routledge: london. walgrave, s. and verhulst, j. 2006 ‘towards “new emotional movements”? a comparative exploration into a specific movement type’, social movement studies 5(3): 275-304. wallerstein, i. (2003) the decline of american power, the new press: new york. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia 47 will the 'shire' ever be the same again? schooling responses to the cronulla beach riot carol reid centre for educational research, university of western sydney abstract in the aftermath of the cronulla beach riots, schools were faced with the fallout of social conflict, including having to deal with widespread fear and confusion both in their local communities and among students. this was especially the case for schools in the sutherland shire and in the local government area (lga) of bankstown. apart from the presence of many young people in the initial riot and the revenge raids, some schools, like churches, had been the target of attacks (leys and box, 2005: 1; daily telegraph, 2005: 5). schools were also targeted as places to battle the consequences of cultural division: the then prime minister john howard, in his australia day speech just over a month after the riots, complained that the teaching of australian history in schools needed reform to properly foster the core values that would bind a nation together (sydney morning herald, 2006). at all levels of government, a raft of programs designed to ease local tensions were introduced, many of which focused on young people or on schools (see board of studies new south wales, 2007; surf life saving nsw, 2006). schools are central to understanding the consequences of these events largely because they are places where the congregation of young people offers a rare medium for the tasks of responding to diversity, inequality and change in an increasingly globalised world. they are also institutions in which debates around values, social cohesion and national identity have become central concerns. this article outlines the contexts for understanding the role of schools: both in terms of the spatial dynamics of the ‘shire’ and in terms of the changing nature of educational policy. it suggests that these contexts produce both a degree of cultural heterogeneity in young people’s social lives and a degree of segregation amongst young people in schooling which delimits ‘what is possible’ in terms of schooling responses to the cronulla beach riot. it then focuses on a national values education project1 (nvep) involving five schools in south and south-western sydney as a direct response to the cronulla beach riot and its attempt to use the values education framework as a conduit to increased understanding of what it might mean to live in the current social context of this part of the sydney metropolitan area, including experiences of ‘cultural dissonance’ and conflict. the local and the global the beach has long been a site of social tensions and conflict, especially amongst young people (collins 2009). cronulla in particular has a long history of defending its territory against ‘outsiders’ visiting on weekends: bruce baird, former federal member for cook that takes in cronulla, remembers the days when the ‘surfies fought the westies’ but the weekend riots he believes are different. he says the atmospherics changed after september 11, tampa and 1 clusters of schools from around australia were selected to design, implement and evaluate quality projects in values education which would reflect and utilise the national framework in local contexts. the projects, managed by curriculum corporation, centred on using action research methodologies to encourage improved values education practice for all australian schools. 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 the bali bombing. ‘there is a memorial to six young people who died in the bali bombing right where the riots took place,’ he said. (skelton, 2005) what makes the contemporary struggles different to these earlier fights over space by different sub-cultural groups is that they are now not only between suburban ‘outsiders’ and ‘insiders’ for this division has become racialised: the outsiders are now considered ‘unaustralian’. while the struggle over space is not new in sydney or more specifically cronulla, it has taken on a different inflection. this shift has occurred partly because of the changing ethnic character of the ‘westies’ (collins 2009), but also because of the significance of the shire in the nation’s history. the shire is home to specific colonial narratives, including the white sacred site: the landing place of the first white ‘discoverer’ at captain cook’s landing place, kurnell. kurnell peninsula is often called the foot, the place where cook's foot first connected with aboriginal land. furthermore, the ‘shire’ has been cushioned from the changing ethnic composition of sydney by its location, relative wealth and the fact that people are not as geographically mobile. families commonly have multiple generations staying in or returning to the local area, children go to local schools and there are few private schools. in many ways, it represents a kind of heartland of ‘australianness’. it would, however, be naïve to suggest that people living in the shire are ignorant of global events and the changing ethnic composition of sydney. yet, as a geographically isolated peninsular and as a largely middle class and white space where a number of the bali bombing victims’ families live, cronulla represents a peculiar case of not just the junction of the local and the national, but also how the local and the global intersect – what is often referred to as ‘glocalisation’. this collision of social and cultural change is neither simply inevitable nor catastrophic, but entails the transformative potential of anxieties, fears and hopes in contexts where teachers and students struggle with the experience of glocalisation, wider cultural dissonance and conflict (carrington 2002). the spatial dynamics in the shire are important to the educational responses to the cronulla beach riot as they provide insights into the ways in which ‘people imagine and navigate racialised space in their own way’ (alexander & knowles 2005, p.5). in the quote above, baird, for example, sees difference in the parallel narratives of past fights but there are also continuities in terms of the struggle over space, identity and race. the original colonial cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 49 footprint was here on aboriginal land after all – something that is often erased from collective memories through a focus on the newer, more urgent dynamics of racialisation. the shifting sands of educational policy schools are not safe havens remote from the forces of social change, international conflict, and debates around national cohesion. indeed, they are at the centre of the tensions produced by these processes. since the late 1980s, for example, the shift in education policy in nsw to increase school ‘choice’ exemplifies one aspect of the contradictions of glocalisation. school choice has turned education into a market place (marginson 1997) and parents have become increasingly mobile in the search for ‘good schools’ (gulson 2006). while the rhetoric has been around ‘schools of the future [becoming] social and educational centres of communities and builders of social capital of the local communities they serve’ (riordan 2005, p. 186), in practice the policies of school choice have led to increasing homogeneity in some schools while demographic change has produced high degrees of cultural diversity in others. research indicates that a number of schools in sydney are increasing in ethnic concentration (mcdougall 2009; nsw department of education and training 2008), including those in the bankstown lga, while schools in the shire remain dominated by anglo-celtic/saxon ethnic groups. after the riot there was also a degree of ‘white flight’ out of the areas where school students were mainly from ‘middle eastern’ backgrounds (bonnor & caro 2007) into schools located in the shire (patty 2008). this has occurred, as patty points out, alongside the state’s encouragement of private schools catering to particular religious orientations, another dimension of the marketisation of schooling and the rhetoric of choice. connell (2003, p.246) found in a study of the changing secondary school system that ‘school choice probably speeds up processes of ethnic concentration and segregation for other reasons too, such as families from a particular immigrant group bringing their children together for mutual support’. yet, while we see that religious and minority ethnic identified schools are growing we often overlook the fact that it is also the dominant ‘white’ group of parents, particularly the middle classes, that are bringing their children together to ensure social mobility at a time marked by greater competition and the increasing risks associated with glocalisation (butler & hamnett 2007). place and school therefore become important as a signifier of racialised privilege and can be symbolic of white power. yet, this power is often invisible and despite research into racialisation in schools there is inadequate analysis 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 of whiteness as the norm (troyna 1998,p.334). this is because the cultural practices, behaviours, demeanours, language and aspirations of the dominant group are considered to be how things should be ‘naturally’. the cronulla beach riots, however, made this whiteness visible. perera (2006) contends that the riots revealed white people's territorial claims. the wearing of t-shirts with the slogans ‘we grew here! you flew here’ and ‘aussies fighting back’ brought to the foreground white nationalisms. this territorialism was also gendered and became the basis of popular claims about the causes of the conflict – how young white men viewed treatment of ‘their’ women by middle eastern men, how the beach should be used for particular activities and how bodies should be displayed and carried in the beach (including issues of decency, body hair and deportment). these are essentially racialised discourses that have become normalised through the absence of overt racial categories. as troyna (1993, p.29) put it: ‘this covert use of racial evaluations serves important political purposes… because it is often capable of ‘justifying racial discrimination by providing other non-racist criteria for the differential treatment of a group distinguished by its racial characteristics’. however, this covert use of racial categories disappeared after the riot and exposed the underbelly of whiteness. the treatment of women, the use of public space and the safety of families were all at some stages presented in terms of western standards of conduct, but in doing this they brought to the surface deep investments in whiteness. these anxieties also fed a wider social anxiety about multiculturalism, social cohesion and cultural values. the comments made by john howard (and other politicians) rejecting a claim about the racism of australian society (sydney morning herald 2005) strengthened claims that there was a need to reaffirm the core values of australia’s western liberal democracy. that is, by criticising the ‘bad values’ (especially towards women) of lebanese youth, not only made it clear who the ‘problem’ was, but how the reform of schooling was seen as a necessary national project (howard 2006). howard’s call to return to teaching history which celebrated a narrative of national progress was not a simple kneejerk reaction, but part of a longer term educational agenda, seen in the growth of civics education and values statements. the focus on anti-racism and programmatic multiculturalism in australia has been largely replaced by values and citizenship education (leeman &reid 2006). values education programs at all levels – state and federal – provide funding for projects that incorporate action research for teachers, across a number of school sites, with university academics. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 51 these same projects produce curriculum materials following a series of planned educational experiences with students and teacher professional development. civics education is largely concerned with the history of the nation and provides units of work for students in primary and secondary schools in the discovering democracy units (curriculum corporation 2009). the racialised relations around territory and gender, then, were connected to an agenda around national identity, education and values. so here was a paradox: a nationalist agenda constructed around a particular view of social life as a singular historical narrative sitting alongside policies of school choice, which created a proliferation of differences – geographic, economic, class, cultural and religious. this disjuncture in policy delimited what was possible in schooling responses to the riot and emphasised the importance of place. the importance of place in school responses we were given intelligence by the local police command to say that there was a planned school invasion. a large number of people from the bankstown area were planning to invade the school and they had a couple of names of kids that they’d allegedly wanted to get. (cited in burridge & chodkiewicz, 2008, p. 33-34) in the days after the cronulla beach riot, conflict spilled out into other suburbs of sydney, and included attacks on shops, in residential areas and streets. churches and schools were particular targets of attack (australian 2005; daily telegraph 2005). one school in the shire had to close down for two days (burridge & chodkiewicz 2008). such reprisals and threats continued for some period of time, and in the aftershock, schools were a key institution that had to deal with the longer term effects, including the impact on local communities. the emotional roller-coaster for families, students and teachers in the shire and the bankstown lga as they grappled with these difficult legacies required a response that could enable an exchange of knowledge, the voicing of concerns and the release of fraught emotions. as wievorka (2004, p 59) argues, a sense of one’s cultural traditions being threatened by the outside world is one of the sources for racist action. so, small scale responses in schools are as important to examine as the broader social, economic and legal frameworks, because these responses entail forms of negotiation that address sources of conflict and injury. such responses need to be understood as grounded in ‘place’ despite the increasing significance of globalisation, because it is through local spaces that cultural transformation is 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 made tangible and sustainable or is opposed. in exploring the significance of place, thomson examined uk community-school projects that bring together people who might otherwise never meet to work on something of community benefit. in her study, students worked with ‘ferals’2 to develop a park and ‘at risk’ youth worked with local elderly men to construct a fair ground. thomson found that ‘students in these projects were also brought together with significant cultural institutions and cultural capital in ways which allowed them to critically encounter local/national narratives’ (2006, p.89). in situating place as a central dimension and dynamic in educational responses to the cronulla beach riot many activities and events involved schools and communities. a number of place-based interventions related directly to the beach, including surf life saving nsw’s educational program on the same wave3 which aimed to train a more culturally diverse group to become lifesavers, and the ‘peace on the beach’ event that brought together shire public schools with islamic schools or schools with predominantly middle eastern students. attempts at dialogue and reconciliation were between geographically dispersed schools, across systems and on each other’s turf. place thus assumed an important dynamic in constructing a socially just curriculum given the increasing separation and segregation of young people in schooling, despite the wider context of diversity, based on geography, class, gender, religion, ability and ethnicised and racialised differences. case study – the unity in diversity project given the spatial dynamics created and revealed in the riot and its aftermath, a ‘place-based’ project was developed with schools in the bankstown lga and sutherland shire. the unity in diversity project was initiated with the explicit aim of addressing many of the critical issues that emerged in the wake of the cronulla beach riots and brought together five schools – two islamic and three public – and a group of staff at the university of western sydney. it was funded under the australian government’s national values education program (nvep), which worked with selected clusters of schools from around australia to design, implement and evaluate projects in values education using the national framework for values education in australian schools (department of education, employment and workplace training 2005). funding allowed teacher’s release from teaching time to gain professional 2 a commonly used term in australia for youths who have dropped out of mainstream society to live a communal ‘hippie’ style life, frequently politically engaged and involved in militant ‘green’ action. 3 the nsw program was the first part of a national strategy. see surf life saving australia (2006). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 53 development, plan and organise collaborative projects and to purchase and develop resources that developed an understanding of values. funding also paid for a university academic network partner to develop and document an action research project, which was central to the learning and development of school staff engaged in the project. a cluster of schools across systems (private and public), religion, levels (primary and secondary) and geographic regions were brought together to build relationships between the clusters’ communities to re/build respect for individual identities and respect for other cultures. there were two high schools (one islamic and one public with a high number of islamic students from the bankstown lga) and 3 primary schools (one islamic and one public from bankstown lga; one from the shire). one other public high school from the shire participated at an event at gunnamatta bay. overall there were over 500 students involved; around 20 teachers and more than 50 parents. key teachers4 from these schools met several times over a two year period with academic partners from uws using an action research methodology. this methodology was constructed by curriculum corporation who was managing the nvep for the former department of education, employment and training. there were also two national meetings with other project teams in melbourne and kingscliff, nsw. meetings were recorded in a number of ways – audiotape, notes and teacher written narratives. there were focus groups with parents and students at each participating school (audio taped) as well as photographs and a film taken during four collaborative events between schools. data analysis went through a number of readings: thematic, interpretive and extractive – whereby illustrative pieces of text, which represented themes and concepts, were selected. central to this analysis was a focus on power so that culture or ‘race’ is not a definer of a community (ramji, 2009, pp.73-75). considerable debate between participating teachers and academics resulted in the desire for the project to avoid becoming ‘preachy’ about values education and to enable social literacy through carefully constructed activities. students were involved in four days of collaborative, inter-school activities as well school-based values education programmes. the collaborative learning experiences were a surf awareness day at cronulla, a web-building workshop at a 4 school-based values education coordinators 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 cronulla public school, a ‘developing a sense of self and others’ day at bankstown civic centre and a day entitled ‘crossing the bridge: a conversation at gunnamatta bay’. parents participated in focus groups at each school to gain understandings about the impact of the riot on their communities, families and children. the outcomes of these discussions were intended to inform values education programs in each participating school. in addition, focus groups of parents and teachers were held at gunnamatta bay on the specific topic of what it means to be and feel australian as well as rights and responsibilities of australian citizenship. at the outset this cluster came together with diverse expectations. one islamic college was particularly interested in environmental education and had worked on a peace garden with another local high school. two schools in the cluster had already met at a ‘peace on the beach’ event at cronulla. one of these schools took the lead with the development of a project website. two other schools – a high school and feeder primary school were interested in issues related to transition to high school and in the multiple forms of literacy that they might continue developing in their students, who were largely islamic but in public schools. a major aim of the second stage of the nvep, which this project was part of, was to address values in intercultural and global contexts. the cluster had a specific focus on understanding how difference might be conceptualised and responded to in a way that did not erase difference or seek to diminish its importance to individuals. at the same time, there was an expressed desire to understand how values education specifically could respond to or provide the conduit through which this process might be achieved. in discussions, curriculum corporation also wanted to understand how values education might deal with ‘cultural dissonance’. while the riot may have been a consequence of cultural dissonance, it is important to emphasise that it does not automatically follow that the children in the schools in these schools felt this way. while there were legacies of fear and uncertainty conflict could not be assumed among students from each school. to assume that this is the case is to rely too heavily on the idea that race or culture is static and that putting groups of culturally different students together will automatically result in tension (cf miles 1993). this is not to suggest cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 55 that young people don’t experience forms of disaffection, but to recognise that more is at stake here than simple binaries of cultural difference. as one teacher commented at an early discussion, ‘children are i had a delegation after the text messages [to join retaliation to the cronulla beach riot]. students said: ‘we don’t know what to do. these are what we are getting and we want to defend ourselves but don’t know if this is the right thing?’ what are the consequences? is revenge justifiable? confused from my observations’ so there were very difficult moral and social questions being posed within schools, families and communities. as another teacher explained: these kinds of value-laden philosophical questions were important to respond to and in considering how the students’ might find less violent ways to react, an islamic high school teacher suggested that students from schools in the shire and the bankstown lga: …jointly publish a letter in a newspaper. the measurement when you start out is to record what they expect or hope for from working with another school. at the end reflect back on what they have learned. after discussing this idea, the same teacher said that it probably wouldn’t work as her students wouldn’t expect to get a letter published. a teacher from cronulla said: mine would have an expectation that they would get published. to which the former replied: we need to address issues of empowerment. the above example demonstrates the way in which students from one of the islamic high schools felt following the riot. that is, they felt that their voices would not be heard because they would either not be believed or not have access to mainstream media whereas students from the shire school clearly felt that their access to the media was assured. it is interesting to consider why this expectation is already strongly embedded in children’s thinking and it points to the unequal distribution of various forms of social power following the riot. henry and tator (2002) in considering media access in the canadian context argue that middle class whites are more able to access media opportunities due to their closer alliance with dominant cultural values and norms. in the highly emotive context following the riot and the construction of middle eastern males as lacking in such values and norms, it is perhaps not surprising that young men from the islamic high school felt they had no voice. 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 parents of students in the schools in this project also felt the changed spatial dynamics in sydney following the riot. cronulla and bankstown now bore what back (2005) calls the mark of racial grafts. that is, cronulla was a white space and the bankstown lga was a middle eastern space. this emerged in discussions with groups of parents in all the schools. for muslim parents, fear was an overwhelming consequence of the riot – fear for themselves, friends, community well-being and their children, especially if they were to visit or return to cronulla. however the flipside of fear was a feeling of loss, particularly parents from cronulla who missed muslim families coming to gunnamatta bay for their picnics. parents felt fear because the riot and the ensuing debates highlighted issues related to dress, especially for women being judged or heckled because they wore a hijab or a bikini. the women were concerned about cultural assumptions (‘oppressed’ v. ‘loose’) resulting from their use in public space. many parents were worried about their children going to different areas of sydney after the cronulla beach riot given the threat of further violence. in attempting to respond to these concerns, a number of collaborative projects were developed to overcome the considerable emotional affects generated by the cronulla beach riot. one of the key aims became ‘geographic’, or rather, to counter the boundaries created geographically as expressed by the parents and teachers. surf awareness day one of the first collaborative projects was a surf awareness day at cronulla. this understandably presented a challenge for parents from the bankstown lga – many of whom were muslim – because it meant their children visiting the site of the riot. seventy-five students from muslim and other backgrounds as well as anglo-celtic/saxon students attended the day together to focus on cultural practices at the beach. this meant that appropriate swimwear for young muslim girls had to be designed and halal food needed to be organised. students participated in joint ‘cross-cultural’ team activities on the beach, received instruction on surf safety and generally gained knowledge about the culture of the beach. the majority of the 75 students who participated in a post-activity survey developed by teachers in the cluster said that they learned what a rip was and that the flags meant it was safe to swim in that area. for them this particular event was an ice-breaker in a space that had become associated with violence, exclusion and alienation. the success of the day was cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 57 evident in turning their perspective around and, at the same time, laying the foundation for future collaborative projects. web-building workshop students also used new forms of technology to foster interaction. a collaborative intranet website was designed by 18 students representing all schools to establish a place where students could visit one another online and discuss impressions of activities of the project. the virtual space encouraged students to challenge stereotypes being presented in the mainstream media through developing an image for the home page, requiring considerable discussion of visual representation and privacy. for these students this connected with their lived experiences more than the disconnected reports they were reading in the media. the process required unsettling some preconceptions (on all sides). the following comments on the blog reveal some of this process: we felt nervous at first, however, meeting other people made us more confident. i learnt that everyone thinks in a different way. i also learnt that the other schools have as much of a right to be here. i learnt that no matter how different a person is you can learn to co-operate with them. the cluster maintained the website over the duration of the project, recording the ongoing activities and encouraging students to respond to a number of on-line surveys and participate in blogs. in total around 110 blogs and survey responses were recorded. one of the main difficulties with this website however was its location on the nsw department of education and trainings’ server, which limited access to students outside of state schools. once again, the consequences of a segregated schooling system limit what is possible in responding to the riot. developing a sense of self and others in another event over 100 students and staff came to bankstown town hall to participate in a range of activities designed to give students a better understanding of themselves and others. the day began with a performance about bullying and racism (cyber, physical, mental and verbal), which was followed by activities facilitated by bankstown youth development services. these included photographing values in the community, creative writing, environmental art, music, no racism rap and hip hop, filmmaking and interview 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 techniques. these different projects produced collaborative products where stories of migration, family, antiracism, environmental action and bullying were central. for the parents of students from the shire, allowing their children to visit bankstown caused similar concerns that visiting cronulla had raised for those from muslim parents in the bankstown lga. however, some of the comments of students from the shire posted on the blog reveal the impact of the day: the things that i learnt about the day were that there is more than one way of hurting someone and not every body has the same skin colour or hair colour. also i learnt how to work with other people from other schools and other cultures. what i got out of the day was that i am very different to the people that i talked to. they had a different religion, played a different sport, liked different music and so on. but i still made friends with them. the only thing we had in common was we went for the souths [football team]. the great thing about the day was that i had a blast of fun, but i also learned about what i have in common with these students such as some of their laws and customs. also that it is so fascinating the way they are able to speak another language. there was considerable social and cultural capital brought together in this project in the form of community workers and activists experienced in many of the issues raised because they had worked in the bankstown lga dealing with marginalised youth. some of the content of this day was confronting, such as the bullying performance. it contained language and concepts that were at times an affront to staff from some schools because of references to sexuality and bodies. however, it was generally agreed that the impact on students was positive and that it had moved them forward in a way that needed to be continued. crossing the bridge: a conversation – gunnamatta bay very early in the project the environment was seen to be a useful focus, for all students could work together and overcome the territorialisation and divisions evident in the riots and move beyond ethnicity and consider community as a whole. gunnamatta bay – a key site for muslim family picnics prior to the riot was chosen, partly because it was known and also because it presented environmental challenges such as water requiring anti-pollution cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 59 activities. the area also had a strong history of indigenous occupation as well as a large hall for silent conversations (noise pollution) and the dialogue groups. just over 120 students engaged in a range of activities such as water conservation, drama and silent conversations using photographs which later fed into the ‘conversations’ activity. a group of students from six liverpool district high schools that had been part of an anti-racism project funded by a department of immigration and citizenship ‘living in harmony’ grant conducted focus groups with the students around issues of racism, multiculturalism and social inclusion. the questions discussed were: ‘what makes you australian?’ and ‘what does it mean to be australian?’ parents and teachers held separate discussions while students participated on their own. some of the comments on the blog were: this magnificent day was to cross the bridge of our religions. i learnt many values but my favourite was the value of the hijab. i think this day was beneficial. no more us and them. i said that i most feel australian when i’m watching the australian sport teams play and when i’m with my friends. what i most liked about the day was bonding and playing with kids from different cultures and communities. i think there should be more days like these because it is great fun for us to learn and tell kids about our lives and our cultures. the limits to values education by the time this last activity was completed many of the students had formed friendships across schools and had come to understand more deeply what was fair and not fair in terms of cultural difference but less about how racisms were produced beyond interpersonal relations. to some extent this can be understood as one of the weaknesses of values education. the project achieved its goals of providing an opportunity to explore differences and sameness and break down barriers, which were significant consequences of the cronulla beach riot yet it failed to move beyond the ‘human relations approach’ (sleeter & grant 1987). in this approach the focus is on ‘managing differences’, which often produces a focus on the ‘otherness’ of students’ difference. we can see this in some of the students’ comments. values education, as a conduit for intercultural understanding is based on similar foundations to pluralistic or liberal multiculturalism, which relies on fixed notions of culture as bounded 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 entities based on ethnicity alone. the problem with this is that it often serves as a form of regulation and fails to problematise whiteness as the cultural norm (troyna 1998) as well as often reproducing stereotypes (cf may 1999 for full discussion). there is no challenge to the status quo so that relations of power might be revealed, such as those articulated by the young muslim males who felt their voices would not be given space in the mass media. this is the essential paradox of liberalism, that it ‘tolerates diversity only as an instrumental quality and not as something valuable in itself’ (griffiths 1993, p. 309). a preferable approach would be to look at the recognition of diversity within the current structures but also develop a political literacy that links these struggles to issues of wider social justice (leeman & reid 2006, p.58). in a critical approach, issues of identity and nation become central to analysis. conclusion the cronulla beach riot sent a tremor across australian multicultural society, exposing the cracks in inter-ethnic youth relations in sydney. an understanding of how to respond to these challenges to diversity is as important as understanding what happened and why. schools are an important and potentially fertile site in responding to these issues. this article set out to examine schooling responses to the cronulla beach riot by analysing one ‘values education’ program that included schools in the cronulla shire and bankstown lga, the areas of sydney that were most affected by the riot. the tangible outcomes of the project included a dvd, a website, teacher narratives, curriculum resources and a report. the project also brought together students and parents from both sides of the spatial, class and education system divide to explore ways of moving forward from the divisiveness expressed in, and encouraged by, the cronulla beach riot. this provided the opportunity for many students to encounter and challenge some of the local narratives that had affected their construction of cronulla and bankstown. the project was successful in terms of the participants who stated that the cultural and spatial stereotypes that they previously held were replaced by a greater mutual understanding and respect. strategies and models for developing better intercultural understandings and for beginning to heal the fears and bitterness that emerged during the cronulla beach riots were trialled and refined. however, it was also apparent that using values education as a conduit for responding to cultural dissonance is constrained by a number of broader, society-wide, factors. two main ones come to mind. first, values education has a focus on individual social relations thus cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 61 limiting understanding of the causes of cultural dissonance to the interpersonal context. second, the segregation of students into different schooling systems private, public, religious and secular revealed the systemic differences in resourcing between public and private sectors. more generally, growing segregation in schooling builds divisions in increasingly diverse communities. against this trend, individual projects such as the ones explored in this chapter, no matter how successful, appear to be swimming against the tide. as a consequence there needs to be a better understanding of power relations and education and the way that increased inequality in education resources and outcomes builds divisions in society – at once inter-ethnic and inter-class rather than overcoming them. put another way identity choices are not available to all individuals or groups equally because class, ethnic and gender stratification, objective constraints and historical factors structure them (leeman & reid 2006, p.58). the responses to the cronulla beach riots for sydney’s schools and communities require deeper re-evaluations of australia’s education system. references alexander, c. & knowles, c. 2005, ‘introduction’, in c. alexander & c. knowles (eds), making race matter: bodies, space and identity, palgrave 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http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the changing political identity of the “overseas chinese” in australia feng chongyi abstract this paper explores the role played by the chinese communities in the australian politics of multicultural democracy from the perspective of political socialisation and re-socialisation. it argues that there is no such a thing as inherent “cultural values” or “national values” that differentiate ‘the chinese” politically from the mainstream australian society. this paper focuses on the chinese nationalism of han chinese migrants in australia. within the “new mainland migrants” who have come to australia directly from the prc since the 1980s, nationalism is much weaker among the tiananmen/ june 4 generation who experienced pro-democracy activism during their formative years in the 1980s. nationalism is much stronger among the post-tiananmen generation who are victims of the “patriotism campaign” in the 1990s when the chinese communist party-state sought to replace discredited communism with nationalism as the major ideology for legitimacy. although ethnic chinese account for only 3% of the total population of australia, chinese citizens became the largest group of immigrants to australia in 2009, displacing the traditional sources of britain and new zealand (tatlow 2010). how the chinese communities play a role in australian politics is a question of great interest to the academic community as well as the public, especially when the political role of chinese australians is complicated by the growing influence of rising china. equally interesting are the contrasting identities of the chinese students in australia, as the democracy fighters and asylum seekers appealing to democratic governments in the west and attacking the chinese communist regime in 1989, and as fanatical nationalist and zealous chinese patriots denouncing democratic governments in the west and defending the same chinese communist regime in 2008. with a focus on the distinctive groups of the “new migrants of mainland china” (dalu xin yimin) who have come to australia directly from the prc since the 1980s, this paper seeks to shed light on the growing trend of statesponsored chinese transnationalism and the ways political beliefs and behaviours of ethnic chinese in australia are shaped by their political socialisation back in china. the term “new migrants of mainland china” was first coined by chinese migrants in the united states in the 1980s and adopted by the chinese government, referring to the chinese immigrants 122 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 who are mostly “born and brought up under the red flag” after the establishment of the people’s republic of china (prc) in 1949, and have migrated overseas after the “reform and opening to the outside world” at the end of the1970s (huang et al. 1998; zhu 2006). what is the cultural, ideological or political baggage carried by these “new migrants”? reflecting cultural determinism, there is a long held view or stereotype which asserts that “the chinese” carry a special set of “cultural values” or “national values”. some try to understand this special set of “national values” in terms of deep-rooted “political culture” (pye 1985), others attribute it to the mysterious “deep structure of chinese culture” (sun 1993). it is claimed that the confucian tradition or other traditions, as handed down from millennia of chinese history, with their stress on hierarchy and conformity, have prevented the chinese from developing an independent personality and nurtured paternalistic and despotic government. assertions of this sort are not supported by empirical evidence, given the fact that the chinese society in taiwan has achieved stable liberal democracy, that democratisation with robust civil society and active political citizenry is well underway in the chinese society in hong kong, and that the overseas chinese living in democracies in the west have engaged in democratic politics with great enthusiasm. some scholars have convincingly argued that the alleged political apathy of the chinese is nothing but psychological and behavioural manifestation contingent on power structure and opportunity structure, springing from the lack of channels for political participation (lau 1982). as to the diametrically opposed roles performed by chinese migrants as democracy fighters and authoritarian regime defenders in australia, a satisfactory explanation can be sought from their specific political socialisation and circumstances rather than confucianism or any other chinese traditions. the concept of political socialisation was devised and widely applied in the 1950s and 1960s, providing a useful framework to understand the process of inheriting political norms, beliefs, ideologies and customs (parsons and bales 1956; chinoy 1961; clausen 1968). family, school, mass media and religion are normally identified as major agents or factors of socialisation. however, under the totalitarian regimes, or post-totalitarian regimes as in the case of china today, the successive political campaigns by the party-state play a key role in political socialisation. through education, mass media, mass campaigns and any other possible means, the chinese communist party-state has successfully indoctrinated the vast majority of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 123 population with its discourse on truth, the “laws” governing human societies, the trajectory of chinese history, and the mission of the chinese communist party (ccp). according to this discourse, marxism-leninism embodies the highest form of truth and knowledge showing the correct way to follow the exorable law on the march to the ideal society of communism. other key aspects include “mao zedong thought”, “deng xiaoping theory” and the “theory of three represents”, products of creatively combining marxist theory with chinese practice. there are also a series of historical claims: that the chinese have a unique civilisation with a glorious history for 5000 years but have been humiliated by western powers for more than a century; that the ccp has provided leadership to liberate the chinese nation from endless miseries; and that only under the leadership of the ccp can the chinese nation stand up to the western hegemony, maintain unity and stability, pursue china's modernisation, and ensure economic prosperity and harmonious society for the people. from this perspective, liberal democracy which “merely” institutionalises regular elections, independent judiciary and political and civil rights “in form” is actually bourgeois dictatorship, whereas the “proletarian dictatorship” (or “people’s democratic dictatorship”) under the leadership of the party is “genuine democracy” as the party represents the interest of “the people” and “serves the people” (lenin 1918; mao 1949). the party also lays emphasis on different themes during different periods. in the “reform era” since 1978, “socialist democracy” has been expanded to include “socialist legality” promoting the concepts of human rights and the rule of law, but in the meantime maintaining the supremacy of the party (ogden 1989). after the collapse of communism in the former soviet union and eastern europe in 1989 and the early 1990s, efforts have been made by the ccp to put increasing emphasis on patriotism and the theory of “building socialism with chinese characteristics” while obscuring the tenets of marxism-leninism-mao zedong thought on the themes of class struggle and communist ideal. the ideological indoctrination of ccp propaganda has deeply shaped the worldviews of prc citizens and the patterns of their political behaviour. it requires an extraordinary, and sometimes painful, process of re-socialisation for them to break away from the communist mode of thinking and embrace liberal democracy. 124 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 democratic aspirations of the generation of the cultural revolution and its impact on chinese migrants in australia the generation of cultural revolution, who were mostly born in the 1950s and drawn into the cultural revolution in the period of 1966-1976, experienced several despairs and subsequent profound crises of belief. paradoxically, the cultural revolution was a nightmare associated with terror, persecution, deception and destruction, but it also taught millions of young chinese selforganisation, political mobilisation and the duty to contest the immoral exercise of power. the initial stage of the cultural revolution was characterised by rebellions answering to the calls of the great leader mao zedong against the authorities and the sending of university and high school students all over china to establish extensive ties, but this eventually degenerated into endless political persecution and infighting. after the end of the cultural revolution this generation of chinese was variously identified as the “lost generation” whose ideals and sense of direction were destroyed by ten years of catastrophe, chaos and betrayal. they were the “cynical generation” who were plunged into confusion, cynicism and nihilism; and the “rebellious generation” or “thinking generation” who reflected on their years of youth with intense pain and quested for truth and a new meaning of life (feng and benton 1992). among those lucky ones within this generation who were accepted to universities and colleges resumed after the cultural revolution, or even joined in the “tide of going abroad” to study at the universities in developed countries, at least some have experienced spiritual regeneration. they categorically rejected the official ideology as cheap idealism, shallow optimism and abject docility; developed scepticism and critical thinking; and even found new beliefs in equality, individualism, human rights, the rule of law, and constitutional democracy. the campaign by the chinese students in australia to support the pro-democracy movement in china in 1989 and the campaign by them to achieve permanent residency in australia in the early 1990s gave full play to the democratic aspirations and communication skills of the cultural revolution generation. as chinese students studying abroad in other parts of the world, thousands of chinese students in major cities of australia took part in rallies and demonstrations in may 1989 to support chinese students on hunger strike at tiananmen square, as well as rallies and demonstrations in june 1989 to protest against the chinese government after the june 4 massacre, which fundamentally changed the life of tens of thousands of chinese students cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 125 arriving in australia around the time (cherrington 1991; goldman 1994). the june 4 massacre, the subsequent harsh crackdown on pro-democracy movement leaders, and the extensive purge of liberal elements from the apparatus of the party and state generated immense fear of persecution and massive alienation from the chinese communist regime among chinese students studying abroad. under such extraordinary circumstances democratic countries such canada and the united states offered permanent residency to the chinese students right away, but the australian government was originally only prepared to offer permanent residency to the chinese arriving in australia before the june 4 massacre and other individual students who could establish refugee status through political screening on a case by case basis, exposing the chinese students to political risks and uncertainty. however, the chinese students turned the table around and almost all of them succeeded in securing permanent residency by 1993 through impressive campaigns and lobbying (gao 2009). after the mid-1980s, when australia set up the scheme of english language intensive course for overseas students to export its english language education on the international market, chinese citizens, mainly from the cultural revolution generation, had taken the opportunity to come to australia in large numbers, with some 20,000 of them arriving in australia before june 4 and approximately 25,000 arriving in australia between june 4 and 1 november 1993. some technical issues added concerns to the australian immigration regime, as more than 70% of those among both cohorts were “language students” and less than 30% of them were “degree students”, with more than half of them no longer holding a valid visa when they lodged the application for asylum. the reluctance of the australian government to grant permanent residency to the chinese students was best demonstrated by the fact that the migration act of australia was amended 11 times between 1989 and 1992 to tighten the border control and abandon the onshore humanitarian program (cronin 1993). fortunately the successful campaigns of chinese students persuaded the australian authorities to join other western democracies in providing protection of prc nationals onshore and allowing about 45,000 chinese migrants to become permanent residents in australia, as reflected in the decision made by the labour government on 1 november 1993 and the decision made by the coalition government on 13 june 1997. 126 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 looking back on the campaigns of the chinese students for democratic china and permanent residency in australia, the connections between their behaviour abroad and their previous political experience and ideological journey back in china are readily visible, such as the connections between the formation of their identity as democracy fighters and their new found democratic aspirations during the 1980s; between the establishment of the chinese association for safeguarding human rights and the working group for the investigation of the basic human rights of prc citizens in australia and their yeaning for human rights since the late 1970s; between their extensive networking locally and internationally and their previous “massive exchange of revolutionary experience through networking” (da chuanlian); and between their skilful use of news media in both chinese and english and their previous expertise in managing big-character posters and tabloids (yin 2009). it is worth mentioning that both the democratic aspirations and the individualism developed among the cultural revolution generation represent neither the mainstream nor an irreversible trend in chinese society in spite of reform and opening to the outside world. patriotic education campaign in china and the nationalist “angry youth” of the posttiananmen generation in a scene unprecedented in history and probably unrepeatable in the future, the australian capital canberra was overwhelmed by “a sea of red flags and placards” carried by thousands of chinese nationals, mostly university students, during the beijing olympic torch relay on 24 april 2008 (english and linnell 2008). about twenty thousand chinese nationals carrying more than ten thousand chinese national flags were there to “protect the olympic torch” from the presumed “sabotage” by the tibetans, a designated “minority nationality” of china. only two thousand of them were from canberra and most of them came from melbourne and sydney by more than one hundred coaches overnight. there were also participants taking flights from adelaide, brisbane, darwin, perth and even new zealand. actually, two weeks earlier, as in many other major cities in the world, thousands of the chinese students and other chinese nationals in melbourne and sydney rallied and marched on 13 april 2008 in protest against “the western media’s dishonest reports” on the march 14 riot in tibet (cctv 2008). on the midnight prior to the torch relay, chinese students had already occupied all of the “strategic cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 127 positions” of the starting point, the finish point and along the line, in order to exclude tibetans and their supporters (xinhua 2008). during the torch relay, the chinese students shouted patriotic slogans, sang patriotic songs and repeatedly used violence against the tibetans and their supporters. (laohu 2008).one activist proudly reflected in the on-the-spot report published on the internet that if the australian police had acted as french police during the torch relay in paris the number of the chinese students arrested would be 50 rather than 5, and without the deliberate protection by the australian police none of those “poisonous tibetans” would be able to safely return home (laohu 2008). chinese nationalism has been on the rise in china and among the overseas chinese around the world since the mid-1990s. millions of chinese nationalists are wild with joy, but the phenomenon of rising chinese nationalism has also caused great concerns and has been well researched and debated by the academic community (unger 1996; zheng 1999; zhao 2004; giles 2004; hugh 2006). the upsurge of chinese nationalism can be partly attributed to the rise of nationalism in the world after the end of the cold war, the rise of china’s economic and military power and the reaction to the conflicts with japan, the united states and other western powers. however, from the perspective of politics in china, the spectacular display of nationalism by chinese students around the world in recent years is a bumper harvest that had been seeded and cultivated by the chinese government through the nationwide “patriotic education campaign” (feng 2009). patriotic education has always been a dominant theme of political socialisation in the prc, although the theme was somehow balanced by the interlude of the “chinese new enlightenment” (xin qimeng) during the decade of 1978-1988, the most exciting period of intellectual history in the prc. the enlightenment project during the period was a new one which benefited the cultural revolution generation greatly by promoting humanist values and critical thinking, just as the chinese enlightenment in the 1910s benefited the may 4 generation and subsequent generations. after the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement in 1989, the following collapse of communist regimes around the world and the official communist ideology’s consequent loss of credibility, the communist regime in china faced a serious crisis of legitimacy. it was the upgrading of patriotic education, as well as rapid economic development, 128 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 that provided the new “performance legitimacy” to the one-party rule of the ccp in china, turning the attention from internal evils to external threat and turning the vast number of young chinese away from liberal values and toward fanatic nationalism. the new “patriotic education campaign” was initiated right after the tiananmen incident and formally launched in 1991, mobilising all of the available resources including the state education system, the public media, arts, museums, popular entertainment, and the “red tourism scenic spots” (zhao 1998; wang 2008). three features of this campaign are readily discernable in comparison with political education during previous periods in the prc history. firstly, nationalism replaced communist ideology as the most important legitimisation device. the class-struggle narrative targeting the domestic “people’s enemy” of exploited classes gave way to the patriotic narrative targeting “foreign hostile forces” which allegedly conspired to keep china down or even destroy china; the revolution narrative depicting the ccp as a revolutionary force to eliminate class domination and class exploitation was changed into the ruling party narrative describing the ccp as the only leading force to unite the chinese nation, safeguard the sovereignty of china, stand up to the west, end national humiliation and achieve wealth and power for china; the social foundation of the ccp was expanded to coopt the new rich for building national unity and “harmonious society”; old rigid tenets of ma-lie-mao (marxism-leninism-mao zedong thought) prioritising class-struggle were superseded by the new pragmatic theories of deng-san-ke (deng xiaoping theory, theory of three represents and the concept of scientific development) prioritising social and political stability; and the communist ideal of classless society was abandoned for the national goal of “relative prosperity (xiaokang) ” (hughes 2006). secondly, national humiliation and historical grievances moved to the centre of political education, in which the anti-western discourse prevailed over the modernisation discourse or rejuvenation discourse (zhenxing zhonghua). the “anti-bourgeois liberalism” campaign was combined with the “anti-peaceful evolution” campaign, in which liberal values or enlightenment values were no longer assumed as an intrinsic part of chinese modernity but denounced as part of the western conspiracy to split up the chinese and maintain the western hegemony over china; the suffering of the chinese and the backwardness of china in the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 129 modern times were interpreted in terms of victimisation and humiliation of china by the west; disputes with democratic countries on human rights issues or commerce were identified as “conspiracy of the west” (wang 2008). thirdly, the post-june 4 generation, who received education after 1989, became the primary target and victim of the campaign aiming to change their attitude toward the western powers and the communist one-party rule. students from kindergartens to universities were fed with the “approved truth” and “approved knowledge” of foreign invasions and oppression and kept away from the inconvenient records of the crimes committed by the ccp, such as persecution and murder of millions of innocent citizens in successive political purges and campaigns; achievements of the party were highlighted and exaggerated whereas access to the information of disasters brought about by the party such as the famine during the great leap forward and democratic challenges such as democracy wall movement and pro-democracy movement in 1989 were blocked; those singing the praises of the party or chinese culture were treated as faithful friends of the chinese whereas criticism made by chinese compatriots of the party or shortcomings of chinese culture were condemned as unpatriotic; denunciation of the west and liberal values became the most convenient way to demonstrate political loyalty and accumulate political capital, whereas expression of liberal values became a serious political liability (feng 2007). there is little wonder that many of the chinese students socialised with this kind of worldview have become “angry youth” (fen qing) captivated by fanatic nationalism and eager to demonstrate their patriotic credentials in showing their support for the chinese communist regime and joining in the anti-west protests, even if they are living in democratic countries beyond the control of the party, provided with free access to knowledge and surrounded by the international media. the “angry youth” among the overseas chinese are fighting in the forefront against the “western conspiracy”. they vied with one another to join the demonstrations around the world against the west during the beijing olympics torch relay in 2008 as they were so angry with the international media criticising the chinese government in favour of the tibetans. accepting what they had learned from the “patriotic education campaign”, they believed that the behaviour of the international media on the tibet issue represented an anti-china conspiracy dating back to 1900 when the “allied troops of eight nations” (ba guo lianjun) drove the qing 130 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 government out of beijing and thoroughly looted the capital after putting down the “boxer rebellion”. these positions are reflected in this quote from internet article by a former chinese student living in canada: “a new strategic step of the anti-china conspiracy by the western powers has finally emerged: they used the tibetan separatists to create a violent incident in tibet, then manufactured the public opinion by the western media about the ‘crackdown’ on the minority nationality of the tibetans by the ‘despotic’ chinese government and, taking the beijing olympics torch relay around the world as an opportunity, aroused an anti-china agitation around the world and in the west in particular. all western powers joined together to express their ‘concern’ and ‘condemnation’, and reserved the right to take further action of ‘sanction’ against china. the western powers are attempting to cook up a situation similar to the ‘june 4’ and force the chinese government to the corner prior to the beijing olympics, using the boycott of the beijing olympics as a stake to blackmail the chinese government for concessions, such as the ‘return and restoration’ of the dalai lama, and paving the way to split up and subvert china. after the invasion of china by the joint forces of britain and france in the 19th century, after the invasion of china by the allied troops of eight nations in the early 20th century, and after the attempt made by the united nations troops consisting of the troops from 16 countries under the leadership of the united states to intimidate and invade china in the mid-20th century, the western powers have joined together again to launch a new round of siege and attack on china at the beginning of the 21st century. this is yet another collective attempt by the western powers to form the new ‘allied troops of eight nations’ and interfere the internal affairs of china” (zhao 2008). the state-sponsored chinese transnationalism in australia and re-socialisation of chinese migrants under multicultural democracy transnationalism emerges as one of the central theories in the study of immigration and refers primarily to the contemporary phenomenon that immigrants "forge and sustain simultaneous multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement" (basch 2003). these multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states can take many forms. in the study of multiculturalism and ethnic identity, the concept of transnationalism also takes on the dimension of identity construction to understand the complexities of multilevel and multipolar bargaining of identities in the multicultural context of the host society in the age of globalisation. this is similar to the concept of “long distance cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 131 nationalism” coined by benedict anderson to characterise a new set of identity claims and practices that connect people living in various geographical locations to the territory of their “ancestral home” (anderson 1992). some scholars have cautioned against the tendency within the notion of transnationalism to homogenise ethnic groups or diasporic groups with vast internal class, regional, sub-ethnic and political diversity (benton 2003). in connection to socialisation of chinese migrants in australia, attention should to be paid to the role played by the chinese communist party-state in the development of chinese transnationalism in the last two to three decades. transnationalism in this sense is an extension of state nationalism with the invention of transnational solidarity beyond national boundaries and the creation of new expressions of belonging and political engagement. the state-sponsored chinese transnationalism does not challenge the chinese nation-state but on the contrary enables it to engage with globalization through economic, cultural, political, and diplomatic united-front strategy. the party-state adapts to the new environment of globalisation, imagines itself as a transnational actor and becomes the driving force of chinese transnationalism, coordinating the “shared” interests between the overseas chinese and the “ancestral homeland” (zuji guo). there have been numerous changes in the relationship between the overseas chinese and the chinese states since the modern times, as well as after the ccp’s rise to power in 1949. after the 16th century when europeans began their projects to establish colonies in the far east, the landbased and agrarian-centred regimes of the ming and qing empires were hostile to the overseas chinese communities of sojourners living abroad in south-east asia and beyond (wang 1991). more often than not the ming and qing governments exercised a strict ban on the sea trade and saw the overseas chinese as traitors or as “abandoned subjects of the heavenly dynasty”, until the early 1840s when the qing government was forced through the opium wars to open china to the outside world and join the modern world. in confirming the fear of the qing government, the overseas chinese did become a subversive force playing an important role in the reform movement with an end to establish the system of constitutional monarchy during the 1890s, culminating in the 1911 revolution to overthrow the qing dynasty (wang 1991). 132 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 subsequently, the relationship between the overseas chinese and the prc has passed through several stages. for the first three decades after the establishment of the prc, the chinese communist regime had an uneasy relationship with the overseas chinese, although the overseas chinese affairs office was set up at both central and local levels to look after the overseas chinese affairs. initially the regime welcomed the return of the overseas chinese to take part in the construction of “socialist mother land” and support the revolutionary activities of the overseas chinese in south-east asia (cheung 2005). however, the overseas chinese eventually fell out of favour and the connection with the overseas chinese communities became a political liability for prc citizens, who were banned from going abroad for private purposes and killed on the spot or sentenced to prison if they tried to leave the country. since 1978, when china engaged in reform and opening to the outside world, the chinese communist government has changed its attitude again and re-defined the overseas chinese as a key force for the project of china’s modernisation. the “new migrants”, the students in particular, were originally sent by the party-state to study abroad with the expectation that they would “return to serve the motherland” with badly needed expertise after completing their programs. by 2003 the number of the “new migrants” had reached 4.2 million (guo 2004), but the party-state was not particularly happy when most of these students chose to stay in the developed democratic countries rather than returning to china. encountering the extreme difficulty of attracting those students back to china, especially in the unfavourable posttiananmen situation, the party-state changed the policy of asking the chinese students to “return and serve the country” (huiguo fuwu) to the policy of encouraging the chinese students to “stay but serve the country” (weiguo fuwu), coinciding with the grand national strategy of “marching toward the world” (zou xiang shijie) (miao 2010). since the 1990s this version of chinese transnationalism has been consciously developed by the party-state with the close cooperation of the overseas chinese as a whole and particularly the “new migrants”, who are believed to be bound to china not only by ties of blood but by sharing the modernisation project of the party-state. a directive with the title guanyu kaizhan xinyimin gongzuo de yijian [opinion on unfolding the new migrant work] issued by the overseas chinese affairs office of the state council of prc in 1996 stated that: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 133 “strengthening new migrant work has important practical meaning and deep-going, farreaching significance for promoting our country’s construction of modernisation, implementing the unification of the motherland, expanding our country’s influence and developing our country’s relations with the countries of residence” (overseas chinese affairs office of the state council of the prc 1996). with sponsorship by the party-state, chinese transnationalism has advanced on both ideological and institutional fronts, linking the overseas chinese institutionally and emotionally to the chinese government. on the ideological front, a new culture was nurtured by the party-state, imagining chinese migrants as part of the chinese economy and polity and celebrating migration as a patriotic and modern act. in this process “the nature of emigration has turned from treacherous, to tolerated but ideologically suspect, to patriotic” (nyiri 2001, p.637). the “ideological work” of the party is so successful that all of the current chinese community newspapers in australia adopt the pro-china position, except for the epoch times published by falun gong and the tiananmen times published by a chinese democracy movement organization. although living in australia, the “new migrants” from china are still surrounded by the chinese media dominated by the chinese government views and narratives. on the institutional front, the party-state has established or encouraged the overseas chinese to establish chinese transnational corporations, associations, exchange programs, a variety of networks, and cultural and professional linkages around the world, cultivating a new army of chinese migrant elites close to china. in australia, the chinese state agencies, including the chinese embassy in canberra and the general consulates in brisbane, melbourne and sydney, are assigned the tasks to identify and coordinate with the patriotic overseas chinese leaders (aiguo qiaoling) in organising the chinese communities for the service of the chinese modernisation and unification projects. the traditional chinese migrant organisations such as the native-place associations (tongxiang hui) remain important but they are no longer up to the new tasks of mobilising the well-educated, modern and cosmopolitan chinese migrants to “serve the homeland” as the native-place associations focus on charity and liaison functions for the benefit of fellow-townsmen. professional associations and political associations, which focus on social, cultural and political issues of transnational or international significance, and conduct their business in mandarin or english rather than native dialects of chinese localities, have emerged 134 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 as the dominant form of associational life among chinese migrant communities. some of them are overtly political, such as australian council for the promotion of peaceful reunification of china, australian chinese culture promotion society and australian council of chinese organisations. in addition, many of them are professional, such as friendship association of chinese students and scholars, federation of chinese scholars in australia, australian chinese science and technology society, australian chinese engineers association, australian chinese information communication technology professional society, australia chinese association for biomedical sciences, society of chinese australian academics in new south wales, victoria association of chinese phd students and scholars, queensland chinese association of scientists and engineers, south australia chinese professionals association, canberra society of chinese scholars, western australia chinese scientists association, and northern territory chinese professional association. according to one estimate, the chinese migrants have established more than 300 associations in new south wales alone (tian 2003). most of these organisations have established and maintained a close relationship with the chinese state agencies in australia. through the chinese state agencies, these overseas chinese organisations have also established and maintained connections with many institutions in china. usually there is a clause of “enhancing sino-australian understanding and friendship” in their constitution and their leaders are usually eager to demonstrate their loyalty to china and seek guidance from the chinese authorities. they organise the celebration of major chinese festivals, the reception of prc leaders and other delegations from china, the recruitment of experts and investors for china, business negotiations involving china, the performance of chinese culture and arts, and a variety of tours to china. the service of these patriotic overseas chinese leaders is rewarded by the party with economic benefits and political recognition. the economic benefits include profitable projects in china and other preferential treatments in business. political recognition may take the forms of appointments to positions in the united front organisation such as the political consultative conference, invitations to join the chinese leaders on the rostrum of tiananmen or at the people’s great hall on the occasions of national ceremonies, and the opportunity to meet and take photos with high-ranking chinese officials during their visits to australia. these symbolic political awards may enhance their position in the overseas chinese communities and business operations. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 135 it is unclear how state-sponsored chinese transnationalism has shaped the engagement of chinese “new migrants” in australian multicultural democracy, which provides institutional opportunities for political participation of minority ethnic groups. a multicultural democracy is defined as deepening of liberal democracy that promotes equality among all ethnocultural groups, respects cultural diversity and protects the rights of non-dominant ethnocultural groups (indigenous peoples, sub-state national minorities and minority groups of migrants) to keep their cultural practices and traditions, compatible with the universal human rights (kymlicka 1995, 2007; united nations development programme 2004). benefiting from the “human rights revolution” since the universal declaration of human rights by the united nations in 1948, multicultural democracy is based on liberal multiculturalism that promotes the policies and practices of recognising and accommodating ethnic diversity with the aspiration to deepen democracy, expand human freedom and eliminate ethnic and racial hierarchies. in violation of these norms, state-sponsored chinese transnationalism may have delayed the process of political re-socialisation of chinese “new migrants” in australia. many of them continue to maintain an authoritarian stance, as demonstrated in their eagerness to suppress the basic human rights of tibetans during the olympic torch relay in 2008, and their consent to or support for chinese government in its crackdown on the chinese democracy movement and the falun gong both at home and abroad (liu 2001; liu 2011). conclusion the development of multicultural democracy and cosmopolitanism in australia has created a favourable environment for political participation by chinese communities, who practice dual loyalty, taking part in australian political process while engaging in the “politics of homeland”. however, the participation of chinese “new migrants” in australian politics since the 1980s has also been conditioned by their world view formed through their socialisation back in china and the rising chinese transnationalism sponsored by the chinese government. the illiberal thinking and strong chinese nationalism and transnationalism have prevented many of them from integrating into the host society and establishing harmonious relationships with fellow citizens of other ethnocultural groups. 136 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 in recent years there has been a new emphasis on a closer attention to the affairs of the host society and the social, cultural and political representation of the overseas chinese communities. in a report issued by the overseas chinese affairs office of the state council of prc in december 2009, the associations of the overseas chinese were criticised for unhealthy practices such as indifference to the affairs of the host society including the welfare of ordinary members, abuses of leadership positions for personal gain or even illegal activities, and the in-fighting and unethical competition within an association and among associations (overseas chinese affairs office of the state council of the prc 2009). more and more chinese “new migrants” have accomplished political re-socialisation and internalised universal liberal-democratic values to become qualified democratic citizens. great efforts have been made by them to not only contribute to the politics of multicultural democracy as active and responsible citizens, but also enrich australian culture by maintaining and expressing their distinctive identities and practices. there are good prospects for them to 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on the issues of new migrants’, http://www.law.osaka-u.ac.jp/~cforum/symposium/0611zhudongqin.htm. http://www.hp.gov.cn/hpqql/qwfg/qwzc/t20081210_81326.htm� http://www.china.com.cn/policy/txt/2009-12/18/content_19088060.htm� http://news.xinhuanet.com/sports/2008-04/24/content_8040216.htm� http://www.wyzxsx.com/article/class20/200805/38358.html� http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/0967067x� http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=publicationurl&_tockey=%23toc%236037%231998%23999689996%2332685%23fla%23&_cdi=6037&_pubtype=j&view=c&_auth=y&_acct=c000050221&_version=1&_urlversion=0&_userid=10&md5=5cd26860a827ca6674e764ffe26c1d87� http://www.law.osaka-u.ac.jp/~c-forum/symposium/0611zhudongqin.htm� http://www.law.osaka-u.ac.jp/~c-forum/symposium/0611zhudongqin.htm� ccj journal introduction cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 i editorial welcome cosmopolitan civil societies : an interdisciplinary journal we are pleased to publish the first issue of our new e-journal, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. this new journal initiative comes out of the establishment of the uts cosmopolitan civil societies research centre (ccs) in late 2007. ccs has an inter-disciplinary research focus, for we argue that the traditional disciplinary boundaries constrain, rather than enable, innovative approaches to the study of contemporary societies. members of ccs come from the faculties of business, arts and social sciences and law. ccs is interested to develop and pursue interdisciplinary research opportunities related to cosmopolitanism and civil societies under four themes: migration and ethnic diversity; civil societies; learning and activism, and human rights. the plural of societies is intentional: we are interested in comparative studies of issues related to the four research themes in western and nonwestern societies today. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal will be published at least twice annually. all articles submitted to the journal will be double-blind reviewed. some issues of the journal will be linked to a specific theme, with guest editors and a call for papers. other issues will be comprised of a broader range of submitted articles. we invite submissions to this journal (url http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/ index.php/mcs). in this first issue we present a range of articles that indicate the breadth of our interdisciplinary research interests and the diversity of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies that are employed. the articles span continents and oceans, looking at the uk, new zealand, australia and the coral sea islands. they also explore a range of themes from racism to ethnic precincts to civil societies to communities and identities. the first articles explore contemporary spatial dimensions of racism in australia (dunn et al) and the uk (mcevoy). kevin dunn and his colleagues present the results of the latest stage of their long-running project to map australian racism. utilising telephone survey data collected in 2006 from informants in sydney, perth and melbourne, the authors explore dimensions of ‘everyday racism’. they demonstrate that between 10 per cent to one third of respondents experiences some form of everyday racism. the authors also explore anti-racism responses that take into account local differences. using more quantitative methodologies, david mcevoy looks at bradford (uk) the site of riots in the summer of 2001 with an eye on the explanatory power of the spatial patterns of settlement of the different ethnic/racial groups in understanding the dynamics of the riots. analysing 2001 census data, collected at ward level, the main contribution of the paper is a quantitative analyses of ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 the exposure index to explore the ethnic mix at a neighbourhood level in bradford and how that changes with age. collins and kunz also investigate spatial aspects of immigrant settlement through their study of ethnic precincts in the australia context. drawing on fieldwork conducted in sydney’s chinatown, little italy, cabramatta and auburn with immigrant entrepreneurs, customers and local government and ethnic community informants, they explore aspects of the authenticity of the ‘ethnic experience’ of customers (tourists, locals). one innovative aspect of this paper is the different subjective takes on authenticity by the three groups of customers in the ethnic precinct: co-ethnic, co-cultural and others. these articles are followed by explorations of community and civil society in australia. mark lyons explores the meaning of the concept civil society before arguing that if it is to be of any use analytically civil society needs to be able to be measured in ways that will permit cross national comparisons. this article is part of an important dialogue and debate about operationalising the concept of civil society with quantitative as well as qualitative methodologies. the article by hilary yerbury presents the findings of an ethnographic study of members of generations x and y. analysing the comments and stories of informants from generations x and y, yerbury is interested to explore their perceptions and experiences as part of on-line communities while, at the same time, both reinforcing and shifting definitions and understandings of what it means to be part of a community. the article by maydell and wilson explores issues of identity construction among russian-speaking immigrants in new zealand. drawing on 23 in-depth interviews they find evidence of identity loss among these russian-speaking immigrant informants, partly because of the lack of familiar cultural resources available to them in new zealand. some responded by attempting to reconstruct their old identities in the new zealand context, while others shifted to embracing a cosmopolitan identity that was not limited to a particular culture or geographical space. finally, the article by judy lattas takes a cultural studies approach to an investigation about the relationship between gay nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the gay and lesbian kingdom of the coral sea. drawing on qualitative interview correspondence and other ethnographic material, lattas explores the relationship between secession, micronationalist queering and the development of a new cosmopolitics. jock collins editor cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 35 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia stakeholder collaboration in a prospective world heritage area: the case of kokoda and the owen stanley ranges amy louise bott university of technology, sydney simone grabowski university of technology, sydney stephen wearing university of technology, sydney in tourism literature during the 1980s a significant trend became apparent, whereby arguments were made for the involvement of residents in tourism. (hardy, beeton & pearson 2002, p. 479) abstract the process of listing a world heritage area in developing countries is often much more complex than in the west. often all stakeholders are not taken into consideration. this paper presents a case study of kokoda and the owen stanley ranges, currently a tentative world heritage site, to show the complexities in stakeholder collaboration and attribution in the process of world heritage designation. six key stakeholders were identified in the study. upon examination of four attributes of stakeholders: power; legitimacy; urgency; and proximity, it was found that all stakeholders in this case study have a high legitimacy in the listing process however only the local community holds high levels of power, urgency and proximity. additionally it was found that several stakeholders, like the private sector, have too many weak relationships with other stakeholders, resulting in a lack of communication. these findings present the first step in understanding how it might be possible to improve the listing process of world heritage sites in developing countries through effective stakeholder collaboration. introduction research in the field of world heritage has often been undertaken to explore local stakeholder involvement in already listed heritage sites. this research has focused on visitation management (li, wu & cai 2008; shackley 1998) and cooperative site management initiatives between tourism operators and conservationists (evans & fielding 1998). to date there is limited research produced on local communities and their views on the developmental use of resources (jimura 2010), particularly pre-designation. the establishment of the world heritage convention (whc) in 1972 aimed to preserve world environmental and cultural heritage for future generations (unesco 2010b) by introducing conservation in global politics. over the past four decades the symbolic brand has changed the nature of heritage conservation and moulded the way in which tourism has interacted with heritage, to the extent that world heritage sites now include tourism as an 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 integral part of heritage listing and operations. the focus of this study is on local communities and how they have more recently been recognised as significant stakeholders within heritage tourism management, and therefore the world heritage listing process. the local communities once seen as barriers to conservation and consequently relocated from their land (lockwood & kothari 2006), are now recognised as significant contributors to the conservation of natural and cultural heritage preservation. at the same time the whc was formed, new approaches and opinions on tourism development shifted focus ‘to people in local contexts and small-scale, bottom up strategies for their development’ (scheyvens 2002, p. 51). ‘buzzwords’ associated with this theory included participation, sustainable development and empowerment, and an even greater focus was placed on communities and their development. sofield (2003) identifies empowerment, a focal point for this case, as a key contributor to sustainable tourism supporting bottom-up approaches in tourism development. the bottom-up approach implies that management and development strategies are devised from the local communities on the ground in the region (scheyvens 2002). while stakeholder collaboration has been investigated in already established world heritage sites and will be reported on in the following section, this study takes a different approach and explores stakeholder collaboration and the involvement of communities in the development and management phases of preparation for world heritage designation. stakeholders in tourism development and collaboration stakeholders in the process of tourism development are individuals and groups that have a vested interest in the tourism planning process or those who represent the interests of the resources in question. it is important to understand the interdependent relationship of heritage and tourism to be able to legitimise the stakeholders involved in the process; this then provides us with the context for their consideration in the world heritage listing process. the changing nature of heritage management has lead to the inclusion of certain stakeholders that previously were removed from the process completely; local communities (scheyvens 2002). timur (2008) proposes three main partners involved in sustainable tourism development collaboration: the private sector, public sector and the local residents. he investigates the representatives of these main groups and their interconnectedness. jamal and getz (1995), cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 37 mowforth and munt (1998) and wahab and pigram (1997) recognise and expand on the idea noting, ‘the basic objective is to involve all those affected by the proposed tourism development within the planning process’ (cited in aas et al. 2005, p. 30). in more recent research the natural environment is considered a stakeholder in collaboration of management (jamal & stronza 2009) as it represents the central theme and is often the playground for development. this addition presents a much larger group of interests to consider when planning for tourism development. an important initial stage in collaboration for heritage management is identifying and legitimising the stakeholders (aas, ladkin & fletcher 2005) concerned with the tourism development process. timur and getz (2008, p. 446) agree stating that ‘power and legitimacy are the core attributes of a stakeholder identification typology’. for collaboration to be successful, all stakeholders identified need to be considered and failure to do so could influence the outcome of a project (jamal & stronza 2009). stakeholder attributes can assist in the process of classifying and justifying those involved. mitchell, agle and woods (1997) established the three main attributes of stakeholders are power, which is the ability to influence, legitimacy of the relationship and urgency of the stakeholder’s claim (cited in jamal & stronza 2009, p. 173). importantly, driscoll and starik (2004) re-evaluate these three attributes and add a fourth, the proximity of a stakeholder to the area (cited in jamal & stronza 2009, p. 173). this is consistent with the idea stated earlier in this section that the natural environment becomes part of the stakeholder collaboration group. jamal & stronza (2009, p. 174) sum up stakeholder collaboration in relation to heritage tourism development; a stakeholder theory of collaboration in protected area destinations should, therefore, integrate the relationship between public/private sector organizations, the natural area destination and those who inhabit it, as well as others who have a “stake” in it. with the extraordinarily large number of stakeholders to be involved in such planning, conflict is inevitable but without the consideration of these stakeholders, planning outcomes are uncertain and can be disastrous. for example, in not considering communities in the world heritage listing process one main outcome has been the relocation of communities to outside the boundaries of the world heritage area which has led to social dislocation, 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 poaching and conflict between communities and tourists (see for example gulinck, vyverman, van bouchout & gobin 2001; van der aa, groote & huigen 2005; wall & black 2005). in a recent publication, kishore rao, the deputy director of the world heritage centre, emphasised the need for greater collaboration in world heritage areas (rao 2010). rao (2010, p. 168) questions the current system of site designation for the world heritage list and insists that there is room for more cooperation between stakeholders ‘who may possess the requisite technical knowledge and expertise, including local communities and civil society’. this demonstrates the demand for greater efforts towards collaboration at the international policy level, specifically with the designation of world heritage sites. it is however important to note that processes that attempt to empower indigenous stakeholders may not achieve this, as banerjee (2000) finds with the jabiluka/kakadu world heritage area. here the communities had no final power of veto on the process. this has also been seen in the joint management regimes in place in australia, where it has been recognised that they are essentially western cultural models of management with an inherent angloaustralian cultural bias (wearing & huyskens 2001). as cordell (cited in de lacy & lawson 1997, p. 176) found, some anangu (indigenous people of uluru) are highly critical of the ninety-nine year lease at uluru-kata tjuta national park, as they see it as a ‘denial of their ability to determine for themselves appropriate land use options’. these complexities of process can be identified through a study of the complications of stakeholder collaboration, particularly in protected areas. complexity of stakeholder collaboration due to the number of stakeholders involved in collaboration, it is clear that there is a substantial process of identifying those involved before collaboration strategies can be executed. each site has its own set of stakeholders specific to the region. with numerous opinions and perspectives on resource management, it can be expected there will be conflict in stakeholder collaboration. an understanding of this complexity is inherent to the review of previous development projects and the introduction of new, more collaborative approaches to the expansion of tourism within heritage sites and specifically here, in the world heritage listing process. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 39 it has been stated that historically tourism development was a top down approach, with governments and tourism operators establishing the industry. this caused great conflict when local residents were not only excluded from the planning process but also even displaced in some areas (sharpley & telfer 2002; telfer & sharpley 2008; wall & black 2005). since the 1980s recognition of this exclusion has encouraged research on the impact of tourism development on local communities (hardy & beeton 2009) and how this can affect tourists’ perception of a site. new approaches to tourism development have recognised the value of local communities and consequently participatory planning has meant these communities are not only considered but often central to tourism planning and management (bushell & eagles 2007). from a policy perspective, it is in the interests of tourism developers to consult and recognise local communities as valuable stakeholders. this then is transferable to the world heritage listing process. understanding different stakeholder perceptions is another component and cause of possible complications in collaboration (hardy & beeton 2009). perceptions of concepts such as tourism development, preservation and conservation of the resource in question, are key issues within effective collaboration. several studies (jamal & stronza 2009; jamal & getz 1995; millar 2006) have articulated these complications and demonstrate the importance of understanding stakeholders, their perceptions and making genuine considerations for inclusion. evans (2005 p. 46) discusses the gap in involvement between large private investors to governments and local communities and concludes there is a ‘lack of genuine local community and cultural involvement in heritage site management’. he acknowledges the need for collaboration between all key stakeholders in heritage management. evans also acknowledges there needs to be an inclusion of those displaced and disempowered. without these important stakeholders, the site becomes void of the heritage itself, the heritage that is being preserved in the first place. evans’ study demonstrates the linkage between heritage and tourism development through stakeholder collaboration. without the appropriate involvement of those important participants, there is going to be conflict and complication within any management plan. once involvement is established, another potential complication of stakeholder collaboration is the distribution of power between parties (aas et al. 2005; mckercher, ho & du cros 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 2005). involving the recognised parties is only the initial stage of collaboration, as there needs to be a willingness on their behalf to cooperate in the process (aas et al. 2005). the role of power is identified in this willingness within the different groups and needs to be addressed to better manage the collaboration. within these groups, power plays a key role as each set of stakeholders has differing priorities and expectations of potential resource management plans. conflict can result due to these power differences (jamal & stronza 2009). recognition of potential stakeholder conflict is the first step to designing an appropriate strategy to manage heritage conservation and tourism development. when aligning the concepts discussed in this review, it is apparent that there has been a shift in the paradigm in the management of heritage properties. millar (2006) calls this shift a sea change in the process of enlisting world heritage sites, as the concept of stakeholders expands to include host communities in the planning and development of their resources. rather than focusing on the effects of world heritage on local communities, millar proposes a case study of the stakeholder collaboration in the planning and development of a region in preparation for world heritage listing. this could therefore prevent the destructive nature of some tourism development on the natural and cultural environment and also assist in the education and development of local communities in the management of their heritage resource. methods this study employed a case study approach to explore the issue of stakeholder collaboration in world heritage area (wha) designation. the case study was the kokoda track and owen stanley ranges, papua new guinea (png), currently a site on the tentative list for world heritage consideration (unesco 2010a). the kokoda track runs through the owen stanley ranges and was the scene of a tough and bloody battle between japan and png, australia and new zealand in world war ii (wearing, grabowski, chatterton & ponting 2009). this site also represents an important tourism product for the people of png and a source of development for the 14 tribes that reside on the 96km track (wearing et al. 2009). six key stakeholder groups were identified and from these seven representatives were chosen and interviewed to understand how the process of world heritage designation has impacted them. the three key themes that emerged from the interviews were sustainability, stakeholder collaboration and the concept of world heritage. these interviews were subject to content cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 41 analysis according to these themes however only the first theme will be discussed in this paper. additionally, a number of documents were analysed to provide extra depth to the findings. these were documents prepared by some of the stakeholder groups such as ecotrekking kokoda: a plan for sustainable tourism prepared by the kokoda track foundation (2006). three techniques were used in stakeholder analysis: stakeholder objectives; stakeholder attribution identification; and stakeholder interactions. stakeholder objectives were examined in both a content analysis of secondary data and through the interview process. of particular relevance were the mission and vision statements of each stakeholder group. this was sourced on respective websites and through questioning in the interview process that established the differing objectives of key stakeholder groups. the method of attribute analysis is generally used to identify current stakeholder collaboration; it not only demonstrates the relationship between the attributes of the stakeholders, it also clearly shows how each stakeholder attribute compares with others. this is what can lead the process of stakeholder collaboration within tourism and protected areas (jamal & stronza 2009). the purpose of adapting the theory of mitchell, agle and woods (1997) to this study is to analyse and show how stakeholder legitimacy and involvement are interconnected and how stakeholder attributes affect current and potential collaboration (cited in aas et al. 2005). this analysis also includes the fourth dimension introduced by driscoll and starik (2004), known as the attribute of proximity (cited in aas et al. 2005). with an examination of current project documentation and through the interview process, the level of collaboration between key stakeholders was obtained. a line of questioning regarding the level of involvement of each key stakeholder in respective projects was examined. specifically relevant to this case was the involvement of the local communities in projects being developed and rolled out by the png and australian governments, the tour operators and the ngo. finally, stakeholder interactions analysis involved a manual coding of themes arising from the interviews to build an interactions web. this shows how strong or weak the relationships are between stakeholders. participants were questioned on how often (if at all) stakeholder groups consult one another on their respective projects and the level of involvement and collaboration between them. general feelings towards different stakeholder groups were also 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 determined through the interview process. this allowed the researcher to determine the relationships that exist between each stakeholder group. the results of each stakeholder analysis technique will be presented and discussed in the following sections. stakeholder collaboration: findings from the case study stakeholder relationships are complex. the stakeholders identified in this case study range from government departments and non-government organisations (ngos) to local management authorities, the private sector and of course, the local communities and landowners. literature has shown that understanding complexities and acknowledging and balancing stakeholder relationships proves difficult in a world heritage region (evans 2005; harrison 2005; icomos 1993; jimura 2010; li et al. 2008; nicholas, thapa & ko 2009; pedersen 2002; thompson 2005; van der aa et al. 2005; wager 1995; wall & black 2005; winter 2005). a pre-world heritage implementation approach would see effective stakeholder collaboration in place, with key stakeholders interacting and knowledge sharing, with the common goal of sustainability and finally, a nomination for world heritage listing. currently ‘research on collaborative tourism planning still relies on rather weak theories of power relations within community settings’ (reed 1997, p. 567). the assumption is that collaboration will override power imbalances in tourism planning when all stakeholders are included and when their needs are perceived to be met (reed 1997). this simplistic theory is not applicable in the case of png (cf. wearing, wearing & mcdonald 2010) and deliberate measures must be carefully introduced to enable indigenous people to take advantage of the tourism opportunities if the objectives are to achieve sustainable development. without such inclusion and ‘implementation of necessary measures, the industry might lose host communities’ support in a gradual manner, that may in turn threaten the sustainability of development in future’ (tosun 2002, p. 250). stakeholder objectives identifying differing stakeholder objectives is necessary to understand why collaboration can be difficult. each of the key stakeholder groups identified in this study represent the typical stakeholder groups in tourism development case studies and texts (mowforth & munt 2008; scheyvens 2002). the government of png (represented by the department of environment and conservation: dec), both federal and local agencies (represented by the kokoda track authority: kta); the government of australia (represented by the department of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 43 environment, water, heritage and the arts); the private sector (in this case study, trek operators); a prominent ngo (kokoda track foundation: ktf); and a representative of the local communities are the six key stakeholder groups. due to the png landownership laws the local communities and landowners, and their relationship with the other stakeholders, is of most interest in this discussion. as discussed, identification and legitimisation of stakeholders is a process of heritage tourism management that traditionally saw local communities excluded (scheyvens 2002). in more recent times, authors have described the evolution of community involvement, now recognising and legitimising these members as key stakeholders and valuable tools in the management of tourism (aas et al. 2005; jamal & stronza 2009; jamal & getz 1995; timur & getz 2008). specifically, jamal and stronza (2009) focus on communities and their participation in tourism in protected areas, a theory ideally suited for application in this study. after identifying the key stakeholders and completing the interviewing process, stakeholder objectives were extracted from the data. these objectives demonstrate the vast scope of vested interests of each stakeholder group. table 1 clearly shows why complexities in collaboration exist. these objectives assist the reader in comprehending what motivates the stakeholder groups and where their focus lies. a useful tool in understanding the stages of each stakeholder group, in relation to the development of this tourist site, is butler’s (1980) product life cycle model. generally accepted as an analytical framework in tourism studies, this model is used to demonstrate that as the tourist site develops and moves through each phase, the involvement and objectives of stakeholders increase and change. the model depicts a tourism destination’s development as the number of tourists increase over a period of time. the destination begins at an exploration stage and after a period of development and stagnation, can either go to rejuvenation or decline. while the model is designed to describe the development of a region in relation to tourist numbers, it can also be applied to the range of key stakeholders and their involvement and the current stage of participation in development. the principals of the model remain the same, as do each stage. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 table 1: stakeholder objectives stakeholder objective png government dec ‘what we’re doing here in papua new guinea as much as through necessity as anything else it’s got to be built from the bottom up so that the last step in the whole process is a [world heritage] listing.’ local authority kta ‘well our role as an organisation, we are very operationally focused organisation, so we are not really a policy organisation, we’re doers not really planners. our key role is to manage the track. our number one strategy over the…last year has been to build trust [with the communities].’ aus government dewha ‘the australian government is committed to making sure the kokoda track is protected and assisting papua new guinea to do that but also in improving the livelihoods of the people along the track which has i guess, two links: one, it links it to the protection and conservation of the track, but also just under the general ausaid relationship and development that goes on with png more generally. we have a delegation…and we're playing a regional role in terms of assisting neighbours…with their uptake of the world heritage convention.’ private sector ‘i'm the director of the company… i guide treks along the track…and the treks are fully guided, all-inclusive.’ ngo ktf ‘our main goal is that we want to improve the livelihoods of the local people alongside…honouring the kokoda story…plus finding a new generation of papua new guinean leaders. we really do try to listen to the needs of the locals and then try to rally support.’ local communities ‘as a local person, i think…development is very vital since tourism brings with it a lot of opportunity apart from creating income earning opportunity to people that live in the rural villages along the kokoda track.’ based on the analysis of primary and secondary data, it would seem that the governments of both png and australia are operating in the development stage of the product life cycle. both governments have identified the potential for growth and recognise the importance of development and have been implementing programs over the past two years. it would be reasonable to suggest the kta is also in the development stage of the lifecycle, due to the nature of its work as the local authority responsible for implementing the government policy. briefly, the kta is a special purpose authority set up with the intention of managing the kokoda track. the australian governments’ involvement in the kta began under the joint understanding, signed by the png and australian governments in 2008. up until january 2011 it had been primarily staffed by australian nationals with png counterparts now slowly assuming lead roles. the ktf on the other hand, through its community workshops and project focus, would be considered to be moving from the involvement to development stage of the product life cycle. ‘we ran workshops in the communities asking them to think about a five year and a ten year vision of where they want to see their communities going. what we kept hearing was that they want development, they want change’ (kokoda track foundation). from this point, the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 45 ktf has focused their project design around community visions, and is now implementing development programs in the field of micro business, health, education and community development. in contrast to other key stakeholders, the private sector has recently gone into the decline stage of development. a question posed by a spokesperson for one of the trekking companies was: ‘the numbers have dropped 30%, how can we reverse this?’ (private sector 1). this decline in tourist numbers shows that the trekking industry went into decline in 2009. the stakeholders who are directly affected by the weakening of the industry will have a different focus than stakeholders in the development stage of the life cycle. the local communities are currently situated at the involvement stage of the kokoda track and owen stanley ranges product life cycle. the community spokesperson indicated: people participate in the very basic activities that they are very familiar with, without any proper tourism and hospitality training. for the kokoda track, the tourism development and activities has just started. there are still lots of opportunities for development in the roles that people play in supporting this industry. the representatives for the ktf, dec, dewha and kta all agree that the involvement of the communities in development is in the initial stages and limited to a basic knowledge of tourism. with such a variety of development stages evident in the analysis of the kokoda track and owen stanley ranges’ key stakeholders, barriers to collaboration are clear. the process of collaboration requires stakeholders to be on equal and similar levels, particularly in relation to their focus for tourism development. it will be important for the future development of the trekking industry that involvement from stakeholders is equal and the focus of development is concurrent between each group. in the context of stakeholder collaboration in the area, the communities are in a unique position. while the communities are only in the early stages of involvement in the product life cycle, their influence is significantly more than that of local resident communities in other regions. the landownership laws in png empower the communities to exercise their rights regarding the development of their land. if communities are unhappy with development or changes, they can exercise their right by closing their section of the track. this attribute of 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 power is unique to this case. enquiry into the theory of stakeholder attributes will facilitate an understanding of power in this case, especially that of the local communities. stakeholder attribute identification a stakeholder identification attribute analysis has been completed to aid the understanding of the difficulties of stakeholder collaboration in this case. information obtained from the interviews and secondary data has been synthesised and provides the foundation for the application of this theory (figure 1). attributes power legitimacy urgency proximity st ak eh ol de rs png government high high high medium local authority medium high high high aus government high high medium medium private sector medium high medium high ngo low high medium medium local communities very high very high high high figure 1: stakeholder attribute identification analysis firstly, the attribute of power is a central theme in stakeholder collaboration theory and an important and interesting concept in this research. the reason that the australian government is considered to have a high degree of power is due to the bilateral agreement with png under a joint understanding signed in 2008. the substantial financial, technical and expert assistance being provided by the australian government makes its position one of power, almost equal to that of the png government. whilst traditionally, governments and policy makers hold the majority of the power (mowforth & munt 2008; scheyvens 2002), in this study the landowners and communities are in fact the most powerful players. the kta stated that it is ‘organic law, which imbeds all power in the landowners’. due to legislation in png, customary land rights automatically place the communities in the position of power; the power to determine their own resource management and land use planning (kta 2010). this is very different from local communities around the world where their experience has been that of oversight, exclusion and even relocation in some instances (evans 2005; gulinck et al. 2001; van der aa et al. 2005; wall & black 2005). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 47 other powerful stakeholders such as the governments of png and australia, need to work with and for these powerful communities; without their acceptance, progress will be slow. demonstrations made by the communities have proven this in the past. when the landowners believed they had not been consulted or they were not happy with the management of the track, they simply closed their portion of the track (kta 2010). this causes disruption for the tourism operators and tension for the local authority and management team of the track to resolve these issues1 . the second attribute of legitimacy is particularly important with reference to the powerful community landowners. scheyvens (2002) discusses how communities’ opinions should be considered in planning and management, which is a fundamental step for this region. legitimising the landowners required other powerful stakeholders to ‘acknowledge and appreciate that communities have the necessary knowledge and skills’ to take part in planning and management of their own resources (wearing et al. 2010, p. 66). although all stakeholders have a high legitimate stake, it is the communities who will be most affected by decisions made regarding world heritage. urgency, the third attribute, refers to the ability of stakeholders to act in collaboration. ‘power alone is insufficient, legitimacy is necessary to enable authority and urgency is required for execution’ (jamal & stronza 2009, p. 173). this has been proven by the landowner demonstrations with regard to dispute settlements on the kokoda track. clearly the local stakeholders like the png government and the communities will be most affected by any changes to the kokoda track and owen stanley ranges. finally, the element of proximity is important when evaluating the three stakeholder groups who share a high level of connectedness in the region. the communities own the land on which the private sector operates and the local authority controls track management. the two governments have been ranked medium because while both of the governments do have some representatives on the ground in the region, the majority of the work is completed off site and in a policy format. the kta is in close proximity because it is responsible for managing the trekking fees and continuing a dialogue between the local communities and the federal governments. any problems that occur in the region (most notably in recent times the death 1 for more on local power relations in the study region, extensive detailed review can be found in wearing, wearing and mcdonald’s 2010 paper entitled understanding local power and interactional processes in sustainable tourism: exploring village–tour operator relations on the kokoda track, papua new guinea. 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 of trekkers and the withdrawal of the png airlines flights into kokoda) will ultimately need to be resolved by the kta. attribute identification analysis is extremely useful in framing and understanding the mixture of stakeholder interconnectedness in preparation for future re-evaluation and establishment of collaboration techniques. if a regional master strategy is to be formulated, close attention would need to be made towards these stakeholder attributes and how they could affect collaboration efforts. stakeholder interactions close examination of the current interactions between the key stakeholders in this study is required to better understand what collaboration is currently occurring. the understanding of stakeholder attributes helps to clarify why some relationships are successful while others are not. lines of communication differ within each organisation and some stakeholders focus more on collaboration than others. a relationship web has been created to demonstrate the known, unknown and weak lines of communication between the key stakeholders (figure 2). this web does not attempt to rank the degree of successful communication and relationships between each stakeholder. ethnographic research would be required to make these judgements and that is not within the scope of this research. the two governments involved in this research state that knowledge-sharing is transferred freely between each government agency and taskforce, establishing the solid line between them. australia and png both have a kokoda taskforce with respective government agencies working under this, communicating projects to field staff and focusing on the development of policy. ‘being a federal environment department, we set more policy and we implement program delivery and the mechanisms around it and we do rely on the agencies on the ground in png to deliver a lot of that’ (dewha 2010). the local agency on the ground that delivers much of the policy is the kta. there are interactions between the kta, dewha and dec. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 49 figure 2: stakeholder relationship web the kta is at the heart of the ground management team. it is located in the region and is a key link between the governments, communities and other stakeholders. the kta is responsible for implementing policy from png and australian governments and dealing directly with the landowners. this is a ‘middleman’ or intermediary role. the kta states its ‘number one strategy…over the last year has been to build trust’ with the landowners and communities (kta 2010), which is an important step in the intermediary process. the kta intermediary role includes communicating information from the landowners to all key stakeholders, including appropriate government agencies. it is also responsible for reporting information from the track and the communities to the png minister of tourism culture, the png tourism promotion authority as well as dewha. the staff of the kta are in fact contracted and financially positioned by the australian government to work in the specific managerial roles, as stated in the bilateral joint understanding (department of environment water heritage and the arts, 2008). this is an example of how important the relationship with the kta is for the powerful stakeholders involved. there is also an important relationship and constant interaction between the kta and the private sector. ‘the local authorities have the delicate task of juggling private sector interests with local resident needs and wants, in order to maintain the economic health of the local communities dec dewha kta private sector ktf known relationship weak relationship unknown relationship 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 community and ensure that development is sustainable’ (jamal & getz 1995, p. 193). the kta holds two forums annually, inviting the trek operators to pre-season and post-season meetings to discuss the track and all aspects of tourism. the trek operators are also invited to the kta office at the completion of each trek to discuss their experience on the track and to advise of any issues they have experienced (kta 2010). this communication is vital for the management of the track, particularly maintenance and community issues, such as track closures or land disputes. this demonstrates that the local authority has solid relationships with all key stakeholders in the kokoda track and owen stanley ranges region. the private sector in this study consists of trek operators who operate their businesses guiding travellers across the kokoda track. more attention needs to be paid to their voices. businesses have been operating in the area for over 20 years and have established relationships with the landowners that are functioning and trusting. with their regional knowledge and close partnership with local communities, they are a valuable resource in collaboration. however, to gain a voice they need to work on their extremely weak ties to the government departments and key ngo in the region, the ktf. the ktf appears to be in close communication with the communities. it is the main stakeholder that interacts with communities and has a strong focus on communication with these communities and other stakeholders in the region. it appears to have a solid grasp of community needs through the participatory rural appraisal workshops completed in 20032005. this was discussed in their interview and is also presented in the eco-trekking kokoda strategic plan (kokoda track foundation, 2006). these workshops provided the organisation with a greater understanding of community needs. they also fostered strong relationships with the landowners and communities that other stakeholders would not possess. we have good connections with… (the) png government, department of education, department of environment and conservation…it’s more of a case at the moment where we inform them and keep them up to date with what we are already doing along the track. i would like to see that move into a bit more of a back and forth relationship where they can keep us up to date with the biggest needs on the track but…we often find that sometimes it’s that they are not engaged with the communities and we happen to be more engaged with them [communities] (ktf). this provides an interesting point of discussion. the ktf appears to be reporting as much as possible to the leading government agency, yet there is no reciprocation. the spokesperson cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 51 for dec did mention the ktf, yet no official communication lines from the agency were acknowledged in the interview. there was also no mention from dec of any current or forecast work with this ngo. potentially in this region, ngos are under-valued and their knowledge is underutilised, something that is not uncommon around the world (scheyvens, 2002). knowledge-sharing is vital for the success of programs like the ones implemented in this case study region, and those expert in this region, being the local communities and those agencies working closely with them, need to be at the centre of collaboration efforts. democracy is particularly relevant in the collaboration process. ‘politically the collaboration process is more equitable than the conventional approach, as the views of stakeholders are as legitimate as those of an expert’ (bramwell & lane 1999, bramwell & sharman 1999, hall 2000 and hall 1999 cited in aas et al. 2005, p. 31). this view is one that needs to be recognised by all stakeholders in the case study region. while the dewha believe its program, the kokoda initiative, is being driven by png, it is important that advisors on the ground are not only consulting and listening to the needs and wants of the local communities but realising the value of their views. the people of the kokoda track and owen stanley ranges have extensive local knowledge of the environment and the entire region that would be invaluable to the other stakeholder groups. conclusion the nature of the kokoda track and owen stanley ranges region differs greatly from other tourism destinations. jamal and getz (1995 p. 193) state: the destination domain is thus characterised by an ‘open-system’ of interdependent, multiple stakeholders, where the actions of one stakeholder impact on the rest of the actors in the community. furthermore, no single organisation or individual can exert direct control over the destination’s development process. in the case study presented here, jamal and getz’s statement is not entirely true as there is one stakeholder group that exerts more control than others. unlike other countries, customary landownership in png is prevalent and the local communities own the land that has been put up for tentative world heritage listing. therefore although the community members may be less educated and less involved in the planning and strategy formulation of tourism development, they not only have the ability to influence the progress of any project, their consent is required and they have the ability to veto any decisions. local communities were 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 shown to have high levels of power, legitimacy, urgency and proximity. it then seems only logical that their genuine inclusion is paramount in the planning and management of what is simply their backyard. in this way, all stakeholder objectives need to be carefully reconsidered and communication between different groups needs strengthening. recognition and legitimisation of all stakeholders however is only the beginning of successful collaboration, with the process of stakeholder attribute identification providing a platform for justifying involvement (jamal & stronza 2009; timur & getz 2008). despite the common diverse range of stakeholder objectives in tourism development, stakeholder attribute identification has proven to be particularly relevant and significant to this unique case. the role of power was found to be a major factor to the process of development and sustainability in this potential world heritage region. the practice of customary landownership in png has contributed to the landowner’s high degree of power in collaboration; it is unusual that the local community stakeholders hold such a powerful position. essential to the success of collaborative efforts and the development of the regional strategy, will be all stakeholders understanding the communities’ role. the existence of this will ensure landowners and communities in this region will be consulted and included in collaboration and planning for world heritage. the next step in the world heritage inscription process will be the establishment of a recognised protected area, ensuring the appropriate safeguarding of the natural and cultural heritage of the kokoda track and owen stanley ranges. this process will require the cooperation of all stakeholders and particularly the participation and acceptance of landowning communities. in accordance with the world heritage convention’s nomination guidelines, an extensive protected area management plan will need to be submitted along with documentation identifying the universally accepted heritage values and an appropriate tourism development strategy for the region. 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no. 2-4, pp. 182-209. wearing, s.l., wearing, m. & mcdonald, m., 2010, 'understanding local power and interactional processes in sustainable tourism: exploring village-tour operator relations on the kokoda track, papua new guinea', journal of sustainable tourism, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 61-76. winter, t., 2005, 'landscape, memory and heritage: new year celebrations at angkor, cambodia', in d. harrison & m. hitchcock (eds), the politics of world heritage: negotiating tourism and conservation, channel view books, london, pp. 50-65. http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5061/%3e� http://whc.unesco.org/en/convention%3e� 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia moving beyond the “lump-sum”: football united and jp morgan as a case study of partnership for positive social change anne bunde-birouste school of public health and community medicine, university of new south wales nicholas bull school of medicine, university of new south wales brad mccarroll mutual sport abstract this paper is based on the foundation of an integrated sport program for positive social change and health promotion, and presents a case study of a community-based health promotion/social change organization (football united) and the relationship it has with a corporate sponsor (jp morgan). the paper articulates the various issues that arise in the management of such a program and the involvement of sponsors in its operation, specifically dealing with themes of corporate partnership and capacity building in the context of corporate social responsibility towards social change. illustrated through the jp morgan football united case study, the paper explores: the difficulties of maintaining a program that remains faithful to the expectations and demands of each stakeholder group involved; the challenges involved in harnessing support for a program when moving beyond the one-dimensional transfer of funds; the different needs and expectations of/for volunteers with this type of complex health promotion intervention. this case study has been written to propose that an ‘integrated partnership’ between a corporate body and a social change organization can produce significant advantages beyond the scope of uncomplicated financial contribution. the key feature documented is that corporate investment can move beyond economic donations or “lump-sum” social responsibility, towards targeted contributions to detailed outcomes through sustainable and meaningful involvement in a health promotion framework. this in turn equates to funding stability and a more empowering partnership for the health promotion/social change organization. introduction there is research evidence that social exclusion is a determinant of negative physical and psycho-social health (hayes, gray, edwards & australian institute of family studies 2008; vichealth 2005). in australia, humanitarian immigrant and refugee families are among those most vulnerable to social exclusion. means that best enable humanitarian refugees to overcome barriers that hinder their overt participation in australia’s social fabric have stirred debate in policy decision making and the public conscience in australia in recent years (collins, harrison & gifford 2007). advocacy by members of government, academic, corporate and sporting cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 93 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia sectors is indicative of heightened awareness about problems of social inclusion and willingness to act in the interests of vulnerable groups, such as humanitarian immigrants and refugee families. ‘football united’ is an innovative grassroots approach using a football development program to foster social cohesion within areas with high refugee settlement, through leadership, skills development, mentoring, and the creation of links with a range of local community leaders and organizations. football united was conceived as a health promotion/social change intervention run by the university of nsw school of public health and community medicine. developed through a participatory community building health promotion methodology, it has expanded from a number of small-scale activities (camps, weekly community programs) to include eight regular school programs, saturday morning programs, camps, large-scale tournaments, personal development programs and opportunities to represent football united on a global scale. these programs involve approximately 800 refugee, immigrant and disadvantaged youth and children per year in a direct manner, with an impact reaching far wider across their families and communities. through shared experiences and a passion for football (also known as soccer), football united aims to encourage relationships, foster personal development and capacity building within communities, and mitigate the effects of both forced expatriation and resettlement on individual and community health and well-being. on a secondary level there are more specific objectives: to support and develop the ideal of football as a means for meaningful social change; to advocate solutions to the various problems faced by different refugee groups both in australia and internationally; and to contribute to the academic literature on community-level complex health promotion/social change interventions in multi-ethnic settings. football united has expanded to represent a multitude of contributors from various sectors. beginning as an academic research initiative through unsw, the program has grown to receive support through government affiliated research grants, sporting bodies on local, national and international levels, charitable foundation contributions, and corporate sector involvement through financial sponsorship and volunteering. there is significant difference between the 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia motives for support by each group and the concerns that they have for program development and operation. taking local sporting bodies as an example, their support comes with the assurance that football united runs in concert with the pre-existing football competitions and will not become a competitor for players, sponsorship or support from football development initiatives. in this sense football united is multi-faceted and complex, where mixed contributions need to be managed to provide clear objectives, despite differing priorities and expectations for the program (bunde-birouste 2009). on the background of the aforementioned diversity of contributors, this paper presents a case study of the relationship between jp morgan, a corporate sponsor, and football united, to articulate the various issues that arise in management of such a program and the involvement of sponsors in its operation. illustrated through the jp morgan-football united case study, the paper explores: the difficulties of maintaining a program that remains faithful to the expectations and demands of each stakeholder group involved; the challenges involved in harnessing support for a program when moving beyond the one-dimensional transfer of funds; the different needs and expectations of/for volunteers that this type of complex health promotion intervention requires. themes of corporate partnership and capacity building are addressed against a background of corporate social responsibility, corporate philanthropy and sport for social change. to set the scene for examination of this case study, we begin the paper with an initial review of the literature examining the current refugee situation in western and south-western sydney, and the role that sport can play in contributing to positive social change. a summary of literature relevant to the involvement of multi-factorial support and sponsorship in health promotion interventions completes this section. the jp morgan-football united case study then provides material for discussion, which shares important lessons specific to this program, providing some direction for the application of innovative volunteering strategies in the corporate sector for the support of social change initiatives. setting the scene the western and south-western regions of sydney have the highest refugee densities in australia (nsw refugee health service 2007). of the 13,000 individuals accepted into australia cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 95 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia each year, through the refugee and humanitarian program, 3,200 to 4,200 settle in these areas (nsw refugee health service 2007; nsw refugee health service and startts 2006). a significant portion of these are children and adolescents – 40% under the age of 25 (nsw refugee health service and startts 2006). child and adolescent refugees can be especially vulnerable to health and psychosocial problems because prior experiences of conflict, social upheaval and displacement, plus resettlement in a unfamiliar environment, can interfere with their physical, psychological and educational development (allotey 2003; bond,et al. 2007; centre for multicultural youth issues & o'sullivan 2006; daud, af klinteberg & rydelius 2008; fazel & stein 2003). adapting to resettlement in a new setting can affect both the social and cultural identity of youth (cassity & gow 2005; zwi et al. 2007). the loss of family, friends and an entire social network is further exacerbated by language and cultural differences that form a barrier to acculturation and often lead to the marginalization or separation of groups of refugees (allotey 2003; brough, gorman, ramirez & westoby 2003; porter & haslam 2005). the potential for long-term negative health and social outcomes among refugee children and adolescents means that particular attention should be paid to their resettlement, and the ongoing difficulties they face in transition (francis & cornfoot 2007; zwi et al. 2007). health promotion and positive social change through sport team-orientated sport has been linked to improvements in social inclusion, ability to deal with adversity, and community cohesion (atherley 2006). football is gathering momentum as a medium that can contribute to positive social change, and is capable of accommodating individuals regardless of race, ethnicity, religion or political views (fifa 2008; mcguire 2008). football provides one of the best sports with which to build such inclusive programs. it is relatively inexpensive, it enjoys worldwide enthusiasm, it is designed as a non-violent, virtually non-contact sport, and very importantly it is played by both genders, thus is not exclusive to either males or females ( bunde-birouste 2009). engagement in the sport can improve tolerance and basic trust between individuals involved; however, a football program needs to interact with many other influences to provide meaningful social change (kamphuis et al. 2008). sport is closely related to social cohesion, health promotion and community empowerment (tonts 2005). 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia participation in sport can, if developed appropriately, can contribute to a sense of belonging, self-identity and social support (tonts 2005; walseth 2006; walseth & fasting 2002). social networks help individuals to mobilize communal resources and facilitate community action, resulting in feelings of inclusion and mutual obligation (atherley 2006; tonts 2005; walseth 2006). organised sports in the australian context offer many avenues of engagement in addition to play, such as team and club management, and volunteering in different capacities (cashman 1995). in terms of football united, however, the leadership noted that community sport, as currently practiced, involves both inclusion and exclusion. participation is either limited or not possible for many socio-disadvantaged youth due to a myriad of barriers such as financial, transport and logistical constraints. football united’s model of football for social development is therefore designed to play a part in addressing these wider issues of exclusion. community-based health promotion and social change approaches health promotion is necessarily complex, as it requires a multifaceted, multidimensional approach, given that through it there are attempts to address the vast range of influences on health and well-being. community-level health promotion interventions increasingly focus on community empowerment and socio-ecological change, which adhere to modern, sophisticated health promotion ideals (bracht 1999; kelleher 2007). community programs have the potential for significant socio-cultural change, yet to do so require careful planning and constant monitoring and adaptation to achieve success (bracht 1999; gardner & liamputtong 2003). ritchie and rowling (1997) outline four characteristics that best practice health promotion interventions have in common:  they are contextual, in that they are developed not only for the individuals within the situation but for the specifics of the social and environmental factors of that actual situation  they are participatory in that they involve community members and other stakeholders in decisions about what happens  they are multi-strategic in that they attempt to address the issues from a variety of perspectives, and  they are dynamic in that they adapt over the course of the intervention. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 97 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the football united program team goes to great lengths to apply these characteristics at all levels of the intervention, including the engagement and interaction with its primary corporate partners, of which jp morgan is one. corporate support and community-based health promotion in recent decades there has been a paradigm shift in the domain of corporate discretionary spending (margolis & walsh 2003). multinational corporations are reallocating resources in light of a more palpable social responsibility, which has arisen through economic and health-related investigation into the ethics of corporate profit-making within communities (margolis & walsh 2003; orlitzky, schmidt & rynes 2003). firms are no longer governed solely by profiteering as the value of involvement in social and health sectors rapidly increases (berrone & gomez-mejia 2009; goddard 2004; orlitzky, schmidt & rynes 2003). economic activity is being considered in an increasingly interdisciplinary context. social responsibility and the impact of the corporate sector on community and individual wellbeing imply that firms should be valued according to complex interests (berrone & gomez-mejia 2009; goddard 2004; margolis & walsh 2003; schmidt & rynes 2003). the benefits related to corporate health promotion is an expanding practical and academic notion therein (margolis & walsh 2003). interventions can influence corporate functions on various levels. humanitarian investment can attract potential employees, improve employee morale and customer loyalty, and enhance corporate, government and media relationships (sargeant & crissman 2006). community development can improve health and individual empowerment with positive financial outcomes, which reflects the interdependence of health and business (goddard 2004; shaw 2008). further, there is an emerging body of evidence that those companies more committed to sustainable engagement in social sectors appeared to outperform peers in the financial market (atkearney 2009; schmidt & rynes 2003). corporate support is often primarily financial, as this is the most easily mobilized resource (sargeant & crissman 2006). however, partnerships within health promotion programs have the 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia capacity to provide volunteering opportunities, improve understanding of both the problem and the intervention, and utilize partnerships to advocate to a wider audience. football united considered through an economic framework in assisting an underserviced target population through unique intervention strategies, football united represents a hybrid organization spanning government, academic, corporate, community and sport sectors. a schematic representation of the football united partnership model is presented in figure 1. while this configuration represents a strong blend of ideals, it requires complex maneuvering and persistent engagement to successfully maintain involvement of the various stakeholders. the workings of each sector demonstrate the challenges encountered in garnering support for football united. figure 1: football united’s partnership model cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 99 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia football in nsw experiences widespread support and participation, which includes professional level competition. however, participation is primarily through representative school competitions or amateur clubs. these options are sometimes not available to many refugee and disadvantaged youth. importantly, then, football united aims to promote participation for those not able to access these options. additionally, football united works in concert with local clubs and schools to provide further football development opportunities for eligible participants. in addition to local football clubs, football united has partnerships with local schools and other community organizations, such as migrant resource centers. football clubs require a substantial amount of funding to facilitate grounds hire, access to equipment and player insurance. unfortunately, the limited government support for football and the relatively low profile of the professional league mean there are not enough resources to support the abundance of clubs in nsw. that said, football receives more support than many other olympic and non-olympic sports. the limited government funding means that the cost of membership with local football clubs is very often prohibitive to those with little financial resources, such as recently arrived refugee settlers. this impacts football united directly as well, in that there are minimal options for support from this sector, thus a need for reliance on other benefactors to support the program costs. football united currently receives a mixture of support including personal and private foundation donations, federal and state government grants, and corporate support of a variety of types. the program is both a practical health promotion intervention as well as a study for development of other upstream community-level programs and innovative qualitative research methods, which is reflected in the government contribution of operational and research grants from various departments, and in-kind support from the school of public health and community medicine, unsw. this functional duality requires vigorous planning, with early optimization of processes rather than an “experiential learning” progression, and staff for operation and observation. 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia through engagement with corporate sponsors, football united receives crucial financial support and access to resources. football united is not a conventional organization. to the uninitiated, it superficially appears to fall under the narrow silo of football development. this has an effect that the program often misses out on government sponsored opportunities, as proposals for support to other sectors such as health, education or immigrant support fail to consider the wider impacts that the program. hence potential funders, including corporations, require education about the diverse areas of intervention and impact of the program itself. in addition, clarification is needed to explain the economic landscape football united resides in, highlighting both the financial inadequacies of amateur football and the labour intensive requirements of research and program operation. this underlines the importance of proper advocacy and understanding of social issues and interventions, which can eliminate the phenomenon of “passing the buck” for corporate responsibility. methodology: providing evidence through narrative this paper uses a case study within the operation of football united to illustrate one example of corporate partnership in a health promotion program. it is through these partnerships that football united is able to sustain its work to impact on the health and wellbeing of the individuals involved, and the social capital of their communities. they also provide the resources for expansion and internal development for the dissemination of football united’s intentions to a larger target population. ethnographic study of football united and its relationship with jp morgan considers the management of a social change organization and the involvement of a corporate sponsor in its operation. this approach uses participant observation and key stakeholder interviews for data collection. qualitative research, in the context of a social change intervention, begins with descriptive personal appraisal of the intervention and the roles played by the various groups involved, which is then coloured by documentation of the individual opinions and experiences of key stakeholders. from the inspection of this raw data it is possible to extrapolate a detailed description of the intervention, the nature of the context it inhabits, the activities of each operational group, and the dynamics of relationships between groups. it allows for cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 101 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia comprehensive and descriptive understanding through thematic analysis (reeves, kuper & hodges 2008). collection of raw data was completed by a senior member of football united involved in direct interaction with jp morgan, as well as other corporations, and granville south high school. he was active in organizational correspondence between football united, jp morgan and granville south high school, while also supervising actual program operation. participant observation was a technique used for data collection. a record of personal observations was used to provide an in-depth description of operational processes and the changes noted over the research period (silverman 2004). importantly, participant observation yields data from within the context of the intervention, granting the researcher a more holistic understanding of salient issues and significant events. however, this form of data collection is highly labour intensive, and so usually a single individual performs the research. this situation is highly sensitive to bias; the researcher needs to understand the role they must play in faithfully recording the sentiments and interactions of others, untarnished by personal partiality or preconceptions (reeves, kuper & hodges, 2008; silverman 2004). interviewing was completed through identification of key stakeholders and then semi-structured interviews. the semi-structured interview followed an open format, which covered broad foci aimed at proposing discussion that could be further explored through dynamic interviewer/interviewee interactions (silverman 2004). the purpose of this format was to create input that directly addressed themes related to corporate involvement in a social change organization, while allowing the interviewer a freedom to facilitate expression of the more significant individual opinions and observations. while this form of data collection provides significant insight into personal attitudes, it rarely produces quantifiable results reeves, kuper & hodges 2008; silverman 2004). the framework approach was utilized to code and then distribute the relevant verbatim quotes into distinct thematic segments (pope, ziebland, & mays 2000). the triangulation of these data sets forms the basis for inference in the following findings and discussion. 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia findings jp morgan has been working in partnership with football united for more than two years. a preexisting mentoring relationship existed between jp morgan sydney’s ceo and the principal of granville south high school, which was part of the jp morgan engagement with the australian business community network. a senior partner of jp morgan, already involved with football united, facilitated a natural link for both the company and the school. what follows is a summary of the program and relationship that developed between football united and jp morgan through engagement in the program, and some of the lessons learned. football united at granville south high school the football united granville south high school program has a compound purpose. it is designed to empower youth leaders from years 10-12 as coaches and coordinators of a football program for year 7 and 8 students within the pe curriculum. this allows for individual skills development and mentoring opportunities through sport. hence it is an opportunity to positively influence the behaviour of students within the school and improve the image and reputation of granville south high school within the local community. more specifically, these goals are achieved through the following processes. between 10 and 20 youths are identified by the school on the basis of leadership potential and/or need for engagement and are then provided with coach training and accreditation. they deliver a weekly program for years 7 and 8 within their pe classes. the coach training, provided by football united in partnership with the australian sports commission, is run over 5 weeks prior to any coaching activities. youth completing the course receive certification from football federation australia (ffa) and the australian sports commission (asc), enabling them to not only coach for football united programs but to engage in mainstream ffa and asc programs. the program is then delivered to year 7 students in term 1, year 8 students in term 2, and ‘disengaged’ students in term 3. term 4 is set aside for new coach training and a gala day for feeder primary schools. youth leaders are timetabled off class for 2 periods per week to run the program, while a teacher is required for general supervision. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 103 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the program further engages community interests by providing a football development squad for school representation in various competitions and involving feeder primary schools, local football clubs and community groups in delivering community-based gala days. involvement of football united football united has various responsibilities in the management and operation of the granville south high school program, and coordinates involvement with other football united programs and stakeholders. the equipment used during the coaching sessions is provided by football united, which includes balls, cones, bibs etc. the facilities are on site at granville south high school. a head coach is employed by football united to provide guidance and supervision for the youth leaders and also to coach the football development squad. football united coordinates with all external partners; this includes the sporting bodies football federation australia, football nsw and the australian sports commission, local primary schools, and community groups. they are also involved in providing opportunities for representation and integration with other football united programs through competition days, representative squads, special leadership programs and other individual opportunities that football united provides. involvement of jp morgan jp morgan has provided extensive and diverse support and engagement for the granville south high school program and for football united more generally. funding has contributed to the establishment of the first curriculum-based football united program at granville south high school. it has also supported general operations within football united and provided start-up support to commence an indigenous program later in 2010. it is important to note that even during the recent global financial crisis the sydney office maintained its support, despite significant economic pressures. 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia approximately 70 jp morgan staff have been involved in the program as corporate volunteers. they have engaged in various activities, including fund raising, coaching logistics support, and mentoring. a volunteer coordinator was appointed to manage the involvement of jp morgan volunteers, and an internal fundraising committee of 10 staff volunteers was also appointed. a jp morgan ceo is also involved with the operations of football united as part of the football united advisory committee, and is in a mentoring relationship with the executive director of football united. jp morgan was intrinsically involved in the development and implementation of the football united leadership program in january 2010, which included hosting the participants, tours of the trading floors and seminars, and round table discussions with the young people for an entire day of the program. outcomes the granville program has entered its second year of operation, already achieving significant goals. these include meeting program expectations, delivering further opportunities for students, and contributing to the school’s reputation and involvement in the local community. ten youth leaders were accredited as coaches and facilitated the coordination and operation of the program; of these four were muslim girls. all year 7 and year 8 students at granville south high school participated in the program in 2009. youth leaders also arranged and managed a gala day for 3 feeder primary schools, which involved the participation of 150 students. the football development squad participated in an all football united gala day, representing granville south high school. four of the youth leaders were invited to attend the sydney fc season launch and presented sydney fc’s professional players with their 2009/2010 a-league playing jerseys. three of the female coaches attended a girls football united camp in narrabeen. in addition, professional player ahmad elrich, who is a former australian representative and football united ambassador, twice attended the coaching sessions at granville south high school, where he is a past student. feedback from the principal at granville south high school highlighted individual advances in the attitude of youth leaders towards volunteering and leadership, as well as wide-ranging cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 105 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia improvements in student behaviour within years 7 and 8 while participating in the program. the program was successful in meeting its objectives due to ongoing support and flexibility from teaching staff at granville south high school and financial support from jp morgan for its establishment and maintenance. the following discussion deals with the relationship between football united and jp morgan and the implications it has for furthering support for a social change organization by a corporate sponsor. engagement through volunteering: mutual capacity building while financial donations form the basis for the program’s corporate sponsorship, the partnership between football united and jp morgan demonstrates that this arrangement can also include contributions through participation and organizational input by individual employees. engagement in a volunteering capacity requires more in-depth communication regarding roledefinition and personnel coordination. through observation of the granville south high school program it was possible to appreciate the different goals and expectations of football united and jp morgan, as well as the operational solutions that allowed for effective volunteering activities. to meet its empowerment and capacity building objectives, football united requires volunteering input that can positively influence the experience of its participants, or facilitate better operation and organization of the program. an ideal volunteering role would involve regular, hands-on and long-term involvement in the program. this would ensure sustainability in the engagement, allowing for the growth of relationships with youth and implementation of mentoring roles that can empower and foster personal development. these expectations require that regular personal input should be possible, and that there is dedication to the long-term operation of the program. hence, the timing of the program needs to coincide with expected personal availability and there needs to be an understanding of the importance of sustainability, which stems from an appreciation of the aims of the program. this is an area where significant planning and engagement with the corporate body on the part of the 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia partner (i.e. football united) is valuable and necessary to improve volunteer input and satisfaction. the football united program is complex and as such there needs to be clear role definition to ensure that volunteer input is productive and best utilizes different volunteer talents, as well as meeting their expectations. to achieve this, football united developed a precise identification of the objectives required for program operation, which was then shared with the jp morgan volunteer coordinator, who was better able to attribute proposals to relevant staff and volunteers involved. this too requires planning and underlies the importance of administration and organization in providing beneficial engagement. jp morgan the involvement of jp morgan in significant corporate volunteer roles was relatively innovative in the experiences of football united and subsequently led to the identification of various challenges. these can be analyzed as management issues or engagement issues. as mentioned above, sustainable and regular input requires availability from jp morgan employees and effective coordination of volunteers. the major challenges in management were employee availability, and coordination of employee involvement. conversely the engagement issues related to effective role definition and the barriers to its implementation, which included volunteer education and reliability. the granville south high school program is run on weekdays and demonstrates the difficulties in optimizing timing for corporate volunteer involvement. football united requires volunteering during times that coincide with normal business hours. as a general rule, jp morgan employees tend not to be regularly available at these times. the outlying location of the school renders access difficult for the few who might be able to take some time out of a working week schedule. saturday mornings are the only time that football united programs overlap with regular availability for jp morgan employees. this is challenging for many to commit to, especially on a regular basis, as they often have personal and family commitments on saturdays. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 107 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia in light of these observations, it is clear that limited involvement is most realistic on the basis of timing, and only in exceptional circumstances is regular input possible. volunteer involvement can therefore be either a singular collective input, or a coordinated long-term roster shared between several individuals. the former was implemented through various fundraisers throughout the study period, whilst the latter was implemented on saturday mornings for a time. both require effective management of volunteers. to achieve this, a volunteer coordinator was appointed at jp morgan to coordinate the involvement of employees with football united. the role of the volunteer coordinator was crucial to motivate employees, where the level of engagement was very much dependent on the impetus of the manager. this was demonstrated when the volunteer coordinator underwent reshuffling and was forced to end their involvement with football united, reverberating as a cessation of all volunteering input for some time. this is an issue of concern for this concept of corporate volunteering across the program in general, as there is significant employment volatility in the current market. involvement in humanitarian programs requires socially-motivated intents and responsibility, which was commonly observed in interaction with jp morgan employees. the challenges arose in providing pathways to transform this intent into positive, contributory actions through effective role-definition. community-level interventions are inherently complicated and there are difficulties in finding effective areas of engagement, especially for those unaccustomed to the program. effective and significant role definition requires reliability from each volunteer, so that they can properly engage in program operation. the most effective strategy for football united was to plan out the roles of each volunteer before the day, and then communicate this information to them via the volunteer coordinator. this improved employee understanding and imposed responsibility on each volunteer to attend. additionally, engagement and sustainability from volunteers required education concerning the aims of the program and how the operations reflected these aims, as well as social skills in engaging and relating to refugee and underprivileged youths. the program is an upstream intervention, and subsequently the health and social outcomes are not as quantifiable, although no less significant, when compared with downstream interventions (kelleher 2007). improved understanding relates to an appreciation of the impact of the program, and the mechanisms 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia involved, as well as an appreciation of the circumstances and particular health issues faced by the target population. this in turn heightens awareness of the importance of the program and the need for sustainable volunteer engagement. where effective volunteer input was observed, there were various corresponding positive outcome factors. engagement needs to be within the realms of the expectations of both partners, which requires compromise on the side of football united. setting realistic goals for volunteering opportunities is important; primarily they represented one-off fundraising events, which place less reliance on individual input. ongoing communication between football united and the volunteer coordinator is also required, as is provision of education regarding the purpose of the program and the health problems being addressed. finally, there needs to be definite structure to volunteering opportunities through role definition; this aids the actions of the volunteer coordinator and ensures purposeful and useful engagement of volunteers. specific comments regarding partner benefits and engagements the relationship between jp morgan and football united is multidimensional, involving financial support, volunteer involvement and management guidance and input. the interaction could create conflicting expectations of the involved parties, potentially compromising strategies used to facilitate a productive and effective affiliation. the complexity of this relationship needs to be taken into account when considering the potential benefits for both corporate and partner organizations in embarking on health promotion and social change programs. the corporation several areas of benefit can be identified for jp morgan in terms of its association with involvement with football united. broadly, there are three levels of impact: i) improvements in social and community outcomes, ii) improvements in the corporate profile of jp morgan, and iii) staff development opportunities arising from the involvement. football united in this relationship is providing an outlet for social responsibility; however this is not simply through corporate financial contribution, as it also involves employee opportunities to support altruistic intents to engage through directed personal actions. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 109 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the rise of social responsibility represents a more insightful approach to economic policy among corporate organizations. jp morgan’s involvement is an example of investment in social outcomes. this has the impact of both empowering and improving the community involved, which can have direct effects on the consumer market. it also has downstream effects, where such involvement reflects upon the integrity and values of the company, and in some respects its perceived prosperity. humanitarian investment and direct involvement in health promotion and social change interventions can have a strong bearing on corporate profile and hence interactions with the financial and public sectors. this is reflected by the positive influences on company image and increased publicity that arise from media exposure in partnership with football united. an improved corporate profile equates to better interactions with government and policy-makers, like-minded corporations, employees, and also the consumer population. this can create various opportunities for the corporate involved. it can also improve employee loyalty and morale, and is more attractive for prospective, socially-conscious employees. the active engagement of jp morgan employees involved in volunteering for the program presents opportunities for personal development, team building, and improved work satisfaction. these opportunities are important in providing more personalized involvement for jp morgan and specifically utilizing the individual skills of various employees the provision of volunteering opportunities provides the means for corporate employees to express social responsibility on a personal level, beyond the contributions of “the firm”. this is an area that can provide the most significant benefits, through development of inter-personal relationships and a sense of purpose within the program; however jp morgan employees require direct pathways to facilitate the transition of positive intentions into meaningful contributions. more proximal involvement of jp morgan representatives in the intervention produces a better understanding of the program and health problems being addressed. this has the potential to influence both the sustainability and strength of the partnership and the extent of corporate financial contributions. 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the social change organization programs such as football united require financial input from corporate partners to ensure sustainable activity, and provide avenues for expansion. however, the active engagement of corporate volunteers in program delivery provides a number of secondary levels of benefit such as: improved exposure and networking opportunities, advocacy for the program and intervention population, and superior resource mobilization through volunteering. capital raising through engagement of corporate partners is crucial to the success of the program. financial assistance is the most easily utilized resource and is necessary for many of the operational functions. however, it represents an impersonal and often expectation-laden contribution to the program. there can be a poor understanding of the health or social problems being addressed, and the intentions and operation of the intervention due to poor exposure and communication between the two groups. there is also the anticipation of reciprocal gains in areas of media exposure, advertising and humanitarian profiling for corporate partners. as already mentioned, football united’s relationship with jp morgan represents a more diverse contribution than simple financial contribution, which involves individual volunteering opportunities secondary to financial support. this extra engagement necessitates, however, superior resource mobilization for football united, as they need to engage in the volunteer support and management. however, the corporate partnership can counter-balance this increased need as it can potentially provide increases in volunteer numbers, employee sponsorship initiatives, management guidance and input, and exposure to potential new partners. this more personal involvement can strengthen the understanding of the intervention through first-hand experience. employees engaged on this level are likely to take more interest in the developments and operation of the program, which manifests as an individual responsibility for ongoing support. engaged employees are hence more likely to advocate for meaningful and sustainable investment in the program. through more personal involvement, football united demonstrates that corporate social responsibility can be an investment in a specific set of social and health outcomes that employees feel both responsible for and actively involved in. the key feature here is that corporate investment can move beyond abstract “lump-sum” social cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 111 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia responsibility, towards targeted contributions to detailed outcomes through sustainable and meaningful involvement in a health promotion framework. this in turn equates to funding stability and a more empowering partnership for football united. the mutually beneficial relationship that has been developed through the football united – jp morgan partnership could also enable better access to the corporate community. football united is able to network with like-minded associates of jp morgan, and also has the backing of preexisting corporate support. this manifests as improved potential to create new partnerships and ensures increased advocacy and “supportability” of the program and the health and social outcomes being addressed. concluding remarks this case study has been written to propose that an “integrated partnership” between a corporate body and a social change organization can produce significant advantages beyond the scope of the typically uncomplicated financial contribution. this particularly involves more individual volunteering input from a corporate partner. it is a legitimate way to extend corporate support, and provides mutual benefit for both partners, so long as there is balanced expectation, effective coordination and lucid role definition. it is important to appreciate that this study demonstrates a partnership that is ideal. the combination of aims and expectations has been matched with open communication and effective organization to create a relationship that is productive for both partners, whilst still furthering social and community outcomes. even in the experience of football united, corporate involvement is a spectrum of both success and failure. it is not the motive of this paper to advocate corporate involvement in any capacity; rather, it is a study in how a relationship can be modeled to extend beyond the boundaries of typical financial support. as the economic climate continues to change and ethical and developmental investment becomes more tangible at the grassroots level, the focus for health promotion and social change groups should involve not only the acquisition of sponsorship, but 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia also the ability to expand this sponsorship in non-financial capacities to provide more meaningful and sustainable involvement. acknowledgements the football united program development was made possible through engagement and hard work from countless individuals and groups. it is impossible to name them all as we would inadvertently omit some. noted here are some of the key people and groups we are indebted to: john hirshmann, clif evers, brad mccarroll, gode mfashingabo, emily sullivan, robert rinck, dave dasilva, stephanie baker, mayumi staley, rose macdonald, dougie hendry, jonnie macarthur, the entire birouste family, craig foster, aytek genc, brendan renaud, nick bull, abraham ajak, ali blaise-balmer. unsw, australian government, blacktown district soccer football association, community relations commission, evans intensive english centre, football united, liverpool migrant resource centre, miller intensive english centre, sydney football club, sydney south west area health service, sydwest multicultural services, transcultural mental health centre, starrts, amrc, jp morgan, gilbert + tobin, sisters of charity, mary mckillop foundation, st george foundation. references allotey, p. a. 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issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia 1 community networks and the nature of emergence in civil society jenny onyx and melissa edwards1 university of technology, sydney abstract our research challenges the limitations of extant knowledge of social formation by its focus on the ordinary, everyday lived reality of maintaining community and on identifying its operations from the internal perspective of civil society. we aim to explore the actual mobilising processes and structures that underpin the formation of social capital in the community. we examine how networks emerge and operate. introduction within this paper we seek to examine how social capital may enable locally sustainable development within a local community context. theoretically we situate this analysis in broader discussions relating to the role and contribution of civil society. we seek to examine how such arguments that advocate a functioning role of civil society may be enabled through the emergence and functioning of locally based community networks. rather than seeking normative perspectives we seek to understand how networks within communities may selfactivate in circumstances of market or state failure to sustain their livelihoods. civil society functions, in part through its organisations, but also through the interconnected collective action within communities. various conceptual frames have been generated to analyse civil society (seligman, 1992; foley and edwards, 1996). foley and edwards (1996) establish a dichotomous view, “civil society i” following de tocqueville which empahises associational life and “civil society ii” with an emphasis upon action-oriented forms of voluntary participation which may be in conflict with the state or market. in our analysis we take the view that aspects of both perspectives may be useful in understanding how social capital is generated to sustain locally based communities. we argue that social capital is an essential ingredient in enabling that community cohesion and well-being, however our conceptual perspective is informed beyond the normative 1 two of the case studies reported in this article, anapia in peru and lovik in sweden, were completed with rosemary leonard of university of western sydney. 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 definition of social capital as derived from the studies of putnam (2000). as civil society perspectives are contested so too the conception, measurement and impact of social capital within studies broadly situated within civil society are contested. we take the view that in understanding the role of social capital in a functioning civil society within a community context it is necessary to combine these perspectives. social capital, like most other social constructs, is subject to disputed definition. social capital is defined as “those features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (putnam 1993). bourdieu (1985, p.248) defined the concept as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”. for bourdieu, social capital was a core strategy in preserving and transmitting the cultural capital of the elite. because all forms of capital can be converted into other (primarily economic) capital, social capital was one way of preserving class advantage. however other theorists including coleman (2000) and putnam (1993), view social capital as a resource (often the primary resource) that is open to all groups and communities. schuller (2001) argues that it is not that all capitals are ultimately reducible to economic capital, but that they interact in complex ways, and indeed the value of social capital may well depend on its linkage to other capitals. prior studies of social capital seeking to quantify the effects of social capital have found that regions and groups measuring high social capital also have a variety of positive outcomes, beyond economic advantage, such as improved health and well-being, reduced levels of crime and better educational outcomes (putnam 2000; halpern 2005).we know that communities have the capacity to mobilize, especially under conditions of extreme emergencies such as floods or bush fires. however, we know little about how this occurs. a relevant line of inquiry is the link between social capital and sustainable development (dale & onyx 2005). an important ingredient in sustainable development is local capacity for action. rogers and ryan (2001) argue that sustainable communities “empower people with shared responsibility, equal opportunity and access to expertise and knowledge, with the capacity to affect decisions which affect them” (2001, p282). this includes the development of locally specific information and indicators of progress. however, while we know that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 3 social capital as variously measured is related to development, we do not understand the mechanisms by which this may occur or be prevented (dale & onyx 2005). social capital is often taken as a kind of black box. its existence and effects may be measured, but the mechanisms by which it operates are left unexamined. the definition of social capital identifies some of its component parts, such as “trust, norms, networks” (putnam 1993) and “social agency” (onyx & bullen 2000). but there is little understanding of how social capital is formed and mobilized. we need to understand the emergent formation of social capital, and hence of community capacity. what are the mechanisms by which information is shared, decisions are made, and community action is mobilized? similarly, after considering various social capital perspectives, edwards and foley (1998, p. 135) conclude that a “social relational” approach to social capital analysis “focusing on social networks and organisation” would be a preferential conceptualization. networks appear to be the basic ingredient of all community action. but what kind of networks, how formalized, for what purpose, and what specific impact are all questions about which there is little understanding. most of the extant literature on networks is oriented from the perspective of business or government. there is a vast literature on organisational theory, including that of interorganizational collaborations (eden & huxham 2001; hardy, phillips & lawrence 2003) and entrepreneurship, all designed to understand how best to organize and mobilize resources for business. the dominant issue is one of control. government policy is also interested in how to support and mobilize community capacity to carry out government policy; again the issue is how to manage and control community action, usually through some sort of legislative mandate and funding accountability. in australia, for example all levels of government have specific policies and departments dedicated to the management of community and society. predominantly, the focus is on mobilizing and establishing management control over the network as a whole. only in social movement theory, is there a real interest in how the community mobilizes itself, which is mobilization from the perspective of civil society. social-movement theories analyse “organisations, resources, structural preconditions, networks and rational choice” (johnston & klandermas 1995), and more recently, identity, culture, norms and transnational advocacy (melucci 1995; khagram, riker & sikkink 2002). the vast array of social 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 movement literature concerned with understanding how social movements operate tend to focus upon: when social movements emerge, the roles they play in social life, the types of impact they have (outcomes) and the conditions under which they can be effective (khagram, riker & sikkink 2002). diverse perspectives offer different answers to each of these dimensions. theorists have attempted to find conceptual linkages to fortify the field (diani 1992) to provide space for interpretations and perspectives to reflect the dynamic and global nature of social change (langman & morris 2002; bosco 2001), drawing across research traditions employing ‘relational’ techniques focusing upon network creation. in fact new social movement theorists specifically focus on the network as the unit of analysis (scott 1990; diani 1992). largely these theories seek to uncover the mechanisms of large scale social movements and their co-ordination, which is of the extraordinary. but what of the ordinary, everyday lived reality of maintaining community? how does that work from the internal perspective of civil society? what are the actual processes and structures that underpin social capital, community capacity? edwards and foley (1998) determine such a focus on network analyses as an impending area for empirical investigation. understanding the mechanisms for community mobilization through complexity theory to better understand the mechanisms influencing people’s shared capacity for action, we draw on recent developments in complexity theory. chia (1999) argues that we need a “rhizomic model” of organizations, in which change and transformation is the norm. we need to shift our thinking from assumptions of institutionalized structure and stability to one of flux, in which “all things flow” in a continuous process of becoming, in which what is now contains the traces of what was, and the seeds of what is yet to be, that is the principle of immanence. networks are malleable, interconnected and framed within the context of their emergence. complexity theory offers an insight into the fundamental issue of emergence (chiles et al. 2004). it offers an explanation for “how system-level order spontaneously arises from the action and repeated interaction of lower level system components without intervention by a central controller” (chiles et al. 2004, p.501). this theoretical approach can be applied to emergent self-organizing networks within civil society. how do community networks develop and how does this occur without intervention though a deliberate community cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 5 capacity development strategy, agency or preexisting organisation? furthermore, this may provide some insight into social capital formation through social networks. complexity theory is concerned with complex adaptive systems (uhl-bien et al. 2007). a complex system is not merely complicated; it is complex because “the system as a whole cannot be fully understood simply by analyzing its components” (uhl-bien et al. 2007, p.302). in the case of civil society, we are dealing with multiple and overlapping complex systems which may be partly, but never totally, bounded by a geographical area such as a community. the systems are not only overlapping, but open, thus adding to the levels of complexity. nonetheless they have meaning to their participants, and they are capable of generating remarkable outcomes. complexity theory suggests a number of crucial dynamics that may explain the process of the self-organizing emergence of networks (cilliers 2005; byrne 1998), many of which are summarised in the table 1 (below). table 1: general characteristics of complex ‘systems’ 1. complex systems consist of a large number of elements which in themselves can be simple 2. the elements interact dynamically by exchanging energy or information. these interactions are rich. even if specific elements only interact with a few others, the effects of these interactions are propagated throughout the system. 3. the interactions are nonlinear. 4. there are many direct and indirect feedback loops. 5. complex systems are open systems – they exchange energy or information with their environment – and operate at conditions far from equilibrium. 6. complex systems have memory, not located at a specific place, but distributed throughout the system. any complex system thus has a history and the history is of cardinal importance to the behaviour of the system. 7. the behaviour of the system is determined by the nature of the interactions, not by what is contained within the components. since the interactions are rich, dynamic, fed back, and above all, nonlinear, the behaviour of the system as a whole cannot be predicted from an inspection of its components. the notion of ‘emergence’ is used to describe this aspect. the presence of emergent properties does not provide an argument against causality, only against purely deterministic forms of prediction. 8. complex systems are adaptive. they can (re)organise their internal structure without the intervention of an external agent. these principles may be used as a means of reconceptualising how social networks function. first, they emerge out of states of disequilibrium, or a tension between disequilibrium and equilibrium in the wider context (plowman et al. 2007). multiple lines of positive and negative feedback loops (cilliers 2005, p.8) are crucial in establishing new modes of operating. that is, through action and interaction people start to develop a collective sense of 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 how they can cooperate, but also share experiences where organising was not functional and learn to avoid repetition of such actions and interactions. stability within the embryonic network is dependent on the development of ‘deep structures’ involving shared intrinsic values, and operating principles of the participants. these are attained through the positive and negative feedback loops and held within the dissipated, ‘collective memory’ (cilliers, 1998) of the emergent network. complexity theory gives leadership a central place, but where adaptive leadership is dynamic and “is the product of interaction, tension, and exchange rules governing changes in perceptions and understanding” (lichtenstein et al. 2006). this approach to leadership is in marked contrast to the classical organizational model of leadership which emphasizes hierarchy and control (avery 2004; chiles et al. 2004). such views of leadership rest on the assumption “of organizations as equilibrium seeking systems whose futures are knowable and arrived at by leaders who plan interventions and control behaviors” (plowman et al. 2007, p.341). by contrast, within complexity theory, leadership should not be viewed as individuals operating in isolation as they influence their followers, or in terms of individual traits. leadership is seen as an emergent phenomenon that arises from interactions and events (lichtenstein et al. 2006). a similar approach (surie & hazy 2006) argues that, with respect to innovation, generative leaders create conditions that nurture it rather than direct or control it. in a similar manner, some forms of collective entrepreneurship, involve emergent and/ or dispersed leadership in a social context. johannisson and olaison (2007) argue for a concept of “enactive entrepreneurship” associated with social creativity, and made particularly visible in the case of a natural disaster or emergency situation facing a community. as a heuristic device, we use some of these key principles of complexity to analyse the emergence and functioning of social networks within three community case studies where participants were encountering prospects of decline; one drawn from australia, one from peru, and one from sweden. the case studies each of the case studies from australia, sweden, and south america were selected because they had demonstrated community development. the choice of case studies was determined by colleagues with a detailed knowledge of each location. the main criteria were that there is a definable small community (<5000 people) that had a relevant organisation that was willing cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 7 to auspice the research and had demonstrated community development capacity. the latter criterion required a clear project for the social or economic benefit of the towns. each case involved observation of the community, interviews with key informants, and a variety of secondary source data. a thick description was developed for each. in each case informants (between 5 and 15) were sought from across the community who are involved in the community development strategies, and possibly some who are critical of the developments. the informants represented a variety of social roles and a cross-section of gender, age and education. recruitment was by invitation from the auspicing organization, with follow-up interviews using a snow ball sampling method. participants were interviewed for approximately one hour roughly following an open-ended interview schedule with scope for the informant to introduce new material. the interview method was selected to allow maximum flexibility and input from the participants. in south america, an interpreter was provided by the host research institute. interviews were electronically recorded and stored on the computer of the chief investigators (in sweden only basic summary data was so recorded). in addition to the interview transcripts, the analysis depends heavily on field notes taken by the authors from observation of the actual field sites, visits to key community houses, organizations and events, and participation in community activities. in addition, census data, reports, web page information and other available information about the communities and their organizations was collected to supplement the interviews. a thematic analysis identified the major issues for each case, based initially on the broad interview questions. however there was a recursive trawling of the data in search of emergent themes not previously identified, thus roughly approximating a grounded theory approach. it is from this analysis that insights concerning emergence of community formations. results in this section we present a brief sketch of the three communities. 1. maleny, australia maleny is a small town in the hinterland of southeast queensland. a major disequilibrium occurred when the struggling dairy farming area experienced an influx in the 1970s of new 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 residents who held a commitment to an environmentally sustainable lifestyle. the new residents identified the need for more services and four of these new residents, led by one woman in particular held meetings of residents to explore the possibility for community development. the main leader was one of the early settlers, living in an organic farming housing settlement on the outskirts of maleny. the idea emerged of developing co-operative organisations to serve the community, starting with a credit union and an organic farm produce outlet. the active initiative of the group was particularly evident in their study tours of other centres and in obtaining an expert to assist in setting up the first co-operatives. since these were moderately successful a positive feedback loop was formed and other cooperatives followed the first, including a community café, and various commercial enterprises. some local residents, especially the dairy farmers, were initially resistant to the new developments, but increasingly were included in community plans and a local newspaper was formed to keep the wider community informed. the main leader appeared to work with great skill and dedication, involving many other people in the gradual evolution of the new town. although she was central to the formation of each new venture, she seldom took a management position. maleny is now a prosperous community with a population of approximately 4,000 and has a large number of community organisations spanning diverse functions. according to the database created through the local maleny working together (mwt) project involving a survey of 411 households as part of a community audit, (and initiated by the same female leader) there are 136 community groups within the maleny local area (mwt, 2003, p. 14). many people (40%) volunteer their time in some capacity and there are strong interconnections between community organisations as over 90% of local community groups dialogue with others locally (mwt, 2003, p. 14) indicating a tightly interwoven collection of community organisations. these interconnections are partly due to individuals belonging to many different organisations simultaneously. informally this provides a flow of information between different organisations and sharing of resources. eighty-eight per cent of the sample felt that it was easy to be involved in the community. as maleny reached a new equilibrium there was evidence of the formation of deep structures based on shared values. an important shared value is to create as near as possible selfsufficient sustainable communities based upon local cooperation and place bound networks. a related value was its commitment to the environment and they received an award for cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 9 environmental citizen of the year. the openness of the local community was another related value that makes the town special. according to one interviewee: it’s an energy thing you just seem to tune in to. it’s vibrant, it’s interesting, it’s very diverse and to a large extent it’s the people. it is very accepting. it doesn’t matter what your background is, age, sexual preference whatever, it makes no difference (female informant). as evidence of the strength of the shared values, survey data revealed that maleny recorded the highest social capital factor across all those communities surveyed in australia (edwards & onyx 2007). maleny scores were high across all the social capital factors including community connections, trust, neighborhood connections, tolerance of diversity and social agency 2 . the strength of these deep structures was tested by a recent disequilibrium caused by the approval by the local council of a large new supermarket for a national retailer on the bank of a river with endangered platypus. the obi obi campaign signalled a general community resistance to the development involving most groups in town, including the cooperative movement and local business owners, as well as environmental and social groups. although the complex was built, local residents continue to boycott the stores. at the time of the obi obi campaign, the woman who had been the early leader was active, but no longer central to the organisational resistance. 2. anapia, peru anapia, population 2000 is the most remote of the islands in lake titicaca of andean peru. reaching anapia requires a 2.5 hour car trip from puno, the regional capital, followed by a 1.5 hour boat trip. the people identify as aymaran and the main economic activities are agriculture and fishing. it is basically a subsistence economy, with little money exchange. most people own land and/or a fishing boat. however there are a few landless families who work on other people’s land in exchange for a share of the produce. 2 further details of this study can be found in onyx and bullen (2003) and onyx et al (2009). seven urban and rural communities have been surveyed and contrasted using a social capital survey tool designed by onyx and bullen (2003). analysis across factors seeks to determine variation between communities. maleny scores were the higher overall, but also the highest across all factors, being a very strong indicator of the existence of social capital in the community. 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 a major disequilibrium occurred in the mid 1990s, when a local entrepreneur and citizen, who had completed some tertiary education in puno, explored the possibility of developing eco-tourism on the island as a means of economic development, but without losing the cultural heritage and ways of life as had happened in other islands where tourism had already been developed. anapia has a unique process of decision making. on the first saturday of each month, the entire community meets in the central plaza. under the management of the mayor, issues of community wide concern are discussed. it is through this process that the social entrepreneur was able to present his case for the tourist project, to have the project thoroughly discussed and debated. there was some conflict as some community members were concerned that outsiders would bring new diseases and that it would change their way of life. others feared that they could not provide adequate service to these strangers. they reported that they had to overcome fear and shame in interacting with the tourists, and they are still very anxious about their ability to please. it took two years of intense discussion within the community before they were ready to undertake the project. although all the dissenters were not convinced, an association called adeturs was formed. unfortunately there was no immediate positive feedback as only a few tourists arrived the first season and none the next. the entrepreneur persisted, however, and sought a partnership with a travel agent, in which the community would maintain the initiative and control. all ways travel agreed to promote the island as an eco-tourist destination, and to assist the islanders to develop a quality product. communication with puno was difficult (and still is) with unreliable telephone service. the leader himself went to puno to find the tourists and bring them back to anapia. with several thousand years of shared culture and lifestyle there are very deep structures and shared values and these principals were used to organise the new venture. the organisational system they chose was consistent with the traditional iynu system of organization in agriculture by which work is collectively organised but each family has their individual plot from which they obtain the produce. translating this into tourism meant that in strict rotation, each family hosts tourists and benefits from the financial return. a strict limit was applied to maximum tourists to be hosted by each family (one couple per week). other families were involved in related activities such as transport and meal preparation. this system ensured a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 11 more equitable distribution of income, where no one person could get rich at the expense of others. all those involved in one of the four tourist activities are members of the relevant subcommittee (maximum of two activities per family) and all decisions are made by consensus. each committee, as well as adeturs itself, has a president elected every two years, as well as a treasurer. adeturs provides overall co-ordination of the four committees. within anapian society and adeturs, the women play a major role. although most of the senior offices are held by men, women take an active role in public meetings and on committees and in developing their homes for tourists. all families involved in adeturs are required to work collectively to improve the village, keep streets clean of rubbish, etc. the new venture required creative thinking, so as members of adeturs realised they needed to increase their skills and knowledge they also created the solutions. some training and advice was provided by all ways travel but they needed to travel beyond the island. groups of women travelled, sometimes for the first time in their lives, to gains the skills they needed and to promote their program. however, the residents are also gradually recognizing the value of their traditional knowledge, taking pride in it and sharing it with the tourists. the program is also providing fertile ground for other ventures. one woman gave a presentation on their program in a community development competition in the national capital. with the prize money they built a community centre with a small library. a volunteer tourist program helped paint the school. the entrepreneurial leader who started the tourist project, and was president of adeturs for many years, is now mayor of the municipality and a new leader has been elected for adeturs. the community is confident that they can maintain control of the development process, and are ready to expand. 3. lovik, in north west sweden lovik is a tiny village of less than 100 people, located in the remote region of northwest sweden. many towns had been left to die following the mechanization of the timber industry and the loss of subsidized support for farming. however despite this severe crisis, the village was determined to revitalize itself. this process began in 1989 with a public meeting called in neighbouring hoting. one woman went “just for entertainment” but as a workshop exercise 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 they were asked to write their thoughts on the future. her vision and that of another woman were of lovik as a well-developed centre. a female economist challenged her to “go away and do it” she couldn’t sleep and was worried that the men would laugh at her but nonetheless she called a public meeting at lovik and much to her surprise 25 of the residents came. some men were sceptical but one older man was encouraging. the community development advisor (cda) attended and gave good examples of what had been done elsewhere. so they agreed to a second meeting at which they formed a voluntary association “ideal village of lovik and surrounds”. its mission was the economic, social and cultural development of the area. the first activity was a cabaret to raise money using local musical talent. with the profits they repaired the community hall and put on a series of social fundraising events for visitors especially in the hunting season (ongoing). they created an annual accordion festival with up to 1000 visitors, many from other countries in which the local residents provide accommodation in their own homes. from 1989 the old people talked about the need for a retirement centre in the village and asked the organisation to speak to the municipality. they were helped by the community development adviser (cda) who was employed by the municipality but funded by the state. there were many obstacles: first the municipality said the village was too small, second, they knew nothing about setting up a cooperative. little happened for a year. then four women (teacher, teacher’s aide, post office worker, and bank worker) and the cda formed the task force. they worked on a tight schedule and achieved their goal in 17 months (including the building of the home). they experienced jealousy and resistance from the municipality and the cda resigned as a result. the prevailing attitude of municipality was “don’t think you are better than anyone else.” our informant said that it was because she was voluntary that she was able to speak out. they did however get good support at the national level from one minister in particular, a woman and obtained a low interest loan. the eldercare cooperative had 18 members, those who lived there, those who worked there and those from the village. the membership required 1000 kronor ($200) and 40 hours of work per year. husbands of the four women mowed the grass, delivered material and food, and did maintenance. there were six apartments each with en-suite and kitchenette. it had an attractive modern design with ecological awareness (eg heating from under the earth). the service cost less than similar municipal services because of all the voluntary labour. voluntary labour was seen as part of developing community. day to day decisions were cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 13 made around the kitchen table (eg to keep hens). a recreational account was built up from miscellaneous income. the municipality funded 3.5 personal care positions (shared by 5 women) so it brought employment to the village. a qualified nurse came once a fortnight. at night there was an emergency call button and a night patrol. there was a room for relatives to stay. other villages subsequently developed similar eldercare cooperatives. the lovik eldercare centre became a model for sweden and received thousands of visitors from all over sweden and other countries. the latest project was for the five children in the village. at the time of the fieldwork they were building a playground next to the eldercare accommodation. the association was planning a “revivalist” meeting of ex-residents with the minister of agriculture in stockholm. the aim was to encourage people to return to the village, particularly those nearing retirement. discussion each of these three rural case studies from different parts of the world has unique conditions and problems but they were selected because they have demonstrated a capacity to develop or to re-invent their town in the experience of market or state failure. in all cases some kind of project was developed and managed by the community. that is, each clearly demonstrates the rhizomic phenomena identified by chia (1999), in which change and transformation is the norm. we did not find institutionalized structure and stability but rather an ongoing situation of flux, in which “all things flow” in a continuous process of becoming. each case also demonstrates the fundamental issue of emergence (chiles et al. 2004); that is, system-level order spontaneously arose from the action and repeated interaction of lower level system components and were not directed by a higher authority or a central controller” (chiles et al. 2004). network emergence through the complexity lens. complexity theory concepts are also useful in describing the sometimes difficult and haphazard path to developing a new project. each case evidenced disequilibrium, sometimes in terms of a crisis as in lovik, sometimes in terms of changing economic conditions and the desire to create alternative sources of income as in anapia. conflict was evident and sometimes encouraged as new ideas were introduced and debated, and sometimes resisted. in all cases there were a series of meetings and a variety of discussions leading to the creation of 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 new organisations, and a search for the necessary resources or knowledge to achieve a desired outcome. in each case there were serious obstacles to the development of the project. these included obstacles of resistance from within the community (anapia for example), obstacles imposed from outside (as in the case of lovik in particular) and the difficulty of obtaining the necessary human and financial capital. in most cases these obstacles created an initial period of inaction or discouragement. it took a year or more before there were clear signs of successful achievement. during this interim period it was usually the leader who maintained optimism and persisted in the search for solutions to the obstacles. as johanisson and olaison note (2007, p.58), these entrepreneurial practices are “driven by passion and joy”. it was probably this perseverance that earned her or him the lasting respect and trust of the community. from this we might deduce that the early stages of emergence are likely to be marked by conflict, not only between the member agents and some wider social or political issue or event, but also between the member agents themselves. the state of disequilibrium may be deliberately created or amplified; it may only be through such turmoil that a new, creative milieu can emerge, one which may generate innovative solutions to perceived problems. in each of the communities reported here, the wider community networks mobilized themselves in a self governing and self regulating manner out of this milieu. in each case this process within the project appeared to mirror established decision making processes within the community at large. that is, there was, in each case, a culture of grass roots participation and decision making for all issues affecting the community at large. anapia was the strongest example of this. action occurred at several quite different points within the community, with many people taking some initiative at different times. some of these actions lead nowhere, while other actions coalesced into a larger community campaign, as in maleny. what is also evident in each community was a deeper set of shared values, and a common commitment to sustainable development. these shared values highlighted the deeper levels of trust within the community, and strong bonding social capital. these norms did not override or eliminate conflict, but on the contrary made it possible for differences to be openly debated and compromises negotiated. within the specific community projects, deeper structures of shared objectives emerged. much of the early work of the project required extensive negotiations with a variety of key stakeholders both inside and outside the community. it was out of this negotiated consensus of often quite different positions and interests that the project cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 15 was able to proceed. hahn et al. (2006) also refer to the importance of resolving tradeoffs in creating a collective vision. in every case the project was then supported by a management committee with representation across the community, and with decision making responsibility. in relation to the process of emergence then, the initial state of disequilibrium draws agents together. these agents may be individuals, or organizations or both. these agents interact, discuss, and explore options for action. many consequent actions are small and localized, involving the active initiative of concerned agents. some of these actions will lead nowhere, but others appear promising, and are communicated to others through positive feedback loops in the embryonic network, which at this stage is little more than a fertile milieu for action. others hear about the actions and discussions, through word of mouth and/or electronic technologies, and/or published papers and media reports. someone, usually a group, calls a meeting, and a network emerges as various agents share information and agree to further action. at some stage it is essential that some actions lead to some sort of positive outcome, perhaps partial and temporary, but enough to motivate others. such results must be communicated to others in the network. the discussion and forms of actions are volatile and full of uncertainty and potential conflict. however, while disequilibrium may be welcomed and further encouraged, there are also counter forces towards some sort of new equilibrium. these will be articulated in terms of a common set of principles or objectives signed off by all participating agents. thus creative turbulence is contained within an agreed broad set of objectives that are shared. enabling leadership guides emergence. despite vast geographical and social differences there were also some important similarities in the nature of the leadership. in each case the identified leader or leadership group were strongly embedded within the formal and informal networks of the community. in most cases they took a strong initiating role in establishing the project. but while they may be the chair of the committee or co-operative that first established the project, they were not at that time in any other position of formal authority. some, such as the leader in anapia subsequently was elected as mayor, but he obtained that position after having demonstrated his capacity in the earlier mobilization of the community project. in the other two cases, the mobilizing leader was one of a small group of active women who gave her the support she needed, and 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 shared some of the leadership responsibilities. the leader was regarded always as “one of the people”, not an outsider. although she or he may have had slightly better qualifications or status, the difference was not marked. above all, they were trusted by the community, as a person of integrity who held the public interest foremost in all cases the leaders appreciated that they were working with open systems and that they needed to engage with other places and structures. so they developed good links outside the village. this was especially important where most links were bonding links within the village and few people ventured outside, and where there was a culture of self-sufficiency. the leader may have had some bridging links to begin with, but in each case, they formed new ones in the course of the project, in order to fill identified gaps in knowledge, skills and material resources. for example, the leader in maleny began the co-operative movement through an initial study tour, and then invited external experts to come and assist. similarly the leader of anapia sought out a tourist operator as commercial partner. the leader in lovic formed an ongoing alliance with the cda and later links to the national level. all these links were essential in the successful completion of the project. in a sense, the leader was able to fill the “structural holes” between the community and outside networks (burt 1998). however they used these connections for public and not private gain. while it may be expected that the state, through the local government may be crucial in resourcing new developments, this was not the case in these three case studies. when local government was hostile as in maleny and lovik or indifferent as in anapia, alternative paths to bridging were found through ngos or other levels of government. the leaders have a broad vision for what is possible in the future for the community. they are able to articulate this vision, and identify a path to achieve it. they are able to inspire others to follow that vision. that is, it is not simply a dream but one that can be actualized. this is the essence of visionary or transformational leadership (avery 2004). it did not necessarily include a vision of future economic expansion. in all cases, the shared vision was one of ecological and social sustainability rather than economic expansion. this raises the question of what is meant by the distinction between “getting by” as opposed to “getting ahead” in woolcock and narayan’s terms (2000). while all communities were concerned to maintain an adequate livelihood, this was only one consideration within a desire for a balanced development, one that put social and environmental issues in the forefront. however in anapia, and maleny, the vision did include the potential for both improved well being and an cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 17 expanded economic base, albeit one firmly located within the ecological and cultural values of the community. in the three cases, power belongs to the group rather than the leader. change may be slower than the leader wished as in anapia, by the need for extensive consultation and wider participation and acceptance of new practices. but this approach was highly successful in leading complex change in a dynamic environment. all the leaders engaged in bridging to obtain the necessary resources and expertise, thus they could be seen as social entrepreneurs. the theme that does not appear in any theory of leadership except complexity theory is that the leaders were embedded in their communities, and leadership action was emergent from the interaction of agents at that grass-roots level (chiles et al. 2004; lichtenstein et al. 2008). indeed most theories emphasise the social distance between the leader and followers. however it is the embeddedness in the community and shared decision-making that help maintain social capital during the community development process. conclusions the three cases reported here illustrate the complex process of emergence of new social formations within the local community. other cases could have been chosen to demonstrate much the same phenomena. the capacity to develop new community projects depended on existing bonding social capital, with common values, existing strong multiplex networks, and good levels of trust. however the process of development also generated new forms of bonding and bridging social capital. in all cases, the project began with very little in the way of financial resources. however, good facilitative leadership created access to the necessary skills, knowledge and financial resources needed to complete the project. above all, networks built trust, shared knowledge and made collective decisions that involved many community members, and in each case lead to the creation of one or more community organisations to manage the project(s). none of this could have been predicted beforehand. as suggested by complexity theory, new, community wide social formations arose from the actions and repeated interaction of lower level components, that is, individuals and groups working within the community, but without the intervention of a centralized controller. there was no bureaucracy, no intervention by state or corporate power. the new forms were controlled by the grassroots community members, often in a dynamic process of creative learning, trial and error, mutual support and 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 debate. cooperative action produced positive feedback loops which enabled further learning and the courage to attempt more ambitious action. we have demonstrated that sustainable community development is a complex, emergent process enabled through the proactive selfformation of locally socially innovative solutions. within the context of civil society, we see coalescing relationships, between individuals who may be operating as individuals or as members of organizations. this coalescing of relationships creates a fertile milieu out of which may emerge new ideas, formations, intentions for collaborative action. associations are significant, but also collective agency which may at times be antagonistic, but at others cooperative with the state is equally apparent. according to the dichotomy presented by edwards and foley (1998) we find that in the case of the community networks presented in these cases the analogies of civil society are not mutually exclusive, but may even be complementary. perhaps this is due to the community context whereby there was an emergency or perceived crisis that required action for survival that triggers both the rapid formation of a new organizational form and collective action. this may be a useful avenue of future study regarding concepts of civil society. we argue that the vast majority of civil society networks are formed from below, emergent from the dynamic and creative turmoil which is driven by social disequilibrium and the search for new responses to current issues and problems. not all networks will become fully fledged and recognized forms. all such emergent networks will go through a period of formation, much of which will be invisible to the outsider, and lack any coherent shape. other embryonic networks may remain as 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world bank research observer, vol. 15, pp. 225-249 beyond the neo-con men – a series of dialogues at the end of 2007 one of australia's most successful conservative governments was defeated at the polls. the defeat of the john howard was followed by the demise of his ally in the united states, george w bush, seemingly signalling the end of an era. two years later, with the benefit of hindsight, this issue of the journal of cosmopolitan civil societies rethinks the political landscape, and assesses forces and possibilities for social and political change in australia. neo-conservatism may be in the history books, but what replaced it? what next for political and social movements: how can they build their power; how do they produce allies, organisations, legitimacy, inspiration, vision? the issue is organized as a series of four dialogues. each dialogue is focused on a key issue in the process of social and political change, namely, issues of organization, collaboration, rights and visions. the co-editors argue that each of these are centrally important for political and social movements, and especially so in the current era. each dialogue is introduced by a co-editor, and engages four or five contributors. the first dialogue debates the issue of organization. four authors, goodman, rhiannon, maddison and fiedler, each with a distinct track record on investigating and participating in social change organizations, debate the merits and demerits of particular organizational vehicles in the current era. how do political and social movements organize for power? organization enables but also limits possibilities: movements need vehicles and infrastructures but what kind? the second dialogue discusses the issue of collaboration, focusing on how people work across cultures for social change. four authors, ho, povey, wadiwel and arvanitakis, debate contrasting experiences, cultural clashes and the foundations for solidarity and anti-racism. in the context of islamophobia and the 'war on terror', where multiculturalism is positioned as a threat to national security, authors explore the politics, challenges and possibilities of crosscultural collaboration to resist racism and war. the third dialogue addresses the key issue of rights framing, with a focus on indigenous rights. agendas for social and political change are often framed in terms of rights, and perhaps none more so than in the case of indigenous movements. formaini, burridge, nettheim and norman debate the role that rights-framing plays in indigenous contexts, asking how indigenous movements position themselves to claim rights, and what issues of autonomy, sovereignty and legitimacy this raises. the fourth dialogue centres on visions for social and political change. four authors, humphrys, mcmanus, tattersall and whyte, debate how new visions and agendas emerge. how do movements pursue transformative agendas while engaging and challenging existing frameworks? what are the possibilities and limits of resistance, what is the role of positive visions and programs? james goodman christina ho heather formaini elizabeth humphrys sydney, 2009 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 65 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia empires of the sun: towards a post-multicultural australian politics andrew jakubowicz university of technology, sydney introduction the participation of people of chinese descent in australian politics has emerged as a critical question in contemporary australian democracy. whether discussing the chinese "push" that was key to unseating john howard in bennelong (saville 2007), or the china connections that undid mps michael johnson and joel fitzgibbon (baker et al. 2010), or the stern hu case (callick 2010), the debate about the chinese (including the usefulness of that composite label for such a diverse set of social groups) calls for a new set of theoretical parameters to locate and analyse the chinese presence. this paper proposes that the chinese question in all its dimensions 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 generates the first case of a "post-multicultural" politics, one that can more usefully be framed through the use of the "empire" concept (jakubowicz 2003). the land that came to be called australia was seized by the british empire; the society established there transmuted over time into an ongoing australian empire project. from the outset the modern chinese imperial project, originally rather inchoate and demographic under the qing rather than military or institutional (lacking those capacities), was constituted in australian politics as the threatening "other" in terms of race, sexuality, economy and religiosity. the chinese were portrayed as dangerous on all fronts; this apprehension embedded them in the australian political imaginary albeit in a negative form, despite their fast dwindling presence after federation as a consequence of white australia. the past generation and a half have seen a reinvigoration of the presence of chinese in australia and as australians, following the ending of white australia. the new chinese presence, this time supported by a rapidly reempowered chinese imperial capacity borne by increasing political and economic resources, has clear economic impacts but the political questions (both empirical and theoretical) are less obvious . how has australian politics been affected by these changes, and in what sense has the chinese presence ensured an imperially-inflected globally-alerted national politics in australia? the paper uses the term “empire” and its adjectival form “imperial” in a consciously provocative approach to the study of multicultural societies. “multicultural” in its policy/analytical applications refers to national societies affected by global population flows, and the internal challenges generated by the rapid emergence of diasporic communities. multicultural approaches analyse the national political, economic and cultural history of the society under review, and the anthropological and socio-cultural transformations wrought by upon it and the incoming peoples by their interaction. explanation tends to be sought then in the specificity of the society, rather than viewing each society as framed by the modern world system of nation states. the concept of “empire project” moves us into a wider frame of reference, both geographically and historically, by suggesting that many modern states manifest some of the characteristics of empires (even if the word is an anathema to them). these include an expansionary view of political, economic or cultural boundaries, a transformational approach seeking to form a unitary cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 67 “people” addressed to the diversity of incoming populations within those boundaries, and a subordination of challenges to the hegemony of the economic and politico-cultural elites especially where these arise either from indigenous populations that have been “conquered” or from incoming diasporas that owe allegiance elsewhere. “australian empire project” provides a short-hand term that captures these multiple dynamics, proposing that these three crucial parameters of boundary expansion and protection, indigenous subordination, and diversity transformation (or “normalisation” (foucault1977), set up an energetic pyramid of forces that are integrally tied together. external and internal economic, environmental and political changes are both constrained by and place pressure on these parameters. for the first time in its modern history, australia now has to engage on two fronts with another imperial project, that of china. on two of the key external parameters boundaries and cultural normalisation australia and china are now more deeply engaged than australia has been since federation, when white australia had the effect of forcing cultural disengagement (with a then far less politically and economically coherent and powerful china). context two weeks out from the august 2010 federal election former prime minister and local member for bennelong john howard was seen on tv spruiking support from a chinese audience for the liberal party in the adjacent seat of bradfield. fifteen years ago it had been howard’s equivocal position on the rise of pauline hanson and her racist speech, and his rumoured blocking of hong kong-born state politician helen sham-ho’s bid for liberal senate pre-selection, that had triggered a mini-split in the nsw liberal branch. one immediate outcome of that split was the creation of the unity (團結 tuan jei) party, which seemed to offer an opposite perspective to that of hanson’s one nation. unity had an attraction for former key political players in the nsw liberal party, winning a state legislative council seat for its leader dr peter wong. no other ethnic community was being accorded quite the same level of care and attention from the former prime minister, who had lost bennelong in 2007 under an organising onslaught that had allied young activists from many different asian communities with a broader progressive community coalition (saville 2007). during that election campaign, saville reports that “robert” ( a nom de guerre) offered the support of a group of chinese senior figures to the alp 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 candidate maxine mckew, under the tag “msg” (maxine support group); when the vote is in and she has been victorious, he texts her: “the emperor has lost his mandate from heaven” (saville 2007, pp. 45, 161). by 2010, the new emperor (former pm kevin rudd) /empress (new pm julia gillard) would come perilously close to the same fate. seven days out from the election and kevin rudd was in bennelong, talking to children and their parents at the feng hua mandarin saturday morning school, held in the eastwood public school. he was trying to repair the damage done to his fervent supporter maxine mckew among her asian supporters by the bloody way he has been dispatched as prime minister, and their loss of confidence in the alp’s commitment to issues of human rights and racial justice. later rudd shared yum cha at king’s seafood restaurant, and was tearful as the chinese kids moved from english to mandarin for the last verse of “edelweiss” from the “sound of music”, a film about children as refugees fleeing for their lives (saville 2010; marx 2010). the energy invested by former prime ministers in salvaging the damaged relations between their parties and the chinese communities, suggests that the emergence of the chinese in the political agenda of contemporary australia reflects something more than a just one dimension of multiculturalism common to all immigrant communities by pointing to political concentration, financial resources, and international linkages. with the concentration of chinese australian voters in particular usually middle-class and therefore swinging electorates and their presence there in large numbers (coughlan 2008), they have the capacity in closely-fought elections to swing seats and change governments. for this to occur en-masse, it requires some sort of trigger to vote according to an “ethnic” rather than economic or partisan sensibility (whatever “ethnic” may imply depending on one’s perspective it may mean in relation to australian chinese a perception of trans-national economic selfinterest, a sense of confucian value-based moral and efficacy assessment of the competing political parties, or a sensitivity to any taint of racism attached to candidates or policies). china-born australians and their families are heavily concentrated in key occupations, including it, medicine and commerce, as well as real estate and international trade (coughlan 2008). they cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 69 are on average therefore quite well-off economically, and can direct their discretionary financial resources in support of their favoured political parties or candidates. indeed the unity party’s peter wong had previously been a key fund-raiser for the nsw division of the liberal party, and his resignation in the late 1990s had significant financial impact on the division. as is noted below, the involvement of the chinese communities in political fund-raising had already had wider ramifications in the australian political system. in relation to chinese communities and relations, australia now experiences two separate though interacting processes – one which relates to the internal problems of the australian empire project, responding to the immigrant, racialised, ethno-national differentiation and class status of chinese settlers; the other which is the consequence of the inter-imperial relations of australia and china. this paper aims to introduce the dynamics of each of these dimensions, point to zones where they overlap, and suggest the research implications of this descriptive analysis. empire and social order much of the debate about cultural diversity and political life in modern democracies has been examined through the lens of “multiculturalism”. modood for instance argues that “a sense of belonging to one’s country is necessary to make a success of a multicultural society” (modood 2007, p.150). it requires “a citizenship and the right to make a claim on the national identity in which negative difference is challenged and supplanted by positive difference” (modood 2007, p.153). here the focus is on “the nation” as a political form. yet as negri, hardt and zolo have argued, the (national) “people is not an immediate nor an eternal identity, but rather the result of a complex process, which is proper to a specific social formation and historical period” (negri et al. 2008, p.82). the key to the construction of the people is representation, both culturally and politically. in a period of globalization, which arguably has been the characteristic political geography of the modern epoch, nation states exist in relation only to each other, and many perform as though they were empires. empires are essentially multicultural collectivities governed by a central force, with a hierarchical structure of cultural power, in which the organisation of diversity reflects the interests of the dominant political grouping. the social technologies necessary to 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 turn the populations of their territories into a people, presents a central challenge for all empires. the australian nation displays the three important imperial characteristics referred to above; namely a history of competition with other empires for control of territory (politically and/or economically), the unresolved challenge in relation to the place of the indigenous inhabitants in the nation, and the challenge of transforming incoming populations into part of the australian people . the successive policy models of immigrant admission and settlement, adopted by australia since federation, can be usefully explicated from this perspective. the racially defined restrictions encompassed in the clearly named “immigration restriction act” of 1901, which were motivated by fear of and disdain for the chinese diaspora, represented a first technology of control (lake & reynolds 2008). contemporary debates a century later about settlement procedures explore the tensions between the different priorities implicit in the competing policy discourses of multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism and citizenship (jakubowicz 2009) australia’s colonial history is well known; the outpost of the british empire that became a clutch of colonies, which finally united in a “commonwealth”, a federation of states with their distinctive histories, ethno-cultural profiles, and political philosophies. the new commonwealth was immediately challenged by the sturdiness of its raison d’être, drawn from a multitude of factors ranging from guaranteeing free trade between colonies, and ensuring tariff-protected industries against the world outside, to ensuring a racially homogenous working class paradise. john fitzgerald has noted the strong support for federation from australia’s chinese communities, who saw in free trade the opening up of their unimpeded travel between colonies that previously had restricted and punitively taxed their movement. many chinese australians of the day celebrated australian democratic ideals, its egalitarian ethos, and its anti-feudal ideology and thrust towards modernity (fitzgerald 2007; lowe et al. 1879). they were, as we know, to be grievously betrayed, their mere presence traduced, their culture portrayed as an anathema, and their aspirations discarded as threatening and poisonous. white australia was more than just an attempt to keep out people of colour; it was a drive to remove people of colour and scrub the society free of the taint of non-white “blood”. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 71 white australia was then a very real “imperial” moment, through which the empire mantle carried by the british, was passed across to the new nation. even the british were less than enthusiastic about some dimensions of the handover; the colonial and foreign office was firmly opposed to the use of race as a divider of peoples, acquiescing finally to the infamous dictation test as a racial proxy (lake & reynolds 2008). the test, first developed in natal in south africa to be used to limit indian immigration (thus explaining the exhaustive list of language options that could be used to trip up any prospective indian polyglot), was then introduced into the new commonwealth. a colonial precursor to the national imperial project was the attempt of queensland to annex south eastern new guinea (papua) in the 1880s. the british government refused to allow this, finally taking on the task itself when germany formally seized northern new guinea, with the dutch already possessing the west. britain only passed the colonial role to australia after federation (which presumably was somehow to restrain the queenslanders’ excessive abuses and exploitation of the papuan indigenous peoples, in the wake of its kanaka “black-birding” history). cyril pearl in his biography of herbert morrison, later to be white australia’s closest link to the unfolding drama of the end of the chinese imperial period, quotes from the melbourne leader newspaper in june 1883, we cannot let the islands of the pacific pass into the hands of dangerous neighbours, and it is not only the european powers who can be dangerous to us. settlements of chinamen or malays will infallibly be formed… if chinamen enter in, they will be the out-post of a possible chinese invasion. (pearl 1967, p.42). so the major imperial challenges to the australian empire project did not come mainly from holland, germany or france, but rather from china and japan. the china challenge was until quite recently ethno-cultural and economic, rather than diplomatic or military, but australia’s actions, attitudes and perspectives are still determined today by the instability of the many dimensions of the inter-imperial engagement. as the chinese state has grown in economic power and political reach, australia’s contemporary worries about china’s expanding regional role and investment in australian economic resources sits over these historic racially-inflected attitudes. 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 from the outset the australian colonies were closely linked to china, with the british china treaty ports and the australian colonies developing a significant economic relationship. british colonial attitudes towards the chinese were translated into the australian colonial milieu; there were families with chinese servants, and chinese workers were widespread as shepherds, gardeners, cooks and shopkeepers. this was more like the straits colonies than life in the home counties. chinese “coolie” labour was in australia even before the opium wars. the free movement of chinese into australia accelerated with the various gold rushes, until in the 1880s the northern queensland palmer river rush saw some 90% of the miners as chinese. so there were tens of thousands of chinese craftsmen, workers, businessmen and even some politicians when federation crashed down on them, and the doors for entry effectively closed. fear of empire today the march 2010 lowy institute survey of australians’ attitudes to international affairs and china argued that “that australians are increasingly conscious of china’s rise and are starting to grapple with its implications. indeed china looms so large that australians have developed a somewhat exaggerated view of its global weight” (shearer 2010). china’s economic role through the purchase of raw materials had seen australia safely through the gfc (laurenceson 2008); 73% of australians (up 10% from 2008) thought china’s growth had been good for australia. about the same proportion thought though that china’s aim was to dominate asia (up 9% since 2008). while happy to sell commodities to china, australians were more reluctant to sell freehold to china – 57% thought the government allowed too much investment (up 7%). in addition 46% thought china would become a military threat within 20 years (up 5%). meanwhile 2/3 believed australia was soft on china’s transgression of human rights. clive palmer a queensland billionaire mining magnate summarised the complexity when in september 2009 he condemned as racist the government’s insistence that chinese investments receive treasury approval, claiming in relation to $1.8 trillion of chinese reserve capital “we've got the opportunity to grab that if our politicians could only be fair and treat the chinese people and chinese government with the dignity they deserve" (marriner, 2009). together these stories suggest a mix of moral superiority, greed and fear, a fairly traditional combination for imperialist endeavours. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 73 apart from the foreign investment review board criteria for differentiating chinese from other sources of capital inflow, the government amended the commonwealth electoral act in 2009 to outlaw foreign property donations to australian political parties or involvement in political campaigns. in this it was following on the us government that had banned foreign donations after a series of major scandals. the arguments for the banning of foreign donations drew heavily on the activities of chinese corporations or individuals, and their involvement in australian party funding, or in the suspected overly comfortable and financial relationship with ministers. the legislative changes sustained the right of foreign entities and individuals to use australian-derived assets to make declarable donations, but not foreign funds. there was growing concern about the activities of some chinese companies and individuals – for instance the defence minister resigned over undeclared business and other links (sharp2009; baker et al. 2010). examples suggest the issues. figures released by the australian electoral commission in early 2009( http://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au) covering the 2007 federal election identified macau gaming figure stanley ho as the source of $400,000 to the nsw alp (and another $100,000 from anthony chan who shared a hong kong address with ho). ho had unsuccessfully sought a share in the second sydney casino license, having been blocked there (and in melbourne). his gold coast based company hungtat had a $600,000 donation to the nsw alp returned, while his fourth wife angela leong had her $500,000 returned by the federal alp following “a due diligence assessment”. ho was successful however in having a lunch meeting with former premier morris iemma in 2006, after he donated $48,000 to the nsw alp. the commission also identified a stream of funding to both the alp and the liberal party from companies associated with chau chuk wing, including kingold, kingson, and chun yip. (the names are wonderful – the old king is the father’s major vehicle, the son king is run by son eric). up to $1.6 million may have gone to the alp, and $400,000 to the liberals (snow et al. 2009). the chau group has a long history in australia and in the past decade has had financial dealings with charles sturt university, the university of western sydney and most recently with http://periodicdisclosures.aec.gov.au/� 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 the university of technology, sydney. from before 2006 chau’s daughter winky chau, now an executive in the family’s new express media empire, was community relations adviser to nsw alp premier bob carr and later premier morris iemma, providing iemma’s bridge to the chinese community. she would later set up a company with iemma (mw and w asia pacific partnerships pty ltd registered february 2009) that is involved in business links between australia and china. this type of detail reflects a much wider pattern of imperial inter-engagement, suggested by the range of government, corporate and political contacts that have been laid down over the past twenty years. at the heart of the imperial issue lies the issue of economic control. this paper does not canvas that huge issue in any detail, rather pointing to the need for a systematic analysis of the economic penetration of australia within the framework of the proposed imperial model (laurenceson 2008). the picture of australian national apprehension of china reflects the many different interests that australians have – ranging from primary producers and resource companies, through secondary industry and infrastructure providers, and then the tertiary sector such as finance, and education. the most significant factor relates to the scale and interdependence of economic relations, where the chinese economy now plays a determining role in the viability of the australian economy. for the first time since early british empire days a foreign power now has control over significant parts of the australian economy; unlike the british example or even japan, china has a central state strategy that ties together the role of chinese entities in australia (as it does elsewhere in the pacific and in africa and south america). the china trade played a critical role in the survival of australia through the global financial crisis (gfc), with mineral exports and international education key areas of robust expansion (dfat 2010). multicultural politics and chinese diversity the second dynamic relates to the presence of chinese people in australia as citizens, settlers, transient workers, students, business people, government officials, “refugees” and tourists. the diversity within the category reflects the complexity of the chinese diaspora, and the political argument about what it means to be chinese and to which power is allegiance owed. pr china is a vast country itself encompassing enormous diversity, and the chinese extend far beyond cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 75 prc. the development of greater han nationalism that has characterized the state ideology over the past twenty years (feng 2010), has been extremely influential on the new generation of prcborn people who have migrated to australia, and has been used to argue a transnational han solidarity (as expressed for instance in virtual huaren networks such as http://www.huaren.org/chinese-communities/australia). yet they are only one part of the story. the diversity of those who have been labeled as “chinese” by at least one stakeholder, includes the following categories: a. australian-born of many generations of settlement (the white australia survivors) whose forebears came from china b. the colombo plan generation – mainly english-speaking tertiary educated chinese diaspora from singapore, malaysia, etc. some were chinese malay leftists who came to australia in the postmalay insurgency period. others came from taiwan or indonesia. c. post white australia entrants, mainly diasporic as in (b) but including significant groups from vietnam, cambodia and laos as refugees, boat people, and orderly departure entrants. d. skilled and other entrants who were able to leave china after the end of the cultural revolution and the opening up of economic reforms e. the june 4/tiananmen generation – political, economic and in some cases opportunistic refugees f. hong kong residents leaving in preparation for the 1997 re-unification with the prc. g. professional and business people from taiwan and prc h. “colonised” non-han peoples, especially those from tibet and xinjiang. i. sponsored immigrants of the current generation j. students who gained permanent residence after completion of studies k. visa category 457 skilled sponsored workers l. short term visitors who converted to permanent through applying for on-shore refugee consideration (often claiming to be persecuted christians or falun gong) (rrt 2008) m. short term business managers and skilled workers associated with major chinese development projects 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 n. chinese government officials and quasi-officials, including those engaged in monitoring all these other groups (rrt 2007, 2008). there may indeed be other groups, and of course there are significant provincial/regional variations in migration histories, languages spoken, skill levels and education (collins& reid 1995). coghlan’s work on the demography of australia’s chinese population points to some important characteristics, especially of the pr china born settlers. table 1 draws on his comparison of chinese and vietnamese settlement, which argues that the chinese are more concentrated by locality than the vietnamese (2009). tracking pr china born residents, those claiming chinese heritage (includes many from non-prc) and speakers of chinese languages, coghlan demonstrates the ways in which the different meanings of “chinese” can provide different pictures of the chinese presence. table 1 number and percentage of australia’s total population by ancestry, birthplace and language, 1976-2006 (census data) year ancestry: chinese country of birth: prc speakers of chinese languages 1976 19542 0.14 1981 25883 0.18 1986 201165 1.29 36595 0.24 127959 0.89 1991 77882 0.46 247563 1.59 1996 111009 0.62 344319 1.92 2001 556554 2.97 142780 0.75 401357 2.19 2006 669890 3.37 206589 1.03 500467 2.50 from: coughlan 2009, p.164 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 77 given the high proportion of “chinese” living in the sydney sd in 2006, a closer examination of their situation reveals how the different criteria produce rather different perspectives. about 53% of all australian pr chinese live in the sydney sd, comprising some 71% of the “chinese” population there (prc, hk, taiwan); they may moreover have been long-term residents of hong kong or taiwan prior to immigration. about 230,000 people claim to speak at least one of the named chinese languages (cantonese, mandarin, other), far higher than the 150,000 who were born in one of the chinas. of these about 125,000 speak cantonese, and 97,000 mandarin, with 12,000 speaking other languages (teochew, hokkien and hakka). about 290,000 claim chinese ancestry, of whom 270,000 had both parents born overseas, with only 6000 having both born in australia. mandarin speakers (from the mainland and taiwan) have a lower likelihood of being australian citizens than cantonese speakers (61%:86%), reflecting the historical political press for australian citizenship among hong kong and macau origin settlers, perhaps the reluctance of many prc citizens to give up their prc citizenship, and also recency of arrival. however to confuse matters slightly, over a thousand sydney residents born in china claimed both russian orthodox religious affiliation and russian ancestry, while over 400 claimed russian orthodoxy and chinese ancestry (abs census 2006). this diversity has been well documented (eg ang 2000, 2001), as its effects contribute to an apparent impossibility of a unified or cohesive chinese political presence in australia. north american studies have pointed to the relatively low level of formal political representations of chinese communities in the usa and canada, relative to their size (freedman 2000; fernando 2006). three reasons are suggested for this situation among those who accept such claims: a) community fragmentation absorbs energy in intra-communal struggles for influence; b) the focus in the first generation on economic establishment and success absorbs most of the creative energy available to recent settlers – they would be more interested in chinese schools than in chinese politicians; and c) power is exerted through influence networks (mobilizing guanxi) (hutchings & murray 2002) rather than through access to authoritative institutional roles in the host society (chin 1997; kwok 2008; gao 2006, 2009). even so this population is well educated and well placed in the developing knowledge economy; in 2006, 15.7% held postgraduate 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 degrees (all australians 3.9%), 24.6% held bachelor degrees (16.2%), while 37.0% held no qualifications (45.2%). they were strongly represented in the fields of it at 10.7% (3.5%) and management and commerce at 32.1% (20.8%). the complexity of the “chinese”, among who are people who would reject that appellation (and whose struggle against the chinese state has spilled over into australia), clearly does render any single unified body representing a chinese interest rather difficult to create. this could be contrasted with the african communities council of australia, the australian arabic council and the arab australia council, and even the federation of ethnic communities councils of australia. these federated bodies seek to provide a common voice for groups that seek a unified outcome. “chinese” is therefore not such a bridging label as might commonly be thought. but this may be no different to what might be said of earlier immigrant communities, and their marginalisation through the first generation of settlement (zappala 1998). multicultural political analysis as a branch of interest group politics, constructs a view of australian society that frames ethnic communities as interest groups – with specific, usually first generation, concerns (jupp 1984; jupp et al. 1989; kymlicka 2007; levey 2008; lopez 2000; modood 2007). the standard rhetoric of multiculturalism usually seeks to mobilise wider social support through foregrounding concepts such as productive diversity, and arguing for its role in enhancing cosmopolitan capabilities in society (including bi-lingualism and intercultural communication competence). in practice a multicultural polity depends on well-organised ethnically-focused organisations able to both articulate the particular interests of their groups, and engage in coalitions with similar groups to deliver broader policy outcomes that provide individual benefits to the groups, and to their constituencies (levey 2008). one of the more salient characteristics of “chinese” communities therefore can be found in the multiplicity of groups and institutions, and their interlinkage with commercial or quasicommercial enterprises. some of these organisations are purely local, some are international but locally-focused (eg clan groups), while some are trans-national (china/australia) and others cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 79 international (eg diasporic multi-nation associations) (lever-tracy et al. 1996; suryadinata 2004). “multicultural democracy” (kymlicka 2007) refers to a system of liberal democracy in which cultural-descent groups are recognised as legitimate actors, and in which cultural heritage issues are legitimately part of the political debate. however there can be theoretical tension between conceiving of the political system as a distributive environment for competing interest groups, and viewing it as a dynamic arena for redistributive justice and the overcoming of discrimination and marginalisation. this tension becomes especially apparent where the nation state involved has a history of racially-biased legislation, and newly immigrating communities still experience racism (fernando 2007). the australian political system is still influenced by racist histories, while asian immigrants still experience some forms of racism, and multicultural democracy has as one of its tasks the working through of these issues, towards equitable participation. australian chinese and racism as already discussed the chinese have a long and unfortunate history as the australian national “other”. with the end of the white australia policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the arrival after 1975 of large numbers of vietnamese chinese, the doorway has apparently opened. the presence of chinese increased dramatically after 1991, with the so-called june 4 immigrants, given open refuge after the tiananmen events. yet the racism that has been a defining characteristic of australia’s empire project in the past has not simply dissipated. while kevin dunn (2003) has found that australians are less (but even so still) prejudiced against “asians” than they are against muslims and indigenous people, booth et al. (2009) identified the chinese as the group most likely to suffer discrimination in employment on the basis merely of their names. forrest and dunn (2007) have also noted the quite high rates of racism and discrimination reported by chinese australians at work and in public. critics have argued that one of the major problems with australian multiculturalism lies in systematic failure by government to engage with residual racism; indeed denial of racism has been a more likely response by government when confronted with inter-communal violence, than any sustained strategy of intervention. even the government’s own australian human rights 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 commission has criticised government inaction on racism in its submission to the united nations (ahrc 2010). from the blainey period on australian chinese have been involved in anti-racism politics, seeking both recognition as equal members of australian society, and government action to reduce discrimination and prejudice. in part their strong support for mckew in bennelong in 2007 reflected the view in the chinese (and other asian) communities that the liberal party under john howard had adopted views that they experienced as racist, and that howard symbolically represented the last embers of white australia. however chinese community leaders have expressed disappointment with the failure of the alp government to adopt a bill of rights, to advance a policy on multiculturalism, or to signal a public commitment against racism. next steps the “chinese” question thus presents the first case of a post multicultural politics, characterised by large scale economic ties to australia, operated through the entities of an imperial nation state, supported by a significant government bureaucracy (through the consulates and related agencies) and interacting with many different civil society organisations. in 2008/9 the collectivity of identifiable chinese (pr china, hk, macau, taiwan) made up the largest of the non-british immigrant intakes (especially with the inclusion of students in diac nom figures after 2006). with the growing presence of china as a global power, international studies of chinese immigrants in national political life have sought to bring together studies of “immigrant” enclaves and their political practices, with studies of transnational networks. freedman (2000) in her examination of chinese in the political life of the usa found that the two key assumptions widely held in the scholarly literature and “in popular opinion”, that the chinese are pawns of their homeland governments, and that they are politically passive preferring to concentrate on economic advancement, were not upheld by recent research. freedman distinguishes between political influence and political participation, noting influence is a function of economic power, while participation is a function of the political system’s openness to new entrants (2000, p.183). this is a useful distinction with valuable indications for australian research. fernando (2007) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 81 working from within a paradigm of “critical multiculturalism”, extends the terrain of freedman’s study into a comparison of toronto and los angeles. she takes on the same contradiction between economic success and apparent political exclusion. the problem she argues lies in the tension between a racialised state structure and a public ideology of equality, producing a “democratic deficit”. multiculturalism as an ideology may disguise the realities of unequal access to power, where active blocking by existing power elites denies access to the formal political system. the two empires projects now overlap, and are deeply implicated in each others’ futures, as they have been in the past. the relative size differences obviously point to the dominance of the prc in the politico-economic relationship, over the australia/taiwan and other diasporic ties. however the china relationship, while a key determinant of this post-multicultural world, does not encompass the whole picture. china has voiced its own perception of this challenge. the former chinese ambassador zhang junsai, said on his departure that australia has become a crucial testing ground for china’s relations with the west and other asia-pacific countries. speaking with the australian’s rowan callick in september 2010, zhang said that "there is no conflict of interest, not in history nor in territory" though he recognised the rising apprehension reflected in public discourse and government defence thinking (callick 2010). for australia’s (post) multicultural democracy to ensure the allegiance of its diverse population, it has to ensure the pathways to participation are open and the moralities of liberal pluralism are firmly embedded and fully exercised (galligan and roberts, 2008). the points of tension lie exactly at the intersections of ethno-nationalisms, imperial interests and political systems. australia’s empire project has to ensure that the emerging australian ethno-nationalism includes rather than marginalizes its “chinese” citizens, and embeds australia’s chinese histories as part of the common national narrative (lake 2008). 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 references ang, i. 2000, 'transforming chinese identities in australia; between assimilation, multiculturalism and diaspora', in t.a. see (ed.), intercultural relations, cultural transformation and identity the ethnic chinese selected papers presented at the 1998 issco conference, kaisa para sa kaunlaran, manila. ang, i. 2001, on not speaking chinese: living between asia and the west, routledge, london. australian human rights commission (ahrc), 2010, submission to the icerd committee on information concerning australia and the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (icerd), july 8, 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navigating the new international politics of diversity, oxford university press, oxford. lake, m. 2008, ‘cosmopolitan colonials: chinese australians and human rights how did early chinese immigrants change australia’s socio-political landcape?’, agora, vol. 29 no.3, pp.13-17. lake, m. and reynolds. h. 2008, drawing the global colour line: white men's countries and the international challenge of racial equality, melbourne university press, melbourne. laurenceson, j. 2008, ‘chinese investment in australia’, economic papers vol. 27, no.1 pp. 87–94 lever-tracy, c., ip, d.f.-k. & tracy, n. 1996, the chinese diaspora and mainland china : an emerging economic synergy, st. martins press, new york. levey, b. 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(1998). ‘old linkages, new networks: the globalization of overseas chinese voluntary associations and its implications’, china quarterly, no 155, september. lopez, m. 2000, the origins of multiculturalism in australian politics 1945–1975, melbourne university press, melbourne. lowe, k., cheok , h. & ah mouy, l., 1879, the chinese question in australia 1878-79, f. f. bailliere, melbourne. macgregor, p. 1995, ‘chinese?australian? the limits of geography and ethnicity as determinants of cultural identity’, in j. ryan ed., chinese in australia and new zealand: a multidisciplinary approach. wiley eastern, new delhi. marriner, c., 2009, mining mogul's racism claim, brisbane times 30 september http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/business/mining-moguls-racism-claim-20090930-gb9m.html marks, k., 2010 ‘mixing it up in bennelong’, griffith review, edition 29, http://www.griffithreview.com migliorino, p. and chan, a. 1993, ‘chinese in australia: the australian chinese community in nsw’, access china, vol.12, pp. 18-22. modood, t., 2007, multiculturalism: a civic idea, polity, cambridge. negri, a., hardt, m. and zolo, d. 2008, reflections of empire, (trans. e.emery), polity press, cambridge. http://books.google.com.au/books?id=j-vde8mduiyc&pg=pa115&lpg=pa115&dq=higley+social+cohesion+australia&source=bl&ots=x5oyebzxen&sig=8fkerelif2oupxfxyqo33nc10nu&hl=en&ei=mtsftfqcli2gvqp74-jadq&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0ccwq6aewag� http://books.google.com.au/books?id=j-vde8mduiyc&pg=pa115&lpg=pa115&dq=higley+social+cohesion+australia&source=bl&ots=x5oyebzxen&sig=8fkerelif2oupxfxyqo33nc10nu&hl=en&ei=mtsftfqcli2gvqp74-jadq&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0ccwq6aewag� http://books.google.com.au/books?id=j-vde8mduiyc&pg=pa115&lpg=pa115&dq=higley+social+cohesion+australia&source=bl&ots=x5oyebzxen&sig=8fkerelif2oupxfxyqo33nc10nu&hl=en&ei=mtsftfqcli2gvqp74-jadq&sa=x&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0ccwq6aewag� 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http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/business/mining-moguls-racism-claim-20090930-gb9m.html� http://www.griffithreview.com/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 85 ouyang, y. & sims, b. 2007, on the smell of an oily rag: speaking english, thinking chinese and living australian, wakefield press, kent town, s. aust. pearl, c. 1967/1981, morrison of peking, angus and robertson, london and sydney. refugee review tribunal 2007, australia rrt research response research response number: chn32643 country: china date: 21 november refugee review tribunal 2008, australia rrt research response research response number: chn33487 country: china date: 7 july saville, m., 2007, the battle for bennelong, melbourne university press, melbourne. saville, m. 2010, ‘bennelong despatch: yum cha and tears with kevin rudd’, crikey, 16 august http://www.crikey.com.au/2010/08/16/bennelong-despatch-yum-cha-and-tears-with-kevin-rudd/ sharp, a., 2009, ‘defence minister joel fitzgibbon resigns’ the age, 4 june, http://www.theage.com.au/national/defence-minister-joel-fitzgibbon-resigns-20090604-bwju.html shearer, a. 2010, sweet and sour: australian public attitudes towards china, lowy institute for international policy, sydney. siminton, i. 1989, ‘china, hong kong, immigration and australia’, in a. saikal ed., refugees in the modern world, dept of international relations, canberra, pp. 97–109. snow, d., christensen, n., and garnaut, j. 2009, ‘chinese billionaire funding our mps’, sydney morning herald, 4 july, http://www.smh.com.au/national/chinese-billionaire-funding-our-mps-20090703d7s9.html sun, w. 2006, media and the chinese diaspora : community, communications and commerce, routledge, london. suryadinata, l. 2004, ethnic relations and nation-building in southeast asia: the case of the ethnic chinese, institute of southeast asian studies & singapore society of asian studies, singapore. tan, c. 2006, ‘ ‘the tyranny of appearance’: chinese australian identities and the politics of difference’, journal of intercultural studies, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 65-82 vasta e. and castles, s. (eds) 1996 the teeth are smiling: the persistence of racism in multicultural australia, allen & unwin, sydney. wang, g., 1998, ‘upgrading the migrant: neither huaqiao nor huaren’, in e. sinn, ed., the last half century of chinese overseas, hong kong, hong kong university press. wu, c.-t., ip, d.f., inglis, c., kawakami, i., and duivenvoorden, k. 1998, ‘settlement experiences of recent chinese immigrants in australia: a comparison of settlers from hong kong, taiwan and china’, in e. sinn, ed., the last half century of chinese overseas, hong kong, university of hong kong press. zappala , g. 1998, ‘clientelism, political culture and ethnic politics in australia.’ australian journal of political science, vol. 33, no.3, pp. 381-97. http://www.crikey.com.au/2010/08/16/bennelong-despatch-yum-cha-and-tears-with-kevin-rudd/� http://www.theage.com.au/national/defence-minister-joel-fitzgibbon-resigns-20090604-bwju.html� http://www.smh.com.au/national/chinese-billionaire-funding-our-mps-20090703-d7s9.html� http://www.smh.com.au/national/chinese-billionaire-funding-our-mps-20090703-d7s9.html� 150 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 the rights defence movement, rights defence lawyers and prospects for constitutional democracy in china chongyi feng abstract contrary to the view that democratic aspiration has been utterly marginalised in china since the 1990s, the discourse of democracy continues to flourish via the internet and other means of communication, and a budding “rights defence movement” (weiquan yundong) has emerged as a new focus of the chinese democracy movement in china. the emergence of this rights defence movement foreshadows a new, more optimistic political scenario in which transition to a stable constitutional democracy through constructive interactions between state and society may occur. this paper explores the social and political context behind the rise of the rights defence movement in china, assesses the role played by rights defence lawyers (weiquan lushi) in shaping the rights defence movement and speculates on the implications of the rights defence movement for china’s transition to constitutional democracy. democratisation of communist china is a major international as well as domestic concern. with the chinese democracy movement shattered in 1989 after the tiananmen square crackdown, and with the rapid marginalisation of the dissident democratic activist leaders, a pessimistic view developed among china scholars in the late 1990s predicting that due to its political stagnation and demographic and environmental challenges china was likely to collapse and be left in a state of prolonged domestic chaos and massive human exodus (chang 2001). more recently, a new and equally pessimistic forecast of “resilient authoritarianism” has gained currency, which argues that china’s authoritarian system is not stagnant but constantly adjusting to new environments, and that the combination of a market economy and political institutionalisation has made the current authoritarian political system sustainable for the foreseeable future (nathan 2003, pei 2006). yet both of these two camps underestimate the positive political impetus for democratisation among the chinese population and within the chinese communist party itself. contrary to the view that democratic aspiration has been utterly marginalised in china since the 1990s (xu 1999), the discourse of democracy continues to flourish via the internet and other means of communication, and a budding “rights defence movement” (weiquan yundong) has emerged as a new focus of the chinese democracy movement in china (feng 2004, 2008). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 151 the emergence of this rights defence movement in connection with the new development of the legal profession foreshadows a new, more optimistic political scenario in which transition to a stable constitutional democracy through constructive interactions between state and society may occur. legal reforms in china have come a long way since the beginning of the “reform era” in 1978 when the legal profession did not exist and there were only two laws, namely the constitution and the marriage law. over the last three decades, the ideas of a legal system, the rule of law and human rights have eventually taken roots in chinese society; china has enacted hundreds of laws and established a modern court system and hundreds of law schools; china has actively participated in the international human rights regime, signing more than 20 international human rights conventions; and the leadership has allowed space for the growth of the legal profession, with more than 150 thousand lawyers employed at 14 thousand law firms in china today. an essential point of this paper is the interdependency of the rule of law and transition to constitutional democracy in china, a relationship in which the rights defence movement is playing a vital role. the paper explores the social and political context behind the rise of the rights defence movement in china, assesses the role played by rights defence lawyers (weiquan lushi) in shaping the rights defence movement and speculates on the implications of the rights defence movement for china’s transition to constitutional democracy. the rise of the rights defence movement in china the current rights defence movement is a comprehensive movement involving all social strata throughout the country and covering every aspect of human rights. due to a strict ban on organised opposition, rather than taking the form of a coordinated nationwide movement, the rights defence movement has instead developed as a diverse and increasingly forceful wave of isolated cases reported daily in the media, as well as public protests (“mass incidents”, the term coined by the chinese communist party-state to describe unapproved strikes, assemblies, demonstrations, petitions, blockages, collective sit-ins or physical conflicts involved 10 or more people) . those “mass incidents” numbered 60,000 in 2003, 74,000 in 2004 and 87,000 in 2005, an average of 200 protests a day, according to official figures. (yu 2007; hu 2008). some of them may involve thousands of people and result in police and paramilitary intervention leading to loss of lives. the movement is not merely “rightful resistance” of the rural poor (o’brien and li 2006), but has also become an urban phenomenon facilitated by the growing strength of the middle class and the latest technologies such as the internet and mobile phones. 152 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 defence of economic and social rights most cases of this rights defence movement aim to defend economic and social rights, including protests by peasants against excessive taxes, levies and forced seizures of farmland; strikes of workers against low pay, arrears of pay and poor working conditions; protests by laid-off urban workers against unfair dismissal by their employers; protests by home owners against forced eviction by government and developers; protests of residents against forced relocations; campaigns by citizens for unpaid social entitlements; campaigns for the rights of women and children; and protests of affected residents against environmental pollution. many serious protests involve peasants, the largest and most vulnerable “disadvantaged group” (ruoshi qunti) in china, accounting for more than 60% of the entire population. detrimental factors such as lack of arable land, lack of capital, poor education, poor technology and poor accessibility make the life of chinese peasantry difficult. their hardship is exacerbated by the state discrimination, especially the “household registration system” which limits the mobility of peasants and deprives them of the state welfare and the opportunity of employment in the state sector. although replacement of the “people’s commune” with “household responsibility system” and other policies in the reform era since the 1980s have increased autonomy and mobility of chinese peasants, their life chance is still greatly limited by the subsistence agriculture relying on a very small piece of land allocated to each household. while this small piece of land generates very little income for peasant households, until very recently they had been very heavily taxed and levied to fund the salaries of local cadres and public projects. worse still, land in the rural areas is run by local governments and does not belong to individual peasants. more often than not, local cadres collaborate with property developers to use the land for commercial purposes to bring in local financial income and personal gains, with little benefits for peasants. the peasants launched protests when they were desperate. one important development in last two years was that in some areas the peasants have raised bold demand for land ownership. in december 2008, when separate groups of peasant farmers in four provinces, heilongjiang, jiangsu and shaanxi and tianjin (one of the four provincial level municipalities) published very similar statements on the internet claiming to have seized their collectively owned land from the state and unilaterally privatised it (shi 2008). the chinese law stipulates that all rural land is owned by the state, which leases it to individuals to use on a 30-year contract basis but can take it back with relative impunity. the peasant rebellions and appeals by lawyers and liberal cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 153 intellectuals have put tremendous pressure on the state to revisit the policies on the landownership. in spite of the strict ban by the state, strikes by workers have become increasingly frequent in china, especially by the most vulnerable migrant workers from rural china, who are denied the right to collective bargaining or to form trade unions outside the official all china federation of trade unions. bureaucratic constraints often prevent them from obtaining legal redress for owed wages and other labour rights violations (chan 1998). according to labour expert han dongfang, director of china labour bulletin, the pearl river delta in guangdong province, china’s industrial powerhouse manufacturing one-third of chinese exports, sees at least one major labour dispute involving at least 1000 people daily, not to mention those smaller strikes (lee 2008). one new development is that china’s labor contract law, which came into effect in january 2008, has provided further encouragement for workers to assert their rights of better working condition and higher pay within the legal framework. massive protests in environmental protection represent a new area of social movement in china, which has witnessed a steady increase in environmental discontent and complaints induced by pollution incidents during the past few years. apart from the growing claim of victimhood through official channels, protests led by environmental non-governmental organizations (engos) and other antagonistic actions taken by the population are on a drastic rise. according to pan yue, deputy director of the state environmental protection administration (sepa), pollution-induced mass incidents grew by 29% every year, with more than 50,000 pollution disputes across the country in 2005 alone (pan 2006). defence of civil and political rights the cases of defending civil and political rights are also on the rise, including campaigns by lawyers, journalists and writers for the freedom of speech and press; campaigns by practitioners of the christian house churches and falun gong practitioners for the freedom of religions, beliefs, assembly and association; campaigns against arbitrary detention , “reform through labour”, torture and excessive death penalty; campaigns by victims of the party-state agents against injustice and abuses of public power, particularly by thousands of petitioners who flow to the national capital or provincial capitals from all over the country to seek redress from perceived injustice; protests by migrant workers against the household 154 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 registration system and other discrimination; and protests by peasants against the irregularities and manipulation in village elections. the fights by millions of falon gong followers and christian family church members to assert their rights of beliefs and religions have attracted a great deal international attention. the leninist party-state in china permits five official religions – buddhism, islam, taoism, catholicism and protestantism – provided that they submitted to strict state supervision. when spiritual entrepreneurs try enticing followers on their own or anyone practicing religions without state sanction, they are banned. falun gong began in 1992 as a form of qigong, a general name describing physical and mental disciplines based loosely on traditional chinese medical and spiritual practices. according to historian david ownby, falun gong is a new version of chinese traditional “redemptive societies.” they are organised around charismatic leaders who preach that salvation can be attained through cultivation of body and mind (ownby 2008). on april 25, 1999, more than ten thousand falun gong practitioners gathered outside zhongnanhai, the guarded compound where china's highest leaders live and work, in a day-long peaceful protest of police brutality against fellow practitioners in the neighboring city of tianjin. stunned and surprised, and with the fear of a potential threat to their legitimacy and control, china's paranoid leaders declared falun gong an “evil sect” (xiejiao) and launched a campaign of brutal suppression against the group. within a few months, the police had imprisoned tens of thousands of falun gong followers. the group claims that some 3,000 of its members were tortured to death in custody. falun gong has survived the suppression and transformed into a well-financed and well-coordinated international movement. while falun gong followers in exile have launched vigorous counter-charges in their own comprehensive media against the chinese communist regime, those within china have turned into underground practitioners. chinese family churches (jiating jiaohui) are assemblies of unregistered chinese christians independent of the government-run christian organisations. they are also known as the "underground" church or the "unofficial" church, although this is somewhat of a misnomer as they are collections of unrelated individual churches rather than a single unified church. they are called "family churches" because as they are not officially registered organisations and they cannot independently own property. hence they meet in private houses, often in secret for fear of arrest or imprisonment. family churches operate outside government regulations and restrictions, but they are not officially outlawed. their leaders and members cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 155 are often harassed by the government officials mainly for the fear of popular mobilisation outside the government control. this persecution may take the form of arrest, a prison sentence, re-education through labour, confiscation and heavy fines. family church members, numbering at least 50 million and accounting for 70% of total christians in china, have rigorously fought back by organising demonstrations and defending themselves in lawsuits (wei 2007). in another development, illegal interception and arbitrary detention of petitioners bringing grievances to higher authorities in china have become more systematic and extensive, and hence a major concern. china’s petitioning system has a long cultural and historical tradition dating back to imperial china and remains in place under the communist rule. the legal basis for the current petitioning system, known as the letters and visits system, is provided by the chinese constitution which protect the rights to petition and the state council regulations on letters and visits, which provides a systematic and coherent framework for the practices of petitions. the chinese government encourages petitions and has an extensive governmental bureaucracy to handle them, because the party-state needs the petitioning system as a window to understand the sources of social problems and unrest and as a release valve to maintain social stability, in the absence of other channels to raise grievances, politicallycharged grievances in particular. however, officials at all levels of government have a vested interest in preventing petitioners from speaking up about the mistreatment and injustices they have suffered. local authorities in particular have always been motivated to prevent information about rights abuses committed at the local level from reaching higher authorities. as petitioners bring complaints about lower levels of government to higher authorities, they face harassment and retaliation. after 2003, when the custody and repatriation system that controlled population movement by detention and forced return to their places of household registration was abolished, the chinese government has developed a complex extra-legal system to intercept, confine, and punish petitioners in order to control and silence them, often employing brutal means such as assault, surveillance, harassment of family members, kidnapping, and incarceration in secret detention centres (known as ‘black jails’), psychiatric institutions and re-education through labour camps. the interception of petitioners violates a number of basic human rights, such as the rights to freedom of expression, to liberty and security of person, and to freedom from torture and other cruel, degrading or inhumane treatment. petitioners, officially estimated to be 10 million, believe strongly that their rights 156 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 have been violated and persist to seek redress, but they are amongst those most vulnerable to human rights abuses in china today (chrd 2008). factors contributing to the rise of the rights defence movement qin hui, one of the most important chinese scholars concerned with rights issues, has argued that the secret of china's current economic advantage is its low human rights standards, a salient feature of “power elite capitalism” (quangui ziben zhuyi). china has become an investor's paradise because the prices of the four prime factors of production (human capital, land, credits and non-renewable resources) have been kept at artificially low levels by reducing the bargaining power of providers through political suppression (qin 2007a). there is no doubt that one essential factor behind china’s economic success is the abuse of rights and the environment (yu 2006; yu 2007; wu 2008). the chinese authorities also admitted that the current waves of “mass incidents” stem from the wide spread of rights abuses, including land seizures, forced evictions, and environmental disasters (li 2009). nevertheless, the theory and practice of social movements have demonstrated that even widespread abuses do not necessarily lead to social protests; other factors may be required, such as a split within the ruling bloc, and the evolving rights consciousness and political calculation of the population (scott 1985; foweraker 1995). the development of the chinese democracy movement since the 1980s and the re-emergence of liberalism and social democracy since the 1990s have greatly enhanced rights consciousness among the chinese population (feng 2003; goldman 2005). prior to the beijing olympics in august 2008, a group of chinese lawyers and activists launched a petition bearing the names of more than 14,000 people calling for ratification of the international covenant on civil and political rights. again on 9 december 2008, in commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights, rights lawyers and other rights activists published on the internet chapter 08, known as the “chinese human rights manifesto” and signed by more than 8,000 chinese citizens since its publication, spelling out 19 steps for rights protection and political reform, including a new constitution, freedom of speech and assembly, an independent judiciary and democratic elections for all levels of government. thus, the sharp increase in protests against rights abuses in china since the beginning of the new century may have more to do with the raised cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 157 level of rights consciousness among ordinary chinese citizens rather than an escalation of rights abuses. the chinese government has always defended its human rights record against international criticism, sometimes defensively, arguing that feeding and clothing 1.3 billion people supersedes political rights in the short term, and sometimes more aggressively, arguing that no country has the justification to interfere in the internal affairs of another country, including criticizing its human rights record. however, despite this defensive rhetoric, efforts have made even by the chinese party-state to come to terms with human rights. one could argue that until the 1990s, the law had been cynically exploited by the party-state as a tool for shoring up its dictatorship. the international discourse on human rights was officially repudiated as “bourgeois liberalism” and as a “western conspiracy of peaceful evolution” – in other words, an attempt to overthrow the chinese regime by stealth. however, partly due to domestic and international pressure and partly as a response to the imperatives of a developing market economy and globalisation, the party-state has begun to engage in a real dialogue on human rights and has adopted a cautiously positive approach towards international human rights norms since the 1990s. in 1991, the chinese government published its first white paper on human rights, followed by similar reports almost annually after 1995. the china society of human rights studies was established under the state council, and numerous research centres on human rights were set up throughout the country. the government signed the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights in 1997 (ratified by the national people’s congress in 2001) and the international covenant on civil and political rights in 1998 (pending ratification). in accordance with its policy of “getting on track with international practice” (yu guoji jiegui) since accession to the wto in 2001, china also revised the prc constitution in 2004 to add the words “the state respects and protects human rights,” enacted a property law in 2007 that guarantees the right to private ownership of property, and announced a state action plan for human rights in 2008. likewise, the communist party has officially replaced the concept of “class struggle” with the ideal of “building a harmonious society” with increasing emphasis on the rule of law. furthermore, a clear distinction has been made between the rule by law (law as a tool for the rulers) and rule of law (rulers subject to the law). rights and rights defence have now become popular topics in the state media as well as in chinese cyberspace, which enjoy much greater freedom than in the past to comment on 158 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 political issues. it is safe to claim that the chinese government is becoming increasingly tolerant of rights assertion, in spite of the fact that it continues to selectively crack down on individual rights defence lawyers and human rights activists. the dual leadership role of the rights defence lawyers it is generally agreed among chinese political activists and scholars that the rights defence movement proper in china was kick started in 2003 by two major events: the sun zhigang case and the sars epidemic (wang 2003; fan 2005a; tang 2005; liu 2006; teng 2006). in march 2003, sun zhigang, a resident from hubei province looking for employment in guangzhou, was detained for not having proper identity documents and was beaten to death in police custody. the incident triggered nationwide protests led by journalists, human rights activists, legal scholars and lawyers against institutional discrimination and inhumane treatment of migrant workers, resulting in the abolition of state regulations on detention of migrants and the entire custody and repatriation system targeting migrant workers. the other major triggering event in early 2003 was the government’s attempted cover-up of the severity of the sars epidemic in china, which stimulated the media to a wave of unprecedented openness and investigation into government dealings in order to uphold the people’s “right to know” [zhiqing quan] (zhao 2005:12–14). the year 2003 has been named as “the first year of rights (quanli yuannian)” in china (qiu 2003; hu 2003; xian 2004). this claim sounds odd as assertion of a variety of rights has been a theme for democracy movement and other civil movements in china since the late 1970s. for example, the educated youth returning to cities movement during 1976-1979 was a large-scale movement for the rights of residence and employment by millions of former urban students who were sent-down to the countryside by the party-state during the cultural revolution. the democracy wall movement during 1978-1979, coincided with the unofficial magazines movement, which lasted until 1981, was a pro-democracy and human rights movement spearheaded by chinese democracy activists who demanded and practised the political rights of free speech, free press and free association. the 1989 pro-democracy movement led by students and joined by millions of other citizens aimed not only to clean the government from corruption but also to establish a variety of political rights, especially the right of association. the current rights defence movement is new in two senses. first, the current rights defence movement rights are grounded in legal framework and legal process. the new features of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 159 sun zhigang case lay in the fact that it was not only a human rights case fought by ordinary citizens against the abuses by the state, but also a case that led to the positive response of institutional reform by the state to redress human rights abuses. second, leadership is provided by the legal profession, rights defence lawyers in particular. it has been a classical story known to all that the petition sent to the national people’s congress by three young graduates holding phd degrees in law from beijing university, jiang yu, teng biao and xu zhiyong who later became rights lawyers, played a key role in bringing about a rare review on constitution violation and subsequent abolition of the notorious regulations on detention and repatriation of beggars and floating population (kingdom law firm, 2008). with their professional knowledge and extraordinary courage, rights defence lawyers have fought in the frontline and provided leadership to the emerging rights defence movement (carnes 2006; li 2007). some have been hailed as “heroes of our times” or “men of the hour”, and have enjoyed an increasingly high profile in the chinese and international media. (ji & wang 2005; hu 2006; tao 2006; ya 2006). actually, there is a hot debate among rights lawyers about the strategy of rights defence movement. (teng 2006; kahn 2007; guo 2008) for those who take a harder line, it is futile and harmful to seek compromise with the ruling communist party, as even the “enlighten leader” hu jintao, in spite of his talks of expanding constitutional rights and strengthening the legal system, tightened the party’s control over the courts and continued to persecute rights lawyers; it is impossible to win the political cases for defendants as courts are strictly controlled by the party; the main purpose of lawsuits is to expose the evils of chinese legal system and the crimes of the communist government. they also support internet campaigns and mass demonstrations, including demonstrations involving violence. there is a tendency for mass demonstrations to become violent when the legal system proves unable to redress widespread social injustice. in june 2008, based on the rumour that a school girl was raped and killed by a son of a local official, thousands of people at weng’an county, guizhou province joined together to burn down 160 offices and 42 vehicles belonging to local government and police. in july 2008, due to the disputes about ownership of rubber trees, hundreds of peasants at menglian village, yunnan province clashed with police, resulting in the death of two villagers and injury of 19 villagers and 41 policemen. again in november 2008, due to resentment against forced eviction, about 30 evicted households and thousands of other people surrounded the city government of longnan, gansu province, burning 110 offices and 22 vehicles. 160 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 for those who take a much softer line, communist bureaucracy is not monolithic and the current top communist leaders, committed to attracting foreign investment and making the country a respected world power, are running the country “according to law”; the basic duty of rights lawyers is to help citizens exercise the rights granted to them within current legal framework; through individual litigations against rights violation, rights lawyers are effecting positive policy and institutional changes and raising the awareness of the concept of human rights. some notable victories have been won by this approach. the “stubborn as a nail household” (dingzihu), a family who refused to vacate their home to make way for real estate development in chongqing, sichuan province, attracted international attention throughout the world in march 2007, and led to a negotiated settlement with the developers the following month. this was seen as a test case on the government’s enforcement of the new property law. likewise, the protests by residents of the coastal city of xiamen in the second half of 2007 forced a giant petrochemical plant (investment of us$1.41 billion) with strong political connections and government support to be relocated elsewhere, probably the first direct concession made by the chinese government to public demands through demonstrations. again in january 2008, similar protests by shanghai residents forced the shanghai government to reconsider its maglev train project to connect the hongqiao international airport to the pudong international airport. in november 2008, starting from chongqing, one of china's four provincial-level municipalities, and extending later to jingzhou, lanzhou, sanya, dali, shantou and other cities, thousands of taxi drivers went on strikes over high operating costs, high traffic fines, shortages of natural gas and the government's lack of efforts in reining in unlicensed taxi operators who were stealing fares away. local governments in these cities negotiated with strikers and took emergency measures to address their demands. these examples are significant because the chinese government, with its tradition of top-down decision making, secretive deliberations and little tolerance for dissent, previously had almost no practice of engaging in real popular consultation. rights lawyers have not only rigorously defended various victims of rights abuses, but also played an important role as opinion leaders to link rights defence cases with political aspirations for the rule of law and constitutional democracy. in their role as professional lawyers, they not only represented clients in ordinary cases, but also took up politically sensitive cases involving victims of state power, defending political and civil rights with a focus on cases of wider social and political significance, and provided legal aid for cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 161 individual and collective rights defence action kept within the realm of law. as legal activists and opinion leaders, they publish regularly on “sensitive topics” via the internet and other media outlets, organise or participate in political petitions, and consciously use lawsuits as social mobilisation for legal and political reform (ji & wang 2005). precisely because of this dual role, rights lawyers have been constantly harassed by the partystate: blacklisted, suspended, monitored, confined, detained or even jailed (fu 2006; liu 2006). lawyers, and particularly rights defence lawyers, are vulnerable due primarily to continuing flaws in the chinese legal system, which still does not recognise a fully independent judiciary and privileges the party-state over any of its “enemies”, real or imagined. as late as 1996, when the prc lawyers law was enacted, the state owned every law firm and lawyers were treated as civil servants (“state legal workers”), expected to uphold the interests of the state as their central priority. while most law firms have now been privatised (michelson 2006), lawyers are still tightly controlled by the state’s regulatory body, the ministry of justice, and its provincial counterparts, the bureaus of justice. these bureaus monopolise the most important powers for management of lawyers, including granting, suspending and revoking their practicing licenses, which are reviewed on an annual basis. many rights defence lawyers have lost their licences or faced other state-sanctioned harassment simply for attempting to represent their clients in politically “sensitive” cases. high profile cases where rights defence lawyers have been harassed include zheng enchong’s imprisonment for three years for representing some evicted shanghai residents in a lawsuit against a real estate developer and the local government; zhu jiuhu’s detention for representing oil-field operators in shaanxi whose contractual right to operate oil wells was unilaterally and arbitrarily taken away by the local government without proper compensation; li baiguang’s detention for representing peasants in fujian province fighting for their land rights; guo feixiong’s detention for representing villagers in guangdong in an action to recall their village leaders; the suspension of gao zhisheng’s practicing license and the closure of his law firm for defending falun gong members; and the suspension of guo guoting’s practicing license for defending dissident journalists and falun gong practitioners (wang 2006; fu 2006; human rights watch 2008). state persecution of lawyers: examples 162 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 name charge and punishment time location zheng enchong 3 years in prison for “leaking state secrets” 2003 shanghai li baiguang detention for “swindling” 2004 fujian guo guoting suspension and exile for “inciting subversion” 2005 shanghai zhu jiuhu detention for “disturbing social order” 2005 shaanxi guo feixiong 5 years in prison for “illegal operation” 2006 guangdong gao zhisheng 3 years in prison with 5 years of probation for “inciting subversion”; indefinite suspension 2006 beijing chen guangcheng 4 years in prison for “disturbing social order” 2007 shandong li heping being beaten for representing “sensitive cases” 2007 beijing teng biao kidnap for representing dissidents 2008 beijing teng biao and jiang tianyong suspension for offering defence to arrested tibetans 2008 beijing lawyers are no enemies of the state, and the current regime in china is eagerly promoting the use of law and lawyers to foster social stability and political legitimacy. in rights issues that do not pose a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the ccp and political stability, such as consumer rights, rights of minority shareholders, or women’s rights, lawyers’ contributions to the process have become indispensable. there is even a new trend that “legal profession” personnel [zhengfa xi], including lawyers, judges, legal scholars and people’s congress deputies, are fast ascending to replace technocrats in leadership positions within the partystate (fan 2005b; lao 2005; wang 2006). the clashes between rights lawyers and the party-state indicate profound contradictions in current legal and political systems in china. on the one hand, mainly through importing legal institutions from the west, a modern legal system has been established since the late 1970s (zou 2006). on the other hand, the chinese communist party still seeks to maintain their monopoly on political power and the power structure of leninist party-state, creating intrinsic contradictions between the rule of law and the supremacy of the party. the constitution is granted the “highest legal authority”; courts are granted power to handle law cases; and legal norms and procedures are put in place to protect citizens against abuses. however, according to the concept of “socialist rule of law”, the principle of the “party leadership” must be upheld and the party power should not be undermined by law. as a consequence, rights lawyers were punished when they crossed the line drew by the party, although the authorities have refrained from suppressing the legal activism of rights lawyers cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 163 entirely, at least partly because it operates carefully within the law and uses china’s judicial system to advance its aims. implications for china’s transition to constitutional democracy several empirical studies have been carried out on the practices of chinese lawyers and legal aid workers (michelson 2006; 2007; gallagher 2006; s.liu 2006; cai 2007). however, these studies do not focus on rights defence lawyers, and they conclude that the vast majority of chinese lawyers have no interest in upholding the rights of ordinary citizens against statesupported defendants. the reasons for this reluctance are that such cases are both politically risky and often have little or no economic pay-off (michelson, 2006). it is true that only a small minority of lawyers are actively engaged in rights defence cases, but we argue that the social and political impact of these lawyers is much broader than their numbers might suggest. it is extremely important to study this impact, and to demonstrate the link between the work of these lawyers and broader political and social reforms in china. the rights defence movement is a tremendous boost to the initial development of civil society in china, transforming the peoples’ consciousness from that of obedient subjects to autonomous citizens; transforming the orientation of many quasi-governmental organisations from the party-state to their true constituencies among the people; and encouraging citizens to further organise themselves for civil rights purposes. as tens of thousands of ngos and professional associations play increasingly important roles in economic, social and political change in china and the term “civil society” (gongmin shehui) has long become part of chinese political vocabulary, there is a debate among china’s scholars whether the concept of “civil society” can be applied in analysing this new development (brook and frolic 1997). our position is that civil society should be understood as the intermediate associational realm situated between the state on the one end and the private realm (including individuals, families and firms) on the other. contrary to the experience in the west, where civil society grew naturally from the society, the emerging civil society in china today comes from the reversing direction and is dependent on the withdrawal of, and subject to the negotiation with, the leninist party-state, which had taken up the space of associational life and continues to deny the right of citizens to free association (feng 2006). however, the popularising of the term “rights defence” and its daily practice have a synergistic impact in enhancing rights consciousness. there are indications that many social organisations and professional associations in china, including the official trade unions, the women’s federation, 164 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 federation of industry and commerce, and lawyers associations are all beginning to play a far more active role in rights defence within the boundaries sanctioned by the party-state. the internet, and increasingly the state-controlled media, are also contributing to the emergence of a genuine public sphere and serious debates on social and political issues. migrant workers, numbering more than 100 million, have started to establish their own unions, and the call for the establishment of peasant associations receives increasing support from enlightened government officials as well as the public. the rights defence movement also contributes to the progress of the rule of law and democratic transition in china. convinced that there is an interdependence between economic and political development, china scholars seem to have reached a consensus that china will democratise in the long run, either through an evolution entailed by sustained economic growth, openness to the outside world and the accompanying social change, or through a violent eruption when an unexpected economic breakdown challenges the remaining legitimacy of the current regime, based as it is primarily on economic performance (brzezinski, et al 1998). however, opinions are divisive about the timing of democratisation in china, and scholars have found it hard to identify the kinds of actors who will actually bring about democracy there. there is a huge body of literature on the decline or crisis of communist rule, the emergence of democratic ideas, and the development of the democratic movement against the chinese communist dictatorship (davis 1995; weatherley 1999; angle 2002). however, research that focuses on the democratic movement in opposition to the party-state has not been able to provide satisfactory answers to the questions of timing and actors, because the exiled leaders of this opposition movement have been effectively marginalised by the ccp. answers should be sought elsewhere. the processes of the transformation in other former communist countries have shown that most important actors were “inside the system” rather than “outside the system” (feng 2008). rights defence lawyers have helped to frame the demands of protesters within the broader language of defending basic human rights, and have thereby shamed the chinese party-state into upholding its own laws and stated ideals. as a new development, rights lawyers played an essential role in drafting up chapter 08, known by some as the “chinese human rights manifesto”, signed by more than 8,000 chinese citizens since its publication on the internet on 9 december 2008, clearly articulating constitutional democracy as an alternative to one-party dictatorship in china and spelling out cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 165 19 steps for political reforms, including a new constitution, freedom of speech and assembly, an independent judiciary and democratic elections for all levels of government. there are those who argue that progress in rule of law is irrelevant to the political transition to democracy. it is our belief that the quest for rule of law is vital for china’s transition to constitutional democracy, which we would define as a political system where the legitimacy of the government is ensured by fair elections and government powers are limited by a constitution that guarantees fundamental rights through a democratic legislature, an accountable executive and an impartial judiciary. law, even if it is the same, functions differently in different political systems. there is a fundamental difference between the “rule by law”, in which the law is an instrument for rulers, and the “rule of law”, in which the law is an instrument used by everyone for justice and the rulers are also subject to the law. (maravall & przeworski 2003). the rule of law is intrinsic to constitutional democracy but impossible in a dictatorship or autocracy, simply because dictators and autocrats are not subject to law. some scholars have argued that china will continue reforming its legal system while maintaining the current authoritarian political regime for the foreseeable future, a socalled “thin” rule of law system (peerenboom 2002, 2006). yet this view underestimates the catalytic power of reforms to the legal system, particularly in the current international environment, when the chinese government must be seen to embrace universal human rights norms in order to retain its international credibility and continue to attract foreign investment. as the government ratifies human rights and other international treaties, it faces increasing pressure both domestically and internationally to uphold the basic legal rights of its citizens, as set out in its national laws and constitution. rights defence lawyers clearly understand this dynamic, and in seeking to assist citizens to uphold their legal rights, many of these lawyers have a much more ambitious agenda in mind. in their various writings, these rights defence lawyers clearly relate their legal work to a broader political and social reform agenda. (teng 2007; mo 2008; xu 2008). they making the chinese government more accountable to its citizens, and this will require much deeper reforms to the legal structure – such as introducing a truly independent judiciary and removing the influence of the communist party over the appointment and discharge of judges and lawyers. (wang 2005) in other words, they demand a “thick” rule of law system, which can only function normally in the power structure of constitutional democracy. conclusion 166 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 by definition, the current rights defence movement in china is a social movement asserting the constitutional rights by chinese citizens through lawful means within the legal framework of the country. with their professional knowledge and extraordinary courage, rights defence lawyers have fought in the frontline and provided leadership to this emerging movement (carnes 2006; li 2007). led by this group of rights lawyers, some citizens in china have been able to file and even win their cases at courts, achieving concessions and negotiated outcomes from the state. however, it is inevitable that rights defenders are forced to at least implicitly confront and challenge the political structure of one-party dictatorship. the system of leninist party-state is set up in such a way so as to virtually ensure that corruption and abuse of power become endemic, since there is no access to an independent media, no independent judiciary court system, no political opposition and no accountability guaranteed by regular elections. the battles of the rights defence movement at the legal front may provide an important step for political reform toward constitutional democracy. the impacts of rights defence cases in contemporary china have extended far beyond the judiciary domain. the most recent wave of rights defence protests has shown the determination of chinese citizens to assert their right to be consulted in decisions that directly affect their lives, a clear sign of their awakening sense of real citizenship. for those rights lawyers, well educated and idealistic, the ultimate aim of the right defence movement is to effect a political transition from one-party dictatorship to constitutional democracy. using the laws and courts the party-state has put in place, they are putting into effect the state rhetoric on rights and translating constitutional rights into reality. the end result can be a robust civil society with legal protection of human rights, predominance of the rule of law, and a political structure of constitutional democracy in which the government is formed through periodic elections and subject to the law. references angle, stephen c. 2002, human rights and chinese thought: a cross-cultural inquiry, cambridge university press. brook, timothy and b. michael frolic, eds.1997, civil society in china, m. e. sharpe, new york. brzezinski, zbigniew, et al. 1998, ‘will china democratize?’ journal of democracy, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 3-64. cai, yongchun 2007, ‘civil resistance and rule of law in china: the defense of homeowners’ rights,’ in elizabeth j. perry and merle goldman, eds., grassroots political reform in contemporary china, harvard university press. carnes, tony 2006, ‘china’s new legal eagles: evangelical lawyers spur civil 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and lianjiang li 2006, rightful resistance in rural china, cambridge university press. ownby, david 2008, falun gong and the future of china, oxford university press. pan, yue 2006, ‘hexie shehui mubiao xia de huanjing youhao xing shehui’(environmentally friendly society is congruous with the goal of building a harmonious society), july, http://www.eedu.org.cn/article/epedu/florilegiums/panyue/200607/9018.html peerenboom, randall 2002, china’s long march toward rule of law, cambridge university press. peerenboom, randall 2006, ‘law and development of constitutional democracy: is china a problem case?’, annals of the american academy of political and social science, vol. 603, p.192. pei, minxin 2006, china’s trapped transition: the limits of developmental autocracy, harvard university press, cambridge, mass. qin, hui 2007a, ‘zhongguo jingji fazhan de di renquan youshi’ (the advantage of poor human rights in china’s economic development), http://www.cicus.org/info/artshow.asp=46041. qin, 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2006, china’s legal reform towards the rule of law, martinus nijhoff publishers, boston. http://www.voanews.com/chinese/archive/w2007-07-26-voa58.cfm� http://www.voanews.com/chinese/archive/w2007-07-26-voa58.cfm� http://www.newcenturynews.com/article%20/gd/2008020205180502.html� http://www.newcenturynews.com/article%20/gd/2008020205180502.html� http://www.article1.chinalawinfo.com/article_detail.asp� 142 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 land rights at last! heidi norman we’re asking all students and all clubs, all unions and the workers to come out on july 14, [1972] to ask that land rights be recognised. briefly land rights means: a claim that all aboriginal reserves be immediately deeded in perpetuity to the aboriginal people as a whole. kevin gilbert – call to rally at the canberra tent embassy on what was national aborigines day, (quoted in tatz 1975) that ‘real’ land rights means more than simply returning title to existing reserves. it involves the granting of title to substantial areas of land in nsw. resolution of the nsw [aboriginal] land council, meeting 10th october 1981, tranby college, glebe. abstract this paper is a history of the little understood events that led to the passing of the groundbreaking aboriginal land rights legislation by the nsw parliament in march 1983. this paper sets out to ask why and how, after over 200 years of colonial land dealings, the government came to recognise aboriginal interests and rights to land and the sorts of strategies initiated by the nsw aboriginal community to bring this moment about. through interviews with key participants and close study of the archive, this paper traces the events that led to the wran government’s 1978 announcement to investigate a range of issues including aboriginal land rights, how the inquiry was run, the recommendations it made and, finally, the bill that was drafted and made law. this study contributes to an understanding of the government’s response to aboriginal social and political activism and therefore a new moment in history whereby we can understand a more just, though not uncontested, relationship between aboriginal communities and the state. the demands for ‘land rights’ have been persistent since invasion, yet they have varied over time in response to specific issues and in relation to the wider political context. for example, land demands have at times encompassed claims for equal citizenship and against the removal or apprenticeship of children, for small tracts for co-operative farming, or for decent housing with running water and sewerage and an oven. in different ways, over the colonial period, land justice was framed to meet economic, social, political, cultural and spiritual demands or needs (goodall 1996, maynard 2007). land has therefore functioned as a central organising and defining dimension of aboriginal culture and identity and since colonisation, has been subject to immense rupture – at times by design but in other instances through the wider imperatives of colonial capitalism. goodall (1996) through close study of the archive demonstrates that land justice has been an enduring demand since colonisation, however differently framed over time. in later 143 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 work goodall (2004, 2009) further illustrates through two ‘biographies’: one of an ‘extraordinary woman’, the late isabel flick, and secondly of a major sydney river, how relationships and attachments to land have similarly been a complex story of continuity and change where relationships and connections to land were forged anew continuous with traditional cultural practices and remade according to the particularities of the colonial economy and administration. however, goodall and others (e.g. maynard, 2007) are less focused on the inter-relations between the state, power and aboriginal land justice demands, in part this is because these studies are prior to significant changes in the way the nsw government dealt with aboriginal people. by the mid-1970s, a new moment in the long story of land rights activism emerged and crafted the political climate for the wran government’s announcement of the select committee inquiry and for key members to recall that it was a moment where ‘land rights time had come’ (keane pers. comm. 2008). but it is first necessary to track back a decade earlier and identify some other developments that contributed to the movement from the mid-1970s. specifically, the land rights movement in nsw was galvanized anew from 1965 in response to the newlyelected askin liberal government’s renewed efforts to achieve assimilation, central to which was the revocation of reserved aboriginal lands. the decisions followed recommendations of the nsw government ‘joint committee of the legislative council and legislative assembly upon aborigines welfare’ on welfare related issues, particularly education and housing, and ‘other proposals necessary to assist aborigines attain an improved standard of living’ (joint committee 1967, vol.5, p. 5). the report (1967) of the joint committee was critical of the aboriginal welfare board’s delay in bringing about the assimilation of aboriginal people and recommitted the government to achieving this goal more effectively. central to this was the recommendation that aboriginal reserve lands should ‘in due course…disappear’ and the decision to cease any further building, infrastructure or even maintenance with the long term plan to gradually ‘divest itself’ of reserve lands. aboriginal people’s long-standing demands for land, including greater control over reserve lands, and compensation for dispossession, were not considerations in the committee’s recommendations. these decisions significantly impacted many families who continued to live on awb 144 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 administered stations and reserves: in 1965, the aborigines welfare board administered 14 stations totalling 2484 residents (including woodenbong, tabulam, cabbage tree island, burnt bridge, purfleet, roseby park, wreck bay, wallaga lake, boggabilla, moree, walgett, brewarrina, cowra and murrin bridge) and a further 4000 residents lived on about 40 reserves or communities across nsw (select committee 1980). the passing of the aborigines act 1969 that repealed the long-standing aborigines protection act 1909, further accelerated the revocations of what for aboriginal people was considered ‘aboriginal land’. the new laws abolished the central governing body of aboriginal affairs, the aborigines welfare board, and transferred reserve land to the state lands department. these developments represented a complex mix of both a desire on the part of the nsw government to soften its welfare authoritarianism through devolution of ‘aboriginal welfare’ to the relevant functional state departments at the behest of the newly appointed commonwealth body, the council for aboriginal affairs (herein ‘the council’) and to lessen the financial burden the board posed, but mostly the new laws were informed by the logic of assimilation as both inevitable and, at the level of government policy, equal and just. the council from the outset advocated a model whereby the states would continue to be responsible for aboriginal affairs with commonwealth grants from assistance and the devolution of aboriginal related programs to functional departments. rather than centralisation, they advocated devolution to the functional state based departments. council member, barrie dexter explains in his unpublished manuscript, ‘pandora’s box’, that devolution to the relevant department would allow for expertise to be drawn upon and would be better funded than the prevailing welfarist administrative regimes. the council argued departmental responsibility would ensure aboriginal people were given a service equivalent to what the rest of society expected and were entitled to. the council, as can be seen in dexter’s reflection of the period was both constrained by the existing conservative welfare regimes in the north and the federal government and by their own assumptions about the inevitability of assimilation (see dexter, chapter 20:5 for an account of the council’s political strategy). tim rowse (2000) suggests that for the council assumptions about the ‘north-south divide’ shadowed their ideas. but at the least the council’s reforms, which were apparently influential in nsw, were premised on ideas of 145 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 ‘integration’ as indicated by the minister at the cairns gathering of relevant state and federal aboriginal affairs agencies in place of the policy enshrined in the joint statement by the commonwealth and the states as amended in 1965. prime minister mcmahon, announced the ‘cairns statement’ on the 23 april 1971: i do not like attempts to embody complex policies in single words like assimilation and integration, capable as they are of varied interpretations and often acquiring irrational associations. we believe that aboriginal australians should be assisted as individuals and, if they wish, as groups to hold effective and respected places with one australian society with equal access to the rights and opportunities it provides and accepting responsibilities towards it. at the same time they should be encouraged and assisted to preserve and develop their culture – their languages, tradition and arts – so that these can become living elements in the diverse culture of australian society. but there were some modifications along the way in response to aboriginal land activism, particularly reserve lands. goodall (1996) explains that reserve lands were understood by aboriginal people as recognition of traditional land ownership, compensation for dispossession and as a promise from the english crown of inalienable security of tenure. the government included aboriginal representation on the board and established a highly constrained land recovery mechanism through the aboriginal lands trust (herein ‘the trust’) in 1972. by 1969, some 25,000 acres of ‘old reserves’ had been revoked by the state government (mcguigan 1984). in response to this threat, different regional groups became organized and went on to form larger coalitions. on the north coast, as the reserves were threatened with revocation, pastor frank roberts junior, along with other groups supporting co-operative farming, along with north-western nsw people, formed a ‘coalition of land and rights council’ (goodall 1996, pp.299, 336-337). this council held a conference in sydney in 1970, forming the ‘land and rights council’. the ‘land and rights council’ drew together north coast and north-western peoples who were experiencing similar threats to their land. from 1969, there were various local responses to the revocations and against the deliberate depletion and neglect of reserve houses: in 1972, some residents of the reserve at mulli mulli, in the state's north, participated in a rent strike to highlight the sub-standard housing and government neglect. at around the same time, activists originally from moree and living in sydney began researching and documenting the ‘land needs’ of the nsw aboriginal community. 146 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the campaign for land rights recognition, in response to the revocation of reserves, gained considerable momentum in terms of profile and awareness in the wider community, and was a coherent and uniting platform for the nsw aboriginal community. the trade union movement was particularly supportive in part because of the connections between members and the land rights movement. other social movements aligned in support of land rights included feminists, students and labor groups. t-shirts and badges demanding land rights animated the newlyminted aboriginal flag. the commonwealth government, despite contrary advice from its key advisory group, the council, actively supported mining applications and this sector’s interests, against the objections and legal actions by aboriginal people, such as by the yirrkala people in what is referred to as the gove land rights case1 the experience of dispossession from land, while a feature of aboriginal life along the east coast since colonisation, was again intensified in the second half of the twentieth century. at the same time, aboriginal people in what became the northern territory were beginning to feel the full brunt of colonial dispossession, as europeans and the government sought to regulate access to land, particularly for mining. whilst the manner of dispossession from land differed greatly from the east coast to the north of the country, the experiences came to share a united political platform, articulating similar and different land demands. . the ‘land rights’ response by prime minister mcmahon, in january 1972, was received with contempt by aboriginal people and sparked a much wider national land rights movement. the land rights struggle in nsw, now long-standing, had endured the tyranny and authoritarian rule of the aborigines protection board and later the welfare board. the dispossession of aboriginal people from their land in nsw was a long process but also one that was within living memory and included the loss or eviction from one’s home. in the period from 1940, with the formation of the aborigines welfare board, the reserve lands were reduced from 15,834 acres to 6,274 acres by 1963. in a period of no more than 23 years, more than half of the reserve land had been revoked (mcguigan 1984). 1 the yirrkala people’s gove land rights case refers to milirrpum v. nabalco pty. ltd. (1971) 17 flr 141. 147 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 this was most apparent in the response to the commonwealth’s limited land rights response. following unsuccessful litigation by the yirrkala people, redfern based kooris and murris, travelled to canberra and set up what became known as the ‘aboriginal tent embassy’ protest. amongst other things, the protest challenged the assumed assimilation of south-eastern aboriginal people and powerfully highlighted the ambiguous status of aboriginal people in our own land. importantly, the land rights movement came together as a national campaign. the limited response of the conservative coalition government following the 1967 referendum, as well as the state sponsored police violence to break-up the embassy protest, entrenched hostilities between the aboriginal community and the government and cemented the national land rights movement (dexter unpub. man. aiatsis library, ms 4167, rowse 2000). in part, the embassy activism also influenced the new policy direction of the reforming alp national government, led by gough whitlam in late 1972 where more substantial innovation in aboriginal affairs developed, including an inquiry into land rights recognition in the northern territory and overall policy framework of self-determination. significant funding was made available for nsw projects in the areas of land recovery, services, employment and training and housing. funding for the purchase of houses in redfern, for example, responded to critical housing needs and was part of a wider employment and training program but was also framed as land rights, particularly as land was central to the making of an urban community and self-determination. nsw government response: the aboriginal lands trust the nsw askin liberal government, in response to land justice demands, enacted the aboriginal lands trust in 1972. the amendments to the aborigines act (1969), to establish the trust, had implications for reserve lands. it was initially thought that the trust, with its nine-member representative body, would hold title to all remaining reserves on behalf of aboriginal people. the amendments establishing the trust not only raised enormous anxiety about the security of reserve land but it was widely considered an inadequate mechanism for land recovery: that it did not deliver real land rights recognition. concerns about the legitimacy and capacity of the trust were well founded: some 4,300 hectares of reserve lands, held by the lands department, were transferred to the trust freehold and a mechanism established for communities to make application to self manage their land. of the 250 claims lodged with the trust only a few were processed and actioned in the earlier period of the trust (wilkie 1985, p.11). 148 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the perception of the ineffectiveness of the trust came to be pivotal in the campaign for ‘real’ land rights recognition. the trust – its activities and the legacy it inherited shaped the nsw land rights movement – was central to the politics and factions that emerged in this period and continued to impact on the land rights movement following the passing of the nsw aboriginal land rights act, 1983. the trust, in effect, assumed responsibility for the management of reserves and housing formerly undertaken by the board. it was an incredibly flawed model: housing stock on reserves was already chronically depleted and inadequate servicing had prevailed well before the government’s decision to cease maintaining reserve housing, to the extent that by 1978 it was noted that eight communities were without electricity, affecting some 480 residents, four communities had no sewerage disposal and 18 were without sewerage or septic systems affecting 2500 residents (select committee 1980, p.46). a new wave of community activism the actions of the trust and the criticism of its limitations further galvanized support, clarifying the demands for land rights. at this time, key people emerged and significantly shaped the development of land rights. the formation of the black defence group was critical at this point. the black defence group drew together an alliance of aboriginal people, active in a number of areas, and union and other community activists. the group was originally convened to fund-raise for the roll-out of aboriginal medical services [ams] across the country. under the guidance of redfern ams coordinator, naomi meyers, the group produced a newsletter and fund-raising kit. with the support of many non-aboriginal people, defence member, marcia langton, explained that she travelled pillion on a motor-bike to various philanthropic organisations, including rotary and lions, in search of financial support to run an ams for 12 months, after which time they hoped government funding would follow. writing initially under the banner, ‘koori-binna’, the newsletter communicated the group's fund-raising activities. kevin cook and marcia langton explain that black defence group activism was influenced by representation from south coast elders, jack campbell and ted ‘gaboo’ thomas, who 149 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 encouraged them to focus their efforts on land rights. south coast elders impressed upon the younger activists that the most important issue was land rights and so the defence group shifted their focus to achieving this objective. kevin cook recalls that: they came up and talked to us about setting up a different act. the lands trust was operating at that time and people weren’t too happy…it was widely perceived that the act was no good. it didn’t allow aboriginal people to do anything for themselves (cook pers. comm.. 2008). with this influence, the black defence group went on to organise a state-wide land rights conference, in 1977, at which the nsw aboriginal land council (nsw alc) was formed. the conference, timed to coincide with the annual aboriginal rugby league knockout carnival being hosted in redfern, drew a large and diverse crowd. the nsw alc formed as an independent non-statutory, non-government funded body with kevin cook as the first chairperson. marcia langton, at the first press conference of nsw alc, outlined some of their plans: ‘we have decided to pressure the alp to embark on a land acquisition program’ and for the nsw alc to become a statutory body (langton 1997). kevin gilbert argued that the trust had proved to be ‘totally inadequate to administer the several thousand acres of aboriginal land it held’ and hoped the nsw alc would replace the trust. the defence affiliated activists and now with the organisation of the nsw alc was instrumental in pressuring the government to respond to aboriginal demands and eventually focus on land rights. their success in having a motion put at the alp state conference in the same year endorsing aboriginal land rights further propelled a formal government response. by 1978 the nsw australian labor party ‘aborigines’ policy included extensive reference to land rights. the chair of the aboriginal affairs committee and defence member, bob bellear, had successfully put the motion at the state conference, and this included: all crown land now being used exclusively as aboriginal reserves to be vested in, and administered by, statutory bodies elected by and comprised of aborigines. an investigation into the leasing and occupancy of land which until recently has been aboriginal reserve land or part of reserves traditionally occupied by aborigines. where possible and desirable these areas shall be handed over to the statutory aboriginal body, or bodies, for their utilisation. the [nswalp]…: 150 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 recognises that land forms the cultural, spiritual, economic and social basis of aboriginal communities; believes that the granting of land rights to aborigines is a most crucial and significant long term aspect of any policy affecting aborigines. the six-page policy document went on to say that, after consultation, a fully funded aboriginal land commission would be established for the purpose of hearing and granting land claims, assisting applications to the federal aboriginal land commission and managing land on a needs and interest basis. the policy further called for a halt to any mining leases where there is land claim interest and for the establishment of regional land councils throughout the state to manage land claims and management (including access and traditional hunting and fishing rights). the nsw alc met regularly across the state, stepped up the demand for reserve lands with claims for terry hie hie in north western nsw orient point near nowra by the roseby park community and wallaga lake on the south coast (goodall 1996, p. 11). elected members of the trust continued to attempt to negotiate a strong position and felt that they had some continuing authority because they were ‘representative’. for example, when it came to the government’s land rights consultation, the trust saw their ‘representative’ role as having some authority and asserted their right to make a submission direct to the premier as a ‘separate viewpoint’, drawing on the trust’s ‘own special knowledge of the aboriginal communities which it represents’ (aboriginal land trust 1981).the trust minutes reveal the growing antagonism. when it came to the land rights conference held at morpeth on the 26th september 1981, the alt members expressed concern ‘because of the unrepresentative nature of such forums’ (aboriginal land trust, minutes, 4-10th december, 1981, page 11). on the proposed land rights conference (to be held at sydney university, february 1982) the trust moved a motion that they be fully consulted in the coordination of the conference. they also expressed concern about the elected chairperson of the nswalc, mr kevin cook, ‘and the recognition claimed by [him].., a person who had never gone through any process of election by the community’. they also ‘expressed concern’ that ‘cook and the nswalc were using the facilities of tranby for purposes other than those for which funds had been donated’ (aboriginal land trust, minutes, 29-30th june, 1982, page 17). the minutes also indicate a naivety on the 151 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 part of trust members about the movement developing around them. they appeared to understand criticisms of the trust as one of ‘image’. for this they decided to embark on a pr campaign, such as through the production of videos and calendars. the political activism by the nsw alc for more substantial land rights recognition created a significant split between those aligned with the trust and the land rights movement that drew on alliances amongst the left and continued to advocate grass roots political activism and community control. these factors contributed to decisions of the trust being widely perceived as ‘self-serving’ and in more disparaging terms as ‘uncle tom’s’ and ‘jackey jackeys’ (cook pers. comm. 2008, langton pers. comm. 2008). the formation of the nsw alc and its effectiveness are generally attributed to the organising capacity of its chair, kevin cook. he was able to draw support from a range of organisations, individuals and communities. his organising skills were honed through the trade union movement: a former dogman and rigger, he went on to work as an organiser with the builders labourers federation (blf), up until 1970. he grew up in an industrial, heavily unionised region, and his politics and ideas were in part shaped by the union movement. cook’s contacts with the blf continued, and several members were part of the defence group and had been involved in other activism with the redfern aboriginal community. nsw blf president, bob pringle, for example, was active in anti-racism campaigns, particularly against the 1971 springbok tour. the links between individuals that extended through key organisations and networks were highly significant in this period. alf clint, the founder of tranby aboriginal college (1957), whom cook succeeded, drew extensive support from the union movement including the wharfies, seamen, miners, teachers, builders and others. political alliances, combined with the institutional support of tranby, were critical in the early years of the land rights movement (and in following years). connections with the union movement, particularly the blf, with its extended political philosophy that linked the ‘environment’ and ‘workers' rights’ with wider social movements, enhanced the success of the land rights movement because this provided an extended political base from which to argue aboriginal land and environmental rights. a vital network, established by cook and others across the union movement, was the trade union committee for aboriginal 152 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 rights (tucar), allowing for wide and quick dissemination of news across the trade union movement. cook says: rather than go to every union we had a core committee who would go back to the union movement and spread the word (cook pers. comm.. 2008). the nsw alc drew on the institutional support of tranby where cook worked. they held meetings all over the state, with many western and south coast representatives attending regularly. often meetings were held at dubbo as this was most central, with delegates travelling by train from the north coast joining the bus at tranby to attend meetings. this was a wide network of resourceful and dedicated individuals. while some communities were not able to make the meetings, they continued to organize at the local level. government election of the wran labor government, in 1976, following the decade-long reign of the liberal government, created new opportunities for social change. the member for woronora, maurie keane, explains his motivations: when i went into parliament [1973 and government in 1976] it was my desire to do something that impacted upon the welfare of people. i had always had an affinity with aboriginal people. i always felt it was unjust and unfair the way they were treated going way back … nsw had the highest number of people living in the worst possible conditions. it was accepted that that’s the way it was. i felt strongly that we should do something about this. it was basically an idea and a desire that i had in my head and a matter of translating this into practicality (keane 2008). keane recollected that he initially approached the then premier, neville wran, with his general idea and desire to ‘do something’ for aboriginal people. with the premier’s support keane took his idea to caucus and successfully convinced members that they should proceed to an inquiry. with the support of the premier and another key minister, frank walker, keane’s ‘desire’ was in motion with the appointment of an all party ‘select committee of the legislative committee upon aborigines’ convened by november 1978, with keane himself as chairperson. the terms of reference were to inquire into: the causes of socio-economic disadvantages of aboriginal people, particularly in the areas of housing, health, education, employment, welfare and cultural issues; 153 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 effectiveness of commonwealth/state arrangements in aboriginal affairs; land rights for aboriginal people in nsw. it was south coast elders who again exercised their influence and successfully persuaded the select committee to focus initially on land rights and further to expand the terms to include sacred and significant sites. the remaining terms of reference were held over for the second report (select committee 1981). the work of the committee revolutionized the nsw government’s approach to consultation with aboriginal people. this was from the outset a clear goal of the committee chair who explained: i had looked at previous committees that inquired into aboriginal matters, and there had been many, that those committees composed of parliamentarians rarely consulted the aboriginal people in their deliberations. they seemed to concentrate on going to the councils in rural areas and suburban areas, meeting aldermans, asking their opinion of aboriginal situations but never asking the aboriginal people and i was determined that i wouldn’t have a committee that went down that path, so the first thing i did was ask the premier's department for funds to employ aboriginal people to assist the committee. with the support of an aboriginal task force that included researchers and liaison officers, the committee consulted widely, circulated a newsletter ‘koori-murri: liaison news and views’ that extensively documented and reported back to the community their work, and its hearings were made as accessible to the public as possible. keane argued that the appointment of ‘aboriginal liaison officers’ was imperative ‘to assist mutual understanding and knowledge between the committee and the aboriginal communities’ and that ‘achieving the full cooperation of the aboriginal community should be the highest priority to the committee’ (keane nd, p.4). the task force included aboriginal researchers and former defence members, marcia langton (who resigned in june 1979 to continue her studies at the anu) and kevin gilbert, and coordinator, pat o’shane, (who was appointed head of the ministry of aboriginal affairs at the conclusion of the select committee). when the author asked keane how he came to recruit such distinguished people, he jubilantly replied, ‘they just appeared’. perhaps we can liken the land rights movement as a kind of (relatively) benign ‘trojan horse’: the movement had so successfully approached and infiltrated the parliament that the demands appeared organic and seamless. where a movement that was shaped by its alliances, tension with the trust, charisma 154 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 of its leadership and by its long and enduring cultural continuity the movement had reached, as keane recalls, a ‘magical moment’ where people appeared and things happened. they actively sought to engage aboriginal people in the process. for example, the committee met at different places, including reserves, community halls and open-air gatherings. on one occasion, the committee members visited a camp where they perched up on old car seats around a camp-fire where there was no running water, sewerage, or electricity. on another occasion, in a hall setting, the committee was dramatically confronted by a naked aboriginal man menacingly clutching several spears (langton pers. comm. 2008). confrontation was avoided with the deft intervention of one of the taskforce members, however these examples demonstrate that the committee members genuinely engaged with aboriginal people. in the interests of wide and genuine consultation they moved outside the confines of parliament house and into very unfamiliar and uncontrolled environments. the committee encouraged direct representation from community members and informally consulted throughout the community. the committee invited by letter 886 individuals, 76 local government bodies, and 306 other organisations. 145 witnesses appeared before the committee, submissions were received from 55 individuals, 5 local governments, and 57 other organizations (select committee 1980). they considered running radio advertisements to attract representation to the committee. the draft scripts, that have a superhero quality about them, were as follows: ‘we aborigines are a passive race…but not for long, something has to be done…and quickly.’ ‘white australians just don’t understand…all we want is a fair go.’ yes someone is going to do something about any problems the aborigines have. the select committee of the legislative assembly upon aborigines. if you have a recommendation or point of view... 2 the committee accepted representation and submission outside the standard format. for example, guboo thomas and percy mumbulla, yuin tribal elders, submitted to the committee a magnificent bound photographic essay of their wallaga lake and south coast mountainous country and people, with a petition to halt all logging and other activities that impacted sacred sites and traditional areas. 2 memo from pat o’shane to m. keane, 15 august 1979. the memo expresses concern about the plans to cancel the radio advertisements as they are too expensive. 155 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 many submissions to the select committee continued to reflect the pre-occupation with assimilation and reject the principles of land rights. these objections were most clearly expressed in submissions by councils where the regional national party had strong support. the council of the city of dubbo opened their submission to the select committee with the emphatic assertion that: the question of land rights does not exist in dubbo. (kelly in select committee 1980). gilgandra shire council argued that the ‘existing depravations and disadvantage are due to the poor attitude of the aborigines to education, employment, self-help and promotion’ and that ‘aborigines should have the same rights as anyone else, except where it can be established that there is a spiritual or tribal affiliation in respect of a certain area’ (cameron in select committee 1980). bourke shire council warned of ‘a big and unpleasant backlash’ should the committee’s recommendations be implemented. they warned: the land rights issue alone is frightening and could cause a major upheaval. people will simply not be forced from their land’ (randall in select committee 1982). the keane report contained a range of far reaching recommendations, unanimously endorsed all-party committee, including the basis for land claims that included traditional rights as well as long association, compensation and needs. the report made the significant point, by way of introduction, that articulated the violent and bloody history of dispossession that aboriginal people experienced at the hands of white australia and the rightful compensation that is due. this was understood in terms of justice and compensation for wrongs of the past. aboriginal people’s land rights were understood in very broad terms as traditional relationship to country and as a relationship that had developed over time. the report reflected an understanding of cultural continuity and change as inevitable consequences of colonisation (select committee 1980). in later discussion keane reflected on the ‘unique situation’ of having unanimous crossparty support. this he argued was ‘because they could see and hear the sincerity and could see the deplorable conditions as far as health, housing and education’. (select committee 1980). keane explains that the committee members, ‘after visiting aboriginal communities they became convinced, they saw with their own eyes and heard the evidence from aboriginal people’. (pers. comm. 2008). 156 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the report proposed to repeal the aborigines act 1969 and replace it with an aboriginal land rights act and aboriginal land and development commission act. the recommendations also included the establishment of aboriginal community councils reporting to regional aboriginal land councils. the proposed aboriginal land and compensation tribunal would hear and determine land claims and grievances and report to parliament. the aboriginal land and development commission would function to support the regional land and community councils in land-purchasing advice and financing. significantly, the report recommended a funding model based on 7.5% of state land tax revenue, half of which was to be invested, with the remainder to support the operations of the three-tier council, including administration and enterprise development. the first report acknowledged three key historical points. firstly, in 1788 ‘aborigines were in possession of nsw’; secondly, that land ‘was and is the material and economic base of aboriginal society’; and, thirdly, that there is a ‘desire to retain distinct aboriginal community life’. the committee understood the granting of lands rights as ‘an act of elementary justice’ and ‘due compensation for wrongful dispossession’. the committee outlined that all aboriginal people, including urban, rural and reserve communities would be given the right to claim crown, lease and freehold land on the basis of needs, compensation, and long association or traditional rights (select committee 1980, p.2). the report also recommended an aboriginal land and compensation tribunal in the event of disputes over land and the establishment of an aboriginal heritage commission to protect and maintain sites. keane’s first report lived up to community expectations and was very well received amongst the aboriginal community. the second report concluded that the causes of deprivations are ‘poverty, discrimination and indifference’ whereby ‘the white citizens of this state have founded their present affluence on the seizure of land that belonged for 40,000 years to the aborigines’ and that ‘in less than 200 years whilst waxing fat ourselves, we have reduced our unwilling benefactors to penury’ (select committee 1981, p.x). the second report recommended the adoption of self-determination as a fundamental starting point in the development of approaches and programs in the areas of housing, health, education, employment, welfare and culture and for the renegotiation of 157 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 commonwealth/state funding and programs. these recommendations were couched in the broader framework of rights to be self-determining ‘in respect of their social, economic, political and cultural affairs’ and ‘heritage, customs, languages and institutions' (select committee 1981). the select committee, its terms of reference and efforts towards genuine consultation, and the involvement of aboriginal people in the process through the task force, amounted to a significant change in how the nsw government related and engaged aboriginal people in government decision-making. support for the select committee’s land rights recommendations was widespread. a loose coalition of supporters from union, church/religious and student groups lobbied to support the select committee’s recommendations and generate public support through education and awareness. for example, they distributed a ‘land rights lobby kit’. however, there were substantial problems afoot. one was related to the divisions at the community level between kevin cook’s nsw alc and the various regional aboriginal land councils that formed further to agitate for land rights, in anticipation of the legislation and the trust. the second was that the government began to distance itself from the first report’s recommendations. the aboriginal land rights act, 1983: a limited response by august 1980, one press article quoted the premier, neville wran, and attorney-general, frank walker, saying ‘financial constraints would limit the implementation of the select committee recommendations' (wilkie 1985, p.35). forestry, mining, tourism and pastoral industries also made known their opposition to the select committee’s recommendations and were able to exercise their influence inside the parliament through their relevant government departments and minister to cabinet and outside through university and professional associations. the local councils, as indicated earlier, were also not only highly organised as a network but they had access to ministers, the press and resources and were united in their opposition to the first report’s recommendations, particularly land recovery provisions. in december 1982, a further article referred to the attorney general’s recommendation for a new 158 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 proposal to cabinet to limit claims to unalienated crown land and open market purchases (milliken 1982). the draft land rights legislation was a long time coming. two years after the select committee’s first report on land rights, and one year after the second, welfare-related report, the ministry for aboriginal affairs circulated 200 copies of the green paper draft legislation, just days before christmas, in december 1982. it was officially published in february 1983, just seven weeks before it was debated in parliament and without the last-minute cabinet changes. the green paper was widely criticized. initially this was over the absence of consultation during the period of the drafting of the legislation and the short time frame between circulation of the green paper and it going to parliament. the further amendments made in cabinet were committed to without any possibility or intention of consultation with aboriginal people. the green paper was in three parts: why land rights? explanatory notes to the draft bill and, draft aboriginal land rights act, 1983. as set out in the first report, the green paper adhered to the same key principles: land in the state of nsw was traditionally owned and occupied by aborigines; land is of spiritual, social, cultural and economic importance to aborigines; it is fitting to acknowledge the importance which land has for aborigines and the need of aborigines for land; and it is accepted that as a result of past government decisions the amount of land set aside for aborigines has been progressively reduced without compensation (aboriginal land rights act 1983, s.1). the legislation established a three-tier land council network of local, regional and state offices. the alra replaced the aborigines act 1969 and abolished the existing alt and its ninemember council. the green paper outlined that membership of local aboriginal land councils (lalc’s) was open to all aboriginal people residing in the lalc boundaries, that they were 159 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 entitled to claim crown land not required ‘for essential public purpose’ or lawfully used or occupied, and to purchase land. successfully claimed crown land was restricted to leasing under certain conditions and could not be sold or developed. the legislation was extremely disappointing for the aboriginal community. it was widely argued that the consultation process was inadequate, that land recovery was severely constrained and the compensation fund inadequate. unlike the extensive consultation that informed keane’s select committee, the ministry for aboriginal affairs did not consult the community on the framework, but rather made available a small amount of money for communities to initiate their own discussion (wilkie 1985, p.39). despite the challenging release time and minimal circulation, the green paper was circulated, discussed and debated amongst the rapidly forming land council network. with assistance from legal officers from the aboriginal legal service, community gatherings convened and scrutinized the draft legislation. despite these limitations in time, resources, expertise, advice and organised support from government, many communities did manage to gather and comment on the green paper. the highly organised wiradjuri land council, for example, began holding meetings days after the green paper was circulated on christmas eve of 1982. the nsw alc state conference, in february 1983, with representation from all affiliated land councils, was very critical of the draft legislation and argued the green paper was not a ‘land rights settlement’ and, ‘it does not compensate us for our loss or suffering’ (cook quoted in wilkie 1985, p.iv). bob bellear, chair of the state alp aboriginal affairs policy committee and uniting church board for social responsibility, said the green paper was out of step with the select committee proposals, ‘lacked principles’ and amounted to a ‘betrayal’. some of the more specific criticisms of the green paper included the lack of clarity about specific rights especially traditional fishing and hunting rights, heritage protection, mineral rights, and the ability to recover land of cultural significance contained within national parks and nature reserves under the national parks and wildlife act 1974. the minister for aboriginal affairs flagged the establishment of an aboriginal heritage commission bill ‘for the protection and ownership of sacred and significant sites’ although this was never pursued (nsw legislative 160 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 assembly hansard 1983, p.5090). other concerns were that the aboriginal land rights act (alra) constituted land councils as non-statutory bodies governed under the act, rather than as a company and subject to those rules and that the act gave the minister considerable power over the land councils through the appointment of administrators (cook pers. comm.. 2008). there was further concern that the compensation provisions, 7.5% of land tax revenue over 15 years, amounted to inadequate financial compensation for the loss of land, culture, and other deprivations in light of the constrained land recovery under the alra. the green paper was perceived as a fundamental failing on the part of the government to honour the promises made to aboriginal people. at the wiradjuri land council meeting ‘everyone agreed that the land rights offer to the aboriginal people of new south wales in this green paper was a disgrace’ (macdonald 2004, p.12). the wiradjuri people’s meeting in january 1983 passed two motions condemning in strong terms the green paper. in writing to the minister, frank walker, the wiradjuri land council said: …the green paper on aboriginal land rights in new south wales is totally unacceptable to the wiradjuri land council and therefore is not to be tabled in the new south wales parliament. it is further moved that funds for local and regional meetings of aboriginal people be allocated immediately to allow for proper consultation to occur. the results of such consultations are to form the basis for amended legislative proposals to be drawn up. that the lands allocated in the proposed legislation, the compensation based on seven and one half per cent of the new south wales land tax, the length of time such compensation is to be paid, and the restrictions on mining rights are totally inadequate and are not acceptable (macdonald 2004, pp.12-13.). macdonald’s (2004) intimate cultural study of this critical period for the wiradjuri community provides an interesting counterpoint to the more political and historical analysis developed in this paper. macdonald’s study highlights the continued optimism, for example, she describes the hastily convened meetings as ‘spirited’ and ‘filled with enthusiasm’ where collections were taken at meetings to cover costs for correspondence and where the desire to ‘do things for ourselves’ and ‘not rely on government’ prevailed (2004, p. 13). macdonald observed that during this stage of the land rights negotiations, wiradjuri land council got to know the green paper very well and assisted others in comprehending and analyzing the implications. despite the many positive developments at the local level, the passing of the legislation was a 161 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 highly political process. the government was concerned simply to get the bill, however ‘imperfect’, across the line. the liberal party, in an ‘unholy alliance’, as keane suggested, aligned with the discredited trust and the als and moved to delay the passage of the bill for a period of 6 months, ostensibly to allow for greater consultation (nsw legislative assembly hansard 1983, p.5280). the minister, frank walker, in meetings with wiradjuri and in parliamentary debate, acknowledged the bill wasn’t ‘perfect’ but that it was a ‘start’ that could be further amended and taken up with the commonwealth government (nsw legislative assembly hansard 1983, p.5097). debate amongst the wiradjuri land council, and presumably others, came to be split over rejecting the flawed bill and seeing it as ‘opening a door’ to parliament house, an argument made, among others, by millie butt in her capacity as liaison officer with the ministry in a meeting of the wiradjuri ralc. labor members warned that if the bill was to be delayed, opposition to land rights would develop further and put at risk any land rights legislation at all. the consultation in the development of the draft land rights legislation came to be the key concern. while the green paper referred to ‘exhaustive’ consultation, this was highly contested by the aboriginal people and even members of parliament who claimed they only received a copy a few days prior to debate (nsw legislative assembly hansard 1983, p.5280). however, consultation was never going to be possible or envisaged for some parts of the legislation subject to caucus deliberations. the wiradjuri lc wrote to the minister in march 1983 asking that the land rights bill be deferred until such time as consultation could occur and the response to community needs and priorities be taken into account (macdonald 2004). their concerns, as documented by macdonald, were less about the principles of consultation but rather that the process would strengthen the legislation. they identified some specific problems and wanted the chance to remedy them. for example, they envisaged, perhaps rightly, that the three-tier network would create conflict because it centralized power with the state office, created a level of bureaucracy and administrative overload and there were insufficient funding provisions for administration. however, by this stage the legislation was very much part of a political process. when the author asked maurie keane about the consultation process and his views on the final legislation he was philosophical. he explained that politics, as the cliché goes, ‘is the art of the possible’. he explained that some committee reports never see the light of day, so the fact that 162 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the majority of the committee’s recommendations were endorsed, particularly the compensation package, was a significant victory. for keane, this was the reality of political life (keane pers. comm. 2009). yet, for the thousands of aboriginal people who gathered outside the parliament, it was a moment of bitter disappointment as hopes had been raised so high and so much had been invested in the achievement of land rights. perhaps the biggest concern with the process related to another piece of legislation put before parliament. the crown lands (validations of revocations) act 1983 retrospectively validated the revocations of reserve lands that had been occurring since the late 1800s. the act retrospectively validated or made legal the revocations of some 25,000 hectares of reserve land by the government (mcguigan 1984). the struggle for land rights as outlined in this paper related in part to the desire to stop the revocation of reserve lands and the assimilation agenda that this represented. the validating legislation amounted to tricky politics in the extreme. not only did the legislation go against the key claims of the land rights movement, it was also apparently a complete surprise. the ministry for aboriginal affairs was not responsible for its drafting, and at no stage, at the various forums that ministers and staff attended, was the validating legislation mentioned to the aboriginal community (wilkie 1985, p.40). when the author asked maurie keane about the drafting he similarly declared no knowledge of the revocations legislation (keane pers. comm. 2008). while the remaining reserve lands, estimated at about 4,300 hectares, were transferred directly to local aboriginal land councils, often this was with previously negotiated long-term lease arrangements continuing on title (macdonald 2004, p.20). as the two pieces of legislation were being debated, aboriginal people gathered in the thousands. ‘the mood’, macdonald says, ‘was anger, frustration and betrayal’, as numbers swelled outside well into the night and the parliamentary debate continued in closed session (2004, p.6). there was a clear concern with the alra, particularly because of the limited consultation, but the validating legislation complicated and confused the situation. macdonald suggests that it was difficult to mount ‘two campaigns at once’, even though they were so entwined (2004, p.20). the legislation in effect retrospectively legalised the revoking of 163 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 aboriginal lands, particularly as this was intensified in the second half of the twentieth century. the alra recognised traditional meaning and association with place as well as adaptation and change through relationship to, for the most part, reserve lands, at least until 1983. the passing of land rights legislation – a government mechanism to recognize and manage this association to land – while seen as a grave betrayal of aboriginal people and of the select committee’s recommendations, has also brought about, over 25 years of land council activity, the alignment of land rights with the means to economic and social independence. this paper has argued that aboriginal land demands have been as dynamic as the colonial conditions have dictated: that is, aboriginal land demands, however imbalanced, have necessarily been in dialogue with the state. we can see this in the expanding definition of land rights, in the nsw alc’s clarification on 10 october 1981, ‘that ‘real’ land rights means more than simply returning title to existing reserves. it involves the granting of title to substantial areas of land in n.s.w.’. from the mid 1970s, land demands were newly configured with a renewed level of intensity and clarity. this paper has identified the placement of key individuals within this moment – from the persistent encouragement of the yuin elders, the organising ability of the black defence group – particularly as key members shaped alp aboriginal affairs policy and formed the nsw alc that further facilitated wider community organizing, the strategic alliances that were forged over a longer period but which came together in a reinvigorated way from the mid-1970s, and the wider social activism that left room for the complex articulation of land rights as a cultural, social, economic and political demand. this paper has also highlighted the perspective from ‘inside’ of government, to understand how government officials also understood the process that led to the achievement of land rights. at times the aboriginal community, the ‘outside’ perspective, aligns with the ‘inside’ recollections. these accounts indicate how the select committee was fundamentally shaped by aboriginal activism and strategic input to the committee process whereby key members of the parliament, supportive of aboriginal social justice issues came to embrace the granting of land rights. 164 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 references aboriginal land rights act 1983, no. 42. aboriginal lands trust, minutes and annual reports 1975-1982. background paper: aboriginal land rights act (1983), nsw, accessed online www.alc.org.au/news/alva/files/alra%20background%20paper.pdf, november 2005. cook, k. 2008, interview with the author, august. crown lands (validations of revocations) act 1983. dexter, b., ‘pandora’s box’, papers of dexter papers, series 7, item 11-15, held at the aiatsis library, ms 4167. goodall, h. 1996, invasion to embassy : land in aboriginal politics in new south wales, 17701972, allen & unwin, sydney. goodall, h., 2004, isabel flick: the many lives of an extraordinary aboriginal woman, allen & unwin, sydney. goodall, h. and cadzow, a. 2009, rivers and resilience: aboriginal people on sydney’s georges river, unsw press, sydney. joint committee of the legislative council and legislative assembly upon aborigines welfare 1967, report, government printers, sydney. keane, m. nd, background paper for select committee of inquiry into aboriginal matters. keane, m. 2008, interview with the author. keane, m. 2009, interview with the author. langton, m., 1997, quoted in aborigines seeking land rights change, sydney morning herald, 3rd october, page 8. langton, m. 2008, interview with the author. macdonald, g, (2004) two steps forward three steps back: a wiradjuri land rights journey, southwood press, marrickville. macdonald, g. 2004, two steps forward three steps back: a wiradjuri land rights journey, southwood press, marrickville. maynard, j., (2007) fight for liberty and freedom: the origins of australian activism, aboriginal studies press, canberra. mcguigan, a. 1984, aboriginal reserves in nsw: a land rights research aid, occasional paper no. 4, nsw ministry of aboriginal affairs, sydney. milliken, r. 1982 ‘money, power battle embroils land rights’, national times. new south wales aboriginal land council, annual reports 1985 2005. nsw parliament, legislative assembly, 1983, hansard, thursday 24 march, p.5090/ nsw parliament, legislative assembly select committee upon aborigines, 1980, first report from the select committee of the legislative assembly upon aborigines, government printers, sydney. nsw parliament, legislative assembly select committee upon aborigines, 1981, second report from the select committee of the legislative assembly upon aborigines, government printers, sydney. http://find.lib.uts.edu.au/?r=opac_b1737103� 165 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 rowse, t. 2000, obliged to be difficult: nugget coombs’ legacy in indigenous affairs, cambridge university press, melbourne. stanner, w. e. h. 1968, after the dreaming, crows nest, n.s.w abc enterprises. tatz, c. 1975, black viewpoints: the aboriginal experience, sydney, australia and new zealand book co. walker, f. 1983, green paper on aboriginal land rights in new south wales, issued by mr frank walker minister for aboriginal affairs, government printers, sydney. wilkie, m, 1985, aboriginal land rights in nsw, chippendale nsw, alternative publishing co-operative in association with black books. http://find.lib.uts.edu.au/search.do?n=0&ntk=all&ntx=mode+matchpartial&ntt=black%20viewpoints%20:%20the%20aboriginal%20experience� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 77 solidarity, friendship and anti racism1 dinesh joseph wadiwel abstract anti racist struggles often aim to construct alliances between groups under the banner of “solidarity” in order to achieve change. using foucault’s society must be defended lectures as a basis, this paper interrogates the difficulties associated with creating solidarity in anti racist movements, when conflict and war might be treated as the basis for racial stratifications. following from this, it is argued that friendships in spite of differences are possible under the guise of “truce”: that is through allegiances that begin by acknowledging the fact of war. the concept of solidarity usually invokes aphoristic phraseology. we are told: “we need to find a way to work together.” we are told: “building solidarity is hard work, but necessary and good.” we are told: “we must learn to find common ground, a common cause”, or failing that, “accept that we have common enemies.” anti racist activists are not immune to this language, since forged alliances and solidarities are often the bread and butter of cooperative anti racist work: “we are all on the same side after all.” in contrast to these apparently commonsense alliances, in this paper i would like to explore the possibility that we actually inhabit a set of relationships that are antithetical to solidarity: namely the idea that we don’t have any common ground; that our starting point suggests we have no reason to work with each other; that we have no natural affiliations, perhaps no common enemy. indeed you and i might be considered enemies. i begin, therefore, with skepticism in relation to the idea of solidarity. i certainly do not wish to preclude the idea of friendship despite our differences. for although solidarity might be considered as a form of friendship, it is a palpably different sort of friendship i 1 this paper is an extension of a collaborative project between james arvanitakis and myself exploring the nature and limits of anti racist politics, previously published under the title “racists like us” (arvanitakis and wadiwel, 2007). as such, this paper is connected thematically to arvanitakis’ own contribution to this volume. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 78 seek, and with it, a different sort of politics that might guide anti racist struggle. solidarity with a person who might otherwise be an enemy is a necessarily fraught venture, which risks misunderstanding, miscommunication, asymmetry, and amongst these factors, risks enshrining a form of domination under the name of friendship. it is the latter possibility that particularly concerns me, in so far as i am aware that the performative declaration of solidarity is easier – more convenient – than the actual project of friendship. in the words of sara ahmed, “it is the premature claim of solidarity, as if it is something we already have, that can block the recognition that there is much harder work to do” (2005, p.81). solidarity might be considered a pernicious form of friendship. the possibility of friendship in spite of the machinations of racial stratification can never be convenient; it necessarily implies inconvenience, and a commitment to the hard work of disarmament that goes beyond the declaration of solidarity. in other words, as i discuss in this paper, the success of anti racism might depend upon the possibility of a more genuine friendship that ruptures the hostility of conflict. please, not the pie to begin, a fantasy of friendship: driving miss daisy (1989). the film depicts the story of an older jewish woman, daisy, and her african american chauffeur, hoke. the film tracks through several years, with reference to both the discrimination faced by hoke, and the growing understanding daisy has of racial prejudice and its relationship to her own background. hoke and miss daisy become friends at the end, with at least two significant scenes in the film marking their bond of companionship: namely, a scene where daisy, before being sent to a nursing home, confides in hoke that he is her “best friend”; and a final scene where hoke feeds daisy some pie. i would like to focus on just one aspect of the film that is useful for this paper: the idea of the unlikely friendship between daisy and hoke. for it is easy to like the idea of the unlikely friendship, to long to be enclosed in the seeping warmth of the moment where daisy grasps hoke’s hand and declares her friendship, and the reality of the racialised divide between these two seeming strangers melts. i certainly do not mean to say that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 79 such friendships are not possible, or did not happen, because very clearly they did (and do) happen. but, what is revealing about this friendship is that it depicts a fantasy that we all want to see, a hope that we might ardently cling to: namely, the fantasy that a possible friendship between us in the face of adversity – a bond of solidarity – might be so powerful as to erase our very significant differences, including the antagonisms that lay between us as a precondition of our positioning within the schema of power. the story interests me because it reminds me how easy it is to live out this fantasy when we dream of solidarity. it’s so easy to imagine that you and i have a common cause, a common source of oppression, that we can lay aside our disagreements. our solidarity will overcome our differences. yet what i believe driving miss daisy can show us is that we need to interrogate this desire to seek solidarity, understand what fantasies it fulfills, and most importantly, in so far as fantasies of allegiance, division and solidarity provide the symbolic guidance for the material effects of race and confer benefits for some within social, political, economic, sexual and juridical economies. liberal political theorists will idealise the concept of the democratic civil political space: a space where we are told it is possible for a range of diverse political subjects to engage freely in order to negotiate their differences. regardless of your background, your class, your sexuality, your culture, your gender, we can all agree to meet in this supposedly “neutral space” on an equal footing. what concerns me about this line of reasoning, is that like the friendship in driving miss daisy, it makes us forget the very real frictions that ensure that the civil political space is anything but fair, even footed or civil. in many respects these frictions suggest a war zone, where stratification and differences are the thresholds of contest between bodies within economies that inculcate material and symbolic violences, and guarantee that outcomes are never going to be fair. it is with this idea of conflict within civility in mind, that we might usefully interrogate how the civil political space might be differentiated from war. arguably modern political philosophy has held the distinction between war and civility as a central and defining feature of relationships of power. thus, we find the cipher of war present within a range cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 80 of explanations for the civil political space: in thomas hobbes, for example, where a vision of a unifying sovereign power is counter-posed to a chaotic state of nature (hobbes 1998); in the works of niccolò machiavelli for whom politics functions as the site of a subtle set of hostilities (machiavelli 1950, p.39, 60); in carl schmitt on enemy / friend distinctions (schmitt 1996); and in derrida’s reading of this and its implications for the political space (derrida 1997). this perception of the nature of politics, which locates political power within a logical system informed by the knowledge of open contestation and strategic armed combat, was perhaps conveyed most acutely by michel foucault in a series of 1976 lectures, published in english under the title society must be defended. during this phase in foucault’s thinking, he came to understand all power relations as involving war through other means, and thus came to look for how intense life and death divisions between people were mediated within the civil political space: war is the motor behind institutions and order. in the smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war. to put it another way, we have to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace; peace itself is a coded war. we are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other. there is no such thing as a neutral subject. we are all inevitably someone’s adversary (foucault 2004, pp.50-1). this view of politics is intended to disturb a view of power that sees civility and agreement as the basis for the social contract underpinning the civil political sphere. peaceful civility is a ruse designed to conceal the violent effects of war: a ruse that, of course, benefits the victors in this war. race and racism is also closely tied to the account that foucault offers in the lectures, since the stratifications within societies that foucault associates with warlike domination generate the inside / outside relations of the nation and subdivide people into categorizations that are assumed to share a homogenous biological relation. racism is thus “a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population …a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain” (foucault 2004, p.255; see also moreton-robinson 2006). racism works by cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 81 putting people at war with each other. the obvious divisions, for example, between black and white, illustrate this and deliver very real advantages: social, economic, and political. and the nature of this war is to attempt to erase the fact that there is indeed a source of conflict: “peace itself is a coded war.” for example, in australia, it has become a convention to acknowledge indigenous people as the traditional owners of the land during public events, at conferences, before speeches etc. an acknowledgement of prior sovereignty hides the truth of war within it: the fact that i stand on this land because war has occurred, and continues to this day. this war, and the racialised economy it maintains, delivers benefits to range of people, including myself. or, in the words of cheryl i. harris: “whiteness has value, whiteness is valued and whiteness is expected to be valued in law” (1993, p.1777). war is the unspoken element here; a war that is a battle for sovereignty; a war that i am inescapably invested in, because quite literally i stand on this land. this acknowledgement therefore can never be comfortable, easy or convenient, since it must always be inconvenient and disturbing because of my own investment within it. really i should acknowledge that a war has occurred, a war that continues today, a war that i am inescapably part of, because i stand here. beyond this question of sovereignty and belonging, we should also note that racism also places us at odds with our own beings and our own body. we therefore are at war with ourselves. in my own life, i can’t help but remember all too many times when i desperately wanted to be more civilized, more respectful, in a word, more ‘white’. yet i can also remember times when i desperately wanted to run from this assimilated self i had become, to be more ethnic, more ‘black.’ the war of race runs not only between you and i, but through myself, as a set of divisions that constantly puts me at odds with myself, with who i should be, and who i might be in the future. what is my essence? and why can’t i be free of my essence? if we are right to assume that we are at war with each other, that in fact we have no natural ground to collaborate, then where does this leave solidarity? as i have argued above, my concern with solidarity is the assumptions it carries with it, and the fantasies it cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 82 satisfies, without necessarily delivering benefits to all. it assumes that we might all be aggrieved parties, and share a common bond in our experience of the violence of race: a dream that those who share an experience of white domination should therefore enjoy a friendship, despite our differences. solidarity in this guise rests on the fantasy of an easy friendship between aggrieved parties. the concern with this is that it becomes all too easy to efface the differences between us, to forget the effects of war. and of course this sort of friendship is rarely symmetrical. so called solidarity will deliver benefits to some, and not to others. for example, it is quite fashionable in progressive politics to develop broad alliances around issues: for example to enable solidarity between those who work towards refugee or labour rights. and of course there are good strategic reasons for this, since solidarity, or at least a declaration of solidarity, can be a stepping stone towards social change. yet, who benefits from these temporary friendships? are these solidarities there to provide benefit to all who join them, or are they construed to deliver benefits to just a few? when we march for workers’ rights, will it be white, male, permanently employed workers who benefit most, while the very real demands of those we expect solidarity from, and claim solidarity with – outworkers, the unemployed, sex workers, casual employees, cleaners etc – are left aside? when we support rights for asylum seekers, will we forget the rights of others who share a similar experience of detention and fundamental disempowerment: aboriginal people, for example, who have always been subject to arbitrary detention, the mission and reserve system, the institutionalization of children, and the extraordinary use of prisons as disciplinary devices? in other words, will our alliances, our forms of solidarity, fail to address the war between you and me, after our marriage of convenience has ended? will our capacity to quickly forget those we claim solidarity with merely reveal the fact that we were always at war with each other, and unwilling to cede our own territory, not even in the spirit of friendship? cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 83 this is important for considering how we might combat racism together, because race positions us all very differently, and provides opportunities to some and not to others. is my desire, for example, to collaborate with aboriginal or arabic activists on issues of racism really about fulfilling my own fantasy for friendship, rather than a serious attempt to address racism broadly, since this means addressing my own position in it? will my collaboration merely work to the benefit of the race war: reshuffle positions, only to leave the broad scaffolding of race in tact, the garrisons of whiteness still armed? ceasefire war ends when opponents stop seeking to injure each other. after war, a formal break in hostilities is usually marked with a treaty: a document that agrees on the terms of peace. however, if we follow foucault’s logic on the relationship of war to political power, we need not assume that a treaty suggests a future relationship of equality. although the treaty provides security and recognition – the terms of peace – the treaty can also be understood in a negative sense as the means for continuing domination, since the agreement frequently confers rights for the victor, and derived from these rights, accords limited freedoms as “concessions” to the previous “enemy.” the treaty is a document bound by force, more often than not in the ever present threat that should hostilities break out again, an annihilatory violence will be unleashed by the stronger party. after the war, and after a crushing loss, those who face total defeat are usually compelled to accept the limited terms, to pay tithes and reparations, to conform to the laws set down by the victor, a simple choice between life and the uncomforting reality of death. as foucault states: “the will to prefer life to death; that is what founds sovereignty” (2004, p.95). another form of armistice is the truce. the truce is frequently seen as weaker than a treaty because of its fragility: ceasefires based upon truce are broken all the time, since they rely on agreements that are founded on mere trust, and are not backed by force. yet truce offers a space that may benefit both parties, in allowing combatants to replenish, plan, assess the damage, redeploy, and negotiate with enemies. a truce does not signal the final end of hostilities, rather it creates a space where hostilities are broken, but with no guarantee that war may not be initiated again. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 84 where the treaty might signify the end of war and the beginning of domination by other means – through reparations, continuing exploitation, silent defeat – truce offers a free peace that is always conditional, always ready to be broken: fragile and utterly cognizant of the continued reality of war. truce is not an equality in power, nor the equitable distribution of means of violence. but it might offer the prospect of a true opportunity for democratic peacability between warring parties, even if this is momentary (see xenos 2001, wolin 1994). in this context, i am aware here of the distinction that jacques derrida draws between fraternity and friendship: the former implying a brotherly bond to a political community or polis, the latter, the possibility of a proximity without bond or debt, “the one promised or promising without promising anything” (derrida 1997, p.298). in other words, truce might function as a debtless friendship, a friendship where there is no apparent reason to be friends, perhaps the only friendship that is likely in war. but a friendship that only works through reciprocal and genuine (rather than theoretical) commitment to lay down weapons. and importantly, the disarmament that may eventuate as a result of truce is the necessary foundation for a treaty that might be capable of not merely reproducing existing forms of domination, but ending war, at least upon a particular front of confrontation. in other words, while truce is not the final answer, it is one way to consider a new allegiance, one which operates within the reality of historical and potentially continuing war, and provides the foundation for a different sort of friendship, a different politics. in what way can we think of anti racist collaboration as a temporary armistice, where we put down our weapons within a race war? are such peaceful friendships possible? and in what way would they offer a more effective foundation for thinking about solidarity, as a basis for a real contestation of racism, and not merely action that reproduces and intensifies the war between you and me? references ahmed, s. 2005, ‘the politics of bad feeling’, australian critical race and whiteness studies association journal, vol.1, pp.73-85. derrida, j. 1997, politics of friendship, verso, london. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 85 driving miss daisy 1989, film, directed by bruce beresford, warner brothers, usa. foucault, m. 2004, society must be defended, penguin books, london. harris, c. i. 1993, ‘whiteness as property’ harvard law review, vol.106, no.8, pp.170791. hobbes, t.1998, leviathan, oxford university press, oxford. machiavelli, n. 1950, the prince and the discourses, the modern library, new york. moreton-robinson, a. 2006, ‘towards a new research agenda: foucault, whiteness and indigenous sovereignty’, journal of sociology, vol. 42, no. 4, pp.383-395. schmitt, c. 1996, the concept of the political, university of chicago press, chicago. wolin, s. 1994, ‘fugitive democracy’, constellations, vol.1, no.1, pp.11-25. xenos, n. 2001, ‘momentary democracy’, in a. botwinick& w. e. connolly (eds) democracy and vision: sheldon wolin and the vicissitudes of the political, princeton university press, princeton. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia ambiguity, oscillation and disorder: online ethnography and the making of culture jonathan paul marshall university of technology sydney abstract online life is usually held to present particular problems for ethnography as it is hidden and ambiguous, and boundaries are not clear. however, ethnography and online daily life are similar procedures in which people go about constructing ‘culture’ to make sense of others and interact with a degree of predictability. ethnographers can learn about culture and society by learning how people themselves go about understanding and making those processes. we further, do not have to expect that the reality we describe will be completely ordered, even though the simplifications of constructing ‘culture’ might make this seem inevitable. disorder can be socially important. this paper grows out of my work on the internet mailing list cybermind between late 1994 and 2005. as i have an anthropological background, i see the basis of ethnography as ‘participant observation’, or living with (as best you can) the people being studied, engaging with their lives, and recording that engagement (generally in notebooks), and this shall be assumed in what follows. ethnography may make use of surveys, structured interviews, or other techniques but, fundamentally, ethnographic research is about ‘living with’ a group, being open to contingency, to variation in meaning, and to both the commonality and disorder of everyday life. it is this sensitivity to disorder and ambiguity which helps ethnography to work the aims of this paper are: 1) to provide a guide for those beginning online ethnography by reference to my own experience. 2) to show that the supposedly ‘difficult features’ of online research, are features of online social life which anyone online has to deal with, or which emphasise problems already found in offline ethnography. 3) to suggest that ‘ethnography’ and ‘culture’ are imprecise and almost undefinable categories, which are connected to each other, so that people produce culture to gain an understanding of each other and act together. 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia 4) to suggest that disorder and misunderstanding are not just defects to be ignored, but that they have a potent social role, and play a part in human activities, including those of ethnography. i argue that culture is, amongst other things, a set of models about: the nature of reality; what people do or should do; and how we should interact with other people. as ethnographers we construct models (together with other people), which explain others and which guide us in our interactions with them, and these models form the culture of the group for us. ‘ordinary’ people also produce their culture in a similar manner and face similar problems in trying to live with the people they have to live with. like any such model, it involves guesses at hidden, ambiguous or uncertain motives and actions, and actions based on those guesses. as such, culture is not an impersonal, or uniform, thing which is ‘out there’, it is situated, varied, often incompatible, and subject to struggle between people. cultures are perpetually ordered and disordered, and that disorder is part of their dynamics. problems of ethnography and its history historically the method and practice of ethnography is ambiguous and uncertain. the term both applies to the method and the result (the book or article). as grossberg writes, ethnography is ‘in the first instance, a certain kind of practice in the field, although it is not clear what sort of practice’ (1989, p. 23). marcus remarks that anthropology is ‘a discipline that has been remarkably silent in a formal way about [ethnographic] method’ (2007, p. 1128). the standard old guidebook notes and queries on anthropology did not try to define ethnography or fieldwork, it simply listed techniques. it accepted contingency and that much of what we might want to describe would be invisible to the ethnographer, but attempted to deal with this uncertainty by recommending that the researcher distinguish between a ‘fact’, a ‘conjecture’ or a ‘retelling’ (anon 1951, p. 36ff.). however, these cannot always be distinguished: a social ‘fact’ may make no sense or may not be noticed, without an interpretation, retelling, or conjecture by someone as to the roles, actions and motives of others. there can be, therefore, little ethnographic observation without some construction of ‘culture’, and some push towards the hidden or unseen. traditionally, within anthropology, a model of culture and society gains its meaning and coherence by fitting (theoretically relevant) observations, conjectures and tellings together, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 3 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia and relating them to other observations, conjectures and tellings, and to theory. as a result the role or meaning of any custom or event, is relational, it depends upon the meaning we have given other such customs or events. so in accounting for one ‘thing’ the ethnographer is always led to other ‘things’. therefore ethnographically produced culture has a tendency to delete inexplicable, ‘unrelated’ and supposedly random events, and produce a coherent ‘system’. when it doesn’t do this, it can produce largely incoherent lists of what people say they do and of tales they tell, as was the case with the early work of franz boas. the early american ethnographer robert lowie adds that ethnography requires academic culture, or awareness of theory (‘ethnology’) (1937, p. 3-4), which in turn requires professional ethnographies of other places so that, again, meaning and validity is relational. this relationship further implies that ethnography is a cultural act within academia. historically the birth of ethnography is connected to the birth of anthropology as a discipline, and marks the decline of comparative or diffusionist studies. ethnography, in contrast, was marked by specificity of field. among anthropologists any universalist statement could always be unsettled by a local counterexample. culture was also made local to justify the boundaries drawn around field sites and to construct a simplicity which excused the ethnographer’s ignorance. thus, in an oft republished 1960’s text book, john beattie could write that although he happily described the societies in which he did fieldwork, he would not dream of writing about economics, or government organization in a ‘modern community’ because of its complexity (1966, p. 80). yet the ‘bounded’ societies he did write about were part of worldwide colonial economic and governmental systems. the boundaries were not ‘real’ but heuristic, and perhaps helped preserve the cultural divisions between academic fields. however, as a result of this boundary making, models of culture became somewhat unreal, and self-contained. as we shall below, these historical shapings of ethnography as local and integrated, are specifically challenged by online ethnography (among other things). problems of culture famously, after kroeber and kluckhohn pronounced that ‘culture is the central concept of anthropology’ (1952, p. 36), they went on to display ‘close to three hundred ‘definitions’’ 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia (ibid, p. 149). this cultural diversity in the meaning of term ‘culture’ shows that variation is not simply an epiphenomenon, but is essential to the cultural process itself. culture is both diverse and shared, and subject to argument and struggle. kroeber and kluckhohn’s own definition did not slow down cultural diversification in the use of the term ‘culture’ either. as leslie white suggested one problem with the kroeber/kluckhohn definition was that it implied that culture is both a real thing and an abstraction, a kind of average behaviour, or an ideal type (1954/1968, p. 17). the well known saussurean division between the abstraction of langue and the immediacy of parole resonates with this ambiguity. the langue or culture is the ideal, and we use the disordered parole or behaviour to deduce or describe this ideal. kroeber also implied culture was ‘the superorganic’, important in its own right and, even, independent of the social (1952, pp. 22-3). when arguing against the reduction of social life to race, genetics or individualism, this could be sensible. but seeing culture as a thing in its own right (independent of people and ethnographer) leads us to treat it as a unified whole with one meaning or dynamic as if it were a single text, or work of art, to be interpreted or translated1 . this dismisses the mess of people’s ongoing production of culture and swallows people’s lives in overarching homogenised text; making everything else they do irrelevant (mceachern 1998, p. 258-60). it ignores the areas of variation, or the ‘varieties of opinion’ that malinowski pointed to, which ‘cannot be reduced or simplified according to any principles’ (1916/1974, p. 252) and thus avoids asking which cultural areas are the more prone to difference or variation and its generation. it separates culture irrevocably from living, surviving and struggle, imposes fixed boundaries, and ignores the ways that boundaries blend into each other. in taking the ragged form of culture seriously, and disagreeing with geertz that ‘culture is best seen… as a set of control mechanisms’ (1975, p. 44), i suggest it is useful to consider culture and social life as potentially self-disrupting, or ambiguous and riddled with disagreement. as strathern suggests, more generally, ‘societies are not simply problem solving mechanisms: they are also problem creating mechanisms’ (1988, p. 33). similarly, if 1 the master of the latter approach is clifford geertz (see in particular geertz 1975: chapter 15). treating culture as text may give spurious generality. geertz can make the astounding claim that all balinese have the same culture, ‘the same general beliefs… the same broad ideas of how their society is or should be arranged’ (geertz & geertz 1975: 2). we would not guess from this, for example, that there were balinese muslims (cf barth 1993). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 5 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia culture was a perfect whole of ordering then in theory it would be possible to live our whole life within a planned programme of experience, rather than (more realistically) dealing with ambiguity and having to make things up as we go along (rosaldo 1993, p. 99-104). the ethnographer may need to be sensitive to these issues and not foreclose in premature wholeness and impersonality. difficulties of ethnographic life online over the years, many people have suggested to me that online ethnography is impossible or dubious because of specific problems, which usually include: • the problem of the non local field site • the ethnographer being within their own culture • the hiddenness of people’s actions • the ambiguous identity/biography of participants • the absence of boundaries, and • the nature of online space many of these criticisms arise in conversation, or are documented in informal forums such as the association of internet researchers mailing list, air-l, but it seems unfair to quote academics in communications which are not as carefully presented as they might be elsewhere, so the reader will have to take my remarks in good faith, and not as a specific refutation of a person’s position. this list is not just a list of problems faced by online ethnography, but constitutes a series of features of, and ambiguities present in, online life which cannot be ignored. they are the existential problems of such a life and everyone faces such issues. researchers and people in online groups all have to work things out, test hypotheses, make judgments and make their culture. that these issues cannot always be resolved needs to be embraced and explored as part of ethnography, rather than used as reasons for abandoning ethnography. these problems also resemble problems which ethnography faces offline. people can lie and hide anywhere; they can information manage the observer, they can decide the boundaries around the ethnographer, they can interpret events and communications misleadingly and so on, as may have happened with margaret mead in samoa (friedman 1983). as such the 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia ethnographer’s life should always be ‘critical’ and oscillatory. boellstorf, speaking of ethnography in second life, distinguishes ethnography from an ‘outsider method’ (2008, p. 63), but it is the oscillating movement from insider to outsider, from involved to detached that characterises ethnography. [f]rom the perspective of the ‘marginal’ reflexive ethnographer, there can be no question of total commitment, ‘surrender’ or ‘becoming’. there must always remain some part held back, some social and intellectual ‘distance’. for it is in the ‘space’ created by this distance that the analytic work of the ethnographer gets done. without that distance, without such analytic space, the ethnography can be little more than the autobiographical account of a personal conversion (hamersley & atkinson 1983, p.102). this also is not strange in normal life; the ethnographer may only exaggerate the motion. choosing a site the first problem of ethnography, similar online and off, is that of choosing a site, with groups you can work with, which allow you to study your interests, without causing too much disruption2 . in my case, cybermind was chosen by accident. i originally joined the group to discuss its official topics of ‘the philosophical and psychological implications of subjectivity in cyberspace’, while searching for a field site. however, i found list members so apparently open about their offline lives and their experiences, that it seemed probable that fieldwork would not be particularly disruptive. it was high volume so there was a lot to analyse. i also enjoyed the list which, for me, was important as i was going to spend a lot of time reading it. the particular interests i brought to my work, such as wondering: how social control was performed without physical presence; how list life related to offline life; how communication conventions grew up; and how marked symbols were used; all seemed possible to investigate. other topics presented themselves for research as i went along, and some topics were abandoned. i discussed the possibility of research with the moderator alan sondheim, who asked me to participate on the list before proceeding further. several months later he asked me to announce my intentions to the other members and the work began. 2 as is well known in studies of the offline world, this produces a bias in which the groups studied ethnographically tend to be open or relatively powerless. elite groups, criminal groups, and tightly bounded closed groups in general, tend to be less studied and present added problems of access and risk, but again closedness presents problems for the group members as well. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 7 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia my own experiences have been central to my writings about the group. i was not a dispassionate observer. i participated in arguments, made political comment, had close offlist friendships, felt grief, frustration, boredom, and so on. but this resembled the life that any almost any involved member would lead. the main difference, if any, was perhaps the care and detail with which i tried to write about living on the list, and the degree of selfconsciousness about my oscillations. there has never been any overt objection to my presence or questioning on the list, perhaps because my research was open, and my onlist writings fitted in pretty well with the blend of confessional, analysis, and political work on the list. other list members have also written about their experiences on cybermind, which adds to the data available3 . cybermind was a fortunate site, but not an exemplary site, as every site has its own features – specificity is a feature of social life. i did, however, compare cybermind to my experiences on other lists, or internet forums, to try and work out what was specific and what was more general. the ethnographer as encultured ethnographers are already in culture. they always have ideas of how the world works, and of how people and their actions should be interpreted. it is usually held that this produces blindness to features of their own social life, and the traditional solution to this problem is making everything strange by going somewhere ‘foreign’4 3 a list of published writings about the list can be found at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cybermind . hence the objection that in studying internet culture we remain within the familiar. however, strangeness alone does not allow us to see clearly. to the contrary, it is only with acculturation, with coming to know the language or idiom, coming to participate within rituals and daily life that the ethnographic venture can take place. lowie argues that ethnography requires prolonged residence and familiarity as this helps overcome the hidden nature of social life (1937, p. 6), however this, 4 ‘to put it simply, ethnography is always about traversing the distance between the familiar and the strange’ (grossberg 1989: 23). as a result, ‘ethnography constructs the other, from the very beginning, as different’ (ibid: 24) or, more realistically, involves ambiguous boundaries. making the other different, does not have to make differences within the culture disappear, as grossberg suggests. this can occur only if the ethnographer assumes the other is not plural. sometimes strangeness has been thought to be beneficial as it destabilises the anthropologist but as ang argues ‘self-destabilization may not at all be necessarily disruptive. on the contrary, it may be a form of confirming the intellectual’s sense of self. self-reflexivity itself then becomes a hidden form of self-indulgence, a form of reinforcing a secure sense of ‘us’, rather than deconstructing it!’ (1989: 28). 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia in turn, leads to the relative loss of strangeness. so if strangeness is the solution then, it too, is caught in paradox and oscillation. even so, with interpretive processes generally, our attention tends to be drawn to those aspects of life which we don’t understand, or which seem different. events that make sense to us are ignored, until we find our understanding or ability to act is inadequate. as michael agar writes, culture is ‘what happens to you when you encounter differences’ (1994, p. 20), or perhaps unexpected empathies. this works both ways for the people being studied and for the ethnographer – both can be changed by the encounter, as they both may change their ‘culture’ although in ways they do not always notice. thus culture, as described, is driven by difference, by error even, rather than by sameness; a ‘symbol’ or ‘custom’ may ‘mean’ one thing, to one subgroup, another thing to another group. people are often strange to each other within the cultural group. when these problems of prior knowledge, ambiguity, hiddenness and difference, are treated as issues for everyone in online life, rather than just for the ethnographer, we can explore how people deal with these features in their social life, without having to resolve them into wholeness or certainty. incompleteness and hiddenness although much is hidden from direct observation online, it is hidden to most people; so this is, again, a feature of online life. however, in any social environment, no one, no matter how much they try, can speak to everyone, or hear or see everything that goes on. people, including the ethnographer, will always be socially placed by other people and thus be reacted to in particular ways and placed in a particular politics. therefore there are always things they will not observe or be told. furthermore, no description can ever be full; it always has to be abridged, and the demands of writing for a particular discipline mean that order and regularity will be imposed upon the data. when the ethnographer says that people do certain things or believe certain things, that is an approximation that, at best, will refer to what most of those who are visible to the ethnographer do on certain occasions. this order, while providing comprehension may disorder the reality by deletion. again, this is part of the nature of social life. the society we live in, is always partly hidden, always out of our complete control or understanding. our ‘social blindness’ has effects on others as we interact with them and sometimes fail to interact satisfactorily. we do our best to make sense of life cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 9 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia as individuals in collaboration and competition, and the methods people use to make sense of failure or misperformance can be studied in themselves and perhaps related to other factors such as status, power, intimacy and so on. incompleteness is a social fact to be investigated. folktales of online life notoriously portray it as open to ‘deceit’ and to the perils of hiddenness5 . again this is not just a problem for ethnographers, as it seems that people in western cultures are less interested in engaging in a free play of multiplicity, as is often alleged (cf poster 2001), than they are in uncovering truth and authenticity; although this varies with context, such as the particular internet forum involved, and the levels of collaboration or intimacy expected. both these varying contexts, and the uncovering of authenticity, are surrounded by conventions which can be investigated. for example, many such conventions relate to the public/private continuum. accuracy of information about ‘the self’ of others might be graded in terms of its ‘privacy’. ‘truth’ is usually taken by group members and researchers, to increase in the order of: online in a group, online in a pair (in private email or private ‘room’ etc.), offline via phone, and offline face-to-face. the more intimacy is expected the more deceit or ‘play’ is considered inappropriate (marshall 2007, pp. 105ff.). it is, however, clear that people can deceive as much in face-to-face, as they can online, but this does not seem to be as high on people’s list of fears. cybermind tended to be confessional and relatively open. people talked about themselves, and these confessions could be compared to previous discussions and confessions (and frequently were by other people). long-term residence with the group helps the ethnographer (and group member) to discover, and check up, more about other participants. people also gossiped about their experience with others. thus if someone travelled to meet someone else and their appearance was not as expected from photographs, then that might be discussed offlist, as would failed relationships, conjectures about the motives of others and so on6 5 we might think of the ongoing tales of gender impersonation, of hidden paedophiles, of nigerian spam frauds and so on. . only comparatively rarely did this kind of discussion reach the public face of the list (it was hidden), so the ethnographer, like other involved members, needs to delve into the non6 i recently observed some teenagers interact with their friends through facebook. as a result it would seem important to explore the oscillation they had between using tools on facebook and telephones. their facebook activity spurred a lot of phone calls to check what other people thought was happening, to pass on secret comments and to make private arrangements. hiddeness and the resulting ambiguity of all communication could not be ignored in an analysis. 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia public side of online life, and the more the group portrays itself as community, the greater the need to go into private settings. this in turn might weaken the group as less activity appears in public and thus there is less in common. so, a way people order and give depth to their social experience may eventually destabilise the group the social experience grows out of (marshall 2007). to pursue this offlist life, i had regular telephone and face-to-face contacts with some australian members and regular offlist email contacts with both overseas and australian members. i also met some overseas members as well. gossip about cybermind was a common ‘natural’ feature of conversation, although obviously with an australian bias, and as orgad (2005, p. 59, 62-3) reports, offline contact was often more open and full than communication through email. of course gossip is not necessarily to be believed (people might be lying to the ethnographer for their own political purposes), but this is a problem faced with offline gossip as well. communication implies the possibility of deceit. people online often seem to realise this, and attempt to work around it. the hidden and transient nature of the population may also affect social behaviour in other ways. quite often the majority of the population may be ‘lurking’ or invisible, and the population of online groups can change fairly quickly. snapshots of group composition will be temporary and always on the verge of being out of date. again, rather than just being an ethnographic problem, this can have effects on the group. for example, group conventions and history may be relatively fragile and little discussed, as most participants may not know what the history refers to, and thus rather than generating closeness and tradition, it generates distance and breakage. members of the group may have to continually re-earn their status, as newcomers do not know what they have done or, on the other hand, perhaps long time members support each other to reduce this potential loss, thus making it harder for new members to participate. again, the effects of hiddenness, ignorance and ambiguity need investigating. an existential phenomenon that seems to arise for westerners from this hiddenness is the state of being suspended between presence and absence which i have called ‘asence’; (marshall 2007, pp. 89ff.). it is often not clear online whether a person, including yourself, is present or being heard, without the responses of others. there are no markers of being other cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 11 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia than communication. even a graphic avatar may not tell you if the person ‘behind’ the avatar is actually there listening to you. westerners seem to find this uncertainty difficult to deal with; they like confirmation of the other’s presence and of the other’s reaction to them. they may prefer flame directed towards them, which confirms their existence, than being ignored. other behaviour, such as netsex, may also be permeated by the need to overcome asence (marshall 2003). friends in facebook may mark presence as much as they mark status. such effects may well differ between groups with different background or different offline culture. as malinowski wrote, in a more conventional fieldwork context, it is of the nature of human life that as we move towards: the manifold details of personal life [our] methods of observations must become more complex and… [our] results less reliable. this cannot be remedied… the most exact of human observations is only approximate (1932, p. 238). as this implies, the argument that we can never know things entirely accurately, or that we can never give a definitive interpretation of what others are or are saying, is not an argument against trying to know as well as we can. if reality is vague, then that has to be factored into the research. lack of boundaries because people rarely live online in just one internet group, the idea of group boundaries is challenged, and internet ethnography automatically has a tendency to become what marcus has called ‘multi-sited’ (1999, p. 79ff). similarly, asence implies that personal boundaries are not firm. boellstorff, however, celebrates these non-existent boundaries, as he wants to study ‘virtual worlds’ in their own terms, without reference to a ‘real’ world (2008, p. 61ff.). he refers to tylor’s definition of culture as ‘that complex whole’ and asks ‘what is a virtual world if not a complex whole?’ (ibid. p.66). however, virtual worlds are not ‘whole’ as you cannot eat pixels. there is no ‘virtual world’ without an offline world, which impacts upon it. the ‘virtual’ only exists via the ways people can access it, and via the potentially conflicting cultures they bring to it. imposing strict borders between ‘virtual’ and ‘real’, is like studying a village without mentioning the contacts the villagers have with other villages, foreign aid, 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia religious movements, governments, forestry companies and so on. for online worlds these externalities provide context, and varying contexts provide the varying meanings for what is done; thus undermining the claims of cultural ‘wholeness’. assuming the online and offline are connected does not, as boellstorff implies, mean that one is derivative of the other (ibid. p. 63), or that cultural construction and creativity does not happen online – merely that the borders are imprecise and multi-sited. some online forums such as twitter, for example, might take their meaning primarily from offline life, others from online life. these permeable, or ‘asent’, boundaries need to be investigated, rather than discarded. as implied above, the interactions between people on cybermind which occurred offlist and in other forums was an important part of the list dynamics. for many members, the list intersected beneficially with their offline lives (marshall 2007, pp. 241ff.). boundaries between ‘virtual’ and ‘real’ were not firm at all. the internet, and these ongoing boundary ambiguities, draws attention to a central and rarely studied feature of modern life namely the temporary and voluntary associations that people form which may be separated, to some extent, from their daily lives. these can include: ‘support groups’, religious meetings, fitness classes, a group of fellow clubbers, sporting associations and so on. the people a person meets at these various groups may be kept quite separate from each other and, say, from their work life. people in the west seem to compartmentalise their lives as part of their general culture, and perhaps this enables their distinctions between online and offline lives at this moment. as more and more of their friends come online, this distinction may evaporate (as may be the case with facebook). as it seems impossible to describe a person’s social life by observing their behaviour in one place, we have to recognise these other places, and may try and find out about them as part of our ethnography. compartmentalisation may also mean that a person or group may act differently depending on the social form of the online group, say whether the online group is connected with work, is connected with neighbours, or is largely anonymous etc. again, we cannot assume that online activity is separated from offline life. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 13 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia finally, these ambiguous boundaries affect academic discourse. it is much harder to pretend that academic or ethnographic research is completely separate from the group’s own cultural processes. with internet groups the chance increases that people will not only read what is written about them but will argue with it, making references to the same theorists that the ethnographer deploys. these theorists are themselves part of the cultural background; they are not independent of it, or separate from it. similarly, it may be hard to draw borders of origin around ideas which have grown up for the ethnographer in the course of the fieldwork. formative emails may include quotes, developments and responses from many participants. ideas, used in analysis, may have arisen in dialogue without a fixed point of origin, and without it being possible to maintain barriers between what is written professionally and what is written out of life in general. the boundary between ‘us’ as ethnographers and ‘them’ as people is increasingly destabilised, and this should be recognised as part of the social process of ethnography and cultural model making. the group has to be acknowledged as part of the creative process and, this too, might need investigation. place? clearly place can no longer be use to draw boundaries around social lives, although place and culture can still have an effect. online place, is further constituted by texts or graphics, or both, all of which affect the kinds of things that can be done in that space, the way it is used and the way messages will be interpreted. it is always a ‘locale’ to use gidden’s term (1984, p. 118). this locale gives information about the ways that the space should be used and the kinds of things which should be done. similarities of place, code for similarity of action and behaviour. people tend to use the conventions of locale to define their internet group, or the internet in general as a specific kind of locale for political and rhetorical purposes, although this does not imply instant unity (marshall 2001). the social constitution of online space does not mean that the online world is deterritorialised. as well as being immersed in offline networks, people are situated in particular conventional spaces when they access the internet. these spaces can affect the ways they can access the internet, the kinds of things they can access, the speed with which they can respond, and the risks involved in that access. it may also influence whether they are 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia online by themselves, in a private room, in an internet café or surrounded by others including offline friends or kin (see miller and slater 2002). again we can explore, the ways in which the local and the global intersect, conflict, connect and misconnect. the boundaries are by no means firm and, online, they may produce new social forms. again the ethnographer (and the inhabitant as ethnographer) is faced with boundaries which are constructed, reinforced, permeable, ambiguous, or overcome, and which may be made so, in different ways, by different people and different groups. archive and memory that cybermind had archives, together with my own collection of emails, meant that it was often possible to ‘relive’ events and check if my memories were accurate. this often produced interesting discrepancies, which could be investigated; something which is impossible in normal fieldwork. in this case, ethnographic notebooks, with their spur of the moment interpretations of events, do not completely replace what happened. however, notebooks are still useful to remind the ethnographer of how they saw and felt events at the time. with archives it is possible to observe what factors are important for how memories, or narratives of things, were constructed, by comparison. for example, i observed that for events in which the group had seemed flooded with flame, the flaming messages often turned out to be quite a small proportion of the total messages. as a result, i could suggest that the perception of flooding occurred because these messages had a coherent tone and subject, while the other messages tended to be fragmented in tone and subject, thus not making as much subjective impact. times in which the coherence of one set of messages seemed dominant were also the most memorable times on the list, for me and for others, and were often used to justify particular behaviours, conventions, or special times onlist, such as when the death of list co-founder michael current was frequently remembered as marking the birth of list community. inaccurate perceptions can have a big effect on social life. however, reading archives is not equivalent to experiencing life on the group. in reading the archives the ethnographer is missing the varying density of messages, the speed with which they arrive and so on, and hence the ambient moods which influenced how people read the group (whether hurriedly of slowly for example), or the way they interpret the group in terms cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 15 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia of its dominant messages at that time. reading 40 messages which have arrived within quarter of an hour is a different experience to reading 40 messages which arrive over a couple of days. unobserved observer fallacy people often suggest it is possible to do online ethnography by ‘lurking’ without participating in the group and thus not altering its behaviour, and indeed some people have announced they have been doing this form of ethnography on cybermind. however this assumes that reading is the same as participation, and is open to the same objections as arise for reading archives alone. if the meaning of a communication inheres in the interaction and resolution of behaviours, then a person who is only reading cannot check their understandings, so their resolution of communication will be even more tenuous than usual. the researcher’s own categories and formulations largely remain uncontested. such research seems particularly open to charges of producing distortion through the importation and imposition of external categories, whereas interactive ethnography has a potential towards openness because dialogue often goes in different directions to those intended. likewise hiddenness suggests that the ethnographer might be able to deceive the group they are investigating and gain perspectives from another social role. this process is likely to reproduce category clichés, as the ethnographer goes about performing those roles, and provoking responses, by the conventions they already ‘know’. hence they might not learn as much as they expect. on the whole, the greatest objections that people on cybermind had to any research was when it was unannounced, was announced with no possibility of participation, or when they just discovered the publications. so ethical problems emerge. to avoid these problems and to be open about the research, all my writings about the list, were made available to list members before publication for comment and/or protest. this proved a useful way of getting further information, and correcting overt errors, but clearly could be difficult if the group wanted to remain closed to the outside world, or if people had objected to publication; it is possible openness can lead to closure. problems of sourcing 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia this leads to the final problem. if the boundaries between ethnographer and subjects are open, then how do we acknowledge the group in our work? over the ten years i was researching cybermind, the issue of how people should be quoted came up many times. while changing people’s names is standard practice in internet ethnography (cf kendal 2002, pp. 241-2), this practice both denies the obligation, and the role of the group in producing the ideas of analysis. making people anonymous also brings up questions of intellectual property rights as gurak points out (1997, p. 137), especially for people who live by payment for ideas and texts. by not attributing statements, ideas or art works, the ethnographer is potentially engaged in theft, and putting hard boundaries in place to support their own livelihood. removing names suggests that boundaries between ethnographer and subject are easily maintained, which, as we have seen, is debateable. these hidden obligations can be exploited by the ethnographer to make their version of the culture seem radically different from the version espoused by members of the group. by referring to people it becomes easier to trace the way the ethnographer’s ideas have risen out of interactions with the group and owe their existence to the group, rather than to a privileged and autonomous academic tradition. by acknowledging others, those others are able to say that i, as ethnographer, have misunderstood. if identity is made uncertain or people are blended into fictions then this is impossible. while acknowledgement increases the vulnerability of the ethnographer to questioning, it could also increase their commitment to being accurate. yet, it is clearly possible for identification to lead to problems for the group (reid 1996), and openness may not always be appropriate if what is discussed is classed as private (and this too may not be clear). discovering what is sensitive, private, or what should not be reported, is part of ethnographic research, will not always be the same in different places, and is always potentially fraught. we can make informed guesses but ultimately the consequences are unpredictable. being aware of these problems will probably lead the ethnographer to selfcensor to protect the group and group members from the incursions of others – especially if they are open about the identity of the group. this may produce distortions of the culture as it is presented, however the censorship is generally censorship of an interpretation. for example, i may have my own opinions about what actions helped lower the population of cybermind after the iraq war. these opinions are not necessarily true, and it certainly does not change the effect of those actions if i report them or do not report them. the place and time for comment would have been when they occurred. reporting them afterwards in a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 17 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia format in which those i might criticise could not reply, could seem like an attack. whatever i decide to do, i cannot remove the ambiguity or the hiddenness from the account, and indeed the self-censorship, to the extent that it exists, is no more a construction of culture than reporting events would be. these problems are, again, not just online problems but faced by ethnographers generally in an interconnected world. whereas some problems arise because people online are supposedly too anonymous for us to do fieldwork, here it is recognised that they are perhaps not anonymous enough. at least most people on cybermind had some knowledge of what social research involved and could give consent to the ethnographer’s presence with some degree of awareness of potential consequences and, as the research was open, did not have to consent. this gives another reason for making papers available before publication; another opportunity is provided for objections. in general, cybermind members objected to the list’s name and long-time members’ identities being concealed unless they requested, or when their words may be the unconsidered words of a moment. so i worked with this, privately deciding not to name people if the topics being written about could be considered potentially harmful to them and to keep private correspondence and interviews anonymous unless otherwise requested. finally, given many passing people may not have been aware of the research, i usually quoted such people anonymously. any practices of acknowledgement would have to vary with the group, and be in consultation with the group, but there are no clear guidelines which can satisfy everybody in every situation; that is the nature of social life. online ethnography and culture: conclusions ethnography involves participating in life with the group being studied, recording what happens and interacting with its members, for a relatively long time to gain familiarity with events and local meanings. it may make use of many tools such as: surveys, interviews, spontaneous queries, counting words in texts, comparing notebooks with archives, recording of our own experiences, and so on. ethnographic practice and convention has to adapt to the group being studied, the kinds of problems the ethnographer is interested in, and to the audience being written for; therefore it cannot always be defined adequately in advance; it is inherently ambiguous. 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia choosing a group to research is always something of a haphazard matter. it is perhaps best to approach the group with relatively clear topics for investigation while expecting that some will be abandoned and other topics will appear. what is discovered will partly be contingent, depending on the events that happen, and the events people talk about. while the ethnographer may participate passionately, they may find it useful to oscillate, to question themselves – especially about their certainties, and what they find as differences. it is also useful to remember that the ethnographer’s problems in carrying out their work may be similar to the problems that other people have. as all sites are unique and have particular issues, it is therefore useful to have some familiarity with other sites and other ethnographies for comparative purposes. much of any life, but particularly life online, is hidden. the ethnographer has to be aware of this, and the limits of their knowledge. this is a problem for anyone online, so we can study how people attempt to resolve that problem together with the consequences of that attempted resolution. rather than being put off by hiddenness, we can investigate the social effects of that hiddenness and people’s fears, uncertainties or certainties about it. this may require that we try and participate in the life around the online group, and move into other spaces online and off. boundaries are vague and crossed all the time, so it may be useful to investigate those boundaries, to find what we and others bring to the group from offline life, and what we take back to offline life. online worlds are not entire in themselves, but the level of interdependence may vary with the particular world. we oscillate between involved and detached, between local and other groups. like everyone we are not just insiders. one further consequence of these blurred boundaries is that we cannot assume that we and our theories, or understandings, are disconnected from the group’s culture. ethnography is inherently collaborative, and this raises issues around acknowledging the group and its members. in making sense of what people in the group being studied do, how they interact, and how they interpret others, the ethnographer is explicitly constructing a model of ‘culture’. this is a more formalised version of what everyone else in the group has to do. people generate culture in the course of living their lives, in moving from one group to another. the process may be more complex if the ethnographer or person comes from a radically different culture, but in general the problems the ethnographer faces online are the problems the group members also cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 19 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia have to negotiate. in any case, people in contemporary society may continually move into interaction with new temporary groups. this renders ethnography even more of a social phenomenon. culture is what enables a person to tell, or to make a case that, an event is significant. as such it involves conjecture about the motives, or behaviour, of others. it tries to make the hidden visible. in this understanding, one event cannot be understood without understanding other events, and hence the culture made by the ethnographer tends to become relatively coherent and possibly hide the actual disjunctures of life. furthermore, the tools the ethnographer uses to understand events will change the model of culture they come up with. the ambiguity of, and disagreement over, the term ‘culture’ in academia shows that contestation and variation of meaning, is part of culture in general. variation and argument is important. simplification will occur, and it is easy to smooth over problems, or to delete events that cannot be integrated into the model and which are thus labelled as random or unimportant, so simplification needs care. everyday life is messy, and this mess may be creative. as barth argues, variation or misperformance within a society cannot simply be considered an epiphenomenon, or ‘noise’ produced by an underlying order, and thus irrelevant. variation ‘should emerge as a necessity from our analysis’ (barth 1993, p. 4). there is likely to be more than one culture in the group, and cultures are likely not to have neat or logically consistent boundaries. any boundaries, and the mechanisms whereby they come to exist, have to be discovered. so will the effects of online ‘place’ and its nature. this view also tends to help us see that society and culture are not just mechanisms of order (however sophisticatedly homeostatic), in which human behaviour is reduced to the side effects of ambiguously present, or ‘asent’, structures. societies and cultures can also be mechanisms of disordering. we tend to perceive ‘order’ as imposed upon ‘chaos’, when particular kinds of social order might depend upon, or create, particular types of ‘chaos’. contemporary global capitalism might depend on its ability to make and distribute garbage, yet the abundance of garbage may threaten it. cybermind’s ways of making ‘community’ could also undermine that community (marshall 2007). with this view we might come to see disruption and disorganisation as more than evidence of simple failure or anomie. rather than simply being a disruption, or something to be controlled, argument, dispute, disorder or 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia conflict can be the site of, or provocation for, cultural creation. similarly, abandoning an association of culture with order allows us to look at the ways in which societies head for disaster through their modes of ordering (such as extending the order of markets), and help us not to reduce all problems to inadequacies. furthermore, we don’t have to assume smooth continuity, or complete disjunction between cultural artefacts. their relationship might be an ongoing point of negotiation and conflict, and might never be entirely resolved. everyone is jointly engaged in interpretation and making sense of others, in making culture for others, and then using this model as a tool to interact with those others. everyone is trying to make sense of daily life and trying to make the behaviour of others predictable and to use ‘cultural tools’ persuasively so as to fit into the valued categories which are open to them. as such, the problems of the ethnographer exemplify the same kind of problems that people experience online. they are not problems to be avoided but to be explored, as are the ways that people go about dealing with these problems themselves, as it might tell ethnographers something useful for their research. while, ethnographic models might be more formal than most, and hopefully have a wider than usual view of the issues involved, what ethnographers are doing is not unique. we are all constructing ‘culture’ with each other and for each other; conducting battles, and harmonies for the life of the group. as hine writes, the position that internet ethnography is particularly unreliable, ‘changes somewhat if we recognise that the ethnographer could instead be construed as needing to have similar experiences to those of informants, however those experiences are mediated’ (2000, p. 10). the next step is to realise the basic similarity of procedures involved, and that the group’s perceived culture will be different for different people; there is no overarching single vision. it is always based in interpretation, experience and conflict. ethnography is not above, but within, cultural interaction. references anon 1951, notes and queries on anthropology, 6th edition, routledge kegan paul, london. agar, michael 1994, language shock: understanding the culture of conversation, william morrow, ny. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 21 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia ang, ien 1989, ‘beyond self-reflexivity’, journal of communication inquiry, vol.13, no.2, pp.27-29. barth, frederick 1993, balinese worlds, chicago university press. 1995, ‘other knowledge and other ways of knowing’, journal of anthropological research, vol.51, no.1, pp. 65-8. beattie, john 1966, other cultures: aims, methods and achievements in social anthropology, routledge, london. boellstorff, tom 2008, coming of age in second life: an anthropologist explores the virtually human, princeton university press. freeman, derek 1983, margaret mead and samoa: the making and unmaking of an anthropological myth, australian national university press, canberra. geertz, clifford 1975, the interpretation of cultures, hutchinson, london. geertz, c. & geertz, h. 1975, kinship in bali, university of chicago press. giddens, anthony 1984, the constitution of society, polity press, oxford. grossberg, lawrence 1989, ‘on the road with three ethnographers’, journal of communication inquiry, vol.13, no.2, pp.23-6. hammersley, m., & atkinson, p. 1983, ethnography: principles in practice, tavistock, london. hine, christine 2000, virtual ethnography, sage, thousand oaks, ca. lowie, robert 1937, the history of ethnological theory, holt, rinehart and winston, ny. kendall, lori 2002, hanging out in the virtual pub: masculinities and relationships online, university of california press, berkley. kroeber, a.l 1952, the nature of culture, university of chicago press. kroeber, a.l. & clyde kluckhohn 1952, culture, a critical review of concepts and definitions, papers of the peabody museum of american archaeology and ethnology, harvard, vol. 47, no. 1. malinowski, bronislaw 1932, sexual life of savages in north western melanesia, rkp, london. 1974, magic, science and religion and other essays, souvenir press, london. marcus, george 1999, ethnography through thick and thin, princeton university press. 2007, ‘ethnography two decades after writing culture: from the experimental to the baroque’, anthropological quarterly, vol.80, no.4, pp. 1127-1145. marshall jonathan 2001, ‘cyberspace or cybertopos: the creation of online space’, social analysis vol.45, no.1, pp.81-102. 2003, ‘the sexual life of cyber-savants’, the australian journal of anthropology vol.14, no.2, pp.229-248. 2007, living on cybermind: categories, communication and control, peter lang, ny. mceachern, charmaine 1998,‘a mutual interest? ethnography in anthropology and cultural studies’, the australian journal of anthropology, vol.9, no.3, pp.251-64. miller, daniel & slater, don 2002, the internet: an ethnographic approach, berg, oxford. orgad, shani 2005, ‘from online to offline and back: moving from online to offline relationships with research informants’ in christine hine (ed.) virtual methods: issues in social research on the internet, berg, oxford. 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia poster, mark 2001, whats the matter with the internet? university of minnesota press, minneapolis. reid, liz 1996, ‘informed consent in the study of on-line communities: a reflection on the effects of computer-mediated social research’, the information society, vol.12, no.2, pp.169-74 rosaldo, renato 1993, culture and truth: the remaking of social analysis, beacon press, boston. strathern, marilyn 1988, the gender of the gift, california university press. white, leslie 1954/1968, ‘on the concept of culture’, in robert manners & david kaplan (eds) theory in anthropology: a sourcebook, rkp, london. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 55 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia living on the outside: cultur al diver sity and the tr ansfor mation of public space in melbour ne andr ew j akubowicz univer sity of technology, sydney mar a moustafine univer sity of technology, sydney abstract melbourne has been described as australia’s most liveable and most multicultural city. what relation do these descriptions have to each other? how has the public culture of victoria been influenced by the cultural diversity of the state? the political class in victoria has tended to be more in favour of multiculturalism as a policy, more resistant to populist racism and more positive about immigration than elsewhere in australia. how has this orientation been affected by the institutional embedding of ethnic power during the past four decades? the organization of ethnic groups into political lobbies, which have collaborated across ethnic borders, has brought about cultural transformations in the “mainstream”. often the public experiences these transformations through changing uses of public spaces. this paper offers an historical sociology of this process, and argues for a view of public space as a physical representation of the relative power of social forces. it is based on research for the making multicultural australia (victoria) project. (http://multiculturalaustralia.edu.au ). an online version of the paper inviting user-generated comments can be found at http://mmav1.wordpress.com . city sign pointing to chinatown and the greek precinct, 2009 introduction the political definition of place and the political geography of space have emerged as major fields for the study of multicultural societies and the cosmopolitanisation of transnational communities. melbourne, state capital of victoria in south eastern australia, has been a site for the settlement of many generations of immigrants. while established by british settlers in the early nineteenth century, it was soon the most diverse of the colonies under the impact of the gold rushes of the 1850s. victoria’s initially open borders permitted the emergence of a http://multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/� http://mmav1.wordpress.com/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 56 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia radical political milieu that saw the arrival of fenians from ireland, republicans from italy, taiping rebels from china, escapees from turkish domination of greece, cameleers from the afghan frontier, and other exiles, refugees and émigrés from the many failed rebellions of europe. the first political struggle for democratic representation, the eureka uprising, saw many of these groups fighting together against the colonial government. during the same period anti-chinese feeling on the gold fields was paralleled by widespread support for chinese miners’ rights among the european and british settlers. thus by the time of federation, melbourne was australia’s most cosmopolitan city, possibly its most racist, and as the seat of the first australian parliament, its most vociferously political. the antipodes festival that occurs around russell and lonsdale streets in central melbourne celebrates its contemporary claim (challenged by toronto, and maybe true two decades ago) to be the second largest greek city after athens. in march 2009 victorian premier john brumby announced to the crowd that $3.25 million of state funds would be directed to “melbourne’s iconic greek precinct” – a majority of it towards a greek orthodox community project to create an antipodes centre for greek culture, heritage and language. opposition leader ted baillieu supported it as the first move to create a “plateia” or greek plaza in the locality (neos cosmos 23/03/09). the grant was one of three to major community bodies in the city – the others being the italian and chinese organisations involved with the heritage of the former italian neighbourhood of lygon street, and with the chinatown area around little bourke street in the city. in 2010 the victorian government extended the program to encompass other communities (such as the vietnamese in richmond); in this paper we focus on the first decision and its precursor social and political changes. in his commentary on the funding for the project, chair of the victorian multicultural commission (vmc) george lekakis noted that these were high profile projects supported by significant increases in funding for the vmc. furthermore he said, “the commission has played a pivotal role in bringing the communities and the key stakeholders together to develop a collaborative and visionary approach that will be beneficial in cultural, social and economic terms” (vmc annual report 2007/8, p.34) the commitment by the victorian government to projects of such fairly grand scale indicates a significant growth in the degree of power and influence exerted by these ethnic cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 57 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia communities in the public culture of the state. it also points to the way in which the vmc, a state agency, has positioned itself as a broker between communities and decision-makers, drawing on a widespread network of experienced political players to build coalitions in support of these innovations. this paper traces the importance of ethnic activists and change agents in the transformation of civic and public attitudes, in this case to space and its use. in particular it examines the perceptions of participants in this process, and what they can tell us about political decisionmaking, and its responsiveness to a widening pool of ethnic stakeholders. these decisions have institutionalised an ethno-political environment created by globalisation and mass immigration over sixty years. our analysis initially explores the experiences of immigrants who arrived at a time when national settlement policy was swinging from assimilation to integration, in the pre-dawn of multiculturalism, in the wake of the waves of mediterranean arrivals of the 1950s and 1960s. arriving the melbourne that remains in the memory of european immigrants of the 1960s and 1970s is of a bland and silent city, where the buildings appeared to be “in mourning” and the streets empty of life. it is a city of quiet parks and gardens, of houses turned in on themselves. eric lloga, an ethnic-albanian immigrant, who arrived in melbourne via london in the 1960s, recalls: i found melbourne to be a city that maybe was 20, 30 years behind anything i’d seen. even my hometown [ohrid in macedonia] seemed to me to be a much more vibrant city, a much more open city. this was an empty city for the most part. people withdrew into their homes after work or into the pubs. and really there was no – nothing else that people did beyond that…. i couldn’t understand why people kept their shutters closed or their curtains drawn. my first thought was that this nation must be in some kind of mourning. because the closest experience i had to anything like what i saw in melbourne, was when some important person died – a deputy president or some minister died so they declared a national day of mourning, so everybody would close their curtains and draw their blinds as a sign of respect…. and people like me who came out, you had these very strong feeling you were shut out. you just weren’t part of that world. (e lloga interview mmav 2007). lloga went on to find work in a factory, and then managed to go to university. he became a labor party activist, and thirty years later emerged as a spokesman for the albanian community in melbourne during the kosovo refugee crisis. for a number of years he worked for the mayor and council of brunswick in inner melbourne, where he was involved in strategy planning. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lmuk_3wqh74� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 58 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia another community leader, laura mecca, who helped found and guide the italian historical society, remembers her first days in melbourne in the 1970s. she and her husband had resisted being sent to the migrant hostel in altona, and instead after a week or so in a city hotel, moved to a flat in south yarra. i felt very lonely. because being from a big city, having an extended family around you, which you know, being italian or greek or whatever, european, the extended family is a very important element in your life suddenly here i was feeling completely displaced, me, my daughter, my husband. no other relatives. so i felt very lonely…. only a little girl to feed. you know, there was not much i could do. …so i used to go into the train station, at four o'clock, at peak hour, because i went to flinders street and stayed there and people would – you know, touch me and push me and whatever and that felt like in milano, i said, “wow!” [laughs]. i used to come home, happy like anything, you know, because i’d been with the people, because here was so deserted. (l mecca, interview, mmav 2007). this sense of emptiness was echoed in other ways. historian john lack (2002) in his biography of melbourne councillor david wang, makes special mention of wang’s awareness of the limitations of australian public culture. he quotes wang as saying “part of melbourne's problem…is its social rigidity”. wang felt he could help transform melbourne into a more cosmopolitan or at least a less rigid place and society. wang was a chinese immigrant from the late 1940s, who in the midst of white australia and then immigration minister arthur calwell’s drive to expel asian wartime refugees, was admitted through a device masterminded by calwell. married to an australian chinese woman, wang become a successful entrepreneur. meanwhile in inner city suburbs like brunswick the flavour of public life had already been transformed. a suburb that had attracted european refugees immediately after the second world war, and later italian and greek immigrants, it had a history of populist radicalism. in earlier generations it had witnessed street battles between irish catholic immigrants and the established protestant working class, particularly over issues like irish independence, and attitudes to conscription and the great war (www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/doc/welcomesydneyrdbrunswick.pdf) . in the 1930s brunswick residents defended the free speech movement and its advocates such as artist noel counihan. by the 1960s it welcomed one of the first http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=untgtzbwlzs� http://adbonline.anu.edu.au/biogs/a160576b.htm� http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/doc/welcome-sydneyrdbrunswick.pdf� http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/doc/welcome-sydneyrdbrunswick.pdf� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 59 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia “non-anglo” leaders of a melbourne municipality, when loreto york became the first maltese-born mayor of an australian city (1972) (http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/record/1260977). italian immigrant emilio russo settled in brunswick in the 1950s as a single man. his first accommodation as he began to establish himself was a shared house with other italian young men. for him, the key concern was the difficulty of finding work – as he moved back and forth from melbourne to the migrant hostel in bonegilla, where italian immigrants rioted at the failure of authorities to provide them with promised employment (jakubowicz, morrissey & palser 1984). for a while, he picked grapes with his brother in mildura/red hill until he found work in melbourne. by the late 1950s, his wife maria, whom he had married in a proxy ceremony, had arrived from italy aboard on one of the bride ships that regularly docked at station pier, port melbourne. the house they bought in albion street, brunswick was home for them and their growing family of six children. despite a return visit to italy, the russos decided to stay in australia and emilio and maria’s only move was late in life from brunswick to a house emilio built himself in nearby coburg. today he misses the honesty and security of the old brunswick neighbourhood, the close friendships among the young migrant men and the way that precious personal space was respected. i remember the first house, the one in albion street (where) i lived together with my brother. we used to work in footscray. we used to live here, because that’s wherewe come here and …– we bought a house. i remember paying the rates of the house and they – we had every week, and we used to leave the money inside the house, 16, 20 pounds – that are safe. the sunday we don’t lock the door, never –anybody used to go there. now,ppppsh! (e russo interview mmav 2007). the roots of an ethnic political coalition: political organisations some key themes emerge from these interviews, which help illuminate the processes through which melbourne changed. melbourne was a city in which social class mattered, and in which religion and ethnicity marked boundaries of interaction. in areas like brunswick ethnicity religion and class coalesced, feeding institutions such as the catholic church with all the diasporas of catholic europe. brunswick was a working class area, where factories provided work especially for women (yakka being the best-known employer) (cura and storer 1976, peck 1999). in the 1960s and 1970s immigrant workers began to be more active in the unions, especially italians after the establishment of the international filef (federazione italiana dei lavoratori emigrati e delle loro famiglie). many of the young http://catalogue.nla.gov.au/record/1260977� http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-qb6ys7hpq� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 60 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia people from the italian community were influenced by european politics and the popular culture of the left, drawn to the eurocommunism of italy and its strong tradition of community-based organising (battison 2004, 2005). joe caputo, now a moreland city councillor (and former brunswick mayor) and a member of the vmc began his political life in the late1960s as an immigrant from italy via south america. in the early 1970s he helped to form filef in melbourne, saying of it: if the new … society does not accept some of those things; they can put that group at loggerheads if you like and in contrast – with the local. so in a way, we were still living the politics of italy when we came to australia. …. some of it, i think, not bad, because it kept us in touch with the world, but to many, because of the – because then the local society was not accepting – was not an inclusive society as such, it meant that then, thinking about italy became like an escape, that’s when it becomes negative. because then instead of thinking of ways that one could integrate within the local society and even do benefit the local society – you then think primarily of what’s happening in the country you left behind. .. whereas if we had a much more inclusive society, i think that a lot of the italian experience would have been blended in the australian experience much more readily. then you would have had the greater benefit for the italians in that particular case and also for the australian society in general. (j caputo interview mmav 2007). caputo was involved in the 1970s and 1980s in the establishment of the migrant workers’ centre as part of the union movement in melbourne, and played a role in struggles for english language training on the job, community languages in schools, and better occupational health and safety. it was some years later, in the wake of the dissolution of the communist party, that he and many like-minded migrant activists joined the australian labor party. the alp in victoria was more left wing than elsewhere in australia, the split of the 1950s having seen the expulsion of the more conservative irish catholic groups, and the consequential development of the anti-communist democratic labor party, heavily influenced by italian australian bob santamaria. in other states this split did not occur, keeping the “movement” within the alp. the experience of struggle in community politics and the trade unions, against the forces of conservatism and “bad” employers on the one hand , and racially-prejudiced officials in the unions on the other, produced a peculiar type of political movement. its major fixed battles http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6u7yn_6y8e� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 61 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia were strikes by migrant workers at the ford and general motors car companies in the 1970s, where migrant workers and the old union leadership disagreed on issue, tactics and outcomes. through the late 1960s and 1970s a loose coalition developed between quite diverse activists including ethnic welfare lobbyist walter lippmann from australian jewish welfare, greek academic george pappadopoulos, trade unionist george zangalis (2009) and politician theo sidoropoulos, and the activists associated with the italian radical working class organization filef they collaborated at the community level with ethnic activists who worked closely with a number of protestant church “street workers” – such as david cox, alan matheson and brian howe (later alp social security minister in the hawke government), and community researchers in the centre for urban research and action (cura) such as des storer (storer 1975, cura and storer 1976, jakubowicz, morrissey & palser 1984, battiston 2004, lopez 2000) (http://www.bsl.org.au/ecumenical-migration-centre-emc.aspx). the network that developed at that time was partly about “place” – the creation of local institutions of social development in localities of heavy immigrant settlement. however it was also ideologically integrated through a commitment to social change, and a more radical form of community development that sought to build leadership in working class poly-ethnic communities. thirdly it was trans-class in the sense that an emerging middle-class of educated immigrants and their children were seeking to make vocal the problems raised through the lived experience of their more working class and often poorly educated confreres. while some addressed the conservative side of politics, most were more naturally drawn to the labor party and associated left organisations. together these people became increasingly influential in drawing the alp towards a more considered position about the place of immigrants in australian society, and the critical issues of employment, welfare, education and health where governments were failing many immigrants and their families. reflecting on the return of the john cain alp government in 1982 (until 1990 and then under joan kirner until 1992), political scientist james jupp recalls the impact of the emerging ethnic political coalition on the identification of policy issues. we went to an all-night greek club in sydney road brunswick where everybody went completely berserk, sang old communist songs, old socialist songs, jumped up and down and everyone was filled with joy. in that election the labor party went in with a whole complete detailed ethnic program, which http://www.bsl.org.au/ecumenical-migration-centre-emc.aspx� http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4uty7knzsu� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 62 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia no other party had previously done including the labor party. so they made a special appeal to ethnic voters, they used the ethnic language media and they had a detailed list of promises and that was an extremely important part of the election appeal. and certainly as far as the greeks go, it was wonderful, just what they had wanted. i think also the liberal party, partly because of the influence of fraser [prime minister 1975-1983] but also kennett [ethnic affairs minister under defeated liberal premier hamer and later to be premier in the 1990s], as well really went along with the policies, because melbourne was certainly the place that the majority of southern europeans went to. sydney did not really come on stream in the same way until the asian and middle eastern arrivals in the late 1970s following the vietnam and lebanese wars. but melbourne had really strongly established greek and italian population, maltese population, from all over the mediterranean area, and from yugoslavia … in political terms, the constituency was there, they were becoming naturalised, they were becoming politically organised, the greeks were highly organised, they had their organisations for every island, newspapers and all the rest of it, and a politician would be foolish to ignore this…. sensible politicians on both sides but the labor party had actually captured it. (j jupp interview mmav 2007). ethno-political formations: the victorian alp ethnic branches it was also during this period that the alp agreed to the creation of ethnic branches, which by 2010 numbered 17 out of the 230 state branches. of these, six are greek, three italian, and two each are from arabic, spanish, macedonian and turkish language groups. joe caputo sees these branches as a means of bringing immigrants into a meaningful relationship with australian political life, though he recognises they can be used for “nastier” purposes – such as the stacking of branches in support of local community leaders, but without any real sense of commitment to the party (allan 1978). the ethnic branches were started in victoria in the ‘70s. it started because it was felt that the reason why immigrants were not joining the labor party as they should be en masse, because they found – they found the structures of the labor party alienating because it was only done in english, it was all bureaucratic etcetera. that if you wanted to have – if you wanted to have, sort of, people from different background immigrants, you had to join the branches and ensure that they were running their own languages. that way, you would have lots of people joining and they did have that impact by the ‘70s, …when the labor party did decide to have ethnic branches. (j caputo interview mmav 2007) over the next quarter century these ethnic branches and the mainstream branches of the party with now the third post-war generation of mediterranean and other immigrant groups involved pervaded the political environment with an acceptance of cultural diversity issues. not everyone in the alp was comfortable with these influences, as former premier steve bracks argues: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ovrnhug3h3c� http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vn-pedyyz6g� http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vn-pedyyz6g� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 63 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia some people have made a career in the labor party of using their ethnicity for advancement. i have made a career of not using my ethnicity for advancement. i was proud of it, pleased that i had it, it was always there but i never used it as a lever for any particular advantage in any forum of the party or to any elected or other position. and maybe that was to do with the longevity of my family history, maybe it’s to do with an attitude, but certainly it’s a view i’ve held. i am happy to be of lebanese background, proud of it, but not to wear it on my sleeve, as… one of the things i think you can say is when you know you have multiculturalism working effectively and many nations, many people from many nations settling her successfully as well, and when people don’t see it as anything unusual or special. when i was premier the lord mayor councillor john so was of cantonese background, a background from china and hong kong, the head of the afl [australian football league] the other key position apart from the premier and lord mayor, andrew demetriou of cypriot background. people did not bat an eyelid, so what? they didn’t get there because of their ethnic origin, they’re just there because they have the abilities and capacities …. oh, you happen to be of chinese background or lebanese background. that’s when you know multiculturalism is mature. when it’s raw, when it’s rough, when it’s undeveloped, is when people say, “i am a symbol, a beacon of light for my ethnic origin”. that’s where it’s a very immature stage. (s bracks interview mmav 2008). identity politics is, however, part of the contemporary landscape of globalising societies, and ethnic claims to recognition and resources have become as legitimate as those of any other mainstream pressure-group. these issues of identity are interwoven with other broader questions; in inner melbourne identity politics seems to be replacing traditional class politics. today ethno-political fissures take on serious consequences. the rising public concerns about terrorism paired with government policies on de-radicalising muslim youth and preventing terrorism, have created in urban australia many of the same tensions evident elsewhere (jaggers,2008). the transformation in the priorities of alp parliamentary member for brunswick carlo carli mp, a former filef activist, demonstrates what has happened to the class politics of an earlier modern melbourne. often issues of powerlessness are expressed in the language of culture and gender, rather than class. carli also notes that the types of issues that drive people have changed quite dramatically, as blue-collar factory jobs have disappeared. political activism today is more focussed on environmental and sustainability issues and around lifestyle and identity issues, already http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vepklygwb3i� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 64 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia beginning to become apparent during the period when he was a student rather than a politician (carli 1982). the issues that really are facing the generation that’s between 18 and 30 and they’re an intriguing generation because they do have a high level of environmental consciousness, they’re political but not necessarily all that party political. they are – they do respond very strongly to issues – if you like – iconic issues. and they’re very, very interested in issues of lifestyle and culture. and so you know, the fact that we to strongly support cultural programs in the area becomes quite important to ensure there’s a strong cultural life, is important. (c carli interview mmav 2007). at the 2010 federal election melbourne (including brunswick) was the first national seat to be captured by the australian greens. that transformation could be said to mark a turning point in the politics of urban space, one that had been building for the previous generation. a politics of cultural recognition and ethnic participation the pattern of immigrant settlement in melbourne has generated many political centres of activity around the multitude of immigrant communities. as noted this paper concentrates on the communities associated with the first three of the ethnic enclave grants made in 2009, though the diversity of the city encompasses many other groups – jewish, south american, yugoslav, turkish, arabic, african, indo-chinese, to name just a few. the pathways first established by the large communities of the 19650s and 1960s have often been influenced their political trajectories, as experiences have been shared through the network of migrant resource centres set up after 1978 and the federal galbally report (introduced under the fraser coalition government), and through peak bodies such as the ethnic communities council of victoria. while there has been an emergent ethnic (essentially mediterranean) working class political movement in melbourne there has also been a reassertion by the city’s long-established chinese community of its place in the city. the dissolution of white australia in the 1960s saw the emergence of a more assertive chinese engagement with the city, and in particular, with the area around little bourke street. with its epicentre in celestials lane, the area that was to become the current vibrant heart of chinatown was then a fairly run-down and nondescript zone of decaying nineteenth century dwellings, grocery warehouses, restaurants and religious and clan buildings (anderson, 1990; couchman, n.d.). as the re-development of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 65 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia chinatown was to show, the chinese business community cultivated strong links both to the alp and to the liberal party. while the population of china-born residents declined dramatically after federation, there were still significant numbers of australian born chinese with strong links to china. people such as eunice leong (ching) and david wang represented the two “ends” of this community. eunice (married to maurice leong, historian of the see yup temple in south melbourne) traces her family story back into the nineteenth century when her grandfather was a government interpreter on the victorian goldfields. as a young woman she lived in rural victoria, where her father was a chinese herbalist and she performed in a small orchestra led by her mother. during the second world war she served in the army and then went on to university. she remained one of the small group of melbourne chinese who continued to support the peoples’ republic of china through the 1950s and 1960s, working for a time in china in the early 1970s as an english teacher at nanjing university. until her retirement she lectured in french at monash university, while at the same time being an active supporter of contemporary chinese cultural expression. david wang met his wife mabel (chen) during the second world war when he was in melbourne as an intelligence officer for the chinese nationalist army. they were reunited in post-war shanghai, and with the help of chen family friend immigration minister arthur calwell, wang was allowed to settle in australia. the condition of his annual visa required him to do significant business with china. this was no mean feat for an ex-kuomintang officer, but wang did so, establishing the business that became the wang emporium. he used calwell, that most ardent advocate of white australia, to advance his career. there is a certain irony in wang circumventing the intent of white australia in the late 1940s, as calwell intensifies its impact through the introduction of the wartime refugees removal act (1949) aimed at expelling chinese and other refugees from asia. david wang’s business prospered and, in 1962, he successfully sought and gained (on appeal) an australian passport to travel abroad. as a citizen he could then become more active in community affairs. he became a justice of the peace and later ran a successful campaign for melbourne city council, to which he was elected in 1969 becoming the first chinese councillor). wang began developing his proposal for a chinatown project in 1960, http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/library/media/image/id/1159.restoration-work-on-the-see-yup-temple-in-south-melbourne� http://www.adb.online.anu.edu.au/biogs/a160576b.htm� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 66 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia arguing that the area should become an economic and tourist centre. he put his own money into developments there, opening the emporium in 1964 with calwell cutting the ribbon. as a councillor, he advocated for a more beautiful and brighter melbourne. his vision for chinatown became a reality in 1976, with street arches and furniture, lighting and the creation of a chinese new year festival. his son, mark wang, is in 2010 deputy chair of the chinese museum on cohen place based near celestials lane. dutch scholar jan rath has reviewed the creation of chinatowns around the world as part of a globalising tendency. he notes that the creation of chinatowns as “tourist” neighbourhoods requires the coincidence of appropriate group characteristics, and the opportunity structure (rath 2007). while david wang experienced the absurdity of white australia, he also saw the possibilities the society offered someone with ambition, capacity and contacts, who could endure the systemic discrimination. he also picked up on the changing politics of melbourne, where the marginalised ethnic groups of the 1950s and 1960s were entering the mainstream of political and business life. wang could act as a bridge between the players in the globalising region – australian chinese, with their long links into asia; the emerging powerhouses of china and hong kong, as well as taiwan; and the heartland of wasp melbourne. his daughter, filmmaker lisa wang, whose company black sheep films made the memoir documentary “reunion” in 1998, reflects on the tension apparent in her father’s ambition. she cannot understand how his drive to succeed in australian terms still required her to remain chinese and follow traditional chinese values and behaviour. viewed from outside the family, this tension seems to be a critical component of his success. rath points to the concept of “social embeddedness” as a way to understand how chinatowns emerge in practice. he describes it as the assumption that individual entrepreneurs participate in ethnically specific economic networks that facilitate their business operations (especially in acquiring knowledge, distributing information, recruiting capital and labor, and establishing relations with clients and suppliers). social embeddedness enables entrepreneurs to reduce transaction costs by eliminating formal contracts, gaining privileged access to vital economic resources, and providing reliable expectations as to the effects of malfeasance. particularly in cases where the entrepreneurs’ primary input is cheap and flexible…(rath 2007, p.5). the political environment of course sets the context for the regulation of opportunity. wang saw this early on and sought to use his political skills and networks to transform the http://australianscreen.com.au/titles/reunion/clip1/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 67 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia impingement on him (and other asians) of that regulatory regime. his armoury of “front” organizations did this extremely effectively – lack’s biography notes the following committees and associations with which wang was closely associated: • keep melbourne beautiful citizens' committee • make melbourne brighter committee • chinese professional and businessmen's association of victoria • little bourke street traders • melbourne city council finance and the parks, gardens and recreation sub-committees. while wang did face opposition to the chinatown project, he was ultimately successful. though he died in 1978 before the project’s full realisation, his family continued to play a critical role in the installation of the dai loong ceremonial dragon as part of the mainstream moomba parade from 1979. the creation of the dragon offers a valuable insight to the inter-penetration of australian and chinese society. mabel wang tells the story of the dragon as a tale of accident and opportunity, set within the overall development of chinatown. chinatown was not a definite sort of area – well it was but it was dull and very ugly in a way and there was nothing to define it. at that time the lord mayor was ron walker and he was also a great a good person who did things, was good at doing things; the victorian government premier mr hamer was also very sympathetic to these sorts of things and so between the three of them it all happened. and so they put the money aside for chinatown and they erected those arches, and fixed up the lighting, and from that time on we tried to organise the miss chinatown contest that finally livened up the place, and then we got a dragon. just before he died he initiated to get a dragon for the chinese community, and then after he died i sort of took over with another leader of the young chinese group who owned the original dragon, and then he asked us to help so then we, my son and i went to china, and ordered the dragon, and we raised the money and we got it here for the 25th moomba anniversary. and ever since then we’ve had a chinese new year celebration in chinatown and it’s got bigger and bigger and it’s nice now. (m wang interview mmav 2007). the traffic was not all one way. mabel wang recalls that the city of foshan, near canton, where the dragon was made, had lost the skills of dragon-making in the years since the 1949 revolution. my son and i went there and we had to take a drawing with us, a plan of the construction because in china they hadn’t made a dragon since the cultural – http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wynbryccuwg� http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wynbryccuwg� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 68 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia no not no, since the communists had come into power and that was 1949, because once they were there, they stopped all these traditional things …this was the case with anything traditional; [it] was just not continued and dragons and all that worshipping and temples and everything was not allowed. so, we had to take our diagrams back with us. and this was after the cultural revolution which was 1976, so if it was before 1976, we wouldn’t have been able to do it. so we went there in 1978 and so we were able to get help to do that…. as a result of our dragon, i think they’ve made lots of dragons all over the world. (mabel wang interview mmav 2007) ethnicity politics and public space over the past decade as the second and third generation of post-war immigrants and their families have become more firmly rooted in the day-to-day multicultural realities of melbourne, a sense of cosmopolitan style has reinvigorated the city. for sixteen years another chinese councillor held the chair as lord mayor of the city. john so, hong kong born and from a later generation of immigrants, captured the imagination of the city’s electors. at the opening of the global metropolis conference in melbourne in october 2007 so waxed lyrical regarding the defining qualities of the city – in which its cultural diversity played a leading role. home to people from 150 countries, speaking over 200 languages, our city is one of the world’s most multicultural capitals. the energy and determination of successive waves of immigrants has driven our economic goals and provide amazing quality of life we all enjoy here. today, our city is home to a peaceful community, sharing in the many advantages multiculturalism has provided. from diverse cultural experiences to an everexpanding network of international trade activities, our ethnic mix is paying social and economic dividends. as the city has developed, so has our understanding of how local government can play a guiding role in connecting the diverse ethnic and cultural groups. melbourne cbd is almost unrecognisable when compared with just 20 years ago. investment in infrastructure and changes in planning have opened up at once laneways, improved civic safety and supported an influx of unique entrepreneurial enterprises. as a result, an incredible range of retail, restaurant and entertainment experiences is now available. i think this is a good time to pay a visit to all these venues. and the 700,000 people who enter the city every day, are reminded of the positive outcomes from the city’s policies of multiculturalism, accessibility and social inclusion. the city of melbourne has also established a reputation for events, for major sporting competitions and arts festivals to ethnic celebrations. we have a year wide of different occasions celebrated here in the heart of the city for all the diverse communities. (j so welcome, global metropolis conference, october 2007) councillor so was matched by the rhetorical excesses of the new premier john brumby, who replaced bracks in 2007. although of an anglo background, brumby had been deeply http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hc-1f_e75y� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 69 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia involved in victorian labor politics, and had been bloodied in some of the stoushes that bracks alluded to above. he was therefore aware of the importance of the ethno-political diversity of the city to the stability of the government. brumby positioned the debate within the framework of the nationalist rhetoric that characterised the final years of the howard government. if you look at the history of australia as a whole, there have been two defining moments in our nation’s history: one of course was the anzac tradition, the birth of the anzac tradition at gallipoli in 1915 and the other has been postwar migration. these are the defining moments in australian history. and you only have to look at the post-war boom to see the extraordinary strength that our community has gained from the italian community, the greek community, the jewish community and a range of migrants from right across europe. and others of course, have arrived from vietnam, from south-east asia, from turkey, from macedonia, from iraq, afghanistan and africa to name just a few. ... we are considered to be in this state, one of the world’s great multi-cultural melting pots. and yes, there will always be challenges to address and to overcome when we welcome new communities. but our experience here is that more than 150 years of immigration has made us socially and economically much stronger. the economist intelligence unit has repeatedly named melbourne as i’ve said as one of the world’s most liveable cities and culture and diversity are key factors in that successful ranking that we enjoy.(j brumby, welcome address, global metropolis conference 2007) class ethnicity and power in melbourne there were a number of different developments in the ethno-political world of melbourne that would lead ultimately to a commitment (yet again) of public funds to the transformation of a non-descript public space into an ethnically inflected place of cultural meaning and social interaction. these developments affected both the liberals and the alp. on the conservative side of politics during the late 1990s, howard’s most effective opponent on the issue of multiculturalism and the populist racism that exploded during that period was kennett’s liberal government in victoria and its few canberra allies, like petro georgiou, mhr for kooyong. kennett re-labelled himself from minister of ethnic affairs (the cain government title) to multicultural affairs, asserting the centrality of cultural diversity in the political operation of the state – from its economy to its cultural activities. middle class “ethnics” became increasingly influential. we have already seen how by the mid 1970s, david wang was able to mobilise two of the “old guard”, walker and hamer, and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dzpgeaz7fzw� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 70 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia deliver on his dream of a renewed or rather reinvented chinatown. his plan proved to be an economic and cultural breakthrough, revitalising a dying part of the inner city, and reinvigorating a tourist industry that would generate thousands of jobs and prosperity for the entrepreneurs involved in it. it was also helped along by the end of racially-based immigration controls after 1972, which opened up immigration to tens of thousands of chinese (from hong kong, taiwan, malaysia, indonesia, as well as mainland china). the election of john so as councillor and lord mayor of melbourne in 1991 was an indicator not only of their growing power, but also of the willingness of the city to accept someone as leader whom a generation before would not even have been allowed to be a resident. ethnically-identified localities, once enclaves, such as the italian “end” of lygon street in carlton, became a hub for other key institutions – from the italian welfare, research and educational centre established by co.as.it in faraday street, with its new museo, to the bicentennial-funded australian multicultural foundation (set up in 1988). the old customs house near the mouth of the yarra river, the site in the 1920s of major conflicts between australian waterside workers and immigrant “scabs” brought in to break the strike on the waterfront, had also by 1988 been turned into the museum of immigration. in the years out of power, between cain in 1990 and bracks in 1999, the electoral heartland of the alp in victoria remained firmly rooted in the ethnic working class areas of the inner city and the corridors leading to the northern and western suburbs. the ethnic branches of the alp and the ethnic activists who were scattered through the social, educational, welfare and cultural institutions of the state, were able to gain greater purchase on the internal agendas of the party. by the time bracks won the 1999 state election, the young activists of the 1970s had become the more sober political players at the centre of the victorian alp. once in government, bracks began to re-energise the bureaucracy that he needed to implement labor policy in the area of multicultural affairs. the victorian ethnic affairs commission (eac) created under cain in 1981, had been the first “ethnic” bureaucracy in victoria. the victorian eac was closely identified with the alp government, and one of kennett’s early moves was to split its powers, into a bureaucratic and political office controlled by the premier and a renamed multicultural commission with far more limited powers than before. with the return of bracks the distinction continued, but the two bodies cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 71 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia were often at loggerheads. in 2007, bracks combined them under the commission name, and the former commission chair george lekakis (a brunswick boy) took over direction of the overall strategy. lekakis, a former psychiatric nurse and social worker, had been involved in the migrant “scene” for many years. as a child he had been taken from brunswick back to greece, where he had tended farm animals and gone to the local school. he was in greece during the junta period in the 1960s, and saw the violence inflicted on socialists and democrats there. back in australia he worked for a while as executive officer of the ethnic communities council of victoria and as director of a migrant resource centre whose chair was former federal labor minister frank crean. these labor contacts and his ethnic credentials prepared him for the job that bracks gave him. central to lekakis’s strategy to achieve greater participation in the dynamics of government by ethnic communities was a process drawn from the radical educationist paolo freire, one which lekakis refers to as “dialogue”: you have open public meetings, where there are no agendas, other than people coming and telling us whether it’s working right or wrong. and i think that’s quite empowering of communities to know that they don’t have to fear anybody, there is a government agency that can go out there and set up a public meeting and you can come and tell all whether the local whatever office or the local police office, or the local this office, is not doing a right – the right thing by the local community. and therefore, i can, in a public space, make my claim or make my praise, or make a call for more resources, or say that those resources that have been provided to us through a particular program – maybe it’s a neighbourhood renewal program, maybe it’s a state government employment program, is a good thing for us. now the good/bad and whatever other commentary, positive or negative, can be made publicly and we record that and feed that back to the government…. there is a polemic about it and we work together. and i think we have been able to combine all those things to bring this about. (g lekakis interview mmav 2007). so the opening up of space is both a physical and a metaphorical process, where the space is much like the “public sphere” of political philosophers, a virtual or imaginary terrain for informed conversations among citizens (kellner n.d). in fact the process establishing such a space requires years of effort, informed both by a theoretical understanding of organising as a http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrotvure1xm� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 72 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia process, and the practical realities of people engaging on difficult issues and reaching collaborative outcomes. lekakis reflects on that process and the commission’s role, which is: to build up a momentum of relationships and that’s the critical key, in melbourne for example, there’s a network amongst people who operate welfare programs. and those relationships are formed over the last 30 or 40 years. the same thing occurs within migrant communities, the ecc set the benchmark for people to cooperate with one another, to talk, to work out problems, to advocate for reform, to support one another, to learn from one another. the same in the interfaith area. religious leaders at local levels are coming together, so you see interfaith networks occurring everywhere. our job is to support all that. (g lekakis interview mmav 2007) conclusion melbourne has been transformed by the impact of immigration, and the cultural diversity brought in its train. the embedding of a multicultural consciousness into government and the wider society may not yet have been fully realised, yet with the extension of the ethnic precincts scheme in 2010 by another $12 million, to refer to areas such as the jewish sector of st kilda, the vietnamese in richmond, and the arabic sector of coburg, it appears that the whole of the city will be dotted with government funded micro-ethnic precincts. nevertheless, numerous points of conflict and pockets of racism continue, especially as evidenced in the bashings of indian students. some refugee families, especially from african backgrounds, still experience extensive problems of settlement and adjustment (jakubowicz 2010) while the victorian electorate’s support for immigration (once the highest in australia) has fallen back to about the national norm (betts 2008). the individuals interviewed for this paper range from people who were and remain at the cutting edge of change, to those who lived through the transformations around them in the everyday world. some were from the outset of a mind to build a new ethnic politics, and found that one of its consequences was a transformation of space and place. others were working on class or sectoral agendas, and discovered that over time the class relations of australia had become strongly inflected with ethnic and cultural characteristics. while class politics still remains an important dimension for the participation of working class immigrants, the context in which it takes place has become more nuanced and penetrated by cultural politics. in the process the wider australian society has become more cosmopolitan in its appreciation of difference, and more embedded in the multiculturalism of the everyday (wise & velayutham 2009). http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qbfbnxdd8aq� http://tinyurl.com/melculprec� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 73 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the celebration of diversity in public space continues from the opening up of melbourne’s alleyways and sidewalks (recommended by the former head of the bureau of immigration, multicultural and population research, john nieuwenhuysen) to a more european approach to wining and dining, or to the omnipresent asian-dominated foodhalls in shopping centres across the city. federation square has become something of a european piazza/plaza/plateia, offering fiestas and carnivals, once having its buildings draped with huge images from the photographic project on australian diversity, “all of us” . multicultural arts victoria has locked in a long-term relationship with the victorian arts centre, transforming the rather upmarket venue into a far more community-focussed space, reflecting the city’s diversity in music and dance. while the victorian ethnic communities council remains critical of some aspects of state government activity (and very critical of what is perceived as federal government inaction), there is also recognition of the extraordinary success of the political organisation of ethnic communities and the mobilisation of their networks of influence over the decades. rath (2007) concludes his analysis of ethnic neighbourhoods by referring to the conditions under which they can flourish, and the circumstances that might render them more unlikely to become tourist attractions. he suggests that not only do the communities need to have an entrepreneurial cultural tradition, and be able to identify and take advantage of the opportunity structure they encounter, they also need to exhibit ethnic cultures that are “of interest” to the rest of society, and be both welcome and unthreatening to their new conationals. the emergence of ethnic communities as legitimate (if sometimes criticised) stakeholders in australia’s pluralist democracy has been reflected in government policy outcomes and urban infrastructure investment. as melbourne demonstrates, the building over time of political networks of influence remains a crucial determining factor, without which immigrants will to a greater or lesser extent remain marginalised. thus political participation that produces real transformation in the wider social world and improvements to the physical environment may provide one of the more effective tests of the capacity of an immigranthosting society to integrate its incoming populations and respond creatively to their presence. for immigrant communities one of the most important outcomes of participation becomes their legitimacy in that society. http://tinyurl.com/melbnieu� http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/library/media/slideshow/id/1374.all-of-us-slides� http://allofus.com.au/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 74 issn: 1837-5391; 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(ed.) 2000, immigrant businesses: the economic, political and social environment, macmillan press and st. martin’s press, houndmills, basingstoke, hampshire. rath, j. 2007, ‘the transformation of ethnic neighborhoods into places of leisure and consumption’, institute for migration and ethic studies (imes), university of amsterdam working paper 144 january. storer, d. 1975, (ed) ethnic rights, power and participation, chomi, emc and cura, fitzroy. tan, c. 2006, ‘ “the tyranny of appearance”: chinese australian identities and the politics of difference’, journal of intercultural studies, vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 65-82. taylor, c. & gutmann, a. 1994, multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition, princeton university press, princeton, n.j. wise, a. & velayutham, s. 2009, (eds.) everyday multiculturalism, palgrave, london. zangalis, g. 2009, migrant workers and ethnic communities: their struggles for social justice and cultural rights, the role of greek-australians, common ground, altona. zappala, g. & australia. dept. of the parliamentary library 1997, four weddings, a funeral and a family reunion: ethnicity and representation in australian federal politics, dept. of the parliamentary library, [canberra]. zukin, s. 1998, ‘urban lifestyles: diversity and standardization in spaces of consumption’, urban studies, vol. 35nos.5-6, pp. 825-839. http://www.humanrights.gov.au/africanaus/papers/africanaus_paper_jakubowicz.pdf� http://www.humanrights.gov.au/africanaus/papers/africanaus_paper_jakubowicz.doc� http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/habermas.htm� http://www.mup.unimelb.edu.au/catalogue/0-522-84997-0.html� living on the outside: cultural diversity and the transformation of public space in melbourne andrew jakubowicz university of technology, sydney mara moustafine university of technology, sydney abstract introduction arriving references collins, j. & p. kunz 2009, ‘ethnicity and public space in the city: ethnic precincts in sydney’, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 1, no. 1, online (http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ojs/index.php/mcs/article/view/1051 ). jaggers, b. 2008, ‘anti-terrorism control orders in australia and the united kingdom: a comparison’, parliamentary library research paper no.28, 2007-08, online (http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2007-08/08rp28.htm ). jakubowicz, a. 2009, ‘new groups and social cohesion in australia’ in j higley, j nieuwenhuysen, & s. neerup (eds.) nations of immigrants: australia and the usa compared, edward elgar, cheltenham, pp. 115-131. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 103 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia politics of a different kind: chinese in immigration litigation in the post white australia era1 jia gao2 the university of melbourne abstract the first mass chinese immigration to australia occurred in the 19th century, with approximately 100,000 chinese arriving between the 1840s and 1901 (fitzgerald 2007; ho 2007), during which questions were raised both in relation to the chinese rights of migration and settlement in australia, and the validity of the government's actions against the chinese. the latter question was in fact considered in the colonial courts (cronin 1993; lake and reynolds 2008). since then, the chinese in australia have never shied away from taking various legal actions, although they are normally seen as people who keep to themselves. australia abandoned its 'white australia' policy in 1974, and lately australia has placed more emphasis on skilled and business migration. as a result, many believe that chinese migrants have come to australia under its normal skilled, business or family migration programs. this ignores the fact that a high proportion of them have obtained their chance to stay in australia directly through a series of litigations over their political asylum claims or indirectly through the effects of court rulings. this paper contributes to the discussion of the chinese in australian political life by looking at how the chinese have fought against adverse executive decisions on their applications for asylum, or more generally against a culture of control that has spread in australia to prevent unwelcome arrivals (cronin 1993; kneebone 2010). it documents key features of their experiences. this is a different type of political activism, characterising the lives of many australian chinese, their engagement with the australian political system, and becoming part of the background of their identity, transnationality, socio-political attitudes and behaviour and many other traits. introduction chinese migrants have been part of immigration litigation in australia since the second half of the nineteenth century (rolls 1992; fitzgerald 2007). the case of toy v musgrove in the late 1880s and 1890s has been considered the leading example in chinese efforts in litigating for their rights of settlement in australia (bennett 2007; dow 1972). their efforts to utilise legal channels to fight against exclusion in the first stage of their settlement in australia were extended into the next period, when australia became a federation in 1901. the white australia policy was introduced in the same year through two legislations: the immigration restriction act 1901 and the pacific island labourers act 1901. in fact, the first legislation contained some loopholes (palfreeman 1967), resulting in the large number of court cases filed by chinese settlers. since then the chinese settlers in australia have never shied away from taking various forms of legal action, some of which have even set precedents in the australian legal system. in the more recent tide of immigration litigation, the most famous 1 this is a revised version of the paper that the author presented at the ‘chinese in australian politics’ colloquium held at university of technology, sydney on 8 september 2010, and the author would like to thank colloquium participants for their valuable comments and encouragement. 2 the author also wishes to acknowledge the research funding support provided by the faculty of arts at the university of melbourne, and the comments of two anonymous referees and the editor on the paper. 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 court battle has to be the case of chan yee kin of 1989, which set the boundaries for refugee determinations in australia (crock et al. 2006). however, as a result of theoretical development in the field of international migration studies since the 1980s (black 1991), scholars of overseas chinese studies have somehow overlooked the case of chan yee kin, which has simply become a topic of interest for researchers in australian immigration and refugee law (crock 1998a; mcmillan 2002). researchers have devoted a great deal of their attention to the issues associated with postmigration experiences and a range of aspects of their lives in australia, especially to topics that are related to new theoretical explanations in international migration and ethnic studies. there are a small number of studies focusing on pre-migration experiences and a number of factors of the migration process of new chinese migrants to australia (kee 1992; kee and skeldon 1994; coughlan 1996; viviani 1996; ho and coughlan 1997; coughlan 1998; harris and ryan 1998; sun 2002). an effort has been made to explore how tens of thousands of chinese students living in australia campaigned for their right to stay in the country after the june 4 event of 1989 (gao 2006, 2009). however, it is fairly evident that a large proportion of research publications in the field have focused on a range of settlement-related issues rather than other aspects of the migration process. the unbalanced research focus on settlement-related issues has blurred our understanding of the totality of migration experiences of the more recent chinese immigrants. one such neglected area has been the various forms of action that chinese asylum seekers have taken to confront a strong and persistent ‘culture of control’ that has dominated the immigration policy-making process and policy outcomes in australia (cronin 1993; jupp 2002; kneebone 2010). without taking into account of how the majority of new chinese immigrants have obtained their right to stay in australia, researchers have offered less reliable and less systematic explanations for analysing essential issues related to the chinese immigrant experience, such as their settlement pattern, identity, socio-political attitudes and behaviour and transnationality. this paper focuses on an understudied aspect, the political activism that the chinese asylum seekers have undertaken in their fight to gain refugee status in the courts in the post-white australia era, and outlines the key features of this political action. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 105 the tide of immigration litigation and the chan case australian society had undergone a decade of transformation from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, which was characterised by strong, widespread opposition to the vietnam war. the whitlam labor government was elected in 1972, and the new government decided to withdraw australian troops from vietnam while introducing a range of far-reaching changes domestically. one of the most important changes introduced by the new government was the abolition of the white australia policy. as a result, tens of thousands of non-white migrants from asia and the middle east were accepted as immigrants into australia throughout the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s, including refugees from vietnam. although the white australia policy was officially abandoned, the migration act 1958 still guided decisions, giving immigration official discretion over who was admitted into australia and who should be refused. the discretionary powers and executive decisions on entry and deportation remained unchallenged for most of the 1970s at the administrative level (cooney 1995; mcmillan 2002). as a consequence, a consensus emerged among immigrant advocates and legal professionals as to what role judicial review could play in assessing the legality of immigration decisions. two developments of the australian legal system in the late 1970s drastically changed the legal landscape in australia, resulting in ‘unabated expansion of immigration litigation’ in the words of john mcmillan, the current, and longest serving, commonwealth ombudsman of the country (2002, p. 17). the first of such developments was the establishment of the federal court of australia in 1976, which made new avenues available to any immigrant wishing to dispute an unfavourable administrative decision, and the second was the enactment of the administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977, which included a series of changes sympathetic to immigrants in terms of the chance for judicial review of adverse immigration decisions. the result of these changes was that the state logic of controlling immigration, especially its managerial procedures, started to be disputed in courts of law by disappointed asylum seekers or residency applicants. these extensive changes also caused an intense debate in australia since the early 1980s about its refugee and immigration policies and programs (betts 1988), making many australians either very compassionate or unsympathetic to immigrants. it was also in the 1980s that there was a substantial increase in arguments about whether many immigration-related rules were being correctly applied. this is why many australian legal professionals and immigrant advocates were also increasingly 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 aware that the judicial review introduced by the administrative decisions (judicial review) act 1977 needed to play a more active role than before in reviewing migration decisions (douglas 2006). at the same time, the culture of immigration control has become stronger and more sophisticated than before since the 1980s, shared by both sides of australian politics (jupp 2002, p. 63). this culture is deeply rooted in australian public opinion and politics, dating back to early colonial times. after more than a hundred years, it has developed a number of dimensions, ranging from general cultural constructions of immigrants or asylum-seekers, such as suspicion, and various ideological notions, to partisan political approaches, institutional measures and legal frameworks. historically, a unique dimension of australia’s culture of control was its focus on the chinese, and its resurgence in the post-white australia era is no different from its past. the increasingly large numbers of chinese over-stayers and onshore asylum seekers since the 1980s have been a direct reason for not only the resurgence of the culture, but also for its long durability. over the past decades, analysts of the immigration processes inside and outside the government system have constantly assessed who are to be the controllers, who are to be controlled, and how controls are to be exercised (cronin 1993). between 1989 and 1992, for example, the migration act had been amended 11 times, the regulations governing immigration programs had seen 58 amendments, and more than six major changes were made to the humanitarian and refugee programs, toughening the control over immigration intake, especially onshore applications for asylum (gao 2010). in such an unfavourable situation, many chinese asylum seekers have turned to the courts to fight against adverse executive decisions on their asylum applications. throughout the post-white australia period, chinese residency seekers have been the largest numerical group in the litigant population. although many of them were not successful in their appeals, some have won their cases, providing a legal basis for further chinese residency claims. it has to be admitted that although chinese residency seekers have been the largest numerical group in the litigant population, they were not the first group of immigration litigants in the post-white australia era. this was because chinese immigrants to australia in the late 1970s and early 1980s came mostly from the so-called ‘nanyang’ countries of southeast asia through a range of immigration programs and from vietnam as part of the boat people exodus of the time. in fact, more than a decade before australia cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 107 abandoned its white australia policy in 1974, the colombo plan that was launched in 1950 among commonwealth countries had brought thousands of students with ethnic chinese backgrounds into australian universities from various parts of southeast asia (oakman 2004). many of them stayed in australia after their studies or migrated back to australia after working in their sending countries for a short period. the first chinese litigant in the late 1970s was a student from hong kong, who applied to the administrative appeals tribunal (aat) in 1977 for review of the decision of the immigration department to deport him from australia (see chan and minister [1977] aata 19). the aat reviewed 12 immigration-related cases in 1978, and one of the litigants was clearly identified as being born in new zealand of chinese parents (see gin and minister [1978] aata 47). obviously, the number of immigration-related aat applications in 1978 was a sign of that not only were the chinese litigants not the first group of residency seekers to litigate against adverse executive decisions, but they also did not account for a big fraction of litigation cases in the late 1970s. in the first year of the 1980s, the aat reviewed only two immigration-related cases pursued by ethnic chinese. the first of these was from a singaporean family with ethnic chinese background (see ang and minister [1980] aata 15), while the other was from a person of ethnic chinese origin, who became frightened of being imprisoned in indonesia if being forced to return (see kuswardana and minister [1980] aata 63). in 1986, six immigration-related cases received by the federal court came from litigants who could be clearly identified as ethnic chinese (see sheng v minister [1986] fca 27; li v minister [1986] fca 68; meggs v minister [1986] fca 318 and soo v director [1986] fca 135). among these six cases, the federal court failed to note that two of them were actually from people with chinese background (see chua v minister [1986] fca 213 and tang v minister [1986] fca 214). as with cases brought to the aat, these six cases formed only a minority of the total 31 immigration litigation cases in the federal court of australia in 1986, but they indicated the beginning of a new period in australian immigration history in which more chinese residency claimants and asylum seekers chose to seek their right to stay in australia from the courts. these six federal court cases were of particular significance in studying the history of chinese immigration to australia, because they included the first application from a chinese mainlander to the australian courts. according to what was 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 recorded in li v minister (1986) fca 68, the litigant was from mainland china in 1982 and overstayed his entry permit in 1983. he took his case to the federal court in western australia to contest the decision of the immigration department to deport him from australia to china. this first legal action taken by a person from mainland china appeared to have confused legal professionals in australia, who did not even spell the litigant’s name accurately in the court documents. a similar situation arose in a case before the aat in 1985 for the reviewing of an executive decision made by the immigration department on the access of the applicant chan yee kin to documents relating to his own asylum application. although the name of chan yee kin was not spelt in the chinese official romanisation system, chan was in fact from mainland china. his name was spelt incorrectly as ‘chan yee kim’ in at least two aat documents (see chan and department [1985] aata 119 and chan and department [1985] aata 149). chan’s application to the aat was the very first step in his series of legal battles against the immigration department, which went to the high court in 1989, and became the landmark high court case of chan yee kin. chan’s story, as recorded in the court documents appeared to contain inconsistencies. he was born in 1951 in china. he appeared to grow up in a city in southern china, but it is difficult to explain how he became a red guard if his father was a member of the kuomintang (nationalist party), who escaped from china in 1950, but also was able to return to china from time to time. all these seem to suggest that he might grow up in a big city where his ‘anti-revolutionary’ family background was insignificant. australian immigration officials and judges also did not ask how he was able to become a red guard if he left school in 1965, an obvious contradiction to known facts that the maoist cultural revolution started in mid-1966. no question was asked by immigration officials and judges as to why he was detained by police in 1968 and listed in his local area as a person opposed to the government. according to courts records, chan yee kin escaped from china in 1974 to macau, and his father who was living in hong kong helped him obtain a temporary identity certificate in macau. chan then went to hong kong and stayed there unlawfully for years. having been unsuccessful in seeking legal resident status in hong kong, he was detained and then deported to macau, but he soon returned to hong kong illegally to seek an opportunity to board a ship to australia. chan entered australia illegally cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 109 in august 1980 according to a high court document, or in november 1980 according to a federal court file. from april 1982 to february 1983, he was detained in melbourne. in november 1982, chan started his extended legal battle to seek political asylum in australia. case officers from the immigration department first interviewed him in december 1982, and the determination of refugee status committee (dors) also considered his case in july 1983, but decided not to grant him refugee status. the chan case then went through a series of reviews. in november 1983, an internal review was conducted by the immigration department, which concluded that chan was not a refugee. his case was then reconsidered for a judicial review during 1985. in october of that year, the first review accepted the decision made by the immigration department. chan decided to seek another internal review by the immigration department. in june 1986, chan was once again interviewed by a case officer designated by the immigration department, through which he had his refugee application re-examined by the dors in august 1986. the dors once again concluded that chan was not a refugee, because his case contained no evidence proving a ‘well-founded’ fear of persecution, a key element of the refugee definition. at the same time while chan was coping with the above reviews, he formed a de facto relationship with a temporary entry permit holder from malaysia in 1984. the birth of their first child in april 1985 made his case more complicated than at the beginning. since april 1985, chan and his de facto partner had not only applied for australian residency individually, but their first child had also become a third party to each of their applications. in late 1986, one of their applications went to the federal court, where he received a favourable court ruling from mr keely, a federal court judge in chan v minister (1987) 14 ald 172, in which mr keely ruled that chan was entitled to be granted refugee status. the immigration department appealed soon after against the ruling to a full court of the federal court, which reversed keely’s judgment in july 1988 in minister v chan (1988) ald 751. having been denied refugee status five times within a span of five years, chan’s only choice after the full federal court was to take his case to the highest court in australia. in 1988, when chan was preparing his appeal to the high court of australia, there were not many onshore asylum seekers. it was also in the late 1980s that the collapse of the eastern bloc resulted in sweeping changes in international politics, one effect of which was that asylumseeking became much easier for people from certain countries including china. chan was 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 fortunate in having dragged his case out for so many years and from its continuing on into 1989, when the tiananmen incident occurred in china in june 1989. his application to the high court was heard before the tiananmen incident, but the ruling was delivered after, in september 1989. the high court not only ruled that the decision made by the immigration department on chan’s case was unreasonable, but it also considered the definition of ‘refugee’(crock 1998a, 2004; aronson and dyer 2000), and this had a major impact on the australian government’s decision on the 45,000 chinese nationals who were also seeking to stay in 1989. the high court’s ruling on the chan case was a big blow to the culture of immigration control. the decision had changed the interpretation of the refugee definition, a key point of which is that the definition would be satisfied if the fear of persecution has a reasonable basis in that there is a ‘real chance’ that the person could be in danger of persecution upon return to their home country (crock 1998b). the high court decision on the chan case also interpreted the meaning of the persecution, and expanded it to include any harm that could be considered offensive by ordinary people in australia. more controversially, the high court also rejected the argument that objective assessment of the ‘well-founded fear’ requires proof that the applicant would, in fact, be persecuted if returned to their country of origin. the high court decision on the chan case was perceived as a piece of good news by the chinese nationals who were seeking asylum in australia, and their reading of the decision was that they must demonstrate their subjective fear of persecution upon return to china first, before substantiating it with evidence. it was through the high court decision that more chinese nationals living in australia realised the extent to which australian elites understood chinese politics and the political behavior of chinese people. to test whether the principles established by the high court in the chan case were applicable to the so-called chinese student issue, five chinese students studying at the australian national university decided to take the immigration department to court after a lengthy consultation process with refugee activists and their lawyers. according to wei v minister [1991] fca 207; 29 fcr 455), these five students came to australia before june 1989 in order to pursue their postgraduate studies. they all applied for residency on humanitarian grounds, while four of them also submitted applications for cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 111 refugee status. but, they did not ask the court to reassess the merit of their cases, and instead, they sought judicial review with regard to the failure of the immigration department to make a decision on their humanitarian applications. this was once considered to be a very strategic action to seek judicial review of the immigration decision-making process first before taking any other legal action. the federal court in the australian capital territory (act) ruled against the immigration department in may 1991 on the basis of ‘bureaucratic delays’ in making decisions on the students’ applications for residency on humanitarian grounds. according to marion le, the lawyer who had assisted these five students, this particular federal court decision resulted in more than 2,000 chinese nationals of the 4,300 or so humanitarian applicants registered on and before 31 march 1990 being granted residency, which opened the door to the processing of some 20,000 others (diea 1994, p. 6; le 2001). because of the combined effects of the above two court decisions, the hawke labor government had no option but to start dealing with the protection demand from 45,000 or so chinese nationals who were living in australia. a special four-year temporary protection visa was legislated and offered to all those 45,000 chinese nationals. this large group of onshore residency seekers were finally allowed to stay permanently as a result of the keating labor government’s ‘1 november 1993 decisions’ and the howard government’s ‘13 june 1997 decisions’ (birrell 1994; dima 1997). the then labor minister for immigration, mr gerry hand, once estimated that if the spouses and children of these 45,000 chinese nationals were included, plus the effects of chain migration, ‘the original 17,000 chinese might increase to 300,000 by the turn of the century’ (jose 1995, p. 58). the intensified politics of residency the ‘1 november 1993 decisions’ resolved the problem of the so-called tiananmen group of chinese residency seekers, but generated significant pressure on many other chinese nationals who arrived in australia later and missed out the opportunity offered by the keating government. that is, the ‘1 november 1993 decisions’ had eventually intensified political efforts of many chinese political asylum claimants to seek residency in australia. seeking asylum in a foreign country is a kind of politics which requires a strategic approach and skills. to casual observers, the chain migration effects from the granting of residency to 45.000 students attracted many later arrivals from china, while student visa holders have become one of the main sources of on-shore immigration. in addition, more have also come 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 under the skilled and business permit programs. what has been ignored is the fact that, among the chinese who have obtained australian residency since 1993 when the student issue of 1989 was resolved, there is also a large number who have been allowed to stay because of many court battles over their asylum claims. the chinese nationals’ efforts to harness resources to seek their chance to stay in australia in the post-1993 years were once described as ‘baxian guohai’ (the eight immortals crossing the sea), a well-known taoist story about how the eight immortals were crossing the sea because of their special skills. of course, as the legend goes, this particular saying has its second half, ending with ‘gexian qineng’ (each showing his or her special prowess). one peculiar ‘prowess’ that new chinese residency claimants or asylum seekers have utilised after 1993 and 1994 is to litigate against unfavourable executive decisions on their asylum applications on every possible front, ranging from immigration-related procedural issues to more complicated issues based upon socio-political and ideological differences between the west and china. the latter includes political opinions, china’s controversial one-child policy, ethnic conflicts, same-sex relationships, religious activities including house or underground churches, the falun gong, and even corruption-related claims. obviously, many of the grounds on which asylum claims were based are closely linked to the refugee definition, and are political in essence, forming a new feature in their campaign to stay in australia. earlier cases of litigation pursued by the post-tiananmen group of onshore chinese asylum seekers took place in 1993 and 1994, when the immigration department was solving the chinese student issue. those who missed out on the chance provided by the ‘1 november 1993 decisions’ began taking legal action to seek their right to stay and their actions were often taken without any clear strategic thinking or focus. the attention of many court cases focused narrowly on procedural issues, as in zhang v minister (1993) 118 alr 165, and li v minister (1994) 35 ald 557. attention was so focused on procedural issues that the second high court ruling on immigration litigation involving chinese asylum seekers in the postwhite period was made in minister v wu (1996) hca 6. in this case the high court commented on the approach to be adopted by lower courts when scrutinising a statement of reasons. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 113 in the aftermath of the so-called chinese student issue, which remains the largest onshore migration intake in australian history (gao 2009), and also in response to a number of boat arrivals in 1992 (khoo et al. 2008), the level of public acceptance of immigrants and refugees appeared to have waned in australia in the early 1990s (jones 2003). evidence for this is to be found in the introduction of mandatory detention laws in 1992, a bipartisan support to the culture of immigration control. another increase in boat arrivals and subsequent asylum claims in 1993 and 1994 not only resulted in more strict policies to deal with irregular migration (schloenhardt 2000), but also in a low public acceptance of asylum seekers. as a result, more chinese asylum seekers not only had to seek their chance to stay in australia from the courts, but also to politicise their claims. also because court battles were becoming difficult to win, various legal actions taken by chinese litigants from the mid-1990s appeared more strategic. the first strategic theme in the intensified legal actions was the utilisation of china’s controversial one-child policy as grounds to apply for political asylum (crock 1995). such an effort was first reported in minister v respondents (1994) alr 383, in which a young chinese couple won their application in the federal court. this case was a turning point in the asylum-seeking strategies of chinese litigants. after this case, china’s fertility control policy has been used in seven high court challenges, more than 200 federal court applications, about 40 aat appeals, over 100 immigration review tribunal applications before 1999. since 1999, there have been approximately 430 migration review tribunal applications, and about 1,200 refugee review tribunal (rrt) cases. the successful utilisation of china’s fertility control policy by chinese nationals in seeking asylum in australia caused public outcry (poynder 1995). urgent political actions were taken by australian policy-makers to revise immigration laws and limit refugee claims related to the fertility control policy (betts 1997). while more legal elites were under the influence of the resurgent culture of control, some one-child-policy-related applications, such as guo v minister (1995) ald 38, were rejected in 1995. in the same year, the abovementioned minister v respondents (1994) alr 383 was also overturned by the full federal court in minister v a (1995) alr 48, in which, the court held in favour of the immigration department, finding that litigants who feared forced sterilisation did not constitute a ‘particular social group’ for refugee status. this particular decision was upheld by the high court in a v minister (1997) hca 4, which led the emergence of a new feature in their 114 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 political asylum claims and court actions, characterised by an emphasis on a membership of a ‘particular social group’. the resurgent culture of control over immigration issues resulted in a series of changes to the strategy of chinese residency claimants. the first strategic change was the inclusion of the ‘black children’, or unregistered children who were born outside the birth-control plan (sackville 2004), into new asylum applications, which proved to be useful in several cases, such as in chen v minister, bc9802287. ‘black children’ were accepted as a type of social group as indicated in the refugee definition (marsic 2000), and this was subsequently confirmed by the high court in chen v minister (2000) hca 19 and s v minister (2004) hca 25. since then, the reasons chinese asylum seekers utilised for seeking refugee status were seen to have been adjusted, paying more attention to other crucial, or highly politicised, elements of the refugee definition than ‘a particular social group’ and ‘political opinion’, the last two components of the definition (black 1991). more cases were based on race and religion, the first two elements of the refugee definition, a closer fit with the socio-political and ideological differences between china and the west than had been used in earlier cases. these strategic changes resulted in a large number of new claims based on ethnic conflict issues in china, such as in fu v minister (1996) fca 1416, ming v minister (1998) fca 534, li v minister (1999) fca 779, and underground religious activities or house churches in china as in chen v minister (1996) fca 1398, li v minister (1997) fca 289, chen v minister (1997) fca 511, and lin v minister (1999) fca 573. the notion of ‘particular social group’ was still in use, but was found to have included homosexuals after several cases were won from 1994 to 1996 such as in guo v minister (1998) fca 1592, (walker 1996). the concept was also extended to the people who were the targets of china’s anti-corruption campaigns, such as in cai v minister (1997) fca 1219, xu v minister (1997) fca 1173, and zheng v minister (2000) fca 670. aside from the religion-related cases, which will be analysed next because their links to the latterly emerged falun gong issue, ethnic issues, homosexuals, and people targeted by china’s anti-corruption campaigns have formed the basis of many claims since the second half of the 1990s, and each ground for claim has been used many times. in 1993, the rrt reviewed only two ethnicity-related applications from ethnic chinese litigants, but the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 115 number of cases increased to 76 in 1994, 91 in 1995 155 in 1996 and 228 in 1998. at the same time, more chinese litigants also tried to base their asylum claims on multiple grounds. as a key feature of their litigation, this tactic was used in one of the earlier court cases such as c v minister (1995) fca 1164 that was based on three grounds: china’s fertility control policy, and forced sterilisation and its effect on christian beliefs. the same approach was also used by the litigant in the aforementioned lin v minister (1999) fca 573, which included religious beliefs, the fertility control policy and litigant’s involvement in the democratic movement of 1989 and the anti-corruption campaign in his home region. as mentioned, there has been an ongoing effort by chinese asylum seekers to base their claims on religion-related grounds since the mid 1990s, which has intensified since the falun gong was banned in china in 1999 (perry 2001). the number of such claims has been so large that chinese litigants appear to believe that religious activities are the best ground for seeking asylum. this type of claim fits well into the political-ideological gap between china and the west, and it therefore appears easy to convince case officers or tribunal members. religion-related claims were first made when china’s fertility control policy was no longer helpful in seeking asylum in australia. yet, a large number of earlier religion-based applications seemed effortless, simply declaring that the applicant had a fear of being persecuted in china for religious beliefs. according to federal court records, christian beliefs were first used in c v minister (1995) fca 1164 and chen v minister (1996) fca 1398, catholic beliefs were first mentioned in chen v minister (1997) fca 511, while the first case concerning protestant beliefs appeared later, in 2000 in wang v minister (2000) fca 511. as recorded in li v minister (1997) fca 289, one chinese litigant even made a claim based on both christian and buddhist practices. the online databases of austlii (the australian legal information institute) have recorded thousands of religion-based cases being pursued by chinese asylum seekers and reviewed by the rrt, with only less than 10 percent of that number going to the federal court for review. as of 10 july 2010, the rrt online database records 1,481 chinese litigation cases based on catholicism-related claims, but the federal court database recorded only 96 mentions of catholicism. among those 1,481 rrt review cases, there were three in 1993, 119 in 1994, 169 in 1995, 192 in 1996, 149 in 1997, 188 in 1998 and 104 in 1999. also as of 10 july 2010, the rrt database records 2,392 chinese litigation cases mentioning the broader concept of 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 christianity. among these, 11 cases were reviewed in 1993, 183 in 1994, 226 in 1995, 243 in 1996, 279 in 1997, 334 in 1998 and 160 in 1999. the same database has 1,231 cases pursued by the chinese referring to both christianity and catholicism, among there were only three review cases in 1994, 109 in 1994, 132 in 1995, 144 in 1996, 115 in 1997, 142 in 1998 and 87 in 1999. there are also 1,165 chinese litigation cases mentioning protestant beliefs, which was first made in v93/00002 (1993) rrta 29 in 1993, but only 30 federal court cases and 36 federal magistrates court cases were based on the same ground. muslim or islam was mentioned in 1,529 rrt cases involving chinese litigants while 51 such cases were reviewed by the federal court. among 1,529 rrt muslimor islam-related cases, there were only two cases in 1993, 35 in 1994, 137 in 1995, 164 in 1996, 234 in 1997, 205 in 1998 and 100 in 1999. these types of case have been so common that the high court of australia was once again asked to rule whether certain procedures are lawful in minister v wang (2003) hca 11, and minister v szkti (2009) hca 30. as indicated by the above figures, the year 1999 saw a decline in the number of review cases across all conventional religion-based application categories. however, 1999 also saw a significant increase in the number of falun gong-based claims, which has maintained a high level of utilisation of litigation by chinese asylum seekers in seeking residency in australia throughout the decade of the 2000s. a detailed review of court documents show that a couple of years before 1999, when the falun gong became a new topic of international politics, some refugee tribunal members and judges in australia seemed to have realised that certain religious practices are allowed in china. some chinese official publications that were normally regarded by many westerners as chinese propaganda materials were cited in more court documents to prove that some religious practices are not punishable in china. the banning of the falun gong in 1999 by the chinese government (perry 2001) created a new ground on which asylum could be sought in some western countries including australia. it was also in 1999 that the federal magistrates court was established in order to provide a simple alternative to litigation in the federal court. since then, the federal magistrates court has received 1,140 or so falun gong-related cases in the first ten years of its history, while 1,016 falun gong-based review cases went to the rrt and 539 of them were reviewed by the federal court. the rrt received and reviewed four falun gong-based asylum applications in 1999, and the number had then increased to 46 in 2000, 90 in 2001, 84 in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 117 2002, 118 in 2003, and 75 in 2004. since 2004, falun gong-related cases have been reviewed by the federal magistrates court, which started with 45 in 2004 and then increased to 161 in 2005, 207 in 2006, 357 in 2007, 245 in 2008 and 121 in 2009. all these claims have further demonstrated that the asylum-seeking process, asylum-related litigation in particular, is a type of politics that many chinese asylum seekers have actively engaged in the past two or so decades. the politics of this kind has added a number of thousand new cases into the already large group of chinese litigants seeking asylum in australia. conclusion this has been an examination of how thousands of chinese asylum seekers have taken legal actions in the australian courts as part of their efforts to stay in the country. in the postwhite australia period, chinese migrants were in fact not the first group of immigration litigants, nor were there many of them seeking their right to stay in australia from the courts in the earlier years of the period. since the landmark high court decision on the chan case, however, thousands of chinese have brought cases in the australian courts in their efforts to seek residency in the country. according to the 1986 census, australia had only 200,000 or so people claiming primary and secondary chinese ancestry (kee 1992). after the ‘1 november 1993 decisions’, the 1996 census recorded that speakers of ‘the chinese varieties’ totalled 343,523 people (clyne and kipp 1999), roughly the same number as the then labor minister for immigration, mr gerry hand, had estimated if each of 45,000 chinese nationals brought in one spouse and one child. according to the 2001 census, the number of chinese speakers had increased to 401,357, with 555,560 claiming chinese ancestry (chan 2005), proving that gerry hand’s prediction of having 300,000 chinese by the turn of the century was correct (jose 1995, p. 58). in 2006, the number of australian residents claiming to be of chinese ancestry rose to 669,900 (abs 2007), with more than 500,000 chinese language speakers. based 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(ed.), new perspectives on gender and migration: livelihood, rights and entitlements. routledge, london, pp. 103-138. poynder, n. 1995, ‘recent implementation of the refugee convention in australia and the law of accommodation to international human rights treaties’, australian journal of human rights, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 75-90. rolls, e. c. 1992, sojourners: the epic story of china’s centuries-old relationship with australia, university of queensland press, brisbane. sackville, r. 2004, ‘refugee law: the shifting balance’, sydney law review, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 37-50. schloenhardt, a. 2000, 'australia and the boat-people: 25 years of unauthorised arrivals', university of new south wales law journal, vol 23, no. 3, pp. 33-55. sun, w.n. 2002, leaving china: media, migration, and transnational imagination, rowman & littlefield, lanham. viviani, n. 1996, the indo-chinese in australia 1975-1995: from burnt boats to barbecues, oxford university press, melbourne. walker, k. 1996, ‘the importance of being out: sexuality and refugee status’, sydney law review, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 568-597. australian society had undergone a decade of transformation from the late 1960s to the early 1970s, which was characterised by strong, widespread opposition to the vietnam war. the whitlam labor government was elected in 1972, and the new government d... two developments of the australian legal system in the late 1970s drastically changed the legal landscape in australia, resulting in ‘unabated expansion of immigration litigation’ in the words of john mcmillan, the current, and longest serving, common... at the same time, the culture of immigration control has become stronger and more sophisticated than before since the 1980s, shared by both sides of australian politics (jupp 2002, p. 63). this culture is deeply rooted in australian public opinion and... throughout the post-white australia period, chinese residency seekers have been the largest numerical group in the litigant population. although many of them were not successful in their appeals, some have won their cases, providing a legal basis for ... the first chinese litigant in the late 1970s was a student from hong kong, who applied to the administrative appeals tribunal (aat) in 1977 for review of the decision of the immigration department to deport him from australia (see chan and minister [1... in 1986, six immigration-related cases received by the federal court came from litigants who could be clearly identified as ethnic chinese (see sheng v minister [1986] fca 27; li v minister [1986] fca 68; meggs v minister [1986] fca 318 and soo v dire... a similar situation arose in a case before the aat in 1985 for the reviewing of an executive decision made by the immigration department on the access of the applicant chan yee kin to documents relating to his own asylum application. although the name... chan’s application to the aat was the very first step in his series of legal battles against the immigration department, which went to the high court in 1989, and became the landmark high court case of chan yee kin. chan’s story, as recorded in the co... in november 1982, chan started his extended legal battle to seek political asylum in australia. case officers from the immigration department first interviewed him in december 1982, and the determination of refugee status committee (dors) also conside... having been denied refugee status five times within a span of five years, chan’s only choice after the full federal court was to take his case to the highest court in australia. in 1988, when chan was preparing his appeal to the high court of australi... the high court’s ruling on the chan case was a big blow to the culture of immigration control. the decision had changed the interpretation of the refugee definition, a key point of which is that the definition would be satisfied if the fear of persecu... the high court decision on the chan case was perceived as a piece of good news by the chinese nationals who were seeking asylum in australia, and their reading of the decision was that they must demonstrate their subjective fear of persecution upon re... according to wei v minister [1991] fca 207; 29 fcr 455), these five students came to australia before june 1989 in order to pursue their postgraduate studies. they all applied for residency on humanitarian grounds, while four of them also submitted ap... because of the combined effects of the above two court decisions, the hawke labor government had no option but to start dealing with the protection demand from 45,000 or so chinese nationals who were living in australia. a special four-year temporary ... the intensified politics of residency the ‘1 november 1993 decisions’ resolved the problem of the so-called tiananmen group of chinese residency seekers, but generated significant pressure on many other chinese nationals who arrived in australia later and missed out the opportunity offere... the chinese nationals’ efforts to harness resources to seek their chance to stay in australia in the post-1993 years were once described as ‘baxian guohai’ (the eight immortals crossing the sea), a well-known taoist story about how the eight immortals... earlier cases of litigation pursued by the post-tiananmen group of onshore chinese asylum seekers took place in 1993 and 1994, when the immigration department was solving the chinese student issue. those who missed out on the chance provided by the ‘1... in the aftermath of the so-called chinese student issue, which remains the largest onshore migration intake in australian history (gao 2009), and also in response to a number of boat arrivals in 1992 (khoo et al. 2008), the level of public acceptance ... the successful utilisation of china’s fertility control policy by chinese nationals in seeking asylum in australia caused public outcry (poynder 1995). urgent political actions were taken by australian policy-makers to revise immigration laws and limi... the resurgent culture of control over immigration issues resulted in a series of changes to the strategy of chinese residency claimants. the first strategic change was the inclusion of the ‘black children’, or unregistered children who were born outsi... these strategic changes resulted in a large number of new claims based on ethnic conflict issues in china, such as in fu v minister (1996) fca 1416, ming v minister (1998) fca 534, li v minister (1999) fca 779, and underground religious activities or ... aside from the religion-related cases, which will be analysed next because their links to the latterly emerged falun gong issue, ethnic issues, homosexuals, and people targeted by china’s anti-corruption campaigns have formed the basis of many claims ... as mentioned, there has been an ongoing effort by chinese asylum seekers to base their claims on religion-related grounds since the mid 1990s, which has intensified since the falun gong was banned in china in 1999 (perry 2001). the number of such clai... the online databases of austlii (the australian legal information institute) have recorded thousands of religion-based cases being pursued by chinese asylum seekers and reviewed by the rrt, with only less than 10 percent of that number going to the fe... as indicated by the above figures, the year 1999 saw a decline in the number of review cases across all conventional religion-based application categories. however, 1999 also saw a significant increase in the number of falun gong-based claims, which h... it was also in 1999 that the federal magistrates court was established in order to provide a simple alternative to litigation in the federal court. since then, the federal magistrates court has received 1,140 or so falun gong-related cases in the firs... conclusion this has been an examination of how thousands of chinese asylum seekers have taken legal actions in the australian courts as part of their efforts to stay in the country. in the post-white 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(ed.), new perspectives on gender and migration: livelihood, rights and entitlements. routledge, london, pp. 103-138. poynder, n. 1995, ‘recent implementation of the refugee convention in australia and the law of accommodation to international human rights treaties’, australian journal of human rights, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 75-90. rolls, e. c. 1992, sojourners: the epic story of china’s centuries-old relationship with australia, university of queensland press, brisbane. sackville, r. 2004, ‘refugee law: the shifting balance’, sydney law review, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 37-50. schloenhardt, a. 2000, 'australia and the boat-people: 25 years of unauthorised arrivals', university of new south wales law journal, vol 23, no. 3, pp. 33-55. sun, w.n. 2002, leaving china: media, migration, and transnational imagination, rowman & littlefield, lanham. viviani, n. 1996, the indo-chinese in australia 1975-1995: from burnt boats to barbecues, oxford university press, melbourne. walker, k. 1996, ‘the importance of being out: sexuality and refugee status’, sydney law review, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 568-597. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 39 ethnicity and public space in the city: ethnic precincts in sydney jock collins and patrick kunz abstract ethnic precincts demonstrate how cultural diversity shapes public spaces. they are clusters of ethnic entrepreneurs who line the precinct streets selling food, goods or services in areas designated as ethnic precincts by local government officials who fund makeovers of public spaces to display ethnic iconography and symbolism to promote the area based on the ‘ethnic’ experience. ethnic precincts are a key site of production and consumption of the ethnic economy, a commodification of place where the symbolic economy of space is constructed on representations of ethnicity and ‘immigrantness’. to explore how ethnic diversity shapes public space we present findings of recent fieldwork in four sydney precincts. we examine the complex relationship between immigrant entrepreneurs, local government and ethnic community representatives in shaping the emergence and development of ethnic precincts and demonstrate how perceptions of the authenticity of ethnic precincts vary according to whether customers are ‘co-ethnic’, ‘co-cultural’ or ‘others’. introduction increasing rates of permanent and temporary immigration (castles and miller, 2003) mean that immigrant minorities are reshaping the built environment of urban neighborhoods and streetscapes of the cities in their host society where they settle. the increasing importance of cultural landscapes of tourism (urry, 2002; selby, 2004) and of the way that cosmopolitan cities generate diversity and excitement (florida, 2003, p. 227) and tolerance of difference that give cities a creative edge (florida, 2005, p. 6) have given increasing importance to the issue of the commodification of ethnic diversity in the city. in discussing the ‘symbolic economy’, zukin (1995) points to the role of ethnic diversity in shaping place and space, and then relates this to a tendency to commodify cosmopolitan lifestyles and turn them into a vital resource for the prosperity and growth of cities. this involves what maccannell (1999, 1973) calls a ‘reconstructed ethnicity’ 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 and a ‘staged authenticity’ or the consumption of signs, symbols, festivals and spectacles used in creating aestheticized spaces of entertainment and pleasure to create a symbolic economy (zukin, 1995, pp. 3-11). ethnic precincts are one example of the spatial dimensions of the commodification of ethnic diversity in cities (rath ed., 2006). ethnic precincts are places in the city that combine both private and public spaces and where the cultural and symbolic economy gain prominence shaped by the interaction of producers (ethnic entrepreneurs), consumers and the critical infrastructure (regulators, community leaders, critics, placemarketers) (zukin, 1995). the private spaces are those of the ethnic and other entrepreneurs that exist in the forms of restaurants, cafes, shops and other businesses that are the main attractor of people to the ethnic precinct. the public spaces are the streets, footpaths, malls, squares, pedestrian thoroughfares and transport nodes outside the private businesses in the ethnic precinct. they have been developed to include ethnic iconography, symbols and design to reflect the ethnicity of the precinct, a public spatial form of the commodification of ethnicity. ethnic precincts are thus compelling sites to explore the relationship between ethnic diversity and public space in the city and the contradictions that emerge. this article reflects on recent research conducted in 2004 and 2005 in four ethnic precincts chinatown, little italy, auburn (little turkey) and cabramatta (‘vietnamatta’) in sydney, australia’s largest and most multicultural city (collins and castillo, 1998; burnley, 2001). in each of the ethnic precincts we consulted with five community leaders cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 41 and local government representatives and five ethnic entrepreneurs. we also surveyed 50 consumers (50 per cent female), approaching every third passerby. the structure of the paper is as follows. the next section reviews the interdisciplinary literature on ethnicity and place in cities. the following one presents an introduction to the four sydney ethnic precincts that were the sites of the fieldwork reported here. the remainder of the paper contains a section on each ethnic precinct before a brief conclusion of the main themes of this article. points of departure as a consequence of immigration, most cities in australia, and cities in many other western countries, have become cosmopolitan cities that are home to people from a wide range of ethnic backgrounds. in australia’s two largest cities of sydney (collins and castillo, 1998) and melbourne (collins et al., 2000), for example, over half of the population today are firstand second-generation immigrants who come from a very wide range of different ethnic backgrounds (burnley, 2001). in north america, cities such as new york, los angeles, chicago, toronto, vancouver and montreal have very large and diverse immigrant populations, as have european cities such as london and paris. in these cosmopolitan cities ethnic diversity shapes public space in a number of direct and indirect ways. first, immigrant settlement patterns lead to ethnic concentrations in different suburbs of the city. in some cities ethnic communities are highly concentrated across the whole city, such as cubans in miami (wilson and martin, 1982), or highly concentrated in certain areas of the city such as the ethnic chinese in richmond 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 vancouver (hiebert and ley, 2003)). in cities like sydney, new york, london and toronto most residential areas are in fact very culturally-diverse, the home to a large number of firstand second-generation immigrants from diverse ethnic backgrounds rather than one specific ethnic group (burnley, 2001). the public places and spaces in these cities develop a multicultural character, with different ethnic groups often vying for influence and representation. second, when immigrant entrepreneurs cluster together in a street, suburb or area, an ethnic precinct may emerge (waldinger et al., 1990; light and rosenstein, 1995; collins et al., 1995; light and gold, 2000; rath ed., 2000; kloosterman and rath eds, 2003). the emergence of ethnic precincts in the city is a long-established feature of many immigrant cities in north america and australia, with chinatowns an almost universal form of this ethnicized place in contemporary western cities (anderson, 1990, 1991; zhou, 1992; kinkead, 1993; fong, 1994; fitzgerald, 1997; lin, 1998). other ethnic precincts such as little italy (conforti, 1996), ‘little india’ (mcevoy, 2003; chang, 2000), ‘little bavaria’ (frenkel and walton, 2000), ‘little sweden’ (schnell, 2003) and ‘finntowns’ (timothy, 2002) have emerged across many continents. a key feature of these ethnic precincts is the provision of ethnic food and ethnic restaurants (warde, 1997; warde and martens, 2000; gabaccia, 1998), while most ethnic precincts are also sites where ethnic community organisations are located and their activities, including ethnic festivals, are staged. ethnic precincts are fundamentally contradictory sites (collins, 2006). first, there is the problem of the credibility and authenticity of the ethnic precincts, which involves who is cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 43 ‘authorized’ to claim authenticity, how that authenticity is symbolized and what employees and employers in ethnic enterprises have to do to generate that authenticity. second, how legitimate can a precinct be in the eyes of the co-ethnic community, other locals and tourists if it has been developed by deliberate regulation, planning and government intervention? third, there is the problem of control and the ways that crime in ethnic precincts threatens the safety of the ethnic tourist experience. the spatial dimensions of immigrant entrepreneurship are in turn shaped by regimes of regulation from local, provincial and national authorities (hoffman, fainstein and judd (eds.) 2003). these regulators make the urban planning decisions to confer on a part of the city an ethnic character and decide the way that this is represented in the public spaces of streetscapes and pedestrian malls and squares where monuments and other ethnic iconography are installed to demonstrate the ethnic character of that place. this planning process involves consultations with ethnic entrepreneurs and the local ethnic community leaders. in addition to city planners, place marketers, tourist guides and food and culture critics and local ethnic community organisations what zukin (1995, 1998) calls the critical infrastructure of the symbolic economy play a role of simultaneously advertising and promoting ethnic precincts and cultural diversity in the city in a way that maximizes the appeal to locals and tourists alike (halter, 2000; selby, 2004). the major symbolic representation of the urban ethnic precinct is ethnicity and ethnic diversity. yet what constitutes such an ‘authentic’ ethnic tourism experience within the city? what symbols are appropriate, who decides, and how? there is a fundamental 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 contradiction here emerging from the coincidence of outdated ethnocultural stereotypes and tourist iconography in countries of immigration that usually depict a static homogeneity of immigrant or ethnic experience and the dynamic diversity of contemporary life in countries of immigrant origin. as fainstein, hoffman, and judd, (2003, p. 246) put it: “the tension between differentiation and homogeneity makes for a contradiction and conflict in urban tourism regimes.” the problem with the concept of authenticity when applied to the ethnic economy is that it is subjective (cohen, 1988; maccannell, 1973). thus, what constitutes an ‘authentic’ ethnic or cultural eating or tourist experience could vary according to the different standpoints of those who participate in the daily life of the ethnic precinct. as meethan (2001, p. 27) has put it, symbols “are multivocal, that is, they have the capacity to carry a range of different, if not ambiguous and contradictory meanings”. meethan (2001) reminds us that authenticity is a matter of negotiation and ascribed meaning. one of the critical parts of an ethnic precinct is its outer façade. what constitutes an authentic chinese/italian/vietnamese place and how do you develop it? bryman (2004, p. 52) refers to the centrality of theming in contemporary consumption places and the contradictions inherent in such theming attempts. critics of theming often disapprove of the use of symbols of nostalgia for thematic cues. drawing on faux designs and histories, theming in terms of nostalgic references is often depicted as presenting a sanitized history, one that removes any reference to hardship and conflict in the cause of consumption. the processes by which the public façade of ethnic precincts is developed, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 45 the authenticity of these ethnic precincts and the contradictions that emerge are explored in the rest of this article by a study of ethnic precincts in sydney. ethnic precincts in sydney sydney is one of the most cosmopolitan cities in the world today (collins and castillo, 1998; connell, 2000), with 58 per cent of the population of four million either firstor second-generation immigrants. sydney’s downtown has a prominent and long-established chinatown, although most of sydney’s other ethnic precincts are located in the suburbs of southwestern sydney. sydney’s ethnic precincts include leichhardt (little italy), campsie (little korea), petersham (portuguese) and marrickville (once greek, now vietnamese) and ashfield (chinese) in sydney’s inner-southwestern suburban ring. in the middle-southwestern suburban ring, ethnic precincts include auburn (turkish quarter), lakemba and punchbowl (‘middle eastern’) and bankstown (asian and middle eastern). cabramatta, in the fairfield municipality, is even further from the city center and has become an asiatown (burnley, 2001). for the sake of brevity, only the ethnic precincts of chinatown, little italy, auburn and cabramatta will be explored in any detail in this article. areas become ethnic precincts because of the ethnicity of the entrepreneurs who own the businesses in the area and/or through patterns of immigrant settlement. in long established ethnic precincts such as little italy and chinatown there is a history of italian and chinese immigrant settlement and of immigrant entrepreneurs remaining long after subsequent waves of italian and chinese immigrants moved out to other parts of sydney. 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 in newly emerging ethnic precincts such as auburn and cabramatta the presence of large numbers of turkish and vietnamese immigrants and entrepreneurs is also a critical factor to their emergence. however, the presence of immigrant settlers and entrepreneurs is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of ethnic precincts: it is also necessary for regulatory authorities to promote the area as an ethnic precinct and to further develop and encourage an ‘ethnic feel’ to the area by promoting ethnic signage in the public spaces of the precinct and holding ethnic festivals there. the focus in this article is on the public space of the ethnic precinct, that is, the footpaths, pedestrian malls, public squares and other spaces at streetscape level. in addition to the infrastructure developed in these ethnic precincts – the signage, symbols and motifs of ethnic culture it is the ethnic enterprises at street level that give the area its ethnic character. in chinatown, little italy, auburn and cabramatta the common feature is the overwhelming concentration of ethnic entrepreneurs who own and operate enterprises at this street level, predominantly involved in food and retail activities. above this level ethnic entrepreneurs still predominate, but are more likely to be professionals providing health, legal and commercial services. this in turn attracts ‘co-ethnic’ customers to the precinct, adding to the ethnic character of the passing parade of the street crowd. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 47 table 1. concentration of ethnic entrepreneurs in street level business enterprises in each ethnic precinct precinct ethnicity of entrepreneurs per cent of all entrepreneurs in the precinct chinatown chinese 89 australian 5 little italy italian 91 australian 4 little turkey turkish 78 chinese 14 vietnamatta vietnamese 86 chinese 10 source: fieldwork 2004-05 methodology a mix of quantitative and qualitative methodologies was employed in designing the fieldwork for this investigation of sydney’s ethnic precincts. the research instruments involved the fieldwork in the four case studies of sydney’s ethnic precincts were in-depth interviews with five immigrant entrepreneurs (producers) and five members of the critical infrastructure in each ethnic precinct and a survey of consumers fifty customers in each precinct. in addition, a door-to-door visit of all the enterprises in each ethnic precinct was used to determine the ethnicity of the owners of the precinct’s enterprises. by member of the critical infrastructure we meant that the person was involved in the cultural tourism industry as a representative of a body, institution, organisation or enterprise and who influenced, directly or indirectly, the ethnic precinct as a whole or the goods or services available in the ethnic precinct. by producer we mean an ethnic entrepreneur who was owner-manager of at least one urban tourism industry organisation or enterprise that was 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 located within the boundaries of the ethnic precinct and who supplied, directly or indirectly, products or services demanded by cultural urban tourists,. five immigrant entrepreneurs (producers) and five members of the critical infrastructure were selected for interview in each ethnic precinct using a two stage purposive sample. in each ethnic precinct we contacted 25 producers and 10 members of the critical infrastructure, drawn from a number of sources, including networks, websites and local directories. these were sent e-mail invitations to participate in the research project. this was followed by a telephone call eight weeks later. this netted fifty-four producers and thirty five critical infrastructure members who were willing to take part in the research. from these, the sample was selected, with all the female respondents included because fewer females responded positively to our call. consumers were interviewed in the streets of the ethnic precinct. they were selected by way of purposive random sampling. a random number of 1 to 5 was selected prior to going into the field and the nth passing consumer was approached for an interview. this led to a survey of 50 consumers in each ethnic precinct (see tables 2, 3, 4 and 5). chinatown sydney’s chinatown has existed in the downtown area of the city since the 1860s. in the 1940s chinatown moved to campbell and dixon streets where it is still located today (collins and castillo, 1998, pp. 278-289; fitzgerald, 1997). chinatown is a residential and commercial center of chinese settlement in sydney. today, as table 1 shows, 89 per cent of the enterprises in the chinatown precinct are owned by chinese entrepreneurs cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 49 while an increasing number of ethnic chinese are living in or nearby the chinatown precinct in high-rise apartment blocks that have been developed in the past decade. chinatown has been promoted as a precinct through a series of attempts by state and local government and the chinese community to put the ethnic chinese mark more firmly on this city space. the sydney city council has played a key role in the planning and funding of a number of makeovers of chinatown over the years, including: the redevelopment of dixon street in 1972 by introducing portico, lanterns, and trash bins with ‘traditional’ chinese symbols; development of a pedestrian thoroughfare in dixon street; the erection of chinese dragons and the planting of chinese trees along the streetscape in the 1980s; and linking chinatown to the new darling harbour development via a chinese gardens in the 1990s (fitzgerald, 1997). chinatown is also the site where all major festivals on the chinese calendar are celebrated, including the largest chinese new year celebrations held outside china. it is interesting to note that the poster advertising the 2006 chinese new year festival featured, on the advice of the chinese consultative committee, not dragons, lions, arches or chinese characters – as might be expected by westerners but rather two cartoon doll-like figures of contemporary chinese popular culture, once again highlighting the contradictory meanings of the symbols of ethnicity. the sydney city council is currently planning for a new makeover of the public spaces and areas of chinatown in consultation with ethnic chinese community leaders and entrepreneurs. but is chinatown an authentic representation of chinese-ness? anderson 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 (1990, p. 150) argues that sydney’s chinatown has been revitalized in ways that reflect white australia’s image of chinese-ness: “making the area more ‘chinese’…[meant] making the area appear more consistent with the architectural motifs and symbols of ancient china.” in other words, attempts by the sydney city council to ‘create’ a chinatown in an image that would attract tourists have resulted in façades, monuments and facelifts reflecting stereotypical images of a homogeneous ‘chineseness’ that exists only in the ‘white gaze’, an argument also made about chinatowns in new york (lin, 1998, p. 173) and vancouver (anderson, 1991). but consultation with the chinese community in sydney is selective: there are over 100 different ethnic chinese community organizations in sydney. an interesting anecdote that emerged during our fieldwork highlights some of these issues. one of the previous attempts at chinese theming of the chinatown precinct relates to the erection of a sculpture titled golden water mouth at footpath level which was designed by artist lin li, using a 200-year-old dead gum tree lined in gold on its top half, out of which water flows and trickles down. this is clearly designed to reflect the early chinese history of settlement during the australian gold rush of the 1850s: as the plaque on the sculpture states, it “celebrates contemporary life and the historic character of chinatown. australian and chinese cultures are signaled in the combination of materials creating a ying-yang harmony using traditional chinese principles of feng shui”. however the chair of the chinese consultative committee established by the sydney city council argues that a dead tree with water (money) flowing out is bad feng shui. another chinese informant who runs walking tours of chinatown for tourists disagrees, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 51 suggesting that the sculpture is authentically chinese, confirming meethan’s (2001, p. 27) argument about the multivocal, ambiguous and contradictory meanings that symbols of ethnicity carry. in order to explore these contradictory meanings of reconstructing chinese ethnicity in chinatown’s public spaces we conducted interviews with passers-by – consumers and customers who were locals or tourists – on the streets of chinatown. we found significant differences in terms of what aspects of chinatown conveyed a sense of authenticity between those visitors/customers who were co-ethnics (that is, ethnic chinese) compared to those who were non-chinese asians (who we call co-cultural) and the rest, that is, other non-asian immigrant minorities and the majority anglo-celtic community (who we call others). co-ethnic customers were generally critical of the streetscape revitalization efforts, which they considered to be kitschy [not a word that they used], and, at times, inauthentic and offensive. as one chinese customer surveyed put it, “it’s [highly visible chinese iconography in the precinct] like fully eww [sic]” (id ct.c.38). on the other hand, co-cultural consumers were largely indifferent to the ethnic theming and façade of the precinct. in contrast, other consumers were strongly attracted to chinatown because of the highly visible ethnic façade and feel of the precinct itself: the lions, arches and lanterns and the chinese characters on the restaurant façades were considered tasteful and authentic, although they preferred that the signage in the precinct also be in english. they were also attracted by the large number of apparently chinese (co-ethnic) customers in the public thoroughfares of the precinct. as a corollary, we also found that the co-ethnic consumers often accused these other customers of gawking at them as if they, like the 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 other elements of the chinatown façade, were on display as one of the ‘exotic sights’ of chinatown. this angered them a great deal. for example, a chinese female surveyed said: “well, you have these people [other consumers] looking and looking at you [it]... is so rude (id ct.c.40). another female ethnic chinese consumer put it another way: “i think they [other consumers] come here [chinatown] with expectations to see all things chinese, that includes us [co-ethnic individuals]” (id ct.c.44). this evokes images of lin’s (1998, pp. 174-76) account of how middle-class new yorkers in the 1880s liked “to go slumming in chinatown”, riding in “rubbernecker vehicles” (also known as ‘gape wagons’), with the term rubbernecker (for a gawking tourist) entering into american parlance during this era. the other consumers, in response, steadfastly refuted the corresponding claims of gawking and countered that the co-ethnic consumers were being overly sensitive. the chinese entrepreneurs we consulted also reported a difference between their coethnic, co-cultural and other customers. co-ethnic consumers were deemed excessively price sensitive. as one chinese entrepreneur who ran a premium gift shop put it, “it’s bloody nauseating sometimes, neh, neh, neh [sic], [co-ethnic customers are] like kids, big kids, over any increase [in prices]. they’ve [co-ethnic customers] got a lot of cheek, really…it’s only because i’m chinese. they reckon “ah, he’s a chinese, i’m chinese, i can get a discount” (id ct.p.2a). co-cultural consumers in each precinct were also respectively seen as price sensitive, though to a lesser degree than co-ethnic consumers; while other consumers were consistently regarded the least price sensitive of all consumers and were prepared to pay premium prices for products and/or services because cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 53 of their ‘uniqueness’. as a chinese male owner-manage of a supermarket put it “we have this tea [chinese tea and]…they [other consumers] come in [and say] ‘wow, special tea’…i charge…double sometimes, and they’re happy to pay” (ic ct.p.5a). the chinese entrepreneurs occasionally found other consumers to be rude and/or condescending, or arrogant, but were prepared to put up with this because of the increased income potential of other consumer patronage. little italy italian immigrants and italian entrepreneurs have a strong history of settlement in leichhardt, which is an inner-western suburb 6 kilometers from the central business district (cbd) (collins, 1992). italian entrepreneurs in leichhardt date from 1885 when fishmonger angelo pomabello and the fruiterers bongiorno brothers opened a fruit shop on parramatta road (collins and castillo, 1998, p. 158). leichhardt was the center of post-war italian immigrant settlement in the 1950s and 1960s, but moved to middleand outer-ring suburbs in later decades. by 2001 there were only 5 per cent of leichhardt’s population who were born in italy. but the italian entrepreneurial presence had been retained and expanded. today leichhardt, especially along norton street, with its outdoor cafes, restaurants and delicatessens reminiscent of roman street scenes, has maintained its definite italian feel. burnley (2001, p. 171) lists 325 italian-owned businesses in leichhardt and neighboring five dock, including 33 restaurants, 18 cafes, 13 butchers and 11 pasticceria). as table 1 shows, 91 per cent of the street-level enterprises in the little italy precinct are owned by first and second generation italians. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 the leichhardt municipal council has been critical in the development of the italian façade in the public places of little italy, providing funds for a series of ‘facial makeovers’ of the area. this involved developing wider footpaths for outside tables to produce the feel of the ‘alfresco’ italian eating experience – permitted after a change in food regulations by the nsw state government in the mid 1980s and encouraging italian entrepreneurs to redevelop their restaurants to add upstairs balconies. leichhardt council approved and promoted the development of the italian forum, financed by the late italian immigrant millionaire, franco belgiorno-nettis, comprising of a large residential and commercial development that recreates the italian village feel complete with four floors of residences with juliet balconies overlooking and encircling a large piazza where the tables of italian restaurants had room to spread out under the stars. the forum even featured a clock tower, wandering italian musicians and a central fountain. the council also sponsors the annual norton street festival when the street is closed and lavishly decorated and cars are replaced by food and market stalls decorated in the green, red and white italian colors, attracting over 100,000 people a year (collins and castillo, 1998, p. 169). despite the population loss, little italy is more vibrant and more ‘italian’ in look, feel, smell and taste than ever, especially along norton street. as with the chinatown precinct, other visitors to little italy were attracted to it because of the promise of the authentic italian experience: the noise and bustle of italian families walking arm-in-arm along the footpaths, gelatos in hand; the smells of italian restaurants owned by italian entrepreneurs serving “authentic” italian food; drinking cappuccinos at italian cafe tables on the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 55 footpath watching the passing parade to the noise and fumes of the hot cars driven be preening, macho italian young men revving up and down norton street. the co-ethnic visitors to little italy go there regularly, often driving many kilometers from their place of residence to visit italian accountants, legal and medical professionals, to meet relatives and friends over a meal and an espresso. they celebrate the rise or fall of the azzuri with noise and emotion along norton street, where the streets were closed to traffic during the 2006 world cup final, but are not overly attracted by its italianate façade. they did not report concerns on ‘gawking’ expressed by co-ethnics in chinatown. vietnamatta cabramatta is a suburban ‘asia town’ in sydney’s western suburbs 45 kilometers from the city center. many vietnamese residents arrived as refugees from the vietnam war and had been ethnic chinese business owners or supporters of the south during the war. they moved to the low-rent residential properties in the cabramatta area from the local migrant hostel that provided settlement services and accommodation for new humanitarian arrivals (vivianni, 1984). the vietnamese-born, who comprise 32 per cent of cabramatta’s population, are one of the largest of these immigrant groups, which led to the unofficial and racialised name of vietnamatta for the cabramatta area by critics of asian immigration in the 1980s (collins, 1991, pp. 66-69). along john street, which runs along the western side of cabramatta railway station, a vibrant ethnic precinct has emerged with over 820 ethnic businesses and institutions (burnley, 2001, p. 252). the owners of these businesses were vietnamese (particularly 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 ethnic chinese vietnamese), other chinese, laotians, cambodians and residual italians, croatians and serbs. today, as table 1 shows, 86 per cent of the enterprises in the cabramatta precinct are vietnamese-born immigrants, while another 10 per cent are chinese-born immigrants. as in the case of chinatown and little italy, there has been an attempt by local and state policy makers, the regulators (hoffman, fainstein and judd (eds.) 2003), to redevelop the cabramatta shopping precinct to attract more customers and visitors from outside the area. in the early 1980s, the cabramatta chamber of commerce – which at that time had no vietnamese entrepreneurs on it received a grant of au$20,000 from the fairfield city council to develop a plaza area along john street. in the late 1980s, another campaign, ‘the start-up for cabramatta campaign’, was introduced with a brief to “change unfavorable images, to promote the acceptance of the indo-chinese community and foster multicultural activities such as the fan festival, the dragon boat race, an international cabaret and ‘good eating’” (burnley, 2001, p. 248). the unfavorable image was due to cabramatta’s growing reputation as an unsafe area – in 1988-89 there were 15 murders in the area and one of sydney’s heroin centers (burnley, 2001, p. 248). this is the contradiction between ethnic precincts as places to see and experience the exotic on the one hand and the fear for safety that comes with a criminalization of immigrant minorities on the other (collins, 2006; poynting et al., 2004). urban planning for the cabramatta precinct thus includes developing the ethnic façade of public places in the area while at the same time planning for increased policing cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 57 and surveillance. in 1991 a new pailau chinese gateway to cabramatta’s freedom plaza was opened and nine bronze and stone sculptures erected, including two guarding lion sculptures (burnley, 2001, p. 250). at the same time the nsw state government responded by increasing policing in the area, including police foot-patrols, and the installing cctv cameras in the main public thoroughfares of the precinct. unlike chinatown and little italy, co-ethnic customers in vietnamatta were more likely to be local residents, although many vietnamese also travel from other parts of western sydney to the precinct to eat and shop at businesses owned by vietnamese entrepreneurs and to socialize and use services provided by vietnamese immigrant professionals. like the chinatown experience, co-ethnics in vietnamatta reported resentment at the gawking by other customers in the precinct and were not really attracted by the ethnic make-over of the precinct which they often thought ‘kitschy’. co-cultural customers in the precinct were largely indifferent to the ethnic façade of the precinct and were attracted because they lived in the area and/or wanted to make use of the vietnamese-owned enterprises there and the authentic goods and services that they provided. the other customers were attracted to the precinct by the place-marketing promise of ‘a day in asia’, the ethnic iconography of the public spaces in the area and the exotic food and shopping available there. they were not too concerned who owned the businesses, as long as they looked, smelt and felt authentic. the vietnamese entrepreneurs we consulted complained at not being consulted adequately by the local council in makeovers of the area but, paradoxically, argued that 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 they were too busy to spend time away from the business for such consultations. they were more concerned about solving issues of adequate parking in the area and about crime than they were about the need for more investment in ‘asian’ iconography in the public spaces of the precinct. none belonged to ethnic or local entrepreneur associations and were more likely to view their co-ethnic entrepreneurs in cabramatta as competitors than co-operators. the vietnamese entrepreneurs thought that co-ethnic and co-cultural customers were too price-sensitive while other consumers were more likely to happily pay more for their meals or goods. as in the other ethnic precincts, the local government authorities promote ethnicity in cabramatta, and the broader fairfield city of which it is a part. the fairfield city council also invests funds in the place-marketing of the area. given the ethnic diversity of the cabramatta and fairfield population, cabramatta is promoted by local government authorities as a multicultural precinct rather than a vietnamese precinct. a glossy brochure targeting visitors to the city and invites tourists thus: “cabramatta is a day trip to asia… here, an hour from the center of sydney, is an explosion of asian color a bustling marketplace offering all the ingredients for a banquet for the senses”. but unlike chinatown or little italy, local authorities have not promoted an official title for the precinct. vietnamatta has, by default, been the name most commonly used in public and private discourses. local expert guides accompany visitors on a walk through cabramatta, helping build an appreciation for the various types of asian products sold there. more recently the fairfield city council launched a ‘multicultural driving tour’ with a cd and map directing tourists to the ethnic sites and features of cabramatta. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 59 eleven of the fifteen sites pictured are churches, temples, monasteries and a mosque, highlighting the significance of the impact of ethnic communities in shaping the built environment in general and the role of religious buildings in particular in imprinting ethnic diversity on the public spaces of multicultural suburbs like cabramatta in particular. cabramatta also is the site of a number of ethnic festivals related to the chinese, vietnamese and other ethnic calendars, with the local authorities playing a prominent role in co-ordinating and promoting these festivals in consultation with local ethnic community organisations. little turkey auburn is 20 kilometers to the west of the cbd on the same western railway line that runs through cabramatta. up until the 1970s auburn was a white working-class suburb of predominantly australian-born or anglo-celtic immigrants. in the past three decades – that is, much later than the other precincts – immigrant minorities began to move into the area. it has thus escaped the attention of those interested in ethnic entrepreneur research. like cabramatta, auburn is an ethnoburb with a multicultural population. the turkishborn compromise only 7 per cent of auburn’s population, but as table 1 shows, 78 per cent of the enterprises in the auburn precinct are turkish-born immigrants, while another 14 per cent are chinese-born immigrants. auburn is different from the previous three ethnic precincts in that it is a newly emerging precinct and, like cabramatta, has not been formally marketed or promoted as ‘little turkey’. the auburn council does promote multicultural festivals and has contributed to some ethnic landscaping of the public spaces in auburn, though in a much more limited sense than the other ethnic precincts. 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 as in the other ethnic precincts discussed in this article, the other consumers or visitors to auburn were most responsive to the proposal for the more formal development of a little turkey precinct in the area, while co-ethnics were more ambivalent and complained that the turkish community has not been sufficiently consulted about the development of the ethnic precinct. indeed, co-ethnic consumers in little turkey praised local council’s streetscape revitalization efforts and organizing of festivals precisely because it did not over-promote a highly visible turkish feel to the wider ethnic precinct. turkish and other ethnic entrepreneurs in auburn were more concerned about issues of crime and parking in the precinct. they mentioned young black african males congregating in groups of five to ten along auburn road, particularly at night, criticizing both local council and local police for allowing the problem to develop unchecked. local council refused to place ‘no loitering’ signs around the ethnic precinct, and local police rarely intervened, directly, to force the groups to move on. relations between these turkish entrepreneurs were more competitive than co-operative. conclusions this paper has investigated the way that ethnicity shapes public spaces in four ethnic precincts in sydney, two long established (chinatown and little italy) and two emerging vietnamatta and little turkey). it demonstrates the critical role of immigrant entrepreneurs (kloosterman and rath eds, 2003) in the emergence of the ethnic economy (light and gold, 2000) in general and ethnic precincts (rath ed., 2006) in particular in the cosmopolitan city. in each precinct the immigrant population was very diverse – they cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 61 were multicultural suburbs but the business enterprises were dominated by the immigrant groups who comprised around 80 per cent or more of all entrepreneurs in the precinct, even though this ethnic group, with the exception of cabramatta, comprised less than 10 per cent of the population. zukin (1995) stressed the importance of the interaction of producers (ethnic entrepreneurs), consumers, and the critical infrastructure (regulators, community leaders, critics, place-marketers) in the emergence of the cultural and symbolic economy. we have demonstrated how this interaction is critical to an understanding of the emergence of ethnic precincts in sydney, and explored the inherent contradictions, though we have utilised a narrower interpretation of the critical infrastructure than zukin envisages with our focus on regulators and ethnic community leaders. more research is needed to investigate the role of cultural critics and place marketers in developing knowledge of and a taste for, literally and figuratively, minority ethnic places in the minds of the majority of other ethnic groups in the city. in the earlier sections of this article we noted in the international literature that perceptions of the authenticity of such attempts to reconstruct ethnicity (maccannell, 1999, 1973) and ethnic theming were subjective, multivocal and sometimes contradictory, particularly in relation to chinatown (anderson, 1990, 1991), highlighting the contradiction of authenticity in ethnic precincts (collins, 2006). this was confirmed by the surveys of consumers not only in chinatown but in the other precincts as well where we found very different consumer responses to, and attitudes about, the 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 commodification of ethnicity in the ethnic precinct depending on the consumer’s ethnicity, a point not sufficiently appreciated by zukin (1995). in this paper we have attempted to sketch the different ways co-ethnic, co-cultural and other consumers view ethnic authenticity in the ethnic precinct. put simply, it is the other consumers who are most attracted to the fabrication of the ethnic precinct, though they requested dual language signage to guide them through the precinct. co-ethnic customers were generally critical of the streetscape revitalization efforts that were thought to be kitschy, inauthentic and offensive, highlighting the contradiction of the legitimacy of ethnic precinct (collins, 2006). co-ethnic consumers often accused other consumers of gawking, a central contradiction of the ethnic precinct where the change of experiencing the ‘exotic other’ is what is marketed. but we are also aware that these constructs of consumer difference are not in themselves homogenous. as demonstrated by the anecdote about the golden water mouth sculpture in chinatown, not all co-ethnics agree in this regard. similarly, the ‘cocultural’ and ‘other’ consumer constructs clearly need more probing as they incorporate such a broad range of ethnic backgrounds and social classes and do not distinguish between tourists (national and international) and locals, with further research needed to unpack these groupings. in this article we drew on responses from only five immigrant entrepreneurs in each precinct, so that results about their role in the development of the public spaces of ethnic precincts are only suggestive and require further investigation. however, even such a small sample suggests that co-ethnic entrepreneurs in each precinct were more often in conflict and competition with each other than they were a united force, rarely cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 63 communicating with one other and rarely finding time to consult with local authorities about the makeover of the public spaces of the precinct. these ethnic entrepreneurs were more concerned about problems of crime and safety (collins, 2006) and parking in the precinct than on the development of an ethnic streetscape. the ethnic entrepreneurs also distinguished between different groups of customers: they saw co-ethnic customers as too price sensitive and other consumers as being sometimes rude, condescending and arrogant. local and provincial government authorities or regulators (hoffman, fainstein and judd (eds.) 2003) play a critical role in the emergence and development of the ethnic feel and look of the public spaces of each ethnic precinct: in all cases they planned for and funded ethnic makeovers of public spaces in the precinct in consultation more with ethnic community organisations than ethnic entrepreneurs who were often too busy to take part in consultations. the streets of the ethnic precincts were also the sites of a number of annual ethnic festivals, adding another dimension of ethnic reputation of the precinct. however, their urban planning sometimes resulted in inauthentic ethnic makeovers which often lacked legitimacy in the eyes of ethnic 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cambridge university press, cambridge. wilson, k. & martin, w. a., 1982, ‘ethnic enclaves: a comparison of the cuban and black economies in miami’, american journal of sociology, vol. 88, pp. 135-168. zhou, m. 1992, chinatown: the socioeconomic potential of an urban enclave, temple university press philadelphia. 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 zukin, s. 1995, the cultures of cities, blackwell, oxford. zukin, s. 1998, ‘urban lifestyles: diversity and standardization in spaces of consumption’, urban studies, vol. 35, nos.5-6, pp. 825-839. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 67 table 2 chinatown sample id gender country of birth ct.p.1a / ct.p.1b male china ct.p.2a / ct.p.2b male china ct.p.3a / ct.p.3b male china ct.p.4a / ct.p.4b female china ct.p.5a / ct.p.5b male china o-m chinese hairdresser o-m chinese supermarket p type o-m chinese restaurant o-m chinese premium gift shop o-m china-oriented travel agency id gender country of birth origin gender number %t ct.c.1 female malta regional male 25 50% ct.c.2 female australia regional female 25 50% ct.c.3 female china regional total 50 100% ct.c.4 male china local ct.c.5 male australia regional country of birth number %t ct.c.6 female new zealand international australia 14 28% ct.c.7 female canada international china 10 20% ct.c.8 male indonesia local indonesia 4 8% ct.c.9 male china regional hong kong 3 6% ct.c.10 male hong kong local canada 2 4% ct.c.11 male china local ireland 2 4% ct.c.12 female hong kong local italy 2 4% ct.c.13 male australia regional new zealand 2 4% ct.c.14 male indonesia local sri lanka 2 4% ct.c.15 female sri lanka regional luxembourg 1 2% ct.c.16 male sri lanka regional malta 1 2% ct.c.17 male new zealand regional poland 1 2% ct.c.18 female australia regional portugal 1 2% ct.c.19 female australia regional russia 1 2% ct.c.20 male russia regional sweden 1 2% ct.c.21 female ireland international switzerland 1 2% ct.c.22 male indonesia local taiwan 1 2% ct.c.23 female italy international usa 1 2% ct.c.24 female switzerland regional total 50 100% ct.c.25 female australia national ct.c.26 male canada international origin number %t ct.c.27 male ireland international local 11 22% ct.c.28 female usa international regional 26 52% ct.c.29 male australia regional national 2 4% ct.c.30 female sweden international international 11 22% ct.c.31 female australia national total 50 100% ct.c.32 male china regional ct.c.33 female poland regional ct.c.34 male taiwan regional ct.c.35 female italy international ct.c.36 female hong kong regional ct.c.37 male china local ct.c.38 female china regional ct.c.39 female australia regional ct.c.40 female china local ct.c.41 male indonesia international ct.c.42 male australia regional ct.c.43 male china regional ct.c.44 female china local ct.c.45 male australia local ct.c.46 female australia regional ct.c.47 male portugal regional ct.c.48 male australia regional ct.c.49 female australia regional ct.c.50 male luxembourg international id gender country of birth ct.cim.1a / ct.cim.1b male hong kong ct.cim.2a / ct.cim.2b female australia ct.cim.3a / ct.cim.3b male china ct.cim.4a / ct.cim.4b female australia ct.cim.5a / ct.cim.5b female china state tourism body representative public ct promoter local council representative chinese community group representative cim type chinese ethnic media representative 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 table 3 little italy sample id gender country of birth li.p.1a / li.p.1b male italy li.p.2a / li.p.2b male italy li.p.3a / li.p.3b male italy li.p.4a / li.p.4b male italy li.p.5a / li.p.5b male italy p type o-m italian restaurant o-m italian café o-m italian café o-m italy-oriented travel agency o-m italian bar id gender country of birth origin gender number %t li.c.1 female new zealand national male 27 54% li.c.2 male australia local female 23 46% li.c.3 female united kingdom international total 50 100% li.c.4 female canada international li.c.5 male united kingdom regional country of birth number %t li.c.6 male australia local australia 13 26% li.c.7 male australia regional italy 8 16% li.c.8 male malaysia local united kingdom 8 16% li.c.9 male italy international indonesia 3 6% li.c.10 female indonesia local malaysia 3 6% li.c.11 male singapore international new zealand 3 6% li.c.12 female fiji local canada 2 4% li.c.13 male united kingdom international china 2 4% li.c.14 female malaysia local ireland 2 4% li.c.15 male italy local brazil 1 2% li.c.16 male china international fiji 1 2% li.c.17 male china local greece 1 2% li.c.18 female australia national india 1 2% li.c.19 male italy local japan 1 2% li.c.20 male japan local singapore 1 2% li.c.21 female canada international total 50 100% li.c.22 male brazil local li.c.23 female malaysia regional origin number %t li.c.24 male new zealand regional local 28 56% li.c.25 female australia local regional 10 20% li.c.26 male united kingdom local national 3 6% li.c.27 female ireland local international 9 18% li.c.28 female united kingdom international total 50 100% li.c.29 female united kingdom international li.c.30 female new zealand local li.c.31 female italy regional li.c.32 male italy local li.c.33 female united kingdom regional li.c.34 female australia regional li.c.35 male ireland regional li.c.36 female australia local li.c.37 female united kingdom local li.c.38 female greece local li.c.39 male indonesia local li.c.40 male australia local li.c.41 male india local li.c.42 male australia national li.c.43 male australia local li.c.44 male australia local li.c.45 female indonesia local li.c.46 female italy local li.c.47 male australia local li.c.48 male italy regional li.c.49 female australia regional li.c.50 male italy local id gender country of birth li.cim.1a / li.cim.1b male italy li.cim.2a / li.cim.2b male australia li.cim.3a / li.cim.3b male australia li.cim.4a / li.cim.4b male australia li.cim.5a / li.cim.5b female australia note: both interviews with the 'australian male 'italian welfare association representative'' (id. li.cim.2a/li.cim.2b) saw an associate of the latter in attendance, also. the primary researcher's interaction with this additional individual was very limited in each of the two interviews. cim type italian ethnic media representative italian welfare association representative local retail o/e center representative local o/e association representative local council representative cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 69 id gender country of birth v.p.1a / v.p.1b male vietnam v.p.2a / v.p.2b female vietnam v.p.3a / v.p.3b female vietnam v.p.4a / v.p.4b male vietnam v.p.5a / v.p.5b male vietnam o-m vietnamese restaurant o-m vietnam-oriented travel agency o-m vietnam-oriented travel agency o-m vietnamese supermarket p type o-m vietnamese restaurant table 4 vietnamatta sample id gender country of birth origin gender number %t v.c.1 male australia local male 23 46% v.c.2 female usa international female 27 54% v.c.3 male italy regional total 50 100% v.c.4 female australia local v.c.5 male vietnam local country of birth number %t v.c.6 female india regional australia 17 34% v.c.7 male greece local vietnam 9 18% v.c.8 female italy local china 3 6% v.c.9 male italy local italy 3 6% v.c.10 male macedonia local malaysia 3 6% v.c.11 female china local macedonia 2 4% v.c.12 female vietnam local new zealand 2 4% v.c.13 female denmark international cambodia 1 2% v.c.14 female malaysia international denmark 1 2% v.c.15 female australia regional france 1 2% v.c.16 female australia local greece 1 2% v.c.17 male france international hungary 1 2% v.c.18 female macedonia local india 1 2% v.c.19 male australia local indonesia 1 2% v.c.20 female australia local philippines 1 2% v.c.21 female vietnam local south africa 1 2% v.c.22 male china local south korea 1 2% v.c.23 female new zealand international usa 1 2% v.c.24 male vietnam local total 50 100% v.c.25 male australia local v.c.26 female australia regional origin number %t v.c.27 female australia local local 33 66% v.c.28 female australia national regional 10 20% v.c.29 female australia local national 1 2% v.c.30 male south korea local international 6 12% v.c.31 male vietnam local total 50 100% v.c.32 male vietnam local v.c.33 male australia local v.c.34 male malaysia international v.c.35 male australia local v.c.36 female vietnam regional v.c.37 female new zealand local v.c.38 male hungary local v.c.39 female australia regional v.c.40 female china regional v.c.41 male philippines regional v.c.42 male malaysia local v.c.43 male indonesia local v.c.44 male cambodia local v.c.45 female australia local v.c.46 female australia regional v.c.47 male south africa local v.c.48 female australia local v.c.49 female vietnam regional v.c.50 female vietnam local id gender country of birth v.cim.1a / v.cim.1b female india v.cim.2a / v.cim.2b male vietnam v.cim.3a / v.cim.3b male china v.cim.4a / v.cim.4b male australia v.cim.5a / v.cim.5b male vietnam cim type private v promoter vietnamese ethnic media representative asian community group representative local o/e association representative local council representative 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 table 5 little turkey sample id gender country of birth lt.p.1a / lt.p.1b female turkey lt.p.2a / lt.p.2b male turkey lt.p.3a / lt.p.3b male turkey lt.p.4a / lt.p.4b male turkey lt.p.5a / lt.p.5b male turkey p type o-m turkish hairdresser o-m turkish café o-m turkish café o-m turkey-oriented travel agency o-m turkish bakery id gender country of birth origin gender number %t lt.c.1 female singapore local male 20 40% lt.c.2 female croatia local female 30 60% lt.c.3 female india local total 50 100% lt.c.4 male australia regional lt.c.5 female turkey local country of birth number %t lt.c.6 male germany local australia 17 34% lt.c.7 female indonesia regional turkey 8 16% lt.c.8 male australia local lebanon 4 8% lt.c.9 male turkey local india 3 6% lt.c.10 male turkey local singapore 3 6% lt.c.11 male south korea local south korea 2 4% lt.c.12 female australia local austria 1 2% lt.c.13 male singapore regional china 1 2% lt.c.14 female austria local croatia 1 2% lt.c.15 female philippines regional egypt 1 2% lt.c.16 male australia local germany 1 2% lt.c.17 male egypt local indonesia 1 2% lt.c.18 female australia local italy 1 2% lt.c.19 female australia local norway 1 2% lt.c.20 female turkey regional pakistan 1 2% lt.c.21 female australia local philippines 1 2% lt.c.22 female lebanon local qatar 1 2% lt.c.23 female pakistan local south africa 1 2% lt.c.24 male south africa regional united kingdom 1 2% lt.c.25 male australia regional total 50 100% lt.c.26 male india local lt.c.27 female turkey local origin number %t lt.c.28 female australia regional local 32 64% lt.c.29 female australia local regional 15 30% lt.c.30 female australia regional national 2 4% lt.c.31 male turkey regional international 1 2% lt.c.32 female norway regional total 50 100% lt.c.33 female singapore regional lt.c.34 female australia regional lt.c.35 female qatar international lt.c.36 female australia local lt.c.37 female china local lt.c.38 female turkey local lt.c.39 male australia local lt.c.40 female south korea local lt.c.41 male australia local lt.c.42 male australia national lt.c.43 female lebanon local lt.c.44 male lebanon regional lt.c.45 male australia regional lt.c.46 female italy local lt.c.47 male india local lt.c.48 female turkey local lt.c.49 male lebanon local lt.c.50 female united kingdom national id gender country of birth lt.cim.1a / lt.cim.1b female china lt.cim.2a / lt.cim.2b male turkey lt.cim.3a / lt.cim.3b male turkey lt.cim.4a / lt.cim.4b male turkey lt.cim.5a / lt.cim.5b male australia note: both interviews with the 'turkish male 'turkish ethnic media representative'' (id. lt.cim.4a/lt.cim.4b) saw an associate of the latter in attendance, also. the primary researcher's interaction with this additional individual was very limited in each of the two interviews. turkish community group representative turkish o/e association representative turkish ethnic media representative immigrant o/e assistance group representative cim type local council representative introduction points of departure ethnic precincts in sydney chinese chinatown little italy vietnamatta little turkey conclusions 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia dangerous narratives: politics, lies and ghost stories louise katz university of sydney abstract narratives that resonate in the cultural imagination inform the ways in which we apprehend the world. this paper considers how certain images and stories that have been valorised over time bleed into reality and become socially and politically affective. if misrecognised or unacknowledged, an entire people may come to be viewed as monstrous, or their identity rendered down until they seem more ghostly than human. i will deal specifically with how jewishness and arabness have been imagined, so that in quite different contexts these peoples come to be apprehended as liminal rather than human beings. from the traditional anti-semitic perspective the jew is viewed – by the dominant culture within which he or she co-exists – as a vampiristic agent of decay. also discussed is how, in contemporary israel/palestine, the arab presence becomes – for certain parts of the jewish population – ghostly, or monstrous. this dynamic implicates both the coloniser and colonised; indeed, at work here is a congeries of interrelationships, far more complex than the traditional self/other dichotomy. i will also consider the liminal zone wherein such fantastical images have their source, because it is through imagination and storytelling that we continually create and recreate the realities we must then inhabit. introduction the practice of interpreting and commenting on real events through metaphor or narrative is used across the arts, philosophy and social sciences. it is a creative process of envisioning and revisioning events and people, and it involves engagement with liminal territory, a mental space that opens up between imagining, and the production of a concept. that is, ideas which can become solidified in reality are a product of the imagination, which according to seventeenth century oxford philosopher, robert fludd, is a kind of world in itself that it is inhabited by the likenesses or ‘shadows’ of forms found in ‘reality’ (cited in warner, 2002). a fissure, or a crack opens between the material world into a liminal space that may be read as akin to other spaces from two particular mythical traditions: the judaic shekhina and the islamic na koja abad. these are mythic spaces, real metaphorically and affective in ‘reality’, and both are seen as connecting the quotidian and the spiritual realms. in mundus imaginalis, islamic scholar henri corbin (1964) characterises na koja abad as ‘imaginal’ space – it has no material value, yet it is real and may link oppositional realities. sometimes these oppositions are conceived as world and self, or self and activity, or perhaps as self and other. we might speculate upon the possibility that fludd’s fissure and corbin’s ‘imaginal’ is liminal territory where destructive or creative ideas, as yet unformed, percolate. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 21 the term ‘liminality’ is problematic, as it has become a sort of academic buzzword to describe a fugal state of being and is used in philosophy and in disciplines ranging across the social sciences, from anthropology to medicine, psychology, politics and the arts.1 it is not my purpose here to engage in a study of the many permutations of this concept; but three perspectives are useful in this essay. one relates to foucault’s heterotopia theory, which directly informs discussion of the political situation in israel/palestine to follow. the second is the anthropological perspective of arnold van gennep (1960), further developed by victor turner (1967), which provides a starting point and useful description of the liminal as fertile ground from which ideas and images germinate. very briefly: van gennep (1960, pp. 74-75) outlined phases of initiation in tribal cultures. during the marginal phase of initiation (which occurs between separation from the group and eventual reintegration) the initiand, or liminar, is neither what he nor she once was, nor yet what they will be. the condition is characterised by ambivalence; it is this that makes this imaginal space the hub of both personal and cultural change: between oppositional poles is the ground of creativity, of individuation, or of possible reconciliation – and also the space for the creation of monsters. gilhus (1984, p.107) asserts in her ‘study in liminal symbolism’ that ‘liminality is basically characterised by being without structure, but is the source and seedbed of positive structural assertions’. i would suggest that liminality is not inflected with morality, but can also become the source of negative structural assertions. it may be akin to the process by which actual people become infused with an otherworldly aspect of darkly imaginative associations born of real or perceived cultural fears (jewish vampire), or if denied a proper social place; that is, unrecognised as a valid social participant, one’s ‘reality’ may become so compromised that one becomes a spectral figure (palestinian ghost). but a human being is not a ghost; indeed, as pierre bourdieu writes in pascalian meditations, ‘there is no worse dispossession, no worse privation, perhaps, than that of the losers in the symbolic struggle for recognition,’ (cited in hage 2003 p. 78). i will discuss how one so dispossessed may resort to violent actions, so that the spectre may in time come to be seen instead as a monster. a third permutation of the liminal is the ‘fourth world’ imagined by dave eggers (2004, pp. 140-141). in his novel you shall know our velocity, he describes a zone where we go to 1 see for example: ‘receiving shadows: governance and liminality in the night-time economy’, an article in the british journal of sociology; a book chapter, ‘the street as liminal space’; and a discussion of the ‘liminal relationship between nonsense and philosophy’ concerning the philosophy of lewis carroll. 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 ‘create the things that will happen’. alongside the initiand’s liminal zone in which gnosis ‘is communicated through myths … and through actions’ (gilhus 1984 p. 107), and na koja abad and the shekhina, egger’s fictive illustration is also useful when considering how the things we imagine, or the stories we tell, create realities. it is here in the ‘pre-real’ fourth world that images and stories with cultural resonance – and therefore the power to endure and proliferate – have their source. western mythic imagery has its own particular glamour and stink, demonic and daemonic vigour, evident in folk stories, in fairy tales, myths and in religion. marina warner’s (2004, p.1) early studies of myth and of faerie explore ‘the pleasures – and the terrors – of … night visitors, watchers and stalkers, werewolves and other kinds of nursery phantom who excite that deep pleasure – the visceral shiver and mental plunge’. for warner, that fascination with ‘divine daimons’ and the territory they inhabit endures beyond childhood, and it is unlikely that she is the only one for whom this is so. i will discuss the way in which certain images from the cultural imaginarium – a culturally specific version, if you will, of the broader notion of an imaginal or liminal zone – find correspondences in the popular imagination, with real people in the real world. these can sometimes result in what might be termed ‘narratives of denial’, where people who represent ‘undesirable’ social elements become imbued with a level of unreality, become like the initiand, or like those non-corporeal denizens of this in-between space: liminal beings. people envisioned in this way may be banished to the social periphery because they are perceived to present a threat to the mainstream. to be marginalised is to be relegated to a condition of only partial reality; making of a woman or a man a kind of ghostly trace of a person. by a further act of imagination, the marginal, already an object of fear may then become imbued with a nightmare aspect. how palestinians become ghosts and jews vampires will be illustrated by reference to other stories; for, as richard devetak (2005, p. 622) asserts in his article, ‘the gothic scene of international relations: ghosts, monsters, terror and the sublime after september 11’, it would be wrong to exclude fiction from the study of international relations, as fictions ‘have a long history in political discourse, from plato’s cave through hobbes’s state of nature to rawl’s original position’. as well as myths and other narrative sources, i will refer to a story steeped in gothic paranoia, bram stoker’s dracula, and to a work of literary fiction that may also be read as a metanarrative for current struggles endured by the people of israel/palestine cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 23 – black box, by israeli author, amos oz. palestinian and jew may, in their different contexts, be read as the liminal other who requires validation, but must remain separate or be somehow controlled in order to preserve social or political stability. further, i will show how the ‘mainstream’ draws from or attains some level of self-justification from the mystery – or mystification – of the other. one might say that in some sense we feed off the body of the scapegoat; we drink the blood of the monster in an act of ‘reverse vampirism’. and we do this through the medium of the story – either inventive fiction, or lies born out of narratives of denial. jew as vampire the vampire might be a denizen of robert fludd’s ‘other world’. he is also easily appreciated as a kind of personified jungian shadow, in that he represents that which civilised humanity prefers to keep hidden. the vampire is embodied in a fantastical form that a culture can agree is evil, but separate. gothic horror stories, including bram stoker’s dracula were written at a time of political transition. in his essay, ‘the occidental tourist: dracula and the anxiety of reverse colonisation’, stephen d arata (2000) claims that in the nineteenth century the british feared a waning of the power and influence of their empire, which may have created a level of cultural anxiety affecting the zeitgeist, enabling those shadows of real forms proposed by fludd to emerge from his ‘other world’ as dreams and symbolic stories. at this time, these dreams represented fears of the possibility of the encroachment of the ‘other’ from the mysterious and dangerous east. dracula comes from ‘transylvania, the exotic, eastern land ‘beyond the forest’, and his project is to contaminate with his own disease the cities of europe. this 19th century form of the vampire myth developed at a time when the colonialist empire was being shaken by the consequences of the very powers that once made it seem so secure; the ‘irrational’ east now pervades the imagination of the ‘rational’ west’. the image of the vampire – born in that fissure between what is imagined and what is real – is that of a lethal yet sensual shadow being, a parasite whose desire is to destroy civilisation and to propagate his own kind by feeding off real, living people. thus we have a situation in the late 19th century where england watches its world influence waning and suffers anxiety in relation to certain barbaric ‘others’ that arata avers were considered by the empire as agents of ‘reverse colonisation’. that is, ‘the “civilised” world feared that it was on the point of being colonised by “primitive” forces’ (2000, p. 162) which 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 would deplete the life blood of the empire: ‘vampires are intimately linked to military conquest and to the rise and fall of empires’ (p. 165). the vampire is an agent of change whose existence is facilitated by decay. he is the spark ignited by the slow-growing heat of accumulated compost. in bram stoker’s dracula, van helsing tells us that vampires follow ‘in [the] wake of imperial decay’ (1996, p. xv). stoker considers problematic relationships to do with the blurring of boundaries upon which the british empire depended, from the uncomfortable relationship between west and east, to conflicts ‘between civilized and primitive, colonizer and colonized, victimizer and victim… stoker probes the heart of a culture’s sense of itself…in its hour of perceived decline’ (arata 2000, p.164). the gothic horror stories that come to light at this time in england’s history reflect these fears, borrowing images from the cultural imaginarium, which infuse with sinister glamour a particular minority group of immigrants, largely refugees from the modern russian pogroms. according to paul johnson’s a history of the jews, the number of jewish immigrants to england between 1891 and 1900 increased by 600% (cited in zanger 1991 p. 34). zanger quotes the bishop of stepney: ‘the jews [are] coming in like an army, eating up christian gentiles’ (italics mine). zanger (1991, p. 33) also reminds us that svengali, the roguish jewish hypnotist from george du maurier’s trilby, was almost as popular a villain at the time as bram stoker’s dracula. svengali, along with shakespeare’s usurer, shylock and charles dickens’ ‘fence’, fagin, was an ‘oriental israelite hebrew’ whose glamour and powers of suggestion enabled him to bend women to his will. jewish svengali is tall, dark and handsome, as is dracula; both are likened to creatures often invested with nightmarish qualities of bats, rats, and wolves. the horror of beasts with claws and fangs, the nightmares in which we are pursued, controlled, and ultimately devoured, are embodied by the strangers who come from ‘[t]he poisonous east – birthplace and home of an ill wind that blows nobody any good’ (gerald du maurier cited in zanger 1991 p. 35). in europe’s tradition of anti-semitism, the ashkenazi jew was seen as an alien and oily pariah, who, from within the dankest crevices of culture, works his sinister magic in a similar fashion to that of the vampire. anti-semitic images and literature identify the jew, like the vampire, with parasitism, avariciousness, and aversion to christianity and its symbols. looking further back, we find that historically, jewish blood was thought to be ‘black and putrid’ (zafran 1979, p. 17). indeed, zafran, continues, ‘there is no people more wicked, more impudent, more troublesome, more venomous, more wrathful, more deceptive and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 25 more ignominious’, and jews were ‘often considered representatives of the devil, or worse still, demons and devils themselves’. the ‘liminal’ jew; that is, the ‘shadow’ form of the jew, like the vampire, is a product of fludd’s ‘fissure’ between what is real and what is imagined. in ‘dracula’s legacy’ the german lacanian critic, friedrich kittler, comments on the inclusion in dracula of one armenius vambery, who is based on an actual professor whom stoker had met at london’s lyceum club. vambery was an international sophisticate and a scholar who ‘travelled the orient in oriental disguise, gathering information’. he is present, yet in his multiple masks of shiite, sunnite, jew or christian, depending on what was required of him, also phantasmal and barely visible; he was undeniably effective in the world – though always through subterfuge. these traits are also those, which at that time in history, associate the caricature of the diaspora jew – whose corrupting influence infiltrates the social body – with the parasite or the vampire. in his article, kittler identifies vambery, with his ‘combination of espionage, orientalism and disguise’ as ‘actually…some sort of a vampire’ (cited in gelder 1994 pp. 8-9). clearly, the consequences of this kind of mythologising are, for actual human beings, dire. by the late nineteenth century in germany, for example, the term schadlinge was used by wilhelm marr to characterize jews. shadlinge, alex bein informs us in ‘the jewish parasite’ (1964, p. 6-7) are ‘…creatures which damage the objects of man in agriculture … breeding stock …the human body itself’. the jew dehumanized and envisioned as parasite may, like vampires, viruses or white-ants, be ‘more or less systematically attacked and destroyed’ (bein 1964 p.7). with the creation of the state of israel in 1948, the east/west, parasite/victim, coloniser/colonised, paradigm found a new form on the world stage at a time when imperialism was at last becoming a dirty word. a parallel may be drawn between stoker’s 19th century paranoia and the particular fears and prejudices that beleaguer modern israel in what may be seen as that nation state’s ‘hour of perceived decline’. ‘decline’ in this case refers less to imperial failure, but to the israeli loss of their original post-war idealism and sense of righteousness, the validity of the nation’s raison d’être being criticised from within as well as from external commentators. political and demographic issues, including a low jewish birthrate and an exodus of young jews from israel alongside the moral exigencies to 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 be discussed, intensify the stresses placed upon the already tautly stretched social fabric, involving ongoing questioning of national identity. in his novel black box, israeli author amos oz deals with uncertain moral ground and political ambivalence. the setting is the unstable terrain of israel/palestine, a zone that may be described by way of the foucauldian formulation of the ‘heterotopia’, or utopian countersite. unlike a utopia, which is an imagined world, heterotopias exist within ‘the real space of society’ (foucault 1967). they are real because they occupy geographical space and historical time, but like the liminal spaces previously discussed, are mythic and timeless in their nature and functions, both sacred and forbidden, illuminated with representations of incompatible realities that function in relation to the oppositional poles of the imaginary and the real. israel is central to the cultural imagination of three monotheisms: a sacred site. or rather, it is three different sacred sites on the same land. in a sense, the contested city of jerusalem is practically rendered unreal, its actual materiality undermined by its massive load of connotative meaning. the inhabitants of this heterotopian liminal zone, both palestinian and jew, must deal with the apparently insoluble paradox of belonging to two separate nations that inhabit the same physical space. black box is an epistolary and confessional novel that, through the development of character relationships, explicates layered crises, not overtly between arab and israeli, but focused within the jewish community itself, which reflects jewish attitudes to the arab populace rather than dealing with these attitudes directly. in black box, the relationship between gideon (ashkenazi, or european jew), one-time war hero who later becomes one of israel’s harshest critics, and sommo (mizrahi, or ‘jewish arab’) reflects the colonised/coloniser opposition and its concomitant questioning of cultural identity; but rather than being written as a simple dialectic, coloniser and colonised are seen to be implicated in the creation of their respective roles, these roles being examined in a series of inversions or character reversals. at certain times, sommo’s role is seen as vampiristic; at other times, the parasite is gideon, the intellectual european. in the novel gideon represents the new face of western imperialism devilling the conservative jewish arab, represented by sommo, who is now seen as the ‘shiftless oriental’, a canny businessman in ‘pale-blue, lightweight …dacron’, (oz 2002 p.123) striking dubious deals with politicians and developers to acquire more land and through it, more power. in an interesting inversion, this image of the arab jew is a quasi-shylockian echo of anti-semitic images of nineteenth century ashkenazi cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 27 moneylenders involved in the ‘cancerous tumour of usury’ (marr cited in bein 1964 p.6). in the israel of black box, the ‘civilised world’ is once again colonising the ‘primitive’. however, this time the situation is complicated by a mutual struggle in which the representatives of each side of the conflict take turns at playing ‘vampire’, reflecting a nation turned on itself in fear of ‘the other within’; that is, within the boundaries of both selfhood and nationhood. the novel traces the decline of gideon, the ex-military hero cum critic of the israeli state, when he returns to israel from beyond the pale, world-weary and dying, to use his wealth to corrupt sommo. yet sommo willingly drinks gideon’s blood money (an image reminiscent of bram stoker’s heroine mina, who must collaborate with her corruptor, dracula, by drinking his blood while he drinks hers). gideon, standing for old europe, for disillusioned ashkenazi jewry, (and for harassed-by-humans dracula) is exhausted, cynical, on the wane; whereas sommo (new israel) is full of vitality – in part supplied by gideon’s cash infusions – enjoying a level of febrile vigour also associated the vampire. thus, after several shifts in the power balance, we see in gideon’s demoralization the exhaustion of a culture in decline; while the religio-political fanaticism of sommo is in the ascendant. the image of vambery, kittler’s disenfranchised jew, becomes useful here (whether or not one accepts kittler’s association of the names ‘vampire’ and ‘vambery’) because there is a connection between vambery and gideon, who in turn stands for the more liberal component of israeli society. vambery and gideon represent the internationalist who, wherever he lives, is always alien; gideon also shares with this ‘actual’ vampire the polyphonic qualities of a jew with a diffuse identity who travels the world, not as a spy, but certainly as a collector then a disseminator of information and ideology; he has alienated himself from his people, has lost his sense of identification with his nation, is unstable and capricious. in sommo’s israel – even if gideon were not a left-wing polemicist – a hybridised jew lacking nationalistic verve and stability and any form of religious orthodoxy is already by default a natural adversary of a conservative like sommo, who seeks, through the consolidation of spurious but biblically sanctioned ‘greater israel’, completion and belonging. gideon is and must remain marginal, and in sommo’s eyes, a parasite. yet the reverse is also true, for sommo, who represents the religious and the colonialist, is alexander gideon’s ‘other’ and destroyer. gideon’s file cards speak to the ‘interdependence’ of ‘torturer and victim. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 inquisitor and martyr. crucifier and crucified’ (oz 2002 p. 146). to this litany of oppositional interactions one might also add, ‘parasite and victim’. philosopher leszek kolakowski’s (1982) ‘law of infinite cornucopia’ discusses how arguments can be used in an infinite number of ways to support any number of positions. similarly, narrative components can be arranged and rearranged to produce different stories. oz’s novel is one rendition of one story about israel. there are other narratives. in his 1998 article on israeli hegemony, baruch kimmerling deals with three countercultures with different stories whose seeds were always present within the dominant model, now arguably declining in power. he mentions that although the aim of the original ashkenazi zionist hegemony was to create a secular jewish society, one must also remember that the religious was always part of the mix. the land was referred to by the biblical term ‘zion’, the language chosen was a modernised version of biblical hebrew, the old testament aim of territorial conquest motivated the establishment of the israeli state, which embraced notions of biblical ‘heroes’ alongside “heroes of labour” [as] cultivated by the soviet regime’ (kimmerling 1998, p.50). it is a complex and contradictory combination of narrative elements. the paradox is well illustrated by kimmerling’s (p.51) words: ‘the reader only has to imagine the chairman of the world zionist organization speaking on the un podium, waving the old testament: “this is our charter for the land” ’. the ancient hebraic narrative of exile and return was consolidated with the creation of israel as a jewish state. the original story is one of heroism, where the david of the jewish diaspora, against all odds, finally defeats goliath and is at last rewarded. in israel it was hoped that jewry would never again have to suffer the consequences of statelessness. but over the last 62 years, the image of freedom fighter has, for many, been corrupted. a brief and simplified time line illustrates this point. first, the heroic narrative: the jewish state is ratified in 1948; the kibbutz movement begins establishing settlements; the pre-emptive strike against egypt, jordan and syria in the six day war in 1967 is magnificently successful, as is the yom kippur war in 1973; the 1976 rescue of hostages from entebbe further casts israelis as defenders of righteousness… however, world sympathies begin to shift with later events: the lebanon war in the 1980s casts israel in the role of oppressor, particularly with the massacre of arab civilians in the beirut refugee camps of sabra and shatilla, in which the israeli army was implicated; ongoing settlements in the occupied territories which continue today are seen by fewer local or international israel watchers as cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 29 worthy; the invasion of gaza in 2008 where israel is accused of war crimes, and the abuse in dubai of other countries’ passports by the israeli special operations team, mossad, provoking an international outcry; and the interception of the gaza flotilla in may 2010, which amid accusations of summary executions and torture, was judged by the un as unlawful. this contemporary image in the eyes of much of the world is a far cry from the old story of suffering and eventual heroic triumph. in an october 2, 2010 article ‘the battle for the middle east narrative’, journalist paul mcgeough, discussing the territorial conflict with palestinians, describes the one-time ‘settlers’ – and here he evokes images of ‘taming of the wilds and something found’ – now being referred to instead as ‘colonisers’, which instead tells a story of ‘dispossession, the planting of foreigners and something lost’. the ‘hero’ is, in the eyes of many, becoming a far more ambiguous denizen of the israeli/palestinian heterotopia. in decline now is the old rhetoric of israel as the lone vanguard of democracy in the middle east, and ben gurion’s application to israel of the biblical concept of ‘a light to the nations’ (isaiah 49:6). a pertinent metaphorical story for this geographical and historical context is that of lucifer, the ‘light bearer’, once the brightest star in the sky: ‘how are thou fallen from heaven, o lucifer, son of the morning! how art thou cut down to the ground which didst weaken the nations!’ (isaiah 14:12–14). this passage is usually read as an indictment against the king of babylon, but this god-king is metaphorically linked with the fall of the rebellious angel referred to in the king james version as lucifer, but in others as ‘day-star, son of the morning’, doomed to the abyss for his arrogance. in myth – and in war stories – the adversary may come to be seen through the lens of monstrosity. if monsters are ‘liminal creatures who “defy borders” and “normality” ’ then it may be defiance of borders that makes human beings too, seem monstrous; while those who defend the same territory come to be seen, as ‘defending ‘the civilised against the barbaric, and [upholding] good in the face of evil’ (devetak 2004 p 624). however, the roles of fiend and defender are unstable; they change depending upon who is telling the story, and whose story accrues moral value. thus lucifer – and, most importantly, those human beings whom he represents in metaphor – might be either heroic ‘bringers of light’, or doomed transgressors. amoz oz explicates the roles of coloniser and colonised, and these roles may be linked to older narratives discussed, in which – sustained by traditional mythical imagery – each protagonist becomes monstrous in the eyes of the other. if, as judith halberstam has claimed, 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 ‘monsters are meaning machines’ (cited in gelder 2000 p.6) then we are fully warned to attend to those meanings. while israel’s secular ashkenazi-dominated culture sidelines certain pietistic jewish citizens, and while restrictions on mizrahi participation in an ashkenazi-dominated culture alienate arab jews, limits placed on palestinian citizenship place this cultural group, far more than any other, outside the social mainstream: israel recognises only jewish nationality, thus muslim arabs are citizens without being nationals (makdisi, ‘the architecture of erasure’ p. 6). in her 1999 article, ‘jewish and democratic’, ruth gavison tells us that historically, israel failed to ‘seriously acknowledge’ or deal with the israeli/palestininan ‘rift’ from the outset. today, the situation is no better. antony lowenstein (sydney morning herald, 2010) argues that israel, ‘an insecure nation demanding obedience to an ideology’ continuing to ignore ‘the legitimate rights of the arab population’ results in both palestinians and leftist jews being ‘loathed … smeared and isolated’. isolation through lack of recognition, according to bourdieu, cuts one off from ‘access to a socially recognised social being … to humanity’ (cited in hage p. 78). palestinians are simultaneously a part, yet apart from the mainstream: a real, yet not real, ghostly presence. only acknowledgement of social validity will ensure full ‘reality’: the ‘ghosts’ can then manifest themselves as human. spectralisation affects both colonist and liminar. ghassan hage points out in ‘”comes a time we are all enthusiasm” ‘that the ‘dehumanising gaze’ that sees ‘them as a nondifferentiated entity … is often accompanied by an equally self-dehumanising, abstracted version of us’ (2003, pp. 65-66). this may equate to the attitudes of both palestinians and israelis. in the latter case, while the secular nationalist narrative (with embedded biblical aspects) and concomitant self-image is failing, a new jewish israeli ‘us’ has yet to emerge. to construct palestinians and israelis as one-dimensional heroes and villains is simplistic, and overlooks the ongoing political machinations of both middle eastern and western powerbrokers as well as the ancient and complex narratival palimspsest that is israel/palestine. nevertheless, the israeli response to the layered images and stories of which the nation is composed has been largely one of denial of both israeli culpability and the complexities of the relationship between adversaries. an increasing number of israelis have responded to this moral dilemma by emigrating (figures provided in following section). at this point it would not be hard to introduce the spectre of the so-called ‘self-hating’ jew, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 31 which reeks of indulgent guilt; but i would argue that there is less self-hatred at work than despair. paul mcgeough has it that israel is losing the ‘contest for control of the narrative’, but more than a matter of losing a propaganda fight for the moral high-ground – which is about appearances rather than substance – israel is failing as a narrative enterprise on an even more profound level. the populace, both jewish and palestinian, need true stories to be told, not romances, mysteries or fabrications: indeed, the consequences of unreal or exclusivist narratives have resulted in the creation of a new kind of ghost. palestinian as ghost heterotopias, as previously mentioned, may mediate between interpretations of reality, or may juxtapose representations of incompatible places. foucault (1967) gives the example of the cinema or the theatre but if the ‘incompatible places’ are real geographical territories, they may act as staging grounds upon which are played out a drama in which a mirrorexchange occurs between utopian vision and ideology. in this sense, if palestine as heterotopia has the virtues of the ideologue’s utopia projected upon it, then the obvious corollary is that israel – problematically the same place – is a zionist heterotopia. borrowing foucault’s terms: israel/palestine, is a ‘privileged or sacred or forbidden’ place, a fecund seedbed, both historically and culturally, of creative and destructive stories that profoundly affect events there and in the rest of the world. it is simultaneously a mythical and very real place charged with both eros and thanatos, a liminal zone where symbols, born out of a sense of disenfranchisement or estrangement, are derived. arthur saniotis, in his 2005 article, ‘re-enchanting terrorism’, illustrates this idea when he characterises islamist extremists as liminal beings because of the ‘indeterminate and transnational nature of jihadism’. saniotis refers to the liminal model posited by victor turner, because of its emphasis on ‘ambiguity, fragmentation and “the blurring of set boundaries” ’, and to the magical or transformative nature of this state in which new images are created, as well as their extreme affect in the world (saniotis 2005 p. 533). the above descriptors, however, might also be seen to apply not only to terrorist actions. with accusations of illegality and war crimes being made against the state of israel, legal boundaries are very ‘blurred’ here also; the nation is riven with moral ambiguity. thus, perhaps it may be seen also as simultaneously a physical as well as a metaphorical ‘lawless zone’, laden as it is with images from a particular utopian vision, fuelling acts of destruction. but these acts are perceived by the participants – whether jihadists or citizen-soldiers – as the 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 means of creating a new paradigm. saniotis frames jihadists as ‘liminal beings who seek to re-enchant the world via their symbolic and performative features’ (p.533). this word, ‘reenchanting’ belongs to a magical lexicography: magic as means of transformation, and it conjures blakean millenarian imagery of ‘arrows of desire’ or ‘chariots of fire’ as much as visions of an apocalyptic version of the shi’ite mahdi, or ‘imam of the age’, due at the end of time. similarly, the zionist dream of an israel bounded by biblically-sanctioned borders ordained by the deity is loaded with portentous mythic imagery. this dream-narrative continues to be reinforced after every yom kippur service and passover seder with the traditional invocation: ‘next year in jerusalem’. perhaps even more potently, the originary myth of ishmael (abraham’s elder son born of an arab slave) and isaac (his half-brother and inheritor of territory contested ever since) is taught to children from infancy. according to rita kissen, in contemporary children’s literature, palestinian arabs ‘remain the children of hagar – sometimes evil, sometimes good, but always subordinate and inferior to their european cousins’ (kissen 1991, p. 112). such stories may create or reinforce political realities. it has been claimed that subordination leading to invalidation of palestinian self-identity is embedded on the curriculum in state-run palestinian schools. in the 1970s, a team of jewish israeli researchers criticised the focus on jewish history and the absence in the curriculum of palestinian history, and the authors of indigenous education and empowerment contend that ‘this lack of attention towards palestinian arab history, culture and identity and its contemporary political concerns has incessantly been maintained.’ (abu-saad & champagne 2006, p. 134). abu-saad quotes an arab student: ‘they don’t want us … to develop an awareness of our national identity’. this means that an increasing number of the state’s citizenry come to age arguably lacking a sense of agency and respect within the mainstream community. this seems likely to preclude realistic future characterisation of the nation as a democracy, given how – according to oren yiftachel, lecturer in political geography at ben gurion university – ‘arab citizenship in israel has been structurally constrained by the state’s ... hegemonic judaization project’. yiftachel conceptualises arab civil status as ‘ghetto citizenship’ (2009, p. 56). it is as if there is literally one land and people (super)imposed upon another, or twin heterotopias bumping up against each other’s reality, and bleeding where they meet. one cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 33 might say that at this ‘intersection of materiality and the imagination’ the cultural product created is war. stories link the material and the imaginal, history and myth, past with present, and create realities from fears and yearnings. ideals and prejudices are inculcated, directly or subliminally, through repetitive storytelling – and narratives, particularly time-hallowed ones based on religious myths – may contribute to the justification of a political position and supply a cultural foundation of a people’s sense of self and of place in the world. so also does historical storytelling. israeli identity and politics – as the interplay of power relations, in this case between dominant and liminal social elements – is unavoidably informed by the aftershock of near decimation of european jewry in wwii. the story of israel as a modern state arguably begins with the slogan of the jewish defence league: ‘never again.’ prescriptions recommended in order for the story to come true vary, however. in her 2004 article, ‘settler nationalism, collective memories of violence and the “uncanny other” ’ joyce dalsheim discusses the stories leftist israeli liberals tell themselves in order to deal with the apparent contradictions of being socially democratic in politics and compassionate in outlook while also being nationalistic. what she refers to as ‘nationalist imagining’ manages a trick of perception so that the ethics of jewish settlement is not compromised, and it might also be characterised as a kind of utopian thinking. the stories exhibit a certain carefully constructed ambivalence and denial of the other. through narrative, what is imagined is perceived as real by means of wishful thinking. dalsheim describes a school trip she accompanied to the palmach museum, whose elaborate audio-visual presentations tell the story of the making of the state of israel. the teachers, from backgrounds in the left-wing kibbutz movement, expressed an intention to refine their student’s ability to think critically about history, yet ironically failed to consider including in the excursion a visit to any sites that had once been arab, or to extant palestinian towns. the author also notes that once at the museum, rather than a story being told which disparaged or in any way denigrated the original inhabitants, she found instead that ‘that the enemy [was] surrealistically almost entirely absent from this narrative…it was as though they had somehow been wished away’ (dalsheim 2004 p.160). 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 dalsheim compares this wishful notion exemplified in the zionist slogan, ‘a land without a people for a people without a land’ with the australian misnomer, ‘terra nullius’. but the glib dismissal of the original population of australia occurred at a time in history when ‘empire’ was associated with glory, whereas the newer nation of israel came into being long after colonialism had slipped to the moral ‘low ground’. in imperial britain there was hardly a need to find ethical justification for colonialist ambitions, but if zionists are capable of absorbing and sustaining a similar belief as late as the 21st century, this act of mental gymnastics is now becoming increasingly difficult to exercise for the modern liberal humanists within the israeli hegemony. living in a postcolonial world, such convenient fabrications are morally insupportable, and so guilt and history meet and cross over and a form of ethical doublethink now comes into play. thus, precisely because it is recognised that palestine was not without a people before 1948 (any more than australia was not empty before 1770), new stories, formed with the aid of an imaginative disconnect based on an impossible paradox of recognising and simultaneously failing to recognise a whole nation with whom one coexists, creates a weird slippage between reality and make-believe. in a fantastical psychic manoeuvre, liberal israelis must inhabit a kind of liminal space where palestinians are there but also ‘not-there’, existing as a ghostly presence or, as dalsheim eloquently phrases it, an ‘uncanny absence’. this poetic characterisation of the ‘villains [who are] somehow not quite there’ (dalsheim 2004 p. 152) or those ‘uncannily absent’ ones, reflects the official term used to describe the palestinians who remained in israel after 1950: ‘present absentees’. those people, comprising approximately 15% (yee, 2008) of the israeli population, fell victim to the new israeli knesset’s ‘law of absentee property’, ‘which retroactively and prospectively provided for the state of israel to confiscate properties from anyone identified as an “absentee” ’ (schechla 2001 p. 21) – even though some of those included in this category were, in fact, categorically present. schechla provides an example of a particularly ironic case of what we might think of as ‘uncannily absent presence’ or ‘spectralisation’ of a group of human beings with the case of the three villages of iqrit, mansura and kaf’r birim, whose inhabitants’ ‘homes and lands were expropriated by the state under the absentee property law even as they continued to press their case in the courts’ (2001, p. 22). such dispossession, and thus invisibility, is illustrated further by israeli scholar hillel cohen (2005 p. 64.): cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 35 israel did not mention the origins of the internal refugees in the formal statistics. they were not included in the unrwa registry, and the abandoned villages did not appear on maps. it goes without saying that no museum was established in israel to commemorate life in the villages which no longer existed. a more recent example of what might be interpreted a wilful oversight or denial, is that of the projected museum of tolerance, designed by frank gehry. it is to be constructed in jerusalem, although part of the site is already occupied by a muslim cemetery, ma’man allah which, according to makdisi’s ‘architecture of erasure’, seems to have come under the jurisdiction, in 1948, of the then custodian of absentee property (2010, p. 6). amidst arab protests, israel’s rabbi marvin hier declared in 2004 that the museum would be ‘a great landmark promoting the principles of mutual respect and social responsibility’ (2010, p.1) the reality is no less paradoxical or oxymoronic as dalsheim’s description, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for the part of the israeli population with whom dalsheim deals in her article to live with this level of ambiguity and contradiction – or with this level of conflict. while popular wars may be thought to promote social cohesion, in the absence of a certain level of consensus ‘such as the belief in the necessity of conflict, that it threatens the entire society, that the society is worth preserving, that the conflict will produce the desired results’, then cohesion fails, resulting instead in ‘disintegration of the group’ (coser cited in cohen 1988, p. 909). as reported in 2004 in ha-aretz, a prominent israeli daily newspaper, it was estimated that back then 760,000 israelis were living abroad, compared to 550,000 in 2000, but ‘the fact that ha-aretz published the 2000 and 2003 figures at all has to mean that they were authorized by the israeli government. this in turn means that the real figures for emigration must be very much higher’ (killgore 2004). and even as jewish settlements spread in contested territory, the population of israeli jews is on the decline. in 2008, michael petrou estimated in his article ‘why israel can’t survive’, that within the next decade or so, due to the higher arab birth rate, the inclusion of the occupied territories within israel and ongoing jewish emigration, that israel will have a majority arab population. considering the profound level of bitterness towards the state of many sidelined arabs it is unlikely that israel, in its current manifestation, will be supported by arab votes; thus, it is highly questionable that israel can continue as both a jewish state and democracy: the influence of both the acknowledged and the spectral ‘uncannily present absentees’ may soon change the nature of israel. the current political situation attests to the state of denial in which the nation exists. petrou draws a parallel with israeli delusional thinking and the story 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 of a cat in a poem by spyros kyriazopoulos ‘who licked an opened tin for hours without realizing that she had cut her tongue on its jagged edge and was drinking her own blood’. dalsheim’s ‘liberals’ are dealing with – or failing to deal with – a lack of parity on many levels. in his 2004 article ‘a disgrace to the map of israel’, ranen omer-sherman reviews amos oz’s illustration in his novel a perfect peace of how the old hebrew conception of t’shuva or of finding the ‘right path’ has become compromised. communal responsibility and nationalist imperative are today, very much at odds. both oz’s black box and a perfect peace reflect that dysfunctional reality and the uneasy combination of factors. questions arise as to the possibility of ever reconstructing a coherent story that can be aligned with ethical ideals. as well as the two heterotopian visions coexisting in extreme discomfort and pain, there are also two israels, as illustrated fictively in black box: the young and beleaguered state of sommo’s story versus gideon’s paranoid and belligerent state of which he is an uncomfortable citizen. it seems that many non-fictional, entirely real citizens of israel deal daily with incompatibilities of nationalism and compassion, and that these paradoxes can be sustained only by a tricky sleight of mind akin to orwellian doublethink. dalsheim offers an interpretation of what happens in the imaginations of some liberal, secular jewish israelis trying to embrace the idea of their right to citizenship of this contested nation state, while being aware – yet failing to acknowledge – the claim of those others to the same territory. but spectralising the adversary patently does not make him disappear. how can palestinian claims be so persistently denied? one response might be: when their humanity is denied. in ‘violence, mourning, politics’, rather than asking if arabs have suffered dehumanisation, judith butler challenges us to consider ‘to what extent have [they]… fallen outside the “human”?’ (my italics), which opens up fundamental questions regarding the nature of reality. she then asks: ‘how might reality be remade?’ and surely it is true that a new way of conceiving self, other and nationhood is essential for israel/palestine, a country comprised metaphorically of twin heterotopias; mythically, of embattled rival siblings; literally, of two nations in one that as mentioned earlier, is ‘turned on itself in fear of ‘the other within’. perhaps this new reality might be based on a story whose action revolves around a ‘spiritual and moral apprehension’ as exemplified in that ‘paradigm of communal responsibility and social consciousness [that] also bears the weight of a nationalist cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 37 imperative’, the judaic t’shuva. however, such a re-visioning is as unlikely as a political solution when the ‘other’ continues to suffer ‘the violence of derealization.’ butler goes on to speculate that ‘if violence is done against those who are unreal, then from the perspective of violence, it fails to injure or negate those lives since those lives are already negated’ (2004, p. 33), and she develops this idea in terms that reflect traditional imagery from the western imaginarium, told and retold (from faerie tales to b-grade horror movies) of monsters who rise again (and again): ‘[the ‘derealized’] have a strange way of remaining animated and so must be negated again (and again)…they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness…the derealization of the “other” means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral’ (pp. 33-34). conclusion ‘if christianity is to a great extent about doctrine and islam about ritual, judaism is about narrative’, suggests stephen prothero in god is not one (2010, p. 243). the story told and retold is of exile and return. in the absence of a homeland, jewish people maintained for centuries their sense of identity and place by retelling stories, and with the advent of zionism, the core narrative of exile and return met an overtly political narrative. but one might argue, given the current political climate, the narrative of ‘rights’ on both sides, israeli and palestinian, has become redundant. alternatively, one might agree with amos oz, and characterise the ‘clash between one very powerful, very convincing, very painful claim over this land and another no less powerful, no less convincing claim as ‘tragic’: now such a clash between right claims can be resolved in one of two manners. there's the shakespeare tradition of resolving a tragedy with the stage hewed with dead bodies ... but there is also the chekov tradition. in the conclusion of the tragedy by chekov, everyone is disappointed, disillusioned, embittered, heartbroken, but alive. and my colleagues and i have been working ... not to find the sentimental happy ending, a brotherly love, a sudden honeymoon to the israeli-palestinian tragedy, but a chekovian ending, which means clenched teeth compromise. (omer-sherman 2004, p.99) from the jewish perspective, through a series of imperialistic and political machinations a new country called israel was brought into being in 1948 as a place of succour for a homeless and historically harassed and horribly abused nation. the establishment of a jewish state in palestine may never have been founded on any moral right, but nevertheless european sympathy for the jews and feelings of guilt after the second world war made such a move 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 forgivable – but only in the non-arab world, as opposed to the arab world where israel’s independence day is referred to as al naqba, the catastrophe. narratives of denial result in palestinian ‘spectralisation’, which has social and political ramifications for jew and arab: demoralisation and anger and reactivity leading to ongoing anguish and conflict. if one’s voice is repeatedly ignored, it is not uncommon to start shouting. this is one way of reading palestinian acts of violence perpetrated against civilians; screams into the ears of the wilfully oblivious. this is not a justification for terrorism. i would agree with ghassan hage’s assertion that ‘both the israeli invasion [of the west bank in 2002] and the suicide bombings constitute a kind of warped postmodern pastiche associating medievally violent political affects, early modern veneration of political entities such as “the nation”, and late-modern military technology’(hage 2003, p. 67) but hage goes on to decry the fact that while forms of violence against civilians are considered justifiable if enacted by this legal nation state, suicide bombings are categorically condemned. when hage sought to interpret terrorist actions he was accused of moral collusion (hage 2003, p. 66). the affect of military actions, no matter how extreme, cannot match that of the ‘terrorist’. ‘they’ must remain in the mainstream consciousness as a ghostly ‘nondifferentiated entity’, abstracted and dehumanised. how does the terrorist identification – by his ‘other’ – move from human to spectre to monster? in ‘terror’s abduction of experience, wickman tells us that terror is provoked by the spectacle of some awful and inexplicable fright and ‘a turbid moodiness lingers… whereas with horror these conventions swell into monstrosities’ (2005, p188). perhaps then, in the case of palestinian suicide bombings, we are actually dealing with horror rather than terror? the pedestrian nature of tanks and guns – their very legality – cannot match the embrace of a kind of mythic space that opens up when the quotidian world is ruptured by an action committed by an enemy fuelled by despair and desire, by existential anguish. wickman is discussing literature, but i think the analysis may be extended into the world of objects and people: ‘in horror …the sublime and the grotesque meet, often in a panoply of kitsch imagery … [or as hage has it, ‘medievally violent political affects’] characterised by a hyperbolic combination of visceral disgust and psychic anxiety’. terror – or rather, horror, plunge the mind into liminal space, ‘a strange world where anguish and ecstasy coexist’ (bataille, 1988, pxxxii). thus, the terrorist, or ‘horrorist’, brings into the world a spiritual dimension of fright cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 39 that culminates in an ontological dreadfulness that could only be perpetrated by those who are no longer identified as human, but as monsters. failure of acknowledgment or misrecognition of another may result in the other becoming, to a greater or lesser extent, dehumanised. in the extreme, the person becomes like a shade. images created for the ‘spectralised’ person are based on old stories from a bank of cultural imagery located between imagination and reality, a zone characterised by ambiguity and, as proposed by robert fludd, inhabited by ‘shadows’ of real forms, or by dreams and symbolic stories. it can be the source of creative energy or a repository of the material of nightmares. so we might say that each culture has its image stock, built up over centuries of remembering and storytelling, available to feed into new narratives, which in turn may enter the cultural imaginarium, perhaps to be used again later on in history: this process might be viewed as an ongoing, two-way exchange between reality and imagination. shades may serve a cultural function. we examined possible permutations of such a role: vilified and scapegoated, the shade may be allocated a burden of guilt or cultural anxiety to bear. also, the now spectral person or group of persons loses what they once had – a monster or a ghost cannot own property. this enables the ‘humans’ to have what he has lost. we looked at these phenomena in the context of anti-semitic europe, and in the heterotopian site of israel/palestine. jewish citizens of contemporary israel, or reconstructed colonisers, carry with them the grim legacy of a history in which they have been allocated the role of pariah, of exotic but noxious weed (‘wandering jew’: a low, creeping herb that threatens the survival of the gardens it overspreads), culminating in a holocaust in which the race came close to extinction. antisemitic images fuelled this history. nightmare images of monstrosity from resonant narratives deprived jewish people of their humanity; rather than refugees seeking succour they became instead, in the european imagination, parasites seeking blood – literally (the blood libel) and figuratively. this may be seen as a sort of negative version of the same process that makes the ‘holy’ city of jerusalem the sacral centre of nations. both come from the same source, that cultural imaginarium, or font of accumulated images and stories. israel’s jewish population is demographically varied and complex, but two main groups emerge. those who, like oz’s sommo, are expansionist in politics and conservative in outlook, and those like gideon who are liberal-minded and increasingly disaffected by their 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 new role of coloniser; these colonisers cannot necessarily accommodate their sense of self with this new role, so antipathetic is it to the old myth. israel/palestine, the staging ground for these conflicts, is a single country overlaid with rival utopian ideologies. with its juxtapositions of representations of reality based on conflicting images, it is neither one place nor another, but several places at once. here, we witness daily a collision of ideology and reality in a liminal zone that is simultaneously physical and imaginary, mythical and mundane, no-man’s land and everyman’s land. it is an apparently insoluble paradox that is perhaps more real in the idealised abstract than it is in quotidian reality. that statement in no way makes light of the reality of the perpetual suffering there but rather brings into focus the idea that it is the intangibles – the warring ideologies, values and beliefs and stories – that create the world of facts and solids, territories and bodies: the liminal has far greater potency than the resolved poles by which it is circumscribed. and it is in the liminal zone where symbols and ideologies form and where ‘the battle for control of the narrative’ begins. israel/palestine is a heterotopian space charged with energy fuelled by desire, a sacred site between contradictory ‘conception[s] and creation’, both seedbed of positive structural assertions’ and also a shadowland. bibliography abu-saad, i. and champagne, d. 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http://www.smh.com.au/world/the-battle-for-the-middle-east-narrative-20101001-1610u.html� http://www.macleans.ca/world/global%20/article.jsp?content=20080423_11237_11237� http://www.macleans.ca/world/global%20/article.jsp?content=20080423_11237_11237� http://www.auckland.ac.nz/webdav/site/central/shared/about/news-events-notices/events/2008-events/documents/magic_and_transformation_1.pdf� http://www.auckland.ac.nz/webdav/site/central/shared/about/news-events-notices/events/2008-events/documents/magic_and_transformation_1.pdf� http://dannyreviews.com/h/catastrophe_remembered.html� http://www.geog.bgu.ac.il/members/yiftachel/new_papers_2009/arab%20citizenship-%20print.pdf� http://www.geog.bgu.ac.il/members/yiftachel/new_papers_2009/arab%20citizenship-%20print.pdf� 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 social inclusion and local practices of belonging rob garbutt abstract social inclusion is often conceptualised through a spatial metaphor which places boundaries on society, yielding the included and excluded. this paper argues for a relational understanding of society, in which all are implicated to varying degrees in practices and structures that privilege and disadvantage individuals and groups. the implication is that social inclusion policy requires an approach that develops programs that reduce exclusion while also addressing practices and norms that socially exclude. the focus of the paper is one aspect of social inclusion: achieving a sense of belonging, particularly at the everyday, local level. belonging in this everyday sense can be thought of as an ongoing project achieved through everyday practices, rather than solely in terms of membership of a group. while many such practices, for example regularly engaging in team sports, are accepted ways of establishing and maintaining belonging, for others in a community practices of belonging may necessitate disrupting or at least broadening the established norms of how one belongs. to ground this discussion of inclusion and belonging, this paper draws on practices of belonging in a regional community. established norms of belonging are examined through the idea of ‘being a local’, a way of belonging that appears to be based on membership. the paper then turns to two local projects which disrupt the exclusive bounds of local membership and attempt to establish new and inclusive practices of belonging. to conclude, parallels are drawn between the boundaries which define ‘the social’ in social inclusion and ‘the local community’ in being a local, to argue for the importance of including relational understandings of social inclusion in policy debates and program formulation. introduction this paper explores those aspects of social inclusion that are a product of relationships at the local level. in particular, my interest is in those aspects of inclusion that relate to people’s senses of belonging within a local community. explorations of this type often conceptualise senses of belonging in terms of membership, that is, being included in a group or excluded from it. conceptualising belonging as membership, however, leaves the field of belonging reasonably static; it ignores the agency of individuals and groups to contest the boundaries of belonging at the local level, as well as the agency of those who are active in boundary maintenance. it also ignores how individuals’ senses of belonging vary over time. therefore, following the groundbreaking work of elspeth probyn, in this paper belonging is not solely conceived as membership, but as a sense of connection to others that is always in the process of being actively achieved (probyn 1996). this approach focuses our attention on practices. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 85 here i particularly want to explore how practices of inclusion and belonging at the local level have the capability of expanding local understandings of who belongs in a place. such practices, which challenge established and apparently coherent senses of belonging are never straightforward in their effects, because in any change in the dynamics of relationships between people in a place there will be resistance to that change. nevertheless, that resistance is the product of new possibilities appearing that begin to question the very coherence, if ever it existed, of established patterns of local belonging. in staking out the scope of this paper, i have already drawn on words and ideas which are the subject of intense debate in themselves: community, social inclusion, and belonging are just three. before entering further into the field of practices of local belonging and social inclusion, it is worth spending a few moments to explain how i intend to use these interconnected terms. prior to that discussion, however, i should make explicit my overall approach to this research area. i situate myself in this discussion as a cultural studies practitioner, and following nick couldry’s lead, my interest is in the ‘complex and contested nature of [everyday] culture’ (2000, p.2). this concentrates one’s attention on ‘think[ing] of culture in relation to issues of power: the power relations […] which affect who is represented and how, who speaks and who is silent, what counts as “culture” and what does not’ (2000, p.2). two outcomes of this set of concerns are a multidisciplinary approach to studying the complexity of culture, often using a mix of methods; and an ongoing engagement with ‘others’ who are marginalised and dispossessed (zylinska 2005, pp.35-39). within this framework, my approach has not been to research marginalisation from the ‘edges’ of culture, but from the hegemonic centre; the practices of the included rather than the excluded, and especially the language with which inclusion and exclusion are framed. in relation to local belonging and inclusion, this interest stems from questioning my own self-description as ‘a local’ of the town in which i was born and bred, lismore in northern new south wales, australia and which also happens to be the place in which i now conduct my research. in considering this conjunction of belonging, social inclusion and being a local i have drawn on a variety of research from cultural studies, cultural geography, sociology, critical race theory, anthropology and linguistics. for method, i rely primarily on norman fairclough’s critical language study method for the analysis of print media (and occasionally, television) texts (2001). the ideas of who is and isn’t ‘a local’ form the centre of this analysis. 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 the community which is the primary focus of this paper is that of a rural australian town, though a metropolitan community also plays a complementary role. this usage of ‘community’ with its connotation of a group of people with a shared local culture belies the complexity of the term. with the idea of community, and of place-based community in particular, there is inherent tension between a sense of coherence of ‘the community’, the diversity of the communities in a place, and the ways in which those communities are constituted. as leonie sandercock writes, a locality may be ‘criss-crossed by networks of social relations whose scope and extent range from neighbouring houses and a few weeks’ acquaintance to religious and kin relations spanning generations and continents’ (2003, p.93). these criss-crossing networks are made ever more extensible and fluid by new communications technologies from email to twitter. while sandercock’s community of criss-crossing networks portrays a community that appears constituted more by holes than by wholes, people thrown together in places can combine in ways to produce the social infrastructure which may dampen the effects of disadvantage or social exclusion (richardson & mumford 2002, vinson, 2007, chapter 6). conversely, aspects of social infrastructure such as commonly agreed norms of dominant groups can generate a high level of cohesion amongst those groups, along with domination of resources, to the exclusion of others. the development of communities that are inclusive and resilient requires a balance of openness to others and a sense of connection to that place. in this paper i am particularly interested in this tension between openness and closure, whether that closure is concerns those closed in (the included) or those closed out (the excluded). with this focus on the local scale in terms of ‘community’, it is important to emphasise the multi-scalar nature of social inclusion; to recognise that the processes that produce social inclusion operate simultaneously at the small and larger scales. the focus on local practices of belonging and inclusion that this paper takes bears larger scales in mind for good reason: as angus cameron cogently argues, in discussions of inclusion and exclusion the ‘occlusion of the non-local […] has profoundly distorting effects. it makes it very much easier to see exclusion as a feature of people in places rather than the wider histories and geographies of a complex polity, culture and economy’ (2006, p. 398). issues of exclusion in a community must be examined across a range of scales that extend beyond the community. for example, the case studies of practices which seek to expand ways of local belonging that are examined cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 87 towards the end of this paper do not arise solely from a local context, but are community members’ responses to a perceived social atmosphere of fear and exclusion of ‘others’ that, since the late 1990s has been simultaneously local, national and global. in this paper, the term ‘social inclusion’ is understood within this multi-scalar framework. social inclusion is understood to be a product of social institutions, processes and practices, which inevitably produce unequal outcomes for individuals. these outcomes depend on how one is positioned at the intersection of different power grids in society (yuval-davis, kannabiran, & vieten 2006, p.7). it is, therefore, a multidimensional, relational concept that describes the nature of individual and group relations to the larger society (silver 2007, p. 15). in general terms one can understand social inclusion to be a state of privilege that has as its corollary, a state of disadvantage or social exclusion. further, as the centre, or the socially included is typically a group that is unmarked, it is more common to find working definitions of social inclusion that refer to the marginalised or marginalisation, that is, ‘as “not social exclusion”’ (cameron 2006, p.396). with this in mind, this paper attempts to identify the centre of social inclusion, as well margins. in terms of belonging at the local level, this involves identifying ‘the locals’ as well as those considered not be locals (garbutt 2005). in line with this understanding of social inclusion, the aspects of social inclusion that this paper concerns itself with are those which hurriyet babacan terms the ‘relational aspects’ of social inclusion, rather than ‘distributional aspects’. relational aspects of social inclusion include ‘culture, ethnicity, racism and other diversity signifiers as a causal factor of disadvantage’ (babacan 2008). as babacan notes, these are the aspects of social inclusion that are not generally addressed in the current australian federal government’s agenda for social inclusion, an agenda which gives priority to labour market initiatives, specific localities, homelessness, people with disability and indigenous australians (australian government n.d.). while the government’s focus on specific measures and groups is understandable, particularly as a way to target funding, this paper argues that it is important to include relational aspects of inclusion that incorporate whole of society strategies. there are two key points to my argument for including babacan’s ‘relational’ aspects into social inclusion initiatives. the first, as she notes, is that relational aspects are often causal factors of social inclusion. to ignore causal factors as part of the social milieu from which exclusion arises, risks the long-term sustainability of more targeted measures. underpinning 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 this is the second aspect of my argument, and that is that without incorporating a relational understanding of social inclusion into policy frameworks, the concept of social inclusion becomes one which casts the excluded as the problem to be solved, and those who are included having no significant part to play in developing a more inclusive society apart from ‘lending a hand’. this is a consequence of both defining inclusion in negative terms, as noted above, and using a model of social inclusion that is based on conceptualising society as a ‘bounded space’ with an inside and an outside (koler & davidson 2008). this model has some usefulness in identifying those groups that need to be brought ‘in towards the centre’, however, if the centre does not shift in its relations with marginalised people, there is no reason to expect that those who have been systematically excluded will not be so again when short to medium term targeted programs finish (labonte 2004). rather than conceptualise society as a bounded space, this paper conceptualises a relational space in which all are members of a society and none are ‘outside’. by taking this view, the focus is on the social practices and relations which marginalise some groups and individuals. in the terminology of the bounded space metaphor of society, this involves the ‘centre’ as well as the ‘periphery’ in new, more inclusive forms of social relations. issues of belonging and practices that include and exclude, then, constitute the third area that this paper deals with, and that deserves preliminary discussion. belonging, as it is understood in this project, concerns ‘experiences of being part of the social fabric’ (anthias 2006, p. 21). these experiences include membership of collectives (for example, voluntarily becoming a citizen of an adopted country or involuntarily being a member of a group through birth). importantly, however, belonging also arises from everyday practices and events (probyn 1996, sicakkan & lithman 2005). these practices could include a daily routine of surfing, regular employment, or cooking and sharing a meal with others. in these examples, belonging is experienced in neighbourhoods and communities, through which larger-scale (national and transnational) experiences of belonging are mediated. the achievement of belonging, however, may be constrained through membership of a group which is socially excluded due to the actions of others including governments and the media. what harms communities in such instances is ‘the preemptive exclusion […] of others on the basis of the codification of others as outside relation, belonging nowhere, a threat’ (diprose 2008, p.47). belonging may also be constrained by a range of other considerations such a lack of transport, or poverty, or narrow constructions and representations of national identity. thus, belonging is directly connected to the distributional and relational aspects of social inclusion. a sense of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 89 belonging develops and is continually sought through finding and making one’s place and through one’s positioning according to social structures and practices (sickakkan and lithman 2005 pp.20-27, bhambra 2006, p. 37). in this paper, i am interested in practices that are intended to challenge the extent of local belonging. these are practices of belonging that can bring some members of a local community into tension and conflict with dominant groups, either when established practices are brought into question, or when existing definitions of local membership (which are often unspoken but nevertheless real) are opened for the admission of new identities and ways of belonging. these types of practices of belonging do not leave the centre undisturbed by the periphery. rather, they are aimed at establishing new sets of local relations and opening and extending the experience of belonging of those who may somewhat rigidly adhere to established social patterns. by challenging dominant structures and practices they aim at developing and extending social inclusion at the local level. the following sections of this paper explore local belonging in australia and its relationship to social inclusion by focusing on belonging as membership and as an ongoing project in the region around lismore on the new south wales far-north coast. the discussion of belonging as membership focuses on the idea of ‘being a local’, or to more accurately represent the collective nature of relationships in a place, ‘being one of the locals’. questions of explicit and implicit rules of membership are explored by analysing the usage of the term ‘local’ in the local print media. national dimensions of this form of belonging are examined through an analysis of metropolitan newspaper coverage of the locals before and after the cronulla ‘riot’ of december 2005. this examination of belonging as membership will be followed by discussion of two examples of projects which encourage practices of belonging by individuals who might ordinarily fall ‘outside’ the bounded space of membership as a local. these practices not only create new sets of supportive relationships within a place but also challenge the ‘centre’, in this case, the locals, to be open to new ways of being local. this process of opening is not always harmonious as it often contests normalised connections between people and place. the final section of this paper ties these discussions of belonging back to government programs aimed at developing a socially inclusive australia. 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 being a local: membership and exclusionary practices of inclusion local belonging in many places throughout australia, both in cities and the regions, is often organised by a specific social form in which some individuals closely connect place to their identity through the idea of being a local (myers 2006, p.325, garbutt 2006). i use the term ‘organised’ here to convey the sense that other ways of belonging in a place are often measured against this idea. it functions as a benchmark for interrogating place-based authenticity: are you a local? the question is one which gauges a range of considerations from whether someone can be relied on to give directions, to whether a person has the right to speak for a place in a public forum, to who is privileged in setting the local rules for behaviour. such considerations are not isolated from larger scale processes, with rules of gauging belonging at the local scale often being the product of practices that are simultaneously local and national (marston 2000). one means of analysing the idea and practices of being a local is through the print media. the two case studies that follow, one centred on the region around lismore in northern new south wales, and the other on the sydney beach-side suburb of cronulla, draw on a critical language study of media texts. in the case of the lismore region, between january 2004 and may 2005 each issue of the regional daily newspaper the northern star was surveyed for the use of the word ‘local’ and ‘locals’ and the instances catalogued. this was a manual process of reading and transcribing 607 instances of use as the newspaper did not have an internet presence or searchable database available at that time (garbutt 2007). in the discussion below, some more recent examples from the northern star and the weekly northern rivers echo have also been used to supplement the data for illustrative purposes. for the cronulla case study, the factiva database was used to find all 512 occurrences of the word ‘locals’ in two daily sydney newspapers, the tabloid the daily telegraph and broadsheet the sydney morning herald, for the three-month period centred on the 2005 cronulla ‘riot’. as ‘locals’ may only be used as a noun, whereas ‘local’ may be used as a noun or adjective, the word ‘locals’ was chosen as the only search-term in order to quickly gather data on the noun-use of the word. the critical language study utilised the method that norman fairclough outlines in language and power (2001). as the term implies, a critical language study aims to show up connections between language and power that may not be apparent on the surface. critical cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 91 language studies take a discourse view of language: a view that language is a form of social practice that is conditioned by social conventions (2001, p.18). social structures, then, give rise to certain structures in language, and conversely language plays a part in the (re)production of those social structures. language, therefore, portrays certain social structures and practices as common sense, natural or normal and so is a fundamental tool for the maintenance of power structures and power relations between social actors (smith 2006, p.82). being a local is part of the ‘linguistic repertoire’ of place-based power relations ‘that are ultimately a matter of who may or may not do what, when and where’ (pred 1990, p.33). because discursive processes represent and reproduce social structures, they are not only processes of social maintenance but also sites of social change. of relevance here is stuart hall’s concept of articulation. for hall articulation has the double sense of ‘giving expression to’ and a connection between one thing and another (hall 1996, p.141). these connections may appear to be natural—between farmers’ interests and legitimate local interests, for example, or between a lack of legitimacy to speak for a place and being a ‘blow-in’—but on analysis these natural connections are often revealed to be historical, social constructions which are contingent and open to rearrangement. a critical language study opens language to an analysis of these relations and the embedded ethos—‘what the customary attitudes, values, and practices of a group are’—to a wider ethical consideration of how those relations could and ‘should be’ (ball 2005, p.31). my particular focus in the analysis below is on the articulation of power, belonging and race. in the local print media based in lismore, covering a region of around 100,000 people, the locals are continually asserting a privileged connection to place in their encounters with others. at nearby byron bay, a favourite stop on the global backpacker route, the locals, tourists and tourism interests constantly jostle over ‘ownership’ of public space. on a more widespread basis, since the 1950s the sub-tropical rurality of this region has drawn a steady seaand tree-change migration that has accelerated from the 1970s onwards (kijas 2002, p.116). for the countryminded lismore of the 1970s it was the aquarius festival, an alternative student happening held over ten days at the nearby village of nimbin in 1973 and which never really ended, that through contrasting lifestyles gave the locals greater cultural visibility. thirty years later the ‘hippy’ or ‘new settler’/local divide has blurred considerably, with that language itself becoming quaint or obsolete, only to be once again resurrected in situations of cross-cultural tension. in these and a range of other contexts, questions of who 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 properly belongs here, who may assert cultural possession of public space, and who may or may not speak for a place are often settled in terms of who is or is not a local. one way of defining belonging as a local is explicitly articulated. if there is a question of one’s status as a local, conversation typically and quickly moves to duration of residence as the following examples demonstrate: when i first came to lismore twenty-five years ago, people told me it takes 25 years to become a local … my time’s up. i think i can safely say i’ve made it, ( nora vidlerblanksby quoted in satherley 2004, p.3) or all [the people i have just mentioned were] born and bred in the area, plus john chant, who has been here for 40 years, which makes him a local, (baxter 2004, p.11) or while many of the anti-[repco car]rally people look like they come from greater nimbin they are, in fact, long-time residents of kyogle shire. as one woman put it, her child was a “third generation hippy” from a family that had been in the council area for 40 years. mind you, 40 years is but a blink compared with the time many grazing families have been in the area, (brown 2009, p.11) or finally candidates [for lismore council elections] were given between two and three minutes open mic time and stayed mostly on message, apart from competing for “most local”, won by greens candidate laurie axtens, who is a fifth-generation lismoron (maxwell 2008). becoming local takes time: routine, everyday time spent on the ground. there is a notion here of connection between identity and a ‘patch of dirt’, of authenticity through autochthony, of being a child of the soil, of coming from a womb and from a place, of being born and bred. being local weaves identity and place together in this most intimate fashion. a local’s sense of identity emerges through time from a developing everyday personal relationship to place through a meld of history, community and geography (miller 2003, p.217). to come from outside lismore, and move beyond being ‘just a blow-in’—an unannounced stranger blown off-course—the honorific must be earned through an infusion of soil into one’s blood. the period required for this metamorphosis is clearly open to question: twenty five years, forty years, five generations. in a sense, locals were never not here. history begins with their arrival, and somewhat paradoxically, with the forgetting of that arrival. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 93 the settled place of the locals, articulated through history, community and geography of necessity excludes. in de certeau’s words locals define themselves within a ‘proper place’ – ‘a place appropriated as one’s own’ – ‘in a world bewitched by the invisible powers of the other’ (1984, p.36). an analysis of the use of the word ‘local’ reveals how the idea of being ‘a local’ stabilises local belonging through concealment of self and other. a local, understood as ‘an inhabitant of a particular locality’ is a substantive, or noun-equivalent, of the adjective ‘local’ (oxford english dictionary 1989, p.1079). the noun which the adjective ‘local’ modifies is, therefore, understood, elided, concealed. this opens the question, what is the concealed noun? as is often the case, it is somewhat simpler to determine what the concealed noun is not. the critical language study of seventeen months’ issues of the northern star shows that within everyday settler discourse aborigines cannot be noun-locals (garbutt 2007). to do so, it seems, would pollute the proper place of ‘the local’ with the other. instead, aborigines are adjective-locals. in the northern star digby moran is described as a ‘local […] indigenous artist’ (redmond 2003, p.5). bill walker, the co-ordinator of the bundjalung nation aboriginal cultural heritage committee, is a ‘respected local identity’ according to the northern star (2004, p.3). these instances are illustrative of the repeated use of the term local as a regular adjective in reference to aborigines. local is a modifier of the nouns ‘artist’ and ‘identity’, indeed a modifier that refers to an imagined boundary rather than to the land itself. if there was a class of substantives (or noun equivalents) to which ‘local’ belonged, we would be justified in labelling them dispossessives. the noun-local excludes more than indigenous australians from this settled form of belonging. as the quotes from the northern star and the northern rivers echo indicate, there is an underlying normative aspect of belonging as a born and bred local which is especially evident in relation to ‘hippies’. jeannette edwards explains that this normative aspect of belonging is a key part of the british born-and-bred kinship system that is now widespread throughout the west. this system functions in terms of being ‘born’ in the ‘immutable place of birth’ and ‘bred’ which indicates ‘the effects of a variable upbringing’ (2000, p.84). thus, it is a kinship system that is both normative and symbolic: ‘it is made up of a code of conduct (what people do and say they do) and ideas of shared substance (symbolized in idioms of blood and increasingly genes)’ (edwards 2000, p.28). this 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 juxtaposition of normative and symbolic elements to kinship means that local belonging is complex. thus: to be born, say, in a particular place does not axiomatically confer the status of belonging to that place, one also needs to be brought up in a particular way. in the same way as being biologically related to a person does not axiomatically make them kin. a claim of belonging (to persons and places) can be made through upbringing as much as birth. the juxtaposition of being born and bred allows kinship to be conceptualized through both or through either. a variety of ways, then, based on birth and/or breeding are mobilized in a constant process of including and excluding persons from social categories which are, in turn, reproduced in the process (edwards 2000, p.28). the function of time spent in lismore stands in for biology or blood and breeding. in terms of breeding, the longer the time spent in a place, the more likely one is infused with local ways of doing things. in terms of blood, the ‘truer’ claims to being a local extend across generations. these local bloodlines are white, settler bloodlines. however, born-and-bred kinship complicates this system of belonging. claims of local status by a flamboyant mayoral candidate who has ‘done her time’, or a car-rally-protesting hippy or greens candidate making their case through generational links to the local area, simplify and misread the system. through the less tangible aspect of the code of conduct, conservative locals can dismiss such claims. indeed it is more likely that a businessman and supporter of the conservative and country-minded national party, such as john chant who arrived in lismore 40 years ago, would have a stronger claim to local status than is afforded by the 40 years of a third-generation hippy. moreover, asserting one’s own local status ignores the protocols of becoming a local: the patronage and acceptance of the established locals is the test. thus through born and bred kinship, ‘hippies’ can be excluded from status as locals by the conservative mainstream establishment despite satisfying the only publicly declared rule of local membership: time spent living in a place. when national and local identity are explicitly contested in the same moment, belonging again takes on issues of blood and a normative code of behaviour. in the instance of the racially-based ‘riot’ at cronulla in december 2005, for example, being a born and bred local was expressed not only through the colonial lineage symbolised by the union jack in the corner of australian flags worn as battle colours. it was also expressed through normative cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 95 codes of dress and behaviour that specifically excluded muslim men and women from ‘proper’ ways of belonging at the beach. the exclusion was at once local and national, that is, it was more than an issue of local beach etiquette, it was an assertion of national possession as well (evers 2006, moreton-robinson & nicholl 2007). suvendrini perera has described the cronulla riot as ‘a performance of native-ised territoriality’ by anglo-celtic settler australians (perera 2006). this description is supported by media reports in which the locals featured prominently. the channel nine news, for example, portrayed the intent of the crowd of 5,000 as ‘a show of numbers by locals wanting to protect cronulla … turning on individuals because of their ethnic background’ (tcn9 2005). these disturbing events began amidst a festive though fiercely nationalist atmosphere ‘sort of like australia day’ (sarah, quoted in jackson 2006). the australian broadcasting corporation’s week-night current affairs program, the 7:30 report, similarly reported that ‘“da boys”, the cronulla locals, turned up early and by 10am a party atmosphere was already underway’ (australian broadcasting commission 2005). defiant statements of angloaustralian possession accompanied this celebration of anglo-australian culture: a young man with an australian flag worn as a cape had the words ‘we grew here! you flew here! 2230 [the cronulla postcode]’ written across his torso; ‘100% aussie pride’ was inscribed on the beach itself; a banner held aloft demanded that unnamed others ‘respect locals or piss off!’ (singh 2007; elder 2007, p.305; murphy 2005, p.5; ramage 2005, p.6). the invitation to party was clearly not extended to everyone. at stake was the issue of (who decides) who belongs where; an issue debated using terms in which the dominant position of white settler australian is already embedded in the language of identity and place, and already localised to cronulla and australia. the language of local identity becomes particularly evident when focussing on the appearances of ‘locals’ (as a group and as a word) in newspapers in the weeks before and after the riot. the histogram in figure 1 charts the number of occurrences of the plural noun form of ‘local’ in the two major daily newspapers in sydney, the daily telegraph and the sydney morning herald (smh), for the three-month period centred on the cronulla riot, the reporting of which occurred in the week ending 18 december. the locals become ever more present in reports, from an average of 17 appearances per week for the twelve month period around the riot, to between two and three times that number in the weeks prior to and after the riot. 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 figure 1 number occurrences of the noun locals in two major sydney daily newspapers in the three month period centred on the cronulla riot of 11 december 2005. an analysis of data connected with the spike in the week of the riot demonstrates a direct connection between cronulla and use of the word ‘locals’. for example in the daily telegraph there were no references to cronulla locals during november 2005 whereas in december, cronulla locals featured in 56 percent of uses. by january 2006 cronulla locals were again fading into the background, accounting for ten percent of appearances. the locals made their presence felt in the week prior to the riot when a fight occurred between lifesavers and a group of young men of ‘middle-eastern appearance’. this event proved a turning point that evoked a call to arms. the daily telegraph, in tacit agreement, headed a number of letters to the editor on the subject with ‘let’s unite to fight this shame on the beaches’, including the following: sutherland shire residents have tolerated anti-social and downright un-australian behaviour from the influx of certain football-short wearing, gang-style riff-raff from the western suburbs for far too long. the suggestion now that cronulla locals may need to travel to out-of-area beaches themselves […] is absolutely ludicrous (de vere 2005, p.40). by the mid-week the sense of dispossession and loss that locals were experiencing transformed itself into action as a text message began proliferating between friends and acquaintances. through planned action locals were no longer victims of an historic ‘influx’ but protagonists who would reclaim ‘the shire’: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 97 racial violence exploded again at cronulla beach yesterday [7 december] as a text message circulated urging locals to take revenge on middle eastern gangs. […] police have […] called for calm amid fears the text message’s rallying call for locals to “take back the [sutherland] shire” this weekend could become a flash point for violence (daily telegraph 2005). another report explicitly sets out the terms of the dispute, and the limits of the process by which locals’ rules were to be negotiated: in the past, battles have been fought between locals and outsiders on city beaches, but this time it's clearly about race. locals claim that middle eastern gangs overrun cronulla every weekend, arriving by train and then gathering in groups to harass young girls. [...] the tribal surf culture in sydney is all about paying respect to the locals. the beach is for everyone, but only if you play by their rules (mcilveen, lawrence& brooker 2005, p. 68). the right of the locals to speak for a place, to define the rules for behaviour and to defend it from others who do not abide by these uncodified rules is a clear demonstration of the way localism marks out boundaries in terms of birth and breeding. that most of these ‘middle eastern’ young people had also been born in australia is not of consequence. the issue here is that the ‘claim of belonging (to persons and places) [… is being] made through upbringing as much as birth’ (edwards 2000, p. 28). or as marilyn strathern (1996) has noted of maintaining boundaries of belonging to a people and a place, born and bred kinship is as much about cutting networks as much as it is about making them. local and national intersections define ‘not being one of us’ which as a consequence leads to social exclusion in the form of denial of social and cultural participation in the wider society (mccrone & bechhofer 2008, p.1246). from the two case examples above, the first from lismore and the second from cronulla, we can see how australian localism faces in two directions to secure the borders of local belonging. firstly, the language analysis of the usage of ‘locals’ in the lismore press defines one boundary which separates conservative, settler locals from aborigines and another which separates those locals from ‘new settlers’ or ‘hippies’. the cronulla example more clearly defines the boundary of belonging between settler locals and later immigrants (in this particular case, the later immigrants are people of ‘middle-eastern’ descent). this boundary depends on the forgetting of aboriginal dispossession, thereby allowing the locals to overturn the prior property rights of aborigines and to install themselves as having moral priority in a 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 place as the first possessors (garbutt 2006, pp.175-179). the overturning of the natural law of first possession is impure, though not disorderly. it operates around two axes: one which overturns and one which preserves. the first is a racialised axis that overturns the ‘natural’ order of aborigine and settler and installs the settler as native. the second axis preserves the order of indigeneity—of being authentically of a place because of being the first from a place. these boundaries defend anglo-celtic born and bred localism against the inroads of multiculturalism and indigenous rights (cf griffiths, t. 1996, pp.220-224). the idea of being one of the locals can be seen as an example of belonging as membership. being a local is predicated on meeting particular rules that vary according to the issue at hand. in one instance these may be unstated rules of racial admission that exclude aborigines from belonging as locals. in another situation, it may be newcomers in the form of ‘hippies’ who do not adhere to conservative local norms. in cronulla it is the newcomers of middleeastern descent who are excluded. of course, the portrayal of local belonging as a form of belonging as membership, as distinct from belonging as an ongoing practice, is simplistic. local belonging as membership is constructed through social practices which exclude and maintain boundaries. these boundaries concern rules of group membership but also define belonging to a geographic place. the rules of this ‘proper place’ of the locals, however, are also intimately connected with practices and performances of national identity. these factors, underpinned by the norms of a born-and-bred kinship system, infuse local belonging with the boundaries of nation, blood, and ways of behaving in complex combinations which derive their power, in part, by rarely being explicitly articulated. in the following section, this paper turns to practices of belonging which include, and in doing so they necessarily disrupt established boundaries of local belonging as membership. they are, therefore, practices of belonging that are also practices of contestation. they seek inclusion, but only by initially creating dissonance. becoming a local: practices of belonging which promote inclusion while the idea of being one of the locals is maintained through established rules of membership, there are individuals and groups who seek to expand the senses of local belonging through inclusive practices. these practices make a place in the local community for individuals and groups who might not ordinarily be thought of as ‘mainstream’ locals, thereby unfixing implicit rules of who belongs in a place. in this section, then, belonging is cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 99 predominantly viewed as the product of everyday practices that connect individuals and groups to the social and civic fabric of a place. the two case examples examined here create new spaces for connecting with others in an inclusive, open and public way. by enabling dialogue across boundaries, the boundaries of local membership are themselves brought into question, and through social practices local identity becomes a matter of what one does, rather than who one is. in the process it becomes clear that belonging as membership has always been fluid with the articulation of being a local with such things as race, class, age, gender and sexuality always being arbitrary, even when essentialised and unquestioned. indeed, the many possible intersections of these and other aspects of identity have meant that the rules for local membership have been under continual negotiation depending on the social situation. nevertheless, an emphasis on local belonging as membership often means exclusion despite one’s efforts to ‘fit in’, and that is based on criteria that are outside one’s control. two community-based projects are the focus of this section: lismore’s living library and an anzac day peace project called ‘remembering and healing old wounds’. lismore’s living library aims to challenge stereotypes and reduce discrimination against marginalised groups through bringing people together in one-on-one conversations. remembering and healing old wounds is a ‘commitment to eternal vigilance against war’ and questioning the role of wars in defining australian identity (northern rivers echo 2009). both projects invite members of the community to develop new relationships and alliances. in the case of the living library the one-on-one conversations that take place, and reports about the living library in the media, have expanded the sense of diversity of the lismore community. the anzac day project, meanwhile, provides a place for questioning the use of the anzac tradition for narrowly nationalistic purposes (mckenna 2007). this in turn creates an inclusive space for those members of the community whose heritage is not from an australian allied nation, or who feel alienated by the purposes to which anzac day has recently been put. both projects, and their inclusive and sometimes contentious nature, will now be explored in more detail. the living library concept is a grass-roots response to discrimination and stereotyping. the first living library was organised for the 2000 roskilde festival in denmark by the stop volden (in english ‘stop the violence’) non-government organisation (council of europe n.d.). the project aimed to bring individual young people together in a short conversation that 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 would put a story to difference. in the words of the organisers, participants are encouraged to ‘[m]eet your own prejudice! instead of talking about it, simply meet it’ (abergel et al. 2005, p.9). in living library projects the living books are usually members of groups who are subject to discrimination and stereotypes. a living library session involves a library of living books making themselves available for borrowing by members of the public for a thirty-minute or so ‘reading’. living libraries can take a number of forms. generalist living libraries are comprised of living books representing a range of backgrounds who might give themselves ‘book titles’ according to intersections of, for example, ethnicity, religion, sexuality or ability. alternatively, living libraries can be organised for celebratory or commemorative days, for example, for international day for people with disability. in all cases the aim is to provide ‘ordinary’ community members with the opportunity for a conversation with a person they may not ordinarily meet in order to dispel negative stereotypes and prejudice. in conversation, readers soon discover that the ‘book title’ is but one chapter of the ‘living book’. in australia the first living library was launched in lismore in november 2006. it was organised by a community-led committee who were concerned to counter, through a local level project, a culture of fear of others that appeared to be present at the national level. lismore city library now operates the living library on a monthly basis (abc 2007, garbutt 2008). books were actively recruited for local and national reasons: some such as a muslim, an aboriginal young person, an african refugee, people with disability, and a person with hiv/aids were all members of groups who routinely suffer from prejudice throughout australia; whereas a hippy and a farmer could be stereotyped for a range of local reasons. the living library project has had a number of effects on the way community is imagined in lismore. constant media attention, as a result of partnerships between the living library and local print media organisations, has seen a widening representation of who lismore is. meanwhile, within the confines of the living library and the individual conversations, the politics of representation takes on new dimensions where listening becomes a key component of the exchange; as is an unmediated marginalised voice to listen to, respond to, and engage with. what is enabled in these conversations is an opportunity to be open to alternative understandings of the world and one’s locale, and doing this together across differences. the journey is risky and personal. as susan bickford writes, quoting merleau-ponty, in such cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 101 conversations ‘[w]hat i come to understand is not simply the other’s perspective, but my perspective in light of his [sic], and his in light of mine – “i learn to know both myself and others”’ (1996, p.147). the possibility is that at a personal level a type of non-assimilationist integration can begin in living library conversations; integration which is based on joint effort and that does not leave dominant groups unchanged (ang 2008, pp.230-231). anthony appiah writes that in such instances ‘[y]ou enter a conversation, and conversation is about listening as well as talking; it's about being open to being changed yourself, but it's not about expecting consensus or seeking agreement’ (brookes & appiah 2006). in many ways, living library conversations put established local identity at risk ‘by enlarging the variety of relationships which constitute [local] selves’ (sylvain 2005). the living library project, then, is not necessarily about seeking harmony, so much as expanding networks of inclusion. through living library conversations, through positive media reports and through the subsequent conversations that books and readers have with friends outside the living library confines, new ideas of who belongs as part of the community germinate. while evidence of a direct causal relationship between improved social inclusion and living library operation is not yet available, a range of small-scale evaluations indicate living library projects have a positive effect on readers’ openness towards others (see for example baltruweit. mcintyre & garbutt 2007). in the lismore project it is clear from living books’ evaluation survey responses that they often challenged readers’ assumptions. one living book remarked that ‘some people come with preconceived ideas and [are] surprised at how “normal” we are’ (mcintyre & garbutt 2007, p.3). a reader at the project launch remarked that, ‘speak[ing] to people openly and honestly enriches my life and draws me closer to them as human beings’. ninety-eight percent of readers at the launch stated that they learnt something by borrowing a book and there is evidence that negative stereotypes were altered. for example, in a candid comment a reader said that ‘[i] learned that not all aboriginal people get drunk and violent’. another stated, ‘many of my assumptions were wrong’; and yet another, ‘i learnt mostly how different, yet the same, gays are to the heterosexual community’. such experiences build social inclusion in a personal way. as one reader put it, ‘there are many different types of people in lismore that are very friendly’ (mcintyre & garbutt 2007). similar evidence from other living library projects reinforces these initial indications from lismore (living libraries australia; living library organisation). 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 the anzac day remembering and healing old wounds project is of a much different kind to the living library project. the living library challenges dominant views of belonging and place, as well as acting to dispel stereotypes and reduce discrimination, however the project has raised few, if any, public objections. the remembering and healing old wounds project, on the other hand, is an intervention that concerns anzac day commemorations and which, therefore, connects to deeply held, even ‘sacred’ ideas of australian national identity. in 2009, the first year of the project, two events were organised: an anzac eve service, and the remembering and healing old wounds ceremony, held on anzac day following the official program that is regulated by the returned services league (rsl). around one hundred people attended the anzac eve service which included a reconciliation ceremony involving australian and japanese representatives. the anzac day ceremony involved ‘people representing many different faiths and backgrounds, from christians and jews to muslims, japanese, refugees, young people and many others’ (sword 2009). it was the ceremony on anzac day that caused the most division amongst community members. as the secretary of the lismore sub-branch of the rsl wrote in the lead up to anzac day: i cannot understand or fathom why this group insists on holding [the ceremony] on anzac day. it’s beyond belief that they would choose a day that is sacred to the ex-service community and the citizens of australia when they could have it on any other day of the year … anzac day is more significant to the general public psyche of what it means to be australian than any other day and, as such, it should … not be diminished in any way. i find their self-interest in holding this event when they have been asked not to goes totally against the spirit of anzac day, which is about self-sacrifice for the common interest (sword 2009). a past national president of the rsl provided the alternative view: while anzac day is about commemorating those who gave their lives in the defence of australia and the service of those who returned, it is appropriate to remember all those who have died in war, including our enemies, if we are to reinforce the lesson of the futility of war and renew our commitment to peace… in my experience, it is those who have been through the worst of war who are the first to acknowledge its folly (sword 2009). these two views on the remembering and healing old wounds project represent the lines along which divergent views were expressed in daily conversation and letters to the editor. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 103 with the stated aim of promoting peace and harmony, this division makes the project a complex intervention to analyse, however in terms of opening a space for conversation about an issue that goes to the core of national identity the project is extremely effective. the three women who organised the celebration, one who ‘grew up in devastated post-war germany’, another ‘a jewish woman whose grandparents survived the holocaust’, and another who is ‘an australian woman born during wwii’ embody the tensions of negotiating national belonging at the local level in a multicultural nation (northern rivers echo 2009). part of that negotiation, just as with controversies over australia day/invasion day, is to create public opportunities for dialogue about the dominant narratives that accompany anzac day and how these narratives position people in relation to the nation to which they belong. again, following appiah’s idea of conversation, this is about listening as well as speaking, and not necessarily about seeking harmony but of getting used to living in a globalising community in which difference is part of life. recent conversations between the remembering and healing old wounds project organisers and the local rsl sub-branch demonstrate that this dialogue across difference is continuing and that there are possibilities for a co-ordinated approach to a diverse range of activities for anzac day 2010. social inclusion and local practices of belonging this paper began by arguing for a relational view of society rather than one solely expressed through a spatially bound metaphor. while it is difficult to maintain this sense of society when writing about social inclusion and belonging—language such as centre and periphery, marginalised, inclusion and exclusion all convey this spatially-bounded sense—it is important to hold onto the thought that through relationships all people are products of a society and part of it. for this reason the quality of social relationships, in particular their inclusive quality, is important. consequently, it has been argued here that relational aspects of social inclusion are important aspects for social inclusion policy as they are ‘causal factor[s] of disadvantage’ (babacan 2008). in order to develop this argument at the local level, this paper has taken local belonging as its focus. again, belonging at the everyday, local level is conceived of in relational terms and as an ongoing project achieved through everyday practices rather than solely in terms of membership of a group. while practices such as regularly engaging in team sports are accepted ways of establishing and maintaining belonging, for others in a community 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 normative practices of belonging may require disrupting or at least broadening the established ways of how one belongs. the established form of belonging that was examined in detail was the idea of being a local, a way of belonging that appears to be based on membership, though is constituted through a range of boundary-making practices. being a local, as we have seen in the case of cronulla in december 2005, can be the subject of sometimes intense border security work that is simultaneously local and national in character. finally, this paper turned to two local projects which disrupt the exclusive bounds of local membership and establish new and inclusive practices of belonging. lismore’s living library and the remembering and healing old wounds project are community-based and initiated projects which enable new possibilities for belonging to be expressed in the media and to be experienced by participants. they enable bridges of belonging to be built across existing boundaries, and sometimes disrupt the very boundaries themselves. they highlight the importance of relational and practice-based models and the perils of spatial metaphors when thinking about belonging and social inclusion, for there are significant parallels between the spatial metaphors that set the boundaries of ‘the social’ in ‘social inclusion’ and ‘the local community’ in being a local. spatial metaphors of society, community and inclusion lend themselves to distributional policy solutions, and these are important. a relational understanding, however, points to the underlying causes of exclusion; to the everyday practices which reinforce a sense of not belonging, whether to a community or the wider society. while it is obvious that government policy approaches to social inclusion could never include projects such as the politically contentious remembering and healing old wounds, it is important that projects are encouraged which stimulate discussion of how communities and the nation are conceived and that open up the established boundaries of belonging. it is crucial, therefore, that as part of the government’s social inclusion agenda, it continues to commit to programs which support local level responses to relational issues of social inclusion. these programs, such as the department of immigration and citizenship’s diverse australia program need to ensure priority is given to projects which bring diverse elements of a community together, especially dominant and marginal groups, on equal terms. the scope of such programs also requires expanding from issues arising from multicultural difference to envelop the range of relational issues already incorporated in the social inclusion agenda such as dis/ability, homelessness, aboriginal disadvantage, together with other issues that are cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 105 salient at the local level. beyond government sponsorship, there will always be a need for the project which will never be funded and would suffer through constraints if it was. these projects, such as the remembering and healing old wounds project flourish in their independence and trouble-making capacity. such projects are also part of local-level responses to inclusion that deserve our critical attention and critical support. references abergel, 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(eds), autoethnographies: the anthropology of academic practices, broadview press, peterborough. tcn9, 2005, national nine news, tcn9, sydney, 11 december. vinson, t. 2007, dropping off the edge: the distribution of disadvantage in australia, jesuit social services / catholic social services australia, richmond. yuval-davis, n., kannabiran, k. & vieten, u. 2006, ‘introduction: situating contemporary politics of belonging’ in n.yuval-davis, k. kannabiran & u. vieten (eds), the situated politics of belonging, sage, london. zylinska, j. 2005, the ethics of cultural studies, continuum, london. http://www.echonews.com/index.php?%20page=news%20article&article=26061&issue=399� http://www.echonews.com/index.php?%20page=news%20article&article=26061&issue=399� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the blindside flick: race and rugby league drew cottle university of western sydney angela keys charles sturt university abstract the issue of race was virtually beyond the touchline in australian rugby league before the 1960s. it was a white man’s game. institutionalised racism meant that few aboriginal men played rugby league at the highest professional level. it is now presumed that race and racism have no place in a game where these questions have been historically ‘out of bounds’. the dearth of critical writing in rugby league history indicates that racism in the sport has been subject to a form of social blindness and deemed unworthy of study. rugby league’s white exclusionist past and the denial of racism in the present era indicate habits of mind that may be described in league argot as the ‘blindside flick’. until the contemporary era of rugby league in australia, the ‘blindside flick’ was a pass to a player who would almost inevitably be forced over the sideline by the opposing team. it was a pass of no consequence, a manoeuvre to be avoided or ignored. fans of rugby league usually viewed such a pass with dismay. in recent years, however, the blindside flick has been successfully deployed by teams possessing players with speed, agility, creativity and vision. nevertheless, it remains a marginal tactic that is absent from most coaching manuals. the evolution of the blindside flick may be seen in broad terms as a metaphor for the issue of race throughout the history of the code of rugby league. until the 1960s, only a small number of talented aborigines had been given an opportunity to play at the highest level in australian rugby league. from that decade onward, the number of indigenous players amongst australia’s representative team and the nation’s professional clubs has increased markedly. in more recent years, there has even been a-statistical ‘overrepresentation’ of aboriginal rugby league players within these teams (hallinan and judd 2009, p. 1222). this paper discusses the changing manifestations of racism in australian rugby league and questions whether a different form of racism has evolved along with the game in its contemporary form. within australia, racism in sport has not been solely confined to the code of rugby league. beyond rugby league, successful aboriginal men and women in a range of sports have continually confronted a racist paradox. their acceptance is dependent upon them being considered like other nonindigenous australians, even as their aboriginality is emphasised. their sporting successes, along with their failures, are often viewed in terms of a racist paradigm (godwell 2000). they are praised for their extraordinary sporting abilities or damned for their enigmatic unpredictability by coaches, the 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia media and sports fans. as bob moore has noted, ‘each positive outcome for indigenous athletes is treated as an anachronism. each negative acts as a metonymic descriptor for the entire indigenous community’ (2008, p. 73). the abilities and achievements of aboriginal athletes in australia are often evaluated in implicitly racist terms. indeed, the realm of sport appears to be one of the few remaining arenas where race ‘science’ still has some cogency. john hoberman’s 1997 study, darwin’s athletes, revealed that sport in the united states remained largely informed by a racist ideology, including notions that align race with aptitudes in specific sports. differences in sporting ability have been ascribed to supposed racial ‘characteristics’, such as the idea that evolution has endowed black athletes with a ‘monkey muscle’ that enhances their running ability (hoberman 1997). similarly narrow ideas have been expressed in the contemporary australian context, for example, by the former cricketer dennis lillee, who has described with admiration the ‘fast twitch muscles’ of indigenous football players (hallinan and judd 2009, p1227). the implications of such ideas are considerable, as they have the potential to reinforce racial stereotypes and divisions. bob moore (2008, p. 73) has explored these implications with regard to aboriginal rugby league players in australia: white players could rest assured that the aboriginal players did not have more ability than them, they simply had better genes. when the performances of aboriginal athletes did not match their theoretical goals, they were marked as lazy. the evidence was reconstructed to fit the hypothesis, and indigenous athletes were placed in an invidious position: if they succeeded in their chosen sport, it was the result of genetics; if they failed to succeed, they lacked the requisite drive and purpose. it is perhaps evidence of the evolution of racism itself that the language used to link race and sport can be subtle, almost inadvertent and, at times, even sound positive. it is customary to hear australian rugby league commentators emphasise an aboriginal player’s ‘natural ability’. regardless of whether or not this constitutes a new form of unintentional racism, the result, as in the past, is that it serves to emphasise differences and divisions along racial lines. the complexities of race in contemporary australian sport have been explored by chris hallinan and barry judd in relation to the australian football league (afl). these authors have applied the theories of ‘enlightened racism’ and ‘inferential racism’ to demonstrate that a racialised logic often underpins both positive and negative appraisals of indigenous afl players (hallinan and judd 2009). on the question of analysing and understanding racism, gillian cowlishaw (1986, p. 22) has argued that: the way physical, cultural or other differences between groups are related to domination, exclusion, exploitation and inequality is an historical question. theories cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 3 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia of racism that continue to reify race and to ignore the particular ways that racial boundaries and definitions are created will remain inadequate. racism within the code of rugby league in australia is historical, following the trajectory of the racism that permeated australian society. from white settlement in 1788, the nation’s aboriginal people were dispossessed, marginalised and segregated on reserves. australia’s indigenous population was denied even the most basic citizenship rights until 1967. aborigines were seen as objects in the gallery of race science and social darwinism. they were initially expected to simply ‘die out’. a prevailing ‘logic’ about degrees or levels of blackness led to the removal and institutionalisation of many lighter-skinned aboriginal children. until the 1960s, the code of rugby league reflected australian attitudes and values by virtually excluding aboriginal people from playing at a high level in what was then a white men’s game. only a few of the most outstanding aboriginal footballers were given an opportunity to play in white teams before that decade. one researcher, david huggonson views the sport of rugby league as an outlet that helped to overcome the problems created within australian society by racism. huggonson has attempted to trace aboriginal participation in queensland rugby league from 1908 to 1958. he believes that black queensland players helped to ‘break the barriers of racial prejudice’ (davis 2008). in queensland, the 1897 aboriginal protection act had segregated indigenous people onto reserves such as cherbourg and palm island, a policy that lasted well into the 1960s. rugby league had a presence on these reserves, with many of the communities forming their own rugby league teams. nevertheless, as huggonson acknowledges, the sport of rugby league could not transcend the barriers of structural racism. huggonson highlights the case of one aboriginal footballer, frank fisher (grandfather of olympian cathy freeman), who was selected to play against a touring great britain side (davis 2008). the british were so impressed by him that their manager suggested to fisher that he go and play professional football in england. that was not possible at that time because he was constrained by the aborigines protection board and not being seen as a ‘citizen’ he would never have been granted a passport (fagan 2008). few aboriginal footballers were permitted to reach the representative level attained by frank fisher in that era. in 1937, arthur kurrie, who played for the tweed heads’ ‘all blacks’ team, (the first all-aboriginal team in a local competition), was selected as a member of the new south wales country squad which defeated the city side (fagan 2008). between the late 1930s and the mid-1940s, the indigenous johnson brothers from currabubula near tamworth played for canterbury, south sydney and the new south wales country representative side (tatz 1995, pp. 188-193). 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia for rugby league in australia, the decade of the 1960s has been viewed as a turning point in race relations within that sport (tatz 1995, p. 199). prior to the late 1960s, very few aboriginal men played at the highest levels of rugby league and only a handful played for australia, including eric simms, lionel williamson, larry corowa, lionel morgan and arthur beetson (stoddart 1986, pp. 167-169). from the 1960s to the present, a growing number of young aboriginal men have played rugby league at the professional level. nevertheless, their involvement with that football code has largely been limited to their participation as players. the high level of indigenous participation on the field has not been mirrored in the off-field facets of the game, such as administration, coaching or refereeing. of former indigenous rugby league players from professional clubs, arthur beetson remains one of the few who has had a career as a coach and been appointed as a selector of the australian representative team. roy masters, a journalist and former football coach, suggests that beetson, unlike other black footballers, was ‘brash, aggressive and unyielding’ on and off the field. perhaps it was these qualities, as well as his talent as a player, that ensured beetson would not be given the blindside flick (tatz 1995, p. 204). heidi norman has explored how the new south wales rugby league aboriginal knockout competition emerged out of the late 1960s and early 1970s as an expression of both cultural resistance and indigenous identity, in an effort to break the mould of assimilation. aboriginal men and women formed teams all over new south wales – in the towns of walgett, moree, kempsey, la perouse, dubbo, bourke, maitland, nambucca heads. links were formed between these towns throughout the state, and by the strength of organising within their communities the towns were able to stage a knockout competition. there was even some discussion of an aboriginal team being created to be part of the national competition, but it was never seriously considered by the governing body of the code. the black knockout competition was a demonstration of aboriginal people creating a game of their own despite difficult circumstances. it wasn’t simply about football; it was about family, community and celebrating their aboriginality (norman 2006, pp. 169-186). similarly, jackie hartley’s study of the role of rugby league in redfern has emphasised the social significance of the game. hartley has explained that young indigenous men in redfern formed the all blacks rugby league team not only to collectively escape the depressed social conditions that they lived in, but more importantly to forge a distinctive indigenous identity that defied the prevailing notion of assimilation. the formation of the all blacks rugby league team was also assisted by the australian communist party, which had an association with a number of the players. the existence of the all blacks team became an example through sport of cultural resistance (hartley 2002, pp. 149171). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 5 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia although the establishment of the aboriginal knockout competition in new south wales and the formation of redfern’s all blacks team appear to be evidence of the empowerment of the indigenous population via the avenue of rugby league, some doubts remain about a game that has a lengthy racist history. the problem of racism in rugby league was exposed by anthony mundine on his departure from the st george team. mundine did not comply with what appears to be demanded by the code: a silence on the issue of racism. in 1998, the st george five-eighth accused the canterbury forward, barry ward, of calling him a ‘black c..t’. ward was fined $10,000 by the judiciary, which reduced the sum to $5,000 on appeal (human rights and equal opportunity commission 2006, p. 139). reflecting on that incident, anthony mundine (pramberg 2009) has stated: people have to understand how brutal racial vilification can be… it can have a brutal mental effect on the person being abused. fines have not been the sole outcome of such incidents. in 2005, bryan fletcher, a south sydney player, was replaced as the team’s captain after he racially vilified indigenous footballer, dean widders, from the parramatta club (honeysett 2009). a refusal to tolerate racist abuse has emerged, too, in other australian football codes. australian football league players michael long and nicky winmar were arguably the most prominent aborigines to reject racism within that sport. racial abuse continues to be an often unrecognised form of provocation within australian sport (mcnamara 1998, pp. 85-109). in the game of rugby league, some aboriginal footballers have acknowledged their reluctance to complain about the racist jibes to which they were subjected. former brisbane broncos player, steve renouf, (malone and dekroo 2008) stated in relation to the worst racial abuse he encountered: i thought it was no big deal because the bloke who said it, i actually get along with him. i didn’t make a deal of it afterwards. another retired brisbane bronco, gordon tallis, (malone and dekroo 2008) said: unfortunately, racism is nothing new. i remember that when i was playing the ‘monkey’ chants were not uncommon. racist taunts and insults have not only been directed at rugby league players of aboriginal descent. fijian-born penrith player, petero civoniceva, was racially abused during a match in july 2008 by fans of the opposing parramatta team, who referred to him as a ‘monkey’. civoniceva (read 2008) described the incident: they were saying `you're a monkey, why don't you get back in your tree'. that's why i took offence to it. i can get over being called `you black so and so'. i have heard that since i was a kid playing footy. 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia in a game in may 2009, cronulla captain, paul gallen called pacific islander and st george illawarra player, micky paea, a ‘black c..t’. gallen was fined $10,000 by the national rugby league, although paea had refused to make an official complaint about the incident (honeysett 2009). john hoberman’s (1997) observations of the racial physicality logic within sport in the united states have a resonance, too, in australian rugby league. colin and paul tatz, for instance, have discussed the ‘natural’ ability of aboriginal rugby league players as ‘black gold’ (2000, pp. 198-231). a 1991 study found that australian rugby league coaches were making selections for team positions that were consistent with racial stereotypes. these stereotypes had historically seen aboriginal players confined to playing out on the wing, where speed and some ball skills were paramount, rather that the game’s strategic positions of halfback or five-eighth, which required organising ability and discipline (hallinan 1991, pp. 69-79). darren godwell (2000) critiques the idea of natural ability and asserts that indigenous involvement in rugby league can be attributed to a positive cycle of personal application and self-confidence. godwell (2000) argues that it is a fixed stereotype that it is their aboriginality that gives players their sporting ability. the stereotype may be internalised by the players and seen as an obvious truth by most non-indigenous supporters of the game. such a view does not address the other areas of prevailing racism within the lives of aboriginal footballers. the notion that aborigines are good at football because they are aboriginal does not begin to address racism, nor the racial inequities in power relations. these ideas owe more to the race science and social darwinism of the past. race, historically, is the blindside flick pass in rugby league. while there is some academic criticism, and sporadic reference to race and rugby league in the press, there is an enduring silence over the question of race in the game. one could say that there is no public voice or identity in australia for aborigines. the dominant whiteness of australia and its essentially racist character, as in rugby league, is largely never questioned let alone interrogated (ingram 2001, pp. 157-176). this was reflected in david mellor’s study (2003, p. 482) of the racism encountered in australia by aboriginal people: the data indicate that the racism experienced by the aboriginal participants is pervasive. there was substantial agreement among the interviewees that non-aboriginal people hold negative stereotypes about aborigines and that this is normative. these stereotypes are seen to be freely perpetuated in society by individuals and the media. in sum, these perceived stereotypes convey the message to the participants that they have no place in the “culturally superior” mainstream society. mellor’s survey identified sport as just one of the numerous areas or activities in which aboriginal people experienced racism in australia on an everyday basis (2003, p. 483). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 7 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia racialised sport has become institutionally normalised.1 the racially marginalised are expected to conform to the dominant whiteness of the sporting codes (gale 2000, pp. 251-263). this question of normalised racism pervades not only rugby league but all sporting codes in australia. historically, aboriginal players have been excluded from the game because of racism in the period prior to the 1960s. what permeates australian rugby league is a politics of whiteness, which reflects a prevailing mentality of white colonial settler exclusionism. indigenous players, even if they played representative football for australia, are never seen as being quite ‘australian’. prior to the 1960s, a form of exclusion on demand was enforced that effectively excluded aboriginal people from every sphere of material life. they were seen to be separate and inferior. in a materialist sense, the sport of rugby league before the 1960s presented young indigenous men with the opportunity to earn money at a time when institutionalised racism excluded aborigines from most avenues of paid work. rugby league, like foot running and tent boxing, saw aboriginal men receive cash in hand payments for their performance. however, payment was usually withheld if a victory was not forthcoming (broome 1980, pp. 49-72; corris 1980). colin tatz has suggested that rugby league was a working-class game that was seen as being receptive to young aboriginal men with talent and ability. rugby league ‘has been more accessible to aborigines than any other sport; it has certainly been the most generous of the major sports they play’ (tatz 1995, p. 188). the cash nexus did not end racial discrimination; it became more complicated in the context of organised professional sport. the virtual exclusion of most aboriginal players from the code of rugby league before the 1960s was a reflection of the dominant social relations within australia. from the early 1970s, rugby league became more commercialised and corporatised at its highest levels. full-time professionalism created opportunities for indigenous players who were marketable in a sport that was becoming a corporate entertainment (cottle 2008, p. 135). this period of intensified commercialisation saw an increase in the number of aborigines playing for professional rugby league clubs. colin tatz (1995, p. 207) observed in the mid-1990s: since 1980 the number of talented aboriginal players has virtually quadrupled. in 1987 there were between twenty-nine and thirty-two aborigines in the senior sydney premiership competition. aborigines form 1.2 per cent of the new south wales population, yet they constituted close on 9 per cent of the players in thirteen premier and reserve grade sides in sydney. in the 1990s the numbers were higher. with the rise in the number of aboriginal players in all positions on the football field, the exclusionist racism of the past had ended. from the 1970s, the old blindside flick pass of race was seemingly 1 this notion is explored in the work of david theo goldberg. see goldberg, d.t. 1993, racist culture, blackwell, oxford. 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia being ignored. nevertheless, there remained a pervasive silence on the question of race and racism in rugby league, which was broken only occasionally by indigenous footballers such as anthony mundine. in the contemporary era, outstanding aboriginal players receive the highest accolades from the game, but the blindside flick pass of the racist past has now been replaced by an emphasis on the ‘innate’ physicality and ‘natural ability’ of these players. the old race flick pass has been transformed into the apparently colour-blind flick pass. nonetheless, the dominant whiteness of australian society cannot be drawn into question.2 racism in rugby league has barely begun to be addressed, just as racism in australia may never be eradicated. the question of race and rugby league has been made more complex and contradictory with the staging in february 2010 of a match to mark the second anniversary of prime minister kevin rudd’s apology for the past injustices in the treatment of the nation’s aboriginal people. the match featured a national rugby league all-stars team against a squad called the ‘indigenous all-stars’. the selection of the indigenous all-stars was viewed by many as an opportunity for remembrance of the past and to celebrate aboriginal culture (marshall 2010). however, the selection of the team on the basis of race could be seen as an example of ‘enlightened racism’ and a reinforcement of perceived racial differences. in recent decades, the ranks of both australian rugby league and rugby union have been swelled by players of pacific island descent, which has had an impact on indigenous participation (horton 2008). the participation of large numbers of these non-white players has seen a return to the evaluation of players in terms of racial characteristics. as chris valiotis (2008, pp. 141-142) has observed: when trying to explain the large presence and success of rugby league players of pacific islander heritage in the national rugby league (nrl) in recent times, popular opinion has almost exclusively focused on the physical attributes of these players. journalists, commentators, talent scouts, club trainers, coaches and supporters are all keen to emphasise that size and brawn offer unfair advantages to pacific islander players that (so the argument goes) non-pacific islander footballers lack. indigenous players registered with nrl clubs in the 2009 season comprised ten per cent of those on professional contracts. in the early 1990s, indigenous players represented twenty per cent of the total number of contracted nrl players. according to roy masters (2009, p. 32), nrl coaches are now selecting ‘bigger, stronger polynesians rather than quicker more agile [indigenous] players’ for their 2 for an illuminating exposition of race and silence, see farred, g. 2004, ‘fiaca and veron-ismo: race and silence in argentine football’, leisure studies, vol. 23, no. 1, january, pp. 47-61. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 9 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia squads. polynesian players in 2009 account for nearly thirty per cent of the total number of nrl contracted players. australia’s rugby league administration has responded to the ‘polynesian expansion’ of the code by trialling new size restrictions for younger teams. in junior rugby league, weight and age measurements have been introduced ‘to enable players who don’t want to play against larger, heavier players to still participate in the game in a restricted team’ (human rights and equal opportunity commission 2006, p. 135). like aboriginal players, pacific islander footballers have been subjected to racial taunts and insults while participating in the traditionally white-dominated code of rugby league (human rights and equal opportunity commission 2006, pp. 135-136). the blindside flick of racism in rugby league leaves a crowded field of questions. is the playing of rugby league a defensive response by indigenous people to the problem of living in a racist australia? is it a form of psychic compensation for racial oppression? does rugby league offer the possibility of achieving for indigenous men respect through the demonstration of their athletic abilities? does rugby league mask or mirror existing racial tensions or inequalities? is it the anodyne illusion of racial harmony and equality? is professional and corporate rugby league a mechanism of escape and social mobility for young aboriginal men? or is this, too, an ephemeral illusion? is it now taken for granted that young indigenous men will become temporary contracted employees in corporate rugby league? should young indigenous rugby league footballers be role models? if they are role models, or are expected to be so, how does this realise or reflect the possibilities and limitations of social change over the question of race? can playing football change the nature of australian racism? this article has attempted in a provisional way to explore the vexed question of race in australian rugby league. the metaphor of the blindside flick has been employed to examine the changing nature of racism within that football code. as anthony mundine has observed about racism in ruby league in australia, “there’s been many incidents… it’s been like a cancer” (pramberg 2009). references broome, r. 1980, ‘professional aboriginal boxers in eastern australia, 1930-1979’, aboriginal history, vol. 4, part 1, pp. 49-72. corris, p. 1980, lords of the ring: a history of prize-fighting in australia, allen and unwin, north ryde. cottle, d. 2008, ‘city money and the boys from the bush: country rugby league in new south wales – a political economy of immiseration’, in moore, a. and carr, a. (eds) centenary reflections: 100 years of rugby league in australia: assh studies, australian society for sports history, no. 25, pp. 127-139. cowlishaw, g. 1986, ‘race for exclusion’, australian and new zealand journal of sociology, vol. 22, no. 1, march, pp. 3-24. 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia davis, s. 2008, ‘herberton indigenous rugby players a link in the game’s history’, abc radio far north queensland, 23 june, accessed online: 3 september 2008, http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2008/06/23/2283234.htm fagan, s. 2008, ‘first indigenous rugby league footballers’, nrl rugby league history rl1908, accessed online: 3 september 2008, http://www.rl1908.com/history/indigenous.htm gale, p. 2000, ‘construction of whiteness in the australian media’, in docker, j. and fischer, g. (eds) race, colour and identity in australia and new zealand, unsw press, sydney, pp. 251263. godwell, d. 2000, ‘playing the game: is sport as good for race relations as we’d like to think?’, australian aboriginal studies, no. 1-2, pp. 12-19. hallinan, c.j. 1991, ‘aborigines and positional segregation in australian rugby league’, international review for the sociology of sport, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 69-79. hallinan, c. and judd, b. 2009, ‘race relations, indigenous australia and the social impact of professional australian football’, sport in society, vol. 12, no. 9, november, pp. 1220-1235. hartley, j. 2002, ‘black, white…and red? the redfern all blacks rugby league club in the early 1960s’, labour history, no. 83, november, pp. 149-171. hoberman, j. 1997, darwin's athletes: how sport has damaged black america and preserved the myth of race, houghton mifflin, boston. honeysett, s. 2009, ‘sharks skipper paul gallen fined $10,000 for racial slur’, the australian, 25 may, accessed online: 20 march 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au horton, p. 2008, ‘australian pasifika youth and rugby: the emergence of glocalised masculinities’, paper presented at the conference sport, race and ethnicity: building a global understanding, university of technology, sydney, 30 november-2 december 2008. human rights and equal opportunity commission, 2006, what’s the score? a survey of cultural diversity and racism in australian sport, human rights and equal opportunity commission, sydney. ingram, p. 2001, ‘racializing babylon: settler whiteness and the “new racism”’, new literary history, vol. 32, no. 1, winter, pp. 157-176. masters, r. 2009, ‘league’s polynesian powerplay muscles in on indigenous numbers’, sydney morning herald, 24 april, p. 32. malone, p. and dekroo, k. 2008, ‘steve renouf backs game’s stance against racism’, courier-mail, 12 july, accessed online: 20 march 2010, http://www.couriermail.com.au marshall, m. 2010, ‘thurston swells with pride after indigenous victory’, courier-mail, 14 february, accessed online: 20 march 2010, http://www.couriermail.com.au mcnamara, l. 1998, ‘long stories, big pictures, racial slurs, legal solutions and playing the game’, australian feminist law journal, vol. 10, pp. 85-109. mellor, d. 2003, ‘contemporary racism in australia: the experiences of aborigines’, personality and social psychology bulletin, vol. 29, no. 4, april, pp. 474-486. moore, b. 2008, ‘black stars on a white background: 100 years of rugby league in the bundjalung nation’, in moore, a. and carr, a. (eds), centenary reflections: 100 years of rugby league in australia: assh studies, australian society for sports history, no. 25, 2008, pp. 65-79. norman, h. 2006, ‘a modern day corroboree: towards a history of the new south wales aboriginal rugby league knockout’, aboriginal history, vol. 30, pp. 169-186. http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2008/06/23/2283234.htm� http://www.rl1908.com/history/indigenous.htm� http://www.theaustralian.com.au/� http://www.couriermail.com.au/� http://www.couriermail.com.au/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 11 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia pramberg, b. 2009, ‘anthony mundine says paul gallen deserved 10-week knockout for alleged racist remarks’, courier-mail, 26 may, accessed online: 20 march 2010, http://www.couriermail.com.au read, b. 2008, ‘petero lashes out after fans’ monkey taunt’, the australian, 7 july, accessed online: 20 march 2010, http://www.theaustralian.com.au stoddart, b. 1986, saturday afternoon fever: sport in australian culture, angus and robertson, north ryde, sydney. tatz, c. 1995, obstacle race: aborigines in sport, unsw press, sydney. tatz, c. and tatz, p. 2000, black gold: the aboriginal and islander sports hall of fame, aboriginal studies press, canberra. valiotis, c. 2008, ‘suburban footballers of pacific islander ancestry: the changing face of rugby league in greater western sydney’, in moore, a. and carr, a. (eds) centenary reflections: 100 years of rugby league in australia: assh studies, australian society for sports history, no. 25, pp. 141-156. http://www.couriermail.com.au/� http://www.theaustralian.com.au/� 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia researching direct action against carbon emissions: a digital ethnography of climate agency r. pearse and j. goodman university of technology, sydney s. rosewarne university of sydney abstract global warming poses very directly the question of human agency. in this video ethnography of climate agency we explore dimensions of subjectivity in climate activism. through a longitudinal study we track activist strategising as a reflexive process of creating climate agency. activist reflection is presented as a balance between involvement and detachment, and analysed drawing on videoed interviews and on our own participation in organisations and events. visual artefacts are deployed to deepen insights into the interview process, and into the contexts for climate action. in terms of the analysis, there are three themes. first we look at trajectories – how people come to identify with the climate movement and engage in its direct action wing. second, we explore the hopes and fears of climate activists in the face of profound challenges. third, we address political antidotes, and the role of direct action in precipitating large-scale systemic change. across these themes there is much diversity and debate: what unifies is a common engagement in the broad field of direct climate action. this visual documentation helps us reflect on the conflicts and possibilities that thereby arise in contexts of climate activist praxis. because you can look at something and go “that was something nice that we created”, or maybe “it wasn’t nice, but we tried”’ [laughs]. (wells 2008) social agency is by necessity caught between involvement in the daily troubles of society and the need to gain an external perspective, in order to act on it. involvement is necessary for the insights it allows into social experiences; detachment is necessary to acquire a perspective on these experiences, to enable social agency (elias 1956, 2007). the responsibility of the sociologist – indeed of anyone involved in social action – is to bridge these worlds, to create the imagination needed for transformative agendas and visions, enabling us to become subjects of history, rather than its objects (mills 1959/2000). the challenge is to produce grounded explanations in dialogue with subjective or affective knowledge (juris 2008). indeed, using embedded explanations to produce normative claims is central to any possibility of a collective social movement ‘subjectivation’ (touraine 1995). the resulting practice-theory exchange, or praxis, is an important site in the production of emancipatory knowledge, to transform social relations (johnston & goodman 2006). this article explores how digital ethnography may help us explore this process, focusing on the current intensifying crisis of global warming. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 77 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia global warming poses very directly the question of human agency in the face of crisis, writ large on a global scale. in his writings on ‘involvement and detachment’, norbert elias addresses exactly this nexus, retelling edgar allen poe’s story of two mariners caught in a whirlpool created by their sinking ship (2007). one mariner is so involved in the crisis that he panics and flails around despairingly. the other mariner is able to reflect critically on their situation, and realises that a wooden barrel appears to be falling more slowly into the vortex. the second mariner grabs the barrel and floats free; the first mariner is drowned. the metaphor nicely encapsulates the global warming crisis, where engagement with the intensity of the crisis can produce a politics of avoidance, a variant of what ulrich beck calls ‘apocalypse blindness’ (beck 1992). here, the involvement/detachment dilemma is cast in sharp relief. we argue that the potential for climate agency comes from precisely this combined engagement with the intensity of the crisis and an ability to reflect on how to act on society to address the crisis (melucci 1996b). climate crisis and climate agency are, in this way, locked into a dialectical struggle. this characterisation is particularly evident where we distinguish crisis as a product of the internal contradictions of society from an externally imposed catastrophe. global warming is a product of human society, in its current capitalist model it is not an accident of natural history. society causes warming, and as such society can solve it. the question, though, is how? in the current era, finding answers to this question is a key priority for engaged sociological inquiry. how are we to investigate global warming in a way that engages both with the science of climate change and the social process of acting on it? notwithstanding controversy over the various diagnoses of global warming, it is possible to routinely access the science of global warming; but how are we to arrive at meaningful accounts of climate agency? in debates about climate change there is a strong tendency to configure climate action as being first and foremost grounded in science, rather than in values or political ideologies (e.g. low 2010). this rationalist bent runs the risk of missing the generative potential of affect, values, norms and of political vision in the process of collective mobilisation. to address agency we need to become as far as possible directly engaged with the embodied process of climate action, as a precondition for framing climate science and for gaining the required 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia transformative imagination. since 2007 we have been exploring how to do this, developing a research process that would approximate to the requirement that, as researchers, we need to generate data that involves us, and as far as possible our readers, in questions of climate agency, whilst at the same time offering a perspective on how that agency may be developed. in doing so we arrive at involvement/detachment as a dialectical relationship, albeit with caution. we are conscious of its limits, as a proxy for reified relations between realism and idealism (rojek 1986); we are also conscious of its radical openness. elias, for instance, supplies no clear methodological approach, save the assertion that history must be studied as a relatively open process (ibid.). our premise, though, is that social agency is best analysed through this lens, as a struggle for leverage over socio-systemic forces. we also arrive at an ethnographic method where dimensions of climate agency are addressed with participations in the climate change movement. as researchers and participants in the movement we begin from the assumption that only a reflexive method of inquiry, of this sort, can embed the needed dynamics of involvement and detachment (steier 1991). we seek to avoid academic ‘self fascination’, and instead explore reflexivity as activist practice, as much as research method (bourdieu & wacquant 1992, p. 72; riach 2009). this two-pronged approach, we believe, allows us to look at reflexivity-in-practice, apparent in both the participants’ narratives and our methodology and interpretation (riach 2009). in what follows we outline key dimensions of the research approach. we then use a series of short videoed excerpts, and in-text discussion, to introduce the concept of direct climate action in australia. we then analyse the activist accounts, focusing on three main themes, with each theme prefaced by videoed excerpts of the interviews. in the first theme we analyse activist trajectories – how people come to identify with the climate movement and engage in its direct action wing. second, we explore how climate activists maintain hope in the context of what may appear as insurmountable challenges. third, we discuss how participants interpret the role of direct action in securing large-scale structural shifts to address climate crisis. researching climate activism within social movement studies there is a long-running theoretical debate about the relative importance of instrumental versus expressive social action. should social movements be seen as means to an end, or as an end in themselves? more directly, is it more important to study cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 79 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia how social movements mobilise as against why? (polletta & jasper 2001). with climate action movements, research reveals a strong instrumental theme, centring on the rhetoricreality gap in climate policy (hall & taplin 2008). this affirms a ‘political opportunities’ model of social movement mobilisation where movements are interpreted as rational actors responding to institutional failure (tarrow 1996; 1998). at the same time, there can be a strong expressive dimension to climate action, as a form of ethical action. here climate action can be an end in itself, an intrinsic defence of ethical values in the face of climate injustice (connor, freeman & higginbotham 2009). however, neither side of this dualism provides an adequate account of social action. this is particularly the case for climate action as played out through climate camps. these mobilisations explicitly combine instrumental and expressive dimensions, and activists themselves combine intellectual understanding and affective outrage in their accounts of praxis. in the project reported-on here we have focused on the ‘direct action’ wing of climate agency, where activists directly protest against proposed carbon-intensive facilities to dramatise the requirement for alternatives (see the following section on climate camp protest events). there is a long international lineage of direct action environmental protest, that this approach draws on (klandermans & staggenborg 2002; meyer 2005). we have engaged with a small number of broadly representative participants in these direct action events in australia, seeking to intensively engage and reflect with them on questions of climate agency. over two years we interviewed participants at first seeking to understand key moments in the movement, but ultimately were swept up in the ebb and flow of the movement itself. we, also, ourselves, became involved in planning and carrying out direct actions, both as participants, and as researchers, with our double role known to the participants. as such, during the research process we found ourselves drawn into larger dilemmas, or political tensions concerning individual and collective agency that can also be a source of creativity (maddison & scalmer 2006). interviews were undertaken by rebecca pearse, the project research assistant, who is also a member of friends of the earth (foe) sydney. james goodman and stuart rosewarne also participated in key direct action events, and have written materials for participating organisations. as an exercise in participant observation, we wanted to ensure, as far as possible, that our accounts would create a fine-grained record of engagement with activist perspectives. in terms of the interview schedule, twenty-five participants were interviewed between two and 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia four times over a period of two years. interviews occurred before, during and after direct action events in order to bring into play both involvement and reflection. of an original 16 participants in 2008, 3 declined follow-up interviews in 2009. an additional 9 participants were interviewed in 2009 at climate camp events in helensburgh and melbourne, with a follow-up interview after. interviews conducted outside protest locations were held in a location nominated by the interviewee. these locations included public spaces such as parks, cafes and university grounds. others were interviewed at work, at a university research centre or in their homes. recruitment was undertaken via recommendations from the climate camp organising collectives, and followed a snowballing technique. as with much sociological research, the task of bringing together a ‘representative’ group of participants is an imperfect science and relies on the researchers’ inside knowledge, nevertheless we still sought to maintain representation across gender, age and background. as such, we consider the group of twenty five to be largely representative of the portion of the climate movement that organised and attended climate camp. all participants identified as being involved in grassroots activism. as outlined in the appendix, interviewees were associated with various community, political and campaign organisations, and four had been had been part of climate camp organising collectives. in terms of regional representation, there is a political-geographic bias toward sydney-based activism with eleven of the participants from sydney, with the rest from newcastle, the hunter valley, brisbane or melbourne. six participants were linked to environmental non-governmental organisations, as campaigners or members of action collectives, including three from friends of the earth. of the remaining participants, two were from a socialist organisation, six from student organisations, two from community radio collectives, and one participant each from a climate action group, a local residents group and a solar energy cooperative; one indigenous activist from the gunai/kurnai nation in victoria was also interviewed. finally, a greens member of parliament was included in the mix, and two other participants identified as local greens group members. in terms of interview structure there were three main aspects: personal biography; climate change; and political strategy. first, participants were questioned about their motivations, initially asked why they were attending the camps. in follow-up interviews, they were asked cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 81 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia to account for the full trajectory of their activism, and were prompted to tell the ‘longer story’ behind their participation in the movement. the second aspect relates to how interviewees understand climate change. they were questioned about the causes of climate change, solutions and its severity. following from this, participants were asked if, and where hope figured in their philosophy of praxis. third, the interviews posed questions of political strategy. specifically, the participants discussed the role of collective mobilisation, the politics of ‘direct action’ (civil disobedience), and more generally the interviewer and interviewee broached questions of how social and political change happens. the interviews were audio recorded and transcribed, and approximately two-thirds of the interviews were captured on video. this article reports on the interviews using the video material and is deliberately positioned as an experiment in digital ethnography. the video record has allowed us as researchers, and readers, to become more engaged with the interviewees as they wrestle with the difficulties and dilemmas of climate agency. most important, the video record helps us personalise the accounts: rather than appearing as an abstracted written account, the video material embeds the record, more closely involving us in the embodied experience of climate agency. the insights, dilemmas and tensions expressed by participants guide the analysis we offer of climate agency. it is an attempt to deploy the digital artefacts of the research process – videoed interview material – to deepen engagement with and thereby help shed light on the question of climate agency. in each section we preface the discussion with excerpts from interviews conducted between 2008 and early 2010. there are four videos included in total. one early product from the project was a short video of activists discussing climate camp which was used for the 2009 climate camp website at helensburgh. it now appears here, in the next section looking at climate camps. the video was a relatively uncritical piece explicitly geared toward event promotion. by contrast the three video sequences we offer in the remainder of this paper seek to explore more critically the dilemmas faced by this movement across the period we interviewed participants. cutting the video data into dialogical sequences was a labour-intensive and at times fraught task. only the authors of this paper have had access to the full body of video material, and we are responsible for making judgements about which interview moments to place into the 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia videos presented here. the video excerpts linked to this paper and the transcripts discussed in the paper itself merely dip into the more than thirty hours of footage. as such the account here is by no means exhaustive and the interpretations reflect our concerns as participants and researchers, as much as the concerns of the interviewees. there is full consent from participants both for the use of the video material and the text; participants gave a specific permission to use the material for this article, in addition to the release form signed when first participating in the research. direct action climate camps in australia video: climate camp, promotion video http://vimeo.com/158579741 climate camp is a form of strategic direct action geared to movement building. camps are spatial interventions mounted as close as possible to the physical site of large-scale carbon emissions. the camps create a temporary community that combines workshops on how to address climate issues with a series of direct actions against expanding fossil fuel installations. as such, they create ideological power as counter-sites, designed to unmask and contest plans to expand carbon-intensive infrastructures and industries (chatterton & pickerill 2010; griggs & howarth 2004; newell 2008; seel & plows 2000). as a genre of climate protest climate camps first emerged in the uk, which has now seen several camps, at drax power station in 2006, heathrow airport in 2007, kingsnorth power station in 2008, the european climate exchange in london in 2009, and also in 2009 at the uk's biggest coal fired power stations at ratcliffe-on-soar in nottingham, and, finally, at the royal bank of scotland in edinburgh in 2010. the camps create a temporary community that combines workshops on how to address climate issues with a series of direct actions against expanding fossil fuel installations (plows 2008; saunders & price 2009). the climate camp model has been taken up in a more than twenty mostly northern countries around the world, including in australia: australia’s first climate camp was held in newcastle, the world’s largest coal port, in 2008; in 2009 another three camps were held in australia, and a further 15 worldwide. 1 donated to climate camp in 2009 from climate action research project footage. video editing by justin harvey and rebecca pearse. http://vimeo.com/15857974� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 83 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the 2008 camp in australia highlighted the impact of coal mining, both for export and for local energy production. given the proposed expansion of the coal industry, with a new coal loader planned for newcastle, as well as more than twenty new mines proposed for the hunter region, the key demand of the camp was simply for ‘no new coal’. the camp was explicitly geared to building a mass social movement on climate change, and thus sought to establish new links between participants, and to increase people’s confidence that they could themselves intervene in public debates, and mount effective action to target key perpetrators such as the coal industry. for this research project, we attended the 2008 climate camp, and also two camps in 2009, one in victoria at the hazelwood power station, and the other at helensburgh in nsw, at australia’s oldest commercial coal mine. the pictures below are intended to give the reader a sense of the scale and nature of public protest in the three climate camp events we attended in australia. the camps are at first glance are quite mundane looking spaces – a few hundred people camping in a public space, often in trying weather. after workshops, collective decision making and everyday camp provisioning, the participant numbers build and the final day of the camps sees the groups launch into a public protest. the images illustrate the various modes of participation undertaken by climate activists. climate camp newcastle, july 2008, photo source: climate camp newcastle organising collective, photographer unknown. 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia a moment’s silence at the final mass rally, climate camp, newcastle july 2008 photo source: climate camp newcastle organising collective, photographer unknown. day of action, switch off hazelwood, victoria, september 2009, photo source: james hitchcock cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 85 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia a spokescouncil at switch off hazelwood, victoria, september 2009 photo source: james hitchcock radical cheerleaders, climate camp newcastle, july 2008 photo source: climate camp newcastle organising collective, photographer unknown. 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia direct action at climate camp newcastle, july 2008 photo source: climate camp newcastle organising collective, photographer unknown. direct action at dendrobium coal mine, october 2009, photo source: climate camp helensburgh organising collective organisers of climate camps have put special emphasis on three elements: the process of maintaining the camp, as itself an exercise in collective action; the creation of spaces for reflection and debate on climate issues and how to address them, and the planning and mounting of direct actions against climate change perpetrators. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 87 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia active engagement with making the camp happen, the creation of collective structures to meet practical needs, as well as define the collective priorities, were key aspects of involvement (osofsky & levit 2008). decision-making structures for the 2008 australian camp for instance rested on a decentralised ‘neighbourhood’ structure, with zones of the camp allocated to specific regions or specific groups, who would each plan their own actions. bringing participants together in ‘neighbourhoods’ provided a common point of connection for individuals from similar geographic origins, to promote inclusivity and a means for engaging people in a sense of common purpose. each neighbourhood would send representatives to a consensus-based ‘spokes council’ which would then coordinate activities for the camp as a whole. these decentralised consensus-based structures were aimed at both maximising a sense of safety, and of direct democratic involvement. a second aspect was involvement in workshops and debates. these were also an important aspect of the uk climate camps, with over 200 sessions planned for the 2008 kingsnorth camp in the uk. the involvement of public intellectuals, and the invitation to engage in debate at the camp, signalled an openness to differing viewpoints, and offered an entry-point for those not already involved with climate action. some of the workshops centred on developing a deeper understanding of the process of climate change – its causes and outcomes – others were focused on debating strategy, in terms of climate policy, and in terms of movement agendas, as well as to transfer campaign skills. a final aspect was involvement in planning and undertaking direct action. the spatial politics of the camp sets the stage for these interventions, as its location defines the target for direct action (doherty 2002; schlosberg 2009). a stream of workshops focused on skills for direct action, including building collective capacity across the groups, such as through the rehearsal of actions, the creation of collective physical capacities, such as non-violent responses to policing, and in simple activities such as capacity to scale fences. in addition, there were ‘neighbourhood’-based discussions on kinds of direct action, along with the formation of camp-wide direct action groupings. at the camps, deliberation on direct action was decentralised into cross-camp groupings, defined by level of risk, from non-arrestable actions, such as a march along an approved route, to more physically-challenging and 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia arrestable actions. in this way, participants could both choose what suited them, participate in debates about how to mount the actions, and then to participate in them. across these three aspects the camps create an immersive experience. whilst politically marginal and episodic, the camps can be seen as a laboratory for climate action, offering a generative politics prefiguring the possibilities of paradigm shift towards a low-carbon future. as such, the architecture of climate camp provided a framework for engaging individuals to recast the terrain on which political ambitions can be progressed. as a social process, climate camp provides a social and organisational space that draws individuals out of what might be their personal frustration with the dominant politics of the times, and what might otherwise be a suffocating malaise, to give voice to understandings and possibilities that come from discussing and sharing this frustration, and acting on it. the camp is designed to enable personal transformation for those frustrated by the failure of established political channels to formulate any meaningful policies to address the ever-increasing production of greenhouse gases, to marshal people’s energies and to concentrate these collective energies to contest our growing reliance on fossil fuels. as such, the camp is an intensive experience, an expressive moment that comes with all the limitations this entails. it is an oppositional formation, defined against mainstream environmental non-governmental organisations, which are more concerned with policy as against mobilisation, as well as against government policy. it is necessarily short-lived and centred on symbolic action to raise consciousness, and never likely to produce immediate successes in terms of directly reducing emissions. its contribution is much more ephemeral, resting in the realm of ecological subjectivity, generated from these embodied experiential (mcdonald 2006). the camps create a sense of community enlivened through sharing knowledge about the challenge of climate change, and for discussing ways of moving forward as an inclusive process. the camp’s architecture actively engages the subject, indeed requires this engagement, drawing on the different and varied capacities, or competencies, to reflect on how to engender a collective consciousness and politics to contest the dominant paradigm. the project explores this direct action politics of climate change. as such it seeks to answer giddens’ claim that ‘we have no politics of climate change’ (giddens 2009, p. 4). we argue cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 89 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia this movement ignites a politics calling forth different, more radical and engaged forms of politics that contrast with established institutional practices, and that contest those practices that have been so crucial to feeding the sense of impotence that lie at the heart of our collective frustration. it is a politics that is essentially dialectical in character, founded on reflexive engagements, and designed to inspire transformative action. climate camp, we contend, makes concrete what guattari sought to encapsulate in the notion of ecosophy – a process of social liberation through ecological awareness that projects political will of reinvigorated subjects, in this case of the climate change community (2005, p. 14). the discussion that follows centres on three themed reflections on the reflexivity embedded in the individual and collective articulations of climate activist praxis. we begin each section with an exploration of the issues led by participants, albeit necessarily framed within our own analytic and personal reflections. each section is prefaced with a series of extracts drawn from the videoed interviews, to offer a means of contextualising the written material. trajectories of activism video: activist trajectories video, http://vimeo.com/158386502 attendance at the climate camps was an important moment in each participant’s mobilisation; and indeed in the development of this movement. in this first section we recount three longitudinal aspects of mobilisation: becoming aware of injustice, establishing personal commitment, and sustaining ongoing reflection. in the stories of becoming aware and committing to act we understand the participants to be relating a process of immersion into new epistemologies and collectivities (often not initially the climate movement). meanwhile, the process of mobilisation also entails ongoing critical and strategic reflection. chris breen’s (2009) reflection in the video on the countless conversations that build into activist subjectivity is instructive. in fact the entire sequence in this first video explores the relational elements of mobilisation. far from being linear, accounts of mobilisation illustrate a dialectical relationship between establishing sustained commitment and periods of more distanced individual and collective inquiry. this section pivots on the interpersonal, cognitive and affective exchanges that underpin individual mobilisation processes. 2 participants in order of appearance: lee rhiannon, john hepburn, rachel woods, david burgess, jasmine ali, jenny curtis, kristy walters, angie, chris breen, peter kennedy, graham brown and anon#. video editing by sarah mace-dennis and rebecca pearse. http://vimeo.com/15838650� 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia individuals vary in the extent to which they are embedded in the groups and networks that underpin social movement participation (stryker 2000). embedding occurs over time, though not necessarily in a reliably incremental manner. in participant’s accounts of their mobilisation they relate an infiltration of social action into the everyday experiences, albeit in differing ways and to varying degrees (melucci 1992). as is typical of participants in mass civil disobedience demonstrations, most of the 25 activists interviewed were considerably involved in one or more environmental organisations or autonomous collectives. in the context of follow-up interviews, participants had varying orientations on the identity of activism. asking participants to account for their trajectory into and experiences of social movements often led participants to reflect on the identity of activist. there was significant ambivalence about the term, and the constraints of defining oneself as ‘an activist’. nonetheless activist as noun, or activism as verb, captures the nature of political identity expressed by this group. as has been the case with the alter-globalisation movement, climate activists navigate various forms of collectivity on an individuated basis (mcdonald 2002). all participants presented multi-causal accounts of their activism, often citing early life connections to nature, family and friends as well as contact with social and environmental issues across time. the paths they described were unruly, both in the telling, and undoubtedly in the experience. narratives enlisted by participants were internally dynamic, both gradual and punctuated by transformatory moments, linear and disjointed (mckechnie & körner 2009). expressions of awakening, or moral shock figured as moments of disjuncture in participant’s accounts of mobilisation, as both starting points and forks in the road toward activism (hunt & benford 1994; jasper & poulsen 1995). these were moments in which the participant relates an event or exchange that crystallises or compels new analysis or understanding of an issue. jasmine ali’s (2009) account of the ‘open political fight’ on a university campus and its effect on her politicisation is expressed with gusto, giving a sense of the almost instantaneous depth of political engagement possible via student activism. by contrast other accounts such as kristy walter’s (2009) summation of most people’s ‘journey’ into activism imply an incremental, almost linear and commonsense process of immersion. in effect, both modes of narrative and affect seem to hold insights into the process of mobilisation. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 91 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia jenny curtis’ account of her participation in the climate movement reflects this. she is a founding member of one of australia’s approximately 80 active local climate action groups that were established from 2005. these groups are often populated by people mobilised for the first time, or in a much more intense way than previously. she remembered having an ‘environmental conscience’ by virtue of her enjoyment of bush walking and completing a degree in landscape architecture, but noted ‘i never bought the ticket and blockaded down in tassie or never really stepped up into a major activist thing… i just didn’t touch me that much that i needed to get more active’ (curtis 2008). we pick up on her story in the video when she notes that not until 2006 with her children a little older did she join members in her community in forming climate change balmain-rozelle. in 2006 it was a friend and fellow climate action group member that provided her with links between the coal industry and climate change. she was really well informed and was saying to the wider group “let’s write letters, because they’ve just approved another mine”. and i’m thinking “but this is climate change, what are we talking about coal mines for?”. and i didn’t get that, and then after talking to her and finding out 40% of our greenhouse gas emissions are produced by coal fired power and all those things, it was like “oh my god!”. i just couldn’t believe it. i thought “why don’t i know about this?”... i mean everybody needs to know about this, and that’s terrible. (curtis 2008) moral shocks figure in participant’s stories to explain shifts in thinking, feeling and occasionally a new life trajectory. in the latter half of the video, former hunter valley coal miner graham brown recounts his decision to leave the coal industry, which in turn propelled a course further into the struggle against coal and climate change. graham has been a long time trade union activist. over the past thirty years he has seen the coal industry dramatically alter the hunter valley landscape, affecting agriculture, air, water systems and communities. in recent years he has worked on the anvil hill campaign posed against centennial coal’s bid to create an open-cut coal mine at wybong in the upper hunter valley nsw. he has been prolific in this engagement with coal and climate campaigns, working with the greens, greenpeace, rising tide, socialist organisations and more. in this video excerpt he is relating a moment in his vacation to chile. sitting with him is his long time friend and coal miner peter kennedy. the spatial dimensions of graham’s story capture both the dilemmas and possibilities built into the climate crisis. mobilisation spans a range of affective, cognitive and instrumental 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia dimensions (hosseini 2006; mcdonald 2006; melucci 1992; melucci 1996a). it is a process over time as well as place-dependent, reflecting the history and context of mobilisation (calhoun 1993). the encounters described by activists illustrate a shift in subjectivity underway as a result of advancing ecological crises such as climate change. beneath the surface of this totalising problem is our planetary interdependence, which in turn creates new frontiers for human consciousness and action (melucci 1996b, p. 58). on the one hand, we see a translocal connection created by the causes and effects of industrial emissions. but on the other, climate change seems to prise the development divide further apart. in graham’s words: and now we see the future prospect of our climate with the major dry period that ended about 18 months ago. that is by anyone’s knowledge created by the burning of coal. that’s the cause of it; coal fired power stations and the use of coal and fossil fuels. we’ve got to stop that, collectively as a nation, as a state, as a local area and globally. we’ve got to stop that for my kids, for their kids and for your kids and for everyone’s kids, for the bloke in south america. we’ve got to stop it. (brown 2008) interestingly, stories such as graham’s do not create a simple logical link between action and outcome, and do not specify agents and agency. they do not engage with the outcome they point to (climate action), but in the moral meaning of events which precede lead to it (polletta 1998). graham’s interest in the movement is clearly not the product of purely instrumental reason. personal involvement in the struggle for climate justice is often in the first instance an affective reaction to the situation facing humanity; over time the ebb and flow of personal and collective reflection sees individuals gaining a perspective on how to sustain their activism. the personal trajectories bring climate activists to a form of hope through direct action and mobilisation. hope in action video: hope in action, http://vimeo.com/158395933 ‘i think if we don’t win there’s no future for anyone. so there’s nothing to gained by giving up… you would want to think that you tried. and i suppose that there’s various levels of dangerous, catastrophic, irreversible climate change. so every time you do 3 participants in order of appearance: emma brindal, robbie thorpe, kate campbell, anne hodgson, chris breen, libby king, anon*, john hepburn, david burgess, kristy walters and lee rhiannon. video editing by sarah mace-dennis and rebecca pearse. http://vimeo.com/15839593� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 93 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia anything, you win, it’s just a pity that you’re probably not going to win enough [laughs].’ (wells 2008) there is a general consensus across commentators on climate action that people need hope in order to take action (caldicott 2009; diesendorf 2009; flannery 2010). but the problem is that dangerous climate change is already with us, and there is little to hope for in terms of avoiding runaway climate change. this compounds already existing challenges to sustaining activism across the lifespan (king 2004, 2006). in this context, some climate campaigners argue the climate movement has to deliberately accentuate the positive: if we want a movement we must use the language of hope. we arrive at what may be called ‘strategic climate action’, a position that represses the reality and welcomes every climate initiative, from changing a light bulb to carbon trading, as a positive step no matter how inadequate. in broaching the issue of hope with interviewees what we have found is that climate activists, and through them movements, are producing their own foundations and motivations for action. out of this, rather than false hopes, we are seeing an emerging model of moral action. the individual stories that describe how the participants in climate camp have been carried onto this charged terrain display how they have been moved by the frustration and despair with the failure of the party political parliamentary process to address the challenge of climate change, while stirred by the hope and inspiration that comes from joining with others to explore ways to confront the challenge of climate change. this is a story of individual responsibility being aroused, discussed and knowledges shared, to ferment an interest in how to begin reframing our place within the ecological world, and to formulate a different form of politics designed to expose the stasis characterised by a hegemonic preoccupation with carbon-intensive with economic growth. however, as we follow the personal and political consequences of these trajectories, we have uncovered more questions than answers. climate science is the key starting point. with it, activists speak of being ‘immobilised by fear’, overwhelmed by the urgency and magnitude of the problem, of losing their sense of agency and descending into ‘climate depression’. people speak of lapsing into bouts of despair, especially intense where it is personified in younger generations. ann hodgson, member of rising tide newcastle says in the video ‘i have nightmares thinking about my young grandchildren, thinking about what their world will be like when they’re my age’ (hodgson 2008). 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia anger is directed at carbon-intensive perpetrators, and their defenders. there are many accounts of engaging with non-activists and encountering a range of avoidance strategies, from outright denial, to strategic and deliberate hopelessness, to self-conscious ambivalence. several of the activists spoke of how they have to channel anger. one put it as follows: ‘the whole yeah, laziness and acceptance of people is infuriating for me. so i’m like i said, i’ve got to try and keep it in check otherwise it would really overwhelm me to a destructive point’ (jen 2008). beyond mobilisation, many stress the opportunities embedded in climate crisis. activists talk passionately about ecological sufficiency, post-consumerism, re-localisation and community mobilisation, as necessary elements and key outcomes of the crisis. these new possibilities can become realities by force of circumstance. or, as one interviewee put it: ‘i don’t think we’ve even had this kind of challenge before. or this opportunity to radically restructure the entire way we do things’ (anonymous# 2008). this balancing between despair and hope, with a dose of anger, is signalled in people’s motivation. amongst this group of activists, at least, there was only one person who said they would not be involved in the movement if they didn’t believe that dangerous climate change could be prevented. a recurrent theme from all participants was that hopes come from engagement with the movement. emma brindal remarked: ‘i think just being involved in campaigning and activism in itself gives hope; and being surrounded by and working with other people who are really dedicated to creating a better world; that inspires me with hope constantly’ (brindal 2008). lee rhiannon broadens this position in the video when she conceives of collective political engagement a success in itself (rhiannon 2008). the rest voiced an absolute certainty in the necessity for mobilisation, regardless of whether climate change can be addressed. their action is grounded in something less contingent that says, as one put it: ‘this is the right thing to do’. here climate mobilisation becomes an intrinsic necessity, and end in itself, regardless of anticipated outcome. what has become clear from the research is that while moral action sustains activist identity, it is not associated with autonomy, rather with universality. climate mobilisation affirms self-respect and human dignity, but it does not enact a sectional identity, rather it directly produces a universalist humanism. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 95 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia importantly, the moral protest of climate activism is, in principle, universal. with climate change whole populations are made immediately and collectively aware of a world-historical process, creating a global consciousness that politicises carbon pollution as a threat to survival. this is the underlying trajectory of climate change, and the foundation for the moral appeal of climate action. as such, climate action makes a claim to be all-enveloping, a movement that is everywhere, embedded in the emergent universal subjectivity of life under climate change. from this perspective activists can despair at the built-in logic of climate change, and at the same time vest hopes in mass action to create new possibilities. regardless of whether hopes or fears are realised, climate action remains the right thing to do. political strategy and vision video: political strategy and vision, http://vimeo.com/158546254 in my experience the thing that sustains activism and involvement in social movements is community. it’s people you know, feeling really supported, feeling really inspired by other people. (hepburn 2008a) nonviolent direct action, directed at challenging the hegemony of the fossil-fuel intensive orthodoxy is one of the key political expressions of the climate camp project. such action draws on the capacities and confidence of individuals working together, on the inspirations that are derived from the communities, and the affinity groups, that help to constitute this political community. it is a dynamic political project that contrasts with the passivity that defines the formal political agenda associated with ecological modernisation discourses. direct actions are designed to firstly expose the calamity that is the fossil-fuel dependent industrial undertaking. equally, however, the direct actions have as a conscious purpose calling a halt to this undertaking. in doing so, the political project confronts capital and the state as the engineers, those immediately profiting from the venture of mining and burning of coal, at the same time as it challenges the dominant politics that underpins this undertaking. climate camp does this through an enduring dialectic between the individual engagement and the collective, one that respects the capacity and the confidence of the individual, 4 participants in order of first appearance: maurice wells, nicky ison, anon*, anon#, chris breen, erland howden, anon^, robbie thorpe and john hepburn. video editing by sarah mace-dennis and rebecca pearse. http://vimeo.com/15854625� 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia ensuring that they are comfortable with the character of their participation and will not be pressured to move beyond their comfort zones. yet, it is also a process that constructs community and instils a confidence in individuals as members of communities. this politics of engagement draws on individual participant’s capacities to explore the different ways in which the political project can be advanced. the key feature is communality, as the foundation for creating empowering ideas and how to act on these. the forms of direct action are founded on the competencies that reside within the affinity groups, as this opens up the spaces in which political wills can be exercised. the relative autonomy of the neighbourhood communities and how these are translated into affinity or action groups provides the space for conceiving and articulating ideas for action; the organisation of another layer in the larger community of the climate camp, the spokescouncils, provides the forum for these to be discussed, debated and developed in conjunction with the broader community. it is a process that is open and participatory while not constraining of the possibilities for action. the climate camp architecture provides the arena in which individuals engage with others, to learn more about the nature of the ecological crisis and how this knowledge can be marshaled in ways that enable individuals to develop the confidence, confront the sense of impotence, to exercise a competence by joining with others to give expression to the political possibilities. direct action, through the exercise of nonviolent direct actions, becomes the vehicle for giving expression to dissident sentiments. civil disobedience actions become one of the few options if the political protest is to be given voice, the means for igniting the collective frustration with the refusal of governments to address the challenge of climate, the failure of traditional institutional political forums to progress initiatives for containing the growth in the exploitation of fossil fuels and generation of greenhouse gas emissions. direct action reflects the arousal of individuals’ capacity to act, to give life to subjectivity, as a collective production of unpredictable and untamed ‘dissident subjectivities’ (guattari 2005, p. 14). this is a particularly distinctive and dynamic politics, centring on direct democracy: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 97 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia i see direct action in a nutshell as a kind of doing it yourself. not asking somebody else to do it for you. (anonymous# 2008) climate camp contests the received ways of doing politics precisely because it is so personally empowering. it is about the exercise of responsibility and taking control of the political process by moving beyond the established political realm. the forms of direct action are contingent upon the capacities of individuals working with others to peel back the sites that are to be object of their political action. and because this politics engages diversity, there is a multiplicity of possibilities as to how dissidence is projected. as such, climate camp is about orchestrating a new political field, one that is directed towards sustaining the endeavour to bring an end to the fossil-fuel based energy-intensive economy. non-violent direct action is defined as the necessary vehicle for progressing this ambition because the established political realm is so deeply embedded in the logic of the fossil-fuel based economy: [direct action] is best thought of, or most powerfully thought of, as a strategy of withdrawing consent from the status quo. and if you think of it as a strategy, then the most powerful thing people can do is to engage in civil disobedience and say ‘i’m no longer consenting to the government killing our planet and ruining our future.’ (hepburn 2008b). dissonance is the necessary vehicle for confronting the established order, the means for venting the frustration with this order, but also the means for engaging beyond the community of the climate camp. non-violent direct action takes the form of spectacle, exposing the sensitivities of the dominant order to carry an alternative political narrative into the public domain, to extend the reach of a counter-hegemonic project. the spectacle of direct actions provides a springboard for building on this alternative narrative. [direct action] can like draw people’s attention to an issue… seeing successful direct action or even just seeing people have a go at something… is a really important aspect of education (anonymous* 2008). the spectacle of civil disobedience, of non-violent direct actions, does not, of course, guarantee that the political message will be taken up among the broader population. the 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia actions will be resisted. the civil disobedience will be maligned, and the progression of the political project will be likely face setbacks and falter from time to time. but the strength of the project does not rest on the outcomes of singular actions. it is an exercise in charting an alternative future that rests on arousing and sustaining the vibrancy of human subjectivity, of an ecological sensibility that requires continual contesting of the established order. it is a movement that is “a call for the revival of individual confidence as a social force” (guattari 2005, p. 15). as such it is one that is founded on the reflexivity of the subjects who go into the making of climate camp, and herein lies the strength of climate camp as a process that is personally empowering and one founded on creating this other community. needless to say this political project is not without its tensions and contradictions. while the spokes-council architecture in bringing different communities together provides the means to accommodate different tendencies and the diversity of strategic visions, the architecture is not necessarily a successful means of assuaging manoeuvring by some organised political tendencies to dictate particular political actions or initiatives. within the climate summit deliberations, the concern with entrisme has been publicly articulated. similarly, the ability of climate camp to engage the broader community is necessarily a delicate process because the occupation of spaces as sites for launching non-violent direct actions, such as occurred with the helensburgh camp, can arouse the antipathy of members of the local community. local communities may understandably be resistant to an invasion of those whom they may regard as interlopers, if not trouble makers, and seemingly posing a possible threat to the local order. the climate camp organisers were quite conscious of this possibility, and concerted efforts were made to introduce the local community to the concerns of the proposed camp in the weeks leading up to the actual event. but notwithstanding the organisation of community-based forums and extensive leafleting of residents with a view to opening a dialogue and inviting them to participate, there was what seemed like a wellorganised reproach of the culminating climate camp event. as activists proceeded down helensburgh’s main street to the entrance to the peabody coal mine, they confronted not just a police formation blocking the entrance, but a large assembly of locals, some displaying banners protesting the action, and others, mostly teenagers, who took great delight in the occasion launching eggs and tomatoes in the direction of activists. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 99 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the helensburgh climate camp action had spawned a counter spectacle, and while this might be interpreted as a symbol of the failure of the climate camp action to progress one of its objectives, that is of engaging the local community, the fact that local residents were excited into action should, we suggest, be read as a positive because their action meant that they too were having to reflect on the challenge of climate change. this does, however, prompt the need to reflect on the more challenging question that confronts the political agenda, and this is how to maintain the momentum of the movement. this is not just an issue extending the reach of the political landscape that is occupied in the ambition of engaging the broader community. it is also a matter of maintaining the dynamism of the broad coalition of social forces, and of sustaining the energy that is so essential to this. it also highlights the necessity for preserving the openness and inclusiveness of the movement, for institutionalising the centrality of reflexivity, and avoiding the movement becoming the prisoner of particular political tendencies to ensure the continuing evolution of the dynamism and innovative nature of the enterprise. conclusions in this discussion we have asked how can we produce accounts that actively involve the reader in the experience of climate action, whilst at the same time, generating insights into how climate agency may be strengthened. through these dual focal points, we have sought to elicit reflexivity vis-à-vis engagement with movement participants, through videoed interviews, transcribed recordings, and through our own participation. our research shows how activists are producing a new language of moral protest in the face of a profound historical conjuncture. as such, they are actively generating the political tools for addressing the crisis. as the historian dipesh chakrabarty (2009) has argued, we are living through a confrontation between the history of the species, as expressed in climate science, and the history of humanity. how we are to bridge the two, and exercise human agency in the face of a species-wide crisis, is the key question for the climate movement. climate activists are self-consciously engaged in this intellectual process of generating new visions and new models for action in the context of climate change. in apprehending the profound clash of histories, activists are finding ways of moving beyond fatalism, and are creating new foundations for mobilisation. 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia appendix participants in the study references ali, j. 2009, interview, 17 november, with rebecca pearse, sydney. anonymous# 2008, interview, 08 july, with rebecca pearse, newcastle. anonymous* 2008, interview, 08 july, with rebecca pearse, newcastle. beck, u. 1992, risk society: towards a new modernity, sage, london. bourdieu, p. & wacquant, l.j.d. 1992, an invitation to reflexive sociology, university of chicago press, chicago. breen, c. 2009, interview, 12 september, with rebecca pearse, switch off hazelwood, hazelwood, victoria. brindal, e. 2008, interview, 09 october, with rebecca pearse, by phone. brown, g. 2008, interview, 11 october, with rebecca pearse, muswellbrook. caldicott, h. 2009, if you love this planet: a plan to save the earth, w.w. norton, new york. calhoun, c. 1993, '"new social movements" of the early nineteenth century', social science history, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 385-427. chakrabarty, d. 2009, 'the climate of history: four theses', critical inquiry, vol. 35, no. winter, pp. 197-222. name organisation anon.# social justice organisation, sydney emma brinda l friends of the earth australia/brisbane erland howden nature conservation council nsw, sydney anon.* various autonomous collectives, newcastle ann and ian hodgson rising tide , n ewcastle graham brown miscellaneous works with the greens, greenpeace and socialist organisations, musselbrook jasmine ali solidarity, sydney jen mayfield east residents group, newcastle jenny curtis climate change balmain rozelle, sydney john hepburn greenpeace, newcastle/sydney lee rhiannon nsw greens, sydney libby king usyd student environment collective, third degree radio show, sydney maurice wells solar energy coope rative, sydney nicky ison australian student environment network, s ydney peter kennedy coal miner, musselbrook angie unsw student environment collective, sydney chris breen solidarity, melbourne dave burgess the total environment centre, sydney kate campbell various, melbourne kristy walters australian student environment network, 6 d egrees/foe brisbane lance batey resident, wollar nsw rachel woods uow student environment collective, wollongong robbie thorpe gunai/kurnai nation; 3c r, melbourne anon.̂ friends of the earth, melbourne20 09 20 08 20 08 a nd 2 00 9 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 101 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia chatterton, p. & pickerill, j. 2010, 'everyday activism and transitions towards post-capitalist worlds', transactions of the institute of british geographers, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 475-490. connor, l., freeman, s. & higginbotham, n. 2009, 'not just a coalmine: shifting grounds of community opposition to coal mining in southeastern australia', ethnos, vol. 74, no. 4, pp. 490-513. curtis, j. 2008, interview, 13 october, with rebecca pearse, rozelle. diesendorf, m. 2009, climate action: a campaign manual for greenhouse solutions, unsw press, sydney. doherty, b. 2002, ideas and actions in the green movement, routledge, london. elias, n. 1956, 'problems of involvement and detachment', british journal of sociology, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 226-252. elias, n. 2007, involvement and detachment, 1897-1990, collected works, vol. 8, university college dublin press, dublin. flannery, t. 2010, here on earth: a sustainable future, the text publishing, melbourne. giddens, a. 2009, the politics of climate change, polity press, cambridge. griggs, s. & howarth, d. 2004, 'a transformative political campaign? the new rhetoric of protest against airport expansion in the uk', journal of political ideologies, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 181-201. guattari, f. 2005, the three ecologies, athlone press, london. hall, n.l. & taplin, r. 2008, 'room for climate advocates in a coal-focused economy? ngo influence on australian climate policy', australian journal of social issues, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 359-379. hepburn, j. 2008a, interview, 07 july, with rebecca pearse, newcastle. hepburn, j. 2008b, interview, 17 october, with rebecca pearse, sydney. hodgson, a. 2008, interview, 07 july, with rebecca pearse, maitland. hosseini, s.a.h. 2006, 'beyond practical dilemmas and conceptual reductions: the emergence of an ‘accommodative consciousness’ in the alternative globalisation movement', portal journal of multidisciplinary international studies, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 1-27. hunt, s. & benford, r. 1994, 'identity talk in the peace and justice movement', journal of contemporary ethnography, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 488-517. jasper, j.m. & poulsen, j.d. 1995, 'recruiting strangers and friends: moral shocks and social networks in animal rights and anti-nuclear protests', social problems, vol. 42, no. 4, pp. 492-512. jen 2008, interview, 23 october, with rebecca pearse, newcastle. johnston, j. & goodman, j. 2006, 'hope and activism in the ivory tower: freiean lessons for critical globalisation research', globalisations, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 9-30. juris, j.s. 2008, 'performing politics: image, embodiment, and affective solidarity during anti-corporate globalisation protests', ethnography, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 61-97. king, d. 2004, 'operationalising melucci: metamorphosis and passion in the negotiation of activists' multiple identities', mobilization: an international quarterly, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 73-92. 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; 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http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia saunders, c. & price, s. 2009, 'one person's eu-topia, another's hell: climate camp as a heterotopia', environmental politics, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 117-122. schlosberg, d. 2009, 'capacity and capabilities: a response to the greenhouse development rights framework', ethics, place and environment, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 287-290. seel, b. & plows, a. 2000, 'coming live and direct: strategies of earth first!', in b. seel, m. paterson & b. doherty (eds), direct action in british environmentalism, routledge, oxon, pp. 112-132. steier, f.e. 1991, research and reflexivity, sage, london. stryker, s. 2000, 'identity competition: key to differential social moevment participation?', in s. stryker, t.j. owens & r.w. white (eds), self, identity and social movements, university of minneapolis press, minneapolis. tarrow, s. 1996, 'states and opportunities: the political structuring of social movements', in d. mcadam, j. mccarthy & m.n. zald (eds), comparative perspectives on social movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings, cambridge university press, cambridge, pp. 41-61. tarrow, s. 1998, power in movement: social movements and contentious politics, cambridge university press, cambridge. touraine, a. 1995, critique of modernity, blackwell, cambridge. walters, k. 2009, interview, 10 october, with rebecca pearse, climate camp, helensburgh nsw. wells, m. 2008, interview, 20 october, with rebecca pearse, marrickville. researching direct action against carbon emissions: a digital ethnography of climate agency r. pearse and j. goodman university of technology, sydney s. rosewarne university of sydney abstract researching climate activism direct action climate camps in australia trajectories of activism hope in action political strategy and vision conclusions appendix / references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 199 contesting realities jessica whyte abstract in 2004, an unnamed bush adviser accused a senior wall street journal reporter of belonging to the “reality based community”—a community that believed solutions stem from the judicious study of reality. “we're history's actors”, he told the journalist, “and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.” overwhelmingly, the response of those on the left, and of us progressives to this comment was to smugly deride the irrationalism and the arrogance of the bush administration. this paper, in contrast, will examine what is missed in the rush to accept membership of the reality based community. it will suggest that the advisor's comments express something that was once a central tenet of the left: the belief that political action is capable of transforming reality. today, on the left, this belief has been all but abandoned in the face of a seemingly unstoppable onslaught of free market capitalism and increasingly repressive state power. this paper will ask what it would mean today to begin to re-imagine political action as capable of remaking the world. in 2004, an unnamed bush advisor accused a senior wall street journal reporter of belonging to the “reality based community”. this ‘community’, according to the adviser, is made up of people who “believe that solutions arise from your judicious study of reality.” not realising he was being insulted, the reporter nodded at this description of himself and made some reference to enlightenment principles and empiricism. before he could finish, the bush aide interrupted him. “that's not the way the world really works anymore,” he said. ''we’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. and while you're studying that reality – judiciously, as you will –we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that’s how things will sort out. we’re history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do” (suskind 2004). overwhelmingly, us progressives responded to this anecdote by smugly deriding the irrationalism and the arrogance of the bush administration. bloggers emblazoned “proud member of the reality based community” across their banners; wikipedia suggested the phrase could form the rallying call for disparate opponents of the bush administration. as the years, and the iraq war, dragged on, the ability of the us to drop its version of reality on the world from a stealth bomber began to look tenuous. in iraq, the “mission 200 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 accomplished” exuberance disappeared, with even bush acknowledging in 2007 that the occupation had brought “a tragic escalation of sectarian rage and reprisal that continues to this day”(bush 2007). in light of dick cheney’s 2008 statement that the invasion was “a difficult, challenging but nonetheless successful endeavour”, it seems reasonable to argue that the bush administration fell victim, at least in part, to its own ‘reality deficit’ in iraq. in such a context, a reclamation of ‘reality’ seems nothing if not realistic. yet, something important is missed in the rush to accept membership of the “reality based community.” the easy dismissals of the bush advisor obscure the extent to which his comments expressed an idea once central to the left: the possibility that political action can transform reality. today, few on the left still believe it is possible to alter the entire terrain on which political action would once have been judged ‘unrealistic’. the portrayal of the aide’s comments as irrational illustrates the extent to which those who once believed in the transformative capacity of political action have succumbed to a pragmatic realism that finds its most recent domestic expression in rudd’s positioning of the alp as the party of the ‘reforming centre.’ as we begin to survey the wreckage left behind by the neocons, it may be worth examining not only what they bequeathed to the world, in their ferocious attempt to transform our reality, but also how it was that they were able to come to ascendancy. today, many of the dreams, and the concepts, that once sustained faith in social transformation lie in tatters. firstly, the ideology of progress has been undermined by the very history that was supposed to lead inexorably to a more humane world. after the nazi death camps, the disillusionment with the idea that technological progress necessarily heralded social progress was captured starkly in theodor adorno's remark, “no universal history leads from savagery to humanity, but one indeed from the slingshot to the h-bomb”(1973, p. 315). this realization had a profoundly demoralizing effect on a left that could no longer conceive of its goals as the goals of history itself. in this sense, george w. bush was correct when he argued, in 2002, “the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress”? (bush 2002) as the neocons set about imposing their own model of ‘progress’ on the world, they did so in the genuine belief, by then discarded by most on the left, that history was on their side. our time is marked by more than the failure of progressive narratives however. almost two decades ago, the berlin wall was reduced to rubble; today, its shards are packaged into small cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 201 glass jars, sealed with cork stoppers, and sold to tourists on the streets of a unified berlin. and yet, the collapse of communism still haunts our political reality. if communism were only a wall, a collection of authoritarian states, or a teleological conception of history, the profound effect of its loss would be incomprehensible. communism was all those things. it was also the dream of a better world that gave strength to those who struggled amidst the brutality and the grinding drudgery of this one. it was an organisational form that united people across oceans, a form of historical memory that allowed the defeats and victories of the past to live in the present, and a source of political futurity. only by understanding the contradictory nature of this loss can we understand how we have lost the belief that political action can transform our reality. as the wall crumbled, the right took the offensive, claiming as its own not only the rhetoric of progress but also the belief that the world could be re-made. “until now, the world we’ve known has been a world divided – a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war,” george bush senior announced two years after the collapse of the wall. “now, we can see a new world coming into view. a world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order”(bush 1991). a year after bush senior's new world order speech, then us under secretary of defence paul wolfowitz, drafted a document that advocated us interventions throughout the world to “encourage the spread of democratic forms of government and open economic systems”(2003). even amidst the new world order hype, wolfowitz's document – which suggested the us should “retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations”(2003) – was rejected as too extreme. with the election of george w. bush administration, wolfowitz's manifesto was revived to underpin the doctrine of “regime change”, which asserts the right of the us to wage wars to depose sovereign governments and remake political systems. the neo-cons, it seemed, still believed it possible to radically re-make the world. as former trotskyist christopher hitchens explained of his alignment with us power; “i feel much more like i used to in the 1960s, working with revolutionaries” (wolfowitz 2003). 202 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 as the neocons forcefully remodelled the world, their ‘war on terror’ eroded liberal democracy, which has given way to a form of state power that is neither liberal nor democratic. while the contours of liberalism’s replacement are still undefined, a discourse of permanent emergency has enabled the introduction of counter-terror measures that undermine central elements of the liberal rule of law, from freedom of speech to habeas corpus to the presumption of innocence. some random examples: • millions of people around the world rally against the war on iraq. their voices are ignored – they watch, powerlessly, as the bombs fall. • counter-terror laws allow for control orders that subject people to home detention, prohibit them from speaking to certain other people, and compel them to wear tracking devices, with no requirement to prove “beyond reasonable doubt” an involvement in terrorism. • after five years in guantanamo bay, david hicks confesses to aiding a terrorist organisation. his ‘confession’ reads like a speech at a stalinist show trial. and so on. wartime emergency measures are nothing new. and yet the representation of the war on terror as a war without temporal limits – dick cheney infamously suggested it “may never end. at least, not in our lifetime” – provides little basis for believing liberal democracy will be restored unscathed in the future (dougherty 2001). barack obama has inherited a status quo in which, in walter benjamin’s words, “the state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule.”(2003, p. 392) what he will do with this reality largely remains to be seen. while early promises to close guantanamo and abandon those military tribunals he called an “enormous failure” were reassuring, the more recent suggestions that these tribunals will be retained, and that those responsible for authorising torture will not be brought to justice are indicative of how much emergency measures have insinuated themselves into the very structure of the us state (pilkington 2009, p. 15). while all of this may call for a radical critique of liberal democracy, the erosion of liberalism has profoundly destabilised those who have seen themselves as its radical critics. anatole france's remark about the abstraction of liberal categories of rights and legal equality – “poor cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 203 and rich are equally forbidden to spend the night under the bridges” (anatole france quoted in benjamin 1985, p. 151) – once marked out the chasm separating a liberal world view from a politics that sought not the management of injustice through a system of formal juridical equality, but the overthrow of a system founded on substantive inequality. today, however, when the alternative seems to include everything up to the use of torture as a legitimate tool of state, liberal democracy seems, perhaps, the ‘least-worst’ system. as the re-election of the alp here, and the demise of the neocons in the us foster hopes for an end to the onslaught on civil rights that characterised the neocon era, any criticism of liberal democracy begins to appear untimely, perhaps even treacherous. wendy brown has suggested that while the death of communism is like the death of a beloved, the loss of liberal democracy is “like the loss of a hated but needed father”(brown 2006, p. 25). the demise of the familiar, yet contradictory, enemy that was liberalism seems to generate the temptation for radicals to step into the costume of the departed adversary, abandoning critiques of capitalism in the process. the belief that the discourse of rights, rule of law and due process offers the greatest advantage in what is conceptualised in advance as a purely defensive struggle, is underpinned by the assumption that it is no longer possible to change the world in any substantial way. to escape our current impasse, we must find the courage to rethink the fundamental assumptions of liberalism, and of a political practice centred on progress, sovereignty and right[s]. in 1938, walter benjamin wrote of the need to develop concepts “completely unusable for the purposes of fascism”(benjamin 1999). two years later he was dead, killing himself after border guards refused him passage across the border to spain as he sought to escape the nazis. the stakes in his attempt to develop new concepts could not have been higher. today, we too face the urgent need to develop a conceptual apparatus adequate to contemporary problems. such critical thought, as benjamin understood, is not a luxury to be saved for times of peace or subordinated to political pragmatism. faced with the destabilization of familiar political categories, we need to ask what effects these categories produced, and what other political possibilities they foreclosed. if we simply defend 204 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 liberalism on its own terms, we abandon too easily a left critique of liberal democracy that retains all its past validity. today, we need to ask why the rhetoric of liberalism, in which opposition to contemporary counter-terror measures has largely been framed, has proved so useful to those waging the war on terror, a conflict increasingly cast as a war for liberal values – for ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, and the ‘rule of law’. to fail to do so would be to miss the connection between familiar liberal concepts and the newer political project of neo-conservativism. in a ‘war’ of a thousand battlegrounds, a war without spatial or temporal limitation, the categories of liberalism have provided coherence to a narrative which recasts the ‘war on terror’ as a civilizing mission. in iraq, for instance – in the wake of the coalition's inability to produce evidence of either weapons of mass destruction or al qaeda links – ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ and the ‘rule of law’ provided retrospective justification for the war and occupation. following the announcement that saddam hussein would be executed for his role in the killings of 138 shiites from the town of al dujail – the only charge he faced in which the united states was not directly implicated – john howard claimed “[t]here's something heroic about a nation that is going through all the pain and difficulty as iraq is,[sic] yet still struggles to give this monster a fair trial – that is the mark of a country that desperately wants democracy”(john howard quoted in aap 2006b). bush likewise relied on a familiar distinction between tyranny and legality, referring to saddam’s trial as “a milestone in the iraqi people’s effort to replace the rule of a tyrant with the rule of law”(george w. bush quoted in aap 2006a). of course, there’s room today for an immanent critique, which questions the democratic credentials of those who would export democracy by force, and reminds them of their fervent commitment to the rule of law each time they introduce a domestic law enabling detention without trial. yet, as rights discourses morph into demands for greater security measures – to ensure the primary “right to security” – and ‘democracy’ and the ‘rule of law’ are used to justify bombings and military occupation, we need to recognise that imperial wars have always relied on liberal categories: the first world war was, after all, also the ‘great war for civilisation’. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 205 what we are seeing today is not simply a corruption of these categories, but an expression of contradictions already present in liberalism, a system which presupposes a state capable of maintaining social order. this means it is crucial to resist the blackmail that suggests that to critique the rule of law, or liberal democracy, would be to undermine the struggle against the real, neoconservative, enemy . today, we must begin the critical work of developing new political concepts adequate to a struggle to transform our political reality – concepts that will only arise in struggle against this reality. it may be that the possibility for such political innovation can be traced to the same source as the demoralization. giorgio agamben has argued: the fall of the soviet communist party and the unconcealed rule of the capitalistdemocratic state have cleared the field of the two main ideological obstacles hindering the resumption of a political philosophy worthy of our time: stalinism on one side, and progressivism and the constitutional state on the other (2000, p. 109). both of these were forms that anchored political imagination to the state. if we are to grasp the possibilities generated by the exhaustion of stalinism and liberalism, we must do without nostalgia and sentimentality, and begin to develop a political praxis that no longer presupposes the continuing existence of the state. as long as we continue to rely on statist political categories, we will find our resistance recuperated into the project of reconsolidating state power. if our time is to produce new political concepts, this will not occur in a realm of pure thought, or within a university system that is increasingly subjected to a neoliberal political rationality. the creation of new political concepts entails praxis, and will require the courage to act and to experiment politically in the face of an uncertain future. this means acting without teleological certainty, without a pre-formulated political alternative, and without guarantees. yet true political action always lacks guarantees – a point obscured by the myth of progress. to act politically is to act without knowing the results in advance, precisely because true political action, as the bush administration understood well, can transform the very terrain on which its consequences are evaluated. in this sense, to act politically is truly to “demand the impossible”, as every political act contains the potential to make what seemed impossible possible. to demand the impossible requires imagination and bravery. our time is not especially conducive to either. under the bush administration, the mantra “there is no alternative” served to vanquish political imagination, while the policy of preemption colonized the future, and high-profile terror raids foster – unevenly distributed – fear. 206 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 if today we are offered not the assertion that there are no alternatives, but a discourse of audacity and hope, this is not without significance. it is up to us, however, to ensure that these words reverberate in struggle, rather than wearing thin, and ultimately generating cynicism, in the face of ‘realistic’ compromises. it is still necessary to act – now more so than ever – because, despite all that was revolutionary about the neocon's political project, the transformation they brought about had one aim: to ensure the world would never change again, to destroy any future challenge to the global ascendancy of capital or to us military dominance, extending both into perpetuity. 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harcourt, brace and world, london. benjamin, w. 2003, 'on the concept of history', in, selected writings, vol. 4, harvard university press, cambridge, mass brown, w. 2006, 'learning to love again: an interview with wendy brown', contretemps, 6th january. bush, g. 1991, 'speech to congress, 6th march', <http://www.albab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm>. bush, g.w. 2002, 'remarks by the president at 2002 graduation exercise of the united states military academy, west point, new york, 1 june', the west point speech, < http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/pres/bush_wp_prestrike.pdf>. bush, g.w. 2007, 'state of the union address', <http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/>. dougherty, h. 2001, 'war may not be over in our lifetime, warns cheney', irish examiner, october 22nd, <http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2001/10/22/story15338.asp>. pilkington, e. 2009, 'obama under fire for guantanamo trials', the age, may 17. suskind, r. 2004, 'without a doubt', the new york times, october 17, <http://www.cs.umass.edu/~immerman/play/opinion05/withoutadoubt.html>. wolfowitz, p. 2003, 'excerpts from 1992 defence planning guidance', frontline, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html>. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-11-05-us-saddam_x.htm%3e� http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm%3e� http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/pal10.htm%3e� http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/pres/bush_wp_prestrike.pdf%3e� http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2007/%3e� http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2001/10/22/story15338.asp%3e� http://www.cs.umass.edu/~immerman/play/opinion05/withoutadoubt.html%3e� http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html%3e� 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 solidarity, community and the political economy of hurt james arvanitakis1 abstract this paper considers whether anti-racist activists we can form a community of solidarity. critiquing the issue of ‘whiteness’, i consider whether such a community reflects or actually confronts the structures of a political economy of whiteness. using both academic literature and narrative research i reflect on my own experiences of racism and hurt. these emotional and important issues are then intertwined within the political economy of whiteness. in the previous article, dinesh wadiwel challenges us to reflect on the issue of solidarity in anti-racist politics. he does this by discussing the complications of forming short-term solidarity groups and asks us to consider who benefits and who loses from these alliances. in so doing, he presents a political economy of solidarity. the political economy of solidarity that dinesh described functions like any other economic transaction insofar as it involves parties in varying positions of power with a series of shared disadvantages and advantages – and those who benefit the most are largely the ones better positioned along the hierarchy. i would like to extend this concept of ‘political economy’ to the subjective concepts of pain, suffering and particularly hurt – shared emotions that result from acts of racism. i want to consider whether some acts of racism can be considered more hurtful than others: in this way, we can consider racism as a currency, and hurt as the unit of value. further, i am interested in interrogating who has the right to claim a racial hurt. do we all experience this, and if so, are my feelings of hurt more or less relevant than those who are 1 this article is an extension of a previous paper written with dinesh wadiwel titled “racists like us”, and sources some additional ideas from a conference panel including dinesh and kiran grewal. i would also like to acknowledge an unpublished essay by amy tyler on ‘security’ that helped me concretise these ideas as well as the anonymous reviewers for their engagement. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 87 others to me? this question leads me to the objective of this article, which is to consider whether we can form a community as anti-racist activists in solidarity? if so, does this community reflect or actually confront the structures of a political economy of whiteness. this article aims to discuss some of these issues from the perspective of my own experiences of racism and hurt, and intertwine these within the political economy of whiteness. like dinesh, i too would like to present something of a disclaimer and also introduction to this controversial topic. i am a tall, fair, male who has been lucky enough to gain the benefits of an education at under-graduate and post-graduate levels. my ethnic background, which is not always evident, is greek-australian, with my parents migrating to sydney in the early 1960s. despite some set backs – including cancer when i was nine years old – i have been successful at various amateur sports including rugby. as a result, i have a solid build (i hazard to use the word athletic because of the less than accurate image that this may present). i take this time to describe my physical appearance because when we discuss the issue of racism, it is the confusion between physical appearances and ‘naturally’ inherited social traits that is the issue. in other words, we look at someone and assume that they will be lazy, good at math, disrespectful to women, violent, cunning and so on, based on their skin colour, eye shape, hair and so on. this, however, is not just a matter of individual discrimination but often takes the form of systemic social discrimination and assumptions: from job interviews to the possible meeting with new friends. it also occurs when we make pre-conceived judgements based on names or places of birth – not just physical appearance. turning to the aims of the article then, i would like to begin by considering whether my encounters with racism – as an almost white man – are comparable to that experienced by others less white than me? can i attend a whiteness conference and make claims of hurt or are these merely dismissed as the whining of some middle-class white boy? to answer these questions, we need to consider whether my hurt is less authentic because of my skin 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 tone. to ask such questions means that we are designating a political economy of hurt – something i will turn to now. the commodity of being white: i will have some of that when i was growing up as a greek boy in the eastern (beach) suburbs of sydney, there was a clear hierarchy of whiteness. the ‘australian surfie kids’ sat comfortably on top of that hierarchy and the rest of us – the greeks, lebanese, italians, asians, indians, pakistanis and so on – fought to climb this scale. there were things you could do to fit in: play the right sports, never speak in your ‘home’ language, anglicise your name (how else do you get james from dimitri?) or ride a skateboard. most importantly, however, you had to distance yourself from others who were not as white as you and join in the mocking. that is, you had to acknowledge the scale of whiteness and in doing so deny your own hurt by laughing at their accent or by the fact that they go to greek school. even as a child, then, i was unknowingly participating in a political economy of whiteness. the irony being that we bought into this economy because we did not want to be different and in so doing confirmed the thesis of hannah arendt (1959) who argued that conformity is at the very basis of a heterogenous populous. though we may have ignorantly supported and contributed to this political economy, it exists on a much larger scale and one that is deliberately implemented in both the national and international spheres. to make this point, i would like to briefly turn to the issue of security. in empire, hardt and negri (2004) identify two forms of security. while the first form emerges through cooperation, the other is a notion of abstract enemies that serve to legitimise violence and restrict freedoms: this is the other we must fear. this later position is analogous to neocleous’ arguments that security involves a “specification of fear” to establish a state of insecurity which brings about calls for greater security (2001, p. 12). this creates the social anxiety that walter benjamin (1940) describes as a ‘state of emergency’. issues of security have flowed into society with postseptember 11 policies such as racial profiling and the introduction of the anti-terrorism cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 89 legislation2 , and adopted in australia with the military intervention to ‘assist’ indigenous communities in the northern territory. anthony burke (2007) takes this understanding of security even further when he highlights how such a socially porous analysis of security is found in the very concepts of progress, modernity, freedom and even cultural identity. for burke, the imperative of security is now at the core of all decision-making and calls for security are used to affirm the nation-state, the value of exclusive citizenship and the importance of sovereignty: a theme that extends burke’s (2001) earlier work linking citizenship to whiteness. for example, australia’s focus on ‘business migrants’ who are sourced mainly from asia highlights how the price of security for the potential citizen ranges depending on the whiteness of the body: that is, whiteness and capital become interlinked as you can buy your way up the whiteness ladder. but even then, you must continue to prove your worth for your position is never guaranteed.3 the neo-liberal project is not colour blind after all. burke’s work also allows us to critically engage with the very issue of ‘whiteness studies’: a recently established academic area that many, including myself, wrestle with. i do believe, however, that we need to see the racial aspect of whiteness giving way to a more sociological understanding of ‘whiteness’ as a dynamic. in this way, whiteness changes over time. for example, commercial east asian urbanites, once considered part of the yellow peril, have only very recently been admitted to the category of ‘white bodied’ through their business acumen. this does not mean that they are totally accepted, but if they can ‘buy’ their way in, they are further up the whiteness scale. 2 for a chronology of legislative and other legal developments from 11 september 2001 – december 2007 see the australian parliament house website: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/law/terrorism.htm. 3 it also exists in low-income nations – from the ‘whiteness creams’ that have become so prevalent in a number of african nations, to the ability to bypass security checks in south america, the more white you are, the higher up the chain you are. in this way, i can wander into a five star hotel in colombia and not be questioned because i am whiter than the average colombian: a clear foreigner, who can obviously afford the hotel, so let me in. http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/law/terrorism.htm� 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 it may sound somewhat absurd to compare the right to migrate to australia via our ‘business migrant’ scheme to schoolyard bully tactics and taunting, but it is important to recognise that the naturalisation of the political economy of whiteness can begin on a micro scale which makes its parallel on the macro level appear normal. in this way, then, we can imagine whiteness like any other tradable commodity. i have no idea who i have hurt as i have traded in this political economy – a trade that has seen me attempt to climb my way along the scale of whiteness. i am, however, beginning to acknowledge that i have experienced hurt as well as produced it on the others i mocked. this has ranged from the taunting and being spat on at school – i was a ‘wog boy’ after all – to my peers at university mocking my writing and inability to express myself. discussing these issues is neither about making myself feel better nor about making this a confessional for therapy. like michael ondaajte’s (1991) central character in the english patient, i do believe that such experiences leave marks and scars on our biographies much like the contours of a cartographical map. the hurt i have experienced has marked me in many ways that are neither relevant nor important for this article. i neither seek your sympathy or your understanding: but neither do i expect you to dismiss it because i am a (almost) white boy. i am also not trying to claim authenticity and establish my credentials as an anti-racist activist based on the extent of my hurt. rather, i write this article with a level of critical reflection that enables me to express empathy with others who may have experienced racism in more brutal forms than i could ever imagine. it also means that i can see other’s who may have never experienced racism empathise with me. i raise these issues in an attempt to make visible the political economy of whiteness and in so doing, confront it as well as the consequences of this hierarchy. hurt, solidarity and community the question then, is how we move forward – working in solidarity – without perpetuating the systems that we are confronting? how do we work together if i may never understand your hurt and you may never understand mine – no matter how much cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 91 we attempt to empathise? is it possible for anti-racist activists not to fall in the trap of judging each other’s experiences? to find an answer to these dilemmas i turn to ongoing debates about the meaning and operation of ‘community’. the concept of community is one that may never be given a definitive definition, for as community development worker jeremy brent (2004) notes, community is something that we want but never seem to arrive at. community is called for whenever social problems are experienced “like a roof under which we shelter in heavy rain, like a fireplace which we warm our hands on a frosty day” (bauman 2001, p. 1). we envision a community, then, through a longing for stability and warmth, being a shelter from the harsh elements. this longing, however, can be a double-edged sword, for as brent (2004) points out, a community can produce cooperation and mutuality but it can also be divisive and create further conflict. while community is something that does not have a concrete manifestation, the longing for it has a real impact on the way citizens interact. longing, then, has an affective element, like hurt does. the orthodox conceptualisation of community is one that largely refers to the ‘communitarian’ or ‘libertarian’ school of thought. this sees community as an ideal that is created in an unproblematic, uncontested and ‘natural’ way through affiliations and recognition of people ‘like us’ (ibid). that is, community is established through social formations that arise from mutual beliefs, understandings and practices that confirm and extend a stable sense of identity and subjectivity (taylor 1994, p. 25). this is a position that relies on forming communities based on a sense of recognition of each other’s experience. from this perspective, we can see how a potential ‘natural’ community can emerge from those with a shared experience of hurt. that is, because you have felt hurt, and i have felt hurt, we should recognise in each other a shared experience that allows us to form some sort of ‘natural and uncontested’ community. in this way, we come to understand and accept each other – we can work together, fighting against those who would institute hurt. 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 i believe, however, that the limitations that emerge when relying on ‘natural’ community formation, rather than resulting in the desired harmony, can often lead to exclusion, and possibly betrayal. i believe this occurs for two main reasons. the first of these is based around the processes of recognition that implicitly establishes an inside for those with ‘authenticity’ – and an outside for ‘others’ (cornell 1992). in the case of racism, those with the greatest hurt can claim to be an exclusive group based on their distance from whiteness: they become the ‘gatekeepers’ who refuse to allow others the same status. from this perspective, we reflect the political economy of hurt because each hurt is assessed in some normative way – and accepted or rejected – depending on the criteria established: it is the same scale of whiteness, just assessed a different way. the next insight extends the above as it relates to the homogenisation of hurt that can occur in the formation of ‘natural’ communities based on recognition. this homogenisation occurs through the ‘natural’ process embedded within the very formation of these types of communities (oliver 2001): the inside group becomes the inside because in the political economy of whiteness they are the ones most discriminated against – the ones furthest away from the top end of the whiteness scale. this inside group, then, accepts their right to feel the most authentic hurt and consequently judges the extent of hurt of those on the outside. the process of homogenisation occurs when those on the outside – who want to be on the inside – attempt to efface their different experiences of hurt in order to be recognised by those on the inside. this is obviously not possible and thus, recognition remains incomplete. moreover, the hurt of the anti-racist who is almost white or those considered in privileged positions is never truly authentic because it is not the same as it is for an underprivileged. the paradox of the ‘natural’ community, then, is that it is likely to use the same hierarchy of whiteness as those that would discriminate against them. this occurs because the recognition of hurt is one that remains defined by the political economy of whiteness and thus the authenticity of hurt. the very scale, then, judges the extent of possible affiliation, that we are trying to confront – the very scale that is causing the hurt. in other words, we cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 93 need to a avoid forming communities based on a hierarchy of hurt for this is both constituted by and reflective of the political economy of whiteness. because in doing so we are making claims in the very language that this political economy establishes, and thus we not only embody it but also reflect its structures. this is not to argue that all hurt is equal or equally unjust: just that the language to claim hurt reflects what we are attempting to overcome. do we really want to work together? creating desire and ‘community’ extending the work of rosalyn diprose, i would like to present a departure from this traditional school of thought that may offer anti-racists activists (like us) the potential to work together without needing to recognise each other’s hurt on any scale of whiteness. this school of thought argues that community is propelled by alterity or essential difference: community does not emerge by some natural process but rather through ‘desiring’. consequently, i argue that in order to create communities that will be inclusive we need to understand solidarity based on reciprocated desire. that is, we can form inclusive communities with people who are other to us if we so desire rather than (solely) with those we recognise as ‘like us’. here, the individual is present within the desired community not as a ‘self-atomised being’ seeking recognition but rather through a desire to share difference as a fundamental expression of uniqueness. such a conceptualisation of community is formed through the desire for alterity, subjectivity and agency between another and me. this is an alterity that is promoted not subdued. this results in a heterogeneous rather than homogeneous community, as the individual is never reduced to a uniform subjectivity. to explain how this occurs, diprose draws on the metaphor of the handshake. this is the ‘open hand’ that signifies a desire for community as it is extended to the stranger. central here is the issue of what is exchanged and shared: for the handshake that brings together different bodies has an important meaning. i have argued elsewhere that this handshake 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 involves more than just the offer of friendship but also the desire to share hope, trust, a sense of safety, and possibly intellect.4 this open hand does not necessarily indicate i want to be your friend – it does not even indicate that i like you. rather, it presents my desire to work with you in an open exchange of ideas in a way that neither assumes recognition or judges. the handshake is often offered with the uncertainty of not knowing, nor understanding the other or their experiences. it is offered, however, with the expectation of reciprocation and thus, in the outstretched hand lays the hope for a community without an outside. that is, we establish a community that does not have a gatekeeper that judges who is allowed in, but one that is open to all who want to join. a conclusion of sorts: confronting the political economy of whiteness what potential exists for anti-racists politics as a result? the answer, i believe is based on our desire – temporary or permanent – to work together with a reciprocated desire to confront the structures of racism. this amounts to a refusal to play the whiteness game: not to buy into the established political economy. for we are not required to compare stories nor biographies to justify experiences or our right to confront racism: rather, it can be an act of desiring to share our good will. for there are many racial taunts and hurts that are beyond my grasp: but does this failure to understand your hurt diminish our ability to work together? the answer is hopefully ‘no’. i was inspired to come to this conclusion a number of years ago when linda burney, the first australian aboriginal woman elected to new south wales’ parliament, spoke at a conference. ms. burney was born under an act of injustice, when in the 1960s she was registered under the flora and fauna act of nsw rather than as a citizen. this seems a substantially greater injustice than having eggs and insults – ‘get off our beach you fucken wog cunt’ – hurled at me while sitting at the north end of maroubra beach. i can never claim to understand the extent of linda burney’s hurt and nor can she understand mine. but we can come together with a desire to never experience our 4 see arvanitakis (2007) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 95 individual hurts again. to achieve this we need to work together in a way that does not perpetuate the hierarchy of whiteness by overlaying it with the hierarchy of hurt. if we cannot achieve such a desire, then we must consider if we are merely perpetuating the whiteness scale rather than confronting it. references arendt, h. 1959, ‘reflections on little rock’, dissent, vol.6, no.1, winter 1959, sourced from the portable hannah, baehr, p. (ed.) (2000), penguin classics, new york, pp.321-48. arvanitakis, j. 2007, the cultural commons, vdm verlag, saarbrücken. bauman, z. 2001, community: seeking safety in an insecure world, polity press, cambridge. benjamin, w. 1940, illuminations, schocken books, new york, published 1986 and translated by zohn, h. brent, j. 2004, ‘the desire for community: illusion, confusion and paradox’, community development journal, vol.39, no.3, pp.213-223. burke, a. 2007, beyond security, ethics and violence: war against the other, routledge, london and new york. burke, a. 2001, in fear of security: australia's invasion anxiety, pluto press, sydney. cornell, d. 1992, the philosophy of the limit, routledge, new york. diprose, r. 2003, ‘communities written in blood’, cultural studies review, vol.9, no.1, pp.35-50. hardt, m. & negri. a. 2004, multitude, penguin press, new york. neocleous, m. 2001, ‘against security’, radical philosophy, vol.100, march/april, pp.715. ondaatje, m. 1991, the english patient, vintage, london. oliver, k. 2001, witnessing – beyond recognition, university of minnesota press, minneapolis. taylor, c. 1994, ‘the politics of recognition’, in a. gutmann (ed) multiculturalism: examining the politics of recognition, princeton university press, princeton, n.j. 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the legal concept of charity and its expansion after the aid/watch decision1 fiona martin university of new south wales abstract this paper provides the reader with an insight into the legal analysis of the concept of ‘charity’ and ‘charitable purpose’. this discussion is important in light of the 2010 high court decision in commissioner of taxation v aid/watch incorporated. it begins with an overview of the historical development of ‘charity’ as a legal concept. it then considers how this concept has been interpreted in the context of taxation law and in particular focuses on the arguments for and against a restriction of advocacy and political lobbying by charities. it concludes with an analysis of the aid/watch case and how this may be applied in the future to other charitable entities. introduction this paper provides the reader with an insight into the legal analysis of the concept of ‘charity’ and ‘charitable purpose’. this discussion is important in light of the 2010 high court decision in commissioner of taxation v aid/watch incorporated.2 it begins with an overview of the historical development of ‘charity’ as a legal concept. it then considers how this concept has been interpreted in the context of taxation law and in particular focuses on the arguments for and against a restriction of advocacy and political lobbying by charities. it concludes with an analysis of the aid/watch case and how this may be applied in the future to other charitable entities. history of the common law definition of charity the common law definition of charity requires that a charity have a charitable purpose and be for the benefit of the public.3 during the 16th century english society saw the role of the church in charitable work declining and it was increasingly recognized during elizabeth i’s reign that poverty was a national problem.4 1 this paper was up to date as at 15 april 2011; draft ato ruling 2011/d2 was issued on 11 may 2011. around this time there were also a series of 2 [2010] hca 42. 3 commissioners for special purposes of income tax v pemsel [1891] ac 531. 4 william kitchener jordan, philanthropy in england 1480-1660: a study of the changing pattern of english social aspirations (russell sage foundation, 1959) chapters 4-6; michael chesterman, charities, trusts and social welfare (weidenfeld and nicolson, 1979)16-24. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 21 events that exacerbated the situation. these included several disastrous harvests, the spanish war, inflation, a domestic and international economic depression and the plague which killed 14 per cent of the population of london.5 these events led to widespread poverty, unemployment and vagrancy. the elizabethan state became more interventionist and established workhouses to discipline and make productive the poor who could work and also required local parishes to provide for their own poor.6 due to its own lack of funds, the state then turned to the encouragement of private philanthropy to assist.7 it did this through three major avenues. first, the court of chancery was reinforced as the dominant legal mechanism for enforcing charitable purposes. secondly, the privileges that the law provided to charitable institutions including remedying many technical defects and ensuring that they did not fail due to uncertainty were confirmed and enhanced. thirdly, the statute of charitable uses1601,8 commonly referred to as the statute of elizabeth was enacted.9 the aim of this statute was to appoint the bishop of a diocese and the local gentry as commissioners to supervise the administration of most charities and to prevent any misuse of charitable property.10 these commissioners were empowered to inquire into the ‘abuses breaches of trustes negligences mysimploimentes, not impoloyinge concealinge defraudinge misconvertinge or misgovernmente’ of any property given for such ‘charitable and godlie uses’ as were listed in the statute’s preamble.11 it is this statute that is important for the balance of this discussion. the most important feature of this piece of legislation is that it set out a preamble that comprehensively listed for the first time a range of charitable purposes. this list has been confirmed in subsequent case law as the foundation of the modern legal definition of ‘charitable purpose’ although it was 5 myles mcgregor-lowndes, 'diversions of charitable assets: crimes and punishments in australia ' (paper presented at the national centre on philanthropy and the law: reforming the charitable contribution deduction 16th annual conference, new york, 2004) 4-5; blake bromley, '1601 preamble: the state's agenda for charity' (2002) 7 charity law and practice review 177, 199; anthony brundage, the english poor laws, 1700-1930 (palgrave, 2002), 9. 6 local parishes were required to provide for assistance for their own poor through the poor law act 1601; for a more detailed discussion refer blake bromley, '1601 preamble: the state's agenda for charity' (2002) 7 charity law and practice review 177, 198-200. 7 michael chesterman, charities, trusts and social welfare (weidenfeld and nicolson, 1979) 19. 8 43 eliz. 1, c.4. 9 michael chesterman, charities, trusts and social welfare (weidenfeld and nicolson, 1979)19. 10 gareth jones, history of the law of charity 1532-1827 (cambridge university press, 1969) chapter 3; michael chesterman, charities, trusts and social welfare (weidenfeld and nicolson, 1979) 16, 24-28. 11 michael chesterman, charities, trusts and social welfare (weidenfeld and nicolson, 1979) 24; gareth jones, history of the law of charity 1532-1827 (cambridge university press, 1969) 225. 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 never intended as an exhaustive list.12 • relief of the aged, impotent and poor; the preamble sets out the following charitable purposes: • maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners; • schools and scholars in universities; • repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways; • education and preferment of orphans; • maintenance of prisons; • marriages of poor maids; • aid and help of young tradesmen and handicraftsmen; • aid and help of persons decayed; • the relief or redemption of prisoners or captives; and • the aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payment of fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes.13 according to william kitchener jordan the statute did not actually create a concept of charitable purposes but rather codified ‘a body of law badly wanting classical statement’. 14 the leading contemporary source of the time considered that the preamble was an elaborate listing of uses, which would relieve poverty and reduce the local parish’s responsibilities under the poor law. it was a list of charities the state wished to encourage.15 in effect, the preamble did not set out a list of areas that were considered altruistically charitable; rather it expressed the state’s agenda for charitable giving. 16the objects enumerated reflect elizabethan political, economic and social programs with the government hoping that the wealthy would be encouraged to implement and fund programs in these areas.17 12 michael chesterman, charities, trusts and social welfare (weidenfeld and nicolson, 1979) 25. 13 gareth jones, history of the law of charity 1532-1827 (cambridge university press, 1969) 224. 14 william kitchener jordan, philanthropy in england 1480-1660: a study of the changing pattern of english social aspirations (russell sage foundation, 1959)112. 15 francis moore, ‘reading on the statute of charitable uses’, in george duke, the law of charitable uses (bridgman, 1805). 16 blake bromley, '1601 preamble: the state's agenda for charity' (2002) 7 charity law and practice review 178. 17 graham moffat, trusts law: text and materials (butterworths & company limited, 4th ed, 2004) 884. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 23 the impact of income tax on the interpretation of ‘charity’ and ‘charitable’ in 1799 the british government imposed its first income tax. the legislation was introduced by william pitt the younger in his budget of december 1798 to pay for weapons and equipment in preparation for the napoleonic wars. pitt's new graduated income tax began at a levy of 2d in the pound (0.8333%) on incomes over £60 and increased up to a maximum of 2s (10%) on incomes of over £200. within this statute was an exemption from income tax of any ‘corporation, fraternity or society of persons established for charitable purposes only’.18 this exemption appears to have its origins in the 1671 and 1688 land tax exemptions for hospitals and charitable institutions, which was then continued in the income tax context.19 in 1816 income tax temporarily ceased, however, it was reintroduced in 1842 with the same exemption. 20 this exemption from income tax was not popular with everyone and william gladstone as chancellor of the exchequer argued that it should be limited to the relief of hospitals, colleges and almshouses in his budget statement in 1863.21 he was however defeated and the exemption for all charities remained.22 in his argument gladstone explained that the original exemption had been warranted at a time when the state made no provision for education or for the poor and that the situation in 1863 was very different and therefore the exemption was no longer needed.23 the insertion of this exemption gave rise to the issue of the meaning of ‘charitable’ in a fiscal context. there was however no judicial consideration of this question for many years due to the fact that until 1874 there was no avenue for an appeal from the income tax commissioners to the courts.24 the issue first came to the courts in 1888 in a scottish case called baird’s trustees v lord advocate25 in which the court held that ‘charitable’ required some element of relief for the poor or deprived. this view was overturned some three years later. 18 income tax act 1799 s5. 19 john f avery jones, 'the special commissioners from trafalgar to waterloo' in john tiley (ed), studies in the history of tax law volume 2 (hart publishing, 2007) 3, 14-16. in respect of some hospitals it can be traced back even further as st bartholomew’s hospital, london was exempt from tax as early as the reign of edward i (1272-1307) see michael gousmett, ‘the public benefit test’ (2006) new zealand law journal 57, 57. 20 income tax act 1842 s61, no vi, sch a; s88, sch c. 21 (1863) 3 hansard 170, 200-247; william e gladstone, the financial statements of 1853, 1860-1863. to which are added, a speech on tax-bills, 1861, and on charities, 1863 (1853, 1860-1863) 370, 426, 461. 22 jean warburton, 'charity one definition for all tax purposes in the new millennium?' [2000] british tax review 144, 144. 23 william e gladstone, the financial statements of 1853, 1860-1863. to which are added, a speech on taxbills, 1861, and on charities, 1863 (1853, 1860-1863) 368. 24 michael chesterman, charities, trusts and social welfare (weidenfeld and nicolson, 1979) 59. 25 (1888) 15 sess cas (4th series) 688. 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 the watershed decision on the meaning of ‘charitable’ in an income tax context is considered to be commissioners for special purposes of income tax v pemsel.26 this case dealt with a trust of land in england which provided that half of the rents and profits from the land were to go towards the maintenance, support and advancement of missionary establishments of the protestant episcopal church (commonly known as the united brethren) amongst heathen nations. until 1886, the income tax commissioners had granted tax exemptions to the trustees in respect of this trust, under an exemption provision in the income tax act 1842 applying to the rents and profits of lands vested in trustees for ‘charitable purposes’ as long as they were applied for charitable purposes. in 1886 the commissioners, under the influence of gladstone’s stricter administration of charities,27 withdrew the exemption. the trustees were successful in an appeal to the court of appeal and the appeal of the commissioners to the house of lords was dismissed by a majority of 4:2. the house of lords decision held that for the purposes of exemption from income tax the definition of ‘charitable purposes’ followed the general law definition which derived from the preamble to the statute of elizabeth. lord macnaghten delivered the leading judgment with which lords watson and morris concurred. he stated: …and those courts, as they were bound to do, construed the words "charitable uses" in the sense recognised in the court of chancery, and in the statute of elizabeth, as their proper meaning. i have dwelt for a moment on this point, because it seems to me that there is a disposition to treat the technical meaning of the term "charity" rather as the idiom of a particular court than as the language of the law of england. and yet of all words in the english language bearing a popular as well as a legal signification i am not sure that there is one which more unmistakeably has a technical meaning in the strictest sense of the term, that is a meaning clear and distinct, peculiar to the law as understood and administered in this country, and not depending upon or coterminous with the popular or vulgar use of the word.28 lord macnaghten decided that the technical legal meaning of the word ‘charitable’ was appropriate rather than the ordinary or layperson concept. he argued that the aim of the statute of elizabeth was to provide new machinery for the reformation of abuses in regard to charities and that the objects stated in the preamble were only examples of charitable 26 [1891] ac 531. 27 myles mcgregor-lowndes, 'the australian definition of charity' (paper presented at the national centre on philanthropy and the law, defining charity, 14th annual conference, new york, 24-25 october 2002), 8. 28 [1891] ac 531, 581-582. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 25 purposes but which had become, by the practice of the court, an index or chart.29 he then traced the history of ‘charity’ from the statute of mortmain in 1736 and the fact that the courts had based their decisions under this enactment on the preamble and its spirit and intendment. his historical view of the legal definition of ‘charitable’ was, on this basis, limited to the common law precedents established by the courts since 1736.30 the decision confirmed that as long as the purpose of the charity fell within the preamble or its ‘spirit’ and a sufficiently large group of the public stood to benefit it was charitable. lord macnaghten also formulated a set of four categories of charitable purposes when he said: “charity” in its legal sense, comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads.31 ‘charities’ as a concept for the purposes of the exemption from income tax in australia the income of charitable institutions is exempt from income tax in australia under s 50-5 item 1.1 of the income tax assessment act 1997 (cth) (itaa97).32 there is no definition of ‘charity’ in the itaa97. this is despite the fact that a statutory definition was recommended by the 2001 report of the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisations.33 in 1974 the high court of australia confirmed the place of the preamble to the statute of elizabeth in australian common law in its conclusion that in order for an institution to be charitable it must be: • within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the statute of elizabeth; and • for the public benefit.34 29 ibid 581. 30 ibid 581, 582. 31 [1891] ac 531, 583. 32 this section was formerly s 23(e) of the income tax assessment act 1936 (cth). charitable funds and institutions are exempt from income tax under ss 50-1 and 50-5 of the income tax assessment act 1997 (cth). 33 commonwealth of australia, ian sheppard, robert fitzgerald and david gonski, report of the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisations, june 2001,18; treasurer’s press statement ‘final response to the charities definition inquiry’ 11 may 2004, http://www.treasurer.gov.au/tsr/content/pressreleases/2004/031.asp. 34 royal national agricultural and industrial association v chester [1974] 48 aljr 304, 305; that this is the law in australia was originally decided by the privy council in chesterman v federal commissioner of taxation (1925) 37 clr 317. 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 this has been reaffirmed more recently by the high court in the case of central bayside general practice association limited v commissioner of state revenue of the state of victoria.35 the australian taxation office (ato) also considers that there are two aspects to the test for an entity to be considered charitable. in its 2005 ruling income tax and fringe benefits tax: charities, the ato states that for a purpose to fall within the technical legal meaning of 'charitable' it must be beneficial to the community, or deemed to be for the public benefit by legislation applying for that purpose; and within the spirit and intendment of the statute of elizabeth, or deemed to be charitable by legislation applying for that purpose. 36 the ato also accepts the four categories established in pemsel’s case as an approach to identifying charitable purposes37 charities and advocacy being charities for the relief of poverty, advancement of education, advancement of religion and other purposes beneficial to the community. prior to the high court decision of aid/watch v the commissioner of taxation38 the common law applying in australia stated that the public benefit test may be failed where an organisation with a charitable purpose engages in political activity or social advocacy.39 this approach is based on the principle that a trust for the attainment of political objects is invalid because the court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit.40 the source of the principle can be found in the comments of lord parker in bowman v secular society ltd in 1917 when he stated: a trust for the attainment of a political object has always been held invalid, not because it is illegal, for everyone is at liberty to advocate or promote by any lawful means a change in the law, but because the court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure the change is charitable.41 35 (2006) 228 clr 168, 178-179; also commissioner of taxation v word investments limited [2008] hca 55. 36 australian taxation office, income tax and fringe benefits tax: charities, tr 2005/21, 21 december 2005, [8]. 37 australian taxation office, income tax and fringe benefits tax: charities, tr 2005/21, 21 december 2005, [13]. 38 [2010] hca 42. 39 gino dal pont, charity law in australia and new zealand (oxford university press, 2000) 203. 40 bowman v secular society ltd [1917] ac 406. 41 bowman v secular society ltd [1917] ac 406, 442. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 27 arguments for and against advocacy of charities there are three main arguments as to why advocacy organisations should be denied charitable status. these are discussed below with the counterarguments. first, it was stated in bowman v secular society ltd42 that the acceptance of advocacy organisations who disagree with government policy would put courts in a position of passing judgement on this policy. however in 1997 santow j of the new south wales supreme court considered that ‘[p]ersuasion directed to political change is part and parcel of a democratic society in which ideas and agendas compete for attention and allegiance.’43 this was not however a case dealing with the income tax exemption. in the same year a new zealand judge made the following comments: is it really inappropriate for a judge to recognise an issue as thoroughly worthy of public debate, even though the outcome of that debate might be to lead to a change in the law? after all, it is commonplace for judges to make suggestions themselves for changes in the law today, whether in judgments or extra-curially…and we do, after all, live in an age which enjoys the supposed benefits of [freedom of thought, conscience, religion and expression]. should not the benefits be real in all respects, including the law of charities?44 more recently, french j observed that the victorian women lawyers’ association did not engage in disqualifying political activity merely because it made representations and took public positions on matters affecting the position of women generally.45 in the twenty first century policy is not developed exclusively by the legislature with the support of the public bureaucracy, nor is this desirable. governments recognise the important role of advocacy in the health, education and social welfare fields in many ways. governments directly fund such bodies, appoint their representatives to advisory bodies, and convene regular meetings between those organisations and relevant ministers. even before the aid/watch case it was therefore arguable that this recognition should be extended to the granting of charitable status as these activities are clearly for a public benefit. furthermore, it 42 [1917] ac 406, 442. 43 public trustee v attorney-general (1997) 42 nswlr 600, 621. 44 re collier (deceased) [1998] 1 nzlr 81, 89-90 (hammond j). 45 victorian women lawyers’ association inc v commissioner of taxation (2008) fca 983 [149]. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 is arguable that rather than passing judgment on public policy the courts are being asked to facilitate policy development and public discussion around issues that bear on charitable purposes (such as the relief of poverty) by enabling advocacy organisations to attract financial support from the public.46 this activity is for the benefit of the modern community. a second argument in favour of restricting political activity of charities is that many disadvantaged groups who are the recipients of charitable services are politically controversial and these are the groups that would be involved in advocacy activities.47 this in turn would undermine the community support for charities. on the other hand if it is accepted that controversial subject matters are not charitable, groups that aided refugees or racial harmony would not be charities. this would be a great loss to the development of our community and would deny us the opportunity to broaden our perceptions and concepts of welfare and what is charitable. a third argument for restricting the scope of the advocacy activities of charities is the difficulty in distinguishing between advocacy for charitable purposes and advocacy which is essentially political.48 it is certainly arguable that there is already a degree of difficulty in identifying and classifying charitable purposes and that adding further classification strata would merely add to this complexity. in its submission to the charities definition inquiry the australian council of social services argued that the appropriate approach is to make a distinction between advocacy for charitable purposes and advocacy with a political end in mind: the key test of whether these activities are merely political (that is, they aim to increase the political power or influence of the organisation or its members) or charitable (that is, they aim to improve public health, education or social welfare) should be their purpose rather than the nature of the activity itself (for example, whether private lobbying or public advocacy are used as the means to achieve charitable purposes).49 46 charles rickett ‘charity and politics’ (1982) 10 new zealand universities law review 169, 174. 47 michael chesterman, charities, trusts and social welfare (weidenfeld and nicolson, 1979) 367; gino dal pont, law of charity, (lexisnexis, australia 2010). 48 mcgovern v attorney-general [1982] wlr 222, 237 (slade j). 49 australian council for social service submission to the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisations january 2001 http://www.cdi.gov.au/submissions/134-acoss.doc part 3(3). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 29 the importance of advocacy to charitable organisations is recognised in many of the other submissions to the charities definition inquiry of 2000.50 the central land council strongly argued that the ability to advocate on behalf of traditional owners was an important function of charities representing indigenous australians in view of the history of marginalisation and lack of government resources for these people.51 this view seems in keeping with the majority view in the united kingdom. the charity commission for england and wales has stated that a charity can engage in political activity if ‘there is a reasonable expectation that the activity concerned will further the stated purposes of the charity, and so benefit its beneficiaries, to an extent justified by the resources devoted to the activity.’ 52 the commission has also stated that charities may comment on public issues, advocate changes in the law, support, oppose, comment on or promote legislation provided that these activities are likely to promote their charitable purposes.53 this narrower view that some political activity is only acceptable as long as it is incidental to the main charitable purpose of the organisation was confirmed in canada by the supreme court in vancouver society of immigrant and visible minority women v minister of national revenue. the final aspect of the statement does require a link with the entities charitable purpose and this has always been the case at common law where the courts have said that an ancillary purpose of advocacy is acceptable. 54 50 for example, philanthropy australia inc submission to the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisations 19 january 2001 the court commented that the organisation could retain its charitable status if its conduct of political activities was in the pursuit of its charitable purposes. its activities were aimed at providing educational benefits such as workshops and seminars for immigrant women. incidental to this were the objectives of lobbying and fundraising from government http://www.philanthropy.org.au/pdfs/submission-to-inquiry.pdf recommendation 2.2; central land council submission to the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisations 25 january 2001 http://www.cdi.gov.au/submissions/328%20%20central%20land%20council.doc 4; australian council for social service submission to the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisations january 2001 http://www.cdi.gov.au/submissions/134acoss.doc part 3(3). 51 central land council submission to the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisations 25 january 2001 http://www.cdi.gov.au/submissions/328%20-%20central%20land%20council.doc 4. 52 charity commission for england and wales, speaking out: guidance on campaigning and political activity by charities, cc9. 53 e cairns, charities: law and practice (3rd ed, 1996) 29-30. 54 (1999) 99 dtc 5034. http://www.philanthropy.org.au/pdfs/submission-to-inquiry.pdf%20recommendation%202.2� http://www.philanthropy.org.au/pdfs/submission-to-inquiry.pdf%20recommendation%202.2� http://www.cdi.gov.au/submissions/328%20-%20central%20land%20council.doc� http://www.cdi.gov.au/submissions/328%20-%20central%20land%20council.doc� http://www.cdi.gov.au/submissions/328%20-%20central%20land%20council.doc� 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 entities for educational support for these women. the organisation’s objects specifically stated that it was not to give direct or indirect support to any political party.55 prior to aid/watch the ato confirmed the common law view for australia that an organisation is not charitable if its purpose is advocating a political party or cause, attempting to change the law or government policy, or propagating a particular point of view. 56 this was considered to be the case even if the subject matter of the change concerned the relief of poverty, education or religion.57 the 2005 ato ruling does however concede that political or lobbying activities that are incidental to the charitable purpose of an organisation will not affect its charitable status.58 the general object is…to prevent cruelty to animals…none of the methods set out for the achievement of this object detracts from its character. it is true that one of these methods, viz. procuring such further legislation as may be thought expedient, if taken alone, would be a political object and nothing more. but it is only a method of achieving the main or fundamental object, the prevention of cruelty to animals… a good example of an approach approved by the ato is the case of re inman (deceased) in which gowans j said: 59 commissioner of taxation v aid/watch incorporated in 2009 the full federal court of australia held that an organisation with the charitable purposes of relief of poverty and education was still not charitable on the basis that it was too heavily involved in political activity.60 aid/watch incorporated, the subject of this case, has as its purposes research, monitoring and campaigning in relation to the delivery of overseas aid. its objective is to promote aid programs that are environmentally sound and effectively delivered however it does not provide aid directly. the court held that one of its main purposes was to attempt to persuade governments (even indirectly) to its point of view, and that this necessarily involved criticism and an attempt to bring about change in government activity and policy. its political purpose, as demonstrated in its political activity was a separate main purpose and not ancillary to the actual charitable purposes.61 55 (1999) 99 dtc 5034, [8]. the taxpayer was therefore held not to be a charity and appealed from this decision to the high court of australia. 56 taxation ruling tr 2005/21, [102]. 57 taxation ruling tr 2005/21, [107]. 58 taxation ruling tr 2005/21, [121]. 59 [1965] vr 238, 242. 60 commissioner of taxation v aid/watch incorporated [2009] fcafc 128. 61 [2009] fcafc 128, [37]. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 31 high court decision in a majority judgement with two strong dissenting judgements the high court held that aid/watch was a charity. the high court stated that the common law as formulated in bowman v secular society did not apply to australian law.62 the high court found that a purpose of generating public debate about the efficacy of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty is a charitable purpose. reliance was placed by the court on the system of law in australia, its basis in our constitution and that it relies upon ‘...communication between electors and legislators and the officers of the executive, and between electors themselves, on matters of government and politics’.63 the majority then made some comments indicating a broader approach. the strong suggestion of the court is that within a charity for the advancement of education or religion or relief of poverty encouragement of public debate about changing government policy or government activities will be charitable. the key statements that the court made are the encouragement of debate. the high court specifically referred to ‘...the generation by lawful means of public debate’. this australian context therefore indicated a public benefit aspect to debate and advocacy which is inconsistent with the earlier bowman v secular society principle. 64 the result of this decision is that charities are allowed an increased ability to carry out campaigning and advocacy activities, rather than just participation in government-led reforms or providing educational information on relevant issues. these activities must however be directed toward purposes which are for the public benefit. such activities include advocating for improvement in the effectiveness of government policies relating to relief of poverty, advancement of education, advancement of religion or other purposes recognised as beneficial to the community. furthermore, as discussed below, the activities and objects must not be illegal or contrary to public policy. it is also likely that representative bodies will have more scope to advocate on behalf of members' interests. this is particularly important for peak bodies that wish to lobby government about systemic issues faced by the sector and in relation to government policy. there is also the possibility that charities are now able to have a sole charitable purpose of 62 [2010] hca 42 [44]-[48]. 63 [2010] hca 42 [44]. 64 [2010] hca 42 [47]. 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 bringing about changes in government policy and public opinion in relation to their other charitable purposes. this can be contrasted to the previous legal position where such a purpose was not charitable in its own right. a further important point to understand is that this decision is consistent with the 2008 decision of the high court in commissioner of taxation v word investments ltd65 the two dissenting judgments found that aid/watch's purpose was not charitable. this conclusion was based on the view that the entity’s objects and activities involved the promotion of particular points of view rather than a more neutral approach to the generation of public debate. which demonstrated that the high court is open to applying the principles of charity law in the context of the values and expectations of modern society. what is not within aid/watch it has been a long held requirement of the common law that activities and purposes of charities that offend public policy principles are not charitable.66 an entity’s purpose is not beneficial if its aims are contrary to public policy,67 unlawful or for a lawful purpose that is to be carried out by unlawful means.68 the types of purposes that are envisaged are illegal acts, purposes or objects which threaten national security such as terrorist activity, religious purposes that place its adherents at risk or which are illegal in some way, education for illegal or harmful purposes or to encourage illegal activities and discrimination against particular classes of people which goes beyond what is allowed by law. 69 the aid/watch decision does not change this principle. it is certainly arguable that in most cases these restrictions are not overly intrusive on a charity’s purposes and activities. however some charities suggest that there is the exception where charities engage in civil disobedience or where the law is unclear or it conflicts with a moral perspective.70 65 [2008] hca 55. 66 perpetual trustee co (ltd) v robins (1967) 85 wn (pt. 1) (nsw) 403, 411; gino dal pont, law of charity, (lexisnexis, australia 2010) 72-75. 67 perpetual trustee co (ltd) v robins (1967) 85 wn (pt. 1) (nsw) 403, 411; see also thrupp v. collett (no 1) (1858) 53 er 844; re macduff; macduff v macduff [1895] 2 ch 451; re pieper (deceased ); the trustees executors & agency co. ltd v attorney-general (vic) [1951] vlr 42. 68 auckland medical aid trust v commissioner of inland revenue [1979] 1 nzlr 382, 395. 69 gino dal pont, law of charity, (lexisnexis, australia 2010) 72-75. 70 changemakers australia, charity law reform project (esther abram, 2011) 30. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 33 it is also unclear just how far the aid/watch decision extends. what does the court mean by the generation of public debate in the context of charities in the first three categories and second, when does it apply to charities that fall within the fourth charitable head, ‘other purposes beneficial to the community’. in other words can a religion or a school or a charity that is working to relieve poverty such as aid/watch advocate a point of view to such an extent that they endorse a particular political party as having in its opinion, the best policy? the idea of debate implies a weighing up or balancing of information and ideas, the talking about something at length and in detail, especially as part of a formal exchange of opinion. perhaps this is as far as the decision extends and supporting one political party over another goes too far but the situation is not entirely clear. furthermore, is it acceptable for charities that fall within other purposes that are beneficial to the community such as those that fight to protect the environment or for animal rights to engage in advocacy or lobbying to the same extent as charities that fall within the first three categories? is there a difference and if so where do we draw the line? advocating a particular point of view and supporting a particular political party’s policy is often extremely attractive to organisations that are engaged in environmental activism or protection of human or animal rights. it is also important to other organisations such as those that favour relaxing gun control and anti-abortion groups. is there a requirement in the concept of ‘debate’ that both sides of the argument are represented in some way? conclusion the ato is now engaged in the process of drafting a new ruling to replace the 2005 ruling referred to earlier in this discussion.71 the initial ruling will be released in draft form with a chance for members of the not-for-profit sector and their advisors to comment. it is however expected that the ato will seek to narrow the application of the aid/watch decision.72 71 changemakers australia, charity law reform project (esther abram, 2011) 31. it is therefore important that members of the charity and not-for-profit sector respond to the draft ruling with strong and cohesive submissions. these submissions should emphasise the decision of the high court in aid/watch that the bowman v secular society principle no longer applies in australia and that public debate is a benefit to the community and an important aspect of our legal and democratic system. 72 changemakers australia, charity law reform project (esther abram, 2011) 31. 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia laissez-faire multiculturalism and relational embeddedness: ethnic precincts in auckland paul spoonley massey university carina meares massey university abstract the rapid diversification of immigration to new zealand post-1987 has made auckland, as the nation’s key gateway city, both culturally and demographically superdiverse, and the location of considerable immigrant business development. we focus here on the development of ethnic precincts as the manifestation of this transformation of the cityscape. the neo-liberalism of the 1980s continues to prevail primarily in minimal postarrival interventions and an unwillingness of central and local government to recognise the ethnic/immigrant nature of such developments. as a consequence of this laissez-faire attitude, immigrants’ relational embeddedness tends to be privileged and ethnic-specific networks dictate the nature and location of ethnic precincts within a policy environment that stresses the importance of market processes and encourages small business development. introduction new zealand, australia and canada share a nation-building project founded on immigration. unlike canada and australia’s more ethnically diverse immigration flows, however, almost all the immigrants who arrived in new zealand until the 1950s came from britain and ireland. that changed with the arrival of immigrants from the pacific from the late 1950s and the changes to immigration policy in 1987. from the 1990s, the cultural mix of immigrants arriving in all three countries has been broadly similar, with a comparable proportion, around 60 percent, of economic migrants. new zealand, however, continues to be different in two particular regards. firstly, biculturalism, the official recognition of maori, new zealand’s indigenous people, and pakeha new zealanders of european descent,1 1 the maori word pakeha, according to fleras and spoonley (1999, p.83), refers to new zealanders of european background. is privileged in policy debates and resourcing and there is no equivalent to the multiculturalism of australia or canada. secondly, the predominance of neo-liberalism in central and local government policy making in recent decades has meant that the approach to immigration, especially settlement policies and economic development, takes a particular form (spoonley 2003; see also lewis 2009; skilling 2010). the state’s investment is in recruiting human capital cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 43 globally; the settlement of immigrants is left to their own agency and the opportunities – and barriers – of the marketplace, notably in relation to the labour market or small business sectors. many immigrants, unable to enter new zealand’s labour market at levels commensurate with their qualifications and skills, open small or medium sized businesses, often serving the needs of their own and/or other new immigrant communities which, by 2010, were significant in size. the ethnic and immigrant character of the rapidly growing colocation of business clusters, resulting in the concentration of economic activities involving one immigrant group or another (ethnic precincts), has been largely ignored. in this paper, we explore what this means for the gateway city of auckland by examining the formation of two ethnic precincts: northcote and somerville-meadowlands. new zealand immigration: a brief history the colonial project of settling new zealand and establishing it as a nation-state assumed a particular character after the signing of the treaty of waitangi in 1840. 2 for most of the next 120 years, more than 95 percent of the immigrants who arrived in the country came from britain and ireland. the largest non-european group were the chinese who numbered 5000 in 1881 (all but 9 were men), but most were sojourners and did not stay. this was reinforced by legislation that sought to prevent chinese migrants from coming into the country or from staying when they got here. chinese residents were not granted the same rights as other new zealanders. although an explicit white new zealand policy was never adopted (ongley & pearson 1995), between 1881 and 1920 some 35 acts were passed to ensure that noneuropeans were excluded from new zealand. this situation changed in the post-world war ii decades when labour was required for the expansion of the manufacturing sector in new zealand’s cities. maori were encouraged to migrate from their rural and provincial locations but additional labour was subsequently sought from the pacific, notably from samoa, tonga, the cook islands, niue and tokelau. this diversification of immigration produced a moral panic in the early 1970s when the newly arrived pacific communities were racialised as a threat in various ways. a reforming labour government in 1984 combined a significant neo-liberal agenda (to reduce the role of the state, decrease welfare provisions and deregulate the labour market) with some distinctly non-neo-liberal elements. these included: the recognition of the rights of maori as tangata 2this agreement was between the british government and the chiefs of many maori iwi or tribes. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 whenua (indigenous people); the expansion of the rights of women and those of homosexuals; and a more independent foreign policy stance. the government also moved to finally abandon the last vestiges of a discriminatory immigration policy and to adopt a globalised skill recruitment policy, in line with its neo-liberal inclinations. the immigration act 1987 was designed to attract individuals from a range of countries who had the proven ability and finance to establish themselves successfully in new zealand. a points system was introduced, similar to those already operating in canada and australia, and so began the rapid diversification of immigrant arrivals. during the 1990s, the traditional source countries of britain and ireland were replaced by countries in asia, africa and the middle east. by 2000, migrants from three countries dominated arrivals: those from the united kingdom, china and india. we focus here on immigration from asia, specifically chinese immigration, and its impact on auckland. by 2010, arrivals from china dominated many visa categories and auckland’s china-born population had risen from 26,547 in 2001 to 53,694 in 2006. the total3 chinese population, which includes those from china, hong kong, taiwan and other countries as well as new zealand-born, grew from 68,130 in 2001 to 97,425 in 2006, approximately 8 percent of auckland’s population. the total asian population was larger still and by 2008, outnumbered auckland’s maori population or the combined pacific population. mid-level population projections anticipate that by 2016, a quarter of auckland’s population will be asian while another quarter will be either maori or pasifika4 . in 2006, 37 percent of the city’s residents were immigrants and if this overseas born-population was combined with their new zealandborn children, this figure rose to 57 percent of the city’s total population. we are interested in what this new-found cosmopolitanism means for policy debates and the ways in which it impacts on the cityscapes of auckland. in essence, our argument is that the continued predominance of neo-liberalism in local and central government policy-making means that immigrant agency is privileged and that the relational embeddedness of immigrant networks has consequences that are evident in auckland’s cityscape and economy. one 3 these statistics derive from the new zealand census and therefore reflect responses of individuals when they are asked to self-select an ethnic identity (or identities). 4 as with the chinese population, this reflects a self-identification question in the census and includes those who identify with various pacific-origin ethnicities. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 45 manifestation is the concentration of economic activities, typically retail businesses, involving members of particular ethnic groups. these ethnic precincts, involving somewhere between 40 and 100 businesses, are owned or run by (in this case) ethnic chinese, mostly immigrants. some ethnic precincts have been purpose-built while others are conversions ie chinese businesses have taken over a pre-existing precinct. many are concentrated in a contained area, either a suburban shopping centre or specific locales in the cbd, while some are spread along arterial routes such as dominion road. there is little recognition at either central or local government level of the ethnic and immigrant nature of these ethnic precincts, particularly compared to the recognition found in other cities that have similarly sized immigrant communities and ethnic business concentrations (see j. collins & jordan 2009). moreover, the biculturalism that recognises the rights of maori and which has allocated significant resources for their economic development (fleras & spoonley 1999) provides an obvious counterpoint to the policy silences concerning immigrant-related cultural diversity, hence the laissez-faire multiculturalism of our title. immigration, and its outcomes, is as subject to ‘market disciplines and practices of the new public management… of neoliberalism’ (lewis, lewis and underhill-sem 2009, p.166) as other aspects of new zealand. next, we explore these issues in relation to the presence of chinese ethnic precincts in auckland. photo a: meadowlands ethnic precinct, south-east auckland. ethnic precincts 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 areas of immigrant business concentration are an important focus and manifestation of immigrant communities, especially in key destination cities such as auckland. the interest in such concentrations has a long and influential history in academic research on the ecology of cities, dating from the chicago school of urban sociology when the focus was on spatial segregation and the non-assimilation of ethnic communities (see fong, chen, & luk 2007). this interest was re-ignited in the late 1980s and 1990s when ethnic and immigrant business precincts (sometimes referred to as enclaves) in cities in north america, australia and europe raised questions about whether such concentrations were the outcome of immigrant choices or were the product of discriminatory processes, as well as whether or not such colocation was a barrier to subsequent economic success, social/cultural integration and social cohesion. waldinger, aldrich and ward (1990) suggested that two key factors need to be considered in order to understand ethnic business co-location: ethnic and socio-cultural explanatory factors, essentially the decisions made by immigrants and their communities, as well as external political and economic factors (pang & rath 2007, p.202-203). but as pang and rath (2007, p.203) go on to point out, this approach, while valuable, tends to omit or underplay other factors, such as the role of gender or the way in which immigrants are racialised (and which, in turn, then precludes them from certain activities or opportunities). moreover, this approach also makes the assumption that immigrant entrepreneurs are somehow different from other entrepreneurs. kloosterman and rath (2003) provide a more nuanced theorisation which focuses on the mixed embeddedness of immigrants. this approach takes into account both immigrants’ embeddedness in ethnic social networks and the impact of the social structures within which immigrants and their social networks operate. the social embeddedness (or relational embeddedness as portes refers to it; see vertovec 2009, p.37) of immigrants in their own ethnic networks affords them a number of advantages: it enables them ‘to reduce transaction costs by eliminating formal contracts [and] gain[s them] privileged access to vital economic resources’ (pang & rath 2007, p.204). but this focus on social networks needs to be balanced by a consideration of the regulatory and opportunity structures within which immigrants and their networks are located; in other words, their structural embeddedness. this approach accounts for the influence of the varied vertical and horizontal linkages between immigrants and the wider communities within which they live (vertovec 2009: 37). as pang and rath cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 47 (2007, p.205) explain, ‘[d]ifferent markets obviously offer different opportunities and obstacles, demand different skills, and lead to different outcomes in terms of business success or – at higher levels of agglomeration – a different ethnic division of labor’. kloosterman and rath’s (2001, 2003) approach emphasises the interaction between the interests/networks and decisions of the immigrant (agency) and the opportunities and limitations imposed by the circumstances in which they are located (structure). they are embedded in different cultural and institutional settings, hence the reference to the mixed embeddedness of immigrant settlement and business development. sometimes, these ethnic business concentrations are in specific occupational niches (the concentration of fijian indians amongst auckland’s taxi drivers, for example) but elsewhere, these ethnic businesses are co-located in geographical concentrations, hence ethnic precincts (jordan 2010, p.62). ethnic precincts perform a variety of functions. they are, above all else, a ‘first access point and a source of support’ (sales, et al. 2008, p.6), but also, as sales et al. (2008) go on to note, ‘serve both newly arrived people and older people’. these groups face isolation and exclusion because they have moved from familiar places where they can access established networks and have a knowledge of how things work, to a new city where they often lack skills (such as a local language) and local networks of friends/acquaintances. co-location also allows those involved in setting up and running businesses to interact easily with coethnics, to access ethnic networks in various ways (for capital, for supplies and information, and for labour) and to establish and develop trust within these networks (see fong, et al. 2007, p.122). immigrants can find work more easily in areas where co-ethnics have established businesses, especially when the immigrant job-seekers lack skills or qualifications that are recognised by other (ethnic) employers or when they lack local labour market experience. (the possibility of exploitation is also present, especially given the vulnerability of immigrant workers). ethnic precincts also serve as a focal point for members of that community, as a place for ‘meeting, shopping and eating’ as sales et al. (2008, p.6) note. in reality, it is often the activity of eating which brings members of the particular community together (see j. collins & jordan 2009), but ethnic precincts also provide an opportunity to talk in a first language, to buy specialist ethnic food products and to access services – medical, financial, travel and real estate. 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 historically, there have been no asian ethnic precincts in auckland, although there were limited concentrations of chinese businesses around some parts of the inner city in the first half of the twentieth century (ip, 2003). however, these were modest and did not involve more than a few businesses. this changed dramatically with the arrival of asian immigrants after 1987. the first wave arrived in the early and mid-1990s and comprised immigrants from hong kong, taiwan and korea. there was a lull during the asian economic crisis of the late 1990s but this was followed, post-2000, by much larger arrival flows from china and india. table 1 shows the numbers of ethnic chinese resident in the auckland area at the last five censuses, according to their place of birth. the most common birthplace at the 2006 census was the people’s republic of china (53,694), a figure which has more than doubled since the previous census in 2001. table 1 auckland’s resident ethnic chinese population by birthplace 1986-2006 year birthplace china hong kong taiwan malaysia nz others* total 1986 1,668 561 39 597 5,250 2,433 10,548 1991 4,110 2,850 2,838 3,681 6,306 3,891 23,676 1996 12,054 8,868 7,965 4,596 10,293 5,928 49,704 2001 26,547 8,406 8,562 4,953 13,203 6,459 68,130 2006 53,694 5,280 7,323 6,003 17,682 7,443 97,425 in sum, by the time of the census in 2006, auckland had a variety of asian communities of significant size which included residents of auckland as well as tourists, students (up to 70,000 per year nationally) and increasing numbers of migrants on temporary work or business visas. these recent and now quite substantial communities provided a demographic base for the development of distinct residential concentrations5 5 or, as li (2009) calls them, ‘ethnoburbs’. and the co-location of ethnic businesses. they first emerged during the late 1990s and by 2010, there were a number of different types of asian ethnic precinct in auckland. we will focus here on those that involve chinese-owned and operated businesses. these precincts fall into two distinct types: those that resulted from the conversion of existing shopping centres, where chinese owners and operators replaced those from other ethnic groups; and those that were purpose built from scratch to service the needs of a growing chinese community. of the two case studies that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 49 follow, northcote is an example of the former while meadowlands and somerville (adjacent precincts) are examples of the latter. photo b: northcote ethnic precinct on auckland’s north shore. northcote, north shore: a conversion the northcote shopping centre is located in the midst of a lower socio-economic area on auckland’s relatively affluent north shore. immediately adjacent to the long-established shopping centre6 is a significant area of state housing7 a few such areas on the north shore. the local schools rank in the lowest decile, (317 state houses in total), one of only 8 contrast to most schools on the north shore, in sharp 9 6 officially opened in 1959, the shopping centre was one of the earliest pedestrian malls in new zealand. and there are also a significant number of maori and pacific peoples living in the suburb (parliamentary library 2009). during the late 1980s and early 1990s, an area referred to in the media as ‘northcote central’ developed a reputation for poor housing and anti-social behaviour, including gang activity. during this 7 housing owned by the state which is rented out to tenants on low incomes. 8 a school's decile ranking indicates the extent to which it draws its students from lower socio-economic communities. decile one schools are the 10 percent of schools with the highest proportion of students from low socio-economic communities. decile 10 schools are the 10 percent of schools with the lowest proportion of these students. 9 eighty-five percent of the schools on auckland’s north shore have a decile rating of 9 or 10, the highest proportion of high-decile schools in new zealand (enterprise north shore, 2010). 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 time, about half of the children attending the nearby onepoto primary school were from soleparent households and most of the parents with children at the school were unemployed (s. collins 2008). the shopping centre was also in decline during the mid-1990s, with around 15 percent of the shops empty and rents modest or low for the north shore. these circumstances were to provide an opportunity for new asian business owners. through the 1990s, the number of asian-owned shops began to increase and this total was boosted significantly after 2000 with the arrival of more china-born immigrants on the north shore. the low rents provided a modest investment threshold for those wanting to establish a business. inevitably, food was an important part of these new asian-owned businesses, and over the first decade of the twenty-first century, several asian supermarkets were established along with restaurants, meat, fish and vegetable shops. the local real estate agents began to employ mandarin-speakers; there were asian-focussed travel shops, chinese dentists and doctors (or other asian health professionals), shops selling chinese health products, video suppliers and hairdressers. these were supplemented by english language schools with a target audience of asian students. an initial survey in 2007 showed that three-quarters of the businesses in the centre were asian-owned; most shop keepers were china-born but some were korean. depending on the day of the week, half or more of the customers in these shops were asian, predominantly from china, and many of the signs on shop fronts and in stores were in chinese. in less than a decade from the mid-1990s, northcote was transformed into an ethnic (chinese) precinct. a follow-up survey undertaken in 2010 revealed that the proportion of asian-owned businesses had increased to 89 percent.10 but while the north shore city council11 10 fifty-three percent were chinese, 17 percent korean, 12 percent pakeha and 3 percent indian while the remaining 15 percent were other asian. was prepared to celebrate aspects of the ‘chineseness’ of northcote (such as festivals), acknowledging the particular character of the centre was still something it appeared unwilling to do. in 2006, the town centre’s strategy and investment plan was silent on the ethnic nature of this precinct (and that of other shopping centres; see north shore city council 2006). the work plan identified $2 million as the projected expenditure to improve the shopping centres’ environment but the discussion was about the ‘attractiveness’ and ‘functionality’ of these centres; nothing was said about the presence or impact of the ethnic (or chinese) nature of 11 which was amalgamated into a single city-wide council in october 2010. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 51 northcote or elsewhere, although there were generalised statements about the value of ‘cultural diversity’. to ensure our city benefits in the long term, we must be willing to acknowledge and then continually invest in the tangible and intangible benefits to the city that this knowledge and celebration of cultural diversity brings, now and into the future (north shore city council 2006, p.16). the area has benefitted in various ways from the revival of the shopping centre, including a shift away from the earlier negative media image of northcote as an area with multiple social problems. part of this change has been demographic. between 2001 and 2006, the proportion of pakeha in the area dropped from 61 to 33 percent, maori from 22 to 11 percent, while the proportion of pacific peoples grew (33%) as did the proportion of asians (28%; s. collins 2008). local groups began to improve the area, founding a graffiti removal service; a partnership between community organisations, the police and the housing corporation was formed to reduce the levels of violence and drug dealing and to improve the housing stock; and other schemes to help the unemployed were established. the shopping centre itself began to gain a reputation for providing cheap and interesting products as well as offering a taste of asia. it became the location for various asian events, such as the celebration of chinese new year and the moon festival, occasions which are regularly attended by local dignitaries. the conversion from a run-down suburban shopping centre to one that offers asian products, services and events is now complete. elderly chinese can be seen playing chinese checkers at the purpose-built tables under the elm tree in pearn place or doing tai chi in norman king square. people mingle and chat, while the shops and the eating hall are always busy with the majority of customers being asian, mostly chinese. somerville and meadowlands, manukau: purpose-built precincts12 unlike northcote, the somerville and meadowlands precincts were developed by hong kong migrant kit wong with the specific purpose of serving the rapidly growing chinese community in east auckland. he chose to locate these ethnic precincts in the affluent postwar suburbs of south-east auckland. this part of the city contains an interesting juxtaposition of affluence and poverty. the first major post-war development was the state housing area of otara, now the largest concentration of pasifika and maori in the auckland region, and with relatively high levels of socio-economic disadvantage. nearby, are the affluent suburbs of 12 see http://www.auckland.gen.nz/sommerville/ and http://www.meadowlands.co.nz/ http://www.auckland.gen.nz/sommerville/� http://www.meadowlands.co.nz/� 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 howick, bucklands beach and pakuranga that have provided a home for significant numbers of chinese immigrants over the last two decades. the major suburban retail centres in these suburbs have been built since 1990, and it was here that kit wong purpose-built the chinese ethnic precincts of somerville and meadowlands. photo c: meadowlands ethnic precinct in south-east auckland. somerville and meadowlands were green-field developments. the land had not been previously built on. wong developed a shopping precinct that was specifically designed to meet the needs of the newly arrived chinese migrants (see section on institutional actors below). it is largely comprised of single story buildings that are built in strips at right angles to the access road, so that shops in one strip face those in the next. there is nothing chinese in the building design but the ‘chineseness’ of the precinct is immediately obvious in the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 53 signage of the shops, and then in the products, owners and customers. like northcote, the majority of shop owners and customers are chinese. the shops are dominated by those that retail food, either as restaurants or those that sell raw (meat, fish, vegetables) and prepared products. interspersed amongst the food retailers are hairdressers, travel operators and video shops. there is little difference in the mix between northcote as a converted precinct and these purpose-built precincts. but in the latter, the design focuses on security, ease of access and delivering specific social benefits (see ‘institutional actors’). in addition, the buildings are new and they were deliberately marketed to arriving chinese immigrants wanting to establish a business in auckland. there is a deliberateness that is missing from the more organic development of the ethnic precinct at northcote. the centre was officially opened in 1997 by then prime minister jim bolger and then mayor of manukau city, sir barry curtis. kit wong managed the project for ten years, moving on to other ventures during the first few years of the new century. meadowlands and somerville have gone on to become an important part of the lives of chinese and other migrant communities living in this increasingly diverse part of auckland. data from the 2006 census show that the largest settlements of ethnic chinese13 in auckland are to be found in this part of the city in the suburbs of buckland’s beach, pakuranga and howick. if we look at the percentages of ethnic chinese in census area units in auckland, seven out of the top ten are found in south-east auckland, with percentages ranging from 24.8 percent in aberfeldy to 31.2 percent in pigeon mountain north. of the 76 premises operating in meadowlands and somerville in may 2010, 71 percent were owned by chinese migrants, 18 percent by koreans and eight percent by others, including new zealand-born asians. these two case studies provide an indication of the shape of the chinese ethnic precincts to be found in contemporary auckland. in most respects, they differ little from ethnic precincts elsewhere, in australia or canada. but there are some interesting issues in terms of the embeddedness of these communities. since 1987, and the diversification of immigration flows, the new zealand government, in both conservative and liberal/left manifestations, has offered little in terms of post-arrival support for immigrants. in the case of chinese immigrants, they have been forced to rely almost completely on co-ethnic networks, both within the extended family but also more generally. the relational embeddedness of these 13 those who identify as being of chinese ethnicity. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 immigrants has a particular significance and influence on post-arrival patterns of economic activity (quite apart from housing/location choices). this can be seen in the very high levels of co-ethnic employment, supply relationships/connections and the mix of consumers (see meares, et al 2010), although those behaviours are not confined to particular ethnicities or should not be characterised as ethnic in a specific sense (see everts 2010). decisions about the nature of business establishment and obtaining advice, capital and labour all rely extensively (often wholly) on chinese co-ethnics (meares et al. 2010). as we have argued, ethnic precincts in auckland reflect the relational embeddedness of chinese immigrants in a context which privileges neo-liberal economic activity – entrepreneurial engagement in a free market consisting largely of small and medium retail businesses – and neo-liberal politics, especially the rejection of the notion that ethnicity is relevant to economic activity (see below). a coalition partner in conservative governments, act, is particularly assertive in articulating such views but other conservative parties – and the conservative wing of the labour party – are sympathetic to the ‘market reigns, ethnicity is irrelevant’ approach.14 identity, including ethnic identity and its various manifestations, is subservient to a neoliberal agenda that stresses entrepreneurialism in a free-market (see skilling 2010). we now turn our attention to these issues and also to the vital role played by institutional actors in ethnic precincts. the neo-liberal approach to immigrant settlement as we have noted above, the new immigration policy framework was established during a major period of economic and welfare reform that reflected the neo-liberalism of a labour government (1984-1989). the emphasis, as with canada and australia, was on recruiting skilled labour that would fill gaps in the labour market and compensate for demographic ageing. in this regard, there have been few differences in approach between the three countries. but in new zealand’s case, the assumptions of a local neo-liberalism are most apparent in what happens post-arrival. it is assumed that migrants have been selected for their education, skills and experience and therefore, the state in whatever manifestation (local or national) is not required to play any major role in settlement. immigrants are ‘competitive responsibilised and entrepreneurial selves’ (lewis, et al 2009: 167) who are able to ‘exploit’ the free market that neo-liberalism offers. in reality, this approach in its early and most 14 the paradox is that these latter factions of conservatism are prepared to entertain the recognition of maori rights. act are not. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 55 minimalist form was unsustainable, and the government has moved to resource settlement in various ways, especially since 2000. but the level of support for immigrants is significantly less than the support provided in australia or canada. for example, there is no equivalent to the $can3000 per immigrant provided to aid settlement in canada, nor are there programmes on language acquisition, understanding the local cultural or business environment or how to access key services offered in new zealand, except on a fee-basis or as an ad hoc local initiative, often offered by ngos or some business associations. the prevailing ethos is that immigrants should either fund special requirements themselves (english language acquisition, for example) or that they are perfectly capable of establishing themselves in new zealand. this is underpinned by another neo-liberal premise. unlike canada or australia, new zealand has never established a multicultural policy platform. from the 1970s, the investment has been in biculturalism: facilitating the maintenance of maori culture and language; establishing the rights of maori in a modern, liberal democracy; investigating and compensating for the abuse of maori through a period of colonisation; requiring government departments to treat maori as a specific client group with particular rights and needs; and including maori language and culture in public and national activities. very little that might parallel these developments occurs with regard to other ethnicities, and there has been a noticeable reluctance to develop anything which might equate to (but not compete with) biculturalism. neo-liberalism has lost this battle in relation to maori (especially with the coalition between the centre-right national party and the maori party after 2008, although the third coalition partner is the very staunchly neo-liberal act party which is determinedly opposed to any form of ethnic recognition, including that of maori). in reality, indigeneity has provided an important basis for contesting neo-liberalism and market sovereignty (lewis 2009). but for the purposes of the current paper and the structural embeddedness of ethnic precincts, official policy is silent on the ethnic nature of such developments. neo-liberalism has impacted on ethnic precincts, but largely in relation to a policy and regulatory environment which stresses individual entrepreneurialism and small business development. in many respects, chinese immigrant entrepreneurialism provides an exemplar of neo-liberal business activity. the relational embeddedness of migrants always plays an important role in settlement, as existing familial and community networks, underpinned by cultural values, a shared language and various forms of solidarity in a situation that is unfamiliar, provide support and guidance 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 for newly arrived migrants. but the neo-liberal regulatory and policy environment tends (unwittingly) to privilege this relational embeddedness. this environment is not unimportant: it encourages the agency of the individual as an expression of a market in action; business establishment and entrepreneurial activity to meet market demand is given prominence as evidence of the ‘obvious’ benefits of a market economy; and the virtues of self-reliance and independence are venerated while dependence on state provision (except in the most dire cases) is deplored. the social and cultural networks of immigrant communities, combined with an interest in small business establishment, make the relational embeddedness of chinese immigrants a significant factor in decisions about what sort of business to establish and where to locate that business. in the decades since the introduction of a neo-liberal approach to economic management, immigrant business establishment has reflected internal, ethnic dynamics combined with the external emphasis on market (agency) driven decisionmaking. in auckland, the relational embeddedness of the chinese immigrant community has played a particularly important role. this is exemplified in the influence of institutional actors from the communities themselves; one example is provided in the next section.15 institutional actors ethnic precincts develop as a result of a number of factors. relatively little attention has been paid to the role of what fong et al. (2007) refer to as ‘institutional actors’, notably developers. ethnic precincts are a product of decisions about investment and development and a number of auckland’s ethnic precincts are the result of developer activity. for example, as outlined in the case study of meadowlands and somerville in manukau city, hong kong immigrant kit wong built these specifically to cater for the new migrant chinese communities in east auckland. kit arrived in new zealand in 1987, at the beginning of a significant wave of asian migration that occurred after the immigration policy changes of the same year. he had worked in property development in hong kong, and although he recognised the many differences that existed between his adopted city and his birthplace, he also saw some similarities to a younger hong kong and this gave him a number of ideas for future developments in auckland. key to his decision to build was his parents’ choice to return to 15 there is no equivalent to wong (as an influential institutional actor) in establishing an ethnic precinct in northcote. the limited evidence is that information networks and chain migration were important. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 57 hong kong after a brief holiday rather than stay in new zealand as kit had hoped. despite their desire to spend time with their son, and to recreate the extended family living environment that had worked so well for them in hong kong, they were lonely and isolated during their time in auckland. they spoke no english, could not drive and had little contact with the world outside kit’s home because at that time, there was no radio, television or newspaper service in cantonese. the development at somerville and meadowlands was designed to remedy these deficits, and others, for the families of the new chinese community. beginning in 1991, kit bought several large lots in east auckland. he marketed the businesses as a concept and sold off the plans, targeting people who wished to start their own businesses or wanted to buy them as investments. he developed the lots together, building them so that each proprietor could keep an eye on her or his neighbour, as he was keenly aware of the vulnerability of the new chinese migrant community. there were 15 shops of different sizes in the first lot, built flexibly so that the partitions between premises could be removed if necessary in order to create larger spaces. because of the experience with his parents, kit placed a lot of emphasis on the social benefits of his development. for example, one of the positive attributes of the site was that it was a short, level walk from neighbouring streets for elderly people who could not drive themselves. the mixture of shops meant that people could do their shopping as well as have somewhere to sit and meet others for something to eat or a chat; and do all of this in their own language. this would, he thought, help them adjust to their new home and alleviate their feelings of homesickness. however, he also felt strongly that the shopping centre should be as diverse as possible and also encouraged larger ‘mainstream’ businesses to set up there. this was partly a pragmatic decision, as many chinese shop owners travel back to china, hong kong and taiwan during chinese new year, and the mainstream businesses decreased the risk of the precinct being deserted at this time. he also encouraged shop owners to serve locals, to take photos of meals and to use signs in english as well as chinese. the role kit wong has played in the development of somerville and meadowlands serves to highlight the influence of immigrant agency. he had to meet a number of building code and design requirements but there was nothing that addressed the specific ethnic nature of the precinct he designed. moreover, these ethnic precincts do not appear as retail destinations with a particular character in the marketing of the city; they do not attract any specific resourcing in city economic development; and they are often invisible as an area of interest to 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 many aucklanders. indeed, outside the chinese community, few non-chinese know of their existence. wong, as an institutional actor, has designed a precinct that specifically meets the social, economic and cultural requirements of a particular community. while he has responded to these requirements, the broader commodification of these and other ethnic precincts has not occurred as it has, for example, in sydney (see j. collins & jordan 2009). commodification of ethnic spaces new zealand cities, auckland in particular, have yet to explore the possibility that areas of immigrant business concentration might provide the opportunity for new forms of consumption and economic activity. there is a considerable literature on the ways in which cities such as sydney (j. collins & jordan 2009), vancouver, san francisco, london (sales, et al. 2008) and washington (pang & rath 2007) have moved to recognise immigrant business concentrations as a site of importance for the city economy and increasingly as a destination for tourists and local consumers. in the case of london, sales et al. (2008) discuss how the institutionalisation of chinatown occurred initially as a result of community associations making claims on the local authority. yeoh (2008, p.10) discusses how singapore has begun to explore the possibility of heritage landscapes as a way of providing a ‘sense of historical continuity’ and an affirmation of the city’s cosmopolitan nature by recognising chinatown, little india and kampong glam (a malay precinct). after a period of urban renewal in which many aspects of these ethnic precincts were destroyed, there was something of a reversal and a recognition and preservation of what remained of chinatown in singapore (see yeoh 2008). by comparison, there are no places in auckland that have been branded as ethnic precincts, certainly not by the key governance or management agencies. in planning, community and economic development documents, there is nothing to suggest an area might have an identity which is associated with the co-location of immigrant businesses or which might have some economic benefit to the city economy more broadly. in considering centre or main street development for northcote, for example, there was no reference until quite recently to the fact that a majority of the businesses are asian in ownership or activity, that it is the location of immigrant/ethnic festivals or that the client or pedestrian mix is particular to that shopping centre (see northcote central development trust 2005). the centre’s asian visibility could hardly be contested and yet this character was largely (and often completely) invisible in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 59 economic and social development commentaries from the local authority; there was silence on the nature and possibilities of immigrant business co-location. this silence is a product of two rather different dynamics. one is the lack of expertise and understanding of immigrantrelated economic development; in our experience, a discussion with officials typically prompts the question of ‘where are these precincts’? but the second factor is the reluctance of key managers and political leaders to characterise developments as ‘ethnic’, as the next section makes clear. political and policy responses in terms of routine planning and economic development processes in auckland, little attention has been paid to the role and contribution of immigrant places and identities. the exception has tended to be manukau city council which adopted a logo and a branding message which did acknowledge cultural diversity, although this tended to focus on pacific peoples. elsewhere, however, the acknowledgement that post-1987 migrants required policy recognition and support was left to particular agencies: the auckland regional settlement strategy and those responsible for its implementation; the auckland chamber of commerce; and omega.16 but even though auckland’s immigrant population was nearing 40 percent of its resident population by 2010, the city and its key institutions were either cautious about doing too much to acknowledge ethnic diversity or they declined to consider it at all. the royal commission on the governance of auckland and the national-led government’s subsequent response to this document in 2010 highlight this reluctance.17 diversity was seen as a positive on many levels by both the royal commission and the government as a new ‘super-city’ was forged from seven city governments in 2009-2011. but immigrant-related diversity was given almost no attention in a three volume report that focussed on governance and economic development. immigrants were not mentioned in terms of the key economic priorities nor as agents in economic development. they appeared in an expert report on demographic changes but were, almost without exception, invisible in any of the extensive discussions on the economic development of auckland, current or in the future. 16 omega matches skilled immigrants with mentors across a range of industries, see http://www.omega.org.nz/ 17 the royal commission was charged with beginning the transition of auckland’s four major city councils (north shore, waitakere, auckland and manukau), plus those on the urban fringe, into one single local authority. the government’s response indicated what they saw as acceptable in the recommendations and added some new elements. http://www.omega.org.nz/� 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 on governance itself, the main concession to diversity from the royal commission was the recommendation that three maori seats be established on the new super-city council. pacific peoples and other ethnic or immigrant communities were recognised by proposed advisory boards. the possibility of specific maori representation was a step too far for the national-led government, however, and its key partner, act, in terms of auckland local government reform. the recommendation was over-turned, much to the dismay of the other partner in government, the maori party. interestingly, statutory maori representation on city council committees has subsequently provided maori with key decision-making votes. the participation of other minority ethnic groups remains confined to advisory boards and roles. the possibility of branding areas as chinatowns has been raised but then just as quickly dismissed. one of us (paul spoonley) noted in a radio interview that auckland, despite the size of its chinese population and the fact that a number of areas in the city had significant densities of chinese businesses, still lacked an official chinatown. a blog entitled ‘a chinatown state of mind’ (mok 2005) was published in response to the comments, and this was followed by a public campaign (largely online plus some columns in the local print media) against the establishment of a chinatown. supporters of the ‘no chinatown’ campaign, most of whom were younger members of the chinese community, felt that it usurped the chinese community’s prerogative to claim its own space and future and that local government involvement in the project would simply confirm their minority status and ‘difference’. in 2008, the mayor of waitakere, bob harvey, argued that new lynn ought to become a chinatown. the area had the highest percentage of chinese residents in auckland (over 30% in 2006) as well as a cluster of chinese businesses. the mayor suggested that the town centre might be enhanced by explicitly identifying it as a chinatown with symbols such as traditional chinese gates. on this occasion too, the mayor was defeated by the opposition of some chinese members of the community, but also by concerns raised by local nonchinese business owners and residents who did not welcome the idea that their centre might become even more chinese than it already was (see thompson 2008). both these responses were localised and while they gained some media publicity, their influence on the broader politics of auckland is limited. very few decision-makers or local government officials would be aware of either incident. the previous auckland city council did take part in the inter-cultural cities initiative that involved a number of cities around the world including oslo in norway and bristol in the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 61 united kingdom. this initiative had, as one of its major local outcomes, a survey carried out by an australian consultancy. the report (brecknock consulting p/l 2006) suggested a number of concepts to describe what an ‘inter-cultural’ city might look like, but these tended to rely on policy orientations and concepts that had been developed elsewhere. there was inadequate acknowledgement of the impact of biculturalism on the concept of the intercultural city in a new zealand context and no discussion about what a more substantive multiculturalism would mean for maori as tangata whenua. the report has not framed or contributed to subsequent policy or political debate in any meaningful way. three factors are influential in the invisibility of immigrant business development, especially manifestations such as ethnic precincts, in auckland in the last decade. the first is the approach of politicians and senior city officials which is to decline to name particular developments as ‘ethnic’ or ‘immigrant’, largely because of an ongoing acceptance of the neo-liberal assumptions that underpin immigration policy. skilled immigrants do not require market intervention; they are characterised as already skilled, naturally competitive entrepreneurial subjects who are quite capable of exercising choice (cf lewis 2009). underpinning this is the reluctance of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ neo-liberals to accept that ethnicity should be seen as relevant to the free-market. secondly, in relation to governance and management of the city economy, there is little expertise in terms of ethnic/immigrant community economic development and what local government might do. finally, when there have been tentative moves to begin a discussion about recognition, some sections of the community involved, in this case chinese, have rejected the possibility of being ‘managed’ in any way. the reluctance to recognise immigrant business activity and the presence of diversity more generally as an asset in auckland make it substantially different from other immigrant destination cities. vancouver made a decision in 1989 to consider cultural diversity a core requirement in governance and economic development. as elsewhere, ethnic precincts (for example) were seen as an important brand difference in the city, as consumer and tourist destinations, and as an important contribution to economic development. as pang and rath (2007, p.207) comment: urban cultural diversity is then a vital resource for the prosperity of cities and a potential catalyst for socio-economic development, particularly since business investors consider this diversity as one of the factors determining the location of businesses. 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 this recognition has led to the ‘ethnic theming’ of some areas and significant support for ethnic and immigrant business development. cities often compete in terms of the ethnic and immigrant-related experiences they can offer and ethnic diversity has itself become a commodity and a point of brand difference (jordan 2010, p.65). collins (in jordan 2010, p.67) notes that ‘ethnic cultural tourism’ involves tourist visits to ethnic precincts and there is some evidence in auckland that chinese tour groups are channelled towards chinese ethnic precincts, often to their dismay (tan 2008). ethnic precincts have significant potential as part of a city’s branding and tourism (see collins & jordan 2009). there are also examples where the planning and economic development processes are structured to specifically recognise and include immigrant communities, for example: ...the public policy framework of city planning, regeneration, place-marketing and other functions may constrain, enable or encourage expressions of ethnic difference in the built environment (shaw, bagwell, & karmowska 2004, p.1985). shaw et al. (2004, p.1986) go on to note that more enlightened city governments shifted from a ‘crude civic boosterism’ in the 1990s to ‘strategic niche management and competitive niche thinking’, one key element of which was the spaces and activities that reflected one ethnic or immigrant community or another. this has not happened in auckland where there remains a reluctance to see ethnic precincts (amongst other ethnic/immigrant business activities) as a civic asset. conclusion the relational embeddedness of chinese immigrants, combined with the regulatory and policy environment of auckland, has contributed to the rapid and relatively recent development of ethnic precincts. they can take several forms but we have focused here on those that are purpose-built or conversions. the neo-liberalism of city governance has meant that not only has their development been devoid of any sort of government (national, but particularly local) recognition or support, but that having been established now for the past decade, there remains a reluctance to brand these precincts as an important aspect of the city economy or to commodify them as part of niche management and tourist development. this is endorsed by a lack of expertise, understanding or interest by city authority employees and resistance by some in the communities (chinese) concerned. the regulatory and policy environment is important. in auckland’s case, neo-liberal governance privileges market cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 63 forces; encourages business development, especially small and medium businesses that dominate a service economy; and gives prominence to entrepreneurial activity. chinese immigrant participation in such businesses and their demonstration of an appropriate entrepreneurialism appears to fit with this emphasis on free-market economic development. local neo-liberal politicians and business organisations have gained ideal recruits to a city economy and they remain reluctant to recognise the specific ethnic nature of their activities. given the presence and significance of ethnic precincts in auckland’s cityscape and economy, it remains to be seen whether and when there will be recognition of the distinctive nature of these ethnic precincts and the contribution they make to economic growth and development. bibliography brecknock consulting p/l. 2006, intercultural city: making the most of diversity. auckland case study report. auckland, new zealand, auckland city council. collins, j. & jordan, k. 2009, ‘ethnic precincts as ethnic tourism destinations in urban australia’. tourism, culture and communication, vol.9, pp.79-92. collins, s. 2008, 30 august, ‘helping themselves’. the new zealand herald: b5. enterprise north shore. 2010, ‘learning in north shore city’, from http://www.ens.org.nz/about+north+shore+city/learning+in+north+shore+city.html everts, j. 2010, ‘consuming and living the corner shop: belonging, remembering, socialising’, social and cultural geography, vol.11, no.8, pp.847-863. fleras, a. & spoonley, p. 1999, recalling aotearoa: indigenous politics and ethnic relations in new zealand. auckland, new zealand, oxford university press. fong, e., chen, w. & luk, c. 2007, ‘a comparison of ethnic businesses in suburbs and city’. city & community, vol.6, no.2, pp.119-136. ip, m. 2003, ‘chinese immigrants and transnationals in new zealand: a fortress opened’. in l. j. c. ma & c. cartier (eds.), the chinese diaspora: space, place, mobility and identity, lanham, rowman and littlefield, pp.339-358. jordan, k. 2010, multicultural place-making in australia: immigration, place and social value, unpublished phd thesis, university of technology sydney. kloosterman, r. & rath, j. 2001, ‘immigrant entrepreneurs in advanced economies: mixed embeddedness further explored’. journal of ethnic and migration studies, vol.27, no.2, pp. 189-201. kloosterman, r. & rath, j. 2003, immigrant entrepreneurs: venturing abroad in the age of globalization. oxford, berg. li, w. 2009, ethnoburb: the new ethnic community in urban america. honolulu, university of hawai'i press. lewis, n. 2009, ‘progressive spaces of neoliberalism’, asia pacific viewpoint, vol.50, no.2, pp.113-119. http://www.ens.org.nz/about+north+shore+city/learning+in+north+shore+city.html� 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 lewis, n. lewis, o. & underhill-sem, y. 2009, ‘filling hollowed out spaces with localised meanings, practices and hope: progressive neoliberal spaces in te rarawa’. asia pacific viewpoint, vol.50, no.2, pp.166-184. meares, c., ho, e., peace, r. & spoonley,p. 2010, bamboo networks : chinese employers and employees in auckland research report no. 1. north shore city, integration of immigrants programme massey university. mok, t. m. 2005, ‘a chinatown state of mind’, http://publicaddress.net/yellowperil/achinatown-state-of-mind north shore city council. 2006, city plan 2006-2016. northcote central development trust. 2005, northcote central project. ongley, p. & pearson, d. 1995, ‘post-1945 international migration: new zealand, australia and canada compared’, international migration review, vol.29, no.3, pp.765-793. pang, c. l. & rath, j. 2007, ‘the force of regulation in the land of the free: the persistence of chinatown, washington dc as a symbolic ethnic enclave’. in m. ruef & m. lounsbury (eds.), the sociology of entrepreneurship: research in the sociology of organisations, amsterdam, elsevier, vol. 25, pp.191-215. parliamentary library of new zealand, 2009, ‘northcote’. wellington, parliamentary library. sales, r., hatziprokopiou, p., christiansen, f., d'angelo, a., liang, x., lin, x., et al. 2008, cityscapes of diaspora: images and realities of london's chinatown. london, middlesex university. shaw, s., bagwell, s. & karmowska, j. 2004, ‘ethnoscapes as spectacle: reimaging multicultural districts as new destinations for leisure and tourism consumption’. urban studies, vol.41, no.10, pp.1983-2000. skilling, g. 2010, ‘the construction and use of national identity in contemporary new zealand political discourse’, australian journal of political sciences, vol.45, no.2, pp.175-189. spoonley, p. 2003, ‘the contemporary political economy of labour migration in new zealand’. paper presented at the annual sociological association of aotearoa, new zealand conference, auckland university of technology. tan, l. 2008, ‘chinese get souvenirs, not the kiwi sights’, the new zealand herald, from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10488730 thompson, w. 2008, ‘mayor: chinatown is money, not food’, the new zealand herald, from http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10548644 vertovec, s. 2009, transnationalism, abingdon, routledge. waldinger, r., aldrich, h. & ward, r. 1990, ethnic entrepreneurs; immigrant business in industrial societies, london, sage publications. yeoh, b. 2008, ‘singapore's chinatown: race definition, nation-building and heritage tourism in a cosmopolitan city’, paper presented at the ethnic neighbourhoods as places of leisure and consumption conference, istanbul, turkey. http://publicaddress.net/yellowperil/a-chinatown-state-of-mind� http://publicaddress.net/yellowperil/a-chinatown-state-of-mind� http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10488730� http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10548644� table 1 auckland’s resident ethnic chinese population by birthplace 1986-2006 photo c: meadowlands ethnic precinct in south-east auckland. digital ethnographies cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 i issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia digital ethnographies michael olsson & hilary yerbury university of technology, sydney this issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal takes as its theme ‘digital ethnographies’. this theme presents many challenges – challenges of interpretation, as well as application. the first is the almost customary challenge of acknowledging the dual meaning of ethnography as a research methodology and a product or outcome of a research process. the second is the consideration of the ways ethnographic data can be used in contemporary scholarship, whether one is interested in emergent online communities or more traditional contexts. the third is the possibilities of electronic publication for the use of ethnographic data recorded in digital forms. the five articles in this issue address these challenges in different ways. the articles by jon marshall and dana walker explore challenge of applying ethnographic principles and approaches to the study of communities in the virtual world – and the relationship between the virtual and ‘actual’. marshall interrogates the issues which arise from the hidden and ambiguous nature of online life. he argues that ultimately, ethnography and online daily life are similar procedures in which people go about constructing ‘culture’ to make sense of others and interact with a degree of predictability. ethnographers can learn about culture and society by learning how people themselves go about understanding and making those processes. there is no overarching single vision. any understanding is always based in interpretation, experience and conflict. ethnography is not above, but within, cultural interaction. walker is concerned with the digital aspect of cultural practices and explores the question of how to construct the location of a project when it cannot be easily placed either online or offline. for her this is both a methodological and a theoretical question and she uses her own work on city-specific discussion forums in philadelphia to highlight the complexities of this issue and to challenge the conventional wisdom that space and place are irrelevant in cyberspace. these articles should both provide useful guidance and generate debate amongst other researchers interested in applying ethnographic approaches to online contexts. peter read and suzana sukovic describe a project which attempts to digitally reconstruct the aboriginal history of sydney. the project incorporates new and forgotten material in a knowledge base of post-invasion aboriginal history, using tagging, timelines and digital mapping to provide multiple paths to the text, videos, still images (and in the future 3d reconstructions) to be found in the knowledge base. the project, which involves close cooperation with indigenous people, aims to make this digital history available as an educational and cultural resource. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 ii issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the articles by andrew jakubowicz and mara moustafine and james goodman, rebecca pearse and stuart rosewarne demonstrate how electronic publication enables ethnographic data to be presented in digital form, rather than merely being transformed into the static medium of text. in doing so, they explore not only new ways for ethnographic research can be carried out but also disseminated. in their exploration of the transformation of public space in melbourne, jakubowicz and moustafine present the words of participants in their study as digital video as well as text. instead of using footnotes, they use the technologies to link to websites and other sources of more detailed information, allowing the reader to explore these aspects in the level of details which suits them. they have used the complementary technology of a blog to encourage readers to provide comment and feedback on the article. goodman, pearse and rosewarne are developing a video ethnography of climate agency. in this report of a longitudinal study, they track activist strategising as a reflexive process of creating agency and use photographs and videoed interviews to deepen insights into the contexts for climate activist praxis. this issue is significant as an acknowledgement of the future of scholarship, where new technologies narrow the gap and blur the boundaries between study participant, researcher and ‘reader’. the articles by read and sukovic, jakubowicz and moustafine and goodman, pearse and rosewarne offer glimpses of how digitally recorded data can be used and re-used to create new knowledges and understandings. they offer a glimpse into a new genre of scholarship, one which transcends the mono-modal narrative form of the traditional printed article. the editors of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal expect that the articles in this issue of the journal will be the first among many to explore the implications of digital representations and electronic forms of publication for research and scholarship. digital ethnographies michael olsson & hilary yerbury cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia cosmopolitanism with a twist1 armanda baruti university of bern, switzerland abstract the smaller the world due to mass migration and new technology, the bigger the conflicts due to perceiving ourselves as more different from one-another than ever. there is new hope, however, because cosmopolitanism has made a spectacular comeback to save the day. unfortunately, everyone seems to be so caught up arguing whether the glass of cosmopolitanism is half full or half empty, that cosmopolitanism is, in fact, causing quite a stir, thus defeating its harmonious purpose. this paper calls for a time-out and proposes a cosmopolitanapproach to cosmopolitanism. introduction just as a cosmopolitan cocktail is mistaken for a martini due to the large cone-shaped glass in which it is served, the concept of cosmopolitanism is often mistaken for an elitist term referring to an impossible social representation characterized by rootlessness and the death of local as well as national identities. however, with the idea of cosmopolitanism being every bit as mouth-watering and refreshing as the cocktail, one cannot help but indulge in it. after all, what intellectual visionary would favour a narrow and local outlook over a more worldly one encompassing global responsibilities? who would not want to be a citizen of the world? certainly not barack obama, who is one of the first politicians to openly declare the cosmopolitan ideal to be his in a famous speech held on 24 july 2008 where he introduced himself to the berlin crowd as ‘a proud citizen of the united states, and a fellow citizen of the world’ (mieder 2009, p. 121). yet, our time is, on one hand, characterized by people's increasing eagerness to define themselves as citizens of the world and a widespread celebration of the melting pot ideal in the form of mixed-race identities, and, on the other hand, by a renewed sense of nationalism, a rising anxiety over immigrants and strengthening of borders. for instance, while a celebrity such as tiger woods starring on the oprah winfrey show publicly proclaims himself as ‘cablinasian’, i.e. simultaneously caucasian, black, indian, and asian, heart-aching reality shows such as u.s. border patrol feature on television worldwide how american volunteers, who regard every illegal immigrant as a drug dealer, sabotage water stations set up by humanitarian groups so that the mexican immigrants trying to cross the border perish of 1this paper was derived from my ma thesis. http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs� 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 dehydration. such inhumane acts lead to a series of questions: why do i have to embrace a special moral responsibility towards other people, for instance towards such destructive vigilante groups vandalizing water stations, for the sole reason that they, by accident, have the same nationality as i? why should such people be free of any ethical sensibility towards others simply because they happened to be born on the other side of the national fence? as ulrich beck points out: what loses any legitimacy is the fundamentally dubious assumption that such responsibilities are absolute within a border, while their absence is equally absolute outside this border. this exclusion crisis sets off an avalanche of cosmopolitan questions: can the reasons which a society gives for the exclusion of strangers be questioned by members of this society and strangers alike? who questions, who decides, who justifies and who defines who ‘who’ is? (beck 2002, p. 36). the sense of threat felt by many in the u.s. is analogous to that which many europeans feel pertaining to islamic immigrants. for instance, in switzerland, a country which prides itself on being one of the most globalized societies in the world and having cosmopolitan centres such as zurich and geneva, a constitutional amendment banning the construction of new minarets was approved in a november 2009 referendum. is such denial of differences a retreat from cosmopolitanism? absolutely, according to stuart hall, a cultural theorist and sociologist. he sees such policing of boundaries as an attempt to regulate cultural mixing and as a form of cultural fundamentalism, ‘a phenomenon by no means only restricted to a certain strand within political islam’ but also ‘perfectly compatible with a certain version of western global modernity’ (werbner 2008, p. 348). so where exactly does the notion of cosmopolitanism stand with respect to nationalism, multiculturalism, globalization, and so on and what are the reasons for the eagerness of many to embrace it, at least in theory, and of others to retreat from it, at least in practice? defining cosmopolitanism it has been argued that although cosmopolitanism appears to potentially serve as a thinkoutside-the-box alternative to the nation-state paradigm, the only box it enables us to open is pandora’s (poulsen 2008). as pollock, bhabha, breckenridge, and chakrabarty eloquently put it: cosmopolitanism may instead be a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic character are not only as yet unspecified but also must always escape positive and definite specification, precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncosmopolitan thing to do (pollock et al. 2000, p. 577). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 3 however, the claim that engagement in the act of defining cosmopolitanism ‘positively and definitely’ may constitute the obstruction of cosmopolitanism itself might just raise reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable person. is there really something inherent in the act of defining that renders it an uncosmopolitan thing to do? in order to answer this question, one not only need to reflect upon whether such a characterization is valid but also reconsider what it means to define. one cannot (not) define defining cosmopolitanism is an uncosmopolitan thing to do. defining democracy is an undemocratic thing to do. really? shall we define dubiousness then because it seems about the only indubious thing to do? of course, one could accept the previously mentioned suggestion by pollock et al. and hastily exclude any definitions as such on grounds of their exclusivistic or ‘illiberal’ tendencies but would that be more of a cosmopolitan thing to do? firstly, the statement above by pollock et al. seems rather trivial in that ‘the positive and definite specification’ of any term is an impossible task, in the realm of social sciences at least. this can be exemplified by means of a simple semantics drill involving several people drawing, for instance, a chair and comparing the result with one-another. although the drawings expectedly vary depending on each individual’s perception of a chair based on previous experience with this or that specific chair, and it is impossible to arrive at one single positive and definite design for it, this does not necessarily imply a lack of agreement on what makes a chair a chair, i.e. on chairness so to speak. secondly, this agreement can certainly be negotiated and altered over time. it goes without saying that the basic definition of a chair cannot and should not make finite a furniture designer’s creativity. on the contrary, a proper definition facilitates the familiar, without which novelty and creativity would not exist in the first place. in other words, although a definition of a chair influences the way we think about one, it poses no serious danger as designers and buyers do not build walls around their imagination by restricting it to the conventional model for a chair. thirdly, there are different approaches to definition. while someone might define a chair by specifying its various parts, e.g. a seat, legs, back, and the material those parts consist of, someone else might take a functional approach to definition by indicating the purpose of a chair, i.e. that it is made for sitting or accommodating a person. while the first consists of countless more product specific, thus ephemeral ideas, the latter constitutes fewer more fundamental, thus longer-lasting and universal ones. however, at some point or another we have all heard of 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 how parliament members involved in brawls in countries such as india, ukraine, south korea, taiwan etc., do not only fight for chairs but also with chairs. needless to say, although, according to the most basic functional definition, a chair is made for sitting, it is ultimately up to individuals to decide what it is used as, whether it be a weapon, ladder, book shelf, footrest and so on. defining, therefore, entails, to a great extent, an activity of choice. clearly, ascribing the label uncosmopolitan to something inevitably implies that there must already exist an idea as to what constitutes the ‘cosmopolitan’. the bottom line is that definitions are as impossible as they are inevitable. a definition of definition the lay evaluations and stereotypical attitude towards definitions stem from the etymological origins of the term define, which comes from the latin de finire, literally meaning both to terminate or end and to place within a boundary. also, the hebrew word for definition hagdara derives from the same root as the word for fence, gader. hence, etymologically speaking, it is argued that to define means to establish boundaries, to finish, to locate, to isolate, to distinguish, to differentiate, to set apart, to limit, to dichotomize, etc. a person asked to define his position, in an argument, is being asked to remove ambiguities from a statement of it which, implicitly or explicitly, he is understood to have made, and thus make it clearer and more precise. a photographic image is said to be ill-defined when the degree of blurring is more than can reasonably be permitted. in these ordinary or commonsense uses of the word, it is implied that definition is a matter of degree: to define is not to make absolutely definite what was absolutely indefinite, but to make more definite what was to some extent definite already (collingwood 2005, p. 94). while, i am inclined to concur with collingwood’s view above that definitions should not be seen as attempting to make definite the indefinite in absolute terms, rather in relative terms, as trying to make more definite the already somewhat definite, i am reluctant to concur with statements such as oscar wilde’s famous ‘to define is to limit’ (quoted in cauti 2003, p. 200). i choose not to view definitions in this light as i believe that we do not, and should not, limit concepts to their verbal counterparts. to define cannot be equated with to terminate or to end because, after all, it is impossible to ‘come to a point at which our knowledge concerning the essence of a concept could be described as complete’ (collingwood 2005, p. 97). hence, i argue that a different understanding of the word define is required and i define my position by quoting the scholar brian k. smith: to define is not to finish, but to start. to define is not to confine but to create something to refine -and eventually redefine. to define, finally, is not to destroy but to construct for the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 5 purpose of useful reflection... in fact, we have definitions, hazy and inarticulate as they might be, for every object about which we know something... let us, then, define our concept of definition as a tentative classification of a phenomenon which allows us to begin an analysis of the phenomenon so defined (smith 1989, pp. 4-5). furthermore, based on the genus – differentia formula handed down to us from aristotle, a definition is not only based on exclusion but also inclusion, on difference as well as sameness. according to this formula, definitions arise when characteristics perceived as common have been gathered and united into one nature or entity, which constitutes the genus. then, differentia, i.e. a sort of particularity, is introduced in this perceived homogeneity. for instance, considering rational animal, a classical definition of man based on aristotle’s statement that the human being has a rational principle, animal is the genus and rational is the differentia (edel 1996, p. 91). now, should we vilify this definition on grounds that it compels us to decide that humans are different from other animals, label that difference rationality, and conclude that, by definition, humans are rational and all other animals are not? the answer is no. firstly, such a definition would immediately spark a debate that would hopefully lead to a new definition of man. whether humans are distinguishable from animals by virtue of their rationality is entirely up for debate. secondly, one can, in a democratic fashion, take the initiative to propose a different differentia, e.g. rationalizing rather than rational or capable of abstract thinking rather than linguistically capable, etc. thirdly, instead of taking this definition at face value, deducing that it merely non-innocently dichotomizes rationality vs. animality or culture vs. nature, seeing it as a conspiracy to take whatever we deem as unworthy, in this case irrationality, and project it onto the other, i.e. animals, one is free to just as well focus on its inclusive drive in attributing membership. according to this definition, being human, first and foremost, means belonging to a single community, that of animals, which encloses humans. thus, depending on how one approaches a definition, it can very well not only presuppose a positive outlook on difference but also a desire to create broad allegiances forming a universal solidarity. therefore, it is not the act of defining per se which ought to be considered as inherently uncosmopolitan, rather our general attitude towards it as well as the way we might approach and interpret definitions. given that a proper definition can promote a deeper understanding, improve communication and lead to a roadmap for further explanation, suggesting that defining is an uncosmopolitan thing to do is, in fact, doing justice to neither the concept of cosmopolitanism nor to that of definition. is the glass half full or half empty? the choice is ours to make: we can either 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 exclude definitions for their alleged exclusivistic or illiberal tendencies or we can include them for their inclusivistic or liberal tendencies. a cosmopolitan approach to definition instead of conceptualizing a definition as trying to establish firm boundaries from which there is hardly an escape route, we can imagine it as consisting of two levels, the inner of which represents a single community of some agreed-upon fundamental characteristics of what is being defined. for instance, in the case of the chair one such characteristic deriving from its functional definition would be that a chair is intended for sitting. even the members of parliament mentioned previously, who perhaps envisage a chair to be used for sleeping in, conquering or hitting each-other with, could hardly disagree with this universally acknowledged definition of a chair. the outer level, on the other hand, constitutes a myriad of personal extensions which are much more varied and culturally as well as individually determined. both of these levels are shaped subjectively and are subject to negotiation and recalibration but whereas the inner level serves as a starting point to establishing understanding, requires a certain amount of consensus and is less disputable, the outer level encompasses each individual’s own version rooted in personal perceptions differing from the content of the universally recognized core. this model, thus, proposes constructing and perceiving definitions as composed of two layers, i.e. what is common and what is particular, convergence and divergence, sameness and difference, unity and diversity, the global and the local. hence, contrary to the suggestion made by pollock et al., definitions seen in this light reflect the core principle of cosmopolitanism, which is suggested in the following sections. a cosmopolitan approach to cosmopolitanism in this section i dare take the risk of being charged with first-degree non-conformity to cosmopolitanism itself and endeavour to pin down its meaning, although the task is as simple as nailing the frothy bright pink concoction of vodka, triple sec, lime juice and a dash of cranberry to the wall. before applying the previously proposed cosmopolitan approach to defining cosmopolitanism, the attention is turned to the nature of cosmos and polis as this might prove fundamental for a better conception of cosmopolitanism. the cosmos and the polis of course, we all know how the luxury vacation ends for the girls that made popular the cosmopolitan cocktail: in sex and the city 2, samantha has trouble controlling her urges and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 7 is arrested for kissing someone in public in abu dhabi, in the movie at least; in reality the scenes were shot in morocco because the government authorities in both dubai and abu dhabi declined the request for filming based on moral objections to the film’s name. while much of human conduct is not regulated by law, public love-making undoubtedly is, not only in abu dhabi but in most contemporary cities and towns around the world. the prosecution of indecent public behaviour dates back to antiquity. the ancient athenian society, for example, operated based on the politics of reputation, i.e. honour vs. shame, the politics of gender, i.e. male vs. female and the politics of spatial differentiation, i.e. public vs. private (cohen 1991). non-conformity to athenian customs meant living life with shame and dishonour, which was commonly regarded as a fate worse than death – but it also meant living life as a citizen of the universe, i.e. as a kosmopolite. the word derives from the greek cosmos (κόσµος) denoting the universe and polis (πόλις) the city. such a kosmopolite was a woman named hipparchia. she was an ancient female greek philosopher who lived by the cynic principle of parakrattein to nomismata, meaning to deface the currency. to deface in this metaphorical motto signifies changing the false values of the dominant culture, i.e. ‘driving out the counterfeit coin of conventional wisdom’ (branham and goulet-cazé 1996, p. 8). initially adopted by diogenes of sinope, the man credited with the first known use of the word cosmopolitan, this cynic principle of defacing the currency implied rejection of the prevailing social and political order in favour of an unconventional, self-sufficient life as a kosmopolite. hipparchia fell in deeply love with crates, a cynic philosopher who had been a student of diogenes of sinope. diogenes preached “cosmopolitanism,” declaring himself “without a city” (a-polis), “without a home” (a-oikos), and “citizen of the universe” (kosmopolites)… diogenes urged people to abstain from all political engagement that, like family or social obligations, might constitute an obstacle to individual freedom (branham and goulet-cazé 1996, p. 24). hipparchia faced her parents’ objections by threatening to kill herself if she was not allowed to marry crates. she changed the currency, thereby becoming a cosmopolite, by rejecting conventional materialism, embracing self-sufficiency and mental asperity. most of our knowledge about hipparchia and other cynic philosophers comes from anecdotes and sayings reported by later authors such as diogenes laërtius and later christian writers. hipparchia was the first known woman cynic. choosing the manly life of the cynic meant not only rejecting social institutions but also choosing hardship and poverty over material comfort. cynics strived to live according to nature by rejecting artificial social conventions 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 and refusing all luxuries and any items not absolutely necessary for survival. they gave up their possessions, only wore a simple mantle, and begged on the streets. furthermore, while women of hipparchia’s social class were expected to be weaving and organizing the household servants, she defended the legitimacy of her presence at greek symposiums traditionally attended only by men when this legitimacy was disparaged by other philosophers. wearing the same mantle as crates, typically male clothing, hipparchia appeared with him in public everywhere, thus defying the tradition of keeping women sequestered at home. she upheld the cynic value of anaideia, or shamelessness. she and crates supposedly consummated their marriage by having sex on a public porch in broad daylight. crates’ decision to marry is quite odd as marriage was a social institution of the sort normally rejected by cynics. earlier cynics like diogenes of sinope had maintained that the philosopher would never marry. crates is said to have called their marriage a cynogamy, meaning dog-coupling. in fact, the word cynic itself derives from the greek word kuon, or dog. this is why philosophers like diogenes of sinope, crates and hipparchia are also known as the dog philosophers. aristotle, a contemporary of diogenes, justified the label as follows: there are four reasons why the cynics are so named. first because of the indifference of their way of life, for they make a cult of indifference and, like dogs, eat and make love in public, go barefoot, and sleep in tubs and at crossroads. the second reason is that the dog is a shameless animal, and they make a cult of shamelessness, not as being beneath modesty, but as superior to it. the third reason is that the dog is a good guard, and they guard the tenets of their philosophy. the fourth reason is that the dog is a discriminating animal which can distinguish between its friends and enemies. so do they recognize as friends those who are suited to philosophy, and receive them kindly, while those unfitted they drive away, like dogs, by barking at them (quoted in navia 1996, p. 94). these philosophers obviously embraced this name designation as well as what it represented. their willingness to accept this derogative term confirms that they upheld animals as models of life according to nature. the cynics adopted unconventional positions also in religious terms. by living like dogs and following their natural inclinations so as to get in tune with the natural world order, they changed the status quo hierarchy animal-human-god to humananimal-god. the human constituted the concrete model, whereas animal and god ‘the theoretical model of self-sufficiency and indifference, and consequently of happiness’ (branham and goulet-cazé 1996, p. 24). this, however, did not mean that the cynics were religious. in fact, they envied animals for not living in constant fear of the gods. diogenes also defaced philosophy in that, not only did he prefer to live out his philosophical beliefs, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 9 unlike other philosophers he criticized, but also in that he regarded philosophy outside our grasp. just as crates was influenced by his teacher diogenes of sinope, hipparchia and crates influenced their pupil zeno of citium, the founder of stoicism in the early 3rd century bc. zeno allowed the quenching of sexual desires even in public and advocated the equality of the genders, coeducational public exercise, and living according to nature in the sense of conforming one’s own reason to the dictates of the rational natural law. according to stoic cosmopolitanism, all people are manifestations of the one universal spirit, ought to live in brotherly love and readily help one another. the stoic philosophy was geared towards helping anyone in need, regardless of gender, ethnicity, religion, and social status. what truly made the stoic idea of offering help to any fellow human in need revolutionary was the fact that this help was extended to slaves, many of whom were brought in from conquests abroad. even though in its early stages stoic cosmopolitanism was chiefly a moral cosmopolitanism, political aspects still figured in as cosmopolitanism faced, right from the start, the conflict between idealism vs. pragmatism. morality vs. the political practicality – one of the main problems surrounding contemporary notions of cosmopolitanism – was present right from the infancy of cosmopolitanism. is loyalty and the feeling of mutual affinity greater within one’s own family, city, country than the loyalty to the world at large? should help be offered by providing hospitality at home or by going abroad? who is eligible for receiving help? the cosmopolitanism of the stoics, which has been relayed and defended by martha nussbaum (1994) as a stance she urges we should adopt today, can be explicated by means of two metaphors put forth by nussbaum. the first comes from the roman emperor marcus aurelius and involves a visualization of the entire world of human beings as the limbs of a collective humanity, and the second a picture of human interaction as a series of concentric circles. although useful in facilitating imagination, both of these metaphors should raise some eyebrows. conceiving of the entire world of human beings as one collective body and of people as its many limbs, would almost certainly lead to a conceptualization of certain individuals or groups as a cancer to this body of a collective humanity. furthermore, the image of a series of concentric circles is also flawed. as nussbaum relays, the circles represent the stoic idea that one can be a citizen of the world without giving up local identifications and that instead of thinking of ourselves as devoid of local attachments, we 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 should think of ourselves as surrounded by a series of concentric circles and part of a greater whole. the individual draws the first circle around the self; the next around one’s immediate family; followed by the extended family; then one’s neighbours or local group, one’s fellow city-dwellers, one’s fellow countrymen and so on. the largest and outermost of all these circles is that of humanity as a whole. the citizens of the world must use reason to ‘draw the circles somehow toward the centre’, thus making all human beings more like their city codwellers, connecting and harmonizing themselves with the ethics of all humanity (hierocles quoted in nussbaum 1994, p. 4). however, what if others do not wish to be made like our city co-dwellers? besides, such a model of solidarity circles radiating outwards from the centre and becoming fainter with distance implies that humans feel stronger attachments to narrower circles, which must not necessarily be the case. the majority of americans, for instance, would probably identify much more with the nation than any particular state. likewise, there are also plenty of swiss who feel greater solidarity with the nation of switzerland rather than the particular canton they live in. augustine of hippo, a latin-speaking philosopher very influential in the development of western christianity, took up stoic cosmopolitanism but with a twist. the christian cosmopolis was a community strictly for those who shared the belief in a christian god. christian cosmopolitanism, as such, was an exclusivist cosmopolitanism, if that is not too much of an oxymoron. obviously, from its earliest beginnings, cosmopolitanism was confronted with one fundamental question: can cosmopolitanism be extended so as to accommodate others who do not subscribe to its beliefs, whether they be roman, christian or stoic? after having looked at the roots of the concept in ancient greek thinking, some traces of which are still with us today, the attention is turned to cosmopolitanism as it was reinvented within the political philosophy of the enlightenment, in particular the kantian sense of cosmopolitanism which has had an enormous impact on the debate to date. according to immanuel kant, an 18th-century german philosopher, the natural state of humans is that of dog eat dog, of a war of all against all and it is man’s telos to free himself from this state of war. his idea for a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view and perpetual peace basically represent an outline for the fulfilment of this telos and the realization of human perfection. kant’s writings for a peaceful coexistence of human beings emerge from a period of a heavily war-torn europe. to contextualize his writing one must keep in mind the (at that time) recent french revolution, which kant abhorred. quite interestingly, in the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 11 introductory paragraph of his 1795 essay entitled perpetual peace, a paragraph which could be described as a prophylactic disclaimer to protect himself from possible malevolent interpretations and backlash by the very statesmen under whose protection is writing, kant assures that politicians must not fear his ideas and consequently demands of them to let him be: the practical politician assumes the attitude of looking down with great self-satisfaction on the political theorist as a pedant whose empty ideas in no way threaten the security of the state, inasmuch as the state must proceed on empirical principles; so the theorist is allowed to play his game without interference from the world-wise statesman (kant 2007, p. 5). furthermore, what makes this clausula salvatoria striking is the way kant takes up the dichotomy between idealist and realist political philosophies by pitching the philosopher against the politician. this dichotomy, in turn, has perpetually become the centre of controversy revolving around the debate on cosmopolitanism between realist and idealist political philosophers. kant’s apparent assertion that philosophical ideas exist so as to transcend the purely practical political concerns comes with a but: but if, in consequence of enlightened concepts of statecraft, the glory of the state is placed in its continual aggrandizement by whatever means, my conclusion will appear merely academic and pedantic (kant 2007, p. 5). kant bases his attempt to transcend the nation state on the uncommon assumption that the same rights that can be claimed by single individuals can also be claimed by nation states. the golden rule echoed in kant’s essay forbids treating a human being as a means to an end because a rational human being is always an end in her/himself. it is along these lines that kant argues that no nation state is allowed to simply take possession of another. this raises a question which plagues kant’s entire essay, namely whether the analogy comparing nation states to reasonable beings themselves can be said to hold. one problem associated with this analogy is that one can politely or impolitely ask an individual to remove her/himself from the neighbourhood; a nation state, however, cannot do so, even though, according to kant, every state as every individual is forced to expect the worst from the other. kant lists a series of preconditions that must be satisfied, if perpetual peace is ever to exist. he puts forward the idea of acknowledging the absolute sovereignty of states and disapproves of all standing armies for having war as a purpose and for resulting in national debt, which, in turn, might serve as a pretext for further wars. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 in perpetual peace kant stages a cosmopolitan right as a guiding principle to protect people from war, and morally bases this cosmopolitan right on the principle of universal hospitality – thereby basically setting the ground for present-day asylum seekers. for kant, if foreigners act in a peaceful manner, they are entitled the right to hospitality in a foreign country. in his own words: hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another. one may refuse to receive him when this can be done without causing his destruction; but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one may not treat him with hostility. it is not the right to be a permanent visitor that one may demand. a special beneficent agreement would be needed in order to give an outsider a right to become a fellow inhabitant for a certain length of time. it is only a right of temporary sojourn, a right to associate, which all men have. they have it by virtue of their common possession of the surface of the earth, where, as a globe, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must finally tolerate the presence of each other. originally, no one had more right than another to a particular part of the earth (kant 2007, p. 21). kant’s hospitality grants a stranger the right to temporarily stay within a certain territory without, however, enjoying the same rights that its citizens do. apart from its communist overtone, the ‘common possession of the surface of the earth’ is also reminiscent of the stoics. kant compares nation states to savages subject to an existence characterized by senseless and lawless freedom. this, he argues, is a state that can be overcome by pursuing a more rational and regulated freedom through the establishment of a league of nations. in his 1784 essay translated to english as idea for a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view, kant presents history as gradually progressing towards a particular end point, i.e. towards a state of human perfection. this end of the road perfect state for kant is cosmopolitanism, the league of nations, the fulfilment of humanity’s telos. humanity progresses towards this point as a result of sheer necessity and antagonism. by antagonism kant means, ‘the unsocial sociability of men, i.e., their propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society’ (kant 1963, p. 15). nations, according to kant, driven by necessity and antagonisms, will progress towards ‘a distant international government’ whose end point is a ‘universal cosmopolitan condition’ (kant 1963, p. 23). he himself, however, admits ‘that with such an idea’ structuring his master narrative ‘only a romance could be written’ (kant 1963, p. 24). kant’s view of a teleologically unfolding history moving towards cosmopolitanism not only suggests that even for kant cosmopolitanism constitutes a millennial concept but also begs cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 13 the question: without any further obstacles and antagonisms to overcome, will humanity simply become slothful? kant’s cosmopolitan (hi)story can be seen as an endeavour on his part to fulfil a sort of romantic longing by bringing sense to a seemingly senseless history. despite the attractiveness of 18th century cosmopolitan ideals, nationalism and internationalism became the dominant ideas in the modern world and cosmopolitanism came to be associated with those who were stateless or not committed to the national project, e.g. the jews and the aristocracy, respectively. however, prompted by a growing awareness of globalization, cosmopolitanism has once again stolen the spotlight and kant’s political writings serve as the main source of inspiration for contemporary cosmopolitan theory. the general: a contemporary blueprint while we would agree that the shameless actions of the self-proclaimed hellenistic cosmopolites would probably, even from our contemporary perspective, constitute public indecency, we are aware that no definition of public indecency covers all the possible circumstances that such a term might cover. lawmakers, for example, cannot be expected to be able to foresee all the ways in which it is possible to commit public indecency. courts of law continuously refine the meaning of the term as new cases occur; they diminish the vagueness and their decisions become precedents for future reference. even established terms need improving and refining and perhaps even reinventing. what makes cosmopolitanism such a term in desperate need of refinement is especially suggestions like the one below by pollock, bhabha, breckenridge, and chakrabarty: [w]e already are and have always been cosmopolitan, though we may not always have known it. cosmopolitanism is not just—or perhaps not at all—an idea. cosmopolitanism is infinite ways of being (pollock et al. 2000, p. 588). this seems like a philosophical dead-end: a tree falls in the forest; no one is there to hear it; does it make a sound? likewise, someone is cosmopolitan by default; they do not know they are; are they cosmopolitan? would it not make more sense to conceptualize cosmopolitanism as performative, i.e. in terms of ways of doing, rather than ways of being? cosmopolitan is not something one is, rather something one does. how exactly can one do cosmopolitanism? while it is impossible to foresee all the ways in which it is possible to do cosmopolitanism, one fundamental way that has stood the test of time certainly seems to involve defacing the currency, i.e. defying what is taken for granted. in the vein of cynic philosophy, defacing the currency was an individual attitude and discipline. as martha nussbaum points out: 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 becoming a citizen of the world is often a lonely business. it is, in effect, as diogenes said, a kind of exile – from the comfort of local truths, from the warm nestling feeling of patriotism, from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one’s own (nussbaum 1994, p. 6). this may still hold true in a present-day world in which cosmopolitanism stands for political protest rather than individual lifestyle. incorporating cosmopolitan perspectives into national and local political affairs does seem, as a matter of fact, to be a lonely business. in ronald stade’s words: fighting for a global constitution and rule of law, to many may appear as tilting at windmills. here, however, we can learn from diogenes of sinope, crates and hipparchia, and all the other shameless dogs. although cosmopolitanism no longer is about personal salvation or becoming godlike, it continues to defy much of what is taken for granted. it is still about parakratein to nomismata, “defacing the currency” (stade 2007, p. 12). this defacing of the currency can occur across various dimensions of cosmopolitanism, i.e. political, cultural, and moral. for example, chris brown, an international relations theorist, defines cosmopolitanism along its political dimension as ‘the refusal to regard existing political structures as the source of ultimate value’ (1992, p. 24). this definition has become wider for many so as to encompass open-ended trans-national and supranational projects as well as seeking a trans-ethnic community within the boundaries of a particular nation state. in the contemporary context and along its cultural dimension, as waldron underlines, cosmopolitanism means: [t]he ability to stand outside of having one’s life written and scripted by any one community, whether that is a community of faith or tradition or religion or culture … and draw selectively on a variety of meanings (quoted in vertovec and cohen 2002, p. 4). alternatively, cultural cosmopolitanism has been said to emphasize ‘the value of global cultural pluralism’ (kleingeld 1999, p. 506). while waldron seems to make a valid point, kleingeld’s view appears somewhat muddied as cultural pluralism can be differentiated from cosmopolitanism. this distinction is made in a subsequent section of the paper. finally, along the moral dimension, cosmopolitanism is generally grounded in characteristics universally shared among humans (and sometimes other kinds of beings). for aristotle in 350 bc this shared characteristic was a telos (edel 1996, p. 62), for kant in 1795 it was reason (kant 2007, p. 45), for bentham in 1780 it was the capability to suffer (bentham 2008, p. 20). lévinas in 1961, on the other hand, based his ethics not on what humans share, rather on otherness (lévinas 1991, pg. 16). the previously mentioned notion of hospitality put forth by kant can serve as an example of ‘an obligation established by universal human reason which cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 15 is morally legislative’ (kant 2007, p. 45). every stranger, he argues, has the cosmopolitan right not to be treated as an enemy upon arrival in the land of another (kant 2007, p. 21). providing this hospitality constitutes a moral obligation. contemporary cosmopolitanism seems to have been turned into a collective ethical as well as institutional project. the changes of the last two millennia have enabled cosmopolitanism to shift from the private to the public sphere, i.e. from individual struggle to institutional configuration. such institutions designed to embody the ideal of cosmopolitanism can be exemplified by: the humanitarian institution of the international committee of the red cross founded in 1863 to protect human life and health and alleviate human suffering without discrimination based on nationality, race, gender, class, etc.; the international criminal police organization established in 1923 to ensure public safety, fight terrorism, crimes against humanity, environmental crimes, etc; the world bank established in 1944 to provide lowinterest, interest-free loans, and grants to developing countries in an aim to reduce poverty; the league of nations which was created in 1919 to maintain world peace and was eventually replaced by the united nations after the end of world war ii in 1945; the north atlantic treaty organization founded in 1949 and committed to a strong and productive cooperation with the un; the european union, an economic and political union of sovereign nation states also established in the aftermath of world war ii known to operate through supranational independent institutions; and even the fictional united federation of planets in star trek – apparently upholding the values of universal liberty, equality, justice, cooperation, and peace. if the abolition of war is a prerequisite for a peaceful co-existence, should this prerequisite be fulfilled by establishing a single universal authority such as an all-powerful united nations or by abolishing nation states altogether since it is nations that wage wars against one-another? in the vein of kantian cosmopolitanism, if there ever will exist a cosmopolis, which institutional state form will it take and will the nation be left behind? not necessarily. in view of contemporary cosmopolitan theory, cosmopolitanism does not mean that the nation is no longer a politically relevant community. delanty argues that ‘cosmopolitan refers to the end of the “closed society” of the nation-state, but does not spell the end of the nation’ (2008, p. 220). the post-universal cosmopolitanism that he proposes ‘is critical and dialogic, seeing as the goal alternative readings of history and the recognition of plurality rather than the creation of a universal order, such as a cosmopolis’ (delanty 2006, p. 35). quite interestingly, even contemporary notions of cosmopolitanism bear resemblance to 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the cynic philosophy of defacing the currency. delanty not only argues, for example, that ‘cosmopolitanism must be seen as one of the major expressions of the tendency in modernity towards self-problematization,’ but also endeavours to defy some usually taken for granted pitfalls of cosmopolitanism such as eurocentrism, universalism and relativism (2006, p. 35). it is precisely this ‘condition of self-problematization’ and ‘self-scrutinization’ that, in his view, characterizes ‘the cosmopolitan imagination’ (2006, p. 25). therefore, along these lines, cosmopolitanism in practice involves not only defacing the currency, i.e. rejecting the dominant status quo, but also defacing one’s own currency as well as its own currency, i.e. the currency of the self and of itself. clearly, whether the discussion is anchored in individual approaches or around institutional implications, the principle of defacing the currency, implying a rejection of the prevailing status quo in favour of a new cosmopolitan vision, seems to underlie every dimension of cosmopolitanism. the particular: personal extensions much to the dismay of toby cecchini’s (2004), who standardized the method for preparing the cosmopolitan using cointreau and freshly-squeezed lime juice, there are as many versions of the cocktail as there exist bartenders in the world. similarly, there might be as many cosmopolitanisms as there are individuals claiming cosmopolitanism. each flavour of the notion is rooted in each person’s own local discourse. my personal concoction includes a willingness to educate and commit myself to global issues such as the environment, a feeling of being at ease with more than one cultural setting, not so much the willingness to listen to the voice of experience, rather to have the courage to be the voice of experience myself. another key ingredient is the flexibility in appropriating cultural forms or practices from elsewhere without the fear of this jeopardizing my identity. cosmopolitanism in practice, the way i understand it, does not involve loudly proclaiming oneself as a proud teenage lesbian or as a proud kosovo albanian or as a british celebrating a swedish sofa or even as a cosmopolitan. rather, cosmopolitanism can be conceptualized as a kind of performative practice through which one (as well as cosmopolitanism itself) avoids being branded. it involves resisting the notion that one’s identity is determined by brands. however, considering that ‘we live in a society where youth recognize 1,000 corporate logos cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 17 and fewer than 10 species of wildlife found in their communities’ (bateman 2008), even this notion of cosmopolitanism seems overly optimistic. the most important ingredient in my cosmopolitan concoction is love. however, this love does not only extend to my fellow human co-dwellers in the world as martha nussbaum (1994) suggests but also to all other living creatures. moreover, doing cosmopolitanism means being as loyal to any nation as i am to any brand. in tune with the marketing saying, ‘there are no more customers, only prospects’ (quoted in kataras 2008, p. 35), i consider myself a prospect rather than a citizen of any country. nevertheless, i try to remain attentive to the social conditions and the situations of those who do not share my privileges of transcending national identities. cosmopolitanism has meaning beyond the weakly translated world-citizenship and that a theory enabling a deep conception of the cosmos, polis and their harmonization has yet to come. in the meantime, cosmopolitanism, nonetheless, encourages us to rethink the relation between the self, community, and the world. it is important for us to think about how we concoct our cosmopolitanisms and what we do with them so that we can do cosmopolitanism not only intuitively as suggested by pollock et al. but also by conscious commitment. mutual affinity cosmopolitanism, as it is widely understood today, contends that solidarities among people should be built based on a shared humanity. cosmopolitanism is often equated to universalism, which is also potentially global or transnational in scope. in universalist terms people are united by virtue of a common adherence to a set of universally applicable ideals such as a liberal democratic creed, religion, etc., regardless of national or cultural divides. these ideas and values are, thus, capable of transcending territorial or cultural boundaries. universalist solidarity is grounded on a shared ideology and extends to anyone who commits and shows loyalty to the ideology. an example would be the world-wide coalition against a common enemy such as al-qaeda. universalists, however, differ from cosmopolitans in that cosmopolitans do not require others to identify with a particular set of ideas, such as political beliefs and cultural values, as a precondition for mutual affinity. the line is still somewhat blurry though because humanity is itself an idea, but cosmopolitanism, even more so than universalism, values cultural diversity as a defining trait of humanity and is more insistent on preserving that diversity. from a cosmopolitan point of view, unity is not the same as 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 uniformity and diversity is not the problem, rather the solution. diversity in sameness is the tenet of the european union. for universalists, on the other hand, a common identity requires a common and homogeneous worldview. an argument made against universalism by postmodern scholars such as jennifer hochschild (1984) is that when it comes to shared ideologies, the global is too global, i.e. no creed is universalizable, although we would like to think otherwise. values and ideas are at least partially predicated on the culture and linguistic tradition from within which they originate. universalism is not only believed by many to be practically impossible but also undesirable. coexistent with cosmopolitanism, hardly the dominant conception of belonging, and universalism, which extends solidarity to anyone adhering to a common set of ideas, are at least two other popular traditions, namely nationalism and multiculturalism. nationalism identifies the members of a nation as a united and distinct people and restricts solidarity to that narrow circle. as defined by anthony smith, the ‘core doctrine’ of nationalism maintains that ‘the world is divided into nations, each with its own character, history and destiny’ (2004, p. 245) and that ‘an individual’s primary loyalty must be to her or his nation’ (1991, p. 74). nationalism is considered dangerous because it heavily relies on the principle of exclusion. national solidarity is the public spirit that stops at the national borders, i.e. a feeling of mutual affinity that binds all the fellow citizens of a nation but does not extend to other nations. this solidarity is grounded in a common national identity built around soperceived exceptional characteristics or shared particularities which are associated with the whole nation, used to characterize it, to distinguish and separate it from other nations. in other words, these exceptional characteristics are shared by the members of a nation alone. these shared characteristics are perceived to involve race, religious heritage, language, national history, cultural symbols and traditions, a set of political institutions and so on. as smith points out, however, a nation’s distinguishing characteristics that unite all its members while simultaneously severing them from non-members boil down to the ‘common myths and memories,’ the ‘distinctive public culture,’ the ‘historic homeland,’ the ‘common laws and customs.’ in his own words, the nation is: a named and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths, memories, symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture, reside in and identify with a historic homeland, and create and disseminate common laws and shared customs (2005, p. 98). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 19 nationalism, thus, contends that the members of a nation share important characteristics which can serve as a basis for solidarity limited by territorial boundaries as well as ethnocultural divisions. this is in contrast to the multi-culturalist or the culturally pluralist tradition which dismisses national identities as not only artificial but also spiritually meaningless. this tradition favours more localized and narrower attachments such as regional or state communities, particular interest groups and so on. pluralism characterizes the nation as a disunited mishmash and, to a certain extent, it ignores the tensions that arise and denies the need for solidarity altogether, i.e. multiple cultures can coexist without blending. the majority of cultural pluralists believe in the coexistence of multiple groups under the same political roof, without the need for a strong common bond. underlying pluralism is the notion that we can only feel attachment to a part of the whole, rather than the whole itself. one important implication is that it is not particularity per se, rather one’s status as a marginalized minority that moves to the foreground. for instance, judith butler is a lesbian rather than jewish; barack obama is black, not christian; we are aware of hillary clinton’s gender. there has been a rather recent wave of right-wing conservative nationalism in switzerland, which arose in part in response to the popularity of multi-culturalism and interest-group liberalism, which is perceived to pose a threat to national unity. for the swiss, posters such as the following distributed by svp, the swiss people's party, have become all too familiar: 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the figure illustrates some of the billboards mushrooming all over switzerland in recent years. they are propagated by the svp, known for its adherence to national conservatism, its commitment to reducing immigration inflow, rejection of increases in government spending on social welfare and education, its opposition to closer ties with the nato and to increased involvement of switzerland in supranational organizations such as the un, eu, etc. the posters portray switzerland as being pierced by minarets which look like missiles; a flag being stepped on by the black feet of immigrant masses; a tiny switzerland being chewed up by big, black crows; many coloured hands each trying to grab a swiss passport, and, of course, the black sheep being kicked out by the white ones. each poster, as fear-instilling and discriminatory as it might seem, is actually associated with the proposal of a new law. for example, as mentioned in the introduction to this paper, in november of 2009, in an act of direct democracy, a ban on the construction of minarets, proposed by svp members, was approved by the majority of voters (57.5%) and became an amendment to the swiss constitution. a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic country such as switzerland, where the world economic forum takes place and where a number of international organizations are headquartered due to the fact that it is considered a so-called neutral country, seems anything but neutral in light of such images. cosmopolitan solidarity is advantageous, in that it attempts to reconcile the dilemma between the inevitable presence of social diversity and the sense of homogeneity necessary for societies to remain united and free. cosmopolitanism does not deny diversity, rather affirms it. clearly, although conservative nationalists may argue otherwise, no nation has ever been homogeneous. multi-culturalism and pluralism may be new words but not new trends. all nations put under the test of distinct national character would most probably fall through due to a lack of homogeneity necessary to unite them, whether this homogeneity be territorial, linguistic, cultural, political or religious. cosmopolitan solidarity, thus, appeals to a category which is higher, more abstract, idealistic and broad so as to encompass all humans. cosmopolitanism provides a sense of universal human solidarity as a direct consequence of diversity rather than in spite of it. if we accept the premise that a community cannot survive free and independent unless its members feel some attachment to the whole, then cosmopolitanism seems to make more sense than pluralism, which promotes narrow factional interests and separate cultural traditions. even if we accept the apparent inescapability of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 21 pluralism, the extent to which we define ourselves in opposition to the whole based our distinctive characteristics, this does not rule out the possibility of a shared human identity. humanity can still be conceived of as distinct within a larger universal collective or whole of creatures and beings, i.e. that which is human as opposed to that which is not. ethnogamy: it is all in the mix ‘like any shaken drink, the cosmopolitan wants to be brutalized. there should be aeration, collision and dilution galore going on in that shaker,’ says toby cecchini, the new york bartender (2008). one takes a sip and surprise, surprise, the ingredient of individuality is not lost, rather strengthened! one can still taste the triple sec made from sun-dried peels of bitter caribbean oranges. that tiny dash of cranberry now sweeps over the tongue like a giant wave of freshness. would lime juice even taste as good, if it were not fused in this particular citrusy sweet mixture? cultures too, are fluids that are inevitably mixed. culture is a fluid process. as delanty points out: it is possible to see cosmopolitanism expressed in the mixing and re-packaging of cultures and identities. this might be a weak expression of cosmopolitanism but, depending on the degree of self-transformation that results, it may also take a stronger form (2008, pp. 219-220). short or long? weak or strong? the quick fix is all in the mix! toby cecchini could have told us that much. obviously, thinking of culture in a nationalist framework is absurd because culture has always been fluctuating. there exists no single authentic culture. even native american jewellery, which is commonly perceived as authentic, for instance, was heavily influenced by spanish jewellery. cultures have always been cross-fertilized and influenced by others. of course, it may be hard for some people to accept that another culture has fertilized theirs because they can then no longer claim superiority over the other culture, if they indebt their own culture to the other. for this reason, colonizers could not admit that the colonized countries had fertilized their own culture. they projected upon the colonized what was other in themselves, while denying any sameness that the colonized shared with them. given the heightened awareness that it is only one’s projection onto the other that makes it other than oneself, forming our cultural identities by excluding what we are not because the rest constitutes what we are seems like an ultimately unrewarding form of imprisonment. 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to buy into the argument that solidarity requires an other, an excluded them against whom we can define us and that ‘collective identities can only be established on the mode of an us/them’ (mouffe 2000, p. 13). cosmopolitanism involves defining oneself with another, not against another. in doing so, we can reach a far more profound sense of definition as expression of meaning. we must define ourselves and our cultures not based on negation and mutual exclusion but through affirmation and mutual recognition, i.e. as contained in one-another. since cultures are dependent on one-another, we have the makings of a marriage. hence, instead of viewing cultures, in a romanticized nationalist light, as distinct from one another, i propose the term ethnogamy to denote the process by which contemporary cultures become cosmopolitan. ethnogamy stems from the union of the greek ethnos (ἔθνος), meaning nation or cultural group, and gamos (γάµος), meaning marriage or union. we should by all means not limit this union to only two cultures. however, ulrich beck’s description is useful in triggering the imagination as to when a couple is considered a couple: the french sociologist jean-claude kaufmann (1994) has a very sophisticated answer: a couple is not formed when two people start living together, or when they start having sex. something else must be added: a couple begins when two persons buy one washing machine – not two! why? because then the quarrels about ‘dirty laundry’ (the title of his marvelous book) start. who washes for whom? what counts as dirty? what as clean? what happens in each case, if he says yes and she says no? (beck 2002, p. 25). ethnogamy emphasizes the fundamental need for unity, collective decision-making and reflection on a shared collective future. multi-culturalism, the extent to which we define ourselves in opposition to the whole, on the basis of our distinctive traits, poses a serious challenge to the very notion of cosmopolitanism itself, which demands solidarity and bonding. this feeling of cosmopolitan mutual affinity can better be established by allowing newcomers to mix their own cultural practices into the melting pot, rather than requiring a complete assimilation on their part into the pre-existing host culture, i.e. integration by means of eliminating difference. like a good cosmopolitan cocktail, the multi-ethnic melting pot needs to be shaken and brutalized until it takes the form of an ethnogamy. cosmopoliteness politeness lies within the same semantic field as cosmopolitanism. politeness stems from the latin polīre (to polish) and means polishedness, which refers to another word in this semantic field, urbanity. in latin the word originally referred to a mentality and a behaviour which one cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 23 ought to have in the urbs (the city) of ancient rome. the fact that, in just three steps, almost any dictionary will take one from polite to urbane to cosmopolitan speaks to the relatedness of these notions. politeness as a facilitator of sociability is an essential aspect of public and private everyday culture, of business and of diplomacy. kant’s roadmap to cosmopolitanism involves transcending antagonisms among individuals and nation states alike. he refers to these antagonisms as ‘the unsocial sociability of men, i.e., their propensity to enter into society, bound together with a mutual opposition which constantly threatens to break up the society’ (kant 1963, p. 15). since social sociability seems to be a fundamental feature of cosmopolitanism, it seems reasonable that one of cosmopolitanism’s theoretical backdrops be relational work, particularly politeness theory. it is important to point out with brown and levinson (1987) that politeness allows communication to take place between potentially aggressive partners, which make politeness theory relevant in the realm of cosmopolitan theory. in kant’s (2007) view mentioned previously in the paper, not only individuals but also nations states are, by default, potentially aggressive partners. the notions of politic and (im)polite behavior along the lines proposed by richard watts, a key figure in politeness theory, are as follows: [l]inguistic behaviour which is perceived to be appropriate to the social constraints of the ongoing interaction, i.e. as non-salient, should be called politic behaviour. … linguistic behaviour which is perceived to be beyond what is expectable, i.e. salient behaviour, should be called polite or impolite depending on whether the behaviour itself tends towards the negative or positive end of the spectrum of politeness (watts 2003, p. 19). rather than restricting these notions to linguistic behaviour, we can attempt to apply them to behaviour in general. for instance, the actions of hellenistic cosmopolites could be considered as cosmoimpolite. laërtius (1853, p.233) tells us that diogenes of sinope pointed at people with his middle finger. he is also said to have defecated in the theatre, urinated on some people who insulted him, dropped by at people’s houses unannounced to offer them advice, strolled the streets in full daylight with a lamp saying that he was just looking for an honest man, etc. like dogs, the dog philosophers ate and made love in public, went barefoot, and slept in tubs and at crossroads. what makes their actions cosmoimpolite is not the fact that they violated what was considered socially appropriate behaviour because, as previously established, defacing the currency is one key underlying principle of cosmopolitanism. 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 rather, the fact that this defacing led to conflict, thus disrupting their peaceful co-existence in their communities. cosmopolitic could perhaps characterize the perspective of the dominant capitalist bourgeoisie whose global reach and its modes of production were bound to equalize the differences between nations as described by marx and engels in the communist manifesto written fifty-three years after kant’s perpetual peace. moreover, it might be used to describe what frantz fanon called a ‘profoundly cosmopolitan mould’ (fanon 1961, p. 149) in the wretched of the earth. according to fanon, this formerly colonized bourgeoisie was dominated by capitalist interests. moreover, these puppets and imitators of the colonizers, while intent on keeping the peace, tended towards mediocrity as they lacked the spirit of initiative. they, therefore, did not deface but endorse the currency. cosmopolite, on the other hand, could be used to imply a harmonious defacement of the currency. the actions of immanuel kant might, for instance, provide an illustration. kant, a visionary with dreams global in size, in the midst of a heavily war-torn europe, wrote for a peaceful coexistence of human beings. he reinvented cosmopolitanism, thus defacing its currency. he took a revolutionary stance but in a peaceful manner by politely flattering the statesmen whom he obviously depended on to carry out his work. he referred to politicians as ‘world-wise statesmen’ and to his own thoughts as ‘empty ideas’ (kant 2007, p. 5). he practised the peace he preached and seemed willing to accommodate others (the ‘world-wise statesmen’) who did not necessarily subscribe to his cosmopolitan vision. cosmopoliteness can, therefore, serve as an umbrella term encompassing cosmopolitic and cosmo(im)polite behaviour. such a model is not meant for sorting cosmopolitans into different types or for branding behaviour, rather for the purpose of facilitating useful reflection so as to spark a debate leading to a deeper understanding. conclusion in the same way that cynicism became the popular philosophy of antiquity as it was no longer reserved for a social or intellectual elite and everyone could philosophize, cosmopolitanism, too, is on its way to become the popular philosophy of our time. as kant’s ‘empty ideas’ fill up with actions, so does the cosmopolitan glass. we are faced with a plethora of definitions of cosmopolitanism. while these definitions should by no means be received uncritically, they should also not be viewed as interfering with cosmopolitanism’s cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 25 process of becoming, rather as assisting that process. the cosmopolitan approach to cosmopolitanism proposed here involves filling the glass with both: sameness and difference, the general and the particular, genus and differentia, respectively. in order to establish some sort of general blueprint for cosmopolitanism, a functional approach is taken in that the main question is not what, rather why, cosmopolitanism is. its trajectory starting off with the cynics and the stoics via immanuel kant to the present suggests that cosmopolitanism serves as a conceptual tool for defacing the currency. this genus is mixed and shaken together with the differentia, i.e. the conceptualization of cosmopolitanism as a kind of performative practice through which branding can be dodged. this paper did not set out to toss a definition of cosmopolitanism at the reader right from the start, rather to stir the imagination and prompt one to concoct one’s own working definition post-analysis so as to facilitate a conceptualization of cosmopolitanism as a performative practice. how do people, cultures, countries, the world – how do i – do cosmopolitanism? perhaps one day the pipe dream(s) of the cosmopolitan project(s) will become reality and will not only stand the test of time but also have in store great rewards for humanity. until then, we should not be arguing if the cosmopolitan glass is half empty or half full but rather ask ourselves what we can do with what is in the glass. bottoms up! references bateman, r. 2008, ‘robert bateman get to know program’, thegreenpages.ca [website], viewed 11 october 2011 <http://thegreenpages.ca/ca/2008/06/12/robert_bateman_get_to_know_pro/>. beck, u. 2002, ‘the cosmopolitan society and its enemies’, theory culture society, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 17-44. bentham, j. 2007, an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, forgotten books. branham, r. & goulet-cazé, m. 1996, ‘introduction’, the cynics: the cynic movement in antiquity and its legacy, university of california press, berkeley, pp. 1-27. brown, c. 1992, international relations theory: new normative approaches, harvester weatsheaf, hempel hempstead. brown, p. & levinson, c. 1987, politeness: some universals in language usage, cambridge university press, cambridge. cauti, c. (ed.) 2003, oscar wilde: the picture of dorian gray, barnes & noble classics, new york. cecchini, t. 2004, a bartender’s life in new york, broadway books, new york. –––. 2008, ‘best cosmopolitans in sydney’, au.timeout.com [website], viewed 11 october 2011 < http://www.au.timeout.com/sydney/bars/features/2275/best-cosmopolitans-insydney>. cohen, d. 1991, law, sexuality and society: the enforcement of morals in classical athens, 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 cambridge university press, cambridge. collingwood, r. 2005, an essay on philosophical method. introd. and additional material james connelly and giuseppina d’oro, oxford university press, new york. delanty, g. 2008, ‘the cosmopolitan imagination’, revista cidob d’afers internacionals, vol. 82, no. 83, pp. 217-230. –––. 2006, ‘the cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory’, the british journal of sociology, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 25-47. edel, a. 1996, aristotle and his philosophy, transaction publishers, new jersey. epictetus ix, 2011, ‘the golden sayings of epictetus ix’, ancient history at about.com [website], viewed 11 october 2011 <http://ancienthistory.about.com/library/bl/bl_text_epictetus.htm >. frantz, f. 1961, the wretched of the earth, grove press, new york. hobbes, t. 2008, leviathan, forgotten bookhochschild, j. 1984, the new american dilemma: liberal democracy and school desegregation, yale, new haven. kant, i. 1963, ‘idea for a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view’, in lewis white beck (trans.) on history, the bobbs-merrill co., indianapolis. –––. 2007, perpetual peace, filiquarian publishing, minneapolis. kataras, c. 2008, nice capitalism: a secret journey to the death of the arrogant brand, xlibris, united states. kleingeld, p. 1999, ‘six varieties of cosmopolitanism in late eighteenth-century germany’, journal of the history of ideas, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 505-524. laërtius, d. 1853, the lives and opinions of eminent philosophers, charles duke yonge (trans.) henry g. bohn, london. lévinas, e. 1991, totality and infinity: an essay on exteriority, kluwer academic publishers, the netherlands. marx, k. & engels, f. 2009, the communist manifesto, the echo library, middlesex. mieder, w. 2009, yes we can: barack obama’s proverbial rhetoric, peter lang, new york. mouffe, c. 2000, the democratic paradox, verso, new york. navia, l. 1996, classical cynicism: a critical study, greenwood publishing group, westport. nussbaum, m. 1994, ‘patriotism and cosmopolitanism’, the boston review, vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 1-8. pollock, s., bhabha, h., breckenridge, c. & chakrabarty, d. 2000, ‘cosmopolitanisms’, public culture, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 577-589. poulsen, f. 2008, element of an archaeology of cosmopolitanism in western political thought: a return to the french enlightenment, department of political science, copenhagen, 2008. smith, a. 1991, national identity, university of nevada, reno. –––. 2004, the antiquity of nations, polity, malden. –––. 2005, ‘when is the nation? towards an understanding of theories of nationalism’, in atsuko ichijo and gordana uzelac (eds.) the genealogy of nations: an ethno-symbolic approach, routledge, new york, pp. 94-112. stade, r. 2007, cosmos and polis, past and present, malmö university, sweden. vertovec, s. & cohen, r. (eds.) 2002, conceiving cosmopolitanism: theory, context, and practice, oxford university press, oxford. watts, r. 2003, politeness, cambridge university press, cambridge. werbner, p. 2008, ‘cosmopolitanism, globalisation and diaspora: stuart hall in conversation with pnina werbner’, anthropology and the new cosmopolitanism, palgrave macmillan, gordonsville, pp. 345-360. 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 contesting the ‘we’ of ‘we’: the rights of indigenous peoples in australia heather formaini abstract introducing three papers which have as their theme indigenous and non-indigenous rights, this paper offers a set of frameworks through which to read the various discourses as they have steered debates since colonialisation. it examines the way indigenous rights have been contested against a colonial legal framework, first through the guise of assimilation, various definitions of ‘reconciliation’, and self determination, and finally in the claim for land rights in new south wales. it argues that the philosopher martin buber offers a means of achieving rights for everyone, through his i – thou model of inter-subjectivity. charting dialogues beyond neo-conservatism forces us to address the question of rights and, more particularly, the question of ‘whose rights?’ from the earliest days of the australian colonial invasion, to the current would-be post-colonial dispensation, indigenous peoples have been subjected to a range of exceptional rights regimes, interventions and special measures. the process of identifying as australian, defining the national ‘we’, is pursued both with and against a subordinated indigenous identification, the indigenous ‘we’. resistance to domination mobilises indigenous collective identity; enforcement of domination mobilises national collective identity. resulting conflicts and accommodations revolve around rights, and who has them. rights are never given: they always have to be claimed, through social mobilisation. shared identification and resulting social solidarity is thus a precondition for the realisation of rights. at the face-to-face level, such solidarities rest on inter-personal dialogue and mutual understanding. the process of mutual recognition that is the basis for respect and trust, enables collective identification and common action. a close parallel can be drawn from the inter-subjective ‘i-thou’ nexus, posited by the austrian philosopher, martin buber, in the 1920s. rather than a process of objectification, of ‘i-it’, as buber characterised it, the ‘ithou’ relationship enables a process of mutual subjectification. through it, social actors claim the subjecthood that, as alain touraine (1995) argues, is the precondition for social movements. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 97 the historical process of constructing national identification in australia, a national ‘we’, on the basis of subordinated indigenous rights, sees the ‘i-it’ relationship writ large. this section addresses challenges to this arrangement that in different ways seek to construct new solidarities, and in buber’s formulation, mobilise ‘i-thou’ relationships. a key focus is to identify how much, if at all, the first peoples of australia have access to the same rights as non-indigenous australians. within an overarching framework of democratic values, one of the central questions addressed in this section concerns the degree to which the indigenous population’s experience is part of an inclusive and participatory 'we', offering an accurate measure of the effectiveness of australia's post-colonial democracy. this introductory article offers an interpretative frame, centred on the question of identification and the assertion of rights. first there is some discussion of the issues raised in the three papers. second, these issues are illustrated through a brief survey of indigenous rights in australian history, in order to contextualise the accounts to follow. three perspectives: international, national, local each of the three papers is differently concerned with the positions in which indigenous peoples of australia have historically been placed. specifically, they focus on the extent to which indigenous peoples now form part of the same decisionand law-making processes as non-indigenous people. in so doing, they centre on rights regimes, and the relationship between indigenous rights and national citizen rights. in normative terms, the articles present arguments for an inclusive symmetry between these rights and identifications, and suggest means of how to get there. implicit in all three papers is the need for a formal treaty that sets the framework for mutual recognition, as the basis for a symmetry of rights. the papers necessarily cover a wide range of historical, legal, political and social legacies of colonisation, as a way of addressing the resulting ongoing debates about indigenous peoples ‘rights’. in the first article, garth nettheim outlines an international legal framework out of which indigenous rights can be established. here indigenous sovereignty conditions state sovereignty: indigenous identification and ownership precedes the state, and thus indigenous rights claims are a priori. 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 in the second article, nina burridge discusses the national-level reconciliation process in australia. here, indigenous sovereignty is subsumed into a transformed state sovereignty so that both indigenous and national identification undergo a mutual translation. in the third article, heidi norman focuses on the land council movement in new south wales. she shows how the recognition of land councils offered limited avenues for reclaiming land, but saw indigenous sovereignty being brought into a legal relationship with state sovereignty, re-embedding national identification. each of the papers explores various forms of activism for indigenous rights, many of which, though by no means all, emerged as a particular discourse over the last forty years. the papers can therefore be situated within a distinct lineage of rights, present from early on in the history of colonisation in australia. rather like an interplay of two voices, the rights discourse emerges, one speaking on behalf of colonisers, the other for resisters. the interplay can be likened to a three-act play. to date it is possible to say that there have been at least two major acts. act one covers invasion and assimilation; in act two we see new forms of resistance and accommodation; in the third act, we see the project of self-determination, albeit in rehearsal. against the words of resistance the first 'we' appeals to a notion of assimilation come and be one of us, be 'whited out'. do our jobs, though don't expect any pay. do not complain when aboriginal women are taken as our playthings. do not expect any offspring of this play to be of any importance to us. still, however, the resisting 'we' cannot be silenced. act two shows that indigenous resistance is powerful, most especially in shaming the authorities. in this second act, the theme of 'reconciliation' emerges. burridge's paper documents some of the underpinnings of the coloniser 'we' and the way a new movement is formed. so it is that the relationship of a form of activism to social movements becomes apparent, as does the invincibility of coloniser governments, regardless of how much they claim to be promoting indigenous rights. burridge addresses the meanings of this version of reconciliation, invoking a sense that there is much more to this story than can be told in these terms. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 99 norman's paper introduces the first scene of act three, from an indigenous perspective. she finds that in order to realise land rights, this is what must be endured: you can certainly ask to have your land returned to you, but you must abide by all the legislation the colonising authorities have established in order to prevent this. making progress on a claim will require a number of historians, anthropologists and lawyers to assist. moreover, it will take a great deal of time. you will be exhausted by the end. you might as well give up now. this story of self-determination is therefore seen through the lens of the struggle to regain land rights in new south wales. against this three-act backdrop of assimilation, reconciliation and self-determination, is the growing importance of international human rights law, especially the declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, adopted by the united nations general assembly in 2007, after twenty-two years of negotiation. the declaration now occupies what was previously a site of silence, creating new links between local, national and international frameworks for indigenous rights. as nettheim argues, it brings signs of hope to a formerly bleak landscape. historical and contemporary contexts whereas the ‘history’ of colonisation in australia is generally rendered in ‘mainstream’ texts as passive resistance of ‘the natives’, this represents a gross abuse of the truth of the matter, allowing stories of indigenous activism to go untold. such narratives rarely frame accounts of economic, historical, political and social debates. although not told here, they are available for all to discover. the recent television series, first australians, provides many accounts (perkins 2008). to return to the very beginnings of colonisation in this country is to visit some of the silences written into the ‘culture wars’ and ‘history wars’ waged by neo-conservative commentators. under the howard government these ‘wars’ became part of an ongoing public debate over the interpretation of the history of the european colonisation, and its impact on indigenous peoples (abc 2009a). the voyage of captain james cook, in 1768, had a twofold purpose: to serve both science and the crown. in the first instance, cook was ‘to observe the transit of venus across the sun, the measurement of which, from several parts of the world simultaneously, would help 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 astronomers determine the distance between the sun and the earth’ (beaglehole 1955–74, 1:514). . the other important aspect of cook’s mission was, on behalf of his majesty, to ‘endeavour by all proper means to cultivate a friendship and alliance with [the natives]’ (bennet and castles 1979: pp 253–54). this and the following point are not well known in 'mainstream' australia. cook’s instructions were clear: ‘you are ... with the consent of the natives to take possession of convenient situations in the country in the name of the king of great britain, or, if you find the country uninhabited take possession for his majesty’ (bennett and castles pp 253–54). on 29 april 1770, the endeavour sailed into botany bay. encountering the local people, cook later wrote that ‘all they seem'd to want was us to be gone’ (beaglehole 19551974). in setting up camp, cook neither heeded the wishes of the local people nor obtained their consent. while the local people’s feelings were registered in cook's writing, respect for these feelings in no way inhibited settlement. such settlement would soon relieve the british of many unwanted convicts, and simultaneously allow the greater expansion of empire. a point necessarily central to the debate on colonisation, and hence to the three papers in this section, concerns the how and why of cook’s failure both to follow instructions and those precedents established by the british in the united states and africa. of this question, stuart banner underlines the point that: ‘members of the royal society and the government anticipated that if there really was an inhabited continent in the south pacific, and if it turned out to be suitable for colonising, britain would buy it from the natives, just like it was buying north america.’ the policy of terra nullius, as banner indicates, was not a standard feature of colonial land policy (banner 2005; see also reynolds 1987). in defiance of both orders and precedent, cook seized the land as if it were uninhabited. although his model undoubtedly followed earlier forms of colonisation, cultural theorist patrick wolfe argues that this represented ‘a zero-sum contest over land on which conflicting modes of production could not ultimately coexist’ (wolfe 2001). thus wolfe finds it possible to draw the conclusion, through the lens of post-colonialism, that a project of ‘elimination’ formed a primary object of this form of colonialism. the notion of 'elimination' has never been far from the mind of governments and is implicit in the 'white australia' policy. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 101 while wolfe argues that an intentionally racist explicitness emerged in the doctrine of terra nullius, banner views it as a ‘second puzzle’:(banner 2005)' in spite of the fact that only a few decades earlier british humanists sought to improve the lives of indigenous peoples in the empire, and to abolish slavery, the law of terra nullius remained in place. by the time the english arrived in australia, many writers had used the connection between agriculture and property to develop a framework for understanding the development of societies. against the british standards of associating property rights with cultivation of land, aboriginal people -hunter-gatherers, to british eyes -failed to conform to what the colonisers took to be established notions of civilisation. no attempt seems to have been made to understand why aboriginal people didn’t ‘cultivate’ the land, but lived in relation to it. decades of agitation and still no treaty in the first of the papers in this section, garth nettheim writes that ‘in australia, there has been a long history of proposals to establish a consensual basis with the indigenous peoples for non-indigenous settlement’ (nettheim, in this issue). in other words, a consensual treaty, or even a set of treaties could, even at this stage of history, be established between indigenous peoples and the non-indigenous population. the question must be asked, however, of how a consensual arrangement can be found, when colonisers have so much to lose, and when they have seemed so unwilling. over the long history to which nettheim refers, various politicians have spoken openly about a treaty. however, no government in power has acted with purpose to see a treaty through to completion. despite the most convincing of arguments, despite the convictions of constitutional lawyers, and the acknowledgement by a former prime minister (keating 1992), that the country was ‘stolen’ from its rightful 'owners', no treaty yet exists. neither has a committee been established which could arrive at a consensual basis for a treaty. from time to time, hope is cultivated only to be diminished, if not entirely banished. the aspiration was expressed, for instance, in 2008, when the catholic parish of st mary in south brisbane. together with the aboriginal people of the area, established a treaty, which they claimed to be legally binding. the indigenous and non-indigenous people worked together for twenty years before establishing this treaty. the parish priest argued that the treaty 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 follows a papal bull of the 17th century, which said that no indigenous person was to be moved from their land. the poet oodgeroo has written that 'the treaty was celebrated in coroborree in accordance with aboriginal customary law and written on paper in accordance with non-aboriginal law (oodgeroo 2008). cycles of repetition with the major strand of hope that came from the united states civil rights movement. a particular form of activism was inspired in australia. to publicise the shocking segregation of blacks and whites on buses in the south of the united states, activists began freedom rides. thus began a series of student political protests in 1961 which took the form of bus trips through the southern states. student volunteers, both african-american and white, rode in interstate buses into the pro-segregationist south, in order to test a 1960 united states supreme court decision (boynton v. virginia, 364 u.s. 454) which outlawed racial segregation in interstate public facilities, including bus stations. the american freedom rides were met with violent protest and hostility, particularly in the state of alabama. the publicity resulting from the trips led to a stricter enforcement of the earlier supreme court decision and increased public awareness of racism in society. following this model, on the night of 12 february 1965, thirty university students from sydney -student action for aborigines, led by charles perkins -began their own freedom ride, taking a bus to a number of country towns of new south wales where local aboriginal communities had been campaigning for decades against discrimination and deprivation. the media intervention by student action for aborigines shocked much of the nation. the students on the freedom ride highlighted the living conditions of aboriginal people, dispossessed, on reserves and missions, or small settlements on the outskirts of towns. conditions were brutally harsh, with sub-standard 'shanty' housing, with no plumbing, electricity or basic amenities. moreover, the students found that racism in country towns they visited was both entrenched and widespread. aboriginal people had no access to cinemas, hotels, cafés and swimming pools, and often suffered prejudice and suspicion as well as verbal and even physical abuse (burgmann 2003). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 103 the freedom ride was crucial in drawing attention to the plight of rural aboriginal people and in time showed that they could have effective political representation from within their own communities. the freedom ride, moreover, hastened the referendum of 1967. referendum it was the indigenous activist and writer, faith bandler, and the indigenous poet, oodgeroo noonuccal, along with a number of others, who began a highly successful campaign for commonwealth recognition of aboriginal citizenship that resulted in the landslide 1967 australian referendum in support of aboriginal rights. citizenship for aboriginal people at federal level is therefore only a little more than forty years old. it had taken almost two hundred years to grant citizenship to the owners of the country. in 1956, faith bandler founded the aboriginal-australian fellowship with pearl gibbs. in 1957, she helped launch a petition for a federal referendum to give aborigines citizenship rights. between 1962 and 1973, she was an executive member of the federal council for the advancement of aborigines and torres strait islanders that led the referendum campaign. oodgeroo noonuccal was born kathleen jean mary ruska, on minjerribah in the stradbroke islands. at a deputation in 1963 to the then prime minister, sir robert menzies, oodgeroo offered a lesson in the realities of aboriginal lives. when the prime minister offered the deputation a drink, he was startled by her response that he could be gaoled for that gesture in queensland (bandler 2001). the referendum approved two amendments to the australian constitution, the first of which involved the removal of a phrase in section 51 of the commonwealth constitution. this stated that the federal government had the power to make laws with respect to 'the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any state, for whom it was deemed necessary to make special laws’. the removal of the provision 'other than the aboriginal race in any state' gave the commonwealth government the power to make laws to benefit aboriginal people, seen by some as a step in increasing the government's ability to provide welfare, empowerment, and access to justice for aboriginal people (national museum of australia 2007 ). the second amendment concerned the documenting of the aboriginal population, removing the provision in the constitution which said that when calculating the population of the states 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 and territories for the purpose of allocating seats in parliament and per capita commonwealth grants, aboriginal people were not to be counted. such provision had historical origins in preventing queensland and western australia using their large aboriginal populations to gain extra seats or extra funds from the commonwealth. its removal eliminated official or formal distinctions between aboriginal and non-aboriginal populations. in spite of this, however, as tom calma, aboriginal and torres strait islander social justice commissioner of the australian human rights commission, stated that ‘our constitution permits the federal parliament to enact laws that racially discriminate against indigenous peoples – and indeed against any other group based on race’ (calma 2008). section 51(26) of the constitution – the very provision that charles perkins and others fought so hard to amend through the 1967 referendum – enables the federal parliament to make special laws for the peoples of a particular race. this has been interpreted by the high court as meaning any special laws – including ones that are discriminatory. surely this is a perversion of the intention of the 1967 referendum (calma 2008). although some are tempted to see the development and success of the policies of these years as the work of government, it must in fact be attributed to the assertiveness of indigenous peoples and the way they worked with their supporters. it must also be remembered that the primary policy shifts were initiated after the 1967 referendum under a conservative federal government. this is a point underlined by peter sutton in his discussion on the way selfdetermination began to replace integration/assimilation as federal indigenous affairs policy, under the conservative leadership of william mcmahon in 1971 (sutton 2001, p132). twenty years after the referendum, in september 1987, the then prime minister, bob hawke, announced that he hoped that the forthcoming bicentenary of federation would bring about an understanding or compact between aboriginal people and ‘the australian community’, implying aboriginal people were not already part of the australian community. hawke said he wanted the australian people to recognise its obligations and to rectify the injustices of two hundred years. hawke's words indicated to indigenous peoples that a treaty was about to be offered. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 105 in june of the following year, at the barunga festival in the northern territory, hawke was presented with ‘the barunga statement’, containing the hopes and aspirations of indigenous peoples at the festival. hawke responded with the following words: it's not the word that's important, it’s the attitudes of the peoples, attitudes of the non-aboriginal australians and of the aboriginal australians if there is a sense of reconciliation... whether you say there's a treaty or a compact is not important, but it is important that we do it (hawke 1987). expressing this sentiment, and responding to growing public concern, in august 1987, hawke announced the formation of a royal commission to investigate the causes of deaths of aboriginal people while held in state and territory gaols. the commission examined all deaths in custody in each state and territory which occurred between 1 january 1980 and 31 may 1989, and the actions taken in respect of each death. the commission's terms of reference enabled it to take account of social, cultural and legal factors which may have had a bearing on the deaths under investigation, and its report, delivered in august 1991, carried 399 recommendations. recommendation 399 stated: that all political leaders and their parties recognize that reconciliation between aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities in australia must be achieved if community division, discord and injustice to aboriginal people are to be avoided (royal commission into aboriginal deaths in custody 1991). with this mandate, in september 1991 the hawke government established the council for aboriginal reconciliation, with the objective of promoting ‘a process of reconciliation between aborigines and torres strait islanders and the wider australian community… fostering of an ongoing national commitment to co-operate to address aboriginal and torres strait islander disadvantage’ (commonwealth of australia 1991). the sense of an onward movement of reconciliation necessarily raises a question about whether the political powers were attempting to sidestep a consensual treaty, concealing the reality of the inequality that indigenous peoples have always suffered and continued to suffer, in spite of a new-found sense of hope. whether the move was an attempt further to delay the creation of a formal treaty-making process, even the council’s own ‘document of reconciliation’ was finally sidelined by the federal government in 2000, despite sizeable mobilisations at the time in favour of reconciliation (discussed in burridge in this issue; see commonwealth of australia 2000). 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the ambivalence was expressed again in december 1992, in a now-famous speech that prime minister paul keating delivered in redfern, inner sydney. keating began with an acknowledgement. he said: it begins, i think, with the act of recognition. recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing. we took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life. we brought the disasters. the alcohol. we committed the murders. we took the children from their mothers. we practised discrimination and exclusion (keating 1992). having made such an acknowledgement, keating continued: it was our ignorance and our prejudice. and our failure to imagine these things being done to us. with some noble exceptions, we failed to make the most basic human response and enter into their hearts and minds. we failed to ask how would i feel if this were done to me? (keating 1992) whilst recognizing that sixteen years have passed since keating’s speech and that any new reading is retrospective, his words recognise culpability while refusing to act upon it. later in the same speech, keating went on to speak as if aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples had already obtained the right of self-determination. we are beginning to more generally appreciate the depth and the diversity of aboriginal and torres strait islander cultures. from their music and art and dance we are beginning to recognise how much richer our national life and identity will be for the participation of aboriginal and torres strait islanders. we are beginning to learn what the indigenous people have known for many thousands of years how to live with our physical environment (keating 1992). having launched into praise of indigenous culture, keating then began to describe what nonindigenous people had learned from the way in which aboriginal people treated the environment. this lesson, far from being known at that time, still has to be learned. but in saying that ‘our’ national life is much richer because of the culture of aboriginal people under colonisation, keating was issuing a one-sided statement on behalf of the ‘other’, blatantly denying indigenous realities. while hawke’s statement is now over twenty years old, and keating’s speech was delivered sixteen years ago, did either of these speeches make way for change, or did they merely continue a cycle, albeit in a more gentle tone? cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 107 land rights in nsw one reality of indigenous life concerns what indigenous people have to undertake in order to claim title to ancestral lands. norman’s paper in this section addresses the complexities involved in just one state. her work emphasises how long it took -over two hundred years before it was recognised that aboriginal people had entitlements to their own land. norman shows how the government renewed its efforts to assimilate aboriginal people in the 1960s, and how this culminated in the revocation of reserve lands. this spurred the land rights movement into action and, in time, the government was pressured to hold an inquiry. assimilation was not, of course, new, but had underpinned so many aspects of colonisation. it came in many forms, as the aboriginal activist, chika dixon, described in a radio interview, referring to the function of his non-education in the late 1940s (abc 2009b). he and the other aboriginal children at his school were for years kept in ‘class three’, for the purpose of maintaining illiteracy. illiterate children, he claimed, were then taken into the labour force to do the tasks no one else was prepared to do the function of assimilation, ultimately, was to diminish, if not entirely eliminate, an indigenous population. a dispersed population, separated from family and home, would find it much more difficult to claim ancestral land. whether this version of assimilation was intended to lead to what raphael lemkin (1944) identified as genocide, where the dismantling of the life of indigenous people was replaced by colonisers, or whether its objective was ‘ethnocide’, that is, a form of cultural genocide, remains unclear. it remains largely unknown that lemkin (1901-1959), a jewish-polish jurist, was keenly interested in colonial genocides. he published his now famous text axis rule in occupied europe: laws of occupation, analysis of government, proposals for redress, in 1944. here the term 'genocide', his invention, was first expounded in print. horrified by the slaughter of armenians by the turks during the first world war, and further outraged by the massacres of christian assyrians by iraqis in 1933, lemkin at first began to examine such barbaric acts as crimes, writing from the perspective of international law. he presented his work to the legal council of the league of nations at a conference in madrid 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 in 1933. however, his proposal to the council failed and it was not until december 1948 that the united nations adopted his work on genocide in the convention and the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. for lemkin, genocide has two parts: ... one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group: the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. this imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization of the area by the oppressor's own nationals (lemkin, 1944). while this writer takes the view that what has taken place in australia can correctly be identified as genocide, following lemkin's terms, there are others who understand the processes of colonisation more as ethnocide. this describes the destruction of a culture of a people, as distinct from the people themselves. ethnocide also involves a linguicide, acculturation, and so on. conclusion in summary, then, it must be said that there is yet a great deal of work to be done before it will be possible to claim that indigenous peoples in australia and the torres straits islands have their rights and can be self-determining. in the struggles that lie ahead, the hope is that the social contract yet, in my view, to be established between indigenous and nonindigenous, will be negotiated as between equals, to generate mutual solidarities and identification, with both sides espousing the philosophy of martin buber's 'i-thou' as a model of 'we-ness'. only on this basis can a treaty between equals be established. the history of indigenous resistance offers many instances of mutual solidarity and action, and in this way prefigures the required transformations. at the face-to-face inter-personal level, the movement forged intimate friendships between aboriginal and non-aboriginal people who saw rights as a key to tackling long-term discrimination. such friendships, based on mutual respect and a belief in human rights, not only formed a basis for radical action, but brought about robust debate in the public sphere, including in the academy. some of these ‘i-thou’ relationships, to use buber’s terminology, gained a powerful symbolic meaning for the wider public sphere, as well as inspiring new forms of social cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 109 dialogue and social action. one example is the relationship between the aboriginal activist, chika dixon and professor fred hollows, which made way for the establishment of the aboriginal medical service in redfern in the early 1970s. another is the relationship between non-indigenous poet, judith wright, and oodgeroo noonuccal, formerly known as kath walker, the first aboriginal poet to be published in australia. references abc 2009a, ‘history under seige’, abc radio national, radio series, 19-23 january, abc, sydney. abc 2009b, ‘chika dixon’, abc radio national, 15 january, abc, sydney. bandler. f. 2001, in ‘unfinished business’, episode 4, 100 years; the australian story, abc tv, <http://www.abc.net.au/100years/pre_ep4.htm> banner, s. 2005, ‘why terra nullius? anthropology and property law in early australia’, law and history review, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 95-131. beaglehole, j. c. ed., 1955-74, the journals of captain cook on his voyages of discovery, cambridge university press, cambridge. bennett, j. m. & castles, a. c. (eds.) 1979, a source book of australian legal history, the law book company, sydney. buber, m. 1958, i and thou. translated by ronald gregor smith, charles scribner’s sons, new york. burgmann, v. 2003, power, profit and protest: movements for change in australian society, allen & unwin, crows nest. calma, t. 2008, ‘still riding for freedom – an aboriginal and torres strait islander human rights agenda for the twenty-first century’, charles perkins ao memorial oration, university of sydney, sydney. commonwealth of australia (1991) council for aboriginal reconciliation act 1991, no. 127 of 1991, australian government publishing, canberra. council for aboriginal reconciliation 2000, reconciliation: australia's challenge: final report of the council for aboriginal reconciliation to the prime minister and the commonwealth parliament,car, canberra. curthoys, a. 2002, freedom ride: a freedom rider remembers, allen & unwin, sydney. hawke, r. 1987, ‘speech to the barunga festival’, northern territory. keating, p. 1992, ‘redfern speech’, sydney. lemkin, r. 1944, axis rule in occupied europe: laws of occupation, analysis of government, proposals for redress, carnegie endowment for international peace, washington. national museum of australia 2007, collaborating for indigenous rights in <http://indigenousrights.net.au/section.asp?sid=5> oodgeroo, n, 2008, ‘oodgeroo accuses brisbane archdiocese over st mary's treaty’, catholic news, 4 march. http://www.abc.net.au/100years/pre_ep4.htm� http://indigenousrights.net.au/section.asp?sid=5� 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 perkins, r. 2008, ‘the first australians’, sbs television series, sydney. reynolds, h. 1987, the law of the land, penguin books, ringwood, vic. royal commission into aboriginal deaths in custody 1991, final report, australian government publishing, canberra. sutton, peter, 2001, 'the politics of suffering: indigenous policy in australia since the 1970s', anthropological forum, vol. 11, pp. 125-173. touraine a. 1995, critiques of modernity, blackwell, cambridge. wolfe, p. 2001, 'land, labor and difference: elementary structures of race', the american historical review, vol.106, no.3, pp. 895-905. social movements and political parties: conflicts and balance1 lee rhiannon abstract the paper addresses aspects of the relationship between political parties and social movements, with a focus on the australian greens. it posits some of the limitations and possibilities of this relationship, arguing that it is a necessary one, both to social movements seeking to pursue their agendas through the political system, and to political parties needing to be open to broad public participation and to maintain strong links to on-the-ground issues. it concludes that the australian greens have sought to strike a balance between party and movement, recognising the limits of both. introduction for much of the 19th and 20th centuries the left was renowned for being strong on organisation while the conservative side of politics relied on money and media dominance to advance their causes. the term "organising" is not used here to mean "well organised" in progressive politics, organising is about a commitment to involve and empower people through democratic decision-making. the term organising in left politics embodies the society that is strived-for (see alinsky 1971; bobo et al 2001). organising as a tool for building democratic structures and taking the message to a wider audience is at the core of progressive movements and political parties (bronfenbrenner 1998; doyle 2001). without that commitment, focussed campaigns and progressive political parties will fail to bring about the far-reaching structural changes required to build a society free of exploitation of people and the environment (kovel 2007; panitch 2007). while right wing commentators and conservative politicians abuse the left for a lack of democracy – and there have been dictators, big and small – a deep commitment to participatory democracy has characterised most progressive movements and political parties (see maddison and hamilton 2006). the left should not be intimidated by right wing attacks, or prevented from acknowledging the contributions its 1 this paper is not refereed. 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 forebears have made to the democratic process through a whole range of political movements. these days the left no longer holds a clear advantage in organising – the wider society including the corporate world has learnt that there is a great advantage in involving ones colleagues, developing the collective mind and respecting and taking up different ways of working. as with many changes in society brought about by a whole range of social, industrial and environmental campaigns, contemporary movements rarely analyse and even more rarely take credit for the progressive changes that they have initiated (see newman 2006). organising on the left remains a critical asset. partly because the left lacks the resources that the corporate world has access to, but, more importantly, successful and democratic organising is a core attribute for the progressive side of politics because it reflects the fairer more just society that it is committed to building (see rose 2005). but organisers on the left need to be aware of the contradictions that have regularly arisen in the relationship between left parties and progressive movements. while in most cases it is social and environmental movements that give the lead to left parties and left mps, there are exceptions which highlight the fluid nature of this relationship. because parliamentary political parties in most cases have access to more resources and more opportunity to influence public opinion than most political movements, progressive mps and indeed all members of left parties have a responsibility to ensure that enhancing progressive causes comes before party sectional interests. political parties of the left need to make sure that not only do they have healthy internal democratic practices but that they do not place their leaders and their party above the movements that give life to so many of the causes on which their policies are based. this article explores a range of themes – historical and contemporary – that shed light on the relationship between social movements and political parties. it addresses the role cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 31 of social movements in driving political agendas, and the role of political parties in either constraining or promoting those agendas. while the focus is on the labor and green parties in australia, there is also discussion of the negative role that social movements can play, in blocking social change. history of struggle progressive political movements have a fine history. in the last few centuries the great advances that have been made are a result of actions taken by social and environment movements – people coming together in a range of organisational forms to agitate for change (burgmann 2004). the achievements show that while political parties and politicians play an important role in achieving important progressive reforms, the impetus and the driving force comes from political movements, from the action of people being well organised. the defeat of slavery, the winning of universal free public education, the right to strike and decent working conditions, women's rights and environmental protection are some of the momentous changes that have come out of social and environmental movements. their method of organising and their achievements have resulted in fundamental shifts in how democracies operate (see goodwin and jasper 2003; tarrow 1998). australian history is a history of struggle since the 1788 invasion occurred. many of the convicts who were sent to penal servitude in australia were political prisoners. the chartists campaigning to extend the right to vote, the british naval mutineers who took a stand against the flogging of sailors opposed to the on-board inhuman standards, and the irish rebels agitating for political separation for ireland from england laid a basis for radical political struggle in australia that carries through to today (mckinlay 1979b; alexander and griffiths 2003). there were the decades of insurrection by many aboriginal tribes across australia against the domination of their land by the british empire, although much of this history has only been documented in recent years. the struggles of aboriginal australia did not 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 fire up in 1788 and then wither until the freedom bus rides of the 1960s (goodall 1996). campaigns by aboriginal people, often with support from white communities, form a great deal of the australian political legacy. these movements of agitation and opposition have used a variety of organisational forms that over centuries maintained pressure on the status quo and resulted in considerable change. however, some of these achievements have been eroded by the howard government and in part by the continuing intervention policy of the rudd government (see altman and hinkson 2007). while inequality and environmental destruction in this country remains extensive, the achievements of a range of social movements have been considerable, and something to be acknowledged and celebrated. popular mass actions have played a key part in many of the most significant campaigns that have reshaped this country and its policies abroad. in the 1960s and 1970s large demonstrations occurred around australia against the vietnam war and the apartheid regime. in 1982 thousands of people travelled to tasmania to save the franklin river (west 1993). throughout the 1980s hundreds of thousands participated in anti-nuclear and peace movement actions. while all these activities started with a dedicated group of supporters they grew to become mass movements that attracted mainstream support and resulted in some important shifts in government policy (doyle 2001; mcphillips 2002). however, progress in many key areas has stalled or gone backwards. despite the powerful your rights @ work campaign (see mcmanus in this issue), casualisation of the workforce and the watering down of key on-the-job rights continues; women's quest for equal pay is slipping with the gender pay gap widening since 2004 (office for women 2009); and a meaningful response to climate change and peak oil is limited in the wake of political pressure by the powerful fossil fuel industry (pearce 2009). the backsliding is a result of the fact that the movements that were drivers for social and environment change have in part been captured or subverted by government or cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 33 mainstream political powers. goals have been tempered due to a range of financial and organisational constraints (see madison in this issue). more than ever, representatives of political parties need to be able to speak out and provide a radical lead. but for such a lead to bring meaningful change a broad-based movement is still needed to exert and maintain pressure on all political parties. at the same time, movements themselves, when acting on narrow sectional interests, can ossify and become roadblocks to change. when movements become roadblocks divisions between movements rights for women workers while australian trade unions have been at the forefront of many of the progressive struggles that have shaped australian society there have been times when leading unionists have limited struggle and inhibited the achievement of a fairer society. in the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, trade union leaders in the meat and public transport industries stopped women achieving the right to do the same work as their male colleagues. clarrie o'shea, the victorian state secretary of the australian tramway and motor omnibus employees' association, for two decades denied women tram workers the right to drive trams. this was the same clarrie o'shea who in 1969 became a household name when he was gaoled by john kerr – who later became the infamous governor general who dismissed the whitlam government for refusing to pay $8,000 in fines imposed on his union, which put him in contempt of the industrial court (mckinley 1979b; milner 2009). today women do drive melbourne trams. but the breakthrough did not come until 1975 when the women who were still fighting for their rights found support within the recently elected whitlam labor government and the women's groups that constituted the 1970s second wave of feminism. this new found support reinvigorated the campaign with women organising on a rank and file basis through the union. at the same time the federal minister for labour clyde 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/john_kerr_(governor-general) cameron announced that he planned to ratify the international labor organisation convention on discrimination and that committees to investigate complaints would be set up. this turned up the heat on the union but it took another two years before emma zelinka became the first woman to drive a melbourne tram (windschuttle 1980) so while the wider movement of rank and file union activists and women's groups were the driving force, the actions of a labor minister played a pivotal role in bringing sense to an out-of-date union leadership. divisions within a movement: greenwashing coal in recent times the groups that make up the environment movement have adopted different tactics in their response to climate change. with about 40 percent of australia's greenhouse gas emissions coming from mining and burning coal, the radical end of the environment movement have identified the need to target the coal industry and state and federal government policies that support this industry. in 2007 and 2008 non-violent direct action aimed at stopping the expansion of the coal industry was initiated by a number of environment groups including greenpeace australia, friends of the earth and rising tide. the australian greens supported many of these actions with greens mps participating in protests against new coal projects. meanwhile, groups that are seen as part of the environment movement such as world wide fund for nature and the climate institute, are backing key tactical manoeuvres of the coal industry such as carbon capture and storage technology (ccs) (wwf-australia 2008). their position on this controversial development is limiting the effectiveness of the growing campaigns to wind-back greenhouse gas emissions. when wwf and the climate institute joined forces with the cfmeu mining division and the australian coal association they were in fact engaging in a major greenwash project designed to attract government money for ccs projects based on unproven technology. the main purpose of this scheme is to reduce criticism of the coal industry, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 35 and opposition to its expansion, by suggesting that it is possible to tackle global warming and still burn coal. money put into this greenwash propaganda might have been instead directed to renewable energy projects to promote a low carbon economy and boost sustainable jobs. the australian greens have worked to expose the deceptive tactics of the conservative end of the environment movement which has set itself up in partnership with the coal industry. greens senator christine milne was referring to wwf and the climate institute when she stated: ‘calling for the government to take control of finding carbon dumping sites and carrying liability for leaks, let alone asking for tax incentives and accelerated depreciation for australia's biggest and richest polluters, is simply untenable’ (milne 2008). greens party – learning how to avoid the conservative trap differences between political parties and political movements can become sharp. contradictions will always exist in such a relationship. the key is how to ensure the differences don’t become so deep that they become irreparable, resulting in party leaders who fail to recognise that it is the actions of mass movements that open up the space for many of their own party policies to come to fruition, and the space to bring new members into party activity (müller-rommel and poguntke 2002; talshir 2002; doherty 2002) history is littered with examples of splits between progressive parties and their mps. too often the politicians tend to believe that they have the wisdom to take forward their party's platform and disregard the need to develop the synergy between their party and political movements. while parliament as an institution embodies many important democratic principles it also exerts a conservative influence on the parties and the mps that pass through the system. the progress of the australian labor party since its creation in 1891 illustrates what happens to political parties that are captured by the parliamentary process. 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 in nsw 35 labor mps were elected to the state parliament in 1891, and queensland and south australia gained their first labor mps in 1893. but within a few years of this achievement tensions were developing over mps who did not vote according to their party's policies, particularly with regard to improving on the job conditions for australian workers (mckinlay 1979a). the tension within the labor party and with wider political movements has become a characteristic of australian politics. over decades many activists and members of the public have expressed anger and disappointment because the alp has not honoured party policy, or what the movement progressives expect should be their policy. the current round of disaffection with the rudd government that has taken hold within a year of the defeat of the howard government is not surprising. the government's failure to abolish the australian building and construction commission and take meaningful action on climate change has angered many progressive voters. for over a century a pattern of disenchantment has been seen to set-in once labor is in office – it emerges due to the minimalist approach they take to social change, and these days to environmental protection. the australian greens have largely avoided this, at least for the past two decades that the party has had parliamentary representation. some argue that this is because the party has not been in government, but considering greens mps have held the balance of power in various australian parliaments, there have been many testing times. while it is a matter of speculation whether greens mps in the future will remain true to party policies, actions to date suggest that the greens are well grounded in how to win seats in parliament while maintaining a radical stance in both policies and political activities (lohrey 2002). greens mps are developing the art of respecting the institution of parliament while retaining a radical edge in their approach to taking forward their party's agenda, and also cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 37 in reforming the functioning of parliament itself. the structure and origins of the greens plays an important role in helping to maintain a healthy relationship between the party and progressive political movements (doyle 2001). the australian greens are a confederation of parties reflecting the different origins and approaches taken in the various states and territories (turnbull and vromen 2006). the first greens party in australia was registered in sydney in 1985. the party policy document emphasised social equality and a just society, with support for a nuclear free, peaceful and sharing world; grassroots democracy; social freedom and equality for all people; a liveable city; and a sustainable and just economy, working in harmony with the natural environment. this document detailed that the members who formed the first greens party came from many backgrounds including "environmental and resident activists, nuclear disarmers, dissidents from the labor party, feminists, anarchists, those inspired by the german greens, and socialists of various kinds" (the greens 1984). this history has helped establish a healthy culture of maintaining a balance between parliamentary work and community activity (dann 2008; dalton et al 2003). the radical approach that the greens have maintained on issues from refugee rights, to women’s fights, to industrial relations and climate change is also reflected in the fact that most of the current crop of state and federal greens mps come from an activist background. senator bob brown encapsulates this approach from his franklin river protests to the famous action in 2003 when he and senator kerry nettle publicly spoke out in the senate while president george bush was addressing federal parliamentarians (kingston 2003). in speaking about the greens global view, senator brown has articulated the views of many in the progressive movement. in 2004 he stated, "i just think it's absolutely inevitable that there will be a popular movement to oppose market fundamentalism and extreme capitalism, that division we have between wealthy and poor people now. if the greens don’t succeed in doing that, someone else will, but the times will be more dire. 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 that's the real question – is the world going to move on through intelligence or catastrophe?" (norman 2004) greens mps maintain a close working relationship with progressive movements and themselves engage in tactics outside the usual parliamentary activities (vromen and gauja 2009). an examination of the work of state and federal greens mps and most greens councillors reveals that they take their work far beyond the parliamentary boundaries of debates on legislation and committee work. many of them spend a lot of time working with communities to achieve important environmental protection, rectify social inequalities and help build mass movements on key concerns. also the organisational structure of the greens with its emphasis on grass roots democracy should help to maintain the party on the progressive end of the political spectrum. in the nsw greens grass roots democracy delivers enormous power to local greens groups whose members determine local preselection and preference decisions. all members can be involved in developing and determining policies (nsw greens 2009). conclusion in australia there has been little analysis of the relationship between progressive movements and political parties. this needs to be addressed, to better understand the dynamics and possibilities of the relationship. history clearly demonstrates the leading role that movements play in shifting the public agenda, and opening up the space for farreaching social and environmental reforms. clearly these advances can be more farreaching when progressive mps and political parties work in unison to develop campaigns and effect change. bibliography alexander, h. and griffiths, p. (eds) 2003, a few rough reds: stories of rank and file organising, australian society for the study of labor history, canberra cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 39 alinsky, s. 1971, rules for radicals: a pragmatic primer for realistic radicals, vintage, new york. altman, j. and hinkson, m. 2007, coercive reconciliation: stabilise, normalise, exit aboriginal australia, arena publications, melbourne. bobo, k. et al. 2001, organising for social change: midwest academy manual for activists, 3rd edition, seven locks press, santa ana, california. bronfenbrenner, k., friedman, s., hurd, r., oswald, r. and seeber, r. 1998, organising to win: new research on union strategies, cornell university press, ithaca. burgmann, v. 2004, profit, power and protest: australian social movements and globalisation, allen and unwin, sydney. dalton, r., recchia, s. and rohrschneider, r. 2003, the environment movement and the modes of political action, comparative political studies, vol.36, no.7, pp. 743771. dann, c. 2008, ‘experimental evolution down under: 30 years of green party development in australia and new zealand’, in frankland, e., lucardie, p. &rihoux, b. (eds) green parties in transition, ashgate, aldershot. doherty, b. 2002, ideas and actions in the green movement, routledge, london. doyle, t. 2001, green power: the environment movement in australia, unsw press, sydney. goodall, h. 1996, invasion to embassy: land in aboriginal politics in nsw, allen & unwin, sydney. goodwin, j. and jasper, j. (eds) 2003, the social movements reader: cases and concepts, blackwell: malden ma. hall, n. and taplin, r. 2007, ‘revolution or inch-by-inch? campaign approaches on climate change by environmental groups’, environmentalist vol.27, no.1, p. 95-107. kingston, m. 2003, ‘parliament greets bush: a day in the life of our faltering democracy’, sydney morning herald, 24 october. kovel, j. 2007, the enemy of nature: the end of capitalism or the end of the world, zed, london. lohrey, a. 2002, ‘groundswell: the rise of the greens’, quarterly essay 8, black inc., melbourne. maddison, s. & hamilton, c. (eds) 2006, silencing dissent, allen & unwin: sydney. madison, s. & scalmer, s. 2006, activist wisdom, unsw press, sydney. mckinlay, b. 1979a, australian labor history in documents: volume ii the labor party, collins dove, melbourne. mckinlay, b. 1979b, australian labor history in documents: volume iii the radical left, collins dove, melbourne. mcphillips, k. 2002, local heroes: australian crusades from the environmental frontline, pluto press, sydney. milne, c. 2008, ‘paying the polluter, propping up a failing industry’, media release, 16 april, senator christine milne, canberra. milner, d. 2009, reason in revolt: source documents of australian radicalism, www.reasoninrevolt.net.au, entry for o'shea, clarence 'clarrie' lyell (1906 1988), accessed 5 may 2009. müller-rommel, f. & poguntke, t. (eds) 2002, green parties in national governments, south end press, london. 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 http://www.reasoninrevolt.net.au/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 41 newman, m. 2006, teaching defiance: stories and strategies for activist educators, jossey-bass, san francisco. norman, j. 2004, bob brown gentle revolutionary, allen & unwin, sydney. nsw greens 2009, constitution, www.nsw.greens.org.au, accessed 5 may 2009. office for women 2009, women in australia 2009, department of families, housing, community services and indigenous affairs, canberra. panitch, l. 2007, renewing socialism: transforming democracy, strategy and imagination, merlin press, london. pearce, g. 2009, ‘quarry vision’, quarterly essay 33, black inc., melbourne. rose, c. 2005, how to win campaigns: 100 steps to success, earthscan, london. talshir, g. (2002) the political ideology of green parties: from the politics of nature to redefining the nature of politics, basingstoke: palgrave macmillan. tarrow, s. 1998, power in movement, cambridge university press, cambridge. the greens 1984, more good oil: draft election platform, the greens, sydney. turnbull, n. & vromen, a. 2006, ‘the australian greens: party organisation and political processes’ australian journal of politics and history, vol.52, no.3, pp. 455-470. vromen, a. & gauja, a. 2009, ‘protestors, parliamentarians, policy-makers: the experience of australian green mps’ journal of legislative studies vol.15, no.1, (forthcoming) west j. 1993, ‘goals, strategy and structure: how the environment movement organised for victory in the 1980s’, in marsh i. (ed.) the environmental challenge, longman, melbourne, pp. 135-156. windschuttle, e. 1980, women, class and history – feminist perspectives on australia 1788-1978, fontana books, melbourne. wwf-australia 2008, ‘wwf joins world's leading environment proponents in ccs call’, press release, 15 april, world wildlife fund for nature australia, sydney. http://www.nsw.greens.org.au/ http://www.amazon.com/political-ideology-green-parties-redefining/dp/0333919866/ref=sr_1_3?ie=utf8&s=books&qid=1239712634&sr=1-3 http://www.amazon.com/political-ideology-green-parties-redefining/dp/0333919866/ref=sr_1_3?ie=utf8&s=books&qid=1239712634&sr=1-3 introduction divisions between movements rights for women workers greens party – learning how to avoid the conservative trap conclusion 180 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the ‘your rights at work’ campaign: 2005-20071 sally mcmanus i was a union branch secretary for the whole of the ‘your rights at work’ campaign, from the dark days of 2004 and i still am now. i was involved in many of the debates that happened at the leadership level within the nsw union movement, and also as a union secretary implementing decisions with members and their communities. with any campaign it is important not to make generalisations and to say because this worked in the campaign, therefore it should be used as a template for other campaigns. that is a mistake the union movement sometimes makes and a mistake we all can make in our own struggles. the other danger is to look at campaigns in retrospect and to say it was a particular aspect that really won the day. of course, afterwards, and especially when a campaign is successful, you have all sorts of people that might have an interest in arguing a certain aspect was the key reason it was successful. for instance media companies saying it was the television advertising that did it. isolating one part in this way, and using it to explain the whole, is a mistake. i want to try and give you a broad perspective about what actually went on in the campaign, the decisions that the union movement took, what that involved, and draw from that some lessons. in the end i want to say two key things: firstly that it was a tried and true campaigning model. it was not anything new, not anything shiny, not anything made up by some brilliant leaders, by this generation of trade union leaders or by union members in general. it wasn’t some model that we got from another movement, it was a strategy that all successful movements have used and really it would be known to all of you. secondly, and in this context it’s important for us not to look for silver bullets. 1 this is an edited version of a keynote address given at the ‘beyond the neo-con men’ conference, 2008. it is not a refereed paper. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 181 new tactics what was new though, and what was special, were some of the tactics used throughout the campaign. they were new for us, for the trade union movement, and they were special because they were unique in the circumstances. but in the end, they are really just tactics. in terms of the overall strategy, what we ended up implementing was the same model you have seen for a lot of successful campaigns. so what was special in the yraw campaign? the first thing was the level of unity amongst the trade union movement. we have the advantage of being one of only a few trade union movements in the world to have just one peak body. many trade union movements are split between several peak bodies, split along religious or along political grounds, and that really hampers their ability to act as a united movement. and whilst there was unity, this did not happen through any stalinist enforcement or the force of personality of any particular leader. there were vigorous internal debates at every key point during the campaign. in the early days, for instance, we debated whether to campaign at all. there were debates about the levy imposed on all unions, which was used for television advertising and various other things. there was a significant debate about whether we should have television advertising at all, and you can imagine many of us were saying why should we give our money to kerry packer? there were debates about whether mass mobilisation was the right way to go or not. and of course, all the way up until election day there was an internal dialectic within our movement about what was the right strategy or the right tactic at that particular time. the strength of our movement was that once we made a decision, we all stuck to it. whether we were on one side of the debate or the other, once the decision was made, we were very disciplined about it. i think this particular strength was built on our history and we had some test runs during the howard years. the mua dispute, for example, was a test-run of building unity within our movement. i remember before that dispute right wing and left wing unions and activists didn’t speak to each other. the dispute, because it was so dramatic, then threw all of us together and a lot of those old tribal hatreds or misconceptions were broken down. that set the scene, enabling the unity that we had during the campaign. 182 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 the second thing that is special about the yraw campaign is that it was highly coordinated. it is a massive logistical exercise to run a campaign of its size over a threeyear period. just getting information out, for it to be simple, and for it to go right down to workplaces, was a big exercise in itself and of course we had central messaging throughout the campaign. that level of co-ordination was essential in the campaign’s success. thirdly, what was special was the resources that were mobilised throughout the campaign. even though union membership has been falling, we are still easily the largest social movement in the country and there are a lot of resources that we can bring to bear when we are co-ordinated and unified. within my union, for instance, we levied our members a dollar a week for the length of the campaign. the levy went to the australian council of trade unions (actu) and raised millions of dollars that was then spent on tv ads, campaigning material, setting up the infrastructure, setting up the information centres, hiring venues, all the things you need to run a campaign on the scale we needed to. also, in terms of resources, we had something important that our opponents didn’t have. and of course that was the people who we could mobilise. the final thing that i thought was special about this campaign, although it may not be very special in terms of campaigns in general, was a mixture of both top-down and bottom-up campaigning. i think that we really needed both. campaign techniques so what was new or unique in the yraw campaign? we had union meetings at key points throughout the campaign, and these were not just in the capital cities and were not only within unions. many of you were probably at campaign meetings that used a sky channel satellite broadcast. this idea of a simultaneous public broadcast to meetings across the country really came out of the nsw teachers’ federation, and the way they organised. these meetings were key in terms of getting a consistent message out, and building a sense of solidarity beyond the big cities, and beyond the union movement. for us to spend a lot of money on mass media was a big decision, as i mentioned before. those of us who were critical in the beginning had renounced our criticism cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 183 probably by mid-2006. the media experts said that the very first advertisement, the one that we call the ‘tracy’ ad, of the woman who’s been sacked with the two kids, was very powerful. in a way it became the defining image for us, right through the two years, and it became very hard for the federal government, for business with all their money and all their resources, to be able to compete with us on that level. also we had consistent branding throughout the campaign. to have a single slogan and recognisable campaign materials across the country, and consistently throughout the campaign timeline, was a new thing. another new aspect to the campaign was that we relied on focus groups and on a media company in terms of us shaping our message. we had a lot of arguments about this because of course union secretaries think they know exactly what people think and what their members think. the idea that we should get someone else to go and tell us was an affront to many people. but many of us realised that we needed to be a bit more sophisticated. that’s not to say that you just take whatever the media people say, but it’s useful information that can then inform your decisions. at those early focus groups, before work choices came out, they’d asked people a questions that states ‘if the government was going to bring in laws to abolish unfair dismissal, to destroy awards, what would you say about it’? and we, as paid trade union officials, were surprised that people were saying this is outrageous and that they were really angry. they said, ‘well, yes, it’s about rights, my rights have been taken off me and they’re worth fighting for’. i don’t think we would have got the bit about ‘worth fighting for’ back in 2005 as part of our slogan and part of our attitude towards the campaign if it hadn’t been for the focus groups. online campaigning, the yraw website, the online forums and email groups also worked very well for those who are at their computers every day and that was a new thing for us. we raised a lot of money through online fundraising, to get billboards up, to keep tv ads running, and just through direct online appeals. this is an approach we adopted from the dean campaign in the united states and from get up!, issues at stake the issue, obviously being the work choices laws, was everything. we really saw it as do or die. work choices was aimed at destroying the trade union movement and at 184 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 destroying for the rights of working families. for us, that was a huge motivating force and the issue in itself. not every campaign has that, not every campaign has an issue that’s felt so strongly and so widely, that it is able to unite people across the whole of the country and across a whole class. i don’t know if we would’ve been able to build consensus, and mobilise all of those resources and effort, if it wasn’t for the seriousness of the issue. it was the big motivating factor, and what i’m really saying about that is that you can’t just make these campaigns happen. people have got to feel strongly enough around the issue in order to cross the political boundaries, to take the risks, and do a lot of the things we ended up doing in the yraw campaign. defining the issue is obviously important in any campaign and for us, something that was also a bit new was the use of a rights-based campaign frame. we had to translate lots of technical changes that the government was making, 726 pages of legislation, into five clear messages. meaning, that work choices was going to take away unfair dismissal, it was going abolish awards, it was going to take away the independent umpire. we had to distil it into that, and ensure they were really clearly understood issues. we had to say them over and over again for three years. as i said before, understanding our audience was important and advice from outside was important in informing our decisions. the whole slogan about working families didn’t come from obama, and it didn’t come from the labor party, it came from the trade union movement in australia. we started talking in terms of working families back in 2005 because we knew from our research that that’s who we had to pitch our message to. we were quite cut-throat in saying well, we basically have to win back all those people who voted for howard in 1996. so we found out who they were, we knew what their demographics were, and we asked them about how they identified themselves. what we found is they identified themselves as working families, so that’s where that aspect of the campaign came from. the other important thing about defining the issue and campaigning around the issue, was making it real. work choices, in terms of the actual legislation, didn’t actually affect the majority of people for some time. of course it did in the sense of the general environment it created for bosses, but there were relatively few people on awas and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 185 most awards were only scheduled to be abolished half way through 2008. in lots of ways the worst aspects of work choices would only start kicking-in after the 2007 federal election. so, making it real in terms of showing the real-life examples of what we were talking about was critical, and that was to do with the rights framework. it was about government taking away your rights, rights you already had, and they were taking it off you. now, it doesn’t matter if you are a union member or not, no one likes to have their rights taken off them. a three-year campaign by about june 2005 we had a really clear strategy. it was quite simple in some ways. first, during 2005 we had to concentrate on educating members. then, in 2006, when work choices was being implemented, we had to defend people against it while continuing that education. in 2007 we had to win the election. in that period, at every union meeting i would go to i would explain to members about what the strategy was and discuss its elements. then people could see where they fitted and why attending a day of action was important, or why building-up union density in their workplaces was important to defend against what your employer might try to do. and why we were spending money on tv ads, or why we were doing certain things was seen within the framework of a clear strategy that people could believe in. in 2005 i went up to the northern rivers region of nsw to start talking to community workers about what was not even announced yet in terms of what the government was planning. we knew what was coming because howard had given a speech to the business council of australia where he announced they were going to take away unfair dismissal laws, and abolish awards. talking to community workers about the effect that was going to have on them, and why we needed to campaign against it, was really hard. no one believed us and people thought it just couldn’t be possible. it was like ploughing the ground in a drought, like a drought of 10 years, but over time it was getting traction. i look back now and think about those hundreds of meetings that union activists did, union organisers did, that delegates had done over those early stages, of educating people, and it was worth every single minute. throughout the campaign, the more people knew about the changes the more they hated them (surprise, surprise) so that was crucially important. 186 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 mass mobilisations were also very important in my view. they provided a real interim goal to organise around for union activists, a tangible thing that people could do in terms of showing opposition, and it gave activists a clear role in their workplaces or in their communities in terms of mobilising people. it built the sense of solidarity that we are in this together as a movement. that is something that you can’t put a price on. also it builds hope, because through that solidarity and seeing that there are all these other people who are mobilised on the issue, it creates a feeling that we can really change things. and it also really developed the activists that became the local ‘your rights at work’ groups. 2006 was a really hard year. it was very much a defensive year because work choices was in and we had to stop as many bosses as possible implementing it. we had that sense that if we could keep the bosses at bay they wouldn’t be able to do enough damage to make it undoable. we all knew about the new zealand experience and that almost overnight the tide had swept over the trade union movement, and that ground lost in terms of wages and conditions was hard to win back. so we had to create such a smell around work choices so that bosses would be afraid to implement the laws, and this meant we had to rally around any workers who had it imposed on them. we were looking for an iconic dispute, and we were expecting there would be something like patricks with the mua dispute, where a big employer would announce ‘we’re introducing awas and we’re going to sack our workforce’. what did we get instead? we got relatively small employers like the cowra meatworks and spotlight. by targeting these employers we educated of our members, and scared other employers. they thought, ‘well, i’ve got to add up the risks now, of starting to implement this. it may attract a national campaign and it may attract action in our communities. maybe we don’t want to be the first to do this, lets let some other people do it first.’ so that helped as well. then of course what we did when the laws affected real workers, we publicised it in a big way on the tv and in every meeting and in every possible way that we could. soon we had muddied the work choices brand, and employers were afraid to be seen to be embracing it. 2007 was our big year. we knew we were going to have a chance to get rid of the government, and start getting rid of work choices. we had to continue the same things we were doing the other two years. we still had to defend workers, but the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 187 closer it got to the election the less employers wanted to touch work choices. of course you had some employers introducing awas, but you didn’t have it in a wholesale way. so in a way the heavy lifting was already done, in my view, in the campaign in 2005, and the first half of 2006. both those two years made 2007 possible. grassroots mobilisation i wanted to talk a little bit about the bottom-up aspects of the campaign, as sometimes they get lost. most of the work in this campaign was done by grassroots activists in workplaces and in their communities talking to people and organising around the issue. most of the hard work was done at the workplace level, building union membership in workplaces, demanding that employers not implement work choices. there would have been thousands of union members that were doing that in their own workplaces. and the decisions about how they were going to organise were made by the workers themselves. the ‘your rights at work’ groups are a good example of this bottom-up organising. the first ‘your rights at work’ group, as far as i know, was set up in lismore in 2005 at the first day-of-action. really what happened was that a whole lot of people came together in the community, union delegates and union members from a whole range of workplaces. they sat there, i think it was in the lismore worker’s club, and watched the sky channel campaign broadcast. at the end of the meeting a few of the more experienced activists said ‘well let’s get everyone’s names’. all these people had lived and worked together in a small town, and were also union members, but didn’t know they had that in common. they may have worked in the nursery down the road, or they might have been a teacher, or they might have been a community worker. normally if they walked down the street, they wouldn’t have much in common, but this brought them together. a group of activists taking some leadership said ‘well, look, why don’t we meet, every few weeks, and start looking at what we can do in our town around this’. so that’s where it started and they called themselves the northern rivers unionists network, and that was long before they were being called ‘your rights at work’ groups. all-of-a-sudden there was a lot of activity in lismore. for the next day-of-action they organised towards it, they leafleted the place, they went and spoke at various 188 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 workplaces, they put in a lot of work, and on the 1st july 2005 thousands of people came. they had a very large turnout for a small place, and people started saying, ‘what’s going on in lismore?’ well really what had gone on was organising at a grass roots level amongst union activists. other unions started to think about this, and there were other towns where groups were set up. i think quite often it was teachers’ federation activists taking it on, because they were the more experienced union activists in some of the smaller towns. these all had started organically, doing a similar thing in their regions. so a decision was made to support these groups, and unions nsw started building membership lists, but it was only later that central resources or any central organising was put in place for what came to be called ‘your rights at work’ groups. from the beginning these groups were obviously cross-union, they were pretty much rank and file. it was only in 2007 that there was any full-time presence at all in terms of union officials in most of these places. they had limited formal structures and didn’t have position holders, anything like that. so the decisions they made then about how they were going to campaign were completely controlled by those activists in those towns and suburbs. the fantastic thing was that this produced very effective campaigns, because the decisions they made were based on their local circumstances. for example in the blue mountains there’s this thing called the winter magic festival, which is unique to the mountains. the local ‘your rights at work’ group decided that they were going to organise a contingent in it and they all dressed up, i don’t know as magicians and similar, and that went down very well in that particular community. if you tried to do that in penrith, or if you tried to do that in newtown, everyone would think you were an idiot. if you had some centralised ‘you must do it this way’ model, it just would not have worked. the same in lismore, they approached things much more around local markets and things that would already be happening around the place. groups launched letter-writing campaigns to the local media, they signed-up people to campaign against the local member, and launched actions to defend local workers affected by work choices. in other places, like in queanbeyan, the empower group there approached things in a different way because they knew their area and they could campaign well within it. in lindsay they approached things in a different way again. this was a particularly beautiful thing cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 189 about the campaign, the way that local union members controlled and innovated within the centralised messaging, using the top-down frames in a very, very effective way. in 2007, as the year went on, we got more and more focussed on marginal seats. we were convinced that we knew which sixteen seats had to change in order to bring down the government. we knew that we had to put everything we possibly could into winning those particular seats. so we did something new: pretty much all unions phoned all of our members in marginal seats. we called them three times during 2007. we spent a lot of time building relationships with people we identified as undecided voters, visiting them in their houses, talking to them about the importance of their vote and the importance of changing the government. that was something very new for us and it was something that took a lot of resources. empirically it probably didn’t matter in the end, and although that part of the campaign did add to the swing, in my view i think we’d won it by mid-2006 and those people had already changed their minds. the heavy lifting we did in those two years had really already shifted it. but if i had the time over again i’d still do exactly the same things, because you can’t leave anything to chance. there were ‘your rights at work’ full-time co-ordinators paid collectively by the union movement in those sixteen marginal seats across the county. they worked for a year, living and working in the electorate, resourcing the local ‘your rights at work’ group. the groups became very successful in these areas because they had the fulltime resources. then on election day, it was a big debate within the union movement, we decided to independently staff and resource all of the booths in seven marginal seats located in nsw. every single one of those booths was staffed. the alp couldn’t staff all their booths, but they didn’t want anything to do with us for the first four weeks of the six-week election campaign. i was saying to my organisers, ‘don’t worry, they’ll come begging’, and they did, about a week or two before the elections, when they realised they didn’t have the resources to staff the booths. so, for example, in places like grafton where every single booth last election was won by the national party, was packed with ‘your rights at work’ people and completely covered with ‘your rights at work’ material. national party people turned up at six o’clock and said ‘what’s going on, that’s our area, and that’s the 190 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 labor party’s area. we’ve had an arrangement here for the last 50 years you know.’ well, that arrangement was gone, and we were able to dominate things. in the end it probably didn’t matter because people had made up their mind by election day. it was more a demonstration of the depth of commitment and extent of the mobilisation. you had people that had never done a basic thing like hand-out on election day. if you look at the numbers of people that were involved, just ordinary working people who would never have done that it was enormous. so, to go back to what i said in the beginning, old campaigning is new campaigning. the activists of a generation before us learnt the same lessons that we learnt. there were new things for us though. we did take-on a new form of political campaigning in the marginal seats. what used to happen at election time in the trade union movement is that a month before the election some of us would give money, some of us would drag a few people out, maybe some of your most active members and your paid staff, and you’d hand-out at a polling booth and that would be it. so the 2007 election was quite different. the other, final thing to emphasise is that the bottom-up elements of the campaign were essential. it shouldn’t now be seen as just a media campaign, because it wasn’t. most of the hard work of the campaign was carried out by workers themselves in their communities, and the most innovative strategies and tactics and energy that went into the campaign also came from there. finally i want to finish with this, which i love, a picture of the ‘your rights at work’ march at the grafton jacaranda festival. all those people that you see are rank and file people from various unions. they each made up a placard about what type of work they did ‘i’m a timber worker, i’m a community worker, i’m a hospital worker’, all the way through the march. for them this was a really big step to go and march in a community festival, because it’s a very conservative place, grafton, with very little activist or union history. there was a big internal debate amongst those activists, and they decided they weren’t going to carry their individual union flags or anything like that; they were going to identify the jobs that they did in the community. and they got a fantastic reception, and they’ll probably do it again. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 191 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 111 perspectives on reconciliation and indigenous rights nina burridge abstract this paper provides an overview of discourses of the movement for national reconciliation prevailing within the australian socio-political context since the inception of the council for aboriginal reconciliation in 1991, to the national apology delivered by the prime minister kevin rudd on 13th february 2008. it provides an framework for the various discourses of reconciliation, by exploring and analysing the accrued meanings to such terms such as ‘genuine’, substantive or ‘true’ reconciliation; the howard’s government’s ‘practical reconciliation’ and the rudd government’s great attempt at ‘symbolic’ reconciliation in the national apology to indigenous australians. in the changing political context in australia today this paper revisits the debates on reconciliation, and endeavours to locate the movement solidly within a human rights framework that includes first nation rights. this requires an examination of the roots of the reconciliation movement including community attitudes to reconciliation and the nature of the peoples’ movement as well as the differing perspectives of policy makers, politicians and of course, indigenous peoples. it asks crucial questions about the progress of reconciliation and the type of reconciliation mainstream australians will accept. in truth therefore, was the ‘national apology’ a grand symbolic gesture by mainstream australia to maintain the status quo and divert our eyes from the more searching questions of the ‘unfinished business’ of ‘substantive’ reconciliation which encompasses first nations rights for indigenous peoples. introduction reconciliation is the contemporary name for the quest for justice for aboriginal people in australia within a policy based framework that extends to the early 20th century. as a policy, reconciliation has been generally supported by the majority of australians (newspoll, 2000; irving saulwick & associates 2000), yet its meaning, purpose and modes of implementation in the current context is often under contestation. this paper provides an overview of discourses of the movement for national reconciliation prevailing within the australian socio-political context since the inception of the council for aboriginal reconciliation in 1991 (herein the council or car), to the national apology delivered by the prime minister kevin rudd on 13th february 2008. it provides an framework for the various discourses of reconciliation, by exploring and analysing the accrued meanings to such terms such as ‘genuine’, substantive or ‘true’ reconciliation; the howard’s government’s ‘practical reconciliation’ and the rudd government’s great attempt at ‘symbolic’ reconciliation in the national apology to indigenous australians. the question that arises in many minds 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 – both indigenous and nonindigenous is “after sorry, what?” the national apology was a long awaited and necessary step on the path to genuine reconciliation. it wasn’t the end of that journey. it was a significant milestone, strong in its symbolism and pathos, timely in its delivery, yet insufficient to put to rest the unfinished business that for many aboriginal peoples constitutes substantive reconciliation. in the changing political context in australia today there is an opportunity to revisit the debates on reconciliation and perhaps reshape them to reflect new voices and understandings and to place the movement solidly within a human rights framework that includes first nation rights. this requires us to examine the roots of the reconciliation movement including community attitudes to reconciliation and the nature of the peoples’ movement as well as the differing perspectives of policy makers, politicians and of course, indigenous peoples. in examining the pertinent issues of the reconciliation movement the importance of a rights framework is clear from the start. issues such as the stolen generations, a national apology, just compensation for past injustices and indigenous people being able to determine their own futures, all point to this need for specific first nations rights that are embedded in national legislation. in september 2007 the united nations signed the declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (herein the declaration). australia, together with new zealand, canada and the united states were the four countries to oppose the signing of this declaration. the australian government has reversed this decision, but there are many unanswered questions regarding its genuine commitment to reconciliation. therefore, despite the apology, it appears that a rights based agenda is not central to the reconciliation debates today. hence questions arise as to the real purpose of the policy of reconciliation. is the policy of reconciliation and the notion of a ‘peoples movement’ that is a key feature no more than a normative discourse? a grand symbolic gesture by mainstream australia to maintain the status quo and divert our eyes from the more searching questions of the ‘unfinished business’ of ‘substantive’ reconciliation which encompasses the human rights agenda noted above. was the national apology merely a symbolic act – an ‘all care, but no responsibility’ type of an apology? these are some of the issues under discussion in this paper. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 113 from a treaty to reconciliation the call for a treaty between black and white australians was the priority long before the enactment of the policy of reconciliation. despite the efforts of the aboriginal treaty committee, formed in 1975 and aboriginal affairs strategists of the hawke labor government to popularise the idea of a treaty by 1988, political pragmatism won the day and any thoughts of a treaty were sidelined for more politically palatable terms such as a ‘compact’ or a ‘makarrata’ and finally, reconciliation. political imperatives in mineral rich states such as west australia affirmed the legal inability to fulfil the call for a treaty in the lead-up to the bicentenary. there was a parallel attempt by the national aboriginal conference (nac), an aboriginal advisory body to the federal government, to gain support for the idea of a ‘makarrata’ – a less politically volatile word than treaty. ‘makarrata’ is a term used in arnhem land to signify the end of a dispute between communities and the resumption of normal relations (nettheim 2001). in june 1988 prime minister hawke reaffirmed a commitment to a “treaty or compact”, adding that the term was less important than the sentiment, (hawke 1988, p. 4) when he accepted the barunga statement painted by the people of north-eastern arnhem land. in his speech he emphasised the need for extensive consultation with aboriginal people in working towards “a sense of reconciliation” (burridge 1999, p. 5). the treaty idea receded and reconciliation became the acceptable alternative in government circles. the need for a commitment to action and greater direction in indigenous issues came from commissioner elliott johnston’s report of the royal commission into aboriginal deaths in custody (1991). the shocking revelations of this royal commission report into the number of aboriginal people who had died in custody in the 1980s and the circumstances of their lives which have led them to be in prison cells, provided the backdrop to the introduction of the policy into the federal parliament and the creation of the council for aboriginal reconciliation. the report devoted a chapter to the need for a reconciliation policy and made the following recommendation. 114 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 recommendation 339: that all political leaders and their parties recognise that reconciliation between the aboriginal and non aboriginal communities in australia must be achieved if community division, discord and injustice to aboriginal people are to be avoided. to this end the commission recommends that political leaders use their best endeavours to ensure bipartisan public support for the process of reconciliation and that the urgency and necessity of the process be acknowledged (johnston 1991). there was a positive air of cooperation in parliament when robert tickner, then minister for aboriginal affairs, in his speech introducing the council for aboriginal reconciliation bill, in 1991, spoke of “the building of bridges of understanding between aboriginal and non aboriginal australians”. in the parliamentary debates on the bill both liberal and labor members noted the urgency of a better future for indigenous australians and of the aspiration that the council would provide the leadership “so that the whole community might take a fresh look at itself, its history and its hope for the future”, (michael wooldridge, the shadow minister for aboriginal affairs). he added: “it is my sincere hope that this…bill that has been a product of government and opposition cooperation -and, dare i say it bipartisanshipwill turn out to give us the win we need in aboriginal affairs (wooldridge 1991, cited in hansard, p. 4827). the debates for reconciliation were substantially enhanced by paul keating’s speech in december 1992 at the launch of the united nations year of indigenous people. in what has been termed as the most significant speech ever made by an australian prime minister on indigenous issues, mr keating spoke of the need for recognition: recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing…we brought the diseases and the alcohol. we committed the murders. we took the children from their mothers. we practised discrimination and exclusion. it was our ignorance and our prejudice – and our failure to imagine these things being done to us (keating, cited in meade, smh, 11 december 1992, p. 1). in making such a speech keating gave further strength to the government’s position on reconciliation. further, in claiming the june 1992 high court ‘mabo’ decision on native title as “an historic turning point, the basis of a new relationship between indigenous and non indigenous australians” (p. 1), he signalled that there was a real connection between land rights and reconciliation. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 115 the creation of the council for aboriginal reconciliation was supported by all sides of politics and by many in the wider community. the expectation was that in ten years the nation would be able to reach real resolutions of many of the issues affecting indigenous australians. it was unclear however, in these early days, the extent to which an indigenous right framework was part of the process of reconciliation. defining reconciliation in the official context, aboriginal reconciliation emerged as a policy endorsed by federal and state parliaments, bipartisan in nature, following on from previous policies such as assimilation, integration, and self-determination. it may also be seen as an attempt at a populist movement emerging from the work of the council for aboriginal reconciliation (car), formed in 1991 to support the new policy, that is, populist in the sense that the work the council was designed to reach the everyday australian citizen to educate them about the meanings of reconciliation. the dynamics of the discourses of reconciliation illustrate the multitude of meanings and interpretations accrued to the term. the representations and agendas vary according to prevailing political ideology as well as individual belief. the council’s research illustrated that, on the whole, indigenous australians were more united in what reconciliation meant than the mainstream community (newspoll 2000, irving saulwick and assoc 2000). politicians, policy makers, church groups, political lobbyists, the media and academics and many ordinary citizens have had different perspectives on what constitutes reconciliation. terms such as ‘practical’ reconciliation; ‘symbolic’ reconciliation; ‘genuine’ reconciliation; ‘true’ reconciliation; ‘substantive’ reconciliation; ‘soft’ reconciliation and ‘hard’ reconciliation were and are used to help in defining the term. many of the contestations related to the extent of support for the rights based ‘hard/substantive’ issues of reconciliation as opposed to the ‘soft’, more symbolic type of reconciliation. this framework represents the varying views on reconciliation: 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 fig: 1 reconciliation typologies rights based symbolic assimilationist substantive genuine symbolic rhetorical normative practical or ‘true’ • ‘treaty’/sovereignty • ceremonies • standard health • compensation • marches • housing • land/sea rights • gatherings, celebrations • education • first nations people • aspirational • all one nation ‘hard’, ‘genuine’, ‘true’, or ‘substantive’ reconciliation refers to the call by many indigenous leaders for a rights based reconciliation that recognises the unique rights indigenous people possess that have to do with native title, customary law, the right to just compensation for past acts of dispossession, the right to self determination and a ‘treaty’ between indigenous and non-indigenous australians. these are the rights framed in the un declaration of the rights of indigenous peoples. ‘symbolic’ reconciliation is the most popular amongst mainstream australians. the symbols of reconciliation are seen as non-adversarial. at times symbolic acts maybe interpreted as superficial or tokenistic, though they are also seen as essential elements of the journey to a more substantive reconciliation. the rhetoric of reconciliation refers to all the political speeches and policies, the exaggerated claims and the heightened aspirations, which are not followed up by authentic actions. at the more conservative end of the reconciliation spectrum is found former prime minister howard’s ‘practical’ reconciliation – referring to the programs and strategies designed to correct the level of social and economic disadvantage in health, housing and education faced by indigenous communities throughout the nation. to the more conservative elements in mainstream australia, reconciliation is about equality and assimilation rather than aboriginal peoples possessing distinct political cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 117 and cultural rights (johns and brunton 1999). in this mode reconciliation affirms the status quo and is seen as a normative discourse (pratt, elder and ellis 2000). the aspiration is to see aboriginal people adopt mainstream cultural values and lifestyles. this focus is seen as part of an assimilationist agenda which does not allow for the rights of indigenous peoples to be recognised. the words of professor mick dodson responding to prime minister howard’s speech espousing practical reconciliation, at corroboree 2000 are telling: …. don’t be distracted by notions of practical reconciliation, because they mean practically nothing. now although issues of health, housing and education of indigenous australians are of course of key concern to us as a nation, they are not issues that are at the very heart or the very soul of reconciliation. but they are, to put it quite simply and plainly, the entitlements every australian should enjoy… reconciliation is about deeper things, to do with nation, soul and spirit. reconciliation is about the blood and flesh of the lives we must lead together, and not the nuts and bolts of the entitlements as citizens we should enjoy (dodson, m., 27 may 2000). these comments emphasise the importance of the symbolic elements of reconciliation as much as the need to address the disadvantages indigenous peoples face which should be addressed as part of any nation’s regime of dealing with marginalised peoples. the varying interpretations of meanings of reconciliation were evident in the sydney bridge walk may 2000 when well over 250,000 people walked across the harbour bridge as many thousands of others did in cities throughout australia. it was hailed as a great triumph for reconciliation. capitalising on the huge crowd, many aboriginal leaders saw the walk as a mandate for a treaty. interestingly, the mainstream media saw it differently, as a subsequent editorial in the australian stated: 'atsic chairman geoff clarke used the sydney harbour walk to claim a mandate for a treaty. he was wrong. people walked for reconciliation' (the australian, 8 december 2000, p. 12). to many, walking for reconciliation was different from walking for a treaty. similarly, when cathy freeman lit the olympic flame and won the 400 metres final at the sydney 118 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 olympic games in september 2000, it was a ‘triumph’ for reconciliation. anne summers claimed in the sydney morning herald that the choice of cathy freeman to light the olympic cauldron 'redefined australia to the rest of the world' (summers 2000, p. 12). herein lies the deep paradox of reconciliation. if reconciliation is not about a treaty – with all of its concomitant repercussions (compensation, social justice, a charter of rights, land rights and self determination) – then can it be called substantive or authentic? in essence, mainstream australia must ask the question, is reconciliation to be merely symbolic expression of nationhood or are there more complex realities we must face as a nation before we are truly reconciled? reconciliation and indigenous rights there were contestations even in the early days of the reconciliation movement as to what it could achieve as can be seen from the following: “[many aborigines] do not want to dismiss reconciliation entirely in case it works, but…fear it will become a gigantic talk-fest delaying still further national land rights, compensation for land lost and other aboriginal aspirations”(jopson, as cited in kelly 1993, p. 10). the aboriginal provisional government, a body created in 1990 by aboriginal activists such as michael mansell, had no illusions that reconciliation would deny a rights based agenda. “the apg believes that the whole reconciliation process is vague and meaningless and simply a waste of taxpayers’ money… [it] sees that the promotion of reconciliation will simply be holding back moves toward real selfdetermination” (kelly 1993, p. 12 ). further evidence of the disparity between indigenous and non-indigenous perspectives on reconciliation came from focus group research conducted with aboriginal and torres strait islander people by irving saulwick and associates in may 2000. according to the research findings: [aboriginal people] are profoundly cynical about government and about most people in high places. many are also cynical about the reconciliation process. they say that they cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 119 have heard it all before, and yet their lives or their prospects have not significantly been improved (irving saulwick & associates 2000, p. 8). this cynicism is again illustrated by several other comments made in research conducted by burridge and cited in other papers, that some aboriginal people saw reconciliation as “a hoax” and a lot of “false pretences” (burridge 2003, p.69). another unrelated example serves to illustrate the disillusionment with what a conservative government would achieve on reconciliation: aboriginal people are still forced to hold much of their contact history with white people locked away inside of themselves. the best parallel which describes that hidden history is to say it that it has been trapped like a bunch of angry hornets inside a pandora’s box. there is a big lock on the outside of this box that white people have slapped a label on called ‘reconciliation’. (wright 1997, p. x) in these quotes there is a feeling of frustration and resentment that reconciliation is really in the hands of white governments and bureaucracies which promise much but fail to deliver on the rights based issues: if reconciliation [means] … we’ve dispossessed all of us of our land and our sacred areas, our sacred sites and teaching aboriginal kids to don’t listen to that and continue on listening to the white man and accept his bright idea of role models, ambassadors, white education and leave behind all what that child has inherited from his whole way of life. now, if that’s the case then reconciliation there’s no room for me in there (burridge 2003, p.70). in the eyes of these indigenous activists, reconciliation may work to silence the more strident indigenous voices. gary foley, a veteran of the 1972 aboriginal tent embassy, cast doubt on the effectiveness of the council’s work: the council has produced vast quantities of propaganda promoting its message, but virtually none of these videos, newsletters and other media productions were produced by indigenous people….this means that the greater part of the annual budget of car…ends up in the pay packets and pockets of non-indigenous people…..just another branch of the aboriginal industry with white people, as usual, gaining most of the tangible benefits (foley 1999, p. 4). the movement to recognise the unique status of indigenous peoples and their rights as prior owners, not just custodians, is an international one. it forms the very basis of all other negotiations between first nations peoples and colonisers. reconciliation, in this 120 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 context, depends on proper recognition of the status of aboriginal peoples either in terms of a treaty, constitutional changes, a bill of rights – these are universally accepted concepts applied in most countries where indigenous populations exist. australia does not have such a bill of rights (tully 1997, p. 5). former aboriginal senator aden ridgeway in a speech to the united nations human rights commission in geneva in 2001 noted the importance of a rights based framework for reconciliation rather than mere rhetoric: ‘… when it comes to the harder issues associated with recognising and giving effect to the broader and fundamental implications of reconciliation, only a minority of australians are prepared to countenance real equality….in other words, non indigenous australians are keen to embrace the rhetoric of reconciliation, so long as it doesn’t require them to take effective action to share the country’s abundant resources and political power. most are not prepared to make any significant adjustments in how they live their lives, or how they see their future’ (ridgeway 2001, p. 2). the long campaign to have these rights recognised by the united nations achieved success in september 2007. one hundred and forty four nations signed the declaration. australia was one of the four dissenting nations while eleven abstained. les malezer, the chairperson of the indigenous peoples caucus that had been campaigning for the declaration noted: the declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples …. affirms many rights already contained in international human rights treaties, but rights which have been denied to the indigenous peoples. as indigenous peoples we now see a guarantee that our rights to self determination, to our lands and territories, to our cultural identities, to our own representation and to our values and beliefs will be respected at the international level. the declaration is a framework for states to link and integrate with the indigenous peoples, to initiate new and positive relations but this time without exclusion, without discrimination and without exploitation. they are rights which are seen by indigenous peoples as essential to our successful survival, dignity and well-being, and to maintain our strong cultural and spiritual relationship with mother earth and nature (malezer, 13 sept., 2007 http://www.iwgia.org/sw248.asp ). http://www.iwgia.org/sw248.asp� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 121 australian lawyers and human rights activists are strong advocates of the declaration and urged the australian government to reverse the previous government’s action and sign the declaration as canada has now done. the human rights law resource centre (hrlrc) and the indigenous law centre (ilc) lobbied the prime minister, kevin rudd in may 2008 in a letter endorsed by over 100 organisations throughout australia. the letter stated in part: a human rights framework, as envisaged by the declaration, will serve as an invaluable guide to the development of appropriately adapted policies for indigenous communities. importantly, it will promote the participation and engagement of indigenous peoples in the political process and in matters which directly affect them. a human rights framework, as envisaged by the declaration, will serve as an invaluable guide to the development of appropriately adapted policies for indigenous communities. importantly, it will promote the participation and engagement of indigenous peoples in the political process and in matters which directly affect them. australia must join the consensus of the international community on the fundamental freedoms and human rights of indigenous peoples…… the hrlrc and ilc consider that the previous australian government's opposition to the declaration was based on a number of ill-conceived perceptions about the declaration. this view is shared by the human rights and equal opportunity commission, which considers that the previous australian government's reasoning for opposing the declaration has no sound base and does not interpret the declaration consistently with international law. (hrlrc and ilc,2008). on 3rd of april, 2009 jenny macklin, the minister for indigenous affairs declared the federal government’s support for the declaration noting that “the declaration gives us new impetus to work together in trust and good faith to advance human rights and close the gap between indigenous and non indigenous australians.” (macklin 2009). community perceptions and a people’s movement for reconciliation? from its inception the council understood the important role of communities at the grassroots level in the reconciliation process. in the words of patrick dodson: while i've spoken of reconciliation in national and sectoral terms, it's important not to lose sight of the fact that reconciliation is basically a grassroots process. it's about people living and working together, and solving problems in local communities. the council has heard many stories about 122 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 people working together to improve community relations (dodson, p, 1992, p. 3). the council conducted social research into community attitudes and awareness of reconciliation as a baseline for raising awareness of the need for reconciliation amongst mainstream australia. in the build up to the reconciliation convention in may 1997, the council launched its renewal of the nation strategy to empower local communities to set up reconciliation networks. over 100 meetings, involving more than 10,000 people took place all around the country in the year prior to the convention (car 1997b). a resource package was distributed to help facilitate the meetings. the aim was to discuss ways of advancing reconciliation in the local community. national surveys were conducted on what reconciliation meant to ordinary australians. however, the election of the howard liberal government in 1996 changed the political landscape. the ascent of pauline hanson to federal parliament and the creation of the one nation party added a divisive element to the federal scene and debates on reconciliation became much more adversarial (hanson 1996; burridge 1999; gomersall, davidson, and ho 2000; huggins, 2002). prime minister howard’s refusal to say sorry for past injustices at the national reconciliation convention in may 1997; the passions aroused by the high court wik native title decision in 1998 that gave aboriginal people native title over leasehold land, and the federal government’s attempt to negate that decision through the 10 point wik plan, resulted in a further polarisation of views. the passions aroused on both sides of the debates render reconciliation as an ‘instrument of struggle’ – much like the south african struggle for justice. in this context the people’s movement was important in mobilising local groups to maintain the struggle for reconciliation at the grass roots level at a time when both political parties began to temper their policies to accommodate the growing negative sentiment in the community on indigenous policy. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 123 from the research it was apparent that even though the council did make people more aware of reconciliation, there was some ambivalence to it amongst ordinary australians. in the words of a 1996 report prepared for the council for aboriginal reconciliation by sweeney and associates, unfinished business. “the concept of reconciliation throws out a challenge to the wider community. it evokes both hopes and fears” (p. 3). hope in that “spontaneous reactions to reconciliation ... generally result in a positive interpretation, encapsulated in words like: recognition, acknowledgment (prior occupation, loss); co-existence; harmony; unity (not perpetuating ‘them and us’); acceptance: sharing (of both cultures); consultation (between all parties) (p. 3). fears because “for some, support for reconciliation may not always be based on goodwill but fears about a society becoming degraded by divisions and hatred” (sweeney & associates 1996, p. 3). this idea of fear can work as a barrier to reconciliation. indeed the report lists fear, apathy and ignorance as the barriers to reconciliation (p. 4). “i live in a suburban area, there isn’t any need for reconciliation because everyone minds their own business” (car, undated, p. 53). these views are affirmed by two other polls conducted for car in 2000. the first by newspoll noted concerns about a rights based agenda (newspoll, 2000) and the second reinforced the lack of awareness: the abstract idea of reconciliation is widely supported. however once people look at the subject in depth their reaction is a mixture of hope, hostility, confusion and boredom (irving saulwick & associates, 2000, pp. 18). the people’s movement for reconciliation reached its peak in may 2000 with the march across the harbour bridge in sydney and with smaller, but still significant marches in other capital cities and towns throughout australia. although the activities of the reconciliation networks have been less widespread since 2000, the people's movement can be seen as the most successful aspect of the reconciliation process and the most durable as it still operates with the assistance of the state-based reconciliation committees and reconciliation australia, the body that replace the council for aboriginal reconciliation in 2001. the nsw reconciliation 124 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 council is one example of a state government funded body that is continuing to support local reconciliation activities. it is affiliated with over 100 groups throughout nsw from inner sydney city groups to suburban networks to regional networks located as far west as broken hill, to the north at coffs harbour and tweed and to the south at albury and bega. their continued involvement in the reconciliation process is evidenced by the flurry of activity amongst local reconciliation groups after the announcement that the new prime minister. kevin rudd, was to say sorry at the opening of the new parliament in february 2008. many communities organised local events and commemorations for the historic national apology. there is some doubt however, whether their activities are sufficient to convince governments to support a rights based platform for reconciliation. reconciliation, rights and the future the journey towards a resolution of non-aboriginal australia’s troubled relationship with its indigenous peoples and their rights has been convoluted and complex. after many years of neglect the process of reconciling black and white australians has been placed firmly on the federal government’s agenda after the national apology of february, 2008. however, the process still remains the ‘unfinished business’ of the australian social and political landscape and while much has been made of the symbolic gesture of a national apology, the test will come in how governments, and communities at all levels, address the level of disadvantage faced by many indigenous australians. for an example which pinpoints the complexities involved in addressing indigenous disadvantage one needs to look no further than the howard federal government’s intervention in the northern territory in june 2007, in response to the little children are sacred (anderson and wild 2007) report on the high levels of child sexual abuse in remote indigenous communities. the methods employed in this landmark action again polarised black and white australians. aboriginal supporters of the government’s actions such as dr sue gordon, head of the australian government's national indigenous council (that replaced atsic in 2004), and noel pearson from cape york emphasized the need for emergency actions. those who opposed the intervention highlighted the government’s lack of consultation with aboriginal leaders, the removal of the permit system which restricts entry to aboriginal lands and the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 125 suspension of the nation’s anti-discrimination laws in order to carry out their actions. suspicion at the motives behind the intervention occurred because of the lack of trust of government authorities – particularly in the howard government years and their intentions. how future governments consult and incorporate indigenous stakeholders into the decision making processes that impact on local communities will be a testing point for the success of reconciliation in the future. the current federal government’s continued support for the intervention has cast doubt as to how genuine it may be in its efforts to consult with and incorporate local indigenous perspectives in addressing the serious issues which face remote indigenous communities. a national apology as a symbolic action for reconciliation, the national apology to australia’s aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples was an event that captured the nation’s imagination at the opening of the 42nd parliament in canberra on 13th february 2008. members of the stolen generations were invited to the nation’s capital to witness the event. screens were erected outside the parliament to accommodate the thousands of people who gathered to watch the proceedings. these gatherings of likeminded indigenous and nonindigenous australians occurred in many communities throughout the nation. they took place in schools, parks, local government halls, lecture rooms and even corporate boardrooms. the apology had cross-party support from the parliament although five members of the liberal-national opposition absented themselves from the chamber. the prime minister’s words emphasised the hurt and sorrow of past policies: we apologise for the laws and policies of successive parliaments and governments that have inflicted profound grief, suffering and loss on these our fellow australians. we apologise especially for the removal of aboriginal and torres strait islander children from their families, their communities and their country. for the pain, suffering and hurt of these stolen generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry. to the mothers and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of families and communities, we say sorry. and for the indignity and degradation thus inflicted on a proud people and a proud culture, we say sorry. we the parliament of australia respectfully request that this apology be received in the spirit in which it is offered as part of the healing of the nation. 126 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 for the future we take heart; resolving that this new page in the history of our great continent can now be written. we today take this first step by acknowledging the past and laying claim to a future that embraces all australians. (rudd 2008) the apology resonated with renewed spirit of unity amongst many australians. while some disagreed and aired their disapproval on talkback radio, the majority of people agreed that it was a positive action. in reality however, the years following the national apology will be crucial in the reconciliation process. what many aboriginal and torres strait islander people call the ‘unfinished business’ of reconciliation, those rights based issues of treaty, compensation, self determination and first nations rights, still remain at the crux of dispute about what constitutes reconciliation. whether this ‘unfinished business’ is incorporated into the national discourse of reconciliation will depend on good leadership and active campaigns to educate the nation that indigenous australians deserve full recognition within our rights framework and that this will benefit our sense of nationhood, both symbolically and in real terms. references anderson, p. & wild, a. 2007, ampe akelyernemane meke mekarle ‘little children are sacred’, report of the board of inquiry into the protection of aboriginal children from sexual abuse, http://www.inquirysaac.nt.gov.au/ pdf/bipacsa_final_report.pdf the australian, 2000, editorial bridge across the great divide, december 8, p. 12. australian reconciliation convention 1997, indigenous peoples and the constitution. issues papers. canberra, australian government publishing service. burridge, n. 1999, ‘teaching for reconciliation’ in craven, r .teaching aboriginal studies, st leonards: allen & unwin. burridge, n. 2003, achieving reconciliation in nsw schools. unpublished phd thesis, macquarie university council for aboriginal reconciliation 1995, going forward – social justice for the first australians, available: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indig.res/ car/pubs/html#reports council for aboriginal reconciliation 1997a, proceedings from the australian reconciliation convention, may 26–28, 1997, books 1-5, canberra, commonwealth of australia. http://www.inquirysaac.nt.gov.au/%20pdf/bipacsa_final_report.pdf� http://www.inquirysaac.nt.gov.au/%20pdf/bipacsa_final_report.pdf� http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indig.res/%20car/pubs/html#reports� http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indig.res/%20car/pubs/html#reports� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 127 council for aboriginal reconciliation 1997b, the path to reconciliation building a people’s movement, nsw regional meetings summary, march 4-27. council for aboriginal reconciliation 2000, road map for reconciliation, available: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indiglres/ car/2000/10/index.htm . council for aboriginal reconciliation (no date), australian reconciliation study circle kit, canberra, australian government publishing service. dodson, m. 2000, speech delivered at corroborree 2000 conference, sydney, australia, may 27. available: www.austlii.edu.au dodson, p. 1997, proceedings of the australian reconciliation convention, vol.1. council for aboriginal reconciliation. commonwealth of australia. foley, g. 1999, reconciliation: fact or fiction, available: http://www.kooriweb.org/ foley/essay/essay_6html gomersall, a. m., davidson, g, & ho, r. 2000, ‘factors affecting acceptance of aboriginal reconciliation amongst non-indigenous australians’, australian psychologist, vol.35, no.2, pp. 118-127. hanson, p. 1996, maiden speech to the house of representatives, september 10. available: http://www.onenation.com.au hawke, r. a. 1988, ‘time for reconciliation’ in baker, i. a., ‘treaty with aborigines’, institute of public affairs, policy issues, vol.7, pp. 4-5. huggins, j. 2002, working the walk: activating reconciliation, armidale, nsw, university of new england. human rights law resources centre and indigenous law centre 2008, letter to the prime minister, url: http://www.ilc.unsw.edu.au/ retrieved 3 august 08. irving saulwick & associates (2000). ‘research into issues related to a document of reconciliation’. council for aboriginal reconciliation, reports no. 1 & no. 2. indigenous qualitative research. council for aboriginal reconciliation. johns, g. & brunton, r. 1999, ‘reconciliation what does it mean?’ institute of public affairs backgrounder, vol.11, no.4. johnston, e. 1991, the royal commission into aboriginal deaths in custody, url: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indiglres/rciadic/national/vol5/4.html#heading4. accessed 2 aug 2009. keating, p. 1992, ‘redfern park speech’, reprinted in indigenous law bulletin, august-september 2001, vol.5 no.11. kelly, l. 1993, ‘reconciliation and the implications for a sovereign aboriginal nation’, aboriginal law bulletin, vol.3, no.61, p. 10. malezer, l. 2007, indigenous peoples caucus url://www.iwgia.org/sw248.asp accessed 30 july 2008. macklin, j. 2009, statement on the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, 3 april, canberra. url: http://www.jennymacklin.fahcsia. gov.au/internet/jennymacklin.nsf/content/un_declaration_03apr09.htm nettheim, g. 2001, ‘reconciliation, challenges for australian law’, australian journal of human rights, vol.7, no.1, pp. 47-76. accessed 5 august 2009. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indiglres/%20car/2000/10/index.htm� http://www.austlii.edu.au/� http://www.kooriweb.org/%20foley/essay/essay_6html� http://www.kooriweb.org/%20foley/essay/essay_6html� http://www.onenation.com.au/� http://www.ilc.unsw.edu.au/� http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indiglres/rciadic/national/vol5/4.html#heading4� 128 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.2, 2009 newspoll market research 2000, quantitative research into issues relating to a document of reconciliation, council for aboriginal reconciliation. available: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indiglres/car/2000/3/ pratt, a., elder, c., & ellis, c. 2001, ‘reconciliation: origins, policy, practice, representations, meanings, futures’, in m. kalantzis & w. cope, (eds), reconciliation multiculturalism identities difficult dialogues, sensible solutions, altona, common ground printing, pp. 135-147. ridgeway, a. 2001, speech to united nations human rights commission in geneva, switzerland, march 26. available : http://www.nsw.democrats.org rudd, k. 2008, apology to australia's indigenous people http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/kevin-rudds-sorry-speech/2008/ ) summers, a. 2000, ‘an olympic icon signals australia’s awakening’ sydney morning herald, september 28, p. 18. sweeney, b. & associates 1996, unfinished business: australians and reconciliation, council for aboriginal reconciliation, australian government publishing service, canberra. tickner, r. (1991). council for aboriginal reconciliation bill, second reading speech. commonwealth government printer. tully, j. 1997, a fair and just relationship between aboriginal and non aboriginal peoples. paper delivered to the institute for humanities and social sciences, university of sydney, australia, september 1. wooldridge, m. 1991, commonwealth parliamentary debates, weekly hansard no. 11, june 5, p. 4827. wright, a. 1997, grog war, broome, magabala books. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indiglres/car/2000/3/� http://www.nsw.democrats.org/� http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/kevin-rudds-sorry-speech/2008/� rights based symbolic assimilationist cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 i issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia editorial welcome welcome to the third volume and year of the publication of cosmopolitan civil societies): an interdisciplinary e-journal. the journal is produced out of the uts cosmopolitan civil societies research centre (ccs), established in 2007 with a cross faculty, interdisciplinary, social science focus that is empirically informed and policy oriented. the research focus of ccs stresses community engagement, and values both scholarly and societal impact. ccs foregrounds civil society, both through and beyond its relationships with economy and the state. it specifically frames its research orientation within a sense of a globalising, increasingly cosmopolitan world, recognizing the penetration of those processes in the local world. it foregrounds a particular recognition of cultural diversity, emphasizing both indigenous and immigrant communities; it carries a broad commitment to issues of equality, including gender and disability dimensions, and it is concerned to explicate the interpenetration of human and environmental sustainability. this issue of the journal presents papers that reflect the broad range of interdisciplinary interest of this journal. interrogating the notion of identities and diversity from multiple, dynamic, perspectives is central to the cosmopolitan research project, as is the notion of agency. all the papers in this volume make contributions to this debate. john rule draws on his research into the changing nature of inner city community development work to reflect on the professional identity of the community worker that emerged in the 1970s and is linked to other emergent identities the resident activist, social activist and community activist. he argues that it is still possible to identify areas for productive engagement and development in community development and community building in inner city environments through what he calls practising place. louise katz also looks at the issue of identity via the narratives of popular culture that resonate in the imagination to inform the ways in which we understand and interpret the world. the identity of an entire people, she argues, can be rendered down so that those social groups come to seem more spectral than human, through either misrecognition or a lack of acknowledgment. to support this argument katz investigates traditional anti-semitism, in which the jew is viewed as a vampiristic agent of decay, and the way in which the arab presence becomes ‘spectralised’ in contemporary israel/palestine. her argument is that it is through imagination and storytelling that we continually create and recreate the realities we must then inhabit. paul spoonley and carina meares make an important contribution on the urban spatial aspects of the super-diversity that emerges from large scale immigrant business development in their article on ethnic precincts in auckland, new zealand’s key gateway immigrant city. their article looks at the ethnic identity of place and the politics underlying it. focussing on the impact of immigrant entrepreneurs in transformation of the cityscape auckland, spoonley and meares explore the way that neo-liberalism and laissez-faire attitudes constrain attempts ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 to develop, brand and market certain areas of immigrant entrepreneur concentration in the city as ethnic precincts. unlike the australian experience of ethnic precincts, reported in the first issue of this journal, there is an unwillingness of central and local government to brand spaces and places of immigrant business concentration with the ethnic iconography and identity of specific immigrant groups. at the same time, ethnic community networks fight for influence and recognition in auckland, one of the world’s most cosmopolitan cities. the remainder of the papers in this issue concentrate on different aspects of the politics of the ethnic chinese presence and issues related to their agency, diversity and identity in australian society. significant flows of chinese immigration to australia dated from the 1850s and continued strongly in the second half of the nineteenth century. the white australian policy, bedrock of australian federation, not only constrained new inflows of chinese immigrants but also made life very difficult for those chinese immigrants resident in australia. it was not until the white australia policy was formally and finally abolished by the whitlam labor government that large scale chinese immigration could resume. in recent decades an emphasis on skilled and business migration has seen the arrival of large numbers of highly educated young chinese and older entrepreneurs. andrew jakubowicz reviews the history of “the chinese” as australia’s other and explores the complex and multiple layers of engagement of the chinese in the australian political system. interrogating the meaning(s) of “the chinese”, jakubowicz looks at many dimensions of chinese politics in australia, including their involvement in a wide range of political parties. he argues that a critical understanding of chinese politics in australia helps us understand the challenges of a globalised post-multicultural politics. the point of departure of jen tsen kwok’s article is the ethnic, socio-economic and political diversity of the contemporary urban chinese immigrant population in australia, who demonstrate patterns of spatial and economic concentration in australian cities. the social dynamics of the chinese community in these areas of concentration are continuously refashioned by new arrivals increasing the diversity of the australian chinese immigrant community that stands in sharp contradistinction with homogenous, racialised constructions of chineseness. utilising the theoretical frame of urban regime theory, kwok explores the politics of chinese australian community groups and associations in brisbane, demonstrating how transnational political tensions highlight the diversity and potential fragility of diasporic interdependence within ethnic chinese communities feng chongyi is also interested in chinese community politics in australia and takes as a point of departure the diversity of the political values, attitudes or beliefs of the chinese communities in australia. he argues that there is no such a thing as inherent “cultural values” or “national values” that differentiate ‘the chinese” politically from the mainstream australian society. he concludes that there is a growing trend among chinese migrants, old and new, to be voluntarily involved in a political resocialisation after settling in australia whereby previous illiberal values are transformed to universal values conducive to multicultural democracy. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 iii jia gao looks at chinese politics in australia through the prism of the law and the legal system and is interested in the political agency of chinese immigrants using the law to fight in the courts for their rights. the validity of the white australia policy was challenged in the colonial courts, a fact often ignored. since the white australia policy was abolished, gao argues, the chinese in australia have never shied away from taking various legal actions, citing instances where chinese immigrants have successfully won the right stay in australia through a series of legal battles. finally, chek ling, in a non-refereed contribution, draws on the experience of 50 years of australian settlement to provide a personal reflection on what it is to be chinese in australia today. jock collins, professor of social economics co-director cosmopolitan civil societies 31 march 2011 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 i issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia race, ethnicity and indigeneity – challenges and opportunities for embracing diversity in sport daryl adair university of technology sydney this issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal was conceived as an outcome of the conference sport, race and ethnicity: building a global understanding, which was staged by the university of technology sydney from 30 nov – 2 dec 2008.1 the event was organised in partnership with the australian human rights commission (ahrc) and the department of immigration and citizenship, and supported by the school of leisure, sport and tourism, uts kuring-gai and the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre at uts. the conference was opened by graeme innes (am), australian human rights commissioner and disability discrimination commissioner, and the honourable laurie ferguson, parliamentary secretary for multicultural affairs and settlement services. the third day of the symposium featured an ahrc led ‘sport and cultural diversity forum’, chaired by paul oliver, author of the 2007 report what’s the score? a survey of cultural diversity and racism in australian sport,2 and david peachey, a wiradjuri man who is best known for his contribution to rugby league football and his commitment to young aboriginal people through the david peachey foundation.3 the eighty speakers at the conference included indigenous peoples from australia, new zealand and canada, together with people of different colour, ancestry and religion from places as diverse as north america, south africa, the united kingdom, brazil and south-east asia. the conference was attended by academics, postgraduate students and sport practitioners and the contributors to this issue reflect that diversity. together their writings emphasise the emergence of sport as a potentially significant contributor to policies and practices of social inclusion and anti-discrimination. sport, as john sugden has argued, is neither inherently 1 for details see http://www.business.uts.edu.au/lst/sre/ (accessed 18 august 2010). 2 for details see http://www.hreoc.gov.au/racial_discrimination/whats_the_score/index.html (accessed 18 august 2010). 3 for details see http://davidpeachey.org/ (accessed 18 august 2010). http://www.business.uts.edu.au/lst/sre/� http://www.hreoc.gov.au/racial_discrimination/whats_the_score/index.html� http://davidpeachey.org/� ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ – it was what humans make it to be.4 as a social phenomenon, sport is a major part of popular culture and global communication; if managed ‘well’ it can facilitate understanding of the ‘other’, mutual respect and a cosmopolitanism ethos. sport can, of course, promote jingoism, sexism, racism and xenophobia, among other negative attributes. as the papers in this issue of the ccs journal attest, norms, values, attitudes and power relationships underpin the capacity of sport to either include and engage, or exclude and disengage. drew cottle and angela keys’ paper ‘the “blindside flick”: race issues and australian rugby league’, observes the rise to prominence of indigenous players in professional rugby league, with a particular focus on their struggles with racism when making a transition from the margins of the sport to its centre stage. cottle and keys welcome the rising number of aboriginal rugby league stars, but deftly point out that indigenous inclusion does not mean an absence of racism. they also make the very important case that aboriginal people are not ‘natural’ athletes, and that belief in them being so can have negative effects in terms of selfbelief in other fields of endeavour. cottle and keys conclude by posing a range of provocative questions around rugby league as a multi-faceted site of opportunity, tension, achievement and conflict for aboriginal people. sean gorman’s paper ‘sporting chance: indigenous sport participation in australian history’, is as critically aware as cottle’s article, but more upbeat in that he believes contemporary sport is more likely to tackle racism than perpetuate it. drawing on interviews with indigenous sports stars, such as afl footballer michael long, gorman argues that without sport providing opportunities – and therefore hopes of achievement – for many young aboriginal men, they would be in a worse position. this is not just his view but that of long, who asserts that ‘sport has been our greatest ally’ in the fight against racism and in the quest for greater aboriginal self respect among the australian community generally. as someone who has worked in aboriginal studies for more than two decades, gorman does not seek to romanticise sport, but he sees in its contemporary form, such as with anti-racism measures in the afl, the opportunity to build a more inclusive and cohesive community of all comers. 4 j. sugden, ‘critical left-realism and sport interventions in divided societies’, international review for the sociology of sport, 45 (3), september 2010, pp.258-272. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 iii issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia in the article ‘speaking the unspoken: racism, sport and māori’, h. raima hippolite and toni bruce continue the theme of indigenous sport and racism, but their focus is with māori sportspeople in aotearoa new zealand. hippolite, a māori postgraduate student, together with bruce, her pākehā supervisor, argue that new zealand sport (and therefore society) is not, as outsiders seem to perceive it, a haven for positive relations between ethnic and racial groups. that perception is sustained, the authors argue, by a pervasive culture of silence in and around new zealand sport. if there is no discussion among sport stakeholders about discrimination on the basis of colour, culture or ancestry then it is presumed not to exist. however, hippolite’s interviews with māori sportspeople reveal a more complex picture: although indigenous athletes are eligible to take part in any sport, their inclusion can be compromised, such as by a lack of awareness among pākehā about māori cultural needs and their overarching responsibilities to family and kin, all of which need to be balanced into sporting commitments. the authors therefore recommend dialogue and consultation between ethnocultural groups and, above all, they cry out for open conversation in respect of racism, exclusion and marginalisation in new zealand sport. this article is also noteworthy in the context of hippolite negotiating her way, as both a maori researcher and university student, through the norms and conventions of academic scholarship. she describes a complex and difficult journey, replete with conflicts and compromises from which this paper is an important and most welcome outcome. megan stronach and daryl adair extend the discussion of indigeneity in sport, but this time in the context of australian aboriginal people and around the profession of boxing. stronach’s ongoing doctoral research examines the retirement experiences of indigenous athletes in the afl, the nrl and boxing, wherein aboriginal and torres strait islander people have been particularly prominent in recent decades. in this paper, stronach and adair note that aboriginal fighters are sought by talent scouts and welcomed by boxing organisations, but much less thought, and indeed enthusiasm, has been directed towards their transition, upon retirement, into a career beyond the ring. stronach’s interviews with boxers revealed that they were, in pierre bourdieu’s theoretical terms, replete with physical capital, but that they typically relied on this to the exclusion of non-physical attributes, such as education or vocational training. stronach and adair have conceived an addition to bourdieu’s theoretical repertoire – the notion of future capital. this refers to a bank of skills and connections, such as by undertaking technical or university training, that provides no iv cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia immediate capital benefit, but instead facilitates the mobility to earn capital in the future. the authors see this as both a pathway and process towards boxers having greater choice of employment and career once their time as a boxer has ended. this seems particularly important for indigenous prize fighters, argue stronach and adair, because the vast majority of them only envisage a role in boxing – whether as a coach or personal trainer – once their days inside the ring are over. the post-retirement transition is difficult for any professional athlete; this article demonstrates that it is particularly challenging for aboriginal boxers. stan thangaraj’s paper, ‘“liting it up”: popular culture, indo-pak basketball, and south asian american institutions’, provides ethnographic insights into migration, ethnicity and race in sport. indian and pakistani communities, while typically having different religious and ancestral loyalties, have a shared history since the partition of the sub-continent and, in the context of america, a common perception that they are similar through being ‘asian’. in the homelands, sports like cricket and hockey provide important cultural connections between the peoples of india and pakistan, but in the us – where games of the former british empire have no currency – there are few opportunities (and indeed little sport-appropriate space) to undertake such activities. intriguingly, thangaraj notes that indo-pak community elders in the us instead actively encouraged young men to take up basketball on grounds beside temples, churches or mosques. this allowed the boys to maintain their religious obligations, but also engage in a mainstream ‘american’ physical activity. a link with tradition and modernity proved popular, with thangaraj evaluating thriving indo-pak basketball competitions in both atlanta and chicago. thangaraj soon discovered, however, that this engagement with the modern and mainstream was constrained by the customary values and traditions of indo-pak communities. he concluded that basketball, for these groups, is malecentred – with virtually no active role for females. furthermore, the basketball spaces were not only male dominated, they were heterosexist; gay men were simply not welcome. thangaraj’s case study is a telling example of how ethnocultural sporting environments can be liberating for some but disempowering to others. the final paper in this volume, a collaboration by anne bunde-birouste, nicholas bull and brad mccarroll, provides analysis of an ambitious grassroots sport program conducted with the aid of a range of partners – a university, a sport consultant, volunteers and corporate sponsors. ‘football united’ is a development program that uses the sport of soccer to foster cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 v issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia social cohesion in areas of the sydney community with high levels of refugee settlement. it does this by engaging young refugees and their friends in sport, and, via a football-specific cultural framework, instilling in them leadership, skills development, mentoring, and the creation of social capital by connecting them, as football united members, to a range of local community leaders and social organisations. the purpose of the paper presented in this volume is to analyse the relationship of football united, a not-for-profit program, with a key commercial sponsor – jp morgan. in an era of corporate social responsibility, it has become customary for companies to donate funds to charitable and virtuous social ventures, but often there is little connection between the donor and the recipient organisation other than an exchange of funds and good wishes. in the case of jp morgan there was a genuine effort on the part of the company to provide in-kind support over and above financial assistance. however, as the article indicates, there were logistical constraints around the extent to which corporate professionals could actively engage in football united programs. the authors conclude that a successful relationship between sponsor and sponsee relies on effective communication and a clear articulation of the needs and expectations of both parties. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 23 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia speaking the unspoken: racism, sport and māori h. raima hippolite toni bruce university of waikato abstract in this paper, we consider the silence that surrounds issues of racism in new zealand sport. we argue that the intersection of two key ideologies – new zealand’s purported history of good race relations, and the positive contribution that sport is believed to make to racial equality – contribute to a culture of silence in which it is difficult to talk about, let alone discuss constructively, māori experiences of racism. our aim is to put the issue on the agenda through engagement with ten experienced māori sport participants, coaches and administrators whose experiences demonstrate the existence of, and pain caused by, cultural and institutional racism in new zealand sport. in this aim, we do not seek to hide behind a veil of neutrality or objectivity. rather, following a kaupapa māori research approach, our interest is in bringing to light the voices, frustrations and concerns of māori sportspeople in order to contribute to a much-needed conversation. introduction he hōnore, he kororia ki te atua he maungarongo ki te whenua he whakaaro pai ki nga tangata katoa ko raima taku ingoa ko tainui, whakatohea, ngati toa, ngati koata, ngai tahu me nga puhi ōku iwi, no reira, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa ko karioi te maunga ko whaingaroa te awa ko jess me nga kaipuke e whitu ōku waka ko pākehā te iwi ko toni taku ingoa no whaingaroa ahau no reira, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou katoa in the mihi [greeting] above, we introduce ourselves as women of aotearoa new zealand, one māori and one pākehā1 1 there continues to be debate over the origins and use of the term pākehā but it generally describes people who are not māori and, more particularly, those with a white european heritage whose cultural values and practices reflect their location as members of the dominant group within new zealand (bell 2004). we note that defining māori identity is equally difficult because it does not relate directly to race or ‘blood’ (ihimaera 1998). indeed, ihimaera (1998) argues that many māori “can claim as much pākehā ancestry as they can māori ancestry or, at least, pākehā influence in their years of growing up. much of our identity has to do with whakapapa [genealogy], with memory based not only on the bloodlines and physical landscapes we live in but also the emotional landscapes constructed by loving grandparents or whānau [family] with aroha [love], manaakitanga [hospitality/caring] and whānaungatanga [kinship connections]” (p. 14). . in this paper, we explore the complex experiences of māori in 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia sport that result from the legacy of the colonisation of new zealand in the 1800s, with particular focus on the way that colonisation has created a sporting context that marginalises, belittles or ignores indigenous2 knowledge, protocols and cultural practice but makes it difficult, if not impossible, to talk about racism. the paper engages multiple voices; our own, the ten māori participants in the first author’s postgraduate research thesis, and a range of researchers and theorists whose ideas have something to contribute to an exploration of the experiences of māori in mainstream sport. we take seriously douglas hartmann’s argument that “the racial dynamics of sport are...determined in context and defined by both possibilities of agency and resistance as well as systems of constraint” (hartmann 2003, p. xiii). thus, our discussion is contextually specific, foregrounding the experiences of māori whose voices, like those of other indigenous sportspeople, have too often been absent from research. our approach is grounded in a kaupapa māori research methodology (bishop 1996; smith 2000) that emerged from challenges by māori academics to “the way that certain knowledge was established as legitimate and the way that other knowledge, like māori knowledge, was not viewed as legitimate” (walker, eketone & gibbs 2006, p. 332). such an approach draws attention to the challenges faced by māori operating in a context that privileges nonindigenous ontological and epistemological understandings of the world. in order to ground this challenge more concretely, we begin with a korero [story] – entitled what i really want to say – by the first author about gaining access to a conference to present an earlier version of this paper (hippolite 2008a). her story was written as an emerging māori scholar learning the rules of an academic ‘game’ that is grounded in colonial/white/pākehā ways of doing and being, and it clearly resonated with the experiences of other indigenous academics in the audience.3 2 by indigenous we mean people who inhabited ‘nations’ before colonization by imperial powers. these include māori in new zealand, aborigines and torres strait islanders in australia, native americans and/or first peoples in north america (canada and the united states). while such groups have been written about, often by non-indigenous scholars, their own voices and theoretical perspectives only rarely appear in the sport literature. our focus on indigenous peoples thus excludes the extensive research about marginalized non-indigenous groups in sport, such as african americans in the united states and canada, and those of afro-caribbean or south asian heritage in the united kingdom, much of which has been done by scholars from these groups. thus, rather than being simply an angry response to a critique of an abstract, we propose that it embodies much more than this. not only is it part of a larger struggle to reclaim tino rangatiratanga [self determination] in which māori have the right to determine what counts as culturally valuable, but it highlights the often different paradigms through which indigenous scholars and research participants, in this case māori, view the world. in 3 they demonstrated this by their comments and questions after the first author’s presentation, and in further discussions throughout the conference. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 25 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia addition, our extended discussions about whether or not the first author should actually present it emphasise the challenges that māori constantly face about ‘what to say, where to say it and to whom’ as they navigate through a monocultural (sports) world primarily defined by pākehā values and belief systems.4 in terms of its content and structure, we draw the reader’s attention to ihimaera’s (1998) description of how māori communicate: “most māori offer subjective experience and they write as they talk. white hot. straight for the jugular. what comes to mind is what gets put down on the page” (p. 12). ihimaera goes on to explain that what is “written about and the way it has been written” is the individual’s “choice for that moment...a particular response on a particular day prompted by a particular memory. but, on another day, the response may have been different” (1998, p. 12). what i really want to say as i stand here today, to the western thinker i stand alone because that is all you see. yet i stand with my family; not the nuclear concept of family but those past and present who have lived experiences that inform my thinking and my being, as well as future generations to whom i am responsible and who will be held accountable for what i say (see also ihimaera 1998; smith 1999, 2000). when i submitted my first abstract for this conference, it was reviewed by two people. one was clinical and, as my supervisor described it, a bit ‘over the top’; the other had a lighter tone but both required theoretical background to validate my research. basically there was a ‘theoretical gap’. and so i threw some names in like russell bishop (1999, 2005), linda tuhiwai smith (1999, 2000) and brendan hokowhitu (2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005, 2007), and if they didn’t know those authors because they’re māori, then i threw in colin king (2004) and franz fanon (1967). obviously it was accepted. but i need to say that although the ‘academy’ requires compliance to set criteria that allows entry to these forums, the voices of the participants contained within my research do not need validation from theorists and other writers on postcolonial themes. these voices speak their experiences and this is what they are saying: māori can stand and speak for themselves. māori have done that since before the pākehā came to new zealand. and when the pākehā came to new zealand, māori continued to speak and stand and it has been a struggle without end – “ka whawhai tonu matou”5 4 before the conference, with another colleague, we debated the merits and potential dangers of presenting it to what was likely to be a predominantly white academic audience. we concluded that the best approach might be to attend the conference, assess the participants and the mood and make a decision at the time of presentation. so the first author prepared a paper that constructed a ‘standard’ academic argument with evidence but also contained the space to insert the korero if she deemed it appropriate. . māori have said the same things from the early 1800s. in recognising the tidal wave of oppression upon them, māori formed their own king movement in 1856 to create an entity that pākehā would recognise in the waikato, for three reasons: to halt the taking of māori land; to cease the spilling of blood; and to retain mana māori – the right to be māori. my research speaks the longings of my heart, and the hearts of those who have gifted their stories – the gift of honesty and integrity. these words are not found in a library. these are living books who walk, talk, breathe, play sport, have raised children in sport, coached and 5 as ranginui walker (2004) has also described it. 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia administrated in sport. who here has the right to tell me that i need research from britain or the usa or australia to validate these māori voices in new zealand sport? it is māori who have waited for the colonials to catch up, māori who have been pushed to the periphery whilst the core of colonial power has only heard the whispering echoes of mana māori and has interpreted these as idle grumblings. now this world of academia has discovered postcolonial literature, gotten on board with it and has created its own hierarchy; what gives it the right to judge what is good māori research or not? so i challenge you white, middle-class theorists to go back to your hills and theorise about your own people before you decide what is acceptable ‘māori research’ and what is not. and if you are indigenous to your nation and you peer-reviewed my abstract, then shame on you for believing that it takes a white man’s system of validation for something to be of worth or value. these conferences are part of ‘playing the white man’s game’, a way of funnelling students’ research to serve professors to multiply their academic accolades. but i have come to this conference to see what these sociologists have to offer my people. you will take what you want and i will seek to know what can i take back to my people from this conference that i can share and say ‘here’s what can help us’. and if i can’t do that then it leads to questions like ‘who does this conference serve?’ what good are these “grand theories if they do not assist in the solving of day-to-day social problems?” (smith 2004, p. 122). the broader context: race relations in new zealand in this paper we identify new zealand’s purported history of good race relations, reinforced by ideologies of equality and fairness in sport, as underlying reasons for the almost complete absence of a much-needed public discussion of the lingering effects of colonisation on new zealand sport. as indicated in the korero [talk] above, and discussed in more detail below, these lingering effects most often privilege non-indigenous understandings while simultaneously (and often unintentionally) marginalising alternative indigenous views. new zealand has an international reputation of (relatively) tranquil race relations, exemplary protection of indigenous rights, and complete religious freedom with social and legal egalitarianism (meijl & miedema 2004) – and this view is widely shared. as pākehā educator robert consedine points out: growing up in the 1960s i thought of race relations as a problem in other countries. like many new zealanders i had been lulled into the popular belief that new zealand had the best race relations in the world. i had very little contact with māori and had no awareness that there was any problem. (consedine & consedine 2005, p. 155) thus, for many pākehā new zealanders, a functionalist view of society prevails in which social institutions, including sport, are seen as having positive functions for society as a whole (coakley, hallinan, jackson & mewett 2009). within a functionalist view, it is cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 27 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia assumed that shared values provide the basis for the existing social order, which is seen as rational and normal (coakley 2004; jarvie & reid 1997). this functionalist way of thinking is espoused by governments, sports organisations, religious groups and most key societal institutions and we argue that it remains the dominant cultural understanding of sport just as it does of broader society in new zealand.6 however, the functionalist view has been heavily critiqued for overstating the positive consequences of institutions for society. in new zealand’s case, this view has meant a privileging of pākehā understandings: “new zealand, through its colonial history, has been designed primarily to benefit pākehā. māori were required to fit into pākehā culture and systems. all our basic institutions functioned on the assumption that being pākehā was ‘normal’” (consedine & consedine 2005, p. 218). as a result, as wetherell and potter (1992) point out, many pākehā have attributed divisiveness and the collapse of the ideal of multiracial harmony to the actions of māori and other groups contesting discriminatory practices: “over and over again we are told that it is māori groups who initiate friction, division and disruption and who thus disturb the harmonious ‘resting state’ of new zealand society” (p. 158). in such accounts, pākehā are constructed as reasonable and rational, while māori groups are positioned as irrational, emotional and acting improperly. thus, in this view, māori claims for tino rangatiratanga [self determination] are not seen as legitimate claims for redress but as creating disruption and disorder. the dominant pākehā account of race relations, therefore, does not recognise that conflict already exists in new zealand and that colonisation by pākehā is responsible for much of it. instead, the view is that “society was harmonious and integrated before māori groups (‘inexplicably’) generated conflict, and now society is divided, antagonized and full of friction” (wetherell & potter 1992, p. 160). several studies have found that pākehā individuals and news organisations tend to divide māori into diametrically opposed forms: as ‘wild’ versus ‘tame’ or ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ (see abel 1996), with ‘tame’ māori “represented as supporting the status quo” and ‘wild’ māori “counterposed as deviant (‘them’) and represented as making unreasonable demands in an unreasonable manner” (abel 1996, p. 33; mcgregor & te awa 1996). thus, māori who do question the status quo are negatively labelled as stirrers, radicals, activists or even terrorists 6 the second author notes, for example, that undergraduate students she has taught in the united states, australia and new zealand overwhelmingly espouse a functionalist view of sport, at least before (and often after) they encounter critical cultural and sociological accounts that challenge this view. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia (wall 2007); terms that are then used to deny credence to claims of racism. indeed, any discussion about racism is perceived as negative for new zealand society (wetherell & potter 1992) and immediately denied or responded to with “considerable hostility and resistance” by pākehā (consedine & consedine 2005, p. 158). for example, the difficulty of directly raising issues about racism in the public realm is revealed by the overwhelmingly negative public response to a wide-ranging study of māori interactions with government agencies in the 1980s: the more recent identification of institutional racism as the basic evil constraining māori participation in new zealand life, has caused something of a furore. the assumption of those under attack has been that their involvement in our monocultural institutions means that they personally are therefore accused of being ‘racist’. the resultant resentment has been bitter and a barrier to change. it has polarised attitudes and clouded the capacity for dealing with the issue of monoculturalism. (puao-te-ata-tu 1988, p. 78) the discourse of sport a functionalist view is even more strongly evident in the powerful ideology that sport is a level playing field in which all people have the chance to participate (coakley et al. 2009; collins & jackson 2007). the functionalist understanding of sport as contributing to social justice and equality first emerged in the victorian british public schools, where sport was encouraged because it was believed to foster “such virtues as leadership, respect, loyalty, courage, honesty, fair play, self-reliance and self-discipline” (arnold 1992, p. 238; coakley et al. 2009; lee & cockman 1995). moreover, similar ideals are reflected in the rhetoric of the olympic movement that competition “shall be fair and equal” with “no discrimination on grounds of race, religion or politics” (arnold 1992, p. 238). new zealand’s belief in itself as an egalitarian culture further reinforces a functionalist view of the role of sport and the place of māori within it (hokowhitu 2007; phillips 1996). although vidacs (2003) suggests this belief in egalitarianism is fraught with contradictions, there is no doubt that māori have been successful at competitive sports introduced by the colonisers, such as rugby union, rugby league, basketball and netball; such sports quickly became an integral part of many māori communities and have contributed to the maintenance of cultural connections (hokowhitu 2007; palmer 2005). according to palmer (2005), “māori values are an important part of the culture of [māori] sports clubs and the kawa (rules) from which they operate. whānaungatanga and manaakitanga, for instance, are often elements of tikanga māori incorporated into the culture of sport teams, clubs, and organizations” (p. 78). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 29 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia however, as the korero [stories] of the participants in this study reveal, kawa and tikanga are seldom acknowledged or valued in mainstream sport contexts in new zealand. instead, the research participants’ responses align more with critical theories, which deal with relationships between culture, power and social relations (coakley 2004). in these theories, sports are seen as social constructions that change as power relations, narratives and discourses change (coakley 2004). research within this framework focuses the meaning of sport as a site for cultural reproduction and transformation (hall 1992). sport thus becomes a platform to a) challenge and transform exploitive and oppressive practices, b) increase the number and diversity of participation opportunities, c) challenge the ideological implications of the stories told about sports and d) challenge the voices and perspectives of those with power (coakley 2004). māori perspectives find their place in this framework when they deal with the social construction of race and ethnicity and issues of privilege and oppression for racial, cultural and ethnic groups in the sport context. thus, although the participants’ experiences indicate the need for critical, sustained discussion of the effects of racial ideologies in new zealand sport, the dominant ideology of sport as a site of (racial) equality and positive race relations makes it difficult to engage in such conversations. writing about racial issues in western sport generally, coakley et al. (2009) point out that “most people think in fairytale terms when it comes to racial and ethnic relations: they believe that opening a door so that others may enter a social world is all that is needed to achieve racial and ethnic harmony” (p. 300). certainly this view has prevailed throughout much of new zealand’s history. for example, while strongly critical of race relations overall, māori author ranginui walker describes māori as “passionately devoted to rugby, the national sport in which they found ready acceptance on equal terms with the pākehā” (2004 p. 175, italics added). indeed, in the early twentieth century, with māori culture on the brink of extinction, sport was a welcome salvation (hokowhitu 2004).7 7 hokowhitu does note, however, that sport has provided māori with only “conditional access to the white man’s world” (2003a, p. 187). māori attitudes to sport have always been positive (smith 1998) and “māori have achieved more in sport than in any other area of new zealand society” (hokowhitu 2004, p. 209). the belief in sport as promoting racial equality is supported by research that struggled to find any evidence of racial stacking in major new zealand sports (melnick 1996; melnick & thomson 1996). this finding is in stark contrast to research in the united states, united kingdom and 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia australia which has consistently found patterns of positional distribution by race. unsurprisingly then, the dominant mythology in new zealand is that sport has played an important role in racial integration (phillips 1996; walker 2004). as phillips (1996) points out, māori success in rugby led many pākehā to believe that new zealand was “a racially harmonious society” (p. 286). further, even those directly tasked with dealing with racism may find it difficult to acknowledge such discrimination in sport. for example, in a 2009 television interview, new zealand’s race relations conciliator, joris de bres, responded to news that the national māori rugby team might be prevented from touring south africa by stating “it’s a very understandable history in south africa that is very strongly opposed to racially selected teams but looking in new zealand we don’t have racial discrimination in sport, we’ve got ethnic diversity” (tv3 news 2009, italics added). de bres claimed that “people of all ethnic backgrounds are eligible to play in new zealand's national, regional and local representative teams, and alongside that, consistent with the principle of freedom of association, people are free to play together in any other combination” (reid 2009, para. 25). he went on to state that “the new zealand māori rugby team has a proud history in new zealand and has the support of the community as a whole” (reid 2009, para. 26). the power of the belief about racial equality in new zealand sport is clear in de bres’ statements yet, as discussed later, his claims about freedom to play and community support are challenged by the participants’ experiences and evidence from other sources. research on māori in new zealand sport in this context, the remarkable dearth of studies that explicitly address māori experiences of racism in sport is perhaps not surprising. in this dearth, new zealand differs significantly from former british colonies such as australia and canada where racism and indigenous sporting experience have been on the agenda for some time, and from other western nations where racism in relation to major non-white populations such as african americans in the united states and those of south asian or afro-caribbean descent in the united kingdom have been well documented. the new zealand silence around racism and its effects on indigenous sportspeople contrasts markedly with the situation in australia, new zealand’s closest neighbour. in the 1990s, the courage of indigenous australian athletes in speaking out against overt racism has put discussions of racism and sport on the research and public cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 31 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia agenda, and led to formal policies such as the australian football league’s racial and religious vilification code that banned racial abuse (e.g., bruce & wensing 2010; coram 2007; gardiner 1997; hallinan & judd 2007, 2009, and numerous others). however, this public and research silence does not mean that māori sporting experiences have been completely ignored. although very little directly focuses on racism, a small body of theoretical and empirical work has emerged in the last decade, led by indigenous scholars brendan hokowhitu and farah palmer (hokowhitu 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009; hokowhitu & scherer 2008; jackson & hokowhitu 2002; palmer 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007; palmer & masters, forthcoming; see also ellis, sperling & toma-dryden 1999; hippolite 2008b; mclean 1999, 2001; melnick 1996; melnick & thomson 1996; rewi 1992; te rito 2006, 2007; thompson, rewi & wrathall 2000). yet new zealand has yet to engage in any meaningful discussion about the existence of contemporary racism against māori in sport.8 the hidden nature of racialised thinking in new zealand has been highlighted by pākehā award-winning sports columnist richard boock in the sport most strongly associated with racial equality: it remains the dirty little secret of new zealand rugby. racist british and european football fans tend to yell and chant their warped abuse at the ground on game day; aussies favour hurling obscenities and/or missiles. over here it's whispered among friends and behind backs, and rationalised into a language that attempts to deodorise the stench of the core message: that it's ok to judge folk on the basis of race (boock 2008, paras. 11-12, italics added). 8 we note, however, that acknowledgement of historical experiences of racism involving the exclusion of māori players from new zealand rugby teams touring south africa during the apartheid era (in deference to south africa’s racially segregated sport) began to emerge earlier in 2010 in conjunction with celebrations of 100 years of māori rugby in new zealand. however, an apology from the new zealand rugby union, made only via media release, did not occur until after widespread media coverage of an apology issued by the south african rugby union (‘timing of’ 2010). a māori former national and māori team player acknowledged the pain of the experience: "it affected us as a tribe, as people and as tangata whenua of new zealand, being denied the right to play for our country because we were dark skinned" (‘timing of’ 2010, para. 10). however, claims in february 2010 by a famous pākehā former all black andy haden that a successful rugby franchise had long operated a racially-based quota system of three polynesian players were immediately dismissed and attention re-directed away from this possible example of institutional racism. instead, the widespread media coverage shifted towards a critique of his use of the term “darkies” [which appeared to be how the pacific island players were described to him] along with calls for him to quit his role as rugby world cup ambassador (see campbell live 2010). as one journalist described it on national television, “it’s a disaster referring to brown rugby players as darkies”. this reorientation towards an individual case of ‘racism’ (which appears much more palatable to the public and media than consideration of more broadly-based institutionalised racism) occurred despite haden explaining in a live television interview that “i’ve had two all blacks ring me up this morning and say they’ve had similar discussions...volunteered by [team] management at the time” and “i had a māori from the [team] call me up...this morning and laughing his head off and agreeing with everything that i’ve said” (campbell live 2010). 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia thus, the contextually specific nature of racism in sport in new zealand is highlighted by boock who explicitly contrasts the hidden nature of racism in new zealand with the more overt racial stereotyping and vilification expressed by non-indigenous europeans and australians (see also bruce & wensing 2010; coram 2007; gardiner 1997; hallinan & judd 2007, 2009). indeed, recent new zealand research indicates that ‘racism’ is more often publicly attributed to māori, particularly when they seek to compete in national māori sporting teams (hokowhitu, 2009). in stark contrast to de bres’ claims about public support for the māori men’s national rugby team, hokowhitu (2009) found the team was labelled as separatist and even racist: he quoted several pākehā who argued that “the only example of the racism in new zealand rugby is the existence of māori rugby” (p. 2328, italics added). thus, public reactions to māori rugby teams and to investigations into māori interactions with government agencies (e.g., puao-te-ata-tu 1988) have ‘taught’ māori that direct discussion of racism is unlikely to be welcomed or to lead to institutional change. consequently, discussing racism becomes a social ‘taboo’ that is not spoken about by māori to pākehā, perhaps to avoid discomfort and associated anxieties. and so effectively between māori and pākehā, it becomes a non-discourse, a non-conversation, with no dialogue and no discussion. the historically potent image of strong race relations between māori and pākehā perhaps shrouds the underlying tensions remaining from unresolved grievances that are hard to forgive when māori continue to be treated unequally and unfairly. pākehā accuse māori of having memories like an elephant; they never forget. the rebuttal would suggest that pākehā suffer from convenient bouts of amnesia, especially where māori issues are concerned. methodology: researching māori sport experiences the research on which this article is based grew out of the first author’s conversations with many other māori sportspeople; conversations that revealed a strong perception that bias and prejudice exist in sport against māori individuals, māori teams and māori organisations (see also hippolite 2006). these conversations, and the dearth of sociological research into māori experiences of discrimination in sport, provided the impetus for the first author to conduct indepth interviews with six women and four men, all of whom have extensive experience in their respective sports as players, coaches, administrators and parents who have also raised cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 33 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia their children in the same sports.9 they are or have been involved in a range of individual and team sports, some of which have high numbers of māori participants and some of which are dominated by pākehā. their collective pool of knowledge comprises more than 360 years of playing, coaching and/or administrating sport from the 1950s to the present. the research uses a kaupapa māori research methodology (bishop 1996; smith 2000; walker et al. 2006) which highlights the importance of conducting research by māori, for māori, in order to give voice to māori as they seek tino rangatiratanga [māori determining their own destiny]. as discussed in the introduction, kaupapa māori research is a response to māori discontent with traditional western research practices (bishop 1999; walker et al. 2006). at its core, this approach focuses on research that is of benefit to māori, conducted in culturally appropriate ways, and validated by its acceptability to māori. as bishop (1999) describes it: the kaupapa māori position regarding legitimation is based on the notion that the world is constituted by power differentials, and that there are different cultural systems that legitimately make sense of and interact meaningfully with the world. kaupapa māori research, based in a different worldview from that of the dominant discourse, makes this political statement while also acknowledging the need to recognise and address the ongoing effects of racism and colonialism in the wider society. (p. 5) the interview format was kanohi-ki-te-kanohi [face to face], semi-structured and open-ended, similar to a conversation and beginning with the process of whakawhānaungatanga in which participants establish kinship connections (see wihongi 2002). like the first author whose mihi demonstrates her whakapapa [genealogical] links to the tainui iwi [tribe], all the participants live in the waikato-tainui region, which lies south of auckland and includes new zealand’s fourth-largest city kirikiriroa (more widely known as hamilton). the region is named after the tainui waka which crossed the pacific ocean from hawaiiki to aotearoa more than 800 years ago, led by the chief hoturoa. four principal tribes – hauraki, ngāti maniapoto, raukawa and waikato – comprise the descendants of the tainui waka. the interviews took place in 2008 at sites negotiated with the participants. some were individual while others were conducted in groups, often in the participants’ homes where whānau [family] and friends passed through, listened in and often contributed to the discussion. thus, although based on the experiences of these ten participants, this study also 9 some interviews were funded by a ngā pae o te māramatanga summer internship scholarship and the results of this work appear in hippolite (2008b). 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia draws upon observations and informal discussions held throughout the research period with other māori involved in sport in new zealand, as well as the first author’s own extensive experiences, which comprise over thirty years of playing, coaching, administrating and encouraging her children in numerous sports. these additional sources of information served as a form of triangulation, confirming the main themes expressed in the formal interviews. in terms of confidentiality, new zealand’s small size and sensitivity about imputations of racism led to the decision not to identify participants, specific tournaments or events in order to protect participants from potentially negative consequences for speaking out. the names of specific sports were replaced in quotations by the notation [sport]. other changes related to maintaining confidentiality are identified by the use of square brackets. all direct quotes from participants are presented in italics. marginalising māori sport “my opinion is that they did set us up to fail.” in this section, in order to challenge the silence that currently exists about racism towards māori in sport, we describe how cultural and institutional racisms combine to marginalise both māori in sport and māori teams. these forms of racism are based on the belief that pākehā culture, lifestyle, values, beliefs and systems are normal and superior; beliefs that become institutionalised in monocultural organisations and national structures (consedine & consedine 2005; puao-te-ata-tu 1988). as one participant described it, “i’ve always felt there’s been quite severe racist policies in [sport]. i think what actually hides it all is the high number of māoris that do play it, who do overcome all of that rubbish...” further, not only is this underlying notion of pākehā superiority “seldom overtly stated in modern new zealand” 10 (puao-te-ata-tu 1988, p. 77) but “contestation over the centrality of white subjectivity is regularly displaced” (hokowhitu & scherer 2008, p. 253). the greater importance attached to new zealand as opposed to māori national teams (see also hokowhitu & scherer 2008; hokowhitu 2009) was evident in the experiences of three research participants, and the broader understanding that māori teams and individuals were marginalised in representative sport from junior to national levels was shared by all the participants. at the elite level, three participants knew of situations where national sporting 10 the writers of the puao-te-ata-tu report did note that, even if not overtly stated, it “is constantly implied” (puao-teata-tu 1988, p. 77). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 35 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia organisations had effectively denied māori athletes the chance to play for national māori teams, even when there were no competing events. in one case, even after national māori team personnel had researched the whakapapa [genealogy] of an australian-born māori player and gained a temporary new zealand passport for her from the new zealand consul in the pacific country hosting the tournament, the national organisation decided “without consulting the coaches” that she could not represent new zealand and sent another player in her place: “and i didn’t find out about that till that girl was on the plane coming over.” for this participant, the national body failed to understand the kaupapa and tikanga of māori teams: ...so we had a player whose grandfather had gone to all her whānau, chased them all up for money to help support this girl to get over there. they’d gone back to her iwi, [which] had given money to help her get there, and she wasn’t allowed to play. so she sat in [pacific country] that whole tournament. when another participant, after “a tonne of meetings” and a “really hard” fight, did convince the national body to let him register national māori teams for an elite south pacific tournament held in new zealand, he was told he could not select any māori players from the new zealand team: “you can’t have any of the[m] because …then it’s demeaning to [them] if you guys use them as māoris and that sort of thing”. nor did the national body want to endorse the team wearing the silver fern, the widely acknowledged national sporting symbol (see wensing 2003): “they didn’t want us to use the fern on our uniforms…” these decisions suggest that being māori is less than being a new zealander and clearly demarcate a racial hierarchy where māori are set below pākehā. the denial of the fern emblem also suggests that, in contrast to race relations conciliator joris de bres’ statements above, māori teams are not accepted as reflecting ‘the support of the community as a whole’. in all three cases, the participants felt strongly that the national organisation did not want māori sport to succeed. as one said, the national organisation “set us up to fail. they didn’t want to see us succeed because ultimately if there is any talent there, they want to have first choice on our players.” another participant called such processes “a subtle way of stuffing māori [sport].” when asked if the national sporting body would sabotage a māori team that became competitive, his response reinforced the issue of silence: “absolutely. in a heartbeat, but you’ll never hear it. no one will directly tell you.” he suggested that rather than simply stating that new zealand team players would not be released to a māori national team, “they’ll say, ‘well, they’ve got other commitments. it’s their choice’.” however, he pointed out that although these players wanted to play “for the love of māori [sport]”, the policies of 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the national body ensured they could not. if they ‘chose’ to play for the national māori team they would risk losing the playing contracts that allowed them to be full-time athletes. these examples demonstrate how institutions, such as national sporting bodies, are able to marginalise māori sport while avoiding charges of racism. in most cases discussed by the participants, cultural and institutional racism have resulted in māori participation in sport being conditional upon subjugating their own values to the systems of those in power. the two participants who explained “we just take it” clearly reinforce hokowhitu’s (2009) argument that māori are “cognizant of the colonial subjugation” (p. 2329). these forms of racism may also have influenced how pākehā organisations respond to māori desires to enter national māori teams into international competitions. for one participant, his attempts to enter a māori team into the south pacific tournament discussed above were initially rejected because the pākehā-run national body was afraid it would be labelled racist or separatist; a fear grounded in the reality of how many pākehā interpret māori teams, as discussed earlier (see hokowhitu 2009). one participant’s overall assessment that one national government body would only “play their hand, in terms of our national māori team, when it’s convenient for them….it’s just token gestures” clearly demonstrated another outcome of these broad forms of racism. in this case, it is the “arrogantly assumed ‘right’” (puao-te-ata-tu 1988, p. 78) to include only certain aspects of māori culture as part of national culture while discarding or not bothering to understand other essential dimensions of māori values and lifestyle. as consedine and consedine (2005) acknowledge, the legacy of colonisation meant that “only the exotic features of māori culture were encouraged, where they benefitted the country in areas such as tourism and sport” (p. 218), of which the performance of the haka before international sporting events is a prime example. this lack of knowledge about māori culture was revealed when one national body asked the national māori team personnel, “well how are you going to [organise] accommodation and pay for all of that?” the participant had to explain that ”this is a māori team so we’ll stay on a marae [traditional tribal meeting place] and the home people on the marae will feed us etcetera, and we will give them a koha [donation] to the marae and that sort of thing”. the marae environment is the appropriate, common-sense, cost-effective solution. logistically, accommodating large groups of people is the function of marae. the marae operates as a place for the people to be fed and to sleep to attend the given cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 37 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia purpose of the stay whether for tangi [funeral], weddings, sports tournaments or hui [meetings] for tribal issues to be discussed.11 although the māori teams swept all the prizes, the national body would not permit any new zealand māori teams to participate in future tournaments. an ignorance of māori custom by pākehā was evident in all the sports in which the participants were involved. for example, simple matters of protocol were often overlooked and disregarded. it seemed to the participants that many “arrogant” pākehā did not understand important differences between the two cultures, nor had they bothered to learn about māori ‘ways’ in order to understand māori athletes. as one participant described it, “they don’t even try to understand it.” one participant and her players “had to have little discussions about the misunderstandings that people may have of us as a club, as players, as māori”. all the participants believed that “māoris have a different way of expressing things”. these differences lead to misunderstandings with major repercussions for māori players or teams, including non-selection, increased surveillance by officials, māori feeling they did not have the mana [clout, status] to be heard, or even deciding to withdraw from particular sports or competitions. the experiences of these participants are also reflected in some existing studies. for example, deslea wrathall’s research with thirteen elite māori sportswomen demonstrated that māori players felt a disconnection between their values and those of mainstream sport, and that coaches and administrators who were not māori “had little understanding of māori ways and values and often were not interested in them as people other than what they could produce on the playing field” (thompson et al. 2000, p. 246). the athletes’ experience was that “you either did it their way or you were out” (thompson et al. 2000, p. 246). another example of the way that pākehā organisations selectively choose parts of māori culture but ignore or are ignorant of other essential elements was evident in wrathall’s finding that “only one culture was taken into account most of the time” except when māori were expected to take a leading role in singing at after-match functions (thompson et al. 2000 p. 247). speaking the unspoken: the challenge of discussing racism in new zealand sport “you know that there is racism in new zealand, that it’s all undercurrent. nobody has the nuts to hop up and say ‘all you black buggers get out, we’re not interested in you’.” 11 each marae is autonomous but is generally aligned to the protocols of its hapu, and iwi. 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia overall, there was little doubt that most of the research participants felt that racial ideologies played a huge part in how māori experienced sport in new zealand, although they sometimes found it difficult to explain why. as one woman put it, “i mean, like sometimes we feel like everything’s against us.” another female participant said, “there’s something happening up there. i don’t know what it is but i think it’s unfair, it’s unjust.” a male stated, “because i was māori, i was behind the 8-ball right from the word go.” another identified the effects on predominantly māori teams that he coached in a pākehā-dominated sport “you always knew that you were the second-class citizen. no one said it but you were treated like that. all the things that happened at that particular tournament and the tournaments later on, you just felt that way.” their use of words such as ‘no one said it’ and ‘it’s all undercurrent’ clearly indicate the lack of openness around how racial difference is expressed. indeed, in part of the quote that opens this section the male research participant identifies the difficulty pākehā have in expressing their views directly to māori in his comment that “nobody has the nuts to hop up and say...” we note, however, that although the participants identified the widespread nature of racialised thinking on the part of pākehā, none of them attributed this kind of thinking to all pākehā. indeed, one noted that that he was “always impressed in places like tokoroa, mangakino, the coasties. the pākehās that come from there have been around māoris all their lives and they’ve got different attitudes.” the problem of racism in sport cannot be solved without clear dialogue between māori and pākehā about what racism is, what it looks like, and the effects it has on individuals, communities and new zealand society. however, discussions with the research participants suggest that māori experiences and feelings are rarely expressed to pākehā, for fear of ostracism or negative labels such as stirrer or radical. therefore, an important advantage of the māori interviewing māori approach embedded in kaupapa māori research methodology is that it increases the likelihood of eliciting responses related to racial discrimination, as opposed to the silence that generally prevails around ‘race talk’. in contrast to pākehā who “smugly assumed that a people who fought and played rugby together was necessarily one people” (phillips 1996, p. 288), the research participants know this is not the case. instead, they suggested that what is said about each other is rarely said to each other. one made it cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 39 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia clear that she could openly discuss issues of discrimination on the basis of race with other māori involved in the sport context, “like i said, they walk the same lines”. however, when three women interviewed together were asked if they could discuss them with pākehā, they all spoke at once, “no, no.” their belief that many – but not all – pākehā hold racist views about māori but do not often express them directly to māori came through clearly in the interviews. three females recalled hearing about a social occasion when “amongst themselves” pākehā openly expressed stereotypes about a group of young māori players: “oh they won’t last long. all those māori girls, they’ll be pregnant.” while two rejected this comment as “a stupid thing to say” or “just stupid” they also recognised it as a form of racism or prejudice. a male interviewee, involved in a sport with many māori participants, felt strongly that racist attitudes held by pākehā would always be revealed, albeit in subtle ways: those long-held attitudes, they manifest themselves. they may only manifest themselves under stress, but they will manifest themselves. you watch. you watch when things don’t go right in the heat of it. you watch. boof, something will come out. i think ‘well, that was off the wall’. but that tells me what that man really is thinking...“oh that black bugger. oops i shouldn’t have said black bugger. bugger that [sport position], he shouldn’t have done that.” but you hear the first attitude. that’s the real attitude. columnist richard boock also encapsulates the widespread and entrenched nature of such attitudes (see also ballara 1986; hyde 1993): you hear it mostly...from ageing, white, narrow-minded rugby-heads, who probably still hanker for the times when you could call fish and chips a “māori roast”, a ditch a “māori drain”, and underarm deodorant a “māori bath”. how they used to laugh. now they're getting old and can't understand the world, poor blighters. (boock 2008, para. 1) one interviewee stated several times that he would prefer pākehā to make their prejudices clear: “i’d prefer that they said that. you know…. ‘we don’t want brown folks in here doing this stuff, you know, we don’t want them’. and then you know where you stand and then you can either say, ‘stuff you!’ or say ‘ah well, no problem’.” later in the same interview, he said “i’ve got more time for a fella who says that. now i know what you are: you’re a redneck, cracker. i know what you are. rather than people who say, ‘aaahhh, i’ll get back to you’.” 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia conclusions the participants’ experiences suggest that in new zealand we are some way from effectively engaging with entrenched but disavowed racist attitudes. their comments clearly identify the difficulty new zealand faces in even opening up debate about some of the “systems of constraint” (hartmann 2003, p. xiii) that influence sport’s racial dynamics. their experiences suggest that new zealand sport is in cultural denial, which cohen (2001) describes as a situation where whole societies slip into collective modes of denial, arriving at some unwritten agreement about what can be publicly acknowledged. for example, in new zealand the denial of racism in sport justifies resistance to discussing the entrenched advantages that pākehā have and continue to gain at the expense of māori. indeed, as discussed earlier, racism continues to be marginalised as an explanation in discourse (consedine & consedine 2005; cormack 2006; wetherell & potter 1992). instead, the high visibility of māori athletes in national teams, especially in high profile sports such as rugby union, rugby league, netball and basketball, appears to reinforce the broader societal belief in sport as a site of positive racial opportunity and race relations. yet māori know racialised thinking is present in sport and many want it out in the open rather than whispered or obscured. however, their desires are undercut by the strength of the belief in sport as a place of equal opportunity, along with the broader mythology that new zealand has the best race relations in the world, which appear to coalesce in a way that makes talking about racism particularly difficult. further, the institutionalised nature of these systems of constraint, in which the structures, policies and processes of sport are based on a pākehā paradigm, provide another significant barrier to creating the desired change. as coakley et al. (2009) point out, “challenging the negative beliefs and attitudes of individuals is one thing; changing the relationships and social structures that have been built on those beliefs and attitudes is another” (p. 306). improving race relations requires those in power to commit to confronting and challenging racial issues (coakley et al. 2009). based on these participants’ experiences, those in power have not demonstrated any interest in confronting or challenging racial issues in sport, especially at the cultural and institutional levels. indeed, from the participants’ perspectives, those in power seem unwilling to even acknowledge that problems exist. as a result, the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 41 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia participants, while loving sport, do not appear to be particularly optimistic about major structural change. for example, asked if she thought sport was a level playing field for māori, one respondent answered: “no, never has been, never will be.” overall, we found that many of the participants’ interactions with a pākehā-dominated sport system have made them feel inferior, frustrated, hurt, disillusioned and angry. some have opted out, some have made a conscious decision to try to change their sport from the inside, while others are re-evaluating their commitment to new zealand national sport organisations that seem unwilling or unable to recognise māori talent. some know families who have moved to australia because other māori have found less racism and more opportunity there. and, not surprisingly, some are getting tired of the constant struggle. they fob you off left, right and centre, you know. and you get to the age now where you probably just want to put your patu [weapon/bat] away mate. you get tired. you know, i’ve been slashing away now for 25 years in some instances. just get sick of it mate, get tired and worn out. yet, despite being tired and worn out, this participant and the others interviewed in this study have not ‘put [their] patu away’. this participant has spoken out because he believes something needs to be done now so that his mokopuna [grandchildren] do not face the same things he and other māori have had to deal with. the research participants’ contribution in speaking out about the realities and pervasiveness of racism in their sporting experiences is part of their commitment, as māori, to future generations. this study is one step towards ending the silence and beginning a discussion that leads towards realising the ideals of sport, based on the participants’ vision of sport without racially discriminating ideologies and practices that negatively impact māori sporting experiences. references abel, s. 1996, ‘“wild māori” and “tame māori” in television news. new zealand journal of media studies, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 33-38. arnold, p. j. 1992, ‘sport as a valued human practice: a basis for the consideration of some moral issues in sport. journal of philosophy of education, vol 26, no. 2, pp. 237-255. ballara, a. 1986, proud to be white? a survey of pākehā prejudice in new zealand. heinemann, auckland. bell, a. 2004, ‘“half-castes” and “white natives”: the politics of māori-pākehā hybrid identities’, in bell c. and matthewman, s. (eds), cultural studies in aotearoa new zealand: identity, space and place, oxford university press, south melbourne, australia, pp. 121–138. 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn:1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia bishop, r. 2005, ‘freeing ourselves from neocolonial domination in research: a kaupapa māori approach to creating knowledge’ in denzin n. k. and lincoln y. s. (eds), the sage handbook of qualitative research (3rd ed), sage, thousand oaks, ca, pp. 109-138. bishop, r. 1999, ‘kaupapa māori research: an indigenous approach to creating knowledge’, in robertson, n. 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http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia scaling up connections: everyday cosmopolitanism, complexity theory & social capital jenny onyx, christina ho, melissa edwards, nina burridge, hilary yerbury university of technology, sydney abstract one of the key questions of contemporary society is how to foster and develop social interactions which will lead to a strong and inclusive society, one which accounts for the diversity inherent in local communities, whether that diversity be based on differences in interest or diversity in language and culture. the purpose of this paper is to examine three concepts which are used in the exploration of social interactions to suggest ways in which the interplay of these concepts might provide a richer understanding of social interactions. the three concepts are everyday cosmopolitanism, complexity theory and social capital. each provides a partial approach to explanations of social interactions. through focussing on social networking as a significant example of social interactions, we will demonstrate how the concepts can be linked and this linking brings potential for a clearer understanding of the processes through which this inclusive society may develop. one of the key questions of contemporary society is how to foster and develop social interactions which will lead to a strong and inclusive society, in short, a rich diverse cosmopolitan community in which people of diverse ethnic and other backgrounds interact and interconnect within the everyday life of the community. while we know that such an ideal cosmopolitan community is possible, and sometimes indeed occurs, we also know that this may be the exception rather than the rule in local communities. the question then becomes, if such a cosmopolitan community is possible, how does it occur? by what processes can we identify the formation of cosmopolitan networks? in order to answer these questions, we need to follow the process that begins with the casual interaction between strangers, the initial interaction between two or more individuals of different ethnic (or other) backgrounds. while many, perhaps most, of these interactions go no further, some may be repeated and extended to include others, thus forming an informal and embryonic network of “others”. we argue that sometimes these repeated social interactions are consolidated into wider and deeper relations of trust that form the basis of future collective action. this paper focuses on the micro processes of localised social interaction that may form the basis of larger, formalised systems of interaction. in order to explicate the basis on which this process occurs, we draw on three theoretical concepts which are used in the exploration of social interactions to suggest ways in which the interplay of these concepts might provide a 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 richer understanding of cosmopolitan formation. the three concepts are everyday cosmopolitanism, complexity theory and social capital. each provides a partial approach to explanations of the process. we hope to demonstrate how the concepts can each contribute to a greater understanding of the process of a cosmopolitan formation. introducing everyday cosmopolitanism cosmopolitanism is understood in a number of different ways. ‘citizen of the world’, a phrase whose meaning derives from the word cosmopolitan, has become part of a popular contemporary western vocabulary. inherent in this phrase are two strands of thought which underpin contemporary scholarly uses of the term. these are the philosophical or moral strand and the political strand. the classic conceptualisation of the cosmopolitan argues that an individual’s relationship with humanity at large is more important than relationships with others from the same state or nation. held’s cosmopolitanism “recognises each person as an autonomous moral agent entitled to equal dignity and consideration” (held 2010, p.15). he argues that cosmopolitanism is based on eight principles which he lists as: (i) equal worth and dignity; (ii) active agency: (iii) personal responsibility and accountability; (iv) consent; (v) collective decision-making about public matters through voting procedures; (vi) inclusiveness and subsidiarity; (vii) avoidance of serious harm; and (viii) sustainability (held 2010, p.69). a more nuanced approach may come from the notions of thick cosmopolitanism and thin cosmopolitanism which may lead to conceptualisations that are closer to experiences of lived realities, with thick cosmopolitanism existing when all moral claims are justified by showing that they give equal weight to the claims of all and thin cosmopolitanism existing when certain treatments are afforded to all regardless of relationships, but “other kinds of treatment [are given] only to those to whom we are related in certain ways…”(miller in held 2010, p. 78). appiah recognises the notions of universal concern and respect for difference, but acknowledges that there will be disagreement and conflict from time to time. he uses the notion of the conversation as a metaphor to present an understanding of cosmopolitanism, asserting that “cosmopolitans suppose that all cultures have enough overlap in their vocabulary of values to begin a conversation,” (appiah 2006, p.57) although this cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 49 “[c]onversation doesn’t have to lead to consensus about anything, especially not values; it’s enough that it helps people get used to one another.” (2006, p.85) for appiah, the starting point for a cross-cultural conversation does not have to be something universal, it just needs to be something the people in the conversation have in common. when we enter into such a conversation with a stranger, this is not a stranger in the abstract but a particular stranger, with whom we may be able to establish a bond of shared identity. the conversation then can become the starting point for understanding things which are not shared. a mark of the cosmopolitan is that they “enjoy” discovering differences and use this “cosmopolitan curiosity” to explore differences and learn from others, or to “simply be intrigued by alternative ways of thinking, feeling and acting” (2006, p.97). they also have the intelligence to look beyond the immediate differences or problem to try to take a broader perspective, seeing that features of their own context may be related to the creation of difference or to the problems of others (2006, p.168). beck insists on a break with what he considers the philosophical approach that held takes. rather, he envisages a cosmopolitanism which equates with praxis and is closer to a political construct. this cosmopolitanism arises from concrete social realities and recognises difference (beck and sznaider, p.386). it causes us to rethink nationalism and globalism, as well as the traditional and the modern. cosmopolitanism thus is a transformative concept, as it also includes the individual and the local alongside the global. for beck, the process of "cosmopolitanisation" should be the focus of concern. in his words, this means “the erosion of distinct boundaries dividing markets, states, civilizations, cultures, and not least of all the lifeworlds of different peoples” and it is important that this process takes place in the everyday lives of individuals (beck 2007). he contrasts multiculturalism, which he considers, “means that various ethnic groups live side by side within a single state” with cosmopolitanism. cosmopolitanism is about diversity rather than homogenisation but at the same time it is about coming together in social interactions. “to put it metaphorically: the walls between [individuals, groups, communities, political organisations, cultures, and civilisations] must be replaced by bridges. most importantly of all, such bridges must be erected in human minds, mentalities, and imaginations (the "cosmopolitan vision") (beck 2007). we will use the terms everyday multiculturalism and everyday cosmopolitanism interchangeably, reflecting the practice of 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 noble (2009) and wise and velayutham (2009) although the meaning will be closer to beck’s cosmopolitanism. within studies of australian multiculturalism, there has been a marked shift in the last two decades towards the ‘everyday’ as a focus of research. scholars of ‘everyday multiculturalism’ or ‘everyday cosmopolitanism’ (e.g. wise and velayutham 2009, noble 2009, butcher and harris 2010) have turned their attention to the grassroots, ordinary interactions that occur between people in their daily lives, focusing on social sites such as neighbourhoods, schools, workplaces and the like. these interactions, it is argued, represent a lived cosmopolitanism, which sees individuals of different cultures routinely negotiating across difference in order to coexist within a shared social space. in contrast to the multiculturalism of government policy, informed by older liberal notions of identity politics and group rights, at the everyday level, this literature argues, interactions are much more fluid and pragmatic. while official multiculturalism defines people by their (singular) ethnic identity, in practice, people’s identities are multi-layered, and in many cases, ethnic background may be much less important than one’s status as a young person, a parent, a local resident, or any number of other identifiers. the idea of everyday cosmopolitanism also departs from classical notions of cosmopolitanism as a universalistic vision for a transnational republican order, or a moral universalism (delanty 2006, pp. 27-28), but rather sees cosmopolitanism as situated in the social world, in the everyday processes that make up social life. delanty emphasises that contemporary cosmopolitanism must be post-universal, shaped by numerous particularisms rather than one underlying set of values (2009, p. 9). everyday cosmopolitanism is expressed in moments of interaction across difference, for example, when neighbours exchange home-grown vegetables and recipes (wise 2009, hiebert 2002) or gather for driveway discussions (gow 2005), when school children swap lunches and gifts (noble 2009), or when women shop and eat together and exchange cooking advice (duruz 2009). as semi et al. (2009, p. 69) write, focusing on everyday micropractices enables researchers to ‘resist the temptation to reify actions, relations and categories’. in all of these everyday examples, cultural difference is accepted as normal and unremarkable. exchanges of goods, information and care create ‘micro-moral economies’ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 51 (wise 2009, p. 26) that bring people together, to enable the ‘recognition or acknowledgement of otherness in situational specificity’ (wise 2009, p. 35). some social spaces are particularly conducive to this kind of cross-cultural interaction. pratt labels them ‘contact zones’, or spaces where ‘peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations’ (1992, p. 7). meanwhile, amin describes ‘micropublics of everyday social contact and encounter’ (2002, p. 959), places such as workplaces, schools, and sports clubs, where people are thrown together and required to engage with each other and work together in a common activity, in the process enabling ‘unnoticeable cultural questioning or transgression’ (2002, p. 969). critics of the everyday cosmopolitanism approach argue that beneath the celebratory descriptions of these spaces for cross-cultural encounter, there is little about the actual processes of how cosmopolitanism is being achieved (valentine 2008, p. 324). valentine warns of the danger of romanticising everyday encounters, arguing that not every encounter across cultural difference can be counted as ‘meaningful contact’, or contact that ‘actually changes values and translates beyond the specifics of the individual moment into a more general positive respect for – rather than merely tolerance of – others’ (valentine 2008, p. 325). she argues that norms of civility do not necessarily translate into genuine respect for the other, or necessarily lead to more meaningful exchange. crucially, she asks how the benefits of such encounters can be ‘scaled up’ beyond the moment (2008, p. 332). researchers of everyday cosmopolitanism therefore need a way of examining the conditions under which everyday encounters may be ‘scaled up’ into something stronger or longerlasting. this means paying close attention to the processes at work when everyday encounters do coalesce into something more permanent, for example, friendship networks or activist associations. obviously, most everyday encounters remain at the level of relatively superficial interactions, and it would be absurd to expect all of these to consolidate into a cohesive or purposive structure. however, to the extent that such structures can sometimes enable people to achieve their goals, it is important to understand how they are formed. anderson (2004, p. 21) describes the growth of ‘neutral social settings’ in cities, ‘which no one group expressly owns but all are encouraged to share’, whether they are markets, parks, malls or hospital waiting rooms. these spaces provide a ‘cosmopolitan canopy’ where people 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 are enabled to relax their guard and interact across cultural difference. race and ethnicity are ‘salient but understated’ (2004, p. 18). anderson suggests that repeated exposure to the unfamiliar provides people the opportunity to ‘stretch themselves mentally, emotionally, and socially’ (2004, p. 29) and anticipates that the model of civility planted in these settings ‘may well have a chance to sprout elsewhere in the city’ (2004, p. 29). other scholars emphasise the important role played by key individuals in bringing people together. wise (2009, p. 24) describes ‘transversal enablers’, or local personalities who ‘go out of their way to create connections between culturally different residents in their local area’, often through exchanges of gifts and knowledge to produce relationships of care and trust. meanwhile, noble discusses the ‘labour of community’ (2009, p. 53), emphasising that producing connection between people is hard work, done by individuals with high levels of ‘bridging capital’ or ‘network capital’ (noble 2009, p. 55). in other words, these are people with knowledge of more than one social group, and are adept at facilitating connection and collaboration. in spite of these glimpses into the processes of everyday cosmopolitanism, there has been little or no attempt to theorise how everyday cosmopolitanism is achieved in overall terms. this is where complexity theory becomes useful. introducing complexity theory we have identified that “everyday cosmopolitanism” concerns the pragmatic everyday negotiation across ethnic and other boundaries by individuals. at this point, no larger collective or social project is intended, nor would we talk about social networks. in order to understand how social networks may form, we turn to complexity theory. this theory can help explain how small, seemingly random, events can coalesce into emergent patterns without a central controller. when talking about human action this refers to the emergence of new networks and collective action formed from the myriad interpersonal encounters independent of any external authority. when applied to cosmopolitanism, complexity theory provides us with a starting point to trace connections between individuals within a social space, through a process based view of understanding everyday interactions. when analysing the social system, cilliers (1998) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 53 focuses on the need to examine the connectedness or dynamic flows between systems. a “connectionist approach” is where the important characteristics are “distributedness, selforganisation and the operation of local information without central control” (cilliers 1998, p. 141). through a connectionist approach the aim is to understand how ‘lived experiences’ within micro communities build or destroy civility, rather than to derive grand sociological narratives regarding cosmopolitanism. griffin et al (1998) argue that the most important implications of complexity theory are situated within the manner through which everyday conversations construct the social realities into which people act. a connectionist approach applied to everyday cosmopolitanism turns the focus to the everyday interactions occurring between individuals within a civil space. yet the principles of complex systems provide insight into how patterns of interactions may scale up into observable system level behaviours (such as the emergence of a collective, neighbourhood centre or temporary community event). whilst the application of complexity theory to the social sciences is largely debated, noted theorists byrne (1998) and cilliers (1998) agree upon several widely accepted principles for understanding complex social systems, explaining the nature of complex systems. table 1 (below) summarises these key principles for complex systems. considering these principles in light of everyday cosmopolitanism maybe useful for understanding how interactions between individuals and groups within particular social settings emerge and under what conditions they translate into other forms of meaningful social action or social change. these features are emergence, non linearity and self-organisation. table 1: principles for complex systems (adapted from gallopin et al. 2001, p. 225). multiplicity of legitimate perspectives: need to take into account multiple stakeholder viewpoints. non-linearity: relationships are non-linear resulting in a magnitude of effects not being proportional to the magnitude of the causes. emergence: the “whole is more than the sum of its parts…true novelty can emerge from the interaction between the elements of the system”. self-organisation: the phenomenon by which interacting components compete to produce largescale coordinated structures and behaviour. multiplicity of scales: hierarchic nature in that each element of the system is a sub-system of a smaller-order system, and the system itself is part of a larger ‘supra-system’. there may be strong interactions between levels and different rates of change within levels. implying plurality and uncertainty. irreducible uncertainty: reflexive social systems are capable of their own observation and analysis becoming part of the activity of the system, but also capable to influence it in certain ways. this may be through purposive, deterministic behaviour, or less predictable chaotic forms. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 one of the key features of complexity theory is emergence (chiles et al. 2004). emergence enables us to look beyond extant notions such as class, culture and identity, but rather to focus upon interactions between individuals within a given micropublic. through understanding how and under what conditions patterns of everyday interactions self-organise to build purposive forms of collective action, or cluster to establish more stable organisational forms (such as shared interest groups), emergence explains “how system-level order spontaneously arises from the action and repeated interaction of lower level system components without intervention by a central controller” (chiles et al. 2004, p. 501). self-organisation is the principle that explains the capacity of a complex system to change and adapt to its external environment. such organisation may emerge through bottom-up locally situated interactions. according to cilliers (1998) “the capacity for self-organisation is a property of complex systems which enables them to develop or change internal structure spontaneously and adaptively in order to cope with, or manipulate, their environment”. applied to everyday cosmopolitanism this principle explains how information exchanged between individuals within micropublics houses the potential for a process of adaptation to the environmental conditions and an adaptive self-organisation structure. critical feedback loops allow the interacting networks to constantly evolve in response to the changing environment. it is largely because of this fluid capacity for self organisation that what happens between individuals within simple interactions is greater than the sum of the individual interactions. this principle complements the critique of the philosophical or moral cosmopolitanism, reinforcing that proposed by beck, and provides greater depth to the understanding of everyday cosmopolitanism. we can identify the development of cosmopolitan networks as situated within the everyday process of building, moving and destroying bridges. individuals constantly reflect, enact and adapt their interactions with others through information and understanding received through feedback loops enforced through conversation, the media...etc. yet the sum of the parts cannot predict the whole due to the non-linear system dynamic. emergence cannot be predicted, nor can self-organisation be predetermined. as feltz writes, ‘its naive formulation is that the whole is more than the sum of its parts’ (feltz, 2006, p. 353) and there are four main variations related to interpretations of ‘more than’ in the above definition. that constitutive elements are non-additive, that novelty arises out of the interrelations between constituting elements, the patterns of emergence are non-deductible, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 55 and finally that elements evolve in a non-predictable manner. that is, they are non-linear systems (a small divergence in initial conditions leads to significant difference in the evolution of the entire systems, which is evolutionary and unpredictable). examining the macro-phenomenon cannot give sufficient insight into the emergence phenomenon. but studying locally situated interactions may provide insight into how micro level builds meaningful interactions between individuals and groups within communities. according to griffin and stacey: it is not possible for committed groups of individuals to intentionally change the widespread patterning of their interaction. all they can change is their own interactions, and from this the widespread patterning will emerge in ways that they cannot intend or fully understand….the aim of the method is, therefore, not one of changing the social ‘wholes’ but of making sense of the ‘live’ experience of interaction. as people make sense differently they act differently, and it is this action, in continuing interaction with others, that macro patterns change in emergent ways which cannot be predicted or controlled” (2005, p. 33). through examining multiple situated micropublics and the interactions occurring every day we may begin to view some temporary patterns of emergence, or identify some common factors that ignite more purposive action. we can generate propositions regarding how cosmopolitanisation may generate emergent civil societies, rather than reinforce existing patterns of entrenched diversity where ‘like’ individuals self select into clusters. complexity theory, as a bottom-up process based view, sees individuals within communities interrelating with one another rather than starting with macro sociological notions of class and ethnicity. this leads us towards adopting a modified grounded theory approach, because it remains open to the possibility of emergence and, enables us to interpret: human beings as active agents in their lives and their worlds rather than as recipients of larger social forces….that process, not structure, [is] fundamental to human existence; indeed human beings created structures through engaging in processes (charmaz 2006, p. 7). within the context of civil society, our concern is with the coalescing of relationships, between individuals who may be operating as individuals or as members of organisations. this coalescing of relationships creates a fertile milieu out of which may emerge new ideas, formations and intentions for collaborative action. there is an ongoing process from individual agency to creative milieu to emergent network structures and ultimately to formal 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 adaptive organisational forms. thus when we apply complexity principles to people living with a common space several new factors come into play. humans: • act with intentionality, at least some of the time. their actions are purposeful. • act within a social milieu. that is their actions involve others, and are meaningful within that social setting. • act within a set of supposed common values. in light of the earlier discussion, complexity theory suggests a number of crucial dynamics that may explain the process of the self-organising emergence of human networks. first, they emerge out of states of disequilibrium, or a tension between disequilibrium and equilibrium in the wider context (plowman et al, 2007). the early stages of emergence are likely to be marked by conflict, not only between the member agents and some wider social or political issue or event, but also between the member agents themselves. the state of disequilibrium generates a new, creative milieu allowing the emergence of new social formations and the potential to generate innovative solutions to perceived social problems. second, this state of disequilibrium draws human agents together. these agents may be individuals, or organisations or both. these agents interact, discuss, and explore options for action. many consequent actions are small and localised, involving the active initiative of concerned agents. some of these actions will lead nowhere, but others appear promising, and are communicated to others through positive feedback loops in the embryonic network, which at this stage is little more than a fertile milieu for action. others hear about the actions and discussions, through word of mouth and/or electronic technologies, and/or media reports. someone, usually a group, calls a meeting, and a network emerges as various agents share information and agree to further action. thus, conflict can be both destructive, but also highly productive in generating new forms of social action. the media (including social media) can be involved in both escalating conflict, but also in bringing people together to find new solutions. one example of this is provided by the 2005 cronulla riots in sydney, which saw approximately 5,000 young, largely white australians gather to ‘take back the beach’, and violently assault anyone perceived to be of ‘middle eastern appearance’. the riots marked a low point in australian multiculturalism, but the subsequent months and years saw numerous community-based responses bringing cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 57 people of diverse backgrounds together in joint initiatives. the most prominent of these was the $1 million on the same wave program of surf lifesaving to encourage young muslim australians to become surf lifesavers (sls 2011). other initiatives included the bankstownbased urban theatre projects ‘stories of love and hate’, a theatre production bringing together youth from the bankstown and sutherland areas to create narratives about their experiences of the riots and belonging in multicultural australia (sydney theatre company 2011). finally, the cronulla riots gave rise to a number of school exchange programs between students from the bankstown and sutherland areas, who visited each others’ schools and learnt about each others’ cultures and histories (reid 2011, burridge & chodkiewicz 2010, 2008). multiple lines of positive and negative feedback loops (cilliers 2005, p. 8) are crucial in establishing new modes of operating. that is, through action and interaction people start to develop a collective sense of who they are and how they can cooperate, as well as what actions are not positive and should be avoided. at some stage it is essential that some actions lead to some sort of positive outcome, perhaps partial and temporary, but enough to motivate others. such results must be communicated to others in the network. the discussion and forms of actions are volatile and full of uncertainty and potential conflict. sometimes, conflict may in fact be productive and a source of innovation, for example, when organisations are challenged to become more inclusive towards new constituencies. surf lifesaving becoming more mindful of encouraging a culturally diverse membership is one example. however, while disequilibrium may be welcomed and further encouraged, there are also counter forces towards some sort of new equilibrium. stability within the embryonic network is dependent on the development of ‘deep structures’ involving shared intrinsic values, and operating principles of the participants. these are attained through the positive and negative feedback loops and held within the dissipated, ‘collective memory’ (cilliers 1998) of the emergent network. normally these will be articulated in terms of a common set of principles or objectives signed off by all participating agents. thus creative turbulence is contained within an agreed broad set of objectives that are shared. complexity theory in human systems gives leadership a central place, but where adaptive leadership is dynamic and “is the product of interaction, tension, and exchange rules governing changes in perceptions and understanding” (lichtenstein et al. 2006). this 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 approach to leadership is in marked contrast to the classical organisational model of leadership which emphasises hierarchy and control (chiles et al. 2004). such classical views of leadership rest on the assumption “of organisations as equilibrium seeking systems whose futures are knowable and arrived at by leaders who plan interventions and control behaviors” (plowman et al. 2007, p. 341). by contrast, within complexity theory, leadership should not be viewed as individuals operating in isolation as they influence their followers, or in terms of individual traits. leadership is seen as an emergent phenomenon that arises from interactions and events (lichtenstein et al. 2006). a similar approach (surie & hazy 2006) argues that, with respect to innovation, generative leaders create conditions that nurture it rather than direct or control it. in a similar manner, some forms of collective entrepreneurship, involve emergent and/ or dispersed leadership in a social context. this is complementary to the ‘enablers’ identified in the everyday cosmopolitanism literature (wise 2009). we argue that the vast majority of civil society networks are formed from below, emergent from the dynamic and creative turmoil which is driven by social disequilibrium and the search for new responses to current issues and problems. not all networks will become fully fledged and recognised forms. all such emergent networks will go through a period of formation, much of which will be invisible to the outsider, and lack any coherent shape. other embryonic networks may remain as informal friendship networks or loose connections between residents of a given area. such loose networks may remain dormant for most of the time, but have the potential to be activated into more formal networks in the event of an emergency, or need for political action in defence of a threatened amenity. how can we theorise the dynamics of formal networks? the next section uses the concept of social capital to address this question. but first, to recapitulate: complexity thinking can provide a new and deeper perspective on the phenomenon of everyday cosmopolitanism. the latter provides some insight into the banal, frequent everyday interactions between ethnically diverse individuals in various micropublics. these encounters are routine, and cultural difference is seen as normal and unremarkable. however, most of these interactions lead no further than the immediate pragmatic needs of the participants. sometimes however, these interactions may be repeated and there is at least the potential for a scaling up of the isolated encounter into something more substantial. complexity thinking suggests how this may occur. however, there is still cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 59 something missing. ongoing social networks are more than random encounters. they are relations of ongoing trust and mutual support, and potentially of collective social action. to understand more about established social networks and how they function, we need to incorporate findings from the social capital literature. introducing social capital social capital can be seen as the outcome of human complex systems as they emerge and adapt without reference to a central controller. social capital refers to human networks of interaction by which energy and information is shared. these interactions are non-linear, multiple, dependent on ongoing feedback loops, and develop a shared history which partly shapes ongoing purposeful interactions. social capital resides within the network as a whole, not within any individual component of it, although individuals may gain benefit from membership in the network. of central significance for human complex systems is a sense of shared social purpose and common values. putnam (1993) defined social capital as “those features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”. bourdieu (1985, p. 248) defined the concept as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition”. for bourdieu, social capital was a core strategy in preserving and transmitting the cultural capital of the elite. because all forms of capital can be converted into other (primarily economic) capital, social capital was simply one way of preserving class advantage. however other theorists, including coleman and putnam, see social capital as a resource (often the primary resource) that is open to all groups and communities. elements of social capital as evidenced by the ongoing definitional debates surrounding the concept, it is clear that social capital is itself a complex, multi-dimensional concept. the key aspects of the concept have gradually emerged from the theoretical and empirical analyses. these include: associational density within the community – this is one of the key indicators of the structural aspect of social capital as commonly measured (putnam 1993, 2000; portes 1998). community based organisations and associations (including economic, social and environmental enterprises) may facilitate effective responses to crisis or change. a critical mass of cooperating organisations can stimulate creative, resource efficient efforts to achieve 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 common community objectives. while development within and between community-based organisations can lead to instrumental outcomes in terms of completed community projects, participation in these organisations can also build individual and community capacity, thereby contributing to the development of the other capacity indicators discussed here. associational density is an outcome of the ongoing process of social capital formation. it is the product of deliberate and formalised interactions within community networks formed over time. participation in community life – this concerns process rather than structure: signs that people are involved in their community. it involves formal membership in community organisations, but also the informal assistance to neighbours and willingness to engage with community action as needed, on an informal basis (onyx and bullen 2000). shared norms and values – not all values need to be shared but a sense of common purpose is a critical factor in catalysing renewal efforts. the very process of coming together to develop community priorities can provide the impetus for sustained collaborative relationships. the identification of priorities also provides goals which, when achieved, provide a point of reflection for celebration and further learning about how to meet other objectives (leonard & onyx 2004). any sustained collaborative network will depend on not only common priorities and goals, but also a set of agreed operating rules or norms for action. these provide a set of rules for how to operate within the network, but they can also provide barriers to outsiders. trust – involves more than predictability; it entails a level of comfort and positive mutuality in interpersonal relations (fukuyama 1995; misztral 1996). signs of trust in the community include a low crime rate. communities are rarely homogeneous and the acknowledgement of difference and the way conflict is dealt with can foster or destroy trust. agency – all the evidence points to the significance of agency or a “can do” attitude in within the social network (onyx and bullen 2000a; johannisson and olaison 2007; williams and guerra 2011). human interaction is marked by intentionality. it is not enough simply to maintain networks of mutual support. what is also required is that they be mobilised into action, that is, that human complex systems may take the initiative in their own development. communities that assume control over their own destiny are better able to deal with crises cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 61 and natural disasters, as well as their own disadvantage. what is important is resilience, a capacity to act, and to learn from this action. social capital is about the connections between people, the rules they agree to follow together and the trust they have for others. if these connections are strong, then the network and the community in which they live and work can achieve much. collective agency, a “can do” attitude, makes many things possible. to the extent that individuals and groups operate within different contexts and arenas, the density of the networks and the bridging links between networks increases. the connections, the networks and the arenas themselves are dynamic, constantly forming, reforming, shifting over time (onyx and bullen 2000b, p. 128). thus social capital, in its dynamic interpretation, is more about process than structure. networks are constantly forming and reforming; the process is iterative in that further use may enhance the capacity for trust, reciprocity and social agency. however, social capital theory in itself, while useful, does not explain how these networks come to be formed in the first place. complexity theory and the concept of emergence are important as they allow us to focus on the micro-level interactions between individuals. but an understanding of how mature networks operate is also important. for this reason, both complexity thinking and social capital are integral to understanding the formation of ongoing cosmopolitan networks in the local community. relationships of social capital to everyday cosmopolitanism and complexity theory to summarise thus far, everyday cosmopolitanism reflects the ordinary interactions that occur between individuals of different cultures routinely negotiating across difference in order to coexist within a shared social space; complexity theory helps explain the process by which complex self organising networks emerge; while social capital describes the potential impact of mature ongoing networks within human communities. while the three concepts address different phenomena, they are all concerned with the process of social interaction as well as the potential result of ongoing interaction. all identify the central role of active agency and personal responsibility. the three concepts also identify the importance of some form of positive feedback loops, that potentially increase (or decrease) the available trust. however, the process of interaction is not a linear one, but is rather one that emerges through negotiation from the perspective of everyday cosmopolitanism and through the iterations that 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 lead to emergence in complexity theory. the formation of networks is central to each of these concepts. as outlined above, everyday cosmopolitanism is the normal, everyday, banal interaction of citizens across linguistic and cultural boundaries. such interactions involves the everyday negotiation between individuals as they go about their business within shopping malls, public transport, schools and leisure centres. they are seen as unremarkable by those engaging in them, and they do not necessarily lead to the formation of ongoing or formalised networks. but they may do so under certain circumstances, and indeed the growing literature on everyday cosmopolitanism suggests that they often do generate informal and formal networks. complexity theory describes how they do so. there is no general agreement that living in a diverse neighbourhood will lead to tolerance as allport proposed (1954). putnam (2007), for example, argued that empirical evidence suggests that diverse communities display lower ethnic tolerance than mono-cultural ones do, that is that linguistic and cultural diversity do not expand cosmopolitanism. uslaner (2010) found, using trust as an indicator of everyday cosmopolitanism, that trust was lower where people of different ethnicities inhabit the same geographic area but where contact between them is nonetheless limited due to segregated clusters of housing. however, in neighbourhoods that were both culturally diverse and where people did not live in segregated clusters of housing, trust levels were much higher. there is also no general agreement that taking part in shared activities will lead to the formation of networks. both noble (2009) and wise (2009) describe actual empirical exemplars of early formation of informal networks. the example used by wise involves the development of shared information and energy between neighbours in sydney. this emerging network revolved around the sharing of domestic plants and recipes required for the preparation of meals that were italian, lebanese and indian. in this example of everyday cosmopolitanism, we have what started out as a series of simple transactions between individuals. but the transactions were repeated, and expanded to involve other neighbours over time. the emergent network gradually developed a shared history, a set of shared interests (values around food) and a growing sense of trust and mutual participation/ reciprocal assistance. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 63 thus, the sustained practices of everyday cosmopolitanism may lead to networking and the creation of trust. and the creation of trust may lead a network to organise activities which encourage collaboration for mutual benefit, for example, clearing a local laneway of weeds. it could lead to the creation of a group presence, for example if one neighbour suggests that others involved in everyday interactions join together to attend a local multicultural centre or if someone organises a street festival. at this point, there may be no obvious leadership involved, but clearly there is agency. leadership may emerge at the next step, which is likely to be the establishment of an associational identity. although complexity theory provides insight into the process of emergence, and everyday cosmopolitanism is concerned with everyday practices, social capital recognises the importance of associations in the sustainability of social capital within a community. in highly culturally diverse cities, such as sydney, there are countless examples of everyday cosmopolitan interactions evolving in a decentralised manner into more or less formalised networks. these networks are likely to coalesce around issues of shared interest or shared concern, not diversity per se. the catalyst for action may be a perceived gap in services within a community, a critical incident that may demand a community response or an institutional policy directive that requires action. one of many examples is the rise of resident action groups. these groups gained widespread prominence in the city of sydney in the 1970s when developers unions and residents confronted each other against the backdrop of the city skyline. the issues transcended class and ethnicity, age and gender. one example of local resident action was the no aircraft noise campaign in sydney’s inner west. meanwhile, sydney’s western suburbs are seeing a proliferation of culturally diverse, self-organised youth artistic networks, particularly those associated with hip hop, film-making and other urban arts (see vanni 2011). some of these actions culminated in the urban theatre project mentioned earlier. perhaps the most dramatic example of the coalescing of various diverse interests and backgrounds can be seen in the formation of the sydney alliance (sydney alliance 2011), which is itself an alliance of various religious groups, unions, and a variety of people and groups of different ethnic origin. conclusion in all of these examples, people from diverse cultures have come together to pursue common interests, and in the process, transcending cultural borders and rendering difference 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 unremarkable. in some cases, social networks have proven more or less durable, and have been productive in enabling individuals to achieve shared goals. in other cases, these networks have become more institutionalised, and have attracted official recognition or support. but understanding the emergence of the networks requires close attention to the processes of interaction between key individuals within specific social settings. in this sense, concepts of everyday cosmopolitanism, complexity theory and social capital can, together, provide a productive framework for analysing these processes of network formation. this is not to say that all such examples of everyday cosmopolitanism will ultimately lead to prolonged and meaningful social change. clearly most do not. most casual interactions remain casual, superficial, instrumental to the specific intentions of those individuals. however, even these casual exchanges are valuable in rendering ethnic diversity unremarkable, and so facilitating social tolerance. but some interactions may lead further to ongoing networks of trust and informal neighbourliness. these networks are also in a sense unremarkable, but together help form an inclusive and productive community. some networks go still further and develop into more institutionalised, formal groups. some may become ongoing interest groups, while some may become activist groups with a social change agenda. we are not suggesting such a linear succession occurs, yet we open the question regarding how, when and even does everyday interaction emerge into different forms of social networks. we have outlined three conceptual frameworks that together may help explain how ethnically diverse citizens may come to form ongoing networks within the community. this framework provides a research agenda. it remains to be established that the casual interactions of “everyday cosmopolitanism” can in fact be taken further to the formation of stable and purposeful networks and ultimately to social change. we do not yet understand the conditions under which this is most likely to happen. we have much in the way of rich descriptions of everyday encounters. building on this research requires an understanding of when and how these encounters can have a more lasting legacy. we propose that applying complexity theory and theories of social capital can be productive in this endeavour. together the application of this theoretical frame may assist in specifying how social interactions may lead to a strong, 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(ed.) social capital and public policy in australia. pp. 105-135. plowman, d., solansky, s., beck, t., baker, l, kulkarni, m., travis, d. 2007, ‘the role of leadership in emergent, self-organization’, the leadership quarterly, vol.18, pp. 341356. pratt, m. l. 1992, imperial eyes, routledge, london. putnam, r. 1993, making democracy work: civic traditions in modern italy, princeton university press, princeton, new jersey. putnam, r. 2000, bowling alone: the collapse and revival of american community, simon and schuster, new york. putman, r. 2007, e pluribus unum: diversity and community in the twenty-first century: the 2006 johan skytte prize lecture, scandinavian political studies, vol. 30, pp.137-174. reid, c. 2010, ‘will the 'shire' ever be the same again? schooling responses to the cronulla beach riot’, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no. 1, pp. 47-62. semi, g., colombo, e., camozzi, i., & frisina, a. 2009., ‘practices of difference: analysing multiculturalism in everyday life’, in wise, a. and velayutham, s. 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(eds.) complex systems leadership theory: new perspectives from complexity science on social and organizational effectiveness, isce publishing, mansfield, ma., pp. 349-366. http://www.noaircraftnoise.org.au/� http://www.sls.com.au/who-we-are/community-programs/inclusion/on-the-same-wave� http://www.sls.com.au/who-we-are/community-programs/inclusion/on-the-same-wave� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 67 sydney alliance 2011, ‘sydney greets its alliance’, online, accessed 4 november 2011 http://www.sydneyalliance.org.au/news/2011/09/16/lets-make-the-city-greater-the-sydneyalliance-has-founded/ sydney theatre company 2011, ‘stories of love and hate’, http://www.sydneytheatre.com.au/stced/2011/stories-of-love-and-hate, accessed: 4 november 2011. uslaner, e. 2010, diversity, segregation, trust and altruism. paper delivered to cosmopolitan civil societies, university of technology sydney. valentine, g. 2008, ‘living with difference: reflections on geographies of encounter’, progress in human geography, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 323-337. vanni, i. forthcoming, ‘walking in the suburbs: networks and affective borders in the work of young australian film makers’, in axford , b. and huggins, r., cultures and/of globalization, cambridge scholar press, cambridge. williams, k. and guerra, n. 2011, ‘perceptions of collective efficacy and bullying perpetuation in schools’, social problems, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 126-143. wise, a. 2009, ‘everyday multiculturalism: transversal crossings and working class cosmpolitanisms’, in wise, a. and velayutham, s. (eds.),everyday multiculturalism, palgrave macmillan, london, pp. 21-45. wise, a. and s. velayutham (eds.) 2009, everyday multiculturalism, palgrave macmillan, london. http://www.sydneyalliance.org.au/news/2011/09/16/lets-make-the-city-greater-the-sydney-alliance-has-founded/� http://www.sydneyalliance.org.au/news/2011/09/16/lets-make-the-city-greater-the-sydney-alliance-has-founded/� http://www.sydneytheatre.com.au/stced/2011/stories-of-love-and-hate� jenny onyx, christina ho, melissa edwards, nina burridge, hilary yerbury university of technology, sydney elements of social capital relationships of social capital to everyday cosmopolitanism and complexity theory cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 i issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia exploring cosmopolitanism one of the consequences of globalisation has been an increase in the global movement of people. more people are moving to another country than at any previous time in history, comprising what castles and miller call the ‘age of migration’. not only are the numbers of immigrants increasing, albeit suffering a slight reversion of the trend in the years following the global financial crisis, but the diversity of immigrant intakes has also increased. some contemporary immigrants are millionaire business migrants or health and financial professionals who fly first or business class to reach their destination city, for most migration reinforces urbanisation. other immigrants come with skills and qualifications that are in short supply in their host country. some come to settle and take up citizenship while others in one chapter of what is a global journal of circular migration where skills and qualifications-indemand are a global passport to mobility. others are temporary immigrants with short stay visas designed to allow migrant labour to fill labour shortages that might soon disappear as globalisation restructures the economy of nations, throwing up new industries while devouring or relocating others. some are unwanted, undocumented immigrants who risk their lives, and hat of their families, to escape conflict, persecution, poverty, tyranny, flood or famine to seek a new life as a refugee or part of the shadow-life of the underground economy. of course the international movement of people has predated nation states, and is as old as history itself. as a consequence, the peoples of most nations are characterised by cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity to varying degrees. in many cases, minority immigrant populations suffer from discrimination and racism, stereotyping and distancing from the majority population, themselves often the products of immigration flows decades or centuries ago. immigration and immigrant populations are, almost universally, controversial and politicised, with right-wing anti-immigration political parties gaining momentum. in western counties like britain and germany, multiculturalism has recently been proclaimed as a failure by prime minister cameron and chancellor merkel. in australia, a nation that has embraced multiculturalism since the 1970s, issues of the ‘boat people’ and citizenship have dominated the political landscape in the last decade. ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 issues of immigrant identity and belonging, particularly related to muslim immigrant communities, have occupied a central place in political and academic debate in recent decades. as a consequence there has been a re-interrogation of the concept of cosmopolitanism and its appropriateness as a theoretical framework to progress a theoretical understanding of, and a political resolution of, the politics of diversity in contemporary societies. in the last decade the literature on cosmopolitanism has flourished, with a lively debate emerging on the concept and theory of cosmopolitanism and its appropriateness for understanding and dealing with issues of diversity in western and non-western contemporary societies. as baruti argues in ‘cosmopolitanism with a twist’, the lead article in this special issue on cosmopolitanism, ‘cosmopolitanism has made a spectacular comeback to save the day’. but cosmopolitanism has also generated a great deal of noise from the arguments as to whether the glass of cosmopolitanism is half full or half empty which, baruti argues, is causing such a stir that it is defeating its harmonious purpose. her paper reviews the definition of and theory of cosmopolitanism from its historical origins (from the early greeks to kant) to its contemporary theorists, canvassing concepts of mutual affinity, ethnogamy and cosmopoliteness. baruti calls for a time-out in the debate, proposing what she calls a cosmopolitan-approach to cosmopolitanism. the cultural turn in the humanities and social sciences is the point of departure for stephanie lawson and her article ‘cosmopolitan pluralism: beyond the cultural turn’. with its critique of universalist ideas developed in european political and social thought, the cultural turn has focussed on the pluralism and difference within political communities and between them and on the instability if not the impossibility of foundations for knowledge. lawson argues that the cultural turn’s deep-seated opposition to virtually all forms of universalism leads to a strong critique of and often rejection of cosmopolitanism. this outcome, she suggests, is a consequence of the fact that the conceptions of culture embodies in this critique are derived mainly from the discipline of anthropology. this tendency has meant the concept of culture embodies in the humanist tradition has been either ignored or rejected. lawson makes the case for a reconsideration of what the humanist tradition can contribute to the conceptualization of culture and its deployment in political thought and action. such rethinking can lead to the development of a conception of cosmopolitan pluralism that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 iii continues to value difference and particularity while remaining committed to a conception of humanity. in australia, multiculturalism has been the philosophical and policy framework for dealing with cultural diversity for nearly four decades if we date its arrival with the whitlam labor government’s immigration minister, al grassby. from the heyday of multiculturalism under the fraser, hawke and keating governments, the policy content of, and institutional framework for, multiculturalism was substantially dismantled under the conservative howard government. the successive labor governments of rudd and gillard have partially resurrected multiculturalism, though without the apparent enthusiasm of the hawke and keating labor governments. in the ministry announced by gillard following her marginally successful federal election in 2010, no minister or parliamentary secretary had formal responsibility for multiculturalism, an event unthinkable in the last quarter of the 20th century. this oversight was later rectified when kate lundy was renamed parliamentary secretary for immigration and multicultural affairs and a new commitment to multiculturalism in the form of the australian multiculturalism council was established in august 2011. one of the problems with australian multiculturalism is that it has been established on the foundation of essentialist notions of ethnicity, ethnic community and australian identity. in their article ‘scaling up connections: everyday cosmopolitanism, complexity theory & social capital’, jenny onyx and her colleagues take as their point of departure the weakness of the homogenisation of ethnicity in australia and the need to explore a more cosmopolitan vision of a society comprising of changing and multiple social networks. using the concept of everyday cosmopolitanism embedded within the theory of social capital and complexity theory they emphasise the importance on conducting research into ‘the grassroots, ordinary interactions that occur between people in their daily lives, focusing on social sites such as neighbourhoods, schools, workplaces and the like’. this provides us with an understanding of ‘a lived cosmopolitanism, which sees individuals of different cultures routinely negotiating across difference in order to coexist within a shared social space’, something not possible within the existing framework of australian multiculturalism. in his article ‘playing the triangle: cosmopolitanism, cultural capital and social capital as intersecting scholarly discourses about social inclusion and marginalisation in australian iv cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 public policy debates’, andrew jakubowicz explores a similar terrain. he compares the usefulness of the concepts of cosmopolitanism, cultural capital and social capital for understanding recent multiculturalism debates, the social ecology of young muslim australians and chinese politics in australia. critics of immigration and multiculturalism often point to the anti-social behaviour of immigrant youth and their lack of connectedness to and identification with the host society. in their article ‘identities, aspirations and belonging of cosmopolitan youth in australia’ jock collins, carol reid and charlotte fabiansson draw on a survey of 340 young men and women most of whom were first or second generation immigrants living in west and south western sydney to explore issues related to aspirations, social networks, belonging and identity. they conclude that these immigrant youth are not disaffected, isolated, fearful and angry but that they are, in the main, hopeful and optimistic. they hold strongly to values of family, friendship, loyalty and trust, but claim cosmopolitan, hybrid identities that reflect the cultural diversity of their family’s history. one critique of cosmopolitanism it that it is elitist and western, resonating only with the lives of ‘business class cosmopolites’ and having nothing to do with ordinary people in western societies let alone any relevance for the rest of the peoples of the globe. yet this critique ignores the long-standing cosmopolitan history of countries in asia, latin america and africa and the cosmopolitan history of working class trade union and labour movements. in her article ‘tracing southern cosmopolitanisms: the intersecting networks of islam, trade unions, gender & communism, 1945-1965’ heather goodall takes as a point of departure the historical cosmopolitanism of indonesian and indian society and of working class peoples. she recounts the relationships among working class australians, indonesians and indians in the aftermath of an intense political struggle of the maritime trade unions in australia from 1945 to 1949 in support of indonesian independence. drawing in particular on the history of rabindranath tagore, tan malaka, phyllis johnson and sylvia mullins, goodall argues that they had been brought together by intersections between the networks established through colonialism, like trade unions, communism and feminism, with those having much longer histories, like islam. their political networks have a vision in 1945 of future universal and transnational networks across the indian ocean that today might be called cosmopolitanism. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 v one feature of the recent literature on cosmopolitanism is the diversity of disciplinary backgrounds and research tradition is on which it draws. in her article ‘i-witnessing; reflections on cosmopolitanism in kigali’ hilary yerbury uses auto-ethnography iwitnessing to recount her experiences with a rwandan woman and her family in kigali, rwanda, as a lens for understanding cosmopolitanism. drawing on cosmopolitan theory and using concepts such as the guest, the stranger, the cosmopolite and cosmopolitan curiosity, yerbury recounts her discussions with her informant, louise, and reflects on her experiences with louise’s household during her stay at a time replete with family emotion and turmoil. stefano mercanti’s article ‘displacing androcracy: cosmopolitan partnerships in bapsi sidhwa’s water’ reflects on cosmopolitanism through his critical analysis of the novel water, based on the film of the same name and published in 2006. water was set in the 30s at the time of gandhi’s freedom movement against the british raj. both the written text and film versions were very controversial. there were riots when first attempts were made to shoot the film in the holy city of varanasi while effigies of the film director, deepa mehta, an independent film maker born in india and living in canada since 1973, were burnt as one militant protester attempted suicide by jumping into the ganges, resulting in a change of location for the film. mercanti explores these reactions to the film and it makers and their powerful social critique of the book and the film, particularly social mores regarding the status of women. mercanti argues that water has been making waves in projecting multiple cosmopolitan trajectories in the ways the filming and the writing of its story have been crossing over local and national boundaries, religious and political alliances. this study contributes to the current cosmopolitan debate by highlighting equal recognition and inclusion as a viable moral engagement towards diversity, through which dominator binary rankings are transcended by valuing mutually empathic relationships. set against the backdrop of gandhi’s freedom movement, water pushes the boundaries of india’s maledominant cultural narratives beyond patriarchal predicaments by questioning the religious tradition and the oppressive constraints imposed on hindu widows. by applying riane eisler’s ‘partnership model’ to the analysis of the novel, with a brief reference to deepa mehta’s homonymous film, mercanti explores how sidhwa’s characters move toward more caring and life-enhancing scenarios by portraying relationships of mutual support, thus overcoming the rigid discourses imposed by dominator hierarchies. vi cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 tracey dowdeswell explores the roots of contemporary cosmopolitan theory in the writings of immanuel kant in her article ‘cosmopolitanism, custom, and complexity: kant's cosmopolitan norms in action ‘. her particular concern is to link the contemporary critique of the western and eurocentric nature of cosmopolitanism and hence its incompatibility with cultural pluralism to the universal norms such as hospitality, reciprocity, and publicity (transparency and free political participation) that were identified by kant. her paper attempts to address these criticisms of cosmopolitanism by studying examples of cosmopolitan norms in action. her aim is to demonstrate that cosmopolitan norms can be found in a diverse array of human communities and cultures and that they are not only compatible with pluralism, but are instrumental in its success and vitality. dowdeswell claims that the flourishing of the civil societies she draws on as examples to support her argument shows that the adoption of cosmopolitan norms are strongly correlated with successful outcomes and well-being. jon marshall, in his article ‘cosmopolitan sophistry: grounding politics in disorder and uncertainty’ goes back to the roots of cosmopolitanism in plato and before plato to explore insights which he claims can be useful to social theorists and cosmopolitans generally. his analysis looks at some of the creative paradoxes and tensions which arise within cosmopolitanism’s use, its rhetorical function and its sophistic beginning. for marshall cosmopolitanism claims to be both a term of analysis and a political objective and deals with multiplicity, apparent contradictions and unity. his argument is that it is how terms like cosmopolitanism are used politically or sociologically that is part of the sociological or political dimension of life. they are not separate domains, and the term works through its evocation of opposites and the dynamics of disorder. jock collins october 2011 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia serious play, serious problems: issues with ebook applications catherine baird university of technology, sydney maureen henninger university of technology, sydney abstract this paper explores the extent to which a digital technology (apple i-pad) supports the development of literacy skills. literacy was traditionally deemed to include reading and writing and numeracy, but now encompasses digital literacies, the capacity to understand and even create the multi-media, multi-modal texts of digital technologies. whereas once, basic literacy was considered essential to active citizenship, now there is a greater emphasis on this broader view of literacies. along with the acknowledgement that individuals learn in different ways, there has been an emphasis on the features of digital technologies which facilitate the notion of “universal access”, making text accessible in a variety of forms to people with disabilities. multi-modal technologies, many supported by applications designed by third party developers, were seen, therefore, to offer significant opportunities for helping people, especially children, to develop literacy skills. using the metaphor of ‘serious play’, this study has found that people with disabilities may still be unable to develop literacy through their ‘play’ in the same way as others. the study concludes that a set of heuristic principles needs to be adopted by the developers of applications for digital technologies, so that the digital playground is accessible to all. introduction the concept of a civil society as the basis of a functioning society in which citizens can participate in democracy is a phenomenon of the 20th century (habermas1989; cohen & arato 1992). for the past several decades there have been national and international efforts in development cooperation in which it is recognised that education in general and literacy in particular are necessary for developing a civil society. “the essential feature of development is that it represents a transformation of society . . . [which] entails a transformation of the way individual persons think and behave . . . [and] education is at the centre of efforts at individual development”. (stiglitz 2003, pp. 77, 92). the role of literacy in the development of democratic societies is widely acknowledged (sen & alderice 2007; nussbaum 2010; gce 2001). one of unesco’s goals in its education for all program is “ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning” (unesco 2000, p. 8). the purpose of this study is to explore the extent to which a digital technology, the apple i-pad supports the development of literacy skills. 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 literacy the concept of literacy is multi-faceted ranging from a relatively narrow view of literacy as competence in reading, writing and numeracy to a broader view of the literate individual as “the flexible and sustainable master of a repertoire of practices with the texts of traditional and new communications technologies via spoken language, print and multimedia” (state of queensland 2000, p. 6), to gee’s definition of literacy “as the mastery of or fluent control over a secondary discourse” (gee 1989 p. 9). this study is concerned in the first instance with a narrow definition of literacy, the ability to read english, to comprehend what is being read and to build vocabulary. it is what is described by wells as the third stage of language development, “the freeing of language from its context of immediate experience” (wells 1981, p. 241). reading is an “information processing skill comprising a number of cognitive sub-skills that enable us to acquire purely visual information from a page and convert it into meaning” (underwood 2000, p. 137).1 this study is also concerned with visual literacy and multimodal literacy — “the many modes involved in learning: the semiotic resources of image, colour, animated movement, writing, sound-effect, speech and so on” (jewett 2006, p. 16). kress et al. argue that communication and learning, two elements that are basic to literacy, are multimodal (kress et al. 2001), involving image, speech, sound-effect, movement and so on. jewett’s research into the use of cd-roms for teaching school english challenged the traditional assumption that learning happens primarily via language (jewett 2002). the question of digital literacy cannot be ignored since “access to and proficiency in the manipulation of information, especially through electronic technologies, define in part the citizen of the modern democracy” (martinez 1994, p. 395). moreover, as new technologies develop, 1 from the point of view of the australian government’s emphasis on literacy skills which “are increasingly seen as important for an individual's ability to participate fully in modern society (abs, 2008, p. 4), the statistics on literacy are troubling. in 2006, according to abs approximately 7 million (46%) australians aged 15 to 74 years had scores at level 1 or 2, (of 4 levels) on the prose scale and similar scores, 7 million (47%) at level 1 or 2 on the document scale. level 3 is regarded by the survey developers as the "minimum required for individuals to meet the complex demands of everyday life and work in the emerging knowledge-based economy" (abs 2008, p. 5). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 3 new literacies emerge, and thus new ways of communication — “literacy as technological deixis” (leu & kinzer 2000, p. 112). katherine au (2006) suggests that technology can be used to close the literacy achievement gap between students of diverse backgrounds and their mainstream peers, if employed effectively. serious play and digital technologies the past three decades have seen an increasing use of digital technologies in schools, from basic computers through to ever-increasingly sophisticated and portable digital devices: cd-roms, electronic games, table-top augmented reality (ar) environments, and electronic books including interactive books, and e-storybooks. these technologies are being used for many types of tasks such as finding information, self-paced learning and teaching and learning numeracy, reading, science and social studies. increasingly, they are found in the home environment. it has been recognized that the concept of ‘playing’ with technologies can have very positive outcomes in the development of literacies. sara lawrence-lightfoot the harvard sociologist stated in an interview with bill moyers in 1988 (moyers 1988), that “learning is at its very best when it’s deadly serious and very playful at the same time.” thus the concept of ‘serious play’ has developed, defined by rieber & matzko (2001, p. 18) as “purposeful, or goal oriented, with the person able to modify goals as desired or needed”. this concept has been well-documented in the education literature (fromberg 1987; mann, 1996; ceglowski 1997; de castell & jenson 2003; cassell 2004; lillemyr 2009). fromberg (1987) in her review of the literature notes that when children engage in any type of educational play, they are developing skills, including literacy development, and knowledge that contribute to future school success. dünser & hornecker’s work (2007) on ar (augumented reality) books developed tangible elements to provide innovative ways for children to play and learn and to bring playfulness back into learning. in fact, rogers and sawyer state that “although play is not a necessary condition for learning language and literacy skills, play is probably the best environment for these abilities to thrive” (rogers & sawyer 1988, p. 64). early electronic books were delivered on cd-rom and their use has generated a large number of studies (for example chang & osguthorpe 1990; miller et al. 1994; davidson et al. 1996; 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 dejean et al. 1997; adam & wild 1997; lewin 1997; blok, et al. 2002). sixteen years and enormous advances in technology have passed since miller et al. in their study of cd-rom storybooks (1994) asked the question “what would happen if the children were given more choice? students not only can click on the words to activate the help features, but they can also double-click or press and drag” (miller et al. 1994 p. 203). cd-rom books were limited in their ability to support ‘serious play’ because they did not support a two-way interaction, rather the flow of information is predominantly one-way, i.e. mono-logical, mediated by technology (burrell & trushell 1997). the newer dialogical technology of interactive books is now widely available and has evolved to incorporate all of the features suggested by miller et al. (1994). an interactive storybook is multimodal in nature providing “the reader with a predetermined storyline but places diversions under the control of the user” (trushell et al. 2001 p. 390). diversions, in this sense, are features diverting the reader away from the traditional linear reading path which kress contends consists of “relatively empty things occur[ring] in a strict ordering which forces me to follow, in reading, precisely the order in which they appear” (kress 2003, p. 3). these diversions include elements such as non-linear progress through the text, cued animations, touch sensitive material, voice, animated speech (natural or synthetic), and speech recognition. “electronic books that incorporate these features [provision of narration, accompanied by animated pictures and sound effects that relate directly to the storyline ] have the capacity to increase children’s comprehension and enjoyment of storybooks” (grimshaw et al. 2007, p. 598). these newer technologies have generated a plethora of studies and discussion (grant 2004; maynard 2005; shamir & korat 2009; pena & almaguer 2008; roskos et al. 2009). there have been many studies of e-storybooks and emergent literacy skills (for example de jong & bus 2004; doty et al. 2001, 2003; fisch et.al. 2002; verhallen & bus 2009; moody 2010) and the general conclusion is that e-storybooks “may serve as a valuable tool for increasing children’s exposure to text, creating opportunities for independent reading, and facilitating interest in text through use of animated digital features” (moody 2010 p. 296). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 5 there has also been criticism that some electronic books are not concerned with serious play but lean more toward ‘edutainment’. ‘eye-candy’ — visual images that are pleasing to see but are intellectually undemanding (wordnet 3.0) — has been found to be distracting and “appears to correspond with poor comprehension” (trushell et al. 2001, p. 400). while underwood (2000) also reported that pupils’ recall of the story of an ‘interactive storybook’ was poor, miller in his earlier study had noted that “on-demand mediation features available in cd-rom books played an important role in promoting reading improvements in terms of a diminution of ‘search for meaning’ miscues” (miller et al. 1994). serious play for all if we accept the concept of literacy as a basic building block for active citizenship, then it follows that the opportunities for developing the skills of literacy need to be available. and there needs to be standards of accessibility for all. this includes standards for tools and technologies by which all persons are able to access information and to understand it. the notion of a digital divide is one which has been discussed widely, particularly in regard to the availability of the internet and other information technologies (for example, castells 1999, 2001; dimaggio et al. 2001; milner 2006). lloyd’s final report on interactive books (lloyd et al. 2003) pointed out that in the mainstream classroom there are often three types of students: ‘ordinary students’ who have few, if any, problems reading; esl (english as a second language) students, who may or may not be able to read in their native language, and students with special needs who have fundamental difficulties learning to read due to a variety of physical, neurological, or psychological problems they face. in the case of the special needs students the challenge of learning literacy skills in an increasingly multimodal digital world has been demonstrated in studies such as those by calabrò et al. (2009) and savidis, et al. (2007). under the current australian government’s digital literacy program there are many initiatives “to ensure that students across australia have the necessary skills to engage in a digital environment. programs are . . . focused on building and development of ict technologies and developing competence with new and emerging technologies” (commonwealth of australia 2009, p. 2). 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 among these emerging technologies are reading technologies such as cd-roms, electronic and interactive books. furthermore, schools, under the digital education program are purchasing apple ipad tablets for use in the curriculum, including reading. it follows that any reading device must be accessible to all students (nielsen 1994; lloyd et al., 2003; donker & reitsma 2004). lloyd et al. in their early evaluation of interactive books (lloyd et al. 2003) tested an interactive book using a set of heuristics based on those developed by jacob nielsen (1994). they found that such a device needed flexibility to account for the different styles and problem-solving strategies of children who cannot read well. they also noted the importance for the system to “just work” (lloyd et al. 2003, p.5), otherwise children lose interest in what they are trying to achieve, which is to learn to read, and they focus on the technology. to ensure that learning materials are available to all and individuals with special needs are catered for, it is important that applications and software programs that are available in technologically-mediated learning environments, including the home, adhere to a set of usability and accessibility principles and guidelines. designers of technologically mediated learning environments have a responsibility to be aware of inaccessibility issues and their implications in the use of digital technologies for developing literacy. at present there is no substantial set of guidelines or heuristics for universal accessibility which can be applied and the emergence of new technologies such as apple’s multi-touch ipad is bringing many to question the effectiveness of the ideal notion of ubiquitous and pervasive computing. to support the principle that there should be many approaches to solving problems and diverse ways to access information, apple, like other producers of multi-modal technologies, has made its software development kit available to third party developers and many of the ‘apps’ which enhance the interactivity of digital technologies are created by these third party developers. this code is available, for a price, to anyone who wants to develop applications for the iphone, ipad, and ipod touch devices. this study sets out to explore the extent to which the features of interactive e-books used on the apple i-pad facilitate ‘serious play’ in the development of literacy, with a focus on accessibility for the visually impaired who would normally use the voiceover function. the ebooks in this cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 7 study were developed by third-party developers, using apple’s proprietary programming code called objective-c. method the study involved a qualitative analysis of interactive ebook applications developed for the apple itunes database and therefore readily available for use in the home. the analysis was undertaken in september and october 2010. ten interactive ebook applications were selected via the apple itune database. the selection was based on three criteria (see table 1): • user star rating of 3.5 and above; • itune’s ranking within the top 100 downloads (based on popularity); • the possibility that the ‘text’ would be used in primary school classrooms in sydney, nsw (established through personal knowledge and informal interviews with primary school educators). table 1 selection of interactive ebooks for evaluation ebook title publisher / designer itunes ranking (oct 2010) user rating alice for the ipad atomic antelope 45 / 50 3.5 / 5 animalia for the ipad appbooks 10 / 50 4.5 / 5 green eggs and ham by dr. seuss oceanhouse media inc 14 / 50 4.5 / 5 how to train your dragon frogdogmedia llc 4 / 50 4.0 / 5 jack and the beanstalk ayars animation inc 48 / 50 4.5 / 5 mickey’s spooky night puzzle book disney publishing worldwide 5 / 50 4.0 / 5 popout! the tale of peter rabbit loud crow interactive inc 16 / 50 3.5 / 5 shrek forever after frogdogmedia llc 11 / 50 4.0 / 5 the cat in the hat oceanhouse media inc 40 / 50 4.0 / 5 toy story 2 read-along disney publishing worldwide 32 / 50 5.0 / 5 to determine their capacity for facilitating ‘serious play’ and developing literacy skills, these ten interactive ebook applications were analysed using the wcag 2.0 accessibility guidelines (w3c 2008). this technical analysis was further informed by the heuristic methodologies used by researchers such as bernsen & dybkjaer (2010), bertini et al. (2006), billi et al. (2010), and nielsen (1994, 2010). these guidelines were initially developed for web applications but have since been applied to the evaluation of mobile devices and applications (see billi et al. 2010). the fundamental principles of these guidelines are perceivability, operability, understandability, and robustness (pour). 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 perceivability refers to the information and the onscreen interface; the ways the design and presentation allow perception through the use of senses. to measure perceivability this study asked questions concerning perception from the point of view of a visually impaired user. with the voiceover tool enabled, how is a user able to navigate and access the interface and the information of the interactive ebook application? do the applications themselves offer internal customisation options, for example text enlargement, internal voice over, or font style variation. operability is the functionality of the interface, how the user actually operates and navigates through it. this was measured through answers to a series of questions concerning the users’ engagement with and navigation of the interface when the voiceover tool was enabled. was the reading experience enhanced or hindered? were users able to navigate the interface successfully? understandability is about the content and whether or not it is readable and therefore understandable. it takes into account both textual and semiotic meaning-making principles. this was measured by asking the single question is the information and content within the ebook applications easy to read and therefore easy to understand. robustness is taken to mean “the content must be robust enough so that it can be interpreted reliably by a wide variety of user agents, including assistive technologies” (wcag 2.0) and was measured through answers to the following questions: can the content of the ebook application adapt to personalised abilities and skills requirements when accessibility tools such as the voiceover are enabled on the apple ipad device? findings perceivability human beings use the five senses (sight sound, touch, taste and smell) to “perceive” the world around us. in a computer-mediated environment, it can be argued that only three of these senses are actively engaged with, the sense of smell and taste being limited to a cognitive memory and/or imaginative process (for example, when we see a cupcake on the screen we are likely to imagine or remember what a cupcake might taste and smell like). we often use touch to engage cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 9 with an interface, we use sight to see information and sound to listen and we sometimes speak within the computer-mediated environment. all of these senses, combined with cognitive processes such as memory, imagination, thought and learning, create a perceivable environment capable of engaging people. many digital devices offer accessibility features for individuals who are visually, hearing and cognitively impaired, so that they can also experience a perceivable environment when they use software, applications and files through the device. however, many applications limit the effectiveness of these features or even cause them to be disabled. for example, someone who is visually impaired and requires text on the page to be of a certain size can go to the system settings of the device and modify the settings to suit his or her need. however, if the tool is disabled when a new application is opened, then the information will not be perceivable and the person will be disadvantaged. the focus in this study is the voiceover tool, which allows the text of the story to be read aloud and which also vocalises instructions to the user. in the tests, we found that use of the voiceover tool, so important in the development of literacy and particularly important for the visually impaired, did not always work in its normal way and it also had a detrimental effect on the functionality of ebook applications. the following examples demonstrate how users' perception of the limitations of the ebook applications when the voiceover tool is enabled. the purpose of an interactive ebook is to allow readers to interact with images on the screen and to engage sight and sound in the process of learning to read. if you touch an image of a cow, you can expect not only to see the word ‘cow’ appear on the screen, you would also expect to hear the cow make a mooing sound. our tests showed that this use of the senses was disabled when the voiceover tool is turned on. many ebooks have two reading options ‘read it myself’ and ‘read it to me’; of the ones we tested some had both. in either case, when the voiceover tool was enabled, the text could not be read aloud, again leading to a limitation of perceivability. in how to train your dragon, the only ebook with background music throughout, the music conflicts with the voiceover. when the 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 voiceover tool was required to read navigation options such as turning the page, the music did not quieten, leaving the user unable to distinguish the voiceover instruction. operability the ipad is a multimodal device, emphasising interactivity through touch, hearing and visionsensing. it is heavily reliant on visuals to convey information; therefore all the applications developed for this device have graphical interfaces. furthermore users are required to perform many touch actions such as ‘swipe up’, ‘swipe right to left’, ‘tap once’, ‘tap with three fingers’ etc. in our evaluation of the interactive ebook applications human perceptual functionality (see bernsen & dybkjaer, 2010) did not become an issue until it was tested against interactive design elements of consistency and accessibility. the operability of the application on the ipad was one of the major areas of concern. consistency of the interface functions is always important, but especially so for users who require accessibility tools. our study showed that three of the ebooks (alice for the ipad, the tale of peter rabbit and toy story 2 read along) ceased to function entirely when the voiceover accessibility tool was enabled. the remaining seven ebooks tested all presented inconsistent functionality errors including disabling of page turning, navigation inconsistencies and ‘alt text’ confusion (for full results of this testing see table 2 in the appendix). one of the major conventions of the accessible web (wcag) is to provide a textual description (alt text) for navigation buttons and links. in practice when a screen reader program ‘reads’ the button or link, it vocalises something meaningful to the user. the majority of ebooks tested produced confusing button text voiceovers. for example when the arrow button (for turning the page) is pressed the user should hear ‘click here to turn to the next page’; instead for example, in mickey’s spooky night puzzle the user hears ‘arrowrightapp2x’, which is not a very helpful instruction. in may 2010 usability pioneer, jakob nielsen, conducted an initial test of the ipad’s usability and one of the major areas of concern for him was the inconsistency of the interaction design. he stated in his report that, “once they [the users] do figure out how something works, users can't cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 11 transfer their skills from one app to the next. each application has a completely different user interface for similar features.” this was also evident in our study; a case in point is the page turning. six of the ebooks required an interaction with arrow buttons (left and right) to turn the pages however two of these (mickey’s spooky night puzzle and shrek forever after) presented the buttons at the top of the screen instead of the normal bottom position. the other four applications used a ‘swipe’ action from the right-to-left of the screen. while such inconsistencies are annoying, most readers are able to adapt. however, other, potentially more serious inconsistencies in the interaction design were apparent when conducting accessibility tests on the ebook applications. the voiceover tool caused changes to navigation. for example, the simple action of opening a link or selecting a navigation option required a double tap gesture on the screen; to go to the next page required a three-finger swipe instead of one-finger swipe. in most of the ebooks tested (for example the tale of peter rabbit, the cat in the hat, and green eggs and ham) the testers were not initially aware of these changes and there was nothing to indicate how to proceed, so that the ebook application became potentially unusable. these functionality issues are detrimental to successful operation of the ebooks and could have a significant impact on the potential learning capabilities these tools and applications offer users with disabilities. understandability children learning to read soon learn to associate a written word with an image and similarly to associate a spoken word with a written word. the tale of peter rabbit offers multiple ways in which a child can engage with and learn from the text. the text is presented clearly on the righthand side of the “book” and as the narrator speaks the words on the page, each individual word is highlighted in order to demonstrate both audibly and visually how the word is spelt and pronounced. a child, carer or teacher can then select an individual word again by touching it on the screen and the narrator will pronounce that word again, exactly how it appears. the text is then accompanied by illustrations, with which you can actively engage, that produce a visual, illustrative meaning to accompany the words further enhancing the overall understanding of the content within the book. however, there is little in the way of instructions throughout and a lot of 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 the navigation is visually bounded, making it difficult for children with visual impairment to be engaged in this process. this convention that links a written word with an image and a spoken word is applied inconsistently in the ebooks, so that there is sometimes no correlation between text, sound and image. for example, in the cat in the hat, users have the ability to ‘tap’ on an image and the narrator speaks the name of the object, such as ‘ball’ and the word ‘ball’ appears on the screen. however, when the user touches the bicycle the user is presented with the word and narration of the word “play” and when users tap on the chair image, they are given three different responses (sit, sat, jumped) before the word ‘chair’ appears. this example indicates inconsistencies that lead to verbal and semiotic confusion, thus weakening the application as an aid to the development of literacy skills. robustness for an individual with no special needs and who is comfortable working with technology, the interactive ebook applications provide reasonable opportunities to develop skills in literacy and in digital literacy. however, as the findings above have shown, those individuals who need to use the ipad’s voiceover tool find their access to the multi-modal capacities of the interactive ebooks limited in a number of ways. applications and devices need to be designed and developed with the user in mind and developers must acknowledge that users have diverse abilities, needs and skills and therefore may have to adapt and personalize the technology (bernsen & dybkjaer, 2010; bertini et al., 2006; billi et al., 2010). while most of the ebooks we tested had options such as turning sound on/off and enabling narration, (alice for the ipad and animalia did not offer narration) none offered customisation options such as setting brightness/contrast, enabling voiceover buttons, enlarging text, and changing font type. lack of such options ignore the principles of accessibility and affects the robustness of an application. as can be seen from the above analysis of the impact of the voiceover tool on the functionality of the ten interactive ebooks in this study, there are a number of factors which limit the promise of these multi-modal technologies in facilitating the development of literacy skills and which further disadvantage those with visual impairment wishing to use the voiceover tool to access cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 13 the content of the application. the ebooks are applications which have been created by third party developers, who as noted above may be amateurs or may be employed by major design studios. the fragmentation of approaches to the development of interactive applications is both a great strength and a significant weakness. it brings creativity and flair to the presentation of information and the design of applications, encouraging playful approaches to diverse problems. at the same time, it leads to inconsistencies in design and incompatibilities with what are taken as basic functionalities. the demands of accessibility add a significant level of complexity to the development of interactive applications. the existence of a code and heuristics for designers and developers would lead to applications with higher levels of functionality and better accessibility. the foundations for literacy, including digital literacy, are laid at an early age. interactive ebooks, used in schools and found at home, are significant tools in the development of this foundation. guidelines for designers and developers are an essential part of their toolkit, broadening the development of their skill set beyond that required for basic interactive functionality. these, in turn, would support the development of the literacies which are significant for life in the 21st century. conclusion the issue of the accessibility of interactive ebooks for children is a significant one for contemporary society. the findings of this study are timely as multi-touch digital technologies are relatively new and the identification of the weaknesses in current applications could go some way to ensuring that future generations of technologies can support the development of literacies rather than add to the confusion of young learners. the standards for universal accessibility to the content of information and communication technologies are well recognised and their consistent application by all designers and developers would foster the development of digital literacies, and consequently enhance the development of active citizens. this study is attempting to open a conversation on this important topic. we seek to shift the debate from technical questions of functionality which tend to preoccupy application developers to the broader implications for civil society of widely used technologies which do not (yet) provide strong support for the literacies that will underpin active citizenship for all. 14 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language, literacy and education, cambridge university press, new york. wordnet 3.0, viewed24 november 2010 <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu> http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/� http://www.useit.com/alertbox/ipad.html� http://www.w3.org/tr/wcag20/� http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 17 appendix table 2 voiceover tool incompatibility with interactive ebook applications interactive ebook application d is ab le d al l f un ct io na lit y d ow ng ra de d fu nc tio na lit y d is ab le d in te ra ct io n d is ab le d pa ge tu rn in g d is ab le d re ad a lo ud b ut to n te xt c on fu si on m us ic /s ou nd c on fl ic t alice for the ipad x x x x x n/a animalia x x x x x n/a green eggs and ham x x x x x n/a how to train your dragon x x x x x x jack and the beanstalk x x x x x n/a mickey’s spooky night puzzle x x x x x n/a popout! the tale of peter rabbit x x x x x n/a shrek forever after x n/a x x n/a n/a the cat in the hat x x x x x n/a toy story 2 read along x x x x x n/a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 9 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia aid/watch and the public benefit of advocacy for the extra-territorial relief of poverty aid/watch incorporated v commissioner for taxation [2010] hca 42 (aid/watch) david barnden giri sivaraman maurice blackburn lawyers, sydney abstract the disqualification of aid/watch as a charity and the high court of australia's subsequent decision shines a spotlight on the common law definition of charitable activity. the aid/watch 1 decision enables charitable organisations to legitimately advocate for more efficient implementation of government policies on the relief of poverty and other recognised charitable goals without fear of reprisal. initially we comment on the inherent tension the australian taxation office experiences as a result of its status as a government department, its responsibilities to administer revenue collection and its role interpreting charity law. we then discuss the common law definition of charity and the constitutional basis for the high court’s decision in aid/watch.2 to conclude we outline areas of uncertainties emanating from the decision and the latest commentary made by the australian taxation office. the role of the australian taxation office (ato) the ground breaking decision in aid/watch places limitations on what some perceive to be a tool available to an australian government to restrict charitable organisations criticising government policy and practice. the decision of the majority of high court judges clarifies the fact that in australia there is no general doctrine which excludes from charitable purposes “political objects”. however, it is not, as we will see, a free-pass for advocacy organisation to campaign on their chosen issues without reprisal. charitable organisations may still be disqualified if their objects and activities impute “reasons of contrariety between the established system of government and the general public welfare”.3 many charities like aid/watch are dependent on benevolent donors to sustain their operations. the most significant implication of losing charitable status for aid/watch was not 1 in this article aid/watch (italicised) refers to the decision of the high court of australia. aid/watch (not italicised) refers to the organisation itself. 2 aid/watch was decided by a majority of 5:2. the joint majority decision was by french cj, gummow j, hayne j, crennan j and bell j. heydon j and kiefel j delivered separate, dissenting judgments which are not addressed by this article. 3 aid/watch incorporated v commissioner of taxation [2010] hca 42 at 46 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 that the organisation was henceforth required to pay more tax, but that it was unable to receive funds from donors mandated to only fund charitable institutions. the resulting impact was crippling and aid/watch lost two thirds of its revenue. it was the so-called “political objects” doctrine that the ato invoked to disqualify aid/watch as a charity after the organisation agitated for change in government behaviour on sensitive foreign policy. the disqualification in 2006 followed suddenly after the ato gave aid/watch an endorsement as a charity in the year before.4 an unavoidable circumstantial implication arose, being that aid/watch was suffering directly because of its public criticism of government activities. whether or not this implication reflects the facts, organisations pushing for change in policy or government actions were concerned enough to publicly pledge support for aid/watch's appeal to the high court. the ato is responsible for revenue collection which funds public goods and services that in turn give effect to economic and social policies.5 it must also assess applications for charitable status. this potential conflict, between optimising revenue collection and the granting of taxation concessions for charities, is to be addressed by establishing the australian charities and not-for-profits commission that will administer charities.6 ultimately however, the decision to revoke aid/watch's charity status was due to an interpretation of an unclear and unsatisfactory area of common law. the result of the subsequent high court appeal was to legitimise aid/watch's functions as charitable, recognising that the organisation contributed to a constitutionally protected ‘public benefit’. what is a charitable organisation? the term “charitable organisation” is not defined by the relevant taxation legislation. to be endorsed as charitable an organisation must satisfy the definition at common law. charitable organisations help the poor, but the common law definition also includes helping others who 4 for the purposes of the fringe benefits tax assessment act 1986 (cth) 5 ato, strategic statement 2010-15, available at http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.aspx?doc=/content/00243384.htm&pc=001/001/002/018&mnu=395 04&mfp=001&st=&cy= 6 the hon bill shorten mp, joint media release with the hon tanya plibersek mp, minister for human services and social inclusion, making it easier for charities to help those who need it, 10 may 2011. available at http://www.treasurer.gov.au/displaydocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2011/077.htm&pageid=003&min=brs&y ear=&doctype http://www.treasurer.gov.au/displaydocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2011/077htm&pageid=003&min=brs&year=&doctype� http://www.treasurer.gov.au/displaydocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2011/077htm&pageid=003&min=brs&year=&doctype� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 11 may not be poor, such as where the aim is to support education or religion. it is pemsel's case from 1891 that is the authority for the requirement that a charity must (1) advance education, (2) advance religion, (3) relieve poverty or (4) advance other purposes beneficial to the community’. of course, a ‘purpose beneficial to the community’ is a sweeping phrase, which becomes relevant below.7 the commissioner’s submissions disqualification as a charity, at least in england, could occur if a charity was devoted to the pursuit of political purposes.8 this idea is referred to as the political objects doctrine. in aid/wat ch, the commissioner of taxation argued that this doctrine also operated in australia, and made submissions before the high court that aid/watch’s dominant purpose was a political one, rather than to relieve poverty. the political objects doctrine english authorities have decided that a trust with a principal purpose to procure a reversal of government policy, or of particular administrative decisions of government authorities, is classified as political as a trust for ‘political purposes’ and as a result can not be classified as charitable9. this is the general “political objects” doctrine which the high court in aid/watch said did not to apply in australia to the same extent as it does in england because the political objects doctrine was “not directed to the australian system of government established and maintained by the constitution itself”.10 we explore how the court relied on the constitution to obviate the full extent of the political objects doctrine below. before we do, it is worth highlighting what seems to us to be the principal justification for disqualification arising from political objects, which is that political parties are not unable to be granted charitable status.11 this measure of disqualification was left intact by the majority who implicitly drew a line between those parties participating in the system of government as representatives or potential representatives, and those organisations that are agitating for political change.12 7 commissioners for special purposes of income tax v pemsel [1891] ac 531 at 583. the high court acknowledged that courts before them had experienced 8 bowman v secular society ltd [1917] ac 406 at 442 and national anti-vivisection society v inland revenue commissioner [1948] ac 31 at 52. 9 at 28 10 at 40 11 at 38 12 at 42-45 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 difficulty in determining whether an organisation that agitated for legislative change could be considered as doing so for a charitable purpose.13 the majority was satisfied that the purposes and activities of aid/watch did not trigger disqualification “for reasons of contrariety between the established system of government and the general public welfare”.14 the court dismissed concerns that the law would ‘stultify’ itself, being the notion that the legal system would invalidate itself by promoting changes in existing law. this was a notion advanced in previous authorities and texts.15 the role of the constitution pemsel’s fourth head of charity is that a charity’s dominant purpose can be for the public benefit, and the court extracted four constitutional principles to support the proposition that aid/watch activities operated in the public benefit. first, the court recognised that the constitution informs the development of the common law. to enable the court to interpret the term “charitable trust” as it appeared in the relevant taxation legislation, the court cited the decision of esso australia resources ltd v federal commissioner of taxation16 which highlighted the complex interrelation and influence between common law and statute. the high court’s remarks reinforced the evolutionary nature of common law, and its subsequent influence on statutory interpretation.17 secondly, the court referred to the s128 constitutional process that enables the constitution to be amended in order to establish the public benefit inherent in the common law’s ability to evolve.18 in this way the court addressed the concerns of stultification and the apparent schism between the stability and legitimacy of the rule of law. in doing so the court was then open to adapt the common law on charities to reflect current social needs. thirdly, the majority recognised that communication between electors themselves and between electors and the legislature and executive is “an indispensable incident” of the constitutional system.19 13 at 43 aid/watch, through the publication of research reports on the 14 at 46 15 royal north shore hospital of sydney v attorney-general (1938) 60 clr 396 at 426 per dixon j. 16 (1999) 201 clr 49 at 59-60 [18]; [1999] hca 67 17 at 22 and 23 18 at 44 19 at 44 per lange v australian broadcasting corporation (1997) 189 clr 520 at 562-566 et al. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 13 effectiveness of government attempts to reduce poverty, was found to contribute to this communication for the public benefit. fourthly, the majority, in a somewhat cautionary reflection upon limiting political communication, gave deference to restrictions only being permissible if the manner in which the communication is curtailed is compatible with the system of government and the constitution.20 the implication is that the general application of the “political objects” doctrine (and the ato's decision to disqualify aid/watch in support of the doctrine) amounted to an unconstitutional restriction on this freedom. it was these four processes which provided the foundation that enabled the court to explore what is meant by the “public benefit”. aid/watch, the court found, was promoting public debate about political matters by lawful means which in a broad sense enabled the organisation’s operations and activities to be classified as in the public benefit.21 aid/watch’s advocacy and extra-territorial impact the reasoning in aid/watch appears to rest upon the fact that the subject of the public debate, being the australian government's purpose or actions, was in the first three heads identified in pemsel. in aid/watch the goal of the relevant government activities was to relieve poverty by foreign aid and the court legitimised aid/watch’s advocacy efforts on the basis that it went to improving government actions. it is worth highlighting that the communities which benefited from government’s ‘charitable’ policy and actions were not communities in australia, but communities in countries with significantly less financial resources per capita. as a result, aid/watch has extended (a) the implied constitutional right of political communication and (b) charitable objects and activities “for the public benefit” in such a way that permits them to be founded upon the domestic goal of alleviation of poverty for communities overseas. it follows that aid/watch's charity status is inextricably dependent upon the government's extra-territorial charitable activities and the relief of poverty. 20 at 44 21 at 45 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 the decision provides an interesting comparison to the united kingdom case of habershon v vardon.22 in this case, the organisation’s purpose was directed at communities abroad, being “the political restoration of the jews to jerusalem and to their own lands” which was deemed grounds for disqualification as a charity. the majority in aid/watch refer to this decision and later commentary by tyssen, but did not comment further on the extra-territorial nature of the impacts of charitable organisations.23 public benefit and the relief of poverty aid/watch argued that in addition to being a charity that engaged in activities for the public benefit, its dominant purpose was for the relief of poverty.24 in practice aid/watch did not do any direct, on the ground work to relieve poverty, but went about achieving this goal by generating public debate on government policies and actions with the goal of improving the efficiency and efficacy of aid delivery. aid/watch argued that in generating public debate it had a tangible impact on the relief of poverty and was therefore permitted to be classified as a charity under pemsel's second head, being for the alleviation of poverty. the commissioner argued to the contrary. the majority deemed it unnecessary to decide this point since aid/watch's dominant purpose, was found to be for the public benefit.25 impacts on the implied constitutional freedom of political communication aid/watch’s reference to the implied constitutional right of freedom of political communication,26 in our view, strengthens this right and simultaneously demonstrates the high court's willingness to revert to overarching constitutional considerations in determining the legality of a range of administrative decisions. previously in lange the high court explored this freedom in the context of defamation in statute and at common law. aid/watch moves the freedom into the territory of charitable trusts, and the implication is that in deciding to revoke aid/watch's charity status, the ato did not take into account wider constitutional considerations in its interpretation of the common law. 22 habershon v vardon (1851) 4 de g & sm 467 [64 er916] 23 at 31 24 at 46 and 47 25 at 47 26 at 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 15 it is worth noting that in mulholland27 the high court restated that this freedom applied to prevent conflict between the acts of the legislature and executive, such as the creation of statute, and inconsistencies in the common law and it was not a right bestowed upon an individual. the majority in aid/watch, as in abc v lenah game meats,28 is also careful to interpret the freedom in the context of development of common law, rather than at the level of ato's administrative decision making.29 however it is clear that administrative decision makers need to defer to constitutional freedoms to arrive at the correct interpretation of law. strengthening accountability in addition to the constitutional implications of aid/watch, we recognise four positive effects which will, in our opinion, contribute to government accountability and strengthen the legitimacy of those advocating for the advancement of charitable outcomes. first, there is now a bridge for organisations agitating for change in government policy or directives which have objectives to reduce poverty without having to prove that their actions or work have a direct and immediate effect on community in australia or overseas. secondly, the link between domestic charitable organisations and their ultimate extraterritorial impacts is strengthened. in the purest sense of globalisation, aid/watch coordinated international research and domestic advocacy, culminating in research papers and public media statements. these efforts are to be commended, as the australian electorate was able access independent research on the activities of the australian government overseas. coordinating overseas research is arguably more difficult than if the subject matter and effects were located in australia, or indeed in another country where the english language was pervasive, and this research and associated advocacy is now recognised as beneficial to the australian public. thirdly, there is a positive outcome on the ability of a charity to close the gap between government rhetoric and action. the aid/watch decision allows advocacy without reprisal, on the government's at times seemingly aspirational goals and the activities it undertakes to implement them. 27 mulholland v australian electoral commission (2004) 220 clr 181 at 245 [180-181] 28 australian broadcasting corporation v lenah game meats pty ltd (2001) 208 clr 199 at 220 [20] 29 at 42 and 44 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 finally, and not to be underestimated, aid/watch provides improved certainty for charities that advocate for changes to government activities which fall under the first three heads of charitable classification. these charities need no longer be concerned that advocacy and generating public debate about government activities will betray their dominant purpose as a political object and risk disqualification. uncertainties from the aid/watch decision our analysis of the aid/watch decision and experience in the charity sector identified three areas of uncertainty. the first concerns the classification of government activities within the first three of pemsel's classifications. in aid/watch the relevant government department, ausaid, was directed by a policy whose dominant purpose was for the relief of poverty. it followed that ausaid's actions also fell into this category. the question arises: what would be the outcome if the department's objects were not for the relief of poverty, but only some of its actions amounted to a charitable activity? by way of example we turn to the activities of the australian defence force (adf), a government department primarily engaged in military activities overseas. applying the dominant purpose test to adf’s objects would not place it into pemsel’s charitable categories. however the adf can assist in disaster relief efforts domestically and overseas, arguably contributing to relieving poverty in regions experiencing fall-out from disasters. how would the ato, or indeed a court, deal with an organisation whose dominant purpose was attempting to improve the adf’s operations assisting communities by promoting debate about the actions of the adf? aid/watch referred to the “activities of government” in the context of encouraging public debate and activities for the public benefit. 30 the court also referred to the “ends and means involved” in a charity’s contribution to the public welfare.31 30 at 48 from these remarks we draw our opinion that the dominant purpose test does not apply to the relevant government body and it is only the charity’s desired outcome (in relation to the government’s activities) that is relevant to the first three heads of charitable activities. therefore, it is our view that the dominant purpose test remains applicable only to the charitable organisation itself. 31 at 49 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 17 the second category of uncertainty concerns the government activities which are not for the relief of poverty. an example is the regular military activities of the adf overseas. it is not difficult to imagine an advocacy organisation whose dominant purpose is to encourage public debate about the impact on poverty by australia’s involvement in international warfare. clearly, the organisation's purpose would be within the spirit of a charitable organisation to generate debate about the alleviation of poverty, however the government's actions would not. in aid/watch the court was explicit that the decision did not “determine whether the fourth head encompasses activities of government which lie beyond the first three heads”.32 so what if the relevant government actions are directly contrary to activities in the first three heads? and what if agitation for changes to these activities would improve the status of poverty? in considering these questions we acknowledge that australian courts are seemingly alive to a modern interpretation of society’s requirements and are not bogged down in literal interpretations. we also take comfort in the constitutional bases outlined in aid/watch for establishing what is for the public benefit, and are optimistic that this circumstance would secure such an organisation's charitable status. in short, it is our view any government actions that exacerbate poverty as a result of competing interests should be open to criticism by charitable organisations, and any ensuing debate is to be fostered and protected by the courts. the third category concerns circumstances where an organisation addresses the activities of non-state actors that are regulated by the australian government with the goal of advancing a charitable purpose. this situation is complicated by the existence of actions of both government and other entities. aid/watch was critical of ausaid's relief of poverty by the involvement and payment to private organisations that carried out actual work. whilst the efficiency of these private organisations was placed under scrutiny by aid/watch, the only relevant activities referred to by the majority regarding the efficient relief of poverty, were those of the government. we argue that, given the constitutional foundations for establishing what is in the public welfare, and that “[t]he system of law which applies in australia thus postulates for its operation the 32 at 48 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 very “agitation” for legislative and political changes”,33 a charitable organisation ought to be able to generate public debate regarding the appropriateness of government regulation which has a direct or indirect effect on the relief, or otherwise, of poverty. the ato’s interpretation on 12 october 2011 the ato published tr 2011/4, the taxation ruling on income tax and fringe benefits tax: charities. the ruling states: [307] whether generating public debate about a particular government activity or policy that lies beyond existing heads of charity can be a charitable purpose under the fourth head will be decided on a case by case basis. arguably, all government activity or policy is intended to be 'beneficial to the community' but this does not mean generating public debate about any government activity or policy will be charitable. the subject matter of the debate will still need to either come within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the statute of elizabeth (established by analogy to existing charitable purposes if not directly specified) or be deemed charitable by legislation applying for that purpose (see paragraph 10 of this ruling). however, it is expected that the subject matter of many areas of government activity or policy would fall under one of the first three heads of charity or the already established charitable purposes under the fourth head, and where they do, a purpose of generating public debate about that activity or policy will be charitable. 34 the ato’s comments provide some comfort regarding the uncertainties above. the tax office views the ‘subject matter of the debate’ as analogous to a charitable purpose, so it seems the analysis of a charity’s activities will fall on purely the subject matter being discussed by the charity and the objectives of the particular government entity will be irrelevant. this interpretation is supported by our comments above. what remains unclear is the situation where the activity of a government may not be charitable, such as the example of the adf in combat above (uncertainty 2). however, by referring to the “subject matter of the debate” and because the debate is inspired by an 33 at 45 34 australian tax office, tr 2011/4, taxation ruling on income tax and fringe benefits tax: charities, 12 october 2011, at 307. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 19 organisation which arguably has charitable ends, we anticipate that the ato will focus on how public discussion is framed and the desired outcome of the debate. we think this is the correct approach and is preferable to the alternative narrow view that the subject matter refers solely to the government’s activity where the resultant impact may be opposite to charitable. for the activities of non-state actors, the ato’s reference to government policy is encouraging. if the objective of an organisation were the reform of actions of private enterprise we hope the ato would acknowledge the government’s role (or potential role) in its regulation. these types of organisations which are seeking charity status are encouraged to recognise and actively pursue strategic advocacy and discussion regarding government policy in order to be afforded the constitutional protection provided to aid/watch. the way forward the door is ajar for charities to explore the limits of legitimately generating public debate. as for any organisation testing the limits of law the risks and potential demands, be they financial or on resources, can be high. that said, we commend the commissioner of taxation on its behaviour as a model litigant, ultimately recognising this area of law was unclear and subsequently providing test case funding, without which the high court appeal would not have been heard. the current government has proposed that the definition of charitable organisation will be codified in statute by the new charities and not-for-profits commission.35 the aid/watch decision provides an instructive, contemporary basis for this statute. we are optimistic that the high court’s careful reasoning underpinning the constitutional bases of what is determined to be in the “public benefit” will guide law-makers to strengthen potential areas of uncertainty and legislate in favour of robust protections for charities. 35 see footnote 6 aid/watch and the public benefit of advocacy for the extra-territorial relief of poverty 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia redefining the political moment: or the way politics hollows out politics and how we should respond james arvanitakis university of western sydney abstract on 16 february 2003, more than half a million people gathered in sydney, australia, as part of a global anti-war protest aimed at stopping the impending invasion of iraq by the then us administration. it is difficult to estimate how many millions marched on the coordinated protest, but it was by far the largest mobilization of a generation. walking and chanting on the streets of sydney that day, it seemed that a political moment was upon us. in a culture that rarely embraces large scale activism, millions around australian demanded to be heard. the message was clear: if you do not hear us, we would be willing to bring down a government. the invasion went ahead, however, with the then australian government, under the leadership of john howard, being one of the loudest and staunchest supporters of the bush administrations drive to war. within 18 months, anti-war activists struggled to have a few hundred participants take part in anti-iraq war rallies, and the howard government was comfortably re-elected for another term. the political moment had come and gone, with both social commentators and many members of the public looking for a reason. while the conservative media was often the focus of analysis, this paper argues that in a time of late capitalism, the political moment is hollowed out by ‘politics’ itself. that is to say, that formal political processes (or ‘politics’) undermine the political practices that people participate in everyday (or ‘politics’). drawing on an ongoing research project focusing on democracy and young people, i discuss how the concept of ‘politics’ has been destabilised and subsequently, the political moment has been displaced. this displacement has led to a re-definition of ‘political action’ and, i argue, the emergence of a different type of everyday politics. introduction in samuel becket’s renowned play, waiting for godot, two characters, vladimir and estragon, wait around for someone named godot to arrive. the play follows the lives of the pair over two days as they attempt to divert themselves while waiting expectantly, and as it turns out unsuccessfully, for godot. they claim he is an acquaintance, but it seems that they hardly know him, admitting that they would fail to recognise him if he were to arrive. they occupy their time eating, sleeping, debating, arguing, playing games, swapping hats, and contemplating suicide. they will do anything “to hold the terrible silence at bay” in their wait for godot (becket quoted in knowlson 1996, p. 57). for many interested in political change, waiting for the political moment is similar to waiting for the arrival of godot: we believe that it will eventually come, but not sure either when this will happen or that we will even recognise it. we are not even sure what will trigger the arrival of the moment. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 73 throughout contemporary history, many authors including karl marx, antonio gramsci and antonio negri direct us to that moment: likely to be brought on by the crisis and inherent contradictions of capitalism (negri 1991). the ecological threats that emerge through the ever-expanding essence of capitalism are also seen to trigger a crisis that will lead to the moment for change (burkett 1999). when it does arrive, we believe that a post-capitalist, ecologically sustainable and socially just society will emerge. at two separate points during the play, pozzo and his heavily laden slave lucky, interrupt vladimir and estragon. the entrance of the two is quite dramatic including an appalling cry from the edge of the stage as lucky enters with a rope around his neck. lucky staggers half way across the stage before we see his master holding the other end of the rope. pozzo yells rudely at the slave, calling him ‘a pig’ while being friendly to the other two, who initially mistake him for godot. this type of ‘false arrival’ is something that has come to dominate the political moment. there have been many instances across the world when we have believed that the political moment has arrived. in 1999 during the world trade organisation (wto) negotiations in seattle, for example, a new global justice movement emerged that insisted the demands of trans-national corporations be secondary to social and environmental concerns. the protesters claimed solidarity with third world movements such as the zapatistas in mexico, and established a ‘people’s blockade’ which ‘shut down’ the wto ministerial (barlow and clarke 2001). such blockades were mirrored all over the world: from melbourne, australia, which attempted to stop the meeting of the world economic forum in 2000, to countless protests against the ‘purveyors’ of ‘development’ throughout the world that have been at the source of an economic model that has failed the majority of the world’s population including the world bank and asian development bank. each one of these blockades was aimed at symbols of globalised capitalism, and represented an alternative vision of globalisation. along with the annual world social forum meetings held in porta alegre in brazil, it was argued that this movement had seized a political moment to bring global capital to account for its excesses (kingsnorth 2003). elsewhere, i have described this movement as ‘counter globalisation’ rather than the popular ‘antiglobalisation’ title it was given as it presented us with a different vision of globalisation (see 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 arvanitakis 2007). though the movement remains active and continues to challenge the excesses of capital, it is difficult to argue that it has not lost momentum, not least because of the 2001 terrorist attacks in new york and washington that put such activity under severe scrutiny (fernandez 2009). the moment had come and gone, and little had changed. likewise, on 16 february 2003, more than half a million people gathered in sydney, australia, as part of a global anti-war protest aimed at stopping the impending invasion of iraq by the then us administration. it is difficult to estimate how many millions marched on the coordinated protest, but it was by far the largest mobilisation of a generation – with new technologies allowing a coordinated approach by the anti-war movement that was not possible during the mass protests against the vietnam war.1 walking and chanting on the streets of sydney that day, it seemed that a political moment was again upon us – the multitude of protesters had re-emerged, taking a different form and expanding to include many who had never previously taken to the streets. in a culture that rarely embraces large-scale activism, millions around australian demanded to be heard. the message was clear: if you do not hear us, we would be willing to bring down a government. the invasion went ahead, however, with the then australian government, under the leadership of john howard, being one of the loudest and staunchest supporters of the bush administration’s drive to war. within 18 months, anti-war activists struggled to have a few hundred participants take part in anti-iraq war rallies, and the howard government was comfortably re-elected for another term in 2004.2 again, a new people’s ‘super power’ emerged, and again it dwindled, leaving many wondering what happened to ‘the moment’ (moore 2003). this paper has two broad aims. to begin with, i discuss the absence of a specific political moment – particularly following the economic and environmental crises that currently 1 one estimate has placed the figure at 36 million people participating in over 3,000 protests in the three-month period between january-march 2003. see http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=6067 – accessed may 2010. 2 though a detailed analysis of the re-election of the howard government is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that john howard was able to sideline and dismiss criticisms about the war during his campaign by appealing to australians to ‘support the troops’. this allowed him to concentrate on then opposition leader, mark latham’s, many weaknesses as well as focussing on silencing many individuals and organisations critical of his government. see hamilton and maddison (2007) for more details. http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=6067� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 75 confront us. i argue that in a time of late capitalism, the political moment is hollowed out by ‘politics’ itself. that is, the processes of contemporary capitalist political cycles undermine and erode moments of political action by citizens, be they large or small. consequently, formal political processes (or ‘politics’) undermine the practices of the citizenship, forcing them to increasingly focus their engagement towards informal or everyday small ‘p’ politics. the second aim of the paper, then, is to consider the transformation in the character of the relations between citizens and civic institutions that follow this – a relationship that has become increasingly complex due to many factors, including globalisation and the rise of neoliberalism. what follows is that the concept of ‘politics’ has been destabilised and subsequently, the political moment has been displaced. this displacement has led to a redefinition of ‘political action’ and, i argue, the emergence of a different type of everyday politics by citizens that we find difficult to understand and measure. the political moment it does not take a ‘marxist’ to appreciate the crises and contradictions that are intrinsic to capitalism. central here is a system – economic, political and social – that relies on ongoing and continuous expansion. to achieve this, capitalist production must find new ways to grow: be it through new forms of domestic exploitation or imperialist expansion. inherent in this is that our society takes on a capitalist subjectivity (hardt and negri 2000). from our politicians and union leaders, to our own personal position, we are constantly looking for new opportunities of growth, wealth, accumulation and affluence. within this ongoing need for expansion, we see the emergence of crises. antonio negri’s (1991) reading of the grundrisse, for example, outlines how the exploitative demands of capitalism lead to antagonistic relationships between classes creating the constant potential for crisis. negri argues that the historical development of capitalist society involves the development of both the working and capitalist classes as separate and antagonistic subjects. for its own survival, capitalism must ensure the relationship expands both horizontally (through increasing levels of surplus labour) or vertically (by expanding a capitalist accumulation subjectivity). negri sees this working class subjectivity constantly being manipulated and controlled by various means, as the working class has the potential to throw the system into crisis and tear it down. here, capital cannot appropriately control the working class and the potential for a revolutionary (political) moment remains constant. 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 in contrast to traditional approaches to marxism, negri (1991) argues that class struggle is not limited to the economic sphere, but exists everywhere. in this way, political relationships are ubiquitous. consequently, the political moment can materialise in any sphere. additionally, the shape of this political moment is also undefined by negri. for clues here, we can turn to negri’s later projects with michael hardt (2000; 2004; 2009) where they discuss the emergence of the ‘multitude’. hardt and negri present the multitude in expansive terms, describing it as “a broad category that includes all those whose labour is directly or indirectly exploited by and subjected to capitalist norms of production and reproduction” (2000, p. 52). later, hardt and negri (2004) attempt to solidify the multitude and qualify it in terms of today’s progressive activist movements. while this attempt to better explain their political subject has many critics (see brennan (2002) and callinicos (2002) for example), hardt and negri (2004) seem to purposefully be avoiding an ultimate definition. as such, they present the concept of the multitude and its emergence as being “internally different, multiple social subjects whose constitution and action is based not on identity or unity… but on what it has in common” (ibid. p.100). the group of social actors, then, defines this common. defined in a more pragmatic way, this can be thought of citizens cooperatively taking control of challenges that confront them (hay 2009). as highlighted above, we do not have to look far to identify crises in capitalism – though the political moment remains elusive. most recently, this occurred during the global financial crisis (gfc) when the exploitative and casino nature of neoliberal capitalism emerged. related here, is simultaneous unmasking of the state apparatus that supports and underpins the system that gave rise to the gfc. a detailed explanation of the financial crisis is beyond the scope of this paper but just how embedded it has become in our contemporary world is best understood by the fact that it has its own acronym: gfc. like lol (or laugh out loud for the uninitiated), the gfc remains very today: not only used as an acronym when writing, but actually used when speaking as well. i am not making light of the crisis that refuses to go away despite promises that all is well. rather, the fact that such an acronym is used confirms it is part of our daily experience. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 77 this is not a stand-alone crisis, however, and is accompanied by the global food crisis (or the ‘other gfc’). though it no longer makes the front page of our newspapers, it has not gone away. the ‘other gfc’ saw the standard of living of over half of the world population fall dramatically following a surge in food prices in 2007-08 (world bank 2010; lorimer 2008). while many of us may have noticed a jump on our grocery bill of a few dollars, the world’s more vulnerable populations felt the effects immediately, with tens of millions of people more than before faced hunger and hundreds of millions having to reduce their food consumption. the world bank (2010) estimated that the result of the surge in food prices increased the number of undernourished people in the world to a staggering 923 million. then of course there is the most challenging of all crises: climate change. with only a handful of political dinosaurs now believing that this is actually not a problem to be confronted, the issue of global warming is interlinked with both the gfc and the food crisis in a number of ways – not least the need for capital to expand despite the consequences. as the global economy stood on the brink of collapse, the combined and complementary struggles of the world's working classes operating simultaneously could have given rise to radical socio-political transformation. despite the mass demonstrations (which are continuing in greece and spain at the time of writing), no such political moment emerged and the general feeling is the worst is over – a point recently encouraged by the international monetary fund in their 2010 economic outlook3 . the crises i have described above, then, have not led to a political moment but a withdrawal from formal political processes (li and marsh 2008). to understand why this is the case, i believe we need to turn to a study of citizenship and how its changing nature has hollowed out the political. despite flashes of resistance and protest, recent research in australia finds that people feel increasingly alienated, excluded and disempowered from formal politics (arvanitakis and marren 2009). i argue below that this is because the formal political sphere constructs and thrives on such feelings of disconnection. before proceeding, it is important to note i am discussing the emergence of both the citizen and the ‘political moment’ within a national context rather than expanding this examination 3 see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/index.htm accessed may 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/index.htm� 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 to include concepts such as the ‘global citizen’ (davies 2006). while this may diverge from the thrust of hardt and negri’s (2004; 2009) broader intent, it is important to note that i am engaging an approach that connects theory with observed reality. my work here is based on what nicolescu (2006) describes as ‘phenomenological transdisciplinarity’. by drawing on this approach, i am attempting to integrate a “non-dogmatic treatment of the transdisciplinary theory and practice” within a plurality lived experiences (ibid. p.3). the complex relations of citizenship in its most basic definition, we can think of citizenship as a set of social practices (turner 1993, p.4) that bind us to a nation (mueller 2002). from this flows a concept that citizenship is linear: a direct relationship between civic institutions and the citizen. the quality of this relationship is measured by voter attitudes and participation (kymlicka and norman 1994). in this way, the concept of citizenship has been proposed as a way of describing what people are excluded from, and what they could be included in. this envisages a form of belonging entailing both rights and responsibilities, and constructs a unifying sense of the civis to which they may belong. in the contemporary world, however, there is a need to understand citizenship as a more complex phenomenon. that is, it should not be seen as a simple one-to-one linear relationship between an individual and a civic body, but it is also a function of the relationships with those around it. this is a relational approach to citizenship, where my bond with civic institutions is complicated by the connection i have with those around me (both near and far), as well as their relationship with the same civic institutions. in addition, we have the rise of duel citizenship and increasing migration levels. in australia, for example, the percentage of people born outside the country has increased dramatically over the last 30 years and now represents 25 percent of the population. in addition, it is estimated that 45 percent of australians were either born overseas or have at least one parent who is a migrant.4 4 see department of immigration and citizenship fact sheets available at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/factsheets/04fifty.htm – accessed april 2010. http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/04fifty.htm� http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/04fifty.htm� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 79 there is also the ‘non-citizen citizen’. that is, the displaced person or temporary migrant who lives within a country’s borders. in an increasingly globalised world, we must acknowledge this section of the population and the influence they have even though they are not ‘citizens’ in the traditional sense of the word. for example, in 2007 australia had over 7 million temporary migrants (who were working, studying or visiting).5 in a population of just over 22 million, this is a significant proportion and one that is also important in influencing the relational nature of citizenship. this became evident in the emerging tensions caused between australia and india when a number of indian students where the victim of violent attacks. such attacks created a number of strains, both locally and internationally, as australians reflected on a history of underlying racist exclusion and tensions (haigh 2010). such a position on citizenship means that we cannot understand the relationship between the individual and the state in a straightforward equation. rather, it is complex and constantly renegotiated. it also means that we should resist the concept of citizenship as stable or its meaning universal. consequently, we need to see the relationship between the state and citizens as constantly in flux with different groups and individuals having significantly different relationships (see figure 1). a key problem is, however, that the most common way of seeing ‘citizenship’ is in rigid, restrictive terms, privileging a limited range of values and identities. in australia, we have found that this is basically a conservative, mono-cultural, anglo-australian, and it is being imposed on those who do not fit: from the young person to immigrant populations (arvanitakis and marren 2009). in this way, it reinforces a sense of exclusion that is aggravated because citizenship is seen as something that you must ‘fit into’ (collin 2008). we can think of this as a type of blunt instrument forcing all citizens, including their values and aspirations, into a pre-determined shape (aly 2010). this idea of citizenship, paradoxically, has led to sense of alienation rather than addressing it. 5 see department of foreign affairs and trade information sheets available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/aib/tourism_students.html accessed april 2010. http://www.dfat.gov.au/aib/tourism_students.html� 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 this process of exclusion was dramatically illustrated during a media debate in 2007 about the citizenship test that controversially asked a question about australia’s most famous cricketer, the late don bradman, who would be unknown to anyone outside a handful of countries. in fact, bradman’s career peaked during the 1930s and ‘40s, and though a ‘cricketing legend’, is from an era that even the majority of australia’s cricketing supporters can barely relate to. this failed to recognise the dynamic reality of today’s multicultural population. this anglo-centric, parochial definition disconnects them (and australia itself) from the dynamic, changing global context that frames all social action today (hodge and o’carroll 2006). from australia’s point of view, it achieves a ‘fantasy of unity’ at the price of excluding the various talents and energies that could make a difference. for those excluded, it reinforces a sense of not being valued or supported, for themselves and for their role in the civis. at the same time, even those who take part in the ‘fantasy of unity’ are feeling alienated, marginalised and neglected, and often believe they are remote from the workings of civic institutions (poynting 2006). this is because the image is hollow and is simply not representative. rather than acting as a way to unite, the image highlights just how far removed we are from the civic institutions that are meant to represent us. figure 1: citizenship typology disempowered marginalisation and citizenship deficit citizenship surplus privatisation and citizenship deficits insurgent citizenship empowered engageddisengaged a b d c zone of frustration cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 81 this disconnection is aggravated when attempts by the broader population to become engaged are dismissed or ignored. there are many examples to draw on, including the dismissal of the then foreign minister, alexander downer, of anti-war protesters as nothing but ‘a mob’ (cited in marr 2007), or when the then nsw premier, bob carr, described the demonstrators as “street fighting fascists” (ibid.). more recently, civil mobilisations and the emergence of a grassroots movement to demand action on climate change that directly assisted the election of kevin rudd as australian prime minister in 2007 – a commitment that the rudd government walked away from (see arvanitakis 2010 for a detailed discussion). the result is increasing disinterest and distrust in formal political processes, as well as, public representatives (collin 2008) and falling membership in formal political parties (jaensch et al. 2004). this can be highlighted by returning to the example of former prime minister kevin rudd’s failure to act on climate change despite describing it as one of the greatest “moral challenges of our time” (wright 2010). surveys and opinion polls following this decision led to a collapse in both rudd’s ‘reliability’ and ‘trust’ rating (colgan 2010). this type of disengagement and distrust of formal politics and lack of access to democratic processes is often described as a ‘democratic deficit’ (della porta 2005, p. 669). della porta (2005) argues that this democratic deficit is caused by a combination of losing any sense of control as well as marginalisation. recognising this deficit, many studies have investigated attempts to re-engage citizens through mechanisms to promote citizenship education and a more active citizenship (portney and o’leary 2007). this has led to a great deal of work to encourage ‘active citizenship’, which focuses on the twin nature of citizenship as including rights and responsibilities: that is, we have to know our rights but also acknowledge our responsibilities to those around us. in reviewing the work put forward here, i believe that they maintain both a ‘one size fits all’ and ‘top-down’ approach to citizenship. the result is that the impacts of such programs may actually be negative as they neglect the diversity of contemporary citizenship and are often rejected by those targeted (ibid.) a better approach is to acknowledge the relationship between civic institutions and citizens, as well as the relationships between different groups. further, we need to understand citizenship as in flux rather than as a stable category. a better way to understand this 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 complex relationship is by understanding citizenship as being in surplus and deficit. this acknowledges the relational and complex nature of citizenship in the contemporary world. citizenship deficits and surpluses in the sections above, i have outlined the need for a complex understanding of citizenship. to overcome this, i have previously presented a typology to reflect the different experiences of citizenship (see figure 1). the aim of this typology is to show how a population’s relationship with civic institutions cannot be taken for granted and must be acknowledged as variable. once people interact with civic organisations, their experiences will reflexively influence future interactions. in this way, a negative experience either directly or by someone within a social network creates a relationship that further alienates a citizen. in this section, i outline the four key citizen types i have identified and implications for the political moment. referring to figure 1, section a portrays ‘marginalisation and citizenship deficits’. this is driven by a belief that interaction with civic institutions is pointless as opinions or demands will be ignored, disconnecting people from the civic institutions surrounding them. there is a feeling that any effort to be involved will have no results: hence, a sense of disengagement and disempowerment prevails. while not always the case, research shows that many young people fit into this group, as well as people from lower socio-economic backgrounds and newly arrived migrants (see arvanitakis and marren (2009) for details). it is important to note that this attitude of disconnection arises from either personal experience or the encounters family or friends may have had with civic institutions. this highlights the need to understand citizenship in relational and complex terms: it is not just the relationship between the individual and the state and its institutions that is important, but also the experiences of those around us. section a also sees ‘privatisation and citizenship deficits’ apply to wealthy populations. this results from a lack of access to civic institutions because of privatisation and neglect by government, leading to the privatisation of decision-making and withdrawal from the public arena and democratic processes (stoker 2006). such citizens find their relationships with civic institutions more like that of consumers. as such, the relationship is merely a commercial rather than a civic one: the citizen simply sees the state as akin to any other service provider and in competition with the private sector. consequently, there are no social cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 83 practices of citizenship as described by turner (1993) but a mercantile relation. such a population may feel empowered during times of economic boom but during times of financial hardships such empowerment may quickly dissipate. section c, ‘citizenship surplus empowered not engaged’ represents citizens in surplus though with limited or no political engagement. this group appears to have much in common with the privatised citizen above, but may come from areas that are highly serviced by civic institutions. the choice not to engage is therefore voluntary. there is a strong push for selfsufficiency – a belief that their social capital and connections, wealth and status mean that they do not require the services of civic institutions (including government bodies). while not antagonistic towards such institutions, they believe that many services provided by the private sector are superior to public ones. section d is the ‘insurgent citizen’ (see holston 2007), who is both engaged and empowered. this group may not have access to many financial resources, but have high social capital and a willingness and ability to make time to be engaged in the political process. they feel empowered through their social background and engage with civic institutions and political processes. this group can have either progressive or conservative agendas: some promoting social justice issues (including students, academics, unionists and so on), while others may have a reactionary ideology (such as ‘anti-immigration’ groups). this group further demonstrates the complex and relational nature of citizenship. such active citizenship draws heavily on civil society connections and interactions (isen and nielson 2008). in this situation, while such individuals may at times experience alienation from formal political mechanisms, links to civil society networks are maintained and active citizenship promoted regardless. importantly, such ‘citizenship surplus’ is increasingly documented in theoretical literature through different descriptions. henrik bang (2005; 2009) draws on the work of marsh, o’toole and jones (2007) to discuss ‘everyday makers and expert citizens’ who, he argues, represent the emergence of a politics of lived experience. bang sees these as evidence of resistance identities that emerge in industrialist society that aim for politically transformation. for bang, this is a group that is driven by a ‘project’: that is, a specific political outcome rather than ongoing solidarity. such citizens are acting on and working with others to 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 confront issues of mutual concern rather than being part of a broader ‘values-based’ movement. for li and marsh (2008), such changes require a broader understanding of the way citizens now undertake the political. section b is the ‘zone of frustration’. this area represents the group of people who are engaged in political processes but for various reasons (including institutional racism) experience feelings of disempowerment. such disempowerment means that frustrations towards democratic institutions may develop. furthermore, this zone could expand as people have negative experiences in dealing with civic institutions. while section d is the zone that a healthy democracy operates in, i would argue that the hollowing out of politics means that this zone is itself being ‘emptied out’. we can turn to the issue of climate change to highlight the ongoing disconnection between the daily experiences and practices of citizens (or ‘politics’) with the practices of formal politics (or politics) as an example of this. this can be seen in the continued subsidisation of the coal industry, despite the rising evidence of detrimental health and environmental effects – both local and global – that has left many australians exasperated.6 despite the engagement in politics to alter this process, the latest federal position is one that continues to underwrite the industry. in fact, just how far the citizenship has become removed from politics was highlighted by a proposed tax on mining ‘super profits’ which actually led to the downfall of kevin rudd as prime minister, who was replaced by julia gillard offering a version of the tax that was more acceptable to the mining industry.7 this sees a split between formal politics and the informal, everyday politics. that is, the formal political realm of political parties and formalised consultation processes are seen increasingly distant from daily experiences and consequently, there is little incentive to participate. consequently, we are not seeing a collapse of support for democracies (norris 2011), but a general disintegration in the participation of political processes to the point that, according to colin hay (2007), we come to ‘hate’ politics. in many ways then, the political processes we are offered are often seen as nothing more than a method of placating public concern rather than being a real part of decision-making processes (hay 2007; collin 2008). 6 see for example http://www.theherald.com.au/news/local/news/general/hunter-cancer-cluster-fear-promptshealth-reviews/1800850.aspx accessed may 2010. 7 see mcknight 2010 for a detailed discussion on the role of the mining industry in the political collapse kevin rudd. http://www.theherald.com.au/news/local/news/general/hunter-cancer-cluster-fear-prompts-health-reviews/1800850.aspx� http://www.theherald.com.au/news/local/news/general/hunter-cancer-cluster-fear-prompts-health-reviews/1800850.aspx� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 85 this phenomenon was also evident in the united states with the election of president barack obama. while an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note how the election of president obama was at the beginning of the gfc and presents us with an interesting example of blurring the line between the activist moment and the political. this was the election of the first african-american president and he managed to utilise many former anti-war, union, student leaders throughout the course of his two-year campaign (bang 2009). also, as the election occurred during the start of the gfc, many of these people have since been tied up in the ‘let him do his job’ mantra (dreier 2008) rather than critiquing his failure to deliver on some of his key campaign promises including action on climate change (hillygus and henderson 2010). is it possible to see how president obama managed to inspire people to feel both empowered and engaged? this has not lasted as we have seen a collapse of his popularity midway through his first term.8 though the reasons for a collapse of his support are many, but it has been increasingly obvious that the president has not been able to ride the wave of support he created in his drive to be elected.9 once again, the formal sphere of politics has led to disappointment. redefining political moments: a conclusion of sorts with such experiences, it is not difficult to understand how politics is hollowed out and how the political moment fails to materialise. in place then, what has emerged? rather than looking for ‘the political moment’, we need to recognise that political moments are occurring consistently around us. that is, a politics is emerging that is outside formal political processes. what does this look like? in many ways, it is difficult to identify as it materialises in ways that are non-traditional and have been dismissed as pointless. for example, in sydney we have seen the emergence of bike cooperatives. within these organisations we see an open 8 see analysis of opinion polls as follows: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2010/04/12/2010-0412_president_obamas_approval_rating_hits_an_alltime_low_polling_data_suggests.html 9 another phenomenon that followed the gfc has been the emergence of the tea party (an acronym for ‘taxed enough already). while it is difficult to discuss this recent phenomenon, its emergence is one that complicates matters for a number of reasons. firstly, despite claims that it is a grassroots movement, it is strongly supported by established interests (hamsher 2009; frank 2010). furthermore, rather than calling for a radical re-think of the political, it has emerged as a force to support the system that created the crisis, calling for an increase in capitalist relations, no less. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2010/04/12/2010-04-12_president_obamas_approval_rating_hits_an_alltime_low_polling_data_suggests.html� http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2010/04/12/2010-04-12_president_obamas_approval_rating_hits_an_alltime_low_polling_data_suggests.html� 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 space where the abovementioned capitalist labour relations break down in an open and free exchange of labour. such moments constantly emerge in ways that challenge the very logic of capitalism – from the open sharing of intellectual labour to the emergence of a free university movement. it is here that we see glimpses of hardt and negri’s (2004) ‘working in common’ – relations that emerge the break down capitalist logic. another political moment can be found in the way many australians continue to support australia’s refugees. when elected, the former rudd government promised a more humane approach to dealing with refugees – an approach that had become internationally renowned for its cruelty under the previous howard government. the australian government has withheld a number of basic human rights from refugees in pursuing its policies of mandatory detention, forced deportations and the rejection of refugee claims. mandatory detention has also meant that numerous refugees have been held in prison cells for years, including newly born children. according to cohen (2002), these policies have reverberated across the world as a number of australia’s positions are increasingly reflected in the policies of other countries particularly throughout europe. by following such a path, australia and other nations have turned even those with ‘legal’ asylum claims into ‘illegals’ – in a sense causing the criminalisation of refugees (card 2001). the result is that refugees have been persecuted twice – once in their homeland and the second time as ‘illegals’ by the nations from whom they seek refuge (unhcr 2002). the rudd government, despite its pre-election commitments, has followed a similar path that only seems to have accelerated since julia gillard replaced rudd as prime minister (eltham 2010). despite this, a significant section of the population continues to resist and challenge this position. it is here we can see a cross section of people working both as individual citizens as well as part of a civil society network to harness their citizenship surplus and drive change. this ranges from lobbying organisations such as get-up10, to labour unions including the maritime union of australia11 and more issue-focussed groups such as the refugee action collective12 10 see . while such groups pursue actions in the formal ‘political’ realm, many of their actions also take place in the everyday politics space where change https://www.getup.org.au/campaign/endmandatorydetention&id=1042 – accessed may 2010. 11 see http://www.mua.org.au/news/support-grows-for-union-stance-on-asylum-seekers/ accessed may 2010. 12 see http://www.rac-vic.org/ accessed may 2010. https://www.getup.org.au/campaign/endmandatorydetention&id=1042� http://www.mua.org.au/news/support-grows-for-union-stance-on-asylum-seekers/� http://www.rac-vic.org/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 87 occurs and many political moments are created. here, we see the organisation of visits to support those held in detention centres, as well as working to break myths about refugees. returning to hardt and negri’s (2004) concept of the multitude, such groups work ‘in common’ to overcome the exploitation of such populations. the challenge for both those aiming to promote progressive political change as well as research it, is to both understand the complexity of shapes that emerge here, as well as why it is difficult to harness its energy. how then can we build a notion of citizenship that is not trapped by the capitalist and exploitative state apparatus, but will mobilise those who currently feel excluded and disempowered, without discounting the heterogeneity of their backgrounds? achieving this is important to confront the various crises confronting our world with the aim of a socially just and politically inclusive global society. acknowledgements the author would like to acknowledge the assistance of professor bob hodge (university of western sydney) in the development of these ideas. the research cited here is based on longterm research projects undertaken in collaboration with the whitlam institute and oxfam australia. references aly, w. 2010, ‘on the 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(ed.) debating empire, verso books, london, pp.97-120. burkett, p. 1999, marx and nature: a red and green perspective, palgrave mcmillan, london. callinicos, a. 2002, ‘toni negri in perspective’, in balakrishnan, g. (ed.) debating empire, verso books, london, pp.121-143. card – cambridge shire against racism 2001, ‘truth about refugees’, press release, http://card.zambezi.org.uk/press/release-2001-10-19.html accessed may 2005. http://newmatilda.com/2010/05/13/labors-antienvironment-budget-draws-fire� http://card.zambezi.org.uk/press/release-2001-10-19.html� 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 cohen, n. 2002, ‘how gunboats can beat the refugees; european leaders want to copy australia's policy for keeping out asylum-seekers’, new statesman, vol.131, 7 october 2002. colgan, p. 2010, ‘survey shows voters’ loss of trust in kevin rudd’, the punch, sourced from http://www.thepunch.com.au/articles/survey-shows-voters-loss-of-trust-in-kevin-rudd/ accessed june 2011. collin, p. 2008, young people and democracy, whitlam institute, sydney, australia. davies, l. 2006, ‘global citizenship: abstraction or framework for action?’, educational review, vol. 58, no. 1, pp. 5 25 della porta, d. 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unwin, crows nest, n.s.w. holston, j. 2007, insurgent citizenship: disjunctions of democracy and modernity in brazil, cloth, california. isin, e. f. and nielsen, g.m. 2008, acts of citizenship, zed books, london. jaensch, d., brent, p. and bowden, b. 2004, ‘australian political parties in the spotlight’, democratic audit of australia report 4, australian national university, canberra. kingsnorth, p. 2003, one no, many yeses: a journey to the heart of the global resistance movement, simon & schuster, london. knowlson, j. 1996, damned to fame: the life of samuel beckett, bloomsbury, london. kymlicka, w. and norman, w. 1994, ‘return of the citizen: a survey of recent work on citizenship theory’, ethics, vol.104, no.2, pp.352-81. li, y. and marsh, d. 2008, ‘new forms of political participation: searching for expert citizens and everyday makers’, british journal of political science, vol. 38, pp.247–272. lorimer, d. 2008, ‘global food crisis made in usa’, direct action, vol. 1, available at 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cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 89 marsh, david, therese o’toole and su jones 2007, young people and politics in the uk, palgrave macmillan, basingstoke. moore, j.f. 2003, ‘the second superpower rears its beautiful head’, unpublished paper delivered 31 march 2003, berkman centre for internet and society, harvard law school. mueller, d.c. 2002, ‘defining citizenship’, theoretical inquiries in law, vol.3, no.1, article 6, available at: http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol3/iss1/art6 accessed may 2010. negri, a. 1991, marx beyond marx – lessons of the grundisse, autonomedia/pluto, london. nicolescu, b. 2006, ‘transdisciplinarity past, present and future’, in b. haverkort & c. reijntjes (eds), moving worldviews: reshaping sciences, policies and practices for endogenous sustainable development, etc/compas, leusden, pp. 142-166. norris, p. 2011, democratic deficit: critical citizens revisited, cambridge university press, cambridge. portney, k.e., and o’leary, l. 2007, civic and political engagement of america’s youth: national survey of civic and political engagement of young people, tisch college, tufts university, medford, ma. poynting, s. ‘2006, ‘what caused the cronulla riot?’, race & class, vol.48, no.1, pp.85-92. stoker, g. 2006, ‘why politics matters: making democracy work’, palgrave macmillan, basingstoke, uk. turner, b. 1993, ‘contemporary problems in the theory of citizenship’, in turner, b. (ed.) citizenship and social theory, sage, london. unhcr – united nations high commissioner for refugees (2002) “basic facts”, source from: http://bit.ly/jmg9si – accessed may 2004. world bank (2010) the global food crisis – “the silent tsunami”, report available at http://bit.ly/incvdf accessed may 2010. wright, t. 2010, “the greatest challenge of our time now in the freezer”, sydney morning herald, 27 april, p.12. http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol3/iss1/art6� http://bit.ly/jmg9si� http://bit.ly/incvdf� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 71 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia “liting it up”: popular culture, indo-pak basketball, and south asian american institutions stanley thangaraj vanderbilt university abstract south asian american participants of a co-ethnic basketball league, known as indo-pak basketball, utilized urban basketball vernacular through the phrase “liting it up” to identify individuals scoring points in great numbers—the person “liting it up” becomes visible and receives recognition. accordingly, i want to “lite up”, recognize, and make visible the role of south asian american cultural institutions, especially religious centers, in constructing sporting venues as one key site to americanisation. i situate sport as one manner in which south asian american communities work out, struggle through, and contest notions of self. accordingly, my findings indicate that such community formation, as south asian americans, through the prism of sport, offer critiques and complicate notions of identity and belonging at the same time that the cultural parameters of citizenship continue to exclude various “others.” in short, the paper demonstrates that co-ethnic basketball allows certain south asian american men opportunities to claim american-ness, but they mediate and negotiate this identity in their own interests. indeed, the paper also points to cultural limitations and exclusions within indo-pak basketball whereby attitudes towards women and gays are conservative. key words: sport studies, cultural citizenship, south asian america, race and ethnicity interview with malik (member of an indo-pak basketball team known as “atlanta outkasts”): malik, a pakistani muslim american, who was born in atlanta and grew up locally, chose a sports bar for our meeting and subsequent interview. this sports bar was located near the venue where we played pick-up (recreational) basketball once a week with south asian american peers. with many tvs tuned into a variety of sports, sports talk and sports coverage resonated through this establishment. as malik and i started going over his life history and passion for basketball, i did not expect malik to attribute his love of basketball with an institution that is unfamiliar in the us sporting landscape. during the course of conversation, he informed me that his father and other muslim elders considered deeply the idea of a basketball court on premises of the first non african american mosque built in atlanta.1 1 in the late 1960s and even early 1970s, the mosques in atlanta were primarily african american. of these, there exist mainstream african american muslims and nation of islam african american muslims. the founders of al-farooq masjid wanted to include a basketball court on its premises. malik explained that his “father and a couple of elders wanted to include a basketball court” as a means to help their children—their 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia sons—find ways to “assimilate into us society” thereby not feeling the alienation that had been felt by the first generation. the interview with malik points to two interesting social phenomena that are interrelated: 1) cultural alienation by first generation south asians in the us whereby legal citizenship does not guarantee cultural citizenship and 2) the role of south asian american institutions in providing venues for integration into mainstream us culture for muslims. malik, a muslim south asian american, was born in atlanta and his father is a prominent businessperson in that city. he mentions, through the figure of his father, how marginalization and dislocation take place for muslims in a christian dominated us culture (joshi 2006). elements of popular culture, such as sport, present minority groups with one such venue for “cultural citizenship” (maira 2009) through which cultural practices and its respective social relations produce different sets of belonging within the us national fabric. sport, therefore, presents a venue through which to contest normativities, along the axes of race, ethnicity, gender, ethnicity, and sexuality, associated with american culture. in addition, south asian american participants, through south asian american cultural institutions, actively engage with sport to create their own cultural contours of belonging in the us and within south asian america—a form of cultural citizenship that collapses ethnic identity as south asians and national identity as us citizens. instead of being marginalized, passive communities, south asian americans and their respective cultural-religious institutions parlay in various kinds of belonging. i use the term “liting it up” to highlight those elements of popular culture and urban basketball vernacular that implicate the parameters of group identity as south asian americans. while the study of cultural texts such as “bhangra” (maira 2002) and bollywood are important to this key idea of a collective self, the south asian american participants in basketball social spaces emphasized basketball and hip hop as key elements of popular culture instead of a bollywood—informed subjectivity. whereas “bhangra” has transnational flows and implications and bollywood implicates south asian, the choice of basketball aligns with discourses that produce basketball as quintessentially american. therefore, south asian american institutions do not simply rely on cultural nostalgia associated with south asia—such as bhangra dance forms and bollywood film—but instead use local sporting spaces of us basketball to pass along cultural systems of meaning and identity around “south asian american-ness.” these sensibilities then shape south asian american-ness with particular cultural contours. key among these is male dominance and a heterosexual masculinity which, as this paper shows, limits full participation of female and male basketballers within the south asian american community. so although south asian american basketball spaces enculturate heterosexual south asian american males into american popular culture, it excludes women and marginalizes queer subjects. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 73 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia as religious and cultural south asian american institutions sets parameters of south asian americanness through sport, these institutions interrogate cultural distinctions and cultural affiliations associated with notions of american citizenship. i want to illuminate, “lite up” if you will, the key role of south asian american institutions as not simply sites of cultural difference but as sites of different sets of american-ness. these institutions are sites where agency is acted out not only by institutions but also by the young men who have persuaded their cultural/religious institutions to have an active involvement with us popular culture.2 instead of locating these cultural institutions as antithetical to the us cultural fabric, this essay demonstrates how sporting practices at south asian american institutions interrogate and complicate norms of citizenship in the us. i argue that sport constitutes a realm where south asian americans act upon the normativities of citizenship and aim for inclusion through cultural engagement with existing tools of popular culture. sport, as popular culture more broadly, opens up analysis of how institutions and individuals in ethnic american communities engage with the mainstream society and produce cultural constructions of self that promote values of us citizenship and contribute to a sense of belonging within south asian america. a careful examination of popular culture, lipstiz (1990, p. 40) argues, “open up for sustained analysis the everyday life activities of popular culture consumers, youth subcultures, and ethnic minorities…they provide sophisticated and convincing arguments about the ways in which the commonplace and ordinary practices of everyday life often encode larger social and ideological meaning.” everyday experiences of sport – basketball – at mosques and south asian american churches detail both the engagement by young people and institutions with popular culture through which they ascribe particular meanings to their social universe. social interactions around basketball and respective conversations at these social venues index complex social phenomenon surrounding acts of belonging for south asian americans. background on south asian america south asians in the americas have faced various forms of displacement from the us cultural fabric through the stereotypical figures of the licentious “hindoo” (shah 2005), the idealised “model minority” (prashad 2000), and the recalcitrant “terrorist/muslim” (puar 2007). south asian american participants in indo-pak basketball either encountered the racialising discourses mentioned above or had ancestors who 2 this commentary was provided by prof. jon hale and prof. beth tarasawa who offered a reading of an earlier draft. dr. daniel burdsey and dr. samaya farooq also provided valuable commentary. i am grateful to dr. daryl adair for his suggestions on earlier drafts and previous work. i am also grateful to my mentors, dr martin manalansan and dr junaid rana, for their intellectual guidance. 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia did. although the term “indo-pak basketball” references indians and pakistanis, the participants in this south asian-only league come from canada and the us with ancestral ties to many places including india and pakistan. the parents of these players came to north america through multiple immigration waves from the early 1900s onwards. the basketball teams from vancouver, canada, have players whose ancestors arrived on north american shores in the early 1900s (chan 1991); they are considered fourth generation north americans. some of the ethnic punjabis (from the region of india and pakistan known as punjab before independence from the british) moved down from vancouver, as a result of persecution, to places in california; they formed their own bachelor communities and married mexican women, but their grandchildren do not play in indo-pak basketball (leonard 1992). most of the us indo-pak basketball players’ parents arrived in the waves following the 1965 immigration act that opened us borders to professional workers from south asia as a means to compete with the ussr during the height of the cold war (prashad 2000). the early post-1965 wave brought in scientists, doctors, engineers, and nurses (agarwal 1991); these professionals and their children would be deemed “model minority” as a result of their academic success and social mobility. players whose parents came through this wave attended four year universities, had social mobility, and are themselves professionals (dhingra 2007). another significant south asian immigration wave to the us took place in the late twentieth century. in 1980, the family preference act was passed—it gave preference for immigration to siblings and family members of the early waves (khandelwal 2002). unlike their counterparts in the early post-1965 immigration waves, those that came after 1980 were not classed in the same upwardly mobile manner as their earlier counterparts (mathew 2005). several of the indo-pak basketball players’ parents and the parents of those players in atlanta’s south asian american basketball scene came through the post-1980 immigration waves; these young men did not all attend four year universities and do not have the same high level profession. most of the south asian american research participants were born in or grew up in the us—some had families that came immediately after 1965 and others who came after the 1980 family preference act. regardless of the immigration wave, participants encountered political and racial discourses after 9/11 that produced them as abject, “forever foreign” (prashad 2000) subjects. this proved especially true for the pakistani muslim american participants in my study. the increase in racial acts and racist acts based on the new racial formation, “muslim looking,” led to their marginalization in us society (ahmad 2004). accordingly, their religious and cultural institutions became key sites for political and racial violence by cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 75 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia mainstream society and the us state—these institutions were semantically constructed as “unamerican.” nativist sentiment and local surveillance surfaced in another incident with the dar-e abbas mosque in lilburn, georgia (a city adjacent to atlanta); this heightened islamaphobic rhetoric emerged in relation to the expansion of an existing mosque. dar-e abbas mosque had been a part of this community for eleven years and wanted to expand with a muslim cemetery to accommodate the needs of its members.3 the gwinnett daily post newspaper and cbs news covered nativist responses—some of the quotes from non-muslim locals follow: “this is about hurting our community, this is about hurting our kids” “i just don't like muslims and i don't want them taking over our neighborhood” "this is not what lilburn needs. this is a christian community, and they are anti-christian."4 such diatribes locate south asian americans in cultural parameters through a religion that was depicted as irreconcilable with american-ness. south asian american populations have felt state surveillance intimately in atlanta in an environment where they are stereotyped as recalcitrant, dangerous masculine subjects (puar 2007). there lies an explicit emphasis on the christian ethos of us belonging and a nativist belief in the bankrupt morality—a defunct american-ness—of local muslims. on the contrary, south asian american institutions stress their “american-ness” and cultural citizenship through the practice of basketball. as cultural norms and values embedded in judeo-christian national ethos and post9/11 racial hysteria displace south asian americans, south asian americans and their institutions utilize sporting cultures—along with its respective values and cultural norms—to perform practices of belonging. the participants in this study, all second generation south asians in the us, dealt with experiences of exclusion at the moment in which they, along with their cultural institution, engage with popular culture to cement their american-ness. methodology how do inclusions and exclusions through sporting processes of cultural citizenship materialize? what are the cultural contours of membership in the us and among south asian americans that create new inclusions and exclusions? to answer these questions and situate the role of south asian american institutions in contests over american-ness, i use a queer diasporic critique (gopinath 2005) to 3 this information came from an activist organization in atlanta called “movement to end israeli apartheidgeorgia” (meia georgia); they organized to support this local mosque. 4 these quotes come from meia and their archiving of quotes from tv news from the local cbs station as well as the gwinnett daily post newspaper. 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia interrogate nation and south asian america. such a queer framework serves to interrogate normativities in the construction of nation, diaspora, and institutions—“queer” serves as an anti-normative signifier (manalansan 2003). in order to flesh out the voices of institutions and individuals in atlanta’s south asian american community, this ethnographic project also included surveys and interviews. with the size of the large south asian american population in atlanta and in the larger indo-pak basketball north american circuit, i utilized surveys. i gave out 150 surveys, in person and over electronic mail, which allowed informants to write out responses at their own pace. survey questions were aimed around finding immigration history, parent’s professional background, experiences with basketball, players’ basketball heroes, social class, and players’ professions. these questions allowed me to locate the background of respondents. to make sense of how respondents attribute meanings to their everyday practices in sport and how community elders give voice to their institutions, i utilized semi-structured interviews and participant observation. i conducted ethnographic research on south asian american communities in atlanta while also paying close attention to the chicago indo-pak national tournament. ethnographic research consisted of prolonged personal engagement with atlanta’s south asian american community in order to make sense of the meanings they place upon certain actions, institutions, and discourses. as a south asian american researcher, i have not only conducted research on this population since summer 2006 but have known gatekeepers in the atlanta indo-pak basketball scene since 1994. my “insider” status, as a south asian american, facilitated movement within these social milieus; participants spoke openly with me as a member of their community. in summer 2006, the research project began with establishing rapport with key members, mostly muslim american men, in the south asian american community. building rapport with gatekeepers, i utilized the “snow-ball” sampling technique whereby gatekeepers pointed me to various other men and women in the community, thereby expanding the social network. after summer 2006, ethnographic research continued through summer 2007 and summer 2008; this consisted of visits to the chicago indo-pak basketball tournament in 2006 and 2008 while spending the majority of this time conducting research in atlanta. this research project culminated with eight months of research with atlanta’s indo-pak basketball community from january 2009 till august 2009; during this time i lived with one of my informants for a month while charting the bodily gestures, signs, and discourses in the professional lives, family lives, and sporting lives of the respondents. most of the young south asian american men were in their twenties and thirties, while the community elders consisted of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 77 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia women and men in their sixties. the south asian american young women in the study were persons that gatekeepers suggested i interview. i took special notice of their acts, signs, symbols—all part of the everyday practices of individuals and institutions—that critiqued us citizenship while normalizing the claims by heterosexual men about south asian american-ness. examining sporting practices allowed me to jot down how south asian american institutions and individuals encode significance; not only in sport, but how such acts of meaning making and cultural citizenship point to larger social processes. although a heterogeneity of religions within the category of south asian america exists, i discussed the role of malayalee5 christian churches in the us and the mosques in atlanta. malayalee american respondents provided knowledge on how their experiences with basketball came through their own churches, while muslim south asian americans in atlanta point to the mosques as sites of americanisation. although south asian american, i was sensitive to my subject position and essentialising practices; thus, i utilized a feminist trope (hooks 1984) to center the voices of my informants and not let my voice represent the entirety of south asian america. although i am a south asian american, the intersections of class, religions (i am a christian south asian american), gender, immigration wave, and ethnicity make the category of south asian america shifting, in flux, and multiply inflected. accordingly, i took into consideration the heightened us state surveillance and racial hysteria faced by muslim south asian american participants since late 2001; therefore, i gave informed consent forms to my subjects and maintain their confidentiality through the use of pseudonyms. interviews with players, captains, and tournament organizers of the chicago indo-pak basketball tournament were audio-recorded—this consisted of thirteen interviews alongside participant observation. the sheer pace of the games and brief intervals between games limited the number of interviews. in atlanta, i interviewed fourteen south asian americans. these interviews prove valuable resources of life histories but the majority of the data comes from field notes. most interviews took place on the court between games with some interviews in places that my informants chose, such as their homes or cafes. i conducted 28 interviews with various players and team captains. these interviews provided insight on the life histories of these young people and their involvement with basketball—it gave meaning to their leisure choices. the interview guide for indo-pak participant interviews consisted of questions that asked them about their family history, how they got to know of indo-pak basketball, their reasons for playing in 5 malayalees are an ethnic group from the state of kerala in india. although there are hindu malayalees, the majority of malayalee american participants in indo-pak basketball and in atlanta’s south asian american basketball scene were christian malayalee americans. 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia indo-pak basketball, and how it compares with the greater south asian american public. through these questions, the answers painted a complex picture of south asian america that spoke of the different immigration waves, experiences of racialisation and racism, the instrumental role of institutions in engendering basketball social interactions, and the safe spaces of south asian american basketball publics. i also interviewed key south asian american elders in the south asian american community. these interviewees were identified by my indo-pak basketball informants; each came to atlanta either in the early to late 1970s or after the 1980 family preference act—they represented both major immigration waves. i interviewed four muslim community elders in their homes, their place of work, or at the masjid. these elders provided not only their family histories but also accounts of diachronic change in atlanta’s south asian american community. furthermore, these community elders articulated the purpose of sport in south asian american institutions, its relevance to “american-ness”, and whom they aimed to reach with such sporting activities. these interviews provided first-hand accounts of the importance of sport for the first generation as a means of assimilation for their children. most material from atlanta comes through participant observation. i attended and participated with two pakistani muslim american indo-pak basketball teams—atlanta outkasts and atlanta rat pack—in indo-pak basketball tournaments at local hindu mandirs (temples), at georgia institute of technology, and at georgia state university; i took note of the interactions on and off the basketball court. atlanta outkasts consists of young men whose parents arrived after 1980 to us shores. atlanta rat pack players have parents who came through the early immigration waves and are deemed “model minority.” in order to make sense of the time, meaning, affect, and energy put into basketball activities, i played in recreational games, organized leagues, and in tournaments. i took notice of how they trained their bodies through not only basketball and by working out with them at local gyms (see sands 2002); these are examples of how institutions discursively produced exemplars of south asian american masculinity in conjunction with american-ness. playing basketball took various forms, from recreational basketball at a player’s house, to “pick-up”6 6 “pick-up” basketball consists of loose recreational play at gyms. some gyms require signing up on a sheet to play while others have players pick teams. it often has a structure of play dictated by the number of people present and the facilities present. at local gyms, to playing monday and thursday nights at a local gym. participant observation also consisted of partaking in activities outside of basketball with these team members such as the party scene, pick-up basketball, invitation to friday prayers at mosques, dinners, and grand events such as weddings. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 79 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia one recurring theme emerged in this ethnographic project: it consisted of the normalizing of men, sport, and citizenship. there existed a “patriarchal dividend” whereby men could participate in sport—but women and queer subjects could not participate in these sporting venues as players. women, often spouses of indo-pak basketball players, took active roles as organizers and volunteers at tournaments but the articulation of citizenship through sport projected women and queer subjects as abject us and abject south asian american subjects. the talk by community elders, the conversations and actions by indo-pak basketball players, and the narratives by women and queer subjects indicated the prevalence of normative projects of membership within the nation and diaspora that excluded both women and queers. origins of indo-pak basketball in the us although various sporting regimes exist in south asian america, this paper examines basketball cultural practices and the ubiquitous nature of basketball in the lives of these second generation south asian americans. some parents of indo-pak basketball players engaged actively with cricket and field hockey7 but their children favored basketball. however, the young men did not choose basketball by individual choice but rather through the influence and collusion of the nba, nike, and media agents (lafeber 1999). during the 2006 chicago indo-pak basketball tournament, i sought out max as an interviewee. atlanta outkasts player, mustafa, suggested that i meet max to find out more about indo-pak basketball, and also as a result of the increased popularity, significance, and prominence of the chicago tournament. i asked max, “how did you become involved with basketball?” he replied, “well, i didn’t play basketball initially. i loved baseball and that was what i played.” puzzled, i inquired, “why did you play basketball?” with a matter of fact assurance, max said, “all my friends started playing basketball. i am from chicago, it was michael jordan’s city. i couldn’t escape it. i loved the competition.” lafeber (1999), farred (2006), and andrews (2000) examine how the spectacularity of michael jordan spread basketball globally and locally. max, an ethnic malayalee christian american, created indo-pak basketball in the us in 1989 while being influenced by the iconicity of michael jordan. however, michael jordan’s popularity and linkages between basketball, cool, and american-ness were also reconstructed by max’s malayalee church. opportunities for basketball play came through unlikely but interesting south asian american institutions—south asian american religious centers and cultural organizations. why would sporting 7 mustafa, one of the muslim atlanta indo-pak basketball players, and his brother, ali, played cricket only a couple of times, according to them, at the local mosque with elders. in addition, mustafa’s father told me that he played field hockey at a national level back in pakistan. 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia spaces for basketball prove necessary or relevant? basketball stood as a key site for a rendezvous with us society for south asian americans. maram (2006) describes how popular culture and sport present opportunities for filipino men to assert their masculinity while finding a process to “americanization.” like the subjects in maram’s work, south asian american institutions, as well as individuals, utilized basketball as a means to assert their “american-ness.” for max, ethnically christian malayalee american, the malayalee church8 and malayalee cultural organizations played a critical role in advocating basketball for its male population. although female nurses led the immigration wave of malayalees to the us after 1965 (george 2005), the church opened up spaces of americanisation for its young men. referencing his experience playing basketball with malayalee american institutions, max said, “they [malayalee church and malayalee community elders] would break up the teams. but…they would stack the best players on two teams. we would kill everyone, the games were easy. there was no competition and it wasn’t fair.” although participating directly with his co-ethnic community through the malayalee church, this religious institution also presented limitations to the conceptualization of basketball sporting cultures. desiring the pleasures and intimacy of competition, max created, along with help from his basketball playing peers in the malayalee community, the first us indo-pak basketball tournament in 1989 in chicago. with a growing malayalee population in the us, co-ethnic organizations have emerged such as fokana “which is the national organization of keralite associations in north america.” (maira 2002, p. 86) utilizing organizations like fokana and the malayalee churches (evangelic, church of south india, syrian orthodox, and marthoma churches), max reached out to malayalee communities in houston and dallas.9 as a result of coming up to chicago for the chicago ipn in 1989, max agreed to bring chicago teams to houston and dallas for their tournaments (dallas in time would then structure and put in place the indo-pak tournament in texas). max also invited the various other ethnic south asian american basketball teams in chicago along with the houston and dallas teams to form the first indo-pak basketball court played outdoors. the tournament currently holds the most prestige and provides invitations to seventeen teams, considered by their peers, to be the premier performers in the north american south asian community. 8 max is a product of parents of evangelic and church of south india religious background. he married rathi whose dad is hindu but mom is a malayalee syrian orthodox (known as jackobite). 9 dallas hosts one of the big four indo-pak basketball tournaments. the organizer of the dallas tournament is also a malayalee christian american like max. the other sites for national indo-pak basketball tournaments are washington, dc (it is specifically in maryland close to dc) and california (san francisco). one other tournament takes place in early summer in vancouver, british columbia. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 81 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia al-farooq masjid and atlanta’s south asian american muslim community mustafa (captain of atlanta outkasts and pakistani muslim american) played in the 1998 chicago indopak basketball tournament. like max, mustafa and his basketball peers encountered the intimacies of american-ness and basketball at their mosque (masjid). similarly, mustafa played various other sports. mustafa said, “man, it was the move from canada to houston when i first played basketball. i played soccer before that.” similar to the role of the malayalee american institutions in indo-pak basketball formation, masjids (mosques) played an instrumental role in sporting identities for atlanta’s south asian american men. although opportunities to play cricket, a game imagined as south asian, existed at the various masjids, the male participants in this study chose basketball and its subsequent social interactions. in the opening interview, malik (a member of atlanta outkasts), told of how muslim elders incorporated a basketball goal on mosque grounds for young muslim men. dr. said is one such muslim elder who played a critical role in the founding and structuring of al-farooq masjid. according to dr. said, the south asian muslim community in 1977 was “small” and about “50 or 70 people” who were professionals and “mostly students or academics…majority of the muslims were affiliated with the university” meeting at the georgia institute of technology student center. with this muslim community growing, they purchased a house near the georgia institute of technology campus in 1980 that became the al-farooq masjid.10 initially, no basketball court existed on mosque grounds and the elders noticed young men playing at the basketball court at a nearby educational facility—homepark learning center—during their break from activities at the mosque. sultan (dr. said’s son) and ali (mustafa’s younger brother) both played for atlanta outkasts and discussed spending considerable time socializing during islamic camps. in between camp sessions, sultan said that he and ali “would hoop during the break…that is all we did. we did not want to go back.” implementing sports in general and basketball in particular at al-farooq masjid brought in young men since, according to dr. said, basketball was: “1. inexpensive, 2. all the youth are attracted, 3. don’t need many people, and 4. not dangerous but still manly.11 10 this became the first international mosque and dr. said estimated that membership comes from muslims from 45 different countries. ” in this sense, commonsensical associations take place between manliness and basketball. dr. said also alluded to the nba and the influence of “indirect role models” in addition to michael jordan and larry bird. to add, dr. said emphasized how young south asian american men found a further level of intimacy with basketball through muslims playing in the nba who served as “indirect role models”: dr. said referenced hakeem olajuwon (african muslim), mahmoud abdul-rauf (african american muslim), and atlanta native sharif abdul rahim (african 11 this was dr. said’s emphasis. 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia american muslim). basketball constituted an element of popular culture through which men could engage with mainstream ideas of cool and citizenship. these role models stood as exemplars of american manhood (although hakeem olajuwon is originally from africa). consumption of these figures and the respective basketball aesthetics allowed for claims to american-ness on muslim grounds. sultan highlighted the importance of basketball in the 1980s for piquing his interest and mentioned an idolization of dominique wilkins of the nba atlanta hawks. sultan stated, “i grew up in the best time of basketball, the 80s...the money wasn’t there yet…it was pure.” in the mid to late 1990s, with the atlanta olympics in 1996, atlanta’s muslim population grew considerably with internal migration and south asian immigration. dr. said estimated the muslim population in atlanta at “80,000 muslims with 35% african american.” he mentioned how the remaining “65% of muslims in atlanta are half south asian while the other half came from north africa, middle east, and eastern europe.” in line with the growth of the population, dr. said highlighted how al-farooq masjid was under way for dramatic reconstruction, renovation, and expansion starting in 199512; it now includes a full outdoor basketball court painted in green to fit muslim aesthetics. to meet the demands of an expanding population, a neighborhood mosque, omer masjid, branched out from alfarooq masjid13 and now contains an indoor basketball court for its muslim youth. several of atlanta’s south asian american teams come out of al-farooq masjid and players on these teams spent their young formative years playing basketball on mosque grounds. the teams are atlanta outkasts (played in the north american indo-pak basketball circuit), camel jockeys, atlanta rat pack, sand brothaz, atlanta franchise, and various others. as these teams formed at the masjids, their formation also meant that “american-ness” could be attained by a particular few. institutionally, al-farooq masjid spatialized gender segregation with separate male and female activities along with separated gendered spaces. therefore, gender segregation constituted one method of enculturation as ethnic americans along the axes of gender and sexuality. thus, venues for american-ness through basketball were normalized for heterosexual men while excluding women and queer subjects. dr. said did not mention spaces of sport for muslim women; elders created social spaces within the mosque as distinctly “feminine” and “masculine.” when asking sultan about interactions with young women at the mosque, he responded, “girls played in the playground or hung out together in the 12 the new mosque houses a clinic, an academy for pre-kindergarten to eight grade, a cemetery, school of quranic memorization (there is a computer-based home schooling component to this as well), and a self-contained brother mosque known as omer masjid (it is a neighborhood mosque while al-farooq masjid is the central mosque). 13 there are, according to dr. said, over 40 different mosques that are neighborhood specific and also ethnically specific as a result of location and residential patterns. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 83 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia hallway. they never played sports.” a young african american muslim woman, yasmin, stated, “there is a sports component for both girls and boy (basketball, i think).” gendering basketball as masculine also limits who can partake, consume, and articulate their subjectivity through basketball. in addition to gender segregation and affirmation of gender dichotomies, the spatializing of gender through sport also posits an opposition between queer-ness and basketball. sharif, self-identifying as a gay muslim south asian american, gave testimony to heterosexist, marginalizing practices as well as the benefits of sport: “we had sleepovers at the mosque, field trips to different states, and sunday school. we were introduced to each other and non muslim south asians at the mosque. i played in the sport gatherings with groups, i played basketball and football. people would make friends through sport. it [sport] got me out of my shell because i was introverted, being gay led to minimal conversations other than in sport. sports gave me confidence, did not feel defiled. overall, it was good. homophobic terms were used on occasion and it irked me. there were talks about girls and marriage, these were the salient topics and made me feel isolated…i was not on atlanta outkasts because those guys went to more heterosexual places, clubs, with girls.” he alluded to the prevalence of homophobic terms in sport and underscored the intimate, intensified character of urdu homophobic slurs, such as “gandu” and “chakka”. sharif said, “these terms in our language can also be used as gender-bending words and when i use them it does not feel like i am compromising anything. i can use it to feel empowered through the language used against me. i have heard the urdu words, and unlike ‘fag’ or ‘faggot,’ they are more penetrating. it is sweeter and used in a more painful feeling. it hurts a lot more…more offensive…king of sobering…you feel like you get angry when it is in english and feel sober and melancholy when used in urdu. you feel like anger would be an anger against your own community and feel individualistic and feel like you are going against the community.” as the social interactions and conversations at the mosque evoke pain for queer subjects, any attempt to resist within that space only serves to produce them as failed muslim subjects as a result of their sexuality. basketball masculinities did not carry the same meaning for sharif as they construct another exclusion at the very moment they resist hegemonic discourses that normalize whites and us cultural citizenship. as a result, a correlation emerged that normalized heterosexuality, citizenship, and americanness whereby queer subjects face double exclusion within south asian america and the us mainstream society. thus, sharif and other gay muslims have formed their own sporting spaces to engage with 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia sporting pleasures; these are separate leagues that provide the safe spaces that the masjid is unable to provide. when talking with mustafa and sharif’s name came up, i asked mustafa if there were safe spaces at the mosque for gay men. mustafa replied frankly, “they would kick his ass straight.” with justification for separate queer sporting spaces, sharif said, “we don’t want to be violated, misunderstood, stereotyped. we also want to be loved.” muslim 3-on-3 tournament: homosocial celebrations of masculinity this institutionalizing of gender and sexual difference by affirming sport as masculine and heterosexual also took place at a 3-on-3 basketball tournament sponsored by omer masjid and a group working with atlanta’s muslim youth—punnam.14 close investigation of the website for punnam provides details on the organization, their mission, and their conceptualization of “ummah” (muslim community). muslim elders utilized basketball as one among various activities to mentor muslim youth and construct “community” conflated with “brotherhood.” according to the website (i use a pseudonym and maintain confidentiality by not giving the name of the website), they define “punnam” as: “the actual name of [punnam] was taken from surat al rahman. it means precious gems [sic] or jewels…the idea was symbolic in naming our youth group [punnam]. for it signified the existence of precious jewels or pearls that lay hidden, yet only need to be searched for to be realized. this is how we view the youth in today’s muslim ummah.” in this instance, the idea of “jewels” and “gems” treasured in this instance consists of young men, there is a value put on the bodies of young muslim men. furthermore the organization states its mission as: “the goal of [punnam] is simple; to create a brotherhood around the teaching of islam with quran and sunnah as our core, for the betterment of our lives as well as for the betterment of society… inshallah, with the guidance from allah (swt), we can create a sense of islamic awareness within the muslim youth to help them realize that they are indeed the crux of our religion, and that with the youth the beauties of islam spread fourteen hundred years ago, and that now, with the youth, that same beauty can be spread across the modern times of the 21st century.” accordingly, the explicit association of “ummah” and “muslim youth” with young muslim men produces exclusions by cementing heteronormativity and patriarchy within the muslim south asian american community. the discourse on “brotherhood” stands in, as sharif’s interview demonstrates, for a heterosexual masculinity that also excludes women. therefore, i contend that the opportunities for 14 this is also a pseudonym. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 85 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia “brotherhood” and “americanisation” provide foreclosed vistas for expressions of muslim americanness. the structuring of the tournament reflected the character of “american-ness”, muslim-ness, and masculinity at play in this sporting space and its subsequent exclusions. the vignette below details the august 15th, 2009, 3-on-3 muslim tournament: with the blistering atlanta summer heat scorching the pavement outside the gym, the energy, competitiveness, and sporting passions of the young muslim men heated up the indoor court. instead of celebrating pakistani independence day and indian independence day—august 14th and august 15th respectively—at various festivals across atlanta, these south asian american youth gathered to play basketball which indexed their american-ness that also posed a generational difference from their parents. beside them and with these young south asian american men were african muslims, african american muslims, latino muslims, and middle eastern muslims. at the gym, punnam tournament organizers, south asian americans ranging in age from early twenties to late forties, divided the young muslim male population into two age groups—one of high school and younger group and the other of adults in college or older. young south asian american muslim men patrolled the courts with a whistle in hand to officiate the various games, to keep game scores, and to document the tournament through photos. sanjeet, a sikh american, played for one of the adult muslim teams but also plays in the more competitive south asian american basketball scene. atlanta outkasts and atlanta rat pack did not play in this tournament. when inquiring into their absence, sanjeet replied, “imran [atlanta rat pack] said this tournament is weak, they won’t play in this. the refs are horrible and they don’t call anything. i am here because my friends [muslim south asian americans] asked me play. i really15 want a trophy.” sanjeet’s explanation of imran’s and mustafa’s absence rings similar to max’s reasons to play in south asian american basketball publics outside of their institution. as a south asian american, sanjeet entered this muslim space freely and no one questioned his membership. i sat on the cold steel bleachers with sanjeet and his teammates as they discussed the gamut of players at the tournament and who would provide them the greatest competition. i observed the interactions on the court and took note of the bodily comportments. in addition to baggy basketball shorts hanging below the knee, sleeveless t-shirts, basketball shoes, and hyper-masculine team names such as “killaz” and “tenacious,” other expressions of a muslim identity materialized in this space not seen in other basketball spaces. for example, one african muslim and a south asian american muslim performed basketball aesthetics while layering such practices with muslim sensibilities and muslim respectabilities. the african player played in jogging pants inside the gym while a blistering, muggy august atlanta heat awaited players outside the gym. similarly, a south asian american player wore a full length burqa-like religious outfit consisting of a long sleeved shirt down to his knees and baggy pants. instead of representing “matter out of place” (ibid), these two men moved seamlessly through the social fabric of this basketball site. 15 sanjeet’s emphasis. 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia these expressive practices gathered momentum while explicitly collapsing poles of muslim-ness and american-ness that are often painted as irreconcilable in the us imaginary. such cultural practices of ethno-religious garb at basketball events complicate how basketball and american-ness are imagined. the particular social interactions, through a muslim “heritage economy” (afzal 2006), underscores a social phenomenon that is very american in nature. muslim men of various persuasions rearticulate the meanings of this physical venue for basketball with basketball meanings around muslim respectability and american-ness. instead of seeing this basketball space as defined only by particular garb and linguistic codes, contrapuntal items such as burqas, speaking of urdu, spoken african languages, english vernacular, and basketball garb co-exist to produce the particularity of this american-ness. through heightened basketball competition and social intimacy facilitated by the masjid and punnam, the young men re-define this public space thereby conflating muslim-ness, masculinity, heterosexism, and american-ness. there also exist various forms of surveillance in this space through the bodies of the organizers, south asian american men. moments of basketball play for the young muslim men present opportunities for spiritual training and particular kinds of discipline. one of my sikh american16 subjects, sanjeet, underscored this spiritual training taking place during a mandatory interval to the tournament. during a break between games, two muslim community elders at the tournament, according to sanjeet, gathered the young men to talk about islam as well as proper “muslim masculinity” through basketball analogies. this is what sanjeet, playing on one of the teams, thought about the events that followed: “i missed the first part of the prayer's…[sic] i got there late but basically from what [abhijeet] told me they had lunch which was provided by them, and then they went inside, [sic] the imam( i think that's how you spell it) came and started praying…[sic]which was fine but then he went on and started talking about what is a good muslim, why is islam such a good religion and what does life mean in islam. most of the player's sat there and listened. he talked for a good 45mins or so.” as basketball can be appropriated to underscore american-ness, this expression is also policed by adults to suit their own interests. furthermore, the muslim elders take this opportunity to represent americanness that is also a specifically managed muslim-ness. these forms of discipline and surveillance are creatively weaved into south asian american appropriation of basketball cultural practices. 16 sikhs are an ethno-religious minority who were persecuted in india and there is a large sikh diaspora in canada and the us. there is a sikh presence in atlanta with five different sikh places of worship (gurdwaras). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 87 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia as i observed these acts of policing, i noted an important absence during the course of this tournament. over the course of the day long tournament, only two african american women made an appearance at the gym—these two women came to watch their african american friends play. young south asian american women did not have a site for basketball play available here; in addition, south asian american women could not come to spectate and socialize. there is a policing of the “legitimate kinds of bodies” (muller 2007) by roving south asian american men—who serve as panoptic technologies— thereby making sport, nation, and diaspora battle ground for “symbolic masculine legitimacy” (brown 2006). south asian elders provided, at this tournament, opportunities for basketball pleasures alongside spiritual training for muslim men. women cannot claim “american-ness” and modernity through such means but, rather, south asian american women are asked to represent south asian tradition, culture, and purity (gopinath 2005). indo-pak basketball as institution and as exclusion accordingly, south asian american men in my study reference only men as their basketball heroes thereby normalizing men both in nation and sport. the indo-pak basketball websites and face-to-face conversations with players foreground one particular south asian hero—parambir. parambir played division i collegiate basketball, played for the canadian youth basketball team, and is from vancouver. unlike african-american heroes, parambir’s visibility in indo-pak basketball defines him as an accessible hero. as a former collegiate women’s basketball coach myself, i knew of madeleine venkatesh as a collegiate women’s basketball coach in atlanta but also knew of her own athletic collegiate career. i wondered about her invisibility in indo-pak basketball’s institutional conversations. the same conversations that celebrate parambir do not point to madeleine venkatesh—she played division i collegiate basketball and holds various records, she is left out of these celebratory discourses. when i asked ali about his thoughts about female basketball players and the women’s national basketball association (wnba), he replied, ““basketball is physical. i don’t think basketball is a women’s sport, i hate the wnba. i hated it when they act masculine. chest bumps, tattoos, pounding the chest, and the gear are masculine and childish. they are butch.” discourses of this sort point to the convention of such cultural practices by men but their abnormality when embodied by women. furthermore, femininity is constructed by ali along narrow parameters—feminine presence in basketball is articulated by ali as an abnormal femininity, thus placing it outside a normative femininity. discourses, such as those of ali, are common-place in sporting cultures. sexualizing female basketball players as “butch”, according to carrington, “devalues their sporting achievements” (carrington 2002, p. 12). thus, athletes such as venkatesh are produced as “lesbian”—this is itself an act of policing these bodies and 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia makes membership in nation and the diaspora subject to gender and sexual orientation—the diaspora and nation exile their queers (gopinath 2005). thus, the stigma of “butch” limits female participation in basketball but also limits the productions of such social opportunities. for example, indo-pak players stressed the need to get young men into basketball while their daughters, sisters, and wives stayed off the courts and could reside only in the stands. indo-pak basketball organizers in chicago materialized the anxiety of not having enough boys in the league through the creation of two tournaments at the 2008 chicago ipn—adult indo-pak tournament and an under-18 years old youth tournament. thus, it normalized young men in basketball; there was not the same concern for involving young women in basketball practices and in providing full membership to this cultural community. madeleine venkatesh, a former division i collegiate basketball player in the us and college women’s basketball coach, discussed her own anxiety when asking her parents whether she could play basketball; she intimated that her older brother had no such worries. juxtaposing her own ambivalence with asking her parents to play basketball while her older brother had no such problems, madeleine highlighted the gendered, sexualized nature of women in basketball as she pointed to the prevalence of south asian american women in tennis, which is gendered and sexualized differently as feminine.17 madeleine venkatesh said, “i only met two indian girls from playing and recruiting for 15 years.” when prodded further about what kinds of stereotypes limit south asian american women from participating in basketball, madeleine used the case of her own mother. she stated, “my mom was very subservient to my dad. my mom’s life revolved around her three kids, no hobbies of her own. her own desires took back seat to family.” this, a south asian femininity, was in counterpoint to what madeleine stated as the necessary traits to succeed in sport, “in order to participate you need to be assertive…cannot be meek or weak…need to take control…not sure how much of it is culture and how much is my own family.” with examples of her mom as symbolic of south asian femininity, madeleine also locates herself differently because of her love for basketball. she says, “i was not a ‘good indian,’ i was not a typical indian.”18 17 the production of south asian american femininities make impossible the queer female south asian subject (gopinath 2005). a good citizen in the nation (us) and in the diaspora is articulated, in a cultural and normative sense, through a tough, aggressive, sporting masculinity in relation to a traditional, passive, domestic femininity. therefore, as south asian american institutions continue to complicate american18 madeleine emphasized that she did not socialize with other south asian americans other than her older and younger brother in addition to her parents. she also mentioned that she interacted with whites in many spaces while with african americans in mostly sporting spaces. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 89 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia ness through sporting practices, they simultaneously limit the nature of the articulation of american-ness and foreclose it to women and queers. conclusion popular culture presents a paradigm by which to understand an active engagement between communities of color and mainstream us society. sport, therefore, underscores not only identity formation among south asian american men through hyper-masculine figures like michael jordan but also how such basketball practices expand, disrupt, manage, and reconfigure simultaneously the us and south asian america. whereas cultural centers (rudrappa 2004), religious institutions (joshi 2006), places of work (dhingra 2007), and collegiate social organizations (maira 2002) play instrumental roles in identity formation, sport is implicated at these various institutions and occupies an important place in south asian america. immersion into basketball play and basketball popular culture facilitated various south asian american cultural practices and sensibilities. however, fields of power also emerge in these moments of pleasure and desire in basketball (farred 2005; george 1992). in particular, the engagement with popular culture—basketball—has taken place through heterosexual norms thereby limiting opportunities of engagement with south asian american queer communities as well as south asian american women. to conclude, whereas the delve into popular culture in the lives of south asian americans often emphasizes “bollywood” and “bhangra/dance party scene,” my research situates sporting spaces as a part of the cultural fabric of some south asian american communities. sporting spaces of basketball also give valuable information to the performance, materialization, and construction of american-ness at the intersection of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality. furthermore, this research project adds to the literature on asian american popular culture by inserting basketball practices of south asian americans to understand how “american-ness” is appropriated and constructed by subjects otherwise produced as problematic, abject subjects in the us imagination. as such, i add to the literature dealing with second generation south asian americans (dhingra 2007; maira 2002; purkayastha 2005) and i demonstrate how young south asian american men articulate cultural citizenship through consumptive practices of sport. finally, research on sport in the us has only begun to study critically how ethnic american communities and their cultural practices of sport inform identity formation—my research complicates and adds to this literature. references 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia afzal, ahmed 2006, ‘from south asian to a muslim heritage economy: religious transnationalism & transformations in the pakistani ethnic economy in houston, texas’, presented at south asian religious transnationalism: regional dynamics, global passages conference. agarwal, priya 1991, passage from india: post 1965 indian immigrants and their children, yuvait publications, palos verdes, ca. ahmad, m. 2004, “a rage shared by law: post september 11th racial violence as crimes of passion.” california law review vol. 92, pp. 1259-1330. andrews, david l. 2000, “excavating michael jordan’s blackness.” pp. 166205. in reading sport: critical essays on power and representation, (eds.) susan birrel and mary g. mcdonald, northeastern university press, boston. brown, david 2006, “pierre bourdieu’s ‘masculine domination” thesis and the gendered body in sport and physical culture,” sociology of sport journal, vol. 23, no. 2, pp 162-188. brownwell, susan 2001, training the body for china, university of chicago press, chicago. chan, sucheng 1991, asian america, twyane publishers, california. dhingra, pawan 2007, managing multicultural lives: asian american professionals and the challenge of multiple identities, standford university press, stanford farred, grant 2006, phantom calls: race and the globalization of the nba, prickly paradigm press, chicago. george, nelson 1992, elevating the game: black men and basketball, harpercollins, new york. gopinath, gayatri 2005, impossible desires, duke university press, durham. hooks, bell 1984, feminist theory: from margin to center, south end press, cambridge, mass. joshi, khyati 2006, new roots in america’s sacred ground, rutgers university press, new brunswick, nj. khandelwal, madhulika 2002, becoming american, being indian: an immigrant community in new york city, cornell university press, ithaca. lafeber, w. 1999, michael jordan and the new global capitalism, w.w. norton & company, new york. leonard, karen 1992, making ethnic choices: california’s punjabi mexican americans, temple university press, philadelphia. lipsitz, george 1990, time passages: collective memory and american popular culture, university of minnesota press, minneapolis. maira, sunaina 2009, missing: youth, citizenship, and empire after 9/11, duke university press, durham. maira, sunaina 2002, desis in the house, temple university press, philadelphia. manalansan, martin 2003, global divas: filipino gay men in the diaspora, duke university press, durham. maram, linda 2006, creating masculinity in los angeles’s little manila, university of california press, berkeley. mathew, biju 2005, taxi!: cabs and capitalism in new york city, new press, new york. muller, tiffany k. 2007, “the contested terrain of the women’s national basketball association arena,” in sport and gender identities: masculinities, femininities, and sexualities, (ed.) cara aitchison, routledge press, london. prashad, vijay 2000, the karma of brown folk, the university of minnesota press, minneapolis. puar, jasbir 2007, terrorist assemblages, duke university press, durham. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 91 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia purkayastha, bandana 2005, negotiating ethnicity: second-generation south asian americans traverse a transnational world, rutgers university press, new brunswick, nj. rudrappa, sharmila 2004 ethnic routes to becoming american: indian immigrants and the cultures of citizenship, rutgers university press, new brunswick, nj. sands, robert 2002, sport ethnography, human kinetics, champaign, il. 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia pieces of a thousand stor ies: repatr iation of the histor y of abor iginal sydney peter read univer sity of sydney suzana sukovic univer sity of sydney abstract the on-line project a history of aboriginal sydney1 , based at the university of sydney, takes existing educational and australian indigenous digital initiatives in a new direction. by dividing sydney into six geographical areas, we are creating a knowledge base of post-invasion aboriginal history, incorporating different forms of tagging, timeline and digital mapping to provide multiple paths to information in text, videos, still images and, in the future, three dimensional reconstructions of former living areas. after eighteen months research we are maintaining a balance between unearthing new and forgotten material, incorporating it into our developing database, and exploring the potential of digital mapping, animation and 3d historical reconstruction for educational and research purposes. with close indigenous consultation, especially the aboriginal educational consultative groups, we hope to digitally construct the aboriginal history of sydney and return it to the people who have been deprived of so much of their history for so long. introduction a lost history? while sydney aboriginal families still carry their own oral histories, very often they are much fragmented. laws and cruel or thoughtless bureaucratic action closed off much information that was the right of every young person to know. government policies accidentally or deliberately put an end to their historical knowledge by separating old from young, families from children, grandparents from parents, knowledge holders from knowledge receivers, and by breaking up community living areas. stolen generations children grew up knowing nothing. some families thought it best, from the mid-nineteenth century, not to identify as aboriginal at all. indeed, some families have only recently discovered their descent from historic aboriginal individuals in the last two decades. partly because so much was lost, family histories are now frequently and fiercely contested by others, who may deny a clan association to their opponents or even the indigenous identity itself. 1 the website will be accessible from december 2010 at www.historyofaboriginalsydney.edu.au https://webmail.adsroot.uts.edu.au/owa/redir.aspx?c=f42cb9213e64424cb737b09f7fa06b81&url=http%3a%2f%2fwww.historyofaboriginalsydney.edu.au%2f� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 41 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia a huge amount of bureaucratic history is still locked up in the state archives, of great importance to historians as well as communities: but thanks to the exercise of somewhat arbitrary privacy laws, they are almost totally closed. despite the closures and restrictions, some specialist historians of aboriginal australia have made some remarkable advances. a few scraps of information are available in local histories, generally in the introductions, before the writer gets on to the ‘main’ (read ‘non aboriginal’) story. works by sydney aboriginal people themselves are few, though short oral histories are beginning to fill out the gaps. research by specialist historians of aboriginal australia has uncovered a remarkable amount of information, but while some of their works remain well known, many are out of print, and some excellent doctoral theses unknown or, for community members, are difficult to access. so what remains is piecemeal, and often disputed. such is the disagreement on clan, tribal and linguistic boundaries today, that it would be probably impossible now to draw up a definitive linguistic map of the sydney region as it was in 1788. background: indigenous visitors and migrants nor did things stay the same after 1788. it is held by an aboriginal oral tradition that people from the south coast, keeping governor phillip’s flotilla in sight, were able to keep pace by walking parallel to the ships and so the first visitors from outside, as well as those living in what became known as sydney, were there to greet the fleet as they dropped anchor in botany bay. aboriginal immigration had begun. within eighteen months a smallpox epidemic had killed perhaps ninety per cent of the harbourside population. clanspeople probably already having customary rights in sydney began to occupy the spaces: north of the harbour a young man, bungaree, from the north side of broken bay, came to settle from time to time near kirribilli. today it is his language group, known today as guringai, that has given its name to the sydney municipal council ku-ring-gai. at the same time, aboriginal visitors and travellers from south west and the south continued to visit traditional areas like today’s la perouse. migrations to sydney continued, interrupted by periodic clearing of communities from around the harbour. sydney was the focus of radical aboriginal action in the nineteen 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia twenties and ‘thirties’.2 after the second world war, thousands of people, especially from northern new south wales, were beginning an economic migration to redfern and surrounding suburbs. traditional camping grounds continued to be destroyed by local councils and the residents transferred to western sydney. by the 1970s many hundreds of aboriginal people were moving from eastern to western sydney by force, or under the promise of a housing commission house. the nineteen eighties and nineties were a time of re-recognising clan and language differences, obscured in some cases for a century. the 1983 new south wales land rights act established the right to join a local land council to anyone of indigenous descent, which sometimes drove an acrimonious wedge between ‘traditional owners’ (those who could trace their descent to people once living in the area covered by the land council) and anyone whose ancestors had arrived some time after the first fleet. family loyalties strengthened here, weakened there. those who for decades had regarded themselves as undifferentiated ‘blackfellas’ became much more aware of their heritage as members of the old sydney clans like gai-mariagal (camaraigal), darug or gandangara, and often of even more precisely located geographical regions. today’s aboriginal population is huge, vibrant, energetic and feisty. there is still much complex historical knowledge to be both unearthed and much to be repatriated back into the indigenous communities of sydney. but what materials should be included in this contested mix and how? the urban area of sydney holds about some ten per cent of all the aboriginal people in australia drawn from every part of the country (abs, 2007). any project trying to return the lost history to the sydney communities and simultaneously to educate students in a vital part of the nation’s history, will need to explain how many different peoples came to be living here, the diversity of their cultures, movement patterns, changing attitudes, legislation, and relations with the outside society and between the people themselves. representing this contemporary and historical complexity is the challenge for our team of historians, researchers, film makers, web developers and educators working together on a history of aboriginal sydney.3 2 radical action included the foundation of the aboriginal progressive association, a petition to the king, an aboriginal newspaper abo call and, in 1938, a national day of mourning. 3 we wish to acknowledge contributions of core members of our team: julie janson, senior research officer, sheena kitchener, film maker and video editor and andrey inkin, web developer. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 43 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia digital repatriation and learning a public awareness of aboriginal issues and the significance of support for different cultures have been raised in both indigenous and non-indigenous communities in recent decades. aboriginal elders, teachers and community workers have all stressed the importance of educating young aboriginal people about their history and traditions. teaching of australian indigenous studies at all levels of education has been strongly recommended in numerous government documents over the last two decades (gunstone 2008). the new south wales department of education requires that aboriginal studies be taught for a semester in year 9, directing students to specific topics like ‘women and children’ and ‘stolen generations’. while developed with best intentions, it is often unclear what resources are available to teachers. often lacking expertise themselves, teachers draw upon on-line material like reports of government enquiries (commission 1997), study kits (reconciliation 1991-2000) or aboriginal-controlled genealogical and personal material from the central desert (ara irititja project 2007, tkrp 2010), which may leave students knowing something about queensland and the central desert, and very little about sydney. the few resources about aboriginal sydney such as barani (sydney city council 2002) are not sufficient to support formal teaching and community interest in learning about sydney’s past. aboriginal students will have even less history of individual sydney people – their own forebears or events in individual suburbs. we want our project to be, simultaneously, sydney wide, but also specifically local; to follow the national leaders as well as the family heads, government policies and the exact sites where they were evolved and had their consequences. digital platform from the onset of the project we considered a publicly available website to be the most appropriate way of delivering information to teachers, students and communities. computers and the internet are available in homes, schools and libraries. unlike most remote areas, sydney has reliable internet connection and, as pointed out by holloway (2005), somewhat higher computer and internet usage than the rest of australia as a whole. data from census 2006 show that nearly 51 per cent of sydney households where indigenous persons lived, had internet connection compared with 66 per cent of other households (abs 2008). 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia socio-economic disadvantage, on the other hand, is likely to limit benefits of online resources. numerous studies showed that the internet adoption coincides with higher socioeconomic status (for example, porter and donthu 2006, willis and tranter 2006, goldfarb and prince 2008). the income may be also related to certain patterns of usage. low-income americans, for example, spend significant number of hours on online entertainment, but they are less likely to use the internet for e-commerce and research (goldfarb and prince 2008). in his analysis of results of australian census 2001, holloway (2005) noticed that a lower computer and internet usage in the west and south west of sydney is closely aligned with areas of socio-economic disadvantage. similarly to internet users elsewhere (chinn and fairlie, 2007, orviska and hudson, 2009), internet users in sydney are predominantly younger, non-indigenous people who tend to be highly educated and with higher income (holloway 2005). while socio-economic disadvantage of a significant part of indigenous population and a lower level of internet access at home are likely to limit the use of online sources in aboriginal communities, it could be expected that older generations would be affected more than younger people, especially students, who use the internet regularly as part of their school work and social life. indigenous people in sydney who are younger, enrolled in educational programs, and have higher socio-economic status are likely to use the internet for research and, generally, in the same way as other comparable groups. teachers are also likely to use the internet regularly for their work. despite obstacles in physical and intellectual access to online sources, the internet is still widely accessible to the majority of sydneysiders and it is particularly appropriate for students and teachers who are our main audience. digital delivery provides some unique advantages, not least that it is the most appropriate for our data, which has been gathered mainly in digital forms. images, videos, copies of archival materials are all gathered and kept in digital formats, so digital delivery avoids problems associated with the loss of quality or problems in transferring data. for students and teachers, digital formats provide a desired flexibility for downloading and their own use of materials. many families maintain their digital collections of images and documents, which could be extended by copies of materials from our website and families may decide to contribute their digital materials to the project. finally, all data on the website is the result of academic research, which should be preserved and archived for future use. aboriginal and torre strait islanders’ data archive (atsida) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 45 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia hosts the project by providing space for the website and archival solutions for long-term use of research data. the current project interface is designed so it can change and grow to reflect the project development and future needs of communities and researchers without affecting the fundamental aspect of the project – to collect and repatriate pieces of stories about aboriginal history in sydney. ethical protocols devised by the university of sydney and the jumbunna house of aboriginal learning (university of technology, sydney) ensure that participants hold the initial and continuing right of determining access to their material. reconstruction begins uncovering aboriginal history in the middle of a modern urban place where everyone seems to be consumed by busy daily lives, requires refocusing on barely visible traces around us. looking for dispersed fragments, scraping surfaces to discover lost tracks and documenting the significance of seemingly ordinary things are our approaches to the recovery of lost paths. as we will explain below, the research team has collected and arranged pieces, but site visitors will have to construct their own track. we want to create a space where sydneysiders of aboriginal descent can look at their history and consider their sense of origin, and where non-indigenous people can look at a history in which main events are not battles with neighbouring countries or coronations of faraway rulers. a quick look at our timeline will show that deliveries of blankets interwoven with numerous acts of forced humiliation form a principal thread of this marginalised history. at the same time, we want to show traditional indigenous plants, objects and rituals thriving in modern suburban backyards. to do that, we draw upon indigenous knowledge and traditions as well as western research practices, archives and technology. our work is ethnographic in the sense that it is descriptive and interpretative. we are aware that ‘[t]he ethnographer, assuming the role of broker, should make all efforts to ensure the participation of indigenous people in as much planning and implementation as possible.’ (purcell and onjoro, 2002, p. 178). we have consulted very widely both among traditional owners of north coastal sydney and later arrivals. however, we are aware that all our efforts to ensure full indigenous consultation are similar to our efforts to provide exhaustive, reliable and appropriate historical material. as indigenous people do not represent a unified community, our advisers represent a range of aboriginal community voices, not all of them. in the end, there are always views which remain unrepresented. with all its flexibility and 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia openness, the project is presented as one particular construction of pieces. we do not deny that our selection of voices is necessarily subjective and guided by our interpretation. our research material, however, will be available via atsida, again under appropriate protocols, to anyone else who wants to develop their own interpretation. how did we construct this digital space? considering the significance of land in indigenous cultures, an acute sense of lost places and the locality in everyday life, we chose place and people as key organising principles of the knowledge base and the website. the website is organised around six main localities: north coastal, central, south coastal, south west, west and north west. visual representations are of particular importance in indigenous traditions and, at the same time, they are essential for digital media. simple visual elements such as a change of colour are used throughout the site as a navigational element so all pages associated with one place are marked by the same colour. the project logo (figure 1) is a modern interpretation of traditional aboriginal symbols for place and movement. while being acceptable and easy to use for everyone, we wanted our site, first of all, to ‘talk’ to young people and support their exploration of the past and uncovering of their sense of belonging and identity. jessica birk, an artist and a young koori woman, has been our guide in developing an appearance, which would suit the sensibility of young indigenous people in sydney. birk designed the project logo and advised us on the site visual design. the sometimes gloomy text of the past unfolds against a black backdrop highlighted with lively colours, which we see as a representation of a new spirit of energy and hope. figure 1. logo, designed by jessica birk discovering & contextualising cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 47 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia material is structured in a way that aids navigation and encourages visitors to make their own discoveries and interpretations. by using a system of tagging text and images, an interactive timeline and map as well as free text searching, we provide different ways of accessing information and seeing it in different contexts. for example, information about marramarra creek could be encountered and retrieved in many different ways depending on users’ needs and interests. it appears in a chronological description of events where text from a historical source is related to a contemporary picture of the place (figures 2 and 3). we have developed a way of tagging text, which enables retrieval of all textual passages on the particular topic. tag ‘sites: historic’, for example, will retrieve all references to marramarra creek in the text (figure 4). tags have been developed to reflect teaching topics and aid students’ work with the materials, but they are also chosen as suitable descriptors. figure 2. page describing events at marramarra creek 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia figure 3. picture from the contemporary site: shell midden, marramarra creek figure 4. text retrieval by tag name cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 49 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia images and videos appear in the relevant gallery and can be viewed with other sources related to the place (figure 5) or a particular tag. free text search by word ‘marramarra’ will also reveal all text passages and resources labelled with this word so the user can see all pictures and, in the future, videos related to the place as well as all textual information related to marramarra creek. figure 5. image gallery north coastal the interactive timeline shows events chronologically. in the example below, events at marramarra creek in 1846 could be seen plotted on the interactive timeline, where events are outlined briefly and additional information appears by clicking on a hyperlink (figure 6). figure 6. timeline 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia marramarra creek can be also seen on the interactive map (figure 7). we are recording interviews with aboriginal elders at certain localities telling their stories and explaining the significance of the place. figure 7. interactive map as the user browses the site, information appears in glimpses that can be viewed and enjoyed as small pieces of a puzzle, or explored and followed further. archival material in this environment is energised by appearing in alluring glimpses, disappearing, only to reveal different meanings in new contexts. monk wrote about displays of old photographs: ‘what was once a photographic window on their world was now only a museum vitrine where all subjective individuality vanished in the generality of an ethnographic display’ (monk and tan, 2007, tuesday, february 6, 2007, para. 4). digital displays provide opportunities to tease imagination, which lends subjectivity to exhibits in digital vitrine. as monk notes elsewhere in the same book, ‘...each generation often skips to its grandparents’ era to be struck by photography’s disturbance, that is, by photography’s difference for them... consensus on photography’s disturbance coincidentally reappears at moments of technological change, along the fault lines of its disruptions...’ (monk and tan, 2007, friday, september 15, 2006, para. 6). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 51 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia figure 8. photographic glimpses snippets of photographs in the mosaic (figure 8) are arranged to tease – to provide opportunities to the observant user to notice some alignments across three time layers and to wonder about inconsistent vertical connections, or to ponder for a moment what is behind a small window into a hidden world. this technique of arranging pictures on websites is not new, but it lends new possibilities and meanings to historical discovery. subjectivity which may have disappeared from archival exhibits behind the glass is recovered through a moment of wonder, rush of the mind to imagine the hidden and a subjective interpretation of what is revealed – always unfinished, always opening up a space for the imagined. in aboriginal history where so much is lost, denied and hidden there may never be the final interpretation. figure 9. another intriguing mystery. who were these children, identified by a visiting jesuit priest father browne, living at quaker’s hat bay, near the spit, in 1924? 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia educational value the essential educational value of the project, we believe, is in discovering aboriginal presence in the biggest australian urban centre, which has very little to do with stereotypical images of indigenous communities in remote areas. almost all indigenous students will wish to find out more about themselves and their families. many non-indigenous students will come to the website to find information for their assignments and encounter on the first page pictures of people of their own district. while wondering about the continuous aboriginal presence, some will start discovering indigenous existence around them and questioning their assumptions. we hope that, while retracing steps either to home or origin, depending on the perspective, some young people will strengthen their understanding of connections between the contemporary urban place and its beginnings. our approach to learning and discovery encourages independence, individual sense-making and creative approaches while providing organised space and making sure that students who want specific information can find it as easily as possible. the significance of spatial information grounds abstract history into locality. brown (2010) summarised branting’s views on advantages of using geographical information in teaching history and stated that gis visualises topics, encourages creative approaches to challenging tasks and assists students in developing their own visual displays. most importantly, it ‘addresses a number of bloom’s taxonomy of higher levels of thinking’ (cited in brown, 2010, introduction). mostern (2010, spatial literacy and history education, last para.) considered advantages of combining geographical and historical information, and concluded: from these three insights—that all peoples have a spatial imagination, that geography shapes history, that and space is historical—i conclude that if history students learn to think spatially, they can understand that there are many simultaneous worlds at any time, that multiple histories therefore coexist as well, and that as a result there is no single and linear path of progress. while learning about aboriginal history, young visitors to our site will be able to learn about aboriginal culture, tradition and their environment. the site provides plenty of sources for teachers to develop stimulus material for factual and creative writing. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 53 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia planning an expanding website as the space between academic work and presentation for the public is becoming less clear week by week, we develop the knowledge base and consider possibilities for the future. clearly, we would like to work further on providing secure spaces for teachers and students to engage with our material. an opportunity for a digital space for families to add new information will be essential if the website is to fulfill its potential. narrowing also is the space between digital educational presentation and the website as research tool. to increase an understanding of the precisely local, rather than merely ‘sydney’, we plan to develop our gps-based digital map which, already locating and reproducing the entries we cited above, will explore digital 3-d technology. for example, the sackville reserve on the hawkesbury river was established in 1889, reached an apogee in about 1912, and was empty by 1946 (brook, 1994). already we have the existing resources of photographs of many of the former inhabitants and one of their homes, some records of the site itself, genealogies, aerial photography and oral histories. to this information we hope to add further interviews, additional aerial photography, google earth digital mapping, and heritage information on the construction of aboriginal owner-builder houses and their precincts. we expect it to be possible to create the reserve in a three dimensional reconstruction. at this point the website moves beyond a comprehensive resource base to a significant research tool to enable users to do their own investigations on data such as why official or unofficial reserves were situated where they were, in what relationship did they stand to surrounding clans, work sites, business nodes, schools, trackways, river routes, food resources, ceremonial or social sites and visibility to whites. who were these people? where did they come from? why were they there? why did they leave? where did they go? where are their descendants today? the website should place no limits on where informed and respectful imagination can lead. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia references abs (australian bureau of statistics ) 2007, 2006 census quickstats, abs, sydney (statistical division). abs (australian bureau of statistics) 2008, 2006 census tables, 20680 number of persons usually resident by type of internet connection by indigenous status of household. abs, sydney (statistical division),. ara irititja project 2007, marleston, sa available: www.irititja.com [accessed 7 july 2010]. brook, j. 1994, shut out from the world : the sackville reach aborigines reserve and mission 1889-1946, seven hills, n.s.w. brown, p. 2010, 'exploring historical space and environments in the history/social studies classroom: discussion and reflections', journal of the association for history and computing [online], 13. available: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3310410.0013.106 [accessed 6 july 2010]. chinn, m. d. & fairlie, r. w. 2007, 'the determinants of the global digital divide: a crosscountry analysis of computer and internet penetration', oxford economic papers, 59, 16–44. australian human rights commission 1997, bringing them home: the 'stolen children' report. council for aboriginal reconsiliation 1991-2000, council for aboriginal reconciliation archive, university of technology, sydney and university of new south wales faculties of law goldfarb, a. & prince, j. 2008, 'internet adoption and usage patterns are different: implications for the digital divide', information economics and policy, vol. 20. pp. 2– 15. gunstone, a. 2008, 'australian indigenous studies and australian universities', in: gunstone, a. (ed.) history, politics & knowledge : essays in australian indigenous studies, australian scholarly publishing, nth. melbourne, vic. holloway, d. 2005, 'the digital divide in sydney: a sociospatial analysis', information, communication & society, vol. 8, pp. 168-193. monk, p. & tan, f. 2007, disassembling the archive : fiona tan, [toronto], art gallery of york university. mostern, r. 2010, 'putting the world in world history', journal of the association for history and computing. 6 july 2010 orviska, m. & hudson, j. 2009, 'dividing or uniting europe? internet usage in the eu', information economics and policy vol. 21, pp. 279–290. porter, c. e. & donthu, n. 2006, 'using the technology acceptance model to explain how attitudes determine internet usage: the role of perceived access barriers and demographics', journal of business research, vol. 59, pp. 999–1007. purcell, t. & onjoro, e. a. 2002, 'indigenous knowledge, power and parity', in: sillitoe, p., bicker, a. & pottier, j. (eds.) participating in development : approaches to indigenous knowledge, routledge, london. sydney city council 2002, barani: indigenous history of sydney city [online]. available: http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/barani/ [accessed 6 july 2010]. tkrp 2010, traditional knowledge revival pathways [online]. cairns, qld. available: http://tkrp.com.au/index.php?option=com_frontpage&itemid=1 [accessed 6 july 2010]. willis, s. & tranter, b. 2006, internet diffusion and inequality in australia. journal of sociology, vol. 42, pp. 43-59. http://www.irititja.com/� http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3310410.0013.106� http://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au/barani/� http://tkrp.com.au/index.php?option=com_frontpage&itemid=1� pieces of a thousand stories: repatriation of the history of aboriginal sydney peter read university of sydney suzana sukovic university of sydney abstract introduction background: indigenous visitors and migrants digital repatriation and learning digital platform reconstruction begins figure 1. logo, designed by jessica birk discovering & contextualising figure 2. page describing events at marramarra creek figure 3. picture from the contemporary site: shell midden, marramarra creek figure 4. text retrieval by tag name figure 5. image gallery north coastal figure 6. timeline figure 7. interactive map figure 8. photographic glimpses figure 9. another intriguing mystery. who were these children, identified by a visiting jesuit priest father browne, living at quaker’s hat bay, near the spit, in 1924? educational value planning an expanding website references 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia inclusion of the “othered” in tourism stephen wearing university of technology, sydney simon darcy university of technology, sydney abstract this paper highlights that tourism, due to the fact it is a multi-faceted activity and by implication its management has similar multiple contexts, often leads to the exclusion of many who are part of that tourism context. one area that has been left on the fringes of tourism is how contemporary tourism management has “othered” those regarded as being removed from the neoliberal business foundation of tourism. one such group is the host communities in developing countries. the failure to involve and engage with host communities and develop collaboration in the process of planning and management for tourism is and has in the past been detrimental to the sustainability of tourism. in many cases, host communities have been ignored by the industry, with few or no mechanisms or processes put in place to enable them to participate in the management of tourism. this paper presents an overview of how this engagement of host communities can expand the market for tourism and lead to more satisfying visitor experiences, enhance the sustainability of these experiences and, thus, be considered good management practice within the industry. the paper examines how to engage in these practices and create processes that are both enabling for communities and incorporate research techniques that move beyond the very limited monocultural attempts undertaken by the majority of tourism enterprises today. in widening the involvement of the host community, we turn to mechanisms for engagement to provide a platform to demonstrate how this can be done to provide better management practice. in doing so, we extend the scope of engagement to involve those previously considered to be outside of mainstream tourism enterprises, and present an argument that, if sustainability is to move beyond economic and environmental western constructs to embrace social sustainability, changing global values require tourism management to adopt more inclusive ways of practice and management principles. setting a context for involvement: the “other” over the last two decades, as the costs and time required for global travel have decreased dramatically, tourism has been liberated from its former spatial constraints, allowing it to increasingly be a global phenomenon (harvey 2000). with this has come a need to better understand the terms of engagement between those involved in the exchanges in these spaces to ensure that we understand the more complex arrangements and to ensure benefits from tourism are directed toward all stakeholders. as more and more communities worldwide are trying to connect to global tourism developments, we as researchers identify a need to explore, beyond the earlier ideas of people like valene smith in 1977 (smith 1989), the relationship between “host” and “guests”. whereas in earlier days attention was focused cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 19 primarily on host–guest interactions, this binary classification is gradually transforming as a result of insistence on a tripartite system; tourists, locals and brokers (cheong & millar 2000; wearing & macdonald 2002). milne and ateljevic (2001, p. 374) argued that “communitybased” approaches are central to many tourism-development plans around the world, and there is a growing realisation that localised cooperation, trust and networking are essential ingredients in providing the right mix for successful tourism-development outcomes. these ideas sit within the framework of inclusiveness; whereas historically these communities in developing countries have been treated as “other” within tourism-planning frameworks, they are now seen as an essential part of this development process. our view positions the “otherness” of hosts as inferior to the tourist’s original culture, which is usually patriarchal, white and infused with western knowledge. the tourist destination then becomes a place for the voyeuristic gaze of the tourist, reducing, at best, the destination culture to an inferiorised exoticism (wearing & wearing 1996; wearing & wearing 2001; wearing & wearing 1999). this paper relies on the theoretical ideas located between tourism, communities and power within the neo-colonialist frameworks presented by a minority of authors writing on this relationship (hollinshead 1999a, 1999b, 2000; wearing & wearing 1999). operations of power between the culture of the tourist and that of the host enable hegemonic constructions of the host’s culture. the paper discusses the interactive space created by the various stakeholders in the tourism-management process, which is a continuous process where different social practices and values meet and new meanings are created (wearing & macdonald 2002). this is achieved through the examination of practices that are more inclusive of ‘other’ stakeholders within this context. this paper suggests that the destination environment can be thought of as tourist places or social spaces for individual experiences. these experiences are largely related to leisure activities, which, amongst other things, are formed via leisure expectations, guest–host relationships and interactions with community members. in this model of cultural construction, the host’s difference in culture is perceived as inferior and serves to reinforce the dominant western values. in a transactional sense, this reinforces the logic of capital accumulation of western economies (brennan 2004). in an emotional sense, it reinforces the narcissistic hedonism of sun, sand and sex, where at best tourists of the developed world indulge in the pleasures of the flesh with each other (bauer & 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 mckercher 2003), while at worst, it reinforces the shadow of sex tourism, where those from developed nations exploit the wealth divide, and create power relations of many dimensions within destination regions (ryan & hall 2001). the discourses of tourist management and marketing have in many ways implicitly adopted this top-down hegemonic view and need deconstruction and contestation from below, from the margins of the re-historicised other. this has also seen large segments of the potential market in the original culture ignored by tourism marketeers, such as those who are older, those of colour or those with disabilities. how can the involvement of the other help improve both the quality of the experiences and also the sustainability of the enterprise? “other” in the foucauldian sense refers to those who are excluded, oppressed or disadvantaged by a particular discourse (foucault 1988). the foucauldian conceptualisation of “other” has been used in poststructural cultural studies to analyse the cultural representation of a host–guest relationship. critical subaltern studies relies on concepts of power from foucault and difference and deconstruction from derrida; in these alternate constructions, both foucault’s and derrida’s critiques of western thought intersect with postcolonial criticism. the concept of “other”, which is also basic in postcolonial theory, was developed in this context by bhabha (1983), who claims that colonial discourses propagated by the powerful coloniser produce stereotypes of the colonised as fixed, other to and inferior to the coloniser. (bhabha 1983, p. 23). poststructuralism provides a way of understanding that while economic organisation is central to exploitation and marginalisation, powerlessness has a cultural context that may vary from society to society (thomson 1997). oppression becomes a manifestation of the cumulative impact on an individual and group identity in all aspects of their lives. young (1990) describes this impact as creating “other”; in a tourism sense, the recognition that the host is a group whose needs are only visible when tourism is able to construct a commercial exchange based on the tourist's desire for authenticity (maccannell 1999). similarly, in an analysis of postmodern feminist theories of “other”, aitchison discusses power as central to the understanding of the construction of “other” as inferior. she calls for greater recognition of “other” to challenge hegemonic representations in leisure and tourism, and enhance the theoretical sophistication of the social-cultural context of leisure and tourism relations (aitchison 1999). similarly, poststructural tourism theory offers potential insights into those with disabilities. in particular, the discussions by uriely (1997) of multiplicity of motivations and experiences and urry (1990) appropriate “other” within the social relations and consumption of tourism. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 21 nonetheless, we are careful to move beyond the essentialised views of culture and the reduction of cultural logic that can impose a crude cultural inferiorisation thesis, which attributes all relations of cultural definition and dominance to the hegemonic culture of capitalist markets. this is reductionist in making out the tourist as capitalist “us” and the host as oppressed “them”. in this paper we add a more complex layer of argument to the cultural logic and contradictions of tourist encounters with hosts and their communities. for, as the phrase cannibalistic tourism (maccannell 1992, p. 66) is a mode of self-betrayal of western patriarchal oppression, the phrase implies hegemonic constructions from below are as much about hosts self-identifying and manufacturing identities in the commodified and normalising tourist spaces. host communities are in effect “eating themselves” with the cultural logic of profit and capital accumulation, and the cultural values of western neo-colonialist discourses. such discourses are inscribed by the intensification of capitalism under globalisation and cross-border interactions (hoogvelt 1997). we suggest a postcolonial approach that is double-edged in challenging the logic of pure marketeering in tourism and creating a politics from the margins that resists the cultural spaces constructed on the terrain (representations) of these markets. as the logic of bhabha (1994) suggests, both hosts and a wider range of tourists, amongst other social actors, can participate in reconstructing tourist spaces as third space. third space has provided a site of resistance for other groups (gutierrez 1999; khan 1998; mesurier & tandukar 2005; simpson & konrad 2005). we seek to achieve this through the examination of practices that are more inclusive of ‘other’ stakeholders within this context, which allows us to engage in a more in-depth discussion and widens the gambit of involvement of inclusive approaches. following bhabha's (1994) conceptualisation of imperialised cultural space, discursive and primordial struggles over and against hegemonic constructions are occurring within what we call the third space of tourist–host interactions and in tourist destinations. when the destination communities’ views are considered and given some credence, there are possibilities for alternate programmes of tourism and counter-discourse to hegemonic modes of interaction. these possibilities allow some re-presentation of “difference” and “otherness” into the performances of tourist experience, albeit an “impure” culture that is hybridised in a third space. thus, we recognise bhabha's important hermeneutic insight that there is no unity or fixity to host cultures and ‘even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistorised and read anew’ (bhabha 1994, p. 37). ways of developing spaces within 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 destination areas that provide experiences to destabilise and transform the constructed self can then become possible and temporal. otherness within this framework can include difference without inferiorisation and identity fixity. an approach is presented that suggests modes of tourist experience that allow for a fluid two-way process of interaction between tourist and host with possible benefits for both. this we maintain is the “nature of engagement” required to ensure that tourism management can operate on a sustainable basis. it also allows for a widening of who is the tourist beyond the fixed view incorporated in current tourism-management practice through traditional stereotyping by tourism marketeers (hall & tucker 2004). this includes those who are traditionally omitted from representation in destination-marketing campaigns, including older people, those of colour and those with disability (echtner & prasad 2003; joy & venkatesh 1994; small 2004). the domination of tourist operations by western developed countries has allowed the tourism industry and particularly the corporate, economically powerful transnational tourism corporations to design, plan, implement and market tourist adventures into developing countries and set the agenda for who should be involved (lea 1988). without consultations with these host communities or the range of potential market segments in the countries of origin, this is a one-way process that has the potential to ensure a cultural hegemony that marginalises host communities. the establishment of cultural hegemonies means that the values of the tourist culture not only encroach on, and often destroy, the host culture, but also reinforce the narrow codes of cultures based in western linear historicity, white (indoanglo) mythologies and industrialised capitalism. under these circumstances the tourist is encouraged to develop a self–other expectation, which reinforces the tourist–other views of the interactions that occur in tourist spaces. this reinforces tourists’ seeking of the refuge of western-constructed tourism spaces constructed by globalised tourism corporations. this in turn creates changes in host-community values based on this idealised corporate tourism culture. yet, such hegemonic construction of the tourist space is not inviolable. we rely on the juxtaposition between coded objectified place and “being in place”, which resists hegemonic constructions of tourism in place and space. commodified images and their discursive constructions can be disrupted and disassociated so that the host and tourist move toward a re-inscription of place with a different sense of self and identity. in effect, we are arguing for a destabilisation of a sense of place that explores deeper desires and meaning in the primordial and unknowable sensing of cultural locales. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 23 the engagement of the tourist with the host community the acknowledgement that a higher degree of experiential interaction (a being in place) can occur in tourist spaces when social value and identities are developed within the host's cultural presentation allows a widening of the types of stakeholders who need to be included in the development of tourism enterprise. in doing this, there is a need to develop social valuing where cultural third spaces of particular hosts are significantly included through community consultation, policy decision making, other participation opportunities in policy implementation and cultural constructions in this process. there is then the possibility of a breakdown of the self–other in the dominant–subordinate dichotomy, and freedom in representation of the host identity to explore a third space of the hybrid selves created for both parties. the tourist's interactive experiences of nature and culture can deconstruct the programmatic coding of tourist markets and socio-cultural re-presentations of the self in cultural settings. how these cultural worlds are accessed and experienced depends, amongst other things, upon the manufactured or socially constructed nature of otherness in tourist experience, the resistance and subversion of host cultures to this programmatic coding and the counter-discourses to the gaze/surveillance of touristic power. in hollinshead's (1999a) foucauldian terms, re-presentation of host identity can be understood as resisting the normalising judgments and “essentialising governmentality” of tourism. such cultural politics involves a postcolonial touristic approach that concentrates on countering the inferiorisation of exotic otherness in the discursive repertoires and codings of western tourism, and in the political economy of postcolonialism governance. a foucauldian approach to governmentality is included in this politics (foucault 1991). resistance as representation in a third space is how the symbolic associations constitute new identities of otherness beyond hegemonic spaces, that is, a reflexive difference that re-presents self in third space rather than representations of identity according to cultural hegemony (bhabha 1994; latour 1988; law 1994). subordinated knowledge and counter-discourse operating as a self-textual anarchism and subterranean translation involves a spontaneous resistance that denies re-inscription and re-presentation in western imperialism and postcolonial governance (o'malley 1998; wearing 1991; wearing & wearing 1999). as such, a break is suggested by moving to the theory of third spaces, however fleeting and temporal, with the white logos, western imperialisms and the colonial past (derrida 1974; spivak 1999). these westernised hegemonic constructions are deeply embedded in global and local cultures and are associated 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 with tourism in developing countries and indigenous communities in developed countries (hannerz 1990). our examples are taken from touristic governance and self-governance of australian aboriginal communities and sex tourism in asia. the paper suggests, first, that within a macro-social explanation of cultural hegemony we see an approach to tourism management that enables more powerful tourist cultures to construct the host culture's otherness as inferior to tourists' own, resulting in cultural cannibalism. second, we see that the relationship between the self and social space can only be addressed with the notion of “engagement” and is then addressed with the possibilities of incorporating otherness into the self without cannibalism when hierarchical dichotomies are deconstructed. third, the value of inclusion in tourist planning, marketing and practice of the unique view from the other, that is, the host culture, through the social value that hosts place on particular spaces and re-inscription in commercial discourse, is suggested. finally, the arguments are drawn together into a model of tourism that challenges cultural hegemony and offers alternatives to hegemonic cultural logic. this re-presentation of touristic identities can allow for a cultural and experiential process of interaction and exchange between tourist and host communities through the idea of “engagement”. here, the argument relies on how interactions are performed under conditions of re-presenting self-knowing the detrimental logic of western tourism. in this way, the domination of the tourist experience by western countries can be challenged and, following de certeau's (1988) arguments on experiential resistance, the balance of knowledge–power can be destabilised and resisted to favour the cultural uniqueness of host communities. as wearing and wearing (1999) have argued elsewhere, there is an important role for local governance, local economies, and indigenous self-management by host communities in counter-imperialistic strategies. in effect, these and other strategies provide revitalised social ethics of association amongst minority and marginal groups in the developed and developing nations of global civil society to overcome the highly commodified, normalising and marketed nature of globalised western tourism (cf. wearing & wearing 1999). such strategies can constitute a new politics of third space tourist cultures. this is greatly assisted by new approaches to theory that are enabling and that allow the involvement of a wider cross-section of societies in tourism. we now move to the use of a number of case studies to explain how host communities can be more involved in the planning and management of tourism. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 25 ecotourism: a way forward? this section seeks to provide examples of how we can conceptualise a process that enables engagement that may then deliver empowered social justice and provide an economic share for grass-roots communities involved in ecotourism. in doing so, this challenges neoliberal ideologies that dominate corporate tourism interests and power relations in local contexts and economies. ecotourism by its nature suggests a symbolic or mutual relationship where the tourist is not given central priority but becomes an equal part of the system. this is not apparent in much of the tourism that occurs in developing countries and many developed countries, nor does it appear likely to occur in the future within current operating practices. further, the tendency to ignore or exploit local culture to enhance tourist experience has seen conflict arise both environmentally and culturally. tourists have been conditioned to accept a structured experience, often packaged by large operators with little understanding of the local natural and cultural resources. the framework created can often relegate the people and their natural and cultural resources to being a stage show or a backdrop for the tourism experience. this ignores the opportunity for cultural exchange, and forgoes understanding the rich natural and cultural heritage that can be part of the tourist experience. overcoming this problem takes us back to the underlying problems inherent in development issues and tourism, which can be addressed with the use of a community-development process that engages a wider spectrum of stakeholders in the process and is sensitive to host-community cultural issues (campbell 1999). by its nature, this process allows a more diverse spectrum of opportunities to be explored, in the context of issues that may require detailed engagement at the local level. wearing and macdonald (2002) explored this in png, offering some insights into what the process revealed, the type of engagement regarded as meaningful and the outcomes from the process. a number of examples are now reviewed. the concept of struggle is a key sociological insight for grass-roots activism and social change because the outcome is never a zero sum. in modernity, this has been more commonly related to the working class or more recently to host and indigenous communities, who are looking to wrest control and resources back from transnational companies who are complicit with governments in developing and overdeveloping natural environments and “modernising” such communities. we find that in reacting to this, the inclusion of more 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 members of the destination communities and other organisations such as ngos is able to balance the outcomes for both the communities and tourists. wearing and mcdonald (2002) suggested that the relationship between intermediaries and rural and isolated area communities can be seen as a process involving many actions and participants’ fields of knowledge and space – a continuous process where different social values meet and new meanings are created: each individual meaning will be constructed according to the tourist’s own cultural and social background, the purpose of the visit, the companions, preconceived and observed values of the host culture, the marketing images of the destination and, above all the relationships of power between visitor and within the host culture (wearing 1998, p. 248). the changing position and focus of some in the tourism industry has created, in some circumstances, a movement away from the predominance of western industrialised society’s ownership and control of rural and isolated area tourism operations. however, the models of operations that have been represented to rural and isolated area communities has led to a paradoxical problem; as rural and isolated area communities have very few models to operate within other than those of the dominant western models, tour operators then tend to treat their own communities as “other” to be exploited as part of the profit motive. despite this, due to changing discourses on the role of rural and isolated area communities and the increased availability of economic access, there are expanding opportunities for these communities to explore tourism as a business (wearing & macdonald 2002). however, these explorations will not simply materialise without a strategy of local engagement, awareness of cultural and resource capacity and a strategy to operationalise business or micro-business opportunities. figure 1 shows a process of working with local porters in developing their trekking support business. the process required a series of workshops in the local language, sharing of stories and developing an understanding of working with the tour operators. if we look at what is occurring around ecotourism and aboriginal culture and identity, most notably in the northern territory of australia, there is often a complicated nexus between welfare and tourism at the peripheries of these societies, as low incomes are bound up with semi-traditional communities and lifestyle. it seems these tourist sites are also targets of “welfare reform” and their populations seen as welfare dependent, along with associated white racist or classist stereotypes. for example, regional australian aboriginal communities cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 27 figure 1: working with local porters in developing their trekking business source: stephen wearing 2001 are commonly depicted in the media as being dependent on welfare benefits for their existence and are immersed in a series of other social issues, including alcoholism (hollingshead 2007). less visible in the australian media are positive images of aboriginal communities as proprietors, custodians and owners of key tourist and heritage areas such as kakadu national park and uluru. yet, with these views and the engagement of these communities that have been traditionally “othered”, we see that through initiatives such as joint management the growth of tourism in a more equitable manner can provide a diversity of natural and cultural experiences that offer the tourist a diverse and engaged experience, where the interest of the host communities is sustained. joint management arrangements has been successfully brokered whereby aboriginal landowners and parks australia work together and decide how best to manage a national park with and on behalf of traditional owners and for other interests. joint management is about working together to enhance and protect aboriginal rights and interests while looking after the natural and cultural values of kakadu national park, and providing opportunities for 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 visitors to experience and appreciate these values safely (wearing & huyskens 2001). for example, the joint management of kakadu is an example of integrated nature conservation and community development. in australia, joint management is achieved through the appointment of a management board that has a majority of indigenous people nominated by traditional owners if the reserve is wholly or mostly on indigenous people’s land. the board makes policy and strategic decisions about park management and tourism. other examples of this engagement through ecotourism can be seen in cases such as leksakundilok and hirsch (2008), who outlined engaging with host communities in developing ecotourism in thailand. the research found that outcomes are improved for both the host communities and the visitors due to the greater understanding of each that is fostered by community based ecotourism development strategies employed. in particular, as they found it should not be surprising that the outcomes vary from area to area due to local priorities. king and steward (1996, p. 293) suggest that to protect both people and their places, native people's claim to control should be legitimised by conservation and government authorities. for example, indigenous people's role in technical management of the protected area can be invaluable. with respect to technical management, park authorities can learn a great deal from traditional land-management practices. while the evolution of ecotourism has seen many failures and successes, it demonstrates that ecotourism moves beyond the mere merging of conservation with capitalism. it has demonstrated that it is able to embrace concern for the economic and social welfare of indigenous people, and at times, appears to portray ecotourism as a mechanism allowing the engagement of grass-roots communities to protect their cultures (farrell & runyan 1991). in this sense, ecotourism has been presented as different from other kinds of tourism in that it claims to be controlled development that builds engagement and relationships between the tourism industry and other stakeholders, who can be often “othered”, like those involved in protected areas and indigenous people. examples of how this engagement can be formulated can be found in the development of indigenous tourism businesses in australia. beyer, anda, elber, revell and spring (2005), in looking at the development of remote tourism facilities in the three case studies, found that consultation with indigenous stakeholders led to the success of the projects. they also found that the development of criteria that engaged with other stakeholders was able to guide the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 29 “developer” in establishing a successful partnership with local indigenous cultural interests in a remote tourism facility development in a process that ensures cultural integrity and respect and understanding of the colonisation of “aboriginal australia”. they suggested that the engagement of indigenous cultural interests in the development process must be genuine and transparent and must embrace the knowledge that cultural tourism is the only commercial use of land that can be done, and only by indigenous people. finally, they maintained that wherever possible the “developer” should be formed from the local and or regional indigenous community, in whole or in part, which tells us about new ways of doing (beyer et al. 2005, p. 20). it is interesting to note that in other areas of indigenous tourism businesses being developed, where there is engagement of indigenous stakeholders, measures of success are higher (tremblay & wegner 2009), as ali (2009) found for the brambuk visitor/cultural centre, which was a culmination of nearly a decade of consultation between a committee of five aboriginal communities from the western district and various tourism and government agencies. the aboriginal (koori) communities who were partners to this project included the kirrae, the whurang, the goolum, the gunditjmara and the kerrup-jmara, located in the south west victoria and the wimmera regions. the interest here is that the outcome found these communities satisfied with how they were included and represented within the ecotourism industry and it was found that tourists were usually satisfied with the visit and the level of enjoyment they experienced from the visit was very high. an example of a comment reflecting that the centre exceeded a visitor’s expectations is ‘i expected much less things then there is. i walked in and i was amazed’ (ali 2009, p. 26). brambuk’s core competencies are the provision of insights into indigenous culture and the provision of an understanding of indigenous history for the visiting public. generally, one would expect that visitors would gain a better insight into indigenous culture, as the centre has engaged with the communities being interpreted; ali (2009) found this was generally the case. palmer’s (2001) research on what is a major aspect of the tourism industry, the guided sport fishing and commercial safari hunting ventures conducted on aboriginal lands in the “top end” of the northern territory, also reinforces this view. in this report, the perspectives of aboriginal landowners and aboriginal organisations, along with government organisations and fishing and hunting tourism operators, about the conflicts, environmental impacts and potential economic benefits of safari hunting, recreational fishing and sport fishing are 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 addressed. the opportunities and constraints for the development of these niche industries and increasing aboriginal participation are outlined. palmer found that in small-scale commercial tourism enterprises, traditional aboriginal owners and their representative local community organisations should be encouraged to take a more proactive role in facilitating the development of their own tourism enterprises (palmer 2001, p. i), this report has suggested that if aboriginal communities and landowners wish to increase their direct involvement in the safari hunting and sports fishing industries, the initial years of a business operation should be undertaken through a cooperative arrangement with an existing operator. in most instances, a joint-venture approach, with operators who have pre-existing market experience, is likely to be more commercially viable than if traditional aboriginal owners directly run operations themselves from the outset. these case studies suggest that through engagement we can find alternatives to the existing predominant models of tourism and that essential to this process is the engagement of the “other”, which moves beyond the current neoliberal management models. although there are many pitfalls in this approach, it provides new directions for the future. tourism management is driven by neoliberal economic imperatives where yield dominates the discourse (dwyer et al. 2006). academics and governments recognise the importance of incorporating more than just economic considerations into the management of tourism; the triple bottom line suggests that economic imperatives must be balanced with environmental and social sustainability. fennel and dowling (2003) note, in commenting on ecotourism planning and development, that western paradigms of sustainability have been heavily focused on environmental values. this suggests that the concept of social sustainability is marginalised from both a tourism management and a governance perspective, in favour of economic and environmental considerations. the first part of this paper identified how the host community is an essential stakeholder in any tourism business or government tourism policy development. yet, it is these very people that are most likely to be marginalised in influencing the type and nature of tourism development occurring in their own communities. this is more so in developing nations, where unequal economic, legal and cultural power relationships exist. the second part of this paper suggests examples of how this situation might be changed, particularly where a conscious effort is made based on a different approach to the “other”. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 31 one area that consistently provides examples of sound approaches to tourism management and the governance of tourism is ecotourism. in a tourism sense, ecotourism has enabled tourism to extend beyond individual firms through ecotourism policy, planning and development governance based on inclusiveness and engagement of stakeholders. most countries have some form of coordination and regulation of tourism as recognition that market failure exists. nowhere is this more evident than in the social dimension of the triple bottom line, which is used extensively in the ecotourism industry. so, where is the pay-off for tourism management of adopting a more open consultative approach with local communities and those whom they do not already consider as their market? conclusion in this paper we have argued for a broader approach to examining the tourist–host relationships than hegemonic constructions of powerful western industrialised countries in a period of neoliberal ascendancy have allowed. through the acknowledgement of the value of empowering communities to act we suggest that this involves engaging in a wider participation of stakeholders, particularly at the grass-roots level of tourism. this, we suggest, enables tourism enterprises to involve a wider spectrum of stakeholders and thus move beyond the current problems of engagement and involvement for tourism management, whereby such constructions are often imposed on both developed and developing countries at the risk of destroying their own culture and values. these modes of “cultural cannibalism” have been a means of reinforcing and homogenising the cultural constraints of the dominant western culture both in developed and developing nations. we have argued that through the use of processes that more widely engage stakeholders, tourism management is able to expand beyond the fixity of both host and tourist identity and thus provide a wider array of opportunities for tourism. the economic and, hence, representational power of tourist marketeers has enabled them to commodify and package their own interpretations of otherness and thus limit the involvement of the “other” in the tourism enterprise. through our use of case studies, we demonstrate how, in widening the involvement of the “other”, tourism management can only benefit, rather than keeping both hosts and guests far removed from tourism enterprise by their “otherness”. the glossy tourism brochures provided by tourism marketeers are in fact ignoring a significant part of the market; the tourism developer focused on mainstream traditional design is ignoring a significant market; the tourism operator who is not engaged in involving all members of destination communities is 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 leaving out activities that might interest the tourist. sightseeing is not the only activity that tourists 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http://www.lib.uts.edu.au/cgi/goto.cgi?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utslibrary/doc?id=2002623%3e� http://www.lib.uts.edu.au/cgi/goto.cgi?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/utslibrary/doc?id=2002623%3e� http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=afh&an=17909145%3e� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 109 institutions and social change: implementing co-operative housing and environmentally sustainable development at christie walk susan mcclean and jennifer onyx abstract how can institutions contribute to the building of civil society in the twentyfirst century? it is clear that the old laissez-faire approach and the more recent neo-conservative reliance on the market have failed to deliver housing for many people. on the other hand the state-based welfare housing model espoused by the australian labor party over the twentieth century has also been beset by problems. social alienation and the crisis in affordable housing make the case that individualist approaches to urban living are not working. more communal solutions are needed – solutions attuned to a complex view of civil society outlined by michael edwards’ tripartite definition. at the same time the onset of global warming now prompts australians to create more environmentally sustainable ways of living. addressing the theme of responsibility, this paper focuses on citizenship in its broader environmental, social and active forms. it analyses interviews and documentary evidence concerning the planning and development of christie walk, an innovative, medium density eco-city development in adelaide. the investigation reveals the effects of some australian institutions on residents’ efforts to live socially and environmentally sustainable lives in an urban environment. the paper offers transdisciplinary research and analysis, linking the fields of history, urban housing, community development and environmental theory. introduction it is evident that both the old laissez-faire approach and the more recent neo-conservative reliance on the market have failed to deliver housing for many people. the state-based welfare housing model espoused by the australian labor party over the twentieth century has also been beset by problems. social alienation, and the crisis in affordable housing make the case that individualist approaches to urban living are not working. more communal solutions are needed – solutions attuned to more complex views of civil society outlined by michael edwards’ tripartite definition. at the same time the onset of climate change now prompts australians to create more environmentally sustainable ways of living. 1 the eco-city approach is considerably at odds with the mainstream for-profit sector. eco-city developments are ‘built to fit [their] place in co-operation with nature rather than in conflict 1 the authors wish to thank dr paul downton, urban ecologist and architect of christie walk for his comments and suggestions during the writing of this paper. 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 with it’ they are designed to strike a balance between the need for people to live, ‘whilst keeping the cycles of atmosphere, water, nutrients and biology’. in short, they aim to achieve social and environmental sustainability, integrating plans for co-operation and social justice with strategies to minimise the environmental footprint of the city (carlin et al. 2007, p.5; walter, arkin, crenshaw 1993). residential eco-city sites are therefore designed for cooperative living (as in independent co-operative housing or cohousing sites). at the same time, they attempt to reduce the carbon footprint of the site, both during the construction phase, as well as during daily life upon completion. here we inquire into the role that institutions have played in the shaping of civil society in australia and address this question in terms of efforts to implement eco-city ideas during construction and to encourage their continuation in daily living. method this paper examines one case study– a recently-completed innovative co-operative mediumdensity eco-city development, christie walk in adelaide. it investigates the processes of planning, building, development and community living at christie walk, drawing on documentary records and oral history interviews. in addition, digital research was conducted in early 2009 into a variety of traditional australian media sources and also new media, identifying circulation of articles and programs, in print, radio and television, which mentioned christie walk between 2000 and 2008. reflecting on this range of evidence, the paper asks how have australian institutions impacted upon the efforts of a group of citizens to put in place a housing development in which they might live socially and environmentally sustainable lives? we will first investigate something of the history and development of christie walk at the same time asking how successful is it in terms of its position in civil society, its environmental sustainability and its cohousing aspirations? we will move on to explore its success as a template for other similar developments, asking how have australian institutions helped and hindered christie walk? christie walk: the building of a community what does the eco-city approach imply and how well does christie walk implement its aims? christie walk is a community of twenty seven houses and apartments of diverse size and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 111 form, located within the square mile of adelaide city on a t-shaped block of land of 2000 square metres, the area of three average suburban housing blocks. it was completed in 2007. figure 1. site plan of christie walk, 2007. courtesy of ecopolis architects. 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 figure 2. ecopolis architects, elevation of christie walk 2004. courtesy of ecopolis architects. a paved courtyard and a further block of apartments has now been completed at the front of the site (lower right of the image). the construction priorities, from the beginning, were the low environmental impact, and the social sustainability of the site, rather than those of the tight timelines, contained costs and profit motive of the mainstream building and development sector. these aims are visible in design, materials and building processes. a number of the dwellings are deliberately small in size, minimising the use of materials. recycled materials were used wherever possible. all materials and finishes used in the interiors were considered for their environmental impact during manufacture and beyond. hence ‘non-toxic construction and finishes [were] used throughout, and a policy of avoiding formaldehyde and minimising the use of pvc’ was implemented (downton 2009, p.285). energy and water conservation measures were built in. a number of the buildings were constructed for long-term survival: the apartment block under the roof garden, for example, has a skin of aerated concrete blocks which are loadbearing and long lasting. the internal apartment walls are not load-bearing and can be moved to create new spaces for low cost, should new owners wish to remodel, making the apartments both long-lasting and flexible. dwellings and windows are placed in relation to the sun, to reduce energy needs so far as possible, on this oddly-shaped site. the ‘skin’ (that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 113 is, the roofs and walls) is highly insulated. low wattage light globes are used by 100% of dwellings for most uses and energyand water-efficient appliances were standard issue. steeply sloping roofs, provide support for solar hot water systems, and also capture and deliver rainwater to large underground tanks for on-site water conservation (downton 2009, p.285). the thick, rendered walls of the timber-frame-and-strawbale cottages are pierced by small, double-glazed windows, the curved reveals of which lend a gentle quality of light to the interiors. an almost mediaeval appearance has resulted from these requirements, prompting some visitors to ask for the head hobbit. architectural form, however, reflects environmental concerns (downton 2009, p.288). stylistic quaintness was an outcome, rather than an aim. provision has been made for biodiversity and productivity in the surprisingly extensive gardens. a deep-soil roof garden on top of one block of units provides a welcome shady and breezy green space for barbecues and leisure pursuits. private gardens and shared spaces are set out along the pathway which meanders along the ‘street’ of houses. the vegetable patch circled by fruit trees is designated as a shared space, providing food accessible to all. along the path are small spaces punctuated by benches where people can meet. trees and creepers provide visual and environmental screens. deciduous vines on northerly and westerly aspects are planted for energy conservation, reducing the heating of interiors in adelaide’s searing summer and contributing to the circulation of cool air through a system of shutters. among the many strategies, which encourage environmentally sustainable practices upon completion, is the provision of a single, large, shared laundry furnished with energy and water-efficient machines, instead of including a laundry in each dwelling. this reduces unnecessary use of space, power, water, and consumption of whitegoods. the energy implications of transport are also considered. the site’s urban location was chosen for its proximity to public transport. only eleven car spaces exist on site and there is no through route except footpaths. provision has been made on site for a storage shed for bicycles. there is absolutely no doubt about the success of the rigorous energy conservation strategies. these have been documented in two independent reports (oliphant 2004, and daniell et al. 2005). uea, projects, not the least christie walk, have also either won or been honourably mentioned in a number of state, national and international inquiries, awards and prizes, including the federal government’s inquiry into sustainable cities, 2005, the world habitat 114 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 award 2005, the ruataro hashimoto apfed international planning award and in 2006 two adelaide trust awards. (downton 2009, pp.299 and 564). christie walk as civil society michael edwards whose writing on civil society underpins this work, cites a predisposition for voluntary sociality, that is sociality beyond the influence of governments and markets, as the first of his three definitions of civil society (edwards 2004). the christie walk project falls well within this definition, having come out of discussions within a voluntary organization urban ecology australia (uea) based on its american counterpart (roseland 1997, p.197). the south australian organisation was prompted by the federal-government sponsored greenhouse 88 conference of 1988. uea was incorporated in 1991 as a non-profit body, with the aim of circulating information about eco-city ideas (downton 2009, pp.221224). from this time onwards, voluntary effort drove the work. kept at arms length from the market through non-profit structures, the project’s civil society standing was never constrained by the drive for profit. nor was it compromised by the intervention of government. for christie walk, unlike many co-operative housing projects in australia, never relied on substantial government funding to pay for the project. those which do, despite their very considerable voluntary efforts, tend to fall under the provisions and regulations of public housing (van reyk 2008). christie walk has no such connection. apart from one federal government grant to fund the photovoltaic cells, its funds originated with the owners of its dwellings, from non-resident supporters of the project and from ethical borrowings (downton 2009, p.288). still the project required interaction with government and market institutions. the purpose of voluntary associations – those causes for which people advocate – are highlighted by michael edwards’ second definition: civil society as the good society. as bob edwards and michael w. foley note, in the west, one of the major functions of civil society groups is the establishing of alternative ways of achieving collective goods. underlying their action is an implicit critique of traditional representative forms of democracy (edwards & foley 2003) and a favouring of greater citizen participation. eco-city projects such as christie walk, aim to create environmentally sustainable sites and communities which are socially self-sustaining. in doing so, they build that social capital without which the economic and non-economic enterprises of an active society cannot cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 115 engage to their fullest capacity. essential to this broad commitment to improving sociality and the urban environment has been the installation of participatory processes and nonhierarchical social structures which value the contributions of all. at christie walk, these were initially integrated into the decision-making of uea forums, and continued in later resident bodies, which managed the development phase. these processes also ensured the installation of environmentally responsible solutions in the construction phase. commitment to civil society as the good society is therefore deeply embedded in the christie walk design and practices through the synergy of normative aspirations in two fields: social and environmental sustainability. edwards also flagged a third definition for civil society – the public sphere, for without the free circulation of information, civil society cannot function. uea’s early role in disseminating information about the eco-city is proclaimed by its name. this demonstrates how alert christie walkers have always been to the importance of communication in the public sphere. uea runs its own website and blog. members provide regular tours of the site, advertising these in the local press. these are led by residents and non-resident volunteers trained for the purpose. uea have produced and offer for sale, moving towards sustainability, a manual about christie walk and the ideals of eco-city development. demand for regular tours of the site is strong, and is particularly popular with secondary school groups and politicians (rohde 2008). it is clear that christie walk represents, indeed synthesises, all three definitions of civil society, in the manner advocated by michael edwards offering a comprehensive picture of the possibilities of civil society. social sustainability civil-society associations achieve much of their work via their resources of social capital. indeed social sustainability requires the generation of social capital. in robert putnam’s terms this refers to “those features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (putnam 1993). both “bonding”, and “bridging” social capital are important (woolcock & narayan 2000; putnam 2000, leonard & onyx 2003). bonding social capital operates within the community and serves to provide the “social glue” that holds the community together and provides social support for its members. it appears to be characterised by dense, multi-functional ties and strong but localised trust. indeed halpern's (2005) multi-layered conceptual map defines 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 social capital as networks, norms and sanctions and assigns trust a salient, consolidating role in relationships. five important elements of bonding social capital are: associational density within the community, participation in community life, shared values, trust and agency (onyx & bullen 2000). bridging social capital refers to connections beyond the community. the extent to which communities can command their diverse social, professional and information networks to draw upon internal and external expertise, ideas and resources is a crucial feature of regenerative capacity. following difficulties in finding a suitable developer for an earlier, large, but ultimately unrealised plan, the halifax eco-city project, uea became developers, forming wirranendi inc., a not-for-profit, registered co-operative. in the absence of a formally employed developer, several committed advocates co-operated to address a wide range of concerns, including those of development (downton 2009, p.284). they undertook as much of the administration, planning and building works as possible as volunteers. one of the houses and all of the gardens were actually built by supporters, following on-site workshops offered with the support of some local building trades. following the completion in 2001 of the first house, the roman hut (named for its owner), residents successively moved into their dwellings as they were completed (the advertiser adelaide 21 april 2001, online transcript; downton 2009, pp.281-286). voluntary effort and collective mode of decision-making and action are built into urban ecology australia and are part of the legal structures of community title under which the site is owned and in the co-operative wirranendi inc, the entity which developed christie walk. they are integral to the design, fabric and processes of building and living at christie walk and is visible in the provision of a common meeting room, in the co-operative vegie garden and in spaces in the garden to sit together. voluntary working bees and social events are part of the life. one author, visiting to undertake interviews for this paper, participated in a working bee, carting paving tiles with others so a large area of paving could be completed. ongoing projects continue the tradition, for example, the commitment to rubbish recycling and the body corporate’s negotiations with go-get, the car-share company, to provide lowimpact transport for christie walk residents and its neighbourhood when other options are not sufficient (rohde 2008). joint decision-making occurs within the body corporate, in the policy of inclusion and encouragement to participate in community work, building and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 117 garden maintenance at christie walk, and in the frequent social events carried on, often in the meeting-room designed for group events and get-togethers on site. bonding social capital is evident in their success – approximately 25 households of the 27 attend and participate regularly (rohde 2008). bridging social capital is also present. many residents have connections with advocacy-based ngos and local community bodies. these are permitted to book and use the meeting room, so long as the christie walk residents do not need it. also a policy of open access to the site means that neighbours are welcome to the place and not discouraged from cutting through on foot on the way to another place, explicitly countering tendencies to a gated community (rohde 2008). the contrast is striking between christie walk and the isolation of suburbia where many residents become cut off in their homes, grooming their real-estate, and entering and exiting in cars so that they rarely meet their neighbours. adjustments have been made by some residents. some of the terrace-house residents found that their top floors were very hot in adelaide’s searing summer. one has installed airconditioning. other residents have decided to install their own washing machines in their residences. despite these small variations, on the basis of contribution to civil society through environmental rigor and social sustainability that christie walk is, by all accounts a very successful development, sustaining its aims through a long implementation period. in a very few cases, residents were unprepared for the differences between christie walk and a mainstream development. one household was very critical of the problems with the experimental sewage system and with the long timelines and moved out (adelaide review, 15 april 2005, downton 2008). still, the overwhelming majority of residents remain very content with the place they have created: although saleable, homes change hands very slowly, for few want to leave. and those that do change, do so by word of mouth (rohde 2008). despite their success only one other comparable urban eco-city development has been built in australia: westwyk in inner-city melbourne. a second south australian example, aldinga, has, like westwyk, acknowledged christie walk as its inspiration, but aldinga is a more expansive development and certainly not urban, being built outside adelaide on rural land (rohde 2008, downton 2008, p.286). why, having won international and national acclaim from planning and environmental agencies, is christie walk not imitated and replicated more? 118 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 part of the answer must lie in the answer to a subsidiary consideration: why was the process at christie walk so lengthy; what made it so difficult? here we will examine one aspect which may shed light on why this question– the contribution of some major institutions. how have these constrained processes and opportunities at christie walk? john henningham’s definition of institutions includes both large, formally constituted forms and bodies, but also those less formal, but still influential, customs and practices of culture, similar to elinor ostrom’s ‘rules-in-use’ – informal institutions which may shape human behaviour. (henningham 1995, p.3, ostrom 2003, chapter 2). the institutions which emerge as significant at christie walk include both formal and informal types. we may thus begin to see some of the character of australian civil society and the ways in which its institutions shape it. four institutions appear to have been particularly problematic: legal, bureaucratic, financial, and media institutions. legal structures where the not-for profit uea worked well, south australia’s community title legal form and the co-operative entity wirranendi were not always successful at christie walk. community title was introduced into australia in the 1990s. it explicitly encourages group responsibility for all common areas (community titles act, 1996, south australia, division 4, parts 28. 29; gleeson 2005). uea members, many of whom became christie walk residents had input into its introduction to south australia and had hopes that it might be better adapted to their needs (downton 2008). residents found, however, that community title, does not allow for community ownership in quite the terms that they envisaged. the roof garden located on the small block of flats was always planned as a group facility, owned by all. community title only permits its ownership to be held by the owners of the apartments within the block upon which it was sited. a great deal of voluntary time and effort has also been put into resolving the ownership of the photovoltaic cells on the roof of the large apartment building, which were also intended to be a common asset (downton 2008), contributing to a blow-out in timelines. some of these issues have never found a satisfactory systemic solution. gleeson argues that community title emerged in australia alongside policies of urban consolidation. in one model, quietly encouraged by some local governments hopeful of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 119 gaining cost-free revenue, streets, parks and other infrastructure are not delivered, payed for or maintained by the government for the benefit of all citizens, but built by and initially maintained by the developer, and paid for by the purchasers. later both the responsibility and costs of maintenance revert to the owners of the dwellings. residents then find themselves paying both rates and community title levies. christie walk being small and including no driveable streets has largely avoided this problem. however, there is also the potential for this form of title to form gated communities, which encourage an isolated, exclusivist attitude, undermining the inclusive public domain, so essential for liberal democratic societies. (gleeson 2005, pp.3-5; gleeson 2006, pp.85-6). to avoid this, the christie walk community had to formulate an explicit policy to ensure open access. still the potential for closing access lies dormant within its legal structure. the constitution of the body corporate under the act, states that members must ‘encourage the community’ but does not spell out what this means. even the word co-operation is absent from the wording of community corporation 20575, or the subsidiary corporations functioning under it. in short, residents are acutely aware that their legal structures do not ensure the continuation of their aims for social sustainability in the future. christie walk remains co-operative in approach, subject, however, to the goodwill of committed residents to continue social sustainability into the future. bureaucratic practices wirrandendi inc. had other problems with the legal structure. the accountability mechanisms for co-operatives in south australia proved largely inappropriate for the christie walk development. the cooperative structures in south australia appeared to the christie walk developers to essentially be designed to facilitate the creation of self-managed, state government-funded social housing. when wirranendi sought advice from the government authority, which had been set up to oversee and assist cooperatives, they received virtually no useful information or support: christie walk simply didn’t fit the model of organisation they had been set up for and had become used to servicing. indeed they would have been better served by a not-for profit company, run co-operatively. (paul downton, personal communication september 2008). barraket investigated the co-operatives of new south wales in a large study on urban renewal. she cites unpublished accord research showing that negotiation of the registration, auditing and reporting requirements were a significant 120 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 barrier for co-operatives. there is a need for more streamlined and accessible accountability systems (2001, pp.75-76). most of the new south wales co-operative communities similarly struggle with the culture of bodies which administer their accountability for the funds they receive. housing cooperatives are to a great extent funded and/or administered by state government departments of public housing and by charitable, often church-based, organizations. all such institutions, like the welfare system, have long been understood in australia as supporters of the poorest and most vulnerable people. henningham reminds us that the australian welfare system is based on the old charitable approach to citizen need, distinguishing between the worthy and the unworthy poor. ironically, instead of increasing equality, this requirement to distinguish between categories of people creates hierarchies and an authoritarian approach to management. many housing co-operatives have long been financed and therefore administered by departments of public housing (lyons 2001, p.87). they have therefore been subjected to the authoritarian welfare structures and practices that accompany it. far from flowering into a wide-ranging and vibrant social sector, which could encompass a community such as christie walk, co-operatives now appear mostly to house only the vulnerable of the community albeit those who want to run their own lives co-operatively so far as possible. not only was the legal instrument unsuitable but the ‘welfare’ culture within the bureaucracy was inappropriate. some governments, such as the victorian state government, have realised that this is a discouraging model which suffocates the growth of social capital. the resourcing of co-operatives needs to be situated more at arms’ length from government and bureaucracies. following this long history of ‘welfare’ thinking, a whole of government approach to change will be necessary to embed new attitudes at all levels (barraket 2001, pp.75). the legal instruments for title and the bureaucratic guidelines and approaches to co-operatives, appear to have been drafted for the initial circumstances in which they emerged. a great deal more awareness of practices outside australia is needed to achieve greater flexibility in drafting and in bureaucratic practice. alternative legal models of co-operative ownership and development do exist elsewhere. in one european model, prospective residents form a not-for-profit company and vest the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 121 ownership of the site and the buildings in that entity. under this legal structure, residents own the real estate through their shareholding in the company, which gives them the exclusive right to a guaranteed lifetime incumbency of their dwelling. a shareholding can be sold intact, complete with its rights to incumbency. the company has responsibility for exterior maintenance of the exterior of buildings, open space and for major aspects of interior maintenance and repair (mårtensson 2008 p.5). building and maintenance issues and disputes can only be addressed though the community’s company, enhancing the standing of communal processes. finance despite the faith of australian governments in markets, the failure of the latter institution in housing leaves many people to the mercy of the rental market, with others losing, during crises such as the current subprime-induced downturn, homes and savings they have worked hard to acquire. it is clear that government intervention is inevitable. housing groups were recently (september 2008) in canberra to lobby the federal government for increased housing stocks of affordable housing. systematic approaches are surely preferable to the cyclical crises of the free market. finance can be difficult for projects such as christie walk, be they considered as a cooperative housing site or an environmentally sustainable project. barraket concludes that traditional financial institutions are wary of co-operative ventures , believing them to be risky. she argues that co-operatives are not always capable of harnessing local sources of finance. nor do they tend to have well-developed networks with external public and private sources (barraket 2001, pp.76-77). direct government finance is only available for the needy. this is understandable, but could be extended by tax instruments. in america, where the involvement of the private sector has been encouraged in non-profit housing since the 1970s, decisions to discontinue large scale public housing, the introduction of, for example, tax credits on land tax for cohousing developments in the 1980s have resulted in an exponential rise in the numbers of cohousing developments (steven rathgeb smith, ccs presentation 19 sept 2008; dreir & hulchanski 1993, p.64). canada similarly withdrew from large scale public housing in the 1970s. in addressing the nation’s social housing needs, its most innovative approach was a non-equity co-operative housing sector in which residents of a variety of small and large co-operatives worked with community-based resource groups to 122 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 manage their housing. the aim was to help develop communities, not just to build large-scale housing projects (dreir & hulchanski 1993, pp.55-56). community title in australia, where it addresses issues of communally owned areas, still prioritises individual home ownership. hence the corporate body of such developments, including christie walk, is largely restricted to addressing issues concerned with the christie walk site itself. issues beyond christie walk, which nevertheless affect it, such as the possibility of forming a wider collective to lobby for cohousing, have not been explored. in the european model, by contrast, the company, once ongoing costs are met, can use any accumulated surpluses in the interests of their co-operative communities. one use of surpluses has been the networking of co-operatives to fund and administer an overarching organization to look after the interests of non-profit housing co-operatives. through forming a co-operative of co-operatives, the swedish hsb riksförbund (the national federation of tenants savings and building societies) housing co-operatives have over time become very prolific developers of new housing in that nation, producing both co-operative and mainstream developments, committed to high standards in design and construction (mårtensson 2008, p.6). in the recession of the 1990s, the european co-operative movement represented by hsb riksförbund, mentioned above, lost no houses. representing the not-forprofit companies which own the co-operative housing developments it approached the banks and arranged a write-off of debt by some 20-30%. all retained their homes (mårtensson 2008, p.5). clearly a range of systematic approaches to financing co-operatives are in place elsewhere. christie walk was built on a not-for profit basis and was financed individually by the residents themselves, by some generous philanthropic contributions and by loans from ethical investment bodies, including the bendigo community bank and the community aid abroad ethical investment fund. the amounts were unfortunately not large enough to finance the full project from the outset, so financing happened piecemeal, contributing to the slowing of the project and to increasing costs. christie walkers also hoped to reduce the costs of construction through their voluntary efforts. the extended deadlines made it difficult to estimate how effective voluntary work was in actually doing so. there was, also, an inherent conflict between the community/environmental goals of the project protagonists which requires considered, potentially time-consuming, reflective decision-making and the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 123 pragmatics of needing to work almost entirely within the mainstream framework of a development process that adds costs to even the slightest delay (downton 2009, p.283). there were internal contradictions at the personal and collective level, as members of the cooperative wanted to develop the project, but did not want to be 'developers'. an earlier halifax eco-city plan foundered at an advanced stage due to the lack of developer preparedness to properly integrate community and ecological programs in the development process (rohde 2008). there is no doubt that environmentally responsible construction increases the cost of building developments. it is often argued that this cost is recouped over time from savings in water and energy costs, but good studies on this have not yet been published (randolf, kam and graham 2007, p.210). with increased understanding of climate change, sustainable development has attracted the attention of federal and state governments over the past two decades. christie walk received a grant from the federal government for its photovoltaic cells (downton 2009, pp.285 and 289). sustainable building codes such as basix in new south wales have been formulated. however, ‘financing mechanisms for the provision of low interest green-home loans ... to improve environmental performance [would effectively target] additional up-front costs and [increase] affordability for home buyers’, especially for low income families (randolf, kam & graham, 2007, pp.207 and 210-211). sustainable housing is at the moment only available to middle class aspirants and the funding system remains piecemeal. for this to expand governments will need to show leadership and not allow developers with an interest in a present-centred approach to set the agenda. in short, government policies which cannot address even a modified universalist approach to housing-needs has stymied innovation in the field of co-operatives for a long time. nor have those offering private sources of funding been keen to widen their purview. in all cases, the narrow circumstances in which the legislation and practices were initially set up have restricted widening of its use and led to problems, most evident in the extensive blow-out of timelines of the christie walk project. mass media given the legendary love affair of australian citizens with real estate and development and also their reputation for taking up new technologies, one would logically expect great interest 124 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 in christie walk from the mass media. for after all, as ‘the most important source of information, entertainment and education, the media are central to our capacity to define ourselves as citizens’ (schultz 1994, p.16). we have already noted that michael edwards argues that the circulation of information is a basic characteristic, even definition of civil society. investigations into christie walk’s appearance in australia’s mass media show the constraints which many new topics face in sparking media interest. the media, both traditional and new have been extensively analysed by academics. mark wheeler’s political history of the british media documents how from the emergence of newspapers, press freedom was contested, but from the nineteenth century the drive for profits also gained a central place (1997, pp.52-53). in australia in the twentyfirst century, as elsewhere, tension still remains between the social and economic functions of the media. indeed nowadays, the press is described as conforming to the ‘mixed business model’ (simons 2007, chapter 7), and is understood to be located in the deeper institutional structure of the manufacturing-marketing-media complex (cunningham & turner 1997, p.267). the ability of all content to remain unaffected by economic considerations is severely constrained, be the article or program overtly political or merely unsuited to the preferences of the advertiser (schultz 1994, pp.29-30; winter 2007, pp.19-20). new media, though subject to less constraint has its own biases (lister et al. 2003, chapter 3). digital research was conducted in early 2009 into a variety of traditional australian media sources and also new media, identifying circulation of articles and programs, in print, radio and television, which mentioned the adelaide housing site from 2000 to 2008, using the key search phrase “christie walk”. the records of operations of many media organizations are made available on the world wide web. broad, internet searches using the google search engine were also undertaken. searches into newsprint sources were carried out through newsbank database which gives access to the major newspapers of every state except western australia. these were supplemented with searches of the websites of individual media organizations both in that state and elsewhere. forty newsprint articles engaging with christie walk between 2000 and 2008 was captured by this method. (commercial radio and television do not consistently offer their archives for searching or do not archive their content in digitally searchable form, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 125 so consistent and exhaustive research into these is not possible. it is possible however to search the content of print media and the national public television and radio programs of the abc (australian broadcasting commission)). thirty of these articles appeared in south australian newspapers, the advertiser (12) being the most prolific. in addition, the adelaide review, a monthly newspaper circulating in adelaide coffee shops has also published two substantial articles and a brief paragraph on christie walk since 2004, but its circulation is limited. new south wales and victoria together published nine, only one of which was substantial. tasmania published just one minor mention and the other states and territories none. fifteen of the total addressed christie walk alone, and a further sixteen focussed on sustainability. this is a remarkably small number of articles about a project of national and international significance, especially published in the traditional media which still claim to have a public interest raison d’être. as simons notes, however, the media tends to maintain the status quo. at best ‘it may be a force for reform and often it is not even that’ (simons 2007 p. 50). christie walk by its not-for-profit ideals and communal modes of planning and organization, encourages new economic and social frameworks in place of the exclusively individualist and capitalist approaches favoured under our current version of the liberal democratic system (crabtree 2005, pp. 333 and 347-348). the commitment at christie walk to the use of environmentally sustainable building materials and construction methods prioritise thoughtful, responsible choice, in place of the marketand pricedriven choices encouraged by the present system. media revenue, however, comes from current businesses/ advertisers, not from future ideas. the australian newspaper, which represents the national print arena is illustrative of the specificity of advertiser’s interests. this paper made minor mention of christie walk in two articles only. both articles highlighted simple, real-estate agent-generated ‘star’ systems for rating some aspects of eco-efficiency in properties on the market, briefly citing christie walk’s rating in their system. the australian’s failure to report christie walk’s achievements in its own right, and the specific focus of both articles suggests the commercial media’s interests in the existing system of real estate. moreover neither of the star systems published in the australian included a category for awarding ‘stars’ for transport sustainability, which christie walk addresses. the sale of motor-cars has long been another revenue raiser for commercial print media, including their new, online sites. it appears that pressure is brought 126 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 to bear on media by big companies who have indeed withdrawn big accounts after adverse reporting of their activities, and have also pressed for and gained control over content. indeed real estate and motor vehicle companies are documented culprits internationally (winter 2007, pp.19-31). winter has further criticised the antipathy that the commercial media exhibits towards citizens who support environmentally responsible practices and policies. when green issues are discussed in the press, supporters are regularly referred to in pejorative terms by the press as ‘militants, eco-zealots, idealogues’, ‘ratbags’ and ‘activists’, engendering mistrust in their opinions, actions and judgment (2007, pp.60-62). this track record of bias, omissions and denigration shows the huge barriers which have to be overcome in achieving circulation of information through the mainstream media. this is important because a great many citizens rely on the public-interest role of the mainstream media for news of new technologies and new issues. for decades an unconscionable silence was maintained by the mainstream news media on the issue of global warming. the silence was broken only when a new circulation path, the cinema, was co-opted to broadcast al gore’s famous 2007 documentary, ‘an inconvenient truth’, a mode of circulation not controlled by advertising and their allies, the media moguls of radio, television and print media. this demonstrates how tightly the commercial media were and are controlled by those wanting current, environmentally-destructive business interests to remain dominant. the national significance of christie walk has not, however, been entirely ignored. abc radio and television have broadcast a small but substantial oeuvre on christie walk. since 2004, four of abc’s specialist weekly programs have addressed christie walk in substantial programs. radio national’s science show concentrated on christie walk in a segment on technical innovation on 28.august 2004. abc tv’s weekly round-up of state news, stateline, led a full segment about christie walk with the announcement of the visit of the un-backed asia-pacific forum for environment and development to christie walk on 28 july 2006, which was to result in a second place for christie walk in this international competition. abc tv’s catalyst featured architect paul downton and christie walk, among others, in a sustainability program on sustainability entitled ‘people power’ on 24 may 2007. by design is a radio program addressing issues of architecture and innovation. its presenter, alan saunders, took a tour of christie walk on 20 october 2007 and included a full interview with architect paul downton. given the weekly scheduling and the more substantial nature of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 127 the programs, this is a better track record. clearly abc commentators in science, design and local news have recognised christie walk as a worthy subject for national broadcasting. searches using new media, specifically the internet, showed coverage surpassing that in the traditional media. google searches, using the key phrase ‘christie walk’ garnered 268 hits, very few of which duplicated the above. these were overwhelmingly derived from blogs, specialist sites or articles addressing environmental sustainability, though some twenty-two dealt with cohousing/social sustainability. another group of sites engages with architectural and design issues, some offering technical manuals on sustainability for builders and homeowners. academic articles and conference papers from several universities accounted for some fifty hits. it is clear that there is far greater interest in christie walk within civil society than the level of interest of traditional media would imply. it is noteworthy that the interest largely comes from an educated audience one already alert to the particular issues of sustainability. here, the class bias of new media is evident. the cost of its infrastructure limits it to those educated and wealthy households which can afford it (lister et al. 2003, pp.199-200). the presence of blogs and postings of educational organizations and advocacy groups for environmental sustainability within this cohort demonstrates that educated citizens are greatly concerned and are drawing on both its social capital and new circulation routes for information, to more widely disseminate solutions to urgent environmental and social problems. it is clear that civil society is far more interested in environmentally sustainable issues and solutions than the number of published mentions of christie walk from traditional media sources implies. still 248 is not a vast number of hits, given the urgency of need for action on climate change and the importance of christie walk as australia’s first and only urban (as opposed to suburban or rural) eco-city development, and one which is internationally recognised. south australians, however, with the advantage of greater circulation of information about the development in their local mainstream media clearly recognised the value of urban eco-city developments. in 2007, dr paul downton was voted a finalist, one of five, in south australia’s process for choosing a candidate for australian of the year (http://www.australianoftheyear.org.au/pages/page356.asp). though another was chosen, it is a measure of the understanding of south australians of the national significance of christie http://www.australianoftheyear.org.au/pages/page356.asp� 128 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 walk and their knowledge of the role of its architect as a critical catalyst of the project, that paul downton was voted a finalist by the residents of that state. the media’s role as a propaganda arm of current industries has played a significant part in the recent failure of world financial and economic systems, which were prompted by a real-estate financing imbalance the sub-prime mortgage crisis. large, motor manufacturers have also been prominent among those companies and sectors which over-reached themselves, and failed. the maintenance of the social/ public interest of the media is essential if new ways of addressing the world’s problems, such as ecological and social sustainability, are to be understood and engaged with by governments and populations. the paltry coverage of the successes of christie walk by australian mainstream media amply demonstrates their suppression of discussion of new ideas and their focus on their own business as usual. this unhealthy situation has deprived big companies of the robust debate which could work to restrain their drive for power and control. for the drive to control exhibited by australia’s media organizations prevents information about new and better methods of being in the world from circulating and being acted upon, certainly in the arena of business practice, but also in other arenas such as environmental and social sustainability. it is clear that the wider circulation of information about sustainability remains seriously constrained. the resistance to change and the provincial mindset of australia’s media minimise the circulation of new ideas, which restricts discussions and therefore the numbers of followers, supporters, lobbiers of government for policy change and the number of potential benefactors. a mass media sector which meets its public interest obligations is an essential part of civil society and a democratic society. concluding remarks the explanation of why christie walk has not been replicated more and why the process was so difficult, must be complex and partly resides in the exponential rise in the cost of land. another factor must be the time-frame: from ‘go to whoa’ the processes, by which the desire of a group of adelaide residents to build and live in a socially and environmentally sustainable urban place, have taken the best part of eight years to achieve. burnout has now emerged as an issue (downton 2008). the role of institutions in the blow-out of timelines must be questioned. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 129 the christie walk community, a network which has a considerable history of pride in its civil society standing, eschewing the mainstream influences of government control and market blandishments, succeeded over the period 1999-2007 in achieving a new type of housing development which was socially and environmentally sustainable during construction. it continues to address, with the increasing urgency of global warming, environmental and social sustainability in everyday life. further, christie walk and other civil society groups have addressed these issues through innovative methods – by utilising their local social capital networks and norms of cooperation and reciprocity. this success has been achieved despite the input of government institutions. market-based institutions, such as the banks have been similarly inactive. the mainstream media have gone further, ignoring their public-interest duties in circulating news of innovative solutions in favour of support for market-based vested interests. though at the moment no substitute for a truly free press, the internet at least offers a number of avenues for the spread of information. it is clear that civil society groups, such as the christie walk community, can make a huge contribution for the public good, at times with little drain on the public purse. however all development requires interaction with major institutions. this is unavoidable and indeed citizens should be able to expect co-operation when engaged in such public-interest projects. it does australia no credit at all that its government institutions, far from supporting the work of civil society bodies, are so inflexible as to be a considerable drag on their ability to implement innovative, indeed essential, social and environmental ideas. similarly, that the public media, which promote the public interest function of the public sphere when it suits them, can so slow the spread of much-needed new ideas. the aspirations and commitment of the christie walk community offer a substantial template for civil society organizations attempting to implement new ideas, especially in the field of social and environmental sustainability. however the processes of construction of christie walk, marred as they were by inflexible practices and vested institutional interests, have not proved to be a model suitable for copying at all. in a time of great crisis concerning global warming, australia’s major institutions, governmental (political, legal and bureaucratic) and private (banking and media) need to re-commit to their public interest functions and, instead of being the enemy of 130 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 innovation, support the implementation of new and relevant ideas for the 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implications for development theory, research, and policy’, world bank research observer online, vol. 15, pp. 225-249. http://linus.lib.uts.edu.au/search~s3?/aputnam%2c+r/aputnam+r/1%2c8%2c18%2cb/frameset&ff=aputnam+robert+d&11%2c%2c11� http://linus.lib.uts.edu.au/search~s3?/aputnam%2c+r/aputnam+r/1%2c8%2c18%2cb/frameset&ff=aputnam+robert+d&3%2c%2c11� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 35 indigenous rights and the 1991-2000 australian reconciliation process andrew gunstone abstract the formal reconciliation process in australia was conducted between 1991 and 2000 and aimed to reconcile indigenous and non-indigenous peoples by 2001. in this paper, i detail the failure of both this reconciliation process and governments, in particular the howard government, to recognise indigenous rights, such as sovereignty, a treaty, self-determination and land rights. in 1991, the australian commonwealth parliament unanimously passed the council for aboriginal reconciliation act 1991 which instituted a ten-year formal process of reconciliation. the aim of this process was to reconcile indigenous and non-indigenous peoples by the centenary of australia’s federation in 2001. the process was facilitated and promoted by the government-initiated council for aboriginal reconciliation (car). during the reconciliation decade, many indigenous political leaders, involved in key indigenous organisations, such as car or the aboriginal and torres strait islander commission (atsic), and who were mostly men, consistently and clearly advocated that a range of indigenous rights needed to be genuinely recognised by the reconciliation process and governments. these rights included sovereignty, self-determination, land rights, intellectual and cultural rights, parliamentary representation and a treaty. in this paper, i detail this history of political demands for indigenous rights by indigenous leaders between 1991 and 2000. i argue that these demands, despite their consistency and clarity, were largely not addressed by the conclusion of the reconciliation process, either by several key documents published by car in 2000, in particular the documents of reconciliation, or by australian governments. early in the reconciliation process, many indigenous leaders were very sceptical of the concept of reconciliation and saw the process as a stalling tactic by the hawke government 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 to avoid discussions of indigenous rights, such as a treaty and sovereignty. kevin gilbert, poet and author, at a ‘day of protest and mourning’ at the aboriginal tent embassy, held on the 27 may 1992, argued: we have seen the australian government and the australian people try to get off the hook of responsibility by saying, ten years down the track, we’ll have reconciliation. and reconciliation doesn’t promise us human rights, it doesn’t promise us our sovereign rights or the platform from which to negotiate, and it doesn’t promise us a viable land base … it is ten more years of death! (cited in attwood & markus 1999, pp.321-322) bundjalung elder reverend frank roberts, was likewise very critical of the concept of reconciliation. he wrote that a meeting of the far north coast nsw aboriginal elders council: rejected outright the concept of reconciliation at this point in time, believing it is mistimed and premature and would put unborn aboriginal people in jeopardy. it would only be a token gesture …. to even contemplate reconciliation now would be an act of betrayal. if we reject reconciliation, then a treaty is a must (roberts 1992, p.5). other indigenous leaders also expressed reservations about the reconciliation process. paul coe, from the nsw aboriginal legal service, stated, ‘why should justice for aboriginal people be delayed till the oppressor is “enlightened” in its attitudes?’ (cited in duke 1992, p.6). charles harris, a retired minister and activist, contended that the initial step in the reconciliation process must be the addressing of ‘the just demands of the people. land rights, sovereignty, etc. must be dealt with’ (cited in wilson 1991, p. 13). in 1994, michael mansell, an indigenous activist and a strong advocate for indigenous sovereignty, argued that in its first few years, the reconciliation process had not shown a desire to work towards changing power relations (mansell 1994, p.15). the chairperson of car from 1991 to 1997 and the person regarded as the ‘father of reconciliation’, pat dodson, similarly advocated the importance of indigenous rights. early on in the reconciliation process, dodson stated that the reconciliation process needed to implement a document of reconciliation and to consider a broad range of issues, including cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 37 sovereignty, constitutional change, indigenous rights and ‘power sharing’ (dodson 1992a, pp.9-11; see mudrooroo 1995, p.233). some non-indigenous people, who supported indigenous rights, were likewise not initially supportive of reconciliation. for example, author judith wright, a key member of the aboriginal treaty committee, wrote that reconciliation was a ‘mischievous attempt to fool the rest of the world into thinking something constructive is being attempted’ (wright 1992, cited in roberts 1993, p.16). historian henry reynolds saw it as a public relations strategy after the policy failures of the 1980s: it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the process of reconciliation is being pursued because the government must be seen to be doing something, having abandoned the pre-1983 commitment to national land rights legislation and having edged gingerly away from the concept of a treaty promised by the prime minister at barunga in 1988 (reynolds 1991, p. 3). a prominent non-indigenous ex-public servant and another key member of the aboriginal treaty committee, h. c. coombs, contended that car was not effective in developing reconciliation as it is not achieving results from the aboriginal community. they do not, in my view, identify with the process: they are looking for evidence that there is a genuine commitment on the part of the government and on the part of the white australian community to accept their right to autonomy (cited in walker 1994, p.14). the reactions from some indigenous leaders to the high court’s 1992 judgement in mabo and others v queensland (no 2) also illustrated the importance that many indigenous people place upon the recognition of indigenous rights. although the mabo judgement recognised the legal fiction of terra nullius and the continuing, albeit severely diminished, existence of indigenous native title, it reinforced the rights of the crown. in a previous judgement, the seas and submerged lands case 1975, the high court decided: ‘the acquisition of territory by a sovereign state for the first time is an act of state which cannot be challenged, controlled or interfered with by the courts of that state’ ((1975) 135 clr 337, 388). brennan j (with mason cj and mchugh j concurring) supported this position in the mabo judgement when he stated: ‘the crown’s acquisition of sovereignty over the several parts of australia cannot be 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 challenged in an australian municipal court’ ((1992) 66 aljr 453). incidentally, this position of the high court was not addressed by the keating government’s native title act 1993 (cth). this aspect of the mabo judgement was heavily criticised by michael mansell who argued that the judgement undermined indigenous people’s campaigns for the recognition of their sovereignty. the court was silent on the equally unjust use of the doctrine [of terra nullius] to deny sovereignty. the court refused to follow precedent on the issue of terra nullius for to do so would be to maintain a legal fiction based on political convenience. yet the very same convenience was relied on by the judges to shut the door to any aboriginal hopes for arguing aboriginal sovereignty in the courts (mansell 1993, pp.4-5; see reynolds 1998, p.209; mansell 1992, pp.36-37). other prominent indigenous leaders, such as noel pearson, executive director of the cape york land council, and magistrate pat o’shane, expressed concerns as well regarding the limitations of the mabo decision (pearson 1994, p.75; o’shane 1994, p.29). the failure of the high court to address sovereignty was further criticised by non-indigenous historian henry reynolds. reynolds stated that, ‘while the courts demolished the concept of terra nullius in respect of property, it preserved it in relation to sovereignty … [which] lines australian law up with the international lawyers writing at the high noon of imperialism’ (reynolds 1996, pp.3, 13). on 3 june 1999, car released its draft document for reconciliation. this contained the draft declaration for reconciliation and the national strategies to advance reconciliation. car wrote that it would consult with the wider australian community about their draft document for reconciliation and would incorporate feedback into a final document for reconciliation that would be presented to the australian public in may 2000 (car 1999, p.4). many indigenous leaders were concerned at the failure of the draft document for reconciliation to specifically mention indigenous rights, such as sovereignty and a treaty. geoff clark, then chairperson of atsic, argued that any document of reconciliation should be a formal agreement between indigenous people and commonwealth and state cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 39 governments that should address several key issues, including: the structural relationship between indigenous people and the australian state; self-determination; land issues; stolen generations (including an apology and compensation); protection from racial discrimination; customary law; the provision of an independent economic base for indigenous people; and a treaty (clark 2000a, p.233). similarly, pat dodson wrote that there needed to be a ‘formal document that recognises and guarantees the rights of indigenous australians within the australian constitution’ and that this document would ‘provide substantial reconciliation’ by addressing: equal human rights and specific indigenous rights; rights of indigenous people to maintain their distinct characteristics, identities, laws, cultures, spiritual traditions and languages; the right of indigenous self-determination; indigenous control over economic and social development; indigenous ownership of land and resources and just compensation for land that cannot be returned; the right of indigenous self-government; constitutional recognition; and the enacting of treaties (dodson 2000, pp.269, 270-273). in 1999, gatjil djerrkura, then chairperson of atsic, expressed his concerns with the draft document for reconciliation. i am pessimistic about the prospects of any document which fails squarely to recognise the principle of self-determination gaining support amongst indigenous constituencies. further, a significant proportion of aboriginal people in my country continue to assert our unextinguished sovereignty. it is reasonably clear that indigenous people will not agree to any document or documents of reconciliation which compromise these assertions of sovereignty … indigenous australians are unlikely to conclude that the draft declaration represents an accurate reflection of our actual aspirations and entitlements (djerrkura 1999, pp.6-7). this concern that any final document of reconciliation should incorporate indigenous rights, such as sovereignty and a treaty, was again demonstrated following the release by the howard government of the proposed constitutional preamble as part of the november 6 1999 constitutional referendum. while car saw this proposed preamble as one possibility for a document of reconciliation and ‘a definite step forward for reconciliation’ (car 1997, p. 4; scott 1999, p. 17), many indigenous leaders argued that the preamble ‘fails to recognise the inherent and distinct rights of the first nations which have been recognised by the high court’ (agius et al. 1999, p. 15; see mansell 1999, p. 18). a meeting of a number of indigenous leaders unanimously recommended that the ‘question on the draft preamble to the 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 australian constitution should be dropped from the forthcoming republic referendum’ (agius et al. 1999, p.15). one of the participants at this meeting, pat dodson, later wrote that all australians should reject any preamble to our national constitution that denies the true status of indigenous australians as the custodians and owners of the land, and suggests that we are nothing more than gardeners at the station homestead (dodson 2000, p.270). just prior to the release of car’s final document of reconciliation, there were two more significant instances of indigenous leaders arguing that indigenous rights should form part of a reconciliation agenda. on 12 may 2000, pat dodson stated that car should recommend to the commonwealth government that a treaty be developed between indigenous people and the commonwealth government (dodson 2000b, pp.20-21). dodson contended the treaty should be based on a number of core principles, including: ‘political representation, reparations and compensation, regional agreements, indigenous regional self-government, cultural and intellectual property rights, recognition of customary law and an economic base’ (dodson 2000b, p.19). on may 25 2000, four indigenous leaders, geoff clark, aden ridgeway, david ross and pat dodson, with bill jonas as an observer, met with prime minister john howard in an attempt to place a number of issues on a post-document reconciliation agenda. these issues included the development of a treaty, the reservation of parliamentary seats for indigenous people, self-determination, compensation, selfgovernment and customary law (saunders & shanahan 2000, p.5; saunders 2000, p.1). it was ‘the most ambitious plan put to the prime minister by aborigines – imposing a deadline for the enactment of legislation and mentioning government funds to facilitate negotiations’ (saunders 2000, p.1). at the conclusion of their nine-month consultation process concerning the draft document for reconciliation, car developed their final document of reconciliation. to commemorate the occasion, a two-day event entitled corroboree 2000 was held from 27 to 28 may 2000 at the sydney opera house. on the first day of corroboree 2000, car unveiled their documents for reconciliation to the australian community, which consisted of the australian declaration towards reconciliation and the roadmap for reconciliation. these documents contained no substantive recognition of indigenous rights. in fact pat dodson cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 41 boycotted corroboree 2000 in protest at car’s ‘grossly inadequate’ documents of reconciliation (gordon 2001, p.100; gordon 2000, p.1). car intended the australian declaration towards reconciliation to be an ‘aspirational statement’ that would be embraced by both non-indigenous and indigenous people (car 2000a, p.71). the wording of this final version was: australian declaration towards reconciliation we, the peoples of australia, of many origins as we are, make a commitment to go on together in a spirit of reconciliation. we value the unique status of aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples as the original owners and custodians of lands and waters. we recognise this land and its waters were settled as colonies without treaty or consent. reaffirming the human rights of all australians, we respect and recognise continuing customary laws, beliefs and traditions. through understanding the spiritual relationship between the land and its first peoples, we share our future and live in harmony. our nation must have the courage to own the truth, to heal the wounds of its past so that we can move on together at peace with ourselves. reconciliation must live in the hearts and minds of all australians. many steps have been taken, many steps remain as we learn our shared histories. as we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and expresses its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the other part accepts the apologies and forgives. we desire a future where all australians enjoy their rights, accept their responsibilities, and have the opportunity to achieve their full potential. and so, we pledge ourselves to stop injustice, overcome disadvantage, and respect that aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples have the right to selfdetermination within the life of the nation. our hope is for a united australia that respects this land of ours; values the aboriginal and torres strait islander heritage; and provides justice and equity for all (car 2000c, p.3). 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 the australian declaration towards reconciliation failed to address many of the arguments raised by a number of indigenous leaders, including dodson, clark and djerrkura, following the release of the draft document for reconciliation. it contained no substantive commitments to address indigenous rights, including land rights, a treaty or sovereignty (nettheim 2000, p.63). the australian declaration towards reconciliation was a nationalist document, containing phrases such as ‘we, the peoples of australia’, ‘go on together’, ‘we share our future and live in harmony’, ‘move on together’ and ‘united australia’ (car 2000c, p.3). also, while the term ‘self-determination’ was used in the australian declaration towards reconciliation, it was linked with the phrase ‘within the life of the nation’ (car 2000c, p.3). as monk outlined, the term ‘self-determination, whilst upheld in the declaration towards reconciliation, was not part of the process of arriving at a document, and has largely been included as a political catch-phrase’ (monk 2001, p.22). lastly, the australian declaration towards reconciliation contained a conditional apology. rather than unambiguously and unconditionally offering an apology to indigenous people, it merely stated that as ‘one part’ of the nation apologises, another ‘part accepts the apologies and forgives’ (car 2000c, p.3). this conditional apology does not belong to a substantial reconciliation process as it was not a genuine apology offered with no conditions that the offended shall forgive the offender (see gaita 2000, p.286). overall, the australian declaration towards reconciliation was far removed from what indigenous leaders had been advocating both before and during the reconciliation process. in addition to the australian declaration towards reconciliation, car presented the roadmap for reconciliation at corroboree 2000. this roadmap for reconciliation outlined four national strategies ‘identifying ways governments, community groups, organisations and individuals can implement the principles of the declaration to help improve the lives of aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples and achieve reconciliation’ (car 2000a, p.71). these strategies were: the national strategy to sustain the reconciliation process, the national strategy to promote recognition of aboriginal and torres strait islander rights, the national strategy to overcome disadvantage and the national strategy for economic independence. as with the australian declaration towards reconciliation, the roadmap for reconciliation failed to address many of the indigenous rights, including a treaty and sovereignty, that indigenous leaders had long been advocating, both from within and from outside the formal reconciliation process. for example, the national strategy to promote recognition of aboriginal and torres strait islander rights failed to articulate many cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 43 indigenous rights, including sovereignty and a treaty (car 2000b, p.3). the national strategy to overcome disadvantage focussed on socio-economic conditions, such as health, education and employment, instead of looking at broader issues of reparative justice such as sovereignty and a treaty (car 2000b, p.5). following corroboree 2000, a number of indigenous leaders continued to campaign for indigenous rights, in particular for a treaty. however, many in the wider community failed to see the connection between reconciliation and a treaty. geoff clark said he was ‘astonished’ when a senior journalist asked him, during corroboree 2000, ‘when aboriginal leaders had decided to place negotiation of a treaty on the reconciliation agenda’ (clark 2000b, p.13). clark argued that the ‘negotiation of a treaty has never been off our agenda’ and that the reconciliation process was imposed upon indigenous people by former prime minister hawke in response to indigenous demands for a treaty (clark 2000b, p.13). clark wrote, ‘true reconciliation means recognising we possess distinct rights. they arise from our status as first peoples … a commitment from the government to negotiate a treaty is essential’ (clark 2000c, p.8). clark contended that the significant public support for reconciliation shown during corroboree 2000 illustrated the wider community wanted a ‘new deal’ for indigenous people, including a treaty, and was the ‘mandate’ that howard claimed he needed in order to negotiate a treaty (clark 2000b, p.13). on june 5 2000, a number of indigenous leaders, including pat dodson, geoff clark, noel pearson, david ross, ray robinson, gary foley, peter yu, marcia langton, michael mansell and charles perkins, unanimously agreed to continue lobbying for a treaty (mitchell 2000, p.2). clark stated ‘the meeting has decided that we need to come out with a formal agreement with government to resolve all the unfinished business in this country’ (cited in mitchell 2000, p.2). these calls for a treaty received some support from the wider community. former prime minister malcolm fraser contended a treaty could be useful ‘if it helped clear up misunderstandings’ (cited in saunders et al. 2000, p.4). the labor federal opposition and the australian democrats indicated they would consider a treaty (saunders et al. 2000, p.4; jopson & metherell 2000, p.7). the australian council of trade unions and the australian council for social services issued a joint statement that ‘called for “real leadership” to bring such a document into fruition [because] “it’s time for a treaty”’ (cited in saunders et al. 2000, 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 p.4). ronald wilson, the co-author of the ‘bringing them home’ report into the stolen generations, also supported a treaty (taylor 2000, p.10). bryan keon-cohen, a prominent lawyer, wrote a treaty would not be a ‘radical concept’, many other nations have treaties and the aboriginal treaty committee ‘laid the groundwork’ for a treaty back in the late 1970s and early 1980s (keon-cohen 2000, p.17). however, there was though substantial opposition to these calls for a treaty. this opposition predominantly came from some members of car and the howard government. the leadership of car both disputed the claims of many indigenous leaders that the public support shown during corroboree 2000 was a mandate for a treaty and argued that demands for a treaty would ‘derail’ reconciliation (saunders & rintoul 2000, p.1; huggins 2000, p.11). evelyn scott, the chairperson of car, claimed discussion of a treaty at this time would ‘hurt rather than help take us forward’ and further education was required (saunders & rintoul 2000, p.1; scott 2000a, p.15). scott attacked the indigenous leaders advocating a treaty, stating ‘who made them leaders? no one has made them leaders’ (nason 2000a, p.1). however, scott herself was appointed by the howard government to be chairperson of car. as well, one of those leaders she criticised was geoff clark, who was the first person to be elected the chairperson of atsic. scott illustrated that she viewed reconciliation and a treaty as separate issues when she contended, ‘the treaty will not be advocated in the council’s final report (to parliament in december) because we are talking about reconciliation in australia’ (nason 2000a, p.4). gustav nossal, the deputy chairperson of car, stated the issue was ‘divisive’ and could damage the support for reconciliation gained at corroboree 2000 (saunders & rintoul 2000, p.1). another car member, jackie huggins, wrote that while she supported discussions on a treaty, corroboree 2000 did not provide a mandate for this ‘highly emotive’ issue and there was a ‘need for wide community education and awareness, so that these issues [a treaty and indigenous parliamentary representation] cannot be turned into divisive diversions’ (huggins 2000, p.11). gatjil djerrkura, a former chairperson of atsic, similarly advocated the push for a treaty could damage reconciliation and that ‘a treaty should not be rushed’ (cited in balogh 2000, p.2). ray martin, another member of car, criticised the campaign for a treaty and promoted a nationalist line by stating that the wider community would not accept ‘the idea of special rights or privileges’ (cited in nason 2000a, p.4). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 45 the howard government likewise strongly rejected the campaign for a treaty. this approach was consistent with the howard government’s strong opposition to indigenous rights, including self-determination and native title. howard described the demands for a treaty as ‘very divisive’ (cited in saunders & nason 2000, p.1). howard argued, ‘a nation, an undivided nation, does not make a treaty with itself. i mean, to talk about one part of australia making a treaty with another part is to accept that we are in effect two nations’ (cited in wright & taylor 2000, p.2). saunders and nason reported that howard claimed that enacting a treaty could lead to ‘national separatism, land claims and litigation’ (saunders & nason 2000, p.1). in addition, the campaign for a treaty was rejected by other conservative political leaders around australia. the chief minister of the northern territory, denis burke, claimed the ‘aboriginal industry’ was ‘hijacking’ the reconciliation process and that it was a ‘disgraceful’ attempt to create separate indigenous states in northern australia (cited in nason & saunders 2000, p.4). the premier of western australia, richard court, expressed similar concerns, stating that ‘we don’t need a treaty, we are one country. a treaty has the real potential to divide, not unite’ (cited in nason & saunders 2000, p.4). some labor premiers were ambivalent about a treaty. the premier of queensland, peter beattie, refused to commit to a treaty and stated his cabinet would discuss the issue ‘to see how it could be effected’ (cited in nason & saunders 2000, p.4). the premier of victoria, steve bracks, similarly did not commit to a treaty and simply stated his government would ‘examine the proposed treaty’ (cited in nason & saunders 2000, p.4). another indigenous right discussed at the may 25 meeting with prime minister howard, namely addressing self-determination through reserving parliamentary seats for indigenous people, received a similarly negative reaction from political leaders. howard called the issue divisive and argued, ‘a large number of aboriginal and torres strait islanders would rather see themselves going into parliament as part of the australian community rather than through some kind of special reservation of parliamentary seats’ (cited in saunders 2000, p.2). the labor opposition federal leader, kim beazley, also disagreed with the idea and believed that increasing indigenous parliamentary participation could be achieved in the ‘normal way’ by political parties encouraging more indigenous candidates to run for election (cited in saunders 2000, p.2). 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 these reactions by many in the wider community to the idea of indigenous rights, such as a treaty and reserved indigenous seats, were criticised by pratt, elder and ellis: in so wholeheartedly and enthusiastically taking up the idea of reconciliation as the solution to the effects of colonial power relations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, non-indigenous peoples often slip quickly and unproblematically from solutions articulated by different indigenous communities and representatives, to actions that often fail to adequately address them. calls for a treaty between indigenous and non-indigenous people, for example, are often sidelined by government agendas that seek to minimise any shift in power relations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples (pratt, elder & ellis 2001, pp. 135-136). on 7 december 2000, the final report from car, reconciliation: australia’s challenge, was tabled in the commonwealth parliament. this report outlined the decade-long history of car and the formal reconciliation process. the report made six recommendations to the commonwealth parliament concerning the documents for reconciliation presented at corroboree 2000. of particular relevance to this paper were recommendation five that called on all australian parliaments to recognize that reconciliation would be advanced through treaties or agreements and recommendation six that called on the commonwealth parliament to pass legislation (car included draft legislation in their report) that would initiate a process to develop an agreement or a treaty (car 2000a, pp.105-106). further, although not specifically mentioned in car’s final report, the draft legislation developed by car included ‘a requirement that the prime minister commence negotiations with atsic to develop a process by way of a treaty or an agreement to address the unresolved issues of reconciliation’ (jonas 2001, p.198). interestingly, this emphasis by car on a treaty in their final report, which was almost entirely lacking during their ten-year existence, was, according to former atsic chairperson, lowitja o’donoghue, largely a result of the efforts of geoff clark, with the leadership of car, evelyn scott and gus nossal, opposing the reference to a treaty (nason 2000b, p.5; see nossal 2000, p.302). in discussing car’s final report, scott illustrated her lukewarm view of a treaty, merely commentating that ‘we must have a conversation about these issues’ (scott 2000b, p.13). in december 2000, car released four booklets that further detailed the national strategies contained in the roadmap for reconciliation. these booklets similarly failed to genuinely cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 47 address indigenous rights. overcoming disadvantage contained over 100 separate actions but generally did not examine rights such as customary law, land rights, a treaty or selfdetermination (car 2000d, pp.3-18). achieving economic independence largely did not address alternative entry programs in education, affirmative action in employment or indigenous rights to their land in accessing capital (car 2000e, pp.3-10). recognising aboriginal and torres strait islander rights excluded indigenous sovereignty in its discussions on self-determination and argued some indigenous rights could only be advanced ‘over the longer term’ (car 2000f, pp.3, 14). sustaining the reconciliation process recognised, to a limited extent, racism and inequality, yet predominantly focussed on education and symbolism, rather than on indigenous rights such as a treaty (car 2000g, pp.5-8, 23-25). after a delay of almost two years from car’s december 2000 report, the howard government finally released their response to the report in september 2002. the response was entitled commonwealth government response to the council for aboriginal reconciliation final report – reconciliation: australia’s challenge and outlined the government’s approach to each of the six recommendations contained in car’s final report. the most relevant responses of the government for this paper were those made in regard to the fifth and sixth recommendations. the howard government stated that while it supported some agreements, such as indigenous land use agreements on native title, it did not support the concept of a treaty because such a legally enforceable instrument, as between sovereign states would be divisive, would undermine the concept of a single australian nation, would create legal uncertainty and future disputation and would not best harness the positive environment that now exists in reconciliation. in fact, such a process could threaten that environment (commonwealth government 2002, p.23). in this paper, i examined the 1991-2000 formal reconciliation process in australia and the failure of this process and governments, particularly the howard government, to genuinely recognise indigenous rights. this failure occurred despite numerous indigenous leaders consistently advocating the need to recognise indigenous rights, including sovereignty, selfdetermination, a treaty, parliamentary representation, land rights and native title, throughout the reconciliation decade. 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 the recognition of indigenous rights would significantly address one of the key elements of reconciliation – that of justice. however, the 1991-2000 process focussed on other elements of reconciliation, particularly peace, forgiveness and repentance. subsequently, the reconciliation process, in failing to recognise indigenous rights and in marginalising the notion of justice, did not achieve its overall aim of reconciling indigenous and nonindigenous peoples by 2001 (see gunstone 2009). for any future reconciliation process in australia to have any chance of genuinely achieving a substantive reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, the reconciliation process must address the key element of justice by recognising those indigenous rights that have been demanded by indigenous leaders for decades. references agius, p., ah mat, r., djerrkura, g., dodson, p., dodson, m., fry, n., havnen, o., mansell, m., o’donoghue, l., perkins, c., ross, d., tanner, a., and yu, p. 1999, ‘media release 12 august 1999 – drop the preamble’, journal of australian indigenous issues, vol. 2, no. 3, p. 15. attwood, b. & markus, a. 1999, the struggle for aboriginal rights: a documentary history, allen and unwin, sydney. balogh, s. 2000, ‘reconcile now, treaty later’, the australian, 5 june 2000, p. 2. clark, g. 2000a, ‘not much progress’ in grattan, m. (ed), essays on australian reconciliation, bookman press, melbourne. clark, g. 2000b, ‘a treaty was always our aim’, the australian, 30 may 2000, p. 13. clark, g. 2000c, ‘we must now step up our struggle’, the age, 29 may 2000, p. 8. commonwealth government 2002, commonwealth government response to the council for aboriginal reconciliation act 1991 (cth). council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 1994, walking together: the first steps – report of the council for aboriginal reconciliation to federal parliament 1991-94, agps, canberra. council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 1997, walking together, no. 20. council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 1999, draft document for reconciliation – a draft for discussion by the australian people, canberra. council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 2000a, reconciliation, australia’s challenge – final report of the council for aboriginal reconciliation to the prime minister and the commonwealth parliament, canberra. council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 2000b, roadmap for reconciliation, canberra. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 49 council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 2000c, corroboree 2000: towards reconciliation, canberra. council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 2000d, overcoming disadvantage: ways to implement the national strategy to overcome disadvantage, one of four national strategies in the roadmap for reconciliation, canberra. council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 2000e, achieving economic independence: ways to implement the national strategy to achieve economic independence, one of four national strategies in the roadmap for reconciliation, canberra. council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 2000f, recognising aboriginal and torres strait islander rights: ways to implement the national strategy to promote recognition of aboriginal and torres strait islander rights, one of four national strategies in the roadmap for reconciliation, canberra. council for aboriginal reconciliation (car) 2000g, sustaining the reconciliation process: ways to implement the national strategy to sustain the reconciliation process, one of four national strategies in the roadmap for reconciliation, canberra. djerrkura, g. 1999, ‘indigenous peoples, constitutions and treaties: a dialogue on indigenous rights in the commonwealth’, london, 23 july 1999, london institute of commonwealth studies, http://www.atsic.gov.au/issues/indigenous_rights/international /archives/constitutions_and_treaties/londonshort_july1999.pdf , accessed september 9 2003. dodson, p. 1992, ‘comments on the reconciliation process’, aboriginal studies association, vol. 2, no. 1, pp.9-11. dodson, p. 2000, ‘lingiari: until the chains are broken’ in grattan, m. 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(ed), essays on australian reconciliation, bookman press, melbourne. gunstone, a. 2009, unfinished business: the australian formal reconciliation process (2nd edition), australian scholarly publishing, melbourne. huggins, j. 2000, ‘emotional thunder cracks unity’, the australian, 2 june 2000, p.11. jonas, w. 2001, social justice report 2001, human rights and equal opportunity commission, canberra. jopson, d. and metherell, m. 2000, ‘howard stands firm over treaty’, the sydney morning herald, 8 december 2000, p.7. keon-cohen, b. 2000, ‘the terms of a treaty’, the age, 1 june 2000, p. 17. mabo and others v queensland 1992, 66 aljr 408. mansell, m. 1992, ‘the court gives an inch but takes another mile’ in the aboriginal provisional government papers, volume 1, deep south sovereign publications, hobart. mansell, m. 1993, ‘australians and aborigines and the mabo decision: just who needs whom the most?’ in hocking, b. (ed), essays on the mabo decision, law book company, sydney. http://www.atsic.gov.au/issues/indigenous_rights/international%20/archives/constitutions_and_treaties/londonshort_july1999.pdf� http://www.atsic.gov.au/issues/indigenous_rights/international%20/archives/constitutions_and_treaties/londonshort_july1999.pdf� 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 mansell, m. 1994, ‘time for a new approach’, the weekend australian, 20-21 august 1994, p. 15. mansell, m. 1999, ‘forget the preamble – give us real rights’, journal of australian indigenous issues, vol. 2, no. 3, pp 18-19. mitchell, b. 2000, ‘indigenous leaders persist on treaty’, the australian, 6 june 2000, p. 2. monk, l. 2001, ‘self-determination, justice and australia in the new millennium’, journal of australian indigenous issues, vol. 4, no. 3, pp.13-28. mudrooroo 1995, us mob – history, culture, struggle: an introduction to indigenous australia, harpercollins, sydney. nason, d. 2000a, ‘behind the hijacking of corroboree 2000’, the weekend australian, 3-4 june 2000, pp.1, 4. nason, d. 2000b, ‘treaty inclusion a “victory” for clark’, the australian, 8 december 2000, p.5. nason, d. and saunders, m. 2000, ‘push for treaty “a disgrace”’, the australian, 29 may 2000, p.4. nettheim, g. 2000, ‘reconciliation: challenges for australian law’, australian journal of human rights, vol. 7, no. 1, pp.47-76. nossal, g. 2000, ‘symbolism and substance in the surge towards reconciliation’ in grattan, m. 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(eds), reconciliation, multiculturalism, identities: difficult dialogues, sensible solutions, common ground publishing, altona, victoria. reynolds, h. 1991, ‘who is reconciling whom and to what?’, australian society, june 1991, p.4. reynolds, h. 1996, aboriginal sovereignty: reflections on race, state and nation, allen and unwin, sydney. reynolds, h. 1998, ‘sovereignty’ in peterson, n. and sanders, w. (eds), citizenship and indigenous australians: changing conceptions and possibilities, cambridge university press, cambridge. roberts, d. 1993, ‘reconciliation and the mabo factor’, kaurna higher education journal, vol. 4, pp.16-24. roberts, f. 1992, ‘government approach is wrong’, twelve to twenty-five, vol. 2, no. 2, pp.4-5. saunders, m. 2000, ‘limited support for black seat quota’, the australian, 2 june 2000, p.2. saunders, m., kerin, j. and rintoul, s. 2000, ‘new backing for dodson’s treaty’, the weekend australian, 27-28 may 2000, p.4. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 51 saunders, m. and nason, d. 2000, ‘howard firm: no black treaty’, the australian, 30 may 2000, p.1. saunders, m. and rintoul, s. 2000, ‘reconciliation body warns on treaty’, the australian, 2 june 2000, p.1. scott, e. 1999, ‘the preamble – a small step for reconciliation’, journal of australian indigenous issues, vol. 2, no. 3, pp.16-17. scott, e. 2000a, ‘on the road to being reconciled’, the age, 9 june 2000, p.15. scott, e. 2000b, ‘the tide has turned’, the australian, 8 december 2000, p.13. seas and submerged lands case 1975, 135 clr 337, 388. taylor, k. 2000, ‘atsic head revives push for a treaty’, the age, 27 may 2000, p.10. walker, j. 1994, ‘autonomy a vital element for uniting the nation’, the weekend australian, 20-21 august 2000, p.14. wilson, j. 1991, ‘reconciliation or whitewash’, the koori mail, 4 december 2000, p.13. wright, t. and taylor, k. 2000, ‘pm rule out “divisive” treaty’, the age, 30 may 2000, p.2. 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia identities, aspirations and belonging of cosmopolitan youth in australia jock collins university of technology, sydney carol reid university of western sydney charlotte fabiansson university of western sydney abstract this article presents the results of a survey of the attitudes, aspirations and belonging of mainly immigrant minority youth living in western and south western sydney conducted in 2007 to provide some evidence to contest the populist view of immigrant youth as being a threat to australian society. rather the survey points to the very positive aspirations of sydney’s immigrant youth, their strong sense of having a positive future role in australian society, their sense of belonging and ownership of their neighbourhood. they live connected lives, with multicultural friendship networks rather than living their lives parallel to and separate from other youth. only one in three surveyed identify as ‘australian’, with most offering some hybrid-australian identity. the paper argues that a more cosmopolitan approach to multiculturalism would assist in valuing the globalised, fluid, hybrid identities of immigrant youth and assist in relieving the nationalist anxieties about australian cultural, linguistic and cultural diversity. introduction the australian population is one of the most cosmopolitan in the world today, a product of one of the world’s relatively largest and most diverse immigration policies and the great linguistic and cultural diversity of australia’s indigenous peoples. australia’s immigration policies have been very controversial, with critics from the right (blainey 1984; sheehan 1998; 2006) arguing that the increasing presence of immigrant minorities – that is, nonbritish and non-white immigrants – supported by multiculturalism will undermine social cohesion in australian society and lead to social conflict. the ongoing federal australian political storm to the 'boat people' issue highlights the undue sensitivity in australian politics and australian society to immigration and immigrant settlement policy. however, australia is not alone in experiencing heightened political debate about immigration issues. the central political plank of newly-resurgent right wing parties and politicians in european and north cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 93 america is opposition to immigrant minorities who have been increasingly linked to crime, criminal gangs and anti-social behaviour. central to this anti-immigration politics has been the argument that the values and identities of muslim immigrants in particular are not only incompatible with western society but a threat to it (huntington 1997; 2004). the ethnic diversity of sydney is the result of sustained waves of immigration. inter-ethnic relations and issues of social cohesion are of key concern in culturally diverse societies like australia (jupp and nieuwenhuysen 2007). although social conflict between young people of different ethnic backgrounds – as witnessed in the sydney cronulla beach riots – are the exception, not the rule (collins 2007), it is important to monitor the aspirations, attitudes and social interactions of young people in sydney. this is particularly the case in western and south-western sydney, the most culturally diverse region in sydney (collins and poynting 2000). the growing literature on ethnic youth gangs and criminal gangs highlights a major anxiety about the dangers that immigrant pose for western countries (van gemert, peterson, and lien 2008; decker, van gemert, and pyrooz 2009). this anxiety about ethnic gangs, particularly youth gangs, has also been prevalent in australia (white et al. 1999; collins et al. 2000; poynting et al. 2004; white 2008; collins and reid 2009; white 2009). the evidence on immigrant youth criminality and ethnic youth gangs is however weak. a moral panic about immigrant youth crime, the isolation of young people into ethnic enclaves and immigrant youth gangs is disproportionate to the reality in western societies, including australia, today. despite this, media discourses and political opportunism helps to build negative, stereotypical images of young people from minority backgrounds. the consequence is that this shifts the criminal gaze from individuals to whole communities in the form of a preoccupation with dysfunctional, disengaged minority cultures and, at the same time, directs attention away from policy responses rooted in the socio-economic disadvantage of minority youth evident in many western societies, including australia. understanding ethnic minority youth experiences involves the exploration of a wide range of institutional contexts within which young people find themselves. ethnic youth from particular cultures can experience problems of social adjustment stemming from the conflict of traditional cultural and family values with those of a secular, western society (hoerder, hébert, and schmitt 2006). issues of national identity have long been considered contentious 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 in multicultural society (parekh 2008) with the hybrid and fluid identities of immigrant youth a challenge to the overt nationalism underlying australian multiculturalism (hage 1988; butcher and thomas 2003; white 2008). to the critics of immigration and cultural diversity, ethnic minority youth in general and muslim youth in particular are viewed as a threat to future of western societies. cited as firm evidence for this argument about the inability of immigrant youth to identify with and integrate into the nations and neighbourhoods where they settle in a cohesive, inclusive way are the instances of inter-ethnic youth conflict in bradford, burnley, and oldham (2001-2), paris (2005), sydney (2005) over the past decade. the cantel report (2002) into the bradford, burnley, and oldham riots highlighted the segregation of minority youth and the separation in their daily lives from white youth, emphasising the ‘depth of polarisation’ between white and minority youth in britain, leading them to live disconnected ‘parallel lives’. loch (2009 p.5) argues that the paris riots can be interpreted as the tipping point from frustrated youth who have withdrawn from the labour market (more than 50 per cent of muslim youth in the banlieux were unemployed) and other society institutions from engagement to spontaneous, violent protest and disengagement from french society. while the riots in 2011 london and other british cities saw youth of all backgrounds – white and immigrant – rioting and looting, to conservatives these events confirm this view of immigrant minority youth as being anti-social and sources of conflict and violence (the guardian 2011). in this article we present the results of a survey of the attitudes, aspirations and belonging of mainly immigrant minority youth living in western and south western sydney to provide some evidence to contest the populist view of immigrant youth as being a threat to australian society. rather the survey points to the very positive aspirations of sydney’s immigrant youth, their strong sense of having a positive future role in australian society, their sense of belonging and ownership of their neighbourhood. they live connected lives, with multicultural friendship networks rather than living their lives parallel to and separate from other youth. this research, then, provides strong evidence that supports australian immigration and multiculturalism policy and undermines the fears and prejudices of the right wing critics of immigration and multiculturalism. the majority of the youth surveyed were born in australia – that is, were second generation immigrants – yet most reported cosmopolitan identities that were hybrid rather than “australian”. this reflected their diverse cultural heritage and their global connectedness through diasporic family networks and global cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 95 youth culture mediated through the internet and social media. this notion of immigrant youth having hybrid, fluid and cosmopolitan identities is not new in australia and is found in most western societies with significant immigrant youth minorities. it is not a threat to australian society but rather a reflection of the global dimensions of contemporary australian life for immigrant youth whose roots are found in all corners of the globe. yet the hyper-sensitivity to the issue of the identity of immigrant youth highlights that the political anxiety about australian cosmopolitanism and the inability of the current generation of political leaders to come to terms with the way that immigration has changed, and will continue to change, australian society. this research also has implications for current policy discussions about the future of australian multiculturalism and theoretical discussions about cosmopolitanism and its relevance to australia and other western and non-western societies. these issues will be explored in the final section of this paper. the structure of the article is as follows. section 2 outlines the methodology underlying the youth survey. section 3 outlines the main findings of the survey. section 4 returns to the themes of cosmopolitan youth and australian multiculturalism. methodology the survey of 340 youth – 144 (42.5 per cent) males and 195 (57.5 per cent) females – aged from 14 to 18 years inclusive was undertaken in western and south-western sydney in 2007. information about the everyday life of these young people, their community affiliations and their attitudes towards school and future prospects were explored. the survey sample was stratified to ensure that 80 per cent were from lote (languages other than english) background. the methodology employed for the survey was a networking methodology. people from each ethnic community were sought, in the first instance, to find and survey other young people from their community through their own social networks and, subsequently, via a process of snowballing. each part-time research assistant was asked to use his/her social networks to find 20 young people to be surveyed. we matched the interviewer to the gender and ethnic/cultural/language background of the young person to be interviewed. in many instances, the paid surveyor was known to the family of the youth to be interviewed or knew someone recommended the interviewer to the family. 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the interviews were confidential, with no identifiable personal information supplied on the completed questionnaire. prior to the interview, interviewees and their parents were informed about the project, and parents were asked to sign a permission form to acknowledge that they were informed about the project, that they understood its aims and that they gave their permission for the interview to be undertaken with their son or daughter. the young people were well established in their residential areas, with two thirds having lived there for more than five years. only a small group of young people had been living in their present community less than two years (15.7 per cent). the majority of the youths were familiar with the facilities and recreational possibilities offered by their community. the majority of youth surveyed – 74% of males and 61% of females were second generation immigrants, that is, born in australia but with one or both parents born overseas. others were born in new zealand, sudan, korean, sri lanka, india, south korea, china, england and tonga. only 4.3 per cent of the mothers (table 1) and 4.4 per cent of the fathers (table 2) were born in australia. table 1 country of birth of young people’s mothers in relation to gender 1 mothers born in malaysia, greece, egypt, new zealand, italy, fiji, croatia, south africa, west papua, england mother’s country of birth males females total per cent per cent per cent/n tonga 23.9 26.8 25.6/71 (south) korea 16.5 11.9 13.7 /38 lebanon 11.0 10.7 10.8/30 sudan 5.5 13.7 10.5/29 sri lanka 8.3 7.7 7.9/22 vietnam 10.1 4.8 6.9/19 china 5.5 5.4 5.4/15 australia 3.7 4.8 4.3/12 india 4.6 2.4 3.2/9 turkey 2.8 3.6 3.2/9 hong kong 5.5 1.2 2.9/8 other1 2.8/3 7.1/12 5.4/15 total 100.0/109 100.0/168 100.0/277 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 97 the largest group of mothers were born in tonga (25.6 per cent) followed by korea (11.2 per cent), lebanon (10.8 per cent) and sudan (10.5 per cent). the largest group of fathers were also was born in tonga (24.5 per cent), followed by korea (11.3 per cent) sudan (10.9 per cent) and lebanon (10.6 per cent). this relatively large tongan sample emerged as a result of finding it difficult to secure the number of surveys required. the research assistant interviewing tongan ethnic groups additionally had the ability to tap into a larger pool of respondents. it was decided that a large group of tongans allowed for experimentation with fieldwork options in this pilot survey. future research anticipates the addition of focus group discussions to the survey instrument in order to drill deeper into underlying social dynamics. table 2 country of birth of the young people’s father in relation to gender findings the young people who identified as ‘anglo’ – the largest group in the sample – stated that the majority of their friends came from australia (44), followed by tonga (31), lebanon (27), parts of asia (16), as well as china (16) and korea (11). the second largest group was from new zealand. the majority of their friends were tongan (16), asian (3) and islander (2). the sudanese had the majority of their friends among australians and among other 2 fathers born in malaysia, england, america, bangladesh, greece, fiji, germany, south africa, png father’s country of birth males females total per cent per cent per cent/n tonga 22.4 25.7 24.5/67 korea/ south korea 16.8 12.0 13.9/38 sudan 5.6 14.4 10.9/30 lebanon 11.2 10.2 10.6/29 sri lanka 7.5 7.8 7.7/21 vietnam 9.3 6.0 7.3/20 china 6.5 4.8 5.5/15 australia 3.7 4.8 4.4/12 india 6.5 2.4 4.0/11 turkey 2.8 3.6 3.3/9 hong kong 3.7 .6 1.8/5 new zealand .9 2.4 1.8/5 other2 2.8/3 5.4/9 4.4/12 total 100.0/107 100.0/167 100.0/274 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 sudanese (both 5), but also among the lebanese (3) and indian (3). even if the respondents were most inclined to have friends who shared their own national identity, they did have friends from other ethnic groups. the group of young people who indicated that they did not have any friends are proportionally largest among the korean (11.8 per cent), followed by the sudanese (8 per cent), new zealanders (7.7 per cent) and the australians (4.1 per cent). thus, loneliness is more prevalent among the non-australian born youths. the issue of national identity among minority youth in australian multicultural society has long been contentious (castles, kalantzis, cope & morrissey, 1988; sheehan 1998; hage, 1998; castles, 2000). critics of immigration in western societies worry that immigrants from different cultural, linguistic and religious backgrounds will not fit in to, and identify with, their new host society. two thirds of the young people were born in australia and it would be anticipated that they would feel ‘australian’. however, less than half of the respondents felt ‘australian’ (48.5 per cent). about a quarter sometimes felt ‘australian’ (table 3). one in twenty rarely felt ‘australian’ and a fifth of the young people did not really feel ‘australian’ at all. this supports the argument that minority youth in sydney have diverse and multiple identities, as noted by butcher and thomas (2003), who also interviewed young people in western sydney and found that they forged hybrid identities that incorporate their migrant identities with elements of ‘being australian’. hall’s notion that ethnicity is an invention by the self and in relation to, and by, others (hall, 1987; 1992; 1996) is also useful in understanding this contradiction. that is, we would expect that identity is fluid but also that choices are not available to all equally. table 3 feeling ‘australian’ in relation to gender feeling ‘australian’ males females total per cent per cent per cent/n yes, australian 51.4 46.4 48.5/162# sometimes i feel australian 25.7 23.2 24.3/81 rarely 3.6 5.7 4.8/16 no, not really 19.3 24.7 22.5/75 total 100.0/140 100.0/194 100.0/334 pearson chi-square level of significance: strong ≥.001***, moderate ≥.001-.009**, weak ≥.01-.05*, # difference not significant. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 99 the males (51.4 per cent) indicated that they felt more ‘australian’ than the females (46.4 per cent). a quarter of the females rarely felt ‘australian’. the difference between the genders, however, was not markedly significant. the young people were asked if the australian flag was important to them (table 4). approximately two thirds of the youths thought the flag was important often or sometimes important (69.1 per cent). nearly one fifth of the males and fewer of the females thought that the flag was never important. there was no significant difference between genders. table 4 importance of the australian flag in relation to gender importance of australian flag males females total per cent per cent per cent/n yes, often 38.9 36.9 37.8/128# sometimes 32.6 30.3 31.3/106 rarely 10.4 16.4 13.9/47 no, never 18.1 16.4 17.1/58 total 100.0/144 100.0/195 100.0/339 pearson chi-square level of significance: strong ≥.001***, moderate ≥.001-.009**, weak ≥.01-.05*, # difference not significant. the young people were asked what the australian flag meant to them (table 5). the most common response was that it was an “australian symbol” (70). it also “represents the australian people”, “patriotism” (66), “being australian” (35), “respect” (33) and “freedom” (31). there was a group of young people, however, who thought the flag did not represent anything (66). taken with responses to questions about national identity this suggests fluidity in subjective belonging: there are moments when minority youth do not feel australian or identify with the flag but at other times they do, particularly if they belong to transnational communities (baldasser, 1997). 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 table 5 what the australian flag means to the young people meaning of the australian flag n meaning of the australian flag n australian symbol 70 peace 13 it is just a flag/nothing much 66 better opportunities 12 our people/patriotism/courage 66 colours/ southern cross/stars 10 being australian 35 democracy/ duty/obligation to laws/politics 10 respects 33 history/heritage 8 freedom/independence 31 living in a good country 6 britain/commonwealth 15 honesty 4 multiculturalism 15 security 3 unity 15 same as the aboriginal flag 1 belonging 14 white country 1 a flag to be respected 14 sport 1 total n 443 we also explored the degree to which these minority youth trust other people and found that most have low expectations in trusting people: only one fifth of the youths felt that people could ‘always’ be trusted, about half of them felt that people could ‘sometimes’ be trusted and one in ten thought people could ‘never’ be trusted, with no significant difference in this regard evident for young men and young women. the levels of trust the young people are expressing are lower than the levels of trust expressed by rural young people, who were asked the same question in 2003 (fabiansson, 2006). it might be concluded that these findings are supportive of notions that minority youth live parallel lives to other majority youth; that they do not identify with or engage with mainstream, white, australian society, and that therein lays an explanation for their (occasional) criminality or anti-social behaviour. such a simplistic conclusion is undermined by other findings from the sydney survey. the first is the finding that most of the young people surveyed felt good about living in australia, like living in their sydney suburb and felt that they belong in local neighbourhoods. two in three young people reported “often feeling good about living in australia” and another one in four young people reported “sometimes cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 101 feeling good about living in australia. on the other hand, one in three males and one in four females ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ felt ownership of their local area, as table 6 shows. table 6 ownership of the local place in relation to gender ownership of the local place males females total per cent per cent per cent/n yes, often 37.8 34.7 36.0/121# sometimes 30.8 40.4 36.3/122 rarely 10.5 11.9 11.3/38 no, never 21.0 13.0 16.4/55 total %/ n 100.0/143 100.0/193 100.0/336 pearson chi-square level of significance: strong ≥.001***, moderate ≥.001-.009**, weak ≥.01-.05*, # difference not significant. nor are these minority youth isolated from other youth. most youth we surveyed have multicultural social networks, evidence that the underlying social cohesion of inter-ethnic youth relations is quite strong in sydney, notwithstanding the rather exceptional events at cronulla beach in december 2005. the sudanese youth surveyed, for example, had as friends ‘australian’, lebanese and indian youth as well as sudanese. what these youth most liked about their local area were their social networks and social environment that they found there. when asked to identify “australian values” (table 7), the minority youth listed (in order of frequency) friendship (98), honesty (80), trust (63), family (61), respect (60), loyalty (45), your own personality (41), religion (39), love (32), school, education, knowledge and intelligence (32). disconnection with schooling is as a key aspect of the social exclusion of immigrant minorities (reid, 2009). most of the youth surveyed seemed to connect with their school. about half of the females (52.1%) and two in five males (42.4%) reported that they felt valued ‘often’, with only one in ten males (9.7%) one in fifty young women feeling that they were not valued at school. the youth surveyed demonstrated strong aspirations and a confidence about their future in australia. the preferred future occupation for young people was to be a medical doctor or work within the medical field (31). this was followed by being a teacher either at school or pre-school level (30). this was followed by an artistic profession (17), lawyer (15) or an accountant (15) related occupation. mechanics and working within the building industry were 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the other most often chosen occupations. it is one thing to have strong aspirations, and another to think that these aspirations will be fulfilled. accordingly, the young people in the research were asked how successful they thought they would be in achieving their preferred occupation, which can express their confidence in their present situation and hope for the future. the results showed that females (49.0 per cent) were more confident in their ability to achieve their preferred occupation than males (39.8 per cent). only a few of the youths expressed pessimism about their chances of achieving their preferred occupation in the future. table 7 important values for young people important values n important values n friendship 98 cultural values 11 honesty 80 equal rights 11 trust 63 acceptance/opportunities 11 family 61 humour 6 respect 60 generosity 5 loyalty/sharing 45 safety /security 4 personality 41 good listener 3 religion/christian values 39 good looking 3 school/education/knowledge/intelligence 32 happiness 3 love 32 good/ nice 3 kindness 21 integrity 2 peace 20 material goods/money 2 caring/compassion 18 elders 2 freedom/ freedom of speech 18 work ethics 2 morals 14 food 2 reliability 12 sport 1 total n 725 discussion the research outlined in this paper presents findings that are at odds with the increasing anxiety about the dangers to australian society of a large scale, non-discriminatory and increasingly non-british immigration policy – an anxiety manifest in the disproportionate hysteria from both major political parties about a few thousand boat arrivals – and the fears that immigrant youth from minority backgrounds will undermine australia’s future and generate conflict. it is often difficult to point to data and evidence that confirms that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 103 australian cosmopolitan society is working well, against the odds. sensationalist media concentrates on the controversies related to ethnic crime, the cronulla riots, and the boat people. in the main, media images of people of ethnic, cultural, and/or religious diversity are associated with those of social conflict and social problem. results from the survey of mainly first and second generation immigrant youth, presented above, suggest that contemporary cosmopolitan youth in western and south-western sydney are not disaffected, isolated, fearful and angry but that they are, in the main, hopeful and optimistic, that they experience the sensation of ‘belonging’ to their western and south-western sydney suburbs in which they live with a majority of their culturally-diverse friends. they generally feel safe, and they feel good about living in australia. they hold strongly to values of family, friendship, loyalty and trust. but only one in three surveyed identify as ‘australian’, with most offering some hybridaustralian identity. this is common across all western countries, and should not be a concern, reflecting the diverse family connections past, present and future of immigrant youth. yet it was this finding that many first and second generation immigrant youth did not identify as solely as australian that is most controversial. immigrant identity is clearly a very sensitive issue to australian policy makers responsible for immigration settlement and the policy of multiculturalism that still frames australian settlement policy and programs. to fixate on this aspect of the research, despite many findings such as positive responses to questions related to aspiration, belonging and values of the immigrant youth informants in western and south-western sydney, reveals a federal government anxiety about the relationship between immigration, multiculturalism and australian nationalism. most do not feel as safe in other parts of sydney as they do in their local neighbourhoods. impressions of confronting racism and prejudice in their lives endure, alongside networks of cross-cultural friendships. most are not sure that people outside their social networks can be trusted. importantly, there is the belief that another riot is possible and that we need to be alert to these dynamics, particularly in schools. the overwhelming sense that emerges from this research is that contemporary cosmopolitan young people in western and south-western sydney tend to live their days feeling that they belong in australia and in their neighbourhood, that they are valued by friends and family, and that they have prospects of achieving their post-school occupation ambitions. the two days of the cronulla riots (social conflict) were an aberration: the daily life of relatively harmonious inter-ethnic youth relations for the remaining days over the past two years (social cohesion) constitute the norm (collins and reid 2009). 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 however surveys are limited in their scope, providing a social snapshot at one point of time. this research needs to be complemented by larger scale longitudinal surveys in order to the track youth attitudes, experiences, aspirations and opinions over time and qualitative research methodologies designed to better probe the complexities of identities and belonging of first and second generation immigrant youth in australia. as tabar, noble and poynting (2010: 12) in their research on australians of a lebanese background point out, identities are not simply symbolic entities through which we represent ourselves and others, but identity embodies practices of identification and adaptation deploying particular kinds of resources through which we position ourselves in diverse social domains. this is, of course, no simple act of will, for those resources are shaped by our histories, which are classed, gendered and racialised, and those processes of positioning are met by the acts of others who often have greater power to reject, validate or reshape those practices. this suggests that there is much more to be investigated about immigrant youth identity than our survey questions can identify. but cosmopolitan youth identities should not be seen as a threat to australian society or australian nationalism, unless that vision of the australian nation is constructed through the prism of british whiteness and the symbol of the australian flag constructed through the drunken, racist, lens of the white australian male youth bashing those perceived as middle eastern at cronulla beach in december 2005 (noble 2009). this suggests that there is a need to move from static, stereotyped and essentialist notions of ethnicity that have characterised the philosophy and practice of australian multiculturalism in the past and recognise the fluidity and global connectedness, alliances and identities of contemporary immigrant communities in australia, particularly of first and second generation youth. we would argue that an australian multiculturalism that is developed to embody more explicitly and enthusiastically elements of cosmopolitanism would assist in moving forward on issues related to immigrant identity and other practices that constrain australia’s ability to embrace the cultural, linguistic and religious diversity that characterises the nation’s people. here we envisage a development which marries the commitments of programs and services of multiculturalism with anti-racism to reduce the extent of migrant social inclusion with a more globally-oriented understanding of identity and belonging in a form of cosmopolitanism (delanty 2009, pp.132-156) that would be more relevant to australian ethnic and cultural cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 105 diversity in the twenty-first century. this could also assist in overcoming one of australian multiculturalism’s key contradictions: that it has not sufficiently engaged the mainstream, dominant anglo australian community. this is because the focus of australian multiculturalism would shift from being concerned only with ethnic minorities to being concerned with all australians living in an increasing globalised world. it would also assist in valuing the globalised, fluid, hybrid identities of immigrant youth, shoring up their subjective inclusion in the nation and in the communities that they live their daily lives. moreover, australian multiculturalism has always had a problem about the place of indigenous australians in the multicultural nation, a problem also indentified in the canadian case (kymlicka 1995). the rudd labor government’s apology to australia’s indigenous peoples makes it now possible to develop a more cosmopolitan approach to multiculturalism that is inclusive of all australians and permit new bridges in inclusion to be built between indigenous, minority immigrant and majority anglo-australian communities. as delanty (2009, p.156) argues, “instead of presupposing discrete cultural groups, as in liberal multiculturalism, a cosmopolitan perspective requires the internal transformation of all groups in a process of ongoing deliberation and interpretation”. at the same time, racism is the social cancer of culturally-diverse societies. while australian multiculturalism has been more effective in embracing anti-racist elements than british multiculturalism, racism is persistent and enduring in australia and other western countries, with indigenous and immigrant minorities the main casualties and social exclusion in everyday life the main consequence. since cosmopolitanism “is not merely about the plurality of cultures but more about the embracing of difference and the search for an alternative political order” (delanty 2009, p.150), a cosmopolitan multiculturalism moves the political community from a liberal notion of tolerance and harmony – which both exaggerates and stereotypes cultural differences and sweeps racism under the carpet – to a cosmopolitan political culture that can more directly address, and track, racism and racial discrimination. references baldassar, l. 1997, `home and away: migration, the return visit and "transnational" identity’, communal plural home, displacement, belonging, vol. 5, pp. 69-94 blainey, g. 1984, all for australia. methuen, sydney. butcher, m. & thomas, m. 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(eds.) 2006, negotiating transcultural lives: belongings and social capital among youth in comparative perspective, university of toronto press, toronto. huntington, s. 1997, the clash of civilisations and the remaking of the world order, simon & schuster, new york. huntington, s. 2004, who are we? the challenges to america’s national identity, simon & schuster, new york. jupp, j and nieuwenhuysen, j (eds.) 2007, social cohesion in australia, cambridge university press, cambridge. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/08/london-riots-brixton-editorial� http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/aug/08/london-riots-brixton-editorial� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 107 kymlicka, w. 1995, multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights, oxford university press, oxford. loch, d. 2009, ‘immigrant youth and urban riots: a comparison of france and germany’, journal of ethnic and migration studies, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 791-814. noble, greg 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and differential policing in australia: the good, the bad and the ugly’, journal of international migration and integration, vol.10, no.4, pp.359-375. white, r, 2008, ‘disputed definitions and fluid identities: the limitations of social profiling in relation to ethnic youth gangs’, youth justice, vol.8, no.2, pp.149-161. white, r., perrone, s., guerra, c., and lampugnani, r. 1999, ethnic youth gangs in australia: do they exist, australian multicultural foundation, melbourne. http://www.umsl.edu/~ccj/images/streetgangs.jpg� identities, aspirations and belonging of cosmopolitan youth in australia jock collins charlotte fabiansson 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia chinese australian urban politics in the context of globalisation jen tsen kwok the university of queensland abstract globalisation and the rise of east asia have accelerated the migration of chinese populations across the asiapacific rim. ethnic chinese populations from highly diverse sub-ethnic, socio-economic and political backgrounds are increasingly aggregated in major cities throughout the region. nonetheless, there remains insufficient attention to the implications of greater economic interdependence and accelerated population movement upon the political cultures of host nations such as australia, especially in the context of ensuing spatial and economic concentrations of activity. both articulate and interlocking relationships between political and economic fields exist in the metropolitan engagements of chinese australian community groups and associations. many of these political dimensions extend into ‘formal’ modes of politics. framed by urban regime theory and the broader notion of urban politics, this paper claims that network resource exchange within chinese australian communities are tied to ethnic economies, and in certain contexts global processes. these kinds of social dynamics have implications for the expression of diasporic chinese affinity and constructions of chineseness. explorations of transnational political tensions, in fact, highlight the diversity and potential fragility of diasporic interdependence within ethnic chinese communities – communities that are persistently refashioned through new waves of migration and from different points of origin. this paper seeks to advance these perspectives through a case study of a particular period of tension between two representative peak bodies in brisbane, queensland. grounded in the testimony of elite political actors, it reflects upon the nature of ethnic chinese community representation in contemporary australia. globalisation is at play through the increasing rapidity of movement of peoples across countries and the increasing presence of non-permanent political actors in the australian labour market and polity. in recognising some of the implications of globalisation for economic systems, it becomes necessary to investigate how cities integrate and harness radically mobile formations of domestic and transnational capital, along with social agents who are heavily engaged in transnational economic flows. the relationship between global processes and ‘ethnic’ or ‘enclave’ economies can be understood through the evolving scholarship on chinatowns. in particular, the development of concepts such as the ‘ethnoburb’ (li 1998, 2006) and the ‘ethnopolis’ (laguerre 2000) have re-characterised ethnic enclaves as anchors for global processes and global cities as aggregations of transnational niches (kwok 2008, 469). re-characterisation of the enclave economy also implies the need to pay greater attention to the role of urban politics in providing processes of engagement between social agents embedded in these networks with those engaged in domestic political cultures (stoker 1998, 126). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 87 such an approach recognises the complex interdependence between political and economic settings, and expresses an interest in chinese involvement in australian politics in a sense that is neither confined to ‘formal’ (lam 2004) nor ‘conventional’ (barnes, kaase & allerbeck 1979) forms of political participation. instead of approaching ‘the political’ through an interest in electoral politics or the mobilisation of community groups and interests, this paper is focused at the interactions between social agents who operate through the apparatus of government. our concern remains with the nature of australian citizenship as experienced by social agents from minority perspectives, but turns to their differentiated experiences of the australian political system. during an epoch of unprecedented global mobility, analysing chinese australian social agents and community organisations through such a lens repositions ethnicity-based community and civic formations as potentially classstratified through differentiated economic and transnational mobilities (zhou & lin 2005). the terrain of this discourse is a particular urban political approach called urban regime theory, what clarence stone defined as ‘the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions’ (1989, p.229). it should be emphasised that the usefulness of urban regime theory arises here for very specific reasons. certainly, it does not presume that network arrangements – which tie social agents from enclave economies and from political parties (or government) together – are regimes in the sense that they lead to comprehensive influence, or control of political decision-making. urban regime theory is useful for other reasons (see stoker 1998, mossberger & stoker 2001, p.813). the first reason is that an urban regime approach recognises the significance of informal networks rather than formal institutions; it thus looks to comprehend the structural bridges between public control of government and private control of economic resources. the second reason is that, while regime arrangements depend upon active collaboration, it assumes stable and durable relationships between urban elites and political actors (spanning successive governments) can be built, especially where they are tied together through global flows. the third reason is that urban regime theory denotes the significance of each particular metropolitan context. implications for the relevant political culture by such arrangements become defined through network participants, and may be distinct in character depending upon the metropolitan location. more broadly, an urban regime approach theorises cultural formations with urban density in mind, acknowledging the city as the domain where the citizenship and identity claims of groups are recurrently, and in some instances, competitively articulated. in addition, the 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 spatial dimensions of interaction, between community or business leaders and formal political agents, recognises that much of the capacity in developing mechanisms of political access and transnational engagement requires support and endorsement by political decision-makers and authoritative bodies, at the state and local government level. such an approach is guided by saskia sassen’s (1991, 2006) research on the competition between global cities as nodes of the global economy, in particular, her analysis in relation to the transforming role of government. this trend she captures through the phrase denationalisation – a phenomenon that has occurred deep inside the nation-state gearing political authority towards global economic engagement. these dynamics have important implications for citizenship and political inclusion from the vantage point of community politics and representation. it brings into stark relief the function of chinese community leaders as cultural and political intermediaries; in particular, their capacity to distribute what lake and huckfeldt (1998) describe as politically-relevant social capital through their commitment to greater civic engagement. in this paper, i intend to explore the civic significance of urban politics through a case study that involves the competition for public legitimacy by two umbrella organisations in brisbane, beginning near the end of 2005. the organisations involved were the queensland chinese forum (qcf) and the queensland chinese uniting council (qcuc).1 this case study, in addition, demonstrates the potential relevance and impact of sub-ethnic diversity in shaping competing transnational political orientations at the urban political level. chinese australian urban politics amidst brisbane’s demographic heterogeneity numerous metropolitan locations around the globe support highly heterogeneous diasporic chinese populations. in australia, the diversification in nations of origin for chinese migrants is evident following the colombo plan (1949-57), the abandonment of the white australia policy (1973) and the rise of multicultural australia (ho & kee 1988; kee 1988; ho & coughlan 1997). in thinking about the political formations of chinese australian actors and communities, what requires further attention is what happens when diverse populations – each who claim, or are identified through, chinese ethnicity – are brought or bound together. 1 interview testimony in this paper has been extracted from a sample of 46 de-identified interviews collected between september 2005 and june 2007 for a doctoral thesis on the legislative recruitment and political incorporation of chinese australians. the interviews with qld parliamentarians, political candidates, academics and community leaders occurred throughout this period of time. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 89 though there has been a continuous chinese presence in queensland since the 1840s, the modern demographic landscape begins after the introduction of australian multiculturalism, in the late 1970s when the first waves of migration from indochina and vietnam reached brisbane (ip 2005, p.68). following the birth of organisations in the late 1970s and early 1980s – such as the chinese ethnic broadcasting association of queensland, the cathay community association (formerly the cathay club), and the chinese-language newspaper queensland asian business weekly – there has been a significant expansion of community associations. there has been, for instance, a proliferation of chinese-language newspapers; of organisational purposes extending from the buddha’s light international association to chinese christian churches; as well as a diversification of sub-ethnic associations from the taiwan friendship society to the mainland chinese society of queensland. though the queensland multicultural resource directory remains a highly fraught document (not the least since its chinese listings exclude taiwanese associations), it contained no less than 70 ethnic chinese organisations in 2006-7 (maq 2009). let us spend a moment comparing patterns of sub-ethnic chinese diversity between the national context and brisbane. the 2006 australian bureau of statistics (abs) census reintroduced a formulation of the ‘ancestry’ category in an attempt to better aggregate migrant populations based upon ethnicity rather than mere language competence.2 2 abs, 2006, 2914.0 2006 census of population and housing fact sheets, (http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/latestproducts/2914.0main%20features235002006?opendocument&tabname= summary&prodno=2914.0&issue=2006&num=&view=, retrieved 10 november 2010) it is not the purpose of this article to theorise about the robustness of the new category as a proxy for the inclusion of australian-born chinese. however, the category does enable us to analyse australians who claim chinese ancestry based upon country of origin. chart 1, derived from the abs census figures, indicates that in 2006 there were more chinese australians born in china than there were born in australia. the chart accentuates that the largest sub-ethnic communities were the mainland chinese (30%), the hong kong and malaysian chinese (10%), followed by the vietnamese chinese (6%), the singaporean, indonesian and taiwanese chinese (4% each). 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 data source: 2006 abs census of population and housing comparing the national distribution to brisbane, chart 2 suggests that though the australian (21%), hong kong (11%), malaysian (8%), singaporean (4%), vietnamese (5-6%), and filipino (1%) populations were similar, there were significantly less mainland chinese (22% not 30%) and significantly more taiwanese (17% not 4%) in brisbane. there was also no notable cambodian or thai chinese presence, though there was an identifiable papua new guinean chinese community (3%). data source: 2006 abs census of population and housing australia total 23% other 6% papua new guinea 0% cambodia 1% thailand 1% viet nam 6% indonesia 4% malaysia 10% philippines 1% singapore 4% china (excludes sars and taiwan province) 30% hong kong (sar of china) 10% macau (sar of china) 0% taiwan 4% chart 1 birthplace of people from chinese australian ancestry national australia total 21% other 6%papua new guinea 3% cambodia 0% thailand 0% viet nam 5% indonesia 2%malaysia 8% philippines 1% singapore 4% china (excludes sars and taiwan province) 22% hong kong (sar of china) 11% macau (sar of china) 0% taiwan 17% chart 2 birthplace of people from chinese australian ancestry brisbane cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 91 the academic literature recognises the concentration of taiwanese migration to brisbane with queensland being the state most populated by taiwan-born chinese, a trend that has emerged since the mid 1990s (ip, wu & inglis 1998; ip 2001; chiang & hsu 2005). the concentration of taiwanese chinese in brisbane is notable in terms of the potential impact upon transnational political issues, particularly the ‘cross-strait’ issue (lien 2006). cross-strait or taiwan-strait tensions refer to the international uncertainty over taiwan’s claims to independence from mainland china and the prospects and conditions for taiwan’s reunification. though it has often been construed as a matter of national identity, the primacy of this issue in taiwanese democratic politics is entrenched by taiwan’s democratisation (wu 2005), and the different stances of taiwan’s two leading political parties, the kuomintang (kmt) and the democratic progressive party (dpp). the kmt, taiwan’s oldest political party, whose origins lie in the democratic philosophies of dr sun yat-sen, has progressively transformed its position on taiwanese independence. this has emerged through political events such as the ‘pan-blue’ or kmt delegation that visited mainland china in 2005 (including the fivepoint consensus signed on 29 april 2005 by both hu jintao and former kmt chairman lien chan on behalf of the kmt opposition), and more recently the chen-chiang summits and the cross-straits economic trade and culture forum. in contrast, the dpp, whose establishment in 1986 followed taiwan’s democratisation in the early 1980s, has maintained a longstanding commitment to taiwanese independence, a commitment that has been gradually nuanced according to the ‘special relationship’ between taiwan and mainland china, as much as its opposition to the one china policy. legitimation crisis: the qcf versus qcuc dispute amidst brisbane’s demographic landscape the queensland chinese forum (qcf) has existed in various forms since 1984, but was only formally incorporated in 1995. though some delegates claimed it operated merely as a liaison group between organisations, qcf has sat at the apex of a changeable consortium of community-based, largely non-profit associations, located mostly in metropolitan brisbane. it is what is commonly referred to as a ‘peak’ or ‘umbrella’ organisation, established to provide a space for community associations to engage with one another, and an entity to act on behalf of the queensland chinese community as a whole. 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 thus the establishment of the queensland uniting chinese council (qcuc) in late 2005 was significant because it initiated what jurgen habermas (1975) once described as a ‘legitimation crisis’ – a crisis over the capacity of qcf to coordinate dialogue and act on behalf of queensland chinese communities. in utilising habermas’s phrase, it is understood that he looked at legitimation specifically in relation to state governance and theorised about the role of a cultural system of legitimation necessary to elicit mass loyalty from citizens. nonetheless, the phrase maintains a more general meaning. it also represents a situation where a governing structure retains formal authority to govern, but is not able to demonstrate that its practical operation fulfils its intended end. it is meant in this sense here. the competition between these organisations for endorsement, by the queensland state government and the mainland chinese consulate in brisbane, represented a substantial fracture in the urban politics of chinese communities in queensland. in this dispute, allegations were made that qcf had provided inadequate community leadership. according to some this was for more than a decade. its alleged precarious reputation was apparent in its incapacity to manage sub-ethnic political tensions; in particular, its alleged failure to accommodate greater mainland chinese integration into its membership structure. m, a qcf delegate intimated: i’m also aware of now, through qcf, there’s official difference (of) opinion between the taiwanese group and the pro-china group. and i think we’re at the moment (in) a bit of a stew because the mainland china group wants to join qcf and so the current taiwanese ones want to back off. g suggested that the cross-strait issue had been an important source of political fragmentation amongst chinese associations in queensland, ‘even now there’s already a split, in regards to taiwan, chinese, and mainland chinese. there’s already a split there’. h agreed, ‘i mean, you can see a lot of activity will be totally organised and involved by one community and it’s the other community will not be involved in it. and this is one thing which qcf is going to overcome’. some attributed this fracture to an aggressive pro-independence stance held by certain groups within the taiwanese community. g suggested, ‘you know, we got some right-wing chinese from taiwan that is influencing others. just one of those sad things to see happen. but what can we do? except to try to pacify them, and try and work together with them as best as we could.’ others attributed it to competition amongst political party intermediaries for the support of sub-ethnic factions. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 93 qcf’s domestic focus notably constrained its capacity to manage cross-strait tensions, with key qcf delegates emphasising that member organisations needed to set their transnational politics aside. h confirmed that qcf’s focus upon domestic issues meant that it refused to take sides in the cross-strait issue: being the chinese community (it) is inevitable that some of our people in queensland are also active in terms of the political activity between mainland china and taiwan… this has been debated and discussed in qcf many, many times. and we make it quite clear that qcf are not, or will not, be involved in the political activity between mainland china and taiwan. others such as e emphasised a role for a peak body in managing the potential scope of this conflict: ‘eventually some issue will divide the chinese community up into parts, like if there was someone stupid enough to push a button across the chinese strait. that will immediately divide the chinese community within an hour… within an hour of that happen segregation instated (sic). how do we manage that as a community?’ in contrast, counter-allegations claimed that qcuc’s aims were almost exactly the same as qcf, and that it was initiated by a small group of community leaders with the intention of competing and eventually replacing the existing peak body. the prominent if not dominant role of mainland chinese migrants in the qcuc also raised questions about the organisation’s capacity to host dialogue on cross-strait matters. comparison of the organisational aims strongly suggests that qcuc was started with the intention of competing for the peak representative role (qcf 2006; qcuc 2005). some explicit differences are evident in organisational structure. the constituting documents confirm that qcf membership depended upon delegates from member associations. where qcf’s organisational structure primarily supports and enhances the capacity of associational leaders, qcuc could be considered more structurally inclusive as it also supports individual membership. the wording and priority of the two aims and objectives also highlight some divergence in organisational priorities. where qcf’s first political commitment is to the interests of ethnic chinese organisations on domestic matters, qcuc’s is more explicitly guided by the principles of better intra-organisational communication and the advancement of chinese culture. former president, dr su mingxian, also publicly argued that qcf had not been adequate in developing chinese diasporic political strength – defining a major purpose for the new qcuc as lifting the engagement of young people in the political process and increasing the number of chinese australians involved in australian politics. 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 reflecting upon the significance of cross-strait tensions in brisbane, it is important to recognise how poorly the symbolic ties of chineseness constitute space for political solidarity. this is not only a dynamic problematised by the interactions between chinese and host populations, but a reflection of the diversity of political attitudes based upon chinese migration patterns themselves. the transnational dimensions of the cross-strait issue in brisbane might be described as a kind of ‘expanded transnationalism’ (vertovec 2009, p.18), resounding in political effects not only between taiwanese chinese and mainland chinese migrants, but with diffuse and uneven implications for enclave networks and the ‘interlocking leadership’ structures that flemming christiansen (2003) described as emerging out of the associational system (119). organisational competition based upon political access the case study is significant because the focus upon political capacity-building by qcuc meant that political engagement became a key area regarding the legitimation of qcf’s peak status. qcuc had successfully invited ethnic chinese political representatives, such as state alp member for capalaba, michael choi, and federal liberal member for ryan, michael johnson, to qcuc as honorary patrons. this delivered the organisation important symbolic legitimacy and put into context the 2007 conference hosted by the qcf, called australian chinese, australian politics. this conference, held at state parliament, effectively reinforced qcf’s peak body legitimacy by providing a platform for not only choi and johnson but coalition leader, dr bruce flegg, and alp campaign manager, milton dick, to address community members. also significant was the chinese new year function held earlier in 2007 by premier peter beattie at parliament house, an event which symbolically backed the qcf and its honorary president, peter low. h, in establishing the political credentials of qcf, looked to premier peter beattie’s annual chinese new year function as a key example; i’m not sure if we are the most politically active, but we are seen as very politically active. for example, qcf successfully lobbied the premier for the last three or four years. he has been hosting a chinese new year function for the last three or four years in parliament. every chinese new year for the last three or four years he hosts a big function, inviting all the – i wouldn’t say all – over two hundred from the chinese community to go to state parliament to celebrate chinese new year. since that time, the vociferousness of the dispute has diminished with the two peak organisations collaborating through activities such as the 2008 beijing olympics, fundraising cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 95 for the sichuan earthquake and queensland flood appeals. nonetheless, the tensions which produced the dispute impart an important window into the competition for political access by elite community leaders, organisations and enclave networks. the dispute between qcf and qcuc goes to the heart of the potential impact of transnational formations upon both the urban politics of globally-dispersed chinese communities and domestic politics, in a more formal context. through the transformation of political institutions, government and consulate representatives assume an important symbolic position as the imprimatur of formal institutions, and as its symbolic gate-keepers. in turn, the instrumental function of these leadership structures establishes routines for more concerted exchange and flow. beyond the explicit role political actors may play in directly influencing the ecology of major cities, particularly in terms of property development, the kinds of activities and networks that strengthen business engagement, particularly through political access, define an important contested privilege – political access in itself represents a locus of contested urban political power. this emerged as a much debated aspect of the conflict between the peak status of qcf and qcuc. speculation arose that part of qcuc’s rationale for advancing the political prominence of a ‘united’ chinese community was its interest in transforming or leveraging the business and trade relationship between australia and china. in january 2006, dr su argued; ‘in comparison with percentage of chinese people in queensland population and chinese economic strength in the state, such a situation is not satisfactory.’ d, a mainland chinese leader, privately asserted that business relations had not been a sufficient focus for qcf: a lot of people know us. even people in china know us. consul people, embassy, know us, government know us, so they all want us to be part of them. but when i go to their (qcf) meeting i can see the job that they did – totally different. totally different! qcf mainly focus on – let the chinese community involve in australian system (sic). consider also that at least seven of twelve delegates of qcf were, at the time, members of the queensland china council (qcc), a consultative body convened by the queensland state government to facilitate trade through the promotion of political and cultural goodwill. the capacity of the body was based upon the late former deputy premier tom burns’ special relationship with the people’s republic of china (prc) politburo; a special relationship that stemmed from his involvement in the original and historic delegation of alp members to 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 mainland china in 1971. its activities have included routine delegations from china to queensland, queensland to china, and their mandate covers economic, educational and cultural network building. the overlap between the two is indicative of the bond between qcf leadership networks and representatives of the alp government in queensland, a relationship reinforced by trade and business opportunities. part of qcuc’s rationale for advancing the political prominence of a ‘united’ chinese community was its interest in gaining greater political access to these kinds of relationships and networks. competition was underpinned by the distribution of substantive network resources through modes of political access, most of these having explicit economic and trade orientations. qcuc’s public statements around the significance of the chinese community’s engagement in government-to-government trade networks failed to acknowledge that transformation of informal networks of access into modes of political influence are inconsistent with mainstream democratic values. in contrast, delegates of qcf made links between political access and influence, but overwhelmingly recognised the informal nature of this influence. importantly, however, political access for some members of the qcf leadership was also a basis to promote personal, commercial, and in a few instances, political interests. implications for chinese australian urban politics chinatowns have persistently been sites for groups and political movements to push the barrow of political ideology. from political allegiances around the hung league and chinese masonic societies, which proliferated at the end of the 19th century, to the nationalist and kuomintang movements of the 1920s and later, the transnational reach of chinese political engagements is uncontroversial. numerous scholars have enhanced historical insight into the texture of these political formations in australia. for instance, tian ming cai (1998) explored this through the chun wah association’s unification of district and clan alliances, to oppose the effects of racism under the white australia policy. likewise, john fitzgerald (2006) more recently considered the role of chinese australians in shaping organisational orientations imbued with the character of australian class politics. there is perhaps no more precise way to dispel the presumption that chinese australians are intrinsically less political compared to other migrant communities or populations. based upon the brisbane case study, two crucial claims about the character of chinese australian urban politics emerge. the first stems from an expansion in the number of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 97 community organisations, as well as an expansion in their adaptive functions. the broadening array of organisational purposes has been triggered by major transformations in diasporic chinese communities themselves (and the spaces that chinese migratory populations inhabit). as edgar wickberg claimed, since world war ii families have replaced sojourning males; chinese immigrants have brought an increasing diversity of skills, resources and status; and migration is sourced from a growing multitude of nations and sub-ethnic backgrounds (1994, p.76). we might add to this observation, the lived dimensions of cultural ‘hybridisation’, which empower a greater range of social agents to cross group boundaries, and also implicitly creates the political space for boundary maintenance by various social agents. this growing demographic heterogeneity poses important questions to community groups and (in particular) peak or umbrella organisations, in terms of their capacity to mobilise and represent communities. in relation to chinese australian urban politics, the ‘contact zones’ of global cities (yeoh & willis 2005) produce complex, fluctuating networks of interlocking ethnic leadership in which group identities become sites for contested meaning. these are dependent not only upon racial marginalisation, migratory flows, but formations of domestic and transnational economic capability. we should also consider that, in some instances, there may be sufficient social stratification to establish diverse rights claims. this can relate to a community’s symbolic resources as much as it can to identity or geographic space. as tseen khoo recognised in the cultural competition for urban space in brisbane, ‘chinatowns have multiple, contested meanings for different sectors of the community, and no single function eclipses others’ (2009, p.215). this does not deny the fundamental need for representative groups (especially representative groups that have political functions), but begs a question about the basis upon which legitimation of an organisation is centred. it is necessary to consider the kind of social resources an organisation deploys to justify the representation of a community or a group’s interests. secondly, the competition for political access and the outpouring of urban political conflict in this case study, highlights the tenacity of those specific network arrangements in bridging public and private spheres. we may consider the effects of globalisation upon the way we understand the australian political system and the apparatus of government as actors in the global economic order. chinese migrations have impacted upon the economic capability of major cities through the migration of transnational economic actors, the development of enclave economies, as well as a reorientation by major cities to the global dimensions of economic activity. these patterns create opportunities for new governance mechanisms and 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 increasingly complex approaches to urban politics as the governing bodies of these cities adapt. while this paper does not posit (as part of its approach to urban regime theory) an emptying out of governance functions, it does seek to reinforce the relevance of globalisation in the development of urban regime arrangements incorporating chinese australian community actors and organisations. according to stone (2005, p.331), urban regime theory ultimately looks to understand how viable and durable arrangements for engagement and governance are created and claims the development of a regime is based upon at least the following three conditions: • an agenda, • resource adequacy, and • an alignment of actors. the conditions for the durability of a regime are further enhanced by ‘selective incentives’, which directly benefit network participants along the way (2005, p.320). though stone constructs urban regimes as largely ‘contingent’ (2005, p.325), he also recognises that regimes are ‘structural’ in the sense that they are compelled by structural forces such as those generated through global processes. thus, in coming to terms with the global orientation of enclave economies, we can understand the recurrent potential for regime arrangements to emerge. the significance of this for governmental and political agents – who are increasingly attuned to the role of ethnically-based enclave economies as anchors for global processes – implies increasing interest in modes of resource exchange that have little to do with the transfer of information or the intermediation capacity of non-elite immigrant organisations (poppelaars 2007, p.20). the influence of the global economy emerges in creating the conditions for network arrangements that sustain durable and recurrent means of interaction, between public and private social agents vested in the economic development of enclave economies, and networks tied to international business and trade. in addition, social agents engaged in these kinds of network and regime arrangements, be they politicians, business or community leaders, may act or be coopted, as agents or interested parties, in building trade, business or government-to-government ties. these ‘opportunities’ are likely to sustain themselves, whether or not trends in migration and multicultural scholarship are interested in political participation and civic engagement. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 99 conclusion the urban regime arrangements considered in this paper provide both opportunities and risks for the nature of chinese australian community representation. engin isin in democracy, citizenship and the global city (2000) argued that the citizenship status of the foreigner swept up in the logics of global capital is expressed in terms of a political struggle for presence. isin implied that the new dimension of political struggle is not in defence of the traditional rights of property, but the right to claim presence, the right to access resources. this is a phenomenon brought about by an unbundling of citizenship rights in global cities constituted by political actors who have different investments in citizenship. while these ideas construct a moral landscape for the expansion of democratic participation, they also establish an apparatus supporting transnational economic flows and mobilities. and thus a durable urban regime can equally operate to entrench social inequality by excluding ‘lowerstatus’ groups (stone 2005, p.328). the nature of fluctuating community leadership networks tie representation and political engagement to informal modes of political access based in enclave networks and economies. in this process, community elites compete not only for the right to represent, but the right to be present, greased by the networks that politicians and political parties often cultivate for fundraising, vote-catching and influencing constituents. in exploring how regimes are established, stone (2005) reconsidered the significance of agenda-setting as a structure for the agency of participants, and the need to comprehend the durability of a regime based upon its capacity to draw together the resources necessary to fulfil or implement such an agenda. this area is perhaps one of the great challenges for local and state governments, as well as political leaders in their engagement with urban politics. the agenda for the establishment of network arrangements between public and private ethnic business interests have often been framed by a symbolic commitment to a version of multiculturalism that has suffered from long-standing and broadly-accepted conceptual flaws. one has been its institutionalisation of difference and its reification of cultural expression, which has diminished the relevance of building democratic cultures through greater civic engagement, and in particular, the potential to utilise community resources to bridge gaps in the distribution of politically-relevant social capital. the second is that newer and supplementary concepts, such as ‘productive diversity’ (bertone, esposto & turner 1998), have in some instances allowed the economic and political dimensions of network engagement to be conflated. in numerous instances, such as in brisbane, queensland, this has 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 bifurcated government priorities in relation to multicultural engagement towards more entrenched and more prosperous communities. the final challenge is that settings within public discourse are a major constraint to exploring australian citizenship in the context of globalisation. in spite of emergent discourses on postnational citizenship, our political identities remain tied to geography – we each remain citizens of somewhere. the citizen is a juridical, cultural and political status, a social position reflecting distribution of power and resources vested by the nation-state, but also a social boundary between us-and-them, arising because of migration or fortune of birth, managed by instruments of the state that range from constitutional protections through the enforcement of human rights covenants and trade agreements to the historical antecedents of national cultures. pervasively human bodies are arbitrated between the inclusion and exclusion of a range of legal protections, in effect the rights and obligations secured by the formal boundaries of citizenship (linklater 1998). therefore, social inequalities can in fact be ingrained where social policies governing cultural difference fail to allocate proper recognition of the role of global processes in transforming urban and metropolitan landscapes. certainly the international education market sits at this conceptual 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australia: construction of a socio-economic profile, institute of applied economics and social research, parkville, melbourne. 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia reconciling universality and particularity through a cosmopolitan outlook on human rights rebecca adami stockholm university, sweden abstract human rights are today criticized as not compatible with different cultural values and the debate has circulated around asian values and islamic values as in dichotomy with human rights as universal ethics (ignatieff, 2003). the theoretical dichotomy between universality and particularity is questioned pragmatically in this paper through a historical study. the working process of drafting the universal declaration of human rights (udhr) in 1946-48, which included thousands of people, is explored as a cosmopolitan space in which individuals from different cultural contexts met to negotiate human rights through cultural narratives. the process where particular values were negotiated with universal notion on human rights resulted in a common proclamation (udhr) without a common philosophical or ideological ground. this paper puts forth a thesis that human rights discourse can work as a cosmopolitan space, in which particular value systems meet in processes characterized by conflict and cohesion. hence human rights can be understood as a master narrative compatible with different conflicting cultural narratives (gibson & somers, 1994). introduction the tension between particularity and universality has been articulated within cosmopolitanism in many ways, from nussbaum’s (2003) words of ‘transcending boundaries of class, gender and nation with narrative imagination’ to benhabib’s (2008) notion of ‘universalist norms mediated with the self-understanding of local communities’ (benhabib 2008, p.71). hence, we have seen a shift in cosmopolitanism from an abstract cosmopolitanism from above (nussbaum 2003) towards a rooted cosmopolitanism from below (benhabib 2008). still, the articulated theoretical problem of a dichotomy between universalism and particularism continues being debated within cosmopolitanism. negotiating and reconciling universality of human rights with particularity of local, cultural values is one example of a presumed dichotomy between universality and particularity. human rights can be seen as cosmopolitan ethics, a suggestion made already in 1998 by john charvet (charvet 1998). what i aim to do in this paper is to explore empirically the supposed dichotomy between universalism and particularism by facing some allegations of eurocentrism against the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 23 drafting of the udhr in 1946-48. when exploring the presumed dichotomy between universality and particularity empirically, i argue that the drafting of the universal declaration of human rights can be seen as occurring in a cosmopolitan space, where human rights were negotiated on conflicting, particular value grounds. negotiating universal ethics in a space characterized as cosmopolitan has been discussed earlier by charvet (1998) and borges (2010). both charvet and borges point to excluding boundaries of cosmopolitan space, in relation to power. the drafting of the universal declaration of human rights in 1948 was a process including representatives to the un commission on human rights and members of the unesco committee, hence setting strict boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in relation to political power. this conceptualization of cosmopolitan space contextualizes the tensions and conflicts arising in negotiating human rights, but also the temporal consensus on universal principles of human rights in 1948. by looking at the process when human rights were negotiated, as a relational, contextual and historical process, illuminates how universality and particularity can be reconciled temporarily, on conflicting grounds. the impasse in discourse on human rights the universal declaration on human rights from 1948 might seem abstract in its wordings, detached from any local contexts or values people relate to in daily lives. the first article of the declaration reads, ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’ (udhr, article 1). when read and analyzed by european scholars though, the concepts of ‘dignity’, ‘reason’ and ‘consciousness’ have been interpreted as originating from western philosophy, and the term brotherhood has been understood in the light of the french revolution and ‘rights’ have been seen as deriving from the american declaration of independence (griffin 2008; ignatieff 2003). so even if the udhr contains broad and inclusive concepts that give it a character of abstractness in the sense that there are no outright references to different religious or cultural values in the document, the udhr has been read by western scholars through a western, liberal approach to its content. within the discourse on human rights, the most dominant view today is that human rights need to be renegotiated in order to meet charges of ethnocentrism. ignatieff (2003) argues that the process of drafting human rights was westernized. although he admits that ‘many 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 traditions were represented at the drafting’, he concludes that western drafters played a predominant role in the drafting of the document (ignatieff 2003). he said that there was an islamic questioning of human rights already in 1948, when saudi arabia did not vote for the article on religious freedom (ignatieff 2003). he chooses not to mention the other states represented in the un commission with large muslim populations, who voted for the article on religious freedom, such as pakistan, india, syria, egypt, iran and lebanon. furthermore ignatieff (2003) only mentions western drafters in the un commission, such as eleanor roosevelt from usa, john p. humphrey from canada and rené cassin from france, but not the pulitzer prize winner colonel romulo from the philippines, or peng-chun chang from china who was vice chairman of the commission, or charles malik, lebanese delegate and philosopher, or hansa metha, indian legislator. the lingering allegation of ethnocentrism, according to morsink (1999) is in part caused by the fact that very few people seem to know what was said and done during the drafting process. ‘this ignorance has led to numerous misconceptions about how the document was written and what it and its various parts mean’ (morsink 1999 p.xiii). the udhr has been criticized since its drafting as presenting ‘western values’. according to tesón,‘what may be regarded as a human rights violation in one society may properly be considered lawful in another, and western ideas of human rights should not be imposed upon third world societies (tesón 1985, p.878). accordingly, ignatieff argues against ‘faith in human rights’ and equalizes human rights negotiations with political debates, by bringing up challenges to human rights legitimacy today, such as dichotomy between islamic values and human rights or east asian values and human rights. ‘an asian model puts community and family ahead of individual rights and order ahead of democracy and individual freedom. in reality, there is no single asian model yet it has proven useful for asian authoritarians to argue that they represent a civilization challenge to the hegemony of western models’ (ignatieff 2003, p.63). the claim of asian values as not compatible with human rights has been debated by xiaorong li (2006) who writes that: ‘the argument that rights are culturally specific implies that social norms originating in other cultures should not be adopted in asian culture. but, in practice, advocates of the ‘asian view’ often do not consistently adhere to this rule. leaders from the region pick and choose freely from other cultures, adopting whatever is in their political interest. they seem to have no qualms about embracing such things as capitalist markets and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 25 consumerist culture. what troubles them about the concept of human rights, then, turns out to have little to do with its western origin’ (li 2006, p.401). the conflict in discourse is rather based on different conceptions regarding whether human rights are based on western philosophy and ideology or not. the ‘universality’ of human rights is criticized as a western concept, where particularity is understood as ‘other’ particular values than values deriving from ‘christianity’, ‘liberalism’ and ‘natural law’. what is worth noting is that western scholars and philosophers generally argue against reconciling ‘universal human rights’ and particular values, by arguing that ‘other’ particular value systems than western, liberal values are not compatible with human rights. a cosmopolitan outlook on negotiating human rights in 1948 when the udhr is read and narrated in diverse national and local contexts, i argue that tensions may arise between different local interpretations of human rights based on different particular cultural, religious, political and ideological values (andreopoulos 1997). i refer here to public or cultural narratives (horsdal 2011), of what gibson and somers (1994) view as cultural, religious, national, ethnic and other group narratives, revealing the particular values in a specific context. this means that there could be stories in other parts of the world, revealing different contextual frames for understanding human rights values. public or cultural narratives are collective stories explaining the events in our lives by evaluation grounded in particular values (horsdal 2011; gibson and somers 1994). these cultural, religious and ethnic values are not subjective, but rather particular. if human rights are narrated within different cultural narratives where people make sense of cosmopolitan values in local contexts, do we need to find common ideological foundation for human rights in order to prove them universally reasonable? the abstract problem of the dichotomy between universal and particular values can be traced to an historical, contextual and relational setting, empirically grounded in the drafting of the human rights in 1948. ‘historicizing’ the concept of human rights is a way to oppose the idea that concepts are a-historical and non-relational (gibson and somers 1994). the conceptual analysis explores a cosmopolitan space where human rights were conceptualized in different, cultural narratives by turning to primary sources of archived un documents from unesco library in paris. 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 udhr drafted in a cosmopolitan space in 1948 the tensions in the world were strong after the second world war. delegates representing post colonial countries met in discussions with their post colonial rulers. delegates from what would become the power struggle between the east and west block in the cold war after the second world war met from opposite sides of economic ideologies. hence, the historical context for the drafting process challenged power positions, creating a possible conflict zone. it was the first time in history that people from all over the world met in a diplomatic arena, negotiating and discussing human rights from different ideological and cultural backgrounds. the working process of drafting the udhr, engaging thousands of people in 194948 opened up what in this paper will be referred to as a cosmopolitan space. was the process, as suggested by some scholars a process characterized by ideological domination (ignatieff 2003)? was the drafting of the udhr another postcolonial step of cultural imperialism (griffin 2008)? conducting an historical study of the concept human rights in relation to universality and particularity, enables an exploration of how universalism and particularism can be negotiated in a cosmopolitan space. the united nations commission on human rights the united nations commission on human rights (henceforth the human rights commission) held three sessions and over hundred meetings between 1947 and 1948 in lake success, geneva and paris where they discussed the content of the six drafts that would later become the udhr. in the beginning of the process, the delegate who wrote the initial draft, john p.humphrey from england, compiled all earlier works on rights he could find, from south america amongst others and when he presented this at one meeting, he was asked what philosophy had guided the secretariat’s work. humphrey had no answer to this question, ‘for the simple reason that the draft was based on no philosophy whatsoever’ (glendon 2001, p.58). in 1948, 56 member states to the un voted for the udhr. the most prominent and active delegations on the human rights commission, set up to draft the declaration, were china, lebanon, india, chile, philippines, france, england, soviet union and the united states. the old generation of countries like france and england, basing their attitude on colonial structure of the world, had to change their strategy of trying to ignore the smaller nations during the sessions. it took three weeks for the 58 delegates from all over the world to first negotiate and discuss and later pass two articles in the declaration the pressure from a new generation of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 27 human rights activists and advocates, such as charles malik, philosopher and diplomat from lebanon, carlos romulo, pulitzer prize journalist from the philippines (who was against colonialism), hansa metha, an indian legislator and outspoken critic of britain’s colonial policies and hernán santa cruz of chile, representing the economically developing countries, was something new in diplomatic relations. charles malik, the delegate from lebanon had a crucial role in the passing of the udhr and was elected president of the economic and social council, to which the human rights commission had to submit its draft declaration. in the fall of 1948 he was elected chairman of the un’s third committee (the social, humanitarian, and cultural affairs committee), which had to present the declaration for approval to the general assembly at its december meeting in paris (glendon 2001, p.124). the two philosopher-diplomats p.c.chang (chinese delegate) and charles malik (lebanese delegate) were by most accounts the intellectual leaders of the human rights commission (glendon 2001, p.145). the process of debating and negotiating the human rights declaration in over one hundred sessions with delegates from all over the world resulted in the exclusion of particular values in the declaration since it was necessary to have everyone agree on the wording of the text. article one in the udhr reads today, ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’ (udhr, article 1). the lengthy process was partly due to political debates, but also to a great extent to different value systems being in opposition to each other. the iraqi delegation agreed with the communists that people are often born into unequal circumstances, which is why they wanted to keep article 1 totally on an ethical plane (morsink 1999, p.292). adbul kayaly, the delegate from syria, wanted to retain the word ‘born’ as it would exclude the idea of hereditary slavery (morsink 1999, p.293). the brazilian delegation withdrew their amendment on reference to god, when the philippine delegation took out their phrase ‘by nature’1 1 http://archives.un.org .the representative from india, mohammed habib, said he ‘favored the use of the word caste rather than birth as the latter was already implied in the article. this observation led several delegates to state their objections to both caste and class as not accurate 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 (uruguay), as categories that ‘human beings were trying to outgrow’ (us) or as too specific (philippines). even though the drafting process was lengthy with endless debates on different wordings and its interpretations, this improved the chances for the udhr to be more acceptable in a world of plurality. as glendon (2001) writes, 'perhaps only someone like malik, from a small, newly independent country, could understand how important it was for every member state to have a sense of ownership with respect to the udhr’ (glendon, 2001, p.143). the chinese delegate to the human rights commission refrained from proposing specific chinese values such as good manners and consideration for others in the declaration and hoped that: [t]he others would show equal consideration and withdraw some of the amendments to article 1 which raised metaphysical problems. for western civilization too, the time for religious intolerance was over. those who believed in god could still find the strong opening assertion of article 1 the idea of god, and at the same time others with different concepts (of human nature) would be able to accept the text (glendon 2001, p.146). since no delegation would vote for the approval of the udhr if the human rights declaration was written according to one dogmatic ideology, compromises had to be made by excluding references to ‘natural law’, ‘god’, ‘allah’, ‘christian faith’, marxism’ etc. the un archives have documented these ideological debates between human rights based on religious grounds and political systems such as liberalism and communism. for example the cuban delegation wanted to shape the udhr more closely on the model of the bogota declaration adopted that april by the nations of latin america (morsink 1999, p.232). watt of australia liked the cuban proposal that a ‘more prominent place should be assigned to freedom of conscious and religion’ than that of social and economic ones (morsink 1999, p.233). the process leading to the drafting of the udhr was hence one of excluding all reference to ideology and philosophical foundation and including an exhausting non-discrimination list for the right to human rights, listing different individual and group belongings; ‘everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’ (udhr, article 2). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 29 the unesco committee on the philosophical principles of the rights of man the unesco report from 1948 to the human rights commission was a publication of the inquiry made by unesco of the philosophical principles of human rights. the unesco committees report from 1948 exhibits different cultural, philosophical, religious and political interpretations of human rights than the dominant literature on human rights today. philosophers from different parts of the world were asked to send written contributions to the unesco committee on the philosophical principles of the rights of man (henceforth unesco committee). there were contributions on ‘the rights of man and the islamic tradition’, ‘human rights in the chinese tradition’, ‘human freedoms and the hindu thinking’ amongst other. according to chung-shu lo, who wrote the chinese contribution to the unesco committee, the idea of human rights was very old in the chinese tradition, the term we use to translate ‘rights’ now is two words ‘chuan li’, which literally means ‘power and interest’. this of course does not mean that the chinese never claimed human rights or enjoyed the basic rights of man. in fact, the idea of human rights developed very early in china, and the right of the people to revolt against oppressive rulers was very clearly established (unesco 1948, p.185). according to this text on the chinese tradition from 1948, human rights as a concept could be traced back in chinese historical texts, suggesting that conceptually human rights reconciled with particular chinese value systems. through a cosmopolitan view of culture as dynamic and in constant change, the text does not imply anything constant in ‘reality’ but rather serves as an example in time on how universal notions on human rights were reconciled with particular values within a chinese tradition, as conceptualized at that certain period in time. the unesco committee also published a written contribution on the islamic tradition in their report, by humayun kabir. although the text is written in1948 it is written with a sense of increased cosmopolization and interconnectedness of people. according to the islamic contribution by humayun kabir, human rights should be based on recognition of the equal claims of all individuals within one common world (unesco 1948, p.189). even if there were divergent conceptions of human rights according to kabir, the interrelation of people and global communication had marked the end of closed cultural systems, the first and most significant consideration in framing any charter of human rights today is that it must be on a global scale. in the past, there have been many civilizations but 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 never one world civilization. two different conceptions of human rights could and sometimes did subsist side by side and because of lack of communication, could even be unaware of one another. today such a state of affairs is unimaginable. whatever happens in one corner of the globe has an almost immediate repercussion on the other parts. days of closed systems of divergent civilizations and, therefore, of divergent conceptions of human rights are gone for good (unesco 1948, p.191). kabir emphasized in his text the need of equal claims of all individuals in a common world. the contradiction between universal and particular was according to kabir’s text due to the dominant conception of human rights as only being rights for european people. it is necessary to emphasize this because of one fundamental flaw in the western conception of human rights. whatever be the theory, in practice they often applied only to europeans and sometimes to only some among the europeans. in fact, the western conception has to a large extent receded form the theory and practice of democracy set up by early islam, which did succeed in overcoming the distinction of race and colour to an extent experienced neither before nor since (unesco 1948, p.192). kabir suggests in the text that particular values grounded in islamic tradition were in line with universal values of human rights and that an islamic democracy could and had historically reconciled non-discrimination in ‘reality’. the tension or conflict in the text is suggested to be between practical inclusion of people who have the right to rights. the proposed conflict did not lie in islamic values contra western values, but in the failure of practically including others than europeans as rights bearers. the contribution from a hindu perspective, by puntambekar, presented a conception of the human being as spiritual, which may differ from a traditional western conception of human beings: then we must note that there is an incalculable element in the human will and an endless complexity of human nature. no system, no order, no law can satisfy the deep potential demands of a great personality, be they religious, political, social or educational. no system can satisfy the growing needs of a dynamic personality (unesco 1948, p.197). hence, putambeker subscribed in his text to universal human rights, but on a different conceptual ground than the islamic or chinese value systems. if human rights may be reasonable conceptually within different particular value systems, then universal principles cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 31 could be reconciled with different particular values. but could human rights find a common ground in a specific value system, perceived as universally reasonable? the unesco committees’ report exhibited antagonistic value systems, each and everyone subscribing to human rights in their particular cultural narrative. the process for the unesco committee to analyze the written contributions from philosophical perspectives can be viewed as a process requiring a dialectical mode of thinking, by conceiving cultural differences as neither absolute nor necessary antagonistic, but relationally defined (rizvi 2008). studying the concept of human rights in a text below by putambekar might at first sight be conceptually divergent from other texts in the unesco committee report on liberal views on human rights. putambekar writes that 'what we want is freedom from want and war, from fear and frustration in life' (unesco 1948, p.199). the claims for freedom in the text are similar to the liberal conception of rights, espoused by the contemporary american president franklin d. roosevelt, namely, freedom from fear, from want, freedom of speech and worship. according to putambekar, ‘freedom is necessary because authority is not creative’ (unesco 1948, p.198). from a cosmopolitan perspective cultural differences are dynamic and interconnected, which implies that cultural narratives cannot be distinguished from each other on static terms, but they rather intertwine. in the words of putambekar, the discussions on universal human rights were necessary but difficult since human beings were particular, as religious, racial, caste or group beings: to talk of human rights in india is no doubt very necessary and desirable, but hardly possible in view of the socio-cultural and religio-political complexes which are so predominant today. there are no human beings in the world today, but only religious men, racial men, caste men or group men [ sic] (unesco 1948, p.198-199). this situatedness in the world that putambekar addresses as a great hindrance towards discussing and learning human rights in particular contexts is what rizvi (2008) suggests as the point of departure in cosmopolitan negotiations. cosmopolitan negotiations and consensus on human rights is according to rizvi helping people to come to terms with their situatedness in the world, of their knowledge and cultural practices (rizvi, 2008). would this mean that people could identify themselves as human rights bearers if human rights were interpreted on a local level as ‘islamic rights’, ‘christian rights’ or ‘women’s rights’? in the report by the unesco committee, different (and sometimes antagonistic) cultural narratives were related 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 to the notion of universal human rights, even though the concepts of ‘rights’, ‘claims’ or ‘human rights’ were not present in the particular tradition. foundation for the same set of rights in divergent local value systems could be found, but when these same lists of rights were discussed and legitimized in another, seemingly antagonistic cultural narrative, conflict arose. the aim of the unesco committee was not to find a common foundation for human rights, but rather to invite thinkers from different parts of the world to an open discussion on the philosophical foundation for human rights. the report the unesco committee, with its particular interpretations of human rights, was not referred to in the udhr, rather the udhr text is stripped of any particular value reference. common agreement on human rights based on conflicting grounds human rights were referred to as practical principles in the unesco committee. according to jacques maritain, french philosopher on the unesco committee, the goal of unesco was a practical goal and he said that ‘agreement between minds could be reached spontaneously, not on the basis of common speculative ideas, but on common practical ideas, not on the affirmation of one and the same conception of the world, of man and of knowledge, but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for guidance in action’ (unesco 1948, foreword, p.ii). the drafting process in the human rights commission in 1948 aimed at excluding all reference to ideology in the final draft declaration in order for human rights to be understood in their local and cultural context, although orally the discussions and debates on particular values in relation to universal human rights were lengthy and ambitious. the unesco committee, on their part, included all contributions from different cultural, religious and political regions in their report, to exhibit the different local interpretations of human rights. both of these processes resulted in similar lists of human rights. the initial question raised in this paper addressed the presupposed polemic between local and universal aspects of human rights that extends beyond borders. the drafting process of the udhr that included both the human rights commission and the unesco committee was held on a national level, between national delegates and invited thinkers from different countries. even so, by studying the texts deriving from this drafting process, it occurs to the reader that the drafters, as individuals in a social context, went through changes in their conceptions of human rights from sharing their local and particular ‘stories’ or cultural narratives and by listening to so many other cultural narratives. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 33 the significance of this paper lies in its illumination of the drafting of the udhr as it was worked on not only by the human rights commission, but also the unesco committee. this highlights the fact that already in 1947 people from different political and philosophical spheres and geographical areas were preoccupied with finding universal foundations of and justifications for the declaration. if the universality and particularity could be negotiated in a cosmopolitan space in 1948, the consensus of human rights, however temporal, can work as a pragmatic response to the theoretical dichotomy of universality and particularity regarding human rights. note that the aim was not to found one universal foundation of and justification for the udhr. the work of the human rights commission and the unesco committee were two separate processes, ending with the same list of universal human rights. ‘is there anything surprising in systems antagonistic in theory converging in their practical conclusions?’ (unesco 1947, p.7) asked jacques maritain in the foreword to the unesco committees’ report. one insightful experience drawn by maritain was that antagonistic theories and reasons for human rights could justify the universality of human rights, but not bring agreement on the foundation for human rights. unesco’s part was to consult philosophers and assemble their replies. (…) many schools of thought are represented, each of which brings to the whole its particular view and justification of individual rights (…). the paradox is that such rational justifications are at once indispensable, and yet powerless to bring about agreement between minds. they are indispensable because each one of us believes instinctively in the truth, and will only assent to what he himself has recognized as true and based on reason. they are powerless to bring about a harmony of minds because they are fundamentally different, even antagonistic; and why should this surprise us? (unesco 1948, foreword, p.i) in other words, human rights as practical principles are reasonable within particular value systems, which are in opposition to each other. the problems in the foreground in formulating human rights were the supposed polemic between ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ values. although, after the extensive political sessions and philosophical discussion between individual contributors from all over the world, the polemic was between different particular values systems, not between universal practical principles of human rights and diverse cultural values. as jacques maritain says in the foreword to the unesco report: 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 at one of the meetings where human rights were being discussed, someone expressed astonishment that certain champions of violently opposed ideologies had agreed on a list of those rights. “yes”, they said, “we agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks us why”. that “why” is where the argument begins. (unesco 1948, foreword, p.i) the discourse on human rights as a cosmopolitan space cosmopolitanism does not imply abandoning our distinctive ways of living nor does it entail a sense of rootlessness (hansen 2009, p.593). a conclusion can be drawn that understandings of human rights originate from our locality and through our particular value systems, with which we identify. narrating our local values within a human rights discourse interconnects us to millions of others, rooted in their particular value system. drawing on thoughts from langlois (2001) the understanding of ‘universality’ can move beyond the impasse, of theoretical struggles of human rights legitimacy, towards reconciling ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ values in the cosmopolitan space that human rights offer as discourse. langlois (2001) combines universal values with local stories, identifying ‘universal’ human rights as a language that can be seen as a common discourse through which cultural narratives are negotiated. re-thinking ‘universality’ from the imperialistic understanding of the concept, as the triumph of one ideology over another, to an inclusive concept, is useful for narrating particular experiences within a human rights discourse on a global arena. ‘preventing the discourse of human rights from stagnating around the old polarities: relativism versus universalism, individualism versus communitarianism, economic rights versus political rights, the discourse on human rights may thus be regarded as an entry point into the global community for the marginalized and oppressed’ (langlois 2001, p.164). taking the critical-ethical aspects of cosmopolitanism seriously is thinking the universal through the particular and acknowledging the tensions that may arise. ‘in thinking the discourse differently is to think it through the stories, narratives and traditions that define us as individuals and communities, rather than trying to avoid them’ (langlois 2001, p.165). ‘avoiding the stories that define our identities means that whatever we are protecting with the human rights discourse will always be something that is slightly different from and out of touch with those things we value most. the issue here is how to use the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 35 discourse of human rights as a means for telling our local stories to a larger audience.’ (langlois 2001, p.165) conclusion ignatieff’s way of reconciling human rights universalism with cultural and moral pluralism is by arguing for a thin, universal theory of human rights as negative liberty. i argue that reconciliation of human rights universalism with cultural and moral pluralism has already happened, if one takes into account the negotiations and temporal consensus that was actually reached in 1948 on a universal set of human rights. the theoretical dichotomy between universality and particularity, as articulated in cosmopolitan literature (nussbaum 2003; benhabib 2008) has been questioned on a pragmatic level by looking at the drafting of the udhr in 1946 – 1948. approaching human rights discourse as a cosmopolitan space opens up for critical-ethical dimensions of pluralism, where conflict and tensions are part of understanding the relation between universality and particularity in regard to human rights. claiming human rights as universal in 1948 through different and antagonistic ideological value systems was possible by the abstract wording in the udhr. dominant european narratives (ignatieff 2003; griffin 2008) on the origin and cultural heritage of human rights in the documents have excluded alternative and equally justifiable philosophical and ideological foundations for human rights principles. by turning to primary sources from 1948 i have pragmatically questioned the lingering allegations of ethnocentrism surrounding the drafting of the udhr. i argue in opposition to ignatieff (2003) that the process of drafting the udhr was not a process of western domination, but rather of negotiating and debating opposing and contradictory ideological, religious, political and cultural values systems in relation to human rights. when eleanor roosevelt concluded that east and west should agree to disagree on certain philosophical grounds regarding the nature of human beings, ignatieff (2003) reads this as silencing. whereas i read it as keeping conflict and tension open in dialogue – not having to reach consensus on every aspect of human rights foundation. 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 the udhr became a document questioning the unequal power relations in the world; a common statement against oppression and marginalization of people, of migrants, of refugees, of noncitizens. the fascinating fact that such a declaration, for the people and against oppression in all forms, was possible when delegates from opposing cultural, ideological, political and ethnic perspectives met to draft the udhr in 1948 has inspired this paper. can this temporal consensus on human rights in 1948, as a cosmopolitan space, enlighten the discourse on human rights today and the presumed dichotomy between universality and particularity? ©rebecca adami figure 1: reconciling universality and particularity in human rights discourse charles taylor (1999) said that the concept of human rights ‘could travel better if separated from some of its underlying justification’(taylor 1999, p.126). this paper has examined that empirically; separating the notion of universal human rights from its denotation with western values deriving from liberalism and natural law, by arguing that human rights found their philosophical foundation in different, but antagonistic philosophy and ideology, in the drafting of the udhr in 1948. hence, there is a need for further research, both highlighting more in depth the historical contributions of nonwesterners in the drafting of human rights 1948 and reaffirming universality of human rights in 1993 at the vienna conference. i agree with ignatieff (2003) when he concludes that ‘a universal regime of human rights protection ought to be compatible with moral pluralism’, but i stress with this paper that it already is. 2.reading international policy documents on human rights into cultural narratives 3. contrasting different cultural narratives in relation to dominant master narrative on human rights 1.keeping the udhr open for interpretation in conflicting cultural narratives by excluding references to particular values cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 37 references andreopoulos, c. 1997, human rights education for the twenty-first century, university of pennsylvania press, philadephia. benhabib, s. 2008, another cosmopolitanism, oxford university press, new york. borges, m. 2010, ‘from national to cosmopolitan: the blueprint of space in citizenship debates’, sgir 7th pan-european conference 2010, stockholm, sweden, pp.1-24. charvet, j. 1998, ‘the possibility of a cosmopolitan ethical order based on the idea of universal human rights’, millennium – journal of international studies vol. 27 no.3, pp.523-541. gibson,g & somers, m. 1994, ‘reclaiming the epistemological “other”: narrative and the social constitution of identity’, in social theory and the politics of identity, ed. calhoun, c. oxford, blackwell press, pp.37-99. glendon, m. 2001, a world made new, random house, new york. griffin, j. 2008, on human rights, rainolds room, oxford. horsdal, m. 2011, telling lives; exploring dimensions of narratives, routledge, london. ignatieff, m. 2003, human rights as politics and idolatry, princeton university press, new jersey. kleingeld, p., & brown, e. 2006, cosmopolitanism. retrieved october 2011 from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/ langlois, a. 2001, the politics of justice and human rights – south east asia and universalist theory, cambridge university press, cambridge. lauren, p. 2003, the evolution of international human rights, second edition, university of pennsylvania press, philadelphia. li, x. 2006, ethics, human rights and culture – universalism and cultural relativism in ethics, palgrave, gordonsville. morsink, j. 1999, the universal declaration of human rights –origins, drafting and intent, university of pennsylvania press, philadelphia. nussbaum, m. 2003, cultivating humanity, a classical defense of reform in liberal education, harvard university press, cambridge. rizvi, f. 2008, ‘epistemic virtues and cosmopolitan learning’, the australian educational researcher, vol. 35, no. 1 pp.17-35. taylor, s. 1997, ‘critical policy analysis: exploring contexts, texts and consequences’, discourse: studies in the cultural politics of education, vol.18, no.1, pp.23-35. taylor, c. 1999, ‘conditions of an unforced consensus on human rights’, in bauer, j. & bell, d. (eds), the east asian challenge for human rights, p.126 tesón, f. 1985, ‘international human rights and cultural relativism’, virginia journal of international law, vol.25, no.4, pp.869-98. unesco, 1947, comite sur les principles philosophiques des droits de l’homme, part i . unesco, 1948, human rights, comments and interpretations, 25 july . http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/� reconciling universality and particularity through a cosmopolitan outlook on human rights a cosmopolitan outlook on negotiating human rights in 1948 udhr drafted in a cosmopolitan space in 1948 the united nations commission on human rights the unesco committee on the philosophical principles of the rights of man cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 55 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia futebol mulato: racial constructs in brazilian football tiago fernandes maranhão universidade federal de pernambuco (pebrazil) jorge knijnik university of western sydney abstract the aim of this paper is to review gilberto freyre’s ideas about futebol mulato and the way these ideas have spread the notion of the brazilian mulatto as a symbol of a ‘racial democracy’, unique in brazil, around the world. the notion first appeared in 1938 in an article by freyre for the diários associados, an important brazilian newspaper. football (soccer) was employed by freyre as the special arena where the multiracial brazilian nation could shine and show the world a different way of being, opposed to the white and ‘rational’ way of european football. in freyre’s work, the so-called ‘football-art’ was compared to poetry, while the european style was equated with prose. this essay argues that freyre’s ideas were useful in constructing the brazilian identity, a nation of harmony in all its aspects, including the area of race, and how the idea of the mulatto has been used to minimise social disparities within brazilian society. freyre’s ideas remain contemporary; many brazilian intellectuals still refer to these concepts. as well, the press in this huge country, and especially in world cup years, uses the concepts of mulatto and football-art to characterize brazil and differentiate it from other countries. introduction the aim of this paper is to discuss gilberto freyre’s ideas about futebol mulato. freyre (1900 to1987) was one of the most influential brazilian social scientists of the twentieth century; his ideas about race have been studied and, indeed, revered, since the first half that century. freyre also wrote about sport, especially football, and its role in the formation of brazilian identity. modern sport is a territory replete with powerful myths; on a daily basis it creates and recreates heroes and epics stories, building one of the most influential of cultural phenomena in the globalized era (elias and dunning 1992). some sports, and among them football (soccer), have become more than just sport: they shine with their own light and have become, in the course of last century, playful, even religious rituals of enormous proportions, exerting a strong influence in the construction of contemporary national identities. 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 the process of constructing a nation is a weaving together of different political, economic and social tendencies using symbols, rituals and practices that unite the population in periodic celebrations expressing community (hobsbawm and ranger 1985; hobsbawm 1990). nowadays, football celebrations actively participate in the formation and the reinforcement of this sense of collectivity, of nation, of a ‘we’ that is located above and beyond individual awareness. brazil, one of many nation-states where football is effectively experienced on a religious scale, is a good example of how this sport, itself metaphor of war and struggle for social power, has been transformed into an enormous carrier of signs through which some of the threads that texture the creation of a national psyche can be glimpsed. football is more than a game in brazil; it is, as the title of alex bellos’ book (2002) states, the brazilian way of life. brazilians play football everywhere possible: at school, on beaches, on streets, in slums (favelas) or in traffic, from recreational formats to organized championships, from basic to professional levels which involve high amounts of sponsorship and money. football is highlighted in all media every single day. the country stops during a fifa world cup. schools, banks and the courts are closed; everybody is watching ‘the game’. in the brazilian context, the analysis of football celebrations allows a privileged perspective on the process of the construction of the national identity based on a system of ‘racial democracy’, a process that is often considered a model and even more so now when terms such as multiculturalism, multiracialism and mestization appear with so much force in the speeches of powerful members of society (anderson, 2005; caldeira, 2005). our goals does brazilian football have the mulatto profile freyre identified? to what extent can it be said to have contributed to the creation of brazil’s culture? how did it develop, historically and socially? is the mulatto profile a real brand of the nation? cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 57 it is important to state that freyre’s concept of futebol mulato was first highlighted in an article he wrote for a newspaper called diários associados in 1938. this article, ‘foot-ball1 mulato’ is the foundation and one of the most important statements of freyre’s theories about brazilian football and its mulatto characteristics. the aim of this paper is to discuss the importance of freyre’s idea and how it has influenced social representations of brazilian football around the world2 . taking freyre’s ideas about race and ethnicity, and his discussion of the nature of the brazilian mulatto, this paper discusses his ideas which, seven decades later, still reverberate in debate on ethnic and racial issues in brazilian football. a recent book by jose miguel wisnik, a significant literary professor, critic and musician who is well-known among brazilian intellectuals, has reopened the debate about the concepts of the game of football which is played around the world. briefly, the ideas wisnik presents in this book (2008), which was published by one of major brazil’s leading commercial book publishers and widely promoted in brazilian’s most important newspapers as well as on brazilian cultural tv shows, recapitulate freyre’s main argument from 1938. wisnik argues that brazilian football is a kind of poetry while the football played in europe is more like prose in style. the latter goes straight ahead to the goal, whereas the former likes to adorn and flourish its movements, like a dance between feet and ball. the characteristics highlighted by wisnik are virtually identical to those freyre expressed more than 70 years ago. this paper explores freyre’s ideas and racial constructs in brazilian football at a time of renewed interest in this subject. a nation of mulattos: football as an icon of mulatism the policy of racial segregation in brazil underwent important changes in the first decades of the twentieth century (capuchinho 2005). then, the theory of the ‘whitening process’, promoted by the aristocracy with its european traditions, was widely diffused. the theory pleaded for the elimination through miscegenation of the afro (black) and indigenous 1 in the first half of the 20th century, english was the official language of brazilian football. people used and wrote in english to refer to football terms such as corner, goal, and foot-ball. from the 1960s, portuguese words and expressions began to replace english terms. 2 despite the fact that when talking about brazilian football most of people would think about men’s football, it is important to recognize that women have continuously played football in that country since the 1940s, or even earlier (knijnik 2011). 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 components in a process of nation construction that would copy europe, the model of culture and progress, a refined and rational region. the black and indigenous minorities were portrayed as damaging the cohesion of social identity and retarding economic development. in particular, the blacks and the mulattos, the latter identified by mixed-ethnicities or more commonly by a range of dark skin tones, liberated from their conditions of slaves in 1888, were considered by the elites to be insolent, loquacious and imaginative, ready only for celebration, diversion and luxury and with neither the persistence needed for work or the capacity to learn anything to do with work (schwarcz 1999). all ‘non-white’ cultural manifestations were systematically disqualified as symbols of the evil, belonging to a malignant and essentially sensual primitive world that did not have the capacity to be europeanized. the rites of candomblé (religion), capoeira (martial arts and dance) and samba (music and dance), all of african origin, were totally prohibited and severely repressed in the public sphere (maciel 1999). this scenario changed with the irruption of the nationalistic, centralized and antimonarchical ideologies that characterized the bourgeoisie in a transatlantic trend. the ‘nationalistic revolution’ of 1930 led by by getulio vargas,3 aiming to industrialize, modernize and promote reconciliation between groups within the country, devised new economic and social strategies destined to promote a common idea of brazil that would bridge the stark differences which existed in all aspects of social life. in fewer than thirty years, some of the ‘not-white’ manifestations, previously ridiculed and despised, were transformed into national symbols, reasons for pride and preservationist fervour for the ‘brazilian people’ (capuchinho 1999). from that time, brazilian identity, (from a cultural perspective found in books and movies highlighting black protagonists and heroes), began to be constructed on the basis of a series of symbolic interchanges in which one of the main protagonists was the black-mulatto of african origin. in a very short time, the figure of the black african-brazilian moved from one 3 getulio vargas (1882-1954), after being the leader of the 1930 revolution which put an end in the ‘old republic’, was twice the brazilian president: the first time for 15 years, from 1930 to 1945, and the second time, from 1951 to 1954, when he killed himself. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 59 continually subject to humiliation, that is slavery, persecution, torture and social marginalization, to one occupying a radically different position in the folklore and the popular culture of the nation. and the playful-festive manifestations such as the samba, carnaval and football, constituted the privileged space in which that transformation took place (schwarcz 1999). the symbolic figure of the mulatto, as well as being a mediator in the conflicting social relations between the different cultural and racial spheres, is directly related to the social meaning of football, the activity through which the ‘brazilian being’ expresses itself with greatest intensity. gradually, the mulatto started to be considered as a creator and symbol of brazilianism, the pride of brazilians. the social sciences actively participated in this ‘racially mixed’ irruption. it was through them that the theoretical basis was designed, serving to create a positive concept of african-brazilians and vindicating them as the pivot of a new social model destined to equip the nation with ‘brazilianism’. in this context, the theories of the anthropologist gilberto freyre about mestiçagem (miscegenation, racial mixing) could be considered as forming one of the most solid of the foundation pillars on which the construction of the new brazilian national identity was built. his innovative perspective rejected the idea of the superiority of the ‘white’ race (maciel 1999). freyre´s perspective was clearly and publicly demonstrated in the insightful ‘foot-ball mulato’ article of 1938. at that time, the diários associados was a leading and influential brazilian newspaper; in the article, freyre maintained that the football played in brazil was a kind of dance, where the human being could shine, as opposed to the football played in europe which, he thought, was overly mechanized. by arguing that the mulatismo of brazilian football would represent the real psychological character of the brazilian people4 4 juliana cabral, the captain and leader of the brazilian women’s football team that took the silver medal in the 2004 olympics, reinforces the point that women should be included when talking about this ‘psychological character of the brazilian people’ and football. in a testimony quoted in knijnik (2011) she said that ‘and i think many people think that soccer is just for men. but i don’t think so!(…) women’s soccer is about technical quality, about swing’. – ‘being a brazilian is being a mulatto’ – freyre was also laying the grounds for the strongly-held sociological concept that is now common thinking about this profound and remarkable cultural manifestation in brazil football. 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 gilberto freyre and the racially mixed brazilian according to freyre´s theory, brazil was and would always be ‘racially mixed’ and that ‘original mestization’ should not only feed the national psyche but also must be, simultaneously, a source of pride and vindication of its special identity. in earlier times, seen as degenerative and the cause of great common evils, mestization now appeared to be interpreted as a positive process for brazilians as they invent a new tradition, their own identity. in his major and best known book, casa grande & senzala,5 freyre emphasised the importance of both the slave owners – whites who lived in big houses, the casa grande – and the slaves – mostly african blacks who lived in the senzala, which were housing areas with miserable conditions – in the construction of brazilian identity. it was, of course, the relationships between these two groups, socially and notably sexually, which produced the mulatto descendents. according to freyre, this process was benign and formed the basis of brazilian ‘racial democracy’. freyre’s article is a search for (in quest of the preservation of) the ‘authenticity of the brazilian folk’, rejecting european notions and emphasising the importance of transforming ludic elements through which individual members of society revealed their passionate natures more openly. he can be seen as the founder of the ‘racially mixed ideology’ underpinning the ‘brazilian way of being’ and football was a key site in the evolution of brasilidade (brazilian-ness). after football began to take on a truly international dimension, freyre collaborated as a contributor to newspapers and magazines, continuing to fervently advocate the advantages of the mulatto style of playing football. this mulatto football would be an indispensable condition for the creation of ‘our [brazilians’] own style’ of playing football, shaping a distinct mode, constructed in a game of opposition in respect to ‘the european playing style’. nevertheless, the choice of the black / mulatto as a distinguishing symbol, among many other possibilities available, points to the fact that brazilian popular culture was hugely influenced by the slaves who came from africa during the previous centuries.6 5 casagrande & senzala was first published in 1933, and was published in english as the masters and the slaves. freyre published 17 books and numerous articles and was the recipient of 25 national and international awards, such as the anisfield-wolf (us, 1957), grand cross of dom afonso the wise (spain, 1983) and the (brazilian) national library medal (1984). freyre argued for the recognition of these influences, replacing the denial of the elites who preferred to be connected to and build brazilian culture as a mimesis of european culture. 6 1559-1888. the portuguese crown officially sanctioned the capture of and traffic in black slaves in 1559; slavery was abolished in 1888. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 61 poetry, football-art and the mulatto – a distinctive brazilian case the intense, lively participation of european modernist artists in the ‘discovery of the black’ during the two first decades of the 1900s had its affect on the development of brazilian national identity. the sudden interest in the african world among an important part of the french intelligentsia directly affected the african-brazilian situation, in which black culture had been despised, an invisible part of the artistic world until that time. in the europe of 1920s, ‘negrophilia’ was a key part of a period of huge cultural change; it was created by the irruption on the european scene of a number of evocative black figures in the world of music (jazz) and sport (boxers), for example. entertainment and spectacle were the doors through which black culture was introduced into the halls of the elites (harris 1995). in the dynamic stage of the construction of a ‘racially mixed character’ as a defining characteristic of brazilian nationality, the integration, the spectacularization and sportivization of the dances and rites7 related to black-mulatto bodies had a crucial role. the social spaces opened up to the most underprivileged members of society and, in theory, destabilizing those spaces, were all related to festive rituals and spectacular performance, especially music and sport, the two main sites of the mediation which freyre’s ‘racial democracy’ celebrates. currently, a generalized feeling is perceived in the world of football that associates the practice of football in brazil, and the passion this sport arouses among brazilians, to natural or innate features. this image of brazilian football can be observed, from other countries (helal, lovisolo and soares 2001). the ability of brazilian football players is seen as a gift in the blood, a racial mark that, simultaneously, characterizes the players and distinguishes them from the other human beings. the very ‘nature’ of the brazilian people is to play football, and brazil reveals its collective face to the world during international competitions. brazilians think they have a natural gift to play football because football mulatto was born in brazil: this is the powerful myth that freyre helped to propagate8 7 since those days, racists have insulted black people by calling them ‘monkeys’, saying that they dance and play like monkeys. it is possible even now to see these insults when the brazilian team goes to play in argentina: the most important argentinean sports newspaper frequently prints as its headlines ‘the monkeys are coming!’ . 8 juliana cabral thinks women have this natural gift as well: ‘so, i think a woman’s place is in soccer! i think it is a sport that identifies with a woman’ (quoted in knijnik, 2011). 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 hylton (2009, p.2) asserts that, especially in sport, human capacities are always naturalized from the physical and psychological characteristics of each person or social group. the author asserts that it is from a belief in the existence of these characteristics that people try to predict who will succeed or fail in the sports arena. with this in mind, and naming numerous athletes whose conduct, inside and outside the sports field, contests racial stereotypes such as ‘asians make good footballers’ or ‘excellent white basketball players’, or even ‘good black athletes who speak well for the press’, hylton believes, paradoxically, that ‘the racialised social structures of sport therefore contribute to the way we shape and experience our own and others’ identities’ (2009, p.2). the nationwide identification with the brazilian national team of footballers, known as ‘the selection’, whose performances paralyze the country and whose victories generate massive and troubled celebrations, serves to assist the evocation of a ‘united brazilian nation’, under the same colours, the same idols and the same slogans. and the phrase ‘paralyze the country’ means just that: everything stops, including banks, schools and courts; a ‘national holiday’ is given so that everyone can see ‘the selection’ play ‘the match’. in his constructional definitions relating to the way football is played in brazil, freyre prioritized a number of categories he formulated on the basis of racial characteristics associated with ‘mestization’ (the racial mixing). in the intervening seventy years, the most notable ‘form of being’ of brazilian football is described as ‘football-art’, a term widely used in the media, which ‘valorises’ black / mulattos bodies as its main creators. this category of art, applied to brazilian football, began to take strength when the idea was transformed into part of the way brazil projected itself on a global scale. with the successive triumphs at the world cups in 1958, 1962 and 1970, brazilian football began to be described as ‘a wonderful work of art’ created out of ‘mestization’ and the active participation of the black and mulatto players. the construction of the ‘mulatto’ category was deeply linked to the search for a form, aesthetically different and ‘authentic’, that would reveal the brazilian ethos. in this sense, football, among many other things the dramatization of a combat between bodies appeared as a perfect field in which the ‘true brazilian body’ could finally see ‘the light’. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 63 the history of brazilian football has been considered by many writers as the conflict of ‘football art’ with ‘football force’ behind which, almost always, is sublimated another weighty system of oppositions: the ‘irrationality’ of brazilian society versus the ‘rationality’ that supposedly characterizes europe and the occident in general. for theoreticians of brazilian football, the ideal game is a sort of ‘danced football’ that necessarily must include the possibility for elastic improvisation by the mulattos. in his 1938 paper, freyre argues that our mulatto football, with the artistic floridness whose efficiency – less in defense than in attack – was demonstrated with brilliance during the matches held this year against the polish and the czechoslovakians, is an expression of our social formation, democratic like nothing else and rebellious to excesses of internal and external ordering; to excesses of all that is uniform, geometrical and standardized; to radicalisms which make individual variation or personal spontaneity disappear (1938, p.4). brazilian mulatismo has become known for its taste for flexibility and for surprise and floridness which recall dancing and capoeira steps, particularly its dance elements. it is a dance which allows improvisation, diversity and individual spontaneity. it is a lyrical kind of dance. all these years’ later writers are saying essentially the same thing as freyre said in 1938. in the last decade of the 20th century, there were still writers stating almost the same ideas: ‘while european football is an apollonian expression of a scientific method and socialist sport in which personal action is mechanized and subordinated to the whole, the brazilian is a sort of dance, in which the person is prominent and shines’ (coutinho 1994, pp. 53-60). freyre’s desire to establish a clear distinction between ‘the european’ and ‘the brazilian’, based on a nationalistic strategy, was intended to present a unique and distinctive way of playing football which related to a social structure that was rebellious to excesses of internal and external organization and rebellious to excesses of uniformization and totalitarianisms that militate against individual variation and spontaneity. the orthodox ‘apollonian’ game originating in england has become, according to freyre, in the symbology of brazilian football, ‘a dionysian’ dance. it could also be viewed as a space for resistance, as lefebvre (1991) conceptualizes it: a space where brazilians can resist european influence and be themselves. the fact that brazilians play football everywhere, not just on recognised sports 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 fields, could be seen as a way of resisting foreign influences and of promoting their native mulatto culture. european football, based on values such as objectivity, strength, speed and resistance, would be played according to scientific methods of physical and technical training. the most important unwritten rule would be that the team must follow the tactics of the game, developed beforehand on theory, with sobriety and effectiveness. tactical and athletic discipline constitutes the supreme values. the players must be united and restless, hard to individualize (freyre 1938). football-art, on the other hand, is represented in a very different way. according to freyre (1938), the ‘instinctive’ and ‘natural’ qualities of ability, touch, spontaneity and malice are attributed to the brazilian player. the capacity for improvisation and the importance of individual talent produces a ‘beautiful’ football, a sport of exhibition. as roberto da matta maintains, the division that emerges between the concepts of ‘footballart’ and ‘strength-football’ directly relates to the resistance between ‘western european rationality’ and a society such as brazil which articulates itself to a large extent on the relation between the magical and supernatural world: strength-football expresses a style where the emphasis in rational training is more intense. football-art talks about charisma, luck, malandragem (trickery), game-of-waist, beauty and a carnival-like seduction. on the one hand there is the western idea of exercise as the basis of everything; on the other hand the idea repressed by the liberal and bourgeois capitalist west, of an enchanted world where the gods exist and speak with men (da matta 1995, p.15). this game of oppositions is also transferred to the world of the fans, the other great protagonists in the football celebrations of brazil. in this way, the self-perception the supporters have about how they cheer is closely connected with the aspects (mentioned above) that oppose western rationality against the supposedly ‘irrational essence’ of brazilian society. against the enthusiastic, the musical and dancing fans from brazil there would be the static, cold and critical fans from europe. 9 futebol mulato: freyre’s ideas and football players in brazil world cup years are invariably special years for brazil. the fifa world cup 2010 in south africa was even more special for brazilians for its being the first to be staged in africa, a 9 it is worthwhile to remark that this image would not be accurate considering the violence and damage provoked by europeans fans mainly in the 1980s and 90s (murphy, willians and dunning 1990). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 65 continent with which brazil has a significant cultural identification, particularly because of the creation of the mulatto with its specifically african origins. nevertheless, even nowadays, some opinion makers 'implicitly believe in a whiter brazil, even if it were no longer respectable to talk about it, living with an intellectual legacy from their parents and grandparents and their commitment in relation to racist theories' (skidmore 1993, p. 239). the issue of race is still widely present in brazilian society and receives a great deal of attention from all segments of society. within this perspective, such content could be a part of sports and become highly functional in the political process of imagining the community. by being such a cornerstone of brazilian cultural identity, and to a great extent the product of a political and cultural project headed by the government and the national political classes, football merits consideration in its historical and cultural context and for its role in the creation of brazilian identity. it is for this reason that it is useful to reflect on freyre's discourse on brazilian football and his racial analysis of the game. figueiroa notes that there are, for example, a number of ideas that are constantly repeated: 'the trickster (malandro) style of the brazilian player, with skill' and 'the ballet-like football, of afro-brazilian dance with dribbles' (figueiroa 2003, p. 3). these expressions strongly reflect ideas rooted in the collective national imagination, to the extent that it seems these concepts have always existed, making it impossible to raise any objection to them as ‘facts’. when talking about the 'history of the black in football', one could say that this history is told by 'another person' (freyre in this case) and this means that the discourse either determines the place from whence the black should speak or gives them no voice' (orlandi 1990, p. 50). however, between 1900 and 1930, there was a social movement marking the first fight from a "minority" group (which is the majority in the brazilian historical evolution). this black protest was embodied and flourished in the 1930s, spreading just beyond the subsequent decade. it was suffocated by the difficult conditions under which black people lived and the intolerance of the estado novo in confronting what was in effect “structurally democratic” (fernandes 1989). in this context, the model of 'imagining the brazilian nation' proposed by freyre seeks to solve the problem of integration of immigrants and afro-brazilians: to inculcate the feeling 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 of being part of the nation in these people. the image of mulatto superiority over the 'rigid' europeans, proposed by freyre, found its expression in the dionysius versus apollo opposition, where the mestizo (mulatto) would represent the smart tropical style, a skilful and ludic one which could surpass the hard and disciplined european mode. football provided a powerful way to stimulate a feeling of 'belonging' for the brazilian population; it also spread freyre's ideas regarding the full-fledged, triumphant and, consequently, superior nation of mulattos. this thinking conveyed a nationalist agenda and became highly functional in the process of imagining the community. using football as evidence that in brazil ‘superior race and a superior society’ was being developed, freyre created and imagined a new avenue for the social integration of the black/mulatto in brazilian society – the mulatto football as the symbol of the ‘racial democracy’ (maranhão 2006). the implication here is that the use of this symbolism was deliberately used by political forces to ensure that the power of the elite remained intact. when describing people, freyre excludes the possibility whereby people x could have the characteristics of people y. in other words, he does not explicitly claim that brazilians are undisciplined and disorderly. however, he makes such a claim by implication when he describes europeans as behaving in the opposite manner. europeans would have a rational game due to their 'organization', while brazilians would have a 'distinct' way of playing, representing the disorganization of the country and its afro-brazilian culture. in summary, the unspoken qualities related to 'rationality', 'calculus' and 'order' in brazilian football reflect the same idea with regards to the structure of society. there is, however, the so-called 'silent discourse' in freyre's works. in other words, there are passages where 'it is necessary to say nothing in order to be able to say something' (orlandi 1950, p. 52). an example of this is when brazilian players (that is, brazilian people) are said to have a way of playing that is 'unmistakably, exclusively ours' and the european style is 'calculated, ordered, mathematical, apollonian and british' (freyre 1974, p.6). brazilians are not seen as a disciplined and orderly people. further, when it is claimed that 'they [africans and afro-descendants] are the ones who tend to reduce everything to dancing work or play' (freyre 2001, p. 182), they cannot be considered 'serious' or 'rational'. according freyre, the brazilian players, mainly the mulattos, have introduced the art of playing football, they have developed the beauty and the lightness of dancing with the ball; cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 67 ‘we dance with the ball’, freyre exclaims. no process of identity construction is able to be sustained without the presence of ‘idols’, ‘stars’ or ‘heroes’ who represent the outstanding members the community, those who seem to exceed the limits of the human condition. many mulatto players, in the 1930s were gradually gaining the status of ‘idols’, players like leônidas (the black diamant)10, didi, domingos da guia among many others – in a process which the pinnacle was pelé11 in the end of the 1950s (filho 1964). in brazil, the popularization and massive diffusion of football practices were carried out through the constructions of mulatto idols. it was an abrupt turn that took the ‘not-white ones’ from the being despised to being considered heroes, representatives of the brazilian-ness. brazilians know that they are worldwide recognized as a land of ‘samba and futebol’, which means black/mulatto bodies expressing spectacular performances while dancing and playing. the construction of the brazilian nationality is well connected to the black/mulatto bodies. remembering freyre: ‘psychologically, being a brazilian is being mulatto’. the brazilian political system, during the process of national construction after the ‘revolution’ leaded by vargas ( in 1930), focussed on generating visible spaces, movements and illusional relationships between potentially dangerous sections of society, certainly to serve its interests but, simultaneously, to ensure that the power of the political-economicintellectual elite remained intact. in the centre of this process was ‘mestization’, now seen as constituting the symbolic foundation of the nation and appearing as the point of mediation between different disparate groups and elevated to an ideology of pacification and resolution of conflict. the mulatto has been used to smooth the interracial conflicts in an extremely polarized society. from this perspective, the mulatto works much more as a stereotype to be simultaneously exported and for internal pacification.12 10 leônidas da silva was a celebrated black brazilian player during the 1930s and 40s. the nickname ‘black diamant’ was also the name of a chocolate bar which was introduced at the time to celebrate leônidas and it is still popular today. leônidas was the creator of the bicycle kick, one of the great juggling gestures in football, where the player literally flies with no feet on the ground and back to the goal while kicking the ball over his head. 11 pele, ‘the athlete of the 20th century’, was known as a ‘black with a white soul’ in conservative sectors of brazilian society. football in brazil was first played in the beginning of the 20th century only by the elites in high-society – white – clubs and it was forbidden to blacks / mulattos, some of whom, such as arthur friedenreich, used white powder (makeup) and straightened their hair to look white (filho 1964). 12 florestan fernandes (1989), one of the most world-renewed brazilian social scientists, charged in 1951 to make a study of blacks in brazil to unesco, has researched the relationship between race and class in sao paulo. on that occasion, he threw himself to the confrontation of the idea that in brazil there was a "racial democracy", supported by gilberto freyre. it was one of the first times that freyre’s ideas were confronted by social scientists. after that, in the 1970s, ‘brazil’s black movement would reject this idea (‘racial democracy’) as a ‘myth’ that occluded widespread discrimination’ (alberto 2008, p. 81). 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 at first sight, one might think that freyre's discourse on the black and the mulatto seems to be flattering, that somehow, he sought the perfect brazilian or the eugenic mulatto. in 1976, freyre wrote a note for the second edition13 of the book 'ingleses no brasil' (the english in brazil). it is worth reproducing an excerpt about the changes of football players in brazil: … at first, anglicized brazilians and the natives with some britishness in looks and behavior (…); after, increasingly, the different degrees of the dark-skinned until the deanglicization culminating in the amazing pelé, after having shone in leônidas. it is curious that the process described is the opposite of the proposed eugenic theory of 'whitening' (freyre 1977, p. 15). thus, the aim and the product of miscegenation should be the darkening of the white both culturally and spiritually14 . football, thus, would be the explicit representation of the perfect performance of an ideal 'race'. in world cup seasons that discourse always returns with power. this affirmation derives from the fact that football is, in fact, an event involving the emotions, engaging the whole human being and is indeed part of the construction of the national spirit. evaluation is more plausible during large-scale events such as the world cup, whether for acts of heroism, or for failure and subsequent disappointment. as it is a national issue, when the brazilian national team does not achieve the 'deserved result' in important competitions, there is a tendency to look for those who should be blamed and often the style that was used unsuccessfully is questioned. on many occasions, the playing style is criticized for not being 'the true brazilian style'. after the elimination of the brazilian team in 1990 world cup, when it was defeated by argentina, the so-called 'dunga age' was fiercely criticized. dunga played for brazil in 1990 and was the image of the 'european style'. the brazilian press reacted this way: the attempt to organize brazilian football failed, leaving the natural talent and improvising skills, in favour of a more rigid standard of defensive play, that of the european style. brazil 13 the second edition is dated 1977. 14 even if this process of darkness smoothly occurred in the brazilian society, with a very slow integration of black people within the society, nowadays black/mulatto are still at the bottom of the social pyramid, they are the majority of the poor people. positives agendas and inclusive policies are in place in some spheres of the brazilian society (such as the public higher education sector) in order to compensate hundreds of years of black oppression. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 69 was eliminated (…) the ‘dunga age’ hasn't come (…) the advantage of the defeat is the necessity to re-evaluate those concepts of tough football.15 some social groups, in such a context, use images that are available in the cultural sphere and re-use them (originally or not) to qualify magnanimities and frustrations. hence, all discussion about football in brazil carries an evaluative meaning, a conducer of traces of discrimination, judgment, distinction, prejudice and taboo. it is no exaggeration to say that freyre’s texts inaugurated a tradition of cultural studies in social sciences in the field of football. it is clear that his thinking has influenced the writing of the history of sport in brazilian by writers such as mario filho and nelson rodrigues, both of whom were friends of freyre. this tradition continues to the present day in the work of authors such as roberto da matta, josé sergio leite lopes, simoni guedes, antônio jorge soares, josé miguel wisnik and others who, adopting or responding to freyre’s ideas, are engaged in a dialogue with his work on ‘foot-ball mulatto’. this indicates how important and perennial this theme is. on deeper reflection, it may be possible to reveal what is meant by the term ‘brazilian’ through freyre's discourse on football. his concept of what is to be brazilian created an idea of brazilian-ness which remained in the intellectual and popular representations throughout the twentieth century, and remains so in the twenty-first century. brazil failed again in the south africa fifa world cup in 2010. the brazilian team’s coach in south africa was dunga, the player who was the symbol of the ‘anti-brazilian style’ during the 1990s. brazilian fans and press, and indeed the world of football (fans, press, and commentators around the world) complained that the team was not playing ‘like brazilians’. in all the criticism ran the thread of freyre: everybody expects that brazilians should play in the mulatto style. his ideas about being brazilian remain with us, influencing the new century. acknowledgements the authors would like to acknowledge dr bob petersen (‘gentleman bruiser’) and mr. brett johnson for the substantial comments and insights they made during the preparation of this essay. 15 o dia newspaper, 25 june 1990, p.3. four years later, in 1994 at the end of the us world cup, brazil was the champion, and dunga, as the national team’s captain, raised the cup. before and after him, every national team’s captain had kissed the cup, as a gesture of love. he was the only captain among the five world cups that brazil won who, instead of kissing the cup, has blamed everybody, yelling against his ‘detractors’, the ones he hated: the brazilian press and journalists. 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 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http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia freedom of political communication in australia: the aid/watch case introduction the right to freedom of political communication is central to democratic life – without it, representative democracy is seriously debilitated. in australia its existence rests on the high court interpretation of the australian constitution, and its extension across political life is subject to case law. only if a case is brought to the high court and won on the basis of the ‘implied’ freedom, can it come to life as a meaningful entitlement. consequently, many aspects of australian political expression remain severely curtailed. one example is the mainstream media – where freedom of political communication is deeply compromised by the concentration of media ownership. another is in the field of political expression, where access to public space for political debate is routinely denied, as most recently demonstrated in the silencing of the ‘occupy’ movement, deemed a public nuisance. this special issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal deals with a recently successful initiative to claim freedom of political communication, in the arena of charitable advocacy. historically, charities have been banned from having a dominant political purpose. with the 2010 aid/watch high court judgement, that ban has been lifted. the judgement has wide implications for political life in australia. remarkably, the high court stated that ‘“agitation” for legislative and political change’ is now protected under the australian constitution. charities, indeed any grouping in australia, have the right to participate in political debate and agitate for political change, as part of the system of representative democracy. the special issue addresses several aspects of the case. first, george williams, from the gilbert and tobin centre of public law at unsw, covers the constitutional implications, arguing that any attempt to curtail freedom of political speech and freedom of political ‘agitation’ for charities can now be ‘struck down’ by the high court as unconstitutional. two lawyers in the case, giri sivaraman and david barnden, from maurice blackburn, likewise stress the constitutional aspects, also arguing the judgement extends protection to public debate concerning the extra-territorial impacts of australian government policy, in this case as relating to overseas aid. fiona martin, from the australian school of taxation at unsw, outlines the pre-existing stipulation that advocacy could only be a means of realising non-political charitable goals. a sharp contrast is drawn with the aid/watch judgement, that defines ‘the generation by lawful means of public debate’ as having intrinsic public benefit, and thus to be in itself a charitable purpose. again, martin stresses the constitutional basis for the judgement. matthew harding, from the university of melbourne law school, undertakes a forensic interpretation of the judgement, seeking its limits. he highlights the question of what constitutes ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 ‘public debate’, outlining how the judgement protects ‘agitation’, including campaigning and activism as undertaken by aid/watch, as a key component of representative democracy, but does not extend protection to lobbying groups or political parties. finally, myself, james goodman, from the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre, at the university of technology, sydney and long-time member of the aid/watch committee of management, offers an ‘inside’ account of the aid/watch case from 2006 to 2011. my objective in this lengthy narrative is to map the process of translating across legal and political activisms in realising political agency, and thus in extending the ‘politics of rights’ in australia. we are left with the broader implications. harding comments that charity law is ‘in many ways the centrepiece of civil society regulation in australia’. this begs the question of what impacts the judgement will indeed have on civil society – both for charities and more widely. the right to ‘agitation’ defined in the aid/watch case has already being taken up by lawyers contesting the use of council by-laws against the recent ‘occupy’ protests, with cases now filed and pending in the federal courts, both in melbourne and sydney. if the activism of aid/watch is constitutionally protected, then why not the activism of ‘occupy’? as george williams states in this special issue, the right to freedom of communication now extends to the ‘provocation of public debate with a view to generating support for legal and policy change’. this is exactly what the occupy protest was undertaking. james goodman november 2011 freedom of political communication in australia: the aid/watch case 132 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 individualized responsibility and climate change: ‘if climate protection becomes everyone’s responsibility, does it end up being no-one’s?’1 jennifer kent abstract whereas global compacts, such as the kyoto protocol, have yet to consolidate action from governments on climate change, there has been increasing emphasis and acknowledgement of the role of individuals (as citizens and consumers) as contributors to climate change and as responsible agents in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. recently, along with the acknowledgement of the threat that anthropogenic climate change presents to the planet, governments and non-government organizations have focused on personal responsibility campaigns targeting individuals and households with a view to stemming the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. the australian government, for example, spent $25 million in 2007 on the climate change information campaign targeted to every australian household, ‘be climate clever: “i can do that”. such measures centre on “personal, private-sphere ….. behaviour” (stern 2005, p. 10786) that focuses on the “choice of goods, services and lifestyles” (wwf-uk 2008: 10) and imply that global greenhouse gas emission reduction targets can be met through the actions of individuals. there is growing concern in some quarters about climate change programs that emphasize individual behaviour change strategies that use “simple and painless steps” (wwf-uk 2008) and “small steps add up” (accountability and consumers international 2007) approaches. the emergent fear is that given the urgency of the climate change problem that such approaches will mean important opportunities for citizen-led action will be lost. this paper will explore how notions of individual responsibility have arisen and what the trend towards individualized responsibility may mean for active citizenship on climate change. introduction concern about human-induced climate change has grown over the last few decades and it is now widely considered to be ‘the greatest threat to humanity’ (hansen et al. 2008; hansen 2007; watkins 2007). whilst global compacts, such as the kyoto protocol (which australia ratified in 2008), have yet to produce concerted actions from governments on climate change, there is a growing rhetoric concerning the role of individuals (as both citizens and consumers) in contributing to and, thereby, bearing responsibility for, climate change. 1 the title comes from bulkeley and moser 2007, p.8. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 133 responses to climate change mitigation within australia are increasingly relying on individual actions and commitments to behaviour change at the personal and household level. the australian government further entrained the individual responsibility model through its 2007 $25 million climate clever campaign, titled, be climate clever: “i can do that” (daily telegraph 2007). this is but one example, however, of how people (on a personal or household level) are being called upon to take on the mantle for greenhouse gas abatement (see accountability and consumers international 2007; bickerstaff & walker 2002, p. 2189). furthermore, personal responsibility based climate change programs are not solely government initiated; there is an ever growing range of individual and community based programs designed to assist australians at a personal and household level to reduce their carbon footprints. wwf’s earth hour campaign, for example, relies on business and community engagement to undertake climate change action by turning off lights for one hour on one day of the year. news limited’s 1 degree program employs a website (www.1degree.com.au ) to encourage individual action on climate change. a more sophisticated approach is typified by the australian conservation foundation (2007) ‘consuming australia’ report which attributes all of the environmental impacts from the production and consumption of goods and services we consume to the level of each australian household, implying that large scale, complex and “messy” (garnaut 2008) problems, such as climate change, become solvable through individual consumer choice and action. recently, however, it has been proposed that individuals taking responsibility for efforts to reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere through the adoption of “simple and painless steps” (wwf-uk 2008), will not create the essential and very substantial reductions needed to avert dangerous climate change (accountability and consumers international 2007; wwf-uk 2008). wwf-uk (2008 p. 5) uses the term ‘simple and painless steps’ to describe approaches that “encourag[e] individuals to adopt simple and painless behavioural changes” with the presumption that this, in turn, will motivate individuals to “engage in more significant changes”. accountability and consumers international have identified a similar issue in relation to the rapid and profligate rise in consumer-focused climate change abatement programs (2007, p. 41). these programs generally require individuals and households to take “small steps” towards http://www.1degree.com.au/� 134 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 lower carbon-intensive lifestyles, such as turning off household lights and purchasing energy saving appliances. they argue that a “small steps add up” approach whereby the expectation is that such actions will lead to more meaningful and extensive behaviour change, will fail to make significant impacts against the “scale and urgency” of emerging climate change. climate change and individual responsibility the intergovernmental panel on climate change’s most recent assessment states that the warming of the earth’s climate caused by greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions “is unequivocal” (ipcc 2007a, p. 2). there has been a 70% increase in ghg emissions between 1970 and 2004 (ipcc 2007b, p. 3). observed temperature changes are accelerating increases to global sea levels; causing the melting of glacial ice flows and polar ice sheets; creating changes in the natural cycles of plants and animals; and impacting on the health and welfare of human beings (ipcc 2007a). under current mitigation practices and policies, anthropogenic ghg emissions will continue to rise. the ipcc’s latest assessment projects an increase of 25-90% between 2000 and 2030 (ipcc 2007a, p. 7). effectively the current economic, technological and social conditions that underpin energy supply and use globally today create an enormous inertia, resisting effective change. prominent climate scientists, such as james hansen of nasa’s goddard institute, predict that the current level of greenhouse gases in the earth’s atmosphere already commit the planet to 2 degrees of warming (hansen et al. 2008) the level considered the cut off for ‘dangerous climate change’ ( see defra 2005) irrespective of the mitigation measures taken. recent dramatic changes to late summer sea ice in the arctic provide evidence that the real changes occurring in the earth’s natural systems are at least at the highest predicted ipcc scenario or beyond (hansen et al. 2008; wwf 2008). hansen (2008) describes the current situation as being critically balanced between a ‘tipping point’ and ‘the point of no return’ and proposes that the window of opportunity for reducing ghg emissions to a level that would offset catastrophic climate change lies within the next two decades. hansen et al. (2008) propose that carbon dioxide levels within the atmosphere would need to be reduced to 350 parts per million (ppm) to avoid dangerous climate change which sits well below the ipcc (2007), stern review (2007) and garnaut cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 135 climate change review (2008) recommendations of 450 – 550 ppm. despite the growing evidence that our current carbon-intensive lifestyles place us on a trajectory towards catastrophic climactic change by the end of the 21st century, political reticence towards making deep cuts in ghg emissions remains. professor bob watson, one of britain’s leading scientific advisors, has suggested that people should be prepared to adapt to a 4 degree rise in temperature (randerson 2008), a level considered by hansen et al. (2008, p.1), to result in “irreversible catastrophic effects”. so, whilst the dominant contemporary climate change discourse is couched in rationalist scientific and economic terms, policymakers consistently state that any successful ghg emission mitigation strategy will require significant changes in individual lifestyles and behaviours (ipcc 2007b, p.12; see also stern 2007; garnaut 2008). jensen (2009, p.216) argues that “lifestyle” is a “concept … commonly used as something that needs to be changed if we want to achieve sustainable development” but which is rarely concretely defined. for example, whose lifestyles require changing and what aspects of people’s lives are considered to make up “lifestyles”? jensen goes on to propose that problems of a global nature suggest that solutions need to engage at the individual level, so that “a global problem means that every single individual is involved” (2009, p. 217). this implies that every single individual’s life must change in some way in order for us to avoid the most severe consequences of global climate change. i understand from jensen’s proposition that everyone on earth is expected to bear the burden of abating dangerous climate change. indeed, social research studies have shown that people want to take pro-environmental action at a personal and household level (accountability and consumers international 2007; accountability and net balance foundation 2008; lorenzoni & pidgeon 2006). concern about climate change is evident in the community and growing and there is a strong desire to make individual contributions to combating climate change (the climate institute 2007; australian research group 2006). the ‘what assures consumers on climate change?’ reports (accountability and consumers international 2007; accountability and net balance foundation 2008) list a diverse group of mass awareness raising campaigns and ‘communities of change’ operating in the uk, usa and australia which focus on individual and household level actions. 136 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 yet this growing sense of urgency surrounding the effects of global warming is failing to translate into an international groundswell of socially and politically engaged public citizens (norgaard 2009). responsibility to understand the advent of the notion of individual responsibility within contemporary society, and it’s more recent association to climate change mitigation, it is necessary to try to unpack its historical and theoretical roots, which i will briefly attempt here. responsibility is an expansive concept, not readily defined. it communicates ideas of accountability or blame (bickerstaff & walker 2002), duty and dependability, ideas that sit comfortably as broad moral principles for human action. in general, two aspects of responsibility are recognized: 1. responsibility as it relates to justice and law. this implies duties and obligations and is often expressed as complementary to rights so that where rights exist, responsibilities are created (caney 2006; singer 2002, 2006; bickerstaff & walker 2002). 2. according to auhagen and bierhoff (2000, p.2), responsibility is also a psychological phenomenon which works both at the personal level (as self-control and free will) but also relates at a societal level. apart from the creation of obligations or duties as described above, it also implies “ethical and moral values or caring” (2000, p. 3). responsibility is, therefore, necessarily socially mediated, i.e. as responsibility involves duties, obligations or care there is implied some relationship with ‘the other’ (bickerstaff & walker 2002, p. 2188). according to birnbacher, these two constructions of responsibility can be traced historically with the first derived from early greek philosophy from where it became systematized for legal purposes (2000, p. 9). this “post-responsibility” established responsibility for some act after the fact and is aligned with responsibility as a kind of moral or legal obligation (2000, p. 14). the second, “ante-responsibility”, is a more recent philosophical concern, which is “prospective and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 137 future-oriented” (birnbacher 2000, p.10) and often described as akin to a duty. responsibilities of this type tend to be “unprescribed”, that is, the “exact nature of the act is left unspecified… which leaves room for discretion and choice” (2000, p. 10). this more recent conception of responsibility, as described by birnbacher (2000), has much in common with modern social theories of individualization (explored below). “anteresponsibility” is also a potent concept in relation to individualized responsibility for climate change. the impacts of climate change (as described above) are based on scenarios that predict environmental and social conditions of the future (ipcc climate models predict up to the year 2100) yet according to emerging scientific understanding of climatic change, action to make deep cuts to greenhouse gas emissions needs to be taken now (by, say 2020). an anteresponsibility for climate change would, therefore, place a duty of care on the current generation for averting dangerous climate change with the aim that future generations would benefit from such action. further understandings of why contemporary interest focuses on individual responsibility for climate change remain largely under-theorised. principally two threads of argument can be drawn from the politico-economic and social theory literatures: individual responsibility as an attribute of neoliberalism; and as a process of individualization. individual responsibility in contemporary society the neoliberalist conception of individual responsibility arose in the 1970s and has since been embraced globally (harvey, 2006). neoliberalism, as defined by harvey, “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, free markets and free trade" (2006, p.145). the political economic ideologies of margaret thatcher in the uk and ronald reagan in the usa, characterized by the dismantling of the social security net and “the passing of all responsibility for their well-being to individuals and their families” (2006, p.151) are commonly quoted exemplars of neoliberalism. 138 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 drawn from the neoliberal, capitalist tradition, individual responsibility now resonates much more widely, becoming a familiar catchcry of politicians, bureaucrats and ngos, including environmental organizations. furthermore, calls for individual responsibility are universally appealing – at least within western democratic societies, where examples are rife. governments increasingly call on their citizens to take greater responsibility across a broad spectrum of societal concerns: whether it is to take charge of one’s own obesity, employment and education, safety from crime (o’malley 2001) and terrorism (sydney morning herald 2008), or harm to the environment. when barack obama called for “individual responsibility and mutual responsibility”, i suggest that he was appealing to a sentiment that already resonates deeply, not only with the american public but also the rest of the democratic world. indeed this supports harvey’s case that “neoliberalism has, in short, become hegemonic as a mode of discourse, and had pervasive effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way we interpret, live in and understand the world" (harvey 2006, p.145). individualized responsibility for climate change in a neoliberal interpretation therefore infers that this political ideology now extends into individual lifestyle choices and behaviours as it “connects with much in ordinary moral thinking; and it is intuitively plausible that justice has something to do with people getting what they are responsible for and not benefiting or being burdened by good and bad luck” (matravers 2007, p.73). in individualization: plant a tree, buy a bike, save the world? maniates (2002) sets forth the idea that the “individualization of responsibility” threatens to seriously undermine effective action to curtail life-threatening environmental concerns by creating a disjunction between “our morals and our practices” (2002, p.51). he argues that the individualization of responsibility focuses on the person as consumer rather than citizen and that the “ten simple things to save the planet” (2002, p.50) approach positions the individual within the comfort zone of consumerism, diverting people from more important environmental and citizen-led democratic action, and hiding the power disparity between citizens, governments and corporations (2002, pp.57-8). maniates proposes that the individualization of responsibility depoliticizes environmental degradation as consumer action replaces political action which strives to change the institutions cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 139 that “drive pervasive consumerism” (2002, p.51). maniates considers global negotiations to address environmental problems to represent only the interests of governments and corporations, whilst those same actors suggest that sustainability can be achieved through “private, individual, well-intentioned consumer choice” (2002, p.58). in his view this reveals the power and institutional barriers to achieving change through individual consumption choices, as these choices are “constrained, shaped and framed by institutions and political forces that can be remade only through collective citizen action, as opposed to individual consumer behaviour” (2002, pp.65-6). if we are to accept jensen’s (2009) proposition that global issues require every single individual to contribute to a solution, for maniates this can only be achieved through collective, democratic action. individualization, globalization and risk the risk theorists bauman, beck and giddens, draw on the notion of individualization as a defining feature of postmodern society. according to beck, the breakdown in social classes; greater competition for jobs; and the collapse of traditional family structures, contribute to the growing liberation of individuals as the agents of their own life courses (beck 1992, p.88). individualization for beck then becomes a “double-edged sword” creating “greater choice and autonomy” but also “the burden of continual decision and responsibility” (mythen 2004, p.119). institutions are also playing a role in establishing greater responsibility for individuals as there are now many more expectations placed by governments on their citizenry to take responsibility for areas which previously would have been more acceptably under state control. this has set in place an acceptance for less state intervention and greater responsibility for individuals on a wide range of social issues, so that: "many features, functions and activities which were previously assigned to the nation state, the welfare state, hierarchical organization, the nuclear family, the class, the centralized trade union, are now transferred inward and outward: outwards to global or international organizations; inward to the individual" (beck 2007, p. 682). 140 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 the accelerating processes of globalization and technological change are creating the conditions within society that form two intersecting paths. on the one hand, “individualized life paths that are increasingly reliant on individual choice and reflexivity” and on the other, the global distribution of risk (mythen 2004, p.118). individualization, which “is imposed on the individual by modern institutions" (beck 2007, p.681), shares much with the neoliberalist interpretation provided above, except that it formulates around conditions of risk. so postindustrial society, which held the promise of wealth and wellbeing as a by-product of techno-scientific development, paradoxically has given rise to risks that are pervasive and deadly. these risks are not limited within state borders, are often invisible and can impact across generations. beck commonly draws on global climate change, nuclear contamination, genetically modified organisms (gmos) and toxic chemicals as exemplars of such risks. in response to the ‘risk society’ (beck 1992) what emerges is “‘organised irresponsibility’ …..[where] there are a diversity of humanly created risks for which people and organizations are certainly ‘responsible’ in a sense that they are its authors but where no one is held specifically accountable” (giddens 1999, p.9). thus individualized responsibility shifts from being a reflexive moral imperative to a set of personal practices divorced from their social moorings that neither “sustain [n]or challenge the structuring of criteria for value in society” (scerri 2009, p.478), “a kind of artificial ethics-lite” (2009, p.477). in many respects harvey, maniates and beck align on contemporary theories of individualized responsibility: in short, each views the processes of neoliberalism as having grown out of globalization and the distribution of risks and responsibilities from the state to individuals as key forces for individualization. i propose however that the risk theorists, exemplified by beck, extend the understanding of individualized responsibility, one which may go some way to explain why the call for individual responsibility finds few social critics. the seeming paradox of individualization not only creates individual responsibility (for example where the state may withdraw from social interventions) but requires it, as people find themselves set adrift from their traditional supportive social structures. whereas the neoliberalist critique provides a rather cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 141 negative understanding of this individualizing process, for beck, the removal of societal constrictions opens up new possibilities. as individualization frees agents from structural restraints, so is created the potential for individuals (as social agents) to actively engage with and change the prevailing social structure. so that “structural change forces social actors to become progressively more free from structure” opening the potential for modernization to advance as “these agents must release themselves from structural constraint and actively shape the modernization process" (lash & wynne quoted in beck 1992, p.2). beck infers that individualization is a means to greater democratic control and thereby a precursor to a new social order. this account of individualization is positive and affirming, and together with the morally desirable characteristics attributed to responsibility (auhagen & bierhoff 2000) may go some way to explain why in principle people find the idea of taking individual responsibility for environmental action appealing. however critics of beck, such as mythen, challenge his normative stance asking that: “we might reasonably request the evidence of a linear link between risk, behavioural change and political activity” (2004, p.46) and suggesting beck’s promise of social transformation is dependent on the “emancipatory capacity which beck attaches to risk society” which relies “upon the durability of the link between risk consciousness and political action” (2004, p.47). empirical psychological and sociological evidence of individual attitudes and behaviours towards global climate risk conditions (considered in the following section) suggest that the processes of transformative social change are yet to emerge. just how willing and able are individuals to act on climate change? a considerable body of social research now exists to deepen our understanding of people’s willingness to undertake actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. accountability and consumers international (2007) surveyed 2,734 people in the us and uk and found that 66% of consumers agreed that individuals need to take responsibility for their contribution to climate change. a more recent survey of 1000 australians found even higher levels – 81% of australian consumers agreed that everyone needs to take more responsibility for their personal contribution to global warming (accountability, net balance foundation and lrqa 2008, p.11). the 142 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 frequently reported types of actions taken are: turning off lights and appliances around the home and buying more energy efficient light bulbs and appliances (accountability and consumers international 2007, accountability, net balance foundation and lrqa 2008). actions requiring greater commitments of time and money, for example, buying green energy for the home or using a carbon calculator to measure a household’s greenhouse emissions were the least likely to be adopted (accountability and consumers international 2007, accountability, net balance foundation and lrqa 2008). in a similar vein, an european study noted that citizens were most likely to state that they had undertaken “passive” actions in relation to the environment that are conducive with the conduct of their daily lives (european commission 2008: 12) rather than “active” ones: “using their car less (17%) and environmentally sensible consumption in terms of buying environmentally friendly products (17%) or locally produced products (21%). these “active” actions are also issues that worry europeans the least (european commission 2008, p.12). pidgeon et al. argue that despite the increased interest and concern regarding climate change in the uk it “remains a low priority for most people in relation to other personal and social issues” (2008, p. 73). they note the “discrepancy between individuals’ intentions to mitigate and their actual behaviours; while people indicate frequently that they are willing to recycle and save energy in the home, only a minority of people do take measures to reduce their energy consumption for environmental reasons” (2008, p.73). the accountability surveys on what assures consumers on climate change (accountability and consumers international 2007, for uk and usa and accountability, net balance foundation and lrqa 2008, for australia), when mapping level of concern regarding climate change against level of action identified large discrepancies. in the us and uk research 75% stated that they were concerned about global warming “but challenged to see how their action could make a difference” and only 9% indicated both concern and willingness to take action (p. 26). in the australian research an equal number expressed concern but not willingness to act (75%), whereas a higher number expressed willingness to take action (21%) (p. 20). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 143 this inconsistency between individuals’ stated intentions and their actions (the “value-action” gap) has been widely described (blake 1999; kollmus & agyeman 2002; macnaghten 2003; darnton 2006; norgaard 2009). there is a range of barriers proposed that contribute to the gap. one of the most potent, and key to this discussion, is that people feel that they lack the ability or sense of empowerment to undertake actions that will ‘make the difference’ on climate change. why individuals are failing to integrate scientific information regarding climate change into effective forms of social action has recently been explored by norgaard (2009) and räthzel and uzzell (2009). they point to people’s perception of their fundamental ineffectiveness on global climate change action as they feel less responsible for those matters that are least under their personal control. räthzel and uzzell’s (2009) research focuses on the spatial biasing of individuals’ felt responsibility. in considering environmental degradation on a scale from the local to the global, their research subjects felt most responsible for local issues and least responsible for global ones. concomitantly they perceived that their local environments suffer the least environmental degradation whilst global environments are the worst impacted. “ironically, then, although people feel that they are responsible for the environment at the local level this is precisely the level at which they perceive minimal problems. the areal level which they perceive has the most serious environmental problems is the areal level about which they feel least personally responsible and powerless to influence or act" (2009, p. 328). these feelings of powerlessness are further entrained as people realize their inability to effect global change through their individual agency, calling on their governments to act (bickerstaff & walker 2002; macnaghten 2003; lorenzoni & pidgeon 2006; pidgeon et al. 2008; bickerstaff et al. 2008; norgaard 2009). however people also understand global degradation as symptomatic of weak political action (räthzel & uzzell 2009, p.329), so not only do individuals perceive an unacceptable level of action from governments on climate change mitigation they are also cynical that governments are genuinely serious about climate change as it is understood to be against their economic interests (darnton 2006, p.24; accountability and consumers international 2007). therefore, governments and global institutions in demonstrating that they are ill-equipped to deal with complex global problems such as climate change, unveil “the possibility that those political 144 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 and economic structures that have been set in place are inadequate to handle the problem” (norgaard 2009, p.30). the global financial crisis and lack of a global agreement for avoiding catastrophic climate change (which beck encapsulates within “organized responsibility”) support this contention. these persistent expressions of individuals’ subjection on climate change (drawn from the psycho-social evidence) are inconsistent with beck’s supposition that actors are freed through the conditions of the risk society to construct their own life courses, as this presupposes that actors possess the authority within their life realms that allow them to influence and overcome the prevailing cultural and structural conditions (norgaard 2009, räthzel & uzzell 2009). from small steps to big change? the evidence provided by psycho-social research supports theories of individualization in postmodern society as individualized responsibility for climate change mitigation now resonates deeply within individuals in australia, europe, uk and the usa. relying on ‘simple and painless steps’ to deliver the world from catastrophic climate change, however, is a flawed prospect as it is clear that the limited range of “passive” actions people are currently willing to make will fail to bring about the deep cuts in greenhouse gas emissions required (wwf-uk 2008). moreover faced with a global climate crisis, individual actors’ feelings of futility come to the fore. so whilst comfortable in undertaking “personal, private sphere” behaviours to mitigate climate change, actors are (perhaps, understandably) reticent to broaden their spheres of authority further. whilst there may be a compelling case for individual responsibility, not the least being the seriousness of the problem at hand, the very significant reductions in greenhouse gases needed, and the willingness of people to play their part, a reliance on personal contributions to greenhouse gas reductions may hinder the development of effective global policy and action whilst diverting public attention from engaging fully in civil society (bulkeley & moser 2007; accountability and consumers international 2007; goldspink & kay 2007; wwf 2008). the public desire for institutional accountability for climate change mitigation (whilst governments meanwhile demand individual responsibility) raises issues for the public of institutional trust, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 145 capability and duty of care (beck 1992; bickerstaff & walker 2002; bickerstaff et al. 2008; macnaghten 2003; pidgeon et al. 2008). it also alerts the individual to the uneven power relationships that operate between the individual and the state and other institutions (maniates 2002; bickerstaff et al. 2008; scerri 2009) as well as people’s actions being constrained by the structural components of, for example, energy supply (wilhite et al. 2000). successful social movements need to jointly build on individuals’ choice and freewill in order to respond to climate change, as well as deliver the means for linking up personal with societal level action. current emphasis on individual responsibility is unhelpful in this regard as it fails to provide a useful framework for local/global linkages on complex global risks and downplays the “social and political relations which are the glue that hold together our understanding and actions on the world” (räthzel & uzzell 2009, p.328). is the paradox that high levels of concern regarding climate change, unmatched by action, symptomatic that the individualization of responsibility is being created without the ability for actors to effectively engage in societal change? scerri (2009) argues that it is the forces of modernization that have promoted individualism as an essential contemporary societal trait but without the reflexivity required to establish effective forms of collective democratic control. in this assessment people’s failure to act as citizens is as hardwired as the conditions that created the desire to act in the first place, deflected in rampant consumerism. so whereas people feel individually responsible for environmental degradation, “personal acts of consumption stand-in for citizen’s ethico-political commitments” (2009, p.475). individuation rather than enhancing agency alerts individuals to their essential ineffectiveness in tackling complex global environmental issues (pigeon et al. 2008, p.75). in essence atomistic agents are created that lack the efficacy and authority to make change (macnaghten 2003; bickerstaff & walker 2002; bickerstaff et al. 2008; lorenzoni and pidgeon 2006; norgaard 2009). norms of individualization in contemporary western culture “make it difficult to politicize ethical commitments because devaluing links between (private) morality and (collective) reasons for acting” (scerri 2009, p. 469). a type of “psycho-social dislocation” (räthzel & uzzell 2009, p.333) forms under such circumstances rooted in the dichotomies between the individual and the social and the local and the global. 146 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 two potential scenarios are thus exposed: one where an ambivalence to personal action is created, where people “choose not to choose” as they feel disempowered and ineffective in the face of the global climate challenge (macnaghten 2003, p.77). the other sees actors not only as individuals but also as “the sum of their social relations to others and the environment” (räthzel & uzzell 2009, p.328) who seek out social and institutional relationships that can expand their individual authority through collective action. there is a growing range of promising societal projects, such as the transition town movement, which can translate “reductionist individualism” into collective alternative low energy futures (räthzel & uzzell 2009, p.334). within australia the burgeoning of over a hundred local community climate action groups over recent years provides similar optimism that democratic responses to the climate change crisis can transcend the dominant individualism discourse. (see www.climatemovement.org.au for an extensive listing.) as community dissatisfaction grows with continuing international government inaction in the lead up to the copenhagen conference to negotiate a post kyoto climate treaty, the emergence of global mobilizing networks that target local-based action, such as 350.org (see www.350.org ), provide further indication that perhaps the social transformation that beck describes is surfacing. conclusion at this juncture of the climate change debate understandings and negotiations over responsibility are becoming critically important – however, there has been little deliberation over how the burdens and responsibilities of global warming mitigation will be shared and linked from personal level action to the global. several views on individualized responsibility have been put forward here that contribute to this debate. birnbacher (2000) suggests that individual responsibility exists in the form of a duty of care towards future generations. could this moral imperative be garnered to overcome political inertia in the face of the impending climate crisis? neoliberalism has generated rationalist models of individual responsibility towards environmental problems which rely on freedom of choice and freewill and encouraged through consumerism. whilst such prescriptions are hegemonic in current societal approaches to climate change abatement, serious concerns are now being raised on the ability of individuals as consumers to bring about the significant changes in carbon reduction required. individualization http://www.climatemovement.org.au/� http://www.350.org/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 147 arising from globalization and technology-induced risk society opens the possibility for individuals to extend their spheres of authority as social agents through collective action and to re-balance the power inequities evident in current climate change regimes. each of these nuanced insights into responsibility extend our grasp of how human action may be garnered to abate the worst impacts of global climate change: as moral agents willing to take action now on behalf of future generations; as political agents engaging in citizen rather than consumer-based action; and as social agents seeking to influence and construct alternative social and institutional associations. references accountability and consumers international 2007, what assures consumers on climate change? switching on citizen power, http://www.accountability21.net/whatassures. accountability, net balance foundation and lrqa 2008 what assures consumers in australia on climate change?: switching on citizen power. 2008 update – australian survey,’ http://www.accountability21.net/ auhagen, a.e. and bierhoff, h-w. 2000, ‘responsibility as a fundamental human phenomenon’ in auhagen, a.e. & bierhoff, h-w. 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(eds.) society, behaviour and climate change mitigation, kluwer, dordrecht, pp.109-126. wwf-uk 2008, weathercocks and signposts. the environment movement at a crossroad, www.wwf.org.uk/strategiesforchange accessed 29/05/08. wwf 2008, climate change: faster, stronger, sooner. a european update on climate science, www.panda.org/eu accessed 30/11/08. http://www.demconvention.com/barack-obama/� http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment%20/2008/aug/06%20/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange� http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment%20/2008/aug/06%20/climatechange.scienceofclimatechange� http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task%20=view&id=43&itemid=41� http://www.climateinstitute.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&task%20=view&id=43&itemid=41� http://www.wwf.org.uk/strategiesforchange� http://www.panda.org/eu� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia move on, move on! what it is to be chinese in australia today chek ling abstract the chinese are all right now. on the whole the mainstream population is quite relaxed about the chinese presence in their midst. that of course was not the case for the 100 years to the end of wwii. and so it should come as no surprise that now and again old scars will resurface. yet the chinese have metamorphosed in the psyche of mainstream australia: honorary whites like li cunxin, lionized professionals like victor chang, are neon-lit signs of this change. all the same, as a huayi (overseas chinese) immigrant, my observations over the last 50 years have compelled me to conclude that there is one last gate for the present-day chinese to walk through, and that it is time for the remaining rearguards of white australia to consciously remove themselves from that gate. lambing flat has lain in my subconscious, ever since i first heard of it some forty years prior. at the time, i would have been hard at it, trying to make a life in australia, as an engineer, a situation i did not enjoy, having studied engineering by accident and not finding it to my liking after the first week. i had flown into melbourne, on a colombo plan scholarship, a week or two before the lectures started in 1962, from sarawak, the soon to be abandoned british colony. sarawak had been the private fiefdom of three generations of the brooke family of great britain, until the end of the second world war. my wife, a fifth generation victorian of anglo-scottish heritage, was probably the one who told me about lambing flat, early in our marriage. but at the time i had neither the intellectual grounding nor the inclination to delve into it. all the same, geoffrey blainey’s campaign against asian immigration in 1984 was to indelibly etch in my psyche the recurrent question of what it is to be a chinese in contemporary australia. lambing flat is hundreds and hundreds of miles away from melbourne or brisbane, the two cities where i have lived to make a living. it is however just two hours by car from canberra where two of our children then worked in 2008. 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 the heat of summer was behind us, at last. we have both retired. so it was time to spend a day in the town of young, to see lambing flat in the flesh, after all these years, during our visit to canberra. we got to the information centre in young and got the ‘fact sheets’ for lambing flat. twenty minutes later, on the side of the now gravelly road, we noticed a sign almost camouflaged under the gum trees. ‘welcome to the lambing flat chinese tribute gardens’, with the two chinese characters, 欢 迎 . a little submarine emerged from the depth of my soul. lambing flat was the scene of the best-known, and most persistently-planned persecution of the chinese gold seekers in 19th century australia. yet not a word of that history was to be found in or near the ‘tribute gardens’. what happened? … i wondered, quietly. a plaque tells us about the history of chinaman’s dam that is now part of the beautiful lake in the tribute gardens. not a word more. the fact sheets at the information centre give us the history of how the gardens came about in the 1990s and how they became dedicated: ‘in recognition of the contribution of the chinese community to the settlement of young in the 1860s and to the ongoing contributions of the chinese people (community) to australia as a nation.’ the word, community, appears in a second fact sheet, in place of the word, people. … hmm… perhaps a hint of disorientation about a community, a race, and even a nation? cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 3 i can’t help feeling that the dark side of lambing flat has been whited out, in the rush to refashion the memory of the early chinese in the souls of white australia. it must have been still too raw for many white australians to acknowledge that dark shadow of our nation’s birth, as there had been no wake for the midnight burial of white australia, no memorial service for its passing. … no doubt it is much easier for the uncleansed soul to just ‘move on’ instead. the gardens are beautiful, oasised in the wilderness that has now reclaimed the desecrated terrain left behind by the early miners and pastoralists: serene, generous in space, and just a little quaint in one respect – a small chinese pavilion with its loud colours on the top of a rise, reached by a meandering path leading from a stone bridge across a narrow part of the lake. so here in the outskirts of a country town, the chinese are honoured for their ongoing contributions to australia as a nation. … why not in sydney, or melbourne where the latter-day chinese mostly reside? or is this all for the international tourists? unlikely… who’s gonna come here from overseas? more likely, just a warm story about how we have triumphed over our (unacknowledged) racist birth? ... i could not help thinking to myself. the chinese are also honoured for their contribution to the settlement of young in the 1860s. this really stirs me up. whilst this is no doubt true of the intention of the project initiators, however naïve, it is nowhere near the whole truth about the chinese settlement in young. at the request of the city elders, some of the chinese, driven out in the ‘lambing flat riot’, did come back to young to restart their businesses and services, after the gold had petered out and young was fast becoming a ghost town as the white fortune seekers disappeared overnight. … so they think they have done the right thing by these early chinese. but do they not see that in so doing they have subliminally laid the grounds for thinking about the chinese as a useable people when they are needed, that is! after all, they were treated badly in those early days, sometimes violently when the stakes were high, if they happened to be an obstacle to the white man’s intentions or a thorn on the side of his god-given rights. 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 i enjoyed the gardens. on the way back to the town, the taxi driver pointed out a sign on the roadside where the riot act was read out to the white mob on 14 july 1861. we stopped at the museum. two volunteer ladies, well past their three scores and ten, greeted us warmly. the roll up banner that headed that violent eviction of the 2000 chinese miners on 30 june 1861 was prominently displayed near the entrance. many more artifacts from that inglorious episode were on show, curated better than small town museums i had seen elsewhere in nsw and queensland. ********** some 18 months earlier i had attended a federal government funded four day workshop on chinese australian cultural heritage. the workshop was intended to rejuvenate a project that had lain in the doldrums for some years. it turned out to be largely a show and tell, with no expressed direction or vision. just do it. anything with a chinese connection would do – a headstone somewhere, a collection of porcelain taken from a vanished joss house the list went on. and there was half a day in a computer lab to showcase computer software that one could upload one’s heritage projects onto. on the first day of the workshop one government officer rolled out a substantial project they had undertaken, in connection with the lambing flat ‘riot’ and mentioned in a throwaway manner something about opium smoking. my ears burned. … how could a public servant be so sloppy historically, and so immature culturally when we are supposed to have moved on from the stereotypical images of john chinaman, infused into the mindscape of white australia until the 1970s?... and before i could manage to refine my thoughts i had blurted out, rather bluntly, that if opium was to be mentioned then something ought to be said about how the chinese got addicted to opium, en masse. the white career-multiculturalist was a little rattled, but (the late) henry chan, sitting in the chair, piped up: ‘you are a bit out of date, …! i’ve recently read two books on opium-smoking in china. in fact it is a custom, amongst chinese gentlemen, that they retire after dinner and have a pipe or two, long before the opium war.’ i was aghast and irritated: ‘i don’t really want to debate this issue, henry, but what you’ve said does not in any way detract from what i have raised.’ henry chan had become the god-father of the chinese australian cultural heritage project. he had put a lot of effort into it and had presided over a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 5 number of chinese heritage projects in nsw. he was born in china, grew up in new zealand, and spent most of his adult life in australia. he had spent the last 12 years of his working life as a lecturer in chinese history in a regional university in new south wales, before he retired and took up chinese cultural heritage with much enthusiasm. why did he do that? was he trying to put me down, for spoiling his show? did he think that it was impolite of me to bite the hand that feeds us? ... the bleeding born-again john chinaman! i ruminated. ******* the rotary club of young started work on chinaman’s dam in 1992 to beautify this public reserve that had been set aside for family picnics and swimming many years previously. a new entrance to the reserve, donated by taronga zoo and which formed the gateway to the zoo’s panda exhibition some years earlier, was erected – the beginnings of a chinese garden. by the end of the year the chinese embassy in canberra had donated the proceeds from the sale of chinese ceramic and craft items it had provided to an exhibition at the burrangong gallery in young. on australia day the following year, 1993, the federal government gave $75000 for the project, in response to a deputation led by the prime mover of the project, rotarian leo callinan. then in november 1996 the rotarians handed the project over to the young shire council. no doubt it had gotten too big, financially. its mayor soon prevailed upon the council to dedicate the garden thus: ‘in recognition of the contribution of the chinese community to the settlement of young in the 1860’s (sic) and the ongoing contribution of the chinese community to australia as a nation.’ … oh, well, it’s got to happen … pauline hanson’s first speech in parliament just a couple of months earlier – warning us that the asians amongst us will always be alien, and that we are in danger of being swamped by asians... john howard our then prime minister had defended her 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 rights to voice her opinion ... free speech, democracy and all that, only, as it turned out, to be a dog whistle for the one million voters who had flocked to pauline hanson from their conservative moorings … the ‘fact sheet’ from the information centre continues: ‘this positive act in a time of upheaval caused by the intensifying of the immigration and race debate brought the town national and international praise from media and politicians from all sides. the garden project was covered by the today show, john laws show, 7.30 report and the american program cnbc asia.’ hmm… i missed all that at the time. the mayor formed a foundation of prominent australians to assist with further fundraising and the strategic direction of the project. many prominent members of the sydney chinese community were said to have joined the foundation. in 1997 gough whitlam, phillip ruddock, the ethnic affairs commissioner stepan kerkyasharian, and a host of politicians launched the foundation at a dinner in nsw parliament house, attended by 400 people. … ah, the multicultural circus, embedded with a sea of cacophonous chinese faces herded there by john chinaman compradors the usual suspects. ‘eventually council believes that the lambing flat chinese tribute garden will become a monument of national significance and one of the new south wales’ major tourist attractions.’ … a nice pat on its own back for the council, eh! and a bit of tourism promo at the same time. a monument? not in my book. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 7 no doubt, the rotary club started off with the best of intentions, simple and perhaps even innocently pure. but it has become, like so many initiatives hitched to our multicultural caravan, an exoticised makeover. a genuine copy of the bronze statue, ‘matafeiyan’ – ‘galloping horse stepping on a flying swallow’, excavated in 1969 from an eastern han dynasty tomb, some 1600 years old, stands on the edge of the lake. we are told that this statue ‘thoroughly reflects the essence of chinese culture.’ … oh, for goodness sake, only a cultural simpleton or a snake oil salesman could say a thing like that! i can imagine that in some of the many meetings, the project might even have been touted as a ‘winwin-win’ situation: the public gets a beautified (and exotic) sanctuary; the chinese, both the early sojourners at lambing flat and the latter-day settlers in the cities, get recognition for their contributions; and the young shire council would gain international stature, and receive a shot in its arm – its tourism arm. and as a nation we could imagine that we have redeemed ourselves in the eyes of the world. we have provided an antidote to pauline hanson’s spectacularly successful re-launch of the yellow peril, just two decades after the surreptitious interment of white australia. yet i can’t help feeling that there is a loser history. the project whited out the dark side of lambing flat’s early history, and infused it with a latter day gin and tonic, garnished with sinophiliac peelings – the warmed up remains of chinoiserie, a benign aspect of the orientalism of old. … i can no more let that sleeping dog lie than see a neighbour’s house being burnt down, without raising an alarm. the early chinese are gone, forever. most of their descendants have left the district and/or have passed into white australia a generation or two back. there is no record of how these early chinese felt about the organized violence inflicted upon them, on that day or during the decades 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 thereafter, nor any inkling of what they might have ever considered as appropriate redress, for the memory of themselves or for the destiny of the homeland of their descendants, of one hue or another. should we care, 150 years on? there is nothing we can do to make them feel better. five or six generations on, it is largely a non-issue for their descendants. surely it’s better for all of us to ‘move on’ ... (and do something positive!) … to forget, and to forgive tacitly, on their behalf ... i cannot. the gardens are a sanctuary: the tranquility of the lake, the multitudinous choir of plants native to china, standing at the fringes of the lake and spreading up and down the mounds and alleys which take one to the high point of the sanctuary, the small chinese pavilion, from where one would see the miniature waterfall from under one’s eyes, and follow the mediated torrents prancing their playful ways down the choreographed rocks, only to be expired by the immensity of the vast imperturbable lake. above the water and below the clouds, the murmur of the torrents, the smell of the plants, the call of the birds … there always to set free every fibre in our laboured bodies. close your eyes, and spirit yourself temporarily into omar khayyam’s paradise enow! do i have the right to spoil it all for all those well-intentioned people, rotarians, shire elders, champions of multiculturalism, born-again john chinamans, by pointing out their collective failure in keeping faith with history, and in upholding the moral integrity of public monuments? … come to think of it, it’s a million times better than what they did to the three hundred odd aboriginal prisoners who were buried in unmarked graves in rottnest island, just off the coast of perth! … the bus driver, a post-middle age anglo-aussie, a self-taught tour guide, informed us in late 2006: a few thousand aboriginals were brought over here from the mainland until the 1930s … for being up to no good … quite a few died here, diseases mainly ... winters are very cold here, the work would have been pretty strenuous, and her majesty’s hospitality not the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 9 best… now, on the left hand side, at the bend just coming up, was where they were buried. it’s now a car park for the mini-golf course. the chinese tribute garden is a striking example of why we need to move on: it started with the best of intentions through (unenlightened) white eyes; got mediated by the political dictates of the time; and ended up with cameos played by chinese actors, hand-picked from amongst the present day born-again john chinamans, frolicking excitedly in the multicultural landscape which we have been dreaming about since the 1970s – with much singing and dancing, but with little of lighting up the past in order to light up the present. ****************** the trials of the early chinese provide but a platform upon which the born-again john chinaman launches his ascent into the multicultural realms – seduced in part by the ubiquitous multicultural awards, the oam or the centenary medal for contribution to chinese-australian affairs (having been, say, the de facto president for life for a chinese-something organization, or having collected money from latter-day business immigrants for this hospital or that flood), an am for contribution to international relations, (being the female attaché to a corporate venture in china spearheaded by white australian males needing a native speaker as the cultural gobetween.) … the list goes on. and there are seats on this advisory council or that, a useful addition to one’s business card when doing business in one’s native land in asia, and well-paid sinecures on boards of government owned corporations where the token chinaman fits in decoratively with the ‘equal access’ refrain from the government’s multicultural song sheets. little wonder that there are some 300 chinese organizations in sydney today and 200 in melbourne. *************** the born-again john chinaman hails from a diverse background, but there is one distinguishing feature about him. until the advent of multiculturalism he had had little consciousness of or yearning to proclaim his chinese heritage. but since then it has taken hold of him like an 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 addiction. the native born-again john chinaman who hails from amongst the descendants of the early chinese, is almost certain to have lost, most if not entirely, his chinese heritage quite some time ago, apart from his facial features if that should happen to be the case, as his forebears had almost without exception deliberately not passed on any aspect of their chinese heritage to give him the best start in life, such being the tyranny of white australia; on the other hand, the immigrant born-again john chinaman, those who have immigrated during the ‘multicultural’ era since the 1970s, from all over asia, is one who has suddenly realized the potential of an asset he has inherited – the chinese-australian brand, a commodity that can be floated on the multicultural stock exchange to his social, political, and financial advantage. doing the ‘right’ thing, to gain acceptance from the white powers that be, is second nature to the native born-again john chinaman; and as for the immigrant latter-day born-again john chinaman, exploiting his new-found chinese-australian brand is not unnatural trying to find a foot-hold in an unfamiliar and not entirely fathomable social setting can and does compromise one’s sense of self. but why do the powers that be allow this state of affairs to flourish, indeed encourage it to take on the sheen of the golden mean for racial harmony, and to persist in rewarding those chinamans who do the ‘right’ thing in the choreographed multicultural landscape? john chinaman of course has loomed large, time and again, in the mindscape of australia, since the mid 1800s. he was an object of ridicule, fear, and hatred: in cartoons, in poems and widely propagated ditties, in newspaper articles, and in books, until the battle against him was decisively won at federation. no more chinaman could come in, no more naturalization for him: he would simply fade away, and australia would be white. in all, about 100 000 chinese came by late 1800s. at federation about 30 000 remained, in a population of nearly 4 million. (some 20 000 had died and been buried in terra nullius.) and by 1947 just 6400 chinese were counted in a population of nearly 8 million. the dream of white australia, a ‘new britainia’ of sorts, was all but achieved. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 11 but john chinaman did not disappear entirely in white australia’s imagination. in fact in the intervening years, he was being rehabilitated, somewhat. a gentle tic of his imminent passing might have come to pass, perhaps not unlike the pang that drove the smoothing of the pillow for the aboriginal peoples who were to die out, as nature had predestined and white man had instrumentally helped it along with diseases, starvation, and guns. in time john chinaman would appear in australian fictions as ‘chinese with white hearts’, hardworking, honest, reliable, but above all loyal to his white employers (aitken 2009): just one step away from the emancipated and liberated chinese-australian – loyal to the national interest of australia, without being obsequious or apologetic, without fear or favour. but the cold war intervened. menzies got us all obsessed with the red menace, forever, it seemed. nonetheless the disintegration of the old empires tolled, and the white australia drawbridge got lowered down finally in the mid 1970s. ******** the rear guard was restive: within a decade geoffrey blainey had launched his public campaign against asian immigration; in 1996 pauline hanson, a candidate in an impossible-to-win seat and dis-endorsed by the liberal party during the campaign, had burst into parliament. she had achieved the impossible, by rekindling the fear of being swamped by asians. john howard took good notes, and embraced her xenophobic offerings to craft a triumphant victory in the 2001 tampa elections (kendall 2005). the tampa was a god-send. its load of middle eastern asylum seekers, rescued from a sinking boat, was perfect for a new refrain on being swamped by aliens with incompatible culture and foreign contagions, this time that of terrorism. race is still an issue, lurking about 35 years after the planting of our multicultural garden. and john marsden’s popularity with young australian readers in his tomorrow series, sequeled by the trilogy, the ellie chronicles, would portend that ‘white australia being invaded by asians’ can still be relied upon as a formula for stirring up the subliminal anxiety in our nation’s psyche, even amongst the adolescent: the scenario of a (unacknowledged invading) white 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 population, still comparatively small, fearful of being invaded in turn by the teeming asians across our waters, two centuries on, when the adolescent ellie, the heroine in marsden’s tomorrow series, had transmogrified to become the true daughter of native australia, thus subliminally whiting out the indigenous people from our present mindscape, as if the cherished destiny of the blacks has come, finally, into effect (ross 2006). ****************** 起来！不愿作 奴隶的人 们。arise! ye who refuse to be slaves! the circumstances in china in 1934 were dire, unimaginable to any of us today, when the poet and playwright tian han wrote that opening line to the march of the volunteers which was to become the chinese national anthem, at various times, since. yet, his call to rise up to become free, in spirit, at least, rings a bell for me, even in today’s australia. in 1996, in the wake of pauline hanson’s explosion into our national life, a young, up and coming politician came to the queensland chinese forum and told the assembled chinese community leaders that we the chinese could not fight this battle on our own. we needed them, the white australians, to do it on our behalf. his close associate, a consultant, would come up soon after with a 40 month community based campaign to present a positive image of multicultural australia, right up to the sydney olympics. ‘we will show the world!’ the chinese in queensland just have to put up the money for a secretariat, the consultant’s fees plus his expenses, and the running costs of the entire campaign. meanwhile the young politician told us that it would be good if the chinese and vietnamese could organize weekend trips to nambour, the heart of pauline hanson’s support base, to provide free medical, dental, and other services to the people there … jeez, we are all right now … trusted even to provide professional services … just accept gratefully the hand of the self-appointed white patron, fund and support his vision of an australia that the rest of the world should see, and we’re gonna be fine. pauline hanson would be edited out of our collective mindscape … and we ‘the asian australians’ would be happy little vegemites prancing about innocently in our multicultural garden of paradise… and furthermore, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 13 we have even been handed an opportunity to display our noble self ... be extra good fellows towards those who happen to see us as an object for their many-layered grievances … in the hope that they might then relent and accept us? … christ almighty! a few years later, in 2001, cathie may wrote, on behalf of the chinese, without our knowing, chinese in queensland in the australian people: an encyclopaedia of the nation, its people, and their origin. she was then living in western australia and had retrained as a lawyer. years earlier i had read her 1984 book, topsawers: the chinese in cairns 1870 to 1920, based on her phd thesis. that work seems to have been the main source for her contribution to the centenary of federation edition of the australian people, 20 years later. the last two paragraphs of her 2001 contribution, about 10% by word count, were devoted to the post white australia period, during which most of the present day chinese in queensland came. there are statistics on when and where we had come from; a sentence on how china has become a place of interest to (white) australians: and the claim that there is now ‘genuine social integration and cultural exchange between chinese and europeans …’ at the end of the article. ah, the multicultural drum roll … in the absence of any knowledge of how the present day chinese are actually faring in trying to find a foothold in today’s queensland. a few words from the mouth of a chinese surgeon, an accidental settler from the tiananmen fallout, working as a machine operator for a health supplements manufacturer would have been telling. or the tale of a taiwanese business migrant that got taken in by his local (white) distributors in his wholesale business in brisbane and went back to university and discovered a way to make a common drug more benign in its side-effects, would have been revealing of the life of a recent business migrant. but the chinese voice was absent, entirely. there was no empathy, no authenticity, compared with contributions from two other (white) immigrant groups i had a quick read of. a hot surge arose in my chest. … was any chinese person asked to write on this topic? did she not have the intellectual integrity to realize that she was out of her depth? did she believe like all white australians of her parents’ generation that that is just what is done? and for god’s sake, using the word europeans, instead of australians, or white australians, in fact! … hiding behind some inherited subliminal guilt? or just being twee? 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 it seems that at the centenary of the chinese being legislated into the status of tolerated aliens who would fade away in due course, we are still a people to be talked about and written about by the other. when will the chinese find their voice? and just last year, a first time (white) mp prime-moved to have a chinese war memorial built in the grounds of the rsl sub-branch in a suburb within his electorate. it is a suburb in which the queensland chinese are most highly concentrated. there is already a memorial bell in the fortitude valley chinatown, a purpose built commercial artifice, in memory of the chinese who took part in the wars, funded with ‘grants’ extracted from all levels of governments just a little time before various elections. the insert in the local chinese newspaper proclaimed: ‘this project is not just about erecting a monument. it’s about educating school children and the broader community about the stories of service and sacrifice of australian chinese in the armed forces.’ billy sing, the gallipoli sniper, born of a chinese father and an english mother, was the hero made much of in the launch of the project by the said mp. further community input was sought, the newspaper insert concluded. … ah, glorifying war has surely lost its sheen … at best war is a necessary evil, as the last resort ... he should move on, and if he is dinkum, he’ll accept my suggestion that the canadian model be adapted for our project .... at the following meeting it soon became clear that everything had been sewn up. in short order an official launch for the project was decided in the form of a chinese banquet to which the usual ‘chinese community leaders’ can be expected to find the chinese to fill the tables. a letter is to be sent the very next day by the mp to his colleagues, the relevant federal ministers, to see if one or more of them could come to brisbane to officiate at that gala evening. the meeting was cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 15 all over in an hour, but not before the chinese community leader held out his hand for funds from the targeted visiting minister, through the mp of course. the minutes of the meeting came out shortly after, but they make no record of my suggestion that we could consider the example of the memorial to chinese canadians in vancouver. it honoured not just the soldier but also the railway builder. the memorial was in front of the chinese cultural centre which amongst other things houses the chinese canadian war museum. the scale is of course far too big for us, but the concept might be apt. we could for instance have a memorial to the early chinese as a whole. they were dominant in the commercialization of the banana industry in north queensland for a few decades after the 1880s; the chinese market gardeners at breakfast creek supplied almost exclusively all the fresh produce for brisbane by 1888; and there was also charles lee, a queenslander who was sent to our embassy in chungking during the war. and if we build the memorial in the ever expanding restaurant, shopping, and business centre, clustered around an intersection in the electorate, it would serve its stated purpose of educating the broader community so much better, and on a daily basis. besides, the subject matter then would be much more amenable to the telling of the history about the early chinese, in schools and on the internet. by contrast billy sing went downhill soon after he got back from the war, died alone in his room in a brisbane boarding house in 1943 at 57, and never had a family. his scottish wife, whom he married during a four week leave whilst stationed in england, never arrived in australia, despite instructions to our man in london to have her ‘repatriated’ expeditiously, after the war. there was 5 shillings in his pocket, and not much else of worth. … he was in all probability the knockabout aussie that needed a war to become a hero, nothing much before, nothing memorable after. yet somehow he is now to be the archetype for the ‘model chinese australian’? the chinese in the steering committee were largely from one group ardently supportive of the idea. as is culturally pre-determined few of the less-than-a-handful of the other chinese also there, could be expected ‘not to do the wrong thing’ by questioning the rationale of the whole idea, when it was just about all sewn up and dusted. what is there to gain from such a fool-hardy move? better to bide one’s own time, eh! and there was no-one from the taiwanese, the prc, 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 and the malaysian chinese organizations, the numerically dominant chinese groups in that electorate. it’s a marginal electorate, where the ‘chinese vote’ if channeled would no doubt be pivotal. has john chinaman metamorphosed into a modern day comprador, (the middleman who did all the dirty work for his white master, sovereign within the ‘concessions’ in the port cities of china, after the british invasion of china to assert its right to sell opium in china), always ready to receive favours from the powers that be in return for delivering the political commodity, chinese-australians, selectively packaged for each occasion? a sort of ‘chinese with white hearts’, depicted in the australian fiction of the 20th century, but with an implant secreted under the blanket of multiculturalism that conferred upon him a ‘respected voice’ which the powers that be appropriate and make consonant with their own political ends from time to time? yes, in the past they simply told the chinese how unworthy and objectionable they were. ‘it’s progress’, some of you might say. be that as it may, the white powers that be continue to speak on behalf of the chinese, often with the chinese playing bit parts, or merely providing the raw material in the construction of what i call the mediated chinese australian perspective. some think it is just how it is. others can’t help themselves and are part of the gig. good intentions are not always absent. it is just that it has become a bit of an industry. the chinese, their history, their heritage have become a commodity transacted in guises as varied as academic research, tourism and political votebuying. however john chinaman is no longer the object of ridicule, fear or hatred. he has had a makeover, with the best of aussie cosmetic surgery: respect, exoticness, and a ‘rich cultural heritage’ bestowed upon him in public ceremonies staged at appointed times, featuring him as a leading dancer in our multicultural song and dance troupes. the born-again john chinaman ventriloquises for the white powers that be, avowing that the chinese are happy, exotic and enterprising people, energetically toiling away in our wonderfully cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 17 multicultural garden. there is no past; only the present, verdant and vivacious. he has moved on, he says, over and over. it reminds me of barack obama’s predicament when his white mother, visiting him in chicago, took him to see the 1950s film, black orpheus, based on the tale of the feckless lovers, orpheus and eurydice, shot in rio during carnival. he wanted to leave at intermission, not liking the way the blacks were portrayed as childlike people prancing about in their colourful attire. but when he turned to face his mother he faltered. she was still wistfully entranced by the film, 30 years after she first saw it at 16. short of a properly constituted institute for chinese-australian affairs, i cannot see how the chinese will ever have a public voice in australia. the latter-day chinese have come from all over asia, with their disparate social, cultural, and political backgrounds: from mao’s red guards who somehow made it through china’s top universities, to heirs of well-to-do chinese middlemen in ex-british colonies who know not a single word of chinese, to refugees who have no exposure at all to anything british. apart from chinese food, there seems to be little that coheres: there is no common spirit for the present; nor anything of a vision for the homeland of their heirs. for a people still being visited upon periodically by hostile social attitudes, first incubated in the 1850s, it beggars belief that we are so deaf to the voices of history and so heedless to the calls for a nobler society. it would help of course if academics, researchers and ‘consultants’ were to get their hands dirty and immerse themselves in chinese organizations and their current comings and goings before they assume the de facto role of speaking on behalf of the chinese in australia. but they would need to learn to fathom the cultural dynamics sufficiently to realize when they are being told things which their chinese informants think they ought or want to be told. in this regard many ‘oral history’ or ‘heritage’ projects about the chinese have been undertaken by people, many well-meaning, with little to indicate that they have the requisite cultural empathy with their subjects. the result is often a 1950s chop suey, liberally sugared and oiled to appeal to the uninitiated when it should have been liang gua, a finely crafted bitter gourd dish to inspire the 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 discerning. such outcomes serve but to prolong the shelf-life of john chinaman in the minds of the remaining rearguards of white australia. ************ earlier last year i went to see mao’s last dancer. it was a clever adaptation of his memoirs. a few days later, over breakfast, i read that this aussie-made film had grossed $12m in five weeks, and was no.2 on the top ten critical list. li cunxin, the film’s hero, had already achieved something of a cult status before the film was made. his memoirs had made him a literary figure, and a sought after motivational speaker. he has achieved the honorary white status: exotic; with the celebrity status that aussies by and large are conditioned unconsciously to adore. just before the credits, we are told that he and his (white australian) wife, mary, and their three children now live in melbourne. what a lovely ending. … and what a wonderful world we live in now. the fairy tale might have ended after we left the cinema, but subconsciously we may feel that we have finally moved on in australia. race is not an issue any more, and perhaps chineseaustralians could even play a part in the warming up of bilateral relations with china – that benign panda in the economic scenarios of australia 2020 and beyond. li cunxin may well be remembered one day as the quong tart of the 21st century – a latter-day chinese-australian whose personal status transcends the unflattering images that had plagued the john chinaman who came before him but did not make it to the honorary white echelon. he is not the only one who has made it though. there is, for instance, victor chang, the immigrant chinese, our acclaimed heart surgeon; or penny wong, our world striding cabinet minister, who came here at eight, portrayed unmistakably in the media as chinese or asian, despite bearing at 50% the irish genes of her australian-born mother; or cathy freeman, our black olympic gold medalist, native born and bred for eons, whose chinese ancestry somehow remains unremarkable, uncelebrated. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 19 and for every cathy freeman there are hundreds if not thousands of edwina chens and anton tangs who feel no particular need to celebrate their chinese ancestry. they have all the advantage of being born of chinese parents ushered into australia as skilled or business migrants in the last two decades. they reap the best of what money and privilege can and do afford them in the 21st century australia where the chinese do not have to apologise for their presence, anymore. in fact, the majority of chinese australians today go about making a life for themselves without coming face to face with arbitrary hindrances placed before them in any overwhelmingly pervasive way. just now and again something erupts, like an old scar. the online comments to the articles in the australian on the ‘whiting’ of billy sing in a mini television series some months ago is an example. on that occasion the remains of white australia shimmered. the epithets have metamorphosed though: the chinese should not complain… billy was australian … using a white actor in his role is no big deal … even so a concession has been allowed. the chinese are part and parcel of australia now, provided that they do not complain about being improperly treated, as if they should know their place in australian society. i wonder what john marsden’s ellie, the made-to-be true daughter of australia, would say about this little episode. on the whole the chinese are all right now, unlike the hapless latter day muslims. nevertheless, the lambing flat chinese tribute gardens, the mediated chinese voice through (untutored) white mindsets in this historical publication or that academic discourse, the commodification of the chinese-australian identity in the multicultural stock exchange, the exoticisation of all things chinese in our tourism, cultural, and academic undertakings, the hand-feeding of the born-again john chinamans to become dummies for the ventriloquist white powers that be, all furnish reasons enough for me to want us all to move on, move on, on! 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 bibliography aitken, a. 2009, "ouyang yu chinese in australian fiction (1888-1988)." http://adamaitken.blogspot.com/2009/06/ouyang-yu-chinese-in-australian-fiction.html may 30, june 18 and june 25 2009 kendall, t. 2005, 'using the past to serve the present: renewing australia's invasion anxiety', east by south: china in the australasian imagination, in miller, p., smith, k. & ferrall, c. (eds)wellington, victoria university press, pp128-129. ross, c. 2006, 'prolonged symptoms of cultural anxiety: the persistence of narratives of asian invasion within multicultural australia'. a. d. hope prize 2006. association for the study of australian literature, vol. 5 2006, p94. http://adamaitken.blogspot.com/2009/06/ouyang-yu-chinese-in-australian-fiction.html� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia 80 “only white people can be racist”: what does power have to with prejudice? pooja sawrikar and ilan katz social policy research centre, university of new south wales abstract social researchers and activists who use the ‘racism = prejudice + power’ definition, often cited in the sociological literature, generally strive for racial equality by highlighting the need to equalise differences in social power among racial groups. however, this definition can be taken to extreme when the role of social power is given disproportionate weight over the role of prejudice, such as assertions that racism is synonymous with white supremacy. while recent debates in the sociological literature do take into account the complex relationship between power and prejudice, it is still important to point out the pitfalls of a reductionist approach. we argue that the definition ‘racism = white supremacy’ is logically flawed, demonstrates reverse racism, is disempowering for individuals from all racial groups who strive for racial equality, and absolves those who do not. we also argue that the recent literature on cultural competency may provide a more enabling discourse towards reducing racism. cultural competency is a move away from ethnocentrism and towards respect and value for cultural difference, with no racial group treated as a reference point around which the discourse on race relations revolves. we have focused on cultural competency in the delivery of human services in this paper, simply as an exemplar for refining the way the term ‘racism’ is used and understood in the current sociological literature. specifically, by properly acknowledging the role of prejudice and not exclusively focusing on power, and by de-centring the discourse on race relations from whites, all racial groups can be better empowered to take responsibility for protecting the human right to racial equality. background and aims disagreements in the definition of racism have long plagued the research and policy discourse on race relations. such tensions have emerged because researchers, policy makers, and activists from different disciplines are interested in different aspects of racism. for example, definitions in the sociological literature (e.g. cazaneve & maddern 1999; carmichael & hamilton 1992) tend to focus on differences in social power as explaining the nature and scope of racism, as well as the factors that sustain or reinforce its occurrence. definitions in the psychological literature (e.g. allport 1979) on the other hand tend to focus on cognitive processes for explaining the emergence and entrenchment of racism. legal definitions (e.g. united nations (un) convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm) are generally interested in how institutional practices and policies contribute to or perpetuate racism, and definitions in the http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 81 economics literature (e.g. blalock 1967; sivanandan 1993) stress the role of competition over limited resources as a primary reinforcer of racism. even within disciplines there may be differences in ideology, such as: • the colour blind approach – the belief that culture and race should make no difference and people are basically all the same; • the equal opportunities approach – believes that structures should be set up to give people an equal chance to succeed; • the anti-racist approach – believes that ultimately the world is divided into ‘white’ and ‘black’ with white = oppressors and black = victims; • the diversity approach – belief that there are different cultures and races and that the aim is to value each person’s unique attributes; and • the marxist approach – believes that blacks are part of an oppressed underclass and the aim is to overthrow the owners of the means of production. differentiating the various elements of and approaches to racism is useful because it increases precision and accuracy on our understanding of its nature, causes, reinforcers, and scope. indeed, racism is a complex phenomenon and a simplified explanation and description would be inconsistent with its nature. racism is seen in the literature as intimately entwined with issues that relate to class, nation, identity, social justice, and institutionalised practices (san juan 2002). however, disagreements in the definition of racism can also lead to misunderstanding because researchers, policy makers, and activists do not have a common language with which to communicate. this can stifle progress towards reducing racism. and as satzewich (1998) argues, the concept of ‘racism’ is a social phenomenon that is alive and well in contemporary society, even though ‘the concept of racism defends us against the project of universal belonging’ (holland 2005) and the concept of ‘race’ has no scientific validity (satzewich 1998). the aim of this paper is not to take these various elements of racism and propose a unified definition that reconciles these differences, but to compare two of the more common definitions used especially in the sociological literature – ‘racism = prejudice + power’ and ‘racism = white supremacy’. while the latter definition has some utility because of its potency to shed light on what reinforces racism in some (mostly white-majority) societies, we 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 argue that this utility is undermined by four main problems. in particular, this definition is logically flawed, it demonstrates reverse racism, it is disempowering for individuals from all racial groups who strive for racial equality, and it absolves all racial groups for taking responsibility for their contribution to racism in society. moreover, we aim to show how the power of language can be used to perpetuate or excuse racism and bring about outcomes that are not actually desirable. indeed, we argue that researchers, policy makers, and activists are interested in different aspects of racism because they have different end goals they aim to attain. those who aim to overcome structurally racist policies and practices are unlikely to use the economic or psychological definition of racism, in which competition over limited resources (blalock 1967; sivanandan 1993) would be used to justify the stigmatisation and devaluing of the ‘out-group’ and a belief in the inherent superiority of one’s own ‘in-group’ (allport 1979). this is because definitions are themselves end goals; identifying the factors that cause racism also provide a pathway for identifying how to reduce it. we argue that the end goal of the definition ‘racism = white supremacy’ is less about striving to reduce racism, and more about striving to making whites aware of the privileges they attain by virtue of their racial group’s strong social power (wildman 1996; chandra-shekeran 2008). as such, and in line with the anti-racism approach described above, this definition is not wholly counter-productive. however, we see that this end goal is achieved at the cost of the four negative consequences mentioned above. finding a language that enhances our understanding of racism but at the same time also helps us reduce it is by no means an easy task. however, it is still seen as preferable to this reductionist definition, which may help us understand racism but not necessarily help us reduce it. importantly, we have focused on this definition of racism because, although it is most often used in the united states of america (usa) and not in australia, lessons learned from the consequences of the misuse (and the power) of language are still relevant in the australian context. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 83 two definitions of racism commonly used in the sociological literature a. racism = prejudice + power definitions of racism used mostly in the sociological literature are generally premised on the assertion that racism is the result of two additive components – prejudice and power1 . this definition was particularly popular during the 1960s to 1980s in the usa (rattansi 2007) but is still used by a number of contemporary theorists. for example, cazanave and maddern (1999) argue that: racism is a highly organised system of “race”-based group privilege [that is, ‘power’2] that operates at every level of society and is held together by a sophisticated ideology of colour/“race” supremacy [that is, ‘prejudice’3 ]. this definition has a number of benefits. firstly, it goes beyond the individualised cognitive process of negative stereotyping that is used more often in the social psychology literature (e.g. allport 1979). in other words, the definition ‘racism = prejudice’ is limited in its ability to explain and describe the nature, causes, reinforcers, and scope of racism beyond individual interactions, and at the societal or systemic level. secondly, such a definition acknowledges that inequities in the distribution of social power do occur between racial groups. as such, it can highlight the need for structural agendas or movements against racism in organisations and institutions, rather than leaving the struggle against racism solely to individuals. finally, by drawing attention to both personal and group factors, this definition is able to show that individuals shape and are shaped by socio-cultural factors (chandrakumar 2008). this is important because although racism is a universal phenomenon, it manifests differently in different societies and so the ways it must be countered are also highly sensitive to the nuances of that contextual environment. 1 while there are a number of different types of power – material, economic, political, and social, for example – power is defined here as the capacity to exert any form of influence on others (giddens 1997). in this paper, ‘power’ and ‘social power’ are used synonymously. 2 italics inserted. 3 italics inserted. 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 in short, defining racism as the combination of both prejudice and power is beneficial because it is not reductionist or simplistic in its approach, it can mobilise both individuals and institutions to take responsibility for striving to reduce racism, and it is sensitive to contextual factors. further, the overarching implication of this definition is that to reduce racism, individuals must become vigilant of their racial prejudices and strive to create a society in which the power of racial groups is equal. current debates in the sociological literature provide important explorations of how the power of groups are affected by a range of factors (most especially economic ones), and also examine the complex relationship between power and prejudice. for example, the extensive work of fraser (2005, 1997) conceptualises the attainment of social justice along three dimensions – redistribution (where the inequity is said to be economically-based distributive injustice or maldistribution), recognition (where the inequality is seen as culturally-based status inequality or misrecognition), and more recently, representation (where the inequality is described as political injustice or misrepresentation). when these three dimensions are ‘in balance’ across racial groups, justice, or parity of economic, cultural, and political participation, is said to be attained. although fraser (2005) views ‘the individual as the fundamental subject of justice’ her approach to consciousness-raising is along the lines that ‘the personal is political’. contrary to fraser, honneth (1996) places less emphasis on structural matters, although he does engage somewhat with the impact of distributive economics, and focuses more on recognition issues. while fraser (2005) sees this framework as simplistic monism, his counter position importantly draws attention to the psychological component of racism. honneth (1996) claims that the struggle for recognition defines both human self-formation and social formation, and permeates all struggles for social justice. as such, justice is understood as the “intersubjective satisfaction of moral expectations that arise as individuals attempt to establish a positive self-relation via recognition from others” (yar 2001, p. 297). gilroy (2005, 1999) is more historical than marxist or philosophical in his approach, and offers an understanding of racism and multiculturalism within the context of british colonialism and its “(melancholic) attachment to global grandeur” (williams 2005). gilroy has an “antipathy towards nationalism” (gilroy 1999, p. 184), and argues that overcoming racism requires a planetary or cosmopolitan humanism (cited in robotham 2005); where cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 85 individuals are asked to overthrow their attachment to (black) identity and discover “that crushingly obvious, almost banal human sameness” that we all share (gilroy 2000, cited in gregg 2002). these sociological theorists have different conceptualisations about the nature of racism (and as a result, how it could be combated), but have in common an interest and focus on ‘group’ factors that bring about racism at the systemic or societal level. nevertheless, their positions are still organised around the role of power in relation to individual factors such as prejudice (albeit to greater or lesser extents). while an examination of economic and other factors that affect the historic and current social power of racial groups are important dimensions in any analysis of racism, a fuller exploration of these are outside the scope of this paper. here, we aim to show that dire consequences can arise when too much weight is given to the unequal distribution of power between racial groups, and insufficient attention is paid to individual responsibility to address prejudice. indeed, past formulations on the nature of racism, namely that racism is essentially synonymous with white supremacy, still appear in contemporary literature. b. racism = white supremacy although the political activist, lewis (1995), acknowledges the role of prejudice, he essentially reduces racism to differences in power between racial groups. in this way, he asserts that: in terms of the current world system, racism is essentially and primarily synonymous with white supremacy … there’s no such thing as reverse racism because there’s no such thing as a simple reversal of the power relationships between whites and blacks … in the current context, only white people can be racist4 . while there are no known researchers, activists, or policy makers who define racism as equivalent to white supremacy (for doing so would be uncomprehensive and mismatched to its complex nature), there are a vast number of writers who use a definition of racism that is essentially synonymous with white supremacy, in the same way lewis (1995) does. for 4 italics inserted. 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 example, the north american sociologist, feagin (2006), argues that ‘rarely are whites seen as the central propagators and agents in a persisting system of racial discrimination’ (p. 5). similarly, bonilla-silva (2001, 1996) argues for the importance of a structural theory of racism based on racialised social systems in any discourse on racism. wellman (1977) was more extreme in his view, arguing that “only ‘white’ people express racist sentiments and act in a racist manner”, although this view has since been rejected (cited in miles & brown 2003). however, somewhat more recently, van dijk (1991) writes that “many white people may no longer believe in white racial supremacy. they may in principle even endorse values of social justice. however, massive legal and scholarly evidence … and personal experiences … show that white people and institutions still engage in the many daily practices that implement the system of white dominance and seldom challenge its underlying beliefs and ideologies” (p. ix). the aim of using a definition of racism that is essentially synonymous with white supremacy is to highlight the pervasiveness of the inequitable distribution of social power in the us (and other white-majority countries like australia), and the resultant level of oppression that is experienced by others. thus, researchers, policy makers, and activists who use this definition aim to demonstrate that if social power were distributed more equally among racial groups, and the pervasiveness of white supremacy were then diminished, racism would reduce. while it may indeed achieve this end goal, we argue that there are four major problems that also arise from using this definition, and which undermine its effectiveness in achieving the end goal. problem 1: this definition is logically flawed a definition of racism that gives disproportionate weight to power over prejudice is based on a logical flaw. it begins with the equation ‘racism = prejudice + power’, but uses the historic and current inequity in social power in favour of whites to replace power with this nominal racial group; that is, ‘power = whites’. in this way, it falsely deduces from these two premises that ‘racism = prejudice + whites’, or in the words of lewis (1995), that ‘only white people can be racist’. the pervasiveness of white supremacy and the oppression it causes others, cannot, and more importantly should not, be denied. there are countless extreme and devastating examples of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 87 white supremacy throughout human history: nazi germany against jews, blacks and immigrants; the klu klux klan; slavery of africans in america; british colonial rule in india; apartheid in south africa; and the stolen generation in australia. white supremacy manifests even in more covert forms. to borrow an example from immigration policy in australia, over the 12 years under the prime ministership of john howard (1995–2007), the language of ‘assimilation’ was arguably normalised in official vernacular. the department of multicultural and indigenous affairs (dimia) was changed to the department of immigration and citizenship (diac), reflecting a move from celebration of multiculturalism to citizenship rights and responsibilities conditional on integration to and knowledge of ‘australian values’ (http://www.citizenship.gov.au/); the language of ‘tolerance of difference’ rather than ‘acceptance of difference’ was arguably routinised; and without a human rights framework in australia, the rhetoric of ‘social inclusion’ rather than ‘social justice’ still implicates that some groups have the power to decide who should or needs to be socially included (jakubowicz 2008). nevertheless, the pervasiveness of white supremacy should not negate inclusion or discussion of instances of racism that do not involve whites. for example, racism can occur between two or more minority ethnic groups in white-majority countries. instances of this are demonstrated between asians and caribbeans in the united kingdom (uk) during the 2005 riots (townsend 2005). although, as noivo (1998) argues, the occurrence of inter-minority racism is in part due to the racialisation they undergo at the hands of dominant group, he also argues that there are other processes that influence how and why minority groups discriminate against one another. racism can also occur between relatively established migrant groups and newly arrived migrant groups in australia (griffiths, sawrikar, & muir 2008; satzewich 2002), as well as between migrant groups and indigenous australians (griffiths et al 2008). to extend the point, racism can occur between the majority and any minority ethnic group in any non-white majority country, such as between fijians and indians in fiji (davies 2007). indeed, the extensive work of okihoro (2001, 1994) embodies alternatives to the commonplace binary-based narratives that devalue or exclude the experience of asian peoples in the usa and assume that there are only two races – white and black (newman 2002). http://www.citizenship.gov.au/� 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 thus, the pervasiveness of white supremacy does not justify replacing the definition of racism, and instances of racism that do not include whites should not be excluded from discussions and debates on racism. in short, we argue that white supremacy necessarily implies racism because it is one (very common and powerfully destructive) example of racism, but racism does not necessarily imply white supremacy. these two terms should not be used synonymously. problem 2: this definition demonstrates reverse racism the statement or belief that ‘only white people can be racist’ (lewis 1995) is itself a negative or prejudicial stereotype. while this statement or belief does not assert that every white person is racist, it does assert that only white people have the capacity to be racist because only white people have power. this is prejudicial, because it reflects a negative generalisation about a racial group (devine 1989). (indeed, the term prejudice is derived from the latin prae judicium, meaning ‘pre-judgement’). lewis (1995) asserts that ‘there’s no such thing as reverse racism because there’s no such thing as a simple reversal of the power relationships between whites and blacks’. while it may be difficult to overturn entrenched discrepancies in social power in the future, given the current and historic inequity in the distribution of social power, it is untrue that racial groups other than white have no social power with which to hold whites accountable for their racism. thus, the prejudicial assertion that only white people can be racist is an example of how people from minority ethnic groups can misuse the social power their racial group does have, albeit currently lower than their white counterparts, and demonstrate reverse racism. in this way, it repeats the very mistake it is trying to rectify – devaluing ‘the other’. it justifies the use of racism to overcome racism, thereby perpetuating its occurrence. problem 3: this definition is disempowering the concept of white supremacy uses the current and historic context to fix the social power of whites as definitively higher than all other groups. by doing so, the quality of power becomes inherent or fixed to ethnicity; white people have more power than other groups because of their race. however, since ethnicity cannot be changed, the implication is that their higher power also cannot be changed. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 89 this is disempowering for all groups that strive to reduce racism. for example, whites who are aware of the privileges afforded to them from their current and historic social power may nevertheless be trapped by ‘white guilt’ (steele 2006); they cannot strive to attain their goal for reducing racism because they cannot change their ethnicity. similarly, individuals from racial groups other than white also cannot strive to reduce racism because their ethnicity precludes them from having the power to affect the discourse on race relations and the way power is distributed across racial groups. they too must accept racism as an ‘unchangeable fact’ because their ethnicity is unchangeable. to overcome this sense of disempowerment for all racial groups, it is important to note that levels of power are not inherent to race; they are reactive to circumstance and therefore can change. in other words, the past does not (have to) dictate the future. problem 4: this definition absolves all racial groups for taking responsibility for racial inequality whites who do not strive for racial equality and do believe in the inherent superiority of their race can use the ‘fixed’ higher social power to justify their racism. if the definition of racism accepts that whites have more power than other groups, then there is an increased risk that whites will believe they are more worthy of this higher social power than any other racial group. this definition lets whites who do not strive for racial equality ‘off the hook’ for taking responsibility for their contribution to racism, because they cannot change their ethnicity and the fixed higher power that this ethnicity then implies. similarly, individuals from racial groups other than white are also absolved for taking responsibility for their contribution to racism because they can use their current and historic lower social power to argue that they are less accountable for the prevalence of racism in society. while it is arguable about whether their racial prejudices may have less capacity (or power) to adversely affect others, this does not however indicate that these racialised prejudices are not in fact demonstrations of racism; it is untrue that ‘only white people can be racist’, as lewis (1995) and others (e.g. feagin 2006) argue. the capacity to be racist is a human phenomenon, not a racialised one. summary in short, the definition ‘racism = white supremacy’ is tendentious, and creates two other social problems in addition to the entrenchment of racism in society: it perpetuates its occurrence by justifying the use of (reverse) racism to overcome racism, and it makes the task 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 of reducing racism impossible because it is based on the notion that racism is an inherent component of racial identity which cannot be changed. by ignoring the subjective (or cognitive and interpretative) aspects of racism, this definition has the perverse effect of ‘fixing’ racism as an inherent constituent of society rather than something which can be changed or combated. indeed, since the definition ‘racism = white supremacy’ has somewhat gone out fashion during the 1980s, and with the introduction of anti-racism and anti-discrimination laws and the implementation of (albeit sometimes tokenistic) policies to improve parliamentary representation, overt racism has reduced, demonstrating that over time things do and can change. extreme examples of institutional racism periodically emerge to remind us of how entrenched white supremacy is. for example, the racist murder of steven lawrence brought to light the systemic racialised inequality and injustice of the uk metropolitan police force (sivanandan, sebestyen, & seabrook, 2000). while such examples are severely costly and support sivanandan’s (2000) assertion that “institutional racism is the litmus test of a society’s democracy” (p. 73), there is also a risk that such examples can induce an equally extreme swing toward mis-weighting the respective roles of prejudice and power in the occurrence of racism. to help bring back the balance after these extreme reminders of the prevalence of white supremacy, we need a language that also reminds us that there are indeed (at least) two aspects or factors necessary for its occurrence; power alone cannot bring about racism5 . where to from here? we have shown in the discussion above that definitions do matter. the challenge is to develop a definition of racism which would show empathy for all racial groups who have suffered hundreds of years of oppression because of white supremacy; advocate for the needs of racial groups with especially low social power6 by taking responsibility for rectifying current inequities in social power7 5 by analogy, ‘power’ is the length of a matchstick, but ‘prejudice’ is the redhead needed to light the match. ; instil a sense of awareness among whites for the privileges that are afforded by their groups’ strong social power (but as pedersen (2008) points out, doing so by developing empathy for the oppressed which is an enabling or 6 or religious groups, especially muslims. 7 for example, ‘the apology’ to australia’s stolen generation and generating strategies to ‘close the gap’ in access to health and education opportunities. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 91 empowering emotion, rather than inducing feelings of guilt which can be disempowering); and look forward into a hopeful future towards reduced racism. so what could be an effective approach for developing a definition of racism that enables its reduction through the more equitable distribution of social power and also continues to highlight its subjective aspect, but without perpetuating its occurrence, disempowering individuals and groups that strive for racial equality, and absolving those that do not? we have turned to the recently emerging literature on cultural competency in the specific area of the delivery of human services to assist in answering this question. while the concept of cultural competency is becoming increasingly acknowledged across a range of study fields (e.g. media studies, downing & husband 2005), we have drawn here upon one specific area with which we are familiar – the delivery of social services. essentially, cultural competency in the delivery of social services is a move away from ethno-centric organisational practices and institutional policies, and a move toward respecting and valuing cultural difference for the richness this difference can offer to both service users and service providers. cultural competency in social service delivery is a multifaceted concept, with the literature emphasising personal or self reflective, organisational, and/or political components (e.g. korbin 2007; butt 2006; gustafson 2005; webb & sergison 2003; weerasinghe & williams 2003; campinha-bacote 2002; purnell 2002; box et al. 2001; forehand & kotchick 1996). based on these various characteristics, we have re-conceptualised cultural competency as an ongoing process (rather than an attainable state) that usually, but not necessarily, emerges from two other interrelated components – cultural awareness and cultural sensitivity. as we have described elsewhere (sawrikar 2009; sawrikar & katz 2008), we define cultural awareness as having knowledge about the norms of other racial groups. in essence, it requires us to have sufficient knowledge about a group to be able to form a stereotype. it is important to note that stereotypes are neither inherently positive nor negative; they are simply cognitive schemas that help us organise information and allow us to make inferences in cognitively efficient ways (baron & byrne 2006). they are only said to be prejudicial when the beliefs that comprise the stereotype are detrimental to the wellbeing (vaughan & hogg 2005) and/or compromise access to opportunities for individuals in that racial group (fraser 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 1997). importantly, by having cultural awareness, a service provider is able to acknowledge the impact of culture on the behaviour of their clients from minority ethnic backgrounds. on the other hand, we define cultural sensitivity as referring to knowledge about how individuals within that racial group differ from the ‘norm’ of that group (sawrikar 2009; sawrikar and katz 2008). in other words, we are now asked to challenge the stereotype we have formed so that it is sensitive to individual variation. the complexity of individuals can then be acknowledged, instead of treating them as representatives of their cultural group (noble 2008). there are a number of personal outcomes for service providers in striving for cultural competency. these include (but are not limited to), having a sense of efficacy when interacting with and providing social services to people from other cultures (bell et al. 2005), not being fearful to admit a lack of cultural awareness about a particular group (brophy et al. 2005), increasing one’s general interest in cultural diversity (braithwaite 2003), being less likely to judge cultural differences as positive or negative, and being more able to accept the occurrence of, sometimes irreconcilable (rossiter 2008), cultural differences. and it is based on these personal and beneficial outcomes identified in the cultural competency literature that we draw inferences and conclude on the pitfalls of the reductionist definition ‘racism = white supremacy’ at the broader sociological level. by analogy, we infer that the main outcome of cultural competency at the societal level is that one’s own racial group is de-centred as the reference point from which others deviate. in culturally competent social service delivery, service providers are asked to explore how their own culture impacts their behaviour and values and to be vigilant on how these may be contributing to biases in the way they deliver services to their minority ethnic clients with different cultural behaviours and values. in doing so, the client group is not seen as deviating from some (ethno-centric) standard, but that the (culturally different) space between the service provider and service user is an ethnically equitable dyadic unit8 8 we are referring here to equity in racialised social power, but acknowledge that professional differences in social power will also affect this unit. in which subjective and interpretative, but negative, stereotypes can be overturned (by both service users and service providers). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 93 at the broader level, de-centring the two groups so that they are each understood in relation to one another, (and not understood as the minority group in relation to the white group), allows for the unique cultural characteristics of each racial group to be acknowledged and valued equally. respect and value for ‘the other’ emerges because each culture is equally valued in their own right, and the value of difference is seen an important asset contributing to the fabric of socio-cultural life; each has something to teach and learn from ‘the other side’. this approach is consistent with the ‘diversity approach’ described earlier. importantly, if there is no reference group around which the discourse on racism revolves, then it can avoid a number of problems. for example, it avoids inadvertently strengthening the power of whites who are seen as the fixed reference point with definitively higher social power than all other groups; no racial group dominates the agenda or movement towards reduction in racism; instances of racism that do not involve whites are not excluded from discussions on racism; each racial group is valued for their unique cultural characteristics; and no racial group is held hostage to their unchangeable ethnicity from which inferences about social power may be made. we have drawn here on the service provision sector as an example of how debates in the general academic literature on racism may want to form itself in the future; taking direction from an area in which ‘the general’ is currently applied (and indeed across several fields of application). however, this paper is not about racially equitable service provision or any other area of application. it is about the definition of racism, the power of language, and the need to avoid discourses that impede the goal of reducing racism. to this end, the concept of cultural competency, drawn from the service provision literature, has been used here to show a possible way forward from the simplistic and (what we see to be) destructive definition ‘racism = white supremacy’. in short, we are arguing that ‘respect for cultural difference’ is one possibly effective strategy for attaining the end goal – reducing racism (or attaining racial equality, to use a part-utopian optimism) by equalising social power but without perpetuating its occurrence, disempowering groups that strive for racial equality, and absolving those that do not. in the words of honneth (1996), ‘it is a claim for ‘respect’ in the form of ‘rights’’ (cited in yar, 2001, p. 300). 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 our argument is consistent with taylor’s (1994) advocacy for ‘cultural survival’; national policies that demonstrate value for cultural preservation. we see that policies that promote cultural preservation enable all citizens (from both the white majority and all minority ethnic groups) to choose which aspects of all the diverse parts of their exposure to multiculturalism (phenotypic, cultural, and/or linguistic, for example) that they would like personally preserve and incorporate into their subjective or “affirmed identity” (taylor 1989, cited in weir 2009). implementing policies that reflect the opposite of cultural survival, namely nationalistic policies of assimilation, ultimately reflect a judgement on which culture (the dominant, ‘mainstream’ culture) is valued or respected enough to (continue to) preserve. such political forces of tension that require minority groups to forsake parts of their own cultures and adapt to some nationalistic set of behaviours and norms arguably provide fertile breeding ground for different groups to be pitted against one another in a separatist fight to preserve their authentic identity. the framework we have offered is a vision of plurality that does not pretend that there is a ‘mainstream’ nor strives to redefine it (at least at this stage), but argues for the equal value of ‘non-mainstream’ cultures to daily and national life. [arguably, ‘respect for cultural difference’ and the right to be different without inherent judgments about the value of this difference can become a tie that unifies a nation (etzioni 2009) assuming a shared national vision is what is desired, although we do not see that striving for a shared set of national values is desirable because such a goal will inevitably involve divisive processes]. importantly, we see that this framework espouses the value of culture itself; and it is the loss of culture which is seen as detrimental and in need of protection. but as culture is a dynamic process in a constant state of re-interpretation (across situations, time, individuals and generations, for example), it is not the specific, identifiable or categorical aspects of culture which we are asking to respect and protect. indeed, we are quick to point out that it is not the group differences that essentialise people and cultures that we see as important in preserving, as taylor has been criticised for implying by fraser (2005) and others (e.g. crowder, ludeman, & vas dev 1997). it is the principle or ideology that culture itself (in however a (globalised) citizen chooses to express their numerous cultural parts) is of value, and that (multi-)cultural differences between people are a rich source of society’s fabric to be acknowledged as essential in preserving. in this way, ‘status equality and not the validation of group identity’ (fraser 2005) is what is protected. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 95 having said this, we do acknowledge that the rhetoric of ‘respect for cultural difference’ comes with its own set of complex issues and it is not a simple goal to understand or implement. for example, such rhetoric will likely lead to questions such as those posed by cantle (2005) who asserts that “in a multicultural country there must be a clear political will to reach a consensus on what level of “difference” is accepted and which differences are acceptable” (cited in burnett 2007, p. 116). that is, the need to empiricise the quantity and quality of ‘respect for difference’ among some researchers as the basis for homogenising a nation and its citizens through some sort of ‘shared vision’ (a notion also espoused by san juan jr, 2002) will form part of the challenge in implementing our suggested framework and language. however, we still take the position that at the very least, this kind of language is a positive step towards reducing racism compared to the perverse and disempowering definition ‘racism = white supremacy’. conclusion in conclusion, racism is not reducible to white supremacy. as the stereotypes that underlie racism are subject to change with new information that either broadens, challenges, or disconfirms the previously held prejudicial stereotype, racism is seen, in part, as a choice. indeed, it is crucial to create a space for the language of choice and personal responsibility in the discourse on racism because this kind of language is empowering and therefore seen as an effective tool for reducing racism. by properly acknowledging the role of ‘prejudice’ in racism, and not exclusively focusing on the element of ‘power’, individuals can be better empowered to exercise their own personal power and choice to be vigilant on their racial prejudices, and all racial groups can be better empowered to take responsibility for protecting each of our human right to racial equality. acknowledgements for their valuable insights from and contributions to discussions at the 4 rs conference (2009) we would like to thank professor hurriyet babacan (university of melbourne), ms kavitha chandra-shekeran (victorian equal opportunity and human rights commission), mr loga chandrakumar (university of melbourne), professor andrew jakubowicz (university of technology, sydney), associate professor greg noble (university of western sydney), and dr anne pedersen (murdoch university). we would also like to acknowledge 96 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http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the location of digital ethnogr aphy dana m. walker univer sity of michigan abstract qualitative researchers interested in digitally-located social and cultural practices have struggled with ways in which to design studies that can account for the digital aspect of cultural practices while also taking into account that those digital practices do not exist as separate (or separable in terms of our research) from other social and cultural practices. as such, one of the primary and ongoing challenges facing internet-based ethnographic research is the question of how to construct the location of a project when the sites, technologically-mediated practices, and people we study exist and flow through a wider information ecology that is neither fixed nor can easily be located as “online” or “offline.” this is as much a methodological challenge as a theoretical one. if one accepts that a rigid distinction between online and offline makes little theoretical sense, then drawing a methodological line between online and offline only reifies such a dualism. while there is a developing body of internet-related ethnographic literature which is attempting to take into account the fluid nature of our information ecology (e.g. burrell 2009, leander and mckim 2003, hine 2007), we continue to operate on shifting ground. this article uses the case of my own work on city-specific discussion forums in philadelphia, pennsylvania to highlight the complexities of locating digital ethnographic work and also argue for the necessity of accounting for both movement and placed-ness. introduction qualitative researchers interested in digitally-located social and cultural practices have struggled with ways in which to design studies that can account for the digital aspect of cultural practices while also taking into account that those digital practices do not exist as separate (or separable in terms of research) from other social and cultural practices. as such, one of the primary and ongoing challenges facing internet-based ethnographic research is the question of how to construct the location of a project when the sites, technologicallymediated practices, and people we study exist and flow through a wider information ecology that is neither fixed nor can easily be located as “online” or “offline.” there has been a growing body of scholarship focusing in a more serious way on how digital technologies fit within people’s daily practices – how such technologies are integrated within the practices that constitute families and communities (e.g. wellman and haythornthwaite 2002) or how internet-based technologies augment or remediate our sense of physical place (crang et al. 2007). 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia this embedded, everyday quality of digitally-based practices and our attempts to study them is as much a methodological challenge as a theoretical one. and while constructing the field site has always been a methodological concern to ethnographers, those studying digital life find such locating practices uniquely complicated in a setting where the researcher often does not occupy the same physical space as the participants. there is a developing body of internet-related ethnographic literature which is attempting to take into account the fluid nature of our information ecology (e.g. burrell 2009, leander and mckim 2003, hine,2007); however, we continue to operate on shifting ground. this article uses the case of my own research on city-specific discussion forums in philadelphia, pennsylvania (us) to highlight the complexities of locating digital ethnographic work and also argue for the necessity of accounting for both movement and placed-ness. my work has focused on the meanings and experiences that emerge around the internet in the context of civic use – researching what happens when people engage in everyday civic discussions in online city-specific forums. in particular, the work has focused on what meanings and interpretations participants in these geographically-based discussion forums construct for themselves on local political issues, civic identity, and the construction and organization of civic space. the focus on the meaning-making work that accompanies the use of information and communication technologies has placed the work squarely within a grouping of internet studies that focus on technologically-mediated practices from the standpoint of the users of the technology (e.g. bakardjieva 2005, orgad 2006, boyd 2008), following user practices rather than particular technologies. my project entailed a multi-sited ethnographic study of internet-enabled civic talk and focused on city-specific online sites primarily in one geographic location: philadelphia, pennsylvania. hammersley and atkinson (2007) usefully describe ethnography in terms of what researchers actually do, explaining that ethnography usually involves “the researcher participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily lives for an extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, and/or asking questions through informal and formal interviews, collecting documents and artefacts – in fact, gathering whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are the emerging focus of inquiry” (p. 3). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 25 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia like many ethnographies, during my 18 months of fieldwork i observed numerous online city-focused and neighborhood-based sites, attended “offline” civic meetings and events, and interviewed local civic organizers, journalists, and academics. i wanted to see civic practices moving on and offline. unlike much work focusing on online civic and political discussion that is either national in scope or interested in particular technological applications, my focus was partly geographical. i was interested in the ways in which online-enabled discussions were constructing and organizing civic places. i therefore needed to locate the field site so that it accounted for the fluid nature of internet practices, but did so without privileging such fluidity over the geographic place in which such practices emerged. in a very particular sense, i wanted to explore the ways in which internet-enabled practices are articulated in local, city and neighborhood specific civic activity. so while i had as a field site a geographic space, my study examined virtual spaces which articulated but did not necessarily fit the cartesian properties of that geographic location. borrowing from jenna burrell’s (2009) notion of “intercept,” i conceptualized the field as a network of relations in which a cluster of city-specific online discussion forums served as a hub of inquiry. the article unfolds in three sections. first, i consider some of the problems and dilemmas researchers have faced in constructing field sites in online environments. second, i take up approaches to account for movement in fluid informational ecologies and look specifically at notions of mobile or multi-sited ethnography. third, i describe my own online/offline field site as a way to explore and ground the challenges of conducting digital ethnographies. i describe structuring my fieldwork by using an intercept and look particularly at the choices i made to enter the field and the ways in which i accounted for the geographical located-ness of the study. problems: constructing the field site a set of fieldwork boundaries is the outcome of a project, rather than its precursor. the decision about when to start and stop, and where to go in between, is for ethnographers not made independently of the field, but is an intrinsic part of the relationship to it (hine 2009, p. 18). how do we construct the location of a project when what we study – the sites and technologically-mediated practices – flow through a vast ecology that is also fluid? the internet, in particular, makes a neat distinction between online and offline exceptionally 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia complicated because, as bakardjieva notes, it is the very place where the “online and offline meet” (2009, p. 54). put simply, the social phenomena we study – the identity construction of teenagers (boyd 2008); how cancer patients cope with their disease (orgad 2005); or even how sociability is constructed in text-based environments (rutter and smith 2005) – do not live exclusively in one particular realm but instead exist, become entwined, and disentangle in a continuous flow through any number of mediated environments. even making the claim that one studies “the internet” as if it were a unified or static phenomenon is problematic (slater 2002) since, in reality, “the” internet is a mix of software; hardware; already-built infrastructures; as well as social, cultural, political and legal practices which combine, become stabilized, and are articulated in different places and under different contexts. this is as much a methodological challenge as a theoretical one. if one accepts that a rigid distinction between online and offline makes little theoretical sense, then drawing a methodological line between online and offline only reifies such a dualism. for the purposes of ethnographic research, the challenge has been to configure a field site that can take into account interconnected and overlapping mediated contexts but in a way as to make the project coherent, manageable and defensible. the field site is not something that is decided upon once and for all at the start of a project, but instead decisions about inclusion and exclusion are made continuously throughout study (burrell 2009). amit describes the problem as an issue of not “discovering” but rather “constructing” the field site, arguing: “the ethnographic field cannot simply exist, awaiting discovery. it has to be laboriously constructed, prised apart from all the other possibilities for contextualization to which its constituent relationships and connections could also be referred” (amit 2000, p. 6). the realization that the field site is constructed rather than discovered (amit 2000) or is the outcome rather than precursor of research (hine 2008) is a crucial theoretical aspect of ethnographic work in digital contexts. this methodological challenge has been approached variously and is tied to theoretical developments within the field of internet studies. reviewing the scholarship, christine hine (2000) has distinguished two distinct understandings of the internet as (1) a culture in its own right and (2) as a cultural artifact. each view, she argued, carries with it its own analytic advantages and affiliated notions of what would be considered an appropriate field site. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 27 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia in the first, the internet is a place in and of itself, containing within it a set of norms and practices to be studied (or at least that could be studied) without reference to people’s unmediated, or offline, lives. this conceptualization is one of the earlier theoretical constructions in which the internet is described as a distinct place with a specific cultural dynamic that one goes to. for example, early in the development of the internet as a mass communication medium, rheingold (1993) in his writing about his experiences with the well (whole earth 'lectronic link) asserted that internet-based communication could provide richer forms of interaction and spaces for deep and meaningful “virtual community” formation. a common early methodological approach, then, was to define the field site as a distinct internet-based technology – a newsgroup, multi-player online gaming site, or social networking software application – and to study that site as a more or less self-contained phenomena. the second of hine’s categories is the internet-as-cultural-artifact perspective, which she develops within a framework of the sociology of science and technology. this perspective involves seeing the internet as the product of culture, co-configured by objects and social contexts and shaped by the ways in which it is used, marketed and taught (2000 p. 9), thus having multiple identities and interpretations. under this conceptualization, the internet exists within a broader cultural, social, political and legal context. it is not a separate system of existence, but instead has rooted within everyday life in important ways. in their notable analysis of the embeddedness of the internet in daily life, haythornthwaite and wellman argued the “pervasive, real-world internet does not function on its own, but is embedded in the real-life things that people do” and argued that one of the great “sins” of early internet research was to think of it as a “lived experience distinct from the rest of life” (2002 pp. 5-7). similarly, miller and slater in their ethnographic study of the internet in trinidad, critiqued analyses that focused on virtuality and separateness as the defining feature of the internet, claiming instead that the extent to which people treat internet relations as unconnected from their everyday lives is something that required explanation, being “treated as a practical accomplishment rather than the assumed point of departure for investigation” (2000 pp. 5-6). as such, a collection of influential critiques have challenged what was once an assumed division between online and offline (e.g. leander and mckim 2003, haythornthwaite and wellman 2002, carter 2005, miller and slater 2000), establishing instead a view of internet 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia enabled practices as being embedded in everyday life. with this grounding, internet ethnographies have adopted different strategies and notions of what constitutes an appropriate field site. hampton and wellman (2003), for example, conducted an offline ethnography of a toronto suburb in order to understand how internet connectivity enhanced a sense of neighborhood by facilitating contact between residents who were loosely connected. also focusing primarily on an offline environment, bakardjieva (2005) studied the integration of the internet into the everyday lives of users by focusing on ethnographic interviews and observation in domestic settings. others have started in the online realm, focusing all or at least most of their attention there. boellstorff (2008) constrained his fieldwork completely within the virtual world second life in order to understand forms of social action and meaning-making that take place within it; while tl taylor (2006) followed the same trajectory as her research subjects, participating first in online gaming and then joining players to observe them during their in-person meet-ups. theories: multi-sited ethnography increasingly as a way to account methodologically for the blurred relationship between online and offline, ethnographers of internet practices have employed mobile or multi-sited ethnographic methods, advocating the analyst follow the movement or trace the flow of “objects, texts, and bodies” as they move between mediated and unmediated environments (leander and mckim 2003). first conceptualized in cultural anthropology, multi-sited ethnography is a response to several decades of methodological reflection by ethnographers who questioned the notion that a field site was a bounded geographic space that contained whole, intact, and knowable cultures (gupta and ferguson 1992 as cited in burrell 2009). marcus (1995), among others, argued that culture was not necessarily spatially fixed but was constituted by global flows made up “in/of the world system.” as such, ethnographic methods must account for those flows, writing that this mode of ethnographic research: . . . moves out from the single sites and local situations of conventional ethnographic research designs to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects, and identities in diffuse time-space. this mode defines for itself an object of study that cannot be accounted for ethnographically by remaining focused on a single site of intensive investigation. (1995, p. 96) marcus forwards “tracking strategies” as a way to provide a coherent research project, including: “follow the people;” “follow the thing” (material object); “follow the metaphor;” cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 29 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia “follow the plot;” “follow the biography;” and “follow the conflict.” the argument for such a mobile approach highlights the centrality of movement and connectedness in social practice. it foregrounds the notion that social processes take place across distance—connecting any range of distinct entities (burrell 2009). in terms of internet research, multi-sited ethnography – in particular marcus’s tracking strategy of “following the thing,” can provide a methodological approach that accounts for the role of material objects (technologies, artifacts, media) in describing social processes that are constituted in and articulated through sociotechnical practices. conventionally, ethnographic research has concentrated primarily on the role of human actors in meaningmaking processes. while documents and artifacts have certainly been part of ethnographic projects, those objects have often been examined as the product, and not a co-producer of, culture. the result is that technology often plays a limited role in understanding social practices, a point bruno latour makes arguing that technical objects are the “missing masses” in social science (1992). latour and colleagues develop the idea of the centrality of objects as a component of the social in ethnographic work emerging from science and technology studies. marcus (1995) himself contends that the emergence of multi-sited ethnography is located, in part, in interdisciplinary scholarship such as media studies and science and technology studies and cites latour’s ethnographic work as case in point of “following the thing.” one of the critical assertions of latour is that we think of society and technology as one heterogeneous collective, composed of people together with technology, machines, and things. it is the interaction among these heterogeneous objects which constitute society and these interrelationships are conceived as networks of human and non-human actors, each of which is itself a network of heterogeneous things (doolin and lowe 2002). the key methodological contribution of such a construct is the notion that actors are constantly moving, interacting, changing, and in flow and the job of the researcher is to “trace” those objects as they circulate in the network. furthermore, multi-sited ethnography’s focus on movement helps to dissolve the coupling of the fieldworker’s physical location as being coterminous with the field site – providing a break between “physical presence and spatial experience” (burrell 2009). traditionally, 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia ethnography has been conceptualized as a geographically bounded project – dwelling in a particular locale for periods of time and participating in the social practices of those locations. from this (traditional) perspective, ethnographic methods are oddly matched to the research spaces of the internet which have blurry (at best) geographic boundaries: site contributors in one location, readers in another, servers and site designers in a third. a focus on movement, tracings and flows is provocative for thinking about studies of internet-enabled practices precisely because it allows the conduct of fieldwork on social phenomena that take place across time and distance. researchers of internet practices have made various attempts to configure field sites so as to account for movement and connectedness. using online traces, researchers have followed links within a field site. beaulieu (2005), for example, used hyperlinks within a large database (the functional magnetic resonance imaging data center) as an ethnographic object – constituting the field site by following hyperlink traces and also reflecting on how those links were both functionally created and symbolically understood. in her study of the scientific discipline of biological systematics, hine (2007) employed what she calls a “connective ethnography,” and explored the connections between different activities including group message exchange, institutional observation, interviews, and hyperlink paths. for hine, a key starting or entry point was a mailing list which she used as a source of data and complement to interviews. in her study of teens use of social networking sites for identity creation and management, boyd (2008) uses a form of networked ethnography in which she analyzes the myspace profiles of teens throughout the united states and interviews teens as to their mediated practices. in each of these approaches, connection and movement are critical methodological concerns of the project with the boundaries of the field site being constructed by: an infrastructure of knowledge production (e.g. functional magnetic resonance imaging data center), discipline (e.g. biological systematics), or social media application (e.g. facebook and myspace). my own work focused on the use of the internet in civic meaning-making and as such i have been interested in the ways in which information technologies, particularly internet-enabled ones, are integrated into the public construction of meaning as well as the construction of a space in which civic practices can be enacted. in a very particular sense, i wanted to explore the ways in which internet-enabled practices are articulated in local, city and neighborhood specific cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 31 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia civic activity. so while i had as a field site a geographic space, my study examined virtual spaces which articulated but did not necessarily fit the cartesian properties of that geographic location. i wanted to understand internet-enabled practices as related to a geographic place, but not reify those geographic boundaries by claiming my field site was the city of philadelphia. if one examines the theoretical work that has emerged from the field of human geography, it is clear that those working specifically on issues of place and space no longer regard them as so easily bounded or separable from the information and communication networks that operate within or through them. for example, massey writes, “the particularity of place is…constructed not by placing boundaries around it and defining its identity through counterposition to the other that lies beyond, but precisely (in part) through its specificity of the mix of links and interconnections to that ‘beyond’” (1994, cited in kellerman 2002, p.40). other scholars, including urban sociologists, architects, and communications researchers have echoed these insights, arguing for the need to see places as constructed through the convergences of many kinds of networked connections, including economic transactions, information loops, and the movement of people. manuel castells (2000) integrates these perspectives into his celebrated argument about the shift to a networked society, one in which the “space of flows” has emerged and to a certain extent superseded the traditional “space of places.” still, we need not concede the continued importance of physical location, or suggest that differences between places have been dissolved. it is possible to arrive at a more restrained conclusion: that choosing a field site has always meant a choice of immersion within particular networks and connections, whether it has been expressly acknowledged by the researcher or not. reflections: the online/offline field site the main research question with which i entered the field was the extent to which information technologies, particularly internet-enabled ones, are integrated into the civic meaning-making process – both in the construction of political public meaning making as well as the construction of a space in which civic practices are enacted. i did not start the project by focusing on one, bounded online site. rather, i approached the field as a network (burrell, 2009) and conceptualized the project by thinking of it in terms of the phenomenon i 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia was interested in studying: the intersection of civic meaning-making and information and communication technologies. because of my interest in civic practices and the co-construction of civic places through information technologies, i entered the field by focusing on a single geographic area: philadelphia, pennsylvania. such an approach allowed me to look deeply at a limited civic context and enabled a combination of online and offline qualitative work. theoretically, philadelphia provided a fruitful research site in part because of its abundance and diversity of neighborhoods, many of which have an active online presence. in a city of 1.5 million people and covering 135 square miles, neighborhoods matter. while it has become cliché, people have long referred to philadelphia as a “city of neighborhoods.” the 1995 edition of the philadelphia almanac and citizens’ manual documented 395 different names for various neighborhoods throughout the city – 200 of which are still used. to a greater or lesser extent, these distinct neighborhoods support an extensive and historic civic infrastructure in the form of neighborhood and civic associations, community development corporations, neighborhood planning councils, and a range of ad hoc civic groups. some of this organizational civic structure transferred to an online environment as early as the mid-1990s1 while philadelphians often talk proudly of their "city of neighborhoods," the negative potential for parochialism this creates is referred to almost as frequently. despite being the sixth largest city in the nation, it is customary to hear stories of native philadelphians who rarely leave their neighborhoods. attempts to link neighborhood organizations have existed in the city at least since the 1970s with projects such as the now-extinct philadelphia council of neighborhood organizations. those linking attempts moved online as early as 1995 at which time the institute for the study of civic values created neighborhoods online with many neighborhood-based groups supporting websites, distribution and discussion email lists (and rival neighborhood groups supporting splinter lists), and later yahoo groups, blogs, and facebook pages. 2 and later phillyblocks.3 1 see, for example, ed schwartz’s (schwartz, 1998) description of the neighborhoods online project in which the institute for the study of civic values attempted to connect and disseminate information about neighborhood organizations. the sites provided information about city-wide issues and political 2 http://www.neighborhoodsonline.net/ 3 http://phillyneighborhoods.org/index.html cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 33 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia developments – compiling information from the distinct neighborhood associations in a consolidated space with the intention of linking community groups (schwartz 1998). in addition to an online presence by traditional organized civic groups, there was a growing online blogosphere representing what then new york university journalism chair jay rosen identified as one of the more active blogging cities in the country (oxfeld 2005). the range of city-based blogs reflected the diversity of the blog genre in general: hyper-local news to individually-authored place-based accounts of neighborhood life; “watchdog” blogs on city government, philadelphia’s metroblogging site; and city gossip blogs. there have also been several successful attempts at aggregating philadelphia’s hyper-local online writing and commenting. homegrown phillyfuture.org has a “philly wire” service that compiles online writers, blogs, and commentators in the philadelphia region. while the later developed multicity everyblock.com collects news articles, blog entries, and other civic information and maps it to a geographic location. despite such a strong online civic presence, i struggled to define a manageable field site. early in my research, i tracked neighborhood email lists from different parts of the city. reading such hyper-local news and commentary sites as well as the neighborhood distribution lists was a critical part of mapping various online civic practices in the city. however, most of these resources were unidirectional and my interest was in meaningmaking through the back-and-forth discussions among city residents about the problems, resources, experiences, and opinions of the city. using an “intercept” based on interviews and observation, an active site for the discussion of neighborhoods was a large, multi-topic threaded message board entitled phillyblog.com. the site was in existence from 2002-2009. despite the misnomer, phillyblog was not a blog but an internet forum that was divided into 41 broadly-defined boards that covered geographic neighborhoods as well as topical areas (e.g. politics, spirituality). on busy days, about 1,000 registered users would login to the site with the most registered users ever online in one day being nearly 4,000 (site administrator, interview). like many forums (also called message boards or bulletin boards), phillyblog employed a threaded conversational structure composed of threads and replies to those threads. discussion threads could be initiated by any registered user and the most 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia current discussion thread appeared on the forum’s landing page. the bulk of the communication was publicly visible, searchable, and archived, though participation could involve anonymous or pseudonymous contributions. importantly for my work, phillyblog was a location where a range of civic groups, citizens, and even journalists looked for civic information. it became a central component of my inquiry based on initial fieldwork and an early appreciation of the scope, diversity, volume and discursive activity in the site; its recognition in the city as a location to talk and get information about neighborhoods and city-wide concerns; and the variety of civic information it manifested. borrowing from jenna burrell’s work on internet cafés in accra, ghana, i saw phillyblog as an “intercept point” – an intersection through which civic life flowed. phillyblog experienced a constant circulation of users and topics. so as users moved in and out of the site, i moved with them: following their links to other discussion, civic, or institutional sites in the city and travelling with them to the places in the city that they were discussing. studying the site as a point of intersection of users and topics structured my work in three critical ways: (a) the way i treated – an analysis and presentation – data that had been collected from multiple sources including “online” and “offline”; (b) the ways in which i travelled with participants as they moved on and offline; and (c) the ways in which both my informants and i entered into the field site. (a)“online” and “offline” data using an intercept and tracing movements online and offline meant that i had to think about how i would collect, analyze, and ultimately present data i encountered in different locations. because i was trying to account for flow from on to offline, i wanted to make sure i was able to collect and triangulate data that i encountered online and offline. i was a participant observer of the site and therefore collected data in the form of digitally-born phillyblog postings. i lived in the city of philadelphia and as an ethnographer was collecting and analyzing artifacts i encountered in my own “offline” realm (e.g. newspapers, community bulletins, etc.). finally, i conducted interviews via three different media: in-person, via the telephone, or over email. in empirical analysis, i combined data from all sources – regardless of how it was collected. indeed, i cannot distinguish if interview data, digital thread data, or observation was more or cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 35 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia less influential in my analysis since ultimately my understanding emerged from observation and analysis of threads, was reformulated based on interviews, and then became more nuanced when i looked at additional threads. as a result, i opted to treat the data similarly in analysis. in other words, i did not assume that interview data was more valid or “real” than data i encountered digitally. i was not interested in whether or not people were somehow “truthfully” representing themselves. rather, i was interested in how they were making sense of their civic lives. in my presentation, i did indicate the location in which i encountered the data – either in digital threads or in interviews. some researchers have used different font types to distinguish data collected online versus that offline (orgad, 2009), but i did not feel it was necessary (and indeed seemed counterproductive) to do so. (b) travelling: understanding the digital layer atop the material spaces of the city using an intercept, secondly, meant that i could examine the connections of phillyblog posts to physical locations in the city; but i did not have to physically follow all of those connections. instead of travelling to the various civic locations that participants discussed, i paid attention to the ways in which phillyblog participants created a kind of digital layer atop their own physical space by locating their digital posts – their first-hand accounts and experiences – within their own neighborhoods. for example, one of the most common posting practices on phillyblog was to report micro-local news. posters asked questions and shared information about neighborhood construction and development projects, restaurant closings and opening, scaffolding in front of buildings, and road closures – the “stuff” of everyday urban living. commonly, those reports were first-hand accounts of crime. in a thread entitled, “car break-in 17th & brandywine,” posted in one of phillyblog’s 14 neighborhood boards, was typical of the types of threads which appeared on the site daily. just wanted to warn everyone that my car was broken into at 17th & brandywine last night. it was around 9:15 and i had just parked my car, came into the house and not even 5 min. later heard the alarm going off. i looked out the window to see 2 young men running away from it. be careful when you park (thread 15763, #1). posters would also solicit others to report on neighborhood activities. in the university city forum, a user asked: “anyone know why two helicopters were flying over around 50th and chester last night around 11pm?” (thread 15765, #1). these kinds of first-hand reports and warnings were almost always “mapped,” in the sense that they included specific coordinates 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia (e.g. 17th & brandywine). as individual posts, this activity is comparable to a police blotter: a running list of corners of the city where one might take care when parking or walking. but commonly such posts did not exist on their own – they were accompanied by an ensuing set of responses, observations, or analysis of the problem. on a thread concerning gunfire in the graduate hospital neighborhood of philadelphia, a poster originated a thread with “there were about six shots fired at 22nd & fitzwater at ~6:30. a guy was shot in the leg” (thread 16963, #1). over the course of two days, 134 replies were made to the thread in which neighbors argued that there was an increasing trend of crime at the intersection because of increased drug activity: this was bound to happen as many people have posted over the past few months that suspicious characters seemed to be congregating at 22nd and fitzwater (thread 16963, #5). this was followed by a response asking: anyone have any ideas as to what we might do to curb the loitering and associated problems on the stretch of 22nd between fitzwater and catharine? (thread 16963, #7). in the successive 130 posts, there was a discussion opened up regarding what neighbors might do collectively. one participant researched and posted all the abandoned buildings in the area. another disseminated telephone numbers for the public housing authority and community police. another suggested a letter writing campaign to city council members and the mayor in which they provided sample copy for fellow neighbors. i never physically travelled to these particular street corners. but by using a digital intercept, i was able to analyze the ways in which phillyblog participants were digitally annotating the material places in which they lived. (c) entry points to the field and to civic life the final, and third, critical way that an intercept structured my own work was that it helped spotlight the ways in which interview participants themselves were using phillyblog as an entry point into the civic life of the city. a common posting practice was for newcomers to the city to ask about neighborhoods in which they might relocate. it became such a frequent posting practice, that one enterprising phillyblogger created a questionnaire that he asked neighborhood home-seekers to fill out so that others would be able to better help them. the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 37 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia form included questions about the most basic, but critical issues of urban life: do you need to park a car; how long are you willing to commute; do you have kids or dogs; do you want walking access to grocery stores, restaurants, museums? other participants described their online conversations as a way to almost “jumpstart” a relationship to the city – learning about the city, its problems, and its resources in detailed ways that may not have been possible without their participation on the site. for example, one participant who had only lived in the city for three and half years explained: “i feel like i know a lot more about the city than i would as a resident who lived here three and a half years and didn’t read it. i feel better informed about things going on in the city about differences from neighborhoods to neighborhoods” [interview]. conclusion structuring the fieldwork using an intercept was critical for practical reasons – the civic discussions on phillyblog moved to physical locations that would have been difficult or impossible for me to travel to because of my own limited resources of time. they also moved outside the geographic boundaries of philadelphia, but practically i was able to maintain a relatively stationary position in following the flows on the site. more than a practical consideration, however, using an intercept gave me access to the digital layer of the city that i would have never seen if i had not followed the circulating discourses on phillyblog. i discovered a public layer of the city that was neither solely digital nor solely material. when i walked by a neighborhood public park, for example, i knew that it was the subject of a vigorous debate between neighbors about the appropriate use of the space – a tennis court or a dog run? neighbors complained that dogs were defecating on the tennis courts, making it at best unpleasant and at worse unsanitary to play on the courts. dog owners defended themselves, arguing that most owners were responsible and that they needed places to take their dogs. materially, this appeared to be a space like many others in the city, a small pocket park in an urban neighborhood that had a tennis court and playground. digitally, i saw evidence of a discursive struggle to decide how to use scarce and valuable resources in a city that doesn’t have much green space. and because i traveled with participants in that discursive struggle and the ways in which they linked to their civic organization by posting the results of meetings, i knew what participants already understood: they were using icts to debate the nature and future of their shared civic spaces. 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia one of the primary rationales for using multi-sited ethnography in digital ethnography is that it can help break down a methodologically pervasive, but theoretically problematic dualism between the neat separation of online and offline. but, as described in this article, seeing the field site as constituted as a network that is moving or in flow, can also allow for an understanding of where flows of activity intersect and where they become set in a place. it is the dual aspect of the network – its moving and placed parts – that lends itself to being able to account for both movement and placed-ness. acknowledgements i would like to acknowledge and thank all those participants who were extremely generous with their time in interviews and follow-up discussions. i would also like to especially thank patrick wehner for his valuable feedback on the project and this article. references amit, v. 2000, constructing the field: ethnographic fieldwork in the contemporary world, routledge, london. bakardjieva, m. 2005, internet society: the internet in everyday life, sage, london. bakardjieva, m. 2009, 'a response to shani orgad', in: markham, a. n. & baym, n. k. (eds.) internet inquiry: conversations about method, sage, los angeles. beaulieu, a. 2005, 'sociable hyperlinks: an ethnographic approach to connectivity', virtual methods: issues in social research on the internet, 183-197. boellstorff, t. 2008, coming of age in second life: an anthropologist explores the virtually human, princeton univ pr. boyd, d. 2008, taken out of context: american teen sociality in networked publics. doctor of philosophy in information management and systems, university of california, berkeley. burrell, j. 2009, 'the field site as a network: a strategy for locating ethnographic research', field methods, vol. 21, pp. 181-199. carter, d. 2005, 'living in virtual communities: an ethnography of human relationships in cyberspace', information, communication & society, vol. 8, pp. 148-167. crang, m., crosbie, t. & graham, s. 2007, 'technology, time space, and the remediation of neighbourhood life', environment and planning a, vol. 39, pp. 2405-2422. doolin, b. & lowe, a. 2002, 'to reveal is to critique: actor-network theory and critical information systems research', journal of information technology, vol. 17, pp. 6978. gupta, a. & ferguson, j. 1992 'beyond" culture": space, identity, and the politics of difference', cultural anthropology, vol. 7, pp. 6-23. hammersley, m. & atkinson, p. 2007, ethnography: principles in practice, routledge, london. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.3, 2010 39 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia hampton, k. & wellman, b. 2003, 'neighboring in netville: how the internet supports community and social capital in a wired suburb', city & community, vol. 2, pp. 277311. haythornthwaite, c. a. & wellman, b. 2002, 'introduction: the internet in everyday life', in: wellman, b. & haythornthwaite, c. a. (eds.) the internet in everyday life. blackwell, oxford. hine, c. 2000.,virtual ethnography, sage, london. hine, c. 2007, 'connective ethnography for the exploration of e-science', journal of computer-mediated communication. hine, c. 2009, 'how can qualitative internet researchers define the boundaries of their projects? ' in: markham, a. n. & baym, n. k. (eds.) internet inquiry: conversations about method, sage, los angeles. latour, b. 1992, 'where are the missing masses? the sociology of a few mundane artifacts', in: bijker, w. & law, j. (eds.) shaping technology/building society: studies in sociotechnical change, mit press., cambridge, mass. leander, k. & mckim, k. 2003, 'tracing the everyday 'sitings' of adolescents on the internet: a strategic adaptation of ethnography across online and offline spaces', education communication and information, vol.3, pp. 211-240. marcus, g. e. 1995, 'ethnography in/of the world system: the emergence of multi-sited ethnography', .annual review of anthropology, vol. 24, pp. 95-117. miller, d. & slater, d. 2000, the internet; an ethnographic approach, berg, oxford. orgad, s. 2005, storytelling online: talking breast cancer on the internet, peter lang publishing, new york. orgad, s. 2006, 'the cultural dimensions of online communication: a study of breast cancer patients' internet spaces', new media society, vol. 8, pp. 877-899. orgad, s. 2009, 'how can researchers make sense of the issues invovled in collecting and interpreting online and offline data?' in: markham, a. n. & baym, n. k. (eds.) internet inquiry: conversations about method. sage, los angeles. oxfeld, j. 2005, 'letting the blogs out', editor & publisher, no. 138, pp. 39-41. rheingold, h. 1993, the virtual community: homesteading on the electronic frontier, addison-wesley, reading, mass. rutter, j. & smith, g. 2005, 'ethnographic presence in a nebulous setting', in: hine, c. (ed.) virtual methods. berg, oxford. schwartz, e. 1998, 'an internet resource for neighborhoods', in: tsagarousianou, r., tambini, d. & bryan, c. (eds.) cyberdemocracy: technology, cities and civic networks. routledge, london. slater, d. 2002, 'social relationships and identity online and offline', in: lievrouw, l. a. & livingstone, s. (eds.) the handbook of new media. sage, london. taylor, t. 2006, play between worlds: exploring online game culture, mit press, cambridge, mass. wellman, b. & haythornthwaite, c. a. 2002, the internet in everyday life, blackwell, oxford. the location of digital ethnography dana m. walker university of michigan abstract introduction problems: constructing the field site theories: multi-sited ethnography reflections: the online/offline field site acknowledgements references social disorder as a social good cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia 21 social disorder as a social good jonathan marshall university of technology, sydney abstract in complex systems, disorder and order are interrelated, so that disorder can be an inevitable consequence of ordering. often this disorder can be disruptive, but sometimes it can be beneficial. different social groups will argue over what they consider to be disordered, so that naming of something as ‘disorder’ is often a political action. however, although people may not agree on what disorder is, almost everyone agrees that it is bad. this primarily theoretical sketch explores the inevitability and usefulness of disorder arising from ordering systems and argues that a representative democracy has to tolerate disorder so as to function. introduction much talk in political life suggests government waste or inefficiency is bad, duplication is bad, the number of politicians should be reduced, the number of tiers of government should be slashed, bureaucracies should be reduced and so on. in general it is assumed that, better, leaner, more efficient organisation, management, measurement or regulation, solves problems. the 2020 conference (2020 plenary stream report) called for: ‘performance targets’ (p.5), ‘urgent action to increase economic capacity through the creation of a truly national, efficient, sustainable, innovative and inclusive economy supported by seamless regulation’ (p.8); ‘efficient regulation’ (p.9); ‘regulation reform to reduce regulation overlaps and complexity and to incentivise timely investment in infrastructure’ (p.10); ‘an integrated, whole-of-government approach underpinned by clear targets and measurement with independent reporting’ (p.21); ‘uniform regulation’ (p.33), ‘nationwide harmonisation of regulation, standards and enforcement’ (p.34) etc. slightly later, prominent conservative politician, and now leader of the opposition, tony abbot was reported as announcing that: 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 ‘the biggest problem australia faces today is the dysfunctional federation… it’s absolutely critical that we establish who’s in charge of all areas of governance. ‘i will be arguing for a constitutional amendment to establish that, where it so wishes, the commonwealth can pass laws to override the states not just section 51 as it is now, but in all areas… ‘the federal government is totally hamstrung by the legal authority that resides in the states…. the article went on to claim that: there is considerable bipartisan federal impatience with the incompetence and intransigence of the states. last week, the defence minister, joel fitzgibbon, proposed abolishing the states altogether, an idea mr abbott described as impractical (smh: 10 july 2008). the ex-treasurer of nsw, michael costa also called for the abolition of the states saying, ‘it would remove a layer of political interference in service delivery’ (smh 13 sept 2008). a website for a group calling itself australia 100 protested against ‘duplicated bureaucracies and regulatory regimes’, ‘excessive parliamentarians’ and so on. others (e.g. cole and parston 2006) call for ‘measured outcomes’ and ‘informed decisions’ (as if many people had campaigned on behalf of uninformed decisions). it is easy to find further examples, from all sides of politics, all calling for efficient organisation with a smooth flow of power. although the 2020 conference emphasised ‘inclusion’ and ‘rights’ in most of its panels, there was no consideration of whether such ‘inclusion’ or ‘rights’ was compatible with these demands for efficiency. there is little criticism of this praise of order from social and political theory. from bodin and hobbes onwards the spectre of social disorder has been used to justify order of almost any type; in their case, order which can overwhelm claims of justice or ‘rights’ (king 1974). marx seems to have thought disorder and serious conflict would stop with the revolution. durkheim thought anomie, or social disorder, to blame for suicide, and sought to prevent disorder in general, although he was happy to consider some forms of disorder (such as crime) as normal if the rituals around it restated the importance of order (durkheim 2006; marks 1974). max weber argued that we should construct unambiguous ‘ideal types’ to do our analysis, thus deleting disorder by ignoring it (whimster 2004, pp.387ff.). even anarchists talk about spontaneous order, and rarely celebrate disorder itself: proudhon supposedly declared that ‘anarchy is order’ (p.marshall 1992, p. x). an obvious advantage of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 23 focusing on order is that it helps to remove from our perception, those parts of social life that cannot be explained by the theory being proposed. however, what if disorder arises from ordering or if disorder is sometimes beneficial? if either of these possibilities are allowed, then we can challenge the notion that if something is not working then it must be in need of greater organisation. it might already be too organised, or organised according to inappropriate principles, or the ordering may have side effects. perhaps redundancy, waste, disorder and frictions, provide the time and place to object, to slow things down, to circumvent rules, thus allowing civil society to function? if so, then it may be necessary to distinguish between creative, or functional, disorder on the one side and disruptive disorder on the other. to avoid confusion let me state what this paper is not arguing. firstly i am not denying that social disorder can impinge negatively upon ‘human rights’, or that disorder, ambiguity or incoherency cannot be exploited to maintain an oppressive order (see for example ferrara 2003). all disorder is not the same. secondly i am not defending the order of corporate markets. the order of capitalism or markets is not under-regulated. the supposedly freer the market, the more protection and regulation the corporate sector has in their favour – such as copyright ownership; skewed distributions of income from work; rewards for failed executives; regulation of workers; diminution of responsibility for working conditions; regulation of unions, strikes or protests; shifting tax burdens onto the middle class; government transfer of taxpayer monies to the corporate sector through contracting or asset sales; shifting of responsibility for regulation onto the industries being regulated, and so on. even if capitalism was anarchic, then by encouraging huge divergences of wealth and power it creates an elite who will attempt to organise the state to prevent others from impinging on their rights and power. political ordering is part of the corporate market, not extraneous to it. this paper does argue that: i) a certain amount of disorder and inefficiency is not only an inevitable consequence of organisation itself, but that ii) disorder can be beneficial to civil society and to democracy. 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 in particular the paper proceeds by showing how ordering can create disorder through necessary technologies of ordering such as: categorisation, communication, disruptive reflexivity, and administration. on ordering whatever the ordering system, only a relatively narrow band of events can be classed as ordered, while an infinite range of events can be classed as disordered. as a result ‘disorder’ seems much more common than ‘order’ (bateson 1972, pp.3-8). the greater the precision demanded in the order, the greater the range of events which will appear disordering. think of arranging objects on a tray. an obsessive person may demand that each object has a precise place so that even a millimetre displaced represents chaos, while a less demanding person may have a greater range of acceptable positions for the objects, and thus face less chaos and distress. both of these hypothetical people might think that the other person’s arrangement was disordered, even if they had its purpose and method explained to them. this explaining might then lead to conflict as they realise their fundamental incompatibility, causing a further crisis of order as they try to assert their own order. orderers tend to see what they classify as disorder as bad; as falling outside the categories they use to classify and order the world, unless it is to be classified as evil or threatening (cf douglas 1966). they have a discomfort with ambiguity as well as disorder. this means that ordering is often incompatible with a politics which is not merely confirmatory of existing schemas, and is thus ineffective in situations of change, as change is categorised as threat or disorder. but being able to do what was done before would imply the situation was the same as previously, even though no situation is ever exactly the same as previously, only similar. what makes something similar, is itself an active ordering or categorising response which invokes the possibility of acting on the event similarly with similar success. in that sense, similarity is circular and precarious; as we only discover the situation is not similar enough when the ordering fails. technologies of ordering order is frequently associated with what we might call ‘technologies of ordering’: classificatory systems, filing cabinets, command structures, divisions of labour, methods and structures of communication, arrangements of space, barriers, etiquette, maps, shelving and so on. as an example, we may think of the way government attempts to order people so as to: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 25 allocate rights, responsibilities and obligations; to provide services to those it considers worthy and refuse services to those not fitting that classification; or to decide who is a full member or citizen and who is not etc. it also aims to categorise its workers/administrators, so they can act and be controlled in that act. computers and software are the tools commonly used nowadays to classify people, which leads to a whole set of problems in itself. we all know the excuse that ‘the computer will not let me do that’ and, as another example, computers also allow automated customer help call waiting ‘services’, which more efficiently parcel labour for the organisers, with the result that things often remain done incorrectly or remain undone. it is characteristic of all technologies that they both enable and restrict – not just one or the other. a filing cabinet, for example, puts everything partially out of reach, usually in an ultimately arbitrary order; documents can get lost in the cabinet, it might not be clear how the documents are classified, and documents usually have to be removed from the system to be useful, a pool of disordered documents usually accumulates before they go back into the filing system and so on. the potential for disorder allows the technology to function as well as fail. a technology, by definition, is something which simplifies and which excludes parts of the complexity of reality, in order to magnify other effects. technology tends to both cut off unseen connections, and to make unseen connections. technology: consists in substituting a man-devised organisation of matter, the ‘technosphere’, which is relatively crude and geared to the satisfaction of short-term anthropocentric ends for the ‘biosphere’ remarkable for its subtlety and geared to the maintenance of long-term stability (goldsmith 1973,p. x) 1 . the relatively old book from which this remark comes, describes the unexpected and disruptive effects of technology on ‘natural systems’. such events might be summarised (itself an ordering which deletes), as eventuating when ‘linear’ or ‘discrete unit’ based technology encounters a complex ‘cybernetic process’ or ‘flow’. the world is in some sense always in flux and always messy, with imperceptible links and complex consequences, and thus it escapes or resists attempts to render it linear, and break it into discrete units. forcing 1 today we might be less certain about the stability of the biosphere. it also undergoes constant change, and biological adaptation can subvert the aims of the technology as when bacteria become resistant to antibiotics and cleaning agents. 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 the world into linearality, or putting it under rules, can render the system unworkable, or lead it to work in unexpected ways, producing further disruption. as everything is constantly changing, technologies of ordering are all impermanent. organisation always lags, and must always lag and hence be inaccurate, otherwise organisation does not provide a simplification that enables people to act. if the technology of ordering is maintained in the face of massive change then the ordering body will gradually even more lose touch with the reality. rules the most obvious organisational technology is the rulebook, aiming to make things predictable, and events similar. as businessman ricardo semler writes: ‘in their quest for law, order, stability and predictability, corporations make rules for every conceivable contingency’ (1992, p.96), but rules can slow things down as well as speed things up – people spend hours arguing about how they should be interpreted, and about the situations they are being applied in, or they ignore the specifics in favour of the rule. as well as clarifying procedures, rules create distrust because they imply that people in the organisation cannot be trusted, and yet they have to be trusted. rules divert attention from the organisations’ objectives, create extra work for rules checkers, fossilise behaviour which may no longer be appropriate, making development difficult, and direct people’s effort to creative rule bending, so that the organisation can work. rules are necessary for order but create disorder. law and the legal system could be a development of the rulebook, and ideally acts as a protection against arbitrary power, or at least clothes official violence in ritual and respectability. the legal system is precisely, a linear technology imposed on the complexities of social life. in practice, western law avoids some of the resultant dilemmas by being situational, although pretending to be universal. judges and juries steer their ways through strange intricacies which are often deleted when the decisions are reported with indignation in a couple of paragraphs, or seconds, in the media. often those who consider themselves ‘popular opinion’ want simple rules applied uniformly, except when it comes to themselves, when the complications previously ignored become obvious2 2 conservative newspaper columnist miranda divine, for example, frequently castigates judges and politicians for letting criminals go, while being indignant about suffering from the speeding laws which apply to her. . at other times the law is cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 27 applied rigorously and that can also seem to be a form of blindness or disruption. however, in general, the legal set-up recognises that what is the correct procedure in one situation may not be so in another situation which appears similar. the problem consists in deciding what is ‘the same’. rather than assuming that similarity automatically comes to the fore, people in the law deal with this problem through argument, and through attempts ‘to get away with things’3 . those in the law, in effect, attempt to break the laws they are enforcing. this can lead to the legal system allowing people to render their responsibility opaque and sever the ties that the law supposedly reinforces. this is particularly marked in cases like mabo, where the appropriating authority is trying to deal with the appropriation of the land that gives it its own legitimacy and force (veitch 2007, especially pp.100ff.). however, the law often has to be contradictory in order to be fair. despite the presumption of innocence, courts do not release all charged people before their trial, and sometimes this results in innocent people serving time in jail. sometimes the accuser will be protected at the expense of the accused in an attempt to stop victims from being further traumatised (despite this assuming the guilt of the accused). such problems cannot be avoided, and the fairer the situation the more such problems may arise. incoherence may allow fairness as well as corruption – and fairness is not straightforward, as guilt, innocence and responsibility are not known in advance. furthermore, it may never be possible to cover all possible cases, in all changing circumstances, by strict laws specified in advance, and if we attempt to do so then the system becomes a game of rules not ‘justice’ and the system loses credibility. categorisation understandings and theories act as filters and selectors of events from the overwhelming flux of reality (popper 1972, pp. 341ff.; feyerabend 1999). conceptual tools are a technology of ordering. 3 this situational law or justice would seem to undermine the kantian categorical imperative (where moral action is independent of conditions and desires and each person ought to do what everyone should do in a similar situation) as, if the disorder is taken seriously, then it implies that staying with kant’s order would render life impossible – a point made by one of kant’s translators, although he does not think it undermines the theory in principle (abbot 2005, pp.13ff). 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 dividing the world into categories is a way of simplifying the world and of gathering things and events together which are different – there is rarely a category of one thing4 . furthermore, humans do not, in general, categorise things and events in the classic platonic manner by making a definition so that all things in the category are the same in the same way. often, those things or events which belong in a category are placed in it in varied ways. they can be linked to a central item or prototype, being similar to it in different ways; they can be linked in chains in which distant members have very little in common and so on. linkages can be influenced by the needs the users wish them to serve, the feelings users have about the categorised, or the ways the categorised fit in with other categorisations (as membership of a category is influenced by comparison with the other categories being deployed at the same time). many or most categories will be ‘congeries’ or ‘collections’ rather than definitional. they, or their members, will also be subject to argument – ‘is that person a refugee, a resident alien, an overstaying tourist, or an economic migrant’, ‘do we have a class society’ etc. membership in a category, and the category itself, almost always has the possibility of being challenged. locating somebody in a category will give you some valid information about that person, but not everything the category implies is accurate. thus because someone is a woman does not necessarily mean she is mathematics phobic or that she likes young children. the average man may be shorter than the average woman, but that tells us nothing about a particular woman and man. a person will only share certain interests or properties with other people of the same category, and this can be cut through by other categories, such as class. an upper class woman may have more interests and properties in common with an upper class man than with her cleaning woman. people tend to spill out of categories, and thus categories can be misleading, even if necessary. categories also create difference. let us suppose we use religion as a primary classifier for people, then some people will be classified as belonging to religion x in relation to religion y whether they particularly identify with religion x or not. classification includes them in previous histories and rivalries, it forces people to emphasise a part of themselves, joins them with others they may want to break from, and allows others to treat them as defined by that 4 i have discussed the issues mentioned in this paragraph at length in marshall (2006, 2007). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 29 religion alone. this may then be enforced by violence. by replacing the mess of human actuality with sharp categories more tension and disorder can be created. it can be even more disordering to administer through computer programs which classify people in advance of the program being written. at least human categories have the possibility of ongoing change should they prove inadequate to the reality encountered, whereas computer categories cannot be altered without a great deal of work, which will probably not be done due to expense and inertia. the more rigorous and stable the demand for categorisation the greater the chance that categorisation will be misleading. people must categorise, so avoiding this problem of category-created chaos is impossible, but we can be more aware of it, or less aware of it, and more or less willing to alter our categories to fit with reality. conceptual schemes are inevitably skewed and disordered with respect to reality and this is increased when they become the basis of communication – as one effect of categorisation is that ‘who’ a person is classified as will affect the way that their message is interpreted, and thus their intentions may be completely overwritten by their listener’s sense of appropriate order. communication communication while increasing the possibility of order is also disordered by order. good communication is only possible between equals (wilson 1980, pp.118-25) 5 . if punishment is possible then a person will adjust the message towards what they think the potential punisher wishes to hear. after several levels of hierarchy, and the same process, the message can be distorted beyond recognition. this is one basis of the power/stupidity nexus. however, if there is no punishment for bad messages then there is no guarantee that the messages will be accurate either, as it may still serve the interest of those below to be inaccurate. hierarchy embodies secrecy and bad communication. secrecy can be a resource used by managers to imply that they have access to a source of mysterious power or understanding, and it allows managers to protect their status by hiding mistakes. however, those beneath can simply assume the worst, and start a counter-secret chain of rumour which fills in the gaps 5 it shows the disreputability of disorder as a topic for theorisation, that many of the best generalisations about disorder in administration come from supposedly comic writing such as wilson (1980), parkinson (1958), peter & hull (1969), adams (1996), and haga & acocella (1980). 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 and becomes the perceived truth of the organisation – again a ‘truth’ which is rarely reported upwards. increasing the amount of communication does not mean that people will be better informed, as they can then start skipping messages to get to the ones they already know might be good or useful. the more information is available, the easier it is to select information that agrees with one’s previous biases6 . a related difficulty arises because redundancy helps a message to get through, or a meaning to occur – it allows people to reduce the ambiguity of words and symbols. without redundancy and excess, the only way to ensure stability of meaning is through force or the suppression of noise (i.e. the unexpected or irrelevant), but if a message seems entirely noise free, expected or predictable then it has little information (hayles 1989, p. 306). attempts to reduce noise, such as spam filters in email, can then remove important messages that fit the way that spam is recognised. so redundancy threatens messages, as does removing it. communication, in itself, does not always bring harmony, or solve the problems of social disorder, as it can propel people who disagree into conflict and it is harder to hate someone you don’t know exists (marshall 2002). consultation may even make people feel snubbed if they do not achieve what they hoped for, thus producing further alienation, or pushing people to silence or to hiding behind the noisy few who do get distributed and heard. good communication takes time, toleration of misunderstanding, working out of difference and so on, and is thus inefficient. as communication consumes time, it also renders complete accuracy impossible in a complex and shifting situation. hopes for complete accuracy and efficiency are simply disordering. reflexivities a further consequence of these problems with communication is that social processes always combine order and disorder because of what we might call ‘multiple interactive reflexivities’. this simply means that everyone has some understanding of how the world works, how to interpret others, and how to operate within that world. even the best attempts to render these 6 this is a kind of gresham’s law of information; ‘bad information drives out good’. ungar suggests we live in a ‘knowledge aversive culture’ rather than a ‘knowledge society’ (2003). see also the idea of agnotology, the study of culturally induced ignorance (proctor & schiebinger 2008). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 31 understandings uniform, comes up against errors of transmission and replication. as a result there is always a complex divergence of views, interpretations of message and events and responses to those messages and events. further, these reflexivities do not exist alone, but interact and modify each other. people are generally aware that other people are likewise operating according to some views and thus some, at least, will attempt to second guess, anticipate, help or avoid, the actions of others and the results of those actions. thus even when there is general agreement and order, people will attempt to manipulate or subvert the results of those actions and orders. if people attempt to predict the actions of other people then that changes the situation, and this gets progressively more complicated, producing the kind of ‘fog’ that clauswitz described of war (beyerchen 1992-93). post chaos theory and lorenz’s butterfly effect, we can no longer be certain that the complex web of interaction between these different reflexivities will even-out into an ‘average’ response or into a predictable equilibrium (eigenauer 1993, p.458). therefore as what others will do, or the consequences of what they do, is never entirely predictable (especially when modified by the effects of other’s responses), disorder is always potentially present (merton 1936). one way of explicitly allowing the web of reflexivities into politics, is to allow or encourage the development of institutional bases for some of these knowledges and resistances to occur. instead of aiming to oil away friction, the aim would be to allow the frictions to collect and to give them a semi-permanent basis for action. this goes against the general ‘cutting away of inefficiencies’ paradigm. however, even then, this ordering process is undermined by the time it takes to hear all the different views, never mind understand them or find a way of comparing them. it may, like consultation, even emphasise the knowledge that some people are not heard. whatever the procedure, not everyone can be heard, and accepting the majority opinion does not really make sure that that majority is correct, or that it will not affect minorities adversely. while exclusion creates disorder, so does inclusion. creativity and problem solving creativity is inherent in almost any system that responds to the world and includes the world as an input/output. however, because it is driven by problems or sometimes by the random coming together of different ideas so as to form something new which allows a progression, creativity can be hampered by order. order can prevent the new problems becoming 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 apparent, can resist solutions to the problems that challenge its ordering, and can hinder the coming together of random ideas. order can also prevent the transmission of ideas as when people decide not to tell those higher in the organisation of a potential solution because they know it might be rejected and they would lose status by being associated with it. order may not allow creativity in the sense of giving it the freedom, or wasted time, to develop an idea, as ideas are nearly always weak when first proposed and thus easily destroyed. order may selectively store the memory both of previous failures and of previous successes that have resulted from following the path of order, and thus decide that creativity or the creative node/person is a failure. people engaged in ordering can also see creativity as a form of vandalism, of defacing its idols, and thus attempt to crush anything which ruins its treasured tidiness (peckham 1979, pp. 274ff.). while people who operate within systems dominated by technologies of ordering are efficient at solving problems through moving symbols around in accordance with the official rules for symbol manipulation (say solving problems within a system, or framework, of established mathematics), they may not be so good at changing the meaning of symbols, changing the framework, or of opening new categories (so as to make a new branch of mathematics). the latter process involves changing modes of being or perceiving, and changing the ways that things will be done; and sometimes solving problems does need a complete shift of framework. this distinction resembles the one samuel makes between ‘priests’ and ‘shamans’ (1990, pp.106ff.). priests work within the world of order; shamans attempt to make a new world. what does seem probable is that both of these seemingly opposed kinds of approach are actually needed. the priests develop the discovery, and in so doing lead the shamans to a new take off point, for a new development, which is then explored completely and rigorously by the priests. while shamans might innovate a completely unreal or maladaptive system, priests are rational administrators, but as we will see in the next section rational administration can also disrupt itself. what seems likely is that when the power system and the ordering systems are matched, then it is less probable that solutions which potentially disrupt order will be possible without seeming to be an overthrow of the whole set-up. the ordering will be defended at the ultimate cost of the system. thus with the problems facing us with climate change, the capitalist mode of ordering seems largely incompatible with the necessary innovation to solve the problems. in nsw for example the government may make advertisements full of black cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 33 balloons displaying carbon emissions and asking us to cut electricity usage, while at the same time increasing electricity prices to keep old producers profitable and encouraging more coal mining in agricultural areas and under water tables, so as to fuel more coal fired power and hence more carbon emissions at potential long term ecological cost (smh 20 march, 2010). the ordering system seems bent on defending itself against aspects of chaotic reality, thus provoking its ultimate disordering and downfall. administration is disruptive as haga and acocella point out, small amounts of organisation affect the ease with which people do things, and reduces anxiety by seeming to make the world more predictable and replicable. as a result, people assume that the more effort they put into administration then the easier and more predictable the situation becomes and more time they will save (1980, pp. 19, 23). however, diminishing returns appear quickly, and more energy is soon spent organising than is saved through the organisation (ibid, pp. 24-5, 45ff.). it can, for example, easily take more time to file and catalogue everything neatly in a way which is obvious and efficient for every user, than it does to hope that people can find whatever they need by a more random search, or by keeping recently used files in a nearby pile (abrahamson 2002). there is also a point at which the amount of anxiety generated by the organising exceeds the benefits (which might then prompt further attempts to reduce anxiety by engaging in more ordering). at a later point the organisation can have so many checks, backups and overseers that the amount of time that people spend ordering each other and checking that ordering, leads to paralysis (haga & acocella 1980, pp.54-5). while demands for measurable outcomes seem beneficial (as we would like to know if things are working), they can also disrupt the organisation’s functioning. measuring the outcomes requires more administrators who thus lower the amount of resources devoted to delivering the services. demands for accountability can take people away from the work they are supposed to be doing, to work that involves measuring what they should be doing. then, the measurement tools may not be appropriate for the services offered, and force services into an inappropriate mode. we can focus on cost reduction in hospitals rather than on treating patients. measurable outcomes lead to the threat of an organisation or a part of an organisation losing funding or income, if it does not come up to the measures. this might be inherently futile in 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 an organisation which is supposed to be creative and inventive, as it removes all recognition of the importance of failure. all attempts at creativity produce dead ends, mistakes and failed attempts. the fact that something is not possible, or some theory does not work, is informative but hard to measure in terms of success. attempting to measure the success of creativity leads to measures of production and the organisation’s members get diverted into producing things which are uncreative or repetitive, as at least this can be counted. in general, most organisations deal with measurable outcomes or dependent funding, by forming committees, possibly hiring external specialists (who don’t know how the organisation works) to write applications for more money or to analyse their administration, appointing fact finding task forces, engaging in cost cutting and staff reduction (perhaps hiring more ignorant external advisors at great expense to do this) and so on. this overburdens the actual workers with paperwork, status reports, minutes, insecurity, putting effort into trying to defend their jobs rather than doing them etc. and the organisation can no longer do its business effectively. the result is that it becomes even more subject to the threat of losing income. however everything is highly organised and satisfying to managers who have done the best they can. this provides an example of parkinson’s law, that ‘work expands to fill the time available’, which is perhaps a popular throwaway line suggesting that people generate work so they appear useful and worth having. more and more fine detail can be collected and commented upon; more reports produced, and the more time it takes to report on the reports (parkinson 1958, pp. 4-7). this may not be bad. it provides employment after all, distributing wealth usefully to people who will spend it, and gives their bosses the feeling that they are controlling some hive of activity. it defends people against their bosses, as they are just doing their jobs and organising things7 . it may also make the organisation resilient, as it has a horde of people familiar with its activities who can be moved to new areas of challenge. inefficiency is not always bad. parkinson adds that ‘an official wishes to multiply subordinates not rivals’ (1958, p. 5), but there may be more to growth than just expanding one’s sense of power and influence. we could also suggest that administration tends to increase, as redundancy demonstrates that you 7 indeed the more a person’s position depends upon others higher up judging their performance, the more they are likely to generate work to be busy and necessary and keep their position. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 35 are administering in the first place. the implicit logic is that if a stronger and repeated message is a clearer message, then more administration is better administration. rescher suggests that management tends to bloat, not just because mangers appoint underlings, but because the more complex situations become, the more checks, controls and information gathering are required (1998, p.177). in that case, the more efficient information technology is, then the greater the swelling of management. even governments who claim to want to reduce bureaucracy end up spending more on management, despite the cuts in the services they provide for ordinary people. indeed, they often try harder and harder to make sure that the benefits are not exploited by the ‘lower classes’ or ‘undesirables’ with ever diminishing returns and increasing costs, but successfully making it harder still for people to obtain any legitimate help. again, inefficiency can increase the more efficiency is promoted. growth in numbers of administrative subordinates can also be beneficial. semler notes that growth is needed in organisations, especially in business organisations, as growth allows the organisation to diversify and adapt so, if part of it fails, the rest can continue8 . growth also provides new opportunities for employees. in a hierarchy, people either strive to be promoted or give up hope of being listened to. as attrition rates rarely equal ambitious hopes, the organisation risks losing people (and possibly trade secrets), or risks people losing their enthusiasm, and so the organisation may create an extra level or two, expanding to satisfy the ambitious and keep itself functional (semler 1992, pp.263). more subordinates can also mean deeper bureaucracy, and the deeper the bureaucracy the more that local activities can be kept secret. obviously this can lead to petty corruption and inefficiency safe from hindrance, but it can also lead to local flexibility, to attempts to adapt to local conditions and to keep the organisation functioning in ways which are not recognised by superiors in the ‘centre’. it can solve the problem of innovation when faced with challenging problems to the ordering system, as new solutions can be tried out unofficially and protected from interference by the secrecy provided by layers. these solutions can be discarded if they fail, or distributed (again perhaps secretly) through the system if they work. 8 imagine a creature with only one skill. if the environment changes so that skill no longer applies, that creature is dead. a creature with more than one skill, or complexities it does not technically need, has a greater chance of finding more than one survival strategy, and hence of surviving. the same is likely for a collection of people with differing skills and views (page 2007). redundancy and disorder can be socially and adaptively beneficial as well as inevitable. 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 a good and functional bureaucracy is not an iron cage but something of a ‘mess with procedures’. however, again it is not simple. as semler points out, with the increase in staff and levels: soon there is such a pollution of titles and levels – and a diffusion of responsibility and authority that much of management’s time is spent dealing with the inevitable conflicts, jealousies and confusion (1992, p.189). organisations are often caught between expansion and discontent. if people do get promoted when they seem competent, then the principle that people tend to get promoted past their level of competence, can take hold (peter & hull 1969). hindle argues that in ‘de-layered’ organisations, with much less hierarchy, ‘much of the incompetence has disappeared’ (2000, pp.171-2), while satirist scott adams points out that in ‘the old days’ the structure of promotion generally meant that a manager had once been competent at something to do with the organisation’s purpose. nowadays they can be imported from outside and thus be promoted ‘without ever passing through the temporary competence stage’ and having no experience of the work they will be administering (adams 1996, pp. 12-13). as these particular brought in managers maybe transient, there is also no incentive for them to produce long-term results, only short-term success, which can often be achieved at the reduction of longer-term viability. contrary to hindle, there is nothing to suggest that with a low hierarchy, a promotion to incompetence cannot have even more of a widespread bad effect, as there are fewer independent and competing competent modules to keep the organisation functional. the manager may have more, rather than less power over their underlings with no intermediary buffer, thus spreading their incompetence further. lower hierarchies, especially when key strokes can be traced, imply less separation between the centre and the periphery, and less room for the periphery to move and adapt to local conditions, thus decreasing the ability of organisations to adapt, and increasing the amount of inaccurate information the centre will receive to plan its response. the more inefficiency and redundancy, the more this effect may be countered; the more efficiency the more the effect will disrupt. some evidence for promotional incompetence is collected by william starbuck (1992, mezias & starbuck 2003), who reports research suggesting that the abilities of managers to plan or actually predict the effects of their decisions is quite low; companies with no formal cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 37 strategic planning perform as well as those who do. however, managers involved in planning tend to evaluate their effectiveness and their actions very highly. as already discussed, these managers will get positive feedback from their underlings who know what is expected, and they are therefore fairly ignorant of reality. starbuck told abrahamson and freedman that when ‘corporate heads of finance were asked to estimate their companies’ sales volumes over the previous five years; 60% of them couldn’t come close’, and ‘the perceptions of executives are usually terribly wrong… sometimes it’s truly ludicrous’ (abrahamson and freedman 2006, pp.43-4). this in itself could be expected to produce disorganisation and anxiety in the workplace as people are driven by the plan, not the reality. another explanation for managerial incompetence is that managerial focus is often directed internally to other managers and staff, not externally to the environment or to the people the organisation impinges upon, as that is a requirement of getting on in managerial systems. resources are allocated throughout an organisation by its administration and administrative structure. the more such resources are distributed internally or the more there is an apparent shortage of these resources, the more the focus of competition will be internal9 . therefore, administration has a tendency to be maladaptive to ‘externalities’, no matter what the kind of organisation is. the state one of the biggest allocators of resources and of defence is the state. the state has an odd ontology. it is clearly not a thing in itself, yet we treat it as such (radcliffe brown 1940, p.xxiii; geertz 2004, particularly the commentary). the state is not necessarily independent of other forces. for example, today, it seems common to argue that the state should be administered like a corporation10 9 the internal focus, internal loyalties, or fear of open communication, may reinforce a hidden regime of fraud or recklessness. vaughan calls this part of the ‘dark side of organisations’ and remarks that: ‘surprisingly,… harmful actions and the extensive social costs to the public-the dark side of organizations-are not claimed as central to the domain of sociologists who define their specialization as organizations, occupations, and work’ (1999, p.272). it could be hypothesised that this learned ignorance results because of our focus on ordering processes rather than on disordering. , even though a corporation has fairly different imperatives, rarely lasts long, and can declare bankruptcy so that all involved can move elsewhere without much hindrance, something a state cannot do. management techniques appropriate to business may not work elsewhere, and may disrupt the state itself. 10 ibm’s explicit contribution to this discourse can be found at http://www.businessofgovernment.org 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 irrespective of how it is administered, by its existence the state creates resources which are limited, such as positions of power, privilege and control over money flows. as a result, conflict is at the heart of the state; both in the relations between people internal to the administration and in their relationships to those defined as potential fellows or outsiders (elias 1970; baker 1979, pp.21-3, 41ff., 59). we could define the state as the conceptual locale in which war is continued by, or contained within, largely non-violent means. however, non-violent combat implies recognition, so if this is not granted by one or other of the parties involved then violence can be deployed, with the success of that violence determining its legitimacy and the legitimacy of the winning party. the equation of power with violence is another base of the power/stupidity nexus – the powerful do not have to think about things, they can hit them (graeber 2004, pp.72-3). however if violence is not equal to the task of imposing consent, then we have civil war which, as a truism, only occurs when there is a state or potential state to be fought over. hobbes’ ‘state of nature’, the struggle of all against all, requires the state in order to exist. over the last three hundred years the western state has expanded to allow more people to participate. this increased the range of civil society, from nobles and their functionaries, through males with certain amounts of property, to males of non-official religions, to women, to all adults irrespective of property, to making sure minorities have representation. this expansion caused a great deal of panic amongst those who traditionally controlled the state and there has been some narrowing in effective general participation after the sixties with an increasing influence or dominance of the corporate sector (marshall 2009). this was an organised solution to the not insignificant problem of getting consensus. the more the state expresses or acknowledges the multiple reflexivities of people and legitimates them, then the more it can be challenged as weak, ineffective and confused. yet narrowing the state to make it more controllable also appears to fail, both socially and ecologically, because it excises parts of the world, and thus deletes views which do not come from, or do not match those of approved power holders. sometimes these deletions will occur because of the communicative factors we have discussed above, and sometimes it may be deliberate (see hamilton & maddison 2007; marr 2007; shulman 2007). whatever the case, intensive ordering lowers communication and the possibilities of feedback. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 39 attempts to impose an order in favour of business have possibly generated financial crisis and self-destructive behaviour as non-pro-corporate perceptions and knowledges were not included in the state’s ambit, and the actions of capitalists could not be curtailed in principle. bailouts brought about by the failure to listen to warnings about the flaws in the system could be alienating voters and leading to legitimacy crises. so attempts to tighten control may eventually loosen it, or they may eventually lead to the systems destruction (ultimate disorder) if the failed businesses are bailed out, and continue to act in the same manner – that is, to maintain the order they prefer. despite this apparent increase in control, there is little evidence to suggest that the traditional holders of power feel more secure than they did. if we listen to those who support them in the media, then we hear a constant cry of dismay that their power is so fragmentary. blame can be put on quite unlikely candidates, creating further ignorance, and leading to further postponement of action, and more attempts to increase control. if organisation is initially a way of reducing anxiety, then organisation will be applied when anxiety arises. organisers fear those who are not orderable. if, for example, it is true as ron suskind reports that dick cheney put forward the idea that “if there is a one percent chance” that someone might do something dreadful to them, then the us government had to “treat it as a certainty”, and that it was “not about our analysis, or finding a preponderance of evidence [but] about our response” (2006, p.62), then this attempt to impose order would not only be never ending, but would lead into wars with little strategic benefit, which might then produce further long-term problems, distrusts and hostilities. having zero tolerance for disorder could lead to disaster. as suggested by earlier remarks the order of communication imposed by high-level command, meant that confirmatory evidence was found or reported, unclear data was framed in terms of suspicion, and any disconfirmation was ignored. at a lesser level these kind of fears drive surveillance, which has the potential to further generate terror in the suspect population, and increases their sense of grievance and of not fitting in with the other parts of society, and thus generates some support for the disorderly and perhaps even makes people consider disorder in revenge. disorder and anxiety is increased and the rights that are supposed to be defended are suppressed. fears of the disorders of violence drive the likelihood of violence, or the likelihood of locking down the society’s capacity to adapt to the changes which make internal violence more 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 likely. the more capacity the state has, the more potential it also has for over-riding dissidents and people who disagree with its actions, and hence the more distrust it generates. if the state could tolerate the idea of disorder then organised, or common, violence could be seen as an indication that something is wrong and might need to be repaired or changed, rather than just suppressed. however, there is never any guarantee that complete peace and order can be reached at all times. we made need to remember durkheim’s point that crime is normal (and sometimes created by morals, so the more moral and controlled people are the more likely trivial things become violations of those morals) and that therefore ‘specialists’ in crime will play into the possibilities of violence. charles tilly (2003a) implies that the more states attempt to efficiently and effectively police and organise categories, boundaries and exclusions, then the more likely they are to generate groups of people whose identities are based in these exclusions. these groups then provide the basis for violence specialists to put in place the organisation, advance planning, prior training, logistical preparation, and strategic coordination which is required for mass disordering violence, which may then be directed at the state, its ‘members’ or minority scapegoats who are perceived as being included in the state rather than being with the excluded. attempts to crack down on the potential violence, also has the possibility of increasing violence by involving people previously on the margins and forcing them into the ‘despised’ category. tilly (2003b) also points out that if trust networks grow up outside the state, and we might add the more these are organised, then it is more likely such people will opt out of the state or attempt to exploit it for their own benefit. this may then, we can suppose, impact on ability of their trust networks to survive. such factors make it a fundamental, and possibly unsolvable, issue for a state that believes in ‘freedom’ and ‘rights’ as to how it acts towards people within its sway who would overthrow it, or who would claim it is their right to suppress others. certainly it would seem impossible to propose a general ordered solution to that problem. maintaining internal peace is a matter of ongoing struggle, not just attempting to fit people in, but attempting the perhaps impossible task of changing, or relaxing, the order to produce minimal exclusion. a step forward into useful disorder? in the west and perhaps elsewhere, people have generally called for greater order and efficiency to solve our problems, without considering whether this order will produce further cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 41 disorder, or if disorder may be valuable (even a sign of upwelling creativity). i have discussed some fundamental technologies of order, such as rules, categorisation, communication, law and administration, and have attempted to show the paradoxes that are involved in using them, and how these technologies both enable and restrict. these technologies while helping people to do things, also distort the world they are ordering, they force contrasts and similarities, rather than look at variety. i suggested that those in the law attempt to deal with these problems through argument, by not assuming that similarity is obvious but that it has to be established, and that even then problems arise. in this sense justice and rights are not categories with strict definitions which are always everywhere the same, and attempts to behave as if they were can add confusions and distort reality. they are disordered congeries, which people struggle over with their differing interpretations. the terms may allow us to add the appearance of order, but they are not ordered in themselves. i have also suggested that good communication is inherently inefficient, and requires some inefficiency and lack of hierarchy in order to work. furthermore, because of the problems of multiple reflexivities, not only will communication frequently be concerned with strategy rather than accuracy, but predictions about human behaviour will tend to be unstable and selfdefeating. inclusion and exclusion both create disorder. similarly, administration, partly because it is concerned with ordering, is plagued with problems of disorder which undermine its efficiency, and this may not be a bad thing in all cases as this inefficiency can further the organisation’s chances of survival. people in management may find, that in order to survive as managers, most of their energy has to be directed at an internal environment rather than the environment that the organisation depends upon, so that the organisation may eventually flounder in its internal efficiency. it may also be harmful to translate a successful mode of ordering from one situation to another, as the situations differ and will require different kinds of responses. if ordering produces disorder, and the more so the more rigorous the order, then there are diminishing returns in pursuing order and efficiency. as a result of these incoherencies there are few, if any, uniform rules for administration. formalised values crystallise certainty and order, rather than recognise uncertainty and disorder, or the possibility of different situations, different categorisations, change, and struggle, and hence reality itself. there is probably no solution, but i will propose a minimalist position, resembling popper’s falsification theory of science (popper 1972, passim). this states that we cannot tell if a proposition or theory is true (as we will always be 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 able to find confirmations), however, we should be able to see if it fails. thus instead of deciding that we know what ‘justice’ is, or ‘rights’ are, or even what ‘efficiency’ is, we can argue over whether a particular decision was unjust, or efficient, or not. there will usually be more agreement about what is unjust than about what is just, in the same way as there can be more agreement about what is disordered than what is ordered. thus, while rights are the only discourse we have to talk about rights, we will be better served not by attributing rights in abstract but by objecting to lacks of rights, by recognising conflict and unresolvability, and by realising rights are born and maintained in struggle and competition. democracy occurs when friction between people is allowed and recognised; when people have the time and place to make objections, to try and slow things down, and to circumvent rules they think are stupid. inefficiency allows debate and encourages the ordering to adapt responsively to the environment it is both in and creates. removing institutions such as state governments, local councils, churches, trade unions, business councils, resident’s groups etc. removes distributed knowledge of the system and usually seems aimed at removing the frictions facing power so that power can be unimpeded once a decision has been made. in australia, the presence of competing civil organisations, levels of bureaucracy, and the three tiers of government mean that governmental bodies have different allegiances, so it is harder for any one group to take over all the machinery, and it provides more institutional space that can be occupied by marginal groups. people can have some hope that their objections against injustice will be heard, rather than just being ignored quickly and efficiently. there was some effective resistance against john howard’s government and its apparently totalising plans, because of wasteful state governments. duplication, although costing more, frequently acts as a check on the power of one organisation, as not everything is done by that one organisation and its masters. the question could be: ‘does this extra spending really count as waste when it acts to check total power?’ in any case, should we allow some kind of economic judgement to be the only form of judgement that is applied to all possible events, including its own failure? it is doubtful that any one schema can deal with the fact that people want to live differently, and judge the success of events by different schema. again we hit the problem of an overarching ordering being inherently intolerant and disordering, no matter how inclusive it might want to be. the economic rationalist order wishes to include everyone cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 43 and everything as wage labour or resource – something which perhaps not everyone wishes to be the case – and indeed most economic rationalists probably do not treat their families in that way. in any society there will be competing ideas and concepts about what is order, what order looks like and so on. thus ‘order’ may be socially positioned and this is why i have not attempted to define ‘order’ and ‘disorder’; such definitions are a political act. in decision making the usual path is to seek what we all agree on, and disregard the rest, yet it may be in the discards that the energy lies, and where people have the most enthusiasm. thus finding the points of agreement may mean that you have an agreement nobody cares about, and cannot actually hold people together. the general blandness of the 2020 reports is a case in point. the initial report stated that: it is only by having these kinds of conversations that we have any hope of understanding our challenges, their possible solutions, and ultimately each other. this does not mean we will always agree, and we have disagreed this weekend about many things. though interestingly, there was a large measure of agreement about many of the major challenges, even if sometimes sharp differences of opinion were evident in discussing solutions. we should not be afraid of disagreement. indeed an important feature of a liberal democracy is respect for conflicting ideas; difference is part of the human condition (2020 initial report, p. 1). however, there was little if any trace of this disagreement left in that report, which mainly consisted of statements that people would like nice things to happen. it suppressed dissent and fracture for the appearance of a dull uniformity which was expressive of little, and gave little sense of how these nice things would be brought about11 . the result was that it seems to have been ignored. an experimental politics recognises that solutions are not known in advance. politics have to be adjusted; even the best and most reasonable ideas will not always work. thus we have to allow things to go wrong rather than to cover them up, or assume that if we apply the policies a little more strongly or a little more lengthily they will start to work. i propose slow, inefficient, government, like slow food. speed is often confused with efficiency as if when something is faster then it is more responsive; but it can also be less responsive. if, for example, you are driving a car at 200 kph there is less chance of veering to miss if something happens suddenly. efficiency removes ‘room to manoeuvre’, ‘space which 11 accounts given to me of the conference by those who attended or who knew people who attended, suggest that some participants actively felt excluded and ignored by this harmonising procedure. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 allows a relaxed considered response’, ‘stored resources’ and ‘resilience’. as usual, the opposite is also true: moving too slowly can also disrupt. the response, while precise, misses because the events have already moved on. speed is sometimes needed. there is no easy answer. however, it would seem to be useful to be aware of two things. firstly, that all systems of governance, or ordering, are subject to incoherence and will produce disorder; the more efficient and more total the order the more likely it will result in disruptive and destructive disorder. secondly, it is useful to recognise this incoherence and the possible benefits that arise from allowing disorder and friction, especially if you are in favour of some kind of democracy. perhaps a society, or state, can only be representative, democratic and inclusive if its members can accept a degree of inefficiency, ambiguity and lack of control? references 2020 initial report 2008, initial summit report 2020 plenary stream report 2008, plenary stream report http://www.australia2020.gov.au/docs/2020_summit_initial_report.pdf abbott, t.k. 2005, kant’s critique of practical reason and other works on the theory of ethics 1889, http://www.australia2020.gov.au/docs/plenary_stream_report_lowres.pdf http://oll.libertyfund.org/ebooks/kant_0212.pdf 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[version used from suskind, ron 2006, the one percent doctrine: deep inside america’s pursuit of its enemies since 9/11. simon & schuster, ny. http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~wstarbuc/mob/strategizg.html tilly, charles 2003a, politics of collective violence, cambridge university press. 2003b, ‘inequality, democratization, and de-democratization’, sociological theory, vol.21 no.1, pp. 37-43. ungar, sheldon 2003, ‘misplaced metaphor: a critical analysis of the ‘knowledge society’’, canadian review of sociology and anthropology, vol.40 no.3, pp. 331-47. vaughan, diane 1999, ‘the dark side of organizations: mistake, misconduct, and disaster’ annual review of sociology, vol.25 pp.271-305 veitch, scott 2007, law and irresponsibility: on the legitimation of human suffering, routledge-cavendish, abingdon. whimster, sam 2004, the essential weber: a reader, routledge, london. wilson, r.a. 1980, the illuminati papers, and/or press, berkeley. http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/editorial/the-case-for-coalmining-is-not-entirely-open-cut-20100319-qm26.html� http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/editorial/the-case-for-coalmining-is-not-entirely-open-cut-20100319-qm26.html� http://www.smh.com.au/business/why-the-utilities-want-us-to-use-more-power-20100319-qm58.html� http://www.smh.com.au/business/why-the-utilities-want-us-to-use-more-power-20100319-qm58.html� social disorder as a social good introduction on ordering technologies of ordering communication creativity and problem solving administration is disruptive references 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia lords of the square ring: future capital and career transition issues for elite indigenous australian boxers1 megan stronach daryl adair university of technology, sydney abstract in australia a serious and widely documented statistical gap exists between the socio-economic circumstances of the country’s indigenous and non-indigenous populations. areas of divergence include life expectancy, health, housing, income, and educational opportunity and employment. this has made entry into an occupation or vocation problematic for some aboriginal people. while sport has provided opportunities for a small number of talented indigenous athletes, it has rarely been a pathway to lifelong prosperity. this paper contends that as a result of overreliance on an abundant bank of physical capital, indigenous australian boxers are particularly vulnerable to potential occupational obsolescence should their bodily assets erode more quickly than envisaged. utilising an interpretive phenomenological approach, the paper examines retirement experiences of fourteen elite male indigenous australian boxers; the goal of this research is to understand their post-sport career decision making. in this respect, pierre bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, capital and field are utilised to frame and interpret the capacity of indigenous boxers to develop sustainable career pathways – future capital – during their time as elite athletes. in terms of career transition and retirement planning, boxers’ engagement with education and vocational training is typically restricted to occupations that complement their sense of physical capital. while this limitation has been observed among boxers from various ethnocultural backgrounds (hare, 1971; ramos, 2010; weinberg & arond, 1969), it is particularly noticeable among non-white boxers (hare, 1971) and, in the context of the present study, indigenous australian athletes. these ‘lords of the square ring’ remain largely unaware or removed from the possibility of pursuing career pathways beyond those that draw upon or accentuate their physicality. introduction on 13 february 2008, australian prime minister kevin rudd made a national apology to members of the stolen generations.2 1 the authors acknowledge the foundational work of peter corris (1980). as part of this apology, rudd pledged that his government would lead a new, national effort to close the gap between indigenous and non-indigenous australians. he referred, in particular, to “the gap in health, in housing, in educational opportunity and attainment, in employment. and the obscenity of the seventeen-year gap in life expectancy” (rudd 2009). the ‘closing the gap’ campaign targets, amongst other issues, the 17 year life expectancy gap between indigenous and non 2 the forced removal of aboriginal and torres strait islander children from their families was official australian government policy from 1909 to 1969. governments, churches and welfare bodies all took part, with the power to remove children without parental consent and without a court order. these children became known as the stolen generations. today many of these people still struggle with issues of identity and deep feelings of hurt. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 47 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia indigenous australians. as a result, the matter of lower indigenous socioeconomic conditions has quickly become a mainstream concern in australia, although it ought to be conceded that indigenous disadvantage is hardly new, having been a feature of aboriginal lives since the impact of colonial settlement. with the ‘closing the gap’ vision as a background, this paper evaluates aboriginal circumstances in the context of an arena in which they appear to have flourished in recent years elite sport. there are three key domains in which aboriginal athletes have not only excelled, but been statistically over-represented in recent years – boxing, rugby league and australian rules football. this paper focuses singularly on the first of these with the rationale that, while indigenous nrl and afl players have begun to receive significant attention from researchers (i.e. hallinan & judd 2009; adair & stronach 2010), the same cannot be said of aboriginal boxers. the paper is particularly concerned about how indigenous sportspeople prepare for life beyond elite-level boxing.. it examines the retirement experiences of fourteen elite australian boxers and, in keeping with the ‘closing the gap’ theme, does so in the context of the longstanding socioeconomic disadvantage of indigenous australians. the paper considers systemic structural inequalities in the areas of education and employment, and their long-term ramifications for indigenous athletes, despite recently released statistics (abs 2008a) showing slightly improved levels of schooling and employment of indigenous people in australia. the paper frames these questions by deploying notions of habitus, capital and field as articulated by pierre bourdieu (1984). by associating these concepts with elite level boxing in australia, we question how they influence the capacity of indigenous boxers to develop sustainable career pathways during their sporting careers. specifically, we test the proposition that as a result of an over-reliance on their perceived abundant bank of physical capital, combined with limited financial planning, vocational training or education, indigenous boxers tend to be largely unprepared for life beyond sport. that may mean that the long-term education or vocational training of these athletes is sacrificed for the sport of boxing. this lack of career planning beyond sport is what the authors have termed an absence of future capital – again linking deliberately with bourdieu and his notions of social, cultural and economic capital. finally, the paper seeks to determine whether post-sport career choice for this group of elite athletes is mediated by factors relating to their indigenous heritage. . the study concludes that indigenous boxers are particularly vulnerable to a deficiency of future capital owing to a preoccupation with their sport life and the virtual exclusion of alternative, non-physical, postsport career paths. in the idiom of sport psychology, this is termed athletic identity foreclosure (brewer et 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia al. 1993), leading to potential occupational obsolescence should a sportsperson’s bodily assets erode more quickly than envisaged (e.g. by serious injury). the following section surveys and analyses the academic literature relevant to the paper and then summarises and evaluates bourdieu’s (1984) concepts of habitus, capital and field. literature review career transition and retirement from sport international research consistently indicates that retirement from elite-level sport may be a potentially difficult, even prolonged and traumatic experience (lavallee & wylleman 2000; mihovilovic 1968; taylor & ogilvie 2001). studies on retirement from elite-level sports have shown that many athletes encounter serious economic difficulties, loss of contact with teammates, they miss the camaraderie of the team, have decreased life satisfaction, suffer depression, lose self-esteem, have a greater probability of marriage breakdown, and may engage in pathological behaviours such as suicide, crime and substance abuse (butt & molnar, 2009). they may also experience zeteophobia, otherwise known as anxiety about career decision making (lavallee et al. 1995). while some athletes find the challenges of their retirement overwhelming and may experience a crisis, others report a positive transition with very few problems (coakley, 1983). it has been suggested that these peculiarly contrasting experiences are merely a reflection of the idiosyncratic nature of career termination which is characterised in the same way as any transition by a complex interaction of personal and situational factors (lavallee & robinson 2007). however, there is consensus among researchers that career transition planning is likely to make the path to retirement more manageable and successful than might otherwise be the case (anderson & morris 2000; petitpas & champagne 1988). in sport, an important concept known to influence career transition is known as athlete identity (ai). the concept was initially developed by theorists writing within the discipline of sport psychology (eldridge 1983; heyman 1986; rosenberg 1981). brewer et al. (1993) defined ai as the degree to which an individual identifies with their role as an athlete. ai is important in this study as: (a) it is considered to be a major factor impacting on adjustment to termination from a sport playing career; (b) significant relationships between ai and zeteophobia have been identified by researchers (albion & fogarty 2003); and (c) athletes found to be most likely to have career and adjustment difficulties were young males in high profile and high income sports, notably the football codes, essentially because of their high levels of ai (albion & fogarty 2003). to date no studies have been undertaken involving ai and elite indigenous australian athletes. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 49 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia indigenous contribution to boxing in australia sport has long played an important social and cultural role in australia. aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples are indeed high profile contributors to elite sport in australia (korff 2008; tatz 1995; thomas & dyall 1999), and boxing is one of the most significant to them. in 1987, tatz reported that there are more indigenous boxers per head of population than among any other ethnocultural group. the sport’s governing body boxing australia inc. (bai) cannot provide membership figures to accurately indicate the numbers of indigenous boxers within their ranks, but the history of boxing in australia has always had close links with indigenous communities. for many, it has offered the possibility of a way out of poverty and a means of overcoming racism. bai reports that many of its members are from a ‘working class background’ (boxing australia 2005). furthermore, bai pays tribute to australia’s strong tradition of aboriginal boxers, fostered early last century by the widely known jimmy sharman boxing troupe, which originated in 1910. many aboriginal boxers commenced their careers in the sharman tents (oliver 2006). there exists a growing body of research about the recruitment of indigenous athletes into professional sport (afl 2008; boxing australia inc 2008; campbell 2008). the rich history of aboriginal australians in boxing is also well documented (broome, 1980, 1995; corris 1980; mooney & ramsland 2008; tatz 1987). however, little is presently known about their adjustment to life after sport, except for the high profile case of former world boxing champion and 1969 australian of the year, lionel rose. during his career rose earned more money than any other australian fighter. however, when he retired in 1971, rose entered a downward spiral of heavy drinking and minor criminal convictions. he also spent most of his money – in his own words, on ‘wine, women and song’ (tatz 2009). australian boxers have won silver and bronze medals at olympic games and produced numerous professional world champions. however, australia is yet to produce an olympic boxing gold medalist: this is now a major objective of amateur boxing officials (boxing australia 2005). professional boxing is, of course, entirely different with its own set of governing bodies, rules and regulations (oliver 2006). bai’s boxing talent identification program, originally entitled ‘lords of the ring’, in partnership with the australian institute of sport (ais), targets young indigenous athletes using the expertise of the national talent identification and development program (ntid). the program offers residential scholarships based at the ais. four scholarship positions are dedicated to developing indigenous athletes in different weight categories (boxing australia inc 2008). this provides excellent opportunities for up-and-coming 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia champions both within the sport itself, but further, to a wide range of athlete services provided by the ais – including education and career planning. socio-economic factors in the 21st century, aborigines and torres strait islanders, once the sole custodians of the australian continent, constitute less than three per cent of the national population. the pernicious legacy of colonialism remains with indigenous disadvantage evident across virtually every socio-economic indicator (adair & stronach, 2010 ). aboriginal people have, as examples, significantly lower life expectancy than other australians,3 much higher levels of unemployment,4 considerably lower levels of education and income,5 and are vastly over-represented in the nation’s prisons.6 figure 1: occupation by indigenous status, males, 2006 at the time of the 2006 census (see figure 1 below), the top three occupations for indigenous males were labourers (30%), technicians & trade workers (19%) and machinery operators and drivers (14%). non-indigenous males were more likely to have occupations as technicians & trade workers (23%), professionals (18%) and managers (16%) (abs, 2008b). (source: indigenous community profiles, australia, 2006 census). 3 australian bureau of statistics figures for 2005-7 indicate that life expectancy of indigenous men is 11.5 years lower than for non-indigenous men, while life expectancy of indigenous women is 9.7 years lower than for nonindigenous women (statham, 2010). 4 in 2001 the unemployment rate for indigenous australians was 20.0%, compared to 7.2% for non-indigenous australians (abs, 2004). 5 for example, 39% of indigenous students stayed on to year 12 at high school, compared with 75% for the total australian population (abs, 2004). both high unemployment and low levels of education have impacted the economic circumstances of indigenous people. in 2002, the average household income for indigenous australian adults was 60% of the non-indigenous average (abs, 2005). 6 australian bureau of statistics figures for 2004 indicate that “indigenous persons were 11 times more likely to be in prison compared with non-indigenous persons”, and that in 2003 some 20% of prisoners self-identified as indigenous (abs, 2005). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 51 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia researchers (gorman 2004; naish 2008) have recently provided systematic evidence to indicate that some retired indigenous athletes have struggled to find suitable employment after their sport career had finished, and that they faced challenges of coping with a new life beyond sport and its athletecentredness. for indigenous athletes, then, the prospect of retirement from sport involves a particularly urgent need, during their athletic career, for sports organisations to provide professional development opportunities and resources for effective transition to a life beyond sport. conceptual framework: bourdieu’s formula bourdieu’s (1984) theory is written as ‘(habitus x capital) + field = practice’ (johnson 2006). in this paper the formula will be utilised to frame the social practices that formulate identity and influence the development of future capital by indigenous boxers within a wider context of familial, occupational and institutional arrangements (mcgillivray & mcintosh 2006). there will be a particular focus on their engagement (or lack thereof) with educational discourses. bourdieu’s (1984) theory assists with the analysis of responses from participants and in the presentation of the researchers’ findings. several authors have argued that bourdieu’s (1984) work is very relevant for understanding the dynamic social practices found within sport. for example, wacquant’s (1995) work focused on social structuring and bodily capital among professional fighters in an american metropolis. moreover, mcgillivray and mcintosh (2006), as well as mcgillivray, fearn and mcintosh (2005), have explored the circumstances in which young scottish footballers perceived their sport as the fulcrum of their lives, thereby committing their whole selves to an occupation that, at best, provided them with short-term occupational and financial security. in each of these studies the social practices of young athletes were theorised using bourdieu’s (1984) formula for social practice. habitus is a concept that seeks to explain the dispositions that influence individuals to become who they are, and yet also includes the conditions of that existence (bourdieu 1990). bourdieu describes the habitus as a set of durable dispositions that are carried with, and which work to shape, “attitudes, behaviours and responses to given situations” (webb et al. 2002, p. 114). as webb puts it, the habitus is not “something one has, like knowledge that can be brandished, but something one is” (webb et al. 2002, p. 114). in this respect it is “unconscious and unthinking” (mcgillivray & mcintosh 2006, p. 373) and absorbed unwittingly, based on what may be called an “unreflective routinisation” (mcgillivray & mcintosh 2006, p. 373). thus the habitus acts to implant certain cultural behaviours such as habits, 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia beliefs, values, tastes, bodily postures, feelings and thoughts that bourdieu argued were socially produced in individuals (johnson 2006). the second element, capital, can be best understood as “currency tradable within a specific field” (mcgillivray & mcintosh 2006, p. 374). within any field the dominant form of capital in circulation governs what is of value. for the investigation of the social positions occupied by indigenous boxers, two forms of capital – cultural and physical – are especially important. possessing the desired cultural capital conferred by the educational field normally enhances an individual’s opportunities for employment (bourdieu, 1984). however, in the sport of boxing, we argue that physical capital and the associated embodied competence (speed, skill, strength) are accorded greater value than the cultural capital associated with formal educational discourses (wacquant 1995). this is understandable in a sport like boxing, which has traditionally attracted athletes ‘from a working class background’ (boxing australia 2005) with modest educational experiences and aspirations. finally, the third element of bourdieu’s formula for social practice is the field, defined as “a structured social place with its own rules, schemes of domination, and legitimate opinions” (johnson 2006, no page number). bourdieu (1990) likened a field and the practices therein to knowing the ‘rules of the game’ or ‘how the game is played’. but within those rules, individuals may use a variety of strategies to ‘play the game’ or take advantage of opportunities that come their way. the field of boxing has an active relationship with habitus and capital, and can play a crucial role in defining social practices and the relative value of capital within. thus it may be argued that the field of boxing constructs, promotes and reinforces a particular cultural habitus within which certain forms of capital are valued more highly (mcgillivray & mcintosh 2006). boxing emphasises the importance of physical capital – (e.g. bodily care and maintenance) over its cultural (educational) counterpart (mcgillivray & mcintosh 2006). this may not be problematic per se in order for boxers to compete successfully, but it may become problematic in the long-term lifespan of these athletes when their physical assets begin to erode, for example, as a consequence of age or injury. bourdieu’s concept of habitus has been critiqued as being deterministic that it limits an individual to reproduce only what they know (johnson 2006). however, according to reay (2004): “[habitus] carries within it the genesis of new creative responses that are capable of transcending the social conditions in which it was produced” (pp. 434-435). this refers to ‘agency’, defined by webb et al (2002) as “the idea that individuals are equipped with the ability to understand and control their own actions, regardless of the circumstances of their lives” (p. ix). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 53 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia methodology for this research, an interpretive phenomenological approach was utilised. phenomenology allows investigators to understand and describe the ways in which individuals reflect on and experience their lifeworld (langdridge 2008, emphasis in original). the present study allows for the voices of indigenous australian boxers to be heard by enabling the study participants to construct narratives detailing the range of experiences that shape(d) their sports career and their ‘lives-after-sport’. however, the current study has a desire to do more with the data than just “describe things in their appearing” (langdridge 2008, p. 1135) as this seems to offer little potential for critique or the possibility of re-conceptualising the phenomenon being studied (habermas 1971). this goal of change accords with a conceptual framework known as the transformative paradigm, first articulated by mertens (2007), which encourages reformist agendas through the identification of stakeholder needs and targeted research responses. in the context of the present study, the transformative paradigm demands deployment of a critical ‘lens’ for interpreting the situations, circumstances and problems of indigenous boxers, and how these might be improved. a purposive convenience sampling method was used in which subjects were selected because of some important characteristics. as with other non-probability sampling methods, purposive sampling does not produce a sample that is representative of a larger population, but it can be exactly what is needed – in this case research into a clearly defined and relatively limited group (patton 2002). in this study, fourteen elite indigenous australian boxers were interviewed. our interest in the athletes extended beyond the current crop of young boxers to incorporate the opinions of more established and experienced senior professionals, some of whom have been retired for up to 20 years, but have maintained links with the sport. participants were all elite performers but variously amateur or professional, and either currently in sport or retired. initial contact with the sample group was made with the assistance of key stakeholders, notably personnel from bai and the ais. several participants were contacted by using the social networking utility facebook: respondents could choose to respond (or otherwise) to online inquiries about whether they would like to participate in the current research project. on two occasions, the koori mail (australia’s national indigenous newspaper) published articles about this research project, inviting readers to make contact with the lead author, if they wished to participate. all of these means were effective in reaching athletes who subsequently formed the sample group. interview guides were developed for both groups, initially based on issues for investigation established by the literature review, and a preliminary analysis of content was undertaken. transcripts were read 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia through several times, which allowed an early appreciation of topics deemed relevant to the participants. these encompassed athletic careers, post-sport careers, social support resources, athlete career and education programs, and recommendations for future indigenous sport programs. as time progressed, the interview guides were modified as a greater understanding of the participants’ transition from their sport career to their present situations was developed. the interview guides were also informed by suggestions of appropriate methods for questioning indigenous peoples developed by australian family law court counsellor stephen ralph. he recommended that, due to strong oral traditions of indigenous peoples, allowing individuals to provide information using a narrative style may be more effective than standard question and answer sessions (ralph 1997). while the interview process was guided to some degree by the lead researcher, it was less rigid than relying on a formal questionnaire (denzin & lincoln 2005). the semi-structured ‘conversation approach’ thus became a loose, fluid, and flexible invitation to share information by personal narratives or ‘story-telling’. interviews were conducted between july and december 2009. a critical approach to narrative analysis was employed, which enabled the lead author to interpret the hidden meanings behind the stories told during interviews. in this process the words of the participants were viewed with both “empathy (understanding tradition) and suspicion (engaging in critique)” (langdridge 2008, p. 1136). however, at all times the subjects were provided with written copies of their testimony, and they each had opportunities to respond to drafts of the study as they were composed. the input of the boxers at all stages of the research process was therefore very important. qualitative data was supplemented by interviewee responses to the athletic identity measurement scale (aims) (brewer et al. 1993). the aims (brewer et al. 1993) is a short questionnaire, with ten items encompassing social, cognitive, and affective elements of ai, and was administered to boxers within the interview process. the aims items tap into the thoughts and feelings derived from athletes’ daily experiences. scores on each item can range from 1–5; therefore the overall score can range from 10-50. scores on this 10-item scale were averaged to give an indication of respondents’ overall level of ai. the authors of this article are not indigenous; nor have we been professional athletes. but we have endeavoured, through dialogue with aboriginal men, to understand how and why they engage(d) with their sport, why boxing matters to them, and how they negotiate(d) their future lives. as mentioned previously, the engagement of the participants in various parts of the study was crucial. this was intended to ensure trustworthiness in the study, with participants engaged as critical members of the research process. all participants whose ‘voices’ appear in this study were provided with a draft copy of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 55 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the article, and invited to confirm that their words were accurate, free from hidden meanings and used in the correct context. when discrepancies were found, the lead author communicated and negotiated with the participants until such time that all parties were satisfied that the representations were clear and accurate. findings these are presented in two interdependent sections, beginning with a presentation of the demographic data, which is then integrated with the interview findings, to produce a synthesised discussion section. table 1 demographic characteristics of participant group demographic data. current retired total professional boxers 3 4 7 amateur boxers 4 3 7 total 7 7 14 the average age of the boxers was 31.21 years, ranging from 18 – 58 years. the average time in boxing at the elite level was 8.36 years, with seven retiring from sport during the past twenty years. nine are currently – or have been – ais scholarship holders, and ten have competed at international level (such as olympic games, commonwealth games, and world titles). all the boxers have left school. currently five are employed in community and personal services (2 personal trainers, 3 youth workers), with two working as labourers. two boxers are currently unemployed, with one describing his occupation as a labourer, the other as a personal trainer. two boxers make their living by boxing professionally; both of these want to become personal trainers. one amateur boxer who has recently completed year 12 and one current ais scholarship holder also intend to become personal trainers. one former boxer receives a disability pension. eleven boxers were married or in a stable relationship with a partner; three were single. five had been born in regional areas, four in remote areas and three in urban areas of australia – all had, at some time in their lives, relocated to larger cities to develop their boxing careers. education and work status figure two compares current education and work status for indigenous, non-indigenous people and indigenous boxers. fewer indigenous boxers have competed year 12 than non-indigenous people, and fewer boxers have a post-school qualification than either indigenous or non-indigenous people. there is a much higher unemployment rate for boxers than for indigenous or non-indigenous people. 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia figure 2: education and work status of indigenous and non-indigenous persons education and work status of indigenous and non-indigenous persons and indigenous boxers *indigenous persons 2008 % *nonindigenous persons 2008 % indigenous boxers 2009 % education highest year of school completed is year 12 or equivalent (15–64 yrs) 21.2 53.8 21.42 highest year of school completed is year 12 or equivalent (20-24 yrs) 31.3 76.2 33.33 has a non-school qualification (15–64 yrs) 32.9 54.3 21.42 has a non-school qualification (25-64 yrs) 40.2 61.3 30.00 work(a) labour force participation rate (15-64 yrs) 64.5 76.5 61.53 unemployment rate (15-64 yrs) 16.6 5.0 38.47 *source: statistics abs: 4714.0 national indigenous and torres strait islander social survey, 2008 figure three compares the education levels between 26 ais athletes who responded to surveys from 2003 to 2007 in a five-year evaluation of the athlete career and education program (ace), the sport career transition program delivered by the ais and associated institutions (australian institute of sport 2009) and the sample group of fourteen boxers. a huge 71% of boxers did not complete year 12, compared to 4% of the total population of ais athletes. while some boxers have completed a certificate or diploma, none have gone on to complete a university degree, compared to 42% of ais athletes who hold an undergraduate or post-graduate degree. figure 3: education levels of ais athletes and boxers ais athletes (n=26) 2003-2007 % boxers (n=14) 2009 % still in high school/college 11 0 didn’t complete high school/college 4 71 completed high school/college 35 28 certificate or diploma 8 21 degree 38 0 post graduate degree 4 0 *source: fraser, albion & fogarty (2008) evaluation of the athlete career and education program interview findings cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 57 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia data analysis led to the establishment of six themes that best articulated the social practices of boxers as they prepare for life-after-sport. close links between these themes and the elements in bourdieu’s formula are apparent. as a set of durable dispositions, the habitus of these boxers appears in some of their values, including the importance of their indigenous heritage, kinship and community obligations; and an ‘unconscious and unthinking’ intense self belief as a ‘natural’ athlete. the group appears to value physical capital, confirmed by a strong ai and a reliance on boxing to improve quality of life, at the expense of educational capital such as schooling and academic success. as the field of boxing imposes the ‘rules of the game’, risk-taking behaviours and a perceived lack of control become apparent. these elements form dynamic relationships that work to develop future capital, to a greater or lesser extent, illustrated in figure four. figure 4: links between emerging themes and bourdieu’s formula in the development of future capital. the ‘natural’ athlete importance of indigenous heritage, kinship & community obligations strong athletic identity reliance on boxing to improve quality of life risk taking behaviours perceived lack of control themes emerging from interviews habitus x capital + field elements of bourdieu’s formula links between emerging themes and bourdieu’s formula in the development of future capital fu tu r e c a p it a l discussion for these athletes, retirement from sport has the potential to be very problematic. boxers typically love their sport, and the prospect of no longer being able to compete is painful. this is consistent with many recent studies. ‘nick’ (retired amateur boxer) expressed feelings shared by many: (retirement) was tragic, it broke my heart, it was the worst thing that happened to me in my life, or that i’d ever done, ever done. and i still feel emotional about it now; still do a bit of crying. i could have turned professional, but to me professional is nothing, i’d never set 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia myself for professional boxing. i wanted to be the first australian to win an olympic gold medal – i’d had that dream since i was a 14 year old kid. habitus the ‘natural order’? the notion that the habitus is ‘unconscious and unthinking, based on unreflective routinisation’ may help to explain many of the values and social practices apparent in the development of future capital by the sample group of indigenous boxers. two themes relating to their indigenous backgrounds were evident in the approach of the boxers towards their sport careers. first, the boxers viewed their decision to develop a career in boxing as the norm, or the ‘natural order of things’. many have grown up with an ‘unconscious awareness’ that entering a career in boxing was automatic, virtually a ‘given’ based on some genetic trait or familial link, so that they would eventually become irretrievably linked to the sport. you know yourself, you can go anywhere in australia, any school in australia, the best athlete is what? the best sportsman is what? indigenous people. they’re gifted, high fighters, running, speed, more balance, rhythm, timing – they’re gifted (‘jerry’, retired professional boxer). if they want to kick a football, they’ve already got the upper hand, because they’re aboriginal. aboriginal people are naturally good at sport. it’s just a known thing they are naturally good at it they’ve got the upper hand, they’ve just got to put their mind to it and they can do whatever they want (‘ian’, current professional boxer). the comments of ‘jerry’ (who retired almost twenty years ago) and ‘ian’, a current professional boxer, demonstrate a widely and still-held belief that, as indigenous people, these athletes are ‘naturally’ talented, ‘naturally’ suited to the sport, and thus they fully expect to perform and achieve at high levels. indigenous boxers enter the sport with an almost unthinking acceptance of all that it entails. this tendency was noted in the prescient work of godwell (1997) who investigated aboriginal men’s involvement in rugby league. godwell (1997) railed against beliefs that ascribed to indigenous people innate, natural or genetically inherited physical abilities that ‘predisposed’ them, as a group, to be good at sport. he observed that this had been popularised by media superlatives for aboriginal players, with descriptors like ‘black magic’, which in recent times has been supplemented by new rhetoric, such as ‘wizardry’ (adair & stronach 2010 ). similarly, hallinan and judd (2009) observed a perception by indigenous australian rules footballers that their excellence in the sport was due to a set of “unique prescribed characteristics and traits determined biologically in their ‘aboriginal’ genes and culturally in their ‘aboriginal’ knowledge of time/space” (p. 2369). in his study of african-american boxers, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 59 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia wacquant (1995) noted the same inclination, describing a “non-thetic quasi-organismic commitment to the sport … operating beneath the level of discourse and consciousness” (p. 88). of course, sometimes there are other factors that generate this strong self-belief. ‘pete’, a retired professional boxer, when asked if his life had been better due to his involvement in the sport was somewhat scathing in his response: i don’t think that needs an answer. i’m sorry but i am a fighter. i was 2 1/2 months premature, so i’ve been a fighter from day one, so you know … i love boxing. the second set of ‘unconscious and unthinking’ values is a staunch pride in their indigenous heritage, along with kinship and community obligations. indigenous communities are described as “thick with kinship and embedded relationships, obligations, and traditions” (pearson 2007, p. 24). these are fundamental concepts for indigenous australians but their complexity may be beyond the comprehension of many non-indigenous people. again ‘pete’ (retired professional boxer) explained. and it’s family first always, sharing, care for your people and respect. and our life – it’s about reciprocation. and we have an obligation to teach our children to follow the rules – rules are fine for everyone. in a very poignant account, ‘ian’ tells how his parents had made significant sacrifices to further his boxing career. in his mind, what his parents gave him most of all was love and security. after the death of his father, there is no doubt in ‘ian’s mind that he must now assume the mantle of responsibility for his family. it was a 5 hour round trip and then we lived a further half an hour out of town, so we had to drive an hour each night half an hour in, then train, then half an hour out, 5 nights a week. and tell me, when you have no money, how can you do that? and they never let me know, they never let me know i bet there were times they had no money in the bank, absolutely none, but we always had food on the table, and i always felt safe. i always thought we were rich i thought i always had the best gloves, and never missed a tournament … so now it’s more of a payback thing, my father passed away, so i’m the man of the house now, and i’ve got to provide for my mother and my little sister (‘ian’, current professional boxer). the values that these boxers bring to their sport are formulated ‘beneath the level of discourse and consciousness’, to the extent that sometimes the athletes are not cognisant that they hold them or that their day-to-day actions are influenced accordingly. ‘jerry’ (retired professional boxer) contemplated his indigeneity, and the sub-conscious level where actions are formulated, concluding: ‘i think it’s there in some way, some things you do, you realise it’s indigenous…’ 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia capital valuing the physical for highly motivated, young indigenous men, the allure of boxing, even in the 21st century, remains in its potential to make money, thus appearing as a way out of poverty, low socio-economic situations, or broken families. medals, honour and glory are also powerful motivators. only two amateur boxers interviewed stated they did not wish to turn professional, and all but two of the professional boxers had started in the amateur ranks. for some, the goal is to become the first australian to win the elusive olympic gold medal. for others, a world championship is not beyond their ability. if i could be the first person to win a gold medal for australia, i could only imagine how much money i would get. you’d make history, you know, you’d be famous overnight, so that’s my aim, that’s my goal … at the end of the day it all comes back to money. you know, if you’re good at your sport and you get good money for it – why wouldn’t you? (‘dennis’, current amateur boxer). it was the olympic qualification year for beijing olympics, and i was fortunate enough to finish second that year i got a silver medal. so i got all the way to the gold-medal round and got second which is good. and now, yeah, well, i want to win a world title (‘jack’, current professional boxer). to say that boxing is a body-centered world is an understatement. it is an undeniable fact that boxers cultivate their own bodies in order to impose maximum damage to that of their opponent, but at the same time they show almost obsessional levels of care in developing their bodies, and enormous pride in the results. i’m a very very exciting fighter – i’m a guy that whenever i was in the ring, there’d be something happening (‘jerry’, retired professional boxer). i’m good on my feet – so it’s technical – i’m very good technically, i don’t use a lot of energy in the ring (‘anders’, retired amateur boxer). these comments are not made to brag or to sing their own praises; rather, they are personal truisms, reflecting how athletes value physical capital. that is, they believe, how things ‘should be’ for indigenous boxers who have worked long and hard. further, valuing physical capital is perhaps manifested by high levels of ai. current boxers in this sample recorded relatively high measures on this scale (range 33 – 49, mean score 37.85), which were higher than scores reported by fraser et al. (2008) (mean score 35.95) by athletes studied in their five-year evaluation of the ace program at the ais. many authors (brewer et al. 1993; lavallee et al. 1995; lavallee et al. 1997) have described positive consequences associated with strong ai on athletic performance. a strong ai may have lasting psychological benefits for the athlete such as the development of a salient self-identity, a positive effect on athletic performance and a higher likelihood of long-term participation in exercise, with corresponding cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 61 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia health and fitness benefits (brewer 1993). these high levels of ai exhibited by boxers appear to be enhanced by their love of the sport and the strong the attraction of the field. ‘dennis’ likens the attraction of boxing to an ‘addiction’, while ‘wills’, having left the sport, laments his loss and describes how his body still reacts sub-consciously as it did when he was in training. it’s hard to keep away from it. i’ve been doing it for so long, it’s an addiction. an addiction. an addiction. when i train i feel good, when you walk around fit you feel good, like on top of the world, you can do this and you can do that (‘dennis’, current amateur boxer). i miss it – when i walk around i walk on my toes. if i’m walking in a crowd i’m walking little boxing moves, just to walk through the crowd – like footwork you know? (‘wills’, retired amateur boxer). the field rules of the game athletes with high levels of ai may place too much emphasis on sport, this leading to psychological and physical limitations in other contexts. a high ai may also prompt some individuals to engage in sport or exercise activity to the extent that their physical health is jeopardised (brewer et al. 1993). boxers acknowledge the damage and the risks involved with the sport, but engage in risk-taking practices nevertheless. these risks may be considerable, leading to debilitating injuries and even death. they include fractures of the carpus, metacarpus and thumb, nose and jaws, acute osteo-articulatory stress, scratched or detached retina and brain damage (wacquant 1995). the common practice of ‘making weight’ (with one boxer reporting a need to shed seven kilos in the 24 hours prior to weigh-in) exposes boxers to ‘adverse cardiovascular function electrical activity, thermal regulation, renal function and electrolyte balance’ (johns 2002, p. 122). by risk-taking behaviour, boxers are not only jeopardising their long-term physical well-being, but also their capacity to develop sustainable career pathways or future capital, whilst in the sport. you’ve always got to think about the risks. but if you train properly, and you do everything properly, you limit those risks, and as long as you’re fully prepared then the chance of something happening are a lot smaller... if you do things properly, most of the time you don’t get hurt. everybody takes risks every day; it’s just about limiting those risks as much as possible (‘kim’, current professional boxer). i was losing too much weight, overtraining, dehydration, so i inflamed the right side of my heart and my kidneys collapsed on me. so i gave up for a year to try to fix that and get my body back in shape again (‘anders’, retired amateur boxer). you know, boxing is a sport where there is a chance of brain damage, and all that stuff, so i don’t want to be in there longer than i should be (‘ian’ current amateur boxer). one serious consequence of such risk-taking behaviour is called dementia pugilistica (commonly known as the ‘punch-drunk’ syndrome), which may result in cognitive impairment, unsteady gait, slurred speech, 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia foot-dragging and memory loss.7 the problem is that the deterioration may not become obvious immediately, and the capacity to assess one’s physical state also declines at a similar rate, so that the more damage a boxer sustains, the less he is able and willing to perceive and acknowledge it (wacquant 1995). boxers in this study demonstrated an awareness that they may not be able to opt out of the sport on their own terms, fearing that the magnetic allure of boxing may overwhelm the commitments they had made to themselves and significant others, thus compromising their planned exits. i’m going to give myself 3 to 4 years, but i’m sort of like, if i can – like if i won an australian title then i’m looking at well, all i’d have to do is win a regional title, like the asia-pacific title, then i could have a shot at a world title, you know what i mean? (laughs) it’s gone from here, like oh if i could reach that pinnacle then i’d think why not have a shot, if i could, at a major title (‘kris’, current professional boxer). bourdieu and wacquant (1990) have referred to this situation as symbolic violence, which, they suggest, was not a physical form of violence but rather being treated as inferior, stereotyped, limited in their social mobility and aspirations. one commentator described the situation: “we were getting sick and tired of ... promoters treating them like ‘cannon fodder’. they don't look after them” (key stakeholder #3, personal interview, 30 september 2009). but this is not what many of these boxers perceive – to them these risktaking practices are the ‘rules of the game’. eventually, however, some boxers recognise that they have been denied resources (lack of educational schemes and support in professional boxing), their aspirations restricted (abrupt dismissals from ais programs when they fail to produce results), their futures compromised by an ongoing, almost singular commitment to the field, with the result that they have lost control over their own careers. in the end i thought i was, i was bein’ ah…sort of… you see i started to think they didn’t have the same interest in me as i thought they did – they wasn’t as genuine (‘billy’, retired professional boxer). to make it worse the ais pretty much said, oh you lost, thanks, thanks for your time, see you later, have fun (‘kim’, current professional boxer). you look at what are the intentions and whose best intentions are they really looking out for are they looking out for me, or are they only looking out for themselves (‘jack’, current professional boxer). perhaps this behaviour is best explained by a line in the iconic song ‘the boxer’: ‘a man hears what he wants to hear and disregards the rest’ (simon & garfunkel 1968). conversely, wacqant (1995) associates it with the ‘pugilistic’ field and the aim therein to produce a specific form of capital. even though the 7 some of the boxers interviewed in this study by the lead author did appear to display one or more of the symptoms of the ‘punch-drunk’ syndrome. the researcher is, however, not qualified to diagnose such a condition. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 63 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia spectacle of the devastated boxer is all around them, boxers seem to manage to screen out awareness of physical danger and impairment, with trainers, managers and coaches colluding to support an illusion that “injury does happen, but … to others, those who do not train right, those who do not sacrifice, or who do not dedicate themselves to the game as they should” (wacquant 1995 p. 86). to this extent, then, boxers are complicit in their own oppression and disempowerment owing to their acceptance of the established social order to which they are subjected. post-sport careers within the field of boxing, young indigenous athletes make significant sacrifices to pursue their dream of a career within the sport, preparing to exchange their ‘bodily capital’ for a livelihood. however, intense involvement with sport at the elite level tends to place significant restrictions on levels of educational attainment (gearing 1999; mcpherson 1980). interviewee data from the present study also suggest that levels of educational attainment are unduly affected by boxing careers. boxers justify their decisions to value the physical over cultural (educational) capital, reflecting the pressures they face to commit to their sport rather than to academic studies, albeit with some regret. i think my love and passion for the sport, you know, i’ve given my life to the sport. like if i’d gave enough effort into school work, maybe in studies and relationships it would have been great, but boxing has been my only thing that i’ve ever give all to… (‘tom’, retired professional boxer) school? – the commonwealth games fell in my hsc (higher school certificate) year and i put all my efforts into commonwealth games so school got missed out. i didn’t care about the school marks and results and now i wish i had good marks because then i would have something to fall back on. as i said i’ve been boxing since i was 10, and that’s all i know, i don’t know anything else (‘dennis’, current amateur boxer). although many boxers commenced vocational education and training (vet) courses whilst on scholarship with the ais, few actually completed these qualifications. in fact, of the seven athletes expressing an interest in personal training as a career pathway, only one has finished the required qualification course (certificate iii in fitness), and this was done in the years following his retirement. (at the ais) i started to do some fitness courses, some different courses like that. i never actually got to finish one i was – i really wanted to finish. it was certificate iii in fitness, yeah, i started that down in canberra but because of training commitments and travelling and stuff like that i didn’t get to finish it (‘kim’, current professional boxer). kim’s comment illustrates the ongoing lure of boxing and the subsequent downgrading by most of the interviewees of educational or vocational qualifications. similar situations have been noted in other research studies. hickey and kelly (2008) have described a “lack of engagement” (p. 477) shown by 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia australian rules footballers in higher education programs, largely due to the intense demands of elite level professional sport. in a study of australian rugby union players, price (2007) demonstrated that involvement in elite rugby does not facilitate the accomplishment of developmental tasks that would be required later in life. finally, mcgillivray and mcintosh (2006) concluded that for professional scottish footballers, “despite increased awareness and availability of educational opportunities, players’ engagement with educational discourses is, at best, an instrumental means-end and outcome-based one” (p. 371). the high levels of ai noted in this group suggest that some may be vulnerable to athletic identity foreclosure and difficulties with sport career termination and career decision-making. a fascination with personal training noted among these boxers seems telling. it is clearly the most popular career or career choice, with seven of the boxers stating that they either do work or have worked in the field, or that it is their primary career choice. arguably it is indicative of the concept of ai foreclosure where individuals see themselves almost exclusively in the role of athlete, and that their ‘natural’ domain is in the world of the physical. the required training, the vet certificate iii in fitness,: ‘prepare(s) you to work in any capacity on the gymnasium floor with confidence’ (fitness institute australia, 2009). in a study of sport coaches, lavallee et al. (1997) provided evidence to suggest that for some individuals, the continued involvement in a sport-based career may ease their transition from being an athlete by allowing their sport-related identities and social support systems to remain intact. for boxers, however, a coaching role does not appeal, because, as one interview respondent put it, “coaches do it because they love it, not to make money” (‘anders’, retired amateur boxer). it seems that a career as a personal trainer is the next best thing, allowing a continued involvement with the sport, a prolongation of ai and potentially producing a livelihood, at least for as long as the boxer’s physical health allows him to ‘work on the gymnasium floor’. personal training offers the possibility of retaining a sense of physical capital, and maximizing the physical literacy developed during a boxer’s career. the other major career pathway noted with this group is in community welfare and youth work. one registered training organisation (rto) that works specifically with indigenous athletes to prepare them for life-after-sport, aflsportsready, has reported that 70% of indigenous trainees in their programs have expressed a desire to return to work in indigenous communities, in areas such as community development, local government, and sport development (naish 2008). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 65 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia two of the athletes in the present study have chosen careers in community welfare or youth work. several others expressed their desire to support disadvantaged indigenous youth and communities. gorman (2008) has noted that traditionally most of the community work that current athletes undertake is unseen or unacknowledged, but “there is a heavy emphasis on maintaining links with their communities” (gorman, cited in winkler 2008). for these boxers, the opportunity to ‘give back’ to community was, yet again, part of their habitus, the ‘natural order’. i want to give something back to it, like, i used to fly up to (northern australian indigenous community) and talk to indigenous kids about drugs, and alcohol – and to give them a dream to carry on with something. i love doing that sort of stuff (‘anders’, retired amateur boxer). agency bourdieu’s (1990) investigations into cultural fields also addressed that ‘actors’ are equipped with the ability to understand and control their own actions that could alter their cultural trajectories, regardless of the circumstances of their lives. this suggests that strategies may be developed to consider the ways that boxers’ identities might be reformulated to broaden their engagement with education, and thus prepare them for sustainable post-athlete pathways during their sport careers, thereby maximising their future capital. there have been two significant changes in the field of boxing in australia in recent years: the initiation of the ais boxing program in 1997 (during the lead-up to the sydney 2000 olympic games) and the launch of the national talent identification and development program (lords of the ring) in 2006, which initially targeted indigenous boxers exclusively. these programs have given scholarship boxers at least some exposure to the ace program and career counseling whilst at the ais (australian institute of sport 2009). as noted previously, boxers who did not complete schooling expressed some regret. however, at the ais ‘kris’ (current professional boxer) demonstrated agency. he saw and grasped an opportunity that came his way: i wanted to make a change in my life, so i saw the opportunity, the opportunity to study, when i was down in canberra at the ais. … the ais scholarship came along, i jumped on it. and then i saw all the opportunities when i went there and i was training, working during the day and studying at night. 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia unfortunately, ‘kris’s experience should not be viewed as typical; other interviewees did not engage in education or vocational training during their boxing careers. due to their habitus or notions of the ‘natural order’, their high esteem of physical capital and the pressure of the field, it appears that indigenous boxers typically need assistance in planning both their professional careers and their life-after-sport career pathways. one vital area of need for amateur boxers is as they try to make a transition into professional ranks. unfortunately, when leaving the confines of amateur boxing, the young boxer is left largely to his own devices, requiring an enormous change in his approach to people around him. as ‘kim’ (current professional boxer) commented: boxing’s the type of sport – in the long part of it, you don’t make any money. when you get to the top of it, the elite level, you’ve got to really make the most of it you really can. there are a lot of opportunities. it’s just a matter of making sure the management do their job. but preparation for this phase of a boxing career does not form part of a structured program, leaving these athletes ill-equipped to cope. it is essential, therefore, that counselors be available to provide advice about both sport and life-after sport career pathways. many of the boxers have described their need for culturally appropriate counseling. in the case of indigenous australian athletes, this advice should ideally emanate from within their own culture, as one retired sportsman argued (personal interview, 10 october 2009): when an indigenous person walks into an organisation, whether it be in a sport or anything else – what they bring with them is who they are, everything about family first, and caring and nurturing, and they understand issues, that really nobody else can, no matter how good, or how much goodwill someone may mean. so how can one person know what’s in another person’s mind if they’re not indigenous? while it may not be feasible, logistically, for indigenous boxers around australia to each have access to a counselor with indigenous heritage, a base line position ought to be that all counselors undergo education in culturally appropriate ways to engage with boxers of varying backgrounds – including aborigines and torres strait islanders. conclusion commentators have argued that elite level sport, despite its profile and financial lure, can be a disempowering environment in the sense that the athlete’s life-world is typically dominated by the field – overwhelmingly so (hallinan & judd 2009; mcgillivray & mcintosh,2006; price 2007). this paper has further explored these issues by relating and examining the narratives of elite australian indigenous boxers. the paper demonstrates that for this cohort, engagement with education and vocational training cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 67 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia remains generally restricted to occupations that complement their heightened values of physical culture, kinship and community obligation. thus they remain, by and large, devoid of realistic alternatives within the confines of their habitus. the field of boxing continues to recruit, groom and then exploit these young men athletically, educationally and financially. boxers are at risk of being quickly discarded once their physical assets are eroded, without having ensured they are fully prepared to enter alternative occupations. the paper provided an overview of career transition issues and produced an initial exploration into the development of future capital for elite indigenous boxers. professional sport for indigenous people is a subject worthy of continued study for, in many ways, these are individuals who have the opportunity to ‘close the gaps’ in their own lives, and in turn be seen as exemplars for indigenous people in other occupational spheres. references abs 2004, 1301.0 year book australia 2004 [electronic version]. retrieved 16 may 2008 from http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/featurearticlesbycatalogue/bc6a7187473c6fb6 ca256dea00053a29?opendocument. abs 2005, 1301.0 year book australia 2005. retrieved 31 march, 2010, from http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/00000000000000000000000000000000/294322bc5648 ead8ca256f7200833040!opendocument abs 2008a, 4714.0 national aboriginal and torres strait islander social survey 2008 retrieved 25 november, 2009, from http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/productsbycatalogue/ abs 2008b, indigenous statistics for schools. retrieved 30 november 2009, from http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/cashome.nsf/89a5f3d8684682b6ca256de4002c809b/ae2abb19 50921fbfca25758b00123537!opendocument adair, d., & stronach, m. 2010, 'natural born athletes? australian aboriginal people and the doubleedged lure of professional sport', in j. long & k. spracklen (eds.), sport and challenges to racism, palgrave macmillan, london. afl 2008, influence of indigenous players. retrieved 15 october, 2008, from http://www.afl.com.au/news/newsarticle/tabid/208/default.aspx?newsid=2539 albion, m. & fogarty, g. 2003, evaluation of the athlete career and education program, phase 1 2003, centre for organisational research and evaluation, university of southern queensland, brisbane. anderson, d. & morris, t. 2000, 'athlete lifestyle programs', in d. lavallee & p. wylleman (eds.), career transitions in sport: international perspectives, fitness information technology, morgantown, wv. australian institute of sport 2009, ais athlete career and education. retrieved 16 january, 2010, from http://www.ausport.gov.au/ais/scholarships/ais_athlete_career_and_education bourdieu, p. 1984 distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste, routledge & kegan paul, london. http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/featurearticlesbycatalogue/bc6a7187473c6fb6ca256dea00053a29?opendocument� http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/featurearticlesbycatalogue/bc6a7187473c6fb6ca256dea00053a29?opendocument� http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/00000000000000000000000000000000/294322bc5648� http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/00000000000000000000000000000000/294322bc5648� http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/productsbycatalogue/� http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/cashome.nsf/89a5f3d8684682b6ca256de4002c809b/ae2abb1950921fbfca25758b00123537!opendocument� http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/cashome.nsf/89a5f3d8684682b6ca256de4002c809b/ae2abb1950921fbfca25758b00123537!opendocument� http://www.afl.com.au/news/newsarticle/tabid/208/default.aspx?newsid=2539� http://www.ausport.gov.au/ais/scholarships/ais_athlete_career_and_education� 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.2, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; 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(eds.), sport, culture and society, macmillan, new york, pp. 443-452. winkler, m. 2008, who is the next michael long? retrieved 25 may, 2009, from http://www.afl.com.au/news/newsarticle/tabid/208/default.aspx?newsid=59975 http://www.alp.org.au/media/0209/spepm260.php� http://rac.sagepub.com/� http://www.afl.com.au/news/newsarticle/tabid/208/default.aspx?newsid=59975� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia practising place: a critical approach to localism john rule university of new south wales abstract this paper draws on empirical data from my doctoral research on the changing nature of inner city community development work. the professional identity of the community worker emerged in the 1970s and is linked to other emergent identities the resident activist, social activist and community activist. inner city community development work is in a state of flux and requires new investigative and analytical tools to help make sense of both its past, present and future. whilst it is clear that governing patterns have changed considerably since the 1970s, and challenged the role and the potential of what were once considered radical or alternative community development approaches, i argue that it is still possible to identify areas for productive engagement through what i have called practising place. introduction my research covered a limited geographical area, inner city sydney, but there are theoretical connections that extend beyond inner city sydney and australia. castells (1983, 2004), dirlik (1996), massey (1993, 1999) and sandercock (1990, 1998) all suggest that ‘local practices’ should be a focus of research and study in contemporary times. there is a growing body of theory and empirical research that is trying to make sense of the various forms of practice that are emerging under the heading of ‘the local’. in this paper i am concerned with two aspects of this larger discussion. firstly, does there remain any potential for the local to be a site of resistance; and secondly, what are the emergent identities that might enable a progressive activist politics to continue at a local level? as i explore these questions in this paper, it becomes clear that those who engage in political practices of resistance and activism are always challenged because of the power of existing rationalities. clifford (2001) and castells (2004) argue that resistance is often ‘reintegrated’ back into existing social structures; therein lies the dilemma of any activist political practice – how to resist such reintegration. based on evidence from key informants, there is some evidence that social change can continue to happen from combined activist struggles. however, in those struggles, those engaged as activists must remain critically aware of the limits of those local practices, and, additionally, must remain aware that the identity of the activist should be fluid, open-tochange and resistant to any form of essentialism. 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 study method rose (1997) was interested in the way that community is imagined and performed and the potential of resistant community work practices. rose explored the diverse interpretation of the ‘local’ and ‘community’ with a group of community arts workers in edinburgh, scotland. i used a similar method of investigation with community workers, who had worked for a range of small inner city sydney community organisations, neighbourhood centres (ncs), from 1975 through to 2005. these community workers (five) were involved in neighbourhood centre work, youth work, family support programs, housing estate development programs and migrant community development programs. in my research i also had regular meetings and dialogic conversations with two people who had a long history of engagement with these organisations and defined themselves as urban and social activists. for rose there are no assumptions about ‘community’, the meanings only becoming apparent by the investigation of how community is performed in specific sites. like rose, i took the view that the local, the specific, the neighbourhood may be valued as a site of investigation, but a critical or deconstructive approach needs to be applied to the stories and myths that are circulated about community. community and urban social movements castells (1977, 1983, and 2004) has monitored the activities of many groups trying to create sensitive and democratic processes to produce liveable cities. castells initially conceptualised urban social movements as manifestations of class conflict (1977, p.325). in a later study castells (1983) proposed that there are some basic themes in urban movements and protests, regardless of whether they are tenant struggles, youth organising associations, urban uprisings, or resident and neighbourhood associations. he concluded that resistance takes place around collective consumption issues of housing, schools and welfare provision, or the defence and expression of cultural identities, or around the workings of the state institutions and sometimes, local government, or a combination of these. he saw all this as a form of resistance, a counter to the imposition of global economic and cultural forms of domination. castells was less hopeful about the potential of ‘emancipation’ promised by the urban movements as he followed their trajectories over a longer period; he notes the ways in which the movements themselves, their discourses, individuals involved and organisations had often been integrated into government arrangements through differing systems of citizen cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 3 participation and community development activities (2004:65). later in this paper i recount a similar trajectory of urban social movements in inner city sydney. sandercock (1990, 1998) has also focused on urban history and the struggles of citizens, communities and groups to shape cities and impact on planning processes. she has written about these struggles in the australian context (1990), as well as presenting an extensive international review of attempts to plan for ‘multicultural cities’ (1998). under the heading of ‘insurgent practices’ she argues that there are individuals who she calls ‘the mobilizers’, these are individuals whose radical local practices are rarely recognised beyond their locality base. in a review of six major cities, sandercock keeps asking questions of the group she identifies as the ‘mobilizers’ and these questions are similar to the ones i asked the community workers and activists: what theories inform their community practice? what knowledges are being used in these practices? what are the definitions of community that are being used? what are the processes that groups are using in their struggles with power and what is achieved? sandercock identifies and seeks out ‘the mobilizers’ in particular struggles; similarly i have sought out activists and community workers who have played ‘organising’ or ‘mobilising’ roles around the development of inner city sydney neighbourhood centre (ncs). massey’s locality studies have also been extensive (1993, 1999). massey argues for a progressive sense of place; otherwise the development of communities constructs a distinction between members and non-members that is exclusionary and intolerant of any sense of ‘other’. she argues that if places that are conceived as a set of social relations, (rather than a point which is arrived at, which needs to be preserved and defended), there may be openness to the possibility that others can be accommodated within that set of social relations (1993, p.66-68). i found this ‘progressive sense of place’; which is massey’s conceptual framework developed to resist exclusions, a useful framework to bring to my research. dirlik (1996) proposes a similar notion in his discussion of ‘critical localism’. he notes that the impact of global capitalism has produced a range of local movements of resistance. he argues that the affirmation of the ‘local’ comes with a danger of sliding into nostalgia and is amenable to exclusionary tendencies. he argues that ‘critical localism’ could be developed and from this critical position the local and place can be useful to negotiate the removal of oppressions or inequalities that are inherited from the past. dirlik sees in this a useful and meaningful resistance to the excesses of global capital, ‘the boundaries of the 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 local need to be kept open (or porous) if the local is to serve as a critical concept’ (1996, p.42). the importance of place i argue that in field of community development work a critical examination of place can provide some new analytical and conceptual tools to enliven community development practices. interdisciplinary work in human and social geography provides an interesting starting point to examine the question of place. in this next section i provide a brief overview of some approaches to community and place which i found useful to bring as conceptual resources to my research, and to developing what i have called ‘practising place’. sandercock provides a critical history of the way that planning, and particularly town planning, have carved out roles as adjuncts to modern bureaucratic and state power arrangements. the consequence has been a limiting of the potential for the development of inclusive local social formations and communities. in response, sandercock (1998), dreams of her ‘cosmopolis’ and searches for her ‘postmodern utopia’. this utopia, she argues must always be present but never actually presented. she does not want to impose her utopian vision on others. sandercock ‘scours cities’ looking for ‘insurgent practices’ and evidence of ‘one thousand tiny empowerments’. keith and pile (1993) and pile (1997) map ‘spaces of resistance’; much of their work concentrates on turbulent inner city environments in england during and after years of rule of the conservative thatcher government. they sought to show how ‘…fragmentation, ruptures and discontinuities can be politically transformed from liability and weakness to opportunity and strength…’ (keith & pile 1993, p.193). concentrating on los angeles as the exemplar of the modern metropolis, soja (1996), uses the concept of a ‘third space’. the third space is a metaphorical space in which ‘difference’ is marked for potential rather than limitations. by paying attention to the possibilities of this third space, which is not unreal but an imagined place, new social patterns could be formed, patterns which are supportive of difference rather than social patterns that are based on a fear of difference. harvey goes, from ‘place to space and back again’ but always with the starting point that ‘…place in whatever guise…is a social construct’ (harvey 1993, p.7). watson and gibson (1994), wilson (1991) and zukin (1992) search the streets of postmodern cities, often, and particularly in the case of wilson, the streets of inner cities or city centres tracing a feminist storyline. watson and gibson (1995) study australian cities and the way in which the urban and place is ‘thought’, they try to overlay that thinking with a social justice cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 5 framework. wilson emerges from her tours of the ‘labyrinth’ with ‘…a new, ‘feminine’ voice in praise of cities’ (wilson 1991, p.11). zukin calls for a professional commitment to ‘liminality’, to supporting by whatever means, those who are not given a place within highly territorialised city spaces (1992, p.242). in my research i was interested in how the activists and community workers imagine their place, in the interviews and conversations with activists and community workers i tested out the possibility that place could be envisaged as utopia, as transformation, as inclusive rather than exclusive, as a social construct and as a place of liminality. like sandercock and the other authors who i have referred to as radical and critical human geographers, i adopt the epistemological stance that we know what we know, through being in a place, and through participating in constructing the sets of social relationships within that place. research context barry, clohesy and smith (1985) provide a history of inner city sydney community and neighbourhood work. they describe the pre-conditions for the emergence of resident and community action groups and neighbourhood associations in the 1960s. these included: technological changes to traditional employment of labour on the waterfront; threatened job losses (in the manufacturing sector); an increase in speculative land development; an expansion of tertiary institutions into residential areas of darlington and chippendale; expressways planned through glebe, ultimo, pyrmont, woolloomooloo and darlinghurst; and actions by the state department of housing in surry hills and redfern which were forcing changes to the working class residential base of pockets of inner city sydney. resident action groups brought together individuals who felt threatened by these changes, planners who thought that there could be more effective ways of managing inner city environments and sections of the student movement attending local universities, who at that time, were looking for effective change strategies beyond the provision of welfare services. the organisations that emerged through this process were marginal to the extent that they concentrated on information, advocacy and social action for groups who had traditionally been locked out of government planning processes. for example, the coalition of inner sydney resident action groups was formed in 1972 with a brief to focus on housing; transport and energy; education and community services. jakubowicz (1974, 1984) questioned the class based nature of urban environmentalism and the difficulties of defending 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 ‘urban’ working class interests within these resident movements, and he noted the importance of cross-class alliances, as did barry, clohesy and smith (1985). mundey (1987) and burgmann and burgmann (1998, pp.56-58) document the connections between the inner city resident action groups and the environmental activism of the nsw builders labourers’ federation. they also note the cross-class alliances, between residents and unions, and amongst resident groups, as well as drawing attention to the central role played by women in these actions. the australian assistance plan (aap) instituted by the whitlam government established a public policy and funding framework in which new organisations developed. the aap provided seeding funding for many small community-based initiatives, including the neighbourhood centres (ncs). the 1970s saw a growth in co-operatives and community associations, usually taking on some form of local resident management structure, and seeking to employ professional staff in the roles of co-ordinators and community development workers (roberts & pietsch 1996, p.144). the ncs early links to the environment and feminist movement, as well as their role in supporting cultural diversity through multicultural project initiatives is described by edwards (1996) in a report sponsored by the inner sydney council for regional and social development. by the end of the 1980s discourses of environmentalism, feminism and multiculturalism were still evident in the community organisations, but other discourses connected with increasing professionalisation, new managerialism and new funding regimes were beginning to circulate. they did not entirely erase those earlier discourses but introduced a new set of tensions. as noted by barry, clohesy and smith (1985) ‘efficiency’ and ‘management rhetoric’ came to dominate community focused projects and development work. yeatman (1990) characterised the preceding decade as a period of struggle between the managerial agenda of the state and grass roots efforts to democratise political processes in australia; the micro techniques of scientific management were applied to social services and welfare provision became market oriented and privatised. this accompanied increasing government monitoring of funding contracts and more detailed reporting procedures. a report produced in 1994, ‘we just grew like topsy’, by the local community services association of nsw, a peak body for community and neighbourhood centres, suggested that in this decade small community based organisations were overwhelmed by a raft of new government directed programs, these programs had strict and generally unmanageable service delivery cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 7 expectations and reporting requirements. this change was also noted by williams and onyx (2002). reviews of community work practice in australia by kenny (1994), and weeks, hoatson and dixon (2003) have noted the ways in which movements based on different structural features race, gender, sexuality, ecology, class and social identity – became active and collectively organised through community development activities in the 1970s. they also note that these movements and the organisations which grew up around them were in a sense forced ‘underground’, or, at least their activities curtailed, in late 1980s and 1990s because of the recasting of social issues as ‘individual problems and individual responsibilities’. everingham (2001) provides a detailed account of the way in which economic rationalism impacted on the community sector. she argues those organisations that had drawn ‘…their inspiration from the emancipatory objectives of the new social movements… in the 1960s…’ were, after ‘two decades of public service reforms under economic rationalism’, in the position where their autonomy and roles within community were severely eroded (2001, p.108). the language of mutual obligation and contractualism brought about a new politics where ‘community' was charged with the responsibility of being an agent for implementing a government directed agenda. further, through a contract state paradigm that became evident in the mid 1990s, government (at local, state and federal levels) has linked community organisation activity to a series of contracted service arrangements with very specific, limited measurements and service outputs (hoatson, dixon & stoman 1996; everingham 2001). the above highlights the changed focus of the organisations as political and economic changes occurred and as other discourses, for example economic rationalism, contractualism, and mutual obligation, came to dominate social processes. the conservative social policy paradigm continued through to the present, and its impacts on alternative social formations at a local community level over the last number of years is well documented (darcy 2002; suehood, marks & waterford 2006; keevers, treleaven & sykes 2008; onyx, dalton, melville, casey & banks 2008) this brief history of the emergence of locally based community organisations in inner city sydney, and how they have been impacted by national social policy changes, provides a context in which to locate the accounts of practice which follow. 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 dialogic conversations with activists and community workers the neighbourhood centres have been sites where particular identity formations have been made possible. the identity of ‘generalist community worker’ for example, is an identity position made possible because of the emergence of local community organisations. clifford (2001) describes local sites as ‘enunciative modalities’ and is interested in seeing what forms of political subjectivity and identities are activated in different local sites. enunciative modalities, according to clifford, ‘…can help us to define and delineate those spaces, or sites, in which individuals fashion their own identity as political subjects’ (clifford 2001, p.11) the identities of ‘resident activist’, ‘urban activist’, ‘social activist’ and ‘community worker’ have only been constructed (and available) in the last forty years. based on my research i suggest these identities have been occupied, or taken up, in the inner city ncs in ways that are distinctive of those sites, and, certainly, shaped by the urban social movements discussed earlier. the participants in this research have adopted those positions and mobilised particular discourses from those positions, to do what i have labelled ‘practising place’. further, being able to mobilise those identities has been an essential part of that practice where place is not just a statement about geographical location but takes on the dimensions of ‘standpoint’, ‘perspective’ and ‘position’. there are similarities to the politics of location described by bell hooks: as a radical standpoint, perspective, position, ‘the politics of location’ necessarily calls those of us who would participate in the formation of counter-hegemonic cultural practice to identify the spaces where we begin the process of re-vision (hooks 1991, p.145). rose (1997) interviewed community arts workers in edinburgh, who were fluent in left liberal discourses of community development and empowerment. those she interviewed were also critical of those discourses, although interested in how they were activated. they saw their community project work and activities as a place to which their own identities and political positions were bought, and within which they were shaped. in my research around the ncs participants indicated a similar awareness, both in terms of the discourses in which they are enmeshed, and, the ways in which identities are shaped by, and shape those discourses. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 9 castells (2004), dirlik (1996), massey (1993, 1999) and sandercock (1998) place some form of identity story at the centre of the story of urban social movements. sandercock describes these social movements, most visible in inner city environments and politics, as not just promoting a form of ‘identity politics’ but as moving ‘towards a progressive politics of difference’. sandercock argues that this identity work is really the most important aspect of planning that is sensitive to community, environment and cultural diversity. she develops the argument that the task is not one of just concentrating on the positives of difference, but of unmasking ‘the social construction of identities’ (1998, p.123). in my research the activists (enid and neil) provided very detailed accounts about their life history as activists. they described in detail what they thought it meant to be an activist; they described how it came to be that they took up this subject position and how their own personal histories were a part of that. the issue of identity became part of the conversation with the activists; they explained what they meant by the activist identity and critically examined its effects. the community workers, (carla, michael, monica, sarah and tevi) also talked about their own subject positions and identities. quite often in the transcript data these kinds of statements were found: ‘...as a community worker i operated in this way…’ and ‘ as a feminist i think...’ and ‘from a structuralist position i see it like this… ‘. other statements included: ‘because i grew up in a working class background…’ and ‘my migrant experience leads me to take this view…’ these identities of community worker, feminist, structuralist and migrant were often put forward as a way of explaining positions and became part of the conversations. it was clear that the community workers saw that their ways of working and their practices were deeply enmeshed with ‘who they were’ and with their identities. the activist position healy (2000) argues that the ‘heroic activist’ is a deeply gendered construction which needs to be opened up to multiple identifications. in the sections that follow it becomes clear that the activists i interviewed did not assume that the activist label situates them as, ‘…heroic actors who stand outside the systems of power and speak the truth to them’ (healy 2000, p.135 following on from foucault). rather, the activists in this research describe what they have done in the course of their ‘daily practices’ and find that the activist label is applied to them, often because in these daily practices they are positioned as challenging power 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 relationships and the label of activist is a way of discrediting their daily practices and actions. the labelling often came from those who ‘speak with power’, as a deliberate strategy to position their (the activists) actions in a marginal place. moreover, the activists do not describe their actions as ‘heroic’. as one of them explains, the only thing that they did, was to ‘contest authority’ and this placed them in a contrary position to ‘authority’ and led them to be constructed in negative and pejorative ways by those positioned with institutional authority. enid and neil acknowledge they are not completely in control of their own naming, or identity position; quite often that identity position, the position of activist, is forced upon them by the social structures in which they operate. in considering the ways that political subjectivities emerge in the governmentalised state, clifford (2001), draws attention to the political subject of the activist. he is interested in the figure of the activist, because of the potential of this subject position. as he describes it, the subject position of the activist, which exists within the ‘interplay of discourse, power and subjectivation’, has radical potential because ‘…we cannot...underestimate the effect of even a single political subject on the experience of the social body as a whole’ (clifford 2001, p.123). notwithstanding the important potential of the political subject position of the activist, clifford suggests that there is a danger that activist political practices are easily reintegrated into existing political structures and rationalities. i raised this dilemma during the dialogical conversations and it elicited the following responses. enid’s story of the ‘urban activist’ position enid called herself an ‘urban activist’. the following transcript material provides an account of what she means by the expression ‘activist’: there was a lot of activity going on in the seventies and there were a lot of people who might not have called themselves an activist although it [activism] was certainly there. there was another expression urban guerrilla i liked that one. that idea of the urban guerrilla…how can i say… it so shocked a lot of people including the bureaucracy, but not all of the bureaucrats because after all, these ‘guerrillas’ often became part of the establishment! so that it [the activist position] may well be a mythic position but it was certainly there. i have great faith in that that word [activism] does come up. i’ve experienced it myself. it really represents the change that occurred in australian society from people who were prepared to go out and have a go the public demonstrations. the demanding baby boomer group who were busy fighting about the vietnam war, they were extremely aggressive people and rightly so. many of us were part of that, perhaps not as violent as some. also the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 11 environmental movement. the women and environment movements were the two most important [activist] movements. and at that time in our inner city the big thing was that the older suburbs were part of a town planning process that was about the demolition and slum clearance… that policy had been around for many years and northcott [a housing department site in surry hills] was created as part of that policy. when asking the building labourers to come in [reference to the green bans of the 1970s], everything there was aggression. aggression against outmoded ideas, but that was the only way in which we could get through, we had to be aggressive in our own way. ‘it’s always been like that’, is the existing rationality that the activists have had to approach. i think it is one of the most difficult things working at local level you hear people say ‘it’s been like that for years and that’s the way we like it!’ it takes a skilled person, or a lot of activists and guerrillas to come in and say; ‘look this is another way of doing it it can be different!’ this story, like that of neil’s, which follows, is about contesting authority. enid describes the shaping of the activist identity as arising out of engagement in social processes and political discourses. enid describes the identity position of the activist as being shaped and re-shaped, necessarily fluid in the context of her own social practices. enid addresses the kinds of questions raised by clifford (2001), recognising that by adopting different identities and subject positions e.g. one moment ‘urban guerrilla’ and next moment ‘urban guerrilla as a member of the establishment’, that the existing rationalities could be challenged and that real social change could happen through combined activist struggles. neil’s story of the ‘social activist’ position neil described what he meant by social activism. contrary to any notion of ‘heroic activism’, neil suggests that the subject position of the activist is an inevitable place to be situated if one is to engage with ‘authority’ in particular forms. it is a place where people are often positioned when they make an attempt to shift systems of power. because ‘difference’ and ‘authenticity’ are often denied in social processes, this forces those who are different, or who act with authenticity, into a contest with those who try to deny differences and ‘struggles for freedom’. neil tells his story of the experience of being positioned as an activist and dissenter. neil says that these positions are constructed in a particular discursive field. however, he argues that it is by recognising the way that the construction of the activist position occurs, that is, by a continual process of deconstruction, that it is possible to open up 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 and continually re-construct and re-enliven the social activist position. neil wrote the following to explain what he meant: for me to talk about being an activist, about community work or community action means to say these things: 1) having an intent to act collectively in the midst of and focussing on the collectivities that do arise and which might arise within our society, these being the sites where society/social beings are shaped 2) deconstructing the social shaping/the social conditioning or identity making which takes place – particularly exposing the apparentness of that social shaping i.e. it is not natural, not essential, and passes away – which embraces calling into question all assumed authorities and titles, including my own – particularly calling into question the corruptness of the social shaping 3) saying “yes” to alternative social identities – this is the act of dissent – it is made out to be “no-saying” but that is the language of the master – it is actually “yes saying” for those with the ears to hear – it is about maintaining the alternative identities – a process of continual coming out, a continual affirmation 4) doing some work together – a project – preferably some work which is sweaty, requiring great effort and attention, and demanding that we work together. i’ll speak briefly about what this means in being an activist. it’s to do with the collective work i’ve mentioned above. i suppose we can talk about being a dissenter in private, although i really think to talk in that way is to talk nonsense. what i’m saying is that to be a dissenter is to also be a contester i.e. to be public, to be out. what brings me into being a dissenter also brings me into being a contester – what we call an activist. what brings about or triggers me into being a social activist is not my desire to colonise those i’m said to dissent from, not my desire to impose on those people a compliance for themselves with my alternative – no, what brings me into the arena of contest is when i experience the acts/utterances of these other people as not respecting me as i am, and desiring to conform me and my world from as it is, to what they want it to be. it is when my difference, my authenticity, is denied. neil suggested that one of the roles of activism is that of ‘deconstructing’ the social shaping, conditioning and identity making that takes place, and, of seeking out and saying ‘yes’ to emergent social identities which often means acting in non-compliant ways in the social arena. according to neil, in assuming the social activist position, as an authentic expression in struggling with power, social activists are made vulnerable because the authentic difference of those who dissent is denied. for enid and neil their identification with the activist position has happened through necessary engagement in a variety of political contests. they see themselves as contesting authority; both describe how they were positioned as aggressive, or how in attempting to gain attention and bring about change they had to adopt an aggressive or oppositional posture. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 13 rutherford (1990) describes identity construction as a search for some kind of personal coherence. rutherford uses the image of identity as a ‘home’; that is place where people ‘speak from’. the identity work above does not support this way of understanding identity the activists have not suggested that the activist identity provides any support or the kind of comfort that the image of a ‘home’ sets up. perhaps the stories above have more in common with the kind of ethical citizenship and identity practices described by watney which have at their core a ‘... refusal of both the values of capitalism and the institutions of parliamentarianism as it is currently practiced and understood’ (1990, p.159). for the activists, those identity positions of social activist and urban activist have been more closely aligned with a ‘practice of freedom’ (watney 1990) than an interest in shaping identity for identity’s sake. neil and enid would probably agree with the criticism that bauman (2001) makes of ‘identity games’. my aim in this section has not been to interpret what the activists have said about their identities but to show that they think ‘identity work’ is an important part of their practice. this is an argument i have developed, that a feature of practising place, is the ability to work with different identities but to work in such a way that opens up different and varied identity formations rather than having the effect of ‘fixing’, ‘stabilising’ or ‘concretising’ identities. the critical community worker position in the dialogic conversations and semi structured interviews the community workers often said that the motivation for their actions came from a desire to bring about some form of social change. they described their attempts to intervene and to shape social arrangements in a way that re-arranged power structures. these desires to bring about change are an important part of the identity of the community workers. in talking with them, recognising their powerful sense of agency, and hearing their descriptions of what they set out to do, and what they hoped to achieve, i was reminded of the description used by weedon of ‘conscious thinking subjects’ who are attempting to give some ‘meaning to the material social relations’ (weedon 1997, p.26) in which they find themselves. weedon goes on to say, that the ability to live like this depends on the ability to access ‘social power and discourses’ that have some political strength. the community workers talked often about trying to achieve that political strength. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 the community workers talked about what they set out to do, what they intended in their community work practices. they describe their work as existing within a mesh of political discourses and power relationships. they analyse the operation of power and how it manifests at a local level. quotes demonstrating this are set out below. they talked about government, communities, developers, funding processes and their own interventions to balance or rebalance power. the community workers are suspicious of power used by bureaucracies or the private economic interests of developers. they described political and personal decisions they made along the way. they talked in detail about the forms of community practices they wanted to enact. they talked about using ‘institutional power’ and the possibilities of ‘direct action’ when other forms of intervention are failing. they talked about their desires for ‘social justice’ and ‘equality’ and their understandings of the methods by which this might be achieved. as with the community arts workers interviewed by rose (1997) the community workers involved in my research had a ‘left liberal literacy’ and a suspicion of the hegemonic practices that they see as present in contemporary australian society. below is material from the transcripts where the community workers talk about what they were doing and through this a picture develops of how the community workers understand their various identities. carla: i think it’s more about what we were really doing was trying to predict the future…you know i think what really goes on is looking at what the funding bodies want to fund; and assessing what you really need funding for and trying to match that need to what’s available and try to satisfy both sides. and so i think that what we were really doing was about trying to predict the future in a way. sarah: well i guess we thought we were about opposition. but i suspect we were probably partly about social control. that’s my take on it now looking back at that time. at the time i thought that what we were doing was empowering people on the estate by informing them about what was really happening. michael: i was certainly attracted to the community sector ten or twenty years ago, because of the range of activities, the nature of the strategies they were using, those commitments to inclusive processes…it was personally empowering and politically empowering. those social movements at the time, whether you look at issues around gender or race or environmentalism and the questioning of social order in the early and mid seventies, i then found the community sector in the period that i first saw it in the eighties as being a field where those ideas came into practice. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 15 monica: well we were trying to change things. i mean we were trying to make things better for those people. we thought we knew what would be better for those people. and we wanted there to be more justice. you know we wanted there to be more equality, that’s what it was all about. we started off by talking about equality for women and that made us realise, or certainly made me realise, that it wasn’t just women who weren’t equal, but there were a whole lot of people who weren’t equal. tevi: being the meat in the sandwich...that’s what it felt like…i was trying to get the best outcome i could for the communities. sometimes i don’t think that was actually right, we compromised, but it was the best possible outcome. so trying to mediate between community expectations and what developers, governments, organisations wanted to do. your personal political views quite often need to be set aside and so that’s why the meat in the sandwich sort of thing. the community workers, like the activists were also narrating their identities. they were describing how their sense of ‘self’ both shaped the work in which they were involved and how they were in turn shaped by those experiences and practices. while there were doubts expressed about what was actually achieved through these practices there is a clear sense of how these community workers saw themselves – they saw themselves as ‘oppositional’, ‘committed to inclusive processes’, ‘questioning of the social order’, ‘trying to change things politically’ and ‘mediating’ between communities, developers, government and other organisations. these community workers saw themselves as having a ‘critical awareness’ in the sense of having an orientation to critical theory in their analysis of society and social structures. they were familiar with and identified strongly with feminist and socialist traditions. they saw themselves as active (although not always ‘successful’), in engaging in political processes and working with power. dimensions of practising place practising place – a suspicion of fixing identities the activists and critical community workers said quite often that their social identities were imposed upon them. their activism and alternative community work practices placed them in agonistic relationships with power structures, and they were often then labelled or positioned in ways they did not necessarily identify with. they argued that their identities arose in the ‘performance’ of their activism and community work and some were identities that were ascribed by others rather than identities they wanted to claim. one of the critical community 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 workers when talking about the subject position of ‘left wing feminist’ said that is not always where she would position herself however, ‘…that’s where the language of the culture positions us…’ the activists, when talking about their work said that at times they were positioned as ‘aggressive’ and as ‘trouble makers’ by those who held some form of institutional power but in fact their own strategies were ones that tried to avoid ‘outmoded’ methods such as acts of aggression. the activists and community workers in the ‘performing’ those roles were often given identities that did not want to claim – they did not want their identities fixed. research participants expressed a reluctance to see either their own ‘selves’ as fixed in terms of being activists or community workers and were suspicious of defining community or community participation in a way that ‘fixed’ either their own identities or the identities of those with whom they worked. ‘practising place’ remains suspicious of attempting to fix or make ‘concrete’ identities. as suggested by agemben (1993) the way to ‘becoming community’ may be through a search for ‘non-essentialised identities’ and may rather be understood as a practice of ‘un-working identities’. practising place – a suspicion of utopias whilst each of the research participants voiced, during some stages of the research, their imaginings of social futures and perhaps even their social utopias, some of the participants remained sceptical about mapping out what that utopia may be. there was a suspicion stated about utopian thinking and certainly an argument was developed (similar to that proposed by sandercock 1998) that ‘my utopia is not yours’. there was an acknowledgement by the research participants that history and the history of some community development work projects demonstrate the dangers and rigidities of utopias forced upon others. castells (1997), dirlik (1996), massey (1993, 1999) and sandercock (1998) argue that utopias cannot be imagined alone and are always unfinished, contested and necessarily characterised by a space for differences, differences which are positively upheld, within that imagining. the research participants seemed to concur with this approach, supporting the view that one should be suspicious about utopian thinking and be aware that a view of utopia held by one person will not necessarily be the utopia held by another. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 17 practising place the importance of becoming communities agamben (1993) inserts the notion of ‘singularities’ into his analysis of becoming communities, arguing that new forms of ‘collectivisation’ wherein ‘new types of nonindividuated subjectivity’ are always forming. these will arise and coalesce regardless of the intervention or non-intervention of the state apparatus. the state cannot tolerate or control the fact that there is always this ‘birth-to-presence’ and always ‘becoming communities’. agamben argues, humans will ‘co-belong’ whether state apparatus allows them to or not. this is because the state cannot, ultimately do anything about the ‘becoming-ness’, the state cannot stop the inevitable and potential co-joining of singularities. as tevi, one of the research participants said ‘...the other will always connect, even if it is to the next stage’. one of the research participants made this summary statement, ‘i don’t have a definitive social future. and there are many people like me and more and more of us. we don’t have any definitive social future because it is so diverse.’ through their refusals to describe the shape of their imagined social futures, the activists and critical community workers continue to inhabit their own diverse and resistant geographies – such resistance is also a dimension of practising place. community development, activism and emergent identities this paper, based on my research, describes a particular location which is always in a state of flux, of change, of impermanent social arrangements and social identities. i have proposed another way of talking about activist and community development work in inner city sydney – i called that practising place. the identity of the community activist, resident activist, social activist and the local community worker emerged in the last forty years and practising place will need to stay alert to other emergent identity positions. those who wish to maintain progressive activist politics and community development work in these places will need to adopt a position of ‘becoming’; wherein identities and relationships must, necessarily remain in a state of constant of negotiation and change; wherein the identities of the activist and community development worker, to be productive into the future, will need to resist being essentialised and will need to be critically un-worked and re-worked. bibliography agamben, g. 1993, the coming community, (trans. m. hardt), university of minnesota press, minneapolis. 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.1, 2011 barry, m., clohesy, m. & smith, p. 1985, ‘inner city 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hoatson, & j. dixon (eds.) community practices in australia, pearson, sydney, pp. 1-8. williams, f. & onyx, j. 2002, odd socks: why the survival of small community services organisations is critical, local community services association, sydney. wilson, e. 1991, the sphinx in the city, university of california press, berkeley. yeatman, a. 1990, bureaucrats, technocrats, femocrats, allen and unwin, sydney. zukin, s. 1992, 'postmodern urban landscapes: mapping culture and power', in s. lash and j. friedman, (eds.) modernity and identity, blackwell, oxford, pp.221-247. introduction community and urban social movements the importance of place research context dialogic conversations with activists and community workers the activist position the critical community worker position dimensions of practising place cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 69 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia legacy of colonialism in the empowerment of women in rwanda ilaria buscaglia university of siena shirley randell kigali institute of education, rwanda abstract this paper aims to trace the genealogy of discourses and practices relating to the empowerment of women in rwanda. their origins are rooted in colonial times, particularly in some social welfare programs for women, known as foyers sociaux (social homes), in which rwandan women were taught to cook, iron, mend and clean, in a word how to be good wives. the foyer social constitutes a revealing example of the ambiguity brought by the colonial idea of “female promotion”: conceived as a way to improve women’s condition, they actually contribute to their domestication, by inculcating victorian gender ideology in the african élite and erasing traditional forms of female pre-colonial power at the same time. this program was reproduced in different forms in postcolonial rwanda, as the case of the karubanda social school clearly shows. in the end, the paper briefly considers, what caused the situation to change following the genocide against the tutsi in 1994, and what more might be done to stimulate full gender equality in education and employment for women in rwanda. introduction the notion of “female promotion” was introduced in congo and ruanda-urundi by the belgian colonizers to indicate the social and political measures intended to enhance women’s position in the society and to encourage what was supposed to be a “more developed” conception of femininity.1 in this paper, “female promotion” will be considered as a foucauldian apparatus, i.e. […] a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions-in short, the said as much as the unsaid. such are the elements of the apparatus. the apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these elements […] (foucault, cit. in agamben 2009, p. 2). 1 in the belgian colonial context, the expression “female promotion” (itself a translation of the french promotion féminine) appeared for the first time in the proceedings of a conference held in brussels in 1956, focusing on the promotion of native women from congo and ruanda-urundi. the phrase is in itself problematic for two reasons. first, it assumes that there exists one “good” model of femininity towards which all the alternatives should be directed. secondly, it implies a certain passivity on the part of women themselves as if they weren’t capable of defining their own aims and lives. for these reasons the expression “women’s empowerment” which focuses more on the active role of the subjects was later substituted. throughout the paper we explicitly use “female promotion” in a pointed reference to the colonial mind-set of the time. 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 the analysis will focus especially on the origins of this apparatus, rooted in colonial times, and on its progeny, by showing the way it affected even postcolonial gender ideology up to 1994. the aim of the study is twofold: on one hand, it tries historically to reconstruct the basis of gender inequality, by clearly showing how misleading it is to blame a conjectural local tradition or culture, without taking into account the colonial encounter. secondly, it suggests that people in charge of planning political and social measures to enhance women’s (or any groups’) condition should always critically re-analyze and rethink previous models of empowerment before automatically applying them. the foyers sociaux and female promotion in colonial times the dawn of female promotion in rwanda dates back to the 1940s, when rwanda, together with burundi, formed the territory of ruanda-urundi. this was administered by belgium under mandate first, and as a united nations (un) trust territory after 1945. every year, belgium had to send a complete report to the un, in which all details about the condition of the colony had to be given. reports had roughly the same structure every year: they listed answers to approximately 250 questions, organized in chapters on geography, economy, social affairs, education, hygiene and public health. women began to be the object of some attention in these documents from the beginning of the 1950s, especially in the chapters on social assistance.2 in the seventh chapter of the 1951 report, entitled ‘social progress’, it is written: ‘[w]hat we call social assistance must not be seen in a general sense, but in the strict meaning of domestic and familiar education of the indigenous woman’ (ministre des colonies 1952, p. 112). women are presented as the beneficiaries of an educational welfare program sponsored by the colonial government and known as foyers sociaux (social homes). the first foyer was founded in usumbura in 1948; two others followed in astrida (1949) and nyundo (1952). the foyer in usumbura institutionalized a previous informal activity carried out by the white sisters. in 1946, together with some lay women, they began to teach dressmaking to some african women from a part of the town called belge, the quarter where 2 some references could also be found in the chapters on education, where the few girls’ schools and their activities were mentioned, and in the chapters on public health, where women appeared exclusively as mothers who benefit from the sanitary maternal and child programs. but only in the chapters on social progress are there any considerations about the concept of female promotion and women’s emancipation. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 71 évolués lived, i.e. indigenous men educated in colonial schools and resident in urban centres who constituted the native élite. in 1948 a professional association of the catholic social service, the assistance sociale au congo, took over, and the sisters were substituted by social assistants. this became an ‘agreed’ institution, managed by a private organization. it had nonetheless to follow the guidelines of the colonial government, which also provided funds.3 according to the 1951 report, courses offered in the foyers of astrida and usumbura were the following: mass courses, i.e. general courses of dressmaking and knitting for all the women enrolled, [n]ot to teach them to make embroidered dresses, artistically made, but simple clothes easy to finish and thanks to which the members of the family will always be clean and well-groomed (ministre des colonies 1952, cited in hunt 1990, p. 456). then the permanence, i.e. the possibility for each woman to be individually followed up in her sewing work twice a week. after six months or one year, the best students were chosen to start domestic courses, aiming at shaping [r]eal ladies of the house, able to keep the house clean, to make the interior pleasant and to offer a cleaned table, an appetizing meal and washed linen to their husbands when they come from work (ministre des colonies 1952, p. 113). once a week the women washed, ironed and mended the linen; another time they cooked a complete meal that was then eaten at home with their families. to check that the notions learnt at the foyers were effectively put into practice and transmitted to neighbors, home visits were made by the directors of the foyers. the latter were also expected to intervene in case of conflicts between the students and their families. eventually, women could also benefit from saving books in order to buy a sewing machine or a cradle. some women (nine in usumbura according to the 1951 report) were chosen to be trained as indigenous instructors in order to help the europeans in their work. the role of the foyers sociaux was at the centre of the discourses pronounced in the 12th session of the national colonial congress, held in brussels in 1956, focusing on the promotion of the indigenous woman. their multiplication, together with an extension of their activities, was seen as a good strategy to improve the life conditions of women and girls. 3 the history and analysis of the foyer in usumbura are drawn from hunt (1990, pp. 455-456). 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 they should reach the same level as their male counterparts, the évolués. the ideal couple was formed by an évolué husband, holder of a civic merit card, and a wife, diligent student at the foyer social. the minister of the colonies said: [i]f we have already noticed a remarkable progress on the part of african society which includes only the male element, it is not the same with the female population. the fault is not only ours. at the beginning, the pioneers were more interested in securing a labor force in order to draw a better organization from an ethnic status stuck from time immemorial in the ancestral rut of routine and custom (congrès colonial national 1956, pp. 18-19). and also: [i]f we have been able to gain an élite out of the male population, which has been growing on and on, it has not been the same for the female population. and it is this delay, due to the will to not suddenly disrupt the basis of an ancestral structure, this rational respite in our civilizing mission, which enhances your task with a peculiar and frightening interest (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 19). raising women to the same level of emancipation as the évolué men was therefore seen as a gradual process, to be accomplished cautiously to avoid the sudden eradication of structures and gender relationships which had been consolidated by an ancient tradition. women were also seen as the bearers of traditional culture. the president of the congress stated: ‘[e]ven more than men, women are trapped in the culture’ (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 25). women were also those responsible for the first education of their children: [t]hey deeply love their children. when the latter reach the age of school, they are already imbued with their mother’s concepts. let us raise the indigenous woman for her interest, for the happiness of an harmonious family and also for a better future. to educate a boy is to form a man; to educate a girl is to form a family (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 25). women had to be led to free themselves from a traditional culture which was seen as a hindrance to their personal and collective development. in doing so, they would easily become good spouses and responsible mothers, with positive social and moral effects on the new generations (their children), the men (their husbands), their families and, in consequence, the whole society. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 73 it was considered that the emancipation process should involve first the women resident in the centers extra-coutumiers4 because their life condition was perceived as constantly at risk. without the control of traditional culture and in the absence of an alternative moral order, these women could easily misuse their freedom. in the opinion of the vice-governor of congo: [w]hile in the traditional villages, women suffer as a beast of burden and men are usually quite idle, in the centers extra-coutumiers men work and their wives become aware of their freedom and often they use it improperly (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 36). female promotion became a strategy of control of the potential disorder due to the moral crisis caused by urban migration. gender power relations had been completely reversed: in rural areas women worked hard in the field and had no time for leisure, while in town they stayed at home without the control of their husbands, who worked the whole day for the colonial administration. unready to perform the role of unproductive wives, it was considered that these women could be tempted by prostitution, adultery and alcoholism, with a consequent increase in divorces. female promotion went hand in hand with social control. the combined action of missionaries, social assistants and colonial authorities was meant to hold back this potential explosive disorder and to organize it according to precise gender roles: men were at the service of the colonial power and they maintained their families through their work; women were confined to the reproductive sphere, with the task of perpetuating the labor force and bringing up their children. men as producers and women as re-producers: this dichotomy, which had been proposed and analyzed by meillassoux (1975), seems to be rooted in colonial times and would not be seen as traditional at all, in a society where women were important agricultural workers. female promotion finally coincided with the imposition of a precise family structure of european origin, the nuclear family, with the related gender roles. the minister of the colonies stated: ‘[t]he promotion of the black woman is necessary if we want to put at the basis of the congolese community the harmony of the évolué couple’ (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 20). 4 colonial towns, under the rule of colonial law. 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 even the laws operating on the colonial territory showed the same intention. the 1957 report states that two decrees issued by the colonial administration were meant to facilitate women’s life conditions: the decree of 5 july 1948, that required the inscription of traditional marriage in the register of births, marriages and deaths, and the decree of 4 april 1950, that annulled all marriages contracted from 1952 onwards by already married men (ministre des colonies 1958, p. 129). these dispositions ratified a formal acknowledgment of the monogamous union, together with an official sanction against polygamy. no polygamous family could take up residence in town. finally, the institution of a supplementary tax on polygamy in the 1930s must be mentioned: every man had to pay a levy on every wife but the first. the monogamous model had to be consolidated first in the native élite, resident in urban areas, and then transmitted to the rest of the population, in order to avoid: ‘[t]he creation of a caste of more or less europeanized black men and women, segregated from the mass of autochthonous people’ (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 94). actually, the class division of the colonized was one of the principal strategies of colonial control, as hunt brilliantly points out: [t]he foyer social thus became a key part of colonial efforts to solidify the class structure of usumbura's african residents and inscribe within this class structure colonial standards of prestige and status. in so doing, the foyer worked to establish, maintain, and enhance hierarchies among women, among africans, between men and women, and between white colonials and africans (1990, p. 474). the crafting of these new subjectivities was carried out through direct contact between the european instructors and african women, occurring in the kitchen, in the sewing class or in the laundry. in this domestic atmosphere, a space of ‘colonial intimacy’ was created, in which the relationship of domination between colonizers and colonized had not the aspect of a patent coercion, but of what homi bhaba calls ‘colonial mimicry’ (hunt 1990, p. 469). the students in the foyers sociaux were called to imitate the behaviors of european women in everyday activities, like cooking, washing the linen, ironing and welcoming their husbands back from work. this fine embodiment of gestures only looks innocent: it is actually one of the most effective and pervasive ways of shaping subjects and creating an indigenous élite. and african individuals had an active part in it: they were not only passive recipients. a young congolese student in belgium noticed: ‘[t]hose gestures that are spontaneous for you, we can only make them after reasoning’ (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 49). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 75 though the simple transplant of western models was seen as inopportune by most of the intellectuals of the time, the practical realization of social assistance programs actually showed a different tendency. one of the évolués present at the congress noticed: ‘[i] saw that in one of the foyers sociaux, the women were taught to cook on an electric cooker or on a petrol one, and to use electric irons’ (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 133). he added: ‘[i]n other foyers sociaux, our wives are taught to prepare onion soup or european specialties. i think it is a waste of time for the wife of a worker’ (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 133). in this mimicry, as hunt stresses in her article, there was no place for a fusion: each part was confirmed in its own position, through a delicate counterbalance of approach and recession between the colonizers and the colonized. the aim was to create a local élite, separated from the mass, which did not call into question the racist hierarchies on which the colonial experience was based: [f]or élite africans, measures designed to seduce their participation and cooperation were as salient as forms of distancing from the colony. although targeted for special attention and inducements by the foyers, their distinct place in the racist colonial hierarchy was ultimately reinforced, even as their elite position among africans was simultaneously delineated (hunt 1990, pp. 449-50). the foyers sociaux thus became an instrument to create a selected and urban model of femininity: the woman must be a wife and a mother, and her work must be limited to the domestic sphere. according to one of the participants at the congress, the aim of female promotion was: ‘[t]o raise women to their traditional role reserved to them in the christian family, central in our culture and whose importance goes even beyond our laws’ (congrès colonial national 1956, p. 51). but are we sure that this new model of femininity is a real way of promoting women? did colonization really emancipate african women as it was stated by the authorities of the time? was the new female élite of wives and mothers more powerful than the one in pre-colonial times? 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 a pre-colonial élite of powerful women during colonial times, several wives of chiefs, queen mothers and princesses had important roles in rwandan history, not to mention that the structure of power itself was based on the couple, king-and-queen mother, as in other african kingdoms of the region (and far away) (de heusch 1958 and 1972; cohen 1977; schiller 1990). in some historiographical works (muzungu 2003; vansina 2004; prunier 1995), examples can be found. the best-known is the figure of kanjogera nyirayuhi, who did not hesitate to sentence to death rutarindwa, her adoptive child, heir to the throne, in order that her own son could seize power. this occurred in 1896 and is known as ‘the coup d’etat de rucuncu’. the reign of yuhi musinga followed, where the power was de facto in the hands of his mother and her brothers. in addition to the example of kanjogera, notorious for political intrigues, it is worth mentioning the case of nyiratunga, adoptive queen mother of yuhi iv gahindiro at the end of the 19th century. nyiratunga reigned wisely until her son reached full age and then she ceased power without arousing hostility. another important figure is nyirarumaga, adoptive queen mother of ruganzu ndori (16th century). nyirarumaga is reputed to have reformed the style of ibisigo, the historical poems that listed names and deeds of the past kings, from their origin up to the time of their composition.5 as schiller points out with regard to the kingdom of buganda: ‘[p]olitical status transcended gender status’ (1990, p. 457). queen mothers, kings’ sisters, princesses and several kings’ wives, whose status derived from the position of their respective sons, brothers, fathers or husbands, could nonetheless exercise a direct political power on the men of their own courts and an indirect one on the kings and their courts. they could do it to favor the members of their lineage or just to influence more general political decisions. women’s political power, although confined in the royal court, was not absent from society. these queens and princesses seem very distant from the wives of colonial évolués, whose promotion coincided with their domestication. we can therefore conclude that the dismantling of the monarchy with its rites, roles, symbols, among which was the figure of the queen mother, led to women’s retirement from political power. the idea is very close to amadiume’s remarks about the igbo of nigeria: 5 we are grateful to dr jeanne nyirahabimana, professor at the national university of rwanda for the precolonial female portraits. she is currently recording an important historiographical work on the role of women during pre-colonial and colonial times in rwanda. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 77 [w]hereas indigenous concepts linked to flexible gender constructions in terms of access to power and authority mediated dual sex divisions, the new western concepts introduced through colonial conquest carried strong sex and class inequalities supported by rigid gender ideology and constructions: a woman was always female regardless of her social achievements or status (1987, p. 119). colonization is seen by the author as ‘the erosion of women's power’. post-colonial times and the progeny of the karubanda social school the concept of female promotion elaborated in colonial times was at the basis of all the following educational and social programs for women disposed by the independent rwandan state. it has to be added that the dismantling of the female pre-colonial élite together with the monarchical structure itself, depended also on ethnic dynamics. before the second world war, the colonial strategy of dominance implied the support of the minority on power (nyiginya dynasty, a small fragment of a tutsi lineage). after 1945, the paradigm changed in favor of the mass of the population, globally identified with the hutu majority. the struggle for independence was led from an anti-monarchic perspective: all the previous political and social models were abhorrently identified with the tutsi ethnic group and they had to be removed (fusaschi 2000). for this reason, even the role of queens and princesses came to an end, substituted by a female évoluée élite, forged in the foyers sociaux according to a pure western model. the karubanda social school, which started its activities on 1 october 1956, is a good example of the penetration of the colonial concept of female promotion in the post-colonial state. the school was founded by the soeurs auxiliatrices des ames du purgatoire, with the approval and the economic support of the ministry of the colonies. the soeurs provisionally started the school in gisagara and they settled permanently in astrida (butare) three years later, in 1959.6 the main objectives of the school were the following: 6 this information, when not specified, is drawn from ngendakumana (1989). ngendakumana was a professor at karubanda school who conducted personal research about the history of the school. 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 • to offer education ‘whose aim is to train rural indigenous social assistants, in a spirit of tolerance and respect, and beyond any form of proselytism’7 • to ‘train young autochthonous girls so that they will be in a position to manage little rural social centers that will multiply in the two countries under the auspices of the government and the chiefdom council’ 8 • to take care of the rural mass not yet involved in western education. the explicit aim was to train social indigenous assistants who could work specifically in the foyers sociaux.9 the implicit aim, mentioned by ngendakumana in his work, was to shape potential wives for the évolués, educated in the groupe scolaire and known as indatwa: [t]he groupe scolaire of butare, created in 1929, trained agents for the colonial administration who could not easily find companions able to satisfy them on many aspects of relational or socio-professional life. their dressing habits, their way of eating, speaking, their religious beliefs, their sanitary habits, their conception of the world, of the environment and of the culture, have changed to the extent that we must train women as their life companions, who could complete them from a professional, personal, familiar and social point of view (ngendakumana 1989, pp. 47-48). girls who had completed five years of primary school with a final mark of at least 8/10 were admitted. the recruitment was executed through applications coming from religious congregations or parishes, or from native families. the educational program encompassed four years. the first year was equivalent to the sixth year of primary school and a general background was given: french, history, sciences and geography were taught. three years of theoretical and professional social studies followed: psychology, law, social organization, anatomy, pediatric nursing, maternal and child hygiene were the main subjects. the practical part included home economics courses and internships at the foyers sociaux. textbooks used were written by the teachers themselves who drew information from leaflets of nestlé or guizot and from books written by missionaries in congo. karubanda social school soon became a model. several religious and lay people 7 art. 8 of the provisional convention drawn from ngendakumana (1989), p. 42. 8 excerpt from the activity report of the year 1957-1958, ibid. 9 there is a strong link between the two realities: the staff of the school was under the control of aimo (affaires indigènes et main d’oeuvres) and had to do internships at the foyers of astrida and nyundo before starting teaching. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 79 wrote to the director, sister marie de st. etienne, to ask her advice on how they could start a similar activity in different areas of the belgian colonies (ngendakumana 1989, p. 35). the colonial model of female promotion through social assistance was consolidated during the two republics, adapting itself according to governmental trends. social action, between the 1970s and 1980s not only focused on women, but became a development action which aimed at involving the rural and popular mass as a whole. for this reason not only did female social schools increase (in byumba a new one was opened in 1979, in rambura and in rulindo in 1981), but also one for boys was founded in kansi in the 1970s. alongside the foyers sociaux the ccdfp (centres communaux de développement et formation permanente) were created. in these new institutions boys and men were also included. women remained, nevertheless, the main beneficiaries of social assistance. the few women in politics during habyarimana's regime had all studied at karubanda social school: among them the notorious pauline nyiramasuhuko,10 minister of equal opportunities from 1992, agathe kanziga, habyarimana’s wife and immaculée nyirabizeymana, a deputy and a politician. agathe uwilingiyimana, member of the opposition and prime minister of the government that issued from the arusha agreement, worked there as a mathematics teacher (guichaoua 1995). all examples of emancipated women of the time, they had a background as social assistants. until very recently, this had been the only path for women towards ‘emancipation’. changing emphases things started to change at the end of the 1980s, when some women in civil society began to organize themselves following the international trend of female activism inaugurated by the 1985 un international conference in nairobi at the end of the decade for women. several women’s associations were created, such as duterimbere, haguruka, reseau des femmes and pro-femmes twese hamwe.11 10 pauline nyiramasuhuko was the first woman to be convicted by the international criminal tribunal for rwanda: she was found guilty of genocide and incitement of rape. the idea that female promotion must also include women’s empowerment through access to the public sphere and to political power was first raised by a lively civil society, rapidly struck down by war and the genocide against the tutsi. after 1994, all these associations restarted their activities and many new groups were created. they 11 profemmes twese hamwe means ‘women together’. 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 made an amazing contribution to the reconstruction and development of rwanda and the reconciliation process. among them, and perhaps the best-known at an international level is avega, an ngo founded by 50 genocide survivors – widows, created to address the needs of genocide widows, orphans, children heads of households, those who lost their children, older people and people with disabilities. more relevant is the fact that women’s empowerment in rwanda today is not entrusted to civil society only, but it has become an important government program. as president kagame has said: ‘gender equality is not just women’s business, it is everybody’s business; gender equality and women’s empowerment are critical to sustainable socio-economic development’ (ministry of gender and family promotion 2010, pp. 10-11). to promote women became a necessary strategy for reconciliation, reconstruction and development, in order to involve the whole population in this challenging task. women therefore came to be conceived not only in the private and domestic sphere, but also in the public one. their entrance (or their return) to politics and power certainly represented a substantial change in the history of women’s empowerment, allowing them to finally come out from a colonial ideology of female promotion which had left its mark on their lives for too long. women’s empowerment today gender equality and women's empowerment have become a national priority. rwanda has adopted some important policies and programs which clearly show this commitment: the rwandan constitution of 2003, which instituted affirmative action; vision 2020, which stated that gender has to be integrated as a cross-cutting issue in all development policies and strategies; the economic development and poverty reduction strategy 2008-2012 (edprs), which analyzed the still existing gender inequalities, including within the education sector; and the national gender policy, which was revised in 2010. important institutions were created in order to implement these policies, such as the ministry of gender and family promotion (migeprof), national women’s council and gender monitoring office. lastly, rwanda is the country with the highest percentage of women parliamentarians in the world (56% since 2008). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 81 despite all these important achievements, which show a dramatic change in politics and public discourse, more has still to be done to completely overcome gender imbalances at all levels of society. an example is the education sector. the main purpose of education today in rwanda is to prepare all young people, both boys and girls, to be active and competent participants in society as a whole and to be productive economic contributors to the workforce. moreover, rwanda is committed to building a ‘knowledge-based, technological’ society, which means that the development of educational institutions is a priority too. rwanda has adopted the 2008 education sector strategic plan, the joint education sector support 2006-2010, the 2008 girls’ education policy revised in 2010, and the 2009 girls education implementation strategy. all these documents put gender equality in education as their central objective. however, a persistent gender imbalance emerges when reading analyses of retention, transition and completion rates in secondary and tertiary education in rwanda.12 gender equality has been reached in primary school: 51 percent of the enrolled children are girls, girls' transition rate is 86.3 percent (while boys' is 89.9%) and girls' examination pass rate is 50.8 percent (while boys' is 49.2%). regarding teachers, 51.8 percent of the faculty are women, and 96.3 percent of them are qualified. the situation in secondary education is different. the enrollment rate is almost equal (49% are girls and 51% are boys) as well as the transition rate (86.9% for girls and 85.2% for boys). however, the examination pass rate reveals a large imbalance: only 44 percent of girls succeed in the final exams compared with more than 55 percent of boys. only 21.8 percent of the faculty is represented by women and only 20.2 percent of them are qualified. girls' disadvantaged position is more evident at the tertiary level, where only 43 percent of the students enrolled are girls (including in private universities) and only 21 percent of the faculty in the public universities is represented by women. at the national university of rwanda (nur), out of 126 phd holders, only 14 are women (masanja et al. 2011, p. 20). even the access to government university scholarships reveals inequalities: at nur, kigali institute of science and technology (kist) and kigali institute of education (kie) the percentage of female recipients of scholarships is under 30 (23.3% at nur, 21.2% at kist 12 randell and fish (2011), p. 8. statistics in this and the next paragraph are drawn from this publication. 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 and 26.6% at kie), whereas at the higher institute of agriculture and animal husbandry (isae) the percentage is 35, and at kigali health institute (khi) the percentage is 50.3. this shows that some old gender patterns die hard: the highest percentage of women in tertiary education is found at khi, where health workers (nurses, anesthetists) are trained, while the lowest one is found at kist, the university for science and technology education. the participation of women in science and technology fields is still weak at both secondary and tertiary education levels. only 19 percent of women studied agriculture in 2005 while those studying science and technology stood at 16 percent at nur in 2005. in 2008, the overall enrolment had declined to 13.9 percent (kwizara 2010, p. 2). an aborted girls’ empowerment program in 2006, which led to 90 girls enrolling in science and technology courses in 2007 and increased female enrolments to 20 percent, was discontinued. the ministry of education has resurrected the girls empowerment program in 2010 by selecting 100 young science students who narrowly missed government sponsorship in 2008 and 2009 to join higher institutions of learning pursuing science and technology courses under the equal opportunity program. the african development bank is funding this program that targets the enrolment of an additional 200 girls in tertiary institutions by the end of 2011. one program goal is to improve science and technology and rwanda’s industrial skills base by building the capacity of female students. conclusion as we have seen in this brief reconstruction of the history of women’s empowerment in rwanda, colonization brought profound changes to the position of women in the nation. the political status of the pre-colonial élite of powerful women transcended their gender status. however, the dismantling of the monarchy with its roles and symbols, among which was the figure of the queen mother, led to women’s retirement from political power. the colonial powers introduced strong sex and class inequalities and strict gender ideologies. memorable among the structures that eroded women’s power were the foyers sociaux, an educational welfare program which supported female promotion for an élite group of women in urban areas with the objective of making them suitable partners for the chosen évolués and under male control. this completely reversed the gender power relations existing in rural areas where women were important agricultural workers. in the new replicated urban nuclear families, men were seen as the producers and women as the re-producers needing social control. far from being emancipated, women became domesticated in their roles, which cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 83 mimicked the roles of expatriate wives and mothers. the establishment of the karubanda social school for girls continued this pattern, training indigenous assistants who could work in the foyers sociaux. women themselves began to change this situation following the international influence on rwandan participants of the 1985 end of the decade conference for women held in nairobi, when they began their own empowering organizations. these were devastated in the 1994 genocide against the tutsi, but were re-established by determined women to become powerful instruments of reconciliation, reconstruction and development. education stands out as one of the most important sectors that must be reformed in order to empower women and reach gender equality at all levels of society. not only must equality in education be conceived in terms of percentages of people enrolled at universities and graduates with degrees, but it must also coincide with access for women to all fields of education and employment, especially in the fields of science and technology, on which rwanda is now basing its development. acronyms avega association des veuves du genocide d’avril (association of genocide widows) ccdfp centres communaux de développement et formation permanente cgcd centre for gender, culture and development gmo gender monitoring office isae higher institute of agriculture and animal husbandry khi kigali health institute kie kigali institute of education kist kigali institute of science and 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http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia issues in civil society in a cosmopolitan world the papers in this issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal explore the theme of civil society, community organisations and national governments in a wide and varied range of social and political contexts. the papers document and explore diverse roles taken by civil society in different conditions and circumstances in a number of geographic locations. the first two papers deal with displacement and the increase in this problem that will occur due to climate change. displacement is difficult not only for those who have to relocate and it is likely to be a challenging process for all involved, including national governments and civil society. a range of other difficult issues are addressed by the other papers in the issue, including combatting child sex-trafficking, rebuilding a post-genocide society and building social capital among turkish women with low socio-economic status. each paper highlights the different roles civil society can play in these diverse situations to improve the well-being of vulnerable people and communities. the first paper, by vinnitta patricia mosby, presents a methodology useful in exploring issues facing the indigenous people of the torres strait islands. a culture and civilisation that has survived on these islands, which are located at the northern tip of eastern australia, for thousands of years is now being threatened by adverse effects of climate change, particularly rising sea levels. migration from the islands is not new; however, the rate of displacement is likely to continue to increase. the research methodology shows the importance to other islanders displaced by climate change of staying connected to self, family and culture as they move from their island. continuing the theme of environmental migration, gil marvel p.tabucanon’s paper explores the role the asean countries could take to assist the vulnerable pacific populations facing the possibility of relocation. the paper also explores the emerging issue of environmental refugees and the response to this issues in various countries, both within asean and elsewhere. these are challenging issues which will become even more severe as global temperatures and sea levels rise. ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 the third paper explores people movement of different kind. deanna davy’s research focuses on the role of transnational anti-trafficking advocacy networks in combatting child sex trafficking in the greater mekong subregion. it uses cosmopolitan globalisation theory to explore the active role taken by civil society to counter global social problems, such as trafficking. the recovery from the extreme social problem of the genocide in rwanda is the focus of paper by gerise herndon and shirley randell. it focuses on the roles of civil society organizations in rebuilding the country following the trauma of the 1994 genocide. it examines the role of women in rwandan social and political life, where they represent 56% of the members of the parliament. this high level of political representation, however, has not translated to women’s empowerment in other parts of rwandan society. the reasons for this and how the obstacles to gender equality might be overcome are explored in the paper. the final paper continues the focus on women, however, in a completely different context. gizem arat, arzu icağasıoğlu-çoban and gonca polat examine the factors contributing to the formation of social capital among turkish women with low socio-economic status through community centres in ankara. both the rwandan and turkish paper show the important role women play in the maintenance and development of strong communities. the five papers provide new perspectives within these different contexts on the emerging and changing role of civil society around the world. it plays an important role in migration, combatting global problems and assisting women develop their communities. we are sure that these papers will make a useful contribution to the knowledge of civil society and the journal would welcome further scholarly contributions in these and other areas related to cosmopolitan civil societies across the globe. dr ian mcgregor sydney march 2013 issues in civil society in a cosmopolitan world cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 27 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia cosmopolitan pluralism: beyond the cultural turn1 stephanie lawson macquarie university abstract the ‘cultural turn’ has had a profound influence across the humanities and social sciences in the last few decades, focusing on the extent to which specificity and particularity underpin what we can know, how we can know it, and how this affects our being-in-the world. it has been opposed, in particular, to universalist ideas, or at least those developed in european political and social thought. this has opened the way to a range of insights, from issues of pluralism and difference, both within political communities and between them, to the instability if not impossibility of foundations for knowledge. but because of the deep-seated opposition to virtually all forms of universalism implicit in the cultural turn, and which has therefore given it a strongly relativist dimension, it tends strongly to undermine cosmopolitan projects. this stems largely from the particular conceptualization of ‘culture’ that underpins projects associated with the cultural turn and which is derived mainly from the discipline of anthropology. few studies embracing this ‘cultural turn’, however, have paid more than cursory attention to the culture concept itself, nor have its critics. this article suggests that conceptions of culture derived mainly from the discipline of anthropology have dominated overwhelmingly, while another important tradition of thought associated with the culture concept – namely the humanist tradition – has been either ignored or rejected. it argues further that we would do well to reconsider what humanist ideas can contribute to how ‘culture’ is both conceptualized and deployed in political thought and action, especially in countering the overparticularization of social and political phenomena that marks contemporary culturalist approaches and which have therefore tended to militate against cosmopolitan ideas. the article further suggests how we can shift from the strong relativist assumptions underpinning the cultural turn towards a conception of cosmopolitan pluralism that continues to value difference and particularity while remaining committed to a conception of humanity. introduction approaches to the study of virtually all of the humanities and social sciences, including my own discipline of politics and international relations, have been strongly influenced by the ‘cultural turn’ in recent years. against the objective certainties supposedly produced by universally valid knowledge gleaned through the application of rigorous, scientifically grounded methodologies, the turn to culture has emphasized the particularities and specificities that underpin an irreducible plurality of knowledges and ‘truths’ possessed by people and communities located in different positions, places, hierarchies, times, spheres, structures, contexts and so on around the world. this has, at least according to its proponents, destabilized the very foundations on which conventional claims to knowledge and truth have long rested. 1 this article is one product of an on-going project on ‘cosmopolitan pluralism’. it draws on, and further develops, material which has appeared in the following previous publications: lawson (2006), lawson (2009) and lawson (2011). i am grateful for the opportunity provided by the uts cosmopolitan civil societies group to present this paper at the ‘other cosmopolitanisms’ symposium, and also to the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this article. http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs� 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the same intellectual currents have seen the repudiation of anything that smacks of universal essences, especially that of an essential universal humanity and associated ideologies, including cosmopolitanism. one clear expression of these currents has been evident in the assertion of a ‘cultural politics of difference’ by those who, in the words of one contributor, have sought to ‘trash the monolithic and homogeneous in the name of diversity, multiplicity, and heterogeneity; to reject the abstract, general and universal in light of the concrete, specific, and particular; and to historicize, contextualize, and pluralize by highlighting ‘the contingent, provisional, variable, tentative, shifting, and changing.’ (west 1993, p. 257). the implications are of course profound, especially in relation to matters such as human rights, democracy, conceptions of the good, and so on. and there is an enormous literature, especially with respect to the communitarian/cosmopolitan divide in normative theory, which reflects just how extensive and vigorous debates over such matters have been. we consider this divide in normative theory in due course. despite the apparent anti-essentialism of these broad intellectual currents, it seems that some forms of essentialism have flourished in culturalist approaches to the assertion of pluralism and difference. indeed, to the extent that they depend on notions of essential difference for their basic rationale, it may be said that ‘culture’ itself becomes the foundation. certainly, this is the case with many ‘culturalist’ approaches to human rights taken by communitarian theorists, where it is commonly argued that different ‘cultures’ produce different conceptions of what ‘rights’ might attach to being human, or even of what it means to be ‘human’. one familiar point is that most ‘cultures’, or at least those outside ‘the west’, have not produced their own authentic, autochthonous conceptualizations of the individual on which conceptions of universal human rights must ultimately rest. rather, the latter is a conceptual development with a specificity and particularity anchored firmly within ‘the west’ – an entity which is also taken very much for granted – and must be contextualized accordingly.2 the purpose of this article is not to go over of familiar ground in debates over such matters of human rights and the merits and demerits of either culturalist or universalist approaches. 2 this is explicit in the famous statement published by the american anthropological association criticizing the notion of universal human rights set out in the un’s universal declaration and adopting an explicit cultural relativist position. see american anthropological association (1947, pp. 539-543). there have been significant changes in more recent years, however. while not giving up the concept of culture as something which differentiates human communities, the aaa now acknowledges the need for an approach which accommodates more universalist aspects of culture. see american anthropological association, (1999). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 29 there are criticisms to be made of both and, again, the literature is replete with such criticisms. the more immediate concern is with the extent to which many studies embracing the ‘cultural turn’ have paid little or no attention to the culture concept itself, simply invoking the language of cultural specificity and particularity without enquiring into just what these terms convey – apart from the fact that they position the author in opposition to some form of universality or cosmopolitanism. what is clear, however, is that the conceptualizations of culture that figure implicitly or explicitly in these debates, on both sides, are derived from the discipline of anthropology, often uncritically so.3 there is, however, another conception of culture which emerged at around much the same time as the anthropological version, and that is a humanist conception. its subsequent career has been rather different and in many quarters it certainly does not seem to have enjoyed the same prestige. indeed, some anthropologists have dismissed it as simply ‘wrong’. i shall argue, though, that it may be fruitful to reconsider what humanist ideas have to contribute to the conceptualization of ‘culture’, especially in terms of serving as a counter to the overparticularization of social and political phenomena that has often been used to undermine cosmopolitan projects. this also accords with recent trends in more critical anthropological work, although these tend to avoid any mention of a humanist conception of culture as offering any useful insights. this article, then, is largely concerned to put a case for a rethinking of the culture concept as an essential prerequisite to addressing an important intellectual problem facing the case for the reassertion of cosmopolitan ideas in the contemporary period – or for a ‘cosmopolitan turn’. that problem is the enormously strong influence that anthropological conceptions have had on the idea of culture as manifest in the broad ‘cultural turn’, and which have given rise to what i call, for the sake of brevity, a ‘culturalist’ approach to a wide range of issues in social and political theory.4 3 note that i use conceptions in the plural indicating that anthropology has produced a variety of definitions. this challenge to an entrenched ‘culturalism’, i suggest, is also essential to projects of ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ which are attempting to transcend a long-established tradition of ‘methodological nationalism’ (see beck and sznaider 2006) and which i believe is directly comparable to the ‘methodological particularism’ which characterizes the cultural turn. the first substantive section looks in some detail at the 4 this article could easily be filled with quotes and references demonstrating the enormity of this influence, leaving no space for anything else, so i must refer the reader instead to several previous works which set this out, especially in relation to political studies and historiography: see lawson, 2006, lawson 2009. 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 emergence of both anthropological and humanist conceptions to illustrate the assumptions underpinning each of these, and therefore what ‘culture’ meant to those who first articulated it. much of this may be well-known to historians of ideas, but it is not evident to me that it is known at all to many in the wider community of scholars who regularly make assumptions about the particularity of ‘culture’, in accord with the assumptions of the broad cultural turn, but rarely consider whether ‘culture’ can also be conceptualized in a way that transcends particularity and boundedness and which is therefore capable of supporting a ‘cosmopolitan turn’. the emergence of culture concepts the development of concepts of culture in europe took place in the wake of an enormous expansion of knowledge in both social and natural spheres. this occurred as part of the move to mount critiques of social institutions within europe, as well as the attempt to theorize a vast new array of facts about the world and its varying inhabitants which had been accumulating since long-range voyages of exploration began in the late fifteenth century. before the late nineteenth century, ‘culture’ had been used in english mainly in agricultural terms for several centuries, reflecting its origins in the latin cultura from the composite term agri cultura –cultivation of the soil. it also denoted training, fostering, and adornment as well as worship and cult (cultus). later, it came to signify the cultivation of arts and letters and of the intellect more generally (kahler 1968, p. 3). this was a distinctly humanist conception first articulated by matthew arnold in 1869. embodied in intellectual, literary and artistic achievement transmitted from the past to the present, culture in arnold’s famous formulation referred to ‘the best of what has been thought and said in the world’ (arnold 1963, p. 6). thus, in the words of terry eagleton, the idea of ‘culture’ completed its journey ‘from pigfarming to picasso’. (quoted in reeves 2004, p. 14). but there was a parallel development in conceptualization taking place which incorporated everything from methods of swine-herding to artistic achievement, and which therefore seemed much more egalitarian and inclusive. while matthew arnold was setting in train the practice of cultural critique as a humanist enterprise, a british anthropologist, edward b. tylor, proposed another definition: ‘culture or civilization, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’. (tylor 1987, p. 37). this definition was to become one of the most widely cited in anthropological literature, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 31 appearing regularly in anglophone textbooks and displayed prominently on the unesco website until at least 2006.5 by using ‘culture’ to denote a ‘complex whole’, tylor was on the way to producing a reification, turning culture from a process – implied in the original idea of cultivation as well as in the humanist sense – into a thing in itself.6 but it was later anthropologists, especially the american school of cultural anthropology, who produced much more strongly reified versions, as we see shortly. tylor’s anthropological approach is generally regarded as positive and descriptive rather than normative and evaluative, thereby placing it firmly within the realm of the scientific rather than the moral or aesthetic. it is partly for this reason that arnold’s conception on the one hand, and that of tylor and subsequent anthropologists on the other, are often seen as in tension with each other. certainly, arnold’s original conception is generally read (especially by anthropologists) as elitist, endorsing a notion of ‘high culture’, and not merely worthless in application to the concerns of anthropology, but ethically suspect too. kroeber and kluckhorn maintain that arnold’s conception, along with other humanist interpretations, is ethnocentric, absolutist, and disdainful of so-called ‘low culture’. the anthropological attitude, in contrast, is relativistic, ‘it assumes that every society through its culture seeks and in some measure finds values … (kroeber and kluckhohn 1963, p. 61). one contemporary anthropologist, following this example, has said that if ‘we want to retain the idea of culture as an analytic tool, we must begin by dismissing arnold’s construction of it’. (avruch 1998, p. 9). arnold’s liberal humanist ideas, however, were much more complex than simple assumptions about elitism convey. and if arnold’s notion of culture ‘was universal in its moral scope and application, emerging from and directed towards what was distinctively human in humanity’ (muhern 2000, p. xvi). then it shares some important common ground with anthropology which, after all, has also been concerned to delineate, through the concept of culture, that which is distinctively ‘human’. arnold was also concerned with the need to promote education so that people could become more critical of their own society. he was very much concerned with the ‘cult of inequality’ in victorian society and its injustices. and if he was 5 until at least then, tylor’s definition was to be found at http://portal.unesco.org as the definition of culture, although it has since disappeared. 6 there is much more to tylor’s formulation that there is space to discuss here, especially in the context of evolutionary ideas prevalent in his time which produced certain overlaps with the humanist approach. for further discussion see stocking (1963, pp. 783-799). 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 elitist, he was also scathing in his assessment of the so-called aristocracy which he saw as incapable of providing worthwhile leadership, such ‘serenity’ as they possessed coming not from a personal harmonization of ideas through the nurturing of culture, but from never having had any ideas to trouble them in the first place. (johnson 1979, esp. pp. 19-24). arnold was therefore ultimately concerned with the role of culture and how it might be used to address social problems through critique. this was certainly different from the concerns of the anthropologists with so-called ‘primitive’ societies. but anthropologists, too, were concerned to say something about their own societies through the study of cultural phenomena in other places. more generally, the humanist approach places a strong emphasis on the relationship between culture and the development of shared values which contribute to social cohesion, and this is not dissimilar to anthropological concerns from tylor’s time to the present. these issues aside, although the earliest of the anthropological definitions of culture in english was decisive for seeing culture as a ‘complex whole’, thereby prefiguring the ‘whole way of life’ approach, tylor did not quite articulate the concept of ‘a culture’ which in turn implied a plurality of different ‘cultures’ as ‘particular ways of life’. in the english speaking world, this step was to be taken more than twenty years later by the german-born franz boas, a key figure in american cultural anthropology (see stocking 1992, p. 203).7 boas began his career with a notion of culture framed by both humanist and evolutionary usages. developments in his native germany and herder’s important plural usage of the term, combined with his strong sense of the equal worth of all human communities and a concomitant rejection of any standard against which ‘progress’ might be measured, were decisive for his later work, and that of his students. stocking notes that in their further development of the culture concept, and in keeping with their own normative purpose in demonstrating the intrinsic equality of all human communities and their distinctive practices as a counter to biological racism, the boasian school promoted a more thoroughgoing sense of difference between such communities. this stamped american cultural anthropology with a strong commitment to the fundamental historicity of all cultural phenomena (stocking 1992, p. 203). 7 note that stocking, in all his reading of tylor, found no instance of the use of the word culture in the plural, nor in boas before 1895, and that it starts to appear regularly only in the first generation of boas’ students around 1910. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 33 since that time, anthropological conceptions of culture have proliferated, but in the latter half of the twentieth century a hermeneutic or interpretive approach pioneered by clifford geertz became highly influential, and remains a touchstone for many anthropologists as well as for those working in cognate fields. geertz’s major work on the interpretation of cultures (1975) is notable, among other things, for leading the anthropological study of culture from explanation to the interpretation of meaning and ‘thick description’. geertz stated his belief in the idea of ‘man’ as an ‘animal suspended in webs of significance he has spun for himself’ with culture consisting in those webs. the analysis of culture, he said, is therefore ‘not an experimental science in search of a law but an interpretive one in search of meaning.’ (geertz 1975, p. 5). this statement encapsulates the key intellectual standpoint of the cultural turn. while the interpretive approach may have shifted anthropology’s task from explanation to interpretation, it retained a heavy emphasis on culture as a marker of difference between human communities. it also retained strong elements of the cultural and ethical relativism evident in the boasian approach. these were originally introduced for the purpose of defeating evolutionary conceptions of culture along with biological racism. however, to the extent that an anthropological conception of culture, rather than biological notions of race, has come to be used as a definitive marker of human difference, it now functions in much the same way that ‘race’ did in the past (see lawson 2006) and is indeed implicated in contemporary expressions of racism, as we see later. defining culture in the contemporary world by the mid-twentieth century, culture had become one of the most complex words in the english language, and open to numerous interpretations (williams 1976). this was probably due at least partly to its strongly appraisive connotations. if a concept denotes something that is highly valued, as ‘culture’ usually does, and if a great deal is claimed in its name (for example, that culture is the source of all moral values), then it is bound to provoke endless contestation among rival claimants over what it really means. at another level, there is a problem when culture shifts ‘from something to be described, interpreted, and perhaps explained, and is treated instead as a source of explanation in itself.’ (kuper 2000, xi). let us look briefly at a number of different meanings attributed to ‘culture’ in the contemporary social and human sciences, conveniently summarized in a typology proposed 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 by cultural theorists glenn jordan and chris weedon (1995, pp. 6-8), and which attempts to categorize the basic understandings that ‘culture’ has acquired over the last century or so. 1. culture as ‘a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development’. 2. culture as ‘the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity’ which generally covers ‘music, literature, painting and sculpture, theatre and film.’ 3. culture as a ‘particular way of life’ where culture cannot be reduced to any one individual but exists only as the property of a particular collective. 4. culture as the signifying system through which a social order is communicated, reproduced, experienced and explored. here culture is a dimension of virtually all economic, social and political institutions, and resides in ‘a set of material practices which constitute meanings, values and subjectivities’. the first approximates a humanist approach which denotes the ‘cultivation’ of individual mind and character, although it is implicit in anthropological approaches as well. the second was originally based on the older conception of ‘high culture’, but which has been expanded to include virtually all kinds of ‘popular culture’ and therefore need not carry elitist connotations. the third category denotes the existence of cultures in the plural which accords with common anthropological conceptions. the fourth is an all-encompassing category although the emphasis is clearly on dynamic processes. jordan and weedon also say that this conception takes two main forms: ‘in its weaker dialectical form, it suggests that as human beings create culture, so culture creates them’. in a stronger version, influenced by structuralist and poststructuralist theory, culture is the determinant of subjectivity (ibid). this latter point begs the rather significant question of who has the authoritative resources to create or interpret ‘the culture’ that in turn creates subjectivities. it also alerts us to the rather important matter of the relationship between culture and power which theorists such as gramsci and foucault have been concerned to expose. gramsci in particular has highlighted the extent to which those with the power to interpret culture for, or on behalf of, the society in question not only do so to their own advantage, but make it seem natural and right, thus cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 35 producing the conditions for hegemonic control (see gramsci 1967). foucault developed similar ideas about the way in which ‘regimes of truth’ are imposed through powerful discourses (foucault 1980, p. 3). neither, however, could be said to be working within a traditional anthropological understanding of ‘culture’ which has often been concerned less with the critique of power relations within ‘cultural groups’ than with using the concept to differentiate one group from another, and more generally to delineate between the ‘west’ – or ‘western culture’ – and non-western others (see lawson 2006, esp. ch. 8). certainly, part of this exercise may involve explaining how power operates within different cultural groups. but the aim has not, at least conventionally, been to critique them – especially if the group in question is ‘nonwestern’. indeed, (western) anthropology’s ethos has for a very long time been strongly averse to engaging in critiques of non-western ‘others’. this is at least partly because contemporary anthropology, having distanced itself from its previous close associations with colonialism, has become a leading exponent of anti-eurocentrism centrism (but not necessarily of ethnocentrism per se) and can scarcely engage in such critiques without running foul of some of its own normative presuppositions. what resources then, can critiques of power that transcend the putative boundaries imposed by (cultural) anthropology draw on? this is an important question for any project of critical cosmopolitanism. i suggest that we might well look to alternative constructions of cultural theory that trace their lineage through a humanist tradition and which are conceived as a source of critique. to do so, however, is to go very much against a highly influential trend in the academy which has seen a distinct ‘anti-humanist orthodoxy’ holding sway for some time (good 2001, p. 6). at the same time, this orthodoxy has been instrumental in promoting the reification and glorification of group identity – whether on the basis of race, colour, gender, class, religion, nation, linguistic community or any number of other categories which have emerged as manifestations of group essentialism, strenuously opposed to universalist essentialism.8 8 there are some interesting ideas about ‘strategic essentialism’ which emerge from gayatri chakravorty spivak’s work in which she effectively argues for the political necessity of invoking group essentialism for example, in the pursuit of feminist causes (spivak 1993). there is no reason, however, why an equally 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 this approach may be called ‘culturalism’, a term which for present purposes captures the general mind-set characteristic of the ‘cultural turn’ in the human sciences and which stands opposed to universalizing tendencies, or at least those emanating from europe or ‘the west’. but for all the scathing critiques that culturalists have mounted of the ‘eurocentric mind’ and its construction of ‘others’, culturalism depends above all on the construction of otherness, and very often with strong exoticist underpinnings. for without group identities based on a differentiating concept such as ‘culture’, we can scarcely have the category of ‘other’ at all. i next consider the concept of culture more specifically in relation to humanism, looking at both critiques of humanism as well as more supportive observations and arguments. culture and humanism the currency of the word ‘humanism’ in arnold’s time was almost as recent as that of the word ‘culture’ (at least in anything much more than an agricultural sense). but as with ‘culture’, ‘humanism’ emerged as a short-hand for a complex of ideas associated with the renaissance (another nineteenth century term) that coalesced around the notion of ‘an essential humanity unconditioned by time, place or circumstance’, something that is ‘everywhere and always the same’ and which contains an inherent rationality and dignity independent of particular theological underpinnings (davies 2008, p. 24). in terms of today’s culturalist parlance, such a view would be denounced as a wholly untenable universalist ‘pretension’ or ‘conceit’; one which is tainted at its core not just with any old form of ethnocentrism but a supremely distasteful and arrogant form – eurocentrism; imbued with a laughable if not pathetic faith in reason and dressing up its gross subjectivities in the garb of objectivity through which it masquerades as the touchstone of ‘the good’ for all people(s). all these crimes of humanist thought are seen as typical of nineteenth century liberal ideas, and certainly quite specific to the european historical/cultural context in which they arose. indeed, tony davies says that the idea of an essential humanity is a ‘nineteenth century anachronism’, one which remains ‘deeply ingrained in contemporary self-consciousness and everyday common sense, so deeply that it requires a conscious effort, every time someone appeals to ‘human nature’ or the ‘human condition’, to recall how recent such notions are, politically strategic form of universal essentialism cannot also be justified. this is suggested in paul gilroy’s work (see especially gilroy 2000). but for an interesting critique of gilroy see robotham (2005). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 37 how specific to a particular history, location and point of view, and how very odd it would seem, in cultures historically or ethnologically unlike our own, to separate out and privilege ‘man’ in this way.’ (ibid., p. 25). davies’ claim, the language in which it is couched (including the epithet ‘anachronism’), and the assumptions on which it is based, constitute an exemplar of ‘cultural turnism’. the irony is that in making this claim, davies uses as a foil an anthropological notion of ‘culture’ (and hence ‘cultures’) based on an idea of particularity and specificity that is itself, according to his own logic irrevocably tied to a particular time and place, having also arisen in the late nineteenth century in response to certain developments then. but there is no conscious effort made to recall this. nor is there any consideration of a broad history of ideas which turns up cognate ideas about ‘humanity’ and ‘human nature’ in other times and other places. let us take, for example, thucydides’ preface to his famous text which clearly expresses the hope that his account of the peloponnesian war may be judged useful to those wishing to understand the past since, human nature being what it is, similar events are bound to occur again (thucydides 1972, i, 48). stoic thought in both the greek and roman worlds was steeped in notions of an essential humanity. well before thucydides and the stoics, and on the other side of the eurasian continent, confucian humanism emphasized the link between virtue and humanity attained only by a process of cultivation (see, generally, tu 1998; cua 1991). interestingly, a contemporary movement in china calls for a version of new humanism specifically to counter the ‘new liberalist’ logic of global capitalism which purports to value human freedom, but which is committed only to the freedom of capitalism (li 2008). another version of humanism has been found in the medieval islamic world of scholarship and learning where openness to new ideas also saw cultivation of the intellect as a valued activity (goodman 2003). this does not mean that all humanist ideas are the same. their expression in different times and places would certainly resonate with local, contextual factors giving rise to many variations on the common themes. even so, these brief examples make a nonsense of claims about the (european) specificity and particularity of ideas to do with human nature and humanity as universal categories. another obvious counter to the claim that humanism is merely a 19th century anachronism with a specificity rooted in the particularities of that time is the fact that although the word may not have been in common usage before then, the emergence of ideas underpinning the concept in european political and social thought spanned several centuries, beginning with 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the renaissance and achieving pride of place in enlightenment thought (feher 1991, p. 183). indeed, ‘a new, self-consciously critical attitude toward prevailing cultural practices and institutions’ (ibid., emphasis added) is often regarded as the defining characteristic of the enlightenment. ever since then, however, it seems that humanism has itself been under attack from almost every other critical discourse (surber 1998, p. 24). in the contemporary period, ferenc feher argues that humanism is the main target of deconstructive philosophical criticism on several related grounds. first, it positions ‘man’ as ‘the philosophical axis of world interpretation’. second, it functions as an oppressive universal, largely because this humanist ‘man’ is actually ‘identical with the european man who embarked on the project of remaking the world in the image of the only progressive arrangement he was familiar with as well as prepared to recognize: nineteenth-century europe’, a scenario which forcibly blended all differences or persecuted, and sometimes exterminated, those who could not or would not be assimilated. it is therefore not merely ethnocentric in a peculiarly european way, it is also regarded as racist (ibid., pp. 184-85). or so the story goes. but as feher further notes, key liberal humanist figures such as kant actually opposed colonization, believing that those who purported to be civilizing the primitives through such means were acting out a ‘shameful parody of the enlightenment.’ for kant, emancipation could only be achieved through one’s own deeds or self-tutelage (i.e., self-cultivation), and could not be imposed by others (ibid., p. 184), while for arnold, the true barbarians were the english aristocracy. in addition, it is hard to see how a set of ideas supporting the unity of humankind can be branded as racist by those seeking the conceptual separation of the species on the basis of a thoroughgoing cultural determinism which is every bit as insidious as the biological determinism that underpinned european racism of the nineteenth century and which it purportedly displaced. more generally, if humanism – of whatever variety – places an excessive emphasis on individualism within a universalistic framework, it is no less a problem than any theory that places an excessive emphasis on groupism, of whatever variety. the question is how we can construct a viable theory of culture that is not positioned firmly on one side or another of the dichotomy and which can support a viable cosmopolitan project that recognizes both the particular and the universal. in approaching this question, we look again at the relationship between culture, identity and political community and a possible way out of the ontological either/or trap. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 39 from cultural relativism to cosmopolitan pluralism although both universalist and relativist approaches have tendencies to absolutism, each mode makes an essential contribution to normative theory in that we need to take account of both the general and the particular, of sameness and difference. we may well see ‘otherness’ as constituted by difference, but this does not mean that we cannot also see the self in the other. this suggests the need for a pluralist synthesis attuned to the realities of human existence, and co-existence, and the multiplicity of experiences, values, interests and needs that subsist not only between groups and collectivities but within them as well, for the tendency to homogenize insiders as much as outsiders – a strong tendency in communitarian theory – creates other kinds of problems. it also suggests that we need to move away from dichotomous thinking towards more of a dialectic mode, enabling an ongoing conversation rather than closure around one or other of the oppositions. let us consider this in relation to the cosmopolitan/communitarian divide in normative theory. in strongly culturalist versions of communitarianism, the community is generally defined by ‘its culture’ which includes its own particular moral universe. the normative thrust of communitarianism therefore tends to relativism (in a cultural sense) and to the adoption of an oppositional stance against cosmopolitan claims about universal moral principles.9 for a communitarian, the notion of the ‘community of humankind’ is practically an oxymoron since communities are by definition a discrete portion of the whole. in contrast, cosmopolitanism transcends, but does not negate, the local and affirms the validity of certain universalist principles in such matters as basic human rights. this does not necessarily settle what is ‘basic’ in the way of rights and what is secondary or supplementary, but it provides a minimum framework for universalist claims. neither approach need lead to a form of absolutism, either by denying the relevance of the social or cultural world(s) in which humans actually live their lives or by insisting on such a radical incommensurability of unique cultural worlds that a notion of common humanity becomes impossible. but without some concessions to pluralism from a universalist perspective, or to minimum standards of moral behaviour from a more relativist one, both do tend strongly towards absolutism. to preserve what is valuable in the concept of culture from 9 at least one communitarian rejects cultural relativism as an obstacle to creating moral dialogues across national lines which may in turn provide a source for global moral principles (see etzioni 1997). 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 cultural absolutism conceived in either particularist or universalist terms, a different approach is needed. in the space between the opposing poles of virtually any dichotomy it is possible to construct a middle ground. in terms of the present discussion, that ground is essentially pluralist. because it stands for ‘the many’ rather ‘the one’ – pluralism is sometimes mistakenly equated with relativism. but as one leading scholar of global politics notes, an ‘engaged pluralism’ recognizes that although concrete phenomena are susceptible to competing explanations, this does not equate to an ‘anything goes’ approach nor does it mean that in the absence of true foundational standards, no standards are possible at all. (kratochwil 2003, p. 126). with respect to culture and normative theory there is, in practice, a middle ground on a range of issues that is essential to avoiding the repugnant consequences of absolutist forms of both universalism and relativism. few communitarians would support the custom of human sacrifice, even if it was endorsed by the ‘cultural community’ within which it was practiced. and it is hard to imagine that any would want to claim that the death camps of nazi germany could be justified by reference to the unique moral universe of nazism. on the other hand, universalists would be hard put to justify one, and only one, vision of ‘the good’ universally applicable across time and space, especially when it comes to deciding who has the authority to define ‘the good’ and impose it on others. due attention to the plurality of values that emerge in different settings must therefore play a part in any viable normative theory alongside more general principles. radical approaches to either universalism or relativism, by attempting to provide clear and unambiguous positions, lead only to dogmatism and closure around a rigid dichotomy. in contrast with either form of absolutism, pluralism does not provide a site from which definitive answers can always be delivered. it is better characterized as an untidy meeting place of contesting ideas, lacking firm foundations for certainties (such as those delivered from the opposing poles), where boundaries (such as they are) remain fuzzy, and where cutoff points for tolerance of this or that practice always require a measure of judgment according to both context and general principles. a normative position based on this approach is best described as cosmopolitan pluralism. it is cosmopolitan in its breadth, because it incorporates humanity as a whole, but pluralistic in character because it both acknowledges and values the diversity within it. it lies between the conventional cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 41 understandings of a rigid universalism requiring uniformity on the one hand, and an incoherent relativism on the other, and repudiates the dogmatic elements that characterize both. above all, it is dynamic, allowing for the contingent as opposed to the absolute, and acknowledging ‘culture’ as endlessly shifting and changing, and certainly never fixed permanently in any particular shape or form. it is capable of recognizing the importance of specific, local circumstances and socializing influences on individual human development while refusing to accept culturally determined outcomes. it does not rely on an evolutionary notion of progress suggested by traditional liberal philosophy, but neither does it preclude the possibility of making life better for those whose lives are blighted by poverty, violence, and injustice. reconceptualizing culture in the ‘cosmopolitan turn’ anthropological conceptualizations of culture have helped to generate many insights about the value of difference and have served as an important counter to ethnocentricity – especially of the ‘euro’ variety. they have also contributed to insights concerning the problems and pitfalls of asserting universalist notions of ‘the good’ in the face of competing conceptions derived from different social contexts. in the process, however, the dangers of homogenization implicit in universalist conceptions of the good have sometimes simply been transferred to the partial entities known as ‘cultures’ which themselves may contain a plurality of interests as well as conceptions of the good, often emanating from differential placement in hierarchies of power. the notion of culture as always denoting difference has its problems as well, for culture understood in this way tends to diminish dynamic properties in favour of those which are fixed and timeless – thus constituting localized essences. contemporary anthropologists are now among those who endorse a more dynamic approach to avoid such problems. the following quotations illustrate a number of difficulties that anthropologists have identified in relation to their ‘master concept’ and which are directly relevant to the concerns of this article: cultural relativism provides an inaccurate set of descriptions of moral pluralism since it wields a misguided conception of culture. … [cultural relativists] seem to hold to a nineteenth-century notion of culture as discrete and homogeneous ... their relativism is predicated upon bounded conceptions of linguistic and cultural systems, but it falls apart in 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 contexts of hybridity, creolisation, intermixture and the overlapping of political traditions. (wilson 1997, p. 9). another provides a similar critique of the discipline’s emphasis on difference: culture is used selectively for that which seems most salient to the outsider, namely difference. … [it] is used increasingly in public debate to define an arena for contesting discourses on “identity”. under current conditions, such discourses provide an extremely fertile field for political entrepreneurship; they allow leaders and spokesmen to claim they are speaking on behalf of others; they allow the manipulation of media access; and they encourage the strategic construction of polarizing debates that translate into battles of influence. such battles create hegemony and reduce options; they disempower followers and reduce the diversity of voices. (barth 1995, p. 65). another powerful argument is that the anthropological replacement of biological difference with cultural difference has simply returned racism to its point of departure since it asserts, once again, ‘the absolute, impenetrable, untranslatable character of different ways of being.’(finkielkraut 1995, pp. 77, 80). on this view, cultural relativism joined with an insider/outsider dichotomy represents not the denial of racist categories of human difference, but rather their reaffirmation under a new banner. stewart hall also observes that biological racism and cultural differentialism constitute not two separate (and opposed) systems but rather two registers of racism (quoted in moore, pandian & kosek 2003, p. 27) while anthropologist adam kuper notes that contemporary cultural anthropologists repudiate the popular notion that differences are ‘natural’, but goes on to point out that ‘a rhetoric that places great emphasis on difference and identity is not best placed to counter these views.’ indeed, the insistence that radical differences can be observed between peoples serves to sustain them (kuper 2000, pp. 239-40). what emerges from these various critiques of the culture concept10 10 there are highly relevant critiques from other disciplines as well which there is insufficient space to explore. for one insightful contribution from human geography see mitchell (1995 pp. 102-116). is that its conceptualization needs to give more prominence to its dynamic properties, especially in terms of the fact that change and transformation takes place through something called culture. the culture concept therefore requires restating as a highly complex and contingent process rather than an objective, concrete ‘thing’ that defines the foundations for political cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 43 communities and/or values systems, and certainly not a thing that possesses people. as a process which is continuous, ‘culture’ leads neither to a final endpoint, nor is it to be equated with ‘progress’. in other words, cultural change can obviously lead to both negative and positive outcomes and therefore has no necessary telos. from a humanist and cosmopolitan perspective, however, there is always a prospect that things can be changed for the better and that critical intellectual engagement is essential to the task. for any form of study that deals with relationships between groups it is imperative to understand that the capacity to interact with other humans, whether they are members of our own or other communities, lies in the dynamics of culture itself. cultural differences between individuals and communities notwithstanding, the fact that we are cultural creatures in the first place implies the ability to learn to navigate around new and different situations and to extend the capacity for inter-subjective communication well beyond one’s own immediate social, cultural and political contexts to a cosmopolitan one. viewed in this way, it is not ‘culture’ that throws up barriers to understanding and interaction, as assumed in notions of ‘cultural incommensurability’, but ‘culture’ that actually enables the barriers to be broken down. this resonates with the imagining of open social spaces, or ‘world openness’ as envisaged by proponents of a new ‘critical cosmopolitanism’ such as gerard delanty, who also see culture ‘as an on-going process of construction as opposed to being embodied in a particular way of life’ (delanty 2006, p. 31). conclusion students of the humanities and social sciences are called on to deal with a highly pluralistic world in which both similarities and differences abound within local, national, regional and global spheres. it is commonsense to adopt an approach that is sensitive to cultural, historical and other contextual factors. this is good practice from both a methodological and normative point of view, leading to informed interpretation and explanation. in an increasingly globalized world, however, it is impossible not to make value judgements about problems and issues in locations other than our ‘own’ national or cultural spaces. the real problem for the study of politics and international relations, and for any other disciplines or fields of study which have to engage with issues that cross any kind of putative cultural boundary is not how to avoid making value judgements about those who occupy what may 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 seem to be a different set of subjectivities, but how to make value judgements that are wellinformed, reflexive and which take into account of both general principles about the human condition as well as the particularities of any given context. a viable project of critical cosmopolitanism, which incorporates pluralism as a key feature of human existence, requires redescribing culture as a highly complex and contingent process rather than an objective, concrete ‘thing’ that defines the foundations for particularistic communities. in practical terms, this means the promotion of shared cultural norms at a global level in the interest of enhancing humanitarian principles and practices, and to which a robust conceptualization of humanity is also central. it is worth emphasizing again, however, that this by no means suggests that we dispense with the insights of anthropology. rather, i wish to emphasize the extent to which particularist (anthropological) and universalist (humanist) approaches both have something to offer in the continuing project of conceptualizing ‘culture’ in a world which is likely to remain irredeemably pluralistic while also becoming increasingly cosmopolitan11 . references american anthropological association, executive board 1947, ‘statement on human rights’ american anthropologist, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 539-543. american anthropological association, committee on human rights 1999, ‘declaration on anthropology and human rights’, adopted june 1999. 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http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/humanrts.htm%20accessed%2023/8/2011� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 45 davies, t. 2008, humanism, 2nd edn, routledge, london. delanty, g 2006, ‘the cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory’, british journal of sociology, vol. 57, issue 1, pp. 25-47. etzioni, a. 1997, ‘the end of cross-cultural relativism’, alternatives, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 177-189. escobar, a. 1993, ‘the limits of reflexivity: politics in anthropology’s post-writing culture era’, journal of anthropological research, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 377-391. feher, f. 1991, ‘between relativism and fundamentalism: hermeneutics as europe’s mainstream political and moral tradition’ in e. deutsch (ed), culture and modernity: east-west philosophical perspectives, university of hawai’i press, honolulu. finkielkraut, a. 1995, the defeat of the mind, columbia university press, new york. foucault, m. 1980, power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 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cultural turn’, presented at the annual conference of the australian political studies 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 association, macquarie university, sydney, 27-30 september, 17 pp. http://www.pol.mq.edu.au/apsa/papers/refereed%20papers/lawson.pdf lawson, s. 2011, ‘nationalism and the politics of culture in a globalizing world’ in d. halikiopolou and s. vasilopolou (eds), nationalism and globalisation, routledge, abingdon, uk. mitchell, d. 1995, ‘there’s no such thing as culture: towards a reconceptualization of the idea of culture in geography’, transactions of the institute of british geographers, new series, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 102-116. mulhern, f. 2000, culture/metaculture, routledge, london. reeves, j. 2004, culture and international relations, routledge, london. robotham, d. 2005, ‘cosmopolitanism and planetary humanism: the strategic universalism of paul gilroy, south atlantic quarterly, vol. 104, no. 3, pp. 561-582. spivak, g 1993, outside in the teaching machine, routledge, london. stocking, g. 1963, ‘mathew arnold, e.b. tylor, and the uses of invention’, american anthropologist, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 783-799. stocking, g. 1992, race, culture, and evolution: essays in the history of anthropology, university of chicago press, chicago. surber, j. 1998, culture and critique: an introduction to the critical discourses of cultural studies, westview, boulder. thucydides 1972, history of the peloponnesian war. penguin, london. tu w. 1998, humanity and self-cultivation: essays in confucian thought, cheng & tsui co., boston ma. tylor, e. 1987, ‘the science of culture’, reproduced in h. applebaum (ed.), perspectives in cultural anthropology, state university of new york, albany ny. west, c. 1993, ‘the new cultural politics of difference’ in s. during (ed.), the cultural studies reader, routledge, london. williams, r. 1976, keywords, london, fontana. wilson, r. 1997, human rights, culture and context: anthropological perspectives, pluto press, london. http://www.pol.mq.edu.au/apsa/papers/refereed%20papers/lawson.pdf� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 97 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia social capital formation among turkish women gizem arat ankara provincial directorate of family and social policies arzu icağasıoğlu-çoban başkent university gonca polat başkent university abstract the purpose of the current study was to identify turkish women’s social capital formation. this study consisted of 170 women with low ses residing closer to shantytowns. the authors performed the logistic regression analysis to examine the social capital formation (civic engagement, trust, social participation, and social networks) of women in terms of six variables (age, educational level, employment and marital status, homeownership, community centers, and the length of stay in the same neighborhood) in four different community centers in ankara, turkey. logistic regression results suggest that the length of stay in the same neighborhood was associated both with staying in touch with neighbors (social networks) and trust in municipal service provision (trust), and women’s educational level was associated with voting (civic engagement) and the utilization of municipal services (social participation). further research should be conducted by comparing men’s and women’s social capital creation by adding other variables. introduction social capital can be seen as integrating social networks, trust, and social participation that lead individuals to take actions collectively, such as joining local groups, or voting to solve problems (lowndes 2004). putnam defines social capital as “the features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate co-ordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (putnam 1995, p.67). with regards to developing and using social capital, there are some differences among women and men (coulthard, walker, & morgan 2002; hall 1999; lowndes 2004; putnam 1995). with respect to trust and reciprocity, first, women are slightly more likely than men to know and trust their neighbors. second, 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 women are more likely than men to stay in touch with their relatives and friends with regards to social networks (coulthard, walker, & morgan 2002). there are six variables that affect women’s social capital creation according to rupasingha, goetz, and freshwater (2006). these are: a. education there is a strong relationship between education and social capital performance in the literature (putnam 1995; helliwell & putnam 1999; glaeser, laibson & sacerdote 2002). according to putnam (1995), education is significantly correlated with social trust and civil engagement. rupasingha, goetz, and freshwater (2006) stated that higher educational status of individuals can result in civic engagement in communities. b. employment status holding a job can lead individuals to socialize more, depending on the job type (glaeser, laibson & sacerdote 2002). for example, a woman working outside the home can go to the movies with friends from her work place which may depict that her social circle consists of friends from her work place rather than neighbors or relatives. c. homeownership there is a strong relationship between social capital and homeownership (glaeser, laibson & sacerdote 2002). dipasquale & glaeser (1999) stated that since homeowners do not usually intend to move out, they will try to improve their neighborhood by joining in local activities. d. age older people are more likely to engage in civil activities (putnam 1995), such as joining non-profit organizations. for example, older people who are grandparents are more likely to support the development of young people and may also donate money to improve the circumstances of children and young people. e. changing role of women women are increasingly in the paid workforce; therefore, they are less likely to seek to create social capital (alesina & la ferrara 2000). women, who are housewives and mothers, tend to actively participate in social activities in their local area (putnam 1995). f. marriage and family there are some differences in participation levels between married and single people (putnam 1995). ‘single people are significantly less trusting and less engaged in civic activities than married people’ (rupasingha, goetz, & freshwater 2006, p.92). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 99 community centers in turkey the predominant role of community centers in turkey is to strengthen the quality of life of families in collaboration with voluntary and non-governmental organizations, and social services (çengelci 1993). community centers help people, groups, and societies enhance problem solving capacities (koçyıldırım 2001) and ‘resolve common problems’ (lowndes 2004, p.47). there are 84 community centers in turkey. most community centers are located in shantytowns, while the rest are located in developing regions (toplum merkezleri listesi 2013). the target group of community centers to meet the objective of enhancing the well-being of economic deprived families, societies, and communities generally consists of women (dalyanoğlu 2007) since they are predominantly responsible for the raising of children and managing household tasks. this role has been attributed to women due to the patriarchal nature of society where women are mainly subordinate to men (mahmud 2003; scott-samuel 2009). in such societies, men work outside, while women work in the home; therefore, women’s social networks are limited to family and neighbors. as a result, it is easier to reach women first to provide services on health, nutrition, child development, and family planning. in addition to these services, community centers aim at teaching women and children their rights and how to benefit from these (dalyanoğlu 2007). through the help and support of community centers, women are more likely to go out and engage with other people. additonally, women start to notice the resources around them in terms of opportunities for developing social capital, such as knitting clothes and selling them in kermises (a fundraising fair). consequently, women become more financially independent and socialize with other people apart from their neighbors and relatives. the aim of this study unfortunately there is still a paucity of gender studies on social capital in literature (fox & gershman 2000; kilby 2002; molinas 1998; molyneux 2002; norton 2001). moreover, among quantitative studies, there is a lack of studies on informal social capital (pichler & wallace 2004). studies aimed at exploring women’s oppression in terms of social capital (e.g. studies of entrepreneurship and trust) have been seen as tackling an important issue recently in turkey (çakır 2008, özen-kutanış & bayraktaroğlu 2003; özen-kutanış & hancı 2004; navir 2008; özdemir 2010, yağcı & bener 2005; yetim 2002). studies focusing on turkish women’s political participation are extremely rare (kasapoğlu & özerkmen 2011). however, 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 the studies which do exist have not focused on the measurement of social capital creation among turkish women in community centers. thus, the aim of this study was to examine the measurement of women’s social capital formation among women involved in community centers. this study, focusing on four different community centers in turkey, explores the dimensions of social participation, social networks, civic engagement, and trust in relation to age, educational level, employment status, marital status, and homeownership (rupasingha, goetz, & freshwater, 2006), and the length of stay in a neighborhood. methodology participants the sample consisted of 170 women attending four community centers (mamak, altindag, golbasi, and natoyolu) in the capital of turkey, ankara. such centers provide social services to economically deprived women and families. these community centers and participants’ apartments were located close to shantytowns. the present study took place from september 2009 to may 2010. it was approved by the institutional review board (irb) of social sciences at başkent university. before the data collection instruments were administered, a brief explanation of the aim of the study and the measuring instruments were provided to each director of community centers and written permission was sought to conduct the study within the center. subsequently, informed consent was obtained from each participant. measures questions in the data collection instrument were drawn from the social capital question bank which is based on the ons survey matrix (november 2001). this showed what type of information on social capital was being collected in various surveys, such as british crime survey (2001), health survey of england (2000), home office citizenship survey (2001), and british household panel survey (2000). the questions were gathered in the survey matrix formed by blaxter, poland, and curran (2001). the question bank was translated into turkish by the authors. the first section of the questionnaire was related to demographic characteristics of the participants (e.g., age, gender, educational status, marital status, employment status etc.). the next section was related to social participation regarding the utilization of municipal services cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 101 (e.g., have you received any municipal services because of problems regarding your neighborhood etc.) while the third section was related to social support and social relationships regarding neighbors (e.g., how often do you stay in touch with the neighbors, in an emergency, will you call your neighbor/s to help you etc.). the fourth section was related to civic engagement regarding voting (e.g., have you voted in the last election etc.). the final section was related to trust in municipal service provision (e.g., to what extent do you trust the municipal service provision). data analysis a rich descriptive picture arose from a descriptive analysis of the original ordinal data and a summary of the demographic data is presented. the spss software 17.0 was used for the statistical analysis, using logistic regression analysis. a p value of lower than .05 was accepted to be a statistically significant indicator. for logistic regression analysis, the variables were converted into dummy variables. questions related to demographic characteristics included gender (0=females vs. 1=males); age (0=15 through 43 years vs. 1=44 through 73); employment status (0=unemployed vs. 1=employed); educational status (0=primary school or less vs. 1= further education); homeownership (0=rent vs. 1=own); the length of stay in neighborhood (0=between 1 and 10 years vs. 1= between 11 and 20 years); trust in municipal services (0= very little vs. 1=very much); voting (0= no vs. 1= yes). results demographic characteristics of women in this study, women from four different community centers participated. of the participants, 26.0% (n=44) attended in mamak, 25.0% (n=43) attended in altindag, 21.0 % (n=35) attended in golbasi, and 28.0% (n=48) attended in natoyolu community center. all of these community centers were located in less developed regions where people with low ses reside. most of the women were married (89.0%) while 5.0% of women were single, 6.0% of women were widows. ninetytwo percent (92.0%) of women had children whereas only 8.0% of women do not have any children. the mean age of women was 26 (sd=1.5) and the mean duration of marriage is 12 years (sd=3.77). the minimum number of children was 1 and the maximum number of children was 8. the mean number of children was 2. 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 when the educational level of women was investigated, 8.0% of the respondents were found to be illiterate, 5.0% of women could read and write, 42.0% of women were elementary school graduates, 14.0% of women were middle school graduates, 26.0% of women were high school graduates, and 6.0% of women were college graduates. in terms of participation in the workforce, only 5.0% of women worked outside home, while 95.0 % of women were only housewives. social capital creation among women binary logistic regression using the enter method helped to identify which of the selected correlates was most important in the prediction of women’s social capital creation. the logistic regression model included a total of 7 predictors (age, community centers, educational level, marital status, employment status, the length of stay in neighborhood, and homeownership) related to women’s social capital formation (the utilization of municipal services, neighbors, voting, and trust in municipal services). furthermore, the exp(b) statistic, or odds ratio, was analyzed in the present study. it depicts the increase or decrease in odds of being classified in an outcome category when the predictor variable increases by a unit (tabachnick & fidell 1996). table 1 regression coefficients for the utilization of municipal services predictor b se wald df p exp(b) age .070 .574 .474 1 .062 .517 educational level .048 .465 .508=] 1 .024* 1.435 marital status .041 .887 .008 1 .063 .041 employment status .682 .822 .687 1 .407 322 the length of stay in the same neighborhood .245 .448 .072 1 .150 .907 homeownership .116 .440 .041 1 .126 1.129 constant -.893 .707 .617 1 .053 .059 *p<.05 the wald statistics and accompanying significance levels reveal that women’s educational level was significant in predicting the utilization of municipal services at the p < 0.05 level, controlling for the influences of the other predictors in the model (wald=.508, p=0.024). the odds ratio was 1.435, showing that for those with a high educational level, they were almost cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 103 43 percent times more likely to utilize municipal services to solve their problems (exp(b) = 1.435). other variables were not statistically significant predictors of women’s utilization of municipal services to solve their problems. table 2 regression coefficients for neighbors predictor b se wald df p exp(b) age .668 .541 .320 1 .398 .581 educational level -.388 .537 .522 1 .470 .678 marital status -.241 .151 .046 1 .471 .468 employment status -.871 .214 .571 1 .224 .516 the length of stay in the same neighborhood .662 .544 .481 1 .045* 1.783 homeownership .622 .555 .254 1 .263 .516 constant 2.228 .230 3.279 1 .070 6.280 *p<0.05 in this study, the length of stay in the same neighborhood significantly predicted their social supports as neighbors (wald=8.443, p=.004). as the length of stay in the same neighborhood increases, women were almost 78 times more likely to stay in touch with their neighbors (exp(b) = 1.783). other variables were not statistically significant predictors of women’s relationship with their neighbors. table 3 regression coefficients for voting predictor b se wald df p exp(b) age .114 .085 1.055 1 .304 .304 educational level .303 .508 .356 1 .045* 1.503 marital status .305 .812 .586 1 .108 .668 employment status -.209 11.26 .034 1 .853 .812 the length of stay in the same neighborhood -.029 .520 .003 1 .895 .971 homeownership .401 .503 .635 1 .425 .493 constant .543 .908 .358 1 .550 .721 in the current study, women’s educational level predicted women’s political participation defined as voting (wald=.356, p=.0045). women with a high educational level were almost 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 50 times more likely to vote (exp(b) = 1.503). other variables were not statistically significant predictors of women’s political participation. table 4 regression coefficients for trust in municipal service provision predictor b se wald df p exp(b) age .763 .531 .063 1 .151 .144 educational level .185 .343 .290 1 .090 .203 marital status .637 .774 .245 1 .411 .890 employment status -.456 .578 .019 1 .313 .451 the length of stay in the same neighborhood .93 .357 .210 1 .026* 1.277 homeownership .244 .337 .526 1 .468 .314 constant .027 .123 .508 1 .212 .358 *p<0.05 the variable, the length of stay in the same neighborhood, was the only significant predictor of women’s trust in municipal service provision in the logistic regression analysis (wald =.210, p = 0.026). as the length of stay in the same neighborhood increases, women were 12 percent more likely to trust in municipal service provision (exp (b) = 1.277). discussion this study was conducted to measure the variables (age, homeownership, employment status, educational level, marital status, and the length of stay in neighborhood) with respect to social capital creation (social participation, social networks, civic engagement, and trust) among turkish women (n=170) attending four community centers in ankara, capital of turkey. women’s social capital tends to be more tied to informal social circles (lowndes 2004), such as neighbors. indeed, neighbors are often part of the extended family in shantytowns in turkey (gökçe 1993). consistent with gökçe’s study (1993), the length of stay in the same neighborhood predicted women’s relationship with their neighbors in the current study. based on the current study findings, as women’s length of stay in the same neighborhood increases, they are more likely to stay in touch with their neighbors. based on the observations of the authors, participants remained in contact with their neighbors on a regular basis if they lived in the same neighborhood more than 10 years. these neighbors are likely cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 105 to include close family relatives, such as aunts and parents in such areas. in turkish culture, there is a popular russian proverb that says “don’t buy the house, but the neighborhood”. this saying resonates with the findings of this current study. it is not surprising that women’s educational attainment was strongly related to voting (civic engagement) and the utilization of municipal services (social participation) in the present study. women with further education are more likely to engage in politics than women with primary education or less. consistent with the findings of this current study, losindilo, mussa, and akarro (2010) stated that tanzanian women who have a higher level of education are more likely to vote and engage in social participation and coley and sum (2012) found that both men and women in america with a higher level of education were more likely to vote and to use municipal services. the present study confirmed that as women’s length of stay in the same neighborhood level increases, women are more likely to trust in municipal service provision. this could be a result of voting. since women’s political participation increases, they may stay in touch with municipal service providers more often to improve their neighborhood’s condition. based on the authors’ observations, almost all of the neighborhoods consist of many malls, restaurants, parks, schools, and playgrounds for children within walking distance. even if these are far away from the places where they live, public transport makes them easily accessible. people who live in the same neighborhood for many years are more likely enjoy the options that municipalities provide (leyden 2003). limitations of the study in this study, certain limits should be acknowledged in both interpreting the results and in planning future investigation. first, the sample size is not representative of turkey as a whole, since the study was conducted only in ankara, the capital of turkey. secondly, the binary logistic regression analysis allowed statistically significant variables to emerge but at the same time, it minimized the opportunity to identify more subtle influences in women’s creation of social capital. finally, more empirical studies using mixed methods are needed to compare social capital creation among men and women. 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 conclusion this study is significant because it is one of the few which explores women’s formation of social capital. it attempts to go beyond a descriptive analysis to identify the relationship of age, education, employment, and marital status, and homeownership, and the length of stay in neighborhood to social capital formation by women in four different community centers in turkey. the findings highlight that women’s educational attainment and the length of stay in the same neighborhood affect their social capital creation as measured by trust in municipal service provision, the utilization of municipal services, social network, and social participation. references alesina, a. & la ferrara, e. 2000, 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published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia an important message welcome to this special edition of cosmopolitan civil societies e journal. the focus of this issue is measuring social impact. the topic has become one of increasing concern within the community sector as government and corporate funding bodies demand ever more detailed evidence of value achieved in return for the funding provided. this demand has now gone far beyond the traditional need for accountability metrics. it is not just a matter of whether the money is appropriately acquitted, but whether it actually makes a difference, and if so, to whom. this is no easy question to answer. are we talking about assisting a specific identified group of clients? or more generally, providing support to the wider community? are we talking about the impact of a single program? or of the organisation as a whole? or indeed of a whole industry? some would argue that the attempt to measure impact is pointless, and indeed dangerous if it leads to an ever increasing bureaucratic specification of what is valued. social impact is not the same as economic impact, and it is dangerous to try to measure one in terms of the other. with social impact we seek measures of quality of life, not dollars saved. often social impact is diffuse and long term, and as such not easily amenable to any metric. however, as the adage goes, if you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it, and ultimately there is no justification for allocating resources to it. so increasingly there is a call, not just by funding bodies, but by the public at large, for a better evidence base for assessing the value of the social impact of the service or event in question. it is therefore becoming more imperative to develop rigorous measures of social impact, both for planning purposes, but also as a means of political justification and advocacy of a policy, and more locally as a justification for continued resources. this special issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal is concerned with issues of social impact in the australian context. however, the reader should find the material as relevant in most other jurisdictions where there is a call for better measurement. all the papers in this issue arose out of a special seminar/ workshop held by the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre of the university of technology, sydney   ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 (ccs) in 2011. an invitation was extended to academics and practitioners alike, and some 100 people attended. the morning was devoted to a series of papers, several of which are presented here. the afternoon was devoted to small group workshops designed to identify current issues in measuring social impact within civil society organisations in sydney, and explore potential solutions to those issues. in preparation for the day’s workshop a small survey of civil society organisations was commissioned, and the overall findings presented at the opening of the seminar/ workshop. thus, the first paper in this special issue is “everyone’s story counts” by the commissioned author of that work, dr barbara bloch. this paper served to frame the day’s proceedings, but also provides a brief summary of the results of the workshop groups in the afternoon. using a brief literature review and the results of some 20 community sector interviews as well as the proceedings of the workshop itself, barbara bloch presents a series of challenging questions that need to be resolved in the search for good social impact measures. the second paper is by a research team from ccs, headed by dr melissa edwards, and funded by a uts partnership grant. this team worked with surf life saving australia, a large iconic community based organisation to develop measures of social impact. this paper reports the first stage of that enquiry with an analysis of a series of focus groups from queensland, nsw, victoria and south australia. the aim of the project is to identify what kind of social impact the organisation has among its members and the wider community, apart from water safety. the third paper in this special issue then broadens the quest for social impact indices, this time in the context of the fishing industry in australia. the author, dr kate barclay, argues that while much progress has been made in assessing the environmental and economic sustainability of fisheries in australia, there has been scant attention to social sustainability of fishing communities impacted by recent changes to the industry. the fourth paper also looks to finding measures of wider community impact, this time of aboriginal communities, and using tools that allow control of the measurement process to remain within those communities. thus measurement and community planning are integrally related, and within the ownership of the community itself. this paper reports a project carried out by a team of nsw government researchers headed by bronwyn batten and kellyanne stanford.   cosmopolitan  civil  societies  journal,  vol.4,  no.3,  2012     iii   the final paper turns to the impact of a major event on the social life of an urban suburb. the team, including dr jason prior and dr giorgio blessi, examines the place of social capital in culture-led urban planning and development processes, and again, although in a different context and coming from a different discipline and a different industry, makes the same plea for better attention paid to the social impact of major events on the local community. the five papers in this special issue of cosmopolitan civil societies journal thus present an interesting and important message. we need to pay more attention to the social impact on local communities at every level, from the work of single community based organisations to major national industries and public cultural events. people matter, not as units in economic development, but as people who live and work in a place, whose well being matters. new ways of measuring social impact are emerging, but of course, much more research is needed to develop and embed these measures in the broader thinking of planners, funders and the general community. professor jenny onyx december 2012 140 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia i-witnessing; reflections on cosmopolitanism in kigali hilary yerbury university of technology, sydney abstract starting from the classic view of cosmopolitanism, this paper uses personal experiences gained during a fiveweek stay in rwanda with a family affected by the genocide to explore the disjuncts which emerge in trying to understand the concept. in this process of exploration, it considers conceptions of the guest, the stranger and what geertz terms the ‘cosmopolite’. taking a reflexive position, it explores what it means to be a witness to events in someone else’s life, with a focus on post-genocide reconciliation that took place in the family in january and february 2011. in this context, it introduces the notions of cosmopolitan curiosity (appiah) and cosmopolitan tolerance (beck) and finds each of them affected by structural imbalances which render them potentially inadequate in practice. the paper concludes that, from a reflexive point of view, an understanding of cosmopolitanism is a work in progress, and that it is much more difficult to sustain as a lived reality than it is as an abstraction. reading this paper the reader can approach this paper in one of two ways. whichever approach the reader adopts, the purpose of the paper is to explore theoretical and conceptual dimensions of cosmopolitanism through the author’s experiences in rwanda. the reader can begin below with the section entitled prologue, sharing something of the author’s experiences over a period of several weeks with a family in rwanda and then return to read the introduction and continue with the reflections on these experiences through the lens of cosmopolitanism; this reading conveys something of the tentative and personal nature of the reflections. or, the reader can continue here for a more structured reading. in this reading, the reader is introduced to louise, the rwandan woman whose wish for a witness to her personal reconciliation led to reflections on cosmopolitanism; and to the author who acted as this witness. the reader can know in advance that the prologue contains extracts from the author’s travel diary during a six-week stay in rwanda, and that these tell the story of the separate strands of her relationship with a rwandan woman of the same age, who had suffered during the genocide and had sought personal reconciliation which occurred during that stay; and who was active in civil society and had worked in building the post-colonial and post-genocide nation. the reader can then take a more removed approach to the exploration of the concept of cosmopolitanism. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 141 introduction early in january 2011, i arrived in kigali, the capital of rwanda. i was there to spend five weeks as a volunteer at the kigali institute of education’s centre for gender, culture and development and to carry out interviews with young activists to further my current research. i was to stay with a family. this accommodation had been arranged for me at third-hand by a young rwandan woman studying in canberra, a friend of a friend, who knew that the parents of one of her closest friends in kigali would be very happy to take in a visiting foreigner for a month or so. from a few emails and a telephone conversation before i left sydney, i learned that there were five daughters in the family, the oldest of whom had studied in south africa and the younger ones who would want to practice their english, that the father was a doctor, that the parents were francophone and that the house was close to kie. i imagined that i would use my ability to speak french to help bridge the cultural gaps between us and that my experience of living with a family in neighbouring burundi for three weeks the previous year had given me some insights into social relations. i had remarked to friends in sydney that it felt a little like going to stay with a pen-friend as a teenager. in that frame of mind, i arrived in the family intending to be a good guest, fitting in with family routines, speaking english with the younger daughters, describing life in australia in answer to questions and open to learning about daily life for an educated middle class family in kigali. my intentions did not exactly match those of louise, the mother of the family, a woman two years younger than me. on my first sunday with the family, on the fourth day after i had arrived, she asked me to promise her that i would do something. i had already made promises as a good guest – not to get up early but to stay in bed until an agreed time (when the hot water for washing would be brought) and to eat two thick slices of bread for breakfast instead of one – and so i agreed. i was caught off guard when she asked me to take on a responsibility – to be the witness for her and her family when i returned to sydney. introducing myself i am a woman in my early sixties, and for many years i have been an academic in australia, mostly in sydney. i grew up in small rural town in southwest england where my father’s family have lived for generations, working as dyers for the woollen mill and as gardeners. i was one of only two in the large extended family to finish high school and the only one to go to university. i chose my undergraduate degree, a joint honours degree in french and spanish, because its purpose was to train us to ‘become’ french (and spanish), so that we could ‘pass’, linguistically and culturally. as a young woman, i was very proud of the fact that i could easily be taken for an educated french woman. since my student days in france and spain in the 1960s, i have been a passionate advocate of democratic processes. when i came to sydney in the mid 142 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 1970s, my skills and experiences were not valued and, like many migrants, i re-invented myself, first as a public librarian with a concern for freedom of access to information and then as an academic in the emerging field of information studies, developing a professional agenda that switched the focus from the organisation of documents to identifying the needs and expectations of ordinary people for the information that would help them make decisions in their lives and be active members of civil society. introducing louise louise is a woman in her early sixties. her family came from the south-western part of rwanda, a wealthy agricultural area and an area important in rwandan history in the 20th century and rich in tradition, both local and colonial. she married her childhood sweetheart, a young man from a family with longstanding links with her family. she is tutsi and he is hutu. they are both devout catholics. they were both well educated; he was trained as a doctor. after the birth of their first child, they moved to kigali where he took up a post in the major hospital and they spent several years overseas, both in belgium and in other countries in west africa. they have five daughters, the youngest being eighteen. their fourth daughter is an orphan whom they adopted after the genocide of 1994. when they moved to kigali from the south-west, they bought land on the outskirts of the city as it then was and built a large and comfortable family home in what would become a solid middle-class suburb. they value education and have ensured that all of their daughters have a university education. their families were actively involved in the development of the post-colonial nation, from the 1970s. one of louise’s brothers was an exiled member of the rwandan patriotic front in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the party which brought the current president, paul kagame, to power. another of her brothers was mayor of a significant community in the late 1990s and early years of the 21st century. most members of louise’s family were killed during the genocide of 1994; her brothers survived because they were both living out of the country. louise herself was active in politics and in civil society. she came to the end of her term as a locally elected representative in february 2011. she works with a collective of genocide widows, providing them with fruit and vegetables from lands that she owns to sell at the nearby market. she had been a member of the national women’s council, and was celebrated for that contribution at a ceremony which was televised. she made the decision to withdraw from local politics and not to stand for re-election only on the day of the election, 4 february 2011. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 143 the life to which louise asked me to be a witness was woven together from these two strands, the strand of the events of the genocide, which she referred to commonly as “les perturbations”, and the strand of the re-building a rwandan society through political engagement, both of which led to reconciliation, one at the personal level and the other at the national level. this process of witnessing is not an objective, external, process; “i” am part of it too. i have created the narrative below in the prologue from my diary notes. the narrative on the events of the genocide and reconciliation is on the left and the narrative on political engagement and reconciliation is on the right. i have used these notes and the experiences on which they were based to explore the concepts of the guest and the stranger, cosmopolitanism and reconciliation. prologue extracts from a travel diary extract 8 january 2011 i had a long talk with louise. she is involved in local politics, in the national women’s council, trying to persuade local women to become actively involved in politics. local elections will be held next month, so this is a busy time for her, with many meetings. she is passionate about the need to support inclusive change and to do it with solidarity. i see traces of the kind of solidarity that means living by the rules. extract 8 january 2011 “ma mère est morte [my mother died]. she was about your age when she died. she shouldn’t have died.” extract 11 january 2011 “when we came back in 1995, the house was destroyed. we wanted to live here. we fixed it all ourselves.” “w. – you know w., don’t you? – he and his family used to live opposite – we were in liège together. they didn’t come back here after the genocide. no, don’t say anything to him.” extract 13 january 2011 i realize that in writing this entry, i’ve been skirting around the most significant thing. louise gave her testimony. it’s easy to write the words. it did catch me off guard. i already knew that the family had been affected by the troubles and that they’d been displaced. but louise described in detail how she had been targeted by one of her neighbours and how another neighbour had stepped in to give them a safe place to be while they arranged to flee elsewhere. the second time she went through the story, it was a kind of re-enactment. “i was here, this is what i heard, this is what i saw, this is what happened, this is what we did.” 144 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 “we heard them in the street. we knew they would come in. jean-marie and the older girls were sitting here. i took the baby and went to hide at the end of the house. jean-marie said they should kill him first and he began to pray aloud. one of our neighbours came. one of them had a machete, he was standing there. there was another one here by this little wall. others were outside. our neighbour said they should leave us alone and he would make sure they did. they said i was on the list. the neighbour said they should know me and they should leave. the baby was crying so i came out. i stood here. the neighbour said he would make sure we were safe and could leave.” “my brothers and sisters – everyone – they were all killed. my mother was there too. all the bodies fell on top of her so she was saved. she waited and waited and when it was dark she went back up to the hill. she stayed there three weeks by herself. she didn’t go outside. she felt safe because everyone thought she was dead. eventually she went down the hill to jean-marie’s family. she thought they would look after her. the families have always known each other. someone must have said something. they came for her. jean-marie’s family didn’t protect her. they could have but they didn’t. the genocidaires humiliated her. they [descriptions of atrocities] and made her watch. then they [descriptions of violence] and took her legs and threw her body in the well. i went to the gacaca, that’s how i found out. i needed to know what happened.” extract 14 january 2011 “tomorrow, jean-marie’s family are coming. we will eat together and then we have to talk. no, you don’t have to go out. i want you to meet them. i don’t know what we will be doing. maybe we will be laughing and joking and maybe we won’t. i don’t know.” extract 15 january 2011 “mwiriwe [hello, good afternoon], how was your class? come, let me introduce you to jean-marie’s family. they all speak good french. … now, i think you should go inside with the girls.” the girls and i chat about inconsequentials. suddenly we hear a wail, a piercing lamentation. i’ve never heard anything like it. it seemed to get right inside me. we see louise get up from the verandah and go towards the garden, continuing to wail. the girls tell me what i should probably have worked out – that jean-marie’s family have come to be reconciled with louise. this is the first time in sixteen years that they have been to the house. i feel awkward. this is not something i should see or hear or know about. i go to my room and close the door. i lie on the bed, trying not to be there, but at the same time, listening. from the sound of voices, i assume that louise has come back to her seat. they are speaking kinyarwanda, so i cannot understand what they say. an old man’s voice begins to speak. he speaks for some time. he must be telling a story, from the way his voice rises and falls. and now he is praying. the tone of the voice has changed and i hear god called upon many times, one of the words i know – imana. the praying continues, occasionally with responses. a final amen and a long silence. no one moves, the chairs don’t scrape on the tiles. then a woman’s voice begins to sing: amahoro, peace, (another of the words i know); this is a song or hymn i have heard elsewhere. the singing continues, hymns and songs with everyone joining in – and with the sound of fidgeting and movement that suggest the tension has been broken. some time later, there is a tap on my door and one of the older girls comes to see if i am ok. she tells me the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 145 families are reconciled. i try to explain that this has been far beyond anything i can comprehend. then louise comes. she says: “well, that’s it, it’s over. now we can think about the future.” i try to apologise, saying that i have felt in the way, “de trop”, in something which was highly significant for her family. she says she heard that i was frightened by the events and that’s why i went to my room. there was no need for me to do that and she was sorry i was upset. she explains that all she ever wanted was for jean-marie’s family to recognize what happened to her mother and to acknowledge that they might have done something; and now she has that. extract 16 january 2011 i can’t/don’t feel i should write the details. … i know about state-based and structural reconciliation, but i suppose one could say that this is reconciliation where it matters. louise said she wanted me to be a witness so that i could tell other people about it all and how reconciliation worked at the personal level. she characterized the sentiments in the people from jean-marie’s family: those who didn’t know what it was all about; those who didn’t understand why it was such a big deal; those who were fearful; those who were drunk and those who felt directed by god. extract 18 january 2011 i can’t remember how it came up, perhaps something on tv about voter registration. the tv news in kinyarwanda is usually on just before we eat. it often is the catalyst for what we talk about over dinner. we have discussed maternity leave – rwandans have excellent provisions – and broadband internet – the government has already taken the decision; the city of kigali will become an wifi hotspot later this year – the cable is laid and you see the little yellow posts saying ‘fibre-optic cable’ everywhere. louise is very proud of the achievements of the president, paul kagame. she thinks he is a man with a great vision for the country. today i learned that all rwandans are registered in an electronic system. they can dial a code and up comes their record – voter registration number, id number and personal details. louise showed me her record. it’s quite scary to think through the consequences, particularly when you put this alongside the aim for every household to have a mobile phone by 2015. extract 20 january 2011 i went to visit b, who is … involved in civil society. she said that a big challenge in her role was not saying something which would land her in prison or worse. she is the first person who has talked about the darker side of a reformist government. she explains that one of the priorities of civil society is to get a freedom of information act before parliament. there is no access to the workings and deliberations of government, people just get presented with the decision. even the budget is not presented for discussion. i heard yesterday that scholarships were withdrawn from many orphans and with no notice, just an announcement one day last week. today there was a fiat that prohibits the sale of undergarments and washcloths, to take effect in ten days. this will apparently have a big impact on some women in the market who sell these clothes imported from uganda and kenya. extract 22 january 2011 louise is preoccupied by the elections. she explains the system of representation to me and through that i learn about how the local areas are organized, from the ‘umugudugu’, a grouping of 150 houses, to the akagari which is the smallest administrative/political unit, to the umurenge which 146 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 makes decisions and implements them through its political committee and its community development committee and then to the akarere which has legislative power and is known in english as a district. the districts are grouped into provinces. as i understood it, those elected at the akagari level are the group from which representatives at the umurenge level are elected and so on. so, elections at the grass roots level determine the outcome at the district level. extract 27 january 2011 to the gisozi genocide memorial on a tourist bus. overwhelmed by the mass graves and have to leave. growing up in post-war britain, with a father who had spent more than three years as a prisoner of the japanese, i always believed that i had been brought up to understand toleration and to be tolerant, to recognize the innate humanity of individuals and not condemn them just because they were german or japanese or were different from us in some other way. my father is not a religious man; he did not take this stance from religious beliefs. if he was influenced, it was by the man who acted as his commanding officer1 i wondered whether my father would have had the same reaction if he had been confronted with japanese people on a daily basis. this tolerance, the one i had grown up with, was an abstract construct. for louise, tolerance was a lived reality. processes of reconciliation were part of everyday life. it involved living in a street where some neighbours might have wanted to kill you and others, in acts of courage, might have saved your life. it involved doing business with people who might have killed a friend or relative. it involved having your relatives acknowledge that they had undertaken or supported terrible acts and yet still accepting them. i struggle with my reactions. at the beginning of his time as a prisoner of war and whose approach was that the men should forgive – forgive, but not forget. extract 29 january 2011 there was a grenade attack at the bus station about 15 minutes walk away. once we know all the girls are safe, louise tells me that there is no need to worry, they will soon find out who did it – someone will know and they will inform the police. the catchphrase ’if you see something, say something’ is a reality here. extract 30 january 2011 yesterday, melissa and i went to umuganda, which is a kind of community service. we saw local politics in action. the purpose was not really to cut down the weeds but to get members of the community together, checking off who is there. they had voter registration cards there to hand out too. extract 30 january 2011 what a different view of reconciliation! m., our driver on the excursion to the lake, was talking rather coyly about his children. anita asked him how many he really had and after some hesitation he replied that he had 12 children and that he had had two wives. the first he had loved, she was beautiful, but during the genocide, she had wanted to kill him. she had told lies about him, he said, and he had spent some months in prison. when he was released from 1 as an adult in australia, i realised the depth of influence of this australian commanding officer, ‘weary’ dunlop. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 147 prison, he went to tanzania so that she had less chance of succeeding and on his travels, he had met and married another woman. eventually, he had come back to kigali with his second family. he thought his first wife still wanted to harm him. he thought the gacaca was dangerous because there was no way of checking if what people said happened really happened like that. extract 1 february 2011 heroes day, a public holiday. louise was responsible for organizing the local gathering. she had to give a speech about heroes – and she chose to speak about women who are heroines in their families. extract 2 february 2011 the minster for women’s affairs hosts a function for the members of the national women’s council. i see louise on tv. it’s the first time i realized what political influence she must have had. “she says: i’ve done my best to make sure there are other women who will stand for election. we have to have a strong showing at this local election. without this, who knows what will happen at the next presidential election.” extract 4 february 2011 election day. quite a different process from our balloting system; voters have to stand behind their candidate. i ask if i can go to see what happens. “no, it wouldn’t be right. i know you would be there to learn but people would think you were a journalist and were going to say things about our rwandan way of doing things. no, we can’t have outsiders.” i-witnessing in this paper, i attempt to keep faith with the promise i made to be a witness, but i also seek to go beyond that, to explore my lived experience of cosmopolitanism. i am not a witness of everyday life in the family. i am a witness for a woman who was living the government’s policy of unity and reconciliation and at the same time i am my own witness, a woman who was asked to move well beyond the role of stranger or guest that she had expected to play. in this undertaking, i acknowledge my background as an academic and seek to use scholarly methods to frame this process of witnessing and the exploration of cosmopolitanism. when i formally acknowledged that i would be a witness for louise, i heard echoes of denzin and lincoln’s words about the purpose of the ‘new ethnography’ being “to understand a self or some aspect of a life lived in a cultural context” and express it through a “personal narrative” (2007, p.213). my approach, then, is ethnographic, broadly following alvesson’s approach to self-ethnography (1999). in this context, the exploration of my experiences and learnings should be seen as “confessional” (van maanen 1988). this, in part, is a consequence of my decision not to make audio and video recordings of my interactions within the family, but 148 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 only to keep my diary as a traveller might and to take the kind of photos a guest in a family might take. more significantly, it is because i am also a witness for myself, taking a reflexive approach to my experiences and my conceptual understandings (alvesson 1999). the notion of being a witness for someone else’s life and culture brought to mind geertz’s use of the metaphor of the i-witness, and his assertion that as an ethnographer, “to be a convincing “i-witness” one must, so it seems, first become a convincing “i”’ (geertz 1988, p.79). golden-biddle and locke argue that authenticity is important in claiming authority in ethnography; the reader needs to be assured that the researcher was ‘there’ (1999, p.373). even if i succeed in presenting myself as a convincing “i”, i am still left with the task which clifford describes as representing “otherness”, transforming “unruly experience” into an “authoritative written account” (clifford 1999, p. 283). for clifford, ethnography is a “continuous tacking between the “inside” and the “outside” of events: on the one hand grasping the sense of specific occurrences and gestures empathetically, on the other stepping back to situate these meanings in wider contexts” (1999, p. 290). i will seek to go beyond the reflection that this process involves, using the literature to engage reflexively with my own understandings of what it means to be a “witness” to someone else’s experiences. ethnographic research, with its strong emphasis on interpretation, requires that the positioning of the ethnographer be transparent and that requirement is even more important in auto-ethnography. this “i” was not a researcher who had set out to investigate aspects of the life of a woman in a professional rwandan family, nor had this “i” established herself as a “professional stranger” in this context (agar 1980). this “i” has used ethnographic methods in much of her research, in studies of sense-making and information use in everyday decision-making, and in studies of the way young people engage in civil society online and understand community. this “i” has been influenced by clifford’s approach to writing ethnographies (1999) and geertz’s interpretive approach to the development of theory (1993) has informed much of her work in the past fifteen or more years. thus, “i” acknowledge that this particular ethnographic inquiry will not be a “relatively simple look, listen and learn procedure but rather as something akin to an intense epistemological trial by fire” (van maanen quoted in alvesson 1999, p. 7). it seems that the circumstances for this “i” were close to those described by alvesson (1999 p.13), an auto-ethnography with an ‘emergent spontaneous approach’ carried out ‘when something revealing happens’ (alvesson 1999, p.13). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 149 having established my credentials as a researcher, i also need to establish my credentials for having “been there”. i lived in louise’s house in kigali for nearly six weeks, spending two or three hours every day talking with her, laughing and joking, exploring our lives of women of a certain age, with daughters who are now young women. i speak only a few words of kinyarwanda, the local language, enough for everyday pleasantries, but not enough to hold a conversation. however, i speak french very well because of my university education which was conducted in french and because i lived and worked in france and this is the language louise and i used all of the time. french was the colonial language of rwanda and until the end of 2009 the language of high school education. most educated rwandans of my age are highly literate in french, having received their university or professional education in french. my ability to speak french, understanding its grammatical and social nuances, and to take part in conversations on topics related to issues of contemporary concern (on the basis of my reading and my interactions with burundians and rwandans living in australia) seemed important in the process of narrowing the distance between louise and myself. her willingness to open topics of conversation in such a way that i could take part also contributed to narrowing the distance. another factor may have derived from the influences of my undergraduate education, which have led me to strive to understand ‘the other’ in cultural terms; as my cultural interpreter in burundi in 2009 put it, “to quietly observe and then take part”. being a witness in rwanda the eye-witness occupies an important place in contemporary rwandan society. ‘les temoignages’ are the testimonies of those affected by the genocide in 1994. they are stories told in the gacaca, (the traditional cultural communal law courts re-established after the genocide as a means to bring justice and closure at the local level and abolished in the first half of 2011), stories told to the media, stories repeated in families and stories documented in the many memorials to the victims of the genocide, such as the gisozi genocide memorial http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org/. they are stories told today, by genocide survivors and orphans such as joseph, a young activist i was introduced to. louise’s story, the story of a genocide survivor, is at one level, a story repeated thousands of times over. it is story of local terror and local bravery, of uncertain survival and humiliating http://www.kigalimemorialcentre.org/� 150 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 death, of displacement, loss, return and re-commencement. it is also a story of how members of a family of mixed background were reconciled. it was the process of return and reconciliation, which she revealed to me little by little, that louise wanted me to witness. this is also the story of an australian woman seeking to understand the re-building of civil society in rwanda at the local level and to come to terms with being seen as a threat to this process; and to be witness to her own struggles with the challenges to her understandings and experiences of being a good guest, of cosmopolitanism and of the implications of reconciliation. in an exploration of these processes of witnessing, i will attempt to make sense of my experiences through a consideration of conceptual literature but importantly i will go beyond these experiences to rethink some aspects of the literature. i will explore conceptions of the guest, the stranger and the cosmopolitan. i will discuss conceptions of cosmopolitanism and in that context consider the concept of reconciliation. thus, as i reflect on what it means to be a witness to events in someone else’s life and to be a witness of my own involvement in this process, i recognize that i need to consider the concepts of the guest, the stranger and the cosmopolite or cosmopolitan to try to understand my own position. in conceptualizing reconciliation; it is not enough to acknowledge that i cannot share in louise’s sense of reconciliation because of my own lack of experience with lived realities. rather, it is important to reflect on the concept itself and re-assess it in the light of experience and a considered understanding of related concepts. exploring cosmopolitanism the guest, the stranger and the cosmopolite i went to stay in louise’s house as a guest and made promises to her in my attempts to be a good guest. however, the statement that i went as a guest is misleading. we did not know each other and she did not invite me. rather, through a chain of friendships2 2 a close friend is a well-networked burundian refugee who made a request to rwandan acquaintances, currently in australia for training or as students, to find a family who might offer me accommodation. one of these contacted her friend in kigali, who discussed it with her parents who agreed without hesitation to take me into their house for nearly six weeks. , she agreed to take me in. thus, i began my relationship with her in an ambiguous position, rather as a ‘visitor’ than as a ‘guest’. however, this did not mean that she accepted me with unconditional hospitality, not needing to know my name or anything about me. i did have cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 151 email exchanges and a telephone conversation with her oldest daughter and she did ask me questions about myself when i arrived in her house. derrida, in his discussion of kant’s piece on cosmopolitan right and hospitality, noted that unconditional hospitality was impossible to achieve. it is impossible to open one’s home to other people without this exchange and without establishing boundaries of behaviour (2000). westmoreland emphasized that hospitality is almost always bounded in that the guest is asked to accept a set of conditions (westmoreland 2008, p.2). and so it was in louise’s house – she set rules which she asked me to accept as promises to her – not to get up before an agreed time, not to use the shower but only to use the water that was brought to me for washing and to eat two slices of bread for breakfast. derrida is concerned with the ambiguous nature of the relationship between the guest and the host. in french, the ambiguity is immediate, because the words for guest and host are the same. however, even without this linguistic ambiguity, there is ambiguity in the relationship, because becoming a good host may involve giving the guest power over some aspect of the relationship. thus, louise reasoned that as someone with no exposure to malaria i needed to be protected from mosquitoes and she had screens fitted at all of the windows in the house. thus she, the host, subordinated herself to me, the guest, in the very act of being a good host. the notion of hospitality and the relationship between guest and host are problematic in a number of ways. on the one hand, hospitality is about welcoming a person whom you may not know, but on the other hand, it is about recognition. derrida notes that it may involve a constant negotiation and re-negotiation of the relationship between guest and host. this relationship is about establishing a sense of proximity, but at the same time, maintaining a distance. towards the end of my stay, louise was introducing me to women in the neighbourhood as her cousin and joking that the differences in our hair and the colour of our skin did not prevent us being closely related. however, linguistically we seemed to deliberately maintain a distance; although from time to time we used the familiar form of address in french (tutoyer), we seemed unable to sustain its use. the use of the formal ‘vous’ enabled us both to keep a distance. the unbounded, cosmopolitan hospitality that kant proposed and derrida (2000) and levinas (1979) elaborated was impossible. louise set rules for me to live in harmony with her and her family. linguistically, we treated each other as equals, but also with formality and reserve. 152 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 thus, both host and guest imposed limits on the relationship of hospitality. when louise asked me to promise her something, i agreed as a good guest. her request pointed up the structural imbalances involved in being a guest as the request to be her witness was not directed at me as a guest, but rather at me as other. the role of witness changed our relationship as it was a constant reminder that i would be leaving her house not just to return to my own house, but to return to my community and tell my family, friends and colleagues about her experiences during the genocide and my understanding of them. i thought that i had gone to kigali as a “cosmopolite”3 , a role i was introduced to many years ago as an undergraduate, which draws on my facility with colonial languages (english, french and spanish), my wide reading and a broad circle of acquaintances to give me a solid introduction into other communities and which i had accepted uncritically. if the role of “cosmopolite” was not effective, i thought could draw on my experiences of the broader role of the ethnographer i had developed as an academic. however, my experiences and in particular the demands that louise made of me showed that the “i” that i had constructed for the i-witness was partial, inadequate and lacking in authenticity. the “i” has to be capable of establishing strong links of commonality to be the witness to reconciliation but at the same time to be different enough to be recognized as an outsider in the political context and therefore potentially as a threat. ethnographers are represented both as strangers and as cosmopolites in the literature of ethnography, a conceptual position i had been comfortable with. agar uses the phrase “professional stranger” to label the ethnographer, someone who “collaborates with another person … to create a social relationship within which an exchange of information occurs” (1980, p.1). this person has to be able to balance involvement with detachment, exploring the difficulties of stepping into and out of a society (1980, p.50-51) and to become part of a society, they need help and assistance, whether through a letter of introduction or through the intervention of a “professional stranger-handler”, someone who can “find out what the outsider is after and quickly improvise some information that satisfies him without representing anything potentially harmful to the group” (1980, p. 85). the uncritical 3 geertz (1988, p.79) uses the tem to refer to malinowski, an anthropologist through whose practice he explores the concept of ‘i-witnessing’. according to geertz, the cosmopolite is the ‘figure of such enlarged capacities for adaptability and fellow feeling, for insinuating himself [sic] into practically any situation, as to be able to see as [others] see, think as [others] think, speak as [others] speak and on occasion, even feel as they feel and believe as they believe”. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 153 acceptance of these conceptual positions does not advance an understanding of what it means to be both a witness and a threat. therefore, i attempt to understand more critically what it means to be a stranger from a sociological perspective. the classic conceptualization of the stranger comes from the work of simmel, the cultural outsider, who has become “the potential wanderer” (simmel 1950, p. 1 of 3), someone who is “fundamentally mobile”, who comes into contact with many people, but who is not connected to any of them by “kinship, locality and occupation” and who has made a commitment to “stay tomorrow” (simmel 1950, p. 1 of 3). simmel considers being a stranger a “specific form of interaction”, which is based on that mixture of “nearness and distance, indifference and involvement” which leads to objectivity. this objectivity is an important characteristic as it may lead others to confide stories they would not tell to those closer to them. the in-between stranger is linked to those on the inside by a recognition of common features of a “national, social, occupational, or generally human, nature” but at the same time separated from them because “similarity, harmony and nearness are accompanied by the feeling that they are not really the unique property of this particular relationship” (1950, p.3 of 3). i am drawn to the notion that the stranger is not a person but a type of interaction, and the concepts of nearness and distance, indifference and involvement seem to have relevance. however, at the same time, i recognize that simmel’s view of the form of interaction which constitutes the stranger is dated, conceived as it was nearly a century ago. bauman offers a much more recent perspective. he suggests that from a modernist perspective, strangers are those who do not fit the idea of order in a society. they are not those in whom i might confide, they are rather “hateful and feared” (bauman 1995, p.10). from a contemporary, postmodern perspective, strangers are essential to societies as a mark of difference, and there is “an almost universal agreement that difference is not merely unavoidable, but good, precious and in need of protection and cultivation” (1995, p.13). until such time as people have adequate resources for building their own identity and for developing strong notions of citizenship, this sense of distasteful distance, of needing the hateful for creating one’s own sense of self, will persist (1995, p.16). in the context of my wish to observe rwanda’s local election process, i found myself albeit briefly, in the position of being the outsider, something different, the stranger, to be feared, as bauman describes. this was something of a shock. to be feared because i was interested in how the democratic process worked or because i came from a democratic country with a free 154 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 press was something i had not expected in my uncritical view of myself as the cosmopolite. i had not considered that others might see me as the kind of threat to which b. had alluded (diary extract 20 january 2011), someone who might make critical comments about the processes of government or about the policies and decisions of the president and who might therefore upset the societal order which the rwandan government has worked so hard to enforce. this was the first of those disjuncts in my understanding of cosmopolitanism. i was forced to reconsider my uncritical understanding of the concept of the ‘cosmopolite’, and consider cosmopolitanism as a concept concerned with power as well as with the moral. reconciliation appiah recognises the notions of universal concern and respect for difference, but acknowledges that there will be disagreement and conflict from time to time. like arendt4 , he uses the notion of the conversation as a metaphor to present an understanding of cosmopolitanism, asserting that “cosmopolitans suppose that all cultures have enough overlap in their vocabulary of values to begin a conversation.” (2006, p.57) although this “[c]onversation doesn’t have to lead to consensus about anything, especially not values; it’s enough that it helps people get used to one another” (2006, p.85). the notion of the conversation with the stranger is a powerful one for beginning a process of understanding as appiah and arendt propose. my conversation with m. (diary extract 30 january 2011) was just such a conversation – i was never going to be more than a stranger to m. and he to me, as it was unlikely that i would meet him again, given that he had been hired to drive a group of foreigners of whom i was one on an excursion. in bauman’s terms, m. would be a stranger to me too but not only because of the differences in skin colour and status. my limited understanding of the interactions in post-genocide rwandan society suggested that people like him who had been in jail because of their actions during the genocide were the focus of policies and programs of state-based reconciliation. his story showed that he had not achieved personal reconciliation with his first wife and his family, 4 arendt proposed the notion of a ‘theoretical conversation’ where the outcome is a ‘potential agreement with others” and where an enlarged way of thinking … cannot function in strict isolation or solitude; it needs the presence of others ‘in whose place’ it must think, whose perspective it must take into consideration, and without whom it never has the opportunity to operate at all” (1961, pp.220-1, as cited by benhabib, 1992, pp. 9-10). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 155 friends and neighbours from the time of the genocide. i found myself wondering about his actions in the genocide, seeing him potentially as someone to be feared, thinking about how others who knew his story would regard him. i had been perplexed by the possibilities of personal reconciliation for some time. in burundi where i had spent three weeks with a family in december 2009, i had met tutsis of my generation whose extended families had been killed in the massacres which took place there and who felt tremendous bitterness towards hutus at large. at the time, burundians were preparing for the election of their president, and one man said: “how can i vote for them? i know that [the hutu president] has done a lot for the reconstruction of the country. but they killed my family, my mother, my father, all my brothers and sisters except the sister who was with me, their children too. i can’t forget that.” louise was quite clear that reconciliation for her was a private matter (kohen 2011). her belief that her catholic god was encouraging her to take the step towards reconciliation and to heal the rift with her husband’s family was a strong motivating factor. another strong motivating factor was the need to preserve the possibility of familial relationships in the future, to allow the next generation the possibility of living in harmony. that it had taken sixteen years to come to this point shows how significant an action this was. her categorization of the sentiments of those members of her husband’s family who came to the lunch and were part of the process indicates that even those engaged in the process of reconciliation acknowledge that others in that process do not share the same objectives (diary extract 16 january 2011). reconciliation might only be noticed by the individual, although others participate in the activities. this categorization can begin to indicate important elements in the process of reconciliation. information about what happened would have been important for “those who did not know what it was all about”. being confronted with the so-called victim, hearing the lamentations and being told of the consequences of the actions might have been important for “those who didn’t understand why it was such a big deal”. believing that god could bring peace through directing the behaviour of believers would be a strong force for many catholics. learning that there were no detrimental consequences, no desire for revenge, no intention to bring criminal charges might have gone some way to alleviate the stresses of “those who were 156 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 fearful”. the acknowledgement that there were also “those who were drunk” might indicate that there were also those who were not ready to confront the reconciliation process. personal reconciliation, then, may not be concerned with notions of “forgiving the unforgiveable” as derrida indicates (2001). in louise’s case, reconciliation does not seem to match levinas’s notion of “giving the past a new meaning” by re-narrating it (1979, p.282). indeed, she was quite clear that it was not right to accept intolerable practices. thus, it may come closer to arendt’s idea that forgiveness comprises two parts, the act and the agent, where it may be possible to “forgive somebody without forgiving anything”5 . louise was very clear that i was to be her witness in this process of reconciliation, and thus it was clear that it was not only a personal matter. rather, she wanted me to be able to express a view and explain to that world of which i am a part and she is not. in terms of her categorization, she had ensured that i was well informed and that i understood why the process of personal reconciliation was important to her. she knew that i did not have a faith which would direct me to take certain actions. i belonged by my own admission to the group of those who were fearful. what was i fearful of? was it fear that prevented me from being entirely engaged in the process of reconciliation? and what are the consequences of my answers for a conceptualization of the cosmopolitan? i was fearful of being a witness to what i had conceived as a private, family, matter. at the time, i protested that i felt “de trop”, superfluous, in the way. this was not a matter that should concern me. it was about the future of relationships of which i was not a part. i was afraid too that i would have to move beyond my abstract notion of tolerance and come to something other than an intellectualized position on the rwandan genocide and the post-genocide process of unity and reconciliation. this did not fit with the role of cosmopolitan that i had willingly taken on. further, it challenged the values of openness and tolerance by which i believed i had lived, because i had no way of understanding the terrible things which had happened. i felt inadequate and i resisted, in spite of louise’s encouragement that it was important for her that i did consider myself part of this process of reconciliation. 5 arendt noted that she was not concerned with “evil”, and that may negate the comparison. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 157 here was a second significant disjunct in my understanding of cosmopolitanism. i had been able to accept that several concepts of cosmopolitanism might co-exist, that the moral cosmopolitanism that i favoured was not negated by some other conceptualisation. in practice, i was faced with an “incommensurability of perspectives” which actually demonstrated ignorance (beck & sznaider 2010, p.399). delanty’s post-universalist cosmopolitanism gives me a way to begin to re-think this position. he suggests that cosmopolitanism should be seen through “the tension between the global and the local on the one side and on the other the universal and the particular” and that a third dimension of cosmopolitanism, a cultural dimension, is concerned with openness in communication (2006, p.35) he goes on to indicate that to the extent that cosmopolitanism can be seen in everyday interactions, a cosmopolitan imagination emerges which gives the possibility of transforming both self and other (2006, p.37). cosmopolitan curiosity the classic conceptualization of the cosmopolitan argues that an individual’s relationship with humanity at large is more important than relationships with others from the same state or nation. ‘citizen of the world’, a phrase whose meaning derives from the word cosmopolitan, has become part of a popular contemporary western vocabulary and a phrase which i had been happy to believe could be applied to me. however, my shock in understanding that there were circumstances where it could not apply showed that a more considered approach to the meaning of the cosmopolitan is required. held’s cosmopolitanism “recognizes each person as an autonomous moral agent entitled to equal dignity and consideration” (held 2010, p.15). as an ideal abstract position this appeals to me, but i see it unworkable in the practice of everyday life. a more nuanced approach may come from the notions of thick cosmopolitanism and thin cosmopolitanism which may lead to conceptualisations that are closer to experiences of lived realities, with thick cosmopolitanism existing when all moral claims are justified by showing that they give equal weight to the claims of all and thin cosmopolitanism existing when certain treatments are afforded to all regardless of relationships, but “other kinds of treatment [are given] only to those to whom we are related in certain ways…”(held 2010, p. 78). for appiah, cosmopolitanism can arise from a cross-cultural conversation whose starting point does not have to be something universal, it just needs to be something the people in the 158 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 conversation have in common. when we enter into such a conversation with a stranger, this is not a stranger in the abstract but a particular stranger, with whom we may be able to establish a bond of shared identity. the conversation then can become the starting point for understanding things which are not shared. a mark of the cosmopolitan is that they “enjoy” discovering differences and use this “cosmopolitan curiosity” to explore differences and learn from others, or to “simply be intrigued by alternative ways of thinking, feeling and acting” (2006, p.97). they also have the intelligence to look beyond the immediate differences or problem to try to take a broader perspective, seeing that features of their own context may be related to the creation of difference or to the problems of others (2006, p.168). beck insists on a break with what he considers the philosophical approach that held takes. rather, he envisages a cosmopolitanism which equates with praxis and is closer to a political construct. this cosmopolitanism arises from concrete social realities and recognises difference (beck & sznaider 2010, p.386). thus it causes us to rethink nationalism and globalism, as well as the traditional and the modern. cosmopolitanism thus is a transformative concept, as it also includes the individual and the local alongside the global. for beck, the process of "cosmopolitanisation" should be the focus of concern. in his words, this means “the erosion of distinct boundaries dividing markets, states, civilizations, cultures, and not least of all the lifeworlds of different peoples” and it is important that this process takes place in the everyday lives of individuals (beck 2007). appiah’s version of cosmopolitanism seems to offer me a way to conceptualise the cosmopolitan because of its match with my experience. the characteristics of conversations with louise, the focus of my exploration of what it means to be a witness, are thrown into relief by an almost casual conversation over lunch with m, the driver on an excursion, as discussed above. one key characteristic of my conversations with louise has been the existence of a “cosmopolitan curiosity” where we have both sought to go beyond a simple bond of shared identity. but this characteristic was missing from my conversation with m. from a personal perspective, the unwillingness to take part in the process of reconciliation also demonstrated that, at this significant time, as in my conversation with m., i did not show that cosmopolitan curiosity which had marked other conversations louise and i had had. because the experiences were so confronting, so far beyond my experience and imagination, at the time i chose not to enjoy exploring the differences between louise’s experiences and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 159 my own. louise was able to demonstrate what beck refers to as cosmopolitan tolerance. he defines that as an active sentiment, involving “opening oneself up to the world of the other, perceiving difference as an enrichment, regarding and treating the other as fundamentally equal”. i had found that cosmopolitan tolerance beyond me as well as cosmopolitan curiosity. here then was a third disjunct and one which was significant as its very existence seemed to withhold the possibility of a conceptualised cosmopolitanism existing in everyday experience. conclusion beck’s distinction between the philosophical, moral position of held and others on cosmopolitanism, and his own more pragmatic, political position enables me to move beyond the sense of being a failed cosmopolitan, trapped in the position of ‘other’ (beck 2009, pp.56) and to elaborate three disjuncts in using the concept of cosmopolitanism to explore experiences in everyday life. these disjuncts were: • the realisation that a moral cosmopolitanism and a political cosmopolitanism can not only co-exist but that, in different interactions between the same individuals, the balance between them can shift, thus changing the nature of the relationships between those individuals; • the recognition that at times, the attempt to acknowledge several perspectives on cosmopolitanism can bring one to confront an incommensurability of perspectives which reveals a long-held ignorance; • the acknowledgement that the transformative aspect of cosmopolitanism, which arises through conversations, communications and curiosity about the world beyond simple bonds of shared identity, can be extremely difficult to sustain especially when the balance between moral and political cosmopolitanisms is constantly shifting. the positions i took in my relationship with louise may not always have been those of the cosmopolitan i had aspired to. yet, on reflection, there were many factors which indicated structural imbalances in that relationship and which therefore made cosmopolitan curiosity and the transformative aspect of cosmopolitanism a practical impossibility. the relationship 160 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 of guest and host is not one of equals and although, with good will, boundaries can be flexible, the host will always have power over the guest and her behaviour. i was the stranger, literally the foreigner, the outsider6. i was simmel’s stranger, the one in a position to take an objective perspective on what i heard and saw, the one frequently asked to offer an opinion comparing some aspect of rwandan life to life in australia. i was also from time to time bauman’s stranger, someone to be feared because i was thought to be in a position where i could expose local practices or government policies and potentially comment unfavourably on them to a world outside of rwanda, outside the reach of social and political powers. beyond that, louise and i each represented the other. she was other because she had life experiences which set her apart from me. although she introduced me as her cousin7 to the women in the market cooperative she supports, they saw me only as other, because of where we each live and our life experiences, through the colour of our skin, through our communication, mediated as it was through french which we both speak fluently but which is a learned language for both of us and not a language which the women in the market cooperative were comfortable with. in this paper, i have kept faith with the promise i made to be a witness, a witness for a woman who was living the government’s policy of unity and reconciliation and a witness of my own experiences. in this process of witnessing, i have explored concepts of the cosmopolitan and the stranger, of cosmopolitanism and reconciliation. i have identified three significant disjuncts which have affected my capacity to be an ‘authentic’ witness, in ethnographic terms. at the same time, from a conceptual perspective, there are structural imbalances which made cosmopolitan curiosity, a potential basis for a future-oriented relationship based on complete equality, extremely difficult. this reflexive exploration of these experiences in rwanda has shown that cosmopolitanism is much more difficult to sustain as a lived reality than it is as an abstraction. 6 when rwandans speak of people not in rwanda, they refer to them, in english, as being “outside”. 7 louise joked that the differences in our hair and the colour of our skin did not prevent us being closely related, as cousins. naming me her cousin drew attention to what might bring us to seem related much more forcefully than if she had referred to me as her ‘sister’. her ‘sister could have been her ‘sister in christ’ (which given my views on religion was not possible) or it could have been her feminist sister from another national women’s council. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 161 bibliography agar, m. 1980, the professional stranger: an informal introduction to ethnography, academic press, new york. alvesson, m. 1999, methodology for close up studies – struggling with closeness and closure, <www.lri.lu.se/en/publications/workingpapers?item=17> accessed 20 september 2005. appiah, k.a, 2006, cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers, w.w. norton, new york bauman, z. 1995, ‘making and unmaking of strangers’, thesis eleven, vol. 43, pp.1-16 beck u. 2007, ‘a new cosmopolitanism is in the air’, www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html accessed 2 may 2011. beck, u. 2009, ‘critical theory of world risk society: a cosmopolitan vision’, constellations, vol.16, no.1, pp.1-22. beck, u. and sznaider, n. 2010, ‘unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: a research agenda’, british journal of sociology, vol.61, supplement s1, pp. 381-403. benhabib, s. 1992, situating the self: gender, community and postmodernism in contemporary ethics, routledge, london. clifford, j. 1999, 'on ethnographic authority', in bryman, a. & burgess, r. 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(ed.) the sociology of georg simmel, the free press, new york, van maanen, j. 1988, tales of the field, university of chicago press, chicago. westmoreland, m. 2008 ‘interruptions: derrida and hospitality’, kritike vol.2, no.1, pp.1-10. http://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_3/westmoreland_june2008.pdf accessed on 3 may 2011. http://www.lri.lu.se/en/publications/workingpapers?item=17%3e� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.kritike.org/journal/issue_3/westmoreland_june2008.pdf� 176 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia cosmopolitanism, custom, and complexity: kant's cosmopolitan norms in action tracey dowdeswell york university, toronto abstract immanuel kant's cosmopolitanism has come to stand alongside political realism and liberal internationalism as one of three broad theories of ethics in international relations. yet cosmopolitanism has been subjected to criticisms that the universal norms identified by kant including such norms as hospitality, reciprocity, and publicity (transparency and free political participation) are western and eurocentric in nature, incompatible with cultural pluralism, and lack the justification and legitimacy for the broad-based consensus required for a cosmopolitan political sphere to emerge among the world’s diverse peoples. this paper seeks to address these criticisms of cosmopolitanism by studying examples of cosmopolitan norms in action. these examples have been drawn from diverse regions around the globe to represent self-organized, 'self-legislating', civil societies that have themselves developed the rules that guide their behaviour and the terms of their discourse in the absence of a centralized governing authority. it is hoped that this approach will contribute to this ongoing debate by demonstrating that cosmopolitan norms can be found in a diverse array of human communities and cultures, that cosmopolitan norms are not only compatible with pluralism, but are instrumental in its success and vitality, and, finally, that the flourishing of such civil societies shows that the adoption of cosmopolitan norms are strongly correlated with successful outcomes and well-being. the social relations between the various peoples of the world, in narrower or wider circles, have now advanced everywhere so far that a violation of right in one place of the earth, is felt everywhere. ~immanuel kant, perpetual peace, p. 31. my father said the whole world is one big chain. one little part breaks and the chain is broken and it won't work anymore. ~johan, 17-year old dutch rescuer, as recounted to samuel oliner, p.142 kantian cosmopolitanism in 1795, immanuel kant argued in his essay, project for a perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch that humanity could solve the problem of violence and war though a political federation, grounded in universal moral principles, of all the peoples of the earth an idea that has come to be known as kantian cosmopolitanism. kant’s cosmopolitanism is based upon universal and fundamental moral principles, the first of which is that all human beings are part of a universal moral community in which each person is equal in dignity and worth.1 1this raises the question of how the autonomy of children and other vulnerable or incapacitated persons is to be incorporated into a participatory political framework, a topic of great complexity and which is outside the scope of this paper. in short, my view is that the participation of vulnerable persons sits uneasily within prevailing liberal conceptions of autonomy and politics, and that special attention must be paid by other members of the community to duly consider the interests of such persons and to facilitate their engagement. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 177 for kant, the public, political, sphere must be consistent with morality. this occurs when all individuals are treated as morally autonomous ends in themselves, when engagement in the public sphere is founded upon the critical and free exchange of information and ideas, when we each consider the interests of each member of society, and in which each member of society is free to engage. cosmopolitanism has come to stand alongside political realism and liberal internationalism as one of three broad theories of ethics in international relations (atack 2005, p. 1). kant's cosmopolitanism has been subjected to three main criticisms: first, that the universal norms identified by kant lack justification and are western and eurocentric in nature (atack 2005, p. 16; rawls 1993, p. 65); second, that normative principles are customary in that they are interpreted and applied in local discursive spheres, shaped by social and cultural factors, and that the principles each community develops have no meaning for outsiders (dower 1998, p. 23; rawls 1993, p. 80); and third, that jettisoning self-interest in favour of cosmopolitan norms, such as hospitality and reciprocity, would place too great a burden on individuals and communities; considering the needs of others is considered a heroic virtue, and not a civic necessity (honneth 1997, p. 167). kant's principles, it is argued, lack the justification and legitimacy required for the broad-based consensus necessary for a cosmopolitan political sphere to emerge among the world's diverse peoples. this paper seeks to address these criticisms of cosmopolitanism by studying examples of cosmopolitan norms in action. these examples have been chosen to represent self-organized communities, communities that have themselves developed the rules that guide their behaviour and the terms of their discourse in the absence of a centralized governing authority. they have also been drawn from a diverse array of human communities throughout the world, including village panchayats in india, farmers and coastal fishers in diverse regions of the globe, as well as rescuers in nazi-occupied europe. it can be shown that self-organized and self-legislating civil societies employing cosmopolitan norms are effective in meeting their goals, adapting to change, reducing conflict, and promoting the well-being of the community's members. it is hoped that this empirical evidence will assist in demonstrating that cosmopolitan norms can be found in action in a diverse array of human communities and cultures; such norms are not merely the products of western liberal societies, but are universal characteristics of thriving civil societies. this challenges the view that kantian norms are remote from the concrete realities of social life; rather, kant was recognizing basic 178 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 organizing principles of social life that are central to civic engagement and political participation, and that have long been known to and valued by diverse peoples around the world. examining such communities can show that cosmopolitan norms are not only compatible with pluralism, they are instrumental in its success and vitality. finally, the flourishing of such communities shows that cosmopolitan norms are not burdensome for individuals and communities; on the contrary, cosmopolitan norms are highly correlated with successful outcomes and well-being. this will open the way for a discussion of how cosmopolitan norms can be given their full effect in larger and more complex forms of social organization. cosmopolitan norms in perpetual peace kant commences his work with a vision of the nature and purpose of human life, beginning with the workings of nature (kant 1796, p. 31), and the fact that humanity comprises a single species (ibid., p. 29). we are all members of the same species, we all share the earth, and we must live in proximity with one another. we all have an equal right to profit by the earth in common, an equal claim to use its resources (ibid., p. 28).2 kant describes this as: the right that all men have, of demanding of others to be admitted to their society; a right founded upon that of the common possession of the surface of the earth, whose spherical form obliges them to suffer others to subsist contiguous to them, because they cannot disperse themselves to an indefinite distance, and because originally one has not a greater right to a country than another... [though we are divided] the ship and the camel, that vessel of the desert, reestablishes the communication and facilitate the right which the human species all possess, of profiting in common by its surface. (ibid., p. 28-29) kant describes this as the 'natural right' we all have to establish communication with inhabitants of other countries and lands (ibid., p. 29) – to communicate, to form part of its 'general will', to 'profit in common' by its resources.3 2 do prisoners, who are removed from society and deprived of civil and political participation under the law, also possess this right? i would analyze this problem by first noting that such deprivations are prima facie immoral, and that any deprivation of right must be carefully justified for each individual by reference to legitimate moral principles. even in those cases in which incarceration is morally justified, we must give special consideration to the needs and interests of prisoners as vulnerable persons, and ensure that the living conditions and the social needs of those persons whom we incarcerate meet the standards required by morality. kant thus offers a vision of a right, founded in nature, in our common heritage as a species, our common biology, and our 3 of course, 'profiting in common' refers to the egalitarian nature of our right, and not to the amount of profit that we are permitted to extract from nature, or to the obligations we have to the environment and to other living creatures. these issues are addressed by elinor ostrom's work, discussed briefly below, which refutes the 'tragedy of the commons' and shows instead that human communities operating under cosmopolitan norms are less likely to degrade natural resources, more likely to preserve them, and are more respectful of the natural environment. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 179 common history, in which each of us are to count as equal members of the human community. kant sums up this idea by the term hospitality. hospitality has been taken by many commentators to refer to an acceptance of strangers, the importance of travel, and an acquaintance with foreign cultures as being the hallmarks of a cosmopolitan worldview (van hooft 2009, p. 12-13). yet we must not allow the definition of 'hospitality' as mere kindness to strangers or an interest in diversity to obscure the deeper meaning of the term, and its origins in the ancient custom of hospitium, which involves care and concern in meeting the needs of each person and welcoming them into our community (a definition better expressed by the modern derivations 'hospital' and 'hospice'4 ). here, kant expresses a universal and equal entitlement of all persons to the society of others and the resources of the earth which we inhabit together (kant 1796, p. 28). kant's vision of human life is rooted simultaneously in the universality of humanity as well as the complexity of human life, which provide the foundation for moral universalism. the connections between humans on a global scale are too robust to be denied, and this gives rise to kant's famous maxim that 'a violation of right in one part of the world is felt everywhere' (ibid., p. 31). at the same time, the diversity and complexity of our ever-changing circumstances and the challenges we face provide the foundation for kant's deontological moral philosophy. for kant, a consequentialist moral outlook one that focuses on outcomes rather than moral actions and values can never work because we can never know enough to make consistently reliable predictions about the future: [r]eason is not sufficiently enlightened, in order to embrace the entire series of predetermining causes; the knowledge of which would alone enable it to foresee with certainty the happy or unhappy effects, which, according to the mechanism of nature, must result from human actions (ibid. p.47). we should not focus on outcomes, then, as we can never be sufficiently certain what those outcomes will be. this is a vision of human life as complex, non-linear and radically indeterminate, and which thus requires reason to understand and to grapple with its manyfaceted problems. this describes the role played by the self-legislating individual elucidating a priori moral principles through the exercise of pure practical reason. it is only through derivation from pure practical reason that this imperative is a categorical – universal and a 4 in many communities, the exemplary treatment of guests and the special obligations we have to them is one of the core values of society values which are not always fulfilled to the same extent in our modern institutions. 180 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 priori – moral judgement. kant viewed consequential imperatives as being hypothetical, determined by personal and subjective factors, and thus incapable of directing moral judgement or determining moral ends. 'good outcomes' are ultimately of only subjective value, and particular to the subject in question. in many cases, outcomes are as indeterminate and elusive as they have always been, and our assessment of probable future events descends into pure speculation; this is true no matter how accurately utility can actually be quantified. the quantitative and reductionist reason of jeremy bentham, in which moral outcomes are governed by the logical algorithms of utility operating in the clockwork-universe, is sometimes misused to blind us to this subjectivity, and it is this misapprehension which made utilitarianism the pre-eminent moral theory of modernism. kant posits that general will results from the exercise of practical reason on the part of members of the collectivity, in a process that we would think of today as constituting an emergent social phenomenon (ibid., p. 17). modern definitions of emergence characterize emergent properties as systemic features of complex adaptive systems, which cannot be predicted or known despite a thorough knowledge of the features of and the laws governing the parts (stanford encyclopedia of philosophy). kant described the general will in a similar fashion, not a sum or balance of the volitions of the individual members of society, but those volitions taken 'by the concert of all' (kant 1796, p. 48). it is the collective unity of the will of all, not of 'dispersed individuals, but the organs by which they cooperate as a body' (ibid.). the general will thus emerges from a public discourse founded upon principles of morality. the public discourse that produces the general will is one that is founded upon the exercise of practical reason, justice, and 'enlarged', 'unprejudiced' thinking (kant 2007, p. 160). it is 'laboriously to consider of convincing arguments' and spending time in 'listening to objections' (kant 1796, p. 54). it requires that we think from the standpoint of everyone else (kant 2007, p. 160). the more we aim only at a given end in view, the less likely we are to achieve it (kant 1796, p. 60). politicians, in particular, are not to pay attention to the material ends which the state seeks (ibid., p. 62). states must reject considerations such as material ends, future consequences, prudence, and the seeking of self-interest, for these are rejections of morality (ibid., p. 46). instead, kant provides the maxim to 'seek first the reign of pure cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 181 practical reason and its justice and your end will necessarily follow' (ibid., p. 60 [emphasis in original]).5 modern interpretations of kantian cosmopolitanism the horrors of the two world wars and the failures of political realism thus exposed led to a number of international efforts that might be termed broadly cosmopolitan, including the kellogg-briand pact of 1928 that outlaws war as an instrument of national policy (a treaty which has been ratified by most states). the prosecutions at nuremberg, the universal declaration of human rights, and the post-war refugee and genocide conventions also express many of the humanist and cosmopolitan norms that resurfaced in the wake of world war ii. modern debates and criticisms of cosmopolitanism focus on the tensions between the universalism demanded by kant and the realities of political pluralism, the nature of publicity and its relationship to the general will, and the notion of reciprocity – the kantian ideal that each person think from the standpoint of everyone else. universalism versus pluralism kant's moral universalism has been critiqued on a number of grounds. erskine, for example, states that 'claims of impartiality in moral reasoning behave as no more than a façade for the cultural and political imperialism of those with power' (erskine 2002, p. 477). robert pinsky has argued, along with michael walzer and john rawls, that cosmopolitan principles are really the parochial ideals of a western upwardly mobile managerial class (pinsky 2002, p. 85). rawls states that universal ideals and a belief in individual autonomy are 'particularly liberal or special to our western tradition' (rawls 1993, p.69), and would not be accepted by non-liberal societies; imposing them would violate core liberal principles of pluralism and tolerance (rawls 1993, p. 80). cosmopolitan norms of human rights, in so far as they are accepted, have been conceived as a kind of 'thin' morality – the very basic rights and standards of conduct upon which we can all agree. for rawls, pluralism means that the 5 in an earlier work, idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose, kant posited that history was progressing towards a 'cosmopolitan civil society which can administer justice universally' (1784, p.20). 'end', read in this way, refers not to the particular ends we may aim at daily as the fulfilment of our self-interest, but the ultimate political end brought about by a universal cosmopolitan constitution. kant posited that this would emerge as a result of the fulfilment of individual striving for pure practical reason: '[i]f [history] examines the free exercise of the human will on a large scale, it will be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions. in the same way, we may hope that what strikes us in the actions of individuals as confused and fortuitous may be recognized, in the history of the entire species, as a steadily advancing but slow development of man's original capacities' (17). kant, i. 1784, 'idea for a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view' in brown, g.w. & held, d. (eds), the cosmopolitan reader, polity press, cambridge, pp.17-26. 182 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 general will is a matter of overlapping consensus, 'the bedrock beyond which we cannot go' (rawls 1993, p. 78), and in order to produce even this very minimum standard of morality, we must be prepared to water down our ideals considerably (mccarthy 1997, p. 206). other critics have argued that universal norms deny the fact that politics, democratic participation, and moral norms flourish in local communities, that they are embedded, and that they derive their moral and normative force from 'the emotional pull of love of hearth and home' (barber 2002, p. 30). moral reasoning is 'necessarily situated, embedded, and embodied' (erskine 2002, p. 572 [emphasis in original]). local community is where democracy and civic patriotism flourish, and not in abstract and intellectual universals (barber 2002, p. 31). amy gutmann argues that we need to teach and think about justice in its concrete form as part of the nation state, for the 'world' is not a community in the relevant sense; cosmopolitan universals are too abstract and intellectual to command any allegiance or normative force (gutmann 2002, p. 66). gertrude himmelfarb similarly argues that everyone must belong to a polity, a community, for we are inherently social. she claims that '[w]hat cosmopolitanism obscures, even denies, are the givens of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, community – and nationality' (himmelfarb 2002, p. 77). in response to these criticisms, martha nussbaum argues for a cosmopolitanism that transcends divisions and extends to all human beings (nussbaum 2002). justifications for human rights upon which everyone can agree must not depend upon a particular cultural or metaphysical conception (van hooft 2009, p. 73). david braybrooke in his natural law modernized draws upon developmental psychology, in which he finds that human beings begin life in bonds of mutual attachment and affection, and argues that this is crucial in developing the reciprocity that underlies the general will (braybrooke 2003). for nussbaum and braybrooke, love of humanity is not a stage of development that comes later, after one learns to love family, then community, then nation, but that these are all manifestations of the love of humanity that is the core of human cognitive and social development and which is present all along. we do not learn to love others who are distant from us; we learn to become divided from them.6 6 here, one might reference henri tajfel and his famous 'minimal group' experiments, in which he found that simple categorization, for example based on a preference for one abstract painting over another, was enough for subjects to demonstrate a preference for 'in-group' over 'out-group' members (see for example, henri tajfel cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 183 publicity and the general will the general will emerges from the individual exercise of practical reason. practical reason stems from the moral autonomy of self-legislating individuals as ends in themselves. this is 'the idea of persons as ends in themselves, the ideal (i.e., idea in individuo) of a kingdom of ends as an association of free and equal rational beings under universal laws they give to themselves' (mccarthy 1997, p. 203). practical reason is embedded reason; it is the critical thinking, reflecting, and evaluating that we use to form judgements and guide action in our everyday lives. practical reason is embedded in language and culture, in our particular time and place in history; it involves a self-awareness of our preconceptions, prejudgements, preunderstandings that inform any rational undertaking (mccarthy 1997, p. 203), and our willingness to confront and challenge them when we appreciate different points of view, when we hear good ideas, when the facts change. to conceive of the general will as an emergent phenomenon, and the exercise of practical reason as an embedded an inherently public and social activity, bridges the inherent tension between the individuals as ends-inthemselves and individuals as part of a collectivity. bohman argues that the general will emerges from the exercise of practical reason when it forms part of an engaged and self-referential public discourse. he states,'[t]he public sphere is not merely a collection of spaces or forums, such as salons, clubs, theaters, union halls, and other meeting places; nor does it consist merely of a set of formal procedures or institutional rules' (bohman 1997, p. 189). it is a part of a community that is self-understanding, selfreferential, and self-critical (ibid.). this self-reflexivity is part of the dynamic public process by which a community constructs a sense of itself by forming and testing its attitudes and beliefs (ibid., p. 190). it is never a given, never an end that converges upon a single rational outcome – ‘for kant, it is always and forever a task' (mccarthy 1997, p. 202). kant’s idea of 'publicity' is by its very nature free from coercion and authority: communicative success in the public sphere can only arise when the audience is unburdened by assumptions about who is authorized to make claims (bohman 1997, p. 184). public 1981, human groups and social categories, cambridge: cambridge university press). while tajfel's work shows the ease with which we are able to form and prefer in-group over out-group attachments, it must be remembered that tajfel also found that out-group devaluation and even more so, out-group harming are not inevitable consequences of in-group identification a position which is supported by the oliner's research on holocaust rescuers, discussed below. 184 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 speech must necessarily be free from restrictions, and assent and dissent must be expressed by free and equal participants (ibid.). kant posited that the only real check on violations of right is when they can be publicly acknowledged, and the rights and claims of the dispossessed can be recognized and defended by public opinion (ibid., p. 182). this is precisely what enables us to 'form justifications that anyone may accept' (ibid., p. 184). the audience is necessarily unrestricted and inclusive. 'such an audience,' bohman argues, 'is thus more, rather than less, pluralistic and diverse in its opinions' (ibid.). all members of a community participate in public discourse, and a community member is anyone who wishes to be admitted, and this provides the surest foundation for a democratic global discourse. reciprocity: thinking from the standpoint of everyone else david held understands the core values of cosmopolitanism to be moral egalitarianism and reciprocal recognition of the equal moral respect of every person (held 2010, p. 230). this idea has sometimes been summed up as the norm of 'reciprocity', of thinking from the standpoint of everyone else. for nussbaum, this means that 'we owe it to other human beings to try to understand their ways of thinking', to allow one’s judgements to be informed thereby, and revised accordingly (nussbaum 1997, p. 36). the notion of reciprocity is necessary for the general will to emerge not by a consensus upon some single rational opinion (bohman 1997, p. 186), but from a particular kind of discourse in which the interests of each have been duly considered. in this discourse, shared beliefs are thus constantly revised as new perspectives are added, new facts come to light. pluralism and the dynamic nature of our social spheres require a constant re-evaluation of our shared beliefs. this involves listening, understanding, an obligation of expression and articulation, and a sense of humility and openness to new ideas. the examples discussed below show that this is not only a liberal ideal, as it is practiced in numerous 'liberal', 'non-liberal', and 'traditional' societies.7 it is often assumed that identity-forming relationships, such as we have with family, friends and colleagues, or as co-members of larger ethnic, religious and social groups, are parochial and necessarily entail the exclusion of others (van hooft 2007, p. 92). as van hooft sums up this argument: 7 i question whether these are relevant categories for classifying societies: reciprocity, hospitality, the freeexchange of information, and participation are core values in many 'traditional' societies, whereas they often fail to come to full fruition in many 'liberal' ones. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 185 in so far as i draw my identity from such groupings i shall care about their members. the key to this ethic is that i am motivated to help others not out of a sense of duty, but out of concern for them. the problem with this ethic is it does not seem to be universal. it apparently confines itself to those with whom i have the relevant kind of relationship... caring does not seem to have the global scope espoused by cosmopolitanism (ibid.). while van hooft argues that reciprocity cannot be extended beyond parochial ties, appiah argues that caring and concern are not only parochial, they are uncertain and contingent bases on which to uphold rights and human dignity for the oppressed (ibid., p. 95). it is with the goal of shedding light on these issues that i now turn to empirical studies of embedded cosmopolitan norms in action, examining the ways in which self-legislating, selforganized communities constructed the general will, handled the exchange and publicity of information, defined community membership, and extended reciprocity, even to those who did not share the same religion, nationality, or ethnicity. cosmopolitan norms can be seen to be embedded in these forms of social interaction, and we might ask how this can lay the foundations for a truly moral civic life, one that can foster linkages between communities at greater levels of scale and complexity, as imagined by kant in his ideal of a universal federation of peoples. public-choice theory and self-organized communities elinor ostrom and her colleagues have studied numerous communities and the challenges they face in establishing collective action, trust, and common rules in the management of common pool resources, such as fishing grounds, irrigation systems, and forests. her work has shed light on public choice theory in economics, work for which she was awarded the nobel prize in 2009. ostrom et al. view communities managing common pool resources as complex adaptive systems. in complex situations, optimal solutions can be difficult to arrive at, yet many communities establish satisfactory rules to govern their common behaviour (ostrom et al. 1994, p. 325). ostrom examined how such communities established their own rules, built trust and a sense of legitimacy regarding self-generated rules, monitored compliance and sanctioned rule-breakers. ostrom's research began in the laboratory, where she demonstrated, through experiments in non-cooperative game theory, that in common-pool resource dilemmas where the individuals do not know one another, cannot communicate effectively, and thus cannot develop agreements, outcomes were much poorer than those predicted by standard rational choice theories (ibid., p. 319). in settings in which rational choice and individual self-interest were emphasized and rewarded, ostrom et al. found that 186 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 'others are likely to over-appropriate, under-provide, and/or engage in high levels of conflict about assignment and technological externality problems'; instead, simply allowing individuals to talk to one another produces a significant change in behavior concerning cooperation, rule-generation, trust and, ultimately, better outcomes (ibid.). as ostrom demonstrated through her experiments in cooperative game theory, even the simple act of communication can facilitate the emergence of shared norms that improve outcomes for all participants. successful communities went further, and demonstrated the values of reciprocity, inclusiveness, and the free exchange of information, and these allowed legitimate self-generated norms to emerge that were able to reduce conflict, meet the needs of community members, and avoid degradation of the common pool resource. the principles which these cultures embody and which make their local systems of common-pool resource use robust are thus the same principles that kant identified as enabling cosmopolitanism to flourish on the global scale. if it can be shown that cosmopolitan principles enable the flourishing of local communities, then we can begin to inquire into how such communities can link together to facilitate cosmopolitanism in larger and more complex – even global – social groupings. edella schlager collected data from several case studies of coastal fishing communities that faced a common pool resource dilemma. these fisheries were drawn from a diverse array of communities from around the world, including north and south america, europe, asia, africa and india (schlager 1994, pp. 255-6). the first issue facing fishers was whether to make their own individual response to the fishing strategies adopted by others, or to organize with other fishers so as to change the structure of the rules affecting fishing activities (ibid.). the individual, unorganized state is similar to the non-cooperative game theory experiments discussed above in which self-interest was rewarded and communication with others cut off, and this led inevitably to the degradation of the common pool resource (blomquist 1994, p. 293). relationships based on reciprocity, with each member thinking from the standpoint of everyone else, such as the fishing community in alanya, turkey, were more successful in generating rules that assigned resources equitably and reduced conflict (schlager 1994, p. 263). fishers who were successful in solving assignment problems were those who understood how their actions might affect each other (ibid., p. 251). opportunistic individual behaviour is seen by such fishers as undesirable in that it destroys the possibility for the gain cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 187 of all (ibid.). in studying performance in irrigation system users, tang similarly found that 'individuals who have lived together for some time are able to develop various social networks and reciprocal relationships with one another in various social arenas. knowledge about these networks and relationships is shared by members of the community. it is often difficult for outsiders to identify these networks and relationships' (tang 1994, p. 239). reciprocity worked best when there were repeated encounters under similar circumstances among the fishers, and an information network arose to gather and exchange information and to identify and negotiate rules (ibid.). relationships based upon reciprocity thus generated rules that were seen as being legitimate, that satisfied the community members' needs and that were more readily followed. community members build trust and extend reciprocity through the use of personal heuristics – stories and maxims that describe the rules and guide right conduct within the community's system of norms – as well as measured reactions, and the use of mild sanctions that progressively increase in their sanctioning power (ostrom et al. 1994, p. 327). individuals operating under norms of reciprocity, cooperation, and the free exchange of information and ideas 'achieve more than predicted by non-cooperative game theory as traditionally understood' (ibid., p. 328). on the other hand, where individuals have no expectations of mutual trust and no means of building trust through communication and continued interaction, or where mistrust is already rampant and the communication and interactions do not reduce the level of distrust, then solutions are unlikely (ibid.). reciprocity and hospitality can be far more powerful in guiding conduct than a centralized coercive authority. ostrom et al. found that communities plagued by conflict and mistrust suffered from higher levels of conflict as well as resource degradation. in this way, communities that adopted cosmopolitan norms suffered fewer of these burdens than those who did not. ostrom et al. also demonstrate a complex relationship between self-organized communities and outside centres of power. where individuals are prevented from creating rules and establishing their monitoring and sanctioning, and when those 'who are preyed upon cannot develop sanctions against their predators, the likelihood of achieving higher outcomes through their own efforts is low' (ibid.). in such cases, outside intervention to restrain oppressive power may be required. arun agrawal conducted a field study of six villages in the almora district of uttar pradesh, india, and their management of the common pool resource of the local forests, called panchayats. all villages were subject to the same centralized laws and administrative rules, 188 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 yet within this framework, each had adapted their own rules to the local conditions (agrawal 1994, p. 271). local users were better able than central authorities to craft rules to govern the use of grazing and fodder extraction from the forests, as they have greater information about themselves, their needs, and the resource, including how to match demands on the resource with its regenerative capacity (ibid., p. 273). the successful management of panchayats depends upon communication, the legitimacy of the norms generated, and successful monitoring and sanctioning of rules. when rules are not monitored or enforced, and violations are not sanctioned, then rules become meaningless guides to behaviour. this often occurred in cases in which government officials were charged with monitoring and sanctioning (ibid., p. 275). when monitoring is left solely to outside intervenors, such intercession runs the risk of disrupting the local system. guards are not numerous enough to catch very many rule-breakers, and they are easily corruptible (ostrom et al. 1994, p. 326). successful panchayat monitoring regimes involved all of the members of the community, including guards and government officials; guards under the direction of local officials brought rule-breakers before the entire village to confess their transgression and receive a penalty imposed by the villagers. the real success of this strategy lies in what agrawal terms the 'closed-loop' created among all monitors in the system: bureaucratic officials direct the guards, who monitor the resource users, who in turn monitor the guards and direct the officials as to what penalties are to be applied (agrawal 1994, p. 276). no formal or legal powers existed to maintain the authority of this system or to enforce the penalties exacted from individual rule-breakers; rather, legitimacy depended upon the recognition of the villagers, who were themselves instrumental in crafting and monitoring the rules (ibid.). closed-loop monitoring systems such as this one are able to make successful linkages with the broader administrative regime, and embody reciprocity, publicity, and participation. it therefore appears that such systems can be extended to communities larger in scale than that of the village.8 not all villages were equally successful. in one village, brahmins dominated the forest use. no brahmin was ever reported to have violated a rule; all penal activities were enforced against the lower castes, who themselves were not involved in crafting or monitoring the rules, and who determined that the rules had no legitimacy (ibid., p. 276). forest resources 8 one such example is police complaints commissions which, even when they allow for some independent monitoring, close off public participation in fact-finding and sanctioning. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 189 went disproportionately to the higher castes (ibid.). the result of this inequity was high levels of forest degradation and inter-caste conflict (ibid.). forest-use systems based upon equity and the participation of the whole village showed lower levels of conflict and lower rates of forest degradation (ibid.). these villages collected more money in fines, and were more profitable overall (ibid.). successful management depends upon communication, inclusivity, and the legitimacy of the norms generated. there were class differentials in the other villages, as well, but this did not become a site of struggle over power and resources, showing that inclusive participation and social difference can co-exist comfortably. ostrom et al. affirm the importance of forming linkages between groups, and between local groups and larger regional authorities, to exchange information and to share resources. encouraging federations of self-organized common pool resource users to exchange information about their experiences 'may be more important in enhancing the efficiency and equity use patterns than attempting to design and enforce uniform rules devised by an external authority' (ostrom et al. 1994, p. 326). the free exchange of information and ideas worked well at the local scale, as did the building of relationships of reciprocity, and these achievements can perhaps be brought to be effective at greater levels of scale within a broader system. rescuers in nazi-occupied europe on 27 january 2008, yad vashem, the holocaust martyrs' and heroes' remembrance authority, opened in new york the first exhibition of besa: a code of honor muslim albanians who rescued jews during the holocaust. besa is the work of american photographer norman gershman who spent four years in albania photographing muslims who had rescued jews during the holocaust. holocaust rescuing communities are expressions of kant's highest ideal of cosmopolitan recht that of hospitality. albania is unique among holocaust rescuing communities in that nearly all the jews living within albania's borders were saved, not only native inhabitants but also the many refugees who had fled persecution elsewhere (shendar & shaechter 2008, p. 12). the albanians' rescuing activities stemmed from a deep-seated belief in 'besa', a code of honour, hospitality, and moral egalitarianism, passed down through the generations. herman bernstein, the united states ambassador to albania stated in 1934, 'there is no trace of any discrimination against jews in albania, because albania happens to be one of the rare lands in europe today where religious 190 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 prejudice and hate do not exist, even though albanians themselves are divided into three faiths' (gershman 2008). norman gershman's photographs of albanian rescuers, displayed at the besa exhibition, are infused with the values of family, humanity and hospitality. rescuers stand in front of their homes, doors open wide, sometimes with shoes strewn across the mat, welcoming all visitors. they hold out cups of tea, or lovingly display photographs of departed relatives, in this small and culturally homogenous, deeply religious and deeply cosmopolitan society, to express kant's ideal of the law of hospitality during the dark days of the holocaust. rescuers embodied kant's ideal of moral universalism that all persons are ends in themselves and of equal worth as well as reciprocity, kant's counsel that we think from the standpoint of everyone else. rescuers demonstrate how cultural pluralism and strong ties to local norms and customs are not only compatible with moral universalism and egalitarianism, but depend upon it for the embodiment of moral values within those norms and customs. rescuers also demonstrate the truth of what kant argued in perpetual peace: that when political discourse is subordinate to morality, peace among peoples can be achieved. the study of holocaust rescuers demonstrates how local, even isolated, individuals and communities embodying cosmopolitan norms can link-together to form networks that span cultural, linguistic and religious divides which, by the end of the war, grew to cover much of europe. the growth and stability of the rescuer networks occurred under conditions of extreme hostility and deprivation. samuel and pearl oliner undertook a large study of rescuers in nazi-occupied europe, individuals who had risked their lives, and laboured under extremely hostile conditions, to help others (oliner & oliner 1988). to be considered a rescuer, candidates had to be motivated by humanitarian considerations only, risked his or her own life, and received no remuneration of any kind. the oliners interviewed 406 rescuers, 150 survivors who had been rescued, and 126 non-rescuers (ibid., p. 2). the oliners found that rescuing was based on the values the rescuers held, and not on situational or demographic factors. situational factors did not distinguish rescuers from bystanders; rescuers cut across all classes and had varying access to resources, with some being very poor (ibid., p. 128). nor did access to information, or pre-existing relationships with jewish persons affect rescuing. it was not the knowledge people had, but the significance they attached to it that was the defining difference between rescuers and bystanders (ibid., p. 123). rescuers viewed the nazi atrocities from the point of view of those who were persecuted, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 191 and had a deep emotional response to injustices committed against even those persons whom they did not personally know. rescuers saw humanity as a universal moral community from which no one is excluded; they felt and interpreted the persecution from the point of view of the persecuted; they demonstrated not only reciprocity, but deep compassion. rescuers 'defy what we think we know about human nature: that we act in the service of our own selfinterest' (schulweiss 1988, p. viii). rescuers held values of egalitarianism and inclusiveness. these values were instilled in early childhood from parents and caregivers, and are what prompted and sustained rescuers' involvement (oliner & oliner 1988, p. 142). universalism and egalitarianism never looking down on people because of who they were were values rescuers said they learned from their parents, and this distinguished them from bystanders (ibid., p. 143). rescuers held values of inclusiveness, which was defined in the study as a predisposition to regard all peoples as equals and to apply similar standards of right and wrong to them without regard to social status or ethnicity (ibid., p. 144). rescuers' caregivers had not communicated negative or stereotyped comments about other peoples in general (ibid., pp. 153-5). rescuers were significantly more likely than bystanders to believe that ethical values were universal, and were to be applied to all human beings as part of a universal moral community. as the oliners state, 'what is striking about a large percentage of rescuers is the consistently universalistic orientation, exemplified not only in the values they recall learning from their parents but also in the reasons they give for rescuing jews' (ibid., p. 166). whereas rescuers were marked by extensivity, bystanders were marked by constrictedness, by an 'ego that perceived most of the world beyond its own boundaries as peripheral'; bystanders were more centered on themselves and their own needs, and they were less conscious of others, less concerned with them, and exhibited the dissociation, detachment and exclusiveness that are the hallmarks of a constricted person (ibid., p. 186). a tendency to privilege only the interests of ourselves and those with whom we have a close personal relationship is neither an inevitable nor a ubiquitous human orientation. parochial affiliations are not a consequence of bonds of attachment, but a consequence of their absence. the values rescuers emphasized included pity, compassion, concern, affection, values that have a strong emotional component, and which in turn come from emotional bonds of attachment (ibid., p. 168). rescuers felt the suffering of a stranger to be as much their responsibility as that of a friend, and their care extended well beyond their close circle (ibid., p. 169). 192 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the oliners' study lends empirical support to the idea proposed by martha nussbaum and david braybrooke, that strong bonds of attachment in early childhood are the key to developing a universal and egalitarian moral outlook. rescuers reported stronger childhood attachments than bystanders, and this was strongly correlated with rescuers developing greater extensivity as adults, i.e. they felt stronger bonds of attachment than bystanders with all people; rescuers did not restrict their attachments only to their own families (ibid., p. 173). supportive and close parental homes propelled rescuers towards extensive relationships with others, and this included even those with whom the rescuers did not have a personal relationship (ibid., p. 183). rescuers also reported a greater belief in the value of attachment – a belief in the value of personal relationships and caring for the needy (ibid., p. 144). sazan hoxha's father, nuro hoxa, sheltered four jewish families through the war. he told them, 'now we are one family. you won’t suffer any evil. my sons and i will defend you against peril at the cost of our lives' (gershman). sazan explains, 'as devout muslims we extended our protection and humanism to the jews. why? besa, friendship and the holy koran. this is a picture of my father that i hold close to my heart' (ibid.). universal and humanist moral principles were thus compatible with culture and religion, as well as a love of country and feelings of patriotism. rescuers expressed strong feelings of patriotism, yet this did not lead them to exclude those of a different nationality. the majority of rescuers and non-rescuers said that they were very patriotic (65 and 68 percent respectively), and only a minority in both groups reported being slightly or not at all patriotic. politics seemed to play a small role in the views of both rescuers and non-rescuers, although rescuers and their parents were slightly more likely to belong to democratic political groups (ibid., p. 159). a universal ethical orientation was found to be consistent with feelings of patriotism, and in rescuers a love of one's own country stood quite comfortably alongside a love of humanity as a whole. support groups tended to grow up among small groups of like-minded persons, often beginning with family members, extending to other relatives, and to supportive civic groups, such as schools, religious congregations, political and resistance movements, and even sporting clubs (ibid., pp. 94-97). these informal networks were self-organized and selfgoverning. as the oliners state, 'informal networks were not governed by rules and regulations but were rather the product of emergent cooperative processes. objectives in such groups were not determined by a remote leadership; rather they emerged in the context of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 193 needs as participants defined them' (ibid., p. 131). what governed the linkages formed in these networks were the sentiments and behaviours of individuals, the kinds of people they were, their values, and whether they were likely to be supportive (ibid.). the rescuers' shared moral universalism gave rise to an emergent civil sphere that linked disparate individuals into large regional networks that were able to articulate core values and solve practical problems of survival under extremely challenging conditions. rescuers and their networks were remarkably successful even under the harsh oppressions of the nazi occupation. under extreme tyranny and deprivation of the necessities of life, polish rescuers sheltered about 450,000 of their jewish neighbours through the war (lukas 1989, p. 13). danish rescuers evacuated 7,200 people to safety in sweden, and yad vashem has authenticated thousands of rescues throughout the occupied territories. furth has found that there were perhaps as many as 1.2 million rescuers in poland alone (furth 1999, p. 227). millions more supported movements dedicated to rescuing and resistance to the nazi occupation. the witnessed the end of the war and the liberation of the camps. their success lies in the lives they saved and the families and communities that continue to flourish as a result, and because they demonstrate to oppressive regimes who would perpetrate inhumanities that the multitude will stand in their way – goals not imagined by the rescuers themselves, but which demonstrate the wisdom of kant's maxim: seek first the reign of pure practical reason and its justice and your end will necessarily follow. conclusion in perpetual peace, kant posited that the key cosmopolitan recht is that of hospitality – the universal custom of opening one's door to strangers, of offering them shelter and a cup of tea, of accepting them simply as fellow humans, as fellow travelers on this small earth we all inhabit together, and whose benefits we equally steward. rescuers demonstrate that this universal moral outlook is neither abstract nor intellectual, that it is embedded in the emotional ties and compassion that we have even for those who are strangers to us, and that it depends for its existence on the 'emotional pull of love of hearth and home' (barber 2002, p. 31). rescuers' cosmopolitan outlook did not obscure the givens of life: parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, community (himmelfarb 2002, p. 77), besa. on the contrary, it sprang from and was nourished by all of these. nor did rescuers obscure and deny their nationality, for rescuers were as patriotic as bystanders, and quite patriotic at that. nor was their universalism and reciprocity a burden for rescuers, despite the hardships 194 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 they faced. on the contrary, they found that articulating the core values of humanity was a source of liberation in the dark days of the nazi occupation. homo sapiens sapiens is a species, and like every species is united by a common evolution, a common biology, a common heritage. like every species, humanity comprises a complex adaptive system, remarkable in its diversity and capacity for change. kant sought to elucidate and ground in our common nature the core principles of cosmopolitan recht which he saw as the constitutional norms of humanity – universal and operative at every level of scale within the system where they serve to guide conduct and justify the rules we choose to govern ourselves. claims about human nature, the nature of moral decision-making, practical reason, public discourse, and social institutions, are in many ways empirical claims. as such, they need to be justified with reference to empirical data gathered by researchers in the social and natural sciences. as kersting states, we may have to place our faith in anthropology (and sociology, and psychology, and economics, and so on), but that it is not necessary for us to imagine a 'culture-free', 'culturally-untouched stratum' of interest and rationality in order to imagine the co-existence of universalism and pluralism (kersting 2002, p. 33). it is precisely within hearth and home and culture that we develop our commitment to moral universalism and our deep appreciation for the dignity and worth of every human being, and which binds us together in a human community. these are the norms which kant thought that everyone can agree to be bound by, as these norms have for centuries made up what kersting calls the 'normative grammar' of our social worlds (ibid., pp. 20-1). it is also here, embedded in hearth and home and culture, that pure practical reason is fostered, expressed, and comes to form the kind of political engagement and public discourse from which emerges the general will. this political space is founded upon morality, and comprises a human commons, a 'normative grammar' from which we all draw as we write the tales that become our particular cultures and our individual lives. formal and rational instruction have their place, but the kind of education that produces practical reason is embedded in deep emotional bonds of attachment and affection, and is open to all communities whether we live our lives in a remote village in albania, a farm in california, a fishing village in turkey, a panchayat in india, or in the salons and universities of vienna and amsterdam. the communities examined in this paper also show us how ethics of universality, hospitality, and publicity underlie a vibrant civil society in diverse cultures. such ethics, by virtue of their commonality, can form linkages between peoples, linkages that can cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 195 span the divides of language, religion, nationality, and geography. we can indeed look towards this cosmopolitan ethic if we would take up the challenge that kant posed 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(eds), rules, games and common-pool resource dilemmas, the university of michigan press, ann arbor, pp. 225 -246. van hooft, s. 2009, cosmopolitanism: a philosophy for global ethics, acumen, stocksfield. http://www1.yadvashem.org/about_yad/magazine/magazine_48/pdf/p12-13.pdf� http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/� publicity and the general will re-visiting key themes this issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal picks up a number of the themes discussed in previous issues. for the first time, we are reprinting an article previously published in another journal; our open access policy brings scholarly articles within the reach of many who would otherwise be unable to read them. grassroots community engagement is a theme in two of the papers. cunningham and wearing have analysed how consensus decision-making works in an ecovillage. edwards, burridge and yerbury explored how small grassroots organisations engage in the measurement and reporting of social impact. two of the papers take an intersectional approach. adami introduces the notion of intersectional dialogue which can be used to study the ‘cosmopolitan space’ in which different axes of power met in the historical drafting of the universal declaration of human rights. chiang, low and collins use an intersectional approach to examine the experiences of asian immigrant women entrepreneurs in australia and canada. davy investigates ways that effectiveness can be understood in the context of transnational advocacy networks in the greater mekong subregion. healy and magnani are both concerned with aspects of bio-politics. healy juxtaposes an analysis of affective bio-politics with existing analyses of the affective and performative dimensions to activist politics to facilitate the identification of specific opportunities for further affective constestationary strategies. magnani argues that financial shocks shape the biosphere at the intersection between labour and life. finally, in a reprinted piece, moustafine explores the russian diasporic community of harbin in north china, the geo-political forces underpinning the various waves of migration of russians into and out of harbin and complex issues of identity and citizenship, with particular reference to the jewish community. hilary yerbury 12 august 2013 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 i issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 19 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia an alternative home? asean and pacific environmental migration gil marvel p.tabucanon macquarie university abstract asean is in a unique position to push for greater global awareness and action for the vulnerable pacific populations facing the possibility of relocation. yet, it is strangely silent on the issue. asean has both moral and legal obligation not to turn its back on its pacific neighbors. asean is proximate to many pacific nations, and it has both the resources and landmass to help: two of the world’s largest archipelagos are asean members. morally, the obligations of humanity and justice require larger and more developed states to aid and assist their more vulnerable neighbors. legally, asean may learn from the african union (au) experience. while au accepted the un refugee convention definition of ‘refugee,’ it expanded it to include those compelled to leave their country owing to ‘events seriously disturbing public order.’ many scholars believe this includes the environmentally displaced. asean can choose to take the easy path of insularity and parochialism as regards the looming issue of environmental migration, or it can take the high road by transforming itself into a dynamic regional actor pushing for clear policies on how to address it. displacements are by nature traumatic and carry with them the impoverishments of landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to common property resources, and social disarticulation. asean can do much to help its vulnerable neighbors. it is a strong voice in the international community asking it to help address the issue. introduction environmental changes are among the most serious threats faced by the world today. yet, negotiations focus more on mitigation and less on adaptation, in spite the fact that potentially, the ‘greatest single impact’ of environmental change will be on ‘human migration and displacement’ (ipcc 1990). while migration would not be an only response to environmental changes, as affected populations may choose to adapt in situ or simply do nothing, yet it is a likely response for those whose homes and means of livelihood are within vulnerable locations. still migration, as an adaptation response has rarely, if at all, reached national and regional agendas. while most migrations are projected to be temporary and internal with a rural to urban or coastal to higher ground mobility pattern, this is only true of larger islands and, generally, for those experiencing short term environmental events (campbell & bedford 2012). for long-term processes, however, such as rising sea levels or irreversible salination of 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 fresh water reserves rendering low lying atoll countries uninhabitable, the prospect of an international relocation will have to be considered. this study examines an aspect of adaptation, namely the role of the association of southeast asian nations (asean) vis-à-vis the vulnerable pacific island populations. the use of asean in this paper is not limited to the regional association strictly, but includes its ten member countries individually. asean is not new to massive displacements at both regional and international levels. for instance, asean received, and helped facilitate the international resettlement of, indochinese ‘boatpeople’ in the 70s and 80s. while the indochinese refugee situation was triggered by political and not environmental causes, asean’s response to the crisis –in particular its resort to international collaboration – provides important lessons for environmentally-induced migrations in the pacific. a closer interpretation of international law documents and principles (which, though not binding, have persuasive force), considerations of humanity and political philosophy culled from various juristic writings point to an increased asean involvement, if not downright ‘obligation’ beyond state borders. climate change is a global phenomenon requiring global response. it mandates progressive thinking, perhaps a veering from traditional realist to more cosmopolitan considerations and modes of problem solving. asean may choose to respond from a parochial perspective by ignoring wider processes, or failing to heed the lessons of the past; or it may choose to transform itself into a relevant asia-pacific regional actor in addressing the globalizing effects of climate and environmental changes. the paper is structured as follows: first, an overview of asean, and pacific environmental situation. second, a discussion on state obligations beyond national and regional borders using asean’s experience on international mass migration from vietnam, cambodia and laos (then non-asean countries) as a learning experience for asean should mass displacemenst occur, this time due to environmental factors. third, the paper identifies key challenges in coming up with appropriate policies relative to the pacific environmental situation. the paper concludes that a globally relevant asean can help raise collective consciousness and action in rallying the international community to address climatic and environmental vulnerabilities. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 21 overview asean since its founding more than 40 years ago, asean has proven to be a resilient regional association that has grown in reach and vision. from five nations founding the association on august 8, 1967, namely indonesia, malaysia, the philippines, singapore and thailand, it has since added five more to its membership: brunei (1984), vietnam (1995), myanmar and laos (both in 1997), and cambodia (1999). east timor is expected to be the 11th member. from a mere joint political declaration, asean has transformed itself into a legal entity by signing the 20 november 2007 asean charter – the region’s constitution – which was fully ratified by december 2008. the charter aims to strengthen the ‘rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights’ (art.1.7), reaffirms the region’s upholding of ‘international law, including international humanitarian law’ (art 2.2) and the ‘centrality of asean in external political, economic, social and cultural relations while remaining actively engaged, outwardlooking, inclusive and non-discriminatory’ (art 2.2). the pacific for millennia, pacific islanders have moved across their vast region in search of opportunities, to satisfy a personal sense of adventure or else, to look for safe havens from natural or human-induced threats. recent events and processes, however, suggest that migration triggered by environmental changes is expected to increase significantly over the coming years (iom 2009). the pacific region with its low-elevation island nations dispersed in a vast ocean setting makes it particularly vulnerable to challenges from the physical environment. the region is predicted to be among those where the adverse effects of environmental changes can be felt the most (locke 2009). climate and environmental changes are expected to have significant impacts on all the countries of the pacific region, particularly the small atoll countries of kiribati, the marshall islands, tokelau and tuvalu. this does not mean the larger island countries are not significantly vulnerable. the capital cities of fiji, solomon islands, papua new guinea and vanuatu, not to mention other areas of heavy population and infrastructure concentration, are located along the coasts thereby exposed to long-term climatic processes. but while larger islands have higher grounds for populations to flee to, this option is not available to low-lying atoll nations. given the possibility of even a ‘moderate amount of climate change over the next century,’ atoll countries may ultimately become unsustainable as human habitations (barnett and adger 2001). 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 while the extent of impacts of environmental change is still subject to debate, plans for proactive migration of human populations are emerging. the kiribati government approved the purchase of 2,282 hectares of land in vanua levu island, fiji, in 2012. extending ‘10 km inland from the coast’ it has the potential for ‘supporting both agricultural as well as fisheries development’ (campbell and bedford 2012). while the land is for investment purposes, it is ‘certainly one of a number of options for future residence for a central pacific people who have long had to grapple with environmental uncertainty in their low-lying coral islands’ (campbell and bedford 2012). kiribati’s president, anote tong, spoke in 2005 before the 60th session of the united nations general assembly on the need for atoll countries to consider relocation of their populations. for watson, former chair of the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc), one of the dangers of land loss and displacement of populations is the ‘possible loss of whole cultures’ (watson 2000). thus, should relocation become imperative, what must be ensured is not only the physical survival of the inhabitants, but the continuation of their cultural and traditional legacies (un general assembly 2008). their preservation in case of in situ adaptation or possible re-creation in host states in case of relocation are among the matters asean can include into its own agenda, or else help bring to the larger international community for consideration. obligation beyond state and regional borders do states have obligations beyond national or regional borders? the answer would have implications to asean on matters of environmental vulnerabilities of countries beyond its member states borders. extraterritorial obligations arise from various sources, among them historical ties and treaties. for instance, colonialism has left the pacific region with a ‘complex legacy of legal and political associations’ (opeskin & macdermott 2009). under new zealand’s citizenship act of 1977, residents of new zealand’s former colonies, the cook islands and niue (now self-governing countries in free association with new zealand), are considered to be new zealand citizens with open migration access to new zealand and access to its social services. under the citizenship act, inhabitants of tokelau, a new zealand territory, are ipso facto new zealand citizens. this agreement has implications for environmental migration and has facilitated the movement of former colonial peoples to new zealand following devastating environmental events. in 1990, hurricane ofa ‘nearly necessitated an evacuation of the island [niue] to new zealand’ (barker 2000). additionally, hurricanes val (1992) and percy (2005) destroyed most of tokelau’s agriculture and led to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 23 ‘severe food shortages’ such that new zealand had to relocate tokelauans to new zealand (moore & smith 1995). states cooperate and enter obligations with other states when it is in their interest to do so. from the rational choice parameters of realpolitik, states collaborate when direct or future benefits accrue. there will be an ‘unwillingness to continue cooperation should it become unfruitful to do so’ (linklater 1977, p. 42). the trans-tasman travel arrangement allowing citizens of australia or new zealand to travel, live and work in each other’s state, cannot only be explained in light of past historical ties, but the economic benefits of a hassle-free exchange of visits, not to mention workers, from english speaking nations with a similar level of development. papua new guinea, which was part of the australian commonwealth, but whose level of economy is deemed lagging behind that of australia was not granted privileges. an exception, due to close cultural and geographical ties, are torres strait islanders who by treaty are given visa-free access to travel to australia’s northern islands under the 1985 torres strait treaty between australia and papua new guinea.1 cosmopolitan considerations a corollary question would be, do states have an obligation to consider the needs of countries with whom they have neither historical ties, nor a reasonable expectation of economic benefits. i am referring in this instance to asean vis-à-vis the environmentally vulnerable atoll countries of the pacific. i will argue that asean has an obligation when seen from a cosmopolitan rather than realist viewpoint. i will use historical, legal and humanitarian considerations why this is so. historical it is helpful to examine past asean practice regarding forced migrations. southeast asia is no stranger to internal and cross-border displacements from conflicts and environmental disasters. among these are the 2004 tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands, and displaced over 1.6 million people of which more than 500,000 were from indonesia (meisl, safaie et al. 2006). the 2008 cyclone nargis, myanmar’s worst storm in recorded history with over a hundred thousand dead and hundreds of thousands more displaced (ozerdem 2010, p. 698.) in both cases, most of displacements were internal, with the displaced either returning of their homes or resettling in nearby villages (gray 2010). 1 the treaty allows torres strait residents of papua new guinea short visits to the torres strait islands within australian territory for traditional purposes, such as fishing and other traditional activities. 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 a well-known case of mass international displacements affecting asean was the indochina refugee crisis in the late 1970s. although conventionally regarded as a situation triggered by conflict, the mass movements from vietnam, cambodia and laos were in fact precipitated by a confluence of socio-economic factors, and not just conflict. in some ways, the experience demonstrates the distinction between conflict-induced migrants and those who were economicallyor environmentally-displaced are far more blurred. for instance, what began as conflict – both regional and ethnic – resulted in ‘poverty and resource scarcity’ (frost 1980, p.348). ‘[e]conomic grievances’ was a frequently cited reason for leaving, and over the years the movements were influenced by the pull of ‘distant relative[s] abroad who left in earlier waves.’ thus, what ‘started as a refugee flow [had] increasingly come to resemble a migration flow’ (suhrke 1981, p. 26). between 1975 and 1979 over 270,000 indochinese arrived by boat in southeast asia and hong kong [see table 1], which created economic and social strain in the host countries. table 1 numbers of people arriving by boat in southeast asia and hongkong year number 1975 377 1976 5,248 1977 15,657 1978 85,544 1979 january february march april may june 8,954 5,737 11,157 26,600 51,550 56,941 source: united nations high commissioner for refugees (unhcr) (quoted in frost 1980). at the insistence of the united nations high commissioner for refugees (unhcr), the december 1978 consultative meeting on displaced persons in southeast asia was convened where thailand called for a wider sharing of the resettlement burden and limit of period of stay in asean countries (unhcr 1978). in july1979, a follow up consultative meeting on refugees and displaced persons in southeast asia was held and resulted in the formalization of the burden sharing principle among asean and western countries. the burden sharing agreement was significant. except for the philippines (and later, cambodia), none among the asean countries have acceded to the two main international refugee law instruments, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 25 namely the convention relating to the status of refugees (1951 refugee convention) and the protocol relating to the status of refugees (1967 refugee protocol) (davies 2008). legally thus, non-convention countries of indonesia, malaysia, singapore and thailand may consider indochinese arrivals illegal aliens and refuse to grant asylum. thailand refused over 42,000 cambodian refugees in late june 1979 while malaysia towed boats back to sea (stein 1979). the july 1979 meeting resulted in an asean commitment to non-refoulement and for the region to grant temporary asylum provided resettlement within third countries was assured (stein 1997). two main refugee processing centers were established, one on galang island in indonesia and the other in the town of morong, bataan, the philippines. a refugee camp was also established on bidong island in malaysia. another condition for acceptance was for the united states and the international community to bear the financial burden of maintaining the centers. at the insistence of asean foreign ministers, another international meeting was held in 1989 in response to a renewed outflow of people seeking better living prospects following the footsteps of relatives and friends already resettled in more developed countries. the meeting, called the 1989 international conference on indochinese refugees (icir), produced the declaration and comprehensive plan of action (cpa) which now involved the source country vietnam’s cooperation. thus, at the icir, vietnam agreed to simultaneously control illegal boat departures for non-genuine refugees, while expanding opportunities of legal emigration from vietnam under the orderly departure program (odp). the vietnamese also agreed to accept returnees to be monitored by the unhcr, and ‘not to take punitive measures against them’ (frost 1980, p.9). by the 1990s the refugee crisis had subsided. if anything asean has ‘successfully made the point that the indochina refugee problem [was] an international problem, not solely, nor even primarily, a regional one’ (frost 1980, p. 29). more research needs to be done on the ramifications of the indochinese refugee situation. forced displacements triggered by whatever type or cause is a global problem requiring global solutions. for more than 15 years, asean agreed to be the country of first asylum conditional on the international community’s sharing the ultimate burden of resettlement. also, legal and diplomatic measures were taken to reduce the push factors that induced the people to leave. in the context of today’s vulnerabilities from environmental factors, this lesson translates to strengthening measures for in situ adaptation to enhance resilience and prevent forced 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 migration. yet, should migration become necessary, as the asean experience has shown, the international community’s coordination becomes an element in the search for durable solutions. legal admittedly, neither asean nor its member states have direct treaty, customary law or domestic law obligation to aid, much less admit, cross-border environmental migrants. unlike the african union which has arguably at least on paper provisions for environmentally displaced ‘refugees,’2 or spain3 which signed a treaty admitting those affected by the volcanic eruption in colombia for temporary and seasonal work, and, unlike sweden4 and finland5 which both have domestic laws recognizing non-national environmental migrants as a discrete category deserving protection, asean’s member states do not as yet have legal protections in place, beyond normal and pre-existing migration channels. yet, a closer interpretation of international law documents and principles reveals asean may be obliged to help. granting, arguendo, the documents and principles do not bind, or if they bind, states may ignore them for them for want of a monitoring or enforcement body, still they are persuasive, and the international community may reasonably expect – if not demand – compliance. 2oau (1969). organisation of african unity convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in africa, adopted on 10 september 1969 and entered into force 20 june 1974. art 1 (2) art 1 (2) states: ‘the term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.’ the definition could potentially include the environmentally displaced. in africa, there is the regional practice of allowing those affected by natural disasters such as famine and drought to enter international borders. while some governments are careful not to characterize the practice as an outright obligation arising from the au treaty definition, it may be argued that the definition can contribute to the development of the protection rights for the environmentally displaced on. see edwards, a. 2006, ‘refugee status determination in africa', african journal of international and comparative law, vol.14, no.2. 3 colombian temporary and circular labour migration scheme (tclm). according to noor, ‘[w]hen in 2006 the galeras volcano in southwest colombia erupted, the tclm programme, which targets different vulnerable communities, was used to provide a migration opportunity for thousands of affected people. this programme allowed them to temporarily migrate to spain, where they could earn an income in seasonal harvest. afterwards, the programme was also expanded to rural populations, whose crops and land are particularly vulnerable to floods, droughts and other environmental disruptions.’ nicole de moor, temporary labour migration for victims of natural disasters: the case of colombia, paper prepared for unu-ehs summer academy on social vulnerability, hohenkammer, germany, 25-31 july 2010 4swedish aliens act, ch 4, s.2(3) (2006).the swedish aliens act, chapter 4, section 2(3) defines a ‘person otherwise in need of protection’ as an alien ‘unable to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster.’ chapter 5, section1 entitles ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’ to a ‘residence permit.’ 5finnish aliens act, ch. 6 s.109 (1) (2009).the finnish aliens act, chapter 6 section109(1) on the other hand, grants ‘[t]emporary protection’ to aliens in ‘need [of] international protection and who cannot return safely to their home country or country of permanent residence, because there has been…an environmental disaster.’ temporary protection may be for a ‘short duration,’ and ‘lasts for a maximum of three years in total.’ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 27 the asean nations and the small pacific island states are members of the united nations. as members they pledged to ‘achieve international cooperation in solving international problems,’ likewise in ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights’.6the question is whether the obligation relates only to the state’s population, or populations within their territories, or whether the obligation extends to peoples outside the state. what is settled is that under customary international law, broadly applying the principle of state responsibility, states must refrain from acts causing harm to another state.7 the prohibition to commit acts of genocide, piracy, slavery, torture and generally violation of peremptory norms (jus cogens) is a universal obligation, and applies to inter-state relations. these are however, mainly negative obligations. the question arises: do states have positive obligation towards other states? under international human rights law, everyone has the right to life (udhr 1948; iccpr 1966). the right to life is one of the foundational principles of international relations. likewise, every person has a right to adequate food, clothing, housing and the continuous improvement of living conditions, (icescr 1966) and everyone has the right not to be deprived of his or her means of subsistence (iccpr 1966). while the right to life, like the right to food, is compellable as a negative right under international customary law, e.g. the right not to be killed or not to be intentionally starved as when another nations’ food supply is cut off, it may not be compellable when expressed as a positive right, e.g. compel medical treatment when sick. be that as it may, under general comment no. 12 of the committee on economic, social and cultural rights, ‘[s]tates have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance with the charter of the united nations, to cooperate in providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons’ (un committee 1995). while internationally displaced environmental migrants are not included, they are not excluded, hence may be subsumed among those requiring ‘disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.’ it is submitted, that in the event of long-term environmental impacts of extreme weather rendering islands uninhabitable, 6un charter, art. 1(3), signed 26 june 1945, 59 stat. 1031, t.s. no.993, 3 bevans 1153, entered into force 24 october 1945. under art 1(3), among the purposes for which the united nations was established was to ‘achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’ it is submitted that ‘humanitarian’ in this context is used in its generic, i.e. the promotion of human welfare generally, and not restricted to conflict situations. 7trail smelter case (united states v. canada), 3 r.i.a.a. 1905 (1941). 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 humanitarian assistance includes not only food and medical supplies but the possibility of permanent relocation. while not all 10 asean countries ratified the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr) and international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (icescr),8 it may be argued the non-signatory countries are nonetheless bound to observe international human rights law principles under customary international law. asean is in a position of strength to promote the adoption of both international and regional legal frameworks relative to the environmental and human-mobility impacts of climate change. asean’s experience in the areas of environment and forced migration demonstrates its capacity. the asean-brokered 2002 agreement on transboundary haze which entered into force on 25 november 2003 is considered a global role model in tackling transnational haze issues and the 2004 asean declaration against trafficking in persons explicitly addresses the issue of human trafficking particularly of women and children. while asean may not solely bear the brunt of resettlement responsibility, it need not remain silent on the issue of cross border climate change displacements. for instance, the asean declaration on environmental sustainability recognizes the need to develop an asean climate change initiative. yet, it only goes as far as pushing for the building of environmentally sustainable cities, the promotion of alternative energy sources, energy efficiency and energy security (yuen & kong 2009). moral beyond legal conceptions, does asean have moral obligations towards environmentally vulnerable populations beyond state borders? the nature of justice and moral responsibilities between nationals of the same state has been the subject of rigorous philosophical inquiry. for instance, rawls, in reviving the social contractarian tradition argued that while an equal distribution of natural talents and acquired wealth may not be avoided, justice requires natural talents to become a ‘common asset’ among those sharing a bond of membership in a society. those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. the naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well. no one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. but it does not 8malaysia, singapore, brunei and myanmar have not ratified iccpr or icescr; while laos ratified the icescr and only signed but did not ratify the iccpr. all other asean member states ratified both treaties. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 29 follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. there is another way to deal with them. the basic structure of society can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate [the ‘difference principle’] (rawls 1971, p. 17). but while notions of justice and moral obligations are more of less settled in a state setting, comparatively little attention has been directed to them in a global setting’ (opeskin 1995, p.20). are the principles of justice and moral responsibility applicable in a world setting? if so, what are they and from where are they based. may humanity be regarded a single community? in this context, does asean have moral obligation towards vulnerable pacific nations which may have to consider the possibility of international relocation? most of us intuitively acknowledge a moral obligation to ‘relieve human suffering or distress’ when doing so would not equally endanger our life and limb (opeskin 1996). such an approach stems from our common humanity and is most manifest in one’s instinctive – almost reflexive – response to save a drowning person from a pool, either by ourselves or through another. admittedly, the demand to respond to such a situation is more compelling within those closest to us: family, neighbors, community. yet, visitors in a foreign land on their holidays would be equally pressed to save a drowning local child should they be in a proximate situation to do so. the obligation thus is not limited to blood relations or psychological proximity, but one rooted in our basic humanity, the sameness of the human condition we all share. writing on the universal obligation to help famine victims of bangladesh in the early 70’s, singer posits that such an obligation extends to individuals beyond state borders (singer 1972). his argument is premised on the fact that suffering from lack of food and medicine is bad, and that it is within the power of other states to prevent or relieve the suffering in such a situation. singer believes that the more privileged nations can do something to reduce the number of starving people without giving up the basic necessities themselves. governments across the region have expressed interest in human displacement. the intergovernmental asia-pacific consultations on refugees, displaced persons and migrants (apc), founded in 1996, provides a forum relevant to forced migration issues to explore opportunities for regional cooperation, while the asean inter-governmental commission of human rights (aichr) established in september 2009, identified migration among its concerns. in 2009, the maritime minister of indonesia announced that indonesia was 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 considering renting out some of its islands to ‘climate change refugees’ (holland 2009). the announcement augurs well for asean and provides a counter-point to parallel considerations regarding environmental migrants as non-traditional threats to the region. challenges to long-term resettlement lack of common agreement among asean’s challenges in explicitly addressing environmental migration in general and pacific environmental migration in particular is the lack of a common agreement on the definition of environmental migration. the conceptual, and consequently legal, parameters of the term are at most hazy and blur with existing definitions of ‘refugee’, ‘internal displacees,’ or ‘labour, circular or seasonal migrants.’ displaced populations due to cyclones, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis have the refugee-like characteristics of being forced out of their homes due to life threatening factors. yet, unlike refugees and refugee-like peoples, environmental migrants are not covered by an international legal framework. in international law, environmental migrants are not a ‘formal category of people in need of special protection’ (mcadam and saul 2008); neither is there a ‘coordinated legal and administrative system’ to relocate them in a ‘planned and orderly manner’ (millar 2007, p.71). there is as yet little international support for a new normative category (kolmannskog 2009); and the difficulty of getting policy-makers to act cannot be underestimated (sriskandarajah 2008, p.61). asean may learn from the african union (au) by expanding the definition of ‘refugee.’ while the au accepted the un refugee convention’s definition of ‘refugee,’ it expanded it to include those compelled to leave their country owing to ‘events seriously disturbing public order’ (oau 1969). the definition could potentially include the environmentally displaced. in africa, there is the regional practice of allowing those affected by natural disasters such as famine and drought to enter international borders. while some governments are careful not to characterize the practice as an outright obligation arising from the au treaty definition, it may be argued that the definition can contribute to the development of the protection rights for the environmentally displaced on ‘humanitarian grounds under customary international law’ (edwards 2006). asean may also learn from state practice where environmental migration policies are in place, albeit embryonic. sweden and finland have legislated protection mechanisms for victims of ‘environmental disasters’. swedish immigration policy names environmental cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 31 migrants as a separate category of ‘person in need of protection’ (swedish aliens act 2006). the finnish aliens act grants residence permits to those who ‘cannot return because of an armed conflict or environmental disaster’ (finnish aliens act 2009). further, an alien residing in finland is issued with a ‘residence permit on the basis of humanitarian protection if… he or she cannot return to his or her country of origin or country of former habitual residence as a result of an environmental catastrophe’. although the preparatory works to the aliens act state that the preferred option in environmental disasters is ‘internal relocation and international humanitarian aid,’ the act expressly acknowledges that protection in finland may become necessary (unhcr 2009). nature of environmental migration another challenge for asean policy makers is the nature of environmental migration. much like other environmental problems such as sea and air pollution, the cause and effects of environmental displacements often transcend national borders. yet, the existing structure of the international system is dominated by state-centrism. based on international law principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty, states have full discretion as to who or who not to admit into their bounded territory (zilbershats 2002). however, in an increasingly interconnected world with globalized problems this causes difficulties. climate change and its effects respect no borders. asean thus needs to find responsive paradigms and solutions that fit the global nature of the challenge. one of asean’s strengths is it is already a step removed from strict state-centrism. by its founding it recognized that there are areas of endeavour within the region needing collective and collaborative responses. an example would be the previously discussed refugee crisis, when boatloads of vietnamese, cambodian and laotian refugees spilled over to neighbouring asean countries. ultimately, the refugees were taken in, albeit temporarily, while awaiting resettlement in third countries, and refugee centers were established in indonesia, malaysia and the philippines. a humanitarian imperative rarely determines a host country’s resettlement decision. instead these are influenced by political expediency, media clamour, ideology as well as shared history and culture. yet, this should not prevent the asean from learning from countries who relaxed border controls following environmental catastrophes, albeit devoid of a shared colonial past. 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 following the december 2004 asian tsunami, canada announced it was fast tracking landedimmigrant status for those affected. by march 2005, about 1,000 applications had been expedited. the department of immigration also announced it would expedite family sponsorships of persons coming from the affected areas. canadian immigration officials also met with members of the indonesian, indian, somali and sri lankan communities in toronto to coordinate the role these communities would have in assisting the resettlement of the migrants. australia likewise fast-tracked migration applications as well as placed priority on the handing of temporary protection visas for the displaced tsunami victims (laczko and collett 2005). prospects for pacific peoples relocated communities often find themselves in a ‘state of discontent’ with many finding themselves wanting to return to their home islands (campbell, goldsmith et al. 2005). a ‘sense of loss’ is especially pronounced in environmental disasters, where the relocated populations are suddenly uprooted from their traditional lands and systems (kirsch 2001). there is a strong bond between the pacific islanders; in most cases people and land are ‘inseparable’ (campbell, goldsmith et al. 2005). while regular migration options depend on individual decisions and the ‘fit’ between the migrants’ qualifications and host state’s requirements, community relocation whether in the asean region or elsewhere presents crucial operational if not ethical questions, among them are as follows: 1. responsibility – who is responsible for the relocation? do neighboring states have moral and legal obligation under human rights principles to facilitate relocations when necessitated? past relocations were initiated by government and development agencies following natural calamities. these relocations were of a humanitarian and temporary nature. evacuees were expected to return after the disaster has passed. for long-term processes such as desertification and possible sea-level rise, permanent relocation is the only option. many of these relocations are expected to cross international borders. the resettlement of carteret islander families in bougainville was made possible by the papua new guinea government which has jurisdiction over both sending and receiving islands (parry 2006). for the smaller pacific states, their only recourse is international relocation. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 33 2. timing – relocation is a complex process that requires entire communities to be uprooted. as such, it requires not only preparation but physical and psychological readiness on the part of both the relocatees and the host communities. considering that natural disasters exacerbated by climate change can happen any time, an early preparation is imperative. kelman suggests an early planning but delayed departure scheme (kelman 2006). this means contingency measures such as the identification or advance purchase of relocation sites would have to be done, but delayed departure when necessary. the delayed departure permits ‘psychological and logistical’ readiness and saves ‘decades of productive island life’ (kelman 2006). 3. funding – relocation involves costs. these can include preparation and transportation of communities, and the setting up of infrastructure in the relocation site. this includes roads, housing and utilities. eventually, provisions for the setting up of schools, health centers would have to be made available as well. in the case of banaba, a resettlement trust fund has been set up years prior to the relocation. this was made possible out of banaba island’s phosphate royalties. funding for climate change adaptation may require multilateral cooperation. although criticized by some as difficult for third world nations to access, the united nations administered global environment facility gef trust fund, which includes the least developed countries trust fund (ldctf) and special climate change trust fund (sccf) offers promise for countries which may require resettlement due to climate change. already, the government of indonesia has set up the indonesia climate change trust fund (icctf) which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation projects within indonesia. the icctf receives contributions from bilateral and multilateral donors for the purpose. the indonesian experience can be used as a blue-print for the establishment of an asean climate change trust fund. this asean fund may already include provisions for possible resettlement options within and outside of asean borders. 4. relocation site australia and new zealand are often mentioned as possible resettlement sites due to proximity and level of economic development. a disadvantage would be possible loss of an island culture if resettlement is made in metropolitan cities, whereas an island in indonesia or the philippines would more or 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 less provide similar tropical island surroundings. this means arrangements would have to be made involving multilateral actors. asean would be in a good position to broker logistics and preparation: from identifying temporary processing centers similar to the bataan refugee center pending final placements, to the purchase or lease of tracts of agricultural lands as relocation sites; when feasible, outright ceding of existing islands or creation of artificial islands may be considered. territorial claims aside, layang-layang island in the spratly islands was artificially created by malaysia by way of reclaiming the shallow sea in between two reefs. conclusion around 10 per cent – 550 millionof the world’s population live on its 180,498 islands, of which some 30,000 are in the pacific. more than one fifth or 22 per cent of the world’s sovereign states are exclusively island states (kelman 2006). although islands occupy just 1.86 per cent of the earth’s land surface area, 13.1 per cent -or 106 out of 812 – of unesco’s world heritage sites are on islands. the various cultural heritages of the pacific islands are important in their own right, and the necessity of preserving them cannot be underestimated. islands yield a rich array of the world’s languages, beliefs, livelihood systems as well as unique social, political and governmental structures. pacific island states account for an unusually high percentage of the world’s linguistic and cultural output. over a third of all known languages are spoken in the four pacific countries of the melanesian region: new caledonia, papua new guinea, the solomons and vanuatu (pernetta 1992). pacific islands are also home to distinctive mores, cultures, indigenous knowledge, and ecological features that cannot be duplicated elsewhere. islanders’ indigenous knowledge, albeit increasingly diminishing in the modern age, mitigates extreme impacts of natural disasters. the indigenous knowledge of solomon islanders helped residents recognize impending signs of the 2 april 2007 tsunami thereby reducing casualties (mcadoo, moore et al. 2009). while the island characteristics of isolation, low elevation, small size and resource base make them more vulnerable to environmental threats, yet, their isolated societies also produce tight kinship networks and a strong sense of community that help address challenges cohesively (howorth 2005). that the pacific is extremely vulnerable to long-term environmental processes cannot be overemphasized. in kiribati where groundwater is the ‘main source of drinking water’ on most cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 35 islands, residents have been ‘forced to migrate temporarily to areas with higher rainfall’ (roy & connell 1991). some of these processes are said not to be caused by climate change but by neglect, short-sightedness in implementation of construction projects and mismanagement. connell argues that in tuvalu, for instance, the construction of roads between islands had blocked the natural lagoon to ocean channels; that the dredging and sea wall construction, airport runway sealing and land reclamation have ‘all transformed the topography of tiny islands’ and ‘ensured that the effects of storms and high tides are different to those in earlier times’ (connell 2003, p.104). in any case, low lying atoll states such as tuvalu remain vulnerable to long term environmental processes such as climate change. asean is in a unique position to push for heightened global awareness and action for the vulnerable pacific populations facing the possibility of relocation. yet, it is strangely silent on the issue. asean has both moral and legal obligation not to turn its back on its pacific neighbors. morally, asean is geographically, albeit not politically, part of the pacific region. it is proximate to many pacific nations, and it has both the resources and landmass to help: two of the world’s largest archipelagos are asean members. the obligations of humanity and justice require larger and more developed states aid and assist their more vulnerable neighbors. calamity becomes an injustice if those who could have ‘undertaken preventive action’ were remiss, or ‘failed to try’ (sen 2009). legally, international human rights instruments mandate everyone to observe the duty to preserve life, the right to life being one of the foundational principles of international relations. asean may learn from the african union (au) experience. while au accepted the un refugee convention definition of ‘refugee’, it expanded it to include those compelled to leave their country owing to ‘events seriously disturbing public order.’ many scholars believe this includes the environmentally displaced. asean can choose to take on the easy path of insularity and parochialism as regards the looming issue of environmental migration, or it can take the high road by transforming itself into a dynamic regional actor pushing for clear policies on how to address it. displacements are by nature traumatic and carry with them the impoverishments of landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to common property resources, and social disarticulation (cernea & mcdowell 2000). asean can do much to help its vulnerable neighbors. with its archipelagos and off shore islands it can open its doors to vulnerable pacific populations. resettlement may be permanent or else temporary, pending determination of the 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 environmental migrants’ permanent home, as in the case of vietnamese and cambodian refugees. at the very least, asean can help raise global consciousness and awareness in rallying the international community to collectively address the issue. acknowledgements i would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their supportive and helpful comments. references associated press 2010, haiti raises earthquake toll to 230,000. the washington post. asean (association of southeast asian nations) 2007, charter of the association of southeast asian nations, signed on 20 november 2007. asean regional forum 2010, asean regional forum documents series 2006 -2009 , asean secretariat, jakarta. australia, senate select committee report 2004, the senate select committee report on ministerial discretion in migration matters, commonwealth of australia. australia, 1995, torres strait treaty australia-papua new guinea, article 11(1), australian treaty series 1985 no 4. australian law reports 1996,ozmanian v. minister for 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wellbeing bronwyn batten kellyanne stanford office of environment and heritage nsw department of premier and cabinet abstract the nsw government has begun to utilise the concept of ‘wellbeing’ in relation to aboriginal communities. this has involved delving into questions about what makes communities strong, and what factors are necessary and/or unique to creating strong aboriginal communities. this paper provides an insider’s view of the government’s journey into wellbeing to date, detailing the positions and assumptions that the work began with and, in particular, outlining the process of the creation of the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing framework (the policy context) and the development of a resource for aboriginal communities a user friendly software program for communities wishing to holistically assess and plan for strengthening their wellbeing (the ‘strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing toolkit’). the paper does not delve into critical literature on community engagement and devolution of community control, but rather provides an overview of why and how a particular policy approach was developed which, in the authors’ view, will increase community control and power in local decision making and local planning processes. background the concept of wellbeing has been increasingly used in recent times, particularly as it applies to indigenous communities. for example, in 2002 the nsw government developed a 10 year plan to improve the wellbeing of nsw aboriginal people and more recently the australian institute of aboriginal and torres strait islander studies (aiatsis) dedicated its 2010 seminar series to the concept of wellbeing. in 2011 the international journal of wellbeing was also created to foster interdisciplinary research in the area. the complexities associated with defining and measuring indigenous wellbeing are noted in the commonwealth government’s 2009 overcoming indigenous disadvantage report (scrgsp 2009, p. 123). frameworks that have been developed by government to measure the impact or effect of particular portfolios or programs may not necessarily take into account or measure other interrelated factors that contribute to, or impact upon, wellbeing. for example: government programs that target the reduction of otitis media cases within aboriginal communities may not necessarily note or measure the potential multiple effects and benefits that the reduction of otitis media may have on wellbeing such as an increase in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 55 school attendance, improved school results or more harmonious family relationships. yet when trying to develop frameworks that measure impacts in a holistic way, government faces the considerable challenge of developing culturally appropriate and relevant measures of the effectiveness of initiatives. the nsw government began exploring the topic of wellbeing in relation to aboriginal communities and culture and heritage management in 2006 – commissioning a report on how cultural heritage contributes to aboriginal community wellbeing and how cultural notions of wellbeing can be applied in a policy setting (grieves 2006). they also conducted a research project examining how aboriginal promoting and protecting heritage contributes to the health and wellbeing of aboriginal communities (carrington & young 2011). this research argued that the concept of wellbeing is particularly embraced by aboriginal communities because it is holistic, and is ‘understood to be greater than general happiness, health, welfare or safety’ (carrington & young 2011, p.4). following this initial research, the nsw government began to explore the application of wellbeing beyond culture and heritage and into the realm of aboriginal affairs more broadly. in 2007, the nsw parliament legislative council standing committee on social issues commenced an inquiry into overcoming indigenous disadvantage in nsw. the 2008 report produced by the inquiry contained a number of recommendations which in turn shaped the direction of further work around wellbeing. in 2009, the nsw government responded to the report and began to develop what they referred to as the strengthening community wellbeing framework which they envisaged would outlast the usual three year political cycle, assist with defining ‘cultural resilience’, provide for a process which would assist aboriginal communities to determine measures of wellbeing and identify local problems and solutions (new south wales parliament legislative council standing committee on social issues 2008, pp. xviii xx). in addition to the influence of the 2008 inquiry report, the nsw government’s work around aboriginal wellbeing was guided by state and national policies in indigenous affairs at the time. these were: the council of australian governments (coag) “closing the gap”; the coag “overcoming indigenous disadvantage indicator framework”; the nsw state plan – “a new direction for nsw” (2006-2016); and the nsw 10 year aboriginal affairs plan – “two ways together” (2002-2012). whilst highlighting critical areas of importance to 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 aboriginal people, these policies largely adopted a deficit approach – focussing on state or national problems and weaknesses existing in communities. in contrast, by focussing on community wellbeing the approach being developed in nsw allowed for an alternative, strength-based and local approach to aboriginal affairs. in addition to the overriding policy context, the work around wellbeing was also guided by reflecting on the principle community planning initiative of the time: the coag trial in the murdi paaki region of north-west new south wales. the murdi paaki coag trial was one of eight trials being carried out around australia, with the aim of improving coordination of government services for indigenous people based on priorities agreed with communities. whilst the coag trial provided and invested substantial financial and human resources to assist communities to develop action plans, no other community planning tools were provided which supported the community to systematically self assess the state of the community, self prioritise the community’s desires for change, and then negotiate, develop and monitor implementation of actions plans in partnership with governments and other service providers. from the authors’ perspective, a review of nsw and commonwealth indicator reports demonstrated that, whilst some achievements were made through a variety of government initiatives, there was clearly an opportunity to improve local aboriginal community planning approaches and outcomes. prior to beginning work on the development of the aboriginal community wellbeing framework a number of guiding principles were established to govern the work. these included the idea that an aboriginal wellbeing and community planning approach had to be genuinely holistic – tackling community development from all angles rather than looking at one or two discreet ‘problem’ areas (e.g. health or education); that aboriginal disadvantage has its origins in the dispossession and dislocation of aboriginal people, the accompanying breakdown of community governance and leadership structures, and the suppression of cultural knowledge and practices (including language); and that communities needed tools in order to practically exercise self determination. a key guiding principle was that communities strong in their culture, governance and leadership will have a greater capacity to overcome adversity to identify and achieve their shared goals. culture, governance and leadership were therefore to be integral elements to the wellbeing work. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 57 during the initial research around the application of wellbeing beyond heritage and into aboriginal affairs broadly (largely conducted in 2008 and 2009) the commonwealth “overcoming indigenous disadvantage indicators report” (scrgsp 2009, p. 98) highlighted the difficulties in defining and measuring social and emotional wellbeing and identified improvements in data on comparable measures of social and emotional wellbeing of indigenous people as a priority. clearly, defining and measuring wellbeing, particularly at the community level, was no easy feat. the nsw government therefore began to also explore international approaches to both measuring and strengthening community wellbeing, with a particular focus on (but not limited to) processes that targeted indigenous communities, were holistic and supported a strength-based partnership approach (see batten 2009 and batten & batten 2011). examining approaches to community resilience and wellbeing in canada further highlighted the principle adopted by the nsw government at the outset that strong culture (including access to country) was critical to community wellbeing. in canada research has shown that communities who have strong cultural identity and pride, along with high rates of language retention and self-determination, are far less likely to be affected by mental health issues and suicide and less likely to be in contact with the criminal justice system (chandler & lalonde 1998). another international example which also informed the nsw work was the “sustainable livelihoods approach” (sla) and framework developed and utilised by the uk department for international development to alleviate disadvantage. the sla approach reaffirmed the nsw government’s guiding principle that a holistic approach to strengthening community wellbeing was required one which recognised that a community’s wellbeing and its ability to overcome disadvantage was closely associated with a community’s access to, and opportunities to use its human, social, natural, physical and financial capital (department for international development 1999). informed by the research, principles, and policies discussed above, a draft framework identifying factors that were critical to aboriginal community wellbeing was developed by the nsw government. the framework drew upon and simplified a range of different, and often overly complex, community strengthening models with adaptations to reflect the unique needs of nsw aboriginal communities: in particular the framework was underpinned by the importance of cultural strength. a think tank was organised to discuss and further develop the 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 draft1 . following the think tank, the framework was finalised during workshops held with the minister for environment’s aboriginal cultural heritage advisory committee and in workshops with both the la perouse and wellington aboriginal communities. both communities were participants in the nsw governments two ways together partnership community program. the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing framework the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing framework was intended to provide a way to systematically consider a broad range of social, economic, environmental, cultural, governance and service delivery issues that are critical for strengthening and maintaining aboriginal community wellbeing. eight interconnected areas were identified as being critically important to wellbeing: cultural identity, access to country, sense of community, leadership and influence, education and learning, community health and safety, infrastructure figure 1: the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing framework 1 the think tank brought together a range of specialists (both indigenous and non-indigenous) working in the area of wellbeing and community development including academics, individuals well known for their involvement in community development, non-government organisations and representatives from government (including various states and representatives from the commonwealth government and an indigenous researcher working in the field via video link from canada). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 59 and services, and economic strength and development. the wellington and la perouse communities along with aboriginal advisory bodies provided examples of the types of issues that might be covered under each of the eight areas (providing the ‘meat’ for the ‘bones’ of the framework). for example, under the ‘access to country’ area, the communities provided the following input: • sufficient access to country provides a sense of belonging – this sense of belonging improves self-esteem, pride in community and pride in one’s self. • for access to be considered adequate, kids in the community must feel a strong connection to country – this is evidence of the ability to practice culture on country, share the stories, memories and history that bind people to place. • access to country means provision of education, training and employment opportunities to care for country – working on country is a natural fit for many, but there often aren’t enough opportunities. • communities want the opportunity to share their land management skills and techniques with the broader community. • access to country is only satisfactory if the community is able to freely practice its culture on its country (public or private), particularly at sites of significance2 • good partnerships with the broader community facilitate access to country – when surrounding communities acknowledge and fully understand the importance of access to country, and work with the indigenous community to allow access and input to management where relevant, access is considered healthy. • access to country may extend to the opportunity to use country to drive economic development for the community – this means having the freedom to conduct commercial enterprises on country, and having access to the support and resources to start these enterprises where relevant. (office of environment and heritage, 2012, p. 35) the other seven areas that together form the wellbeing framework were similarly ‘fleshed out’ by the communities. perspectives gathered on each of the factors contributing to 2 practicing culture includes hunting, fishing, cultural camps, sharing stories in places of significance. ‘freely practice’ means free from onerous rules and regulation. 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 wellbeing were intended to serve as reference points to prompt other communities using the framework about the range of issues the eight interconnected areas of the framework could cover. after the development of the framework, the focus of the wellbeing work then turned to developing appropriate processes for measuring wellbeing within the framework. this was to help community and government to track trends in wellbeing over time and improve service delivery in response to trends. measuring wellbeing one clear message arising from the 2009 overcoming indigenous disadvantage key indicators report was that it is difficult to define and measure social and emotional (indigenous) wellbeing (scrgsp 2009, p. 123). australia does not currently have a nationally-agreed approach to defining, measuring or planning for the wellbeing of aboriginal communities. existing national and state wellbeing monitoring, reporting and evaluation frameworks have typically been program-specific. there is also a dearth of reliable and conclusive data to establish the solid evidence base required to measure community wellbeing in a holistic way. several challenges are noted nationally and internationally relating to measurement of aboriginal wellbeing, including how to bridge the gap between governments’ expectations and aboriginal peoples’ world views about culturally relevant standards for measuring aboriginal wellbeing. governments generally focus on tangible “things” that are easily measured, whilst community understandings of what it means to “be well” often focus on the less tangible dimensions of wellbeing. there are a few examples that challenge this generalisation including work being undertaken in victoria (community indicators victoria n.d.) and the australian bureau of statistics (2010). despite the challenges noted, there is widespread recognition within government that a strong cultural identity and/or sense of community identity is essential to family and community wellbeing and should be measured. there is also recognition within communities and government that the need to measure and track wellbeing over time is critical to improving the circumstances of aboriginal people. the overcoming indigenous disadvantage report states that ‘culture pervades every aspect of the lives of indigenous people, and some studies have suggested that cultural strength can provide communities with a degree of resilience to entrenched disadvantage’ and that ‘no single indicator could adequately reflect the place of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 61 culture in the lives of indigenous people’ (scrgsp 2009, p. 124). the report highlights the complexities of capturing data that adequately reflects the place of culture in the lives of indigenous people. initially, the approach adopted by the nsw government to measure wellbeing was to develop a series of indicators that would sit under each of the eight interconnected factors identified as contributing to wellbeing under the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing framework. however, readily available data was largely only available at an aggregated state and national level which meant that the scale of available data was not really meaningful at the community level nor was the available data flexible enough to allow for the diversity of communities situations. in addition to this there was a clear absence of data that could provide a meaningful picture of less tangible or traditionally ‘unmeasurable’ areas such as a community’s cultural strength and identity. the approach therefore evolved to one which aimed to turn arguably the best source of information about aboriginal communities – community held knowledge – into a format that could be used to consistently monitor community wellbeing over time. it was decided to use the methodology of appreciative inquiry to conduct social research with two aboriginal communities (la perouse and wellington) in order to develop a series of statements that communities could utilise to self assess their current levels of wellbeing under each of the areas in the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing framework. appreciative inquiry assumes that progress is more likely to be made by focusing on and exploring what we want to see more of (wellbeing), rather than being fixated on studying problems (disadvantage). for this reason, the nsw government embraced the appreciative inquiry method and incorporated it into the toolkit. appreciative inquiry was consistent with a key nsw government principle adopted at the commencement of the wellbeing work – that a strength-based wellbeing approach was required. as a method of strengthening wellbeing, appreciative inquiry differs from other problem-solving and community planning approaches. the basic assumption of the majority of problem-solving and community planning methodologies is that people and organisations are fundamentally ‘broken’ and need to be fixed. problem solving and planning usually involves identifying key problems, analysing root causes, searching for possible solutions, and developing an action plan. in contrast, the underlying assumption of appreciative inquiry is that people, organisations and 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 communities are full of assets, capabilities, resources, and strengths that are waiting to be located, affirmed, stretched, and encouraged. given that appreciative inquiry is 1) verbally based, 2) solutions focussed and 3) community or location specific, the nsw government recognised that appreciative inquiry could potentially be a great ‘cultural match’ with aboriginal communities. in addition to fleshing out the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing framework the nsw government began exploring the development of a toolkit to support aboriginal communities to make informed decisions about their future needs and priorities – decisions grounded in a solid evidence base and a realistic understanding of a community's current situation. the toolkit was intended to identify and support a community’s priorities and aspirations and to provide the community with a strong negotiating position when it comes to agreeing on action plans in partnership with government (nsw government response to the recommendations of the legislative council social issues committee's inquiry into overcoming indigenous disadvantage 2009, p 13). working with both a rural and metropolitan community (along with various aboriginal advisory bodies with representation across nsw) was a deliberate strategy to help ensure that the diverse needs and views of nsw aboriginal communities would be addressed throughout the framework and toolkit. a series of community wellbeing self-assessment statements were developed through the social research by communities telling stories about the best aspects of the past as the foundation for effective visualisation of what would constitute “success” and “wellbeing” in their community for each of the eight areas in the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing framework. as an example, the self-assessment statements produced for the area of ‘access to country’ are reproduced below: 1. youth: younger members of our community feel connected to our country. 2. cultural practice: we have the ability to practice culture on our country, which drives a sense of belonging for members of our community. 3. partnerships: our community has strong partnerships with the broader community that allow access to country and give the community a say where relevant. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 63 4. opportunities: there are opportunities for education, training and employment to care for country for members of our community. 5. self-determination: our community has the ability to determine how we use our country, including for commercial enterprise for the community’s benefit if desired. (office of environment and heritage 2012, p. 34) as part of the toolkit process communities are asked to confer on how accurate the statement is for the community and how important it is to the community. a more thorough description of the toolkit processes is included later in the paper within the section ‘development of the toolkit’. throughout the development of the self-assessment statements, the communities also groundtested the framework and agreed that all matters that impacted on their community’s wellbeing were addressed under the framework. the communities confirmed the value in having the framework to guide a structured and focussed conversation, with appropriate “prompts” (i.e. the self assessment statements) to facilitate discussion and consideration of a broad range of issues, rather than only focussing on immediately identifiable issues within the community or limiting discussion to those issues that were currently affecting or impacting on their wellbeing. in the authors’ opinion the methodology of appreciative inquiry proved to be a great “cultural match” as an approach to consultation about the framework and as a method to hold discussions using the framework. applying appreciative inquiry resulted in meetings that were strength-based and solutions-focussed. it is not uncommon for a strengths-based approach to feel different and unconventional at first. in the authors’ observation, after people have experienced this approach they feel much more comfortable about it and can see the logic behind it. as one elder observed, ‘we used to tell stories like this. once upon a time we used to tell stories that made us feel proud. but over the past 20 years it seems all we ever talk about is our problems. we have forgotten how to tell stories differently. this has helped a great deal. it feels right. it is the way we should think about ourselves, our community, our country’ (office of environment and heritage 2012, p. 27). the development of the toolkit most community strengthening programs have developed methodologies which are contained within lengthy and often complex guide books that require considerable skills and 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 background knowledge to guide communities through the process. many aboriginal communities feel “over planned”, having been required to go though many community planning processes with government. to address this issue the nsw government adopted an alternative approach to community assessment and planning: the creation of a user friendly software-based tool designed to support solutions focussed conversations between the community and service providers (both government and non-government) in a way that captures and records that conversation for community planning purposes. the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing toolkit was developed by tailor making a software program which guided aboriginal community groups through three important steps to both measure community wellbeing and inform the development of community action plans designed to strengthen community wellbeing. the steps identified as critical in a community planning process are reflected in the three modules which make up the software: 1 – assessment – understanding how our community is going 2 preparing for negotiation – goal setting and prioritising 3 planning together to strengthen wellbeing. figure 2: the home screen of the toolkit showing the three different modules cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 65 module 1 – the assessment module, guides the community through a process of assessing their current levels of wellbeing (utilising the series of community developed self-assessment statements) against each of the eight areas identified as contributing to wellbeing under the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing framework. communities select answers from a performance and importance ranking for each of the self-assessment statements (48 in total). figure 3 shows the screen shot of one of the self-assessment statements contained within the area of education and learning. communities are required to make a judgement on whether they have ‘access to well funded and well functioning schools, tafes or other educational institutions’. the community must select an answer from the performance criteria from ‘always, most of the time, occasionally or never’ and also select the level of importance of this particular area to the community ‘somewhat important, important, very important, crucial’. figure 3: example of one of the self assessment statements in the assessment module the toolkit is designed to be used by a group that is representative of the community in ‘round table’ sessions (this is explored later in the paper within the section ‘who will use the toolkit’). each of the self-assessment statements would normally involve significant 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 discussion by the group, and potentially involve prior consultation with the broader community (for example, surveying the community using the self-assessment statements to gauge broad community perceptions using complimentary, cost effective and user friendly tools such as survey monkey). module 1 also requires communities to map existing strengths and assets and provides space to record issues and stories for each statement in the assessment module. module 2 uses the results of the assessment process to support communities to set and prioritise goals. this step also assists communities to map out their strengths and to incorporate goals and actions from existing community plans. figure 4: a screen shot from the preparing for negotiation: goal setting and prioritising module module 3 uses the results of the assessment and goal setting processes (the two prior modules) to support the community and government to work together to negotiate and plan community and government roles in actions in order to achieve community goals; strengthen cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 67 community wellbeing, and improve service delivery. relevant non-government organisations and service providers may also be involved. figure 5: a screen shot from the planning together module the toolkit provides an output of a report for each of these three stages or ‘modules’ of the software. the reports can be used to facilitate monitoring of community wellbeing over time and to inform the development of community action plans. as a result of the overwhelmingly positive feedback from communities about the appreciative inquiry methodology, key elements of the methodology were incorporated into the toolkit. for example the toolkit provides a mechanism for capturing the important community conversations, allowing for differing opinions to be recorded .the toolkit also simultaneously provides for recognition of existing community strengths, capacities and assets whilst identifying gaps and aspirations for change. the toolkit has the potential to provide communities with an evidence base about their current level of wellbeing across the areas included within the wellbeing framework. such an evidence base can assist in negotiations with government about actions and services to address identified gaps and to 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 assist with maintaining or strengthening actions, programs and/or services that are critical to their wellbeing. the toolkit also focuses on community perceptions and gives communities a strong say in determining what’s right for them. consultation with the wellington and la perouse aboriginal communities also highlighted another important consideration for community planning which was incorporated into the toolkit – a process for community prioritisation of issues and actions which was responsive to the community self-assessment process and independent of existing government priorities and/or programs targets. to support this process a matrix was incorporated into the software which enabled the community to determine for themselves both the level of importance of the issue and the frequency in which it occurred in their community. by considering and ranking both these factors the community was able to utilise the toolkit to simultaneously self-assess and selfprioritise matters affecting their wellbeing. the figure below demonstrates how the software is able to translate the community’s answers to help determine priorities for planning. areas that the community identifies as never or only occasionally occurring in their community, yet are ranked ‘crucial’ or ‘very important’ are prioritised highly by the software program, prompting communities to consider focusing their attention on addressing these matters. im po rt an ce s ca le 4 crucial suggest focusing effort here maintain current efforts and consider directing new efforts here 3 very important 2 important consider maintaining or redirecting effort not a current priority area; suggest redirecting effort to higher priorities 1 somewhat important 4 never 3 occasionally 2 most of the time 1 always performance scale figure 6: the community self prioritisation matrix cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 69 at the end of the assessment process, the community is prompted to identify goals for the areas which the software has suggested should be ranked as ‘focus efforts here’ and ‘maintain efforts here’. the aim is to focus the community efforts and resources on the key actions that will provide the most benefit to their wellbeing. throughout the community consultation process, communities confirmed that the process of identifying a limited number of focussed key goals and actions will assist with development of a realistically achievable action plan, rather than a comprehensive list of community aspirations. during consultation, communities advised the authors that a long list of aspirations provided a substantial risk of the community being diverted to areas of their wellbeing which were not key community priorities because funding or other type of support for that area may become available rather than focussing on a smaller and more manageable list of areas identified by the community as “key priorities”. however, it is also recognised that community planning may need to legitimately change in order to take advantage of available government funding or new community priorities. therefore, in order to maintain community autonomy and control over the process, a function was added in to the software, in response to communities’ requests, for the option to reject the software suggestions and to have the option to create community goals for areas that the toolkit did not suggest based on community responses alone. the final module in the toolkit is the ‘planning together module’. the aim of this module is to set out the specific actions that will help the community to achieve its goals. some actions may involve partnerships with government agencies or other organisations, and some actions may be carried out and owned by the community themselves – without the need for partnerships with government or other service providers. this module is designed to be completed with the community working together with the relevant partners so that all parties who will be involved in carrying out an action are also involved in determining what the action is, what their specific roles will be, and what is needed to complete the action. communities recognised that actions stand a better chance of being completed if they have been negotiated and agreed upon first by all the parties involved rather than spending a lot of time and energy debating how to deliver an action after a plan has already been developed. for this reason, the toolkit provides for development of actions that have been negotiated with and committed to by partners and service providers – rather than finalising the plan in isolation from input from those that will need to respond to the actions. the communities advised that the information generated by the toolkit in the first and second modules (self70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 assessment, prioritisation and goal setting) would place them in a strong position to negotiate appropriate responses from partners and service providers – using information that was self generated, but presented in a way that bridged the “cultural divide” – effectively creating a common language. who will use the toolkit? the main users of the toolkit will be communities participating in the nsw government partnership community program. the government intends that the partnership community program will establish ‘a basis for aboriginal communities and government (state and federal) to work together to improve outcomes for aboriginal people through partnership, mutual accountability and strengthened local decision making’ (department of aboriginal affairs 2009a). the program aims to ‘improve service delivery and outcomes on the ground for aboriginal people; and strengthen aboriginal community wellbeing’ (department of aboriginal affairs 2009a). the partnership community program is based on the principle that ‘aboriginal people know best the needs of their communities, and that government agencies and aboriginal communities need to work in partnership to improve outcomes on the ground’ (department of aboriginal affairs 2009a). community program officers employed by aboriginal affairs nsw (previously called the department of aboriginal affairs) have been trained by the office of environment and heritage in facilitating the use of the toolkit in communities. the toolkit is designed to be used by a community engagement group as defined in the partnership community governance framework (department of aboriginal affairs 2009b). however, the toolkit is also available as a resource for communities, peak bodies and other interested parties who may not currently be participating in the partnership community program. the toolkit is designed to be user friendly and intuitive; nevertheless a manual is also available as an additional resource to help any community who wishes to use the toolkit. in order for the toolkit to be an effective resource for communities not participating in the partnership community program, it is recommended that the toolkit is used by an engagement group or equivalent – i.e. a group that: reflects the diversity of the community; is representative of the interests of the entire community, and is supported to make decisions on behalf of the community. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 71 discussion the toolkit has the potential to meet dual aspirations, those of the community e.g. facilitating community self determination and improving community wellbeing and those of government e.g. achieving real progress in community wellbeing and meeting program and strategy targets and outcomes. meeting community aspirations the communities involved in developing and using the toolkit have provided informal feedback to staff involved in developing the toolkit that it will support self determination by enabling community self assessment – communities will tell their perspective instead of being told about themselves by government using government collected data. government information still remains a useful source of information but having the community “story” is important – discrepancies between the two “stories” will prompt a useful and valuable discussion between government and communities. the communities involved in the development of the toolkit also believed that the fact that it allows for self prioritisation of community priorities instead of priorities being forced by accessing available funds and programs due to government created indigenous targets also contributes to community selfdetermination. when using the toolkit, the community is generating their own information (turning information held in and by the community – information that they own and control) into a form that is compatible with government processes. the community is making its needs and wants heard in a way that is mutually understood by both community and government. communities have advised that negotiating with service providers utilising community generated data will be a first for many communities and will be empowering and “level out the playing field”. communities have also advised that they have felt disempowered in past negotiations due to lack of “evidence” to support their priorities and their inability to demonstrate a community process for developing priorities. the communities involved in the development of the toolkit felt that the toolkit supported a strength-based participatory community self assessment and planning process. the toolkit commences the community discussion in a positive way– encouraging the community to reflect upon and recognise the good things (assets and capacities – both tangible and intangible) in the community. in the authors’ observation it is often easier to agree upon the 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 positives which encourages a consensus building process and lays the foundation for application of positive lessons from the past along with aspects of an appreciative inquiry methodology throughout the 3 modules of the toolkit. the toolkit is strength-based and solution-focussed. the communities consulted acknowledged that the process of recognising existing community strengths, assets and capacities is one quite often overlooked in planning processes and discussions with government. in the authors opinion past community planning processes generally commence with “problems and issues”, and without a holistic assessment of the current status of the community. however in the “wellbeing” process, the consultation commenced with discussions about existing community strengths and assets and moved into a conversation about what the community would like to see more of – through this process, the community identified key matters that warranted focussed action, and prepared to plan, in partnership with government and other service provider, to address those matters, some members of the wellington and la perouse communities expressed the feeling that the toolkit will help establish processes where for the first time community planning provides an opportunity to tell their own stories in their own voices, and to assess, for themselves, their own wellbeing. the wellbeing framework enables the community to genuinely consider its wellbeing independent of government plans and targets or other governance or statutory reporting requirements. the community is not forced to slot its information into a format that suits the latest government plan. it is a resource that can outlive political cycles and ‘state plans’ and so on. meeting government aspirations the nsw government ombudsman’s 2011 report ‘addressing aboriginal disadvantage: the need to do things differently’ observed that the answer to addressing disadvantage is not providing further financial resources to initiatives, rather a different approach to the way governments plan, fund and deliver services. the report identified five key areas for change: • aboriginal leadership • improving the capacity to respond to vulnerable aboriginal children and adolescents • investing in education • building economic capacity in aboriginal communities cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 73 • establishing a new accountability framework for addressing aboriginal disadvantage (nsw ombudsman, 2011) the toolkit and framework has the potential to support a different way of working with aboriginal communities and the five areas identified by the ombudsman, and more, by supporting government and community to work together to identify ways to plan, fund and deliver services. in addition, the strengthening community wellbeing framework enables the government to demonstrate actions that are responsive to community identified needs and aspirations. the framework could also be utilised to develop portfolio and program specific indicators which could be aggregated to a state level whilst providing for comparison at the community level (given it forms the basis of community planning). the strengthening community wellbeing framework and toolkit supports a number of recommendations within the auditor general’s performance audit of the nsw aboriginal affairs plan (2003 – 2012) – two ways together. these include: • the partnership community program has merit and should be supported by providing ongoing training for the community governance bodies; • that a process be developed which monitors nsw government compliance with the requirement to work the community governance bodies within the partnership community program; • that aboriginal people know best the needs and aspirations of their local communities; (nsw auditor-general, 2011) the toolkit does this by serving as a resource to partnership communities (and any other community that wishes to use it) that will help prepare them to engage with government to jointly agree on a series of actions to best meet community goals and priorities. the toolkit will also contribute to changing the current way of implementing a plan in aboriginal communities by getting the community involved early in assessment, prioritisation and planning stage; informing both the community and government decision making process; and more clearly defining what the community actually wants and how that will contribute to improving wellbeing. 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 the nsw government’s commitment to strengthening community wellbeing was clearly indicated in 2010 with bipartisan support to amend the nsw constitution in order to recognise and acknowledge aboriginal people of nsw. hansard recorded the nsw government’s pledge to close the gap in aboriginal disadvantage, and to work with nongovernment organisations and the community to improve aboriginal wellbeing (new south wales parliament, 2010, pp. 26125 – 26133, pp. 26152 – 26158). conclusion the strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing toolkit was formally launched on 14 march 2012 by the minister for environment and heritage. it is still therefore very much “early days” for the toolkit. the use and effectiveness of the toolkit will be monitored and then reviewed two years after its launch and the office of environment and heritage will be asking anyone involved in using the toolkit to contribute to its review so that it can continue to be refined to meet the needs of communities. the evaluation will address a broad spectrum of issues from user friendliness to its usefulness as a tool for both measuring wellbeing and facilitating community planning. a survey has been set up to help collect information on the effectiveness of the toolkit whilst the experience of using the toolkit is fresh in the minds of communities. the comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of the wellbeing research, framework and toolkit will need to begin with a definition of the measure of success. the evolution of the wellbeing research into the development of a framework and toolkit has occurred simultaneously within a changing aboriginal affairs policy context in nsw – from two ways together to closing the gap and now to the development of a new (and yet unknown) policy framework. the nsw government is currently developing a new aboriginal affairs strategy, which may result in indicators and targets developed for the state level. the question remains as to how communities will measure the success of the framework and toolkit at the community level. it is important that the evaluation of the framework and toolkit take into account the success of this dual focus – meeting both community and government aspirations – at the local level. the la-perouse community became the first community to formally use the framework and toolkit with the la-perouse aboriginal community alliance utilising it on the 22 march 2012 in a forum of approximately 50 people. the use of the framework and toolkit by the lacosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 75 perouse community in a large community setting demonstrates that its use is flexible – one size does not fit all. given the large number of people present and the challenges of reaching consensus in a forum of that size the la perouse community did not use the toolkit software, instead they utilised the toolkit handbook and the appreciative enquiry methodology to inform a community forum about the strengths of the la perouse community within the context of the framework and to hold round table sessions using the toolkit self assessment statements. a second session utilising the framework will also occur in order to determine what the community would like to see more of, and how they think this would best occur (i.e. developing community derived solutions). the la perouse community alliance (a team of approximately 15 people) will then analyse the results of the community forum and utilise the toolkit software in order to generate a community action plan in partnership with services providers. the toolkit and framework are not intended to be a “magic wand” in aboriginal affairs. the toolkit and framework will not solve all issues in communities overnight nor will they immediately bridge the gap between the government’s and communities’ understandings of issues affecting community wellbeing – it is hoped, however, that over time these resources will create dialogue and discussion around wellbeing in communities and how to actively improve it and empower communities to turn their knowledge and perceptions into information to inform community planning. this will allow communities to be in a position of informed strength and to be able to negotiate relevant actions with government and other service providers to achieve their goals. at this stage the toolkit is only available via a cd for use on a local computer and not online. this decision has been made deliberately, and in consultation with the aboriginal communities that assisted with development of the toolkit. although promoting and distributing the toolkit online would be much easier, and the ease of access for many communities could be greater, distributing the toolkit via cd ensures that all information entered into the software program remains the property of communities. no information is stored online by government, only on community computers. the wellbeing work began its journey by simply undertaking an exercise to “define” aboriginal community wellbeing in order to measure improvements as a result of government investment and commitment. as discussed throughout this paper, this journey 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 and task evolved into a far more complex task – that of supporting communities to have an increased level of control over defining, assessing, planning for, and measuring, their own wellbeing, in a culturally appropriate way, and in a way that was easily understood by government, facilitated an appropriate government response and enabled the government to track and measure the success of investments into service delivery and policy responses. a copy of the toolkit on cd can be obtained by contacting the office of environment and heritage – country, culture and heritage division on (02) 9585 6453 or emailing aboriginal.affairs@environment.nsw.gov.au. references australian bureau of statistics, 2010. 4703.0 framework for measuring wellbeing: aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples, 2010. available online: http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4703.0?opendocument batten, b. 2009. building aboriginal community resilience: learning from canadian experiences, unpublished report. batten, b. and batten, p. 2011, ‘strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing – learning from canadian experiences’, journal of australian indigenous issues, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 85-100. carrington, b. & young, p. 2011, aboriginal heritage and wellbeing, department of environment, climate change and water (nsw), sydney south. available online: http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/nswcultureheritage/aboriginalheritagewellbeing. htm chandler, m. & lalonde, c. 1998, ‘cultural continuity as a hedge against suicide in canada's first nations’, transcultural psychiatry, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 191-219. community indicators victoria n.d, an introduction to community indicators victoria, community indicators victoria. available online: http://www.communityindicators.net.au/about_us department of aboriginal affairs (nsw) 2009a, partnership community program fact sheet, available online: http://www.daa.nsw.gov.au/data/files//partnershipcommprog_factsheet110811.pdf department of aboriginal affairs (nsw) 2009b, draft partnership community governance framework, available online: http://www.daa.nsw.gov.au/publications/twtpcgf.pdf department for international development 1999, sustainable livelihoods guidance sheets: introduction, dfid, london, available online: http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0901/section1.pdf grieves, v. 2006, indigenous wellbeing: a framework for governments’ aboriginal cultural heritage activities, department of environment and conservation (nsw). available online: http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/cultureheritage/grievesreport2006.pdf mailto:aboriginal.affairs@environment.nsw.gov.au� http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/4703.0?opendocument� http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/nswcultureheritage/aboriginalheritagewellbeing.htm� http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/nswcultureheritage/aboriginalheritagewellbeing.htm� http://www.communityindicators.net.au/about_us� http://www.daa.nsw.gov.au/data/files/partnershipcommprog_factsheet110811.pdf� http://www.daa.nsw.gov.au/publications/twtpcgf.pdf� http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0901/section1.pdf� http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/resources/cultureheritage/grievesreport2006.pdf� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 77 new south wales auditor – general 2011, performance audit, two ways together – nsw aboriginal affairs plan. available online: http://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/articledocuments/143/213_two_way_together_aborigi nal_affairs.pdf.aspx nsw ombudsman 2011, addressing aboriginal disadvantage: the need to do things differently. available online: http://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/publication/pdf/specialreport/sr_aboriginal%20disadv antage%20report.pdf new south wales parliament 2010, legislative council, parliamentary debates, (hansard) (october 19). available online: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hanstrans.nsf/v3bykey/lc2010101 9/$file/541lc215.pdf new south wales parliament legislative council standing committee on social issues 2008, overcoming indigenous disadvantage in new south wales. final report (report 41) nsw parliament, sydney, nsw. available online: http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/5e06cb564943b260c a25750e0002d05d/$file/081125%20final%20report%20for%20website.pdf new south wales parliament legislative council standing committee on social issues 2009, new south wales whole of government response to the recommendations of the legislative council social issues committee's inquiry into overcoming indigenous disadvantage. http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/5e06cb564943b260c a25750e0002d05d/$file/090527%20govt%20response%20to%20oid%20final%20re port.pdf office of environment and heritage 2012, strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing toolkit user manual, office of environment and heritage, nsw department of premier and cabinet, sydney south. scrgsp (steering committee for the review of government service provision). 2009, overcoming indigenous disadvantage: key indicators 2009, productivity commission, canberra. available online: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/90129/key-indicators-2009.pdf http://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/articledocuments/143/213_two_way_together_aboriginal_affairs.pdf.aspx� http://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/articledocuments/143/213_two_way_together_aboriginal_affairs.pdf.aspx� http://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/publication/pdf/specialreport/sr_aboriginal%20disadvantage%20report.pdf� http://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/publication/pdf/specialreport/sr_aboriginal%20disadvantage%20report.pdf� http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hanstrans.nsf/v3bykey/lc20101019/$file/541lc215.pdf� http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/hanstrans.nsf/v3bykey/lc20101019/$file/541lc215.pdf� http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/5e06cb564943b260ca25750e0002d05d/$file/081125%20final%20report%20for%20website.pdf� http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/5e06cb564943b260ca25750e0002d05d/$file/081125%20final%20report%20for%20website.pdf� http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/5e06cb564943b260ca25750e0002d05d/$file/090527%20govt%20response%20to%20oid%20final%20report.pdf� http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/5e06cb564943b260ca25750e0002d05d/$file/090527%20govt%20response%20to%20oid%20final%20report.pdf� http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/5e06cb564943b260ca25750e0002d05d/$file/090527%20govt%20response%20to%20oid%20final%20report.pdf� http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/90129/key-indicators-2009.pdf� strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 i issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia information in civil societies – a multi-faceted approach this issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal addresses many of our contemporary issues around information and knowledge management in civil societies. it takes a holistic view of information and knowledge management by touching upon all facets of its expression in our lives -the personal, the professional, the social, the negotiated, and the public. the articles deal with aspects of information and knowledge that range from the personal, private and experiential ‘knowledges’ we value and trust, to how we make sense of our work and our actions using our knowledge, and share information and knowledge in social spaces and in organisations, and how governments encourage the processes of democracy through access to public sector information. a key theme is how knowledge can become part of everyday culture, from the understandings of the iconic shakespeare to the use of information and data produced by governments or generated through the use of social media in online civil society. the issue of barriers to the spread of scholarly knowledge, which can prevent certain types of knowledge from becoming part of everyday culture, is also raised. the articles arise from challenges which form the research agenda for the information and knowledge in civil societies group within the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre. these challenges include how are information and data used, shared and re-used in the context of specific communities, cultures and practices, how contexts can influence the process of a cycle of knowledge creation and how do specific communities create and manage knowledge? hilary yerbury’s revaluing women's knowledge calls for a fresh look at women’s participation in scholarship and contribution to civil societies by proposing new ways for women to tap into their traditional knowledges and networks using contemporary modes of the information commons such as open access journals that are afforded by digital media. michael olsson’s making sense of shakespeare: a cultural icon for contemporary audiences uses an empirical approach through interviews to argue that the performance of shakespeare involves the operationalisation of several modes and levels of information, ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 understandings, and knowledge that ranges from the epistemic to the historical, cultural, national and political by drawing on information arising from discourses and knowledges that make personal and professional sense to the theatre professionals. bhuva narayan’s from everyday information behaviours to clickable solidarity in a place called social media covers a range of ways in which we conceive of and use social media technologies in our networked information society and how this new form of digital media is affecting information flows in civil society. it does so by using spatial metaphors and theories that help compare and contrast our real world with the virtual worlds of social media. dean leith’s representation of the concept of trust in lis literature explores the concept of trust and the role it plays in knowledge sharing within and between organisations. it does so by examining the several facets of trust such as faith, truth, power, and authority through various theoretical lenses, for trust is an important aspect of civil society and trust in shared information is the glue that holds it together. maureen henninger’s the value and challenges of public sector information explains the opportunities and risks to civil society posed by new data-analytic technologies that help both governments and commercial organisations easily access not just the content of public sector information but also aid the discovery of new and unintended information within this information store through discerning the information patterns using metadata and other markers. this is a very important and timely topic of discussion that relates to all the other articles in this issue for it affects how and what we intentionally and unintentionally reveal about our personal and private information. public sector information is necessary for civil societies but public information that is publicised or used in ways they were not originally intended can affect both our personal and professional lives and also the organisations we place our trust in. other scholars are confronting similar challenges in their work on information and knowledge in civil society. we hope that these articles from our research group will encourage others to submit their efforts to respond to these challenges to the cosmopolitan civil societies journal. bhuva narayan sydney, november 2013 information in civil societies – a multi-faceted approach cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2013 i issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia a common theme – ethical practice james goodman university of technology, sydney as with every open issue, we aim here at opening up new lines of inquiry, embracing a range of themes and topics. generally some unexpected common themes emerge, and this open issue is no exception. across all of these papers there is a shared concern with the dynamics of ethical practice. what drives it, how can it be fostered, what does it generate? jenny onyx takes the ‘social impact’ debate from top-down evaluation or assessment to grassroots practice. instead of beginning with elite-defined program ‘impact’, onyx starts with the actual practices of civil society organisations. through ‘practice theory’, social interactions are seen as constituting the social field. rather than fixing and monetising impact, the approach charts civil society as a ‘developmental process’. the approach then involves mapping the multi-faceted social interactions of organizations. the emphasis here is on highlighting the dynamic process of social relations, as the immediate manifestation of civil society. the following two papers address issues of ethical practice through the analysis of fields of policy. ying hooi khoo offers an in-depth account of the disjunctures between human rights practice and national reporting to united nations human rights council. khoo’s focus is on the malaysian case, and clearly the tensions she highlights are shown to have wide application wherever states fail to embrace the reporting process and instead approach it as a diplomatic exercise. for khoo the un process offers opportunities for states and ngos to develop human rights practice on the ground. through it, states can build reputation, and ngos can gain leverage. in the malaysian case these opportunities remain unrealized, in large part due to the defensive stance taken by the malaysian state. wearing, cunningham, schweinsberg and jobberns discuss the ethics of whale watching, as an instance in the commercialisation of nature. they stress the ethical boundaries that arise, set by an underlying framework of ecological tourism. there are practical limits in terms of interference, but there are also ethical concerns in terms of the exploitation of the ecological commons for commercial gain. what responsibilities come with exploitation, in terms of public education and active conservation? the authors suggest these can be realized in practice through the ethics of eco-tourism, and provide both ‘an avenue for economic growth and the development of political capital’. questions of ethical practice also arise for the remaining two papers, both of which conduct ethnographic or participant investigations into fields of practice. kirpitchenko offers an opportunity to reflect on our own practices as students and academics, and thereby ‘bring home’ the question of ethical practice, specifically through the analysis of academic cosmopolitanism. the phenomenon of academic mobility across international borders and between different cultures, both as an intellectual and an experiential exercise, is seen as ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2013 generating the conditions for cosmopolitanism. the paper investigates the practices of academic cosmopolitanism, and finds they flourish in the encounters and interactions of research subjects. kirpitchenko argues that intellectual inquiry and mobility dovetails with inclusivity and interculturalism, creating fertile ground for cosmopolitanism. in a final paper for the open issue, chris khoo, with schulenkorf and adair, take us to the ethics of sport and development policy in samoa. the paper investigates the use australian foreign aid to promote cricket for community development. khoo et al. draw on local engagement and in-depth interviews with participants to discuss whether the program had benefitted local communities, and to identify any issues needing to be addressed. as is often the case with aid programs, a key issue was indigenisation and ‘ownership’, and specifically the relationship between a widely-played local version of cricket, ‘kirikiti’, and official cricket as an international sport. khoo et al. stress that respondents saw the need to build on local practices rather than supplant them, thereby highlighting a centrally important dimension of ethical practice as embedded practice. a common theme – ethical practice james goodman university of technology, sydney cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 i issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the third sector and issues in civil society the papers in this issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal explore the theme of third sector and community organisations and their engagement with notions of civil society. these organisations are at the heart of civil society, creating spaces for individuals to come together with others to work towards a shared vision for their community. the papers in this issue show the increased diversity and complexity of relationships between individuals, organisations and the wider community. each provides cases of the pressures, negotiations, resistance, and partnering that characterise volunteer, state, and, corporate interactions in contemporary civil societies. the very different configurations of public action, civil society and community involvement highlight how no single model offers an optimum relationship among civil societies’ and the polity other various actors. they also are part of the growing recognition of the importance of 'civil society' both at the domestic and international level for its role not only to promoting civic organisations to become policy participants but also in fostering innovative approaches to improving the well-being and better outcomes for the most vulnerable. the first paper is by debal singharoy, who was a visiting scholar at the cosmopolitan civil society research centre in 2010. it reports on a study he conducted into grassroots indigenous organisations and their involvement in environmental issues. through a series of case studies, he examines the process of articulation and rejuvenation of indigenous identities that negotiate the contending pressures of development and the environment across culture and the needs of the community. in the second paper, jonathon main examines partnerships between organisations within the community services sector. he argues that drivers of collaboration can only be understood in the context of previous interactions between agencies. whether these were seen as strong, weak or ambiguous was related to whether previous relationships were considered to be disengaged or cooperative in nature. ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 in the third paper, naomi berman and emily mellon focus on individuals, showing how creating space for young social change-makers to develop participatory practices that lead to civic engagement can enhance their sense of self as well as strengthening the community. questions of identity are also central to the fourth paper by ilaria buscaglia and shirley randell. they show how a colonial program intended to empower women in what is now rwanda undermined the traditional power and authority of women in the society at the expense of creating a westernised elite. they argue that post-genocide reconstruction of society in rwanda has established a social and legislative space where the identity of women in society can be reframed. these four papers continue existing debates and open new perspectives on longstanding questions about how members of democratic societies that value civic engagement interact collectively. these articles show that civil sector organisations do not simply exist in a condition of conflict or partnership with other civil society actors, government and private sectors, but is these relationships are in a state of continual negotiation to create pragmatic solutions to produce and maintain a space for civic inclusion in the polity. we hope that they will spark debate and lead to further scholarly contributions in this important area. bronwen dalton sydney february 2012 the third sector and issues in civil society cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.2, 2011 i inclusion, identity and the capacity to act this issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal brings together papers which focus on involvement in civil societies in different locations, from brazil to papua new guinea, from cyberspace to australia, and which are concerned with inclusion, identity and the capacity to act. baird and henninger use the metaphor of serious play to show how digital technologies can prevent those with visual impairments from developing the literacy skills which are fundamental to contemporary life and propose the need for developers of applications for digital technologies to adopt a set of heuristic principles so that the digital playground is accessible to all. maranhao and knijnik explore gilberto freyre’s ideas from the 1930s about futebol mulato and the way these ideas have spread around the world the notion of the brazilian mulatto as a symbol of a ‘racial democracy’, unique in brazil. they argue that freyre’s ideas, which are as applicable now as they were when they were first published, were useful in constructing the brazilian identity, a nation of harmony in all its aspects, including the area of race, and how the idea of the mulatto has been used to minimise social disparities within brazilian society. bott, grabowski and wearing are concerned with complexity of developing a case for world heritage listing in developing countries and in facilitating stakeholder collaboration in this process. they present a case study of kokoda and the owen stanley ranges which demonstrates that stakeholders exhibit differing levels of power, legitimacy, urgency and proximity and that collaboration is essential for the best outcome. in the context of tourism, wearing and darcy explore the question of the other in tourism, in this case, host communities, which are often seen as removed from the neoliberal business foundation of tourism. they present an overview of how the engagement of host communities can expand the market for tourism and lead to more satisfying visitor experiences, enhance the sustainability of these experiences and, thus, be considered good management practice within the industry. they argue that, if sustainability is to move beyond economic and environmental western constructs to embrace social sustainability, changing global values require tourism management to adopt more inclusive ways of practice and management principles. finally, arvanitakis is concerned with notions of citizenship and explores how the political moment, signalled by the anti-war protests in sydney, australia in 2003 which brought more than half a million people onto the streets, was displaced into the everyday. he proposes that this displacement has led to a re-definition of ‘political action’ and the emergence of a different type of everyday politics. hilary yerbury cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 1 the politics of remembering and forgetting: native title law and reconciliation in australia francesca dominello abstract the post-mabo era was to be the age of reconciliation and the end of unjust dispossession of indigenous peoples’ lands. however, as the more recent cases in native title show this vision did not become the reality. in this paper, i will examine mabo in its historical context. in particular i will examine the claim that mabo was a product of the ‘new history’ movement in australia. this movement developed in response to the silence that had shrouded the history of colonial relations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples for most of the 19th and 20th centuries. through the writing of these histories, new historians have raised awareness of the history of colonization in australia and the impact it has had on indigenous peoples in particular. in the paper i will outline the ways in which mabo is a product of this history. however, if mabo did not bring to an end to the injustice and inequality facing indigenous peoples in the context of land law in australia, it is because of the traces of another history informing that decision and the events that followed it. in this paper i will refer to this history as the ‘old history’ of australia. in this history indigenous peoples are placed in a paradoxical position: they are inferior, but still seen as threat to the colonial enterprise. the paper will explore how this ‘history’ is repeated in mabo and continues to inform the high court’s approach to native title law. the post-mabo era was to be the age of reconciliation and the end of unjust dispossession of indigenous peoples’ lands. however, as the more recent cases in native title have shown, this has not become the reality. in this paper mabo will be examined in its historical context. as part of the reconciliation movement, mabo has been identified by some as a product of the ‘new history’ movement in australia (attwood 1996a). this movement developed in response to the silence that had shrouded the history of colonial relations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples for most of the 19th and 20th centuries. through the writing of these histories, the new historians have raised awareness of the history of colonization in australia and the impact it has had on indigenous peoples in particular. the first part of the paper will consider how mabo may be understood in terms of this history. however, if mabo did not bring an end to the injustice and inequality facing indigenous peoples in the context of land law in australia, this failure may be understood in terms of another version of history, which in this paper will be referred to as the ‘old history’ of australia. in this history indigenous peoples are placed in a paradoxical position: they are inferior, but still seen as a threat to the colonial enterprise. the second half of the paper will explore how this ‘history’ may assist our understanding of the limitations of the mabo decision and of the more recent high court cases in native title law, especially with respect to 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 their interpretation of the definition of native title in the native title act 1993 (cth) (‘nta’). by contrast to the reconciliatory sentiment that underlies mabo and the new history movement that forms part of its background, the third part of the paper will examine the more recent developments in the case law. the paper will conclude by arguing that mabo may have provided the potential impetus for change in the context of land rights in australia, but that there are still many obstacles in the way of this change. mabo and the new history movement in mabo for the first time in australian law a form of indigenous native title was found, not only to exist, but also to have predated and to have survived the acquisition of british sovereignty. the court’s formulation was grounded in the common law: the common law recognized that native title survived the acquisition of british sovereignty over the australian territories as a burden on the radical title of the crown to the land. the content of native title, however, would arise from the traditions and customs of the indigenous peoples themselves. in order to facilitate the common law recognition of native title, the court first considered it necessary to reject the terra nullius doctrine as forming no part of australian law. whether in fact it was necessary for the court to ‘reject’ the ‘terra nullius doctrine’ remains to be seen, especially since there had been no direct authorities in australian common law declaring the australian territories to be ‘terra nullius’ in those precise terms (ritter 1996). even so, if the court found that the ‘terra nullius doctrine’ had operated to deny any indigenous rights to land, it may be because of the characterization of australia at the time of first settlement as a land belonging to no one. this legal characterization had found support in a line of judicial pronouncements that declared the continent to be in effect ‘desert and uncultivated’ at the time of british settlement, and provided the framework in which colonization was legitimized (deane and gaudron jj in mabo, 1992, at 102-4). thus, even in the absence of direct authorities claiming the australian territories to be terra nullius, the authorities that supported the ‘discourse of terra nullius’ (ritter 1996, p. 13) may have led the court to come to the conclusion that the ‘terra nullius doctrine’ must be overcome in order for native title to be recognized in australian law. notwithstanding this error, when the authorities treating australia as ‘desert and uncultivated’ (in effect ‘terra nullius’) were translated to the indigenous inhabitants, the effect was that they were cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 3 deemed to be still living in a state of nature: with no laws, no organized society and no culture. by contrast, the court’s rejection of the ‘terra nullius doctrine’ was in effect an acknowledgement that the indigenous inhabitants did belong to organized societies with their own laws and customs. in this way the apparent change in the law can be explained in terms of changed perceptions of indigenous peoples. ultimately, this change in perception depended on a change in values. for brennan j the common law of australia could not remain ‘frozen in an age of racial discrimination’ (mabo, 1992, at 42), but could be modified to reflect changed contemporary notions of justice and human rights, as manifested in part by international law and the common law as it has developed in other common law countries. thus, from a legal perspective we can understand the decision in mabo as finally aligning australian jurisprudence in relation to native title law with developments in international and australian domestic law (most notably the rejection of the terra nullius doctrine by the international court of justice in western sahara (advisory opinion) and the enactment in australia of the racial discrimination act 1975 (cth) (‘rda’)). we can also understand the high court’s decision in mabo as bringing australian law into line with developments in countries such as canada and the united states. it had already become evident after blackburn j’s judgment in milirrpum v nabalco that australia was lagging behind in this area. notwithstanding the extent to which jurisdictions elsewhere had extended legal recognition to traditional titles to land, blackburn j in milirrpum rejected the claim for native title in that case on the basis that ‘the doctrine does not form, and never has formed, part of the law of any part of australia’ (milirrpum, 1971, at 141). however, even at the time of the decision in milirrpum there was an evident disjuncture between blackburn j’s final determination and his own perception of the indigenous claimant groups in that case. indeed blackburn j accepted the evidence that showed the claimants: had a subtle and elaborate system highly adapted to the country in which the people led their lives, which provided a stable order of society and was remarkably free from the vagaries of personal whim or influence. if ever a system could be called ‘a government of laws, and not of men’, it is that shown in the evidence before me (milirrpum, 1971, at 267). the evident discrepancy between fact and law in this case is clear: the indigenous claimants were found to be socially organized with their own system of laws and government that predated the british arrival, yet there was no legal acknowledgement of that fact. 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 it was only in mabo that this gap was finally bridged through the legal recognition of native title in that case (dominello 2008a, p. 172). but while the decision in mabo reflects a change in the perception of indigenous peoples and is overtly critical of the colonial practices, policies and laws that contributed to their dispossession in the first place, these developments can be understood more broadly in terms of the work of the new historians in the latter half of the 20th century. for instance in mabo deane and gaudron jj declared: if this were any ordinary case, the court would not be justified in reopening the validity of fundamental propositions which have been endorsed by long-established authority and which have been accepted as a basis of the real property law of the country for more than one hundred and fifty years … far from being ordinary, however, the circumstances of the present case make it unique (mabo, 1992, at 109). arguably, if mabo was no ordinary case then it should be seen as more than just a simple ‘correction of a local anomaly’ (nettheim 1993, p. 18), bringing australia into line with the developments that had occurred elsewhere in the common law world. while it may be true that mabo was not a ‘judicial revolution’, but a mere ‘cautious correction to australian law’ (nettheim 1993, p. 2), there was something much more profound motivating the court in mabo ‘to change the law’ in a way that may only be explained by reference to its broader historical context. thus, it is one of the contentions of this paper that in order to fully understand the court’s decision in mabo we must look beyond the pre-existing legal framework that the court drew upon to support its decision, and acknowledge its broader historical context – and, in particular, the writing of australian histories from the late 1960s onwards – as contributing to the impetus for change (in law and in society) that culminated in (among other things) the mabo decision. there are four significant ways in which the new history writing of the time may be seen as important to the decision in mabo. first, it is important to acknowledge the role of anthropologists such as weh stanner who made the call to break the silence surrounding the history of dispossession in australia in the late 1960s (stanner 1969). in a similar vein, the court can also be seen as actively engaging in the process of breaking the silence surrounding the history of colonial relations in australia. this was conveyed most forcefully in the joint judgment cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 5 of deane and gaudron jj through their ‘acknowledgement of, and retreat from … past injustices’ (mabo, 1992, at 109) experienced by indigenous peoples in australia – the dispossession of their lands. this sentiment directly echoes the sentiment of the new historians – a ‘sense of dis-ease’ about the silence that had shrouded colonial history in australia, and a motivation to come to terms with this history in order to overcome it (attwood 1996a, p. xxix). for new historians ‘the continuing colonial crime’ was to keep locked the ‘cupboard of our history’ (smith 1981, p. 26). the forgetfulness surrounding the history of dispossession was the ‘moral issue central to the nation’s existence’ (smith 1981, p. 17) and continued to pose ‘a central problem for the integrity and authenticity of australia’ (smith 1981, p. 45). similarly for deane and gaudron jj there was a recognition in their judgment that ‘[t]he acts and events by which that dispossession in legal theory was carried into practical effect constitute the darkest aspect of the history of this nation’; and that only by overcoming this history (through rejection of the terra nullius doctrine) could a ‘diminished’ nation find salvation (mabo, 1992, at 109). just as the new historians had recognized that indigenous peoples had been exposed to serious injustices through colonization, so too had the court, and in mabo the court took the opportunity to do something about it. secondly, insofar as the new historians have engaged in the writing of colonial history, the work of henry reynolds has proved most influential – not least in the mabo decision itself. reynolds himself has acknowledged his own contribution to the decision in various places (reynolds 1992, pp. 185-202, reynolds 1993), and his influence is acknowledged by others (ritter 1996, p. 29; briscoe 1993, pp. 4-5; hughes and pitty 1994, p. 13). most importantly there are references to his work in the actual judgments (deane and gaudron jj, in mabo, at 107, 142; toohey j, in mabo, at 181). and it has been argued that it was reynolds’ analysis of the terra nullius doctrine as standing in the way of legal recognition of native title that compelled the court to reject it in the first place (ritter 1996, p. 29). in other words, if the court made an error by perceiving the terra nullius doctrine as having operated to deny the recognition of native title in australia, that error could be traced back to reynolds’ research as he had been the one to launch the term ‘into mainstream public debate’ (ritter 1996, p. 27). as ritter has described it: ‘reynolds turned the dispossession of aboriginal people into a “legal” event, in the sense of an event recognised as traceable to the operation of a legal general rule’ (ritter 1996, p. 29). 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 more significantly, however, reynolds’ work had revealed that there had not been a wholesale extinguishment of native title, but that in early colonial times the colonial office had recognized the indigenous occupants’ legal interest in the land, and had tried to protect it in 1846 by an order in council – which in reynolds’ view ‘was a clear and demonstrable recognition of native title: the right to use and occupy land held under traditional title’ (reynolds 1987, p. 139). in this regard reynolds’ analysis of legal history was at odds with blackburn j’s conclusions in milirrpum, and was crucial in raising awareness of the need to correct the law in this area. indeed, if reynolds’ view is accepted, then the law had always recognized indigenous peoples’ native title rights and interests to their traditional lands: it was the settlers and successive governments, jurists and historians that had got it wrong. reynolds’ historical work had found traces of earlier attempts to protect native title, although those attempts had failed until mabo. but if mabo was an attempt at recovering this lost history, it was also an attempt to recover aboriginal history. in the writing of new history the new historians not only recovered long forgotten facts of colonial history, but created a space for the writing/speaking of aboriginal histories. thus, the third contribution of the new histories to australian history writing that came to be reflected in mabo was the valorization of aboriginal history. this is most evident in the court’s acceptance of the perception of indigenous peoples as having their own laws and social systems as a basis for ‘rejecting’ the terra nullius doctrine and extending legal recognition to native title. moreover, the content of native title was to emanate from the indigenous claimants themselves. in this regard the oral testimonies of the claimants that related to proof of custom, otherwise termed ‘traditional evidence’, were accepted by the trial judge, and in turn by the high court in the final proceedings, as supporting the claimants’ contentions concerning the survival and nature of their rights and interests to land (keon-cohen 1993, pp. 195-7). importantly, as in the writing of history, indigenous peoples were seen as engaged in the process – as active agents in history and in law. this brings us to the fourth contribution made by the more recent history writing to the mabo decision. according to more traditional approaches to historical methodology the writing of history entails maintaining strict delineations between past and present (and future): cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 7 so long as scientific methods are adopted, it is possible for the historian and the archaeologist to show the past as it really was and to understand it on its own terms, and thus have independent, historical truth (attwood 1996a, p. xvi). this approach assumes ‘a radical disjunction between past and present,’ treating the past as ‘complete, unchanging and unchangeable,’ and as having an objective existence (attwood 1996a, p. xx). by contrast, a cluster of ‘new’ historians have rejected the idea that it is possible to write history in terms of such strict distinctions between past and present. instead, they take the view that ‘one always reaches the past “by starting out from the present,” and is “always concerned with the meanings of historical reality for us, now”’, for it is how the past is interpreted now that will shape the future (attwood 1996a, p. xvii). according to this approach, the writing of history is performed within the historical context of the present, and its content is informed by the interpretive framework of the historian. the acceptance of indigenous peoples’ accounts of history, both in historical works and in the law, illuminates how the historical record may be revised and how such revisions may influence change in the law. the acceptance by the high court of the claimants’ evidence in mabo supported their contentions concerning the survival and nature of their rights and interests to land, and located the source of those rights and interests in their traditional laws and customs. moreover, by changing the law through acceptance of the pre-existing property rights of indigenous peoples, and by rejecting what brennan j described as the ‘barbarian’ theory of law in response to contemporary values (mabo, 1992, at 39), mabo not only represented a shift in the basis for interpreting australian history by acknowledging the relevance of aboriginal traditions, but took its place in the broader developing tradition of a history of reconciliation – the end of the age of racial discrimination in australia: a sentiment also conveyed in the judgment of deane and gaudron jj (mabo, 1992, at 109). admittedly, while the approach in mabo conforms to the historiographical methodology of the new history movement, it is also true that in any event it is an accepted methodological approach of the common law to modify the law where its presuppositions no longer reflect current social standards – which is in effect the approach that was taken in mabo. reflecting on the methodology of the common law, jeremy webber has noted: 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 it is a much more active process of probing for what is valuable in our past, cherishing what we take to be important, refining it, and basing our further growth and reflection upon it – all elements of a sophisticated grappling with precedent. respect for precedent involves modesty – a sense that we can and should learn from our own community’s past – but it also involves a critical element, in which we actively engage our past, drawing lessons for the future. at times, reflection upon our past (including reflection upon where our community now seems to be moving) leads us to question prior assumptions. we can come to the conclusion that elements that once seemed central to our society are now out of step with, perhaps even antagonistic to, our most cherished commitments (webber 1995, p. 25). importantly, the focus of revision in cases such as mabo is not merely an interpretive reading of the past, but demonstrates concern for what should be done in the present to chart ‘a future course that accords better with what we take to be good in our community’s experience’ (webber 1995, p. 10). as webber has pointed out, the issue in mabo ‘was not about some action or defect of the remote past’: the defect was very much alive within the law, its application in question today. often, people presume that indigenous title is about dispossession long ago. usually, however, the dispossession is much more recent, often happening in the present. that was certainly the case with mabo. the meriam people were still living on their land. they had maintained an unbroken occupation since time immemorial. the court had to decide whether they had a right to that land or whether they were mere sojourners, subject to removal at the government’s whim. if dispossession occurred, it would not be in 1788 or in 1879. it would effectively be now, in 1992, by virtue of the judges’ action. while the previous cases might be old, it was their present operation, at the end of the 20th century that was in issue. the problem was not one of correcting an ancient injustice, but whether australian law still took indigenous land, paying no heed to the present inhabitants . . . (webber 1995, pp. 25-6). yet, according to the more orthodox view of history and law, dispossession would have already occurred in 1788 (in the case of new south wales) or 1789 (in the case of queensland where the proceedings in mabo arose) with the acquisition of british sovereignty over the australian territories, notwithstanding the changed circumstances of the present. indeed, this had been the approach taken by dawson j (dissenting) in mabo. needless to say if this view had prevailed the course of australian history would have been undeniably different and, from a social justice point of view, all the worse for indigenous peoples and for the nation as a whole. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 9 thus, apart from the developments in the law that the court relied upon to legitimize its decision in mabo, the decision can also be understood in terms of the new history writing that had emerged in the decades leading up to the decision, providing versions of australian history alternative to those that had consciously excluded the impact of colonialism on indigenous peoples. the court adopted a similar approach in its recognition of the impact of colonial laws and policies on the indigenous inhabitants – which, as brennan j put it, had made them ‘intruders in their own homes and mendicants for a place to live’ (mabo, 1992, at 29). thus, the mabo decision demonstrates judicial acceptance of the changing ‘truths’ about indigenous peoples and their societies, and acknowledgement of the significant role played by law, and state policies and practices, in undermining their continued survival in australia. these were truths that had already become apparent through developments in the new history movement; but the significance of mabo was that it also gave those developments legal effect. the rejection of the ‘terra nullius doctrine’ was the discursive means by which the court sought to address the past injustices and discrimination experienced by indigenous inhabitants, to acknowledge the pre-existing legal systems of the indigenous inhabitants, and thus to secure a more legitimate foundation for australian property law by acknowledging that native title had survived the acquisition of british sovereignty. for some this was an indication that mabo signalled the potential transformation of the nation by providing a new foundation for the relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in australia, based on equality of treatment of indigenous and non-indigenous property interests. this potential was itself a product of history and reflects acceptance of the ‘new australian history as an interpretation of australia’s colonial past [and australia’s present and future]’ (attwood 1996a, p. vii). in this way mabo was not only a turning point in the direction towards reconciliation, but could also be located on the trajectory of the reconciliation movement in law and society. mabo was itself a reconciliatory event, but was also the product of a history of reconciliation, or what has been termed the ‘new history of australia’. unfortunately, developments in the context of native title law have demonstrated that much more needs to be done in order to make the end of dispossession and discrimination a reality in the legal context. 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 mabo: australia’s past, present and future if the historians in colonial times had come to forget that colonial australian history involved relations between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, it was because at least by the latter half of the 19th century it had become accepted that indigenous peoples were not subjects in australian history, but objects of scientific study. in this ‘old history’ it was first naturalism and then social darwinism that came to dominate the way in which indigenous peoples were perceived through the eyes of the european colonizers. naturalism supported the creation of a hierarchical relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples: perceived as hunter gatherers indigenous peoples were thought to be still in a state of nature – assigned to pre-history, and therefore outside history altogether (davies, 2002, 261-5). when social darwinism replaced naturalism it continued to perpetuate the hierarchical relationship between the colonizers and colonized. it was in this period that ‘race’ clearly became a classifying tool, used not only to distinguish between races, but to place different races at different levels on the scale of civilization, with indigenous peoples at the bottom. insofar as these theories came to inform the laws and policies relating to indigenous peoples they would in turn legitimize inequality of treatment of indigenous peoples, justify the removal of indigenous children from their communities and make more land available for non-indigenous usages. however, the ill effects of colonization on indigenous peoples were not seen as the consequences of those practices and policies, but as the natural consequences of their inferiority and inability to match the western forces of civilization. social darwinism predicted the eventual demise of the aboriginal race and when that did not become the reality, governments tried to ensure that it would through social engineering. the eventual failure of social darwinism would lead to the adoption of assimilationist policies based on anthropological perceptions of indigenous peoples as capable of being absorbed within the broader mainstream australian society. throughout these periods of colonization the supposed inferiority of indigenous peoples (and the corresponding superiority of the european colonizers) seemed irreconcilable with the threat that indigenous peoples appeared to pose to the colonizing processes. a classic example of this paradox can be found in a statement made in 1937 by the second chief protector of aborigines in western australia, ao neville, during discussions of the growing ‘aboriginal problem’ that was then facing the states and territories : cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 11 the native population is increasing. what is to be the limit? are we going to have a population of 1,000,000 blacks in the commonwealth, or are we going to merge them into our white community and eventually forget that there ever were any aborigines in australia? (commonwealth of australia 1937, p. 11).1 interestingly, it was the anthropologists, notably elkin, who in the first half of the 20th century found that indigenous peoples did in fact have a culture: ‘a social, economic, legal, political and religious organization by which they are able to adapt themselves to their geographical and social environment’ (elkin 1934, p. 15). at the time, the anthropologists may have provided the scientific basis for the adoption of the policy of assimilation. nevertheless, it is clear that it was their perception of aboriginality that came to inform the high court decision in mabo, particularly in the court’s recognition of native title and its corresponding acknowledgement that indigenous peoples do have systems of laws and societies. thus, while in its original context anthropological constructions of aboriginality purported to advance the understanding that indigenous peoples could be absorbed into white australian society (in this sense aboriginality was still seen in negative terms requiring further negation), in mabo such a construction was applied in positive terms – as a positive recognition of difference. however, this construction of aboriginality has not proven to be unproblematic. the problem with the anthropological construction, as with all the other colonial constructions of aboriginality, is that aboriginality is perceived as timeless and homogenous, reflecting the natural differences between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. for the early anthropologists like elkin, once the traits that were proof of aboriginality were exposed to and tainted by british civilization, it was thought they were lost forever. this understanding has also come to inform developments in the native title context. since mabo there have been numerous high court decisions in the area of native title. of these the decisions in yorta yorta and ward are two of the most significant as they set out the court’s understanding of the definition of native title contained in the native title act 1993 (cth) (‘nta’), which now governs this area of law. according to section 223(1) of the nta ‘native title’ is defined as: 1 for an earlier account of this phenomenon see morris 1992. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 the communal, group or individual rights and interests of aboriginal peoples or torres strait islanders in relation to land or waters, where: (a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the aboriginal peoples or torres strait islanders; and (b) the aboriginal peoples or torres strait islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and (c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of australia. in yorta yorta gleeson cj, gummow and hayne jj, in a joint majority judgment in the high court, dismissed the claimants’ appeal against orders rejecting their native title claim over their ancestral lands that lie across the border of victoria and new south wales. the critical issue involved the effect of the ‘adaptation and change’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 449) that had occurred to the claimant group and their relationship to the claimed lands as a result of colonization. the claimants’ argument was that their ‘society, whose laws and customs had adapted and changed over time, continued to exist and … continued to occupy the claim area, or large parts of it, from before european settlement to the date of the claim’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 449). the resolution of this issue depended on the joint judgment’s interpretation of the word ‘traditional’ in section 223(1)(a) as it relates to ‘the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the aboriginal peoples or torres strait islanders’. in support of the claim it was argued that the reference to traditional laws and customs in section 223(1) should be interpreted in the present tense so that they relate to ‘traditional laws currently acknowledged and currently observed’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 424): section 223(1) does not require that they be the same as those which existed prior to sovereignty. … a requirement of positive proof of continuous observance and acknowledgment by each generation of ancestors of the claimant group would impose an impossible burden of proof. such an approach would not allow for adaptation and change. no judgment in mabo v queensland [no 2] went so far (yorta yorta, 2002, at 424). the high court disagreed. for the purposes of interpreting ‘traditional’ as it relates to the traditional laws and customs referred to in the nta, the joint judgment took as its starting point cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 13 the understanding that ‘the origins of the content’ of these traditional laws and customs ‘are to be found in the normative rules of the aboriginal and torres strait islander societies that existed before the assertion of sovereignty by the british crown. it is only those normative rules that are “traditional” laws and customs’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 444). moreover, their honours found that the nta requires ‘that the normative system under which the rights and interests are possessed (the traditional laws and customs) is a system that has had a continuous existence and vitality since sovereignty’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 444). the continued existence of this ‘body of norms’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 445) depended on an inquiry into whether the society of the claimant group had continued to acknowledge and observe those laws and customs. thus, in the context of native title the change of sovereignty meant that ‘the only native title rights or interests in relation to land or waters which the new sovereign order recognised were those that existed at the time of change in sovereignty. although those rights survived the change in sovereignty, if new rights or interests were to arise, those new rights and interests must find their roots in the legal order of the new sovereign power’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 447). thus, a native title determination requires us to conduct an inquiry about the relationship between the laws and customs now acknowledged and observed, and those that were acknowledged and observed before sovereignty, and to do so by considering whether the laws and customs can be said to be the laws and customs of the society whose laws and customs are properly described as traditional laws and customs (yorta yorta, 2002, at 447). however, the joint judgment did concede that ‘some change to, or adaptation of, traditional law or custom or some interruption of enjoyment or exercise of native title rights or interests in the period between the crown asserting sovereignty and the present will not necessarily be fatal to a native title claim’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 454; see also 443). how much adaptation or interruption would be acceptable was not entirely clear.2 on the issue of adaptation the joint judgment found it was a ‘question’ of whether the law and custom can still be seen to be traditional law and traditional custom. is the change or adaptation of such a kind that it can no longer be said that the rights or interests asserted are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and the traditional customs observed by the relevant peoples …? (yorta yorta, 2002, at 455). 2 but see, eg, western australia v sebastian [2008] fcafc 65 (2 may 2008). 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 on the issue of interruption the joint judgment was of the view that a claimant group must establish that ‘acknowledgment and observance of those laws and customs must have continued substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 456). this was a necessary requirement as the rights and interests which are said now to be possessed must nonetheless be rights and interests possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged and the traditional customs observed by the peoples in question. further, the connection which the peoples concerned have with the land or waters must be shown to be a connection by their traditional laws and customs. … were that not so, the laws and customs acknowledged and observed now could not properly be described as the traditional laws and customs of the peoples concerned (yorta yorta, 2002, at 456). the limitation of native title recognition to only those rights and interests that were in existence at the time of the change in sovereignty, and the requirement that the acknowledgement and observance of ‘traditional’ laws and customs be ‘substantially uninterrupted’ as proof of continued connection to ancestral lands, reinforce ‘old’ colonial constructions of aboriginality – the essentialized image of untainted aboriginality found in anthropologism and the image of the dying race found in social darwinism. on this approach the joint judgment in yorta yorta could not take into account the impact that colonization had on the members of the claimant group through which they survived; rather the impact was proof of their own demise. the approach could not really accommodate the idea that a society’s traditional laws and customs may have evolved over time to become the laws and customs that the group currently acknowledges and observes in relation to their land and waters. indeed, according to the logic of the joint majority judgment, the claimants’ ‘society which had once observed traditional laws and customs had ceased to do so and, by ceasing to do so, no longer constituted the society out of which the traditional laws and customs sprang’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 458). however, the emphasis that the joint judgment placed on the date of the acquisition of sovereignty as pre-determining the native title rights and interests that the court could recognise as ‘traditional’ under section 223(1) of the nta may also be understood as an inevitable consequence of some of the unresolved issues in mabo. however much each of the majority judges in mabo appeared committed to change the law in a way that would benefit indigenous peoples they could not undo one fact of australian history – the acquisition of the australian cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 15 territories by the british crown. the legal consequences of this fact are still being felt today. in mabo the rejection of terra nullius may have paved the way for legal recognition of native title, but this was not matched by the legal recognition of aboriginal sovereignty. indeed if the decision in mabo had in fact involved a need to reject the ‘terra nullius doctrine’, the australian territories would have been reclassified as either ‘ceded’ or ‘conquered’. in that case the settlement thesis upon which the classification of the australian territories is based would have become obsolete and the sovereignty of the peoples in pre-existing occupation would have been acknowledged (although the existing laws could be subject to modification or replacement by the crown or by parliament) (dominello 2008a, p. 176). in fact what did happen in mabo was that the court gave legal recognition to a concept of indigenous property that had its origins in indigenous customary laws (as evident in the court’s insistence that the content of native title was to emanate from the indigenous claimants themselves), but continued to take it for granted that within the native title regime indigenous peoples must continue to look to non-indigenous institutions for the protection of their native title rights and interests. in mabo the court may have given legal recognition to changed perceptions of indigenous peoples, but the power to make this decision and the framework for deciding native title claims in the future remained squarely within the hands of australian legal institutions – not indigenous ones. significantly in mabo brennan j had found that ‘native title, though recognised by the common law, is not an institution of the common law’ (mabo, 1992, at 59): an understanding that has been subsequently accepted by the court in its interpretation of native title under the nta. however, the corollary of this reasoning is that australian laws have their origins in the english law. the effect of maintaining such a distinction based on the difference between the origins of australian laws and native title has been to reclassify racial differences between ‘australians’ and indigenous peoples. where once distinctions were drawn between the personal traits of the british (and now australians) and indigenous peoples, distinctions in the native title context are being drawn on the basis of the differences in the legal origins of their respective laws. however, if the court has continued to draw these distinctions it has been seen as a necessary step to preserve the acquisition of sovereignty by the british crown and the australian legal system that originated from that act. in mabo the court itself held that the acquisition cannot be challenged in 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 a municipal court (brennan j in mabo, 1992, at 31). in yorta yorta the joint majority judgment went even further: the assertion of sovereignty by the british crown necessarily entailed … that there could thereafter be no parallel law-making system in the territory over which it asserted sovereignty. to hold otherwise would be to deny the acquisition of sovereignty and … that is not permissible (yorta yorta at 422, 443-4). whether the crown requires such protection remains to be seen. paradoxically what can be seen in the developments in native title is the perceived difference in origins of australian law in english law, and native title in aboriginal customary law, has left native title vulnerable to inferior treatment – the regrettable legacy of the colonial enterprise. this is nowhere more obvious than in ward. the native title claim in ward related to the region known as the east kimberleys, and covered lands and waters in northern parts of western australia (the miriuwung and gajerrong claim) and adjacent lands in the northern territory (the ningarmara claim). because there were competing rights and interests in the claimed land, the issue of whether native title rights and interests could be subject to partial extinguishment, and the general principles applicable to the issue of extinguishment, were crucial. however, in order to determine those issues, it was first necessary to consider what exactly might be subject to extinguishment; that is, the nature of native title as defined by the nta. on this issue, the miriuwung and gajerrong claimants submitted that the ‘occupation approach’ that lee j had applied at first instance, should be adopted and that the ‘bundle of rights’ approach subsequently taken by the majority of the full federal court should be rejected in this case. according to a ‘bundle of rights’ approach, native title rights and interests are severable from each other. as thus understood, native title as a ‘bundle of rights’ is susceptible to partial extinguishment, however, as a title based on occupation, it is not. in relation to the definition of native title in the nta the claimants submitted that they through their predecessor community, occupied exclusively the determination area so that then, as now, they hold a right to exclusive possession. it is a “community title” which is practically cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 17 “equivalent to full ownership”. this conclusion is justified by the concept of “belonging to country”, evidenced by the findings of fact, and is supported by the judgment of brennan j in mabo [no 2] (ward, 2002, at 10-11). this argument was based on lee j’s judgment at first instance (and on the decision of the supreme court of canada in delgamuukw v queen (in right of british columbia). justice lee had treated native title as a communal ‘right to land’ and had found in relation to the circumstances of this case that ‘the right … to “speak for” that land, in particular to “speak for” its use … justified the finding that there was possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the traditional homelands of the applicant group’ (ward, 2002, at 11). in this way the claimants posited native title as analogous to a title in fee simple – as proprietary in nature: passages in the judgment of brennan j in mabo [no 2] support the view that the interest of a community in exclusive possession of land is proprietary because there are no other proprietors. an identifiable community that was in exclusive possession of land, which is an identifiable community today and which observes customs that are traditionally based, has proprietary title (ward, 2002, at 12). the high court, however, rejected this conceptualisation of native title. in a joint judgment gleeson cj, gaudron, gummow and hayne jj found that the change in sovereignty meant that the right to speak to country — ‘the right to be asked for permission to use or have access to the land — was inevitably confined, if not excluded’ (ward, 2002, at 94). the change in sovereignty meant that new rights to control access to land were created. the rights of traditional occupiers to control access to the land may have been affected, but the joint judgment opined that ‘because native title is more than the right to be asked for permission to use or have access (important though that right undoubtedly is) there are other rights and interests which must be considered, including rights and interests in the use of the land’ (ward, 2002, at 94). the joint majority judgment also stressed the requirement under section 223(1) of the nta that the relevant native title rights and interests are only those ‘in relation to land or waters’: they are the ‘rights and interests which are “possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed”, by the relevant peoples’ and who ‘by those traditional laws and customs … “have a connection with” the land or waters in question’ (ward, 2002, at 66). in this way, their honours limited native title rights and interests to those arising out of the traditional laws and customs that demonstrated the claimant group’s connection to their lands and waters. 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 overall, the joint judgment preferred the ‘bundle of rights’ approach to the occupation approach: it draws attention first to the fact that there may be more than one right or interest and secondly to the fact that there may be several kinds of rights and interests in relation to land that exist under traditional law and custom. not all of those rights and interests may be capable of full or accurate expression as rights to control what others may do on or with the land (ward, 2002, at 95). in turn the joint judgment rejected the occupation approach: the fact of occupation, taken by itself, says nothing of what traditional law or custom provided. standing alone, the fact of occupation is an insufficient basis for concluding that there was what the primary judge referred to as “communal title in respect of the claim area” or a right of occupation of it (ward, 2002, at 94). it follows from a ‘bundle of rights’ approach to the content of native title that native title rights and interests can be subject to partial extinguishment (ward, 2002, at 89). in fact, the joint judgment found that certain provisions of the nta ‘mandate entire and partial extinguishment’ (ward, 2002, at 63). on this basis, they opined that it was not appropriate to view native title rights and interests as ‘a single set of rights relating to land that is analogous to a fee simple’ (ward, 2002, at 91). to do so ‘assumes, rather than demonstrates, the nature of the rights and interests that are possessed under traditional law and custom’ (ward, 2002, at 92). their honours, however, did not seem to rule out altogether claims for rights of control over traditional lands arising from the right to speak for country. however, in terms of the ‘bundle of rights’ approach, such a right could only be one among many of the rights that comprise native title. in fact, a determination under section 225(b) of the nta is required to state ‘the nature and extent of the native title rights and interests in relation to the determination area’; and for anything less than ‘a right, as against the whole world, to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of land or waters’, their honours opined that ‘it will seldom be appropriate, or sufficient, to express the nature and extent of the relevant native title rights and interests by using those terms’(ward, 2002, at 82).3 3 but see, eg, neowarra v western australia [2004] fca 1092 and sampi v western australia (no 2) (2005) 224 alr 358. when no such right of exclusive possession exists as native title, ‘it will be preferable to express the rights by reference to the activities that may be cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 19 conducted, as of right, on or in relation to the land or waters’ (ward, 2002, at 83). thus, in their view now that native title is governed by the nta, native title could no longer be understood in terms of the common law developments in this area which had been the approach of lee j at first instance. furthermore, the majority’s construction in ward of the connection which indigenous peoples have with the land – ‘country’ – as essentially spiritual led them to question whether native title could ever amount to the same entitlements as under the common law (ward, 2002, at 65, 93). adopting the ‘bundle of rights’ approach, the joint majority judgment confined its enquiry to those rights and interests of the claimant group that might demonstrate their connection to the claimed area. in this regard, the court, agreeing with the full court majority, rejected the proposition that control of traditional cultural knowledge was a native title right: the ‘recognition’ of this right would extend beyond denial or control of access to land held under native title (ward, 2002, at 84). according to the joint judgment, a connection must be made between the rights and interests claimed and the land in question. that connection was missing in relation to these rights. such rights might involve, for example, the restraint of visual or auditory reproductions of what was to be found there or took place there, and this would fall outside the definition of native title rights and interests in the nta (ward, 2002, at 84). furthermore, the right to use the resources on the land was limited to a right to use the traditional resources of the land. thus it was held that no native title right or interest in minerals was established (ward, 2002, at 185-6).4 4 even if they had established traditional rights to these resources, the provisions in the mining act 1904 (wa) and the petroleum act 1936 (wa) had extinguished those rights, at least in relation to the claim over parts of western australia). moreover, the bundle of rights approach to native title supported the application of the ‘inconsistency of rights’ test for extinguishment. as applied to various parts of the claimed land, the joint judgment found that the claimants’ rights of controlling access to these areas and making decisions about them had been extinguished, although that did not necessarily extinguish all aspects of native title (ward, 2002, at 190-8 in relation to the pastoral lease in the northern territory; at 138 in respect of the reservation of land for public purposes; at 157-70 in respect of mining leases). notably, such a dissection of the 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 claimants’ rights would not have been possible if the occupation approach had been adopted (lee j in ward, 1998, at 508-10, north j in ward, 2000, at 516). it is evident from the joint majority judgment in ward that a stark contrast between indigenous law and australian law effectively meant that common law property precepts could not be used to give substance to indigenous peoples’ conceptions of property (ward, 2002, at 65). in any event their understanding of the operation of the nta appears to have precluded any alternative approach to native title based on common law conceptualizations of native title. however, it is also important to acknowledge how the joint judgment established support for its reasoning on the basis of the nature of the relationship between indigenous societies and their traditional lands. indeed, the joint majority judgment found that the relationship between indigenous peoples’ and their ‘country’ was essentially spiritual, and this led them to question whether native title could ever amount to the same entitlement as a common law property title (ward, 2002, at 93). again, this was reminiscent of the ahistorical aborigine of anthropologism that had been accepted by blackburn j in milirrpum v nabalco as ‘the fundamental truth about the aboriginals’ relationship to the land’ (ward, 2002, at 64). the reasoning of the joint majority judgment in ward suggests that the spiritual nature of the connection that indigenous peoples have to their lands precludes its construction and treatment as a common law property right (ward, 2002, at 65). one may perhaps wonder why the court found it necessary to draw such distinctions and not to rely solely on the terms of the nta. however, by adopting this approach, the majority judgment appeared to accept a tacit distinction between the spiritual (indigenous conceptions of property) and the economic (non-indigenous conception of property).5 5 see also callinan j in ward, 2002, at 395-7. it would appear that such distinctions are reason enough to treat native title as an inferior property entitlement. the court may have tried to construe this distinction as an inevitable consequence of the operation of the nta, but it cannot really conceal its own role in continuing to perpetuate such differences. indeed if non-indigenous property rights are superior it is because they have been made so in the australian legal context. the result is that indigenous peoples are clearly being discriminated against on the basis of race and the perceived differences cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 21 in their conceptions of property that arise from racial differences: there is nothing inevitable about it. mabo and the (post)-colonial legacy the decisions in yorta yorta and ward show that there still has not been an end to the history of the dispossession and discrimination. mabo could be seen as a product of new history writing, but it is equally true that the developments in native title law have seen a return to some of the old ways of seeing indigenous peoples. it is no wonder that when native title claims have failed there are claims made that the terra nullius doctrine continues to pervade australian law: indigenous peoples may continue to maintain connections to their ancestral lands, but their presence on the australian landscape continues to be denied. it may be that in mabo that both ‘new’ and ‘old’ approaches to history coexist, but that ultimately it was the spirit of reconciliation that triumphed in that case. regrettably, this spirit may have dwindled in the more recent case law. a significant aspect of the new history movement was to break the silence surrounding the history of colonial relations in australia. an important aspect of these histories (although by no means their sole focus (veracini 2003)) was to illuminate the injustices that indigenous peoples have experienced during this history. the reconciliatory tone set by brennan j in his appeals to bring australian laws into conformity with contemporary notions of justice and human rights, and by deane and gaudron jj in their appeals to correct the law and overcome a legacy of grave historical injustices for indigenous peoples, accord with this historical approach. but they are in stark contrast to the judgments in yorta yorta and ward. notably at first instance in yorta yorta, olney j was of the view that there was not any warrant within the native title act 1912 [sic] for the court to play the role of social engineer, righting the wrongs of past centuries and dispensing justice according to contemporary notions of political correctness rather than according to law. … [t]his case is not about righting the wrongs of the past, rather it has a very narrow focus directed to determining whether native title rights and interests … have survived to be recognised and enforced under the contemporary law of australia (yorta yorta, 1998, at [17], [21]). furthermore, by contrast to the judgment of deane and gaudron jj in mabo, with its acknowledgment of the impact of colonization and attempt to address and retreat from past injustices, in ward such aspirations have been construed as beyond the reach of the courts to 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 achieve. in ward, in even stronger language than that used by deane and gaudron jj in mabo, mchugh j acknowledged that: at least on occasions the dominant class in a society will use its power to disregard the rights of a class or classes with less power. on any view, that is what the dominant classes in australian society did – and in the eyes of many still do – to the aboriginal people (ward, 2002, at 231). unlike deane and gaudron jj, however, he questioned the role that the court and the present legal system could play in remedying such injustice – observing that: redress cannot be achieved by a system that depends on evaluating the competing legal rights of landholders and native-title holders. the deck is stacked against the native-title holders whose fragile rights must give way to the superior rights of the landholders whenever the two classes of rights conflict. and it is a system that is costly and time-consuming. at present the chief beneficiaries of the system are the legal representatives of the parties. it may be that the time has come to think of abandoning the present system (ward, 2002, at 240-41). until the system is changed, however, it is clear that the law of native title in australia is governed by the statute (mchugh j in yorta yorta, 2002, at 467). ultimately, the result in yorta yorta has seen a return to the silencing of aboriginal history and the impact that colonial history has had on indigenous peoples and of the need for remedial relief of this impact. in the high court the joint majority judgment endorsed the trial judge’s conclusion that the claimant group’s adherence to traditional laws and customs was irrevocably severed sometime in the late 19th century. this conclusion was largely based on the claimant group’s traditional laws and customs as reflected in the written work of edward curr, a 19th pastoralist, and not on the oral testimonies of the claimants’ own connection to their traditional lands. the joint judgment also specifically endorsed the trial judge’s conclusion that an aboriginal petition in 1881, protesting that ‘the government and white settlers’ had taken possession of ‘all the land within our tribal boundaries’, could be used as ‘“positive evidence emanating from the aboriginals themselves” to the effect that the descendants of those who had originally occupied the land no longer continued to acknowledge their traditional laws or observe their traditional customs’ (gleeson cj, gummow and hayne jj in yorta yorta, at 450). the petition had originally been tendered by the claimants to demonstrate their history of survival and resistance, by showing that they had continued to struggle for land throughout the period of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 23 colonization. the distortion of the intention of the petition by the courts effectively turned the notion of aboriginal agency against the indigenous claimants themselves: as evidence of continued survival and struggle for land, the petition was (mis)-interpreted as proof of the extinguishment of their rights to their lands. the entire approach taken by olney j has been criticized for giving preference to white man’s history – not only his version of that history, but the way that he tells that history through the written word, discrediting any oral version of that history (read indigenous versions) that may contradict the written version (paul and gray 2002). only black cj, dissenting in the full federal court, warned of the dangers of accepting colonial accounts of aboriginal people in colonial times (yorta yorta, 2001, at 262-3), and only gaudron and kirby jj, dissenting in the high court and echoing the approach of black cj, could accommodate the effects of colonization on the claimant group (yorta yorta, 2002, at 464-5). justices gaudron and kirby, in their dissenting judgment in yorta yorta, disagreed with approaches taken at trial and in the full federal court, insisting that they did not fully appreciate the intention of parliament to acknowledge a history of dispossession and give protection to native title rights and interests in the nta: so much was impliedly recognised in the preamble to the act which “sets out considerations taken into account by the parliament”, including that aboriginal people and torres strait islanders had been “progressively dispossessed of their lands” (yorta yorta, 2002, at 463). the extent to which the approaches taken by the high court in yorta yorta and ward have been able to accommodate the effects of colonization on indigenous claimant groups in other cases has varied according to the circumstances of those cases. notably, in some recent cases reliance on the conception of the claimants’ connection to their ancestral lands as ‘spiritual’ has, to some extent, helped to address the impact of colonization and for some native title claimant groups has led to positive findings. for instance, in de rose wilcox, sackville and merkel jj (confirming the full federal court decision in ward) found that: a spiritual connection and the performance of responsibility for land can be maintained even where aboriginal people have been hunted off the land or it has become impracticable for them to visit. the full court said that physical presence is not essential in circumstances where it is no 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 longer practicable or access to traditional lands is prevented or restricted by european settlers (de rose, 2003, at [418]). their honours further noted that this approach was not dissented from in the high court on appeal in ward. similar conclusions were made in daniel in relation to the continuing connection of both claimant groups to their lands: despite the substantial impact of european settlement that had affected the continued occupation on the land, nicholson j in that case found that the yindjibarndi and ngarluma peoples had maintained a strong sense of connection to their lands (daniel, 2003, at [421]-[422]). however, it is to be remembered that the acknowledgement of a spiritual connection to land does not fully accommodate the connection that indigenous peoples have to their ancestral lands and that it is the land itself that has the spiritual significance for them. at most casting the connection between claimant groups and their lands as ‘spiritual’ has only mitigated some of the effects of colonization on these groups. it should not be forgotten that the reaffirmation of difference in ward – stemming from the perceived differences in origin of australian law and native title – has merely cast indigenous property precepts as different and inferior to common law property precepts as well as common law conceptualizations of native title: native title as a bundle of rights is not the same as the full ownership of land. arguably, the adoption of the occupation approach would have been more in line with the claimants’ own understanding of their relationship to their traditional lands, since on that approach the land itself would be the focal point of any enquiry into native title (north j in ward, 2000, at 515). stressing the spiritual nature of the connection that indigenous peoples have to their traditional lands may further confine native title to ‘personal’ or ‘domestic’ rights and interests (as opposed to ‘economic’ or ‘trading’ rights) and in this way may limit the success of claims that would help indigenous peoples to engage in commercial exploitation of any natural resources that may be present on their traditional lands. for instance in daniel nicholson j found that the only native title rights and interests that had survived the acquisition of sovereignty were those: not exercisable otherwise than in accordance with and subject to traditional laws and customs for personal, domestic and non-commercial purposes (including social, cultural, religious, spiritual and ceremonial purposes) (daniel v western australia [2005] fca 536 at [4]). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 25 notwithstanding that native title rights and interests can include hunting, fishing and gathering rights and interests under section 223(2) of the nta, the decision in yorta yorta, by confining native title rights and interests to those that were in existence at the time of the acquisition of sovereignty, may make it all the more impossible to recognise the existence of rights to trade in resources. this problem had already been foreshadowed in the high court decision in yarmirr v northern territory (in relation to fishing rights) and in ward (in relation to rights to minerals). only in rare circumstances has a court recognized the commercial rights of a native title claimant group, for example in lovett on behalf of the gunditjmara people v state of victoria where north j recognized the claimants’ traditional rights to trade in eels. in most cases australian courts have been unable to accommodate indigenous forms of economic exchange. indigenous practices have at best been misconstrued ‘as a type of primitive exchange’ and at worst re-constituted ‘as an absence of economic relations’ (langton, manzel and palmer 2006, p. 307). indeed these cases illuminate another shortcoming of the native title regime. australian courts have been prepared to say yes aboriginal culture was of a type that was capable of supporting a system of laws about ownership and use of the lands but not so far to acknowledge that the system included trade in the resources in or on the lands, or even if aboriginal people did trade in those resources it was only with each other and therefore not trade in the sense of western trade (mcavoy 2001, p. 4). in other cases, the effects of colonization have precluded a positive finding of native title completely. for instance, in risk, the effects of colonization on the claimant group led mansfield j to conclude (echoing the high court majority in yorta yorta) that ‘the current larrakia society, with its laws and customs, has not carried forward the traditional laws and customs of the larrakia people so as to support the conclusion that those traditional laws and customs have had a continued existence and vitality since sovereignty’ (risk, 2006, at [13]). by contrast, in bennell v western australia wilcox j was able to distinguish the facts in that case from those in yorta yorta. finding that the noongar people held native title over the claim area situated in the perth region, he noted that ‘unlike the yorta yorta people … the south-west community did not suffer a cataclysmic event that totally removed them from their traditional country. families were pushed around, and broken up … [h]owever, people continued to identify with their aboriginal heritage’ 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 (bennell v western australia, 2006, at 265-6). however, on appeal, the full federal court disagreed with this approach. justices finn, sundberg and mansfield found the requirement in yorta yorta that ‘acknowledgment and observance of … laws and customs must have continued substantially uninterrupted since sovereignty’ itself contained an acknowledgement of the effects of european settlement on native title: ‘european settlement is what justifies the expression “substantially uninterrupted” rather than “uninterrupted”. it explains why it is that the common law will recognise traditional laws and customs that are not exactly the same as they were at settlement’ (bodney v bennell, 2008, at 109). but that was as far as the full court would go to accommodate the effects of white settlement. the full court found that: if … there has been a substantial interruption, it is not to be mitigated by reference to white settlement. the continuity enquiry does not involve consideration of why acknowledgment and observance stopped. if this were not the case, a great many aboriginal societies would be entitled to claim native title rights even though their current laws and customs are in no meaningful way traditional. yorta yorta … would have been decided differently … (bodney v bennell, 2008, at 109). the question that remains is whether the results in these cases are the inevitable consequences of mabo: was mabo only intended to address some but not all of the effects of colonization that had contributed to the dispossession of indigenous peoples’ lands? clearly the acceptance of the idea of extinguishment of native title, the framing of conditions on which native title could be extinguished and the limits placed on the availability of compensation for past acts of extinguishment, suggest that there were certain events in history that the court found could not be undone. but it is also to be remembered that each of the judgments in mabo took a different approach to these issues. as for the requirement for a continued connection to the land as proof of native title, the majority judgments in mabo differed again. notably it was only brennan j (in the often referred to ‘tide of history’ passage) who clearly postulated the requirement that to retain native title, a claimant group must still have a connection to their ancestral lands through continued observance and acknowledgement of their ‘traditional’ laws and customs (mabo, 1992, at 60). moreover, according to brennan j’s formulation such a connection (so far as practicable) must have been ‘substantially maintained’ (mabo, 1992, at 59). by contrast, toohey j focused on the nature of the traditional title as ‘rooted in physical presence. that the use of land was meaningful [in relation to a society's economic, cultural or religious life] must be proved but it is to be understood from the point of view of the members of the society’ (mabo, 1992, at 188). his cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 27 approach appears to be focused on proof of continuity of the community over time and suggests that it might be sufficient to maintain native title even if the group has lost its traditional customs (webber 1995, p. 19). it may be important to point out here that the different views on these issues that were being expressed in 1992 when mabo was decided may need to be understood within the broader historical context of that decision and more specifically within the interpretive framework of each judge. moreover, the differences in approach in mabo meant that there were alternative approaches available to future courts on how to resolve these differences. if the law was to continue to develop in the spirit of reconciliation, those approaches that offered the most protection to native title should have been followed. given that these approaches were not followed in cases like yorta yorta and ward, one explanation could be that the nta now precludes their application. however, it is equally true that there was no unanimity in these cases either on the question of how the act should apply. both cases specifically related to the nature of the content and proof of native title. in ward lee j at trial had continued to postulate the common law understanding that native title was proprietary in nature, notwithstanding the provisions in the nta. in yorta yorta gaudron and kirby jj’s interpretation of the definition of native title in the nta still enabled them to follow toohey j’s formulation in mabo of the standard of proof required to be met in order to succeed in a claim for native title. in their view ‘adaptations, alterations, modifications or extensions of laws previously acknowledged’ could fit within the definition of ‘traditional laws acknowledged’ in s 223(1)(a) of the nta (yorta yorta, 2002, at 264). moreover, while gaudron and kirby jj found that the continuity of a community was important in determining whether current practices are part of its traditional laws and customs, they also found that: the question whether a community has ceased to exist is not one that is to be answered solely by reference to external indicia or the observations of those who are not or were not members of that community. the question whether there is or is not continuity is primarily a question of whether, throughout the period in issue, there have been persons who have identified themselves and each other as members of the community in question (yorta yorta, 2002, at 264). most notably in response to the stringent standard of proof that had been applied by olney j at first instance (based on brennan j’s approach in mabo), gaudron and kirby jj found that ‘[t]here 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 is nothing in … the definition of “native title” or “native title rights and interests” which requires that “traditional connection with the land ... [be] substantially maintained”’ (yorta yorta, 2002, at 466). the same argument could be made in response to the joint majority judgment in the high court: there is nothing in the definition of native title in the nta which requires that traditional connection with the land be ‘substantially uninterrupted’. evidently, the nta can be read in ways that could provide native title with more protection than it has been offered in yorta yorta and ward. thus, to understand why native title has not been adequately protected it may be necessary to look beyond the current law and at the wider political, social and historical context in which developments in this area of law have taken place. the lingering effects of old colonial approaches to history and indigenous societies are particularly relevant here. the more recent developments in native title law may be lamented as just another example of the eternal return of colonialism in australia. indeed the conservative backlash in response to mabo, and then subsequently in relation to wik, most clearly demonstrates how old colonial constructions of aboriginality are still prevalent in certain influential quarters of australian society (attwood 1996b; marcus 1996). this backlash had its greatest influence on the native title regime, most notably through the amendments to the nta in 1998 that have further contributed to compounding the inferior status of native title in australian law (tehan 2003, p. 555). the unprecedented attacks on the high court for their decisions in mabo and wik may also help to explain the more cautious approach of the high court in cases such as yorta yorta and ward, confining the recognition of native title to the much more fragile conceptualisation spelled out in those cases. it is also important to acknowledge the extensive resources poured into defending native title claims by public and private bodies alike, and the frequency with which claims are met with the response that native title has ceased to exist (or never existed in the first place). in ward, the defendants devised arguments that were even more restrictive in scope than those that were finally accepted by the joint majority judgment, in an effort to convince the court to reject the native title claim completely. though the joint judgment did not accept these arguments, callinan j (in dissent) did. reminiscent of the old version of australian history callinan j opined: the first non-indigenous people who occupied this country brought with them their common and statutory law which had long included a doctrine of adverse possession and settled notions about cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 29 the use and occupation of land. these were closely connected ideas: land was to be used and enjoyed, and those who possessed, used and enjoyed the land should own it … those early non-indigenous settlers also brought with them a knowledge of agriculture and husbandry, and of domestic, commercial and official construction of a kind completely different from that of the indigenous peoples. to the undiscriminating, and perhaps insensitive and unimaginative eyes of the former it must have appeared that much of this large continent was not in fact being used or enjoyed, or certainly not so in a way that was familiar. … the different conceptions [about land] held by the new settlers, much the stronger of the peoples, were bound to prevail. this was inevitable when those who were the more powerful had a well settled, long-standing body of property law in written texts, statutes and cases, and those whom they dispossessed depended for the assertions of their rights to occupy and use the land upon traditional oral customs and practices. … the problems for the indigenous people were compounded by the difficulty of finding any conceptual common ground between the common and statutory law of real property and aboriginal law with respect to land. it seems likely that the first settlers would have regarded the two as incompatible, that whatever the aboriginal peoples possessed by way of title to land was too foreign, fragile and elusive to withstand and survive the common law. mabo (no2) was a brave judicial attempt to redress the wrongs of dispossession. but … “recognition” of native title … has no parallel in the common law. the court has endeavoured to find a way of recognising, and to a degree protecting, that anomalous interest without unduly disturbing the law of australian property. the results of this enterprise can hardly be described as satisfactory (ward, 2002, at 3957). furthermore in yorta yorta callinan j accepted an interpretation of the word ‘traditional’ in the definition of native title in the nta that confined native title rights and interests to those that were in existence at the time of the acquisition of british sovereignty, but limited the scope of their potential for adaptation and change since that time. justice callinan went so far as to say: the extent to which longstanding law and custom may evolve without ceasing to be traditional may raise difficult questions. the matter went uncontested in yanner v eaton, although for myself i might have questioned whether the use of a motor boat powered by mined and processed liquid fuel, and a steel tomahawk, remained in accordance with a traditional law or custom, particularly one of alleged totemic significance (yorta yorta, 2002, at 493). the extensive litigation in cases such as these shows how contentious native title continues to be for those who perceive their interests to be ‘under threat’ by a native title claim. it also shows how much resistance there can be to engaging in negotiation in native title cases, as an alternative to the adversarial processes of litigation, notwithstanding the provisions for agreement-making 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 under the nta. indeed in ward western australia decided to hold off engaging in negotiations for an agreement with the miriuwung gajerrong traditional owners until after the high court’s decision on appeal (yu 1999, p. 25-6). in light of the high court’s decision (by contrast to that of lee j at first instance) this proved to be an effective strategy, since the government’s leverage increased as the claimant group’s native title rights and interests were diminished. even in the case of yorta yorta an agreement (though limited in its scope by comparison to what would have been the outcome if the native title claim had succeeded) may have been reached between the yorta yorta nation aboriginal corporation (‘yynac’) and the state of victoria (seidel and hetyey 2004), but new south wales has not engaged with such a process at all. moreover, the general public response to native title claims also appears to be one of resistance as evidenced by media reports that wilcox j’s decision in bennell v western australia would have meant the closure of public access to beaches. instances such as these show how divided we are as a nation on the issue of native title and how far we still need to go to adopt the spirit of – let alone achieve – reconciliation in australia in this area of law. however, it may be more accurate to interpret the high court’s approach in yorta yorta and ward as exalting certain anthropological perceptions of aboriginality – the image of indigenous peoples living in a tribal state untouched by civilization, the timeless aborigine. it may be no coincidence that this image of aboriginality, the one that has been most valorized in the australian popular consciousness, is also the one that has found most protection in native title law. and to a certain degree it is this image of aboriginality that is favoured among certain historians – even those who subscribe to new historical methods and practices. this has been most patently clear in the tacit support that has been given by some to the limitations that have been placed on native title recognition – most notably the requirement that there be continuous association with the land based on past traditions (webber 1995, p. 19; attwood 1996a, p. xxxvii). of course, even when mabo was decided it was never envisaged that it would provide a solution for all indigenous peoples. in fact it had been predicted that only 5% of the indigenous population would benefit from the decision (aboriginal and torres strait islander commission 1993, p. 16). indeed the opposition between ‘real’ aborigines (whose native title has survived), and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 31 dispossessed aborigines, whose native title rights have been extinguished and can no longer be revived, had already been foreshadowed in the context of the statutory land rights that pre-dated mabo. it is no coincidence that the former are statistically more likely to be found in the north of australia and the latter in urban centres. for instance, in the statutory schemes aborigines from the northern territory are referred to as ‘traditional’ aborigines (aboriginal land rights (nt) act 1976 (cth)), but in more settled areas such as new south wales, the land rights regime is aimed primarily at dispossessed aborigines (aboriginal land rights act 1983 (nsw)). however, as the more recent land reforms in the northern territory (northern territory national emergency response act 2007 (cth)) and queensland (aboriginal and torres strait islander land amendment act 2008 (qld)) have shown, such regimes still fail to address the dispossession of those indigenous peoples in urban centres, nor have they availed to protect indigenous communal title to land (watson 2008). in conclusion, it may appear from the more recent history of native title law that mabo has turned out to be a lost opportunity to right the wrongs of dispossession and establish equality of treatment for indigenous conceptions of property. maybe that opportunity was never there to begin with. as more of the shortcomings of the native title regime become apparent so too does the need for additional remedial action (pearson 2003; dominello 2008a; dominello 2008b). crucial to these developments will be how indigenous peoples are perceived and how aspirations for the nation are conceived. whatever form that action may take, it is to be remembered (as the new historians have indeed reminded us) that any course of action taken now will continue to have ramifications into the future. references domestic cases bennell v western australia (2006) 153 fcr 120. bodney v bennell (2008) 167 fcr 84. commonwealth v yarmirr (2001) 208 clr 1. daniel v western australia [2003] fca 666. daniel v western australia [2005] fca 536. de rose v south australia (2003) 133 fcr 325. 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 lovett on behalf of the gunditjmara people v victoria [2007] fca 474. mabo v queensland (no 2) (1992) 175 clr 1. members of the yorta yorta aboriginal community v victoria [1998] fca 1606. members of the yorta yorta aboriginal community v victoria (2001) 110 fcr 244. members of the yorta yorta aboriginal community (2002) 214 clr 422. milirrpum v nabalco (1971) flr 141. neowarra v western australia [2004] fca 1092. risk v northern territory [2006] fca 404. sampi v western australia (no 2) (2005) 224 alr 358. ward v western australia (1998) 159 alr 483. western australia v sebastian [2008] fcafc 65 (2 may 2008). western australia v ward (2000) 99 fcr 316. western australia v ward (2002) 213 clr 1. western sahara (advisory opinion) [1975] icjr 12. wik peoples v queensland (1996) 187 clr 1. yanner v eaton (1999) 201 clr 351. domestic legislation aboriginal and torres strait islander land amendment act 2008 (qld). aboriginal land rights act 1983 (nsw). aboriginal land rights (northern territory) act 1976 (cth). mining act 1904 (wa). native title act 1993 (cth). northern territory national emergency response act 2007 (cth). petroleum act 1936 (wa). racial discrimination act 1975 (cth). international legal material delgamuukw v british columbia (in right of british columbia) [1997] 3 scr 1010. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 33 references aboriginal and torres strait islander commission. 1993, first report 1993. attwood, b. 1996a, ‘introduction: the past as future: aborigines, australia and the (dis)course of history’ in attwood b. (ed), in the age of mabo, allen & unwin, sydney, pp. vii-xxxviii. attwood, b. 1996b, ‘mabo, australia and the end of history’ in attwood b. (ed), in the age of mabo, allen & unwin, sydney, pp. 100-116. briscoe, g. 1993, ‘land reform: mabo and “native title”, reality or illusion?’, pacific research, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 3-6. commonwealth of australia. 1937, aboriginal welfare: initial conference of commonwealth and state aboriginal authorities, canberra, 21-23 april 1937. davies, m. 2002, asking the law question: the dissolution of legal theory, lawbook co, sydney. dominello, f. 2008a, ‘in a world without a sovereign’ in verschuuren, j. & van schooten, h. (eds), international governance and law, edward elgar, cheltenham, pp. 168-190. dominello, f. 2008b, ‘beyond symbolism: aboriginal sovereignty and native title’, journal of the australasian law teachers association, vol. 1, pp. 141-151. elkin, a.p. 1934, ‘anthropology and the future of the australian aborigines’, oceania, vol. 5, pp. 1-18. hughes, i. and pitty, r. 1994, ‘australian colonialism after mabo’, current affairs bulletin, vol. 71, no. 1 june/july, pp. 13-22. keon-cohen, b.a. 1993, ‘some problems of proof: the admissibility of traditional evidence’ in stephenson, m.a. & ratnapala, s. (eds), mabo: a judicial revolution, university of queensland press, st lucia, qld., pp. 185-205. langton, m., manzel, o. & palmer, l. 2006, ‘the spirit of the thing: the boundaries of aboriginal economic relations at common law’, the australian journal of anthropology, vol. 17, pp. 307-321. markus, a. 1996, ‘between mabo and a hard place: race and the contradictions of conservatism’ in attwood, b. (ed), in the age of mabo, allen & unwin, sydney, pp. 88-99. mcavoy, t. 2001, ‘recent developments in native title seminar’, paper presented at native title representative body legal conference, townsville, 28-30 august. morris, b. 1992, ‘frontier colonialism as a culture of terror’ in attwood, b. & arnold, j. (eds), power, knowledge and aborigines, la trobe university press, melbourne, pp. 72-87. nettheim, g. 1993, ‘judicial revolution or cautious correction?’, university of new south wales law journal, vol. 16, pp. 1-26. paul, m.; & gray, g. (eds.) 2002, through a smoky mirror: history and native title, aboriginal studies press, canberra. pearson, n. 2003, ‘the high court’s abandonment of “the time-honoured methodology of the common law” in its interpretation of native title in mirriuwung gajerrong and yorta yorta’, newcastle law review, vol. 7, pp. 1-14. reynolds, h. 1987, the law of the land, penguin, ringwood, vic. 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.3, 2009 reynolds, h. 1992, the law of the land, 2nd ed. penguin, ringwood, vic. reynolds, h. 1993, ‘what is native title’, wiser, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 25-30. ritter, d. 1996, ‘the “rejection of terra nullius” in mabo: a critical analysis’, sydney law review, vol. 18, pp. 5-33. seidel, p. & hetyey, j. 2004, ‘summary of the yorta yorta nation aboriginal corporation/state of victoria co-operative management agreement’, indigenous law bulletin, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 15-17. smith, b. 1981, the 1980 boyer lectures: the spectre of truganini, australian broadcasting commission, sydney. stanner, w.e.h. 1969, the 1968 boyer lectures: after the dreaming, australian broadcasting commission, sydney. tehan, m. 2003, ‘a hope disillusioned, an opportunity lost? reflections on common law native title and ten years of the native title act’, melbourne university law review, vol. 27, pp. 523-571. veracini, l. 2003, ‘of a “contested ground” and an “indelible stain”: a difficult reconciliation between australia and its aboriginal history during the 1990s and 2000s’, aboriginal history, vol. 27, pp. 224-239. watson, n. 2008, ‘the abuse of indigenous land tenure as a tool of social engineering’, journal of australasian law teachers association, vol. 1, pp. 163-170. webber, j. 1995, ‘the jurisprudence of regret: the search for standards of justice in mabo’, sydney law review, vol. 17, pp. 5-28. yu, p. 1999, ‘possibilities for regional agreements in the kimberley in the wake of the miriuwung gajerrong decision’, indigenous law bulletin, vol. 4, no. 21, pp. 24-26. http://www.alta.edu.au/pdf/jalta/(2008)%20jalta%20typeset%20articles/(2008)%20the%20abuse%20of%20indigenous%20land%20tenure_n%20watson.pdf� the assertion of sovereignty by the british crown necessarily entailed … that there could thereafter be no parallel law-making system in the territory over which it asserted sovereignty. to hold otherwise would be to deny the acquisition of sovereignt... if … there has been a substantial interruption, it is not to be mitigated by reference to white settlement. the continuity enquiry does not involve consideration of why acknowledgment and observance stopped. if this were not the case, a great many abo... 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia contextualising the self and social change making: an evaluation of the young social pioneers program naomi berman foundation for young australians emily mellon yarra city council abstract this article presents an investigation of an australian social entrepreneurship and leadership program to highlight some of the challenges young social change makers face as they attempt to influence change in their local, national and international environments. the findings from an evaluation of the young social pioneers program demonstrate how reflexive, communicative and participatory practices position young people at the forefront of new forms of civic engagement and that there are certain needs relating to the development of self and community which must be addressed in order that these young social actors can fulfil their civic aspirations. the findings reported here demonstrate that if social entrepreneur programs are to be successful in providing a service to young people, they need to foster the creation of environments characterised by collectivism, collaboration and opportunities for self development while providing practical solutions to common barriers faced by social entrepreneurs. however, whilst youth social leadership programs work to legitimise young change makers, this narrative can also be problematic for young people. the “lone hero” or “solo entrepreneur” tropes pervading the youth leadership and entrepreneurial discourse serve to disguise the realities and structural barriers that young change makers face as they strive to fulfil their social ambitions. introduction during the last decade, a complex reconfiguration of the relationship of government, private corporations and civil society has begun that has enabled new opportunities and spaces for young people to engage in change making on matters that are of importance to them. in this changing environment, young change makers pick and sample from corporate, government and third sector resources and approaches to create more agile organisational vehicles for making social impact. through innovative social enterprises, these individuals seek to work in between the spaces typically occupied by government, philanthropy or corporate social responsibility arenas. research indicates forms of participation for young people vary and recently there has been a shift away from institutional or “citizen orientated” action to more “issue-based” participation (vromen and collins 2010). corresponding with what harris et al. (2010) describe as a “third space”, whereby more “unaffiliated” and highly “informalized” cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 53 modes of participation take place, young people’s social action is becoming mobilised around social causes rather than state based political phenomena, traditionally expressed as grass roots activism and social movements. a key characteristic of the activities of social entrepreneurs is the engagement of local communities in the pursuit of ethical initiatives that speak to greater civic goals. their commitment to applying novel approaches to social problems across a range of different fields makes social entrepreneurs powerful agents of change. a tenet of community development theory is the notion that social structural change will arise from the deliberative participative actions of a group of people mobilised to address social problems and empower others. in this regard social entrepreneurs are located at the nexus of individual civic participation and community development outcomes. however, beyond community development is the question of how communities are formed; a question which has engaged sociologists for some time (anderson 1983, cohen 1985, tönnies [1887] in cahnman & heberle 1971). cohen (1985) explores community as a cultural phenomenon, specifically how community boundaries are symbolically defined and the ways individuals develop a sense of belonging to community. through a process of symbolically constructing community, individuals make ‘it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their identity’ (cohen 1985: 118). as will be explored further in this article, this notion of “communities of meaning” is important for understanding the process by which the young social pioneers define themselves and the kinds of social networks or systems required, within a particular grouping or encounter, for the formation of a community of meaning to take place. the young social pioneers program since 1999 the foundation for young australians (fya), a national not-for-profit organisation, has been implementing educational and social action initiatives that promote youth participation. the organisation also has a research arm that conducts and advocates for research highlighting the systemic disadvantages that limit forms of civic and social participation for young people. the fya’s young social pioneers (ysp) program, established in 2009, is based on the international youth foundation’s (iyf) global initiative youth action net (yan), which has supported over 140 young social entrepreneurs from many countries including: the usa, 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 brazil, spain, mexico, jordan and israel. the program seeks to develop young leaders who can respond to the increasing challenges of a post-global world (http://www.youthactionnet.org/). fya has a longstanding affiliation with iyf and this australian adaptation of the yan program seeks to address the emerging youth social action landscape while also fulfilling the broader values of fya around youth empowerment and active citizenship. designed to fill a gap in social entrepreneur programs which are characterised by business or social enterprise models predominantly for older people, ysp provides a twelve month leadership program for fourteen individuals aged between 18 and 29 years. to be eligible for the program, a young person must be the founder or co-founder of an initiative which has been in existence for at least six months. during the 12 month program participants are encouraged to expand their initiatives by being given access to a broad range of networks from corporate, philanthropic and not-for-profit sectors and are expected to nurture these relationships consistent with the needs of their individual projects. predicated on the principles of experiential and flexible learning, the program includes team building activities and workshops designed to develop “hard” or practical skills such as communication, branding and media training, uses of social media, business planning and financial skills. this occurs in a community setting (made up of retreats and workshops) lending to a sense of community and collegial space for shared learning to take place. development of the person or the “soft” skills and characteristics needed to navigate the complex path of social change are also an integral aspect of the ysp program. in this way, the program progresses along the symbiotic planes of the individual and the group. two examples of a young social pioneer are alissa phillips and edwin kemp attrill. alissa established s.p.a.c.e (specialised programs and community endeavours) in an outer suburb of brisbane as a community centre with a particular interest in special needs. since 2007, its fitness and learning programs have provided a rehabilitative service for people living with a disability while fostering relationships between those people and the broader community (http://thespace.org.au). edwin is the founder and former artistic director of actnow theatre a youth led theatre company that works in collaboration with professional artists and young people to create contemporary theatre projects that tackle a range of social issues. using theatre as a tool for http://www.youthactionnet.org/� http://thespace.org.au/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 55 social change actnow operates in a range of community settings including young people in prisons, refugees and migrants, people with disabilities and survivors of trauma and torture. contextualising the self and social change making there is an emerging body of literature which highlights the need for greater support of social enterprise activities in young people. research conducted in 2006 by the global entrepreneurship monitor (harding 2006) revealed that ‘younger people are more likely to be social entrepreneurs than any other age grouping’ (harding 2006: 3). however, the study also found that as entrepreneurs become more experienced the rate of disenchantment increases. the research concluded that providing young entrepreneurs with networks and guidance is a critical ingredient for building successful social leaders rather than disillusioned entrepreneurs. an evaluation of the school for social entrepreneurs (sse) highlights the importance of recognising social entrepreneurs as individuals with a diverse set of personal and professional needs (new economics foundation 2006: 3). it found there needs to be a greater focus on the individual, particularly developing qualities such as confidence, resilience and passion, as these traits are considered integral to the success of social action initiatives. participants were found to be over one and half times more likely to succeed when these individual attributes were developed, reinforcing the value of focusing on the individual entrepreneur rather than the social enterprise (new economics foundation 2006: 76). as mentioned above, this notion of building individual capabilities is central to ysp, which is premised on a positive youth development approach; building on an individual’s character and existing strengths enables them to ‘flourish throughout life’ (park 2004: 40). character strengths can include optimism, wisdom, social intelligence and teamwork. in addition to promoting wellbeing and providing a buffer against social disadvantage, the development of these personal competencies is considered to lead to an array of personal and social outcomes. as a leadership program, ysp encourages the development of these competencies in an effort to produce broader community outcomes through the creation of young leaders. a chief objective of social entrepreneur programs is the development of participants such that they are empowered to effect the social change they are committed to. to achieve this, leadership programs draw on a range of development theories and activities that focus on 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 enhancing participants’ self-awareness and self-efficacy, along with other skills and competencies, in order to build on their existing talents and improve their civic aspirations and potential. however, there are underlying assumptions to “character building” which have not been adequately explored. it would seem the “social good” attribute of character building, and by extension social leadership/entrepreneur, programs renders the concept somewhat unproblematic. moreover, deterministic approaches which locate agency in psychosocial constructions such as self-concept and self-efficacy (bandura 2006) imply that an individual has an ‘ability to act intentionally and exercise a measure of control over one’s environment and social structures’ (pajares & schunk, 2002: 22). this is sociologically problematic as it has a tendency to diminish, or even ignore, the effects of social structure on social outcomes. idealistic constructions of young social entrepreneurs are in part perpetuated by romantic, falsely agentic images of young people, particularly those who have ambitions to create social change. sukarieh and tannock (2011) describe a “positivity imperative” which manifests in programs designed to empower and engage young people, placing an emphasis on individual agency to the exclusion of the broader social, political, cultural and economic landscape within which these social action initiatives take place. social leadership and entrepreneur programs unwittingly assume a set of competencies and characteristics that equip young people to overcome their circumstances, to thrive in society and, most importantly, to make a positive contribution to it. under this positivity imperative, discourses not only homogenise youth experience, but in doing so risk perpetuating the uncritical valorisation of young people and their actions. furthermore, notwithstanding the systematic marginalisation of young people, such discourses further exclude the experience of acutely disadvantaged groups and in turn deliver an unfair expectation that all young people should have the capacity to effectively participate in social change (see wyness 2009). of salience here is the existence of normative assumptions regarding individuals pursuing social entrepreneurial endeavours. reuf (2010) explores the prevalence of a “myth of the lone entrepreneur” which serves to romanticise notions of a lone social visionary. rather, he explains, an important feature of entrepreneurs is their ability mobilise collective action. this notion of entrepreneurial social groups challenges conceptualisations of the solo, “heroic” individual entrepreneur represented in historical treatments by proponents of methodological individualism such as weber (2003). for reuf, these ideals, which still have currency today, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 57 are inaccurate and mask the reality of these individuals whose activities do not only rely on but are in fact embedded in ongoing, durable social (group-centred) relationships. the evaluation of ysp reported here, while attempting to demonstrate change as a result of program participation, echoes some of these sociological critiques. this article presents the results of the first stage of a three year evaluation which addresses multi-level outcomes, namely, individual, organisational and community. the first year of the evaluation focused on the individual and explored the nature and influence of the program on its participants whilst identifying any underlying barriers to the participants fulfilling on the goals of their initiatives. the remaining two years of the evaluation (currently in progress) will deliver more material about the medium and long term outcomes of participating in this program. evaluating the young social pioneers program the evaluation of ysp, conducted by fya in 2009, was designed to reveal insights into the program’s outcomes for young people with regard to their development as social leaders. it also aimed to identify factors that enable or inhibit the fulfilment of the program’s aims. method a qualitative approach based on face-to-face interviews and questions via an online medium as well as the most significant change (msc) technique was employed to capture key aspects of the participant experience and demonstrate what success looks like for young people in the realm of social entrepreneurship. aside from a small sample size (13) that precluded the valid use of surveys, these methods were considered best suited to, and consistent with, the principles of the collaborative nature of the ysp program. the individuality of each of the pioneers and their initiatives called for a more nuanced approach to understanding the differing perspectives. the evaluation centred on an investigation into the extent to which the program contributed to its desired outcomes, rather than making a case for how the outcomes could be wholly attributed to the program. this distinction was based on a relatively new approach, gaining popularity in the field of program evaluation; contribution analysis (mayne 1999). contribution analysis, in recognising it takes time to achieve an impact beyond what can realistically be achieved in a program and evaluation timeframe, seeks to provide more plausible evidence to counter uncertainty regarding program impacts/effects. attribution, on 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 the other hand, involves drawing causal links and explanatory conclusions between observed changes and a program. determining whether the outcome was caused by the program is an ongoing challenge and many evaluations identify whether the outcome was achieved and if it was, assume the program can take credit for this (kotvojs 2006). in order to build a coherent picture of the participant journey, interviews were conducted during several key stages of the program. a set of questions were also posted on an online platform mid-way through the program to track pioneer progress against their self-identified milestones whilst they were undertaking more ‘solo’ activities. in this way the ysp evaluation took an action research methodological approach (dick 2002). as internal evaluators we sought to support the program’s goal of developing pioneers through the evaluation process whilst seeking to critically examine the process of change taking place. however, it is worth noting there was no formal mechanism for sharing findings with program staff throughout the program (i.e. before write up) and a prearranged structure may have strengthened the action research process. data collection for this evaluation was conducted between august 2009 and august 2010 and corresponded to the three key program phases; an initial learning retreat, two weekend workshops and a final retreat. the original 14 pioneers who participated in the 2009 ysp program were included in the evaluation, although due to wellbeing issues, one participant withdrew after the first retreat, leaving a sample of 13. interviews face-to-face interviews were conducted at the commencement and then again towards to end of the program. the interviews were on average 20 minutes in length and, with the consent of the participants, involved the use of recording devices (both audio and video). the interviews were structured around broad themes derived from the objectives, these themes were: leadership; organisational (projects); collaboration/partnership; and impact and sustainability. during the middle of the program a series of interview-type questions were posted to an online community platform which spoke to these themes. in an effort to faithfully capture the participants’ intentions, meanings and experiences, the full interview transcriptions were analysed using a “buddy” system. this system involved two members of the evaluation team drawing key themes from the data. the role of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 59 “buddy” is to provide an independent and critical view of the data collected. the two sets of interpretations were then discussed and compared, and subsequent conclusions and recommendations developed. most significant change msc, originally designed for international development programs, is a narrative-based methodology that captures a broad range of subjective experience (davies 1998, dart and davies 2003). it is an innately democratic and participatory method with a strong emphasis on amplifying the “voice” of participants who may otherwise not be heard within the design and implementation of complex initiatives. a key advantage of the technique is that it lends analytic depth and explanatory power to qualitative data and is particularly useful for gaining an in depth understanding of the transformative effects of programs such as ysp. msc maps the social processes that are given to change and principally relies on storytelling. however, it differs from a typical narrative methodology in two key ways. the first difference is that the methodology respects the “voice” of participants, avoiding problems in typical qualitative methods where the results derived from stories or interviews depend solely on the interpretations of the researchers. the other difference is that the results have an objective interpretive structure determined by the relationship of the stories to domains derived from program objectives. although these “domains of change” are widely used in evaluations involving msc, due to time limitations the decision was made to not apply them here. a single msc session was conducted with 10 pioneers (three were absent) during the final retreat (marking the completion of the program). the value of applying msc in the latter stages of the program is that it provides testimony from participants as to how events are interpreted and what meanings are attached to activities when they have had time to reflect on the past 12 months. the adaptation of the msc technique for this evaluation involved three stages whereby stories were collected from each participant in a focus group setting where the larger group was broken down into smaller groups of three to four. participants were asked to write a story consisting of a single event reflecting practical change (for good or bad) related to the program. in the first selection phase, the most representative stories were selected by the 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 participants in their small groups based on the extent of the common experiences they shared, and the meanings or values participants found in the stories. during this time, a scribe was designated in each group who recorded key points from the discussion. this more tangential data forms an equally critical part of the msc data set along with the selected stories. in addition to collecting stories of change from participants, a panel of key stakeholders was created to discuss the stories selected by the pioneers in the previous session. the role of the panel was to discuss these stories and make a final selection which would produce just one story. the discussion during this process was recorded, transcribed and validated before being incorporated into the overall analysis. the value of a panel selection session is that it elicits a different set of values and opinion than the participants in the story selection process. importantly, the panel data adds a more critical (outsider) lens to straight msc story content which as a participant-led process is more vulnerable to bias. the panel selection data, along with the core msc data, was analysed alongside the interview data to provide a more comprehensive, multi-perspectival set of insights into the ysp experience. participant consent was gained prior to all data collection activities. an important consideration in the reporting of these findings necessarily is the protection of the confidence and privacy of participants. consistent with the principles of anonymity and confidentiality, identification of participants has been removed in this report. all names corresponding to participant comments derived from the interviews have been replaced with pseudonyms. findings: tool for social change the evaluation of the ysp program revealed a number of important themes in relation to what young social change makers need when it comes to fulfilling their expressed social purposes. these include the value of being in an environment that promotes a community of likeminded change makers, the refinement of their initiative focus, and gaining insight and expertise in the area of sustainable business practice. participants identified these as important for the success of their entrepreneurial endeavours and they also derived personal benefit from the experience with many taking the lessons into their non-pioneering activities. community of pioneers a key outcome of participating in the program for participants was the creation of a pioneer community which resulted in an elevated sense of collectivism and enhanced opportunity cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 61 through the leveraging of shared goals and experience. the value of being brought together in an environment which is supportive, collegial and encourages reflection was often contrasted against the practical challenges faced by the participants as they navigated the everyday reality of attempting to effect broad social change. participants described the benefit of the program environment as providing opportunities for not only knowledge acquisition and sharing of ideas, but also collaboration. the program enabled the participant group to become a powerful mechanism for self-generated accountability, responsibility and reflection, as much of their planning and development activities occurred in a peer-to-peer learning environment. participants expressed an appreciation for the sense of shared experience that stood in contrast to the often isolating experience of leading change: it’s always good to know that you’re not out there on your own doing these things, that’s been one of the biggest benefits and i think it will continue to be (steph, initial retreat, 2009). for the participants, the building of relatedness which refers to having a sense of mutual respect and reliance on others was an important and memorable part of their experience of the program. the importance of having an environment of like-minded individuals in which to ‘bounce ideas off’ (msc story, 2009) was echoed throughout the data. this was also coupled with an often observed realisation that they now felt part of a wider community (mobilised around social action) as well as the broader youth-led sector. this location of self within a broader socio-political context crystallised many participants’ views of change making and increased possibilities for supported networks. one participant illustrates how this awareness impacted his initiative: it’s just that sort of moment where everyone has that understanding that there is something, that there are people out there who want to support us and who want to help us and we do have friends in wider networks. just to be able to share that feeling with a bunch of 20 disengaged young people; it’s just incredible and they love it and they feed off it and that’s fantastic (daniel, final retreat, 2010). for the program, providing a supportive environment where young social change makers are surrounded by others working towards similar goals had the effect of stimulating a renewed commitment towards the individual’s own initiative. furthermore, cultivating a mutual 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 understanding of the power of the collective was viewed as integral to the achievement of their individual goals. not dissimilar to cohen’s formation of symbolic communities, an emergent group dynamic was formed and participants synergistically influenced one another towards the attainment of social gains. the evaluation data revealed that much depends on an environment which actively facilitates dialogue and communication, and the importance of working together and being connected with others through the shared experience of the program. echoing ruef’s contention, the evaluation has shown that the experience and needs of young social change makers represents the antithesis of a prevailing myth about the lone (pioneer) hero who navigates this social landscape alone. rather, the strength of peer connections is viewed as vitally important as young leaders value a safe and collegial space to discuss their challenges and how they can leverage the collaborative dimension of their work. the camaraderie often described by participants indicated that the pioneer community alleviates the alienation and despondency felt in some traditional social action initiatives. while there were substantial benefits to the individual being part of the ysp community, there was also evidence of participants drawing comparisons between their own achievements and that of their colleagues. while this occurred predominantly during the early stages of the program, in some instances this had a negative effect on the individual’s sense of efficacy. theories on self-efficacy posit that the individual’s self-assessments of his/her perceived efficacy is not independent of the activities of other (group) members. in short, how an individual gauges his or her degree of efficacy is the result of interactive group dynamics; a socially embedded process rather than individualistic (bandura 2006: 317). this is a point of significance for youth leadership programs. young people must be (and feel) supported through their process of reflexivity in a group environment in order that they utilise the experience to strive rather than retreat. refining one’s purpose while participants came to the program with sufficiently developed, indeed often successful, initiatives, the program was successful in producing a more refined sense of purpose. the importance of achieving a greater sense of clarity around the purpose and goals of their initiative was a key outcome for many of the pioneers. the data suggests having a clearer sense of purpose lead to an increase in confidence and self-belief to initiate a variety of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 63 diverse relationships. the program in this respect acts as a pull towards a valuable process of reflection. the interim periods between key gatherings allowed pioneers to step outside the day-to-day operations of their initiatives and think strategically about their work. this is evidenced in the remarks of one participant who felt her day-to-day life did not allow for much ‘time to see that future goal’ and prevented her from: taking the time to understand what my cause is and all the things that we’ve been learning … and how to articulate that. so already in this retreat i feel like i’ve taken that giant leap forward in knowing what i need to do and how to get there (marie, initial retreat, 2009). participants demonstrated a strong appreciation for developing a deeper understanding of their social purpose and what else was possible. by challenging participants’ previous held assumptions regarding their initiative boundaries, these social change makers became highly adept at responding to their circumstances (both opportunities and limitations) to create collaborative civic outcomes: i think i’ve just got more clarity. i think when it started i was a bit unfocused i think now i’ve really connected with what the whole process needs, now i’m actually making it happen whereas before i was kind of going with whatever was happening at the moment but now i can see what a vision for the future could be (marie, initial retreat, 2009). this process of “forced reflection” is integral to the expansion of both oneself and the initiative. it provides a critical link between one’s ideas and activities. however, with a growing sense of possibility for their initiatives comes increasing frustration at the challenges around fulfilling on these ambitions. the same participant (at a later period) comments on her lack of resources: ‘i just don’t have the resources or the time to do it’. the remaining evaluation years (the follow up) will add further insight into the outcome of such opportunities and the ways in which the program can support these transitions. through the program, pioneers are forced to stop, reflect and refine their objectives. this encourages a clearer and in some cases more meaningful articulation of their project purpose. it is clear from the interview and msc data that achieving increased clarity around the 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 purpose of their initiatives made a significant difference in how the participants viewed themselves as leaders of social change. this reflexive activity made them highly adept at leveraging opportunities to further their initiative’s goals. sustainability the drive to deepen impact and lead a successful social initiative was accompanied by a sense of frustration and anxiety about financial sustainability. it proved to be an area in which almost all participants required knowledge, support and practical expertise. the tools required for such an undertaking are diverse and complex. for instance, across the ysp group, the level of competence around sustainable practices varied considerably and was mirrored by variability in the revenue streams for their initiatives. whether for philanthropic or social enterprise models, social entrepreneurs require support in understanding financial models and identifying the marketable aspect of their initiative. young change makers benefit greatly from possessing skills for effectively communicating the economic and social value of their work; to finesse “the pitch” so that investors understand the value. importantly, achieving clarity of purpose (discussed above) is integral to this process. a lack of funding sources is a palpable and unavoidable reality for many social entrepreneurs. although participants were acutely aware they needed to diversify their funding sources, securing interest outside sectors specific to their initiatives proved difficult. the data revealed that there was a sense of powerlessness in generating a wider pool of resources and support. one participant claimed that ‘i’ve been very cautious in who i address for resources’ (alex, weekend workshop, 2010), adding he only felt comfortable approaching ‘like-minded organisations’. although challenges in the area of funding and support are often a common and expected reality in social entrepreneurship spaces, young people require expertise and assurance to negotiate these challenges. furthermore, it is in these spaces that fya and the ysp program are well positioned to advocate on behalf of pioneers, drawing the link between secure funding and greater social change. the need for advice regarding financial sustainability is concordant with a need for pragmatic solutions to organisational sustainability. almost all participants wished to hand over their initiative within a few years (whether to another leader or beneficiary community) and skill in succession planning was a highly desired and valued commodity. not unlike accruing finance, there were varied pathways and levels of required knowledge identified for how cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 65 succession was to occur. the contribution of programs like ysp, in developing the individual’s facility in this area, is invaluable in this regard. one participant commented that the eventual test for his organisation was the ability for him to step away, while another described how she wanted ‘someone else to come and put their mark on the organisation and take it to wherever it needs to go next’ (katy, initial retreat, 2009). participants linked financial gain or creating a steady, sustainable organisation with their role as leader. this shared aim and acknowledged responsibility for financial procurement among the participant community was considered beneficial. this attitude underscores the entrepreneurial spirit of the young change maker. supporting the founders of social initiatives in identifying transferrable skills and robust organisational practices is essential for the growth of social action and leadership. conclusion this study of the ysp program highlighted how the activities of young social pioneers are characterised by reflexive, communicative and participatory practices which, importantly, place these young agents of social change at the forefront of new forms of civic engagement. a key finding in the evaluation was that the program led to the creation of a pioneer community, enhancing participants’ sense of collectivism and opportunity. the program provided an environment in which the young social change makers, surrounded by individuals working towards similar goals, developed a renewed commitment towards their own initiatives. this shared experience strengthened their sense of self and belief in what they could achieve in the realm of social change. the program contributed to a greater sense of relatedness amongst participants which led to an increase in their motivation to pursue their personal and professional aspirations. this evaluation has shown that the ysp program created an environment that supported collegial relationships as well as autonomy by providing a particular blend of opportunities for collaboration and self-direction. despite these collaborative efforts, the findings reveal that the question of longevity and durability of these social connections remains extant, and needs to be explored further. social entrepreneurs face a range of unique challenges, a lack of funding sources being the chief amongst these. for participants, the drive to deepen impact and lead a successful social initiative was accompanied by a sense of frustration and anxiety about financial sustainability. while participants were acutely aware they needed to expand their funding sources, securing interest outside sector-specific areas proved difficult. the 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 need for pragmatic solutions to organisational sustainability was highlighted as an important area for development for the participants. this exploration of young social entrepreneurs participating in a leadership program has reinforced the notion that the self is socially situated. therefore, one of the key benefits of the program is that it extends the idea that personal achievements have multiple interdependencies that bring together not only the individual social actors but also the right mix of other agents that will bring about desired change. for a program that seeks to galvanize young people wanting to make an impact on their local and broader environments, our findings reveal there are several essential attributes of a program that need to be developed. these include providing an environment that fosters greater depth and quality of connections, the provision of a supportive network of mentors, and skills for developing sustainable business practices and succession planning. although the participants were adept at mobilising their communities towards the fulfilment of their discrete ambitions, this evaluation has shown that this cannot be done in isolation and that these young people require a community of likeminded individuals to support their attempts to reshape social life. improvements in this area will enable youth-led and youthfocused social enterprises to extend, enhance and improve how they make impact. indeed, rather than being lone heroes, young social entrepreneurs are dependent on others to achieve their social aims. ruef (2010) argues that social visionaries create collegial environments, assembling groups around themselves to create a fertile ground for the fulfilment of their social objectives. these findings support this contention, highlighting the practical benefits for young social entrepreneurs of operating within a community of likeminded individuals. they reveal that ongoing and durable social relations are critical for supporting young people’s attempts to reshape social life. furthermore, there remains an ongoing challenge around the risk of these discourses homogenising young people and social experience. ysp is, by its very nature, a program that privileges certain personal capacities of young people as social change makers. the ysp cohort represents a self-selected sample of young people who have demonstrated both their commitment to and success in the design and implementation of ambitious social change projects. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 67 in presenting the activities of young social change makers as driving action within their communities and leading initiatives for widespread social change, a positive and optimistic narrative of young people’s social engagement and agency prevails. however, the findings of this study highlight how the realities and struggles at a ground level as described can be at odds with the more optimistic ways in which young people as social pioneers are sometimes presented. while it is expected that research on social entrepreneur programs depicts and portrays young people from a strengths rather than deficit model of development as demonstrated above, this still risks contributing to an essentialising discourse that valorises achievement to the detriment of ignoring the realities (barriers and myths) which constrain these young people. while the question of whether the self (particularly a social change maker) can transcend structural barriers was not the focus of this paper, the findings of this study highlight a need for a closer interrogation of the taken-for-granted assumptions operating at a program level and around youth leadership more broadly. this calls for an approach that can reconcile optimistic narratives of young people’s agency while identifying barriers that can significantly restrict that agency. references anderson, b. 1983, imagined communities, verso, london. bandura, a. 2006, ‘guide for constructing self-efficacy scales’, in parjares, f and urdan, t (eds) self-efficacy beliefs of adolescents, information age publication (iap): greenwich. cohen, a. p. 1985, the symbolic construction of community, routledge, new york. dart, j. and davies, r. 2003, ‘a dialogical, story-based evaluation tool: the most significant change technique’, american journal of evaluation, vol. 24, no.2: 137–155. davies, r. 1998, ‘an evolutionary approach to organisational learning: an experiment by an ngo in bangladesh’, impact assessment and project appraisal, vol. 16, no. 3: 243250. dick, b. 2002, action research: action and research, retrieved from http://www.aral.com.au/resources/aandr.html 16 february 2012 harding, r., 2006, social entrepreneurship monitor, global entrepreneurship monitor, london business school. harris, a., wyn, j. & younes, s. 2010, ‘beyond apathetic or activist youth: ‘ordinary’ young people and contemporary forms of participation’, young, vol. 18, no. 1: 9-32. kotvojs, f. 2006, contribution analysis: a new approach to evaluation in international development, paper given at 2006 international conference, darwin, australia, 4 – 7 september 2006. http://www.aral.com.au/resources/aandr.html� 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 mayne, j. 1999, addressing attribution through contribution analysis: using performance measures sensibly, discussion paper, office of the auditor general of canada, june 1999. new economics foundation 2006, school for social entrepreneurs: evaluation report, october 2006, retrieved from http://www.sse.org.uk/_uploads/file/sse%20report%20041206.pdf 12 february 2012. pajares, f. & schunk, d. h. 2002, ‘self and self-belief in psychology and education: an historical perspective’ in j. aronson (ed) improving academic achievement, academic press, new york. park, n. 2004, ‘character strengths and positive youth development’, annals of the american academy of political and social science, vol. 591: 40-54. ruef. m. 2010, the entrepreneurial group: social identities, relations, and collective action, retrieved from http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9214.html 14 february 2012. ryan, r.m. & deci, e.l. 2000, ‘self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being’, american psychologist, vol. 55, no.1: 68 78. sukarieh, m. and tannock, s. 2011, ‘the positivity imperative: a critical look at the ‘new’ youth development movement’, journal of youth studies, vol. 14: 675-691. tönnies, f. 1971, on sociology: pure, applied and empirical, edited by w.j. cahnman & r. heberle, university of chicago press, chicago vromen, a. & collin, p. 2010, ‘everyday youth participation? contrasting views from australian policymakers and young people’, young vol. 18, no.1: 97-112 weber, m. 2003, the protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, dover publications, new york. wyness, m. 2009, ‘children representing children: participation and the problem of diversity in uk youth councils’, childhood, vol 16, no. 4: 535-552 http://www.sse.org.uk/_uploads/file/sse%20report%20041206.pdf� http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9214.html� contextualising the self and social change making: an evaluation of the young social pioneers program cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia divine intersections: hindu ritual and the incorporation of religious others kathinka frøystad1 department of social anthropology, university of bergen abstract this article throws the study of multi-religious sociality in western contexts into relief by examining examples from india. much of the current scholarship of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism tends to assume that religious beliefs, practices and spaces make the respective religious communities close in entirely upon themselves. while this assumption may hold true for most of the western settings we study, it does not necessarily give an accurate description of the conditions for multi-religious sociality in other parts of the world. in india, for instance, religious boundaries still display signs of malleability despite the religious politicization and occasional interreligious violence of the past decades. drawing on recent anthropological research, this article shows that people of different religious denominations still visit sufi shrines, that hindus still incorporate ritual elements and divine beings from the religious traditions of their others and that they exercise a wide personal choice in terms of spiritual activities, thus enabling spiritual paths that cross in and out of hinduism. in a hindu context rituals do not necessarily have an insulating effect; they may also provide points of intersection that open up toward the other, thus fostering familiarity and recognition. similar arguments have been made for buddhist settings. the question is thus whether the current scholarship of cosmopolitanism may entail a certain monotheistic bias that needs to be accounted for, something that is of particular importance when theorizing in ways that make universal claims. is religion necessarily divisive in societies marked by religious plurality? much of the contemporary scholarship on cosmopolitanism relies on an implicit assumption that religious boundaries are only crossed within arenas such as popular culture, sports, education, employment and residential spaces, while religious rituals, beliefs and holy places make the respective communities close in upon themselves. thus hip-hop, football, class rooms, offices, markets and neighbourhoods are scrutinized for their potential to enhance social cohesion across religious boundaries, whereas religious rituals, ontologies and congregational sites are dismissed as unireligious and insulating. leaving aside ‘dialogues’ in which religious representatives meet to 1 earlier versions of this essay were presented at the ‘other cosmopolitanisms’ conference at the university of technology, sydney, in august 2011 and at the department of social anthropology at the university of oslo in april 2012. i am indebted to the participants on both occasions as well as to joel s. kahn and the anonymous referees of this journal for invaluable comments, many of which would have deserved a far more substantial treatment than i have been able to give them here. 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 enhance mutual understanding, search for common ground and exercise damage control, religion is typically ruled out as an arena that facilitates inter-religious sociality. this, at least, is the overall impression emanating from studies of cosmopolitanism in europe, most of which pertain to contexts of recent long-distance migration bringing together members of at least one, and often two, monotheistic religions with long histories of promoting one truth by sanctioning heresy, blasphemy and apostasy. the dizzying number of government-funded research programmes, conferences, scholarly networks and journals on migration and multiculturalism that have existed in europe since the early 1990s has reinforced this assumption so profoundly that we have almost witnessed a blind spot in the making. but as this article suggests, religious beliefs, practices and spaces are not necessarily insulating; in some cases they also provide astonishing openings toward religious others. the potential of such openings was recently suggested in american grace: how religion divides and unites us (2010), authored by robert putnam and david e. campbell. based on data from a large-scale survey throughout the united states, the authors argue that the frequency of religious switching is so high that religion not only fosters ‘bonding’ ties to coreligionists but also ‘bridging’ ties to practitioners of other faiths. at least a third of their respondents were married to someone from a different religious community, and a third could virtually see a religious alter in the mirror, so to speak. additionally, most of their christian interlocutors – including the most pious ones – thought that non-christians with good conduct could go to heaven even though the bible quotes jesus to have said that ‘no man cometh unto the father, but by me’ (2010: 536). to my knowledge this is the first major western study to take seriously the possibility that religious practices (in this case non-dogmatic interpretations, conversion and lack of sanctions against religious exogamy) can generate ‘social glue’. the authors are more preoccupied with the extent to which social capital and trust cross religious boundaries than with religious life as such, and their quantitative method renders unanswerable the difficult question of whether it is religious practices that promote inter-religious ties or vice versa. nonetheless, their study provides a timely opening for the possibility that certain lay ontologies and onto-practices can encourage interfaith cordiality rather than merely resulting in religious insulation. in this article i want to take this discussion further by introducing some anthropological reflections along these lines from india, where the context of religious plurality is neither one of substantial switching and intermarriage, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 3 nor one of recent migration, nor even one of abrahamic monotheistic dominance. what can the study of cosmopolitanism learn from study of the more established religious synthesis on the indian subcontinent? drawing on ethnographic observations on how hindu ritual – or, rather, ritual acts carried out by hindus – contain ontic ‘openings’ toward religious others, i argue that these examples provide a crucial counterpoint that needs to be taken into consideration in any attempt to make universal claims about the role of religion in promoting either cohesion or division in plural societies. in terms of ethnography i describe three of the many religious intersections i observed while doing fieldwork among upper-caste hindus in the north indian states of uttaranchal and uttar pradesh: that of a hindu priest apprentice prostrating in front of the tomb of a sufi saint, that of a young hindu opting for a muslim-style fast rather than a hindu fast in hope of fulfilling a certain wish, and that of the religious plurality i noted within a single household. it is significant that all these incidents were methodologically serendipitous in the sense that no fieldworking scholar could have planned for them, and that two of the three involved movement rather than spatial fixity and people acting alone rather than in established social units. this is so because uppercaste hindus do not commit such crossovers particularly often, and because certain kinds of crossovers could even be embarrassing. for years i dismissed these incidents as cases out of the ordinary. but their number kept growing, and whenever i mentioned them to indian friends or fellow south asianists, i was told how utterly common they were. thus despite their singularity and infrequency compared to more conventional forms of upper-caste religious practices, none of the incidents described below is exceptional even after decades of attempts to ‘purify’ hinduism and south asian islam alike. this is one of the reasons why joyce burkhalter flueckiger, whose work i introduce shortly, wants to ‘make more room for the possibility that one basis for shared identity might also be religious’ (flueckiger 2006: 171, emphasis in original). and if this can be said about the most religiously plural and populous country in the world, there is due reason to rethink the models that inform the current scholarship of cosmopolitanism in multi-religious societies, asking to what extent it may entail an implicit western, monotheist bias. as don handelman (2008) argues in a discussion on the concept of belief in social anthropology, graded, organic ontologies of the kind found in buddhism incorporate new elements far more easily than monotheist religions. this is so because the former acknowledge a continuum of divinity between 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 gods and humans while the latter subscribe to a more ‘fixed’ cosmic order given their anchoring in the fall from paradise which separated humans from god.2 following this argument, organic ontologies are typically more elastic and enable more religious intersections that hold potential to unsettle the difference which supposedly is the primary factor that distinguishes religious communities from one another. the hindu context in which i work shares this elasticity, as the next section suggests. historical and analytical background indian historiography is replete with descriptions of indeterminate religious boundaries, ontological overlaps and interfaith cordiality alongside studies of conquest, missionizing and strife. it could hardly be otherwise with such a variety of local cults, rhizomatic offshoots from the so-called ‘great traditions’ and influence from immigrant traders and rulers throughout the last millennium. the popularity of sufi pirs (islamicite guru-like healers) and the dargahs (shrines) constructed around their tombs has received particular attention given their mediation between indic and islamicite traditions.3 mohammad habib, in alam 2006: 21 originally muslim mystics who were ‘enrolled’ among the hindu seers ( ), many pirs came to incorporate indic elements. their followers, clients and adepts were drawn from a variety of communities, though typically from castes of low or middle rank. the songs and stories that narrated their deeds could either emphasize their ‘hindu’ or ‘muslim’ traits depending on the composer and performers that helped keep the tradition alive. over time their dargahs could either be ‘hinduized’ or ‘islamicized’ depending on the religious outlook of the political rulers in the area, which occasionally turned dargahs into spaces of fierce political dispute (hayden 2002). despite the growing crystallization and politicization of religious identities since the nineteenth century, not least during the hindu nationalist wave in the early 1990s (hansen 1999), contemporary dargahs still have profound mediating qualities. carolyn heitmeyer (2011), for instance, describes a dargah in the gujarati town of mahemdabad that, alongside a portrait of its 2 handelman’s observation is probably more appropriate for protestantism and judaism than for catholicism and islam. 3 i follow gilmartin and lawrence (2002) in trying to escape the historical inaccuracy of projecting the ‘hindu’ and ‘muslim’ terms back onto a distant historical past by using the terms ‘indic’ and ‘islamicite’ to distinguish between autochthonous traditions on the one hand, and traditions that entered the indian subcontinent with muslim traders and rulers on the other. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 5 founding pir and his successors displays a portrait of the mainly hindu saint sai baba of shirdi besides being decorated with the hindu mantra ‘om’ alongside the crescent moon and holy words from the quran. parvis ghassem-fachandi (2011) describes another dargah in gujarat whose trustees always encourage its visitors to enter the hindu ram temple across the courtyard before they leave the village. and joyce burkhalter flueckiger describes how a female muslim healer and pir husband in hyderabad freely let their disciple invoke hanuman, the monkey god in the ramayana epic, on their premises. for them hanuman was a messenger who could bring requests to the saint suleman baba, who in turn was renowned for retrieving lost objects (2006: 178). hindu deities were by no means rejected as phantasms but rather acknowledged as beings who were indisputably powerful despite being subordinate to allah and his archangels and saints. all these studies describe the clientele as interreligious, working class and lowor middle-caste. to indians and south asianists the implicit assumption that religious rituals, practices and spaces necessarily are insulating would simply come across as badly informed. a few studies of divine intersections in india have also moved beyond sufi pirs and dargahs. jackie assayag’s monograph at the confluence of two rivers (2004, first published in french in 1995) is a seminal contribution in this regard. by following the religious life of hindu, muslim and christian villagers in karnataka for more than a year, assayag gives a convincing account of the festivals, rituals and spaces that separated the communities one from another, and of those that brought them together. the dargahs had clearly the strongest centripetal effects, but assayag also documents the continued participation of hindus in the shi’i muharram processions despite the falling hindu attendance elsewhere in the country, to name one of his valuable observations. based on a more individual methodological approach, veena das (2012) narrates the story of a muslim healer (amil) in delhi whose occult powers partly derived from the rituals he was made to perform in an abandoned kali temple in the pakistani province of sindh. towards the end of his apprenticeship as an amil he was brought to this temple where a luminous person whom his companion addressed as guru maharaj seated them in front of an image of the hindu goddess kali and guided them through some rituals he did not understand, but which helped him gain control of a female spirit that had troubled his family since his grandfathers’ days. eager to live up to the ideal of islamic purity, however, the amil was deeply troubled by the hindu elements of his powers. guru maharaj had begun to appear in his dreams, and when das met him, he 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 consulted islamic manuals on dreams to find out whether his dreams about the mystic in the kali temple could have been sent by shaitan. religious identities, das concludes, can still be surprisingly malleable. in my attempt to continue the examination of contemporary divine intersections in india i am particularly influenced by three analytical prisms. one emerges from flueckiger’s aforementioned study of the female muslim healer in hyderabad. lovingly called amma (mother) by her clients, her healing room was a ritual space in which muslim, hindu and christian clients arrived in search for spiritual assistance for their problems. lack of space made the clients sit side by side and listen to each others’ stories, whether they pertained to chronic pain, sickly children or disobedient wives. regardless of their religious background, they all worried that their problems could have been caused by the evil eye, black magic or malevolent spirits, hoping that amma could diagnose them correctly and advise a proper cure. in this way amma’s healing room emerged as a caurasta (crossroads) where people of different denominations met and ontologies intersected to such an extent that religious boundaries became overwhelmingly fluid. what counted was ritual efficacy, not fixed identities or ‘official’ religious beliefs (see lindquist 2008 for a similar argument). another useful prism is michael carrithers’ polytropy concept (2000), which aims to capture the common indian tendency to seek spiritual intervention from many (poly) directions (tropos). this prism originates in carrithers’ long-term study of digambar jains, a religious community that does not acknowledge god in a dualist form (i.e. as something external to oneself), but whose lay practitioners nevertheless perform hindu-style worship (puja) to the 24 realised jain beings (tirthankars) as if they were hindu deities. some also worship hanuman. in carrithers’ interpretation such slippages occur because the physical movement of minimal puja – particularly the pranam or namaskar greeting of joining one’s palms while bowing – is so deeply engrained that lay jains do it as a bodily reflex to everything that ‘seems holy’ (cf. carrithers, et al. 2010).4 4 i am not entirely convinced by carrithers’ 2010 argument that the propensity to do puja to everything that ‘looks holy’ is unrelated to vernacular ontologies, but more detailed discussion of this argument will have to await a later occasion. the result is a constant tension between ‘purists’ (who subscribe to an official version of the religion) and polytropists. as carrithers points out, polytropic tendencies are equally common cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 7 among hindus and jains, with the crucial qualification that the quest for hindu purity is also driven by religious reform movements and hindu nationalist organizations that add a considerable political thrust. a third prism i find useful is louis dumont’s ‘encompassment of the contrary’ principle. originally developed to capture the hierarchical thought that underpins caste (1970), dumont defines ‘hierarchy’ as distinct from ‘rank’ in that it subsumes, or encompasses, that which it dominates, making it a lesser part of itself. given a hierarchical relation between x and y, x stands for the whole and y for an imperfect derivative. his notion of encompassment is applicable far beyond caste: dumont’s own examples include the relation between adam and eve in the bible, between goods and work in classical political economy, between work and exchange for adam smith and between production and consumption for karl marx (dumont 1970:245), and further examples are found in rio and smedal (2009). following dumont one may discern how religious elements that ‘officially’ belong to a different religious tradition are incorporated and simultaneously subordinated, as in amma’s incorporation of hanuman among the islamic messengers. elements that are contrary to a purist may nevertheless be incorporated in ritual practice, especially in ‘caurastic’ spaces. as a more general prism i nevertheless prefer to speak of ‘divine intersections’, which i use as common denominator for all the forms of religious synthesis one may encounter in plural religious societies. advocating one principle as more fundamental than the others would be to misinterpret their complementary nature, though it is true that one principle may dominate the others in singular cases. let me now detail three of the divine intersections i have observed in upper-caste ritual life over the years while conducting fieldwork on everyday hindu nationalism and new spiritual trends respectively. i begin by following the well-trodden path of looking at dargahs, albeit in an unconventional way. the priest student and the pir haridwar, february 2011. the sun was losing its midday intensity, and one by one the elderly ashram residents left their rooms for an evening stroll or a cup of tea in the pale sun. the ashram, a residential spiritual centre i call joyti ashram, was located at the end of the road, bordering the 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 holy ganga river to the east, a tributary river to the north, a ramshackle low-caste settlement (basti) to the west and a brick-house village inhabited by middle-caste farmers and traders to the south. some years earlier i had lived in this ashram to study the appropriation of western new age influences among its mainly urban middle-class hindu residents, and now i had returned for a follow-up visit. noting continuities and changes, i registered that the tributary had been reduced to a tiny stream that could now be crossed more easily, and that the morning and evening arati (fire worship) rituals in the ashram temple now longer was conducted by a professional priest but by a group of twelve advanced students at a nearby vedic college in exchange for free accommodation. as it turned out, these changes were vital for the incident that was to unfold that afternoon. before moving on, some contextual details are required. haridwar, the closest town, is one of india’s main hindu pilgrim centres. tourist brochures state that this is where lord vishnu’s heavenly bird garuda spilled his elixir of immortality, where the renowned kumbh mela festival is held every twelfth year, where one’s misdeeds can be cleared in the ganga to fasten the way to liberation from rebirth (moksha), where scores of family genealogies are stored and where the density of temples, ashrams and pilgrim rest houses (dharamshalas) surpasses that of any other city except, perhaps, banaras. while downtown haridwar is almost uniquely hindu, the nearby towns have a sizeable muslim minority, the administrative unit of haridwar district counting no less than 34% muslims (census of india 2011). local newspapers describe the interreligious relations in the district as cordial, also during religious turbulence elsewhere in the country, as when hindu-muslim riots raged in 1992 and 2002. the rural surroundings of the joyti ashram was nevertheless almost uniquely hindu except for two unassuming dargahs. one was located within a partial enclosure along the village road; the other in a forest clearing across the diminished tributary, and this is the dargah that became the scene for the present ethnographic case. writing field notes by the window i had often seen this dargah from a distance. deserted during daytime but with occasional flickering lights at night, the pir still had his devotees. once i also heard singing, which indicates a gathering to mark his death anniversary, his wedding to allah (urs). until this particular day i had refrained from visiting the dargah due to the reproaches i cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 9 often got from the ashram residents if i strayed too far away from the roads and spaces they held to be safe and non-defiling. the forest across the tributary had not only been difficult to access but also potentially dangerous given that village outskirts, forest areas and places where rivers meet are places where evil spirits and restless ghosts (bhut-pret) are known to hover about (cf. assayag 2004: 101). visiting a place associated with death could moreover be seriously defiling. no longer so restricted by such concerns now that my main fieldwork was over, i decided to walk across. to make my expedition transparent i made it a point to inform the ashram manager, who surprised me by asking if he could come along. to my even greater surprise, one of the priest students joined us as well. so off we went, across the drying-out river basin and up along the path toward the forest clearing – the priest student first, the manager next and then me. once there i noticed that the space was larger than i had thought. it contained not only one but two dargahs; a large one in the centre and a smaller one to the left. there was nobody there but us. all we could hear was the sound of the river and the whispering of trees. the young men approached the place in silence. before entering the stone enclosure they reached for their shoes. ‘here we must take off our shoes’ (yahan chappal utarna hai), the priest whispered. having entered the makeshift portal, they stood respectfully in front of the central dargah, joining palms just as they did in the temple. to my surprise the priest student then knelt down in front of the central grave and bowed his head to the ground. next he proceeded to the smaller tomb, where he bowed respectfully with his palms together. the manager followed suit but remained standing, presumably to avoid soiling his light grey trousers. the priest student, wearing dark track pants, had no such concerns. on the way back i was full of questions. had they been there before? the priest student once, the manager never. whose dargahs were they? no idea, probably some pir baba or the other.5 5 baba is a respectful title typically given to pirs, gurus and other men of renown. who maintained the space and came for urs? maybe someone from the nearby basti, who were only ‘half hindus’. as we approached the ashram we could hear the sound of hymns (bhajans) that were always played over the loudspeakers prior to the aratis. the priest student sped up, and as soon as we returned he rushed to his dormitory, had a quick bath, changed into his white priestly garb and joined his fellow students in ringing the bells to alert the gods to the vedic chanting and fire sacrifice that were to follow, switching within less than an hour from 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 prostrating to an unknown muslim pir to worshipping ganesha, krishna, radha, ram, sita, hanuman, shiva and durga, to name the main deities represented in the temple. how come a hindu priest student paid such deep respect to an unknown pir? that hindus seek polytropic help from pirs – whether living or in their graves – is not uncommon. pirs are renowned for their remedies against long-term chronic problems such as infertility, weak children, madness, marital distress and repeated economic loss, especially if suspected to be caused by supernatural beings (cf. flueckiger 2006). whether the beings are called jinns (as in vernacular islam), asuras (as in hinduism) or something else is insignificant, which is why pirs and dargahs attract hindu and muslim clients alike. pirs are considered experts in diagnosing spirit afflictions, whether by means of islamic geomancy or other divination forms. they also treat these afflictions – most commonly by writing numbers or words on slips of paper that are to be worn, burned, hidden or smoked. in serious cases the pir can also contain spirits by transferring them from the patient to an object. a renowned pir has an immense innate power (barkat/baraka), which survives his passing. the tomb of a renowned pir thus radiates an immense protective power, which is why his adepts and clients construct a shrine around it and convert it into a place of healing and solace. though this particular dargah on the outskirts of haridwar was modest, its location suggested a pir capable of treating highly serious afflictions. even an outsider unexposed to village lore would grasp the immense power present in this forest clearing as long as he acknowledged the existence of malevolent spirits and a pir’s ability to contain them. clearly the priest student did so since he was the one to lead the way and instruct us how to behave. that being said, it is rare that hindus of brahmin descent consult pirs and dargahs, especially if they are priests. not only should their vedic rituals ideally contain all the remedies required; brahmins are also more resistant against spirit attack than low castes since their bodies generally are better sealed. according to osella and osella (1999), malevolent spirits typically enter human bodies through their lower orifices (the anus, the vagina and possibly the navel), and the many ritual prescriptions and sealing practices that brahmins typically do make them virtually impenetrable. yet even brahman priests are known to have secretly consulted pirs and dargahs as cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 11 a last resort.6 in the incident described above there was no need for assistance, but the deep prostration of the priest student nevertheless suggests a strong appreciation of the barkat of the place, prior acquaintance with pir healing and acknowledgement of the possibility that his body could be insufficiently closed since he had neither grown up in a priestly household nor completed his vedic education yet. in terms of analysis the incident may be described as a transition from purism to polytropy and back following the physical movement from a vedic space to a ‘caurastic space’ and back. while the condescending remark about the basti villagers being only ‘half hindu’ appears to boomerang on himself, it primarily reflects the tension between these modes that he experienced midway back to vedic purity, as if deliberately shaking off his own polytropic inclinations. above all, this incident demonstrates that even brahmins may have considerable ontic overlaps with vernacular islam, which makes the muslim other less unfamiliar than he or she would otherwise have been. to deepen this point i turn now to a ritual act that crossed the hindu-muslim divide in an entirely different way. ratan’s roza kanpur, january 1993. like several other cities in north india, kanpur was about to recover from the gravest hindu-muslim riots india had experienced since the secession of pakistan in 1947. only a month earlier around 110 people had been killed in this post-industrial city in retaliation for muslim protests against the demolition of the babar mosque in ayodhya a little further east. streets that had been deserted for weeks due to curfew and fear were now returning to life. it was in this context (elaborated in frøystad 2005, 2009) i first met ratan, a 19-year old college student whom i engaged one week later as a research assistant. his task was to help me conduct a survey among working-class hindus in the outskirts of town to assess the degree to which they shared the negative views about the 20.4%-strong muslim minority in the city that i had found in the middle-class segment. in the months that followed ratan and i spent substantial time together knocking on doors, filling forms and sipping tea with our respondents, which is how i came to know about his roza (fast). ratan was a khatri, a caste that claims descent from the kshatriya (warrior/king) varna in the vedic hierarchy, from the region of punjab and – according to some – from surya, the sun god. 6 ute hüsken, personal communication. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 living with his parents, younger brother and two servants in a bungalow reserved for civil servants, ratan was privileged compared to his average age mate. he had just begun his ba studies, and his evening assignment for me gave him a welcome opportunity to earn pocket money while getting acquainted with the most outlandish foreigner in town. one day ratan surprised me by rejecting the tea and sweets we were routinely offered by our respondents. he did not even want water in the breaks. worrying that our interlocutors would be offended by his rejection of their hospitality, i pleaded with ratan to have at least one sip of tea in each house, but to no avail. this gave him no option but to let me in on his secret love affair. as it turned out, ratan was in love with a girl in his class, and she with him. in 1993 kanpur was still a city in which virtually all marriages were arranged, pre-marital relationships were scandalous and youngsters of the opposite sex could not be alone together without damaging their reputation. as it turned out, ratan’s parents were going away for the weekend and ratan had concocted the following plan. he would dismiss the servants and smuggle the girl home on a cycle rickshaw, covered in a brown woollen shawl that made her resemble an elderly woman to potential gossipmongers in the neighbourhood. safely inside they would share his food, chat and perhaps even hold hands and kiss. but could he succeed without getting caught? ratan was nervous. nothing should go wrong. to optimise his chances, ratan decided to undertake a oneday roza. roza is the persian term used by south asian muslims to designate the fasting prescribed by islamic law during the month of ramadan. some muslims also fast at other times for a particular wish to be fulfilled, and this was the kind of fasting for which ratan had opted. why did a young hindu select a muslim ritual of wish-fulfilment despite its hindu equivalents? let us consider the alternatives. one was vrat, a hindu fast typically maintained during religious festivals or independently as a pledge. yet a vrat would be too feeble a stratagem for such a risky plan. the working logic appeared to be that, other things being equal, the degree of efficacy was proportional to the degree of sacrifice, and since a hindu vrat only required abstention from certain kinds of food while an islamic roza prohibited not only food and drink but also the swallowing of one’s own saliva, a roza would be more potent.7 7 ratan took the saliva prohibition very seriously, which – given his inexperience – resulted in considerable spitting outside our interviewees’ homes. fearing that this would add to their offence, i had to end our working day far earlier than usual. besides, vrats are primarily done cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 13 by women and have far more pious purposes, such as expressing devotion to god, ensuring the longevity of one’s husband or lifting a curse (lipner 1994: 261), which made vrat entirely inappropriate, if not counterproductive in ratan’s case. following the same logic, another alternative could have been to seek help from a hindu deity by a more elaborate puja offering than usual. yet pujas are ideally conducted to ensure the general wellbeing of one’s family and wider community, not for individual wish-fulfilment that would defy their propriety (fuller 1992:69-72). this made puja equally inappropriate as a vrat, so if ratan was to seek divine help, he had to look beyond the ritual repertoire with which he was familiar. a hindu option could have been to seek help from a tantric, but tantrics were hard to find and time was short. doing roza – which he knew about from muslim classmates – was at once quicker, more potent and more discreet. that none of his muslim classmates were likely to have done roza for such a dubious purpose did not appear to trouble him. whether he was unaware of its inappropriateness or reckoned that potential adverse effects would be milder since he generally relied less upon the grace of allah than on the hindu deities favoured by his family is however uncertain. interestingly ratan had no hesitation in crossing the religious boundary in search for divine assistance despite the intense politicization of hindu-muslim relations of the preceding months and years. as such he exemplified the polytropic principle in a slightly different way than that indicated by carrithers: rather than joining his palms in an ‘unofficial’ direction, he made a different bodily sacrifice from the usual. for this to make sense, ratan must have acknowledged the efficacy of certain islamic rituals. the extent to which he acknowledged allah and his powers as well is less clear, but if he did, there are two ontological possibilities. either he considered allah another name for brahman, the absolute, which is not uncommon among hindus, or alternatively he saw allah as a deity with highly specialized powers but insufficiently important to merit regular attention. the latter possibility would invert the way in which flueckiger’s female healer incorporated hanuman though both cases would bear strong resemblance to dumont’s principle of encompassment in the sense that they subsumed their contraries without altering their own logical systems. incorporations of this kind are particularly common in hinduism, which has often been likened to a sponge (see inden 2000, smith 2003 for a critical discussion of this argument). for another incorporating aspect of hinduism i now move to my final case, which examines the element of personal preference. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 the multispiritual soundscape and personal preferences kanpur, march 2011, late morning. having finished our tea, those in my host family who had not rushed off to work withdrew one by one to have a bath, get dressed and do their morning rituals. eyeing the possibility of an hour’s solitary fieldnote writing, i grabbed my laptop and began to type. half an hour into my work the sound of loud female chanting – nam myo renge kyo, nam myo renge kyo, nam myo renge kyo – began to emanate from my host’s brother’s section of the house. the sound came from the soka gakkai group of his daughter-in-law, which gathered twice a week for collective chanting. five minutes later a male, monotonous recitation joined it from the opposite side of the house. jay hanuman gyan gun sagar…the voice began. this was my host, the retired pater familias, who had begun his daily recital of the hanuman chalisa. on top of this unintended duet a ting ting ting sound suddenly penetrated the air. this was the temple bell with which the latter’s daughter-in-law alerted the deities in the house temple to the daily puja she was about to begin. thus within a single home one could hear a multispiritual soundscape representing no less than three modes of worship and two world religions. and this was just the auditory aspect of the religious diversity in the family. as most other hindus in this region, this family subscribed to a vernacular, dualist form of hinduism that acknowledged wide array of gods and goddesses of different abstractions. an annual and weekly cycle of worship ensured that each of the main deities received their due share of attention, making sure that none of them felt abandoned and took revenge by causing misfortune. beyond these cycles there was a considerable element of personal choice. according to the kuldevta principle, each family, lineage or caste may have a patron deity who is accorded a prominent ritual position. additionally, the ishtadevta principle enables each family member to devote particular attention to a deity of his or her choice. what i want to suggest is that the ishtadevta principle reflects the possibility of a far wider personal choice – not only of patron deity, but also of mode of worship, sect, movement, guru and so on, which in turn enables personal spiritual biographies that sometimes venture outside what is generally acknowledged as ‘hindu’.8 8 ventures out of hinduism are generally temporary and partial, but can also form the seed of permanent conversion, as flueckiger ( those who undertake such spiritual paths may in turn bring some of their new spiritual 2006) shows in her description of a hindu apprentice of amma who, after several years, changed his name and underwent circumcision to become a muslim. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 15 elements home, which, though not always inspiring their relatives to follow suit, at least produces a certain familiarity, which resonates with putnam’s and campbell’s argument from the us. returning to the aforementioned family – an upper-caste family of punjabi descent living in an old bungalow in the city of kanpur – its diversity of worship can be summarized as follows. their life cycle rituals and the main annual festivals were officiated by a professional brahmin priest who had conducted its vedic rites for several decades. the pater familias had hanuman as his ishtadevta. every morning since his wife passed away he recited the hanuman chalisa, a devotional poem about hanuman composed in the sixteenth century. on occasional tuesdays he also visited the neighbourhood hanuman temple. his sons limited their ritual participation to the annual festivals, but the wife of the eldest one had cleaned out a closet in order to install a house temple (mandir) where she could worship durga, shiva, hanuman, ganesha and krishna as well as a few minor deities. her temple images also included a representation of guru nanak, the founder of sikhism, to whom she did puja just like she did to the aforementioned gods. many hindus have high reverence for guru nanak, but since iconolotary and idol worship (murti puja) were among the key factors that made sikhism crystallize as a separate religion (mandair 2005:273), doing puja to guru nanak seems to be a double contradiction at first sight. making such an argument would however be to value theological principles over ritual, consistency over bricolage, beliefs over practices, ontologies over ontopraxis, and purity over polytropy. following carrithers (2000), the propensity of doing puja to everything that ‘seems holy’ – in this case guru nanak – overwrote completely the potential logical inconsistency of doing so. indeed, my host’s daughter-in-law freely incorporated guru nanak among the deities she worshipped just like amma incorporated hanuman, thus making the turbaned guru nanak a highly familiar character for her four-year old son, his cousins and playmates. in this way the young mother brought sikhism to the house, albeit in an altered form. moving on to a shelf with religious paraphernalia displayed out of respect rather than for worship, i found additional surprising incorporations. next to a marble shiva lingam, a dusty image of ganesha, an image of the nineteenth century saint shirdi sai baba and a photograph of the deceased guru of a family friend was a crucifix of jesus christ with the letters inri written on the upper part of the cross. the incorporation of jesus is interesting. contrary to the common 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 argument that contemporary hinduism was modernised in a protestant fashion to better withstand competition from the religion of the colonizers, what we rather see in contemporary micro settings is that hinduism incorporates christianity in an encompassing manner. placing a crucifix on a shelf or in a house temple alongside hindu deities is only one way in which this may occur. another is by means of the legend that jesus, rather dying on the cross, managed to escape to kashmir, where he became a famous yogi. a shrine in srinagar marks what its adherents take to be his tomb. a third mode is found in the legend that portrays jesus as an incarnation of vishnu, almost on par with krishna. while the forms of incorporation differ, the principle remains that of encompassment, subordination and transformation. though my host once claimed to only keep the crucifix there in fond memory of the priest from his catholic school, he also expressed a desire to safeguard himself by ‘covering’ as many divine beings as possible in his ritual invocations, which also made him include jesus in the all-round invocation that followed his hanuman calisa recital. the religious diversity was even more remarkable in the portion of the house in which his brother’s family lived. his wife – whom he had defied his parents to marry – was born in a parsi family and still identified as a zoroastrian, still participating in numerous zoroastrian religious functions with her natal family. in her present home it was nonetheless she who performed all the domestic hindu rituals that did not require a professional priest. their son followed his cousins in restricting his worship to the main annual rituals, but his wife had become an active follower of the japanese soka gakkai movement, which spread like a wildfire among middle-class housewives in north india in the 2000s. twice a week her group got together to chant the japanese title of the lotus sutra (nam myo renge kyo) for thirty minutes to awaken their buddha nature, a practice initiated by the thirteenth-century buddhist monk nichiren daishonin and now promoted by the indian branch of the soka gakkai movement. on holidays their husbands and children occasionally joined in, and the nine-year old son in this particular family had been enrolled in a soka gakkai youth programme. yet none of this precluded the family from selfidentifying as hindu, which was what they had asked the census officer to tick off when he came to collect data for the census of india 2011. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 17 summing up, the extraordinary religious diversity within this semi-joint family included images and elements from mainstream hinduism, sikhism, christianity, zoroastrianism as well as buddhism. of the world religions represented in this part of india, the only religion missing was islam. this void was not necessarily a token of sharper religious alterity; it could equally well be a sign of respect. having islamic representations in the house temple would presumably be interpreted as denigrating by muslim visitors given the strict islamic prohibition of idol worship. and though the family technically could have had qu’ranic calligraphy or an image of kaaba on the wall, they had no way of predicting how muslim visitors would have appreciated such images decorating the house of non-believers (kafirs). the best friends of the sons happened to be muslim, and they were far too precious to be alienated. the religious distance that this family maintained to islam could thus equally well be analysed as a precondition for maintaining cordial relations with these and other muslims. if so, it would pose an interesting twist to putnam and campbell’s conclusion that religion may foster bridging as well as bonding ties: in this case preexisting bridging ties rather precluded religious crossover by respecting certain islamic exclusivities. beyond islam, though, the home of my host was virtually a religious caurasta (crossroads) in itself. concluding remarks let me wrap up by reiterating the main points of the russian dolls-like argument of the preceding pages, beginning with the outer layer. religious practices, beliefs and rituals do not necessarily insulate religious communities from one another; they may also provide ontic openings that make religious alters more familiar. religious traditions do not necessarily have as hard kernels as they do in the monotheist contexts that underpin most current reflections on cosmopolitanism, something we ought to take into account if we aspire to develop analytical models with broader applicability. the main lesson from india is that everyday religion is still replete with ‘divine intersections’ that constitute a subtle, under-theorized counterforce against religious and political discourses of purity despite their inability to eradicate either. a deeper problematization of the scarcity of such a counterforce in western contexts would be one way to bring the study of cosmopolitanism forward in a manner that incidentally also falls in line with chakrabarty’s call (2000) for the ‘provincialization’ of europe. in order to make these arguments i have been inspired by the budding ‘ontological turn’ in the anthropology of south asia, which 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 privileges everyday ontic practices over religious texts, political rhetoric and patterns of social action. for the purpose of this essay i have found particularly useful flueckiger’s crossroads (caurasta) concept (2006), carrithers’ purity–polytropy distinction (2000) as well as dumont’s classic encompassment of the contrary model (1970), to which i have added the ishtadevtarelated hindu emphasis on personal choice. the extent to which these lenses hold relevance for potential intersections elsewhere is a question i must leave for others; my main hope is to inspire further research along these lines. arguing that religious rituals are not necessarily divisive is not to argue that divine intersections across religious traditions are never divisive. indeed, certain divine intersections amplify conflicts, particularly if religious boundaries coincide with stark socio-economic differences. diane mines (2007, 2002), for instance, describes how a scheduled caste man entering a temple to worship the village goddess against the will of its upper-caste trustees triggered a conflict that ended with murder despite the legal prohibition against denying temple entry on the grounds of caste. the trustees did certainly not appreciate the low-caste appropriation of their goddess and ritual space but rather considered it an unpardonable transgression. harrison (1999) mentions additional examples, including that of sinhala buddhists in sri lanka who besides appropriating the tamil minority’s worship of kataragama also sought to deny the hindu origin of this worship (cf. gombrich & obeyesekere 1988). he also brings up the wounded feelings of many native americans over the new age appropriation of their shamanic rituals, which constituted an inalienable part of their identity (see aldred 2000). once our analyses shift to contexts of starkly unequal power relations and emphasize the perspective of the ‘appropriated’ and their spokesmen rather than that of the ‘appropriators’, it becomes evident that not all divine intersections are favourable for societal cohesion. yet in the indian cases discussed in this paper, there was no sign of hurt or loss, though there would undoubtedly have been so if the picture of guru nanak had been replaced by a picture of the kaaba, let alone of the prophet. divine intersections that challenge religious prohibitions are unlikely to have cohesive potential. two questions require further attention. the first is putnam and campbell’s unanswered puzzle of whether it is religious practices that promote interreligious ties or vice versa. my own cases may at first sight seem equally indeterminate: while the roza and the crucifix display were cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 19 anchored in pre-existing interreligious ties, the reverence for guru nanak and soka gakkai-style buddhism were not. based on my field experience so far i suggest a sequence of action in which a pre-existing interreligious tie – often of the kind that granovetter (1973) analysed as ‘weak’ – may well provide the initial ritual inspiration, the resultant ontological opening of which in turn may pave the way for additional interreligious ties. whatever the context-specific answer may be, it must be sought by a close attention to process rather than in abstract ideas of causation. another question that requires more attention is whether our eagerness to promote interreligious cohesion inadvertently leads us to overemphasize the frequency and beneficial effects of ontological openings. social anthropologists have often debated the influence of their moral positioning on their research, and as roy d’andrade (1995) argues, ‘moral models’ which are too strong can easily make us overlook crucial contrary evidence. while i largely agree with his warning, it must also be said that the current interest in ontological meeting points – within or beyond india – partly arose to counterbalance the long-standing academic attention to religious purity as expressed in religious texts, nationalist rhetoric and interreligious conflict. to document their subtle counterforces, fieldworking scholars have a crucial role to play, though this does not entirely solve the ‘moral models’ problem. i end with a speculation that may clarify my own moral entanglement while bringing the question of divine intersections westward to my home country, norway. could the massive rhetoric against european muslims and islam that has increasingly dominated social media and sections of the press since the mid 2000s have been reduced if the religious traditions in the country – 79% are members of the lutheran state church, 2-3% of various muslim congregations – had been more open to ritual crossovers? personally i believe so. most of the anti-islamic rhetoric reveals a striking lack of knowledge about islamic beliefs and practices though it increasingly has come to revolve around islam – in stark contrast to the hindu nationalist anti-muslim rhetoric in india, which primarily revolved around non-religious issues (cf. frøystad 2005). interestingly it took a ghastly massacre to bring about the first known ritual intersection between christianity and islam in norway. in july 2011 the blond 32-year old anders behring breivik killed 69 participants of the annual labour party youth camp whom he held co-responsible for what he took to be an ‘islamization’ of norway. one of the victims was the 18-year old bano abobakar rashid whose family had fled from kurdistan in 1996. hers was the first funeral after the 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 massacre, and her parents’ decision to organize a christian-islamic burial – widely covered in the press – was not only invented to reflect the religious traditions that had influenced their daughter but also to communicate to the norwegian public that the mutual exclusivity of islam and christianity had been widely exaggerated. the fact that it took such a disastrous event for a ritual intersection to come about speaks volumes about the nature of religion in northern europe. fortunately it says less about the prospects of multireligious sociality elsewhere in the world. references alam, s. 2006, ‘on retelling the muslim conquest of north india’, in chatterjee, p. & ghosh, a. (eds), history and the present, anthem press, london, pp. 24-43. aldred, l. 2000, ‘plastic shamans and astroturf sun dances: new age commercialization of native american spirituality’, american indian quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 329-352. assayag, j. 2004, at the confluence of two rivers: hindus and muslims in india, manohar, new delhi. carrithers, m. 2000, ‘on polytropy: or the natural condition of spiritual cosmopolitanism in india: the digambar jain case’, modern asian studies, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 831-861. carrithers, m., candea, m., sykes, k. & holbraad, m. 2010, ‘ontology is just another word for culture (debates in anthropological theory, university of manchester, 2008)’, critique of anthropology, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 152-200. census of india 2011, basic data sheet, district haridwar 813, uttaranchal (05), http://www.censusindia.gov.in/tables_published/basic_data_sheet.aspx accessed 15 march 2012. chakrabarty, d. 2000, provincializing europe: postcolonial thought and historical difference, princeton university press, princeton, nj. d'andrade, r. 1995, ‘moral models in anthropology’, current anthropology, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 399-408. das, v. 2012, ‘the dreamed guru: the entangled lives of the amil and the anthropologist’, in copeman, j. & ikegame, a. (eds), the guru in south asia: new interdisciplinary perspectives, routledge, london, pp. 133-155. dumont, l. 1970, homo hierarchicus: the caste system and its implications, the university of chicago press, chicago. flueckiger, j.b. 2006, in amma’s healing room: gender and vernacular islam in south india, indiana university press, bloomington, in. frøystad, k. 2005, blended boundaries: caste, class, and shifting faces of ‘hinduness’ in a north indian city, oxford university press, new delhi. frøystad, k. 2009, ‘communal riots in india as a transitory form of political violence: three approaches’, ethnic and racial studies, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 442-459. http://www.censusindia.gov.in/tables_published/basic_data_sheet.aspx� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 21 fuller, c.j. 1992, the camphor flame: popular hinduism and society in india, princeton university press, . princeton, nj. ghassem-fachandi, p. 2011, ‘religious synthesis at a muslim shrine’, in clark-decés, i. (ed.) a companion to the anthropology of india, wiley-blackwell, oxford, pp. 260-276. gilmartin, d. & lawrence, b.b. 2002, ‘introduction’, in gilmartin, d. & lawrence, b.b. (eds), beyond turk and hindu: rethinking religious identities in islamicate south asia, india research press, new delhi, pp. 1-20. gombrich, r.f. & obeyesekere, g. 1988, buddhism transformed : religious change in sri lanka, princeton university press, princeton, n.j. granovetter, m.s. 1973, ‘the strength of weak ties’, american journal of sociology, vol. 78, no. 6, pp. 1360-1379. handelman, d. 2008, ‘afterword: returning to cosmology – thoughts on the positioning of belief’, social analysis, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 181-195. hansen, t.b. 1999, the saffron wave: democracy and hindu nationalism in modern india, princeton university press,princeton, n.j. harrison, s. 1999, ‘identity as a scarce resource’, social anthropology, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 239-251. hayden, r.m. 2002, ‘antagonistic tolerance: competitive sharing of religoius sites in south asia and the balkans’, current anthropology, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 205-231. heitmeyer, c. 2011, ‘religion as practice, religion as identity: sufi dargahs in contemporary gujarat’, south asia: journal of south asian studies, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 485-503. inden, r. 2000, imagining india, indiana university press, bloomington, in. lindquist, g. 2008, ‘loyalty and command: shamans, lamas and spirits in a siberian ritual’, social analysis, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 111-126. lipner, j. 1994, hindus: their religious beliefs and practices, routledge, london. mandair, a.-p.s. 2005, ‘the emergence of modern ‘sikh theology‘: reassessing the passage of ideas from trumpp to bhai vir singh’, bulletin of the school of oriental and african studies, vol. 68, no. 2, pp. 253-175. mines, d. 2007, fierce gods: inequality, ritual, and the politics of dignity in a south asian village, , indiana university press, bloomington, in. mines, d.p. 2002, ‘hindu nationalism, untouchable reform, and the ritual production of a south indian village’, american ethnologist, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 58-85. osella, c. & osella, f. 1999, ‘seepage of divinised power through social, spiritual and bodily boundaries: some aspects of possession in kerala’, in assayag, j. & tarabout, g. (eds), la possession en asie du sud: parole, corps, territoire, collection purushartha 21, editions de l'école des hautes études en sciences sociales, paris, pp. 183-210. putnam, r.d. & campbell, d.e. 2010, american grace: how religion divides and unites us, new york, simon & schuster. rio, k.m. & smedal, o.h. 2009, hierarchy: persistence and transformations in social formations, berghahn, new york. smith, d.j. 2003, hinduism and modernity, oxford university press, new york. divine intersections: hindu ritual and the incorporation of religious others translating public policy: enhancing the applicability of social impact techniques for grassroots community groups. melissa edwards university of technology, sydney nina burridge university of technology, sydney hilary yerbury, university of technology, sydney abstract this paper reports on an exploratory action research study designed to understand how grassroots community organisations engage in the measurement and reporting of social impact and how they demonstrate their social impact to local government funders. our findings suggest that the relationships between small non-profit organisations, the communities they serve or represent and their funders are increasingly driven from the top down formalised practices. volunteer-run grassroots organisations can be marginalized in this process. members may lack awareness of funders’ strategic approaches or the formalized auditing and control requirements of funders mean grassroots organisations lose capacity to define their programs and projects. we conclude that, to help counter this trend, tools and techniques which open up possibilities for dialogue between those holding power and those seeking support are essential. introduction literature on social impact planning and assessment has become prolific with many articles concentrating on difficulties in the measurement of social impact (eg. dimaggio 2001;flynn & hodgkinson 2001). nonetheless, large funding bodies are increasingly looking to implement social impact reporting into the acquittal of specific projects and other organizations such as local governments (lg) are following suit. this paper outlines an empirical action research project that explored how grassroots organisations engage in social impact measurement and reporting and how they demonstrate their social impact to lg funders. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 29 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia setting the scene: the australian context broad agreement has not emerged regarding how and when social impact tools should be implemented nor which techniques are more effective and how these can be associated with different forms of program delivery (mulgan, 2010; zappala & lyons, 2009). further, in the current climate, with its emphasis on the financialisation of social outcomes, not only may funders feel driven to ensure that the projects they fund lead to the maximum social benefit, they are also frustrated by the reporting process for seemingly small to medium sized grants. small grassroots organizations that rely heavily on volunteers are often resource poor and struggle to maintain their programs. at the same time, they are placed under increasing pressure from funding bodies and governments to prove their social impact. the large array of complex techniques available for measuring social impact and the confusion over their use and effectiveness compounds the difficulty. none-the-less, the ‘added value’ of the programs they deliver may result in unintended or unexpected outcomes (collins et. al 2003, reed et al, 2005) or ‘spillover’ effects, forms of social impact that are broader than the direct outputs of specific programs and that are beneficial to the broader community. accounting for the impacts of small grassroots organisations may be useful for understanding broader community benefits within localised areas. a benefit of social impact measurement is that it can enable non-profit organisations to reflect upon the long-term impacts of their work which is a fundamental driving force for so many practitioners engaged in the non-profit sector (franke, 2005). however if the focus is on reporting within predetermined frameworks, demonstrating the real impact of community based projects may be lost or the reporting process compromised as organizations are obliged to show positive changes to ensure ongoing funding. these observations and the concerns expressed by lgs for burdensome reporting requirements which may not reflect the real impact of community groups triggered this research project. similar to a study conducted by reed et al. (2005) we adopted an appreciative inquiry framework to interpret how grassroots community organisations understand social impact assessment. we also used a design thinking methodology with members of community groups to further refine the ways community organisations expressed their understanding of social impact. in addition, we engaged with the lg department 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 responsible for awarding community service grants to determine what synergies these stakeholder shared in relation to social impact. method the study used an action-research methodology (kemmis & mctaggart, 2005) that was sponsored by a large urban lg which has a large community development program through which it funds community-based programs. three parties were actively engaged in process: staff from the lg, members of grassroots community-based organisations and a team from the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre at the university of technology, sydney. conceptualised as a social process and as a process of learning a key outcome of the methodological design was the reconceptualisation of social impact measurement and reporting practices (kemmis and mctaggart 2005, p.277). through the action-research approach, we studied participant practices in the community-based organisations and in the lg. we interpreted how participants understood and expressed their practices and the structures and constraints that shaped these practices. to some extent, we also acted as mediators between lg staff and the community organisation members. we designed the action-research through two iterative cycles. the first cycle used an appreciative inquiry (ai) approach (cooperrider & whitney, 2005: positive engagement 2010, online) and incorporated elements of communicative action (habermas, 1987) to give a structure to the processes which the community-based organisations would work through. this approach also formed the basis for discussions with lg staff. the second cycle used a design thinking methodology where community-based organisations participated in an ‘incubator’ workshop that guided participants through the project planning processes. both techniques encouraged workshop participants to focus on the needs of their clients, or local community members’ needs and their own social change vision as the driver for social impact indicator development. the cycles thus shaped a bottom-up approach that allowed community organisations to determine social impact indicators for a project. appreciative inquiry appreciative inquiry (ai is used as a method of analysing organisational performance by small not-for-profits and large organisations alike. ai processes are open and collaborative, allowing for individual voices to be heard. ai comprises four stages and in this paper we use cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 31 the four ‘i’s of ai, namely inquire, imagine, innovate and implement (preskill, 2006). through open dialogue with members and key stakeholders, the inquire phase, is an honest appraisal of what an organisation does well and what is positive about its operations. the imagine phase allows participants to envision the future and establish strategic action priorities and in the innovate phase participants discuss and agree on the best ways to tackle the future challenges and design pathways for future development. the final phase, implement, involves carrying out the agreed processes and actions and documenting these for reflection and re-consideration. rather than perpetuating a negative ‘deficit model’ cycle of failed initiatives, ai focusses on positive attained actions and envisions future possibilities. organisations challenge negative mindsets and build collaborative cultures. when applied to social impact planning, ai processes encourage community-organisation members to express the change outcomes of their projects and therefore express their own view of their project’s social impact. design thinking design thinking began to emerge in its current form in the 1980s at stanford. in essence the approach is about looking beyond ‘obvious’ solutions and engaging in the lived complexity of the social problem. rather than focusing on past practices the techniques encourage participants to focus on community needs. it is a creative problem-based approach to strategy development for organisational change, using divergent thinking to generate many ideas and possibilities and convergent thinking to narrow the selection to those that are appropriate and feasible in the context. the stanford method incorporates five steps which we extended to seven: define, research, ideate, prototype, choose, implement, and learn. the u.lab team at university of technology, sydney (http://ulabblog.wordpress.com/) has adapted the stanford model, for use in a “pressure cooker” environment, aimed at producing a plan of action with specified outcomes and a narrative for implementing that action within a full-or even half-day session. when applied to social impact, we developed a fast-paced workshop, influenced by ai to take participants through the project planning process. through the use of storytelling participants defined their projects and articulated their social impact aims. all the stages focus on using creative approaches to communicating serious content. 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 http://ulabblog.wordpress.com/ implementing the project as might be expected in action research projects, there were a number of steps and processes, some of which were unanticipated. originally the project was conceived to document of an expression of social impact from a grassroots perspective and to develop a simple reporting tool to be used by lg funding recipients. this would simplify the reporting process for both community-based organisations and lg staff. it was assumed that the communication and discussion processes in place would lead to the kind of inter-subjective or social understanding that characterises authentic communication (habermas, 1987). very early in the process, it became apparent that all parties needed discussion and deliberation rather than a diagnostic tool. the approach to action research used is often from a systems perspective where an intervention is required as the catalyst to prompt changes in processes and behaviour. however, in action research involving ai and communicative action, the focus is on working through a process and on deliberation. as noted above, the research team worked in collaboration with a large urban lg community services department and with members of community-based organisations who had currently or previously obtained funding from this lg grant scheme. we were especially interested in those organisations struggling to maintain their funding base. the lg sent out a call for expressions of interest, to identify willing organisations to participate in the project. eight groups representing a broad diversity of community groups responded to the call and of these six groups committed as project participants. these project participants worked with a range of community members, including children, youth (2), aboriginal youth, local residents and gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people. the following outlines the three iterations of the action-research; ‘initial workshop’, ‘ongoing deliberations and tool-kit development’, and ‘evaluation’. initial workshop we convened an initial workshop with participant group members. prior to attending an initial workshop participants completed a questionnaire and a subsequent follow-up questionnaire designed to ascertain the level of current engagement their organisation had with social impact planning and their awareness of the recently developed lg social sustainability strategy which will set the direction for community development. the initial workshop was attended by fifteen individuals including paid staff, volunteers and board members from six organisations. following an ai approach, it comprised a series of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 33 structured activities designed to enhance the capacity of staff and volunteers to develop community based projects and to document outcomes and impacts. through discussions around these activities, we sought to understand how grassroots community-based organisations undertook social impact planning and assessment and how they expressed their project social impact (cooperrider & whitney 2005; positive engagement 2010, online). ongoing deliberations and ‘tool kit’ development the second iteration was a series of further discussions with participants as they moved through a process of identifying their social impact. involvement in action research is not without a cost in terms of time and effort. it requires individuals and the collective of each group to engage in a social process, to be open to learning and change and to maintain a collaborative orientation. for small grassroots organisations where all staff are part-time and most are unpaid, this need to make additional time to discuss practices and plan for potential changes may be more than they can manage (kemmis & mctaggart 2005, p. 280-283; popplewell & hayman 2012, p. 9). thus, after the initial workshop, three groups withdrew. each remaining participant organisation took a different approach to identifying its social impact and thus our interactions with them differed. we maintained a focus on social processes, and their project practices and priorities began to diverge. these interactions explored; the differences the participants thought they made in their communities, what supported or hampered them in their work, how they described the impacts of their work, and what evidence they collected. in parallel with these subsequent meetings with community groups, we worked with lg staff to engage them in exploration of their own understandings of social impact from the grassroots perspective. this occurred through meetings, phone calls and emails. while the original intention was to develop and test a set of social impact social indicators, it became clear through deliberation that for participants their understanding of social impact was abstract and that measurement and reporting of social change, measurement and reporting was not everyday practice. nor were lg clear about how they might incorporate these measures into their community grants program reporting. therefore we explored the potential of developing a resource that might clarify the meaning of social impact. 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 social impact indicators and the evidence for demonstrating it were drawn from three sources: (i) the participants and their descriptions of their own achievements and their brainstorming about how they could document these achievements; (ii) discussions with staff employed in the lg community grants program; and, (iii) analyses of other community-based projects describing indicators of social impact. this information was incorporated into a ‘tool kit’ resource which the lg could distribute to grassroots organisations intending to apply for community grant funding. the purpose of this ‘tool kit’ was to lead organisations through a planning process based on the steps of ai such that they could identify and articulate their social impact. at the same time, this resource would allow them to complete the application form for the lg community grants program and would give them the plan for collecting evidence of their social impact and reporting it. evaluation parts of the tool kit were tested in a two-hour workshop attended by members of over fifty community organizations, invited from a list generated by lg staff. members of the organisations in the earlier phase of the project were not invited. the kit was also critically evaluated by lg staff in the light of their work practices and their communication with community-based organisations. we then held a half-day workshop to introduce a much larger number of community organisations to the ‘tool kit’. twenty-five participants from twenty grassroots community-based organisations attended this workshop. based on design thinking and run by staff from the university of technology, sydney’s u.lab. participants were divided and conceived as an ‘incubator’ approach the aim was to test parts of the kit such that groups might be able to express their ideas on social impact. findings in this section we report on the findings of the action-research study. each finding is connected to a cycle of the action-research methodology. we report these findings as: current level of engagement with social impact planning as reported by the first six case studies; findings of the deliberations and the final workshop with the broader sample group; and, the development of ‘the kit’. in the first cycle, participants from the participant organisations identified resource constraints as significant barriers to identifying and communicating their social impact. from the pre-workshop survey, we are aware that most participants had no formal training in social cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 35 impact assessment or social impact measurement and reporting. given that most of the participants were volunteers, this was not surprising. those who had received some training (6 out of 15) described it in terms of “performance-based accounting” or as “results-based accountability”. similarly, most participants lacked a structured approach to gathering and analysing information to document their social impact. grant acquittal output reporting was most common practice. only participants from one organisation reported the use of formal (commissioned) evaluations and two participants indicated that they had used informal questionnaires. other approaches included the use of anecdotal feedback, for example in the compiling of annual reports and, occasionally for one organisation, client surveys. overall, social impact measurement and reporting was sporadic, non-systematic and informal. constraints to formally identifying and reporting social impact were lack of money and lack of experienced staff. for participants, the small number of paid staff and the requirements of service delivery left little time for the “additional” activities associated with project delivery such as the identification of social impact measures. one of the participants revealed reports including accountability reports on funding projects were written by volunteers. several participants highlighted a barrier being the difference in timescales between reporting periods and the impacts of the activities. despite this, participants understood the benefits of social impact planning, measurement and reporting to: demonstrate and justify their projects; to develop their capacity to deliver long-term benefits to the community; and, to maintain and extend funding. groups had been invited to participate in the study as they were prior or current local government community services grant holders. a surprising finding was that participants had a limited understanding of the social sustainability strategy recently released by the local government after an elaborate process of community consultation. the government’s intent was for this strategy to set down the vision for the community and to guide community funding priorities. only four participants were aware of the strategy and understood how they could associate their current activities with the social indicators in that report to better enhance the impact of their activities and to increase their capacity to access future funding. another two realised that they ‘should’ become familiar with the social indicators in the social sustainability strategy to help ‘dovetail’ their activities with those outlined in that strategy in order to ‘serve both missions’. a further two were aware of the strategy but said they would not refer to it inform their future programs as they believed their projects were 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 short term and the strategy was of limited relevance to their organization. six participants were not familiar with the lg sustainability strategy. identifying key stakeholders was a barrier to participants in the workshop and in subsequent deliberations. they were asked to consider people and organisations in the community who were supporters of their work and those who might oppose or be critical of their achievements and how they would communicate their social impact to these groups. they were also asked how they would represent their impact to their client group, members of the organisation (both employees and volunteers), and to funders. while it was understandable that they might have difficulties in the hypothesised communication with unknown people, it was surprising that the groups also had difficulty in translating impact themes even for client group, employees and volunteers and funder(s). several participants expressed frustration at being asked to consider how they would express their achievements to others. participants had no difficulty in identifying the broad areas where they believed their programs and activities had an impact. in discussions among themselves, they were often able to describe the differences their activities had made in their local community. one purpose of the first workshop was to scope the degree to which community groups were aware of social impact and the strategic priorities of the lg. having adopted ai as a core framing for the determination of social impact for grassroots groups, we used these techniques to uncover the key statements that guided the ‘imagine’ phase of the process for organisations. table 1 summarises the key themes and examples of the micro narratives recorded against each theme. table 1: key social impact themes and micro-narratives theme micro-narrative provide links, leverage, connections and support ‘integrating the broad community and business as real partners to shape the world we live in’ to provide access/empower ‘counteracting disadvantage and extending access to resources and opportunities’ raise awareness/reflection ‘raising awareness in multicultural communities of issues affecting them’ improvement ‘improving living/lifestyles in given geographic constraints’ build capacity ‘builds capacity of individuals and communities to meet their own needs’ reduce discrimination ‘reducing social stigma and discrimination among cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 37 people living with hiv/hcv’ advocacy ‘advancing the rights, dignity and well-being of older women’ educational development ‘increased food literacy to promote greater participation in a healthy, fair food system for young people’ the key themes that emerged from an analysis of the contributions in the workshop and in subsequent discussions were clear and consistent. however, a striking feature was the discrepancies between the discussions of goals and objectives and of social impact and the recording of those discussions. whereas the discussions were often specific, identifying clear measures of social impact, when they were written down, people used broad and generalised terms. this had the consequence of creating a gulf between the internal discussions of the work of the organisation and its external reporting. an opportunity to probe reasons for these discrepancies arose in the workshop held to test sections of the “toolkit” developed by the university researchers. this workshop was attended by more than 50 people, representing small and large community organisations which had not been involved in the earlier processes, as well as some funding bodies. using steps from the implementation of ai, participants were asked to identify differences in the community they had been responsible for and how they could substantiate this and then think about how they would explain these differences. then they were asked to express the same idea in language appropriate to the community or client group and finally in language appropriate to the funders. most participants had similar difficulties to those of the participants from the initial community groups and did not manage to complete the task. among those who did succeed, there were three participants who had in place in their organisations strong online and social media communication programs and who were used to communicating the differences their programs made to a variety of audiences. at the other end of the spectrum, there were several participants (including some funders) who did not attempt the task of expressing impact in different ways for different stakeholders. they expressed the ideological view that grassroots organisations should not be concerned with social impact at all, only with service delivery. they argued that accounting for the funds received was all grassroots organisations should do. funding bodies should be 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 responsible for social impact reporting, as they set social change priorities through their grant programs. participants in the design thinking workshop did not appear constrained by concerns about resources or anything else. they adopted the playful approach of the techniques of design thinking, although as one participant commented “[it was] not quite what i expected. but it was creative and interactive.” this sense of the approach not being what they expected was echoed by most participants, who had expected “a more academic approach” especially to reporting. participants benefitted from “new ways of thinking”, and understood how the storytelling approach enabled them to develop different narratives for different stakeholders. given these multiple storylines they would need various sources of evidence to justify their “story”. while it is acknowledged that story telling is not a way to measure social impact, we found it a powerful way to mobilize and engage participants with the practices needed for social impact planning, accounting and reporting. the themes and micro-narratives were very similar to those which emerged from the first part of the study. on the one hand, this was surprising as there was no overlap in participants and the approach different and different facilitators were used. on the other hand, the grassroots community organisations are all within the same government area and therefore potentially influenced by the local government’s community development priorities. table 2 shows the themes and micro-narratives to emerge from the design thinking workshop. table 2: key social impact themes and micro-narratives from design-thinking workshop theme micro-narrative to provide access/empower ‘to empower young people to play an active part in their community’ raise awareness/reflection ‘raising awareness in multicultural communities of issues affecting them’ build capacity ‘builds capacity of individuals and communities to meet their own needs’ advocacy ‘advancing the rights, dignity and well-being of older people’ as in the first part of the study, the majority of participants struggled to complete each of the stages of the process. through the story telling technique, participants showed that even those cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 39 who did not complete each stage of the process were able to document the expectations of the various stakeholders. several participants stated that it was easier to use drawing to communicate their view of social impact or that story telling was easier than having to use a more formal vocabulary. after the workshop, government staff sought feedback from participants. this showed that participants believed that through this new and playful approach, they had a much stronger understanding of how to develop a grant proposal and indicate how they might measure social impact. several stated that it would be useful to have a follow-up session focussing on a more “in-depth analytical” approach. it is not known at this stage how participants in the workshop were able to communicate this approach to identifying social impact to their colleagues, paid and unpaid in their community organisation or to translate their new-found skills into an effective plan for a applying for a grant and managing the project. discussion the findings of this small-scale study have shown that grassroots community-based organisations have difficulty in engaging effectively in processes which are fundamental to the workings of social democracy. there are two points which warrant discussion here. the first is concerned with issues of training and the significant roles of volunteers in managing the affairs of community-based organisations. the second relates to ways in which auditing and control requirements of funders lead to loss of voice for members of small grassroots organisations. although there is little research on grassroots community-based organisations, across studies of larger organisations, the important contribution volunteers make to programs and to the work of ngos when they are well trained is a commonplace. by and large, the emphasis in training is on practical technical skills, for example, techniques for cardio-pulmonary resuscitation or approaches to answering telephone calls from desperate young people. there is often an assumption that volunteers who bring professional skills to their role do not need significant training in the tools and techniques of management and the lack of resources in some small organisations means that continuing staff cannot develop the level of knowledge and skills that would improve the work of their organisation (eisner et al. 2009). in the context of this study, more than half of the participants had no training in social impact and its measurement, in spite of their roles as initiators of programs and their responsibilities for 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 reporting on grant outcomes. even though they may have recognised that their practices in reporting on their community-based actions were unsystematic and lacked cohesion, they were largely unable to harness the resources to make changes in these practices. the action research approach reinforced the sense of a gulf in understanding of social impact between community organisations and the local government. a lack of vocabulary prevents community groups from taking part in discussions and debates on social sustainability at local and state levels and this may have been influenced by the apparent lack of familiarity with the local government’s goals for social change. the requirement for auditing and control by funding bodies leads in part to a lack of voice for community groups. power, in his influential paper the audit explosion, argues that the requirement to report on publicly funded activities in a structured, auditable way, while it may give the appearance of transparency and accountability, is becoming “an emerging principle of social organisation” (1994, p.38) where administrative processes may overwhelm public engagement. he cautions that there is a danger that an auditing process “can bring an end to dialogue inside and outside an organisation” (1994, p. 39). in this study, it was clear that members of most communitybased organisations struggled with using the language of their stakeholders, their funding body or even of their clients to report on social change and they tailored their reports to the accountability format adopted by government. this is a further example of how the processes of social democracy were impaired and opportunities for debate initiated from the grassroots were lost. development of a conceptual tool could mediate between the lg and the community and be introduced into the everyday practices of both community groups and staff in the local government. in the early stages of this study, the research team acted as a ‘go-between’ for the two groups, an approach which was not sustainable. it had been a relatively straightforward approach to devise a set of measures of social impact for reporting purposes that incorporated the interests of the community organisations and also reflected the program objectives of the local government (as described above). while it was clear that these measures would undoubtedly make reporting easier for all concerned, they had not created any substantial shared understanding of social impact; they had not bridged the gulf between the internal workings of the group and the needs and expectations of government staff. nor had they made it easier for members of community-based organisations to express the social impact of their programs in the language of their community, or even in their own working cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 41 language. indeed they had the potential to function as a different kind of audit tool, controlling what the community-based organisations could report on. both the ‘tool kit’ and the workshop based on design thinking have the potential to act as a bridge between government and community. as catalysts in these interactions with the ‘tool kit’, we were also activist professionals (groundwater-smith & sachs 2002), using our knowledge and skills to foster and develop democratic discourses (habermas 1996). the ai method can still lead to an audit tool, but it is one which gives scope for the public dialogue which is fundamental to social democracy. thus, the tool kit emphasised the importance of multiple approaches to data collection, with a focus on local engagement and local representations of qualitative ‘evidence’, including photographs, personal anecdotes and audio-recordings. the decisions on what evidence might be required and who might collect it were made by the community-based organisation, demonstrating their autonomy in decisionmaking and underlining the high level of trust inherent in such a process (power 1994, p.7). the evaluation comments from the design thinking workshop show that design thinking has the potential to promote new ways of thinking and lead to creative approaches to identification and measurement of social impact, thus forming a bridge between government and community. however, it did not give participants a strong sense of confidence in their capacity to carry through with the project management and reporting processes in the longer term. within the current accountability culture, there is a need to ensure that members and clients of grassroots community-based organisations can have a voice in debates on social change. the obstacles may appear insurmountable both from the perspective of the community-based organisation and the perspective of the funding body. yet, without efforts to remove these obstacles or minimise the hindrance they cause, the principles of social democracy will be weakened. finally in regards to the role of the authors as activist academics the findings are insightful. it is all too easy for academics to use their knowledge and skills in the service of the audit culture, developing easier to use audit tools and encouraging grassroots organisations to take a universalist position acknowledging common ground with funding bodies as more important than the differences identified by community members and clients. a position as activist professional gives the opportunity for academics to use their scholarly knowledge to 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 contribute to agendas of social change and to act in ways that foster negotiated, collaborative, future-oriented democratic processes. conclusion given the increasing international trend for accountability and social impact analysis, our findings suggest that the relationships between small grassroots organisations, the communities they serve or represent, and their funders are increasingly driven from the top down grassroots community-based organisations are challenged to find ways to meet agendas set through externally-imposed policy and translate these into local actions. this approach undermines the legitimacy of community-based non-profit organisations at the same time as it bolsters the legitimacy of local government policy agendas. to help counter this trend, tools and techniques which open up possibilities for dialogue and deliberation between those holding power and those seeking support are essential. the processes of social democracy can also be supported by scholars who are willing to take on a role as an activist professional. references cooperrider, d.l., & whitney, d. k. 2005, appreciative inquiry, berrett-koehler publishers, san francisco, cal. dimaggio, p. 2001, ‘measuring the impact of the nonprofit sector on society is probably impossible, but possibly useful’, in flynn, p. & v.a hodgkinson (eds), measuring the impact of the nonprofit sector, kluwer academic/plenum publishers, new york, pp 249-272. eisner, d., grimm r., maynard, s. & washburn, s. 2009, ‘the new volunteer workforce’, stanford social innovation review, winter 2009. flynn, p. & v.a hodgkinson (eds), 2001, measuring the impact of the nonprofit sector, kluwer academic/plenum publishers, new york. franke, s., 2005, measurement of social capital reference document for public policy research, development, and evaluation, government of canada. policy research initiative, september 2005. groundwater-smith, s. & sachs, j. 2002, ‘the activist professional and the reinstatement of trust’, cambridge journal of education, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 341-358. habermas, j. 1987, the theory of communicative action, polity in association with basil blackwell, cambridge. habermas, j. 1996, between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, mit press, cambridge. kemmis, s., &mctaggart, r. 2005, ‘participatory action research: communicative action and the public sphere’, in denzin, n, k. and lincoln y. s. (eds), the sage handbook of qualitative research (3rd ed.). sage, thousand oaks, ca., pp. 559-603. mulgan, g. 2010 ‘measuring social value’, stanford social innovation review, vol. 8, no.3, pp. 38-44. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 43 javascript:void(0); http://proquest.umi.com.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/pqdlink?rqt=318&pmid=66418&ts=1320054942&clientid=20928&vinst=prod&vname=pqd&vtype=pqd popplewell, r. & hayman, r 2012, ‘where, how and why are action research approaches used by international development non-governmental organisations?’ briefing paper 32, international ngo training and research centre, http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/752/briefing-paper-32-where-how-and-whyare-action-research-approaches-used-by-international-development-nongovernmental-organisations.pdf accessed 11 september 2012. positive engagement 2010, positive-engagement.co.uk http://www.positive-engagement.com/ accessed 11 september 2012. power, m. 1994, the audit explosion http://www.demos.co.uk/files/theauditexplosion.pdf?1240939425 accessed 11 september 2012 reed, j. jones, d. & irvine, j. 2005, ‘appreciating impact: evaluating small voluntary organizations in the united kingdom’, voluntas: international journal of voluntary and nonprofit organizations, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 123-45. u.lab 2011, http://ulabblog.wordpress.com/ zappalà, g., and lyons, m. 2009, recent approaches to measuring social impact in the third sector: an overview. csi background paper no. 5, centre for social impact, unsw. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/752/briefing-paper-32-where-how-and-why-are-action-research-approaches-used-by-international-development-non-governmental-organisations.pdf http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/752/briefing-paper-32-where-how-and-why-are-action-research-approaches-used-by-international-development-non-governmental-organisations.pdf http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/752/briefing-paper-32-where-how-and-why-are-action-research-approaches-used-by-international-development-non-governmental-organisations.pdf http://www.positive-engagement.com/ http://www.demos.co.uk/files/theauditexplosion.pdf?1240939425 http://ulabblog.wordpress.com/ translating public policy: enhancing the applicability of social impact techniques for grassroots community groups. 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the social construction of the microfinance industry: a comparison of donor and recipient perspectives arjun bisen bronwen dalton university of technology, sydney rachel wilson university of sydney abstract once driven fundamentally by development concerns, most importantly higher incomes for the poor, many scholars increasingly argue that microfinance “success” has become measured against the success of microfinance institutions themselves, gauged by their progress toward achieving financial self-sufficiency; a shift gary woller describes as a move from a welfarist to an institutionist model of microfinance. the regularity in which the institutionist position is articulated in most of the published literature in the field of microfinance is cited as evidence that institutionist perspectives have gained ascendancy over welfarist approaches (woller 1999, p. 1). one key driver of this trend is the institutionist perspective’s alignment with the interests of those with capital or in bateman and chang’s (2009) words microfinance’s “supreme serviceability to the neoliberal/globalisation agenda” (2009, p.1). but to what extent is the ascendancy complete? given the role of the media in framing public discourse and influencing public opinion, do institutionist or welfarist themes dominate the mass media, particularly in the major donor and recipient countries? this paper presents an analysis of media coverage of microfinance in one key donor country, the united states, and one major recipient country, india. it finds that while there are some differences in subject matter and style, overall both sets of media articles are dominated by business-oriented language, language that aligns with the institutionist view of microfinance. we argue that the microfinance community, in particular development focussed ngos and agencies, have yet to come to terms with the implications of the emerging hegemony of the neoliberal institutionist world view. they face major and yet unresolved strategic challenges: do these ngos and agencies discard the welfarist model? or can something be retrieved, if so what? do they compete head on and become more commercialised themselves, or develop new methods and client bases, or do they exit? and what are the implications for academic understandings of the field through institutionalism and welfarism – and to what extent do they shed light on the logic, or instead help obscure on-the-ground power relations? given the dominance of institutionist thinking, we argue that welfarist oriented ngos, agencies and academics must work together quickly and creatively to ensure that what began as a grassroots project to reduce poverty is not abandoned in favour of the pursuit of profit. microfinance has been one of the fastest growing “industries” of the new millennium, with the sector now containing over 10,000 microfinance institutions (mfis) with over $60 billion in assets (macfarquhar 2010). this expansion has stimulated interest from both scholars and the mainstream media. there is a growing volume of academic research which broadly centres on two approaches: an “institutionist perspective” that highlights microfinance as an cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 63 innovation in applying market solutions to social problems; and the other approach, often described as “welfarist”, that questions the capacity of an increasingly commercialised sector to realise a mission of poverty reduction. but do these themes and concerns permeate academic boundaries? specifically, does media coverage in key donor and recipient countries confirm or challenge or even engage with these debates? to date much of this academic literature has overlooked how “microfinance” has been socially constructed in the public sphere through the mass media. this article compares how microfinance is framed in one major recipient country, india, and one key donor country, the united states, by conducting a media content analysis of 100 newspaper articles (sorted by level of relevance) that appeared in the top 10 highest circulating english language newspapers in the india and us over the 12 month period january-december 2008. we find that media coverage of microfinance in these two countries differed in various ways. the indian media sample tended to focus on operational issues and report on specific business activity within the microfinance industry, in general treating it as a ‘regular’ part of the financial and banking system. us media articles often made broader generalizations about the industry, linking it to meta-narratives and broader themes – particularly microfinance as an innovation due to its harnessing of market forces to realize positive social outcomes. despite these differences we find that overall both sets of media articles used business-orientated language. we argue that this is further evidence of the extent to which institutional change within microfinance, which started with a dominant development logic, has shifted to a market logic. this focus contrasts dramatically with the development focus of much academic debate about microfinance. it also has broader implications for development ngos and oda agencies and raises questions for future research. in particular: do the agencies centred on development have a responsibility to condemn the widespread abuses of some microfinance initiatives, and themselves discard the microfinance model? or can something be retrieved, and, if so, what? furthermore, what are the implications for academic understandings of the field and the perspectives of institutionalism and welfarism? to what extent do institutionism and welfarism shed light on the logic, or do they instead help obscure on-the-ground power relations? microfinance has become the intervention of choice of the world’s major international donors and aid agencies. given the dominance of institutionist thinking, we argue that welfarist oriented ngos and academics must work together quickly and creatively to ensure that what began as a grassroots project to reduce poverty is not abandoned in favour of the sole pursuit of profit. 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 the microfinance story micro-lending has existed in various forms since the rise of formal financial systems (brau & woller 2004). examples of quasi-charitable micro-lending can be found throughout the nineteenth century in europe and america (hollis & sweetman 1998b). the current use of the expression ‘microfinance’ however can be traced back to the 1970s when mohammad yunus established the grameen project in bangladesh. yunus established his first micro lending program in 1976 with the objective of providing a ‘hand-up’ rather than a ‘hand-out’ to the impoverished masses of bangladesh by pioneering the so-called ‘solidarity circles’ methodology; wherein joint guarantees by groups of borrowers encouraged very high repayment rates on microloans as mechanism to sustainably provide hundreds of thousands of microloans to the very poorest (yunus & jolis 2003). yunus’ microfiance model of issuing small loans at interest rates of zero to 20 per cent with no collateral requirement was formalised into the grameen bank in 1983. the bank has now loaned more than $9.8 billion and operates in over 100 countries. despite having no collateral requirement or legal recourse against defaults, over 97 per cent of loans are repaid in full (yunus 2005). while the original generation of microfinance programs – grameen bank, brac, and proshika – remain market leaders in terms of client numbers, other early entrants into this “industry” have become firmly established microfinance institutions (mfis). the us government’s usaid arm was an early champion of yunus’ approach endorsing microfinance as ‘best practice’ (bateman & chang 2009). in the late 1980s the world bank began to provide significant support for new microfinance programmes and lead the establishment of cgap (consultative group to assist the poor), a multi-donor institution that conscientously promoted the ‘new wave’ mfi concept. the un also embraced the concept and funds microfinance initiatives through a number of its arms (e.g., undp, uncdf) (bateman & chang 2009). other early entrants include accion international and sewa bank which both developed large microfinance programs. accion headquarters are in boston but its operations span across latin america and africa. sewa started as a cooperative bank in the indian state of gujurat. sewa remains largely a gujurat based operation which has expanded to include over 30,000 members. (cgap 2003). now the microfinance field is characterised by a mix of several large, for profit service providers and numerous smaller nonprofit ones. many of the large for profits are funded by an influx of capital market funding. by 2006, private investment funds, also known as cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 65 microfinance investment vehicles (mivs) held portfolios of mfis’ shares with a total value of $2.3 billion (cgap 2007). in the 2004–2006 period, foreign investment in microfinance more than doubled, from usd 1.7 billion to around usd 4.4 billion (deutsche bank research 2007). two events highlight microfinance’s transformation from being viewed as a vaguely leftist idea of a bangladeshi academic around the efficacy of assisting the poor through grassroots interventions, to becoming the poverty reduction methodology of “choice” for the world’s largest international aid programs and wealthiest “socially minded” private foundations and investors. the first was in 2005, when the un nominated the year the ‘international year of microcredit’. then microfinance legitimacy as best practice was confirmed the following year, when dr muhammad yunus and the grameen bank were jointly awarded the nobel peace prize. as shivani siroya, ceo/founder of the us based inventure fund, wrote in 2010 in the huffington post: “when muhammad yunus won the nobel peace prize for his work at grameen bank, we all believed we had found a miracle tool that could help entrepreneurial individuals lift themselves out of poverty.” apace with this enthusiasm for microfinance programs from aid agencies and investors has been growing interest from within the academy. a large and growing volume of academic research has emerged much of it sharing the optimism of practitioners. however, within the microfinance literature a debate has also emerged which broadly centres on two approaches: an “institutionist perspective” that highlights microfinance as an innovation in applying market solutions to social problems; and the other approach, often described as “welfarist”, that questions the capacity of an increasingly commercialised sector to realize a mission of poverty reduction. institutionist perspectives on microfinance as the numbers of for profit financial institutions have increased in response to the lure of the massive profit potential of microfinance, a more diverse set of beliefs and ideological perspectives began to pervade the industry. many of the larger and more recent entrants into the industry share an agenda based on neoclassical interpretations of economic development. microfinance has come to be increasingly viewed as the perfect instrument for these new players to improve the lot of the poor and turn a profit with the added benefit of improving 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 an organisation’s reputation for its commitment to corporate and social responsibility (hulme & mosley 1996, otero 1999, copestake 2007; rhyne 2001). in the us in particular, microfinance is often projected as the ideal holistic approach to development, leading to outcomes such as the empowerment of women, financial inclusion, poverty reduction and overall development. this form of lending is often described as a pathway to self-sufficiency through entrepreneurship and as an example of the success of market-based alternatives to welfare government programmes. these initiatives are believed to create jobs, expand consumption and change attitudes towards entrepreneurship and business (fernando 2004; otero 1999; bruck 2006; ahlin and lin 2006; gonzalez 2007). however, overall ‘success’ of microfinance has often come to be judged on the basis of the financial sustainability of the mfi itself (woller 1999). this financial sustainability not only comes directly through profit generation but via other benefits, for example, an investment in microfinance can provide large financial organisations the opportunity for low risk portfolio diversification in volatile economic times (krauss & walter 2009). as elisabeth rhyne, formerly at usaid and now managing director of the center for financial inclusion at accion, writes in a 2008 article in the american banker, “the crisis of confidence has highlighted what a good credit risk most microfinance clients have proven to be. isolated in most cases from their countries' formal economies, the self-employed poor are also resilient during downturns. indeed, microfinance may be a bright spot in the banking industry's future” (rhyne 2009). collectively scholars have come to refer to proponents of market-based approaches to microfinance as falling under the umbrella of institutional perspectives and this support for ‘market solutions to social problems’ often is referred to as the “institutionist” approach. the terminology was initially applied to the microfinance literature by jonathan morduch in his influential paper ‘microfinance schism’ (1998) and further developed by gary woller and james brau (woller, dunford, & woodworth 1999; woller 2002; brau & woller 2004). the “institutionist” approach is characterised by arguments that successful poverty reduction requires massive scale, given the number of poor households and the demand for microfinance. this massive scale in turn requires financial resources far beyond the levels provided by traditional ngos and aid donors. instead they prescribe an approach where microfinance institutions that generate the highest return for investors attract the most capital cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 67 with which to expand their business, service more clients, and therefore alleviate the most poverty are seen as examples of ‘best practice’(gonzalez-vega 1994; 1998; schreiner 2003; cgap 2003, ayayi & sene 2008). practitioners that subscribe to the institutionist approach cite the failed rural credit agencies of the 1960s and 1970s as proof that receiving subsidies in the form of aid is damaging to the microfinance industry (hollis & sweetman 1998a; 1998b). they argue that the financial health of the institution is of the utmost concern. success of the institution is measured by its progress towards financial self-sufficiency while the positive impact on the client is assumed (hulme & mosley 1996; otero 1999; copestake 2007; rhyne 2001). welfarist perspectives on microfinance despite this enthusiasm for microfinance, a growing number of scholars argue that microfinance has lost its way, deviating from the professed social objective to eradicate, or at least reduce, poverty in favour of a focus on generating profits (woller, dunford, & woodworth 1999; woller 2002; lewis 2008). they claim that microfinance does not reach the poorest of the poor (scully 2004), or that the poorest are deliberately excluded from microfinance programs (simanowitz 2002). these scholars point to how sharp increases in interest rates and a tendency to extend larger average loan sizes to a more secure client base are signs of widespread mission drift. they point to the behaviours of some of the world’s largest commercial microfinance institutions (mfis) which operate with two bottom lines: alleviating poverty for clients and generating profits for investors. for example, one of mexico’s largest not-for-profit microfinance entities, compartamos (‘let’s share’ in spanish) became compartamos banco, one of the country’s largest banks, after a 2007 ipo that raised over $450 million. yet, according to lewis, the realization of compartamos’ commercial bottom line has come at the expense of its social mission. compartamos’ borrowers routinely pay annual percentage rates (apr) of more than 100 percent (lewis 2008). compartamos’ exorbitant charge has been blamed for excessive loan rates across all mexican financial institutions (macfarquhar 2010). welfarists argue that such developments signal that the movement, which broke away from traditional banking and economics in a bid to ‘fix’ the system, has come full circle; 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 transforming into an industry that values commercialisation and adheres to conservative economic views. the critique of microfinance points out that the arguments for commercialisation are firmly based on conventional economic mechanisms such as markets, individual rational choice, and supply and demand. however, the critique also notes that it was these same economic mechanisms that pushed the poor, particularly the poorest, out of the system in the first place (sinclair 2012; bennett 2009). unlike the institutionist perspective, which emphasises breadth of outreach, the welfarist perspective focuses on depth of outreach and supports practices that allow microfinance institutions to serve the very poor, often cited as the original goal of the microfinance movement (christen 2001). welfarist scholars also argue that mfis that can secure a regular stream of subsidies including untied aid can also be deemed institutionally viable (murdoch 1998, woller et al. 1999). this debate is likely to continue, not least because of a lack of definitive evidence about the actual capacity of microfinance to alleviate poverty. researchers around the world have only recently started measuring the actual long-term social impact of micro-lending and as zeller and meyer (2002) argue, microfinance field operations have far surpassed the research capacity to analyse them and that the enthusiasm for microfinance is unsupported by research evidence (zeller & meyer 2002). even jonathan morduch, the co-author of a major international textbook on the economics of microfinance and long time microfinance advocate, admits that, while economic theory suggests micro-finance has benefits, “[r]igorous evidence that shows it happening just doesn’t exist … the evidence is pretty dicey” (morduch 2007). nevertheless, there is evidence that the institutionist view has come to dominate the microfinance discourse. woller writes that institutionist “emphasis on financial self-sufficiency and institutional scale, appears to have gained ascendancy over the welfarist approach, with its emphasis on direct poverty alleviation among the very poor.” (1999, p.1). he goes on to write: the institutionist position is articulated in virtually all the literature coming out of the ohio state university rural finance program, the world bank and the consultative group to assist the poorest (cgap) in the world bank, and usaid. it is also found in the many writings of maria otero (accion international) and elisabeth rhyne (formerly of usaid) (see, for example, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 69 otero & rhyne, 1994). most published literature in the field of microfinance espouses the institutionist view (woller 1999, p. 1). woller et al. (1999) explain that institutionists speak the language of modern donors: the institutionists have been more articulate and persuasive and certainly more prolific in their writing and their message has been more in tune with the times, the currently dominant culture of laissez-faire business (1999, p.3). milford bateman and ha-joon chang (2009) go further and argue that the key driver of the ascendency of the institutionist model is because it tacitly supports the neoliberal values of the most wealthy and in so doing bolsters the neoliberal globalisation project: the final concern we have with the microfinance model is its intimate relationship with neoliberalism and the globalisation project...by emphasising individual entrepreneurship over all other forms (state, cooperative, etc), the microfinance concept has strong political/ideological serviceability to the prevailing neoliberal/globalisation model. this association is extremely problematic, because there is much evidence to suggest that policies and institutions could be deliberately favoured simply because they support neoliberalism and the globalisation project, and for no other reason than this (2009, p.6). but to what extent is such an ascendancy complete? has this debate permeated practitioner and academic boundaries? an as yet underexplored domain of public discourse remains to be analysed, that is the domain of the mass media. this is a significant gap in our understanding of the state of play between these competing schools of thought as the media is central to how societies frame public discourse and interpret ideas. phillips (1996) writes that the concept of ‘discourse’ depicts language “as a site of struggle and a medium for the exercise of power” (1996, p.150). gamson argues that the discourses in mass media as a reflection the wider symbolic tussle over meaning and interpretations in society (gamson 1988). by representing particular discourses, the media can tacitly endorse certain perspectives while silencing others by not giving them a voice. it is the main medium through which views expressed in the public sphere are conveyed to a wider public. given such responsibility, it is important to be aware of media constructions surrounding microfinance as a way of not only appreciating wider discourse but also how the media or other groups may slant this discourse in ways that influence individuals’ and organisations’ perceptions of their own interests. so do institutionist or welfarist themes dominate, particularly in the media of major donor and recipient countries? 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 given the significance of the media to inform and even shape interpretations of microfinance in the public sphere, it is insightful to analyse the content of media in one key donor country, the united states and one major recipient country, india. media content analysis methodology we conducted a media content analysis of 200 newspaper articles that appeared in the top 10 highest circulating english language newspapers in india and the us over a 12 month period january-december 2008. the articles were retrieved using the web tool factiva™. sampling strategy and design for articles the analysis sampled 100 articles each from the us and india sorted by relevance that appeared between 1 january to 31 december, 2008. the query not only used the general name for the industry, ‘microfinance’, but also the most common services provided by microfinance institutions in order to cover almost all possible references to microfinance. this process also allowed a large number of media articles to be reduced to a more manageable sample (riffe et al. 2008). the search initially generated 357 articles from the usa and 212 from india. to assist comparisons, the number of sample articles was reduced to 100 from each of the two countries, with each article selected according to relevance, determined by word frequency using factiva. coding operation coding was conducted to convert the raw data into a standardised form (babbie 2003). little, if any, research has been undertaken on media representations of microfinance so the coding categories were developed in an inductive and exploratory way. coding categories of both manifest and latent content were created to balance out their respective shortcomings. the software package nvivo 8 by qsr was used to code both types of content. the surface, or manifest, content categories are specific words. the manifest content is analysed first, using word frequency query available in nvivo 8, to gain an understanding of some of the common language used. some 500 of the most commonly occurring words from both countries were extracted and grouped into categories. the remaining words were cross checked between the two countries’ media samples and word searches were run on any words cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 71 that only qualified for one country’s top 500 ‘word frequency’ search. this was done so that comparable tables and graphs could be made. rationale behind selection of india and the us the us and india were selected because they are major players in the microfinance industry. the us hosts the majority of donor coordinating agencies and large intergovernmental agencies proving microfinance outside of the developing world. agencies such as grameen foundation us, usaid, accion, cgap, the world bank and the microcredit summit campaign are all based in and raise much of their funds in the us and these funds constitute the majority of funds flowing within the industry. due to the volume of funds at their disposal, the breadth and reach of their programs and, more generally, their central role in the global financial system, these agencies play a significant role in shaping microfinance policy and practice. india was chosen for four primary reasons. firstly, it has the largest number of mfis and recipients of microfinance in the world. india and bangladesh constitute approximately 60 per cent of the world’s microfinance activity, making them the two largest nations in which microfinance is practised (campaign 2007). regionally the highest concentration of microfinance clients was in india (188 million accounts representing 18% of the total national population). secondly, compared to other recipient and mfi industry countries, india offers a practical advantage in terms of conducting comparative analysis as, unlike other recipient countries, india has a significant number of english language publications, and these publications are more readily accessible for analysis through the media search engine factiva™. the implications of differences in indian and american english for the analysis are discussed later. nevertheless, these differences notwithstanding, this shared language makes india the most suitable recipient country for comparison with the us. finally, scholars of west asia argue that india’s news industry, in particular the large privately owned component of that industry, has a strong tradition of editorial freedom. metcalf argues that it was only during the state of emergency declared by prime minister indira gandhi (1975 1977), that india’s media was exposed to any significant government intervention and retribution (metcalf 2006). limitations in comparative media analysis of indian and us media: elite readership and linguistic and stylistic differences india’s print media industry has expanded significantly in recent decades. in 2011 the 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 economist citing world association of newspapers figures wrote that: “between 2005 and 2009 the number of paid-for daily newspapers in [india] increased by 44% to 2,700 and the total number of newspapers rose by 23% to more than 74,000 (the economist 2011). the largest print media organisations of india are the times of india group, the hindustan times group, the indian express group, and the anandabazar patrika group of which all, except the latter, publish english and vernacular versions of each issue (metcalf 2006). table 1 below shows the top 10 daily english language newspapers along with their total readership. the top five most popular newspapers listed are also printed in the vernacular. table 1: top 10 english dailies rank newspaper 2007 2008 1 the times of india 13,400,000 13,332,000 2 hindustan times 6,092,000 6,347,000 3 the hindu 5,253 000 5,276,000 4 the telegraph 3,040,000 2,970,000 5 deccan chronicle 2,987,000 2,823,000 6 the economic times 1,986,000 2,006,000 7 the new indian express 1,875,000 1,825,000 8 mumbai mirror 1,627,000 1,622,000 9 mid-day 1,772,000 1,617,000 10 daily news & analysis 1,218,000 1,337,000 (source: newswatch 2008) despite these large numbers there are some limitations associated with analysing only indian newspapers printed in english. while india has 90 million english speakers giving it the second largest population of english speakers in the world, this figure only makes up 10.66 per cent of the overall population with less than a quarter of a million people considering it their first language (census of india 2003). moreover english language speakers are unlikely to be representative of recipients of microfinance. there are several characteristics that set consumers of english language media apart from the majority of india's population. firstly, 70 per cent of all indians live in rural communities cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 73 (indian census 2003) but all of the english language publications have a geographic focus on major commercial cities. for example, the times of india is mumbai centric while the hindustan times is new delhi focused. this suggests that most of the readers of english language newspapers are city dwellers and less directly affected by rural issues. a more significant difference centres on class background. in her paper titled ‘colonial interventions and the postcolonial situation in india’, parameswaran (1997) described the indian media as a mechanism of the post-colonial caste system. she identifies a strong “upper-class bias of the english-language media in india” (1997, p.1). she goes on to argue that india’s english-language media “articulate and support the interests and ideology of the english-educated urban upper/middle classes” (ibid.). other scholars such as ramanathan (2005), annamalai (2004), kumar (2003) and scrase (2004) have also explored power, education and class dimensions of the use of english in india. by contrast, the media of choice among those in poorer rural areas tends to be local vernacular newspapers. if the media is seen as a reflection of its audience’s values then this content analysis is comparing the views of india’s, and perhaps to some extent america’s, elite. this has implications for any media analysis, in particular it could explain if media reports are biased in favour on investors and mfis themselves rather than their clients. another limitation is comparative media analysis between the countries is that there is significant linguistic and stylistic differences between indian and us journalism. the indian media sample largely reflected the findings of peer (2007) in that most articles were very short. since articles were shorter and less descriptive, the word counts were consistently lower for the indian sample. we also found that 55 per cent of the articles on microfinance appeared in the business pages. by contrast, the us sample articles were much longer, more descriptive and covered broader themes and appeared in the general news section. thus the us sample outscored the indian sample in both word count for specific words and number of articles containing specific words. rationale for development of categories relating to ngo / development oriented words and commercial/ economic categories. in an attempt to be as inductive as possible, categories were developed on the frequency of the top 500 words that appeared in all the articles in the sample. however, it is important to acknowledge that the grouping together of categories was problematic. some were created 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 based on synonyms; some around terminology such as economic terminology; or types of languages such as commercial language; others were based on a thematic orientation or association. some groupings were tenuous and there was a degree of overlap. for example, the word ‘philanthropy’ has been placed in the ‘aid’ category and not the ‘ngo’ category. there are many ways in which the data can be arranged, nevertheless, it is argued that this inductive approach to compiling these categories provided at least some insight into media representations of issues relating to microfinance. based on the institutionist and welfarist theoretical frameworks, commercial language can be viewed as representative of institutionist orientations while development and ngo oriented language can be seen as emblematic of a welfarist orientation. media discourse of microfinance manifest coding the relative frequency of words in eight different categories is shown in table 2. out of the eight categories, three categories were categorised as relating to the welfarist perspective: • development oriented words (development oriented help develop* need* peace); • aid and philanthropy oriented words (philanthrop*, donat*, aid, donor(s)) and • ngo oriented words (community, mission, non profit, ngo(s), foundation). the remaining five were considered to fall under the umbrella of commercial language which aligns with the institutionist perspective: • 4. financial expansion/ growth’ oriented (access, large* reach, big*, expan* ); • 5. financial viability and sustainability oriented (sustain* return profit*); • 6. other commercial language (strategy, private management business* capital, director, ceo, company, commercial, corporate, enterprises, executive); • 7. investor oriented (invest*, equity, fund(s) portfolio); • 8. other economic terminology (regulation, market*, econom* ). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 75 table 2: average word count summary for usa and indian articles the categories which registered the highest results in both samples in terms of total word count, average word count, number of articles containing words and number of words in each category (from highest to lowest ) were: 7. investor oriented development; 8.other economic terminology, and; 4. financial expansion/ growth’ oriented categories. all are examples of commercial language associated with the institutionist perspective. the lowest word counts were in the categories: 2. aid and philanthropy oriented, and; 3. ngo oriented, particularly in the indian sample where many of the words did not appear in the top 500 list of most frequent words. thus, the manifest content results show that institutionist language dominated both media samples, while welfarist language was used infrequently, particularly in the indian media sample. each of these categories is briefly discussed below. institutionist themes the most popular categories covered issues related to mfi operations and performance or investor orientation. this is significant as it indicates that the focus of most articles from both samples is likely to be on investors and mfis themselves rather than their clients. based on category words india average word count us average word count 1. development oriented help, develop*, need*, peace, poverty, support, poor, social rights 47.1 152.9 2. aid & philanthropy oriented philanthrop*, donat*, aid, donor(s) grant(s) 5 33.8 3. ngo oriented community, mission, ngo(s) non profit, ngo, foundation 14 54 4. financial expansion/ growth oriented access, large*, reach big*, expan* increase, grow* 41.3 91.3 5. financial viability and sustainability oriented sustain* , return profit* 27 64. 7 6. other commercial language strategy, private management, business*, capital, director, ceo company , commercial, corporate, enterprises, executive, entrepreneur* 38.8 89.2 7. investor oriented invest*, equity fund(s), portfolio 64.3 161 8. other economic terminology regulation, market*, econom* demand competit* 32.4 93.6 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 the samples, it appears that newspaper readers from both countries are largely exposed to language of investment and commerce in microfinance, which in turn may mean that readers are from an investing class and thus interested in this type of information and themes. 4. financial expansion/ growth’ oriented category financial expansion or growth is essentially an element of outreach as well as the expansion and growth of the institution. growth related words were used relatively frequently in both samples. in terms of total word count, this category was fourth highest in the us sample and third highest for the indian sample. both institutionists and welfarists believe in the importance of growth to different extents. opinion falls along the spectrum from those scholars who argue that impact is most important to those who argue it is entirely about outreach and growth. the institutionists tend to emphasise that expansion and outreach of the mfi is paramount. while welfarists focus on impact over growth. the frequency with which financial expansion or growth and its synonyms were mentioned suggests an institutionist orientation in the media samples of both countries. methods for funding growth shed greater light on other themes in both media samples. 7. investor oriented despite only four words falling into this category, the average word count for investororiented words was the highest for both samples. investor language was used far more frequently than aid or philanthropy oriented words, which was the most infrequently referenced category in both samples. based on the sample, investment was the most frequently mentioned funding source for mfis. this is indicative of an institutionist orientation within articles from both samples as investment and capital markets are an important concept in the institutionist worldview. institutionists see capital markets as the only source of funding large enough to satisfy demand. investing in mfis also requires that the institution is viable and profitable. 6. other commercial language in the ‘other commercial language’ category most of the words were focused on mfi operations and described employees in a commercial sense. results for words deriving from ‘business’ were particularly high. the abundance of commercial language in this study can be interpreted as an institutionist orientation to the majority of articles from the sample, further cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 77 supporting woller et al.’s (1999) notion of prolific and persuasive propagation of institutionist thought. 8. other economic terminology the results from the manifest data demonstrated significantly higher results in this category for the us sample over the indian sample, particularly for words deriving from market and economy. this largely aligns with ferraro et al.’s (2005) argument on classical economics resonating more with american meta-narratives around individualism and the rags to riches motif (lyotard 1984; stephens & mccallum 1998). welfarist themes 1. development oriented the second most populated category incorporated words associated with development. these words acknowledge to various extents the act of poverty alleviation and assistance. as expected when discussing microfinance, words associated with development are likely to be commonly used. the total word count made this category the highest for the us sample and second highest for the indian sample. the results were relatively higher for the us sample (325 per cent higher). this result could tenuously suggest a concern for impact which forms the basis of the welfarist paradigm. however, another explanation could be that the frequency of words in the us sample over the indian sample can partly be explained by the tendency for us journalists to link microfinance to broader themes and meta-narratives such as the rags to riches ‘american dream’. 3. ngo oriented the category ‘ngo oriented’ accounted for the second lowest related word counts. morduch (1999) argues that those who sympathise with ngo and donor language values are primarily influenced by the welfarist perspective. based on this, the media samples from both countries are unlikely to have a strong welfarist orientation, particularly the indian sample which rarely used ngo terminology. the low results for both samples are particularly surprising considering the large number of mfis that are ngos. 4. aid and philanthropy oriented us articles concerned with aid, philanthropy and serving the poorest were relatively few when compared to the commercial themes outlined above. three out of nine articles that 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 referred to aid argued that aid programs were ineffective. the six other articles described microfinance in aid projects or microfinance and aid having similar goals. the indian articles mentioned philanthropy only 11 times, broadly covering individual philanthropy and elements of venture philanthropy and corporate social responsibility (csr). an extract from a the times of india suggests a greater need for philanthropy rather than referring to existing philanthropic practices. there is a need for seeing very wealthy people in india beginning to understand that it is their responsibility to deal with poverty issues and then to provide grants, charity as people are doing in hong kong, brazil, mexico and china. wealthy national citizens provide foundations that support. “wealthy citizens should donate” the times of india 11 september 2008. discussion regarding content analysis the concept of a commercial industry was evident in the us press by continual references to microfinance in a business and finance context. half of the us articles discussed microfinance in this context. the commercial orientation of many of these articles is evident in the following quotes: barnevik says he isn't just helping poor people, he is building businesses. "everything i learned as a ceo applies in this world as well," he says. this is about business, not charity. it’s about giving people capital and tools. colvin, geoffrey “a ceo masters micro-credit” the washington post 23 december 2008 we’ll see a marriage between microfinance and the corporate sector, and that marriage will prevail. maria otero, accion president quoted prnewswire/ may 1 2008 it is important that government policies reinforce the microfinance sector and not convert them into instruments of social policies, no matter how well intentioned these are. princess maxima of the netherlands quoted in enp newswire, 23 april 2008. it would be remiss to imply all coverage of microfinance in the us has provided an unquestioning endorsement of the institutionist view microfinance and not to point to some more recent articles in high profile us publications. in particular, a front page new york cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 79 times story faulted lenders for profiting off the backs of borrowers (macfarquhar 2010) and in 2010, the wall street journal reported that as many as 30 micro-borrowers in india had committed suicide over looming, debilitating debt (bellman & chang 2010). the indian sample also mentioned sustainability and commercialisation regularly with 56 per cent of the articles alluding to microfinance within a business context and treating it as a business and a commercial industry. out of these, 29 per cent reported on non-banking financial institutions; 9 per cent covered mfis partnering with commercial businesses; and 7 per cent on commercial banks with microfinance operations. there were comparatively far fewer articles that focused on the development aspects of microfinance. half of the us articles referred to some kind of development impact caused by microfinance while only 44 per cent of indian articles associated microfinance with development. us articles concerned with aid, philanthropy and serving the poorest were relatively few when compared to the commercial themes above. three out of nine articles that referred to aid felt the practice of aid was ineffective and propounded a bottom-up approach instead of a traditional top-down approach to development. the six other us articles described microfinance in aid projects or microfinance and aid having similar goals. the indian articles didn’t refer to international aid but addressed philanthropy 11 times. conclusions little scholarly attention has been given to differences in the way the media, the donor and recipient aid communities have framed the contested concept of microfinance. in this article a comparison of how microfinance is framed in the us and indian media provides some insights into the differences and similarities in the way microfinance is socially constructed in these two countries. this content analysis of the top 100 articles in each country relating to microfinance shows that the indian media sample tended to focus on operational issues and report on specific business activity within the microfinance industry, in general treating it as a ‘regular’ part of the financial and banking system, while the us media sample made broader generalizations about the industry, linking it to meta-narratives –particularly microfinance as an innovation due to its harnessing of market forces to realise positive social outcomes. however, we found that market-based interpretations dominated both the us and indian media samples. this dominant business-orientated rhetoric in both sets of media contrasts 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 dramatically with the development focus of much academic debate about microfinance. instead it demonstrates the extent to which microfinance has become subsumed in a larger set of commercial imperatives. in this way this finding contributes not only to our understanding of the differences in interpretations of microfinance between donor and recipient countries but also offers insights into the power relations at play within the microfinance industry and the broader development and business community. the analysis also has broader implications for development ngos and oda agencies and raises questions for future research. in particular: in what ways can organisations reform or discard the current micro-finance model? and; are the academic understandings of the field, conceptualised as institutionism and welfarism, helpful heuristics? do they shed light on the logic behind mfi operations? or do they instead neglect the on-the-ground realities of power relations, competitiveness and instability in current global economic climate? these questions seek to clarify the mission of mfi organisations and ways that they can best fulfil their mission. the media analysis here highlights the need to continually question the missions and means of these organisations within the shifting social construction of their work. donors, governments, and ngos will need to reconsider their strategies in new circumstances. in its establishment phase, microfinance was been driven fundamentally by development concerns, most importantly higher incomes for the poor. now the financial sustainability of mfis themselves has taken centre stage. the more traditional players of the microfinance community have yet to fully come to terms with the implications of such a shift. commercialization and competition in microfinance pose challenges to ngos as great as any they have faced in the past. ngos may have to make major strategic changes. relative to commercial entrants, ngos’ major advantages are commitment to their mission and knowledge of their client base. ngos may wish to consider how best to use those advantages in competitive situations. planning for the future ngo leaders will face some tough decisions about whether to compete head on, become more commercialised themselves, develop new methods and client bases or exit the industry. given the dominance of 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vol.21, no.3, pp. 357-382. scrase, t. 2004, ‘the hegemony of english in india’, in: r. cribb (ed.), asia examined: proceedings of the 15th biennial conference of the asaa, 2004, canberra, asian studies association of australia & research school of pacific and asian studies, the australian national university. scully, n. 2004, microcredit: no panacea for poor women, global development research centre, washington, dc. simanowitz, s. 2002, ‘microfinance for the poorest: a review of issues and ideas for contribution of imp-act’, improving the impact of microfinance on poverty: an action research programme, university of sussex, brighton. sinclair, hugh 2012, confessions of a microfinance heretic: how micro-lending lost its way and betrayed the poor, berrett-koehler publishers, inc. siroya, shivani 2010, ‘the backlash in microfinance’, the huffington post november 10, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shivani-siroya/the-microfinance-backlash_b_781431.html woller, g. m. 2002, ‘the promise and peril of microfinance commercialization’, small enterprise development, vol.13, no.4, pp.12–21. woller, g. m., dunford, c., & woodworth, w. 1999, ‘where to microfinance?’. international journal of economic development, vol.1, no.1, pp. 29–64. http://www.nwmindia.org/newsmakers/sevanti.htm� http://www.cjr.org/feature/style_over_%20substance_1.php� http://www.cjr.org/feature/style_over_%20substance_1.php� http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shivani-siroya/the-microfinance-backlash_b_781431.html� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 83 yunus, m. 2005, ‘social business entrepreneurs are the solution’, grameen foundation usa publication series. yunus, m. 2001, ‘towards creating a poverty-free world’, in hossain, f. and rahman, z. (eds.), microfinance and poverty: contemporary perspectives, department of administrative sciences, university of tampere, tampere, pp. 21 -41. yunus, m. & jolis, a. 2003, banker to the poor: micro-lending and the battle against world, public affairs (perseus), new york. zeller, m. & meyer, r.l. 2002, ‘the triangle of microfinance: financial sustainability, outreach and impact’, john hopkins for the international food policy research institute. the social construction of the microfinance industry: a comparison of donor and recipient perspectives arjun bisen bronwen dalton university of technology, sydney rachel wilson university of sydney abstract the microfinance story institutionist perspectives on microfinance welfarist perspectives on microfinance media content analysis methodology sampling strategy and design for articles coding operation rationale behind selection of india and the us limitations in comparative media analysis of indian and us media: elite readership and linguistic and stylistic differences rationale for development of categories relating to ngo / development oriented words and commercial/ economic categories. media discourse of microfinance manifest coding table 2: average word count summary for usa and indian articles discussion regarding content analysis conclusions references 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia tracing southern cosmopolitanisms: the intersecting networks of islam, trade unions, gender & communism, 1945-1965 heather goodall university of technology, sydney abstract this paper investigates the continuing relationships between australian, indonesian and indian unionists and activists in the aftermath of an intense political struggle in australia from 1945 to 1949 in support of indonesian independence. these groups had been brought together initially by intersections between the networks established through colonialism, like trade unions, communism and feminism, with those having much longer histories, like islam. the men and women in this australian setting expressed their vision in 1945 for a future of universal and transnational networks across the indian ocean which would continue the alliances they had found so fruitful. their experiences as well as their hopes can be called cosmopolitanism and were ‘southern’ in the sense that they drew on subaltern, non-western and/or anti-colonial networks in all three countries. although these hopes for new futures of universal alliances and collaborations were held passionately in the 1940s, all seem to have died by 1970, diverted by newly independent national trajectories and defeated by the cold war. yet many of the relationships persisted far longer than might be expected and their unravelling was not inevitable. this paper will trace the course of a few of the relationships which began in the heat of the campaigns in australia, 1943 to 1945, in order to identify the continuing common ground as well as the rising tensions which challenged them. at the end of world war 2, there were high hopes across the indian ocean for a new world in which the relationships between working people would mean more than the borders which separated them. this paper will explore the fate of such hopes in the decades after 1945, by following the uneven relationships among australians, indonesians and indians in the aftermath of an intense political struggle in australia from 1945 to 1949 in support of indonesian independence. the men and women in this australian setting expressed their vision in 1945 for a future of universal and transnational networks across the indian ocean which would continue the alliances they had found so fruitful. today their experiences as well as their hopes might be called cosmopolitanism – they expected that the person-to-person friendships they were forming could be sustained and be able to negotiate the differences between them to achieve cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 109 common aims.1 “we hope for an everlasting friendship and cooperation between the indonesian and indian people in general, and the indonesian and indian workers in particular, both struggling for national independence, freedom and humanity” (fadilla and soemadi 1945). this hope was expressed by some of the departing indonesians in december 1945 to dasrath singh, the secretary of the indian seamen’s union in australia: yet they drew on a wider range of ideas and traditions than the classical 'cosmopolitan' of european politics at the time. these were 'southern cosmopolitanisms' in that they were relationships between colonised peoples and across racial and imperial lines – in the gaps between empire authorities and outside their control. australia had been a settler colony and had achieved nominal independence, yet it continued to be dominated by metropolitan political and economic interests, leading to widespread, vigorous republican and anti-british sentiments. india and indonesia shared their colonial conditions: both were administered (or indirectly ruled) colonies with minority colonising populations but these colonies spoke different vernaculars and were governed by different empires. the relationships which occurred between the three in australia in 1945 were between marginalised working people, all of whom were unhappy with their different types of colonial roles. the networks had been nurtured in the long nineteenth century when relative peace allowed mobile colonised peoples to explore the networks the european empires had built. some of these visions of a new future arose from networks of cultural expression, like those fostered by rabindranath tagore on his travels from india to iran and yugoslavia in the west to indonesia and japan to the east (bose 2010; frost forthcoming). other visions were drawn from religious faiths, particularly from islam, a universalist faith in the indian ocean long before colonialism (frost 2004, 2010; reetz 2006; germain 2007). while there are many differences across geographies and between doctrinal expressions within islam, all shared an understanding of an ummah or collective of believers (ummah wahida or ‘one community’ in the qur’an) that is the whole islamic world. still other visions were drawn from the 1 this is roughly the definition in use in current critical literature: a focus on individual relationships which enable interactions across group, class or cultural lines, across or beyond ‘national’ border, see for example: essays by both bruce robbins or pheng cheah in their 1998 co-edited volume cosmopolitics: thinking and feeling beyond the nation, special issue of cultural politics, vol 14, uni of minnesota press, minneapolis; carol breckenridge, sheldon pollock, homi baba and dipesh chakrabarty (eds) 2002: cosmopolitanism, duke university press, durham and london; gerard delanty, 2009: the cosmopolitan imagination: the renewal of critical social theory, cambridge university press, cambridge, uk; chris rumford 2008: cosmopolitan spaces: europe, globalisation, theory, routledge, ny and london; and gill valentine 2008: ‘living with difference: reflections on geographies of encounter’ in progress in human geography 32(3) pp323-337. 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 common experiences of working people, whether they were among the indentured labourers sent across the empires to work on colonial plantations, or among those organising themselves into trades unions around the port cities and on the ships on the newly global imperial trade routes (broeze 1981, 1998; manjapra 2010; martínez 2001). yet again, the networks which arose through contacts between travelling men and the women in the places they visited, either as tourists or workers, have not been well examined, despite having existed throughout this long period of peace. some were those of sex work and ranged from astute cultural calculations to brutal exploitation. others were enduring and affectionate relationships, occasionally resulting in marriages and the resettlement of one or other partner. still others, and this is very clear in the 1945 situation in australia, were social and political relationships, born out of the broader expectations which were the result of rapid change and challenge in the mid-twentieth century. such networks did not arise from the conditions generating ‘cosmopolitanism’ inside europe. bose for example has stressed the asian roots of what he calls 'universalism' while frost has identified islam as a structure entirely outside european control within which such networks were formed. yet what is notable about each of these networks is that they drew not only from pre-colonial and non-western technologies and ideas but at the same time from those initiated from europe. although he was only marginally interested in europe, tagore travelled on the vessels of european empires in order to explore the asian cultural worlds he was hoping to bring together. islam had gained from the new transport networks established by colonisation, both through the cultural influences of the expanding numbers of steam ship crews who were often muslims and through the ships themselves, which offered new and cheaper routes to the haj for far flung muslim communities established by the earlier sailing traders. the networks of mobile working people, whether among indentured labourers or the seafaring lascars (largely from india) and seedies (arabic-speakers from aden) (ewald 2000) had all arisen from the economies and technologies of empire, even though they built some of their relationships on the older ties of language and local home cultures as well as new industrial conditions and strategies. the relationships between men and women across cultures arising in port cities through sea transport, although long established with sail, had been greatly accelerated in the age of expanding imperial trade and proliferating steam ship routes (falkiner 2008). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 111 finally, there were organizational structures like international conferences and regular newsletters which had been initiated in the political movements of the west, like marxism and feminism, but which drew in and linked non-western peoples. the ideas of these political movements had been challenged and reshaped as they circulated in colonised settings where non-western ‘universalisms’ existed alongside assertive new local cultural movements. the international organisations of the 1920s deemed ‘communist’ for example, like the league against imperialism, were often seen by western commentators as being entirely under western – in this instance, soviet – domination. but they can be seen to have operated like the material structures of the shipping lanes, in that they formed structures – although intellectual structures rather than material ones which acted as conduits for flows of debate and contestation in many directions, not just from europe to the colonised world. the hopes for new futures of universal alliances and collaborations were held passionately in the 1940s, yet all seem to have died by 1970. the bitter struggles to force out colonisers led to national identities which were inward-looking, as newly independent peoples tried to define and authenticate themselves, as well as to justify their new borders. hampering transnationalism as well was the fact that borders continued to be problematic after independence. in the dutch east indies, for example, there had been deep ambivalence from the earliest years of the twentieth century in a number of communities, including among the sumatrans and the javanese, about whether their emerging ‘nation’ should embrace all of the islands in the archipelago which had been controlled by the dutch, despite religious and ethnic differences, and indeed whether it should include the malay population of british malaya (zurbuchen 2005; kumar 1979; anderson 1979; reid 1979). this ambivalence and debate continued to be unresolved at least in part because even after 1949, the dutch retained control over irian jaya,2 2 known by various names, including dutch new guinea and west papua. a place which had long held emotional significance for nationalists because it was where the dutch had imprisoned many indonesian political prisoners, including haji misbach, the ‘red haji of solo’, a high profile communist member of serakat islam, in 1924 and over 1300 communist party activists and others in 1927 (mcvey 1965; shiraishi 1990; ricklefs 2001; federspiel 2006). although its population was melanesian, irian jaya had no greater differences in ethnicity and religion than did other islands now included in the new independent republic. hostilities between the indonesians 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 and the dutch over irian jaya had flared into international consciousness by the early 1950s as we shall see. inside indonesia there was intense popular anger that even after such a bloody independence battle in the 1940s the dutch continued to be intransigent in holding onto their last foothold of colonialism. this ensured that, despite ambivalence inside indonesia over the challenges of extending the borders, the indonesian government demanded that the un declare incorporation into the indonesian nation and eventually invaded irian jaya in 1961. border insecurity and nationalist assertiveness was not limited to indonesia. in india, bitterness over the border with pakistan was paralleled by rising conflict with china over the borderline on the north east. india stationed armed troops there and increasingly severe border clashes marked the later 1950s until open warfare broke out in 1962. at the same time, cold war politics on all sides had forced everyone – still colonised or not to recompose themselves in regional and political 'camps' or 'blocs' as the hostile polarisations lined up through the 1950s. all these were ongoing processes, generating occasional peaks of crisis but often simmering, yet still shaping both internal and international political relationships. there were also, however, some obvious landmarks of sudden change which are usually used as explanations. there was the end of the world war itself in may 1945, then indian independence in 1947 and the tragedy of partition, which split the memberships of at least some unions like those for the seafarers who had sailed as indians but who lived across all sides of the borders of india, and west and east pakistan. the indonesian battle against the dutch went on for far longer and was accompanied by much more internal bloodshed among the nationalists than had been expected in august 1945. independence was finally achieved only in december 1949, after years of isolation behind a dutch blockade. in australia, there had been rising conflict between left and right inside the labour movement, with pressure on left members and organisations to declare their distance from the australian communist party (cpa) and withdraw from all soviet-aligned international organisations. labor lost the election in december 1949 to robert menzies, who led a deeply conservative government to power for 23 years, entrenching an alignment with the usa in the cold war hostilities. were these abrupt events – dramatic as each was – enough to sever the alliances formed during the campaign against the dutch? many of the networks in existence in 1945 persisted in fact into the 1950s and even the 1960s, beyond these major landmarks. some indeed, like cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 113 the connections between women, seemed to have gone beyond the fragile links of the 1940s to expand in the early 1960s. they all continued to be marked by warm friendships and sustained communication. so if it was not those early disruptive events, what was the cause of the eventual loss of these networks? their persistence begs for closer study, to understand not only their victories but also their eventual defeats even after so much effort had gone into keeping them alive. ............................. this paper will briefly trace three of these intersections between non-western and western networks. the first is the relationship between islam and communism. the second is around trades union organisation and strategies in established and newly independent nations. the third is around gender and sexual relationships across racial lines, the area far less often investigated than the other two in the recent scholarship on cosmopolitanism (cf stivens 2008), yet arguably one which was sustained the longest. there are publications around some of these themes, but most are focussed within national borders, seldom drawing international comparisons. each of these intersections was visible in 1945 in the australian campaign to support indonesian independence and they can be seen to exist, with varying degrees of tension, in events up to the 1960s. the campaign in australia to support the indonesian declaration of an independent republic in august 1945 was carried out through a boycott of dutch shipping (lockwood 1982; fitzpatrick and cahill 1981; cottle 2003; beasley 1996; goodall 2008; cottle and keys 2005) initiated by indonesian seamen and activists caught in or brought to australia when the japanese invaded dutch east indies in 1942. it was then taken up by australian maritime unions and others including the indian seamen’s union in australia (isuia). these unions all refused to load, service or crew any dutch shipping or other shipping carrying arms or supplies to the dutch. the boycott was spectacularly effective, holding up around 500 ships in australian waters for nine months and completely stopping the dutch and british in that period from re-establishing colonial power over what had been netherlands east indies (lockwood 1982). the dutch ramped up their physical attack on the indonesian republican areas and then imposed a naval blockade around them, but the independence movement continued to call for support from governments they believed to be sympathetic in australia, vietnam, india and the philippines (raliby quoted in anderson 1976, p.179). although less uniformly observed by 1947, the boycott continued to act as a significant obstruction to 114 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 dutch supply lines and as a constant reminder to the australian public of the battle going on to their north. the campaign brought together not only australians and the indonesian seafarers and political activists but involved all the seamen, from many nationalities, who were temporary residents in australia, because they were the crews on the foreign vessels, including the dutch and british, which were being used to reinforce the dutch as they tried to retake the nei (lockwood 1982, p.170; cottle 2003). these seafarers included chinese, vietnamese and papuan sailors, but most notable were the indians who were in the greatest numbers, crewing all of the british and many of the dutch ships.3 often stereotyped by later australian authors (fitzpatrick and cahill 1981) as subservient workers and unreliable allies, the indians played a key role in the strike. they were not only highly unionised and militant in india itself (broeze 1981) but formed a union for themselves while in australian waters, the isuia which has left many documents to record the indian views and statements about the strike.4 this article, addressing the years 1945 to 1965, will focus on the ongoing relationships between indonesians and australians, as the indians appear to have taken a less active role on the international stage in those years.5 yet the indian experience forms an essential comparative backdrop in considering the interactions between indonesians and australians, particularly in relation to islam, which otherwise might be interpreted very differently. intersection 1: islam and communism the rapidity with which ideas around socialism from the 1880s and then communism after the russian revolution were circulating globally owed much to the travels of colonised peoples for trade, education or business into europe as well as into the rest of the colonised world. most of the high profile advocates of anti-colonial and nationalist movements from the colonised world had spent some time in their respective metropolitan countries or in other european centres. often this was in events or conferences which were associated with the 3 the majority of iconic ships immobilized in sydney – including those named in the film indonesia calling – had been crewed by indians. see list in tribune, tues 23 october, 1945, p 1, ‘indians prevent dutch getaway’, and friday 26 october, p 3, ‘indians defy dutch, enter lido.’, tues 30 october, 1945, ‘indians establish complete dutch ship boycott’. 4 at the noel butlin archive of business and labour, menzies library, australian national university. rupert lockwood recorded many of the indian strike details but focussed his story on the indonesians. for an account focussed on the indian records, see heather goodall 2008: ‘port politics: indian seamen, australian unionists and indonesian independence, 1945-1947’, labour history, no. 94, may 2008, pp 43-68. 5 the next stage of my research will be the exploration of documents in indian archives to identify what obstacles there may have been to international participation 1947 to 1965, as is suggested by the indonesiaaustralia comparison. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 115 emerging ideologies of european countries like soviet russia, but it is an illusion to see these individuals or their long established movements as falling under any immediate soviet discipline. kris manjapra, investigating south asian and indian ocean communism, has argued that the soviets sought little control until after stalin’s rise in 1928 over the far flung and emerging communist parties in the colonies – and in fact would have had had great difficulty imposing any single ‘line’ even then on the tumultuous ferment of ideas which was being debated and circulated between the anti-colonial and nationalist movements both in european cities and in their homelands (manjapra 2010a, pp.167-170; manjapra 2010b). the iconic conferences held under the auspices of the international communist and socialist movements in europe in the 1920s saw a great diversity in attendance as well as debate and contestation about content. both jawaharlal nehru and mohammed hatta attended the league against imperialism conferences in 1927 and 1929, along with european pacifists and the anti-colonial left. neither nehru nor hatta ever toed any european directive, let alone a soviet one, and some like hatta went to great lengths in the 1940s and beyond to prove their implacable resistance to communism. kyaw zaw win (2011) along with manjapra and others have pointed to the pan-islamic conference at mecca, in 1926 as being just as – if not more influential in the region. win points to the pan-asiatic conference in nagasaki, also 1926 and the networks of socialists throughout the region, who became visible in the early 1950s in, for example, the rangoon asian socialist conference in 1953, as being different but similarly active and explicitly non-western and anti-colonial networks, which exerted strong influences over nationalist activists generally (win 2011; manjapra 2010). one issue over which there was particular and continuing tension between communists in the indian ocean and those in the soviet union was islam. the career and statements of tan malaka demonstrate the intensity of this issue and the lack of control over non-western communists which the comintern could command in the early 1920s. malaka was not by any means alone in indonesia – there was widespread affiliation to both islam and communism among members of the organisation sarekat islam (si), founded around 1908 with an economic rather than primarily a religious function. until the mid 1920s, si was made up of a wide range of members, many of whom were not only islamic but were either in the indonesian communist party (pki) like haji mesbich, the ‘red haji of solo’, from central java, or were strongly sympathetic to socialist and communist policies and strategies (mcvey 1965, pp.172-3; shiraishi 1990; ricklefs 2001; federspiel 2006). tan malaka (1894-1949) 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 was a sumatran who was a committed nationalist and communist, studying in the netherlands where he was inspired by the russian revolution. returning to indonesia in 1919, he became chairman of indonesian communist party (pki) but was exiled by the dutch in 1922, again arriving in the netherlands. soon after, he ran as a communist candidate for the dutch parliament, then, on his defeat, moved to moscow to become the comintern’s officer for se asia.6 lenin, in his influential theses adopted at the second comintern congress in 1920, had emphasised the need to ‘struggle against pan-islamism.’ this statement had been republished by the pki in indonesia, alienating many in sarekat islam. tan malaka addressed the fourth comintern congress in 1922 on ‘communism and pan-islamism’. he argued that the pki had worked closely with sarekat islam which he described as ‘the islamic league …. a very large organisation with many very poor peasants’, until 1921, when minor differences between them were exploited by the government to briefly separate them. cooperation had been restored within the year and their relationship was so close, he explained accurately, that sarekat islam had campaigned on the same electoral platform as the pki. he went on to say: ‘today, pan-islamism signifies the national liberation struggle…. pan-islamism now means the brotherhood of all muslim peoples, and the liberation struggle not only of the arab but also for the indian, the javanese and all the oppressed muslim peoples. this brotherhood means the practical liberation struggle not only against dutch but also against english, french and italian capitalism….the liberation struggle against the different imperialist powers of the world…. just as we want to support the national struggle, we also want to support the liberation struggle of the very combative, very active 250 million muslims living under the imperialist powers (malaka 1922).’ this position was rejected in moscow just as it was by many western communists, but it had a powerful resonance in india, particularly among the unionised seafarers from bengal who formed a major proportion of those in sydney in 1945. historian suchetana chattopadhyay has traced the emergence of bengal’s first communists in the early 1920s from the region’s muslim intelligentsia (chattopadhyay 2011, pp. 1-6). the communist party of india continued to have a significant proportion of muslims, and it was influential during the 1920s and 1930s in the seamen’s unions operating in the two big ports of the region, bombay and calcutta (chattopadhyay 2011, pp. 178-9, 218). these indian unions were, in turn, strongly 6 tan malaka’s own voluminous writings were gathered and translated by helen jarvis and published in english in 1991 as from jail to jail. athens, ohio: ohio university center for international studies southeast asia series number 83. a number of authors have discussed tan malaka, including george mcturnan kahin, 1952: nationalism and revolution in indonesia. ithaca, ny: cornell university press; ruth mcvey, 1965: the rise of indonesian communism. ithaca, ny: cornell university press; helen jarvis 1987: ‘tan malaka: revolutionary or renegade?’ bulletin of concerned asian scholars 19(1): 41-55; abidin kusno 2003: ‘from city to city: tan malaka, shanghai, and the politics of geographical imagining’. singapore journal of tropical geography 24(3): 327-339. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 117 represented in the indian seamen’s union in australia, whose members continued to practice their islamic faith throughout the strike and boycott of dutch shipping. the isuia records indicate that at a minimum 70% of the seamen in australia were muslims and the proportion may have been higher (goodall 2010). a photograph published in the australian communist newspaper, the tribune in november 1945 showed dasrath singh, the sikh secretary and abdul rehman, the islamic president of the isuia in sydney with the visiting dr muhammad hassan, a barrister who came from india to be the imam during the 1945 eid-ulfitr ceremonies hosted by the indian seamen’s union in australia during the strike (tribune 23 november 1945, p.8). for the australians most directly involved in the isuia, like clarrie campbell, the seafarers’ commitment to islam was obvious and they took it seriously. campbell assisted in compiling a list of the names and addresses of sydney’s muslim community in 1946 to be invited to attend the eid celebrations which the isuia hosted and to compose the respectful letters of invitation in english which the union issued. in wider circles, however, among the largely atheist left of the union movement and the communist and socialist parties, the indian seamen’s diverse faiths were noted but assumed to be unimportant. australians interviewed for this project confirmed they were aware of religious differences largely because there were problems whenever the australians tried to organise food purchases or cooking. they learnt quickly that things went far more smoothly when the seafarers themselves managed the strikers’ kitchen for all traditional food requirements – christian, muslim and hindu. australian observers of the seafarers’ tactful management of dietary differences were delighted at what they took to be a growing ‘ecumenism’ among the striking seamen which would involve, as reductivist versions of marx advocated, the eventual ‘withering away’ of organised religion. at most, these australians saw such religious differences as quaint and outmoded customs.7 for many of the indians and the indonesians, however, the role of islam in fostering international unity among muslims was extremely important. the indians pointed out in november 1945: “the indonesians are 98% mohammedan and the indian seamen in sydney are 98% mohammedans,” said one indian spokesman. “thus the shipping companies are trying to force us to take part in a war on our brother mohammedans. this is against our conscience, as well as being against the law” (tribune, 30 october 1945). a group of indian crewman after refusing to sail a dutch ship said: “we made our attitude quite clear. we were simply not going to java and help suppress our brothers, and that as all there was to it.” (tribune, 2 november 1945). the celebration of eid-ul-fitr in 1945 was – no doubt like others – intensely political. a tribune photograph was captioned: “indian nationals and indonesians gathered outside the sydney town hall after celebrating the mohammedan new year festival led by indian barrister and muslim priest, muhammad hasan. crowd cheered when mr hasan advised that success in the 7 phyllis johnson (born 1917), interviewed heather goodall, padstow, nsw, 10 may 2007. 118 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 struggle for independence depended on unity among those seeking fulfilment of promises made in the atlantic charter.” (tribune 27 november 1945, p.7) differences in empires, languages and shipping lines had kept the indians and indonesians separated in the past, although the indian seafarers commented bitterly that they believed this was due to the shipping companies seeking to ‘divide and rule’. one indian organizer put it this way when he spoke formally to the indonesians at a shared function: we indians are indeed grateful that you accepted our invitation to join us in this picnic today. we feel that in doing so, we have welded a chain of fraternal friendship which no force can break . . . in the past there have been small conflicts between indian and indonesian seamen . . . we know now that in spite of the urgency of winning the war, certain shipping companies in their greed for profits, and even at the risk of losing the war, were prepared to use the people of one country against another . . . the unity of our people, the people of two important countries . . . ensures our ultimate emancipation.8 at this event in sydney, both groups pledged that in the future they would put aside such colonisers’ divisions and instead concentrate on the bonds of religion and class politics which rightly drew them together. in india and indonesia, however, the relationship between the communist parties and muslims had taken very different paths, even before partition in india in 1947. in indonesia, the divisions which tan malaka had spoken of between muslims and communists in the 1920s had widened, in part because the comintern had failed to adopt tan malaka’s argument about supporting the liberation struggles of 250 million muslims under colonial control. tensions repeatedly surfaced during the course of the revolution in indonesia, exacerbated for example in the aftermath of complex events like the madiun uprising in 1948 (mcgregor 2009) and were eventually to widen in some areas into a bitter and apparently irreparable gap, as will be discussed later in this paper.9 in india, however, the strong affiliations between communism and islam continued, ensuring that muslims continued to play active roles as marxists and in marxist parties and governments throughout the early decades of independence and into the present. 8 ‘indians reply to indonesians’ typescript, nd [possibly september 1945 but also may have been pre-august as it refers to the war as if it had not yet ended], isuia archive e177/5. noel butlin archive of business and labour, anu. 9 there are a number of reflections on the bitter division which had come into existence by 1965 in indonesia and its persistence to this day. see greg fealy and katharine mcgregor, 2010: ‘nahdlatul ulama and the killings of 1965-66: religion, politics and remembrance’ in indonesia, 89, april 2010, pp 37-60. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 119 in australia, however, most communists had ignored the importance of islam in fostering communication between left wing indian and indonesian seafarers. they had expected that all religions would be opposed to communism, and so they continued to assume that communism and islam were by definition mutually exclusive and antagonistic. the eventual outcome of the divergence between islam and communism in indonesia looked, from australia, as if it had always existed. yet in fact, as the comparison with india demonstrates, it had not been inevitable but instead was a recent change brought about by specific political decisions and strategies. intersection 2: trade unions & anti-colonial strategies: tuk subianto and eliot v. elliott the sustained friendship between the unionists tuk subianto and eliot v. elliott offers a example of inter-personal communication across ethnic and national lines through the organisational structure of the international union movement. for a long time, the friendship between elliott and tuk subianto operated in association with the very active international role played by the indonesian trade union movement until 1965, when there was also a robust indonesian international presence in the women’s and youth movements (mcgregor 2010). tuk subianto was therefore not dependent on elliott for international access. instead, the two met on equal terms. this, along with the very public documentation of their work, allows a better understanding of how the common view point they shared in 1945 was sustained and then undermined.10 tuk subianto had come to australia in 1943 as a 19 year old javanese seamen on a merchant ship, trapped outside his country when the japanese invaded. these indonesian seamen demanded equal wages with australian and other empire seafarers and were immediately jailed alongside the political prisoners brought from digul prison in west irian by the dutch who had hoped they would help to establish a resistance against the japanese. eventually released and by then thoroughly politicised, tukliwan was elected in 1944 to be general secretary of sarpelindo, the new union formed in australia by indonesian seamen with the support of the digulists. eliot v. elliott, the melbourne seaman and communist who had become general federal secretary of the seamen’s union of australia (sua) in 1941 became the sua representative to sarpelindo while barney smith, the nsw sua 10 much of the biographical detail on eliot v. elliott comes from rowan cahill, 1998: ‘sea change/ an essay in maritime labour history’, http://www.takver.com/history/seachang.htm; see also brian fitzpatrick and rowan cahill 1981: the seamen's union of australia, http://www.takver.com/history/seachang.htm� 120 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 secretary was closely involved with both the indian seafarers and the indonesians (healy 2007). returning to indonesia in 1946, tuk subianto became general secretary of the indonesian seamen’s and dockers’ union, sbpp, in february 1953 (elliott 1997, pp. 112-116). in this role, he published an article in the indonesian workers’ newspaper bendera buruh in october 1953, outlining his key principles for an indonesian audience. he argued that the waterfront and the maritime industries remained under the control of foreign monopolist capital and that, with support from regulations enacted by the new republican government, profits still flowed to kpm and other dutch shipping lines. he was in favour of strikes against these industrial conditions but he also explained the necessity to support strikes called for cultural rights – such as that the union had fought to ensure the rights to wear muslim headdress and to be paid an end of ramadan allowance. his central point was that the situation was directly analogous to colonial conditions in which the old discriminatory racial wages system between indonesians & dutch employees was sustained. he argued that ‘in general, the dock and shipping bosses still consider the indonesian people to be their colonised people’ and ‘the fate of the workers is no better than in the dutch colonial period.’ (bendera buruh october 1953, translated by suzan piper, 2009). the solutions he put forward were in general to establish international solidarity through the world federation of trade unions (wftu), a trade union network based in europe although with an extensive network in the non-western world. his primary solution, however, lay in building direct collaborative political and industrial relations with workers in the colonised and newly decolonised world. eliot v. elliott maintained his indonesian relationships after the repatriation of his seafarer comrades. he stayed in touch with tuk subianto and spent 16 days in indonesia in october 1952, stopping over on his trips overseas, like that in february 1953 when he was headed to the wftu conference in prague. his hopes for a transnational future which he saw as a particular strength of his own union, seafaring, continued to be held passionately, as he showed in this late 1953 statement: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 121 ‘we transport workers alone, among all the workers in the world, cross the frontiers of the nations on land, cross the oceans in the ships to many different nations and fly through the air to every nation in the world. we are truly international. (elliott nd)’11 as a member of the wftu transport division, containing not only seamen but railway aircraft workers, he included them in his speeches but his focus was always on the maritime industry. he was also devoted to maintaining an international communist network, and although not uncritical of stalin, he put up a steely defence against the conservative australian government’s attempts all through the 1950s to have the sua disaffiliate from the wftu.12 in all his defences of the international network, he stressed the importance of alliances and collaboration with the maritime unionists of asia and particularly of indonesia.13 his reports on indonesia and australia offer an important comparison with those of tuk subianto. elliott argued there were historic links and much common ground between the maritime unions in both countries. in his view, the important common goals were the struggle for decent wages and conditions and the commitment to a strong independent national identity. elliott placed great importance on unionising the thousands of workers in the asian region and stressed the tenacity of the indonesian workers and their successes so far. in line with this approach, the seaman’s journal from 1953 to 1958 consistently stressed comradeship with indonesian, chinese, vietnamese, indian and other asian seafarers. elliott argued that – for indonesia just as much as for australia – it was essentially class analysis which would offer solutions and so alliances between fellow working class unions, through the wftu, was the way to gain external support. there were two key differences between tuk subianto’s and elliott’s positions at this time. the first was that elliott failed to notice the indonesian union’s interest in campaigns to achieve cultural goals like recognition of eid at the end of ramadan as an important holiday. 11 eliot v. elliott, probably delivered to the third, world trade unions congress, transport unions, wftu, vienna, october 1953. in bundle of correspondence from this congress in mid 1954 file, noel butlin archives of business and labour, location: e183/21/8. 12 see his published articles in 1953 and 54 for his criticism of stalin, sua archives, noel butlin archives of business and labour, location: e183/21/8. 13 eliot v. ellliott, 1953: ‘our indonesian neighbour’, communist review, feb 1953, pp 37-42; 20 jan 1953, j.woddis, wftu publications to e.v.elliott, re delays in publication of article relating to australia, to which elliott responded with minor revisions; 12 mar 1954, e.v.elliott to f. leriche, wftu, vienna, austria; both held in sua archives, noel butlin archives of business and labour, location: e183/21/8. 122 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the second was that elliott failed to discuss the building of links between decolonising nations. for him, the priority was to support the centralised international organisation, whereas for tuk subianto, the priority was seeking out and consolidating bonds between decolonising and newly independent workers, with the wftu as a secondary – although highly important – set of alliances. although these were, even in 1953, important differences, they were outweighed by the extensive common ground between the two men and their two union’s positions. they spent the next several years in close communication and international collaboration. the structure through which this could occur was the wftu, originally established in the uk as a global network between unions, it had become more soviet-aligned when it was opposed by a newly formed body, the anti-communist itf, which concentrated its attention on the emerging cold war in europe. the wftu had developed a strong set of partnerships with the trade unions of the non-western and newly independent nations. although based in eastern europe, and meeting in prague and vienna, the wftu nevertheless sustained a flow of news from many parts of the globe, including japan, india, ceylon and various countries in africa. however, when the minutes of wftu meetings are studied, it becomes apparent that the only representatives of these non-western trade unions who were consistently present at meetings and were regularly sending updates, reports and proposals, were those from indonesia.14 it was essentially the indonesians who gave some reality to the important claim of the wftu to have a non-european membership. while elliot was sustaining his communication with the wftu and with tuk subianto, his union came under increasing political and legal attack from the conservative menzies government, leading it to reduce its international involvement and focus instead on defending itself against the relentless industrial campaigns of the government.15 14 many wftu records are held in the archives of the sua and mua in the noel butlin archive of business and labour, anu. nevertheless, tuk subianto was invited to the sua’s 1956 conference and given extensive coverage in the seamen’s journal to discuss the goals of indonesian maritime unions. the focal point in tuk subianto’s reports to the australian conference was that shipping in indonesia continued to be under foreign control and he stressed that decolonisation was the key to ending the continuing presence of metropolitan capital in the region. he was interested 15 report by j. tudehope on asian maritime conference, 5-14 october, 1953, sua archives, noel butlin archives of business and labour, location: e183/21/8. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 123 not just to offer support for others seeking national independence but to benefit from the shared knowledge of common decolonisation struggles. he raised this issue in a number of ways in his main speech to the 1956 conference, suggesting australia should participate with indonesian trade unions in plans for a network of afro-asian unions arising from the recent afro-asian conference in bandung. but in the sua-written summary of this conference event, this theme was not mentioned at all.16 in fact, decolonisation had seldom been addressed in the journal over the previous 12 months. the bandung conference, held in april 1955, had formed a major turning point in the communication around the globe between colonised peoples (walker 2005; mackie 2005, tan and acharya 2008, finane and mcdougal 2010; kahin 1956). the delegates represented two thirds of the world’s population. it had drawn representatives from 29 asian and african newly independent nations, and delegations from those in the midst of anti-colonial wars. the bandung conference was widely publicised around the world, leading journalist and author richard wright to make a great effort to be present so he could write about this historic meeting which he saw as reflecting a world divided by race. yet the seamen’s journal did not mention anything at all about the bandung meeting till april 1956, a whole year after it had happened (wright 1956; walker 2005; j.w. burton 1933, p.4; dunn 2004; c. burton 1955; the seamen’s journal april 1956, p.9). there had been other major events for the decolonising world in the period before the sua conference. in the battle of dien bien phu, the vietnamese nationalists under ho chi minh had driven the french out of south east asia, while in kenya the mau mau uprising had been underway since 1952, striking terror into british colonisers across africa. yet there is little reference anywhere in the seaman’s journal across 1955 or 1956 to those events, or to decolonisation generally in its coverage of the 1956 annual general meeting where tuk subianto spoke. the journal frequently featured articles on international peace and disarmament strategies, but these focussed exclusively on european conflicts and there was no mention of decolonisation as a strategic approach to achieving disarmament and peace. 16 the seamen’s journal: pp 2: ‘facts re indonesian seamen’, history of 1945 black ban of dutch shipping; pp 3-5 report of agm, largely eliot v. elliott delivering report from committee of management but also some extracts of tuk subianto speech at end p3 and box, p4; tuk subianto writes: ‘indonesian report… national independence’, p15-17; ‘australian seamen express appreciation’, p20; tuk subianto writes: ‘impressions of australia’, p23. 124 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 certainly in 1956, tuk subianto and eliot v. elliott were demonstrating that they were having real conversations. their speeches and reports show they had much common ground between them, including a commitment to understanding social conflict as class struggle, although while this was important for tuk subianto, it was the dominant theme for elliott. each felt that seamen were both in need of international solidarity but were also uniquely able to contribute to building a new, internationalised world. and each advocated the achievement of strong national independence and identity as a goal for all countries. yet there were also indications of dissonance in 1956. as tuk subianto appeared to be uneasily aware, australians had failed to recognise the primacy of continued struggle against colonialism for indonesian activists. the events around bandung and other key markers of decolonisation had passed unnoticed in australia, even for an internationally oriented union like the sua. in a worrying outcome of this disinterest, australian seamen failed to pursue either the trade union conference which may have resulted from bandung or indeed any other trade union networks in the decolonising world. by 1958, the gap between these two old comrades had widened. tuk subianto was again invited to be a key sua guest at the annual general meeting in june but this time, his speech is very different. he stressed – politely but sternly – the disappointment he and his union felt about australian government intransigence on west irian, the one remaining dutch colony. nationalist unions like the seamen and dockers union (spbb) had bitterly opposed the continuing colonial control of the dutch over the shipping industry. they did not interpret the indonesian government’s plan to incorporate west irian as expansionism but rather saw it as the final removal of the colonial power from what had been the dutch east indies. the australian government had refused to approve of the transfer of power from the dutch to the republic of indonesia, not because it was at all interested in the wishes of melanesian west papuans, but instead because it feared the expansion of a left-leaning, anti-colonial neighbour to a shared border with its mandated territory in papua new guinea. australia preferred to see the dutch remain in control (seamen’s journal sept 1958, pp. 12 – 13). this, combined with a number of disputes about the failures of australian employers to pay adequate wages to indonesian divers along the north coast, led to a souring of relations between the two countries at national level (martinez 2010). for tuk subianto, this was a clear case of the importance of support for decolonisation and it was a shock to him to realise that the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 125 australian maritime unions were unenthusiastic about supporting his union’s call for an end to dutch colonial rule. eliot v. elliott’s speeches at the 1958 conference suggest that, rather than opposition to the indonesian calls, the maritime unions like the sua were simply too focussed on the internal pressure from the menzies government and anti-communists within the labour movement to involve themselves in international affairs. the unions were, at the same time, facing massive technological changes to the industry. the introduction of cranes and later containers led to dramatic losses in jobs in all the australian maritime industries which weakened the unions. combined with the continuing political pressure, this forced the sua to conserve resources by withdrawing further from its previous international presence. it finally succumbed to the pressure it had faced for over a decade when it disaffiliated from the wftu (the seamen’s journal, sept 1958, pp 42-43). with government support, shipping companies began to employ labourers from neighbouring asian countries to further challenge the wages and conditions for which the australian unions had fought. the sua was actually battling the companies which had made these employment decisions, but the challenge the union faced was whether it could keep its campaign rhetoric focussed on the companies rather than on the exploited employees with whom its members were being forced into competition. could the sua sustain the relationships which had been built up over the last two decades with asian trades unions and workers? by 1963 the answer was sadly clear. the sua was in full campaign mode against the australian companies like ampol which were hiring crews outside australia on less than australian award wages. its headlines and editorials made it quite clear that it was targetting the workers as well as the company as it railed against ‘cheap labour asian crews’. the wftu was still in close enough contact to send a message of support, but it very carefully demanded support for paying ‘australian wages’ to crews employed on these boats. the sua, however, was arguing not about wages but about race: the union demanded – often under elliott’s own by-line – that australian companies must employ ‘australian crews’.17 17 the seamen’s journal, jan 1963, p 7 ‘cheap labor asian crews’, p. 17, campaign image of the campaign against ampol running in 1962-63; feb 1963, pp 1 for sua call for ‘australian crews’ as opposed to wftu call for ‘australian wages’, in reproduced cable of support, same issue, p. 28. as containerized cargo-handling escalated, job losses spiralled and the government continued its relentless attack with penal clauses applied to unionists and massive fines to the union. 126 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the sua succumbed: the old racist approaches to defensive unionism, which had not been visible at all in the seamen’s journal over the previous decades, again came to dominate the pages of the union’s newspaper. tuk subianto did not come to australia again, and in fact there were no asian delegations to the sua annual general meeting in the years that followed. the shared hopes of 1945 had been submerged in the grim new worlds of mechanisation and job losses in the 1960s. worse was to come. the escalating anxieties in indonesia around the rising popular support for the pki and its links to the sukarno government led to the events of 1965, when an alleged abduction of a number of army generals by left wing groups was used as the pretext for a full-scale army coup led by general suharto (vickers 2005). a massacre of pki members and supporters began which left perhaps half a million people murdered. one of them was tuk subianto. intersection 3: gender across racial lines none of the authors who have considered ‘south-south’ networks around islam, communism or trade union structures have traced interactions through gendered contacts or through sexual relationships. religious and political leadership, and mobile populations like seafarers, have been predominantly male, and so their transnational networks are assumed to have existed without any involvement with or between women. similarly, the tensions of the intimate, domestic or private spheres seem irretrievably localized and vernacular and so are removed from the cosmopolitan and the transnational other than in the most ‘everyday’ sense. gendered relationships have of course been intensely entangled with colonial and anticolonial power at both the personal and the organisational level, so they may have offered or utilised the same type of structures and technologies of continued communication as did marxist or trade union networks (breckenridge et al. 2002; stivens 2008). australia in the 1940s: recognising the personal and the political if the indian side of the story about the boycott of dutch shipping has been obscured,18 18 fitzpatrick and cahill, 1981, beasley, 1996, ivens 1946 – but not lockwood 1982 (who just dismembered it and spread it across the narrative in such a way as to make it hard to find) the presence of women has been completely invisible except for the stellar roles of two extraordinary women, molly bondan and lotte maramis, whose writing has given us a glimpse of their worlds. yet these two individuals actually represent two larger groups of women. the first, similarly to molly bondan in sydney and brisbane, were those who cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 127 became involved with indonesian and indian seamen through political activism, which at times shifted into personal and intimate relationships. those more like lotte maramis, in sydney, became involved initially through personal and emotional relationships, although these may then have led them into political activity. these two groups have seldom been recognised, except in the untiring work of another woman, the linguist and educator jan lingard, who in her book refugees and rebels also sketches out a third group, the small number of women who came from boven digul as wives and daughters of the political activists who had been imprisoned by the dutch, often for many years, on west irian and who spent most of their australian time in mackay in far north queensland. i would add a fourth group, of whom we know next to nothing, the sex workers of all of the australian ports, whose interactions with indonesian and indian seafaring men may have been as complex, as moving and as politicised as those described by henry trotter in south africa (trotter 2001) and luise white in kenya (white 1990) . while this is an important arena of gendered relationships which must have left many different types of impacts, we have little knowledge about it yet. even for the first three groups, this comparative paper can add only marginally to this discussion, but will at least to open up some possibilities. each of the earlier two intersections has a bearing on how these gendered relationships may have played out. two of the women interviewed for this project, phyllis johnson and sylvia mullins, were members of the communist party of australia (cpa). molly bondan was not, but her initial connections to the other australians who were interested in opening contacts with people from any of the south east asian countries, were assisted by clarrie campbell, her employer, who as mentioned earlier had had a long connection with indian activists and was himself, although a member of the labor party, also a close associate of the cpa (hardjono and warner 1995, pp 18-21).19 19 asio tried repeatedly to prove that clarrie was a card carrying cpa member but never succeeded. there is no doubt however that clarrie, who was a member of the alp, had extremely close relationships with the cpa and with communist parties elsewhere. note clarrie’s experience organising an australia india association to raise funds to assist indians through the severe bengal famine of 1943. for communists and non-communists alike in the 1930s and 40s, the possibility of influencing society seemed very real. by 1944, many australians had become aware of the decolonisation process, and had turned to look at how they could become more engaged with their closest neighbours as they became independent of empire. the work around the unions being established in australia by seamen like the indonesians and the indians was highly attractive – the social clubs being run were in parallel to those run 128 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 for australian and american servicemen but had the additional interest of opening up a window onto the new worlds of emerging nations. sylvia mullins and phyllis johnson each described the excitement they felt on meeting people who were in the midst of such dramatic events as decolonisation.20 phyllis laughed about how she was always asking about political figures and parties, while the indian sailors in the social club were mainly trying to practise their english. both women shared warm friendships with many of the indians and indonesians at the same time as they learned about these neighbouring countries. they remembered other young women who came to the indian and the indonesian social club functions for similar reasons – combining political interest and developing friendships. sylvia was one who took an active role, being in the protests beside a dutch ship strike-bound at sydney docks, where she was photographed being drenched by the dutch crew’s fire hose. molly warner became even more directly involved (hardjono and warner 1995, pp 1-41). she moved from helping to set up the new australiaindonesia society, to developing a personal relationship with mohammed bondan, an exdigulist who was active in contacting the new indonesian government, and then herself taking on a role in operating the radio to receive broadcasts from the republican government and writing the press releases to circulate the news. she married bondan and they began a life together which continued when she joined him in indonesia where she remained for the rest of her life. the other major group of australian women, like lotte maramis, became involved with indonesians when the young men exiled in australia when the japanese invaded were invited socially to their family homes. all groups of indonesians, those accidentally caught and those like the ex-digulists who had been brought by the dutch, were eventually able to mix relatively freely with australians in a number of towns and cities all along the eastern seabord, which opened up social and cultural interactions which had not been known in australia for many decades, if at all. lotte fell in love with anton maramis and married him with her family’s support, although she battled much antagonism from the broader australian public she encountered (maramis 2006, pp.5-36). many other young australian women faced strong opposition from families and friends to the decisions they made to marry their indonesian fiancés and return with them to their homes once independence had been 20 phyllis johnson (born 1917), interviewed heather goodall, padstow, nsw, 10 may 2007; sylvia mullins (born 1925) interviewed heather goodall, normanhurst, nsw, 13 mar 2007. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 129 declared. as lingard has documented (2008, pp.237-248), for some of these women the marriages were not successful in such different environments. but for others – and lotte and molly were not alone – these relationships proved strong enough to embrace and flourish in the very different society and cultures they found in indonesia. these relationships generated ongoing networks in those situations where communication continued. molly and lotte, for example, both became journalists who sent news of the newly independent indonesia out to the broader english speaking world, offering another perspective to add to the stories of the exiting dutch but also to the emerging voices of indonesians themselves on the world stage, including women. the third group of women in australia were the indonesian wives and daughters of the political prisoners who had been in boven digul and had been brought to australia by the dutch. lingard has written about siti chamsinah, the daughter of an ex-digulist who lived in mackay, who came to melbourne to train as a nurse. even as young woman in the 1940s, siti made clear her opposition to dutch rule and, as lingard discovered when she met her many years later in indonesia, she had remained a strong-minded and thoughtful woman all her life (lingard 2008, pp.97-98). we do not know what became of the other indonesian women who had been associated with boven digul and returned to the new republic – this remains to be followed up in later research. what is clear is that as women’s organisations took shape after independence in indonesia, they began to look for international networks. in 1950 gerwis was been formed from an amalgamation of six small women’s organisations across java. it had an association with the pki, although not a direct affiliation and it did not always follow pki advice. it was chastised by the pki in 1951, for example, for concerning itself with ‘political’ issues like opposition to the dutch retention of west irian, instead of focussing on the local and everyday concerns of non-elite women. gerwis defied the party by continuing to express this concern and seemed happy to have a distance from the party. internationally, gerwis looked to the widf, (the international federation of democratic women) which had been formed in paris in 1945. the widf became a soviet-aligned body in the turmoil as the cold war took shape, in a way not dissimilar to that of the world federation of trades unions (wftu) which had begun as a british-based global body but, after being abandoned by the anti-communist unions, had ended up aligned to the soviets (lewis 2003). in australia, the body aligned with the widf was the union of australian 130 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 women (uaw) a left leaning organisation which included members of the cpa but was also joined by women of a wide range of other affiliations (curthoys and mcdonald 1966). one of the key members of the uaw was jessie street, who had been also a founding member of the australian indonesian association (hardjono and warner 1995, p.19). the link was made between gerwis and the uaw at least as early as march 1954, when the australian women’s organisation was formally invited to attend the second congress of the indonesian women’s movement (curthoys and mcdonald 1966, pp. 36-7; hindley 1964, pp. 203-5). the widf sent delegates as well and at this meeting, the indonesian organisation changed its name to gerwani to reflect its decision to address the interests of women of all classes, religions and ethnic affiliations. this was a significant step – as tan malaka had pointed out, relations between the left and islamic groups in indonesia were fragile even in 1922 and they had worsened in the 1940s. gerwis – and later gerwani – were opposed to some practices of islam in indonesia, such as polygamy, although not to islam itself wieringa 1993; wieringa 2002; mcgregor and hearmann 2007). the change of name reflected the diverse interests of its expanding membership, encompassing women and children’s health, education and rights in families and marriage as well as world peace and disarmament (hindley 1964; wieringa 1993, 2002). these were consistent with the goals of the widf which stressed education and maternal and child health in all their campaigns. this diversity of interests and affiliations was a hallmark of the uaw as well, despite its orientation to the left. whether there was any personal link between gerwis and the uaw, such as a connection through jessie street, is not clear – indeed it is not yet known whether gerwis contained any of the ex-digul women who had been in australia from 1943 to 1945. the link may rather have been only through the formal structures of the widf. in any event, uaw members attended the conference in indonesia which led to sustained communication such as inviting a formal delegation from gerwani to australia in march 1960 to mark international women’s day (our women 1960). recent research by kate mcgregor shows that through the 1950s, gerwani was taking a similarly activist role on the world stage in the widf as tuk subianto, on behalf of the indonesian dockers and seamen’s union (sbpp), was taking at the wftu. just like the wftu, the widf identified itself as the body which had reached out to the decolonising and non-european world. yet also like the wftu, although there were many countries in africa, asia and south america on the widf membership lists, it was most often the indonesian cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 131 delegations from gerwani which actually attended the conferences around europe and it was the gerwani leaders like mrs mudigno, sudjinah and sulami who wrote to the widf executive with ideas, proposals, reports and motions. the gerwani interventions were aimed at moving the widf concerns away, for example, from those of european social structures to look at the needs of women in decolonising countries, such as indonesian peasant women. consistently gerwani pressed for widf support for decolonisation struggles and it was gerwani delegates who pointed out the importance of the 1953 colombo conference and the 1955 bandung afro-asian conference to the widf executive office in east berlin (mcgregor 2010). the bandung afro-asian conference was of high importance in indonesia, not only for unionists like tuk subianto but across the whole population. it had demonstrated the effectiveness of indonesia’s voice on the world stage as well as opening up the very exciting possibilities of practical cooperation between newly decolonised nations. although the conservative australian government rejected approaches to attend, australian voices were strongly evident. not only were there two australian ‘observers’, but the english language accounts of the conference beamed overseas included the work of two of the australian women, lotte maramis and molly bondan, working as journalists in their new home (hardjono and warner, 1995, pp 102-105; maramis: 2005, pp 183-199). they wrote in very different styles from each other, reflecting their differing political orientations, but each reflected an enthusiasm for the decolonising world which had been so evident in the australia of the 1940s, on all sides of politics, but which had retreated there by this time under the menzies regime. gerwani brought its concerns to australia. representatives of gerwani expressed their goals to the uaw for recognition of women in non-industrial economies and support for the decolonising world during visits in the 1950s and again in 1960. particularly important was roesijati sukardi, a journalist who led a gerwani delegation in 1960 and in the trips the uaw members made to indonesia in 1962 and again in 1964. the general secretary of gerwani, mrs kartinah wrote to the uaw after roesijati sukardi’s visit, returning to the theme of west irian. she suggested that the australian organisation might join gerwani in its opposition to the dutch decision to send troops to west irian (our women 1960, p 3). unlike the seamen’s union in 1958, the uaw was listening to the indonesian argument and agreed with it, beginning from that time to voice its concerns about the west irian question. the 132 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 uaw may have been more responsive because it was not facing the overwhelming challenges being confronted by the sua. nevertheless, the uaw was one of the very few australian organisations which from 1960 supported the indonesian claims to west irian. events in indonesia overtook gerwani. the massacre of pki members and anyone associated with the pki which began in 1965 took a particularly devastating form for gerwani members. the organisation as a whole was said to have been complicit in the initial, alleged coup in which six army generals were abducted and murdered. gerwani members were accused of enacting obscene tortures and of castrating each of the men. not only was this accusation never substantiated, or even pursued in later trials when the women were charged with different offences, but the autopsies on the generals demonstrated there had not been any castration (wieringa 2002). yet the accusations were widely believed.21 the imprisoned gerwani women, after suffering torture and rape, were eventually released, often a decade or more after 1965. but they found that the pornographic defamation of themselves and their organisation was being perpetuated. even after the fall of suharto, when there was a tentative rehabilitation of others who had suffered long jail sentences, the denigration of gerwani continued. the rising influence of islam on indonesian society has been suggested as the reason that gerwani members continue to be distrusted, even by young members of the women’s movement (allard 2009). it has taken huge acts of courage for sudjinah and sulami to publish their memoirs, but even these accounts of torture and false imprisonment have not yet been effective in challenging that distrust.22 the two notable australian women who had been in indonesia were not directly caught up in the 1965 events and neither wrote about it as journalists. lotte maramis and her husband were nationalists who had always been opposed to communism, and they had in any event 21 indonesia: the prison state, 1975, tapol (political prisoner) number 1, 1975, newsletter of the british campaign for the release of indonesian political prisoners; anne pohlman (2004) ‘a fragment of a story: gerwani and tapol experiences’, intersections, issue 10, august, http://wwwsshe.murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue10/pohlman.html, see image, (p12 pohlman): 'women on trial, jakarta’, february 1975, left to right: suharti harsono, sri ambar rukmiati, sudjinah & sulami.'; katherine mcgregor & vannessa hearman, 2007: ‘challenges of political rehabilitation in post-new order indonesia” the case of gerwani (the indonesian women’s movement) in south east asia research, 15(3) pp 355-384; anne pohlman, 2009, ‘vivisection and verification: appadurai’s uncertainty and mutilation during the 1965-66 massacres in indonesia’, conference paper, session 7, killings of 1965, indonesia council conference, 17 july, 2009, university of sydney. 22 mcgregor and hearman, 2007, have analysed the memoirs of sudjinah and sulami and interviewed other gerwani survivors. see wieringa, 2002, pohlman 2004, and mcgregor and hearman 2007 for discussion of continuing attitudes to gerwani. http://wwwsshe.murdoch.edu.au/intersections/issue10_contents.html� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 133 returned to australia before the massacres. molly and her husband were associated with the left but mohamad bondan had refused all party political positions in indonesia since his return in the 1940s, so they were not targets themselves. bondan was given a role in the new public service but, after a polite interval, retired and was soon joined by molly (bondan 1992, p. 285). with a son and stepchildren there, molly must have felt that they were all vulnerable. she undertook low-key roles, editing and translating independently and assisting bondan with his writing, including translating his digest of indonesian newspapers which they hoped would give english-speaking observers a better sense of how indonesian society and its commentators were writing (bondan 1992, p.285; hardjono and warner, p. 145). her only comments about 1965 were oblique, published in the early 1990s and in english, in her book about bondan’s life, spanning a revolution, and in her own writings in love with a nation.23 neither of these books was translated into indonesian till 2008. molly did not mention the women’s movement, but she is quoted in in love with a nation as believing it had been a grave error for the communist party to have become so alienated from the islamic religion in indonesia, a point with which tan malaka would have strongly agreed. she went on sadly: ‘you don’t have to believe in karma to see what the social consequences of that awful millstone of murders and injustices around our necks could be. well, we’ll just have to work through our national karma!’(hardjono and warner 1995, p.142). the writing that lotte maramis and molly bondan did publish has given australians and other english-speaking readers many glimpses they would not otherwise have had of life in indonesia. they could not overcome, however, the chasm that opened up after the violence of 1965 had severed the most active ongoing connections which australian women had with indonesian women. the uaw reported sadly in our women that gerwani had been closed down and this put an end to the mutual visits between the uaw and women’s movement in indonesia (our women, vol.29, p.12). …………….. conclusion returning to compare these ‘southern’ cosmopolitanisms as they frayed apart, there may only be tentative conclusions to draw. 23 spanning a revolution was finished by molly in 1989 but still in press when she died in 1990. the collections of her writings by hardjono and warner were published 1995. 134 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 there are certainly many more questions than conclusions. one question is what became of the indians who were so active in building relationships along the networks both of islam and of shared labour experiences in the 1940s. there seems to have been little indian presence in those 1950s meetings of the wftu in europe where both the australians and the indonesians participated. there was certainly correspondence from ceylon and from a number of smaller, separated areas in india, and it is unlikely that the militant, left-leaning maritime unions in south asia would have been involved with the anti-communist itf. but there appears to have been little contact in the diverse but soviet-aligned networks, like the wftu and the widf, with the major indian seafaring unions which had been so visible in the global scene in the 1940s. nor were there any delegates from newly emerging pakistan, from where so many of the seafarers before 1947 had come and to which they expected to return. another question is whether and how the long-established networks of islam – which had operated to enable some interactions between the mobile indian and indonesian seafaring groups in 1945 – might have sustained such connections in the decades afterwards. the sources used for this investigation, such as communist and trade union archives and oral histories arising from australians, the group least likely to have been aware of the islamic networks, cannot be expected to be offer much useful evidence to answer this question. but it is notable that just posing the comparison with the indian situation demonstrates that the rupture in connections between islam and the political left which occurred in indonesia was not inevitable, no matter how unproblematic it appeared to be to australians. the indian comparison must return our focus to the need for research into the specific conditions which opened up and then perpetuated that breech in indonesia because it did not occur in india. in the interactions we can trace – largely those between australians and indonesians – there seem to have been a useful roles played by the universalist european-origin structures which had been generated by international communism, international trade union networks and the international women’s movement. of the two latter structures the left wing organisations the wftu and the widf – there appears to have been far greater diversity in the international women’s movement and as well to be more flexibility in responding to the perspectives of those from outside any one country. this may reflect the levels of relative power represented by the two groups – the trades unions for example were clearly often bearing the brunt of the policies of national governments, whereas in australia at least, the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 135 women’s movement was not in this position. being marginal to the main power struggles of the day allowed the women’s organisations to respond more rapidly and more innovatively to the perspectives of those international or cross-cultural groups with whom they might be in close touch. yet in the cases where the european structures did offer a useful platform for meeting and communicating, it was always the case that decolonising country delegates like those from indonesia felt the need to challenge these bodies. it was only pressure from the indonesian and delegates from other decolonising nations in both organisations which led them to open up some of their policies and programs to revision. the demands to pay more attention to the needs of non-western and non-urban workers were examples of the ways in which people like tuk subianto and the gerwani delegates could reshape those european-origin networks so they became much more genuinely a place of refuge and support for campaigning ‘southern’ working people. at a personal level, the meetings and conferences of those international structures offered opportunities for people like tuk subianto and eliot v. elliott to stay in touch and to talk over their common ground. the events in each home country – shaped and responding to both external ‘cold war’ pressures but also local dynamics and demands – eventually widened the gap between old comrades. ultimately, rapidly changing economic conditions and then the catastrophic violence of warfare and massacre had severed the last links. however, it is clear that some of these personal bonds in 1945 had proved to be able to withstand the early shocks of independence, partition and electoral defeats. at least for a decade, those bonds – and indeed just the hopes of ongoing communications – had been resilient enough to keep people looking for ways to collaborate. those ‘new worlds’ may not have turned out to be what people had hoped for in 1945, but perhaps the attempts made to keep searching for them have left some legacies. acknowledgments a number of people have contributed to this paper. i would like to thank suzan piper for painstaking translations and thoughtful contributions to research strategies. kate mcgregor and julia martinez have been generous in their advice and suggestions for sources. at heart, a 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(ed.) 2005, beginning to remember: the past in the indonesian present, singapore university press and washington university press, seattle. tracing southern cosmopolitanisms: the intersecting networks of islam, trade unions, gender & communism, 1945-1965 affective dissent stephen healy university of new south wales. ‘there is at least one invariant that means that that the population taken as a whole has one and only one mainspring of action. this is desire…’ (foucault 2007, p. 72). ‘the ability of affect to produce an economic effect more swiftly and surely than economics itself means that affect is a real condition, an intrinsic variable of the late capitalist system, as infrastructural as a factory’ (massumi 2002a, p. 45). ‘the status quo is entrenched not only through a common economic logic, but also a common sensorium, which we neglect to our detriment. neoliberalism entrains us to experience certain emotions over others, suggests rules for their expression, and even tries to define what one is “allowed” to feel for. these everyday flows of feeling—from bodily intensities of relation (affect) to their narrativized accounts (emotion)—habituate us to the cadence of neoliberal subjectivity’ (jensen 2011). abstract this article identifies a form of corporeally enacted affective bio-politics more intimately engrained than that identified in recent work emphasising the affective qualities of activism and labour. while these latter reinforce and bolster existing analyses through highlighting affective concerns, the affective bio-politics identified here suggests that neoliberalism is significantly maintained through, what have generally been, unrecognised affective means. while this affective regulation can only ever be partial and imprecise, its unrecognised, and thus implicitly concealed, character lends it a particular strength and cogency. illuminating the mechanisms through which such affective regulatory modulation is achieved thus has a powerful potential to clarify further opportunities to disrupt and counter neoliberalism. this account juxtaposes an analysis of affective bio-politics with existing analyses of the affective, and performative, dimensions to activist politics, in order to facilitate the identification of specific opportunities for further affective contestationary strategies. much has been written about the affective dimensions of activism and dissent (hynes, sharpe & fagan 2007; hynes, sharpe & greg2008; hynes & sharpe, 2010), of labour (hardt & negri, 2000; 2004) and even of politics more broadly (protevi 2009) although affective bio-politics per se has received only limited attention (but see: anderson 2012). this account endeavours to address this deficit in order to suggest strategies that might be harnessed to counter the affective regulation sustaining neoliberalism, both within and beyond activism. after a brief introduction to the analytic vocabulary employed in this article the rest of this section presents a brief review of recent work addressing the intersection of affect and politics. the subsequent section further 114 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia delineates the specific perspective on affective bio-politics adopted here. this is followed by a discussion of recent accounts of affective politics and activism that informs an ensuing discussion of further, more focused, affective contestationary strategies, which prefaces a short concluding section. affect, as understood here, is distinguished from the, typically, subjectively conceived notions of emotion and feeling, with which it is associated, by its dependence ‘on a sense of push in the world’ (thrift 2004, p. 64).1 this might be the ‘pull and push of place’ (duff 2010, p. 893), or of bodies or of other entities in those places. affect is, thus, relationally constituted and ‘does not reside in an object or a body, but surfaces from somewhere in-between’ (adey 2008, p. 439), emerging ‘as a relation between bodies, objects, and technologies’ (bissell 2010, p. 272). affects, however, affect in the sense of ‘pushing’ such relationships in some directions rather than others and while they may, as brennan (2004) argues, have a biological basis affects are, and have been, widely employed to promote specific outcomes. architecture provides an exemplary example (e.g. allen 2006; adey 2008; kraftl & adey 2008) that kraftl and adey argue can both ‘engender…new fields of virtual potential…[and]…simultaneously delimit, design(ate), and demarcate strict performative and often moral possibilities’ (2008, p. 226). while thrift’s ‘microbiopolitics of the subliminal’ (2004, p. 68) is suggestive of mechanisms that might help explain how the kinds of ‘possibilities’ depicted by kraftl & adey (2008) are accomplished, broader ranging discussions of the dynamics of affective bio-politics are hard to come by. anderson (2012) addresses this lacuna in an analysis that emphasises macro-scale dimensions to affective bio-politics, notably ‘state-phobia’ a term that foucault (2008, p. 76) coins for antistatism while, echoing thrift (2004), remaining optimistic regarding the ‘political and ethical promise’ of ‘work on the dynamics of affective life’ (anderson 2012, p. 29). the author (healy 2012) has, however, problematized this ‘promise’ by arguing that ‘affective life is imbricated in the working out of the neoliberal problem of how to organise life according to the market’ (anderson 2012, p. 40) more thoroughly and intimately than anderson’s emphasis upon macro1 while there is no consensus in the literature, those using the language of emotion commonly concede traditional distinctions between it and ‘rationality’ and privilege cognitive criteria, while those using the language of affect do neither of these things. scholars such as demasio (e.g. 2003) and maturana and varela (e.g. 1992) illuminate the problematic character of traditional thinking, while pile (2010) is illustrative of recent debate regarding these differences. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 115 scale affective phenomena suggests. this more pervasive and intimate perspective on affective bio-politics is further pursued here in order to explore and illuminate its contestationary potential. for while a more ubiquitous perspective on affective bio-politics implies further challenges for contestationary politics, the delineation of these dimensions to neoliberal government also has the potential to illuminate further opportunities, and means, to counter neoliberalism. as a first step to identifying these opportunities, the rest of this opening section briefly surveys recent work on the intersection of affect and politics. among the best-known invocations of the affective character of politics is the notion of affective labour that arose in autonomous marxist critiques of the 1970s and has become an important aspect of hardt and negri’s recent work (2000; 2004). for hardt and negri affective labour is an aspect of immaterial labour focused upon ‘human contact and interaction’ and which they illustrate through the examples of the health services and entertainment industry (2000, p. 292). although they highlight the somatic and corporeal aspects of affect their perspective is quite unlike that adopted here. ruddick (2010) gets to the crux of this difference, succinctly showing how for hardt and negri affect becomes little more than a ‘corporeal motivation, a push and pull factor’ (2010, p. 33) in ‘a neo-leninist determination in which affective labour plays the role of vanguard’ (p. 32). protevi (2009) is far more ambitious, developing a ‘political physiology’ concerned with how ‘bodies, minds and social settings are intricately and intimately linked’ (p. xi). however, while indebted to deleuze and guattari, protevi adopts a cognitive perspective on affect such that, regardless of the complexity and sophistication of his analytic framework, affect is reduced to little more than the emotional content of his case studies (specifically love, rage and fear), far removed from the non-cognitive relational interpretation of affect adopted here. activism provides a major focus of work on the affective dimensions of politics. while some have focused on the emotional and/or affective content of activism (e.g. sullivan 2005), of more relevance here are accounts of the political, and sometimes transformative, impacts of humour, performance and other activist interventions (hynes, sharpe & fagen 2007; hynes, sharpe & greg 2008). indeed this transformative potential has informed and inspired specific forms of activism exemplified by groups such as the ‘yes men’ (hynes, sharpe & fagen 2007), the 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 ‘clown army’,2 and the ‘laboratory of insurrectionary imagination’. much of the flavour of these is caught by the latter that ‘merges art and life, creativity and resistance, proposition and opposition … treat[ing] insurrection as an art and art as a means of preparing for the coming insurrection’.3 while these might simply be conceived in terms of the well-understood power of the performative and, more broadly, affective dimensions of activism,4 mcdonald (2006) argues that ‘experience movements’ of this character are now prevalent and of more fundamental significance. for mcdonald (2006) the corporeally enacted experiential ‘grammars of action’, characteristic of recent activism, signal a rupture with the instrumental logic of the isolated individual so central to neoliberal modernity. the leading green political theorist douglas torgeson echoes this in arguing that a performative style of debate and humour provide the green movement with a powerful means to transform politics as usual (1999). such work, and various of the forms of resistance it informs, and that inform it, highlight the potential of affectively infused forms of activist ‘doing’ (mcdonald 2006) to interrogate, usurp and potentially transform conventional politics. others have investigated the affective registers through which politics as usual operates, the ways these act to maintain and sustain neoliberal subjectivities and behaviours, and the opportunities that might be generated by elucidating these generally unacknowledged affective ecologies. much of this latter work, particularly the perspective on affective bio-politics adopted here, stems from post-structural analyses of affective life that, most typically, derive from a deleuzian reading of spinoza. massumi (2002), thrift (2004) and cultural geographers working in the non-representational tradition (e.g. anderson 2009; 2012; bissell 2010; duff 2010), pioneered by thrift, provide key sources drawn upon here. while it has been long recognized that affective life is political and that power operates in affective registers (e.g. massumi 2002a; thrift 2004), the specifics of affective bio-politics have received only scant attention. anderson (2012) presents a seminal analysis that, building on foucault’s contention that ‘homo economicus…becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environment and 2 http://www.rebelclown.net/clogs/; accessed 29/1/13. see: http://birca.blogspot.com.au/ (accessed 29/1/13), for the down-under offshoot. 3 http://labofii.wordpress.com/; accessed 29/1/13. 4 greenpeace, for example, have long has this down to a fine art with the, commonly consultant produced, campaign report targeting relevant government ministers issued the same day that a dramatic stunt highlighting key campaign arguments hits the evening tv news and, when successful, headlines them. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 117 http://www.rebelclown.net/clogs http://birca.blogspot.com.au/ http://labofii.wordpress.com/ systematically modify its variables’ (2008, p. 271), proposes ‘environmentalities’ as a key mechanism.5 these ‘work through systematic modifications of the ‘environment’ within which an action occurs, rather than directly on the body’s capabilities’ (anderson 2012, p. 39), a notion that will be further explored below. the ‘normative blind spots’ (barnett 2009) that have been identified in this work will also be briefly addressed. affective bio-politics work in the tradition discussed in the latter section above has identified many affective dimensions to politics.6 thrift, for example, notes: ‘the marshalling of aggression through various forms of military trainings’ (2004, p. 64); ‘a mediatisation of politics’ that ‘tends to foreground emotion…concentrat[ing] on key affective sites such as the face or voice’ (p. 65); ‘new forms of calculation in sensory registers,’ involving mapping what bodies can and cannot do gesturally, conversationally and so on, at all physical and temporal scales (pp. 66-67); and ‘the careful design of urban space to produce political response’ (p. 67). while some of these, notably ‘mediatisation’ and ‘new forms of calculation,’ might be regarded as novel, ‘the marshalling of aggression’ and political character of spatial design have long-standing historical antecedents (notwithstanding a clear scale up in the scale and sophistication of such endeavours in recent centuries). similarly, while thrift acknowledges ‘the greater and greater engineering of affect’ over time (2004, p. 64) his focus upon developing a ‘microbiopolitics of the subliminal’ (2004, p. 68), inspired in large part by connolly’s ‘neuropolitics’ (2002), emphasises specifically contemporary manifestations of the ‘engineering of affect’, such as ‘mediatisation,’ rather than other longer standing instances of such ‘engineering.’ it is these latter that are of particular concern here. although anderson’s (2012) aims resonate with those of this account his emphasis upon ‘statephobia,’ briefly discussed above, effectively discounts what may be more fundamental aspects of the ‘engineering of affect’. anderson aims to illuminate how ‘affective relations and capacities are object-targets for discipline, bio-politics, security and environmentality’ (2012, p. 28), and 5 this differs from the natural environment focused usage of this term by, notably, luke (1995) and agrawal (2005) but is used in precisely this sense by massumi (2005, p. 12, n.9) in a translation that foucault (2008, p. 261) renders as ‘environmentalism.’ see also massumi (2009; 2010, p. 68 n. 12). 6 distinct from how others have identified the way emotion/feeling can motivate and/or sustain movements (e.g. gould 2002). 118 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 finds that homo economicus is ‘an ‘object-target’ that actualises and expresses state-phobia’ (38). however, more fundamental affective influences are at work on homo economicus. as anderson notes, homo economicus ‘is always-already an affective subject,’ particularly in terms ‘of desire and disinterested interests’ (2012, p. 38). regarding the latter he notes hirschman’s (1977/1997) pioneering work that showed how ‘the hybrid “interests” were first conceptualised as a counterweight to the destructiveness of passions and the ineffectiveness of reason’ (anderson 2012, p. 38). anderson does not, though, discuss how hirschman went on to note that the outcome of the success of this conceptualization, in the form of contemporary economics,7 was ‘to repress certain human drives and proclivities and to fashion a less multifaceted, less unpredictable, and more “one dimensional” human personality.’ with the result that once ‘capitalism was triumphant and “passions” seemed indeed to be restrained and perhaps even extinguished…the new world seemed to lack nobility, grandeur, mystery, and, above all, passion’ (hirschman 1977/1997, p. 132). in other words, according to hirschman (1977/1997), the regulation of ‘certain human drives and proclivities’ are a key to the establishment and maintenance of homo economicus. the ‘environmentalities’ this required, attuned to achieving the hegemony of ‘a less multifaceted, less unpredictable, and more “one dimensional” human personality’ type, provide a focus for the account below. the author’s analysis of the affective atmosphere of contemporary retail spaces (healy 2012) illuminates the ‘environmentalities’ that homo economicus requires, while mcdonald’s (2006) emphasis on the embodied and experiential character of contemporary activism, further discussed in the ensuing sections, suggests how contemporary activism might provide a rupture with the narrowly instrumental neoliberal personality characteristic of modernity. much of the character of how the hegemony of this personality type is achieved and maintained can be gleaned from mcdonald’s repeated insistence that the focus of much recent social movement theory upon the symbolic mediation of identity, via for example ‘interests’, simply reproduces an out-dated paradigm (2006, pp.211-214). healy (2012) shows how much of the power of this paradigm, in addition to its assimilation in bodies of theory, has rested upon the way it engages 7 hirschman’s (1777/1997) argument is somewhat more nuanced than this with a key finding being that adam smith’s innovation was to conflate ‘the passions and the interests’ via the finding that a desire for material advancement was the predominant factor driving humanity a view that, from this time, became institutionalized in the form of contemporary economics. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 119 affective domains, such as those of the senses, while at the same time denying them explicit legitimacy. this significance of sensate phenomena to neoliberalism is highlighted by the sensibility of physical comfort, which emerged in tandem with the eighteenth century consumer revolution (crowley 2001). this sensibility directly informs the ambient form of thermal comfort generated by air-conditioning that provides a component of the affective engineering of contemporary retail spaces (healy 2012). the affective atmosphere of these spaces facilitates the involuntary, but regulatively enacted, subdual of the auto-affective attention of consumers making them more vulnerable to stimuli specifically designed to encourage shopping. this subliminal affectively mediated mechanism is, thus, a form of sensate, and generally opaque, bio-politics and likely illustrative of ‘environmentalities’ more broadly. the close links between these retail spaces and automobility is highly suggestive of this and underlined by sheller’s observation that automobility is ‘implicated in a deep context of affective and embodied relations between people, machines and spaces of mobility and dwelling, in which emotions and the senses play a key part’ (2004, p. 221). healy (2012) argues that such affectively engineered relationships are likely a pervasive feature of contemporary neo-liberal environments and behaviours. affect and contestationary activism while, as briefly outlined above, much work in this area has focused upon the affective, performative, humorous and/or experiential content of activism, a variety of recent work has started to interrogate the dynamics of these and how they may intersect, or be brought into intersection, with the affective dynamics of capitalism. hynes & sharpe (2010), focusing on the anti-globalisation movement, suggest that understanding the movement ‘at the level of ideals and ideology’ (2009, p. 1) overlooks the affective dimensions to these protests and, following spinoza, caution that ‘[b]y assuming ourselves to be masters of our bodies and their passions, knowledge of the real order of causes eludes us’ (2009, p. 7). they highlight spinoza’s distinction between affectio (affection) that describes a determinable state at a particular moment and affectus (affect), which describes a passage between states, and the related increase or decrease in the ability of the bodies thus affected to act. this leads them to emphasise how the corporeal reality of protest can give substance to the potential of an alternative politics through 120 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 reflecting and expressing alternative ideals rather than simply enunciating pre-existing ones. however, while hynes & sharpe (2010) underline the potential of protest to engender positive affects they say little about how such an affective politics might engage the more ‘infrastructural’ ways affective forces are harnessed to support and maintain neoliberalism (massumi 2002a, p. 45). mcmanus (2011) sets out from a recognition of ‘the pervasiveness of the ways in which contemporary politics mobilizes, assembles (and dissembles) affective states into anticipatory and agential formations’ to develop a ‘critical understanding of the dynamics of affective politics generally, and of hope and fear in particular.’ emphasising the agential capacity of affect she sets out to identify ‘manoeuvres of affective ambivalence; that is to say…the ways affects can orient or dispose very different agential possibilities’. she finds that ‘[o]ne way of restructuring fearaffect…is by intervening in the feedback loops through which fear is stabilized. this might involve turning the technologies that are central to the production of fear against themselves: when protesters use surveillance technologies against police, for instance’. or, as she later restates, ‘the human and non-human technologies through which fear-affects circulate can be restructured, made to resonate differently’, a matter further explored in the following section. ultimately, though, her emphasis upon illuminating ‘“wriggle room” against forms of affective determinism’ (massumi 2002b, p. 214) while also, perhaps somewhat incongruously, highlighting the autonomy of affect (massumi 2002a), constrain her to a focus upon strategies of ambivalence and indeterminacy. she does, however, further suggest that ‘visceral experimentation with our everyday sensorium can have effects upon the “tone” of the age,’ a matter taken up by jensen below and that, in the following section, i will argue, points to various, generally overlooked, means of countering ‘infrastructural’ affective influences. jensen points to how the sensorium erected by neoliberalism helps entrench the status quo through ‘entrain[ing] us to experience certain emotions over others, suggest[ing] rules for their expression, and even tr[ying] to define what one is “allowed” to feel for…habituat[ing] us to the cadence of neoliberal subjectivity’ (2011). he specifically cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 121 ‘advance[s] the common sensorium as a name and frame for exploring how the animating forces of affect and emotion are collectively configured to achieve…normalizing structures…in which cultures reproduce themselves by encouraging the experience of particular emotions in particular ways, sanctioning certain expressions of those emotions while disciplining others’ (http://timjensen.net/2012/06/dissertation/; accessed 5/1/13). he is also sensitive, echoing a key argument of this account, to how: ‘tactics that leverage the features and formations of existing terrain to their advantage can be applied to the emotional and affective terrain created by neoliberalism’ (jensen 2011). jensen, however, and perhaps reflecting the constraints inherent in his emphasis upon emotion, primarily limits his analysis to matters of rhetoric and discourse. sensoria, though, as the author demonstrates through the example of contemporary retail environments (healy 2012), also involve a: ‘material grammar of the encounter of bodies, that traverse and transform those bodies, and galvanize and energize (or ‘diminish’) the subject’s capacity for acting within its world’ (mcmanus 2011). this ‘material grammar’ reading of how contemporary sensoria, such as malls, ‘habituate us to the cadence of neoliberal subjectivity’. jensen (2011) suggests potential interventions to reframe and reconstitute neoliberal subjectivities and behaviours. in addition mcdonald (2006) identifies new ‘grammars of experience and action’ in contemporary activism that challenge the impoverished neoliberal circumscription of ‘certain human drives and proclivities’ (hirschman 1977/1997, p. 132). so ‘[t]actics that lever…the emotional and affective terrain created by neoliberalism’ (jensen 2011) might draw upon both ‘material grammars’ involving many other than human things, such as air conditioning systems (healy 2010; 2012), and the new ‘grammars of experience and action’ at work in contemporary activism (mcdonald 2006). some of the potential avenues for affective dissent these suggest are explored below. 122 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 http://timjensen.net/2012/06/dissertation/ further avenues for affective dissent while the ‘emotional and affective terrain’ of neoliberalism remains relatively poorly understood some indication of potential further avenues for dissent can be gleaned from examining some more unusual, and emergent, avenues explored to date. the ‘yes men’8 strategy of impersonating spokespeople for corporations and a variety of other mainstream neoliberal organisations at high profile meetings, usually to throw light on their politics through tactics such as reversing policy platforms, is a good example. many analogous forms of, what are commonly labelled ‘culture jamming’, similarly utilize satire and irony to play up the ethically and politically dubious content of, in particular, media culture and advertising. other groups, such as ‘reclaim the streets’,9 apply an analogous logic to specific targets, in this case automobility. notable, in recent years has been the emergence of a range of civil society groups, very much in response to a perception that politics as usual, both mainstream and oppositional, is proving inadequate for purpose, commonly motivated by environmental challenges. the transitions towns movement10 provides an excellent large-scale coordinated example, with the parallel proliferation of local climate action groups11 a good illustration of the grass roots demand for such initiatives. more broadly, the recent exponential, and incredibly rapid, spread of ‘occupy’ movement mobilisations12 illustrates the depth of appetite for fundamental change. another indication of both this ‘appetite’ and disillusionment with existing avenues and means for change is the way the artistic community is increasingly engaging with political alternatives. while many simply echo existing discourses, such as ‘sustainability,’ others are bringing an artistic sensibility to bear on alternatives because, for example, they ‘have stopped believing the stories our civilisation tells itself’ (http://dark-mountain.net/about/faqs/; accessed 12/2/13). while exceedingly diverse, the examples given above tend to diverge from more traditional activism in terms of the means, methods and/or sites through which they express and/or accomplish dissent. generally more focused by process and means, and on giving substance to an alternative politics, they target: neoliberal institutions directly (i.e. the ‘yes men’); 8 http://theyesmen.org/. the idea of using this as a basis for identifying further contestationary opportunities is the inspiration for: http://yeslab.org/. 9 http://criticalmass.wikia.com/wiki/reclaim_the_streets 10 http://www.transitionnetwork.org/ 11 http://www.climatemovement.org.au/groups/ 12 http://www.occupytogether.org/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 123 http://dark-mountain.net/about/faqs http://theyesmen.org/ http://yeslab.org/ http://criticalmass.wikia.com/wiki/reclaim_the_streets http://www.transitionnetwork.org/ http://www.climatemovement.org.au/groups/ http://www.occupytogether.org/ unaddressed challenges (i.e. climate change); political inertia (i.e. the occupy movement); the stories through which neoliberalism sustains itself (i.e. that we are homo economici); neoliberal ‘forms of life’ such as automobility, and even the home,13 among other things. before examining what an engagement with affective bio-politics might add, it is important to underline that this heterogeneity echoes further recent conceptual developments. although traditionally many activists have commonly conceived their purpose as being to counter an all-embracing, totalising capitalism whose logic is global in both character and extent (e.g. the ‘multitude’ contesting ‘empire’), others have argued for ‘neoliberalism as exception’ (and exceptions to neoliberalism) (ong 2006). ong’s anthropological study (2006) underlines that neoliberal power rests on its flexibility and ability to hybridise and adopt to ‘political settings as varied as postcolonialism, authoritarianism and postsocialism…migrat[ing] from site to site, interacting with various assemblages that cannot be analytically reduced to cases of a uniform global condition of “neoliberalism” writ large’ (2006, p. 14). her focus upon east asia illuminates a range of sites and means that, rather than manifesting a unitary neoliberalism witnessed primarily in a limited number of predictable locations such as banks and corporations, involves a variety of neoliberal logics and governing mechanisms across a wide range of settings, commonly quite unpredictably. ong’s (2006) work might, thus, be understood to suggest that activism should extend its horizons beyond the most evident sites of ‘“neoliberalism” writ large’ to the further sites and means in, and through which, neoliberalism is manifest. as outlined above the circumscribed subjectivity underpinning neoliberalism and the ‘environmentalities’ supporting it provide one such site and are suggestive of means. mcdonald (2006) underlines that the experiential ‘grammars of action’ he identifies at work in contemporary activism are precisely such a ‘means’. his emphasis on the centrality of sense, sensation and embodied experience in contemporary activism underscores both how these disrupt circumscribed neoliberal subjectivity, with its emphasis upon an instrumental individualism opaque to the life of the senses, and point toward new forms of sociality. this occurs through the ‘communicative construction of personal experience’ (2006, p. 107) that 13 see, for example: http://www.twoaddthree.org/; accessed 25/6/13. 124 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 http://www.twoaddthree.org/ values vulnerability to others and builds relationships through ‘embodied intersubjectivity’ (p. 215). while mcdonald points to many other important aspects to these ‘grammars of action,’ such as an altered bodily ‘experience of time’ (p. 217), perhaps of greatest significance is how the ‘ways of being in the world’ that he suggests are manifest in contemporary activism might be understood to prefigure an alternate world. while some suggest a key challenge is to develop ‘new stories’ better suited to our times (http://dark-mountain.net/about/faqs/; accessed 20/6/13) this emphasis on language and representation risks reproducing the logocentric disregard for embodiment and the senses so central to neoliberal modernity. in this respect mcdonald’s (2006) portrayal of contemporary movements as articulating ‘ways of being in the world’ that counter various of modernity’s pathologies might be understood to articulate a ‘counter-story’ using an experiential/corporeal vocabulary illustrative of the substance of the story enunciated. while mcdonald (2006) focuses upon movements, other sites for dissent such as domestic mundanities (see footnote 13) and shopping14 have started to gain activist attention with the way ‘material grammars’ might inform contestationary strategies. this is particularly marked in architecture where a variety of recent work has started to engage the affective and bio-political dimensions of architecture (e.g. hauptman & neidich 2010). wallenstein’s biopolitics and the emergence of modern architecture (2009) is the most explicit.15 building, most notably, on foucault’s limited work on architecture wallenstein argues that the purpose of contemporary architecture is ‘to persuade, to prefigure, and to become a project in the sense of pro-jecting that which does not exist, above all a body that senses and feels’ (2009, p. 24). focusing on hospitals he argues in a conventional foucauldian vein that: ‘[r]elations of power and knowledge inform techniques of normalisation, and…produce subjects and objects through the infinite modelling that today extends into the smallest fibers of our bodies and desires’ (2009, p. 38). he is also at pains, however, to underline, echoing healy’s (2012) contention regarding the design of shopping spaces: 14 for example: http://www.revbilly.com/; accessed 25/6/13. 15 sven-olov wallenstein, wrote the framing chapter for hauptman and neidich (2010). see his website (http://webappl.sh.se/p3/ext/content.nsf/aget?openagent&key=sh_personal_profil_en_940305; accessed 14/2/13) for further information. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 125 http://dark-mountain.net/about/faqs/ http://www.revbilly.com/ http://webappl.sh.se/p3/ext/content.nsf/aget?openagent&key=sh_personal_profil_en_940305 ‘that the space they create is also an openness, a multiplicity that contains an equally infinite capacity for resistance and transformation, and for the actualisation of other spaces and subjects’ (2009, p. 38). architecture and design are thus important sites at which the ‘material grammars’ involved in affective bio-politics might be engaged. while these have long been recognised to have political content,16 the emphasis of this account on affective bio-politics enacted via sensoria gives a quite different take on that politics, underlining that, in addition to explicit considerations such as inclusion and exclusion, it is vital to consider how they shape subjectivities and behaviours. finally it is important to address what these observations might offer critics of affective biopolitics of the form adduced here. barnett (2008) argues that theories articulating the idea that ‘a normatively charged threat of harm or injustice’ results from subjectification by affective means present the problem of how their normative basis can be judged or ‘what reconfigured understanding of criteria might help in this task’ (barnett 2008, p. 198). the account given above suggests a number of such criteria and understandings. mcdonald’s (2006) emphasis on the experiential, rather than more narrowly cognitive, basis of individual subjectivity and experience of others is a powerful place to start. in the case of the movements, mcdonald (2006) focuses on the normative basis for action arising from intersubjective interaction and the understandings that arise from this. this account has also suggested that one such ‘understanding’ would be to identify particular ‘environmentalities,’ such as by delineating the sensoria such as shopping malls in which they are manifest, and then, on that basis, developing alternative design principles (healy 2012) to those currently operative. these would be subject to democratic oversight in the way other normatively infused proposals usually are. conclusions while a variety of recent work examines the affective dimensions to, and content of, politics and activism little of this has explored affective bio-politics. while others (anderson 2012) have argued that there are significant affective bio-political dimensions to contemporary neoliberalism this account, building on this author’s previous work (healy 2012), has underlined further, 16 winston churchill remarked "[we] shape our dwellings, and afterwards our dwellings shape us" in 1924 (http://www.drmardy.com/chiasmus/masters/churchill.shtml; accessed 18/2/13). 126 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 http://www.drmardy.com/chiasmus/masters/churchill.shtml intimate micro-scale dimensions to such politics. hirschman’s (1977/1997) seminal observations regarding the affectively impoverished character of homo economicus provide the basis for the contention that neoliberalism specifically engineers circumstances, such as those of shopping, to lever off of this character (healy 2012). this argument highlights two key means of contesting neoliberalism. firstly, the experientially oriented ‘grammars of action’ that mcdonald (2006) detects at work in contemporary movements, which directly address the affectively impoverished character of predominant subjectivities and secondly, the sites at which specific environmentalities, such as those associated with shopping, play out. the latter circumstances are being targeted via the ‘material grammars’ (mcmanus 2011) constitutive of them. none of this is straightforward, however, having to contend with neoliberalism’s proven flexibility and ability to incorporate, what were once, alternatives. as wallenstein remarks regarding architecture such means: ‘have to come to terms with the control society’s dispersive spatialisation…with the forms of subjectification that this spatialisation makes possible…[and]…will always run the risk of prematurely providing an answer before the full weight of the question can be felt’ (2009, pp. 40-41). wallenstein’s remarks underline that, in many ways, such ‘answers’ are perhaps as much matters of a fundamental cultural project as they are of activism. the sensoria of neoliberalism are the way they are not only because of the forces of capital writ large in corporations, banks and governments, but also because they are manifest in design schools, architectural protocols and the generally taken-for-granted legitimacy of neoliberal imaginaries. in many ways this might be the power of the experiential ‘grammars of action’ (2006) mcdonald detects in contemporary movements. that is that they both demonstrate and instantiate ways of being in the world fundamentally different from, and at odds with, the ‘ways’ by which the status quo maintains and sustains itself. of interest, perhaps, here is a widely remarked upswing in societal interest in bodily practices (e.g. thrift 2000), which suggest a potential broader civil interest in analogous ‘grammars.’ whether the case or not, addressing the durability of neoliberalism probably requires that its long-standing ability to colonise the heterogeneity of life, including affective life, requires heterogeneous cross-domain strategies. here, perhaps, lie some further opportunities. the conjunction of emergent interest in sense, sensibility and embodiment detectable across cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 127 domains as diverse as activism (mcdonald 2006), architecture, broader 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http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia a theoretical model of social impact jenny onyx1 university of technology, sydney abstract this paper constructs a theoretical model of social impact as it applies to civil society organisations. it does so by drawing on the social ontology defined by practice theory. this approach begins with what is understood within current organisational practices. it then assesses a practice approach against the recent literature on impact and evaluation. this is followed by an exploration of the capitals, notably social, human and cultural capital and their interrelationships, as a theoretical base for the explication of social impact. a formal model of social impact is finally identified together with a set of basic propositions that may collectively be said to define social impact. finally the implications of the model are discussed for social policy and organisational management. . defining the scope of the paper while much is talked about concerning social impact, and policy papers stress its importance, there is in fact considerable confusion about what it is, and how it relates to wider issues of community cohesion and wellbeing. this paper attempts to structure a theoretical model of social impact, to construct a conceptual frame which may then be useful in determining not only what it is, but how it might then be measured within a community context. this paper focuses specifically on grassroots, community-based nonprofits such as sporting clubs, service organisations, youth organisations, church-based clubs, community arts organisations. the question that needs answering is ‘what is the social impact of these organisations on their local community, and on civil society more broadly’? the question goes beyond any particular program or project of the organisation in question, but is concerned with the impact of the whole organisation. the paper takes a radically different starting point from that normally adopted for considering social impact. the initial starting point is a reflection on my observations of a wide set of 1 i acknowledge the contribution to this project of all members of the research team: melissa edwards, simon darcy, paul bullen, hazel maxwell 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 community practices over many years. in doing so, i draw on practice theory. as identified by schatzki, practice theory draws on a different social ontology, in which ‘the social is a field of embodied, materially interwoven practices’ (2001, p. 12). practices are conceived as ‘embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity centrally organized around shared practical understanding’ (2001, p. 11). they are thus collective activities which are not determined either by the individual working alone, nor by the social structures within which they are located, but rather by the social interaction of agents seeking meaning and common purposes within these constraints. again, following schatzki, a theory refers to a general and abstract account of a field of practices. as applied to this case, i therefore attempt to develop a general account of a field of practice relating to the social impact of the arrays of human activity located within community-based organisations. while this project draws on various aspects of the existing literature, it is not specifically derived from the literature, but rests strongly on empirical observations, both from formally constituted research and from personal observations and discussions. however the intent is to develop a conceptual model that goes beyond any specific empirical case and that may provide a more general template for future research. the practical impetus to this project is the need, commonly expressed by policy makers and managers, to understand what kind of social impact the organisation has in society at large and for its specific constituencies. it is important to know whether the organisation as a whole is making a difference to the social life of the community, and, if so, what kind of difference. sometimes it is important to know what kind of economic impact the organisation is making. however, more often what is required is an understanding of the social contribution made by civil society organisations. social impact is: illusive, partly because it does not lend itself readily to a monetary analysis; qualitative rather than quantitative; long term rather than short term; diffuse and multi layered rather than specific and focused; and probably means different things in different contexts. therefore, a prior step in the measurement of social impact is the development of a useful conceptual framework, one that permits a clear identification of the crucial components of social impact within community-based civil society organisations. it should then be possible to construct more formal and reliable measures of social impact. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 3 this paper therefore begins by presenting the core aspects of a proposed conceptual model as drawn from an understanding of prevailing practices within civil society organisations. the paper then goes on to explore the concept of social impact as variously used in the literature. in particular, two literatures are deemed relevant, though neither could be seen as sufficient in accounting for social impact. the first is the conventional literature on evaluation and impact. the second is the emerging literature on social capital within community-based organisations. the paper concludes with a series of propositions which may then be the basis of future empirical work. an outline of the model it is possible to begin by positing a number of basic principles of social impact, as drawn from my understanding of the current practices of community-based organisations. for purposes of illustration, the example of the rural fire service (rfs) in nsw will be used. the epistemological justification for this approach also lies within practice theory, or at least the phenomenological branch of that theory. i seek to uncover those principles of action that organise this field of activity both temporally and spatially. as articulated by schatzki, these arrays of human activity are centrally organised around shared practical understanding. they are socially constructed with a shared meaning around what people within a community organisation do collectively, and around what they say about what they do. it also follows, that as a social researcher engaged in some kind of ethno-methodology, i am also engaged in the intersubjective construction of meaning. i have done so through a reflexive and recursive interrogation of both informal, incidental observation such as that pertaining to the rfs, but also many thousands of conversations with community participants over many years. that process of reflexive interrogation has then led to several major research projects involving community-based organisation in australia and around the world, again with recursive analysis of the results within teams of researchers (onyx, kenny and brown 2011; onyx and leonard 2011; edwards, onyx, maxwell and darcy 2012). this process was at all times informed by a general interrogation of potentially relevant literature. however, the articulation of what i believe to be the central principles of action within this field is ultimately my own synthesis and goes beyond any single empirical analysis or research project. some of the core organising principles of this developing field of knowledge can be articulated as follows: 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 (a) social impact refers to wider social effects beyond the immediate program objectives of an organisation and beyond any short term effects. (b) it refers to effects on the wider community of the organisation as a whole over an extended time period, and includes intended and unintended or spillover effects. (c) it includes material benefits but more importantly impacts of social cohesion (or disintegration) and levels of wellbeing within the community (productivity commission 2010). social impact begins at the immediate and local level. it ultimately depends on the creation of a warm and welcoming culture within the local organisation such that new members feel valued and ‘part of the family’. during the recent bush fires in sydney [october 2013], the media was interested in why so many volunteers were willing to face danger and discomfort to battle the fires. many volunteers responded that in joining the rural fire service, they felt valued and supported, as part of a wider family. an international survey of many thousands of members of community organisations found that one of the key reasons for joining an organisation was its welcoming culture (onyx, kenny, and brown, 2011). a recently completed analysis of surf life-saving organisations found the same thing (edwards et al. 2012; onyx et al. 2012). to the extent that new members of an organisation feel welcomed and valued, they are likely to develop shared values and a commitment to the purpose of the organisation and to other members of the organisation. in particular they are likely to develop a sense of reciprocity, which is of giving as well as receiving the benefits that the organisation provides. to the extent that the particular organisation is embedded within a local community, then the individual members as well as the organisation as a whole will develop a commitment to supporting the whole community. this commitment may be recognised as a strong sense of citizenship. through the activities of the organisation, the members develop a variety of new skills. these new skills include those specific to the organisational mission, such as fire fighting. but they will also include more intangible skills such as leadership, team work, perhaps personal development skills like time management. members will also develop new networks which provide a wider source of information, knowledge and advice. new skills and knowledge will be both received and shared with others. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 5 finally, to the extent that all the above is achieved through organisational practices, then there will be a wider contribution into the surrounding community. in the case of rfs, the contribution is tangible as lives and property is saved. but it also serves to knit the wider community together, especially during times of stress. the recent fires gave many examples of the whole community coming together to assist the fire fighters with food and drink, to acknowledge the fire fighters’ achievements, to celebrate the communities’ survival. the local fire service is invariably invited to be part of any community celebration, including for example a ‘santa truck’ at christmas. social impact refers both to the impact as experienced and provided by individuals, but also that of the organisation as an organisation, independently of any single member. the strength and sustainability of the social impact of an organisation will depend in part on the extent to which it is embedded within the host community, at both individual and organisational level. this, in part also depends on the reputation accrued to the organisation and its members. again the rfs provides a good illustration of this. in the blue mountains, every small community includes a bush fire brigade, and local residents regularly contribute time and resources to its maintenance. collectively, the rfs has enormous prestige, with its members celebrated as local heroes and formally acknowledged in periodic parades and civic receptions. social impact is thus seen as a complex, developmental process, one that is important for both the individual and the organisation. much of it concerns the development and enactment of social relationships, both for the overt intention of achieving the organisation’s mission, but more importantly for the development and enactment of community for itself. many of the individual and organisational benefits arise from this more subtle level of social enactment. this view is quite different from that normally provided within the literature on evaluation. it is to that literature that i now turn. evaluation and impact impact is often confused with evaluation. while evaluation has become a growing industry, there remains much confusion concerning exactly what evaluation does or should measure, and how these measures relate to impact, if at all. for example, an empirical study of some 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 178 community organisations in new york state, found that evaluation activities were very limited. while almost all organisations reported some form of regular evaluation, this was mostly in the form of accountability to funders and directors, and was perceived as a form of accountability or quality control rather than actual evaluation. very few organisations adopted any form of systematic social impact measurement tool such as “logic models” (17%) or “balanced scorecard” (3%) (carman 2007). similarly, a study of 237 nonprofits in chicago found that while the majority of organisations could identify outcomes, including long term outcomes that they expected to achieve, only about half had any means of assessing these (thomson 2010). the logic model of evaluation for an organisation and its programs provides one way of distinguishing between evaluation of short term outputs or outcomes from more far reaching impact. within the logic model of evaluation, a distinction is made between the different levels of evaluation as indicated in figure 1 below (arvidson 2009; ebrahim and rangan 2010; maas and liket 2011; productivity commission 2010). figure 1 the logic model of evaluation inputs activities outputs outcomes impacts what goes in, resources what happens, program implementation specific, immediate and countable products of the program benefits of the program as identified in the program objectives sustained, significant change in effects in the wider environment beyond the immediate boundaries according to the logic model of evaluation, there are several distinct stages of the process of the organisations programs, and therefore of the evaluation of these programs. inputs refer to the resources provided for the program, both material and human. activities refer to the implementation of the program. outputs are specific, immediate and countable products of the program while outcomes refer to the benefits of the program for the intended beneficiaries, as identified in the program objectives. these are sometimes expressed in terms of a hierarchy of outcomes moving from more specific to more general. impacts within the logic model relate to all changes in the wider environment, the community at large, that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 7 occur as a result of the program whether intended or unintended, positive or negative, short term and long term. impacts usually refer to effects beyond the immediate boundaries of the organisation and its programs (zappalà and lyons 2009; arvidson 2009). most evaluations are concerned with second generation level evaluation (guba and lincoln, 1986), that is, measuring performance against program objectives, without consideration of the wider ramifications of the program. the majority of evaluations are limited to measures of outputs and lower order outcomes (thomson 2010; ebrahim and rangan 2010). they focus on specific programs and not the organisation as a whole. these evaluations are evidence-based attempts to assess outcomes against intended objectives of the program, without any concerns for examining the wider implications of these, even where the wider impact is the ultimate goal of the program in question. applying these ideas to the proposed model of social impact, the definition of social impact provided within the logic model is consistent and appropriate, that is we are concerned with understanding sustained, significant change in effects in the wider environment beyond the immediate boundaries of the organisation’s programmes. however as used within program logic, impact is normally regarded as an extension of the formal objectives of the organisation’s program, and is thus limited to the same parameters of objective outcomes. so for rfs, impact measures would be limited to the wider extent of lives and property saved, and perhaps to wider effects on the economy and on bush regeneration. the broader intangible social effects on members and the community are rarely considered. they are what may be termed “spill-over” effects (productivity commission 2010). these are effects that may be unintended, and are not specified in the statement of organisational objectives. they are effects that are produced outside the planned intervention, either directly or indirectly as a result of the intervention. in accounting terms they are externalities, and as such not measured. they may however be very important in terms of wider impact of organisational activities on the wider community, with potential positive and negative wider implications. more recently there have been attempts to develop a framework of evaluation that can be used across the sector, that provides a clear and consistent approach and that can potentially measure effects beyond the immediate outputs (maas and liket 2011). of these, the social return on investment (sroi) is gaining considerable attention in the uk and australia. it is essentially a monetising exercise, identifying a dollar value for each nominated activity or 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 event to put in the ratio equation of investment against return. this leaves open the question of identifying the key variables to include in the equation, and the appropriate dollar value to impute to each variable. any variable that cannot be readily given an attributed value is simply omitted from the equation. perhaps more seriously, the use of sroi and similar monetised evaluation frameworks reduces organisational performance to financial values at the expense of the human and mission-based values of the service provided (zappalà and lyons 2009; arvidson 2009; mook, richmond and quarter 2003; ebrahim and rangan 2010). a second problem with techniques such as sroi lies with the identification of causality. sustained significant social change, such as increased community wellbeing, is complex and likely to be the result of multiple and unrelated causal factors and influences. while the actions of the organisation may contribute to these benefits, it is impossible to establish how much of these benefits would have happened anyway, from other causes, for example changing economic circumstances that reduce poverty quite apart from the action of the organisation. there are good reasons for this; the further removed the effect is from the intervention, the harder it is to obtain reliable measures and the greater the likelihood that the effect will be produced by a number of other factors, outside the control of the organisation. while evaluation methods are useful in measuring the outcomes of specific programs, they do not address wider effects beyond program objectives. most importantly, they are invariably limited to formal and ‘objective’ measures of material events. they are not concerned with such immaterial practices as a welcoming organisational culture, the development of broader citizenship values, or a commitment to supporting the wider community. thus while these formal accountability measures may be a useful form of evaluation at one level, they go nowhere near an assessment of the deeper value and therefore wider social impact of the organisation as a whole. social capital and impact a more useful literature for assessing the intangible contribution of community organisational practices concerns the use of the concept of social capital. the literature on social capital does not attempt to specifically address issues of impact except at the broadest macro level. nonetheless there are potentially a number of important insights arising from it. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 9 social capital is an essential ingredient in community cohesion and well-being. studies indicate that regions and groups measuring high in social capital also have a variety of positive outcomes, beyond economic advantage, such as improved health and well-being, reduced levels of crime and better educational outcomes (putnam 2000; halpern 2005; onyx and bullen 2000). social capital was defined by putnam (1993, p. 167) as ‘those features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions’. for him, and others following this approach, social capital is a basic resource that is used to maintain and enhance community cohesion and collective action in promoting community-wide civic health. in other words it focuses on the productive aspect of social capital when people are able to work cooperatively and collaboratively. bourdieu on the other hand defined the social capital as ‘the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition (bourdieu and wacquant 1992, p. 119). for bourdieu, social capital was a core strategy in the struggle for dominance within a social field. his focus was not on collaborative action but on the struggle for power and wealth, and in particular the strategies adopted by elite groups to maintain their relative advantage. other scholars have adopted a middle ground, that is acknowledging the capacity of social capital to be both a productive resource, but also a strategy used by marginal groups in their struggle for economic survival and human rights (woolcock and narayan 2001; halpern 2005; onyx, edwards and bullen 2007). despite these different approaches, there is a growing consensus that social capital must be defined in terms of networks that are durable and mutual with norms and sanctions to enforce their interactions. there is also agreement that social capital is a complex multilayered concept with several components, though scholars disagree as to which other elements are core and which peripheral to its definition. in particular one point of discussion concerns the centrality of trust. for some it is critical (fukuyama 1995; putnam 1993; schneider 2009), for others simply a fortunate side effect (portes 1998; woolcock 2001; schuller 2001). other scholars have emphasised different core elements of social capital, elements such as 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 reciprocity (putnam 1993) and social agency (leonard and onyx 2004). agency refers to the capacity to take the initiative, to be proactive. most discussions of social capital distinguish between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital (woolcock and narayan 2001; putnam 2000). bonding social capital is usually characterised as having dense, multi-functional ties and strong but localised trust. it is essential for a sense of personal identity, support and belonging. however, to the extent that it creates narrow, intolerant communities, it can be oppressive even to those who otherwise benefit. bridging is more complex. bridging, as the name implies, is about reaching beyond these immediate networks of family and friends. bridging is important for personal and community development (woolcott and narayan 2001). bridging can be used in at least three different ways: to cross demographic divides, notably ethnic divides; to bridge structural holes between networks; and to access information and resources outside the community in question. however as schneider (2009) and others (eg leonard and onyx 2004) have argued, bridging is not simply a matter of weak or transient ties, but of more formal ties which also require the development of trust over time. evidence is increasingly making clear that both bonding and bridging are essential resources for individual and collective wellbeing (putnam 2000; leonard and onyx 2004; edwards and onyx 2007; schneider 2009). as applied to the proposed model of social impact, social capital is consistent with practice theory. social capital in all its forms clearly refers to consistent and coherent embodied and materially mediated arrays of human activity that are centrally organised around shared practical understanding of their meaning (schatzki 2001). both bonding social capital and bridging are relevant and important. bonding concerns the development of close, mutually supportive social relations within the organisation, and thus provides the basis for the development of members’ commitment to the organisation. bridging suggests the benefits gained from the development of networks beyond the individual’s initial set of family and friends, first within the organisation, then beyond it. the interaction of the capitals one of the most significant contributions of bourdieu was his broader sociological analysis of the role of capital. he argues that there are a number of different capitals, all of which are cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 11 linked and under some circumstances can be converted into other forms of capital. for example he argues: capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital made up of social obligations (connections) which is convertible in certain conditions, into economic capital (bourdieu 1986, p242). bourdieu later added the concept of ‘symbolic capital’ which alludes to the power of prestige or reputation when economic or cultural capital is recognised and acknowledged by others. he also defines cultural capital as having several subspecies, notably embodied cultural capital, objectified cultural capital and institutionalised cultural capital. embodied cultural capital refers to long-lasting personal dispositions such as ethnicity, religion, family background, linguistic codes. objectified cultural capital refers to the value and power of cultural products. institutional cultural capital refers mainly to educational qualifications as formally recognised (bourdieu 1986). the importance of cultural capital in the creation of social impact has been highlighted within another discipline, that of social psychology, by latané and his colleagues. they define culture as ‘the entire set of socially transmitted beliefs, values and practices that characterize a given society at a given time’ (latané 1996, p. 13). he proposes a dynamic theory of social impact to account for how coherent cultural patterns emerge out of a self-organising complex system of individual networks. bourdieu in his analysis privileges economic capital as the primary source of wealth and power; other capitals are primarily useful in so far as they may be ultimately convertible into economic capital. however other scholars are more interested in the interdependencies between capitals for their own sake. of particular relevance here is the link between social capital and human capital. human capital resembles bourdieu’s institutional cultural capital and is defined by the oecd for example as encompassing skills, competences and qualifications (schuller 2007). schuller argues that the value of social capital depends in large measure on its linkage to other capitals, especially human capital, just as human capital requires access to social capital in order to actualise its potential. both are important ends in themselves but each is enhanced by the presence of the other capital. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 while the literature on social capital does not address the issue of social impact directly, it has direct relevance to the model here proposed. the implication of this discussion is that social impact must be conceptually linked to the generation of social capital, but it is likely to be more than that. in formal terms, social impact will refer to the generation of increased (or decreased) levels of social, cultural and human capital within the constituent communities in which an organisation operates. the generation of these capitals, as emphasised by bourdieu and others, is seen as an ongoing process within the communities in question, one dependent on the complex set of relationships. that is, we are not examining an extant “stock” of capital, but an ongoing process of generation. the individual vs the organisation a recurring debate within the literature is the extent to which social capital adheres to the organisation or to the network. putman sees social capital as a collective resource, located in the social networks which are potentially open to all. bourdieu was concerned with the advantages individuals gain from social capital resources, but he nonetheless recognised that social capital was generated within durable social networks. more recently, some economists have attempted to identify social capital as an individual possession, to be accumulated and used like any other form of capital, regardless of what other people may do (glaeser, laibson, & sacerdote 2002). i would argue that, by definition, social capital adheres to the connections between people that are a quality of the social rather than the individual. however, as putnam (2000) and others have noted, the individual may access the resources available in the collective, and may do so to their personal advantage. for example, individuals in organisations are able to use their networks to gain new employment opportunities. but, to the extent that the individual continues to draw from the collective social capital resource without contributing to it, that resource will ultimately be drained of its dynamic renewal. this raises the problem of the “free rider”. as ostrom explains: whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts of others. if all participants choose to free-ride, the collective benefit will not be produced. (1990, p. 6) if social capital resides in the social connections between people, then logically, the best measure of it also requires measures of the collective. in fact most attempts to measure social cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 13 capital make use of individual, survey type instruments (eg onyx and bullen, 2000) in which individual scores are aggregated to provide a picture of the larger collective. as a consequence of this approach, there has been little effort to apply social capital to the organisation as a whole, that is, to the organisation separate from the individuals who make it up. schneider on the other hand defines organisational social capital as ‘established, trustbased networks among organisations or communities supporting a particular non-profit, that an organisation can use to further its goals’ (2009, p. 644). she provides considerable evidence of the role of organisational social capital which is independent of the people involved and which is based on that organisation’s history and reputation. so, even as key individuals move on, the organisation can continue to draw on its organisational networks as important resources. just as with individual networks, the organisational network ties are reciprocal, enforceable and durable. schneider further makes use of bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital to explain how subcultural differences within and between organisations help to define social capital networks. thus, organisations are likely to form social capital networks with those other organisations within the same field which have one or more core values or cultural attributes in common. resources are more likely to be shared and collaborative action developed between alliances within this organisational network. in terms of social impact, the implications are clear. social impact, like social capital, occurs at both the individual and the organisational level. the two are related but not synonymous. any analysis of social impact must therefore consider both the impacts for the individuals concerned and also the independent effects of the organisation. the proposed model of social impact it is now possible to return to the proposed new conceptual model of social impact, drawing on both the literature and observed practices of community-based organisations, this time identifying in formal terms a number of testable propositions. it is suggested that the social impact of an organisation can be defined by the collective result of these propositions. the propositions provide a synthesis of insights from the literature and from both formal and informal empirical observations of community action and discourse, without being specifically derivative from any of these. at this stage it is premature to attempt further 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 explication of the likely causal links between and within these principles. that is a task for future research. proposition one: the generation of social impact is an ongoing process within the communities in question, one dependent on a complex set of relationships and practices. it includes importantly the development of core values and networks. proposition two: social impact is not an all or none affair, but involves several distinct aspects or phases which are causally related. social impact begins with the organisation itself, and the extent to which the organisation provides a welcoming climate for individual members and thus the extent to which those members feel included, with a sense of personal belonging ( onyx et al. 2011; edwards et al. 2012). bonding social capital is a necessary precondition for the generation of further effects (edwards and onyx 2007). to the extent that this occurs, then wider impacts become possible, extending out from the immediate local organisation into the wider community, in a manner not dissimilar to the ripple effect of a stone dropped in still water. proposition three: an important aspect to the generation of social impact is the development of social and citizenship values developed by members as a direct consequence of the organisational practices. these values will vary, but are likely to include a sense of community and the importance of community service. this may reflect what latané described as the emergence of cultural capital (latané 1996). proposition four: organisational practices enable the development of personal skills and knowledge (human capital), and the development of wider social networks, both within and beyond the organisation (bridging social capital). there is an interdependent development of both social and human capital (schuller 2007). proposition five: a wider contribution to the local community in which the organisation is embedded occurs as a direct consequence of organisational practices. this may involve the creation of broader networks and volunteer action outside the immediate organisation. in part this wider contribution occurs as a result of active networks within the community involving the organisation and its members. much depends on the wider reputation that the organisation cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 15 has within the community, as developed over time (onyx and leonard 2011). bourdieu’s symbolic capital plays an important part. proposition six: impact occurs both at the level of the individual member and at the level of the organisation. impact depends both on the culture of the local organisation, as schneider (2009) suggests, but also on the response of the individual members. the networks that are formed relate to organisational networks as well as individual networks. contributions to the wider community are made by the organisation as an organisation as well as by individual members. what the organisation espouses as an organisation can have a direct and separate effect on other outcomes, quite distinct from that of the individual members. in other words organisational policy counts, but not completely. proposition seven: to the extent that the organisation is embedded within the local community (and probably only to the extent that it is so embedded) then the social impact will continue to strengthen, and indeed may reverberate back into the organisation, thus strengthening its internal impact in an iterative fashion. that is, to the extent that the organisation is able to contribute to a stronger community, then the community will support and strengthen the organisation. as suggested from some sport development projects organisational practices will only provide wider, long term impact to the extent that the communities in question take ownership of them (schulenkorf, thomson and schlenker 2011). discussion of implications of the model the model of social impact here developed makes it clear that social impact is a complex, developmental process, one that is important for both the individual and the organisation. the implications are important for policy makers and organisational management alike. this conceptual model does not in itself provide a measure of social impact, but it does provide the necessary basis for formulating appropriate qualitative and quantitative measures of social impact. indeed the application of the specific propositions to a single large community-based organisation, surf life saving australia (slsa), would suggest that such an application for the measurement of social impact is entirely possible and relevant (edwards et al. 2012; onyx et al. 2012). 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 the organisations as well as government funding bodies need to know what the social impact (positive and negative) of the organisation is within its host community. this is not a question of faith or conjecture. nor is it a question of the adequacy of any specific program. it is a question of what difference the organisation makes as a whole, over time, within the local community. but then, how can we know? to answer that question, requires comprehensive measurement tools. but the measurement is only useful to the extent that it is able to capture the essence of the social impact in its complexity. the measure must be about the measure of all capitals involved, especially the social, cultural, human....and only indirectly relevant is the economic capital. the conceptual model presented here potentially provides the basis for the development of such measures. governments at state and commonwealth level have come to accept the vital role played by organisations of civil society in providing essential services to the community, but also in developing wider social cohesion and basic democratic engagement of its citizens. ultimately, of course, the implications of social impact and its measurement are profoundly important for our intellectual and practical understanding of the nature of social impact, its role in maintaining a healthy, cohesive society, and the continued role of civil society. references arvidson, m. 2009, impact and evaluation in the uk third sector: reviewing literature and exploring ideas, third sector research centre, working paper 27, universities of birmingham and southampton. bourdieu, p. 1986, ‘the forms of capital’, in j richardson (ed.) handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education, greenwood, new york, pp.241-258. bourdieu, p. and wacquant, l. 1992, an invitation to reflexive sociology, university of chicago press, chicago. carman, j. 2007, ‘evaluation practice among community-based organisations: research into the reality’, american journal of evaluation, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 60-75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1098214006296245 ebrahim, a. and rangan, k. 2010, ‘the limits of nonprofit impact: a contingency framework for measuring social performance’, harvard business school working paper 10-099. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1611810 edwards, m. and onyx, j. 2007, ‘social capital and sustainability in a community under threat’, the local environment, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 17-30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549830601098206 edwards, m., onyx, j., maxwell, h. and darcy, s. 2012, ‘meso level social impact: meaningful indicators of community contribution, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol.4, no.3, pp.18-37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1098214006296245 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1611810 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13549830601098206 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 17 fukyama, f. 1995, trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity, penguin, london. glaeser, e. l., laibson, d., & sacerdote, b. 2002, ‘an economic approach to social capital’, economic journal, vol. 112, no. 483, pp. f437-f458. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/14680297.00078 guba e. and lincoln y. 1986, fourth generation evaluation, sage, newbury park, ca. halpern, d. 2005, social capital, polity press, cambridge. latané, b.1996, ‘dynamic social impact: the creation of culture by communication’, journal of communication, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 13-25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.14602466.1996.tb01501.x leonard, r. and onyx, j. 2003, ‘networking through loose and strong ties: an australian qualitative study’, voluntas, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 189-204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1023900111271 leonard, r. and onyx, j. 2004, spinning straw into gold: social capital in practice, janus, london. maas, k and liket, k 2011, ‘social impact measurement: classification of methods’, in r burritt et al. 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(eds) the practice turn in contemporary theory, routledge, london. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00078 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00078 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1996.tb01501.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1996.tb01501.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1023900111271 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1390-1_8 http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1025614619742 http://www.nationalcompact.gov.au/resources/vision-purpose-and-principles http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0021886300361002 http://dx.doi.org/10.5172/rsj.351.17.3.215 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474746411000406 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cdj/bsq041 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 schneider, j 2009, ‘organizational social capital and nonprofits’, nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 643-662. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0899764009333956 schulenkorf, n., thomson, a. and schlenker, k. 2011, ‘intercommunity sports events: vehicles and catalysts for social capital in divided societies’, event management, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 105-119. http://dx.doi.org/10.3727/152599511x13082349958316 schuller, t. 2001, ‘the complimentary roles of human and social capital’, canadian journal of policy research, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 18-24. schuller, t. 2007, ‘reflections on the use of social capital’, review of social economy, vol lxv, no. 1, pp. 11-28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00346760601132162 thomson, d. 2010, ‘exploring the role of funders’ performance reporting mandates in nonprofit performance measurement’, nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 611-629. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0899764009360575 woolcock, m. 2001, ‘the place of social capital in understanding social and economic outcomes’, development research group, the world bank, and kennedy school of government, harvard university. woolcock, m. 2001, ‘the place of social capital in understanding social and economic outcomes’, canadian journal of policy research, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 11-17. woolcock, m. and narayan, d. 2000, social capital: implications for development theory, research and policy’, world bank research observer, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 225-250. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wbro/15.2.225 zappalà, g., and lyons, m. 2009, recent approaches to measuring social impact in the third sector: an overview, csi background paper no. 5, centre for social impact, university of new south wales. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0899764009333956 http://dx.doi.org/10.3727/152599511x13082349958316 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00346760601132162 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0899764009360575 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wbro/15.2.225 a theoretical model of social impact defining the scope of the paper an outline of the model evaluation and impact social capital and impact the interaction of the capitals the individual vs the organisation the proposed model of social impact discussion of implications of the model references two sets of business cards: responses of chinese immigrant women entrepreneurs in canada and australia to sexism and racism frances chiang kwantlen polytechnic university angeline low university of technology sydney jock collins university of technology, sydney abstract existing entrepreneurial discourses have been dominated by white middle-class androcentric approach, giving little space to the discussions of racism and sexism experienced by minority women entrepreneurs. this paper aims to fill this gap through an examination of the experiences of asian immigrant women entrepreneurs in canada and australia using an intersectional approach. the key research question addressed in the paper is to what extent, and in what ways, do racism and sexism impact on the entrepreneurial experiences of asian immigrant women entrepreneurs and what strategies do they use in managing discrimination to protect themselves and their businesses? four main strategies were derived from our findings, namely, creating a comfortable niche, playing the mainstream card, swallowing the pain, and resisting. introduction this paper examines the experiences of asian immigrant women entrepreneurs in canada and australia. the point of departure is the growth in the number of immigrant women who have become entrepreneurs, that is, who have moved into self-employment by taking over an existing business enterprise or starting up a new enterprise. this is itself the result of the intersection to three related international trends. the first is the growth in entrepreneurship per se, mainly because of a renaissance of the small business sector over the past four decades, particularly in the usa, australia and canada (light & rosenstein 1995, pp.12-3; hindle & o'connor 2005, pp. 1-2). the second trend is the growing importance of female entrepreneurship. while female participation in entrepreneurship varies significantly across countries (minniti et al. 2005), it has been particularly strong, and growing, in australia and canada. in canada, the numbers of women who were in self-employment or owned their own business increased fourfold over the decades between 1976 and 1997 (hughes 1999). oecd data for participation rates as employers and own account workers for 1976, 1986 and 1996 for 19 selected oecd countries shows that australia had the fourth highest rate of participation in small businesses (32.8 per cent) after canada (41.2 per cent), the usa at 39.2 per cent and mexico (36.1 per cent) and that women exceeded 30 per cent of all entrepreneurs in 11 of these countries (oecd 1998, p. 25). the third trend is the increasing cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 63 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia importance of immigrant entrepreneurship (light 1972; waldinger et al. 1990; light & rosenstein 1995; light & gold 2000; rath 2000; kloosterman & rath 2003). this is particularly the case in many high immigration countries such as australia, canada and the united states, where immigrants manifest a higher rate of self-employment and entrepreneurship than their non-immigrant counterparts (light & rosenstein 1995). in australia 25.8 per cent of all self-employed are foreign-born, higher than all the major oecd countries other than luxembourg (oecd 1998, p. 36). the entrepreneurship literature has traditionally been dominated by a white middle-class androcentric approach, concentrating on the way that women support the entrepreneurial activities of their male spouses, partners or relatives and ignoring or underestimating the experiences of women who are entrepreneurs in their own right. as a consequence the experiences of women entrepreneurs who come from minority racial or ethnic backgrounds are particularly ignored, despite the fact that the rate of entrepreneurship among minority racial or ethnic backgrounds is often higher than for other women. until recently most women entrepreneurial discourses, under the influence of masculine scholarship, presented women’s entrepreneurial development as a process of ‘othering,’ and depicted women entrepreneurs as inferior to their male counterparts (bruni, gherardi & poggio 2005). when focusing on the experiences of women, these discourses were mostly seen through the lens of white middle-class women, failing to give space to women of colour (knight 2005). indeed, variations among women entrepreneurs and the invisible barriers they faced have not been adequately addressed (see for example, hauge & havnes 2005). based on the relatively privileged histories of white middle-class women, most studies of entrepreneurial women emphasised the notions of independence and autonomy, self-determination and personal growth, hence undermining the labour histories of working-class women and women of colour (knight 2005). in addition, ‘the networking discourses are often framed as racially neutral and classless’, with the assumption that ‘all women have the ability of acquiring or being a part of thriving networks’ (knight 2005, p.156). even when this ‘mainstream’ entrepreneurship literature engages women entrepreneurship, it does so without reference to the immigrant entrepreneurship literature that has the potential to throw considerable light onto the experience of immigrant women entrepreneurs. these two strong traditions of entrepreneurship scholarship appear to live ‘parallel lives,’ not connecting with each other. 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 meanwhile, while the ethnic entrepreneur scholarship has long recognized diversity among racial and ethnic groups who become entrepreneurs, it has tended to ignore the contributions of immigrant and ethnic women. like the mainstream entrepreneurship scholarship, immigrant women are studied, in the main, as important contributors to the activities of male immigrant entrepreneurs, but not as entrepreneurs in their own right. the immigrant entrepreneurship literature, which focuses on the way that different immigrant experiences of entrepreneurship are embedded within family and ethnic community networks locally, nationally and internationally, as well as within regimes of governance, regulation and policy (kloosterman & rath 2001), has been mainly concerned with male immigrant entrepreneurs. while the contradictory aspects of classism and racism, and class and ethnic resources have been brought to the centre of understanding (light & rosenstein 1995), the androcentric nature of such discourses has marginalised the experiences of ethnic minority women and the gendered nature of entrepreneurship. as apitzsch commented, ‘women remain the ‘hidden side’ of the success story of ethnic entrepreneurship’ and ‘need to be more generally recognized as agents’ (apitzsch 2003, p.169). asian women entrepreneurs, in particular, are deemed invisible in entrepreneurial discourses with only a few studies that focused on them (dhaliwal 1998; kang 1996, 2003). further, the integrated aspects of race, ethnicity, gender, and class have rarely been dealt with in studies relating to the entrepreneur, and issues of racism and sexism have been silenced in most entrepreneurship discourses (greer & greene 2003). in the literature on ethnic and/or women entrepreneurship, discrimination, manifested as underemployment and blocked mobility due to accent and glass ceilings, often played a key role in explaining the dynamics of entrepreneurship amongst immigrant minorities and ethnic women. immigrants who could not achieve labour market outcomes commensurate to their human capital because of individual or institutional racial and sexual discrimination were ‘pushed’ into self-employment. by setting up their own business enterprise they had the opportunity not only to earn more but to also to escape prejudice entrenched in the culture of the workplace (aldrich & waldinger 1990; castles et al. 1991; collins & castles 1992; collins et al. 1995; light & rosenstein 1995; peters 1999; light & gold 2000; pio 2007). although the literature offers an explanation as to why some immigrants go into business to escape discrimination in the workplace, it rarely looks into the discrimination these individuals face after entry into entrepreneurship and further fails to examine how immigrants respond to discrimination in their own businesses. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 65 this paper will attempt to fill these gaps by bringing the diverse experiences of asian immigrant women entrepreneurs in australia and canada to the centre of analysis. by adopting an intersectional approach, our primary focus is to investigate the nature of their experiences of racism and sexism, the impact on themselves and their businesses, and their responses to it. conceptualising asian immigrant women entrepreneurs in a national context the literature on immigrant entrepreneurship has rarely focused on immigrant women and entrepreneurship, with little recent research published in the field (collins and low 2010). this paper is based on the narratives of asian immigrant women entrepreneurs in sydney, australia and chinese immigrant women in richmond, metro vancouver, canada, collected via two independent studies. by coining our group of women as asian we run the risk of using a western imperialistic lens of reductionism and overgeneralization. as lee (2006) argued, asia is ‘a european invented term to refer to certain geographically locatable territories and cultures’ outside of europe and ‘asians [as] a generalized other to europeans, who see “asian-ness” as a strange and exotic way of being…’ (lee 2006, p.23). bearing this in mind, it is important to acknowledge that the adoption of asian as a group in this paper does not downplay their multiplicity and heterogeneity but is solely for analytical purposes. asian women, therefore, were defined according to geographical locations based on european construction; and asian immigrant women in the canadian and australian contexts referred to non-native women born in asia. although the women entrepreneurs in our studies came from diverse backgrounds, and were half a globe apart, the results on the aspects of racism and sexism yield considerable commonalities. needless to say, though minority immigrants arrive at the host societies for different reasons, australia and canada share similar histories of imperialism and colonialism, patriarchy, immigration and immigrant settlement (adelman et al. 1994a; 1994b) including a common history of racialised immigration policy and racialised histories of minority immigrant settlement, particularly in relation of asian immigrants (collins & francis 1994). a comparative study of asian women entrepreneurs in australia and canada holds the potential to highlight the commonalities and differences of their experiences across transnational and transcultural spaces, thus contributing to the understanding of how gender, 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 race, ethnicity and class intersect to shape the lives and businesses of women entrepreneurs and their experiences of, and responses to, racism and sexism. asian immigrants, particularly those from china, have a long history of entrepreneurship in canada (li 1988) and australia (collins 2002). before world war ii, the white australia and white canada immigration policies that restricted chinese entry into both countries (collins & henry 1994) were accompanied by formal and informal racist legislation and practices that either prevented their entry into paid employment or confined them to menial, manual, low paying jobs. most turned to establishing their own business, often restaurants, furniture shops and factories, market gardens and retail activities. this is a classic case of the ‘push’ to entrepreneurship by the blocked mobility that was derived from racist exclusion. both countries abandoned racist immigration policies in the 1960s (canada) and early 1970s (australia). a non-discriminatory immigration policy was introduced, with australia adopting canada’s points system to select immigrants. in the last two decades, chinese and other asian immigrants featured prominently in the immigration intakes of both countries, though most arrive as skilled migrants with university educations and professional skills and are able to find high paying jobs in the service sector in the major cities of vancouver, toronto, sydney, melbourne, brisbane and perth. while anti-asian sentiment is enduring in both countries, it has reduced substantially so that blocked mobility is today a more subtle, and different dynamic in the entrepreneurial story of asian immigrants in australia and canada than it was more than a century ago. there has been some important research into asian entrepreneurs in australia. lever-tracy et al. (1991) surveyed 104 chinese and 40 indian entrepreneurs with businesses in retail trade (including take-away food shops), restaurants, wholesale trade, property and business services and health in brisbane and sydney. the survey found that both the chinese and indian business owners surveyed had to confront ‘a residue of prejudice and discrimination and a battery of obstacles to the recognition of overseas qualifications’ during the process of applying to emigrate to australia (lever-tracy et al. 1991, p. ix). stromback and malhotra (1994) surveyed 45 south asians who were business owners in the western australian capital city of perth. this study reinforces the ’blocked mobility’ hypothesis because many entrepreneurs surveyed reported difficulties in having their qualifications recognized in australia, problems in gaining admission into professional bodies and ‘more subtle influences’ which prevented them from fully utilizing their skills in australia: ‘as a result of such cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 67 problems many south asians start their own businesses’ (stromback & malhotra 1994, pp. xxi). both of these studies focused on male chinese immigrant entrepreneurs. very few studies – the exception is ip and lever-tracy (1991, 1992) – looked at asian women entrepreneurs. on the canadian front, recent notable research on asian immigrant entrepreneurship include li’s (2001) work on chinese immigrant business, wong and ng’s (2002) work on chinese immigrant entrepreneurs, wong’s (2004) research on taiwanese immigrant entrepreneurs, and karl froschauer and lloyd wong’s (2006) study on transnational businesses among south asian and chinese immigrants. using the 1996 census data, li (2001) found that both chinese immigrant men and women are drawn into business as a result of ‘blocked mobility’ when compared with their native born counterparts who are more likely to consider entrepreneurship as a viable option. similar to li’s findings, wong and ng (2002) support the significance of structural constraints and blocked mobility in the mainstream economy that relegates chinese immigrant entrepreneurs in vancouver to the ethnic economy. in addition, they noted the significance of transnationalism in fostering immigrant businesses. extending on this notion, wong (2004) studied the impact of transnational businesses and networks among taiwanese immigrant entrepreneurs and noted that these entrepreneurs have a tendency to operate on transnational social space emphasising transnational familial networks, transnational business circuits and transmigration. further on the development of transnationalism, froschauer and wong (2006) studied new transnational chinese and indian immigrant men and women entrepreneurs who benefit from the growth of high technology development in the asia pacific locations and acknowledge the importance of social capital in terms of transnational network and social space between asia and western canada. while these studies include both men and women in their analysis, sole attention on the experiences of asian/chinese immigrant women entrepreneurship is rare. despite the wide recognition of blocked mobility in explaining entrepreneurship, the experiences and subsequent responses to discrimination is virtually non-existent in entrepreneurial scholarship. intersectionality and entrepreneurial scholarship the concept of intersectionality denotes an integrative model that focuses on the analysis of minorities or the ‘other,’ and the multiplicity of oppression. discourses on intersectionality build from anti-racist feminist thought that is highly critical of the masculinist western 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 traditions and the non-representation or misrepresentation of white feminists in explaining the experiences of women of colour. the vast majority whose work is based on this perspective (see for example, anthias & yuval-davis 1992; yuval-davis 1996; dua & robertson 1999; hellwig & thobani 2006; massaquoi & wane 2007) take note of the fact that the experiences of minority women are not uniform, but complex and diverse, as a result of their differential locations in the interlocking historical contexts of imperialism, colonialism, patriarchy, and capitalism. this perspective recognises women as agents intersecting with structural forces most commonly expressed in the intersection of race, class and gender, and correspondingly interested in the analysis of intertwining and interlocking experiences of racism, classism, and sexism. this can be extended to include other socio-cultural-political categories such as ethnicity, sexuality, disability, and nationality. intersectionality challenges the essential, ahistorical, fixed, independent, and quantitative nature of social categorizations from which one category compete for primacy and importance over the other. rather, it emphasises the fluidity of social construction in producing and reproducing unique experiences and social relations. hence, the experiences of chinese immigrant women entrepreneurs in australia would be different from that of filipino domestic workers, or aboriginal women; the oppressions experienced by black women in the united states would be different from those experienced by caribbean or ghanaian women in canada. taking an intersectional standpoint, we argue that incidents of racism may be sexualised, and those of sexism are likewise racialised, as well as classed. for example, as victims of racism, minority women are targeted because of their integrated identity as asian, women, women of colour, and the rich or the poor. similarly, as victims of sexism, these women are targeted not just because of their gender but also because of their race, ethnicity, and class locations. moreover, racism and sexism interplay to produce stereotypes and misrepresentations. for instance, asian women are often portrayed as binary oppositions in the media: exotic, subservient, compliant, industrious, and eager to please on the one hand, and ‘dragon ladies’ and ‘warrior women’ on the other (jiwani 2006). they are often perceived as naturally inferior, socially unimportant, belonging to a ghettoized work force capable of doing only low-paid work, but at the same time, viewed as ‘model minorities’ (hellwig & thobani 2006) when targeted for their hard work, accomplishments, and wealth. using intersectionality to understand entrepreneurial behaviour of minority women, therefore, involves analyses of continuously evolving processes relative to various intertwining sociocosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 69 economic-political characteristics , with a focus on the ‘agency’ of minority women who actively shape their own lives within these broader structural constraints. however, existing entrepreneurial projects rarely identify the need to address diversity and difference among women entrepreneurs. despite the call for recognition of race, sex, and class in entrepreneurship (beggs, doolittle & garsombke 1994), discourses and research in this area are rather scarce. one study showed how gender resources intersect with class and ethnicity among iranian immigrant women entrepreneurs in los angeles (dallafar 1994). another study focused on language dynamics in everyday interaction based on race, gender and class of korean nail salon owners in new york city (kang 1997). kang (2003) further explored how diverse racial and class locations call for different forms of gendered emotional management among these korean nail salon owners. anthias and mehta (2003) reported on how family resources operated differently between men and women entrepreneurs when studying the interconnections of gender, ethnicity, and the family. harvey (2005) studied how black working-class women entered into the hair and beauty businesses by taking an intersectional lens of race, class and gender. more recently, essers and benschop (2009) studied muslim businesswomen by analyzing the intersection of gender, ethnicity, and religion, documenting how these women take charge in stretching beyond islam crisscrossing with their ethnic and gender identities in their entrepreneurial work. when comparing with the existing literature on women and ethnic entrepreneurship, the intersectional approach provides a richer, deeper and more nuanced picture of entrepreneurialism, thus offering an important contribution to supplement existing scholarship. in this paper, we will focus on the intersection of race, ethnicity and gender, dealing primarily with issues of racism, sexism, racialized sexism, and sexualized racism brought about within the context of the class. as entrepreneurs who are primarily professional, educated, and middle classed, our respondents can use class as a resource to deal with the issues of racism and sexism. we shall discuss how these minority women entrepreneurs respond to diverse situations of discrimination in business. research method as the previous section noted, the intersectional perspective recognizes the importance of agency of minority women, and thus has important methodological implications. it emphasizes bringing women of colour to the ‘centre’ by seeing them as subjects with ‘free 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 minds’ capable of telling their own stories (collins 1991). the most preferred research method then is the kind that is culturally and gender sensitive, which allows women to give their voices so that their experiences are adequately represented. in order for women to relate their experiences and values in their own ways using their own language, we believe it is necessary to adopt a qualitative research agenda through which these tales can be analysed in a nuanced manner. further, to collect narratives in a more systematic manner, we decided to conduct semi-structured interviews. both hong kong chinese immigrant women in richmond, metro vancouver, canada and asian immigrant women in sydney, australia were recruited through a snowballing of referrals. the canadian sample was referred mostly by relatives, friends, association leaders, and business acquaintances, while the australian sample was acquired mainly through one of the researchers’ contact network in banking and in business. most interviews with the canadian sample, approximately two hours in length, were conducted in cantonese with the exception of a few who used mandarin or english. interviews with the australian women were conducted in english with a few exceptions where a mix of cantonese and english were used. to protect their identity, all the names of the women entrepreneurs used in this paper are pseudonyms. samples the canadian study comprised of fifty-eight women who were mostly born in hong kong (forty-eight or 83 per cent), with seven born in mainland china, one in macau, one in vietnam, and one in the philippines. the australian sample comprised of eighty women born in one of the following ten asian economies china, hong kong, indonesia, laos, malaysia, philippines, singapore, taiwan, thailand and vietnam. many of the women in the canadian sample were relatively new immigrants to canada, arriving in the early 1990’s, mainly for the fear of the 1997 reversion of hong kong to chinese sovereignty. most came under the independent family migration category or the entrepreneurial program, and none of them came as refugees. the majority of these women were between the ages of 35 and 49, married mostly to middle-class or entrepreneurial husbands of the same ethnic background, and had few children who were mostly adolescents. most had finished high school but few had received university or professional training. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 71 in the australian study, the majority of the asian-born women entrepreneurs were between 30 and 50 years of age, married and with dependents. more than half of them held a university degree, mainly gained from overseas. close to a quarter of the australian sample who came from laos and vietnam had entered australia as indo-chinese refugees. the rest entered australia under the business skills, employer nomination and independent visa categories. about a third of these women were sponsored by family members to settle in australia. unlike the canadian sample, women in the australian sample were more educated, and had more diverse immigration experiences, but were of similar age group and were mostly married with children. the businesses owned by chinese-canadian women were mostly small businesses concentrated in the retail and service sectors. with a strong and well-established chinese community, an overwhelming majority of these businesses (86.2 per cent) found their niche in the ethnic economy, hiring co-ethnic staff and serving the chinese market with their businesses located in chinese or asian theme malls. within the ethnic economy, twenty-one enterprises (39.6 per cent) were women-specific, targeting chinese women’s market in the areas of beauty, fashion, and lifestyle, and many of which had women employees. in other words, a considerable number of chinese canadian women entrepreneurs made use of their class and gender resources to provide services and employment for co-ethnic women. similar to the canadian sample, the australian sample has established a broad range of businesses, the majority of which were in retail and wholesale trade, and in property and business services. however, unlike the canadian counterpart, their businesses were mainly located in mainstream commercial precincts. other than the hong kong chinese who located their businesses in chinatown, and the poor and less educated refugee group who depended on co-ethnic support from families, many women in the australian sample were members of communities that are dispersed and fragmented. hence, these women were more likely to make use of their class resources to enter business, and less likely to take advantage of ethnic resources. experiences of racism and sexism racism and sexism, in many different ways, are felt and experienced in both canadian and australian societies despite the claim of building an open and liberal civil society. systemic racism and sexism, embedded in social, economic, and political systems to preclude women 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 and minority groups from equal participation, are still prevalent and deeply entrenched in the histories of colonialism and imperialism, and patriarchy. in the eyes of the mainstream society, asian women immigrants do not belong as they are viewed as ‘women who stand on the outside looking in’, occupying ‘a transition zone between aliens and citizens’ (lee 2006, p.38). it is widely documented that asian women face forms of discrimination in everyday life, in school, and in the workplace (bannerji 1993; hellwig and thobani 2006). the women in our samples are no exceptions. prior to starting their own businesses, many had attempted to look for work but were denied the opportunity; others suffered from underemployment and denial of promotional opportunities. their reported experiences range from verbal abuse and name calling in everyday encounters with whites/ males to belittling and sexualization in job interviews; from isolation, rejection, and ridicule from white/male colleagues to working long hours with low pay, and denial of vacation time from white/male employers and managers. whether the discrimination at work was blatant or subtle, many took a proactive approach and decided to turn to entrepreneurship as a way out. these women, who have to continue succumbing to racist and sexist barriers to sustain livelihood in unpleasant working environments, possessed and used a variety of class resources, such as investment capital and/or related skills and experiences to avoid future humiliation. with or without self-awareness, these women used their class resources to gain power and the right to control their livelihood, and survive animosities in situations of marginalization and subjugation. however, despite such class privileges racism and sexism do not end with entrepreneurship. even though becoming entrepreneurs means the end to racial and gender discrimination from employers and colleagues at work, racism and sexism are still unavoidable in business situations when dealing with clients, customers, and business associates. in the following section, we present how the women in our studies managed racism and sexism in different ways. responses to racism and sexism in business from the experiences of the entrepreneurial women in our samples, we delineated four main strategies commonly used in responding to racism and sexism in business: first, ‘creating a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 73 comfortable niche,’ secondly, ‘playing the mainstream card,’ thirdly, ’swallowing the pain,’ and fourthly, ‘resisting.’ it should be noted that these strategies are not mutually exclusive, and depending on specific situations and experiences, may be used simultaneously or interchangeably. creating a comfortable niche to deal with racism and sexism, the most comfortable and easy way is to avoid direct contact with the perpetrators: white men and women, and/or co-ethnic men. some of the women in our studies, empowered by class, ethnic, and/or gender resources, including economic resources, ethnic connections, ethnic-specific and gender-specific knowledge and skills, decided to use entrepreneurship as a means to create employment for themselves in the ethnic or feminised ethnic economy to avoid or reduce the chances of dealing with white men and women and co-ethnic men and the unnecessary harassments targeted at them. to ‘make life easier,’ these women set up businesses in the ethnic market and targeted co-ethnics; they hired co-ethnic staff, and ran their businesses dealing exclusively with co-ethnic business associates. some women engaged their businesses in an exclusively co-ethnic female environment. they used their class, gender and ethnic resources to set up women-specific businesses in the ethnic economy, hiring women staff and targeting women customers or clients. these culturally feminised resources that involved knowledge, skills and connections provided them with the opportunities to set up beauty-related and women fashion businesses that catered to the needs of co-ethnic women. in other words, a ‘women only’ safe haven was established with the sharing of a unique feminised ethnic culture that facilitated business and work relationships. isabelle from canada, for example, spoke candidly about how her beauty salon was set up in a way that provide a ‘tranquil environment’ for her clients, who would feel comfortable sharing stories of ‘their lives, their families,’ and ‘fashion and beauty tips.’ beatrice talked about how keeping an all-female staff can constitute easy management and a ‘cooperative’ work environment. the comfortable niches these women built worked to escape the chances of racism and sexism. such a move also provided them with a competitive edge and consequently, better chances of survival in business. 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 playing the mainstream card one way to deal with racism or sexualised racism is to camouflage the business as mainstream. this involves the process of dichotomization between women themselves as minorities and the ‘white/canadian/australian/westernised’ as mainstream. to play this out, their businesses have to appear ‘mainstream,’ which entails a process of de-ethnicizing the business such as dropping the ethnic business name and adopting a western (english) name, westernizing the décor of the premises, putting the business in mainstream settings, hiring white employees, and as far as possible hiding the true identity of ownership. in certain circumstances, this mainstreaming approach would involve ‘masculinization’ when white male staff are considered preferable over female. this strategy was perceived as effective in dissolving conflicts that could hurt the business. beatrice from the canadian sample owned a hair salon that served mainly white customers. in order for her business to appeal to white people, she used an english name for the salon, hid her identity as the owner, and hired a white woman as the manager in charge of daily operations while she posed as a chinese hairstylist working along the six white women hairstylists she personally hired: people know me only as a hairstylist working in the salon. i don’t want them to know that the boss is chinese. white customers do not like to patronize chinesestyle hair salons. i worked in this industry long enough to realize this. so when i started this business, i decided not to let clients know that this is chinese owned. when they come to the salon and see a chinese person at the reception area, and all hairstylists being chinese, and hear chinese people talking loudly in chinese, they would not feel comfortable. they resent that kind of environment. that's why i hired a white woman working as the manager in the reception area. this makes the white customers feel at ease…my manager is also responsible for dealing with sales representatives sent over by the wholesalers, who are mainly whites. such a set-up helped beatrice from running the risk of losing customers should she have to deal with discrimination in her daily business: …but sometimes i would know immediately that the [white] person did not like me. they doubted my abilities and would ask questions like, ‘do you know how to do a haircut?’ i usually would feel very embarrassed in front of my staff and other regular customers. but what can i do? i am used to it. so i would just let my other staff serve them. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 75 similarly, jessica from australia who ran a printing business hired white sales representatives to do the work while she stayed in the background. when she had to step in, she never revealed herself to the customers as the owner: we do hire australian [white] sales reps on the road, so if i come across racist people, we know they're racist, we send out our [white] sales people. so we stay in the background. so that's how we work… i go out never saying to them that i’m the owner. i have two sets of business cards. one business card, just my name, no title, nothing. so i never let them know that i’m the owner… so i could say, ‘ok, i’ll refer back to my manager. i’ll see if i can give you a better price’ and things like that. in addition, jessica ensured that the racial composition of employees in her company was balanced and the wage rate competitive to australian standard to prevent negative criticisms of her hiring policy. she also made sure that all the production was done locally to avoid people from labeling her company as non-australian. the employment of white staff is beneficial to business should racist or sexualized racist incidents occur: sometimes i hire [white] marketers, telesales people in the customer service, so they ring, ring, ring and they get the quote and we quote for them, they are happy with the price…. then it happened … when i went to see the client and he saw me, he didn't say anything and was very polite. then later on i followed up; he didn't want to give the order. i knew it was due, you know, [to racism]. i pressed for the order … but after seeing me, he kept putting it off. so when i got my australian [white] rep to ring to find out why he didn't give us the order, he said ‘i don't want to deal with the vietnamese girl . . .’ … when i sent out the australian girl, he told her that. in the end, he still promised the australian girl because he doesn't want to deal with me. (note: jessica was born in malaysia, and is not of vietnamese background.) this mainstreaming strategy worked to protect the business even though it did not curb racism and sexualised racism entirely from happening. as long as these women entrepreneurs interacted with white people in running their businesses, they had to be prepared to face these challenges. nonetheless, chances of harassment were greatly reduced and when it happened, they were able to resolve the problem more handily. 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 swallowing the pain direct confrontation may not been considered the best solution by some women and thus their defense mechanism works around non-confrontational and passive behavior, and quiet acceptance of their fate. some women choose to ignore, dismiss, and withdraw from unpleasant situations by ‘swallowing the pain’ whereas others resort to an accepting approach. some are even generous with a forgiving attitude. in order to run their businesses smoothly, many women chose to swallow the pain and let the perpetrators continuously exploit them, as one woman who owned a café recounted her negative experience: some of the customers thought that because you were chinese they could take advantage of you. for example, when they did not read the menu carefully they would blame me for ‘false advertising’… a white male doctor came in every morning and ordered bacon and egg for breakfast despite i told him repeatedly that i was not allowed to serve this kind of food because of building regulations that did not allow us to fry. every time he would get upset, and sometimes would even make arrogant comments like ‘what kind of a café is this? you don’t even serve proper breakfast!’ (edna, canada) this white male doctor seemed to enjoy his superior status and kept coming back despite knowing that the restaurant did not serve the kind of breakfast he wanted. and time over time, edna swallowed the unreasonable accusations and felt helpless dealing with it. like edna, many ignored or dismissed the problem. betsy from australia, for example, said: ‘it’s because you are asian they look at you as if you are different from them. but you just don’t take notice of them, you just let go.’ sheila from canada felt that she was being taken advantage of because ‘i am a woman’ and ‘they put pressure on me in negotiating a good deal for themselves.’ she ‘felt so bad’ but decided to dismiss it. others decided not ‘to acknowledge it’ and ‘concentrate on the ones who love you and you’ll be happier.’ still others wore out any discrimination by being humble and used an accepting approach as the following demonstrates: they say something rude in front of you and you just hold your tongue. even if you argue, there's no point. so if they are not happy, you just say sorry and let them out of the shop and that's it. and we try not to argue with any customer because you're here every day, you see all kinds of people, you prepare for that. (tania, australia) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 77 when dealing with sexism perpetuated by co-ethnic men, these women also choose to accept it with pain, for example: sometimes i didn’t feel being recognized as a boss. for example, when the wholesale reps came, they usually would look for my husband. and if my husband was not in, they did not even bother to talk to me and said they would come back some other time… well, that’s the way it is. (joan, canada) in other situations, traditional gender expectations would impact women’s behaviour and make them look for more acceptable alternatives. for example, in coping with the sexist expectation that it is inappropriate for women to entertain men, some women resorted to withdrawal and avoided entertaining altogether or sought help from other men: sometimes it’s difficult when you have to go out with a male client, say to lunch… when my friends saw me having dinner with a man, and it’s not my husband, they would give me a weird look… this could lead to misunderstandings… gossips, you know. that’s why i try to avoid entertaining my clients. sometimes if it were really necessary i would invite their wives and my husband to go along. then i would feel more comfortable. (ophelia, canada) a lot of our clients are typically asian male and you can't go out and be like one of the boys. they are very much used to typical business people, they entertain and all this. it's different if you are male, then you are one of the boys and you go and dine with them and whatever. we can still dine with them but it’s a very different sort of dining… i bring my [business] partner in and he does the other side… so after dinner, my partner does the other role if they want to go somewhere else. (penny, australia) these women, having internalised their gender roles, withdrew from the situation when it challenged their comfort zone, and they did so even if such moves would do harm to their businesses. what is prescribed to them in a patriarchal society outweighs the importance of business. instead of challenging sexist social expectations, they chose to comply. resisting although many women took a passive way in managing discrimination, the assertive ones chose to resist and struggle in order to regain control even if this means compromising their businesses. this strategy is more commonly used among women who face sexism, racialised sexism or sexualised racism in handling daily business. jocelyn from australia, who owned two legal practices, recalled how she learned to be tough and fought back after years of 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 harassment from other australian white male lawyers. for example, in the case when these lawyers refused to talk to her, she would say: if you don't want to talk to me that's fine. i don't have to talk to you anymore, so don't ring here to speak to the person handling the matter. jocelyn learned to ‘tell them off’ upfront and would not shy away from it: at first i would ask them politely to talk to me in a respectable manner. if they still go on in a harassing way i would give them a warning and i would say, ‘if you keep on like this i will hang up the phone’, and if they don't change their attitude i just hang up but, sometimes if they make me mad, obviously i have to raise my voice and scream back and then slam the phone. a different technique used in resistance that is less confrontational pertains to changing the negative impressions of the perpetrators when these women’s work is undermined. gloria from canada spoke of getting ‘tough’ and ‘presenting a superwoman image’ when dealing with bankers, suppliers and customers in order for these people to ‘take [her] seriously as a woman’ and to prevent people from taking advantage of her. another woman, sharon, talked about how she had to ‘work extra hard to convince people’ and to ‘gain respect’ from her employees whereas her husband ‘didn’t have to do anything’ and people ‘would just listen to him.’ conclusion a general perception of entrepreneurs is that they are independent profit-seekers, privileged with entrepreneurial spirit and economic resources and the power to exercise control and realize goals. such a view, however, is misleading when applied to immigrant women entrepreneurs, who run primarily time and labour intensive small businesses. their position in the economy is beyond comparison with the mainstream corporate power. rather, like other underprivileged workingwomen, they are marginalised and isolated in struggling for survival. despite their efforts to fight discrimination with entrepreneurship, mobilizing available class, gender, and/or ethnic resources to start businesses, our findings show that entrepreneurship does not end the experience of racism and sexism. these women continue to struggle with discrimination in business, fighting it mainly alone without institutional support. in this paper, we reviewed the various strategies employed by asian women in our studies when dealing with racism and sexism. although some managed to create a ‘comfortable cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 79 niche’ in the ethnic economy or a feminized ethnic economy, such a choice would have limited their business opportunities to these marginalized sectors. those who engaged in ‘mainstreaming’ their businesses were able to use their class resources to compete with other mainstream businesses but still could not protect themselves from racism and sexism in daily business operations. others resorted to ‘resist’ and fought for dignity, respect, and control, or ‘swallowing the pain’ for the purpose of survival. needless to say, minority women entrepreneurs, when compared with white men and women as well the co-ethnic male counterparts, have to direct extra resources, energy, time and efforts to maintain their businesses. in closing, this paper provides a new angle to understanding entrepreneurship and opens up space for future research. we argued that there is an urgent need to bridge the gap between the ‘mainstream’ entrepreneurship literature and the immigrant entrepreneurship literature. both literatures are weak in their theorizing of, and understanding of, minority immigrant women entrepreneurs. the existing ethnic entrepreneur and women’s entrepreneur scholarship focus primarily on racism and sexism as barriers driving minorities into starting their businesses, yet rarely address how racism and sexism shape the dynamics of the enterprises the minority women establish and the strategies they employ to manage this discrimination. despite the novelty of our approach, there are some unanswered questions that need to be addressed: are the strategies used 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https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal 2014. © 2014 megan stronach and daryl adair. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(2): 3859,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3859 dadirri: reflections on a research methodology used to build trust between a non-indigenous researcher and indigenous participants megan stronach university of technology, sydney daryl adair university of technology, sydney abstract this article reflects on a methodology employed in a phd research project that set out to investigate sport career transition (sct) experiences of elite indigenous australian sportsmen. the research was necessary as little is known about the transition of this cohort to a life after sport, or their experiences of retirement. a key problem within the sct paradigm is a presumption that an end to elite sport requires a process of adjustment that is common to all sportspeople—a rather narrow perspective that fails to acknowledge the situational complexity and socio-cultural diversity of elite athletes. with such a range of personal circumstances, it is reasonable to suppose that athletes from different cultural groups will have different individual sct needs. the researcher is non-indigenous and mature aged: she encountered a number of challenges in her efforts to understand indigenous culture and its important sensitivities, and to build trust with the indigenous male participants she interviewed. an indigenous methodology known as dadirri, which emphasises deep and respectful listening, guided the development of the research design. consistent with previous studies conducted by non-indigenous researchers, an open-ended and conversational approach to interviewing indigenous respondents was developed. the objective was for the voices of the athletes to be heard, allowing the collection of rich data based on the participants’ perspectives about sct. an overview of the findings is presented, illustrating that indigenous athletes’ experience sct in complex and distinctive ways. the article provides a model for non-indigenous researchers to conduct qualitative research with indigenous people. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3859 118 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 introduction the thesis ‘sport career transition: stories of elite indigenous1 australian sportsmen’ was started in 2008 by the first author (the researcher) at the university of technology, sydney (stronach 2012). the research was necessary because international research into sport career transition (sct) has consistently found that life after sport is fraught with uncertainty for elite athletes. this situation has never been more clearly demonstrated, than with the likes of swimming greats ian thorpe and grant hackett currently undergoing treatment for severe depression and drug addiction respectively (balym 2014). yet the predicament of elite athletes experiencing problems as they move out of the sporting limelight has been recognised and researched for some 40 years. the thesis focused on a key problem within the sct paradigm: it has been presumed that an end to elite sport requires a process of adjustment that is common to all players—a rather narrow perspective that fails to acknowledge the situational complexity and socio-cultural diversity of elite athletes. with such a range of personal circumstances, it is reasonable to suppose that athletes from different cultural groups would have different individual sct needs (stambulova & alfermann 2009). in developing that argument, the thesis focused on an athlete group that does not fit ‘mainstream’ participation in elite sport, or the ‘conventional’ sct policy milieu. the context was australian sport, and the focus was with a small but significant number of indigenous athletes who, despite substantial socioeconomic, geographic, and cultural obstacles, had all contributed significantly to elite-level australian sport. while many indigenous australians have assumed high profile careers in sport, little is known about their transition to a life after sport, or their experiences of retirement. to address this research gap, the thesis explored the sct experiences of 30 current and former male indigenous athletes from three sports in which they have a proportional high representation: australian rules football (i.e., afl), rugby league (i.e., nrl), as well as professional and amateur boxing. the article proceeds with a background to the methodological challenges and cultural issues that required careful consideration during the research project. it introduces the methodology of dadirri and discusses how it was deployed to assist the author to understand and manage a 1 the term ‘indigenous’ is used in this paper to refer generally to the two indigenous populations of australia— australian aboriginal people and torres strait islanders cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 119 range of cultural sensitivities. the approach to research is explained, along with methods that were consistent with previous studies conducted by non-indigenous researchers with indigenous participants. a précis of findings is presented, and then the paper concludes with a discussion of the value of dadirri to this qualitative study. background according to stambulova and alfermann (2009), athletes’ perceptions of their sport transitions, along with researchers’ perceptions and interpretations of data, are infused by their cultures. therefore, they argued, in order to understand both mono-cultural and crosscultural studies and practice, researchers interested in studying athlete career transitions should consider cultures in more depth and treat them as discrete contexts with particular sets of characteristics (stambulova & alfermann 2009). this is because, they claimed, people internalise meanings from their cultural contexts, and it is impossible to separate their development and behaviour from these frameworks. furthermore, these authors argue, researchers need to appreciate that cultural context is fairly rigid and cannot be readily changed by an individual (stambulova & alfermann 2009). thus, if this thesis was to further deepen contemporary understanding of sct for a discrete cultural group, it would be important to consider athletes in their own group contexts, using approaches that could deal with culturally specific differences. therefore, an underlying assumption of the thesis was that an understanding of the sct experiences of cald groups would require a focus on underlying distinctive social, demographic, and ethno-cultural factors. explicitly, the thesis explored the following question: what are the retirement experiences of elite indigenous australian athletes? to address the question two initial objectives were framed: • to explore the experiences of elite indigenous australian athletes undergoing sct or preparing to do so, and • to identify any ethno-culturally distinctive sct characteristics of indigenous australian athletes. while the major focus of the study was to explore the nature of sct for elite indigenous australian athletes, the dialogue with respondents was expected to help inform recommendations about culturally relevant sct programs and support mechanisms. therefore, the final objective of the research was: 120 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 • to evaluate sct protocols offered by australian rules football, rugby league and boxing, to ascertain how (if at all) they cater to the needs of indigenous australian athletes, and (where appropriate) to suggest reforms to these protocols. cultural considerations at the commencement of this study, it became apparent to the author—a non-indigenous woman—that the ethics of working with indigenous peoples would encompass far more than merely obtaining approval from the relevant university authorities. three significant issues needed to be considered when developing the research design. these were: • cultural sensitivities involved with conducting research with indigenous peoples; • potential power imbalances between researcher and participants, and • the need to develop trust between the researcher and participants. i) cultural sensitivities the first challenge related to cultural sensitivities. the literature documents evidence of the capacity of researchers to oppress and marginalise, just as it maintains the potential to emancipate and empower. research with indigenous peoples in australia, as elsewhere, has an inescapable political dimension, with investigators operating in the context of a history of previous scholarship that has variously been “inappropriate, irrelevant, and irreverent” (tuhiwai-smith 2003, p. 437). the effect of european settlement on australian indigenous peoples has been described as an “almost unrelieved tragedy”, with indigenous peoples remaining victims of “entrenched prejudices” (hallinan 1991, p. 71; tatz 2010). researchers such as morton-robinson (2000), tuhiwai-smith (2003) and rigney (1999) have all illustrated how the legacy of some research involving indigenous peoples has been one of disempowerment. in the past, indigenous peoples were often treated patronisingly or paternalistically, as subjects to be ‘observed’. within this paradigm, research became a tool and a condition of colonisation, with investigators constructing a power-knowledge nexus that served to marginalise local knowledge by controlling and defining it (holcombe 2006). the worst of this practice led non-indigenous researchers to enter a community and take knowledge out of it, with little long-term reciprocal engagement and knowledge exchange, and little or no consideration of local capability development (porsanger 2004). further, colonising research led to the view that in relation to indigenous peoples, their entire existence seemed to be a problem or a question for researchers, often formulated as “the … cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 121 (insert name of indigenous group) problem” or: “the … (insert name of indigenous group) question” (tuhiwai-smith 2003, p. 35). indeed, tuhiwai-smith argued that “problematising the indigenous is a western obsession” (2003, p. 35). finally, from an aboriginal perspective, australian scholar, fejo-king (2006), insisted that, as a result of these processes, indigenous peoples of the world have become the most researched population groups since the colonisation of their lands: in the past most researchers in australia privileged western knowledge, research methods and methodologies in undertaking research with australian indigenous peoples. the impact of this ideology has rippled out and touched all aspects of the life of australian indigenous peoples and continues to have profound implications for individuals, families, communities, and nations (fejo-king 2006, p. 2). fejo-king maintained that the term ‘research’ as heard, seen, and experienced by indigenous peoples, had become not just a dirty word, but a major tool by which the disempowerment of indigenous peoples continues today (examples of such research are discussed in briskman 2003; porsanger 2004; turnbull 2003). given this background and legacy, it became clear that there were major challenges and particular sensitivities associated with research into aboriginal and torres strait islander communities that would impact the study under discussion here. ii) power relationships and trust the second issue in the development of the research design was coming to terms with a potential power imbalance. pierre bourdieu’s conceptual framework of habitus, capital and field helped to provide structural insights into social and racial inequities. in bourdieusian terms, cultural capital refers to an accumulation of cultural knowledge, skills, and abilities possessed, inherited, and valued by privileged social groups in society. therefore, the researcher, a well-educated, highly literate, mature-aged, non-indigenous woman from a middle-class background, would be rich in cultural capital and, as such, be part of the dominant (non-indigenous) group within australian society (bourdieu & passeron 1977). white, middle-class society has assumed a standard of cultural dominance, with a tendency for other groups to be deemed deficient when compared to this ‘norm’ (yosso 2005). a major challenge, therefore, was for the researcher to earn the respect and trust of the indigenous research participants. there were significant differences between the researcher 122 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 and participants, including age, gender, cultural capital, and the researcher’s status as a nonindigenous person. there was a significant risk that these differences could hamper attempts to build communication, understanding and trust between the researcher and participants. dealing with the challenges i) dadirri the decision to conduct research with “one of the most researched populations in the world” (fejo-king, 2006, p. 4) was of immediate concern. as a result, the researcher undertook a review of indigenous research, while at the same time seeking a culturally appropriate pathway into engaging authentically with the world of aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples. it was found that researchers and writers (particularly those who come from nonindigenous backgrounds) have at times drawn on indigenous philosophies, images, metaphors and methodologies in an effort to better comprehend and clarify indigenous cultures, values and beliefs. examples of some of these are shown in table 1 below.2 the word dadirri belongs to the language of the ngangikurungkurr people of the daly river area of the northern territory and means ‘listening to one another’, but listening in contemplative/reciprocal relationships. dadirri has been called “the aboriginal gift” (ungunmerr, 1993, cited in atkinson 2000, p. 16). it is described as: another special quality of my people that i believe is the most important. it is our most unique gift. it is perhaps the greatest gift we can give to our fellow australians. in our language, this quality is called dadirri. this is the gift that australians are thirsting for […] it is inner deep listening and quiet still awareness—something like what you call contemplation (ungunmerr 1990, p. 34). the use of dadirri as a research methodology was articulated by professor judy atkinson, herself an aboriginal woman. working with a group of indigenous females of central queensland in the 1990s, atkinson was able to define and delineate a philosophical stance and an overarching set of principles for research practice. as atkinson (2000) explained: 2 it is significant to note the similarities that exist between some such concepts that reflect the diversity found in australian indigenous communities. for example, deep listening is a principle of inter-personal relations central to the cultures of aboriginal nations across the australian continent, and is found under a variety of names, such as dadirri, garma, winangargurri, yimbanyiara and ngara. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 123 [dadirri brings] a knowledge and consideration of community and the diversity and unique nature that each individual brings to community; ways of relating and acting within community; a non-intrusive observation, or quietly aware watching; a deep listening and hearing with more than the ears; a reflective non-judgmental consideration of what is being seen and heard; and, having learnt from the listening, a purposeful plan to act, with actions informed by learning wisdom and the informed responsibility that comes with knowledge (atkinson 2000, p. 16). table 1: indigenous philosophies theme people/region meaning alcheringa central australia a religious philosophy, embracing mythic ancestral heroes, their pastimes and everything associated with them. in the english language the philosophy is known as ‘the dreaming’. totemic groups central australia special or sacred places which mark the resting place or activity of the supreme beings. the concept connects aboriginal people inextricably to the land and all of creation and into a set of obligations and cultural practices. all aboriginal people are related to the species and to the landscape as kin, through the process of being born from a totemic site. in the english language the closest meaning is the word ‘kindredness’. ganma arnhem land a powerful metaphor relating to the meeting and mixing of two streams, a stream of salt water from the sea and a stream of fresh water from the land. the metaphor has meanings at surface and deep levels, and inside and outside meanings. yerin gurringgai as ganma. garma yolngu garma happens when people with different ideas and values come together and negotiate knowledge in a respectful learning environment. tjibari balgo a women's healing song, seen in stories, dance and artworks, which points out the responsibility of the women in aboriginal culture to raise and educate the children, in particular to teach the dreaming, in the face of commercial culture taking over as 'knowledge' of identity. ngara eora the word of the people of the eora nation for ‘listening’. kulini or pulgkara kulin tjugku pitjantjatjara really deep listening, and wanting to listen. gan’na bundjalung hearing, listening, feeling, thinking, and understanding. winangargurri gamilaraay deep listening (similar to dadirri). yimbanyiara central queensland listening to elders (similar meanings and responsibilities to dadirri). dadirri ngangikurungkurr deep listening and learning more than just ‘listening by the ear’, but ‘listening from the heart’. listening that happens in contemplative-reciprocal relationships. in recent years, dadirri has been consulted and deployed in research with indigenous people, particularly where complex cultural and personal issues have needed investigation (for 124 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 examples, see atkinson 2000; burrows 2004; gabb & mcdermott 2007; tanner, agius & darbyshire 2004). the researcher believed that dadirri could also inform her research project, and serve as an authentic pathway to try to appreciate how and why indigenous people function in their own cultures and environments. dadirri is not a research methodology in the western scientific tradition, yet it proceeds inductively by gathering information through quiet observation and deep listening, building knowledge through sensitivity and awareness, and developing understanding by contemplation and reflection (atkinson 2000). dadirri may operate at many levels, including at the deepest of levels, where there is a search for profound understanding. at that level, dadirri is “more than just listening by the ear, but listening from the heart” (atkinson 2000, p. 19), suggesting a depth of critical thinking and intensity of feeling. dadirri’s approach to research has the following associations with western methods and methodologies: • consciousness-raising: where a raised consciousness between the researcher and the researched gives value to community processes. • participatory action: recognition of the valuable contribution people make in their activities of relating, defining, and narrating their life experiences. • reciprocity: ethical research from within an indigenous worldview and critical pedagogy must be embedded with reciprocity—receiving something and giving something. • phenomenology: utilising a narrative approach enables the understanding between the inner world of an individual and the outer world (atkinson 2000). embracing the concept of dadirri was a critical step in this research, resulting in a raised awareness of factors that eventually proved vital—reciprocity and participatory action. ultimately, dadirri became an instrumental part of the author’s learning experience as a researcher. ii) other approaches to research other strategies were drawn upon to address cultural sensitivities and help to develop trust with participants. it was planned that the initial connection with participants would be made via a key contact, such as another athlete, a respected coach, or an indigenous program manager. the follow-up would be by telephone conversations, during which the terms of research would be discussed and negotiated in a friendly and transparent manner. following cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 125 that, it was hoped that a snowball effect (goodman 1961) would occur amongst potential participants (a snowball effect occurs where people encourage each other to be involved: if a few key people contact others, involvement gathers speed and size like a snowball rolling down a hill). the final step in the process of ensuring cultural sensitivity was to link with indigenous people who would be in a position to counsel the lead researcher and provide guidance. three respected members of tasmania’s aboriginal community agreed to participate in the research project and formed an advisory committee. the group met with the researcher regularly throughout the four-year study, providing advice and support, discussing the structure and methodology of the study, and eventually helping to identify emerging themes from the findings. in this way, the viewpoints of the indigenous advisory committee were an integral part of the lead author’s learning, research and interpretive process. a retrospect from the researcher: the author’s personal experiences of completing this research as a non-indigenous researcher this study was sometimes hard to undertake and involved me developing and improving my qualitative research skills. it took time to gain confidence in my ability to attain understanding in this area. as a researcher i had carefully planned my project to obtain as much relevant data as possible and to ensure the ethical guidelines were appropriately met. but at times i felt a great deal of personal limitation when dealing with the cultural differences between myself and participants. to a certain extent, some previous work experiences assisted me. firstly, while working with aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples in indigenous health in north queensland, i had developed a deep appreciation of the cultural diversities of these people. secondly, i had worked for many years as a sports coach, and had developed communication skills and empathy to be able to work effectively and closely with athletes—often from younger age groups—who had diverse socio-economic backgrounds. yet another challenge was that my supervisors were also non-indigenous. therefore, i had to look outside of my research team for answers to cultural questions. in this regard, the contribution of the advisory committee was invaluable. finally, the issue of developing trust with participants was confronted, and i believe overcome, as i embraced the values and 126 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 philosophies of dadirri. i strongly believe that committing to the essential practices of dadirri helped to reduce potential barriers to effective interactions and communication. methodology dadirri advocates an interpretive qualitative approach to research that links with traditional phenomenology; this allows investigators to understand and describe the ways in which individuals reflect on and experience their lifeworld (langdridge 2008, emphasis in original). in this study, qualitative methodology offered the researcher a greater insight into an individual’s understanding, meaning and experiences, this providing for the building of a story around the studied topic of sct (berglund 2001; ward & holman 2001).this is important, because qualitative research provides a platform for ‘discovering novel or unanticipated findings’ (bryman 1984, pp. 77-78), thereby allowing for ‘information rich cases’ to gain better understanding of the research area (price 2007). phenomenology has been adopted by different disciplines as an effective way of exploring research questions that lead to different ways of knowledge being constructed. however, the aim of the current study was to do more with the data than just “describe things in their appearing” (langdridge 2008, p. 1135), as this seemed to offer little potential for critique or possibility for re-conceptualising the phenomenon being studied (habermas 1971). as already explained, the intention to appraise the status quo and suggest reforms was a key research objective. thus a critical ‘lens’ for viewing and interpreting the thoughts and situations of the athletes was adopted. such an approach is described by langdridge (2008) as interpretive phenomenological analysis (ipa). the methodology has clear synergies with dadirri’s principles of listening, learning and thinking about what people are saying in a given context, and then acting on that knowledge to bring about change. the use of ipa in this study was ideal as it enabled detailed examination of the life-worlds of indigenous athletes. an aim of the research was to explore very personal experiences from the point of view of indigenous athletes, by focusing on the individual’s personal perceptions or accounts of their athletic retirement. this was quite different, for example, from an attempt to produce a generalised overview about the impact of sct for indigenous athletes. using ipa as a methodological approach, the research exercise became a dynamic process, with an active role for the researcher within that process. the researcher wished to get close to the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 127 participants’ personal world, to take an ‘insider’s perspective’, but could hardly do this directly or completely (tuhiwai-smith 2003). the participants were trying to make sense of their world; the researcher was trying to make sense of the participants’ attempts to make sense of this world. using ipa, the words of the participants in this study were viewed with both critical empathy and critical inquiry (langdridge, 2008). i) methods the athlete participants were 30 indigenous australian athletes who had retired from their sport (afl, nrl or boxing) within the past 20 years, or who were currently at elite levels. all of the participants were high performance competitors in their chosen sport. they volunteered to contribute to the research either through a sport organisation or by personal approaches using email or social media. after initial contact, a snowball sampling process ensued, with participants providing contact details of other indigenous athletes who might be interested in taking part. the participant group consisted of: • australian rules football (10) • boxing (14: 7 amateur, 7 professional) • national rugby league (6). consistent with previous studies conducted by non-indigenous researchers (see for examples atkinson 2000; dé ishtar 2005; kingsley et al. 2010) an open-ended and conversational approach to interviewing indigenous respondents was developed. the objective was for the voices of the athletes to be heard, allowing the collection of rich data based on the participants’ perspectives about athletic retirement (veal 2006). the interview guides were fluid, but drew specifically from the issues raised in the literature review—both in terms of sct research and in respect of indigenous athletes. this allowed key themes to emerge, such as social support resources, indigenous sport programs, athlete career and education programs, and recommendations for future indigenous sport programs. in seeking further explanation for the experiences of the athletes, other individuals were approached and interviewed. these 25 key stakeholders were current or retired coaches, managers, and officials from the clubs or associations where the athletes had been located. generally, they had direct involvement with indigenous player recruitment and/or welfare (development) programs. at the point of data collection, each participant was coded with a 128 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 pseudonym, their sport, current status and year of retirement. formal approval for the research was granted from the uts human ethics research committee. following data collection, the researcher embarked upon a process of coding the information to allow for critical interpretation, analysis and understanding. interviews were initially transcribed, checked for coherence, and then returned to participants; this was not simply about fact-checking, this was part of the collaborative process of creating knowledge. feedback and follow up points were welcomed from participants. transcripts were then coded using the constant comparative analysis of data approach, as outlined by glaser and strauss (1967). constant comparison can be undertaken deductively (i.e., codes are identified prior to analysis then looked for in the data), or inductively (i.e., codes emerge from the data) (leech & onwuegbuzie 2007). in this study, codes were developed using both methods of analysis. identifying themes and sub-themes deductively was done by referring to the literature. an example of deductive analysis is the four phases of the retirement experience. these were described by kerr and dacyshyn (2000) as (a) exiting sport, (b) nowhere land, (c) new beginnings and (d) moving on. a theme that emerged inductively was called engaging indigeneity. it was an obvious major theme that was identified by the occurrence and repetition of relevant topics. table 2 illustrates the themes that emerged from the data, and which formed the basis for analysis. table 2: table of themes and sub-themes major theme sub-theme engaging indigeneity 1. personal identity 2. indigenous heritage and culture 3. ‘natural athletes’ 4. family cohesion and connectedness athletic retirement 1. exiting sport 2. ‘nowhere land’ 3. new beginnings 4. moving on athlete career and education programs career choices and stereotyping support during and after sport cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 129 indigenous context of athletic retirement to ensure reliability of the coding process, a strategy recommended by miles and huberman (1994) was followed. this involved a series of meetings between the advisory committee members and the researcher. blank copies of the transcripts were re-coded. pleasingly, comparisons with the original coded transcripts demonstrated very high levels of code-recode reliabilities. findings i) dadirri in action: norman’s story to illustrate the deeply personal nature of the data collected in this project, the following is an excerpt from the interview with ‘norman’ (retired afl player). norman: probably in my last four years i wanted to walk away from it and hang up the boots, but i just stuck at it. i had my doubts for the last 4 years. so when i did retire – i mean my body couldn’t handle it, the level of the game, it was a very scary moment, a very very scary moment, because, um, my whole life was football. i didn’t know what to do. life after football – i didn’t know what i wanted to be, i didn’t know how to operate a computer, and a fax or a form, i didn’t know how to pay a bill, ‘cause everything was done for me through the club, and the bills were paid for. i went through a transition after football – i went back to [home town a regional australian city]. it was probably the best for me, now, when i think back now, probably the best move i ever made. eerr i lot of people don’t realise how i felt, this is a very scary time and i didn’t know where i wanted to go in life at the age of 32. i was comfortable financially. but i just didn’t know what i wanted to do. i ended up going to [home town] to pay football and to be with family. i went through a funny phase where i grew my hair long, and i went into a hermit crab shell. i just went through a funny phase for a year... researcher: what do you think you were looking for? norman: well, i was looking ... i knew i was [norman] the footballer, but i didn’t know who i was gunna be after football. and that was the confusion. i grew my hair down like as if was a drug lord or something. i had my hair right down to my shoulder, and had it in a ponytail. i did things that i normally wouldn’t do. i would just walk around; pack a bottle of water and my mobile phone. i wasn’t working. i’d just walk along the beach. and it was time that i just thought [about] what i wanted to do. like i said, i just had to find out who i was. and i spent a lot of money, drinking, going out a lot, partying, and spent a lot of money with a lot of mates, because i wasn’t sure what i wanted to do. researcher’s notes from project journal: language is much more than verbal and, during the interview, norman’s non-verbal communication was almost more powerful than his words. he sank back into his seat, hunched his shoulders, and 130 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 crossed his arms over his chest. from time to time he rubbed one hand over his cheek, and averted his eyes downwards. the tone of his voice was measured and deep and he appeared to be immersed in thought; brooding, dreaming, and wistful. clearly his story was intricate, intensely personal, and still difficult for him to share. nevertheless, he was keen to communicate something he felt to be of great significance both to him and to the research project. this required a huge mental effort and, for him at times, the ‘telling’ was draining. ii) a précis of participants’ recommendations the final phrase in dadirri advises that having ‘learnt from the listening’ one should then construct: [...] a purposeful plan to act, with actions informed by learning wisdom and the informed responsibility that comes with knowledge (atkinson 2000:16). the following reflections, suggestions, and recommendations for future practice were all contributed by the participant group in this study. they believed that a process was needed whereby indigenous athletes can negotiate an improved athletic retirement experience, and they suggested the following tactics, some or all of which may assist towards such an outcome: • recognising and accepting the deep variations that exist between indigenous and nonindigenous people’s beliefs and values. • providing culturally-appropriate support during sport careers and during their transition to the post-sport career from other indigenous people. the footballers believed that, ideally, each club required the full-time services of one indigenous staff member, while the boxers believed that there should be an indigenous support staff member closely linked with all programs set up to foster indigenous boxers. • mapping the retirement environment in advance, including pre-empting the specific potential difficulties and challenges relevant to indigenous athletes. • empowering indigenous athletes to take on leadership and decision-making opportunities. • providing vocational training that takes into consideration the cultural needs, aspirations, and obligations of indigenous people that is relevant to their unique situations. • providing ongoing cultural awareness training for sport officials, managers, and coaches. the objective in this research was for the voices of the athletes to be heard, thereby allowing the collection of rich data based on the participants’ perspectives about sct. these recommendations listed above would not have been possible without the influence of dadirri cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 131 in the interview process. participants developed trust in the researcher, and felt empowered to share their intensely personal reflections. in producing this list of needs and strategies, the athletes were calling for indigenous ways of knowing, being, and doing (martin 2003; yunkaporta 2009) both during sport and beyond. the tactics reflect many of the challenges that are present in australia, both within sport and in society more generally. these approaches are not intended to diminish the role and contributions of career and education programs already available for retiring athletes. rather, the athletes recognised that in addition to mainstream programs, they needed learning and support to complement their indigenous world views. this is consistent with the concept of dadirri as a bridge between indigenous and non-indigenous cultures. conclusion this article provides a model for conducting and improving qualitative research for nonindigenous researchers who want to engage with indigenous people in a research setting. the approach of dadirri can help non-indigenous researchers to deal with cultural sensitivities and build trust with indigenous participants. the research project was a journey not only for the researcher, but also for the participants involved, and by consulting and adhering to the methodological stance of dadirri, the study allowed the voices of the athletes to be heard. indeed, the way forward, or the “purposeful plan to act”, came from the athletes themselves. this knowledge had not been acquired prior to this research project, and consequently, the participants and the researcher reciprocally benefited during the research period. by conducting and embracing dadirri and thereby developing trust with participants, the research was able to provide an understanding of sct for indigenous male athletes. the athletes were not sceptical or doubtful of the researcher’s intentions, and were happy to discuss personal and complex issues, and relate their life experiences. ultimately, the thesis gave the participants an opportunity to demonstrate that indigenous athletes experience sct in complex and unique ways. as the researcher, dadirri opened my eyes, ears and heart. i learned deep listening and culturally respectful conversation. thus i was privileged to speak with some outstanding men who were going through—or had experienced—a time of intense change in their lives. 132 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 references atkinson, j. 2000, trauma trails, recreating song lines; the transgenerational effects of trauma in indigenous australia, spinifex press, melbourne. balym, t. 2014, 'troubled stars ian thorpe and grant hackett to be offered mentoring 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http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1045-3830.22.4.557 http://septentrio.uit.no/index.php/nordlit/article/viewfile/1910/1776 http://dx.doi.org/10.5172/conu.18.1-2.3 134 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 tuhiwai-smith, l. 2003, decolonising methodologies: research and indigenous peoples, university of otago press, otago. turnbull, p. 2003, 'ancestors, not specimens: reflections on the controversy over the remains of aboriginal people in european scientific collections', the electronic journal of australian and new zealand history. ungunmerr, m. 1990, dadirri: listening to one another, viewed 21 october 2008 http://www.freewebs.com/indigenous_sobriety/aboriginal%20australia/dadirri%20l istening%20to%20one%20another.pdf veal, a.j. 2006, research methods for leisure and tourism: a practical guide, 3rd edn, henry ling ltd, dorchester. ward, j. & holman, d. 2001, 'who needs a plan?' in c. berglund (ed.), health research, oxford university press, melbourne. yosso, t. 2005, 'whose culture has capital? a critical race theory discussion of community cultural wealth', race ethnicity and education, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 69-91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1361332052000341006 yunkaporta, t. 2009, aboriginal pedagogies at the cultural interface, james cook university, townsville. http://www.freewebs.com/indigenous_sobriety/aboriginal%20australia/dadirri%20listening%20to%20one%20another.pdf http://www.freewebs.com/indigenous_sobriety/aboriginal%20australia/dadirri%20listening%20to%20one%20another.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1361332052000341006 dadirri: reflections on a research methodology used to build trust between a non-indigenous researcher and indigenous participants abstract introduction background cultural considerations i) cultural sensitivities ii) power relationships and trust dealing with the challenges i) dadirri table 1: indigenous philosophies ii) other approaches to research a retrospect from the researcher: the author’s personal experiences of completing this research methodology i) methods findings i) dadirri in action: norman’s story ii) a précis of participants’ recommendations conclusion references 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the social in assessing for sustainability: fisheries in australia kate barclay university of technology, sydney abstract the notion that sustainability rests on three pillars – economic, environmental and social – has been widely accepted since the 1990s. in practice, however, the economic and environmental aspects have tended to dominate the sustainability agenda, and social aspects have been sidelined. two reasons for this are: 1) there is a lack of data collected about which to build meaningful pictures of social aspects of sustainability for populations over time, and 2) there is a lack of recognition of the role of social factors in sustainability, and a related lack of understanding of how to analyse them in conjunction with economic and environmental factors. this paper surveys the literature about sustainability in fisheries, focussing on australia, and focussing on the way social aspects have been treated. the paper finds that the problems that have been identified for assessing the social in sustainability in general are certainly manifest in fisheries. management of australian fisheries has arguably made great improvements to biological sustainability over the last decade, but much remains to be done to generate similar improvements in social sustainability for fishing communities. this is the case for governmentrun resource management as well as for initiatives from the private sector and conservation organizations as part of movements for corporate social responsibility and ethical consumerism. a significant challenge for improving sustainability in australian fisheries, therefore, lies in improving data collection on social factors, and in bridging disciplinary divides to better integrate social with economic and biological assessments of sustainability. assessing social factors in sustainability the question of sustainability came to international prominence with the publication of the brundtland commission report our common future in 1987, with its well-known definition of sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. concerns about environmental degradation from human activities had been gaining ground in the public arena since the 1960s so the ecological aspects of this perspective on sustainability were taken up relatively quickly, with governments collecting data on environmental impacts and (more or less) orienting their regulation of the economy to manage these. at the same time, however, the importance of the economy to governments and their populations, and powerful corporations, meant that the economic aspects of sustainable development remained high on the agenda. it was always recognized that social aspects of sustainability were important cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 39 intergenerational equity, the organization of economic activity and indeed the whole rationale for economic development are at root social phenomena. so, especially since the 1990s with john elkington coining the phrase ‘triple bottom line’ (elkington 1999), sustainability has often been depicted as resting on three equally important pillars of ecology, economy and society. the global reporting initiative (gri) came into existence with a system of guidelines for companies to report on their sustainability in terms of their environmental, economic and social performance. many of the world’s largest companies now use the gri format and report in this manner. despite the acknowledgement of the equal importance of the social in sustainability, however, there has been less success than for economic or ecological aspects of sustainability in defining the social aspects of sustainability, agreeing on indicators to measure them, systematically collecting data for that measurement and thus being able to track social sustainability and plan for it in governance. in the early 2000s the gri found that reporting on social performance was done less frequently and consistently than environmental reporting (global reporting initiative 2000, p.33). a large study on social aspects of sustainability by the western australian council of social services also found that government efforts at sustainability tended to focus on the environmental and economic aspects, leaving social aspects to ‘fall off the agenda’ (l. barron & e. gauntlet as quoted in mckenzie 2004, p.6). financial performance auditing processes are well established, and much progress has been made on environmental auditing standards, but there are few guidelines by which to construct a ‘meaningful social audit’ (mckenzie 2004, p.7). stephen mckenzie argues that the social is crowded out by most approaches to sustainability because they are either focussed on the economic, or on the environmental, and treat the social as subordinate in either case (mckenzie 2004). nevertheless, the imperative remains for governments and companies to report on social aspects of sustainability. various influential documents have increased the profile of social aspects of sustainability in recent years, especially since the global financial crisis. in 2009 the report by the commission on the measurement of economic performance and social progress (stiglitz et al. 2009) found that sustainability is about quality of life, which cannot be meaningfully measured by gross domestic product (gdp) alone but must also include other indicators. in the same year the european commission came out with gdp and beyond. measuring progress in a changing world (european commission 2009). the 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 oecd came out with measuring and fostering well-being and progress: the oecd roadmap (oecd 2009), as part of the same program that gave rise to the global project on measuring the progress of societies which encourages governments to improve the statistical information they collect on quality of life indicators (bijl 2011). there is still much to be done, however, in developing definitions of social sustainability, linking those to appropriate indicators, and collecting the data necessary for measurement. for example, according to kathryn davidson (2011), the australian government reports on measuring australia’s progress compiled by the australian bureau of statistics in 2004 and 2006 have no stated definition of sustainability. furthermore, the abs does have not have data sets oriented to reporting in the ways imagined in the oecd measuring progress of societies project, so has used proxy indicators with existing data sets that were devised for other purposes. social sustainability assessments have yet not been applied to many fisheries internationally, and where they have been the process of developing the assessment tools has often been slow. the united nations code of conduct for responsible fisheries, initiated in 1991, has always included social factors, with its objective being to establish principles ‘for responsible fishing and fisheries activities, taking into account all their relevant biological, technological, economic, social, environmental and commercial aspects’.1 however, the guidelines for incorporating social factors in fisheries management practices for the purposes of complying with the code have taken many years to develop and just become available in the last year.2 ‘rapfish’ is a rapid appraisal framework for assessing the sustainability of fisheries that had been applied in various countries by 2001 (pitcher & preikshot 2001). it also always included social factors, but in 2011 it was decided that rapfish had not addressed the ‘human dimension’ adequately so the framework was suspended and revised. the new version of rapfish collects and analyses data on use of local environmental knowledge, strength of social networks, equity and stability of distribution of benefits from fishing, consumer attitudes about sustainability, and rates of change in fishing operations (rapfish 2011).3 1 the fao code of conduct for responsible fisheries is available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm#1 . 2 rick fletcher, personal communication, email, 27 june 2012. see the ecosystem approach to fisheries (eaf), which the fao has adopted as the way to implement the code http://www.fao.org/fishery/eafnet/topic/166236/en . 3 as stated on the rapfish home page in september 2011, see http://www.rapfish.org/ . http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm#1� http://www.fao.org/fishery/eaf-net/topic/166236/en� http://www.fao.org/fishery/eaf-net/topic/166236/en� http://www.rapfish.org/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 41 defining and measuring social aspects of sustainability social aspects of sustainability may be understood in various ways. the literature on sustainability points to the utility of having an overarching conceptual framework for considering sustainability across different contexts, but having the details worked out to suit locally specific contexts. the validity of an assessment, and its value to the target community, depends on the details being worked out in consultation with local stakeholders. for example, the wuppertal institute of climate change and energy developed a ‘prism of sustainability’, with three points of a triangle representing the environment economy and society, and a forth connecting those three being ‘institutions’. the prism is used as a ‘compass’ to orient planning for sustainability in each location, but the set of indicators used for measurement and planning of sustainability are derived through stakeholder consultation in each location and thus vary from place to place (valentin and spangenberg 2000). one practical approach along these lines is to define sustainability as a social condition and then measure it with a set of indicators (mckenzie 2004). a possible overarching definition might be: ‘social sustainability is a life-enhancing condition within communities and a process within communities that can achieve that condition’ (mckenzie 2004, p.12). there are various kinds of indicators that may be used to measure the extent to which a particular fishery meets the general definition of social sustainability. the revised rapfish framework has six social attributes and five institutional attributes, each with a numerical measure (rapfish 2011). the rapfish model, however, is a ‘rapid’ appraisal tool so for more a more in depth understanding of the social aspects of sustainability other models should be considered. the social assessment handbook (schirmer & casey 2005) lists six types of information that may be gathered regarding fisheries: 1) history of fishing; 2) social profiles; 3) quality of life; 4) social capital; 5) values and beliefs of fishing groups and the wider community; and 6) spatial analysis of communities in relation to the fisheries resources they use. there is not space here to discuss the kinds of indicators that might be used under all of these headings, discussion below is limited to: quality of life, social capital and social profiles. quality of life is a key way of understanding the social aspects of any given phenomenon. quality of life may be measured by three different kinds of data. the first is economic indicators about people’s income and their capacity to buy goods and services, which over the decades have been fairly well considered and documented internationally. the second 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 type of indicator is other kinds of social data such as health and crime rates, which similarly are well established. the third type of data is subjective information about how people feel about their lives and societies. subjective measures of quality of life include satisfaction with life in general and satisfaction with work. since this type of data is not routinely collected, assessments of quality of life have to generate their own data through interviews and questionnaires, which means only small populations are covered and longitudinal data is rarely available. each type of indicator has strengths and weaknesses but a comprehensive picture of quality of life can only be achieved with a combination of all three types of data (diener & suh 1997). quality of life indicators overlap with several of the other types of indicators listed by schirmer and casey (2005). for example, the values and attitudes of fishermen affect their satisfaction with their work. attitudes and beliefs held by the wider community about fishing are related to the position of fishing families within society. quality of life is also often measured through an assessment of social capital. social capital, among other forms of capital, has been used in several approaches to measuring social sustainability (mckenzie 2004, pp. 15-16). social capital exists in people’s relationships and networks. it works through shared norms and values, and acts as capital in that trust and habits of reciprocity within relationships can facilitate action, including communal action. social capital can help with resilience in adapting to change, and also contribute to quality of life, particularly in terms of a sense of belonging and community. in some cases, however, the existence of social capital has been taken to mean the existence of social sustainability, and this assumption is problematic. different kinds of social capital, such as ‘bridging’ and ‘linking’ (connections across social groups, including to decisionmaking bodies) and ‘bonding’ (ties within a group), may mean different things for sustainability (brooks 2010). the two types can lead to different outcomes regarding the capacity for collective action to manage natural resources (ishihara & pascual 2009). power relations are key to the different ways social capital can work. for example, some kinds of strong social capital entrench inequity (bijl 2011). if marginalized groups’ perspectives are not taken account of in plans for collective action those groups may undermine the collective action (ishihara & pascual 2009). it is therefore important in using social capital data to assess for social sustainability to ask ‘sustaining what?’ and ‘for whom?’ (bijl 2011; mckenzie 2004) the kinds of data that can be used to assess social capital include information about the nature and frequency of interactions with family and friends, participation in social and community organizations, contacts with decision making bodies cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 43 outside the community, and relations between different groups within communities (schirmer & casey 2005). data on social capital is rarely collected by government agencies so like subjective data on quality of life, assessments of social capital need to generate their own data. the kinds of indicators that might be included in a social profile include: average and median age; gender ratios; dependency ratios; employment across different industries; income levels; household spending patterns; educational qualifications; health status; home ownership levels; economic diversity of local economy; occupational health and safety; number of years working in current occupation; generations of family involved in that occupation; and numbers of people dependent on people working in a sector. these may constitute indicators for social sustainability in that an aging population, or one with economic prospects markedly below that of the surrounding community, may be unstable. data for these indicators can come from abs census data, occupational licence data, and also be collected via interviews and questionnaires (schirmer & casey 2005). social assessment in australian fisheries the position of social factors within understandings of sustainability in australian fisheries reflects the broader international trends, with ecological concerns having been taken up first, and then over the last few years more effort put in to capturing the social aspects of sustainability. in 1992 the australian government formally responded to the sustainable development movement that arose from the brundtland report with a national strategy for ecologically sustainable development (esd). in 1999 the commonwealth environment protection and biodiversity conservation (epbc) act provided a regulatory framework for the management of australia’s natural resources. in 2000 the various fisheries agencies and major stakeholder groups in australia came together in a workshop to work out how to implement esd in fisheries. a range of projects emerged from that process to incorporate esd principles into fisheries and aquaculture management and to set up systems for reporting accordingly (millington & fletcher 2008; fletcher et al. 2002; 2005). the overarching plan divided esd into components under three main categories of ecological well-being, human well-being and ability to contribute. in considering the contributions of a fishery to human well-being the esd assessment manual for wild capture fisheries (fletcher et al. 2003) broke this down into component trees for national socio-economic well-being and community well-being, each with a one-page set of possible objectives, indicators, performance measures 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 and data requirements, but most of the work on esd at that stage was on the ecological wellbeing side of the sustainability equation. the social side was taken up in the social assessment handbook: a guide to methods and approaches for assessing the social sustainability of fisheries in australia (schirmer & casey 2005) and an extensive literature review of social and economic evaluations methods for fisheries (vieira et al. 2009). since 2005 the australian fisheries research and development corporation (frdc) has funded several studies into the social aspects of aquaculture (brooks et al. 2010), the western rock lobster industry (huddleston & tonts 2007), the south australian marine scalefish fishery (schirmer & pickworth 2005), the commercial fishing industries in northern new south wales (harrison 2010) and also a research audit of social sciences fisheries research (clarke 2010). the recent application of an ecosystem based fisheries management (ebfm) framework to australia’s west coast bio-region included ‘social amenity’ and ‘social risk’ among six factors used to prioritize fisheries issues (fletcher et al. 2010). the frdc has also published a report spelling out very clearly the value of social science research to natural resource management, and giving an overview of some of the main social science methodologies and how they may address particular issues in resource management, including for fisheries (brooks et al. 2011). notwithstanding all the work that has gone on in recent years to incorporate the social into consideration of sustainability in australian fisheries and aquaculture, as in the broader field of sustainability internationally, there remain serious stumbling blocks over implementing social assessments. brooks et al. (2010) found that esd principles cannot be properly implemented in aquaculture until there is more reporting on relevant socio-economic indicators. furthermore, the social is still not well integrated with the biological and economic in assessing for sustainability. dowling (2011) found that widespread misunderstandings about the role of women in fisheries in australia meant a corresponding misunderstanding of the social basis for sustainability. in 2005 the south australian marine scalefish fishery was restructured for ecological reasons (to combat overcapacity). the restructure had positive economic outcomes for the fishermen who remained in the fishery, because of reduced competition (brooks 2010). the restructure, however, did not take social aspects into consideration, even though a large social assessment had been undertaken just before the restructure (schirmer and pickworth 2005). another social assessment done after the restructure, building on the earlier social assessment, found that the restructure cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 45 exacerbated social fragmentation among commercial fishing groups and their connections to potentially useful networks outside their industry, and restricted opportunities for succession planning (brooks 2010). so despite the restructure having generated ecological and economic improvements in the fishery, the long-term sustainability of the fishery seems likely to be derailed by not having taken social factors into consideration. in reviewing the progress of esd in australian fisheries in 2008 the stakeholders found there was still a gulf between ecological research and socio-economic studies on fisheries, and furthermore that there was ‘a real capability gap in social scientists who can examine the human behavioural element within an nrm [natural resource management] context’ (millington and fletcher 2008, 12). the 2009 audit of social science in fisheries in australia found that no studies tackled integrated economic, social and ecological (triple bottom line) decision-making (clarke 2010). australian fisheries management has successfully improved the biological aspects of sustainability over the last decade, but not in balance with social aspects. up to the early 2000s the number of fish stocks in australia classified as overfished or overfishing (on the way to being overfished) had been steadily increasing, with around 40% of fished stocks being fished too hard. by 2010 this situation had been turned around, with only around 15% of the fished stocks still being fished too hard, and signs of stock recovery being seen in some of the previously overfished stocks (woodhams et al. 2011). one of the main policies implemented widely in australia to improve ecological outcomes since the 1990s has been individual transferable quotas (itqs), which require fishermen4 4 although not all people who fish are men, english language fishing groups usually prefer to be called ‘fisherman/men’ rather than gender neutral terms such as ‘fisher/s’. to buy an amount of catch in advance and stick within that limit. another is marine protected areas (mpas), which create spatial zones where fishing activity is limited or banned. arguably these measures prioritized biological sustainability, and have been implemented without a clear understanding of how they affect social sustainability. both of these measures have radically changed the ways fishing business is done, and pushed people out of the industry. having people leave a biologically or economically unsustainable industry need not be socially a bad thing, especially if this process is understood and planned for in restructuring plans. at least in some cases, however, the changes caused by management measures had wholly unanticipated social effects, in that the socio-economic group that had been doing the fishing was marginalized because they did not have the skills or cultural capital to engage in the 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 fishery under new conditions requiring much more complex accounting systems and connections with markets (minnegal & dwyer 2010). corporate social responsibility and ethical consumerism in seafood retail the preceding discussion has focussed on public issues of resource management, to be achieved through government policy in conjunction with industry and other stakeholders. there are, however, also measures being taken by the private sector to improve sustainability, including for social aspects. like efforts in the public sector, private sector attempts to assess social factors in sustainability suffer from the dual problem of a lack of available data on social factors, and a lack of understanding of how to integrate analysis of social factors with economic and biological factors. there is a growing trend internationally of branding products at the point of retail in a way that provides consumers with information about the social and environmental conditions under which the product was made. in the mid 1990s this trend took off in fisheries with the sustainable seafood movement. within a few years there were various interventions at the point of retail, such as consumer guides like one developed by the monterrey bay aquarium in the usa, and eco-labels such as the marine stewardship council (msc) ‘blue tick’. these retail interventions are based on the assumption that consumers want to shop in a socially responsible way, and one way to enable consumers to do this is by having a reputable nongovernmental organization (ngo) show via a guide or a label that certain products are more ethical than others. eco-labels and consumer guides, however, may not always act in the ways ngos hope they will. one issue with these retail interventions is that the image of the ethical consumer upon which they are premised is problematic. while surveys often show that consumers say they would like to have more information about the social responsibility of the products they buy, and that they would be willing to select responsible products over others and pay more for them, comprehensive studies of what people actually buy and their willingness ‘at the checkout’ to pay more for socially responsible products reveal that most consumers are more influenced by price and functionality than by social considerations (devinney et al. 2010). studies on ethical consumerism in seafood, have found that even consumers who are concerned about overfishing generally do not shift from a ‘more preferred less sustainably fished’ species to a ‘less preferred more sustainably fished’ one because of this (johnston & cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 47 roheim 2006). furthermore, seafood guides that use the ‘green, yellow, red’ schema may confuse consumers because there are inconsistencies between guides produced by different organizations using different bases for their judgements (roheim 2009). some studies also show that the implementation of seafood eco-labels may not necessarily improve the sustainability of fishing practices but be more about complying with new reporting standards (ponte 2008; ward 2008). this is similar to what some researchers have found with the global reporting initiative, companies may use these systems as ways to present themselves publically as socially responsible without necessarily changing mindsets or practices within organizations to improve sustainability (moneva et al. 2006). nevertheless, the boom in eco-labelled seafood proceeds apace. it is yet to be strongly felt in australian food retail, but has been an influential part of the scene in europe and north america for most of the last decade. in 2006 walmart declared it would aim to have all of its fish products certified by the msc, and by 2012 76 per cent of its wild-caught seafood was certified. most large european retail chains also have seafood sustainability policies including eco-labelling. in 2012 target became the latest large us retailer to make a similar declaration, that all of its wild-caught seafood, including canned, fresh and frozen, would be certified as sustainable by 2015 (atuna.com 2012). in 2011 a consortium of pacific islands countries whose combined waters make up the with the richest skipjack fishing grounds in the world achieved msc certification for a certain kind of fishery conducted in their waters that supplies a significant proportion of the world’s canned tuna.5 when the msc eco-label certification process was created in the late 1990s it was intended to cover all three pillars of sustainability, but due to the complexity of a triple bottom line assessment ended up doing only biological sustainability assessment.6 5 see the pacifical website: since then progress has been made in applying social criteria in eco-labelling for aquaculture products. the best aquaculture practices (bap) label and wwf certifying standards for pangasius, shrimp and tilapia exported from southeast asia include several social criteria (wwf 2009; global aquaculture alliance 2010). the fairtrade foundation, which has always had a social focus, is currently working on certifying its first aquaculture product, shrimp from asia, for uk markets (partos 2011). two forms of social certification are also being considered by canned http://www.pacifical.com/ . 6 duncan leadbitter, personal communication, email, 27 august 2011. http://www.pacifical.com/� 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 tuna processors in pacific island countries – from the business social compliance initiative (bsci) and social accounting international (sa 8000).7 fieldwork interviews i conducted in april 2012 in papua new guinea revealed that several tuna processors are moving ahead with sa 8000 certification, and that this is necessitating changes in some human resources practices – such as extending options for collective bargaining and improving health services for employees. one manager of a processing company said this was because their main buyer was planning to use the msc label, and wanted the social certification to go with it, as part of the branding for that product (preston et al forthcoming). the development of a new eco-label in australia, sustainable australian seafood (sas), shows the difficulties inherent in instituting a social assessment of sustainability in fisheries, compared to a biological assessment. several years ago the non-government organization (ngo) the australian conservation foundation (acf) perceived a need in australia for an independent assessment process for sustainable seafood. the need was identified in calls from seafood consumers wanting information to help them make sustainable seafood choices. the seafood industry also wants to enhance the sustainability of its operations while working on the marketing and promotion of wild-catch and farmed seafood products. the msc system offers an independent assessment process for sustainable wild-catch seafood, but it can be very expensive to gain msc certification, and the reporting requirements to achieve and maintain certification can be onerous for small-scale producers. the acf felt it was important to have a process that also covered aquaculture and would be easier for small-scale producers. the sas approach was adapted from the monterey bay aquarium’s seafood watch approach to establishing recommendations about specific seafood products. fisheries are classified as ‘green’ if they are found to be ecologically sustainable, ‘yellow’ if they have some areas to work on to achieve a ‘green’ status, and ‘red’ for fisheries that are unsustainable. the acf aims to work with retailers (usually restaurants) in using the system, as a way of encouraging retailers to think about and improve the sustainability of the products they source. the acf felt that to ensure credibility the assessment should be designed and carried out by an independent panel of scientists. the acf worked with marine biologists to set up an independent, university-based group to develop the criteria used to assess fisheries. the 7 see http://www.bsci-intl.org/ ; http://www.sa-intl.org/ . http://www.bsci-intl.org/� http://www.sa-intl.org/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 49 information used to make assessments against these criteria includes information in the public domain, for example, state-based fisheries status reports and fisheries assessments under the commonwealth environment protection and biodiversity conservation (epbc) act. it also includes data and knowledge provided by producers or suppliers, and evidence from conservation organizations such as reports from the marine stewardship council ecolabel certification process. in 2008 and 2009 a set of biological assessment criteria were drafted, work-shopped with scientists and fishermen, and preliminary assessments of several wild-caught and aquaculture products were conducted. this process was used to develop the assessment criteria into a form that would be suitably rigorous but also workable as an ongoing project for the acf as a charitable ngo to manage with limited resources. a small science research team collates the data on a fishery which is being assessed, which is provided to a science reference panel that then looks at the data against the specified criteria, seeks further input from key informants where there are gaps in or questions about the data, and makes a decision. in 2010 a pilot project applied the criteria to five seafood products from around australia. assessment was rolled out further over 2011 and 2012. the assessments are to be reviewed periodically.8 setting the sas system up was facilitated by the existence of two things. one was existing data about the biological sustainability of fisheries in an easily accessible and usable format, in the form of reports to government under the epbc act. the other was models of acting on assessments in the form of seafood guides and eco-labels that have been running internationally for several years. neither of these things exists in the same way for assessing social aspects of sustainability. the bap, wwf and fairtrade systems of assessing and labelling have only just been implemented, so do not as yet offer a tried and tested model. in addition, these are only for aquaculture, and are specifically designed for a developing country context. for example, some of their key criteria are about child labour and forced labour, which are not relevant for australian contexts. the bsci and sa 8000 certifications are also a useful starting point. these systems, however, are designed for assessing working conditions of employees, whereas many people working in australian fisheries are owneroperators. considering the social sustainability of fishery entails looking at the entire community, not just employment conditions. so existing models of implementing assessments are not such a good fit for social sustainability criteria, and would require more 8 for further details on the sas assessment process see http://blog.acfonline.org.au/css/. http://blog.acfonline.org.au/css/� 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 work and testing to be adapted. neither is the existing information about social factors as good a fit as the epbc act data was for the biological aspects of the sas initiative. the epbc act data is for the same purpose – biological sustainability of fisheries – and collected by one main agency. there is no data collection for the purpose of understanding social aspects of sustainability in fisheries, so data collected by various agencies for other purposes would have to be pulled together, and there would still be big gaps (subjective measures of quality of life and indicators on social capital, for example). in other words, the social data that exists is less suitable, it would require more effort to access and would need to be supplemented by additional primary data collection. the human hours this extra work entails, especially the data collection and analysis, is expensive, so these problems amount to a disincentive for charitable ngos to commit to certifying for social sustainability. conclusion the social in sustainability has been subordinated to economic and biological considerations. this is apparent in australian fisheries, where there have been considerable improvements in biological sustainability in recent years, but where despite increased effort to include the social there remains a lack of data by which to assess social factors, and an evident lack of understanding of the way social, economic and biological factors interact in fisheries management. this pattern is visible both in government policies, and in private sector moves to address sustainability via corporate social responsibility and eco-labelling; biological factors began being addressed over the last decade or so, with social factors just starting 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community sustainability indicators’, environmental impact assessment review, vol. 20, pp. 381-392. vieira, s., schirmer, j. and loxton, e. 2009, social and economic evaluation methods for fisheries: a review of the literature, fisheries research contract report no. 21, department of fisheries, western australia. ward, t.j. 2008, ‘barriers to biodiversity conservation in marine fishery certification’, fish and fisheries, vol. 9, pp. 169-177. woodhams, j., stobutzki, i., vieira, s., curtotti, r. and begg, g. a. (eds.) 2011, fishery status reports 2010: status of fish stocks and fisheries managed by the australian government, australian bureau of agricultural and resource economics and sciences, canberra. wwf. 2009, international standards for responsible tilapia aquaculture, world wildlife fund, inc., 17 december. the social in assessing for sustainability: fisheries in australia kate barclay cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 56 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia locating cosmopolitanism within academic mobility liudmila kirpitchenko deakin university abstract intensified academic mobility is an enticing platform for examining the emerging manifestations of cosmopolitanism in expanding intercultural encounters. cosmopolitanism calls for a dialogue between cultures and for reciprocal appropriation and internalisation of cultures within one’s own culture. this paper endeavours to locate empirical evidence on evolving cosmopolitanism in everyday intercultural interactions and academic experiences. it is guided by the methodological applications of cosmopolitanism and the way cosmopolitanism is redefining the sociological frame of reference. this paper presents discussion and empirical testing of three defining features of cosmopolitanism according to beck (2002): globality, plurality and civility. mirroring these guiding principles, this research attempted to identify and analyse cosmopolitan values and dispositions in everyday intercultural encounters, discourses, situations and experiences. this paper presented an argument that cosmopolitan values and dispositions tend to create mutually beneficial conditions for intercultural inclusion and academic mobility provides a fertile ground for their current and future exploration. introduction this article focuses on the opportunities and preconditions for knowledge sharing which exist within the processes of ever-expanding transnational academic mobility, defined as international mobilities of tertiary students and staff for educational purposes. it is set to explore global intercultural encounters and intensified everyday interactions of diverse ethnic identities, cultural patterns and knowledge traditions, all in the context of increasing transnational knowledge mobility. this research anticipates an innovative look at academic migrants and mobile scholars as important agents of knowledge translation. it endeavours to uncover effective ways for understanding knowledge flows, exchange and translation in the new flexible, liquid and mobile intercultural academic environment. previous research has suggested that intercultural scholarly encounters can bring about misunderstandings and refusing the other (marginson & sawir 2011; matthews & sidhu 2005), but they also have enormous potential for knowledge cross-fertilisation and enrichment. it has been observed that intercultural exchanges of dissimilar cultural patterns cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 57 have a propensity to generate shared beliefs and cosmopolitan attitudes (wise 2009). contemporary intercultural encounters are widely assumed as sites for emanating cosmopolitan perceptions of cultural inclusion (rovisco & nowicka 2011). cosmopolitan values tend to provide feelings of unity and community cohesion and are conducive to intercultural affinities (or commonalities) in understanding social inclusion (vasta 2012). positive dynamics of intercultural encounters have been described as leading to a formation of a shared cosmopolitan understanding of cultural inclusion (noble 2009). this paper is an initial attempt to test these positive assumptions in relation to intercultural encounters among mobile scholars. academic mobility in recent decades, the scholarly community witnessed the increased mobility of university students and scholars thanks to a number of academic mobility programs. the futures of increasingly international academic communities contemplate growing opportunities for intermixing of diverse ethno-cultural identities, cultural patterns and scholarly traditions. academic mobilities of tertiary students and staff for scholarly career purposes are on the increase worldwide. in this research, academic mobility is seen as a part of the continuing changes in the teaching and learning processes that academic institutions are undergoing globally. these changes are often termed ‘internationalisation of education’ and they are expressed in the transformations in both the curricula and the recruitment practices for students and staff (agoston & dima 2012). internationalisation of education responds to the needs of preparing graduates for a globalised society and it inevitably alters the ways knowledge is transferred, exchanged and created in academia and beyond. academic mobility is a growing phenomenon worldwide and australia is one of the leading countries in promoting edubusiness (ball 2012), where the education sector is seen as having a business rationale of generating economic revenues. australia has been receiving substantial economic, cultural and intellectual benefits from the inflows of people, skills, knowledges and ideas (hawthorne 2005; arunachalam & healy 2009). academic mobilities have often been accompanied by a growing migration of knowledge workers. international flows of highly skilled migrants including international students and scholars has been steadily high in the last decades, and research on the positive outcomes of academic mobility is gaining its recognition and urgency worldwide (kenway & fahey 2006; 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 2009). most significantly, there is a growing body of research on the educational prerequisites for success in internationalised academia (abdallah-pretceille 2003; 2007) and on the best practices of intercultural dialogue in academia worldwide (boesmans 2007). knowledge mobility is investigated alongside contiguous concepts, such as knowledge sharing, transfer, exchange, translation, mobilisation and creation (e.g., graham et al. 2006; williams 2006). how knowledge is shared and what preconditions are necessary for successful knowledge transfer is an interesting topic in itself, but it becomes even more compelling when knowledge is being shared across diverse cultures and continents (asad 1986). academic migrants and mobile scholars have been perceived as important agents of intercultural knowledge flows (kim 2010) and this project is set to explore this topic by looking at the agency of scholarly migrants and their capacities to attain cosmopolitan attributes. mobile scholars are perceived as being more prone to developing cosmopolitan outlooks and dispositions, as marotta (2010, p.105) observes, ‘cosmopolitan strangers develop a more perceptive, broader and keener insight than those confined to either a particular or universal perspective’. the purpose of my research is to explore empirical evidence on the academic interactions of diverse cultures in order to advance our understanding of the processes of knowledge exchange, transfer, and ultimately knowledge creation. internationalised education signifies inclusion of multiple cultures where teaching and learning become not only multicultural by promoting inclusion, but also intercultural by sustaining interactive learning practices. intercultural education opens the doors to intermixing, combining and interchanging multiple cultures. intercultural encounters inevitably involve knowledge translation which means much more than a one-way linear diffusion of knowledge. successful knowledge translation includes interactive practices, such as collaboration, linkages, sharing and exchanges of cultural perspectives. this project benefits from utilising insider research methods, as the researcher has been actively engaged in these interactive practices, and she has been a part of transnational academic mobility as a participant and a researcher for a number of years. these transnational academic mobility experiences have helped the researcher to develop an insider’s viewpoints on the intricacies of intercultural dialogue in the milieu of internationalised education and transnational knowledge mobility. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 59 the global scholarly community has become increasingly aware of academic mobilities after many programs for academic mobility exchanges were introduced within the evolving and expanding european union. they include erasmus, socrates, marie curie, tempus and others. the most prominent and widespread of them remains erasmus, which stands for european community action scheme for the mobility of university students. the erasmus program started in the european union in 1987 as a program for student exchange, and with its newer addition of erasmus mundus, it now extends beyond europe and truly involves the global community. academic mobility is an ever-growing phenomenon and mobile scholars or academic migrants have been portrayed as a very enticing research target group because of their unique cosmopolitan propensities and outlooks. according to bryan turner (2013), the academic professional elites are a very promising and fruitful subject of study, and much can be learnt from their trajectories of success. yet, they rarely become a focus of exploration for the social scientists and my research aims at addressing this knowledge gap. mobile scholars and academic migrants can be perceived as unique in displaying a new cosmopolitan spirit of constantly looking outwards and embracing our increasingly liquid modernity and cosmopolitan outlooks. as examples of the ‘real cosmopolitan communities’, jeremy waldron (1992, p. 777) cites the ‘international community of scholars (defined in terms of some shared specialisation), [and] the scientific community… [who] effortlessly transcend national and ethnic boundaries … to pursue common and important projects under conditions of goodwill, cooperation, and exchange throughout the world’. my research seeks to test and provide empirical evidence for this thesis. mobile scholars and academic migrants this study focuses on the experiences of the skilled, highly mobile and often migrating groups: mobile scholars and academic immigrants. interviewees for this paper include international postgraduate students, postdoctoral researchers and mobile academic staff. academic migrants are a promising subject for study since they possess unique characteristics which are rarely found in other professional immigrant groups. academic migrants have higher levels of education (postgraduate degrees) and more diversified international professional experience compared to other skilled migrant groups. in turn, immigrant-receiving countries provide ample incentives for targeting mostly educated, experienced and affluent groups of migrants. consequently, academic migrants have a greater propensity for global mobility, and more diversified options for temporary or permanent 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 migration. academic migrants are more likely to be engaged in the newer types of migration patterns, such as: hyper-mobility, circular migration, return migration and shuttle migration. traditionally, migration has been viewed as a one-time mobility with a view of a permanent settlement; migrants were less likely to move again once settled. nowadays this traditional way of migration is becoming less appealing, as we witness increased complexities of migration patterns. hugo (1999) termed this shift ‘a new paradigm in international migration’ and noted that new fluid mobility patterns are becoming more complex and diversified (hugo 2006a; 2008). as ho & bedford (2008, p. 53) observe: ‘the distinctions between temporary and permanent migration are becoming blurred’. khoo, hugo & mcdonald (2008 , p. 195) agree, adding that ‘nevertheless, there has been a tendency to dichotomize permanent settlement and temporary migration as though they are two quite separate and unrelated processes’. this complexity of mobility patterns pertains not only to nuclear families, but also to the mobility between family members. for example, new patterns of migration and corresponding interesting terminology have been proposed recently. in new zealand, ho (2002) and ho & bedford (2008) conducted research among bi-local asian families who were termed ‘astronaut’ families, in which one or both parents decided to return to their countries of origin to work, leaving their children to be educated in the new country. children who are left to study in the new country are termed ‘parachute kids’ (ho & bedford 2008). couples without children are termed ‘cosmonauts’ and they are even more likely to stay outside of their new country for prolonged periods (nzis 2000). academic migrants display newer tendencies for liquid mobility, similarly to some other professional and entrepreneur groups. they are more likely to adopt a new cosmopolitan spirit of being open to malleability, constantly looking outwards, challenging old rigid social migration constructs and embracing our increasingly liquid modernity of global mobility (kirpitchenko 2011). academic migration allows us to look at migration in a new way: not as a clearly defined pattern of people’s moving to a settler location, but as a more fluid pattern of malleable international mobility. thus professional migrants are a very suitable subject of research on mobility in the age of post-modernity. additionally, academic migrants form an enticing research group because it can be argued that they tend to be better equipped for smooth international integration: they tend to have broad liberal education, knowledge of the host language, prolonged international cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 61 exposure, greater openness to diversity of ideas, and general cosmopolitan outlooks. it can be assumed that this group will be easily integrated in any international environment because academic migrants may not face any solid barriers to integration, such as a necessity to learn the language or to learn a new skill or profession. their barriers to integration tend to take a more subtle, liquid and culturally defined form. scholars tend to agree that research on academic mobility is in its nascent state worldwide (kehm & teichler 2007; kenway & fahey 2006; 2009). this emerging field of research witnessed its inaugural conference in finland in 2006. conference participants were mainly engaged in drawing conclusions from the highly successful erasmus program on student mobility within the european union. it was noted that academic staff mobility is growing alongside student mobility, yet academic professional mobility remains under-studied and under-researched internationally. many countries of the expanding european union present opportunities for academic mobility. at the same time, the leading immigrant-receiving countries – australia, canada and new zealand – have enhanced their immigrant recruitment techniques to attract highly educated and experienced people, reflecting a political shift in immigration policies, from family reunification to skilled selection (hugo 2006a; 2006b; arunachalam & healy 2009). it was observed at the conference that despite all the opportunities that the expanding european union is offering, eastern european scholars seem increasingly to be migrating outside the european continent, mostly to north america and australia. nonetheless, only a modest body of research exists on academic mobility outside europe. the first academic mobility conference provided a glimpse into the amount and quality of research on academic mobility that has been done in europe (dervin & suomela-salmi 2006). existing research is mainly concentrated on the differences in academic expectations among non-native students and staff in the modes of academic writing (durkin 2004; 2007), critical reading (angelova & riazantseva 1999), and academic interpersonal relations (kirpitchenko 2007; zharkova-fattore 2007). research is growing on the educational prerequisites for success in academic intercultural dialogue (abdallah-pretceille 2003; 2007) and on the best practices of intercultural dialogue in academia internationally (boesmans 2007). the main conclusion from the conference was summarised by abdallah-pretceille (2007): ‘mobility without education is nothing but ruin to the soul’ which parodies the famous formula of rabelais, ‘science without conscience is nothing but ruin to the soul’. mobility presupposes 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 education and this study endeavours to shed light on some educational prerequisites for migration which can be termed cosmopolitan dispositions. the second academic mobility conference was meant to build on this emerging theme and it was held in estonia in 2009. it was the third international conference on academic mobility and migration held in 2012 that marked a shift in how academic mobility is approached. the conference themes suggested two important changes to the scholarly perceptions of academic mobility. firstly, by adding academic migration to its title it admitted that mobility and migration often accompany one another. secondly, by holding the conference at the kuala lumpur international university, the conference extended its reach to asia-pacific academic mobility in recognition of this geographical region that has an increasingly active participation in global scholarly mobilities. within the asia-pacific region, australia is one of the preferred destinations for academic mobilities and the country strives to compete globally to remain one of the largest net beneficiaries of ‘brain gain’ (beine, defoort & docquier 2007). this expanded vision of fluid academic mobility presents a chance to study global intercultural encounters and test emerging cosmopolitan values and dispositions. cosmopolitanism re-envisioned the concept of cosmopolitanism has recently re-emerged in scholarly writings and has received keen attention among social scientists globally (e.g., kendall, woodward & skrbis 2009; van hooft 2009). reborn interest in cosmopolitanism has been sustained by our heightened perceptions of increased mobility, globalisation, transnationalism, individualisation and associated cosmopolitanisation. the modern understanding of cosmopolitanism is generally attributed to immanuel kant’s universalistic theory of ethics (toumlin 1990). in vertovec and cohen’s (2002) summarising definition, cosmopolitanism has five main facets: sociocultural condition, a philosophy, a multifaceted political project, attitudes and, finally, competences. cosmopolitanisation thesis is a part of the overall new framework for analysing social dynamics ‘which helps to overcome methodological nationalism’ (beck 2002, p.18). following beck’s (2002, 2006) lead, studies on cosmopolitanism are multiplying, as they are diversifying. this attention to cosmopolitanism can be explained in part by the exacerbated global social changes that marked the new stage in the postmodern period. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 63 the central defining characteristic of a cosmopolitan perspective is dialogic imagination which means an imaginary practice of entering into conversation with the other and creating a dialogue with diverse cultures. ultimately, ‘dialogic imagination’ refers to appropriation and internalisation of cultures and rationalities within one’s own life, and creation of the ‘internalised other’ (beck 2002). the dialogic imagination corresponds to the coexistence of rival ways of life in the individual experience, which makes it a matter of importance to express quintessential openness (hannerz 1996) to reflect, understand, combine and embrace contradictory certainties. the national perspective is a monologic imagination, which excludes the otherness of the other, as beck (2002) has been very vocal in arguing. the cosmopolitan perspective is an alternative imagination, an imagination of alternative ways of life, cultures and rationalities, which necessarily include the otherness of the other. it highlights the importance in observing the processes of interpenetrations between various cultures of the world, the processes that are often described as interculturation. ideas of every culture exist ‘side by side, in combination, comparison, contradiction and competition in every aspect of human experience’ (beck 2002, p. 18). these processes of interculturation are continuing as they are imminent and inevitable. this research is guided by the methodological applications of cosmopolitanism and the way cosmopolitanism is redefining the sociological frame of reference. three central ways of redefinition, according to beck (2002, pp. 35-36), are: globality, plurality and civility. globality describes openness to the world, awareness of a globally defined sphere of responsibility, and globally shared collective futures. plurality is an acknowledgement of the otherness of others and commitment to ‘stimulate the self-reflexivity of divergent entangled cosmopolitan modernities’. civility defines commitment to dialogue, soft power and nonviolence (beck 2002, pp. 35-36). these three features of the cosmopolitan society will be discussed in relation to my empirical data collected among academic migrants. an objective of this discussion is to examine empirical evidence of growing cosmopolitan values and dispositions in everyday social interactions. guided by these three fundamental features – globality, plurality and civility – this study approaches cosmopolitanism as an open-ended and welcoming disposition. hannerz (1996, p. 104) proposed a classical definition of cosmopolitanism that effectively captures all these features – he wrote that cosmopolitanism can be viewed as an ‘orientation, a willingness to 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 engage with the other ... intellectual and aesthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity’. similarly, calcutt, woodward & skrbis (2009, p. 172) stress universal features and maintain that ‘cosmopolitanism includes kantian universalism, cross-cultural competence, and either a willingness to tolerate or engage with otherness’. the idea that ‘willingness to engage with the other’ leads to better societal-wide outcomes is central in a very influential work conducted by florida (2002; 2005) on global competition for talent. skrbis & woodward (2007, p. 730) isolate openness as a key feature of cosmopolitanism and add that ‘cosmopolitans espouse a broadly defined disposition of “openness” toward others, people, things and experiences whose origin is nonlocal’. being open and being attuned to different cultures on many levels has been considered a necessary cultural attribute in the age of modernity. cultural openness is considered to be a crucial prerequisite for a globalised world by urry (2000a; 2000b) who is a leading theoretician of globalisation. cultural openness means ‘the search for, and delight in, the contrasts between societies rather than a longing for superiority or for uniformity’ (urry 2000b, p. 7). cultural openness is seen as the main component of a cosmopolitan standpoint, a stance that may be conducive to generating new forms of critical knowledge (hannerz 1996, pp. 103-109). another component of a cosmopolitan standpoint is described in ethical, humanitarian and outward looking terms. cosmopolitanism has to entail universal ethical commitments and ‘a distinct ethical orientation towards selflessness, worldliness, and communitarianism’ (kendall et al. 2009, p. 22). these commitments promote public service and emphasise public good. while theoretical conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism has advanced in recent years, the empirical dimensions of cosmopolitanism still remain to be explored in depth (kendall et al. 2009; van hooft 2009; pichler 2009; van hooft & vandekerckhove 2010). i intend to undertake this challenge of exploring cosmopolitanism in everyday intercultural interactions. the focus in my research is on the everyday cosmopolitanism which combines cosmopolitan values, attitudes and competences that are manifested in everyday interpersonal relations. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 65 limitations of cosmopolitanism reborn interest in cosmopolitanism has been sustained by our heightened perceptions of increased mobility, globalisation, internationalisation, transnationalism, individualisation and associated cosmopolitanisation. at the same time, studies questioning, querying and problematising cosmopolitanism have also multiplied (e.g., calhoun 2002; van hooft & vandekerckhove 2010). some authors believe that cosmopolitanism has limitations which can be seen in the abstract and idealistic nature of the concept along with its apparent philosophical detachment from everyday concerns. while cosmopolitanism is an appealing concept for the theoretical level of discussion, difficulties remain in applying this concept empirically. one of the challenging issues is finding empirical dimensions for measuring cosmopolitanism and demonstrating that this concept is suitable for empirical studies. one of the most effective critical outlooks on cosmopolitanism has been provided by skrbis, kendall and woodward (2004, p. 116) who describe cosmopolitanism ‘as a progressive humanistic ideal’ focusing mostly on its envisioning as a form of global openness. yet, skrbis et al. (2004, p. 115) are adamant that such understanding of cosmopolitanism remains at the level of abstraction and ‘it does not necessarily make a good analytical tool’. they argue that what is needed is to establish linkages with observable everyday practices and interpersonal attitudes. yet there is a growing agreement that cosmopolitanism is a valuable notion and that it is worthwhile exploring and testing in empirical studies. skrbis et al. (2004, p. 131) conclude that cosmopolitanism is characterised in recent discourses as ‘an idealist sentiment that indulges in excessive self-reflexivity and consequently has left unspecified the empirical sociological dimensions of the concept’. the authors state that ‘most emphatically, cosmopolitanism needs to be pinned down empirically’ (skrbis et al. 2004, p. 132). an essential part of the pinning down process is accounting for what malcomson (1998, p. 238) calls ‘the actually existing cosmopolitanisms’. this research seeks to undertake this challenge and endeavours to assess the idealistic, theoretical, detached and abstract limitations of cosmopolitanism by locating empirical cosmopolitan values and dispositions in everyday discourses, situations and experiences of interpersonal interactions among academic migrants. cosmopolitan cultural dispositions, which are durable cultural propensities and inclinations that individuals display in relations with others (bourdieu 1977, p. 72), are to be explored as the crucial components of successful intercultural dialogue. cosmopolitan dispositions have a potential to challenge the essentialist binaries of local and global, particular and universal, or 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 national and international. they can be viewed as the gains of successful cultural knowledge interchange leading to mutually beneficial social inclusion. i will analyse cosmopolitan attributes which tend to be developed in the processes of successful knowledge translation. they include: mutual willingness to engage; cultural acceptance; openness to diversity; and mutual accommodation in the processes of intercultural communication. by examining intercultural encounters of mobile scholars, my central aim is to test empirically an often made theoretical assumption that cross-cultural interactions generate cosmopolitan values, beliefs and attitudes that can be described as cosmopolitan dispositions. by testing the connections between academic mobility and cosmopolitan dispositions stemming from intercultural communication, this research provides an innovative perspective on intercultural encounters as venues for knowledge translation. ethnographic research the research question is concerned with examining synergies of cultural interactions among mobile scholars and underlining conditions for new knowledge breakthrough and creation. this research made a first attempt at exploring successful strategies of knowledge integration and probing cosmopolitan values and dispositions arising from intercultural encounters. ethnographic research among mobile scholars was undertaken to test some of the assumptions in the theoretical literature on the emerging cosmopolitan values and dispositions. participant observation and in-depth interviews were conducted among academic migrants and mobile scholars of eastern european background. participants were mainly in their late 20s and 30s and included postgraduate, postdoctoral researchers and academic staff from several university sites in australia and overseas. interviews and participant observation activities were conducted on the premises of several universities in melbourne and two universities in italy the european university institute (eui) in florence and luiss guido carli university in rome. all universities were selected based on their international outlooks and predominant cosmopolitan milieu and turned out to be the perfect sites for examining the experiences of mobile scholars of contemporary times. australian universities in melbourne, where research was conducted, are all eager participants of the growing edubusiness (ball 2012) and succeed in attracting large numbers of international exchange students and visiting scholars. the eui is an international educational institution overseen by the european union. luiss guido cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 67 carli stands for libera università internazionale degli studi sociali, which is translated as free international university for social studies. both the eui and luiss make their priority the creation of a diverse intermix of international students and staff. both universities are synonymous with academic mobility internationally and represent a vivid example of liquid academic mobility. their scholarly environments provide an excellent opportunity to explore how social and intercultural interactions develop among hyper-mobile academic professionals. as a part of my ethnographic research, i conducted participatory observations by taking part in all types of educational activities, lectures, classes, seminars, conferences and recreational social events of the host universities. lengthy stays at the eui and luiss provided me with ample opportunities for ethnographic work and i was offered unique advantages in experiencing academic research environments enriched from cross-fertilisation of research traditions and scholarly approaches which are unique. the eui and luiss are leading research and teaching institutions devoted exclusively to social sciences. they especially emphasise comparative studies and international links which are of particular interest for academic migrants and mobile scholars. both are renowned academic institutions which promote academic mobility by recruiting their full-time teaching staff, fellows and research students from all countries of the european union and many other parts of the globe. participants were selected based on their extended and diverse experiences of academic mobility. open-ended questionnaire included questions to explore the challenges and successes of interactive processes between people from diverse ethno-cultural backgrounds. the distinguished international institutions offered perfect sites for examining modern intercultural encounters in a cosmopolitan scholarly milieu. two european universities represent a very important case study for this research as they are synonymous with academic mobility in europe and present a vivid example of liquid academic mobility unbounded by a ‘permanent’ place of destination. these european institutions provided an opportunity to explore how social interaction develops among scholars who are unconstrained by dominating cultural patterns or cultural pressures of the ‘permanent or settler’ host society. it could be observed that in the pan-european environment devoid of overbearing cultural patterns, migrants tend to feel more liberated in intercultural social interaction and the creation of new knowledge. therefore intercultural dialogue may be less inhibited by the old culturally constructed moulds and be conducive to new fluid and enriching patterns of social 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 interaction between cultures. european-based research is a chance to look ahead and preview intricacies of migration and mobility in the age of post-modernity which presents less permanent, fluid and more flexible opportunities for settlement, work and education. everyday cosmopolitanism mobile scholars tend to display multiple cosmopolitan dispositions that aid them in being successful in intercultural interactions and professional communication. cultural dispositions describing ‘long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body’ (bourdieu 1986, p. 243) that individuals display in relations with others, were found to be the crucial components of successful intercultural dialogue. this discussion contributes to building an argument that cosmopolitan dispositions facilitate and promote intercultural dialogue, knowledge transfer and creation of shared cultural meanings. this study analyses the role of culture in the intercultural communication processes appropriating advances in contemporary debates on cosmopolitanism. these current approaches share a central feature – a clear emphasis on diversity and plurality of viewpoints. giddens (1990, p. 2) states that ‘the post-modern outlook sees a plurality of heterogeneous claims to knowledge … ’. individual projects are no longer bound by the traditional social anxieties in constructing and maintaining their self-identities. individual projects are seen as more open and flexible undertakings (giddens 1991). writing about a postmodern cosmopolitan society, beck (2006, p. 89) suggests the idea of ‘internalization of difference, the co-presence and coexistence of rival lifestyles, contradictory certainties in the experiential space of individuals and societies’. by this is meant a world ‘in which it became necessary to understand, reflect and criticize difference, and in this way to assert and recognize oneself and others as different and hence of equal value’. in this way, cosmopolitan theory has opened the way to considerations of mutual recognition, understanding and respect of cultural otherness. globality among participants, there was a deep sense of global openness to the world, awareness of a global opportunities and responsibilities, along with globally shared collective futures. very high hopes and aspirations of the possibilities open up in the new countries. stepan could not hide that he ‘was very fascinated about going to study at the western institution’. timofey cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 69 was equally enthusiastic: ‘my expectations were terrific and just unbelievable. i was going there with a lot of enthusiasm and great hopes’. when dina went abroad for the first time she described her prospects even in more brilliant terms: ‘my expectations were amazing. i thought that it was very important and it can even change my life, something along these lines’. many respondents thought that their stay abroad would provide additional chances for their career advancement. nikolay explained that his reasons for going abroad were ‘mostly altruistic. ... [but] i was very interested in the literature for my dissertation which was not available in hungary’. many others have felt deprived of international contacts during the times of the iron curtain. therefore, new possibilities to cross the borders were met with lots of excitement and enthusiasm despite the looming difficulties. eugenia also had an upbeat attitude to the challenges her trip abroad would entail: ‘i wanted to try how it is to live and study in a different country. … i thought let’s see whether i can really live and survive in another academic system’. larisa was also driven by the new challenges and wanted to ‘try other instructional and methodological approaches different from ours’. olga admitted that she was driven by her curiosity to learn about the educational systems abroad: ‘i wanted to learn something that i have not encountered before. it was always my main motivation. and i always wanted to compare both systems’. larisa also voiced her curiosity about the world: ‘i wanted to see the world and i expected to meet people from other countries’. larisa was also thinking about her professional career opportunities: ‘i expected and hoped that there would be more opportunities opening to me in terms of finding an employment afterwards’. some participants had overly exaggerated expectations of the possibilities abroad. boris had ‘unrealistic’ expectations, in his own words. when he went to milan for his studies he hoped to find employment afterwards, but unfortunately, as boris admits with a grain of self-irony: i speak italian fluently and this is my working language. … therefore, i considered the italian labour market as my first target for finding employment. … right now my italian ambition is considerably much smaller. … my hopes to find employment have not decreased; but my understanding of its impossibility have greatly increased. equally, sofia had many expectations: ‘i [expected] the usual stuff – better life, better education, a new world, and new friends’. dorota also had a number of professional and 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 personal hopes: ‘so that i will be able to develop myself not only in the academic sense, but also in the cultural sense’. dorota’s summarising thoughts showed that people develop a variety of hopes and expectations in their multiple sites of everyday experiences, and that for them academic mobility provides unsurpassed exciting opportunities for realising their hopes for better lives. plurality plurality is an acknowledgement of the otherness of others and commitment to be selfreflexive of diverse cultures, no matter how entangled they may be in a cosmopolitan milieu. many participants found it very satisfying to learn about many cultural differences. thus, larisa described enjoyment in interacting with people from different cultures: ‘their worldviews are different and you have to adjust to different viewpoints and it takes time to figure out that people are different. but it is also interesting to see how different viewpoints can be’. eugenia also recounted that ‘it was genuinely interesting… to hear someone speaking who experienced [diverse] societies and realities’. similarly, nikolay enjoyed the new culture very much: ‘everyone is very open and there are much more social and agitated people who care more about everything that is public. ... i can talk a lot about public and private things that i terribly enjoy [sic]’. timofey also noted that preserving one’s own cultural distinctiveness could be of great advantage. alexey agreed that ‘being different is not necessarily your drawback’. it was only a lack of adaptation that mattered: ‘but when you adapt, those differences can play on your behalf’ and he continued: i cherish these differences. … i am actually curious about cultural differences and it is a good challenge: how does this work in your country, in your culture? can you give me a hint on how i should behave in this situation when i am in your country? it is like languages whenever you learn another language, it enriches you. olga noted that among cultural differences, what mattered was which of them had any significance. for example, in germany, ‘lots of communication was done in a written form and unless you had written a letter they would not hold an agreement or respond’. recognition and acceptance of these cultural differences through the process of selfreflection led to the creation of a shared understanding of interpersonal communication. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 71 civility civility is understood as an ethical commitment to dialogue, use of persuasion, soft power, instead of violence. research participants reflected on what civility meant for them and many discussed communication strategies, personal cultural dispositions and societal conditions that would be helpful for civil intercultural dialogue. ruslan suggested that people who applied extra efforts, such as learning foreign languages, were more effective in mixing and interacting with diverse cultures. olga was certain that cultures that were more communicative, open and sociable would be more likely to succeed. in her view, while some cultures were happy with initial conversation and superficial socialising, other cultures needed deeper levels of involvement and interaction. civility was described as learning and teaching style in academia. olga noted that the american system was based on the so called socratic method, the method of open discussion on a topic. olga believed that russian students expected to be passive while they were taught and american students expected to be active in self-education. in stepan’s experience, in the west there was more tolerance in relation to different views and less explicitly defined ‘compulsory’ knowledge that one had to acquire. he thought that this ‘discussion type’ learning created a more stimulating learning environment and civil communication culture. this highly interactive teaching approach meant that more student contribution was required. susanna noted that students were not expected to listen only to the lectures, but to participate in ‘lively’ discussions and presentations: ‘in estonia we were not used to discuss very much in classes. usually we listened to the lectures and then we had to record and reproduce the information we heard’. susanna was happy to admit that this system helped her to develop academic communication skills. many praised the fact that the academic culture of communication presented more opportunities for engagement and interaction, all nurturing civility in communication. there were more seminars, discussions of students’ work, presentations and more cooperation in research that cultivated interpersonal civility. larisa also appreciated that everyone was strongly encouraged to go to conferences, present their work, and receive feedback: ‘you feel that people are interested in your success and it creates a good environment’. alexey agreed that the everyday communication culture in academia abroad was pleasant: ‘academic world is very friendly and open minded and you would hardly feel excluded’. many concluded that 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 this environment of mutual support and encouragement was very productive and upheld civility as a cosmopolitan trait. conclusion this paper draws attention to emerging cosmopolitanism by testing the assumptions that intensified encounters of diverse ethno-cultural identities, cultural patterns and historic traditions create conditions for arising cosmopolitan values and dispositions. this research has been guided by ‘dialogic imagination’ which is a defining characteristic of the cosmopolitan perspective. dialogic imagination helped in examining a dialogue between diverse cultures as an ongoing process of reciprocal appropriation and internalisation of other cultures within one’s own culture. while employing theoretical premises of the cosmopolitan perspective, this paper made an initial attempt at testing their empirical applicability for analysing modern intercultural encounters among academic migrants within the internationalised academia. my discussion is linked to the ideas of cultural inclusion, and it adopts a cosmopolitan logic of living in terms of inclusive oppositions and rejecting the logic of exclusive oppositions. this initial examination of empirical findings is structured along beck’s three important characteristics of cosmopolitanism: globality, plurality and civility. following these three guiding principles, this research attempted to identify and analyse cosmopolitan values and dispositions in everyday intercultural encounters, discourses, situations and experiences. it analysed cosmopolitan dispositions which mirror beck’s key characteristics and which further can be described as mutual willingness to engage, cultural acceptance and reciprocal accommodation. this paper argues that it is cosmopolitan values and dispositions that tend to create mutually beneficial conditions for intercultural inclusion in everyday encounters and transnational academic mobility provides a fertile ground for their current as well as future exploration. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 73 references abdallah-pretceille, m. 2003, former et éduquer en contexte hétérogène; pour un humanisme du divers, anthropos, paris. abdallah-pretceille, m. 2007, ‘mobilité sans formation n'est que ruine de l'âme’: on the importance of preparing academics to move’ in dervin, f. & suomela-salmi, e. 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(eds), academic mobility: blending perspectives, university of turku, turku, finland. vertovec, s. & cohen, r. (eds) 2002, conceiving cosmopolitanism, oxford university press, oxford. waldron, j. 1992, ‘minority cultures and the cosmopolitan alternative’, university of michigan journal of law reform, vol. 25, nos. 3-4, pp. 751-793. williams, a. m. 2006, ‘lost in translation? international migration, learning and knowledge’, progress in human geography, vol. 30, no. 5, pp. 588-607. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0309132506070169 wise, a. 2009 ‘everyday multiculturalism: transversal crossings and working class cosmopolitans’ in wise, a & velayutham, s. (eds), everyday multiculturalism, palgrave macmillan, london, pp. 21-45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14767720500046179 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263276404047418 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954x.2007.00750.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0309132506070169 locating cosmopolitanism within academic mobility liudmila kirpitchenko deakin university abstract introduction academic mobility mobile scholars and academic migrants cosmopolitanism re-envisioned limitations of cosmopolitanism ethnographic research everyday cosmopolitanism references 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia playing in the sandpit together, alone; partnerships and collaboration in the community sector jonathon main abstract the community services sector is the largest provider of non-profit human services in australia. this sector has experienced considerable growth as a consequence of public policy and sector reforms introduced by successive governments over the past two decades. these reforms have seen the introduction of private sector managerialist agendas, outsourcing of government services and competitive tendering processes. as the community sector has grown governments have sought to consolidate program funding mechanisms, simplify contracting out arrangements and encourage collaboration and formal partnerships through national tender processes. in recent years there has been significant evidence of governments actively encouraging formal intrasectoral partnerships and consortia in program tenders. while there is a considerable body of overseas and national literature on partnerships and collaboration, the predominant focus is on intersectoral relationships such as public-private partnerships between government and the business sector or government contracted services to the community sector. this research responds to a call for more local research on partnerships and collaboration in the australian community service sector. a case study approach was used to examine the key drivers of intrasectoral partnership and collaborative practice in the context of the literature within business, government and community sectors. the study found prior interactions between organisations significantly influenced whether these drivers were viewed as strong, weak or ambiguous. the findings contribute to the understanding of intrasectoral partnerships and collaboration in the community sector in that prior relationships understood as parallel (i.e. disengaged) or cooperative in nature, can be predictive of potential partnership relationships and outcomes. background the extensive literature on partnerships and collaboration has traditionally focussed on business partnerships and public-private partnerships, although since the 1990s research has emerged on partnerships and collaboration in the community sector. the limited body of partnership research in the community sector reinforces a “need for local studies in developing an understanding of merger and other forms of strategic restructuring, rather than relying on the international and/or private-sector literature” (baulderstone, presser et.al 2008: 68). the literature explores these various partnership contexts using themes such as the distinctions between partnerships, collaboration and coordination; the continuum of partnerships from voluntary to statutory; barriers to, or ‘blueprints’ for effective partnerships; recognition of the need for partnership to respond effectively to the challenges of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 27 globalization, technological changes, the recognized impact of social capital and increasingly complex social and economic issues; and the need for new forms of governance and institutional structures. collaborative and partnership relationships identified in the literature cover a wide range of purposes and timeframes from short term (specific project-based activities, joint ventures et cetera) to longer term relationships such as mergers, acquisitions and consortia. there is an abundance of such relationships in the corporate sector evident in industries such as airlines (mergers, route sharing, customer rewards schemes involving other commercial enterprises), automotive industry (mergers, cross-badging and supply), alliances between environmental organisations and business and also between governments and the business sectors in publicprivate partnerships (e.g. construction of public works and delivery of social services). organisations in the community sector engage in partnerships or collaborative practices for a variety of reasons and often prompted by a number of different ‘drivers’ to those in the business sector including organisation’s own analysis of risk and opportunity, relationships between key personnel, requirements of funding bodies and the vision or aspiration of network peak bodies or governing bodies. this paper explores particular issues and themes of partnerships and collaboration in the australian community sector through a case study research of four community service organisations that entered a formal partnership after an initial merger of two of these organisations was rejected. the case study examined the circumstances and key drivers in the formation of the partnership, and how these contribute to our understanding of collaborative forming conditions in two alternative forms of inter-organisational relationships, viz. partnership and merger formations. partnerships, collaboration and play the title of the research draws on the significance of play described in psychologist jean piaget’s influential theory of early childhood development. piaget’s four stages of play, viz. solitary, parallel, cooperative, and highly cooperative stages provide useful distinctions in 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 understanding partnership and collaboration as a continuum with varying levels of engagement. ‘together, alone’ refers to an important developmental distinction of parallel from cooperative engagement which this research found relevant to relationships between the case study organisations. moreover, consideration by community sector organisations of higher levels of intra-sectoral collaboration (partnership or merger) was examined in the context of their history and extent of parallel or cooperative of engagement. context for this research an increasingly globalised economy has seen the development of alliances in industry become common place, whether as one-off partnerships, joint ventures or full mergers. organisations, particularly those in the business sector, have recognised the ability to increase competitive edge is a key corporate asset or ‘collaborative advantage’. this refers to “a well developed ability to create and sustain fruitful collaborations…” (kanter 1994: 96). research on organisational cooperation has only recently been viewed as important although there has been a long history of literature in psychology and sociology disciplines regarding cooperation between individuals and groups (smith, carroll et al. 1995). it is only since the 1990s that research has focussed on partnerships and collaboration specifically to the community sector (kohm 2000). much of the early theory and research on organisations focussed on single organisation theory and omitted looking at the interdependencies of the organisations and their dynamics (gray & wood 1991). internationally the community sector has experienced significant expansion following the contraction of the welfare state and introduction of new public management with greater demands for flexibility and efficiency in service delivery and greater outsourcing of government funding (quiggan 1999; casey & dalton 2006). some have described this as a shift in the service delivery paradigm in which partnership and collaboration is now necessary in order to be competitive and provide better services (giffords 2003). emerging ideas of social capital articulated by putnam in the 1990s and the development of the uk labour party’s ‘third way’ policy highlighted a stronger role for the community sector to the extent that it is regarded as a “key partner…[with government] in the reform of public services and the reinvigoration of civic life” (h.m.treasury 2002: 3-5). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 29 while managerialist agendas and the introduction of competitive tendering significantly impeded collaboration within the sector, federally funded programs more recently in australia have actively encouraged formal intra-sectoral partnerships and consortia. this change in policy is reflected in a report commissioned by the australian government recommending a “need to strengthen the...sector through increased contact, consultation and cooperation among funded agencies…refinement of certain aspects of the process of tendering for... funds could help reduce any negative aspects of inter-agency competition” (urbis keys young 2004: ii). definitions of partnership and collaboration a wide range of terms are used in the literature to describe various working relationships and with an equally diverse range of meanings being applied (ring & van de ven 1994). this is unsurprising since these terms describe both inter-organisational processes (i.e. interactions between parties which presuppose some form of relationship) and forms (i.e. the organisational or operational structure). collaborative processes refer to interaction or negotiation between parties working together, while terms such as ‘cooperation’ or ‘coordination’ are used by many authors to differentiate more informal interactions from other descriptions which are applied to ‘higher order’ action (thomson & perry 2006). process definitions of collaboration focus on the nature of the relationships rather than their form. for example, huxham and vangen define collaboration as “…the full range of positively oriented inter-organisational relationships including, partnerships, alliances, joint ventures, networks…collaborative forms of contracting and out-sourcing, joint working and so on” (huxham & vangen 2005: 3). other definitions of collaboration include “…the act or process of shared creation or discovery…” (thomson & perry 2006: 20) or more simply creating new value together (kanter 1994: 97). the term ‘merger’ is least ambiguous and describes changes to corporate control and/or structure and implies a new legal entity (baulderstone, presser et al. 2008; cairns 2003; charity commission 2003; kohm 2004). some authors argue merger decisions are now more 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 likely in the community sector and regarded as a “strategic choice” rather than a response to survive a crisis or deal with uncertainty or scarce resources (cairns 2003: 4). regardless of definitions, many authors note that partnerships and collaboration are characterised by uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (baulderstone 2008; boyce, macintyre et al. 2006; huxham & vangen 2005). partnerships and collaborations can also be viewed as socially contrived and dynamic forms of action shaped by the actions and interpretations of the participants and which determine their creation, evolution, maintenance and dissolution (ring & van de ven 1994). cooperation, collaboration and partnership inter-organisational relationships are depicted in the literature as a variety of continua according to extent of formality, structural arrangements, level of engagement, activity focus or intensity of the relationship. in a significant study of nearly 200 partnerships in the non-profit sector kohm (2000) identified an integration continuum comprising ‘collaboration’ (high level of autonomy and low level of formality); ‘strategic alliance’ (organisations retain individual identity); and ‘corporate integration’ (changes to corporate structure and control). in this schema the term ‘strategic restructuring’ is an overarching term used to describe the alliance and integration forms in the continuum. these partnership forms consist of “formal and long-term integration of operations and corporate structure” such as occur in consortia and joint ventures (strategic alliances) and mergers (corporate integration) (la piana & hayes 2003: 55). strategic restructuring occurs when autonomy is replaced by formal integration between organisations, usually reflected in written agreements and ultimately expressed in merger. this is consistent with business-based definitions of alliances as “…intentionally long-term contractual and equity-based (e.g. joint ventures) cooperative arrangements…” (bell 2006: 1608) others suggest a defining feature of ‘strategic restructuring’ is an overall strategy to increase competitive advantage (hynes & mollenkopf 2008). a different continuum based upon relationships is proposed by kanter to describe a range of interactions from weak and distant (e.g. “mutual service consortia” in which similar industries pool resources to gain benefit too expensive to acquire alone); mid range (e.g. joint ventures); and strong and close e.g. “value-chain partnerships” involving companies in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 31 different industries with different and complementary skills which link their capabilities to create value (kanter 1994: 98). in this continuum, the stronger the cooperative arrangements, the higher the commitments of partner organisations to engage in joint activities across a wider range of organisational functions and the more likely the relationship creates substantial change within each organisation. literature review and key themes partnership drivers partnerships and collaboration in the business sector are undertaken explicitly for economic or financial reasons e.g. to gain competitive advantage or increased market share. in the disciplinary perspectives of economics, commerce and business management literature drivers predominantly cited relate to efficiency, effectiveness, viability or survival. managing scarce resources through cost savings and efficiency measures were cited most commonly across research engaged by all disciplines and sectors (boyce, macintyre et al. 2006; charity commission 2003; huxham & vangen 2005; hynes and mollenkopf 2008; kohm, la piana et.al. 2000; lober 1997; la piana & hayes 2005; takahashi & smutny 2002; thomson & perry 2006; walker 2002). research in the uk found the most common motivations for charities seeking a merger were to increase efficiency (54%); as a way of rescuing a charity in difficulties (44%); and to prevent duplication or to improve services (42%) (charity commission 2003: 2). early research highlighted a crisis within an organisation or the existence of problems or increasing turbulence in the political, social or economic environment requiring multistakeholder collaboration to achieve a solution (gray 1985, 1991; lober 1997). these ideas emphasized the importance of increased leverage through ‘collaborative advantage’ (huxham & vangen 2005) or ‘collaborative alliance’ (gray & wood 1991). this became evident in the early 1990s when traditionally adversarial organisations began collaborating, as for example seen in the alliances between environmental groups, government and business to address a range of environmental issues (lober 1997). the impetus for formal partnerships and mergers within the community sector in recent years has been observed as an imperative for organisations to conduct their business differently. 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 reasons for this include a sudden interruption to the status quo (such as the sudden departure of a key person, a financial crisis or funding opportunity) or alternatively entrepreneurial individuals who shepherd the idea of partnership through opposition (kohm, la piana et.al. 2000: 21). kohm’s study found collaboration was a key factor to mitigate competition within the community sector and enhance legitimacy and competitiveness in bidding for funds (kohm, la piana et.al. 2000). in their study of non-profit organisations kohm found that in circumstances in which organisations integrated their operations they were twice as likely to be motivated by reduction in funding and increased competition for clients (kohm, la piana et.al. 2000: 15). many studies referred to pooling of resources (krsevan 2004), developing mutual exchange or synergies (boyce, macintyre et al. 2006; huxham & vangen 2005) and mutual dependence (douma et.al. 2000) as a way of dealing with complexity. this can be to gain a benefit or asset too expensive for one partner alone; to improve services to clients (kanter 1994; wagner & spence 2003); or achieve something that could not have been by one organisation alone (huxham & vangen 2005). this enables organisations to create or modify service delivery (walker 2002) through complementary activities of partners which minimise overlap and provide value-added benefits for clients and partners e.g. sharing expertise, problem solving and staff training and development (cairns 2006). a defining driver of the non-profit sector as distinct from corporate organisations is expressed in their sentiment of “mission – that is the change that organisations are seeking to effect in the world” (la piana & hayes 2005: 11-12). achieving common visions is articulated as a driver by researchers (cairns 2003; huxham & vangen 2005; kohm, la piana et.al. 2000; douma et.al. 2000; walker 2002; la piana & hayes 2003). the importance of a shared strategic vision in regard to future developments within an industry or sector (douma et.al. 2000) underscores the importance of strategy as an explicit aspect of operations in which corporate plans are informed by current and anticipated opportunities and threats. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 33 in the non-profit sector, an organisation’s ‘mission’ reflects a commitment to social and community development (walker 2002), building social capital and advocacy in social policy (cairns 2006). this suggests more altruistic drivers for partnership which have as their premise the belief that important issues facing society cannot be tackled alone or simply by sectional interests (gray 1985; huxham & vangen 2005). research in technology-based industries characterised by high levels of partnership formation (and failure), highlights the importance of strategy as a central feature of their operations (hynes & mollenkopf 2008). similarly in the community sector, the role of forecasting and planning is emphasized in developing a strategic agenda (kohm, la piana et.al. 2000) in order to improve quality, range or efficiency of organisations as well as manage funding risks or threats of closure. melville for example argues the community services sector needs to engage in “…critical self-reflection so that it can strategically reframe its own partnership agenda and seize political opportunities within the current institutional context” (melville 2008: 104). finally, political factors in the form of policy initiatives, local political relationships and changing funder mandates will influence the development of partnerships (cairns 2006) and the spatial dimensions which enable or constrain these developments (takahashi & smutny 2002). in the context of the community sector this implies participation in policy development (walker 2002) or agenda-setting through advocacy to policy makers (lober 1997). facilitating processes of partnerships the outcomes of alliances are “…inextricably linked to the initial objectives and motives for forming an alliance…” (hynes & mollenkopf 2008: 196). indeed the initial conditions in which an alliance is formed can result in “stable imprinting” which will either cause inertia or adaptive, generative conditions within the alliance (doz 1996: 55). early contributors recognised the existence of a catalyst as the first stage in determining whether merger or partnership considerations arise. many authors point to actions of particular individuals, agents or organisations in key positions which act as a catalyst in facilitating partnerships (boyce 2006; douma et.al. 2000; kanter 1994; lober 1997; walker 2002; winer & ray 1994). 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 clear ‘communicating infrastructures’ that enhance information transmission, build trust and support growth are particularly important in the initial negotiations and relationship building phase of partnerships (boyce 2006: 13). in the early stages of partnership, participant interaction has been likened to a ‘melee of cycles’ in which participants’ identities can be aligned or ambiguous, reflecting consistent (positive or negative) or divergent expectations. this has significant implications for organisation’s sense of ownership in the partnership (huxham & vangen 2005: 198). douma et.al. (2000) found the success of alliances depended on partners’ alignment or fit (defined as a balanced package of strategy, structure, processes and managerial ideology) and a dynamic process of responding to change in either the external environment or partner organisations. kanter identifies key elements in the early stages of partnerships include knowledge of self, markets and experience in evaluation of partners; rapport between ceos and executives to ensure goodwill if tensions develop; and compatibility based on common experiences, values, principles, and hopes for the future (kanter 1994: 101). project methodology this research chose a case study approach to enable examination of two quite different scenarios of inter-organisational cooperative relationships involving four independently incorporated church-based community organisations of the same religious denomination. these first of these scenarios involved two similar sized organisations considering a full formal legal merger and resulted in a decision not to pursue this option. these organisations (“cso 1” and “cso 2”) located within the same capital city were of a similar large size with respect to funding, staffing and a history dating back to the early 20th century. the second scenario examined is a formal non-contractual partnership entered into by the original two organisations with another two organisations (‘cso 3’ and “cso 4”) with each maintaining their individual identities. of the other two organisations that joined the partnership one which was significantly smaller in size and based within the same capital city (cso 3) while the fourth organisation (cso 4) was based in an industrial and commercial regional centre servicing a large agricultural hinterland. cso 3 had substantially the longest cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 35 history of all the partnership organisations, having commenced operation in the middle of the 19th century while cso 4 commenced operation in the early part of the 20th century. the common church affiliation and longstanding history of the organisations provided additional dimensions to the case study. by using a case study methodology the research was able to explore the range of issues identified by key personnel in leadership positions who were involved in both the merger and partnership negotiations. the participant sample did not include staff as their involvement was confined to limited implementation focus group consultations rather than decision making processes of the merger or partnership considerations. primary data was obtained through semi-structured participant interviews to elicit a wide range of perspectives (dey 1993). secondary data sources in the form of organisational documentation were reviewed. these sources evidenced the factors which influenced partnership, how these factors aligned with processes undertaken by the organisations and the decision ultimately to enter a formal partnership as opposed to an initial merger proposition. the case study approach enabled a high level of descriptive detail and depth of enquiry (berg 1998; marshall & rossman 1999). while confined to the particularities of the circumstances and limited in the extent to which data can be generalized, it had the advantage of being able to provide a higher level of descriptive and explanatory detail (huberman & miles 1994) than other methodologies. the research sample a sample of eight participants was selected comprising staff who occupied executive positions and board members of csos 1, 2 and 3 during the merger and partnership negotiations. sample selection aimed to achieve a reasonable degree of representation of organisations comprising the partnership while influenced by constraints of practicality and convenience. selection of the case study participants was undertaken to ensure the most equitable representation of board, chair and executive members across the three case study organisations as depicted below. it was not possible to obtain representation from cso 4 due to the study timeframes and inability to contact those who had left the organisation. although 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 a comprehensive sample would have enhanced research findings, this was not considered to be essential in establishing the research outcomes of the study nor to compromise the validity of the findings since cso 4 was not party to the original merger discussions and many impacts of partnership were mitigated by its entirely separate geographic and rural location. table 1: case study participant representation participant role org. 1 org. 2 org. 3 executive    ceo    board chair   board member    role of the researcher the researcher, being an employee of one of the partnership organisations occupied an observer-as-participant role drawing on gold (1969) and jorgensen (1989). this was advantageous to the research as it facilitated a higher degree of immersion in the case study (marshall & rossman 1999) resulting in richer primary data. the research instrument a semi-structured interview was developed by the researcher as the primary research instrument for collection of data. the design of the research instrument sought to elicit participants’ views without being predetermined, maximize contextual validity and minimize researcher impact (patton 1990; huberman & miles 1994). the research instrument comprised seventeen open questions which focussed on the impetus and rationale for considering merger or partnership, the anticipated benefits and risks of a merger or partnership and the future of partnerships based on this experience. the instrument design aimed to encourage participant’s own descriptions and allow the researcher to explore issues drawing on distinctions or descriptions of other participants. limitations limitations of this particular research relate to sample size, the passage of time since the event of the merger/partnership negotiations, the researcher’s role and data collection/collation. the small sample size in this research is consistent with qualitative approaches which generate detailed descriptive data of complex circumstances that are not well explored in the literature. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 37 the frequency with which factors were cited was used to identify key themes from the primary and secondary data. while this can be considered a limitation in the way the examination of data is grounded (berg: 1998), these themes have been corroborated by use of excerpts cited by participants to support overall analysis. the passage of time between the merger/partnership discussions between the case study organisations and the research may have altered participant perceptions or generated ‘hindsight’ interpretation of events in which dominant issues are highlighted or recalled and ‘lesser issues’ not otherwise recalled or cited. to address this, the research utilized available documentary evidence from the merger and partnership processes to complement interview data and identify key decisions or actions through the merger/partnership negotiations. the participant-observer role of the researcher raises issues relating to objectivity and bias (jorgensen 1989). by contrast, a researcher who is a ‘complete outsider’ i.e. external to the organisations, is unlikely to have similar access to information or indeed the research project itself (guest 1962). in the context of this study, the researcher was more in an observer perspective given he had no direct involvement or influence in the merger/partnership negotiations. results data collected identified 22 primary factors considered relevant to either the initial merger or subsequent partnership option. the majority of these (19) pertain to both merger and partnership options. the study results found that taken together, the key drivers and inhibitors for the initial merger option determined the conditions for subsequent partnership negotiations. all participants noted the decision for cso 1 and cso 2 not to merge gave rise to the proposition of a broader partnership of four organisations. this decision was variously described in terms of ‘merger failure’; a ‘logical next step’; an ‘attractive alternative’ to doing nothing after the decision not to merge; and an opportunity to build on the organisations’ strengths. 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 partnership drivers and inhibitors analysis of the primary factors identified in the case study enabled these to be refined into 8 discrete and inter-related drivers for partnership or merger. there was high support for a majority of drivers based on participant response rates as summarised in table 2 below. however a number of drivers highlighted differing impacts or benefits of partnership and some partnership drivers were seen as a means to mitigate potentially negative ramifications. for example, cso 1 was in a unique position in that it had significant financial reserves. while openly acknowledged by all participants as an asset for a merger of cso 1 and 2, this also gave rise to questions as to motivations, management and culture/philosophy of the merged organisation. in regard to the partnership proposition, a participant from cso 3 noted, “what makes sense is not necessarily what you prefer” in that agreeing to enter the partnership was viewed as delivering some benefits (e.g. support from the larger partner organisations) but also could increase their vulnerability alongside the larger organisation economies of scale. mapping of the 8 case study drivers against the 12 drivers identified in the literature review shows a high degree of alignment and strong interdependencies. for example case study drivers relating to a recognised brand, value-adding and competitive advantage provide leverage to each other in partnership activities. similarly, the drivers identified in the literature suggest interdependencies in strategic agenda or approach which both impacts on, and is impacted by, organisational or industry/sector learning, achieving joint visions, managing crisis and instability and increasing visibility and prestige. participants identified 9 inhibitors or contraindications to the initial merger. these fell into equal groupings related to operational issues (4) e.g. lack of compelling financial reasons; different management structures; and loss of identity and jobs and ‘process issues’ (4) e.g. consultant influence; the appointment process for the ceo; and board meeting and constitutional arrangements. differences of culture and philosophy were the most frequently cited contraindication (7 participants) and the only one also cited against the partnership proposition. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 39 table 2 partnership drivers and inhibitors refined drivers (i,ii..) responses by participant total 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (i) opportunity or crisis 7 ceo vacancy in one organisation        7 (ii) value adding benefits 8 complementary services “strength in coherence”    3 infrastructure efficiencies, synergies, “shared buying power” e.g. hr/payroll/fundraising       6 combined/shared staff talent, peer support, build on each others strengths       6 provide a “bigger picture collaboration” of in sa  1 (iii) brand development 7 brand – single name and logo, increased community recognition, ”unified fellowship of care”       6 ‘mission’ confusing & problematic  1 publicity/promotion   2 advocacy enhanced    3 (iv) competitive advantage 7 national focus and tenders    3 awareness of competitive environment & “presence “ of rivals    3 access to reserves of one organisation(merger only)   2 sponsorship     4 donations & fundraising    3 (v) compatible organisations 8 shared history and board members       6 common values   2 enhanced opportunities to network, build on existing relationships       6 similarities / common issues    3 (vi) organisation size 4 one organisation needs to either to be bigger or restructured / both organisations similar size for merger     4 (vii) creative problem solving 5 merger “failure” / alternative decision (partnership only)     4 concern not to be left out (partnership only)   2 (viii) enhanced services 4 improved outcomes for clients     4 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 the case study merger proposition the unexpected departure of the ceo from one of the case study organisations, described by a number of participants as a ‘crisis’, provided a clear catalyst for the merger proposition. for a number of participants, that this proposition arose at all was evidence of an existing cooperative relationship and therefore a driver for merger. the perception of a crisis is recognised as one of four preconditions necessary for collaboration (gray 1985). other preconditions identified by gray include the existence of complex problems requiring multiple stakeholder intervention, the failure of adversarial approaches in solving the problems and organisations seeking stability and minimising uncertainty to mitigate increasing turbulence in the social, political and economic environment. none of the case study drivers indicated the organisations faced complex problems requiring multi-stakeholder intervention; neither could the partnership be described as ‘multi-stakeholder’ as the organisations provided substantially similar services. the merger proposition is consistent with lober’s concept of collaborative windows and the conjunction of four process streams (lober 1997). in the case study these streams are represented by the crisis in one organisation (problem stream), introduction of new public management principles and governments emphasis on competitive tendering (the policy stream); a history in the case study organisations of supporting one another (the organisational stream); and an increasing reliance on government funding of services delivered by the community sector (social/political/economic stream). half the participants and secondary data indicated no compelling reasons for the merger, suggesting there was no catalyst for a different way of organisations to conduct their business (kohm, la piana et.al. 2000: 21). significantly, kohm found most organisations considered partnerships as a result of “…forecasting and planning rather than…any immediate threats…” (kohm, la piana et.al. 2000: 21). organisations were more likely to engage external and independent (“outside”) consultants and undertake more rigorous research and planning given the complexity and risk associated with mergers (kohm, la piana et.al. 2000). by contrast planning in the case study was only in response to the unplanned ceo vacancy which raised the proposition, not vice cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 41 versa. the merger planning processes in the case study organisations was informal or ‘inhouse’ in that the consultant engaged by each organisation were contacted via the state administration of the church and one had been a longstanding past chief executive and subsequent board chair of one organisation. this raised questions regarding actual or perceived conflicts of interest as well as questions regarding motivations which clearly affected the decision not to merge. these issues suggest important notions of ‘fit’ articulated in a generic framework by douma et.al. (2000). the framework recognises the dynamic process of partnership building and the need for organisations to have a good fit (or alignment) in five areas in order to succeed, whereas insufficient fit in any one area can result in alliance failure (figure 1). figure 1. the generic fit framework (douma et.al. 2000: 582) the inhibitors of merger discussed above are consistent with concerns of cultural fit; differing management, pay and fee structures (operational fit); questions regarding the constitutional arrangements and organisational structure of the merged entity (organisational fit); and mistrust of individuals motives (human fit). questions of human fit can have a ‘knock-on’ effect becoming central leadership problems as a result of leaders having difficulty sharing control, making joint decisions or thinking of the partnership ‘common good’ (kohm, la piana et.al. 2000: 17). three participants in the case study cited personality issues as having contributed to concerns as to how the merged organisation might form, particularly in relation to the constitution, organisational structure cultural fit human fit operational fit organisation al fit strategic fit alliance success 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 and recruitment of the ceo. the effect of these concerns was to reinforce perceptions that the terms of a merger may be unequal or would have potentially negative ramifications for the independence of the remaining two community organisations. that the two case study organisations which considered the earlier merger proposition were of similar size and history might suggest good organisational fit. however the converse was found to occur as these commonalities served to amplify issues of fit, presenting instead paradoxes of partnership. findings from the case study indicate assumptions about a closer working relationship or merger were offset by countervailing and often implicit concerns. this confirms that ambivalent interactions significantly influence “…whether that experience inspires the kind of trust necessary for a workable partnership” (la piana & hayes 2003:58). as noted earlier, the literature points to the actions of particular individuals, agents or organisations in key positions which act as a catalyst in facilitating the formation or achievement of partnerships. the foregoing discussion on trust highlights how questions of fit need to be managed well by organisations at the earliest stage and mistrust can readily deter or prevent partnerships from forming or working effectively. finally, of ten inhibitors or contraindications of partnership identified in the case study, many contrast markedly to the drivers for partnership or merger, suggesting some important findings. compatibility of the organisations was identified as a key driver for merger by all 8 participants on the basis of their shared history, values and services. significantly organisational culture and philosophy, which might be expected to be included as a feature of compatibility, was in fact the most strongly cited contraindication for the proposed merger (cited by 7 participants). participant comments highlighted a number of inhibitors to culture and philosophy such as different pay, management and administrative cost structures (cso 2 being lean and flat, cso 1 having greater costs and delegations) and also operating cultures (i.e. cso 1 as “business run” and “bureaucratic” compared with the “church-based” and “relationship” focus of cso 2). these tensions were understood in the context of the histories of the two organisations, significantly different leadership styles and personalities of past leaders, and reflected in different approaches to ‘mission’ and business models giving rise to perceptions of an intrinsically competitive relationship. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 43 similarly value-adding benefits and competitive advantage drivers had corresponding contraindications of loss of identity and an absence of compelling strategic or financial reasons to merge. such ambivalent or contradictory findings suggest underlying tension or conflict which inevitably manifests at the proposition of more highly engaged relationships such as a partnership or merger. the partnership proposition the catalyst for the partnership proposition lay in the decision by two of the case study organisations not to proceed with a merger. this was described by two participants as a “failure” to merge, reflecting their view that the decision was due to particular difficulties rather than an assessment of insufficient fit (douma et.al. 2000) or drivers. this reinforces a view that “unless potential for real collaborative advantage is clear, it is generally best, if there is a choice, to avoid collaboration” (huxham & vangen 2005: 80). while the drivers identified in the literature closely align with those identified by the primary data, there were significant variations in meaning attached by participants to the case study drivers. these differences highlighted current and pre-existing relationship tensions and ambivalence regarding the partnership process. for example the driver cited as a concern not to be left out was articulated by one participant (cso 2) in terms of “enormous advantages” for the other two organisations while another participant (cso 3) observed there was "no real defining reason not to be in [the partnership]". for this latter participant, partnership represented the lesser of two evils and a hope it would be a strategic step to prevent loss of identity or possible future takeover by the partners. an important distinction between formal ‘strategic restructuring’ (i.e. partnerships and mergers) and informal collaboration focuses on the “…formation of more substantial bonds…[and] ongoing commitment to the partnership, and decision-making power over key management and program functions” (kohm, la piana et.al. 2000: 3). despite obvious substantial bonds between the case study organisations by virtue of their common history, many of these were markedly ambivalent. this is evident in an ‘ongoing commitment’ reflected in the partnership agreement in which any reference to decision making power over key management and program functions was notably absent. the partnership therefore 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 offered little different to that which existed previously between the organisations and is therefore consistent with informal collaboration, lacking the substantial bonds of strategic restructuring. discussion overall the results indicate a high degree of alignment between drivers identified by case study participants and those within the literature for both the merger and partnership propositions. many of the case study drivers for merger and partnership align strongly with findings in the literature, although a number of examples are evident where this alignment is weak or partial, reflecting a ‘multi-dimensional and dynamic entanglement of aims’ (huxham & vangen 2005). many drivers for partnership identified in the literature are similar for community organisations to those for business and industry sectors. the distinction between them lies in the latter sectors’ explicitly fiscal orientation, reflecting a primary focus on profitability and accountability to shareholders as compared with community sector commitment to ‘mission’ (la piana & hayes 2005). this refers to the changes community organisations seek that promote strong community engagement, social justice and inclusion. consequently while many of the partnership and merger considerations in the community sector also aim to achieve fiscal efficiencies this is for the purpose of a social dividend. the context of longstanding relationships between the partner organisations in the case study has produced a qualitatively different aspect to the body of literature. that these drivers had ambiguous meanings attributed by participants has important implications for both the type of cooperative relationship organisations choose and the level of engagement (parallel or cooperative). such ambiguity confirms the significance of pre-existing relationships in informing drivers of future cooperative relationships between organisations. paradoxes of partnership the contraindications for merger and relationship ambivalence highlight a resonance in the case study findings of the paradoxical nature of many drivers. one such paradox is illustrated in the organisational fit of the two merger organisations in which factors such as shared history that contributed to their alignment also amplified differences and tensions. similarly a view of ‘enormous advantages’ of partnership identified by some participants were viewed by cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 45 others in terms of there being no reason not to partner, or needing to salvage something from the failed merger. while partnership was widely seen as an opportunity for mutual support, this raised another paradox that this could be to the exclusion of more valuable support from organisations outside the partnership with more specialised service delivery portfolios. a third paradox was expressed regarding the value-adding driver and what might be termed an ‘equity dynamic’. while partnerships could enable the larger partners to support smaller organisations with less favourable scale economies, this also raised concerns regarding these partners having disproportionate advantage in a range of areas including funding, profile and intellectual property. parallel and cooperative interactions it is apparent that tensions or ambivalence between the case study organisations resulted in merger and partnership drivers which were ambiguous or diffuse. for example shared history was a factor cited in the compatibility driver and included the natural network of support between the organisations which was understood as cooperative interactions. however some participants cited negative aspects of this shared history including competitive relationships, personality issues and questions of motives. these negative aspects describe parallel interactions by the organisations and are consistent with spatial dimensions identified by takahashi & smutny which act to constrain and define the choice of collaboration or partnership. these dimensions include the capacity of parties to engage in partnership; availability or presence of stakeholders, coalitions, networks; and enabling factors (takahashi & smutny 2002: 168). case study findings suggest a ‘melee of cycles’ (huxham & vangen 2005: 198) which occurs in the early stages of partnerships is in fact evident in the relationships prior to partnership. this is most obvious in perceptions of power imbalance and consequent concerns about access to the collaborative agenda. these parallel versus cooperative interactions indicate the level of engagement between organisations prior to consideration of partnership. such pre-conditions are significant when one considers “…the peculiar circumstances that facilitate collaborative formation among social service providers may lead inevitably to partnerships’ short-term demise” (takahashi & smutny 2002: 180). 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 the initial conditions in which a partnership is formed has been argued can lead to ‘stable imprinting’ of the either fixed processes (which cause high inertia) or generative processes which enable partnerships to be highly adaptive (doz 1996). the decision to form a partnership is a critical point which others suggest requires an assessment of the likely stability of the partnership, judged by a balance of rigid capabilities (necessary to avoid premature dissolution) and adaptive capabilities (which enable strategic flexibility to adapt to environmental changes) (jiang, li et al. 2008: 179). proxy drivers it is evident from case study participants that a number of particularly sensitive matters were expressed euphemistically through ‘proxy drivers’. these proxy drivers have significant implications for the type of cooperative relationships considered and their level of engagement. proxy drivers represent both facilitative and inhibitive factors of cooperative relationships in ways that preserve existing relationships between parties or their agents. the use of proxy drivers occurred when participants expressed key issues or events in terms of another driver (the proxy). for example “viability issues” regarding cso 3 were cited by four participants in cso 2, two of whom referred to a long-held implicit agenda for the operations of this organisation to be absorbed into other organisation(s) in the partnership. while viability was not identified as a driver for partnership or merger, it was cited by one participant (cso 2) as an aspect in the organisation size driver (the proxy) and a negative factor by the cso 3 participant (history of internal competition, unequal status) of the compatibility driver (corresponding proxy). significant in this context is that the two participants were from organisations of different sizes with a history of internal competition and one participant sat on the other’s board. this highlights the importance of proxy drivers needs to be understood as a means of responding to implicit power while maintaining equilibrium in the relationship dynamic. proxy drivers were also evident in the decision for the merger not to proceed. this use of proxy drivers enabled equilibrium to be preserved in relationships between the organisations after the ‘merger failure’. as one participant noted, doing nothing after the merger failure was cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 47 a difficult option and partnership was an attractive ‘middle way’ to achieve some merger outcomes. strategic agenda strategy is often a centrepiece in the operations of the business or industry sectors and with a focus on expansion plans. while this level of competition seldom applies in the community sector, a number of authors have suggested there is a need for community sector organisations to be more strategically focussed in the form of having a deliberate growth and risk-taking orientation or simply being able to respond quickly to political opportunities (boyce: 2006, huxham & vangen: 2005, moatti: 2009, melville: 2008, roberts: 2009). it was noted earlier there is an issue in the community sector in relation to the extent to which organisations are ‘strategic’ or have a corporate strategy vis-à-vis the sector. the case study evidence highlighted planning in response to the merger proposition was reactive in nature, conducted ‘in house’ and did not form part of a corporate strategy for future engagement in the sector. the implications of a more planned approach to developing a strategic agenda is the ability of organisations to have greater flexibility and responsiveness to accurately assess and respond to collaboration and partnership opportunities (including merger options) based on a sound analysis of sector dynamics and capacity, and their internal capability and performance. this suggests a clear area for future consideration of partnerships within the community sector. conclusion a vibrant civil society needs a dynamic and robust community sector which can promote social inclusion and community engagement and manage the tensions of innovation, partnership and competition. this study has highlighted a number of dimensions of intrasectoral relationships which influence effective partnerships and collaboration. the initial conditions and drivers for inter-organisational cooperation have highlighted ‘paradoxes of partnership’ which raise important challenges to the form and process of cooperative relationships. the most significant paradox in the case study is that shared history of organisations, if not well understood, can be a significant inhibitor to partnership. a consequence of this paradox in the case study organisations was the partnership was actually consistent with informal collaboration with unclear goals or outcomes. secondly, 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 evidence from the case study indicates anticipated competitive advantage could in fact be disadvantageous in that partnerships can exclude the development of extra-partner relationships. thirdly, while differences in relative size of organisations considering partnership is assumed to provide resource benefits to smaller partner organisations, the resulting partnership dynamic may in fact be disadvantageous. smaller scale or ‘niche’ organisations may in fact be better positioned than their larger counterparts. the metaphor of parallel or cooperative interactions of organisations provides a useful framework for understanding inter-organisational relationships. these interactions are determined by a complex array of drivers underscored by key issues relating to shared history, motivation/trust and the different meanings attributed to drivers by key participants. these parallel and cooperative interactions can be likened to relationship continua cited in the literature including kanter’s weak and distant (i.e. parallel) or strong and close (cooperative); jiang, li, et al.’s rigid capabilities (parallel) and adaptive capabilities (cooperative); and doz’ high inertia (parallel) compared with highly adaptive relationships (cooperative). an important finding of this research is that pre-existing relationships between the organisations are important determinants of drivers for cooperative interactions (i.e. collaborations, partnerships or mergers). that is, the history of engagement between organisations (of either parallel or cooperative interaction) constitutes a form of ‘stable imprinting’ (doz 1996) in which partnerships are facilitated by their history of either generative relationships (characterised by learning and adaptation) or otherwise constrained by static relationships marked by competition, caution or suspicion. while proxy drivers reflect ambiguity and contradiction, they function to preserve relationships or maintain equilibrium between organisations. this is understood in the context of a sector characterised by long-standing inter-organisational relationships and histories in which maintaining positive relationships is important for driving effective coordination or integration within service systems. the effects over the past 20 years of managerialist agendas, contracting out and competitive tendering, have seen in more recent years recognition of the importance of partnerships and collaboration between government and community organisations in the delivery of public services. in this context there is a now a clear opportunity for community organisations to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 49 strengthen their strategic agenda in 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journal of australia, vol.13, no. 1: 60-4. winer, m. and ray, k. 1994, collaboration handbook: creating, sustaining and enjoying the journey, h. wilder foundation, amherst. playing in the sandpit together, alone; partnerships and collaboration in the community sector (douma et.al. 2000: 582) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia development, environmental and indigenous people’s movements in australia: issues of autonomy and identity debal k. singharoy indira gandhi national open university, new delhi abstract indigenous movements in australia are at a crossroad in their efforts to protect their intrinsic relations with land, nature and culture on the one hand and engaging with the reconciliatory and developmental dynamics of the state on the other. this paper examines the process of articulation and rejuvenation of indigenous identities that negotiate across culture, environment, sustainable livelihood and the developmental needs of the community. locating these movements within wider socio-historical contexts it focuses on the tensions between a proconservation and a pro-development approach in grass roots indigenous movements. three case studies are presented – drawn from the sydney region. one indigenous group’s struggle against a housing development, defined as a threat to indigenous and environmental heritage, is contrasted with an indigenous group that is internally divided over an agreement with a mining developer, and a third group that has engaged in constructing housing and welfare projects, and in part has itself become a developer. the article thereby addresses the reformulation of indigenous identities in australian society as indigenous peoples’ movements have renegotiated the contending pressures of environment and development. the problem and the perspective as collective identity is constructed through contemporaneous processes of daily interactions and engagements and through the historicity of these processes it gets negotiated with local conditions, historical experience and interconnections with the wider society. as a complex and dynamic process of acquiring collective selfhood and constructing culturally-defined meaning with a sense of solidarity, identity also gets reformed and rejuvenated in the process of change and transformation in society. identities are thus continually shifting descriptions of us (hall 1996), and ‘can be defined as differential probability’ (stryker 1990, pp. 873–74), formed and reformed with varieties of alternative ‘choices based on reason, tradition or else’ (sen 1999, p. 22). these choices may be formed with several cross-cutting discourses of identity namely, class, gender, race, age, and ethnicity at a given time and space. they can also be articulated in different ways. hence it is the very plasticity of identity that makes its cultural and political significance, since the shifting and changing character of identities chronicles the way that it gets transformed over time (hall 1996). 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 the changing character of identity is rooted in its subjective construction paving the way for its transformation from ‘structure to agency’, and resurgence through ‘changed self perception’, and ‘rejuvenation for the collective action’ (cerutti 2001). here we see the ‘creation of new meanings’ for actors themselves, and by themselves (castells 1997, p. 2). these transformations are linked to struggles against hegemony, and contestation of subordination and subjugation wherein people are located within oppressive structures of power, hierarchy and domination through interactions of racial, ethnic, colonial, class, caste, gender inequality and discrimination. identities, to castells, are constructed in the varied contexts of power relationships. accordingly there are legitimising identities meant to maintain the status quo, introduced by the dominant institutions of society to extend and rationalise their domination vis-à-vis social actors; resistance identities generated by those actors that are in conditions devaluated or stigmatised by the logic of domination, to build trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from or opposed to those permeating the institutions of society; and project identities constructed by social actors on the basis of whatever cultural materials available to them to build a new identity that redefines their positioning in society, and which in the process, seeks the transformation of the whole structure. these identities however are not discrete; rather in a historical context one may get transformed into another. castells, for instance, maintains that “identities that start as ‘resistance’ may reduce to ‘project’ and may also in the due course of history become ‘legitimising’ identities to rationalise their domination by becoming the dominant institutions in society. to him there is per se no progressive or regressive identity except for its historical context (castells 1997, p. 8). in the wake of globalisation, ‘along with the technological revolution, the transformation of capitalism, and the demise of statism’, as castells puts it, ‘we have experienced … the widespread surge of powerful expressions of collective identity that challenge globalisation and cosmopolitanism on behalf of cultural singularity and people’s control over their lives and environment. these expressions are multiple, highly diversified following the contours of each culture, and the historical sources of formation of identity. they include proactive movements, aiming at transforming human relationship at their most fundamental level’ (castells 1997, p. 6). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 3 identities and social movements social movements are the essential ‘connecting process of formation for collective identity and production of solidarity’ (pizzorno 1978, p. 293). they “empower” members in defense of the acquired identity (melucci 1992, 1996). social movements are circumscribed by identities based on subjectivity, morality, emotion, value and cognition (touraine 1981, bertaux 1990, eyerman and jamison 199, hegedus 1990) on the one hand, and also common interest, rational calculations and contentious politics (tilly1985, mccarthy and zald 1977, tarrow 1995) on the other. it is again that social movements, rather than becoming a reflection of collective identity, at times become the ‘public experience of self’ with the increasing quantum of mobility and shockwaves of fluidity in contemporary society (urry 2000, cf. mcdonald, 2002). indigenous life, culture and identity the life and culture of indigenous people across the globe have largely been characterised by their intrinsic relationships to land, nature and environment and the ideals of solidarity of collective identity and autonomy that generate struggles for the preservation of these relationships and ideals. for them, collective resistance has become a continuous experience against historical and contemporaneous oppression by colonial and post-colonial powers that have encroached on their lives and autonomy within the public agenda of ‘civilising’, ‘modernising’, ‘mainstreaming’, ‘developing’, ‘educating’ and ‘globalising’ their specific ways of life, institutions and culture. the processes are experienced as economic and environmental dispossessions, cultural and political subordination, physical annihilation and forced assimilation with the colonial way of life. in the globalising world many of the modern states, despite their commitment to international obligations and popular mandates have seldom been successful in protecting indigenous social rights and cultural autonomy, to promote the ideals of their self-determination, to prevent their economic dispossession and political subordination, and to integrate them within its developmental and reconciliatory initiatives. in this article the view that indigenous social movements have constructed and rejuvenated indigenous identity through contestation and protest against the state, its coercive apparatus, and the dominant sections of society will be critically examined. hence the major questions are: how have indigenous movements in australia engaged with issues of culture, nature and development? has there been any uniformity in the process of such formation? what has been the nature of transformation of 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 such identity? towards this endeavour the following three cases from the sydney region are examined: indigenous people’s resistance against sandon point housing project in thirroul, wollongong; commercial mining on traditional lands to finance community development, and agitation against these initiatives in worimi land council; and engagement with protection of land and welfare initiatives in gandangara land council. the field work for this study was conducted during march-september 2010. the process of manifestation of indigenous social movements, and the formation and reformulation of indigenous identities in australia are rooted in historical neglect and injustice on the one hand and contemporary socio-political conditions on the other. herein is a glimpse of this historical trajectory of the indigenous people in australia. historical trajectory and the indigenous people of australia: a few milestones the process of colonisation of australian aboriginal and torres strait peoples by the british imperial power that took place in 1788 and continued unabated through the 18th, 19th and middle of the 20th century, led to the grabbing of the land of these people, robbing them of their livelihood and inherited linkages with nature, culture and environment, relegating them to the margins, as aliens in their own land. prolonged colonial state policy of annihilation and exclusion and forced assimilation also saw the practice of confining the indigenous people in reserves and forceful removal of aboriginal children from their parents, that produced a hugely traumatised aboriginal ‘stolen generation’, who are the victims and witnesses to this ‘blemished chapter’ of british colonial history in australia (haebich 2001). colonial domination accompanied by the loss of land, autonomy, and human dignity, ethnic and cultural identity, generated resistance and discontent amongst indigenous people, manifested in organised social movements from the 1930’s. the australian state granted indigenous people voting rights in 1962 in the wake of increasing public demand for reconciliation. though subsequently various land related acts were enacted, for instance the aboriginal lands trust act of south australia 1966, and the aboriginal lands act of 1970, indigenous people’s movements were set back in 1971 when in the gove land rights case, the court ruled that australia had been terra nullius before british settlement, and that no concept of native title existed in australian law. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 5 significantly on 26th january (australia day) 1972, a group of young aborigines made history by erecting 'aboriginal tent embassy’ on the lawns of parliament house in canberra with the demand for the northern territory to be predominantly represented by the indigenous people, for indigenous land and mining rights and preservation of their sacred sites, and for compensation money for not returnable lands (goodall 1996). the whitlam government in 1972 introduced the policy of aboriginal self determination with provision for aboriginal-controlled organisations, limited land rights and created a new department of aboriginal affairs to look into the affairs of the indigenous people of australia. the aboriginal land rights (northern territory) act 1976 was later enacted to facilitate land claims, followed by the nsw aboriginal land rights acts in 1983 (norman, 2007). the rejuvenated indigenous movements gained significant political space in the 1980s and were further advanced with the judgment of the mabo v. queensland case in 1993, which declared that the previous legal concept of australia as terra nullius was invalid, and recognised the native title of the indigenous people under common law. the paradigmatic shift in this judgment was followed by the enactment of the native title act 1993 and the australian high court decision in 1996 to recognise the indigenous rights over pastoral leases. these developments led to the creation of the indigenous land corporation (ilc) and subsequently the (state and local) land councils as statutory bodies to assist indigenous people with land acquisition and management and to achieve economic, environmental, social and cultural benefits. with recognition of indigenous land rights, indigenous identities were rejuvenated in the later 1990s. the bringing them home report (1997) of the human rights and equal opportunity commission of australia created a huge public outcry in 1999, and called on the australian parliament to recognise the mistreatment to the indigenous people by the british colonisers\ (haebich 2001). the people’s walk for reconciliation on 28 may 2000, with more than 250,000 people walking over the sydney harbour bridge demanding a public apology and respectful reconciliation, marked a new departure for indigenous movements in australia. eight years later, on 13 february 2008, the australian government apologised to indigenous australians, as follows: ‘we apologise especially for the removal of aboriginal and torres strait islander children from their families, their communities and their country. … to the mothers and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of families and 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 communities, we say sorry.….. we the parliament of australia respectfully request that this apology be received in the spirit in which it is offered as part of the healing of the nation ….’ (rudd 2008). many indigenous people, however, are not reconciled with the healing process, and they continue to protest against the state, for instance by observing the aboriginal day of mourning on the australia day (26th january) every year. many indigenous people have protested against the federal government’s intervention in the northern territory, launched in 2007, and especially the suspension of the racial discrimination act 1975, necessary to enable the intervention. lee rhiannon, a green nsw senator in an interview for this project on may 16, 2010 stated that: ‘the northern territory intervention is a black mark on the government. it was done without consultation with the indigenous people. the army has been deployed, legitimate government has been suspended, and there have imposition of several policies on them. this is very unfortunate and needs to be stopped …’ similar concerns have also been expressed against queensland's wild river act 2007 by the indigenous people as it has been perceived to be an encroachment on traditional practice and also betrays a lack of trust in indigenous peoples ability ‘to keep the rivers as pristine as they have done for thousands of years’ (pearson 2010). however despite these acrimonies, a visible shift has been marked in the reconciliatory approach of the australian state towards the indigenous people. such a shift has been influenced by the indigenous people’s pressure from below and by the important declarations and regulations of the united nations to which the australian government is a signatory. the policies of accommodation and reconciliation that have been introduced in the wake of proliferation of self-conscious indigenous movements since early 1970s have opened up new possibilities and challenges in reestablishing linkages between the indigenous culture and environment. have these measures for reconciliation been able to provide equal status to the indigenous people in the australian society? we shall discuss this in the following section. indigenous people today indigenous people are disadvantaged in australian society, both in absolute and relative terms. over the past 20 years, the indigenous population has doubled from 227,593 in 1986 to 562,861 in 2009 and currently indigenous people constitute about 2.7 % of the total population of australia (australian bureau of statistics, 2010). in the process of colonisation, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 7 the indigenous people of australia lost control over their language and culture: only 12% can speak an indigenous language and only one percent practice within indigenous belief systems. though there is a higher proportion of young people amongst indigenous than nonindigenous people, the proportion of elderly people is substantially lower – 3% of the indigenous and 13% of the non indigenous people are aged 65 years and above, reflecting the poor health, education and economic status of the indigenous people of australia. indigenous people have a substantially higher proportion of teenage mothers, with 20%, as against 4% amongst non-indigenous people. the infant mortality and maternal mortality rates are substantially higher for indigenous people and indigenous people have a lower life expectancy, of 59.4 years for men and 64.8 years for women, as against 78.7 years for men and 82.6 years for women amongst the non-indigenous population. 27% of indigenous people live in crowded housing in comparison with only 6% for non-indigenous people. more than 9% of indigenous people are homeless as against 2.5 % of non indigenous people. the proportion of learners completing year 12 educations amongst indigenous people is 22% as against 47% for non-indigenous people. attendance at university or technical college is 6% amongst indigenous people, as against 25% for the nonindigenous population. similarly the employment rate for the age group of 15 years and above is 46% amongst indigenous people, in comparison with 62% percent amongst nonindigenous people. again, 16% of indigenous people are unemployed and 46% are not in the labour force in comparison with 5% and 35% respectively for non-indigenous people. the mean gross individual income per week for indigenous people in 2006 was $278, while for non-indigenous people it was $473 (australian bureau of statistics 2006). indigenous people are also politically disadvantaged: despite gaining the right to vote from 1960, there was no indigenous politician elected to the lower house of the federal parliament until the 2010 parliamentary election (reconciliation australia 2010). all of the negative markers for disenfranchised populations—imprisonment, domestic violence, alcoholism—are much higher for aboriginal peoples. the report of the royal commission into aboriginal deaths in custody (1991) stated that aboriginal disadvantage is directly associated with dispossession and forced removal from traditional lands. such 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 dispossessions have disrupted connections between indigenous culture and the spirit of 'country', and have produced waves of discontent amongst indigenous people against the australian state. development, conservation and indigenous movements developmental and reconciliatory perspectives have always been a contested terrain amongst indigenous people, as they try to integrate divergent values, ideologies, expectations and experiences. there are contradictory views on economic development, with some viewing it as a possible means of breaking the barriers of marginalisation, while others view development as a threat to the links between culture, land, environment and the dreaming story of indigenous people. indigenous views on conservation and development at the grass roots generate conflicts, not only between the state and indigenous activists, but also at times amongst indigenous people themselves. in the wake of an emergent need for development, integration and reconciliation of indigenous peoples with the wider society on the one hand, and a continuing desire to preserve linkages with cultural heritage, nature and livelihood on the other, indigenous people’s movements in australia are now moving through a changing trajectory. in the context of these tensions, there has been a reconstruction of indigenous identity at the grass roots, both in terms of historical experiences and contemporary realities. the following case studies reflect on some aspects of these movements and reconstructions. sandon point sandon point, also known as the mccauley’s beach, comprises 61 hectares of open scenic space between the coastal villages of thirroul and bulli in the northern suburbs of wollongong, on the east coast of nsw, australia. the local indigenous people claim that the beach has been a traditional place of their worship, story-telling and tool-making: the place relates to their ‘dreaming’ and has been a burial site dating back 6,000 years. in 1998, a human skull-bone was exposed on the sand dune and the local indigenous people believed it to be the ceremonial burial remains of an aboriginal cleaver man, kuradiji, a man with special spiritual status. the land was once public land zoned for mining and industrial use and had been zoned for public use since 1980. in 1995 the area was sold to a sydney-based property developer, stockland, for a proposed luxurious housing project of 1200 dwellings units. the sale sparked a series of protests from both indigenous and non-indigenous people. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 9 indigenous people agitated against the sandon point development in early 2000 in the wake of wollongong city council’s finalisation and approval of the project. protests and agitation compelled the developers to suspend development work in the identified site, pending an archaeological survey. in february 2001 the survey was submitted and wollongong city council (wcc), and subsequently the land and environment court, allowed housing construction to resume. protesters felt that the archaeological surveyors were biased as they had consulted only one wodi wodi elder, while other traditional owner groups representing korewal, illawarra, jerrungarugh, shoalhaven groups, were ignored. protestors argued that the surveyor had not collected sufficient material from the appropriate places on the site. as a result, the agitation was intensified. under the leadership of uncle dootch kennedy, a community elder and elected chairperson of illawarra local aboriginal land council, and with the overwhelming support of local indigenous people, the sandon point aboriginal tent embassy (spate) was established in december 2001 by igniting sacred fire, erecting a tent on the site of construction, and maintaining a twenty-four hour vigil to stake their inherited claim. meanwhile, to muster support from across australia, the sacred fire was carried from the sandon point aboriginal tent embassy to canberra, and elsewhere, and brought back as a symbol of indigenous unity, resistance and cultural autonomy. during an elaborate ritual yurin elder uncle guboo ted thomas renamed the sandon point as kuradji to reassert the indigenous claim. the illawara local land council also declared the whole sandon point area as a place of significance for aboriginal culture and heritage. as the developers started fencing the area on february 14 2002, the community formed a human chain to prevent vehicle movements for construction in the area, and police arrested a large number of protesters. uncle dootch kennedy then brought a legal petition to the nsw land and environment court, seeking an injunction against development activities on the site. the injunction delayed construction, but ultimately the court upheld the development approval of wollongong city council, albeit with some conditions. construction activities resumed in late 2002, however the speed of the construction was slowed down in view of sustained agitation. 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 the protesters approached the nsw government, but also in vain. the nsw minister for planning approved the development plan at sandon point in december 2006, despite the significance of aboriginal heritage on the disputed site. activists also approached the nsw land and environmental court and in early 2007 the court considered the impact of flooding due to rising sea levels, and declared the development concept null and void. following an appeal by the nsw minister for planning, the supreme court of australia over-turned the decision. significantly, in may 2007 an appeal by the protestors for sandon point to be declared an aboriginal area to be protected under the national parks and the wildlife act forced another suspension of construction work. however the minister of planning, as the ultimate authority on developmental planning, reapproved the project in october 2009. the indigenous activists again moved to the land and environment court in november 2009, raising the issues of environmental hazards. in july 2010 the environment court rejected the appeal, and protestors took the case to the supreme court. meanwhile on 8 april 2011 the developer stockland was fined $1500 by wollongong city council on the complaint of the sandon point aboriginal tent embassy (spate) that recent heavy rains, which triggered floods in the region's south, had also caused a build-up of storm water at the mccauley's beach residential site. the flooding vindicated the environmental concerns, but the complaints were rejected on several counts (munro 2011). the process of legal challenge and counter-challenge created a host of confrontations between the nsw government and the developers on the one hand, and the indigenous people on the other. the protestors strongly felt that the issue was shaped by racism: that in a white-dominated australian society it was very difficult for the indigenous people to get their collective concerns and voice recognised. to them the government was guided by the interest of the developers, and not by respect for indigenous culture and heritage. such a feeling is reflected in the words of dootch kennedy, the chairman of spate: ‘we are marginalised as we are only a tiny minority in australia…and our voice is not heard by them (the government)….…. they have given this land to the developers to earn money. they are not the native australians; they are not linked to the land… its ecosystem, its cultural heritage. they are linked to the land through extraction of natural resources to earn profit for them…. the government in australia is run by the miners, developers, international companies who have little respect for the land heritage and culture of the indigenous people…. they are killing the aborigines like animals. they have destroyed our land, our nature our cultural heritage and we have lost control on our life. we are fighting with our own people to protect our heritage…’ (roy dootch kennedy interviewed august 1, 2010) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 11 the protesters challenged the propriety of the state in damaging the indigenous people’s linkage between land and culture: ‘they call us savages, but they keep on committing genocide... why have you robbed me of my heritage? why should we continue to be robbed? why is our mother earth to be sacrificed? what have you done and what are you doing to our land? all cultures in this earth have respect for their own land, why should we be deprived of such respect? we want them to stop disrespecting our culture and stop harming our land… our culture. they should repair all the damage they have done to our mother earth, our cultural heritage…. they don’t understand and don’t want to understand the way we speak and the way we do we think and the way we live with nature. what they have done to us, they can’t repeat the same to our children.’ through this movement the indigenous people wanted to preserve and rebuild their linkage to culture and environment: ‘we need to establish the significance of indigenous people in the community in australia. you are to recognise the cultural linkages of the indigenous people with the story telling, craft and tool making values that connect them to their country. …. while talking about assimilation you are to take care of indigenous values as well and you are to connect the country through their cultural heritage, and language. you have to believe in the adaptive nature of indigenous culture’. the protesters were confident of the strength of their unity and optimistic about the outcome of their movement, despite the setbacks: ‘we have lost in the court but there is the win in this loss. it strongly indicates that the aborigines can’t get justice in australia since the law and the state machinery is operated by the non-aboriginals. the journey does not end here. we are neither going to bow down our heads, nor throw our hands in the air saying that we have lost. the journey begins now. we are united – all aborigines of australia are with us in the struggle for our land, culture and environment’. (roy dootch kennedy interviewed august 1, 2010) the campaign was remarkably successful in mobilising non-indigenous supporters. echoing the sentiments of kennedy, a non-indigenous resident described the situation as follows: we give lip service to the issue of the aboriginal issue. we have a very limited view on the aboriginal interest in australia. the land belongs to them. even if the sacred site is out of the boundary of the development project, we should respect their sentiment… belief is not guided by an artificial boundary..... we have played our innings... we have developed the country by destroying their culture, nature and everything. let us allow them to have their say in the development” (sandon point resident august 1, 2010) 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 the sandon point activists developed a common voice and identity through their collective action by mobilising indigenous symbols, rituals and comprehensive collective action. they not only developed responses against developers and the state initiatives, but also proactively developed networks of local indigenous people with the wider society in their efforts to defend the relations with indigenous land, nature, culture and environment. sand mining through the worimi local aboriginal land council (wllc) aboriginal land councils in australia have emerged out of long drawn struggle of aboriginal people to protect their interests and aspirations related to land rights. as such, land councils are ‘committed to ensuring a better future for aboriginal people by working for the return of culturally significant and economically viable land, pursuing cultural, social and economic independence for its people and being politically pro-active and voicing the position of aboriginal people on issues that affect them’ (merlan 2005). the worimi aboriginal land council is made up of several indigenous peoples, buraigal, gamipingal and the garawerrigal, and is recognised as one of the most vibrant and active land councils in nsw. it has been successful in acquiring a vast track of land by through land claims, and has also initiated business ventures, including a pleasure park to attract tourists. however in 2003 worimi became bankrupt due to alleged corruption and mismanagement of land and resources, leading to an inquiry in 2004 into the loss of $720, 000 of land council funds (jopson and ryle 2004). in spite of these financial issues, the worimi land council has initiated a sand dune touring company and a large-scale sand mining program. though it obtained support from a majority of the indigenous communities and members of the land council for the venture, a section of the indigenous community elders, environmentalists and local administrators opposed the economic expansion plan, especially the sand mining activities. according to the pro-development land council members the sand-mining project ‘is expected to generate about 60 operational and contract jobs and a handsome revenue and … the income that would generate out of these scheme would be used for the housing, health, employment and environmental sustainability programs for the aboriginal community’ (andrew smith, interviewed, august 25, 2010). however, the pro-conservationists allege that these initiatives are pushed forward by the vested interests and undemocratically, unmindful cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 13 of the significance of indigenous art, craft and heritage, and sentiments of the majority of the indigenous people. reflecting this, there have also been claims and counter claims about the status of actual occupiers of worimi land. aunty carol ridgeway-bissett, a community elder, who claims to be the actual traditional occupier of the land, has strongly opposed the mining project, fearing that sand mining would not protect the traditional spiritual and cultural sanctity of the land. she has organised protests against mining and has gained regular support from the locals and the environmentalists. she asserted that: ‘sand dune is a part of our culture, our heritage. the sand dunes are the ancient landscape of my ancestors; it is full of the bones and artifacts of my people. we get blessings from them, from these sand dunes. we would protect it….who knows how much and how many have already been crushed and destroyed by the mining”. she claims that the sand miners ‘conduct biased archaeological studies without consulting the actual owners of the land. these development and mining activities are anti-indigenous people, their culture and heritage…..the land rights act has not handed over land to the people who have links to the land. the local land council and not to the actual owner of the land…the land council in connivance with the developers is destroying the aboriginal cultural heritage….’ (aunty carol ridgeway-bissett interviewed september 3, 2010). aunty carol ridgeway-bissett is in the process of preparing an alternative archeological report. she is lobbying extensively with nsw politicians, appealing to federal ministers, organising a rally to stop sand mining and the other commercial ventures of the land council. non-indigenous environmentalists have also been critical of the sand mining and have echoed the voice of indigenous people. director of total environment centre, jeff angel is of the view that coastal sand mining had run its course and ought to stop, arguing: ‘there has been enough devastation…dune systems are dynamic and always moving. interfering with them is something that ought to be approached with caution’ (ray, 2009). however andrew smith, the chairperson of worimi land council is a pro-development activist. he wants to use the available indigenous resources for the economic and social benefits of these people. he is personally enterprising, wants to take risks and learn from the experience. he says: 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 ‘they [the government] have given back our land. we feel good. however, we have also got lots of liability. we are to give tax...we have huge expenditure… … so we are to generate revenue by using our land, undertaking a cultural heritage program through the developers and through the extraction of sand from the sand dune. this money we use for education, for health, for fellowship and training program of the indigenous unemployed youth and also for the community awareness on environmental sustainability program’. he explains that 30% of the revenue generated from sand extraction will accrue to the local land council, the remaining 70% going to the state land council and the developers, yet sand extraction from the sand dune has an immediate practical purpose: ‘the sand extraction is done not for this little money alone, but also to protect the indigenous community from the disaster of ever expanding sand dune. the moving sand dome will engulf us very fast if we don’t stop it….’ andrew smith is also an assimilationist. though he is very critical of the injustice historically meted out to the indigenous people of australia, he is in favour of rebuilding indigenous society and culture through a synthesis between indigenous traditional values and the ways of life of contemporary australian society and culture. he looks for a respectable assimilation of the indigenous people in australian society. to him: ‘assimilation however should not be the way that australia tried to assimilate the aboriginals. they introduced a genocide killing millions of aborigines…. we are so assimilated now that we don’t live the way we lived thousand years ago. we don't wear lap-laps and live in the dunes. we live in houses, at the end of the day, we sleep in a bed, and eat at mcdonalds, drive cars and watch tv…despite all these changes we the indigenous people are still here with our own cultural heritage and our connection to the land and the country. we are struggling to get back our country of dreaming, our autonomy and independence. we want to preserve our culture and our linkage with nature and environment. however it should not be done by removing the community from the australian society…’ (andrew smith, interviewed august 25, 2010). though the worimi local land council has been oriented towards developmentalism and reconciliation, an element of discontent against these processes has been shaped by the indigenous people to protect their cultural heritage and linkage to nature. the inner cleavage among the indigenous people however is not devoid of common concern for their plights, historical oppression and neglect in australian society. gandangara land council, liverpool the gandangara aboriginal local land council covers nine local government area councils including parramatta, penrith, fairfield, auburn, bankstown, holroyd, sutherland, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 15 campbelltown and liverpool. it is located in the traditional area of the cabrogal clan of the darug nation and is considered to be a model land council that has acquired distinction for several of its activities. it excelled in providing employment and training to the indigenous unemployed youth, and in providing education, health and old age care and housing services. it has undertaken indigenous land care (for instance, at mt annan botanical gardens), and built a memorial to the stolen generations, and sought to strengthen cultural awareness amongst aboriginal youth. the land council has taken initiatives to exploit community-held land resources to extract benefit for its members. in march 2009 the gandangara members passed a resolution governing land use, and approved an elaborate business plan. a commercial housing project is a part of this plan, and is supported by all the members of the community. the community members have developed a missionary zeal to initiate welfare and development activities. they meet regularly with the community elders, stolen generation members, young job seekers and others, to take proactive initiatives to build a new future for the indigenous community through welfarism. overall, they have initiated a social movement to reconstruct their identity through the developmental process. indeed, assimilation and integration have emerged to be a dominant perspective for them, even though they are not uncritical of colonial oppression and dispossession. such views are reflected in the perspectives of several activists of the land council, such as carole brown, a member of the land council. carole brown is an aboriginal assimilationist. she says: ‘my father is irish and my mom was an aborigine, so i have a mix heritage. i have the best of both cultures with me. my mom told me to take best from both and i look the both. my first husband was black and second husband was white and i have two beautiful children from these two partners. they represent both world of australia …the aborigines and the white. we have best of both the cultures....abba-gabba…’ (carole brown, interviewed august 12, 2010, august 17, 2010) however the indigenous people face several problems in white-dominated australia. to her: ‘being minority we face problems. in the growing up process the children lose confidence. we are forgetting our culture, language, songs, and music… we train the children to know our culture; we also let them know the other culture as well as to protect the indigenous cultural heritage. the aboriginal people should maintain their own culture and be developed by their own rights...’ she adds, ‘…..this is unfortunate that a huge number of in the youth from mixed parentage are unable to speak the indigenous language. they are not aware of the significance 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 of indigenous culture in our developmental activities. … because of mixed parentage, and the long practice of child removal from the indigenous community, knowledge about cultural heritage is declining among the aboriginal people, especially among the youth…. australian society has got too much technology, too much consumerism and too much of the comforts. many of indigenous are forgetting their culture because of the pressure of these technologies, consumer culture, comforts….’ to remain rooted in one’s own culture despite being historically uprooted in a multicultural context is a very difficult task: cultural protection can’t be pursued against the development process of the community. what are the strategies? the land council has organised initiatives for cultural change and also for economic development: we have also activities related to day care of the community elders. in the day care centre we keep them engaged with the activities like indigenous painting and drawing and making of indigenous craft and tools. we have also a health care centre that takes care of the health related issues of the aboriginal people, especially for the elderly ones, who come here not only for health care service, but also to share each other’s experiences. (carole brown interviewed august 12, 2010, august 17, 2010) she adds: ‘we have land development, land caring activities. we have identified a housing project that is supported by the community…. this housing is for all indigenous and non-indigenous. the profit is supposed to help us for employment generation, age care, health and education program. the land is carefully selected and there is no problem’. within these developmental activities indigenous culture is carefully preserved by bringing a harmony. she says: ‘it is a big thing that we have got the land rights now. in the hype of all these developments, the youth tend to forget their own culture. the indigenous people are to educate themselves about their cultural heritage. we need harmony between indigenous culture and development. we teach the young generation to be honest to you by a becoming respectful both the culture. this approach will bring a lot of harmony in society.’ (carole brown interviewed august 12, 2010, august 17, 2010). within this urge for harmony, there is also the voice for discontent, which is historically rooted. forceful removal of children has brought not only a traumatic experience for the victims but also to their parents. a victim of the stolen generation, auntie lily, associated with the hoxton park elders centre of gandangara land council, had an horrific experience. she was united with her son 40 years after he was forcibly removed. she says: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 17 ‘you can’t simply explain what the torture is. …. it is emotional, psychological and physical. . hundreds of thousand mothers in australian lost their children. i am a mother; i also lost my child who was taken away from me on grounds of race. that was a new baby. i was kept in church in brisbane to serve the priests and others…. they have destroyed every thing… our culture, nature, our lives.’ though her life is circumscribed by bitter experience, she looks for reconciliation through harmonious coexistence in australian society. she finds a hope in the unity and activities of the land council. to her: ‘it is a time to rebuild… that is however is not an easy process. all the victims of the stolen generation, the children and the parents, should be given land under the local land council, to maintain the eco-system. it is through this land that we will build connection between nature and our indigenous culture’. (auntie lily, interviewed on august 28, 2010) the gandangara land council while has emerged to be integrationist with the developmental perspective of the state; it uses this opportunity to revive the indigenous cultural ethos and idioms through these developmental activisms. herein the criticality against the state is used to redefine indigenous identity and unity at the grass roots. conclusion: dichotomies of cooption and contestation in indigenous collective mobilisations the australian historian, h. c. coombs stated that, ‘throughout their history since 1788 aborigines have sought a “composition” with white society in which their links with the land and the essence of the “aboriginal way” can be maintained’. coombs talked about ‘the two streams of people, black and white, which are forming australian society, each with its own origin and character but influencing each other, yet preserving even into the ocean itself, its own identity and its distinctive contribution to the character and life-sustaining capacity of the bay as a whole’ (coombs 1991, pp. 21-22). though there are also contradictions in the construction of such symbol. one of the prominent challenges is the perceptive cultural differences in the understanding of each others’ culture. bennett argues that ‘aboriginal people see their relationship with the australian nation as requiring recognition of their status as its original resident and as different to-as superior to-the position of all others. although the western view of rights talks of each individual’s right to be treated equally with all others, aboriginal people see their ‘first people’ status as demanding different treatment from that given to all others because 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 ‘western legal systems have provided inadequate protection for the group rights of indigenous people. it is in respect of such views that aboriginal people have had the greatest difficulty in having their message understood by other australians (bennett 1999, p. 10). indigenous peoples not merely ‘disadvantaged australians’ or a ‘minority’ group, they are the first nation peoples of the country. they have been the victims of poverty and inequality caused by historic treatment and the persistence of systemic discrimination’ (calma 2007, p.19). the issues of their discrimination and marginalisation now have been articulated through grassroots collective action, and they have been empowered in australian society through an awakening and politicisation of social questions that challenge the parochialism and institutions of authority (clark 2008, p.249). despite shared circumstances, aboriginal communities in australia remain intensely, and proudly, local (behrendt 1995, p. 27). despite such localisation, indigenous identity and social movements encounter a host of tensions in contemporary australia which are caused not only by colonisation but also by the processes of modernisation, economic development and state policy of assimilation and reconciliation. as sarah maddison has argued, divergent experiences have produced great diversity in how communities engage with power structures, ‘as they grapple with the often-uncomfortable intersection of their fractured (but not abandoned) traditional and cultural life, the legacies of colonisation, and their own diversity across the continent’; maddison continues: ‘these intersections of history, culture, experience and identity have produced an extraordinarily complex political culture. these complexities have produced tensions between autonomy and dependency; sovereignty and citizenship; tradition and development; individualism and collectivism; indigeneity and hybridity; unity and regionalism; community and kin; men, women and customary law; elders and the next generation; and mourning and reconciliation’ (maddison 2009, p.xxiv). despite these challenges there remains the possibility of creating a common symbol, founded on indigenous people’s linkage between their life, culture and nature. rowley’s (1973) observation holds the key when he says: ‘we of the west seem likely to destroy ourselves through our assumption that god gave nature to man. perhaps we have to learn, what aborigines always assumed, that man is no more than part of nature’ (rowley 1973, p. 194). thus there is shared logic of indigenous grassroots protest, assertion and initiative, defined by the tensions within indigenous society and their relations between land, nature and culture. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 19 logic of grass roots protests and their divergence the culture of indigenous social protest has emerged to forge vital links between indigenous people, the state and the civil society. these have been sustained and institutionalised in australian society through the functioning of the local land councils, development initiatives of the state, and the formation of solidarities between indigenous social movement organisations, trade unions, environmentalists, students and many other groupings. through these mobilisations indigenous people have developed distinctive orientations towards their own culture, nature and environment and the state. they have developed a variety of support bases for their collective action and have followed different strategies of collective action. they have articulated through their every day struggle distinctive solidarities and specific identities, and have received varied state and civil society responses towards their mobilisations over the decades. the variations in orientation, actions and attitudes reflect the kind of issues addressed in the mobilisation and specific framework of assimilation as propagated by the australian state. in sandon point the indigenous people united themselves to preserve their culture, nature and environment. in the process they have confronted developers and the state by forging solidarities amongst themselves, rejuvenating their identity in terms of traditional cultural heritage and its association to nature. significantly, through these protests their association with nature and culture was reinforced ideationally, and their relationship with fellow indigenous people was rejuvenated and integrated with the wider network of civil society as represented by environmentalists, students, trade unionists, feminists and others from across australia, cutting the boundary of localised resistance. protestors have acquired a resistance identity against the logic of state and developer domination in a white-dominated society. significantly, the attitude of the state towards this mobilisation has remained predominantly oppositional albeit allowing the space for review and appeal. the local land councils of australia provide the framework for assimilation of australian aborigines with the state and wider society. though indigenous people are invariably critical of the european invasion, and the perilous treatment, humiliation and torture inflicted on them in by the ‘settlers’, they have strategically engaged with the process of assimilation (though by compulsion rather than by choice). however their approach and perception towards the state initiatives remains highly eclectic. 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 notwithstanding a section of indigenous people viewing developmental initiatives as destructive to nature and indigenous cultural heritage, the dominant section of the worimi local land council aims to commercially exploit their cultural heritage, land and other assets to generate income. they look for a synthesis between conservation and welfare-induced development, defining a process of ‘selective assimilation’ and integration with the state, paradoxically pursuing self-determination of indigenous people without compromising the space for development. though they are critical of past injustice and white domination, they are in the process of creating a space for their engagement with the reconciliation process. thus amongst them the process of reconstructing indigenous identity moves like a pendulum between legitimising and resistance identity even though the tendency has been towards a ‘legitimising identity with criticality’. conservationists have rejuvenated a form of indigenous identity which is predominantly geared to local resistance. however at a wider level they recognise the state apparatus and look for legal remedies. significantly, though, the state is indifferent towards the oppositional perspective of the conservationists, while it accommodates the pro-development activists’ views and actions. in the process of mobilisation pro-development assimilationists have become more integrated with the state apparatus, while anti-development conservationists have become more interlinked with wider civil society networks. the gandangara local land council has essentially taken a pro-development approach even though they are critical of the state at the historical injustice meted out to them. they are protective of their cultural heritage and simultaneously in favour of commercial use of the land, and are selectively conservationist in relation to environment as they use development initiatives to bring change in the economic, health and educational status and life style of indigenous people. as such they have developed a model of a ‘legitimising identity with criticality’ and are in process of getting integrated with the state apparatus for development and welfare of the community. as noted, the state is accommodative of the aspiration and the activities of this indigenous people. in brief, indigenous movements in australia are in a fast process of transition at the grassroots, causing diverse orientations towards indigenous cultural heritage, nature and environment, inculcating and attracting specific support bases, initiating distinct collective actions, constructing varieties of collective action, solidarity and collective identity, forming specific attitude towards the state and thereby inviting distinctive state responses. the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 21 distinctive forms of indigenous protests, identities and state responses discussed in this article are summarised in table i. table i: diverse orientations of three indigenous people’s movements in australia cases orientation to indigenous culture orientation to nature/ environmt support base nature of collective action attitude towards state attitude of state towards protests nature of indigeno us solidarity nature of identity sandon point protective proconservation indigenous people, environmenta list, students, trade unions, feminists etc agitation, symbolic rituals, legal petition, blockade , tent embassy conflicting oppositional total solidarity resistant worimi land council selectively protective selective conservation sections of indigenous people, environmenta list, students agitation, legal action partly conflicting partly integration accommodating part solidarity predominantly legitimising gandangara land council selectively protective selective conservation indigenous people collective development initiatives integrating accommodating total solidarity legitimising indigenous people’s linkage to land, culture and environment is intrinsic and locally circumscribed, as are their protests against historical and contemporary oppression. while within the developmental and reconciliatory dynamics there has been resistance against development initiatives that threaten these linkages, there has also been a legitimising process through the cooption of indigenous people’s initiatives within the welfare domain of the state. the resistance and the legitimising processes have created tensions not only between indigenous people on one hand and the state and developers on the other, but also within the indigenous society itself. the pro-conservation activists across the investigated areas, guided by their sensitivity towards cultural heritage, rejuvenate their indigenous identity in resistance to the state and developers, producing solidarities and political agency with non-indigenous groupings. they propagate for autonomy and self-determination, in terms of indigenous cultural heritage, protocol, and pre-colonial historicity. significantly the policy of reconciliation as propagated by the australian state since 1990s has provided space for the integration and cooption of many conflicts and initiatives of indigenous people in australian society. state-mandated mechanisms like local land councils provide space for democratic development at the grassroots and solidarity amongst the indigenous people for their collective assertion, and have paved the way for the cooption of indigenous initiatives within the state apparatus, creating the framework of legitimising the 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 initiatives of pro-development activists. in the process of cooption a degree of compromise with cultural heritage and environmental sustainability has emerged. here, indigenous society encounters tensions from within. these tensions moreover are compounded by the localised specificities of the indigenous culture, their heterogeneity and the diverse contexts of social and economic development, leading to divergent identities and collective mobilisations. the sustained mobilisation and rejuvenated identities strengthen solidarity in terms of historical experience to develop resistance and politically question social injustice and persistent marginalisation, challenging emerging state perspectives on reconciliation, integration and development. within the same context, indigenous identity is reformulated to legitimise state perspectives. despite the differences, sustained mobilisations on land rights and cultural and political autonomy and the common experience of historical oppression, and concern for cultural heritage contribute to articulate and rejuvenate indigenous identities. these identities are in the process of creating space for their engagement with australian society by maintaining autonomy and respect for each other’s culture. this dynamic is reflected in the following statement from roy dootch kennedy, chairperson of spate: we need a major change in the mindset. that is a mountainous thing and not going to happen so immediately… while talking about assimilation you are to take care of indigenous values as well, and you are to connect the country through cultural heritage and language… the government should now have serious dialogue with us….. the journey begins now. in this changing trajectory the processes of forming of identity and solidarity amongst indigenous people, as pointed out by various scholars, is affected by emergence of an indigenous middle class and by the overwhelming tendency of that class to become absorbed professionally into government and by the increasing welfare dependency of a large section of indigenous population (jones and hill-burnett 1982, p. 224, cf. merlan, 2007). however neither the pattern of middle class emergence and nor welfare dependency has been uniform in australia. these assimilationist forces are positioned within eclectic social and economic processes and differentiated levels of economic development and engagement with the state and wider civil society. there has also been a varied quantum of mobility and migration. thus the processes of social and cultural integration, economic development and political empowerment at the grassroots through the local land council have produced multiple identities across localities, which are in the process of constant construction and reconstruction, formation and shifting. within these processes, in term of historical experience, indigenous people remained aligned with resistant identities, while in terms of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 23 contemporary reality one section has shifted from a resistant to a legitimising identity (castells 1997). these identities become solidified and are institutionalised in a new context (pizzorno 1978; melucci 1992, 1996). in the context of social movements while the conservationists are guided by a subjectively moral commitment to culture and indigenous values, a section of pro-development protagonists are guided by common interests, and rational calculations of earning revenue for their immediate economic betterment. these divergences reflect the diversity of available resources and institutional contexts in which the place and identity for indigenous peoples are sustained and empowered in australian society. thus, despite the formation of conflicting identities, whether resistant or legitimising, there has remained a continuity in the dynamic of indigenous identity expressed in the aspiration to reestablish linkages between land, environment, culture and autonomy. acknowledgement i am deeply grateful to professor james goodman for his keen interest, regular guidance and wholehearted support in enabling me to undertake this research in the civil society research centre, university of technology, sydney as an endeavour fellow. i am also grateful to professor heather goodall and dr heidi norman, university of technology, sydney, and to professor stuart rosewarne, university of sydney, for their profound encouragement and insights. i am extremely thankful to the respondents for kindly agreeing to give me time for discussion with them. references australian bureau of statistics 2006, government of australia, canberra. australian bureau of statistics 2010, government of australia, canberra. behrendt, l. 1995, aboriginal dispute resolution a step towards self determination and community autonomy, federation press, sydney. bennett, s. 1999, white politics and black australian, allen and unwin, sydney bertaux, s. 1990, ‘oral history approaches to an international social movement’, 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(eds) resurgence of class conflict in western europe since 1969, macmillan, london ray, g. 2009, ‘against the grain’, newcastle herald, 17 october 2009, p.4, http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewdocument.ac;jsessionid=280b3f5135ec938 ec48bdf7bf49093ef?sy=afr&pb=all_ffx&dt=selectrange&dr=1month&so=relevan ce&sf=text&sf=headline&rc=10&rm=200&sp=brs&cls=130&clspage=1&docid=nch 0910171j2fu56u0sc http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/07/30/1091080440163.html� http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/stockland-breach-gets-council-fine-20110407-1d67y.html� http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/%20breakfast/noel-pearson-leads-the-fight-against-the-wild/3073140� http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/%20breakfast/noel-pearson-leads-the-fight-against-the-wild/3073140� http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewdocument.ac;jsessionid=280b3f5135ec938ec48bdf7bf49093ef?sy=afr&pb=all_ffx&dt=selectrange&dr=1month&so=relevance&sf=text&sf=headline&rc=10&rm=200&sp=brs&cls=130&clspage=1&docid=nch0910171j2fu56u0sc� http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewdocument.ac;jsessionid=280b3f5135ec938ec48bdf7bf49093ef?sy=afr&pb=all_ffx&dt=selectrange&dr=1month&so=relevance&sf=text&sf=headline&rc=10&rm=200&sp=brs&cls=130&clspage=1&docid=nch0910171j2fu56u0sc� http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewdocument.ac;jsessionid=280b3f5135ec938ec48bdf7bf49093ef?sy=afr&pb=all_ffx&dt=selectrange&dr=1month&so=relevance&sf=text&sf=headline&rc=10&rm=200&sp=brs&cls=130&clspage=1&docid=nch0910171j2fu56u0sc� http://newsstore.fairfax.com.au/apps/viewdocument.ac;jsessionid=280b3f5135ec938ec48bdf7bf49093ef?sy=afr&pb=all_ffx&dt=selectrange&dr=1month&so=relevance&sf=text&sf=headline&rc=10&rm=200&sp=brs&cls=130&clspage=1&docid=nch0910171j2fu56u0sc� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.1, 2012 25 reconciliation australia 2010, reconciliation australia welcomes first aboriginal mp to house of representative, http://www.reconciliation.org.au/home/latest/reconciliation-australia-welcomes-firstaboriginal-mp-to-house-of-representatives rowley, c.d. 1973, ‘from humbug to politics: aboriginal affairs and the academy project’, oceania, vol. xliii, no.3, pp. 182-97. rudd, k. 2008, apology to australia’s indigenous peoples, house of representatives official hansard, 2008, no.1, 13 february 2008 http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/reps/ dailys/dr130208.pdf sen, a. 1999, reasons behind identity, oxford university press, new delhi. stryker, s. 1990, ‘identity theory’, in borgatha, e.f. and borgatha, m. l. 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civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia displacing androcracy: cosmopolitan partnerships in bapsi sidhwa’s water stefano mercanti university of technology, sydney abstract this study contributes to the current cosmopolitan debate by highlighting equal recognition and inclusion as a viable social engagement towards diversity, through which dominator binary rankings are transcended by valuing mutually empathic relationships. set against the backdrop of gandhi’s freedom movement, water pushes the boundaries of india’s male-dominant cultural narratives beyond patriarchal predicaments by questioning the religious tradition and the oppressive constraints imposed on hindu widows. by applying riane eisler’s ‘partnership model’ to the analysis of the novel, with a brief reference to deepa mehta’s homonymous film, i explore how sidhwa’s characters move toward more caring and life-enhancing scenarios by portraying relationships of mutual support, thus overcoming the rigid discourses imposed by dominator hierarchies. the need to open up new ways of promoting respect for the variety of world cultures, languages and literatures, at local and global levels sets the primary purpose of this paper. this is even more crucial and timely as, in our current age of transnational flows, social and cultural environments are increasingly transformed and enriched by ongoing migrations. under the impact of these continuing global interconnections, economic, social and cultural structures go through significant changes and at the same time authoritarian social systems of rigid rankings, hierarchies of domination, robust nationalisms and ethnocentric histories are brought into question, and, as dipesh chakrabarty aptly reminds us, ‘may be renewed from and for the margins’ (2000 p.16). providing a conceptual framework that rejects the colonial binary model of constructing knowledge and overcomes the dominant ways in which the relations between western and non-western people are represented, has therefore become fundamental. in order to move beyond the epistemic violence of (neo) colonialism and allow transnational encounters to fruitfully grow, overlap and borrow from each other, intercultural configurations and global aspirations need to be recognized as invaluable opportunities for productive alliance and cooperation, ‘grounded on the critique of all possible fundamentalism (western and non-western, national and religious, neoliberal and neosocialist)’ (mignolo 2002, p. 181). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 163 in this respect, anthropologist and macro-historian riane eisler enhances such visions in what she calls the ‘partnership model’ or gylany,1 a cultural paradigm which emphasizes mutually respectful and caring relationships as an alternative to the usual unilateral patterns of domination based on gender inequalities, top-down hierarchies and violence. supported by the archaeological discoveries of marija gimbutas (1974; 1982; 1991), she gives evidence of ‘another history’, that of the neolithic europe before the violent invasion of the indoeuropean nomads, in which an equalitarian2 mode of living was far more central than a dominant one, resulting in relations of reciprocity rather than relations of control. in the chalice and the blade,3 hailed by ashley montague as the most important book since darwin’s origin of species, eisler describes both partnership and dominator systems that organize personal and social relations in world cultures across time: one result of re-examining human society from a gender-holistic perspective has been a new theory of cultural evolution. this theory, which i have called cultural transformation theory, proposes that underlying the great surface diversity of human culture are two basic models of society. the first, which i call dominator model, is what is popularly termed either patriarchy or matriarchy—the ranking of one half of humanity over the other. the second, in which social relations are primarily based on the principle of linking rather than ranking, may best be described as partnership model. in this model—beginning with the most fundamental differences in our species, between male and female—diversity is not equated with either inferiority or superiority (eisler 1987, p. xvii). according to her cultural transformation theory, history is neither linear, cyclical nor random, but the result of the interaction between two evolutionary movements: the first is the tendency of social systems to move from less to more complex forms of organization largely due to technological breakthroughs or phase changes. the second is the movement of cultural shifts between two basic models or “attractors” for social and ideological organization which i have called the dominator and partnership models—or more specifically, androcracy and gylany (eisler 2002b, p. 160). 1 the neologism is composed of the prefix gy(gyne, woman) and an(andros, man) linked by the letter l for lyen (to resolve) or lyo (to set free) to indicate that the female and male halves of humanities are linked rather than ranked. 2 ‘equalitarian is used instead of the more conventional ‘egalitarian’. the reason is that ‘egalitarian’ has traditionally only described equality between men and men (as the works of locke, rousseau, and other ‘rights of man’ philosophers, as well as modern history, evidence). ‘equalitarian’ denotes social relations in a partnership society where women and men (and ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’) are accorded equal value’ (eisler 1987 p. 216). 3 see also eisler (1996; 2000; 2002a; 2002b; 2007). 164 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the dominator model primarily refers to social systems generally characterized by hierarchic and authoritarian structures, in which power and the central roles of political leadership and moral authority are accorded to only one half of humanity, either female (matriarchal or gynocratic forms of social organization) or male (patriarchal or androcratic social structures). from an equalitarian perspective, both patriarchy and matriarchy are undesirable as they correspond to two sides of the same coin based on relations of control — the ranking of one half of humanity over the other, and therefore characterized by a high degree of institutionalized violence. within the patriarchal system, which has prevailed over most of recorded history, there is not only rape, wife battering, incest, and other structural forms of violence designed to maintain men’s domination over women; but also institutionalized violence designed to impose and maintain the domination of man over man, tribe over tribe, and nation over nation. conversely, in the partnership model social systems are structured on the principle of linking, in which ‘diversity is not automatically equated with inferiority or superiority’ (eisler 2002b, p. 161). by situating human relationships within riane eisler’s mutual paradigm, it becomes possible not only to re-inscribe the grids of domination conditioning by unveiling conventional binarisms of hegemonic and authoritative systems, but also to take new steps toward the construction of greater intercultural understanding.4 in the same vein, emergent discourses on cosmopolitanism have been articulating the need to ground mutuality toward ‘planetary conviviality’ (gilroy 2004), cultivated in everyday encounters and relationships beyond the manichaean demarcation of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’. from this rejection of the binarism of ‘either/or’ and ‘us/them’ emerges a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’, as appiah puts it, in which ‘everyone is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of his or her own, with its own cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other, different, places that are home to other, different people’ (2007, p. 113). here, cosmopolitanism portends new forms of relationships that would promote a global society that has left behind both unequal encounters between different people and dominator hierarchies. in eisler’s terms, it would correspond to a cosmopolitan partnership that seeks the transcendence of old dominator in-group-versus-out-group rankings by valuing diversity and honouring equal recognition and inclusion of any difference through mutually symmetrical and caring relationships. in this paper, i therefore intend to contribute to the current 4 for a detailed discussion of the partnership model in world literatures, languages and education see the partnership studies group (psg) website <http://all.uniud.it/?page_id=195> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/authority� http://all.uniud.it/?page_id=195� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 165 cosmopolitan debate by highlighting equal recognition and inclusion as a viable social engagement towards diversity, through which old dominator binary rankings are transcended by valuing mutually empathic relationships. for this purpose, i have chosen to analyze bapsi sidhwa’s novel water (2006),5 as the characters are constructed under conditions of subjugation and, although marginalized and muted, are seen contesting the discourse of patriarchal mastery and projecting toward freedom. i shall demonstrate how they transcend androcracy by exploring their capacities for expressing love and reciprocity. in drawing attention to the novel’s main theme – the alienating condition of hindu widowhood in colonial india – i shall also briefly address the unsettling potency of water as a movie, as it posed a more visible challenge to the dominator cultural narratives of hindutva, an ideology that seeks to establish a monochromatic hindu state in india with its own fascist theory of racial exclusivity (sharma 2003). due to its powerful thought-provoking critique as both fictional and cinematic text, water has been making waves in projecting multiple cosmopolitan trajectories in the ways the filming and the writing of its story have been crossing over local and national boundaries, religious and political alliances and intertwining many people in order to come to its full completion. since the first attempted shooting in the holy city of varanasi, numerous riots led by extreme right-wing political parties (the bharatiya janata party, the vishwa hindu parishad, kashi sanskrit raksha sangharsh samiti and raksha sangharsh samiti)6 5 all page references in this paper are from the following source: bapsi sidhwa (2006). took place to stop the production of the movie. effigies of deepa mehta were burnt, several militant protesters threatened to set themselves ablaze whilst one of them attempted suicide by jumping into the ganges, resulting in local authorities forcing the filming crew to evacuate the location. as bapsi sidhwa points out in her open letter to the hindustan times in defence of deepa mehta (2000), the riots were orchestrated by the fascist rss party which targeted the offending ‘anti-hindu’ movie script with the intent of garnering more support from their electorate. at a transnational level, the indian government blamed the director for portraying a backward india still steeped in blind religious fundamentalism, revealing an anxiety of being globally represented as an uncivilized country. however, mehta was aware that water was more centrally engaged with human suffering at large, transcending borders and evoking themes relevant to all human beings as traditions should never become rigid, they should 6 these political parties were held responsible for communal violence such as the babri masjid demolition in 1992 and the gujarat riots in 2002. 166 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 flow like good water’ (mehta 2005). when the production was eventually shut down under the rubric of public safety, the international film community was outraged at the blatant denial of the right to free expression, with prominent filmmakers and intellectuals from around the world raising support for her work, including director george lucas placing a full-page ad in variety to encourage her to keep on fighting. deepa mehta is not new to fierce political and religious controversies. her previous works have been consistently unpalatable and indigestible to hindu fundamentalists: fire (1996), openly depicts the romantic and sexual love between two women beyond their repressive marriages, and earth (1998) tells of the bloody partition of india and the hindu, muslim and sikh violence against each other that followed.7 as mehta strongly felt that water had to complete her courageous elemental trilogy, the movie underwent a turbulent five-year production, causing the loss of eighty percent of the original budget and compelling her work to be secretly filmed eventually in sri lanka. as an independent film maker born in india and living in canada since 1973, mehta inhabits a transnational and interstitial position, through which she subversively mediates her challenging stories of human drama based on meaningful empathy, understanding and caring relationships, even when confronted with the most demeaning violence. in an interview she declares that she felt confused about her identity for a long time: i’ve never felt canadian. i used to be upset about being called a ‘visible minority’, that’s what they called colored people there. i used to come to india and was called an nri [non resident indian] here. the problem was not about belonging anywhere; it was a dislike for labels…now i feel very happy being who i am, deepa mehta’ (ramchandani 1998). for bapsi sidhwa, her feeling of belonging to the world has been enriched by her life experiences in india, pakistan and the united states, which coexist simultaneously within her, as she declares in an interview: ‘a parsi first, then a pakistani, specifically a punjabi. i am a woman simply by gender. i don’t feel american at all. my consolidated 3 p identity has enriched my writing’ (karkaria 2005). as an eight-year old girl, she witnessed first-hand the 7 both movies are adaptations of south asian fiction: earth is based on cracking india (originally published as ice-candy man in 1988) by bapsi sidhwa (1991), and fire loosely based on ismat chughtai’s short-story the quilt ([1941] 1996). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 167 horrific violence of the partition, later becoming a supporter of women’s rights.8 she married and lived in bombay for a while and subsequently moved to houston in 1983, where she currently resides. this overlapping of multiple territories is also visible in her chosen language: at the time when most of pakistani writers wrote in urdu, she wrote only in english and therein found herself at ease: my written urdu is not very good, though i speak it fluently. as for gujarati, hardly anyone in pakistan knows the language. in britain, of all places, people say. ‘why don’t you write in your own language?’ and they bring very heavy political overtones to bear on this. but i think, well, the english don’t have a monopoly on the language. it is a language of the world, now. and it is a means of communicating between various nationalities and the most immediate tool at hand. so i use it without any inhibitions or problems (montenegro 1990 p. 523). emblematically, the novel is set during the 30s at the time of gandhi’s freedom movement against the british raj, which also focused on social justice, particularly the expansion of women’s right and untouchability, thus promoting new forms of knowledge. the story opens with a prologue through which the main character chuyia, a six-year old girl, is introduced to the reader through her carefree and playful time in the jungle near her village on the biharbengal border. the joyful atmosphere of the first pages vividly contrasts with the unfolding of the sombre events into which she is forcefully thrown by the orthodox customs of her brahmin family. her father somnath, a poor brahmin priest, decides to marry her off to a 44year old noble brahmin, ignoring his wife bhagya who has no say in family matters as the sacred scriptures already clarify: ‘a girl is destined to leave her parents’ home early or she will bring disgrace to it. she is safe and happy only in her husband’s care (…) in the brahmanical tradition, a woman is recognized as a person only when she is one with her husband’ (p. 8). chuyia is hardly aware of the implications of this predicament and when she is seen pampered and celebrated during the numerous wedding rituals, she innocently enjoys the enticing offer of new clothes and the festive celebrations of her community. after the wedding, chuyia lives in her parental home as was the custom with wedded pre-pubescent girls. not long after, news of her husband’s near-death reaches her parents and they feel 8 she has also worked as the voluntary secretary in the destitute women and children’s home in lahore for years, and was appointed to the advisory committee to pakistani prime minister benazir bhutto on women’s development. 168 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 heavily burdened by her daughter’s fate. they know that ‘in brahmin9 culture, once widowed, a woman was deprived of her useful function in society – that of reproducing and fulfilling her duties to her husband. she ceased to exist as a person; she was no longer either daughter or daughter-in-law. there was no place for her in the community, and she was viewed as a threat to society’ (p. 24). here the author attentively observes how chuyia’s father reacts helplessly to the harsh reality of sending her daughter to a widow colony (vidhwa ashram), highlighting the fact that in rigid dominator systems every human being is a victim of the violence and un-humanness that support them: somnath gazed at her as if he wanted to fix her form forever in his memory. every line in his weary face reflected his grief at her untimely widowhood and the parting that loomed ahead of them like a curse. finally, giving way to the pain that seemed to have squeezed his heart into something wrung-out and dry, he lay his head on the stone and began to weep, releasing his anguish in half-stifled sobs that racked his body (p. 31). the cruelty of chuyia’s descent into her enforced widowhood is powerfully depicted by the smashing of her glass bangles, tonsuring and being dressed in a homespun white cloth: ‘as the razor scraped across her scalp, chuyia’s teeth were set on edge. somnath noticed her toes curl, almost reflexively, in mute protest’ (p. 35). within the dominator and androcratic brahmanical view, the widow constitutes a threat to society as she is perceived to be inauspicious and polluted — because of her association with death — and sexually dangerous as she becomes desirable and uncontrolled by a male counterpart. in her seminal study of widowhood in rural india, martha chen points out that because they have lost their roles as wives,10 9 the difference in spelling occurs as the author uses the term 'brahmanical' to refer to the ancient tradition of vedic sacred texts (sruti) and various books of hindu law, whereas 'brahmin' indicates members of the priestly caste. the disfiguring of the body is enforced in order to reduce their attractiveness as women by transforming them into neuter or asexual beings by prohibiting them from wearing the symbols of marriage (vermillion mark, bangles, marriage pendant) and, more deeply traumatic, having their heads shaven (2001 p. 136). the brutal transmutation of chuyia’s body being shorn as a trademark of her civil death and the strict severance from old ties marks the beginning of the miserable life that awaits her in the destitute widows’ house: ‘with her white sari and bald, yellow head, chuyia was a very different child from the girl who had ridden in the bullock cart’ (p. 44). she comes across a new world populated by various characters, each one animated by their own humanity transpiring from their stripped 10 in fact the widow is called vidhava, literally, the one whose husband is gone (chen 2000 p. 28). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 169 and primal state. they all have a past, which saves them from utter despair and oblivion. the taming tyrannical presence of madhumati sternly reigns over the house, dictating instructions to the widows with the help of gulabi, a eunuch (hijra) who arranges the side business of prostitution to financially support the colony. chuyia is not prone to conforming to the oppressive restrictions which regulates the whole community. madhumati reminds her that ‘when our husbands die, god help us, the wives also half die. so how can a poor half-dead woman feel any pain?’ but chuyia’s untainted logic makes her defiantly reply ‘because she is half alive?’ (p. 42). she is too young and feisty to conform to the pressures of dominator orthodox traditions and, unwilling to resign to her fate, she inevitably creates a change in the lives of other widows. she particularly connects with kalyani, the young prostitute who is forced into selling her body to financially support the widows’ house, and shakuntala, a literate middle-aged woman and a very devout hindu who is aware of the injustices of their plight. their presence enriches chuyia’s new life from the beginning through their demonstration of caring and bonding. even in their forced isolation from the world, they seek companionship and build up collective strength to make their lives more meaningful: ‘you must say the japa, jai shree krishna 108 times a day and you will soon fly away home’ (p. 54), kalyani encourages chuyia to never lose hope. similarly, shakuntala reads her the story of dushyanta, reminding her to be brave and strong like him who grew up alone in the forest. they all enjoy a caring and affectionate friendship that is subsequently preserved only by the motherly figure of shakuntala as tragedy befalls kalyani. the novel unfolds into deeper dramatic dimensions when kalyani meets narayan, a young upper-class gandhian idealist and follower of the ‘quit india movement’ whose love for the beautiful widow poses a threat to the social and moral order of the colony. yet, the couple secretly meet until kalyani discovers that she used to visit nayaran’s father as a prostitute and decides to end the relationship. this, and the rejection from the widow’s house as she is discovered breaking the colony’s rules, pushes her to commit suicide as an ultimate refusal of any further exploitation. madhumati finds a substitute for prostitution in chuyia who is taken away to a client by gulabi. it is too late when shakuntala finds out, yet, knowing that gandhi and his followers are visiting the city, promoting his ideas of peace and a casteless society, she courageously resolves to take chuyia away from the colony and gives her to narayan as his train departs, confident that the child will be taken care of, symbolically, under the mahatma’s custody. 170 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 in water, the serious challenge to the androcratic traditions is posed by the indomitable spirit of chuyia who refuses to be enslaved by the oppressive limitations of the monolithic patriarchal system. animated by her inquisitive innocence, and too young to succumb to the gender norms imposed by society, she persistently asks shakuntala why there are no male widowers and why only women have to spend their lives in renunciation. she bites madhumati when the latter orders her around sternly and defiantly shouts ‘i don’t want to be a stupid widow! fatty!’ (p. 42). in contrast, both shakuntala and kalyani reveal a deep-rooted patriarchal conditioning that makes them more obedient and conformed to their widowhood. as soon as chuyia enters their lives, both women undergo an inner change that moves them to interact fluidly and unpredictably to the rigidness imposed by the colony dominator system. this is clearly shown in the unfolding of two sets of relationships based upon the partnership values of love, care and respect: narayan-kalyani, and shakuntala-sadananda. the first couple meet by chance when narayan helps chuyia to bring her dog back home. their love is pure and their romance is symbolically reinforced by the cultural signifiers of their names: kalyani is another name for lakshmi, the hindu goddess of abundance. she is in fact the financial support for the widows’ house and her beauty radiates the purity of the lotus flower, unsullied by the dirty water in which she resides. similarly, narayan derives from ‘nara’ (water) and ‘ayana’ (moving) and represents vishnu, the all-pervasive preserver of the universe. in the novel, narayan is a gandhian and also a rationalist who questions the archaic patriarchal laws and points out at the end of the story, after kalyani’s death, the injustice laid down by the law-makers of the ancient age that have institutionalized male dominance over women. the purity of the kalyani-narayan romance reaches its highest celebration when narayan expresses his love by reciting the sanskrit verses of kalidasa’s classic meghaduta (‘the cloud messenger’), a poem about the pain of separation between lovers, foretelling at the same time their future parting. in the novel, their relationship serves as a powerful contrast to kalyani’s enforced prostitution, which is enjoyed by narayan’s father, a wealthy landowner (zamindar), who had secretly used her for his pleasure and then hypocritically calls her a whore. here his condemnation of kalyani’s prostitution is even more perverse as, in the usual dominator fashion, widow exploitation is condoned for men’s sexual needs, including child rape, as in the case of chuyia. conversely, narayan’s love for kalyani is far removed from his father’s lust, his feelings being even more noble as motivated by the gandhian ideals of emancipating her from widowhood by making her his wife. like chuyia, kalyani has been led to prostitution unwittingly. after having fallen in love with narayan, she finds herself no longer capable of living as a passive victim of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 171 patriarchal oppression. she knows that ‘cast out in the streets she would die, but to live without narayan and return to a life of forced prostitution would be a worse kind of death’ (p.177). when she makes a final attempt to rejoin the ashram, she is cruelly mistreated by madhumati who does not show her the slightest affection. she becomes aware that ‘nothing had changed. and yet everything had’ (p.177). by meeting narayan, her consciousness has expanded to the extent that she would never be able to subjugate herself again to a life of exploitation. here, sidhwa invokes rich implications of rebellion—the defiance of institutionalized segregation, the challenge to enforced oppression, and the rejection of patriarchal demands on a woman’s body. for kalyani, this freedom comes at a tremendous price and suicide becomes a desirable and honorable option, which she lucidly embraces: ‘she clasped her hands in prayer for a moment. then she calmly walked into the river until her short hair floated in an inky stain on the water’ (p.178). this act situates her death outside of patriarchal discourse as a legitimate and free—albeit dead—woman, and has also a powerful and subversive impact on narayan, which makes him aware of the hypocrisies of his family and he leaves home. the same movement from dominator to partnership is traceable in the relationship between shakuntala and the priest sadananda. shakuntala is a very devout and discerning hindu whose conscience is oriented in finding spiritual liberation. she can read, write and has a good knowledge of sacred texts, and her seeking spirit makes her believe that ‘there must be a reason for it. why are we sent here?’ (p. 181). she ponders over the meaning of life with the priest sadananda and courageously asks: ‘pandit–ji, is it written that widows should be treated badly?’ (p. 157). she entered the widows’ house as a marginalized widow who escaped the cruelty of her family as ‘she was not only viewed as responsible for her husband’s death, but also as a threat to her husband’s family and, most of all, to that of her dead husband’s spirit, simply because of her vital womanhood and potential sexuality. she felt all eyes were constantly watching her, waiting for her to commit some sin that would bring curses on them and consign her husband to hell’ (pp. 149-150). like the mythical shakuntala, the foster girl of the sage kanva, she suffers on account of respecting her duty and deeply hopes that one day she can find love again. she asks sadananda why widows are treated so harshly and he tells her of the possibility of being remarried: ‘a law has recently been passed favoring widow re-marriage’. ‘a law? why don’t we know about it?’ shakuntula responds. sadananda’s concern deepens. ‘men ignore the laws that don’t suit 172 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 them’, he declares solemnly” (pp. 157-158).11 as sadananda gives shakuntala the right support in discerning true faith from blind superstition, her loyal adherence to hindu orthodox laws gradually widens to the extent that she is capable of breaking the shell of the ideal upper caste hindu widow, and becomes the agency for alternative scenarios beyond the regime of the widows’ house. through courageous actions, she sets kalyani free when she is locked away by madhumati and eventually saves chuyia by handing her over to the care of gandhi, thus signaling the beginning of new journeys, including hers as an emancipated middle-aged widow, and indeed for india at large on the cusp of its imminent independence. although the figure of gandhi appears arguably simplicistic and naive in his functioning as a saviour who, by promoting social change in the country, becomes a sort of deus ex machina in saving chuyia at the end of the novel, it nonetheless constitute a powerful subtext permeating the whole story with the possibility of a more humanistic future over systemic oppression and violence. even if left predominately in the background, his presence intensively reverberates through the diverse comments, at times trenchant, given by several characters such as madhumati and gulabi who see him as a dangerous man ruining the country with his efforts to abolish untouchability and caste discrimination: ‘didi, have you heard?’ gulabi asked in her deep, affected voice. ‘what?’ ‘about that mohandas?’ she said. ‘mohandas who? is he a new client?’ ‘no, mohandas gandhi! he’s from the jungles of africa. he doesn’t sleep, he doesn’t drink’. ‘why? doesn’t he feel sleepy?’ ‘nooo! he doesn’t sleep with women. he lies beside them, but he doesn’t sleep with them. self-discipline, he says’ (p. 71) ‘this gandhi is going to sink india’. ‘what’s he done now?’ ‘gandhi says, “the untouchables are the children of god!”’ (...) disgusting! before he came, everything ran like an english clock. tick tock!’ (p. 103). even narayan’s parents criticize their son for being a gandhian idealist, and one of his friends, loyal to the british empire, openly sees the mahatma as a nuisance. conversely, 11 as uma chakraborty points out the widows remarriage act (1856) was legislated to provide ‘relief’ for remarriage of widows of castes that practiced enforced widowhood, mainly the brahmins and certain other upper castes such as rajputs, banias and kayasthas (2003 p. 123). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 173 chuyia’s mother asks her husband to get her a picture of this ‘holy man from far away’ to place it along with her pictures of gods and goddesses, while narayan expresses the revolutionary impact of gandhian ideals in his reformist commitment to widows remarriage and emancipation. most importantly, as santosh gupta points out, we should at the same time keep in mind that both mehta and sidhwa have constructed the holy city of benares and hindu society from a specific angle that, although highlighting the backwardness of hindu orthodoxy in colonial india, it does not pay due attention to the flexibility of hindu tradition and the changes that were taking place in the same period: vasudha dalmia’s study of bhartendu harish chandra relates the rebel poets and thinker to the context of new intellectual spirit of questioning (of tradition) and changing attitude towards the suffering of the widows in the middle of the nineteenth century. in her work, the nationalization of hindu traditions (1997), dalmia provides extensive support of the view of banaras as a centre of enlightenment and new learning in the hindu world (gupta 2007 p. 248) some other critics have also pointed out several inaccuracies in the depiction of hindu widowhood, which allegedly fail to frame their plight in the right socio-cultural context and anchor the narrative to orientalist discourses (arora et al. 2005; rai 2007). however, to read water as a mere critique of hindu patriarchal orthodoxy is as much detrimental as it is a denial of its universal appeal in evoking the redemptive potential of all human beings for social change and renewal. far from representing a precise portrayal of socio-cultural practices and outlooks of hindu widowhood in pre-independence india, both authors are legitimately correct in their interpretation of the novel and the film as being against violence, beyond the boundaries of time and space. as they have stated in many interviews, the exploration of the widows’ plight served as a main background for a deeper questioning of the difference between moral conscience and religious conservatism, thus transcending local and national boundaries and symbolizing the revolt of all women against physical and psychological violation (phillips 2006; mannoni 2007). such an approach is creatively expressed in both the novel and the movie through the central message of arousing women’s awareness and overcoming dominator hierarchies. what is also fundamental is that water frames indian widows within aspects of indian culture and society that still inhabit several aspects of life, both in economic and regional areas, with a presence of over 33 million widows according to the 2001 census (chauhan 2011 p. 240). according to chen, there are several reasons for this high proportion in contemporary india: 174 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 marriage in india is near universal; husbands are five years older on average than wives; male mortality rates are still rather high; women begin to outlive men after their productive years; and, most importantly, widow remarriage is infrequent (…) most societies have social rules and norms designed to regulate women’s life (…) even now, in some communities in india, girls are married before they reach puberty. as a result, they are child widows, including so-called ‘virgin’ widows whose marriages had not been consummated before their ‘husband’ died (chen 2001 p. 3). the existing evidence, although more limited when compared to the socio-economic-cultural conditions of colonial india, provides enough reasons for considering widowhood in india as an ever-present social problem. as we have seen in the analysis of the novel, although oppressive dominator values are firmly institutionalized through blind religious indoctrination, gender inequality and enforced sexual exploitation, they are shown to be questioned and unsettled by the partnership values of love, mutual care and respect, which link rather than rank human beings in their common pursuit of freedom. both female and male characters appear to be enslaved by unjust social institutions, yet they are shown to gain agency only when they are willing to subvert the restrictive values of their brutal orthodox set up. far from representing themselves only in ways dictated by hindu patriarchy, chuyia, kalyani and shakuntala subversively move beyond the oppressive social world that they experienced by establishing overtly dissident partnerships, which project them towards different futures. as anindita ghosh puts it, ‘everyday’ and ‘small’ (even failed) rebellions are shown as complementing larger meta-narratives of the more successful women’s movement, reopening and enriching questions of agency in the process’ (ghosh 2008 p. 20). more importantly, though the ideology of dominator discourse displays its power to control, a challenge to its content and a courageous resistance to its normative system become equally empowering. references appiah, k.a. 2007, cosmopolitanism: ethics in a world of strangers, norton, new york. arora, k., kamal s., & ahmad, u. 2005, ‘water: drenched in colonial benevolence’, seven oaks magazine, viewed 1 august 2011 <http://www.sevenoaksmag.com/commentary/ 81_comm4.html> chakrabarty, d. 2000, provincializing europe, princetown university press, princetown, nj. chakrabarty, u. 2003, gendering caste through a feminist lens, stree, calcutta. chauhan, a. 2011, ‘social securities and aged widows in conflict situations: social transformation at the international border in northwest india’, in analyzing gender, http://www.sevenoaksmag.com/commentary/%2081_comm4.html� http://www.sevenoaksmag.com/commentary/%2081_comm4.html� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 175 intersectionality, and multiple inequalities: global, transnational and global contexts, chow, e.n., segal, m.t., tan l. (eds.), emerald, bingley, uk, pp. 235-262. chen, m. a. 2001, perpetual mourning. widowhood in rural india, oxford university press, new delhi. chughtai, i. 1996, ismat chugtai: the quilt and other stories, ed. and trans. by t. naqvi & s.s. hameed, kali for women, new delhi. eisler, r. 1987, the chalice and the blade: our history, our future, harper & row, san francisco. eisler, r. 1996, sacred pleasure. sex, myth, and the politics of the body: new paths to power and love, harper & row, san francisco. eisler, r. 2000, tomorrow’s children, westview press, boulder, co. eisler, r. 2002a, the power of partnership, new world library, novato, ca. eisler, r. 2002b, ‘the dynamics of cultural and technological evolution: domination versus partnership’, world futures 58, pp. 159-174. eisler, r. 2007, the real wealth of nations, berrett-koehler, san francisco. ghosh, a. 2008 (ed.) behind the veil. resistance, women and the everyday in colonial south asia, palgrave macmillan, basingstoke, uk. gilroy, p. 2004, after empire. melancholia or convivial culture, routledge, london. gimbutas, m. 1974, the goddess and the gods of old europe, 7000-3500 bc: myths and cult images, thames & hudson, london. gimbutas, m. 1982, the language of the goddess, harper & row, san francisco. gimbutas, m. 1991, the civilization of the goddess, harper & row, san francisco. gupta, s. 2007, ‘variations on a theme. water and banaras’, in films, literature & culture, jain j. (ed.), rawat, new delhi, pp. 241-254. karkaria, b. 2005, ‘ice candy woman. an interview with bapsi sidhwa’, the times of india, 19 february, ed. 4, lucknow. jain, j. 2007, ‘the diasporic eye and the evolving i’, in films, literature & culture, jain j. (ed.) rawat, new delhi, pp. 54-74. mannoni, f. 2007, ‘bapsi sidhwa: “water” – interview’, <http://www.bapsisidhwa. com/downloads/qa-water.doc> mehta, d. 2005, viewed 20 july 2011 <http://inhome.rediff.com/movies/2005/sep/ 23deepa.htm> mignolo, w.d. 2002, ‘the many faces of cosmo-polis: border thinking and critical cosmopolitanism’, in breckenridge c. a., pollock s., bhabha, h.k. & chakrabarty, d. (eds), cosmopolitanism, duke university press, durham & london, pp. 157-187. montenegro, d. 1990, ‘bapsi sidhwa: an interview’, the massachusets review, pp. 513-533. phillips, r. 2006, ‘deepa mehta speaks with wsws’, <http://www.wsws.org/articles/ 2006/ may2006/deep-m15.shtml> rai, s. 2007, ‘the diasporic gaze. deepa mehta’s and bapsi sidhwa’s water’, in jain, j. (ed.) films, literature and culture. deepa mehta’s elements trilogy, rawat, new delhi, pp. 201-217. ramchandani, v.1998, ‘passionate plots’, viewed 22 july 2011 <http://www.theweek. com/98dec06/> sharma, j. 2003, hindutva. exploring the idea of hindu nationalism, penguin viking, new delhi. sidhwa, b. 1991, cracking india, milkweed editions, minneapolis, mn. sidhwa, b. 2000, ‘they are punishing deepa for deflating their egos’, viewed 17 july 2011 < http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/may2000/ dm2-m19.shtml> sidhwa, b. 2006, water, penguin viking, new delhi. http://www.bapsisidhwa.com/downloads/qa-water.doc� http://www.bapsisidhwa.com/downloads/qa-water.doc� http://inhome.rediff.com/movies/2005/sep/%2023deepa.htm� http://inhome.rediff.com/movies/2005/sep/%2023deepa.htm� http://www.wsws.org/articles/%202006/%20may2006/deep-m15.shtml� http://www.wsws.org/articles/%202006/%20may2006/deep-m15.shtml� http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/may2000/%20dm2-m19.shtml� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 69 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia surviving genocide, thriving in politics: rwandan women’s power gerise herndon nebraska wesleyan university shirley randell sria rwanda ltd abstract rwandan women have given their nation new status as a world leader in gender equality, having achieved a 56 per cent majority in parliament. women have reached this level of political power for many reasons, including the current government’s political will and women parliamentarians’ conscious decision to emphasize precolonial traditions of leadership as an alternative to prevailing patriarchal notions of women’s capacity. highlighting women’s historical roles as behind-the-scenes advisors effectively promoted gender equality in the public sphere. not only have women in parliament taken leadership in promoting laws that protect women against gender-based violence, but also civil society organizations have participated in rebuilding and unifying the country following the trauma of horrific sexual violence and killing during the 1994 genocide. interviews conducted in kigali and butare in 2009 and 2010 inform this study of perceptions of women’s power at the parliamentary and the grassroots levels. women’s visibility in national government has not immediately translated into empowerment in the home, in agriculture, in the office or in social life. formal education is central to providing girls and women the tools to analyze and dismantle remaining obstacles to gender equality in the professional, social and private spheres, building on their political achievement. strategic essentialism for social transformation in discussions of gender equality and representation of women in government, researchers typically cite three countries as exemplary: canada, finland and sweden. sweden, however, can no longer boast the highest global female representation in parliament. on 18 september 2008, rwanda, a country associated by most western nations with the 1994 genocide against the tutsis, overtook them all by electing a parliament comprising 56 per cent women. many people remain unaware that rwanda has advanced significantly in terms of gender and power, specifically in terms of the number of women in elected political positions. an investigation of how women came to hold these visible positions of power reveals that women in the ancient rwandan monarchy held advisory roles that could inspire current women leaders. indeed, even before the genocide, the rwandan patriotic front (rpf), rwandan’s most powerful political party, promoted gender equality in leadership. examining rwanda’s complex (and contested) history, women’s experience of sexual victimization during the genocide, and the role of women’s grassroots organizing can add dimensions to other countries’ understanding of how rwandan women came to hold more public roles. 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 in order to achieve equitable representation, it takes more than ‘adding women and stirring’ (kilgour 2007, p. 751). great violence, such as experienced in rwanda, has the potential to show the need for radical change. in addition, the realization that the belgian colonizers redefined and reified the largely constructed differences between tutsi, hutu and twa caused some women’s organizations and government officials to search their collective memories of rwandan tradition prior to belgian imperialism. in seeking solutions to the trauma resulting from the genocide, some rwandans began to argue that women, especially mothers, had an honored place in pre-colonial history and there was huge potential for them to take peaceful leadership roles in contrast to the male violence of the genocidal regime (uwineza & pearson 2009). of course, some women played active roles in the preparation and implementation of the genocide, but politicians chose to emphasize instead women’s revered roles as mothers in order to bring about sweeping social transformations. what may appear to be essentialism is in fact a conscious rhetorical strategy to use comforting imagery to pave the way for radical change. rwandan politicians’ canny use of traditional images of motherhood made social transformation possible. it is to be hoped that other countries do not need the violence of genocide to realize the importance of gender sensitivity and the benefits of the participation of women’s organizations in civil society. methodology: engaged listening, invested analysis both authors have lived in rwanda: one has worked for seven years, first as the senior gender, education and governance adviser for the netherlands development agency (snv), then as the founder and director of the kigali institute of education (kie’s) centre for gender, culture and development (cgcd), and still continues to reside in the country; the other worked as a visiting researcher during a sabbatical year. following the feminist principle that advocates for interviews as an important method to amplify voices of those otherwise unheard, our project included interviews with rwandan women and men who hold leadership positions in government as well as in both local women’s grassroots movements and international non-government organizations (ngos) working in rwanda. the authors acknowledge that the idea of “giving voice” is problematic. this notion is well explained in “can the subaltern speak?” by gayatri spivak who shows the risk of “appropriating the other by assimilation” (spivak 1988, p.20). trinh t. minh-ha signals similar concerns in her documentary reassemblage. she carefully sidesteps a claim to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 71 authority when making the film in senegal by stating in the voiceover, “i do not intend to speak about/just speak nearby.” in reporting this study, we would like to speak “nearby” rwanda. clearly, the very presence of researchers listening or recording may influence the evidence observed. gluck and patai in women’s words (1991) advocate the necessity of ethical listening, acknowledging the power relations between interviewees and interviewers. recognizing the complications and limitations of such ethnographic research, we add our contributions to the myriad voices analyzing gender and power in rwanda. our methodology includes qualitative, in-depth, semi-structured face-to-face ethnographic interviews. the authors speak french but do not speak kinyarwanda. participants gave informed consent to be interviewed, some in french, some in english and some in kinyarwanda through interpreters. some interviews and email exchanges were conducted with a promise to maintain confidentiality, and the names of interviewees or writers are withheld by mutual agreement. written texts consulted include email communications from members of the rwanda association of university women. given the authors’ substantial investment in higher education in rwanda and work for gender equality, our interests have shaped the research conducted. many of our contacts have been made through university and government colleagues. thanks to referrals from prof. chantal kalisa and prof. rangira béa gallimore of the interdisciplinary genocide studies center (igsc), a few of our sources have little formal education and live in rural areas. however, many of the research participants are urban residents of kigali with formal university education and, in some cases, are government officials. government employees have understandably emphasized a positive vision of rwandan government initiatives. many rwandans have experienced the phenomenon of being “studied” by foreigners and rightly ask why they should trust interviewers. indeed, the authors have attempted to avoid the extraction of knowledge (comparable to the extraction of mineral wealth) that does not benefit local organic intellectuals; we attempted to use our research to begin conversations that have turned out to be ongoing relationships. by avoiding ambitious claims of objectivity or authenticity, we hope to avoid epistemic violence. the ideological battleground of the body 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 to understand the contemporary position of women in rwandan society, we begin with a discussion of how women’s bodies were subjected to symbolic and very real physical violence and how these dreadful experiences gave rise to solidarity and empowerment. sexual violence is a major weapon of war, and mass violence has certainly been the experience of many rwandans, at least since the pogroms against the tutsi began in 1959. one important manifestation of rwandan women’s power reveals itself in women’s organizations’ empowerment of survivors of sexual assault by soldiers and militia. abasa (we are all the same), is an association of 60 women who were raped during the genocide. the association grew organically from genocide survivors who had no one left but each other and includes both tutsi women and hutu women who had been married to tutsi men. as targets of the genocide against the tutsi, these women experienced war in their bodies through sexual assault as a weapon of war and a war crime. rangira gallimore, originally from rwanda and currently a professor at university of missouri, has worked for years with the women of this collective. she cites the testimony of the oldest woman in the collective (gallimore 2009), who changes the formula of traditional storytelling when expressing the horror of women’s experience of the genocide: my daughter. let me tell you a tale, let me wake you up with a tale, even one who comes from fairyland will find a grown up tale attached to the pillar of the hut…let me now tell you a story, the tale of a country where cows were slaughtered and divided up and placed on inert corpses. let me tell you how virgins were raped with pickaxes, how pregnant women had their stomachs cut open, how their breasts were cut off, and how elderly women were sexually tortured – ahaa my daughter, the kabakobawa that you have heard about – ahaa! according to gallimore, the kabakobawa is a particular location on a hill where girls would receive sexual education. the sound ‘ahaa!’ indicates a taboo or horror that words cannot describe. because of the near impossibility of even naming the heretofore-unimaginable violence, we may never know the extent of the atrocities visited on women as part of the genocide. rape survivors’ testimonies show how either being identified as or associated with tutsis served as a justification for rape and torture. at nyamata, where tutsis took refuge in a church, a group under the auspices of the igsc heard the testimony of a boy who had survived the massacre of the militia by pretending to be dead (igsc nyamata site visit 2009). he told of the hutu militia, the interahamwe, torturing refugees they found in the church. he cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 73 witnessed the militia asking a pregnant hutu woman, ‘why are you here?’ she said, ‘because my husband is tutsi.’ they responded, ‘no, we mean what you have inside you?’ and they cut open her stomach, ripped out the fetus and drove a spear up her vagina. tutsi women’s perceived threat stemmed partly from the mythology that they ‘reproduced the alien other’ (baines 2003, p. 487). of course, many raped women did not survive. colonial ideology had promoted the notion of tutsi women as more aesthetically pleasing because of imagined similarities to european features. this perceived division between imagined ethnic groups is part of the larger whole of genocide ideology, but women suffered rape as a hate crime in particularly brutal ways that men generally did not. the imagined difference between tutsi women and hutu women, however, was indeed mythical: ‘eight young men did bad things. i couldn’t breathe...after raping me, they told me: ‘we thought tutsi women were different but we found they are just the same’’ (nowrojee et al. 1996, p. 51). ‘they said they were raping me to see if tutsi women were like hutu women’ (nowrojee et al. 1996, p. 42). thus, the desire to explore perceived radical sexual otherness appears to have influenced the interahamwe’s violence: militia members desired ‘to see how tutsikazi [kinyarwanda word for tutsi woman] look inside’ (nowrojee et al. 1996, p. 47). one survivor whose testimonial appears in the men who killed me quotes a rapist who wanted to ‘see what tutsi sex looked like’ (de brouwer 2009, p. 60). another tells how interahamwe said ‘they wanted to kill us but first they wanted to ‘taste’ a tutsi woman’ (2009, p. 133). some of these hutu women of abasa had been told by rapists during the genocide to do what they used to do with their tutsi husbands. rapists assumed that these hutu women had somehow learned distinctive sexual practices of tutsis. their assumption illustrates the prevailing construction of biological ethnic difference, because, according to gallimore, sexual education for tutsi and hutu women was the same the bodies of tutsi women became a specific battleground, a space where rapists claimed victory, an ‘expansion of ethnic territory by the male conqueror’ (handrahan 2004, p. 437). perpetrators obeyed the order to destroy the physiological capacity of ‘the tutsi’ to reproduce themselves. these accounts merely hint at a tiny fraction of the horror experienced by women (including hutu and twa women). even if, in the traditional wars of ancient rwanda and other east african countries, women from the conquered side were taken for forced marriages or servants as a 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 sign of victory, they were not killed or subject to the shocking acts carried out during the genocide1. women’s post-conflict identities: difference and equality women were more often targeted for sexual assault than male survivors, yet because women were kept alive to be sexual slaves for the militia, more of them survived the genocide than the men. the population in 1995, immediately after the genocide, was estimated to be 60 to 70 percent female with 90,000 men in prison (paxton & hughes 2007). prior to the genocide, women had been able to participate in political and economic life provided that their maternal role was not threatened (baines 2003). given the demographic imbalance after the genocide, women and even girls stepped up to take on roles as heads of household, community leaders and financial providers, addressing the needs of devastated families and communities. elizabeth powley (2005) argues that the genocide forced women to think of themselves differently, and in many cases to develop skills they would not otherwise have acquired. suzanne ruboneka (2009), former executive secretary of pro-femmes/twese hamwe, an umbrella organization for women’s non-government organizations, attributes greater agency and intentionality to rwandan women. in a personal interview, she cites their desire to work together to organize and influence the government. women saw their commonalities, as in the collective where both tutsi and hutu women make what are now sold as ‘peace’ baskets by macy’s, a us-based department store. why peace? because the women who had been abandoned by everyone found each other: survivors and wives, mothers, daughters and sisters of victims came together with wives of perpetrators, who were also victims in a sense. many of them, like the members of abasa, had no-one left in their families, so they worked together. formerly, they may have been identified as either hutu or tutsi, but now they publicly insist that they are all rwandans, have all suffered from the genocide, and must abandon politically constructed differences to continue to survive and thrive. some parliamentarians tend to argue that the roots of women’s post-genocide power are precolonial, and that politics, rather than culture, manifests social transformation. still, we should be aware that réseau des femmes and two other women’s organizations came 1 some men were also victims of sexual assault: see the narrative of faustin kayihura in de brouwer (2009). according to de brouwer, hutu women raped men and boys (2009, p. 17), and men were subject to genital mutilation and were forced to rape (2009, p. 15). unfortunately, studies of male survivors of sexual assault present monumental challenges given the even greater social stigma attached to men as rape victims. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 75 together in 1986 to form pro-femmes, well before the 1994 genocide, so even grassroots political organization has pre-1994 sources. women across africa who attended the 1985 united nations international women’s conference at the end the un decade for women, including rwanda, were radicalized into action when they returned to their countries. in rwanda additional women’s ngos were established and flourished. after 1994, rwandan women in ngos had urgent motivations to lead the country in reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. looking in from other cultures, many observers respond with admiration for rwandan women’s resiliency and strength. are they resilient? or simply choosing survival? genocide was, according to esther mujawayo (2004): ‘l’insupportable. mais insupportable pour qui? pour moi? mais non, moi je n’ai pas le choix de me poser une telle question. pas le choix de trouver cela insupportable puisque je dois le supporter, pour mes filles, qui, elles, doivent vivre…nous avons été condamné à vivre’2. perhaps, as chantal kalisa (2009), scholar of aesthetic responses to the genocide, has suggested, in personal communication with one author, that what those from other social formations see as amazing strength is merely a sense that survivors are doing what is necessary if they are to live. the other choices would be death or insanity. as mujawayo (2004) indicates above, responsibilities to children, whether biological or adopted, may have given some survivors the will to live. rwandan women’s elevated image as mother has enormous cultural importance and has contributed to their political success. women are powerful symbols of healing and rebirth, especially birth (note the 4.8 fertility rate in 20123). the status of mothers and importance of motherhood are referenced at all social levels. interviewees expressed disbelief and pity when one of the authors revealed that she had chosen not to have children. at ineza4 a sewing cooperative of women who have publicly declared their hiv-positive status as a result of the genocide, one survivor in particular testified to the honor associated with being a mother. one survivor spoke with anguish about having lost her title as a mother when her children were killed during the 2 all english translations of the french quotations in the text are by gerise herndon, unless otherwise attributed. ‘unbearable. but unbearable for whom? for me? no, i didn’t even have the choice to ask myself such a question. i had no choice to find it unbearable because i have to bear it for my daughters who must live...we were condemned to live.’ 3 using the data from the demographic and health surveys, rwanda has seen an overall decline in fertility from a total fertility rate of 8.5 in 1983 to 5.5 in 2007/8 (hartwig, r and s randell, cgcd occasional research paper 2, kie, 2010:7) and in 2012 to 4.81 (cia world fact book, in https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html). 4 ’doing good when it is needed’ or ’a good deed in need’ (trans. frank mugisha). ineza, like abasa, is a grassroots cooperative that came together organically and is governed by consensus. 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 genocide. for example, mama emmanuel would be the title of a woman whose oldest child is named emmanuel. she was able to regain her status when a sister ‘gave’ her a daughter and the survivor was able to take in her niece as her own child. a vital study of women’s political power preand post-genocide shows how indigenous tradition provided a special status for mothers: social taboos and traditions arose to reinforce respect for motherhood and to protect women and children from danger or abuse….a woman’s family and inlaws would pamper and exempt her from certain chores during pregnancy and immediately after delivery of a child. on some occasions, chiefs would punish men who did not conform to these expectations. in poor communities, neighbors guaranteed a steady supply of milk to a woman who delivered a baby (uwineza & pearson 2009, p. 11) . the special position of mothers in pre-colonial rwandan society meant that their power to create, carry and bear new life deserved a particular kind of respect. while those outside rwanda may initially analyze such reasoning as essentialist, the veneration of the idea of motherhood among rwandan men and women of all classes cannot be overstated. rwandan women’s place in history is exemplified by the role of the queen mothers who advised their husbands and sons. according to the late aloisea inyumba, rwanda’s first minister for gender and social affairs and a distinguished parliamentarian,5 even in nonroyal families, women in rwanda had power: rwandan history and tradition provide pre-colonial examples of women’s power. we had traditional family structures long before we came under colonial leadership. men could not make major decisions in the home; for example a man would not give away land or cows without consulting his wife. the family tradition is one basis of dialogue with women. (inyumba 2009) while some researchers question women parliamentarians, asking, ‘where did you get this idea about gender from? is it from sweden?’ inyumba, in a lecture to the igsc in 2009, notes that ideas about gender came from within rwanda, not from outside: ‘the leadership of rwanda has always been aware of the importance of identifying women as true actors in the transformation of our country rwanda. therein women’s roles as key advisors in decision 5 the late aloisea inyumba was one of the three women among the eight commissioners leading the rwandan patriotic front when it was still a rebel group fighting the country's genocidal government. she was the commissioner for finance and responsible for raising funds and other support from the diaspora. when she died in 2011 she was minister for gender and family promotion. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 77 making inform their ascension into current government posts’. such analysis counters arguments that often arise when notions of gender equality appear to be imported from the global north rather than indigenous to the local cultures and region. government ministries and agencies, such as the ministry of gender and family promotion (migeprof), the ministry of finance and economic affairs (with its gender budgeting office), the national women’s council, the gender monitoring office, the rwanda national police (with its gender desks) and the rwandan women’s parliamentary forum (rwpf) offer a visible commitment on the part of the rwandan government to gender equality. women parliamentarians initiated what might be considered a feminist process of sensitizing their male colleagues by inviting them to listen to voters and making them aware of genderbased violence (gbv) before crafting the gbv law. according to pearson and powley’s demonstrating legislative leadership, ‘women have improved dialogue between the grassroots and national levels, enhanced collaboration between civil society and the government, demonstrated legislative leadership and advocated for human rights’ (2008, p. 6). the attempt to unify the higher levels of government with civil society conforms to the postgenocide nationalist discourse aimed at erasing perceived ethnic divisions among rwandans. national unity, the important concept that ‘we are all rwandans,’ is tied to gender unity. the late inyumba spoke of the necessity of such post-conflict unity (2009): after five years, there was a general agreement in the country that no one will be discriminated against because of their identity…the guiding program for rwanda…was unity and reconciliation...we are keeping men and women working together. we are not going to advocate for a certain women’s agenda, but rather use a mainstreaming approach. each advocate for gender sensitivity stresses the importance of working in partnership with men. indeed, the fact that pro-femmes includes the rwandan men’s resource center (rwamrec) under its rubric is a testament to women’s recognition of the necessity of men’s collaboration and input towards achieving gender equality. rwanda is now making considerable progress in involving men in this endeavor, using targeted methods of engagement with male leaders both at national and village levels (carlson and randell, 2012). 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 men’s post-conflict perceptions given that gender mainstreaming and full partnership with men must be part of any gender analysis in rwanda, men’s perspectives necessarily inform any balanced analysis. one male interviewee expressed the perception that the family structure had been affected by the genocide and women needed special attention. another interpretation claims that men’s governance has been fraught with violence, so perhaps women can govern in a different manner. the (male) former justice minister and current minister of the national commission for the fight against genocide, hon. jean de dieu mucyo, explained in an interview (2009): ‘men managed badly. we are trying to see if women succeed where men failed. some say genocide is the fruit of the power of men.’ while this view remains open to debate, it is consistent with the idea that the entire society needed fundamental transformation following the devastation of 1994. parliamentarian hon. berthe mukamusoni remarks that women’s strength during the genocide made an impression on men. she said, ‘men and women both took part in the fight against the genocide, even at the front. when the men saw how tough the women were, healing the sick and cooking the food, as well as their presence at the front, they saw what women were capable of and the value of collaborating with them’ (women for women international 2004, quoted in paxton & hughes 2007, p. 175). stereotypes about women’s weakness or emotional vulnerability were belied by the rpf when 37.5 percent of their leadership during the struggle was female. efforts towards gender equality did not emerge only after 1994; rpf’s conscious effort to promote women’s leadership was a priority well before the genocide. women’s new political visibility provides evidence of rwanda’s social transformation. hon. jean de dieu mucyo, in response to a question about whether rwanda had undergone social transformation (2009), used women as an example: you see the position that women were in before and that they are in now and you can see real social change. the resistance to change was strongest, or the change took longest, out in the country. men believed that having women in charge was a bad idea, that female-headed households weaken the family and the society, but now they are beginning to see that women can lead. this interpretation holds that out of great violence, fruitful change can emerge. rwanda has banished archaic patriarchal laws still enforced in many african societies, such as those cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 79 permitting polygamy and those that prevent women from inheriting land. thanks to rwpf, the legislature has passed a gbv law aimed at ending domestic violence and child abuse. a member of the liberal party and the chair of parliament’s human rights committee speculates on reasons for women’s particular experiences that may make them better equipped to occupy positions of power in rwanda: more than men, women are the victims of the war. they have different priorities to those of men. they have more concern about issues related to violence in general, and gender-based violence in particular. women have faced discrimination so they want to put a stop to discrimination. all of this will contribute to preventing another genocide. (hon. evarist kalish mp, quoted in mcgreal 2008, para. 16). this frequently expressed opinion is not necessarily essentialist but is based on women’s experiences of discrimination and having been singled out for particular sexual violence. ‘real’ women, of course, experienced discrimination and violence often differently from men, not because they are fundamentally different, as imagined by the propagandistic discourse, but because their experiences as women influenced their understanding of discrimination. they experienced fighting as soldiers, hiding from perpetrators, fleeing pogroms, rape as a war crime, sexual slavery, the killing of their children – all aspects of the genocide. they experienced these phenomena not only as targets because of their ethnicity or collaboration, but they also experienced them in female bodies constructed as different and potentially maternal, whether they were menstruating, pregnant, giving birth, breast feeding babies, nursing children, going through menopause or caring for the sick and elderly. their experience has inevitably influenced their lives as women. while few genocide survivors moved on to political roles, many of them continued to struggle in much more fundamental ways. nonetheless, the devastation of women’s experience and the strength shown in their recovery is part of the story of rwandan women’s power, and that story has shaped the perceptions of rwandan women leaders. collectives creating and transforming institutions local women’s organizations like pro-femmes and avega (association of widows of genocide), contributed to the political process and the writing of a gender-sensitive rwandan constitution (inyumba 2009). women’s participation in civil society has drawn them into 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 politics. women are selected as ‘integrity judges’ to administer justice in local gacaca courts (a system of community transitional justice based on traditional, cultural law enforcement procedures), which have proved to be far more efficient and inexpensive than the international criminal tribunal of rwanda (ictr). while international researchers like professor phil clark (2012) have praised the effectiveness of gacaca courts, they have also been the targets of criticism from international human rights groups as well as some survivors, who question their impartiality and effectiveness. indeed, some members of ineza have reported re-traumatization and fear of reprisal as a result of being called as witnesses. however, the majority of interviewees said they preferred local justice, which they see as more likely to be restorative, to be culturally sensitive, and to lead to reconciliation, than the costly and slow justice administered by the ictr. women are perceived as less corrupt and more likely to be seen as having integrity, according to the testimonies of avega members, who pride themselves on serving as a pool for gacaca judges (igsc avega site visit 2009). what is more, denis bikesha, head of the gacaca commission, while acknowledging that he has no expertise in gender studies, commented in a personal interview (2009), ‘in my experience women are among the best judges.’ similarly, muhire bitorwa, (whose wife, a teacher, is helping pay his way through a kigali university) contends: ‘in my view, women are more reasonable, more merciful and less corrupt than men’ (quoted in mccrummen 2008, para. 27). these men are careful to qualify their assertions as personal opinions, but such views may be well informed. the opinions contrast women’s rationality, mercy and integrity with the kind of ‘justice’ enacted by the male-dominated genocidal regime, which was known for corruption before it was known for cruelty. internationally, one can see these assumptions at work in the elections of michele bachelet to the presidency of chile and ellen johnson sirleaf to the presidency of liberia – war-torn countries imagine women and mothers as more likely to seek peace. clearly, multiple counter-examples contest a view that theorists might deem essentialist: the oft-cited military initiatives of golda meir, indira gandhi, and margaret thatcher come to mind. further, rwandan women should certainly not be romanticized: they have been convicted both at ictr and gacaca courts of planning and participating in the genocide. part of the reason for public perceptions of women’s difference is rooted in strategic political rhetoric about mothers. just as anti-rape activists appeal to masculine notions of protection to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 81 stop rape (every female is someone’s mother, wife, sister, or daughter), so politicians successfully use the rhetoric about maternal strength to convince the population that women’s leadership adds potential for peace. given the relative newness of women assuming political leadership in rwanda, invoking maternal status as indigenous rather than colonial wields rhetorical power. whether the rhetoric continues to be useful, metamorphoses, or becomes constraining remains a question for further study. while women’s ongoing recovery from violence evokes admiration, the most visible success of rwandan women is their rise to elected political positions, and their current status as being part of the most gender-equal governing body on the globe. we can see the jump in numbers between 1997 and 2008. obviously in part because of the demographic imbalance between males and females post-genocide, in 1997, women went from 4 percent to 17 percent representation in parliament. post-conflict transformations include a constitutional change in 2003 requiring 30 percent of parliamentary seats be held by women. in that year, women jumped from 26 percent to 49 percent of parliamentarians, and in 2008 to 56 percent. rwanda remains the only country in the world to achieve a female majority in parliament. incidentally, rwandan parliamentarians evince surprise upon learning that women comprise under 20 percent of the u.s. congress. in addition to the 30 percent quota for women in parliament in rwanda, the transitional government established the ministry for gender and women in development as well as gender posts in all other government and ministerial bodies in 2003. these bodies are charged with ensuring ‘gender sensitivity’ in all policies. it was the women parliamentarians who made certain that laws against gbv were passed. what is more, women parliamentarians were instrumental in advocating and lobbying for the inheritance and marital property law rwanda in 1999, giving women property rights, including the right to inherit land from their parents (world bank 2008). nonetheless, constant vigilance is necessary. for example, the passing of the recent labor law [ref] reduced the maternity leave allowance for working women. given the difficulties faced by mothers working fulltime in the formal sector and given the absence of discourse about families other than heterosexual, it can be concluded that the special status of mothers does not include all manifestations of parenting. those who parent outside the sanctioned boundaries of heterosexual marriage or those who adopt rather than give birth to children with the parents’ dna, reveal noticeable lacunae in public discourse. 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 indeed, rather than a concept of traditional maternal power, more immediate and urgent matters called women to work for their country following the genocide. one parliamentarian spoke of her sense that she needed to run for office: mais le rwanda avait besoin d’un cadre administratif et politique, aussi simple soit-il, pour redémarrer un semblant de vie, soigner les malades, envisager la reprise des écoles, imaginer rendre justice, etc. il fallait imaginer de nouvelles lois et un travail au parlement a fini par me sembler tout à fait nécessaire (mukankomeje 2009, p. 361)6. under a norwegian government-funded program ‘we can do it’, preparation of candidates by pro-femmes includes teaching women how to respond to questions, how to dress and how to respect ‘time’ (the word ‘time’ was spoken in english during the interview). returning refugees from the rwandan diaspora have also taken key positions among officeholders. the outstanding public performance of women ministers holding senior positions in cabinet, for example, foreign affairs, health, agriculture, infrastructure in 2012, has altered perceptions about female office holders: women are perceived as ‘more approachable and trustworthy politicians than male counterparts’ (remmert 2003, quoted in powley 2005, p. 25). this perception may not be because women are fundamentally different but as stolberg (2011) notes regarding the relative dearth of scandals among women politicians in the united states: ‘“i have no hard evidence that women are less likely to engage in risky or somewhat stupid behavior,” ms pearson [university of minnesota expert on u.s. congress] said. “but women in congress are still really in a situation where they have to prove themselves to their male colleagues and constituents.”’ women’s political power remains open to additional scrutiny and thus women police their own public behavior in ways that male officeholders may not. women’s economic promise while women’s ability to survive trauma and to thrive in politics is striking, enormous challenges remain to empowering the majority of rwandan women. extreme poverty exists ‘upcountry,’ or in the countryside. even when women make money at markets through 6 ‘but rwanda needed an administrative and political framework, as simple as it was, to start up a semblance of life, to care for the sick, to envision restarting schools, to imagine rendering justice. we had to imagine new laws and working in parliament ended up seeming completely necessary to me’. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 83 selling agricultural products, those who work in grassroots organizations report that many husbands take control of the money and thus women’s autonomy. however, journalist anthony faiola celebrates rwanda as an ‘example of how empowering women can fundamentally transform post-conflict economies and fight the cycle of poverty’ (2008, a4). a positive illustration comes from the southern province where the women-only cooperative of abasa has been highly successful in its work with raising cattle and keeping bees. continued barriers to women’s financial success include customary traditions in rural areas. even though laws technically protect women’s land rights, ‘households headed by women have smaller landholdings than men. women are also less likely than men to use land for their enterprise development’ (world bank 2008). yet, because women head more than onethird of households in rwanda, women in rwanda are more likely to own land than in some neighboring countries. in 2012, women ran forty-three percent of businesses in rwanda (mbabazi, 2012). in a 2008 ‘peace through business’ initiative by the institute for economic empowerment of women, rwandan women worked with afghan women to share ideas on how to start and manage a small business. indeed, u.s. secretary of state hillary clinton cites rwanda as a model of economic progress, particularly compared to elsewhere in africa: in a country that had been ravaged by genocidal conflict, the progress is amazing. it has one of the fastest growing economies in africa, even in the midst of the global recession…the rwandan people believed in themselves. and their leaders believed in policies based on evidence and measurable results, including a nationwide emphasis on family planning, crosscutting partnerships with donors and ngos, and a greater premium on professionalism in the government and the health sector. (2009) clinton highlighted the role of ngos and family planning. clearly, both in rwanda and globally, lack of knowledge or power in regard to controlling fertility hinders women’s economic empowerment and educational attainment. but gender-focused ngos in rwanda have made important strides in the past 15 years, especially in contrast to what has been possible in other societies in the great lakes region. anthony faiola (2008) notes that women have proven to be more reliable when it comes to borrowing, saving and spending wisely: women more than men invest profits in the family, renovate homes, improve nutrition, increase savings rates and spend on children’s education, officials 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 here said…‘rwanda's economy has risen up from the genocide and prospered greatly on the backs of our women,’ said agnes matilda kalibata, minister of state in charge of agriculture. ‘bringing women out of the home and fields has been essential to our rebuilding…we are becoming a nation that understands that there are huge financial benefits to equality’ (faiola 2008, a4). according to winnie byanyima, director of the united nations development program’s gender team ‘we have overwhelming evidence from almost all the developing regions of the world that [investment in] women makes better economics’ (quoted in faiola 2008, a5). women have proven to be careful investors and stewards—and they are also more likely to pay back loans than male borrowers. indeed, faiola cites the opinion that women have more self-restraint and more resilience than men whose credit record shows less success. while the explanation may be open to debate, the fact that women are better investments is not. debating power inside and out observing the operation of gendered politics and social power in rwanda provides immeasurable complexity and limitless ideas for debate. analysts must acknowledge the limitations of various women’s situations in rwanda through an examination of various sources: interviews, meetings, advocacy, online communications and texts, including investigative reports and academic analyses. many respected political scientists from europe and the u.s. question how much actual power rwandan women have, despite their apparent numerical power as political representatives. paxton and hughes, in women politics and power (2007), argue that rwanda is an authoritarian state and that the women who have acceded to positions of power tend to be former rpf members. indeed, non-rpf women appear to have limited access to governance. burnet (2008) claims rwanda is an authoritarian single-party state and that women’s policy-making power has actually decreased, in part because the most vibrant women from ngos now work in government, and those who took their places have less experience and capacity. at the same time, she argues that women as heads of household have expanded the boundaries of socially acceptable roles and broadly expanded freedom in career choice. devlin and elgie (2008) argue that women parliamentarians’ policy output is largely symbolic. many scholars contend that women’s power is more image than reality and that women’s presence in parliament has not brought about substantive policy changes. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 85 certainly, rwanda can rightfully be called ‘authoritarian’ using u.s. or even g-20 definitions. rwanda’s laws against genocide ideology do not allow genocide denial, just as germany’s laws do not permit holocaust denial. granted that rwanda is not democratic by u.s. definitions, one may nonetheless question the extent to which u.s. understandings of democracy can be effectively implemented at this point in rwanda’s recovery from near destruction a mere 19 years ago. inyumba (2009) argued that democracy for rwandans is about social transformation: ‘working for the welfare of our people is the best democracy, not the cosmetic version of elections.’ that is, democracy includes giving people jobs, electricity, internet access, and safety. in addition, the current government has emphasized gender equality and has strategically showcased women’s apparent political success. interviewees often cited political will and good leadership as vital to rwandan women’s political ascendancy. pragmatically, the push for women’s visibility in government may be partially economic rather than purely democratic. that is, any economy that does not take advantage of the creativity and potential of over half the society hurts its opportunities for improvement. women’s leadership roles may offer strategic arguments for further economic investment from donors. even if women’s political power does not coincide with u.s.-style democracy, women’s visibility may serve as inspiration for girls throughout the country to strive for leadership positions they might not have considered without women role models. as burnet indicates, even if women’s narrowly defined political efficacy is questionable, women’s possibilities for professional careers and social roles have expanded and improved dramatically. in rwanda, there is a history of women participating in decision making at all levels and women members of parliament are by no means token leaders, having come through the leadership ranks at village, cell, regional and national levels. for example, the minister of migeprof, oda gasinzigwa, appointed in 2013 had both ngo and government experience before taking up her position. she was first an elected member of a cell women’s council, went on to be a member, then president of rnwc, and was the first director of the gender monitoring office before taking up her ministerial position. in recent debates on the mailing list members of the rwanda association of university women (rauw) provide insight to critics of rwandan women’s power. those rauw members cited below are either rwandans or long-standing residents who have at least an 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 undergraduate degree. one member insists on the specificity and complexity of the kinyarwanda language. just as those who did not understand the meaning of ‘go to work’ and ‘cut down the tall trees’ prior to the genocide were not able to see the planning of the genocide underway, those who do not speak kinyarwanda cannot fully understand the culture. how many scholars consider what is lost in translation? she writes in an email to the rauw listserve on 10 june 2011: ‘firstly: it is a big mistake by the international community wanting to make themselves experts in all local situations rwanda is rwanda and basically better understood by rwandans. a lot is hidden in our language and culture that may not be easily understood by outsiders.’ what is perceived as authoritarianism may be called “strict” or “strong” leadership, or “political will,” within the country; such leadership is sometimes perceived as necessary for a small country (especially one so recently devastated by widespread violence) to compete with larger, wealthier and more industrialized countries. another scholar of gender argues that what we may assume is repression may in fact be selfcensorship by local media and agencies striving to project the image of success. she also advocates distinguishing between policy and implementation. in an 8 june 2011 email to the rauw listserve, she explains some of the nuances of civil society interactions with government: ‘there is little overt political repression in rwanda but quite a lot of selfcensorship by the media etc. there are policies and programs in place to build a strong civil society and citizen engagement. these need to be strengthened.’ while international human rights organizations and some scholars emphasize rwanda’s authoritarianism, rwandans with formal education argue for awareness of cultural particularities and better implementation of existing policies. even rwandans who believe that woman do hold authentic political power do not necessarily agree with the current provision that 30 percent of parliamentary seats should continue to be reserved for women. privat rutazibwa, a journalist and media analyst, contended in a 2009 lecture to igsc that the quotas for women in leadership positions should end: ‘toute cette politique des quotas risque d’infantaliser les femmes qui ont besoin de ce pourcentage. cette politique doit être conditionnelle, pas permanente.’7 but the 30 percent requirement does not mean electing women just because they are women. in response to the 2008 election results, gasinzigwa, then rnwc president said: ‘our aim is not having 70 percent or 80 percent 7 all these politics of quotas risk infantilizing women who ’need’ this percentage. this policy should be conditional, not permanent. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 87 representation in parliament, as people may think...what we care about is competent women with appropriate capacities — and those who were elected have that capacity’ (unifem 2008). women do not want charity or even affirmative action – some women parliamentarians, in fact, voted against university admission standards for women that were different from those for men. sugar and salt, poverty and pads: challenges to equality of course, women’s capacity generally lags behind that of men because of barriers to formal education. a male university student revealed in conversation the perception that women in parliament had lower educational levels than their male colleagues (personal interview february 2010). a rauw member demonstrates some of the challenges that women face: the statistics of the elections show that majority of the women elected in leadership have a28 or below a2 education. in the villages probably men have the same level of education but at other levels women might not even have the guts to open their mouths because of their level of education (email message to listserve 8 june 2011). because of this persisting inequity, members of rauw and kie researchers researched the reasons girls fall behind in many educational contexts with the aim of addressing the obstacles. prof. grace verdiana masanja of national university of rwanda (nur) has documented some of the disparities, demonstrating that gender mainstreaming in formal education remains an unmet goal for the nation: the gender gap within the research and academic ranks is still very wide . . . among the 377 phd holders in higher education institutions in rwanda only 32 (8% in the category) are women and among the 1,159 masters degree holders in the country, women are 210 (18% in the category) (source hec – higher education council). . . . the proportion of women in research teams is low in general and mostly they occupy junior positions. only 3 out of 70 research grants projects that have received funding through the nur research directorate since 2003 are led by women, and of the 21 post doctoral grants only 3 have gone to women (masanja 2010). education and training are key for candidates for political office. at a meeting of the norwegian people’s aid evaluation of the we can do it (wcdi) training program, dinah 8 education in rwanda is generally modeled on the british system, thus a levels are studied between the ages of 16 and 18. after a1 is completed, a2 is the stage prior to applying to university. a-level students take three subjects and thus focus their education more narrowly than students in international baccalaureate programs. 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 musindarwezo (2010) indicated that the country still needs to avoid essentialism in filling positions such as appointing women only to gender-related posts. nonetheless, rwanda should not assume that female candidates are fundamentally and essentially different from male candidates or that just because a candidate is female, she has the necessary training, expertise and gender sensitivity to perform well. the needs assessment report for wcdi includes the following recommendation: men should be engaged in the wcdi so that they come on board to support women’s participation in politics instead of becoming obstacles to women. it was discussed that wcdi is a women empowerment program, however it was agreed that men can be brought on board during local actions (musindarwezo 2010). hence, there are dangers in essentialist assumptions about innate qualifications of biological females. it bears repeating that rwandan women’s lived experiences shaped by social expectations and discourse of a patriarchal culture (though, some would argue, a matrifocal history) informs their view of how they came to power and why they have the necessary capacity. rwandan parliamentarian henriette umulisa (2010) noted that while, in her opinion, women have power behind the scenes in managing the household, many could not have succeeded politically without the support and involvement of men. jefremovas (2002, pp. 84-5) argues that belgian control diluted the traditional power of women in their roles as wives and mothers. other scholars debate how much actual power rwandan women possessed historically. recent research questions to what extent indigenous culture meant real power for women: by insisting that rwandan culture is rooted in values that support women’s rights, women parliamentarians – and their male allies – explicitly and successfully used cultural arguments to build a constituency around a modern political reform. rather than focusing on dramatic cultural shifts that enabled women’s political participation and highlighted the need for change, the women leaders argued that a continuity of cultural tradition supported their efforts (uwineza & pearson 2009, p. 16). that is, some of the references to pre-colonial women’s power may exemplify more rhetorical savvy than balanced historical research, which may well demonstrate that the colonial era built on existing gender divisions based on the gender stereotypes in patriarchal societies everywhere. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 89 contrast women’s public power with women’s private lives and roles at home in rwanda, and we find women working a second and third shift, lack of family planning, poverty, lesbian invisibility, and patriarchal ideology, especially in rural areas. many individuals who work in ngos, both male and female, confirm that while women have political visibility, they do not have social power in the spheres of the home or the workplace. the roles of wife, mother, and household manager matter greatly at home, but women differ in their opinion of whether those roles confer power or bespeak servitude. poorer women do all the cooking, the cleaning, and other household chores in addition to much of the agricultural work. even if women earn money by farming and selling produce, many men still manage the money. generally, upper-class women must make sure the household is in order while men sit and wait to be served. a professional woman told one of the authors during an interview that, in spite of her husband’s higher education, he expects to be served like royalty: ‘i am a to z, i am sugar and salt, i am soap, electricity and rent and what do i get out of it? that is gender in our country’ (personal interview 2010). this same interviewee responded to a question about what rural women think of women in parliament: ‘they don’t know what parliament is.’ the lack of perceived relevance between the poverty and customary practices in rural areas and the rhetoric of gender equality in more urban areas remains a persistent challenge for rwanda’s lawmakers. despite excellent laws against gbv crafted and implemented by rwandan women parliamentarians, of course women of all classes and all locations experience domestic violence, just as they do in every other country. only one women’s shelter exists in rwanda; what is more, wives are expected to suffer in silence, to try to save their marriages rather than bring the perception of public shame to their families. in addition, there are challenges with the implementation of the gbv law. after poverty, gbv might be the most serious of inequalities that rwandan women face. yet another on-going challenge is the extent to which women at all levels of income and education are unaware of their rights. as in many african countries, women do the majority of agricultural labor, but despite international conventions such as the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (cedaw), women often do not own the land they work or if they do, they may not be aware of their inheritance and property rights. as with gbv, excellent laws exist to protect women (the 1999 inheritance and marital law, reinforced by the new constitution in 2003 and the new land law on 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 property in 2005). the 1999 law gives a woman the right to inherit her husband’s land if the couple’s prenuptial agreement recorded husband and wife as co-owners. nonetheless, many fail to take advantage of pre-nuptial agreements because they cannot afford them. thus, in divorce cases, women have no legal evidence that property was jointly owned in practice. de brouwer notes that despite excellent laws permitting women’s land ownership, it remains a struggle for women to own farming assets (2009, p. 148). consequently, the ideal expressed by the legal system is rarely a practical reality. concerning the laws against gbv, admirable attempts to communicate women’s rights have been made by government agencies as well as by pro-femmes, rwamrec and other ngos, yet only a small percentage of rural and village women have access to this training. as the migeprof notes, ‘it is a good idea to enact laws, but it is better to make them known by beneficiaries.’ a 2005 study indicates that 31 percent of rwandan women have experienced gbv from a partner or husband (rwanda demographic and health survey 2005). most women cannot leave their work at home, whether with children or on the farm, to attend the kinds of training sessions that make them aware of their rights if their chores are not completed at the end of the day, men may batter them. thus, they may not be fully aware of the newer laws against gbv and women’s rights to property, especially if they get divorced. indeed, interviewees indicate that gbv is prevalent at all levels, from women parliamentarians down. lucie nukurundo, formerly of rwanda initiative for sustainable development, argues that ngos have made great strides in educating women about their rights. nukurundo worked against gbv in the rural areas of ruhengeri, kabushinge and gitarama. at the end of a training session to raise awareness, women and men are asked to sign contracts stating that they will not use violence in the family. women folded up the contracts and tucked them in their pagnes (traditional wrap-around long skirts) so that they could later remind their husbands, if necessary, that they have signed an agreement not to break the law. nukurundo contends that women who do have access to anti-gbv training inform and protect their compatriots who are not able to attend. she and emmanuel kabalisa of rwamrec argue that they have seen clear progress in changing attitudes about violence and have observed behavioral changes among participants within two months of the training. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 91 when men and women realize that what they do is defined as violence, they pledge to renounce violence and to inform their friends about what constitutes violence. kabalisa describes training of men and women in coffee cooperatives in gisenyi. the workshops aimed to help citizens in rural areas understand and recognize violence. rwanda has outstanding laws to protect women from domestic violence, employment discrimination and unequal distribution of wealth and property. but there may be a disconnect between the excellent legislation and the reporting or enforcement of that legislation. as in many cultural contexts, domestic violence remains a private issue that women hesitate to reveal for fear of hurting or shaming themselves and their families. crucial also is the lack of legal protection in terms of implementing the legislation. of course, many of rwanda’s challenges to achieving gender equality could be addressed by education. while girls and boys are present in equal numbers in primary schools and fare more or less equally well until age 12, the number of girls drops precipitously during adolescence. according to the 2009 annual report of the centre for gender, culture and development at kigali institute of education, ‘girls start dropping out in secondary school and comprise less than 30 percent of students in rwandan public universities’ (randell, p. 3). girls’ and young women’s inequality in formal educational systems is one of many areas of research in progress by the new cgcd at kie. according to a 9 june 2011 email message to the rauw listserve, a professor observes the challenges girls face in rwanda’s formal educational institutions: women’s low proportion at undergraduate level in public higher education institutions is based on the selection after their secondary advanced level...the average shows the number of female students at undergraduate level is slightly higher than that of male students because the majority are in private hei (higher education institutions) or in evening programs whose quality generally is not as good as that of public hei. women are extremely few at the level of postgraduate studies (masters and especially phd level); also women with such qualifications are proportionately very few compared to men in the country...now, generally, women in leadership need also to have a sufficient level of education for them to make an impact on the society and to be transformative agents. because girls tend to fall behind boys, particularly in science and technology education, at around ages 12-14, researchers at cgcd have conducted interviews with girls, parents and teachers to determine the reasons for this decline in performance. responding to studies that 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 indicate that girls begin missing school around the time they begin menstruating, in part because of lack of pads and separate bathrooms, rauw has conducted an ongoing campaign to break the silence about menstruation. rauw’s hope is to address the stigma surrounding menstruation and remove obstacles that hinder girls’ attendance before they leave school altogether. but rauw could not have begun its initiative to remove import taxes on sanitary pads without the assistance of researchers educated at internationally recognized institutions. to respond to the disparity between women’s numerical majority in government and girls’ lower educational level, more researchers in gender studies need to be trained. rwanda’s report on progress towards the beijing+15 goals notes that ‘many people (including officials) do not understand clearly gender as a concept and planners do not have the required skills to mainstream gender in programs, policies and projects. in addition, there are not enough gender experts in the country, since no university, so far, has a gender studies department’ (2009, p. 62). so while gender balance and gender sensitivity are clear goals of the government of rwanda, education in gender studies is essential to achieving the reality. fortunately cgcd at kie launched its master’s degree in gender, culture and development in 2011, which has graduated gender sensitive men and women at the end of 2012, who in turn can involve others. soft voice, strong heart inyumba (2009) argued that promoting women in decision making is inspired by indigenous culture and is upheld by the present leadership. other countries can learn from both the rhetoric employed to advance gender equality and from rwanda’s economic progress. inyumba recounted the following anecdote as an illustration of the current administration’s gender sensitivity: ‘it is not surprising for a leader to call a male-dominated tv show and say that a program is not gender-sensitive and point out the need for female representation’. incipient gender mainstreaming can be traced to parliamentarians’ conscious decision to emphasize pre-colonial traditions of leadership as an alternative to prevailing patriarchal notions of women’s capacity. women’s civil society organizations have participated in rebuilding and unifying the country and training women candidates following the trauma of horrific sexual violence and killing during the 1994 genocide. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 93 those critics who contend that women’s presence in parliament has not brought concrete results neglect the importance of the legislation promoting women’s land rights and against gender-based violence (not to mention the inspiration that parliamentarians have given to local women). grassroots trainer nukurundo congratulates the president and the highest levels of government when praising the progress rwanda has made. one parliamentarian commented in a personal interview about the president’s advocacy for women parliamentarians: ‘when one woman was taking oath in parliament, her voice was so soft that the others could not hear her oath, and some of the men started laughing. the president admonished the men, saying, ‘no, behind that soft voice is a strong heart’’ (personal interview 2010). and in her study on rwandan women in parliament, powley (2009) concludes: ‘the rwandan case provides us with examples of gender-sensitive policy-making and innovative electoral mechanisms that could be models for other parts of the world,’ certainly the usa with its 17 percent of women in congress. to be sure, women’s visibility in national government has not immediately translated into empowerment in the home, in agriculture, in the office or in social life. formal education is key to providing girls and women the tools to analyze and dismantle remaining obstacles to gender equality in the professional, social and private spheres, building on their political achievement. the documentary about women post-genocide, god sleeps in rwanda, takes its title from a rwandan proverb: ‘they say my country is so beautiful that although god may wander the world during the day, he returns at night to sleep in rwanda’ (2005). the beauty is not found only in the hilly landscape, but indeed, in the willingness to use innovative rhetoric in striving for social change and to rethink assumptions about gender. the question remains, however, whether in the next generation, the exalted role of mother which has facilitated such strong engagement in the social and political life of the country will function more like a ladder or a cage. 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http://www.unifem.org/news_events/story_detail.php?storyid=736 umulisa, h. 2009, senator, personal interview, kigali, rwanda, 4 february 2010. uwineza, p. & pearson, e. 2009, ‘sustaining women’s gains in rwanda: the influence of indigenous culture and post-genocide politics’, institute for inclusive security, hunt alternatives fund. world bank group, international finance corporation 2008, voices of women entrepreneurs in rwanda, world bank, washington d.c. world bank group & vital voices 2008, ‘weaving peace in rwanda’, global partnership doing business in africa, world bank, washington d.c. http://www.unifem.org/news_events/story_detail.php?storyid=736 surviving genocide, thriving in politics: rwandan women’s power gerise herndon nebraska wesleyan university shirley randell sria rwanda ltd abstract strategic essentialism for social transformation methodology: engaged listening, invested analysis the ideological battleground of the body women’s post-conflict identities: difference and equality men’s post-conflict perceptions collectives creating and transforming institutions women’s economic promise debating power inside and out sugar and salt, poverty and pads: challenges to equality soft voice, strong heart references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 39 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia understanding the motivations and activities of transnational advocacy networks against child sex trafficking in the greater mekong subregion: the value of cosmopolitan globalisation theory deanna davy university of sydney abstract child sex trafficking has become one of the most highly publicised social issues of our time and, due to its global nature, transnational anti-trafficking advocacy networks are well placed and central to lead campaigns against it. whilst there is an abundance of literature on the subjects of child sex trafficking and transnational advocacy networks we lack an understanding of the motivations of these networks that act as buffers against trafficking. cosmopolitan globalisation theory remains a compelling framework for examining the motivations of transnational anti-child sex trafficking networks in the greater mekong subregion. applying a cosmopolitan globalisation lens, this article discusses the social justice goals of transnational advocacy networks, their centrality in combating child sex trafficking, and their ability to perform cosmopolitan ‘globalisation from below’ to counter global social problems. introduction in the greater mekong subregion (gms) transnational advocacy networks (tans) have been forming since the 1990s to combat child trafficking for sexual exploitation. child sex trafficking (cst) occurs in all southeast asian countries. in a region where the demand for young brides, adoptive infants, sex with children, images of child pornography, and cheap labour is strong, children may be trafficked at source or during migration, either en route or after reaching their destination. origin, transit and destination countries for child trafficking exist throughout the southeast asia region with some countries characterised as origin, or transit, or destination, and others encompassing all three (unicef 2009, p. 19). internal trafficking, from rural to urban centres and from small towns to big cities, is also a considerable dynamic although far less researched than cross-border trafficking. complex push and pull factors including poverty, gender inequality, unemployment, and forced migration complicate the cst issue. the regional picture that emerges from the available literature is one in which children experience serious physical, psychological, emotional and 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 social consequences as a result of being trafficked (dottridge 2004; rafferty 2007; unicef 2009). this article examines two important themes: first, the significance of cosmopolitan globalisation theory for explaining the proliferation of tans against cst, their motivations, and the response of tans to the cst problem; and, second, tans’ creation of a form of ‘globalisation from below’ to respond to cst as a form of social injustice. research into these areas is important for both improving our understanding of tans in the current era of globalisation and our understanding of in what circumstances and in what ways tans act on partners’ collective values and motivations. research into these areas is also important for understanding how tans can provide an effective cosmopolitan response to cst, and indeed other forms of social injustice, in today’s global political economy. this article is divided into three sections. first, it discusses the definitions, estimates and dynamics of cst in the gms as well as the complex ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors of cst with a particular focus on poverty in the current era of globalisation. second, the article examines cosmopolitan globalisation theory as a compelling framework for examining the motivations and activities of tans. third, the article discusses tans’ cosmopolitan response to cst through the creation of a form of ‘globalisation from below’. methods data collection for this research was conducted in thailand and cambodia over a six month period in 2010. twenty-two interviews were conducted with child trafficking experts employed in nongovernment organisations (ngos), united nations (un) agencies, tans, and academia in bangkok (thailand), pattaya (thailand), chiang mai (thailand) and phnom penh (cambodia). the purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to build a complete picture of the child trafficking problem in thailand and cambodia; a picture of tans and their diverse structures; an understanding of the anti-trafficking advocacy strategies employed; and a picture of tans’ campaign highlights and successes. additional methodologies included process tracing and participant observation (performed while i was employed as a researcher at an international ngo in bangkok and attending regional anti-trafficking fora, seminars and meetings). thailand and cambodia were chosen as the focus countries for the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 41 research as they are widely considered the cst ‘hot spots’ of southeast asia and therefore many tans have their head offices and field offices in these two countries. central questions for this research included: • what are the advantages and disadvantages of anti-trafficking tans? how is it important that ngos and un agencies organise their advocacy in networks rather than anti-trafficking organisations working independently of each other? • what is occurring in tans’ internal politics and what are the internal and external factors that facilitate or impede organisations’ participation in tans? • what are the motivations for tans? what are their activities and goals? • how are tans contributing to a cosmopolitan ‘globalisation from below’? interview questions focused on the history of the organisation, processes (for example, decision making, conflict resolution), motivations and values, and activities (programs, policy strategies), reasons why the network chose to work on anti-trafficking initiatives, and how the network defined its success and effectiveness. since little was known about tans and their organisational structures, i adopted an exploratory, naturalistic approach to help answer the research questions. due to the difficulties of quantifying a complex and transnational social problem, employing a qualitative research methodology allowed the exploration of normative and theoretical questions within the social science framework. definitions, estimates and child trafficking dynamics defining child trafficking cst is an important component of the broad sex trafficking industry, which in turn is a subsection of the general phenomena of human trafficking. human trafficking can refer to trafficking for sexual exploitation, labour exploitation (for example sweat shops, the fishing industry), organ trafficking, adoption and trafficking for other purposes. however, sex trafficking is often considered the most sinister of the human trafficking types, and is therefore one of the most researched. there is a broad consensus in the literature that cst is an issue that urgently needs to be tackled. most cst research reports start from the premise that child trafficking is a ‘sinister’, ‘serious’, or ‘major’ problem. early twentieth century conventions defined trafficking as internal or cross-border movement for purposes of prostitution, and defined all sex work as trafficking, whether the women and girls were in the 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 profession voluntarily or not. pointing out that until recently there was no internationally agreed-upon definition of trafficking, a handbook from the global alliance against trafficking in women (2007) gives some modern definitions of trafficking from the un and from the human rights standards for the treatment of trafficked persons. common elements in these definitions include movement from community of origin; fraud, force, deception, or coercion; and exploitation in slavery, near-slavery, or servitude with or without pay (gaatw 2007, pp. 3-4). the modern definitions do not require that sexual exploitation be involved for it to be called trafficking and gaatw emphasises that movement for sexual exploitation is only one type of trafficking, though it has arguably been the most prioritised form for concern (2007, p. 4). child trafficking estimates the united nations inter-agency project on human trafficking (2008) states that there are no universally accepted estimates of child trafficking numbers throughout the world. difficulties in identifying victims and differences in applying trafficking definitions to local realities make such estimates virtually impossible. however, some commonly quoted figures provide some sense of the magnitude of the problem. unicef (2009) suggests that globally, about 10 million children, mainly girls, are subjected to various forms of sexual exploitation worldwide. a further one million children are estimated to enter the commercial sex trade each year (unicef 2009). unicef (2009) further estimates that a third of all sex workers in southeast asia are between the ages of 12 and 17. kristof (1996) similarly notes that more than a million girls and boys, aged 17 and younger, are engaged in forced prostitution in asia. a recent study by the international labour organisation (ilo) (2009) estimates that 43 per cent of all victims of forced labour worldwide are trafficked for sexual exploitation. according to child wise (2007), an australian ngo working on the human trafficking issue both domestically and internationally, more than 250 000 sex tourists visit asia each year, with 25 per cent coming from the united states, 16 per cent from germany and 13 per cent from both australia and the united kingdom. this includes those seeking sex with children, a practice better known as child sex tourism, and those specifically targeting pre-pubescent children, that is, paedophilia (peters 2007). however, in most countries the major demand that creates a market for commercial sexual exploitation of children is still domestic. local perceptions of childhood, which often differ from the international legal norm, contribute to this phenomenon (world bank 2003, p. 15). in many traditional cultures in the mekong region young people aged between 15 and 17 are often considered ‘adults’ in their own cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 43 societies (peters 2007, p. 27). they may marry, and otherwise function as adults (peters, 2007 p. 27). this view is supported by qvortrup who argues that “what children do and what is expected from them is largely historically and culturally determined” (2004, p. 267). furthermore, the age of ‘consent’ to work or engage in prostitution varies across states and countries and according to the age and agency of the individuals involved in sex. the age of consent is not static either and has changed over the centuries especially with regards to same sex intercourse (waites 2005, pp. 45-46). thailand, for example, increased its minimum age from 13 to 15 in 1987, and to 18 in relation to prostitution in 1996 (waites 2005, p. 49). child trafficking dynamics over the past three decades international ngos, together with un agencies, governments and other bodies, have become increasingly aware of the widespread phenomenon of child trafficking – both across borders and within nation-states themselves. much attention has been given to the asia-pacific region, and especially the gms, which has become a hub for trafficking in children, particularly for the purposes of sexual servitude. the asian countries surrounding the mekong river (the six countries of the gms – cambodia, china, laos pdr, myanmar, thailand and vietnam) have among the highest incidence of internal and transnational migration in the world (zheng, 2008). hundreds of thousands of men, women and children in this region leave their homes to cross borders each year in search of new economic opportunities and a better life. the countries of cambodia and thailand are therefore within a region where the ease of cross-border movement coupled with the relative economic prosperity and political stability of some countries has attracted large numbers of would-be economic migrants. despite the ease of cross-border mobility, political sanctions against would-be migrants in destination countries have created a need for networks of ‘people-movers’ to facilitate cross-border movement. that these facilitators often serve as links to low-paid, exploitative and slave type jobs, including sex work, in the destination countries is hardly surprising. further impacting the migration of adults and children in the region, the lucrative tourism industry in the gms has not only created jobs within legitimate sectors but has also stimulated a demand for women and children – both male and female – in the entertainment sector, which generally translates as the sex sector (dottridge 2004, p. 23). many of the children in this sector are poor and have low education levels (peters 2007, p. 20). the sex sector can offer these poor migrating children higher paid jobs than they would find elsewhere (peters 2007, p. 24). 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 in the southeast asia region children are trafficked either within their own countries or over the border into neighbouring countries, for example from laos to thailand or cambodia to thailand, or thailand to china, or myanmar to laos, and so on. some children are moved across international borders and some are trafficked across the world into developed regions such as europe, the united states and australia (marshall 2001, p. 21). lim (1998) argues that whilst adults might choose sex work as an occupational choice, children can only be considered victims of coercion and trafficking. children, in contrast to adults, “are clearly much more vulnerable and helpless against the established structures and vested interests in the sex sector, and are much more likely to be victims of debt bondage, trafficking, physical violence or torture” (ilo 1998). in a similar vein marshall (2001) has argued that children’s ‘choice’ is questionable as it is often motivated by poverty or other extenuating circumstances. because of extreme poverty, families in the southeast asia region have been known to be manipulated into giving up their children to recruiters to make ends meet when faced with bleak economic opportunities (leung 2003). some children are turned over to recruiters by their families in situations of debt bondage, in which children, usually girls, are sent to work for creditors until they pay off a family’s debt (blackburn et al. 2010, p. 108). in many cases of trafficking in the gms, the children have themselves initiated the migration process, motivated by real and/or perceived differences in lifestyles, employment opportunities and pay levels between thailand and surrounding countries (huijsmans 2008, p. 341). the global and public policy response to human trafficking has been profound. as wong (2004) suggests, “from a poorly funded ngo women’s issue in the early 1980s, human trafficking has entered the global agenda of high politics, eliciting in recent years significant legislative and other action from the us congress, the eu and the un”. while end child prostitution, child pornography and trafficking of children for sexual purposes (ecpat) (2006) reports that, to date, “there is no clear strategy to deal with the demand for sex with children”, it is the cosmopolitan response of tans through political activism, campaigning and creation of child protection policy and systems that has influenced the promotion of child trafficking as an important issue for domestic and international policy concerns. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 45 child trafficking push and pull factors: globalisation and poverty according to a critical cosmopolitan globalist reading, it is not only inequality between rich and poor states that is increasing but also inequality and poverty within states (held 2002, p. 81). globalisation exacerbates poverty, which leaves more people vulnerable to contemporary forms of slavery, such as child labour, child trafficking and bonded labour (van den anker 2004, p. 16). the new global division of labour has reorganised rather than ameliorated patterns of global inequality and exclusion (held 2002, p. 81). consequently, the world is no longer divided as it once was on geographic lines, that is, between north and south, but rather exhibits a new social architecture (held 2002, p. 81). this architecture, which divides humanity into elites, the bourgeoisie, the marginalised and the impoverished, cuts across territorial and cultural boundaries, rearranging the world into the winners and losers of globalisation (hoogvelt 2001). poverty and increased economic inequality are important risk factors associated with child trafficking and child sexual exploitation (shifman2003). child trafficking is but one symptom of the unevenness of globalisation. scholars of human trafficking suggest that there are a number of key reasons for the growth of trafficking internationally. gupta (2010) argues that there are six global trends that accentuate vulnerability to trafficking and have caused the surge in growth of trafficked people. first, an increase in demand for trafficked people, from end users to those who make a profit from the trade, has become the most immediate cause for the expansion of the human trafficking industry. second, new technologies have made moving and recruiting people much easier. third, petty criminals have been replaced by organised criminals in the human trade, turning it into a large-scale industry. fourth, natural disasters have driven people from their homes. fifth, displacement and migration and the absence of protection mechanisms have increased vulnerability to human trafficking. sixth, the global economic crisis of 2008 to 2010 has increased unemployment and undermined social safety nets, contributing to increased vulnerability by exacerbating the effects of existing sources of marginalisation (gupta 2010, pp 70-71). these events have led to an increase in the number of vulnerable people that can easily be targeted by traffickers, “disposable people” as bales (2004) calls them. in a similar vein,nanu suggests that the factors that lead to trafficking in destination countries can be broadly classified in economic, political and social clusters (2010, p. 153). on the supply side, vulnerability to trafficking can be linked to poverty, unemployment, economic crisis, political conflict, dysfunctional family situations, lack of education, and tolerance of violence, amongst others. on the demand side, vulnerability to trafficking is 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 caused by the growing informal economy, the world demand for cheap labour, ineffective law enforcement, and discrimination against marginalised groups (nanu 2010, p. 153). the factors contributing to child trafficking can be broadly divided into two major levels (roby 2005). first, the macro-level, constituting the international, national and local demographic, social, economic, ethnic and cultural environments in which trafficking occurs, and, second, the micro-level of individual and familial risk factors (roby 2005, p. 137). economic injustice and poverty are among the major macro-level risk factors for sex trafficking (roby 2005, p. 137). there are several major ways in which globalisation has served to further escalate the effects of poverty as a cause of human trafficking. the first of these is the widening of the wealth gap between countries and regions around the world (chuang 2006, p. 138). improved and increased use of technology such as the internet and television has made the supply side of poverty much more clear, with the poor becoming increasingly aware that development has eluded them. poor people, including children, realise their poverty comparatively to others and seek access to the jobs that will enable them to buy televisions, cars and other modern wants. traffickers have the increasing opportunity to exploit this situation by luring young people into promises of jobs in neighbouring regions or countries. as human trafficking has such close ties to slavery and has existed prior to the latest period of globalisation, it cannot be argued that globalisation is the only cause of trafficking of humans. globalisation has, however, played an important role in the escalation of the trafficking problem, and the problem of child trafficking in particular (emmers 2004, p. 19). poverty, unemployment and economic crises are felt profoundly by females and it is often young girls in the gms who, due to economic stress, are driven to cross borders in search of work. until recently, the ‘supply’ side of poverty – meaning the human beings that are trafficked into sexual exploitation for the lucrative international sex trade – has been the most studied by ngos, multilateral organisations and governments and is therefore the side of trafficking that is best understood amongst stakeholders (danailova-trainor&belser 2006). this is reflected in the advocacy efforts of tans that have largely focused on campaigning on issues related to the supply side of trafficking. this has, of course, led to the ‘demand’ side of trafficking (the users of children and adults’ sexual exploitation and labour) being largely overlooked. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 47 the 2009 to 2010 global financial crisis has provided a new episode in history for viewing the transformation of child trafficking. economic crises affect countries in many important ways that can result in the exploitation of children (ecpat 2009). an economic downturn may involve reduced capital inflows, reduced development aid, declining export markets, changing terms of trade and a reduction in overall gdp. as a result, countries already weakened by recent food and fuel price increases experience high unemployment, subsequently exacerbating income gaps. children are at particular risk, resulting in poor health indicators, lower educational attainment, reduced family incomes and subsequently increased child labour (patel 2009, p. 50). with the recent worldwide economic downturn, a number of anti-trafficking agencies and analysts began to look at the potential impact of the recession on the phenomenon of human trafficking (ecpat 2009, p. 10). ecpat found, along with a number of scholars, that poverty will grow significantly as a result of financial crises (ecpat 2009, p. 11; percy 2009; kane 2009). widespread impoverishment is already being accompanied by a fall in world exports, a rise in unemployment and consumer prices, returns of unemployed migrants to countries of origin and a decline in remittances, with the consequent deterioration of living conditions of entire households, thus making families even more vulnerable to trafficking (ecpat 2009, p. 11; percy 2009). compounding this is the reaction from governments that tend to adopt more restrictive immigration policies towards foreign workers, which in turn results in more irregular migration and strengthening of the informal labour market (iom 2009). another negative effect of economic crises is that budget spending for social services, child protection and child care often decreases (ecpat 2009, p. 11). furthermore, development aid is drastically reduced during economic downturns (ecpat 2009, p. 11; patel 2009). all these factors serve to exacerbate children’s vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking. understanding tans: the value of cosmopolitan globalisation theory whilst it is the political activism of tans that has moved the cst issue onto the global agenda, theorists continue to struggle over how to define the motivations and activities of these fluid transnational networks. scholarly attention on tans has tended to focus on measuring campaign ‘impact’ over internal network dynamics or network motivations. network scholars have developed theories about network campaign tactics including the ‘boomerang theory’ (keck & sikkink 1998) and campaign ‘blocking’ and ‘backdoor moves’ 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 (hertel 2006). international relations scholars, opposing the state-centred paradigm of an anarchical international political system, have analysed non-state actors in international politics (piper &uhlin 2004). other scholars have made use of social movement theory and focused explicitly on transnational activism (keck & sikkink 1998). sociologists and political scientists interested in social movements have analysed the extent of social movements to a transnational or global level (della porta et al. 1999). however, these theories are not particularly useful for explaining tans’motivations for collective action and their campaign activities, goals, and politics. cosmopolitanism is a useful theoretical framework for examining tans against cst as it both provides a lens to examine the links between globalisation, poverty and inequality, and it also explains the proliferation of tans advocating for universal values, poverty eradication and their motivations for acting as buffers against child trafficking. cosmopolitanism has been criticised as being a “vague” or “diffuse” theory (skrbis et al. 2004, p. 117), however, as miller claims, cosmopolitanism is now the “preferred self-description of most moral philosophers who write about global justice” (2007, p. 23). given the increasing pressures of globalisation, the recognition that we are in need of some global conception of humanity is not surprising – increasing globalisation demands some normative understanding of global community, responsibility and governance. the underlying dynamic of globalisation is cosmopolitan, that is, it is simultaneously but increasingly differentiated growth of world markets, interstate institutions, and global civil society and norms. this dynamic, once unleashed, can have diverse consequences (brysk & shafir, 2004, p. 5). thus while the political economy of hegemony dictates an unequal distribution of resources among and within states and a general weakening of state citizenship, the resulting dynamic is more complex in that power is moving from weak states to strong states, from states to markets, and away from state authority entirely in certain domains and functions (strange 1998). for this research, a perspective that recognises the relationship between contemporary globalisation, inequality and trafficking is in line with that of devetak and higgott (1999) and their argument that globalisation inhibits liberty and justice for many people. this research also supports the idea put forward by delanty (2006) that cosmopolitanism concerns a dynamic relation between the local and the global. this is suggested by the term itself: the interaction of the universal order of the cosmos and the human order of the polis (delanty 2006, p. 36). cosmopolitanism thus concerns the multiple cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 49 ways the local and the national is redefined as a result of interaction with the global (delanty 2006, p. 36). cosmopolitanism is a useful theory for making sense of social transformation and in opening up discursive spaces of world openness and thus in resisting globalisation (delanty 2006, p. 36). current debates in political theory draw attention to the revival of the kantian cosmopolitan ideal, which, it is argued, is relevant in the present context of globalisation, the alleged crisis of the nation-state and the need for global civil society (bohman & lutz-bachmann 1997). cosmopolitanism offers a basis to establish a more just global order, predominantly through its espousal of a commitment to humanity as a whole, facilitated by building consensus on values that demonstrate a commitment beyond the nation tans have a key role to play in activating the cosmopolitan system – producing frameworks for universal ethical values – given their cosmopolitan credentials (carey, 2003, p. 1). contemporary cosmopolitan theory is a response to a range of global problems including economic injustice, poverty, malnutrition, human rights abuses and ecological degradation (eckersley 2007, p. 675). cosmopolitanism has emerged as an important theoretical approach in the social sciences in recent years (delanty & he 2008, p. 323). originally a development within moral and political philosophy concerning a universalistic orientation towards world principles, it has become increasingly pertinent to social science especially in the context of issues relating to globalisation and transnational movements of all kinds (delanty& he 2008, p. 324). while for early cosmopolitans such as kant cosmopolitanism was primarily a demand for the recognition of universal rights, today it has a considerable impact in the human and social sciences as a way to respond to contemporary globalisation (delanty& he 2008, p. 327). cosmopolitans argue that problems such as poverty and injustice arise from, or are intensified by, the processes of globalisation. according to a cosmopolitan reading the growing range and intensity of cross-border flows of money, people, goods, services, pollution, disease, weapons and communication have undermined the distinctions between ‘internal/external’ and ‘inside/outside’ that have been central to the formation and practice of modern states (eckersley 2007, p. 675). contemporary cosmopolitanism takes the individual to be the ultimate unit of moral worth and to be entitled to equal consideration regardless of his or her culture, nationality or citizenship, besides other morally arbitrary facts about the individual person (tan 2002, p. 461). as nussbaum has put it, the cosmopolitan view holds that, wherever he or she is, “each human being is human and counts as the moral equal of every 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 other” (1996, p. 133). as a thesis about responsibility, cosmopolitanism guides the individual outward from local obligations, and prohibits those obligations from crowding out responsibilities to distant others (brock 2009, p. 3). the borders of states, and other boundaries considered to restrict the scope of justice are considered irrelevant roadblocks in appreciating responsibilities to all in the global community (brock 2009, p. 4). one of the principal expressions of cosmopolitanism as a political condition concerns the search for alternatives to purely instrumental economic and security relations between societies (delanty & he 2008, p. 324). cosmopolitans take seriously their allegiance to the entire community of human beings by seeking global institutional reforms that dilute state sovereignty, weaken national identifications and globalise citizenship (eckersley 2007, p. 675). their inquiry thus focuses on such questions as: do contemporary international economic arrangements promote or harm the life chances of those who are most vulnerable, particularly the poor in developing countries, relative to feasible alternative arrangements? how has the international trade regime influenced global poverty rates and global income distribution? does the global economy and its associated policies help the poor, or does it work against them? how can the international economic structure be reformed to meet the basic needs of the poor and least advantaged? (kaptstein 2004, p. 74). cosmopolitans refuse to grant any privilege to the state and are, in fact, quite sceptical that government policies serve the interests of those who are most vulnerable (kapstein 2004, p. 74). they take seriously, in a way that others do not, the problem of state failure and also unjust states (kapstein 2004, p. 74). while they recognise that states could serve the cosmopolitan end of a social arrangement in which each individual is treated equally or fairly, they also accept that many governments around the world lack the will or capacity to provide for the basic needs of their citizens especially those who, due to income, gender, race, religion or other factors, are most vulnerable (kapstein 2004, p. 74). as a result they argue that efforts to secure justice should focus on the reform of social arrangements beyond the nation state (kapstein 2004, p. 74). they also hold that global economic arrangements should be reformed so that they no longer bring about or permit such significant shortfalls from minimally adequate living conditions for so many people (kapstein 2004, p. 74). one example of the ‘source’ of this economic unfairness that needs addressing is the set of international trade rules that oppress poor nations and individuals. cosmopolitans argue that there is good reason to believe that the current structure of the international trade regime, to provide just one cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 51 prominent example, is tilted in important respects against the interests of the poor (kapstein 2004, p. 74). alexander highlights the link between globalisation and the cosmopolitan tan response in his argument that globalisation has appeared as a response to the trauma of the twentieth century in a moment of hope when it seemed that the possibility for a worldwide civil society was finally at hand (2007, p. 85). cosmopolitanism has also been theorised as a transnational mode of practice whereby actors construct bonds of mutual commitment and reciprocity across borders through public discourse and socio-political struggle (kurasawa 2004). the crux of the matter lies in grasping the work of constructing and performing cosmopolitanism from below via normatively and politically oriented forms of global social action (kurasawa 2004, p. 234). in a similar vein delanty and he argue that to speak of cosmopolitanism is to refer to a transformation in self-understanding as a result of the engagement with others over issues of global significance (2008, p. 324). the ongoing challenge for cosmopolitans is to develop and sustain dialogue across cultural and civilizational worlds (delanty & he 2008, p. 324). held argues that cosmopolitanism today must start by building an ethically sound and politically robust conception of the proper basis of political community and of the relations among communities, which requires recognition of four fundamental principles (2003, p. 470). supporting kapstein (2004), held argues that the first of these is that the ultimate units of moral concern are individual people, not states or other particular forms of human association (held 2003, p. 470). the second principle emphasises that the status of equal worth should be acknowledged by everyone (held 2003, p. 470). in other words, each person has an equal stake in this universal ethical realm and is, accordingly, required to respect all other people’s status as a basic unit of moral interest (held 2003, p. 470). at the centre of the cosmopolitan view is the idea that human well-being is not defined by geographical or cultural locations, that national or ethnic or gendered boundaries should not determine the limits or rights or responsibilities for the satisfaction of basic human needs, and that all human beings require equal moral respect and concern (held 2009, p. 537). the principles of equal respect, equal concern and the priority of the vital needs of all human beings are not principles for some remote utopia but are, rather, at the centre of significant post-second world war legal and political developments including human rights law and the statute of the international criminal court (icc) (held, 2010, p.95). held’s third principle, the principle of 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 consent, recognises that a commitment to equal worth and equal moral value requires a noncoercive political process in and through which people can negotiate and pursue their interconnections, interdependence and differences (held 2003, p. 470). the fourth principle is inclusiveness and subsidiarity, which seeks to clarify the fundamental criterion for drawing proper boundaries around units of collective decision-making, and on what grounds (2003, p. 471). held argues that those significantly affected by public decisions should have an equal opportunity, directly or indirectly to influence and shape them (2003, p. 471). therefore, collective decision-making is best located when it is closest to, and involves, those whose opportunities and life chances are determined by significant social processes and forces (held 2003, p. 471). held highlights the fact that the fourth principle points to the necessity of both the decentralisation and centralisation of political power (2003, p. 471). if decision-making is decentralised as much as possible, it maximises the opportunity of each person to influence the social conditions that shape his or her life (held 2003, p. 471). in sum, therefore, cosmopolitanism can be understood as the moral and political outlook that builds upon the strengths of the post-1945 multilateral order, particularly its commitment to universal standards, human rights and democratic values, and that seeks to specify general principles upon which all could act (held 2004, p. 389). these are principles that can be universally shared and that can form the basis for the protection and nurturing of each person’s equal interest in the determination of the institutions that govern their lives (held 2004, p. 389). the aim of modern cosmopolitanism and the tans that support and promote it, therefore, is the conceptualisation and generation of the necessary background conditions for a ‘common’ or ‘basic’ structure of individual action and social activity (held 2009, p. 539). criticisms of cosmopolitan theory while cosmopolitanism has been used as a new moral and ethnic standpoint suitable for 21st century global life, it has also been criticised as a manifestation of the mentality of the upper and middle classes (featherstone 2002). cosmopolitanism has also been criticised for being an elitist, western concept with little draw in the context of nationalism, ethno-nationalism, and territoriality – all instrumental in shaping identity among many affected by globalisation and other dynamics of change. authors such as de sousa santos and rodriguez-garavito argue that cosmopolitan projects have a long and ambiguous history anchored in western cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 53 modernity (2005, p. 14). some theorists such as calhoun (2002) have criticised cosmopolitanism as a “discourse centred in a western view of the world”. in a similar vein van der veer (2002) has called it the western and profoundly colonial engagement with the “rest of the world”. the mapping of cosmopolitanism has concerned not where in the world you find the cosmopolitans, but where in the social structure you find them (hannerz 2006, p. 16). hannerz suggests that in theoretical statements about cosmopolitanism there is a “rather uncosmopolitan” disregard for other parts of the world (2006, p. 15). an alternative view is set forth even more sharply by ashis who suggests that europe and north america have increasingly lost their cosmopolitanism, paradoxically because of a concept of cosmopolitanism that considers western culture to be definitionally universal and therefore automatically cosmopolitan (1998, p. 146). critics of cosmopolitanism argue that more often than not cosmopolitan projects have been as western or northern-centric and exclusionary as the global designs they oppose (de sousa santos & rodriguez-garavito 2005, p. 14). for example, human rights institutions and doctrines, with their western roots and liberal bent, have often been blind to non-western conceptions of human dignity and collective rights that hold out the prospect for an expanded, cosmopolitan conception of rights (de sousa santos & rodriguez-garavito 2005, p. 14). cosmopolitanism also articulates an impulse to be rootless – to be a cosmopolitan means having no allegiance or loyalty to any particular community, being capable of renouncing identity, being motivated by universal values and the capacity to be mobile. these functions are, according to yegenoglu, those of an elite class (2005, p. 118). furthermore, ong argues that cosmopolitanism “gives the misleading impression that everyone can take equal advantage of mobility and modern communication and that transnationality has been liberatory, in both spatial and political sense, for all peoples” (1999, p. 11). pollock et al. (2000, p. 582) posit that cosmopolitans today are often the victims of modernity, failed by capitalism’s upward mobility, and bereft of those comforts and customs of national belonging. refugees, peoples of the diaspora, and migrants and exiles represent the spirit of the cosmopolitical community (pollock et al. 2000, p. 582). too often in the west these people are grouped together in a vocabulary of ‘victimage’ (pollock et al. 2000, p. 582). such benevolence is well intentioned but it fails to acknowledge the critique of modernity that minoritarian cosmopolitans embody in their historic witness to the twentieth century (pollock et al. 2000, p. 582). ignatieff (1994) further argues that cosmopolitanism fails to appeal to 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 ethno-cultural minorities because the rarefied language of cosmopolitanism is antithetical to the “vernacular” politics of minority struggle. critics of cosmopolitanism have also addressed their criticisms at the civil society actors that espouse the universal values that cosmopolitanism espouses. de sousa santos and rodriguez-garavito, (2005, p. 11) highlight the links between hegemonic and counterhegemonic actors – for instance, between philanthropic foundations in the north and human rights organisations in the south – as well as the contradictions within transnational activist coalitions. from this viewpoint such links and tensions reveal that, far from “happily coexisting in this effort to work together to produce new and emancipator global norms” (dezalay& garth 2002, p. 318) ngos and other actors of counter-hegemonic globalisation are part and parcel of the elites benefiting from neoliberal globalisation and thus contribute to the construction of new global orthodoxies through programs to export western legal institutions and expertise (de sousa santos & rodriguez-garavito 2005, p. 11). thus, access to globality is not an even one: while globalisation enables diasporas in the developed world to fight with the weapons provided by the discourse of democratic rights and equality, access to such claims are severely curtailed for the underclass in the third world mainly because the nation-state in the third world is in the business of adjusting itself to the injunctions of global capital (yegenoglu 2005, p. 105). welfare structures in the south cannot emerge due to the priorities of transnational agencies as civil society shifts its understandings from service to citizen to capital maximisation (spivak 1997, p. 90). according to the critics of cosmopolitanism, transnationalism in fact diminishes the possibility of a functioning civil society in developing nations (spivak 1997, pp. 90 – 91). defence of cosmopolitan theory the assertion that cosmopolitanism is an elite project overlooks the potential of world society, of trans-cultural sympathisers and the growing densification of contacts and support for tans that work on behalf of such world-order values as humane governance, economic sustainability, non-violence, human rights and environmental protection, essentially for those who live underprivileged lives (carey 2003, p. 4). moreover, as argued by hannerz, significant changes in the world including new patterns of global migration and activism demonstrate there has not for a long time, or perhaps ever, really been a world divided cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 55 between “haves” who move and “have nots” who stay put (2006, p. 17). cosmopolitanism is no longer only an elite phenomenon (hannerz 2006, p. 17). as argued by skrbis et al. (2004) what matters most is not whether cosmopolitanism is a western invention but, rather, whether it can serve as a shared universal value, applicable across different cultural and social contexts. in a similar vein, hannerz asserts that looking for the points and areas in the social structure where some kind of cosmopolitanism may grow should not be a matter only of looking up or down in the social strata as conventionally understood – we should, rather, seek out, along more varied dimensions, the loci where experiences and interests may come together, in individuals and groups, to expand horizons and shape wider sets of relationships (2006, p. 19). in questions of socio-economic justice there are significant parallels between domestic and global spheres which do allow us to identify similarities between theories of domestic and global justice (walker 2011, p. 83). we see that, on a global level, the defining principles of liberal democracy are embodied in the cosmopolitan position that all human beings are of equal moral worth, entitled to liberty and equality of rights and resources (walker 2011, p. 83). this research supports the theories put forward by supporters of cosmopolitanism such as held (2002) who argues that cosmopolitanism entails a distinct ethical orientation towards selflessness, worldliness and communitarianism. the close connection between ethical commitment and cosmopolitan disposition has been one of the key characteristics of cosmopolitanism since the stoics, but it became distinctly pronounced in the modern era, characterised by the seemingly unstoppable thrust of time-space compression fuelled by information technologies and the media (skrbis et al. 2002). it is cosmopolitanism’s distinctly ethical commitments that drive much of the contemporary environmental, anti-war, antiglobalisation and other social movements (skrbis et al. 2002, p. 128). since 1945 there has been a significant entrenchment of cosmopolitan values concerning the equal dignity and worth of all human beings in international rules and regulations; the reconnection of international law and morality; the establishment of complex governance systems, regional and global; and the growing recognition that the public good requires coordinated multilateral action if it is to be achieved in the long term (held 2002, p. 135). the principal political question of our times is how the issues of inequality and unevenness in the global economy can best be addressed and governed (held 2002, p. 134). cosmopolitan theory provides a 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 useful framework for further thought and action on this question, in a domain of overlapping ideas that unites a significant body of progressive opinion. cosmopolitan theory is useful as it explains the motivations and activities of tans. it demonstrates that there is an alternative to hegemonic, neoliberal, top-down globalisation, and that is counter-hegemonic solidarity or “bottom-up globalisation” (de sousa santos 2006, p. 398). falk (1999) has devoted almost as much work to delineating the problems of an eliteimposed “globalisation from above” as he has to defending what he persuasively argues is a more liberating ideal of “globalisation from below” (furia 2005, p. 336). in claiming that cosmopolitanism is not inevitably elitist, falk echoes many previous scholars who have invoked transnational social movements as evidence of a ‘bottom up’ response to certain really existing exercises of global citizenship (furia 2005, p. 336). as argued by held, only a cosmopolitan outlook can ultimately accommodate itself to the political challenges of a more global era, marked by overlapping communities of fate and multilevel/multilayered politics (2003, p. 469). findings responding to global social injustice: transnational advocacy networks against child sex trafficking in the mekong subregion in southeast asia, especially since the 1997 financial crisis, there has been a growing tendency for ngos, social movements and activist networks to organise and work transnationally (caouette 2007). in the fight against child trafficking in the gms and internationally there are three major categories of contributors: national governments, the un (and its various agencies) and ngos from both the ‘north’ and the ‘south’. many network partners, particularly ngos, are on the ground, carrying out day-to-day operations such as protecting victims, performing ‘rescues’ and repatriating victims to their home countries. the un serves as the important forum where international consensus on human trafficking is built and where the bulk of coordination takes place. national governments, of course, remain important contributors because they have the power to legislate and have access to enforcement mechanisms, intelligence and resources to fight trafficking (dyrud et al. 2007, p. 22). historically these organisations – ngos, government and un agencies – have had little experience of coordination, largely due to financial constraints and economic, labour, and political concerns and differences. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 57 while international and grassroots ngos had been campaigning against trafficking for a number of decades, funding from the united states and other governments pushed the trafficking issue onto the global agenda. the demands of donors and the history of antitrafficking funding from the united states were key reasons for the development of, initially, anti-trafficking organisations in the gms and, subsequently, anti-trafficking networks. the creation of uniap – a key inter-agency anti-trafficking network in the gms and that of a handful of other anti-trafficking organisations was largely the result of a significant (1 billion us dollar) donation from the turner foundation, a private american trust. the substantial turner foundation grant, as a research participant explained, aimed to “get the various un agencies to work together on human trafficking issues and for the un to work with ngos and the private sector where possible and appropriate”. subsequently uniap was established in the early 2000s and mandated to consist of and coordinate un agencies, ngos, and southeast asian governments. the donor funding provided for trafficking could be seen by some critics as antithetical to tans’ goal of creating a form of ‘globalisation from below’ but in the case of tans against cst this was not the case. anti-trafficking organisations had already been forming partnerships prior to this funding and the will to form partnerships and a united front against the cst issue was already present – the donor funding merely provided the anti-trafficking organisations with the much needed resources to formalise and expand their already existing relationships. human trafficking also received attention in the 1990s and 2000s because of the hiv/aids pandemic. health experts during this time visited brothels and talked to sex workers about public health and how and why sex workers started working in the brothels and, as a research participant explained, “realised that many of the prostitutes had not consented to their employment”. anti-trafficking and anti-forced labour campaigns in the region were subsequently launched to combat forced prostitution and more organisations became interested in issues to do with hiv/aids and human trafficking. from there, with the ted turner funding, campaigning against human trafficking simply snowballed. in the 1990s, at the same time as the ted turner foundation was providing large amounts of funding for anti-trafficking activities, the united states government was creating new legislation on human trafficking. the us passed its first human trafficking bill in 2000, which led to the us trafficking in persons law and the us trafficking in persons report 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 card (us tip) for countries all over the world except itself. the us government was also actively encouraging the development of anti-trafficking legislation in all countries and provided funds for the development of this legislation. it also actively encouraged antitrafficking advocacy, particularly the development of awareness programs to prevent trafficking from occurring. however, an early problem in anti-human trafficking advocacy was that us money for anti-trafficking campaigning was conditional. in the early years of this funding under the bush administration the majority of funding from the us government was reserved for ngos that specifically did not support women working as prostitutes. therefore the bulk of us anti-trafficking funds in these early years were given to non-secular ngos and faith-based advocacy networks. tans against child trafficking also formed in the gms as a result of shared values and social justice concerns. katcher (2010) argues that what ultimately holds advocacy networks together is the common values shared by network members and the collective interest in stopping human trafficking, helping victims and punishing the perpetrators of this exploitative practice. research participants expressed a desire to eradicate child trafficking and all participants also mentioned the importance of having ‘mutual interests’, ‘commitment’ and ‘common values’. staff of ngos and un agencies discussed their desire to create a more ‘just world’, secure ‘justice for all’, ‘alleviate poverty and inequality’, and ‘protect children’. research participants also discussed their desire to transform systems for children, develop new legislation on child trafficking and associated problems, work with other sectors such as government for improved inter-agency collaboration and capacity building, and streamline victim services. a key theme derived from interview data was that the representatives of ngos and un agencies were initially drawn to their organisations because they strongly adhered to the organisation’s mandate. another important theme was that the staff of these organisations sought networking opportunities in order to create a coherent and consistent message with governments and gms communities regarding child trafficking. research participants explained that what motivated tan partners and the staff that worked within them was the collective desire to build systems to protect children as well as create new legislation and policy to protect children and punish traffickers. through the process of working collaboratively and pooling knowledge and resources, tans were much more successful at achieving these goals than in previous decades when anti-trafficking organisations worked independently of each other. tans were also motivated by the desire to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 59 create behavioural norms regarding the protection and treatment of children. they worked collaboratively to keep the cst issue on the global agenda. research participants acknowledged the enormity of the cst issue and suggested that tans’ political activism and globalisation from below was important because, as one interview participant stated, “it ultimately takes a network to combat a network”. as another interview participant stated: we’re working against the entrenched idea that inequality is ok. what we’re trying to do is huge, it’s much bigger than any individual organisation, it’s much bigger than the networks, but what motivates us is the desire to eradicate poverty and promote equality. it’s what started us working together in the first place and it’s what sustains us and continues to motivate us. tans against cst have achieved a number of important successes. in the gms transnational advocacy networking against child trafficking has enabled organisations with different mandates and expertise to share skills and capacity for a broader and improved response to child trafficking including prevention, protection, and prosecution activities and rehabilitation of victims. the network uniap has been extremely successful in encouraging gms states to collaborate on the cst problem and worked closely with states to improve trafficking legislation and policy, and the development of extraterritorial legislation (whereby traffickers and sex tourists can be arrested and prosecuted in their home countries after they have fled the gms). while child trafficking continues unabated, networks such as uniap have succeeded in increasing trafficker prosecutions, a fact that will hopefully deter would-be traffickers and paedophiles in future. in addition, by networking against this problem, tans have been able to have a stronger voice in lobbying for new child trafficking policy and legislation, and improved opportunities for working collaboratively on improving child protection systems in the gms. most importantly, transnational advocacy networking has contributed to a redistribution of knowledge, power, influence and material resources from the rich north to the core southern actors working on the ground in local ngos in the gms. advocacy networking against child trafficking in the gms has helped to ensure a number of important benefits for victims. foremost amongst these has been the benefit that victims are able to access a wide range of services. tans have facilitated the streamlining of victim services and once victims are identified, networks have been effective in referring victims to partner agencies for a range of protection and rehabilitation services. in addition, advocacy networks are helping vulnerable children acquire knowledge and tool sets to mitigate their risks of exploitation. networks such as chab dai have successfully turned their attention to 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 the ‘demand’ side of trafficking and have been working in sex tourism hot spots to educate travellers about the cst issue and provide them with information regarding the identification of victims and traffickers, the existence of extraterritorial legislation, and the ramifications for paying for sex with local children. tans in the gms are facilitating effective collaboration among law enforcement agencies across jurisdictions so that bureaucratic obstacles are minimised and perpetrators of child trafficking do not escape justice. improved prevention-oriented coordination has facilitated the involvement of all sectors of society so that anti-trafficking networks can move toward the ultimate goal of preventing the exploitation of children. in providing such victim services, and through the direct sharing of global political economy knowledge, networks are bringing an equal level of counter-activity to a social problem that is clearly enhanced, even promoted, by the economic connectedness of the globalisation of criminal networks that sell children’s sexual labour as a commodity. a further major benefit of collaboration through tans is that anti-trafficking campaigns can reach all corners of the globe rather than just a small geographic corner. campaigns have been adapted and developed to target citizens not just in the gms but also in a large number of developed countries to teach such developed nation citizens about slavery, trafficking and ethical consumerism and make the west aware of the strict penalties imposed on those who travel to poorer countries to sexually abuse children. this expansive outreach, beyond the borders of the gms, and the incorporation of cultural difference and engagement, reflects the essentially cosmopolitan nature of advocacy networks and provides an important model for addressing global social problems. through performing anti-trafficking advocacy through tans and promoting collective action, organisations were promoting cosmopolitan values in the region and creating a social movement against cst that embraced ngos, un agencies, governments, academics, churches, and civil society. with a united voice advocacy network members have provided an effective buffer against child trafficking. as one research participant commented, “there is real value in coming together, the voices together are a lot more difficult to quiet than on their own”. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 61 centrality of transnational advocacy networks in creating a form of ‘globalisation from below’ since keck and sikkink’s (1999) seminal work on tans as structures with the potential to transform the “terms and nature of the debate”, a wave of scholarship has followed that has attempted to identify the relevance of such groups, focusing in particular on themes of globalisation and legitimacy (gilson 2011). recent studies on the benefits of collaboration among advocacy organisations conclude that tans can have significant influence in key debates and discussion, increase their political standing, and improve access and leverage as well as political influence (dutting & sogge 2010, p. 351). research participants highlighted the fact that the modern aid industry has changed in recent decades and now “encourages collaboration” and co-production and has created a range of relationships, not just between states, the un and ngos, and ngos and civil society, but also amongst ngos themselves, including alliances, coalitions and network. international ngos and un agencies seeking social transformation collaborate on a number of levels to influence global governance. they create and activate global networks, participate in multilateral arenas, facilitate inter-state cooperation, and act within states to influence policy and enhance public participation (alger 1997). even in areas often considered to be the sole domain of states such as international security, advocacy networks can play a role in shaping the agenda and contributing to policy change (price 1998). through transnational advocacy networking against cst, tans are conducting a form of “globalisation from below” in the gms. tans have demonstrated that there is an alternative to “globalisation from above” (falk, 1999) and this is what evans (2000) has labelled “globalisation from below”. the idea of “globalisation from below” is to challenge and transform the negative features of globalisation from above, both by providing alternative ideological and political space to that currently occupied by market-oriented and statist outlooks and by offering resistance to the excesses and distortions that can be attributed to globalisation(falk 1999, p. 139). globalisation from below is currently occurring as organisations use global networks and ideologies to shift the balance of power in favour of the dispossessed (evans 2000). tans in the gms have pushed cst onto the global social policy agenda, built global networks, and transformed opinion on child protection and child rights in order to shift the balance of power in favour of the vulnerable. as argued by evans (2000), cosmopolitan activists are turning the old aphorism “think globally and act locally” around. they are “thinking locally” in discovering how to solve problems that manifest 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 themselves at the local level, but “acting globally” in building transnational networks and campaigns that use extra-political leverage to make local improvements possible (evans 2000). tans are promoting cosmopolitan values and the building of cosmopolitan systems in order to create and sustain an anti-trafficking movement. networks are key cosmopolitan players for a number of reasons – they create norms, promote cosmopolitan values, protect the vulnerable, encourage inter-agency collaboration, build human rights institutions and child protection systems, and act as buffers against contemporary globalisation and transnational crime. tans against cst in the gms, as key cosmopolitan players, are successfully rejecting the notion that the bad luck of certain persons to find themselves locked up in states that deny or fail to provide basic human rights is reason enough for those of us who are more fortunate to turn our backs on their plight. in a similar vein to the women’s rights and other social justice movements, tans in the gms are promoting the cosmopolitan notion of global justice and supporting the creation of global forums to fight child trafficking. examples include the global forum on human trafficking, the asian taskforce, uniap, and also international legislation such as that provided by the crc and the palermo protocol, and extraterritorial legislation to intercept and punish perpetrators. another important recent example is un. gift, which was launched in march 2007 by the united nations office on drugs and crime, in cooperation with the ilo, the iom, unicef, ohchr, and the organisation for security and cooperation in europe (osce) with the aim of eradicating human trafficking “by reducing both the vulnerability of potential victims and the demand for exploitation in all its forms; ensuring adequate protection and support to those who do fall victim; and supporting the efficient prosecution of the criminals involved, while respecting the fundamental human rights of all persons” (un. gift 2012). through conventional and unconventional advocacy activities such as rock concerts and social media campaigns, antitrafficking networks have been successful in broadening their appeal by reaching out to members of the public who may not be able to join protest marches but are willing to engage in and support “innovative activities with a critical edge” (kurasawa 2004, p. 251). further, anti-trafficking networks’ development of forums and involvement in creating new legislation have pushed the child trafficking issue onto the global social policy agenda and promoted the goal of universal child rights. they have also provided participants with opportunities to exchange and acquire first-hand information about the difficult political, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 63 cultural and socio-economic circumstances faced by ordinary citizens on all continents, in order to gain more global perspective (kurasawa 2004, p. 242). conclusion this article has discussed the cosmopolitan motivations of tans and posited that cosmopolitan theory is a useful framework for examining the collective motivations, values and activities of tans advocating against cst in the gms. this article has discussed how tans are key cosmopolitan players for a number of reasons – tans create norms, promote cosmopolitan values, protect the vulnerable, encourage inter-agency collaboration, build human rights institutions and child protection systems, and act as effective buffers against contemporary globalisation and transnational crime. supporting cosmopolitan theory as put forward by kapstein (2004), this research has demonstrated that tans against cst, as key cosmopolitan players, have successfully rejected the notion that the bad luck of certain persons to find themselves locked up in states that deny or fail to provide basic human rights is reason enough for those of us who are more fortunate to turn our backs on their plight. the tans observed for this research have supported the notion that efforts to secure social justice should focus on the reform of social arrangements beyond the nation state. they have also held that global economic arrangements should be reformed so that they no longer bring about or permit such significant shortfalls from minimally adequate living conditions for so many people. this article has addressed the difficult question of tan values and motivations. recent scholarship on tans has tended to focus on their campaign tactics and outcomes which, though worthwhile for expanding our understanding of tans, does little to explain what motivates organisations to form tans in the first place. such theories also provide little explanation for what sustains tans over time and what they endeavour to achieve. such theories also fail to explain the effectiveness and achievements of tans, and there are indeed many examples of recent successes against cst. this article has demonstrated that cosmopolitan globalisation theory is a compelling theoretical framework for examining anticst advocacy networks in the gms. cosmopolitan globalisation theory helps to explain the common values and goals of tans that focus their efforts on securing justice for all. what these groups are achieving through their inter-agency collaboration is a new form of ‘globalisation from below’. tans in the gms are successfully promoting cosmopolitan 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 values, improving partnerships between agencies and sectors, developing new legislation to protect children and punish traffickers, and establishing new instruments and systems to secure justice for all gms citizens. this article has demonstrated that it is the shared cosmopolitan values and goals of tan members that continue to sustain their partnerships over time. without these collective values, tans will, as one research participant stated, “simply wither and die”. the arguments presented in this article do not begin from visionary aspirations of what might be, but from the concrete accomplishments of activists who have chosen to act globally through tans. new child rights mechanisms and measures such as the convention on the rights of the child and the palermo protocol, as well as the successes of tans such as uniap in increasing trafficker prosecutions and increasing states’ commitment to the cst issue, attest to the success of tans and the potential for nongovernmental actors to play a significant role in shaping international norms, and international law and policy. references alexander, c. 2007, ‘globalization" as collective representation: the new dream of a cosmopolitan civil sphere’, international journal of politics, culture and society, vol.19, pp. 81-90. alger, c. 1997, 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madrid. yegenoglu, m. 2005, ‘cosmopolitanism and nationalism in a globalised world’, ethnic and racial studies, vol. 28, no.1, pp. 103-131. zheng, e. 2008, human trafficking on the rise in mekong countries. retrieved 11 october, 2009, from http://news. xinhuanet. com/english/2008-11/06/content_10317352. htm http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-11/06/content_10317352.htm understanding the motivations and activities of transnational advocacy networks against child sex trafficking in the greater mekong subregion: the value of cosmopolitan globalisation theory abstract introduction methods definitions, estimates and child trafficking dynamics defining child trafficking child trafficking dynamics child trafficking push and pull factors: globalisation and poverty understanding tans: the value of cosmopolitan globalisation theory criticisms of cosmopolitan theory defence of cosmopolitan theory findings responding to global social injustice: transnational advocacy networks against child sex trafficking in the mekong subregion centrality of transnational advocacy networks in creating a form of ‘globalisation from below’ conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 75 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia the value and challenges of public sector information maureen henninger university of technology, sydney abstract the aim of this paper is to explore the concept of public sector information (psi), what it is, its history and evolution, what constitutes its corpus of documents and the issues and challenges it presents to society, its institutions and to those who use and manage it. the paper, by examining the literatures of the law, political science, civil society, economics and information and library science explores the inherent tensions of access to and use of psi—pragmatism vs. idealism; openness vs. secrecy; commerce vs. altruism; property vs. commons; public good vs. private good. it focusses on open government data (ogd)—a subset of what is popularly referred to as ‘big data’—its background and development since much of the current debate of its use concerns its commercial value for both the private sector and the public sector itself. in particular it looks at the information itself which, driven by technologies of networks, data mining and visualisation gives value in industrial and economic terms, and in its ability to enable new ideas and knowledge. introduction public information in all its forms pervades modern civil societies. within liberal democracies there is the expectation that public information should be publicly available. what constitutes the corpus of public sector information (psi); under what circumstances that corpus may or may not be made public and re-used; and the ramifications of these decisions are the focus of this paper. public sector information in practical terms is fuzzy and often contested. it is this lack of clarity that gives rise to conflicts about access to psi and its reuse among those generating it and other parties who wish to use it. answers to questions concerning the ownership of public information, its economic and social values, and the kinds of rights, entitlements and privileges of individuals and particular sectors are complex, some might even say byzantine. the answers are constantly shifting, evolving and dependent on citizens’ attitudes toward governmental and democratic principles. the state, embodied in governmental institutions, is central to public information; it creates the information, often by collecting the raw data from its citizens and institutions. the state also makes use of psi for its own decision-making and for informing the governed of those decisions. it may provide access to this information to enable its citizens’ examination of government policy decisions and assessment of its governance, and to facilitate its use and 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 reuse by all sectors for social and economic purposes. there is a notion that all government information belongs to its citizens because it is derived through governmental processes and therefore should be freely accessible and re-useable by them. that notion has, in part, been transformed by concepts of neo-liberalism and the commodification of information within an information society. this transformation is manifested, for example, in public-private partnerships (ppps) where generated information may be subject to intellectual property rights, or in the private sector which frequently uses psi for economic gain or to provide forprofit public services. there is little dispute that public information is integral to economic development resulting in the ability to raise revenue for the delivery of social benefits which include the creation of new knowledge. nor is it contentious in liberal democracies that public sector information is essential for the advancement of an informed citizenry which subsequently can contribute to a civil society. it is therefore, important to examine the current debates on the questions of the roles and functions of public sector information and its accessibility, and particularly on the dichotomies between self-interest and public interest, commercial value and the public good. within the framework of these debates the paper defines public sector information and its relationship to the concept of the public domain. it then examines the role of psi in democratic societies and the subsequent development of the open government movement and its consequences. finally the paper explores the issues and implications of the economic and social values of public sector information, since these are ultimately the drivers of these debates. what is public sector information all national governments and international institutions produce information that is variously referred to as government information, government-held information and public sector information. but what it is exactly is contested (blakemore & craglia 2006; uhlir 2004). in his report for unesco uhlir notes that there is ‘little in official public documents or even in the scholarly literature that deals definitively with this subject’ (uhlir 2004, p. 2). nevertheless, at least in the context of this paper, there needs to be a comprehensive understanding of what is public sector information. this section examines the concept of psi from the definitive perspectives of the united states, the oecd (the one accepted by australia), and unesco; by discussing the issues and difficulties of each of these cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 77 viewpoints, a working definition will be developed within which the landscape of public sector information can be explored. in the united states the term public sector information is not widely used; rather the concept at least at the federal level is deemed to be government information that is ‘information created, collected, processed, disseminated, or disposed of by or for the federal government’ (office of management and budget (omb) 2000). it may be argued that while this definition implies government and government-held information, such a demarcation is too narrow since it does not include all branches at all levels of government, nor does it include information created by non-government public institutions. the oecd (organisation for economic cooperation development) definition is broader in its understanding of public sector information, however, as will be shown, it does not include some important nuances of access and use that should define public sector information. the oecd considers psi to be ‘information, including information products and services, generated, created, collected, processed, preserved, maintained, disseminated, or funded by or for the government or public institution’ (oecd 2008, p. 4). this definition introduces two further notions that need to be considered. the first recognises a broader remit than government; that there are non-government institutions that carry out public functions, the public interest institutions – bodies governed by public law which are ‘established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character’ (european commission 2003, p. 93). the second embedded notion deals with the difficulties of information produced for governments by third parties as in public-private partnerships (ppps) and other co-operative ventures. the public sector in liberal or capitalist democracies is commonly understood to be government or political institutions whereas market institutions are within the private sector (lane 2000, p. 1). however the boundary between the public and private sectors is neither clear nor permanent because of government privatisation, outsourcing or subsidisation of assets (services) such as prisons, hospitals and transportation (flynn 2007). the oecd definition considers information produced in this manner to belong in the public sector. finally in his 2004 report for unesco, paul uhlir offers this definition of public sector information: 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 information produced by public entities in all branches and at all levels be presumed to be in the public domain, unless another policy option (e.g. a legal right such as an ip right or personal privacy) is adopted and clearly documented, preventing it from being freely accessible to all (uhlir 2004, p. 6). if one accepts the concept that an entity is a legal fiction or institution which has legally binding rights and obligations, this definition acknowledges that psi includes all levels and branches of government-created information. it overtly includes information produced by public institutions and recognises that there are constraints on the usage of such information, but it does not explicitly include information that is the product of public-private collaborations or contractual agreements as does that of the oecd. on the other hand uhlir introduces a very important concept, the public domain, which must be included in any definition of public sector information, since it has extensive legal, economic and social implications, as discussed below, for the information produced and held by governments and public institutions. therefore for the purposes of this paper public sector information will be considered to be: information, including all information products in any format, and services, generated, created, collected, processed, preserved, maintained, disseminated, or funded by or for public entities (governments or public institutions) in all branches and at all levels be presumed to be in the public domain, unless another policy option (e.g. a legal right such as an ip right or personal privacy) is adopted and clearly documented, preventing it from being freely accessible to all. the public domain the idea of the public domain is deeply entrenched in western culture and the language that surrounds it connotes the notion of freedom, ipso facto, any property in the public domain is freely accessible and usable, a connotation which in the context of public sector information needs to be examined. the term arises out of an historical background of english law and the commons enclosure movements of 18th century england where the public domain was a matter of land rights. this concept has evolved into the contemporary notion of any property rights, including those of intellectual property being attached to creative property such as tangible information documents (boyle 2003b). one consequence of this evolution is the present analogy of an information commons and it is argued, as we shall see, there are circumstances in which there should be access to information unfettered by property rights. while it is universally recognised that the public domain exists equally in the digital cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 79 environment, some have argued that in the context of the internet the domain is a virtual space, a public space or land, just like a commons (benkler 1999; lessig 2001). there is an enormous amount of legislation and literature from a wide range of disciplines related to public sector information within a framework of the public domain or an information commons, much of which stems from the development of neo-liberalism and the commodification of information. in the emergent informational society and informational cities where information is a property, information generation, processing and transmission have become the fundamental sources of productivity and power (castells 2010, p. 21, n.31) and intellectual property rights (ipr) are central to this, and indeed are the focus of much of this literature. the legal literature examines the public domain in its historical basis and defines the modern informational public domain and commons (e.g. boyle 2003b; lange 1981); most agree that the ‘public domain’ implies material that is openly and freely accessible but with individual ownership rights (e.g. birnhack 2006; samuelson 2006). an interesting perspective leading to the creative commons licensing system and its application to the use of government datasets, is that ‘the commons’ implies material that is subject not to individual control but control by a larger group, which may impose some limits (boyle 2003a; rose 2003). others (such as boyle 2008; samuelson 2003) contend that attaching property rights to information is comparable to an intellectual enclosure movement, a perspective that is prevalent in the informational professional literature. information professional scholars have been quick to apply the analogy of the commons to information (bollier 2007; kranich & schement 2008) where intellectual property rights, including copyright restrictions and extensions may prevent access to information and knowledge (lessig 2001; reichman & uhlir 2003). for example much of the opposition to new legislation (e.g. the trips (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights) agreement of 1994, the wipo copyright act of 1996, and the united states digital millennium copyright act of 1998) has come from the information profession, as well as from legal and economic scholars, who are concerned that public sector information will become less accessible (benkler 1999; perritt jr 1997). indeed drahos and braithwaite warned that trips was ‘the first stage in the global recognition of an investment morality that sees knowledge as a private, rather than public, good’ (2003, p. 10). 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 economists have quite naturally written a great deal about the economics of information and some have examined the value of the public domain pointing out that in a knowledge economy there is both economic and social value in ‘open’ information (pollock 2010; weiss 2003). while kirsti nilsen (2010) in her review of economic theory and public sector information noted there had been very little specific literature on the economics of public sector information, this is changing rapidly as governments recognise that the reuse of psi, particularly of datasets, can and does generate enormous revenues for both the public sector itself and for the private sector (dekkers et al. 2006; vickery 2011; weiss 2010). the role of public sector information a popular government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. knowledge will forever govern ignorance: a people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives (james madison) genuinely public policy cannot be generated unless it be informed by knowledge, and this knowledge does not exist except when there is systematic, thorough, and well-equipped search and record (john dewey) the role of public sector information is mutable and multi-layered from the self-serving to the altruistic; to inform government policy decisions, to raise revenue and support economic development, to provide trust in government, to prevent government corruption, to encourage citizen participation in government, and to make knowledge available for the public good. these roles expanded and changed rapidly in the second half of the 20th century with the development of digital technologies and electronic technologies for creating, finding, disseminating and using information. throughout history governments have recorded and codified information for practical, legal and administrative purposes to inform those being ruled. by example, early legal codifications such as the publically proclaimed laws of justice known as the hammurabi code and solon’s statutes in archaic greece, and administrative types of information from disparate societies, for instance those from the neo-assyrian empire or the pylos archives of mycenean greece. such government information generally was not for any notion of democratic processes, rather it was to serve the purposes of those in power (tauberer 2009). even the genesis of the united states government printing services promulgated by the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 81 printing act of 1819 was set up essentially to support legislative (congressional) activities (stathis 1980). however with the rise of liberal democracies in 18th century europe there developed two converging ideas. the first is that democratic states have a responsibility to inform citizens of the law and therefore it follows that such information needs to be freely available; as jeremy bentham in his petition for codification stated ‘we hear of tyrants, and those cruel ones: but, whatever we may have felt, we have never heard of any tyrant in such sort cruel, as to punish men for disobedience to laws or orders which he had kept them from the knowledge of’ (bentham 1838-1843). secondly was the idea that governments should be held accountable to their citizens; the implication of which gave rise to the earliest freedom of information act— the swedish freedom of the press act of 1766 which ‘offers greater opportunities to each of our loyal subjects to gain improved knowledge and appreciation of a wisely ordered system of government’ (mustonen 2006). one of the most important roles of public sector information is to serve the public interest, a fuzzy concept often used synonymously with ‘public good’, the meaning of which has changed across time, political regimes and democratic contexts (box 2007; dahl 1989; douglass 1980; mitnick 1976). this paper assumes the public interest is a process that balances self-interestedness particularly that of the private sector, with what can be deemed to be good for the whole of society as declared by all the people. there is an assumed understanding that, in walter lippmann’s words ‘the public interest may be presumed to be what men would choose if they saw clearly, thought rationally, acted disinterestedly and benevolently’ (lippmann 1955, p. 42). public interest information informs government policy decision-making to deliver benefits to society and the building of social capital; placing this information in the public domain aims to enable government accountability and transparency (lathrop & ruma 2010; longo 2011). finally in the era of egovernment, edemocracy and government 2.0 it is apparent that governments are encouraging more citizen engagement in the democratic processes. some scholars suggest there may be an emerging shift in these processes from a representative government to participative or direct government because of new and powerful information and communication technologies (castells 2009; fung & wright 2001). others, however, consider this is overly optimistic and unrealistic since it may lead regulators to spend far 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 more time satisfying citizen’s requests to the detriment of delivering the optimal policy, under current legislation (freedom of information act, see next section) that fulfils the statutory mandate or public interest (burkert 2007). what is certain is advanced industrialised democracies governments are embracing web 2.0 technologies to solicit citizens’ opinions and input into policy decision making (mergel 2012) and to engage citizens in collaborative democracy (noveck 2009). access to public sector information for both citizens and decision makers – cary coglianese (2007) advises an expansion of the available information base – is an important factor for informing discussion and deliberation. as dalton et al. note, ‘citizens must have equal and effective opportunities to learn about relevant policy alternatives and their likely consequences’ (2004, p. 130). the premise on which the opportunities are based is that public sector information should be open to all members of a democratic, civil society. the open government movement the open government movement and its implications for public sector information is a recent phenomenon representing a paradigm shift in politics and administration away from arcana imperii (literally ‘secrets of empire’, the term used by tacitus to describe the secret powers and knowledge upon which autocracy rests) towards a public, new, political and administrative openness, rising from a confluence of developments in information and communication technologies, the debate over economic efficiencies of state-provided services, and public scrutiny of government secrecy (burkert 2004; geiger & von lucke 2011). one of the first formal government proclamations of this openness was that of president obama in which he stated ‘openness will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in government’ (obama 2009). however the open government movement evolved from earlier right to information movements and their assumptions that citizens and civil societies have a right to government-held information. it is arguable as to what kind of right this might be. james madison and john dewey suggested the right to read such information was implicitly essential for democracy and modern scholars generally agree (mason 2000; mendel 2003; stiglitz 2003); others consider there is a legal basis to this right, including a constitutional right (peled & rabin 2011; prins 2004). it appears that the united nations in its 1946 resolution 59(1), considers it is a human right to ‘to gather, transmit, and publish news anywhere and everywhere without fetters’ and in recent years scholars are exploring the basis of access to information as an emergent human right (e.g. birkinshaw 2006; mendel 2003). whatever the degree of right to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 83 information, the basic premise can be found in mid-20th century legislation such as legal deposit and freedom of information acts, mechanisms to make some government documents and records public. legal deposit is regarded as having its genesis in a royal charter issued by king françois i of france in 1537, the ordonnance de montpellier, which forbad the sale of any book until a copy was placed in the king’s library. most western countries now have some kind of legal deposit legislation (jaeger, bertot & shuler 2010; larivière 2000) and most of these schemes include government and official publications such as government reports, legislative (e.g. hansards, congressional records) and judicial (court and law) reports. as already noted freedom of information (foi) began with sweden’s 1766 freedom of press act but the phrase and the conditions shaping it can be traced to the second half of the 20th century (burkert 2007; relyea 1980). currently over eighty countries now have some kind of foi legislation and there is a range of treaties and international agreements enshrining the rights of citizens’ access to government public records (vleugels 2012). however these legislative instruments are not concerned with non-government public sector information; they enable only the reading of some but not all government-held information and certainly not the right to the reuse of its underlying data. open government data ‘people aren’t satisfied with seeing the final product; they want the right to see how, and with what, it was made’ david eaves (2010, p. 145) so far this paper has assumed that public sector information is made up of tangible documents, i.e. products, which are the stuff of legal deposit and freedom of information legislation. however if these documents are the products of analytical processes and deliberations, it can be argued that the raw data which is created, collected and processed by governments and public institutions are also public sector information. public access to these datasets (‘big data’), driven by the open government movement and participative egovernment and government 2.0 initiatives that assume the data are licensed for unfettered reuse with creative commons type licenses, emerged as the open government data movement (ogd) in the early 2000s (davies 2010). by 2012 davies and bawa (2012) suggested there were at least 100 ogd initiatives worldwide. that governments, the information industry and civil society agents recognised the potential of accurate data for the development of community services, economic growth, greater government efficiency and 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 transparency and education is represented in the calls for ‘raw data now’ (berners-lee 2009; davies 2010; european commission 2003). the first formal initiatives and the major driver of this movement were implemented in the united states in may 2009 (obama 2009) with its data portal project data.gov; this was followed in september 2009 by the australian equivalent data.gov.au, by data.gov.uk (uk) in january 2010, and the eu’s opendata.europa.eu in 2012. non-government, international public sector institutions such as the world bank, the oecd and the united nations followed suit. the fast-moving environment of ogd means there is little explicit reference to or indeed description of electronic datasets in formal national and international definitions of public sector information; however they are included explicitly in various directives and legislation concerning psi reuse either within the remit of foi or direct access portals in the us, uk, the european union and australia (see e.g. fischer 2013; gruen 2009). the uk protection of freedoms bill [bill 146, 2011] notes a dataset ‘is not the product of interpretation or analysis other than calculation (in other words that it is the ‘raw’ or ‘source’ data)’. in public sector information they are described as either ‘data sets released by government in the public interest, in which all data are anonymous’ (leadbetter 2011, p. 14), or by advocates of the information commons who regard them as ‘all stored data which could be made accessible in the public interest without any restrictions on usage and distribution . . . [and] combines not only stored data from the public sector, but also includes data from businesses, broadcasting stations, universities and non-profit organisations’ (geiger & von lucke 2011, p. 184). most governments specifically exclude from reuse the datasets in the form of metadata (not the digitised objects themselves which have third-part intellectual property rights) of broadcasting stations and cultural institutions, since the metadata is costly to produce and may be a source of revenue and if freely available could pose a serious financial disadvantage (davies et al. 2009; quiggin 2009). however with the enormous success of the europeana cultural heritage metadata portal (http://www.europeana.eu/portal/), the european commission in 2011 proposed amending their open data directive to include cultural institutions (dietrich & pekel 2012). as well there is the issue of research data which, created through the support of government and sometimes non-government research grants, may be considered to be in the public sector. therefore such datasets may be mandated to be made publicly available, for example the national research council (us), the proposed us federal http://www.data.gov/ http://www.data.gov.au/ http://www.data.gov.uk/ http://www.open-data.europa.eu/ http://www.open-data.europa.eu/ http://www.europeana.eu/portal/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 85 research public access act, the australian research council, and the national health and medical research council. the literature identifies many types of datasets, for example email (boudrez & van den eynde 2002), social media (leadbetter 2011; scifleet, henninger & albright 2013), and statistical and scientific data including meteorological, geospatial data (geiger & von lucke 2011; pollock 2010) and research data (arzberger et al. 2004; borgman 2010). however the issues and challenges specific to individual types of data are not addressed in this paper. it has been suggested that ogd is a natural evolution from freedom of information, the latest element in the foi continuum (halonen 2012; heusser 2012) and, from the standpoint of the right to information and open government movements, this seems reasonable. however freedom of information legislation and open government data are not the same thing; david eaves (2012) suggests that currently they are separate but complementary processes, with the ability of open data to circumvent the onerous and expensive processes of foi requests while maintaining foi’s inherent protections and rights. more fundamentally ogd is a shift in the public’s attitude to public sector information, ‘in comparison to reactive freedom of information, the open-data movement—or two-way online transparency, as it is sometimes called—is seen as enabling a participative writing society instead of a reading society, where citizens are theoretically able to receive information but not to re-use it in creative ways’ (halonen 2012, p. 22). value of psi data the true value of information is realised only when others can use and build upon it to create new ideas, inventions and strategies (office of the australian information commissioner (oaic) 2013) the number of public datasets produced by governments and public sector organisations is exploding (the data catalog lists 365 catalogs, the us alone containing 90,000 datasets) and the new tools and capabilities developed to support its analysis (data analytics) provide tangible and intangible value for both governments and users. while there is no intrinsic value in open data, the benefits are a result of value-added processes. in general terms governments have recognised the transformational potential of access to their own data to drive efficiency in the public sector, to provide better and new community services and basic infrastructure. there are many examples of the use of ogd to deliver weather and transport 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 and environmental impact benefits, to support national and international economies, the development of technological innovations, and the contribution of new knowledge (janssen, charalabidis & zuiderwijk 2012; wind-cowie & lekhi 2012). in economic terms, that there is enormous value in public sector datasets is summed up in a european commission press release titled ‘turning government data into gold’ (european commission 2011). the ‘gold’ can be a direct value (revenue from selling the data), a commercial value (revenue generated by companies who have purchased the data), or less quantifiable economic social benefits. several studies have made estimations of the economic value of ogd and they are astonishing; for example the much-quoted 1990 pira study (2000) put the value of the eu’s government datasets at €68 billion; a later study (dekkers et al. 2006) shows it to be €10 to €48 billion, including norway (the disparity reflects different estimation approaches). however vickery has suggested that while aggregate direct and indirect economic impacts are worth €140 billion annually, the ‘direct revenues to governments from psi are relatively low and are much lower than the estimated benefits from access to psi’ (2011, p. 4). the greatest value is in national and international economies where users, particularly the commercial sector, add value to the raw data along a value chain (fornefeld et al. 2008). the pira study estimated the economic value of the united states to be in the vicinity of $750 billion (this figure is for the entire information sector, not just datasets). in australia there has not been a detailed study of the value of government datasets, however through several case studies houghton (2011) showed that the cumulative returns far-outweighed the cost of open access supply. for example, the australian bureau of statistics cost of free supply to users is $4.5 million per annum and measurable annualised benefits of $25 million. as a result government policies encourage high priority be given to the release of datasets with high economic and research value (e.g. australian government 2011; office of management and budget (omb) 2009, december 8), which in commercial terms are meteorological and geospatial data (weiss 2010). as dekkers et al. (2006, p. 51) note ‘the fact that public bodies sell the [meteorological] data themselves clearly mirrors the value of the market’. advocates of open government data suggest the overriding benefits are social and political, particularly when examining the economic value delivered to society. for example, lower costs for services delivery resulting from more accurate data for decision-makers, or reliable cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 87 meteorological data for the prediction of natural disasters (janssen, charalabidis & zuiderwijk 2012; pollock 2011). while studies have quantified these benefits (fornefeld et al. 2008; weiss 2010), overall social benefits are difficult to calculate. governments and open data supporters alike state one of the most important contributions to civil societies is government transparency and accountability (e.g. obama 2009; office of the australian information commissioner (oaic) 2013). this point is particularly observable with the trend in data-driven journalism, where leading newspapers such as the guardian and the new york times use open government datasets for investigative purposes (cohen, hamilton & turner 2011; kronenberg 2011). there are however some sceptical voices raising the potential dangers of public access to government datasets. jerry brito (2010) suggests that governments’ releasing of datasets may increase accountability of those entities they regulate, but not necessarily of their own actions, while others are concerned that greater transparency expectations may be too high and that open data could, at least in the short-term, have negative effects including erosion of public trust in government (bannister & connolly 2011; bauhr, grimes & harring 2010). some scholars have warned that special interest groups – political elites, lobbyists and commercial services who use ogd – privilege those with the capacity to pay for services to the detriment of those delivered by the public sector (baldeck 2013; bates 2012; kaplan 2011; longo 2011). finally there is always the possibility that users may misinterpret or falsely manipulate the raw data (fioretti 2011; halonen 2012; mcginnes & elandy 2012), although this concern could be expressed equally for any publicly accessible information. possibly the greatest value of open datasets and public sector information, in both economic and social terms, is the capacity to foster innovation and the development of new products, public services, and new knowledge emanating from pure and applied research. the proliferation of access to large datasets combined with new technological capabilities has spawned innovative projects such as the semantic web, the linked open data project, the internet of things (bizer, heath & berners-lee 2009; o’reilly & bartelle 2009) and thirdparty and domain-specific applications (anderson 2009; pollock 2010; salvadores et al. 2010) all of which promise extraordinary changes in ict global connectedness. the rapid growth of these technological innovations, the cyber infrastructure that supports data-intensive research, access to ‘big data’ and burgeoning r&d investments are producing 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 quantifiable results including discoveries of new health benefits (drugs, diagnoses and therapies), greater understanding of environmental health, and better capability to examine history and the social sciences (borgman 2010; interagency working group on digital data 2009; uhlir & schröder 2007). data analytics and new visualisation technologies are enabling pattern matching and other analytical processes to produce new knowledge in many disciplines (fayyad, piatetsky-shapiro & smyth 1996). conclusion this paper has examined the concept of public sector information and proposed a definition that includes the current notions of its inclusive nature. while a consensus on what constitutes public sector information may be reached, difficulties arise from limitations on access to its content, particularly on its reuse. such difficulties result from historical attitudes and paradigms regarding the purpose, ownership and control of state information, from conflicting contemporary philosophies of liberal democracies and their processes, and from modern economic models for the welfare of civil societies. states have always kept information secret both for state stability or economic interests (pollock 2006; roberts 2006). it has been suggested that dissemination of early codifications of public laws and administrative records, the precursors of public sector information, was not for purposes of democratisation, civil society or equality of justice, but to serve the selfinterest of the ruling powers. in liberal democracies the urge or need for secrecy still conflicts with current calls for openness and transparency in the public interest. at the institution or government level obviously there is a need for some psi to remain secret or ‘classified’ for reasons of national security and defence; this paper does not argue against this general proposition. however, the withholding of public sector information often can be the result of elitist (powerful) or commercial self-interest. a case in point are documents designated ‘commercial in confidence’ (for example in public-private partnerships), or information protected from reuse by intellectual property rights. these are examples of commercial selfinterest, which nevertheless do deliver innovation and new knowledge. but with wholesale commodification of information and the rise of neo-liberalism in the second half of the 20th century a number of scholars argue that commercial, private sector self-interest has overridden the public interest (bates 2012; lessig 2004; schiller 1991). it would be wrong to suggest that the private sector is the only powerful or elitist group which benefits from access to public sector information and ogd in particular; gurstein (2011) points out public access cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 89 to this information may privilege the technical elites, those better able to use and analyse the data for profit or for an enriched citizen/public engagement in policy – a new data divide. the tension between commerce and altruism in the use of open datasets, however, is nuanced. one the largest group of users is businesses that use them as test-beds for the development of innovative products or applications. while on one hand businesses are getting a ‘free-ride’, studies have shown that the indirect benefits are very significant, either to a country’s economy or to its welfare through new public services (davies et al. 2009; pollock 2010; vickery 2011). on the other hand the private use of public data to deliver services that may be better than those delivered by government, privileges the more affluent members of society; certainly there are many examples of industries such as the pharmaceutical and biotechnical industries that use public research data that delivers enormous profits to themselves to the detriment of the public good. this exploitation of public data, particularly in the areas of health and the environment, is ameliorated by government and international policies which consider the public good should override private interest (stiglitz 1999; uhlir & schröder 2007). in the public sector itself studies have shown that the level of trust in governments is diminishing for many reasons (see e.g. miller 1974), nevertheless there is little evidence that transparency has delivered more trust in government (longo 2011; worthy 2010), possibly because access to psi enables publicity of government scandals such as the british parliamentary expenses scandal (bowler & karp 2004). it remains to be seen what the longterm effects of more openly accessible public sector information and data will have on contemporary attitudes to democratic models and governments. finally among public 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(eds), access to public sector information: law, technology and policy, vol. 2, pp. 592-608. wind-cowie, m. & lekhi, r. 2012, the data dividend, demos, london, viewed 11 november 2012, <http://www.demos.co.uk/files/the_data_dividend_-_web.pdf>. worthy, b. 2010, 'more open but not more trusted? the effect of the freedom of information act 2000 on the united kingdom central government', governance, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 561-82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2010.01498.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2f0196-335x%2880%2990070-9 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2f0196-335x%2880%2990070-9 http://www.headstar.com/egblive/?p=251 http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/02/rethinking-open-data.html http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/02/rethinking-open-data.html http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001373/137363eo.pdf%3e http://dx.doi.org/10.2481%2fdsj.6.od36 http://www.umic.pt/images/stories/publicacoes6/psi_final_version_formatted-1.pdf%3e http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/sep/foia-fringe-special-overview-sep-20-2010.pdf%3e http://www.statewatch.org/news/2010/sep/foia-fringe-special-overview-sep-20-2010.pdf%3e http://www.demos.co.uk/files/the_data_dividend_-_web.pdf%3e http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2fj.1468-0491.2010.01498.x the value and challenges of public sector information maureen henninger university of technology, sydney abstract introduction what is public sector information the role of public sector information the open government movement value of psi data conclusion references issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal 2014. © 2014 graeme baxter. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(2): 3914,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3914 rough justice? exploring the relationship between information access and environmental and ecological justice pertaining to two controversial coastal developments in north-east scotland1 graeme baxter robert gordon university abstract this paper explores the relationship between information access and environmental and ecological justice through an historical comparison of two controversial coastal developments in aberdeenshire, north-east scotland: the building of a north sea gas reception terminal by the british gas council and the french exploration company total oil marine in the 1970s; and the more recent construction of ‘the greatest golf course anywhere in the world’ by the american property tycoon, donald trump. these two projects have much in common, not least because each one has had actual or potential impacts on an environmentally sensitive site, and because each has also been affected by plans for another major structure in its immediate vicinity. but the trump golf course project has taken place during a period when access to information and citizens’ influence on major planning decisions in scotland has been significantly greater, at least in theory. with these points in mind, the paper considers whether or not environmental justice (more specifically, procedural environmental justice) and ecological justice are now more attainable in the current era of supposed openness, transparency and public engagement, than in the more secretive and less participative 1970s. it reveals that, at the planning application stage, information on the potential environmental impact of trump’s golf resort was more readily obtainable, compared with that provided by the gas council and total forty years earlier. however, during and after the construction stage, when considering whether or not the developments have met environmental planning conditions – and whether or not ecological justice has been done – the situation with the gas terminal has been far clearer than with trump’s golf resort. despite the golf course being built in an era of government openness, there remain a number of unanswered questions concerning its environmental impact. introduction this paper examines the relationship between information access and environmental and ecological justice through an historical comparison of two controversial coastal developments in aberdeenshire, north-east scotland: the building of a north sea gas reception terminal by 1 this paper is based on a presentation made at the 24th annual conference of the uk socio-legal studies association, aberdeen, 9-11 april 2014. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3914 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 95 the british gas council (a public body) and the french exploration company total oil marine in the 1970s; and the more recent construction of ‘the greatest golf course anywhere in the world’ (kirk 2006) by the american property tycoon, donald trump. figure 1 shows the location of the two developments. although their construction is separated by 40 years, these two coastal projects have much in common, not least because each one has had potential or actual impacts on an environmentally sensitive site, and each has also been affected by plans for another major structure in its immediate vicinity (in the case of the gas terminal, this was a military radio station; in the case of the golf course, an offshore windfarm). figure 1: location of gas terminal and golf course developments in north-east scotland (© crown copyright/database right 2013. an ordnance survey/edina supplied service) at first glance, the paper may appear rather parochial, focusing as it does on two projects only a few miles apart in north-east scotland, however, the issues it discusses are illustrative of the country-wide developments in public engagement and government openness that have taken place over the past four decades in scotland. the trump golf course project has taken place during a period when access to information and citizens’ influence on major planning 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 decisions in scotland has been significantly greater, at least theoretically. with these points in mind, in comparing these two coastal developments, this paper investigates whether or not environmental justice (more specifically, procedural environmental justice) and ecological justice are now more readily attainable in this current era of supposed openness, transparency and public engagement, than in the more secretive and less participative 1970s. the paper begins by providing a brief overview of the concepts of environmental and ecological justice, before moving on to discuss scotland’s environmental justice movement and its current openness and transparency regime. it then provides an account of the building of the gas terminal in the 1970s, concentrating on issues relating to information access and to environmental and ecological justice. it proceeds to do the same with the trump development to date, comparing and contrasting the situation with that occurring over 30 years earlier, before concluding with some initial observations on the relationship between access to information and environmental and ecological justice. the paper is derived largely from desk-based research in which the author has collected data from a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including: local, devolved and national government archives; records of the developers; environmental interest group archives; academic and trade literature; and print and broadcast press coverage of the two projects. environmental and ecological justice the concept of ‘environmental justice’ is regarded by many commentators as having emerged in the united states in the period between 1978 and 1982, when the state authorities in north carolina chose to locate a landfill site for the burial of hazardous waste in warren county, where the residents were primarily poor and african-american (e.g., mcgurty 1999; faber & mccarthy 2001; pezzullo 2001). in subsequent years, much of the discourse on environmental justice (and injustice) in the us focused on the disproportionate distribution of environmental hazards — such as toxic landfill sites and chemical plants — in minority and low-income communities (stephens 2003). as bullard (1999, p. 284) stated bluntly: ‘all communities are not created equal. some communities are more equal than others. if a community happens to be poor, working class, or inhabited largely by people of color, it has a good chance of receiving less protection than its affluent or mostly white counterpart. the nation’s environmental laws, regulations, and policies are not applied uniformly which results in some individuals, neighborhoods, and communities being exposed to elevated health risks.’ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 97 in 2004, schlosberg noted that, globally, most theoretical understandings of environmental justice remained tied solely to the issue of inequity in the distribution of environmental ills and benefits. more recently, however, he has observed a broadening and deepening discourse that has moved beyond this distributive interpretation of environmental justice (schlosberg 2007; 2013). in these works, schlosberg categorises three additional, multifaceted and interrelated ‘conceptions’ or ‘notions’ of environmental justice: • recognition. where recognition of, and respect for, various communities, identities and cultures affected by environmental risk are integral elements of justice. • capabilities. where justice is considered in terms of the extent to which environmental policies and decisions restrict or enhance the basic functioning of individuals and communities. • participation and procedural justice. where the construction of inclusive, participatory decision-making institutions is at the centre of environmental justice demands; where policymaking procedures institutionalise and encourage active public participation, and recognise local community knowledge. given that the current author’s research has focused on the extent to which citizens were informed about, and could participate in, the planning processes surrounding the development of two sparsely populated and environmentally sensitive coastal sites, it is with the last of these notions — procedural environmental justice — that much of this paper is concerned. equally, though, this paper considers the concept of ecological justice in relation to the two coastal developments. baxter (2000) attributes the coining of the term ‘ecological justice’ to low and gleeson, who defined it as the ‘justice of the relationship between humans and the rest of the natural world’ (low and gleeson 1998, p. 2), and who further declared: ‘the first principle of ecological justice is that every natural entity is entitled to enjoy the fullness of its own form of life. non-human nature is entitled to moral consideration.’ (low and gleeson 1998, p. 156) parris et al. (2014, p. 71), meanwhile, define ecological justice as the ‘extent to which human activity treats the natural world with respect and dignity to insure the well-being of nonhuman species, flora, and the physical landscape’. drawing on these definitions, this paper 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 considers ecological justice in terms of the extent to which the environmental planning conditions attached to the gas terminal and golf course projects were met by the respective developers, and, by extension, the ways in which the flora, fauna and landforms were protected, maintained or restored during and after the construction phases of the two developments. environmental justice and information access in scotland environmental justice first emerged as a concept in scotland in 1999, when friends of the earth scotland (foes) launched a campaign to coincide with the inauguration of the new scottish parliament2. foes’s initial understanding of environmental justice linked classbased environmental maldistributions in scotland with global inequalities in the consumption of ecological resources (scandrett, dunion & mcbride 2000). the first official recognition of environmental justice in scotland came in a 2002 speech by the then first minister jack mcconnell (bbc news 2002), although slater and pedersen (2009) observe that he made no clear distinction between the concepts of social justice, environmental justice and sustainable development. from that point onwards, the scottish executive (rebranded as the scottish government in 2007) approached environmental justice from both the distributive and procedural perspectives (slater & pedersen 2009), although maschewsky was critical of the lack of a clear strategy and of the scottish executive’s practice of following an ‘embedded’ political approach, where environmental justice was ‘smuggled’ into existing programmes with ‘little or no changes in targets, priorities and funding-schemes’ (maschewsky 2005, pp. 24-25). as slater and pedersen (2009) point out, many of the procedural changes to scottish legislation have reflected the scottish government’s obligations under european law. key here was the 1998 aarhus convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters which recognised that: 2 for those readers unfamiliar with the legislative situation in the united kingdom, dramatic constitutional changes in the late 1990s saw the devolution of some legislative powers from central government in london to three new devolved bodies: the scottish parliament, the national assembly for wales and the northern ireland assembly. the devolved matters on which the scottish parliament can pass laws include: agriculture; civil and criminal justice; education; environment; health; housing; local government; planning; social work; sport and the arts; and transport. at the time of writing, the uk is on the eve of potentially its most significant constitutional change in over 300 years: the scottish independence referendum on 18 september 2014 may result in the end of the uk in its present form. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 99 ‘improved access to information and public participation in decision-making enhance the quality and the implementation of decisions, contribute to public awareness of environmental issues, give the public the opportunity to express its concerns and enable public authorities to take due account of such concerns’ (united nations economic commission for europe 1998, p. 2). as its full title implies, the aarhus convention is built upon three ‘pillars’ — access to information, public participation, and access to justice — the first two of which were the subject of european directives in 2003. directive 2003/4/ec was concerned with public access to environmental information, which was defined as information on: • the state of the elements of the environment (i.e. air, water, soil, etc.) and the factors affecting these; • the measures or activities designed to protect these elements, and the analyses and assumptions associated with these; • reports on the implementation of environmental legislation; and • the state of human health and safety as they are affected by the state of the elements of the environment (adapted from european parliament and council of the european union 2003a, article 2(1) ). directive 2003/35/ec, meanwhile, was concerned with providing for public participation in the drawing up of certain plans and programs relating to the environment (european parliament and council of the european union 2003b). a proposal for a directive on access to justice in environmental matters, which might address the third pillar of the aarhus convention, has yet to be adopted (european commission 2014). in scotland, responses to directive 2003/35/ec on public participation have included: the introduction of the environmental assessment (scotland) act 2005 which ensures that environmental assessments are carried out in relation to public sector development plans and programs; amendments to existing environmental impact assessment regulations (in place since 1999) which granted standing before the courts to any non-governmental organisation promoting environmental protection (environmental impact assessment (scotland) amendment regulations 2006); and the introduction of the planning etc. (scotland) act 2006, which talks repeatedly of ‘involving the public at large’. 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 meanwhile, directive 2003/4/ec on access to environmental information led to the introduction of the environmental information (scotland) regulations 2004 (eirs), giving the public a general right of access to environmental information held by scottish public authorities. the eirs came into force on 1 january 2005, the same day as scotland introduced its new freedom of information legislation — the freedom of information (scotland) act 2002 (foisa) — which gave people the basic right to see information held by scottish public authorities. january 2005 was, therefore, meant to herald a new era of openness and transparency amongst government and other public bodies throughout scotland. the extent to which these recent consultative and openness agendas in scotland have impacted upon the environmental and ecological justice issues relating to the donald trump golf course development will be discussed later. but first this paper will explore the issues surrounding the gas terminal development, which took place in a less open and participative era, and of course before the terms environmental justice and ecological justice had been conceived. ‘jobs versus ducks’: the gas terminal development in november 1972, in the midst of the north sea oil and gas exploration boom, the british gas council and total announced plans to construct a gas reception terminal on a disused airfield at crimond, aberdeenshire. at this stage, the developers were not forthcoming with details of their proposals: all that they would reveal was that the terminal would handle gas piped from the frigg field, 200 miles away in the north sea, that it would be built on a 500acre site, would cost several hundred million pounds, and would result in around 50-60 permanent jobs, although the pipelaying and construction stages would employ hundreds (dunn 1972). these plans were controversial, as the proposed site was adjacent to britain’s largest coastal dune lake, the loch of strathbeg, which had recently been designated a site of special scientific interest (sssi) because of its natural history, particularly its ornithology (nature conservancy 1970). strathbeg had long been recognised as an internationally important site for wintering geese and ducks, and, in fact, the royal society for the protection of birds (rspb) was in the process of trying to secure various parcels of land around the loch to create a new nature reserve. the situation was further complicated by the fact that the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 101 ministry of defence (mod) had already received clearance to build an important royal naval radio station on the same airfield site. at the time, there was little history of public consultation in planning processes in scotland, with the existing legislation — the town and country planning (scotland) act 1969 — referring only to ‘adequate publicity’ and entitlement to an ‘opportunity of making representations’. indeed, burton and johnson (1976), in a review of public participation in planning in scotland, noted that much confusion existed amongst planning authorities as to what exactly was expected of them. participation in planning, they concluded, was still at an experimental stage. this unsystematic approach to public engagement was evident during the initial, 14-day, public consultation period, where a copy of the crimond terminal site plan could be inspected at the offices of the local planning authority, aberdeen county council. the lack of detail on the plan, and the short time frame in which representations could be made, angered local environmental opponents. as one pointed out: ‘the plan consists simply of a map of the old airfield at crimond, coloured red, a blue road leading into it from the west and a ‘corridor’ one-third of a mile wide from the airfield through the loch itself and the coastal dunes leading to the sea labelled ‘possible pipeline corridor’... how can anyone be expected to make sensible representations…on the basis of such meagre information? … how, indeed, can any responsible planning authority give planning permission in principle, on such data?’ (dunnet 1972) within a few weeks of the crimond plans being announced, some organised opposition began. most notable here was the formation of the north-east environmental liaison group (elg), which consisted of academics from the botany, geography and zoology departments of aberdeen university, and representatives of various conservation groups, including the rspb, the scottish ornithologists’ club, and the scottish wildlife trust (swt). the elg sought not only to prevent the terminal being built on the airfield site, but also to appeal for a more careful planning approach to industrial development in general across north-east scotland. given the lack of detail emanating from the developers, the elg came to play a crucial role in disseminating information and advice on the potential environmental impact of the terminal being located immediately next to strathbeg. the local and national (scottish) press were generally sympathetic to the arguments of the elg and afforded them significant 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 column inches in which to present their case (e.g. aberdeen press and journal 1972; macdonald 1972). members of the elg also had an article published in the highly influential journal nature (bourne et al. 1973), thus ensuring that the story reached an international, scientific audience. and the county council, perhaps realising the lack of environmental expertise within its own ranks, quickly invited the group to adopt a semiofficial advisory role, with the elg taking part in all of the council’s subsequent meetings with the developers. individuals in another new protest group, the buchan action group (buchan is the historical name for the area surrounding the town of peterhead – see figure 1), were instrumental in organising a public meeting, held at crimond in february 1973, at which representatives of the gas council and total appeared in order to explain their choice of the airfield site. yet, opponents remained critical of the lack of detail from the developers. indeed, a few days after the public meeting, the aberdeen evening express, in the concluding part of an investigation into the human impact of oil and gas exploration — entitled ‘people’s lives matter: tell us what is going on’ — argued: ‘it is not good enough that the people of buchan have so little information about the gas terminal planned for crimond… it is not good enough when ‘little man’ action groups are called upon to prove big business wrong with little expertise and less money’ (ogilvie 1973). clearly, then, the systems and procedures required in order to attain some semblance of what is now known as procedural environmental justice were lacking at the time of the crimond planning application. aberdeen county council was not alone in this regard: holmes found that scotland’s planning authorities were generally ill-equipped to deal with the demands created by the oil and gas boom and by other large-scale industrial development, with one planner exclaiming: ‘we’ve all these preservation people, conservation people… they all want us to keep them fully informed! how can we do it? how can we possibly do it?’ (holmes 1973, p. 1) a detailed account of the full sequence of events relating to the planning application is beyond the scope of this paper. however, in april 1973, the gas council and total announced that they had found an alternative site for the terminal, a few miles away at st. fergus, in a far less environmentally sensitive area. much to the chagrin of the elg, though, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 103 the developers refused to concede victory to the conservationists, insisting that the decision to change site was driven solely by the mod’s need for the airfield site. in a prophetic turn of phrase, the elg declared that this did ‘much less than justice to the ecologists’ case’ (cummings 1973). years later, the gas council continued to maintain that ‘solutions acceptable to all parties could have been implemented’ should the terminal have been built next to strathbeg (dean 1981). a new planning application for the st. fergus site was submitted by the gas council and total in may 1973. following another public meeting (this time arranged by the developers, rather than by local residents) and a further 14-day consultation period, no public objections were lodged. although further concerns were expressed by the conservation lobby about a lack of detailed information on the new st. fergus proposals (dunn 1973), planning permission in principle was given in july 1973. outline planning permission for the terminal plant, an administration block, heliport and access roads was then granted in october 1973, subject to some conditions, most significantly that the developers consult and co-operate with the county council and the swt in ensuring that the local flora and fauna be conserved, that public access to the foreshore and dunes be preserved, and that the foreshore and dunes be returned to their former state once the pipelines from the north sea had been laid through them (aberdeen county council 1973). in order to confirm that these planning conditions were being met, a committee was established, under the aegis of the gas council, to monitor the construction of the terminal and its impact on the coastal environment. in the initial stages of the terminal’s development, this committee was effectively an offshoot of the elg, comprising aberdeen university academics and representatives of the developers, the council, and various regional conservation bodies. as the terminal subsequently expanded,3 and as additional pipelines were laid through the dunes, the original committee was replaced by the st. fergus dunes management committee in 1988, and renamed the st. fergus coastal environment committee in 1998. in later years, the regional conservation bodies discontinued their membership, ‘being content that their interests would be served by the membership or by consultation processes when required’ (ritchie 1997, p. 10). throughout, the committee, in 3 the first full environmental impact assessment did not take place until 1976 when the company shell proposed to build its own gas reception facilities on the st. fergus site (cremer & warner 1977). 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 its various guises, has monitored and assessed the impact of the terminal complex on the local wildlife, vegetation, landform, soil, water quality and drainage. looking back over the construction and subsequent expansion of st. fergus, has ecological justice been done? some of the earliest published assessments, written by members of the dunes management committee (e.g. ritchie 1980; ritchie & gimingham 1989), indicated that the landform and hydrology had been restored satisfactorily, although efforts at revegetation had met with mixed success. in a major scientific volume published to mark 25 years of the committee, which included papers on the hydrology, vegetation, and the bird and insect life of the st. fergus dunes, ritchie (1997, p. 15) reported: ‘another pragmatic approach to the measurement of success is to state that in relation to any environmental issue related to the pipeline landfalls at st. fergus there have been no public or local enquiries, no complaints of substance by local or national regulatory bodies and no controversies as engendered by official or voluntary environmental or ecological bodies.’ perhaps ironically, the terminal itself became something of a haven for birdlife. a flat-roofed building on the site housed britain’s first roof-nesting common terns. the security fences surrounding the complex prevented four-legged predators such as foxes entering the area, allowing ground-nesting birds to flourish (tomlinson 1990), although when stoats and weasels subsequently negotiated the fences many of the ground-based nests were destroyed (bourne 2005). the terminal operators have won a number of environmental awards (e.g. aberdeen evening express 2007; shell world uk 2013); and, in terms of ecological justice being seen to be done, they continue to make information on their environmental policies, systems and performance publicly available (e.g. total e&p uk 2011). to summarise, then, the gas council and total, in the earliest planning stages, paid scant regard to providing information on the environmental issues associated with building the gas terminal next to strathbeg, and on how they might address these issues. however, once a new location for the terminal had been announced, and as construction and operation of the terminal progressed, then information on its potential and actual environmental impact was more forthcoming, albeit with significant input from concerned local conservationists. in short, it might be said that procedural environmental justice and ecological justice were eventually done. the extent to which the same can be said about donald trump’s golf resort will be explored in the next part of this paper. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 105 ‘livelihoods before liverwort’: trump’s golf course development the story of trump’s bid to build the ‘the greatest golf course anywhere in the world’ is a long and complex one. this paper will, therefore, relate some of the key events only. the £300 million project on the menie estate in aberdeenshire — trump international golf links, scotland (tigls) — was announced initially in march 2006, and was to include two championship courses, a 5-star hotel, and a mixed residential development. crucially, though, trump also warned that he would abandon his plans if proposals for a nearby 33-turbine offshore windfarm were to proceed, arguing that this would spoil the sea views from his resort (johnston & smith 2006). trump’s plans immediately attracted polarised views: business and tourism groups welcomed the news and the estimated economic benefits the resort would bring to the region; while environmental bodies expressed concerns, particularly as the course would be built partly on an existing sssi, including a rare, dynamic, shifting dune system4. in november 2006, trump submitted his outline planning application to the local planning authority, aberdeenshire council, indicating that it would now be a £1 billion project, and would include the two courses, a clubhouse, a 450-room hotel, a golf academy and turf research centre, an accommodation block for 400 employees, almost 1,000 holiday homes and 500 residential properties. as trump’s proposed development was subject to the environmental impact assessment (scotland) regulations 1999 (such regulations, applying to certain types of planning applications, have been in place in scotland since 1988), tigls was statutorily obliged to provide an environmental assessment report. this 316-page report (plus several appendices) was submitted in march 2007 and acknowledged that there would be ‘significant adverse changes’ to the sssi (ironside farrar 2007, p. 305), but also promised various ‘mitigation measures’ to ‘maintain and enhance as much natural interest as possible’ (pp. 309-316). these promises were frequently accompanied by verbal assurances from trump himself, who proclaimed, for example: ‘because we are stabilising the land, the environment will be much superior when we are finished’ (ross 2007). 4 opposition to the golf resort was based mostly on environmental grounds until may 2009, when tigls raised the prospect of pursuing compulsory purchase orders to acquire four residential properties on the menie estate. the threat of compulsory purchase was finally lifted in january 2011. 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 in complete contrast to the crimond gas terminal application in the 1970s, the tigls environmental assessment and other supporting documentation (including economic and transport assessments) was made readily available to the public, online, at council offices and public libraries, and at a series of public exhibitions and meetings held throughout the area. the full planning application was subject to the by now standard 28-day public consultation period, but, owing to the ‘complexities’ of the proposals, conservation bodies including the rspb, the swt, and scottish natural heritage (snh) were allowed more time in which to respond (urquhart 2007). aberdeenshire council also continued to accept representations from the wider public until november 2007, meaning that the consultation period was effectively eight-months long. one of the key elements of procedural environmental justice — the right to participate in environmental decision-making — was, therefore, to the fore during the tigls planning application process. although the council’s planners had recommended the approval of the tigls proposals, arguing that ‘this is an occasion where the social and economic benefits are of national importance and that these do override the adverse environmental impacts’ (aberdeenshire council 2007a, paragraph 6.55), the application was controversially rejected by the council’s infrastructure committee in november 2007, largely because of these adverse impacts on the sssi and because of concerns about the inclusion of commercial housing on land not allocated for that purpose in the local development plan (aberdeenshire council 2007b). a few days later, however, the scottish government called in the application, stating that it ‘raises issues of importance that require consideration at a national level’ (scottish government 2007). following a public inquiry in the summer of 2008, the scottish government decided to grant outline planning permission for the resort in november 2008, affirming that ‘there was significant economic and social benefit to be gained from this project’ (scottish government 2008a). this outline planning permission was subject to 46 conditions that had been recommended by the public inquiry reporters (see scottish government 2008b, appendix 1b, pp. 247-260), several of which focused on environmental issues, including: • agreed methods of stabilising the dunes; • safeguarding the foraging routes of otters and badgers; cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 107 • a goose management scheme; • provisions for bats and barn owls in the built elements of the resort; • a scheme for monitoring local water quality; and, importantly, • the appointment of a suitably qualified ecological clerk of works (to be funded by the developer) to ensure that all works relating to the ecological interests of the site are undertaken appropriately. the final report of the public inquiry also noted an existing agreement between tigls and aberdeenshire council to create an independent menie environmental management advisory group (memag), the idea for which had been first mooted in the tigls environmental assessment report (ironside farrar 2007, appendix 6-6). memag was to be funded by tigls and was to be based on the st. fergus dunes management committee model, with a remit to provide advice to tigls and the council on: • environmental management and operation ‘best practice’; • monitoring the local environment; • minimising unanticipated adverse changes; and, significantly, • complying fully with the relevant conditions attached to the outline planning permission (scottish government 2008b, p. 264). initial preparatory work on the menie estate began in october 2009, and in february 2010 tigls submitted the final masterplan for the resort, including an 89-page (plus appendices) environment management plan (stri ecology & environment 2010). as with the original application, this was subject to a 28-day consultation period, and the documentation was made publicly available, online and at a special exhibition. following approval of the masterplan, construction work on the first championship course commenced in june 2010. that course, together with a temporary clubhouse, opened in july 2012, but plans to build the rest of the resort (the hotel, housing, etc.) were recently abandoned after trump failed in a legal challenge to prevent the offshore windfarm (by now an 11-turbine project) being built (urquhart 2014). how, then, have the ecological clerk of works (ecow) and memag fared in monitoring the environmental impact of the construction work carried out on the course, and in ensuring 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 that ecological justice has been done? the ecow — a commercial environmental consultancy — submitted 21 site visit reports to aberdeenshire council between december 2009 (just after preparatory work had begun) and june 2012 (just before the golf course opened for business). these documents can be found (with some difficulty) on the council’s website (see aberdeenshire council 2012) and are generally positive, in that they confirm that tigls and its contractors did largely comply with planning requirements but also note occasions when planning conditions were not being adhered to.5 for example, they highlighted any earthworks that occurred outside the agreed course layout, and any deviations from agreed construction traffic access routes; they talked of the protocols followed when earthworks and vegetation clearance took place within the bird nesting season; and they provided evidence of the ecow prohibiting vehicles stopping in an area adjacent to a breeding gull colony, and having ordered the suspension of planting work taking place too close to a badger sett. despite this, opponents of the golf course have questioned the impartiality of a tigls-funded ecow: ‘who was in charge of the environment? it seems paid trump personnel... how can a system allow a developer to be his own watchdog?’ (kelly 2013a) it should also be noted that the 21 ecow reports appear not to have been made publicly available online until november 2012, some months after the course had opened. the public at large, therefore, had little opportunity to assess the environmental effects of the construction work as it progressed. opponents have also cast doubts on the reliability of the environmental information that was provided by aberdeenshire council during the construction phase. for example, kelly (2012) had written directly to the ecow on environmental planning matters in 2011, but claimed that the information received in return (relating to the removal and burial of trees on the site, and the construction of earth bunds close to residents’ properties) directly contradicted that obtained from local residents, as well as footage from a documentary film about the golf course development entitled you’ve been trumped (baxter 2011). with regard to memag, meanwhile, although tigls declared that the group had prepared ‘glowing reports’ on the environmental care taken with the course (pauling 2012), the extent to which it has been successful in meeting its remit is currently unclear, largely because it 5 it should be noted that tigls was subsequently criticised by aberdeenshire council for the number of retrospective planning conditions it made in order to remedy ‘breaches of planning control’ (edwards, r. 2013a). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 109 appears to have ceased operation. it is known that memag met for the first time in december 2009, and that it consisted of representatives of tigls, aberdeenshire council, a local community council, and the scottish government’s conservation and environmental watchdogs, snh and the scottish environment protection agency (sepa) (davidson 2009). by may 2012, however, members were expressing concerns about the absence of tigls representation at recent meetings (see kelly 2013b). memag appears to have met for the last time in january 2013, and the council claimed to have been carrying out a review of the group’s remit in the summer of that year (edwards, r. 2013b). by august 2013 all minutes of its meetings had been removed from its website at www.memag.org.uk (see kelly 2013a), and by february 2014 its entire website had disappeared. recent efforts by the current author to establish the fate and future of memag have so far met with mixed success. these efforts have largely taken the form of freedom of information requests to the group’s constituent members. sepa ignored the request completely; snh suggested that contact be made with the tigls legal team; and the tigls legal advisor in scotland simply mentioned the decision to suspend further development at menie, without explaining why tigls had effectively played no part in memag for almost two years. aberdeenshire council, at the third time of asking, eventually acknowledged that there is an obligation for memag to continue, and that they had contacted trump’s agents with a view to conducting a review of the group. clearly, then, the existence and effective operation of memag has been reliant on the whims (and, of course, the finance) of tigls. as such, the ‘independence and scientific integrity’ promised by tigls in order to ensure the ‘ongoing maintenance of the environment and its ecology’ (ironside farrar 2007, appendix 6-6) has been lacking. the present author is not the only one to have queried the status of memag. the online citizen newspaper aberdeen voice has run several articles by opponents of the trump development, a number of which have highlighted the apparent demise of memag (e.g. kelly 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). aberdeen voice has also published articles which suggest that environmental care may not always have been taken during and after the construction of the golf course. for example, edwards writes: ‘piles of rubbish are burnt regularly, and heaps of grass cuttings have plastic chemical containers buried in them. attempts have been made to cover the evidence with sand’ (edwards, s. 2013) http://www.memag.org.uk/ 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 in the case of trump’s golf course, then, it is unclear if ecological justice has been done. despite systematic monitoring procedures having been included as part of the planning conditions, the responsible planning authority, aberdeenshire council, has not been rigorous in ensuring that these conditions are enforced. and despite a supposed culture of openness and transparency amongst public authorities in scotland, the council and the other bodies involved in the environmental monitoring process have been unwilling to impart information in a full and timely manner. with further regard to information access, responsibility for the enforcement and promotion of scotland’s eirs and the foisa lies with the scottish information commissioner (sic), and in a special report to the scottish parliament the first (and outgoing) commissioner highlighted the ‘wealth of information’ relating to trump’s menie development released under the foisa by the scottish government in 2008 (scottish information commissioner 2012, p. 7). however, close examination of these documents (see scottish government 2008c) reveals that 20% were the subject of considerable redaction which effectively rendered them meaningless. it is also fair to say that some of trump’s opponents remain unconvinced that all pertinent information relating to the golf course project has found its way into the public domain (e.g. kelly 2013d). indeed, at the time of writing (june 2014), the sic has completed six investigations into eirs or foisa applications relating to the golf resort, and in each case has found that the public authorities concerned have failed to comply fully with the legislation (see scottish information commissioner 2014). the sic is also currently considering an appeal made by the present author, after the scottish government declined to provide information on those ‘third parties’ (i.e. individual citizens) who made representations to the 2008 public inquiry on the menie planning application. clearly, then, not all public bodies involved with the trump development have fully embraced the spirit of openness and transparency. much of the information relating to the resort has been released almost under duress, following interventions from the sic, rather than being provided as a matter of course. why this should be the case must remain conjecture. perhaps there are concerns that the release of information might shed light on embarrassing or damaging political machinations. perhaps they have been too readily influenced by trump, who has developed a reputation for being litigious (e.g. alter 2013) and something of a ‘cavalier and unpleasant bully’ (scotsman 2012) in his business dealings. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 111 or perhaps the tigls case simply reflects, in microcosm, wider attitudes towards freedom of information amongst officialdom in scotland, for the sic has recently expressed concerns about a rise in the number of appeals following a lack of response to foisa requests: ‘eight years on from the implementation of foi, we would expect to see authorities becoming more effective in the technical aspects of request handling, not less so. a failure to respond is, quite simply, a failure to respect the requester’s statutory rights...’ (scottish information commissioner 2013, p. 10) conclusions this paper has explored the relationship between public access to information and procedural environmental justice and ecological justice through a comparison of two controversial developments on the coast of north-east scotland: the building of a north sea gas reception terminal by the british gas council and total some forty years ago, and the more recent construction of donald trump’s golf course. using these two projects as examples, can it be argued that environmental and ecological justice are now more attainable in this current era of supposed transparency and public engagement in planning procedures, than in the more secretive and less participative 1970s? certainly, at the planning application stage, information on the potential environmental impact of the tigls golf resort has been more readily obtainable, compared with that provided by the gas council and total forty years earlier. planning permission to build the gas terminal at crimond was sought within just 14 days and was based on ‘the sketchiest of information’ (dunnet 1974, p. 14), and the one public meeting that took place was arranged at the behest of concerned residents rather than by the planning authority or the developers. forty years ago, anyone wishing to participate in the initial planning process had to rely on information provided by environmental opponents of the terminal, rather than by the applicants themselves. even when attention had switched to the far less environmentally sensitive st. fergus site, detailed plans were not immediately forthcoming from the developers and representations were again expected within 14 days. in complete contrast, the full tigls application was effectively subject to an eight-month consultation period, and was supported by a lengthy (and, of course, mandatory) environmental assessment report, which was made widely available to any interested parties, both online and offline. the subsequent masterplan for the resort also included a detailed environment management plan. in this regard, information provision has played an important role in ensuring that procedural 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 environmental justice has been further to the fore during the trump resort planning application than in the case of the gas terminal four decades earlier. during and after the construction stage, though, when considering the provision of information on whether or not the developments have met the environmental planning conditions — and therefore establishing whether or not ecological justice has been done — the situation with the st. fergus gas terminal has been far clearer than with the tigls resort. over the last 40 years, the various incarnations of the st. fergus dunes management committee have continually monitored the impact of the terminal, and have reported publicly on what has generally been regarded as an environmental success story. with trump’s golf resort, however, although the reports of the ecow suggest that environmental care was generally taken during the construction of the first course, these were not made publicly available until some time after the course had been completed. and the objectivity of the ecow — a consultancy company funded solely by tigls — has been challenged by some of trump’s more sceptical opponents, who have also offered alternative views on the environmental effects of the course construction. meanwhile, the unexplained demise of memag and the removal from the public eye of all records relating to the group, has meant that the environmental impact of the golf course, in its post-construction, operational stage, remains shrouded in mystery. bearing these points in mind, there is little evidence to indicate that ecological justice is more attainable in this current age of supposed open government. despite the existence of freedom of information legislation, there remain a 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union 2003b, ‘directive 2003/35/ec of the european parliament and of the council if 26 may 2003 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending with regard to public participation and access to justice council directives 85/337/eec and 96/61/ec’, official journal of the european union, l 156, 25 june, pp. 1724, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32003l0035&from=en accessed 24 june 2014. faber, d. & mccarthy, d. 2001, ‘the evolving structure of the environmental justice movement in the united states: new models for democratic decision-making’, social justice research, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 405-421. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1014602729040 freedom of information (scotland) act 2002, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2002/13/contents accessed 30 june 2014. holmes, a. 1973, ‘sands of time are running out for the planners’, the scotsman, 12 may, weekend supplement p. 1. ironside farrar 2007, golf & leisure resort, menie estate, balmedie, aberdeenshire: environmental statement, http://www.aberdeenshire.gov.uk/plann4605ing/apps/detail.asp?ref_no=app/2006/4605 accessed 30 june 2014 johnston, j. & smith, g. 2006, ‘wind may be hazard in trump’s plans to build £300m golf resort’, the herald (glasgow), 1 april, p. 3. kelly, s. 2012, ‘bully for you: trump threatens suit against filmmaker’, aberdeen voice, 24 october, http://aberdeenvoice.com/2012/10/bully-for-you-trump-threatens-suit-against-filmmaker/ accessed 30 june 2014. kelly, s. 2013a, ‘menie: the case for a public inquiry – part 2’, aberdeen voice, 27 august http://aberdeenvoice.com/2013/08/menie-case-public-inquiry-part-2/ accessed 30 june 2014. kelly, s. 2013b, ‘the menie estate: from sssis to bluegrass country’, aberdeen voice, 25 february, http://aberdeenvoice.com/2013/02/the-menie-estate-from-sssis-to-bluegrass-country/ accessed 30 june 2014. kelly, s. 2013c, ‘trump golf course public consultation 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http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:32003l0035&from=en http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1014602729040 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2002/13/contents http://www.aberdeenshire.gov.uk/plann4605ing/apps/detail.asp?ref_no=app/2006/4605 http://aberdeenvoice.com/2012/10/bully-for-you-trump-threatens-suit-against-filmmaker/ http://aberdeenvoice.com/2013/08/menie-case-public-inquiry-part-2/ http://aberdeenvoice.com/2013/02/the-menie-estate-from-sssis-to-bluegrass-country/ http://aberdeenvoice.com/2013/08/trump-golf-course-public-consultation-my-experience/ http://aberdeenvoice.com/2013/08/trump-golf-course-public-consultation-my-experience/ http://aberdeenvoice.com/2013/06/scottish-enterprise-trump-and-menie-business-as-usual/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 115 maschewsky, w. 2005, environmental justice in scotland – just words? a view from outside, http://www.foe-scotland.org.uk/aviewfromoutside accessed 24 june 2013 mcgurty, e.m. 1997, ‘from nimby to civil rights: the origins of the environmental justice movement’, environmental history, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 301-323. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3985352 nature conservancy 1970, sites of special scientific interest: loch of strathbeg – aberdeenshire, letter announcing proposals to designate strathbeg as a sssi, sent by the nature conservancy to a crimond landowner on 17 november 1970, held by rspb scotland, aberdeen. ogilvie, g. 1973, ‘people’s lives matter: tell us what is going on’, aberdeen evening express, 9 february, p. 8. parris, c.l., hegtvedt, k.a., watson, l.a. & johnson, c. 2014, ‘justice for all? factors affecting perceptions of environmental and ecological injustice’, social justice research, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 67-98. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-013-0200-4 pauling, t. 2012, ‘councillors snub trump invitation’, aberdeen press and journal, 16 june, p. 8. pezzullo, p.c. 2001, ‘performing critical interruptions: stories, rhetorical invention, and the environmental justice movement’, western journal of communication, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 125. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10570310109374689 planning etc. (scotland) act 2006. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2006/17/contents accessed 30 june 2013. ritchie, w. 1980, ‘environmental aspects of oil and gas pipeline landfalls in northeast scotland’, proceedings of the seventeenth coastal engineering conference, march 23 to 28, 1980, sydney, australia, volume iii, american society of civil engineers, new york, pp. 29382954. ritchie, w. 1997, ‘the st. fergus gas terminals: the structural and environmental context of monitoring’ in ritchie, w. & kingham, l (eds), the st. fergus coastal environment: monitoring and assessment of the north sea gas terminals at st. fergus, aberdeen university research & industrial services limited, aberdeen, pp. 1-15. ritchie, w. & gimingham, c.h. 1989, ‘restoration of coastal dunes breached by pipeline landfalls in north-east scotland’, proceedings of the royal society of edinburgh, section b, vol. 96, pp. 231-245. ross, j. 2007, ‘trump: i could lose millions over golf plan’, the scotsman, 9 october, p. 13. scandrett, e., dunion, k. & mcbride, g. 2000, ‘the campaign for environmental justice in scotland’, local environment, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 467-474. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713684885 schlosberg, d. 2004, ‘reconceiving environmental justice: global movements and political theories’, environmental politics, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 517-540. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0964401042000229025 schlosberg, d. 2007, defining environmental justice: theories, movements, and nature, oxford university press, oxford. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286294.001.0001 scholsber, d. 2013, ‘theorising environmental justice: the expanding sphere of a discourse’, environmental politics, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 37-55. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.755387 scotsman 2012, ‘leader: trump’s swipe at wind farm site puts him in the rough’, 10 february, p. 32. scottish government 2007, proposed golf course at menie estate, news release, 4 december, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/news/releases/2007/12/05082758 accessed 30 june 2014. scottish government 2008a, trump golf resort gets go ahead, news release, 3 november, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/news/releases/2008/11/03123709 accessed 28 march 2014. http://www.foe-scotland.org.uk/aviewfromoutside http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3985352 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-013-0200-4 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10570310109374689 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2006/17/contents http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713684885 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0964401042000229025 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286294.001.0001 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2013.755387 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/news/releases/2007/12/05082758 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/news/releases/2008/11/03123709 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 scottish government 2008b, decision on the menie estate planning application by trump international golf links, scotland: report of the public local inquiry, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/resource/doc/212607/0067709.pdf accessed 30 june 2014. scottish government 2008c, information regarding the menie estate planning application by trump international golf links, scotland, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/publications/1997/03/17133808/0 accessed 30 june 2014. scottish information commissioner 2012, informing the future: the state of freedom of information in scotland, http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?lid=5266&sid=5972 accessed 30 june 2014. scottish information commissioner 2013, 2012/13 annual report: upholding the right to know, http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/home/sicreports/annualreport201213.aspx accessed 30 june 2014. scottish information commissioner 2014, decisions, http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/applicationsanddecisions/decisions/decisions.php accessed 30 june 2014. shell world uk 2013, ‘clean, lean and green’, autumn, pp. 19-20, http://s00.staticshell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/gbr/downloads/pdf/swuk-autumn-2013.pdf accessed 30 june 2014. slater, a. & pedersen, o.w. 2009, ‘environmental justice: lessons on definition and delivery from scotland’, journal of environmental planning and management, vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 797-812. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09640560903083749 stephens, t. 2003, ‘an overview of environmental justice’, thomas m. cooley law review, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 229-247. stri ecology & environment 2010, trump international golf links scotland: environmental management plan, https://www.aberdeenshire.gov.uk/planning/apps/detail.asp?ref_no=app/2010/0423 accessed 31 march 2014. tomlinson, d. 1990, ‘terns for the better’, country life, vol. 184, no. 27, p. 131. total e&p uk 2011, st fergus environmental statement 2011, http://www.uk.total.com/activities/documents/stfergus2011.pdf accessed 30 june 2014. town and country planning (scotland) act 1969, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1969/30/contents accessed 30 june 2014. united nations economic commission for europe 1998, convention on access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters, done at aarhus, denmark, on 25 june 1998, http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/dam/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf accessed 30 june 2014 urquhart, f. 2007, ‘protests muted as trump’s golf plans attract just 60 comments’, the scotsman, 3 may, p. 8. urquhart, f. 2014, ‘defeated trump turns his back on scotland’, the scotsman, 12 february, p. 1. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/resource/doc/212607/0067709.pdf http://www.scotland.gov.uk/publications/1997/03/17133808/0 http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/nmsruntime/saveasdialog.aspx?lid=5266&sid=5972 http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/home/sicreports/annualreport201213.aspx http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/applicationsanddecisions/decisions/decisions.php http://s00.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/gbr/downloads/pdf/swuk-autumn-2013.pdf http://s00.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/gbr/downloads/pdf/swuk-autumn-2013.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09640560903083749 https://www.aberdeenshire.gov.uk/planning/apps/detail.asp?ref_no=app/2010/0423 http://www.uk.total.com/activities/documents/stfergus2011.pdf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1969/30/contents http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/dam/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf rough justice? exploring the relationship between information access and environmental and ecological justice pertaining to two controversial coastal developments in north-east scotland0f graeme baxter robert gordon university abstract introduction environmental and ecological justice environmental justice and information access in scotland ‘jobs versus ducks’: the gas terminal development ‘livelihoods before liverwort’: trump’s golf course development conclusions references 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia inside the aid/watch case: translating across political and legal activism james goodman university of technology, sydney abstract the article explores the interaction between legal and political strategy in producing social change. it centres on a long-running dispute in australia over whether charities can have a dominant political purpose. the focus is on the strategising of the small activist charity that successfully pursued the case over a five-year period. as an 'insider' account, the article charts the in-practice process of translating activisms across legal and political fields. with a stress on contingency and agency, the account affirms a 'politics of rights' approach to legal activism. it shows how the case opened-up new grounds for political contestation, and as such offered prospects for 'non-reformist reform'. it also demonstrates how this occurred more by strategic engagement with unintended effects, than necessarily by design. there has always been a difficult relationship between legal and political activism, especially in liberal democratic societies. political legitimacy in such societies centres on the lockean contract between the national state and its citizenry, and is played-out in various modes of rights framing. here, political contestation is channelled into rights claims that reinforce legitimation structures. legal reforms, though, may prefigure wider transformations: as andre gorz argued, ‘nonreformist reforms’ can open up political spaces for mobilisation and broader forms of political claim-making (gorz 1967, p.7; see bond 2008). as argued here, the aid/watch case can be seen as an example of ‘non-reformist reform’, where a matter of minor legal irritation snowballed into a case that offers important political possibilities. as a battle between a small political charity and the machinery of the state, it affirmed political agency, demonstrating the possibilities as well as the tensions of fusing legal and political activism. in terms of the claims that were pursued, the case defines a new right to political ‘agitation’, whilst paradoxically affirming judicial structures. this article canvasses some of the dilemmas that arose during the conduct of the case, and is presented as a first-hand internal narrative. aid/watch is a small member-based non-government organisation (ngo), with an income of less than $100,000, which monitors the australian government overseas aid program. in 2006 the australian tax office (ato) disqualified aid/watch as a charity for having a dominant political purpose. for the following four years the organisation sought to overturn the ato cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 47 disqualification. it was ultimately successful, achieving its goal without spending one dollar of its members’ donations. the case passed through five levels of appeal. aid/watch unsuccessfully appealed to the ato in 2007, then in 2008 won its appeal at the administrative appeals tribunal (aat); the ato successfully appealed against the aat outcome at the federal court in 2009; aid/watch then successfully sought special leave to appeal to the high court. the high court ruled in favour of aid/watch in 2010. significantly, the case gave the high court the opportunity to extend rights to political communication in australia, thereby transforming australian charity law, lifting the common law ban on charitable political purposes. the insistence by one small ngo that it had the right to speak-out as a charity forced the extension of constitutionallyentrenched rights in australia. it should be noted the australian constitution does little to protect human rights. as the human rights commission states, the constitution ‘offers only limited protection for a small number of discrete human rights’: the right to trial by jury, freedom of religion, the right to judicial review, the right to compensation for compulsorily-acquired property and the right not to be discriminated against on the basis of state of residency (australian human rights commission 2009, paras 114 and 117). all other rights are subject to legislation and thus to limitation, the exception being the right to ‘freedom of expression in relation to public and political affairs’, commonly referred to as ‘freedom of political communication’, recognised by the high court from 1992 as a constitutional right arising from the necessity for political debate in representative democracy (australian human rights commission 2009, para 118). in the high court judgement for aid/watch this ‘implied’ right to political communication trumped the ban on political purposes for charities. communication was broadly defined to include ‘“agitation” for legislative and political purposes’, which the high court defined as ‘constitutional processes which contribute to public welfare’ (high court of australia 2010d, para 45; also see williams in this special issue). the aid/watch case therefore enacts a constitutional guarantee for political ‘agitation’, and in the process raises important questions as to how this right to agitate may be similarly applied to benefit other fields of political life. to help answer these questions, this article uses an ‘inside’ narrative to ask why this small organisation took on the task, and identify what factors enabled it to pursue the case. as a view from ‘inside’, the account is framed as a reflection on practice, with the benefit of hindsight, to draw out key themes and factors in the development of the case from an aid/watch perspective. 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 in doing so, the paper addresses dilemmas between legal and political activism, within ‘rights’ framing, and beyond it. as will become clear, there are many individuals from the ngo sector and amongst legal firms and in universities whose encouragement, sound advice and personal commitment played a central role in ensuring the case was pursued. one individual should be mentioned at the outset: the late professor mark lyons, my former colleague at uts, and authority on the not-for-profit sector in australia, who encouraged us at every step. in 2003 he had commented ‘from time to time the ato has stripped a nonprofit organisation of its charity status on the ground that it transgressed the lobbying prohibition. these occasions are few and attract no attention’ (lyons 2003, p.1). with aid/watch, between 2006 and 2009 he played a key role in proving himself wrong. unfortunately he passed away before the federal court judgement was overturned. legal and political activism ‘in translation’ in capitalist societies formal legal equality is in permanent tension with substantive inequality: paradoxically, formal equality enforces and institutionalises real inequalities. the extension of legal rights, from property rights, to political, social and cultural rights, reflects the extension of liberal principles across social fields (marshall 1950/1973). the deepening lockean contract does not supersede substantive inequalities, yet it renders them politically visible and open to challenge (woods 1995). that challenge may come ‘from within’, for instance in the form of legal activism; or it may come externally, through political activism. in debates about legal reform a continuum may be constructed between legal activism that limits itself to extrapolating existing legal principles, to political activism that aims to delegitimise the law, a form of immanent critique in the name of higher political norms. legal activism seeks to extend rights observance, the assumption being that the legal regime can ameliorate the system that produces it. taken alone, though, legal activism may enable de-radicalisation, cooptation and normalisation, entrenching the very power sources that are ostensibly being targeted (lobel 2006). the target of immanent critique is the political system as a whole, and the legislative process as part of it, rather than legal authority per se. pearson and salter describe it as an ‘effort to turn the normative standards that a legal ideology employs back upon the institutional procedures and actions which are supposed to embody these standards… [it] can involve taking a measure promising ‘equal’ rights ‘at its word’ even, or rather especially, where the underlying institutional intention was never to fully realise this ideal’ (pearson and salter 1999, p. 484). an cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 49 example is the call for ‘animal rights’ for ‘enemy combatants’ at the guantanamo bay military jail on the basis that dogs received better treatment at the jail than the human detainees (zevnik 2011). clearly, legal and political activism can be linked. legal activism on its own may proceed independently of political agency, but only within the existing legal framework. shifting that framework requires political activism directed at publics beyond the immediate legal process. immanent critique on its own is also inadequate: critiques may have wide political resonance, but are highly contingent. extralegal activism, in a ‘sphere of alternative social activism’, may vacate the legal field in favour of a performative politics, which can lack traction (lobel 2006, p. 981). even if exposing contradictions forces regime change, a legal remedy is not guaranteed (and guantanamo bay may be a case in point). most often, though, the problem is of legal cooptation, where political movements give way to legislative initiatives, with political aspirations subsumed by legal norms. the diversion of political conflict into the pursuit of rights norms, in particular, can offer slim pickings: two cases that have received attention in the us, for instance, are labour movement demands during the 1930s new deal era, and the civil rights movement in the 1960s, both of which are said to have been de-radicalised in the face of the legal rights bestowed upon them (lobel 2007). to guard against cooptation, scheingold, in his classic 1974 text, argued for a focus on the ‘politics of rights’ rather than rights as abstract legal claims (scheingold 1974/2004). the politics of rights rejects the distinction between law and politics and puts political-legal strategising in the driving seat, offering the possibility of more sustained transformation. yet the balance is a difficult one, especially given the in-built elitism of the legal profession, in tension with political activism, which relies on the mobilisation of broader publics. strategising between political and legal fields becomes a precondition for the kind of ‘nonreformist reforms’ favoured by andre gorz. the alternation should perhaps be understood as a process of strategic ‘translation’, from legal into political fields and vice versa (paris 2006, p. 1029). legal activism centres on the conduct of particular cases as they pass through various levels of judicial authority; political activism is also highly episodic, moving across issues and agendas according to the political process. the process of translation between the two is thus an active and on-going process of seeking to capture the agenda, a process which can be tracked and mapped. as a subjective engagement, the process involves individuals in strategic manoeuvres, in 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 seeking-out ‘strategic possibilities hidden within the concrete particularity of issues and movements’ (hunt 1990, p. 361). what is attempted here is a personalised mapping, to draw out the twists and turns across political and legal categories in the process of building a snowballing ‘non-reformist reform’. before embarking on this narrative, the following section provides some context on issue of charities and politics in australia. charitable status and advocacy in australia the conservative coalition that governed australia 1996-2007 came to power with a mandate to rule for the ‘mainstream’ against ‘special interests’, as represented by advocacy ngos. ngo elites were seen as impinging on the capacity of elected governments to govern for the mass of the populace, undermining economic efficiency and distorting the workings of the market (staples 2007; phillips 2006). the coalition explicitly identified advocacy ngos as unaccountable and self-serving, and sought to reduce their influence (mowbray 2003). ngos dependent on government funding were especially vulnerable: these were deemed to have violated public trust if they publicly criticized government policy, and could only advocate for individual cases, chilling public debate (see maddison and hamilton 2006). dependence on charitable donations from individuals and foundations was another source of vulnerability. advocacy ngos are often expert-based rather than member-based, and are particularly dependent on charitable status. for these organizations the capacity to establish and maintain a presence, and thus to influence the public sphere, can hinge on access to tax concessions. government efforts to contain charitable status began in 2001, when the government initiated an inquiry into 'the definition of charities and related organizations' headed by a former judge, ian sheppard. the inquiry assessed what changes were necessary to ensure the legal definition of charities remained relevant to the contemporary environment, and unexpectedly recommended the definition of 'charitable purpose' be broadened. the inquiry found that advocacy could be a core element of charitable activity, provided it furthered or was 'in aid of... charitable purpose or purposes': any activity was acceptable provided it was not 'illegal', 'contrary to public policy', or involved promoting 'a political party or a candidate for political office ' (commonwealth of australia 2001, p.108). in 2003 the federal government published its 'draft charities bill', rejecting sheppard's recommendations on advocacy. within the bill, under section 8, a set of 'disqualifying purposes' was created that included 'the purpose of attempting to change the law or government policy' cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 51 (commonwealth of australia 2003). the government referred the bill to the federal taxation board for public consultation, and about 260 submissions were submitted, mostly from the charitable sector. for many of these, the bill's impact on advocacy was a central concern. for instance, philanthropy australia, a peak group representing 217 organisations, argued that: ‘to exclude lobbying, advocacy or activities designed to achieve changes in government policy or legislation, is to take charities back 40 years. such an exclusion would severely limit the effectiveness of many organizations…’ (philanthropy australia 2003). in its final report, the tax board described section 8 as 'the most controversial section of the draft bill’, and added, 'concerns about section 8 reflect the view that the section may operate to limit the advocacy activities of charitable bodies. respondents saw this possibility as significant because of the widely-expressed view that advocacy is of vital importance to the operations of the modern charitable sector' (federal taxation board 2004, p.13). a key issue was the relationship between activities and purposes, and the extent to which a disqualifying purpose could be inferred from activities (federal taxation board 2004, p. 21). in may 2004, in the face of overwhelming opposition from charities and churches, and from the national roundtable of non-profit organisations, the federal government shelved the bill. with the legislative path blocked, the federal government moved to take the regulatory route. in 2003 the government had commissioned the institute for public affairs, a ‘free market’ think-tank which itself has tax-deductible status, to audit the federal administration of charitable status. the ipa had established its own ‘ngo watch’ project in 2001, and was a vocal critic of advocacy ngos. at the time, oxfam community aid abroad condemned the government for funding the ipa’s ‘smear campaign against charities, welfare and aid agencies’ (oxfam australia 2003). the ipa’s project promoted the idea that charitable ngos needed to disclose more information about their activities to the authorities, as part of a new ‘protocol’. while the government did not implement the protocol, it did introduce new legislation that required charitable organizations to establish their credentials with the ato in order to retain charitable status (commonwealth of australia 2004: schedule 10 endorsement of charities). the legislation came into effect in 2005, strengthening the ato's role in policing eligibility, and in 2005 the ato issued tax rulings to clarify what criteria would be used to test eligibility. despite the efforts of many organizations, including the national roundtable of non-profit organisations, the eventual ato rulings imposed new limits on charitable activity. in particular, 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 the ato ruling 2005/211 banned charities from having a purpose of ‘propagating or promoting a particular point of view’ (ato 2005, para 102). this disqualifying political purpose could be inferred from the organisation’s activities: if such activity was deemed more than ‘incidental’ to the charity’s purpose, then the organisation would cease to be a charity. the ato reserved for itself the right to characterize the extent of political activity, potentially enabling it to deregister a charity whenever it took a ‘point of view’. the aid/watch case from ‘inside’ aid/watch was set up in 1993 with the main aim of forcing greater accountability from australia’s agency for overseas development aid, ausaid. the ato recognised aid/watch as a charity in 2000, and it was listed under the register of environment organisations for deductable gift recipient status. i joined the aid/watch committee of management in 1998, having worked with the organisation in the successful campaign against the oecd’s multilateral agreement on investment. by 1998 aid/watch had developed an organisational model that remains in place today, namely a focus on researching and campaigning with people affected by the australian aid program. the organisation attracted a small but loyal membership base, many of whom provided tax-deductible donations, and it received several project grants from international charitable foundations. aid/watch disqualification 2006 the ato’s ‘notification of revocation of endorsement as a tax concession charity’ was issued to aid/watch in october 2006. the notice recognised that aid/watch objectives, as stated in its constitution, were charitable, and were fulfilled through a range of different research and education activities, including through the provision of advice to governments in australia and overseas. however the ato cited three activities of the organisation that it believed were not consistent with charitable status. these three 'political' activities were: urging the public to write to the government to put pressure on the burmese regime; delivering an (ironic) 60th anniversary birthday cake to the world bank; and raising concerns about the developmental impacts of the us-australia free trade agreement. the ato claimed the three activities were more than incidental to aid/watch’s charitable purpose and demonstrated that aid/watch had a ‘separate, political purpose’.1 1 ato, notification of revocation of endorsement as a tax concession charity, 2 october 2006. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 53 the arrival of the ato’s disqualifying letter sparked an intense debate within aid/watch. given the ato’s grounds for disqualifying aid/watch, there was a strong view that this was a political decision, driven by members of the government. during the decade of conservative rule, from 1996, the australian aid program had become increasingly politicized, and tensions between aid/watch and the government had sharpened. in 2006 for instance, aid/watch released research highlighting the misuse of tsunami aid to indonesia, and the foreign minister telephoned aid/watch offices, threatening to de-fund the organization (he was informed that under its constitution the organization could not accept government funding). the ato, itself, denied any political motivation in disqualifying aid/watch. at a mediation session required by the administrative appeals tribunal (aat) in april 2008, the ato refused to disclose how it had identified aid/watch from the 48,000 organisations that had tax-exempt charitable status. in a written response, the australian government solicitor stated that to ‘maintain the integrity of compliance programs’ the ato could not reveal the ‘manner and method of selecting individuals and entities for audit’.2 efforts at alerting the new labor government, that came to power in 2007, to questions of political bias, met with a similar response. separate letters from federal ministers, bob mcmullan as minister for international development assistance responding to a constituent, and wayne swan as treasurer responding to senator brown, insisted the ato was ‘independent’ and ‘impartial’ (27 july 2007 and 15 january 2009 respectively). more detached observers of the process suggested that governments had kept the compliance system deliberately opaque, ‘as a useful weapon of bureaucratic discretion… a weapon they could wield against certain organizations’ (lyons 2003, p.1). the actual character of the compliance program was inadvertently revealed at a november 2008 federal inquiry into 'disclosure regimes for charities and not-for-profits' when deputy commissioner mark konza told the inquiry that the ato investigated aid/watch following an 'intelligence lead' (senate standing committee on economics 2008, p. 22). ironically, mr konza breached the ato's own confidentiality obligations, and acknowledged he was doing so, when he agreed with a senator that aid/watch was the only organisation denied charitable status on political grounds, claiming it 'was only engaged in political activity'. intriguingly, mr konza appeared to acknowledge that a liberal senator, senator mason, had been the source of the 2 australian government solicitor, letter to aid/watch, 14 may 2008. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 complaint against aid/watch. in a follow-up discussion mr konza also put on the public record that the ato would initiate investigation of the groups involved in the ‘make poverty history’ campaign, and also the wilderness society should a formal complaint about these organisations be forthcoming from senator mason. these informal exchanges, recorded in hansard, reveal much about the regime that was in place, despite the ato’s official insistence that it was (and is) independent of government. this was the position put to senator brown in response to a series of questions he submitted to the treasury on the aid/watch case and the apparent politicisation of the ato. in response, the treasury had stated that secrecy laws prevented the tax commissioner from raising individual cases with the government (and vice versa). as such treasury denied there had been any discussion with members of the government about the ato’s decision to launch a federal court appeal to overturn the aat aid/watch decision. it insisted: ‘the tax office review of ngos is based on an understanding of the legal requirements and is no way influenced by the government’ (senate standing committee on economics 2009, para 5). internal ato appeal 2007 the political context in which aid/watch was selected for disqualification influenced the approach taken internally. with the help of a pro-bono lawyer, aid/watch lodged an internal ato appeal in late 2006 against the disqualification. in the meantime aid/watch also looked at the possibility of revising its constitution in order to make clear that its activities conformed to ato guidelines. this conciliatory approach was forced off the table when the ato responded to the aid/watch appeal by arguing that some of aid/watch purposes were disqualifying political purposes, as well as the three cited activities.3 further, at a mediation later required by the aat, the ato refused to state what form of words would be required in order to meet their requirements: aid/watch would have to accept disqualification and reapply.4 in light of the ato’s response to the aid/watch appeal, an overall strategy coalesced around a political campaign to promote a legal challenge. first, though, aid/watch had to decide whether they indeed had any chance of success. after the ato appeal aid/watch the pro bono lawyer stated they had ‘formed the view that aid/watch does not have a reasonable prospect of success in appealing’, and declined to continue assisting 3 australian tax office, reasons for decision, aid watch inc. objection reference 5567873. 4 aid/watch, notes from aid/watch mediation, 30 april 2008. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 55 the organisation.5 the lawyer was from one of australia’s leading law firms, and its decision to drop the case was a major blow. fortunately, aid/watch was also being informally advised by several lawyers based within large charitable ngos. these individuals played a key role in persuading aid/watch that it was worth taking the case further. their strong recommendation was to appeal the case to the aat as, if the appeal failed at the tribunal, ato legal costs could not be imposed on aid/watch. the question of financial liability for the aid/watch committee of management, at this stage, was therefore not a major concern. given the risks were low, aid/watch began searching for a new source of legal representation. aid/watch now decided to politicise the ato’s decision, to define it as a test case for the charitable sector as a whole. with no further hope of persuading the ato to change its position, aid/watch planned to target the ato as having made an arbitrary and politicized decision. this would strengthen support from the ngo sector, and help in sourcing legal representation. a wide range of development and environment charities were approached, and also other commentators, to brief them on the case. specific journalists were contacted and a broadsheet news story was developed to coincide with a public announcement that aid/watch had been disqualified. publicising the ato disqualification was timed deliberately with a major aid/watch critique of the aid program: on 28 may aid/watch was in the media accusing the government of having manipulating the aid program; on 30 may a media story outlined how the organisation had been disqualified for its political activities (jopson 2007; wade 2007). also, on 29 may aid/watch used a budget estimates hearing in the federal parliament to question the ato, with the greens senator kerry nettle asking a range of questions of michael d’ascenzo, commissioner of taxation and senator nick minchin (then minister for finance).6 the media visibility politicized the case, and a wide range of ngos began raising concerns. a number of prominent aid charities asserted the importance of charitable advocacy for a democratic society. the chief executive of oxfam, andrew hewett, stated the decision was negative for the sector, for public policy and for governance in australia; the chief executive of world vision, tim costello, stated advocacy was inseparable from charity, even in the most immediate and direct forms of humanitarian assistance (see wade 2007 and abc news 2007a). the peak aid ngo, the australian council for international development (acfid, acfoa's successor), was concerned the case would send a 'disturbing, anti-democratic signal across 5 aid/watch confidential source, lawyers letter, 2 may 2007. 6 the commissioner stated that charities had to be engaged in the ‘direct provision of assistance’, claiming indirect advocacy was not charitable; see senate standing committee on economics 2007. 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 australia’s large non-profit sector' (acfid 2007). there was also a strong response from the social services sector, with the chair of the national roundtable of non profit organisations, david thompson, stating: ‘if we're to have a robust, transparent and effective democracy, we need organisations like aid/watch doing the homework’ (abc news 2007b). the chief executive of the st vincent de paul society, john falzon, stated in an article devoted to the case that ‘we will never countenance a concept that charitable assistance should be separate from advocacy’ (davies 2007). at the time, and after, government hostility increased. the secretary to the treasurer, peter dutton, stated aid/watch was seeking to make ‘political mileage’ out of the ato decision, demonstrating the ‘sort of organisation that they are’ (abc news 2007b). when aid/watch released a report in june 2007 that criticized the use of australian aid to gain access to the iraqi wheat market, the foreign minister’s office simply labelled aid/watch ‘extremist’ (abc news 2007c). nevertheless, the legal case was being seriously assessed by tax advisors and charity lawyers. even a former ato auditor raised concerns at the increasing politicization of the ato, stating the case needed ‘to be examined by the external authorities’ (seage 2007). in august 2007 a not-for-profit briefing on the case from a melbourne-based legal firm, moores, stated: ‘pressure by the ato on perceived political activities of charitable and especially overseas aid organizations is at odds with contemporary thinking that real change will come about when governments intervene to deal with the causes of poverty rather than alleviating the outcomes of poverty’ (irvine-so 2007). it added: ‘the difficulty for charitable organizations is to work out when an ancillary activity may become so dominant that it becomes a purpose in itself. at the moment there is little guidance and the outcome of the aid/watch case will help. in the meantime there is danger in extensive or aggressive political activity…’ (irvine-so 2007). political visibility defined the case as a possible public interest test case, and helped aid/watch find pro bono legal representation with the progressive legal firm, maurice blackburn, through its ‘social justice practice’. this was a key stage in the case, as it later shifted the legal frame, from a largely tax and charity law focus into a constitutional context, offering broader possibilities for a legal remedy. administrative appeals tribunal 2008 the aat case was listed for june 2008; the aat waived the application fee and the aat president justice downes presided over the case. a mediation between aid/watch and the ato cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 57 prior to the case hearing was required (against ato objections). rather than mediating the case, this further entrenched the legal dispute: the ato now argued that because the aid/watch constitution sought ‘to ensure’ aid was more effectively distributed, then by definition it had a dominant political purpose. in their submission responding to the aat appeal the ato now argued that ‘all of the applicant’s objects seek to change law or policy’, and hence that all of the aid/watch purposes were political (ato 2008, para 3.4). the aat appeal was a major task for aid/watch as it required extensive evidence, linked to legal arguments that the organization conformed to the existing common law on the definition of charity. importantly, the process of making the argument from within the existing legal framework was in some tension with the political stance that charities had the right to speak out. the legal argument at the aat turned on whether aid/watch sought to propagandize for changes in the law, or undertook monitoring, research and campaigning to improve the administration of the aid program. in some respects, the organization would defend the right to do either or both of these: the argument that charities should be allowed to speak out does not discriminate on how they do this. at the aat though, aid/watch argued its activities were not aimed at changing the law, but rather at helping the government implement ausaid’s policy commitment to alleviating poverty and promoting environmental sustainability. the two-day hearing involved two large legal teams, an aid/watch witness, and justice downes. the ato had trawled through the aid/watch website, and had made several requests for internal documents, including funding applications, notes from planning sessions, and minutes of meetings. several additional papers, mined from the aid/watch website, were unexpectedly tabled on the day. the judgement, when it came, was in favour of aid/watch: its purposes were found to be directed to the relief of poverty and the advancement of education, and also otherwise of benefit to the public; its political activities were found to be ‘encouraging’ the realization of existing government policy on aid, not ‘opposing’ it (aat 2008: para 6). significantly, the judgement explicitly stated that aid/watch did not have to distribute aid in order to be charitable: ‘the objects are charitable notwithstanding the fact that aid/watch does not itself provide aid’ (aat 2008, para 7). the aat hearing was to prove invaluable as it set a benchmark establishing the ‘facts of the case’: in formal terms subsequent appeals could only be pursued on the basis of legal arguments, as against questions of fact. for aid/watch this was welcome, as it meant there would be no need 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 for further evidence to be presented. in large part, from then on, direct participation in the legal case was in the hands of the lawyers. federal court – 2009 in responding to the aat judgement the ato insisted that aid/watch was still no longer a charity, and signaled it would appeal to the federal court. to overturn the judgement the ato needed aid/watch to mount a defence, and hence had to concede that the matter was a test case for the sector. as such, the aid/watch legal defence at the federal court was funded from the ato’s ‘test case litigation program’, and aid/watch was indemnified against the ato’s legal costs. for the organization, then, the ato’s federal court appeal had minimal impact: the case was defended against the ato solely through legal arguments centring on charity law, and given the test case funding, there was no financial risk to the committee of management. the real risk, though, was that the ato would succeed in their appeal, and this risk was now not simply to aid/watch, but to the sector as a whole. the case was being treated as a test case, and the ato, in their submissions, were clearly seeking to deepen the ban on political charity. the ato now argued that aid/watch could not have a purpose of relieving poverty as it provided no direct relief (ato 2009, 4.2), and also that it could not have public education purpose as it failed to offer a ‘syllabus’ (ato 2009, 4.3). as such, the ato was now seeking to delimit the definition of charitable purposes as well as extend the scope of the political disqualification. at the aat, aid/watch had successfully argued it was helping the government implement its own policies on overseas aid: at the federal court the ato, quite remarkably, argued there was no such policy, that legislation ‘does not indicate that the present australian government supports overseas aid’ (ato 2009, 2.8). the ato also maintained its position, as expressed at the aat, that aid/watch sought to ‘ensure’ the effectiveness of the government’s overseas aid program, and as such by definition had a dominant political purpose. the federal court judgement of september 2009 overturned the decision of the aat and found in favour of the ato. significantly, though, it did recognise that aid/watch had a clear charitable purpose in aiming to alleviate poverty, and that it did this by monitoring the aid program (federal court 2009, para 20). it thus rejected the ato’s claim that charities must be involved in directly alleviating poverty if they are to be defined as a charity. it also rejected the ato’s argument that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 59 conducting and publicising research, as undertaken by aid/watch, could not be defined as public education (federal court 2009, para 29). on the question of whether there was a disqualifying political purpose, though, the court agreed with the ato, arguing that aid/watch had a dominant political purpose because its constitution seeks ‘to ensure’ that aid alleviates poverty. the court fully accepted this argument: ‘aid/watch’s attempt to persuade the government (however indirectly) to its point of view necessarily involves criticism of, and an attempt to bring about change in, government activity and, in some cases, government policy. there can be little doubt that this is political activity and that behind this activity is a political purpose. moreover the activity is aid/watch’s main activity and the political purpose is its main purpose.’ (federal court 2009, para 39). what disqualified aid/watch, for the court, was that it sought to ensure ‘that the delivery of aid should conform to its view’ (federal court 2009: para 41; bold in original). attempting to influence the public to change government practices was now unacceptable, as well as attempts to directly influence the outcome of legislation or policy: as such, the court substantially deepened the political ban (federal court 2009, para 47). aid/watch cried foul, stating the judgement narrowed the scope for charitable advocacy. specifically, aid/watch argued the judgement was contradictory: as a charity aid/watch could devote itself to monitoring the aid program in order to educate the public and alleviate poverty. but it could not take a view on the aid program, begging the question of how it could fulfil its purposes. responses from the media and from legal observers affirmed the broad anticipated impact on the sector, with concerns widely expressed: the australian financial review reported ‘ruling threatens charities’, the australian stated ‘tax battle may affect advocacy bodies’; sector journals and think tanks responded in a similar way, and senior charity lawyer, murray baird, flagged the necessity for a high court appeal (jacobs 2009; callick 2009; abc radio national 2009; third sector magazine 2009; the australia institute 2009). the judgement was certainly a very negative outcome for the sector. there was always a risk that the aid/watch case would give the ato an opportunity to further tighten charity law. such a possibility had been discussed internally at aid/watch before the decision to proceed with the aat appeal: lawyers based in the larger ngos had stated that the 2006 notification itself had established a precedent, and that it had to be challenged. but now the stakes had risen substantially: a notification, or indeed a failed aat appeal would have had less significance than 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 a full federal court appeal judgement. clearly, for the sector as a whole, the situation had deteriorated. application for leave to appeal to the high court – 2009 if it was important to contest the original ato notification, then certainly it was vitally important to find a way to overturn the federal court judgement. but if the legal stakes had risen, then so had the financial stakes. if aid/watch was to appeal to the high court it would first have to apply for special leave to appeal. this in itself, if it failed, could leave aid/watch liable to pay the legal costs of the ato. the government solicitor had already indicated that it would seek to recover these costs, which were estimated as in the order of $70,000. the aid/watch committee of management had to find a risk-free means of appealing to the high court or face a financial liability. under the nsw rules of incorporation individual members of management committees are personally liable if a debt is incurred when ‘there are reasonable grounds to expect that the association will not be able to pay’ (nsw government 1984, article 38.1). to deal with this, the management committee held specific meetings on the issue, and ensured that the organization’s strategy for minimizing the risks was thoroughly minuted. the strategy came in two parts. the first element was to approach the ngo sector and seek a financial ‘backstop’ of at least $70,000 to insure aid/watch against any possible liability incurred by applying to appeal to the high court. the second element was to decide that aid/watch could not proceed with the high court appeal if the ato failed to provide test case funding. the ato had refused test case funding for the application for special leave to appeal, but there had been some informal suggestion that if the special leave application was successful then a request for test case funding would be looked at more favourably. in mid 2009 the management committee sought to raise the guarantees from ngos. in terms of the legal arguments, maurice blackburn and the barristers had listed a series of reasons why the application was likely to be successful. the federal court itself had prefigured a high court appeal, stating ‘this area of australian law is informed by concepts which, due principally to their antiquity, are not easily adapted to the modern context’, emphasising that 'as an intermediate appellate court' it was limited in its capacity to do this (federal court 2009, paras 9 and 45). additionally, the case had sector-wide implications, and was in an area of legal uncertainty. most important, following the federal court judgement, the case now hinged solely on the question of political purposes. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 61 the response from ngos was encouraging: about fourteen organizations were formally approached, and only two were unable to provide a guarantee. the organizations were in the main from the overseas development and environment sectors, and all agreed that given the federal court judgement, a high court appeal had to go ahead. in addition, several other organizations, including the st vincent de paul society, and peak organizations such as acoss and acfid, agreed to write to the high court urging it allow the appeal to go ahead. with the $70,000 guarantee in place, the aid/watch management committee made the decision to go ahead with seeking special leave to appeal. at the hearing itself, in march 2010, the court asked little of the aid/watch side, and instead focused on the ato and its team of lawyers (which were now headed by d.m.j. bennett qc, former solicitor-general for the howard government). the court agreed with aid/watch that there were grounds for the high court to consider whether or not the australian taxation office should have revoked charitable status in 2006: justice gummow did not agree with the ato argument that this was an ‘inconvenient vehicle’ for a test case, and asked of the ato, ‘what is offensive in influencing government?’ (high court of australia 2010a). the court noted that the role of government in addressing poverty had significantly changed over the past 150 years and agreed that the appeal should go ahead. high court appeal – 2010 with the high court appeal pending, the financial risk to aid/watch had multiplied. if aid/watch lost the high court appeal, the government solicitor would most likely seek to recover costs, both from the appeal and from the special leave application, a total bill approaching $300,000. aid/watch lawyers again submitted an application to the ato for test case funding, this time arguing that given the high court would now hear the appeal, the case had indeed become a test case for the sector. ironically enough, aid/watch was unable to take its appeal against the ato without the ato funding. if the ato refused to fund the case, aid/watch could have argued the ato was denying natural justice, as the ato had used test case funding to overturn the aat outcome. aid/watch could also have argued the case demonstrated the necessity for legislation. but even then, the financial prospects were not good: even if aid/watch had dropped the case, it could still face the possibility of a $70,000 bill from the ato (and it seemed unlikely the ngos that had supported 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 the special leave application would be willing to waste funds on an appeal that was never pursued). for a fortnight the ato considered the test case funding application: aid/watch sought to exert some pressure, releasing details of the financial ‘backstop’ and stressing widespread ngo support for the case to be heard, which were reported extensively in the australian (callick 2010). it was only on the evening of the thursday before the 2010 easter bank holiday that the aid/watch lawyers finally took a call, from the assistant commissioner himself, saying that after some deliberation, the ato had decided to fund the case. this was an important moment for aid/watch. with the ato funding the case, aid/watch was assured its lawyers would be paid, and that aid/watch would be indemnified against the ato’s costs should the appeal fail. maurice blackburn could prepare the full high court appeal. at this stage aid/watch was still arguing within the frame of charity law, that charitable activity could be political and should not be construed as a dominant purpose. in late 2010, for instance, aid/watch had made a submission to the productivity commission inquiry into ‘the contribution of the not-for-profit sector’, arguing that the government should adopt the sheppard inquiry recommendations so that charities could engage in ‘lobbying, research and monitoring’ as well as direct service provision (goodman 2009). in hindsight, aid/watch had begun to believe its own legal arguments, basing the approach on the existing charity law, rather than on in-principle commitments. what had been a legal strategy in the service of a political principle had become a legal dispute on the finer points of charity law. the appeal papers submitted to the high court – both the application for special leave to appeal, and the appellant’s submissions – directly challenged the extension of the political disqualification rule under the federal court judgement. the special leave application argued that ‘many australian charities indirectly attempt to influence government’, and thus are endangered by the federal court judgement, posing a ‘substantial risk of grave injustice in the future’ (aid/watch 2009, paras 44 and 45). the respondent’s submissions, from the ato lawyers, argued that the ‘political disqualification principle’ applied at any ‘level of generality’, whether in terms of overall goals, means, or activities (ato 2010, paras 7 and 39). to resolve this problem, the aid/watch submissions made a positive constitutional argument in favour of the public benefit of political debate. the federal court judgement had stated the court cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 63 could not usurp the legislative political process and sit in judgement over the merits or otherwise of the points of view promoted by aid/watch: it simply ruled them to be political and the organisation to be uncharitable. aid/watch submissions to the high court sought to up-end this argument, stating that political debate is by definition in the public benefit. submissions cited the implied right to freedom of political communication, established by the high court since 1997, that ‘recognises the public benefit in the dissemination and receipt of information, opinions and arguments concerning political matters which affect the people of australia’ (aid/watch 2009, para 31). the claim that promoting public debate on political issues is by definition in the public benefit was sharply contested in the respondent’s submissions, which asserted ‘mere discourse is not a public benefit’ and argued the high court had not ruled political debate should be supported by tax-exempt charitable status (ato 2010, paras 52 and 53). here, the aid/watch lawyers and barristers raised the legal stakes beyond these limits of charity law, and very effectively reframed the case. in part this reflected the high court jurisdiction, where broader questions of political principle could be translated into legal arguments around constitutional rights. it also reflected the public interest focus of the lawyers, and the extent to which they were able to reframe the case in constitutional terms. in the process, at the high court hearing they were able to capture the legal agenda, and put the ato lawyers onto the defensive. as a result of this reframing, the high court appeal itself centred largely on the aid/watch argument that silencing charities was an unwarranted restriction on freedom of political communication (high court of australia 2010b). in its own terms, the ato’s political disqualification prevented charities from having a dominant political purpose, and as such delimited political communication. not surprisingly, the ato preferred a very broad definition of what constituted ‘political’ activities, and hence what could be construed to be a dominant political purpose. the result was a direct and extensive constraint on political communication for any organisation holding charitable status. aid/watch lawyers argued that the common law disqualification only applies to purposes contrary to public policy, rather than much broader political purposes. this public policy disqualification would simply require that charities not act in ways that are contrary to the law. the aid/watch lawyers argued this latter constraint was already established in the case law, and would be more suited to the australian constitutional context. members of the bench were concerned that the public policy approach may allow political parties to gain charitable status – a 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 point answered by aid/watch barristers, who suggested the courts could disqualify political parties on the basis that charitable status would entrench a political party in office. this would contravene the constitutional commitment to representative democracy, and thus would be contrary to public policy. the ato’s main objection to the argument that political disqualification violates the doctrine of freedom of political communication was that the doctrine is recognised by the high court as a negative freedom, not a positive freedom. the ato is thus not obliged to use its charitable tax concessions to encourage freedom of political communication. charitable status, the ato argued, is simply a privileged status awarded to certain categories of organisation that perform a particular role in society (high court of australia 2010c). the problem for this argument was that the legislature had in 2004 itself chosen not to define charitable status in australia. as such, members of the bench stated the high court should not concern itself with the legislative context – it was an irrelevance. crucially, then, the high court was free to develop the common law in the area. in doing so it would not in any way usurp the role of the legislature: the legislature had opted-out. the ato lawyers very strongly objected to this argument, suggesting that the consequences could be very negative in terms of lost revenue if the political disqualification rule was lifted, as a result of many more organisations qualifying for charitable status. this claim was literally ruled out of court, as a matter for the ato, not for the high court. the remainder of the ato’s defence centred on whether or not aid/watch acted in the public benefit. a distinction was drawn between biased political speech, attributed to aid/watch, and genuine efforts at raising issues in ways that do not prejudge outcomes. an analogy was drawn between propagandizing and debating. in making these points the ato repeatedly referred to specific viewpoints adopted by aid/watch. despite being informed by the bench that freedom of political communication was a freedom to engage in any form of legal political rhetoric, the ato returned repeatedly to the content of aid/watch materials (high court of australia 2010c). each time this was attempted, the bench responded by asking how this was relevant, pointing out that it was not the role of the high court to rule on the content of political communication, but simply on the freedom to engage in it. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 65 a similar move emerged with the ato’s argument that aid/watch did not serve the public benefit. the ato barrister spent some time asserting that aid/watch was not effective in discharging its responsibilities, and that this meant it could not be described as having public benefit. the bench responded by asking how the question of effectiveness was relevant to purposes. again, it appeared the ato’s main reason for making these assertions was to discredit aid/watch in a context where the organisation could not effectively respond. the key argument remained: the common law of charity in australia had to move with the times. given the legislature had failed to act in this area, it was up to the high court to resolve a potential clash between the constitutionally-entrenched freedom of political communication, and the existing law of charity. one had to give way to the other. the majority judgement, 5-7, when it came in december 2010, favoured the constitutional norm: it overturned the federal court judgement, finding in favour of aid/watch, and updating the common law on charity to make it consistent with freedom of political communication. departure from english common law was necessary as it had not been developed with regard to the ‘australian system and government established and maintained by the constitution itself’; reflecting that system, the high court ruled that ‘the generation by lawful means of public debate… itself is a purpose beneficial to the community’ (high court of australia 2010d, paras 40 and 47). in the process, the high court established a distinctive australian law on charitable advocacy, of great significance both for the sector and for broader questions of political engagement and ‘agitation’ in australia, and internationally; as the australian put it, ‘the ‘implied right is back in business’ (pelly 2010).7 conclusions the narrative reveals an oscillation between legal and political spheres during the conduct of the aid/watch case, from 2006 to 2010. that oscillation continued after the high court judgement as aid/watch and others sought to ensure that the ato implemented the judgement in a way that would lift the political disqualification for all charities. the importance of this was made clear at public forums held in melbourne and sydney in early 2011, where some of the ambiguities in the 7 the case was cited as having implications for other jurisdictions, notably in new zealand and the uk, see wiggins 2011. 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 judgement were highlighted and debated.8 the forums were significant as they demonstrated that the sector’s expectation was that the ato should now permit a dominant political purpose for all charities. in the event the ato fulfilled this expectation. the ato’s draft ruling on charities issued in may 2011 responded to a range of high court cases on charitable status, including the aid/watch case. in terms of political purposes, the draft ruling simply lifted the political disqualification: it stated that ‘following the high court’s decision in aid/watch… an entity can be charitable if it has a purpose (including a sole purpose) of generating public debate with a view to influencing legislation, government activities or government policy in relation to subject matters that come within one or more of the four heads of charity’ (ato 2011a, para 68(i)). importantly, there was no requirement to present a balanced position: ‘an entity does not necessarily have to present a balanced position in order to be considered an entity with a purpose of generating public debate’ (ato 2011a, para 68(iii)). there was some uncertainty about areas of public policy and public debate that may sit outside the four heads of charity, to be decided ‘on a case by case basis’; there was also a requirement that charitable political purposes involve public debate, not private lobbying, and not party-political activity. after a period of public consultation the finalized ruling was released in october 2011, replicating much of what appeared in the draft version, at least in respect of the aid/watch case (ato 2011b, paras 70-74). there was even some further loosening of the political constraints, with the mention of lobbying dropped from view, and the ban on associating with political parties confined to organizations that have this as their ‘sole purpose’ (ato 2011b, para 72). as such, the ato ruling, finalized in october 2011, confirmed that the aid/watch case produced a significant change in the australian law of charity. but the story was by no means over, with the government seeking to revive the statutory route that had been abandoned in 2003. in parallel with the high court case, in the may 2011 budget the government had initiated its own process for developing a statutory definition of charitable status in australia. the new 8 the papers in this special issue were presented at two of these forums. the first was held at the melbourne law school in february 2010; the second was hosted in sydney by the uts cosmopolitan civil societies research centre. there were two further forums, with input from the ato, organised by changemakers australia, which also made several submissions to the ato on the issue. see: www.changemakers.org.au http://www.changemakers.org.au/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 67 statutory definition of charity was to be revenue neutral9 and was to be ‘based on the 2001 report of the inquiry into the definition of charities and related organisations, taking account of the findings of recent judicial decisions, such as aid/watch incorporated v commissioner of taxation’ (treasury 2011, 37). in late october 2011 the treasury opened public consultations on the basis of a paper, leading to an exposure draft of legislation in 2012. surprisingly, instead of using the 2001 sheppard inquiry, treasury chose to ‘base an australian statutory definition on the work already done on the charities bill 2003’, a bill that had been widely discredited (treasury 2011, para 41).10 reflecting the 2003 bill, treasury sought to elevate a strengthened ‘public benefit’ test, which could have the effect of cancelling-out the high court insistence that public debate on matters of public policy has an intrinsic public benefit (treasury 2011, para 111). while the issue of charitable advocacy has moved back into the political sphere, certain constitutional safeguards had been put in place. the aid/watch high court ruling relied upon the implied freedom of political communication, and was grounded in australian constitutional law as much as in the common law of charity. as such, any statutory definition of charitable status would have to comply with the constitutional protection of public debate on political matters. nevertheless, ensuring such protection is vested in the statutory provisions would no doubt require continued political pressure and possibly still further legal activism. the necessity for ongoing ‘translation’ across political and legal fields remains in place. but most important, if the new rights to political expression and ‘agitation’ are not claimed and tested by existing charities, and indeed by political organizations seeking charitable status, they will surely wither on the vine. setting aside the on-going drama of defining charitable status, this account of legal and political activism by one small ngo has been aimed at detailing the contingent character of the political and legal process. nothing in this narrative was given from the outset – the foundations for legal change were created in the process of contestation. as such, what the narrative reveals is a process of strategizing and translating across legal and political fields in order to accumulate forms of leverage. there is no evidence here that political pressure influenced the legal outcomes, rather, we see political activism laying and re-laying the foundations that enabled various levels 9 the new australian charities and not-for-profits commission, which was to oversee the implementation of the new definition, was expected to generate $41m in tax revenue over four years; one legal firm speculated that the only means of achieving this would be for treasury to ‘narrow the scope of charitable activity in its definition of charity and have the commission take a hard line’; see corney and lind 2011. 10 perplexingly, para 41 claims: ‘this approach is broadly consistent with recommendation 7.1 of the pc [productivity commission] report that the australian government should adopt a statutory definition of charitable purposes in accordance with the recommendations of the charities definition inquiry’ (treasury 2011, para 41). 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3s (special issue), 2011 of legal intervention. clearly one side of the equation could not proceed without the other: the lawyers had to develop strong legal arguments for the case to succeed, but likewise, nothing would have happened without the stubborn insistence of aid/watch that it had a case to answer. in fact, one might argue that the redefinition of charitable status in australia would not have happened unless aid/watch had so successfully antagonized the government of the day. if aid/watch had not signed up for the release of political prisoners in burma, not joined the campaign against the australia-us free trade agreement and not delivered an ironic birthday cake to the world bank, the ato would never have revoked its charitable status. the political disqualification, that now we understand to be unconstitutional, would still be in place. the simple lesson is that activism can produce results, both intended and unintended. references aat 2008, decision and reasons for decision [2008] aata 652, para 6, aat, sydney. abc news 2007a, ‘aid/watch appeals charity status decision’, radio national: am program, 30 may. abc news 2007b, ‘downer dismisses iraq aid claims’, abc news, 3 august, abc radio national 2008, ‘charity in the 21st century’, the law report, interview with aid/watch solicitor anne gooley, 5 august. abc radio national 2009, ‘when is a charity no longer a charity’, in the national interest, 25 september. acfid 2007, 'aid/watch ato ruling on charitable status', acfid media release, 30 may 2007. acfoa 2003, submission to the board of taxation on the draft charities bill, september, 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sport – in this case cricket – as a community development tool in samoa. this pacific island nation, like others in the region, has been the focus of various development programs in the post-colonial era, with developed economy neighbours like australia and new zealand providing aid funding. some of these programs have involved sport as a development tool, underpinned either by funding from the national government, foreign aid agencies, or a combination of both. this paper aims to explore the use of sport as a community engagement tool by focusing on a cricket-fordevelopment (cfd) program in samoa. the paper examines the activities of relevant sport and government organisations, and draws upon interviews with local stakeholders involved in the cfd process in samoa. in short, the prime purpose of this paper is to identify and interpret – from the perspective of locals – what the cfd program has brought to samoan communities thus far. this is important because, to date, there has been an absence of qualitative inquiry into the efficacy of sport-for-development programs in samoa, and very limited research in a pacific islands context. introduction over the last decade, sport has become a useful tool in the quest to pursue social development issues. indeed, sport-for-development (sfd) is now part of the strategic policy apparatus of several major international aid organisations and development agencies such as the united nations and the australian government’s agency for international development, ausaid2 (australian sports commission 2011). however, while sfd has grown in scope and scale as social practice, it has only recently become a focus of concerted academic research 1 christopher khoo conducted the fieldwork for this study as a volunteer with the samoa international cricket association (sica). at the time, he was a postgraduate student at uts. he would like to acknowledge that this study would not have been possible without the support of sica and the advice and assistance of samoan community representatives. 2 in 2013, ausaid was supplanted by the australian government’s program australian aid, which is administered by the department of foreign affairs and trade. 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia (levermore 2008; darnell 2012). this is all the more problematic, coalter (2013) asserts, because in terms of policy and practice sfd is often underfunded, unregulated, poorly planned/coordinated, and typically isolated from mainstream development efforts. this criticism is particularly relevant for sfd programs implemented by external agents in developing nations; there are opportunities, but tremendous challenges in environments with limited resources and infrastructure. all that said, there can be benefits associated with sfd, but only if locals are engaged as facilitators in a development program (schulenkorf 2012). this research stems from the lead researcher’s involvement as a volunteer in ausaid’s australian youth ambassadors for development program. his participation consisted of a 12-month assignment with the samoa international cricket association (sica); the aim was to build the managerial and social capacity of local staff members, particularly by using cricket as a community development tool. the present study is an exploratory study of a sfd program that is very much in its infancy; the goal here is to identify opportunities and challenges using sport as a development vehicle in a pacific island context. a unique aspect of this empirical investigation is the use of cricket in samoa: this sport is particularly interesting because a local form of the game is widely practised at the community level. it is different from the sport of cricket played at the elite level and the interplay between these two forms of the game is an intriguing dimension in this study. samoan context the ten islands of samoa are located in the south west pacific ocean, with only four of these islands inhabited. samoa has a population of 187,820, with 36,735 or 19.6% being in the apia (samoa’s capital) urban area region (samoa bureau of statistics 2011). apia is also the hub for various sport associations and the majority of organised sport in samoa. while there is a significant amount of informal and unstructured sport played in rural samoa, sport teams from villages regularly travel to apia to compete in major competitions. historically, western, codified sport in samoa is a function of european colonisation. english cricket was introduced to samoa in 1884 by the british royal navy, although formal matches were not really seen until much later with the formation of the ‘wanderers’ club in 1964. significantly though, there was local adaptation to the colonial game during that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 77 intervening period. from the example of cricket, an indigenous game called ‘kilikiti’3 (also referred to as ‘kirikiti’) was created and embraced by many in the local population. although there is scarce literature on the history of kilikiti, this game has become part of samoan culture; it also shares many similarities with english cricket in terms of how matches are played. kilikiti was easily naturalised to local circumstances with large teams, a lighter and bouncier ball, longer triangular-shaped bats, and a more pronounced emphasis on festivity and communal participation (ryan 2007). the essence of kilikiti is that it is a socially inclusive game involving whole villages regardless of age or gender. today kilikiti is played throughout communities in samoa in a largely unstructured way, while cricket with its more formal structure is predominately played in geographical village clusters that surround purpose-built cricket grounds. the samoa international cricket association is the formal governing body for cricket in samoa. it is assisted in-country by a number of sports-related and supporting organisations, including the samoan ministry of education, sport and culture (mesc), special olympics samoa, as well as numerous schools, villages and community groups. sica has very strong links to the samoan government, with the chairman of sica being the current samoan prime minister, tuilaepa lupesoliai sailele malielegaoi. sica has been an affiliate member of cricket’s international governing body, the international cricket council (icc), since 2000. it was then that cricket was formalised as a development program in samoa. the icc provides annual funding support, regional and international participation opportunities, as well as professional assistance and training in cricket development programs to 106 members across the world (international cricket council 2007). as an affiliate member, sica receives this support from the icc east asia-pacific regional office and it enables sica to develop and manage cricket programs with a view to growing the game. however, while sport development (participation) is a fundamental goal, the deployment of cricket as a sfd tool is a more recent initiative, stemming largely from the assistance of australian government agencies. 3 according to the te papa museum tongarewa museum in wellington, new zealand (2014), kilikiti is ‘a form of cricket, played samoan style’. the game is thought to ‘have been introduced to samoa in the nineteenth century by visiting sailors and missionaries’. it is now ‘a major summer sport for samoans’ the basic rules are as follows: ‘in samoan kilikiti each team has two wicket keepers, and numbers can range from 10 to 20 players, involving all ages, women and children. the kilikiti bat called pate, is generally made from wood from the hibiscus or breadfruit tree, and can measure up to 1 metre long. its triangular sectioned blade adds a weight advantage, and the narrow circular handle lashed with sennit (coconut husk fibre) binding, ensures a tight grip. the rubber ball uniquely made by continuously wrapping the latex fibre is extracted from the pulu vao tree (castilloa elastica) or panama rubber tree.’ 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 samoa relies heavily upon assistance from foreign countries to finance both sport participation and social development goals. since the 2011-12 financial year, there has been targeted funding into samoa through the australian sports outreach program (asop) – a joint strategy and agreement between ausaid and the australian sports commission (asc). the asop ‘aims to increase the capacity of partners (local authorities, development partner agencies and communities) to plan and conduct quality, sport-based activities which contribute to addressing locally identified development priorities’ (australian sports commission 2011). in samoa, support through the asop includes two programs: (i) the pacific sports partnership (psp), which involves sica receiving financial and logistical support from the australian government (ausaid and asc), cricket australia and the icc east asia-pacific (australian sports commission 2012); and (ii) the samoa country program, which is a partnership between the asc and mesc to deliver the samoa sport for development program (ssfdp) (commonwealth of australia 2012). through the psp, australia has allocated au$15 million over a five-year period to establish and support sports partnerships between australia, oceania regional sports federations and their pacific island counterparts (commonwealth of australia 2012a). samoa received an undisclosed share of a pool of au$402,000 (for the 2012-13 financial year), which is provided by ausaid through the psp to fiji, papua new guinea, samoa and vanuatu for cricket-specific development goals. during that twelve months, a further au$60,525 was invested into the samoa country program to deliver the ssfdp in their multi-sport approach (parliament house of australia 2012). as with all sfd programs, evaluation of spend and impacts thereof are important. thus far, the ssfdp provides a self-monitoring and evaluation framework. it was also part of an independent evaluation of asop country programs conducted in 2013 by ausaid (asop 2013). the present paper adds to that literature by offering an evaluation of opportunities and challenges in a samoan cfd program. literature review to understand and discuss localised benefits and limitations in respect of a sfd program, it is necessary to contemplate the notion of community development. there are numerous definitions of this concept, each with a slightly different focus. one group of scholars has suggested that as an activity, community development is ‘a group of people in a locality initiating a social action process (i.e. a planned intervention) to change their economic, social, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 79 cultural or environmental situation’ (frisby and millar 2002). vail (2007) believes that, fundamentally, community development involves agency – helping people improve their life conditions through a sense of shared common interests. lawson (2005) sees community development as a concept that underpins plans and activities for building and re-building local institutions and neighbourhood structures; this being a particular priority for those living in poverty or who experience social exclusion, social isolation and either inter or intra community conflict. lawson (2005) points to five prominent contributions that sport, exercise and physical education programs may have on a community: (i) production and/or reinforcement of social networks; (ii) the development of collective identities; (iii) improvements to human health (including health-enhancing environments); (iv) a heightened sense of holistic well-being; and (v) the development of human capital. he asserts that the key to achieving these community benefits lies with professionals who deliver the programs being able to empower others, who are then skilled in community building and effective collaboration. these findings are particularly relevant in terms of sfd projects in the pacific where there is a similar focus on sport professional agents building local capacity to plan and deliver sustainable community development programs. clearly, the focus is not solely on sport development in the form of participation, but on developing people and communities through sport. research undertaken by burnett (2006, 2009), which focused on sfd programs in south africa, is highly pertinent to this paper. the ‘active community clubs initiative’ (acci) used a number of team sports – including cricket – to effectively mobilise social capital through network functioning and individual empowerment. the south african acci initiative was facilitated by the asc and is part of ausaid’s asop. the community benefits that were identified from this initiative included enhanced job opportunities for youth, increased social trust between coaches and participants, reduced social distance between parents and children, and increased self-esteem (burnett 2009). the study concluded that a program such as asop can assist in the creation of professional opportunities for those who are involved, but also that team sports – with their focus on working in groups – can be effective in enhancing social inclusion and individual confidence in the community. 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 stewart-withers and brook (2009) have researched the impact that rugby league can play in a sfd context in the pacific – primarily in papua new guinea. they found clear evidence of community benefits from rugby league’s approach to sfd, particularly through the use of high profile players as ambassadors. players from different indigenous backgrounds – including players of aboriginal and torres strait island, papua new guinean and pacific islands descent – have been involved in initiatives to mentor individuals and promote positive life pathways and cultural awareness many of these initiatives – particularly targeting troubled youths – were effective in conveying a positive message; in part, this stemmed from the players’ prominence and the respect they have built within their rugby league fan base. the program encouraged health promotion, youth development and social cohesion. while this research exhibited a correlation between involvement in sfd programs and positive community outcomes for selected individuals, the longevity of the ambassador/role model approach is open to question. therefore, follow-up research is needed, including long-term assessments regarding the sustainability of such programs. it is indeed important to acknowledge scepticism about sfd. some critics have argued that it is naive to assume that sport is inherently suitable as a community development tool; these scholars caution against sfd idealism and, more seriously, a ‘sport evangelist’ view where it is assumed that sport has a ‘special’ quality or power to dramatically change lives (coalter 2010; giulianotti 2004). for example, they have noted that this fundamentalist faith in the transformative power of sport is associated with a belief that sfd programs can almost ‘magically’ improve the quality of individual lives and address serious problems in communities under stress (giulianotti 2004: 28; coakley 2011). others have argued there is no blind faith or magic about such a process; community development needs to be driven by engagement with stakeholders, understanding the nuances of their needs, an appreciation of the complexity of program context, the provision of adequate staff, ongoing funding, and so on. for sfd programs to be effective there needs to be strategic development of policies and practices that align with needs of locals, together with plans to achieve community outcomes that have the support, skills and resources needed to provide sustainability (vail 2007; lawson 2005; chalip 2006; darnel 2012; schulenkorf & adair 2014). indeed, for sport to play an effective role in gauging and delivering positive social outcomes, there must be a tailored approach accompanied by an awareness of resources and needs, as well as a strategic program structure and appropriate means of implementation (skinner, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 81 zakus & cowell 2008; hartmann & kwauk 2011; schulenkorf & adair 2014). poor design of programs is a common issue, as has been reported in zambia where sfd ngos have duplicated efforts and competed against each other for scarce resources (lindsey & banda 2011). similarly, a study of the siyadlala and school sport mass participation program in south africa showed that unequal power relations during program implementation accentuated gender and class divisions in that community (see burnett 2006). hence, sfd programs are not inherently successful in achieving their aim of community benefits and claims about their potential contribution to social capital should be treated with caution (schulenkorf 2013). according to the secretariat of the pacific community (2011), community development in a pacific islands context normally involves a grassroots approach where all members of the community are invited to participate and take responsibility (as they see it) for improving aspects of their lives in their locality. as indicated, though, the literature on sfd in a pacific island context is rather limited; research relating directly to samoa is particularly scarce. hartmann and kwauk’s (2011) study on the impact of sport-based development programs in pacific island communities is one of the few exceptions. the authors found that sport-based programs in samoa often deployed eurocentric attitudes to health, education and social development in the community, this providing significant challenges of uptake for locals. they considered that sport is generally a good ‘hook’ to involve the community, but questioned whether external interventions were in fact relevant and meaningful in terms of development outcomes for local communities. there are, moreover, challenges with sfd programs in terms of monitoring, evaluating and reporting, each of which is important for goals of effectiveness and sustainability. method this study sought to develop understanding by engaging in dialogue with stakeholders in a samoan cricket-for-development (cfd) context. maykut and morehouse (1994) have emphasised that qualitative research can be a very useful exploratory tool in research of this kind, for it allows interpretations to be formed based on comments and findings from ‘those who matter most’ – people with the lived experience of a phenomenon under investigation. with the aim of forming a deep and thorough understanding of human experiences and attitudes, qualitative research allows investigators to discover how participants feel and relate 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 to certain social events, giving the researchers an understanding of what is occurring, how things are unfolding, and why they are taking place (saunders, lewis and thornhill 1997). it should be noted that qualitative research has limitations, notably that the often small sample size of research participants results in findings that are not necessarily relevant to or reflected in a wider population (jones 1997), and are thus not generalisable. as will now be discussed, the research undertaken in this paper drew specifically upon feedback from key locals involved in the development and implementation of cfd strategies in samoa. central to this case study are the opinions, recommendations and implications of nine key informants: these were people identified as integral to the planning and implementation of cfd programs in samoa. semi-structured in-depth interviews with this targeted group of experts were the major source of data. this approach provided an opportunity for fluid dialogue between the researcher and the participants and added to the experiences of the researcher over a period of time (kvale 1996; rubin and rubin 2005). interviews were guided by two main areas of questioning: (i) has cricket provided social opportunities for communities in samoa? (ii) what have been the major challenges using cricket as a development tool? the data gathered from these interviews were integrated into the data gathered through content analysis of document analysis of relevant textual material – key program reports, manuals, brochures and websites pertinent to cricket and development in samoa. in the process of analysis of the amalgamated data, key themes emerged. selected data from this research is therefore presented as a combination of feedback from participant interviews, as well as information from documentary sources – salient articles, reports and statistics from public forums. that approach adds value to the interview data collected; it is fundamentally important complimentary evidence. from a sampling perspective, the research was very focused, with participants chosen purposefully based on their level of involvement in cfd programs in samoa. participants were recruited from a wide spectrum of program stakeholders: an australian diplomat to samoa, australian government sfd consultants, an international cricket development specialist, a samoan village church cleric, directors of samoan sport organisations, and key local cfd staff members. the interviewees provided to the principal researcher their written consent for the involvement, the proviso being that they be deidentified. data for the interviews with the nine respondents was manually transcribed and coded. welsh (2002) asserts that manual methods of coding provide the researcher with a personal engagement cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 83 with the data, this allowing for greater sensitivity in the interpretation of data. the manual reading and re-reading of transcripts is rigorous and more iterative than software-facilitated approaches to textual analysis. the manual process was particularly suitable for this study because of the small number of interview subjects, making depth of dialogue with each respondent especially important. ultimately, the manual process provided a tactile means of reading the data, allowing for flexibility in the identification of emergent themes. subsequently, the principal researcher consulted with the interview respondents to check whether the manual coding and interpretations offered were consistent with what they each conveyed during verbal dialogue. case studies always have limitations. this paper seeks to yield context-specific knowledge that is relevant to cfd agents and locals in samoa. it does not seek to unravel universal truths; the uniqueness of the samoan context flies in the face of generalist assumptions (flyvbjerg 2006). this is a crucial point: planning for development outcomes varies significantly between countries and cultures in which programs are run (schulenkorf and adair 2014a). however, other programs may be able to learn from the experiences provided, and use suggestions and recommendations from this study in an adjusted way to suit their own needs. findings the data provided evidence of opportunities for cricket as a community development in samoa, but it also identified major challenges. from the nine interviews undertaken there were significant commonalities. the prominent themes in respect of community engagement from cfd were: improved inclusiveness; better gender equality; enhanced social cohesion; raised health awareness; and greater travel opportunities. the main challenges identified were: inadequate resources; poor collaboration; ineffective monitoring and evaluation of programs; lack of education; and cricket’s limited fit into traditional samoan culture. inclusiveness cricket is a sport that involves a wide range of people in samoan communities. although the national sport is rugby union, the aggressively physical nature of that game can be an obstacle to some people’s involvement. cricket, on the other hand, has a capacity for participation from a wide spectrum of the samoan community: 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 cricket just has the ability to transcend all gender, all hierarchical barriers. so even if someone has a disability they can still play cricket. male and females – we have broken down those barriers allowing both to be able to play equally together. also from any ages – you can have a five year old boy bowling to a reverend and it can still be fun, or a reverend bowling to a five year old boy. (sica representative) the inclusive nature of cricket, with several modified forms, can incorporate those less skilled or mobile, including people with a (minor) disability. numerous cricket programs have been established that show collaboration between sica and disability groups, such as special olympics samoa, the association for the blind, as well as senese inclusive education. cfd programs have actually brought disability communities together, allowing networks to grow across samoa. a member of special olympics samoa stated: as our athletes enjoy cricket, they are encouraged by the support and excitement of our volunteers and parents within our community... this (cricket) engages everyone and anyone with or without a disability. sessions and trainings to equip community volunteers make them feel responsible. gender equality cricket was seen by key informants as a sport that can help to break down gender barriers in participation. sica has targeted cricket to promote gender equality, placing particular importance on female participation at all levels of the game. the interviewees indicated that junior participation at a grassroots level has produced an even ratio of boys and girls and the level of support at an elite level is also equally weighted for both genders, with national teams of men and women competing at icc-sanctioned tournaments (samoan international cricket association 2014). a leading figure of the icc east asia-pacific outlined the reasons for cricket breaking down gender barriers in samoa: i’m sure kilikiti has helped in the past but also cricket is a non-contact sport. the samoan women’s team has also been quite successful at national level and they have had some good players who are based locally (and) who have gone back to their villages to really pump things up. cricket has thus been successful in providing women with the same opportunity to participate in the game as men at the grassroots level. at the administrative level, though, cricket appears to be making slower progress in terms of gender equity. in a country where 73% of all jobs are taken by men (samoa bureau of statistics 2011), cricket in samoa has provided a small number of employment and professional development opportunities for females. in early cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 85 2012 sica employed its first full-time female staff members, filling the senior roles of development manager and administration officer. one icc east asia-pacific representative pointed to the positive steps that sica are taking to promote gender equality: …given the fact that they (sica) have got females on their board and they have a female in a really senior role in their organisation as development manager, i think the gender side of things is an area they could really excel in empowering women through those villages and providing opportunities for women for professional development and employment. social cohesion and leadership this study of cfd identified social cohesion opportunities for samoan communities. key informants thought that the nature of cricket – being a team sport and non-contact – lent itself to wide access, community engagement and socialisation. the village system, complemented by strong links to church groups, has a positive impact in terms of involving community groups through cricket. a strong advocate of cricket is a local reverend of iva village. he encourages the youth of his village to be involved in cricket as players, officials or administrators, since he sees the values of cricket to be closely linked to his christian beliefs: the gentlemen’s nature of cricket and the teamwork that it builds are vital factors that have a positive impact in the village. this leads to a strong and united community … i like the youth to play cricket as they get to meet other people in the village, build relationships and work together as a team. the exposure of samoa’s youth to cricket was seen by a number of informants as a boon to promoting them as youth leaders. cricket programs provide opportunities for youth to be leaders as captains, team managers, coaches and officials. in these roles they become representatives of their village, church or cricket club and are thus required to show a greater level of responsibility. prominent youth members can meet youth of other villages and, in addition to cricket, have been found to discuss wider topics and issues in respect of their communities. the opportunity for youth to build leadership skills is furthered by the regular participation of village elders, who show guidance and mentor youth while playing cricket. a representative of the australian sports commission believes cricket is a sport that breaks down all age restrictions for involvement in samoa: i feel cricket is somewhat unique because it provides opportunities for intergenerational interaction. there aren’t many sports where three generations can legitimately compete together at a club level. 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 the presence of cricket development programs and their planned expansion into rural areas of samoa has also provided a small number of employment opportunities. in 2012, sica employed the first staff member based on the island of savai’i. this is a major step in creating sustainable cricket programs; more importantly, it suggests to community members the social opportunities that cricket can create if they are involved in promoting the game and engaging with locals in a positive way. a sica representative described the approach to providing employment: for cricket, this is a real goal – not just to play, but to offer help to people and spread out the game especially to help the families and community to give them a job. employment of staff does not solely help the individual. in a community that is very familyorientated, providing money to an extended family is an integral part of samoan culture (thornton, kerslake & binns 2010). another sica representative argued that employing people in rural and village areas had a positive impact on the wider community: it [employment] doesn’t just affect those staff. it affects their families and also their small communities around them, which is good for their local economies and small villages. health awareness a number of informants identified the role that cricket plays in targeting increased physical activity and thereby contributing towards knowledge about the prevalence of noncommunicable diseases (ncds). with one of the highest rates of overweight and obese people in the world, samoa is facing significant public health issues; hence, the government of samoa has been advocating ncd prevention programs and physical activity projects. for example, with the assistance of mesc, sica has approached villages to participate in the ssfdp, with community leaders nominating a ‘village sport leader’ who is provided with support to run sporting programs. an international asc sfd consultant outlined their approach to raising ncd awareness: village sport leaders self-organising large scale, ongoing physical activity in and between villages ties into key strategic areas of the samoa national ncd strategy. promoting health awareness programs is something that sica has targeted in the past, and the association continues to collaborate with health awareness organisations. sica was awarded the ‘spirit of cricket initiative’ in the icc east asia-pacific region development program annual awards for 2007 (frayne 2008). that award was recognition for the ‘run cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 87 out aids’ promotion that was implemented in partnership with the samoa red cross and samoa aids foundation, combining cricket participation with hiv/aids awareness sessions. similar programs including sessions with a focus on ncds have continued since this time, and a leading sica manager stressed the need to nurture these collaborative relationships: in seeing that we have created a platform that we can leverage off and go forward with into the future – we are open to the opportunities to the chance to take those ideas further and get the ministry of health and the aids awareness foundation a lot more actively involved in our programs. travel opportunities an interesting finding came from those who were born and raised in samoa; these respondents specifically identified the opportunity that cricket may provide for samoans to travel. the chance to experience life abroad is something that a local minister encourages the youth of his church, with cricket being seen as an avenue through which they can achieve this: travelling to new places and meeting new people gives the youth a whole new view on life. they are able to experience other people’s cultures and find new opportunities. a sica representative, who has experienced significant overseas travel due to her involvement in cricket as a player and an administrator, discussed the exposure that she and other female cricketers have had, which has allowed them to see various parts of the world and meet different people with different talents. she emphasised that these were experiences she would not have had if not for an involvement in cricket. that view was supported by a senior sica representative, who stated that the icc’s involvement in sfd programs – with funding from ausaid – is aimed at supporting sica owned and run programs by targeting capacity building as well as personal and professional development. (we) provide opportunities for various staff to travel to australia and new zealand for professional development and .... lots of different courses. inadequate resources when questioned about the challenges associated with cricket being used as a development tool in samoa, all informants identified a lack of resources as a major barrier. the cost of expensive cricket equipment is an impediment to participation by a majority of samoan people. a general lack of equipment was identified as a major problem in engaging people long term in cricket programs. informants argued that providing villages and schools with 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 equipment was essential to the sustainability of cricket development programs, for this would allow people to be involved regularly in the game. fundamentally, without equipment, people may experience a one-off ‘cricket experience’ but will not have a further opportunity to play the game again. a sica development manager explained: lack of equipment is hard as when you go there [to a village or school] you have to leave something for them to practice. there is a need to show them and teach them, but how can they practice if there is no equipment? by contrast, kilikiti requires minimal equipment, and implements such as bats, balls and stumps are simply made from trees that are naturally abundant on the islands. cricket in samoa faces tough competition from other sports and does not receive the same level of funding as rugby union, football (soccer), rugby league and netball. the informants raised a number of resource challenges, including a lack of equipment, facilities, transport and human resources to effectively run programs, which ultimately stem from insufficient finance. another sica representative mentioned the strain that limited finances has on attracting workers and volunteers to assist in running cricket programs and spreading the game across the country. we have a problem of a shortage of workers, but in samoa and in the villages people are willing to come join us… our financial system is an issue as we need enough to pay people. to get more people involved in cricket throughout samoa, several informants mentioned the challenge faced with limited facilities and transport. one sica representative suggested that more structured competitions are an effective way to get people involved, but this involves adequate venues and spaces. the small amount and location of such facilities in samoa is not ideal for such a proposal. this is particularly so if transport is required for different villages and schools to compete against one another on the cricket field. the onus of providing such transport for villages and schools has fallen on sica, which is generally a costly exercise for the organisation. poor collaboration with many stakeholders involved in the delivery of cfd programs in samoa, collaboration between these groups was raised as a challenge. a key to this is communication between sica and mesc. this is particularly important: mesc play a considerable role in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 89 controlling which sports are played in schools, as well as sports chosen in the delivery to villages via the ssfdp. the challenge faced by poor communication in the past was identified by both parties. a leading manager of sica stated: i think that a lack of planning is something that prevents people working together here and a lack of communication between the ministries and sporting bodies creates a real issue… we (sica and mesc) had both made plans to work together for a while but due to lack of planning and communication from both sides it just did not go ahead like planned. outside funding into sfd has grown, particularly with the implementation of the asop in samoa. however, the interviewees indicated that notwithstanding this increased support, sport organisations have tended to work separately rather than collaboratively in terms of optimising the potential shared benefits of these resources. indeed, coordination of sport activities is fundamentally important for the participation of community members. for example, an asc representative pointed to challenges associated with the delivery of both organised sport and physical education in school settings: in samoa, as well as some other psp countries, the growth in uncoordinated activity has placed pressure on schools to give the sports access to children. schools have reported that sports have been allowed to conduct activities at the expense of delivering the physical education and health curriculum. this asc representative alluded to the challenge of communicating a clear idea of the overarching purpose of the psp. this was seen as particularly important given the diverse array of sport organisations involved in providing activities through schools. in addition, the sports organisations themselves sometimes found difficulties accessing key stakeholders in villages. this is something that the asc is supporting mesc to address; it is assumed that improved communication will benefit all. program outcomes the challenge of monitoring and evaluating the development opportunities in samoa was raised as a concern by informants. currently, sica records participation data of those who are involved in cricket activities, as well as sporadic anecdotal evidence from participants. a representative of the icc east asia-pacific explained that there is a need to get more and better quality data in order to provide reliable indicators as to the impacts of development programs. he stated: 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 there is some anecdotal evidence about social cohesion and health promotion and things like that but it’s now about getting in deep and getting some qualitative data. a representative of the asc argued that capacity of sports organisations to administer their sport, while also trying to achieve other agendas (such as sfd), is highly variable. this makes it difficult for a small organisation with limited resources (like sica) to be able to evaluate their programs effectively while attending to all other operational activities. he concluded: current monitoring and evaluation data from sica covers participation figures but is limited in its detail around who is participating. this is a common issue amongst psp sports and sports federations. generally the sports are collecting participation data but don’t have the tools to analyse this data in any detail. lack of knowledge and education key informants were of the opinion that, generally, people throughout samoa have little knowledge of the international game of cricket; they are much more familiar with kilikiti, the local game. growing up in samoa, a sica representative argued that educating the samoan people about the game of cricket was a particularly difficult challenge, yet essential to getting people involved at a young age. she went on to say that it was not just the wider community but also those within the cricket community who needed more education on the game. within the association we also need to have more education and people with a background in cricket who know about cricket. for example, a sica administration officer plays volleyball and she never played cricket, but she has the willingness to promote cricket but she needs to learn more about the game to promote it. according to an sic interviewee, educating the wider community about the sport of cricket is also impacted by its low media profile in samoa. stempel (2005) has taken a similar argument previously, identifying a positive association between sport engagement, sport spectatorship and sport participation. as the sic informant, explained, with minimal opportunities for cricket to be shown to samoan television audiences due to limited national involvement in high-level competitions, together with an inability to get domestic matches filmed and broadcast, elite-level cricket has a much lower profile in samoa than, for example, rugby. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 91 cricket’s limited ability to fit samoan culture/environment the prominence of kilikiti – a very popular local game with basic similarities to english cricket – was generally seen by informants to be constraining the uptake of the formal game of cricket. a representative of the australian high commission (samoa post) raised the fact that the samoan prime minister, tuilaepa lupesoliai sailele malielegaoi, who is also the chairman of sica, had in the past proscribed kilikiti in favour of english cricket. however, a majority of those involved with sica considered that kilikiti is a crucial building block and opportunity to develop the icc’s version of cricket in samoa. indeed, as one of the informants explained, the prime minister’s stance on kilikiti has not stopped samoans playing their local game. it has, though, seen many people identifying ‘english’ cricket as a threat to their indigenous game, which has negative flow-on effects on the image and reputation of cricket in samoa. discussion the aims of this study were to explore perceptions of community development opportunities for cdp in samoa and to discuss challenges that were seen to be faced in that process. this section of the paper now examines the implications of the research findings and their relevance to both sfd practitioners and researchers. it is, of course, important to keep in mind the limitations of this case study, which provides no more than a snapshot of the use of cfd in one pacific island nation. yet there is virtue in such a very focused enterprise. the principal researcher, after interviewing key informants in samoa, has created a knowledge base around opportunities and challenges for cfd in this country, an approach that is typical of sfd research globally – where case study analysis and localised data gathering are dominant methodologies (levermore & beacom 2009; adair & schulenkorf 2014a). this knowledge is limited but important: advocates of sfd are seeking to learn about the efficacy of programs in different parts of the world. more specifically, in samoa there has been a dearth of qualitative research into either sfd or cfd. this paper makes a contribution by exploring an emerging cfd program, and by investigating opportunities and challenges associated with its inception and implementation. social inclusion, community engagement, and health awareness in terms of cfd in samoa, cricket seems able to successfully promote gender equality, both in terms of participation in the sport, as well as providing limited opportunities for players to 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 compete at the elite level. often, the largely domestic role that a woman plays in the family creates a cultural barrier to sport participation in samoa (right to play 2008). however, cricket in samoa has proven a challenge to this norm as 46% of the 7985 cricket participants in the 2012/2013 season were female (international cricket council east asia-pacific 2012). the village-wide style of community participation has allowed for both men and women, boys and girls, to take part in similar proportion. however, any claims of improved gender relations outside the sporting grounds need to be treated with caution (see schulenkorf 2013; jeanes and magee 2014). indeed, follow-up research will be needed to investigate if there are flow-on effects for families and wider communities in samoa. social inclusion was an important theme in the data. cricket was found to be attractive to some owing to it being a non-contact sport, which is quite different to male-dominated rugby union. having more people from the community involved in sfd programs gives cricket potential to provide the foundations upon which to build social capital through game-specific networks, skill development in managing the game, and empowerment of individuals in key roles, such as captains and coaches. burnett’s sfd research in south africa has indicated possibilities for achieving this, though such developments are more likely as a program is given time to mature (burnett 2006). increasing health awareness is a strong priority for those involved in the design and implementation of cfd programs in samoa. in the past, there has been positive work by sica in relation to hiv/aids awareness programs, but the need to specifically target ncds in samoa is extremely important. samoa shows some of the highest rates of obesity in the world with 45% of males and 67% of females over the age of 19 being classified officially as obese (world health organization 2012). cricket is not physically arduous by comparison to rugby union, and to some participants this is part of its attraction. additionally, cricket does provide opportunities for healthy levels of physical activity and exercise. on a wider community level, interviewees in this study argued that cricket offers a potential advantage over other popular sports in the pacific islands such as rugby and football. as a non-contact game, cricket is widely considered by locals to be gender neutral (particularly when compared to rugby) and a physically safe option, especially for juniors, the elderly, people with disabilities, and recreational participants. of course, cfd is only relevant where the game of cricket is well known; sports with a more global in reach, such as soccer and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 93 basketball, tend to be the focus of most sfd programs (as examples, see hognestad & tollisen 2004; hartmann 2012). opportunities to travel were also seen by interviewees as a significant benefit of cfd programs. indeed, the case for travel was raised by those who have lived only in samoa, rather than those who are from non-samoan backgrounds. the prospect of experiencing life abroad thus appears to be a strong incentive for those involved in cricket at the elite level in samoa. previous research in a sfd context has focused predominantly on local social and physical benefits of participation in organised physical activity (as examples, see burnett 2006 2009; schulenkorf & adair 2014) without considering external aspirations on the part of those with representative ambitions other studies, though, have indicated that travel opportunities (and even migration) are an attractive element of representative participation in sport, whether in samoa or other pacific island communities, where many locals lack the resources and opportunity to travel outside of their region (grainger 2006; kanemasu & molnar 2013). interviewees contended that cricket is a highly inclusive sport in samoa, particularly when targeting those with low fitness levels and people with a disability, who constitute 2.2% of samoa’s population (samoa bureau of statistics 2011). the flexibility that cricket can create in providing participation opportunities to those with differing abilities, such as by modifying rules and equipment, appears to offer options to a range of participants, irrespective of age, ability or physicality. however, at present existing sfd programs do not seem to take full advantage of the potential that cricket – and indeed the local game kirikiti – might offer. a shift away from what hartmann and kwauk (2011) have described as eurocentric attitudes to health, education and social development could pave away forward in making cricket (in all its forms) truly inclusive for the wider community. for this to be achieved, cooperation with local (interest) groups will be a key to making the game and its desired outcomes more relevant and meaningful to locals (see vail 2007; lawson 2005; darnel 2012). improving monitoring & evaluation according to interviewees, the education of staff members who deliver cricket programs is an essential element of the quest to optimise monitoring evaluation (m&e) practices in samoan cfd. . indeed, it is well understood that the process of m&e is fundamental to understanding the effectiveness of sfd programs (coalter 2010; kaufman, rosenbauer and moore 2014). 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 in line with this, the asc has therefore implemented an m&e partner who facilitated a workshop for all sports and countries involved in the psp – training selected members of sport organisations in the use of qualitative and quantitative m&e tools to determine program impacts. an asc representative revealed that he is hopeful that, as a consequence of this education, m&e practices would continue to improve: we expect this training and the establishment of formal m&e frameworks will help the psp partners and the pacific federations (including sica) to better indicate the impacts of their programs including their psp-funded activities. but at this stage this data is limited. further to this, the icc east asia-pacific has identified three specific m&e areas that require focus: (i) establishing a logical framework matrix for programs (ensuring planned outcomes are identified); (ii) budgeting sufficiently for m&e; and (iii) upskilling staff in m&e principles and techniques (international cricket council east asia-pacific 2012). the implementation of these suggested areas for improvement will require ongoing observation , for, as kaufman et al (2014) have lamented, m&e tends to be largely underfunded and often overlooked in many sfd initiatives around the world. improving collaboration poor collaboration was a major challenge raised by respondents. the common response in addressing this issue was simply to improve the frequency and quality of communication between key stakeholders. although obvious, this is a key for progress in addressing development goals, as poor collaboration ultimately leads to inefficient and inequitable allocation of resources. this finding is consistent with lawson (2005), who identified the need for effective collaboration to allow the prospect of community benefit. that appears to be a major issue in the samoan context as there are a number of stakeholders who are trying to achieve similar development goals through the use of cricket, yet appear to not fully leverage off each other’s efforts or resources. this is a common issue, as dealing with community partners is often problematic for those within a sporting organisation (vail 2007). a representative of the icc east asia-pacific believes that the key for cricket to expand in the future is for sica to formalise partnerships with other stakeholders outside of mesc and the asc. by formalising partnerships, he believes that there will be stronger relationships and a more efficient allocation of resources towards common goals. a senior sica representative identified health awareness as an area where it could build strong relationships cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 95 with the samoa ministry of health, samoa aids foundation and samoa red cross, to involve each of them in sica programs and competitions. another area that was identified as a barrier to development was a lack of collaboration between different sports federations and conflicting scheduling with one another. coakley (2011) asserts that many ngos and agencies do a poor job of coordinating efforts to achieve similar development goals. in samoa, collaboration between sports federations is loosely regulated by mesc, although this did not eliminate problems. a senior asc representative explained that sports federations had recognised the need to clarify their schedules and have been aiming to create a unified sporting calendar, facilitated by mesc, to better coordinate the activities conducted by different sports. improving training and education a major challenge identified with cricket in samoa was a lack of local knowledge about the game itself – particularly compared to kilikiti. the need to build the capacity of local staff members and volunteers is vital. sfd programs often place significant importance on local capacity building, community development and local sustainability (coalter 2010); concurrently a gradual reduction of input by program administrators may allow the local community to increase their involvement and sense of ownership of programs (schulenkorf 2010). it appears from the findings of this study that learning about cricket is foremost and essential, most likely as an extension to existing knowledge of kilikiti, but further education on targeting community development strategies through cricket programs would be an equally positive focus. it seems likely that the opportunity for people to receive training and education would assist in building the volunteer base in the cricket community in samoa. burnett (2006) found that through the active community club in south africa, training opportunities for potential volunteers and coaches was very empowering, giving people skills with the aims of preparing them for employment. with over 40% of the samoan working-age population reported to be not economically active and undertaking ‘domestic duties’ (samoa bureau of statistics. 2011), the opportunity to involve more people in the community and provide them with skills in cricket and community development seems apt. 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 optimising minimal resources the need for often expensive equipment to run cfd programs and the associated high costs to purchase that hardware continues to be a barrier. the findings indicated that both sica and mesc have difficulties in being able to provide sufficient equipment to distribute to villages and schools, although both saw this as an essential factor in the sustainability of any cricket program. rather than sica or mesc directly supplying equipment to villages and schools, a number of ideas were raised. these included putting the onus on villages or schools to purchase their own equipment, or using natural resources and human skills to craft cricket equipment – similar to the approach of kilikiti. both of these options appear problematic due to the cost for villages to purchase equipment and a lack of available education on how to craft cricket equipment (as opposed to that for kilikiti). one sica representative has suggested that the organisation should better utilise partnerships that they have with the cricket equipment donation charity cricket4kids, as well as the funding support they receive through the asop. ultimately, it appears that a more targeted approach when allocating resources is needed in order to provide equipment that is essential to running sustainable cricket programs. as an icc representative put it: we can actually get more benefit out of doing more targeted programs rather than just trying to do everything at once. then in the future as we show our governing body – the icc – that we are able to achieve their goals we will actually be able to get more income. the limited ability of sica to attract workers and volunteers was identified as another barrier. with financial resources already a concern, they play a key role in samoa in terms of reducing the costs to run programs, while the work undertaken has a high social and economic value (coalter 2005). their involvement is also fundamental in developing community inclusiveness (putnam 2000; coalter 2005). burnett (2006) has argued that in the south african case volunteering tended to raise an individual’s sense of dignity, self-worth and empowerment. she stated: ‘the fact that opportunity may lead to empowerment and investment in volunteering, is a worthwhile choice for the individual’ (p. 289). highlighting the benefits of involvement to prospective volunteers could also be important in the samoan context. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 97 embedding cricket in samoan culture interviewees each contended that similarities between kilikiti and cricket should be fostered, not stymied. indeed, kilikiti was seen by them as an important step to continue the growth of cricket, so long as it remained sensitive to the cultural significance of kilikiti. all respondents who were questioned on this topic saw kilikiti as an essential building block for cricket to grow in the communities. as a sica commentator observed: from a development perspective, it is important that english/international cricket is not developed at the expense of kilikiti. another sica administrator believed that incorporating cricket into more villages depended on their organisation’s capacity to develop tangible links with people who play kilikiti, and subsequently inviting them to be part of sica’s cdf program – thereby allowing for the promotion of both sports. this is something of a dilemma: trying to promote an international game while endeavouring not to compromise the cultural importance and authenticity of a longstanding local custom. will the global and local find a way of co-promoting and feeding off each other? there are fledgling initiatives under way: since 2011 sica has run a ‘junior kirrikriket program’ that aims to provide an ‘enjoyable introduction to samoa’s most popular bat and ball sport’. sica has, therefore, intelligently recognised the benefits of promoting both kilikiti and cricket (samoan international cricket association 2014a). conclusion according to the interviewees in this study, cfd programs in samoa have shown an ability to provide tangible, even if limited opportunities for improved physical activity and social engagement. while cfd initiatives in samoa appear to have been generally beneficial to communities, such a conclusion needs to be tempered by the embryonic nature, modest scope and limited scale of the present study. indeed, in terms of the future, there needs to be improved planning and resourcing of cfd activities in samoa; otherwise anticipated benefits to local communities will not be sustained. cfd events and activities in this region will not have lasting impact without community structures in place to support them: in that respect effective local management, meaningful cultural engagement and regular participation are the developmental building blocks. 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 this study found that modified rules and equipment can assist in creating an inclusive environment for people of all abilities to participate in a sport – in this case cricket. samoan kilikiti also appears to have the potential to provide a culturally familiar platform for a link to cricket. however, further research is needed into the relationship between these two activities at the community level. significantly, cricket in samoa is largely a gender inclusive sport, unlike the dominant sport of rugby union. kilkiti, also being gender inclusive, adds to the reputation of bat and ball games as activities for both males and females. this paper has not claimed that it would shape the sfd literature in a new way; it has instead evaluated the opportunities and challenges of cfd as an example of sfd in practice. it has shown possibilities, limitations and problems in the case of cricket and samoa. that knowledge, while limited to this context, is important because so many advocates of sfd programs need advice and guidance about application and practice. we therefore hope that the findings of this study will help to inform future cfd initiatives in samoa, as well as providing insights for similar sfd initiatives elsewhere. references australian parliament house 2012, ‘international sport for development grants 2012/2013 as at 6 november 2012’, commonwealth of australia; accessed 19 march 2013, available from: http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/estimates/live/rrat_ctte/estimates/sup_1213/regional/ asc_166_attachments.ashx australian sports commission 2011, independent review of aid effectiveness, australian sports commission, canberra. australian sports commission. 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http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8373.2010.01410.x http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/865/1880 http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/865/1880 the opportunities and challenges of using cricket as a sport-for-development tool in samoa abstract introduction samoan context literature review method findings discussion conclusion references 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia meso level social impact: meaningful indicators of community contribution melissa edwards, jenny onyx, hazel maxwell, simon darcy university of technology, sydney abstract social impact measures are not widely agreed, nor implemented by third sector organisations. meso level indicators of social impact are underdeveloped. financialised methods such as social return on investment can only account for direct outcomes of defined programs and activities. the broader societal impacts of any such activities are undervalued. this paper outlines the findings of a grounded theoretical approach to determining measures of social impact within a large australian iconic third sector organisation. several key factors revealed in this study are discussed in regards to their potential for attributing social impact to organisational activities outside of a program specific outcome. based on these findings the paper concludes that the development of a tool to measure meso level organisational social impact of third sector organisations may be attainable. introduction the third sector as a whole, and each organisation within civil society, needs to know what kind of impact it has in society at large and for its specific constituencies. it is important to know whether the organisation as a whole is making a difference to the social life of the community, and if so, what kind of difference. sometimes it is important to know what kind of economic impact the organisation is making. however, more often what is required is a measure of the social contribution made by civil society organisations. for this, a social and not a financial measure of social impact is required. there is increasing, and increasingly, urgent demand for measures of social impact. yet to date, there are no social impact metrics that are agreed, generic, widely relevant, with a useable metric base. social impact is elusive, partly because it does not lend itself readily to a monetary analysis, is qualitative rather than quantitative, long term rather than short term, diffuse and multi layered rather than specific and focussed, and probably means different things in different contexts. this paper provides an empirical approach to measuring social impact within a single large australian organisation, the surf life saving australia (sls). measuring social impact while there is an urgent demand for measures of social impact, to date, there are none that are agreed, generic, widely relevant, with a useable metric base. indeed there is little agreement about what social impact is, or should represent, or whether a generic metric is cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 19 possible. most measures of economic impact, or economic wellbeing, are based on their financial dollar value. this is a common, easily understood, measure, and consequently is widely used to measure impact or effectiveness, or value, far beyond the actual monetary value it represents. financial value cannot be a surrogate for health, happiness or social wellbeing. current measures of social impact within the third sector australian nonprofit organisations contribute to the overall functioning of the economy as demonstrated by the recent productivity commission report which estimates the sector: ‘now makes up just over 4 per cent of gdp (just under $43 billion), with nearly 5 million volunteers contributing an additional $14.6 billion in unpaid work’ (productivity commission 2010). furthermore, the recent development of the national compact signifies a federal government commitment to recognise and promote the social contribution of third sector organisations (national compact, 2010). however, these initiatives whilst significant are inconclusive in determining a methodology for attributing the social contribution of non-profit organisations; a singular methodology remains elusive. whilst the productivity commission’s (2010) report identifies various methodologies for assessing the social impacts of non-profit organisations the conclusion remains that these approaches must be contextualised. the majority of existing techniques simply measure program specific outcomes but do not capture long-term or systemic social impacts. furthermore, many activities of non-profit organisations were identified as contributing ‘spillover effects’ that cannot be directly attributed to proxy measures or cost-benefit analysis. this situation arises as the proxy measures used to estimate inputs such as volunteer and in-kind contribution do not account for the social capital generated as a result of these activities; that is they do not account for additional social benefits such as the social networks resulting from volunteer activity and the development of interpersonal relationships that establish a sense of community and 'belongingness', amongst others. ironically these proxies are unable to account for the social benefits, which comprise the entirety of the social effectiveness of the third sector’s contribution toward strengthening civil society. some of these spillover effects may be attributed to the generation of social capital both within the organisation’s membership and within the broader community within which the organisation operates. 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 the measurement of social impact has become an important sphere of evaluation for third sector organisations. all of these have the specific aim of measuring the social impact of the organisation’s programs and associated activities. that is they focus on the organisation itself and whether the organisation’s programs actually meet their social objectives. there are three major frameworks for the measure of social impact within the third sector: social accounting audits (saa), logic models, and social return on investment (sroi). these three have been reviewed in a paper by zappala and lyons (2009). of these, sroi is gaining considerable attention in australia. it is essentially a monetising exercise, identifying a dollar value for each nominated activity or event to put in the ratio equation of investment against return. this leaves open the question of identifying the key variables to include in the equation, and the appropriate dollar value to impute to those variables. any variable that cannot be readily given an attributed value is simply omitted from the equation. all measures of impact within this evaluation framework have other limitations. all focus on the organisational program’s social objectives. there is little awareness of wider considerations, in terms of broader social impact outside those objectives, unintended consequences, or interactive linkages with other events and programs outside the organisations immediate control. also, because each approach depends on the particular program and organisational context, it is not possible to identify more broad based indicators of social impact, i.e. comparable data across organisations or districts is not possible. while evaluation methods are useful in measuring the outputs of specific programs, there remains a need for broader measures, ones that relate to impacts beyond the immediate and intended outcomes of specific objectives. there is a growing movement for the measurement of broad wellbeing, or ‘the progress of societies’ apart from economic progress (giovannini et al. 2009). this recognises that human individual and collective wellbeing depends on more than economic or material wealth. there have been a number of international efforts to construct a global measure of wellbeing, but this has to date been unsuccessful. as giovannini et al. note: over the last forty years several attempts have been made to build composite indicators or other statistical frameworks to measure progress, to overcome one of the key difficulties in the practical implementation of the different frameworks, i.e. the lack of a single metric that can bring together indicators of various phenomena expressed in different units of measurement. the european parliament….concluded that in order to achieve sustainable development, human wealth and well-being, multidimensional indicators are needed to supplement gdp cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 21 and to set gdp in an appropriate socio-ecological context, ….notwithstanding some good ideas, the “holy grail” has not yet been found: none of the proposed frameworks has been recognised as fully satisfactory and none has emerged as a worldwide reference (giovannini et al. 2009, p.10). the oecd paper goes on to identify the conditions required for an adequate framework to measure societal progress. it should contain a minimum set of dimensions that taken together capture the main elements of progress, but few enough to be digestible. they need to be based on values or human ends rather than means, and they need to be meaningful to all stakeholders. many of the wellbeing indicators now in use are focused on more moderate targets, i.e. the wellbeing of a population in a target geographic area. this is mainly aimed at the local government level. it makes use of macro statistics as well as locally produced surveys. the aim is to obtain benchmark standards to measure various aspects of population level wellbeing over various domains. perhaps the best of these in an australian context is the community indicators victoria, or civ (wiseman et al. 2006). the data framework for this rests on indicators for five domains and accompanying policy areas, with several indicators derived for each policy area. this framework seeks to account for impacts of a geographical region that can be directly measured within the strategic frameworks of local government areas (lgas). the approach has been taken up and expanded in other states, most recently in city of sydney (partridge & west 2010). there are a number of limitations of this approach, apart from the difficulty of deriving effective indicators. the measures are very broad brush, usually at a macro level so that finer, disaggregated analysis is difficult. they try to capture the totality of current wellbeing regardless of the source, whether related to the state, the market, or society more broadly. this approach therefore does not provide measures of the social benefits generated by third sector organisations within the local community. meso level indicators there has been little attempt to develop measures that may be more specific than the macro wellbeing indicators, but less specific than program evaluation measures. one such measure which is gaining increasing usage is the social capital scale (onyx and bullen, 2000). social capital is an essential ingredient in community cohesion and well-being. studies indicate that 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 regions and groups measuring high in social capital also have a variety of positive outcomes, beyond economic advantage, such as improved health and well-being, reduced levels of crime and better educational outcomes (putnam 2000; halpern 2005). social capital, like most other social constructs, is subject to disputed definition. social capital was defined by putnam (1993, p. 167) as “those features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions”. woolcock and narayan (2001) identified the multidimensional nature of social capital, which is created through various forms of joining mechanisms. these dimensions are bridging, bonding and linking. bonding refers to the denser link of relationships common among family and friends and often visible at the community level, where individuals make regular face-to-face contact. bridging social capital consists of weak ties, based on the impersonal relationships between strangers who share a common interest (leonard & onyx 2003). linking refers to “the relationships that people form with people in power or legitimate authorities” (woolcock 2000, p. 19). thus interconnected networks lie at the heart of communities, and appear to be the basic ingredient of social capital infrastructure. they are also crucial for social-capital development, which is iterative and may further enhance other relational dimensions such as trust, reciprocity, tolerance of diversity, and social agency (onyx & bullen 2000; onyx, edwards & bullen 2007). despite the potential of social capital to measure community well being at the meso level, attempts to use such measures have been sporadic. there has been little effort to establish the validity of the social capital scale in multiple contexts, or over other domains. measuring the levels of social capital in a given community may provide one indicator of social impact, but these are also limited in terms of what is measured. indeed there is some critique that in principle, social impact can never be reduced to a simple metric, and to do so is dangerous, and can lead to serious abuse of the measure. clearly, much more empirical evidence is needed to try to disentangle the various aspects of social impact, and to relate these to more direct, meso level indicators of the social impact(s) of third sector organisations within the local community. the sls empirical study the study reported here aimed to identify those activities contributing towards sls’s social contribution to the wider community and, in so doing, to develop a potential model of social cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 23 impact at the meso level for community based organisations in australia. whilst designed specifically for the sls, the proposed research potentially has broader implications for social policy development in other third sector organisations and may prove useful in developing government policy and a national compact. surf life saving australia: an australian social icon sls is a large volunteer based third sector organisation. in 2008/09 the volunteer membership consisted of 150 318 participants, comprised of 57% males and 43% females (sls 2009). whilst there is a general national trend for declining volunteerism as a rate of population growth and a reduction in the number of hours volunteered by participating individuals (abs 2007) membership at sls has experienced steady growth. a commissioned social and economic benefit analysis uncovered the extensive contribution of sls, but could not adequately determine the social contribution of the organisation (allen 2005). this analysis was acknowledged as an exemplary cost-benefit analysis in the productivity commission report (productivity commission 2010), based upon measuring inputs (cost of volunteer replacements and value of replacement spending on injury and death prevention required by state and federal governments) against outcomes (such as value of lives saved and injuries prevented). in net terms, the report considered that, through the value of lives saved or serious injury averted, surf lifesaving contributed $1.4 billion to the australian economy in 2003-04 (allen 2005). the value of volunteer time was estimated based upon the number of volunteer hours contributed, yet the report identified social capital contributions both within sls and the spill-over effects of this into the broader community as one of the key strengths of sls, although this contribution was not systematically evaluated. similarity, the commissioners report notes that: ‘the benefits to those who volunteer, including those arising through enhanced social networks, were discussed, but not valued in the study’ (productivity commission 2010). in the one study where victorian volunteer members were asked of their motivations for joining the sls (matthews 2006), the responses related to aspects of volunteering that are difficult to measure and attribute a numerical value. the sls strategic plan (2006) notes that volunteers report ‘community involvement’, the development of friendships and social networks and the enjoyment of a healthy lifestyle as a motivation for involvement. the sls value matrix recognises a social contribution at the personal, organisational and community levels. furthermore, after an analysis of the demographics of their membership database, sls 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 has uncovered the need to emphasise diversity as one of the core values of a socially inclusive organisation. such recognition has fostered initiatives to encourage social inclusion in the attitudes and membership of sls. research design the study reported here represents the first stage in the development of a social impact measurement tool, and is designed to lead to the development of a larger survey tool. this first phase consisted of in-depth focus group discussion with a variety of sls stakeholders. both the questions and the participants were identified in consultation with sls. two members of the research team attended each focus group. data was collected from eight focus groups with key sls staff, board members and 'toes in the sand' volunteers, nationally (a total of 61 participants). there were two focus groups from each of the four states of queensland, nsw, victoria and south australia. all were conducted between december 2010 and february, 2011. numbers ranged between 3 and 11, with a mean of 8 participants in each group. of the total, 37 were male and 24 were female. their ages ranged from 18 to about 70, as indicated in table 3 below. table 3: breakdown of focus group participants by age group age group percentage % 18 25 21 % 26 35 13 % 36 45 21 % 46 55 23 % 56 65 15 % 65 75 7 % the questions were broad and open ended, inviting participants to reflect on what they had personally gained from involvement in the club, and what they could identify about the broader community benefits. participants were asked to critically reflect upon those social benefits they felt they could specifically attribute to their involvement within this particular organisation. the discussion was audio recorded for later transcription and analysis, using nvivo software to identify key themes arising from the discussion. identification of ‘nodes’ or dominant themes within the focus groups was conducted through a two stage process. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 25 initially, the identification of relevant nodes was undertaken independently by two researchers, and then discussed with the research team. two researchers then independently ‘blind coded’ the same two transcripts using the nodes developed in the first stage and then cross-compared coding to ensure consistency between the interpretations of the nodes. at this stage the nodes were further refined and additional nodes were added to the coding scheme. once all data had been coded using this template, all uncoded data was then analysed separately to enable the emergence of new themes that were not initially identified. this section reports the overall results of this analysis. findings figure 1 illustrates the overall structure of the main themes in terms of a ‘mind map’. some themes referred to activities internal to the organisation, others more to activities external to the organisation, while many covered both. some referred to specific activities or processes, others to broader skills, while others referred to broader feelings or values. figure 1: focus group coding schema internal external process/ activities skills ‘emotion’/ values volunteer social leveller public education networks club contribution belonging personal development train others community service leverage skills feel good social values/citizen diversity economic contribution cultural symbolism physical club hub club programs local organisational connectivity health & fitness focus groups revealed a family orientated and supportive organisational culture (engagement of whole family over life-span); the personal development of members which flow on to the wider community (e.g. social values); generic skill development among members of direct applicability to wider community (e.g. leadership skills); public education programs for the wider community (e.g. water safety); mutual assistance with other community based organisations (e.g. emergency assistance, fund-raising); facilities available as social/ training 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 resource for wider community (e.g. community meetings); formal programs for disadvantaged groups (e.g. indigenous, migrants). each of the main themes is presented for more detailed examination below with representative quotes in table 4. table 4: emergent themes and representative quotes from the focus groups emergent theme description of theme representative quotes belonging feeling valued by others in the surf club, developing common values and enduring friendships “so you're hanging out with your mates on the beach and you're part of an extended big family… then you go down on the beach and you're all on the beach like a big family, big community” (fg1). “every person that identifies themselves as a life saver immediately becomes a friend” (fg 7) “if you are having a hard time like on a weekend, you know you go to the club and there’s always someone there to have a talk to and go for a swim with” (fg6) a socially inclusive organisation an organisation which treats people equally and is made up of people of all backgrounds, ages, both genders and people from different occupations and ethnicities. “it’s a real equaliser. it doesn't matter who you are or what you do, you can be involved with the club” (fg 2) “the fact that you can go to any club in australia really and be accepted for what you are. whether you are a bricklayer, a politician or a doctor, it doesn’t make any difference” (fg 6) “most other sporting codes … are single sexed divided, whereas the surf club is not” (fg 2) social and citizenship values common or collective standards or principles inculcated in the organisation which include personal reliability, commitment, responsibility, pride, respect, helping each other, making a difference, and giving back to the community “the greatest thing we put back into the community is community minded people” (fg 3) “i keep being amazed at the willingness of any member of any age in the club that's just willing to contribute in any way or just be cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 27 involved in something as big as surf lifesaving…they're always seen as people that are contributing (fg 4) “like you might go along and be happy to help the football club run their sausage sizzle, for example, because you've already got that sense of helping the community through surf lifesaving” (fg 1) “i used to get babysitting, because … this association had recognised me as responsible enough to look after people on the beach. therefore it opened a broader relevance” (fg 5) community service voluntary service provided by surf club members in the wider community outside the confines of the club and beach using surf skills, equipment and knowledge ‘there was a call recently when all the floods in brisbane. we all got emails, any clubby who has got experience in boat skills, et cetera, rubber ducky and radio skills, you know could volunteer to help in the flood situation in brisbane’ (fg 6) i know that some clubs are involved each year in the christmas pageant. so that's not fund raising at all, but it's about being in the community and showing a bit of a presence (fg 4) public education the role the organisation and its members have in educating the public in surf safety and associated skills i mean we sort of apply ourselves as the guardians of the beach, and water safety and everything around the water (fg 3) “primarily the role of it is to get out there and educate them… it's about, getting that education out so that when they do come to the beach, they have some sort of understanding of what's going on (fg 1) 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 personal development the development of skills, knowledge and understanding which includes mentoring, leadership, team work and communication leading to the development of self confidence and self esteem “they learn skills that can be used for the rest of their lives” (fg 3) “learning those life skills in a fun way and sometimes probably not even aware they are learning life skills like nippers” (fg 6) ‘people come on board the committee and then become confident in their own ability to go out and go onto other committees” (fg 5) “i think mentoring, like younger groups through our club and it's just great to teach them and watch them learn and then watch them develop through the club” (fg 2) leveraging skills members using human capital (skills, training and knowledge) developed through life saving in the wider community particularly in work places, to assist in emergency situations, to gain employment, at home and in leadership roles. “you join life saving to get skills for life. it’s kind of got a double meaning where you get skills to save lives and you get skills for your own life (fg 6) “there is a lot of people … actually get full time employment as a result of the skills they learn through life saving…many of them go on to become council lifeguards” (fg 6) “quite often you're the person that's going to be on the spot. car accident or, as i said, somebody has a heart attack somewhere. that's one of the things that you're taking out into the community” (fg 1) connections with local organisations linkages and partnerships with other organisations in the local area including sports clubs, local voluntary organisations, local businesses, local emergency organisations, local councils, and schools. “all the community groups do networking together at some stage, so you do get the respect from those groups because they realise how important the surf club is to the community in the smaller communities. then the lions club might come in and sponsor or they might have an award that they cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 29 have that they will ask if the club's got someone who they'd like to nominate for an award, or we've got a certain amount of money that we'd like to donate to your club or something like that” (fg 1) “i mean we have strong links to local community organisations such as rotary and lions. they get involved in a lot of street fairs. if you look at the brighton junior classic, they all come down here to sort of look to help, to all raise money” (fg 3) “we have a very good support group within the local council which helps all of us because they understand what we do” (fg 5) physical hub for the community the club building and associated facilities as venues that the community could use for meetings, training, accommodation and for local events. “our club's got a café on it. you know we've got a function area outside. glenelg's got a function area upstairs that has three or four nights a week available for the community to come in and use that” (fg3) “we've given local clubs the benefit of coming into the club on a particular night and using the venue to fundraise” (fg5) volunteering members ‘giving back’ to the community “when you go for a job, it looks better because they see that you're giving something back to the greater community, to the public. so you're not so selfish, you're thinking of other people, because you're helping other people and you give up your free time” (fg 1) “when you come to the surf club you are surf club member and you are there to do services for the club and for the public. i think that’s really important and part of the volunteering situation” (fg 6) “all i do now in terms of active 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 involvement is patrolling…i think it is the fact that you're doing something for the community and the satisfaction you get out of that” (fg 7 belonging was the dominant theme. it refers to the sense that participants expressed in feeling connected through their surf activities. feeling connected through a community or family builds bonds between individuals which is fundamental for the development of social capital. some of the perceived effects of this connectedness are emphasised in the participants’ quotes which relate to feeling valued by others, developing common values and enduring friendships, and creating a reciprocal space for social exchange not through obligation but through shared good will. participants cited surf as a place to develop new and enduring lifelong friendships and as a social space where friendships could be developed and maintained. some referred more strongly to their relationships within the club as a form of shared mateship on the beach. associations formed through club activities form a social mateship that extends outside of the beach and clubhouse to the backyard barbeque, bringing clubbies together from various different clubhouses. others described this mateship as a more loosely tied sense of camaraderie developed through engaging with common purpose in the club. family was used both in the relational and the metaphorical sense of the word. in the relational sense participants mentioned how they had come into surf through the involvement of their family members. for parents this may have been for the first time with their child as a nipper. but for others it was a case of ‘growing up with surf’ with generations of family members being active and continuing members of surf. however there was also the notion of an extended family or the club being a family oriented place. the second most prominent theme was ‘social and citizenship values’ where ‘surf’ provided a connection for the development of these common values. membership in sls provided a bedrock of social values. these values are inculcated in everything the members do from nippers (junior lifesaving training) onwards. they form the basis of their own personal development and participation within the club, but also provide a very strong set of citizenship values within the wider community. these values include volunteering which is discussed in terms of members ‘giving back’ to the community and ‘making a difference in society’ by ‘helping people out’. the core to sls activities involves volunteering. focus group participants emphasised the importance of being a volunteer and providing a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 31 community service within the surf club. providing voluntary service through club activities included activities such as patrolling the beach, training others, working behind the bar, cooking a barbecue or being an age group manager on the beach. many participants identified the importance of community service within the club, in particular in relation to water safety for the public. however they did much more than that, many referred to voluntary service provided by sls members in the wider community outside the confines of the club and beach using skills, equipment and knowledge from sls. this occurs in emergency situations, at community events and festivals, in community education settings, through charity work and in environmental projects. for example, sls members provided rescue and emergency assistance during natural disasters such as floods and bushfires. there were many other examples of community service in the normal course of the community calendar, or as part of wider outreach activities. the third most frequently mentioned theme was termed ‘club contribution’ and encompasses the contributions individuals made in various roles to the collective operation of the club and associated activities. these roles include administration, competition, education, training, rescue, fundraising and committee roles. whilst an intra-organisational contribution, the majority of these roles were fulfilled as volunteer hours and included some external contributions such as fundraising for other local clubs, patrolling public beaches and training and development courses offered to the public. the later was another major theme (fifth most frequently cited) and relates to the role sls has in educating the public. this occurs across a range of settings including schools, at community events and on the beach. sls educate the public in surf safety, surf awareness, survival skills, first aid, and surf rescue. the development of skills, knowledge and understanding related to ‘personal development’ was frequently discussed by focus group participants. these skills include mentoring, leadership, team work and communication leading to the development of self confidence and self esteem. these skills were discussed in terms of developing skills to train others. the idea of leveraging skills was discussed in terms of members of sls using personal skills as a form of human capital (skills, training and knowledge) developed through life saving out in the wider community particularly in work places, to assist in emergency situations, to gain employment, at home and in leadership roles. sometimes the skills learned are applied directly in emergency situations out in the community and other times they were useful in work situations and in everyday life. 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 as a result of being engaged in surf activities, members referred to the benefits associated with developing internal networks, connections and relationships develop. these may lead to personal recommendations, avenue to job opportunities, and chances to participate in new activities, opportunities to learn about other communities and to develop new friendships. the development of such networks extends the social inclusivity of the club into the broader community enabling the extension of bonds into other areas of member’s lives. the respondents explained that sls clubs do not operate in isolation from other community organisations. the focus group participants were able to identify strong connections with other community organisations in the area including sports clubs, and local voluntary organisations, local businesses, local emergency organisations, local councils, and schools. this bridging social capital has the potential to provide the clubs with new members, sponsorship opportunities, and a chance for sls to assist local communities. networking involved sls clubs working with a range of sport clubs such as golf, gymnastics, rugby, afl, swimming, and other surf clubs. this network brings in resources and attracts new members who may participate in surf sports during the summer when they are in an off season from participation in other sports. partnerships with rotary and lions clubs were often mentioned. reciprocity was highlighted with surf clubs assisting other local organisations with fundraising by inviting them to use their club facilities or to attend their events to hold bbqs with sls often accepting donations from these groups in return. sls also sponsors events organised by other voluntary groups. these networks are partly about sponsorship and businesses donating to surf clubs or supporting then by providing in kind assistance. links with local councils were also regarded as important. the clubs maintained active networks with a range of organisations through the physical club building and its associated facilities which were described as venues that individual community members and community organisations could use. the clubs themselves were described as places for meetings, training, accommodation for sls members, and as venues for local events. surf life saving was also described as an organisation which treated people the same irrespective of their background, described as a ‘social leveller’. gender used to be an issue in sls given the bronzed aussie bloke image. but that was shown to be changing, and women were much more included in sls activities at all levels. all ages and socioeconomic status groups are included. however, despite the rhetoric of tolerance, cultural diversity cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 33 remains an issue within sls, illustrated by comments such as “it's traditionally anglo-saxon, white protestant. and we've got to change that. and it is changing, but it is changing slowly” (fg 3). discussion the results from the focus groups demonstrate very clearly that sls as a whole provides far more than a safe beach environment. it provides within club membership a nurturing environment which builds a sense of belonging and acceptance, and the basis for developing core citizenship values and life skills. in particular it instils a valuing of volunteer actions for the wider public good. these values and skills are then played out throughout the person’s lifetime and in many community contexts outside the club itself. but in addition to these personal capacities, the organisation as a community entity is embedded in wider community networks and is engaged in reciprocal aid and support of other community organisations and actions. all of these things add up to an enormous ongoing social impact within the local community. by and large the impact is a positive one, enriching the lives of all citizens. there are, however some weak points, particularly in terms of reaching a more inclusive connection to ethnic minority groups. while the formal sls organisation does indeed provide specific programs for indigenous or migrant groups, these are seldom embedded within the daily life of the local club. nonetheless, the sls movement is a rich and dynamic part of many communities, constantly evolving to provide a more inclusive environment of belonging. the various themes that arise from the focus groups may be broadly clumped into larger categories or factors and these factors may have more general relevance, beyond the specific organisation of sls. in the first instance, the strongest theme was one of belonging, which is developing a strong sense of identity based on club activities. this initial identity leads to potentially strong personal development, including the development of citizenship values and a sense of the importance of serving others, working in a team and administering and organising club activities. strong internal networks of mutual support suggest the development of strong bonding social capital. the club programs in turn produced increasing levels of human capital in the form of increased skills and knowledge base. this growing stock of human capital was then made available in various forms to the wider community, thus increasing the human and social benefit to that wider community. finally, the club developed a variety of bridging links within the wider community, both at an individual and 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 at an organisational level, suggesting the development of bridging social capital within the local community and beyond. all of these outcomes represent a form of social impact, as modelled in figure 2. as suggested by the model, the process begins at an individual and club level. strong networks of mutual support and the immediate practices of lifesaving and team work then generate broader impacts for the individual and the club. ultimately the benefits of these values and practices extend outwards to embrace the wider community. however, these developments should not be seen as following a linear causal path. indeed social capital itself is iterative in the sense that the resulting action of networks reinvigorates and enriches the initial forms of trust, agency and social connectedness. figure 2: modelling social impact while this paper specifically focussed on surf life saving as an organisation in australia, we are interested in examining the potential of using this case to develop a broader measure of social impact. the challenge here is to develop a measure that is more than a micro evaluation tool for a specific program, and less than a global measure of community wellbeing. we are seeking a tool that focuses on the local community, and the social impact that a community organisation or group can make to the broad well-being of that community. in this project, we are seeking to identify a number of criteria, drawn in the first instance from surf life saving clubs, but criteria that may have a broad relevance to any local community group, including for instance, local church congregations, other sports clubs, service clubs, or smaller self help support groups. belonging development human capital bridging social capital bonding social capital citizenship values community contribution cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 35 while part of the social impact demonstrated within this model relates to social capital, nonetheless social impact, at this meso level, is broader than the concept of social capital would imply. of equal relevance is the concept of personal development, and human capital. all of these have clear social benefits beyond the immediate organisation. it is likely that the initial construction of club identity and the supportive bonding relationships within the organisation are crucial for the subsequent development of social and human capital in the broader sense. we conceptualise social capital in the first instance as a resource, developed within the community organisation in the form of bonding social capital, which is then available to use as a tool in creating wider social impact outside the organisation. to the extent that the organisation does create a positive social contribution to the local community, then it will serve to increase the stock of human and social capital more generally throughout the community in question. however it is also likely that these factors do not form a linear progression (as suggested by the model) but rather are mutually interdependent, suggesting that there is likely to be a reciprocal feedback effect of each factor on the others. therefore the sum of the parts cannot predict the whole due to the non-linear system dynamic. but studying locally situated interactions may provide insight into how the micro level builds meaningful interactions between individuals and groups within communities. each of these factors is in principle measurable, and their inter-relationships empirically demonstrated. these results are consistent with recent data coming out of the uk, for example the study by kay and bradbury (2009) found similar outcomes for a youth volunteering in sport program. however it also clear from the present study (and others) that only social measures of social impact can accurately reflect the real and positive contribution that organisations and programs such as this can provide for the wider community and for long term benefits to its members. it may be possible to estimate the dollar value of some generic outcomes of the social impact process, but any monetised indicator will inevitably understate the true social value of the process. one important question concerns the reach of these criteria. do those identified as generic here actually apply to all other organisations, or only some types of community organisations? are there other dimensions of social impact not tapped within sls but which are nonetheless important in other contexts? for example some organisations may generate a deep sense of learning about life and death, whereas others may be concerned with a much 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 more superficial sense of pleasure. we don’t have the answers to these questions yet. what we have done is identify a set of criteria for the measurement of social impact in the local community, which may provide a useful starting point in the development of a generic measure. secondly we have established a research agenda, one which will gradually serve to explore the reach of social impact(s) of different kinds of community organisations in different contexts. in doing so, it should be possible to create a broader understanding of the social contribution made by such organisations to the larger well being of the local community. acknowledgements the team has worked closely with shauna sherker and others at the surf life saving association of australia. this work was made possible through a uts partnership grant (2010) references abs 2006, voluntary work australia. cat no: 4441.0 allen 2005, valuing an australian icon: the economic and social contribution of surf lifesaving in australia, report to surf life saving australia limited october 2005, the allen consulting group pty ltd. carman, j. 2007, ‘evaluation practice among community-based organisations: research into the reality’, american journal of evaluation, vol.28, no.1, pp. 60-75. giovannini, e., hall, j., morrone, a., and ranuzzi, g. 2009, a framework to measure the progress of societies. draft oecd working paper, oecd. halpern, d. 2005, social capital, polity press, cambridge. kay, t. and bradbury, s. 2009, 'youth sport volunteering: developing social capital?', sport, education and society, vol.14, no.1, pp. 121-140. leonard, r. and onyx, j. 2003, ‘networking through 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2000, ‘social capital: implications for development theory, research and policy’, world bank research observer, vol.15, no.2, pp. 225-250. zappalà, g., and lyons, m. 2009, recent approaches to measuring social impact in the third sector: an overview. csi background paper no. 5, centre for social impact, university of nsw. http://www.communityindicators.net.au/files%20/civ/20060817_vcip_final_report.pdf� http://www.communityindicators.net.au/files%20/civ/20060817_vcip_final_report.pdf� meso level social impact: meaningful indicators of community contribution melissa edwards, jenny onyx, hazel maxwell, simon darcy university of technology, sydney the politics of consensus: an exploration of the cloughjordan ecovillage, ireland paul a. cunningham rikkyo university, tokyo stephen l.wearing university of technology, sydney abstract ecovillages have grown in number around the world since the early 1990s. this growth appears to be largely due to the contested nature of post/modernity and the desire to establish a more simple, meaningful and sustainable lifestyle that is centered on community. the end of the 1990s represented the high tide of neo-liberalism in most advance liberal democracies. ten years later, and the global economy still demonstrates signs that modes of capitalism have intensified and spread under the influence of global and state orchestrated markets, giving rise to a search for alternatives that might provide other mechanisms for organizing our lives. cloughjordan ecovillage is used to examine how governance through a consensus-based decision-making approach works as an alternative in this circumstance. generally, intentional communities are organized around egalitarian principles and therefore commonly embrace the ideology of consensus. the primary research question guiding this study was – does consensus work in the governance of alternative lifestyles? the preliminary findings of this case study suggest that in spite of the impressive nature of the built infrastructure at this site, the community continues to struggle with consensus-based decision-making as a form of self-organization and governance. introduction this article outlines the evolution of the cloughjordan ecovillage with a focus on the consensusbased approach to decision-making adopted by this community. the development of this aspect of governance is examined based on the narratives drawn from both former members (fms) and current members (cms) of the ecovillage (hereafter referred to as ‘the village’), all of whom play(ed) varying influential roles in the ongoing development of this community. the village is situated within an alternative lifestyles model, which suggests that meaningful representations of culture, social valuing, sense of place, identity and belonging are concomitant within the community. the village is located in the town of cloughjordan in county tipperary, the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia republic of ireland (hereafter referred to as ireland). the discursive narratives that emerge are based on the voices of fms and cms of the sustainable ireland project, ltd (spil), the organization in charge developing the village, as practiced within this community. the critique that emerges provides the opportunity to explore the contested narratives on governance, especially as related to the consensus-based approach to decision-making adopted by the intentional community under study. models of alternative lifestyles depend upon a considerable shift in power from globalized values to those internalized in local community autonomy. the ‘interplay between the local and the global is at the heart of the battle for a compatible modernity, and the desire to determine destiny’ (curry, koczberski & connell 2012, p. 122). an important component in this shift is the social valuing of place, as it allows communities to move beyond oppressive or detached interactions to more self-enhancing and engaging ones. this shift also involves a focus on the experiential micro-politics and ethics of governance, and the development of critical community awareness and the prioritization of social and ecological costs over purely profit-orientated decision-making. such a shift usually involves explicit ethical and social agendas for change that value place and belonging in local communities. to a large extent, this shift will depend on the historical and political context of the community involved, and its approach to governance. examining the way in which a community organizes and governs itself, provides an indication of how much it has moved away from the challenges of neoliberal dominance – and developed a governing process that truly embraces the ideals of the community (erikson 2007, fraser 2010). social justice, as both the recognition of cultural identity and the redistribution of resources for local communities, cannot take place without these important elements (fraser 2010). intentional communities intentional communities have been defined in various ways, but they are generally considered to be communities formed by like-minded people who create a community in which they can share, sustain and promote their beliefs and values. according to the intentional communities website (http://www.ic.org/), an intentional community is an inclusive term for: ecovillages, cohousing communities, residential land trusts, communes, student co-ops, urban housing cooperatives, intentional living, alternative communities, cooperative living, and other projects where people 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 http://directory.ic.org/records/ecovillages.php http://directory.ic.org/records/cohousing.php http://directory.ic.org/records/cohousing.php http://directory.ic.org/records/communes.php http://directory.ic.org/records/coops.php strive together with a common vision. ergas (2010) describes such a community as one that has established a ‘collective vision by agreeing on common values, establishing goals, and converting them into action’ (p. 33). intentional communities can also be viewed as social movements (schehr 1997) because they attempt to reinterpret the social order of property and labor relationships in a way that is more collaborative and collective. in the same light, ecovillages can be seen as part of this social movement, given their common stance against organizational and cultural authority (snow, soule, & kriesi 2004) and their contested view of dominant culture as it embraces material possession and resource extraction (foster & york 2004; watson & zakri 2001). kirby (2004 p. 1) adds: the rise of a protest movement to challenge the forces that promote the globalization of a non-sustainable capitalist/industrial system has been paralleled by the rise of the ecovillage movement as a national and international enterprise. globalization, environmental degradation and information technology development have played a role in the precipitation of socio-cultural-environmental changes that have radically altered our perception of space and place. at the same time, there is a growing perception that family and community ties have grown weaker and modern life more fragmented, isolated and disconnected (macnaghten & urry 1998; putnam 2000). a number of authors have criticized neoliberal dominance, arguing in favor of recentralizing nature and ecology in our lives and the lifestyles we choose. mccarthy and prudham (2004), for example, refer to neoliberal nature as ‘the politics of transforming and governing nature under neoliberalism’ (p. 279). heynen and robbins (2005) refer to the acceleration of ‘the ongoing commodification of natural things’ (p. 6). while heynen, et al. (2007) refer to neoliberal environments as ‘the ways that attempts to ‘stretch’ and ‘deepen’… the reach of commodity circulation relying on the re-working of environmental governance and on entrenching the commodification of nature, and vice versa’ (p. 3). we maintain that in a broader context, neoliberalism re-intensifies the older liberal projects of individualism, where citizens are seen to be free from government intervention and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 3 marketization. markets are the best way to enable individual autonomy and efficient economic outcomes, often embracing the views of privatization and free trade. it is important to remember that neoliberal governance provides external controls, managed by powerful stakeholders that embrace this form of governance. we suggest that in order to move away from this dominant worldview, the next step is to migrate towards those values represented by the ecovillage concept of alternative lifestyle, which charts a path to a more just global order. intentional communities endeavour to create an alternative that synthesizes social, environmental and spiritual concerns. ‘it is the fusion of these elements that forms the core of the ecovillage ideology, and provides a focus for those who see conventional social patterns as unacceptable’ (kirby, 2003 p. 324). schor (1998) refers to this departure as a voluntary simplicity movement that arose during a period of heightened environmental awareness. members of such communities typically move away from consumerism and materialism in search of a more spiritual way of life, with a strong emphasis on community. following kirby (2003) and ergas (2010), we locate ecovillages as part of the environmental movement. this is evident in the emphasis ecovillages place on living a simple, sustainable, community-orientated life in harmony with nature and based on the principles of permaculture. in this article, place is viewed as embodied space (cf. relph 1976; tuan 1977), embedded in interactive community practices (cf. decerteau 1984, 1988; butz & eyles 1997). the focus on practice contributes to the production and reproduction of local practices of belonging and identity (cf. stedman 2002, 2003b). we suggest that consumption appears irrepressible because it is an idealist practice that is no longer based on the satisfaction of needs and realistic consumption. so any desire to ‘moderate consumption’ or to establish a normalizing network of needs via moralist positions alone is naïve (baudrillard 1970/1998, pp. 24-25). in order to move forward, we see a need to highlight the practice of face-to-face interactions between and within local communities and assume the existence of a plurality of spaces and places in which to challenge and negotiate the construction of specific discourses pertaining to cultural, social and personal matters. 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 in our view, the process of governance within these communities requires that encounters be reciprocal. one indicator of this is the degree to which governance resides within the community, and the extent to which the community plays a key role in organizing and managing the environment in which these encounters take place. this paper focuses on the space and place of governance in an effort to uncover the degree to which the governance in question enables significant community encounters that abide by the values of the community at large. findings drawn from this study have direct implications for advancing our understanding of how intentional communities govern themselves and make decisions within their communities. this study is designed to identify a range of social issues in order to stimulate discussion, debate and further research in the area of governance and decision-making in ecovillages and other intentional communities. the finding may also be of interest to researchers in the area of community-based tourism (cbt) development and management, where participation in the decision-making process is seen as vital for all stakeholders. furthermore, this work might be of interest to town and city planners, who are directly involved in developing, managing and progressing communities within their jurisdictions. ecovillages according to the united nations charter (1987), sustainability can be defined as ‘development that meets the needs of current society without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. gillman (1991) notes that ecovillages are based on: 1) limited human scale; 2) full-featured settlement; 3) harmless integration of human activities into the natural world; 4) support for healthy human development; and 5) sustainability (p. 10). the ecovillage movement is ‘one example of small communities that are intended to build community and ecological sustainability’ (ergas 2010, p. 32). human scale refers to establishing a community whose size enables people to know one another and to have a direct input into the direction of the community. a full-featured settlement is one that includes a favorable balance of residences, organic food production, light industry, commerce, social life and leisure. harmless integration of human activities into the natural world helps establish equity between the two and encourages the use of renewable energy sources and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 5 recycling. ensuring healthy human development provides a balanced and integrated approach that includes physical, emotional, mental, and spiritual aspects of life. finally, an ecovillage should be sustainable and ideally offer itself as a microcosm of the whole of society (gillman 1991). (see trainer [1998] for additional information on conceptualizing ecovillages.) ecovillages are commonly conceived around four pillars: sustainable building, organic farming, resilient community and alternative energy. winston (2012) holds that the village illustrates a grassroots sustainability enterprise that brings together social and technological innovation, with a focus on sustainable housing. the author cautions, however, that most sustainable housing initiatives have thus far tended to be isolated experiments in housing construction or design, limited in terms of both impact and scope. kirby (2003) identifies three major challenges in the ecovillage in ithaca (evi): boundary issues, communication issues, and consensus issues. during the early stages of settlement and planning, the consensus process ‘stretched the resolve, patience and creativity of the group’. with many financial obligations and decisions to make, the consensus process ‘was pressured by the deadlines imposed by the need to begin construction’. the consensus process was viewed as ‘a blessing and a curse, described variously as ‘a beautiful process in theory’, ‘ponderous’, and ‘the tyranny of the minority’’ (p.328). commitment and time constraints were not the only barriers to the consensus process. kirby reports that some members felt resentment and animosity toward other members borne out of the early planning stages. this in turn led to tensions within the community and threatened the viability of the consensus process. outside facilitators were brought in to help ameliorate communications, which reportedly resulted in ‘significant improvement in the ability of ecovillage residents to listen to each other and to respond appropriately’ (2003, p. 328). renz (2006) studied the role of consensus decision-making in the context of cohousing. she reports that reaching agreement was complicated by value differences among members as well as discontinuity in their participation. she identifies three characteristics that influenced the consensus process: 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 the role of structured communication within and between group meetings; a tension between maintaining process openness and reaching decision closure; and the expectation that group members will work within the consensus process. (p. 163) renz’s analysis highlights the importance of timing in the interpretation of conflict and the role of process change when a group reaches its limit in terms of the members’ commitment to the consensus process. sargission (2004) notes, ‘consensus is an example of procedural justice at its best. however, procedural justice on its own cannot ensure just outcomes’ (p. 321). political projects that seek to deliver social justice for grassroots communities such as ecovillages must challenge the ideology, assumptions and practices of neo-liberalism in various local contexts and economies. the process of consensus offers one such approach, albeit a challenging one. consensus seeks agreement. it mirrors the egalitarian intents of ecovillages, thus presenting itself as the most legitimate form of decision-making in this context. this approach aims to enable people to negotiate disagreements and to find collective solutions. it also binds each individual to the decisions made and the ensuing outcomes. like all democratic forms of governance, consensus is open to manipulation and abuse, and can be misused to legitimize non-consensual decisions made without the full support of the group. on the other hand, a bonafide consensus process can find solutions to apparently unsolvable problems and form strong bonds within the group (sargisson & lyman 2004). the consensus process is built upon the provisions of full access, participation and trust. if faith in the process is compromised, it can lead to an oppressive environment in which people end up nominally supporting decisions they do not agree with. while community empowerment is one way to challenge the ideology of neoliberalism, it does not always ensure equity in practice. therefore there is a need to establish sustainable practices that influence the efficacy of the consensus process and constrain the disproportionate influence of a persuasive speaker, an articulation of technical talk, or someone empowered by backroom lobbying. done right, however, consensus is a fully inclusive, cooperative and non-hierarchical process of decisioncosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 7 making that provides the organizational structure for all voices to be heard and all opinions respected (sargisson & lyman 2004). cloughjordan ecovillage this section draws from winston (2012), duncan (2010), connolly (2007); a content analysis of village related literature, and from numerous communications with former and current members (fms and cms). see winston (2012) for a comprehensive account of the development and evolution of the cloughjordan ecovillage. the idea of creating an ecovillage in ireland was conceived of in the mid-1990s by gavin harte and gregg allen, both of whom had a strong commitment to sustainable development. a small group of interested people gathered, which led to the founding spil—a not for profit company limited by guarantee and run along co-operative principles. the company established a board of directors (bod) and an advisory panel comprised of experts with relevant skills to advance the project, including an engineer, an architect, an accountant, a solicitor, a surveyor and the then leader of the green party (winston, 2012). spil was launched in 1999, at which time the public was invited to attend a series of monthly workshops given by harte. interested parties were invited to become members, which required a £1,000 investment in the project. membership was limited to roughly 40 in order to ensure a manageable size and to allow for the realization of the core principles of the organization. an office was rented and harte and two part-time workers were employed to manage the project. spil established a memorandum & articles (constitution) for the company as well as a membership agreement that outlined the responsibilities of the company and its members. subsequently, spil developed an ecological charter, which outlined the core principles of development. this charter includes environmental objectives, building and construction code, and calls for the use of a district heating system (dhs) and sustainable drainage. for example, buildings are expected to be well insulated, to make use of passive solar gain and renewable energy, to minimize potable water consumption, to reduce construction waste, and to use low embodied energy materials (those requiring relatively little energy to produce). spil then 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 applied for charitable status and established the rules of operation—with an emphasis on consensus-based decision-making (winston 2012; connolly 2007). in 2001, spil began to consider potential building sites within roughly 150 kilometres from dublin, preferably adjacent to an existing town rather than a greenfield (agricultural) site. cloughjordan was chosen from among a dozen short-listed sites due to the range of infrastructures it offered—including a train link to dublin, as well as the enthusiasm shown for the project by a local councilor and historian. spil negotiated a one-year option to purchase the 67-acre site while investigating whether or not it could obtain planning permission to develop an ecovillage on what was a greenfield site. the map below, taken from the official village website, shows its location within ireland. spil held a number of public meetings in cloughjordan to inform the residents of its plans as well as to solicit feedback from the local community. for example, spil invited local school children to make a model of the town and then to join it together with the ecovillage model that spil provided. this community-based project was reportedly successful in gaining the support of the town residents by including them in the development process. figure 1. map locating the cloughjordan ecovillage. source: http://thevillage.ie/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 9 http://thevillage.ie/ spil worked with the local planning authority in an effort to integrate the creation of a sustainable settlement within the redrafting of the county development plans. spil had a masterplan for the construction of an ecovillage drawn up by solearth ecological architecture and buro huppold (an engineering firm). by this time, each of the roughly 50 spil members had invested €15,000 in the project. this risk investment allowed spil to hire consultants to assist them in gaining planning approval. in 2005, spil received outline planning permission to build a sustainable community of 130 homes and work units, albeit with over 30 conditions attached. these conditions took more than a year to comply with and significantly increased the cost of the project. figure 2. map of the cloughjordan ecovillage. source: http://thevillage.ie/ in order to purchase the land, spil members borrowed roughly half the money from clann credo (a social lending institution) and the rest in loans from spil members, making use of a loan stock scheme that offered lower interest rates than commercial banks. in order to finance the costs of putting in the infrastructure, spil took another loan from the loan stock scheme as well as one from a commercial bank. this put a financial strain on the membership, at which time a substantial number of members withdrew from the project. the infrastructure was completed in 2008 and building began the following year. at the time of this writing (june 2012), building is 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 http://thevillage.ie/ still underway. the map above, as displayed on the official village website, shows the layout of the village and its connection to the town of cloughjordan at the southern border of the property. currently, spil has approximately 125 members. about a third of the members have built a home in the ecovillage and reside there. some members live in the town, awaiting the construction of their home. others are waiting for approval of a bank loan. still others have resigned themselves to the fact that they cannot afford to build, but who choose to live in the neighborhood and participate in village activities. as of november 2011, approximately 83 of the 130 plots had been sold, with growing recognition that spil may not be able to sell all of their sites. consensus from the beginning, spil adopted a consensus-based approach to decision-making, as stated on their website: as a community we aim to share out the rights and responsibilities of making this project work successfully. our evolving decision-making processes are founded on the consensus model, with practical structures in place to ensure that we achieve our aims. (spil 2011) connolly notes, ‘there has always been a tension between task and process—the need to get things done within a specific time period and the need to reach consensus on how to do it’. for connolly, a longtime spil member, the greatest strength of the project has been ‘how we resolve this tension through our decision-making process’. he claims, ‘we’ve never made a decision without using consensus’ (2007, p.5). in 2007, spil began to implement the viable systems model (vsm) in an effort improve their consensus-based approach to decision-making. vsm was designed by stafford beer and provides a practical, non-hierarchical decision-making structure based on natural systems. walker and espinosa, two vsm experts, have worked with spil members in implementing this system. this has reportedly enabled the village to decide on a wider range of issues within a more favorable time frame by distributing the decision-making cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 11 process across a series of committees. espinosa and walker give a detailed account of the methodology, approach, and staged learning of this ongoing project (espinosa et al. 2011, ch.5). vsm is characterized by sharing out work and responsibility in an effort to ensure that decisionmaking is both efficient and accountable. spil members can choose from six ‘primary activity’ areas (sales & marketing; infrastructure maintenance; land use; developing the local economy; community building; and education, research & training). there are also a number of ‘metasystemic’ groups employed to promote ‘cohesion and synergy’ in the management (espinosa et al. 2011, p. 542). currently spil employs one full-time general manager, a part-time sales manager, and a parttime administrator. members’ meetings are held monthly, at which time information is shared, issues discussed and policy approved. a general meeting is held once a year, at which time 70% of the membership must be in attendance in order to establish a quorum. a village mailing list is employed to enable spil members who live on, near or away from the village to communicate and to stay informed of village issues. village contributions and challenges the village has been developed largely in accordance with the principles of permaculture. it established the first local community supported agriculture (csa) program in ireland, drawing its membership from the ecovillage and the wider cloughjordan community. as a partner in the sustainable energy for rural village environment (serve) project, the village received funding from the eu concerto program towards the purchase and installation of ireland’s first renewable energy dhs and the establishment of the largest solar farm in ireland. according to duncan (2010), this project was seen as ‘exemplary’ for ireland, earning spil approximately €1,000,000 in government and eu grants (p. 27). furthermore, the village has made its mark on sustainable housing initiatives in ireland and has received a lot of positive attention from the irish media. the village meets many of the criteria for sustainable housing, including access to public transportation, providing local employment, using energy-efficient housing construction and 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 making use of renewable building materials. it also provides on-site recycling of construction materials, produces on-site renewable energy, provides access to high quality green space for food, energy, leisure, and to a wide range of social resources within the local area. to date, however, there is limited empirical data available to evaluate the extent of the village’s contribution to sustainability. the one exception is the ongoing evaluation of the energy use and efficiency rating of each of the village buildings. winston (2012) notes that in order for the village to fulfill its aims as a demonstration project, there needs to be more systematic and detailed reporting of the contribution it makes to sustainability. further investigation into the areas of environmental, economic and social impacts would help to clarify the contributions the village has made. the village boasts a number of firsts, but it has also encountered some disappointments. the original well field (with a dug well) was paved over due to concerns about traces of nitrates found in the water. the village is now connected to the public water main. plans for a reed bed sewage disposal system were approved and the infrastructure built, however, this has been put on hold due to increasingly stringent eu water quality directives and the projected cost of maintenance and management. according to duncan (2010, p.28), the village is currently being served by ‘a package plant discharging to the public sewer’. the dhs provides heat to the village via hot water but is not running at full efficiency since it was designed to heat 130 homes. this has required some tweaking of the system, though it continues to send hot water through some 2.5 kilometers of pipes, including those leading up to vacant lots. finally, the state-of-theart solar farm reportedly has a design flaw, which has rendered it limited in use until a solution can be found. finally, the village was not immune to the demise of the celtic tiger, the banking crisis, the collapse of the housing market, the ongoing recession and limitations imposed by the eu bailout in 2010. the unexpected cost of putting in the village infrastructure significantly increased the price of sites, making them more difficult to sell. within the current economic climate, it is exceedingly difficult to obtain a housing loan, leaving many spil members unable to build on their site. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 13 there is now a renewed interest in diversifying the sites for sale to include more cohousing, cooperative housing, equity partnerships, investment packages and rent-to-buy options. it remains uncertain, however, whether spil will be able to reach its goal of selling all 130 sites. one current member suggested that selling 70 sites or so would enable spil to get the ‘banks off their back’ and enable the village to put in external lighting, pathways and do some landscaping work. plans for developing a central market square, children’s play areas and two community buildings remain on hold pending funding. methodology this case study employs a qualitative approach (cf. denzin 2005). the epistemology of the approach is interpretive, informed by hermeneutics and phenomenology ( cf. ragin 1987). grounded theory (glaser 1967; glaser 1978; strauss 1990; glaser 1992) guided and informed both the collection and analysis of the data. this approach seeks to incorporate different types of knowledge from a range of stakeholders in an effort to unmask new ways forward between individuals and organizations—and in their relations with wider society (alvesson & ashcraft, 2009). one of the researchers visited and lodged at the village during a five-day period in july 2011. the primary purpose of this visit was for the researcher to introduce himself to the village community and to discuss the research proposal with the village education, research and training (vert) committee, one of the six ‘primary activity areas’ established under the vsm system. the visit also served to inform the development of interview questions. data collection and interpretation a total of eight participants were interviewed based on theoretical and snowball sampling (cf. barbour 2001). interviews were conducted over a five-month period and took place in the village, in dublin and (one) by skype. materials informing the interview questions were drawn from participant observation, personal communications, content analysis and a literature review. four semi-structured interviews were conducted with former members and four with current members, comprised of six males and two females ranging in age from their 30s to 60s. each interview was 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 made up of ten core questions and ran roughly 60~90 minutes. all interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed in full. transcripts were examined in detail and data grouped according to emergent themes. a process of ‘open’ coding (strauss & corbin 1990 [2007]) was employed to name and categorize these data in a way that was both fitting and true to these data. the reduction of themes and categories presents a potential weakness but one that is accepted and rationalized by grounded theorists. according to glaser (1992), interpreting patterns that emerge within the data is more important than any bias caused by such reduction. the goal is to build working categories that represent the data fairly (glaser 1992; strauss & corbin 1990 (2007). the preliminary interview data are limited in scope but provide what is considered to be a balanced account, given that all those interviewed play(ed) influential roles in the development of the village. emerging narratives on governance and decision-making due to the relatively critical nature of former members’ comments, it is believed that aggregating these data into a single narrative would present an overly negative view of the village. in an effort to avoid this, the voice of the fms will be presented first followed by that of the current members. out of respect for the privacy of the interview participants, all data have been anonymized and will be referred to simply as “fm” or “cm” data. the emerging narratives drawn from fms and cms are predictably different given that their experiences are based on different time frames and circumstances. this section explores these discursive narratives in an effort to better understand the strengths and shortcomings of the consensus-based decisionmaking process as practiced in the village. responses that emerged as significant across the interviews were grouped together under a set of general categories. these categories were subsequently aggregated under more general categories, creating a coding hierarchy that identified commonalities within the narratives. the table below provides a consolidated view of the core categories that emerged from the fm interview data as well as a brief description of each as drawn from the data. due to space limitations, responses have been truncated to keywords or phrases. great attention has been paid to preserve the original wording as much as possible. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 15 table 1. core categories: former members (fm) group categories descriptors i. governance difficult to balance efficiency, consensus and status quo; command and control mindset; emergency meetings; high alert; crucial decisions— have to make a decision right now; imposing emergency law; heightened circumstances; red alert; last minute votes; vote coaching; suspended all of the nice discussion; rubber stamp meetings; discussion topics pre-determined; leadership of zealots with moral authority; leadership knew what they are doing; had greater vision; walked the walk, talked the talk, environmental activists locked up together—there were bonds; forceful people—anything they said went; we’ll do the thinking for you; hidden agendas; counter proposals required but viewed negatively; with us or against us; lacked scope to address problems; forfeited deposits by departing members not addressed. secrecy; lack of accountability; the finance committee was less than open in keeping the bod informed; control of information; didn’t satisfy need to understand; jobs for the boys; private mailing lists inadvertently reinforced the lack of openness; ineffective communication; there was a lot of secrecy in the upper levels of the project; there was a lot of secrecy around the financial side of the project. ii. decision-making site selection—paid three times over the odds for agricultural land without planning permission; certainly no sense of ever admitting or acknowledging that they made a bad choice; did a really extraordinarily poor job dealing with landowners; centralized decision-making; undue influence of three or four members; rifling through decisions; marginalizing people who wanted to be more inclusive; design link to town put houses down in the hollow. a. consensus consensus wasn’t possible; consensus lacked structure; takes time— often decisions had to be made quickly; consensus works best on large issues, with small picture stuff, decision have to be made quickly to keep the project on track; workload needed to be broken down— spreading the load but weakened the whole involvement of everyone— each person involved only in their own little bit; felt like we were crying in the wilderness in trying to ensure consensus. fms reported that the legal structure of spil as a charity with a bod and a consensus-based approach to decision-making didn’t work. you had a legal structure that had a board of directors, a chairman and yet layered on top of that you had this attempt to have this consensus decision-making process… the 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 conflict of having a hierarchical company structure and a consensus decision-making process were in conflict with each other. another fm noted: if you have a bod, you have a chairperson. that chairperson has certain responsibilities… this is a legal thing. and to try to sit that structure on top of an organization that was basically supposed to be consensus-based, it was a bad fit. fms noted the inherent difficulties of consensus-based decision-making in terms of executing time-effective decisions while at the same time seeking consensus. as one fm recounted: it was very easy to have consensus when you were just kind of meeting in a room somewhere and there was no actual reality—everything was theoretical. there were no pressing time frames, so you had time for consensus. as things moved on and spil got more involved with planning departments and eventually with contractors, consensus was reportedly no longer possible. what happened then was that a couple of individuals, who would have been more in the command and control mind set, started to have more and more influence within the group. this reportedly led to diminished transparency, as one fm reports: things were always presented after decisions had already been made – like who was going to be paid to run the office. votes were often taken at the last minute – ten to nine, so we needed to take a vote now. so this is the issue, and this is how you should vote on it. the same respondent continues: if there were a big decision to make, they would wait until the last minute. we are going to apply for this grant tomorrow, so we really should vote ‘yes’ for this. and you are like – this is the first i heard of this. can i read about this grant? what is it for? similarly, another fm reports: every meeting was an emergency meeting – always on high alert. oh my god, you have to come to the next meeting – we have to make a crucial decision. in five years, every meeting was about making a crucial decision. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 17 the same respondent continues: it’s a bit like imposing emergency law. you have to make decisions now, so you suspend all of the nice discussion…so under those heightened circumstances, red alert is on all the time. fms claim that the decision-making process was centralized around a few members who ‘rifled through decisions’ with a ‘command and control mindset’, marginalizing the bod and membership in the process: i didn’t see much of a distinction in power in being on the bod because i was on the bod and frankly being on it made no difference… it really didn’t matter who was on the bod because you didn’t really have power. it was only 3-4 people running around [behind the scenes]—and it wasn’t you. fms question the transparency of the leadership, citing the finance committee as a prime example. claims were made that this committee was “less than open in keeping the bod informed” which made it difficult for the bod to oversee the development of the project and to know where they stood financially. in turn, secrecy within the leadership raised questions about accountability. one fm notes: there was a lot of secrecy in the upper levels of the project… there was a lot of secrecy around the financial side of the project. one fm contends that the consensus process lacked structure, was time consuming and didn’t allow for quick decisions to be made on urgent matters: consensus works best on large issues. with small picture stuff, decisions have to be made quickly to keep the project on track. the same respondent continues: i felt that we were crying in the wilderness in trying to ensure consensus and on trying to ensure issues were brought before the whole group, rather than decisions being largely taken in smaller groups and then just brought to the main group for rubber-stamping. 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 the workload needed to be broken down and distributed. by doing so, however, people and projects reportedly became isolated—with each person involved only in ‘his or her own little bit’. the same respondent offers the following insight on the structure of leadership and the consensus-based approach to decision-making: i could see very well when things weren’t working. some of those involved might not have understood the importance of structure and how important it is to make things work. if you don’t have a structure for your consensus to work, it is not going to work. the fms hold that the leadership and decision-making process divided the membership by ‘ostracizing those perceived as trouble makers’ and by ‘marginalizing people who wanted to be more inclusive’. fms viewed ‘ineffective communication’ within the leadership as a contributing factor in their reported lack of transparency and accountability. as one fm recounts: we were supposed to have consensus, but as soon as there were any questions things got very antagonistic… you were ostracized or seen as making trouble… this is the process, and if you are against this process you are against the village. that is all fine and dandy, but we need accountability. you are basically centralizing the decision-making power. one fm reported that there was ‘a limited sense of social justice or equality’ on the part of some of the most influential members in terms of providing and sustaining equity within the community: those with considerable money to invest had undue interest. it wasn’t high on their list of priorities that this would have to be within the means of people who put their inspiration into it. poorer members were squeezed out of the project. the table below highlights the core categories that emerged from the cm interview data, including brief description of each as drawn from the data. given space limitations, responses have been truncated to keywords or phrases. once again, great attention has been paid in preserving the original wording as much as possible. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 19 table 2. core categories current members (cm) group categories descriptors i. governance we’re an educational charity; what does that mean; we are a fishbowl; we have this remit that we want to show that we are a sustainable community… that is what you are buying into; i think that there is a good honesty and integrity in the people who are in positions of leadership... there is an awareness of proper governance. ii. decision-making the membership is supposed to be the primary decision maker; they can come together and decide anything at once; vsm allows for distributed systems and distributed leadership; you can lead in certain areas and follow in others… it moves away from command and control and allows us pursue autonomy and self-organization; it works quite well when you understand it; a lot of people don’t fully understand it… but i think it is a fairly good system. a. consensus we took the consensus decision-making procedure from the food coop that a few of us were working at; people can talk at the expense of action; we have consensus—everything has to be done by consensus; but then we allow boards to run just on the consensus of the board; if you disagree, it is not enough to say that you disagree—you have to present an alternative; if people are making decisions on a consensus basis, they have responsibilities too… and if you take that responsibility on yourself to see all parts of the story and then say no, i still can’t go along with that, then the community won’t go along with it; it can be drawn out, and sometimes we do leave things undecided—and we can come back to them; sometimes maybe a majority decision makes sense; we’re supposed to operate on a consensus basis in the boards, but we don’t really do it… a lot of our decisions would be basically on a show of hands. note: chp = combined heat & power one cm reported that he feels there is ‘honesty and integrity in the people who are in positions of leadership... [and] an awareness of proper governance’. another cm notes that the consensus decision-making process ‘was taken from the food coop that a few of us were working at and that has been built upon’. the vsm system includes a ‘process group’ whose job it is to research these sorts of things. the same respondent continues: as times goes by, we are better and better at making decisions. vsm allows for distributed systems and distributed leadership. you can lead in certain areas and follow in others… it moves away from command and control, and allows us to 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 pursue autonomy and self-organization. it’s a system to empower people and allow them to self-organize. another cm offers the following account on vsm: it works quite well when you understand it. a lot of people don’t fully understand it… but i think it is a fairly good system. the same respondent adds: the membership is supposed to be the primary decision maker. they can come together and can decide anything at once, but that responsibility is given to the groups… the principle is that they are self-organized groups, so they will consider what that group needs to do—whatever it is. the meaning and scope of consensus appears to vary among cms. one cm noted, ‘everything has to be done by consensus’, but then added, ‘we allow boards to run just on the consensus of the board’. similarly, another cm adds, ‘we’re supposed to operate on a consensus basis in the boards, but we don’t really do it… a lot of our decisions would be basically on a show of hands’. he suggests, ‘sometimes maybe a majority decision makes sense’. a successful consensus-based process calls for a well-informed membership that stays abreast of pertinent issues and who remains engaged in the project. yet one cm noted, ‘there are some people who just want a quiet house in the country, and… others who want this [community] to be a model of sustainability’. regardless of purpose and level of participation, one cm comments: part of the remarkable fact about this community is how well we really do work together… we are quite involved. cms agree that a consensus-based approach to decision-making requires individual and collective responsibility. one cannot simply disagree without providing an alternative. according to one cm: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 21 if you take that responsibility on yourself to see all parts of the story and then say no, i still can’t go along with that, then the community won’t go along with it. it can be drawn out, and sometimes we do leave things undecided, and we can come back to them. discussion developing a sustainable community may be more challenging than implementing the built infrastructure. kirby notes: whereas integrating into the built form the technology for living in an environmentally sustainable manner is relatively easy, the task of creating the kind of community that can experience and demonstrate a socially sustainable lifestyle has proven to be a much greater challenge. (2003, p. 327) the village has installed an impressive infrastructure, replete in green technology, and has built an eclectic array of purpose-built, sustainable houses. however, the findings suggest that it has struggled in terms of governance and in its consensus-based approach to decision-making. kirby reports that nearly one third of the issues reported at evi were interpersonal in nature (2003, p. 329). the case of the village would corroborate this finding, where most of the reported tensions revolved around the consensus process and governance. it is widely understood in the village that when a proposal is contested, members are expected to suggest an alternative proposal. yet one former member reports, ‘counter proposals were required but were viewed negatively…. there was a ‘with us or against us’ ethos within the leadership’. that a ‘leadership’ was consistently identified by fms suggests the existence of powers that operated outside of the consensus process. one fm asserted that spil was run by a ‘leadership of zealots with moral authority… [who] walked the walk, talked the talk… [and were] locked up together’. this sheds some light on why this group of individuals was reportedly so cohesive and influential. if there were those who were empowered by leadership, there were others who have been described by fms as ‘sheepish followers [who] were dragged along… who didn’t want to rock the boat’. some members ‘opted out because they felt like they didn’t have a voice’. others felt ‘it would be too much hassle to put time in’. still others were reportedly ‘quite happy to let the 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 active group make decisions’. there was a sense that ‘they know what they are doing because they stand up at meetings and tell us what is going on, what to think and what to do’. this deference (or apathy) amounted to tacit approval: ‘you have all the power and moral authority, so you should tell us what to do’. in 2007 ‘almost half the membership of the cloughjordan membership decided to leave the project’ (http://cloughjordan.net/). for those who forfeited their risk investment and left, they have expressed regret and even resentment. the implementation of vsm came on the heels of the 2007 exodus. this suggests that the village was aware of mounting tensions and sought to improve the way in which it governed itself and dealt with conflict resolution. like evi, the village resorted to calling in outside experts to facilitate communication within their community. current members now report that they are basically satisfied with vsm, though its overall effectiveness and sustainability remains to be seen. in addition to governance and communication issues, questions have been raised about the preparedness and capability of the founding members to manage the village project—one which grew fast and far beyond its original conception. as one fm put it, ‘volunteer environmentalists were not equipped to be commercial property developers’. their alleged lack of experience and ability may offer some insights into why decisions were reportedly made at the last minute and to the perceived lack of transparency and accountability consistently reported by fms. if the leadership were not fully equipped to manage the development of the ecovillage on the scale that emerged, this may have contributed to the shroud of secrecy that has been reported by former members. keeping a tight rein on the financial committee may have allowed the leadership to present an image of financial solvency and project solidarity at times when the project was in jeopardy. since 2007, unsold sites have been marketed in a way that more accurately reflects the costs of putting in the infrastructure. newcomers attracted to the village now know more clearly what it costs to buy into this community. new members have been reported to be more financially secure than earlier members. as one former member put it, ‘idealists were replaced by ecocosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 23 http://cloughjordan.net/ entrepreneurs’. indeed, a current member notes, ‘a lot of people who look like entrepreneurs are coming around looking to invest’. he adds, ‘when all is said and done, this community here is a pretty middle class community’. conclusion from a broader, historical and socio-analytical perspective, there is little doubt that there are individuals seeking alternative lifestyles in the current world, which enables a move from globalized values towards local community autonomy. with this shift comes a need for processes that are sometimes naively assumed to be a easily prescribed, that allow for a different, more equitable approach to governance one that is able to repel the ills of globalized values in favor of inclusive community organization. we suggest that being removed from the influence of neoliberal-based reference groups and the dominance of consumer culture may encourage the individual to think more for him/herself and to assume a more proactive role in decision-making. in doing so, the individual must assume responsibility for his or her actions, whether they be right or wrong (heller 1970), divest themselves of neoliberal values and learn to become more independent and community minded. beyond establishing an ideology and built infrastructure in which to practice and promote alternative lifestyles, this study demonstrates the need for the village to establish an effective form of government that is commensurate with the values embraced by the community and sustainable over time. the findings reveal, however, that an alternative form of governance that resists the well-known effects of modernist, conventional, industrialized, mechanized and dependent lifestyles is not easily attained. counter-cultural governance that promotes a more democratic and organic form of government can encounter a steep learning curve in developing an equitable government in what is often a contentious process. our research suggests that while there may be clear intentions and strong motivation to establish an alternative form of governance, this objective can be time consuming and difficult to accomplish. when the centrality of monetary exchange is removed from human 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 encounters to ensure a lifestyle capable of providing deeper connections with community and nature, one challenge is to develop a suitable form of alternative governance. this issue of alternative governance has been examined in this study as well as the efficacy of its outcomes. it will be interesting to see if the future brings a more prominent move in the direction of alternative governance and the decision-making processes that they adopt—that are more organic than economic in nature. part of being a resilient community involves establishing sustainable leadership that embraces the spirit of consensus. the data suggests that reaching consensus improves over time, but at times contested issues have to be left unresolved until some future date. the evidence would suggest that consensus decision-making can be a rocky road, especially during the early stages when time constraints require urgent decisions. perhaps the consensus approach should be implemented gradually—after urgent building considerations have been settled. as ideologically appealing as consensus may be to egalitarian-minded communities, the findings would suggest that this process is contested and solutions can be elusive. given such a steep learning curve, it might be prudent for such communities to consider adopting vsm (or similar system) in order to provide a more objective (and neutral) foundation on which the consensus process can be built. such a structure might help to diffuse the personalization of issues and prevent the buildup of interpersonal tensions within the community. adopting an ‘expert’ system, such as vsm, would allow its structure to become the focus of debate, rather than singling out individual community members or questioning the viability of the consensus process itself. vsm provides a framework in which consensus can be practiced with greater transparency and accountability. it allows for the differentiation and distribution of tasks in a way that the village bod or invisible leadership could not. such a system encourages process openness, facilitates decision closure and embraces the consensus process. by distributing tasks and responsibilities, vsm allows for multiple valuations at different locations within the system. as such, this system cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 25 would seem better suited to tolerate value differentiation and discontinuity than a direct consensus approach. further research is called for in order to better understand the voices of ecovillage and other intentional community members vis-à-vis governance and a consensus-based approach to decision-making. at 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(ed.) enterprising communities: grassroots sustainability innovations, emerald, bingley, uk. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 http://cloughjordan.net/ http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/42/ares42-187.htm http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/condition.aspx%23download the politics of consensus: an exploration of the cloughjordan ecovillage, ireland abstract introduction intentional communities ecovillages cloughjordan ecovillage figure 1. map locating the cloughjordan ecovillage. source: http://thevillage.ie/ figure 2. map of the cloughjordan ecovillage. source: http://thevillage.ie/ consensus village contributions and challenges methodology data collection and interpretation emerging narratives on governance and decision-making table 1. core categories: former members (fm) group table 2. core categories current members (cm) group discussion conclusion references cohesion and conflict in contemporary living cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal is concerned with developing a better understanding of social change and cultural cohesion in cosmopolitan societies. the four papers in this issue demonstrate in different ways what may be at the core of this concern. both froystad and adami are interested in cultural and religious values in multi-religious societies and cosmopolitan spaces where individuals from different cultural contexts interact. froystad throws the study of multi-religious sociality in western context into relief by examining examples from india. for her, the key question is whether the current scholarship of cosmopolitanism has a monotheistic bias that should be accounted for. adami suggests that human rights discourse can work in a cosmopolitan space where value systems meet in processes characterized by conflict and cohesion. collins and reid take as their starting point the increasing global mobility of professionals for their study of immigrant teachers in australia. they show that forces of inclusion and exclusion are part of the everyday experiences as of these teachers as they settle in to their professional lives as new migrants. bisen, dalton and wilson analyse media coverage of microfinance in the usa and india. their study found that while there are some differences in subject matter and style in the newspaper articles, both sets of articles are dominated by business-oriented language, emphasizing the importance of the profit motive in microfinance schemes over the poverty-alleviation for which microfinance schemes were first recognized. together, these papers show how cohesion and conflict, inclusion and exclusion, shared experiences and difference are an integral part of experiencing contemporary life; individually and collectively they add to the richness of scholarly and societal debates. hilary yerbury sydney cohesion and conflict in contemporary living 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia whale watching as ecotourism: how sustainable is it? stephen l. wearing university of technology, sydney paul a. cunningham rikkyo university, tokyo stephen schweinsberg university of technology, sydney chantelle jobberns university of technology, sydney abstract whale watching as an alternative to the practice of commercial and ‘scientific’ whaling has evolved as an ecotourism activity. this paper explores whale watching in an effort to determine its economic and social viability as a sustainable, marine tourism activity – and whether the whale and the tourist can coexist in the future. we define whale watching as an ecotourism product, as it holds the potential for sustainable practice, one that is both ecologically sound and profitable. responsible whale watching is seen as a clean, green industry that simultaneously supports local economies and promotes whale education and conservation.the question is, can this ecotourism activity live up to these expectations? introduction in 2001, the journal of sustainable tourism published an article looking at the transition from whale hunting in tonga to whale watching (orams, 2001).since then, the overnight growth of the whale watching industry has ‘industrialised the ocean’ (corkeron 2004, p. 848).viewed by the international whaling commission (iwc) in 1983 as an alternative ‘use’ for whales, today whale watching is recognised as a legitimate form of ecotourism (orams, 2000), although viewed by some as ‘an acceptable form of benign exploitation (gillespie 2003, p. 408).leading up to 2001, the international whale watching industry was valued at over $1 billion usd (hoyt 2001), and attracted oven 9 million people annually.according to the international fund for animal welfare (ifaw), by 2008 this number had grown to over 13 million people, participating in over 119 countries (o’connor et. al, 2009). http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 39 patrick ramage, the director of the ifaw whale program, notes that whale watching revenues have more than doubled since 1998, and that whale-watching operations around the world now include 3,330 operators and employ an estimated 13,200 people with the fastest growth seen in asia (o’connor et al. 2009). peter garrett, the former australian environment minister, reports that the whale watching industry generated $2.1 billion usd of tourism revenue worldwide (afp 2009). ramage adds, ‘while governments continue to debate the future of whaling, the bottom line is increasingly clear: responsible whale watching is the most sustainable, environmentally‐friendly and economically beneficial ‘use ‘ of whales in the 21st century’ (o’connor et al. 2009, p. 9). whale watching guidelines suggest it can be operated within the boundaries of sustainable practice. however, with its growth worldwide; ‘the whale watching industry has grown at an average rate of 3.7% per year, comparing well against global tourism growth of 4.2% per year over the same period’ (o’connor et. al, 2009, p. 23), it may not be possible to ensure that all stakeholders operate within the parameters of sustainable practice for whale watching. at a regional level, average annual growth has exceeded tourism growth rates in five of the seven regions in this report: asia (17% per year), central america and the caribbean (13% per year), south america (10% per year), oceania and the pacific islands (10% per year) and europe (7%) (o’connor et al. 2009, p. 23). currently it is logical to pursue whale watching as it is viewed positively by tourists. for example, in 2007 tourists in the dominican republic were surveyed to determine whether the stance of a country towards whale conservation or whaling would affect their decision about whether to visit that country on holiday. the majority (77.1%) reported that if a caribbean country supported the hunting or capture of whales or dolphins that they would be less likely to visit it. an even larger majority (81.1%) stated that if a country had a strong commitment to whale and dolphin conservation, they would be more likely to visit that country on vacation (parsons & draheim 2009). additionally, it is within the interests of the whalewatching industry to ensure that it remains within sustainable practices aligned to ecotourism. higham and lusseaunote the need for sustainability, lest one find themselves ‘slaughtering the goose that lays the golden egg’ (2008, p. 63). further empirical research is called for in order to investigate the values and views of tourists on the issue of whale watching and the wider range of animal welfare issues. 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 it is believed (wearing, buchmann&jobberns 2011) that this industry evolved more quickly based, in part, on the film free willy, which portrayed a lone, captive orca released into the wild and reunited with his family. the star of the film was a killer whale named keiko, who played a fundamental role in changing perceptions of killer whales from beasts that ‘were feared and hunted’ (as in moby dick) in the 1970s, to creatures that were revered and glorified following the release of the first free willy film (lawrence & phillips 2004, p. 9) and its sequels. considering our collective history of hunting whales, the ‘save the whales’ movement represented a global change in public perceptions, which humanised these animals, forcing the public to reconsider the ethics of hunting whales (lawrence & phillips 2004) and to explore activities such as whale watching instead. we argue that whale watching, as an activity, encourages people to appreciate and protect whales through their interaction and experience with these creatures. encounters with wildlife create a need within people to help protect them (lien 2001), and has the potential to benefit conservation from the long-term effect of changing attitudes towards wild animals and natural habitats (duffus&dearden1993). whale watching also provides the opportunity to educate people about other environmental issues affecting oceans and waterways – such as high toxin levels and pollution, and can act as a platform from which commercial tour operators can educate their tourists about long-term sustainable benefits of whale watching. it is with this in mind that we argue that ecotourism creates a market value for the observation of animals through the commodification of wildlife and its habitats. at the same time, it provides education through direct experience and kindles a value for the natural environment. however, some have criticised the commodification and consumption of animals through whaling and whale watching on ethical grounds (scarpaci, parsons, & lück 2008). ecotourism provides us with an opportunity to provide both conservation and commercialisation, where the direct human ‘gaze’ of wildlife is central to the experience (ryan &saward, 2004, p. 246). given its alignment to alternative tourism (wearing & neil 2009), it is believed that ecotourism provides a mechanism to improve animal welfare and to conserve nature in general. for the purpose of discussion, we categorise whale watching as an ecotourism activity, but acknowledge that it could fall under the umbrella of various types of tourism. positioned as cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 41 an ecotourism activity, we are able to examine whale watching in terms of its ability to provide strong environmental protection objectives that may also lead to a positive imagery in terms of animal welfare, thus having the potential to attract more whale-watching tourists (kuo et al. 2009, p. 6). the question we seek to investigate in this paper is to what degree can we consider whale watching an ecotourism activity and to what extent emerging whale-watching practices will impact beyond the parameters acceptable to ecotourism and sustainable practice. this paper presents the opportunity to explore these ideas in more detail through an analysis of the literature. ecotourism sustainable growth for a common future this section investigates what ecotourism is and how whale watching fits into its remit as an extension of the sustainability discourse and as a model of tourism development that embraces the preservation of ecology and culture.according to the japan ecotourism society (jes, 2010), ecotourism should utilise unique local natural, historical and cultural resources; promote the conservation and preservation of local resources through appropriate management; and should activate local communities through responsible tourism and economic development that makes sustainable use of the natural and social resources.ecotourism australia (ea 2010) defines ecotourism as ecologically sustainable tourism with a primary focus on experiencing natural areas that fosters environmental and cultural understanding, appreciation and conservation. whale watching falls within the realm of ecotourism.it focuses on the aesthetic consumption of whales through the process of a largely visual experience that is supposed to be educative in nature.some types of whale watching are more tactile, notably the programs that offer the chance to swim with dolphins.whether viewing whales from a promontory point on land or from the bow of a boat, this activity fosters use and appreciation of these creatures that is sustainable in nature.while ‘swim with dolphin’ programs have been criticised for being more akin to adventure tourism, the participants generally have a great love for these creatures. outright categorisation of these activities is difficult, so we provide some discussion to enable judgment as to how whale watching might be postioned and how, if 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 given the ecotourism banner, it might be able to standardise guidelines in a way that made it more sustainable. wearing and neil (2009) suggest that the ecotourist is concerned with development and fulfilment, including self-education.this has led to an increase in the number of nature-based activities and interpretive programs in marine-based ecotourism (zeppel & muloin 2008).tisdell& wilson (2005) have identified the importance of learning and the interaction of tourists with wildlife as contributors to their pro-conservation sentiments and actions. with the growing presence of ecotourism and the activity of whale watching,we see an opportunity for sustainable growth.furthermore, as a way forward,pursuing the visual consumption of whales may help the culturally sensitive issues associated with the practice of whaling to evolve by aligning use, sustainability and profit. ecotourism experienced a growth in popularity during the 1980s, leading up to the international year of ecotourism occurring in 2002.it was believed that tourists had begun to question tourism products, and were willing to pay more for tourism products that were perceived to be ethical (boo 1990; wight 1993; king & stewart 1996; cole 2007).wight found that ecotourists are willing to spend ‘8.5% more for services and products provided by environmentally responsible suppliers’ (1994, p. 41).yet such findings remain contested.cunningham found that only one out of four lodgers was willing to pay an additional 10~20% to stay at an ecolodge, even though nearly 60% of the same respondents indicated the desire to stay at one (2007, p. 31).similarly, kirk (1996) found that 71% of the respondents he surveyed claimed that they would prefer to stay at hotels that showed concern for the environment, but were not willing to pay extra for it.hobson and essex reported that few guests showed any regard for environmental practices carried out by hotels and usually only require a ‘clean, comfortable bed’ with a ‘good breakfast’ (2001, p. 145). in their research of ecotourist activities in kaikoura, new zealand, cloke and perkins examined the nonhuman agency of nature and the role it plays in the performance and meaning of place.the recent boom in ecotourism at this location has been ‘co-constituted by the networked agency of whales and dolphins, whose charismatic animal appeal is a magnet for tourists’ (2005, p. 903) and plays a role in the mediation of the meaning of place.this research poses significant questions about the ability of actor networks and relational cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 43 networks to fully capture the power of nonhumans to evoke ‘sublime emotional and aesthetic relations with humans’ (2005, p. 903). hoyt notes the importance of ecotourism and other organisational structures to ensure the validity of whale watching as an ecotourist activity.noting that the atlantic islands comprise nearly a third of all marine protected areas (mpas) worldwide, the author reports that few of these mpas have management plans that include strategies for sustainable ecotourism. when whale watching is conducted in a sustainable manner, especially in or near a cetacean mpa, and with other regulations in place, it has the capacity to take a leading role in the development of an island-based ecotourism industry (2005, p. 141). whale and dolphin watching has now become the fastest growing sector of the eco-tourism industry (corkeron 2004; curtin 2003).although whale watching is part of the global tourism trade, it is really a community level industry. whale watching tourists support local economies through their purchases, from whale watching tickets to associated expenses for travel, food, hotels and souvenirs.beyond economics, the whale watching industry offers communities a sense of identity and cultural pride, and helps foster an appreciation for the marine environment.this supports local businesses, creating jobs and providing income (ifaw 2010). there are many advantages of this kind of ecotourism.if conducted properly this activity is relatively benign (blewitt 2008; jensen et al. 2009; lusseau, bain, williams & smith 2009; noren, johnson, rehder & larson 2009).through proper management, whale watching has proven to be profitable and sustainable.this approach provides a resource for ongoing cetacean research as well as a context in which to promote an appreciation of the marine environment and to explore conservation issues in the public discourse (greenpeace 2010). whale watching has widely been viewed as a harmless activity with considerable educational and conservation benefits. however, there is growing concern about the inadvertent damage caused by whale watching. the questions scientists, policy makers and the tourism industry are facing are how to determine the conditions under which whale watching becomes detrimental to the animals it targets, and how to best protect them (simmonds et al. 2007).higham and lusseau (2007, 2008) have echoed the urgent need for empirical research into whale watching. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 parsons, lück and lewandowski (2006) and scarpaci, parsons, and lück(2008) note that whale-watching research encompasses a wide variety of disciplines and fields of study, includes ‘monitoring the biological impacts of whale-watching activities on cetaceans and assessments of the effectiveness of whale-watching management and regulations, to the sociological and economic aspects of whale watching on communities hosting such activities’ (2008, p. 55).the conflicting use of marine mammals as non-consumptive versus consumptive is attracting more attention. in order to ensure the viability of whale watching in the future under the ecotourism banner, one needs to examine the educative elements of this activity and the social impact it has upon the participants.while whale watching is widely assumed to enhance people’s awareness and appreciation of whales – and perhaps lead to a greater sense of conservation and protection of the environment – one needs to evaluate the educational impact of this activity.in their examination of whale watching experiences in new south wales, australia, stamation et al. found that ‘the current education provided lacks structure, there are no clear conservation objectives, and there is limited addition to knowledge and conservation behaviors of whale watchers in the long term’ (2007, p. 41). in order to justify this ecotourism activity and to validate its claims of inspiring conservation and environmental awareness, the whale watching industry needs to address these issues.in his investigation of dolphin-swim tours in new zealand, lück found a demand for structured interpretation programs on marine mammal tours, with respondents clearly indicating that they would have liked to receive more information, in particular about the wider marine environment (2003, p. 943). zeppel and muloin (2007) echo the call for further research examining the educational component of marine wildlife tourism in order to be able to assess whether or not there is an increase in tourist knowledge and whether there are any attitudinal shifts or lifestyle changes that help to conserve marine wildlife.in a meta-analysis of guided tourist encounters with whales, dolphins and marine turtles from 1996 to 2007, the authors conclude that mediated encounters with marine wildlife contribute to pro-environmental attitudes and improved onsite behavior, with some longer-term intentions to engage in conservation actions that benefit marine species. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 45 in order to effectively manage wildlife tourism, the biological impacts as well as the needs of tourists, industry and other stakeholders need to be taken into consideration.stamation (2008) suggests that an adaptive management system that is both integrative and holistic be adopted in the management of whale watching.this would allow for the study of both the human and animal dimensions of this activity by incorporating biological and social sciences.such an approach would provide a framework for maximising the benefits of whale-watching, while at the same time minimising the adverse effects on whales. sustainable practices with the current trend towards animal and environmental awareness, people have become eager to experience wildlife and nature (amante-helweg, 1996). over the last 20 years there has been an awakening interest and a general fascination in observing cetaceans (i.e. whales, dolphins and porpoises) in their natural environment (orams 2000; muloin 1998; neil &breize 1998; corkeron 2004; curtin 2003). data available for australia reveal that in 1994 approximately 600,000 people participated in whale watching activities. it was also estimated that over $4.5 million usd was generated directly from whale watching tours for the year 1994 (anderson et al. 1996; hoyt 1996). currently, whale watching in australia generates an estimated $100 million usd a year. four times as many whale watching locations exist in 2010 than existed in 2005 in australia (whale and dolphin watch australia, 2010). in popular whale watching destinations like hervey bay, australia, whale watching activities create significant economic, social and educational benefits for the region (foxlee 2001). however, whale watching is not without its own impacts, which we explore here to provide insights into the difficulties in considering it a bonifide ecotourism activity that consistently operates according to sustainable practices. marine tourism often targets specific cetacean communities that are repeatedly sought out for prolonged, close-up encounters (especially in the case of dolphin swim programs). as the demand for more frequent and intimate encounters increases, so does the responsibility of conservation authorities and the scientific community to assess the effects of these activities upon the animals (corkeron 2006). the ifaw’s scientific work related to whale watching has aimed at facilitating data collection relevant to general whale conservation, and studying the effects of whale watching 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 on whales. the focus has been on developing benign, non‐intrusive techniques that can be used from whale watching vessels (o’connor et. al. 2009, p. 12). software developed by the ifaw for data collection is now used around the world by whale watching operations and other researchers. the ifaw has also contributed to studies concerned with compliance, regulations and guidelines (wiley et al., 2004), their scientific basis and techniques for monitoring these more effectively (denardo et al. 2001; leaper & gordon 2001). human interaction with cetaceans can cause short-term changes in the behaviour of these creatures, such as alterations to foraging strategies or reduced maternal care, which in the long term can lead to the displacement from preferred habitats or reduced reproductive success (blewitt 2008). for this reason, a variety of strategies have been implemented in an effort to manage and control whale-watching activities throughout australia and other whale watching locations. these strategies include regulations, permit and licensing systems, industry guidelines, education, and interpretation. an important component supporting these management systems is research. a growing number of studies have investigated the impact of vessel noise on cetacean communication. jensen et al. (2009) suggest that the increasing number and speed of vessels may have reduced the habitat quality of cetaceans by increasing the underwater noise level. lusseau, bain et al. (2009) report that vessel traffic has disrupted the foraging behavior of southern killer whales (orcinus orca), resident around san juan island, washington, usa. noren et al. (2009) focused on the same group of whales, reporting that the surface-active behaviors (sabs) of these whales were affected by the proximity of vessels in the area. the authors conclude that the minimum approach distance of 100 meters in whale watching guidelines may be insufficient in preventing behavioral responses from whales. weinrich and corbellistudied the potential impacts of vessel exposure on the calving rate of humpback whales off the coast of southern new england (usa), but found no direct evidence for negative effects. they posit that any ‘short-term disturbance may not necessarily be indicative of more meaningful effects on either individuals or populations’ (2009, p. 2931). sousa-lima and clark (2008, p. 174) found an important negative effect of boat traffic on singing activity. adaptive management should aim at reducing the number of noise events per boat, which can improve the whale watching experience and reduce the impact on male cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 47 singing behavior.stamation et al. (2010) found that calf pods were more sensitive to the presence of vessels than non-calf pods, and that dive times and the overall percentage of time whales spent submerged were higher in the presence of vessels. the authors caution that since the long-term impacts of the effects of vessels are unknown, management of the humpback whale-watching industry should adopt a conservative approach. whales and dolphins are increasingly the focus of tourism activities in many coastal locations; however the impacts of these activities remain largely unknown. in his investigation of bottlenose dolphins living in similar fjords but exposed to different levels of tourism activities, lusseau (2004) compared the impacts of boat interactions upon these cetaceans. in particular, the author examined short-term avoidance strategies and the threshold at which those strategies were no longer effective. according to lusseau, the resting state was the most sensitive to interactions, whereas socialising was less sensitive. short-term displacement or in extreme cases area avoidance were typical responses to boat exposure, yet the author contends that the overall behavior of the dolphins remained largely unchanged. short-term boat avoidance of less than 68 minutes was found to be ineffective. the call for the monitoring and management of whale watching extends to the frigid waters of the antarctic. shipboard visitors are routinely rewarded with whale sightings. however, careful management and dedicated research are needed to ensure that the growing antarctic marine tourism industry does not inadvertently harm these populations. responsible tourism has a substantial contribution to make to antarctic whale conservation and research through collaboration (williams &crosbie, 2007, p. 195). a review of the whale watching research (corkeron 1996; (scarpaci et al. 2008) revealed that so far, most studies have concentrated on the biological and behavioural aspects of whales, with little recognition given to the social aspects. this is hardly surprising, as most research concerning human-wildlife interactions has come from the biological sciences (muloi 1998). duffus and dearden (1993) were among the first researchers to investigate the ‘human’ dimensions of whale watching in the context of managing human interaction with these creatures. they stress that both human and ecological dimensions of whale watching must be understood and balanced at all stages of management. recent research has explored the activity of whale watching in terms of human-animal interaction and the impact on whales (noren et al. 2009; tosi& ferreira 2009; vieira &brito 2009; weinrich&corbelli 2009; 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 williams et al. 2009), on the income of fishing communities (einarsson 2009), and on how to manage whale watching (stamation 2008). learning more about wildlife users (e.g. whale watchers) in terms of their motivations, expectations and satisfaction would allow for more effective management strategies (stamation, 2008). in particular, a better understanding of the ‘human dimension’ of whale watching would guide educational and interpretive programs aimed at whale watching participants (orams 1999; amante-helweg 1996; (stamation, croft, shaughnessy, waples, & briggs 2007). a few studies have specifically examined factors relating to visitor satisfaction with cetacean watching (mainly involving whales). in an australian study, foxlee (2001) found that the factors contributing to visitor satisfaction, in order of importance were: numbers of whales seen, distance from whales, whale activity, information about whales, information available about other marine life and style in which the information was presented. exploring touristic interaction with dwarf minke whales in the great barrier reef, valentine et al. found that most of the participants had low expectations about whale encounters, with only one out of four coming specifically to swim with the whales and with nearly half of the participants being content to learn about the whales on board the vessel (2004, p. 647). the authors cited a number of factors that contributed to visitor satisfaction, including the diving experience and particular dive sites, the most significant factor being the closeness of approaches by the whales, total number of whales seen and total time spent with whales. until research addresses the ecological and human dimensions of whale watching more thoroughly, it is likely that the resource and the recreational experience will be degraded (clark, simmonds, & williams-grey 2007; higham & lusseau 2007). long-term strategic planning would help to mitigate the impact of tourism on targeted animals and ensure a responsible and sustainable approach in appreciating cetaceans and their environment (highamet al. 2008). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 49 challenges in the management of whalewatching as eco-tourism there is little doubt that whale watching can be considered an ecotourism activity, but it is precariously balanced when one considers the requisite requirements of ensuring that this activity fully complies with sustainable practices and given its alignment to alternative tourism and ecotourism (wearing & neil, 2009), it should also provide a mechanism to improve the plight of animals that are central to its function. so while whale watching provides the opportunity to demonstrate the potential of ecotourism as sustainable development, and at the same time honoring the principles of conservation it is essential that we see this in practice. this potential can be realised as parsons et al. found, where the value of the non-consumptive utilisation of cetaceans (i.e. whale-watching) to rural, coastal communities in west scotland was three times greater than the value of the consumptive utilisation of cetaceans (i.e. commercial whaling) for rural, coastal communities in norway.this study demonstrates that the sustainable use cetaceans in scotland can provide notable financial benefits, while at the same time contributing to the resource upon which this activity is based (2003, p. 397).whales and dolphins are scotland's number one wildlife attraction.with 11,770 km of coastline, the potential for the scottish industry is huge.in rural areas it can provide as much as 12% of local income (woods-ballard et al. 2003, p. 40). we would suggest that the consumptive process of ecotourism and the global commodification of animals makes the argument for developing whale watching pervasive – with consumerism ‘commodifying almost all aspects of social life’ (macnaghten&urry 1998, p. 26). however, the use of nature is highly contested. whale watching might provide a sustainable economic incentive to pursue this activity, while at the same time building political capital upon the world stage if we can find guidelines that ensure the rights of the whale are respected. ecotourism provides a vehicle for economic development within the context of conservation.as patrick ramage, whale program director of the ifwa, aptly puts it, ‘at a time when the global economy, our planet’s great whales and international whale conservation measures are all under threat, it is encouraging to see coastal communities the world over continuing to reap increasing benefits from this rapidly developing form of ecotourism’ (o’connor et. al. 2009, p. 9). 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 the rapid growth in the demand for tourist interactions with cetaceans in the wild constitutes a challenge to management, as short-term animal behaviour changes can have long-term biological consequences for individual animals and populations.whale watching management therefore encompasses macro, meso and micro dialogues that contribute to the way we view whales on the global and local levels. whale watching management derives from this context and at the same time contributes the evolution of thoughts regarding the use and protection of whales.in an effort to improve the current shortcomings in the long-term management of whale watching activities, higham et al. (2008) suggest the use of an integrated and adaptive management model, based largely upon the delineation and monitoring of limits of acceptable change (lac).likewise, curtin suggests that lac guide the development of sustainable whale watching within the larger context of nature-based tourism and the preservation of biodiversity (2003, p. 173). developing a global code of ethics might go a long way in regulating the consumption of nature, but this is complicated by different cultural values.adopting the developmental model of ecotourism, with its built-in code of ethics, would provide a vehicle to pursue whale watching for sustainable economic gain, while at the same time adhering to the general principles of conservation.ecotourism provides a business model that would provide an avenue for economic growth and the development of political capital.it would allow whale watching to be repositioned as an economic activity, rather than as a contested cultural activity. we suggest in concluding that by scrutinising the intersection of globalised and localised environmentalism as in lajes do pico in the azores (portugal) at the historical juncture when whale watching superseded whale hunting in this village, neves-graça sheds light on cultural valuations and how they evolve through interaction.the author explains how localised environmentalism (including the ecological knowledges and practices of local inhabitants) was reproduced, learned, and transformed within the context of globalised environmental concerns (2006, p. 19).conversely, globalised, macro-cultural discourses have an influence upon local actors, interweaving local and distant dialogues into a mutually constituted, albeit contested, narrative. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 51 promoting whale watching through the ecological and economic developmental model of ecotourism would act upon the local and global discourses on conservation.the intersection of these discourses marks the cutting edge of this narrative and point to the future. conclusion this review of the literature has highlighted a number of factors which impact on the development of whale watching as a sustainable activity in the context of eco-tourism. these can be categorised as factors related to tourists and the practices of the tourist industry; factors relating to the cetaceans themselves, their biology and behaviours; and factors relating to the environment. each of these factors may be underpinned by cross-cutting cultural, scientific and economic themes. this complexity in the literature is further compounded by conflicts in study findings, for example in the scientific literature on cetacean behaviours in the context of tourist activities. although it may be possible to propose whale watching as an alternative to the practices of commercial whaling and there is considerable optimism that this ecotourism activity can indeed live up to its promises of sustainable practice, there is no simple approach which can be adopted worldwide. this review suggests the need for more research into whale-watching as eco-tourism, with an emphasis on the differences in local context that may affect the outcomes of the research. references afp 2009, june 24, whales worth more alive than dead, says new report, sydney morning herald, online. http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-world/whales-worth-morealive-than-dead-says-new-report-20090624-cvjd.html, retrieved on april 5, 2010. amante-helweg, v. 1996,‘ecotourist’s beliefs and knowledge about dolphins and the development of cetacean ecotourism’,aquatic mammals,vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 131-140. anderson, g.r.v., forbes, m.a. &pirzl, r.m. 1996,‘a national overview of the development of whale watching in australia’, in cogan, k., presser, s. &jeffery, a. 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stephen l. wearing university of technology, sydney paul a. cunningham rikkyo university, tokyo stephen schweinsberg university of technology, sydney chantelle jobberns university of technology, sydney abstract introduction ecotourism sustainable growth for a common future sustainable practices challenges in the management of whalewatching as eco-tourism conclusion references 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia immigrant teachers in australia jock collins university of technology, sydney carol reid university of western sydney abstract one of the features of contemporary society is the increasing global mobility of professionals. australia is a major immigration nation with an increasing emphasis on selecting skilled and professional applicants. while have been an important component of skilled and professional immigration into australia over past decades immigrant teachers, there is no comprehensive contemporary national study of the experiences of immigrant teachers in australia. this article aims to fill this gap. it draws on quantitative and qualitative research with immigrant teachers in nsw, sa and wa to provide insights into the contemporary immigration experience of immigrant teachers. the article explores a number of stages in the immigrant teacher experience: their decision to move to australia; their experience with australian education departments in getting qualifications recognised their experiences as teachers in the classroom and in their lives in their new australian community. introduction one of the features of contemporary global society is the increasing brain circulation of professionals (castles and miller 2009; goldin et al. 2011). while the education industry is a key site of the demand for contemporary global professional migration, little attention has been given to the global circulation of education professionals, including teachers and university lecturers. the labour shortage of educational and other professionals in western nations is partly due to demographic (supply) factors and partly due to the strong growth of the services sector in countries like australia. in 2003 the organisation for economic co-operation and development (oecd) reported that western nations like australia face a serious shortage of experienced teachers within the next few years, with teacher shortages most likely in male-dominated secondary specialisations such as physics, chemistry, mathematics and technology studies, and languages other than english (oecd 2003). two years later, the oecd recommended that oecd countries could learn from each other through “sharing innovative and successful [teaching] initiatives, and to identify policy options for attracting, developing and retaining effective [immigrant] teachers” (oecd 2005). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 39 as a consequence of global movements of teachers the australian teaching workforce is being transformed by transnational flows of bilingual and multilingual teachers, itself an expression of, and response to, the complex phenomena named globalisation. yet little is known about teachers from overseas in australia. who are they? why do they come? what is their experience in australian schools and with australian education departments? are their overseas teaching qualifications, skills and global experience valued in australian schools? how do their students and their parents respond to their accents and cultural difference? what is their experience of life in australian cities and regional and rural towns? will they stay or will they go? will they recommend to their international teacher friends to come to australia and to teach in australian schools? these questions are critical to an understanding of the contemporary australian immigration experience in general, and to australia’s educational future in particular. this article draws on recent fieldwork with immigrant teachers in nsw, western australian and south australia to begin to answer these questions. the structure of the article is as follows. section 2 provides some background on the history of immigrant teachers in australia and a profile of immigrant teachers in australia today. section 3 presents and analysis of quantitative and qualitative primary data generated from fieldwork with immigrant teachers in schools in nsw, sa and wa conducted in 2008-9. it looks at their immigration experience and their experiences teaching and living in australia. section 4 draws together the major findings of this research into immigrant teachers in australia. immigrant teachers in australia: background there is a long history of immigration to australia in the past six-decades. australia is an immigration nation where immigrants comprise a greater proportion of the population than most other western nations, with 26.5% of the australian population born overseas in 2009 (oecd 2011: 261). australian immigration intakes reached record levels in recent years, with skilled permanent and temporary immigrants the largest component (markus et al. 2009; collins 2008). over past decades, immigrant teachers have been an important component of skilled and professional immigration into, and emigration out of australia. australian trained teachers are sought after by other countries as part of the ‘brain circulation’ of education professionals (robertson, 2007). 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 australia has a long history of teacher immigration. at various times in the past 6 decades up to 20 per cent of the australian teaching force have been overseas trained (inglis & philips 1995, p. 95). up to the mid-1970s most teachers were directly recruited from the uk and ireland, and this was later extended to the united states and canada. more recently australia’s immigrant teachers also come from non-english-speaking countries in asia and africa, reflecting the changing patterns of australian immigration following the end to the white australia policy in the early 1970s (collins 2012). australia has an experience of welcoming new immigrant teachers and farewelling australian teachers who seek a temporary or permanent experience as part of the australian diaspora living in other countries. these two flows of teachers in and out of australia have tended to balance out. according to birrell et al. (birrell, dobson, rapson, & smith 2001 cited in fullilove & flutter 2004) australia had a net gain of 1% in relation to immigrant school teachers in the period 1996–2001. with baby-boomer teachers now retiring, the future supply of australian teachers is an issue confronting the public and private australian education planners. in 2005 the australian education union (aeu) suggested that since average age of the teachers across the nation was 49, australian governments needed to implement specific policies to entice wellqualified professionals into their schools in a context of high attrition rates of teachers during the first five years of their career, the aging population of the teaching profession and increased teacher-stress (australian education union, 2005). the australian education union warned that with the average teacher retirement age being at 58 years, a very large proportion of current teachers in australia would retire in the next ten years (aeu, 2005), given rise to warnings about impending teacher shortage which could amount to a crisis (peeler & jane 2005). these concerns of teacher shortage in australia were also voiced by the ramsey review (2000, p. 46) and a department of education, science and training report (dest 2003, p. 74) on australia’s future. these reports emphasised the need to attract, prepare and retain quality teachers – including immigrant teachers and also argued that teachers ought to reflect australia’s ethnic and cultural diversity. there is also evidence of an increase in the emigration of australian professionals as part of the australian diaspora of 1 million (hugo et al 2003; hugo 2006) with other countries such as the uk seeking to recruit australian teachers. for example, in the period july 2001-july 2005 australia lost 5,819 trained teachers to the united kingdom alone (miller, ochs, & mulvaney 2008). this loss of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 41 australian-trained teachers to other countries adds to demographic factors to create gaps in the teaching labour market. one solution is to train more teachers in australia. another is to lure australian teachers back from other countries while a third solution is to attract and retain immigrant teachers to australian classrooms. similar issues confront countries such as canada, the united kingdom, and south africa. in 2004 all countries in the commonwealth agreed to the commonwealth teacher recruitment protocol (commonwealth teacher recruitment protocol, 2004) in attempt to address critical problems faced by national education systems and individuals alike. in other words, there is increasing global competition for teachers. an important part of a successful australian recruitment and retention strategy of immigrant teachers is solid evidence-based research on the experiences of immigrant teachers in australian schools. while there has been some research on immigrant teachers in australian schools (bella, 1999; han, 2004; kamler, reid, & santoro, 1999; reid, 2005; santoro, 1997, 1999; kirchenheim & richardson, 2000 ), most of this is now dated and narrow in focus. the australian college of educators (2001) carried out a national survey that provided a tantalizing glimpse into the diversity of the teaching force but there are a number of factors related to the diversity and movement of teachers we still do not understand (a.c.e 2001). some work has also been done on the specific contexts of individual states including wa (dunworth 1997; jones & soyza 2006) and queensland (bella 1999; oliver 1998). despite the increasing importance of understanding and responding to the global movement of teachers in australia, there is no comprehensive contemporary national study of the experiences of immigrant teachers in australia. this article aims to fill this gap. this issue of cultural difference is central to australian classrooms because of the cosmopolitan character of the australian population, a consequence of australia’s large and diverse immigration program. as a consequence, the australian primary and secondary school population is also very diverse in terms of ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural background. in nsw, for example, 27.6% of secondary and 27.9% of primary enrolments in 2007 were from a lote (language other than english) background (nsw det, 2008: 23) with arabic, chinese (cantonese and mandarin), croatian, dutch, farsi, fijian, french, 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 german and greek the top ten lote backgrounds of school students in nsw schools (nsw det, 2008: 24). according to 2006 national census data, as table 1 shows, there are approximately 438,060 teachers in australia. 74,620 of these, or 16.95% of all teachers in australia, were born overseas, that is, first generation immigrants. compared to the proportion of the australian population who were foreign-born at the time of the census (24%) immigrants are underrepresented in the australian teaching sector. table 1 birthplace of australian teachers birthplace of teacher no. % australia 356120 81.29 overseas 74260 16.95 not stated 7680 1.73 total 438060 100 source: compiled from 2006 national australian census australia’s immigrant teachers are drawn from countries around the globe. as figure 1 shows, the majority of teachers – like the majority of all immigrants were born in the uk and english speaking countries. many immigrant teachers in australia also come from new zealand, south africa, india, the usa, and germany. other immigrant teachers in australia come from europe, the middle east, asia, and south america, so that cultural, linguistic and religious diversity characterises the population of immigrant teachers in australia. birthplace of immigrants is often a very crude measure of the cultural diversity of australian society. for example, many ethnic chinese immigrants are born in china, india, fiji, malaysia or the uk. as a consequence data on the ancestry of immigrants can assist in getting a more accurate picture of ethnic diversity of immigrants in australia. figure 2 presents ancestry data of teachers in australia. by far the most common ancestry of teachers other than australian is english, followed by other uk countries. however the very long ‘tail’ to this graph indicates the ethnic background of the australian teaching profession is very diverse with those of european ancestries german, italian, dutch and greek the largest cohorts of non-british ancestries. these are the second generation whose parents arrived in australia in the 1950s and 1960s to work as labourers or shop-keepers but gave their australian-born children an education to open the doors to professional employment. chinese cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 43 and indian ancestries are the next largest group of teachers with ‘minority’ ancestries. these immigrants arrived in the past two or three decades and their numbers can be expected to increase significantly in coming decades as asian countries often fill 8 out of the ‘top ten countries of immigrant arrivals today. figure 1 top 20 countries of birth for teachers born overseas source: compiled from 2006 national australian census figure 2 non-australian ancestry of teachers in australia source: compiled from 2006 national australian census 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 vietnam south america melanesia other south eastern europe polynesia (excludes hawaii) other southern and east africa germany other united kingdom, ireland scotland new zealand % teachers born overseas c o u n rt y o f b ir th 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 n u m b e r o f t e a ch e rs ( 0 0 0 's ) ancestry second response first response 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 a survey of immigrant teachers in australia in this section we report the results of fieldwork conducted with immigrant teachers from three states. the fieldwork consisted of surveys of 269 immigrant teachers nsw (197), sa (27) and wa (48) conducted in 2008-91 , focus groups of immigrant teachers and key stakeholder interviews conducted in each state. teaching is a profession where the majority are women. similarly our survey of immigrant teachers was predominantly (72.5%) female. the immigrant teacher informants reflected the diversity of the australian immigrant intake (collins 2011). we first outline the characteristics of the immigrant teachers surveyed. we then explore their immigration experience, including the reasons why they wanted to come to australia and their teaching experiences in australia. as figure 3 shows, most of the immigrant teachers surveyed came from the uk (36%), asian countries (16%), south africa (13%), new zealand (9%), and the usa and canada (9%). others came from africa with smaller numbers from european countries, oceania, latin america and the middle-east. figure 3 regions of birth of immigrant teachers in australia (%) 1 the research was funded by an arc linkage grant no. lp0668926: globalisation and teacher movements into and out of multicultural australia. uk/ireland, 36.06% usa/canada, 8.92% asia, 15.99% european countries, 4.09% oceania, 4.09% south africa, 13.38% saharah african countries, 5.58% new zealand, 9.29% latin america, 0.74% mid-east, 0.37% n/a, 2.23% cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 45 one of the key economic benefits of immigration is that australia gets professionally trained and experienced people whose education has been paid for by other coutnries taxpayers . these immigrants arrive not only with educational qualifications – human capital, in the language of economics – but also with experience working as education professionals. they fill gaps in the australian teacher labour market. while they may be seen as a ‘brain drain’from the point of view of the sending country, they are clearly a ‘brain gain’ for australia. these teaching professionals had accumulated substantial amounts of human capital in the form of teaching qualifications, with a number of teachers holding more than one teaching qualification. 198 immigrant teachers had a bachelors teaching degree, 65 had a masters degree and 10 held a doctorate. in addition, 78 immigrant teachers had a teaching diploma and 75 immigrant teachers had a teaching certificate (see figure 4). figure 4 immigrant teachers by teaching qualification by gender teaching shortages in australia are often specific to curriculum areas, to secondary, primary or early childhood education, to public or private sector schools or to specific geographical regions in metropolitan or regional and rural areas. most of the immigrant teachers surveyed had qualifications to teach in secondary (155 immigrant teachers) or primary education (147 immigrant teachers), while another 44 had teaching qualifications in early childhood education. a number (31) also had qualifications to teach in tertiary education institutions. women teachers surveyed were more concentrated in early childhood and primary education with the male teachers more likely to be teaching in secondary schools. 52 22 19 19 1 1 0 142 43 59 56 9 0 1 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% female male 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 one of the problems in the labour market for school teachers in australian states is that a teacher shortage in one area of the curriculum (often mathematics and physical sciences) can co-exist with an over-supply of teachers in other areas, such as social sciences. as figure 5 shows, the immigrant teachers who participated in the australian survey had expertise and experience across all areas of the teaching curriculum. immigrant teachers with expertise in english (with 48 immigrant teachers), life sciences (with 48 immigrant teachers), social science (with 48 immigrant teachers), and mathematics (with 25 immigrant teachers) were most numerous in the survey. figure 5 areas of the curriculum in which immigrant teachers are trained these immigrant teachers bring with them significant global teaching experience. as figure 6 shows 120 immigrant teachers, or 45% of those surveyed, had taught in the uk or ireland before coming to australia to teach. another 39 teachers (15%) have taught in new zealand schools, 38 (14%) in south africa, 36 (13%) in schools in south-east asian countries and 27 (10%) in north america. other teachers had teaching experience in european union countries other than the uk, 18 in african countries other than south africa and 14 teachers had experience in schools in the oceania region other than nz. the survey also included 9 informants with teaching experience in north east asian schools, 2 in arabic countries and 2 in schools in latin america. 5.95% 9.29% 16.73% 17.84% 4.09% 12.27% 2.97% 4.46% 5.95% 1.12% 1.12% 2.60% 0.00% 2.00% 4.00% 6.00% 8.00% 10.00% 12.00% 14.00% 16.00% 18.00% 20.00% cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 47 figure 6 the countries where australia’s immigrant teachers have previously taught (%) note: ‘none’ means they only have taught in australia as a foreign country. the majority who are in the category of ‘uk/ireland’ are from the uk. immigration experience immigrant teachers, like other professional immigrants, thus face considerable difficulties before they even get to work in australia in their professional area, in their case before they get to teach in an australian classroom. deciding to leave their country, their family, friends, jobs and their familiarity to uproot themselves (and, where relevant, partner/spouse and other family members) to take the risk of trying their luck in a new country. this is a process that some 200 million immigrants have taken to date; the exceptional people, as goldin and his colleagues call them (goldin et al 2011), who are willing to take a step into the unknown with the hope of improving their life and securing a better future. australia draws in immigrants on permanent resident visas or temporary entrant visas. immigration intakes to australia reached record post-war levels in 2008-9, with an unprecedented rise in the proportion of temporary immigrants (mainly skilled and professional) in the immigration intake (collins 2011). the process of immigration is itself costly, time consuming and difficult. immigrant teachers draw on their social networks in australia and on their direct and indirect knowledge of life in australia to select it over other possibilities, the usa or canada perhaps, or european countries, as their country of settlement. the majority of immigrant teachers surveyed (75%) arrived on permanent resident visas. this indicates the important role that permanent residence in australia has in attracting immigrant 44.61% 6.69% 0.74% 10.04% 5.20% 14.13% 6.69% 3.35% 13.38% 0.74% 14.50% 5.20% 0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00% 45.00% 50.00% 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 teachers to australia. about one in five immigrant teachers surveyed are on temporary visas, with most on the 457 visa or the spouse visa, with a few on student or working holiday visas. the majority of those surveyed on temporary 457 visas came to australia with the specific intention to teach, using their professional educational qualifications and teaching experience as a passport to get sufficient points to enter australia under the points-test selection process. however, only one in three who came as part of the permanent immigration intake planned to teach in australia at the time of immigration. the survey explored the reasons why those who came to australia with the specific intention to teach wanted to teach in australia. as figure 7 shows, the top reasons given are professional [‘teaching is my occupation’/ ‘enjoy teaching’ (20%), ‘better resource/professional development’ (17%)] and lifestyle [‘better lifestyle’ (8%) and ‘to live life’ (3%)]. it is interesting that ‘spouse’ or ‘family reunion/migration’ is no longer a prominent reason for teaching in australia although considerations about ‘spouse’ is a key factor impacting on the decision to migrate to australia. figure 7 why did you want to teach in australia? some immigrant teachers came to australia for better career opportunities. here are two nsw immigrant teachers: “i came, i don’t know word of mouth or how, believing australia was desperate for teachers”; “ i heard a lot about australian schools and i heard that education was excellent here”. others came for the future of their family: as three nsw 19.70% 16.73% 3.35% 1.86% 4.46% 3.72% 2.23% 7.43% 0.74% 37.92% 0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00% cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 49 immigrant teachers put it: we thought it would be better job opportunities for our children”; “because of the racial discrimination, we were not quite settled but we moved on to greener pastures. a better life for yourself and the kids.”; “it’s peaceful here, and yes, that’s the main thing, we want peace”. others came because of push factors: “we immigrated as a family i think because of the political turmoil in south africa. (nsw). for others it was family connections: “my sister was here already so, too, family member.”; “i actually came with my husband who is a doctor at griffith base hospital. i met an australian man and we decided that we would shift out to australia”. one of the realities for globally-mobile professionals the world over is the issue of qualification recognition and professional certification in the countries that they emigrate to. often this process does not go smoothly enough for, or meet the expectations of, or promises made to, the immigrant professionals themselves. one of the strongest themes that emerged from our fieldwork is the dissatisfaction with the red tape that goes with the institutional requirements that immigrant teachers must meet in australia before beginning employment in australian schools. different professions have different registration procedures and for immigrant teachers these registration procedures and requirements vary from state to state. for immigrant teachers, this means getting their teacher qualifications recognised in australia, undertaking teacher induction programs to familiarise them with the australian education system which varies from state to state. half of the immigrant teacher informants – those from non-english-speaking countries went through processes to assess their english proficiency. most of those surveyed complained about the time consuming and unnecessary paper work they confronted before being allowed to teach and reported that they had problems with the bureaucratic systems and processes that they encountered in australia schools. experience in australian schools the final hurdle is to secure a teaching job in australia. once appointed to a school, australia’s immigrant teachers experience emotions of uncertainty mixed with the satisfaction of beginning the final leg of their global teacher journey. this can be a quite stressful, lonely and uncertain time for an immigrant teacher: the journey to an unfamiliar location; the need to find new accommodation; having to meet with the principal and fellow teachers for the first time; and, finally, standing in front of your new students in an australian classroom. now begins the experience of being an immigrant teacher in australia. 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 most immigrant teachers surveyed found a teaching job in the public teaching sector, but the majority of these could only secure temporary or casual teaching positions. a permanent teaching position is difficult to achieve in australia, particularly in the large cities such as sydney, adelaide and perth. there are more openings for permanent teachers in nonmetropolitan schools, particularly in those schools located in rural and remote areas where the lifestyle is not as attractive to young australian-trained teachers. more immigrant teachers surveyed were employed in rural and remote regions than in metropolitan schools. what is it like to be an immigrant teacher in australian schools? what barriers and difficulties do they do they face and how are these issues resolved? are the global teaching experience and skills as immigrant teachers valued? what is the response to immigrant teachers and their cultural difference from other members of the teaching staff, from students and their parents? what opportunities do immigrant teachers get for professional development and promotion? does the actual experience as a teacher in australian schools match their dream and expectations? will they stay or will they go? will immigrant teachers recommend to their teacher friends back home or teaching in other countries to come to australia to teach? all these questions are critical to the ability of australia to compete successfully in the competition for global teachers, to attract and retain sufficient immigrant teachers in coming decades to fill shortages in the australian teacher labour market. in this section we answer these questions. we asked immigrant teachers: ‘what difficulties, if any, have you faced as an immigrant teacher in australia?’ the most common answer (figure 8) was that immigrant teachers had problems with the bureaucratic systems and processes that they encountered in australia schools. the difficulties that ranked next in order of immigrant teacher responses were: discrimination/racism; employment difficulties; and lack of support. other difficulties noted by immigrant teachers were qualifications not recognized/appreciated; student behaviour, issues related to curriculum, welfare issues and cultural gap/way of doing things. perceptions of discrimination and racism took a number of forms. one related to responses to the immigrant teachers’ accent, especially in classroom settings. a number of immigrant teachers from africa and india reported negative responses to their accent, as did teachers with american and irish accents. some commented that their accent had been mocked, or that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 51 other negative feedback had occurred as a result of it. one female from a school just north of perth reported the following experience: “yesterday, i got a new class, yr9 students; it happened that the other teacher was doing something else so they asked me to go to that class, and i came to the class and they started laughing. and i said why are you laughing guys? and they said, oh, your accent is so funny. i said, oohh, and then you have to laugh so much. i wasn’t (pauses very upset)”. figure 8 the difficulties that immigrant teachers faced in australian schools another teacher in wa with an irish accent reported one incident with students in the classroom: “you must find my accent, because you know being a bit irish, you know, you must find my accent very strange here in australia and they said ‘no no, you just go wah, wah, wah’”. a female teacher in nsw said “i just felt, i always felt self conscious, i always felt that my accent all the way interfering with my knowledge so yeah, i wasn’t comfortable”. such racist responses to immigrant teachers by students hit immigrant teachers hard. as one female teacher in a regional school north of perth put it, “it makes me feel devalued as a person because he’s telling me a blatant lie, and i think just because i’ve got an accent doesn’t make me stupid”. immigrant teachers often responded to instances of perceived racism from students. here is an account of a male teacher in a nsw school: “last year, somewhere in the end of the year, 14.50% 7.87% 14.87% 33.46% 14.50% 7.87% 8.55% 4.83% 3.35% 4.46% 10.41% 0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00% 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 i have a reported 3 guys in yr 11 that i was ah, sort of provoked and discriminated because of my accent, they did that purposely when i was telling them you should go somewhere from here or move or you out of bounds, they said what, i don’t understand you and such things, so i reported this as sort of a provocation and discrimination to the deputy principal”. similarly, another nsw male teacher from india recounts the following experience of racism: “there is racism, and especially from the students here they will laugh at you… the curry munchers, they’ll talk about you like that and the words sound differently from them, i heard at the beginning, i used to tell my head teacher, some yr7, yr8 when i had them for the first time, they’ll try to use the word curry muncher in front of me for me to hear, so i’ll turn around and give them a smile and say oh, i love my curry”. racial discrimination in the workplace either stands as a barrier to employment in the first instance or a constraint on their working lives once in a job. one concern of immigrant teachers in australia is where they stand in relation to promotion. we sought responses to the question: ‘immigrant teachers in australia are as likely to be promoted as non-immigrant teachers to jobs for which they are qualified and eligible.’ about the same proportion of the immigrant teachers surveyed agreed (8%) to or strongly agreed (25%) to the proportion as those who ‘disagreed’ (19%) or ‘strongly disagreed’ (12%). the remaining 36% were either neutral (30%) or did not answer (6%). the suggestion here is of a substantial number of immigrant teachers’ perceptions of discrimination against immigrant teachers in the processes and procedures (formal and informal) related to promotion. in relation to the concern about fairness in employment and promotion, it is interesting to note that only one teacher interviewed reported promotion within an appropriate timeframe (2 years) of beginning teaching in australia. she had taught for 16 years in a number of countries but the recognition was purely based on her teaching in australia. a young chinese background immigrant teacher felt that being an ethnic minority would make it harder to gain promotion. “yeah, and, sometimes it’s a bit hard for ethnic australians to get into the top positions. this is true in the profession, for local teachers, and sometimes this is hard, so what i’m looking at is just do my job well and make a difference in my expertise, that’s it, yea”. a young woman of american background commented: “i have also experienced a lot of professional prejudice, because i never understood the tall poppy syndrome, but i understand it now”. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 53 in focus groups with immigrant teachers, concerns with racism emerged at a number of levels. from the metropolitan area, a young female teacher said: “other teachers, my line manager, it’s seen as a threat if you try to improve anything, and i can’t tell you the amount of time i’ve been told ‘stop it you american’”. as one nsw teacher put it, “yeah, so, in terms of promotion, i feel very much as though there are 5 teachers who have been there very much longer than i have, they’re australians, they are going to climb the ladder much faster than our kind”. so overall how did immigrant teachers rate their experiences of uprooting themselves and families, taking the long journey to australia, going through bureaucratic red tape and, finally, teaching in australian schools, was it all worth it? the research suggests the answer is mixed, with roughly equal numbers satisfied and dissatisfied with their experience as a global teacher in australia. figure 9 shows that those who responded that their expectations of being a teacher in australia been met (80 or 30%) only slightly outnumbered those who reported that their expectations of being a teacher in australia had not been met (67 or 25%). another three in ten respondents had their expectations only partly met. if the key issue is the attraction and retention of immigrant teachers to australia, this finding is of some concern. the informal feedback that the unsatisfied teachers give to their peers considering a similar move to migrate to australia as a teacher would not be positive. moreover, it is likely that dissatisfied immigrant teachers in australia might think of returning home, moving to another australian state to teach or going to yet another country as an immigrant teacher. figure 9 have your expectations of being a teacher in australia been met? one immigrant teacher from wa reflected on those teachers who are dissatisfied: “i know that teachers from overseas who arrive now seem to be discontented that the reality of teaching here does not meet their expectations. they feel that they are promised better wages and conditions than they actually receive.” yes, 29.74% partly, 30.86% no, 24.91% n/a, 14.50% 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 we also inquired about the extent to which the immigrant teachers in nsw, sa and wa were satisfied with their immigration to australia from a personal, rather than teaching professional, perspective. once again, only a slight majority reported that they were satisfied (105 or 39%) rather than unsatisfied (80 or 30%) from this point of view (figure 10). figure 10 satisfaction as a teacher in australia from a personal perspective teacher labour shortages are strongest in regional and rural communities. working in regional communities brings new experiences for immigrant teachers. a focus group participant in a wa regional mining centre summed up his experience: “but dealing with people and trying to get to know people, cause i think people in a town like this are a little bit wary of getting involved with you because it is such a transient town as well, and you know, so it’s a bit of a tricky one to get to grips with, especially if you are coming from a very highly populated area to where everybody is kind of in your face and you know, it can get a bit lonely at times and that sort of thing”. other immigrant teachers find themselves isolated for reasons of cultural difference in communities as a metropolitan teacher explained after finishing a period of time in regional area: “they were, i mean obviously i got flak, cause i was you know, a pom, and i that’s great i mean that didn’t bother me at all, it doesn’t bother me now and that was the way it was out there, that was the community and yeah, and they were just lovely people, very friendly”. a teacher from kenya who was teaching in a wellresourced mining town commented that he had plenty to do through organised sport: “…but the culture and the society that can be really difficult and i think that’s what really frustrates most new teachers”. a young irish woman in a focus group in a regional coastal town recounted her story of her difficulty in settling in as an immigrant teacher: “lots of tears were shed in the first 6 months satisfied, 39.03% not satisfied, 29.74% n/a, 31.60% cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 55 because i had no support, i couldn’t go see a doctor, i had to go home, i still haven’t been able to see a dentist i think i’ll have to go home for that too”. some immigrant teachers, particularly those places in remote regional and rural schools, reported difficulty in dealing with indigenous students. one immigrant teacher placed in remote wa schools commented: “and then if you do 2 years there then you can get permanent residency. but if you’re coming from inner london, and end up going to fitzroy crossing or way up in one of the really remote areas in the kimberley, total culture shock, you’ve got the weather, you’ve got the aboriginal culture, which is totally beyond anything that anybody would’ve experienced”. another immigrant teacher in a regional wa school had this story to tell: “it goes very quick, when i first came with my family i said what the hell am i doing here and it was a huge culture shock coming to this school because in perth we used to see indigenous people, they weren’t in your face, i didn’t really have to talk to them, not that i didn’t want to but i didn’t have anything to do with them, and then you go into a classroom where you have 50-60% indigenous kids and it’s like ‘f’ you miss and you bitch and i used to go home crying…i am really tired; these kids are giving me a hard time…that is a big issue here i find that i did not find in perth. i taught there as well but when i came here i found there was a big gap between the two groups and last month there was actually some kind of communal fight which i had to sort out in my own way because we are expected to do things for aboriginal kids which we are not expected to do for the white kids. now that i find is something that can be put in as discriminatory”. it is interesting to note that most of the immigrant teachers surveyed in nsw, sa and wa rated their work ‘very favourably’ (14%) or ‘favourably’ (45%) compared to their experience working as a teacher in another country. only 40, or about 15% of the immigrant teachers surveyed, rated australian teaching as ‘not very favourably’ or ‘very unfavourably’ compared to their experience working as a teacher in another country. (27% did not answer the question.) the immigrant teachers in australia were asked to reflect on their experiences to date and were asked: ‘if you were able to make one major change to education policies or procedures, what would that change be?’ figure 11 shows the responses to this question. there were a very broad range of responses, with the most common suggestion (about one in five responses) relating to making it easier to navigate the administrative and institutional 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 pathways that new immigrant teachers must travel to be permitted to front a classroom in an australian school. one in four wanted policies related to immigrant teachers changed, while another one in ten complained directly about the application process in australia. the two other most common responses related to suggestions about school processes and procedures: student related issues and the need for increased support. work and employment conditions were of concern to 33 immigrant teachers. a few respondents raised suggestions about curriculum issues. figure 11 if you were able to make one major change to education policies or procedures, what would that change be? experience living in australia an immigrant, permanent or temporary, comes to australia not only to work but also to live. they become workmates in schools and neighbours in the suburbs, cities or towns where they settle. the immigrant experience is at once professional and social. as figure 12 shows, most of the immigrant teachers in nsw, sa and wa did get involved with their new local community: three in four (72%) were regularly engaged in activities involving sports or hobbies while a slight majority regularly attended activities arranged by the local school or by the local community. one in three immigrant teachers regularly attended activities arranged by people from their home country. this evidence suggests that many immigrant teachers are embraced by their ‘host’ neighbourhood and school community forming social networks that assist decisions to stay rather than to go. policies, 25.65% curriculum, 5.58% work condition, 7.43% more support, 11.52% employment related issues, 4.83% student related issues, 12.64% application process , 9.67% other or n/a, 24.54% cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 57 figure 12 since coming to australia have you regularly attended any of the following activities? a critical question to evaluate an immigrant experience in a country like australia is: ‘have you or would you recommend to other immigrant teachers that they teach in australia?’ 60% of all respondents said that they have or would recommend to other immigrant teachers that they teach in australia. this finding is very relevant to the issue of the attraction of new immigrant teachers to australia. this is a very positive endorsement for the experience of immigrant teachers in nsw, sa and wa. responses to this question are not sensitive to gender differences. another critical question, this one relevant to the issue of the retention of new immigrant teachers, to evaluate an immigrant experience in a country like australia is: ‘in five years time do you see yourself teaching in australia?’ two in three (64%) of all respondents, or 75% of those who provided an answer to this survey question, said that they do see themselves teaching in australia in five years time. this is also a very positive endorsement for the experience of immigrant teachers in nsw, sa and wa. responses to this question are not sensitive to gender differences. immigrant teachers in australia: an overview in this article we have drawn on new quantitative and qualitative research to explore the experience of immigrant teachers in australia. we now have a much better understanding of who these immigrant teachers are, where they came from, why and how they came to australia. we also have important insights into their experiences on arriving in australia of religious activities, 44.61% activities arranged by local school, 55.39% activities organized by people from your home country, 33.83% activities arranged by the local community, 58.74% activities involving sports or hobbies, 72.12% other, 7.43% none of these, 4.09% n/a, 4.46% 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 getting their teaching qualifications recognised, getting teacher registration in the states in which they settled and getting their first school appointment. we can also better understand the experiences of these immigrant teachers in their schools and the australian communities into which they settle. and we know if they are likely to stay or to go. while australia has a long history of importing teachers from other countries, there are major differences evident in teacher immigration in the past few decades. first, whereas most immigrant teachers came from the uk in the first post-war decades, in recent decades more immigrant teachers have been coming to australia from asian and african countries, with india and south africa in particular important source countries for today’s australian immigrant teachers. second, immigrant teachers today include temporary as well as permanent immigrants. one in four of the immigrant teachers we surveyed arrived on temporary 457 skilled-worker visas. they were mostly from western australia – the state that deliberately attended australian immigration expos to directly recruit teachers. immigrant teachers are, of course, highly educated. two in three have an undergraduate university degree while another one in five had a post-graduate university qualification. the contradiction is that most teachers surveyed reported that they had experienced problems with qualifications recognition and teacher registration – that is, problems with the red tape of the state education departments. despite this, the majority were generally satisfied with their experience in australian schools: three in four liked their job, despite bad experiences in the form of negative responses to their accents from students or barriers to their promotion within the school. many teachers reported negative responses by students, other teachers and parents to their accents. interestingly some teachers with irish, american and south african accents, as well as those who came from india and africa, perceived negative responses to their cultural difference. most also appear to be generally satisfied with their experience as an australian immigrant. they are connected to other people where they live, participating in sport and leisure activities, and attending local social activities that are religious, based in their schools or their local community while one in five have social networks with other immigants from their country. on the other hand, half of australia’s immigrant teachers think that there is racial dicrimination in australia, although only one in ten think that there is a lot of racism in australian society. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 59 the conclusion then is that the immigrant teacher experience in australia is a mixed bag from the point of view of professional teaching experience and as an immigrant living in australia, though the majority judge that the benefits and positives outweigh the negatives. overall, those who responded that their expectations of being a teacher in australia been met (80 or 30%) only slightly outnumbered those who reported that their expectations of being a teacher in australia had not been met (67 or 25%). nevertheless most immigrant teachers rated their experience as a teacher in australia favourably or more favourable when compared to their teaching experience back home. from a social point of view, most immigrant teachers had connected to their new communities and regularly attended sporting and social activities. this may explain why 60% of all respondents said that they have or would recommend to other immigrant 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http://www.aare.edu.au/98pap/oli98322.htm� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.2, 2012 61 ramsey, g. 2000, report of the review of teacher education. sydney, department of education. reid, c. 2005, ‘global teachers with globite cases’, australia journal of education, vol.49, no.3. robertson, s. l. 2007, ‘brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation’, globalization, societies and education, vol.4, no.1, pp.1-5. santoro, n. 1997, ‘the construction of student teacher identity: an analysis of school practicum discourse’, asia pacific journal of teacher education, vol.25, no.1, pp. 9199. santoro, n. 1999, ‘relationships of power: an analysis of school practicum discourse’, journal of intercultural studies, vol.20, no.1, pp. 31-42. immigrant teachers in australia cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 17 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 stephen danley. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(1): 4127,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i1.4127 creative coercion in post-katrina new orleans: a neighborhood strategy to address conflict in networks stephen danley rutgers-camden university abstract the study of relationships within networks has traditionally focused on concepts such as cooperation, collaboration and other forms of partnership (brown & keast 2003). the assumption has been that actors in a network have shared vision and are working together. this study tests that idea by using mixed methods and ethnography to examine 15 neighborhood associations in post-katrina new orleans, and 71 of their relationships within policy networks. contrary to our typical understanding of networks, neighborhood associations engage not just in partnership, but also in power struggles. when excluded from policy networks, neighborhood associations use creative coercion to ensure their voice is heard. facing a power deficit, these associations look for informal levers to assert themselves into policy negotiation. the result is creative and coercive measures, such as co-opting elections, bribery, blackmail and what one neighborhood activist calls ‘guerrilla warfare.’ these conflicts force a reconsideration of networks. networks are not solely homes of collaborative action; they are also the location of sharp power struggles over priorities. introduction provan and kenis (2008) argue that in studying networks, academics focus on the volume of relationships and the outputs created by those links. they call for increased attention to the nature of relationships within networks. this paper focuses on these relationships, using postkatrina new orleans as context for a series of case studies on neighborhood associations and their networks.1 in doing so, it radically transforms and redefines the typical conception of such relationships, moving beyond configurations such as brown and keast’s (2003) categorization of relationships as being collaborative, cooperative or coordinative. brown and keast’s classifications, and the broader literature on which they are built, fundamentally envision networks as working together. an in-depth look at policy networks in new orleans 1 this research is part of a broader inquiry into these issues. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 shows that this is not the case. conflict is a key feature of networks, and conflict is a reaction to being excluded from them. new orleans neighborhood associations are creatively coercive about joining networks. when they have little power or are actively excluded from such networks, they seek levers from outside the policy system. these creative tools are their ‘weapons of the weak’ (scott 1985) and allow them a voice in matters critical to their locale. this reframes networks. no longer do networks serve only as partnerships to make policies more efficient. instead, urban policy networks are the scene of community conflict made famous by alinsky (1971). creativity is critical to these conflicts; excluded neighborhoods enact strategies to increase involvement and voice. literature dahl (1961) famously asked ‘who governs?’ the use of the term governance has changed over time (kooiman 1993) to include more actors in networks. the new governance literature highlights the roles of additional actors in policy networks. network governance highlights the relationship between these new actors, particularly when they interact in informal, nonhierarchical ways (sørenson & torfing 2005). brown and keast (2003) categorize the different types of relationships community groups within networks can have. these three core concepts (new governance, network governance, and relationship categories) set the stage for a more specific discussion of power and conflict with policy networks. scholars claim that increasingly, ‘public policy is less of a governmental dictum and more of an ongoing negotiation among government and non-government actors (katz & mair, 1995; castells, 1996; blumler and kavanagh, 1999; ornstein and mann, 2000; bingham et al, 2005a; blyth and katz, 2005)’ (crozier, 2008 p. 3). while crozier makes an empirical claim, other scholars soften the claim arguing, ‘the idea of a sovereign state that governs society topdown through laws, rules and detailed regulations has lost its grip and is being replaced by new ideas about a decentred governance based on interdependence, negotiation and trust’ (sørensen & torfing, 2005, pp. 195-196). kooiman (1993) argues that the term ‘governance’ entered the literature in the 1990s. stoker (1998, p. 17) notes this shift and argues that it no longer only refers to what government does, but to a broader process. stoker (1998) is not alone in noticing this shift in the understanding of governance. forrest (2003, p. 593) argues that governance has moved from ‘centrally steered’ to being ‘negotiated, multi-actor, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 19 interorganizational relations that link together state and society’. bogason and musso (2006, p. 4) describe this new term as referring to ‘an analytic focus, emphasizing process rather than formal organization, with a gradual evolution to recognition of processes as networks’. scholars working within the new governance paradigm look to sharpen the analytical understanding of what occurs when more actors are involved in policy networks. network governance is directly derived from new governance, but includes a more formal definition and contains a number of theoretical insights and tools that make it applicable to the urban context. in particular, network governance stipulates that relationships between actors in networks be non-hierarchical and that the policy process be a negotiation. jones et al. (1997) define network governance as patterns of interactions in exchange and relations and flows of resources between independent units. these two basic concepts, independence and relationships, are common in definitions of network governance. network governance research spans multiple generations, from theoretical discussion, to examples of case studies, to understanding the democratic implications of non-hierarchical, negotiated networks (torfing 2005). this work pushes that boundary, by extending beyond single case studies to look at a cornucopia of different examples of relationships between neighborhood associations and other organizations (from non-profits to elected officials) in post-katrina new orleans. much of the discussion around community participation in network arrangements is contextualized by a need to decrease the costs of public services (see rhodes 1996). this is a core theme in network governance literature, where rhodes explicitly describes governance as being about new public management and stoker (1998, p. 39) calls governance, ‘the acceptable face of spending cuts’. more recent research focuses on the benefits of using networks to provide social services (see goldsmith and eggers, 2004). brown and keast (2003) take this discussion in another direction, shifting the focus away from efficiency and towards types of relationships. one understanding of networks argues that they increase the efficiency of social services through market mechanisms such as competition; this is an extension of the logic of new public management (rhodes, 1996). but other scholars and politicians trumpet networks because of their collaborative power. in particular, katz and bradley’s metro revolution 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 (2013) focuses on how cities are not only distinct units but part of global networks. locally, katz and bradley argue for cooperation between networks of suburban and urban municipalities. william eggers and stephen goldsmith, the former mayor of indianapolis and deputy mayor of new york city, make the same argument on an even more local scale in governing by networks (goldsmith and eggers, 2004), arguing that the future of governance is in the management of local networks such as those that a city uses to provide its social services. provan and kenis (2008, p. 229) get to the heart of this line of thinking, claiming: ‘the advantages of network coordination in both public and private sectors are considerable, including enhanced learning, more efficient use of resources, increased capacity to plan for and address complex problems, greater competitiveness, and better services for clients and customers’. brown and keast (2003) are a part of this second class of network theorists, who argue that working together provides new opportunities to improve efficiency. they classify relationships within these networks as the ‘3cs’.2 these categories are cooperation, coordination and collaboration. the categories are based upon differing levels of partnership. cooperation is the least formal of these configurations, featuring short, informal relationships (hogue 1994; cigler 2001; lawson 2002) in which organizations share things such as information and space, but still have autonomy (winer & ray 1994; cigler 2001; mulford & rogers 1982; melavillee & blank 1991). coordination is also short-term, but involves additional planning and coordination (mulford & rogers 1982; daka-mulwana 1995; lawson 2002, litterer 1973, lawson 2002). finally, brown and keast (2003, p. 8) describe collaboration as ‘the most stable and long term’ relationship, with ‘comprehensive planning and well-defined communication channels.’ the classification of the ‘3cs’ in terms of working together harbors an implicit assumption that network governance is a viable strategy because partnership leads to more efficient outcomes. but in doing so, brown and keast ignore the possibility of power struggle and conflict within policy networks. in the urban context, there is a long history of conflict as part 2 brown and keast narrow the five categories of relationships from “informal, cooperative, coordination, collaborative and integrative” (hogue 1994; cigler 2001; leutz 1999; and szirom et al. 2002), and build upon the five companion ‘c words’ for integration used by lawson (2002): co-location, communication, coordination, collaboration and convergence. brown and keast (2003) use the more recent consensus that has emerged (see winer & ray 1994; konrad 1996 and fine 2001) around the use of 3cs: cooperation, coordination and collaboration. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 21 of the toolkit for progress. that can be through social movements (anyon 2005), neighborhood conflict (arnold 1979), and community organizing (alinsky 1971). each of these examples refers to communities using policy networks as a way to gain power. in doing so, they reflect a movement in the philosophical understanding of power, from power of one person over another (lukes 1974; hunter 1969) to power of people (and organizations) over each other (foucault 1978; gaventa 2003). in the latter philosophical approaches, people and organizations can be interdependent; power does not have to be complete and dominant. those in positions of weakness can still exert power over those in positions of strength (and those in positions of strength can, of course, exert power back over the weak). by discussing power in the context of urban policy networks, this study examines an aspect of the structure or agency debate (see hayward & lukes 2008), in which sources of power are seen to be systematic or individualistic. in one corner of that debate, authors have specifically looked at how ‘weapons of the weak’ (scott 1985) over time, fuel resistance to power structures, or the ‘power of the powerless’ (havel et al. 1985) in which rejecting symbols has a similar effect. but that discussion has not reached the discussion of networks, where networks are seen not as sites of power struggles but as opportunities for partnership and efficiency gains. this research provides a link between this philosophical arm of the study of power, the urban tradition of social movement, and community organizing. this research shows that neighborhoods in new orleans not only find themselves in conflict over the construction and direction of networks, but also use specific strategies to address their power deficit. methodology this research is part of a larger inquiry into the priorities and strategies of neighborhood associations in post-katrina new orleans. that study focuses on new orleans as a result of the paucity of comparative examples in network governance as most studies focus on a single example of network governance. the post-katrina new orleans context provides an excellent example to compare and contrast multiple cases of network governance in which neighborhood associations join policy networks to pursue their objectives. 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 on august 29th, 2005, hurricane katrina hit new orleans. the resulting flood caused $60 billion in damages (birkland, 2006) and over 1,000 deaths. just days before, the city called for a full evacuation. at the time, it was the largest evacuation in the country’s history. eighty percent of the city flooded after the storm, as new orleans, a city shaped like a bowl, filled up with water, endangering the lives of those who stayed. new orleans lost not just lives, but key infrastructure, leaving the city with a series of policy decisions and controversy over who should make those decisions. for residents struggling to find a way to return to the city, neighborhood associations were a key way to stay connected and attempt to have a voice in the city’s recovery. neighborhood associations have long been part of the discussion of the urban eco-system (de tocqueville 1835; arnold 1979), but they have taken on a particularly important role in the post-katrina context (ahlers & hummel 2007; chamblee-wright 2008). after hurricane katrina, these organizations took on a variety of roles, some becoming watchdogs, some providing services to their residents, some engaging in fierce conflict with their elected officials or developers. in doing so, neighborhood associations became an ideal mechanism with which to study network governance. they clearly meet the theoretical criteria: they have no formal relationship with government or others in their networks, and they are an actor from outside the traditional sphere of government. new orleans was forced to reexamine many of its public systems after the devastation of hurricane katrina; these neighborhood associations engaged in a wide range of activities in a wide range of networks, creating an almost unparalleled chance to study multiple cases of network governance. doing so is not easy. neighborhood associations are notoriously difficult to contact; information from city government indicated that neighborhood associations sometimes disappeared from the mayoral administration’s eye only to reappear a decade later. as a result, this study uses a mixed methods approach to attempt to triangulate these associations, their activities and their motives. these methods include: ethnography, survey, document analysis and interviews. the case for mixed methods research is rooted in both the difficulty of penetrating neighborhood-level processes and the tendency for non-profits to tailor their answers to their audience (stablein 1996). using multiple methods expanded access to these associations. the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 23 methods built upon each other. ethnography provided important context and allowed for a strategy of repeatedly showing up to build trust, which was built over three years of study, and approximately six months a year in the field. ethnography also allowed for verification of claims in interviews. the survey, essentially a census conducted in collaboration with a now-defunct non-profit called city works, established a baseline of organizations from which to draw a sample. that sample was stratified by income, ensuring that this study did not simply draw case studies from the strongest, most visible neighborhood associations as was often done after the storm (see chamblee-wright 2008; ahlers & hummel 2007). participation rates for both the survey and the sample of neighborhood associations for document analysis and interviews were extremely high, in part due to process of the researcher becoming a familiar face in the region over a number of years. participation in the survey was 65%, which would have been higher except many organizations from the sampling frame simply did not exist. eighty-eight percent of associations selected for the second stage of the study chose to take part, by providing documents and engaging in interviews, with 93% of potential interviewees participating. this second stage was characterized by a document analysis of each neighborhood association’s historical documents. these mostly consisted of meeting minutes, but association leaders helped strategize to provide comprehensive documentation where possible, including emails, flyers, blogs and other historical placeholders. the document analysis was conducted based upon mayhew’s (2002) ‘action’ analysis. it also provided the foundation for interviews, allowing the study to go past associations’ talking points to discuss specific incidents in their history. together these strategies combined to be what i call, a methodology of access. by combining ethnography, partnership with a local non-profit, document analysis and interviews, i gained access far beyond what was typical in post-katrina study. such access helped with rigor, as it allowed for a fuller picture that included hard-to-reach organizations and issues, and it also helped with depth, as i knew about and could ask about hundreds of issues for each association. 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 findings in examining 71 different relationships in the context of 42 interviews with 14 neighborhood associations in new orleans, neighborhood associations repeatedly found themselves excluded from, or in conflict with, a policy network. lacking traditional power in these situations, they exhibited what i call creative coercion, using levers outside the system to help gain influence in their power struggles. among the organizations i studied, there are myriad examples of conflict. virtually every association that provided documents had evidence of exclusion and power struggles alongside the more traditional partnerships. among these, three examples are the clearest examples of such conflicts, and display the broader pattern best. they show how neighborhood associations look for a creative lever outside the system, when they are excluded from networks. their role in networks is not just as another group working together for a common goal, it is as an agitator, looking for a foothold to assure that their priorities are incorporated into the decision. in the historic faubourg lafayette association, the former president explains her own struggle to protect her neighborhood from a proposed development of a grocery store. historic faubourg lafayette is located in central city, a historically african-american neighborhood in one of the most crime-ridden areas of new orleans. the historic faubourg lafayette association opposed a proposed development in 1998 on several grounds. the first was the inappropriateness of the development. it was sprawling and suburban, with a large store and expansive parking lots. the opposition was also influenced by a desire for preservation. the development designs called for the demolition of eight historic homes. the racial implications of preservation were used by local city council representative oliver thomas to discredit the association. oliver thomas was a rising star in a political machine in central city run by former city council representative, jim singleton. he was supported of the project, and it appeared that the developer had bought all the property necessary to start development. with little legal power and no financial resources, the historic faubourg lafayette association had no means to impact the debate. oliver thomas undercut support for the neighborhood association further by referencing a coalition between the association and primarily white preservationists. at a public meeting to discuss the development, oliver thomas criticized neighborhood protest as being supported by white preservationists who did cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 25 not live in the neighborhood. although the president of the historic faubourg lafayette neighborhood association was african-american, her association had only a few members. she reached out to the felicity street redevelopment project inc., whose volunteers came from the nearby garden district and were almost all white. oliver thomas used that fact against her. the neighborhood association lacked public support, money or legal influence. but it was not content to let the development of the grocery store continue. working on a local tip, the association’s members discovered that one of the properties in the development area was still on the market. the developers only thought they had purchased it. this often occurs in relatively poor, african-american neighborhoods in new orleans. properties stay in the family for generations and paperwork is rarely up to date. as a result, developers believed they owned all the necessary properties and were caught unawares. armed with information about the true owners of the home, the preservationist felicity street redevelopment project inc. and the historic faubourg lafayette association approached a second grocery store that was eager to spite the development as it had lost on its own bid to develop the grocery store. the association elicited a six-figure donation from the grocery chain, then used that money to purchase the home. under cover of darkness, and worried that the developer would discover their plot, they met with the homeowner and purchased the property. the purchase slowed the development, and although it was eventually abandoned for other reasons, that purchase was considered to be a key moment in the policy process by interviewees from the historic faubourg lafayette association and collaborative partner felicity street redevelopment project inc. it also gave them a stake in a policy process from which the association was excluded, by leveraging resources considered by others to have been outside of the process. as the historic faubourg lafayette association was excluded from the policy networks in its neighborhood, it grasped for another way to insert itself into the debate. it eventually took something extraneous, a donation from a rival developer and the purchase of a historic home affected, and used these things to insert itself into the policy network. this is what i call creative coercion. the algiers point association followed that same pattern in a conflict with crescent city connection. the algiers point neighborhood is across the mississippi river from the rest of new orleans. known as the west bank, many of the neighborhood residents commute into 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 the downtown for work. poorer residents often use the free ferry to cross into the french quarter, where the tourism industry thrives and where they work at a variety of restaurants and stores. after hurricane katrina, the ferry service was suspended, and later opened with limited hours. this was an area of concern for residents of algiers point, as they found themselves stuck in the french quarter because shifts ended after the ferry had closed for the night. as a result, many found themselves paying for taxis to return to their families after work, an added expense they could not afford. neighborhood association meetings dealing with the ferry saw spiked attendance, and the association started an organization called friends of the ferry specifically to deal with the issue. friends of the ferry interacted primarily with an organization titled crescent city connection that was in charge of all travel between the west bank and new orleans. according to members of the algiers point association, crescent city connection repeatedly stated that there was not enough demand to justify running the ferry late into the evening, a curious claim because the ferry was free and there was no monetary impact from running the ferry with few riders. friends of the ferry, with no legal say in the matter, had no way to impact this decision. facing a power deficit, friends of the ferry set about creating its own influence. it made public records requests and sorted through the records of the crescent city connection. in these records it found that crescent city connection had broken a political promise made to the west bank. along with the ferry, the other primary manner in which residents commute to and from new orleans is via a bridge. this bridge has a toll, and many residents of the west bank are forced to pay it in both directions each day. west bank residents were promised that the toll money from this bridge would be reinvested into transportation issues that affected the west bank, such as repairs to the bridge and funding of the ferry. the crescent city connection records revealed that instead of keeping the funds from the toll local, they were being used to fund highway repairs on the la-1, far to the west of algiers point. friends of the ferry took this information to state senator pat connick and the state senator used the information to place political pressure on the crescent city connection causing crescent city to change the policy and revert to the full complement of hours. just as the historic faubourg lafayette association aggressively inserted itself into a policy negotiation, the algiers point association found creative and coercive ways to insert itself into the governance network. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 27 a third example of creative coercion was the efforts of the president of the northwest carrollton neighborhood association. that president used a host of different creative techniques to be heard in different policy struggles. after hurricane katrina, the neighborhood association became involved in a conflict with a walgreens pharmacy on a primary corner in the neighborhood. similar to the development of the grocery store in central city, the neighborhood association believed that the planned store model was too suburban and not respectful of the neighborhood and its history. the association engaged in a number of tactics to attempt to influence aspects of the development, from the direction the stores would face, to the look of the construction plans. at one point, it even engaged in what it cleverly called a ‘guerrilla warfare’ approach that involved hanging handmade signs from the construction that lamented, ‘walgreens kills neighborhoods’. the association did deep research into the land use qualifications of the corner lot, finding that some of the plans were inconsistent with the legal requirements. also, the association made the grocery store development an issue in an election. city council candidate shelly midura included support of the neighborhood association against walgreens as a plank of her platform in her campaign. when she was elected, she held a press conference in support of the northwest carrollton neighborhood association, which was cited as the turning point in the policy negotiations. again here, the neighborhood association, which was excluded from all meaningful aspects of a decision with quite a large impact on the neighborhood, found a creative way to insert itself into the policy negotiation. in this case, research and legal approaches complemented a broadly political strategy. both were designed to give the association power at the negotiating table. the northwest carrollton neighborhood association received only minor concessions from walgreens, but these included historically influenced designs as well as a shift in the back facade of the building so as not to screen out the neighborhood. that was not the last time that the northwest carrollton neighborhood association was a thorn in the side of a policy network that sought to exclude them. another critical issue after the storm was demolitions and blight. mayor ray nagin and his administration asserted emergency powers for demolitions. the immediate problem was that damaged houses were collapsing, and causing other houses damage. but secondary problems emerged. rumors of perfectly good houses being demolished without due process ripped through neighborhoods. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 the mayor was caught in a scandal with the new orleans affordable housing (noah) in which houses were claimed to be demolished that did not exist. the northwest carrollton neighborhood association featured two avid preservationists as its leadership. one started a blog that took pictures of thousands of homes so there would be a record if they were demolished without cause. she also worked on the noah story, helping expose the corruption behind the demolition process. the other leader, according to an interview with another neighbor, took even more extreme action. the president of the association was dismayed not only at the demolitions, but also at the lack of a response from her neighbors. so one night, she bought spray paint, and painted the demolition sign on a number of neighborhood houses. the result was immediate; now her neighbors were invested. there were policy changes as a result of these creative and coercive measures. emergency powers for demolitions were ended, and a board oversaw and approved demolitions. the leadership in the northwest carrollton neighborhood association took an issue in which they were completely excluded, and had no formal authority, and inserted themselves into the discussion. the same thing was found all over new orleans. the sugar hill neighborhood association opposed a land use measure by dillard university to assure the university removed a program that placed ex-convicts in their neighborhood. the dreux avenue good neighbors society used repeated police calls to attempt to protect their neighborhood from what they perceived to be a threat from a local apartment complex. the upper audubon association used its political clout to oppose development by tulane university that would have expanded student housing in their neighborhood. these different examples of creative coercion all follow a pattern. a neighborhood association is excluded. that association lacks traditional power, financing or decisionmaking, so it searches for something outside the system. it then uses that creative, coercive technique to insert itself back into the process. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 29 conclusion the exclusion of neighborhood association in new orleans policy networks and their ensuing conflicts, points out the need to reconsider these networks. theory on networks, particularly within the work of brown and keast (2003) and network governance scholars (see torfing 2005), views networks as partnerships with the potential to increase efficiency. in this paradigm, if a group of actors join together for a common goal, they stand a better chance of succeeding. the experience of neighborhood associations in post-katrina new orleans shows a different experience; there, policy networks are the location of power struggles. neighborhood associations, faced with exclusion, use creative and coercive measures to insert themselves into these networks. the response to this exclusion by new orleans’ neighborhood associations fits within a broader debate on the agency and structure of power. neighborhood associations are clearly disadvantaged by the structure around them; they have little in terms of resources or formal legislative clout. in this way, they have much in common with scott’s (1985) wielders of ‘weapons of the weak’ or those with havel’s ‘power of the powerless’ (havel et al. 1985). in both these situations, the challenge is to have a modicum of influence despite little structural power. similarly, how-to guides to urban activism and community organizing, such as alinsky’s (1971) rules for radicals, provide a roadmap for asserting the same type of influence. urban neighborhoods have long engaged in strategies to oppose development, fight for civil rights, or empower locals in politics. while none of this is new or unique to new orleans, it is new to the broader theories around networks and connection. castells (1997, p. 425) argues that, ‘the new power lies in the codes of information and in the images of representation around which societies organize their institutions, and people build their lives, and decide their behavior. the sites of this power are people's minds’. but this is an argument about the power of technology and media in uniting opposition, one castells also makes in networks of outrage and hope: social movements in the internet age (2013, p. 6) arguing, ‘this networking is operated by the act of communication’. similarly, classic social capital arguments (see putnam 1995) focus on connections between those in communities, not the power dynamics between them. so while the creative activity of neighborhood associations is not unique, it does make an important contribution to the understanding of networks. specifically, these associations and 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 their conflicts illuminate a model of how urban neighborhoods address their structural power deficit in the context of networks. the contribution is in the incorporation of these conflicts and strategies into an understanding of network formation and negotiation. that model of how urban neighborhood associations work is called here, creative coercion. cook (1972) coined the term, but this research both expands his concept and adds a strategic understanding to its use by grassroots and neighborhood organizations. while cook sees coercion as morally neutral, he argues that coercion is creative when it is used for positive ends, often against the status quo. one example he gives is against racism in the south. conrad (1974, p. 420) claims that this makes the term ‘creative coercion’ a rhetorical one, arguing ‘was stalin’s coercion of the kulaks ‘creative’? was american bombing of north vietnam ‘creative’? it is clear that cook thinks of coercion as ‘creative’ when he agrees with its objectives’. this research redefines creativity within coercion to refer to not to moral direction, but to a specific pattern of strategies used by those less powerful against authorities. the research then catalogues the pattern of strategies used by neighborhood associations in new orleans. the form of creative coercion established in this study, in which less powerful entities, here neighborhood associations, challenge more powerful authorities, has several characteristics. the first characteristic is that the neighborhood association is excluded from a network. sometimes this means the association is not a part of the network at all, and at other times the association remains in the network but does not have the influence to affect final decisions. as discussed above, this is already a reconceptualization of networks as being the location of power struggles rather than primarily the location of partnership. the second characteristic of the creative coercion model is that neighborhood associations are at a structural power deficit; they have little money or formal decision-making power. this leaves them unable to use traditional strategies to leverage a spot within the network, or to influence the network. finally, the third characteristic of the creative coercion model is that in response to this power deficit, neighborhood associations are forced to find and pull a lever from outside of the current policy debate to force others in the network to give them a seat at the table. while the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 31 nature of innovation, creativity, and unexpected action make it difficult to make broad generalizations what these levers are, there are a number of levers commonly used. first, creative levers are often found by a small group of volunteers rather than wide unified action, a sharp delineation from castells’ (2013) networks of outrage, which depend on greater numbers. second, the creative action often involves the repurposing of a formal structure. for example, the northwest carrollton neighborhood association repurposed an election to make it about a local development issue. the association also repurposed blighted buildings to promote their message (and physically, their signs) that ‘walgreens kills neighborhoods.’ other neighborhoods repurpose structure in similar ways. this creative coercion model draws from similar writing on community organizing tactics, but has a different purpose. rather than provide a guide to community activists, it is an incorporation of power and agency theory into an understanding of networks. thus, this article makes two contributions to our understandings of networks. first, it moves beyond current theorizing that networks are primarily partnerships to be used to create more efficient government, to a conception of networks as the location of power struggles. the article also uses the conflicts of neighborhood associations to build the creative coercive model, which shows specifically how long-standing community organizing tools are used to battle 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independence (1919-1922): modernisation of turkish womanhood burcu cevik-compiègne university of technology sydney abstract in many countries, the services of nurses during the first world war have recently been given a commemorative space in an attempt to make the memory of the war more inclusive and less masculine. in contrast, turkish nurses’ experience has so far been studied only from a nursing education and practice perspective. this article aims to shed light on this forgotten story by taking a gender and war studies perspective and reflect upon the much-celebrated memory of women fighters in turkey. © 2014 burcu cevik-compiègne. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(3): 4206,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i3.4206 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia introduction in australia, when we think about the commemoration of women's war service, the first group of women that comes to mind is nurses. although the recognition of the service of the nurses came late, they nevertheless took their place in the short list of those who deserve official recognition. the women who took what were traditionally considered as men's jobs or those who had to face all sorts of difficulties such as rape, displacement and privations due to the war do not seem to fit in any narrative of men going to the front to accomplish heroic deeds and women following them as their carers or waiting patiently at home. in turkey, the remembrance of women's wartime experience is quite different. in the ottoman empire, nursing had, for a long time, been a male-only profession. in the 20th century women started being introduced to the profession in order to provide care for female patients. after the balkan wars (1912-1913), the shortage of medical staff and the increasing contact with western nurses and nursing education institutions brought change in the practice of female nursing (bahçecik and alpar 2009 p.699; özaydın 2006 pp.163-4). in gallipoli and the other campaigns of the first world war many women served as nurses and, although their work was greatly celebrated at the time, nurses are not remembered in turkey now. the image of turkish women which dominates the national iconography is that of women as warriors rather than that of women as nurses. in the aftermath of the war, there was a tangible concern around the definition of turkish national identity and there were very specific expectations from women in terms of nation building. the representation of women's war experience was crucial in defining their so-called national character. although the modernisation of the nation, starting with women, seemed to be the main drive, the role model for turkish women as a patriot warrior has still been largely embodied in the unsophisticated, uneducated and supposedly backward rural anatolian woman. this complicates this idea of modernisation. while discussing the limits and the scope of the liberating effects of the wartime experience for turkish women, this paper will also address the seeming juxtaposition of the modernity of urban women and the backwardness of peasant women. women at war: ‘an army of mothers and sisters’ and labourers women became particularly active in relief work during the balkan wars. there was a massive influx of muslim refugees in istanbul at the time and they needed food, clothing and health services. several women's organisations and particularly the women's branch of the red crescent society (rcs) took care of the fund raising and relief work. the red crescent society also offered nursing classes for women over a period of five months and after a practical training a final examination was taken in order to obtain a diploma. from november 1914 to april 1915 alone, 300 women took the classes and 120 of them passed the exam (tepekaya & kaplan 2003, p. 165). as well as the red crescent society, certain hospitals also provided training for prospective nurses. making the nursing profession available to women was certainly a necessity in the context of the war but it was also perfectly in line with the idea of modernisation of the tanzimat period1. similarly to spivak's assessment of indian women's position, deniz kandiyoti argued in the late 1980s, the ‘position of women in the ottoman polity was constituted as an ideological terrain’ upon which the project of modernization was negotiated (spivak 1993, p.102; sirman 1988, n.p.). forced to admit the material superiority of the west because of their colonial subjugation, indian and ottoman/turkish nationalisms sought to protect their moral and spiritual values as the realm of eastern superiority. the binary opposition of material and moral found its equivalents in world and home, public and private and man and woman (chatterjee 1993, pp.120-1; findley 1998, p23). while the discourse on modernity focused mainly on westernization of the first category of each pairing, the latter was jealously protected as the signifier of national identity. the ottoman elite often qualified their society as ‘backward’, and the condition of women was also pointed at as an element of backwardness. it was argued that women should have access to education and knowledge in order to be able to give appropriate education to their children. kandiyoti identifies the agenda of this male-sponsored reformation of women as ultimately liberating the younger generation of men from the oppressive patriarchal ottoman family (tekeli 2005, p.253). therefore, woman's modernization was not aimed at their liberation at all but simply towards access to education in order to perform their traditional duties in a way that met these new expectations within modern family structures. the nuclear family became the new norm, both establishing every head of the household as a figure of authority and preventing the moral decay that was associated with the collapse of traditional family structures. during the war period, family ceased to be a private affair and was regulated by diverse public agencies in order to ensure that women would not escape their reproductive duties (toprak 1992, p.226). the example of the islamic society for working women (hereafter isww) illustrates how this policy was implemented. the isww provided work for thousands of muslim women in factories as well as in offices or other establishments depending on their skills. the aim of this society was not only to organize and promote work for women but also to give the activity of women official sanction (ahmad 1988, p.280). on the other hand, the isww adopted the principle of compulsory marriage by the age of 20 for its female workers. the society took care of finding appropriate prospective grooms, or gave approval in cases where the young women designated their own future husbands. the carrot was a 20% increase of wage for marriage and an additional 20% for each child, the stick being a 15% cut and subsequent dismissal from isww if women refused to get married by the age of 20 (toprak 1992, p.225). therefore, women's work outside the home was accepted and even encouraged as an aspect of modernity as long as their activity did not threaten the modern and yet still patriarchal family structure. the nursing education program also fulfilled this requirement and therefore, it was met with support from the government and army as well as enthusiasm from the media. some of the women who worked in the women's branch of the red crescent society also shared this ideal and described nursing education as a moral obligation for all women. fatma aliye, one of the prominent woman writers of the time and a founding member of the women's branch said: women have practiced the art of nursing from time immemorial knowingly or unknowingly. nursing has always, everywhere and in every household been a duty of women. in fact, nursing which is an important and difficult task is now bound by modern scientific principles. caring for a patient while ignoring these principles may cause more damage than benefit. since all women are endowed with qualities required for nursing and they are also morally responsible for this task they have to learn these principles (in sarı & özaydın 1992, p.16). therefore, women were considered to be inherently inclined to patient care but this natural disposition was not enough anymore. they were also held morally responsible for developing their nursing skills further with formal education. this project of modernisation did not necessarily empower women and even women's ability to perform their traditional duties was questioned. fatma aliye continued: women suffered so many privations for so long, being taken for a flower or a doll, that let alone bandaging a wound, she would not stand seeing a little blood on a small cut and would pass out. in this situation, our ladies who go to bandage wounds are the heroes of our time. holding an arm that is to be cut off, cleaning the wounds of a disintegrated hand and carrying out this duty with courage and calm, yes it qualifies as heroic (in tepekaya & kaplan 2003, p.166). of course, the author, the subject and the addressee are all women who belong to an urban upper class and mostly are members of a bureaucratic elite. all women who were involved in the red crescent society as well as most of those who took nursing classes came from the same urban elite. the condition of women described in their writings and their grievances are very specific to their social status as much as to their gender. these women had access to more than basic education and a good number of them studied further and excelled in a field, mostly in foreign languages and literature. some of the women of this social background complained about the idleness of their daily lives and about not being able to put their knowledge to good use. during the gallipoli campaign when hospitals were full and an increasing number of nurses were needed, the women's branch prepared publicity to encourage women to sign up to take classes in their spare time (sarı & özaydın 1992, p.13). this notion of spare time and the desire to make contributions to society gave impulse to some of these women to become active in public life and the war gave them the opportunity. however, these activities did not defy the established gender order. they defined themselves as an ‘army of sisters and mothers’ and even the official papers of the red crescent society defined them in relation to a male in their family (sister of x, daughter of y, wife of z, and so on). not all women who were involved in these activities, however, were content with the description of their role as auxiliaries to men. fatma züleyha, who attended the classes in 1915, translated a nursing handbook from french because, she said, while she was studying there were no sources available in turkish. she took special pride in translating this book that had been written in english by a woman (miss oxford) and also translated into french by another woman. in the preface of her publication she emphasized the role of nurses beyond its supposedly secondary nature. ‘without a scientifically trained nurse, a doctor will not get any results. nursing is the acting hand of medicine […]. the reason for the success of the surgical projects in germany is the excellence of the nurses.’ (sarı & özaydın 1992, p.15). clearly, fatma züleyha saw in the nursing profession something more than an extension of women's traditional duty and she meant to make a difference both as a nurse and as a translator. there were also women from backgrounds other than this urban elite who were taken on in different circumstances. one of the reports of the red crescent society, covering the period from 1912 to 1915, states that about 40 destitute armenian women who immigrated to kayseri were given room and boarding by the rcs and at the same time, they were offered nursing classes in an attempt to rehabilitate them. at the end of the mission in kayseri, those who wished to go to istanbul with the mission had their travel expenses paid (sarı & özaydın 1992, p.11). in istanbul, it was possible for them to keep working as nurses. the same report represents rcs as the provider and these armenian women as the beneficiaries of a charitable act. in so doing, it does not acknowledge the output of these nurses in the war effort. nevertheless, it provides insight into how nursing education and practice may have significantly improved the condition of some poorer women. we do not know for sure what the social background of these armenian women might have been. we can only speculate that a part of the stability that they lost because of the war may have been restored thanks to this new profession that was available to women, also because of the war. some women chose to join field hospitals and it seems that they even had a say in which front they would like to go to. in july 1915, a certain fatma servet who was working in taksim hospital in istanbul obtained approval to join the war in gallipoli as a wage-earning nurse (ka 221/43). kerime salahor, safiye hüseyin elbi, münire i̇smail and nesime ahmed dölen also volunteered to go to gallipoli (bahçecik & alpar 2009, p.700). this list may not be exhaustive and we do not know exactly how many women served as nurses in this campaign and what their experience was like. at least one female nurse named erika died in service due to allied bombing of the hospital behind the frontline, in the village of yalova in eceabat (esenkaya 2011, p.59). she may not have received any posthumous honours but a number of women who volunteered to work in the hospitals in istanbul were rewarded with medals (tepekaya & kaplan 2003, p.164; esenkaya 2011, p.59). in spite of official recognition and public encouragement at the time, the contribution of the nurses was soon to be forgotten2. nursing was not the only way for women to join the war. some women from diverse backgrounds were engaged in the labour battalions. formation of these women's battalions in 1918 was a necessity. although many of the exemptions from military service had been revoked and the age of conscription had been extended to include males from 15 to 55 by 1916, high death tolls and desertion meant that the army had to make the best of whatever workforce was available (zürcher 1996, p.242). in february 1918, a call for enrolment was launched for robust women between 18-30 years of age, with good morals and character (to be certified by the local authorities) and without infant children. single women were to stay in the barracks at all times whereas married women were allowed to spend four nights a week at their home, provided that they lived close enough to get back to work at a given time in the morning. women in these battalions were to serve either as administrative clerks or labourers but after a while, all positions including the command and the administration of the battalion were left to women (toprak 1992, pp.226-7). this decision seems to have been taken with a view to ‘protecting the honour’ of these women by reducing their hierarchical subordination to men. the war opened up new possibilities to women and therefore this could be acknowledged as a time of progress. however the narrative of the war of independence and the foundation of the republic has been largely based on the association of the late ottoman period and especially the wartime istanbul with moral decay, corruption and sexual promiscuity (neumann 2006, pp.321-5). this representation contrasted with the image of the new nation-state leaders posing themselves as the enlightened saviours of turkish women from the shackles of ignorance and subservience. although the new regime shared the ideal for women's modernization with the young turk government of the ottoman empire, the leaders of the republic rejected their heritage and continuity with the late ottoman period. the achievements of the turkish nurses along with other professional women during the war were thus buried in the pre-history of the republic. resistance and political activism some urban women from upper classes, such as halide edip adıvar, were also engaged in active resistance to the allied occupation in the aftermath of the war. she was a prolific writer and a respected intellectual in nationalist circles. in march 1915, during the naval battle of gallipoli, she attended secret meetings with other intellectuals, in order to coordinate a national resistance movement in case of the fall of istanbul (köroğlu 2010, pp.184-190); and she seemed to bring together a certain number of prominent nationalists and emerged as a de facto leader by the end of the war. after the occupation of istanbul by the allied forces in 1918, halide edip organized several protest rallies and the best known of these meetings took place on 19 may 1919 when she truly became a public figure by addressing a crowd of several thousands of people. she had, by then, become a seasoned orator but it was significant that it was the first time for a woman to deliver a speech on a public platform in a society where sexual segregation had only just started to dissipate. many other women joined in the resistance against the foreign occupation and organized similar events throughout anatolia (tekeli 2005, p.259). in fact, women had practiced political activism within women's branches of various organizations during the balkan wars. the scope of their activities during that time went beyond the frontiers. for instance, women from the ottoman national defence organization had reached out to indian women for support. although there is no evidence that links the two events, almost simultaneously, a group of muslim women from calcutta organized a meeting in support of their ottoman co-religionists and sent a resolution to the government (özcan 1997, p.148). pan-islamic solidarity was the main feature of the ottoman-indian muslim relations at the time and this was not particularly an original initiative. it is interesting, however, to note that this pan-islamic solidarity signified not only an anti-colonial struggle but also a fight to acquire a public voice for women in the face of the islamic practice of gender segregation. halide edip reports that during her visit to india in 1936, letters she received from young muslims (girls probably) all begged her to speak against purdah during her lectures ([adıvar] 1938, p.52). however, as an observer halide edip was able to notice the range and the nuances of the attitudes to purdah among women and tackled with the topic sensibly. an interesting comparison can be made between the turkish and indian muslim women's wartime activities, because wartime political activities of muslims of india were tightly linked to the events in turkey. india saw an unprecedented mobilization of its muslim population in support of the ottoman empire, which culminated in the khilafat movement following the defeat of the central power. this period of turmoil was also an opportune moment for women to be involved in activities of public significance. although they claimed the motivation of their activities was purely religious, in that particular context, religion and politics were inseparable. thus, like the turkish nurses, indian muslim women were able to extend their domestic responsibilities – in this case, safekeeping of the religious integrity – to the public sphere. another similarity between turkish nurses and indian muslim women is the fact that these women were also related to the prominent male leaders of the time. they conducted their activities in parallel to their husbands’. the first muslim woman who is reported to have ever addressed a mixed political gathering is bi amman, who spoke behind her veil at the annual meeting of muslim league in 1917, on behalf of her son, muhammad ali, who was in prison. in 1921, she would speak lifting her veil this time and introducing herself as a mother figure to all present (minault 1982, pp.252-4). not only muslims but also hindu women such as sarojini naidu used the symbolism of the self-sacrificing mother, thus merging their political activities with the traditional responsibilities of women in order to obtain social acceptance. the limits of the socially acceptable shifted quickly and by the indian independence in 1947 women had taken up active roles in politics, although they were typically involved in women's organizations instead of taking part in the existing male-dominated parties (forbes 1982, p.236). undoubtedly, the war affected indian and turkish women to very different degrees. the experience of armed conflict within the territory disturbed the sense of normality to a greater extent in turkey. as discussed above, this opened up hitherto unseen possibilities to turkish women who were, unlike their indian counterparts, resolutely against sexual segregation at this point in time. women were granted political rights soon after the foundation of the turkish republic. however, validating those rights in a male-dominated and authoritarian regime was another battle. nezihe muhiddin and her collaborators founded the first political party of the republic, people's party of women, which was denied the right to run for the presidential campaign in 1927. the party was not even recognized as such and the leaders were advised to create an association instead (tekeli 2005, pp.259-260). halide edip, who participated in the creation of the republic in so many ways, was also removed from the political scene during the early republic. she had joined the resistance in ankara and served with the armed forces throughout the war of independence with the rank of sergeant first and then sergeant-major. she did not really bear arms but worked as a translator; however she is sometimes referred to inaccurately as a woman fighter. after the independence, however, like many others who actively took part in the liberation, she was disappointed with mustafa kemal atatürk's authoritarian take on leadership. halide edip chose to leave turkey in a self-imposed exile because she was unwilling to submit to the absolute authority of mustafa kemal who consequently labeled her a ‘traitor’. she went back to turkey shortly after his death and was elected to the parliament in the 1950s. in spite of her falling out with atatürk, whose judgment is hardly ever questioned, she has been remembered respectfully and represented as the archetype of modern republican women. turkish women form an element of backwardness to the symbol of modernity the modernity that halide edip supported and expanded in her writings was a very complex one. during the war, she developed a strong mistrust for the western world and rejected almost everything associated with it. therefore, in her search for an indigenous model of modernity, she turned to rural turkish women. some other nationalists of the time were even more radical in their opposition to non-turkish elements of identity. nationalists such as ziya gökalp and fatma aliye blamed women's conditions on persian or arab influences. according to this idea, sexual segregation, polygamy and woman's confinement in household had nothing to do with either turkish tradition or islam ([yalman] 1930, p.234). thus, the emerging turkish nationalism found both its oriental ‘other’ and the authentic ‘self’. as discussed earlier, the ottoman elite had internalized the european representations of their empire as backward and thus they also internalized the system of values through which they were judged. it is, therefore, not surprising that they viewed their own subjects with the same lens through which they were regarded in europe. as ussama makdisi put it, ‘ottoman reform created a notion of the pre-modern within the empire in a manner akin to the way european colonial administrators represented their colonial subjects’ (2002, p.770). in ottoman orientalism, self definition was created in contrast with the arabs as well as with the turks of anatolia. the major shift that occurred during the war was the identification of the ottoman muslim elite as turkish, as opposed to ottoman, which now connoted corruption and decay. thus, anatolian women were idealized as being authentic, simple, upright, hardworking, morally pure and self-reliant both by halide edip, who promoted a local islamic mysticism, and those including mustafa kemal atatürk, who looked back to a mythical past where turkish society used to be egalitarian. celebration of the anatolian female heroes who bore arms in provincial towns and villages also contributes to the myth of turkish women as fierce fighters. recently, a turkish historian brought to light accounts of a few anzac soldiers who told stories about women snipers some of whom were reportedly captured dead at gallipoli (tunçoku 2002). although no official documents support the statements of those anzac soldiers, some of whom were named and others of whom were anonymous, and tunçoku himself is unable to affirm the veracity of these accounts, the article certainly propagated a strong belief in the existence of women fighters at gallipoli. in the last few years, there has been an increasing number of web articles and pages dedicated to the celebration of those female heroes. an example is the story of sergeant halime who enlisted disguised in men's clothes (she was in fact, probably a transgender as she wore men's cloths and shaved her entire life). another is the story of corporal nezahat who supposedly fought at gallipoli as a child-soldier at only 8 alongside her father col. hafiz halid bey. tens of other stories have been circulated and kindled the national zeal of a receptive public. depiction of turkish peasant women as the carriers of ammunition and other supplies is also very common in the national celebration of women's contribution to the war effort. given that these women usually appear with a baby in their arms and in traditional civilian clothes, their affiliation with any army troops would have been doubtful. that may be because it was not so rare that civilians spontaneously contributed to the war effort, particularly during the war of independence after the first world war and the number of women labourers was not strictly limited to those who were recruited through official channels. however inaccurate it may be, the presence of a baby in that representation is very significant. many of the stories that accompany these images (either in monuments, paintings or other media) relate the event of the death of the baby and the patriotic and dignified response of the mother. the message is that the sacredness of the nation prevails even over the sacredness of motherhood. in a country where the perceived constant threat of internal and external enemies translates into a readiness to fight and the militarisation of the entire society, this message is still relevant today. the mother who willingly offers the life of her child for the greater good of the country still stands as a role model for turkish women. this myth of the strong and self-reliant turkish woman emphasizes manly characteristics and purposefully desexualizes and militarises women's identity. the suppression of femininity was certainly desired in order to decrease the discomfort of men in their social encounters with women, however there is more to it. since the early republic, turkish girls are drilled to march in step usually three abreast, manoeuvre and stand to attention as part of their basic physical education, in order to maintain their readiness to fight in case of invasion. the underlying anxiety is obviously about rape in war. the fact that everybody knew at the time, and halide edip related in her novels and short stories, was that a tremendously bigger number of women went through the traumatic experience of rape than took up arms. the fantasy of turkish women as fierce fighters operates as a coping mechanism, both acknowledging men's inability to protect them and the denial that the rape actually took place. in fact, not only in the disputed areas, nor the places under occupation after the war, but also in other parts of current turkey, rape was an everyday experience or a ubiquitous threat for many women. mehmet yavaş, a gallipoli veteran said that when he came back from the war, he discovered that his wife had been kidnapped and he never saw her again (önder 1981, p.57). in the ottoman army there was an extremely high rate of desertion. it was very common for these deserters to form armed gangs and take refuge in mountains or other hideouts. they lived by carrying out raids and extortion and represented a danger particularly for women. even after the war, some of them were not able to resume normal lives and some gangs had a surprising longevity. rape by these gangs – let alone by the enemy – must have been so widespread that ‘being taken to the mountain’ became a synonym for ‘being raped’ in the turkish language. urban women also suffered sexual exploitation of a different sort. the number of prostitutes increased dramatically and segregated muslim prostitution quarters were authorized for the first time during the war. some 746 women were reported to have gone back to a regular activity after the war ([yalman] 1930, p.244). conclusion the war's impact on women depended as much on their social background as their gender. while an urban elite seized the war as an opportunity to become active in public, professional and political life through charities, nursing and political activism, poorer urban women who already worked outside of the house before the outbreak of the war had more and more trouble looking after their families. although the absence of men provided them with some opportunities, the war economy destroyed almost all hope of earning a decent living. women in rural areas and disputed areas were more vulnerable to rape and killings. the types of activities they were involved in did not change but they had a higher workload due to the absence of men. some of them spontaneously fought against the enemy or contributed to the war effort however they could. but, as discussed above, their image as warriors was out of proportion and was created to fulfill the different agendas of the ideologues and the leaders of turkish nationalism. although gender roles were challenged to a certain extent, the evolution of the condition of women was fundamentally in line with pre-war policies. the war perhaps gave added pace to women's modernization process, which concerned and was led by mainly an urban population. the war also challenged the conceptualization of modernity. while the intended outward image was still western, an idealized image of rural anatolian women was posed as the spiritual model for all modern turkish women. the story of turkish nurses was written out of history in the process, because the earlier examples of social progress did not fit the narrative that the liberation of women was achieved under atatürk's reforms in a complete rupture with the ottoman social policy. references ka 221/43 kizilay arsivi. hastabakici fatma hanimin gelibolu'ya istihdam edilmesi. 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[yalman], a.e. 1930, turkey in the world war, yale university press, new haven. zürcher, e.j. 1996, 'between death and desertion: the experience of the ottoman soldier in world war i ', turcica, vol. 28, pp. 235-58.doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/turc.28.0.2004343 footnotes 1tanzimat literally means reformation. this period started in the 1839 with the introduction of european inspired laws and was interrupted with the reign of unpopular abdulhamid ii (1876-1908). 2by contrast, male nurses’ experience was always disregarded. male nurses served in much larger numbers throughout the war and although they were advantaged by lower eligibility requirements, they were sent to most dangerous posts. undoubtedly, service in the ambulance corps was considered less honorable than bearing arms. once women were introduced to the profession, the number of male nurses plummeted and in turkish republic nursing became a female-only profession until 2007. © 2014 lucy fiske and rita shackel. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(3): 4183,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i3.4183 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 123 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia ending rape in war: how far have we come? lucy fiske university of technology sydney rita shackel university of sydney abstract the rape of women has for centuries been an endemic feature of war, yet perpetrators largely go unpunished. women were sanctioned as the spoils of war in biblical times and more recently it has been claimed that it is more dangerous to be a woman than a soldier in modern conflict. nevertheless, until the establishment of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for rwanda and the former yugoslavia, there was very little concern regarding the need to address the rape of women in conflict. this paper briefly maps historical attitudes towards rape in war, outlines some analyses and explanations of why rape in war occurs and finally turns more substantively to recent efforts by the international community to prosecute rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity. we argue, that while commendable in some ways, contemporary approaches to rape in war risk reinforcing aspects of women’s status which contribute to the targeting of women for rape and continue to displace women from the centre to the margins in debates and practices surrounding rape in both war and peace time. we conclude by arguing that criminal prosecutions alone are insufficient and that, if we are to end the rape of women and girls in war (and peace), we need a radical restructuring of gender relations across every sphere of social and political life. introduction rape of women has long been an endemic feature of war. for centuries, perpetrators of sexual attacks during conflicts have enjoyed effective impunity. public narratives of war tend to focus on the victories and defeats of military troops or perhaps on the impacts on a degendered civilian population, such as displacement or death as ‘collateral damage’ (palmieri et al. 2012, pp. 10-13; henry 2011, p. 20; puechguirbal 2012, p. 140). until very recently, the ways in which conflicts impact on women in particular received very little attention. at least since the international criminal tribunals for rwanda and yugoslavia, there is a growing awareness and concern in both public consciousness and among legal and political leaders, of the extent and need to address the rape of women in war. the incidence of rape in war is such https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 124 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 that major general patrick cammaert, former commander of the un peacekeeping operations in democratic republic of congo (drc) in 2008, declared that ‘[i]t is now more dangerous to be a woman than to be a soldier in modern conflict’ (chaikel 2011). an estimated 25 – 50,000 bosnian women and girls were raped in the bosnian war from 1991 – 1995 (chaikel 2011). in a landmark study of 68 victims of this abuse loncar et al. (2006, p. 71) reported that of these women, 44 were raped more than once and 21 were raped daily during their captivity. most of the rapes (96%) were also accompanied by physical torture. between 250,000 and half a million women and girls were raped during the 1994 genocide in rwanda; special rapporteur on rwanda rene degni-segui remarked in 1996 that ‘[r]ape was the rule, and its absence the exception’ (un special rapporteur 1996, p.16). in the nanking massacre of 1937 during the second sino-japanese war somewhere between 20,000 and 80,000 women and girls were raped (williams 2014). a 2011 study conducted by scholars at harvard school of public health estimated that 48 rapes took place every hour in the drc, this translates to 1,152 women raped every day (peterman et al. 2011, p. 1060). it is difficult to establish accurate statistics on the incidence of rape in conflict for a range of social and methodological reasons including the widespread under-reporting of rape due in no small part to social stigma attached to the status ‘raped woman’ and the collapse of social infrastructure which would ordinarily assist in the collation of such information, such as health services, police, courts, and psychosocial services (palmieri et al. 2012, 13-14). argument around the accuracy of rape statistics, however, is a diversion which obscures the lived experiences of women and the catastrophic effects that rape has. for example in the bosnian study by loncar et al. (2006) noted above, most of the women revealed psychological trauma. the most frequent psychological symptoms were depressiveness, avoidance of thoughts or conversations associated with trauma, and suicidal ideas. none of the women in this study had a psychiatric history before the rape, but at the time of the study, over 76% suffered from depression, 75% from social phobia, almost a third from posttraumatic stress disorder and a quarter of the women in the study had sexual dysfunctions. the link between militarisation and rape is clear (henry 2011), but focusing on the number of rape victims also diverts attention away from the more important questions of ‘why does a rise in militarism bring with it a rise in rape?’ and ‘how can we stop rape in war?’ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 125 this paper briefly maps historical attitudes towards rape in war, outlines some analyses and explanations of why rape in war occurs and finally turns more substantively to recent efforts by the international community to prosecute rape as a war crime and a crime against humanity. drawing on academic and legal sources as well as our own empirical work in the great lakes region of africa we argue, that while commendable in many ways, contemporary approaches to rape in war risk reinforcing aspects of women’s status which contribute to the targeting of women for rape and continue to displace women from the centre to the margins in debates and practices surrounding rape in both war and peace time. we conclude by arguing that criminal prosecutions alone are insufficient and that, if we are to end the rape of women and girls in war (and peace), we need a radical restructuring of gender relations across every sphere of social and political life. mainstream and high-level political and juridical concern about rape in war is a very recent phenomenon. hagay-frey (2011) identifies three historical phases in international law’s approach to rape of women: the ‘era of silence’ (prior to the geneva conventions of 1949), the ‘era of honor’ (from 1949 to the mid 1990s) and the ‘third era’ (from the prosecutions of rape in the international criminal tribunals of yugoslavia and rwanda in the late 1990s). historically, the rape of women by victorious soldiers has been sanctioned as the ‘spoils of war’, fairly won in battle. the bible for example, albeit historically contestable in parts, contains several tracts which sanction raping women as the ‘spoils of war.’ for example, in zechariah 14: 1-2 (cited in turano 2011, 1047) it is stated that: behold, a day is coming for the lord when the spoil taken from you will be divided among you. for i will gather all the nations against jerusalem to battle, and the city will be captured, the houses plundered, the women ravished… numbers 31: 17:18 states: now therefore, kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman who has known man intimately, but all the girls who have not known man intimately, spare for yourselves. (cited in turano 2011, p. 1047) analogous sanctions are found in the koran. in koran 3.50 it is stated: o prophet! lo! we have made lawful unto thee the wives unto whom thou hast paid their dowries, and those whom thy right hand possesseth of those whom allah hath given thee as spoils of war. (cited in turano 2011, p. 1047) 126 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 attitudes to rape in war have progressed considerably over the last two centuries, moving from sanctioning of rape, through to official prohibition but little enforcement, to a recent trend towards prosecution. in 1863 abraham lincoln made rape by union soldiers an offence punishable by death. prohibitions against the violation of ‘family honour’ are found in the hague convention (1907) and the geneva conventions (1949). despite these legal prohibitions however, there has been widespread political and popular silence around rape (palmieri et al. 2012, puechguirbal 2012, snyder et al. 2006). the deep-rooted religious and historical sanctioning of rape continues to echo through the ages underpinning a fatalism that tacitly accepts the practice as an unfortunate, but natural and inevitable side effect of war (‘boys will be boys’). there is also an argument to be made that to acknowledge rape in war poses a risk to ‘higher order’ goals and the protection of the nation and polity: exposing the rape of women and girls unsettles nationalist narratives of the soldier as hero, the selfless and innocent defender of the nation and its values (henry 2011, p. 20). despite extensive evidence of sexual offences during world war ii, there were no prosecutions at nuremberg, and only peripheral mentions of rape, subsumed under the larger category of ‘atrocities’ in the international military tribunal for the far east (hagay-frey 2011, p. 62). asia’s ‘comfort women’ are to this day still seeking acknowledgement and justice for their sexual enslavement (arakawa 2001). rape and other forms of sexual violence such as forced marriage, enforced prostitution, sexual humiliation and forced pregnancy committed in war time were first prosecuted in the international criminal tribunal for former yugoslavia (icty) and the international criminal tribunal for rwanda (ictr), despite the fact that rape was not expressly mentioned in either statute governing these courts (o’connor 2012). rape is included in the rome statute (2002), establishing the international criminal court, as a war crime (article 8), a crime against humanity (article 7) and, in certain circumstances, as genocide (article 6). moves by the international community both to legally prohibit and prosecute rape in war have been welcomed by many as an important step in confronting the culture of impunity surrounding rape in war and bringing an end to the practice (hrw et al. 2014). some human and women’s rights advocates hope that establishing women as legal subjects in international law will have a positive impact on women’s standing in national jurisdictions, bringing consequent gains in women’s rights more broadly (eaton 2003, un ecosoc 2003). there cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 127 are however, questions regarding the efficacy of prosecutions to achieve these goals and a risk that celebrating successful prosecutions on the international stage may deflect attention away from a lack of progress in other areas such as enhancing women’s safety in conflict and post-conflict environments and programs aimed at changing unequal power relations between men and women which arguably underpin violence against women. why does rape happen? the link between militarisation, war and rape of women and girls is irrefutable and well established (henry 2011, palmieri 2012, brownmiller 1975, hagay-frey 2011), but it is important to ask the question ‘why?’ why is rape so prevalent during many (but not all) conflicts? why do men rape women in war time? there are many possible reasons advanced for this. first is the power of rape as a weapon of war to dishonour, demoralise and emasculate the enemy, which is well recognised (el-bushra and mukarubuga 1995, meger 2010). secondly, rape can occur with the intention of genocide, particularly in societies in which national and ethnic identity is patrilineal (chesterman 1997; snyder et al. 2006, p. 190). the deliberate impregnation of a community’s women by the enemy disrupts the group’s ongoing existence as a defined ethnic group. rape is also sometimes used to terminate existing pregnancies – with the same intent of discontinuing ethnic bloodlines (snyder et al. 2006). thirdly, rape provokes terror. the widespread rape of women and the violence that accompanies such attacks affects whole communities acting to destabilize and disempower (puechguirbal 2012). fourthly, rape begets food insecurity. this occurs particularly in societies where women are responsible for working the fields, procuring food and water and collecting firewood. by raping women while they are working or collecting wood or water, the food supply for the entire community is disrupted (el-bushra and mukarubuga 1995). moreover, in some sites, magic plays a role, some men have reported beliefs that raping women will cure them of aids, make them undefeatable in battle, or that they had been overcome by the devil or spirits and directed to rape (lent hirsch and wolfe 2012). the rape of women may also be seen as a result of amplified gender roles in war time and an extension of pre-existing power relations and inequalities in many societies (mazurana and proctor 2013). susan brownmiller (1975, pp. 32-33) argues that rape during war is an extension of pre-existing misogyny: war provides men with the perfect psychologic backdrop to give vent to their contempt for women. … [war] confirms for men what they long suspect, that 128 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 women are peripheral, irrelevant to the world that counts, … war provides men with a tacit license to rape (1975, pp. 32-33). a detailed discussion of all the varied reasons that may explain the phenomenon of rape in conflict is beyond the scope of this paper. in order however to probe further the question of why rape is used as a war strategy, we focus on the links between women as bearers of honour and on the amplification of particular and idealised gender roles during conflict. honour, nation and gender yuval davis (1993, p. 627) argues that the ‘nation’ is an imagined community ‘which divides the world between 'us' and 'them'’ and which ‘is maintained and ideologically reproduced by a whole system of … symbolic 'border guards'’, with gender playing ‘an especially significant role.’ the territory on which a nation exists and upon which its members are born and depend for survival and for the reproduction of their collective national identity is imagined as feminine; the giver of life who must be defended by her sons1. the territory is feminised and the imagined ideals of the nation, its most sacred attributes are symbolically represented by the women of the nation (yuval davis 1993, saigol 2012). ‘women often come to symbolize the national collectivity, its roots, its spirit, its national project. moreover, women often symbolize national and collective 'honour'’ (yuval davis 1993, p. 627). thus, in most societies, the category ‘woman’ is invested with powerful labels and symbolism. women are reified as the mothers of the nation, bearers of ethnic or national identity and bearers of the group’s honour. these reified ideals are problematic for women in peacetime, tightly circumscribing what is appropriate conduct for women (the policing of which is diffused as a sometimes sacred obligation amongst all members of society, making a woman’s body and behaviour not entirely her own), with serious consequences for those who transgress. however problematic such collectively held ideals of womanhood and honour may be in peacetime, such tropes tend to be amplified in war with profound implications for women in conflict and post conflict societies. snyder et al. (2006, p. 188), in exploring possible roots of the systematic rape of women as a feature of the yugoslav wars in the 1990s, identify a ‘rising tide of nationalism’ in which ‘women became popular symbols who both embodied 1 female symbols and language are evident in many nationalist discourses including marianne of the french revolution, little mother serbia, mother india, and the mother country (england). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 129 and marked the boundaries of the homeland in a nationalist discourse that conflated images of mothers with the nation itself’. examples of images and narratives of women as essentialised symbols of nation and honour deployed to justify and fortify the nation’s war effort – either as the worried, but essentially powerless mother/sister/daughter, or as the victim of a barbaric monstrous enemy can be found throughout history. propaganda posters from world war two are particularly illustrative of such discourses. whilst such overt woman-nation-honour images are seldom seen today, similar discourses are nevertheless still easily found. for example, time magazine’s cover of the 9 august 2010 edition urging america and her allies to ‘stay the course’ in afghanistan reveals the hegemonic tropes of idealised masculinity and femininity put to service in the war effort2. these gender roles however are not spontaneously created at the outbreak of fighting, rather they are pre-existing and deeply embedded in patriarchal notions of the family, community and nation. when conflict erupts gender roles become narrowed and amplified. hegemonic masculinity is aggressive, brave, conquering and powerful; whereas the corresponding femininity is the symbol of purity, the keeper of honour and home, the goodness worth fighting, killing and dying for. that these forms of masculinity and femininity may not be an accurate reflection of actual people matters not, for the hegemony needs simplicity and clarity, a clear demarcation of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ for it to mobilise into action (mazurana and proctor 2013). the amplification of women’s symbolic power elevates her value as a strategic target in war. and it is this honour, rather than the integrity of the woman as individual, autonomous legal subject which earlier prohibitions against rape in war sought to protect. the hague convention and the geneva conventions all articulate the prohibitions as a protection of ‘family honour’. the commentary accompanying the geneva conventions explains that ‘women . . . have an absolute right to respect for their honour and their modesty, in short, for their dignity as women’ (cited in chesterman 1997, p. 332), and in so doing, makes a woman’s right to the protection of the law contingent upon the highly contextual and problematic notions of ‘honour’ and ‘modesty’. chesterman (1997, p. 332) argues that framing rape as an injury to honour ‘mask(s) the violent nature of the crime’ and ‘is 2 the cover image can be viewed at http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20100809,00.html accessed 20 september 2014 http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,20100809,00.html 130 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 contingent upon hierarchized gender relations that naturalise the experience of women as victims.’ susan brownmiller goes further, arguing that the rape of women in war is a form of communication between men and that the woman herself is incidental, a mere message board in the correspondence: the body of a raped woman becomes a ceremonial battlefield, a parade ground for the victor's trooping of the colors. the act that is played out upon her is a message passed between men – vivid proof of victory for one and loss and defeat for the other (brownmiller 1975, p. 38). rape in international criminal law as noted above despite international law purporting to have long offered protection to women against rape and offences against their honour, rape was first prosecuted in the icty and ictr. the akayesu3 decision of the ictr (handed down in rwanda in september 1998) was revolutionary in several respects. apart from being the first conviction for sexual violence against women on the international stage, it found that rape in the rwandan genocide was used as part of a widespread and systemic attack and constituted genocide and a crime against humanity. it further developed a progressive definition of rape as ‘a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.’4 this definition is crucial as it does not require the victim to demonstrate her/his non-consent, nor does it require that the perpetrator used threats or force, instead understanding the circumstances of conflict to constitute coercion. finally, akayesu was not personally accused of committing any rapes himself, but as a commander he was held responsible for rapes committed in and around his bureau communal and of sending ‘a clear signal of official tolerance for sexual violence, without which these acts would not have taken place.’5 the icty further developed jurisprudence on rape in war through several other decisions. importantly it sought to establish more specific elements of the crime of rape and considered the issue of consent, stating that ‘the true common denominator which unifies the various 3 prosecutor v. akayesu, judgment, case no. ictr-96-4-t, 2 september 1998. akayesu was mayor of taba commune in rwanda and was charged with multiple crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide. 4 akayesu judgment at 598. this definition of sexual violence was also later concurred with in the prosecutor v kvocka et al., case no. it/98-30/1-t, 2 november 2005. for further analysis of ictr and icty decision see for example chesterman 1997, de ruiter 2011, de vito 2011, hagay-frey 2011 or turano 2011. 5 akayesu judgment at para 693. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 131 systems [of law] … is the basic principle of penalising violations of sexual autonomy.’6 on a more positive note however, it also extended liability of superior officers for the conduct of their soldiers to impose a duty for officers to proactively investigate ‘in order to ascertain whether offences were being committed’.7 while recent efforts to articulate and prosecute sexual crimes against women is a welcome departure from both euphemising sexual violence as an offence against a woman’s honour (as offences are codified in the geneva conventions) and the historical reluctance to prosecute, there remain several concerns. we limit discussion here to three key points which by no means represents an exhaustive critique. first we argue that there are ongoing echoes of women as bearers of a group’s honour; secondly that there is a legal focus on certain types of sexual violence to the exclusion of other types of sexual violence; thirdly that there is a privileging of criminal justice over physical, emotional, social and economic recovery for the woman. echoes of honour while women appear before international criminal law (icl) due to violations of their bodies and minds, rather than of her modesty or honour, a woman still does not appear as an autonomous rights bearing subject. as several scholars have persuasively argued, ‘sexual violence is not in and of itself an international crime’ (grewal 2010, p. 75). in order to be a crime in international law, sexual violence must occur in specific contexts and circumstances. chesterman (1997, p. 333) argues that the treatment of sexual violence in international law ‘impos(es) a definition that depends not on experience but on the legally validating circumstances in which that experience obtains a context’. he goes on to argue that ‘the legal response to rape in war’ is based on ‘the effacement of the feminine subject, and her selective appropriation into the discourse of war crimes as the bearer of essentialized feminine virtues (protecting men's interests in "their" women)’ (chesterman 1997, p. 332). kirsten campbell concurs, noting that international criminal law, for all its progressive developments continues to misunderstand the atrocity of rape at a fundamental level by continuing to treat it as significant ‘only where it is understood in terms of a crime against a victim’s community or nation’ (cited in grewal 2010, p. 76). 6 prosecutor v. dragoljub kunarac, radomir lovac and zoran vukovic (trial judgment), case no. it-96-23-t and it-96-23/1-t, 22 february 2000 at para 440. 7 prosecutor v. naser oric (trial judgement). case no. it-03-68-t. 30 june 2006 at para 322. 132 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 although the terminology of ‘honour’ has been expunged, women’s experiences of sexual violence continue to be interpreted through national, communal and predominantly patriarchal lenses. the effects this has are multiple and profound. rather than radically delinking women and honour, modern icl has potentially reinforced women becoming visible in the high status public sphere of international law through her ethnic or national identity rather than her gender identity, even though it may be her gender that is primarily determinative in terms of her life experiences in both war and peace. icl has also arguably created a new role for women to play in service of the nation – that of testifying at international tribunals about the victimisation of her national or ethnic group and the criminality and barbarity of the ‘other side’ (mertus 2004). the raped woman witness is of great value during the trial, but if patriarchal constructions of womanhood remain uncritiqued, she returns not as ‘national hero’, but instead takes up her position as a ‘raped woman’; sullied, without honour and of little or no value in future life. redress africa, a british based ngo, interviewed several rwandan women who had testified about sexual violence at gacaca (the domestic special courts set up to respond to the mass violence of the genocide). one woman complained that ‘wherever i went, people mocked and made fun of me. it affected me so much that i became sick and remained bed-ridden for a long time’ (redress 2008, p. 88). this corresponds with interviews we conducted with women in drc in april 2014 as part of a research project exploring women’s experiences of justice following mass violence8. many of the women we spoke with recounted trying to hide their rape from husbands and communities for fear of being abandoned and stigmatised, a fear which was sadly realised for many: i remember before being raped that my health was very fine and i had sufficient means. after rape, my husband left me. … i am unable to do anything by myself. even if he comes, i am unable to satisfy his needs, so i am nothing in the society. (41 year old woman, mother of seven children, 22 april 2014, rutshuru, drc) 8 the research project is an australian aid funded project in partnership with the authors and action aid australia, uganda, drc and kenya titled making transitional justice work for women: rights, resilience and responses to violence against women in northern uganda, kenya and democratic republic of congo. for more see www.justiceforwomen.net.au. http://www.justiceforwomen.net.au/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 133 focus on certain types of sexual violence for rape to constitute a war crime, crime against humanity or genocide, the act of rape itself is insufficient, it must be committed in particular circumstances (such as during a genocide, an inter-ethnic war or other circumstance that enables the violence to come under icl jurisdiction) or in the context of a particular relationship between the woman's and the perpetrator’s ethnic or religious identities. the effect of this is that only certain types of rape can be prosecuted – those conducted by, or at the instruction of, a member of the enemy forces committed during a genocide or armed conflict. women who are raped in circumstances that do not meet the legal definition, such as those raped by members of their own ‘side’, by peace-keepers or other actors in emergencies, gain no benefit from recent advances in icl. this is a significant omission. in 2004 the un launched an investigation into sexual assaults by peace-keepers in drc, leading to the expulsion of 65 military personnel and 9 civilian staff of monuc in 2005 (fleshman 2005). allegations have been made against un peace keepers in cambodia in the early 1990s and again in former yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. in the early 2000s reports emerged of peace keepers and humanitarian workers seeking sexual favours from women and girls in exchange for food, water and medicine in refugee camps in sierra leone, guinea and liberia. no charges were laid in any of these cases (fleshman 2005). in northern uganda the entire population was forced into idp camps and a position of dependency on updf soldiers and humanitarian agencies for the necessities of life. here too, stories of ‘survival sex’; when women ‘consent’ to sex with those in positions of power in exchange for food, water, access to firewood, or protection against assaults by others, have been extensively recorded (okello & hovil 2007). even in cases where the act may meet the elements of the definition, decisions to prosecute and on which charges are made according to a range of considerations. although law as an institution and legal prosecutions of rape draw upon a narrative of concern for women, women’s experiences and desires are often relegated to secondary concerns in prosecutorial decision making (mertus 2004). cases are chosen for their strategic value. which are most likely to secure a conviction? which will advance jurisprudence on an issue? which are politically palatable? which will develop the historical record in the ‘right’ manner? political context, for example, was key in the inability of the special court for sierra leone to prosecute any sexual offences committed by the civil defence forces (cdf), with the trial 134 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 chamber ruling all evidence relating to sexual violence inadmissible.9 as one woman told researchers: i feel so bad, because they raped me very brutally, and that was the main reason for going to court to testify. as soon as i got there, my lawyer told me that i should not talk about that anymore. and up to now, that still causes me pain. it makes me feel bad. (cited in grewal 2010, p. 72) furthermore, it does not address the heightened levels of sexual and other violence that women experience before and after periods of conflict. grewal (2010, pp. 75-76) argues that while the highly specific definitions of sexual crimes as international crimes is necessary for the law ‘it is based on a fiction: that a clear distinction can be drawn between women’s experiences in war and women’s lives in peace.’ privileging of criminal justice over woman-centred recovery the recent enthusiasm for prosecutions of rape in conflict focuses attention and resources on legal responses to rape, rather than on direct efforts to prevent rape or to assist women to recover after the event. our current qualitative research in drc anecdotally accords with larger, quantitative studies (e.g. bartels 2010) that women there are most commonly raped while in their homes at night, while working in the fields during the day or are abducted from either home or the fields and raped in captivity in the forest. with such a predictable pattern of risk identified, it is difficult not to have questions about the criteria for decision making about where protective forces are deployed and which targets attract priority status for protection. the prosecution of rape in conflict is important and may yet deliver on its intended aim of ending impunity and bringing the practice to an end. however, practices entrenched across centuries, even millennia, will not be eradicated easily and we must approach this as a long term project. we must also approach the task holistically and keep women and their experiences at the centre of thinking and planning. 9 the lome accord, which brought the conflict to an end grants amnesty to former combatants, reading at article 3 ‘to consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the government of sierra leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the ruf/sl, ex-afrc, exsla or cdf in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organisations…’ (cited in shocken 2002, p. 440). for further reading on prosecutions in the scsl see for example eaton 2003, grewal 2010 and shocken 2002. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 135 courts and tribunals are expensive ventures to run. the ictr operated with a biennial budget of $269,758,400 for 2006 and 2007. in the same period, the icty operated at a cost of $276,474,100. by october 2006 the icty had tried 51 cases and the ictr 22 (wippman 2006, p. 861). while significant attention and resources are directed to courts and tribunals; health, psychosocial, economic empowerment and community attitude programs are struggling. while juridical approaches to rape may focus on the elements of the event and conclude at the end of the rape, the legacy of rape reverberates throughout a woman’s life in multiple ways long after the attack is over. one of the questions we are currently asking in our research and interviews with women from drc, kenya and uganda is ‘what would justice look like for you?’ some women have talked of wanting to see the perpetrators of violence against them and others, prosecuted and jailed, or even killed, but the common responses focus on the need to recover. women have talked of the need to heal their hearts, provide for their children, recover from the injuries and illnesses sustained during the rape and to establish economic independence. we need peace in our areas so that we may come back home and continue our former activities. in addition we need money to help children study or create schools for them. but the most important need is to take care of the victims both after rape and in case the perpetrator is captured. actually by giving us sewing machines to become dress makers for the family to survive. but we notice the drc government thinks capturing the perpetrator is sufficient whereas the victim is still suffering. (25 year old woman, mother of three children, 19 april 2014, minova, drc) the conviction of the perpetrator is an important and necessary part of justice, but it is insufficient in itself. a woman-centred approach to justice for rape would look very different. the under-funding of woman-centred services is so chronic that one woman told us she was unable to complete an essential course of post-rape anti-hiv medication as the hospital supply was unable to keep pace with the rate of need: ‘when i went there they missed the medicine saying that we are too numerous.’ (27 year old woman, six children, 23 april 2014, bweremana, drc). the focus on prosecutions also serves to obscure the catastrophic impact that rape can have on a woman’s life. a woman’s emotional pain and loss of a sense of safety in the world, her low social status, poor marriageability, economic precarity, chronic illnesses such as hiv, or injuries such as fistulas or maiming sustained during the attack, her abandonment by her 136 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 husband or her becoming pregnant and then having a child born of rape are all excluded from the judicial process, yet it is precisely these issues that women in kenya, drc and uganda are raising in interviews. conclusion rape is a scourge with wide-reaching and lasting effects for its victims. it is undoubtedly a practice which needs concerted attention aimed at prevention, prosecution and healing for survivors. effective actions to end rape in war need to be based in multivariate understandings of the phenomenon, acknowledging the deep historical roots, contemporary power relations and social structures and contextualised critiques of rape’s function in specific conflicts. the prosecution of rape in war in some ways marks a radical departure from previous responses, but must also be scrutinised for inadvertent effects such as the potential for reinforcing unhelpful gendered ideals and its approach to rape in war as exceptional, thereby reinforcing a delinking from sexual violence in peace and from other types of violence that women experience. if rape, in both war and peace, is to be effectively addressed we require a radical restructuring of gender relations in society. women need to be freed from the burden of honour and recognised legally, politically and socially as autonomous rights bearing human beings in their own right. this task requires a more holistic approach engaging prosecutions, health, reparations, long term attitudinal change programs and community development approaches. references chesterman, s. 1997, ‘never again... and again: law, order, and the gender of war crimes in bosnia and beyond’, yale journal of international law, vol. 22, pp. 299 – 343 de ruiter, d. 2011, sexual offenses in international criminal law; cases and documents, international courts association, the hague. de vito, d. 2011, rape, torture and genocide; some theoretical implications, nova, new york eaton, s. 2004, ‘sierra leone: the proving ground for prosecuting rape as a war crime’ georgetown journal of international law, vol. 35, pp. 873-919 el-bushra, j. and mukarubuga, c. 1995, ‘women, war and transition’, gender and development, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 16-22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/741921866 fleshman, m. 2005, ‘tough un line on peacekeeper abuses. action initiated to end sexual misdeeds in peacekeeping missions’, africa renewal. 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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1461674032000165950 http://www.inprol.org/publications/prosecution-of-rape-as-a-war-crime http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijm036 http://dx.doi.org/10.2105/ajph.2010.300070 138 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 on gender, sustainable livelihoods, human rights and peace; 4 september4 october 2012, dhulikhel, nepal. shocken, c. 2002, ‘the special court for sierra leone: overview and recommendations’, berkley journal of international law, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 436 – 461. snyder, c., gabbard, w., may, d. and zulcic, n. 2006, ‘the battleground of women’s bodies: mass rape in bosnia-herzegovinia’, affilia, vol.21, pp. 184-195, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886109905286017 turano, l. 2011, ‘the gender dimension of transitional justice mechanisms’, international law and politics, vol. 45, pp. 1045-1047. un special rapporteur to the commission on human rights,1996， ‘report on the situation of human rights in rwanda’ (e/cn.4/1996/68) at para 16, available at: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/68-rwa.htm accessed 16 september 2014. williams, k. 2014, ‘conflicts profile: nanking’, women under siege project, available at: http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/nanking accessed 21 september 2014. wippman, d. 2006, ‘the costs of international justice’, the american journal of international law, vol. 100, no.4, pp. 861-881. yuval-davis, n. 1993, ‘gender and nation’, ethnic and racial studies, vol. 16, no.4, pp. 621632. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1993.9993800 http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0886109905286017 http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/68-rwa.htm http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/conflicts/profile/nanking http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1993.9993800 ending rape in war: how far have we come? abstract introduction why does rape happen? honour, nation and gender rape in international criminal law echoes of honour focus on certain types of sexual violence privileging of criminal justice over woman-centred recovery conclusion references 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia playing the triangle: cosmopolitanism, cultural capital and social capital as intersecting scholarly discourses about social inclusion and marginalisation in australian public policy debates1 andrew jakubowicz university of technology, sydney abstract a constant challenge for scholarly research relates to its impact on and integration into public policy. where the policy issues are ‘wicked’, as are those concerning intercultural relations and social cohesion, social science research often becomes implicated in real-world problem solving which occurs within everyday political manoeuvring. this paper takes three empirical problems, and three conceptual approaches, and explores what happens when they are pressed together. in particular the paper explores how together they can enhance the social value of the concept of ‘social inclusion’. cosmopolitanism has a myriad of possible definitions, but is perhaps best addressed in anthropological fashion, by trying to capture the space formed by its presumptive antagonists: nationalism, prejudice, localism, parochialism, and ‘rootedness’ (as in ‘rootless cosmopolitan’). cultural capital, as developed by bourdieu (1977, 1986), concerns a disposition of mind and body that empowers members of those particular groups that have the resource in socially–approved abundance to operate the cultural apparatus of a society and therefore the power system, to their mutual and individual benefit. social capital, removed of the vestiges of marxist class analysis that lurk in bourdieu’s explorations of education and social power, harks back to another sociological forebear, emile durkheim. durkheim's vision of modern societies saw them as being on the edge of incipient catastrophes resulting from anomie and alienation, unless they could renew and reinvigorate their "conscience collective". such a sense of the importance of collective solidarity has influenced, through the ideas about social systems developed by talcott parsons, the work of american robert putnam, whose leading australian disciple has titled his book on the theme of social capital, 'disconnected' (leigh 2011). having examined these concepts the article applies them sequentially to three cases of state/civil society relations, through (a) the february 2011 people of australia multiculturalism policy, (b) the place of young muslims in australian society, and (c) the place of chinese australians in the australian polity. finally it is argued that the concepts are most useful when they are applied to analyses that reveal rather than conceal hierarchies of social, cultural, economic and political power, through an examination of the possibilities of democratic inclusion. introduction at the height of the grip of multiculturalism on australia policy in the late 1980s, two senior scholars with an involvement in public policy on cultural diversity confronted one another over the future of that policy’s framework. stephen fitzgerald, former ambassador to china, polymath and diplomat, scholar and advisor to government, brought down a report on immigration and population to the immigration minister robert ray that argued ‘multiculturalism’ should be dropped as a descriptor and indeed a concept, with a policy orientation more based on cosmopolitanism to be adopted in its place (fitzgerald 1988). across the corridor as it were, peter shergold, former (and in 2011 once more) academic and economic historian, was sponsoring in his role as head of the prime minister bob hawke’s 1 i acknowledge the feedback and engagement from colleagues at the queensland academy of social sciences in australia symposium on cosmopolitanism in april 2011, and in the cosmopolitanism reading group in the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre at uts, in june 2011. http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 69 office of multicultural affairs, the development of a report on the future of multiculturalism that would advocate for a multiculturalism act, and the embedding of social justice as a key parameter of policy. shergold was to win that encounter, though not all elements of the battle it initiated, ambushing fitzgerald and leaving the coterie of fitgerald’s ministerial supporters undone (jakubowicz 2009b). while the politics are fascinating, more interesting are the theoretical domain assumptions about the social realm revealed by the stoush, and therefore the role of humanities and social science scholarship in informing the contesting deep structures of thought underpinning contemporary australian governmentality. this article is driven by an interest in how scholars conceptualise the social, and how reflexively aware they are of this process. it is also driven by a concern that the proliferation of social theories about these issues reflects, as one nameless public servant once put it to the author, the emphasis on the post-hoc rationalisation conveyed by the ironic terminology ‘policy-driven evidence’, rather than the reverse where theoretically-inflected and carefully considered work on researching social problems produces well-weighed evidence for the pathways of policy chosen. nowhere has the confusion about policy and its engagement and resolution of social problems identified by both scholars and public debate been more apparent than in the field of cultural diversity relations. the production of knowledge in the social sciences occurs within a political economy that reflects in many ways the wider social context; as intellectuals, academics are located within a competitive market-driven environment where increasingly their reputation (the major economic resource and the central component of academics’ cultural capital) fashions life opportunities. research occurs in a ‘real-world’ setting, where pressures towards conformity of thought and deed interact with the opportunities offered for innovation and experiment. in recent research projects, i have been drawn to use three conceptual ‘thought-nodes’ to explore empirical dimensions of australian diversity. colleagues at the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre at the university of technology sydney have been developing research conversations around the use and value of ‘cosmopolitanism’ as an analytical framework. my research in this regard relates to the experience of wartime refugees from europe residing in the cosmopolitan city of shanghai (jakubowicz 2009a) and also in relation to the fitzgerald/shergold contest discussed above about multicultural policy (jakubowicz 2009b). in contracted government research drawing on a requirement to use a methodology 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 including a social ecology approach, our research team has adopted/ adapted pierre bourdieu’s (1977) idea of cultural capital to analyse the situation of and appropriate policy responses to the knowledge cloud enshrouding/ engulfing/ empowering/ constraining young australian muslims (jakubowicz, collins and chafic 2011, collins et al. 2011). one implicit dimension of the values/practices question raised in this research points to cosmopolitanism as a ‘repertoire of values’ captured by the idea of ‘disposition’ developed by bourdieu. in addition, both these concepts, and the idea of social capital borrowed from putnam (1995, 2007), have been applied to exploring the chinese dimension of australian politics and diversity (jakubowicz 2011a, 2011b). are the social relations being analysed only called into existence by voicing them within particular theoretical parameters? is there a ‘social something’ that cosmopolitanism, cultural capital, and social capital each illuminate from their own trajectory? that is what i am seeking to discover. given the importance of systemic models of the social realm, the policy debates with which i am concerned inevitably are framed by discussions of social inclusion, social cohesion and social marginalisation. the big ‘c’, cosmopolitanism, with its huge literature and range of perspectives, provides the first portal into this problem. cosmopolitanism: analytical, empirical, philosophical, ethical? cosmopolitan(ism) has multiple intellectual forebears and has ‘form’ in many different contexts. in the same way we may distinguish between ‘multicultural’ as a descriptive term referring to a multiplicity of cultural groups within a society, and ‘multiculturalism’ as variously a political program and a philosophy of social relations, so cosmopolitan also needs to be separated into its different conceptual elements. cosmopolitan can refer adjectively to a society, and to a perspective on the world, and as a noun to people who adopt such worldviews, or indeed live in such societies. cosmopolitanism refers however to a philosophical or ideological take on the form of social relations suited for a complex and culturally diverse society or world. the distinction between multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism lies in exactly those unspoken values at the heart of the shergold/ fitzgerald dispute described above. the distinction emerges partly dialogically, as a consequence of the clash of domain assumptions of the protagonists about the nature of the social, and partly politically through the institutional interests that they are seeking to advance, defend, or attack. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 71 ulrich beck, a european advocate of cosmopolitanism, in his discussion of the desirability of a ‘new cosmopolitanism’ (beck 2007 : http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html) offers (in a slight parody of nineteenth century german philosophy via marx’s theses of feuerbach) seven theses against global capital. he proposes that we can only understand the global inter-relatedness of societies and peoples from a ‘cosmopolitan perspective’, the adoption of which he describes as ‘cosmopolitanisation’ (beck 2002). this perspective arises from the ‘erosion of distinct boundaries dividing markets, states, civilizations, cultures, and not least of all the lifeworlds of different peoples’; it occurs inside societies in the mundanity of the everyday (and is echoed in a different key in the idea of ‘everyday’ multiculturalism). furthermore, “it is a question of inverting marx's basic idea: it is not that being determines consciousness, but instead that consciousness maximizes new possibilities for action (cosmopolitan perspective)”. beck goes on to summarise his sense of the distinctiveness of the cosmopolitan from the multicultural: multiculturalism… means that various ethnic groups live side by side within a single state. while tolerance means acceptance, even when it goes against the grain, putting up with difference as an unavoidable burden. cosmopolitan tolerance, on the other hand, is more than that. it is neither defensive nor passive, but instead active: it means opening oneself up to the world of the other, perceiving difference as an enrichment, regarding and treating the other as fundamentally equal (beck 2007). this setting of multicultural against cosmopolitan, with the former portrayed as essentially a minority-sought apartheid versus the latter’s ostensible vision of an inclusive engagement with cultural diversity, marks the heartland of the european policy debate. multiculturalism’s opponents are in evidence most vividly in the ‘multikulti ist tot’ soliloquy from germany’s chancellor angela merkel, the distancing of british official discourse under the prime minister david cameron, and other moves in holland, denmark and france towards a more monocultural vision of cohesion (jakubowicz 2011b). beck voices as it were an anti-capitalist version of the pro-capitalist policy position of the european leaders. however opposition in europe to multiculturalism does not necessitate support for cosmopolitanism, which may meet equally rancorous opposition. http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� http://www.signandsight.com/service/1603.html� 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 australian scholarly discussion and research on cosmopolitanism has demonstrated the complexity of the term, including its potential to be seen as ideologically neutral and analytical, rather than programmatic. both woodward skrbis and bean (2008) and phillips and smith (2008) have sought to operationalise cosmopolitanism as a set of specific values, beliefs, attitudes and practices (qua bourdieu’s ‘disposition of mind and body’, one of three dimensions of cultural capital). woodward et al. have used the 2004 australian election study to problematise the relationship between cosmopolitanism and globalisation. they find that there are at least three types of ‘cosmopolitanness’ in australian society, each factor cluster being associated with different (though somewhat overlapping) social groupings. the first cosmopolitanism, ‘consumptive’, refers to the appropriation of the cultural objects of the other for one’s own use (especially cuisine and tourism); in australia an overwhelming majority of people are happy to do this. the second, economic cosmopolitanism, appears less evident where people are less comfortable with the endorsement of neo-liberal movements of people thought of as ‘human capital’. they do not so readily accept the alleged benefits of economic globalisation, even where they are strong consumers of ‘ethnic’ food, music and other cultural artefacts. thirdly, a significant group sees globalisation as having strong human rights benefits, facilitating the spread of cosmopolitan human values. the authors also explored the demographic predictors of support for cosmopolitan values. economic cosmopolitanism was more likely to be supported by younger than older people; more by managers, less by professionals; more by protestants, less by other or no religions; more by non-anglo immigrants, less by australian born. in relation to global rights, stronger support is evident among the young, women, and non-anglo immigrants. concluding the study, the authors suggest that “cosmopolitan outlooks develop from the expression of universal sentiments to which most in the globalizing world have access, but they are also ruptured and skewed by the peculiarities of discourses within the nation” (2008, p.224): that is, there can be no singular universal cosmopolitanism, just variegated national ways of orienting oneself to the world from within a cosmopolitan frame of mind. while woodward et al. (2008) interrogate the attitudes and values involved in cosmopolitan dispositions, phillips and smith (2008) ask how might such values (conceived of as an ‘outlook’) link into what could be seen as cosmopolitan practices. their practice indices include visits overseas, long-distance conversations overseas, friends outside australia, hours cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 73 of daily internet use, and watching sbs television (the national multicultural broadcaster). outlook was tested by asking respondents to place themselves on a social distance scale in relation to indian, greek, aboriginal, lebanese and vietnamese australians. the authors concluded that their respondents were high on cosmopolitan outlook, but their practice was significantly lower; however they argued that if you were high or medium on practice, you were very much more likely to hold to a strong cosmopolitan outlook. in addition, cosmopolitan outlooks were more likely among people who were non-religious, welleducated, and younger (and they of course would be more likely to ‘practice’ cosmopolitanism). the third dimension of cosmopolitanism identified by woodward et al. (2008) , manifested through the ideas associated with human rights, has become the most problematic in relation to multiculturalism (the latter of course otherwise sits comfortably with consumption of diversity, and neo-liberal economic and labour market policies). human rights are generally thought of as universal; that is, independent of any specific culture (though they have been contested especially by china and malaysia as being from a western, neo-colonial and culturally biased perspective). to what extent, we might ask, does cosmopolitanism go beyond recognising other cultures as ‘fundamentally equal’, to accepting cultural difference as a legitimate basis for refusing to apply general human rights criteria? that is, how does the universal perspective of cosmopolitanism deal with cultural approaches which express values that contradict common (western or global?) standards of human rights? fitzgerald’s critique of multiculturalism was that it did in fact permit if not legitimize cultural differences that were in conflict with human rights; he held that universal human rights trumped multiculturalism’s cultural relativism, and thus multiculturalism should no longer hold dominance as an ideology of egalitarian inclusion (a task at which he suggested it had in fact failed). shergold’s defence of multiculturalism was predicated on a framework that took fundamental human rights for granted as the sine qua non of australian democracy. fitzgerald’s cosmopolitanism promoted the need for wide societal acceptance of the value of diversity and appreciation of different civilisation histories, while foregrounding angloaustralian mores as the bedrock of the society (in that these values were indeed what made it possible to be cosmopolitan). his recommendations for australia’s immigration program proposed it should be based on a ‘points system’ that privileged immigrants with cultural capital that accorded with mainstream views of australian society, and the needs of the 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 australian economy. shergold might well have argued that cultural integrity would be dissolved if multicultural norms were not asserted; the focus here would be on retaining and enhancing family reunion. it is important to acknowledge that neither actor advocated assimilationism, both accepting the importance of social dynamics that should integrate immigrants into the ‘democratic civility’ of australian society. essentially if we unpack their discourses and use them together to interpret the scene, it appears that multiculturalism as a policy and set of practices protects ethno-cultural groups from the destruction of their cultural institutions brought about through temporal erosion or active host-society assimilation policies, through permitting and facilitating but not requiring a trans-generational inculcation of ethno-cultural mores. cosmopolitanism sees no particular value in such interventions, but does see the inculcation of reciprocal recognition and respect within and between ethnocultural groups through their trans-cultural endorsement of human rights as a critical social cohesion feature of societies caught up in the irresistible dynamic of globalisation. in (my) summary, for fitzgerald, the multiculturalists were self-serving rent-seekers uncaring about social cohesion; for shergold, the cosmopolitans were anglophile elites bent on forcing australian diversity into something quite limited and suited to their aesthetic sensibilities to sustain their power and resist the threats of diversity to their hegemony over political, cultural and social power. this brings us directly to the concept of ‘cultural capital’ and its infusion of the debate about inclusion with questions of power, interest, and super-ordination. cultural capital: a disposition of mind and body, and the power to do something about it the concept of cultural capital, drawn from the work of social philosopher pierre bourdieu, reflects the sense of ‘investment’ and the associated cultural ‘goods’ that enable social mobility and access to power within a society. bourdieu refers to cultural capital having three dimensions, namely the embodied state of long lasting dispositions of the mind and the body, secondly the cultural objects that ‘objectify’ a society’s cultural value, and thirdly an institutionalised context where society rewards some forms of cultural capital while ignoring or de-legitimating others (bourdieu 1986). cultural capital represents the objectified forms of cultural production, the ‘store of cultural value’ built up within an ethno-cultural group over time, circulated and transmitted inter-generationally through socialisation and education. it includes social knowledge, and the instruments to sustain and communicate that knowledge. one manifestation of cultural capital must surely be found in the ‘perspective’, world-view or cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 75 weltanschauung that individuals and groups bring to bear on identifying, interpreting and understanding their world. for immigrant communities, the acquisition of new cultural capital necessary to gain purchase on their new world has to be accommodated within the cultural frameworks they carry with them from their previous lives. some sub-cultures and class-based cultural repertoires, especially those associated with super-ordinate social classes or strata, are more experienced or better-oriented to do this than others. the capacity to ‘open oneself up to the world of the other’ and appreciate the equality of the other’s culture requires a particular enabling ‘long-lasting disposition of mind’, that is, a particular fragment of cultural capital, though the conditions of its possibility may be carried in other fragments (eg englishlanguage skills). the process of immigration, settlement and integration requires both that one have this pre-existing disposition of self-opening, and also the capacity to modify other pre-existing dispositions and internalise new ones. now it may be argued that voluntary emigrants from a society are exactly those people who have already such an incipient disposition, indeed that the disposition is one of the drivers for emigration. migrants then may well be the groups in a society with the most pre-wired fragments of cultural capital in relation to bearing a cosmopolitan perspective, both because their mundane lives are already interwoven with the realities of ‘internal globalisation’, and because they have decided to some extent to move social worlds, even if choosing to buffer the necessity of choice by seeking to reside in communities and neighbourhoods of like-minded people from their cultural location of origin. however such an optimistic reading needs to be offset by examining to what extent other elements of their cultural capital interpret their new world as one to which they wish to become ‘open’. indeed the response to the immigrants’ arrival, by the various fragments of the receiving society, will demonstrate how and to what extent the cultural capital the immigrant brings is valorised in the receiving society, by whom, and with what implications. a particularly apposite example can be found in the processes through which ‘overseas’ qualifications are recognised or rejected; these qualifications represent enormously significant stores of personal cultural capital, the value of which is heavily dependent on whether they are acknowledged to have cultural currency in the new society. christina ho (2004) points to the importance of qualification recognition by the host society in the settlement experience of skilled women immigrants from china and hong kong; the latter 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 were far more advantaged by three factors – they were english speaking/writing; they had experience of working within western capitalist enterprises; and their qualifications were far more readily acceptable (indeed they sometimes simply transferred into australian jobs with multi-national corporations for whom they had worked in hong kong). some of this debate has been foreshadowed by ghassan hage’s examination of the fitzgerald report and his construction of the term ‘cosmo-multiculturalism’ (2003) (i would argue a mis-reading of fitzgerald) and the critique of this reading by scott brook (2008). however i want to think about how cosmopolitanism as a fragment of cultural capital might be understood in different segments of australian society; how it might be acquired, and what import it delivers to individuals and groups competing for access to wider social power (and the capacity thereby to have greater control over their life chances). i return to an application of this approach below, but first set out the logics associated with the ‘social capital’ approach. social capital: the production of trust and the (social and theoretical) problem of social cohesion the social cohesion and social inclusion discourses come from a rather different spaces in the sociology of social policy, though the terms have slipped effortlessly and often confusingly into popular debate. the australian parliament’s joint migration committee inquiry into migration and multiculturalism (2010-2012) opens with a question about the optimal relationship between multicultural and social inclusion policies. melbourne’s scanlon foundation has pumped significant funds into the monash research project on social cohesion, whose director andrew markus has argued that the trend line in social cohesion was continuing to rise through 2007 to 2009, but dropped dramatically in the period 2009 to 2010. the scanlon work derives its questions from the literature on social capital, evident in this comment by markus: the 2010 poll registered change across indicators of rejection and social justice. those in agreement with the proposition that ‘most people can be trusted’ fell from 55 per cent to 45 per cent. those who reported involvement in ‘unpaid voluntary work’, which was defined in the survey as ‘any unpaid help you give to the community in which you live, or to an organisation or group to which you belong’, fell from 38 per cent to 32 per cent (markus 2011). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 77 the key operational elements of social capital theory – trust and volunteering are drawn from the work of robert putnam (e.g. 1995, 2007; portes 1998). given that bourdieu also uses the concept of social capital, it is worth sorting out how the term can be distinguished in the approaches of these french and us scholars. siisiäinen (2000) points to the underlying sociological domain assumptions that shape their arguments. bourdieu uses ‘social capital’ as one dimension of a tri-partite model of capital: cultural (as above), economic and social. in a sense bourdieu refashions weber’s ideas to position social capital as the resource base for the realm of political conflict and social dominance and resistance. putnam comes out an american pluralist tradition, affected by parsonian models of consensus and social integration, drawing ultimate inspiration from durkheim. for him social capital is built through supportive interactions, creating bonding capital within groups, and bridging capital between them. for putnam, both are necessary – too little bonding capital and people become isolated and marginal; too little bridging capital and groups become separated and even potentially conflictual. social capital that strengthens society does so through producing trust between people and groups as one of its outcomes; such a trust-rich society would be one with high levels of social cohesion, in which the population were included effectively in the material and non-material rewards of participation and sociability. social inclusion (as developed in australian government social policy discourses such as on http://www.socialinclusion.gov.au) sounds like social cohesion, but in fact seems to be about some other problem; in practice it refers to groups and individuals who do not appear to possess adequate or the ‘right’ range or type of cultural capital (education, world views, saleable skills, emotional flexibility, focus on employability etc.) for autonomous survival in contemporary neo-liberal capitalist australia, thereby failing to flourish. frustration with the failure of the government’s social inclusion strategy (pm gillard was social inclusion minister for 3 years) seems to be a driver for renewed government discourses about hard work and contributing to society, echoed in uk pm cameron’s castigation of immigrants as welfare system abusers. so the decline in social capital, in this logic, can be attributed to the inadequacy of cultural capital of those marginalized in the broader economic system. why is the cultural capital inadequate? for cameron it is a consequence of immigrant cultures (read muslim). for gillard it appears to be lack of self-discipline. in both cases one can deduce an anxiety that social cohesion (read the social order in bourdieu’s terms) is threatened by those http://www.socialinclusion.gov.au/� 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 who have insufficient social responsibility, that is, insufficient willingness to see themselves as part of a wider society, incapable of ‘opening themselves up to the other’ where the other are those who are empowered by their cultural capital, and effectively control the range of social capital validated by the political system. the triangle applied 1: policy given my theorisation of the relation between the master concepts (‘the triangle’), i now want to bring them together as tools to reflect on three empirical problems. these problems reflect distinctive research contexts, employing different methodologies, but illuminated by the triangle’s glow. the following diagram points to the problematic space of ‘democratic inclusion’, that seems to be the area where the concepts compete for purchase and explanatory power. by democratic inclusion i mean a space of respectful interaction among equally-valued citizens, in which both rights and responsibilities are broadly shared and understood, and in which reciprocity underpins social interactions (honneth 1995). the venn diagram refers to social spaces claimed in the different theoretical discourses discussed above, which overlap in terms of practices they claim to explain and/or control. the diagram thus refers to a theory/governance relationship, and thus becomes an expression of modes of governmentality. the overlap between them all, i suggest, can best be captured through the idea of ‘democratic inclusion’; ‘democratic’ because it can be approached for all society’s members through processes of political participation, ‘inclusion’ as it interprets society as a complex system of interacting and interdependent often unequal relationships, that can be more equitably resolved though processes that foreground reciprocity of recognition of the other’s legitimacy (honneth 1995; deranty and renault 2007). a public policy that ostensibly seeks to advance democratic inclusion offers a useful starting point. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 79 the announcement of a national multicultural policy in february 2011 by immigration minister chris bowen (bowen 2011) at the conservative sydney institute took outsiders to the machinations of government somewhat unawares (though the policy histories have been well documented by roth 2007 and koleth 2010.) the australian multicultural advisory council 2010 report to the government ‘the people of australia’ had asserted the need for national leadership and an anti-racism strategy but had not supported submissions to it to resurrect the 1989 push for a multiculturalism act, nor the re-establishment of a national research and policy institution, nor the re-affirmation of social justice (the pillars of the shergold strategy of 1989/90 discussed above). its recommendations were not part of the alp’s 2010 election platform, while after the election the title of multicultural affairs had been stripped from the relevant parliamentary secretary. however the february announcement which essentially accepted the amac report and gave it some shape, reinstated the multicultural affairs label, gave particular acknowledgement to the role of the federation of ethnic communities councils of australia’s (fecca) ‘reclaim multiculturalism’ campaign, and made a direct comment about the inappropriate policy positions taken by the rejectionist europeans. the policy document printed and circulated in april 2011 gives us a ‘text’ to examine (gwenda tavan offered a first summary and critique of the document on the conversation at http://theconversation.edu.au/articles/why-chrisbowen-isnt-afraid-of-multiculturalism-but-others-are-1043). what does the policy tell us about cosmopolitanisation in australia? to what extent does the policy recognise the ‘opening self to other’ standpoint, or the nature or social benefit of a cosmopolitan perspective on the world? how have ideas about cultural and social capital been referenced in the policy? to begin, this multicultural policy asserts its goals of cultural diversity. whatever these diverse cultures are, they remain apparently unchanged and unchanging. there is no suggestion of wider cultural change as a result of cultural interaction; rather it ‘allows those who choose to call australia home the right to practise and share in (emphasis added) their cultural traditions and languages’. the preposition ‘in’ gives it away: it is not about sharing their cultures with other people, but rather remaining within their cultural frame of choice, constrained only by the national legal framework. on the other hand, diverse cultural 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hierarchy of cultural capital expressed in the policy, cultural minorities have to subordinate their values to those of the wider society as expressed through the legal structures. thus anything that is not forbidden is permitted: the heartland of liberal democratic theory. the model is designed to reassert the cultural capital enshrined in the dominant social mores. multicultural grants are now to be targeted to ‘multicultural arts and festivals’, possibly away from the previous focus on de-radicalisation of muslim youth. multicultural arts ‘encourage social cohesion and mutual understanding’, to be achieved through community groups expressing ‘their cultural heritages and traditions’. while the rhetoric remains that ‘multiculturalism is for all australians’, the practice appears to be ethnic community-focused. it is only when we come to the new anti-racism partnerships in which we find a strategy that asserts a zero-tolerance position on racism and discrimination, that a denser sense of social theory is discernible. here we begin to see the influence of social capital theory, with an emphasis on expanding networks, enhancing leadership capacity, and developing and implementing strategy. the concern to build the influence of anti-racism perspectives as part of social change in australia suggests an awareness that robust cultural capital would necessarily underpin such as strategy. so where are the problem areas from the perspectives we are exploring here? firstly discussion of power is notably absent, especially cultural power. cultural power in australia draws on education, institutional leverage, ‘national legal framework’, english language skills, and elite cultural networks. in each case the policy remains silent; no legislative rights framework (ie national legal framework) for advancing cultural diversity, no national language policy, no mention of longer-term resources for english language acquisition, nothing about the role of the media, no strategy for ensuring that input into the multitude of government advisory bodies reflects the diversity of the society, no rescission of australia’s reservation (on the criminalisation of race hate) on the international convention of the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (icerd) article 4, and no knowledge creation strategy that places cultural diversity within the national curriculum and at the heart of policy collaborative development. instead we get a solitary focus on bridging social cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 81 capital, to be carried forward by the australian sports commission in the arena of youth sports, a ‘proven strategy to build social and community cohesion’ (though no evidence or proof is offered in support). drawing together the point of intersection of cosmopolitan, cultural and social capital theories does throw useful analytic light on the missing link in the policy, namely the lack of concept and investment in democratising cultural capital and empowering processes of reciprocity and ‘opening up to the other’. the core culture (always conceived of as a singular entity rather than riven with contradictions, sub-cultural permutations and geo-class differences) need not change, merely desist from responding in racist and discriminatory ways to groups who are free to follow their own cultural forms (that is, nurture their own cultural capital), unless these breach the law. the triangle applied 2: social ecology introducing his recent edited essay collection on muslims in australia, philosopher raymond gaita writes: the response to muslims after september 11 would not have been the same if most muslims were white. fear of them tapped into a strain of australian racism that runs deep….nothing, indeed, goes deep with ‘them’ as it does with ‘us’. that is what makes them ‘them’, and the fact we are not like them, makes us ‘us’ (gaita 2011, p.15-16). my research group at uts tendered for and was successful in securing a contract from the australian government department of immigration and citizenship (diac) for a project on the influences on muslim youth, to be conducted within a framework of social ecology. none of us, or indeed the department by the time we began the project in 2009, was exactly sure why the social ecology approach was required, and what specific advantage might flow to the national action plan from insights it generated. however it became clearer as the project developed that social ecology, which locates social actors in an ever-expanding set of layers of influences and interactions, would become critical, especially where effective program interventions would need to be salient and compelling for the people addressed. social ecology can best be understood as a metaphorical device that connects the global to the local, to the intimate spheres of experience and influence on people’s lives, attitudes and practices. 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 this project along with maybe a dozen or more over the previous few years, had been funded by a budget tranche that was a consequence of two major politically paradigmatic events – the cronulla riots of 2005, and the london ‘home grown’ bombings of 2007 (http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/). the howard government carried out a national consultation with muslim leaders and representatives in 2006, which exposed the dearth of information about the lived experience of australia’s diverse muslim communities, and the by-passing of their needs by government programs. in addition the national living in harmony funding program had been pointed towards inter-faith projects, and then tightened to focus on the de-radicalisation of muslim youth and their integration into the australian mainstream. by the time the alp took control of the portfolio under laurie ferguson as parliamentary secretary in 2007, diac’s multicultural affairs section was working closely with the australian federal police (afp), the australian security intelligence organisation (asio) and the department of the attorney general (ag) on a broad approach to identifying, de-mobilising and diverting potential participants in muslim jihadism in australia. two competing administrative philosophies were in place in the same space; that of anti-discrimination and social integration of young muslims, and that of surveillance and incarceration, described in the uk as the tension between programs labelled ‘community cohesion’ and ‘prevent’ (husband and alam 2011). social ecology as we began to elaborate it, gave us the opportunity to explore the sociocultural worlds of young australian ‘muslims’ (a term requiring deconstruction as it refers to belief, ritual behaviours, identity, labelling, and social relationships). increasingly we returned to the value of bourdieu’s ‘cultural capital’ to analyse the issues we were seeing. if integration, the catch cry in policy, refers within this theoretical space to the acquisition of social mores, world views and public behaviours that ‘lock into’ pre-existing mores in the non-muslim world, then we were in fact exploring the constitution of cultural capital and its investment, circulation and expenditure in multiple layers of association. this is not the place to report the results of this research (see jakubowicz, collins and chafic 2011) but rather to reflect on the analytical purchase of the concept of cultural capital in such a poly-religious and multi-ethnic society as australia. our research used two main methods – a survey of 300 or so young muslims (all in situations where espousal of religious identity would be a taken-for-granted reason for being there – eid il fitr celebrations and muslim schools) and extensive focus groups with gatekeepers (from http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 83 youth workers to musicians), professionals, and specific groups of young muslims from different ethno-national backgrounds in sydney, melbourne and darwin, with a few individual deeper interviews. the vast majority of youth surveyed were australian born, the majority from lebanese families. they were in general well-educated, and overwhelmingly reported pious life styles. to capture the dynamics through which cultural capital was acquired and elaborated, we explored a range of influences. who were their role models? to whom did they turn for advice – family, friends, religious advisors, the internet/media? what web sites did they use, and what media did they consume? did they have facebook or bebo pages? did they belong to muslim or non-muslim organisations or both or neither? what had been their experience of discrimination and where had this occurred? how diverse were their friendship networks? how did they manage interaction with non-muslim friends in situations that might challenge muslim mores (eg serving alcohol, non-halal food)? did they identify as muslim, australian, or muslimaustralian? our focus group panels took us through comedy and film, the outer-edges of muslim youth culture and to the challenges of orthodoxy, interpretation and creativity. what musical instruments were halal, which haram, and why? for those who were sufis, how comfortable were they where other muslims might be salafist? for young people with gender identity questions, how were these managed? what about mental health issues and community approaches? how would they rank values (drawn from the world values survey)? the research was complex, fascinating, and intellectually challenging, as we were writing to a government agenda, one that was changing but which had as its distant backstop an alert for anything that might cause public concern and outrage against the minister. moreover it became increasingly clear to us that muslim youth were diverse, contextually responsive, sub-culturally involved and quite socially engaged (as the majority were attending muslim schools, many took part in community-related activities whether directly or through mosque-based groups). in our sample, as might be expected, social and moral views were conservative, with high personal aspirations. the young people expressed strong awareness of the marginalizing processes impacting on them from the wider society, especially the media. many had experienced discrimination in the public education system, in public places and at work. muslim schools represented a far safer if socially constrained 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 space; they instilled pride in islamic cultural and history, and a strong affirmation to be treated as equally australian. their cultural capital can be seen as a constantly evolving stock of skills and understandings that emerge from an interaction between their ‘australian’ worlds, and their ethno-religious one. in that process they have to manage the sustained barrage of what they perceive as mainstream ‘delegitimation’ of their cultural capital (effectively reducing its ‘currency’); for some this means they pro-actively press themselves into situations where they can demonstrate a muslim-inflected australian modernity, for others it creates barriers from which they retreat into ethno-religious enclaves, for others still it contributes to isolation, alienation and bitterness. the inter-active dynamic to which gaita refers above, in which islam is racialised and visual racial difference becomes synonymous with religion, feeds the process of legitimating and delegitimating the cultural capital that young muslims share. are young muslims more or less likely to hold to a cosmopolitan perspective, given islam is both more world-encompassing than any individual national identification, though not necessarily ‘inclusive’ of non-muslims? are they, because of their intimate immersion in both muslim and non-muslim social worlds, better attuned to opening up the self to the other? does their awareness of a global islamic ummah of which they are a part, reduce their feelings of nationalism and identification with the australian state? on the other hand, does their association with islam reduce their capacity or willingness to engage outside-thefaith communities as other than combatants (intellectual rather than terrorist)? do they express a reciprocal respect for those who are ethno-culturally different from them, or do they hold to a binary divide between muslim and infidel/non-believer? muslim communities make serious investments in the building of social capital, developing internal relations of trust, in the face of a distrustful external environment. it is not surprising therefore that bonding capital measures turn up very high scores for muslim youth; muslim organisational membership, volunteering in community enterprises, coaching younger children in religious classes at mosques, and raising funds for muslim charities are some examples. while putnam may see social capital dissolving in advanced capitalist societies such as the us, expressed through the decline in voluntary organisation membership and volunteering, the opposite seems to be occurring among the subjects in our research in relation to bonding within communities. however bridging social capital is far harder to find, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 85 though inter-faith groups and participation in non-muslim organisations are still apparent. the process of constituting bonding social capital seems to increase the legitimation and deepens the community focus of cultural capital. as nsw noticed in the march 2011 state election, the entry of muslim young leaders into the liberal party and their empathy with its conservative moral program swung a substantial part of the muslim community towards the coalition, delivering (along with the chinese vote) a swag of unanticipated victories to the party in sydney’s western and south western suburban so-called green crescent. chinese and muslim/arab localities abut and indeed overlap in suburban sydney. we turn now to the chinese communities of australia, especially those engaged in local and state politics in nsw. the epicentre of the chinese communities has become ashfield, with its main street sometimes stereotyped as ‘little shanghai’ (wise 2005). triangle applied 3: the chinese in australian politics pan ling writes, in 1982, nostalgically reflecting on the shanghai of pre-1949: shanghai was cosmopolitan. there were really two shanghais – the foreign and the indigenous. early european visitors to the city often remarked that shanghai was not chinese…for millions of chinese, its name was synonymous with trendiness… for it was, to the popular chinese mind, the capital of style (pan 1982/1991, pp. 3,5). i have had a lifelong fascination with shanghai, where my refugee family survived the holocaust. my parents crept into australia through a small window opened in 1946 by then immigration minister arthur calwell, before he capitulated to anti-semitism in post-war australia, while also embarking on his ex-fenestration of chinese refugees who had found haven in wartime australia. my parents’ stories were full of adventure and excitement, interspersed with the sudden silences of survivors when they caught themselves thinking of those who had perished (jakubowicz 2009a). my parents would fit many of the positive and negative definitions of cosmopolitan. they were children of a secular jewish generation growing up between the wars in the new nation of poland, living a bourgeois educated lifestyle in one of the country’s great industrial cities. my father’s family spoke german, russian and polish, and he was educated in vienna at the fachhochschule that today still carries an early twentieth century carving of an australian 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 aboriginal face (among other global peoples) on its pediment. as an adult he spoke english, french, yiddish and the other languages; he was trained in the global language of mathematics, and worked as an accountant. my mother was educated in warsaw in political economy, and suffered under the anti-semitic fascist taunts of the polish endeks (national democracy party) who would become infamous as collaborators with the nazis after 1939. she then became production manager on a polish newspaper in her hometown of lodz, also speaking french, russian, english and german. for hitler they were asiatic jews, for stalin rootless cosmopolitans, for the japanese who interned them in shanghai, stateless émigrés, and for the australian government suspect aliens of the hebrew faith. this all by way of a slight detour, better covered in my website ‘the menorah of fang bang lu’ (http://research.hss.uts.edu.au/shanghaisite). by happenstance, in 2008 i took up a new position at the university of technology, sydney as head of the social and political change academic group, which incorporated the china research centre (crc). in 2010 with two crc colleagues and prompted by the remarkable research into brisbane’s chinese politics of jen tsen kwok, my research assistant on the queensland leg of making multicultural australia (http://multiculturalaustralia.edu.au), we developed an (unsuccessful) arc application. this then led to an academic conference and community symposium on the chinese in australia politics in september 2010 (http://cosmopolitancivilsocieties.com/nodes/mcdara/chinpol/ and http://vimeo.com/17991025 ), and a couple of research papers scoping the issues raised for australian multiculturalism by the chinese presence (jakubowicz 2011a, b). my thesis is that the contemporary chinese ‘moment’ represents the first time australia (since the original british settlement and expansion) has experienced a large population component that is drawn from a major trading partner, so that both the australian economy and society are significantly affected. multiculturalism was never designed to address such a situation, so the policy and the residual racism that continues to penetrate and undermine it (also evident with indians) thus counter-productively erodes the australian national project. as the quote from pan suggests and my family story implies, immigrants carry a potential for ‘cosmopolitanism’ as part of their arrival baggage. this potential requires that certain conditions be activated, associated in turn with their ethno-cultural group, their class and capacities for operating in an urban capitalist environment, their historic experiences and the receiving society, in order for them to flourish after arrival. http://research.hss.uts.edu.au/shanghaisite� http://research.hss.uts.edu.au/shanghaisite� http://research.hss.uts.edu.au/shanghaisite� http://research.hss.uts.edu.au/shanghaisite� http://research.hss.uts.edu.au/shanghaisite� http://research.hss.uts.edu.au/shanghaisite� http://research.hss.uts.edu.au/shanghaisite� 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to ethno-nationalism as its dominant ideology and strategy for regime survival, suggests that the earlier prc immigrants (for instance the june 4 1989 movement tiananmen escapees) may well have had a more cosmopolitan perspective (with their insistence on universal human rights and democratic reforms) than more recent arrivals socialised under the han empire ideology guided by premier wen jiabao. but the prc while dominant is not the only source of chinese populations. as kwok (2008, 2011) has demonstrated for brisbane, the tension between the three arcs of chinese immigration – cantonese/hong kong, mandarin/prc and taiwanese – emerges from political, cultural, demographic and economic competition. often it is expressed in the need for interpreters (mandarin/english/cantonese) at pan-chinese meetings. the formal participation of chinese in australia electoral politics is fairly low given their population size; on the other hand chinese-linked entities and individuals are overrepresented among registered large donors to political parties (jakubowicz 2011a). one argument has been that their direct political participation reflects a generational issue, with first generation immigrants focussed on putting down economic roots; only later (as for the greeks and italians) do they become active in parliamentary politics, usually through the australian-educated second and third generation. even so chinese australians have gained representation (usually at state level) in periods when race-politics were more salient, especially during the hanson/one nation ascendancy in the decade after 1996. during that time in nsw the anti-hanson unity party elected dr peter wong to the upper house, while liberal party upper house mp helen sham ho left the liberal party and sat as an independent. in victoria chén zhībīn was elected to the senate for the liberal party (19992005) winning pre-selection against an incumbent, then losing it next time around. that is, the chinese were most likely to be successful when the wider social sentiment was more selfconsciously cosmopolitan (paradoxically perhaps if hanson’s ascendancy is our touchstone). the september 2010 chinese in politics symposium (http://vimeo.com/17991025 at 18 min http://vimeo.com/17991025� http://vimeo.com/17991025� http://vimeo.com/17991025� http://vimeo.com/17991025� http://vimeo.com/17991025� http://vimeo.com/17991025� 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 30 sec) heard from dr wong, who complained about the disappearance of chinese politicians from australian public life. in response a group of younger politicians (in local government) argued that they were now building political careers that were inter-ethnic, suggesting that the cosmopolitan perspective had changed somewhat, to accommodate to a culturally-diverse australia. furthermore this cosmopolitanisation in certain areas of sydney and melbourne (and brisbane), complemented by the building of new hybrid chinese-australian cultural capital, was increasingly demonstrated in the evolution of bridging social capital between chinese and other ethno-cultural groups. we can discern that cultural capital necessary for successful migration and settlement, especially in a diasporic flow that maintains strong links and even opportunities for residence in countries of origin, can be delineated as follows: • access to and possession of globally transferable skills and knowledge suitable to advanced economies • class-related capacities to operate in an economic system that assumes capitalist economic relations, and corporate modes of thinking and working • aspiration for globally-relevant ‘cosmopolitan’ virtues, including education, high-culture, multi-lingualism and professional career ambitions • language skills relevant to the settlement society • knowledge of ethno-community resources • capacity to mobilise the economic potential of kin and ethno-cultural community networks. while not all of these factors are necessary in every case, they do point to the interaction of cosmopolitan perspectives, cultural capital and social capital (especially trust-based bonding capital and access to bridging social capital), both as useful theoretical tools, and as practical expressions of lived reality. they may also help to explain why chinese has been hailed as a critical language for australia’s economic and regional future in the national government’s language policy paper (http://www.deewr.gov.au/schooling/nalssp/pages/default.aspx), but arabic has not. conclusion three different theoretical paradigms based on rather different world-views and intellectual trajectories have been applied to three different cases of diversity and society – policy, society and politics. the first paradigm (cosmopolitan/ism) refers to a capacity to empathise cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 89 with, interact with and appreciate the different cultural backgrounds and expressions of people within one’s own society, and elsewhere. in this, following beck, i distinguish between on the one hand grudging tolerance of different cultures generated by poly-ethnic proximity and enforced through state management of group tensions, and on the other active welcoming of difference (and implicitly constant transformative resultants of the intercultural interactions). the second paradigm (cultural capital) refers to the tools available within people’s subcultural frames of reference, which enable them to advance their interests in a pluralist society, and thereby generates value for their motile place in a constantly seething social hierarchy. sub-cultures are generated in complex societies by factors of class, ethnicity and education, and contain both elements enabling activity in the wider society (bridging), and specific elements relevant to the group (bonding). the third paradigm (social capital) further develops the ‘capital’ metaphor to describe systemically the strength or weakness, presence or absence, of intra-personal, intra-group and inter-group ties of association. it emphasises the role of trust as an outcome of mutually beneficial interactions, allowing the ‘holding together’ of social relationships, and enabling longer-term social collaboration. these paradigms become most useful when they are used as interrogatory approaches to empirical situations, rather than as totalising theoretical models. if they are reconceived as scaled dimensions of social power (from less to more, or limited to expansive, etc.) in culturally diverse societies, they enable us to place groups relative to each other and also test these relativities against wider social power hierarchies. put more simply they are variables that provide through their interaction, insight into the political sociology of australia and the dynamics of what might be necessary to better achieve democratic inclusion. they point to the directions that political interventions might need to move 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and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(2): 3918,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3918 civil society: overlapping frames bronwen dalton university of technology, sydney abstract the social sciences are bedeviled by terminological promiscuity. terms and phrases are used at one time in a certain context and later borrowed and applied in different circumstances to somewhat different phenomena. sometimes different groups of actors or researchers simultaneously use the same term with somewhat different meanings. such is the use of the term civil society. in this 5th anniversary of the cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, it is timely to trace the evolution of the idea of civil society to its multiple guises in the present. the paper reviews the term’s 18th and 19th century roots, its recent resurrection and the opposing views of civil society, including views that question its applicability to non-western settings. it then discusses prospects for developing agreed approaches to the study of civil society. to guide our thinking the paper presents a brief overview of different approaches to defining civil society taken by some of the major so-called centres for civil society in australia and internationally. the paper concludes by reflecting on these definitional challenges as it has played out at one particular cross faculty research centre, the university of technology, sydney’s cosmopolitan civil societies research centre. civil society: overlapping frames the social sciences are bedeviled by terminological promiscuity. terms and phrases are used at one time in a certain context and later borrowed and applied in different circumstances to somewhat different phenomena. sometimes different groups of actors or researchers simultaneously use the same term with somewhat different meanings. such is the use of the term civil society. in this 6th anniversary year of the cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal it is timely to trace the evolution of the idea of civil society to its multiple guises in the present and then to consider its prospects in the near future. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3918 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 41 an important component of most conceptions of civil society is to connote a particular set of organisations that are neither government nor operated for a profit. again, these are described in a variety of ways: social movement organisations, ngos, nonprofit organisations, voluntary organisations, social economy organisations and so on. some group them under the descriptor of ‘third sector’. the paper will outline the main ways in which civil society have been conceptualised and studied. the paper then examines how this rich yet tangled conceptual history has led to two major challenges confronting those wishing to operationalise the concept of civil society. first, contemporary scholars have demonstrated a tendency to preference one part of civil society and focus on a particular setting and then equate the phenomena that they observe to civil society itself. second, various difficulties arise when transferring the concept of civil society to non-western settings. arguably, both problems stem from the lack of a precise definition. one can be pessimistic or optimistic about this state of affairs for those engaged in the field. perhaps seeking agreement on a shared definition is unnecessary and misses the point of the field which is to build and expand our knowledge of social change? or perhaps collaboration among the members of the different centres for civil society across the world may lead to the excavation of some common ground? the discussion below first looks at approaches to defining civil society; then discusses the term’s new found popularity; presents a (deliberately polemic) outline of opposing views of civil society; examines how the term’s relevance to non-western settings has been questioned and concludes by looking at current approaches taken by those in the field. popular term but what does it mean? ‘civil society’ is a hot topic. today there is almost no field devoted to the study of social or political change, be it sociology, political science, history or even economics, that omits mention of the importance of civil society. jean and john l. comaroff describe the concept as the ‘big idea of the millennial moment’ (comaroff and comaroff 2001, p. 40) while un secretary general kofi annan labeled civil society as ‘the new superpower’ (un 2003). using the media search tool factiva1,figure 1 shows how the frequency of the appearance of the term in the media has risen exponentially over recent decades(although note this sample is biased as its searched only media sources published in english). 1factiva aggregates the content of over 36,000 sources (such as newspapers, journals, magazines, television and radio transcripts etc.) from almost 200 countries in 28 languages. 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 figure 1: frequency of term ‘civil society’ 2001-2014 (nb in global media english language sources only (n = 585418 documents)) 0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000 80000 90000 source: © 2014 factiva, inc. despite such ubiquity in the academic and wider discourse, consensus on the meaning of civil society remains elusive. according to benjamin barber (1996) ‘the more the term civil society has been used in the recent years, the less it has been understood.’ what are the possible reasons for this prolonged and fierce debate and what are the consequences for the study of civil society? has the debate generated heat or light? it may be that the consequent confusion has hindered the laying down of a conceptual foundation strong enough to support future research. confusion may also mean that the concept has become victim to neglect or attack. alternatively we can view the current unresolved state of play as reassuring in that this heated debate has assumed many of the characteristic of civil society itself open, discursive, contentious, dynamic, or as michael walzer argues, civil society is an experiment or a long series of experiments, in the sense that everything about it is tentative and subject to revision, but no one is in charge of the experiments (2002, p.44). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 43 after all, as nietzsche has pointed out, concepts with histories elude definition (from nietzsche’s the genealogy of morals, essay 2, section 13, tr. kaufmann and hollingdale 1968). opposing views of civil society2 the term civil society became in vogue in the 18th and 19th centuries in context of the rapid development of capitalism and the spread of liberal ideas in britain and europe, a time when those who controlled capitalist production, a rising bourgeoisie, sought access to political power and freedom as well as being able to exercise their new found economic freedoms pitts 2009). these c18th and c19th uses of the term civil society throw some light on current debates on the topic. the 18th and 19th centuries were a period when disciplines, first political theory and philosophy and later sociology, developed ways of theorising the relationships between society, state, economy and political society (kuper and kuper 1985). although some of these theories purported to provide explanations, they were also deeply normative in the value commitments and ethical and political orientations (more about the normative dimensions of theories of civil society below). first, it is useful to sketch out the dominant conceptions of civil society developed first in the work of political philosophers and theorists, namely, georg wilhelm friedrich hegel, john locke and thomas hobbes. then the legacy of their contribution to the emergent discipline of sociology in the 19th century and its trajectory is mapped out in the work initially of de tocqueville and later in the work of 20th century sociologists such as gabriel almond and sidneyverba and later still robert putnam and edward shils. in discussing modern conceptualisations of civil society, reference is also made to the work of political scientists such as helmut anheier and in particular democratisation theorists such as seymour martin lipset, larry diamond, philippe schmitter, guillermo o’donnell and lucian pye (almond & verba 1989; putnam1993, 1995; shils1997; anheier2004; lipset1956, 1967; diamond1994;schmitter1995;o’donnell & schmitter 1986; pye, 1999). 2 parts of this section were developed in the unpublished conference paper: bronwen dalton and virginia watson, 2007 ‘civil society, third sector: overlapping frames’ presented at the university of technology, sydney, conference on cosmopolitan civil societies, 4–5 october, 2007 sydney. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 one conception of civil society that became very influential is that which derives from the work of the german philosopher g.w.f. hegel (1770 -1831) and which we see developed more fully in republican political thought (or more precisely participatory republicanism see morris 2006). this ‘hegelian’ conception of civil society involves tying the term to a specific set of institutions or organisations that are held to ‘mediate’ between public and private life (kelsay 2002, hegel tr wood 1991). examples of these organisations and institutions include churches, labour unions, political parties, most social movements, and ngos. in this hegelian and more recently republican tradition in political thought, organisations like these are held to be critical for the development of the type of people who can participate as full citizens in the political life of a modern state. as john kelsay explains, “they mediate in the sense that taking part in them helps people develop loyalties beyond kinship” (2002, p. 3). in other words, the importance of civil society in these terms is that it represents a crucial stage in the development of a people who can deal with those who are different from themselves. kelsay argues that “this quality is held to be crucial ‘practice’ in anticipation of the more extensive experience of difference characteristic of the modern state and society” (2002, p. 3). another influential conception of civil society is that which comes from the english political philosopher, john locke (1632-1704) and which has gone on to inform the work of liberal anglo-american writers in particular. locke argued that the consolidation of political power can be turned into autocracy, if it is not brought under reliable restrictions (kaviraj 2001, p. 291) and saw civil society as largely akin to a certain kind of political or governmental regime, namely, constitutional democracy. the mediating organisations such as unions and churches feature in this conception of civil society and are seen as crucial counterweight to the power of government. strong mediating organisations act to balance governmental power and also enable people to pursue their collective interests (interests that in non-civil societies give rise to violence). here the argument is: give people the freedom and opportunity to participate in a wide set of forms of social life and thereby to learn to tolerate different points of view and ways of life. in this sense, strong institutions help keep society civil. this will have the effect of limiting the tendencies of government towards authoritarianism and disenfranchised citizens toward communal strife – this is the lockean tradition (locke 1965). lastly, a third influential conception of civil society is that which derives from the work of the political philosopher thomas hobbes (1588-1679). for hobbes, self-interests motivate human beings (graham 1997:23). with this worldview, society – or more precisely civil cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 45 society institutions – do not make the state civil, but rather, it is the state which civilises society. ‘society’ and individuals in this hobbesian tradition are too driven by their passions (and not enough by their interests – their rational, self-interest). and because of these ‘passions’ – religious, ethnic, national, cultural it is fundamentally impossible for human beings to achieve any measure of self-government. therefore, to civilise society, the state needs to exercise absolute sovereign authority. the absolutism and authoritarianism of leviathan in this tradition is seen as essential to the necessary civilisation of society (ewin1991, hampton 1986). these conceptions of civil society, as they derive from the political philosophy and political theory developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, have gone on to inform the development of thinking in the discipline of sociology on the topic. in particular, one of the first sociologists to take seriously the idea of ‘civil society’ was alexis de tocqueville (1805 –1859).in his democracy in america (which appeared in two volumes: 1835 and 1840), de tocqueville developed his concept of civil society from a vantage point in which he was able to draw on both hegeleian and liberal/lockean models. when de tocqueville looked at society in the 19th century in the united states of america he saw hundreds of voluntary associations and community organisations doing the work that kept the government accountable, democracy alive and its citizenry active and politically engaged. more recently, we have seen the legacy of de tocqueville in the work of many 20th century sociologists including gabriel almond and sidney verba and later robert putnam and edward shils (almond &verba 1989; putnam1993, 1995; shils1997). contemporary normative definitions of civil society: the cwa versus the solidarity versions of civil society in the latter half of the 20th century, civil society is increasing proffered as a kind of panacea to the many ills of the modern world. scholars who see civil society as having such cure all powers generally fall into one of two groups: one group drawing on both hegelian and lockean traditions argue that civil society has a civilising influence, that it encourages trust and reciprocitythat in turn supports citizen engagement and by extension the functioningof democratic states. the second group, drawing more emphatically on the lockean tradition and a commitment to constitutional government views civil society principally in terms of its role as a counterweight to authoritarian states and thus a driver of regime change. foley and edwards (1996) describe these two modern versions as civil society i and civil society ii. 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 we can somewhat irreverently refer to civil society i asthe country women’s association (cwa) version and civil society ii as the solidarity (ie in poland) version. the division can largely be attributed to contemporary scholars’ tendency to preference one part of the sector and focus on a particular political setting and then equate the phenomena that they observe to civil society itself. it should be noted that below i present idealised and extreme ‘versions’ of civil society by comparing the ‘good’ versus the ‘bad /ugly side’ of civil society. it is a deliberate construction of a [false] polemic. it is important to note that historically few organisations represent the ideal democratic supporter of society and/or act as appropriate counterweights to the state. similarly, it is true that there are historically few organisations that represent the ideal ‘ugly version’ of civil society. the vast majority of civil society organisations muddle along somewhere in the middle, with some commitment to values of social justice, democratic decision making , and social change, but falling short of actually fulfilling these ideals consistently. this is, of course, human and this construction of ideal types is designed to be purposely provocative to highlight how civil society research has generated debate. civil society as supporter of democratic state: the cwa version robert putnam (1993) has argued that organisations in civil society are vital for democracy. this is because they build social capital, trust and shared values, which are transferred into the political sphere and help to hold society together, facilitating an understanding of the interconnectedness of society and interests within it. this approach focuses on how the governance and other internal political activities of many civil society organisations facilitates better awareness and a more informed citizenry, who make better voting choices, participate in politics, and hold government more accountable as a result. the norms and practices of these organisations have often been considered micro-constitutions because they accustom participants to the formalities of democratic decision making (putnam 1994). some theorists have taken this approach a step further with scholars such as cheshire calhoun (2000), edward shils (1997) and most recently helmut anheier (2007) advocating to bring civility, ie courtesy, back in to the civil society debate. anheier notes that if we ‘neglect of the notion of civility, both conceptually and empirically’ within civil society discourse we risk a ‘potential slow-down in generating new knowledge and understanding of global civil society’ (2007, p. 1). civility has connotations of good manners or politeness but cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 47 also goes deeper to link with classically liberal ideas of civility as a concern for the interests of ‘private’ authority and order, such as the family, religious institutions, clubs and community organisations. but could this lead to us missing key civil society actors? civil society as counterweight to state: the solidarity version the literature on links between civil society and democracy has its roots in early liberal writings like those of de tocqueville. however the literature on these links was developed in significant ways by 20th century theorists like gabriel almond and sidney verba, who identified the role of civil society in a democratic order as vital. seymour martin lipset observed in union democracy (1956) that voluntary groups help mobilise diversity in the political arena and thereby make it more difficult for movements such as communism and fascism to dominate a society. lipset emphasises how they are a training ground for politics, a source of new ideas, and a significant method of communication (p. 16, pp. 82-86). however, the term got a new lease of life during the democratisation period, described by samuel huntington as the third wave, particularly the regime change sweeping eastern europe and latin america in 1970s and 80s. during this time the credibility of the transformative potential of civil societywas reinforced by its perceived political role in the overthrow of the former communist regimes. scholars studying these political transitions argued that the emergence and ‘activation’ of civil society is a major weapon against despotism and the key driver of democratisation. this resurrected civil society provided the critical basis for the articulation and aggregation of interests and of exerting pressure on the state to liberalise the political system and now is the means to deepen political reforms in the post-socialist societies (o’donnell and schmitter 1986; pye 1999). larry diamond writes, ‘increasingly, scholars are recognising the symbiotic nature of the relationship between state and civil society, in the process of democratic consolidation and more generally. by enhancing the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, and hence legitimacy of the regime, a vigorous, pluralistic civil society strengthens a democratic state and moves it toward consolidation’ (diamond 1997, p. 34). what both strands share however is their normative orientation as it presupposes a certain level of civic culture and civic consciousness. both groups of scholars view civil society as generally something desirable to have, for both promoting democracy and achieving a good 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 society, and as an important barometer of modernity and social progress (hall 1995; keane 1998). limitations and problems with current approaches but civil society – whether you understand it in hegelian or lockean terms – ain’t always pretty, as the saying goes, and can make things worse. also it can often make no difference at all. finally, civil society has had a great deal – probably too much – asked of it. first, the ugly side of civil society not all associative experiences cultivate the reciprocity, trust, and recognition putnam envisages (putnam 1993, chap 6). civil society can be flavoured by exclusivity, inequality and worse: violence, favouritism, graft, and corruption. ngos are commonly regarded as open affairs, as groups like (some) trade unions or humanitarian organisations such as the red cross. but civil society also includes exclusive, secretive or ritualistic groups that can generate bonding rather than bridging social capital, that is, the type of social capital that strengthens the links between people with the same background and that have similar objectives to create closed communities (portes 1998). as charles hauss (2003) argues ‘bonding social capital can serve to reinforce our preexisting beliefs including our prejudices’. associations such as the orange order, freemasonry, and opus dei all flourished but within tightly controlled memberships. in a sense they were the original international ngos. more recently, we have seen nazism and fascism emerging from secretive organisations, later in the violence generated by civil society groups in groups in parts of the middle east and africa. even putnam’s seemingly innocuous society of elks has been described as a stronghold of sexist and racist views of 1950s america (foley and edwards 1996). before i proceed i will reiterate my point above, and i have selected some cases to build this polemic. recent debate and empirical research on the subject has questioned whether bonding social capital, for example, has any associated risk of exclusivity. instead it has identified how both bonding and bridging are essential in any healthy organisation/network. bonding is essential to establish a sense of belonging and commitment and mutual support, but bridging is essential to connect with new information and other networks. for example the findings of studies in australia and ireland suggest that a model for a high social capital society might be a chain of well-bonded groups each with strong links to some other groups (leonard &onyx 2003; onyx & edwards 2010; leonard 2004). http://www.uts.edu.au/staff/jennifer.onyx cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 49 second, civil society that can make things worse in particular, the democratising potential of civil society associations (assumed by those classical models of civil society) can be undermined by a paucity of democratic process within associations themselves. here, inequalities of membership tend to mirror other inequalities. indeed, it is likely associations now multiply the influence of those who already have resources (verba et al. 1995, chap 16; warren 2001, p. 19). lipset (1967) argues that in latin america high-status social clubs have sustained the governing class, and major agricultural organisations are the preserve of the elite (1967, p. 9). in a similar vein, foley and edwards (1996) have questioned how democratic civil society actually is, noting that some civil society actors in the us have now obtained a remarkable amount of political power without anyone directly electing or appointing them; on this basis they warn of ‘warring factions’ and ‘rent-seeking special interests’ (1996, p. 39). as for those democratisation theorists that focus on civil society as a counterweight to the state, foley and edwards astutely observe that ‘there is no reason in principle why the ‘counterweight’ of civil society should not become a burden to a democratic as well as an authoritarian state’ (1996, p. 40). third, civil society can often make no difference in this regard it is worth considering those large, highly bureaucratic organisations that are unlikely to promote much membership engagement at all – putnam’s so-called cheque-book organisations – where the only connection between ordinary members and those that run the organisation is made when they pay their annual dues; in australia the nrma, and in the us groups like the sierra club are perhaps examples. these large organisations are the kind that theda skopol (2003) fears are signaling the death of grassroots organising and, in turn, the diminishing of democracy in america. finally, civil society has too much asked of it economic factors and political culture are also politically important for establishing democracy. sometimes they are the dominant factors at play. moreover – and this relates to the point above about making no difference – without legal structures and political systems, associations are much less likely to successfully cultivate the ‘habits of the heart’ and for this to translate into strengthening civic engagement and democratic consolidation. an overly civil society-centric view fails to acknowledge how the interactions of various parts of 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 society and polity are also a key source of civil society’s effects (see whitehead 1997). activists in weak or failed states face enormous challenges promoting democratic other kind of civic minded values in the absence of any rules of the game (whitehead 1997). the current situation in places such as syria and the sudan are cases in point. questioning from the south the popularity of the civil society concept is not restricted to countries with a european historical background. the term is often used in latin america, africa and east asia. many latin american and african countries can claim to have a tradition of civil society due to the legacy of european colonialism. but even in east asia, which has had a very different history and set of traditions from europe or latin america, the language of civil society has great appeal and is used as frequently to talk about the recent transition to democracy as in other continents. while not representative of the scholarly literature, using factiva, media coverage can serve as a proxy measure to demonstrate the breadth of interest in civil society. figure 2 below shows the frequency of the term ‘civil society’ in english language media that also includes mentions of specific countries from january 1 1981 to 31 dec 2013. figure 2 below shows the frequency of the term ‘civil society’ in english language media that also includes mentions of specific countries from january 1 1981 to 31 dec 2013. it is important to note that this search was of media that appeared in english only so is biased in favour of the western media. however, in terms of specific media outlets outside of the newswires and ‘bbc – all sources’(n. 37,713) the largest numbers of mentions of ‘civil society’ appeared in ‘times of india – all sources’ at 11,480 , the hindu (india) at 7,072 and the nation (pakistan) at 4,712. although some of these outlets may republish syndicated news more than other media outlets it nevertheless suggests that interest in civil society is strong outside of the western world. it should also be noted that only the total number of mentions 1981-2013 appear but the coappearance of civil society and specific countries or regions will be relatively high during certain periods, for example 7,420 of the 10,470 mentions of civil society and the middle east occurred between 2011 and 2013 in media coverage relating the ‘arab spring’. the application of civil society to the arab spring is a case of stretching civil society to fit an array of complex and context specific circumstances. further, it raises questions about whether the term ‘fits’ outside of the west. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 51 figure 2: frequency of ‘civil society’ in english language media by country 1981-2013 source: © 2014 factiva, inc 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 failure to account for different civil society traditions the democratising potential of civil society in non-western settings has been widely celebrated (see discussion by lewis (2001) on keane’s (1998) view of role of civil society in japan and harbeson’s (1994) on civil society in africa). for many in the west, and in particular in the eyes of western governments, civil society is most virtuous when the focus of its advocacy lies elsewhere, such as in the developing world. the actions of civil society seem to diminish in virtue – in the minds of politicians – when turned on the regimes in which they are situated. then, civil society is seen more as an irritant (dalton and butcher 2014). accompanying the adoption of the term have been debates regarding emerging civil societies notably in africa (ebenezer obadare, nira wickramasinghe, etc) and asia (neera chandhoke, carter j. eckert, bruce cummings) and non-western settings in general (munck 2006) that raise questions about the term’s applicability and usefulness, with scholars calling for a re-imaging at least of the concept. these authors argue that historical circumstances, intellectual contexts and institutional arrangements in the west have influenced how the civil society has been interpreted. and that the term civil society is so deeply rooted in the specific experiences of a few selected western countries that it has significant limitations in explaining the realities of non-western societies. it has also been argued that civil society is biased towards the global north. partha chatterjee has argued that, in most of the world, ‘civil society as an ideal continues to energise an interventionist political project, but as an actually existing form it is demographically limited.’ (chatterjee 2006, p. 39). for jai sen, civil society is a neo-colonial project driven by global elites in their own interests (sen 2010). how separate from the state? related to the point above, another major difficulty is the notion that civil associations must be ‘autonomous.’ to a certain extent, this is because the notion of civil society promises the extension of civil as opposed to state-driven forms of association as a good. and that civil society itself refers to a realm separate from – often contrasting with or indeed counterbalancing – state power. ernest gellner said, ‘civil society…is first of all that part of society which is not the state. it is a residue’ (gellner 1990, p.307). however, this posits an easy separation between state and society, one which in practice hardly exists. in particular, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 53 the state has dominated civil society in much of the developing world, and thus civil society has not been as much separated from the state as in the western democracies (cotton 1992). for example in the case of japan, schwartz argues that the japanese state plays an active role in targeting and monitoring welfare corporations that could well operate as part of civil society, but which instead ended up serving as non-profit ‘subcontractors’ for the state (schwartz 2003, p. 13). (here, incidentally, it is interesting to note that the clubs and societies in northern italy described by putnam in his seminal making democracy work: civic traditions in modern italy (1993) were backed by political parties). bruce cummings (2002) decries the uncritical application of civil society in the study of east asia as an example of hegemony of western liberalism yet (somewhat contrarily) also criticises many western scholars (he singles out putnam) for failing to account for the existence (at least in any significant way) of civil society existing there at all. he argues that this is because many western scholars interpret nonwestern contexts as entirely unsuitable settings for civil society (2003, p. 16). calhoun argues that ‘the cosmopolitan ideas of global civil society can sound uncomfortably like those of the civilizing mission behind colonialism’ (calhoun 2003, p. 93). munck (2006) also discusses a failure to take account of other civil society traditions and the application of civil society as being part of the western modernisation project. neera chandhoke (2003) a political scientist from india, argues that application of civil society to nonwestern context is not only problematic but has made matters worse in terms of political and economic development. chandhoke argues the unquestioning faith in civil society as the driver of democracy and economy growth has stimulated the expansion in developing countries of a ‘fake’ civil society sponsored by government as a way for them to gain access to development aid or to provide the illusion of popular support for northern political projects. related to this (and the points about imperialism above) chandhoke (2002) argues these fake ngos become agents of westernisation. nira wickramasinghe describes the ‘instrumentalization of this neo-tocquevillian conception of civil society…where civil society is becoming a means to an end – democratization, economic growth or sustainable development – rather than an end in itself’ (2005, p. 458). these problems of course all relate back to the problem of definition – or more precisely the lack thereof. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 how is this definitional no-mans-land resolved by those in the field? regardless of, or because of, the uncertainty it appears that being vague or avoiding defining civil society is a popular route. one indication is how a selection of entities that describe themselves as ‘centre for civil society’ or close variations thereof. after conducting a search through google for the terms ‘civil society’ and ‘centre’, examining the membership of the us based nonprofit academic centers council (nacc), a group dedicated to the promotion and networking of centres that provide research and education relating to the nonprofit sector (nacc 2014) the following 15 centres were identified. most are affiliated with a university. table 1 shows how the centres, both those aligned with universities and those with community, for-profit or even government affiliations, deal with the thorny issue of how to define civil society. 3 (note that the centres are listed in no particular order). table 3: definitions of civil society included on websites/key literature of civil society centres name of centre affiliation/ country definition university affiliated 1. center for civil society studies http://ccss.jhu.edu/thecenter/about-the-center johns hopkins usa ‘we use the terms ‘civil society sector’ or ‘civil society organization’ to refer to a broad array of organisations that are essentially private, i.e., outside the institutional structures of government; that are not primarily commercial and do not exist primarily to distribute profits to their directors or ‘owners’; that are selfgoverning; and that people are free to join or support voluntarily. this definition was formulated in collaboration with teams of researchers and advisors from around the world and has been used successfully to 3 note the table only covers centres that have ‘civil society’ this in their title and does not include a civil society focus eg columbus state university’s nonprofit and civic engagement center (npace). there is also an array of scholarly societies that state that civil society is a key area of their focus including the us arnova and the uk (arvac association for research in the voluntary and community sector) and the international society for the third sector research (istr). david horton smith (2013, pp. 640-43) identifies around 30 similar interdisciplinary altruistics researcher associations and over 30 academic journals in his comprehensive review of the broad field of ‘altruistics’ (‘all the related phenomena of our field, individual and collective. included are philanthropy, the nonprofit sector, third sector, voluntary sector, civil society (sector), social economy, volunteering, associations, and nonprofit organizations, among other topics’). note there has also been significant growth in the number of academic programs with a strong focus on civil society in particularly in the us programs with a focus on the nonprofit sector. in australia, the nonprofit sector is now a significant area of academic research and learning, with nonprofit management education programs being offered in seven major australian universities and two new zealand tertiary education institutions (malcolm, onyx, dalton & penetito 2014). http://ccss.jhu.edu/the-center/about-the-center http://ccss.jhu.edu/the-center/about-the-center cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 55 guide field work in over 40 countries.’ this is contained in many of the publications authored by centre members (ie by lester salamon; s. wojciech sokolowski regina list et al.) not on the website directly. 2. hauser institute for civil society (the hauser center for nonprofit organizations was established in 1997 in 2013 it merged with the center for public leadership at the harvard kennedy school, and became the hauser institute for civil society) http://hausercenter.org harvard university mas. usa the hauser institute for civil society at harvard university is a university-wide center for the study of civil society and nonprofit organisations. the hauser institute seeks to expand understanding and accelerate critical thinking about civil society, its leaders and institutions among scholars, practitioners, policy makers and the general public by encouraging scholarship, developing curriculum, fostering mutual learning between academics and practitioners, and shaping policies that enhance the sector and its role in society. 3. the centre for civil society (founded in 1995 closed in 2010) http://www.spa.ucla.edu/civilsoci ety/webfiles/template1.cfm?page= abt_whtis.cfm&mid=2 lse, uk ‘civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. in theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. civil society commonly embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and power. civil societies are often populated by organisations such as registered charities, development nongovernmental organisations, community groups, women's organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and advocacy groups.’ http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29398/1/ccsreport0 5_06.pdf 4. the centre for civil society http://civilsociety.ucla.edu/ ucla, calif. usa as above. note common leadership / sister relationship but also: ‘civil society, adopted an initial working definition that is meant to guide research activities and teaching, but is by no means to be interpreted as a rigid statement:’ this is contained in many of the publications authored by centre members but primarily developed by founder helmut anheier (now dean of the hertie school of governance in germany). international council of focuses on ‘altruistics’ (‘all the related http://hausercenter.org/ http://www.spa.ucla.edu/civilsociety/webfiles/template1.cfm?page=abt_whtis.cfm&mid=2 http://www.spa.ucla.edu/civilsociety/webfiles/template1.cfm?page=abt_whtis.cfm&mid=2 http://www.spa.ucla.edu/civilsociety/webfiles/template1.cfm?page=abt_whtis.cfm&mid=2 http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29398/1/ccsreport05_06.pd http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29398/1/ccsreport05_06.pd http://civilsociety.ucla.edu/ 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 voluntarism, civil society, and social economy researcher associations (icsera; www.icsera.org). (est 2010) phenomena of our field, individual and collective. included are philanthropy, the nonprofit sector, third sector, voluntary sector, civil society (sector), social economy, volunteering, associations, and nonprofit organizations, among other topics’ ), david horton smith (2013) 6. the inglis clark centre for civil society http://www.utas.edu.au/provost/in glis-clark-centre utas community engagement embeds and extends the university as a key actor in civil society – defined simply by the london school of economics as ‘the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values’. http://www.utas.edu.au/provost/inglis-clarkcentre 7. the centre for civil society http://www.ukzn.ac.za the university of kwazulunatal (ukzn), south africa no definition but lists social movements, trade unions, community-based organisations and ngos http://www.ukzn.ac.za/civil society/default.asp 8. the centre for civil society founded in 1997 by parth shah, former professor of economics at the university of michigan. http://www.civilsociety.in new delhi. india civil society is an evolving network of associations and institutions of family and community, of production and trade, and of piety and compassion. individuals enter into these relationships as much by consent as by obligation but never under coercion. …the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ demarcates the proper arenas for civil and political society, and for local, state, and central government within the political society. civil society champions individual rights, freedom of exchange, rule of law and limited government for india to reap the benefits of political and economic freedom. http://www.civil society.in/about_us.html 9. cosmopolitan civil society research centre (est 2007) http://www.ccs.uts.edu.au uts, nsw australia no definition but refers to multidisciplinary perspectives to investigate ‘the practices that are crucial in enabling social cohesion and change in cosmopolitan societies’. 10. the civil society national centre for excellence consultation process began june 2014, to go out to tender second half 2014 www.civilsocietycentre.org.au. * australia definition changed from civil society organisations (csos) refers to organisations with a primary focus on social purpose* whether local, regional or national, whether voluntary, not‐for‐profit or social enterprise. (added after first round of consultation) ‘civil society also incorporates relationships and interactions between csos, people in communities and organisations in different sectors (including business and government) working towards stronger social outcomes.’ *social purpose may include (and is not limited to) health, social services, education, research, culture, arts, sport,recreation, http://www.utas.edu.au/provost/inglis-clark-centre http://www.utas.edu.au/provost/inglis-clark-centre http://www.utas.edu.au/provost/inglis-clark-centre http://www.utas.edu.au/provost/inglis-clark-centre http://www.ukzn.ac.za/ http://www.ukzn.ac.za/civil%20society/default.asp http://www.ukzn.ac.za/civil%20society/default.asp http://www.civilsociety.in/ http://www.ccs.uts.edu.au/ http://www.civilsocietycentre.org.au/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 57 religion, community development, employment & training, housing, ageing, disability, environment, lawand advocacy. http://www.civilsocietycentre.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/civil-societydiscussion.pdf community/ government affiliated 11. the centre for civil society http://www.civilsociety.org.au/ (social enterprise partnerships ltd) melbourne, australia the term 'civil society' refers to the relationships and associations that make up our life at grass-roots levels of society, independent of government (in families, neighbourhoods and voluntary associations). http://www.civilsociety.org.au/ 12. civicus (global nb.large africa-based membership) ‘ an international alliance of members and partners.’ http://civicus.org/ main office johannesburg, south africa also offices in switzerland, us &uk. civicus: world alliance for citizen participation is which constitutes an influential network of organisations at the local, national, regional and international levels, and spans the spectrum of civil society. civicus includes the following in its definition of civil society: civil society networks and organisations; trade unions; faith-based networks; professional associations; ngo capacity development organisations; philanthropic foundations and other funding bodies http://civicus.org/index.php/about-us-125 13. the ghana civil society resource centre http://civilsocietyghana.org undp & civicus / ghana no definition but refers to providing ‘services and support to civil society organisations engaged in civic education, human rights, women’s advocacy, and anticorruption http://civilsocietyghana.org/index.php?opti on=com_content&task=view&id=12&item id=31 note affiliation with undp – i.e. government affiliation; strong emphasis on need to capacity build southern ngos to meet conditions of western funders (incl undp) 14. centre for studies of civil society and nonprofit sector http://www.grans.hse.ru/ national research university higher school of economics moscow, russia scientific studying of civil society and nonprofit sector institutes is an important line of research of the contemporary russian society because the said institutes have become a signal of transformation processes in our country. specific research trends both fundamental and applied, focused on the range of civil society problems, are forming in the context of different sciences. (might have a definition somewhere but rest of site is in russian) 15. center for strategic philanthropy and civil society duke university, us the center for strategic philanthropy and civil society (cspcs) researches, analyzes, and promotes philanthropy that consistently produces high impact. cspcs http://www.civilsocietycentre.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/civil-society-discussion.pdf http://www.civilsocietycentre.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/civil-society-discussion.pdf http://www.civilsocietycentre.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/civil-society-discussion.pdf http://www.civilsociety.org.au/ http://www.civilsociety.org.au/ http://civicus.org/ http://civicus.org/index.php/about-us-125 http://civilsocietyghana.org/ http://civilsocietyghana.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&itemid=31 http://civilsocietyghana.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&itemid=31 http://civilsocietyghana.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&itemid=31 http://www.grans.hse.ru/ 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 http://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/ stimulates communication, collaboration, and problem-solving around pressing issues of public policy and philanthropy. 16. the office for civil society (2008-2011) http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/dire ctory/company/2765/office_for_ci vil_society uk government (it replaced the office of the third sector following the general election in 2010 but was abolished in 2011). archived website does not show use of definition but states that it ‘holds responsibility for charities, social enterprises and voluntary organisations in the cabinet office. http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/directory/co mpany/2765/office_for_civil_society the definition of civil society posted on the websites of the centres for civil society in ucla and lse (numbers 3 and 4 above) were both at some point headed by helmut anheier and while in these positions used the same definition and also stressed flexibility in the definition: ‘[we] adopted an initial working definition that is meant to guide research activities and teaching, but is by no means to be interpreted as a rigid statement’ (center for civil society ucla, accessed november 2007). other groups, notably the melbourne based centre for civil society which not aligned with a university, see civil society from more of a self-help or ‘capacity for collective organising’ perspective (the centre for civil society 2014). it appears for this group that the value of civil society lies in its capacity to stimulate collective effort to realise local benefit. a number of the research centres for civil society (e.g. south africa and civicus) appear to not provide any definition civil society, at least on their website, but list various civic organisations and in particular nonprofit organisations or ngos as the key unit of analysis. also listed above is the uk cabinet-level office for the third sector which was renamed the office for civil society. (the conservative embrace of the term is an interesting development in the evolution of the term ‘civil society’ is discussed below). at the time of writing, in australia the centre-right abbott federal government (2012 ) is funding a research centre based at the university of nsw’s, the centre for social impact to conduct a consultation process to inform the design of a proposed civil society national centre for excellence (nce), ‘to enhance the institutions of civil society, including through collaboration, education, training, representation and advocacy for the sector’ (csi 2014). the federal coalition said that it is committed to abolishing ‘the australian charities and http://cspcs.sanford.duke.edu/ http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/directory/company/2765/office_for_civil_society http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/directory/company/2765/office_for_civil_society http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/directory/company/2765/office_for_civil_society http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/directory/company/2765/office_for_civil_society http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/directory/company/2765/office_for_civil_society cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 59 not-for-profit commission and replace it with a smaller sector-focused centre for excellence.’ however, given that many of acnc regulatory functions would return to the australian taxation office and the australian securities and investments commission reference to it being a ‘replacement’ has recently been dropped. to date the consultation process around setting up the centre for excellence has involved the centre for social impact conducting an online survey with 227 responses and several focus groups principally made up of those working in the nonprofit sector (csi 2014). in the consultation process, the definition of civil society was hotly debated. the proposed definition that ‘civil society encompasses a wide range of organisations with a primary focus on social purpose, from the smallest community groups to large national organisations, whether voluntary, not-for-profit or social enterprise, as well as their interactions with local communities, business and government.’ was questioned by some respondents: this definition (and in particular as demonstrated by the diagram) will inevitably lead to governments/ agencies and for-profit businesses representing themselves, or being portrayed by others, as forming part of civil society, even though neither of these two sectors has a primary focus on social purpose. this dilution of what the ‘civil sector’ or ‘third sector’ means is a step backwards (survey respondent) (csi 2014, p.3.) i think the definition of civil society organisation is too narrowly defined it should also include companies that use the power of business to solve social and environmental problems see b corp certification (survey respondent) (csi 2014, p. 3) various respondents questioned why civil society was equated to organisations and not relationships: ‘the definition should be the ‘traditional’ definition of civil society focused on relationships between individuals and social relationships in society’ according to the report ‘this (and similar views) is a very strongly held view in some stakeholders’ (report’s italics) (csi 2014, p. 3). csi concludes that civil society language is not in as common usage in australia as in some overseas countries; and that may be either a barrier or an opportunity to define or introduce it. ‘retaining this name – depending on the scope of the final nce – will also alienate some. inclusion or specific exclusion of relationships with either business or government sector is an important question in refining the scope of the nce’ (csi 2014, p. 3). 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 civil society and big society: aligning civil society with neoliberal agenda while having progressive connotations, the term has proved flexible enough to be a talismanic theme among political thinkers from both left and right. in recent times it has been adopted by conservative governments in the uk and australia. one of the most interesting contemporary advocates civil society is the english theologian and director of the respublica think tank, phillip blond, whose ‘red toryism’ borrows from both the right’s and the left’s uses of civil society (blond 2010). blond’s ideas have been a driving force behind the uk conservative cameron government’s 'big society', in particular the government’s commitment to a smaller state and an expanded role for the community sector (cameron 2011). like red toryism, big society argues that the british government has crowded out civil society organisations and undermined social capital and, to correct this, powers must be devolved from the central governments to local communities, small businesses, and volunteerism. the cameron government embraced the term civil society and early in their first term, established the office of civil society (number 17 in table above. note it was closed in 2011) senior conservative party member nick hurd was appointed the first minister for civil society in may 2010 (he was replaced by conservative mp brooks newmark in july 2014) (meade 2014). in australia, similar sentiments in favour of smaller government have been expressed by the conservative liberal party, tony abbott referenced big society principles in a ‘landmark’ speech in 2012, saying that ‘securing our future depends more on strong citizens than big government’(abbott 2012), although the australian liberals seem to deliberately avoid any reference to the term “big society”. like the uk’s cameron government, the abbott government has embraced the term civil society, often in reference to the not-for-profit sector, take for example the government commitment to establish a civil society national centre for excellence (nce). the term ‘civil society’ has been central to the coalition’s construction of the appropriate role for government and, by extension, its approach to the activities of the organisations within civil society, such as the funding and policy settings affecting community and not-for-profit organisations. in 2011, now minister for social services kevin andrews evoked edmund burke’s ‘little platoons’, when he wrote, ‘the essential task of civil society – families, neighbourhood life, and the web of religious, economic, educational, and civic associations – is to foster competence and character in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 61 individuals, build social trust, and help children become good people and good citizens’ (andrews 2011). according to a report titled big society and australia by australia’s centre for policy development james whelan, “elements of cameron’s agenda have been endorsed by the centre for civil society, the centre for social impact, the sydney institute and by the institute of public affairs whose director, john roskam, urged tony abbott to adopt the ‘big society’ program (whelan, 2012: 6; roskam, 2010). ‘big society’ has been widely criticized as using progressive sounding jargon to present longstanding neoliberal preferences for shrinking government through budget cuts, privatisation and outsourcing (davies and pill, 2011). in terms of the use of civil society, cooption of the terms has been criticized for the way in which individuals are recast as entrepreneurs, and civil society becomes an amalgam of consumers and end-users having ‘choice’ (bbc 2010; the times 14-apr-2010). still it is no doubt that the term progressive connotations of the term “civil society” has been a useful softening agent in the delivery of messages around budget cuts which are needed to end the “age of entitlement”. what does this mean for the study of civil society? in 2003 the british library made an attempt to sort through all the definitions of civil society. it concluded that ‘all observers agree that civil society refers to voluntary participation by average citizens and thus does not include behavior imposed or even coerced by the state’ (british library 2004). but as noted at the outset, there is currently no consensus on when civil society emerged and what it is understood to represent, that is, who and what it is seen to include – who inhabits it, where the conceptual boundaries lie and which version of civil society should prevail? should we include business or the ‘market’? by extension, should we include economic associations such as trade groups, professional organisations and labor unions? what about political organisations? should we distinguish between political organisations and politically aligned or motivated groups? what about the family and even illegal bodies such as cartels and crime rings? in many examples of definitions it is not what a particular approach includes that is as significant as what is effectively excluded and why. one can be pessimistic or optimistic about the consequences of this definitional confusion. 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 being pessimistic it can be argued that civil society definitional imprecision can undermine current relevance and usefulness, indeed it can threaten to cut civil society loose from any meaning at all. according to chandhoke (2003, p. 13), ‘civil society today has been reduced to a onedimensional, watered down concept that has ceased to have any definite meaning’. some scholars have warned that the term will soon fall into disuse unless some agreement can be arrived at. brian o’connell writes that ‘we will/are left with no basis for future research work…any hope of achieving awareness of civil society depends on our ability to make it strikingly visible and manifestly consequential. that begins with a solid understanding of just what civil society is and does’ (o’connell 2000, p. 471). on the bright side… let many flowers bloom! it could be argued that civil society is simply suffering the same limitations as its inhabitants, eg– diverse, prone to contestation and debate, critical, dynamic, heterogeneous. i believe, like the british library, civil society has excavated some common ground. the centre for cosmopolitan civil society at uts: a meeting place for overlapping frames the social sciences collectively know too little to waste time on foolish disciplinary squabbles. disciplinary disputes and turf wars are of little or no importance. in my mind, this book is as much a work of history as of economics. thomas piketty 2014 p. 37. established at the university of technology, sydney, in 2007, the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre is a cross-faculty, cross-disciplinary centre committed to community engaged academic research that investigates the broad field of cosmopolitanisms and civil societies (ccs 2012). ccs grew from academics across two faculties, arts and social science and business, who engaged in interdisciplinary research but now welcomes members from across uts. after extended deliberations it was decided to incorporate the term cosmopolitan in the centre’s title. cosmopolitan is used to describe the leadership of civil society in the international arena contribution of diaspora communities to australian society. it was chosen because it decouples the analysis of leadership from nations or territories, and focuses more on civil society’s leaders’ mindsets instead of on the physical reach of their organisations. it was also cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 63 a deliberate choice to help reclaim the positive meaning of a word that has a long and distinguished history, but also a controversial one that serves to illustrate of potential perils of the use of any one term. 4 in the last decades, however, cosmopolitan has been reclaimed by civil society founders and others as a descriptor for those who value diversity and are at ease working with different cultures and countries – a global cosmopolitanism that brings human rights and social justice into its primary operational frame. civil society is thus studied with the view to identifying the practices that are crucial in enabling social cohesion and change in cosmopolitan societies. in recognition of how research on civil society is becoming increasingly diverse and scattered across multiple disciplines, ccs researchers share an interest in investigating civil society from multi-disciplinary perspectives. to do so they incorporate the theories and methodologies developed by historians, sociologists, and political scientists, management researchers and economists. within this interdisciplinary field members engage a range of theoretical approaches to cosmopolitanism and to civil society, articulate differing analytical concepts, and build multidisciplinary on-the-ground investigations. the research program centres around nine thematic areas: alternative cosmopolitanisms; cultural life and events; indigeneity and power; migration, diversity & racism; human rights, inclusion and communication; collective action and learning; strengthening civil societies; knowledgesharing and information in civil society; sport and social action and environment & society. in many ways, the ccs membership represents in microcosm the contested field of civil society with advocates of many and sometimes opposing versions of civil society that have been highlighted in this paper. to some extent they may be guilty of demonstrating tendency to preference one part of civil society and focus on a particular setting and then equate the phenomena that they observe to civil society itself. some members have focused their civil society research on the transformative power of social movement organisations, while others view civil society principally through the lens of nonprofit organisations under the descriptor of ‘third sector’. others decry the uncritical transfer the concept of civil society to non 4during much of the 20th century, particularly in the nazi and communist eras in europe and the soviet union, cosmopolitan was often a pejorative epithet used for those deemed disloyal to a nation or regime and beholden to foreign elements because of their ethnicity, religion, ideology or worldview. members of the opposition were branded ‘cosmopolitan traitors’ and the term was often used by anti-semitic elements as a code word for ‘jewish’. 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 western and indigenous settings. perhaps the difference is that these members exchange views in what is, for the most part, an open, discursive and democratic space, in efforts to forge common ground and boost interdisciplinary collaborations. the range of ideas and the arguably previously unlikely coupling of scholars across diverse fields in co-authored research that has appeared in the last five years of the cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal is testimony to, at the least, a capacity to get along and, at best, the excavation of some common ground. do these experiments of collaboration among the members of ccs, and among members of the various centres for civil society discussed above, suggest that in due course interdisciplinary collaborations will precipitate some decisions regarding defining civil society being made? or are attempts to pin down a dynamic, contested and evolving term with a long and rich scholarly history simply a fool's quest? such an endeavour may even miss the main point, that interdisciplinary collaboration continues to add to conceptual dimensions of approaches to the study of civil society that can shed light into previously unknown corners. it can also show us not what civil society is or is not but how go about conducting civil society research. conclusion so after this long lament over the absence of consensus regarding a definition – and thus the debate's tendency toward generating heat not light – i, hypocritically, also avoid the task. maybe as helmut anheier says we have ‘become very conceptual and overly focused on the issue of definitions relative to empirical research findings. and instead we need to evaluate the empirical approach itself, and in particular its level of contribution to the study of global civil society thus far’ (2007, p. 1). perhaps the real question should not be what it ‘civil society’ but ‘how does it matter’ ongoing questioning of definitions is routinely applied to virtually all social science concepts of any note, with the usual conclusion that if we can't define it, the concept and therefore the content of that concept will disappear or become meaningless. but conceptual definitions are always fluid because: a) the world we are concerned with changes and b) inevitably any concept that connotes progressive thinking of ‘the left’ is co-opted and transformed by the political right for its own purposes. so perhaps the critical challenge for any new research centres claiming to have civil 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http://p2pfoundation.net/engaging_critically_with_the_reality_and_concept_of_civil_society http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226924717.001.0001 http://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cpd_big_society-final-web-version.pdf http://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/cpd_big_society-final-web-version.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/siso.69.3.458.66521 http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story006/en/ http://www3.weforum.org/docs/wef_futurerolecivilsociety_report_2013.pdf cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 69 united nations 1998, secretary general describes emerging era in global affairs with growing role for civil society alongside established institutions, press release sg/sm/6638, 14 july 1998. available at: http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/1998/19980714.sgsm6638.html http://www.un.org/news/press/docs/1998/19980714.sgsm6638.html civil society: overlapping frames abstract civil society: overlapping frames popular term but what does it mean? opposing views of civil society1f contemporary normative definitions of civil society: the cwa versus the solidarity versions of civil society civil society as supporter of democratic state: the cwa version civil society as counterweight to state: the solidarity version limitations and problems with current approaches first, the ugly side of civil society second, civil society that can make things worse third, civil society can often make no difference finally, civil society has too much asked of it questioning from the south failure to account for different civil society traditions how separate from the state? how is this definitional no-mans-land resolved by those in the field? civil society and big society: aligning civil society with neoliberal agenda what does this mean for the study of civil society? being pessimistic on the bright side… the centre for cosmopolitan civil society at uts: a meeting place for overlapping frames conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia everyone’s story counts: measuring social impact in the not-forprofit sector – an overview∗ barbara bloch university of technology, sydney abstract as a lead-up to a symposium on measuring social impact in the not-for-profit sector, held in november 2011, the author conducted a small number of interviews (20) across the not for profit sector in sydney, as to their views, concerns and issues regarding the measurement of social impact of their organisations' work within their communities. this paper provides a synthesis of these interviews, as well as situating social impact measurement within a broader economic and political frame. the paper draws the conclusion (confirmed by many at the above symposium) that the concept of collective impact – where a large number of diverse organisations collaborate through, for example, agreed benchmarks of performance and shared measurements, in order to make a difference, and know that they have made a difference to the lives of specific populations in need. introduction as a lead-up to the symposium on social impact, the cosmopolitan civil societies (ccs) centre decided to selectively measure the pulse of the not-for-profit (nfp) sector in sydney and regional nsw, to gain a sense of their views, concerns, frustrations, issues about measuring the social impact of their organisations and beyond. the symposium focused on the question of how to measure the social impact (as opposed to evaluation) of organisations and programs within the local community. the morning consisted of presentations and discussions of current approaches and issues. in the afternoon, small groups attempted to develop some potential solutions and a future research agenda. twenty interviews were conducted with managers and program leaders in some peak bodies and local community organisations working with migrants, refugees, older people, young people and people with disabilities. the selection, made through a snow-balling technique, was by no means comprehensive, and was mostly located in the community services and arts sectors. the findings are not conclusive. however, their inclusion at the commencement of the symposium provided an empirical basis for the day’s discussions. overall, this investigation sought to discover what understandings of social impact measurement existed ∗ the title ‘everyone’s story counts’ is a quote from one of the interviewees for this research. it alludes to a basic issue related to measuring social impact, which is how to put into quantifiable or metric terms, the qualitative aspects of the not-for-profit sector’s work. 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 among the subjects interviewed and what generic measures of social impact, with a useable metric base, could be developed, which are not based on financial or economic considerations. what follows in this paper is a discussion and contextualisation of the term ‘social impact measurement’, a discussion of ‘collective impact’, a concept whose application is considerably more developed in the united states than in australia, and a summary and analysis of the key issues raised by the interviewees. the paper concludes that there is an urgent need for governments and other funders of community services, to encourage those in the welfare and community sectors to work together to produce more beneficial outcomes for those individuals and communities most in need, as well as to find ways to share the measurement of this endeavour. background to social impact measurement an international professional body concerned with social impact assessment (sia) has formalised principles and guidelines for measuring or assessing social impact. their definition is broad and encompasses interpretations of sia both used, and not used, in this article: ‘social impact assessment includes the processes of analysing, monitoring and managing the intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) and any social change processes invoked by those interventions. its primary purpose is to bring about a more sustainable and equitable biophysical and human environment’ (vanclay 1993, p. 5). social impact can be defined as any intervention that changes the human environment. measurement of social impact can occur in advance of an activity occurring, for example before construction of a large housing development, or the impact of a major gas pipeline development in a small town, or before the placement of a youth refuge in a suburb. local government is ‘increasingly recognising the need to assess the impact of new major developments within their boundaries’ (davies 2004, p. 1). a few councils, like newcastle city, have established social impact committees to assess prospect development applications. these kinds of assessments are proactive, examining likely consequences before they occur. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 3 on the other hand, the productivity commission’s research into the contribution of the not for profit (nfp) sector, conducted in 2010, clearly set out four levels for measuring this contribution ‘impact mapping’ – they are the measurement of inputs, outputs, outcomes and impacts. these measurements one might view as reactive, in the sense that they are seeking to categorise impacts that have already occurred. impacts were distinguished from outcomes in that they were broader; they tried to capture long-term effects on individuals and the community (productivity commission 2010, p.34). they also attempted to capture what they called ‘spillover effects’, or the unintended consequences of an activity, program and so on. the productivity commission report stated: ‘measurement of change at the impact level is important to guide the allocation of resources to deliver the highest community wellbeing for the resources used. disaggregated, ‘impact’ measures also provide information for targeting interventions as well as assessing broader trends in wellbeing’ (2010, p.34). the researchers lyons and zappalà (2009), from the centre for social impact at the university of new south wales, noted three levels of analysis in measuring the impact of the social economy. they started from the macro to the micro, but here we will reverse the order as it seems to better suit the reality of large parts of the nfp sector, that is for those who work in small organisations. so, the ‘smallest’ level, if you like, or most specific, is measuring the impact of individual programs run by particular organisations – this is perhaps evaluation by another name; followed by the meso or middle level of analysis, which concerns the impact of individual organisations, and finally, the macro level of analysis which is ‘identifying and measuring the contribution or impact of the social economy or the slightly smaller nonprofit sector’ (zappalà & lyons 2010, p. 3). the discussion about social impact must be situated briefly within the broader context of the evolving role of and expectations on the nfp sector in australia (as well as in other, particularly anglo-saxon countries where neo-liberal policies have had the greatest influence over the past three decades). barraket (2006, p.1) states it succinctly: ‘…shifts in public policy are changing the community sector’s operating environment. these policy shifts include: new standards of performance measurement; the movement from core funding of organisations to purchasing their services contractually; an emphasis on partnerships between sectors ….and the growth of social policy responses that are focused on improving local communities of place. these changes are driving the developing of new agendas 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 within the sector – in terms of competition, accountability, performance and service delivery – while also creating new opportunities to innovate and diversify’. this increasing emphasis on ‘competition, accountability and performance’ has inevitably led to a monetisation of impact measurement; that is measuring economic impact, or economic well-being, based on the dollar and more generally, the quantification of impact measures, for example the increased numbers of families who have access to a particular community service. aggregation of a number of quantifiable measures will contribute to a picture of a community’s well-being, but it will by no means paint a complete picture. social impact, as some of our respondents understand it, is more ‘elusive, partly because it is qualitative rather than quantitative, long-term rather than short term, diffuse and multi-layered rather than specific and focused, and probably means different things in different contexts’ (onyx 2011, p.1). collective impact collective impact, in relation to measuring the work of not-for-profits, is a concept which is yet to be fully realised. in this study, people spoke about it informally in the sense that there was general acknowledgment that no one organisation or program could be responsible on its own for changes in population indicators. collective impact then ‘involves a community – say a state, a school district, a hospital system, a mental health delivery system, discerning that change can only be made if the whole sector collaborates as one. each individual agency abandons their individual organisational agenda in favour of a collective approach to improving a shared goal’ (douglas 2011). collective impact, according to the way it is defined and used in the united states, where it is more extensively practised than in australia, ‘is the commitment of a group of important actors from different sectors to a common agenda for solving a specific problem’ (kania & kramer 2011, p. 36). it differs from networks, partnerships, collaborations partly through its scale (large), through having a centralised infrastructure, a dedicated staff and a structured process that leads to a common agenda, shared measurement, continuous communication and mutually reinforcing activities among all participants’ (kania & kramer 2011, p.38). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 5 kania and kramer (2011) outline the work of strive, a project seeking a transformation of the educational attainment of the young people of the greater cincinnati area (usa). more than 300 separate organisations have come together from schools, principal and teacher groups, governments at all levels, philanthropists, local businesses, health professionals, universities and hundreds of different education related non-profits. collectively they have planned a way forward, agreed benchmarks of performance and shared measurement – in short, they’ve agreed to ‘sing from the same song sheet’. it has required a separately funded secretariat which convenes, enrols and facilitates all the players to work together more harmoniously. the study defined five success criteria of successful collective impact projects: • a common agenda – a shared vision for change including a common understanding of the problem being solved • shared measurement systems – agreement on a common agenda is illusory without agreement on the ways success will be measured and reported • mutually reinforcing activities – all the various activities, across all the sectors need to be pulling in the same direction, even if they have very different approaches and methods. this is also where the magic of specialisation comes in – everyone is now able to concentrate on their strength • continuous communication – relationships and communications within the broader community of collaborators need to be well maintained with plenty of time and space for bonding and connecting. if the trust doesn’t develop, the results won’t come – it’s as simple as that. • backbone support organisation – running a collective impact project requires a particular skill set. it is about creating collaborative spaces, nurturing trust across a broad set of people, keeping the focus clear, continuous reporting and communicating clearly. it requires moral governance of all the players in the project, ensuring that they are on track in terms of their individual contributions and the way they are playing the game together. the significance of ‘shared measurement systems’ is worth noting. these authors state that shared measurement is essential: ‘having a small but comprehensive set of indicators establishes a common language that supports the action framework, measures progress along the common agenda, …. encourages more collaborative problem-solving and becomes the 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 platform of an ongoing learning community that gradually increases the effectiveness of all participants’ (hanleybrown, kania & kramer, 2012). collective action to achieve greater social impact in australia is in its infancy, albeit with a few exceptions. for example, the australian research alliance for children and youth, whose work on improving the well-being of australian children rests on the necessity of a shared measurement framework in order to achieve collective impact – working across governments and community service organisations (emerson, 2011). progressive evaluation of the complex, multi-pronged ‘keep them safe’ program1 of the nsw government is being undertaken for 3 years until 2014. the evaluation’s effectiveness will depend on analysis of data across a number of government and non-government agencies. social impact will be able to be measured through accumulation and aggregation (and disaggregation) of both quantitative and some qualitative data. interestingly, the evaluation framework, developed in 2010, is a very comprehensive document, yet it does not mention the term ‘social impact’ (adamson et al. 2010). methodology this small research activity was intended to provide an indication of how a selection of nfp organisations in nsw understood and possibly implemented the measurement of social impact. due to time constraints, only a small number of organisations were contacted. given the time frame, the rationale for inclusion was based on selecting a diversity of organisations in terms of size, purpose and function. several peak bodies engaged with policy work were contacted as well as those ‘on the ground’, conducting service delivery. the questions were devised in order to stimulate the most wide-ranging and open discussion on the subject of social impact. the symposium at the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre in november 2011 also yielded data for this paper. analysis was based on the outcomes of discussion in five focus groups. each group was asked to discuss the following questions: what kinds of measures were needed to assess qualitatively, the work of their organisations? what issues were related to this measurement, in planning and implementation? what resources and tools were 1 its overall objectives are improving the safety, welfare and wellbeing of children in nsw, particularly those in the child welfare system. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 7 required to measure social impact? what barriers were there to measuring social impact? what broader concepts could be identified in relation to this topic? the organisations data was also collected through a questionnaire to be found in the appendix. the following organisations, mostly based in sydney, responded to the questions in person, by telephone or by email. they were: • new south wales council of social services (ncoss) • information cultural exchange parramatta (ice) • local community services association (lcsa) • western sydney community development forum • south-west sydney community development organisation • metro migrant resource centre, campsie • parramatta community pals • metro lands council • canterbury city community centre, lakemba • illawarra youth services • ethnic communities council (ecc) • bankstown area multicultural network (bamn) because these organisations perform different kinds of work, the way they understand impact and seek to measure it is also different. the organisations can be grouped into four categories: those that were solely concerned with direct service provision and its impact; those that do a combination of this and community development, peak bodies who are concerned with their own efficacy as ‘peaks’ as well as the sector they represent and those whose work is more geared towards effecting policy. the responses are grouped under four headings, which reflected the questions asked of them and the ensuing themes and issues which emerged. 1. defining social impact how did the respondents define social impact? everyone saw it as much broader than program evaluation, that it was a planning and a predictive tool, which inevitably went beyond the stated objectives of a particular program or service. they regarded it as being 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 about long term measurement, which has attendant problems like the issue of attribution which is discussed later. importantly, they saw it as being about trying to capture unintended consequences, or ‘spill-over’ effect. social impact was about client and community outcomes, and it asked the fundamental question: what is making a difference? it was about planning in order to make fundamental changes, not based on band-aid solutions, according to one interviewee. some respondents struggled to find ways to describe si. yet, it could help determine if ‘what we do makes a difference, help determine where the resources will go, and where the gaps are’. another interviewee made the point that it was important not to become preoccupied with measurement, at any level. 2. the difference between social impact assessment and program evaluation it is no surprise that it is program evaluation that is the most common form of measurement. it measures the past, it measures the effectiveness of a program and of course, since it is connected with on-going government funding, it tends to cover those areas, or services, that the specific contract is for. it is concerned with showing that the program provided good financial value, it is concerned with outputs and tends not to ask or answer questions like does the program service solve a problem? are people being helped? what are the outcomes and for whom? in short, it is confined to those that participate in specific programs and is driven largely by the needs of the funding body. ‘measurement then, exists only if you can touch it, see it and count it’, in the words of one of the interviewees. for example, one community centre executive officer (eo) described a particular program the centre runs, providing gardening services for elderly people who still live at home. the funder wanted to evaluate output – what was the cost of the hours spent per garden, how many hours of service for paid and unpaid staff, but the interviewee also noted a range of outcomes the funder was not interested in measuring, such as the impact on the elderly who have a regular gardener coming to their homes, the impact on the environment as exotic plants get replaced by natives and need less water, the impact on the volunteers who give their time for this activity. interestingly, the eo concluded this vignette by saying that she was hesitant to inform the funding body about these less tangible outcomes. it is the amalgamation of hundreds of these kinds of specific examples that becomes ‘social’ impact. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 9 3. if you do measure or assess the social impact of your organsiation’s work, how do you do it? in terms of actual practice, no one in this small cohort, used the frameworks for measuring social impact sometimes used within the third sector, like social accounting audits, logic models or social return on investment (sroi). zappalà and lyons conclude in their paper that very few organisations have adopted either the saa process or the sroi. and those which have tend to be the larger charities like mission australia or the smith family. these authors acknowledge that ‘the reality is that all the approaches are resource intensive for nonprofit organisations to implement in terms of the time taken and the money required to either divert existing staff…or employ external specialists to assist them through the process’ (zappalà & lyons 2009, p.22). their paper focused on the need for funding bodies like foundations, companies and philanthropic organisations to include resources (both financial and capacity building) to their grantees to undertake sia. additionally, all three levels of government, the major funding source for the majority of the community/welfare sectors, also need to include financial support for the inclusion of various types of evaluation into their funding contracts. in the words of one executive officer interviewed for this research: funding bodies generally require raw numbers and a little bit of very basic qualitative assessment in some cases, based around client satisfaction. there is nothing longitudinal or more in-depth to look at the depth of impact that a program has had on participants. it would be great if we were able to introduce it, but it’s always a question of time, skills and resources. despite these limitations, a number of the respondents discussed practices which they identified as attempts to measure ‘social impact’. for example, one fairly large service noted how they collect data on individual clients across their agency, they also get feedback from external agencies they work with, and their clients. this is a form of triangulation, of corroborating evidence – so vital in a research project. they also discussed the difference between services for specific target groups like youth, or the elderly, and those of a community organisation, a peak regional body or neighbourhood centre, whose activities are more complex, varied, and diffuse. it was noted also that tracking the impact on individual clients, even over a longer period of time, does not necessarily change into social impact. the community arts organisation in western sydney, which has grown considerably in the past 5-10 years, has also become more sophisticated and systematic in its data collection and impact measurement strategies. they count where and what they can, they gather qualitative 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 feedback from different sources, including their external stakeholders, they track web and social media interactions and collect stories to give a richer context. they observed that tracking changes that go beyond the individual also depends on the community and whether it is possible to track these changes, because communities change, change is a constant feature, even at the point of an intervention or a program, which makes certainty difficult. before leaving this section on practice, it is necessary to briefly discuss results based accountability (rba). rba has been adopted ‘by the human services departments of the nsw government as its agreed framework of measuring outcomes and applying for funding’ (keevers et al. 2010, p. 57), a process which has been ongoing since 2005. the community services agency of the nsw department of family and community services (formerly docs), is the funding body most mentioned by my respondents. nevertheless none of the organisations i interviewed were actually using the docs version of rba, to report on their work, although a number of them had attended training in mark friedman’s rba. (friedman is the american creator of results based accountability). rba combines a means for coordinating effort with a performance measurement system. it: starts with the outcomes the activity or program is intended to achieve. it then works backwards to identify the resources and processes by which those outcomes can be achieved, and the indicators by which success can been measured. it attempts to distinguish the specific contribution of the organization from other factors that can influence outcomes (productivity commission 2010, p. 52). it also distinguishes between performance – dealing with programs, agencies and service systems and population accountability dealing with ‘whole populations in a community, city, county, state or nation’ (friedman 2005, p. 39). it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed critique of rba. a few respondents were critical because they saw the rba processes as limited, they questioned how ngo knowledge and practices could be measured, stating that they thought the indicators were too broad, that the language of the indicators could not cover measurement of the impact of community development, for example. one report is based on a joint australia research council funded project of various university partners and the illawarra community forum, is entitled ‘practising social justice: measuring what matters – locally based community organization and social inclusion’ (2010). this research examined rba planning processes cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 11 in a number of diverse organisations and institutions in the illawarra community services field. the following questions from this report are pertinent to all measurement frameworks: the authors query: ‘rba, like any other measuring apparatus makes boundary cuts. so what got included and excluded from mattering when implementing rba? what happened to the local practices of social inclusion and justice that community sector workers make and remake in their everyday/everynight work lives?’ (keevers et al. 2010, p. 72). their study points to: the need for accountability and planning processes that recognize and are sensitive to the different knowledges and the distinctive roles and contributions of the diversity of organisations that make up the community services industry. such recognition would mitigate against the ‘one size fits all’ approach that currently mandates common statewide results and performance measures (keevers et al 2010: 101) the local community services association (lcsa) utilises a ‘community builders results based performance accountability framework’, which it is rolling out to neighbourhood centres throughout nsw. this forms the basis for the mandatory data reporting for all community builder funded services in nsw2 . it is based on results based accountability by measuring "how much do we do?" "how well do we do it?" and "is any one better off?" for each of the four service activity descriptions – community capacity building, community skills development, community sector development and community hub. one of the interviewees noted the need to be careful about the motivations for collecting data – of course organisations want and need to ‘prove impact’, to justify the programs they run rather than critiquing them in order to improve them. that is, in the words of one of my interviewees, ‘everyone wants to show they’re doing a good job’. 4. what issues do you face in trying to measure social impact? this section covers both issues that arose from the initial interviews, followed by a discussion of further points that were raised in the symposium itself. overall, interviewees acknowledged that the sector (that is, the community sector) does not have much understanding of social impact but there was a strongly articulated general need to measure 2 the community builders is a funding program which aims to strengthen communities across nsw and particularly the disadvantaged groups within them. the program was developed in response to a growing body of evidence that suggests that community strengthening is an effective way of reducing inequality and disadvantage. community strengthening is about building the capacity of and opportunities for people to actively engage in a wide variety of social, economic, cultural, recreational, learning and civic activities. it also includes supporting the relationships and networks that result from these activities. (nsw human services, community services, 2012, community builders guidelines http://www2.communitybuilders.nsw.gov.au/program_guidelines_2012_full.pdf ) http://www2.communitybuilders.nsw.gov.au/program_guidelines_2012_full.pdf� 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 other things apart from what the funders needed. a manager from one of the interviewed organisations sent me an email, which encapsulated many of the issues people face. she wrote: indeed we need measures around social impacts in my experience it's what do we use as indicators, how do we make time for it and commit resources to it and what type of research methods are useful with our target groups? – these are the issues. attribution the question of attribution was one of the major issues identified in relation to social impact measurement. for example, if decline in youth suicide rates is an indicator of successful social impact within a particular community or cohort, the impact of a specific organisation is very difficult to measure since most service providers work together, in networks and partnerships. this issue is compounded by the fact that, as everyone acknowledged measuring social impact must include an element of longevity to make it valid. it was said that there are not the evaluation tools to determine this attribution. the productivity commission research corroborates this, saying that measuring impact rather than outcomes or output means that ‘there are less data available to construct attributable outcome or impact measures’. it adds that ‘outcomes and particularly impacts are usually the result of a much wider array of influences than just the nfp activity’ (productivity commission 2010, p.36) – the point made above in relation to youth suicide rates. in general terms, no one organisation or program can be responsible on their own for changes in a population. there are so many independent variables, indicators need to be holistic, but do they then become of no use? linear causality a related concern to attribution is that of linear causality – how can one be sure that x caused y, and it was not because of z or a or b. people can be influenced by other factors apart from direct service provision. there was criticism of logic models because they assume a linear causality; that is, you work from what you are doing to prove social impact. they assume that ‘one thing leads to another in predictable or highly probable ways that can be written down in the form of a flow chart’ (lee 2011, p.2). a number of interviewees spoke about the complexity of causality in the social world, that any social problem and its solutions will have ‘uncertain causal relationships’ (ibid). on the other hand, the importance of measuring impact is to discover whether – together – organisations are doing the right things and are making a difference. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 13 time and data management the time factor was noted frequently as being one of the main impediments. as well, a respondent said: ‘the community care sector is driven by reporting that requires regular outputs, not outcomes. we need to go outside normal data collection methods, to report on people’s strengths, rather than deficit reporting.’ in general there was considerable frustration expressed about various funding bodies’ data requirements. a few questions articulate this: ‘what do you do with all that data we provide for you?’ ‘what happens with all those reports we provide? do they just sit on someone’s desk?’ it was said that reporting mechanisms are not designed to assist organisations with planning, nor was there the capacity to do analysis over time of programs and services. in almost all the interviews, there were complaints about data collection – the limited resources for organisations to use the data they collect, to be able to identify trends, especially significant in relation to impact, with its need to look longitudinally. confirming this anecdotal evidence was a nation-wide report commissioned by the australian national council on drugs (ancd) in 2008, of alcohol and other drugs ngos. a survey of 71 ceos of ngos revealed that they ‘are spending in excess of 473 hours (12.5 weeks of work) over a 12 month period to simply report back to funding bodies’. ….in other words, these organisations reported that they were diverting more and more resources from the front line into “backroom compliance” as they struggle to complete an array of reporting requirements’ (ancd 2009). statistics such as these should alert funding bodies as to the efficacy and purposefulness of demanding such onerous reporting regimes onto the overstretched community sector. the ccs symposium the afternoon’s group discussions at the symposium in november allowed for corroboration and further exploration of the issues expressed above. a number of themes emerged: • what do organisations need to measure in social impact? several groups addressed the “what” question and came up with lists of broad concepts to focus measurement; for example health, levels of safety, human capital, social capital, social justice, diversity, empowerment, including measures of change in attitudes and values, measuring impact on government policies and practices. • how do we capture spill-over effects, that is, the wider impacts beyond those anticipated by the organisation or program? 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 • can we convert impact into a monetary base? what happens when we try to do so, what is lost? • there was discussion about tensions between short-term measures imposed by funding bodies and measures which resonate with community members. it was suggested that an audit be made of the differences between measures used for formal program evaluations required by government and other funding sources, and the kinds of measures/data that service providers are interested in gathering. • in relation to the preceding point, it was thought that service organisations should also develop their own measurement tools and strategies, they should be culturally appropriate techniques to obtain meaningful engagement with diverse communities. it was also suggested that an audit be conducted of the difference between measures and data used for formal program evaluations that are required for governments and other funders; and the measures and data which organisations use for their own purposes. • barriers to measuring social impact were clearly articulated. they included, (and confirm the earlier discussions in this paper): current lack of agreed theoretical/technical frameworks and models; lack of access to analysis of data; shortterm funding cycles of government; government counts outputs, mostly financial, not impacts; the economic principle of market competition inhibits collaboration between ngos; risky to try new approaches and finally – the time it takes not only to conduct a thorough, rigorous study, but also the length of time in years needed for many types of social impact to be realised. • what kind of resources can be made available to measure impact collaboratively and systematically within the sector? for example one group mentioned centralising resources like websites, academic collaboration, accessing data across programs, creating a shared repository of knowledge and critical analysis. conclusion the next decade will see significant changes in the not-for-profit sector, particularly in relation to how the sector is funded. the nsw government, following some evidence from britain and the us, has instigated a pilot project using social impact bonds (sib)3 3 sibs, following from their development in the united kingdom, are a way of reducing public sector funding for social welfare, by encouraging ‘social investment’ by individual investors, superannuation funds, financial institutions and so on, who will receive a ‘dividend’ from the government, if the social program has achieved its outcome/s. (see centre for social impact, 2011, for discussion on the feasibility of the nsw government adopting the sib concept.) , as the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 15 basis for funding two community programs; one to reduce the incidence of out-of-home foster care, and the other to improve recidivism rates among criminals. it is too early to make a judgement on the efficacy of this significant shift in the role and responsibility of the state in funding programs for those who are deemed disadvantaged. however, observations from discussions thus far in australia reveal that the issue of the seemingly obvious relation between the collective and the social, for measuring impact is not seriously being addressed at a governmental level, whose main concern appears to be reduction in tax-payer spending. nevertheless, on the basis of this small piece of empirical research, as well as some of the literature perused for this article, it could be concluded that there is an urgent need to think about ways to act together to assist those communities and individuals who are doing it tough, as well as to find ways to share the measurement of this endeavour. references adamson, e, bromfield, l, edwards, b, matthew, g, hilferty, f, katz, i, mcdonald, m, mchugh, m and valentine, k. 2010, keep them safe evaluation framework, final report, australian institute of family studies and social policy research centre, university of new south wales, sydney. australian national council on drugs 2009, non-government organisations in the alcohol and other drugs sector, http://www.ancd.org.au/images/pdf/researchpapers/ rp17_non-government_orgs.pdf accessed 30 may 2012. barraket, j. 2006, community sector sustainability: research evidence and public policy implications, victorian council of social services, melbourne. centre for social impact, february 2011, report on the nsw government social impact bond pilot: executive summary, csi, unsw, sydney. douglas, e. 2011, ‘collective impact a new approach to community collaboration’, centre for social impact unsw, sydney. https://secure.csi.edu.au/site/home/ blog.aspx?defaultblog=https://blog.csi.edu.au /2011/03/collective-impact%e2%80%93-a-new-approach-to-community-collaboration-2, accessed 10 september 2012. emerson, l. 2011, ‘collective action to improve children’s wellbeing’, www.conferenceonthenet.com/clients/niftey/docs/emerson.pdf, accessed 21 february 2012. friedman, m. 2005, trying hard is not good enough: how to produce measureable improvements for customers and communities. victoria, canada: trafford publishing. hanleybrown, f, kania, j and kramer, m. 2012, ‘channeling change: making collective impact work’, in http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/channeling_change_ making_collective_impact_work, 26 january, accessed 14 february, 2012. kania, j and kramer, m. 2011, ‘collective impact’, stanford social innovation review, winter. keevers, l, treleaven, l, backhouse, h and darcy, m. 2010, practising social justice: measuring what matters, illawarra forum inc: jamberoo nsw. lee, p. 2011, what’s wrong with logic models? lcsa: occasional paper no. 1, local community services association. http://www.ancd.org.au/images/pdf/researchpapers/%20rp17_non-government_orgs.pdf� http://www.ancd.org.au/images/pdf/researchpapers/%20rp17_non-government_orgs.pdf� https://secure.csi.edu.au/site/home/%20blog.aspx?defaultblog=https://blog.csi.edu.au%20/2011/03/collective-impact-%e2%80%93-a-new-approach-to-community-collaboration-2� https://secure.csi.edu.au/site/home/%20blog.aspx?defaultblog=https://blog.csi.edu.au%20/2011/03/collective-impact-%e2%80%93-a-new-approach-to-community-collaboration-2� https://secure.csi.edu.au/site/home/%20blog.aspx?defaultblog=https://blog.csi.edu.au%20/2011/03/collective-impact-%e2%80%93-a-new-approach-to-community-collaboration-2� http://www.conferenceonthenet.com/clients/niftey/docs/emerson.pdf� http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/channeling_change_%20making_collective_impact_work� http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/channeling_change_%20making_collective_impact_work� 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 local community services association 2008, ‘neighbourhood centres and results accountability. a conversation with mark friedman’, local, the newsletter for community development in nsw, lcsa. onyx, j. 2011, measuring social impact: a scoping paper, cosmopolitan civil societies research centre, university of technology, sydney, unpublished. productivity commission 2010, contribution of the not-for-profit sector, research report, canberra. vanclay, f 2003, ‘international principles for social impact assessment’, impact assessment and project appraisal, march. zappalà, g. and lyons, m. 2009, recent approaches to measuring social impact in the third sector: an overview, csi background paper no 5, july, centre for social impact, university of new south wales. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 17 appendix – interview questions 1. in your opinion, what is the difference between social impact assessment and program evaluation? 2. are you concerned with the social impact of the work of your organisation? 3. why (or why not)? 4. do you try to measure/ assess the social impact of your organisation? by qualitative or quantitative means? 5. how do you do this? (or why do you not do this?) 6. what issues do you face in trying to measure social impact? everyone’s story counts: measuring social impact in the not-for-profit sector – an overview0f( barbara bloch appendix – interview questions measuring the immeasurable: understanding the effectiveness of anti-child trafficking transnational advocacy networks deanna davy university of sydney abstract transnational advocacy networks’ anti-child trafficking efforts have led to significant progress in the mekong subregion by bringing the child trafficking issue onto the global social policy agenda, resulting in new child protection legislation and improved inter-agency collaboration in the region. however, a significant gap in both the literature on tans and tan practice is the lack of monitoring and evaluation of tan ‘effectiveness’. this article discusses the recent literature on tan effectiveness and discusses the ‘key elements’ of tan effectiveness, as highlighted by child trafficking experts operating in tans in the greater mekong subregion. research into the area of tan effectiveness is important for improving our knowledge of what tans are achieving in terms of preventing child trafficking and protecting victims, as well as improving our knowledge of the different meanings and interpretations of tan ‘effectiveness’. furthermore, research into this area is important for improving our understanding of how tans are well positioned to provide an effective response to the child sex trafficking problem. introduction in the greater mekong subregion (gms) transnational advocacy networks (tans) have been forming since the 1990s to combat child trafficking for sexual exploitation. child sex trafficking occurs in all southeast asian countries. in a region where the demand for young brides, adoptive infants, sex with children, images of child pornography, and cheap labour is strong, children may be trafficked at source or during migration, either en route or after reaching their destination. origin, transit and destination countries for child trafficking exist throughout the southeast asia region with some countries characterised as origin, transit, or destination, and others encompassing all three (unicef, 2009, p. 19). internal trafficking, from rural to urban centres and from small towns to big cities, is also a considerable dynamic although far less researched than cross-border trafficking. complex push and pull factors including poverty, gender inequality, unemployment, and forced migration complicate the child sex trafficking issue. due to their transnational nature, and the diverse membership of government, non government and un agencies operating within tans, these groups are well placed to lead campaigns against child sex trafficking. anti-child trafficking tans operating in the gms 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia have successfully lobbied for new legislation on the child trafficking problem, developed improved systems for protecting children, improved inter-agency cooperation on child trafficking and associated issues. also, they have facilitated the development of a global social movement against child sex trafficking as demonstrated in the examples of un.gift, the united nations inter-agency project on trafficking (uniap), global anti-trafficking campaigns such as the child wise and body shop campaign, and new extraterritorial legislation on child trafficking. this article examines the important theme of the effectiveness of anti-child trafficking tans in the gms. the article first discusses the methods used for collecting data for this research. next, it briefly summarises the definitions of child trafficking, and provides an overview of child trafficking estimates in the southeast asia region. it then provides a discussion of the recent literature on tans, and an overview of the literature on tans in southeast asia. the article finally discusses the research findings, including an examination of the barriers to measuring the effectiveness of tans; the ‘key elements’ of tan effectiveness that were identified by anti-child trafficking experts operating in tans in the gms; and the centrality of tans in combating child sex trafficking. research into the issue of tan effectiveness is important for improving our understanding of the complex interplay between tan partners, the importance of network structure, charismatic leaders, and information sharing. it is also important in order to better understand how tans are well positioned to lead the fight against global social issues such as child trafficking. methods i spent a period of six months based in thailand in 2010 in order to collect data for this research. i conducted twenty-two interviews with anti-child trafficking experts employed in ngos, un agencies, tans, and academia in bangkok (thailand), pattaya (thailand), chiang mai (thailand) and phnom penh (cambodia). the purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to build a complete picture of the child trafficking problem in thailand and cambodia; a picture of tans and their diverse structures; an understanding of the antitrafficking advocacy strategies employed; campaign goals and highlights; and experts’ impressions on tans’ effectiveness. additional methodologies included process tracing and participant observation (performed while i was employed as a researcher at an international ngo in bangkok and attending regional anti-trafficking fora, seminars and meetings). due to the difficulties of quantifying a complex and transnational social problem, employing a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 85 qualitative research methodology allowed the exploration of normative and theoretical questions within the social science framework. the strategies employed illuminated complexities in the child sex trafficking issue, and also complexity in advocacy networking processes against child trafficking in thailand and cambodia, and diverse interpretations of tans’ ‘effectiveness’. although this article discusses the issue of child sex trafficking as a global social issue, thailand and cambodia served as the primary country case studies for data collection and the analysis of tans’ activities. through the study of these two countries and the tans against child sex trafficking operating within them, interesting networking phenomena became evident including fluidity in tan dynamics, goals and activities; the development of cohesive networks against trafficking; the collective sharing of resources, knowledge and expertise among network partners; and diverse manifestations and interpretations of tan ‘success’ and ‘effectiveness’ such as improved victim services, improved inter-agency cooperation, and the shaping of social policy on the child trafficking issue as a result of the collective advocacy efforts of these networks. child sex trafficking definitions and estimates, and dynamics definitions today the most widely accepted definition of human trafficking comes from the un protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the un convention against transnational organised crime, better known as the palermo protocol (november 2000). the palermo protocol provides a widely used definition of trafficking: a) ‘trafficking in persons’ shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. b) the consent of the victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in the subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in the subparagraph (a) have been used; 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 c) the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered ‘trafficking in persons’ even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in the subparagraph (a) of this article; d) ‘child’ shall mean any person under eighteen years of age. as the protocol implies, sexual trafficking refers to a specific subset of wider phenomena of human trafficking. it can be understood as the component of human trafficking that deals with the use of persons – almost exclusively young women and children – in prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation. as subsection (b) of the protocol clarifies, the use of whether a victim ‘consents’ or not is ‘irrelevant’. in essence, the protocol holds that consent cannot truly be given when acts such as fraud and deception are employed. exploitation rather than consent is the central feature of the palermo protocol’s definition. the emphasis on traffickers is also evident in the fact that the palermo protocol is a supplement to the un convention against transnational organised crime. it is these organised criminal networks of traffickers that have played an instrumental role in the globalisation of sexual trafficking, however, the trafficking of children in the gms operates as more of a cottage industry rather than a large-scale criminal enterprise as occurs in eastern europe. wylie and mcredmond (2010) argue that the adoption of the palermo protocol and its tripartite definition of trafficking as involving deceptive/coercive recruitment, movement and exploitation of a person, has driven the debate on trafficking forward and has been a crucial factor in states’ recognition of human trafficking as a serious problem. the palermo definition of ‘trafficking’ has provided an important step towards ensuring structure and cohesion in approaches to the prevention of trafficking and the prosecution of traffickers (unodc, 2008). advocacy organisations and tans have, however, also pointed out that the definition reduces trafficking to a law and justice issue rather than a problem associated within the larger global issue of uneven wealth and resource distribution due to globalisation (canadian council for refugees, 2009). the palermo protocol has highlighted the need for increased border security with the objective that prosecution of traffickers would curtail cross border smuggling. such policies have, however, at times had negative effects. instead of contributing to the eradication of trafficking, related government policy has instead forced the individuals who would previously have attempted to migrate legally, to turn to smugglers and traffickers to help them navigate the often difficult terrain across national borders to their point of destination (marshall, 2001). this leaves open the very real possibility of migrating cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 87 adults and children falling victim to the lure of traffickers. piotrowicz (2008) has argued that ‘the problem (or at least the limitation) of the palermo protocol is that it is aimed primarily at tackling the perpetrators of trafficking… however, from the victim’s perspective, the protocol offers only limited assistance with rather nebulous, aspirational obligations that leave much to be desired’. this then leaves the burden of attending to the concrete rights of, and assistance for, trafficking victims in the hands of individual states. therefore, there is no uniform standard for the rights and reparations of victims (brusca, 2011). what we therefore have in the palermo protocol is an instrument aimed at tackling trafficking through fighting the traffickers, with ‘limited acknowledgement of the rights of the victims, who may need protection and assistance’ (piotrowicz, 2008). a further criticism of the palermo protocol is that it uses a rigid notion of the ‘child’ which lacks any nuances (huijsmans, 2008, p. 331). it defines the ‘child’ technically on the basis of age as any person below the age of 18 years and thus leaves no room for children’s evolving capacities (huijsmans, 2008). it also ignores dramatic sociocultural as well as socioeconomic heterogeneity hidden in the singular notion of the ‘child’ (huijsmans, 2008, p. 331). a problem with the palermo protocol’s definition of the ‘child’ is that by a priori rendering children’s consent to ‘exploitation’ irrelevant, it denies children any form of agency, even at a conceptual level (huijsmans, 2008, p. 336). the result is that children are treated as passive victims of abuse in need of rescue rather than inviting more child-centred approaches to address child trafficking (huijsmans, 2008, p. 336). estimates the united nations inter-agency project on human trafficking (2008) states that there are no universally accepted estimates of child trafficking numbers throughout the world. difficulties in identifying victims and differences in applying trafficking definitions to local realities make such estimates virtually impossible. however, some commonly quoted figures provide some sense of the magnitude of the problem. unicef (2009) suggests that globally, about 10 million children, mainly girls, are subjected to various forms of sexual exploitation worldwide. a further one million children are estimated to enter the commercial sex trade each year (unicef, 2009). unicef (2009) further estimates that a third of all sex workers in southeast asia are between the ages of 12 and 17. kristof (1996) similarly notes that more than a million girls and boys, aged 17 and younger, were engaged in forced prostitution in asia. according to child wise (2007), an australian ngo working on the human trafficking 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 issue both domestically and internationally, more than 250 000 sex tourists visit asia each year, with 25 per cent coming from the united states, 16 per cent from germany and 13 per cent from both australia and the united kingdom. this includes those seeking sex with children, a practice better known as child sex tourism, and those specifically targeting prepubescent children, that is, paedophilia (peters, 2007). the global and public policy response to human trafficking has been profound. as wong (2004) suggests, from a poorly funded ngo women’s issue in the early 1980s, human trafficking has entered the global agenda of high politics, eliciting in recent years significant legislative and other action from the us congress, the eu and the un. while end child prostitution, child pornography and trafficking of children for sexual purposes (ecpat) (2006) reports that, to date, there is no clear strategy to deal with the demand for sex with children, it is the political activism and campaigning of tans that has influenced the promotion of child trafficking as an important issue for public and international policy concerns. recent literature on the dynamics and activities of tans problems cannot be resolved by individual states or organisations acting alone, and today there exists a significant number of actors whose interests and capacities span national borders (florini, 2000, p. 15). for keck and sikkink (1998) transnational networks operate as ‘advocacy networks’, producing a common discourse on particular contentious issues. tans in today's society consist of partnerships between ngos from both north and south, un agencies, and, though frequently to a lesser extent, government partners. inter-agency tans such as uniap incorporate government, non-government, and un agencies, while ngo networks such as ecpat are composed of international and domestic ngos. these networks often have a number of partners spanning the globe, a structure including a secretariat to coordinate partners, and common values that have brought the network partners together for a specific purpose. what these networks achieve is a new form of political space beyond the state that transcends state boundaries and defies the traditional notion that development actors are bounded by local or national scales (morvaridi, 2005, p. 135). tans seek influence in many of the same ways that other political groups or social movements do. since they are not powerful in a traditional sense of the word, they must use cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 89 the power of their information, ideas and strategies to alter the information and value contexts within which states make policies (keck & sikkink, 1999, p. 16). tans’ powers of influence also stem from their ability to operate transnationally, that is, beyond borders, and to extend their advocacy to all groups. the value of keck and sikkink’s (1998) approach is that they define tans as a unified web with overarching aims and strategies and in doing so they define the concept as a type of political actor worthy of academic and political attention. keck and sikkink (1998) see the local effectiveness of these global networks as built on three interrelated effects: transmitting information, invoking norms, and shifting political venues. in a similar vein, evans (2000) argues that networks gain their fundamental leverage from the global spread of certain basic norms centred on human dignity. transnational networks unite citizens across the world to advocate for certain global issues (morvaridi, 2005, p. 135). tans usually focus on one narrow issue that is of interest to all their participants while ngos and other global activists typically have broad agendas focusing on a range of different human rights, environmental and other issues (shawki, 2007, p. 12). once established, tans campaign using a number of different tactics: the collection and strategic use and dissemination of credible information, and pressure on governments and other powerful actors to uphold the values, norms and principles that they have pledged to respect (shawki, 2007, p. 14). in comparison to other relationships between organisations, tans have the potential to provide a more flexible, flat and non-hierarchical means of exchange and interaction that promises to be more innovative, responsive and dynamic, while overcoming spatial separation and providing scale economies (henry et al, 2004, p. 839). the perceived advantages of these kinds of networks fit with ngos’ ideologies concerning their presumed comparative advantage over the state and market. international ngos and un agencies seeking social transformation collaborate on a number of levels to influence global governance. they create and activate global networks, participate in multilateral arenas, facilitate inter-state cooperation, and act within states to influence policy and enhance public participation (alger, 1997). even in areas often considered to be the sole domain of states such as international security, tans can play a role in shaping the agenda and contributing to policy change (price, 1998). 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 in a media-saturated global environment, the communicative power of tans – the capacity to reach a global audience and shape international public opinion – is considerable (held, 2002, p. 69). this is manifest in the ways the networks exert influence by exploiting distinctive political strategies including influencing public attitudes, interests and identities; redefining the agenda of local, national and global politics; providing communities and citizens with a voice in global decision-making fora; and seeking to make governments and corporations accountable for their actions and decisions (held, 2002, p. 69). although a decade old, as the network literature has demonstrated, tans do a great many things including lobbying governments, standard-setting, monitoring of compliance with standards and laws, and naming and shaming norm violators (keck and sikkink, 1998). in the last decade many tans have developed in the fields of advocacy and policy within the environmental movement, the women’s movement and the human rights movement, amongst many others. among successful transnational campaigns are the jubilee 2000 drop the debt campaign, the aids campaign, the international coalition for the establishment of the international criminal court, the campaign against the multilateral agreement on investment, and the ottawa convention banning landmines (held, 2002, p. 69). yanacopulos explains that a key motivation for organisations, particularly ngos, in forming networks and coalitions is their economies of scale (2005, p. 101). advocacy at the global level is extremely expensive and no one organisation can afford to finance and support a global advocacy campaign (yanacopulos, 2005, p. 101). this factor has influenced the strategic reconfigurations of organisations. furthermore, information sharing and the specialisation of skills is also an essential cost saving and value-added element of forming networks and coalitions (yanacopulos, 2005, p. 101). an additional benefit of networks is that they harness expertise through pooling research, staff, funds and resources. another key network motivation is to take advantage of the strengths or comparative advantages of different ngos as well as the expertise of the un agency partners (hudson, 2002, p. 411). perhaps most important reason, however, is the collective weight that such cooperation can provide (hudson, 2002, p. 411). as baehr (1996) argues, by aligning, organisations can minimise overlapping endeavours and share resources. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 91 transnational advocacy networks in southeast asia while organised collective action is strong in certain regions of the world, transnational activism is a relatively new phenomenon in southeast asia. tans have emerged in asia in the past four decades in response to problems such as chronic poverty and inequality. the past twenty years have seen greater democracy take root in most of asia, and there have been increased political freedoms, even in some tightly controlled societies such as china and vietnam. the people’s power movements, in the philippines in 1986, in china in 1989, and mass demonstrations in myanmar in 1988 and thailand in 1992 and 2010, were a new symptom of a new approach to politics spurned by the growth of a new middle class. transnational activism has emerged in southeast asia as a response to socioeconomic and political processes associated with globalisation, as well as a consequence of relative and limited political liberalisation that has characterised some southeast asian countries (caouette, 2007, p. 150). as loh and ojendal note, ‘although the southeast asian countries enjoyed unprecedented high rates of economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, and experienced pluralisation of their societies, nevertheless, the state authorities continued to dominate over their societies’ (2005, p.3). transnational activist organisations in southeast asia have established themselves in countries where relative political space existed, or at least allowed, for global organising (caouette, 2007, p. 150). in recent decades in southeast asia, as in many other regions of the world, there has been a growing tendency to organise and work transnationally. the philippines, thailand, indonesia and increasingly malaysia host various forms of transnational activist organisations (caouette, 2006, p. 6). today bangkok, manila, and jakarta act as ‘nodes of transnational activism’, places that ‘provide not only the practical infrastructure required by transnational ngo networks, but also a political climate that is not too hostile toward civil society activism’ (piper & uhlin, 2004, p. 14). more funding and international changes led in the 1980s to far more non-governmental activity in asia. moreover, there was a shift in focus as political repression lessened and there was a growing interest and concern with various marginalised groups such as ethnic minorities and women (gilson, 2008). the growth in the usage of the internet quickened the pace of social learning and development amongst such networks (gilson, 2008). in southeast asia transnational activism has been a defining feature of civil society processes, especially 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 since the 1997 financial crisis (caouette, 2006, p. 12). in this region tans have produced shared identifies and a common understanding of issues, as well as generated common campaigns and proposals that can be put forward during regional and international gatherings and implemented both at the regional and national levels (caouette, 2006, p. 12). furthermore, tan activism has connected grassroots ngos’ struggles to a broader set of issues and struggles, thus amplifying the work being performed at the local level in the region. not only have tans come to be accepted by the states of the gms region, but they now carry with them a much more international focus and demonstrate the confidence to work with external groups (gilson, 2008). simultaneously, groups are no longer simply working alone, but increasingly are collaborating at other regional and international levels in order to gain greater leverage and strengthen their own claims (gilson, 2008). the development of ngos in cambodia and thailand has followed different strands depending on the socio-political situation in these countries. ngos have emerged in these countries when the political environment has been relatively open and free from rigid state control (pednekar, 1995). in thailand, which has enjoyed longer periods of political stability and political freedom, local ngos are the most diversified in mainland southeast asia and are now a force capable of creating social change. ngos in cambodia are independent of the cambodian government in part because most domestic ngos were formed during the united nations transitional authority in cambodia (untac) period of the early 1990s. the untac period followed cambodia’s return to democracy after the 1993 elections. during the 1990s cambodian ngos received financial support from international ngos, donor agencies including various un bodies, and governments of developed countries. brehm (2004) argues that the cambodian ngo sector has emerged in the mirror image of international ngos since the opening up of the country in 1991. cambodian ngos are now successfully filling the social welfare gaps that emerged in the country after decades of conflict (brehm, 2004, p. 3). religion has also played a major role in the proliferation of ngos in southeast asia. in thailand the christian church is fully recognised by the thai government and, as argued by horstmann (2011), benefits from religious freedom in the country. this religious tolerance has motivated the presence of multiple christian missionary agencies in bangkok and northern thailand, from where they provide essential aid and services for thailand and neighbouring countries. large international ngos such as world vision international have cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 93 head offices and field offices throughout thailand and neighbouring gms countries, and christian tans such as chab dai also have a strong presence and campaign reach throughout the region. in thailand, since the atmosphere of suspicion in the 1970s when, during the height of the communist party of thailand’s insurgent activities, grassroots-level ngos were accused of being communist front organisations, the ngo-government relationship has come a long way to at least the beginnings of sustained coordination (pednekar, 1995). recent decades have seen tans in the gms region play an increasingly influential role in framing the debate around a wide variety of international policy concerns (ratner, 2003, p. 75). the government of thailand has accepted that ngos do not work against the system and that they are often effective in overseeing projects at grassroots levels (pednekar, 1995). ngos too are beginning to accept that they alone provide no alternative to development and that their job is to complement the work of government and official donor organisations (ruland and ladavalya, 1991, p. 58). the development of thai ngos has run parallel with recent socioeconomic changes. the initial wave of ngos concentrated on health, literacy and economic activities as a means of promoting overall human development (pednekar, 1995). securing funding will become a more challenging task for thai ngos as external funding which, according to one estimate, accounts for 70 90 per cent of the budget of most ngos, is declining (pednekar, 1995). with its rising economic prosperity, thailand is receiving significantly lower funding from external agencies (pednekar, 1995). in most cases in southeast asia, tans are interested in creating linkages and coalitions among diverse types of actors operating on different scales (local, national, and international) in order to respond to various political contexts (turner & caouette, 2009, p. 965). turner and caouette also highlight the fact that there are a number of dilemmas and choices when transnational networks seek to bring local perspectives to the regional and global scales (2009, p. 965). measuring the effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks the term ‘effectiveness’ is a complex one and the term’s meaning when applied to analysing advocacy networks provides a challenge for advocacy network staff and scholars alike. tans rarely conduct research projects to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of their programs and campaigns. this poses inevitable problems for measuring the effectiveness of advocacy 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 network collaboration and the perceived or actual success of their collective campaigns. furthermore, in ignoring the question of network and campaign effectiveness, networks are also ignoring questions of accountability in tans. accountability in this sense refers to the networks’ accountability to those they claim to support, that is, the recipients of their campaigning, as well as the international donors who fund their advocacy work. atkinson and scurrah suggest that there are two aspects to the issue of organisational accountability – accountability to those who fund and support them, and accountability to those whom they wish to help (2009, p. 214). there is also a significant and powerful informal accountability that these organisations have to the members of the public (atkinson & scurrah, 2009, p. 214). unless an organisation can maintain the trust and good-will of those who donate money to it or support its campaigns, its ability to function and its financial viability will be undermined (atkinson & scurrah, 2009, p. 214). foreman suggests that accountability is a function important to any governance structure and that, from a top-down perspective at least, ngo boards hold staff accountable to the mission and principles of the organisation while, in turn, ngo governing boards must be accountable to multiple stakeholders – donors, partner organisations or members, and the poor or the beneficiaries of the ngos’ work (1999, pp. 179 180). critics such as hulme and edwards (1997) highlight the obstacles to having a broad base of stakeholders and suggest that ngos focus too much on the demands of donors and the conceptions of ‘accountability’ developed by donors. schweigert argues that questions of effectiveness are part of a fundamental human effort to make sense of experience, an effort that is necessary for any understanding of reality and at the same time an effort that is always problematic (2006, p. 419). it is problematic not merely because human experience is endlessly extensive but because causal understanding in itself is ultimately a leap from evidence to understanding and a leap that requires, in the difficult cases that concern scientists and evaluators, some method to assure the inferential leap is justified (schweigert, 2006, p. 419). consequently accountability based on standards of effectiveness appeals to a criterion that rests on a problem requiring methodological solution, and conversely, effectiveness cannot be reduced to the straightforward administrative function of accountability despite their similarities (schweigert, 2006, p. 419). atkinson and scurrah in discussing the question of effectiveness, pose the important question what characterises an organisation that can be regarded as legitimate, as usefully adding to the debate about issues in the south (or any other issue) from one that cannot? they argue that the characteristics would include having knowledge that is solidly based on research and/or cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 95 experience, being recognised by other legitimate bodies as having useful knowledge or expertise to bring to the debate, and being sensitive to the views of those who are being spoken for or about (atkinson & scurrah, 2009, p. 208). the scholars stress, however, that this route to legitimacy through democratic effectiveness or usefulness gives a ‘voice but not a vote’ and ‘it conveys the right to speak, to have views heard, but not the right to take part in decision making’ (atkinson & scurrah, 2009, pp. 208-209). other scholars suggest that better organisational evaluation is not merely a matter of better or more measurement (ostrower, 2005). without a clear conception of effectiveness, organisations cannot assess, quantitatively or otherwise, how close they are to the mark, and thus risk adopting measures first and then adjusting their conceptions to fit the measures (ostrower, 2005). with careful discernment of organisational aims and values, organisations can take better advantage of continual improvements in evaluation methods and designs and avoid being attracted away from their fundamental purposes by new technologies of data collection, new methods of analysis, and anecdotal accounts or program success (ostrower, 2005). in today’s world ngos are hard-pressed to know what they have achieved in their advocacy work, and hence what they should be accountable for (hudson, 2001, p. 339). organisations balance and prioritise their relationships with other organisations on the basis of values, whether these values concern profit-maximisation, increasing market-share, empowering the poor, or generating transnational solidarity (hudson, 2001, p. 344). more precisely, the ways in which organisations balance and prioritise their relationships with other organisations reflect what their real, in contrast to simply stated values are (hudson, 2001, p. 344). the prevailing view in the networking literature has been that interdependent groups of two or more organisations that consciously collaborate and cooperate with one another are more effective at providing a complex array of community-based services than the same organisations are able to do when they go their own ways (alter and hage, 1993). cooperation is particularly appealing when the profit motive is absent because the potential downsides of cooperation such as reduced autonomy, shared resources, and increased dependence, are less likely to be seen as a threat to organisational survival (provan and milward, 2001, p. 415). 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 assessing the effectiveness of tans is not an easy task and assessing the effectiveness of a network is much more complex than evaluating that of a single organisation (provan and milward, 2006, p. 416). a significant challenge lies in the fact that the analysis of multiple organisations requires dealing with multiple sets of constituencies, and the joint production of services may satisfy clients with multiple needs but it may also raise problems regarding resource sharing, political battles and so on (provan and milward, 2001, p. 416). measuring tan effectiveness therefore is not a straight forward task and is rendered even more complicated by competing internal and external factors. findings: measuring anti-child trafficking tans’ effectiveness barriers to measuring tan effectiveness the design of the interview questionnaire for this study took into consideration the fact that most tans would not have regular monitoring and evaluation activities in place to measure their processes and outcomes. because of the fluid nature of tans, and their unique and often changing structures, tans would probably spend more time and resources managing internal relationships rather than expending energy on measuring the quality of these relationships and their campaign achievements. thus the interviews contained questions to gauge tan experts’ perceptions on what they believed were areas of effectiveness, whether that be solid relationships amongst partners, effective resource distribution, information sharing, or campaign reach. the interviews revealed a number of key elements of effectiveness that provide valuable insight into the tan effectiveness question. more data might be available on the effectiveness of tans and their campaigns if monitoring and evaluation activities were undertaken regularly. however, for all the tans observed for this research, these activities were rare. as initially hypothesised, research participant interviews demonstrated that there was little attention among tans to systematically assess the effectiveness of direct and indirect prevention and advocacy efforts. anti-trafficking programs and projects were often designed by those running the organisations without baseline data and little research initially went into the planning and implementation of a significant number of projects. many of the projects had no reported outcomes that were directly related to reducing the number of victims trafficked. in reporting on their work ngo networks often referred to activities that took place and the number of participants involved, but there was no attached measurement of how these activities had been beneficial and to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 97 whom. without measures of attitude change or changes in the public’s knowledge of trafficking it was unknown whether the programs were having any effect and were an efficient use of donor funds. when interventions were developed without sound methods for assessing their effects it was possible that they were ineffective or, worse, had unintended negative effects. yet campaigning without monitoring and evaluating the impact of the campaigns seemed to be the norm in a significant number of tans observed for this research. a problem for tans in measuring network and campaign effectiveness was that a significant amount of tan campaigning consisted of ‘awareness raising’, which was extremely difficult to evaluate in terms of reach and impact. awareness raising activities had historically avoided monitoring and evaluation analysis by tans due to the difficulties in quantifying their impact on the public. research participant interviews highlighted the fact that after two decades of ‘awareness raising’ of human trafficking in western countries a fatigue had developed amongst the anti-trafficking community regarding the usefulness of these awareness raising campaigns. some anti-trafficking experts were very critical of the ambiguity of trying to enhance the western world’s ‘awareness’ of human trafficking at all, and believed that the world was now, as an expert stated, “well aware” of the trafficking problem. in referring to the recent body shop anti-sex trafficking campaign, a research participant had the following criticism of awareness raising campaigns, conducted in western countries, on sex trafficking: i’m not completely sure that rubbing yourself with ginger after you’ve taken a shower is really going to help too much but the body shop wants that. but it’s hard then to move to “what has actually happened?” no one is ever held responsible for programs. we ask – “what are you doing?” the answer is “oh we’re raising awareness”. maybe twenty years ago you were raising awareness. i’m not sure there is much of an impact. experts also criticised other ‘awareness raising’ activities such as the targeting of middle range and higher end hotels in anti-sex tourism and anti-sex trafficking campaigns: the accor group of hotels has taken a strong stance on child sex trafficking. but how many paedophiles were taking children to the accor hotels to begin with? generally they go to 2 star hotels. it’s nice that they did this but there is little impact. 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 these examples highlight the importance of strategic planning when developing antitrafficking campaigns. as the examples suggest, it is important for tans to consider who anti-trafficking awareness raising campaigns are designed to target. misguided campaigns such as in the examples provided above mean that tans waste valuable donor funds and miss reaching important target audiences. these examples also highlight the challenges for tans in measuring the effectiveness of campaigns that cannot truly be quantified. the fact that experts in the gms were already critical of the validity of the campaigns suggests that an evaluation of their effectiveness would result in rather dismal findings. on the flip side if more tans monitored and evaluated their campaigns and project work they may find some hard evidence that they are making an impact, or achieving very little, and could subsequently be able to better direct their advocacy efforts. with these and other barriers to measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of tans in mind, such as the lack of funding and resources for performing monitoring and evaluation, during data collection i endeavoured to identify other means of conceptualising tan effectiveness. the research participant interviews highlighted a number of key tan effectiveness ‘elements’. these ‘key elements’ can be understood as the core principles highlighted by experts as essential for tans to ensure their sustainability and effectiveness. not all antitrafficking experts were unanimous on the key elements and there was some dissent particularly regarding the importance of the tan having a sound structure as a requirement for tan success. however, overall there was consensus that these key elements were essential for tan success and that if networks were to thrive and be sustainable they must incorporate these principles into their structures and daily practices. the following section of the article summarises a select number of these key elements. ‘key elements’ of tan effectiveness key element 1. tan partners need to share common anti-trafficking values and goals. a commonly expressed sentiment in the interviews was that in order to be effective, tans must incorporate members with similar anti-trafficking values and goals. anti-trafficking experts emphasised this point repeatedly and suggested that it was ‘perhaps the most important principle for successful advocacy networking’. one expert explained that his network believed so strongly in the importance of shared values and commitment to antitrafficking work that an affiliation process had been designed for new partners wanting to join the network. during this affiliation process ngos had to prove their values, their cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 99 commitment to anti-human trafficking activities, their knowledge of human trafficking and their enthusiasm to conduct anti-trafficking activities. the network would assign ngos a number of tasks to perform to ‘test’ whether ngos had the values, capacity and resolve to do the work prior to organisations becoming affiliated with the network. this may appear an obvious key element to tan success, but experts lamented the fact that ngos frequently sought to join tans without demonstrating an adequate commitment to the tan. some ngos sought to leverage off the tan without reflecting on what the ngo could bring to the tan in terms of skills and knowledge. affiliation processes were therefore a positive means of determining ngos’ commitment to the tan and its anti-trafficking campaign activities. values and anti-trafficking commitment were two themes closely linked by research participants. they emphasised the point that ngos were not simply ‘good’ just because they were ngos. ngos must prove their mettle and their commitment and values in their campaigning activities: we need to find partners with strong skills and commitment to do the activities. if you don’t have commitment how can you do it? so we talk openly amongst the partners about this. if we have commitment we have a strong voice. if there’s no commitment there’s no voice. the interviews supported another hypothesis, which was that organisations form partnerships in tans because they believe that through uniting their values and resources, they will have a wider campaign reach. a common thread in the interviews was the idea that, as one interview participant stated, ‘united we’re going to make a difference’. if organisations worked independently of each other, ‘those small delicious projects’, as one expert stated, would ‘not achieve much’. it was from this common commitment, vision, and shared value system that organisations found partners to work with and that tans developed: we always ask ourselves – how do we take what works and doesn’t work and do that next step? we have partners and we can grab their hand two at a time and walk down the path together. it’s a case of ensuring it’s not us who is imposing our views on them but collectively coming to the decision that we should go a certain direction because this organisation offers something, and this other organisation offers something. to get to that point we need to work together. it’s a clumsy process sometimes. if you don’t have a vision and a sense of where you’re going, some organisations never get anywhere. 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 keck and sikkink have pointed to two factors concerning the political outcomes of tans: issue and actor characteristics (1998, p. 26). the researchers argued that networks tend to be most successful when they mobilise around value-laden issues “involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, especially when there is a short and clear causal chain assigning responsibility” (keck & sikkink, 1998, p. 27). therefore successful campaigning and mobilisation is likely to occur around the first type of issue involving physical harm to innocent persons in the case of this study, children. the tans studied here focused a significant proportion of their campaigning on the child victim of trafficking and potential victims of trafficking. interview data reflected the desire to network from a programmatic point of view. in order to improve child protection systems it was necessary to have interested groups working together to build functioning systems in countries where such systems were still in a state of underdevelopment: it’s trying to develop, work with other partners to develop, standards for child protection and a common understanding of what is child protection because it’s not always an area that’s understood. there’s not a lot of consensus, and in terms of looking at building a system you obviously need coordination between partners, it makes sense from a programmatic point of view. it makes sense that you need people, especially in the area of child protection, you need coordination, you need people working together, you need all the systems working together, you need people who have an understanding of the issue. because by nature it’s a very multisectoral area you have to have people working together if you actually want to improve the system. key element 1 therefore demonstrates that for tans to be effective, partners must have a shared commitment to anti-trafficking activities and shared cosmopolitan values. tans preferred partners with experience in the field and expertise in anti-trafficking advocacy. some tans had stringent affiliation processes to check that these values and commitment were present. this was less frequently the case with smaller ngo networks that had in many instances already worked collaboratively with network partners on previous campaigns and adopted more fluid structures cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 101 key element 2. tans should include not just ngos but also un agencies and government partners. in addition to the importance of having shared values and commitment, anti-trafficking experts suggested that tans were most effective when they incorporated partners from ngos, un agencies, and governments. there was consensus in the interviews that interagency collaboration across all sectors was crucial to effective advocacy against child sex trafficking. for example, in order for agencies to work effectively on victim protection, tans needed to first have a good working relationship with the police so that they could collaboratively work in a way that best assisted the trafficking victims. inter-agency networks such as uniap, by virtue of their history and structure, were already composed of partners from ngos, un agencies and governments and were therefore already collaborating across multiple sectors. the call for improved government-ngo-un agency collaboration came more from the various ngo networks that concentrated a large proportion of their work on protecting and rehabilitating victims. research participants from all types of ngo networks expressed a desire to work with un and government partners either regularly or on an ad hoc basis when the need arose, even though this kind of inter-agency collaboration was often described as a ‘difficult’ and ‘tedious’. interviews for this study revealed that tan members desire inter-agency collaboration for a number of reasons. partnering with un agencies in tans enabled ngo members to gain access to the un’s expertise and capacity on trafficking, training programs and access to governments. the un often represented ngos in national and regional fora, therefore by partnering with the un, ngos were ensuring that their ‘voice’ was heard at a higher political level. this was particularly important for southern ngos that frequently lacked a voice with their own governments and in international fora. partnering with un agencies also sometimes enabled ngos to source new avenues of funding. the interviews revealed that ngos collaborated with governments in tans in order to train government staff on human trafficking issues and improve government capacity to fight trafficking. ngos also networked with gms governments to improve anti-trafficking policy and legislation and facilitate collaborative victim rescues and arrests of paedophiles. there was consensus in the interviews that it was also important for ngos to network with un agencies and governments in order to be able to better plan for victim services. one expert 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 explained how the network she was involved in worked closely with the police on child rescues and paedophile arrests. when the network was made aware of a paedophile in the thai locality the staff would immediately call their police counterparts and, working with the witness (often a child living on the street) they would organise the arrest of the paedophile. the expert explained that local children ‘did not trust the police’ so would not report cases of abuse directly to police but, rather, would contact her organisation. research participants from un agencies explained that from the un perspective, partnering with ngos was essential in order to have access to child victims of trafficking and a presence ‘on the ground’. ngos were the organisations predominantly responsible for managing protection shelters for trafficked children. ngos, particularly grassroots ngos, had a strong presence and considerable expertise working in the field with victims and at-risk groups. without links to grassroots ngos, the un’s access to these aid beneficiaries and trafficking victims was greatly hampered. key element 2 therefore demonstrates the importance of engaging partners from all antitrafficking sectors (ngos, un agencies and governments) in tans against child trafficking. in partnering with members from diverse sectors, tans are able to leverage different skills sets and expertise to improve campaign reach and to have a stronger political voice. through partnering with diverse groups across all sectors tans are better able to plan for, and meet, the needs of victims and are therefore more effective at achieving their network goals. key element 3. anti-trafficking networks should balance the ‘voice’ of northern and southern ngo partners in tans. as discussed in key element 2 effective tans consisted of partners from all sectors, including ngos from both the north and the south. north-south collaboration was a key aspect of network politics, however, while the desire to network across all sectors appeared a truly voluntary commitment, some networking relationships with grassroots ngos were considered ‘forced’ partnerships by a number of research participants and a necessity rather than a truly voluntary decision. the attitude expressed by some northern experts of networking with southern organisations as “just getting on with it” suggested that collaborative north-south relationships in tans did not always progress smoothly. nonetheless north-south ngo networking remained a necessity for tans to effectively cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 103 identify, access and assist child trafficking victims. key element 3 touches on the important theme of ‘voice’ within networks and explains how a balance of power and voice is essential if tans are to be effective. representatives from inter-agency networks expressed a desire to see more southern ngos represented in tans and lamented the fact that the grassroots ngo voice was ‘represented’ by larger peak and global ngos in international fora. while inter-agency networks had devised strategies to ensure that the voice of the southern ngos was heard, for example, through rotating chairs within national taskforces, there was still frustration that the structure of the network did not allow for southern ngos to have a stronger voice in the tan. southern partners expressed a desire to have a partnership in tans, as one expert stated, ‘based on genuine dialogue, where their own experience is recognised and where northern ngo partners are more transparent about the decision-making processes within tans’. some tans, particularly the larger ngo international networks, appeared to maintain a customer-client attitude to networking with southern ngos. southern ngos enabled northern ngos to access child victims of trafficking while northern ngos provided southern partners with important resources and funding. a core problem in equalising the power balance between the northern and southern network members lay in the unequal resources between the two groups. northern ngos were significantly better funded and resourced than their southern counterparts. instances of negative networking between northern and southern network members due to resource related tensions sometimes led grassroots ngos to leave tans. research findings suggest that the power dynamics in tan relationships may reinforce organisational hierarchies and patterns of exclusion. to counter this some networks, particularly inter-agency networks, had systems in place to prevent instances of north-south conflict. instead of merely funding southern ngos and, as an expert stated, ‘leaving them to their own devices’, these networks would endeavour to ‘hold the hand’ of southern ngos and train them ‘collaboratively’ to ‘increase their capacity’. some scholars such as smith (2002) argue that this kind of conflict is not without its benefits. smith has argued that gaps between northern and southern members persist, but that some good north-south relationships can arise from this kind of forced partnership for a common good (2002, p. 505). 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 key element 3 therefore demonstrates the importance of balancing north-south voices in tans. key element 3 touches on some of the obstacles to promoting cosmopolitan values. even within networks, whose aim is to promote these values, there are internal issues surrounding voice and equality. before networks can hope to successfully promote equality they must first balance their own internal power relationships. key element 4. tans should be composed of partners with diverse skills, not partners doing “exactly the same kind of work”. research participant interviews revealed that tan strength is derived from the diversity of its members. moreover, while organisations may want to network, competition occurs between partner organisations and this can lead to instances of conflict amongst network members that regularly compete over donor funds, branding and reputation. the interviews with anti-trafficking experts brought to light the importance of organisational diversity in networks as a means of reducing instances of conflict between partner organisations. research participants couldn’t ‘emphasise enough’ that anti-trafficking tans ‘should partner with organisations with complementary skills, not with organisations doing exactly the same kind of work’. two decades of experience in the anti-trafficking advocacy field has taught tan staff that it is better to diversify members to increase capacity and capability rather than have partners with similar skills sets and performing similar tasks, which only led to activity repetition and conflict between partners. diversity of network partners meant, for example, that some ngos could concentrate on the protection of trafficking victims while others focused on child trafficking prevention activities. through operating in tans, partners were thus able to better meet the legal, health, shelter and service needs of victims. although victim protection was the main focus of tans’ campaigning, network partners spent considerable time performing other activities such as training police, working to improve human trafficking legislation, lobbying governments, organising and conducting rescues in conjunction with police, and conducting awareness raising campaigns. when faced with a large number of victims, networks needed to have the capacity and resources to deal with all aspects of victim protection and rehabilitation. performing all tasks simultaneously was beyond the scope of any individual organisation’s expertise and capacity. when cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 105 organisations operated in tans with partners with different areas of expertise they were able to better meet the needs of the victims and target their campaigns more broadly. this meant that the networks’ impact was stronger and that victims’ needs were better met. i spent six months working for an international ngo in thailand, where i was able to witness first-hand the tensions that can arise amongst tan partners. the ngo i worked for has a very good reputation in the region and attracts significant amounts of international funding for its anti-trafficking advocacy and policy work. it is similar in size and budget to another international ngo that also has a strong presence in the region. the two ngos have historically worked together on anti-trafficking campaigns, however, these partnerships have not always progressed smoothly. it was difficult to divide tasks between the two ngos, who ultimately competed for reputation and donor funding, and therefore both wanted to enhance their branding. conflict arose primarily over task-distribution, and also over product output, funding arrangements, and, indeed, campaign goals. ultimately, these tensions were smoothed over by the individuals who represented the ngos, and the better the relationships between ngo representatives, the more effective the campaign would progress. some anti-trafficking tans in the gms had processes in place to ensure that partners were complementary to existing members in the network and not performing exactly the same activities or services. as this expert’s comment suggests, network representatives placed considerable emphasis on the value of organisations partnering with organisations that complemented their anti-trafficking work: there’s really no point hooking up with someone who is doing exactly the same thing. i can’t overstate that. it would be far better for you to find someone who is doing something slightly different and which complements what you’re doing. research participants also explained that by networking with organisations with complementary skills they were also able to prevent disruption to network function when a member left the tan. diversity of tan partners provided a kind of safety net for when partners left the network and a gap in expertise or victim services was created by partner attrition. in those tans that possessed diversity in partner membership, other partners could quickly step in to fill knowledge and service gaps. 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 key element 4 therefore demonstrates that a key principle to effective advocacy networking against trafficking in the gms is that tans must consist of partners with complementary skills, rather than partners with similar expertise, or performing similar anti-trafficking activities. this is important for ensuring that networks can assist large numbers of beneficiaries with diverse needs. by networking with organisations with complementary skills, tans could also ensure that there was less chance of duplication of programs and services, that important campaign messages were streamlined, that a gap was not left when an organisation decided to leave the network, and that instances of conflict between network members, who were naturally in competition over funding, branding and prestige, were avoided. diversity of tan members also meant that campaign reach and impact with gms citizens and governments was stronger. key element 5. networks should have strong structures and a secretariat. research participants revealed that for tans to be effective, they must have sound and transparent structures. interviews with anti-trafficking experts reflected a preference for structured networks with a secretariat or a central coordinating office that was responsible for communicating tan activities and relaying information between tan partners. while such a strong structure may invoke impressions of cumbersome, conservative, bureaucratic structures, this was not often the case in anti-trafficking tans in the gms. in this region, the tan secretariat or coordinating office acted as the backbone of the advocacy network and provided the coordination and communication centre that the tan required in order to share information with its diverse partners and coordinate campaign activities. anti-trafficking experts suggested that it was beneficial for tans to have terms of reference, individual ownership of tasks, a strong secretariat, rotating chairs, joint leadership plans, and the flexibility to change the direction of the tan and its activities. this structure seemed to be most popular amongst networks that needed it, for example, inter-agency networks that incorporated partners from government, ngos, and un agencies and that focused on developing laws and policy on prosecution and that had specific targets for achieving certain policy goals. some participants in the more structured networks such as inter-agency networks emphasised the importance of designing specific network rules, for example, through memoranda of understanding or agreements about how the organisations were to interact and treat each other, as well as their roles and responsibilities in the tan. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 107 the inter-agency network, uniap, provides a good example of the importance of sound structure to tan effectiveness. uniap was established in 2000 with a mandate to strengthen the coordination of organisations in the fight against trafficking in the region and to implement a wide range of protection, rehabilitation and reintegration programs. in 2004, uniap brought together the governments of thailand, laos, myanmar, cambodia, china and vietnam, thirteen un agencies and many local and international ngos to establish the coordinated mekong ministerial initiative against trafficking (commit). commit was the first regional instrument to make a serious effort to institutionalise a multi-sectoral approach to make certain that the responsibilities and commitments made in the memoranda of understanding between gms governments were implemented in accordance with international norms and standards. the articles within the subregional plan of action specifically referred to the need for governments to work together with international organisations and ngos to close all avenues of exploitation (jayagupta, 2009, p. 236). in thailand, a number of memoranda of understanding have been developed to strengthen interagency coordination. the memorandum of understanding on the operations and nongovernment organisations engaged in addressing trafficking in children and women focused on cooperation between government agencies and ngos, while the memorandum of understanding on the operational guidelines of non-government organisations concerned with cases of trafficking in women and children addressed cooperation and action within the ngo community (jayagupta, 2009, p. 233). the memoranda of understanding provided for operational taskforces on rescues and suppression of trafficking crimes, and comprised representatives from government agencies and ngos forming a multi-disciplinary team (jayagupta, 2009, p. 233). uniap has proved to be a highly effective network for the coordination of a significant number of the diverse anti-trafficking organisations and networks in the region. uniap not only hosts commit but also acts as a coordinating office for the gms governments, many northern and southern ngos, and un agencies, providing them with platforms for discussion, coordinating workshops and seminars, and acting as a central resource and information hub. tan structure was crucial to uniap and it drew heavily on its structure to determine inter-agency cooperation, partner tasks and responsibilities, the development of policy and legislation, and trainings. without its sound structure, secretariat, and its mandate to coordinate anti-trafficking stakeholders, uniap would have not been able to make the significant contributions it has already made to the gms region including government cooperation, the development of memoranda of 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 understanding between governments, government capacity building, and the streamlining of human trafficking campaign messages in the region. key element 5 demonstrates that the structure of the tan determines the important flows of communication between network partners. this constant flow of communication and information keeps tan partners fully cognisant of their roles and responsibilities within the network, and network activities and campaigns. sound network structure means that network partners can have a ‘voice’ in the tan by communicating to other partners directly or through the tan’s secretariat or other coordinating office. the centrality of tans in combating child sex trafficking in the gms when tans are successful in incorporating the key elements discussed in previous pages, they can be extremely effective in protecting children, performing valuable advocacy, and providing victim services. in the gms transnational advocacy networking against child trafficking has enabled organisations with different mandates and expertise to share skills and capacity for a broader and improved response to child trafficking including prevention, protection, and prosecution activities and rehabilitation of victims. in addition, by networking against this problem, tans have been able to have a stronger voice in lobbying for new child trafficking policy and legislation, and improved opportunities for working collaboratively on improving child protection systems in the gms. most importantly, transnational advocacy networking has contributed to a redistribution of knowledge, power, influence and material resources from the rich north to the core southern actors working on the ground in local ngos in the gms. advocacy networking against child trafficking in the gms has helped to ensure a number of important benefits for victims. foremost amongst these has been the benefit that victims are able to access a wide range of services. tans have facilitated the streamlining of victim services and once victims are identified, tans have been effective in referring victims to partner agencies for a range of protection and rehabilitation services. in addition, tans are helping vulnerable children acquire knowledge and tool sets to mitigate their risks of exploitation. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 109 tans in the gms are also facilitating effective collaboration among law enforcement agencies across jurisdictions so that bureaucratic obstacles are minimised and perpetrators of child trafficking do not escape justice. improved prevention-oriented coordination has facilitated the involvement of all sectors of society so that anti-trafficking networks can move toward the ultimate goal of preventing the exploitation of children. in providing such victim services, and through the direct sharing of global political economy knowledge, tans are bringing an equal level of counter-activity to a social problem that is clearly enhanced, even promoted, by the economic connectedness of the globalisation of criminal networks that sell children’s sexual labour as a commodity. a further major benefit of collaboration through tans is that anti-trafficking campaigns can reach all corners of the globe rather than just a small geographic corner. campaigns have been adapted and developed to target citizens not just in the gms but also in a large number of developed countries to teach them about slavery, trafficking and ethical consumerism and make the west aware of the strict penalties imposed on those who travel to poorer countries to sexually abuse children. this expansive outreach, beyond the borders of the gms, and the incorporation of cultural difference and engagement, reflects the essentially cosmopolitan nature of tans and provides an important model for addressing global social problems. individual anti-trafficking organisations, particularly grassroots ngos, have little ‘voice’ with states and the gms community in campaigning for child trafficking prevention and victim protection. however, when organisations unite in tans they are able to share resources, knowledge and skills and thus have a stronger campaign reach and impact in the gms community and a stronger political voice with states. with a united voice tan members are providing an effective buffer against child trafficking. as one expert commented, ‘there is real value in coming together, the voices together are a lot more difficult to quiet than on their own’. conclusion in a similar vein to the women’s rights and other social justice movements, tans in the gms are promoting cosmopolitan notions of global justice and supporting the creation of global fora to fight child trafficking. through conventional and unconventional advocacy activities such as rock concerts and social media campaigns, anti-trafficking tans have been successful in broadening their appeal by reaching out to members of the public who may not 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 be able to join protest marches but are willing to engage in and support ‘innovative activities with a critical edge’ (kurasawa, 2004, p. 251). further, anti-trafficking tans’ development of fora and involvement in creating new legislation have pushed the child trafficking issue onto the global social policy agenda and promoted the goal of universal child rights. this article has discussed the importance of understanding tan effectiveness and considering new ways of measuring tan success and effectiveness. it has discussed barriers to measuring tan effectiveness, and suggested that a way of manoeuvring around the difficult task of measuring the immeasurable is to examine the ‘key elements’ of effectiveness that tan experts have identified. the article has discussed a number of these key elements and explained how the key elements are essential to ensuring network sustainability and success. core principles of tan effectiveness include inter-agency collaboration; the balancing of power and voice between northern and southern tan partners; diversity in expertise and capacity of tan partners to meet the needs of victims; and a strong and transparent network structure to ensure efficient communication flow between tan partners. when tans achieve these key elements, they can be extremely effective. the success of 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advocacy networks deanna davy university of sydney abstract introduction child sex trafficking definitions and estimates, and dynamics recent literature on the dynamics and activities of tans transnational advocacy networks in southeast asia measuring the effectiveness of transnational advocacy networks findings: measuring anti-child trafficking tans’ effectiveness the centrality of tans in combating child sex trafficking in the gms from everyday information behaviours to clickable solidarity in a place called social media bhuva narayan university of technology, sydney the vision of a citizen-designed, citizen-controlled worldwide communications network is a version of technological utopianism that could be called the vision of “the electronic agora.” in the original democracy, athens, the agora was the marketplace, and more – it was where citizens met to talk, gossip, argue, size each other up, find the weak spots in political ideas by debating about them. howard rheingold, the virtual community, 1993, para.59. abstract the article is a research essay based on a thematic interdisciplinary literature-review that examines social media using the lens of selected theories and concepts in information science and allied disciplines such as communication and media ecology. the specific focus of the article is how social media has altered our notion of cyberspace from being an abstract information space to being perceived as an actual place, for social media more than any other digital media before it, embodies cyberspace and reifies it as a real place, both in our everyday lives and in our public spheres. anything can happen in this dynamic and heterogeneous place, just as it can in a real place, including protests and revolutions. introduction although there is no agreed-upon definition of information society, scholars generally agree that we live in one (webster 2002). the concept of society in itself is a modern notion that goes beyond the nineteenth-century notions of collectivist traditional community predicated on place and vicinity (agnew 2011, p.316). it is not rooted in any one place, and hence one can be part of a society irrespective of geographical boundaries. in fact, we can be ‘apart together’ (huizinga 1950, p. 12) in an information society. with the rise of social media combined with the ubiquity of mobile internet devices, many of us are even ‘alone together’ (turkle 2011, p.1); that is, we may be present together in a physical space, but still be alone and ‘telepresent’ elsewhere, living in a ‘pocket technospace’ (richardson 2007, p.205), interacting with others who may not be with us, using haptic communications. many have proposed also that we are already moving from an information society to a network culture, ‘characterized by an unprecedented abundance of informational output and by an acceleration of informational dynamics [between people]’ (terranova 2004, p. 1). this evolution from community to society to network culture is notable but in many ways it is a natural 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia progression in that connectivity is no good without people to connect. thus, while moving the focus away from the individual to community to society to connectivity, social media has also moved us further from mere connectivity into hyper-connectivity and a network culture, where the network, rather than the network’s actors, becomes the focus of the culture. in this network culture, social media has become more than just another network in cyberspace, being a shared and lived-in global space that spans most of the world and is influencing many aspects of our lives. we do our personal socialising on facebook, we build and share our professional networks on twitter, we publicise our cvs on linkedin, we seek answers on social question and answer sites such as yahoo answers, we read socially on goodreads, we eat socially on yelp, we continually disseminate our views to the world on blogs, and we watch the news on youtube; there is some form of social media network to fulfil every aspect of our everyday lives. in many ways, social media technologies have already supplanted the home letterbox, the office mailbox, and television in many people’s lives. this is possible because it is an affordance to co-experience that helps us simultaneously experience and share our world with others by transcending not just spatial distances, but also temporal distances. in doing so, social media platforms have become tangible and real places where we gather in intended and unintended ways and this has the potential to nurture democracy and civil society, sometimes in dynamic and unexpected ways. this article explores the place of social media in contemporary civil society by examining social media as a place in and of itself where people search for, seek, find, use and share information for their personal, private, and public spheres. it does so using approaches from information science, an interdisciplinary field ‘that investigates the properties and behaviour of information, the forces governing the flow of information, and the means of processing information for optimum accessibility and usability’ (borko 1968, p.3). this includes the study of human information behaviours or the totality of human behaviours (both cognitive and affective) with respect to information, and draws upon insights from varied fields such as cognitive psychology, sociology, human learning, organisational behaviour, communications studies, philology, anthropology, evolutionary biology and philosophy. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 33 social media as an information space social media is fuelled by information, just as the internet and other digital media before it, but the information on social media is different from other media in that we are not just consumers of the information on it, but are also active producers of information within it. the term prosumers developed in the context of a market economy by alvin toffler (1980) has been applied to our so-called information economy where we are simultaneously producers and consumers of information (tapscott 1997) and to social media where we are now produsers or both producers and users of content (bruns 2009). irrespective of the purpose of production and use of information, social media is fundamentally an information space that is transformed into a place through human interactions that create co-experience or an experience in a social context that is shared, interpreted and given meaning with others (forlizzi and battarbee 2004); this co-experience can be perceived through different lenses – sociologists might see it as a social space, communication researchers as a communication space, artists as a creative space and so on. this article will focus mainly on social media as an information space and use spatial metaphors and theories to make sense of how we use this space, and how we transform it into a place. in many ways, social media is the contemporary incarnation of the internet, which is a complex information-and-communication environment, very much analogous to physical environments, but consisting of symbolic rather than physical matter (postman 1979). all social networks (be they physical or online) are also information environments and people engage in information behaviours within this environment. information behaviour is the ‘totality of human behaviours with reference to information including unintentional or passive behaviours such as glimpsing or encountering information’ (wilson 2000, p.49) as well as ‘purposive behaviours that do not involve seeking, such as actively avoiding information’ (case 2012, p.5). increasingly this information is coming to us through social media channels. it is estimated that one-third of all new content on the world wide web is created on social media sites (most of it born-digital information) and accounts for 20% of all time spent online across the world, with social media reaching 82% of the world’s online population in 2011 (comscore 2011). the term social media represents a plurality of concepts and platforms rather than one singular notion, but the essential underlying architecture of all social media is the same – one that enables multipoint to multipoint (group) interactions, with very little structure or 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 hierarchy; that is, it allows not just for one to many, or many to one, but also many to many and peer to peer interaction along with choice, where person a can follow person b without person b making the same decision to follow person a. there is no physical space in cyberspace; instead, it is a de-centred network of computers that span spatial and temporal boundaries, with no imposed order or hierarchy, allowing immediate connections between any of its points in the same way that deleuze and guattari (1987, p. 7) described rhizomatous connections. this means also that individuals have increasingly differentiated ways to interact with people and with information in their everyday lives. this sets apart social media sites from previous iterations of digital communities in that they not only allow individuals to meet strangers, but also that they allow users to create, manage, control, and make visible their social networks to those they choose, hence forming a transparent community space with its implicit rules and codes of conduct which is fundamentally an information space (boyd & ellison 2007; haythornwaite 2005). social media as a place for information the rise of social media is adding more dimensions to our notions of place where we voluntarily or involuntarily become part of a public space termed networked publics or ‘an imagined collective that emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, and practice’ (boyd 2010, p.39). people come together in this network from across geographical divides and spatial and temporal divisions in the spirit of habermas’ positive and vibrant public sphere where none who are able and wish to join are excluded (habermas 1989, p27). this helps make social media a public place (juris 2012) while also making social media a place in and of itself – ‘a place to go to, a place to be in, a place to gather, and a place to be seen in’ (narayan, talip, watson, edwards 2013, p.1). this influences how people seek, share, communicate, collaborate and disseminate information. in short, they influence our information behaviours, not just within this information space but also in our everyday lives. so how does cyberspace become a place? in fact, how does any space become a place? the notion of space ‘provides the context for places but derives its meaning from particular places’ (relph 1976, p.8). a space becomes a particular place through the lived human experience that focuses on the mediating role of place in both social relations and the acquisition of meaning (sack 1997; agnew 2011) or in the words of geographer fi-yu tuan ‘place is security, space is freedom: we are attached to the one and long for the other’ (tuan 1977, p.3). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 35 indeed, ‘a place require[s] human agency, is something that may take time to know’ (sack 1997, p.16). while space refers to the specific coordinates or structural qualities of a physical environment, our sense of place is a concept that includes the lived experience, interaction and use of that space by its inhabitants, be they permanent or temporary. in effect, a space becomes a place when we attribute meaning and value to a space, or in other words, the notion of place is socially constructed and consists of ‘repositories and contexts within which interpersonal, community, and cultural relationships occur, and it is to those social relationships [affective, conative and cognitive], not just the place qua place, to which people are attached’ (low & altman 1992, p. 7). these concepts around space/place are important in understanding how we inhabit social media in our everyday lives and also how we use it to engage with information, with society, with the civil sphere, and with the world at large. social media and the challenge of cosmopolitan civil societies sociologist jeffrey alexander urged that we conceive of civil society as a civil sphere, analogous to habermas’ concept of public sphere (habermas 1989) but one that ‘relies on solidarity, on feelings for others whom we do not know but whom we respect out of principle, not experience’ (alexander 2006, p.4); it relies on a wider solidarity alongside personal autonomy. such solidarity requires spaces and practices that enable it and nurture it, and social media platforms provide this space while promoting the patterns of interaction that shape our information practices and is easily integrated into one’s social fabric, making it an ideal candidate for a public sphere. peter dahlgren refines this idea of civil sphere down to a civic culture ‘comprising a number of dynamically interrelated parameters such as values, affinity, knowledge, identities and practices (dahlgren 2005, p.158). this civic culture is evident in most social media sites which group themselves around some common everyday values in which users share other affinities such as common interests with faraway strangers within a familiar space, and where they engage in knowledge sharing, and ‘where the most fundamental and most ubiquitous practice is precisely civic interaction, and discussion’ (dahlgren 2005, p. 159). moreover ‘no organisation “represents” civil society, civil society is a space of participation, not representation’ (kohler-koch & quittkat 2009, p.19). social media provides this space of participation and hence has a legitimate place in our contemporary civil society and our conceptions of cosmopolitanism. 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 although there is no single conceptualisation of cosmopolitanism, the core idea relates to a sense of mutual respect and tolerance within an environment with a diversity of cultures, of being a citizen of the world and spanning boundaries without conflict; a ‘universality plus difference’ [that is neither a naive universalism nor a universal cultural relativism] – ‘a name for something that is a challenge rather than a solution’ (appiah, 2007 p.xv). ulrich beck (2009) proposes that cosmopolitanism is something that underpins the notion of hybridity, as something that ‘rejects the either/or alternative between territorially-bounded national and ethnic identities without denying the historical narrative behind them’ (beck 2009, p.22). previous iterations of the internet were expected to lead to cosmopolitanism – a digital cosmopolitanism. nevertheless, some studies (zuckerman 2010) show that every country gets all but 5% of its information from domestic sources and not from diverse information sources as we would imagine, and in instances where clusters of activity do cross national borders, they flow from pre-existing ethnic identities, as between expatriates and the home country, and hence according to zuckerman (2010) our perception of a digital cosmopolitanism enabled by the internet is simply an imaginary cosmopolitanism. this has also been called cyber-balkanisation (sunstein 2004, p.57) – ‘given the vast number of possible clusters one can associate with, it becomes easy to find a comfortable niche with people just like oneself, among other individuals whose views merely reinforce one's own…giving us the illusion that we are connecting with others’ (2010 para 36). this confirms and connects to information behaviour theories such as selective information seeking and concepts such as one’s information source horizons. individuals generally tend to expose themselves to information that is already in accordance with their interests, needs, or existing attitudes, and avoid information that contradicts them, thus employing selective exposure, and consciously or unconsciously avoid or reject information that does not agree with their world-view or previous experience (jonas et. al 2001; rogers 1983; kuhlthau 1991). from a social and cultural aspect, this points to meaning as fundamentally a shared concept, or all meaning as shared meaning (dervin 1992) involving a sense-making process within a personal frame of reference (kuhlthau 1991). hence, people often stay within their own comfort zones in regard to information seeking and information sharing, rather than venture into zones that involve a lot of sense-making. in a study of young social activists’ use of digital technologies in rwanda, yerbury (2013) found that they did not use the internet to create new connections outside the network of people they cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 37 already knew, and posits that such behaviours could be a hindrance to any attempts at globalised action for social change (yerbury 2013). one’s interests drive one’s everyday information practices, and these interests structure the subject areas of daily life into an order of importance or regions of relevance; these preferences, in turn, are reflected in the construction of one’s information source horizons (savolainen 2007, p. 1712). accomplishments in information technology are often celebrated as tools to advance cosmopolitanism and the ‘global village’ (mcluhan 1964, p 63), or more precisely, that ‘one’s “village” could span the globe’ (wellman and gulia 1999, p.333) by removing the need for physical co-presence via telegraphy, radio, telephony, television, internet etc. nevertheless, some argue that they have had no such effect (zuckerman 2012; agnew 2011), for ‘what [the technologies] did do was [simply] help reconstitute and reorganize spatial relations such that places [in the digital world] were remade and reconfigured’ along existing worldviews and affinities (agnew 2011, p.316). despite the diversity, richness, and accessibility of information in digital media, not all of us can access the different ‘registers of knowledge’ in the digital world because the ‘the keys of knowledge all don't always open the same doors’ (shayegan 1996 translated by silverstone 1999, p.24). these are valid reservations that apply to social spaces as much as they do to digital and social media, but they need to be viewed in the context of social media being predicated on global communication technologies that are not yet accessible to a majority of the world. nevertheless, the spread and reach of these technologies is widening every day and in 2014, the ranking of regions by social network users is expected to reflect regional shares of the global population and also reach more of the younger demographic through mobile social media (pew internet research center 2012; emarketer 2013). hence, digital cosmopolitanism or virtual cosmopolitanism in regard to social media bears studying as it is still an emerging new information environment with great potential to aid cosmopolitanism, for it gives voice to citizens who are often ignored, and can shine light on places often bypassed by mainstream media. it is also an economically and socially viable manner of building social and cultural capital where communication tends to be playful, positive and informal (soukup 2006) and an emerging space for social questioning and answering (social q&a) where people are increasingly seeking and providing information about everyday life, medical, as well as extraordinary situations (morris, teevan & panovich 2010). cosmopolitanism is also 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 a name for the ever-shifting, ever-vibrant space in which persons fuse reflective openness to the new with reflective loyalty to the known. cast in other terms it is a name for a dynamic way of leaving and remaining at home (hansen et al. 2009 p. 592) this connects well to the discussion of space/place in the previous section and how social media creates and provides affordance to this vibrant space and provides us with a dynamic way of leaving while remaining at home, and of being home while away, of being a citizen of the world à la diogenes; a place for a rooted cosmopolitanism rather than an elitist and eclectic perception of cosmopolitanism that is not accessible to all (olson 2011, p.5). social media in everyday life one of the most notable aspects of this cyberspace (gibson 1984) is the problematisation of the boundaries that offered structure to everyday life and the disappearance of the lines between private and work spheres (schement & curtis 1995); this is more so within digital social media for it straddles traditional notions of personal, professional, and public space, and even makes it hard to pry apart personal and public time. although professionals, organisations, and academics alike increasingly use social media for informal information sharing, communication, and disseminating information (chamberlin & lehmann, 2011; kassens-noor 2012), issues related to credibility and authenticity mean social media is still seen as an informal communication media rather than a formal one (black 2008; hadjerrouit 2011). nevertheless, in everyday life and work ‘many people use formal sources rarely, relying instead on informal sources such as friends and family, or knowledgeable colleagues at work’ (case 2012, p.375). in fact, ‘barring special circumstances, people turn to other people when seeking everyday information’ (fisher et. al, 2005, para 2). this type of information seeking and sharing between people without the involvement of a perceived cognitive authority is increasingly evident in social media spaces within interactions between people and with organisations both formally and informally (talip, narayan, watson, edwards 2013) as people first ask questions of their networks within social media before seeking information outside of it; the only authority here is the authority of experience that the people in the network share with each other. one defining aspect of social media technologies is how it has altered and made fluid our sense of time and space, more so than previous technologies. giddens’ notion of time-space distanciation or the separation of time [when] from space [where] (giddens 1981, p. 4) and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 39 harvey’s notion of time-space compression (harvey 1990, p. 226) in postmodern life are still relevant, but this loss of fixity is further amplified in social media. while the rise of digital media prompted scholars to remark on the loss of public places (gumpert 1987), social media in combination with mobile technologies has prompted a warning also about creating ‘disembodied private places’ (gumpert & drucker 2009, p. 1) within physical public places where a person can be there and yet not there. it also allows people to choose how they employ their digital private space, analogous to how edward hall, in his theory of proxemics (hall 1966, p.60) describes our different approaches to people in our physical communication environments to maintain separation and distance as needed – intimate, personal, social or public distance. in this way, social media allows us also create a form of embodied interaction (dourish 2001, p.17), an interaction that occurs in real time but in virtual space instead of real space, yet is intertwined with our physical worlds, thus creating a place. in fact, while some see cyberspace as an individual conceptual space, most see it as a product of civil and social interaction (strate, jacobson, & gibson 1996) where our collective actions are turned into meaning through our interactions. although it sounds tautological, this is certainly true of social media spaces that would not exist without the people that make it a place. the fluidity, non-fixity, and ambiguity of space and time unbounded by physical or temporal borders afforded by digital media have prompted some scholars to see cyberspace as a utopia where a new society can evolve (barlow 1996; shirky 2008), while others simply see it as an unexceptional isotopia that simply mirrors the real-world (lefebvre 1996; cohen, 2007). social media, on the other hand, has the potential to be a heterotopia, a term michel foucault used to describe distinct human societies ‘that have the curious property of being in relation with all other sites… of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible’ (foucault 1986, p.25-26). although foucault applied this to alternate spaces such as brothels, cemeteries, colonies, and even museums and theatres, ‘it refers in one sense to a place that is socially different from the (implicitly normal) spaces surrounding it. however, the difference presented by heterotopia is not essential to that place. instead, heterotopia is foremost an ambiguous, variable, and dynamic site that incites (re-) consideration and (re-)negotiation of socio-spatial norms’ (kraftl 2010, p.355). many (but not all) social media spaces can be considered heterotopias as they are alternate spaces in our societal web that is a reflective space rather than simply a reflection of the real world. ‘heterotopia are spaces in which an alternative social ordering is performed’ (hetherington 1997, p.52) as opposed to a modernist society based upon ordering individual persons 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 (agnew 2011, p.316) or a traditional collectivist community based on ordering by place and vicinity. mainstream social media sites such as linkedin reproduce and extend real-life professional networking whereas facebook.com and twitter.com can be considered isotopias that simply mirror and replicate the real world in the main (or even our imagined utopias in some cases). other alternative social media such as 4chan.com, reddit.com, chatroulette.com, ask.fm, and formspring.me can be considered social media sites that are on the cyber-frontier, for they can be places of freedom (where rules are limited) or danger (where rules do not protect) – and sometimes both…social media websites can also be other places, set aside from routine kinds of interactions… heterotopic social media websites take the user out of the routines of regular life…and are characterised by their liminality where users are both within the site and in the physical world…where the separation between them is not clear (marlin-bennet & thornton 2012, p.596). social gaming websites such as world of warcraft can also be considered heterotopias as they are ‘capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible’ (foucault 1986, p.25). another concept that relates to social media is the third place concept, which explains one of the ways in which a space becomes a place. third places are hangouts at the heart of a community, or the ‘great good places in society, a public place that hosts the regular, voluntary, informal, and happily anticipated gatherings of individuals beyond the realms of home and work’ (oldenburg 1997, p.16). they are important for civil society, democracy, civic engagement, and establishing feelings of a sense of place. oldenburg proposed that any place can be a third place, but he firmly rooted it in the notions of a physical space. other scholars have argued that computer-mediated information environments, including social media, are highly suitable for being considered a third place in our contemporary world as they have indeed evolved into hangouts at the heart of certain communities (soukup 2006; crick 2011; sternberg 2012). in fact, on social media, ‘people’s sense of social place may be restored ...or they may begin to develop a sense of social place if they were previously unacquainted with such feelings’ (sternberg 2012, p.174). this idea that third places can actually help develop a sense of social place is remarkable and definitely adds to the claim of social media as a third place and a great good place in our contemporary information society, which can also be viewed as an information commons shared by everyone in civil society. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 41 the concept of information commons was proposed in the 1990s by libraries, civic organisations and scholars as key to 21st century democracy. it evolved from historical ideas about shared spaces such as the public commons in england. information commons extends this concept to virtual spaces where information and ideas can be freely exchanged. it envisions the creation and maintenance of a wide variety of openly accessible democratic information resources that are free from access restrictions and ‘information enclosure’ (kranich 2004, p.6) in order to create a community for ‘democratic participation, openness, social equity, and diversity’ (bollier & watts 2002, p.3). social media applications are highly conducive to this notion of information commons. this is partly because social media facilitates ‘phatic communication’ (miller 2008, p.395) or ‘small talk’ whose main purpose is a social one and not necessarily one of communicating any information. despite many scholars’ reservations about the usefulness of such phatic communications in the public sphere (karpf 2010), others argue that such phatic communication helps people develop online communities through seemingly personal but inconsequential small conversation; they build engagement, solidarity, and ceremony (habits) that create inter-personal trust through familiarity and interaction that is a crucial element of civil society (makice 2009; gibson 2002). indeed, digital and social media communities that begin as informal spaces do evolve their own norms and rules of behaviour, and often engage in the public use of reason for collaborative planning and deliberative democracy (schlosberg, shulman, and zavestoski 2007); this is related to the communicative rationality of habermas’ (1989) public sphere. however, there are still issues that influence the use of social media as information commons. the key issues are trust, authorship, authority, reliability, credibility, and convergence of information, along with cost of participation in terms of time and effort (velonaki, et al. 2008; gannon-leary et. al. 2011; westerman et al. 2012). in societies that lack civil and democratic values, strong ties to family and the clan tend to be a prevalent form of ties but they inhibit interactions with those outside the network (gibson 2002). hence the creation of weak ties in the form of social networks is important in order to spread new ideas, and to foster civil and democratic values. the theory of strength of weak ties states that within an information network, ‘those to whom we are weakly tied are more likely to move in circles different from our own and will thus have access to information different from that which we receive’ (granovetter 1973, p.1375). in social media, these weak ties are a ‘rich source of new information that we tap when we are trying to improve our lot… we might trust socially distant people less, but the information and contacts they 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 have may be intrinsically more valuable because we cannot access them ourselves’ (christakis & fowler 2011, p. 158). the theory of strong and weak ties was extended through the theory of information grounds, which are ‘social settings where information, people, and place come together and [unintentionally] create information flow within a physical environment’ (pettigrew 1998, p.811) such as in doctor’s waiting rooms and hair salons (fisher, landry, & naumer 2007). unlike the third place, it is not a designated place and there need not be regulars. social media platforms share many of the characteristics of being online information grounds except that information, people, and online platform (space) come together to create information flow in a much less restrictive way than in physical information grounds, as they are unbounded by temporal and spatial restrictions, enabling effective information sharing geographically across any number of physical spaces, both synchronously and asynchronously (counts & fisher 2010). the openness, transparency and availability of social media have also helped users share, disseminate, and find information serendipitously in online spaces (campbell, ellis, & adebonojo 2012). this serendipitous information acquisition on social media is not a naïve encountering of information, but just as in physical information grounds where people, place and information come together, it is an ability to drown out the noise and pick up what is meaningful or relevant to us. preparedness of mind or intuitive sagacity, ‘a random juxtaposition of ideas in which loose pieces of information frequently undergo a period of incubation in the mind and are brought together by the demands of some external event, such as a reference query, which serves as a catalyst’ (liestman 1992, p. 530), plays a large role in serendipitous information encountering and serendipitous information discovery on social media within our everyday lives. social media as a hybrid thirdspace in the civil sphere postcolonial theorist homi k. bhabha, in his location of culture, describes a hybrid space, since termed the thirdspace, a concept that adds social and historical dimensions to the spatial. it is a space where two cultures share an extraterritorial space of discourse; this space can be in the public sphere where the centre and the margins come together for dialogue but is often also a space on the margins for whispered plotting and planning (soja, 1996; bhabha 1994; spivak 1988). in our contemporary society, social media has become the extraterritorial medium of choice for those within this hybrid thirdspace, organising public action or seeking cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 43 solidarity for their political or democratic causes and revolutions. this is evident from recent events that originated with or alongside social media in countries such as tunisia, egypt, iran, and bahrain that gained worldwide attention. irrespective of whether these events are seen as successful or unsuccessful attempts at organising public opinion and influencing authorities, it cannot be denied that social media tools are helping build more informed communities which enables them to express and share political and national opinions publicly, increase transparency, and seek to hold governments accountable (ghannam 2011). social media can aid in democratising as it encourages and enables collective interactions and provides the resources to organise political changes. this is true both in the sense of facilitating pluralised interaction and discourse in everyday life as well as providing the means for organising for democracy (ghanavizi 2011; sreberny and khiabany 2010). blaise cronin and holly crawford (1999) proposed the concept of community/social information warfare, where political and social activists use the internet and related technologies to advance their objectives. they argue that the internet provides the ‘immediacy of audience access’ (cronin & crawford 1999, p.261), where social information warfare can thrive. the earliest example of a major social information warfare operation was the zapatista movement in mexico from 1994 to 1996, where the internet was effectively used to force the government into making reforms (ronfeldt & arquilla 1998). the internet was used to mobilise protests at the wto summit in seattle in 1999, and later, mobile phones and online social media have been used to orchestrate anti-government protests in the philippines, iran, moldova, and urumqi in china (pillay, van niekerk & maharaj 2010). the uprisings in tunisia, egypt, iran, and bahrain in 2011 and onward are the latest in this budding trend of using social media to facilitate mass protest actions. such citizen-driven social media can achieve three interrelated goals through cyber-activism: erosion of support for the state (both domestically and internationally), mobilisation, and internationalisation (mclaughlin 2003). this was the case in egypt and in libya in 2011 where social media sites were crucial to cyber-activism, especially as protesters set up extraterritorial proxy servers in the face of mass censorship by authorities in the respective countries (dainotti et al. 2011). there have been decentralised, diffuse, and leaderless networks since at least the 1960s but social media sites have made them more transparent and helped the diffusion of global justice movements by enhancing their scale of operation and allowing activists to more effectively 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 communicate and coordinate across geographic spaces without the need for vertical hierarchies (juris 2012). social media sites are also used for generating grass-roots support by non-government organisations (ngos), as well civil society, social justice, and equality advocacy organisations that mobilise supporters through communications alone. these new online civil society organisations are ‘redefining membership from a financial-supporter relationship to a communication-recipient relationship’ (karpf 2010, p. 5). examples include moveon.org, avaaz.org, change.org, getup.org, destroythejoint.org and several other activist organisations that use petitions and actionable items that are propagated through social media (caro 2013; hara & huang 2011; marichal 2010; rutledge 2010; valenzuela 2013; vromen 2011). by involving individuals from diverse geographical, cultural and social locations with the opportunity to publicly participate in dialogue and collective action on social issues, these civil society organisations are changing the nature and landscape of social protest and activism locally (rutledge, 2010; hara & huang, 2011) albeit their global effects are less evident. social media channels ‘allow individuals to quickly, cheaply, and effectively blast out vast amounts of information, links, and updates via person-to-person, ego-centered networks…taking advantage of powerful “small-world” effects to generate massive viral communication flows’ (juris 2012, p.267). this is possible because social media enables individuals to connect with and participate in forceful collective action in a way that is integrated with their everyday activities and behaviours in an online world (bennett, 2012; rotman et al. 2011). this could be seen as a shallow solidarity and has been referred to as ‘clicktivism’ (karpf 2010, p.8) rather than true activism, but juris (2012) posits the idea of networking logics where such practices build more than ‘horizontal connections across diversity and difference by helping other political actors interpret such practices’, thus initiating action. on the other hand, aggregation logics also ‘shapes our interactions with social media and generates particular patterns of social and political interaction that involve the viral flow of information and subsequent aggregations of large numbers of individuals in concrete physical spaces’ (juris 2012). in this way, one’s effortless entry into such online solidarity spaces by entering them via clickable gateways on social media can indeed lead to a connection between the virtual space and physical space, and between our online lives and the public square. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 45 in 1996 barlow prophesied that cyberspace would be ‘a civilization of the mind’ and challenged the world’s governments, ‘your legal concepts . . . do not apply to us’. (barlow 1996, para. 9). in 2011 howard et al. declared that power to control information no longer resides exclusively with the institutions of the state and that it resides in media networks, specifically technologically mediated social media (howard et. al. 2011). yet, sadly, in 2013, through revelations around global security monitoring (schmidt & cohen 2013) we were reminded that ‘the ungovernability of cyberspace was neither permanent nor technologically necessary’ (cohen 2007, p.217), and that 'the differences in cyberspace expose the latent ambiguities in even formerly straightforward legal guarantees' (lessig 2000, p. 22); this works both ways, and as the very infrastructure of cyberspace depends on authorities of power, it is truly a heterotopian thirdspace where the centre and margins can and do come together, especially in times of conflict or unrest. when asked about social media in the context of thirdspace, homi k. bhabha, in an interview (2013), said: i think social media is very important, but we have not developed the kind of public institutions that would allow social media to be more than episodic. we need it to have a sense of the ongoing conversations in a place of public resonance. and i don't think we have those institutions. that's why, whether twitter or facebook, we have to build into these very important innovations space for reflective conversations. that is one of the most important bases of democratic growth. we have to create institutions where public reason can be disseminated, constructed in a context so that we can have the full use of digital communication. we need a public sphere of the digital world (bhabha 2013, p.4) social media certainly has the potential of moving from the civil sphere to the public sphere, and has done so in many instances – governments increasingly use social media platforms also for egovernment and disaster management specifically – but issues of trust and credibility still remain due to questions about privacy and security. there is also a movement initiated by public-service employees across the world to make government more open, transparent, digital, mobile and citizen-centric, and social media use is an integral part of that effort. for example, public sector employees in australia have been self-organising around gov 2.0 conferences (via social media about social media) around the country to share and promote innovative ways in which governments can use social media in achieving a more citizen-oriented, open and responsive government and promote democratic conversations and civic discourse. there is also a gov 2.0 taskforce (gov2.net.au/ ) set up the australian government to look at incorporating social media technologies to aid deliberative democracy. 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 conclusion this article examined the various ways in which we can conceive of and perceive social media and how this intersects with pre-existing theories of how we as humans seamlessly translate habits and information practices from our physical spatial environment to cyberspace and to virtual places. and yet, the literature reveals a paucity of empirical research on how social media is influencing our everyday lives. this is a rich area of exploration and theory building that social science researchers can contribute to in a way that helps build civil discourse. there is one issue this article did not touch upon and that is the increasingly relevant issue of uncivil behaviours and rule-breaking within social media. just as in the physical places of human society, the social media space is inhabited also by seemingly unwanted elements – from bullies to criminals to profiteers to perverts. as well, issues of user privacy versus statesurveillance dominate current discourse around social media. howard rheingold’s optimistic vision of a technological utopianism (the epigram for this article) ends with an ominous warning: ‘but another kind of vision 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http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia re-valuing women’s knowledge hilary yerbury university of technology, sydney abstract women’s knowledge has often been seen as ‘a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity’ (foucault 1980, p. 82). the purpose of this paper is to explore the assertion that women’s knowledges are inadequate and to document ways in which they are marginalised so that the hierarchical nature of scientific practice can be understood and the contributions of women and all those from the global south can be recognised and facilitated. revaluing women’s knowledge is recognised as one of the most direct methods of changing the way a society works. a vast literature (eg sen 1999) has argued that women’s knowledges are a key factor in development and have been shown to lead to poverty alleviation, to the development of active citizens and to the creation of a more open and democratic society. possibilities for the revaluing of women’s knowledges and the democratization of access to scientific knowledge using information and communication technologies are considered, focussing on the concepts of open access and the information commons. introduction foucault argued that, traditionally, scientific discourse and the way it was presented was the basis of truth in a society and that truth was incorporated in the processes that generated the statements in this discourse and oversaw their distribution and circulation in society. traditional knowledge, then, by its nature, cannot be deemed truth. it is not a scientific discourse, there are no institutions as such which oversee its production, regulation and distribution and there is rarely a system of procedures or a system of power which oversees it. many women’s knowledges are deemed not scientific but rather belong to a category of naïve knowledges. these knowledges are not created or validated through institutions in society. they are often referred to as traditional knowledge or indigenous knowledge and thus separated from scientific knowledge. thus, they are not the concern of this paper, even though indigenous knowledge is socially and contextually situated and if it is ignored in programs for development, these programs are very likely to be less successful (brokensha et al. 1980 in agrawal 1995; munk 2013). women interested in scholarship and research have not always been treated in the same way as their male peers, even when their knowledges have not been considered inferior. marie curie, for example, was refused membership in the french academie des sciences in 1911, 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 in spite of having won two nobel prizes. although we are no longer at this point in history, throughout the world, women scholars have not found their rightful place, especially in the sciences and technology. there are two key reasons relevant to this paper. firstly, those who have established themselves as women scientists are only a tiny minority of those who began their education at the primary school level. women are under-represented in many areas of employment and in science and technology in particular. secondly, those who have managed to establish themselves as scientists do not find the same recognition as their male counterparts especially in the developing world (gülser corat 2010). both men and women from the global south struggle for recognition as scholars in a system that favours an angloamerican approach to scholarship (murphy & zhu 2012). knowledges ‘disqualified as inadequate’ women are under-represented in science and technology in universities and research institutes. in 2005, lawrence summers, the president of harvard, presented the essentialist argument that there were two reasons for this under-representation, the first being that they were not prepared to work the long hours necessary to be successful and the second that girls are inherently less able than boys in science related subjects. symonds et al. (2006) in an australia study aiming in part to test summers’s assertion, found that indeed men were on average 40% more productive than women and that this discrepancy appeared early in their careers, “in the second year after their first publication”. however, after the initial two or three years, women have the same publication rate as men. the consequence of this is that men appear to be more productive than women of equal experience and therefore they gain the promotions and the research funding (glimcher & lieberman 2009). a pattern of claim and counter claim pervades the literature on scientific productivity (prpic et al. 2009) and is not limited to studies of scientists from the global south (davarpanah & moghadam 2012). little of this essentialist literature considers the factors which may have resulted in women being under-represented in science, writing fewer articles or submitting fewer patents. these factors may stem from childhood experiences, where girls may perceive science as gendered and intellectual inclined girls and women are seen as social losers. the difficulties girls have with maths are not given the same attention as boys’ problems with reading. the culture in classrooms and scientific laboratories is often hostile to girls and women, with the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 3 expectations of bench practices often conflicting with the demands of domestic life, especially if the women have children. women in the west are gaining degrees, including doctoral degrees, in ever increasing numbers, albeit not necessarily in the physical sciences, maths and engineering. however, in the global south, the exclusion of girls from education, especially beyond primary school, markedly affects their participation in the sciences and technologies. many governments in the south appreciate the importance of an educated citizenry and in particular of the need to draw on the knowledge and skills of women to eradicate poverty, but have great difficulties in providing the opportunities for girls to complete their education. rwanda is an example of a country which struggles to keep girls in secondary education, with a number of excellent programs, and is not yet able to provide opportunities for university education on a par with those in the west, as the provision of tertiary education, particularly in the sciences is so costly. in rwanda, there is gender parity in primary education but the achievements of boys outstrip the achievements of girls even at primary level and that gap widens in secondary school, being very wide in science, mathematics and technology subjects. in part, this may be because science and technology subjects are potentially more costly than subjects in the humanities and girls may be more likely to miss out on the more expensive subjects than boys. it may also be because the topics studied are not immediately relevant to girls (masanja 2010). other reasons include the lack of female teachers both in schools and in the university (only 21% of academics at the national university of rwanda in 2012 were female (masanja, pers. comm. 2012) and the very small numbers of female role models in schools and in the community. throughout the global south, at the university level, small numbers of eligible women are likely to enrol in courses1. excluded from the research process in the world of scholarship, it has been assumed that the best way to create scholarly knowledge is to carry out research and publish the outcomes. women’s knowledges and experiences have been excluded from the processes of formulating research questions until recently, in part because they have been excluded as researchers, as noted above, and their 1 even in the australia, where numbers of female students are likely to be at least equal to the number of males, the number of female students in science and technology is often low; at the university of technology, sydney, in 2010 for the first time, female students were in the majority (51%) (uts 2010), but only 14% of the undergraduate students enrolled in the faculty of engineering and information technology were female. 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 voices have been missing from the data collected in many studies because women and girls were not included as participants. in this way, women’s knowledges were systematically excluded from policy-making and from investment and other decisions made on the basis of research results. thus, any approach to increasing the numbers of women in science has to be supplemented by programs which change the way that research questions are posed, for example by incorporating gender analysis into basic and applied research (schiebinger & schraudner 2011). without this kind of systematic analysis, we are left with isolated examples of women’s perspectives being incorporated into scientific research. research into breast cancer and its treatments is one field where the inclusion of women’s voices and a female perspective on a personal and societal problem significantly changed the understanding of these problems. as a consequence, radical mastectomy is no longer considered the only avenue of treatment. this pressure to ask research questions relevant to women can also be seen behind the us reforms of the 1990s which required that women be included in clinical trials of drugs. until that point, almost all treatments of heart disease for example had been studied on groups of men, even when the concern had been with the effects of the female hormone oestrogen. women are often excluded as practitioners of research, even when they are employed as academics. they are likely to be employed at junior levels and on temporary contracts. thus they are not part of strong research communities and therefore have lower social capital. this is important because those with higher social capital are more likely to be involved in the discussion of research questions and in the setting of research agendas. they are also more likely to have the relationships and ties that will help them with problem solving. people with higher social capital are likely to experience higher levels of trust and to be valued more highly within a group. in the context of research, one way to identify levels of social capital is to explore the collaborations researchers are engaged in. in general, women scientists are more likely to collaborate with other women than are male scientists. according to bozeman and corley (2004) those women who do not hold a tenure track position have 84% of their collaborations with other women. the reason for this is not clear, although it may be further evidence that the women at the bottom of the university hierarchy are not invited by men to take part in research teams. interestingly, however, in this study, men were more likely to mentor women. the reason for this is not clear, but it may be that some male scientists recognise that women have had fewer opportunities to develop their knowledge and skills and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 5 that this is a pre-requisite to developing the trust that can lead to social capital (bozeman & corley 2004, p. 611). women’s contribution to scientific knowledge can be minimised in other ways. in australia, for example, indigenous women are acknowledged as knowledge specialists and what they know is recognised as being of great benefit to their own community and with the potential to support development in other communities. this acknowledgement and recognition however may become problematic. according to the australian ngo shadow report on the implementation of the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (cedaw) (koorie women mean business 2005), indigenous women complain that they do not get paid as knowledge specialists. rather, consultants work with women to understand their specialist knowledge, which is then transferred out of the community, with no recompense to the community. the consultants often gain a double benefit from their involvement – they are well-paid and their work with the knowledge of indigenous women may bring them academic qualifications and scholarly renown through scientific research reports. publications “low down in the hierarchy” scientists and scholars from countries which are not english-speaking and which have not been part of the western scholarly tradition find that the journals and other publication outlets available to them are rarely considered important by scholars from the us, uk or australia. lists of journals which are ‘recognised’ as meeting standards of quality set by governments, such as the list generated for australia’s excellence in research for australia contains very few journals published in languages other than english. lists such as these encourage patterns of publishing since scholars’ recognition and acceptance are key to the process of developing new knowledges. for the african woman and scholar, for example, there are many obstacles to the recognition and acceptance of her knowledges and scholarship. her knowledges are often ‘disqualified’ in the ways that women’s knowledges in other places are deemed less valid or less important. as an african, her knowledges and scholarship are ‘located low down in the hierarchy’ for a range of additional reasons, related to ‘the institutions which produce [knowledge]’. african knowledge about africa is swamped by western knowledge about africa. the world bank 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 report on extending african knowledge infrastructure (jackson et al. 2008) reported that the majority of books and journals on africa are held in libraries and other repositories in the west and that databases and websites of resources about africa are also predominantly held in the west. a report by thomson reuters (2010), producers of the significant web of science database, analysed research publications in africa. it noted that although great gains have been made in the publishing of scholarly literature in the previous ten years, nonetheless, the whole continent of africa produces about the same number of scholarly articles each year as the netherlands, a small european country in terms of scientific output. the most productive countries are: south africa, egypt and kenya. rwanda is one of several countries producing fewer than 20 scholarly articles published in journals covered by web of science in 2008. rwanda also appears to have a relatively low level of collaboration with scholars in other countries, fewer than the five papers per year required for inclusion in the analysis of international collaborations. this picture was no less bleak in the unesco science report of 2010, where it is also reported that no patents have been granted to rwandan inventors by the us patents office in the period 2005 – 2009. these reports of non-existent dissemination of knowledge do not necessarily reflect the endeavours of african scholars. many african scholars publish their findings in reports and technical papers or in working papers or conference proceedings which do not become part of the formal publishing record and therefore are not accessible to other scholars (abrahams et al 2008).this approach is not limited to women from africa. women working for social change in australia are also more likely to discuss their work at conferences or professional meetings or to produce working papers for dissemination among other practitioners and policy makers, according to the anecdotal evidence of women experts. overwhelmed by power of western publishers to continue the consideration of disadvantage of african scholars, even if african scholars do try to publish the results of their research in established (western) scholarly journals, they may be overwhelmed by the hegemony of the major journals and their publishers. the editor of the lancet, a major british medical journal, is reported to have said that ‘if he chose to publish african authors, this might reduce the citation impact of his journal’, leading to a situation that he describes as ‘a racist culture in journal decision-making’ (gray 2010, p. 10). a similar point is made by van der werf-davelaar (2006) who notes that dutch scholars cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 7 researching african questions felt that the emphasis on citation and impact measures was forcing them to publish in journals not read by their african peers. the objectives of scholarly production in the global south may be different from those in the hegemonic west, again leading to under-representation of these knowledges in the scientific record of so-called ‘world-class’ journals. scholarship in the global south may be more concerned with practical relevance than with empirical study, an approach which is deemed “unpublishable” in these western journals. in an attempt to get published, scholars are using exotic western research concepts to appeal to the editors of these journals and ignoring their own contexts. the consequences of this include derivative work whose authors produce sound technical data analysis and who have ignored their own scholarly context (xi & han 2010; keim 2011). the power of the large publishing houses in controlling the flow of knowledge cannot be underestimated. elsevier now publishes about 20% of the key scholarly journals. the days when journals were published by scholarly or professional associations or by universities or research centres have passed and with them, the days when a subscription to a journal meant ownership of a physical copy of a journal and the potential for preferential rates for those less able to pay. instead, companies like thomson scientific control access to scholarly knowledge and are thus able to decide which journals to include in their electronic databases and how much to charge. in australia, between 1986 and 1998, the number of journal subscriptions in university libraries declined by 37% and expenditure on them increased by 63%. the unit cost of a journal subscription increased by 474% (houghton 2001). without access to new scholarly knowledge, students and researchers alike are denied the opportunity to explore new ideas and different ways of knowing. in developing countries, these moves by the major publishing houses have marginalised scholars even further by minimising their access to scholarly knowledge taken for granted in many institutions in the west. there are a number of programs, for example supported by unesco, which have made available full text data bases to libraries in developing countries, and these will go some way towards giving opportunities for exploring new ideas and different ways of knowing. 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 the need for a moral framework lor and britz, from the university of pretoria, argue that the current information flows between north and south and south-south raise moral questions and that a moral framework should underpin any attempts to redress inequities in information flows. they argue that ‘justice is the main normative tool that can be used to regulate world information flows’ and identify four types of justice. distributive justice implies that information is available fairly and equally to support everyday living and to enhance understanding and exchange of ideas. contributive justice, which brings together the individual and the common good, implies that african scholars have a responsibility to make their research findings and knowledges available to others throughout the world and that systems of scholarly communications have a responsibility to acknowledge and accept the work of african scholars. commutative justice is about a fundamental fairness in interactions, so that knowledges generated in the south should not be taken and used elsewhere without acknowledgement and recompense. retributive justice is about the possibility of taking action against those who infringe moral rights and the principles of justice. in information flow terms, this assumes the protection of the interests of the owners and producers of knowledge, not only in terms of intellectual property but also in terms of traditional knowledges (2006). working from these principles, lor and britz (2006) identify the open access movement as an encouraging development in increasing information flows. open access includes peerreviewed open access journals, e-print repositories and institutional repositories. the open access movement includes many initiatives by scholars, research libraries, foundations, public interest institutions and many collaborations among and between them. there are already many examples of open access journals bringing about the re-valuing of african scholarly knowledge. the african journals online project is testament to the success of this venture. using the open journal system software, the scheme hosts over 380 peer-reviewed journals from 29 countries. this project helps to address the problem referred to earlier, that african scholars find it difficult to gain recognition and publication of their work in western scholarly journals. it is now run through a non-profit organization, based in south africa. the knowledge commons and civil society elinor ostrom and charlotte hess propose the notion of the information or knowledge commons (hess and ostrom 2006) as a way of making scientific knowledge more widely available. ostrom was awarded the noble prize for economics in 2006, the first woman to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 9 win the prize in this field, for her pioneering work in showing that common resources can be successfully managed by the people who use them, rather than by governments or private companies. a commons is a resource shared by a group of people. ostrom and hess argue that the knowledge commons has its origins in notions of democracy and freedom, based in openness and inclusiveness. they propose (2006, p. 6) that collective action, self-governance and social capital are key factors in the development and success of commons and note that although the open access movement might be seen to be similar to the knowledge commons, there are differences. they emphasise the importance of the social interactions involved in creating a knowledge commons and assert that as with any other social interaction, the outcomes can be beneficial or detrimental. open access, on the other hand, sets out to provide a public good – free and unfettered access to information, while at the same time allowing authors to retain copyright. levine argues that there are two types of knowledge commons, the libertarian commons and the associational commons (levine 2006). he argues that “open access” is an example of a libertarian commons. the key characteristics of a libertarian commons are that everyone has a right to use a public resource and that right usually derives from the law or at least a policy. the associational commons, which is at the heart of the knowledge commons proposed by ostrom and hess, is controlled by a group, such as a non-profit association or a community group, who ‘band together to protect a public good’. for levine, associational commons are central to civil society and he favours the associational commons over the libertarian commons because in an associational commons, there is a structure and individuals who have made a commitment to the commons and will be prepared to defend it. in a libertarian commons, there is always the problem that some people will exploit it and that law-makers and policy-makers will threaten the shared nature of the resource through political constraints of overprotection, such as censorship or claims of ownership. further, he argues that the only value underpinning the libertarian commons is liberty whereas an association may support a number of values, including freedom, truth, sustainability, reliability, decency and public access. libraries have traditionally operated as knowledge commons and in western countries they are seen as essential to the development of democratic societies. as knowledge commons they can provide an institutional approach to the revaluing of women’s knowledge, through a 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 variety of programs, including collection development programs which emphasise the work of women scholars and through providing training in information literacy which is considered fundamental to the development of knowledge and of democracy in the future (unesco 2007). in the context of the knowledge commons of libraries, it is important to ensure that young women who complete their education are well placed to reach their potential and develop and express their own knowledge and understandings with confidence. there is also scope for women scholars to work together create associational knowledge commons and to establish a journal within this framework, which will support the scholarly work of women. the process of establishing and managing a scholarly journal provides opportunities to develop many skills which will be of use in the revaluing of women’s knowledge. an editorial committee makes decisions on the scholarly direction of the journal and establishes the criteria for operation which underpin the integrity of the journal and the articles it publishes. it also takes responsibility for identifying reviewers to take part in the peer review process. more experienced women scholars can mentor younger scholars in the peer review process. it can also identify potential authors and seek ways to collaborate with scholars in universities and research centres to mentor less experienced writers, through workshops, writing groups and other mechanisms. open access journals run through associational commons can provide a way to disseminate knowledge that may not be seen as a priority for the major commercial publishers, a category often largely comprising the work of women scholars. conclusion this overview shows that women’s knowledges are systemically undervalued and often disqualified because they seem ‘beneath the required level of cognition and scientificity’. yet, there are many voices urging women to claim positions as contributors to scholarly knowledge and policy development.a brief consideration of open access journal publishing and of knowledge commons suggests ways in which the knowledges of women scholars may be re-valued. re-valuing of women’s knowledges will require effort from women scholars themselves.all women scholars and scholars in the global south could heed the words of mshaï mwangola (2008), who offers sound advice on how to encourage the valuing of their scholarly cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 11 knowledge. addressing african women scholars, she urges them to find appropriate ways to communicate their scholarly knowledge to local audiences, not only writing scholarly articles but also becoming public intellectuals and using performance and journalism to communicate, especially when more traditional avenues for scholarly publication are closed. she encourages them to question the interpretive frameworks and research methodologies (2008 p.14) which underpin education and research so that african [women] can develop their own intellectual paradigms which reflect their position as ‘african intellectuals participating in the global knowledge community’. she challenges young african scholars to take responsibility for their own development as scholars and to use all the techniques and strategies available to them, including the use of information technologies and other new ways of working. references abrahams, l. et al. 2008, opening access to knowledge in southern african universities, southern african universities regional association. agrawal, a. 1995, ‘indigenous and 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http://www.health.nt.gov.au/library/scripts/objectifymedia.aspx?file=pdf/46/35.pdf&siteid=1&str_title=cedaw%20indigenous%20women%20shadow%20report%202005.pdf http://www.health.nt.gov.au/library/scripts/objectifymedia.aspx?file=pdf/46/35.pdf&siteid=1&str_title=cedaw%20indigenous%20women%20shadow%20report%202005.pdf http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/gst_2010/masanja-ep.8-egm-st.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.4314%2fad.v33i1.57243 doi:10.1179/030801811x13013181961518 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 13 http://web.archive.org/web/20080130023006/http://www.president.harvard.edu/speeche s/2005/nber.html accessed 10 july 2013. symonds, m. et al. 2006, ‘gender differences in publication output: towards an unbiased metric of research performance’, plos one, vol.1, no.1. http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0000127 accessed on 10 july 2013. thomson reuters 2010, global research report; africa. 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of xi’an jiaotong university, vol.13. http://web.archive.org/web/20080130023006/http:/www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2005/nber.html http://web.archive.org/web/20080130023006/http:/www.president.harvard.edu/speeches/2005/nber.html http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0000127 http://researchanalytics.thomsonreuters.com/m/pdfs/globalresearchreport-africa.pdf http://sciencewatch.com/sites/sw/files/sw-article/media/globalresearchreport-africa.pdf http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001570/157020e.pdf http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001899/189958e.pdf http://www.uts.edu.au/ http://dlib.anu.edu.au/dlib/february06/vanderwerf/02vanderwerf.html http://dx.doi.org/10.1045%2ffebruary2006-vanderwerf re-valuing women’s knowledge abstract introduction knowledges ‘disqualified as inadequate’ excluded from the research process publications “low down in the hierarchy” overwhelmed by power of western publishers the need for a moral framework the knowledge commons and civil society conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 129 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia from financing labour to labouring finance: subjectivity in financial times elisabetta magnani university of new south wales abstract the global economic crisis offers a powerful instance of how financial shocks shape the biosphere at the intersection of labour and life. in financial times, capitalism activates two interdependent processes, a process of contamination that somehow blurs the borders between life and financial matters, and a process of abstraction, which increases the emotional distance between object and subject, thus interrupting the potential for change embedded in experiences of fear that accompany environmental crises. these processes involve key tenets of contemporary neo-liberal capitalism, namely financialization and entrepreneurship, and produce new subjectivities. this is, in my view, central to understand our current organization of ecological concerns and the way biopolitical events, such as the financialization of the economy, organize our collective perception of the possible and alternative ecological configurations to the one we live in. by recognizing the working of a process of contamination and a process of distancing implicit in the financialization of life we are able to acknowledge that ‘ecological relationships are semiotics’ (von uexkull 1982 [1940]) in the sense that they involve the construction and organization of signs, perceptions, affects, interpretations and meanings. understanding this new semiotics of power is essential to engaging with actual practices of governance of the sustainability discourses. operationally, these practices and discourses have deprived ecological knowledge of one of its fundamental ingredient, namely a future (chakrabarty 2009), conceived as a historical process of change that involves the subject-object relationship and which constitutes both the knower and the known. the result is an interrupted understanding of the way bio-political events reorganize collective perceptions of possible configurations of the ecological system that are ‘alter’ to the one we live in. reconsidering the distance between finance and life matters in proclaiming the way capitalism opens the gate to a new society through workers' political awareness and consequent empowerment, marx and engels (1888 [1848]) wrote of how modern bourgeois society ‘is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells’. both financial crises and environmental crises have appeared to bring capitalism to its sticky end. climate change has been named as ‘the greatest and widest-ranging market failure’ (stern 2006), and the global financial crisis and the consequent global economic crisis have been linked to systemic fiascoes driven by commercial banks’ excessive risk taking decisions, the existence of uninsured systemic risk of financial institutions and the opacity of financial markets. these twin crises have opened opportunities to engage with debates on political and economic change, but they have also revealed clear limits to opportunities for social transformation. despite the mounting social mobilization and protest following the twin crises, the system is 130 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 resistant to the profound transformation that many have declared as necessary. what has become increasingly clear is that recent experiences of political struggle over our ecological future have failed to translate into more acute political awareness of the actual range of possible actions. this paper interrogates the roots of what has been the recently experienced capitalism’s resilience (walker and cooper 2011, welsch 2013) in the face of the twin crises of capitalism (magdoff 2002). it does so by critically analyzing the relationship between finance and labour and how this relationship produces both discursive and non-discursive effects that contribute to such resilience. here i take financialization, a process whereby financial markets, financial institutions and financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes, as a central component of the means ‘whereby neoliberalism has transformed society into an “enterprise society” based on the market, competition, inequality, and the privilege of the individual’ (lazzarato 2009). i argue that capitalism’s resilience, its ability to de-activate the transformative political potential that the twin crises have offered, stems from the modulation of a relation between financial matters and biopolitical matters, particularly those involving the figure of the entrepreneur. the fact that entrepreneurial activities are so central in the implementation of capitalism’s emerging responses to environmental crises motivates my choice to focus on entrepreneurial subjects as pivotal neoliberal subjects, and to partially neglect other neoliberal subjects including wageless ones, for example domestic house workers. i contend that the particular way in which the financelabour nexus shapes the operation of green capitalism illustrates the exemplary function of the relation between labour and finance in blocking any transformative pressure in response to capitalism’s crises. my argument is developed in five sections. in section two i argue that the process of financialization has been a financialization of labour in the first place. it has involved an increasing exposure of households to financial decisions and risks – stock market participation in the us for example has been increasing since the 1970s due to the low cost of access and to the need for portfolio diversification. furthermore, it has brought a transformation of capital-labour relationships – e.g., the increasing reliance on entrepreneurial “animal spirits”. this latter aspect has been particularly visible in labour abundant economies where the needs to create jobs and increase employment have emerged as a pressing imperative following the gfc of 2007-2009. foster and magdoff (2009) argue cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 131 that the need to find profitable outlets for an increasing economic surplus and the increasing volatility of financial markets related to this wild allocation of massive funds have shaped the now prevailing features of monopoly-finance capital. rampant market instability forces credit to be conditioned on labour disciplining in a process that i call labouring finance. both these processes, financing labour and labouring finance, articulate material and nondiscursive effects of the apparatus of financialization, which interrupt the potential for change. ultimately, both processes rely on and enact new forms of subjectification of labour, as the example of entrepreneurial subjects should make clear. capitalism not only relies on a process of abstraction, one that increases the (emotional) distance between object (e.g., the ecological crisis) and subject (e.g., the entrepreneur), but it also produces a process of contamination, which blurs the borders between life and financial matters. with no intention to reduce complex material connections to signifying relations, the link between economics and environmental crisis is also mediated via a complex semiotics that turns use values into financialized exchange values. in fact the central tenet of my argument, which is developed in section three, is that these processes involving labour and finance work together to prompt a discursive effect of the financial apparatus. a new semiotics of power emerges from the finance-labour contamination, one that contributes to interrupt the potential for change embedded in experiences of fear that accompany environmental crises. i argue that the discursive effects of financialization are particularly visible in the rhetoric of green capitalism. a particular semantic link between the economic sign and the matter it refers to (environmental crisis, for instance) sustains a green entrepreneurial spirit by suspending agents’ disbelief in capitalism as a response to the current risk of total annihilation. thus the discursive effects of financialization are essential to understand the emerging regime of governance known as green or sustainable capitalism. in section four, i argue that ongoing global economic and environmental crises highlight how the micro management of the perceived distance between finance and labour is central to capitalism's logistic operations. processes of financialization of labour and management strategies for labouring finance are central moments of the biopolitics of life because they contribute to the production of entrepreneurial subjects. financialization, i argue, becomes a dispositif (foucault, 1977) a “general and heterogeneous set” comprising linguistic and non-linguistic statements, institutions, laws, scientific claims and moral propositions, but always with a strategic function and consequently characterized by a strong connection to power. these two movements, namely contamination and abstraction, are, in my view, central to understand our current organization of ecological concerns. they also contribute to shed light on the role that 132 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 biopolitical processes, such as the financialization of the economy, play in organizing our collective perception of the possible and alternative ecological configurations to that in which we live. section five concludes this article by arguing for the importance of a critical inquiry into how contemporary power uses the financialization of our lives to shape the contour, and in fact the sheer possibility, of ecological alternative societies and economies. neoliberal subjects: the entrepreneur one of the most discussed effects of neoliberalism is the growing influence of capital markets, their intermediaries and processes, in contemporary economic and political life. financialization has had increasingly visible effects on households and firms since the 1970s. household indebtedness has grown considerably in most developed countries over the past thirty years, sustaining consumption if not its growth and contributing to the decline in the household saving rate (barba and pivetti 2009). for many commentators household indebtedness should be seen principally as a response to stagnant real wages and retrenchments in the welfare state, i.e. as the counterpart of enduring changes in income distribution that capitalism has produced since the 1970s. at the same time, the use of precarious employment arrangements involving temporary labour, subcontracting and contracting-out, has been growing in all major industrialized countries, including the us, european nations, canada and australia. the timing of these changes is important as they follow the beginning of a significant slowdown of productivity growth in the "observable" sector of oecd economies, following the first oil shock in 1973 and two decades of high productivity growth in the 1950s and 1960s. these deep changes in the systems of social protection, production, consumption and savings, have clearly marked the emergence of a new way of organizing capitalistic societies, namely neoliberalism, with its deep reliance on a new subject, the entrepreneur of oneself (foucault, 2004a). entrepreneurial subjects best exemplify the processes of financialization of life that i explore in the following sections. sergio bologna sees the self-employed worker, the entrepreneur, as the emerging figure of post-fordism, with its mass unemployment, underemployment and precarious employment in oecd countries. in emerging and mature capitalist economies alike, entrepreneurial activities are central for the creation of micro-enterprises (with less than 10 employees), which comprise the majority of the small and medium enterprise (sme) sector (firms with less than 250 employees). the sme sector is an important source of employment, particularly for low-skilled workers, as well as women and young people. everywhere, the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 133 flat management structures of sme mean that their personnel must fulfill multiple roles, which makes them less vulnerable to unemployment during periods of economic downturn. their small size and flexibility allow them to adjust to local market fluctuations and to weather local market shocks more comfortably. smes also represent an important source of innovation, for example by re-engineering products or services to meet market demands, exploring innovative distribution or sales techniques, or developing new and untapped markets. this often makes them good partners for large corporations (ayyagari et al. 2011). according to a recent european commission investigation, 37% of eu smes have at least one full or part-time green employee. green jobs are largely created in smes as opposed to large firms: in 2012, 1 in 8 employees of small and medium-sized firms had a green job or almost 13% of all sme jobs. in large firms it was only 1 in 33, equivalent to 3% of all large company jobs. green jobs in smes are also estimated to expand dynamically with a rate of 35% in the next 2 years. meantime, the gradual but relentless introduction of carbon emission markets has shaped a recent wave of financial innovation and opened new financial markets. according to the economist intelligence unit (eiu) 2009 report, a major international research and advisory firm, smes have faced a painful rationing of finance, most notably by banks, as a result of the global economic crisis. the credit crunch is still far from over. of particular concern is the fact that employment in smes is extremely sensitive to the supply of finance. according to the eiu survey, both smes facing tough credit conditions and smes facing severe cashflow problems are almost three times as likely to lay off staff as those not so affected. falling asset prices can contribute to the credit squeeze if they affect assets commonly used as collateral by smes. interestingly, these statistics indicate two important trends, namely the growing importance of green entrepreneurship and the fragile relationships that small entrepreneurs have with the financial management of their operations. later i argue that these trends are transforming the way we perceive (or don’t perceive) environmental crises, and in turn, this shapes governmental practices of sustainability and how we engage with them. financing (precarious) labour while the arguments above seem to suggest the potential effectiveness of development strategies based on micro-enterprises and entrepreneurship, they also stress the fragility of these capitalist agents in the face of financial turmoil, especially those linked to global supply 134 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 networks. there is evidence that smes substantially differ in their linkage with financial markets (alfaro et al. 2004). large corporations have little difficulty securing sizeable bank loans and private investments. smes require greater access to financial services and investment capital and often struggle to obtain credit and loans. in summary, the historical experience of financial crises shows that individuals and households are increasingly subjected to labour market vulnerability and flexibility, and only the more privileged are compensated by investments and pensions. the transformation of the households’ and firms’ exposure to financial risk undoubtedly reciprocates the transformation of financial and labour markets’ institutions. ultimately, the economic processes of accumulation and investment in neoliberal capitalism rely on a contamination of finance and life, which informs global capitalism in both post-industrial economies in the west, in emerging economies in the east and in the global south. this process blurs the boundaries between labour and finance and changes the material conditions through which labour is employed and reproduced, thus financing labour. what discourses on entrepreneurship also reveal is the increasingly untenable argument of one capital and the importance of the plurality of capital (chalcraft 2005). as starosta (2010) argues, drawing upon marx’s discussion on the peculiarities of small-scale peasant ownership, recent waves of entrepreneurs make evident the differences between two categories of capital, namely `small capital' as opposed to ‘normal capital’. unlike ‘normal capital’, small capital does not have the concentration needed to actively participate in the formation of the general rate of profit. small capitals do not reach that size and scale of operation and struggle to survive the competitive battle. an argument on the stratification of individual capitals with differential valorization powers can help elucidate the essential nature of entrepreneurship, its differential access to finance and its contribution to an evolving labouring-financing nexus, not only financing labour but also labouring finance. labouring finance entrepreneurs have a complex relationship with financial markets. the presence of noninsurable assets – assets that cannot be easily accepted as collaterals in capital markets – is a salient feature of smes’ financial positions, particularly in family owned companies (cochrane 2007). this potentially disrupts the ease of access of entrepreneurs to financial markets and introduces a new dimension in the analysis of entrepreneurs’ financial cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 135 management issues. in particular, the presence of assets that cannot be used as collaterals opens important questions on the relationship between labour and finance. it is not surprising then to discover that the recent global financial crisis has had harsh labour market consequences, which are particularly visible in terms of official unemployment rates (sziraczki et al. 2009). a shift to informal and vulnerable employment has marked the adjustment to retrenchments in developing asia, where some of the most labour intensive economies are located (stiglitz 2009). the expansion of informal and vulnerable employment has taken place in the lower tiers of the informal economy, where earnings are low and working conditions tough (seguino 2009). expectedly, the labour market effects of economic crises are often disproportionally felt by specific groups of workers, particularly subcontracted, casual, and temporary workers as they are often the most vulnerable to initial factory job cuts. in fact the 2007-09 financial crisis is a powerful reminder that financial markets sometimes create and amplify risks, rather than simply reallocating them. a few commentators have argued that finding ways to access financial resources forces entrepreneurs to change the way they employ labour (that is, pay, train, retain or lay-off workers) in the construction of a portfolio of assets that is tailored to a specific employer's outside income risk. in an important seminal paper, michelacci and quadrini (2005) suggest that financially constrained firms pay lower wages in exchange for higher future wages, effectively borrowing from their employees. caggese and cuñat (2008) suggest that firms may strategically use labour variables to enhance their chances to receive finances. these studies show that firms reduce their exposure to liabilities/employee entitlements by using contract and casual modes of employment. this has the effect of shifting financial risk onto employees, from employers, as employee income becomes increasingly insecure. both these contributions reinforce the need for a systematic exploration of the links between financial constraints and labour market results. if firms strategically use precarious employment to enhance their chances to receive finances, de facto they use their employment policies as “collaterals” to access financial resources and to generate the promise of stable and less vulnerable employment. this practice of labouring finance, a sort of labour l and finance f circuit, or l-f-l', is another form through which financial capitalism solicits shaky beliefs about the ability of labour to finance its reproduction, l'>l, via financial capital f, or l−f−l'. this raises the question of how the financialization of labour transforms subjectivities. 136 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 central to the neoliberal doctrine is the shift to government and governance concerns, where we attend to the complex and variegated practices and procedures whereby the autonomous activities of individuals and groups are brought into line with the objectives of political authorities. neoliberal ideology heavily relies on the homo oeconomicus as the ‘entrepreneur of oneself’, who optimizes the use of its human capital in competition with all other economic agents. clearly, neoliberalism blurs the border between economic structure and the superstructure (read 2003), but equally, as i have tried to point out in this section, it questions relationships and boundaries between real and nominal variables in economic analysis and between material and immaterial events and processes in contemporary capitalism. contamination and interruption the micro-economic effects of the financialization of labour have only recently started to be explored. however, even more obscure, i believe, is the effect of financial capitalism on the positioning of entrepreneurial subjects with respect to the matter (the economic order) they contribute to create. the point is that we are empowered to be capitalist entrepreneurs, but this power remains interrupted. marriage, migration, health, education are all life aspects that more and more, we are told, require entrepreneurial spirit. very few subjects, from migrants to patients and students, feel politically empowered to change the machine they are required to participate in. this is even more paradoxical in times of biopolitical production when the ability of producers to autonomously organize cooperation and produce collectively in a planned way has immediate implications for the political realm, providing the tools and habits for collective decision making. the relationship between agency that produces economic change and agency that produces political change is at the heart of the problem that elettra stimilli faces in il debito del vivente/ ascesi e capitalismo (2011). stimilli sees in the financialization of the economy ‘a confluence of single consumers/savers’ risk with the risk that capital faces’ (2011, p. 79). in this way, ‘financialization enters everyone's life’ (2011, p. 79). the mechanism of wealth creation within the financial community relies on the faith of single investors, their responsiveness to beliefs and opinions about others’ beliefs and opinions that constitutes the system's structural vulnerability and instability. financial capitalism relies on a financial management of debt (e.g., loans to attend university) and gifts (e.g., genetic predispositions cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 137 and abilities) (stimilli 2011, p. 98) to augment value. it is credit that disciplines us all, forcing us to rely on trust and faith, the trust we can inspire by means of our own past deeds and the faith that our creditor may have that our loans will be used productively. drawing upon agamben (2007), stimilli argues the economic narrative that sustains the organization of economic life in western capitalism is inherently religious, but nonetheless produces a series of mundane effects. the financialization of our economic life, and the entrepreneurial spirit we all need in order to manage it, produce ‘an obliging, although not necessarily constrictive, power’ (stimilli 2011, p. 98), which limits the transformative potential of systemic crises, as i will argue in the next section. the point i will develop is that the transformation of current modes of capitalist organization into a new form of greener, sustainable capitalism has discursive effects that transform the subversive potential of ecological pressures. operationally, both discursive and nondiscursive elements of the financialization-made-dispositif have deprived ecological knowledge of one of its fundamental ingredient, namely a future (chakrabarty 2009), where future is conceived as a historical process of change involving the subject-object relationship and constitutive of both the knower and the known. the result is an interrupted understanding of the way biopolitical events reorganize collective perceptions of possible configurations of the ecological system that are ‘alter’ to the one we live in. finance and the biosphere, or, have we always been green capitalists? the idea that environmental crises could strengthen capitalism through deregulated markets and by accelerating (green) consumption developed rapidly in the 1990s. more importantly, as argued by janet webb (2012, p.110) ‘questions of power and collective responsibility (were) marginalized, and the contradictions between neoliberal capitalism and sustainable consumption (were) obscured’. green capitalism seemed to be able to reconcile another apparently contradictory connection, the one between economic growth and sustainability. at the end it became all too clear as to how to achieve sustainable growth, namely by mobilizing an army of ‘self-governing subjects making pro-environmental choices’ (webb 2012, p.112). in other words, all economic units, households, individuals and firms alike, are called to play a part in the transformation towards a green economy. by now, a chorus of radical voices has been joined by more mainstream ones in the call for a radical transformation of capitalism. a newly established consensus drives the agenda to produce a decarbonized global economy 138 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 through market mechanisms (e.g., carbon markets). constructing a responsible calculating subject relies not only on technologies of selfhood, “susceptible to evaluation, calculation and intervention” (miller & rose 1990, p. 7). it also requires a semiotics that establishes a semantic link between the economic sign and the matter it refers to (environmental crisis for instance), and an awareness of its effect on the users of such language (pragmatics). in so doing, it sustains the green entrepreneurial spirit. the erosion of the distance between labour and finance has another distinctive implication for our comprehension of why dramatic market failures such as gfc or climate change have not delivered the swaying protest movements that precede structural shifts. as hornborg argues, ‘abstract language, universalizing knowledge, general purpose money, globalized commodities and cosmopolitan personalities all share one fundamental feature: they are free to transcend specific local contexts’. money in particular deserves attention: it is a ‘code with one sign’ (hornborg 1998, p.5). meaning centres on relative nominal value (not on substantive real value), and emerges ‘in contrasts, or in differences, between what something stands for, and it doesn't stand for’ (ibid). the distinction reflects an important contrast between entrepreneurial behaviour based on financialized relative values (for example a prevailing system of pricing carbon permits), where all is rendered commensurable, and behaviour based on use values (e.g., the non-commensurable value of our bio-sphere). where the former defines the latter, we may say we necessarily live in crisis. correlating financial incentives and environmental degradation through the economic language used to create the exchange values of ecosystem services, for instance, requires a certain suspension of disbelief that arise from the gap between exchange relative values and use values of green capitalism’s activities. with this widespread financialization of our lives ‘we have, in a sense, divested ourselves of the possibility of investing the economy (and the biosphere) with meaning’ (hornborg 1998, p.9). this is an example of what larry grossberg (2010) calls the problem of ‘commensuration’ that defines the ‘economic’ in the present conjuncture of ecological catastrophes. the economic valorization of the natural environment, the ‘promise of pleasure’ that it carries, is embedded in the financialization of our lives where ecological assets are only valuable to the extent that they are instrumental to achieve something else we feel indifferent to. the financialization of the biosphere, together with the material separation of rich economies from those that mostly suffer the consequences of ecological imbalances, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 139 creates a zone of indifference between various portfolios, in which the various assets or scenarios of post-ecological crisis futures are turned into financial planning exercises, confused in an array of possible financial portfolio configurations, finally freed from any emotional involvement (cooper 2010). as in foucault's analysis of ascetism, the alternative scenario thus reaches us in a zone of indifference, where what is prominent is not the ‘absence of temptation’ (foucault 2004 [1978], p. 206), but rather our ‘indifference’ to the temptation (of a different world). foucault points out the profound structural difference between pastoral power and ascetism, with the former relying on obedience, while the latter relies on freedom, freedom from the body and from fear of bodily suffering, but also the freedom to explore this ‘indifference to temptation’ that underpins entrepreneurial spirit. financial language makes this reductio to indifference possible. green financial capitalism operates with ecological scenarios in the way financial capitalism operates with financial assets: it relies on a savvy manipulation of various assets to achieve indifference between expected returns. indifference between outcomes is central to constructing market ‘efficiency’ yet is antithetical to ecological reality. in so doing, green capitalism nullifies the fear of the end of the world and rationalizes it by transforming it into fuel for the irrational exuberance that feeds itself. here lies the contradiction of green capitalism. from one hand, ecological crises take us contrary to the logic of growth driving capital, from the other hand market driven responses to such crises feed the supply chain of unlimited growth (parr 2013, p. 35). this swift twist from environmental catastrophe to green capitalism further demonstrates that factors other than technical fundamentals are used by market subjects to gauge the value of its products. the imagery and affect associated with green securities can be a powerful basis upon which to judge their worth: the result of the financialization of the biosphere is semiotic and material at the same time. in fact, never as clearly as in the case of green capitalism, commodities represent both material and metaphysical processes. through the financialization of the biosphere, we are forced to ‘internalize the economic value of the environment’ (jenkins & bayon 2009), we internalize capitalist ideologies, bounding our future to the very source of our chains. from financing labour to labouring a finance-led alternative? conclusions in this paper i have argued that the ongoing global economic crisis offers us a powerful example of how the financial dimension of capitalism becomes dispositif. two processes 140 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 interlace life and finance in the era of green financial capitalism, which blurs the boundaries between labour and finance. a process of financing labour changes the material conditions through which labour is employed and reproduced. a parallel movement of labouring finance, the undercurrent that the gfc has brought to the surface, involves a subordination of real to nominal economic entities. the modulation of the distance between biopolitical matters and financial matters, what i have named contamination, goes hand in hand with a process of abstraction (of the commodity and of labour power). more than ever this abstraction operates by means of financial evaluations that make possible a reduction to indifference (between financial assets, but equally among ecological scenarios). this evaluation transcends any emotional connection with what is valued, for example in the evaluation of the financial risk connected with our perceived and still desirable longevity (the ‘longevity risk’ in pension finance) or in the financial evaluation of environmental risk. distancing through abstraction is fundamental to the operation of green capitalism. this process of distancing from emotions and affects to let the economic reductionism prevail is apparent in the call for green entrepreneurs' action. through distancing, green capitalism manages to accomplish two important steps: blocking the psychotic fear of disintegration that anthropologist jonathan friedman sees as the origin of ecological awareness, and overcoming the binding physicality of nature that limits entrepreneurial exuberance. through contamination with the world of finance and abstraction of the physicality of the biosphere into financial assets, financial capitalism can be rebranded as green capitalism and continue its operation unperturbed. a contradiction arises around financial incentivizing in the face of collapse, and creates ground for alternative forms of anti/non-entrepreneurial agency that address the crisis directly (rather than through 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http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_ change/sternreview_index.cfm (accessed february 2013): stimilli, e. 2011, il debito del vivente. ascesi and capitalismo, quodlibet, macerata. sziraczki, g., huynh, p. & kapsos s. 2009, ‘the global economic crisis: labour market impacts and policies for recovery in asia’, ilo working paper series http://www.ilo.org/asia/whatwedo/publications/wcms_110095/lang--en/index.htm accessed 17 july 2013. walker, j. & cooper, m. 2011, ‘genealogies of resilience: from systems ecology to the political economy of crisis adaptation’, security dialogue vol. 42, no.2, pp. 143-160. webb, j. 2012, ‘climate change and society: the chimera of behaviour change technologies’, sociology, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 109-125. welsh, m. 2013, ‘resilience and responsibility: governing uncertainty in a complex world’, the geographical journal, doi: 10.1111/geoj.12012, accessed 17 july 2012. http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm http://www.ilo.org/asia/whatwedo/publications/wcms_110095/lang--en/index.htm from financing labour to labouring finance: subjectivity in financial times elisabetta magnani university of new south wales abstract reconsidering the distance between finance and life matters neoliberal subjects: the entrepreneur contamination and interruption finance and the biosphere, or, have we always been green capitalists? from financing labour to labouring a finance-led alternative? conclusions references russians from china: migrations and identity mara moustafine1 abstract in the first half of the 20th century, sizeable russian communities lived in a number of chinese cities, including harbin, shanghai and tientsin. the largest and most diverse of these was the community that grew up around harbin in north china. by the mid 1920s, harbin was home to one of the largest russian diaspora communities in the world, with over 120,000 russians and other nationalities from the former tsarist empire. moreover, many russians in shanghai and tientsin had links to harbin, as their first place of domicile in china. by the late 1950s, political transformations in china had driven almost all these people elsewhere. but for many of them, their roots in china became a key aspect of their identity in emigration in their new diasporas. this paper explores the background to this unique community and the geo-political forces underpinning the various waves of migration of russians into and out of harbin. it analyses the complex issues of identity and citizenship russians faced while living in harbin, their fates determined at various points in time by the dominance of three powers – russia, china and japan. drawing on the experience of my own family, whose life in harbin and manchuria spanned four generations over fifty years, it touches on the rich ethnic and cultural mix that lay beneath the surface of “russian” harbin, with particular reference to the jewish community that once thrived there. finally, it examines how the ‘harbintsy’ perceive their identity in emigration and the recent changes in attitude towards them of the chinese authorities. introduction in the first half of the 20th century, sizeable russian communities lived in a number of chinese cities, including harbin, shanghai and tientsin2. the largest and most diverse of these was the community that grew up around the city of harbin in north china, then known as manchuria to europeans and dongbei to the chinese. by the mid 1920s, this region was home to one the largest russian diaspora communities in the world, with 120,000 living in harbin and some 35,000 in other settlements in manchuria (stephan 1978, pp. 96-109). the harbin community was comprised of ethnic russians, as well as other nationalities from the former tsarist empire, living in relative harmony in a “russian world” on chinese soil3. 1 mara moustafine is an independent scholar. http://maramoustafine.com. this article was first published in international journal of diversity in organisations, communities and nations, vol.9, no.6, 2010 and is reprinted here with permission of the editor. 2 in the mid 1930s, the russian communities of shanghai and tientsin were estimated to number around 21,000 (wang 2008, p. 94) and 6,000 (balakshin 1958, p.236) respectively. 3 much of the information in this paper is drawn from (moustafine 2002) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 143 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia http://maramoustafine.com/ harbin’s russian history began in 1898 with the construction of the chinese eastern railway (cer) across manchuria, linking the trans-siberian railway to vladivostok. as part of a deal struck in 1896 with the government of qing china, russia gained a concession to build and operate the railway in return for a secret defence pact against japan. with this came extraterritorial rights in the five mile zone along the route of the railway – the cer zone. manchuria, in effect, became a russian colony, and harbin, where the headquarters of the cer administration was located, its de facto capital4. waves of inward migration 1898–1917 to build the cer and develop russian manchuria the cer drew tens of thousands of people from the far reaches of the tsarist empire to the largely wild and sparsely populated steppes of manchuria. engineers and labourers came to build the railway; clerks, guards and civil servants to work in its administration. merchants and traders came to develop natural resources and provide goods and services in harbin and other russian settlements along the railway’s route. large numbers of chinese “coolies” were also brought in from shandong province in southern china as construction labour. during the russo-japanese war of 1904-1905, harbin was a base for russian military operations in manchuria, supplying the tsar’s 950,000-strong army with provisions and serving as a hospital and rest and recreation centre, with a garrison for some 100,000 troops. after demobilisation, some of the soldiers returned to live in manchuria with their families (wolff 1999, pp. 121-125). harbin was a distinctly russian city in china. its architecture was reminiscent of moscow or st. petersburg, with onion-domed cupolas, empire-style façades, wide boulevards and touches of art nouveau. russian was spoken in the streets, shops and theatres. it was also the language of administration, commerce and education. street signs and billboards were written in russian. only in fujiadian, where most of harbin’s chinese lived and few russians ventured, did chinese prevail.5 4 for a background to the cer and early history of manchuria, see (quested 1982), (melikhov 1991), (wolff 1999). 5 see (melikhov 1990) (taskina 1994) re russian life in harbin; (balakshin 1958) for an account of émigré politics between 1917 and 1945. 144 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 from its early days, “russian” harbin was a community of diverse cultures and ethnicities united by their origins in the russian empire. it was multicultural and cosmopolitan6. keen to attract entrepreneurs and private investors to drive the rapid economic development of manchuria, the st petersburg authorities deliberately created an environment of tolerance, equal opportunity and actively encouraged minorities of the tsarist empire to come and live there7. settlers of various cultures and religions flocked there in search of a better life, among them jews, poles, tatars, georgians, armenians and ukrainians (chernolutskaya 2000). harbin offered them a russian-speaking cultural, social and economic world, without the official boundaries and prejudices of the russian state. jews the case of the jews, who in 1903 were the earliest minority community officially recognised by the cer administration and who continued as an organised community until 1964, demonstrates the way in which this cosmopolitan dynamic developed. for jews of the tsarist empire, russian manchuria was the land of opportunity. the discriminatory laws and restrictions which prevailed in the empire proper – like those confining them to live in the pale of settlement8, excluding them from certain professions and setting quotas for their numbers in schools and other educational institutions – did not apply there9. most importantly, there were no pogroms and little overt anti-semitism, at least until the late 1920s. efforts to impose restrictions on the jews were actively opposed by the cer chief administrator, general horvath10. jews started coming to manchuria from 1898 and played an early role in developing natural resources (lumber, coal, flour mills, distillery, sugar refining, meat & livestock), freight based export industries (grain, soya bean oil, wool, skins, furs) and commerce (hotels, restaurants, music stores, jewelers, pharmacies). small communities sprang up in the small towns along the railway at hailar, manchuria station, mukden and tsitsihar, but most settled in harbin. 6 according to the 1913 census, there were 22 nationalities living in the commercial pristan district of harbin (half of them minorities of the tsarist empire) (levitsky 2000, p. 47) 7 see (wolff 1999, pp. 78-90) re internal debate in the tsarist government regarding settler policy in the cer. 8 the western border area of the tsarist empire, stretching from the baltic to the black sea. 9 on jewish community, see (bresler 2000), (shickman-bowman 2000), (wolff 1999, pp. 96-106), (kaufman 2006) 10 the former leader of the harbin jewish community, dr a. i. kaufman described an instance when horvath thwarted such an attempt by the governor-general of the far eastern province, gondatti. (kaufman 2001, p. 34). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 145 they quickly established their own community institutions (schools, a synagogue, a burial society and communal dining room) and played an active role in the commercial, cultural and public life of russian harbin. they also participated actively in harbin’s municipal affairs – making up 12 of the 40 members on the city council in 1909 (kaufman 2001). although there is no evidence of jews being employed by the cer before 1915, this may have been in deference to the hiring practice in russian state enterprises, as there was no law to this effect (wolff 1999, pp. 104, 222). chain migration was common, with one member of an extended family coming first to test opportunities in the distant new homeland, then others following. so it was, with the families of my maternal grandparents from byelorussia, who arrived in harbin in the first decade of the 20th century. my grandfather’s family established a successful meat and livestock business in harbin, while my grandmother’s family settled in the town of hailar, near the russian border, where they had a small dairy business (moustafine 2004). refugees from bolshevik revolution, civil war and collectivisation 1917 1930 the second major influx of russians into harbin came in the wake of the 1917 bolshevik revolution and the ensuing civil war. at its height, harbin and the cer zone served as a staging ground for white armies in their battle with the bolsheviks in siberia. after the white defeat in 1922, masses of people who had spent the civil war in siberia, including my paternal grandparents, came across the border with the retreating white armies. stalin’s forced collectivisation campaign (1928-31) brought more refugees on the dangerous journey from siberia across the amur river.11 among the thousands of refugees who flooded into harbin were people from all walks of life and diverse nationalities: from former royalty to anti-bolshevik white guards and cossacks, as well as poor unskilled labourers. the influx of artists, musicians and intellectuals endowed it with a rich cultural life. at its peak in the mid 1920s, the russian community numbered about 120,000 people, with another 35,000 living in the smaller towns along the railway’s 11 in 1926 the border was closed on the soviet side and in 1932 on the chinese side by the occupying japanese. (kaufman 2006, p. 30) 146 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 route12. by this time the jewish community in harbin had grown to around 13,000, with around 2,000 in other towns – comprising some 10 per cent of the russian population. they now boasted two synagogues and had extended their communal institutions (bresler 2000). as a conspicuously russian city in china – in terms of architecture, language and culture – harbin provided russian refugees with a semblance of familiarity. still, this could not overcome the deep sense of displacement and loss which the refugees felt as they strived to come to terms with broken families, loss of loved ones, homeland and often status. citizenship and identity 1898 – 1930 before the 1917 bolshevik revolution, issues of identity and citizenship13 for russian harbintsy14 were quite straightforward. arriving from the russian empire on tsarist passports, they regarded themselves as russians or russian jews living in the cer zone – russia’s “colony” in manchuria. some saw their residence in harbin as temporary. for others, it was their new home, a place where they could live in a russian-speaking cultural, social and economic world, without the official boundaries and prejudices of the russian state. while the political status of the cer zone remained undecided, anti-bolshevik white russians and chinese warlords were in effective control. in 1920 the chinese republican government withdrew recognition from tsarist representatives to china and ended russian extraterritoriality in the cer zone, leaving russians in manchuria stateless (bakich 2000; quested 1982). in june 1924, the chinese finally recognised the soviet government and the two powers agreed that henceforth they would jointly administer the cer, and that chinese law would apply. in practical terms, the soviets were in control of the administration of the cer, 12 according to (bakich 2000, p. 56), between 100,000 and 200,000 russian émigrés flooded into harbin during this period, though many moved on to other cities in china and beyond. (stephan 1978, p. 56) puts harbin’s russian population at 120,000 in 1922, plus some 13,000 jews. 13 (bakich 2000) provides an interesting analysis of these issues. 14 harbintsy is the russian word for “people of harbin”, cf. berliners, new yorkers, muscovites. it applies to any nationality, not just russians. although the paper focuses on russian harbintsy, many of their experiences were shared by russians living elsewhere in “russian manchuria”. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 147 including the railway, schools, hospitals and other institutions15. it was decreed that only soviet or chinese citizens could work for the cer, a reasonable requirement for what was effectively the civil service in the cer zone. around 20,000 cer employees registered with the soviet consulate to preserve their jobs. many of them were jokingly called “radishes” – red on the outside, white on the inside. a small number took chinese citizenship (bakich 2000, pp. 17-18); (lensen 1974, pp. 17-18). those who preferred to remain stateless began to seek work elsewhere. by the early 1930s, with their old tsarist passports obsolete, russians who did not work for the cer administration also started to consider their citizenship. their choices were to register as soviet or chinese citizens, or to remain stateless. out of patriotism to the old russia and opposition to the bolsheviks, most chose to remain stateless – “white émigrés”. a few became soviet citizens out of sympathy for the revolution. quite a number of longterm settlers, like my mother’s family, chose the soviet option simply to avoid being stateless in the turbulent times in which they lived. registering with the soviet consulate did not entitle these people to full rights as soviet citizens, or even the right to emigrate to the ussr. the little brown clothbound books with which they were issued looked like passports but were, in fact, ‘residence permits’ which gave them the protection of the soviet consulate while living in china. at this stage, these citizenship choices had little impact on the lives of russian harbintsy, other than in terms of their employment opportunities. they continued to live side by side, to mix socially and to do business with each other. still, from this time onwards, concerns about citizenship and identity left many harbintsy insecure about their place in society, a sense which would continue for their remaining years in harbin. the division into white émigrés and soviets would have far-reaching consequences during the 13 years of japanese occupation (bresler 2000, p. 204), (melikhov 1997, pp. 199-200). waves of outward migration 1931-1960s from its inception at the turn of the 20th century, the city of harbin served both as a transit point for people escaping the confines of the russian or soviet empire to the world beyond 15 this situation prevailed for the next seven years, except for a brief period during the sino-soviet conflict in 1929 (lensen 1974, pp. 13-81) 148 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 and as an end point for those who wished to seek their fortunes in china. even before the bolshevik revolution, many russians took the chinese eastern railway from siberia to harbin, then travelled to the treaty ports of shanghai and tientsin, as well as other points in asia and even australia. but a majority stayed on in harbin and other towns in manchuria, where they built a new life and contributed to the economic and cultural development of the cer zone. a sequence of major political transformations in china, driven by the three powers competing for hegemony in manchuria – japan, the soviet union and china itself – prompted the exodus of russians from the region. these were the japanese occupation of manchuria in 1932, the soviet union’s sale of the cer to japan in 1935, occupation by the soviet red army in 1945 and finally, the chinese communist revolution in 1949. japanese occupation of manchuria–manchukuo–1932-1945 the japanese occupation of manchuria and the establishment of the puppet manchukuo regime in 1932 fractured harbin’s “russian world”, driving many russian harbintsy to seek refuge elsewhere. many moved to other cities in china, notably the international settlements in shanghai and tianjin16. others went to the soviet union. by the end of the 1930s, the russian population of harbin had dropped to around 30,00017. as part of their effort to gain control of the cer and drive the soviets out of manchuria, the japanese military police began a campaign of harassment of cer employees and other soviet citizens, through attacks and arrests. this became most pronounced after the soviet union sold the cer enterprise to japan in march 1935, as did the polarisation of the russian community into white émigrés and soviets (lensen 1974, pp. 212-334). life for jews in manchuria too deteriorated seriously after the japanese occupation. the japanese themselves were not driven by anti-semitism and publicly maintained good relations with the jewish community. but they associated closely with militant anti-soviet whites, such as the russian fascist party (rfp), whose ideology of anti-bolshevism and 16 the japanese did not take over these cities until the end of 1937. 17 this figure is based on japanese data given in ('the white russians of manchukuo' 1937); (clausen & thøgersen 1995, p. 116). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 149 nationalism was laced with virulent anti-semitism18. in the early 1930s, russian thugs linked to the rfp engaged in a campaign of kidnappings, extortion and murder against wealthy businessmen, mainly jews, masterminded by the japanese military police, the kempeitai19. their spree culminated in 1933 with the kidnap and brutal murder of the accomplished jewish pianist simon kaspe, whose father owned harbin’s hotel moderne (vespa 1938); (stephan 1978, pp. 78-90); (breuillard 2004). faced with a declining economy, banditry, anti-semitism, political intimidation and the takeover of their businesses by the japanese, over half of its jewish population left harbin. many moved to other cities in china, notably the international settlements in shanghai and tianjin, as well as the soviet union. by 1935, harbin’s jewish community had declined from 13,000 in 1931 to only 5,000 (bresler 2000, p. 209). soviet sale of cer to japan 1935 in march 1935 the soviet union sold the cer enterprise to japan, losing its influence and ability to protect the interests of its citizens in manchuria for the next decade. a mass exodus of russians from harbin followed, as some 30,000 families departed for the soviet union on overcrowded trains strung with banners reading “mother russia, receive your children”. most were cer employees but there were also those who felt there was no future for russians in manchuria20, among them my grandmother’s parents and siblings. for many of these people, their identity as harbintsy proved to be a death warrant. as xenophobia against foreign enemies grew at the height of stalin’s great terror, they were arrested as “japanese spies” under nkvd chief yezhov’s special harbin order of september 193721. 48,000 harbintsy were arrested, 31,000 of them executed; the rest sent to labour camps22. 18 (stephan 1978) provides a fascinating account of the role the rfp played in the politics of manchuria. the roots of their ideology and collaboration with the japanese are described on pages 55-78. 19 (bresler 2000, p. 209) notes that eight of the 12 people kidnapped between 1932 and 1934 were jews and four of them were murdered. 20 exact numbers of “returnees” are unknown and estimates vary between 21,000 and 100,000. see discussion in (merritt 1998). 21 operational order no. 00593 of 20 september 1937. an english translation appears in (moustafine 2002, pp. 449-452). merritt (1998) provides an interesting analysis in the context of the purges. 22these statistics, based on research work by a. b. roginsky and o. a. gorlanov of memorial’s research and information centre, were provided to me in may 2002. my book secrets and spies: the harbin files (2002) 150 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 citizenship and identity in manchukuo for the russians who remained in harbin during the 13 years of japanese occupation, citizenship and identity became paramount as the community was polarised over these issues. suddenly people who for years had lived side by side, united by their russian origins, became identified by the characteristics which divided them: ‘white émigré’ or ‘soviet’, ‘orthodox christian’ or ‘jew’. in garnering support of russian émigrés for their occupation, the japanese rekindled old dreams and prejudices. in 1934 the japanese established the bureau of russian émigré affairs in manchukuo (brem) as a mechanism of controlling the russian population in manchuria. nominally under russian control, it was headed by a succession of white army generals and run by members of the rfp and their sympathisers, thereby giving implicit sanction to their anti-bolshevik and anti-semitic ideology23. all adult émigré russians were required to register with the brem24. only then could they receive identity papers, residence permits, employment cards and travel documents. those who did not were denied employment and education for their children. in the later years of the occupation, russian émigrés were issued with identification badges – at first, striped white, blue and red like the tsarist flag, later, round, white aluminium disks, with numbers, which the wearers labelled “dog tags”.25 soviets were instantly conspicuous because they had no badges. faced with such pressures, many soviets, including former employees of the cer administration and some prominent merchants, saw no option but to “convert” to émigré status. by the 1940s, through departures and conversions, the number of soviet harbintsy had dwindled to around 1,000 (stephan 1978, p. 176). my mother’s family were among those who retained soviet citizenship throughout the japanese occupation, as my grandfather insisted that being stateless – “a citizen of nowhere” – was too risky in the face of japanese aggression. the price was the seizure of his meat tells this story, based on the secret police files of my family which i obtained from the fsb after the collapse of the soviet union. 23 (aurilene 2008, pp. 48-72) (breuillard 2000) (stephan 1978, pp. 173-178) discuss the functions of brem and life for émigré russians under its administration. 24 captured by the soviets in 1945, the brem files are now held in the khabarovsk state archive. 25 poles and other citizens of the former tsarist empire were issued with yellow badges. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 151 business by the japanese and my mother’s exclusion from school and youth activities. still, the family fared much better than friends and relatives in hailar, some of whom were imprisoned by the japanese as alleged soviet agents; while others were among the 47 beheaded by the japanese on the eve of the arrival of the soviet red army in august 1945. for most émigré harbintsy, the oppressiveness of japanese occupation also weighed heavily, particularly after the outbreak of the second world war. in addition to cultural subservience to the japanese “imperial way”, the émigré community was expected to help build japan’s new east asian order through the conscription of young men into military detachments and the deployment of some in cross-border raids against the soviet union. the invasion of the soviet union by japan’s ally, germany in june 1941, severely tested émigré loyalties. eventually even the most anti-soviet whites, who had made common cause with japan in the hope that white russian rule would be restored in the soviet far east, were left with no illusions that japan was pursuing anything other than its own interests. 26 soviet army occupation of manchuria 1945 the next migration of harbintsy was the forced deportation which took place after the soviet red army arrived in august 1945 to “liberate” manchuria from the japanese. most harbintsy, regardless of their political tags, welcomed them with flowers and euphoria. however, with the arrival of the slick operatives of the military counter-intelligence organisation smersh (death to spies!), thousands of innocent émigrés were rounded up and deported to prison camps in the ussr, along with japanese collaborators (bresler 2000, p. 211). among them were young men who had been conscripted into anti-soviet military detachments like asano, as well as representatives of harbin’s various communities and social organisations, who had had dealings with the japanese on behalf of their communities. this included jewish community leader dr abraham kaufman (kaufman 1973); (kaufman 2006, pp. 131-159); (pasternak & raleigh 1983). smersh drew its information from the archive of émigré files compiled by brem. 26 by this time, they had discovered that the japanese did not include the russians among the five races for whom they were building manchukuo (bakich 2000, p. 62). 152 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 during its short lived occupation of manchuria, the soviet union established “soviet” style administration and registered most russians as “soviet citizens” (without rights). after the soviets departed in april 1946, their influence over russian harbintsy was maintained through the society of soviet citizens, created to administer the affairs of russians in manchuria, much as brem did during the japanese years. it operated in close collaboration with the soviet consulate, as brem had with the japanese military mission. after the 1949 chinese communist revolution the final major wave of migration from harbin came in the wake of the 1949 chinese communist revolution. in the mid-1950s, russian harbintsy were invited, then pressured, to repatriate to the soviet union as part of khrushchev’s “virgin lands” campaign.27 some went as patriots, others in the hope of being reunited with loved ones deported in 1945. most found themselves stranded in the steppes of southern kazakhstan or the snows of siberia, though most were later able to find jobs in urban centres. those who resisted the pressure to go to the ussr were sacked from any chinese state enterprise employment, but were eventually permitted to migrate to other countries, including australia, brazil, argentina, israel, canada and the united states. by the time my family left for sydney in 1959, the russian community in harbin had dwindled to a couple of thousand, with a couple of hundred jews. some of our relatives, unable to secure visas earlier, left china in 1964, bearing the repercussions of the breakdown of relations between china and the soviet union in the early 1960s. by that time, fewer than 500 russians remained in harbin (clausen & thøgersen 1995, p. 160). during the cultural revolution in china from 1966-1976, russians who had remained in harbin found themselves under attack from red guards as “foreign devils”. some of them were imprisoned as “soviet spies”. others were forced to witness the destruction of st nicholas cathedral, harbin’s holiest orthodox religious shrine, blown up in 1966 (working 2001), and the desecration of tombstones and other churches. 27 an intensive agricultural project to encourage young people from all over the ussr to develop the vast grasslands of kazakhstan and siberia that had never been farmed before. the programme was extended to soviet citizens in china in 1954. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 153 in 1986, one of the surviving russian orthodox churches – the pokrov church – was renovated and reopened for services, which were conducted by a chinese priest, father grigori zhu. the parishioners included the dwindling number of ethnic russians, as well as orthodox chinese. father grigori’s death in 2000 has left the church without a priest to conduct services (‘timeline of orthodoxy in china’ 2009). the last of the long term russian residents died in 2006 at the age of 96. beyond harbin: identity in emigration after the turbulence and insecurity they had lived with, most russians from china found welcome respite in their countries of resettlement, blending into the societies around them with relative ease as they embraced the stability they offered. to preserve their religious and cultural heritage, in many places, ethnic russians established churches and weekend language schools for their children.28 they maintained their social links and formed alumni associations, like that of the harbin polytechnical institute, harbin’s main tertiary institution, which published a journal in australia for over 35 years. russian jews from china still keep in touch through the bulletin of igud yotzei sin, (the association of former jewish residents of china), established in israel in the 1950s, with branches all over the world. for most of these people, harbin and china remain central to their identity – they call themselves russians “from china”, not simply “russians”. in their literature, they describe themselves as the “chinese” branch of the russian or jewish diaspora. following the collapse of the soviet union, periodicals with names like in the hills of manchuria, russians in china emerged and gained a following among harbintsy around the world. the pages of these publications are laden with histories of russian institutions and life in china, personal reminiscences, searches for erstwhile friends, necrologies and nostalgia. to a large extent, this is not an identification with china itself, but with the world of “russian harbin”, which the harbintsy created in the manchurian hills, then lost. during their years there, most lived in a predominantly russian world, with little thought for the china around them. few studied the language seriously or delved into the culture. most of their interactions with chinese were confined to their domestic assistants, tradesmen and 28 see (ryan 2005) on language retention in émigré russian communities. 154 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 merchants, who spoke pidgin russian, or with educated russian-speaking chinese. few ventured into the adjacent district of fujiadian, where most of harbin’s chinese then lived. for most russians, the underlying element was their sense of harbin’s role in preserving the rich cultural heritage of pre-revolutionary russia, uncontaminated by soviet influence.29 for russian jews, their china was one where “jews could be russians”, free to participate fully in either or both cultures. today many former harbintsy and their children and grandchildren seek to reconnect with their history and rediscover their roots, through genealogical research as well as travel to harbin. in the last decade, this is being positively encouraged by chinese authorities. attitude of current chinese authorities to harbin’s “russian” past harbin’s russian past, which went unmentioned during the maoist period, was long caught up in the intricacies of the historical, political and ideological rivalry between the soviet union and china. the demise of the soviet union in 1991 eliminated the ideological dimension and the relationship with russia is now developing along more pragmatic lines, allowing some acknowledgement of the role russians played in harbin’s development. since the late 1990s, efforts have been made to preserve some old russian buildings and harbin’s daily newspaper, the heilongjiang daily, started to run feature articles about former harbintsy30. while harbin’s centenary in 1998 went uncelebrated, a program of civic works was started a year ahead of it. the former church of st. sophia was refurbished as the harbin architectural museum, complete with orthodox crosses on its domes. zhongyang street, the main street of the daoli district (formerly kitayskaya ulitsa of old harbin) was converted into a pedestrian mall and many of the buildings spruced up.31 the motive was, of course, to attract tourists. but st sophia has now become a symbol of harbin, and the museum inside it is a testament to the city’s russian history. other russian buildings have also been preserved. the former tartar mosque has been refurbished into a functioning place of worship. there is talk of restoring other russian churches, as relations with russia are strengthening. 29 (stephan 1978, p. 43) “like excised tissue preserved in formaldehyde long after the parent body has perished, the émigrés of harbin persisted, a lifelike fragment of the pre-revolutionary era”. 30 these have since been published as a book (zeng 2003) 31 (berton 1999) notes that a celebration of the anniversary of zhongyang street’s conversion into a pedestrian mall just happened to coincide with the hundredth anniversary of both the street and harbin. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 155 far less contentious, at least since diplomatic relations with israel were established in 1992, has been the role of the former jewish community in harbin. the last decade has seen concerted efforts to preserve vestiges of jewish life in harbin as a priority, endorsed by the provincial and municipal governments. this has resulted in the restoration of harbin’s large jewish cemetery, where 600 graves have been identified, the refurbishment of one of the former synagogues as an exhibition hall, which now houses a permanent exhibit on the history of the jews of harbin, as well regular conferences on similar subjects organised by the jewish studies centre of the heilongjiang academy of social sciences.32 as well as the intrinsic historical and cultural value of this restoration work, the aim is clearly to attract tourists and investors. it is also part of an effort to reposition harbin in relation to the global economy by linking the city’s cosmopolitan past with its drive for a global future.(koga 2008) conclusion as headquarters of the chinese eastern railway – tsarist russia’s last imperial project – in the early 1900s, harbin was transformed from a small fishing village on the sungari river in north china into a major economic hub. it was a magnet for indigenous chinese workers from the south, as well as entrepreneurs, adventurers and minorities from across the tsarist empire. though holding a common citizenship, this latter group was multi-national and multi-ethnic. importantly, the hierarchies that operated within the empire proper were rapidly eroded in pursuit of economic opportunity and modernisation. the aftermath of the 1917 bolshevik revolution and the civil war that followed brought a massive wave of immigration to the cer zone, the last remaining russian enclave outside the soviet union. in the absence of clear political authority and defined citizenship in the zone in the interregnum between tsarist and soviet rule in the russian empire, the identity of russians there became strongly focused on locality – they became harbintsy. this largely continued in the brief period of joint sino-soviet control. harbin was at its peak in the mid 1920s, with a rich russian cultural life, offset by a unique cosmopolitan flavour and the interplay of ethnic, religious and cultural communities. the 32 the first international conference on the history and culture of the jews of harbin was held in august 2004. 156 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 emergence of a harbin identity was most aptly demonstrated in the experience of the jews, who were able to be both russian, in their economic, political and cultural practices, and jewish, in their communal and religious. the japanese occupation of manchuria from the early 1930s turned this russian world upside down. arbitrary arrests and intimidation aimed at driving out the soviets, the polarisation of the russian community between “reds” and “whites”, economic decline and the rise of antisemitism prompted the first major exodus of russians from the cer zone. some went to the soviet union; others to the international settlements of shanghai, tientsin and beyond. the fate of those who remained lay in the hands of the controlling power – firstly japan, later the soviet union and finally china itself. by the early 1960s, almost all of them had moved on from china. in the various diaspora communities in which they settled, their lives in china became the defining element of their russian identity, however removed they had been from the reality of the country in which they had lived. today, the chinese authorities are trying to recover and reinterpret harbin’s cosmopolitan past within the new national ethos of a multicultural china and its drive for a global future. references aurilene, e.e. 2008, rossiiskaia diaspora v kitae, 1920-1950 (the russian diaspoa in china, 1920-1950), chastnaya kollektsia, khabarovsk. bakich, o. 2000, ‘émigré identity: the case of harbin’, south atlantic quarterly vol. 99, no. 1 (winter), pp. 51-73. balakshin, p. 1958, final v kitae (finale in china), vol. 1, sirius, munich. berton, p. 1999, ‘a trip to khabarovsk, birobidzhan, and a nostalgic return to harbin after fifty seven years’, bulletin of igud yotzei sin (english language supplement), no. 359 (may-june). bresler, b. 2000, ‘harbin’s jewish community 1898-1958: politics, prosperity and adversity’, in j. goldstein (ed.), the jews of china volume 2, vol. 2, m. e. sharpe, new york, pp. 200-215. breuillard, s. 2000, ‘general v. a. kislitsin: from russian monarchism to the spirit of bushido’, south atlantic quarterly, vol. 99, no. 1 (winter), pp. 128-131. breuillard, s. 2004, ‘reviving the case of kaspe’, international conference on the history and culture of jews in harbin eds w. qu & t. kaufman, heilongjiang people’s publishing house, harbin chernolutskaya, e. 2000, ‘religious communities in harbin and ethnic identity of russian émigrés’, south atlantic quarterly vol. 99, no. 1 (winter), pp. 79-96. clausen, s. & thøgersen, s. (eds) 1995, the making of a chinese city: history and historiography in harbin, m. e. sharpe, new york. kaufman, a. 1973, lagernyi vrach (camp doctor), am oved, tel aviv. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 157 kaufman, a.i. 2001, ‘lecture of 17 february 1962’, bulletin of igud yotzei sin, vol. 336, p. 35. kaufman, t. 2006, the jews of harbin live on in my heart, association of former jewish residents of china in israel tel aviv. koga, y. 2008, ‘‘the atmosphere of a foreign country’: harbin’s architectural inheritance ‘, in a.m. cronin & k. hetherington (eds), consuming the entrepreneurial city : image, memory, spectacle, routledge, new york, pp. 221-254. lensen, g. 1974, the damned inheritance: the soviet union and the manchurian crisis 1924-35, the diplomatic press, tallahassee. levitsky, v.v. 2000, ‘pristan na sungari’, bulletin of igud yotzei sin no. 336 (nov-dec), p. 47. melikhov, g. 1990, ‘glimpses of old harbin’, far eastern affairs, vol. 4, pp. 160-164. melikhov, g.v. 1991, manchzhuriya daliekaya i blizkaya (manchuria far and near), nauka, moscow. melikhov, g.v. 1997, rossiiskaya emigratsiya v kitae (1917-1924), institute of russian history, russian academy of sciences, moscow. merritt, s. 1998, ‘matushka rosiia primi svoikh detei! (mother russia, take in your children)—archival materials on the stalinist repression of the soviet kharbintsy’, rossiiane v azii (russians in asia) vol. 5, no. autumn, pp. 207-208. moustafine, m. 2002, secrets and spies: the harbin files, random house australia, sydney. moustafine, m. 2004, ‘my family and its city: fifty years in harbin’, international seminar on the history and culture of jews in harbin, eds w. qu & t. kaufman, heilongjiang people’s publishing house, harbin, pp. 364-371. pasternak, g. & raleigh, e. 1983, to reach this season, judah l. magnes museum, berkeley. quested, r.k.i. 1982, ‘matey’ imperialists: the tsarist russians in manchuria 1895-1917, university of hong kong, hong kong. ryan, n. 2005, rossiya, harbin, avstralia (russia, harbin, australia), russkii put’, moscow. shickman-bowman, z. 2000, ‘the construction of the chinese eastern railway and the origins of the harbin jewish community, 1898-1931’, in j. goldstein (ed.), the jews of china, volume 2, m. e. sharpe, new york, pp. 187-197. stephan, j.j. 1978, the russian fascists: tragedy and farce in exile 1925-45, hamish hamilton, london. taskina, e. 1994, neizvestnyi harbin (unknown harbin), prometei, moscow. ‘the white russians of manchukuo’ 1937, contemporary manchuria vol. 1, no. 3. ‘timeline of orthodoxy in china’ 2009, timeline of orthodoxy in china, orthdoxwiki, 2009 <http://orthodoxwiki.org/timeline_of_orthodoxy_in_china>. vespa, a. 1938, secret agent of japan, little brown, boston. wang, z. 2008, istoriia russkoi emigratsii v shanhae (a history of the russian emigre community in shanghai), russkii put’, moscow wolff, d. 1999, to the harbin station: the liberal alternative in russian manchuria, 18981914, stanford university press, stanford, ca. working, r. 2001, ‘reminders of russian legacy linger in harbin’, st petersburg times 3 april 2001. zeng, y. 2003, the city and its people: stories of harbin heilongjiang people’s publishing house, harbin. 158 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 russians from china: migrations and identity mara moustafine0f abstract introduction waves of inward migration 1898–1917 to build the cer and develop russian manchuria jews refugees from bolshevik revolution, civil war and collectivisation 1917 1930 citizenship and identity 1898 – 1930 waves of outward migration 1931-1960s japanese occupation of manchuria–manchukuo–1932-1945 soviet sale of cer to japan 1935 citizenship and identity in manchukuo soviet army occupation of manchuria 1945 after the 1949 chinese communist revolution beyond harbin: identity in emigration attitude of current chinese authorities to harbin’s “russian” past conclusion cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 1 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia using metasynthesis to develop sensitising concepts to understand torres strait islander migration vinnitta patricia mosby james cook university abstract emerging research indicates that more and more indigenous peoples will be forced to migrate due to climate change. current responses focus on mitigation and adaptation strategies. one such group, torres strait islander people are already moving for other reasons and existing vulnerabilities compound levels of disadvantage when moving. it will be important to understand torres strait islander people’s experiences of contemporary movements in order to inform policy development and facilitate the process of migration and resettlement as movement increases. a synthesis of existing studies would allow the development of sensitising concepts that could inform future research in the torres strait islander context. this article presents a metasynthesis of six qualitative studies of the experiences of different indigenous and minority groups at various stages of migration, displacement and resettlement. articles were selected on contemporary movements (2001-2011) and importantly the inclusion of first person voice. reciprocal translation was used to synthesise common themes and a core construct. the overarching construct that became apparent from the metasynthesis was ‘continuity of being’ through staying connected to self, family and culture. three themes emerged: ‘freedom to be’, ‘staying close’ and ‘forming anchor’. these were enacted through people valuing their personal, social, religious and political freedom and recognising the importance of maintaining or forming strong social and family networks. when researching the experiences of torres strait islanders it will be necessary to focus on motivations for moving, and understand the processes for staying connected to kin and homeland in order to achieve the desired outcomes of successful resettlement under conditions of uncertainty. vignette i am a torres strait islander woman, born and raised on thursday island. my mother is from the murray islands. my tribal wind is koki (north westerlies), which sweeps through the islands during the monsoon period of november and march. koki kerker (seasonal period) replenishes our water supplies and cleans the land and waterways of litter and dust that accumulates during the dry and windy spells. the sea turtle, nam, is my matriarchal totem. it is from nam, an ancient symbol of longevity and endurance, that i form my character. nam moves with perfect ease, travels far yet returns to her place of birth to nest and bury her eggs. i moved to the mainland to further my career within the past 10 years. experiencing a sense of displacement as a consequence of my move made me question whether other people in my situation felt the same. it is this sense of disconnection that motives my research. although successfully establishing a physical home in cairns, i feel my spirit is firmly anchored in the torres strait. 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 in this time, i have witnessed a large number of torres strait islander people migrating from the region. i expect to see more people move as environmental pressure mounts and a growing population amplifies the current issues of land and housing shortage, coupled with limited employment opportunities and high cost of living. i want to know more about this displacement to understand my own experience through the lives and stories of others. for this reason, i chose to conduct a metasynthesis to develop sensitising concepts that could inform future research on the torres strait experience. reading outside and beyond the australian context enhanced my own understanding of migration, displacement and the processes and outcomes of resettlement, validating as well as refuting pre-existing assumptions. considerations emerging from the literature synthesis allowed for a deeper exploration of my own qualitative research agenda which intends to uncover previously hidden features of internal migration and resettlement of torres strait islanders in australia. introduction emerging research indicates that indigenous peoples will be forced to migrate as climatic conditions add to environmental pressures that will impose on people’s livelihoods. climate change discourse has brought special interest to small islands nations in the south pacific and flood prone areas of india, vietnam and africa (warner, 2010). despite media and political attention focusing on future predictions of rising sea levels, studies in the south pacific have identified that vulnerable groups are already on the move for reasons other than environmental changes. whilst the current focus is on climate change refugees, adaptation strategies and mitigation, there is a need to understand the realities of displaced indigenous peoples particularly those already on the move for other reasons. existing migration studies tend to focus on the history and extent of mobility rather than seeking a deeper understanding from displaced people’s perspectives. the internal migration of indigenous australian people came to light in the 1970s when they were first included in the national census (altman, biddle & hunter 2005). previous to this there was little or no understanding of indigenous australians’ contemporary movement, especially that of torres strait islanders (gray 1989). one of the first studies of torres strait islander migration in north queensland was conducted in 1974 by the research school of pacific studies. the study was based on data which was collected from the 1971 census. the study supported the notion that a large population had already moved out of the torres strait and were residing on the mainland. almost 60 per cent of torres strait islanders at the time were residing outside cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 3 of the torres strait region, with townsville having the second largest population of torres strait islanders in australia (fisk, duncan & kehl 1974). the interest in indigenous migration patterns has since expanded, mostly for political and economic reasons (taylor & arthur 1993; altman et al. 2005) to identify shifts in the labour market (gray 1989). studies were undertaken for economic and planning purposes by governments which looked at levels of unemployment that would place demands on social services required to support an increasingly mobile indigenous population. the study by fisk et al. (1974) of torres strait islander migration provided a number of motives for movement. these included: better living conditions, education, health and employment opportunities, and freedom from the torres strait islander act of 1939 which gave local councils more power over domestic life and island policing, adding to the existing restriction of free movement and controlled wages (beckett, 2010). under this act the practice of abusive power become more localized, even permitting the enforcement of bylaws which were not recognised by australian law. these laws were punitive, sometimes resulting with the accused being expelled from the islands indefinitely (beckett, 1987). people’s choice of destination was determined by where friends or relative had already settled, providing a stepping stone for new families to become established and providing a conduit for others who followed (fisk et al. 1974; beckett 1987; watkin lui 2009). migration is not always permanent or intended as such. as large numbers of aboriginal and torres strait islander people live in remote areas, the need to travel great distances to access services from regional centres is often necessary (long and memmott 2007). people also move to be close to kin who are receiving medical treatment in urban-based hospitals, or to be near those incarcerated (coulehan 1996). indigenous migratory patterns are continually being explored by demographers, economists and service providers to gauge the viability of remote and rural communities for government provided infrastructure and essential services (taylor 2009). much has been recorded on the refugee experience of displacement and the experiences of transnational migration (gough 2006; locke 2009; correa-velez, gifford and barnett 2010). less is known about the experiences of indigenous people who move internally, especially within the confines of first world nations such as australia. existing international qualitative studies do to some extent explore first person accounts of the motivations, experiences and 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 outcomes for displaced groups but more is written from the perspective of minorities (becker 2003; holtzman and nezam 2004). a synthesis of such existing international studies would allow the development of sensitising concepts that could inform future research in the torres strait islander context. the aim of this meta-synthesis is to explore first person accounts of experiences of movement captured through qualitative methodologies. methods as the disciplines of the social sciences have become more involved in evidence-based research, the application of metasynthesis has been adopted as one way of presenting seemingly diverse qualitative research credible to the scientific community. metasynthesis is a technique for combining the results of multiple qualitative studies on the same topic (beck 2009). it has gained prominence in the field of nursing since the early 1990s and is becoming popular within social sciences (sandelowski, docherty and emden 1997). metasynthesis involves looking beyond descriptive information, as presented in conventional literature reviews, to locating qualitative studies within a broader interpretive context (sandelowski et al. 1997). integrating qualitative data for the process of metasynthesis requires locating references of particular bodies of literature with a common focus which is cross-examined to identify key constructs and themes. the advantages of this process allow for individual, isolated pieces or studies to be identified and drawn together to form a larger picture of a phenomenon. glaser and straus (1971 as cited by beck 2009) describe individual studies as separate islands of knowledge that remain detached from each other. the goal of metasynthesis is not only to look for similarities of results of a specific phenomenon, but rather to probe deeper to reveal new information that may increase our understanding. the aim is to account for all important similarities, differences and nuances in language, concepts and around key ideas (sandelowski et al. 1997). noblit and hare’s (1988) development of meta-ethnography for synthesizing qualitative research in anthropology is perhaps the most established systematic method of literature synthesis of primary data and it has been adapted by a growing number of disciplines (britten, campbell, pope, donovan, morgan & pill 2002; beck 2009; mccalman, tsey, wenitong, wilson, mcewan, cadet-james & whiteside 2010). the approach of noblit and hare (1988) includes a seven step process for aggregating and analysing individual qualitative studies cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 5 (table 1). the step-by-step procedure proved invaluable in providing a conceptual framework to understanding the depth and complexity of this mode of analysis (beck 2009). table 1. seven step process for aggregating and analysing individual qualitative studies 1. identify topic 2. decided which studies are relevant 3. read the studies multiple times 4. determine how the studies are related to each other by making a list of key metaphors (concepts or themes) 5. translate the studies into one another (reciprocal translation) 6. synthesize the translations 7. interpret the synthesis results through written form source: noblit and hare (1988), adapted by beck (2009) the literature selected for review in this study was organically and deliberately derived for the purpose of informing a future research study which seeks to address the question ‘what factors determine successful contemporary migration of torres strait islanders who are moving to the australian mainland?’ the study will use constructivist grounded theory (charmaz 2006) within a theoretical framework of decolonizing methodology (smith 1999) which provides indigenous researchers with a guide for working from the inside out as well as from the outside in. my future research agenda thus defined the topic. in order to focus on current issues of migration, inclusion was limited to studies published between 2001 and 2011. the time limit here also reflects the increasing knowledge around climate change and the effect this will have on certain marginalised populations. climate change has prompted a new focus on the displacement of marginalised and vulnerable groups and studies have become interested in how these people are living and their future lives. i sought articles that had rich descriptions containing firsthand accounts of people’s experiences of migration. 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 for inclusion, a study had to contain a rich description of the data collected using various qualitative methodologies; particularly important were those whose findings were based on actual accounts of their participants. the inclusion of direct quotations throughout the articles was an important feature, giving people voice that would otherwise be lost to the scholarship of expert observers. the chosen studies are not historical or colonial and the voices of marginalised people have been valued, particularly those of indigenous people who are now recognised for their environmental knowledge and stewardship. more thought is given as to how people research indigenous issues and how they write about them as increasing numbers of indigenous scholars are emerging in the ranks of academia. smith suggests that indigenous people are now in a position to tell their own stories, write their own versions, in their own ways, and for their purposes (smith 1999). the search began with articles relating to the experiences of indigenous australians, assuming that more recent literature would be centred on climate change induced migration. however, current studies into indigenous people were mainly based on community adaptability capacities in view of climate change, for example green, alexander, mclnnes, church, nicholls and white (2010) and petheram, zander, campbell, high and stacey (2010). therefore it was necessary to widen the search parameters. many existing torres strait studies tend to be historical third person accounts of movement from archival research and through ethnographic methods, or quantitative from census data. these do not meet the criteria established and it was important to select articles that analysed success of migration beyond historical descriptions. because of the very small number of studies into the success factors in movement of indigenous people in australia with particular reference to torres strait islanders, my search for literature extended outside of australia as i had found a dearth of rich descriptive research on the migratory experiences of these groups. i found extensive literature on refugee experiences and diaspora. for example, correa-velez et al. (2010) considered the psychosocial factors associated with subjective health and wellbeing outcomes of young people with refugee backgrounds. this was typical of this group of literature which focused predominately on impacts of resettlement, the process of acculturation and social integration. these types of papers considered outcomes and did not necessarily examine the process of migration. literature surrounding physical adaptation of communities to climate change was cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 7 excluded, as well as those providing only policy analyses and descriptive outsider commentaries. ultimately, six articles were selected for metasynthesis as they met the selection criteria of: first person accounts collected through rich descriptive qualitative methods between 2001 and 2011 (table 2). reciprocal translation was used to first analyse and then synthesize the articles (britten et al. 2002). as noted above, metasynthesis is a multi-step process, which relies for its rigour in part on an adherence to process. the selected studies were read multiple times and key concepts identified within each study were listed in a table, following the process used by ypinazar, margolis, haswell-elkins and tsey (2007). these concepts are presented in table 2. key concepts identified from this process became the data for synthesis using tables. the themes from one study were then translated into themes from the next in an iterative process to identify commonalities across the other studies selected for analysis producing the higher order synthesis presented in table 3 and the section on results. selected literature the studies selected focused on people with existing vulnerabilities who had experienced displacement or were faced with the prospect of forced migration. the studies were carried out in various locations internationally. the participants in the six studies came from various ethnic groups who had experienced displacement or were faced with the prospect of forced migration. even though there are considerable variations in participants’ ethnicity or country of origin and different conditions for migration, there were similarities in the methodologies and methods used in the studies. case study was predominately chosen as the methodology for all but two of the studies and data was captured using in-depth interviews. of the selected studies, two researched internal displaced of minority groups within united states of america: the king islanders experiences of being displaced twice from their traditional homeland in alaska (kingston and marino 2010) and the hurricane katrina evacuees of new orleans (murakami-ramalho and durodoye 2008). in both cases, people were unable to return after losing their homes and possessions. two articles researched the experiences of people escaping persecution or seeking freedom from restrictive and oppressive political systems (nielsen and reenberg 2010; greene, tehranifar, hernandezcordero and fullilove 2011). the remaining two articles consider other refugee experiences both permanent (rosbrook and schweitzer 2010) and temporary (mortreux and barnett 2009) 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 details on each of the published articles selected for metasynthesis are included in this section (table 2). table 2. key concepts in selected studies greene et al. (2011) based their study on the experience of displacement as a family group. twenty families were interviewed representing 18 different countries. the criterion for recruitment was that displacement was the only option available to maintain or achieve family well-being. families left for reasons of religious, ethnic and political persecution and economic deprivation. despite the situational differences among the families participating in authors/year/location participants study year methodology/design key concepts greene, tehranifar, hernandez-cordero, & fullilove (2011) usa 20 families (representing 18 different countries) septdec 1996 case study three in-depth interviews with each family families moved to escape restrictive conditions that deprived them of opportunities, economic, religious and political freedom. wanting their children to live in a free world. kingston & marino (2010) alaska 14 king island community members 2005 case study interviews conducted with participants age 35 to 75yrs physical and emotional closeness of community ensured maintenance of language, culture, norms and values. moving to the civic centre of nome fractured this sense of ‘closeness’. mortreux & barnett (2009) tuvalu 40 tuvaluan's jul-07 case study 40 semi-structured interviews (28 personal capacity 11 professionals) migrations mostly economical motivated, and influenced by attributes of age, education and family type. remittance vital source of income for sustaining families living on tuvalu. murakami-ramalho &durodoye (2008) usa 9 african american women (katrina evacuee's) 2006 case study 2 focus group discussion, participants recruited through network sampling vulnerable people, living in poor area are often worst affected by natural disasters. most are unable to return to their homes and recover what remain of their lives. nielsen & reenberg (2010) africa not provided aug 2007 feb 2008 ethnography 65 semi-structured interviews, 50 questionnaire survey, 12 focus group interviews and participant observation the fulbe, faced a moral and cultural dilemma as preferring to live in the bush maintain personal freedom and integrity. their isolation restricts access to aid organisations that assist livelihood diversification. rosbrook & schweitzer (2010) australia 9 karen and chin refugees no date phenomenology in-depth semistructured interviews, recruitment by snowball sampling home is experienced not only as physical, but a psychological space of safety and retreat, of personal freedom and feeling valued. confronting the unfamiliar, can create disturbances in one’s personal identity. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 9 the study, a common process of displacement emerged consisting of four phases: the antecedent; uprooting; transition; and resettlement. these involved a process of disconnection and reconnection, accompanied by massive shifts in social, cultural, and economic capitals. losses identified by families from migration stemmed from the fact that group connections were not always transferrable from one socio-geographic setting to another. the forced movement of the ugiuvangmiut (king islanders) from the remote makeshift settlement of east end to the urban setting of nome in alaska is an earlier account of forced migration and the integration of indigenous people into larger non-indigenous populations (kingston & marino 2010). initially there was a gradual movement away from their traditional home on king island to the mainland town of east end from the 1940s onwards. the second move to the city of nome came after the 1974 storm that destroyed the makeshift community of east end. participants recounted their earlier years at east end as resembling the close knit community of king island. close kinship ties became severed as people no longer lived in close proximity to each other, resulting in the decline in the number ugiuvangmiut language speakers and the inability to interact on a daily basis. having to rely largely on the cash economy, the ugiuvangmiut had neither the time nor means to maintain traditions such as canoe making, or take part in ceremony and hunting which regulated and maintained community life (kingston & marino 2010). the study of mortreux and barnett (2009) in funafuti found that current migration was being influenced by factors other than climate change. current migration was essentially spurred by economic needs and access to opportunities not locally available. they noted that factors that encourage people to remain on their islands were not well-explored, however there were several speculations which included an individual’s knowledge of and access to facilities and financial resources; place-specific work knowledge and skills; and the value of close ties with one’s cultural identity through a given community. despite the international media and some academic reporting, individuals did not necessarily identify climate change as a risk or as a motive for migration. personal observation of environmental change, belief in god and the significance of maintaining physical connection to their islands were important factors shaping individuals perceptions of climate risks, responses and reason for staying. murakami-ramalho and durodoye (2008) conducted a qualitative study one year after the devastation of the gulf coast of america by hurricane katrina. this disaster saw a large 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 number of evacuees displaced and unable to return home to rebuild their lives. those profoundly affected were african-americans whose lower socio-economic positions meant that they lived in low-lying flood prone areas of new orleans (murakami-ramalho & durodoye 2008). evacuees were forced to start a new life away from their usually place of residence, leaving behind family, history, traditions and well-established social networks. participants were recruited through network sampling among members of the evacuee community who had chosen to settle in san antonio, texas. the study explored the experiences of life in new orleans prior to katrina and the consequential events that followed the storm. as participants recalled the accounts prior to and after the event, they themselves found ways of moving forward in their lives. some of the participants felt that being accepted and welcomed in their new location made the task of resettling less traumatic. the study by nielsen and reenberg (2010) of the fulbe of northern burkina faso looked at their resistance to diversification despite being just as involved with rain-fed agriculture as their counterpart the rimaiibe. part of their resistance is to maintain the traditional practice of transhumance, the practice of moving livestock between seasonal pastures. the other reason is to keep at a distance from the rimaiibe whom the fulbe once kept as slaves. their absence during transhumance often leaves the fulbe unaware of the presence of project work and the hiring of labour to realise these projects. the fulbe’s reluctance to give up transhumance is mainly due to existential and moral reasons, despite the fact that transhumance is associated with difficulties, not strictly necessary, and stands in the way of often more economically viable strategies such as labour migration. the fulbe are well aware of the benefits of labour migration, development work, and market gardening, but are unwilling to fully embrace these strategies, preferring to live in the bush, outside the control of ‘foreign rule’ and subjugation. rosbrook and schweitzer’s study (2010) used a phenomenological approach to explicate the meaning of home across pre-migrations and post-migration phases of refugee experience. the aim of this study was to identify the patterns of meaning relating to the experiences of home and its implications for burmese refugees in terms of their emotional well-being. participants in this study were members of the karen and chin refugee communities who had recently resettled in brisbane. the results were the identification of three super-ordinate themes: home as the experience of a psychological space of safety and retreat; home as a socio-emotional relatedness to family; and home as a geographical-emotional landscape. home as a geographical-emotional landscape conveys the idea that the landscapes of home are more cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 11 than physical landscapes – they are landscapes to which the individual has an emotional connection, which in this regard is best understood as relating to the power of landscapes that stir up strong feelings or agitations of the mind. results the six qualitative studies selected looked at migration experiences through chronicles of loss. what emerged through metasynthesis were stories of strength and resilience that are often concealed within separate, isolated studies. these were stories that tackled the difficult task of maintaining a continuity of being from one cultural and social context to another. this overarching construct of continuity of being needed to operate at self, family and cultural levels. three themes related to continuity of being emerged from the process of reciprocal translation and synthesis of the selected studies (table 3). these were; freedom to be, staying close and forming anchor. table 3. key themes derived from reciprocal translation of selected studies study freedom to be staying close forming anchor greene, tehranifar, hernandez-cordero, and fullilove seeking freedom breaking long-standing ties restoring familiarity kingston and marino loss of freedom to practice way of life keeping unity and group identity being able to practice tradition mortreux and barnett maintaining freedom staying back with family moving away being the last resort murakami-ramalho and durodoye restricted freedom reminiscing the old to feel welcomed nielsen and reenberg remaining free from ‘foreign rule’ taking care of your own maintaining a separate way of life rosbrook and schweitzer free from worry maintaining contact to feel safe, valued and cared for freedom to be freedom to be is a motivating factor that influences individuals’ decision to migrate or not to migrate. the choice of migration therefore is determined by the cost of one’s ability to maintain a certain level of freedom, whether to retain or regain a certain way of life. in all six studies, participants noted that personal freedom, and the freedom to live a peaceful existence 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 was the motivating factor when considering to move or not to move. in the tuvalu study, mortreux and barnett (2009) found that the free and relaxed lifestyle experienced by islanders was a key factor influencing people’s decisions to stay on tuvalu when asked if they had considered migrating. this theme is highlighted in one of the participants’ statements. is good here. it is my paradise. i can sleep wherever i want, do whatever i want. i can visit my sister and just talk – and sleep there if i want… i can sleep and work when i want. (mortreux and barnett, 2009, p. 108). political and religious freedoms were themes that emerged from four of the studies. people who experienced displacement through forced migration (rosbrook & schweitzer 2010) described their motive for moving was to search for a better life for themselves and their family. this seemed to be the case in all family groups unless their lives were in danger or their displacement was a result of conflict. one of the participants indicated that they wanted their children to ‘see the free world’ (greene et al. 2011, p. 408). a similar but reverse situation was evidence where the fulbe chose not to migrate and live in permanent settlements in order to maintain personal freedom from political control. despite recognising the benefits of living in permanent settlements and adopting the diversification measure taken by the rimaiibe through labour migration and project work, the fulbe would rather accept the hardships of living in isolated family groups in the bush. freedom from the subjugation to foreign rule and dependency on others was morally correct and valued over material gains. out here i am free. . . i don’t have to worry about what my neighbours does, where my animals are, i just have to look after myself and my family. (nielsen & reenberg 2010, p. 149). staying close the process of ‘uprooting’ from one’s homeland involves severing longstanding ties with families, friend and community (greene et al. 2011). this change disrupts the individual’s routine daily activities and day-to-day physical and emotional help is withdrawn. all six studies emphasised the invaluable support from within the family, especially those living together (rosbrook & schweitzer 2010) or in close proximity (murakami-ramalho & durodoye 2008; kingston a& marino 2010). the multi-generational space of the family home was valued in the karen and chin refugees study. their understanding of ‘home’ is described as sharing a physical dwelling with others as well as being a place of ‘giving and receiving care and support’ (rosbrook & schweitzer 2010, p. 165). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 13 home can be experienced as both a tangible place and an intangible perception which would include the space for family or community. the closeness of community and family is missed when displaced as in the case of the hurricane katrina evacuees who had to rebuild their lives in other parts of the country. ‘i miss the closeness, the family thing at home. family and friends they are the same and one to me’ (murakami-ramalho & durodoye 2008, p. 125). family support was a significant part of living in new orleans where people came together to celebrate festivals over food and dance. physical closeness for the king islanders living at east end guaranteed the protection and survival of language, dance, and traditions (kingston & marino 2010). the knowledge of kin relationships was also retained and practiced as people interacted on a daily basis. the movement to nome resulted in many young people neglecting traditional practices as they became reliant on a cash economy. forming anchor the process of recreating home elsewhere is likened to setting down an anchor. staying connected with family back home, or making new friends in the new location tends to enable people to establish themselves in new environments. families also formed anchor by investing in their children’s education and future (greene et al. 2011). being accepted in a new place, to be valued and welcomed, also facilitates the course to anchorage. people on the move can often remain in a state of limbo between the old and new worlds. having to sever well-established ties can leave people feeling uncertain and vulnerable. restoring the old sense of being is achieved by connecting with ethno-cultural communities and surrounding oneself with the art, food and language of the former country (greene et al. 2011). murakami-ramalho and durodoye (2008) found in their study that the new orleans evacuees found meaning by revisiting past lives in order to make sense of the new situation before being able to move forward. reminiscence of what was left behind enabled participants to recover their loss and restore order in their lives once more, often under unreceptive and difficult conditions. mourning the loss of familiar people, places, practices and landscapes was constantly negotiated in the new world, so was the remoulding of personal identity (rosbrook & schweitzer 2010). to be able to smell familiar scents (greene et al. 2011) and revisit the physical landscapes of one’s childhood (rosbrook & schweitzer 2010) evoked pleasant memories for participants. this loss of familiarity and certainty was experienced when people 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 move away from physical landscapes that were once foundational places of childhood memories (rosbrook & schweitzer 2010). having a sense of belonging also meant having somewhere to return to emotionally, psychologically, spiritually as well as physically, despite danger (rosbrook & schweitzer 2010). greene et al. (2011) found that participants overcame these senses of loss by developing connections within their new environment, achieving financial stability and seeing the benefits in the lives of their children. discussion the overarching construct that became apparent from the synthesis of the studies was that people needed to maintain a continuity of being through valuing their personal, social, religious and political freedom, and the importance of maintaining or forming strong social and family networks. in seeking a continuity of being it was important to have an enabling environment where there was freedom to be, and where individuals were able to stay close to family, culture, language and tradition. the process of resettling and forming an anchor in the new world enable people to recover and regain their sense of wellbeing. it is also for these reasons, of maintaining self, family and culture that people had chosen not to migrate despite hardship. although the assumption is that people move to increase their prospects of a better life, the challenges fraught in the new location may outweigh the hardships experienced at the place of origin. where migration is a conscious and voluntary decision, poverty and the poverty of opportunities (connell and viogt-graf 2006) is often the motive for migration, coupled with the presence of kin in the destined location. when being forced to migrate, it is often those who are already vulnerable that have to move with little hope of returning. the displacement of hurricane katrina evacuees is evidence of vulnerability in first world nations, as it is often the poor that live in hazardous areas and who are unable to recover from their loss (cernea 1997). the belief that people migrate for better opportunities can have the reverse effect on people’s lives when confronted with additional stressors and disenfranchisement. better employment opportunities also means longer working hours and less time to carry out cultural and family obligations. oftentimes, cultural obligations to extended families and community increase with the rise in income and living standards (hanna 1998). to maintain one’s culture can be a source of strength for new migrants and studies have suggested that the experience and processes of resettlement can be supported by regrouping cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 15 with ethno-cultural groups of similarities (becker 2003; adamo 2010; greene et al. 2011). recreating these environments during the initial phases of migration may improve the resettlement experiences of displaced people. integrating objects and practices that are familiar into one’s home provides a space for recovery and restoration. conversely, cultural systems can become impediments to social integration as in the case of the fulbe whose resistance to modify their traditions reduces their ability to diversify (nielsen & reenberg 2010). resettlement strategies adopted by migrants are also moderated by individual factors, again relating to situations and experiences prior to migration and as well as upon arrival. individual factors may include age, gender, social status and degree of distance between two cultures (mortreux & barnett 2009). moderating factors that obstruct the transitional phases of resettlement include: discrimination, coping strategies, and resources and social support received (berry 1997). there is however an emerging field of psychosocial approaches which may offer an alternative for exploring the experiences of migration as encompassing a psychological dimension which relates to the social, material and cultural issues that influence and facilitate this process (stillman, mckenzie & gibson 2009). conclusion this study shows that metasynthesis is a valuable methodology, it has uncovered sensitising concepts for future research on torres strait islander internal migration. when researching the experiences of torres strait islanders it will be necessary to focus on motivations for moving such as, but not limited to, questions of freedom, and to understand the processes for staying connected to kin and homeland. the results from the metasynthesis clearly highlighted the need to develop ways to support resettlement experiences that help people maintain a continuity of being that enable them to form an anchor under conditions of uncertainty and vulnerability. the need to look at the experience of migration more closely is ever more critical as torres strait islanders are compelled to move involuntarily in the context of future climate change. a comparison of key themes in studies from quite different locations has shown that the desired outcome of social integration and economic participation generally means leaving some of the old ways behind and adapting to situations in order to move forward. extended 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 family ties can be weakened and strengthened at the same time. while physical distance may separate people, the increased use of technology can bridge this divide by keeping families close. staying close to self, family and one’s culture is essential at the first stages of resettlement. the aim is to find a balance between the two worlds – the old and the new. to firmly form an anchor, there must be room to move freely and space to allow for the continuity of self, family and culture. these concepts will be central to investigations of climate-related migrations, especially among such under-researched peoples as torres strait islanders. references adamo, s. 2010, ‘environmental migration and cities in the context of global environmental change’. current opinion in environmental sustainability, vol. 2, pp. 161-165. altman, j. c., biddle, n. & hunter, b. h. 2005, ‘a historical perspective on indigenous socioeconomic outcomes in australia, 1971–2001’, australian economic history review, vol. 45, pp. 273-295. beck, c. t. 2009, ‘metasynthesis: a goldmine for evidence-based practice’, aorn journal, vol. 90, pp. 701,702-705,710. becker, g. 2003, ‘meanings of place and displacement in three groups of older immigrants’, journal of aging studies, vol. 17, pp. 129-149. beckett, j. 1987, torres strait islanders: custom and colonialism, cambridge university press, cambridge. beckett, j. 2010, ‘from island to mainland: torres strait islanders in the australian labour force’ in: keen, i. 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environmental change, vol. 19, pp. 105-112. murakami-ramalho, e. & durodoye, b. 2008, ‘looking back to move forward: katrina's black women survivors speak’, nwsa journal, vol. 20, pp. 115-137. nielsen, j. ø. & reenberg, a. 2010, ‘cultural barriers to climate change adaptation: a case study from northern burkina faso’, global environmental change, vol. 20, pp. 142152. http://www.desertknowledgecrc.com.au/resource/dkcrc-wp-05-aboriginal-mobility.pdf� http://www.desertknowledgecrc.com.au/resource/dkcrc-wp-05-aboriginal-mobility.pdf� 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.1, 2013 noblit, g. w. & hare, r. d. 1988, meta-ethnography: synthesizing qualitative studies, sage publications, newbury park, calif. petheram, l., zander, k., campbell, b., high, c. & stacey, n. 2010, ‘ ‘strange changes’: indigenous perspectives of climate change and adaptation in ne arnhem land (australia), global environmental change, vol. 20, pp. 681-692. rosbrook, b. & schweitzer, r. 2010, ‘the meaning of home for karen and chin refugees from burma: an interpretative phenomenological approach’, european journal of psychotherapy & counselling, vol. 12, pp. 159-172. sandelowski, m., docherty, s. & emden, c. 1997, ‘qualitative metasynthesis: issues and techniques’, research in nursing & health vol. 20, pp. 365-371. smith, l. t. 1999, decolonizing methodologies: research and indigenous peoples, zed books, dunedin. stillman, s., mckenzie, d. & gibson, j. 2009, ‘migration and mental health: evidence from a natural experiment’, journal of health economics, vol. 28, pp. 677-687. taylor, j. 2009, ‘social engineering and indigenous settlement: policy and demography in remote australia’, pp. 4-15. taylor, j. & arthur, w. s. 1993, ‘spatial redistribution of the torres strait islander population: a preliminary analysis’, australian geographer, vol. 24, pp. 26-38. warner, k. 2010, ‘global environmental change and migration: governance challenges’, global environmental change, vol. 20, pp. 402-413. watkin lui, f. 2009, my island home. phd thesis, james cook university. ypinazar, v. a., margolis, s. a., haswell-elkins, m. & tsey, k. 2007, ‘indigenous australians' understandings regarding mental health and disorders’, the royal australian and new zealand college of psychiatrist, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 467-478. using metasynthesis to develop sensitising concepts to understand torres strait islander migration vinnitta patricia mosby james cook university abstract vignette introduction methods results freedom to be staying close forming anchor discussion conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 i issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia looking back and looking forward this issue of the journal covers an exciting range of topics related broadly to the concerns of cosmopolitan civil societies, as have previous issues, but it also differs from others in that it contains a number of articles which reflect back on key concerns of the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre which publishes the journal, as well as two articles on issues which are fundamental to inclusive and just societies. cosmopolitan civil societies journal is now in its sixth year of publication and the editorial committee asked researchers in the centre to consider writing articles which could mark five years of successful publication of the journal and in some way record its contribution to the development of knowledge in the field or which could present a scholarly commentary on some key concept of significance to ccs’s research agenda or outline and analyse a contemporary moment. the five papers which appear here were submitted for peer review in the normal way, and the reviews indicated both support for the intellectual agenda for ccs and the challenges of making accessible the local issues and concerns of members of a research centre to a globalized audience. andrew jakubowicz, ,a scholar with over forty years of research experience in migration, racism and multiculturalism, draws on his experience of the interaction between research, policy and politics to argue that independent research that tackles difficult questions can contribute to wider social understanding of complex issues. he demonstrates the impact both of the investment in and expansion of research, and the contrary contraction and deprivation of resources. in the context of national disability insurance scheme which is being progressively rolled out in australia, jenny green and jane mears review research and reports on the person-centred approach on which the scheme is premised. bronwen dalton took the opportunity to trace the evolution of the idea of civil society to its multiple guises in the present. she discusses prospects for developing agreed approaches to the study of civil society, exploring in the process different approaches to defining civil society taken by some of the major so-called centres for civil society in australia and internationally. she concludes by reflecting on these definitional challenges as it has played out at one particular cross faculty research centre, the university of technology, sydney’s cosmopolitan civil societies research centre. jenny onyx, similarly, has explored ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 a concept which is at the heart of much of the work of members of the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre, the concept of social impact. using work done by some members of cosmopolitan civil societies research centre, she demonstrates some of the approaches which have been developed and which run counter to the all too common so-called objective indicators of social impact, framed in terms of monetary cost and benefit. she notes the importance of these attempts to measure social impact in social terms rather than from a monetized perspective and concludes that exactly what we should be measuring remains contested and elusive. michael olsson’s paper on information practices in contemporary civil society charts some of the concerns with the nature of an information society. he considers how the emergence of social constructivist approaches to information research drawing on discourse analysis, practice theory and ethnographic theories and methodologies has led to a have led researchers to a radically different understanding of central concepts such as: the influence of emergent information and communication technologies on contemporary society; the relationship between knowledge and power, the nature of expertise and authoritative information; as well as a re-thinking of community and consensus; a re-interpretation of notions of space and place in information dissemination, sharing and use and a reconsideration of the role of the researcher. the issue also contains two other papers which emphasis key aspects of the research agenda of the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre. baxter’s paper is concerned with the relationship between information access and environmental and ecological justice. he takes as his case studies two controversial coastal developments in aberdeenshire, north-east scotland. megan stronach and daryl adair describe how an indigenous methodology known as dadirri, which emphasises deep and respectful listening, guided the development of the research design for a study of sport career transition among elite indigenous australian sportsmen conducted by non-indigenous researchers. the paper provides a model for nonindigenous researchers to conduct qualitative research with indigenous people. hilary yerbury august 2014 looking back and looking forward militarised violence in the service of state-imposed emergencies over palestine and kenya annie pfingst goldsmiths, university of london abstract colonial states of emergency are declared and promulgated to contain the disorder of rebellion, resistance and revolt and to effect a return to an order integral to colonial settlement and occupation. the paper draws on colonial archives, analysis of emergency and colonialism evident in the literature, and the contribution of images to guide apprehension of the sites and locations of the emergency landscapes and the geographies of resistance of kenya from the 1950s and across historic palestine since 1948. positing the practices enabled through emergency regulations as intensified forms of instrumentalised colonial governmentality and violence, part of the structure of settler colonialism, the paper examines the racialised vocabularies of the british colonial administration of the emergency over kenya and the zionist/israeli state/military frames of palestinian resistance, the technologies and architectures of subjugation and punishment through which the threat of disorder is contained in carceral zones, and the militarised violence of the colonial response to resistance characterised as catastrophic threat from an enemy located within frames of terrorism, disloyalty and illegality. photographs taken as part of an inquiry into the architectures, remnants, material assemblages and spatial arrangements found in the emergency landscapes and the geographies of resistance of post-colonial kenya and across the multiple geographies of historic palestine are included as evidence of the photographic event and as provocation to thought in an encounter with the workings of colonialism and of resistance. © 2014 annie pfingst. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(3): 4108,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i3.4108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia this writing on emergency applies archival, visual, theoretical and spatial modes of inquiry to historic and contemporary provisions and practices authorised under colonial state-imposed emergencies. it brings forward the rhetoric and events found in archives, the theoretical concerns on emergency and colonialism evident in the literature, and the contribution of images to apprehension of the sites and locations of the emergency landscapes and the geographies of resistance of kenya from the 1950s and across historic palestine since 1948. it aims to bring attention to the technologies of oppression authorised through colonial state-imposed emergencies and to re-frame the militarised violence through which all that is necessary will be done to protect sovereignty from the resistance of the colonised and occupied and to effect a return to an order integral to colonial settlement and occupation. in late 2012 at the london high court, mau mau veteran claimants won the right to a full trial hearing of their claims for compensation for alleged torture during the british emergency in kenya from 1952 to 1960. elderly kenyans sat quietly in the court as the state, through legal argument, attempted to dislodge their claims.1 as i observed the legal proceedings in london, palestinians incarcerated as administrative detainees in israeli prisons were on hunger strike. the situation reiterated the commonality of the structures of colonialism experienced by kenyans and palestinians, in particular those practices enabled through the promulgation of colonial states of emergency and codified through emergency regulations. from the end of the first world war to the late 1960s, britain introduced martial law and declared states of emergency against the disorder-ing of state sovereignty by acts of resistance, rebellion and riot across a number of colonies, protectorates and mandated geographies – india, ireland, palestine, kenya, malaya, aden. practices and personnel were moved across the empire – villagisation, mass detention and deportation, for example, were transferred from the administration of the emergency in malaya to kenya.2 palestine and kenya became linked through technologies of control, containment and punishment as the provisions and practices common to emergency regulations followed a genealogy from the british mandate administration to that of israel over palestine since 1948, to the emergency over kenya in the 1950s. legal provisions based on racial separation/segregation were applied by britain in kenya throughout settlement and continue to be applied by israel over palestine. having detained and deported arabs during the arab uprising of the 1930s,3 in the 1940s the british mandate detained jewish militants firstly in eritrea and later at gilgil in kenya.4 these regulations were followed by the british emergency (defence) regulations, 1945 which israel adopted when, on the 21st may 1948, it declared a state of emergency over palestine, only days after the declaration of the establishment of the israeli state on the lands, villages and cities lost to palestinians through the war of 1948, al nakba. the state of emergency – promulgated for the defence of the state, the maintenance of public order, supplies and essential services (mahozy 2012, p. 148; law and administration ordinance no. 1 of 5708-1948), and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion, or riot (adv. ben natan et al. 2009) – has been renewed in the israeli knesset every year since 1948. in 2012 the supreme court rejected a petition first filed in 1999 by the association for civil rights in israel (acri) to cancel the state of emergency in place since 1948 on the grounds that, in part ‘(israel) is not a normal country in that its existential threats have yet to be quelled’ (acri 2012). in october 1952 the colonial office declared an emergency over kenya to impose order on the land and freedom movement (also known as mau mau), a resistance movement framed as lawlessness, violence and disorder (tna co/822/443 october 1952). the emergency in kenya would last eight years until negotiations brought about a transfer of power and independence. mau mau, illegal under emergency regulations, remained proscribed as a movement and an organisation until 2003 when the kibaki government lifted the proscription and the case for compensation could begin. palestine, having been under some form of state of emergency at least since 1937, arguably since 1920 under the mandate and under israeli control since 1948, is said to be in a state of ‘permanent’ (adalah 2013) or ‘perpetual emergency’ (al haq 1989). colonial sovereignty, suggests stephen morton writing on kenya’s colonial state of emergency, ‘was experienced as a permanent state of emergency from the standpoint of the colonised’; the emergency over kenya signifying the violence and injustice inherent to colonial rule (morton 2002, p. 112), inherent, one might add, to the ‘logic of elimination’ that wolfe (2008 p.102) identifies as central to the settler-colonial project.5 premised as it is on ‘the securing – the obtaining and maintaining – of territory’ (wolfe 2008, p.120), settler colonialism frames those features found in common,6 both historically in kenya and across contemporary palestine including, but not limited to, discursive frames of terra nullius, the dispossessions and re-territorialisation of what colonialism intended as permanent settlement (wolfe 2008, p.112), and what elkins describes as ‘settler tyranny’.7 figure 1.   the wall, abu dis, palestine 2007. photo: annie pfingst this writing is accompanied by photographs taken as part of my inquiry into the architectures, remnants, material assemblages and spatial arrangements found in the emergency landscapes and the geographies of resistance of post-colonial kenya and across the multiple geographies of historic palestine. taken as i walked, was guided, stopped to observe, they are inscribed here as encounters to work together with the material gathered from the archives, from kenyan and palestinian writings, and from discursive analysis in an apprehension of the work of emergency. images are offered here not as forensic evidence but as evidence of the photographic event or the event that photography has encountered (azoulay 2012, pp.11-27) and as provocation to thought, an opportunity to ‘“slow down” reasoning’ as stengers posits, ‘to arouse a slightly different awareness of the problems and situations mobilizing us’ (stengers 2005. p. 1). as an encounter with the workings of colonialism and of resistance, this is also the moment to contemplate the ‘civil contract of photography’ in which the ethics of viewing shifts to the ‘spectator’s responsibility toward what is visible’ (azoulay 2008, p.131; pfingst & rosengarten 2012, pp.102-5). butler reminds us that apprehension is a process of framing through which some lives are recognisable as life whilst others do not register as grievable, do not command our recognition of their deaths and thus not of their lives (2008, pp. 2-15). this essay considers the conditions of state-imposed emergencies through which categories of life not apprehended as grievable, are not protected but rather framed as threats not only to order but to the ‘foundational fictions’ (stoler 2002, p. 99) of colonial regimes rendering them subject to the extremes of colonial emergency practices of control, containment and punishment. figure 2.   hebron, palestine 2014. photo: annie pfingst the declaration of an emergency and the practices enabled through emergency regulations are intensified forms of instrumentalised colonial governmentality and violence, part of the structure of settler colonialism (wolfe 2006, p. 388) – of settlement, dispossession, repression, expulsion and containment – in which the technologies and architectures of oppression are codified and the legitimacy of colonialism unquestioned by either the colonial administration or the settlement project. the state of emergency as an oppressive regime is characterised by surveillance, arrest and detention, screening, secret evidence and torture, and the workings of secret services and militarised violence – characteristics evident in israeli daily practices over palestine to structure what pappe describes as an oppressive state – a mukhabarat state – a secret services state (2008, pp.148-169). three forms of violence, according to mbembe – founding violence, the violence of legitimation that in turn produced ‘an imaginary capacity converting the founding violence into authorizing authority’ and a third form of violence that would ensure the ‘maintenance, spread and permanence’ of the authorizing authority – form the seamless web of colonial sovereignty (2001, pp. 24-25). this writing departs from agamben’s analysis of the occurrence of sovereign violence outside the law as necessarily delineating the state of exception and draws instead on the codification of laws, territorial distinctions and the structures and political logic of colonial governmentality provided by what mbembe sets out as commandement, that is a ‘regime d’exception’ (kohn 2011, p. 94) – ‘(t)he lack of justice of the means, and the lack of the legitimacy of the ends, conspired to allow an arbitrariness and intrinsic unconditionality that may be said to have been the distinctive features of colonial sovereignty’ (mbembe 2001, p. 26). turning our gaze away from colonialism’s legitimating rhetoric we come to what kohn suggests is evident in the work of kenyan writer ngugi wa thiong’o – an examination of what ‘emergency tells us of the legitimacy of colonialism itself’ (2011, p. 80). figure 3.   mau mau cave kahuru river, thigingi, nyeri district, kenya 2013. photo: annie pfingst for palestine, the colonial antecedents found within the ‘war to end all wars’ invoked the british mandate and the balfour declaration. martial law promulgated under the british mandate over palestine introduced collective punishment, the construction of guard posts and security fences against infiltration, provided for swift prison sentences, mistreatment in interrogation, death sentences and executions by hanging, administrative detention without trial, curfew and curfew orders dropped from airplanes, searches, punitive demolitions, and private armies (segev, 2000). for kenya the 1919 soldier settlement scheme that came out of the ‘war to end all wars’ was seamlessly added to the colonial settlement project. an array of state-imposed emergency practices and determinations evident in the british colonial emergency over kenya in the 1950s and by israel over palestine since 1948 administer detention without trial using secret evidence; enact land forfeiture and demolition; impose curfew and close or prohibit entry to designated and mapped locations; monitor, restrict and control movement through a system of passes and permits and forms of permission; construct trenches, fences, walls and blockades; invoke questions of loyalty and of sedition; provide for collective punishment, deportations, expulsions, removals and exile; authorize mass arrest, arrest without charge, punitive conditions of detention; screen, interrogate and torture; photograph, fingerprint, map and colour code geographies and detainees; determine, measure and ration the allocation of food; enable capital punishment and executions through targeted assassination; enclose and concentrate populations; authorise military operations and aerial bombing; destroy material culture and ban cultural practices and national modes of identity; and construct affiliations of loyalty that are messy, unpredictable and in constant flux. figure 4.   site of mass grave, kiawara, nyeri, kenya 2013. photo: annie pfingst walking down the path on the edge of kiawara outside nyeri in the highlands of kenya, i cross the open drains and climb up the hill opposite. i walk slowly beside my guides across the site of a mass grave. mounds in the earth indicate the trenches in which the british colonial administration buried some three hundred bodies during the emergency against the mau mau rebellion in the 1950s. i turn 360 degrees to apprehend the remnants of an emergency landscape intertwined with multiple geographies of resistance and overlapped by the geography of a post-colonial kenya. what do we apprehend, recognise as living in this encounter with a remnant, a landscape, when we look across or dig down into the vertical strata of the land; or walk between the buildings in a boys rehabilitation school that was once a detention camp; or along the deep ditches that are all that is left of the trenches; the grid arrangement of houses and shambas that mirrors the straight lines of a concentrated village; or down the steep path through the forest, across rocks and a river to find ourselves at the mouth of a cave used by mau mau for shelter and gathering? i remember walking past two women standing, talking on the jerusalem side of the apartheid wall – small figures against the immense grey concrete structure reaching metres above their heads. abu dis. it was a still moment in this landscape of separation, enclosure and control. farther behind us an old man walked slowly along the road. earlier a military vehicle had sped along the military road that is an integral part of the construction of the wall. how do we apprehend the lines of people waiting, the concrete holding sheds, the electronic monitoring, the glassed in soldiers booth, the guns, military vehicles and radios of the checkpoint; the concrete panels, the round towers of the wall topped by barbed wire; the surveillance cameras dotted throughout the old city of jerusalem, the soldiers; the wide swathe of a settlement lying across the judean hills seen from the road between beit sahur and ramallah; a palestinian town glimpsed in the valley? how might we apprehend the miles on miles of fences that guard the military installations and zones across the southern naqab/negev? this inquiry works at the intersection of the knowledges held in kenyan and palestinian writings and collections, images, both historic and current, including photographs made by the author through this inquiry on emergency, and the archives of colonial files and documents encountered as ‘sites of contested knowledges’ (hamilton et al., 2002, p.15). apprehension of the secret letters, orders, directives, opinions, photographs, lists, intelligence and security reports, legal deliberations and juridical decisions contained in the british colonial ‘migrated files’8 provoke a particular set of considerations. colonial framing of the colonial enterprise is administrative, privileged and dominant in official and imperial discourse.9 the files frame beginnings to rebellion, riot, or resistance as phenomena that explode into the colonial space as if from somewhere outside. there is no ‘before’10 – deliberations are only ever interpretations of intent or colonial imagining according to colonial configurations and discourses of power (hamilton 2002, p. 9; guha 1988) resulting in a linear narration that elides ‘traces of marginal lives’ (hamilton et al. (ed.) 2002, p.12). traces of marginal lives appear as names in the lists of the administration of detention and capital and collective punishment, or in propaganda flyers for capture, or in the correspondence between those seeking permission to enter or leave closed zones or seeking redress for harm under detention and the administrators of the colonial emergency; lives framed within colonial governmentality. in composing truth/fact, the archive, whose existence mbembe posits ‘constitutes a constant threat to the state’ (2002, p.23) assembles time, places fragments of life in order, and formulates a coherent story of beginnings and ends to create ‘an illusion of totality and continuity’ (2002, p.21) in effect constructing what stoler describes as colonialism’s ‘moral narration’ (2002, p.90). the files from the administration of the emergency against mau mau reveal that those resisting colonial rule were considered law breakers, political agitators, terrorists at large, rebels, bad persons, prominent gangsters, agitators, enemy actors, ‘leaders of violent resistance against the forces of law and order’ engaged in ‘acts of rebellion’ (tna fco 141/6809 1956). 11 figure 5.   mau mau shelter, mount kenya 2013. photo: annie pfingst intended to be at least secret and hidden if not destroyed, the files on kenya did in effect ‘testify that a life did exist, that deeds were enacted, and struggles engaged in or evaded’ (mbembe 2002, p. 22) as the high court in london judged that the case could go to a full trial asserting the rights of the claimants on the basis of the material available to the court including from the recently released files. a year later the british government agreed an out of court compensation settlement.12 in the second half of this essay, i examine the racialised vocabularies found in the british colonial administration of the emergency over kenya and the zionist/israeli state/military frames of palestinian resistance, the technologies and architectures of subjugation and punishment through which the threats of disorder are contained in carceral zones, and the military violence of the colonial response to resistance characterised as catastrophic threat from an enemy located within frames of terrorism, disloyalty and illegality. figure 6.   old city, jerusalem, palestine 2011. photo: annie pfingst the spatialisation effected through settlement and occupation produces a racialised geography in which the sovereign claim to power determines who can live and who must die. absolute rule over the bodies of the enemy, suggests mbembe, is authorized through the ‘racial denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the native’ (2003, p. 24), the enemy, the savage, the terrorist. racialised designations, locating the body of resistance outside the norms of what constitutes the human, authorise levels and forms of violence against resistant bodies and geographies and render those resisting colonial ‘technologies of rule’ (stoler 2002, p. 90) as the agents of impending catastrophe and destruction. palestinian resistance is always and only understood to pose an existential threat and all palestinians, including children, are construed and constructed as terrorists whose intention is the catastrophic annihilation of the state. accused of placing their children and civilians as human shields in times of conflict, palestinians are instrumentalised as arsenals and weapons of war, as the enemy, as infiltrators, as snakes (electronic intifada 7 july 2014). this authorising discourse was already set in motion when the mandatory response to the palestinian revolt of the 1920s-30s included execution by hanging, the collective punishment of villages, and torture. the british regarded mau mau practices, such as the taking and administration of oaths, as bestial. whipping was imposed for hardened, violent or bestial criminals in order to ‘break down a criminal arrogance and disregard of all decent principles’ (tna fco141/6145 1954). the kenya weekly, reporting on the deaths of 11 detainees in hola detention camp, commented on the ‘appallingly difficult task of redeeming tens of thousands of men from bestiality to decency’ (kenya weekly 31 july 1959 in tna fco141/5655). they are, in butler’s terms, not grievable, and therefore their suffering is not apprehended as suffering (2009). the bodies of resistance are apprehended only by what they refuse – the authority and legitimacy of the rule of colonial occupation and settlement. screening, the process to ‘extract confession by intensive interrogation’ (tna fco141/6521 1954-58) was intended to ‘cleans(ed) the hearts and minds of all those contaminated by the mau mau’ so they would ‘regain the old spirit of loyalty between master and man’ (tna 1953 fco141/6750). settlement is in any case never over because it always provokes what farred calls the ‘issue of origin’, the potential disturbance that emanates from the past. the possibility of violence always remains as a consequence of the force of the ‘unsettlement required to produce settlement’ (farred 2008, p. 799). the palestinian assertion of self-determination further animates collective punishment and punitive measures of containment including mass arrests and curfews across the occupied west bank and east jerusalem and the siege/blockade and aerial bombardment of gaza. figure 7.   settlement between beit sahur and ramallah, palestine 2011. photo: annie pfingst resistance and rebellion to the very conditions – loss of life, loss of land, loss of freedom – of colonial oppression and dispossession are met by colonial emergency technologies and architectures of subjugation and punishment through which the threat of disorder is contained in carceral zones across settlement and occupation geographies, zones in which emergency practices monitor, prohibit, detain and deport. some 150,000 kenyans were detained in the years of the emergency from 1952-1960 (anderson 2005, p. 5); by 1954, governors detention orders were extended to the detention of all those suspected of being or potentially being trouble-makers in order to ‘demonstrate that mau mau was not to be tolerated (tna cab/129/65 telegram no 72, 27 january 1954). some would be detained ‘on grounds of public security because of … complicity in mau mau’ (tna fco141/6298 1956), to having taken the oath even where no charges were brought. the complex kafkaesque nature of the detention regime and of screening classified detainees as z1, z2 or y, then later as mau mau leaders, self-confessed murderers, surrenderers and ex-convicts, minor mau mau adherents, and as co-operative or anti-government (tna fco141/6298 1956). the conditions in the detention camps, spread across the geography of kenya were harsh, accompanied by forced labour and violent interrogation. detainees were allocated to camps on the basis of the severity of their offence and moved through what was known as the pipeline – a series of detention and works camps – on an assessment of their willingness and capacity to give up mau mau, to give up the oath, to show loyalty to the colonial crown, to be ‘rehabilitated’ – that is to be redeemed or cleansed so that a ‘contiminated (sic) person may once again be accepted by his people as clear and ready to assist the government if called upon to do so.’ (tna fco 141/6521 1954-58). the most resistant kenyans held in the detention camps were designated ‘irreconcilable’ for their refusal to recant their affiliation with mau mau, to show loyalty or to reconcile themselves to the authority of colonial power and control. only then would they be considered ready to transit through the rehabilitation structures of the pipeline and on to eventual release. as ‘irreconcilables’, they were sent to the exile camps on the islands of saiyusi and mageta on lake victoria. their resistance and refusal turned them into criminals who would face the most severe punishment. between october 1952 on the declaration of the emergency and march 1957, 1071 kenyans were executed for offences under emergency regulations – including murder; furthering terrorism; demanding supplies; consorting; and offences relating to oaths. it became an offence punishable by death to ‘do, attempt, or conspire to do any act likely to endanger life, assist terrorists or impede the operations of the security forces’ (tna fco822/728 press office handout no 139 1953). figure 8.   remnant detention camp, mweru, nyeri county, kenya may 2013. photo: annie pfingst through curfews and prohibited or closed areas, the colonial administration of emergency contains threats of disorder and punishes resistance as it authorises or withholds permission to enter or leave locations mapped and gazetted as closed or prohibited. during the emergency over kenya, access to geographies classified as ‘prohibited’ or villages and rural areas as ‘closed’ was prohibited except to the few who could secure permissive passes through a complicated process of application and approval, and then only for those known to be loyal to the colonial forces and with good cause to be entering a prohibited area (tna co822/451 1952-3)). hundreds of barriers – including military checkpoints, trenches, agricultural gates – impede and restrict palestinians in the occupied west bank and east jerusalem whose movement is dependent on residency or enabled with permits and id cards – jerusalem id, west bank id, gaza id, citizen of israel, permit to enter for medical reasons, permission to enter for work; a colour coded – blue, green, orange – permit system of surveillance, monitoring and control (tawil-souri 2011, p.67). palestinians are prohibited from entering vast areas designated as military zones and all movement between the two geographies of the occupied palestinian territories – between the west bank and the gaza strip – is closed except through deportation. thirty-two palestinians have been deported from the west bank to gaza under the israeli policy of ‘assigned residence’ since 2002 (b’tselem 2014). deportations from the gaza strip and the west bank between 1967 and 1978 – for incitement or for security, for choosing ‘migration’ over prison sentences – were authorised under the provisions of the british mandatory emergency (defence) regulations 1945 (lesch 1979, p.101). colonial emergency regimes manage surveillance, monitoring and punishment through the architectures of concentration and the spatial technologies of closure. the emergency in kenya forcibly removed people through the policy of villagisation from their scattered homesteads on the hills of the central highlands into concentrated villages as purportedly protective, but in effect punitive measures where they could be closely monitored; their existing huts were burnt. in the nyeri district, by the beginning of 1955, 165 villages housed 75% of the population and across the central province, 600,000 people had been moved and 155,000 huts destroyed (kna op/e/1/982 1955). the conditions and brutality of forced labour, curfew, punishment and little food (women were allowed out for one hour a day to gather food) exposed the women, their children and the older men in the concentrated villages to extremes of injury and disease, violence and death (elkins 2005). severe outbreaks of disease such as typhoid were recorded in the detention camps, including for example at manyani (tna co822/801 1956). palestinian refugees from the war of 1948 are contained in nineteen refugee camps in the occupied palestinian territories – among them balata, kalandia, aqabat jaber, aida, jenin, shu’fat, al jalazone – enclosed within the occupied west bank and east jerusalem by the wall and in gaza – rafah, deir al balah, khan yunis – by the siege. as well as demarcating zones of closure, the wall, purportedly constructed as a temporary security measure, punishes palestinians through enforced and restricted movement and appropriates land into the israeli settlement project as its construction makes its way along the eastern side the length of the green line. even before the military attack of july 2014 the seven yearlong siege of gaza produced conditions where the maintenance of life itself is compromised in the extreme. controlling the capacity for life, also through carefully controlled abandonment (azoulay/ophir 2012, pp.178-199) produces conditions in which the maintenance of life is restricted and curtailed – the production of extreme precarity threatens, at the same time as it ‘indefinitely suspends’, catastrophic (humanitarian) emergency (see azoulay/ophir 2012, p. 195). figure 9.   balata refugee camp, nablus, palestine 2007. photo: annie pfingst colonial emergency structures and practices, enacted across geographies that had already produced new cartographies of borders and boundaries through the colonial ‘division of space’ and the ‘writing of new spatial relations’ (mbembe 2003, pp.25-6) engender destruction, separation, enclosure, restriction, containment and fragmentation.13 the british mandate over palestine introduced land mapping, registration and appropriation; laws on citizenship and collective and individual rights; mapped state borders and movement; and constructed settlement practices and militarized landscapes of control. the assemblage of israel over palestine is always in flux, continuing to locate palestinians within multiple spaces of dispossession and oppression, imprisonment and separation continually remade, constantly assembling spatial arrangements across fluid zones of militarized control. spatial disintegration and fragmentation, themselves technologies of control and domination (ophir 2009), assemble landscapes of emergency and re-assemble multiple geographies of resistance. every location becomes the site for the confrontation between the agency of resistance and the agents of sovereign power and control. every location becomes a frontier; every confrontation between an occupying force and those colonized occurs in the zone of emergency. a deep trench filled with spikes surrounded mt kenya; they were placed around the concentrated villages to control and contain the population and to isolate mau mau fighters and restrict their access to food. the wall fragments the geography of the occupied west bank and east jerusalem leaving in its wake the debris of construction: demolished houses and villages; uprooted orchards and olive trees; broken wells and farm buildings, stonewalls and terraces. since 1948, swathes of palestinian property have been demolished and rendered uninhabitable through military exercises including in gaza. military incursions – in jenin and nablus as part of the 2002 operation defensive shield – reshape the fabric of palestinian urban space, including that of refugee camps. some 27,000 palestinian structures have been demolished in the occupied palestinian territory (including east jerusalem) since 1967 some through military destruction (47% between 1967 and 2012), some under civil/administrative authority, and some as punitive measures (icahd 2014). the demolition of bedouin structures is a daily occurrence across east jerusalem, the naqab and throughout the jordan valley. during the 2014 israeli aerial bombing and land offensive across the gaza strip, more than 16,700 housing units were destroyed or severely damaged (unocha opt 12 august 2014). in order to control and limit movement and deny access to food and supplies, colonial emergency practices delineate zones of exclusion across which it is forbidden to pass and in which growing crops was prohibited. in kenya, a zone was demarcated between the fields and mt kenya and the growing of maize and potatoes prohibited. israel delineated a military buffer zone inside the gaza border – the most fertile of gaza’s land no longer available for cultivation. figure 10.   the wall, palestine 2011. photo: annie pfingst the total closure effected through siege acts as both collective punishment authorised through a state of emergency and a military institution in which the entire population becomes the target of the sovereign (mbembe 2003, p. 30). the practices of states of emergency – aerial mapping and bombing of enemy locations, the deployment of army and military personnel, the drawing up of military manoeuvres, the application of the hardware of war – are shaped by the logic and authorised by the presumption of defence that in turn enables military practices to treat acts of resistance as acts of war and those resisting as combatants. the story of the emergency in palestine and specifically in gaza, does not begin with the killing by burning of palestinian mohammed abu khudair in early july 2014 in the jerusalem forest in revenge for the abduction and killing of three israeli settler teenagers from the settlement of kfar etzion, north of hebron, nor with the arrest of some 700 palestinian men and boys across the occupied west bank as israel searched for the settler teenagers. nor even with the sniper shooting of nadim siam abu nuwara and mohammed mahmoud odeh salameh at an annual nakba day protest outside ofer prison in the occupied west bank (mondoweiss may 20 2014). nor does this story begin with the july-august 2014 israeli operation protective edge that killed and injured thousands of palestinian civilians across gaza through military missile air attack and the tanks of a ground offensive. there are here no originary acts to a cycle of killing. if there can be said to be a beginning, it is with the colonial settlement and occupation of palestine and the israeli declaration of a state of emergency in may 1948 outlined above. a complex, layered set of mechanisms and procedures of the state of emergency shape israeli governmentality both inside the state and across the occupied territory. a system of mandatory, administrative and primary emergency laws, together with belligerent occupation, construct a fluid and enduring system, enabling shifts and turns to developing situations, always maintaining a semblance of legality to veil its political intentions and always maintaining a state of emergency to authorize laws and legal orders (mahozy 2012). the state of emergency structures not only the military occupation of the palestinian territories, but the matrix of the legal, the civil, the commercial and the political. inhabiting a geography designated by israel as an enemy entity, the people of gaza, 80% of whom are refugees from the expulsions from southern israel in 1948, are simultaneously inside and outside political space. participation in ‘hostile acts against the state of israel’ renders gazans illegal combatants subject to the provisions of the incarceration of unlawful combatants law (hamoked 2002). figure 11.   kalandia checkpoint, palestine may 2008. photo: annie pfingst as colonial emergencies map and patrol territory, control and punishment, containment and closure is effected through militarised violence, the form and intensity of which is enabled and authorised through racialised hierarchies. racial vocabularies frame acts of defiance, disloyalty and rebellion. in both the emergency in kenya and the administration of a state of emergency over palestine, military defence authorises practices of curfew and siege, of surveillance and monitoring, of aerial bombing and of execution. in the occupied palestinian west bank and east jerusalem, the regulations of the state of emergency have been taken into the military orders of belligerent occupation. in the political and military actions against the forces of resistance, colonial emergency military control designated both the mau mau movement and the hamas movement as terrorist organisations, rendering them legitimate military targets. palestinians are regularly arrested, most often as administrative detainees, for belonging to organisations proscribed under the provisions of emergency regulations. precision attacks on palestinian resistance leaders and operatives are carried out either as targeted assassinations or as part of military operations. mau mau attempts to propel the end of colonial control were regarded as terrorist activity and the punishment of the forest fighters went beyond detention. in an attempt to flush the gangs out of both mt kenya and the aberdares in the central highlands, british forces bombed the forest locations and the caves of the forest fighters. the remnants and sites of some of the gallows used to hang mau mau adherents and mass graves from the emergency can be found across the post-independence kenyan geography. the location of emergency screening centres, detention and works camps – hola, manyani, aguthi, athi river, mackinnon road, mwea, kamiti, lamu – rendered the wide kenyan landscape, from the central highlands to the northern frontier, from the western exile islands on lake victoria to the detention prisons on the eastern islands of lamu and mombasa of the emergency era militarised zones. figure 12.   gikondi, nyeri district, site of mass grave, kenya 2013. photo: annie pfingst the prisons that detain palestinian administrative detainees are similarly scattered across the landscape. together with the areas designated as closed military and firing zones inside the ’48 state, and the settlements and outposts on hilltops, the checkpoints, the fences, the barriers and the wall, surveillance towers, and the separate roads and bridges in the occupied palestinian territories, assemble the constantly composed and recomposed militarised landscapes across historic palestine. the southern naqab/negev is effectively a series of connected military zones. across and between the deep valleys and rugged hills of the naqab south to the egyptian border, west to the zones along gaza, and east and north to the judean hills all the land, as far as the horizon and through all the wadis, is designated military; square concrete blocks sit along the roads at every possible path or dirt road declaring the land as dangerous, closed, a firing range; ketzion, nafah and ramon prisons in which palestinian detainees are held; military bases on hill tops; the buildings of holot the open detention camp for asylum seekers; the white circular domes of surveillance installations; the miles of perimeter fences that enclose airforce bases and deep in the hills, secret military bases, known but hidden. this was once the land of the bedouin before the expulsions of 1948 when the area was designated for military use. it is said that 5,000 bedouin were expelled to make way for the construction of the nevatim air base in the 1980s (human rights watch 2008). now there are plans to bring 10,000 idf to what is being described as a city of bases under construction south of beer sheva. up and down throughout the jordan valley, a third of the occupied west bank, bedouin villages lie in ruins after demolition for illegal construction, demolished to make way for the expansion and development of settlements illegal under international law, located in area c under the oslo agreement over which israel holds security control. civilian and military zones of settlement and occupation are further mapped onto the geographies of resistance. the resulting landscapes become layered by remnants – of the sites and locations of detention, of interrogation and torture, of enforced labour, of military violence, of resistance and anti-colonialism, of landscapes lost under sites of settlement and of military constructions and closures. tucked in between buildings and the pathways of a school in mweru, nyeri county, kenya, sits a tiny brick and mapati building, securely locked and with one tiny opening high up on one wall letting the only light into what was otherwise a dark restricted space that, according to the panel on the front, tells us that this was used for the torture of mau mau. found across the landscapes of kenya, these remnants of the structures for detention, for example at othaya approved school, or even the absence of their presence, as in the site of the former langata screening camp now the uhuru gardens memorial park, or the structures built through the works camps and the forced labour of those detained – including the githunguri stadium and the one at rurig’u – can also be apprehended as the ‘spasmodic irruptions of multiple pasts into the condensed present’ (benjamin in gregory 2004, p. 7). the goal post on the field within the rurig’u stadium is the site at which the forest fighters laid down their arms on independence. nearby is the mau mau flag site – erected in memory of freedom fighters 1951-57 – where the promise to fight for independence was made. figure 13   rurig’u stadium, nyeri, kenya 2013. photo: annie pfingst i walked with my guides along a path deep in the kenyan landscape down a steep gully, past waterfalls, through rock formations and dense forest and across rocks, to the kariba mau mau shelter located just above and beside the fast flowing ruiri river at ngaine, in nyeri district. a place for quiet contemplation and prayer, the roof of the small cave is black from the cooking fires of mau mau sheltering here during the period of the emergency; down another steep path, it’s entrance hidden by a waterfall, to the mau mau cave on the kahuru river, thigingi sub/location in nyeri district. figure 14.   ruiri river, ngaine, nyeri district, kenya 2013. photo: annie pfingst some way into the mount kenya forest, once more deep in a gully, i walked through the landscape of waterfalls, pools, forest and cave shelters that is the location of the burguret mau mau shelter at gakawa, part of a network of caves and shelters, hideouts and forest paths that made up the mau mau geography. the mau mau cave at naromoru, perhaps one of the largest, with a wide mouth hidden by vegetation, stretches far into the hillside. in the imagination of the colonial emergency administration, the forest fighters were the penultimate enemy, terrorists engaged in a guerrilla war. much of the british colonial policy throughout this time was aimed at reducing the capacity of the forest fighters to continue. inducements were offered to surrender; leaflets calling for surrender were dropped over the forests; rewards were offered for information or the capture of forest fighters; and pseudo gangs were organised to find the fighters in the forests and to arrange their capture or surrender. british fighter planes dropped bombs over the forest targeting what they believed to be mau mau hideouts. figure 15.   mau mau post-office, aberdare national park, kenya 2013 photo: annie pfingst these spatial, temporal and material encounters across the multiple sites and locations of mau mau resistance and the remnant architectures and technologies of colonial violence and control occur at the intersections of colonial and post-independence geographies – from eastleigh to the forests, from detention camps to the pipeline, from passes and ids to the concentrated villages, from forced labour to the rehabilitation programs in the forest villages, from wire fences to spiked trenches, from the central region to the northern frontier, from the coastal centres to the exile islands. the movement to end colonialism mapped itself through and onto multiple connected geographies. figure 16.   site of the 1948 palestinian village of ayn ghazal, palestine 2007. photo: annie pfingst the remnants of palestinian villages, scattered across the 1948 state landscape, can be found under the jewish national fund (jnf) forests or incorporated into kibbutzim. the 1967 palestinian west bank and east jerusalem are overlaid by the architectures and spatial arrangements of settlement and military control. state-imposed emergency authorises the continuing erasure and enclosure of palestinian space and life and maps itself onto palestinian geographies of resistance both inside the ’48 state and in the occupied palestinian territories. in al jalazone refugee camp outside ramallah, building goes up, a vertical stack of apartments, so that the original small concrete shelters from the 1950s are hidden, barely visible, some disused, others disappeared into the vertical structures that have overtaken them; in aqabat jaber refugee camp in jericho infrastructure for water and waste is implemented in order to enable a passable life without ever forgetting that life continues as the life of refugees. the un distributes food, now no longer to all refugees, but to those in hardship, disabled, old. in iftliq, the bedouin rebuild their houses and communal structures after the everyday occurrence of demolition. their poverty and precarity palpable as they live crammed up against the rocky hills in israeli controlled area c of the occupied jordan valley. figure 17.   jordan valley, palestine. photo: annie pfingst israeli liability for the deaths of civilians throughout the military offensive against gaza in july-august 2014 is framed by the abrogation of internationally recognised norms of humanitarian law, of the laws of war and of the obligation of the occupying entity to protect the lives of those under occupation. palestinians can only sift through the debris of destruction on an already devastated and fragmented landscape. if for israel this constitutes the ‘completion of the war of independence’, of 1948, for palestinians it is the continuation of al nakba authorised under the conditions of a colonial declared emergency as the state attempts to effect ‘calm’ – the end of disorder, the end to resistance.14 figure 18.   ramallah hills, palestine 2014. photo: annie pfingst acknowledgements the research for emergency: a genealogy of emergency regulations was supported by a british academy/leverhulme trust small research grant. this essay extends ‘emergency geographies and archives of militarised violence – palestine and kenya’ first presented to whose ‘emergency’? interrogating 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(eds), 2012, agamben and colonialism, edinburgh university press, edinburgh. tawil-souri, h. 2011, ‘colored identity: the politics and materiality of id cards in palestine/israel’, social text 107, vol.29, no.2. united nations office of the coordination of humanitarian affairs in the occupied palestinian territories (unocha opt), occupied palestinian territory: gaza emergency, situation report, 12 august 2014, accessed 12 august 2014, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sitrep_12_08_2014.pdf wolfe, p. 1999, writing past colonialism – settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology – the politics and poetics of an ethnographic event, cassell, london. wolfe, p. 2006, ‘settler colonialism and the elimination of the native’, journal of genocide research, vol. 8, no. 4, pp.387-409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14623520601056240 wolfe, p. 2008, ‘structure and event: settler colonialism, time, and the question of genocide’ in moses, a.d.(ed.) empire, colony, genocide: conquest, occupation, and subaltern resistance in world history, berghahn books, new york, pp.102–132.   the national archives kew (tna): (in order of appearance in text) co/822/443 – original correspondence; proclamation of a state of emergency in kenya. governor baring to secretary of state, october 1952. fco 141/6809 – confiscations of land. note on amendment to the forfeiture of land ordinance, minister of african affairs, 27 june 1956. fco141/6145, 1954 – mau mau unrest; corporal punishment. corporal punishment, memorandum on whipping, under cover letter executive officer, nairobiextra provincial district emergency committee to deputy secretary (civil) cabinet office, 12 august 1954. kenya weekly 31 july 1959 in fco141/5655 mau mau unrest; death of eleven detainees at hola detention camp, 3 march 1959. fco 141/6521, 1954-58, screening camps: mau mau investigation centre, embakasi. inquiry into screening camps and interrogation centres under the control of the provincial administration, p.2. fco141/6750, 1953, district officer, londiani forest division: correspondence on home guards and screening. office of the provincial commissioner, rift valley province to employers of kikuyu labour, rift valley province, 4 january, 1954 cab.129/65 – detention of supporters of mau mau. telegram no 72, 27 january 1954 from the governor of kenya to the secretary of state for the colonies. annex to memorandum by the secretary of state for the colonies, 8 february 1954. fco141/6298 – detainees and detention camps. mr hare reply to barbara castle, 22 february 1956. fco141/6298 – detainees and detention camps. telegram from the district commissioner’s office embu to the special commissioner, nyeri, screening of detainees at manyani, 27 august 1956. fco 141/6521, 1954-58, screening camps: mau mau investigation centre, embakasi. inquiry into screening camps and interrogation centres under the control of the provincial administration, p.3. fco822/728 press office handout no 139 – new emergency regulations, press office, nairobi, 18 may 1953. co822/451 activities of the advisory committee on detainees established under the emergency regulations kenya 1952-53. co822/801 1956 detention camps set up for emergency in kenya, 1 january 1954 – 31 december 1956. kenya national archives and documentation centre, nairobi: (kna): op/e/1/982 – unrest – villagisation 1954-59, en clair telegram from the governor to the secretary of state, 21 february 1955. footnotes 1 the case was brought by the mau mau war veterans association together with the kenyan human rights commission. the defence did acknowledge the claimants had experienced the mistreatment that was the basis of their claims. 2 charles tegart, transferred to palestine from india, built a line of fortresses along the northern border of palestine as part of counter-insurgency against the arab revolt. see also khalili, pp. 176-180. 3 under the emergency (defence) regulations of 1936 that followed the early mandate collective responsibility ordinance and collective punishment ordinance (1925); a revised collective punishment ordinance was applied in kenya in 1930 (kenya gazette 20 june, 1930:1520). 4 under the palestine defence order in council of 1937. 5 wolfe (2008) distinguishes settler colonialism, determined by this ’logic of elimination’ as a primary motivation, from other forms of colonialism that he characterises as chattel slavery (us) or franchise colonialism (india) p.103. 6 notwithstanding that the settlement of palestine started as anti-colonialism began the process of securing independence from colonial rule (israel-palestine has been described as ‘the only successful settler nation-building of the twentieth century’ elkins and pederson 2005, p.3) there are innumerable common practices of colonial rule between kenya and palestine. see elkins and pederson, 2005. 7 caroline elkins argues that ‘settler tyranny – with its vicious racism, restrictive conceptualization of citizenship, and infiltration into the colonial state – unleashed uncontrollable violence in the final moments of empire, (2005b, p. 219). settlers in kenya were an integral part of the emergency regime; settlers in the occupied palestinian territories are part of the civilian and military regime of occupation. 8 boxes of files on the late british colonial administration across 37 colonies were found and released to the national archives as a result of the mau mau case at the high court in london. they are tagged as the ‘migrated files’. 9 see ranajit guha, 1988, ‘the prose of counter-insurgency’. 10 from the archival records it is clear that the precursors to emergency practices existed within the structures of the british colonial project in kenya – from the expropriation of land to the kipande system, from identity cards to passbooks and movement permits, from squatter lines to the concentrated villages – registration of natives ordinance (1921); masters and servants ordinance (1906); native administration ordinances, outlying districts ordinance (1902); the special districts administration ordinance (1934). 11 in the prose of counterinsurgency, ranajit guha analyses the language of colonial reports on india to note : ‘they make the despatch into more than a mere register of happenings … an interpretation so that the protagonists emerge from it not as peasants but as ‘insurgents’, not as musalman but as ‘fanatic’; their action not as resistance … but as ’the most daring and ’wanton atrocities on the inhabitants’; their project not as a revolt …but as ’defying the authority of the state’, not as a search for an alternative order … but as ’disturbing public tranquil(l)lity’’(p. 57) emphasis in original. 12 it recognized that the claimants had been ‘subject to torture and other acts of ill treatment at the hands of the colonial administration’ (statement to parliament on settlement of mau mau claims, 2013) but denied liability for ‘events that occurred overseas outside direct british jurisdiction more than fifty years ago’ suggesting that they could not ‘be resolved satisfactorily through the courts without the testimony of key witnesses that is no longer available’, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-to-parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims, last accessed 10 december 2014 13 mbembe suggests that coming as it did at the end of the european colonial period and at the beginning of decolonization, the late modern colonial occupation of the palestinian territories, combines the disciplinary, the biopolitical and the necropolitical manifesting in territorial fragmentation, a splintering occupation, and infrastructural warfare (2003, pp. 27-30). 14 as the 2014 ‘operation protective shield’ ground offensive on gaza was prepared, the israeli daily, ha’aretz, reported that arrests during demonstrations in jerusalem and in the negev (naqab) had been made ‘on suspicion of involvement in disruptions of order’ (ha’aretz july 8.2014); that ‘violence and disruption of order’ would be dealt ‘with a hard hand’ (ha’aretz july 5 2014) echoing the language of emergency regulations. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia making sense of shakespeare: a cultural icon for contemporary audiences michael r. olsson university of technology, sydney abstract the works of william shakespeare are more popular in the 21st century than ever before. why are theatre and audiences around the globe still drawn to his work? how do they make sense of these texts in ways that resonate with their cosmopolitan, contemporary audiences? this article uses the findings of a study interviewing 35 theatre professionals in canada, finland and the united kingdom to explore these issues. theoretically and methodologically, it is a bricolage, drawing on a range of approaches including foucault’s discourse analysis, and hobsbawm’s invented traditions to understand participants’ sense-making as a social practice. it argues that attempting to understand the significance of a major cultural icon such as shakespeare in contemporary cosmopolitan civil society needs to recognise the many meanings, roles and significances that surround him and that this complexity makes it unlikely that any one theoretical lens will prove adequate on its own. introduction all the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players: they have their exits and their entrances; and one man in his time plays many parts (as you like it) the works of the english playwright william shakespeare (1564-1616) have had a profound effect on the world we live in. words and phrases he coined litter the everyday speech of english speakers around the world (mccrum, 1986). although considered by some to be the quintessential english playwright, his works are published around the world, not only in english but 80 other languages. shakespeare’s global popularity and prestige in the theatre would also seem to have never been higher. the 2012 world shakespeare festival, for example, included performances of his plays in 50 languages (dickson, 2013). how is it that a writer who died almost four centuries ago remains such an iconic figure in contemporary cosmopolitan civil society? why are theatre professionals – actors, directors, designers and audiences around the globe still drawn to his work? how do theatre professionals, individually and as part of a creative community, make sense of these texts in ways that resonate with their cosmopolitan, contemporary audiences? cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 15 the present article will endeavour to explore these issues through its analysis of the findings of an international study examining how theatre professionals (actors, directors, designers and others) in different countries make sense of the works of a culturally iconic author (william shakespeare) in the course of performing one of his plays. in doing so, it will not only shed light on the working practices of members of this heterogeneous creative community, but also illuminate aspects of the continuing importance of shakespeare not just for the english or english speakers but for people around the globe. more broadly, in doing so it may shed light on the nature of people’s relationship with information in a 21st century postmodern world. methodology though this be madness, yet there is method in 't. (hamlet) the present article draws on the findings of a larger study of theatre professionals’ sensemaking (olsson 2010a; 2010b; 2012). methodologically, the study was a bricolage, adapting approaches and techniques from a variety of disciplinary traditions, including critical discourse analysis, communication and education, as well as information behaviour/practices research. the approach to both interviewing and analysis was iterative, developing and changing significantly through the course of the study. the findings of the study are based on interviews with 35 theatre professionals in canada, finland and the united kingdom. participants include actors, directors, set and costume designers, voice coaches and dramaturges affiliated with a number of theatre companies, including the stratford shakespeare festival of canada (north america's largest and most prestigious classical repertory theatre), shakespeare’s globe, the royal shakespeare company, the national theatre and the central school of speech and drama in the uk and the tampereen työväen teatteri (tampere people’s theatre) in finland. while some participants were purposefully sampled and directly approached by the researcher, the majority (28) were recruited via snowball sampling (patton, 2002), where participants nominated other theatre professionals (in their own company or elsewhere) they felt should be included in the research. the interviews were carried out face-to-face, usually in informal settings (green room, rehearsal room etc.) at the theatre where the participants worked or in other informal settings, such as cafes or the participant’s home. 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 one particular challenge of the present study was that many of the participants, especially actors and directors, were very used to being interviewed: publicity and talking to the press being part of their job. this had both positive and negative aspects. these participants were confident and comfortable in talking about themselves, with a ready supply of amusing anecdotes to hand. however, this meant that it was important to develop strategies that probed below the polished surface of these oft-told stories. the strategy developed was to move away from a semi-structured approach to interviewing and to carry out, longer, more conversational interviews of the kind advocated by seidman (1991). even the briefest interview (cut short by the bell for an afternoon matinee) lasted just over an hour, with many running more than two or even three hours. a number of participants commented that they found the interviews a revealing process, offering them an opportunity to reflect on both their professional life and their relationship with shakespeare in a way they had not done before. i just want to thank you because i’ve never had the opportunity to think about my life as an actor in this way before. i think it’s going to make me a better actor. (seyton, actor) the interviews were digitally audio-recorded and professionally transcribed prior to analysis. an inductive critical discourse analysis (fairclough, 2003; paltridge, 2008) of the interview and follow-up transcripts was undertaken. this process included a detailed micro-analysis of the interview transcripts, aided by the use of nvivo software, with the researcher’s field notes and listening to the original audio recordings also used to inform the process. in addition to this micro-analysis, the researcher made extensive use of the broader thematic writing techniques advocated by glaser and strauss (1967) to explore emergent trends, concepts and theories. participants played an active role in the analysis process and were frequently asked to comment on the extent to which emerging patterns and concepts reflected their own experience. conceptual framework as, painfully to pore upon a book to seek the light of truth (love’s labours lost) the design of the study and the analysis of the interview data were influenced by theories and approaches from a range of different disciplinary traditions including communication, critical cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 17 discourse analysis and sociology of knowledge, as well as information studies. the analysis of the research described in this article will draw particularly on ideas drawn from foucault’s approach to discourse analysis, including pouvoir/savoir (power/knowledge) and ‘death of the author’ (foucault, 1980; rabinow, 1984). it will also critically engage with hobsbawm’s notion of ‘invented traditions’ (hobsbawn & ranger, 1993). shakespeare’s iconic status as the greatest playwright that has ever lived would seem, at first glance, to be a perfect example of hobsbawm’s idea: 'invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. in fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past. (hobsbawm, 1993, 1) certainly, there is ample evidence to suggest both that shakespeare’s iconic status is more recent than his present pre-eminence might lead one to assume and that there have been long periods when his work was not popular or even publically performed. although there is evidence to suggest that shakespeare was well regarded by his contemporaries, such as ben jonson, much of this extant commentary focuses on his poetry. theatre (like television today) was regarded by the jacobean intelligentsia as an essentially popular and ephemeral medium. already beginning to go somewhat out of fashion in shakespeare’s own lifetime, the puritan closure of the theatre during the english civil war and changing theatrical tastes from the restoration onwards meant that his plays were largely unperformed for more than 150 years until the late 18th century. it took the rise of romanticism – and the rise of britain as a dominant imperial power in search of a symbol of its cultural superiority – to lay the foundations of the monolithic reputation his work enjoys today. the advent of prestigious theatre companies dedicated to the performance of shakespeare’s work is even more recent: the royal shakespeare company was founded in 1961(royal shakespeare company, 2013), while shakespeare’s globe had its first season in 1996 (shakespeare’s globe, 2013). yet to view shakespeare’s iconic status solely as an example of an invented tradition raises more questions than it answers. if, for example, shakespeare’s rise to pre-eminence can be dated to britain’s rise to imperial power, why has prestige continued to grow as that same empire has dwindled? why is he not now seen, as other victorian imperial icons such as 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 milton and kipling are, as an outmoded relic? why does performing shakespeare remain so popular in so many post-colonial contexts, from australia and canada to india? why, as the study’s findings will show, is his work venerated in countries that were never part of britain’s imperial orbit, such as finland and sweden? despite the prevalence of the view of shakespeare as a ‘timeless’ genius whose works contains a ‘universal’ truth, it is clear that every production of shakespeare is – indeed, must be – different: the product of the sense-making processes of different people, with different beliefs and understandings operating in different organisational/cultural/artistic/national contexts performing in different places for different audiences. golder and madelaine (2001), for example, found that the recent australian productions they examined drew inspiration from sources and issues as diverse as freudian psychology, japanese kabuki and the indigenous land-rights debate. in seeking to examine the working practices by which theatre professionals made sense of shakespeare, the analysis therefore also made use ideas and approaches drawn from the work of the french historian and philosopher, michel foucault (1980; rabinow, 1984). in foucault’s conception of it, discourses are more than just a way of talking – rather it is seen as a complex network of relationships between individuals, texts, ideas and institutions, with each ‘node’ impacting on other nodes, and on the dynamics of the discourse as a whole. analysis of the study’s findings will show that participants’ constructions of shakespeare are the result of complex interactions between the members of the company, the text and an array of prevailing discourses about shakespeare and performance, some of them international, found in all participants’ accounts, some of them specific to a particular national or cultural context. like hobsbawm, foucault emphasised that any discourse is inextricably tied to its particular socio-historical context and cannot be studied or understood if divorced from this context: “for foucault there is ... no universal understanding that is beyond history and society” (rabinow, 1984, 4). however, foucault also recognised that discourses are never static: the dynamics of people’s ongoing engagement with them means they are in a continuous process of contestation, re-affirmation and re-invention: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 19 there is a battle ‘for truth’ or at least ‘around truth’ it being understood once again that by truth i do not mean ‘the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered and accepted’ but rather ‘the ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true. (foucault, in rabinow (ed.), 1984, 418). the ongoing relations between people, institutions and texts generate regimes of both meaning and authority (power/knowledge) simultaneously. in this view, the creation and dissemination of ‘texts’, the ‘weighting’ of one ‘text’ more than another, involves a series of dynamic power relations. these relations are constantly re-inventing and re-affirming themselves through the process of applying the discursive rules to examine new ‘texts’ and to re-examine existing ones. as a consequence, a foucauldian lens must lead us to question one of hobsbawm’s central assumptions. implicit in the notion of ‘invented tradition’ is the implicit assumption that there is such a thing as an authentic i.e. non-invented tradition; foucault’s work is likely lead us to the view that traditions, however old, however continuous, are discursive constructs and that contemporary engagements with them must inevitably involve a degree of re-invention. it is simply not possible, for example, for a 21st century reader or performer to understand shakespeare’s work in the way that his jacobean contemporaries did – the sense we make of it is inevitably coloured by our own discursive context. the findings suggest that one reason for shakespeare’s continuing popularity, the continued performance of his plays around the world, may not be, as in popular wisdom, their universality but their mutability – the ability of theatre professionals to continually re-invent the plays, giving them new meanings for increasingly cosmopolitan contemporary global audiences. the study has sought to explore the interplay of how these diverse constructions – as well as the sometimes convergent, sometimes divergent interests of actors, directors, designers and technicians – interact in the cooperative environment of producing a theatrical production. 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 findings there are more things in heaven and earth, horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy. (hamlet) the study’s findings produced a very rich picture of the information practices the participants engaged in to make sense of shakespeare – a portrait in many ways at odds with the assumptions underpinning prevailing approaches to information behaviour research. in particular, they highlighted the essentially social nature of the participants’ knowledge acquisition, not only in their heavy reliance on personal relationships but also in the clear relationship between their sense-making and the social norms and accepted practices (discursive rules) that have developed in the theatre world over many generations. audience – the silent partner but pardon, and gentles all… and let us, ciphers to this great accompt, on your imaginary forces work… for 'tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings, carry them here and there; jumping o'er times, turning the accomplishment of many years into an hour-glass (henry v) theatre professionals’ interpretations of shakespeare are social in a very literal way. underpinning all participants’ accounts was an understanding that they needed to make sense of shakespeare not only for themselves or their colleagues but rather they needed to do so in a way that would make sense for their audience: it’s really about building that connection – it’s like a dialogue between you and them … and sometimes you won’t know what works until you are actually in front of an audience. (hippolyta, actor) furthermore, many of the theatre companies involved in the study routinely perform to heterogeneous, multi-cultural audiences. it was clear from participants’ accounts that they understood that different backgrounds and experiences would make sense of their performance in different ways: here at the globe our audience is so different – you’ve got tourists from all over the world, with varying degrees of english …you’ve also got your serious shakespeareans… some of them have seen everyone from olivier and burton to branagh… at the same time you’ve also got your school groups. you’ve got to find a way to connect with all of them on some level. (mercutio, actor) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 21 the challenges of an international audience were also evident in canada: we need to be canadian – but not too canadian! we’re a government funded company and like to think of ourselves as the national company – but then quite a lot of our audience come from over the border. so if we make the references too specific – if the clown characters all sound like they’re from newfoundland, eh? we’ll lose the americans! (rosalind, voice coach) in describing these challenges, participants demonstrated their appreciation of shakespeare as an icon whose power extends well beyond their own particular professional and cultural contexts, as well as an awareness that his work – and their performancewill have different meanings for different people interpreting him through their own cultural lenses. the challenge for a contemporary theatre company – and for individual theatre professionals – is therefore to simultaneously meet the multiple and sometimes conflicting expectations of a cosmopolitan audience: that they will see a performance that is relevant and accessible yet at the same time connected to the iconic shakespearean tradition. the battle for truth once more unto the breach, dear friends (henry v) meeting this challenge of connecting to an iconic tradition was at the heart of the professional creative lives of all the study’s participants. it was a subject that all participants had thought deeply and cared passionately about. for many, it was a question they had literally dedicated their lives to. in speaking with the researcher about shakespeare, it was clear that although participants held a variety of opinions, they did not make sense of his work in an idiosyncratic way. instead, the views they expressed were explicitly related to discourses that were well established in the theatre world. participants’ accounts were eloquent and well thought out, the distillation of years of professional endeavour and showed a strong awareness of being part of a long-standing theatrical tradition of enormous cultural importance. these discourses provided a framework – or rather a set of frameworks – that participants, both individually and as a part of a working community, engaged with. participants did not blindly accept prevailing discourses, nor were their sense-making processes dominated by a single discourse: all participants engaged with them selectively, critically and strategically. their accounts demonstrate that foucault’s ‘battle for truth’ is not only a macro-sociological 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 phenomenon: it is integral to micro-sociological interactions between community members and even the thought processes of individuals. perhaps the most striking feature of participants’ accounts of their relationship with shakespeare is that, without exception, every participant drew on two essentially contradictory discourses. authenticity discourse speak the speech, i pray you, as i pronounced it to you, trippingly on the tongue (hamlet) the first of these, allied to the long-standing tradition of viewing shakespeare as a ‘universal genius’, valued authenticity: i feel it’s a great honour and a great responsibility to do this work in an authentic way: to be true to shakespeare’s language ... these characters... shakespeare is bigger than all of us. (robin goodfellow, actor) this is a discourse focussed on divining authorial intent: that the plays have a ‘true’ meaning and the role of theatre professionals is to represent this faithfully: i often ask myself “what did shakespeare mean here?” his characters have such depth, are so well written… my job is to bring them to life. (viola, actor) related to this was a widely expressed view that saw theatre professionals as having a special insight into the work’s ‘true meaning: you know, i don’t think you can really understand shakespeare, until you perform it ... the plays were written to be performed, not read. (ned poins, actor) in using this discourse, some participants put forward the view that theatre professionals are the ‘true custodians’ of shakespeare’s legacy often explicitly contrasting this with academic approaches: i just can’t stand it when they go on about ‘death of the author’i want to find that connection to shakespeare… (mistress quickly, actor) in a few cases, participants supported this by reference to theatrical tradition: it’s kind of amazing to think of yourself as being part of a tradition that goes back through the centuries ... to shakespeare and the globe. and i think you feel a responsibility to carry on that tradition, to honour it. (antony, actor) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 23 while present, reference to this kind of hobsbawmian invented tradition was not the primary discursive practice that participants referred to. instead, their accounts emphasised the importance of a close reading of the text, often combined with the rehearsal room interactions described above, as a way of uncovering their true meaning: when i’m working on the play, i feel i’m really coming to understand shakespeare … i sometimes feel like he’s talking directly to me. (tamora, actor) perhaps the ultimate expression of this authenticity discourse was a highly sophisticated set of practices for reading employed by some participants both at the globe and at stratford in canada. this ‘shakespeare as director’ discourse, which focusses on a close reading of punctuation, stage directions and other cues in the first folio and early quartos, essentially argues that instructions on how to perform shakespeare are integral to the structure of the text: shakespeare actually tells you how to speak the lines! if you look at the blank verse, it shows you when to pause, what to give emphasis to ... he does the work for you... (rosencrantz, actor) shakespeare is such a master of language. if you listen to the sound of the words, he uses the sound of the words to convey the emotion… he even uses punctuation to tell you where to take a breath. (ned poins, actor) the participants who discussed this approach (all classically trained actors) demonstrated an extraordinary knowledge of the texts they described and a depth of analysis at least the equal of anything to be found in the academy. creativity discourse o for a muse of fire, that would ascend the brightest heaven of invention (henry v) at the same time, all participants’ accounts showed an understanding that interpretations of shakespeare had changed over time, and that their adaptability was a key feature of their enduring popularity: the reason that this stuff has lasted for as long as it has is .... that there are as many different ways of interpreting it as there are people coming to it. (hippolyta, actor) in using this creativity discourse, participants explicitly related this to the high value theatre professionals place on originality: 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 i don’t want to just copy what’s been done before. i need to make the part mine... find my own truth. (mercutio, actor) drawing on this discourse, each participant would strive to bring something “new and fresh” to each new production: we wanted to make this production very political, quite marxist...show shakespeare in a new way, different to what the audience expects (puck, actor) you need to find new settings, new approaches to the design ... get away from ‘pumpkin pants’ shakespeare! (sebastian, designer) allied to this discourse, is a concern with making the plays relevant to a contemporary audience: how do you get across the idea of what royalty means to a modern audience? i mean they weren’t nice polite guys cutting ribbons ... they were more like mafia dons! (rosalind, voice coach) a servant of two masters? we came into the world like brother and brother, and now let's go hand in hand, not one before another (comedy of errors) these two discourses of authenticity and creativity are frequently in opposition in participants’ accounts, with the one being used to critique the other: on one level, it’s interesting and kind of cool to delve into what people in shakespeare’s time believed about ghosts – stuff like that… but at the same time, i have to say that doesn’t really help you get out and connect with a front row full of teenagers! (laertes, actor) well we have a director now, he’s very focussed on the look of the thing, making a big spectacle, but to me that’s going against what shakespeare is about – the characters, the language... (antony, actor) it would be a mistake to see participants’ use of two apparently contradictory discourses as a ‘problem’, some failure on their part to comprehend the ‘truth’. discourse analytic scholars have long understood that complex topics will invariably give rise to multiple discourses and that individuals will move between these discourses as circumstances dictate. furthermore, it is clear from the study that this apparent paradox is not a weakness but a strength. were the ‘authenticity’ discourse to be dominant, the likely outcome would be theatre that was simply an exercise in historical recreation, of interest to only a few scholars. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 25 conversely, a production where the ‘creativity’ discourse was pre-eminent might be rejected by the audience (as avant-garde productions frequently have been) as ‘not shakespeare’. the competing claims of these two discourses frame the ‘battle for truth’ (foucault) within each production. it is the creative tensions between their competing claims that make each new production both unique and connected to iconic tradition. national voices cry 'god for harry, england, and saint george! (henry v) nowhere was the battle between the creativity/contemporary relevance and authenticity discourses clearer than in the extensive discussion of accent by both canadian and uk participants: there’s a lot of argument here as to whether you should say “the duke” ... or “the dook”. (rosalind, voice coach) in both countries, there were a number of participants, both actors and directors, who wanted to move away from the received pronunciation (bbc/public school english) of ‘traditional’ shakespearian productions to use accents more like the everyday speech of the audience: i don’t see why an ancient greek character needs to sound like he went to eton! (zero, director) as in the above example, three uk participants talked about the accent issue in terms of class: i want the kids from brixton – or glasgow! – to feel that shakespeare’s for them too …it’s not just posh gits with lah-de-dah accents! (macmorris, actor) in both countries, the discussion of accent could be seen as drawing on the ‘creativity’ discourse the auditory equivalent of the shift away from ‘pumpkin pants’ costumes –a strategy to distance the production from traditions that were seen as outmoded and alienating for contemporary audiences. contemporary accents, some also argued, not only made the characters more accessible to the audience but could be used to convey meaning: one of the best productions i’ve seen was a romeo and juliet from quebec... the capulets were francophone and the montagues were anglophone... (rosalind, voice coach) 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 i’ve loved seeing a first nations actor playing shylock – i think that’s really brought the racism home to people. (iago, director) interestingly, the authenticity discourse could also be employed to justify the shift away from received pronunciation (rp): we had a talk from a language professor from england and he said that the accent in shakespeare’s time would have sounded much more like americans then rp... (antony, actor) after all, rp is a 19th century invention, shakespeare wouldn’t have even understood it! (zero, director) two scottish participants made a similar argument, arguing that the scots voice is not only more authentically elizabethan, but much more effective at conveying powerful emotion to the audience than the smooth, polished sound of rp: the language works so much better in scots – it’s more raw, visceral ... and there is a much greater range of sounds... and it’s a much more elizabethan sound! (ned poins, actor) their spontaneous performance of various speeches to demonstrate this were not only convincing but mesmerising – in a way that no words on a page can convey! the use of different accents, as with non-traditional costumes or stage settings, is a material example of the tools theatre professionals use to re-invent the iconic shakespeare authorconstruct (foucault in rabinow, 1984). while on the one hand, these innovations challenge certain features of the shakespearian invented tradition, on the other, by presenting shakespeare in a new light, by making explicit connections between his work and social/cultural contests and practices the audience can relate to, they actually serve to reinforce the central tenet of the tradition: that shakespeare is a genius whose work speaks to all people and all times. the idea of shakespeare as a specifically english writer was raised as an issue only by two canadian participants. when asked about this in a follow-up one responded: maybe that’s seen as an issue here not just because of our history and being part of the commonwealth but because of our theatre tradition. tyrone guthrie (prominent english actor and director) was the first artistic director at the stratford festival and so many canadian actors went to england for their training. (rosalind, voice coach) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 27 an american-born and educated participant made an interesting comment in relation to this: you know i never really heard of this idea of shakespeare as english and that being a problem until i came to canada. …in the states we’ve never had a problem seeing shakespeare as ours! (antony, actor) a finnish participant made a similar comment: i don’t think i think of shakespeare as being english – i mean i don’t see sophocles as only for greeks! these writers are for the world. (dionyza, dramaturge) shakespeare in translation what country, friend, is this? (twelfth night) the large majority of the study’s interviews were carried out in english-speaking countries with participants for whom english is their first language. nonetheless, there was more discussion of non-english language shakespeare than might have been anticipated. much of this discussion drew on the creativity discourse: i think a lot of the most exciting shakespeare i’ve seen in the last ten years has come out of asia. i saw an indian [midsummer night’s] dream that just blew me away! it was like nothing i’d ever seen. (orsino, designer) japanese directors seem to have a great sense of social distinctions that shape the characters actions. maybe they are closer to that kind of hierarchy than we are now. (iago, director) some of this discussion was based on a belief that performing in other languages offered more creative freedom: you know, in many ways i envy my overseas colleagues who get to work with shakespeare in translation, because they don’t have to worry about the problems of archaic language that audiences can’t understand ... but we’re all “you can’t change it, it’s shakespeare!” (andromache, dramaturge) the study did, however, also include four finnish participants (two actors, a dramaturge and a director), all highly experienced and critically acclaimed. all four had performed shakespeare in finnish, while two had also been involved in swedish-language productions. this provided some insight into how making sense of and performing shakespeare in another language might be different from, as well as similar to, doing so in english, at least in a nordic context. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 …he doth bestride the narrow world. like a colossus (julius caesar) a striking feature of english language participants’ accounts is the extent to which they embraced a view of shakespeare as the greatest writer who has ever lived. perhaps this was not only a reflection of shakespeare’s iconic place in english-language culture but also that the great majority of participants worked for companies, such as the globe and the rsc, where shakespeare was their raison d’etre. the finnish participants tended to a slightly different view: for us perhaps shakespeare is not the only one but he is one of the greats … every actor wants to perform the great roles – hamlet, macbeth, lear… (puck, actor) nonetheless, all four participants’ enthusiasm for shakespeare was striking and much of their discussion of his work closely mirrored that of english language participants: there is no one like him … not even ibsen or chekhov produce such characters! (fortinbras, actor) one participant put forward an explanation for shakespeare’s importance in a finnish context (a view shared by a finnish drama academic i consulted): …because of our history – ruled by sweden, then by russia, there was not so much written published in finnish before independence. and so translating shakespeare into finnish has become a kind of measure of the language… when a new translation comes out, it shows us how the language has developed… and it shows that finnish can be a language for great poetry. (dionyza, dramaturge) this is a striking example of the fact that in addition to global discourses around shakespeare as an author-construct (foucault in rabinow, 1984), that such an iconic figure will also take on particular meanings and significnaces unique to particular cultural contexts. another potentially important issue that the study provides only a glimpse of is the differences in meaning that arise when a play is translated into one language rather than another. both participants who performed in both finnish and swedish commented on this: at first we were performing in swedish but then when we were performing in finnish, it became like a different play! the emotions were different … the audience didn’t see it the same way … we had to make changes… (nerissa, director) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 29 such a small relevant sample means that the present study provides only a small glimpse of the complex issue of translation as a shaper of meaning. conclusion but that's all one, our play is done, and we'll strive to please you every day. (twelfth night) the findings of this study provide us with some significant insights, not only into the meaning and significance of shakespeare in the 21st century but also into the nature of collective creative endeavour and social sense-making. in doing so, the study also provides a microcosm which may provide insights about the nature of meaning in contemporary cosmopolitan civil society. the findings suggest that attempting to understand the significance of a major cultural icon such as shakespeare in contemporary cosmopolitan civil society needs to recognise the many meanings, roles and significances that surround him: shakespeare in the 21st century is not a single monolith but a multitude of continually evolving author constructs. such complexity makes it unlikely that any one theoretical lens will prove adequate on its own. this article has therefore endeavoured to use several theoretical approaches in order to see what insights different lenses might provide. hobsbawm’s concept of invented traditions, while problematic in some of its implicit assumptions, is valuable in highlighting the need to critically examine the historical underpinnings of even the most apparently venerable and august of cultural icons. it reminds us that the past is not simply another country: it is a narrative that is continually being rewritten, reconceptualised through the lens of our own societal values and its authority coopted to supported contemporary social and political agendas. it demonstrates that the ability of different institutions – schools, universities, museums, theatre companies – to shape the ways we see and the stories we tell about the past, and people and events from previous eras, will have much broader consequences in terms of the way we see the world we live in. on one level, the study can be seen as a micro-sociological case study of foucault’s concepts of discourse and power/knowledge – manifested not on the broad canvas of history but in the everyday working practices of the participants. for all that participants evinced a sincere 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 desire to perform ‘authentic’ shakespeare, their sense-making of his work was clearly an ongoing process of social construction, involving engagement and negotiation not only with their immediate colleagues in the company but long-standing discourses, conventions and established social practices in the theatrical episteme. the complexity of the discursive landscape that participants negotiated, with its mixture of local, national, and global discourses, brings to mind baudrillard’s (1994) view of the postmodern world as a complex sea of interacting signs and simulacra. participants’ accounts would certainly seem to support the postmodern view that in contemporary society no text has only one meaning or significance. consequently, as social researchers, when we encounter contexts where a group or institution seeks to assert a single truth, we might usefully follow fairclough (2003) in questioning whose interests are served by such an assertion and whose are marginalised. the study’s findings suggest that a variety of discourses, even contradictory ones, around an iconic figure such as shakespeare should not be a source of concern. foucault’s work suggests that such a multiplicity of meanings is the inevitable consequence of the dynamics of discourse. as contemporary civil society grows ever more globally connected, as each of us engages with more and more ideas and debates from around the world, this process can only accelerate. the present study, however, suggest that this phenomenon can have many positive outcomes: that audiences around the globe continue to be entertained and inspired by performances of shakespeare precisely because they are the product of this dynamic ongoing process of reinvention. references baudrillard, j. 1994, simulacra and simulation, the university of michigan press, ann arbor. fairclough, n. 2003, analysing discourse: textual analysis for social research, routledge, london. foucault, m. 1980, power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977, harvester press, london. glaser, b.g. & strauss, a.l. 1967, the discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative research, aldine publishing corporation, new york. golder, j. & madelaine, r. 2001, ‘‘to dote on such luggage’: appropriating shakespeare in australia’, in golder, j. and madelaine, r. (eds) o brave new world: two centuries of shakespeare on the australian stage, currency press, sydney, pp. 1-16. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 31 hobsbawm, e. 1993, ‘inventing traditions’, in hobsbawm, e. and ranger, t. (eds) the invention of tradition, cambridge university press, cambridge. mccrum, r. 1986, the story of english, bbc, london. olsson, m.r. 2010a, the play's the thing: theater professionals make sense of shakespeare’, library and information science research vol.32 no.4, pp. 272-280. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lisr.2010.07.009 olsson, m.r. 2010b, 'all the world's a stage the information practices and sense-making of theatre professionals', libri, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 241-251. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/libr.2010.021 olsson, m.r. 2012, ‘making sense of shakespeare: the social information world of theatre professionals’, in widén, g. and holmberg, k. (eds), social information research, emerald, bingley. paltridge, b. 2008, discourse analysis, continuum, london. patton, m. q. 2002, qualitative research & evaluation methods (3rd ed.), sage publications, thousand oaks, ca. rabinow, p. 1984, the foucault reader, peregrine books, harmondsworth, middlesex. royal shakespeare company 2013, history. http://www.rsc.org.uk/about-us/history/ seidman, i. e. 1991, interviewing as qualitative research: a guide for researchers in education and the social sciences. teachers college press, new york. shakespeare’s globe 2013, rebuilding the globe, http://www.shakespearesglobe.com/aboutus/history-of-the-globe/rebuilding-the-globe accessed 10 november 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2fj.lisr.2010.07.009 http://dx.doi.org/10.1515%2flibr.2010.021 http://www.rsc.org.uk/about-us/history/ http://www.shakespearesglobe.com/about-us/history-of-the-globe/rebuilding-the-globe http://www.shakespearesglobe.com/about-us/history-of-the-globe/rebuilding-the-globe making sense of shakespeare: a cultural icon for contemporary audiences abstract introduction methodology conceptual framework findings conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 1 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 helena heizmann. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(1): 4245,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i1.4245 working across cultural spheres: the knowledge sharing practices of boundary spanners in a global insurance firm helena heizmann university of technology sydney abstract as organisations are becoming increasingly complex from a cultural perspective, it is important to understand how practitioners manage the differences that arise when working with peers who engage in different cultural (national cultural, professional, functional) spheres. the purpose of this paper is to contribute to practice-based research on knowledge sharing by using a discourse analytic lens which exposes the link between the knowledge (sharing) practices of boundary spanners at cultural interfaces and its immediate power effects for the subjects involved. drawing on the results of a qualitative study, the paper examines how a community of inhouse consultants in a global insurance firm shifts from translating to transformational knowledge sharing practices depending on the power relations that link them to their audiences. the study’s findings highlight: (1) the political nature of boundary spanners’ knowledge sharing practices, (2) the power effects for the subjects involved and (3) the relational character of communities of practice. the study suggests that knowledge (sharing) practices are not neutral but have power implications that need to be considered in cross-cultural boundary work if participants want to achieve more meaningful forms of mutual engagement. introduction as olsson (2014) has noted, traditional modernist views of the role of information and knowledge in cosmopolitan civil society are increasingly being challenged, making way for more practice-based, situated forms of exploration that recognise their socially constructed nature. from a research perspective, this requires an intent to understand ‘a lived cosmopolitanism, which sees individuals of different cultures routinely negotiating across difference in order to coexist within a shared social space’ (onyx et al. 2011, p. 50). these https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 negotiations occur at the interfaces of multiple cultures such as national culture, organisational culture, professional culture and/or functional culture (sackmann 1997; sackmann & phillips 2004; saunders et al. 2010), involving complex cross-community boundary spanning situations where different knowledge(s), values and beliefs come into contact. cross-cultural research increasingly recognises that such boundary work does not occur in a power vacuum, but rather transports, reinforces and/or transforms power relations that need to be considered if we are to better understand the nature of collaboration in a globalised world (primecz, romani & sackmann 2011). however, the link between power and knowledge (sharing) practices in bridging such ‘cultural spheres’ (schneider & barsoux 2004) is not yet well understood (hislop 2013). this paper draws from the insights of a qualitative private sector study on organisational boundary spanners to provide a more comprehensive understanding of power effects in relation to knowledge sharing. the paper seeks to address the following research question: how are the knowledge (sharing) practices of boundary spanners at cultural interfaces connected to relations of power? in addressing this question, the paper offers insight into the knowledge sharing relationships between (1) australian head office and pacific island staff (a cultural interface rarely explored in the knowledge management and cross-cultural communication literature, as well as (2) between human resources practitioners and line managers in various australian business units. the paper contributes to the practice-based literature on knowledge sharing by using a discourse analytic lens which exposes the link between knowledge (sharing) practices and its immediate power effects for the subjects involved. it is argued that, rather than taking the cultural unity of organisations for granted, attention should be paid to the ways in which the knowledge practices of boundary spanners bring about a particular fabric of interdependencies between communities, discursive positions, and practices. the paper’s findings highlight how boundary work involves the translation and/or transformation of knowledge at cultural interfaces. while the notion of boundary spanning has its roots in corporate sector research (aldrich & herker 1997; ancona & caldwell 1992) the topic has been recognised as equally central to collaboration within and across third sector organisations (isbell 2012; leung 2013), thus the paper will discuss implications beyond its immediate locus of study. following this introduction, the second section outlines the practice-based conceptual framework on knowledge sharing across multiple cultures (sackmann 1997) or ‘spheres’ (schneider & cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 3 barsoux 2004). the third section outlines the methodology of the study and presents its empirical findings. the fourth and fifth sections provide a discussion and conclusion. conceptual framework in recent years, the practice-based turn in the wider social sciences (schatzki, knorr-cetina & von savigny 2001), practice-based studies in organisation studies (gherardi 2000; nicolini, gherardi & yanow 2003), and the ‘information practices’ discourse in information studies (savolainen 2007) have promoted a shift in perspective towards analysing workplace knowledge sharing not in functionalist-structural terms but by paying attention to the fluid social relations among practitioners that emerge from an engagement within and across shared domains of practice. conventional approaches conceptualise knowledge sharing and learning as the transfer of knowledge from a sending to a receiving person. they are rooted in the classic information transmission model, which views communication primarily as a mechanical process, in which a message is first constructed and encoded by a sender, then transmitted through a channel, and finally received and decoded by a receiver (shannon & weaver 1949). ever since the interpretive turn of the 1980s, this mechanistic view of communication has been increasingly criticised for conceptualising knowledge/information as a thing, which is first ‘possessed by a sender and then dumped into the heads of receivers as though they were empty buckets’ (foreman-wernet 2003, p. 5). applying a practice-based perspective to knowledge sharing means recognising that the activities which make up a social practice are only the ‘tip of the iceberg’. those activities ‘emerge and become visible because lying beneath them is a mass of practical knowledge and discursive (material-semiotic) practices that justify practices as morally and aesthetically acceptable (gherardi 2009, p. 123). thus, from a practice-based perspective, knowledge sharing is not simply a matter of asking what, when, where and how knowledge is exchanged, but also of understanding what (and whose) knowledge is deemed legitimate in particular (organisational, professional, national cultural) domains of practice. what is accepted as ‘good’ practice is the outcome of negotiations about the authority of particular knowledge claims (foucault 1980). 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 community of practice (cop) theory challenges the idea that knowledge may be successfully ‘internalised’ without any engagement in social practice as learning is seen as a by-product of participation in cops (lave & wenger 1991, p. 35). lave and wenger’s pioneering work on this topic defines a cop as a ‘set of relations among persons, activity, and world, over time and in relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of practice’ (1991, p. 98). through collaborating in shared practices, people become mutually engaged in a joint enterprise and develop a shared repertoire of cultural resources – they come to see the world through a particular lens (wenger 1998). cop members can thus share knowledge without an explicit articulation of the tacit dimension of knowledge, which is embedded in the shared context of practice. conversely, in the absence of shared practices, knowledge is hard to transfer. ‘it [specialised knowledge] becomes “sticky” and therefore dramatically tests the absorptive capacity of the receiver’ (holden 2001, p. 159). in the context of the global workplace, the ‘stickiness’ of knowledge constitutes particular issues when knowledge is shared across functions, national and regional offices, or organisations (gherardi & nicolini 2002; heizmann 2011, 2012; sole & edmondson 2002). interactions across such ‘cultural spheres’ (schneider & barsoux 2004) or boundaries tend to be characterised by different identities, epistemic assumptions and world-views (brown & duguid 1998, 2001; carlile 2002, 2004). multiple cultures and cross-boundary knowledge sharing the multiple cultures perspective emanates from an understanding of culture as a characteristic of all forms of collectives, including for instance the cultures of specific professional, industrial, ethnic, or gender groups (sackmann 1997). organisations are seen as complex settings in which many cultural ‘spheres’ (schneider & barsoux 2004) may co-exist at the same time. cross-boundary contact, from this perspective, involves the negotiation of meaning between different, sometimes competing and contesting values and beliefs, existing within different knowledge traditions and formations (foucault 1972). as such, the cultural interface is a space which involves both the potential for cross-cultural synergy and conflict. in nakata’s words, as much as the cultural interface is overlaid by various theories, narratives, and arguments that work to produce ... consensual, and co-operative social practices, it is also a space that abounds with contradictions, ambiguities, conflict and contestation of meanings (nakata 2007, p. 199) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 5 one approach that can help to overcome the difficulties of collaboration across cultural spheres is the active involvement of boundary spanners who develop the social relationships between people from different communities of practice (hislop 2009, p. 195). such individuals need to understand the specialist domains of both communities and be trusted by its members in order to be able to assume the role of a knowledge broker or translator (brown & duguid 1998). paul carlile's work (2002, 2004) has been seminal in providing a theoretical framework for boundary spanning knowledge (sharing) practices. his empirical studies focus on knowledge sharing across organisational functional boundaries in the context of new product development. based on an ethnographic study of four different units (sales/marketing; design engineering; manufacturing engineering; and production), carlile was able to show that knowledge is structured and interpreted differently in different organisational areas. of particular interest to this paper is his distinction between semantic and pragmatic boundaries. at a semantic boundary, knowledge sharing can be challenging as actors interpret the same knowledge differently. they will thus need to develop a mutual understanding of these interpretive differences – a process which boundary spanners can promote through the ‘translation’ of meaning. however, knowledge sharing becomes even more complex when actors do not only encounter different interpretations but also different interests that are ‘at stake’ (carlile 2004, p. 559). carlile describes such boundaries as pragmatic boundaries which require one party to change and/or adapt their knowledge (‘transformation’). as we shall see in the study, boundary spanners can transform domain-specific knowledge by reframing it in the interests of target audiences. the study data and methods the findings presented in this paper are drawn from an inductive case study (yin 2009) which sought to explore knowledge sharing issues and enablers in a global insurance corporation with a particular focus on cultural interfaces. the study involved 17 semistructured, in-depth interviews with a group of in-house consultants in the area of human resources business partnering (hrbp), learning and development (l&d), and communications (comms). this community of practitioners was considered particularly interesting for the purposes of the study since a large part of their work involved interacting 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 across functional, regional, or national boundaries. functionally, the consultants operated as part of the organisation’s human resources (hr) group. their tasks ranged from delivering staff induction seminars on corporate culture, planning and implementing leadership development, talent management, and workforce planning, to consulting specific business units on hr and communication matters. according to strategic documents, the joint purpose of these practitioners constituted the transformation of the organisation into a ‘high performance organisation’. starting with an initial group of five consultants who collaborated closely with each other, further participants were selected drawing on the participants’ strong informal practice-related contacts through a snowball sampling method (minichiello 1990). this sampling approach was considered particularly useful in order to identify a community of practitioners that was interconnected through their joint engagement in shared domain of practice (wenger 1998). all of the interviews were digitally recorded and lasted, on average, 60-90min. interview studies have been criticised for eliciting mainly opinions rather than giving insight into behaviours (kvale 1996, p. 292). the interviews therefore were guided by an approach that focuses on the participants’ experiences of everyday work incidences, starting with descriptions of actual behaviours and, thereafter, exploring more closely the participants’ interpretations of the situation (sundin 2001) and what they saw as important in enabling successful knowledge sharing relationships. in addition, the study involved observation of meetings and staff induction workshops and sourcing of organisational documents to inform the interviews. the data were analysed with a critical-interpretive approach to discourse analysis (heracleous 2004; phillips & hardy 2002) and guided by the question of what discourse(s) dominated the participants’ speech in the context of different knowledge sharing relations. to illustrate how the consultants’ knowledge (sharing) practices were connected to power relations, i focus on two knowledge sharing relationships: (1) with staff in the company’s pacific island operations and (2) with line managers in various australian business units. one limitation of the study was that it did not include the voices of the respective co-workers (e.g. line managers and pacific island co-workers). therefore, an assessment of the impact of the consultants’ knowledge (sharing) strategies from their counterparts’ perspective, i.e. whether they generated counter-narratives and resistance or compliance, did not form part of the analysis. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 7 findings the participants offered many examples that highlighted the difficulties of sharing knowledge when common frames of reference existed only partially or not at all. however, what became particularly evident was the presence of two differing discourses in the participants’ accounts: • a discourse around the need for corporate standards that was prominent when consultants spoke about their interactions with staff in the pacific island operations and • a discourse of cultural adjustment that featured heavily when consultants spoke about their interactions with line managers of various business units in the australian operations. the ‘corporate standards’ discourse one example of the corporate standards discourse could be seen when a consultant explained the difficulties of implementing hrm (human resource management) policies in a subsidiary in papua new guinea to ensure regular office hours. according to the participant, discussing this type of information with local staff was a particularly challenging part of their role: sometimes you’ve got to deal with talking to someone about being always late, or taking additional time off over lunch. …some of them just, you know they don’t realise that they’ve got to be in an office by a certain time. …it’s challenging to see that because here we are in australia where we need to get to work on time, we’ve got an hour for lunch. what is evident in this particular statement is a positioning of ‘us’ and ‘them’ where the behaviour of local staff (‘them’) is constructed as deviant from the standards set by the australian head office operations. another consultant related how working with staff in the pacific islands frequently required raising issues around dress code. people turn up with sort of shorts and thongs because that’s the culture over there, but it’s not the company culture. so we have to sometimes reinforce what the company culture is and make sure that that sort of overrides the local culture, because the local culture is that you would turn up to work in shorts and thongs and a t-shirt. discursive claims such as ‘we have to…reinforce’ and ‘they don’t realise’ were statements 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 that attributed less power and authority to the cultural ‘other’. in both examples, the construct of a homogenous company culture (shaped by head office standards) was drawn upon in legitimating the ‘overriding’ of local cultural practices. when asked how they dealt with the tensions arising from efforts to establish corporate standards, participants highlighted the need to communicate messages in ways that they felt were sensitive to language barriers (‘i did a lot of “so, what i’m hearing you say is”, “can i just check my understanding”?’) and cultural differences (‘we ended up sending out a bulk email with information about the dress code, because even though we knew who they were, you shouldn’t single people out over there.’) these examples showed an awareness of the complexities of interacting across cultural spheres and an adjustment in communication style. however, at the same time, this did not alter the prevailing influence of the corporate standards discourse in the consultants’ speech with its hegemonic power effects on local staff. the ‘cultural adjustment’ discourse an important part of the participants’ role was working with line managers across a number of business units of the australian operations (e.g. it, finance, various insurance divisions) and supporting the implementation of a range of hrm practices (e.g. talent management, performance development, and engagement surveys). this involved working at the cultural interface of a number of professional and/or functional cultural spheres which were not always easily reconciled. we might as well be speaking dutch to these guys [it]. you know, they don’t understand necessarily that language and the need for that change... and if you reverse that it would be the same. … if someone from it talks to me about what they do it’s “bla bla bla”, that’s all i hear is “bla bla bla”. the discourse that dominated the participants’ speech when discussing their interactions with line managers could be characterised as a discourse of cultural adjustment. contrary to the corporate standards discourse, the main emphasis was here on positioning themselves as ‘partners’ of management and ‘influencing’ line managers to accept hrm practices. we set ourselves up as partners to work with the business and the key part of our role is to drive cultural change, help the business to manage their people better and get most out of their people. and i guess as we aspire to become a high performing organisation, do it through building relationships and influencing, rather than being enforcing. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 9 for instance, one participant explained how sharing knowledge was becoming increasingly challenging when interacting with line managers in other business units who were unfamiliar with, and perhaps less receptive to the hr ‘philosophy’. within that world [of hr] we’re pretty well connected now, and we have a fairly good understanding of what each different area is doing and what the key projects are … we know the philosophy behind it. … as you get further away from that circle of hr, there’s less understanding of that. and so you have to do a lot more of that filling in of the why [emphasis added] and the process stuff about how we’re doing it. the participant’s account highlights the need to explain, and more importantly, ‘justify’ hr initiatives when working with line managers – rendering the translation of knowledge into a matter of framing knowledge in the interests of the clients’ perspectives. ‘you’d wanna put it in their language if you can. so if you’re trying to sell an idea you sell it through the business impact for example.’ in a similar vein, a communications consultant related how he would always give written communications about a change project with the it department to an it practitioner for proof-reading. this was because he had realised that the it group had their own way of verifying the ‘veracity of information’ which involved a thorough scrutinising of texts for everything which sounded like ‘fluffy’ hr talk. asking for feedback was thus not simply a way of seeking input but also a mechanism of social legitimation. as credibility did not exist at the outset, it had to be established in a two-way process with people from within the it community: ‘i’ve learned that you must have a foot in either camp, if you’re going to share knowledge.’ what is evident in the previous examples is the consultants’ intensified need for adapting knowledge (sharing) practices in a context where the authority of knowledge may be challenged. in contrast with their accounts of working with pacific island staff (characterised by efforts to assert dominance), the consultants’ discourse manifested a struggle for equal partnership in their relations with line managers. discussion the purpose of this paper was to examine the link between the knowledge (sharing) practices of boundary spanners at cultural interfaces and power relations. the discourse analytic focus on boundary spanners’ interpretations of their knowledge sharing relations revealed three important issues. 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 firstly, knowledge sharing at cultural interfaces is never a ‘power-free’ process as its participants operate in a broader socio-cultural and political context that shapes their discursive practices. as became evident in the findings, the consultants’ prevailing discourse shifted depending on the cultural interface at which their boundary work was enacted: from a ‘corporate standards’ discourse that gave authority to cultural norms constructed by head office and positioned pacific island co-workers as the ‘other’ (hall 2003); to a ‘cultural adjustment’ discourse that constructed a collective identity of partnership between consultants and line managers with the purpose of influencing line managers to adopt hrm practices. intertwined with their discursive practices, the consultants’ knowledge sharing practices shifted as well: from ‘translating’ practices (carlile 2004) such as paraphrasing information, checking understanding among local staff and sending out explanatory emails about cultural norms; to ‘transformational’ (carlile 2004) practices such as adapting to their counterparts’ (i.e. line managers’) language and belief system, seeking to understand their needs in dialogue and using the received feedback to legitimate hrm knowledge. what becomes apparent is the following: how knowledge is shared and received in a cross-cultural boundary situation depends on processes of intersubjective validation among the parties who may switch flexibly between the discursive repertoires of different cultural spheres to legitimate their actions. secondly, the discursive practices at cultural interfaces are linked to immediate power effects for the subjects involved. as could be seen in the study’s findings, the discursive shift from ‘enforcing’ to ‘influencing’ at the two cultural interfaces signalled (and reinforced) a shift in power relations and discursive positions among the consultants and their counterparts. in the case of working with staff in the pacific islands, the consultants attributed deviant behavior to ethnicity, engaging in a process of ‘othering’ (hall 1997). in doing so, the consultants embodied (and relied on) the authority of a head office discourse which rendered the truth claims of local staff less powerful. intra-organisational, geo-centric differences translated into power dynamics or, as yanow (2004, p. s22) puts it: ‘from the perspective of organizational ‘centres’, the further from the centre, the less power and status one is perceived to have and the less legitimacy is accorded to one’s knowledge.’ in the case of collaborating with line managers in various departments and occupational specialisations, the consultants’ vantage point was a different one. their focus was on influencing line managers to adopt hrm (rather than enforcing these practices), yet they also had to contend with line managers’ resistance and instances in which the credibility of hrm knowledge came to be contested. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 11 this dynamic is perhaps best understood in the broader context of the precarious standing of hr professionals in relation to line managers highlighted in the hrm literature (legge 1995; wright 2008). finally, the study’s findings highlight how the shift from practices of translation to practices of transformation (carlile 2004) and its associated power dynamics have implications for the very nature of communities of practice. while the community of in-house consultants and their knowledge (sharing) practices could be seen as hegemonic in relation to pacific island staff, their relation with line managers was characterised by a much stronger dependency, given their need for managerial ‘buy-in’ in hrm. it is here that we can see the importance of a critique of functional-managerialist conceptions of communities of practice that reify the community, rather than recognising its relational character (østerlund & carlile 2005). as gherardi has noted, community and its boundaries should not be presupposed, but understood and studied as an effect that is ‘realised through the discursive practices of its members’ (gherardi 2006, p. 110). the role of boundary spanners in this context has been overlooked and thus, drawing from the study’s insights, it is suggested that future research pay more attention to the ways in which the knowledge practices of boundary spanners bring about a particular fabric of interdependencies between communities, discursive positions and practices. broader implications the consultants’ relations with pacific island staff did not appear to ‘scale up’ to the kind of meaningful connections envisaged from a perspective of everyday cosmopolitanism (onyx et al. 2011) and it is hard to imagine how this would be realised within the constraints of hegemonic discourse. boundary spanners need to build trust with their counterparts (brown & duguid 1998) and this requires an interest in learning about cultural differences and a willingness to negotiate them in regular and sustained dialogic interactions (isaacs 1999). in the case of the consultants’ boundary work with line managers the consultants displayed a willingness to engage and transform knowledge, yet these efforts were not always reciprocated by their clients. as a result, the consultants’ boundary work became predominantly about the legitimation of the hrm project (mueller & carter 2005), rather than about realising more genuine forms of mutual engagement. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 while these power dynamics were prominent in the case organisation, they are not confined to the private sector. in spite of the participatory philosophy that commonly underpins crosscultural partnerships in the third sector, in practice, these are often undermined by perceptions of power and status differences that hinder two-way knowledge sharing and learning (girgis 2007; mansell 2010; powell 2006). for instance, capacity development projects in developing countries require western actors and their local counterparts to bridge existing power differentials (heizmann, fee, and gray 2014). by using practice-based and discursive perspectives, future research in this area could go much further in exposing such power effects. unpacking the discursive and socio-material practices in which people engage when working at cultural interfaces can be the starting point for social action, by (1) rendering visible the power relations and effects in which actors are involved, and (2) bolstering voices that have received limited legitimacy up to this point. on a more pragmatic level, such research could help uncover the boundary spanning strategies that actors draw upon to counter perceived power differentials and build more mutually engaged forms of collaboration. conclusion the findings presented in this paper were gained through a qualitative methodology, which seeks to enrich and widen the body of in-depth contextual knowledge on a particular topic, rather than claiming statistical generalisability in and of itself (kvale 1996, p. 289). as such, the links highlighted in this paper between the knowledge (sharing) practices of boundary spanners at cultural interfaces and power relations may offer impulses for the analysis of boundary work in a range of culturally complex spaces (e.g. aid & development work, social movements, inter-organisational collaborations). what has become evident in the provided examples is that, when people cross cultural spheres, their collaboration efforts are situated within a discursively and politically shaped environment in which they cannot help but participate; indeed, it is the participants’ narratives and discursive positioning that bring about particular forms of collaboration or non-collaboration, inclusion and exclusion (hardy, lawrence & grant 2005; hardy & phillips 1999). therefore, to reach more meaningful forms of cross-cultural interaction, participants need to engage openly with the discourses of their counterparts as well as be sensitive to the power effects of their own discursive practices. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 13 references aldrich, h. & herker, d. 1997, 'boundary spanning roles and 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abstract the article is based on a critical cosmopolitan outlook on dialogue as not aimed at reaching consensus, but rather keeping dialogue of difference open, with the ability to reach common understanding of human rights on conflicting grounds. intersectional dialogue is used as a concept that opens up possibilities to study, in a pragmatic sense, the ‘cosmopolitan space’ in which different axes of power met in the historical drafting of human rights. by enacting analysis of united nations (un) documents from 1948 on the process of drafting the universal declaration on human rights (udhr) the conceptualization of intersectional dialogue is put to work. the utopian foundation for deliberative democracy as dialogue in the absence of power and interest does not acknowledge the power bound context in which the human rights were negotiated; where conflicting and sometimes agonistic narratives on the ideological foundation of human rights were debated on an international arena in 1946-48. introduction there are some main challenges faced in a plural world, of conflict and intersection of power, which are not dealt with properly in a traditional view of dialogue as reaching consensus on rational arguments. inter-cultural dialogue has been one response to cross-cultural conflicts – although the paper argues that it can be limiting to discuss culture in a static notion, disregarding the intersection of power and social categories people are moving between in interaction with others (adami & schumann forthcoming). instead, the paper introduces a new methodological concept, useful for analyzing dialogue in diverse cosmopolitan spaces, which will be elaborated further on in the paper. this cosmopolitan vision and the elusive goal of democratic place-making can be framed in the language of thick and thin as used by michael walzer (1994) where ethics and morals are thought of in one’s local context (thick with cultural values that form social boundaries for inclusion) and in more cosmopolitan contexts where the moral considerations reach beyond our close relations and social ties (where thin is associated with universalism, of including everyone on the basis that what grants entry is based on a rather thin set of common values or ideas). the question of power cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 45 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia and its relation with space is fundamental in considering and recognizing spaces where ethics and rights are negotiated. intersectional dialogue acknowledges that people in different power positions intersect in changing relational contexts. intersectional dialogue hence refers to the way in which power intersects when individuals position themselves in dialogue by drawing on different cultural narratives (adami 2012). the importance of keeping dialogue open is reached in this sense by putting conflict and agonism at the heart of political dialogue. the paper builds this conception of intersectional dialogue on three main aspects that a traditional view of dialogue fails to acknowledge, namely: 1) how power and interest intersect to frame what is said and by whom 2) how agreement can be agreeing to disagree, keeping conflict at the center of dialogue (mouffe, 2005; todd, 2010) and 3) how competing ‘truth claims’ can reach universal common ground if dissent about interpretation is respected (white, n.d.). dialogue as an ethical challenge for cosmopolitanism – facing pluralism in a more socially interconnected world characterized by war, conflict and inequality we encounter challenges in safeguarding cosmopolitan ethics such as human rights and at the same time taking into account pluralism and cultural diversity. human rights as a common ethics based on a shared humanity has been problematized as overshadowing difference in human encounters. keeping an openness towards otherness while granting human dignity beyond cultural boarders is an ethical challenge regarding human rights. we can see tendencies of a cosmopolitan turn, from a cosmopolitanism focusing on sameness as drawn by martha nussbaum (nussbaum, 1998), to a more pluralism-oriented cosmopolitanism, as drawn by sharon todd (todd, 2010). the critical-ethical dimension of cosmopolitanism has been raised in this cosmopolitan turn by urging an awareness of the plurality of voices on different interpretations on rights and duties, generally marginalized under hegemonic power structures in human rights discourses. the notion of a presumed dichotomy of universal notions of human rights and contextually rooted cultural, ideological and religious values (mutua, 2002) seems to question the very notion of universally claimed human rights. lynn hunt (2007, p. 36) asks how the invention of universal human rights in the eighteenth century could become thinkable when several categories of persons – women, the poor, blacks – were considered subservient and unequal? 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 when doing analysis on historical declarations like the universal declaration of human rights, it is important not to regard the text as being without authors. many scholars (hunt, 2007; mutua, 2002) have assumed that the declaration was the result of the work of a few western delegates to the un, who dominated the thinking and wording of human rights as based in western humanism and natural law. scholars such as michael ignatieff (ignatieff & gutmann, 2003) and makau mutua (mutua, 2002) have argued that human rights are a western project, in need of contestation and re-articulation from other cultural perspectives. this is the dominant view of the creation of human rights in the udhr, which has overshadowed other voices in international relations on delineations and different cultural and ideological foundations for universal human rights. the ways in which to read and analyze political and international policy texts on human rights are vast, however a traditional approach to policy ‘as based upon idealist assumptions about the nature of language itself which take it to be a transparent vehicle for the transmission of information, thoughts and values’ (codd, 1988, p. 235) has been criticized by john a codd (1988), who argues for policy analysis to examine the effects the text has on readers and to ‘expose the ideological processes which lie behind the production of the text’ (codd, 1988, p. 235). the readers of the universal declaration of human rights interpret the text into their own context and the udhr has been translated into more than 370 different languages, which makes it among the most translated documents in the world. codd (1988) argues that these kind of texts “contain divergent meanings, contradictions and structured omissions” (codd, 1988, p. 235) so that it has different meaning for different readers. in order to analyze the ideological processes that lie behind the production of the udhr, i have developed the analytical concept of “intersectional dialogue” to capture how power struggles frame dialogues and hence influences the leaving out of references to particular values in the text, making agreements to disagree possible. codd names this critical analysis a form of “textual deconstruction” (codd, 1988, p. 235). a significant number of scholars have acknowledged the lack of effective intersectional methodologies in policy analysis (hancock, 2007; nash, 2008; phoenix & pattynama, 2006). efforts to move beyond one-dimensional policy analysis are met with challenges in applying an intersectional approach since there is a lack of clearly defined intersectional methodology. various tools to operationalize intersectionality have been developed (crenshaw, 2006; parken, 2010; symington, 2004). these methods aim at illuminating how social categories of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 47 difference intersect in constantly changing ways in order to expose undemocratic dialogues (hankivsky et al., 2010). nira yulu-davis (yuval-davis, 2006), myra ferree (ferree, 2009) and birte siim (siim, 2011) have all argued for the need to enact analysis of intersectionality on regional and international levels. the udhr may seem to be rooted in western thinking, but reading the policy document only reveals the resulting text, not the process towards it. i argue, following codd’s critique, that it is important to take into account who wrote the text and in what historical context, in order to make the declaration more transparent for its readers. such a reading may question the dominant narrative on human rights as western, and additionally re-vitalize the importance of research into different ideologies and faiths that ground human rights in other, non-western, philosophies. hunt argues that the invention of human rights was made possible due to western philosophy, hence she traces the discourse on human rights to a eurocentric doctrine, neglecting the actual people who participated in drafting the udhr, coming from all corners of the world. i argue that in order to understand the impact of the udhr internationally and its potential for social and political re-imagination in diverse contexts, the process leading up to the first international document of human rights needs to be further researched by studying the vast historical material from the un archives and the un dag hammarskjöld library. to see human rights as a western universalism seems to be underpinned by a notion of dialogue as reaching consensus on common philosophical and ideological ground that underscore the argument that the actual working process when human rights were drafted in 1948 was a process characterized by domination of western thoughts. the primary sources from 1946-48 reveal quite the opposite. towards a cosmopolitical notion of dialogue this historical process of creating the udhr, when seen as a process of efforts for dialogue on an international arena, has been interpreted, i argue, through a dominant habermasian view of dialogue as in absence of power relations, where so called “less-rational” arguments had minor influence on the creation of the text, a text hence built on consensus about the philosophical and ideological foundation of human rights. the view of deliberative dialogue, characterized by thoughts on rationality and consensus, has been developed by jürgen habermas (1984) and later sheyla benhabib (benhabib, 2006). the aim of reaching consensus in dialogue can, according to habermas, be reached based on an ideal 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 communication, where reason and argument leads the rational being to the best decisions. habermas does mention symmetry between the participants and sets up criteria for the ideal communication situation, but he does not in his earlier work elaborate on the causes or consequences of social inequality or oppression, hence the theoretical point lacks a perspective of power analysis. how can dialogue be understood in a pluralistic world, with conflicting worldviews and diverse morals of agonistic value systems and cultural morals? mikael carleheden (carleheden, lidskog, & roman, 2007) criticizes the theory of habermas (1984) for not acknowledging power positions, and argues that it neither considers social inequality nor cultural pluralism. studying international policy work and international efforts for dialogue surrounding the creation of declaration, conventions and other proclamations, the policy texts in themselves may not reveal the tensions and conflicts over meaning and words, that preceded their drafting. neglecting these power debates and negotiations risks losing the dimension of ambivalence and the openness in policy texts on human rights for different and opposing interpretations and readings. hence, some of the political imaginary of human rights may be lost in universal declarations like the udhr through de-contextualized and de-historicized readings of the text. benhabib (2002, 2006) proposes ‘translation’ between particular and universal notions of human rights in order to enhance local and cultural claims in relation to universal aspirations on rights. such international efforts to create regional and international arenas for discussing human rights practices risk de-legitimizing the role of conflict in democratic practices, i argue, if the ‘local’ and ‘particular’ is exclusively linked to non-western claims, whereas the ‘universal’ is conflated with western notions of human rights, as based on a certain kind of individualism and liberalism. chantal mouffe (2005) has stressed the importance of keeping conflict at the center of such dialogue, in order to accept that hegemonic power structures are at work in any dialogue. mouffe (2005) aims her critique, not at the concept of human rights, but at the institutions that are supposed to uphold the notion of human rights, and she suggests that conflict over interpretation regarding human rights is what keeps dialogue open for different and agonistic opinions. she presents a pluralistic democratic alternative by introducing the concept of ’conflict consensus’ arguing for the need of collisions between different political positions and critiques a traditional view of dialogue, for not taking into account conflict and dissent cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 49 about interpretations, since the aim of consensus and harmony actually put at risk political solutions to questions of cross-cultural conflict (todd, 2010, p. 105). crucial in this argumentation towards a more conflict-oriented analysis of dialogue that acknowledges how power intersects in human relations, is a problematization of the conflation of universalism with western notions of human rights and local interpretation with non-western cultures, since without this problematization any effort to truly contextualize international documents may reify hegemonic notions of the concept of ‘human rights’. paternalistic notions of universality generally accompany a traditional view of dialogue as leaning towards universalism where the rational is equalized with dominant narratives of ‘truth claims’. as todd notes, ‘both within certain strands of cosmopolitanism itself and within democratic theory broadly speaking, there exists a deep suspicion of such universal aspirations’ (2010, p. 216). todd not only takes into account difference and pluralism in discussing human rights but equally faces conflict in dialogue which she says non-critical cosmopolitanism fails to acknowledge. this notion of agonistic cosmopolitics is what the paper leans towards in re-thinking dialogue through an intersectional approach. an ethical dimension of dialogue in order to take into account not only what was spoken but also the actual concrete beings who participated in the debates, the paper draws on michael bakhtin’s notion of an aestethic approach to dialogue (bakhtin 2004). to be aesthetic in a bakhtinian sense is to contribute value to another by seeing the dialogue from without and trying to see what can be seen by another. in other words to give legitimacy to one’s opponent by seeing what makes sense from the other position, even though the opponent’s position might seem remote to oneself. ‘an aesthetic approach creates room for the individual, as a unique personality, to remain unfinalized, incomplete and with a capacity to change and contribute in dialogue throughout the life span’1. hence an ethical challenge with dialogue and any analysis of dialogue is to leave room in the analysis for people’s uniqueness, influenced and changed throughout individual lifespans rather than analyzing meaning limiting people within cultural or social categories. it is upon this notion of people’s uniqueness that a narrative approach to intersectionality is valuable, in order to understand how individuals position themselves in dialogue by orienting 1 e. j. white, ‘bakhtinian dialogism: a philosophical and methodological route to dialogue and difference? ej white victoria university of wellington, new zealand po box 17-310’ (n.d.), accessed january 29, 2013. 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 themselves in relation to their experience of interactions, practices and cultural narratives embedded in their life stories. however, without acknowledging how power and oppression can silence individuals in dialogue, the critical notion of intersectionality loses its potential of exposing hegemony. intersectional dialogue enhances the notion that people position themselves differently depending on context and intersection of power due to that positioning where cultural narratives play the role of relating meaning to known value systems (adami 2012). dissent about interpretation of ‘universal human rights’ is acknowledged when analyzing dialogue as intersectional. post structural, post colonial and feminist perspectives have represented alternative, counter narratives of particularism to this dominant narrative of universality. in the notion of intersectional dialogue developed in the paper, it is held that people draw on particular or cultural narratives when positioning themselves in relation to dominant narrative of universality. exposing power in undemocratic dialogues looking at the primary sources from the un and the unesco archives and building on earlier research on the drafting of the udhr (eg morsink, 1999; lauren, 2011, glendon, 2001, adami, 2012), a different picture than a consensus oriented process emerges, which cannot be captured adequately in its complexity by a model of dialogue in the absence of power and conflict. rather, the drafting process of the udhr in 1948 was a power struggle after the second world war between east and west (of different values and political ideologies), between north and south (of colonialism and national independence), and between an inclusive or exclusive understanding of equality and humanity ( as referring to only men or to women and men). during the drafting of the udhr in 1946-48, representatives from different continents, countries, religions, political systems and traditions met on a diplomatic arena, forced into dialogue and compromise for the universality of the human rights they wanted to defend in contrast to the atrocities of the world war two. in order to expose this process in the reading of the udhr, there is a need for a new way to theorize the social and political conflicts that occurred in the aftermaths of the world war two. it is against this background of power relations between individuals and groups in this historical and specific context, i argue, that the development of an intersectional alternative to intercultural dialogue is needed. intersectionality as used in the paper should be understood as not only regarding intersections of power in discourse but also taking into account the actual cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 51 individuals giving voice to the spoken. this notion of intersectionality as the positions that individuals take in different arenas will be elaborated further on. intersectional dialogue reframes the conflict between particular and universal in international policy development on human rights through its emphasis on relationality that makes every contextual and historical encounter unique in how power intersects in dialogue. by introducing the analytical concept of intersectional dialogue the paper takes into account the notion of conflict and tensions faced in aspirations for cosmopolitan dialogue on universal ethics and values, such as human rights. secondly, by referring to the working process of drafting the udhr in 1948 as a cosmopolitan space (cf. schumann & adami forthcoming) the paper leans towards what has been referred to as critical cosmopolitanism, a critique against cosmopolitanism as a universalism in the sense of polite tolerance. space is used to illustrate how people from different cultural backgrounds met in a certain time and place with a common task to negotiate on cosmopolitan ethics in a declarative sense. critical cosmopolitanism takes conflict and imperfection of human beings into discussions on coexistence and on the common claim for universal human rights. the dichotomy which has not yet been reconciled theoretically between universal values and particular cultural values is met pragmatically in the paper by exploring their relation in a specific historical and relational context, in 1948 (adami, 2012). background to the drafting of the universal declaration on human rights the tensions in the world were strong after the second world war. the un commission which had been appointed for the task of drafting an international bill of rights faced great challenges in cooperating since the conflicts between the soviet union and the usa were fought as an ideological battle between communism and liberalism, and the de-colonization and increase of independent states led to an increase of member states in the un and in the light of political claims for equal rights of women. delegates representing post colonial countries met in discussions with their colonial rulers, delegates from what would become the power struggle between the east and west block in the cold war after the second world war met from opposite sides of economic ideologies and islamic nations met with former christian crusaders. in other words, the historical context for the drafting process challenged power positions, creating a possible conflict zone with domination of some over others (adami 2012). still, the de-stabilization of international relations through the world war 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 two and the shared condemnation of the defeated nazi regime, created a window of opportunity for the delegates who were assembled from different parts of the world to create and vote through a universal declaration on rights and duties of people. in such times of social change, intersection of conflict and cohesion were at work. when studying the international policy process of drafting the udhr in 1948 that included people from different cultures and ideological background, divisions that were transformed into dialogue, recognition and inclusion can be analyzed. at the first session of the drafting committee, the uk delegate reminded his colleagues ‘of the historical situation in which the committee met. it was one, he said, where germany and other enemy countries during the war had completely ignored what mankind had regarded as fundamental human rights and freedoms. the committee met as a first step toward providing the maximum possible safeguard against that sort of thing in the future.’2 in this historical context, there was a collective aim of the delegates, limiting a static dominance of some over others and enhancing a kind of dialogue where the power positions were under constant change and negotiation. it took three weeks for the 58 delegates from different parts of the world to first negotiate and discuss and later pass two articles in the declaration. after a whole month the delegates had passed only three out of thirty articles. the delegates met over hundred times, which gives an idea of how tense the power relations were within the un commission and how much time it took for all delegates to debate different aspects of human rights. the “fathers” of the udhr have been referred to as rené cassin (lauren, 2011) and john humphrey (morsink, 1999) although it is questionable if this can be taken for granted, since their initial drafts that emphasized the rights of man were reworked in more than seven versions of the udhr. the udhr was written at a time when colonial empires started to break up. it could be presumed by this that the colonial powers dominated the discussions when in fact two of the most influential drafters, the delegation from lebanon and from the philippines, were from countries gaining their independence in 1946, the year the un commission was established. syria also joined that year. in 1947 india, burma, pakistan gained their independence; both india and pakistan played an active role in the drafting process. in 1948, 56 member states to the un voted for the universal declaration on human 2 un archives, e/cn.4/ac.1/sr.7, p.5. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 53 rights. there was an underrepresentation of african countries in 1948, a fact that would be heavily criticized over the following years, until the world conference on human rights in vienna 1993, were 177 member states were represented. the drafting process is too complex and the historical material too rich to be captured in this paper, however, i draw on three characteristic aspects of the drafting process that points back to the conceptual framework of “intersectional dialogue” to illustrate some examples on how different intersections of power framed the dialogue. i focus particularly on the impact of colonial power structures and how these positions between newly independent state delegates and delegates from colonial powers, such as england and france, were re-negotiated during the drafting process, especially in the question of rights for people under colonial rule. secondly, i expose how disagreements were a basis for agreement, and how this acknowledgement of keeping conflict at the center of dialogue is crucial in intersectional analysis of dialogue. thirdly, i highlight the influence of the women delegates to the un (who, although in great minority, held power positions related to other positions than gender) and how the east-west power relation impacted on the enforcement of gender-neutral language in the final udhr text. using the conceptual framework of “intersectional dialogue” when analyzing the primary un sources from 1946-48 raises questions that focus on: who participated? what axes of power were operating in the discourse? how did the delegates position themselves in relation to each other, in terms of influence over the discussions and voting, during the debates? whose voice was heard and to what extent? from these questions evolves a different picture than a consensus oriented drafting process, portraying the endless negotiations and changes in power positions during the creation of the udhr. power bound dialogue within the un commission on human rights in june 1946 the un commission on human rights was established. during the two years it took to draft the udhr, the member states of the un had increased due to the number of newly independent states that before the second world war had been under colonial rule (like india and pakistan). the colonial powers, joined by nations form latin america, did not support the inclusion of human rights in territories under colonial rule. still, voices were raised from a number of states for the rights of people living under colonial rule. even though the delegate from the philippines, romulo, was representing a former colony in relation to england’s delegate, noel baker, who represented a colonial power, romulo had a strong 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 rhetoric in human rights as a journalist who had won the pulitzer prize for articles predicting the end of colonialism. with the pressure from human rights activists and media covering the work in the un commission, it was hard for the colonial powers to neglect the arguments for human rights for ‘dependent people’, as people living under colonial rule were called. hence, in the udhr, there was no mention of "rights of citizen's" but "everyone, regardless of nationality or place of residence" were entitled to all the rights set forth in the declaration. there were a few women in the un commission, eleonor roosevelt, delegate from usa and hansa metha, delegate from india. as the only female delegates to the un commission, their voices risked being marginalized, but looking from an intersectional approach, we see that other power positions were at work than the gender based. eleonor roosevelt was delegate from one of the great powers, and widow to the american president franklin roosevelt. she was in a power position both regarding class, race, nationality and political influence in relation to many male delegates in the un commission. she also acted as chair in the un commission. hansa metha, the indian delegate was a legislator, an activist in the movement that led to india’s independence in 1947 and had been a sharp, outspoken critic of britain’s colonial policies (glendon, 2001). the delegate from india, metha, said ‘she did not like the wording of ‘all men’ or ‘should act …like brothers’. such phrases, she said ‘might be interpreted to exclude women, and were out of date.3 the rhetoric used by the delegates who were in a power position of not being affected by gender-based discrimination was focused on a language, which to them seemed neutral and inclusive. the term ‘all men’, which was used in the first drafts of the declaration, was according to many delegates gender neutral, based on the argument that women were included in the term ‘men’. one could assume that eleonor roosevelt, as a woman and from a liberal usa would have fought for inclusion of women’s rights in the debates, but she often took a gender-blind position and did hence not understand why ‘all men’ would not include all women too. in the un commission, though, there were women like hansa metha, who had fought for the equal rights of women in india and she argued for changing the wording of ‘all men’ to ‘everyone’4. gender is one of many parameters influencing claims of rights, and 3 un archives, e/cn.4/sr.34, p.4 4 ibid. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 55 it is interesting to note that the male delegates of the un commission from the communist countries fought for the inclusion of a gender-neutral language, based rather on their ideological conviction. the wording ‘all human beings’ was approved, which frees article 1 of sexist implications. when the article on right to work and equal pay was voted on, neither eleonor roosevelt nor hana metha voted for the adoption of specific mention of non-discrimination of women in such an article. the bssr delegate expressed his astonishment that the representative of india, herself a woman, was opposed to paragraph 4 (mentioning nondiscrimination against women regarding pay). the importance of such a provision was great, in view of the fact that women had been discriminated against in the matter of pay almost more than in any other aspects. moreover, the commission on the status of women had adopted a resolution, requesting that the declaration should contain a provision with regard to equal pay for equal work. 5 that hansa metha and eleonor roosevelt were against specifying nondiscrimination of women was not because they objected to equal rights to equal pay, but because they felt that any specific mention of women in the article would have rendered weaker the sense of inclusion of women in the term “everyone” in other articles of the declaration. the representative of uk declared that, ‘in spite of the arguments of the ussr representative, he would be guided by the views of the two female members of the un commission’6. does this illustrate that women have greater influence in debates on human rights of women than men? i argue that an intersectional dialogue contains complex power relations that are under constant negotiations, which means that when people meet in cosmopolitan spaces, their belonging and rational for argumentations cannot be limited to analysis that focuses only on gender, culture, ethnicity or faith, but depend on how they want to position themselves in relation to a multitude of social belongings, connected to diverse cultural narratives. 5 un archives, e/cn.4/sr.66, p.6 6 un archves, e/cn.4/sr.66, p.6 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 giving legitimacy to ones opponents – or agreeing to disagree the un commission held over hundred sessions between 1946 and 1948 and governments appointed individuals with the capacity for rhetoric and intellectual debates; there were professors, authors, diplomats and human rights activists, who could discuss human rights through different perspectives. china named dr. peng-chun chang, a former professor, ‘highly knowledgeable about the west, islam and arabic culture, yet deeply committed to confucianism and the values inherent in asian culture and philosophy’. lebanon appointed dr. charles habib malik, a former professor of philosophy, personally and professionally shaped by both christianity and islam. the philippines selected carlos romulo, public official and devoted catholic, who won the pulitzer prize for journalism’ (lauren, 2011, p. 207). any common ground that could lead to satisfying answers as to what was meant with concepts such as ‘by nature’, ‘inalienable’, inherent’, ‘reason’, ‘conscience’ or ‘morality’ was hard to find, viewed through various philosophical, religious (and nonreligious), and ideological perspectives. the delegates in the un commission sought to discover universal principles by creating a discourse ‘wherein no regional philosophy or single way of life was permitted to prevail’ (lauren, 2011, p. 209). the un commission asked unesco if they could initiate an inquiry on the philosophical foundation for universal human rights. unesco appointed a committee of philosophers who consulted great thinkers from all over the world, and assembled their written replies. the unesco committee conducted parallel work to the un commission, which resulted in a \ list of universal human rights principles similar to the udhr. this fact has not received much attention in earlier research (adami, 2012). the workings of the un commission and the unesco committee were different, the un commission being a political arena for individual delegates giving lengthy speeches in order to influence each other’s opinions, whereas the unesco committee handled their work through written reports from various parts of the world. unesco’s part was to consult philosophers and assemble their replies. ‘they thus invited one hundred and fifty very different leading intellectuals to send their thoughts on the specific philosophical questions raised by international human rights’ (lauren, 2011, p. 210). the report of the unesco committee’s work, ‘human rights – comments and interpretations’, consists of fundamentally different conceptions of human cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 57 rights, ranging from islam to communism and hinduism and of competing interpretations on the philosophical foundation of universal human rights. human rights were referred to as ‘practical principles’ in the unesco committee, since these intellectuals agreed that there could not be an agreement on philosophical principles, but rather practical principles that could be understood through competing moral systems. even though the philosophers could not find agreement on a philosophical foundation for universal human rights, they found legitimacy in each and every ideology, philosophy and religion that was represented in their philosophical inquiry, for universal human rights as practical principles for action. mahatma ghandi contributed with a text discussing the importance of duty towards one another. the question of duties was incorporated in the final draft of the udhr in article twenty-nine, ‘everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible’ (udhr, article 29). the chinese representative discussed how human rights could be traced in asian history and be understood in relation to confucius and humaneness as an ethical stance in social relations. the islamic representative explored how human rights needed to be secured within a society, where security was fundamental for human beings in relation to food and clothing, housing, education and health. jacques maritain, who was the chair of the unesco committee, wrote in the foreword to the report, how, i asked, can we imagine an agreement of minds between men who are gathered together precisely in order to accomplish a common intellectual task, men who come from the four corners of the globe and who not only belong to different cultures and civilizations, but are of antagonistic spiritual associations and schools of thought? because, as i said at the beginning of my speech, the goal of unesco is a practical goal, agreement between minds can be reached spontaneously, not on the basis of common speculative ideas, but on common practical ideas, not on the affirmation of one and the same conception of the world, of man and of knowledge, but upon the affirmation of a single body of beliefs for guidance in action. (unesco, 1948) confronting conflicting ‘truth claims’ – dissent about interpretation there were different interpretations on the islamic faith within the un commission. when it came to freedom of religion in the declaration, conflicts arose between different moslem delegates. in countries where religion and politics were separated, the freedom of religion 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 was viewed as an individual choice; the lebanese delegate pointed out that freedom of religion also meant the protection of the inner being of each individual 7. article 18 on freedom of religion had not prevented other muslim countries, like syria, iran, turkey and pakistan from voting for the declaration, though the saudi arabia delegation abstained from voting on the article on freedom of religion. the danish delegate supported this perception of the muslim faith, saying that: ‘the adoption would mean that the representatives of 300 million mohammedans would be unable to support the draft declaration’ 8. the indian delegate replied that the indian constitution included ‘the right to convert or be converted; that applied to the 40 million moslems of india as well as to all others’ 9. there was another conflict about religious faith in the un commission regarding article one in the declaration. the debate concerned inclusion or exclusion of reference to god or allah in the first article of the udhr, which today reads: all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. (udhr, article 1). the south american delegations argued that faith was uniting people from all over the world and created understanding between people. there was a majority of religious states in the un commission, but a majority did not mean domination and the dissent of interpretation was acknowledged, by leaving out reference to god in the final text. we can today find in the first article in the udhr that reference to ‘god’, ‘allah’ and ‘by nature’ was excluded from the text, asserting freedom and dignity of everyone without reference to any particular ideology, philosophy or faith. the dissent on why human beings should be seen as born free and equal in dignity and rights was respected, leaving the current text open for interpretation on the philosophical, ideological and religious foundation on universal human rights. conclusion in 1948, people from all over the world met during intense discussions in over hundred sessions to claim universal human rights. exploring the drafting of the udhr as an 7 un archives, a/c.3/sr.128, p. 405 8 un archives, a/c.3/sr.128, p. 407 9 un archives, a/c.3/sr.128, p.407 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 59 intersectional dialogue, the importance of taking pluralism into account became evident. universal human rights needed to make sense in a plural world. according to todd, agonism and conflict keep dialogue open when put at the center of discussions, rather than being silenced by domination and forced consensus. the udhr was reached on conflicting grounds with dialogue between people of different faith, sex, culture, political conviction, class-generated conflicts, based on different morals and beliefs. examples of opposing world views in the un commission, that was set up to draft the declaration, was between the soviet communist regime and south american catholic countries and between the apartheid system in south africa and all other countries represented in the un commission. human rights were hence interpreted differently by the delegates of the un commission, by the saudi arabia in contrast to india on the islamic faith regarding freedom of religion and the right to convert to another religion. discussions on the origin of human rights illuminated the contradiction between natural law and divine origin of human beings, though these opposing perspectives were coincided by excluding reference to particular values in the declaration (adami, 2012). all these different views and perspectives collided when delegations from opposing ideological contexts met in what has been referred to in this paper as ‘intersectional dialogue’. without neglecting the participation of western delegates to the un commission on human rights, one finds counter narratives in the primary sources from the un archives, contrasting the western-oriented notions that have been re-enforced in contemporary interpretations of the udhr. the concept of intersectional dialogue illustrates that people have a multitude of belongings; one person can hold different identities and represent different belongings depending on the social context, hence intersectional dialogue exposes hegemony and multiple oppression. a person’s experience does not have to coincide with how others categorize the person, but rather has relational, contextual and situational dimensions. using this analytical concept of intersectional dialogue when studying primary sources of un documents from 1948 envisages how power structures intersected when people from all over the world met in dialogue over universal human rights. intersectional dialogue as an analytical concept can be used in future research on policy and dialogue enabling discussions on ethical challenges of power and pluralism. by enacting analysis of the drafting process of the udhr, i emphasised in the paper how conflict was kept at the center of the dialogue, in that the delegates gave legitimacy to their 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 opponents in debates, hence did not force an unjust consensus for the approval of the udhr, but rather let the incompatible and antagonist cultural, religious and political values held by the delegates serve as the ground for a universal acceptance of human rights. references adami, r. & schumann, c. forthcoming, ‘towards a critical cosmopolitanism in human rights learning: the vienna conference in 1993’, in papastephanou, m., strand, t. & pirrie, a. 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the drafting of the universal declaration on human rights power bound dialogue within the un commission on human rights giving legitimacy to ones opponents – or agreeing to disagree conclusion references © 2014 raykerkhove. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(3): 4218,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.4218 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia tribal alliances with broader agendas? aboriginal resistance in southern queensland’s ‘black war’ raykerkhove abstract frontier violence is now an accepted chapter of australian history. indigenous resistance is obviously a part of this story, yet as john connor notes (2004), the tactics and objectives of aboriginal fighters are more often presumed than investigated. thus aboriginal resistance is generally portrayed as parochial, half-hearted and devoid of long-term planning. the usual image is a handful of warriors pitifully tossing some spears – a hopeless prelude to wholesale massacre. the implication is that aboriginal groups were incapable of collaborating or of mounting effective, inventive, planned resistance. in this paper, the author investigates laurie’s and cilento’s remarkable assertion (1959) that during the 1840s1860s an alliance of at least a dozen aboriginal groups openly declared war in southern queensland and conducted a highly effective ‘black war’ that temporarily impeded settlement. the author examines whether such a ‘state of war’ was recognized at the time, and whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that intergroup collaboration, inventive strategies and broader military objectives were at work. the author utilizes definitions from guerilla and terrorist conflict (e.g. eckley 2001, kilcullen 2009) and identifies tactics, planning and objectives. he challenges the claims of military historians such as dennis (1995) that aboriginal strategies were devoid of innovation. instead, the author notes the use of new materials, a move away from pitched battles and the development of ‘guerilla bands’. the problem of ‘aboriginal guerilla warfare’ half of henry reynolds’ forgotten war (2013) –his recent foray into australia’s frontier violence – concerns two pressing issues: ‘but was it warfare?’ and ‘what kind of warfare?’ this may seem odd, given that countless books and articles now exist on frontier http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.4218 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 39 engagements. however, john connor (2004) points out that australia’s frontier conflicts have rarely been dissected from a military perspective. this may explain the lack of clarity about the organisation and strategies of aboriginal resistance. the problem seems that aboriginal resistance presents similarities to guerilla warfare: lowintensity, irregular, disruptive, small-scale engagements utilizing natural hideaways and blurring the division between civilian and combatant (eckley 2001), yet military historians such as jeffrey grey (1999, p. 25) struggle to place it under this definition. grey found ‘no resemblance’ between indigenous resistance and post-1945 guerrilla warfare. for example, he contrasted the pitiful numbers of whites killed in indigenous affrays (usually less than 5 per ‘war’) with a single incident in the maori wars where 1,843 europeans were routed and 22 killed (1999, p. 31). keith windschuttle (2002) exploited this perspective to claim that aboriginal resistance was not guerilla warfare. he found no evidence of military, political or patriotic objectives (2004, p. 221) – no hint of clear organization, military intelligence, command strategy, or declarations of war. aboriginal ‘resistance’ from his perspective was a crime wave of ‘revenge and plunder’ led by ‘detribalized’ aboriginals victimizing isolated, defenseless civilians (2002, p. 129-130). it was chiefly robbery and assault (2003, p. 13). windschuttle hardly represents majority opinion, yet even henry reynolds views australia as devoid of dramatic military confrontations. he paints a continent immersed in a ‘state of petty warfare’ (2013, p. 53-54). likewise, jonathan richards’ analysis of the native police corps highlighted the negligible death toll on the part of the troopers and officers, suggesting conflicts were massacres rather than battles (2008). certainly the works of evans and thorpe (2001) and timothy bottoms (2013) – who, it must be conceded, all confirm the widespread existence of aboriginal resistance – evidence thinly-disguised genocide. robert orstedjensen’s very thorough analysis of the indigenous losses in queensland (2011) crystallized this understanding – placing indigenous casualties above 65,000. 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 aboriginal resistance at its ‘place of origin’: evaluating the historicity of southern queensland’s ‘black war’ thus it has become difficult to place aboriginal responses to invasion as ‘resistance’ as understood from other military contexts. therefore it may help to revisit how and where the concept entered academic debate. according to peter sutton (2008), the first person to use the term ‘war of resistance’ to describe aboriginal responses was a queensland historian, bill laurie. as early as the 1930s1950s, laurie, along with clem lack and ralph cilento, penned notes and newspaper articles about queensland’s turbulent settlement history. the trio’s concept of aboriginal ‘resistance’ grew from their socialist-inspired interest in ‘people’s uprisings’ and the combative mood of australians during world war ii. laurie (1959) coined the phrase ‘black war of queensland’ specifically for the struggle of aboriginal people during the 1830s-1880s. this culminated in lack’s and cilento’s triumph in the tropics describing ‘a guerrilla war’ along ‘aboriginal frontiers’ (1959, p. 177). a decade later, ‘bill’ stanner’s boyer lecture (1968) popularized the notion and a deluge of ‘frontier wars’ research followed. bill laurie was convinced the ‘black war’ began with an official declaration. in 1843, two escaped convicts – bracewell and davis – had dr stephen simpson (protector of aborigines in his role as lands commissioner) pen reports on their behalf to send to the new south wales governor george gipps. their report (1982, p.5) stated that as a consequence of the poisoning of many aboriginals at kilcoy station: … there was a great meeting of native tribes, 14 or 15 in number, in the vicinity of the great bunya scrub (baroon pocket near maleny)…. these tribes vowed vengeance and said they had already had some but were not yet satisfied. the blacks at the toor (gathering ring) were much infuriated. eyewitnesses such as petrie and russell reveal this ‘declaration’ was shared with a swarm of colonists who had gathered specifically to welcome the runaways’ return (petrie 1904; cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 41 russell 1888). this was followed by a letter with a similar dire warning from the german missionaries, also sent to the governor.1 thus declaration ‘news’ spread swiftly. squatters began to write letters to england of fears that ‘the tribes (will) get solid behind the kilcoy fiasco’ (lergessner, 2008, p. 203). when leichhardt passed through one of the affected areas, he referred to lands regained by the ‘united tribes’ and added: ‘now there is open warfare’ (darragh & fensham 2013, p. 266). in other words, several primary sources support laurie’s view. what is equally telling is that the year of declaration was remembered decades after. pugh’s almanac as early as 1869 marked that year (1843) as the date ‘when the blacks were now beginning to be very troublesome’.2 even more pointedly, business man and travel writer nehemiah bartley, who moved to brisbane in the 1850s, gave very exact dates for the war in his australian pioneers and reminiscences (1896): many a pretty bush station, where ladies in muslin and silks now dwell, and walk and ride as they please, has its humble mound neatly fenced, where sleeps the stockman or shepherd untimely slain by boomerang, spear or tomahawk, between ’43 and ’55 (italics mine) (bartley, 1896, p. 167). bartley’s ‘end date’ probably refers to the execution of aboriginal leader dundalli which ‘created a sensation in brisbane,’3 and saw the native police finally visit brisbane, causing almost all ‘town blacks’ to flee the vicinity for a while.4 beyond brisbane – at sandgate and especially further north between caboolture and taroom – conflict continued and worsened for another decade. evaluating civilian anxiety over the ‘black war’ the literary style of this era was notorious for myth-building and dramatic overstatements. thus it would be wise to determine whether the citizens of southern queensland equally believed the ‘united tribes’ threatened their existence. 1 ‘the bunya mountains’, the queenslander, 21 may 1892, p. 987. see also karl w e schmidt, 1843, report of an expedition to the bunya mountains in search of a suitable site for a mission station, p.5,acc 3522/71 in box 7072, jol. 2 ‘the history of the moreton bay settlement’, the brisbane courier, 23 december 1869, p. 6. 3 ‘spring hill – an historic suburb – growth from early days, courier mail, 2 aug 1930 p 21 4 ‘moreton bay’, the sydney morning herald, 7 august 1855, p.2. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/1304959?searchterm=bunya%20bunya%20outrage%20blacks&searchlimits= 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 today, with vast urban sprawl across southern queensland and a tiny aboriginal minority, it is hard to imagine an ‘aboriginal threat’. however, between 1840 and 1850, southern queensland had only 1000 to 2000 european inhabitants. local aboriginal population stood somewhere between 3000 and 8000 according to simpson, eipper and other contemporaries. when the explorers (petrie and russell) brought the convicts and their ‘war declaration’ to brisbane, they had risked their lives, having to wriggle free (after severe negotiation) from an inter-tribal group of 1,000 angry aboriginals – a larger population than brisbane itself.5 the official tally of whites slain during the black war stood at 174 at the end of captain wickham’s term, and at 230 by the time of captain coley (queensland’s first sergeant-inarms) (broomfield, 1923, p.19). a couple of decades after the war, the editors of the warwick argus put the toll even higher ‘at least 800’.6 if we use the more modest of these estimates, this means one in four to one in ten settlers died as a result of aboriginal attacks in this period (the population grew in the interim). aboriginal losses were easily tenfold, but it this does not detract from the fact that settlers had reasons to be alarmed. brisbane often pleaded for police and military protection – the begging reaching a crescendo when plans arose to remove brisbane’s tiny military detachment: … should (the blacks) please to unite …..what possible protection could the vanquished seek .. ? … is it fair and honourable to withdraw a slender guard of some thirty men from the country …? …. we hope that in the admixture of matters civil and military, the protection of moreton bay will not be forgotten, nor the claims of its inhabitants treated contemptuously. …. the police force appears to be totally inadequate to render protection to settlers...7 chas melton, living in brisbane at this time, remembered the period as the ‘hungry forties’ and ‘the fighting fifties’8 on account of the numerous ‘disabilities’ citizens endured from ‘the blacks’. he wrote a ‘contemplation of contrasts’ claiming the peaceful, dainty world of 1890s-1910s brisbane was surreal compared to the traumatic, rough-and-ready environment his peers knew, where the ‘principal topic of conversation’ was ‘the depredations of the blacks’.9 his wife backed this up this with her own recollections: ‘people did not usually 5the population of brisbane even two years later (1845) stood at just 890. by 1855 this had increased to over 2,000. 6‘queensland's history: non-politically reviewed’, warwick argus, 16 december 1882, p. 2. 7 bell’s life in sydney and sporting reviewer (nsw), 5 december 1857, p. 2. 8‘nut quad’ depredations of the fifties’, the brisbane courier, 8 july 1911, p. 13. 9 ‘when woolloongabba was wattle scented – old pioneers and predatory black’s, the brisbane courier, 18 june 1921, p. 16. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/20460962?searchterm=moreton%20bay%20outrage%20blacks%20cunning&searchlimits= cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 43 venture out at night’ on account of their fear of aboriginal attack.10 we have similar accounts – for instance from captain wickham’s personal assistant – that it was customary to halt at the nearest hotel outside brisbane if the sun was low ‘as the blacks were often bad’. 11 more graphically still, author rosa campbell praed tells us her girlhood in the burnett district was thick with fear: …the women practiced at targets with firearms, and the men would ride home with a sinking feeling in their hearts, fearing for their wives and children. often i heard father describe how each evening coming in from the run, he used in cold fear to mount the hill overlooking the humpy, and draw free breath when he saw it lying quiet and unharmed (campbell-praed, 1902, in penguin anthology, 1988, p. 352). such angst may explain why the outskirts of brisbane were generally fortified. as an anonymous kin kin settler recalled, huts were ‘usually made’ with barricaded windows and doors against indigenous attack.12 others describe the standard windows as ‘port holes’ that shut like the hatch of a ship.13 walls were generally pierced with augur holes to shoot ‘the blacks if they made a raid’.14 even newstead house, where the district’s government resident (captain james wickham) lived, had a ‘hidden room’ excavated ‘just in case there was trouble with the blacks’.15 captain wickham’s personal assistant had barely arrived in brisbane when, on account of the hanging of dundalli: ‘i was ordered to get out of the city, as the blacks might be hostile’.16 during dundalli’s hanging, not only was there a heavily armed guard, but settlers (many armed) were additionally called in from all over the district to surround the spot (bartley, 1892, p. 1130). such measures suggest brisbane was hardly confident in its dominion over the region. 10 ‘woman’s world. gold wedding’, the brisbane courier’ 6 february 1919, p 11. 11 ‘early brisbane in the fifties and sixties – an interesting reminiscence’, brisbane courier 18 january 1919, p. 12. 12 a.j.b., ‘beseiged – a legend of cootharaba’, the queenslander, 6 december 1919, p.5. 13‘domestic intelligence ipswich’, the moreton bay courier, 23 august 1851, p 2 14‘nut quad the contemplation of contrasts’, the brisbane courier 8 july 1911 p 13 15 anon, early brisbane history vol. 1, zillmere local studies mss, n/d p. 20. 16‘early brisbane in the fifties and sixties – an interesting reminiscence’, brisbane courier 18 january 1919, p. 12. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 evaluating the actual impact of ‘black war’ resistance thus aboriginal resistance was significant enough to arouse paranoia, but did this translate as ‘on ground’ violence, let alone military gains for aboriginal groups? the empire describes an ‘explosion of long-pent feelings of revenge and hatred towards the whites’.17 brisbane certainly had to contend with an aboriginal population that was increasingly emboldened and aggressive: ‘they thought nothing of entering the hut or garden (of brisbane residents ) and removing all the food and produce in sight’.18 this occurred ‘weekly – indeed almost daily’.19 sometimes hundreds of aboriginals were involved – attacking in broad daylight, ignoring the occupants, who they threatened if they resisted.20 as chas melton recalled: …. residents were often alarmed by half a dozen stalwart blacks coming to their doors and demanding flour, tea, sugar, tobacco, and rum. ... (they) frequently swooped down on the huts of the settlers and carried off all they could lay their hands on, sometimes killing those who offered any resistance. ....captain wickham, the government resident, was often requisitioned for police protection, but owing to the scarcity of men was unable to afford much relief.21 beyond the township and its outliers, squatters were evicted from their properties. soon after war was declared by the ‘united tribes,’ 300 to 500 mary river warriors poured across conondale ranges to attack balfour’s station.22 simultaneously there were raids all over the darling downs23 including the ‘battle of one tree hill’ at helidon (which temporarily routed the settlers). almost all stations established between 1841 and 1842 around wide bay, the upper brisbane and stanley rivers were abandoned in 1843 (bottoms, 2013, p. 25), – the wide bay ones remaining vacant for 4 years (mckinnon, 1940).24 to give just a few examples, the first owner of maroon (1840s) was ‘chased off by the blacks’.25 in 1847, john stevens on the condamine river found ‘the natives surrounded the hut and… ordered him and his men to leave the station’ – which he did. then they drove off 17 ‘the aborigines of australia – no. xiv: the ‘rising’ of 1842-4, empire (sydney 15 april 1854, p. 3. 18‘brisbane’s suburban beauties – a world of fair scenes describe with pen and camera: no. xiv: windsor’, the brisbane courier, 13 october 1906, p 12. 19‘early brisbane in the fifties and sixties’, the brisbane courier, 18 january 1919, p. 12. 20 ‘moreton bay’, the sydney morning herald, 5 may 1847, p. 3. 21 early brisbane in the fifties and sixties’, the brisbane courier, 18 january 1919, p. 12. 22 a j mcconnel, 193?, ‘on blacks’ mss 89/206, fryer library 23 a j mcconnel, some old stations no 2 brisbane courier, 30 jan 1932 p 19 24 h j summer, ‘100 years of history in newstead house: quadrilles – and a snake in vice-regal bed’, the courier-mail 14 december 1946, p. 2. 25‘the first settlers’, queensland times (ipswich) 21 april 1944, p 5. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/49335129?searchterm=black%20war%201843%201855%20queensland&searchlimits= cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 45 all his cattle.26 in 1848, mr blyth and mr chauvel after only four days on fitzroy downs were ‘obliged to abandon it – the blacks having driven off four hundred sheep, killed one of their men and speared (another)’.27 between 1854 and 1858, thomas dowse and others were thrice repelled in their efforts to set up huts at sandgate. 28 john ross around 1860 tried to settle cockatoo creek but likewise found ‘the dawson blacks were too bad and he had to retrace his steps towards the burnett’.29 searching for military objectives what, though, was the purpose of such attacks? they certainly discouraged settlement and turned back initial forays on both fronts (towards wide bay and towards the downs), but was this intentional or was this simply, as keith windschuttle alleged, ad hoc pillage and revenge? settlers had no illusions about the main motive: their foes were asserting land ownership. they note raiders had: ‘an unforgiving resentment towards the intruders into their native wilds’30 and were unwilling to share ‘use of the soil’.31 however, finer military objectives were not recorded. we have only fragmentary glimpses, but they allow some perspective. firstly, in 1844 the moreton bay correspondent to the sydney morning herald told the paper that ‘from their manners, and the partial conversation they (aboriginals) have had’ with settlers, it was understood the raiders were ‘determined to annihilate if possible the whole of the stock in the district’ (italics mine).32 this aim is echoed in other observations. in 1851, squatters on the burnett and condamine rivers reported aboriginals ‘driving everything before them and killing cattle in all directions’.33 henry russell, recalling events thirty years later, was an on-ground eyewitness when he described groups having colluded to drive off all livestock: ‘wherever they were’ (russell 1888, p328). even when ‘caught in the act’ the raiders continued this task: ‘if a 26 ‘moreton bay’ the sydney morning herald, 5 may 1847, p 3. 27 ‘to the editor of the moreton bay courier’, the moreton bay courier, 2 december 1848, p. 2. 28 ‘colonial news moreton bay wanton outrage by the aborigines’, bathurst free press and mining journal 31 december 1853, p. 2; ’to the editor of the sydney morning herald’, the sydney morning herald, 30 november 1857, p. 8. 29 ‘cracow -the first owner’ the central queensland herald (rockhampton,17 november 1932, p. 31. 30bell’s life in sydney and sporting reviewer 5 december 1857, p. 2. 31‘moreton bay’, sydney morning herald, 27 december 1848, p 3. 32‘moreton bay’, sydney morning herald, 10 september 1844, p.4. 33‘moreton bay’, the argus (melbourne,) 26 september 1851, p. 4. http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/70307288?searchterm=redbank%20blacks&searchlimits= 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 (white) man happens to come upon them unarmed during the time they are committing these depredations, they immediately assail him with their waddles, and order him about his business’.34 why would the raiders wish to annihilate all of the district’s livestock? this was not the spearing of a few bulls or sheep, but the diversion and slaughter of vast herds and flocks– for example, 1,400 and 2,000 at ewers station and grafton range:35 or the ‘entire herd of milkers and young stock’ at mason’s station (pine rivers).36 at times, the attackers moved from one run to the next, inflicting similar damage within a short period. equally, food stores were not simply pilfered for a ‘ready meal’. they were emptied. crops were ‘destroyed’ rather than raided37 – pulled up in entirety – even many acres.38 the latter was done with such frequency that the survival of free settlements such as nundah was imperiled.39 to tear out vast fields of crops; to raid drays (in the case of helidon sacking a cavalcade of ten drays, with 17 armed bullockies),40 to drive off and slaughter entire herds of sheep and cattle – all this required a great deal of planning and manpower. in some cases, prize stock or stud cattle were being targeted, or livestock were hamstrung (wounded) – which made them worthless for fattening or breeding. other times, the whole herd was scattered into impenetrable areas. this suggests the attacks were aimed not so much as a means of sustenance, but as a means of divesting squatters of food and income. certainly early settlers such as charles pearce of cockatoo creek had that impression: ‘continually killing – more for the sake of killing than anything else..... sometimes they would take a small quantity – about 20 lb. or so – of the best of the beef and leave the remainder to decay (italics mine)’.41 34‘a sufferer by blacks – original correspondence: what has become of the native police!’ the moreton bay courier, 17 october 1857, p. 3. 35 frederick n isaac, audi alterem parem, the moreton bay courier 2 december 1848, p 2. 36 ‘moreton bay’, bathurst advocate, 3 june 1848, p 1. 37‘affray with natives at moreton bay’, the australian, 25 july 1827, p 3. 38‘moreton bay’, sydney morning herald, 10 september 1844, p 4; ‘pine rivers’, the maitland mercury & hunter river general advertiser, 17 january 1849, p. 4; moreton bay courier, 26th february 1848, vol.2: no. 6, p. 89. 39‘news from the interior – moreton bay’, sydney morning herald, 21 august 1847, p. 3; ‘moreton bay fine press. moreteon bay’, colonial times (hobart), 20 april 1852, p. 2. 40‘the history of the settlement of moreton bay’, the queenslander, 4 december 1869, p 8. 41‘the early days: reminiscences of mr charles pearce’, western star and roma advertiser (toowoomba), 13 december 1922, p. 4. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 47 multuggerah – one aboriginal leader – stated that the aim of this destruction was to ‘…starve the “jackeroos” (strangers)’.42 apparently, as ‘tinker’ campbell summarized just a decade after multuggerah’s attacks, the combination of dray-plundering, stock killing and pastureburning was meant to terrorize squatters and reduce their livelihood to the point that they had no option other than quitting their holdings: let the pale jackeroos view his waddy with dread! their grass he hath fired, their sheep he hath ta'en, their drays he hath plunder'd, their oxen hath slain.43 thus economic sabotage – which henry reynolds judged the ‘most effective’ resistance strategy aboriginal people developed (1982, p. 113), and john connor identified as the greatest innovation of aboriginal resistance (2002, p. 21) – was evidently the objective of many ‘black war’ activities. apart from this objective, we have a statement from multuggerah to the effect that he would ‘fence off the roads, stop the drays travelling over the range’44 – effectively, ‘close the road’.45 also at this time a leader called jackey jackey took refuge in the bunya lands and sent a message down to brisbane that he would halt all further forays into what is now enoggera and newmarket (three mile scrub): ‘… kill any white fellow that goes that road’.46 halting road travel and drays was probably directed at cutting lines of communication and supply in and out of aboriginal lands. it prevented further influx of settlers. it isolated and ‘starved’ settlers already in residence, and denied whites the opportunity of coordinating defence. during this period, bullock drays provided the main ‘artery’ of settlement– carrying supplies and mail out to the runs, and carrying saleable produce back to brisbane. it was doubtless for this reason that drays were so regularly targeted – at mt edwards,47 on the northern rivers,48 near brisbane49 and on the gwydir river.50 not only did aboriginal 42lack, clem, ‘when black men routed the whites a pitched battle of the early days, and something about "tinker" campbell's adventures’ the courier-mail, 16 april 1938, p 7. 43‘random rhymes’, the moreton bay courier, 24 february 1855, p 4. 44lack, clem, ‘when black men routed the whites’, the courier-mail, 16 april 1938, p. 7. 45‘the history of the moreton bay settlement’, the brisbane courier, 23 december 1869, p. 6. 46‘the aborigines – moreton bay’, sydney morning herald, 23 february 1847, p 2 47 the queenslander, 5 december 1925, p. 10. 48‘murderous abos of long ago and white settlers’ savage reprisals’, the richmond river herald and northern districts advertiser, 22 november 1935, p. 2. 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 parties isolate and sack drays, but they set large packs of dogs onto the drays and attendant horsemen to harass them (lergessner 2007, p. 204). a related measure was to frighten whites off any aboriginal pathway – especially creek crossings51 and mountain passes (e.g.cunningham’s gap).52 perhaps the best example occurred between the hills near mount gravatt on logan road, where german settlers literally ‘ran the gauntlet’ and developed sideboards for their wagons to protect themselves from flying spears.53 intercepting mail men or stealing their mail54 seems similarly aimed at exacting control over communications. certainly the mailman between stradbroke (where most mail was dropped off by boat) and brisbane was slain, and another mailman was killed between nanango and gayndah in 1851.55 aboriginals knew the strategic value of controlling mail as they were often called upon to deliver notes and letters, and suffered the consequence of the contents. a final recorded objective was to ‘spear all the commandants’ (lack, 1938, p. 7) or similar overseers and take over whatever they controlled. as frederick isaacs (a settler on the darling downs) noted at the time: i have since heard, that the plan of the blacks was to murder first all the men at my head station, and sack the store; and then, having waylaid the shepherds, to take possession of the whole of the sheep.56 ‘picking off’ isolated individuals – especially shepherds at outstations and commandants of groups – was a tactic used by aboriginal groups as recently as the coniston massacre (northern territory) especially as ‘payback’ against whites who had broken tribal law. it was quite efficient as a means of inciting terror, as the element of sleuth and ‘surprise’ put settlers 49‘moreton bay’, empire (sydney), 5 april 1858, p. 4. 50‘jessie hunt, a wayside cemetery where pioneers sleep’, the north western courier, 4 september 1933, p. 14. 51 mary guthrie, ‘by the pleasant watercourses’, the brisbane courier, 19 march 1927, p. 23. 52 ‘moreton bay’, the cornwall chronicle (launceston), 23 january 1847, p. 63. 53 ‘do you know your brisbane – mt gravatt and eight miles plains’, sunday mail, 28 july 1929, p. 23. 54 ‘murderous abos of long ago’, 22 november 1935, p 2; ‘the early days – reminiscences of charles pearce’, the capricornian (rockhampton), 4 november 1922, p. 47. 55 ‘moreton bay’, empire (sydney), 24 march 1851, p. 2. 56‘to the editor of the moreton bay courier’, the moreton bay courier, 2 december 1848, p. 2. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 49 in constant fear of attack. moreover, it could be carried out many years after the offense in question. the tactic seems to have been used in south-east queensland (connors, 2005). the idea of ‘taking possession of the whole of the sheep’ was usually aimed at annihilating flocks. however, at wide bay and some other spots, entire herds or flocks were sometimes driven off to ‘bush pens’ especially constructed by the aboriginal raiders to maintain the flocks. this occurred in many parts of australia: in tasmania, western victoria (critchett, 2003, p. 55), walgett (connor, 2002, p. 109), and new england (bloomfield 1986, p. 32). was this an attempt to beat squatters at their own game, by wresting the pastoral industry out of their hands? we can only speculate, but aboriginals were often the first and main workers on the runs.57 thus it is feasible that some thought of this option. there is as yet no evidence of the motives for this practice in southern queensland, but near mt isa, grazier alexander kennedy discovered through this corroboree song (which one of his workers translated), that the group there (kalkadoon) believed they could take charge of the ‘magic’ (cattle rearing) by slaying graziers and taking over their cattle: our hunting grounds are ravished our water is taken by the cattle, but bullock is good, kill and we shall have beef forever! kill the white man, kill the white man... we are many and can conquer the white man’s magic (behnke 2011). evidencing inter-tribal alliances perhaps the most controversial claim bill laurie made about the black war is that it was perpetuated by an inter-tribal alliance. in 1975, malcolm prentis (1975, p. 27) declared that indigenous resistance in australia was never organized except at a very local (clan/ single tribe) level. twenty years later, peter dennis and others asserted that the egalitarian, noncohesive nature of indigenous society prevented inter-tribal alliances and associated military strategies. their viewpoint has remained the ‘historic orthodoxy’ ever since. 57 colonial secretary's office (nsw), annual report on state of the aborigines in various districts, 22 september 1852, 52/1, 4/7153, p.2. 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 however, small-scale societies elsewhere (e.g. tribes of californian indians) are recorded conducting separate but simultaneous forays that were pre-planned and agreed upon by a number of their groups (mcnab, 2010, pp. 175ff.). thus it would not be accurate to conclude that inter-tribal alliances were necessarily unfeasible on account of the nature of aboriginal society. in the case of the southern queensland black war, as already noted, some 14 to 15 groups were said to have been involved. we noted leichhardt called them ‘the united tribes’ (darragh & fensham 2013, p. 266). we even have a fair idea which groups were involved because witnesses to the 1841-2 bunya gathering: petrie, schmidt and davis – all give us a very similar listing that in each case equals the ‘14-15’ cited in the statement sent to governor gipps. these were groups from logan district; moreton bay islands; burnett river; wide bay district; bundaberg; mt perry; gympie; bribie; fraser island; gayndah; mt brisbane (= mt cootah & d’aguilar ranges); kilcoy/ esk and brisbane/ enoggera. this embraced a number of language-groups: kabi, yuggera, wakka, batjala … the ‘glue’ for these groups – long before the arrival of settlement – was the tri-annual (or annual for local groups) gathering at the ‘bunya lands’ – a broad area of bunya pine shrubs stretching from the bunya mountains in the west to the blackall ranges in the east, centred on mt mowballan near bell and baroon pocket near maleny (kerkhove, 2012, p. 4ff.). bunya gatherings were conducive to inter-tribal forays because they engaged diverse groups in shared activities for anything from a month to three months, including an ‘inter-tribal parliament’ (kerkhove, 2012, p. 23) where ‘each tribe would tell the others what happened in his part of the country’ (simpson 1979, p. 1400). indeed, it was joint outrage over the retelling of the kilcoy massacre that had sparked the ‘declaration’ davis and bracewell carried to brisbane. the role of these gatherings in fuelling, reviewing and reiterating inter-tribal attacks on whites was frequently noted by settlers (evans 2002, p. 64) as in these accounts of 1856 and 1858: …it has frequently been a cause of complaint that … after the dispersion of the grand gathering at the bunya season, many outrages are sometimes committed by the blacks when returning to their own districts.58 58‘fifty years ago – cxlv: records of moreton bay – our extract today from the ‘courier’ of may 31 1856’, the brisbane courier, 2 june 1906, p. 12. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 51 this gathering.... (precedes) the approach of some devilment … towards the habitations of the pale faces. the plan of their operations, after having assembled in masses as at present, is to swarm off in various directions, with the sole purpose of revenging for imaginary injuries.59 davies – as someone who had lived many years amongst the wide bay groups – was called before the select committee into the native police specifically to explain the purpose of bunya gatherings. he answered that apart from honouring traditional customs, they were used to ‘hatch mischief against whites’. davies’ assessment is echoed by ludwig leichhardt. in 1844 he travelled to baroon (the heart of the coastal gathering) and witnessed ‘several powerful main figures …among the warriors at burun (baroon)’ all painted red (war paint). these warriors, he noticed, ‘found fault’ with ‘those who join the whites’ (darragh & fensham, 2013, p. 379-380). during the corroboree pantomime, a warrior sang a war song wherein: ….he reproaches those who no longer come to hunt kangaroos, and to catch possums, and who don’t take part in the battles… his ‘accused’ answers: ‘i do not live in the dwelling of the whites, the whites are angry with me. i have no pipe, no tobacco, no hatchet. i live in the bush. (darragh and fensham, 2013, p. 379-380). in other words, it seems baroon warriors were shaming others into joining their cause. certainly it appears that many of ‘black war’ activities were collaborative efforts occurring soon after bunya gatherings. for example, during the wide bay offensive, several stations along the burnett river were ‘attacked at three different points simultaneously’60 in april (when groups were starting to move out from the bunya lands). in that same area (miriam vale), contemporaries describe ‘a meeting of different tribes’ deciding to attack the head station.61 likewise, on both the logan river and at lockyer creek at this time, portions of ‘various powerful tribes’ were witnessed assembling ‘according to a pre-concerted plan’ and then committed a raft of ‘outrages’ such as destroying an entire maize crop in one night, hunting cattle and bailing up travelers.62 especially after the kilcoy massacre and similar 59‘moreton bay’, northern times, 29 may 1858, p 4. 60‘moreton bay burnett district’, freeman's journal (sydney), 29 april 1852, p. 11. 61 richard r ware, ‘bucca bucca’, the queenslander, 5 december 1908, p. 62. 62 moreton bay courier, 26th february 1848, p. 89; ‘moreton bay’, the sydney morning herald, 8 november 1844, p. 2. 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 occurrences elsewhere, it seemed to some that a coordinated offensive was sweeping the entire eastern seaboard of australia: ….so simultaneous, indeed, and so general (that)… a belief would be encouraged that the onslaught…. was the result of a perfect organization… from wide bay to port phillip, the organization seemed to extend, and scarcely a day elapsed without tidings reaching the city (sydney) of some remote station being driven in, some flock driven away or speared, some shepherd or hut keeper being wounded or killed.63 it is probable that settlers’ atrocities inflamed ‘joint outrage’, forging a sense of united action that petered out but revived again with each bunya gathering. certainly when dalaipi – a north pine headman – was asked to explain his people’s attacks on settlers in his area, he spoke instead of injustices perpetuated against jinabara people near kilcoy, and referred to the two groups as ‘us’: …. this (killing of whites) is nothing…. what a number were poisoned at kilcoy! ... they (the whites) stole our ground where we used to get food, and when we got hungry and took a bit of flour or killed a bullock to eat, they shot us or poisoned us! why did the white man not stop in his own country, and not come here to hunt us about like a lot of kangaroo? if they had kept to their own land, we would not have killed them (petrie, 1904, pp. 183-184. evidencing military co-ordination if inter-tribal alliances were a reality, how were their military activities organized? eckley (2001, p. 637) views charismatic leadership as essential to maintaining guerilla movements. in the aboriginal australian context, such leadership was more likely to be reticent, understated and plural rather than singular (foley, 2007). the southern queensland war certainly had more than one leader – amongst those named by colonists were commander, cowander (make-i-light) and diamond; later zrombugongo, pamby-pamby, twarr, wungoe wungoe, buckabolu (lergessner, 2007, pp. 216-217); yilbung, moppy and dundalli. contemporaries tell us ‘the blacks….had been in the habit of looking up to’ these figures.64 dundalli for example was hailed ‘as their great man’65 – at least amongst the groups directly aligned with him. 63‘the aborigines of australia – no. xiv: the ‘rising of 1842-4’, empire, 15 april 1854, p. 3. 64 ‘domestic intelligencethe paris exhibition’, the moreton bay courier, 6 january 1855, p. 2. 65 ‘the native police’, geelong advertiser and intelligencer, 23 september 1854, p 5. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 53 as was also the case on the great plains of north america, this was not a cohesive front but rather many shifting factions – some groups (e.g. the people of brisbane and stradbroke) preferring to side with the settlers as their fortunes changed, or on account of having in earlier decades secured their own arrangements with whites after a resounding defeat or stand-off. nevertheless, there was evidently an extraordinary amount of communication between groups in widely separated places. thomas archer was at nurum nurum outstation (towards woodford) when he received a note: …from a sable (aboriginal) messenger, telling me that two of mackenzie’s men had been murdered by blacks within a few miles of my camp… (and) warning me that i had better be on my guard as they might possibly serve me the same if they caught me napping (wales, 2000, pp. 18, 58). at the same time, in kangaroo point (nearly 100 kilometers to the south), john ‘tinker’ campbell was receiving a messenger sent by multuggerah, who was at that time near gatton (an additional 130 kilometes to the west), informing him: ‘the blacks were rising’ and that he should not travel west: ‘baal (don’t) you go, mr campbell!’(campbell 1936; lack, 1938, p. 7) when the ‘uprising’ over much of eastern australia seemed to be occurring (1842-1844), formerly friendly tribes turned against settlers and unheard of tribes suddenly joined in attacks. the empire (sydney) attributed this change to the speed with which news of ‘aboriginal protector leniency’ was being conveyed from tribe to tribe: (protectors’) partiality became the subject of conversation in every hut, and on every station. the civilized blacks soon gleaned from the discourses of the shepherds and hutkeepers the facts of the matter, and with that shrewdness in which they are by no means deficient, they perceived that the tide had turned in their favour. the blacks resident on the stations, transmitted the welcome intelligence to their wilder brethren; these communicated it to their neighbours, and those again despatched the news to the remotest tribes. then followed the general onslaught on the europeans along the entire border of the colony. these were the views of the colonists whose interests were (most) involved in the matter66 whether or not this many aboriginal groups were in communication with each other, it is known that during the ‘black war’ strategies were relayed from larger to smaller gatherings 66‘the aborigines of australia’, empire, 15 april 1854, p. 3. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 through a system of messengers (william clark calls them ‘post men’).67 frederick walker, the first commandant of the queensland native police, found a variety of signals coopted into coordinating attacks – presumably developed from hunting signals or speech taboos (roth, 1908; kendon 1988). during raids on crops or stock, sentinels were on guard with prearranged hand signals.68 there was also a system of tree marking involving series of marks or chops 69 and most of all, smoke signalling. smoke signals were used to relay the movement of groups of whites (jones, 2007, p. 99), to bring scattered groups from great distances together ‘almost simultaneously’ 70 and to warn of impending attack – as occurred at sandgate.71 special bark funnels were used to fashion high smoke columns and camps were often located near a headland or hillock, within sight of another high point which itself lay behind another camp. this allowed a virtual relay of signals. walker said this ‘code’ was used to ‘communicate with their detached mobs’ and to decide ‘the locality of meeting places’.72 when john campbell’s party fought off raiders whilst climbing the hills to the darling downs, they knew a second attack was being arranged at the steep pinch ahead of them as ‘all this time we could hear their signals passing alongside the sugar loaf mountain to the red hill, some two miles ahead of us’ (campbell 1936, p.19). it is not clear if campbell meant the crackle of fires or coo-ees, but in either case it indicates the use of signalling hills for military ends. assisting such modes of communication were ‘insider spies’ and decoys– much as occurs in modern guerilla warfare (grill, 2001, p. 742). for example an aboriginal youth who worked for patrick mcenroe at surat was used to lure workers away from their arms and stores.73 decoys and diversions were another means. multuggerah sent three old women out to drive off part of a herd at windgate so that he could attack at helidon whilst the settlers were occupied.74 the headman of a group near fitzroy kept a squatter chatting and smoking over 67clark, w. ‘explorer walker – organiser and first commandant of the native police’, the brisbane courier, 28 december 1912, p. 10. see also: terry, m. ‘”paper yabber” and bush telegraph – aborigines as friends – and foes’, the sydney morning herald, 4 april 1942, p. 7. 68 ‘early days – abos fearsome and resentful but brave and kindly’, the richmond river herald and northern districts advertiser, 3 june 1932, p. 3. 69 clark, w. ‘explorer walker, 1912 p. 10’ as above. 70 j.c. bennie, ‘the bunya mountains – early feasting ground of the blacks,’the dalby herald, 1931, p. 2. 71‘to the editor of the sydney morning herald’. the sydney morning herald, 30 november 1857, p. 8. 72 clark, w. ‘explorer walker, 1912, p. 10’ as above. 73‘ domestic intelligence ipswich’, the moreton bay courier’ 23 august 1851, p. 2. 74 ‘random rhymes’. the moreton bay courier, 24 february 1855, p. 4. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 55 dinner whilst his people – some distance away – drove off 400 sheep, speared the shepherds and pursued the remnant another 70 miles.75 evidencing adaptive tactics aboriginal resistance is sometimes denied the status of ‘proper’ guerrilla warfare on the grounds of limited evidence for a dramatic shift in tactics. aboriginal society, we are told, was too static to combat the european invasion, being bound to ‘highly ritual’ formats of war (dennis et al., 1995, p.5). however, the black war in southern queensland seems to have demonstrated a range of adaptations: • circumventing alien technology • moving from pitched battle to ambush tactics • terror (psychological warfare) • permanent ‘guerrilla bands’ circumventing alien technologies australia, unlike other colonial forums, never permitted trade of firearms or horses into indigenous hands. their use was even restricted amongst ‘friendly’ aboriginal workers. few came into the possession of war parties, and it was rare that a warrior knew their use or had sufficient gunpowder (smith, 2010, p. 114). free settlement was a blitzkrieg. for queensland, it occurred within 40 years (1840-1880) as opposed to 300 years of american colonization. guns and horses had no time to become deeply entrenched in aboriginal culture. thus the usual response to the alien technology was to attempt to remove or destroy it. war parties stole and hid, or broke or dampened guns and ammunition (eg campbell, 1936, p. 20; ‘battler’, 1938, p. 40). in some cases they would plug up the portholes from which shooting was conducted,76 or even rush up to the muzzles protruding from fortified huts, seize hold of the barrels and attempt to bend or break them. horses were similarly killed or driven into the bush (to avoid these being used for attack or escape).77 john campbell recalled that during the darling downs invasion, the killing of a horse ‘would be counted by them as a great 75‘to the editor of the moreton bay courier’, the moreton bay courier, 2 december 1848, p. 2. 76 ‘domestic intelligence ipswich’, the moreton bay courier, 23 august 1851 p 2. 77 ‘domestic intelligence ipswich’, the moreton bay courier, 23 august 1851 p. 2. 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 victory. the tail being taken as a trophy would be whisked in the first white man’s face they met’ (campbell, 1936, p. 19). equally, raiding parties tried to circumvent the new technology. some rushed bullets en masse, knowing that chaos and mass of numbers would limit shooters’ capacity to target individuals. another method was to attack only in thick jungle or high grass, allowing maximum cover or enabling some to sneak up on armed settlers. others threw themselves to the ground or immediately slid behind large rocks or trees whenever guns were fired (connor 2002, p. 48). a similar tactic was to capitalize on technical weaknesses. this meant rushing shooters between re-loadings (reynolds, 1982, p. 104; ryan, 1981, p. 114), keeping just slightly out of firing range; waiting for rainy periods when gunpowder was damp and could not be re-supplied (due to creek floodings) or encouraging settlers to exhaust their supplies. what clearly demonstrates the real problem regarding firearms was simply limited access is that other elements of european technology – iron and glass – had a quite different history. these materials could be obtained even as discarded rubbish if not directly traded, so they spread rapidly into local toolkits and weaponry (harrison, 2002). when drays or storehouses were sacked, iron tools, nails, tomahawks, shears knives and metal scraps were removed in large quantities, and traded to the furthest regions. in southern queensland, club heads were fitted with spikes of nails, and spears were fitted with points made from broken shears or shards of glass – and these were used against settlers (campbell, 1936, p. 20). in man-to-man combat, knives of shell were ‘abandoned ….for blades of sheath knives, or broken shear blades’ (clark, 1916, p. 8). a similar adaptation was the use of flaming spears and firebrands fixed to spears. these were hurled at white combatants or – more usually – onto the roofs of their huts to burn them out.78 huge fires were also lit to halt progress. for example, when ross tried to reach the darling downs around 1860, aboriginals set fire to the surrounding fields, forcing him to drive his flocks into the scrub. 79 moving from pitched battle to ambush tactics despite the assumption that indigenous engagements with whites were all furtive ‘hit-andruns’, early sources usually describe pitched battles. in the southern queensland war, even 78‘domestic intelligence ipswich’, the moreton bay courier, 23 august 1851 p 2. 79‘cracow – the first owner’, the central queensland herald (rockhampton), 17 november 1932, p. 31. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 57 when groups were surprised or peacefully camped, they lined up and ‘gave fight’. 80 traditional fighting entailed groups meeting at a set pullen pullen (fighting ground) and filing out in hundredsall in pairs, led by the war champions. the lines would then toss weapons at each other, and try to chase the others off the field, eventually breaking into one-on-one tournaments (petrie 1904, pp. 44-48, 160-164). davies records that they were obliged by custom to stand their ground when violently attacked, regardless of the context. thus in the early years of the war, southern queensland tribes would ‘stand up and face the white man's gun’ (‘battler’, 1938, p. 40). leichhardt observed: ‘the black with his weapons is no coward. calmly he meets his enemies’ (darragh & fensham 2013, p. 3). for example, 500 warriors ‘marched on the head station’ on the upper burnett, and ‘with loud voices’ demanded the surrender of the overseer’s wife and then ransacked the station.81 thus ambush engagements were a radical departure from traditional warfare. the new style probably evolved from revenge or execution raids. bartley noted that due to the impact of gunfire, the ‘dash in the open’ gave way to a ‘crafty ambush behind some huge rock or tree’ (1896, p. 167). soon such attacks were used with deadly effectiveness, for instance in the vine forests of samsonvale, to attack a native police corp: …. (they) cried out in english ‘kill the white fellows'' and (addressing the lieut.) ‘you bloody coward!’' ….a trooper immediately fell dead, pierced by numerous spears…. 2 other troopers (were) wounded…. lt williams and (his) corp resisted with determination….82 a variant of this was surprise attacks on outstations. the usual procedure was for a raiding party to send a forward scout to make a ‘friendly’ visit for surveillance purposes, and lure the occupant away from armaments. anything from a dozen to hundreds of warriors would be hiding along an adjacent creek bank, ridge or forest fringe. these then leapt out and harassed the worker into leaving (killing him if necessary), burnt down the hut and sacked all its contents – for example, at pine rivers.83 80 ‘domestic intelligence ipswich’, the moreton bay courier, 23 august 1851 p. 2. 81‘moreton bay burnett region’, freeman's journal (sydney), 29 april 1852, p. 11. 82‘moreton bay’, northern times (newcastle), 5 may 1858, p. 2. 83‘domestic intelligence’, the moreton bay courier, 3 july 1852, p. 2. 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 terror (psychological warfare) a less damaging but terrifying technique evidently developed after the invasion consisted of harassment, shock and bluff. we should class this as terrorism, in that it aimed to provoke the enemy, decrease their morale, and incite anxiety (kilcullen 2009, pp. 30-32; cassidy, 2004, pp. 41-46). a good example is this 1856 attack on a home at breakfast creek (near brisbane): five or six of them entered the premises of a person residing there, and helped themselves to the garden stuff most liberally and unceremoniously, … defying (the woman) to make them leave the premise. another woman was ordering several of them off, when a blackfellow spat in her face and used some grossly insulting language.84 also at breakfast creek they taunted the pursuing police by brandishing their spears, gesturing and calling out insults.85 in other cases, assailants ‘prowled about at unseemly hours’ 86 apparently to frighten brisbane’s citizens, or even uprooted building stumps and stamped and danced on settlers’ graves.87 similarly provocative were silent ‘shows of force’ – ominously appearing in great numbers, stretched along hills and ridges (hoff, 2010, p. 109). sometimes this entailed doggedly following and harassing travelers for hundreds of kilometers,88 or threatening womenfolk when men left for work.89 as well, there was parody and mockery (karskens 2011). petrie gives several accounts of dignitaries being deliberately mimicked, mocked and tricked, to the amusement of the rest of the tribe. one example is when yilbung, a brisbane-region leader, was imprisoned and flogged for extracting a monthly ‘rent’ of flour from brisbane’s windmill. upon release, he cheerfully visited his tormentors and stole a valuable tobacco box from under their noses whilst they lectured him on ‘being good’. he then gave this away to a gardener for a bag of sweet potatoes (petrie 1904, p. 169). 84 ‘moreton bay’, sydney morning herald, 20 may 1856, p. 5. 85 ‘moreton bay’, colonial times, 20 april 1852, p. 3. 86the moreton bay courier, 17 october 1857, p. 3. 87‘ dawson valley history’, morning bulletin (rockhampton), 11 november 1947, p. 8. 88jessie hunt, ‘a wayside cemetery where pioneers sleep’, the north western courier, 4 september 1933, p. 14; ‘local intelligence’ the courier, 5 sept 1861, p. 2. 89 mary guthrie, ‘by the pleasant watercourses’, the brisbane courier, 19 march 1927, p. 23. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 59 developing full-time guerilla bands? a final and telling evidence for adaptive tactics is the emergence of what might be classed as ‘guerilla bands’. groups most involved in repeat attacks were enticing ‘wild’ tribes into joining them as ‘bands of savage plunderers’ – subsisting ‘entirely’ from what they took from ‘the property of the settlers’. 90 despite the potential settler retaliation, they stored plundered flour and stock (connor 2002, p. 41). instead of the usual open camps, they resided in ‘fastnesses’ and ‘strongholds’ in ‘broken and unfrequented country’ 91often strategically using creeks and swamps to bog would-be pursuers.92 camps in ‘strongholds’ took on a new, defensive form: the weapon or article of european manufacture is the tomahawk of iron, doubtless plundered…. other signs of the dawn of civilization are bullockbones about the camp. .... the gunyahs are so situated that an enemy cannot approach from any quarter without being seen by the occupants of at least two gunyahs. ... (there are) cattle spears, to be dropped on beasts from boughs of trees over-hanging their tracks....(italics mine)93 in southern queensland, some five or six areas were repeatedly described by colonists as ‘strongholds’ from which ‘robber bands’ launched attacks.94 these included the bunya lands, rosewood, bribie island and fraser island. conclusions the precise nature of australian indigenous resistance will require dedicated analysis for decades to come. this particular study found evidence for the ‘black war’ of southern queensland being a fully historic, region-wide occurrence. it seems to have had some effect in frustrating or slowing settlement. the ‘southern queensland black war’ manifested elements that equate with military strategy, inter-tribal co-ordination, and military adaptation, even if we have an incomplete understanding of how these worked. considering ‘what kind of war?’ it would seem that 90‘summary of news – domestic and foreign’, the moreton bay courier, 10 june 1848, p. 2. 91‘to the editor of the moreton bay courier’, the moreton bay courier, 17 october 1857, p. 3; see also brisbane courier, 8 november 1932, p. 15. 92 ‘m. b. moreton bay’, colonial times (hobart), 20 april 1852; moreton bay. the sydney morning herald, 10 september 1844, p. 4. 93‘an interesting model’, the brisbane courier, 8 march 1886, p. 2. 94‘the strongholds of the aborigines’, bathurst free press and mining journal, 20 september 1851, p. 7. 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 guerrilla-type tactics prevailed, but of a mode distinctive to aboriginal cultural practice. for instance, it did not entail massive casualties for the white population. it consisted mostly of economic sabotage, the disruption of transport, and a great deal of harassment (‘psychological warfare’). leichhardt noted that within the groups he encountered ‘extermination battles are completely lacking’ (darragh & fensham 2013, p. 392). ironically, it is probably this ‘low-violence’ response that has led to indigenous military achievement being severely under-rated, even when military ‘gains’ lasted months or even years. presumably it was such successes that gave aboriginal groups sufficient hope to continue their resistance despite the carnage they endured on the frontier. references bartley, n. 1896, australian pioneers & reminiscences, gordon & gotch, brisbane. bartley, ‘n. 1892, ‘blackfellow criminals,’ the queenslander (brisbane), 11 june 1892. ‘battler’, 1938, ‘early fights – blacks and whites’, sunday mail (brisbane), 13 february 1938, p. 40. behnke, s. 2011, the savage kaldadoons, available at http://www.gattonmurders.com/thekalkadoons.pdf , accessed30/6/2014. bloomfield, g. 1986, baal belbora: the end of the dancing, the alternative publishing co operative ltd, chippendale, nsw. bottoms, t. 2013, conspiracy of silence: queensland’s frontier killing times, allen & unwin, london. bracewell, j. 1979, ‘statement of bracewell & davis as to the supposed administration of poison to some blacks by white men’, in simpson letterbook, trans. langevad, g. st lucia, qld: anthropology museum, university of queensland. broomfield, f. 1923, ‘a record in black and white; conquest of the wilderness,’ the brisbane courier, 15 september 1923, p 19. campbell, j. 1936, the early settlement of queensland, bibliographical society of queensland, brisbane. campbell-praed, r. 1988, [1902], ‘my australian girlhood; sketches and impressions of bush life – extract autobiography’ in the penguin anthology of australian women's writing, penguin australia, pp. 309-373. cassidy, r. 2004, ‘winning the war of the flea; lessons from guerrilla warfare,’ military review, vol.84, no.5, pp. 41-46. cilento, r. & lack, c. & centenary celebrations council (qld.) (historical committee) (1959), triumph in the tropics: an historical sketch of queensland, smith & paterson, brisbane. clark, w. 1916, ‘aboriginal ceremonies – the bora grounds’, the queenslander, 9 december 1916, p. 8. connor, j. 2002, the australian frontier wars 1788-1838, university of nsw press, sydney. http://www.gattonmurders.com/thekalkadoons.pdf cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 61 connor, j. 2004, ‘the tasmanian frontier and military history’, tasmanian historical studies, vol. 9. connors, l. 2005, ‘indigenous resistance and traditional leadership: understanding and interpreting dundalli’, queensland history journal, vol.19, no. 3, pp. 701-712. critchett, j. 2003, ‘encounters in the western district,’ in attwood, b. & foster, s. (eds.) frontier conflict – the australian experience, national museum of australia, canberra. darraght. & fensham, r. 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(eds.) strangers on the shore: early coastal contacts in australia, national museum of australia, canberra. wales, m. ‘shepherds on the stanley’ in fisher, r. & harrison, j. (eds.) brisbane: squatters, settlers and surveyors, brisbane history group papers no 16, brisbane. windschuttle, k. 2002, the fabrication of aboriginal history, vol.1, macleay. paddington. windschuttle, k. 2003, ‘doctored evidence and invented incidents in aboriginal historiography’, in attwood, b. & foster, s. (eds.) frontier conflict – the australian experience, national museum of australia, canberra, pp. 99-112. windschuttle, k. 2004, ‘guerrilla warrior and resistance fighter? the career of musquito’, labour history, no. 87, pp. 221-235. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/27516008 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/27516008 tribal alliances with broader agendas? aboriginal resistance in southern queensland’s ‘black war’ abstract the problem of ‘aboriginal guerilla warfare’ aboriginal resistance at its ‘place of origin’: evaluating the historicity of southern queensland’s ‘black war’ evaluating civilian anxiety over the ‘black war’ evaluating the actual impact of ‘black war’ resistance searching for military objectives evidencing inter-tribal alliances evidencing military co-ordination evidencing adaptive tactics developing full-time guerilla bands? conclusions references development paths, problems and countermeasures of chinese civil society organizations chao ye east china normal university jenny onyx university of technology sydney abstract although the process of reform and opening-up accelerates continually in china, the speed of development for chinese civil society organizations (csos) is still slow; most organizations still operate under the government shadow and it is very difficult to cut relations with government. the autonomy of chinese csos, to a large extent, is affected by the constraints from government. overall, chinese csos are still in their infancy, and they need to be further perfected and developed. the aim of this paper is to present a review of the field, with issues and promise identified. specifically, the paper focuses on the internal management of these organizations and their existing problems in the development process, and some potential solutions for csos’ future development. introduction since reform began in 1978, with the growth of the economy, civil society organizations (csos) have been developing quickly and have improved in quantity, scale and quality. civil society organizations (csos) in china fall into three legal categories: social organizations, civil non-enterprise institutions, and foundations. in addition there are a great many informal grassroots organizations. by the end of june 2014, there were 561,000 registered csos in china, including 294,000 social organizations, 3,736 foundations, and 264,000 civil non-enterprise institutions. they cover a broad service area including education, scientific research, health care, welfare, culture, art, environmental protection, social services, among others. csos have become an important social force in promoting civilization and progress in china. the bulk of formal, registered nonprofit organizations carry out a social service function and receive public benefit status. they are increasingly valued by government and society alike. this paper will focus on these domestic organizations, which cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol. 7, no.2, 2015 1 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 chao ye and jenny onyx. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(2): 4350, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i2.4350 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i2.4350 represent a rapidly growing sector within the highly complex and dynamic chinese civil society. these social organizations are playing a more prominent role in chinese public service and they are being accorded greater social responsibility within government policy. however, social organizations also face more and more deep problems in this rapid development process. these include both external environment problems deriving from state control and regulations, but also internal management problems as these rapidly developing organizations seek to establish sustainable internal structures and processes in order to meet their mission. the focus of this paper is not on the wider political environment per se, but on the major management and governance issues within these organizations as they struggle to develop their own sustainable development capabilities and self-management ability. the political context the chinese state is moving in two apparently contradictory directions with respect to civil society organizations. on the one hand there are clear moves towards liberalization and growing support for an independent sector, particularly related to social organizations providing domestic welfare and public benefit services. on the other hand there are increasing restrictions against what are perceived to be foreign interests within civil society, and against those organizations seen as a threat to social cohesion, particularly those organizations concerned with advocacy, labor rights, religion and ethnic minorities. two major pieces of new legislation are the charity law and the overseas ngo law (both expected to be ratified in 2015). in 2014, the third plenary session of the 18th cpc central committee put forward a plan to stimulate social organizations’ vitality and in 2012, former president hu’s report at 18th party congress also said ‘…a system of modern social organizations in which functions of the government are separated from those of social organizations, rights and responsibilities are clearly established, and social organizations exercise autonomy in accordance with the law…’. in other words, to strongly cultivate and develop social organizations is an important issue in china’s future social and economic comprehensive development and innovative social management system construction. however this must be seen within a frame of strong national identity and resistance to unwanted foreign intrusion into the affairs of chinese civil society. the chinese state is concerned about influence from overseas organizations and their impact on social stability and national security. consequently, new regulations are simultaneously improving the 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 independence and efficiency of csos, while nonetheless retaining tight state control over the form and operation of these organizations traditionally, the main development path for new social organizations has been very top down, meaning that the development and growth of chinese csos were driven by government or the relevant departments in the government, at both the national and regional, provincial levels. thus, the relationship between csos and government shows the feature of dependence and control (zhou 2014). in china, a number of social organizations are directly founded by the party and government organizations at all levels, or transformed from the party and government institutions, or founded by former officials from the party and government and those famous people who have close relationships with the party and government. traditionally china has adopted a dual management system, which means if csos want to obtain legal status, they needed to obtain the consent of the department of the government which is finally responsible for government services in the area of operation (often known as ‘the mother-in law agency’) as well as formal registration with the civil affairs department. in fact, this dual management system has been the biggest obstacle to current chinese csos’ development (jia et al. 2001). specifically, on the one hand, it provides a system guarantee for relevant authorities to integrate the work of the social organization within the department’s mission. on the other hand, it also sets up institutional obstacles for meeting wider social demands. the dual management system was also designed to ensure only one association could operate within a given industry space. this gave some official-run organizations a monopoly advantage over resources, thus limiting orderly competition. however, since 2004, china has been experimenting with modifications to this regulation within various provincial and municipal jurisdictions and since the 18th congress (2014), china has moved to a ‘direct registration system’ so that organizations do not need to find any administrative body (mother-in-law) to rely on for establishment purposes. overall, from the perspective of relationships between top-down csos and government, there are three main functional forms provided by csos: (1) the supplementary form: csos provide a supplementary form of public policies, in such policy areas as diplomacy, agriculture, environmental protection; (2) the coordination form: csos provide a coordination service, helping government to supervise relevant industries such as metallurgy, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 3 and textile; (3) the implementation form: csos may assist with the implementation of government policy in fields such as women, labor, the disabled and similar social welfare fields. there is an alternative pathway to the establishment of csos. the bottom-up development path means csos are established independently from below and such establishment and its development mainly rely on social or civilian power. these organizations have not been formally registered with the civil affairs department. a typical example is industry associations which grew rapidly in wenzhou in 1980-1990. the csos, on such a growth path, are often associated with the development of the market economy and economic and social democratization related to its development. it is a product that is created by a well-organized economic process, social process, even political process for citizens. in the process of bottom-up growth, wang and jia (2014) claimed that there are eight kinds of non-registered csos that are developing quickly. they are: (1) elite organizations with a broad mass base, e.g. global village, friends of nature; (2) independent think tanks, e.g. unirule institute of economics, south-north institute for sustainable development, china development institute; (3) volunteer organizations based on an urban community; (4) expert groups which reply on a university to conduct public consultations; (5) organizations for the weak and special groups, e.g. the welfare organization for the disabled people; (6) college students’ organizations with university background and concern for society; (7) spontaneous industry groups, which arise from the market economy; (8) public organizations, which go deep into the grass-roots level in rural areas. the two kinds of development path above-mentioned actually reflect the difficult situations that chinese csos are facing in the development process, and this indicates that chinese csos are still in their infancy, and they exhibit transitional characteristics (zhang 2013). many csos have an unclear status, being both part of government but also separate from it. the phenomenon, ‘the duality of both being officials and people’, has become the typical characteristic of csos’ status in china. according to a survey of 99 clubs and organizations in xiaoshan, zhejiang province, wang et al. (1993) pointed out that ‘the duality of both being officials and people’ is the basic feature that most of chinese csos have during the actual operation and such a feature makes chinese csos fully play a role as social intermediary. this is quite different from the ‘bridge’ positioning role of csos which places emphasis on 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 the close relationship with the people and their capacity to act as ‘messenger’, providing feedback from the people to government (zhang 2013). as a consequence, a large number of csos find it difficult to be truly independent from government’s control, especially those csos which are involved in the legal registration system, and still retain the color of government or the institution. some independent, nonregistered voluntary organizations are excluded from the legal system and their scope of operation is limited. this confused and ambiguous status has led to some serious governance problems which influence the organizations social credibility. the existing problems of chinese csos development table 1 – the main problems chinese csos face types of problem percentage (%) rank out of funds 41.4 1 lack of space and office equipment 11.7 2 lack of talent 9.9 3 insufficient support from government 8.5 4 management problems within organization 7.5 5 lack of information, communication and training opportunities 5.2 6 no social responses about additional activities 3.6 7 imperfect relevant law and regulation 3.4 8 lack of projects 3.0 9 no problem 1.8 10 large administrative interference from government 1.1 11 others 9.3 source: deng, g.s. 2001, ‘preliminary analysis of chinese ngo questionnaire survey’, in wang, m. (eds) research of chinese ngo: case study. uncrd. compared with the western mature civil society, the development of csos in china is still in its ‘infancy’ stage, and they still face many problems and bottlenecks which need to be improved if development is to continue. according to ‘chinese ngo research’ published by tsinghua university ngo research center in 2000, major problems were government and social group incorporation, lack of funding, poor capability, and a defective legal system creating major bottlenecks and restricting the development of chinese csos. deng (2001) analyzed the main problems that chinese csos were facing in a ‘nationwide survey’ (see table 1 below). while this data reflects the situation in 2001, it provides a benchmark for cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 5 identifying areas of necessary progress in the modernization of the governance of csos in the intervening decade. indeed many of these problems appear to still exist in 2015. this paper will examine five main problems that chinese csos are currently facing. financial resources at present, the major performance indicator showing insufficient capabilities of chinese csos is insufficiency of funding. like western csos, organizations lack funding and their reliance on a single source of funding is one of the ‘bottlenecks’ in restricting the development of csos. whether the funding comes from the government’s support, or is income from a business run by the cso or from the social donations, all sources are very limited and the structures for funding are constraining. those organizations that are registered show high levels of resource dependency. the financial structure of registered csos is usually determined by the supervising government agency, or ‘mother –in-law’ agency. as ding (2008, p223) notes ‘where the csos do not have a formal financial procedure, the higher-level authorities…arrange funds or resources and also manage these resources and funds’. the organization is thus limited in their operation to the services designated for those funds. in most cases, organizations are limited in their capacity to raise their own funds. until recently, all public fundraising has been banned. on the other hand, those unregistered csos that have developed from a bottom-up path, experience a typical out-of-system resource dependence. in other words, the main resources of unregistered bottom-up csos include people, money, material, assets, and the corresponding organizational resources, which must come from the market, society, overseas and other open competitive sources, thus highlighting two different development roads during the transformation period of china’s civil society. these unregistered organizations have had no party and government powers involved, and may be susceptible to policy failure and are called ‘edge zones’ (zhang, 2014). the establishment of csos (especially informal ones) always relies on the elites’ initiative, and media mobilization and various social forces to achieve their development, using all kinds of material resources from the community to develop positive activities towards certain 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 social problems. they demonstrate the typical diversity, spontaneity and randomness of emerging organizations during the period of transition. of particular concern has been the capacity of organizations to access overseas funds. for example, in guangzhou, it was proposed to ban organizations whose funding came mostly from overseas sources or had close links with overseas organizations. this proposal was subsequently amended to allow such overseas donations, but under strict reporting rules concerning activities, personnel, funding and location for any project involving participation with foreign partners (icnl international centre for not-for-profit law, 2015). human resources the development problem of csos in china, in fact, is the problem of organizational selfconstruction. this has two aspects. first, chinese csos at present lack the capacity to take any initiative on their own; they lack a dynamic mechanism. this is directly related to the close relationship between the organization and a chinese administrative agency, or ‘motherin-law’. many leaders of registered csos are retired public servants or other notables appointed by the government. leaders from the party and government offices also share the leadership positions in csos; this is one of the features of top-down csos’ management in china. for instance, china youth development foundation (cydf) is a product of fission and proliferation from central committee of the communist youth league (cccyl) and each youth development foundation at province level is also a product of fission and proliferation from provincial cccyl. provincial cccyl usually appoints a principal to act as a leader for provincial foundation, and the secretary-general of the foundation is selected from cadres of the communist youth league at provincial level. in order to access ‘in-system resources’ and to advance the personal interests of those csos, many csos are willing to become ‘the second government’, but they ignore their own mission and vision. they are heavily financially dependent on government (wang 2014). this is why some csos have the feature of being government-run and this feature is embodied in three aspects: first, status and identity derive from the government supervising agency; second, the organization’s leaders come from government agencies, and they manage the csos with reference to the government's bureaucracy; third, the organization mainly undertakes certain government functions or government-entrusted functions. as a consequence of these factors, many csos are simply unable to construct their own strategic cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 7 planning initiatives as independent entities. they have low ability for sustainable development, weak competitiveness, poor mobility and lack of credibility. perhaps as a consequence of this human resource dependency, there is no or little stable human resources channel and its strength is limited. activities mainly rely on volunteers or hired retirees for their development. because of the barriers and disadvantages of the current personnel system including poor organizational compensation benefits, it is difficult to attract and retain high-quality talents. there is little if any access to formal training appropriate to cso management. li (2014) pointed out that although csos’ capability building varies according to their different forms, insufficiencies of funding and human resources severely limit the csos’ internal governance capability and prevent its development. legal accountability mechanism despite the apparent strength of regulatory regimes of csos in china, in fact there is very poor accountability of the internal governance of most csos. from the perspective of law enforcement, existing laws have a strong principle but weak operability, and there is no corresponding judicial interpretation available or specific implementation detail. for example, to investigate and treat illegal csos, the legal system only has the macro principles without detailed operating rules. government only provides some strongly-principled guidelines towards such csos as unapproved established specific groups, but there are no explicit legal provisions with pertinence and adaptability. li (2014) also confirmed that such an imperfect legal system cannot bring any real guarantee to csos, but only set barriers to their future development. second, from the perspective of organizational diversity, there is a lack of special laws aimed at different types of csos, which means the management approach in different csos is mixed, or even meaningless (chen 2012). for example, legislation relating to industry associations is still lacking and their legal status and functions of management have no clear special provisions, which results in unclear legal status and confused governance mechanisms. yu et al. (2002) claimed that the management of the industry associations in china still relied on ‘regulation on registration and administration of social organizations’ and other legal documents of the party and government offices. they mix industrial associations with other kinds of social organizations and the mixture of multiple management structures creates dilemmas for all concerned and is not conducive to the development of industrial associations. to take another example, while there are detailed prescriptions relating to those social organizations concerning foreign affairs, basic-level 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 domestic social organizations have no such detailed laws and regulations, which means that the administering government departments ‘have no law’ to obey. so far, there are only the rules and regulations issued by the ministry of civil affairs. lower level regulation is scattered in various ministries and policy documents, and some rules conflict with each other (wu, 2014). moreover, the legislative level of these regulations is often subordinate to other levels of legislation, which means that the nature, position, organizational form, management system, sources of funds, property relations, internal system, the rights and obligations, and relationship with the government and enterprises of various types of csos is unclear and contradictory. internal governance accountability there are other reasons why government monitoring of registered csos is difficult. the civil affairs department, which is responsible for registration, is often overwhelmed when it faces a large number of csos, and the relevant authorities government departments have their own businesses to be in charge of, and they do not have additional time and energy, or willingness to manage csos’ daily activities. besides, relevant authorities departments have complicated relationships with csos, which means it is difficult for the former to supervise the latter. as zhou (2011) noted, insufficient management and monitoring from government may easily result in wrangles and a shuffle among different main bodies, none of which wish to be held accountable for the actions of the cso. as a consequence of this lack of clear monitoring responsibility, the csos, and especially those that are unregistered, remain in a regulatory vacuum. supervision from society at large is also absent. there is no independent third party to supervise csos. the media is limited in overseeing or investigating csos; the public lacks any institutionalized channels to call into account those csos which go against their principles. for example, very few csos provide public accounts of their financial records (ding, 2008). against this background, the supervision of csos is mainly conducted by csos’ self-discipline, and this kind of single way of supervision will inevitably cause bureaucracy, corruption and misuse of public resources, which reduces the credibility of csos and affects their ability to access resources. chen (2012) stated that from the practical perspective, many csos still confuse the question ‘we are responsible for what’ and some of the criteria conflict with each other, especially when the political factors, institutional arrangement, changing mission, competitive values, and assessment strategy are all taken into consideration. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 9 the lack of accountability mechanisms directly impacts the organization’s reputation. reputation is a core asset and strategic management object in csos, and, in view of the fact that the products csos provide are of non-physical attribute and csos bear public responsibility, increments of value of nonprofit activities are much reflected via reputation which is an intangible asset (zhang 2013). during the time of rapid development of csos in china, there inevitably emerged a reputation and trust crisis. for instance, some organizations are under the guise of being non-profit, turned to individual or small group profit. they abused, embezzled or misappropriated various forms of public welfare funds. some organizations pretended to serve the public interest, but used the organization to gain personal political position in fact. in 2007, a number of scandals emerged in public awareness, including the cartel in the instant noodle industrial association which forced up prices, the ‘guo meimei’ case of the chinese red cross, the ‘shangde’ charity fraud of charity federation, and the ‘project hope for africa fund’ from cydf. these public cases greatly shook csos’ public image in people’s hearts. undoubtedly, there are a variety of reasons for the loss of reputation of chinese csos. the three main ones are: (1) the lack of social monitoring mechanism. the products that csos provide have (quasi) public service properties; they are intangible and difficult to observe. therefore, under the condition of information asymmetry, the stakeholders of csos find it difficult to control and monitor organizational operation information effectively. (2) the lack of reputation punishment mechanism. in most advanced capitalist countries, csos are judged by their reputation with the public. however in china, csos form a public service market which is supplymonopolized. therefore the market has no means of comparative judgment and so the behavior of organizations may become distorted. the market has no way of punishing poor performing organizations. (3) the failure of incentive and constraint mechanisms. given the lack of organizational internal governance and external incentive and constraint, some leaders and staff in some csos are likely to pursue self-interest and bring serious damage to the organization’s reputation. the lack of credibility and reputation not only destroys people’s good heart for public benefits and the voluntary spirit, but also collapses the moral basis of csos, which in turn seriously impacts on the public trust of all csos. capability and functional problems of csos in sum, chinese csos are weak in functional implementation. most registered csos still continue the traditional way of management, acting as a ‘second government’ which gets 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 transferred regulatory power from the government. they do little more than carry out a specific function under direction from their administering department. there are only a few csos which are able to do some self-innovations according to market demand. qiang et al. (2004) took economic mass organizations as an example and pointed out that while the functions of industrial management cross and overlap among government departments and administrative agencies, the function of industrial management in organizations are weakened. professional management exists only in name, there is a lack of early warning management systems, a lack of macro-control management means, a disorder in self-disciplinary management function and management is not being linked with international practice. overall, the weak capability of chinese csos and their imperfect functions limit their capacity to participate in social management, and hinder their great contribution of serving society and meeting more social demands (li 2013; ren 2014; yao 2013). potential solutions solutions to problems inhibiting the development of csos in china have been proposed. to some extent these depend on further liberalization of the legal and registration system imposed by the state. however there is also much that cso organizations can do for themselves. remodeling the relationship between government and social group this mainly means the chinese government needs to change the traditional government management mode as soon as possible, establish new relationships between government and csos, transfer more management functions to the organizations, make csos become an important part of social and public governance, and establish a creative pluralistic society management system. the first step in this process must be the removal of the dual management system, and the creation of a single and broad registration system. in fact, this solution has become fact since the 18th national congress. however, implementation is at an early stage and the future direction is still uncertain. nonetheless the process is well underway, being led by experiments at municipal and provincial levels. guangzhou in particular has initiated a number of liberalization policies. among these is the removal of the requirement of organizations seeking registration to operate through a government ‘mother-in-law agency’. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 11 under the ‘direct registration system’ csos do not need to find any administrative body to rely on for establishment or management purposes. this of course places greater onus on the organization to manage its own affairs. other regions in china have also been trying to implement management institutional innovations for csos, such as ‘the model of unified competent business unit’ in wenzhou and the ‘association manages association’ model in anshan. the new measures are expected to be formalized at a national level under the much awaited new ‘charity law’. under the new law it is expected that more than one cso will be permitted to register within a given field, thus potentially providing some form of competition between cso providers. as wang and liu (2004) noted, the direction of the reform is to abate the state’s dominant force and strengthen social autonomy for csos. government support is still required particularly for those csos that are in the initial stage of development. the government does need to provide material support to assist independent csos to actualize their potential development. for example, government agencies may give assets support such as financial subsidies, supportive tax policy and purchasing services to individual csos. in particular, the purchasing service is an effective measure in reforming the government support model. it is not only conducive to establishing new government funding mechanisms, but also is conducive to reshaping the new ‘contract’ relationship between the government and the cso. again this appears to be led by guangzhou, including ‘provisional measures for government procurement of services from social organizations’ (icnl, 2015, p15) to encourage social organizations to bid for government projects to provide social services. guangzhou is also moving cautiously to permit more organizations to obtain permission to engage in public fundraising. the creation of a suitable legal environment for the development of csos plays an important role in promoting healthy growth, especially for the legal status of csos and the perfection of related policy and development. this requires both a set of uniform national laws governing all not for profit organizations, but also specific laws to differentiate and support different forms of cso. on the one hand, special laws and regulations for all csos has the great significance for clarifying the legal status and giving corresponding legal protection for csos’ operation. leng and zhang (2004) thought that from the view of rule-by-law, a major strategy of governing, and the needs of market economy development, it would be necessary to 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 introduce new legislation, the ‘law of mass organizations’, under the framework of the constitution as soon as possible and formulate various subordinate laws or regulations for mass organizations and industrial associations under this parent law. at present, existing legislation is piecemeal and inconsistent with most areas having no appropriate legislation. therefore, the relevant departments in the national people’s congress and government should set out the relevant law and regulations such as ‘law of nonprofit organizations’, to create national norms for the management of csos. on the other hand, it is important to set out different types of laws and regulations for different types of csos. the concept of csos is a very broad one, and it includes people-run non-enterprise organizations, social organizations, foundations, and so on, and within and between each of these there are major differences in the nature of the organization and therefore their legal requirements. therefore, the government should differentiate situations and set out special legislations to reflect these differences in order to change the phenomenon of ‘one-law-fit-all’ and guarantee the unique advantages of different types of csos. specifically, on the basis of the existing legislation, china should focus on four aspects of legislation, namely, the law and regulation of public csos, the law and regulation of industrial csos, the law and regulation of social csos and the law and regulation of peoplerun non-enterprise organization (for which the law and rules have already been set out). to perfect the relevant laws and regulations relating to csos is the only way to promote their development and provide a system guarantee of csos’ cultivation and development. as jiang (2012) confirmed, the management of chinese csos should eventually rely on the perfection of the legal system, especially for the perfection of a national-wide legal system and this is the only way to provide a stable environment for society, which enables csos long-term and sustainable development. the construction of appropriate accountability mechanisms from international experience, while different countries have different monitoring and accountability systems, the social supervision and governance mechanism is always an irreplaceable mechanism, and goes far beyond the limited control provided by government. to strengthen the social accountability and governance of csos, there are three main aspects: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 13 first is the public’s potential role in supervision and governance. putnam (1993) pointed out that public participation can promote the development of trust in social life. therefore, csos should allow and encourage citizens to participate in the process of the organization’s strategic planning, major decision making and performance evaluation. for instance, they can hold forums for civil feedback to achieve cooperation, dialogue and meaningful construction from citizens, and this makes citizens change their roles from passive people to active participants in the organization’s development. you (2013) also believed that public supervision can be conducted via auditing csos’ financial reports, and receiving information about the csos development plans. for this purpose, each cso needs to help the public understand and accept its social values by a variety of publicity events and make the social supervision channels smooth. in other words, csos need to change the public from passive supervision to an active one. second, independent third party supervision is essential. in the west, third party supervision is an important institution for csos and its role and functions exceed those of government’s (sun 2014). guo (2012) also confirmed that western countries not only focus on supervision from the public and the media, but also pay close attention to supervision from an independent third party. for example, the national charities information bureau in america provides a multi-form supervision service to society, government and citizens and it provides vital information to donors when they implement donations. third-party supervision can help stakeholders to effectively reduce the costs of collecting accurate, objective and fair information. those csos, which have obtained recognition through this evaluation process, can not only avoid losing the public’s trust due to the reputation scandal of some black sheep, but can also be inspired to improve their working performance and internal governance for sustainability and more certain external donations. therefore, china should have the consciousness to foster and develop this kind of independent and authoritative third party. this will over time gradually form the situation of ‘csos managing csos’ and eventually replace any need for a ‘dual management system’. third, other supervisions may also occur. in addition to the public and third party supervision and governance, supervision from the media and donors is also important. wang (2012) claimed that the mission of csos is to make the public interest come true and in order to keep all cso activities on track, it is vital to have objective social and media monitoring. public media is the main channel for the public to access information, and the media has wide 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 popularity and influence, playing a guiding role and having a deterrent effect. it can bring the strong force of constraint to csos’ managers. at the same time, donors are those who are both important and powerful in csos and they need the power to monitor the appropriate use of their donations. the self-construction of npos while the support of government and a legal framework is an essential precondition of cso development, ultimately it is up to each organization to take responsibility for its own development. those that rely passively on external agents will be unlikely to achieve their mission. the self-construction of csos is the main force for development and reform, and csos need to strengthen the construction of their own capabilities. this must begin with the construction of the organizations internal governance. it is easy to emphasize the constraints of self-development in the current system during the process of organizational development. but this can become an excuse to ignore the construction of organizational capability and dynamic mechanism to initiate and improve their internal capacity. among many factors, an effective internal governance structure is the key and necessary condition for success to the csos’ capability construction. therefore, chinese csos need to perfect their organizational internal governance mechanism, establishing an organizational internal ‘policy-making department, executing department and supervisory department’ as a three-in-one mechanism to restrain and supervise each other. in particular, the steps include: first, perfect the organization’s constitution, clearly defining the mission and vision of the organization. second, create or improve the organizational system, optimizing the existing csos’ structure. third, establish and perfect a governing board, which is separate from the management of the organization. this forms the organizational internal effective separation of powers and mutual supervision. fourth, perfect the incentive and constraint mechanism of management in order to attract high-quality talents, and to promote the professional construction in the organization. fifth, construct the organizations’ leadership to ensure that decisions from the board are rational and to overcome authoritarian and insider control phenomena. for example, we can learn from the experience of corporate governance and introduce a system of independent members for the board. overall, chinese csos should pay attention to their internal governance mechanism and optimize their structure in order to strengthen their development capability and the internal system construction. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 15 conclusion csos stand at an irreplaceable position in the construction of the socialist market economy in china. however, the deepening of social management system reform and government function transformation, and the csos’ own short-comings as well as the constraints in external development environment require urgent attention. it is important to understand the current situation and existing problems of chinese csos in order to identify the direction of future solutions so that csos may prosper. by attempting these solutions, csos may play a bigger and vital role in the social and economic development in china. undoubtedly, this paper is an overview of csos’ overall situation and it still needs further cases and empirical analysis to understand the specific way and problems of csos’ development in china. in addition, there are many different types of csos in the chinese context and each of them has different connotations and 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(in chinese) 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 development paths, problems and countermeasures of chinese civil society organizations abstract introduction the political context the existing problems of chinese csos development potential solutions conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 197 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia cosmopolitan sophistry: grounding politics in disorder and uncertainty jonathan marshall university of technology, sydney abstract conceptions of the state, nation and politics, in play in ‘the west’, usually descend from totalitarian models which are primarily platonic in origin. they aim for unity, harmony, wholeness, legitimate authority and the rejection of conflict, however much they claim to represent multiplicity. by expressing a vision of order, such models drive an idea of planning by prophecy as opposed to divination, as if the future was certain within limits and the trajectory was smooth. chaos theory and evolutionary ecology shows us that this conception of both society and the future is inaccurate. i will argue that it is useful to look at the pre-platonic philosophers, in particular the so-called sophists gorgias and protagoras and heraclitus with their sense of ongoing flux, the truth of the moment, and the necessary power of rhetoric in the leading forth of temporary functional consensus within the flux. this ongoing oscillation of conflict provides social movement and life rather than social death. opening this paper begins by asserting the importance of disorder and proceeds to caricature some aspects of primarily english speaking ‘western’1 1 ‘western’ is not a fixed absolutely definable category, any more than are ‘developed’, ‘first world’, ‘global north’ or other handy terms of the day. it shifts around ambiguously. the main point of using the term is to draw attention to the possibility that there are ‘non-western’ cosmopolitanisms, which escape the arguments presented here, although i think this unlikely. ‘western’ is not so much meant as a marker of inclusion, as a marker of limits. cosmopolitan/multicultural theory while pointing to some of the creative paradoxes and tensions which arise within cosmopolitanism’s use. amongst many paradoxes i point to cosmopolitan exclusion, suggesting that as cosmopolitanism involves a rhetoric of group category creation and an attempt to make unity, it may create and enforce an outside category and therefore undermine itself. i then argue that these cosmopolitan caricatures carry implicit theories also found in platonism, and suggest that some pre-platonic, or sophistic, philosophers (in particular heraclitus, gorgias and protagoras) give insights useful to social theorists and cosmopolitans generally, as they emphasise the failure of definitions as a mode of knowing, the flux and indeterminacy of reality, the relevance of paradox, the necessity of conflict and the importance of creative rhetoric in establishing social groups. i then further outline a rhetorical process of group formation and show how this impacts on our understanding of the paradoxes 198 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 and incoherencies of cosmopolitan politics and analysis. finally, the paper concludes with some pointers towards further thought. as ‘cosmopolitanism’ serves an explicit rhetorical function it is sophistic from the beginning. it further claims to be both a term of analysis and a political objective to which we are to be persuaded, and it deals with multiplicity, apparent contradictions and unity. within the sophist framework these features are not necessarily disorders but conditions of possibility. how we use terms politically or sociologically becomes part of the sociological or political dimension of life. these are not separate domains, and the term works through its evocation of opposites and the dynamics of disorder. disorder cannot be ignored in the manner in which implicit platonist seekers of ideal fixed truth and method do. disorder readers will not find an axiomatic, orderly and logical argument here, but that is the point: the argument assumes that the world is also messy and largely unpredictable2 . let us begin by proposing some axioms: • disorder is always present, and often produced by modes of ordering. the more we strive for an order the more our modes of ordering may disrupt that order, or produce apparent paradoxes. • disorder varies from moment to moment: it is not an eternal ‘object’. • disorder is political. it is defined or perceived differently from different social positions and different aims. so is order. what looks like order from one point of view can look like mess from another. in that way, order is also messy (marshall 2010). despite disorder being intertwined with order, we social theorists and cosmopolitans (and definitions of who ‘we’ are, are always messy3 2 an overly orderly presentation arguing that disorder is important may appear to be a contradiction, and thus undermine the points being made. yet if the argument is disorderly, then people may never arrive at the points, or become exasperated in the journey. hopefully, should it arise, that exasperation will still convey something to the reader about our collective attitudes towards disorder. ) prefer to separate them. disorder and disordering processes, tend to be either ignored by models and analyses (disorder is, for example, deleted from ideal types almost by definition), or disorder is seen as temporary or as a pathology – an indication of decay or transition. 3 a cosmopolitan paradox could centre around the question of whether, and when, the term ‘we’ is inclusive and ‘cosmopolitan’, or exclusive of its unmentioned other. i am using ‘we’ to indicate i am not external to, or above, the discourse i am currently discussing. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 199 if we describe a dynamic mess as if it was clear, ordered, static and predictable then we not only distort it, but use it as a rorschach blot, seeing what we hope and fear, and perhaps try to clean it up, or harmonise it according to those views, destroying it in the process. we may try to order the world to alleviate our own anxieties rather than act with attention to the world itself. disorder is often implicated in definitions of evil as loss of wholeness or as viscous and slimy (russell 2011). to the contrary, virtue is often defined in practice as clearing up disorder or as making order and harmony – but if disorder is natural and ordering can make disorder, then such virtue risks creating further problems. possibly people are at their worst and most severe, when they think they are doing good and removing the disorder that troubles them. considering this problem may cause us to ponder both applying our virtue, and the ill effects of not acting. it renders life more realistically complex. caricature whenever we summarise, or map, we distort. the summaries presented here are caricatures; they are exaggerated and don’t pretend to completeness as do ideal types, or normal descriptions4 . good caricatures are disturbing and disorderly. they are not likely to be taken as real. they have meaning in a particular moment (which shall later be discussed as kairos) and give attention to the potential of that moment. we may also be moved to wonder as to why we see a caricature as being like what it models; what are the limits of distortion before it becomes unrecognisable? what is involved in the (rhetorical) creation of similarity and difference, or the placing of ‘things’ in differing or similar categories? cosmopolitanism: a caricature of its ideals cosmopolitanism is hard to define. “cosmopolitanism is, of course, a contested term; there is no uniform interpretation of it in the growing literature” (beck & sznaider 2010, p. 382). there are distinctions made between ‘institutional’ and ‘moral’ cosmopolitan, everyday cosmopolitanism and presumably non-everyday cosmopolitanism, and so on (see the papers 4 distortions are not always and inevitably caricatures of course, however, we cannot limit what people will do with distortions, anymore than we can limit what they can read into a body of messages. when something becomes a sign it escapes its maker’s (or other’s) intentions. therefore attempts at communication can lead to either disharmony (‘how could they think i meant that?’), or to repressive exercises of power in an apparently necessary attempt to stabilise meanings. distortions, even if meant to be accurate, can become caricatures depending on how they are used – the question here is whether this is intentional, and self aware, or not. 200 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 in brown & held 2010). we may be tempted to say that everything is terminally unclear and incoherent. nevertheless, as caricature, i suggest that the categories ‘cosmopolitanism’ or ‘multiculturalism’ seem to express a family of ideas which include:5 • living together with difference in relative harmony. • mutual respect. • that dialogue, or presence, can lead to understanding. • ideals like universal democracy or universal justice are vital. • a hope for stability or continuing order. • legitimate authority and the rejection of conflict. • increasing global interaction and shared risk. • a hope for world government of some kind • a degree of mobility of some parts of the population. (see papers in brown & held 2010; appiah 2006; archiburgi 2008; beck 2006; carey 2003). there often seems to be a sense that because we need cosmopolitanism, it will necessarily happen. [t]he cosmopolitan outlook means that, in a world of global crisis and dangers produced by produced by civilization, the old differentiations between internal and external, national and international, us and them, lose their validity and a new cosmopolitan realism becomes essential to survival (beck 2006, p. 14). this is perhaps an example of a theorised order and harmony being used to relieve anxiety about disorder. while cosmopolitanism is not a fixed thing, it does imply a universalism and an ordering or an aimed for harmony. use of the term may also attempt (successfully or unsuccessfully) to undermine the importance of some previous splintering identity categories such as race, religion, kinship or national culture, in favour of a wider order. appiah (2006) for example thinks that we can establish commonalities amidst dialogue and getting used to each other while zizek (1999) suggests that we need a universality for political action. from a perspective which sees disorder as important, we may also wonder what disorders cosmopolitanism creates, and what we undermine, or ignore, through its application. 5 not all these ideas must be present of course, but at least some of them will be. for more on the social use, construction and contestation of categories see marshall (2006). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 201 some of the family of ideas underlying cosmopolitanism, as described above, have paradoxical overtones. democracy can lead to leaders attempting to gain support for themselves by stirring the hostility of a majority (or large minority) towards others. justice is decided through relations of power, conflict, condemnation and exclusion, and through the argumentative creation of similarity or difference to precedent and social category. bringing people into contact or dialogue can emphasise differences that they were not previously aware of, and were formerly quite happy to ignore; even using the same language may not always lead to mutual understanding. cultural borrowing can be a form of exploitation. connection can spread disruption speedily through networks. political integration can lead to new disputes, spreading of old disputes, and pushing of responsibility elsewhere (as when people won’t act on climate change unless everyone else does). localisms may be strengthened in opposition to globalisms, while being spread through globalisation. movement of peoples can lead to the building of physical, and other, barriers. similarly, can we always ask everyone (slaves and slave owners for example) to exist in harmony? cosmopolitanism is enframed in tensions between: nation and diaspora, local and global, cultural and universal, power and suppression, purity and borrowing, hybridity and ethnic cleansing, relativism and global ethics, preservation of difference and levelling of difference. these oppositions collide, rather than separate out in accord with a desire for analytic neatness. there are also some common criticisms of ‘cosmopolitanism’ which display some further paradoxes in the idea, such as: • cosmopolitan tolerance involves power and marginalises those being tolerated (brown 2008). • cosmopolitanism is a western concept tied in with western imperialism or capitalist globalisation, and requires that we ignore histories of imperialism (cheah 2006)6 • to be truly cosmopolitan and live together in harmony we should all become christians, muslims, capitalists, communists, indians, or perhaps cosmopolitans. this hardly needs comment, other than to point out yet again . harvey (2000, pp. 532ff.) points out that kant’s cosmopolitanism, often considered the foundation of contemporary cosmopolitanism, is connected to something resembling a white supremacist geography. 6 as with appiah’s claims that, say, aboriginal ownership of relics is the same as disney’s ownership of mickey mouse and an infringement of universal cultural rights (2006, p.130). 202 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 the difficulty of defining ‘cosmopolitanism’ universally. appiah calls such monotonic cosmopolitanisms ‘counter cosmopolitanisms’ (2006, chapter 9) and fine (2007, pp.142-3) points to forms of nationalism, wherein the interests of a particular nation state become taken as universal. • multicultural versions of cosmopolitanism essentialise identity, reducing it to ethnicity thus producing “caged ethnicities” (hage 1998) and risk increasing interethnic violence (sen 2006). • cosmopolitanism is a revolt of the mobile elites against the localised masses (delanty 2006, p.26). • cosmopolitanism, as sociological analysis, depends on the decline of the nation state and the even-globalisation of the economy everywhere, but there is little evidence this is happening; we cannot even agree on common action on climate change (lind 2011). cosmopolitanism is a hope or policy not a current reality. cosmopolitan tensions and prophecy the pro-cosmopolitan school seems to load the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ with theories emphasising the unifying consequences of conversation, globalisation, political integration, ngo presence, cultural borrowing, justice and so forth, without much reflection on the disunifying processes. the basic implication seems to be that we could all live in harmony if only we just increased our virtue or changed our thoughts, and thus that achieving cosmopolitanism is largely a matter of correct policy and good will. however, the evidence from the world is not that encouraging. even if you achieved correct policy it may not remain correct as relationships change. similarly goodwill cannot always be maintained. the anticosmopolitan school focuses on the fracture without seeing any unities, which is equally unreal. indeed, the criticisms of cosmopolitanism come from a cosmopolitanism point of view, seeing it as not harmonious enough. in other words, the idea of cosmopolitanism, while useful and perhaps essential, is inherently paradoxical and prone to self-undermining. these contradictions go to the heart of cosmopolitan politics, leading either to relativism in which we accept anything provided it is ‘within cultural tradition’ or to the assumption that some morality is obvious and universal. thus beck and sznaider write: the principle that women and children should not be sold or enslaved, the principle that people should be able speak freely about god or their government without being tortured or their lives being threatened – these are so self-evident that no violation of them could meet with cosmopolitan tolerance (2010, p. 399). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 203 this cuts out a great deal of the world that we might want to interact with. appiah’s book is filled with similar glosses, but nevertheless some principles remain “if you are the person in the best position to prevent something really awful, and if it won’t cost you much to do so, do it” (2006, p. 161). not perhaps an over onerous demand, and easy to avoid as there is almost always an imagined other person who could take the action. a fundamental paradox in the good intentions in cosmopolitan politics arises when it meets those who would destroy it from within. that is, issues of cosmopolitan tolerance or acceptance of an enemy, who may not even be an intentional enemy. what does a cosmopolitan do with people who cultivate ignorance of others, who denounce other forms of understanding, or who work to prevent such understanding? this is a marked problem in an information society, where limitation of information to bias confirmation is relatively easy. if cosmopolitans do not take seriously the option that there are those who wish to destroy cosmopolitanism, then those cosmopolitans are not open to the culture of the other, and are not embracing a cosmopolitanism that takes others seriously. if, however, we do take these others seriously and decide to exclude them because they are hostile to our culture, then we violate our principles and lose persuasiveness and moral justification. more shall be said on this later. cosmopolitanism is a theory with consequences which acts as a guide for action as well as analysis. a position of intentional harmony through ordering (whether excluding or not), implies that human life is conscious, that we know all the variables and the ways they interact, and can predict the result of our actions7 7 once admitted, unconscious processes point to the non-simplicity of our self which constantly faces disruption by the necessary ordering processes of the ego, and which disrupts that ego in turn. without some idea of the dynamics of unconscious processes (and our resulting attractions to that which we suppress, or our tendency to project our own ‘evil’ onto disorder, or onto those who thwart us), then we will never understand why plans are disrupted. . as a result, cosmopolitan theory implies that we can plan by a model of prophecy. that is, we can declare the future (and the results of our actions) with certainty, as opposed to divination a continual looking at the signs at that moment (kairos) – as if the future was determined within limits and the trajectory to that point was smooth. however, chaos theory and evolutionary ecology shows us that this conception of both society and the future is inaccurate as, in sufficiently complex interactive systems, increasing accuracy in our observations does not converge on a particular result, as is the normal statistical assumption, but may give widely variant results (the so called 204 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 butterfly effect). similarly while these results depend upon ‘initial conditions’, in social life there are no simple initial conditions. something has always preceded; hence the selection of initial conditions is largely arbitrary (prigogine 1997). prophecy also becomes attractive because we think we understand people, when in fact not only do we fail to understand others, even others close to us, but we do not understand ourselves – and possibly cannot understand ourselves and others (watts 2011). test how well you can predict any person’s behaviour exactly over a two day period. the chances are high that you will not do very well. you certainly won’t predict much of what they will be thinking, or how they (or others) might interpret what is said or done. people are not a class or fixed category (understanding one business person is not understanding them all), and understanding to even a limited degree takes work and openness to correction. plato the idea being proposed is that cosmopolitanism is not definable, is self undermining or paradoxical, is open to argument and, at best, will posses some of a number of characteristics, making for endless debate as to whether a particular system is cosmopolitan or not. politically, cosmopolitanism implies an ability to predict the consequences of people’s actions and of policies which seems implausible. ideas that cosmopolitanism can be defined independently of the rhetorical/political processes that create a version of it, or that it will necessarily arise from current social processes, either ignore or prematurely resolve these issues. to try and explain why cosmopolitanism seems to be conceived as a relatively simple unity, let us return to plato and caricature. i assert that most politics today is platonic and monotheistic because it seeks to impose order, it sees order as natural and virtuous, and one. within this schema, disorder is the result of ignorance, vice or sabotage, not just of the way things work; disorder is rarely seen as inherent or potentially informative. the political and philosophical aim is unity, harmony, wholeness, legitimate authority and the rejection of conflict. i will try and contrast this platonism with a ‘sophistic’ approach – hopefully without making that approach too uniform8 8 the issues are not purely ‘western’, a similar kind of contrast might be made between taoism and confucianism; again with ambiguity as its easy to do a taoist reading of confucius and because taoism, as practiced, has tended to become confucian. perhaps the same point could be made with charvaka against almost every other indian philosophy, or between some sufisms and mainstream islam. . cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 205 it is, in this argument, of little concern that plato is sometimes totalitarian, as probably few people are directly influenced by the republic or the laws, and that subject is already covered by popper (1949) among others. plato is perhaps a bit more ambiguous than this in reality (clark 2003). no one can be rigorously platonic; the ideal always has to be violated to maintain the ideal. anyway, if plato is not always an explicit platonist, we can still look for the signs of platonism, which are: • belief in definition – categories are permanent, and all things with the same name must be similar in the same way. things exist, corresponding to the terms, with explicit commonality, or the person is engaging in meaningless ignorance. in this view, democracy and cosmopolitanism are not political terms argued over by particular people and groups and used to evoke a particular hope, but terms which either refer to a reality (or potential reality), or are without meaning. the standard process of a platonic dialogue is that socrates asks for a definition. if the person interrogated cannot give one, or prefers to list by example, they are declared to be ignorant. socrates’ move against sophists has two pincers. first to try and get the sophist to delimit what they are teaching. thus a shoemaker would make shoes, what does a sophist make? (plato gorgias §447). if the sophist, in plato’s writings, agrees to this form of interrogation (which they might not in reality), then socrates asks them to define what it is they are teaching/making. if the sophist cannot define this so as to cover all cases, then they have shown themselves to be ignorant and incapable. plato would suggest that we should either get a correct definition of cosmopolitanism, or abandon it altogether to the contrary, sophism suggests, that not only ‘cosmopolitanism’, but many other terms which are important in delimiting social and political groups, inherently cannot be defined, and that it is necessary for them to be ongoingly understood through rhetoric and action for them to ‘work’ at all. in a platonic view, all the elements of cosmopolitanism, as discussed above, must be necessary or present when the term cosmopolitanism is used, if they are relevant for that term. again a sophistic view denies this and would accept a list of potential and shifting factors. 206 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 • belief that the ideal world is static or harmonious. hence we can ignore the mess of this world. when combined with the first expectation that all real things can be defined, this can lead people to expect their categories to be both static and abstract. goodness, for example, is enduring and orderly. we are not interested in this good, but the good, as good is eternal and universal. there is no flux in reality, only in appearance or in the secondary world. in this view, clear ideas are more important than mess, and indeed they exclude it, so the actual disorderly world becomes secondary to the ideal world of ideas. this kind of attitude appears unconsciously when people assume that the ruling class is a whole or has one set of interests, that nations exist, that justice has a force in itself and can be agreed upon, that pure cosmopolitanism (without paradox) can exist or manifest in harmony, or that good cannot destroy anything that is not evil and thus that if cosmopolitanism is good it has no harmful consequences. as should be clear from the famous story of the cave in the republic (§514ff), the philosopher brings back the vision of order from the real abstract world to the disorderly prison of this world. platonists look first for theorised harmony and integration, and give them causal priority or importance. at the end of the cratylus (§440), where socrates dialogues with a follower of heraclitus, socrates suggests that if all is flux, then naming cannot work and we cannot know anything. this might be unfortunate, but it does not mean the world has to depend on static abstractions, or that mess is not an important part of reality. • everything has one opposite. therefore, if the opposite of democracy is tyranny, there must be nothing in common between any specific examples of democracy or tyranny. static, abstract categories can be kept pure in ways which non ideal categories and realities cannot. for example in the platonic dialogue protagoras, socrates argues that “everything has one opposite and not more than one” so as to declare that justice is one unified thing with no touch of the impure disorder of intemperance (§332ff). in this view differences tend to become melded into oppositions and opposites cannot be present together, or be dynamically interesting. thus a platonist wishing to use the term cosmopolitanism must repress its multiple opposites and incoherencies; sophists would celebrate and utilise them. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 207 • there is only one type of truth. approximation or mess is a denial of truth. this is expressed in the cratylus as mentioned above, and the protagoras continues the ideal of tidying by removing oppositions as stated above. hence mess cannot be really real and thus may need to be suppressed, which (in theory) will not diminish anything. • dialogue can lead to rapprochement, virtue or justice, and uncover or transmit knowledge. plato implies that real dialogues work better than written ones, but nevertheless the overwhelming idea is that dialogue (dialectic) leads in a positive direction. as i have already suggested dialogue (however cosmopolitan) can increase disagreement, conflict and the appearance of injustice. what is good in one situation may not always produce what you think is good in another. • if we know what is good and what it is to be good then we will seek this good. this is essentially socrates’ theory of virtue, and why theory is so important to his virtue. if we do not attain the good through knowledge, and not everyone can, then we must be compelled to seek it by the knowledgeable elite of philosopher kings. the metaphor plato deploys is that of the physician. if the patient refuses to do what is necessary for their recovery then they should be compelled (gorgias §477ff, §480, §521). we might contrast this with gorgias, who according to plato, argued that the person who knew persuasion was perhaps more effective in helping a patient than a good physician who could not persuade (ibid. §456). gorgias’ position implies both a degree of democracy and free will amongst the ruled, and a degree of practical ‘makedo’ in the situation rather than the imposition of perfection across all situations. plato’s position implies that correct knowledge is found in advance through discussion and then acted upon, while the sophist implies that knowledge is found while doing. • true philosophers are reluctant to be political. the republic, argues that the best people, the philosophers, will not rule voluntarily. plato’s famous allegory is the ‘ship of state’ in which a ship’s crew mutiny against the captain, thinking all are equal. the crew will never choose the wise, and apparently dreamy, philosopher to tell them what to do, and disaster results. “the philosopher should not beg of mankind to be put 208 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 in authority over them” (§488ff). this is functionally convenient as platonists then don’t have to risk an encounter with real politics and mess; they can stay in their ideal world of pure ideas and virtues. sophists let us carry these criticisms of plato further by looking at pre-platonic philosophy in more detail. heraclitus, gorgias and protagoras are what i will call sophists of flux. they have differences as well commonalities, but here i am primarily interested in their differences from plato. this is another caricature. at the conclusion of his dialogue the sophist (§268) plato characterises a sophist as a person who causes self-contradiction, imitates appearance, and juggles words. sophists were also criticised by plato for having no roots, for wandering and attracting foreigners, which suggests some cosmopolitan default (tell 2011, chapter 5). however, it seems likely that sophist cosmopolitanism was more a denial of ties to one place or culture, than it was an assertion about universality; there is no forced unity here. aristides also claimed that plato reviled the sophists because of his “contempt both for the masses and his contemporaries” (sprague 1972, p. 1), which could imply that sophists were at least interested in those ‘masses’. it needs to be emphasised that compared to the shelves of platonic writings that have survived from the ancient world (from plato, through albinus, philo, plotinus, proclus, porphry, iamblichus, to simplicius and the neo-platonic commentators on aristotle), the christian platonists (clement of alexandria, origen, augustine) and the islamic platonists (al-kindi, al-farabi, ibn sina), almost nothing survives of the writers we are about to discuss – just a few sentences here and there, and some paragraphs largely by enemies. they have almost been removed from history. people still wish sophists to be removed. alain badiou, who is known as an activist philosopher, claims it is the job of philosophy to destroy sophism and flux yet again – something he does first by attacking the early wittgenstein; and then abusing the late wittgenstein as sophist, thinking we shall take that as argument enough. the purge must be performed to gain philosophic purity. for badiou sophism is philosophy reflected badly and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 209 emptied of truth (bosteels 2011, pp.25ff). i suggest sophism is politics emptied of monotypical truth, and good intentions emptied of one truth only. sophists should be annoying, and turn everything over: they should be superficial, in order not to pretend to the profundity or depth which comes from avoidance of disorder and paradox. let us begin with heraclitus, although he is not usually considered to be a sophist, as he sets down some of the basics. heraclitus heraclitus is often known as ‘the obscure’, and the fact that he survives in fragments helps render him more obscure. one saying is: the way up and down is one and the same (§60; sweet 1995, p. 27). the path goes both ways, however much we want it to go one way only. if we insist that it only goes one way then we are suppressing ‘things’, or generating a paradox. the point is, that by analogy, ‘oppositions’ can exist together, not disconnectedly, and this is what gives a thing/event its usefulness. cosmopolitanism can be productively paradoxical and bidirectional, as that is the nature of terms and reality. carl jung quotes the following fragment which is not found in the usual collections of heraclitea (1953, p. 425, n.37). fate is the logical product of enantiodromia creator of all things (stobaeus ecl. i. 60). assuming this fragment is genuine, heraclitus is arguing that we switch from one thing to another, in particular from one opposition to another, or that events proceed from interplay. there is never just ‘the one’, or even the one direction. increasing the strength of one pole at the expense of another, leads to oscillations which, if held back, produce collapse. a strong cosmopolitanism, may generate a strong reaction against it. more generally heraclitus argues that: what is in opposition is in agreement and the most beautiful harmony comes out of things in conflict. all happens [or, ‘is born’] according to strife (§8; sweet 1995, p.5). disorder and conflict, action and reaction, are part of dynamics. they are not always bad, and may be essential. 210 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 for the harmony of the universe, like that of a lyre or a bow, is by alternatives, and in mortal affairs there is nothing pure and unmixed. but as in music there are low notes and high notes, and in grammar there are vowels and consonants, yet a musician or a grammarian is not the man who dislikes and avoids the one or the other, but rather the man who knows how to use all and to blend them properly so also in human affairs, which contain the principles of opposition to each other; since, as euripides has it, the good and bad cannot be kept apart, but there’s some blending, so that all is well (plutarch de tranquill. §15; p.219) cosmopolitanism can be driven by conflict. its harmonies arise out of allowed, expected and cultivated dispute, or out of clashes with forms of anti-cosmopolitanism. in any case, its manifestation depends on art, as much as, if not more than a set of rules, fixed definitions or prophecies. heraclitus argues for the importance of change. seneca writes: and i, while i say these things are changed, am myself changed. this is what heraclitus means when he says, into the same river we descend twice and do not descend, for the name of the river remains the same, but the water has flowed on. this in the case of the river is more evident than in case of man, but none the less does the swift course carry us on (patrick 1969, §41). for platonists, there is a fixed place in the soul or in god, for heraclitus there is no fixed place, nor is there any place outside, from which to forge fixedness. life does not stay the same and attempts to fix life, or forms of life, produce death. the ever-presence of flux, undermines normal concepts of ‘being’ – there is no stasis or purity, never a moment in which ‘something’ is not changing into something else. similarly, cosmopolitanism is not fixed and neither are the people who participate within it; everything is in flux forever. one consequence of this situation is that the categories we use to explain the world are themselves deceiving because they attempt to stop flow. the world escapes language, but we have to use language to understand and act on the world. even more disconcertingly, flux may or may not be orderly: “the fairest kosmos is random pile of sweepings” (§124, sweet 1995, p. 51). if the world is not orderly, then it is not predictable in detail and we must always adapt to the kairos, the moment, and flux, not to an imagined abstract perfection or fixed aim. it implies we need to abandon our sense that we can prophesise, rather than divine, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 211 what will result from our and other’s actions. uncertainty is fundamental and words/ categories distort flux. gorgias & protagoras: rhetoric as philosophy and the moment of virtue gorgias and protagoras take paradox, opposition, the uncertainty of flux, and the distortion of words seriously. for gorgias, it appears that there are some central terms. the meanings are necessarily hazy, so the explanations here are not firm; they are plausible. others may say differently. • rhetoric: gorgias and protagoras are both associated with rhetoric. rhetoric, according to aristotle (1926), is what we use when we argue from uncertainty. contrary to aristotle, sophism recognises that uncertainty is the normal state, not an inferior one. therefore, we humans are forced to make use of comparison, probability, and plausibility and always use rhetoric. • paradoxologia involves moving out of the commonplace, and being aware of the arguments on ‘both’ sides; the potential similarities and differences between ‘things’. we could tie paradoxalogia to the opposites of heraclitus and the statements of protagoras that there are two possible positions on every question, opposed to each other (sprague 1972, p. 13; plato protagoras §331). the recognition of fundamental uncertainty makes it worthwhile to be aware of all the possible arguments which can be discovered, and not be devoted to the one argument. that way we can respond to the moment rather than the ideal. lawyers and judges may need this awareness to find as much truth as possible amidst their uncertainty in a trial. • kairos is the name given to the properties of moment and implies attention needs to be given to that moment. as there is no ideal, there is, for example, no generalised and definable areté (excellence, virtue). there is ‘only’ the areté of this moment and the persons involved; the point of power depends on the kairos, so the techniques (say of cosmopolitanism) used at one moment, may not work later. there is always flux. smith argues that kairos points to a qualitative character of time, to the special position an event or action occupies in a series, to a season when something appropriately happens that cannot happen just at ‘any time,’ but only at that time, to a 212 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 time that marks an opportunity which may not recur (2002, p. 47). • political knowledge is universally distributed. plato reports protagoras as arguing that political wisdom was distributed amongst all humans by the gods, otherwise we could not live in society (protagoras §322ff.). thus, at best, the philosopher is one of many, an adviser and teacher, but not an ideal ruler. the sophist has some faith in the wisdom of others. a good cosmopolitanism, if it can arise in all its splinteredness and dynamics, will arise from the bottom up, even if seeded, and exemplified, by the sophist. that is the sophist’s limit. if people resist, then that resistance may express some unperceived political wisdom, not just evil or ignorance, and this could be attended to. • understanding by listing and multiplicity: as we have argued, plato assumes that important terms can be defined, that all eventualities of what we label by a term are the same, and that if we find the right meaning we have solved the problem. so much as we can reconstruct gorgias position, he refuses this. as already stated, the best one can do is not to define areté (virtue or excellence) but to list examples of it relative to kairos, social position, aims, work being done etc, and to exemplify it yourself. areté is not understood uniformly. thus, we can list ideas which could be part of ‘cosmopolitanism’, without caring whether the term can be properly defined, or whether everyone agrees on the absolute vital factors of its definition. protagoras and gorgias and other sophists open the questions of ‘what if we don’t know what is beneficial or virtuous, or if the virtuous is not beneficial for someone, or what if we don’t agree on virtue, or what is virtuous at one time is not at another? what if there is no ideal justice, no ideal virtue, no single benefice? what if the law benefits the law enforcers? what if, as heraclitus implies, every kairos is different? if you cannot step into the same river twice, or even once?’ a thing might be good for some persons but bad for others, or at one time good and at another time bad for the same person, [but they are not the same] (dissoi logoi in sprague 1972, pp.279ff.). this approach leads to the common accusation by those who believe in rules, definitions and the oneness of virtue, that sophists are not virtuous. however, without the need to define everything for all time and space, we can admit that some cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 213 may, at some times and less at others, not be well disposed to certain aspects of cosmopolitanism; they may even find themselves harmed by it. this reinforces the necessity of listening to the discontents who tell us about disorders we do not perceive. we can then worry whether this harm is internal or paradoxical to the project, despite our intentions, rather than retire into a certainty of good. this oscillation is part of reality. • power of words. gorgias insists we are never removed from words, and words have consequences. words alter the psyche as if by witchcraft. we cannot see the whole truth of all the past or the present (as memories are not the past), and so words are what make the situation real to us, or present it to us, and in doing so bind the soul (sprague 1972, p. 52). gorgias also points out that words are not the things themselves and thus do not re-present things or events (ibid., p.46). we are always dealing with approximations, swayings and inclinations. we can be using the same words but understanding them differently. whether we like it or not we live amidst magic. “[t]he process of cosmopolitanization is bound up with symbol and ritual, and not just with spoken ideas” (beck & sznaider 2010, p. 388). again cosmopolitanism can be seen as a rhetorical art, or magical act, which brings itself forth, amongst many different rhetors with no single focus, in a specific kairos. • truth. plato holds geometry is truth, while aristotle tells us that protagoras argues that geometrical objects, like perfect circles and tangents do not exist (sprague 1972, p. 22). for sophists, models are not real. the actual properties of things in this world, their disorders, are more important than models. the kairos of events is different, so the events are different, although we must make them similar to be able to talk about them, and thus we could explore the kinds of processes involved in creating similarity and difference for us. just as sophists deny the existence of ‘the good’ but don’t deny that acts/events can be more or less good in a particular kairos, so they deny the existence of ‘the truth’ but don’t deny that statements can be more or less true in that kairos. recognising that truth is problematic and even momentary, we might avoid taking our implicit understandings and models as eternal and necessarily the case. 214 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 i will briefly assert there are different types of true statement, although the following list is not meant to be exhaustive.  definitional: where things are defined as being the case. a cat is a mammal of the genus felis. 1+1=2. consistency of definition is important, and may lead to uncovering other properties of the world as so defined.  propositional: where things are said to be the case, and within the boundaries of the definitions and other means of checking seem to be the case. the cat sat on a lap.  close enough for practical purposes. the cat is half a metre long; all measurements are imprecise.  symbolic or poetic: statements about ultimate, or basic, things will tend to be symbolic as they are currently beyond human knowledge or ability to know literally. the symbols will rhetorically and symbolically point towards these ultimates. similarly poetic metaphors can lead to understanding, insight or relationship, but it would be a mistake to take these metaphors as literal. a lover is not a summer’s day. atoms did not turn out to be hard or indivisible.  procedural: knowing how to do something. take the cat for a walk as opposed to saying ‘she is taking the cat for a walk’. note the person may not be able to tell you how to take a cat for a walk so that you can do it, but could perhaps point you in the direction. only with definitional truth can there be absolute accuracy. in the other cases there is the possibility of better accuracy or accomplishment; nothing is ever done perfectly, so truth is not exhausted or fully expressed, but it can get ‘better’. what counts as ‘true enough’ may vary with different social aims, and different rhetorics of framing and grouping. it is not that there is no truth, but acting in reality outside of pure definition, some degree of error (and appropriateness to the moment) is as good as it gets. we can act and continually test our predictions and the accuracy of our statements, or play with the definitions. is snaffy a cat or a tiger? is pauline a catholic or an australian? (or is that a meaningful question?) is multi-culturalism cosmopolitan? part of the art of rhetoric is to point out the probabilities and to create our perceptions when things are unclear – which is most of the time. rather than saying there is no truth, as is often alleged, the sophist’s question is ‘what are the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 215 criteria of truth in a particular situation?’ while truth is not one, some statements can be true and some can be true enough. • finally, sophists, as opposed to platonists, do not seem to have assumed that you can learn from dialogue. gorgias for example in his list of situations of persuasion, implies that in dialogue you may be persuaded to things or make mistakes which you might not, if you were to stand back and think carefully (sprague 1972, p. 81). contrary to plato, there are circumstances in which we might prefer a book to dialogue, because the book cannot interrupt our thinking process and cannot so easily send us down false trails; we can reflect upon it. sophists, in their teaching procedure, seem to have assumed that people learnt, not by dialogue or just by accumulation of knowledge, but by emulation, and by encountering problems in their lives and working out how to deal with them with hands-on help. to use a platonic simile: is it possible to teach a person to make shoes by talking about it alone? or to make cosmopolitanism by debate alone? the sophist position is that you learn by being in the presence of one who knows or does (as best they can), and follow them and are corrected by them. then you might go to another sophist etc. you learn by apprenticeship, not by reading or talking. learning is social, not abstract. if you wish to teach, you teach by example, which you cannot avoid doing anyway. if, in dealing with the cosmopolitan paradox, you suppress those who oppose your cosmopolitanism, then you are teaching that cosmopolitanism is about suppression. fighting terror with terror risks legitimating the original terror. sophism suggests a connection between truth, uncertainty and social-rhetorical processes. in particular it gives the sense that a) words and reality are always changing; b) that the creation and recognition of truths involves the creative use of language; c) that this can create potential oppositions and messes, and; d) that this is important in social, political and moral life. by pushing identity into category and rhetoric, sophism politicises it; identity is what you do politics with, with others and against others. it is creative. this is made clearer by more recent work on group formation and persuasion by nick hopkins and steve reicher (1997), and this allows us to think further about the creation of cosmopolitan identities and their relations to others. 216 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 categorisation theory hopkins and reicher add to sophist ideas about the importance of rhetoric in positioning us in uncertainty and creation. they argue that rhetoric is social and that rhetorical language has the potential to use and construct social-group categories and affiliations so as to include us with others, exclude us from others, and position us against others. it matches agreement with conflict. in a paper on an abortion debate hopkins & reicher (1997) show how effective persuaders: • define category boundaries so as to include as many of the audience as possible; • try to make the audience and speaker part of a common category; • construct the recommended actions or beliefs as congruent with this category and, if possible, as a good example of category behaviour; and finally • try to make opposing arguments represent an outgroup category. we are more easily persuaded by someone who we categorise as belonging to our own selfcategory, and less easily persuaded by those we categorise as belonging to an outgroup category. making some belief or behaviour a good example, or prototype of how, a member of social category should behave “depends upon increasing differences from outgroup members and decreasing differences from members of the same category” (turner et al 1987, p.155). because of this dynamic of persuasion, groups, by moving away from their perceived prototypes of negatively valued others, can move to an ‘extreme’ position rather than towards an existing more ‘median’ position, which might be closer to the other group (ibid., p. 151). the prototypic response of a group does not necessarily correspond to the ingroup mean of responses (ibid., p.80-1). conflict framing can strengthen categories, thus causing ‘ambiguous’ individuals to be expelled and help bring group members to the extreme position. for example, while the average republican in the us may share much with the average democrat, the rhetoric of persuasion, separation and purity has tended to drive republican prototypes further towards ‘the right’, dragging with them those who identify as part of that group. this effect has been unintentionally promoted by democrats moving to the right and attempting to take over the ‘middle’ ground. making a group different from our own, which of course they are as no groups are the same, tends to suppress recognition of what the groups have in common, while rendering all members of that group similar. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 217 in other words, to persuade people of things risks destroying the possibilities of what you aim for. again we are faced with another paradox. dedicated cosmopolitan persuasion, and creation of a cosmopolitan self-category, risks creating an ‘other’ (a non-cosmopolitan selfcategory) and forcing people into it, so as to distinguish them from good cosmopolitans. these excluded people may also embrace and create the category to distinguish themselves from cosmopolitans. if faced with the original cosmopolitan paradox we opt for the exclusion of those who don’t tolerate or are hostile to cosmopolitanism, we may need to wonder whether the categorygroup we are excluding and creating is uniform or whether we are making them uniform. indeed, by creating uniformity and opposition, we may be making people who were prepared to co-exist, classify themselves with the excluded and their hostile ideology, and thus generating support for our overthrow. problems of increasing category opposition are particularly marked when, in order to remove oppression and increase inclusion, you have to emphasise the oppressed category and the differences between the categories involved, even if you want to emphasise their similarities. without this emphasis on difference, on not fitting in, on opposition, you cannot talk about the oppression. this talk also leads to increased conflict, possibly increased unhappiness, and risks destroying the recognition of similarities and bondings, and hence inclusion. yet it may be necessary. politically, we can say that particular categories may or may not be useful for motivating groups at particular times – again the kairos is important. thus the category of ‘working class’ may no longer work politically in australia, partly because the right has associated the category with failure, and disharmony. it is hard to say who is working class, or can identify as working class – accountants, minor managers, artists, police etc? – yet it is still a major way of framing different interests and stopping them from being subsumed into the interests of a more dominant group. similarly, views which accept the unified ‘other’, intensify images of their power, thus talk of the ruling class, can make this object seem real and unified and thus unshakeable, when this may not be the case. the unification is both real and unreal. we cannot talk about it without giving it properties it may not have, and making it appear more insurmountable than it is. 218 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 talking about groups politically and coming to understand them can firm those groups in their oppositions, magnify the oppositions, and increase frictions. attempts to remove oppression or promote unity can be paradoxical. counter-plato instead of world which is (or should be) ordered, by abstract models, harmony, unity, definition, constancy and absence of contradiction, we might consider a world in which: • flux is basic. • variation is important (similarity and difference are not always given). • categories vary with use, and this is part of their use. • definitions are useful but do not always produce knowledge. words and categories change in meaning and application depending on the kairos, the comparison, and the context or framing of the word-event. how we frame the questions will affect our answers. • not everything belonging to a category belongs in the same way. we can define by listing. • increased communication can promote disharmony. learning does not just occur through dialogue, and dialogue is often not enough. • persuasion can increase oppositions, as can attempts to recognise oppression. • conflict and harmony (opposites) exist together. paradox is basic. states of affairs can both reinforce and undermine themselves. • there is no single overall virtue or justice. virtue is not just knowledge. • rather than ‘the general’ we consider the moment (the kairos), ‘things as they are’ at this time. • feedback and iterative unpredictability of complex systems is taken for granted –hence the concern with kairos. • philosophers do get involved in politics and thus discover things; this is how they learn and the purpose of philosophy is practice. the sophist is not focused on another ideal world. • political sense (or confusion) is not confined to philosophers or the particularly knowledgeable. • we recognise disorder as always present, political, and intertwined with ordering systems. disorder is not necessarily bad and can be informative. comments: the cosmopolitan hope? the mess now hopefully forms some kind of knot, having chaotically circulated around various issues in the disorder of cosmopolitanism, tying them together but not completely. the main problem i have presented is that order, even cosmopolitan order, tends to undermine itself. discussion and persuasion can also undermine their own aims and create conflict, isolation and otherness. certainly there is nothing in communication or being together that automatically produces harmony. the kairos can lead in either direction, and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 219 indeed, harmony may not be required. even if we had order, we would still have disorder. simply put, the world is not as implied by plato. i have further tried to show that pre-platonic sophism directs our attention to these problems, and is thus more useful to cosmopolitans, than an implicit platonism. what then is the way forward? firstly we accept that cosmopolitanism, as process and as term, is non-definable and not static. there is no platonic ideal conception; it shifts with the moment. as some already recognise, this is not necessarily bad: cosmopolitanism may… be a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic character are not only as yet unspecified but also must always escape positive and definite specification, precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncosmopolitan thing to do (pollock, et al. 2002, p.1). so let us not be too platonic in our worries about definition. we can list good and bad characteristics to be realistic, and explore how these interact and interfere with each other. the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ may refer to many types of attempted truth; procedural, poetic and propositional. it is a term of group formation and exclusion. it is both rhetorical and analytic together (it includes oppositions) and this may be confusing; it is not always useful to criticise one direction from another. it is perhaps more important to exemplify it than to discuss it; abstract knowledge is not enough, but knowledge is useful. rather than being fixed in categories (without compulsion) people generally belong to, or identify with different groups, depending on context and moment, which also unsettles their identity and allegiances. sometimes they can be in categories which seem contradictory from the perception of other categories. the one does not exclude its other. these identities and allegiances will further shift with their perception of kairos, the histories of group relationships to one another, and the persuasions being attempted. thus again, with persuasion we have to be aware of the context, moment, and the ways the groups have been constructed previously. 220 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 rather than just look for integration or conflict we look for both (or more)9 if something enables, how does it restrict? . if it connects, how does it separate? if it orders, how does it disorder? if it stabilises, how does it destabilise? if it produces harmony, how does it produce disharmony. if it establishes communication how does it sever communication? and so on. sophism assumes that social life is unpredictable, and this is a phenomenon of life for everyone; order is always slipping away, or our plans are being annihilated. if members of ‘the ruling class’ conspire to promote their order, this may undo them. there is no uniform direction to history, and increased interconnection opens both stability and instability. bearing this in mind: we look at how social attempts at order fail, and how those failings, and rescuings, are part of society. we look at the things/flows which don’t fit – what do those things/flows do? we ask what is the garbage that is essential for social production or without which production could not occur, and what does it do? we don’t assume that ‘things/events’, whether categories or objects, or people, stay the same; they are all in flux – we ourselves change as we talk and move. we recognise that every moment can be a potential tipping point, but we cannot be sure if it is, or which way our actions will tip events, until after the moment has passed. we divine rather than prophesise. we recognise that the emergent is not simply and linearly determined, but determined by a network of causation, balancing and disruption. we look for unintended consequences. yet we recognise that we also resist change, we are not able to flux in every way. if we use ideal types let us construct ones that are confessedly caricatured, that have their rhetoric spelt out, not hidden. social categories are not fixed, but argued over. people belong to overlapping categories which can conflict. people do not all belong to a category in the same way. we don’t assume communication, or interaction, works towards harmony. culture is driven by difference, misunderstanding, misinterpretation, reinterpretations, ordering and disordering. 9 with more space i’d discuss the importance of moving from oppositions to multiples, or at least threes, as these undermine the sense of opposition alone. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.3, no.3, 2011 221 there are multiple framings of, and different understandings of, events. the events themselves come into flux, or existence, out of this conflict of understanding and action. second guessing is also a social fact. we act because we guess how someone will act in response, and they likewise… there is again no simple interpretation or causality. and these guessings are interpretations, and possibly mistaken. “things” dissolve into flux – like storms….. the term cosmopolitanism is supposed to indicate cosmopolitanism is happening and help movement towards its achievement, but its use may have other consequences. therefore we remain uncertain and attentive. life is complex and social analysis should reflect this. conclusion implicit platonism suppresses disorder, paradox, irregularity and uncertainty; explicit sophism recognises their importance. a focus on disorder, does not imply an assumption that humans are intrinsically conflictual, or threatened by their ‘animal nature’ (whatever that is) or that they need cultural or religious discipline. if it appears that way, then that is the order which arises by making a contradiction and then allying with one side of the contradiction alone. even if humans were totally and absolutely co-operative, which they aren’t, then their attempts at ordering would still necessarily fail sometimes, and need constant correction. life is always chaotic – perhaps especially when we try and order things. trying to work without disorder is a bit like trying to do engineering or physics without friction or entropy; this is something which people did attempt until relatively recently. it is hard to keep disorder in mind, and hard not revert to harmony, to purely constructive thinking, or to prediction rather than divinatory attention to kairos. to get anywhere we have to 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distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(2): 3915,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3915 the implementation of the ndis: who wins, who loses? jenny green university of technology sydney associate professor jane mears university of western sydney abstract the national disability insurance scheme, well into its pilot phase with bipartisan support, looks clear to be the future of support for australians with disability. this paper takes a timely review of key research and reports, analysing the potential benefits and disadvantages of the person-centred approach on which the scheme is premised. it addresses these through the frame of services, employees and people with disability in the australian context. whilst there are potentially overwhelming benefits there are also potentially major losses. introduction the promise of the national disability insurance scheme (ndis) is that it will provide nofault insurance cover for australians who are born with or acquire a severe or profound disability (baker 2012, p.1). in addition to being a substantial financial commitment on the part of the commonwealth and states, the ndis represents a major paradigm shift in the funding models and organisation of services for those with disability that will dramatically change the planning, funding and delivery of services. this paradigm is commonly referred to as a ‘person-centred’ approach. its hallmarks are user-controlled budgets and the direct purchasing of services (dowling et al. 2006). https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3915 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 paradigm shifts are not new to disability services. up until the middle of the twentieth century care was predominantly provided within the family or in government asylums and ‘homes for the incurable’ (green 2010). after the second world war, parents of children with disability began to mobilise against government institutions and build their own parentoperated services. these were funded through philanthropic fundraising and government grants (green 2010). in the latter part of the last century, on the back of the civil rights and women’s movements, the disability rights movement started to gain momentum. people with disability started to organise for themselves both in terms of services and advocacy. 1981, the international year of disabled persons was the catalyst for policy and legislative change. disability was included in human rights and anti-discrimination legislation and the process of ‘deinstitutionalisation’, moving people with disability out of congregate institutional care and into the community to live and work, began in earnest (green 2010). service provision was distanced from parents and families who were characterised as infantilising their adult sons and daughters, and from the medical profession, which was characterised as medicalising disability as illness and aberrant. new professions emerged: disability care workers, social educators, habilitation specialists, guardians and advocates. new organisations formed with specific focuses: employment, community accommodation, leisure and recreation, rights and advocacy. people with disability mobilised and engaged (green 2010). in 1992 the first commonwealth state and territory disability agreement (cstda) was formed to streamline funding and rationalise and integrate services. the commonwealth assumed responsibility for employment services and the states and territories took responsibility for the rest. the premise was funding based on need and consequently the disability services national minimum data set was established to determine need. in line with the commonwealth, states and territories disability human rights legislation, disability service standards were developed (australian institute of health and welfare 2014). the most recent six standards, developed in 2013, can be applied across a diverse range of circumstances (department of social services 2013). they are: • rights • participation and inclusion • individual outcomes cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 27 • feedback and complaints • service access • service management. predominantly, government funding of service provision has gone directly to the service provider in a service-centred approach. generally this has been in advance, in block funding agreements that defined expected outputs with a focus on cost and service quality (nsw government 2010). nonetheless, there has been a small but growing shift taking place that attaches funding packages to individuals. by 2010 individual funding constituted a quarter of the funding allocated under the cstd. on balance the individual funding was more likely to be used by people of working age with low support needs (department of families, housing, community services and indigenous affairs 2010, p.13). in 2010, service providers held the majority (80 per cent) of individual packages. financial facilitators primarily held the other twenty per cent. currently, there are three models of decision-making. in the first, the person with disability makes the decisions and the service provider managing the finances implements the decisions. this includes decisions to change service providers, in which case the funds transfer with the individual. with the second model the service provider controls the funds, consults with the person with disability about a decision and implements that decision in the person’s best interests. in the third model the funding is paid directly to the person with disability, or their substitute, to manage and purchase services as they see fit (department of families, housing, community services and indigenous affairs 2010, pp.811). all three models reflect some elements of a person-centred approach. the paradigm shift in person-centred approaches places the individual person with disability at the centre of service planning and delivery. it is variously referred to as ‘direct payments’ (uk), ‘self-determination’ (usa) self-managed care’ (canada) and ‘cash for care’ (europe) (department of families, housing, community services and indigenous affairs 2010, p.7). the concept originated in north america in the late 1980s (o’brien and mount 1989; mount 1992; garner and dietz 1996; o’brien and o’brien 2000). it recognises people with disability as active participants and decision makers in their lives and their communities. support is conceived as enabling them to achieve their lifetime goals based on their strengths: 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 the person-centered approach creates a team of people who know and care about the individual with a disability, who come together to develop and share a dream for the person's future, and who work together to organize and provide the supports necessary to make that dream a reality (garner and dietz 1996). the productivity commission (2011), in its report on disability care and support, described the intention of a person-centred approach as maximising ‘as much as reasonably possible, the capacity for people with disabilities to take control of their lives’ (productivity commission 2011, p.345). it takes ownership, giving choice, flexibility, control and real purchasing power to the person with disability. they can then decide what they need and want, and buy it from the provider they choose. the people with disability who purchase their services fund the disability organisations. the funds are given to the person with disability not the provider organisation. this has been applauded as a welcome and exciting change in principle that all who are committed to the rights of people with disability embrace (baker 2012). nonetheless, as hilferty and cortis (2012, p.22) point out ‘implementation is complex and this approach requires infrastructural change and strategic redesign of service delivery’. the ndis is in a pilot phase and the process of policy development. its final form is far from defined. consequently, it is timely to review the research and literature that has informed state and federal governments with a focus on potential risks. methodology the methodology used in this paper is a directed literature review to answer the research question: what is the potential impact of the ndis on individuals with disability, service providers and employees? the primary sources are: • the product commission’s reports on the contribution of the not-for-profit sector (2010) and disability care and support (2011); cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 29 • three recent australian community sector survey reports from the australian council of social services (2009, 2011, 2013); and • four reports developed by the social policy research centre at the university of new south wales for government and union customers (cortis et al. 2009; cortis et al. 2013; department of families, housing, community services and indigenous affairs 2010; hilferty & cortis, 2012). additional peer-reviewed research literature, web-based and practice literature was drawn on to provide contextual information. findings and discussion the findings and discussion are addressed together in the interests of narrative and clarity. the three stakeholder groups are taken individually, with service providers addressed first, followed by employees and then people with disability. for each stakeholder group there are specific issues which are addressed separately. service providers person-centredness presents two types of changes for service providers. the first is conceptual and requires new and innovative ways of thinking about service provision. the second is practical, being in terms of income and cash flow. government funding will now be directed to individuals; consequently, service providers will no longer be able to rely on block funding in advance of their service provision. instead, service users will select services and pay on receipt of those services (nsw government 2010, p.20). in order to get the ‘conceptual’ right, service providers will need to be close and sensitive to their actual and potential service users, understand the changing landscape and participate in shaping it. there is the potential for great social innovation (productivity commission 2010, p.xxiv). however, social innovation requires organisational capacity in the form of resources/investment and risk management, which is the ‘practical’. in this section the risks and potential winners and losers are examined in relation to organisational capacity, connectedness, responsiveness and voice, and organisational roles beyond direct service delivery. 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 capacity in terms of capacity, nfp social services are hugely reliant on government funding for their operations. in nsw alone, nearly eighty per cent of primary income is from commonwealth and state governments (acoss 2011, p.29). one of the significant problems with this reliance is that most government funding does not actually cover the costs of service provision. it only covers a proportion of the costs and on average this is around seventy per cent (productivity commission 2010, p. 281). in the recent australian council of social services (acoss) community sector survey, seventy-four per cent of disability service providers reported that the cost of service delivery exceeded their revenue (acoss 2013, p.23). what is more, many government contracts require the return of any surplus, leaving little if any for investment in the organisation (productivity commission 2010, p. xxxii), let alone innovation, for person-centredness and capacity to traverse funding models from preto post-service delivery. organisational size plays a big part in capacity for innovation, traversing change and risk management. resource reserves, cross-subsidisation, investments and loans tend to be the preserve of larger multifunctional organisations (productivity commission 2010, pp.225-226). the 2013 acoss survey found that fifty-three per cent of respondent organisations had annual revenue of less than one million dollars and eighty-three per cent had less than five million dollars (p.16). whilst this is not directly representative of disability services, it is nonetheless indicative of a service provision sector that is disproportionately made up of small to medium players, which it is reasonable to assume are resource constrained. at face value it would seem inevitable that larger organisations will survive the funding transition better than smaller ones. connectedness, responsiveness and voice whilst larger organisations are likely to have greater capacity in the new frontier, they are also likely to have greater bureaucracy and less flexibility (billis & glennerster 1998). their governance is significantly removed from the service user/purchaser by layers of management and, in many cases, geography. what is more, disability may be only one service in a portfolio of several within an organisation. consequently, the further up the management and governance chain information is delivered, by necessity, the more it is distilled and aggregated. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 31 the connection between an organisation’s governance and its service users is central to the voice service users have and an organisation’s responsiveness to that voice. this is particularly so in a landscape of many stakeholders such as disability services. governance is about ends and means, what and how (carver & carver 2001), the key pillars of which are mission, direction and strategy. the closer the board or governance structure is to the service user, the better and more directly informed it is likely to be, and the more likely there is to be service user representation among the board members. for example, st vincent de paul is a large, established, multifunctional social service that has provided disability services in nsw for many decades. it has a 17 member nsw council. there is geographical diversity in its membership but no member identifies with a disability. of the 17 council members, three have worked in disability services at some stage (st vincent de paul 2013, pp.12-13). by contrast, spinal cord injuries australia was established in 1966 by a group of young people with severe spinal cord injuries. it offers a range of services but with the single focus of disability. it has a nine member board, five of whom have disability. moreover, as part of its portfolio of disability services it engages extensively in advocacy (spinal cord injuries australia 2014). clearly it has service user representation on its board and, for that reason alone, is better connected to its disability community than st vincent de paul. it is reasonable to conclude that smaller organisations have greater connectedness with service users simply by virtue of their size, which also enables them to respond flexibly. if smaller organisations are at risk in the new person-centredness landscape then so is the strength of the voice of service users, and the strength of the connections between services users and services that goes beyond mere service delivery. roles beyond direct service delivery the productivity commission (2010, p.xxix) identified that disability services generate benefits beyond the recipients of their services and their families. they are agents of social capital, community change and the embracing of pluralism. the most visible activity of disability organisations beyond direct service provision is advocacy. because it is not a direct service to a service user it cannot be purchased in a new person-centred context. it is, nonetheless, an essential conduit and game changer. for example, it could be said that the national disability insurance scheme is a direct result of effective advocacy on the part of the disability community. the relationship between advocacy organisations and governments has been a mixed bag. labor governments have tended to recognise and uphold the role of 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 advocacy in nfp community services and liberal coalition governments have tended to close it down (green 2010, pp.40-41, maddison 2009), the darkest times being the howard government years when advocacy services were defunded and confidentiality, or ‘gag’, clauses were included in funding contracts (green 2010, p.40). the significance and scope of the shift in funding services under a person-centred model could see advocacy substantially reduced and left to the province of large multifunctional organisations that have the capacity to ensure their independence but may not have the detailed, nuanced agendas of smaller, community representative organisations. the ndis has introduced funding for a select number of organisations to operate as facilitating disability support organisations. these organisations will maintain up to 20 local support groups, providing and promoting local mutual support activities for people with disability (ndis 2014). this suggests a role for small to medium organisations that is grounded in the community. whether that role will include advocacy when it is not a direct service and, history suggests, unwanted by government, remains to be seen. its loss would be a significant blow to civil society democracy and people with disability would be the poorer for it. employees the productivity commission (2010, p.78) identified that labour accounts for the majority of expenditure in social services that include disability services. in 2010, the disability services workforce was estimated at approximately 68,700 workers (martin & healy 2010). the roles included personal carer, home care worker, community care worker and disability and residential support worker. seventy six per cent of the workforce was vet sector qualified with at least a certificate iii qualification (martin & healy 2010). this reflects a growing professionalisation in the workforce. along with growing professionalisation is a growing demand for career paths which are essential for workforce development, retention and stability (productivity commission 2010, p.269). however, currently there are three major career path impediments. the first career path impediment is fewer training opportunities and career mobility within community services (productivity commission 2010, p. 263). career paths within an organisation are largely dependent on organisational size. however, within smaller organisations there are often greater opportunities for acting in positions with a significant cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 33 range of responsibilities. funding staff development and training is a vexed issue for service providers. for organisations whose primary source of income is government funds there is little, if any, financial capacity for staff development and training. alternatively, using the donor dollar for staff development and training is also problematic because of the expectation that donations are given specifically for service users (productivity commission 2010, p.228). what is more, a lack of career paths has been identified as a disincentive to employees investing in their own professional development and training (productivity commission 2010, p. 269). the intersection of this issue in organisations is staff turnover. for example, acoss (2011, p.26) found that in nsw the organisational turnover in disability services was fortysix per cent, whereas the average staff turnover across all service areas was twenty-six per cent. the second career path impediment is low wages (deewr 2008; acoss 2009; department of families, housing, community services and indigenous affairs 2010; productivity commission 2010; kaine & green 2013). whilst wages improved after the 2012 decision by fair work australia in the social and community services (sacs) equal remuneration order, they are still low relative to other industries. in april 2014 on www.mycareer.com.au , disability support worker positions were advertised requesting the following common knowledge and experiences: • experience supporting people with a disability. • experience working with people with autism/acquired brain injury/psychiatric disability who may display challenging behaviours. • experience providing direct personal care. • good communication and computer skills. • cert iii or iv in disabilities is an advantage. • a current first aid certificate. • respect for the rights and dignity of all people from all backgrounds in the community. • local community knowledge and connections. (my career 2014) the requested complex knowledge and experiences required of care workers not only reflect the growing professionalisation of the work but also the increasing requirement for disability service workers to deal with more complex and diverse client needs, an issue identified by the http://www.mycareer.com.au/ 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 productivity commission (productivity commission 2010, p. 263). nonetheless, hourly rates ranged from twenty dollars to thirty dollars per hour. the third career path impediment is the significant and increasing casualisation of the workforce. this has been a long-standing issue (martin & king 2008). for example, the australian bureau of statistics reported in 2009 that sixty-eight per cent of community service workers were part-time or casual, compared to twenty-nine per cent of the workforce overall. this figure does not reflect employee choice. the productivity commission (2009, p.264) reported that thirty percent of part-time workers were part-time because that was the only work offered to them and that a substantial proportion of workers reported a desire for more work (cortis et al. 2009; martin & king 2008; productivity commission 2010, p.264). a casual workforce gives greater flexibility and economy to the employer with little or no costs attached to cancelling and rearranging shifts. consequently, greater casualisation of the workforce under the ndis and person-centred care has been foreshadowed as a major issue of concern (hilferty & cortis 2012; productivity commission 2010). the staffing risks attached to person-centred care and direct purchasing by service users are intermittent service usage, short notice requests or cancellations of care (baxter et al. 2010) and service user ‘churn’ as purchasers pick and choose to find the right care. in the uk, where person-centred care is already under way, policy makers are concerned that, whilst a casualised workforce enables providers to manage fluctuating demands, it may also result in reduced training and service quality (cunningham & nickson 2010). clearly this is an issue for service users, but it is also an issue for employees who, by and large, choose to work in community services for lower wages because they believe they are making a contribution to the social benefit and this is meaningful and important to them (productivity commission 2010, p.7; green 2010). how does the future look then for employees under the ndis and person-centred care? predictions would suggest that there will be greater casualisation at the frontline and less inhouse training and development due to the uncertain return on investment given the likely fluctuations in service demand. this will enlarge an already existing career hurdle to first line management, making the path from entry level difficult and, consequently, unattractive. again, larger organisations with greater resource capacity will most likely offer the clearer career paths and thus be more attractive to the committed and career-minded workers. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 35 front-line employment in terms of possible front-line employment options there is potential for three tiers of direct care work. one tier may be occupied primarily by for-profit providers and offer more expensive and ostensibly better quality care for those people who can afford to supplement their ndis payments. another tier may be predominantly occupied by not-for-profit providers and offer a ‘no frills’ service for those paying the nominated rate under the ndis. the third tier may be direct employment by the service user or their families and have little or no employee benefits, such as health and safety, paid training and professional supervision (carmichael & brown 2002, p.803; productivity commission 2010). this raises the question of the quality of the services provided and what that means for service users. studies in the uk link good quality services and service user satisfaction with good employee working conditions that include training, guaranteed working hours, equitable remuneration and tenure within an organisation exceeding five years (netten et al. 2007, p.84). by the same token, the productivity commission (2010, p.263) found that poorly trained, inexperienced and unqualified staff had adverse effects on service users, with poor quality care at best and negligence at worst. people with disability if a person with disability or their guardian is well informed or well supported, able to exercise agency and has options for choice, then person-centredness has few risks and offers considerable benefits. lead barwon, a project located in the ndis launch site of geelong, is documenting such stories and there is little doubt about the life-changing capacity of person-centredness with options including home modifications, equipment, tailored care and support, and therapy and tutoring at home (lead barwon 2014). nonetheless, it is not without its challenges. reports from the uk identify that for people with disability, taking on the role of employer for direct support workers can be a steep learning curve, is time consuming and can include additional costs and risks, such as cash flow and insurance (adams & godwin 2008; carmichael & brown 2002; glendinning et al. 2000). in a victorian trial the people with disability who chose to employ direct support workers already had relevant experience, such as bookkeeping, accounting, or business ownership, that 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 assisted them in executing their role (hdg consulting 2010, p.25). this suggests that, for most people with disability, some support to operate as an employer is desirable. the main risks with person-centredness arise for individuals with disability who have little or no agency. their choices will need to be made and managed by others such as families, guardians and organisations. inherent in this is the potential for exploitation (productivity commission 2010, p.321; department of families, housing, community services and indigenous affairs 2010, p.32). unscrupulous service providers, for example, could over service and ‘cherry pick’ users who have the greatest capacity to pay or who are the least expensive to support (productivity commission 2010, p.324). another difficult or risky area is the employment of family members or close family friends in direct support. there may be good reasons for considering employing family members, such as their detailed and intimate knowledge of the person with disability and the comfort and trust between them. nonetheless, the downside can be a blurring of roles, conflicts of interest, burnout, limited if any quality control and a compromised independent voice. all or any of these issues may increase the vulnerability of the person with disability (disability services commission 2012, p.3). finally, moving people with high support needs, particularly cognitive and communication impairments, from long term placements, possibly through a number of services, to find the one that best fits can incur losses often overlooked (green & wunsch 1994). whilst there is little doubt that obvious information such as skill levels, support needs, and medical and dental records will move with the individual, more nuanced information such as preferences, interests, friendships, connections, routines, likes and dislikes may not; not to mention essential factors that contribute to identity such as a sense of belonging. moreover, this information can be valued quite differently by family members and discounted as unimportant. its loss can have a significant and sustained impact on a person’s quality of life (green & wunsch 1994). it underscores the importance of ensuring informed, careful and considered decision-making, a process that may require multiple inputs and support. conclusion the promise of the ndis is that it will enable all australians with disability to live full, engaged and rich lives of their choice. many hopes and dreams are invested in this scheme cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 37 and, indeed, many hours of tireless work have been invested to bring this dream to fruition. however, all of the reports reviewed for this paper highlighted, alongside the positive experiences of those already receiving individual support packages, that there is much confusion, misunderstanding and anxiety from providers, employees and people with disability. implementation will inevitably be complex. as stated at the outset, the philosophy and principles of person-centredness and the ndis are not in question here. the purpose of the paper is to draw attention to the possible risks and losses so that we can minimise these risks and not lose effective programs and experienced and committed workers. a major concern, as outlined above, is the potential drying up of funding for the specialist support organisations that are providers of information to, and advocates on behalf of, those with disability and their carers. loss of these organisations, and the knowledge and human capital within, could be devastating to the disability human rights movement. precautions can be taken in this planning and pilot phase. we all need to be as well informed as possible as to unintended risks and losses. cortis et al. (2013, p.43) summarise a way forward to take account of the interests of organisations, employees and people with disability. it is referred to as the ‘high road’ strategy (folbre 2006) and requires higher costs and investment in the short term to support organisations and individuals through the transition and establishment of person-centredness. implemented effectively, it will lead to more sustainable and higher quality service delivery in the immediate and longer terms with ‘better outcomes for people with disabilities, and a more efficient and cost-effective system of care’ (cortis et al. 2013, p.43). we need to follow this high road. references australia, department of families, housing, community services and indigenous affairs 2010, occasional paper no. 29: effectiveness of individual funding approaches for disability support, accessed 15 april 2014 http://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/05_2012/op29.pdf australia, department of social services 2013, national 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implementation of the ndis: who wins, who loses? abstract introduction methodology findings and discussion service providers capacity connectedness, responsiveness and voice roles beyond direct service delivery employees front-line employment people with disability conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 28 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 sumugan sivanesan. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(1): 4715 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i1.4715 alex & i: against indifference sumugan sivanesan independent scholar abstract this text and photo essay concerns a series of portraits made with a community of tamil refugees living in bangkok who refer to themselves as ‘the bachelors.’ the project was initiated by refugee and one-time media figure, sanjeev ‘alex’ kuhendrarajah who hoped his peers would tell their own stories to an ‘international community.’ with reference to judith butler’s frames of war (2009), i have sought to ‘discursively frame’ the images by considering the discrimination these young single men encounter living in the margins of this south asian metropolis, awaiting the outcomes of their re-settlement applications. this paper concerns an ongoing collaboration and friendship i have developed with the tamil refugee and one-time media figure, sanjeev ‘alex’ kuhendrarjah. it recounts a trip i made to bangkok in july 2015 to visit him soon after he was released from immigration detention after having been incarcerated there since 2011. the paper contextualises a series of photoportraits that were made in collaboration with a community of urban refugees of which alex is a part. by publishing these images first in this journal, i address my anxieties about presenting these images in a culture inured to stories and images from the borderscape. this paper narrates, contextualises and, with reference to judith butler (2009), ‘discursively frames’ these images as a means of addressing and ultimately overcoming this perceived political inertia. like many others around the world, i first came to know of ‘alex’ in october 2009 as a spokesperson for 254 tamils fleeing the aftermath of the war in sri lanka which had concluded earlier that year. the asylum seekers were caught in a stand-off with indonesian https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i1.4715 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 29 authorities at the port of merak, indonesia, after attempting to reach australia on a small wooden cargo ship, km jaya lestari 5. the stand-off became a media spectacle lasting six months, however alex jumped ship before it resolved in april 2010. i first made contact with the asylum seeker in 2011 via facebook whilst he was living as a fugitive. a year later, alex announced his whereabouts on the social media platform with a series of smug ‘selfies’ taken with a mobile phone smuggled into a crowded cell in bangkok and uploaded to his profile page. in 2013 i travelled to thailand to meet alex face-to-face after his refugee status was confirmed and we struck up a friendship across the bars that kept him in immigration detention. alex remained incarcerated until may 2015 when he was quite suddenly granted community release, or as he puts it, ‘let out on bail.’ in july 2015 i returned to bangkok to visit alex, the first time we would meet since his release. i was a little anxious. what if we had nothing in common? what if we did not get along? these thoughts were dispelled when i spotted alex grinning and waving at the skytrain station exit. he looked healthy, tall and well built. his hair was styled with bleached highlights and he was dressed in sports clothes, all bright white and neat. it was mid-morning but already humid, so we bought some young coconuts to drink from a local street vendor before making our way across the highway to his apartment, a modest one bedroom studio— palatial in comparison to the overcrowded cells he had inhabited over the last four years. figure 1: ‘alex’ 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 as we walked and talked, alex mentioned he was looking for some help with a photoblogging project, similar to ‘humans of new york’1 but concerned with the refugees of bangkok. being a compulsive photographer, i was relieved to have a practical, collaborative task to focus on for the few days we would spend together. we decided to immediately visit some of alex’s friends living in an apartment block inhabited almost exclusively by refugees and asylum seekers. the following day we ventured further to om yai, a suburb on the outskirts of bangkok’s urban sprawl, to spend some time with another group of refugees who had been detained with alex in kanchanaburi. over the following days we visited a number of alex’s friends; some families, but mostly young men who ranged in age from their early twenties to early forties. they refer to themselves as ‘the bachelors,’ a title that has some poignancy given that many countries are wary of accepting young single men, especially those involved in conflict.2 we documented this excursion in several hundred images sharing a single camera. inevitably authorship became confused, and as positions often switched between those being photographed and those handling the camera, these images should be understood as a collective effort. having the advantages of citizenship to a modern democratic state and also being the owner of the camera, i must acknowledge the uneven distribution of power and privilege amongst our group. nevertheless, i was a guest amongst this community and was received with generosity, patience and care. thus, i do not believe these portraits should be considered ‘atrocious images’ (sontag 2003, p. 88) designed to haunt or disturb, but rather as acts and evidence of friendship. reviewing these images i began to wonder how they might best be put to use. certainly they document and make visible people living in the margins, but how could they improve the conditions in which they live? could these portraits assist their subjects to be resettled? are such photographs able to make accessible the services these people need to survive in bangkok or would they expose them to further discrimination? 1a popular photoblogging site and book founded by brandon stanton in 2010. url: http://www.humansofnewyork.com/ 2albeit a generalisation, this is an opinion held amongst many with whom i spoke in thailand and is more recently reflected in canada’s recent decision to restrict its intake of single male refugees from syria (kingsley 2015). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 31 figure 2: ‘alex, giri and abdulla’ stephen fitzpatrick, the journalist who broke alex’s story in the media in 2009, once told me that it is crucial that voices and stories of the marginalised are heard, especially when governments are actively trying to suppress them (fitzpatrick 2013). in hindsight, it may have been remiss of me not to attempt to hastily publish these images through the media channels in which alex once had some infamy, however being mindful of his earlier experiences with the press and his current precarious existence, i opted to pursue my particular interest in his narrative beyond the constraints of the news cycle. publishing these portraits first in the context of this journal primarily addresses my own concerns as to how they are received. whilst i may ultimately have no control over the affects these portraits relay or the thoughts and sensations they summon, as the one who possesses the digital files i am, at least initially, responsible for their presentation and distribution. my inability to ‘let the images speak for themselves’ and to instead frame them ‘discursively’ (butler 2009, p. 111), belies a certain caution about their reception in a culture in which representations of suffering are considered clichéd. in a society oversaturated with images all vying for limited attention spans, is it not reasonable to think that images that speak of the injustice of the ‘borderscape’3 might be received with fatigue, indifference or 3 a term coined by suvendrini perera to describe the multidimensional, mobile and shifting aspects of current border regimes in contrast to the planar representations of state sovereignty on a map (perera 2009). 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 worse still, cynicism? if art functions as a kind of ‘commodified persuasion’ (adams 2007, para. 9), then the consumption of representations of the marginalised within the gated communities of the cosmopolitan centres risks their becoming ‘a pornography of poverty’ (demos 2013, p. 123), designed to elicit certain conditioned responses—perhaps even a pleasure that arises in acknowledging the suffering of others. figure 3: ‘kudgen and sons’ in a recent edition of the australian experimental arts journal realtime focused on performance and asylum, guest editor and performance scholar caroline wake describes how for almost fifteen years, cycles of revelation, political manipulation and media reaction to the violence of australia’s border policies have overall led to public indifference. wake proposes that the ‘performances’ of politicians, journalists and other concerned public figures determine ‘social scripts’ through which australians can enact grief, guilt and ultimately apathy (wake 2015, para. 3). if the frequency and repetition of images and stories from the margins has de-sensitised us to the precarious conditions they depict, then as judith butler (2009) argues, it becomes imperative that we find ethical and political positions that are able to make the lives being represented understood as ‘grievable.’ butler claims that precariousness must be understood as a condition common to all life. this is evident in an absolute sense given that from the very moment of birth survival is premised upon ‘a social network of hands’ (butler 2009, p. 24) to provide care. it is also crucial to acknowledge the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 33 ‘differential allocation of precarity’ (butler 2009, p. 10), that global inequalities are politically structured and maintained, ensuring that our relative wellbeing in the (over)developed world is premised on lives elsewhere being exposed to more risk and instability. considering that certain ‘epistemological frames’ (butler 2009, p. 9) effectively render certain lives unknowable and ungrievable (think of ‘collateral deaths,’ those killed by ‘friendly fire’ or nameless ‘deaths at sea’) then the ethical and political corrective is to devise alternative or counter epistemological frames by which such ‘non-lives’ become recognisable and could be said to matter. anthony downey argues that figures such as the refugee, the political prisoner and the dispossessed are exemplars of, rather than being the exception to, contemporary conditions. with the re-emergence of sovereign power blurring the boundary between the rights-bearing ‘citizen’ and the ‘merely human,’ these lives ‘half-lived’ exist in ‘zones of indistinction’ (a phrase downey draws from giorgio agamben) that are both geographic and embodied (downey 2009, p. 109). in his discussion of artworks (including photography) that represent life in the margins downey claims that the ‘fact of discrimination’ that these artworks foreground, is ultimately common to both subjects and audiences. thus, to be indifferent to the plight of the marginalised ‘is to be indifferent to our own potential plight’ (downey 2009, p. 123). figure 4: ‘suresh’ 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 the discrimination that urban refugees living in bangkok are subject to becomes most obvious when determining who is granted re-settlement and who is left to subsist in the margins. that is to say, which refugees are recognised by the regimes that administer the resettlement process and the frames that make a certain group of refugees more recognisable— and more grievable—than others. such frames can be perceived in an anecdote that alex recounted for me on this recent trip. soon after alex was released from immigration detention he attended a ‘refugee bazaar’, an annual event organised by some local non-government organisations (ngos) at a cafe in central bangkok. here refugees are encouraged to sell handicrafts, artworks and food, express themselves and their culture without fear and, in alex’s words, ‘be themselves for a day’ (kuhendrarajah 2015). patrons buy coupons which they exchange for the goods and services on offer, which refugees are then able to exchange for cash. it is one of the few opportunities refugees in bangkok have to make some money. having bought coupons at the entrance, alex browsed the market, received a henna tattoo, grazed on snacks and admired the handicrafts. when he went outside for a cigarette, alex fell into a conversation with some of the gathered ngos and expats who assumed he was one of their own. he took the opportunity to survey their thoughts about the prospects of resettlement for a single tamil man, like himself, who was living as an urban refugee in bangkok awaiting the outcome of his applications. the general perception was that since the war in sri lanka had ended in 2009, and especially since president mahinda rajapaksa— who had overseen the bloody defeat of the separatist movement—had been ousted in the election earlier in 2015, the country would be safe for returnees. those tamils remaining in bangkok were considered the ‘last batch’ and would also be expected to leave, despite ongoing accounts of torture and the ‘dirty war’ being waged against those critical of the sri lankan state. one ngo who headed up a united nations humanitarian project offered that the remaining tamils in thailand would be best-served finding ‘other means’ to leave the country and to make their claims elsewhere. it seems there was nothing the unhcr in bangkok could do for them. to reiterate, alex was advised by the very people administering the resettlement process that he would be better off taking the ‘illegal route’ rather than ‘joining the queue’—either way was a gamble (kuhendrarajah 2015). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 35 after returning to sydney, i attended a seminar to discuss the work of the asia-pacific refugee rights network (aprrn) where i met one of the ngos with whom alex was speaking. aprrn is an affiliation of civil society groups and individuals operating in 26 countries and anoop sukamaran is its executive director. during the seminar he emphasised that those providing services for refugees in thailand often operate ‘under the radar’ (sukamaran in refugee council of australia 2015). thailand is not a signatory of the 1951 un refugee convention and makes no provisions for refugees and asylum seekers who, like all other migrants and tourists without the correct visas, are considered ‘illegal aliens’. regardless, the country continues to attract refugees and asylum seekers, in part due to the presence of the united nations high commissioner for refugees (unhcr), the international organisation for migration (iom) and other informal refugee support networks. whilst let out on bail, alex and his community are tolerated by the grace of the thai government, however they have no assurance that this hospitality will not be suddenly withdrawn. alex understands thailand wants to clear out its overcrowded immigration detention centres, yet questions how it expects refugees to survive without resources or support (kuhendrarajah 2015). perhaps this is exactly the point? once outside refugees must cover their living expenses, but are refused legal rights to work. forced to find ways to survive, urban refugees become dependent on irregular charity, susceptible to exploitation in the unregulated labour market and vulnerable to harassment and extortion by authorities and potential criminality. figure 5: ‘hillary’ 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 as of january 2015 the unhcr estimates there are over 14 million refugees and almost another 2 million asylum-seekers, a figure significantly higher than in previous years (unhcr, n.d. a). in thailand the unhcr estimates over 100,000 refugees, almost ten thousand asylum seekers and a ‘population of concern’ of over 600,000 (unhcr, n.d. b). the current global refugee crisis attests that there are many more stateless people than places being offered to resettle them, so what are the possible consequences? at the aprrn seminar, yunita purnama a representative from the indonesian civil society network for refugee rights protection (suaka) alerted those gathered that in her country the unhcr was only processing refugees interned in immigration detention, effectively pushing migrants back into these less-than-ideal living situations (rca 2015). if these terms spread to other south asian countries, then who stands to benefit? journalist antony loewenstein (2013) argues that australia’s policies of remote and offshore detention have given rise to an immensely profitable internment industry, in which private contractors have a vested interest in sustaining a worldwide refugee problem. there is some anxiety amongst refugee activists that the privatisation of the processes by which refugees and asylum seekers are re-settled will result in them becoming subject to market conditions, in which their welfare is not the primary concern. arguably, nations that are not signatories to the un refugee convention, and therefore not obliged to provide for the welfare of refugees and asylum seekers, would be receptive to having other organisations manage the noncitizens within their borders. alex has been granted a 12–18 month release in thailand during which time the state expects him to be re-settled, however as many working in the system acknowledge the time taken to process claims and applications are unpredictable and elastic. alex believes his media notoriety has already hampered his passage to seek asylum, exposing him to persecution and violence as a detainee, so he is understandably anxious of being forced back into these conditions. he related to me how a un official once told him, rather insensitively, that if his re-settlement was not forthcoming, then he might have his refugee status revoked! (kuhendrarajah 2015) even if this were not possible, this exchange does not give one confidence in the current system and those administrating it. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 37 what this anecdote illustrates are the flaws of the system supposedly designed to assist refugees to be re-settled. as alex confirms, there is simply no ‘queue’ for refugees, rather there is a range of determining factors, such as one’s age, gender, marital status, ethnicity, where one is fleeing from, specific nations’ refugee intake quotas, a refugee’s application history and ability to negotiate interviews and bureaucratic tasks, to name a few. as many holding countries are not obliged to provide welfare for refugees, these services are often provided by ngos and charity groups who operate in legal grey zones to address the day-today needs of this urban underclass. it is a process that generates rivalry and mistrust amongst refugees and indifference and potential abuse of power amongst its administrators. without any means of redressing the discrimination they face in holding countries such as thailand— with no recourse to law and without the means to leave—refugees and asylum seekers are excluded within the law, framed as ‘outlaws’ and subject to the unmediated power of the state which could turn intolerant at any given moment. figure 6: ‘mathusan and his mother’ on reflection, we did not set out to make portraits of a people who are emblematic of the contemporary condition. nor do i believe our intention was to elicit empathy or pity. rather the exercise was taken up by the bachelors as a novel opportunity to document and narrate their lives for themselves, and to grant myself and by extension others insight into their existence. in these portraits, those who normally avoid exposure to authority present themselves as faces, families and a community. appealing to a potential international 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 audience, the subjects of these portraits leverage some agency as individuals and as a community against the indifference of the state and the intergovernmental resettlement mechanisms to which they appear as statistics. it might not be unusual, but as one who habitually takes photographs, i avoid being in front of the camera. i cherish and guard my privacy and do not seek to be known or ‘captured’ outside of the fields in which i choose to work and socialise. similarly, whilst these men seek to be recognised as people with families and histories, due to their ambiguous status they are cautious of being exposed to possible exploitation and further risk. so, i am struck by how many of those who posed for these portraits looked directly down the camera lens, seeking to engage the gaze of the viewer. figure 7: ‘abdulla’ judith butler compels her readers to be conscious of the ‘not seeing that is the condition of seeing’ (butler 2009, p. 120). the subjects of these portraits may never see us themselves, but by meeting the gaze of their photographic representations do we ‘see ourselves seeing’ them (butler 2009, p. 119)? are we, perhaps narcissistically, made self-conscious of our own presence in the operations of power that determine whose lives matter? it is one thing to acknowledge one’s privilege, but is one by default of that privilege, complicit with global mechanisms that discriminate? if so, then i—we—appeal to you not to be indifferent to these cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 39 portraits, to engage with their subjects and to resist the way we habitually consume such images and the social scripts that bind us to political paralysis. arguably the ‘fatigue and fatalism’ (wake 2015, para. 9) with which concerned australians receive revelations of border violence and policy failure is conditioned by the seemingly unshakeable bipartisan political commitment to tough border policies. caroline wake’s creative response to overcoming australia’s politics of asylum was to pen a ‘draft apology to the survivors of immigration detention’ (wake 2015b) to be delivered by a future australian prime minister ‘at the time of her choosing’. in a gesture that resembles the federal government’s 2008 apology to the ‘stolen generations,’ wake imagines an australia in which the camps have all closed and those who have suffered and survived are welcomed to the mainland as citizens. by imagining what this ‘finish line’ might be, wake challenges her readers ‘plot a path from here to there’ (wake 2015, para. 9). figure 8: ‘meeting at om yai’ alex is unique in that despite his persecution, marginalisation and immobility he has been able to engage a network of supporters around the world. so whilst these portraits exhibit the conditions in which urban refugees in bangkok live, they also represent the means, networks and friendships by which these images were made possible. discursively framing these 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 portraits in this journal and having them discussed and distributed in the ranks of academia is an invitation to make connections ‘from here to there’—across a vastly differential terrain of privilege and precariousness. it is an attempt to recognise in these bachelors our own potential plight and the possibility of community against the mechanisms of indifference. references adams, t. 2007, ‘a lost boy who found his voice’, the guardian, 20 may. accessed: 28 october 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/may/20/fiction.features butler, j. 2009. frames of war: when is life grievable? verso, london. demos, t.j., 2013, return to the postcolony: spectres of colonialism in contemporary art, sternberg press, berlin. downey, a. 2009, ‘zones of indistinction: giorgio agamben’s ‘bare life’ and the politics of aesthetics,’ third text, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 109-125. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09528820902840581 fitzpatrick, s. 2013, interview with author, 15 march, sydney. 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abstract references big news: the indian media and student attacks in australia1 matt wade sydney morning herald i’d just finished interviewing a flinty, north indian farmer named kulbhushen sharma in september 2009 when he looked me in the eye and asked a probing question: ‘why are our people being attacked in australia?’ like tens of millions of people across the subcontinent, mr sharma had seen dramatic television reports about assaults on indian students in australia. his question showed how deeply the negative perceptions of australia, created by media reports of the attacks, had infiltrated the indian community. the safety of indian students in australia wasn’t just a concern for urban elites with relatives studying abroad. here was proof that the issue had registered in remote villages as well. attacks on foreign students in australia became one of the biggest news stories in india during 2009 and early 2010. according to john mccarthy, australia's high commissioner to india when the crisis flared, ‘you had to live in india to see what a big deal it was i don't think it's ever quite sunk in for people in australia how much this issue caught the public imagination’ (mccarthy et al. 2012). the portrayal of attacks on foreign students in australia underscored the growing social and political influence of india’s media, especially television news. the intense media coverage of the attacks left australia’s reputation in india greatly tarnished. the episode strained relations between india and australia and triggered a sweeping overhaul of australia’s international education system. i was the delhi-based correspondent for the the age and the sydney morning herald newspapers at the time of the student crisis and reported on the public and political reaction to it. this paper will draw 1 this is a non-refereed contribution. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 93 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 matt wade. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, 2015, 7(3): 4657, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i3.4657 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i3.4657 together some observations about the nature of the indian media, explore why the student attack story gained so much momentum in india and examine how australian officials sometimes made matters worse. the media landscape in india with more than 70,000 newspapers and over 500 satellite television channels, india has one of the most competitive media markets in the world. explosive growth in the media industry, especially in television broadcasting, followed an historic program of economy-wide reforms announced by the indian government in 1991. less than two decades ago the dowdy stateowned broadcaster, doordarshan, had a virtual monopoly over television news. now more than 100 cnn-style news channels operate around the clock in english, hindi and at least 10 other regional languages. most of india’s major states have at least three or four, if not more, news channels, and the majority are accessible nationwide. almost 150 million households have a television and receive programs via free-to-air, cable and digital direct-to-home platforms. in 2012, digital media penetration soared by 63 per cent to 42 million households (mccarthy et al. 2012). intense competition for viewers has contributed to a sensationalist television news culture in india which emphasises political controversy and conflict. medcalf (2009) says the indian media has developed an unmatched ability ‘to make a story huge, and to keep it that way’. many news channels in india have adopted a highly nationalistic editorial stance reminiscent of america’s fox news broadcasting model. according to malik & medcalf, their coverage of india’s place in the world is touched by jingoism. in middle india this often has bizarre consequences, as the news channels can be the typical provincial news consumer’s only window to the outside world (2011, p. 12). despite its reputation for sensationalism, the public has considerable trust in the indian media. the india-australia poll 2013, conducted by the lowy institute for international policy and the australia india institute, found 86 per cent of respondents believed the indian media accurately reported events in india and 83 per cent believed it accurately reported world events (medcalf 2013). 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 the indian media’s coverage of student attacks in australia the safety of foreign students in australia caught the indian media’s attention in may 2009. the timing of two assaults in melbourne, and the imagery associated with them, were important factors in the development of the story. a closed circuit security camera on a melbourne train carriage played an especially important role. it recorded graphic television images of 21-year-old indian student, sourabh sharma, being brutally bashed on the night of may 9, 2009. victorian police released video footage of the attack about 10 days after the incident and this was soon broadcast by news outlets in australia and india. the chilling images caused understandable outrage in india – it showed mr sharma being repeatedly punched and kicked by a gang of five hooded youths. one attacker rifles through his bag, taking a phone and a significant amount of cash. he appears to laugh after kicking the victim. television news channels in india broadcast the frightening pictures on high rotation for many days after their release. photographs of mr sharma’s badly bruised face were also published and broadcast frequently. a few days after the train attack video was released, another indian student, 25-year-old shravan kumar, was stabbed in the head with a screwdriver during an attack in melbourne. disturbing photographs of mr kumar unconscious in hospital with tubes coming from his nose and mouth stoked the media frenzy over the safety of indian students in australia. the dramatic images of violence were tailormade for india’s influential cable news channels and they were recycled frequently in the months that followed. as subsequent reports of assaults on indians in australia emerged during 2009, the images of the assaults on sourabh sharma and shravan kumar were shown repeatedly to large television audiences in india. the timing of these initial attacks was significant. they occurred during a rare lull in the indian media cycle. it was the peak of summer in india and interest in the year’s biggest story – the 2009 general election – was beginning to fade. the violent incidents in melbourne handed indian television news directors a new storyline: ‘racist australia’. reports about the attacks – especially on television – routinely portrayed them as racially motivated. for months after the story broke, the times now television network had a featured link on its website entitled ‘racism beyond shame’. in late july 2009 it linked to more than 50 television reports about attacks on indian students and problems faced by foreign students in australia. pramit pal chaudhuri, a delhi-based foreign policy specialist and senior editor at the hindustan times newspaper, says the story probably would have passed relatively unnoticed had the events happened during the indian elections a month earlier. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 95 it was a story made for television…when nothing else much was going on. but if it had happened during the indian election people would have paid much less attention (chaudhuri 2009). the nature of the story also contributed to its wide appeal. indian television historian, nalin mehta, said it resonated with the country's burgeoning urban middle class – the key audience for india’s news media – where there is a strong perception that the country is an emerging power and that its citizens should be treated with great respect: it had an element of middle-class students being victimised, it also had elements of racial and national pride. that’s what made the story so sexy for channels targeting india’s primary viewing audience (mehta 2009). millions of middle-class families in india either have a relative studying abroad or aspire to send a family member to study overseas. as a result, media reports about indian students being mistreated struck a chord with a key audience for india’s burgeoning television market. scores of mass circulation newspapers and news websites also provided comprehensive coverage of the attacks in multiple languages. the indian media’s interest in the issue of student safety in australia was sustained for an unusually long period, with two distinct peaks. the first peak was between may and july of 2009 and the second followed the january 2010 knifing murder of indian national, nitin garg, in melbourne. new, low-cost communication technologies and social media played a role in drawing attention to student attacks in australia and sustaining the indian media’s interest in the issue. in some cases indian students used smartphone cameras and text messages to supply indian media with information about the experience of international students in australia. those claiming to speak on behalf of indian students in australia were frequently interviewed on indian television via a skype video link. these technologies allowed indian television channels relatively easy, inexpensive access to those willing to speak about the issue in australia, even when they did not have their own reporters based there. in february 2010, more than eight months after video images of the attack on sourabh sharma were first broadcast, the influential indian weekly news magazine, outlook, ran the provocative headline on its front cover: ‘why the aussies hate us’. the edition featured a 10page special report including stories and photographs of indians who had experienced violence and racial abuse in australia. it claimed to have found ‘evidence that “curry-bashing” 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 is becoming a fun game for white australians’ and quoted the leader of an ultra-nationalist political party saying indians were ‘becoming a serious threat to white australians in the job market’. van thanh rudd, an anti-racism activist and nephew of the then prime minister kevin rudd, told outlook the ‘dominant culture in australia’ was racist, and that many of the attacks on indian students had been racially motivated. when i interviewed outlook’s editorin-chief, vinod mehta, about the report, he defended the magazine’s coverage of the issue and denied allegations that the indian media was overreacting to events in australia. ‘we sent two correspondents to australia and they found that an overwhelming number of these incidents were racial and they found that indians in australia live in fear’, he said. ‘there is tremendous outrage in this country. i don't think the australians realise that’ (mehta 2010). another telling indicator of the scale of public interest in the student crisis was the attention it gained from bollywood. one of the biggest stars in indian cinema, amitabh bachchan, announced he would not accept an honorary doctorate offered to him by the queensland university of technology in protest over the treatment of indian students in australia. ‘under the present circumstances, where citizens of my own country are subjected to such acts of inhuman horror, my conscience does not permit me to accept this decoration from a country that perpetrates such indignity to my fellow countrymen’, he wrote on his blog in may 2009. mr bachchan’s decision received a blaze of publicity in india. the student crisis even inspired a bollywood blockbuster. the film, called crook, was set in melbourne against the backdrop of attacks on indian students. produced by cinema veteran, mahesh bhatt, and starring several well-known bollywood actors, the hindi-language movie was released in october 2010. numerous scenes in the film dramatised violence against indians; romper stomper-style louts in balaclavas brutally beat an indian student in a parking lot; a pakistani convenience store owner is knifed by a racist attacker; and an indian attack victim recovers after being beaten in a bath filled with blood-stained water. another scene depicts a battered indian student with facial wounds telling the crowd at a protest march that ‘i got this punishment due to my colour it's because i’m an indian’. crook also featured a bigoted policeman in cahoots with racist gang members. mahesh bhatt claimed the film was an unflinching examination of the ‘burning issue of racism which has devastated the life of thousands of young indians who go to australia in search of a better life, putting not only all their money but even their lives at stake’ (bhatt 2010). the portrayal of the attacks in a highprofile example of indian popular culture was another illustration of how deeply the issue cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 97 infiltrated public perceptions in india. ‘art is a reflection of our society’, bhatt told me. ‘this is not the first time that bollywood is going to mirror society’s thoughts in a movie.’ reactions to the media’s portrayal of student attacks more than 115 million indian households had a television set in 2009 and it is likely that most of them were exposed to bad publicity about australia as a result of the student attacks. nalin mehta (2009) said the story ‘redefined the image of australia for the average tvwatcher in india’. mccarthy et al. (2012) argue the indian student crisis of 2009-10 exposed australia to the harsh realities of cultural collision and media image-formation in the era of global migration, business and communications. in particular, it illustrated how instant, global, television news can sweep away decades of benign perceptions – in this case, cricket, commonwealth and curry – and replace them with a more dramatic, negative counter-narrative (mccarthy et al. 2012, p. 48). the fervent media coverage of student attacks triggered anti-australian fury in india. television news channels received a barrage of angry calls while news websites and blog sites were flooded with comments highly critical of australia. many referred to australia’s convict history and some called for tit-for-tat attacks on australians in india (a senior western diplomat in india suggested that i get a guard permanently posted outside my house in delhi amid the public outcry over the student attacks). in june 2009 members of the hindu nationalist political movement, the shiv sena, and student protesters, burnt effigies of the australian prime minister in the indian capital, new delhi. the hindu nationalist party, vishwa hindu parishad, said it would call for a boycott of australia if authorities did not do more to protect hindus in australia. television reports also spurred community-level activism, especially in the states of punjab and haryana, the home states of many indians studying in australia. this put pressure on local members of parliament who began to lobby india’s ministry of external affairs to take action on the issue. the media frenzy and intense public reaction over the safety of students in australia made it difficult for the indian government to remain on the sidelines. in august 2009, the then minister of state for external affairs, shashi tharoor – a former united nations undersecretary general – told me that the frequency of attacks on students in australia had raised 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 legitimate suspicions in india. the repetitiveness of the attacks had given the issue ‘critical mass’ in india (tharoor 2009). india’s foreign minister, s.m. krishna, and minister of overseas indian affairs, vayalar ravi, made regular public statements in 2009 and early 2010 expressing concern about the safety of indian students in australia. amid the media firestorm that followed the murder of nitin garg in january 2010, mr krishna’s language became more strident. on one occasion he said ‘non-redressal of this vital issue will cast a shadow on our otherwise excellent bilateral relations’. he also warned that the indian government could advise young people not to go to australia for study if attacks continued. ‘i'm sure that the australian authorities would take confidence in the fact that india talks softly but when the decisive moment comes india can also act’, he said on television. the response of indian officials to student attacks in australia highlighted the influence that india’s broadcast media, with is vast audience, can have on the country’s foreign relations. mccarthy et al. argue: the episode was perhaps the earliest example of how the interplay of news television and provincial politics was beginning to affect foreign policy and diplomatic action in india. it was as sobering a lesson for the [ministry of external affairs] as it was for foreign countries and diplomats dealing with india (2012, p. 29). the australian government was slow to comprehend the damage indian news television could inflict on the bilateral relationship with india. in february 2010, australia’s defence minister, stephen smith, acknowledged that the student crisis ‘cast a long shadow...across our broader relationship and bilateral agenda’ with india. according to malik & medcalf, it is notable that both indian ministers and their australian counterparts were forced into breathless reaction by the indian media’s coverage of the ‘racism story’. this represents a phenomenon at once noteworthy and worrying. it establishes that news channels are democratising not just india’s domestic political debate, but also its global attitudes and the sources of its foreign policy (2011, p. 13). media commentary in india often linked the student attacks to other irritants in relations between australia and india, such as labor’s ban on the export of uranium to india (labor announced the ban would be lifted in november 2011) and even aggressive behaviour of the australian cricket team while playing test matches against india. commentary on the attacks sometimes mentioned the white australia policy (largely dismantled in the 1960s and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 99 abolished in the 1970s), the anti-immigration rhetoric of the one nation party and the wrongful imprisonment of indian-born doctor mohammad haneef in australia. when julia gillard raised concerns about security in the lead up to the 2010 commonwealth games in delhi some media reports linked her remarks to the student attacks. the role of australian officials the indian media has been accused of sensationalising the violence against indians in australia in 2009-10 and exaggerating the danger to foreign students. but australian officials sometimes added to the negative media coverage of australia unnecessarily and increased the reputational damage. once the safety of indians in australia had emerged as a matter of public interest in mid-2009, the indian media closely scrutinised remarks about the issue made by state and federal ministers, police and other officials. comments by officials about specific incidents and investigations were often broadcast to huge indian television audiences and forensically examined by indian journalists and commentators. malik & medcalf point out that: to many millions of indians, an officer of the melbourne police, addressing a local audience, became the spokesperson for all australia, addressing the world (2011, p. 14). indians were often unimpressed by what they heard. eight months after the safety of indian students in australia first made headlines, a report on the popular times now website said australian officials ‘never fail to shock’ with their remarks on the issue. three examples illustrate how the reaction of australian officials sometimes made matters worse; the initial failure to acknowledge racist elements in some attacks; ineffective communication with the media; and ill-advised comments by senior politicians and officials. the initial failure to acknowledge racist elements in some attacks australia’s failure to seriously address the racist dimension of the 2009 crisis sparked fears in india of institutional prejudice against indian students. australian officials initially described the attacks as ‘opportunistic’ robberies and played down any racial dimension to them. but this contradicted claims made about the attacks on indian television. witnesses to some of the assaults claimed they had heard attackers shouting racial abuse. those claiming to speak on behalf of indian students in australia also linked the attacks to cases of racial vilification. the defensive statements made by australian officials, and the failure to acknowledge racist 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 elements in the attacks, sometimes demanded as much attention from the indian media as the attacks themselves. vinod mehta, the editor of the influential outlook magazine, told me one reason for the anger over the student attacks was the ‘smug and superior attitude of the australian government for denying there was racism and then telling the indians not to hype this up’ (mehta 2010). the perception of a cover-up was especially damaging because it stirred old perceptions of australia as a racist nation and heightened the fears of indians who had relatives or friends studying in australia. indians were not interested so much in the gap between reality and perception as australian officials seemed to be, but in getting credible, detailed information about the crimes and the people affected, the motivations behind those crimes, and what government agencies were doing to stop more crimes being committed. when they didn’t get that information, panic set in (mccarthy et al. 2012, p. 43). ineffective communication with the media there were occasions when better media management by australian officials might have promoted more accurate reporting of violence against indians and reduced the damage to australia’s reputation. one telling example followed an attack on two indian nationals outside a melbourne pub late on saturday, september 12, 2009. the victorian police did not make an immediate statement about the incident and it went unreported by the australian media. instead, the high-rating indian television station times now broke the story with an exclusive interview with the alleged victims nearly three days after the incident in melbourne. they told times now that ‘70 people’ were involved in the attack, a claim quickly repeated many times in television and newspaper reports across india. a headline in the delhi-based newspaper asian age was typical of the indian coverage: ‘oz mob of 70 attacks 3 indians’. victorian police eventually refuted this claim, saying four or five people were directly involved in the attack while about 20 looked on. but it was too late. the delay in the official account meant an incident that took place in the suburbs of melbourne had been framed for tens of millions of indians by television news editors in mumbai. the belated response by victorian police was widely interpreted as an attempt to downplay the significance of the attack and subsequent efforts by australian officials to set the record straight went largely cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 101 unreported. times now continued to report that ‘70 racist australians’ had bashed the two indian citizens more than a week after the incident took place. ill-advised remarks by senior politicians and officials some remarks made by senior politicians and officials during the student crisis attracted very negative media coverage in india. in july 2009, the then prime minister, kevin rudd, was lambasted on one of india’s most popular television programs after he told an indian journalist that indian food had made a major contribution to australian culture. arnab goswami, the editor-in chief of the times now channel and presenter of the newshour program, said mr rudd’s remarks trivialised the attacks on indians in australia. ‘let it be known that australian prime minister kevin rudd should do something a bit more serious than give interviews to indian channels talking about how much he likes indian food – that’s not the point’, he said. the newshour segment was titled ‘take this, mr rudd’ and it featured a report called ‘yes, it’s racism’ about the treatment of indian students in australia. there was a similar case in september 2009 when john brumby, then premier of victoria, was visiting india to promote melbourne as a safe destination for foreign students and tourists. soon after mr brumby’s arrival, essendon footballer, michael hurley, was accused of punching and kicking a taxi driver of indian origin in melbourne (mr hurley was later charged with assault). mr brumby drew fire in the media when he described mr hurley as ‘a good kid’ during a press conference in new delhi. mr brumby’s remarks were interpreted as a character reference for the alleged attacker which could compromise any subsequent police investigation and judicial process. a report on the times now website said mr brumby had ‘added insult to injury by giving a character certificate to the attacker’. in february 2010, simon overland, then victoria’s police commissioner, triggered an angry reaction in india when he advised international students to ‘look poor’ to help avoid attacks. gautam gupta, secretary of the federation of indian students of australia, responded to mr overland’s advice by saying: ‘what is he saying? indians don't have the right to be rich? and if they look rich, do they maybe have to get bashed?’ this and other strong criticisms of mr overland’s comments were widely quoted in the indian media. some media commentary expressed frustration at the repeated gaffes by australian officials over the student safety issue. a report on the times now website about mr overland’s remarks said: 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 australian officials never fail to shock with some of their comments on the race attacks down under. but, arguably in the most ridiculous statement so far, the victoria police chief commissioner has said india students must ‘dress to look poor’, if they don't want to be targets (times now 2010). conclusion by any measure, 2009 was a big year for news in india. there was a general election – the largest poll in world history given the size of india’s electorate; prime minister manmohan singh made the first ever official state visit to the white house; and tensions simmered in the aftermath of the november 2008 terrorist assault on mumbai. and yet the safety of indian students in australia ranked among the major news events in india that year. the indiaaustralia poll 2013 found 65 per cent of respondents believed the indian media had accurately reported the problems faced by indian students in australia in 2009-10. that implies two-thirds of indians accepted the indian media’s mostly negative depictions of australia. those who believed the media reporting about australia had been accurate were more likely to be from large cities, be tertiary educated and have relatively high-incomes. the poll found 62 per cent of respondents thought australia was a dangerous place for indian students and that 61 per cent believed attacks on indian students were motivated by racism. the results suggest negative perceptions about australia created by the media’s portrayal of the student attacks linger in the indian community. the timing of the initial attacks, and the imagery associated with them, helped attract and sustain media attention on the issue. the story also had significant appeal to india’s aspirational middle-class, a key audience for india’s complex, fast growing and highly competitive television news business. the public reaction to stories about the safety of indian students in australia made it impossible for the indian government to ignore the issue. the diplomatic tensions created by the crisis highlighted the growing influence of the broadcast media on india’s foreign relations. but the episode also exposed a deep lack of understanding about india in australia. governments were slow to comprehend how much damage media coverage of student attacks could do to australia’s reputation in india. at times australian officials made matters worse with ill-advised or uniformed remarks. the student crisis showed that australia still has much to learn about india. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 103 interviews bhatt, m. (2010) interview with the author, october. chaudhuri, p. p. (2009) interview with the author, may. mehta, n. (2009) interview with the author, may. mehta, v. (2010) interview with the author, february. mccarthy, j. (2012) interview with the author, july. tharoor, s. (2009) interview with the author, august. references mccarthy, j., baru,s., parthasarathy, g., mckew, m., malik, a. & kremmer, c. 2012, beyond the lost decade: report of the australia-india institute perceptions taskforce australia-india institute, melbourne. malik, a. & medcalf, r. 2011, ‘india’s new world: civil society in the making of foreign policy’, lowy institute analyses, lowy institute for international policy, sydney. available from: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/malik_and_medcalf%2c_india%27s_new _world_web.pdf medcalf, r. 2009, ‘troubled waters in need of oil’, tehelka, vol. 6, no. 23, june 13. —— 2013, ‘india-australia poll 2013’, lowy institute for international policy, sydney & australia-india institute, melbourne. available from: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/india-australia-poll-2013 outlook 2010, february 8. times now 2010, ‘aus police’s bizarre remedy for indians’, february 7, available from http://www.timesnow.tv/articleshow/4338002.cms 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/malik_and_medcalf%2c_india%27s_new_world_web.pdf http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/malik_and_medcalf%2c_india%27s_new_world_web.pdf http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/india-australia-poll-2013 http://www.timesnow.tv/articleshow/4338002.cms big news: the indian media and student attacks in australia0f matt wade sydney morning herald the media landscape in india the indian media’s coverage of student attacks in australia reactions to the media’s portrayal of student attacks the role of australian officials conclusion interviews references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 35 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 jon van til. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(1): 4303,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i1.4303 from liberal democracy to the cosmopolitan canopy jon van til indiana university lilly family school of philanthropy budapest university of jewish studies abstract liberalism is that ideology, that worldview, which values, in an ever-evolving set of intelligently intermingled thoughts: democracy, freedom (liberty), equality (justice), fraternity (solidarity), the pursuit of happiness, pluralism (diversity), and human rights – and explores the ever-open ever-possible futures of their rediscovery and advance. the study of ways in which social movements relate to third sector/nonprofit or voluntary organizations can be structured, if we choose, as a liberal endeavor. that is the message i receive from antonin wagner’s (2012) telling of the emergence of a field that focuses its study and developmental energies on place of intermediate associational life in modern society, from adalbert evers’ efforts to sustain the welfare state in an era of untrammeled capitalism (2013), and from roger lohmann’s (1992) comprehensive vision of a social commons capable of assuring the values of liberal society. this paper sets the theory of liberal democracy in a contemporary cosmopolitan context, drawing on case material from hungary, northern ireland, and the united states. the creation of cosmopolitan civil society is essentially a liberal construction. and liberal constructions are typically, if not necessarily, rooted in the theory and practice of democracy. this paper explores the path from liberal democracy to cosmopolitan civil society. along this path, i follow the observation of the liberal democratic theorist, roland pennock1, who 1 pennock was a leading theorist of liberal democracy over a wide span of the 20th century. less flamboyant than benjamin barber and certainly less recognized, he spent his career teaching at swarthmore college, and authored several influential books on democracy as well as editing a number of nomos volumes. i should add that his honors seminar on political theory at swarthmore, in which i participated in 1959 as a rising junior at that college, provided intellectual grist and inspiration for a number of my own writings, in particular mapping the third sector (1978). https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 observed that the theorist’s job is ‘to speculate and to interpret the facts as he sees them’ (pennock, in pennock and chapman 1969, pp. 285-286). i begin by recalling insights from three leading theorists—the swiss economist antonin wagner (2012), the german political scientist adalbert evers (2011, 2013) and the american social welfare scholar roger lohmann (2015)—who define key concepts related to society’s third sector and civil society. i then proceed to set these contentions into the context of liberal and democratic thought, the field that pennock explored in a lifetime of scholarship. i present three case studies of hungarian liberal democracy under stress and in retreat. and i conclude with a consideration of the uplifting research of cosmopolitan development by sociologist elijah anderson (2011) and cultural historian herbert j. muller (1952). beginning with wagner: liberalism provides the key to resolving the fundamental distinction between managerialist approaches and the participatory emphasis of civil society. then lohmann: democracy is at the core of many personal and social aspirations in modern societies. finally to evers: if we want to construct a civil society, we need first to understand ‘civility’. wagner places a central focus on the concept of ‘intermediate organization’, drawing on the 1969 nomos yearbook, co-edited by pennock and john chapman, on the subject of voluntary associations. by this choice, wagner moves directly into the path of the highly significant social/political theory of liberalism. lohmann (2015), who also draws on pennock’s seminal work, asserts that ‘democracy is increasingly more than a theory of government. it is a principle by which we seek to conduct aspects of our daily lives. voluntary action in the wider third sector beyond government, the market order and the intimate sphere has emerged as a powerful expression of the widespread wish for more democratic social relations in civil society.’ evers (2011), taking an ‘all-and’ rather than an ‘either-or’ approach, asserts the greater significance of civil society conceptions that incorporate not only actions and organizations within a bounded third sector, but also address broader concerns of deliberation, civicness, and civility throughout all corners and all institutions of society. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no1, 2015 37 anchored in the history of social and political theory, the core values of the liberal tradition are best expressed in the aspirations of the american and french revolutions. pennock (1950, pp. 11-12) sees in liberalism the elaboration of interaction between three basic values: progress, natural law, and equality. liberal democracy (or what he later called pluralistic democracy) is the structured decision-making system that becomes a ‘way of life’ providing an ‘equal right to liberty and happiness’ and to ‘equality before the law’ (pp. 16-17). the development of this world view is powerfully described in the writings of the cultural historian herbert j. muller (1952, 1966), who himself gives a long quote to ortega y gasset, who said it as well as it can be stated: liberalism is the supreme form of generosity; it is the right which the majority concedes to minorities and hence it is the noblest cry that has ever resounded in this planet. it announces the determination to share existence with the enemy; more than that, with an enemy which is weak. it was incredible that the human species should have arrived at so noble an attitude, so paradoxical, so refined, so acrobatic, so anti-natural. hence, it is not to be wondered at that this same humanity should soon appear anxious to get rid of it (quoted in muller 1966, pp. 387-388). liberalism is that ideology, that worldview, which values, in an ever-evolving set of intelligently intermingled thoughts: democracy, freedom (liberty), equality (justice), fraternity (solidarity), the pursuit of happiness, pluralism (diversity), and human rights--and explores the ever-open ever-possible futures of their rediscovery and advance. the study of ways in which social movements relate to third sector/nonprofit/civil society/ voluntary organizations can be structured, if we choose, as a liberal endeavor. civil society and liberal democracy the word ‘liberal’, of course, is one of the most confusing and polysemic in the lexicon of social analysis. originally developed as a way of justifying capitalistic liberties as a replacement for feudalism, it took on a strong political cast following the american and french revolutions – signifying the active participation of the citizenry in governance and public administration. with the rise of centralized, and later authoritarian, approaches toward the assurance of social and economic equality, ‘liberalism’ moved to the political center – between the ‘right’ of untrammeled capitalism and the ‘left’ of various experiments with socialism and communism. 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 in contemporary parlance, ‘liberal’ continues to be appropriated to a variety of uses: in ‘liberal’ studies to assure a wide range of open intellectual exploration; in ‘neo-liberalism’ as a reclamation of capitalist ideological roots; in ‘pointy-headed liberalism’ as an effort by nonconservatives to besmudge their intellectual opponents as secret or misguided agents of conspiracy. following pennock, i would assert that, to be a useful concept of social science, liberalism needs to be specified into an institutional mode. it is too general an idea to be of analytic use in itself, but becomes increasingly powerful when modified, for example, as ‘economic’, ‘social’, or ‘political’. and most useful of all becomes its delineation in terms of ‘liberal democracy’ or, to use a closely related term, ‘pluralistic democracy’.2 michael edwards’s influential work on civil society (2009) presents three basic puzzles to be solved: 1) civil society as associational life; 2) civil society as the good society; and 3) civil society as the public sphere. no one of these approaches, he asserts, offers the one best or exclusive resolution. rather, ‘civil society gains strength both as an idea and as a vehicle for social change when the weaknesses of one set of theories are balanced by the strength and contributions of the others’ (2009, p. 82). perhaps there’s something of a dialectic at work. civil society type 1 mediates between polity and economy in the two-sector view of society handed down through the centuries by classic theoretical conceptions, from plato to hobbes to locke to smith to marx. it’s the thesis. civil society type 2 appears with the recognition that society’s ‘third sector’ has a shape and standing of its own, and might be recognized as at least somewhat ‘independent’. that’s the antithesis. comes then the synthesis: civil society type 3 mediates, yes, but it also stands on its own and performs many important functions. but there is more: civil society also serves to actualize the values and processes of liberal or pluralistic democracy – and not just in the third sector, but also in government and politics. and, as if not yet enough, maybe in (at least) other parts of the economy, like cooperative and participative businesses. and why not within 2 here i recall the remarkable work of william kornhauser (1959). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no1, 2015 39 the family and kin structures themselves – aching for ways of accommodating the aspirations for women and children and grandparents for roles that provide them with the satisfactions of participating in decisions and actualizing their own aspirations?3 it is a truly cyclical process. liberal democracies may actualize themselves by adopting the best practices of civil society construction: dialogue and deliberation, civic participation, active and civil listening, and learning behaviors. and in return, civil organizations and polities and corporations and families may come to recognize that they can function best if they adopt the principles and practices of liberal and pluralist democracy. uncivil democracy and the problem of majority rule but there is a big problem with contemporary democracy: it is not working very well, as we see in country after country in the 21st century (diamond 2015, but see fisher 2013.) for democracy contains, if not contradictions, at least some important areas of tension, and they surround its linchpin idea: the principle of majority rule (pennock 1979, p. 7). the will of the majority may be qualified, democratic theory asserts, by insistence on the protection of minority rights or actions requiring ‘supermajorities’, but the fundamental principle requires that all citizens have the right to vote, and that ‘plurality is determinative’ (ibid.). in the contemporary democracy of the united states, pluralities come and go, often achieving only the narrowest of electoral victories as the revolving doors of electoral success and failure transform one term’s ‘ins’ into tomorrow’s ‘outs’. traditions of loyal opposition, partially learnt from the mother country (england), receive in the heat of contemporary politics only the most occasional of lip service. in an era of fierce polarization between center and right (and far right as well), the fundamental rule of politics becomes: ‘you be the leader; i’ll be the assassin.’ the assassin’s weapon of choice typically involves what can be gotten away with. in the usa, it is usually (but not always) non-lethal, but nonetheless devastating: the big lie, the personal smear, the appeal to fear, the questioning of legitimacy (even of birth), the hint of limited capacity on the basis of race/ethnicity/religion/gender/age/sexual preference, etc. 3 the present author has been making this point for quite a while. see van til 1988. 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 this brutal game lowers the quality of governance, assuring that insult and derogation set the tone for political discourse, and stalemate becomes the frequent result of policy outcomes. in hungary, where i twice served as fulbright specialist, it often appears that denigrating the opponent becomes more attractive to political participants than achieving electoral success. there, one party has achieved an unassailable super-majority, but that does not prevent them from relentless efforts to denigrate and control their political opposition. there seems to be something in the human being, likely built into the beast and then encouraged by culture, that exults in humiliating the opponent. popular culture shows this in the anglo nations: a self-seeking francis urquardt (unforgettably played by ian richardson in the bbc tv series house of cards) was transformed nearly a decade later into the american political hack francis underwood, just as heartless but a bit less nuanced, at least as depicted by kevin spacey. brutality seems to edge out brilliance as incivility spreads. macbeth, and lady macbeth, redux. in the modern democracy, both majorities and minorities join forces to spoil the political commons. hungarian prime minister orban flaunts his supermajority and invites his opponents to leave the field (literally, by migrating to other countries), while the parties that might take advantage of his lack of respect find it impossible to either join forces or articulate an alternative vision of policy and governance. in the united states, president obama doggedly repeats his call for inter-party cooperation, but fails to find ways of making deals or bargains, grand or not, with his adversaries. whether political, nonprofit, or corporate – devotees of obstructionism all seem determined rather to be ‘right’ than responsible – or indeed, effective at the enterprise of governing. examples from northern ireland, another location in which i performed fulbright service, are here both instructive and more heartening. for three decades in the late 20th century, government in that province of the united kingdom was in effect replaced by violent paramilitary organizations that captured large segments of its all-too-active third sector. in the years leading up to the cease-fire of 1994 and, ultimately, the good friday agreement of 1998, nonviolent nonprofit organizations played a crucial role in assuring social welfare and sustaining public peace during those troubled times (birrell and williamson 2001). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no1, 2015 41 moreover, the good friday agreement provided a means of assuring the electoral minority, and the majority as well, a clearly delineated, predictable, and influential role in the governance of the country. the exhaustive understanding between the major ethno-nationalreligious-political segments of that society that was hammered out in the agreement, and then validated by a referendum requiring consent of the major solidaries, stands as one of the great accomplishments of conflict resolution in modern times. if total peace and harmony has not come to prevail in northern ireland, this has more to do with the time required to move beyond the horrors of civil war than it does with flaws in the agreement and what it prescribed. the image of former guerrilla leaders standing hand to hand in shared governmental roles gives hope for the success of civil democracy in other divided nations throughout the world. the point, then, is that liberal democracy, if it is to function smoothly and well, requires civility (cf shils 1977). and civility is strong, though certainly not universal, in the currency of the third sector, and is beginning to be seen, as we have noted in the discussion of evers (2011), as a linchpin of a whole and civil society. majority rule, the basic principle of democracy, often fails to provide stability in an era of continuing disenchantment with governmental outcomes. the revolving door of parties, the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ exchanging places, perhaps after enjoying the brief light of supermajority rule, becomes inescapable in nearly every society in a globe exceeding its carrying capacity. in such times as ours, national governments will continually fail to meet the expectations their citizens hold for them, and if the party scene is reasonably competitive, will fall from power after one or two terms. a set of unpleasant alternatives face democracies in this situation. there is the american alternative: continuous political strife between the ins and the outs – each knowing (or at last believing) that their roles will be reversed in an upcoming election, and that therefore it makes little sense to try to do too much (more being easier to block than less) while in power, or to cooperate at all while out of power (as the time is rapidly advancing when they will hold the reins once more). hardly more attractive is the hungarian choice: abandoning liberal democracy for a more permanent domination of regime – revamping electoral laws, voting eligibilities, and constitutions themselves; building political machines in which winners take all and losers get blacklisted; hanging onto power through electoral victories in the face of widespread public disapproval. on the one hand then, uncivil stalemate; on the other, illiberal 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 democracy by manipulated majorities. thus appears not just the desirability, but perhaps even the need for liberal, pluralistic, and civil democracy. three cases follow, each touching on contemporary hungary and presented to suggest openings to a basic question i have sought to answer throughout my career (cf. van til 1988, 2008): how can we create a liberal, pluralist, and civil form of democracy in our national politics, in our third sector/nonprofit/civil organizations, in our businesses and corporations, and in our family and kinship structures? case 1: resurgent civic activism and a hungarian memorial throughout the months following his overwhelming re-election in 2014 as prime minister of hungary, viktor orban’s government carried on an increasingly bitter disagreement with important forces within budapest’s jewish community. the major representative organization of that community, mazsihisz, had, over this period, taken an unprecedentedly independent stance toward the regime of orban’s ruling party, fidesz. mazsihisz publicly objected to major appointments to several state-initiated projects marking the 70th anniversary of the german nazi occupation of budapest, and the drastic increase in the level of holocaust atrocity this occupation provoked in hungary. most visibly, this lead jewish organization took a public role in opposing the construction of a highly controversial and poorly conceived statue proposed by the government to mark this anniversary. in an unprecedented fashion, maszihisz rejected the offer of state funding to support several community-based remembrance activities of the 1944 events. in a country long accustomed to dependence on governmental funding of religious organizations, this rejection of financial support from the government was important news indeed. as the official monument took form, protesters sought to restrict its construction, but police protection quickly restrained such efforts. but at the same time, protestors had begun to create a ‘living monument’ on the square, itself the location of the american embassy, a venerable monument to the soviet union, and an iconic statue of ronald reagan. visitors began to bring mementos of the hungarian past and assemble them around the construction site. at the current writing (early 2015), the living memorial expands in its scope and impact every day, while behind it, the misleading and official monument finds its role as a mere cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no1, 2015 43 backdrop to a greater power of civic imagination that dominates its foreground (van til 2014). case 2: a government takes on civil society in today’s hungary, a duly elected government seems bent on creating a one-party state that controls nearly every aspect of the country’s life – public, commercial, civic, voluntary, and even religious. and this monolith is steadily reducing the capacity of the third sector to provide for citizen initiative and participation. prime minister orban has secured lasting power for himself by utilizing governing techniques he learned as an oppositional movement leader fighting the sovietized autocracy of the late 1980s. whatever he does seems to work, at least in assuring repeated re-election. in both 2010 and 2014 his ruling party, fidesz, secured a two-thirds majority in parliament, allowing it to reshape the constitution of the country at every overnight whim. variously identified by its critics as a ‘mafia’, ‘octopus’ or ‘franken’-state, practicing ‘crony capitalism’ within the context of an ‘operetta state’ inside a ‘goulash archipelago’of ‘orbanistan’, the government of ‘viktator’ orban functions as a highly effective political machine.4 the third sector has been turned inside-out in orban’s hungary. philanthropy finds itself subject to state control and direction; the participatory processes of civil society find themselves closely sniffed by the big nose of the state in the form of blacklists and grants favoritism; and the independence of what americans have come to call the (at least partially) ‘independent sector’ is reduced to a set of complaisant organizations placed on what political scientist merle fainsod (1958) identified as the ‘transmission belt’ of an authoritarian society. a rather bizarre case in point is found in a contemporary conflict between the norwegian government, acting as a philanthropist to hungary under the peculiar folkways of the european community, and the hungarian government, which took exception to a grant awarded to a nonprofit organization it found too closely associated to a rival political party. according to press reports5, hungary’s position was that: 4 see krasztev and van til, forthcoming, for discussion of these identifications. 5 http://www.politics.hu/20140515/pms-office-to-respond-this-week-to-norway-on-grants-suspension/ http://www.politics.hu/20140515/pms-office-to-respond-this-week-to-norway-on-grants-suspension/ 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 it would like norway to extend the suspension over the three funds disbursing monies allocated to civil organisations and to renegotiate the entire programme structure of the scheme. the most important aim in connection with the norway grants scheme is to ensure that only state bodies should fulfil tasks connected with the management of funding… norwegian funding for ngos is currently transferred through (a) foundation which appears to be an ngo but in reality is a satellite organization’ of (a) small opposition party. so, the brave new world of the hungarian third sector is revealed: grants may be received from sources outside the government, but only if they are managed by the government and are directed to organizations it approves. so much for encouraging philanthropic giving – ‘give only to me’ is the government’s message. so much for an independent third sector—‘organize only what we approve’ is the government’s message. so much for encouraging civil processes of social participation and innovation in the civil sector—’do only what we tell you’ is the government’s message to its third sector leaders. case 3: making a debater’s point against liberal democracy little and landlocked, hungary re-entered the purview of international news following a remarkable speech by prime minister orban on july 26, 2014. within a week, commentary and editorials appeared in the financial times, the new york times, the washington post, and newsweek expressing distress with orban’s comments about the virtues of ‘illiberal democracy’ and his apparent admiration of the national leadership of such countries as russia and turkey. within a couple of months, even bill clinton and barack obama found themselves referring to these comments in disdainful terms. the speech6, delivered at a summer youth camp located in tusnádfürdő, a heavily hungarian region in romania, took the form of a professorial presentation while providing important content regarding hungary’s crucial though precarious geopolitical position. increasingly a buffer between an expanding russia and a worried eu, and highly dependent on both forces for its economic viability, orban’s hungary is in the process of a massive concentration of its economic and social institutions under governmental control. it is also implementing a 6 http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26july-2014/ http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/ http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no1, 2015 45 dramatic repositioning of its economy, relying on russian assistance for an expansion of nuclear power and exchanging large segments of its intelligentsia (by out-migration) for manual workers from the hungarian sections of neighboring romania, slovakia, and serbia. orban’s speech bears careful consideration both for its content and its implications for global political futures. the speech is notable for its rejection of key aspects of liberal democratic thought – among which were mentioned the welfare state, the role of nongovernmental organizations (seen as agents of foreign power), and the influence of the european union itself. emphasizing national values and the development of a ‘workfare state’ as a new path to development, orban inspired gyorgi schopflin7, one of his principal admirers, to state that it may be assumed ‘that a decade from now, the tusnádfürdő speech will be remembered as a valiant and brave forerunner of the required changes. of course, it might not. but then democracy will be in big trouble.’ to be sure, social relations in hungary show little experience with the democratic niceties of intergroup collaboration, and its leaders have historically exhibited cooperative skills at least as rarely as their citizens. hungary’s rulers tend to be remembered for their military losses and their authoritarian governing styles. indeed, orban, the land’s most recent ruler, already receives nine citations in the dictator’s handbook.8 toward a cosmopolitan canopy for civil democracy liberal democracy, if it is to survive and thrive, is built on the mutual respect of citizens. novelist and sociologist richard sennett has documented the wastage involved in building a ‘purified identity’ on the basis of characteristics as inconsequential as skin color, family of origin, religion, nation, or other accidents of birth. a competitive and productive society, as social theorist talcott parsons (1966) noted, is based on what is accomplished and achieved, and not on what is ascribed and incidental. as the content of the unionist identity fades with the distancing of the english from northern ireland, and barriers to racial minorities and women fade in the united states and many other parts of the world, the triviality apparent in basing identity on differences is bound to emerge less vividly with the passing of time and generations. 7 http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/aspen%20en.pdf 8 written by bruce bueno de mesquita and alastair smith, published in 2011 by publicaffairs. http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/pdf/aspen%20en.pdf https://www.kirkusreviews.com/search/?q=bruce%20bueno%20de%20mesquita;t=author https://www.kirkusreviews.com/search/?q=alastair%20smith;t=author 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 social psychologist louis zurcher (1977) found in his work that the modern identity often takes the form of the ‘mutable self’, capable of adjusting to differing social situations. many middle-class professionals in northern ireland have developed skills in mutability that permit them to place their ethno-national-religious identity into the background at work, in the neighborhood, in mixed marriages, and in other broader walks of life. citizens of the modern world may be faced with choices involving too many potential identities – national, religious, political, strategic, residential, and the like. and it may be the ambiguities involved in choosing a national identity that give rise to the most serious of these confusions. certainly these questions were not easily resolved, and indeed not all have been, in northern ireland (cf. van til 2007). in divided societies there remains the temptation to tolerate the ‘tall fences’ and ‘peace walls’ that aim to provide comfort through what would otherwise appear self-destructive segregation. at the same time, however, there are lessons of diversity that will have to be learned in societies less extremely divided--such as the united states, the united kingdom, and hungary--lest the rising generation in these lands fall hopelessly behind in the quest for personal and professional advantage in the universalist structures of the global economy and society. comfort notwithstanding, there’s a strong case to be made that the 21st century citizen needs to learn to swim in a bigger pool, at least from time to time. the dilemma was dramatically cast by sociologist louis wirth, in his classic 1928 study of the ghetto. wirth described the choice faced by the ‘marginal man’, readied by education and training to leave the ghetto in which he was born, and take his place in a multi-cultural world: the difficulty is that the jew, as long as he remains in the ghetto, is of a separate caste, living in a world that is narrow, but warm with the flow of familiar life, full of sentiment, and with opportunity for self-expression within the limits of the group. but when he emerges from the ghetto he becomes human, which means he has contacts with the outer world, encounters friction and hostility, as well as familiarity and friendship…(1928, p. 267). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no1, 2015 47 sociologist elijah anderson (2011) writes of what he calls ‘cosmopolitan canopies’, ‘public spaces within cities (that) offer a respite from… wariness (of those who seem different), settings where a diversity of people can feel comfortable enough to relax their guard.’ anderson describes everyday life within the reading terminal market in philadelphia, where as visitors stroll up and down the aisles, stopping at various shops and kiosks, they experience other people, and they generally seem to trust what (and whom) they see… when taking a seat at a lunch counter, people feel they have something of a license to speak with others, and others a license to speak to them. the author, an african american, was tapped on the shoulder by a total stranger, a ‘redfaced’ irishman, asking about the score of a basketball game – not something that would occur out on the street. what is so striking about sitting at a lunch counter in the reading terminal is that in this setting, a white man with white supremacist friends is able to have a frank conversation with a black stranger. in these settings people engage in folk ethnography and formulate or find evidence for their folk theories about others with whom they share the public space (2011, p. 36). creating cosmopolitan canopies is never an easy task, as these constructions rest on a confluence of built, cultural, social, and political structures. the built environment in most societies provides potential canopies within its physical structures. these ‘third places’ (oldenburg 1989) – markets, like philadelphia’s reading terminal, which exist in varying forms throughout the world; coffee houses like budapest’s tranzit art café; bookstores that bring authors together with readers; school and church halls that lie unused many hours of the week – provide the turf from which the cosmopolitan canopy may sprout. the cultural requisites for successful bridging interactions (cf. putnam and goss 2002) involve, at the individual level, a willingness to explore relations across divisions of race, religion, class, ethnicity, and gender by means of simple conversation (wheatley 2002). some cultures seem better suited to such interaction than others. the irish, for example, seem able to strike up conversations on their weather with great ease and frequency. hungarians, while typically confining their conversation to persons known to them, benefit from a long experience with classlessness in the post-war era and often burst into conversation with strangers while shopping or on the tram. perhaps those of the varieties of anglo heritage are 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 most retarded in this capacity, trained from the outset to be able to talk easily only with ‘their own kind’. forthcoming research on the dynamics of cosmopolitan canopies awaits research on such differentials. a third factor affecting cosmopolitan canopies relates to the social segregation of different societies. americans and hungarians, for instance, tend to live out a good deal of their lives in the social silos enforced by residential segregation, political party membership, or church affiliation. the walls of these silos are perhaps better breached in the former society than the latter by dint of its greater experience with third sector involvement (cf. zick and associates 2012), but the recent american turn away from face-to-face association toward computerlinked mass organization surely takes its toll on the quality of the cosmopolitan canopy.9 the political life of a country also affects the prospects for its cosmopolitan canopies. authoritarian or totalitarian governments look suspiciously on such turf, fearing that seeds of dissent and opposition may sprout therein (krasztev and van til 2015 forthcoming). however, in both the long and short run, organizations, including countries, may suffer from the majoritarian zeal of those elected to office who choose to run it all. even the strongest ruler stands to benefit from citizen interest in resolving society’s problems – especially those problems that government seems nearly always unable to resolve – poverty, unemployment, pride in ethnicity and life-style, disaster relief, substance abuse, comfort for those in need or distress. among the anticipated products of the cosmopolitan canopy may be emergent philanthropy, the establishment of an independent third sector, and a civil respect for civil society groups, ideas, and programs throughout the countries they are elected to serve. voluntary and nonprofit organizations, the linchpins of the third sector, can do much to construct the cosmopolitan canopies under which citizens can come together to give voice to the causes they value, to relieve the suffering that life places in their paths, and to find comfort in the company of friends and neighbors. the social health provided in such organizational spaces can substantially aid in co-producing, along with government, the satisfaction and happiness of society’s members and citizens. 9 the reader is invited to observe the behavior within the contemporary coffee shop. what, for example, is the balance between conversation and individual computer work at its tables? i recall enjoying a fine cup of coffee in chicago’s ‘intelligentsia café’ a few months back, and noting that every table was taken by customers absorbed by their computers, each sitting individually without a live partner for conversation or deliberation. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no1, 2015 49 contemporary autocracies such as orban’s hungary, erdogan’s turkey, and putin’s russia leave little room for ideas like deliberative democracy, citizen participation, income redistribution, social diversity, or human rights. these governments, it would seem, act to hollow out democratic and pluralist institutions in order to create their own response to the challenges of contemporary geopolitics. some practical suggestions and a conclusion several practical suggestions emerge from the discussion above, which if followed might enhance the quantity and quality of cosmopolitan canopies within contemporary society: • at every level of social structure – individual, organizational, sectoral, societal – civil interaction and dialogue has its place. • civility is a skill that can be learned, and indeed must be learned, if individuals, organizations, sectors and societies are to function in mutual respect, a necessary modicum of social peace, and an appreciation of diversity. • civil dialogue can be built into the bones of a well-designed community. the cosmopolitan canopy facilitates dialogue and diversity, which are themselves prerequisites of whole persons, civil organizations, workable democracies, and peaceful liberal societies. the liberal response to the inevitability of differences in opinion and preference in society typically posits a central role for dialogue and deliberation, not dictation and persuasion. dialogue and deliberation play central roles theories of deliberative democracy, like those of habermas (1998), which are often seen to involve a more direct conception of democracy than the mediated forms of pluralist democratic thought. but if people and organizations are to disagree with each other, both privately and publicly, as is inevitable in a liberal society, structured dialogue and deliberation may allow them to do so in a civil and non-destructive manner. a further contribution of effective dialogue and deliberation comes from the possibilities these participatory approaches provide for the actual resolution of even the deepest of human conflicts. harold saunders developed the sustained dialogue methodology by means of the 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 shuttle diplomacy that brought about sadat’s visit to the knesset in 1977 (saunders 1999) and the techniques in these approaches have since been developed in a variety of venues (cf. lohmann and van til 2011). liberal conceptions of society develop and accept a full, albeit tragic, vision of history and life.10 claudia horwitz (in edwards (ed.) 2011, p. 280) puts it well in the oxford handbook: ‘marrying a rich inner life dedicated to the cultivation of loving kindness and compassion with the practice of new forms of politics, economics and public policy is the key to social transformation.’ such are the challenges that await dialogue and deliberation beneath the civil and cosmopolitan canopies of our planet in the years ahead. references anderson, e. 2011, the cosmopolitan canopy: race and civility in everyday life, norton, new york. birrell, d. and williamson, a. 2001, ‘the voluntary and community sector in northern ireland: political development and new forms of governance, 1970-2000’, voluntas, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 205-220. diamond, l. 2015, ‘facing up to the democratic recession’, journal of democracy, vol.26, no.1, pp. 141-155. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0009 edwards, m. 2009, civil society, wiley, new york. edwards, m. (ed.) 2011, handbook of civil society, oxford, new york. evers, a. 2011, ‘observations of incivility: blind spots in third sector research and policy’, voluntary sector review, vol. 1, no 1, pp. 113-117. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/204080510x497064 evers, a. 2013, ‘the concept of ‘civil society’: different understandings and their implications for third sector policies’, voluntary sector review, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 149-164. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/204080513x667800 10 on the tragic vision, see the magisterial conclusion to muller’s comprehensive telling of the uses of the past, a volume emanating from his research stay in one of the globe’s greatest canopies, istanbul’s hagia sophia: (t)he tragic sense is the profoundest sense of our common humanity, and may therefore be a positive inspiration. if all the great societies have died, none is really dead. their peoples have vanished, as all men must, but first they enriched the great tradition of high, enduring values….(w)e might be heartened as well as sobered by the thought that we shall vanish into that same darkness, and live on in the same tradition. we might be freed from the vanity of grandiose hopes, as of petty concerns. we might learn that ‘ripeness is all,’ and that it is enough. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jod.2015.0009 http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/204080510x497064 http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/204080513x667800 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no1, 2015 51 fainsod, m. 1958, smolensk under soviet rule, harvard university press, cambridge, ma. fisher, j. 2013, importing democracy, kettering foundation, dayton, ohio. habermas, j. 1998, between facts and norms: contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy, mit press, cambridge, ma. kornhauser, w. 1959, the politics of mass society, free press, glencoe, il. krasztev, p. &van til, j. (eds.) (2015, forthcoming), the hungarian patient, central european university press, budapest. lohmann, r. & van til, j. (eds.) 2011, resolving community conflicts and problems: public deliberation and sustained dialogue, columbia university press, new york. lohmann, r. 1992, the commons, jossey-bass, san francisco. lohmann, r. 2015, voluntary action and the new commons, skywriters press, morgantown, wv. muller, h. 1952, the uses of the past: profiles of former societies, oxford university press, oxford. muller, h. 1966, freedom in the modern world, harper’s, new york. oldenburg, r. 1989, the great good space, paragon books, new york. parsons, t. 1966, ‘on the concept of political power’, in bendix, r. & lipset, s. (eds.), class, status and power, (2nd ed.), free press, new york, pp. 240–265. pennock, j. r. 1950, liberal democracy, greenwood, westport, ct. pennock, j. r. & chapman, j. (eds). 1969, voluntary associations, nomos xi yearbook of the american society for political and legal philosophy, atherton, new york. pennock, j. r. 1979, democratic social theory, princeton university press, princeton. putnam, r. & goss, k. 2002, ‘introduction’, in putnam, r. (ed.), democracies in flux; the evolution of social capital in contemporary society, oxford university press, oxford, pp. 1–19. saunders, h. 1999, a public peace process: sustained dialogue to transform racial and ethnic conflicts, st. martin’s, new york. sennett, r. 1971, the uses of disorder, vintage, new york. shils, e. 1997, the virtue of civility: selected essays on liberalism, tradition, and civil society, liberty fund, indianapolis. van til, j. 2007, breaching derry’s walls, university press of america. van til, j. 2008, growing civil society, indiana university press, bloomington. van til, j. 2014, ‘insulted and aroused by a proposed monument, budapest's jewish community finds its voice’, huffington post, july 2014 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-van-til/insulted-and-aroused-bya_b_5286158.html van til, j. 1988, mapping the third sector, foundation center, new york. van til, j. and krasztev, p. (forthcoming in 2015), the hungarian patient, central european press, budapest. wagner, a. 2012, ‘“third sector” and/or “civil society”: a critical discourse about scholarship relating to intermediate organizations’, voluntary sector review, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 299-328. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1332/204080512x658036 wheatley, m. 2002, turning to one another: simple conversations to restore hope to the future, berrett-koehler, san francisco. wirth, l. 1928, the ghetto, university of chicago press, chicago. zick, a., küpper, b. & hövermann, a. 2011, intolerance, prejudice and discrimination: a european report, friedrich-ebert-stiftung, berlin. zurcher, l. 1977, the mutable self: a self-concept for social change, sage, beverly hills, ca. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-van-til/insulted-and-aroused-by-a_b_5286158.html http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jon-van-til/insulted-and-aroused-by-a_b_5286158.html http://dx.doi.org/%2010.1332/204080512x658036 from liberal democracy to the cosmopolitan canopy abstract civil society and liberal democracy uncivil democracy and the problem of majority rule case 1: resurgent civic activism and a hungarian memorial case 2: a government takes on civil society case 3: making a debater’s point against liberal democracy toward a cosmopolitan canopy for civil democracy some practical suggestions and a conclusion references 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia social capital, local communities and culture-led urban regeneration processes: the sydney olympic park experience jason prior giorgio tavano blessi university of technology, sydney abstract culture has become increasingly important in regeneration processes designed to deal with urban futures. urban regeneration processes in which culture has played a prominent role range from large-scale public investments in cultural facilities and artefacts as ‘hallmarks’ of urban regeneration projects (e.g. guggenheim bilbao), through to the use of ‘one shot’ cultural events such as the olympic games as a catalyst and engine for regenerating urban areas. the aim of this paper is to examine the association between social capital (sc), local communities and the culture-led regeneration process at sydney olympic park (sop), new south wales, australia. the catalyst for the transformation of an industrial wasteland into sop was the awarding of the olympics to sydney in 1993. a convenience sample of 47 professional reports associated with the regeneration process at sop between 1993 and 2010 were analyzed, the aim being to understand how local communities had been linked to the regeneration process through sc. results from the analysis identified three principal associations between sc, local communities and the ongoing sop regeneration process. the first association related to how, during the early years of the regeneration process, sc was used as a means of expressing concern about how governance mechanisms implemented at sop might adversely impact the ability of local communities to engage in decision making that affected their local environment. the second related to the use of community development programs to build sc in local communities through the sop development. the third related to a call for the development of measures to understand how the development of sop impacts on the sc in local communities. eight in-depth interviews with professionals involved in the regeneration process were used to provide further insights into the three principal associations. the paper discusses findings through reference to broader arguments surrounding the potential, capacity and nature of sc. introduction in the last two decades culture has gained increasing importance in regeneration processes designed to deal with urban futures. there is a growing acceptance and recognition of the important role that cultural activities and events can play in the development of mature, postindustrial urban areas (hall 1998; hutton 2006; hutton 2009; landry 2001; sacco & tavano cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 79 blessi 2009; scott 2000).the utilisation of such processes has multiplied in recent decades. regeneration, as evans (2004, p.4) has noted, can be defined as ‘the transformation of a place (residential, commercial or open space) that has displayed the symptoms of environmental (physical), social and/or economic decline’. furthermore, evans (2004, p.5) uses the term culture-led regeneration, to describe those instances where culture is used as a catalyst for the regeneration process. urban regeneration processes in which culture has played a prominent role range from large-scale public investments in cultural facilities and artefacts as hallmarks of urban regeneration projects (e.g. guggenheim bilbao) through to the use of one shot cultural events such as the olympic games as the catalyst and engine of regeneration within cities (garcía 2004a; gospodini 2009). the reasons for implementing these processes vary considerably. they range from seeking simply to increase urban infrastructure to addressing more diverse goals of enhancing a city’s international brand, its economic prosperity and its attractiveness to tourists, and improving the quality of the social and cultural life of its residents (evans 2001; gold & gold 2007). the aim of this paper is to examine the association between social capital (sc), local communities and the culture-led urban regeneration process at sydney olympic park (sop), new south wales (nsw), australia. the catalyst for the regeneration of a previous industrial wasteland at homebush bay west into sop was the awarding of the olympics to sydney in 1993 (see figure 1). this paper is not just focused on the regeneration process that led up to the sydney olympics as an event in 2000 (see e.g. garcia 2004b; waitt 2003); it also examines the broader regeneration processes at sop that continued up until this study was conducted in 2011. a convenience sample of 47 professional reports associated with the regeneration process at sop between 1993 and 2011 were analyzed, the aim being to understand how local communities had been linked to the regeneration process through sc. results from the analysis identified three principal associations between sc, local communities and the regeneration process at sop. the first association related to how sc was used during the early years of the regeneration process as a means of expressing concern about how governance mechanisms implemented at sop might adversely impact the ability of local communities to engage in decision making that affected their local environment. the second related to the use of community development programs to build sc in local communities through the sop development. the third related to a call for the development of measures to understand how the development of sop impacts on the sc in local communities, by virtue of their membership in social networks that arose through the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 80 regeneration process at sop. eight in-depth interviews with professionals involved in the regeneration process were used to provide further insights into the three principal associations. given the diverse terminology that was used for sc across the studies and interviews that were analyzed, the paper adopts a common conceptual language for sc when discussing the findings. the paper also discusses the findings from the analysis through reference to broader arguments surrounding the potential, capacity and nature of sc. in carrying out this examination, as radcliffe (2004, p.519) recommends, we seek to open more fully the black box of sc with specific reference to its association with communities and culture-led urban regeneration processes. the conceptualization of social capital sc is the key concept explored in this paper. sc is a quality of social networks (holt 2008; mohan & mohan 2002; radcliffe 2004;coleman 1988; glaeser, laibson & sacerdote 2002; putnam 2001), and is built about the core idea that ‘social networks have value’ (putman 2000, p19, emphasis added). as westlund (2006, p.1) asserts, sc as a concept can be understood as emerging from the work of bourdieu (1983) and coleman (1988). bourdieu (1983, p. 248) defines sc as: ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’. in a similar way, coleman (1988, p. s98) describes sc as: ‘a variety of entities with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether personal or corporate actors –within the structure’. sc is the outcome of social networks and as such it is generally agreed that neither individuals nor organizations can own sc, and that ‘sc cannot be stored materially, institutionally, textually and by, for example, academic titles (like cultural capital)’ (bærenholdt & aarsæther 2002). as bullen and onyx (1998) note: it is created from the myriad of everyday interactions between people. it is not located within the individual person or within the social structure, but in the space between people. it is not the property of the organisation, the market or the state, though all can engage in its production. whilst sc cannot be stored, scholars such as putnam have asserted that stocks of sc can amass ‘where trust and social networks flourish, [for use by] individuals, firms, neighborhoods, and even nations’ (2000, p. 319). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 81 despite the earlier origins of the concept of sc in the work of others, putman’s work (1993, 2000) often assumes a more central role in discussions of sc. putman (2000, p. 19) defined sc as ‘connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them’, reflecting the views of his predecessors. whilst putman’s conceptualization of sc is aligned with that of his predecessors, it also deviates. putman, along with a range of other sc scholars (woolcock 1998), argues that there needs to be a greater understanding of the diverse dimensions of sc. of particular importance to this study is putnam’s (2000, pp. 22-24) distinction between bridging sc and bonding sc which he acknowledges as adopting from the work of others. bridging sc refers to the social connections that cut across narrow groups and interests, connecting people in a community, and spans diverse social groups (putman 2000). bonding sc refers to social connections that create perpetual in-group cohesion, sometimes at the expense of cross-cutting social interactions, and reinforces exclusive identities and homogeneous groups (putman 2000). in a figurative sense bonding sc has been described as the glue and bridging sc as the lubricant within social networks (anderson & jack 2002). for putman these are the two most important dimensions of sc (putman 2000, p.22), and should not be considered as mutually exclusive. for example it is possible to have in-group cohesion in addition to connectedness to other groups in a society. putnam and others suggest that bridging and bonding sc have different consequences and effects, not only on individuals but also on broader society, arguing that these consequences and effects can be both positive and negative (putman 2000, p.22). for example bonding sc, whilst generally having negative effects for society as a whole, may have positive effects for the members of a closed social group or network. conversely, bridging sc can have positive effects on society in that it supports contact between different groups or networks. furthermore, according to researchers (fukuyama 1995; putman 2000; halpern 2001) better health conditions, a favorable climate for entrepreneurialism, improved crime statistics, and better school performance can be observed in societies with ample social capital. whilst bridging and bonding sc have become widely used in sc analysis, woolcock argues that it is important to recognise a third key dimension of sc: linking sc (woolcock 2001, 13-14). the concept of linking sc is applied to the relations within the hierarchical structures of society, which connect us with people in positions of influence. linking sc may be provisionally viewed as a special form of bridging capital that specifically concerns power cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 82 – it is a vertical bridging across asymmetrical powers and resources. we use the concepts of bonding, bridging and linking sc as components of a common syntax for sc in this study, allowing the diverse and often confusing expressions of sc that were presented in the studies and interviews that were analysed to be standardised in the presentation of the findings. methodology a mixed-method design that investigated the culture-led urban regeneration processes at sop, using the analysis of published studies and in-depth interviews, served to address the research aim. the study’s methodology was approved by the human research ethics committee (hrec) of the university of technology, sydney. the culture-led urban regeneration process at sydney olympic park in 1993 sydney’s largest brownfield site – containing a disused brickworks, an abattoir, and a military base – and covering 760 hectares at homebush bay west, near the ‘geographic heart’ of the sydney metropolitan area, became the focus of one of australia’s largest culture-led urban regeneration processes. the catalyst for the process was sydney’s selection as the host city for the 2000 olympic games (figure 1). whilst the site had been the subject of various unfulfilled regeneration proposals since the early 1970s, in 1992 a new plan was prepared for the 2000 olympic bid. the plan contained a sports complex, an athletics centre, an aquatic centre, recreational facilities, a regional park, housing, and major event facilities (cashman 2011). whilst partial regeneration of parts of the site had commenced prior to the nomination in 1993 of sydney as the 2000 olympic host city, the nomination acted as a significant catalyst for the site’s regeneration, speeding up the process on a scale that would not otherwise have been possible (e.g. a new rail line to homebush bay west would not have been built without the olympics) (cashman 2011). the selection of sydney to host the olympics skewed the regeneration between 1993 and 2000 towards the construction of olympic and cultural venues, leaving out the proposed industrial areas in the former strategies. ongoing visions for sop since 2000 have sought to extend its role as a leisure and cultural centre, through promoting ideas such as the development of museums, cultural festivals, education complexes (see e.g. moore 2000) and more recently its promotion as a centre with the ‘potential to provide for a broader range of employment uses, including commercial uses, whilst maintaining ... its chief function as a metropolitan and international sporting and cultural events facility’ (nsw dop 2007, p.8). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 83 figure 1. map showing location of sop, auburn lga, and two adjoining suburbs of newington and auburn discussed within the study’s findings collection and analysis of professional reports a convenience sample of 47 professional reports related to the regeneration process at sop between 1993 and 2011 was analyzed to explore the principal associations that had emerged between local communities, the regeneration process at sop and sc during this period (see e.g. green games watch 2000; owen 2001). the convenience sample comprised reports from local governments, nsw government departments and agencies, consulting companies (e.g. engineers, planners and architects), non-government organisations, and academic researchers. reports were selected, firstly because they focused on the regeneration process at sop, and secondly because they made reference to sc and/or local communities1 . the use of reports as a data source was considered appropriate for several reasons. first, they are a valuable source of data for addressing the aims of this study because they provide detailed insights into how, where and why sc and local communities were being considered within the sop regeneration process. second, they are one of the few ways of sourcing such data other than interviews with those engaged in the regeneration process. third, it seemed appropriate to use the professional reports to initially collect data prior to engaging through interviews. the reports also provided guidance on who was appropriate for interviews. 1 the vast majority (42 out of 47) of reports in the convenience sample made reference to local communities. fewer made reference to sc (22 out of 47). only some of the reports (15 out of 47) focused specifically on local communities and/or social capital and the regeneration process at sop (e.g. green games watch 2000). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 84 a strategic approach was developed towards the collection and analysis of the professional reports. in cases where it was necessary to maintain confidentiality, reports were deidentified prior to their being provided to the researchers for analysis. the analysis of the reports utilised a stepped qualitative data analysis (qda), as explained by dey (1993). in order to address the aim of this study, two researchers used nvivo qualitative software to code those sections of the main body of the reports that addressed local communities and those that addressed sc (e.g. titles, tables of contents etc. were removed prior to analysis)2 for this coding, sc was classified both generally, and more specifically where reference was made to bridging, bonding and linking sc3 . for this coding, ‘local communities’ was only classified generally, and was understood to mean those individuals and/or groups residing in the locality of sop. one researcher did the classifying/coding of data. in order to maximise intra-coder reliability, a second researcher verified this classifying/coding once all data had been coded. when an issue related to inter-coder reliability occurred, the researchers discussed variations and agreed on a common understanding. interconnections between the coded units were analysed in a cumulative process by the two researchers, firstly by exploring the principal associations that existed between the coded units for general sc and local communities, and then by exploring how coded type of sc (bridging, bonding and linking sc) emerged in the principal associations. only the principal associations emerging from this cumulative analysis are presented in the results and discussion section of this paper. collection and analysis of in-depth interviews further data on the common associations between sc, local communities and the regeneration process at sop identified within the reports was collected using eight in-depth interviews with representatives of organisations who played a role in the regeneration process at sop. the interviewees included: two auburn council planners, an auburn council community development worker, a north west community care (nwcc) community development worker, two oca representatives, and two sopa representatives. the in-depth 2 the raw frequency counts of the number of times sc or local community were mentioned in the reports are not presented in the paper as it was thought that they meant little out of context (e.g. green games watch, 2000 mentioned sc voluminously, whilst other reports make only one or two references. see owen 2011). 3 few reports directly mentioned bridging, bonding or linking sc (e.g. green games watch 2000). whilst few made direct references to these forms of capital, these concepts were detected across a number of reports (15 out of 95) (e.g bonding sc was described as densely interwoven sc, whilst bridging sc was described as loosely interlaced sc). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 85 interviews (average length one hour) were informal discussions. a principal advantage of this method is that it provides rich insight into how participants frame, understand and debate the principal associations arising from the analysis of the report as seen in participants’ own terms. the interviews were audio recorded and fully transcribed and where used to provide further understanding of the associations emerging from the analysis of the reports. results and discussion the analysis revealed three principal associations between sc, local community and the regeneration process at sop. the first association related to how, during the early years (1993-2001) of the regeneration process, sc was used as a means for expressing concern about how governance mechanisms implemented at sop might adversely impact the ability of local communities to engage in decision making that affected their local environment. the second association related to the emergence of community development programs from 2001 onwards that sought to build sc in local communities through utilization of the sop development. the third association related to a more recent call for the development of tools to examine how the development of sop impacts on the sc in local communities, by virtue of their membership in social networks that arose through the regeneration process at sop. when discussing the three associations, direct quotes from the interviews are identified using quotation marks and organizational affiliation only. association one: sc, and sop’s governance and engagement of local communities in decisions affecting their local environment sc emerged within the reports as a vehicle for expressing ongoing concerns about the ways in which local communities might be excluded from engagement in decisions affecting their local environment (see e.g. green games watch 2000; owen 2001). underlying these concerns was the ‘affectedness principle’ which suggests that all those individuals, such as local residents immediately adjoining sop, affected by an issue should be involved in decisions about its future (barnett 2011, p. 281). driving these concerns was the implementation of special governance vehicles for the regeneration process at sop. in 1993 a special governance vehicle – the olympic coordination authority (oca) (called sydney olympic park authority after 2001) – was established for the sop site. its key aim was to ensure that the transformation of the brownfield site at homebush bay west into a venue for the sydney 2000 olympics was completed in time for the games (see e.g. dunn & mcguirk 1999; owen 2001). this involved meeting inflexible deadlines. this arrangement excluded cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 86 the local council (that previously had authority over the site) from the regeneration process. as one auburn council officer noted, auburn council was not involved: in the planning of ... physical infrastructure at the park or ... activities/events in it, which was driven by... a lack of cooperation and interest by … [oca officials].this effectively excluded the local community from any planning decision for sop … reducing their power within local environmental decisions that may affect them (planning officer, auburn council). in this context sc was used as a way of expressing concern for how decisions affecting the community’s local environment were reframed as existing in the shadow of a centralised governance body that had a ‘lack of accountability’ to that local community (davidson & donald 2012, p.1634). firstly, concern was raised about the way in which the implementation of the special purpose governance vehicle had the potential to cut off local communities from stocks of bridging sc. in particular this applied to linking sc that previously allowed the local community to be linked upwards with actors (such as local government), with the power and resources to make local environmental changes. this linking sc enabled the local communtity to ‘have a say’ if they felt that proposed changes were not in line with community needs or did not deliver needed services to that community. secondly, concern extended to the potential for such special governance vehicles not only to sever traditional linking sc that enabled communities to effectively engage in local environmental decisions, but also to actively block the local community’s ability to develop effective networks (bridging and linking sc) through which they were able to engage with decisions about their local environment. as dunn and mcguirk note, such special governance vehicles ‘often utilize their powers to discourage dissent and engage in superficial or tokenistic community engagement in planning and development processes’(dunn & mcguirk 1999). association two: sc, community development programs and the regeneration process at sop the concept of sc was frequently mentioned in the analyzed reports in relation to a series of local community development programs. these programs emerged in 2001 after the completion of the olympic games. they reflected part of a new post-2000 strategy that guided the development of sop and its relationships with local communities (see e.g. sopa 2003, 2005; sopa board 2008). this strategy saw sc, that is, ‘the connections within and between social networks’ as having ‘particular importance to the future sop’ (sopa board 2008, p.10). this part of the strategy, as noted in a recent report on sop by sopa, sought ‘to build and nurture the social capital of sop’, through ‘the principles of social equity and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 87 opportunity, and designing for people and communities’. these principles, sopa declared ‘will be applied in the future development of [sop]’. sopa stated that ‘a priority will be for community infrastructure to be developed to an adequate level … [so] people from all sections of the community should be able to participate fully (sopa board 2008, p.10). one way sopa sought to achieve this was through collaborations with auburn council and nongovernment organizations to explore ways in which sop infrastructure could be utilized to build social networks in local communities. for residents of the auburn local government area (lga) this was facilitated through auburn council’s, community development program (cdp). as a community development worker noted: immediately after the games council started an informal collaboration with sopa and local community associations and services, including chinese and turkish organizations, to explore ways in which the park’s facilities could be used for recreational and meeting activities for local residents …to build and expand their social networks. the key focus of the auburn cdp was the development of stocks of bridging sc through the use of sop infrastructure to expand the social networks in which auburn residents were able to engage. auburn community development workers noted how their attempts to use auburnbased community associations to facilitate the cdp adversely impacted on programs aiming to build bridging sc, where the strong bonding sc (built about culture, language, etc.) in some of these associations limited connections with broader social networks through passive barriers (e.g. language) and by the active use of ‘soft sanctions’ of blame between local residents who participated in the events (see magnani & struffi 2009, for a discussion of the use of sanctions in communities). as vervisch (2011) suggests, such strong bonding sc may be utilized as a force for social good and mutual support (as was the intention of the cdp) or it may have a negative impact by creating suspicious and inward-looking groups that form factions. in addition to the auburn council cdp, a second cdp was implemented by nwcc, a privately funded non-government organization. this privately funded cdp was aimed at the residents who moved into the newly formed suburb of newington (formerly the olympic athletes’ village). the program was designed to ‘welcome, and help new [newington] residents settle into their homes, and facilitate opportunities to engage and connect with … others through activities at sop’ (community development worker, nwcc). the aim of this newington cdp was to build bridging sc by developing social networks between cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 88 newington’s residents and those in surrounding established communities, while at the same time developing bonding sc through the development of social networks between the newly settled residents who moved into newington from 2001 onwards. as one nwcc community development worker noted sc ‘can be built by ... exploit[ing] the park and its resources as a … tool for linking the new local residents within newington and adjoining communities together through activities and events’. association three: measuring the effect of the sop regeneration process on the accumulation of sc within local communities whilst the previous discussion focuses on attempts to build access to stocks of sc for local communities through sop, the reports also identified the need to develop instruments that can provide evidence of the ways in which the sop contributed to stocks of sc within the local communities. one report that we analyzed sought to provide insight into the effects of the sop development on the sc of local communities (see prior & tavano blessi 2008). this study draws on findings from a survey that was conducted in 2006. part of this survey investigated the effects of the development of sop on the sc of residents in two adjoining suburbs, auburn and newington. auburn is one of several older established suburbs surrounding the park. newington is a newer suburb that adjoins sop and emerged as part of the olympic-led development process at homebush bay west. newington became part of auburn lga in 2001. both suburbs share significant concentrations of residents who are overseas-born and have english as a second language, but they differ significantly in terms of their socio-economic status. according to the australian socio-economic indexes for areas (seifa), residents in newington have one of the highest average socio-economic levels (1120.0) in australia, whilst auburn residents on average have one of the lowest (872.00) (australian bureau of statistics 2006). the survey was distributed to 310 residents (18 years and over) in the selected suburbs, and 193 were completed, 124 from auburn and 69 from newington. surveys were collected using two methods: surveys with residents in public areas in each suburb; and surveys collected through local associations that service residents of diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds in both suburbs. whilst the sample cannot be considered to be representative in the strict sense of the term, it did tap a broad cross-section of adults living in the two suburbs (see prior & tavano blessi, forthcoming). a further limitation of the study is that it only cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 89 explores the impacts of the development of sop on the sc of residents over the age of 18 years. the survey collected data on opportunities (e.g. social activities and spaces) provided as a result of sop through which residents were able to expand their stocks of bridging sc through the development of mutual acquaintances/relationships to other individuals outside their community as a result of the social activity at sop and they were able to expand their stocks of bonding sc through the development of mutual acquaintances/relationships to other individuals inside their community as a result of the social activity at sop (see table 1). this data was used to assess whether the infrastructure associated with sop’s development contributed to or left unchanged the respondents’ ‘aggregate of ... actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of … relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (bourdieu 1984, p.248). the quantifiable findings from the survey suggest that only a small proportion of respondents from each suburb believed that sop’s development provided opportunities for social activity that led to increased social networking (see table 1). a small number of respondents from each suburb indicated that these opportunities for social networking led to their forming connections with individuals outside or within their community, that is, increased the stocks of bridging and bonding sc (see table 1). percentage of respondents from each suburb indicating that their: auburn percentages (n=124) newington percentages (n=69) increased no change increased no change social activity at the park increased/did not change opportunities for social networking 27.8 72.2 50.4 49.6 mutual acquaintance/relationship to other individuals outside their community increased/ remained unchanged as a result of the social activity at the park (bridging capital) 10.9 89.1 30.4 69.6 mutual acquaintance/relationship within their community increased/remained unchanged as a result of the social activity at the park (bonding capital) 10.2 89.8 10.7 89.3 table 1 – sop’s impact on respondents’ opportunities for social networking, and accumulation of bridging sc and bonding sc cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 90 the issues examined in the quantitative questions were explored further through qualitative interview questions that sought to investigate the limitations associated with the interactions local residents had at sop. answers to these questions were diverse and identified that a range of barriers, such as language barriers, religious differences, and class differences operated within the existing social networks in the established communities, which were identified as inhibiting the accumulation of bridging sc through the auburn cdp (see previous section of paper). the study also identified other barriers that limited local residents’ ability to accumulate bridging sc as a result of the sop development, including physical barriers and local beliefs. physical barriers such as a lack of crossings and safe sidewalks along major roads that separated local residential areas from sop, and limited transport links, limited residents’ access to opportunities to expand their social networks through activities at sop. as a result many respondents reported that the durability of connections that could be established through social networking activities at sop were limited by their higher transaction costs, when compared to the connections they could establish in the dense familial networks of social relations found in their places of residence or work. these more immediate connections were seen as easier and cheaper to maintain due to their close proximity and familiarity. local residents’ ability to connect through activities at sop was also affected by local beliefs that circulated within the communities. as one auburn respondent to the survey noted, for many residents from auburn the development of social networks through social activity at sop was hampered by a perception that sop was a ‘recreational playground for only wealthy and educated people, that was too sophisticated in terms of cultural supply’ (resident, auburn suburb). this affected their propensity to participate in the park’s opportunities. conclusions the study sought to provide insights into the associations between sc, local communities and the regeneration process at sop; and how, when and why sc and local communities were being considered within the sop regeneration process. to uncover these associations the study analyzed two data sources, firstly professional reports on culture-led regeneration processes at sop, and secondly interviews with those involved in this ongoing regeneration process. the analysis identified three principal associations. we do not assert that these are the only associations possible, they reflect those that emerged through the study’s methodology which was subject to the flaws that beset most studies that use convenience sampling, including the fact that the sample may have been biased by the collection method. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 91 we conclude the paper by discussing these associations with reference to broader arguments surrounding the potential, capacity and nature of sc. the first association related to the use of sc, during the early years of the regeneration process at sop, as a conceptual tool to express concerns for how special purpose governance vehicles established for sop might adversely affect or stifle the local communities’ linking sc – links with hierarchical authority –which allowed local communities to engage in and influence decision making that affected their local environment. these findings reflect those of other studies of sc that stress that careful consideration needs to be given to the structure of formal governmental institutions if they are to contribute to the development of resources – funding, power, and hierarchical networks of contacts and expertise (e.g. linking capital) – that local communities can use to address local need (warner 1999, evans 1996). despite these concerns, as searle (2007) has noted, the ability of local communities to actively counter the intervention of centralized government when it usurps their ability to engage with local environmental decision making is very much dependent on the broader stocks of bridging sc (such as access to courts) that are held by that local community (searle 2007). see for example searle’s (2007, p.5) study of a government intervention in local environmental decision making in balmain (sydney) which was ‘countered by court action started by residents and the council’. the second association related to the use of a series of cdps to expand the access of local communities to bridging sc and bonding sc through the sop development. we highlighted how this association emerged at the same time that the sopa sought to transform its strategy for sop following the completion of the olympic games. part of this new strategy was focused on ‘building and nurturing the social capital of sop’ (sopa board, 2008, p.10). the focus that the cdps and sopa placed on the belief that stocks of sc can be built for the benefit of local communities is supported by a range of sc theorists (evans 1996; skocpol 1996; warner 1999) who insist on the possibility of building community sc where it is weak. they also point to the role that formal organizations (e.g. non-government organizations and local governments) can play in structuring community-level interventions to build sc (evans 1996; skocpol 1996). in arguing that sc can be built in this way they also point to the strong evidence of the happiness, wellbeing, and health effects that come from social connectedness (see e.g. putnam 2000; szreter & woolcock 2003). whilst some support the idea that stocks of sc can be built, others argue that the current rhetoric about sc-building through cdps is a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 92 myth (defilippis 2001). defilippis (2001), for example, cites putnam’s (1993) study in italy, arguing that it provides little evidence of an ability to construct sc. furthermore, such critics argue that formal organizations such as nwcc and auburn council are fundamentally illsuited for helping to build sc (etzioni 1993; fukuyama 1995). the final association revealed through the analysis was related to a call for the development of measures to understand how the development of sop had impacted on the sc of residents within local communities. we highlighted one study which, despite its methodological limitations, is the only study which to date has provided insight into this last association for sop. this study by prior and tavano blessi (2008) suggests that sop had a limited impact on the accumulation of bridging and bonding sc by residents in two adjoining suburbs – newington and auburn. this reflects the findings from a study conducted by sacco and tavano blessi (2009) on a culture-led urban regeneration process in the bicocca district, milan, italy which showed similarly low impacts of the development on the accumulation of sc by residents in adjoining areas. furthermore, examination of the associations suggest that a range of factors, including physical barriers, social status, language and religious beliefs, amongst others, impacted on the way in which local communities and members within them were able to accumulate various forms of sc, in particular bridging sc, through sop. these findings are reflected in a growing body of research which suggests that the accumulation of sc is not only affected by the more commonly recognized dimensions of social networks such as language, but can also be impacted by physical barriers and spatial dimensions (see e.g. westlund, rutten & boekema 2010). as rutten, westlund and boekema (2010 p.863) have highlighted, ‘social capital pertains to the social relations between humans, and since these social relations have a spatial dimension, so too does social capital’. in conclusion, it is worth noting some insights from the research that are of benefit to those who seek to engage with sc and local communities through culture-led urban regeneration processes like those at sop. firstly, the findings suggests that closer consideration needs to be given to the way in which governance mechanisms are developed for culture-led regeneration projects, so that such mechanisms are not only designed to achieve often strict development deadlines associated with such regeneration projects, but are also designed to ensure that local communities are given the opportunity to engage in decision making that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.4, no.3, 2012 93 affects their local environment. as owens (2012, p.224) recently noted with reference to the urban regeneration process associated with the london olympics, when developing the planning and governance framework for such processes: ‘the right balance needs to be struck between creation of expedient delivery arrangements and the maintenance of democratic controls over planning decisions and more generally over public investment and the creation of public goods’. secondly, the findings suggest that diverse factors ranging from physical barriers through to language barriers need to be considered if a development like sop is to be used to build sc in surrounding local communities. in particular it suggests that the design of physical infrastructure associated with such development as sop (e.g. distance, venues and accessibility) needs to be considered just as much as the design of its soft infrastructure (e.g. events) if it is to be used as a means for sc development. finally, the findings suggest the growing interest and need to develop ways to measure how developments like sop impact on the sc of residents within local communities, to match measures within other tools such as economic capital assessments (see hutton 2008; scott 2000) and physical capital assessments (hemphill, berry &mcgreal 2004) that are currently being utilized to assess the capital impacts of such developments, so that we can, as lim suggests, ‘sort out the hype from the substance’ (lim 1993, p.594) in the claims commonly made about what such processes can achieve with regards to sc development. references anderson, a. & jack, s. 2002, 'the articulation of social capital in enterpreneurial networks: a glue or a lubricant', enterpreneurship 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capital and economic development: towards a theoretical synthesis and policy framework', theory and society, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 151-208. woolcock. m., 2001, ‘the place of social capital in understanding social and economic outcomes,’ isuma: canadian journal of policy research, vol. 2, no. 1, pp.11-17. http://www.sopa.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/344627/environmental_guidelines_2008_web.pdf%3e� http://www.sopa.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/344627/environmental_guidelines_2008_web.pdf%3e� social capital, local communities and culture-led urban regeneration processes: the sydney olympic park experience cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 2 2017 © 2017 gary levy. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: levy, g. 2017.monday mo(u)rning. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(2), 72-78. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ ccs.v9i2.5464 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au commentary monday mo(u)rning gary levy deakin university, burwood campus, melbourne, australia corresponding author: gary levy, school of education, faculty of arts and education, deakin university, burwood campus, 221 burwood highway, burwood, melbourne, vic 3125, australia. glevy@deakin.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i2.5464 abstract this piece presents an imaginary scenario taking place in any typical primary school around australia. it was developed for the special issue of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, on fake news and alternative facts, to show how these may arise in everyday practices. keywords fake news; alternative facts; truth; primary schools declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the work was produced with no funding. mailto:glevy@deakin.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i2.5464xxxx mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 monday mo(u) rning primary school teacher (pst): good morning, children. children: good morning, mx! pst: how are we all today? children: (various, muffled, and mingled responses) pst: good to see everyone back again this week, bright-eyed and bushy-tail’d. who has some news to share this morning? child a: my nanna had to get rushed to hospital by ambulance, ‘cos her heart wasn’t working properly. pst: oh dear, how worrying! is she being well looked after? child a: the doctors thought they’ll have to do an operation, but now they think she just has to take some new pills. pst: good to know. well, next time you visit, tell her we are including her in our ‘get well’ thoughts each day. child a: thank you, mx; my nan will be happy about that. pst: who else has some news? child b: on saturday, our dog ate the cat’s breakfast, and then vomited all over my bedroom floor. the stink was so bad, i had to sleep that night on a mattress in my big sister’s room. child c: oh, yuk. child d: that’s revolting! child e: that sounds like fake news to me. pst: what do you mean, child e? child e: i don’t believe him. pst: but, what do you mean by ‘fake news’? child e: ‘fake news’…it’s like…some of the news you hear, like on tv and stuff, that you’re not s’posed to believe, because someone else doesn’t like the people who told that news. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 73 child f: no, no….fake news is the news you hear that is still real, except it’s not the same real for everyone. child e: yeah, that’s what i meant-that some news is just fibbing, or twisting things around a bit, or even lies, made up by the news-teller, to get more attention. child g: but, from what i’ve heard my mum and dad talk about, fake news is also….somehow…really fake…because….well…it’s not the real news about something that actually happened, it’s more like….hmmmnnn….i don’t know… pst: yes, children, you might have heard more people using the term ‘fake news’ latelyon tv, or the radio, or in conversation…you might have noticed that this ‘fake news’ is something that the new president trump in america has been talking about a lot… child h: yeah, and he’s annoyed, because not everyone likes him, or says good things about him all the time, especially some people on the television, and newspapers and stuff like that, and that’s why he’s…. pst: well, that’s an interesting observation child h…how do you know he’s annoyed and has those feelings about himself? child h: you can see it in his red and frowning face, and hear it in his achy and angry voice; and he’s like other bullies that we talk about in class, who pick on other people because they are hurting too much inside themselves, but… child i: yeah, so they have to make other people feel smaller and worser than they do… child h: yeah, like…that’s it…like… child j: but i thought we’ve learnt there are ways to work out what is ‘true’ and what is ‘false’, just like some things are ‘right’, and some things are ‘wrong’, and… pst: well yes, we have talked about these differences, at times, and the importance of knowing good from bad, and right from wrong, so that… child: so that we have like, a society, and not just… child: yeah, and, like some codes to help us organise and live our… child: yeah, like morals and stuff… cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 74 pst: very well done for remembering these things children! yes, we have talked a lot about how, as a class of different individuals, with many small but important differences between each of us, we have to find ways to work together, to co-operate, trust, and respect one another, even if we don’t always like one another, or when we sometimes disagree with each other. we have discussed many times how important it is for everyone to feel safe, and to be respected for who they are, and how we each have an equal right to express our beliefs and opinions, to find and use our own voice, without any … child: …without any fear of… child: …of being teased, or embarrassed, or made to feel puny. pst: yes, well done for remembering these important agreements we have made together, and that we revise and renew from time to time, in order to keep remembering what we have agreed to, and to keep that agreement strong and working for everyone’s benefit… child x: … and protection! pst: yes, well done child x-for everyone’s protection too... child y: and isn’t that, like protection, what the government here, and for mr trump, and in other countries too, isn’t that what governments are saying they are doing for all the people? i mean, like, giving protection… child k: yes but … child l: yeah but now, it seems, it’s hard to know whether the dangers, and our fears, are real, or also just made up ones… pst: what do you mean, child l? child l: i mean, like…well, from what my parents say, they reckon that, even though bad things are happening in the world, like, well, like all kinds of hating and killing and stuff, that, well, that even though these bad things are happening, now there are some political, um…politicians who, like, want people to be really worried, so that they can then pretend to be strong and like, be there to protect everyone, and stuff… child o: yeah, and then like, but… cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 75 child q: yeah, so that means they can find new reasons to hate people, and prove they’re super-strong by making wars, or stopping some people from..… child y: but we do need big strong people to protect us against bad people, and like, isn’t that what the government people are voted in to do? child k: yeah, but we’ve been learning about ‘making peace’, instead of ‘making war’, and how hard that can be because in history and also now, fighting and winning fights always seems to be more important than being friendly with different people, and enjoying life together. pst: that’s very well expressed, child k. maybe we need to send you along to meet some of the government people and tell them your ideas about these important things. child d: yeah, except they probably wouldn’t listen anyway, because we’re only little, and haven’t been to school for that long, and they might think we’re just making stuff up and believing in things that aren’t true anyway, like lots of kids have their own make-believe world… child l: yeah, but my dad also reckons this is a big problem with the government people, because they kind of go more with just what they believe in, instead of getting to know the important facts about something. pst: that’s interesting child l…so, what do you think the difference is between fact, belief, and make-believe… child l: hmmmnn…well, it’s like…well… i thought i knew this… but now…i’m not so sure, ‘cos… child r: well, i think i know, mx…facts, are, when…so, facts are when… child v: i know mx….a fact is when something is true because, like, you can touch it, or see it, feel it, or prove that it is like, there…., or here…in some way, like… pst: ok, very good child v…and so, how does a fact differ from a belief, or from make-believe, do you think….? child v: so, if facts are, like…. oh, this is making my brain hurt mx; do we have to talk about this anymore now….? pst: no, of course we don’t child v…maybe we all need to leave this discussion alone for a while, and come back to it when we’re feeling ready for more. child d: but before we finish mx, can we try and work out the difference between facts and alternative facts, ‘cos i’ve also heard those being talked about lately. child v: what? alternative facts? come on, child d, now you must be making that up! cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 76 child d: no, no, it’s true, isn’t it mx, or like real, or, i mean, like people are really talking about these, quote ‘alternative facts’, like they are different to other facts, but also... child v: oh come on, this must be a joke! you must be kidding? these people must be like, looney or something…. child s: yeah, but how do we even know what’s looney, and what’s normal, when normal people are saying looney things…? pst: well children, you amaze me with your thoughtful and really sharp comments and questions! even though i’m your teacher, i certainly don’t have any definite answers. i do need to say, however, that many of your points and questions are also being raised and discussed by concerned citizens here, but also in america, and in other countries too… child v: mx…. how do we know who to believe or how to trust them, when there’s all this blurring going on between truth and facts and beliefs? pst: that’s another excellent question child v, and one that is not so easy to answer. this is where we have to start applying some of the thinking skills that we have been developing and practising together. who can remember the first step in this process….? child q: uhm...isn’t it…to….oh yeah, now i remember…the first step towards thinking clearly is to stop, to make some time and space, and not to try and know anything too quickly. pst: very good, child q. yes, we need to stop, not react too quickly, and give ourselves time to have a look at all the parts and angles of a situation and… child n: yeah, that’s right, to ‘hasten slowly’, so that we can get fully ‘in the picture’. pst: very good, child n, and then, gradually… child n: so, gradually, as we become more informed, we can start to get clearer and... child d: yeah, clearer, and after becoming clearer, then we can start to understand the situation enough to … child k: … to then be able to shape a response. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 77 pst: i’m very impressed with you lot, i must say, remembering these stages in the thinking process that we have worked on together-well done! child v: so then what about trust mx, how do we get this happening more…? child x: you know child v, once we have worked through the stages of thinking, we can trust our own judgement more, and then-like my dad says-we can ‘sort out the sheep from the bs’, or something like that… various children: (mixed laughter) yeah the bs, good one! child v: so then, does that mean that we have to keep using our thinking skills, and trusting that these will help us get clear about where the real truth is, and what the lies are? pst: well, yes child v, you could put it that way…and it does appear that many people these days, including some of our politicians and leaders, have become lazy in their thinking, or have decided that they can get more of what they want if they think less, and stop many other people from thinking so much too. child z: but mx, if we stop thinking, doesn’t our brain become like stodgy and weak from not being exercised enough…? pst: well, yes, you could say that too, and well, you did say that…! children: (shared laughter)-yuck, stodgy brains! jelly brains! thickheads! wobbly wackos! pst: it is great that we can laugh about this children, while also knowing together that this unthinking is a big problem in the world today. child q: yeah, but if we keep practising our thinking skills, and lots of other kids in schools, even young ones, keep learning these skills, then more and more of us will be able to work out the difference between what’s real and true, and what’s fake and bs, right? pst: well, gee…i would certainly like to think so child q… really, truly… my goodness…. i most certainly would like to think so…. child s: do you ‘think so’, as in real thinking and deep thinking, or ‘think so’ as in, like, ‘believe whatever you want’, kind of… cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 78 children: (much laughter) ... pst: no, i mean ‘think so’ as in, knowing and trusting that more and more children will learn, like you, how to develop their thinking skills, so that lies and fake news and other bs… children: (even more laughter, then chanting together): no more bs! no more bs! no more bs!… if you don’t think, your brain will stink! if you don’t think, your brain will stink! if you…. grey matter, matters! grey matter, matters! grey matter, matters! grey… if you don’t mind, you lose! if you don’t mind, you lose! if you don’t… go more mental! go more mental! go more mental! go more mental! go… think, think more, think harder! think, think more, think harder. think… abstract keywords monday mo(u) rning the politics of war and the ‘battle of balaklava’ john maynard university of newcastle abstract this paper seeks to aid and open further discussion on the impact upon aboriginal communities and lives during and after world war one. we now know that over a thousand aboriginal men enlisted and went overseas to fight for their so-called country during the great war and that many made the ultimate sacrifice. but what was happening at home to their families and communities whilst they were away? did they receive just recognition on their return home? these are some of the questions this paper will reveal and analyse. © 2014 john maynard. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(3): 4207,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i3.4207 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia in 1925 an aboriginal returned soldier by the name of arthur weetra led a so-called aboriginal street ‘riot’ in the rural town of balaklava in south australia. the eruption of hostilities was in direct response against local white community pressure upon aboriginal land and injustice. weetra and a number of his brothers and friends not only voiced their discontent but also openly showed their anger by knocking a number of policemen to the ground in what became known as the ‘battle of balaklava’. the article will examine the infamous battle but also locate that event in the context of aboriginal returned soldier experiences across the continent in the aftermath of the first world war. clearly for much of the twentieth century this country conveniently forgot, missed or erased aboriginal history, including the history of those who had fought for the country, and the recognition that australia itself had been a widespread battlefield through the frontier wars. a war was waged in this country by the british from 1788 in which tens of thousands of our people lost their lives in defending their country in the face of invasion, occupation, dispossession and cultural destruction. there are few monuments, plaques, or memorials to mark the bravery of our people in defending their country. a small minority of tragic events like myall creek and the coniston massacre remain as stained markers upon the shameful history of this country. as gary foley (2014, p. 19) eloquently reminded the wider white community: many australians are further entrenching an attitude of denial about key aspects of their own history. they are seeking to divert attention away from earlier wars that had more to do with defining the australian national character than gallipoli did. by that i mean the ‘colonial’ wars that many in australia still have great difficulty in even accepting as wars… battles such as the gallipoli campaign were more about fighting on behalf of britain rather than australia. these are the sorts of discussions we should be having alongside the gallipoli and world war one celebrations over the course of the next four years. nevertheless, a new major four year study led by professor mick dodson titled serving our country acknowledges that there are many aboriginal families and communities that carry great pride in their forebears’ military records. the project’s brief is to recognize indigenous involvement in every military campaign from the boer war through to afghanistan and iraq. the main focus for my involvement on the project will centre on both wwi and the boer war. it is the missing stories that i am most interested in uncovering. i seek to provide insights in some of the tantalizing issues around individual aboriginal and community responses to war, through snapshots of our experiences. these sometimes unexpected stories will both enrich and dismantle the australian mythic war narrative. whilst a majority of scholarly studies of aboriginal military service have concentrated on world war ii (eg ball 1991; gordon 1962; hall 1977, 1995), a number of scholars have targeted world war i (eg foster 2000; goodall 1987; 1988; huggonson 1993; jackomos & fowler 1993; kartinyeri 1993; scarlett 2014). this paper continues with the tradition of recuperative history that takes pride in accountability first and foremost to aboriginal communities. over a long period of time i have had great success based on archival research examining old newspaper files. the final section of this paper is importantly based on a case study of bubbling aboriginal resentment over ill-treatment and injustice in the wake of world war one at the south australian town of balaklava in 1925. the story is not framed in the common ‘they were there too’ format of aboriginal experience of wwi. the account of this incident is very important and different in that it examines a little known episode of protest and revolt by returned aboriginal servicemen. this case study illustrates the importance of newspaper records and their usefulness to aboriginal history. the majority of material utilised in this instance i first uncovered at the mortlock library in south australia more than a decade ago. it was not retrieved using the national library of australia’s trove, an online search system giving access to the holdings of thousands of organisations, but rather i examined on microfiche as many newspaper runs published during the 1920s as i could find, looking for references to issues relating to indigenous political struggles. over the course of the next four years (from 2014), australia will be bombarded with celebrations of the hundred years since the first world war and gallipoli. it is of critical importance that our stories are told and recognized as part of this history. aboriginal men and women have fought in every military campaign that this country has taken part in with many making the ultimate sacrifice. incredibly up until 1967 our people enlisted and fought for a country within which we had been told that we were not even recognised as citizens. the aboriginal history of wwi and wwii is not just about battles, medals and glory but the savage injustice inflicted upon our people despite their courage and heroism. i have previously reflected on stories not told before, including of aboriginal opposition to the war (maynard 2014). legendary aboriginal political activist, fred maynard, for instance as a sydney wharf labourer, had campaigned against billy hughes’ conscription referendum and helped defeat it twice (maynard 2007, pp. 18-19). but many of our communities actually gave unwavering support to patriotic funds and assistance to the war effort. the records reveal that aboriginal women knitted batches of socks to be sent to australian soldiers in the trenches (australian aborigines advocate 1919). aboriginal men carved walking sticks for the badly maimed soldiers that returned home (our aim may 1915, p. 3.) coverage in the brisbane courier revealed that aborigines ‘state that their wish is to be useful to the commonwealth and point out that in the recent war men of their race assisted in fighting and those who were left behind helped with patriotic funds’ (24 july 1922, p.7).the fervour that aboriginal people carried patriotically for the war effort would, in turn, through disappointment and lack of recognition, act as the catalyst and ignition point of political revolt in the postwar years. the impact of wwi on aboriginal communities had many long lasting negative effects. ‘the catastrophic global impact of the spanish influenza pandemic in 1918 witnessed a high percentage of aboriginal people succumb to the deadly outbreak. it has been estimated that over 500 million people were infected worldwide and it killed between fifty to one hundred million of them’. returned soldiers brought the spanish flu back into australia and its horrific devastation of our communities was readily identifiable (crump 2014). a queensland newspaper report revealed the flu’s deadly impact at barambah: not long after the outbreak fifty blacks were dead, showing that the inmates must have died like flies. it also says that the men who were engaged in making coffins were unable to keep pace with the mortality, and that some of the bodies were interred in trenches (morning bulletin (rockhampton) 7 june 1919, p. 9). inferior housing and living conditions, poor diet and inadequate health provisions were instrumental in the high proportion of aboriginal deaths attributed to the flu. as for the war itself, the question still remains why did aboriginal men go? on the latest australian war memorial figures available over thirteen hundred aboriginal men fought for their country in wwi. 1 this figure has quadrupled from the some three hundred as noted in 1988 (goodall 1988, p. 32). unquestionably there were numerous motivations for aboriginal soldiers wanting to enlist and fight overseas in wwi. the desire for decent wages was one: ‘the average wage of aboriginal workers in queensland in 1914 was seven shillings and six pence per week… a private was paid the princely sum of five shillings a day’ (huggonson 1993, p. 3). aboriginal men were also fighting for change for their people back home ‘which some thought would be won through war service’ (scarlett, 2014, p. 39). in correspondence a barambah resident said ‘three of us went to the great war out of my family one was killed. i always thought that fighting for our king and country would make me naturalise[d] british subject and a man with freedom in the country’ (quoted in scarlett 2014, p. 39). it is fair to assume that for aboriginal men the war was an opportunity of gaining justice, acceptance and respect. sadly on their return it was to be denied. heather goodall reflected that: we do not know all the motives of the young aboriginal men that enlisted… perhaps they went for adventure or to escape from rural life or perhaps they went to escape the early protection board activities. perhaps they went to demonstrate the validity of their place in australia: they certainly returned with the conviction that their service and sacrifices would be acknowledged as for all other returned soldiers (1988, p.32). the aboriginal disillusionment was long lasting with deep resentment carrying over into the second world war. the older aboriginal wwi veterans had ‘believed in 1914 that a shared future could be developed with white australians, but their belief had been eroded as each initiative they took was rejected’ (goodall 1988, p. 33). mick flick (a wwi veteran from western nsw) argued strongly against his two elder sons’ thoughts of enlisting in wwii. ‘this is not our fight’ he declared, adding, ‘it’s their fight, so they should fight it’ (goodall 1988, p. 33. emphasis in original). in the wake of the first world war, a general discontentment raged for oppressed groups globally. this was certainly the case for aboriginal people in australia, mirroring american indian and african american experiences of a rising mobilization of organized agitation (britten 1999; lentz-smith 2011; mcmillen 2007; winegard 2012). reverend j. c. phillips speaking at a conference in melbourne warned of the global ‘colour problem’ brewing: ‘the allies forgot when they gave the world the word ‘self-determination’ that the idea knew no colour line’. ‘from constantinople to tokyo the air is electric with the new ideas of nationalism, self-determination and equality’ (the news june 15, 1925). the widespread revoking of aboriginal land, the acceleration in removing aboriginal children from their families and a mounting resentment carried by aboriginal returned soldiers was responsible for the establishment of the australian aboriginal progressive association (aapa). in response fred maynard as president of the aapa in newspaper correspondence and public speaking engagements demanded ‘freehold land for aboriginal families to engage in farming and for the immediate cessation of the removal of children from their families’ (huggonson 1993, p. 7). as huggonson noted, aboriginal reserves and land occupied in the early decades of the twentieth century: were essentially crown lands reserved from sale by notification in the nsw government gazette. the title of the land remained with the crown and classification of the land could be revoked at any time by the government, hence maynard’s call for freehold land title (1993, p. 7). in the simplest of terms aboriginal people could hold land only as long as others did not want to use it. maynard and the aapa would be involved with a number of highly public confrontations over aboriginal reserves that included nana glen, greenhills and old burnt bridge. the aboriginal leadership on several occasions severely embarrassed the board through encouraged press coverage that highlighted the injustices committed against the aboriginal population in new south wales. it was little wonder that the aapa as part of their platform and agenda echoed the call for ‘self determination’. newspaper coverage of the first ever aboriginal civil rights convention held at st david’s church hall in surry hills in april 1925 stated ‘first australians to help themselves – self determination’ and ‘aborigines in conference – self determination is their aim’(maynard 2007, p. 53). fred maynard and others of the aapa membership ninety years ago were greatly influenced by marcus garvey and his organization in the united states (maynard 2007, p. 55). garvey became the torchbearer of inspiration for many with a powerful platform of genuine self-determination. in an interview that first appeared in the literary digest usa garvey was cutting in his assessment: during the world war nations were vying with each other in proclaiming lofty concepts of humanity. make the world safe for democracy. self-determination for smaller people reverberated in the capitols of warring nations opposed to germany. now that the war is over we find those same nations making every effort by word and deed to convince us that their blatant professions were just meaningless platitudes never intended to apply to earth’s darker millions. we find the minor part of humanity – the white people constituting themselves lords of the universe, and arrogating to themselves the power to control the destiny of the larger part of humanity (morning bulletin (rockhampton) 11 june, 1921, p. 10). in australia there was rising widespread discontent and a growing aboriginal voice of dissatisfaction. james harris wrote to a newspaper in western australia: some of our numbers took part in the great war and made the supreme sacrifice, while others have returned to find that they are no nearer to getting a fair deal. we haven’t got a vote in the country, nor a voice in the framing of the laws that govern us (sunday times (perth, 30 october, 1921, p. 12). the callous treatment of ripping away aboriginal land during this time period was given wide press coverage. a white returned soldier in atherton in northern queensland stated with compassion and feeling ‘the saddest thing he ever witnessed was the deportations of about a score of abo[rigine]s of all ages. yes we heard of the germans deporting the belgians to germany, but here we have a more brutal thing taking place’ (cairns post 19 february 1920, p.6). there was pressure mounting on aboriginal land at karuah in nsw as a racist complaint printed in the local press reveals: the residence of aborigines on allotments is detrimental to white settlement… it is not much encouragement for returned men who want allotments near karuah to have to live alongside blacks, and to be classed socially the same as them (the raymond terrace examiner and lower hunter and port stephens advertiser april, 1923). at least one correspondent in writing a response recognized the contribution of the aboriginal community at karuah: dark men, many of them went to the front, as well as white men, some lost their lives in defence of the king and country, and some returned bearing the brand of brave soldiers of the king (the raymond terrace examiner and lower hunter and port stephens advertiser april 6, 1923, p3). those speaking out against what was a brutal process were in the minority but their voices remain in the record. an article in the wingham chronicle revealed: during the past few months’ circumstances of such character have made the conditions of the aborigines extremely difficult – the land is being sold and they are finding themselves on the roadside, or any other corner of ‘no mans land’, where they in their hapless lot find themselves, homeless, disheartened and resentful of the injustice which is being meted out to them (the wingham chronicle june 10, 1925). further up the coast of new south wales similar pressure was being applied to aboriginal land holdings at rollands plains near port macquarie. a newspaper column letter to the editor entry remarked: that the local aborigines reserve be made available for returned soldiers… in connection with the aborigines reserve here the [a]borigines have but very limited use of it… such being the case, could not inferior land be found to answer the purpose of a reserve… when it comes to a question of [a]borigines reserve or soldier’s farm, my voice is given for the soldier (the port macquarie news and hastings river advocate 17 may 1919, p.4). ‘the battle of balaklava’ and not the famous charge of the crimean war this bubbling over of aboriginal resentment erupted in a long forgotten event in south australia in 1925 known as the ‘battle of balaklava’. the rural town of balaklava is located some 92 kilometres north of adelaide on the banks of the wakefield river and the town was named after the famous battle of the crimean war (place names of south australia n.d.). local white residents and the town council had mounted a campaign to close the nearby aboriginal reserve and have all of the aboriginal residents moved on. the hon. t. butterfield (commissioner of crown lands) in referring to the balaklava district council report that it intended to close the aboriginal reserve stated, ‘it seems to me to be a peculiar request… where does the council expect the [a]borigines to go? they must go somewhere’ (the news 7 april, 1925). robert foster has revealed that white pressure on aboriginal people and their communities in the wake of world war one was not an isolated incident in south australia. in 1921, three aboriginal men, including ‘eustace garnett wilson a world war one veteran, were driven off point mccleay by the authorities for relatively minor infractions’. in 1931 the ‘white residents of port victoria applied to have their town declared a prohibited area. their reason was that they objected to aboriginal people coming into town on a saturday night’. during the mid-1920s the south australian aborigines department armed with the passage of a new aborigines (training of children) act intended to accelerate removing aboriginal children from their mothers’ care. the projected success of this new policy backfired on the department when the first child taken away in 1924 was the ‘child of priscilla karpany, a young mother working on poltalloch station near point mccleay’. karpany gained the services of an adelaide solicitor and the case received widespread media coverage. the press interest was undoubtedly encouraged by the fact that priscilla karpany’s brothers were two highly respected world war one veterans, george and william karpany. the men had served with distinction in france. george had also served at gallipoli, earning the rank of lance corporal. priscilla karpany’s mother spoke of the hypocrisy and injustice of the department’s actions: ‘two of my sons fought at the war for england and australia. is there to be one law for the white people, and another for the black?’ subsequently through the sustained media coverage priscilla’s child was returned. (foster 2000, pp. 22–25). in the lead up to the ‘battle’ at balaklava, newspaper accounts had alleged aboriginal men had been demanding railway construction workers provide them with liquor under the threat of violence. one of the railway workers, it was claimed, had been wounded in such an incident. but a police inquiry turned up no evidence to verify this account. the newspaper provided details of the so called ‘battle of balaklava’ when a large group of white railway workers were in the town drinking and it was inferred that someone had supplied aboriginal men with alcohol. in the wake of the earlier confrontations and allegations, this was probably an orchestrated strategy in order to provoke an incident. an argument erupted between one of the white workers and aboriginal man maxwell weetra. whatever the provocation, weetra struck the white man and a fight erupted. sgt. rowe of the police station was notified. the sergeant’s arrival was evidently the signal for a combined resistance on the part of the blacks, who came onto the scene. in attempting to arrest maxwell weetra, an attack was made on the sergeant, in which he received severe blows to head and was felled to the ground. just then a mounted constable came to his senior’s assistance, only to meet with the same treatment (the register 1 april, 1925, p.11). the ‘battle’ received wide press coverage. a report in the launceston telegraph stated that ‘two constables were roughly handled by the blacks, who were mostly returned soldier natives, and fought like tigers’ (the daily telegraph 1 april, 1925). arthur weetra was easily identified in the thick of the fracas being ‘considerably over six feet in height, and a returned soldier. he knocked the sergeant down’ (the chronicle (adelaide) 4 april, 1925). the white townspeople and railway workers moved to rescue the severely beaten policemen. greatly outnumbered, the aboriginal men gave a great account of themselves and most made their retreat. unfortunately, maxwell weetra was grabbed by the crowd and arrested. military warrior arthur (called albert in some press reports) weetra described as a ‘big powerfully built man’ was discovered in the bakery and ‘it took five men to secure him’ (the daily telegraph 1 april, 1925). the rest of the aboriginal men were chased down by cars on their way back to the reserve and were arrested without incident. all of the aboriginal men appeared in court on the following monday. maxwell weetra, arthur weetra, sperling weetra, harold martin, harold chester and joseph power were each sentenced from four to six months hard labour for various charges including assaulting the police, intoxication and having used obscene language. two other aboriginal men, harry weetra and harry taylor, were each fined 40/-. the bench congratulated the police officers for their courageous behavior! the incident gave ammunition to a move that ‘the aboriginal reserve in balaklava might be closed and the land be put to a better use than a harbour for blackfellows, who were not only indolent but a menace to the town’ (the daily telegraph 1 april, 1925). the aboriginal residents received support from an unlikely source for the time, protector of aborigines mr. f. w. garnett, who said ‘white people may get drunk and disturb the peace, and nothing unusual takes place. but if anything went wrong among the blacks… a great fuss is made out of it’ (the register 30 april, 1925, p. 12). another writer to the editor challenged the validity of the police and court actions in the incident: the poor black is down and out, and we have heard nothing in their defence from the natives… they have a right to more than the present reserve if needs be. it would be wrong to shift them, and to take away their legitimate reserve just because they got drunk and were fighting. would the council shift every white man and confiscate his land that gets drunk and engages in fighting. the black man is, by proclamation and law, entitled to be protected and found food and country in return for what he gave, or rather what was taken from him… in all probability this area of country was the home of his forefathers… some of the blacks that travel about shearing and working are more worthy than many white men. they are most respectable and intelligent (the register 30 april, 1925, p. 12). another report in the news revealed that not all of the white residents agreed with the proposal to ‘oust the weetra family from the reserve’ (the news (adelaide) april 9, 1925). the media coverage in excited tones stated: balaklava has not yet exhausted the topic of the recent ‘battle’ which occurred there between a number of excited [a]borigines on the one hand and police and townspeople on the other. those who witnessed the event are constantly discovering some fresh little episode with which to regale the ears of those who missed it (the news (adelaide) april 9, 1925). the press coverage was adamant that all was now quiet ‘on the northern front’. the paper included a revealing interview with the very well respected mrs eliza weetra, the mother of the weetra brothers: ‘i don’t think they can turn us out’, she said. but her voice expressed a doubt and two big tears rolled down her cheeks… mrs weetra expressed the opinion that her sons arthur, spurling, maxwell and harry weetra and their friends had been too harshly dealt with. she considered their wrongs had been magnified. ‘i know there are many people who would like to drive us off our holding but that would be most unjust’, she remarked. her father, she added, held the land before her, and she and her husband had cultivated it on the share system for the past 20 years (the news (adelaide) 9 april, 1925). mrs weetra went on to say that all of her boys were employed on local farms and stations as stockmen and shearers. her boy albert [arthur] was a returned war hero and had been left ‘hard of hearing, one of his eyes was affected, and he still had a piece of shrapnel in his head’. in her concluding remarks mrs weetra declared she had ‘brought up a family of nine children, the youngest being a girl aged seven years, who was still at school’ (the news (adelaide) 9 april, 1925). it takes little imagination or research to unravel the persistent insidious attacks to remove the weetra family from their home: the property, which consisted of about 100 acres of good land, had been inherited by them from mr. goldsmith, the father of mrs weetra, to whom it had been allotted as an [a]boriginal reserve. (the news (adelaide) 9 april, 1925). in fact three of eliza weetra’s sons had enlisted in wwi: arthur, hubert and harold. arthur had been wounded in action in france in 1917 (national archives of australia). these were the experiences of aboriginal soldiers and their families in the aftermath of wwi: neither recognition nor compensation. their land was under severe attack through the pressure of white greed and the memories of their courage and valiant deeds in defence of their country quickly consumed with the passage of time. for the greater part of the twentieth century the memorialisation of gallipoli and the western front was confined to a white anzac history. i conclude with another reference to the ‘battle of balaklava’ that appeared as a poem in that renowned australian journal, the bulletin, publisher of the likes of ‘banjo’ patterson, henry lawson and ‘breaker’ morant: the charge of the dark brigade all the world has duly wondered, as the poet sternly bade, at that gallant, grim six hundred who to death and glory thundered and, because somebody blundered, died betrayed. oh, the blades that bravely flashed, as they cut and thrust and slashed through the huddled ranks they smashed. undismayed! but there’s never sword nor sabre for a carver, when weetra leads the blacks at balaklava yet untold in epic story is the wondrous charge they made; not so grim nor yet so gory was the path they trod to glory, this undaunted minnatory dark brigade. oh, the beers they bravely met, and the blood from noses let! the policemen they upset on that raid with peace league measures he holds no palaver when weetra leads the blacks at balaklava. so i cry upon him shame who first said ‘what’s in a name?’ could another see the same charge remade? not a spot more aptly named from here to java, when weetra leads the blacks, than balaklava. (the bulletin april 16, 1925, p. 24) postscript the tag ‘the fighting weetras’ is not an undue recognition of a remarkable family. eight members of the weetra family went on to enlist in the second world war in the australian army and air force cecil, glenard, keith, james, leonard, leslie, thomas and valma.2 references ball, d. (ed) 1991, aborigines in the defence of australia, anu press, canberra. beadman, m 2015, personal communication and correspondence, 12 january 2015. britten, t. 1999, american indians in world war i – at war and at home, university of mexico press, albuquerque. crump, d. 2014, queensland aborigines and the spanish influenza pandemic of 1918-1919, accessed 3 february 2015. http://blogs.slq.qld.gov.au/ww1/tag/spanish-flu/ foley, g. 2014, ‘whitewash obscures the truth of gallipoli’, the sydney morning herald, april 25, pp. 18-19. foster, r. 2000, ‘endless trouble and agitation: aboriginal activism in the protectionist era’, journal of the historical society of south australia, vol. 28, pp. 15-27. goodall, h. 1987, ‘not such a respected soldier: the impact of world war 1 on aborigines in new south wales’, teaching history, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 3-6. goodall, h. 1988, ‘winning overseas, losing at home’, land rights news, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 32-33. gordon, h. 1962, the embarrassing australian – the story of an aboriginal warrior, lansdowne press, melbourne. hall, r. 1995, fighters from the fringe – aborigines and torres strait islanders recall the second world war, aboriginal studies press, canberra. hall, r. 1977, the black diggers, aboriginal studies press, canberra. huggonson, d. 1993, ‘aborigines and the aftermath of the great war’, australian aboriginal studies, no. 1, pp. 2-8 jackomos, a. & fowell, d. 1993, forgotten heroes: aborigines at war from the somme to vietnam, victoria press, melbourne. kartinyeri, d. 1996, ngarrindjeri anzacs, south australian museum and raukkan council, adelaide. lentz-smith, a. 2011, freedom struggles – african americans and world war i, harvard university press, cambridge, mass. maynard, j. 2007, fight for liberty and freedom, aboriginal studies press, canberra. maynard, j. 2014, missing voices aboriginal dissent and patriotism in world war i, paper presented at more than service black diggers and the great war, nsw state library, sydney, 10 july, 2014. mcmillen, c. 2007, making indian law, the hulapai land case and the birth of ethnohistory, yale university press, new haven, ct. national archives of australia, digital copy, b2455 weetra, arthur, weetra, harold, james, weetra, hubert, a. accessed 3 february 2015. http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/namesearch/interface/itemslisting.aspx place names of south australia – balaclava accessed 3 february 2015. http://www.slsa.sa.gov.au/manning/pn/b/balaklav.htm scarlett, p. 2013, aboriginal and torres strait islander volunteers for the aif – the indigenous response to world war one, 2nd ed. indigenous histories, canberra. winegard, t. 2012, for king and kanata – canadian indians and the first world war, university of manitoba press, winnipeg, canada. newspapers & journals our aim, may 1915 the advertiser (adelaide) 7 april 1925 the australian aborigines advocate, 31 october 1919 the bulletin, april 16 1925 the brisbane courier, 24 july 1922 the cairns post, 19 february 1920 the chronicle (adelaide), 4 april, 1925 the daily telegraph (launceston), 1 april 1925 the morning bulletin, (rock hampton, qld), 11 june 1921 the news (adelaide), 15 june 1925 the news (adelaide), 9 april 1925 the news (adelaide), 7 april 1925 the register (adelaide) 1 april 1925 the register (adelaide) 30 april 1925 the port macquarie news and hastings river advocate, 17 may 1919 the raymond terrace examiner and lower hunter and port stephens advertiser, 6 april 1923 the sunday times (perth), 30 october, 1921 the wingham chronicle, 10 june 1925 footnotes 1 personal communication with margaret beadman australian war memorial 12 january 2015 2 thanks and appreciation to margaret beadman of the australian war memorial for her help and assistance in uncovering further weetra family records. issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal 2014. © 2014 jenny onyx. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(2): 3923,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3923 the politics of social impact: 'value for money' versus 'active citizenship'? jenny onyx university of technology, sydney abstract there is growing interest in identifying the social impact of everything: academic research, funded projects, organisations themselves, whether in public, private, or community sectors. the central questions are first what benefits do organisations create and deliver for society and second how do we measure these benefits? these questions are notoriously difficult to answer and yet go to the heart of efforts by governments and civil society organisations to create a better world, to generate social value. the importance of finding a way to measure social impact becomes all the more crucial when it comes to arguing that the benefits obtained far outweigh the cost of producing those benefits, and indeed the benefits may directly or indirectly increase economic wealth. this line of thinking has started to generate various attempts in australia and elsewhere in the neo-liberal world, to find objective indicators of social impact, and preferably to frame these in terms of monetary cost and benefit. indeed there is increasing insistence on the part of funding bodies that we measure the social impact. however, exactly what it is that we should be measuring remains contested and elusive. introduction there is growing interest in identifying the social impact of everything: academic research, funded projects, organisations themselves, whether in public, private, or community sectors. the central questions are first what benefits do organisations create and deliver for society and second how do we measure these benefits? these questions are notoriously difficult to answer and yet go to the heart of efforts by governments and civil society organisations to create a better world, to generate social value. the importance of finding a way to measure social impact becomes all the more crucial when it comes to arguing that the benefits obtained far outweigh the cost of producing those benefits, and indeed the benefits may https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3923 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 directly or indirectly increase economic wealth. this line of thinking has started to generate various attempts in australia to find objective indicators of social impact, and, preferably to frame these in terms of monetary cost and benefit. calls for impact measurement are particularly strong in systems aligned with neo-liberalism with its emphasis on evidence based management. indeed there appears to be increasing insistence on the part of funding bodies that we measure the social impact. however, exactly what it is that we should be measuring, and how to ascribe its “value”, remains contested and elusive. over the past five years, the university of technology, sydney’s cosmopolitan civil societies research centre (ccs) has been actively involved in attempts to grapple with the concept of social impact, as applied in different contexts. more recently this involvement has taken a distinctly political edge. this paper traces some of that attempt to interrogate the concept, and the disputed outcomes that have emerged. in 2011, ccs convened a major symposium to explore the use of social impact. as a lead-up to the symposium on social impact, researchers at ccs decided to selectively take the pulse on this issue in the not-for-profit (nfp) sector in sydney and regional nsw, to gain a sense of their views, concerns, frustrations, and issues about measuring the social impact of their organisations and beyond. this preliminary commissioned research was conducted by dr. barbara bloch and subsequently reported to the symposium and published in this journal. the symposium itself focused on the question of how to measure the social impact of organisations and programs within the local community (as opposed to an evaluation of programs). the event consisted of presentations and discussions of current approaches and issues. in the afternoon, small groups attempted to develop some potential solutions and a future research agenda. a major outcome of that symposium was a special issue of cosmopolitan civil societies journal on social impact (vol. 4, no. 3, 2012). the papers delivered at the symposium and subsequently published in the special issue give testament to the range of situations in which social impact is, or should be measured. thus for instance, kate barclay examined the nature of sustainability within fishing communities in nsw and concluded that while there is general acknowledgement of the three pillars of sustainability, that is the economic, environmental and social, nonetheless ‘there is a lack of recognition of the role of social factors in sustainability, and a related lack of understanding cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 71 of how to analyse them in conjunction with economic and environmental factors’ (barclay 2012, p 38). this especially is true of fishing communities. another paper similarly examined the concept of urban regeneration and the association between social capital (sc), local communities and the culture-led regeneration process at sydney olympic park (prior and blessi 2012), while a third examined the use of a toolkit to increase wellbeing within aboriginal communities (batten and stanford 2012). in these papers, social impact is associated with community wellbeing or social capital; in each case there is an identified need to understand the broader impact an event or industry or program has on the wider community in which it is embedded. however the commissioned research and analysis by bloch illustrates that social impact is usually defined much more narrowly when applied to programs within the community sector. nonetheless the organisations interviewed clearly saw social impact as much broader than program evaluation, ‘that it was a planning and a predictive tool, which inevitably went beyond the stated objectives of a particular program or service. they regarded it as being about long term measurement. importantly, they saw it as being about trying to capture unintended consequences, or ‘spill-over’ effects. social impact was about client and community outcomes, and it asked the fundamental question: what is making a difference?’ (bloch 2012, p 7 ). interestingly, while several organisations tried to assess this longer term impact, usually by qualitative means, they seldom mentioned their findings to the funding body, which invariably was interested in ‘objective’ and quantifiable outcomes from specific funded programs. from the symposium itself a number of questions emerged: • what do organisations need to measure in social impact? • how do we capture spill-over effects, that is, the wider impacts beyond those anticipated by the organisation or program? • what are the tensions between short-term measures imposed by funding bodies and measures which resonate with community members? • can we convert impact into a monetary base? what happens when we try to do so? 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 potential answers to these questions centred for example on health, levels of safety, human capital, social capital, social justice, diversity, empowerment – including measures of change in attitudes and values, and the impact on government policies and practices. a brief overview of the literature this overview has been covered in a number of publications through ccs and elsewhere. evaluation models are commonly used to test for social impacts. the model used by the australian productivity commission and many funding bodies seeks to distinguish short term outputs or outcomes from more far reaching impact. within the logic model of evaluation, a distinction is made between the different stages of evaluation as indicated in figure 1 below (arvidson, 2009; ebrahim and rangan, 2010; maas and liket, 2011; productivity commission, 2010). figure 1: the logic model of evaluation inputs activities outputs outcomes impacts what goes in, resources what happens, program implementation specific, immediate and countable products of the program benefits of the program as identified in the program objectives sustained, significant change in effects in the wider environment beyond the immediate boundaries according to the logic model of evaluation, there are several distinct stages in any organisational process and these can be evaluated sequentially. inputs refer to the resources provided for the program, both material and human. activities refer to the implementation of the program. outputs are specific, immediate and countable products of the program while outcomes refer to the benefits of the program for the intended beneficiaries, as identified in the program objectives and are sometimes expressed in terms of a hierarchy of outcomes moving from more specific to more general. impacts within the logic model relate to all changes in the wider environment and the community at large, that occur as a result of the program whether intended or unintended, positive or negative, short term or long term. impacts usually refer to effects beyond the immediate boundaries of the organisation and its programs. (zappalà and lyons, 2009, arvidson, 2009). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 73 most evaluations focus on specific programs and not the organisation as a whole. these evaluations are evidence-based and aim to assess outcomes against intended objectives of the program, without attempting to examine the wider implications of these, even where the wider impact is the ultimate goal of the organisation in question. impact, then, is normally regarded as an extension of the formal objectives of the organisation’s program, and is thus limited to the parameters set by the program. the broader intangible social effects on members and the community are rarely considered. they are what may be termed ‘spill-over’ effects (productivity commission 2010). these are effects that may be unintended, and are not specified in the statement of organisational objectives. they are effects that are produced outside the planned intervention, either directly or indirectly as a result of the intervention. in accounting terms they are externalities, and as such not measured. they may however be very important in terms of wider impact of organisational activities on the wider community, with potential positive and negative implications. the monetisation of social impact more recently there have been attempts to develop a framework of evaluation that can be used across the sector, that provides a clear and consistent approach and that can potentially measure effects beyond the immediate outputs (maas and liket 2011). of these, the social return on investment (sroi) is gaining considerable attention in the uk and australia (nicholls, lawlor, neitzert, and goodspeed 2009). sroi is essentially a monetising exercise, identifying a dollar value for each nominated activity or event to put in the ratio equation of investment against return. this leaves open the question of identifying the key variables to include in the equation, and the appropriate dollar value to impute to each variable. any variable that cannot be readily given an attributed value is simply omitted from the equation. a recent meta-analysis of social return on investment studies was conducted by the centre for social investment at heidelburg university (kriev, munscher and mulbert 2013). that analysis was based on 114 published studies of sroi, the majority of which were conducted in the anglo world of uk, canada and australia. while supporting the potential for the use of sroi, the study nonetheless found that the majority of studies gave relatively little detail on the methodology making it difficult to assess the validity of the results. where information was provided, there was relatively little use of indicators of genuine social impact as opposed to existing available indirect statistical data such as health status, household income or local crime statistics. 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 perhaps more seriously, the use of sroi and similar monetised evaluation frameworks reduces organisational performance to financial values at the expense of the human and mission-based values of the service provided (zappalà and lyons 2009; arvidson 2009; mook, richmond and quarter 2003; ebrahim and rangan 2010). so, for example there is little or no capacity to monetise self-esteem, community cohesion, social capital networks, or social justice despite various ineffectual efforts to do so (kiev et al. 2013). the political will despite these limitations, or perhaps because of them, government funding bodies and commercial organisations are increasingly applying, or demanding, sroi measures as a basis for assessing social impact. indeed this is rapidly developing into a lucrative consulting industry, lead in the first instance in australia by social ventures australia (sva) and later picked up by the centre for social impact (csi) at unsw and the broader simna (social impact measurement network australia). while simna now professes a broader brief, its origins were clearly fostered from the sroi tradition as indicated by statements on the simna website: ‘simna came about following a three year “investing in impact partnership” established by social ventures australia, the centre for social impact and pwc from 2009 to 2012. one of the recommendations from this report was the establishment of an sroi network in australia. in october 2011, a social impact measurement in australia conference was held and supported by the “investing in impact partnership” project partners. following this conference a number of attendees came together to establish an australian network about social impact and social return on investment (sroi). open meetings about establishing a network were held in sydney and melbourne throughout 2012 and promoted as an australian sroi network. attendees included people from nfp, business, philanthropic, social investment, social enterprise, consulting, corporates and academic organisations. their feedback indicated that http://socialventures.com.au/collaborators/investing-in-impact/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 75 they wanted a network about the practice of social impact measurement generally rather than a network for a specific framework.’ (simna.com.au 2014) while the network is now seeking a broader analysis of social impact, much of its work continues to lie in the promotion of sroi or other monetised impact measures. the consulting arm of sva is one of the very few organisations ‘accredited’ to carry out sroi. they appear to be successfully lobbying the state government to impose sroi as a condition of grant acquittal. this, combined with specialist industry conferences on sroi, has created a lucrative industry, one however that few small organisations can afford to pay. the ethics of this are highly questionable given that sva had a direct interest in the model, through its consulting arm, and given the high cost of undertaking sroi when it is imposed on funded agencies. an alternative: ripple impacts and the slsa debates at ccs have taken a different turn. in 2010, ccs was successful in obtaining a uts funded grant between uts and slsa (surf life saving australia) with a broad brief to identify a means of measuring the social impact (social capital) generated by surf life saving, apart from its core life saving mission. the project was carried out over two years (2010/ 2011) and involved initially a set of focus groups in four states followed by a national survey of items developed from the initial qualitative study. the initial study was published in conjunction with the social impact symposium and special issue (edwards et al. 2012) while the survey results were first presented at the international society for third sector research (istr) biennial conference in sienna in 2012 (onyx et al. 2012). the research results demonstrated that social impact is related to the development of active citizenship and not the specific targeted outcomes of programs, monetised or otherwise. it became clear that social impact is a process which flows from the initial establishment of a welcoming culture within the organisation, to increasingly wider effects within the organisation itself and ultimately to wider contributions to the host community. that is, the welcoming organisation creates a climate in which members develop a sense of identity with the organisation, and broader social/ citizenship values, such as a desire to work as a team, and to contribute to the community. from that develops a set of skills and knowledge (human capital) and networks (bridging capital). the skills are the kind of soft skills valued in any 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 corporate setting, such as team work, time management and leadership skills. the networks begin within the immediate organisation but quickly spread beyond; these networks ensure the flow of information and mutual support, perhaps for example leading to new job opportunities or access to external resources that is, there appears to be a flow, or ripple effect, from a central organisational core to increasingly wider impacts both within the organisation and beyond it. the effects can be measured both for the individual participants and for the organisation itself, though the two are linked. the factor analysis identified as separate factors: a welcoming organisational culture, individual sense of belonging, then organisational and individual social/ citizenship values, then skills and networks at the individual and organisational level, and finally organisational and individual contributions. the structural equation modelling verified the projected causal path. the theoretical underpinnings of this ‘ripple’ model have been published in the ccs journal (onyx 2014) together with a set of propositions which now need to be tested in other contexts in order to establish the wider validity of the model and its measure. one follow up study now underway by the ccs team involves an analysis of a series of disability arts programs funded by nsw arts in order to attempt to develop a measure of social impact, using the ripple model, in a very different context. while the analysis is incomplete at this stage, it does appear that the model is appropriate; the conceptual structure is similar albeit with a slightly different detailed content of each factor. wherever the model with the slsa data has been presented to those interested and involved in civil society, there has been an extremely enthusiastic response. practitioners ‘get it’ and want immediate access to the developing tool. the response of academic reviewers has been less positive. academics seem most concerned that the model is not derived from the logic model or anything like it, and indeed that there is no obvious literature to justify some of the factors obtained, they having emerged in a grounded manner from the data itself. it appears that the ripple model represents a paradigm shift, at least in the field of evaluation and impact measurement, and consequently there is some resistance to its acceptance, particularly as it avoids any direct attempt at monetising costs and benefits. however, demonstrating and recognising the worth of non-monetary impacts, in non-monetary terms, holds an intrinsic benefit, particularly in the many situations where social benefits have no clear or relevant financial reference. once fully developed as a measuring tool, it should also be relatively cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 77 simple and cheap to apply, while still providing an objective, quantified measure of social impact. it is interesting that simna itself has now professed an interest in the model, and indeed the most recent seminar on social impact hosted by ccs and held early in 2014 was badged as a joint ccs/ simna event, following which a number of participants have requested access to the detailed instrument. clearly these are early days. the propositions derived from the model need to be tested in other contexts to determine just how robust the model is. both the theory and the empirical measure will no doubt undergo some modification as testing proceeds. it is the intention of the research team that this measure of social impact, if it is formalised, should be available to all community groups at little or no cost, should be readily applied and analysed and provide meaningful data to participating organisations for their own purposes. the instrument, once fully developed, will allow organisations to assess the extent to which they engage with their members in a process that delivers the characteristics of active citizenship: which enhance the members’ individual capacity, but which also strengthens the wider community. references arvidson, m. 2009, impact and evaluation in the uk third sector: reviewing literature and exploring ideas. third sector research centre, working paper 27. universities of birmingham and southampton. accessed on 4 august 2014, available at: http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/183217/1/arvidson_working_paper_27.pdf barclay, k. 2012, ‘the social in assessing for sustainability: fisheries in australia’, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol.4, no.3, pp.38-53. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2655 batten, b. and stanford, k. 2012, ‘strengthening aboriginal community wellbeing’, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol.4, no.3, pp.54-77. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2574 bloch, b. 2012, ‘everyone’s story counts: measuring social impact in the not-for-profit sector’, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol4, no 3, pp1-17. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2623 ebrahim, a. and rangan, k. 2010, the limits of non-profit impact: a contingency framework for measuring social performance, harvard business school working paper 10-099. harvard university, accessed on 4 august 2014, available at: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/publication%20files/10-099.pdf http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/183217/1/arvidson_working_paper_27.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2655 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2574 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2623 http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/publication%20files/10-099.pdf 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 edwards, m., onyx, j., maxwell, h., darcy, s. 2012, ‘meso level social impact: meaningful indicators of community contribution’, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol.4, no.3, pp.18-37. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2576 kriev, g., munscher, r. and mulbert, k. 2013, social return on investment (sroi): state – of-the-art and perspectives. centre for social investment, heidelberg university maas, k. and liket, k. 2011, ‘social impact measurement: classification of methods’, in r. burritt, et al. (eds) environmental management accounting and supply chain management, springer, new york, pp. 171-202. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/97894-007-1390-1_8 mook, l, richmond, b. and quarter, j. 2003, ‘integrating social accounting for nonprofits; a case from canada’, voluntas, vol. 14, pp. 283-297. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1025614619742 nicholls, j., lawlor, e., neitzert, e. and goodspeed, t. a. 2009, guide to social return on investment, the cabinet office, office for the third sector, london. accessed on 4 august 2014, available at: http://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/cabinet_office_a_guide_to_social_return_on_inv estment.pdf onyx, j. edwards, m., maxwell, h., darcy, s., bullen, p .and sherker, s. 2012, ‘measuring social impact’ paper presented at international society for third sector research istr international conference, sienna. prior, j. and blessi, g. 2012, ‘social capital, local communities and culture-led urban regeneration: the sydney olympic park experience’, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol.4, no.3, pp.78-96. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2684 productivity commission 2010, contribution of the not-for-profit sector, research report, canberra. accessed on 4 august 2014, available at: http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/94548/not-for-profit-report.pdf pricewaterhousecooper 2011, what is the economic contribution of surf life saving in australia? price waterhouse coopers international. accessed on 4 august 2014, available at: http://www.surflifesaving.com.au/about/pwc-report.pdf simna (social impact measurement network australia) 2014, www.simna.com.au accessed on 4 august 2014. surf life saving australia 2011, surf life saving australia annual report 2010-2011, surf life saving australia, sydney, australia. accessed on 4 august 2014, available at: http://sls.com.au/sites/sls.com.au/files/annual report 2011-12_online single pages.pdf zappalà, g. and lyons, m. 2009, recent approaches to measuring social impact in the third sector: an overview. csi background paper no. 5, centre for social impact, university of new south wales, australia. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2576 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1390-1_8 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1390-1_8 http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1025614619742 http://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/cabinet_office_a_guide_to_social_return_on_investment.pdf http://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/cabinet_office_a_guide_to_social_return_on_investment.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v4i3.2684 http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/94548/not-for-profit-report.pdf http://www.surflifesaving.com.au/about/pwc-report.pdf http://www.simna.com.au/ http://sls.com.au/sites/sls.com.au/files/annual%20report%202011-12_online%20single%20pages.pdf http://sls.com.au/sites/sls.com.au/files/annual%20report%202011-12_online%20single%20pages.pdf the politics of social impact: 'value for money' versus 'active citizenship'? jenny onyx university of technology, sydney abstract introduction a brief overview of the literature the monetisation of social impact the political will an alternative: ripple impacts and the slsa references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 19 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia malaysia’s human rights performance: assessment of its first session of universal periodic review in the united nations human rights council ying hooi khoo university of malaya abstract since its inception, the universal periodic review (upr) has been subjected to a substantial amount of criticism. the mechanism began functioning in 2008, however little has been made known about the roles and functions of the upr. this article explicitly examines the first upr process of malaysia in 2009, in order to illustrate how the mechanism operates in practice by highlighting the engagement of malaysia government with the stakeholders, the follow-up process and the main issues concerned. this article argues that in spite of the excellent diplomacy skills that were portrayed by the malaysian government in the upr session, the human rights situation in the country has not improved much. this paper seeks to determine how effective the upr has been at encouraging human rights reforms nationally by analyzing and assessing the implementation actions of the malaysian government in response to their accepted upr recommendations. introduction the united nations general assembly resolution 60/251 of 15 march 20061 established the united nations human rights council (hereinafter referred to as the council) and included the universal periodic review (upr) as one of its function under paragraph 5(e). the resolution was adopted by the general assembly by a majority vote2, after five months of protracted negotiations (meghna 2006, pp. 11-12) with the objective of being less politicized and selective than its predecessor, the commission on human rights (chr) (ohchr 2010. p. 3). the chr was widely perceived as ineffective in its mission to ‘weave the international legal fabric that protects fundamental rights and freedoms’3. the council was therefore 1 a/res/60/251 of 15 march 2006, para 5 (e). 2 a/res/60/251 was adopted with 170 votes to 4 (united states, israel, marshall islands and palau), and 3 abstentions (belarus, venezuela and iran). 3 the un commission of human rights was established in 1946 with the intention to this particular purpose. initially formed by only 53 member states, the roles were expanded from time to time to allow it to cover the holistic human rights problems. http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 created with the introduction of several mechanisms, among them the upr, to better facilitate the advancement of that particular mission. the resolution provides that: the council shall undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable information, of the fulfillment by each state of its human rights obligations and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all states; the review shall be a cooperative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the country concerned and with consideration given to its capacity-building needs; such a mechanism shall complement and not duplicate the work of treaty bodies4. by nature and by its structure, the upr is clearly a state-driven exercise. all state actors repeatedly emphasized impartiality, tolerance, cooperation and a harmonious approach in order to conduct a upr. such an approach is unique because the mechanism was introduced to consistently and periodically scrutinize a member state on their human rights records on the ground. according to the un secretary general, ban ki-moon, the upr ‘has great potential to promote and protect human rights in the darkest corners of the world’. on 7 april 20085, the upr mechanism began functioning. while many parties challenge the effectiveness of this process, there has been very little research conducted to evaluate the process and implementation of the mechanism. literature on universal periodic review overall, there have been very limited academic writings on upr. since its inception, the upr has been subjected to a substantial amount of criticism from particularly the stakeholders. the following literatures generally provide constructive criticisms and valuable of the upr process and implementation. of particular highlight is, nonetheless, the usage of the mechanism for political purposes. mutual praise society, produced by un watch, is one of the earliest analyses of uprs. this study found that ‘out of 55 countries examined including all 47 members of the un human rights council, only 19 had average scores indicating that overall, the countries whose reviews were analysed, had contributed positively’ (un watch 2009, pp. 3-4). un watch 4 a/res/60/251 of 15 march 2006, para 5 (e). 5 the 1st session of the upr took place from 7-18 april 2008, with the review of 16 un member states: bahrain, ecuador, tunisia, morocco, indonesia, finland, united kingdom, india, brazil, philippines, algeria, poland, netherlands, south africa, the czech republic and argentina. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 21 was critical of such a congratulatory report, noting the effect of bloc voting on the peer review process. it called on free democracies to act as free democracies in carrying out the upr process and urged countries not to overlook information on human rights violations submitted by ngos and to permit a greater role for ngos in the review process itself. universal periodic review: an ambivalent exercise, published by the international federation of actions by christians for the abolition of torture (fiacat), addresses similar issues. in the report, fiacat notes that the review process is institutionally weak and allows countries to make selective choices where they could categorically reject relevant and important recommendations. fiacat observes that: ‘the reviews of some countries presented a singular problem: a lack of objectivity. indeed, on several occasions there was a clear contradiction between the image portrayed of a country at the conclusion of its review... and the issues raised by special procedures, treaty bodies and ngos’(2009, pp. 15-16). curing the selectivity syndrome, published by human rights watch, also criticizes the response of countries to recommendations particularly in the implementation stage. this report discusses the ‘absence of clear responses’ by some countries and notes that, ‘without such responses, the upr cannot achieve its purpose of fostering tangible improvements in the protection of human rights. failure by states to make clear commitments limits the council’s ability to measure or follow up progress on the ground’. based on the first cycle of the upr, mcmahon (2012) considered the upr process an evolutionary process and not revolutionary. he notes that although first cycle of the upr has resulted in many positive elements, one significant finding is that the upr still functions through a regional prism. for example, states in asia and africa particularly tend to take a softer approach in addressing human rights among themselves. while the upr’s support from the states may be broad enough because no state refused to take part in the upr process, this does not necessarily means that upr is a robust mechanism. contrary to most of the other reports, dominguez redondo (2012) argued that the upr as a non-confrontational approach to human rights implementation can have an added value provided it acts as a supplement to other work by the un charter and treaty-based bodies. beyond the “naming-and-shaming” approach, this article suggests two key outcomes of the upr. first, the existence of the compilations of human rights information at country level can 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 be used as the basis of follow-up for improving human rights in every state. second, the upr could contribute to the sources of international human rights. generally, most of the reports tend to lean towards the negative or rather unsuccessful in their consideration of the implementation of the upr. at its core, the upr represents a new and largely untested forum in which states make policy recommendations to each other. the multilateral context in which it functions is highly complex and sensitive. to date, there is limited information and analysis about the actual functioning of the upr, and virtually no related comparative analysis in the literature (mcmahon 2010, p. 5). the universal periodic review mechanism the detailed basis for the upr mechanism was set out under the council resolution 5/1 of 18 june 2007. there are six purposes of the upr: (a) the improvement of the human rights situation on the ground; (b) the fulfillment of the state’s human rights obligations and commitments and assessment of positive developments and challenges faced by the state; (c) the enhancement of the state’s capacity and of technical assistance, in consultation with, and with the consent of, the state concerned; (d) the sharing of best practice among states and other stakeholders; (e) support for cooperation in the promotion and protection of human rights; (f) the encouragement of full cooperation and engagement with the council, other human rights bodies and office of the high commissioner for human rights (ohchr)6. under this resolution, the upr reviews, in a four-year cycle, the fulfillment by each of the united nations’ 192 member states of their human rights obligations and commitments. so to speak, the mechanism oversees and evaluates the human rights records and addresses human rights violations of each member state. at the same time, it allows the opportunity for all member states to declare their actions in improving their human rights situation and to overcome challenges to the enjoyment of human rights. the mechanism also intends to enhance the capacity of member states to deal effectively with human rights challenges and for them to share best practices around the globe. recommendations are presented by interested parties and can be accepted or turned down by the state under review (sur). 6 human rights council resolution 5/1 of 18 june 2007. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 23 the human rights council established a special working group for upr7 consisting of all 47-member states to conduct the upr, with the council president of the year as chairperson. one of the reasons for creating the upr was that, previously, the un mechanisms focused too much on certain regions. therefore, the upr was designed to be more universal and consistent in its approach. for example, the examinations of the states’ human rights records are based on the universal declaration of human rights (udhr) and un charter together with the human rights conventions to which the individual state is party. international humanitarian law, recommendations from special procedures and other un mechanisms, voluntary pledges and commitments including those undertaken when presenting candidature for election to the council8 are also included. that basically forms the basic criteria of review. in accordance with its institution-building package, there are three documents on which state reviews should be based. these are information prepared by the state concerned, which could be presented either orally or in writing; information contained in the reports of treaty bodies and special procedures, to be compiled in a report by the ohchr; and information provided by other relevant stakeholders to the upr including non-governmental organizations (ngos), national human rights institutions (nhris), human rights defenders, academic institutions and research institutes, as well as civil society representatives. in one of the earliest studies on the upr mechanism, rathgeber (2008, p. 2) put forward five expectations of the potential contribution of the upr. according to him, the upr could: contribute to reveal the truth on human rights violations; do justice to victims of human rights violations by exposing the violations; suggest ways of rehabilitation for such victims by strengthening the national law and justice system; and last but not least, prevent gross human rights violations and improve the situation on the ground by focusing international attention on human rights. apart from creating the domestic momentum for human rights strengthening, the upr also provides legitimization and entry points for ngo stakeholders’ engagement with governments. on top of that, the upr too provides a forum and catalyst for extensive human rights dialogue between the sur and recommending states, and the international institutions 7 working group on upr holds three sessions per year. 8 human rights council resolution 5/1 of 18 june 2007. 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 (mcmahon 2011, p. 4). it is worth mentioning that some countries make full use of these salient positive characteristics that have assigned to the upr. malaysia’s experience in the universal periodic review the upr provides an important opportunity to hold the malaysian government to account for its domestic human rights records. the political significance of the mechanism is that it allows other countries to examine malaysia’s human rights records. as of now, malaysia remains in the bottom 10 countries in the un on its human rights treaty ratification record. malaysia has only ratified three of the nine treaties, namely the convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (cedaw), the convention on the rights of the child (crc) and the convention on the rights of persons with disabilities (crpd). most importantly, it has not ratified the two major human rights treaties; the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr) and the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (icescr). malaysia is also being criticized because of its reluctance to permit the un special rapporteurs to visit malaysia. according to council resolution 5/1 of 18 june 2007, states are encouraged to prepare the information they submit through a broad consultation process at the national level with all relevant stakeholders. in the case of malaysia, that refers directly to the human rights commission of malaysia (suhakam) and various ngos and civil society representatives. aside from the state’s submission of its upr, suhakam and other stakeholders may also submit separately their own reports for the upr on malaysia. there are basically two stages in the upr process. the first stage involved the 3-hour interactive debate, which took place at the 4th session of the upr on 11 february 2009. the draft report was subsequently adopted on 13 february 2009. it contained 62 recommendations that enjoyed the support of malaysia. malaysia rejected 22 recommendations and reserved comments on 19 recommendations. the second stage was the tabling of the upr outcome report on malaysia; this took place on 12 june 2009 at the 11th regular session9. this time a draft report of the outcome of the review prepared by the upr 9 the council holds three regular sessions per year, including a main session, for a total duration of no less than ten weeks. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 25 working group was adopted. the response to the 19 reservations was also provided on the same day. a) first stage – 4th session of the upr, 11 and 13 february 2009 on 11 february 2009, the upr process involved a three-hour interactive dialogue in the upr working group between malaysia and the 47-member states of the council and the observer states. during the session, any un member is allowed to ask questions and make recommendations. three council members serve as troika10 for the review. the state concerned has the right to request that one of the troika members should stem from the same regional group. the state concerned can also reject one of the troika members. members chosen for the troika have the right to refuse to become members of a specific troika. the members of the troika for malaysia were nicaragua, qatar and egypt. relevant stakeholders like suhakam and several ngos representatives also attended the february 2009 sessions as observers. suhakam’s delegation was headed by the then chairman tan sri abu talib othman11. the ngos’ delegation was from the coalition of malaysian non-governmental organisations in the upr process12 (comango), and the indigenous peoples network of malaysia (joas). malaysia brought in a large delegation of 31 officials, led by h.e. tan sri rastam mohd isa, the then secretary general of the ministry of foreign affairs and supported by tan sri abdul gani patail, the attorney general as alternate head of delegation. apart from the ministry of foreign affairs and the attorney general’s chambers’ representatives, the delegation also consisted of representatives of several ministries including the ministry of home affairs; ministry of women, family and community development; ministry of higher education; ministry of unity, culture, arts and heritage; ministry of housing and local government; ministry of education; ministry of defence; national security council, department of orang asli affairs; legal affairs division of the prime minister's office; sarawak state office and the permanent mission of malaysia to international organizations in geneva. 10 three countries chosen from council members of the regional groups asia, africa, latin america and the caribbean region, east europe, western states and others. 11 also attended was former suhakam commissioner dato’ choo siew kioh and the writer whom was formerly the head of international issues and cooperation in suhakam. 12 the comango comprises more than 50 malaysian ngos. 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 tan sri rastam in his opening presentation reaffirmed that malaysia's upr was prepared in consultation with civil society and suhakam. nevertheless the presentation highlighted the country’s composite nature, being made up of various cultures, religions and ethnicities. he said that malaysia’s efforts to secure the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for its people had been much focused on achieving inter-racial harmony within the society, with equitable socio-economic development and concern for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual. he further highlighted that individual rights come with the responsibility of maintaining national unity and security (suhakam bulletin 2009, pp. 10-11). he defended the human rights record in the country by quoting that the basis for the promotion and protection of human rights in malaysia was enshrined in the federal constitution, as the primary source of law in malaysia. basically, the issues that served as the focus of his presentation were derived from economic, social and cultural rights such as the importance of poverty eradication as a major effort for promoting and protecting human rights. for example, in order to improve the quality of life and well-being of the malaysian population, the government placed great emphasis in providing adequate, affordable and quality housing for the people. he also drew attention of the working group towards some discrepancies in the un compilation report. the report highlighted specific communications addressed to malaysia and noted where the government had not responded to particular communications (suhakam bulletin 2009, pp. 10-11). during the three-hour interactive discussion, delegations noted a number of positive achievements of malaysia. most states complimented malaysia’s achievements in the promotion and protection of human rights despite the challenges of its multi-cultural background. they also offered constructive criticism and made specific recommendations. the delegation acknowledged malaysia’s shortcomings and did its best to provide detailed and frank responses. nevertheless little attention was given to concerns put forward by the ngos and addressed in the ohchr compilation report. a few states made critical remarks and raised questions on some of the issues as follows: malaysia is not party to major international conventions on human rights; there is a lack of and general vagueness in legislation concerning migrant workers and refugees, and the resulting abuse of migrant workers; there is discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 27 transgender persons in legislation and in particular the criminalization of homosexuality; there is repression of fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and association, as well as arbitrary arrests related to the exercise of these; capital punishment persists for a wide range of crimes; there is a need to share the best practices on reducing the poverty levels and so forth. on 13 february 2009, a total of 30 minutes was allocated for the adoption of the report of malaysia. malaysia was given the opportunity to make final remarks and to indicate which recommendations it supported and which it might not and such would be identified and noted in the report. malaysia adopted 62 recommendations in the outcome report, which included, among others, the ratification of international treaties, the review of existing laws and judicial system, national policies and strategies in human rights, economic, social and cultural rights, human rights of the vulnerable groups, foreign workers and trafficking in persons. as noted above, 22 recommendations were rejected and comments were reserved on 19 recommendations. the response to the 19 recommendations was brought forward for the second stage on 12 june 2009, in conjunction with the tabling of the upr outcome report on malaysia, at the 11th regular session of the council. b) second stage – 11th regular session of the council, 12 june 2009 the second stage in the upr process is the adoption of the report and for malaysia this session took place on friday 12 june 2009. this time, h.e. ambassador datuk othman hashim, the then permanent representative of malaysia to the un in geneva, led malaysia’s delegation. apart from the representatives from the permanent representative office, the representatives of the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of home affairs and attorney general’s chambers also presented. malaysia, as a state, submitted a written document prior to the consideration of the outcome in the plenary. relevant stakeholders, including ngos and suhakam, also attended the session and delivered an oral statement. the former chairman tan sri abu talib othman headed suhakam’s delegation, while the ngos’ delegation consisted of representatives from the comango, and the abolish isa movement (gmi). 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 during this session, additional time of up to 60 minutes was allocated for the consideration and the adoption of the outcome by the plenary of the council. the 60 minutes was distributed equally among the three main entities: malaysia; un member states, observer states and un agencies; and stakeholders. however, due to time constraints, states were given only 2 minutes each to raise questions and issues on malaysia's upr. there were 21 states inscribed to speak, but only 12 were able to do so due to time limitation. also speaking were malaysia’s stakeholders. apart from that, several other regional and international ngos also took the floor, such as the amnesty international, asian forum for human rights and development (forum asia), action canada for population and development, commission of the churches on international affairs of the world council of churches, islamic human rights commission, national consciousness movement, and arab commission for human rights. datuk othman hashim, the head of malaysian delegation, said, in accepting the majority of the recommendations, that malaysia exercised considerable flexibility with a view to effecting improvements to the human rights situation in the country. he reaffirmed that the malaysian government since february 2009 had commenced several programs to implement those recommendations, and was committed to ensuring that they were implemented. some of the programs mentioned were the human rights awareness and training, harmonization of national legislation with international human rights instruments and compliance with treaties that it had acceded to, and regional and international cooperation for capacity building. taking a similar stand to that adopted by tan sri rastam at the 4th session of the upr, he stated that malaysia reiterated its efforts to secure the protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms for its people based on these principles of achieving interracial harmony within society, equitable socio-economic development, while taking into account the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual13. during the debate session, generally the speakers were encouraged by malaysia’s cooperation during the review session in responding to the recommendations put forward by other member states, and commended the voluntary commitments presented by malaysia towards the protection and promotion of human rights in the country. malaysia highlighted several 13 official statement by h.e. othman hashim, the permanent representative of malaysia, on the adoption on malaysia’s universal periodic review outcome report for the 11th session of the human rights council, 2-18 june 2009. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 29 practical measures that were being undertaken to further strengthen the system for the protection on promotion of human rights, such as the establishment of a technical committee in the area of the rights of children; the consolidation of its national human rights infrastructure, and the emphasis placed on the advancement of economic, social and cultural rights14. malaysia’s engagement with the stakeholders even though the upr guideline documents do not oblige states to organize consultations with relevant stakeholders before and after the review, nevertheless the states are strongly encouraged to conduct proactive dialogue and broad consultation at the national level whilst preparing the national report. this is one of the main components of the upr process. however, prior to preparing their national report, there was only one consultation organized by the malaysian government, which was held on 21 august 200815. apart from that, the government did not communicate with the other stakeholders formally or on a regular basis. in general, local ngos under the umbrella of comango expressed their disappointment over the upr exercise on malaysia mainly due to this lack of consultation. on the other hand, the stakeholders themselves played a much more pro-active role than the government in facilitating debate. during the 4th session of the upr, for example, immediately before the adoption of the malaysia report on 13 february 2009, the regional ngo forum asia organized a discussion on the upr of malaysia. the purpose was to share views and observations after the plenary upr session on malaysia that morning, as well as to discuss the way forward for the promotion and protection of human rights on the national level after the session. among the participants were members of ngos, the suhakam delegation, representatives from the united nations of high commissioner for refugees (unhrc), and several representatives from the malaysian government delegation. suhakam, as the national human rights institution in the country, was actively involved at both the preparatory and review stages in malaysia. it undertook steps to follow-up and monitor the implementation of the upr recommendations. they included, among others, establishing an internal upr follow-up and monitoring committee comprising focal officers 14 media statement by the ohchr dated 12 june 2009. http://www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/displaynews.aspx?newsid=9370&langid=e 15 the author was in attendance. http://www.ohchr.org/en/newsevents/pages/displaynews.aspx?newsid=9370&langid=e 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 of various groups and divisions within the commission itself; conducting awareness and training programs on the importance of the upr mechanism and malaysia’s obligations under the international human rights mechanism; engaging with government agencies and other relevant stakeholders through consultation and briefing sessions; sharing of best practices and contribution in upr-related training materials and engaging with regional and international human rights bodies through information exchange and delivery of statements 16. apart from that, suhakam also published an information booklet in both english and bahasa malaysia on the mechanism itself, which served as an awareness-raising tool regarding the upr process. the objective was to provide an explanation on the upr and, more importantly, to highlight recommendations that were accepted by the malaysian government. in addition, suhakam also recommended that the government include the upr recommendations as a point of reference in the development of malaysia’s national human rights action plan (nhrap). suhakam also submitted a mid-term progress report and delivered an oral statement on malaysia’s upr implementation at the 18th regular session in september 2011 (khaw 2012). the objective of this mid-term report was to remind the government of the pledges made to the international community. suhakam provided an interim report on the upr implementation to the council in its 18th session under agenda item 6. however, the malaysian government did not provide such a report although they could have done so. the biggest challenge for the malaysian government is the follow-up on upr as well as their engagement with the ngos and nhris. rathgeber (2008, p. 8) has, in this regard, also listed a number of challenges which are faced by the malaysia government itself: to disseminate the report and outcomes of the upr in each of the countries involved in the review; to design and propose an action plan; to discuss a time frame for implementation; to request a yearly meeting for further consultation and assessment on the implementation; to keep reporting to the council; and to make use of further complaint procedures. 16 datuk dr. khaw lake tee, progress in human rights over the past three years, new straits times, 12 november 2012. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 31 preliminary assessment on malaysia’s performance in the universal periodic review the 4th session of upr revealed a procedural problem caused by the extensive list of states willing to take the floor. this situation worked to the great advantage of the malaysian delegation. first, due to long queues for the speaker’s list, the time was extended to 25 minutes before the normal time for registration (half a day before the review). second, with too many states competing to participate, the allotted 2 hours were not enough to accommodate all. with so many states registered to speak, the number of states admitted within the time allotted was restricted to no more than 60 at the maximum, with each state given 2 minutes. in tactical consideration, in two minutes, not much can be said for or against any part of a state’s upr. hence malaysia was at no time under pressure and it could choose to give general replies to questions by clusters. successful lobbying to ensure that a large number of speakers would be present guarantees the dilution of the oral impact from speakers taking to the floor. this is one of the factors which contributed to malaysia’s success in its upr. other countries will no doubt use the same technique in diplomatic defense when their turn comes for review. a second point which the malaysian government turned to their advantage was the commitment to a broad definition of human rights. the government of malaysia made important commitments to the promotion and protection of human rights in malaysia in its upr and placed a heavy emphasis on the economic, social and cultural rights. comango indicated that more needed to be done in accordance with the spirit of the udhr 1948. comango had highlighted issues such as: the implementation of the crc with particular reference to the right of children to make decisions; standing invitation to the special procedures; the right of assembly and freedom of expression; and the lack of consultation on the appointment of members in the judicial appointment commission. the malaysian delegation opted not to respond to critical questions particularly on civil and political rights and gave no concrete commitment to improve the situation. some of the sensitive issues were not attended to or appropriately responded to by the government, for example, the welfare of the foreign workers, as well as refugees and asylum seekers. a third factor which can work in the favour of any state is that the upr is an intergovernmental process, which means that states are judging states. it is easy to see that eventually no state would care to be over critical of another state’s performance as one day that state itself would be open to similar scrutiny. again, as had happened to the defunct 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 human rights commission, political alliances and bilateral relations among the states of the world are very likely to undermine the upr process. the malaysian government undertook the upr exercise as a major diplomatic event to defend its record and performance on human rights. for that purpose it had brought along one of the largest delegation of senior officials from every relevant ministries and agencies including the attorney general. if we examine the dynamic, rhythm and language used during the upr on malaysia, be it written or oral statements, they clearly indicate the excellence of diplomacy skills at the international level. the ministry of foreign affairs had also done extensive lobbying amongst friendly countries to gain support or at least neutrality in their statements. the government operation was a success because it minimized exposure on weaknesses of performance and utilized the constraints of time to circumscribe the length of discussion. the irony was that the government’s success meant that critical issues of human rights concern were obfuscated. the upr nevertheless has some positive aspects. in the process, important documentation becomes available to the public on the human rights situation of the country under review. the final report adopted by the country under review with a list of recommendations could be used as a catalyst to ensure full and prompt implementation of the outcome of the review. the upr has been a great challenge for not only the malaysian government, but also to suhakam and the ngos who have worked to elicit commitments and obligations from the government to promote and protect human rights. the upr has been a catalyst for the civil society stakeholders, both nhris and ngos, to take stock of their own national performance as well as for governments to change their general approach to policy making on human rights issues. there is the risk that the state-driven consensual approach will become a template for all other assessments, including even special procedures and the high commissioner’s reports. although the focus of the upr is such that it should not be possible for it to substitute for other mechanisms which evaluate the situation in countries, nevertheless, the current approach of the council means that there is the possibility that a upr may overlap with other mechanisms. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 33 another negative aspect of the upr process is the poor outcome in terms of a genuine and immediate improvement for the human rights situation on the ground. these limited outcomes have been critically assessed by several ngos and nhris. for example, the national ngo coalition from indonesia expressed their utter disappointment with the process and showed their regret by suggesting that upr may take on a new meaning, now standing for ‘universal periodic rhetoric’. through this phrase, these indonesian rights groups were indicating that the upr was a rhetorical exercise because the process was hampered by self and mutual exoneration statements and comments from the “friends” of indonesia. the final adoption of the outcome report of the upr can consist of an assessment of the human rights situation in the reviewed country, including positive developments and challenges; sharing of best practices; emphasis on enhancing cooperation for the promotion and protection of human rights; provision of technical assistance and capacity building in consultation with and with the consent of the country concerned; and/ or recommendations for voluntary commitments and pledges made by the country reviewed. in malaysia’s case, there were also proposals for the outcome document to include an assessment of the implementation of recommendations relating to the ratification of treaties treaty and the implementation of special procedures and their follow up. however, these were rejected because of the opposition of some states supportive of the malaysian government, including pakistan on behalf of the organization of the islamic conference (oic), china, indonesia, iran, and the russian federation (meghna 2007, p. 40). the mechanism of the upr can also generate positive aspects given the willingness of a government to simply acknowledge its reality at home. the true test for malaysia government remains with the follow-up and implementation on the ground, which means bringing human rights to home. one of the important channels of communication to use is the media to promote the outcomes of the upr process; however, it is no secret that only a minority among the un member states is prepared to do so. thus, it is difficult to make the upr a working instrument for the people on the ground and in this sense generating a success story about its outcomes becomes a challenge. after more than five years, there is still an obvious reluctance on the part of the malaysian government to publicize the human rights commitments made under the upr mechanism. 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 upr is also a big challenge for civil society stakeholders in discussing how to make it more useful. this requires at least certain coordination on national as well as on international level in order to attempt setting common priorities (rathgeber 2008, p. 7). council resolution 5/1 under paragraph 15(a) spelled out clearly the obligation of the country under review to undergo a consultation process with stakeholders of the national civil society prior to concluding the state report to be submitted to the council. malaysia commented, ‘in order for the upr to be effective and meaningful, we believe that countries participating in the process must approach this important exercise in a spirit of sincerity, openness and transparency. we are of the view that observations and recommendations, raised during the session, no matter how difficult should be addressed and dealt with in a constructive manner. if we choose to be defensive, in denial, cynical and not wanting to engage with others in good faith, we will render the whole process meaningless’17. although malaysia publicly proclaimed the importance of broad consultation in a cooperative spirit, on the ground, this was apparently not the case. the malaysian government only conducted one consultation with their stakeholders prior to their first review scheduled during the 4th session of the upr. nevertheless, there are countries that have actually conducted broad consultation and included as many stakeholder views as they could prior to drafting their national report and these can provide an example for others, such as malaysia, to follow. the involvement of ngos at that stage of the process can be positive for the government. it provides an opportunity for listening and responding to the concerns of civil society at the national level before these questions are raised internationally. a number of states have seen the benefit of this and made reference to these national consultations in their reports or in their introductory statements. in this respect, guatemala is an especially remarkable example. the guatemalan government worked closely with the ohchr to consult with members of civil society and inform them about how they could participate in the upr process. another positive example is tonga, where civil society as a whole publicly approved the national report. switzerland18 published its draft national report on its foreign affairs ministry website and invited members of civil society and all swiss citizens to post their comments. the finnish government organised a roundtable discussion with members of civil society, who were sent 17 statement by malaysia, 20 march 2009 under agenda item 6, 10th regular session. 18 more information can be obtained from the website of switzerland’s federal department of foreign affairs at http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intorg/un/humun/upr.html http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intorg/un/humun/upr.html cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 35 the draft report for their comments. in addition, a representative of civil society, who sits on the advisory board for international human rights affairs, was part of the finnish delegation. conclusion the upr exercise presents an opportunity for all stakeholders in human rights to call upon the state to strengthen and uphold its national and international commitments on human rights. it is a perfect platform for the exchange of best practice and it also creates further precedent for self and mutual assessment. it is a mechanism which reviews all the 192 member states of the un in cycles of four years. it should not only be seen as an international obligation, but rather as an ongoing national process in which civil society organizations engage with their governments either to pressure them to comply with their human rights engagements or to increase their efforts in the promotion and protection of those same rights (awomi 2010, p. 1). the entire upr process can be very beneficial to the citizens of a country. the process of preparing the upr report gave malaysia the opportunity to assess and reflect on its achievements and shortcomings in the promotion and protection of human rights in the country. the upr also offered an environment of cooperation and consultation as envisaged by the council in the creation of the process. while some might be disappointed with the process, the issues raised during the malaysia review, for example, gave holistic consideration covering a wide range of issues in the areas of social, economic, cultural, civil and political rights. malaysia underwent its second review on 24 october 2013. while most of the comments offered by other member states were generally positive and complimentary in nature as they had been during its first review, a few expressed concern regarding the government’s amendments to the prevention of crime act (pca) that are retrogressive and inconsistent with human rights principles. more recently, there has been outrage that the ministry of home affairs has deemed comango an illegal (‘haram’) organisation in january 2014 and suhakam has expressed its regret and concern at the move. some muslim groups within malaysia have spoken in support of the denouncing of comango and have accused it of trying to challenge the position of islam. judging from the two reviews of malaysia under the 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 upr in 2009 and 2013, it could be said that thus far, the government has not fully utilize the upr as a tool to effectively promoting and protecting the human rights. ideally, the review is a cooperative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of the country concerned. it is important for the malaysian government and other stakeholders to work constructively with it. the upr attracts not only international attention but also most importantly domestic momentum, and the mechanism itself has certainly opened up areas of core concerns for further improvement. bibliography dominguez-redondo, e. 2012, ‘the universal periodic review: is there life beyond naming and shaming in human rights implementation?’ new zealand law review, vol. 4. human rights watch 2011, curing the selectivity syndrome, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/hrc0610webwcover.pdf accessed 2 april 2014. international federation of acat (fiacat) 2009, universal periodic review: an ambivalent exercise, fiacat, paris. http://www.fiacat.org/-fiacat-and-the-universalperiodic-reviewaccessed 2 april 2014. khaw lake tee 2012, ‘progress in human rights over the past three years, new straits times, 12 november. http://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnist/progress-in-human-rightsover-the-past-three-years-1.170216 accessed 2 april 2014. mcmahon, e. 2012, the universal periodic review: a work in progress: an evaluation of the first cycle of the new upr mechanism of the united nations human rights council, friedrich ebert stiftung (fes), geneva. http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/genf/09297.pdf accessed 2 april 2014. mcmahon, e. 2011, ‘the 2011 united nations human rights council reform process: the status quo prevails’. paper presented at the fes conference on the human rights council review in geneva, switzerland 6-7 october 2011. http://www.fesglobalization.org/geneva/documents/presentation_hrc%20review_67oct2011_mcmahon%20notes.pdf accessed 2 april 2014. mcmahon, e. 2010, herding cats and sheep: assessing state and regional behavior in the universal periodic review mechanism of the united nations human rights council. upr info, geneva. meghna, a. 2007, building the new human rights council: outcome and analysis of the institution-building year, fes occasional paper, no.33. fes, geneva http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/04769.pdf. accessed 2 april 2014 meghna, a. 2006, a new chapter for human rights: a handbook on issues of transition from the commission on human rights to the human rights council. fes, geneva. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/hrc0610webwcover.pdf http://www.fiacat.org/-fiacat-and-the-universal-periodic-reviewhttp://www.fiacat.org/-fiacat-and-the-universal-periodic-reviewhttp://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnist/progress-in-human-rights-over-the-past-three-years-1.170216 http://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnist/progress-in-human-rights-over-the-past-three-years-1.170216 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/09297.pdf http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/09297.pdf http://www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/documents/presentation_hrc%20review_6-7oct2011_mcmahon%20notes.pdf http://www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/documents/presentation_hrc%20review_6-7oct2011_mcmahon%20notes.pdf http://www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/documents/presentation_hrc%20review_6-7oct2011_mcmahon%20notes.pdf http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/genf/04769.pdf cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.1, 2014 37 un watch 2010, mutual praise society, un watch, geneva. http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdkkisnqemg/b.4967647/k.7162/mutual_praise_soci ety.htm accessed 2 april 2014. office of the high commissioner for human rights 2010, working with the universal periodic review in the united nations human rights council: a handbook for civil society organizations, http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/documents/practicalguidecivilsociety.pdf accessed 2 april 2014. rathgeber, t. 2008. the human rights council universal periodic review: a preliminary assessment, fes briefing paper 6. fes, geneva. suhakam 2014, ‘ministry of home affairs’ statement on comango a setback for the freedom of association and expression in malaysia’, http://www.suhakam.org.my/ministry-of-home-affairs-statement-on-comango-asetback-for-the-freedom-of-association-and-expression-in-malaysia accessed 2 april 2014. suhakam 2009, bulletin. january-june 2009, suhakam, kuala lumpur. http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdkkisnqemg/b.4967647/k.7162/mutual_praise_society.htm http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdkkisnqemg/b.4967647/k.7162/mutual_praise_society.htm http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/documents/practicalguidecivilsociety.pdf http://www.suhakam.org.my/ministry-of-home-affairs-statement-on-comango-a-setback-for-the-freedom-of-association-and-expression-in-malaysia http://www.suhakam.org.my/ministry-of-home-affairs-statement-on-comango-a-setback-for-the-freedom-of-association-and-expression-in-malaysia malaysia’s human rights performance: assessment of its first session of universal periodic review in the united nations human rights council ying hooi khoo abstract introduction literature on universal periodic review the universal periodic review mechanism malaysia’s experience in the universal periodic review malaysia’s engagement with the stakeholders preliminary assessment on malaysia’s performance in the universal periodic review conclusion bibliography 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia representations of the concept of trust in the literature of library and information studies dean leith university of technology, sydney abstract governments and organizations around the world are increasingly turning to knowledge and information sharing as a lead strategy for developing response capacity to address issues in a wide range of programs and policy areas. the sharing of information and knowledge within organizations may be influenced by a range of factors, one being trust. this paper seeks, firstly, to identify and explore some key theoretical approaches to trust applied in the broader social sciences literature, including trust as a ‘leap of faith’ or willingness to vulnerability; trust as a key component of social capital; and trust as a component of the concept of power-knowledge and truth-telling as found in the work of michel foucault. second, the paper presents the findings of a meta-analysis conducted of recent library and information science (lis) literature in order to analyze how these three theoretical approaches are represented. findings of the meta-analysis indicate that the trust definitions offered by two of the three theoretical perspectives investigated are well represented in recent lis research; that other simpler definitions of trust are also represented; and that over one quarter of the sample were found to offer no explicit definition of trust. analysis of these latter studies suggest that trust is represented by the implicit views and assumptions of researchers and the focus is more on the embedded authority of the information or abstract system rather than on the trustor as an essential component of the trust dynamic. introduction at the heart of the researcher’s broader project are key questions about knowledge and information flows and the potential to increase our understanding of why, how and where knowledge sharing takes place in the workplace and, more broadly, between organizations, communities and national boundaries. this paper forms one of several components of this larger project to explore how trust may impact on organizational knowledge sharing. the researcher’s interest in this area arises from over two decades of professional practice attempting to facilitate information and knowledge sharing within and between organizations. this professional experience has led to the proposition that trust may play a key role in information and knowledge sharing. more broadly, in the context of the wider research project, it is suggested that understanding the dynamics of organizational knowledge sharing, and the role of trust in this sharing dynamic, is central to developing an understanding of the factors that may impede knowledge flows in the broader social context of cosmopolitan civil societies. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 55 this paper will begin by analyzing trust as it is conceptualized in three theoretical perspectives drawn from the wider social sciences literature which the author has selected based in an interest in a social constructivist perspective. these include that of trust as a ‘leap of faith which brackets ignorance or lack of information’ as found in the work of british sociologist, anthony giddens, and later researchers who emphasize a willingness for vulnerability and risk involved in the act of trusting; the approach to trust found in the broad range of research into social capital as exemplified in the research of fukuyama (1995a), putnam (2000) and halpern (2005); and thirdly, trust as a potential component of the exercise of power-knowledge or truth-telling practices as found in the work of the late michel foucault. in the second part of the paper, the results of a meta-analysis of recent library and information science (lis) literature is presented and discussed in terms of how trust is represented by the use of explicit definitions of the concept. in instances of research studies where the concept of trust is not explicitly defined, an analysis shows how the lis authors may be implicitly defining trust. based on the results of the meta-analysis, implications of the findings are discussed and suggestions for future research offered. part 1: theoretical approaches to trust from the social sciences literature trust as a ‘leap of faith’ or willingness to be vulnerable british sociologist, anthony giddens (1991, p. 244) defines trust as, ‘the vesting of confidence in persons or abstract systems, made on the basis of a ‘leap of faith’ which brackets ignorance or lack of information’. for giddens, trust is learned in infancy and enables the individual to deal with the unknowable in the social context. central to this view of trust is the concept of expertise whereby modernity has dis-embedded individuals from previous social institutions to such an extent that they must now negotiate a myriad of expert systems in order to deal with daily life. such expert systems employ modes of technical knowledge and penetrate all areas of our social life, however they are not confined to areas of technological expertise. such systems impact on a range of social relations such as in the seeking of medical, financial or other forms of advice. giddens distinguishes between an individual’s trust in embodied expertise, such as that held by other people, and their trust in these abstract systems. while he sees such systems as depending on trust, he sees them as providing none of the moral rewards of personalized trust and, indeed, as increasing the vulnerability, the essence of trust, of the individual. an example of such vulnerability may be that of an individual investor to the fluctuations of the global economy or, in the context of 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 information seeking, the vulnerability of the information seeker to the technical vagaries of an automated network holding key information required for their research. thus, for giddens, the ‘leap of faith’ at the center of trust involves the trustor experiencing a lack of expertise in a particular area of their life and acknowledging that the expertise they require to address this lack is held by another individual or system. they either consciously or subconsciously make a ‘leap of faith’ to trust in that individual or system in order to address the lack of information or accept the authority of the ‘expert’ until they have evidence to the contrary. giddens sees this ‘leap’ as underlying a multitude of day-to-day decisions, but, as he states, ‘…trusting is not by any means always the result of consciously taken decisions; more often it is a generalized attitude of mind that underlies those decisions, something which has its roots in the connection between trust and personal development’ (giddens, 1991, p. 19). in the context of the lis literature, jansson (2012) borrows giddens’s definition and develops the concept of ‘sectors of reflexivity and trust’ based on his concept of the ‘lifestyle sector’ defined as, ‘…a time-space slice of an individual’s overall activities, within which a reasonably consistent and ordered set of practices is adopted and enacted’ (giddens, 1991, p. 83). in this context, reflexivity may be defined as regarding oneself and one’s surroundings from a distance, that is, to be conscious, but not necessarily reflective, in terms of one’s actions (rasmussen & jochumsen, 2007). jansson distinguishes between social and systemic reflexivity and trust in which the former refers to trust in social rules and conventions and a willingness to act in accordance with those conventions. systemic reflexivity and trust refers less to other people and more to ‘abstract’ systems through which social life is administered such as monetary, technological and other ‘expert’ systems. jansson argues that all these systems depend on trust and we must count on the predictability and correctness of these systems to live in the modern world. he argues though that it is certainly possible for such systems to fail and we need to deal with such failures as well as adapt to new systems and reinventions of older systems and integrate them into our pre-established ‘lifestyle sectors’. in the context of lis, systemic reflexivity involves the client, or user, needing to count on the predictability and correctness of the information systems, to deal with instances of system failure, and to adapt to new systems as they develop, integrating them into their information practice. information practice here, and throughout this paper, refers to the interdependent acts of information seeking, use and sharing directed by professional and social rules and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 57 norms, and affected by an individual’s stock of knowledge, which become meaningful through contributing to projects of various kinds, both generic and specific (savolainen, 2008). in line with giddens’s concept of trust as a ‘leap of faith’ is a commonly applied definition of trust proposed by mayer et al (1995) in which trust is seen as ‘the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party’ (mayer et al, 1995, p. 712). this definition of trust is similar to giddens’s in that it emphasizes the vulnerability or risk involved in the act of trusting. it differs from giddens’s definition in that it focuses on the conscious willingness to trust as well as the context of the modern organization. mayer also distinguishes trust from cooperation, where the latter does not necessarily imply risk; from confidence which, unlike risk, does not presume previous knowledge as trust does; and from predictability which differs from trust in that it is insufficient to increase the likelihood of risk-taking and indeed, if the prediction is of negative consequences, will reduce the willingness to be vulnerable or take a risk. mayer et al (1995) also identify characteristics of the trustee or trustworthiness, which include ability, benevolence and integrity and analyze the role of context in the study of trust such as the stakes involved, the balance of power, the perception of the level of risk and the trustor’s available alternatives. mayer’s definition however is limited to one trustor’s interaction with a particular trustee rather than trust in a wider social system and is thus only unidirectional in nature. trust as social capital the concept of social capital originates from the founding fathers of the social sciences such as adam smith, de tocqueville and durkheim, who all emphasize the key role that community plays in individual prosperity. bourdieu defines social capital as ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (1985, p. 248). this concept, made more visible and popular in american sociology by coleman, may be defined by its function, namely as ‘a variety of entities with two elements in common, where they all consist of some aspects of social structures, and they facilitate certain action of actors-whether personal or corporate actors-within the structure’ (coleman 1990, p. 301). 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 portes (1998) sees this definition as rather vague and insists that any systematic treatment of social capital, must distinguish among a) the possessors of social capital (those making demands), b) the sources of social capital (those agreeing to these demands) and, c) the resources themselves. he concludes that there is a consensus in the literature that social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership of social networks and other social structures. fukuyama (1995b) sees social capital as closely tied to the concept of trust in that it is seen to arise from the prevalence of trust in a society, or certain parts of it. putman (2000), too, identifies trust as a key driving force in the development and operation of social capital. trust here is seen as arising within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms on the part of other members of that community (fukuyama, 1995a, p.26). halpern (2005, p. 3) defines social capital as the ‘web of social understandings of how to behave in society which forms a social fabric of connection and tacit cooperation’ and identifies what he sees as functional sub-types of social capital. the most important of these are described by putman (2000) and gittell & vidal (1998) as the bonding and bridging distinction. bonding social capital tends to be inward looking and to reinforce trust and bonds with exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. bridging social capital, on the other hand, is outward looking and encompasses people from across diverse social boundaries. granovetter’s (1973) concept of the ‘strength of weak ties’ focuses on bridging social capital in that it stresses the importance of more peripheral contacts and trust relationships as opposed to those in families or well defined close-knit groups. in a study of professional, technical and managerial job changes in boston, he found that weak professional ties with colleagues are an important resource for facilitating job mobility opportunities and creating a ‘sense of community’ between otherwise disconnected networks. granovetter (1985) later found that the degree of embeddedness within concrete personal relationships and structures within economic networks is key in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance. while positive reputational information may encourage trust and co-operation between colleagues, direct personal experience is preferable because it is cheap; one trusts one’s own information best; the expectation of future transactions is motivation to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 59 be more trustworthy; and finally because, economic motives aside, continuing economic relationships become overlaid with social opportunities so expectation and experience of trust and honesty is increased. leonard and onyx (2003) later challenged grannovetter’s findings concerning the ‘strength of weak ties’. in a study of participants connected through dispersed urban and rural community organizations in new south wales, they found that close multi-functional ties are preferred for both bonding (within group) and bridging (between group) connections. further, they found that the only loose ties that are used for bridging are those with formal professional status. such findings stress the central importance of trust both within and between communities in order to grow social capital. trust as a component of power-knowledge and truth-telling michel foucault, sees knowledge as inextricably linked to power and, indeed, elaborates his theory of power-knowledge in a 1978 lecture presented at york university, toronto, as follows, ‘no power is exercised without the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge. at this level, we do not have knowledge on the one hand and society on the other, or science and state; we have the basic forms of powerknowledge’ (foucault, 1978, p.20). foucault also sees resistance as a necessary and constant companion to power in that, while power may be visible and dominant, resistance, being less visible and carried in oppositional discourses, will be both a support but also a constant limit to power. while this view of the inevitability of the exercise of power-knowledge has been applied to lis theory and research, the concept of trust has not generally been identified as a key component of foucault’s contribution. his later work on ‘the care of the self’ however, concerns a form of truth-telling which potentially has, as a central component, the concept of trust between the truth-teller and their listener. indeed, luxon (2004) argues that in foucault’s later lectures at the college de france, delivered between 1982 and 1984, where he elaborates on the ancient ethical practices of parrhesia, or truth telling, there is scope for identifying the concept of trust as playing a key role in this work. in these lectures, foucault describes parrhesia as ‘telling all’, but tied to the truth: telling the whole truth, hiding nothing of the truth, telling the truth without hiding it behind anything’ (foucault, 1984 [2008]). 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 while such truth-telling forms the basis of parrhesia, foucault also imposes other conditions on the practice, or on the truth-teller, namely that there must be a fundamental bond between the truth-teller and the person to whom the truth is addressed; that they provide their opinion unreservedly and are bound to that truth; and, also, that they run some degree of risk through telling this truth. luxon contends that, in presenting the practice of truth-telling in this way, foucault develops a powerful contemporary model. more importantly, for the purpose of this paper, the potential ethical contribution of the concept of parrhesia is that it is a process of the development of the subject governed by relations of trust, ultimately enabling the education and development of individuals rather than mere production of subjects. indeed, parrhesia may be seen as a means of reversing the effects of the coercive practices explored in foucault’s earlier work and presenting the possibility of learning how to be active in creating and testing authority figures and making them productive through trust relationships. trust then, in the context of foucault’s later work, may sit at the heart of what is termed the parrhesiastic game or as a central component of the process of truth-telling. applications of foucault’s theoretical perspective to lis research include a range of studies undertaken in a variety of contexts, though not specifically with respect to trust. such applications include the analysis of business information (gordon & grant, 2005), the nursing profession (johannisson & sundin, 2007) and in university researchers ‘truth statements’ and discursive practices (olsson, 2007). frohman argued as early as 1992 that lis theory is so extraordinarily unreflective about its institutional underpinnings to warrant the hypothesis that power’s invisibility is the consequence of a deliberate discursive strategy and concludes that any analysis between knowledge and power in the discipline, as found in the work of foucault, was long overdue (frohman, 1992, p. 368). savolainen (2007, p.109) in a systematic analysis of lis literature, identifies concepts such as information practice as an ‘umbrella concept’ in lis literature and warns that, unless such discourses are investigated and challenged, researchers are in danger of ‘becoming trapped in their own discursive formations’ as foucault (1972) had earlier warned. olsson (1998, 1999) presents a comprehensive theoretical framework for examining information behavior of groups based on the concept of discourse and draws on foucault’s theoretical perspective in a variety of settings including that of academic information cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 61 behavior researchers and their social construction of an ‘author’ (olsson, 2005a, 2005b) and amongst theatre professionals (olsson, 2010a & 2010b). olsson also calls for a re-thinking of the concept of information users in lis research and a greater focus on ‘context, on long-term relationships, and the complex role of emotion and embodiment in people’s sense-making’ (olsson, 2009, p. 22). mcnabb (1999) too, adopts foucault’s view that every society/institution imposes strong constraints on the production of discourse through a process that is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according to a range of procedures (foucault, 1972, p. 216). these constraints, mcnabb (1999) contends, restrict what modern institutions can classify as knowledge; the rules and procedures that determine what statements can be made about knowledge and, further, who has the authorizing power to speak about knowledge. although providing apparently diverse conceptualizations of trust, the three approaches outlined above have some areas of commonality. both giddens’ and foucault’s work may be seen as representing a social constructivist approach in that they are both engaged in considering how social phenomena or objects of consciousness develop in social contexts. both also share an interest in the dynamics of power and power relations and both see power as a generative force in modern society and as being neither inherently positive nor negative. they differ, however, in their view of structure and agency in that giddens is mainly concerned with agency as the primary object of study within a social context, whereas foucault foregrounds the importance of discourse in the exercise of power over subjects. for foucault, individuals do have an active role in producing themselves as subjects through which discourse may act (kendall, 1999), however, his focus, at least in most of his work, is on the way power produces knowledge, discourse and subjects. other parallels include that between mayer et al and some strands of social capital theory in that they both arise out of economics and organizational theory. both take a strongly empiricist perspective and are concerned with the operation of trust within organizations and how trust may be developed to achieve successful business practice. in contrast, other strands of social capital theory, such as that developed by putnam (2000) and coleman (1990), have more in common with giddens stemming from the tradition of sociology. 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 part 2: meta-analysis of recent lis trust literature in the light of these three broader theoretical approaches to trust, this study sought to investigate how these perspectives are represented in recent lis literature both in terms of the explicit trust definitions used by researchers and, in studies where explicit definitions of trust are not provided, the implicit representations and assumptions offered by researchers and/or practitioners. the research article sample was identified by conducting an advanced title search for the term ‘trust’ for the period 2007-2013 in the lisa: library and information science abstracts (proquest) database as provided via the university of technology, sydney library website. in addition to the term ‘trust’ in the title, other search elements included peer review, english language, conference papers/proceedings or scholarly journals and the document type included conference reports, journal articles or literature review. a total of 137 articles were analyzed by a comprehensive search for references to any formal definitions of trust. the primary focus of the analysis was literature review sections with corresponding checks in bibliographies for authors cited, however all sections were scanned for such definitions. the aim was to identify if the author offered an explicit definition of the term trust in the article. if no definition was offered, the article was analyzed according to the characteristics identified in the literature review for each of the three concepts. table 1 shows the definitions that were used to analyze the articles. table 2 shows the results of this first level of analysis. subsequently, those 37 articles which offered no explicit definition of trust, (ie. those in category 5), were analyzed in their entirety to identify the main subject or content area of the research. the findings from this level of analysis are presented in table 3. four of these articles have been identified for further discussion below. these have been identified as articles a, b, c and d, rather than by the name of their author. this is to indicate that they have been chosen as representative of the group of 37 articles offering implicit definitions of trust. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 63 table 1: criteria for classification of trust definition provided by article authors theoretical approach – trust definition category: operational definition of trust and/or reference to researchers such as: 1. trust as a ‘leap of faith’ or willingness to be vulnerable article refers to a definition of trust which identifies a risk or vulnerability addressed by a willingness to make a ‘leap of faith’ toward another person or entity in order to seek a, usually positive, outcome. eg. giddens, mayer et al 2. trust as a component of social capital article refers to a definition of trust which explicitly identifies trust as the essential element or ‘glue’ of a positive social relationship or explicit reference to trust as a component of ‘social capital’. eg. fukuyama, putnam, halpern 3. trust as a component of power-knowledge or truth-telling article refers to a definition of trust which explicitly identifies trust as an essential element in the operation of power-knowledge or truth-telling. eg. foucault 4. trust as defined by another theoretical approach (not defined in 1-3 above) article provides a clear and explicit definition of trust which is not able to be categorized in 1-3 above. eg. millar (2006) defines trust as ‘belief in the responsibility of others’ 5. no explicit definition of trust provided in the article article provides no explicit definition of trust and makes no reference to any theoretical or operational definition of trust. findings in terms of the explicit definitions of trust used by researchers, over 70% of the studies in the sample offered a clear definition of trust; conducted and provided a review of previous trust research; and opted for an explicit definition previously identified in the literature as shown in table 2. the majority of these studies (50%) offered either giddens’s or mayer’s definition of trust, namely as a ‘leap of faith’ or a willingness to be vulnerable or to take risk. the vast majority of this category quoted mayer’s definition. the lis literature contains numerous examples of the application of mayer’s definition of trust which arises out of research within an organizational and management context and, given much traditional lis is also conducted in such a context, such as in libraries and their ‘parent’ organizations, this level of application is unsurprising. the strong presence of managerialism in the lis context (mcmenemy 2007) may also account for such a finding as it may be expected that researchers and practitioners would select a definition commonly used in this organizational context. indeed, mayer’s definition had, in 2007, been cited over 1,100 times according to google scholar (schoorman et al, 2007, p. 344) and the popularity of this definition across a number of disciplines, including lis, accounts for this strong representation in the period following his initial research and publication. 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 table 2: number and percentage of articles assigned to each of 5 trust categories. trust category: no of articles in category % of total articles 1. trust as a ‘leap of faith’ 68 49.63 2. trust as a component of social capital 17 12.42 3. trust as a component of power-knowledge or truthtelling 0 0 4. trust as defined by another theoretical approach 15 10.95 5. no explicit definition of trust provided in the article 37 27.00 total: 137 100.00 n/a – either the article was unavailable in full-text or the term trust in the title refers to a trust entity, eg. ‘primary care trusts in north england’ 20 in the context of lis research, these studies generally present the trustor, in many cases the ‘user’ or ‘client’, as lacking in expertise and therefore needing to make a ‘leap of faith’, or exhibit vulnerability, vis à vis another individual or system in order to address this lack. several of the studies concerned trust in other people, but by far the majority concerned the trust in abstract or expert systems. this conceptualization of trust in the context of lis research is reflective of what dervin and nilan (1986) identified as a significant move in information needs and uses research from a focus on systems and their embedded authority to a focus on library and information services users and their concerns. these studies acknowledge the trustor as an integral component of the trust dynamic or, as dervin and nilan propose, ‘posits human beings as actively constructing, rather than passively processing, information’ (dervin & nilan, 1986, p. 24). a definition of trust as an integral component of the operation of social capital appeared in about 12% of the articles analyzed. the majority of these articles concern trust in social networking on the internet, or trust in e-government, and it would be expected that researchers in these fields may tend to focus on trust as a component of social and community networking and related activities. it is interesting to note that the majority of these articles were also concerned with information sharing and information practice and focused on trust as an essential element in these activities. in contrast to the ‘leap of faith’ category, these articles primarily focused on trust between people or groups, albeit in some studies mediated through some form of technology. this reflects the conceptualization of trust as an integral cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 65 component of the development of social capital and the trust experienced by, say, the ‘user’ or ‘client’ for the librarian, knowledge manager or information specialist. an example of the application of the social capital approach to trust in the lis literature includes that taken by tötterman and widén-wulff (2007) who identify three dimensions of social capital, namely the structural or network dimension; the relational or trust/identity dimension; and the content or communication dimension. the structural dimension constitutes the social network through which resources are exchanged and form the information and knowledge channels between participants. the relational dimension is the component in which trust resides and refers to communication and trust relationships developed in the community. tötterman & widén-wulff (2007) see these trust relationships between community members as the very foundation of social capital and a key mechanism in generating more social capital via the development of a common knowledge base, especially in the organizational context. here trust is the social ‘glue’ that binds community members and builds social capital both for the individual and the community. in a review of the literature on social capital, bakker et al. (2006) identify two general approaches through which social capital is presented. the first considers social relations equating to social capital so that the more ties maintained, the greater social capital created. the second represented by gabbay and leenders (1999), argues that social ties only produce social capital if they are related to the social goals of the actor. the lis literature contains a wealth of studies describing how social capital impacts on a range of settings including online social ties on knowledge sharing (su and shin, 2010); virtual groups and computer mediated communication (walther & bunz, 2005); social capital and libraries (goulding, 2004) and a range of others. cox (1995) and goulding (2004) stress the positive nature in which social capital is presented in that they emphasize that social capital, as opposed to human and physical capital, lead to community well-being, beneficial outcomes and desirable goals for the benefit of the community. these beneficial outcomes are said to be a consequence of the trust that individuals feel towards one another as a result of their engagement in social networks and this trust enhances the community’s capacity to join together in collective action in order to resolve common problems or to ensure governments address such problems. http://jis.sagepub.com/search?author1=gunilla+wid%c3%a9n-wulff&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://jis.sagepub.com/search?author1=gunilla+wid%c3%a9n-wulff&sortspec=date&submit=submit 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 the finding that no articles in the sample defined trust with reference to michel foucault’s description of the dynamics of either power-knowledge or truth-telling may be seen as somewhat surprising given the recent application of foucault’s theoretical approach to lis research. foucault’s application to lis research and literature is analyzed by radford (1992, 1997, 2003), anderson & skouvig (2006), and buschman (2007) and his relevance and importance to lis practices and methodologies continue to be debated in the literature. irrespective of the debate, hannabuss (1996) contends, ‘it is impossible fully to understand knowledge management in the modern age, and the infinite variety of information gathering behaviors observed in information work, without acknowledging the intellectual heritage of foucault’s work’ (hannabuss, 1996, p.98). such a result may reflect the perception that the primary concern within foucault’s oeuvre concerns the dynamics of power and power-knowledge and, until more recent analyses of his later work such that by luxon (2004) have appeared, it has been perceived as having little application to research into the dynamics of trust. indeed, many argue, like nealon (2008), that, rather than foucault’s later focus on subjectivity representing a significant theoretical shift away from his archaeological and genealogical periods, he never abandoned his midcareer focus on power. that is, that the later apparent shift towards ethics and subjectivity, as suggested in the secondary literature, merely represents an intensification of earlier concerns. just over 10% of the articles analyzed explicitly used alternative definitions of trust to the three forming the focus of this study. the majority of these definitions were more simplified definitions of trust than found in 1 to 3 in table 1 above, such as trust as a ‘belief in another entity’ (mital et al., 2010), or trust as ‘relying upon or placing confidence in someone or something…’ (mcdonald & walters, 2010). these definitions define trust as a belief or a confidence in an outcome and, while presenting a more simplified view of trust than giddens, mayer or social capital theorists, they still acknowledge the role of the trustor and their relationship to the trustee. the studies in this category are generally concerned with predicting behavior of the individual while interacting with data and systems, rather than people, though some analyze interactions with people via online systems. over 25% of the articles in the sample provided no explicit definition of trust and this finding is worthy of more detailed analysis. an analysis of the subject matter of these 37 articles was cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 67 undertaken by analyzing the articles in their entirety to determine the focus of the content or subject area. results are provided in table 3. while many of these studies provided literature reviews, and, in some cases, these were quite comprehensive, the researchers did not provide an explicit definition of trust, despite using trust as a term in the title of their article; including trust as a variable in their research; and referring to trust throughout their research reports. the majority of these articles concerned technology and automated systems and the focus of the research appears to be the technology under investigation rather than the ‘user’ or ‘client’. in the absence of an explicit definition of trust it appears that the author’s assumptions about the meaning of trust are offered instead. as noted, trust was seen to be concerned with the authority or expertise of the information system. the point of view of the trustor, or service or system client, is secondary or absent. table 3: category of subject research area for 37 articles providing implicit definition of trust subject area/content description category number of articles a) trust in computer systems, technical research and implementation 12 b) trust in library or archives services and practice 9 c)trust through website user interface design and development 8 d) trust in e-government 4 e) other eg. trust in using the internet for research sampling 4 particularly clear examples of this are found in article a, which reported outstanding success in the implementation of a secure digital repository and concluded that ‘security is a combination of responsibility, trust and goodness’. here, there appear to be assumptions being made on the part of the researcher or practitioner that trust is achieved by the provision of a secure, authoritative and well-functioning information system, without reference to, or acknowledgement of, their users’ opinions. another example is article b which, despite reporting on consumer’s trust in web-based information, offers an evaluation with no reference to users of the websites. if trust is indeed a variable identified in this study, it seems to be an implied trust in what giddens may define as the abstract system, however no explicit definition is provided so it remains unclear. in other examples, even where ‘system users’ are components of the research, in the absence of an explicit definition of trust in the research report, it is difficult to establish that trust, as originating from a trustor or client is indeed being measured at all. in these studies, trust appears to be used as a surrogate term for 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 ‘authority’ or, as wilson (1991) investigated, ‘cognitive authority’. such authority concerns ‘claims to special knowledge’ which characteristically require social recognition, may be of wide or narrow scope, and are based on reputation and/or performance. chatman extended wilson’s work with respect to authority and information behavior in a range of ‘small world’ settings including amongst janitors (chatman, 1991), elderly women in a retirement complex (chatman, 1992), and female prisoners (1999). ‘small world’ here refers to those settings found in everyday life in which people have little contact with people outside their immediate social milieu. huotari and chatman (2001) investigate authority, trust and information sharing in other settings such as higher education and concluded that authority and trust is strong in ‘small worlds’ but information is not shared with outsiders when they are not trusted. while focusing more on trust in librarians, the library reference service or information literacy services rather than technology or automated systems, various other studies in this category make assumptions about trust without reference to the trustor. a particularly representative example is article c which reported on research in which librarians cooperated with faculty staff to ‘build trust’, relieve student anxiety and increase literary skills, without explicitly defining what trust and its outcomes actually mean. here, it may be that the ability to cooperate or collaborate is taken as an indicator of trust. however, as meyer (1995) suggests, cooperation differs from trust in that it does not necessarily imply vulnerability or risk, thus, while the study may be measuring cooperation or even collaboration, without explicit definitions, it is difficult to determine if they are measuring trust as defined by any of the three perspectives. similarly, article d makes the claim that ‘public libraries have always been valued and trusted institutions in society’ and that ‘libraries have come to earn the trust of their communities’, without explanation of what trust is or how this has been achieved. here, trust is presented as a moral value, with institutions being, to some extent, given human characteristics of trustworthiness, authority and expertise. this example is interesting in that it does recognize the contribution of people to the creation of intellectually-based information systems which take their place in a shared community environment. the studies in this category appear to represent trust through the lens of the researcher’s implicit assumptions that are presumably based on their research experience or professional cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 69 practice, rather than with direct reference to the user or trustor in the context of a trust dynamic with a person or system. with respect to dervin and nilan’s (1986) work, many of these studies focus more on the automated system and its perceived authority and operation, rather than the user of the library or system. the absence of an explicit definition of trust and explicit consideration of the trustor’s role in these studies tends to place greater emphasis on the system and its role in the trust dynamic. trust then becomes a universalized consequence of expertise and of authority, expected as part of a power-knowledge relationship by those who are vulnerable and lack information. conclusions, implications and further research in summary then, this paper offers three contrasting theoretical approaches to trust which may usefully contribute to the researcher’s future project of exploring the role of trust in organizational knowledge sharing. at the center of giddens’s view of trust is a commitment or expectation, through a suspension of doubt, that is learned in infancy and enables the individual to deal with the unknowable in the social context. at the heart of this expectation is the view of the individual as both an autonomous and active participant in the trust relationship. mayer et al. take a similar view of trust and see the willingness to be vulnerable, or take a risk, as an essential element of their definition. social capital theorists, on the other hand, do not focus on a ‘leap of faith’ but see trust as an expectation of regular, honest and cooperative behavior and one that is deeply embedded in a social context. in essence, trust for them is the ‘glue’ at the center of a sense of community. they see trust as operating to seek benefits and advantages, enhance a community’s capacity to bond, take collective action, or to resolve common social issues or problems. further, the individual is seen as an active and autonomous social being participating in social practice which has both a structural and an agency component. in contrast, foucault’s work is largely concerned with the ubiquitous nature of the exercise of power-knowledge and discursive practices, and how these dynamics impact on the subject in society. as suggested by luxon (2004), trust exists in foucault’s later work as a central component of the act of truth-telling where participants in the ancient ethical practice of parrhesia build relationships through trust. 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 the results of the meta-analysis suggest that the trust definitions offered by two of the three theoretical perspectives investigated are well represented in recent lis research. foucault’s theoretical perspective on the other hand, while applied to a range of other lis research contexts, is not represented with respect to trust in the articles in this sample. this may be the result of the perception of foucault’s prominence in the areas of the analysis of power and power-knowledge rather than in the area of trust and/or the impact of the sample selection process. in addition to these definitions, other simpler definitions of trust are also represented in the sample, however, over 25% of the sample were found to offer no explicit definition of trust. more detailed analysis of these studies suggest that trust may be represented by the implicit assumptions of the researchers’ or practitioners’ view of trust, that is, one that is focused more on technology and system rather than the trustor, or the system or service client. the implications of the study’s findings for lis research and practice warrant further consideration. first, the findings have highlighted that, despite the article authors representing a mix of both academics and practitioners, over one quarter of the sample did not recognize a need to offer an explicit definition of a central concept in the title of their research report. while, for some observers, this may not be surprising, it does appear to assume the reader will share a similar understanding of the term trust or, as foucault’s work would suggest, the sharing of a common discourse between author and reader. while this may well be the case in some circumstances, it is generally considered common practice in research to offer definitions of central terms and, in turn, to acknowledge the source of such definitions. the findings suggest that attention still needs to be directed to meeting such expectations. second, given that the explicit definitions of trust identified in the literature all assume, and indeed focus on, the presence or ‘point of view’ of an agent, trustor, or, in the case of lis practice, a ‘client’, the results suggest a lack of acknowledgment of this role or even the presence of this ‘client’ in the information practice described in the research. this suggests that the emergence of a greater client-focus and less of a systems orientation within lis practice, as described by dervin and nilan (1986), may still have a way to go. this metaanalysis suggests a strong need for lis researchers and practitioners to continually re-focus their attention on to their clients and their client’s point of view, rather than make implicit cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.3, 2013 71 assumptions about services and systems based on their own personal or organizational perspectives. what appears to be occurring in these studies is an unspoken set of professional beliefs, values and practices that, on the one hand, assume client trust is present but, on the other, removes the client from the research process by both failing to define trust, and thus the trustor’s role. lis researchers in this category may need to make stronger attempts to link their technical and systems research to the viewpoints and perspectives of end users or ‘clients’ of those systems. placing the ‘client’, or trustor, at the center of the research by acknowledging their role in an explicit definition of trust assists in placing them at the center of the research. that is, the ‘client’ or trustor needs to be placed in the context of a relationship with the trusted person, professional, service or system as an essential component of the information practice being studied. this research forms one component of a wider investigation into the role of trust in organizational knowledge sharing. it follows that the findings suggest a number of avenues for further investigation for the wider project. in the context of knowledge sharing, it would be instructive to undertake further research into the concept of expertise as a component of the dynamic of trust. if, as giddens suggests, trust results from ignorance or a lack of information, it would assist to gain more of an understanding of how expertise is conceptualized both as being embodied in another person and/or by an abstract or expert system. similarly, it would be instructive to expand the investigation of conceptions of ignorance and how individual trustors recognize their vulnerability or take risks, in order to, either consciously or unconsciously, address this ignorance through the act of trusting. the author acknowledges the generous 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(eds.) exploring the contexts of information behavior: proceedings of the 2nd international conference on research in information needs, seeking and use in different contexts, 13/15 august 1998, taylor graham, london, pp.136-149 olsson, m. 2005a, ‘making sense of sense making: information behavior researchers construct an "author”’, canadian journal of information and library science, vol. 29 no.3, pp. 315-334. olsson, m. 2005b, ‘meaning and authority: the social construction of an 'author' among information behavior researchers’, information research, vol. 10 no.2 [available at http://informationr.net/ir/10-2/paper219.html] olsson, m. 2007, ‘power-knowledge: the discursive construction of an author’, the library quarterly vol.77 no.2, pp. 219-240. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/517845 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2fs0740-8188%2801%2900093-7 http://dx.doi.org/10.1086%2f517843 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080%2f00201740410004269 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108%2f00242530710760328 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307%2f258792 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2f0735-2751.00090 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111%2f0735-2751.00090 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/lisa/docview/57617910/13ce6ed312a3dc222f0/4?accountid=17095 http://informationr.net/ir/4-2/isic/olsson.html http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/lisa/docview/57599760/13ce6ed312a3dc222f0/3?accountid=17095 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/lisa/docview/57599760/13ce6ed312a3dc222f0/3?accountid=17095 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/lisa/docview/57617910/13ce6ed312a3dc222f0/4?accountid=17095 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/lisa/docview/57617910/13ce6ed312a3dc222f0/4?accountid=17095 http://informationr.net/ir/10-2/paper219.html http://dx.doi.org/10.1086%2f517845 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, 2013 olsson, m. 2009, ‘re-thinking our concept of users’, australian academic and research libraries, vol. 40 no.1, pp.22-35. olsson, m. 2010a, ‘all the world’s a stage: the information practices and sense-making of theatre professionals’, libri, vol. 60, pp. 241-252. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/libr.2010.021 olsson, m. 2010b, ‘the play's the thing: theatre professionals make sense of shakespeare’, library & information science research, vol.32 no.4, pp. 272-280. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.lisr.2010.07.009 portes, a. 1998, ‘social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology’, annual review of sociology, vol. 24 no.1, pp. 1-24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.1 price, d. & smith, j. 2011, ‘the trust continuum in the information age: a canadian perspective’, archival science, vol. 11, pp. 253-276. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10502011-9148-z putnam, r. 2000, bowling alone: the collapse and revival of american community, simon and schuster, new york. radford, g. 1992, ‘positivism, foucault and the fantasia of the library: conceptions of knowledge and the modern library experience’, the library quarterly, vol. 62 no.4, pp. 408-24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/602496 radford, g. & budd, j. 1997, ‘we do need a philosophy of library and information science, we're not confused enough: a response to zwadlo’, the library quarterly, vol. 67 pp. 315-321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/629965 radford, g. 2003, ‘trapped in our own discourse formations: towards an archaeology of library and information science’, the library quarterly, vol.73 no.1, pp1-18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/603372 rasmussen, c. & jochumsen, h. 2007, ‘problems and possibilities: the public library in the borderline between modernity and late modernity’, the library quarterly, vol. 77 no.1, pp.45-59. savolainen, r. 2007, ‘information behavior and information practice: reviewing the ‘umbrella concepts’ of information-seeking studies’, the library quarterly, vol. 77 no.2, pp.109-132. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/517840 schoorman, f., mayer, r. c. & davis, j. 2007, ‘an integration model of organizational trust: past, present and future’, academy of management review, vol. 32, no.2, pp. 344-354. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2007.24348410 su, a & shin, k-s. 2010, ‘exploring the effects of online social ties on knowledge sharing: a comparative analysis of collocated vs. dispersed teams’, journal of information science, vol. 36, pp.443-463. tötterman a-k & widén-wulff, g. 2007, ‘what a social capital perspective can bring to the understanding of information sharing in a university context’, information research, vol.12 no.4. [available at http://informationr.net/ir/12-4/colis/colis19.html] walther, j. & bunz, u. 2005, ‘the rules of virtual groups: trust, liking and performance in computer mediated communication’, journal of communication, dec. pp. 828-846. widén-wulff, g. & ginman, m. 2004, ‘explaining knowledge sharing in organizations through the dimensions of social capital’, journal of information science, vol. 30, pp. 448-458. willmott, h. 1986, ‘unconscious sources of motivation in the theory of the subject: an explanation and critique of giddens’ dualistic models of action and personality’, journal for the theory of social behaviours, vol.16 no.1, pp. 105-21. wilson, p. 1991, ‘bibliographic instruction and cognitive authority’, library trends , vol.39 no.3, pp. 259-270. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/lisa/docview/853214343/13ce6ed312a3dc222f0/2?accountid=17095 http://dx.doi.org/10.1515%2flibr.2010.021 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/lisa/docview/853214343/13ce6ed312a3dc222f0/2?accountid=17095 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016%2fj.lisr.2010.07.009 http://dx.doi.org/10.1146%2fannurev.soc.24.1.1 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007%2fs10502-011-9148-z http://dx.doi.org/10.1007%2fs10502-011-9148-z http://dx.doi.org/10.1086%2f602496 http://dx.doi.org/10.1086%2f629965 http://dx.doi.org/10.1086%2f603372 http://dx.doi.org/10.1086%2f517840 http://dx.doi.org/10.5465%2famr.2007.24348410 http://jis.sagepub.com/search?author1=gunilla+wid%c3%a9n-wulff&sortspec=date&submit=submit http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.lib.uts.edu.au/lisa/docview/57248120/1413e71a0012e61e8f/1?accountid=17095 representations of the concept of trust in the literature of library and information studies dean leith university of technology, sydney abstract governments and organizations around the world are increasingly turning to knowledge and information sharing as a lead strategy for developing response capacity to address issues in a wide range of programs and policy areas. the sharing of informatio... introduction part 1: theoretical approaches to trust from the social sciences literature part 2: meta-analysis of recent lis trust literature in the light of these three broader theoretical approaches to trust, this study sought to investigate how these perspectives are represented in recent lis literature both in terms of the explicit trust definitions used by researchers and, in studies w... the research article sample was identified by conducting an advanced title search for the term ‘trust’ for the period 2007-2013 in the lisa: library and information science abstracts (proquest) database as provided via the university of technology, sy... a total of 137 articles were analyzed by a comprehensive search for references to any formal definitions of trust. the primary focus of the analysis was literature review sections with corresponding checks in bibliographies for authors cited, however ... table 1 shows the definitions that were used to analyze the articles. table 2 shows the results of this first level of analysis. subsequently, those 37 articles which offered no explicit definition of trust, (ie. those in category 5), were analyzed in... main subject or content area of the research. the findings from this level of analysis are presented in table 3. four of these articles have been identified for further discussion below. these have been identified as articles a, b, c and d, rather tha... table 1: criteria for classification of trust definition provided by article authors findings table 2: number and percentage of articles assigned to each of 5 trust categories. table 3: category of subject research area for 37 articles providing implicit definition of trust conclusions, implications and further research the author acknowledges the generous advice and assistance of dr. hilary yerbury in the writing of this paper. references issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal 2014. © 2014 andrew jakubowicz. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(2): 3904,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3904 ‘don’t mention it…’: what government wants to hear and why about multicultural australia1 andrew jakubowicz university of technology, sydney abstract research into migration, settlement, racism and multiculturalism has been a major theme of the cosmopolitan civil societies research centre at the university of technology, sydney, since its inception in 2006. in this article the author, a scholar with over forty years of research experience in this thematic area, draws on his experience of the interaction between research, policy and politics to argue that independent research that tackles difficult questions can contribute to wider social understanding of complex issues. he demonstrates the impact both of the investment in and expansion of research, and the contrary contraction and deprivation of resources. key research exercises discussed include the henderson poverty inquiry, jean martin’s 1970s study of the first indochinese arrivals, the galbally report, the australian institute of multicultural affairs, the bureau of immigration population and multicultural research, the office of multicultural affairs, the eureka harmony reports, the challenging racism project, the scanlon social cohesion project, and the people of australia report. knowledge and power in multicultural australia the relationship between research and policy has long been a contentious space, in which politics and knowledge struggle for ascendancy in determining the allocation of scarce public resources. for libertarian advocates such as tim wilson, formerly of the institute for public affairs, policy should reflect values, and therefore frame research. writing just before his appointment in 2014 as human rights commissioner by the incoming conservative coalition government, wilson concluded that in his view: 1 a longer and earlier version of this article appears in (husband (ed) 2014). this article appears with permission of the chapter copyright holders. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i2.3904 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 public policy is not driven by evidence, it is informed by evidence. public policy is driven by the political values of those elected to govern. those values determine what issues the government believes need to be tackled, how they then approach it, how they weigh evidence, and the policy solutions ultimately proposed. an ‘evidence-based approach’ amounts to discarding the choice of democracy for government by technocratic bureaucracy, particularly when much of the evidence is financed by government to justify their decisions. (wilson, 2013) 2 wilson’s statement serves by way of peroration to a long narrative about how public policy (in our case, about settlement and cultural diversity) is framed by and then selectively seeks out evidence to reinforce specific hierarchies of power. in australia’s multicultural society the power hierarchy is dominated by the foundation imperial peoples. their interests are reflected in the functioning and impact of the institutions that their descendants and those who support them continue to control. this article explores the process that began to be apparent at the end of white australia, when a concern with evidence and research about australian society drew the bureaucracy involved in higher level strategic planning over immigrant settlement to a consideration of what such research should cover, how it should be done, who should do it, and how it should be used (mackey, 2014)3. the extraordinary decisions taken in the late 1940s and early 1950s to create a nationalistic white australia had a long pre-history, reified in the constitution and the racial exclusion laws associated with the foundation of the commonwealth in 1901. this vision was reiterated most famously by australian prime minister billy hughes in 1921, when he effectively sabotaged the attempts of the japanese to have the visionary league of nations accept a non-racial goal for the post grand war world (fitzhardinge, 1983). the rise of evidence over ideology? white australia, dismantled slowly though it was through the 1960s, was to last as policy into the early 1970s; its final demise would await the election of the labor party under prime minister whitlam in 1972; ironically the alp had once been white australia’s strongest champion. the whitlam government would last a brief three years, facing its end just as the 2 tim wilson wrote this for the australian; he was appointed in 2014 as human rights commissioner. his ipa colleague louise staley has a rather different view where she notes ‘the comprehensive implementation of evidence-based policy will ensure that the public sector has the tools and approach to deliver’ (staley, 2008). 3 richard mackey, director of research and evaluation projects in the australian department of immigration and border protection, advocates the new ‘research and policy dynamic’ encapsulated in the public governance, performance & accountability act 2014. mackey references joseph schumpeter’s concept ‘the perennial gale of creative destruction’ of capitalism, ‘which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives’ (schumpeter, 1976:82). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 3 american war in indo-china was reaching its terminal phase. with the fall of saigon hundreds of thousands of refugees fled for hoped-for sanctuaries. the first major empirical study of the first wave of these refugees was undertaken by sociologist jean martin, but this too did not long survive the end of the whitlam government4. the incoming conservative prime minister malcolm fraser’s government terminated her research, despite what proved to be strong support from fraser himself for multiculturalism, and his advocacy for the acceptance of vietnamese refugees. even so, from that point on the tension between ideology and social science would bedevil the creation of knowledge about australia’s increasingly multicultural society. the return of the hawke alp government in 1983 redirected public attention once more towards the potential value of social science research in the creation and evaluation of public policy, though not necessarily in positive ways. the alp commissioned a review of, and then closed down, the australian institute for multicultural affairs (aima)5, a fraser-era institution under the direction of petro georgiou, just previously senior adviser to prime minister fraser and architect in many ways of the galbally report. aima had been criticised by alp influentials in the academy and civil society for having a political agenda allied to the liberal party, an antipathy to anyone with labor links, and an aggressive mode of interaction manifested most clearly in its director’s personal style. facing rising criticism of inaction over its replacement, the hawke government then created a bureau of immigration research (later to become the bureau of immigration, multicultural and population research). in turn the bimpr was closed down by the incoming coalition government (bimpr 1996:72-80) under john howard in 1996, but this time there was to be no institutional replacement, only a small very policy-focussed research group in the immigration and ethnic affairs/citizenship department. the rudd and gillard and rudd (again) labor governments (coming to national power in 2007 and 2010 and 2013) left this situation unchanged, with the only sign of their awareness of the issues reflected in a raft of inquiries and advisory bodies advocating for some national research framework around settlement and community relations (australia, 2011;2012;2013). yet at the defeat of the second rudd government in 2013, nothing had been put in place. 4 to be published after jean martin’s death as lewins and ly (1985). 5 discussed in two documents from the aima council, council of the australian institute of multicultural affairs (1983) and council of the australian institute of multicultural affairs (1986:7-13; 28-29). 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 despite its perceived bias aima had done one crucial thing: it had instigated a process of interaction and communication among and between its diverse stakeholder groups – from government, through academe, large not-for-profit organisations, corporate research consultancies, and the emergent ethnic sector. while there had been a small social science research community generated by the imperatives of the department of immigration’s recruitment and settlement program, it was really with the advent of the first modern labor government after 1972 that the relation between the academy and the state seriously expanded, soon to be caught up in ideological and partisan arguments over the type, value and use of social science knowledge. the five decades of relationships that have followed the initial recognition of cultural diversity as a feature of public life in australia, have been marked by a volatile fluctuation in the closeness and impact of research, and the trust or mistrust by government of the academy. ground rules while there had been a small but important group of researchers concerned with immigration and settlement from the advent of the post-war immigration program (borrie, 1975) (demographers, sociologists, psychologists and social anthropologists), the first sustained government research into the social and political impact of the ‘migrant presence’ as it became known, was initiated by liberal immigration minister billie snedden in the dying days of the white australia policy. snedden’s department of immigration, well known as a bastion of conservative and assimilationist ideology, was required by the minister to report on the number, extent and operation of ‘national groups’. jim houston, a bi-lingual francophone ex-teacher, was assigned to the task in 1968, and began to tour australia tracking down, documenting and writing up the governance and activities of over a thousand of what would today be described as ethnic community organisations. while houston’s report was finished for some years before it was made available to a select circle (national groups unit, 1974), it created in the mind of the bureaucracy and among politicians aware of its existence an increasing realisation of the size and potential influence of the migrant groups. in 1973 houston was approached by recently appointed alp immigration minister al grassby, to prepare a working paper on settlement issues and policy; reporting directly to grassby and by-passing the department houston produced a game-changing paper, the first to foreground the idea of australia as a multi-cultural society (grassby, 1973). grassby as a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 5 political figure would become inextricably tied to this concept, and its explicit goal of recognising and including ethnic communities in the ongoing conversation about the australian nation. the first main social policy research report that inter alia considered ‘migrants’ produced for an australian government, the commission of inquiry into poverty, was chaired by a melbourne economics professor, ronald henderson, and initiated in the dying days of the long durée coalition government (1949-1972). these studies were not ultimately published until the end of the whitlam government period (henderson, 1975), though they encapsulated the welfare reform agenda that had driven the extension of the inquiry in its full form by whitlam. henderson found that when the cost of housing was taken into account, recently arrived migrant household units had a one in eight likelihood of falling below the poverty line. for an immigration program that had long been lauded as a fool-proof means of introducing fairly low cost labour into the economy, such revelations supported emerging arguments about the role of migration in facilitating a dual labour market, one characterised by ethnic background and english language skills (collins, 1988). henderson referred to the pattern of systematic exclusion and endless self-exploitation of parents and children that typified the life experiences of poorer non-english speaking background immigrants. martin was to make a similar argument about the failure of the education system to deliver on its rhetoric, collecting and presenting evidence that was to be published after the end of the whitlam government (martin, 1978). thus by 1975 government was aware of the role that research could play in uncovering social issues that might well lie below the everyday concerns of the public service, even though such research could present the political leaders with challenges that would appear difficult to address, let alone resolve. the value lay in the role of research as an early alert mechanism, allowing time to develop and implement policies that might otherwise be overwhelmed by suddenly emerging crises. however despite such potential benefits, such research and the research communities around its production often were viewed by both the bureaucracy and the politicians as too risky and uncontrollable. 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 wollongong centre for multicultural studies from 1979 to 1982 my job was to develop the ‘centre for multicultural studies’ (cms) at the university of wollongong. wollongong is an industrial steeltown about 50 miles south of sydney, with a large working class migrant population, and a very limited and diminishing set of job opportunities for women. the city was facing a series of significant transformations brought on by the acceleration of globalisation. women’s traditional employment in clothing and textiles, no longer protected by tariffs, was moving offshore; the residual clothing industry was based on domestically-produced piece-work, known as ‘outwork’ (piecework undertaken by women in their own homes for small payments). the industry was poorly paid, badly regulated, dangerous and highly exploitative. some women had tried unsuccessfully initially, to get work as ‘steelworkers’ at the steelworks, leading to an ultimately successful jobs for women campaign6. meanwhile the steelworks was undergoing major changes in technologies of production, creating significant job losses exacerbated by product dumping by importers and international low-wage competition. these class and gender dimensions of change were further complicated by a sudden ‘racialisation’ of the city generated by the inflow of vietnamese workers produced by the end of ‘white australia’ and the refugee intake in the wake of the end of the vietnam war. racist groups were flourishing, and existing european immigrant groups were not necessarily as comfortable with asian migration as they had been with each other. the university centre would play a leading role in the creation of the communitybased illawarra migrant resource centre (imrc), an agency funded under a commonwealth program recommended by the galbally report. research projects included one on outwork in conjunction with the imrc, which had identified the crisis in women’s employment as a first priority. the project tracked the workflow associated with outwork, from the source (usually a major clothing brand in sydney) through the middlemen to the outworker. at the time outworkers were judged as ‘self-employed’, and were harassed by trade unions, and abandoned by health and safety officials. however in a move ‘outside the square’ the imrc with cms came across an injured outworker suffering from overuse injuries, brought on by very stressful working conditions, and poor ergonomics. a case was taken to the workers’ compensation tribunal; 6 see the news reports on the jobs for women campaign at http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/library/media/video/id/466.world-news-women-at-work http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/library/media/video/id/466.world-news-women-at-work cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 7 the evidence demonstrated that this outworker met all the conditions of being an employee, only that she worked at home. she had no control over the labour process, the price she was paid, or the conditions of employment. the court found that she was effectively employed by the middleman on behalf of the brand company, and they had responsibility for her safety and injuries. within a year or so the trade-unions had changed their position on outworkers, and began to recruit them as members and argue for improving their conditions of work. research and policy under labor 1983-1996 through the 1980s i worked on a number of projects that sought to use social science methodologies to bring social ‘realities’ to the awareness of policy-makers. one of these, ‘equal disappointment opportunity’ (meekosha and jakubowicz, 1987), provoked a considerable reaction from the department of community services, even though the minister at the time sen. don grimes was most supportive. the tension was generated by a complete disagreement over the nature of the research problem: the department was under pressure to adapt to the cultural diversity of australia’s ethnic communities, by this time very much more influenced by the tens of thousands of indo-chinese who had arrived under the orderly departure programs of the previous six or seven years. the department had developed a raft of programs covering everything from children’s services to aged care, and felt that the programs were fine, but believed that ethnic communities either did not understand them or were not willing to use them: that is, there was a ‘migrant problem’ that lay in their cultures and required cultural change among the potential clients. our research on the other hand pointed to the distance between what was provided, and the needs as articulated to us by our community research partners. furthermore there was evidence of structural racism, where procedures that awarded access to services were biased in favour of majority culture clients. the situation was not improved by an atmosphere of funding crisis where the government in its 1986 budget forced departments to reduce expenditure, such that across the board the major service departments all sacrificed their programs for ethnic minorities as their first action. the report’s title came from an interview with a senior public servant, who proclaimed the best that could be hoped for between majority and minority community people seeking access, would be ‘equal disappointment opportunity’. as part of our research contract required the department to agree that the report could be distributed to everyone who participated in the research, public pressure from community organisations finally forced its release. the department refused to endorse the report or act on its findings; indeed we 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 were handed the copyright in the research and the ‘official’ copy placed in the national library carried a statement distancing the government from the findings of the report. the library copy held by the department of immigration and citizenship/border control has been endorsed ‘departmental use only’7. the impact of the research was difficult to assess; many of the evidence-based arguments we made did trickle through the system, and they had purchase for some years over practice. within a short time any corporate memory of the report, its context and its implications faded, especially as department structures changed. within two years (when commissioned for another project on assisted accommodation) we were unable to find any officer within the assisted accommodation area of the department that had any awareness of the report, despite its detailed documentation of accommodation assistance priorities for ethnic communities (chesterman, 1988). moreover many of the issues which we raised were still unresolved nearly thirty years later, remaining on the agenda of lobby groups seeking to advance services for cultural minorities (migliorino, 2013; vamvakinou, 2013a; 2013b). the facilitation and destruction of communities of knowledge the early investment in research under the whitlam government, especially through the poverty inquiry, produced a base line of data about the relationships between various parameters of inequality, including social class, gender, disability and ethnicity, and the challenges for social policy of these often-hidden dimensions. such insights also fed the growth of a more engaged social policy environment, one which sought to empower communities through recognition of both the shared and the specific dimensions of need. the australian assistance plan (1974) and a new cities program (1975) brought together many of these dimensions with a geographical awareness of the concentrated and overlapping effects of disadvantage in specific localities. in this they reflected australian versions of the initiatives developed under targeted urban programs in the usa and canada, and in the community development project in the uk. the interaction of government, the academy, and civil society organisations with local communities produced some of the first modern community organisations. thus in nsw the western sydney regional council for social development, an agency sponsored under the australian assistance plan of the whitlam government would be one of the first to espouse the importance of community development 7 the trove record shows the annotated copy limiting access held by the immigration department library at cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 9 and leadership facilitation among ethnic groups, feeding the process that created the ethnic communities’ council of nsw in 1975, and then the state government’s own ethnic affairs commission in 1976 (to be relabelled after 2000 as the community relations commission for a multicultural nsw). while conservative governments seem to have the greater suspicion of social science research (as exhibited by each incoming conservative government in australia in 1975, 1996, and 2013), the labor party has had its own tussles with the field. social science (apart from economics and demography) as a set of research practices seems to require a quite high level ‘product champion’ in order to gain a place at the policy table. shaver (2014) demonstrates the key role of pm whitlam’s ex-adviser dr peter wilenski as head of the immigration department in securing dr jean martin’s place; as soon as wilenski was removed, martin’s support in the bureaucracy died. under the fraser government (1975-1983) which had sent martin packing, fraser’s adviser petro georgiou, a political scientist, drove the agenda for the galbally committee, and was then appointed to head the australian institute for multicultural affairs (aima). fraser’s defeat in 1983 by bob hawke was followed by georgiou’s departure from aima, a review of the institute in 1983 by a team of alp appointees (including social scientists) (committee of review of aima, 1983) and its closure in a scorched earth ethno-cleansing during the 1986 ‘horror’ budget. the fraser/ georgiou/ galbally trio had been particularly innovative in the field of ethnic and multicultural affairs. labor on the other hand, while not antagonistic to multiculturalism, had no significant product champions, though the shadow minister mick young and his adviser ursula doyle would play key roles in sustaining the bi-partisan milieu during the early period of the hawke government. however, faced with a demand from their prime minister to cut back expenditure, every minister turned to their newly instituted ethnic priorities as a source of savings. this context saw aima closed, sbs almost amalgamated into the australian broadcasting corporation, and damaging cuts in welfare and education. the widespread negative reaction to the 1986 budget debacle forced the government to reconsider its direction on research, producing two new agencies – a bureau of immigration (1989) multicultural (1994) and population http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/18265927?q=equal+disappointment+opportunity&c=book&versionid=21439401 http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/18265927?q=equal+disappointment+opportunity&c=book&versionid=21439401 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 research (1995) in immigration (bimpr. 1996) and an office for multicultural affairs (1989) within the department of prime minister and cabinet. the bureau would hold regular conferences, initiate its own research, and contract researchers to produce a broad range of policy related and wider social research. oma would in parallel also contract specific policy research associated with government priorities. at the time this did not seem to be confusing, as the types of work tended to be rather different. for instance the bureau was more concerned with population and immigration issues (multiculturalism was a later addition to its brief), while the office explored attitudes and values associated with multiculturalism, and how key agencies of the multicultural project were performing (eg the special broadcasting service or the media more widely). besides providing new resources to support academic research, and generating a wide range of publicly accessible data and studies, both the agencies contributed to a flourishing of knowledge, debate and argument around issues associated with immigration, settlement and diversity. if we take the growth in the community of policy-responsive social science in relation to cultural diversity to begin in the early 1970s and fluctuate (though build) through the period until 1996, the election of the howard government in that year marked a serious braking of the momentum. in the name of financial prudence but in fact as the sharp end of an ideological attack on multiculturalism, the 1996 coalition government began to terminate a number of hawke and keating era initiatives. the office for multicultural affairs was closed, and the very limited (and now ideologically suspect) multicultural affairs area moved back in toto to immigration, with its research role also truncated. the bureau was also closed and its remaining acceptable research transferred back to the departmental structure of immigration. the impact of this latter move can be deduced from two key documents, one being the last list of bureau publications, the other being the slightly defensive tone of the following year’s annual report from the department. the final bimpr projects and publications list appeared in its last bulletin (august 1996). key ‘new projects’ included a study of how poverty had changed in australia from 1975 to 1996, led by the recently departed director of the bimpr, dr john nieuwenhuysen, in his new role as ceo of the committee for the economic development of australia. there would also be studies of the impact of immigration on australian cities, the initial labour market cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 11 experiences of immigrants and other projects drawing on the first wave of the longitudinal survey of immigrants to australia (lsia), the only real bimpr initiative to long survive the agency’s demise. the bureau also supported the first study of black african settlement, signalling the arrival in australia of humanitarian settlers from the sudan, and an assessment of the impact of twenty years of the galbally reforms on migrant welfare on civil society. projects that were well underway when the bureau was closed included a 1996 census atlas, a second encyclopaedia of the australian people, a survey of population issues, a century of photographs of immigration, and an exploration of citizenship and national identity. work was being supported on muslim women, homelessness among indochinese youth, the ethnicity of immigrants, and the first major study on religion and immigration. there were dozens of other research projects in the field, illustrating the efflorescence of intellectual curiosity and the energetic engagement with a multiplicity of dimensions of social change, and the vigorous excitement of a multicultural society two decades in from its first acknowledgement as such. one major contribution supported by the bureau was the publication in the pre-internet era of a series of commissioned bibliographies, ensuring the widest possible circulation of research that addressed social issues. central to the concerns of the bureau were the position and experience of immigrant women in terms of health, employment and participation. in all some 21 pages of projects are reported, and hundreds of publications had been supported, as listed on the making multicultural australia site (www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au ). the tap however was turned off very quickly. the 1996-1997 annual report of the department of immigration and multicultural affairs under its sub-program on research and statistics, noted the demise of the bimpr: most activity focused on managing and producing research reports commissioned by the former bureau of immigration, multicultural and population research (the branch continues much of the core work formerly undertaken by the bureau, whose melbourne office formally closed on 15 november 1996); ongoing management of the longitudinal survey of immigrants to australia (lsia) and the release of associated information; production of a range of statistical publications and services; provision of library services; and the development of a business plan to produce a more focused strategy for better meeting portfolio research and statistics needs. (dima, 1997) there was no definition of what might be core, and what ‘non-core’, though the department went on to note under the heading ‘(i) needs of the minister and the portfolio’ that http://www.multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/ 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 the lsia remained the central research activity of the portfolio. it is designed to provide reliable data for commonwealth and other agencies to monitor and evaluate immigration and settlement policies, programs and services, and to provide a basis for the development of future policies. … it is the most comprehensive survey of immigrants undertaken and, because of its longitudinal methodology, it avoids many of the pitfalls and potential allegations of speculative or unsubstantiated research findings that haunt many research endeavours…. the department continued with an exculpatory statement, setting the scene for readers seeking an explanation for both the ending of the research, and its consequences: while no new research was commissioned, the number of research reports published surpassed by 20 per cent the number published during the bureau of immigration, multicultural and population research's (bimpr) final year of operation. this increase was achieved through a combination of the special efforts of staff and the adoption of in-house editing and advanced digital publishing technology. this has also resulted in necessary cost savings. the sub-program finalised and published 42 research reports and initiated a new internal bidding round for research proposals for 1997-98. it also sought to enter into research partnerships with several external agencies to access other research funds that may be available from non-portfolio sources. the closure of the bimpr resulted in a rationalisation of the department's library services and a refocusing of its core activities to meet the portfolio's information needs… the main impact of the closure was to significantly constrain the range of research and the types of issues. while there was a last spurt of material released from the end of the labor period, thereafter the research function of the department (its name would drop the multicultural component in 2006 to be replaced by citizenship, and in 2013 citizenship would be replaced by border control) would contract and lose its overarching concern for the social justice questions that had driven a key dimension of the bureau era. the research population in the academy would also decline significantly over the following years, its communal networks fragmented, and research funding withdrawn. government would also restrict the flow of information, and tie research ever more closely to the priorities of the department in meeting the coalition’s agenda. social justice was not part of the coalition lexicon, though concern about social cohesion definitely was. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 13 theorising harmony under howard at the 1996 election that returned the coalition to power after thirteen years of labor government, a rising rhetoric about national identity, the racial makeup of australia, and the question of racism pervaded the political scene. added impetus for this debate had been contributed by pauline hanson, a pre-selected liberal candidate in queensland, whom howard had to dis-endorse after she made some significant comments that were widely seen as racist. hanson went on to win her seat as an independent, and enter the federal parliament. she then established her own political party, ‘one nation’, which was successful in the 1998 queensland state election to the degree that the coalition lost power there, and the alp was returned on one nation preferences8. prior to the election the commonwealth senate (in an alliance between libertarian and coalition forces) had rejected government attempts to criminalise race hate speech, with the coalition committing itself to a pathway of ‘education’. following its victory the coalition commissioned a market research firm to survey australian attitudes to cultural diversity and propose strategies as to how issues of racism might be addressed. the research was completed in 1997, and on the back of its findings and recommendations, the government announced the living in harmony program, with the key component being harmony day (elsewhere in the world known as the international day for the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination). unlike other research commissioned by the commonwealth in the past, and published for public access, the research reports were locked away under orders of the prime minister, under rules of cabinet secrecy. why was this research, on which a program that would last for over fifteen years would be based, apparently so dangerous? for thirteen years i tried to find out, requesting from minister after minister and parliamentary secretary after parliamentary secretary access to the data. at the time those of us interested surmised that the research would reveal rather too high a level of support for the perspective advanced by hanson, against whom howard was running a wrecking campaign steered by one of his then junior ministers tony abbott, who by late 2013 would be prime minister of australia. despite approaches and freedom of 8 unlike the uk where each mp is elected ‘first past the post’, many australian jurisdictions allow some form of preferential voting, which sees the lower supported candidates having their votes redistributed until one candidate receives 50% +1 of the formal votes cast. preferences prove crucial to most election outcomes. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 information requests from journalists, the reports were never released. then in 2011 the labor attorney general robert mcclelland arranged for the normal government strategy on information (keep it locked up unless it has to be released) to be reversed (make it available unless it has to be kept confidential) (oaic, 2013). soon afterwards a department official indicated that i might like to try again with a foi request: this time it worked. i received the research reports, minus the research brief and the survey schedule, then after a further foi, the implementation strategy and documents associated with the launch of the living in harmony program, including a slightly weird 1998 launch video which sought to encapsulate the research findings (diac, 1998/2012). announcing the commencement of the research in 1996, the new immigration minister phillip ruddock proposed that ‘australia has been fortunate to be comparatively free of the more virulent forms of racism… we cannot afford to be complacent… increasing community awareness through community education is our best viable long-term approach’ (20 aug 1996). with that statement ruddock pre-empted the findings of the research and guaranteed that whatever anti-racism strategy might emerge would not step outside the confines of his ‘education’ template. the findings of the research are important for two reasons firstly to identify why a conservative government might find them so threatening that they would need to be locked away prospectively for thirty years and secondly to identify how governments might want to limit the dissemination of information about society as part of their strategy of political control. essentially the coalition leadership had a number of problems: its lack of firm action at that point on hanson’s more outrageous statements was increasingly painting it with a similar brush, especially in international media reporting; it was anxious to invalidate any allegations by its political opponents that racism lay deep in the heart of australian conservatism; and it did not want to legitimise more extreme right wing claims that hanson’s attitudes were ‘mainstream’. at the same time they were appropriating some of her policies to try to win back conservative voters who had drifted further to the right. ultimately none of the data nor the findings and recommendations was released for wider public scrutiny, nor was its methodology or analysis tested in any scientific literature. nevertheless, the key finding of the research, which was advice not to mention racism and to stress harmony, did become the core logic of community relations strategies from that moment on. thus the government policy that followed avoided issues of racial discrimination, denied that australia was a ‘racist society’, ignored issues of minority rights, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 15 and concentrated on building harmonious and tolerant relations between groups. this approach survived the anti-terrorism panic after 11 september 2001, the bombings of australian tourists and others in bali in 2002, the london transport bombings of 2005, and the summer riot in cronulla in sydney in 2005. however the general focus on wider community relations began to tighten in the face of these global events, towards a specific concern with the behaviour of muslims. by 2006 the howard government moved most of the research funding associated with the harmony project to focus on australia’s muslim communities, under the so-called national action plan. through the 11 years of the coalition rule the level of public knowledge about diversity, which had been so remarkably expanded through the work of the bimpr, was reduced to dependence on a small trickle of uncontroversial research reports, many of which were only released (if at all) after they had been cleansed of any elements that might elicit adverse public comment. social inclusion and social research the long years of conservative control of information about diversity has really only been relieved through the work of a small group of socially-committed scholars. the suppression of the eureka reports had been one trigger for the focus by a sydney social geographer kevin dunn on quantifying racism in australia. he had received some support for his work on islamophobia and local government from the tail-end resource of the bimpr; however he was to depend on australian research council support for his major studies, with another geographer jim forrest, of the extent and location of racism, and its socio-economic and attitudinal correlates. the scope of the work was expanded with the collaboration of yin paradies, a melbourne-based psychologist. they managed to bring together critical social theory about racism with systematic surveys based on matching census profiles. by the return of the labor party to government in 2007 the dunn and forrest studies 9were effectively the only large-scale survey-based empirical work in the public realm. one of the key areas of concern for the new government was the problem of social exclusion, and its implicit response in policy, ‘social inclusion’. the social inclusion discourse was imported from north america and the new labour period in the uk. a social inclusion 9 examples of their extensive research include forrest and dunn (2006a;b). 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 board was asked to develop criteria for social inclusion, and report on the extent and nature of social exclusion. the first board report of 2008 (australian social inclusion board, 2009)10 made no mention of issues of ethnicity or racism, understandably as it drew on existing government statistics and research, none of which had explored this territory for over a decade. the next report (australian social inclusion board, 2012) responded to widespread criticism of this failure by drawing on dunn and forrest’s work, but was able to make little policy sense of the data and findings. the board and indeed much of the government’s research infrastructure, had been stripped of any capacity to consider questions of ethnicity, culture, migration and refugee status, or experiences of racism, as issues requiring some considered and collective response. the new institutional locus for some of this policy directed work was to be monash university. in conjunction with the scanlon foundation, and the australian multicultural foundation, prof andrew markus set in place a long-term project that would track and test australia’s social cohesion, social capital and levels of trust in community, government and society11. this privatisation of research funding marked a new pathway: while the conservative government had cut funding in part to dry up alternative sources of information that were uncomfortable for policies they had adopted, the potential for non-state actors to advance new knowledge marked an important turning point. until this point ‘private’ research had tended to be available only through ‘pay-per-view’ or purchase from market research and similar companies, and thus corralled to businesses and government. under labor after 2007, the quantum of research commissioned by immigration began to grow again, and the department slowly moved to a more open orientation to its commissioned research, agreeing to the release of material and the reporting of research before the full political vetting of previous times had been completed12. usually though the approval for use of research carried a caveat that no recommendations that had not been 10 the closing of the board has removed its reports from easy access: but see australian social inclusion board (2009). 11 scanlon foundation social cohesion research program reports since 2007 are available at http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/mapping-population/scanlon-foundation-surveys.php. 12 following the re-organisation of departments with the return of the coalition in 2013, immigration research can be found at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/research/index.htm, while settlement and multicultural research is now at http://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-and-multiculturalaffairs/publications. http://www.arts.monash.edu.au/mapping-population/scanlon-foundation-surveys.php http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/research/index.htm http://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-and-multicultural-affairs/publications http://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-and-multicultural-affairs/publications cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 17 endorsed by the relevant minister could be floated in the public realm. the department was wary of anything released under its sponsorship that might embarrass the minister13. the coalition government’s multicultural advisory council had lapsed in 2006, and was not re-invigorated by the new government until 2008. the labor minister gave the council a brief to prepare a report on multicultural issues and suggest directions for development. the report, the people of australia, recommended that a research capacity be re-established (australian multicultural advisory council, 2010). it was not until early 2011 that the government, now dependent on the greens for parliamentary support, released its response, and accepted that something would need to be done on the research question, flicking it to the now re-named australian multicultural council (created in august 2011) to define. the amc had done nothing on this issue (for which it was given no resources) by the re-election of the coalition in september 2013. meanwhile two other review reports surfaced, one following on from the people of australia, on access and equity in government services (access and equity inquiry panel, 2012), the other a joint parliamentary report on multiculturalism and migration (vamvakinou, 2013a). access and equity had been introduced as a policy framework and government institutional set of practices in 1984 by the then alp immigration minister chris hurford, to refocus policy on the disadvantage experienced by immigrants seeking employment in and services from the national government; it had waxed and waned in effectiveness over the decades. by 2010 it had become routinized and secured little purchase on the activities of government departments. the access and equity review recommended that 19. that the australian government consider adequacy of current provision for research, including national research priorities, on the practical outcomes of the migration program. this assessment should particularly include research on interactions between the australian government and access and equity target groups and interactions with temporary entrants (access and equity inquiry panel, 2012). the government response to the review produced in march 2013 reflected an increasing awareness of the wider issues for social science research that could underpin robust policy. it supported the review recommendation, and added: 13 one example negotiated by the author was jakubowicz et al. ( 2013), reworked from data but without recommendations presented in collins et al. (2013). 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 australian government departments are considering key challenges in incorporating social science research and evidence into policy development and the government’s future research priorities for policy. the australian government is considering a national research investment plan which provides a strategic framework and a set of principles to guide the government’s investment in research. the plan aims to ensure australia has the capacity to conduct research in areas of national priority and provides advice on the future role of the national research priorities. in addition, the department of immigration and citizenship has an annual program of research into the practical outcomes of the migration program. it is set each year to address priority issues, data, research, evaluation and analytical gaps to inform the work of the department. all relevant research produced by agencies is to be referred to in agency multicultural plans (australian government, 2013) 14 meanwhile the parliamentary report argued a stronger line about the effects of the failure of policy to adequately support and communicate research that might help the migration settlement process to be more successful. in summary it concluded: the reduction in national research capacity has had a significant impact on the ability of agencies to deliver, monitor and evaluate their efforts. the absence of qualitative research also hampered the work of the committee. as such, rebuilding research capacity is a priority to ensure policy and programs are well informed, tailored and effective (vamvakinou, 2013a:10). one of the committee’s chapters focussed on research and multiculturalism, opening with the reflection that the committee heard from a number of sources about the challenge of accessing useful data across a whole range of issues. advocates of research included academics of world standing, state government bodies, and even the prime minister’s office, which complained that its social inclusion policy couldn’t function effectively because data was so poor15. submissions expressed concern about the decline in research capacity, especially qualitative research relating to immigration, cultural diversity, and settlement participation in employment outcomes. (chap.7) the committee then detailed how the director of the community development division of the department of prime minister and cabinet, and the director of the australian population and migration research centre had both expressed concern about the lack of research 15 hundreds of detailed submissions (some of them racist and anti-immigrant) are at http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=mig/mul ticulturalism/report.htm at appendices a and c. http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=mig/multiculturalism/report.htm http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=mig/multiculturalism/report.htm cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 19 capacity and findings, with the latter noting an undermining of research since the closure of the bimpr. the committee supported the access and equity review recommendation, and included some additional ideas: recommendation 14 at 7.31 the committee recommends increased collection, by the australian government, of accurate and up-to-date disaggregated data in order to identify trends in migration and multiculturalism, and to measure and address culturally and linguistically diverse (cald) related disadvantage. recommendation 15 at 7.32 the committee recommends the establishment of a government funded, independent collaborative institute for excellence in research into multicultural affairs with functions similar to that of the former bureau of immigration, multicultural and population research. the institute should have a statutory framework articulating key principles of multiculturalism, functions in research and advice to government, and a cross sectoral independent board. this institute should actively engage with local communities, private business and non-government organisations and provide data for better informed policy. the qualitative and quantitative research capabilities of the institute must enable up-to-date and easily accessible data and research analysis on social and multicultural trends. more dedicated research into long-term migration trends occurring within australia and the social effects of migration—such as the local impacts of migration on cultural diversity and social inclusion within australian society— should be supported. the committee particularly recommends an increased emphasis on qualitative data collection. recommendation 16 at 7.33 the committee recommends the department of immigration and citizenship collect data to support research to collect data on secondary migration in order to better drive services to where needs exist. recommendation 18 at 8.40 the committee recommends that the australian government undertake greater qualitative and quantitative research on australian expatriates, and diaspora communities settled in australia to better inform government policy. the committee recommends that such research should be carried out by an independent research institute in collaboration with business councils, chambers of commerce and community groups. this research could be undertaken by the previously proposed independent collaborative institute for research into multicultural affairs. the committee’s final report was released in march 2013 to an already heated pre-election context, where the financial profligacy of the labor government was a major target of the 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 opposition’s campaign. so while the opposition members and senators on the committee supported all these recommendations, they did so with this proviso: coalition members and senators support … these recommendations in principle, but are mindful that the recommendations would involve the expenditure of new funds. coalition members and senators consider that these recommendations ought only to be implemented if it can be undertaken within existing budgetary parameters (vamvakinou, 2013a:249). the way backward the re-election of the coalition in september 2013 brought with it the expected but uncompromising negative attitudes to social policy and research. its wastewatch committee targeted social science and humanities grants by the australian research council as ‘not a good spend of australia taxpayer money’ (abc, 2013). the arc was to lose $103 million over 4 years in the first coalition budget, with the government declaring that it would mostly come from the humanities and social sciences, with money redirected to medical research. the arc however has continued with its 2013-2016 strategic plan, which does not target the humanities and social sciences16. it is worth considering the implications of such a move were it to succeed. the projected spend for new projects funded by the arc for 2013 in 2012 provides some idea of the likely impact. in the social, behavioural and economic sciences panel, some $43 million had been committed over three years, in humanities and creative arts about $32 million. on a rough basis that is about $25 million p.a.; the proclaimed cuts would break down to about $25 million p.a. that would mean, should the cuts eventuate after the rhetorical impact had lessened, that there would be no support for any new humanities or social science research. given the comments in the reports above on the dire state of research within and sponsored by government, and the current dependence of scholars on the arc for any research that addresses cultural diversity and social justice, the consequences would very be serious. 16 arc website accessed 27 july 2014 http://www.arc.gov.au/about_arc/goals_discovery.htm, where the objectives remain ‘1.1: fund excellent, internationally competitive research by individuals and teams that will produce high quality outcomes 1.2: build australia’s research capacity through supporting and facilitating research training and career opportunities for excellent australian and international researchers 1.3: support research in priority areas that will deliver national benefits 1.4: enhance research capacity and outcomes through support for international collaboration’. http://www.arc.gov.au/about_arc/goals_discovery.htm cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 21 at the time of writing it is too early to assess changes in settlement and multicultural policy under the coalition government. the australian multicultural council appointed by the alp in 2011, and charged with advising on research, was extended until june 2014, and then all appointments lapsed. during its time in office it played little if any role in developing a research agenda. the reorganisation of departments, that has separated immigration and settlement research from multicultural research, has once more created a false dichotomy and fragmented policy about how australian society might keep abreast of what in reality remains a continuous process of immigrant adaptation and integration. multicultural policy reached its apogee in government commitment, rhetoric and support in the late 1980s and early 1990s, towards the end of the hawke administration. since that period the philosophy, the policy parameters, and their implementation have moved between more generous and less generous interpretations of their scope. the rhetoric has however been rather more volatile, subject to moments of inflammatory political opportunism, or driven by perceptions of short-term political benefit. while the building of a corpus of research intensified during the period of the alp government, concluding with a significant investment in research around asylum seekers generated by the report of the expert panel on asylum seekers17, there are signs that new government-sponsored research has come to a halt. in the period of the most recent alp government the immigration wing of the former department released some 24 commissioned studies, while only one, on department of immigration and border protection user satisfaction, seems to have been released since the 2013 september election. unfortunately the department of social services, now responsible for settlement and multicultural research, has restructured its publications page on the web so that it is impossible to easily distinguish between commissioned research outcomes, in-house information pamphlets, and application forms – all get captured on the publications page18. this specifically obscurantist tactic will reduce the value of the previous research and may well ensure its use is limited. 17 expert panel on asylum seekers website at http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/ 18 see web site at http://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-and-multicultural-affairs/publications. the dibp irregular migration research program had one significant iteration in 2013, with the small grants funding halted by the incoming government – see http://www.immi.gov.au/media/research/irregular-migrationresearch/. http://expertpanelonasylumseekers.dpmc.gov.au/ http://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/settlement-and-multicultural-affairs/publications http://www.immi.gov.au/media/research/irregular-migration-research/ http://www.immi.gov.au/media/research/irregular-migration-research/ 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.2, 2014 drawing together the past and present of research on cultural diversity under governments of all political colours in australia, one might well conclude that this occasionally tense but in general productive relationship has served australia fairly well. when research is rich and diverse in terms of topics, disciplines and methodologies, so public debate from the professional/technical to the popular and demotic has been enriched with data, and stimulated by the surfacing of difficult but nuanced questions. when research is suppressed and left as a residual activity on the edge of academic engagement, then the national debate becomes halting, driven by innuendo, momentary debates fed by inter-group flare-ups, and poorly articulated questions of either policy or practice. there is a very real sense in which scholars have both a responsibility and an obligation to illuminate the value that research necessarily plays in shaping public debate, and in hardening the logics that underpin public policy. surely some of such an imperative can be seen as selfserving, since the research field grows as resources are contributed. yet it is also clear that when research shrinks and questions are no longer asked, or investigated with rigour and seriousness, then the society as a whole suffers, evidence-based debate is replaced by anecdote and prejudice; difficult questions of inter-group relations, discrimination, opportunity and marginalisation, not only slide under the radar, but also allow real unease to fester and perhaps turn to violence and conflict, as took place in cronulla in december 2005 in an atmosphere of political denial during a government-fostered research drought19. in the mid-nineteenth century in the usa a nativist anti-immigrant party appeared for a short period. it was known as the ‘know nothing movement’. if i may be allowed to make a comment, ‘shades of back to the future’. references abc 2013, ‘arc wasting taxpayers’ money says hockey’, pm, september 5, at, http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2013/s3842173.htm access and equity inquiry panel 2012, access and equity for a multicultural australia: inquiry into the responsiveness of australian government services to australia’s culturally and linguistically diverse population, canberra. june australia, government of 2011, the people of australia: australia’s multicultural policy, at http://www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/pdf_doc/people-of-australiamulticultural-policy-booklet.pdf. 19 the events are discussed in the award-winning sbs-northern pictures online documentary (2014) 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http://www.mariavamvakinou.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=607:migration-report-committees-house-of-representatives&catid=2:speeches&itemid=3 http://ipa.org.au/news/3013/paternalism-an-unhealthy-threat-to-freedom ‘don’t mention it…’: what government wants to hear and why about multicultural australia0f andrew jakubowicz university of technology, sydney abstract knowledge and power in multicultural australia the rise of evidence over ideology? ground rules wollongong centre for multicultural studies research and policy under labor 1983-1996 the facilitation and destruction of communities of knowledge theorising harmony under howard social inclusion and social research the way backward oren yiftachel, department of multidisciplinary studies, ben-gurion university of the negev, beersheba. corresponding author: yiftach@bgu.ac.il issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 oren yiftachel. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(3):5272. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5272 commentary extending ethnocracy: reflections and suggestions oren yiftachel ben-gurion university of the negev abstract as prelude to the special issue, this short piece reflects on the scholarly origins of the 'ethnocracy' concept, and comments on the arguments made by james anderson's insightful opening article. it then outlines several concepts developed in the author's own work in later years as 'offsprings' of ethnocracy. finally, it answers the challenge raised by anderson by suggesting future theoretical, conceptual and empirical directions for research into ethnocratic dynamics on urban, state and global scales. this special journal issue, devoted to the concept of 'ethnocracy', is an excellent opportunity to reflect on the making and life of the concept some two decades after its emergence in the social sciences and humanities. it is also an opportunity to evaluate the concept's strengths and weaknesses, and assess its ability to shed light on the nature of political regimes and identity politics during a critical transitional period in the world's political geography. in this short piece i will first reflect on the origins of ethnocratic theory, then briefly comment on anderson's insightful lead article, and highlight several concepts and research agendas that rest on the foundations of the ethnocratic angle. to refresh the readers' mind, the term 'ethnocracy' was developed into a comprehensive theory during the 1990s and early 2000s (yiftachel, 1997, 1999, 2006). it identified a particular regime type, which uses a 'thin' layer of (often distorted) democratic practices, but structurally facilitates – explicitly or implicitly – mechanisms of ethnic control and expansion over contested lands. ethnocratic theory analysed critically the causes, content, consequences and different trajectories of ethnocratic regimes. it was developed (after years of being https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5272 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 31 sporadically mentioned in the literature) following criticism of conventional, typically noncritical scholarship describing the nature of political regimes, (e.g. alvarez et al. 1996). it was also propelled by a critique of several key concepts that emerged in the 1990s, such as 'nationalizing states' (brubaker 1996) or 'ethnic democracy' (smooha 1990, yiftachel 1992). these discussions exposed a serious void in existing typologies of political regimes, which consistently overlooked the persistence and often neo-colonial nature of ethnic domination in a wide range of states, even during their so-called 'democratic transition'. while the development of ethnocratic theory was strongly influenced by studying the zionistpalestinian conflict, the concept was developed by using comparative methods, and hence became equally relevant to other regimes facilitating the domination of a particular identity group over others, such as malaysia, sri lanka, northern ireland, cyprus, estonia and serbia. the insightful articles of this special issue, dealing with fiji, australia, lebanon, ireland, the baltic states, sri lanka and the city of jerusalem, vividly illustrate this international relevance. during the 1990s and 2000s, empirical and comparative work on ethnocratic societies resulted in the development of a set of related concepts, seeking to fine-tune the understanding of the logic, workings and consequences of ethnocratic systems of power. these have focused on the impact of spatial, legal and discursive practices on social and political relations, and included concepts such as 'settling ethnocracy', 'ethnicization', 'ethnic religion', 'ethno-class', 'fractured regions', 'trapped minorities', 'stratified citizenship' and 'urban ethnocracy' (see, among others: anderson 2013; murtagh and keaveney 2006; nagle 2009; howard 2012; o'dowd and komarova 2011; renemyi 2011; tuathail, 2013yiftachel 1997, 1999, 2006; yiftachel and yacobi 2000; yiftachel and ghanem 2004). extending ethnocracy in his perceptive leading article, james anderson suggests extension of the concept in three related directions, dealing with 'imperial ethnocracy', 'religious-political ethnocracy' and 'post-conflict' ethnocracy. indeed, such insightful suggestions take the concept into areas of investigation often overlooked in previous work. conceptually and politically, religion is obviously a major mobilizer of identity and politics. the two decades since the development of 'ethnocracy' have seen a significant rise of religious discourses as key platforms of identity 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 conflicts, notably in the middle east, where political islam has radically reshaped previous political landscapes and forms of violent conflicts in key states such as turkey, egypt, iraq and syria. in israel/palestine religion has never been far from the political surface, but in recent years its impact has amplified, often positing a radicalizing challenge to state ethnocratic logic (see also yiftachel and roded 2010). likewise, countless political struggles in africa, asia, and the americas and even in europe have revolved around explicit or implicit notions of religion. beyond its empirical validity, the rise of political religion also presents a challenge to the ethnocratic model in ways unpredicted by the original model. new religious politics often promote different sets of political boundaries and horizons around which power is mobilized and contested. in ethnocratic settings, religious identities often overlap ethno-national definitions to create ‘ethnic religions’, leading to a mutual reinforcement of the two sets of political mobilizations (evident in cases such as lebanon, the balkans, sudan or northern ireland). other times, however, religious boundaries and goals contest state authority and power, particularly when fuelling expansionist agendas, as in some versions of political judaism and islam (see yiftachel and roded 2010). the unstable relations between ethnonational and religious projects, as anderson points out well, add an important dimension of ethnic politics yet to be fully analysed or understood. anderson's additional idea of extending ethnocracy, 'back' to imperial history, and 'forward' to post-conflict settings, is also highly commendable. beyond the obvious interest in the historically changing nature of territoriality and identity, it also introduces the importance of time and temporality as critical analytical categories, often underplayed in the study of political geographies and conflicts (see also jamal 2016; yiftachel 2016). in ethnocratic societies, the management of time has become a tool for preserving the position of dominant groups, through the portrayal of their history, archaeology and belonging to contested territory as timeless and natural. in parallel, ethnocratic time management tends to define the existence of other groups as temporary, transient, invasive or uncertain, hence weakening their claims for recognition, belonging and resources. in many ethnocratic states, territorial time has been colonized by the dominant power, with the effect of triggering resistance, hardening identities and deepening conflicts. on the contrary, in federal, multi-cultural or liberal societies, the recognition of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 33 multiple collective times and overlapping histories have been instrumental in the transition from conflict to coexistence. therefore, even beyond imperial and post-conflict settings, anderson's intervention opens up wide horizons for new research on these timely topics. further horizons in the spirit of anderson's discussion, let me now identify other aspects of ethnocratic theory, which call for further scholarly and political attention. these include (but naturally, not limited to) race, gender, immigration and urban regimes. race is closely related to ethnicity, being a 'biological-like' social and political category constantly changing over time. racial categories have been commonly imposed over marginalized groups in order to maintain social and political supremacy. the similarities and differences between race and ethnicity in the making of political and spatial power need to be further explored, if we are to fully understand the making and maintenance of ethnocracies and group conflict (see winant 2011). this is particularly the case in the current age of increasing immigration and refugee movement, as collective identities are increasingly essentialized. at the same time, liberalization and democratization see indigenous and national minorities reassert their demands, thus further fuelling group boundaries and tensions. gender, like race, is understudied in the ethnocratic context (for exceptions, see mostov 1999; fenster 2005; yuval-davis and werbner 1999). gender is obviously critical to the very making of ethnic categories and the manner in which they are reproduced. gender relations are mobilized both to sharpen the differences between collectivities, but also to shape the nature of gender and sexualities within groups. in particular, ethnic conflict and neo-colonial relations often suppress the struggle over gender issues such as abuse, domination, equality, family structure and sexuality, commonly in the name of serving 'higher' collective goals. the typical ethnocratic silencing of gender issues thus facilitates the essentialization of collective identities and the inability of women to challenge their oppression (see: mostov 1999). but other examples also exist, where women mobilize the struggle to move 'upwards' in the social order, as occurred in the first palestinian intifada or with women mobilization in liberia. research is these areas can add crucial insights to the understanding of the making and maintenance of oppressive ethnocratic systems, and the manner in which 'cracks' in the system have been exploited to challenge patriarchal ethnocracies. 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 two additional areas of research appear to be vital for the understanding of contemporary ethnocratic societies: immigration and urban regimes. the expansion of the ethnocratic inquiry into these areas has already begun (see: porter and barry 2015; roy 2009). using a 'grounded theorization' approach, my own work has explored the changing spatio-political positioning of these groups in rapidly expanding urban regions. while these topics still require much more research, it is clear that ethnocratic and racial logics are critical for the understanding of governance and social relations in today's metropolis. this factor has been underplayed in most critical urban and planning theories with the effect of ignoring and/or misunderstanding major political upheavals (yiftachel 2016). systematic engagement with urban identity regimes has spawned the development of new concepts, such as ‘gray spacin’', ‘dynamic structuralism’, ‘creeping apartheid’ and ‘metrozenship’ (yiftachel 2015). space limitation prevents proper discussion of these concepts, which can be likened to branches splitting from the core of ethnocratic theories, and shedding light on related, yet different, configurations of power, space and identity. immigration, either international or internal, was also previously underplayed in the study of ethnocratic regimes. it has nonetheless become a critical factor in understanding new formations of class and identity, and hence political regimes. the amplifying mobility (of both immigrants and refugees) has been unprecedented in recent years, causing shockwaves to political systems worldwide. the recent examples of brexit and the rise of donald trump in the us are clear illustrations that even in the most liberal capitalist societies, ethnocratic considerations are firmly on the agenda. hence, the current stage of globalizing capitalism, often portrayed in the literature as either (neo)liberal or color-blind, is strongly implicated in the rise of ethnocratic practices and mobilizations. in such settings, ethnocratic principles play a critical new role, by creating new hierarchies of civil status between 'veterans' (typically citizens with full rights), and 'newcomers' (often having partial or minimal rights). the normative and legal foundations of this process are rooted in the putative 'ownership' of particular groups over states and public resources. hence, the institution of citizenship, which was created to overcome feudal or colonial hierarchical systems of privilege and create a universal ‘demos’, has now – ironically – become a foundation of new, often racist, social hierarchies. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 35 urban regimes have become central to shaping these relations as the manifestation of these processes became nearly exclusively urban, with most immigrants congregating in rapidly growing urban regions. this has put in train a process i have conceptualized as 'gray spacing', in which growing groups, areas, developments and economies are being placed, indefinitely, between the 'lightness' of full membership, legality and safety, and the 'darkness' of marginalization, criminality and eviction. this indefinite ‘in-betweenness’ has structurally marginalized large parts of the population, signalling a new manifestation of ethnocratic norms that rear their head in the current age of capitalist globalization and the associated rapid urbanization (see yiftachel 2011; tzfadia 2013). gray spacing has become a hallmark of the new metropolis, and hence the foundation of a new political order. one of the main challenges is thus to explore in new research the interaction of ethnocratic and racist, or alternatively liberal or democratic practices, on the emerging or new urban regimes. given the centrality of cities, the urban order will increasingly become a main battleground for the making of new citizenship and social relations. although states obviously remain key players, the city is where new colonial relations are being forged, where new mobilizations, democratization and/or marginalization are being established. 'creeping apartheid' is therefore emerging as a leading urban political order. the congregation of marginalized, ‘partial’ citizens in major urban centres has meant that many urban regimes are now – knowingly or unwittingly – facilitating this process through a range of structurally discriminating practices and regulations, in policy areas such as housing, land, development and representation. apartheid is 'creeping' because these practices and policies remain undeclared, being justified as ‘temporary’ or as a result of a ‘natural’ market or ‘international’ order. here, the concept of ‘metrozenship’ was suggested to offer a new normative and political horizon to de-colonize the emerging exploitive and often racist urban order (yiftachel 2015). nevertheless, these urban apartheids too should be considered as ‘branches’ of the ethnocratic state, as it attempts to control the tensions between persisting governance structures, ethnic and cultural demands, within the latest stage of global capitalism. these regimes must be further studied theoretically and comparatively to better understand their impact on social relations and political transformations. 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 finally, the connection of ethnocracy to israel/palestine can, and should, be explored more deeply in line with the suggestions above, and beyond. further bold, critical, theorizations of such studies will demonstrate that israel/palestine is not an exception, as is often argued. it is rather an intense hyper-example of processes commonly evident elsewhere, many of which as 'off-springs' of the ethnocratic order which should be further studied, critiqued and resisted. references alvarez, m., cheibub, j., limongi, f., przeworski, a. 1996, ‘classifying political regimes’, studies in comparative international development, vol.31, no.2, pp. 3-36. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02719326 anderson, j. 2013, ‘imperial ethnocracy and demography: foundations of ethno-national conflict in belfast and jerusalem’, in pullan, w. and baillie, b. 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(eds.), cities to be tamed? spatial investigations across the urban south, cambridge scholars publishing, newcastle upon tyne, pp.192-214. winant, h. 2001, the world is a ghetto: race and democracy since world war ii, basic books, new york. yiftachel, o. 1992, ‘the concept of ethnic democracy and its applicability to the case of israel’, ethnic and racial studies, vol. 15, no.1, pp. 125-136. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1992.9993736 yiftachel, o. 1997, ‘israeli society and jewish-palestinian reconciliation: ethnocracy and its territorial contradictions’, middle east journal, vol. 51, no.4, pp. 505-519. yiftachel, o. 1999, ‘ “ethnocracy”: the politics of judaizing israel/palestine’, constellations, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 364-390. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.00151 yiftachel, o. 2006, ethnocracy: land, and the politics of identity israel/palestine, university of pennsylvania press, philadelphia. yiftachel, o. 2009, ‘theorizing “gray space”: the coming of urban apartheid?’, planning theory, vol. 8, no.1, pp. 88-100. doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095208099300 yiftachel, o. 2011, ‘critical theory and gray space: mobilization of the colonized', in brenner, n. et al (eds.), cities for people, not profit: critical theory and the right to the city, routledge, london, pp. 94-112. yiftachel, o. 2015, ‘from gray space to metrozenship: reflections on urban citizenship’, international journal of urban and regional research, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 726-737. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12263 yiftachel, o. 2016, ‘aleph: jerusalem as critical learning’, city, vol. 20, no.3, pp. 483-494. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2016.1166702 yiftachel, o. and ghanem, a. 2004, ‘understanding ethnocratic regimes: the politics of seizing contested territories’, political geography, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 647-676. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.04.003 yiftachel, o. and roded, b. 2010, ‘abraham's urban footsteps: political geography and religious radicalism in israel/palestine’, in alsayyad, n. and massoumi, m. (eds.) the fundamentalist city? religiosity and the remaking of urban space, routledge, london, pp. 178-207. yuval-davis, n. and werbner, p. 1999, women, citizenship and power, zed books, london. acknowledgements i am grateful to james goodman and james anderson for organizing this special issue and for the opportunity to comment. their initiative is an excellent illustration of the value of global scholarly exchange, without which conceptual, theoretical and political progress would be impossible. statement of conflict of interest the author is unaware of any conflict of interest. funding no external research funding was used in the development of this commentary. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1990.9993679 https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1992.9993736 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.00151 https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095208099300 https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.12263 https://doi.org/10.1080/13604813.2016.1166702 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2004.04.003 extending ethnocracy: reflections and suggestions extending ethnocracy further horizons references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 53 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 john robert evans, rachel wilson, bronwen dalton, steve georgakis. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(1): 4232,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i1.4232 indigenous participation in australian sport: the perils of the ‘panacea’ proposition john robert evans university of sydney rachel wilson university of sydney bronwen dalton university of technology sydney steve georgakis university of sydney abstract the argument that participation in sport among disadvantaged populations can produce positive outcomes in wide range of areas has been a consistent theme in academic literature. it is argued that sport participation can promote women’s empowerment, sexuality, lifestyle, peacemaking, youth development, poverty reduction and conflict resolution. similarly, in australia, participation in sport among indigenous australians has been proffered as a ‘panacea’ for many indigenous problems; from promoting better health and education outcomes, to encouraging community building, good citizenship and entrepreneurship. parallel to this has been a focus on documenting and analysing sport participation among indigenous australians in elite sport which often concludes that indigenous australians have an innate and ‘natural ability’ in sports. these two assumptions, first, that sport participation can help realise a wide range of positive social outcomes; and second, that indigenous australians are natural athletes, have driven significant public investment in numerous sport focused programs. this paper questions these assumptions and outlines some of the challenges inherent with an emphasis on sport as a solution to indigenous disadvantage. we highlight how participation in sport has often been tied to ambitious, ill-defined and, in terms of evaluation, often elusive social outcome goals. second, we also argue that there is limited research to indicate that participation in either elite or grassroots level sport has led to any discernible social progress in addressing inequality. we contrast historical indigenous participation in a range of sporting codes to demonstrate the influence of factors beyond the ‘natural ability’ and ‘born to play’ propositions. finally, we outline six ‘perils’ associated with viewing sport as a panacea; including how privileging sport can not only perpetuate disadvantage by reinforcing stereotypes and also contribute to a diversion of attention and resources away from other approaches that have been proven to have a greater positive social impact. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 introduction and background much of the research on sport and indigenous australians has focused on their role in elite australian sport where indigenous australians1 have had a significant presence. in some studies, success at this elite level has implicitly been viewed as justification of the benefits of sport participation at the community level. for example, in reference to indigenous communities, cashman argues that ‘sport was the cement which bound the community together’ (1995, p.34). this argument has its roots in earlier historical documentation and has been supplemented by studies which looked at indigenous sporting issues associated with gender, class, rural/urban divide and various sports using wide and varied methodologies (fredericks et al. 2002; tonts 2005; godwell 2000; maynard 2010). this literature dates back to work undertaken by tatz (1987) and harris (1989) more than a quarter of a century ago, who consistently argued that this focus elevates the place of sport as an institution in indigenous society. tatz’s work explores a number of key themes associated with indigenous sport. he contends that sport has offered indigenous australians opportunities to excel and be recognised in a positive form (tatz 1987; tatz & adair 2009). however popular media has held many sportspeople in awe because of their ability and skill (bamblett 2013; godwell 2000; klugman & osmond 2013). beyond academia it also appears that sport and indigenous achievement have become inextricably linked in the broader australian public psyche. for example, these attitudes are typified by the fact that of the indigenous australians that have been awarded ‘australian of the year’ four out of a total of eight have been athletes (lionel rose, 1968; yvonne goolagong, 1971; cathy freeman, 1998; and adam goodes, 2014). yet this recognition often creates a dichotomy as it does not recognise the activities or aspirations at a community level. tatz makes the important claim that sport can make a significant contribution to reducing youth suicide and improving aspects of health and well-being in many communities (tatz 2012). tatz also suggests that sport offers many roles for community members other than as athletes. the contested nature or dissonance that represents indigenous participation in sport is reflected in the work of kickett-tucker (2008) and nelson (2009) who point out that on the one hand there is the highly visible success of elite professional athletes and the endeavours of local communities; while on the other hand 1 the most commonly accepted definition is (abs, 2012): an aboriginal or torres strait islander is a person of aboriginal or torres strait islander descent who identifies as an aboriginal or torres strait islander and is accepted as such by the community in which he or she lives ... the definition has three elements – descent, selfidentification and community acceptance. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 55 participation in sport for many young indigenous people may be problematic because of the intrinsic competitive requirements and the need to be highly proficient. the importance of sport to indigenous communities and the success of indigenous elite athletes in the australian sporting landscape has been well documented (tatz 1995, hallinan & judd 2009; norman 2012). but, while the situation in elite level sport is quite positive, this is not the case in other domains (tatz 2009; nelson 2009; adair & stronach 2011). indigenous australians account for a small percentage (approximately 2.5% or 520,000) of the total australian population (abs 2012); however, they are grossly over-represented as service users of both the health-care and judicial systems. compared to the non-indigenous population, indigenous australians experience higher mortality and morbidity rates; lower life expectancy; poor education outcomes; low socio-economic status; and poor employment opportunities (see for example bradley et al. 2007; norris 2001; reeve 2012; vos et al. 2009). for example, in terms of education attainment, a significant disparity exists between indigenous and non-indigenous australians. this is reflected from primary to tertiary levels. the difference in educational outcomes between the indigenous and non-indigenous population in the 2012 national assessment program literacy and numeracy (naplan) results is stark. data comparing indigenous students in remote western australia (wa) to non-indigenous australians shows that whereas 92.6% of non-indigenous year 5 students met the national reading average, only 32.3% of students in remote wa met the same standard; this represents a gap of 60.3%. this gap was similarly reflected in writing; whereas 93.9% of year 5 non-indigenous students met the national average, only 34.2% of indigenous students in remote wa achieved this result. the figures do not appear to improve with age (acara, 2012). indigenous australians have also been the subject of a wide range of disenfranchising and marginalising government policies; for example, the white australia policy and policies of assimilation, integration and protection. it was not until 1967 that there was a referendum to have indigenous people counted in the census. in 1991 the royal commission into aboriginal deaths in custody reported on unacceptable levels of indigenous incarceration deaths (beacroft, lyneham & willis 2011). the following year heralded the mabo decision, which set aside the notion of ‘terra nullius’ and introduced the formal recognition of ‘native 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 title’. considered together, these events clearly indicate that indigenous australians have been the subject of profound social, cultural and economic disadvantage. the 1991 aboriginals deaths in custody enquiry recommended, among other things, that sports programs be developed to further social and anti-crime goals. since that time increasing levels of government funding have been directed at sports programs aimed at addressing indigenous disadvantage by attempting ‘to close the gap’. the australian productivity commission‘s 2012 indigenous expenditure report estimates that that total direct indigenous expenditure at a national level in 2010-11 was $25.4 billion, accounting for 5.6 per cent of total direct general government expenditure. of that, indigenous programs for recreation and culture2 for 2010-11 accounted for just under half a billion australian dollars (productivity commission 2012). as a consequence, numerous sport for development initiatives targeting indigenous australians have proliferated over the last decade. some of these programs have been commonwealth initiatives (e.g. the indigenous opportunities policy, the national indigenous health strategy, national aboriginal and torres strait islander education policy) while others have been initiatives of the states and territories (e.g. the nsw aboriginal education policy, the nsw aboriginal health plan, the queensland indigenous sexual health strategy and the stronger futures policy). however, in terms of on the ground programs, many are delivered by not-for-profit (nfp) organisations. in the context of the increasing shift in responsibility to third-sector (nfp) organisations (lyons 2001; skinner et al. 2008), increasingly sport for development programs are designed, implemented and run by nfps, including organisations affiliated with major sporting codes. this significant public and philanthropic investment in sport-based indigenous programs is driven by the view that participation in sport has the capacity to deliver a wide range of positive outcomes, from improved education and health outcomes to broader goals associated with social inclusion and community wellbeing, including promoting a sense of belong, leadership and entrepreneurship. in the australian productivity commission’s review of indigenous expenditure it states that these sport and recreation based programs were 2 this includes expenditure on other recreation facilities and services such as playgrounds, sporting grounds and recreational parks and gardens, and administration and operation costs associated with recreational and cultural affairs and services such as the indigenous community sport and recreation officer program. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 57 ‘vehicles for (re)engaging disengaged youth’ (australian productivity commission 2010, p. 225). according to the stated goals of one major commonwealth government funded program, the national indigenous sport and active recreation program (isarp), the program: contributes to health (by encouraging a healthier lifestyle that includes physical activity), economic participation (through employment opportunities for both indigenous and non-indigenous people such as sport and recreation officers), safe communities (by providing an alternative to anti-social behaviour) and governance and leadership (by funding initiatives to build capacity of indigenous communities to deliver sport and recreation activities independently). (department of regional australia, local government, arts and sport, 2013). in many states, isarp is delivered in partnership with the police citizens youth welfare association. according to queensland’s pcyc website, active sport participation objectives in each indigenous community serviced through the isarp ‘aims to increase aboriginal and torres strait islander social engagement through active community participation’. in delivering the program the pcyc (2014) is also working towards: • building community leaders • creating social connections • promoting healthy lifestyles • supporting volunteerism • increasing health and wellbeing • preserving cultural values. similarly, a report from the closing the gap clearinghouse suggests that there is evidence: in the form of critical descriptions of programs and systematic reviews, on the benefits to aboriginal and torres strait islander communities from participation in sport and recreational programs. these include some improvements in school retention, attitudes towards learning, social and cognitive skills, physical and mental health and wellbeing; increased social inclusion and cohesion; increased validation of and connection to culture; and crime reduction. (ware & meredith 2013, p.1) however, evidence from methodologically strong studies is hard to find and we argue that these claims are overstated. in fact although ware and meredith refer to ‘systematic reviews’, their paper draws primarily upon literature reviews and there are no comprehensive reviews 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 of research in this area that discriminate between studies in terms of methodological quality using systematic review methodology, nor any that conduct statistical meta-analyses. the small number of research evaluations carried out to date have not employed methodologies suited to determining causal relations between sport and outcomes; indeed few of the social outcomes are defined, and fewer still evaluated, within the literature. research carried out by cunningham & beneforti indicated that this was a difficult and problematic area leading them to make the following comments in their discussion: it is evident from the literature review that indicator development relating to outcomes from sport and recreation programs (for the general population and even more so for indigenous populations) is in its infancy. research evidence on the links between sport and recreation programs and various health and social outcomes is also limited (2005, p.96). one of the recommendations in response to the parliamentary inquiry into the contribution of sport to indigenous wellbeing outlined in the 2013 report sport – more than just a game was the need to establish an evaluation framework to assess the impact of sports programs in indigenous communities (see commonwealth of australia 2013, page xiii). this clearly signals that previous efforts to evaluate and monitor outcomes have not been effective. furthermore once evaluation evidence is available this would need to be appraised in terms of quality and synthesised in systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses. overstated claims are also found in the broader international sport for development literature. coalter (2010) suggests that although there is a theoretical logic to some of these sorts of claims, there are also some inherent dangers. these include: 1. confusing potential micro-level individual outcomes with community and broader macro-level impacts; 2. ignoring wider socio-political contexts within which sport-fordevelopment organisations have to operate; 3. seeking to solve broad gauge problems via limited focus interventions; cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 59 4. encouraging mission drift by sport-for-development organisations wholly dependent on aid from a variety of aid agencies, with often overly ambitious non-sporting agendas. (coulter, 2010, p.295) within this context we examine the challenges inherent in the trend to present sport as an area of natural strength for indigenous australians and as a panacea to the challenges they face. we argue that driving much of this faith in the power of sport is a deeply held view that indigenous australians are born with innate sporting talents. ‘born to play’: an overview of indigenous sport participation across major sporting codes any attempt to comment on contemporary indigenous sport issues is problematic without conceptualising the history of indigenous sport in australia. in this section we argue that indigenous participation in sport is heavily influenced by social determinants rather than the racial determinants exemplified in the ‘born to play’ or ‘natural ability’ premises. we argue against the view that indigenous athletes have a pre-disposition to certain sports is based on racial issues. this viewpoint seems to held by a cross-section of society including spectators, coaches, media commentators and academics who collectively propose that the success of indigenous athletes is due to their ‘natural ability’, ‘flare’ and ‘heritage’ and who very rarely attribute indigenous success to hard work and perseverance. typical of this were comments made by eminent australian rules footballer, tony lockett who gave an address honouring indigenous teammate michael o’loughlin and noted: mick had something that was a little different. he had real good skills and he just knew where the ball was going to be. he had something special that players can’t learn. i think you’ve either got it or you don’t. those blokes are pretty rare but it’s more common among our indigenous fellas. they just seem to have the knack, that something different. hallinan & judd note that, as evident in lockett’s comment, indigenous australians ability to achieve in sport is often seen as: due to a set of “unique” prescribed characteristics and traits determined biologically in their ‘aboriginal genes and culturally in their “aboriginal” knowledge 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 the abilities and talents of aboriginal players are not seen as an outcome of perseverance and dedication.… but in terms of racial and cultural determinates (2009, p.2369). we argue that socio-cultural factors are highly influential and in order to support this standpoint we will use pertinent examples related to the sports of rugby league, australian rules football, cricket and rugby union. these are all prominent australian sporting codes which provide contrasting historical and current levels of indigenous participation. we contrast the stories of growth in indigenous participation in australian rules and rugby league football, with those of rugby union and cricket where indigenous engagement is much lower. australian rules football and rugby league the football codes (rugby league and australian rules football) are sports where indigenous athletes have clearly had a significant presence. in various indigenous communities around australia, especially in west australia and the northern territory, australian football league (afl) is the premier sport for males, while in queensland and nsw rugby league is popular. the sydney morning herald notes that there were indigenous athletes playing australian football in 1860 in a team referred to as the ‘gippsland blacks’ (12 june 1860, p.13). while this demonstrates that indigenous athletes were playing afl just two years after the sport was codified in australia, their presence in the sport from 1860 up until the early 1980s was minimal. gardiner (1997) estimated from the establishment of the victorian football league (vfl) in 1890 until 1980, there were fewer than 25 indigenous players. this all changed exactly 20 years ago after the nikky winmar racism incident (klugman & osmond 2009) where winmar responded to racial vilification by raising his jumper and pointing to the colour of his body. this ‘proud and defiant act’ (gardiner 1997, p.10) sparked widespread awareness about the role of indigenous players in the game and resulted in the afl reaching out to indigenous athletes and communities to be a part of the sport. this policy resulted in an unprecedented growth of elite level afl players. while up until 1980 there were fewer than 25 indigenous players in the vfl, in 2012 there were 79 registered players or 11% of the total number of registered afl players (afl players association 2013). this historic rise of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 61 indigenous representation in afl is related to the sports openness to inclusion rather than biological race issues. the afl’s recent support of indigenous participation is perhaps best reinforced by an incident in 2008 when the afl celebrated its 150th anniversary. hibbins (2008) produced a history of the code which noted that afl had no links to indigenous ball games, such as ‘marn-grook’; that is that afl had no indigenous influence. this analysis by hibbins (2008) generated heated debates because it occurred at a time when the afl embarked on a process of becoming a national sport and the afl was attempting to link itself to australia’s indigenous history and thus reinforce its aspirations to be the national sport. as such, afl had for some time positioned itself as a sport which evolved from the original inhabitants of the land, not from the british such as other football codes rugby league and rugby union. hallinan and judd suggest the use of indigenous players to promote the sport arose from a desire to present the ‘relationship between aboriginal australia and the australian game of football as one of amiable historic continuity’ (2009, p.2363). in 1990 the vfl became the national football league and, by 2013, the link between the sport and indigenous culture was clear and evident with the indigenous round, dreamtime at the ‘g’ as well as the playing roster; which included more than 80 indigenous players, more than 10% of the total number of players. while it has been suggested that indigenous participation in afl is attributable to ‘a sixth sense’ or ‘natural athletic ability’ (hallinan, bruce, & burke, 2005), we argue that these participation rates reflect aggressive recruitment and talent identification programs conducted by the afl. the afl conducts a number of indigenous specific initiatives. the qantas afl kickstart program for example funds specific development programs for aboriginal communities in the nt, northern queensland and north western australia; the ‘flying boomerangs’ program is another leadership program which culminates in a certificate 2 qualification in indigenous leadership; while there is also a national youth girls championship. in addition, the afl conducts visits to aboriginal communities, establishes and supports junior football competitions, conducts coaching and umpiring clinics and provides educational scholarships to colleges in the nt. there is no doubt that the afl has a strong link to the indigenous community and in most indigenous communities outside of nsw and queensland, australian rules football is the sport of choice. the afl has permitted the entry of indigenous athletes into the sport, not only for the sake of improving 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 indigenous and non-indigenous relations, but because of their perceived ‘natural athletic ability’ (hallinan, bruce & burke 2005). rugby league has also been another football code where there has been a distinct indigenous presence. in the 2011 rugby league national census, indigenous australians made up 3.39% of committee members at registered clubs, 5.8% of all registered rugby league players, 8% of national toyota cup players, 12% of nrl players, 21% of state of origin players and 35% of the australian national team. moreover, 8,830 males and 532 females were listed as playing organised rugby league in 2012 (arlc 2012). the history of the indigenous presence in rugby league is often misunderstood even though there are a number of accounts (hartley 2002; o’neill 2005). the documentation of indigenous rugby league players has for the most part reinforced the notion that indigenous athletes were discriminated against, although this fails to locate this discrimination in a wider sporting context. typical of this was the work undertaken by hartley who argued that the redfern all blacks rugby league football club ‘provided the indigenous community of redfern with a vehicle of resistance to depressed socio-economic conditions, to racial discourses and to discrimination’ (2002, p.149). established in 1944 and playing in the south sydney district junior rugby football league, the club flourished in a time when the official policy of assimilation was at its peak. the club was one of the many which existed in the south sydney district and included redfern united and la perouse united. the club played in the mainstream south sydney junior competition in a game which was anglo-celtic in origin. there is no doubt that the redfern all-blacks had confronted racism and there is no doubt that hartley’s (2002) analysis is correct that rugby league was not a crucible of tolerance. what hartley and other contemporary scholars overlook is that even though this racism occurred in rugby league itself, the code had allowed indigenous teams and players into competition; a situation which did not occur in other sporting codes or in other political and economic domains. so advanced were relations in rugby league (compared to other domains) that by 1973, an indigenous player, arthur beetson, captained the national team (cottle & keys 2010). this link between indigenous culture and rugby league continues to the present day. not only is there a significant presence of indigenous rugby league players in the nrl, there are a number of indigenous rugby league teams and competitions. indigenous teams all come cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 63 together in the annual ‘indigenous rugby league knockout carnival’ (norman 2012). this knockout carnival is the largest gathering of aboriginal people in australia, and has a deep significance to the indigenous community (norman 2009, 2012). it has been posited that this event is a contemporary cultural practice providing opportunities for congregation and competition. in 2010 a landmark in indigenous rugby league occurred when the indigenous all-stars game was inaugurated. at this annual clash, an australian indigenous team (the indigenous all stars) plays a non indigenous team (the australian all stars) (arlc, 2012). rugby union and cricket while the section above demonstrated that the presence of indigenous athletes is clearly linked to those sports that have allowed their inclusion, there are a number of sports which have not been as inclusive and have a limited indigenous presence. these sports show that the link between participation and lack of participation is based on the philosophy of the sport rather than racial or other issues. the sports of rugby league and rugby union share many aspects in common. in 2013, former rugby league international israel folau was able to make a strong transition to rugby union, starring for the wallabies in the tests against the irish and british lions. in fact for more than a century there has been a steady stream of rugby union players transferring their allegiances to rugby league (howitt 2008). while these two football codes are very similar, the presence of indigenous athletes in rugby union is minimal (tatz 2012). the lack of indigenous presence has been linked to issues related to class, that is rugby union is an exclusive sport played in the private school system, although this thesis is not supported as it does not explain the strong presence of polynesians in rugby union (zakus & horton 2009). we argue this is more related to indigenous athletes being excluded from the game of rugby union. the elitism of rugby union is manifest in a number of different ways. writing the history of the mosman rugby union football club, hewitt set the tone of his book by noting ‘mosman had come far in just 60 years when only a few docile aborigines inhabited its bushy foreshores’ (hewitt 1996, p.1). in fact there is no substantive indigenous presence until the appearance of the first national player, lloyd mcdermott, who played for the wallabies in 1962. mcdermott, who received a scholarship to attend the anglican church grammar school, was introduced to rugby union at this school (tatz 1995). mcdermott would be the 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 last national representative until the appearance of the matraville high school educated ella brothers who in 1977 represented the australian schoolboys. apart from the sporadic appearances of the players mentioned above, there has been very little attempt by the rugby union fraternity to link up with the indigenous communities. there is one exception to this and this is the work that has been undertaken by the lloyd mcdermott foundation, which has expressed a commitment to increasing participation rates for aboriginal men and women in rugby union. the foundation organises rugby competitions for aboriginal youth, and provides coaching and skill development clinics (australian rugby union 2013). in comparison to the work undertaken by rugby league and afl this is a small venture. it is also clear that rugby union have not reached out to indigenous communities with the same success. the sport of cricket provides another relevant example in the contemporary australian landscape; it is a sport which has currently no significant indigenous presence. this was not the case in the 1800s when indigenous participation in the sport was comprehensive. it is not well-known that the first australian cricket team to tour britain was the indigenous team which toured england in 1868 (farquharson & marjoribanks 2006; gemmell 2007; mallett 2002; maynard 2009). the team played 47 matches throughout england, winning 14, losing 14 and drawing 19 (mallett 2002; whimpress 1999). the first non-indigenous team to tour occurred more than a decade later in 1878. the playing of cricket by indigenous people took place very early in australian colonial history because the british believed that the playing of this sport would ‘civilise’ indigenous youth and hence it was popular in missions. the best example of this is the cricket which took place at poonindie by reverend hale in the 1850s, where indigenous teams played against non-indigenous teams. consequently the history of australian cricket is full of indigenous athletes playing in the mid to late 1800s. players such as johnny mullagh, twopenny, king cole and johnny cuzens are among the indigenous names that feature prominently (mallett 2002). however this all changed in 1901, when indigenous australians were excluded from mainstream activities by the white australia policy and overnight indigenous australians stopped playing cricket. since that period there has only being one indigenous player, jason gillespie, to represent australia in test cricket. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 65 in spite of the well documented indigenous cricket history, the dominant arguments for the low participation levels of indigenous people in the sport have typically centred on the accessibility of cricket to the indigenous community. richardson exemplifies this idea in his suggestion that ‘sports like cricket and swimming are not as accessible as they require more equipment or specialized facilities’ (2012, para. 10). until recently australian cricket has predominantly comprised players from an anglo-celtic background and cricket authorities have had limited engagement with indigenous athletes and communities. history demonstrates that indigenous australians have experienced success in sports that they have been encouraged to participate in. the high participation rates of indigenous players in afl and rugby league, and the underrepresentation of indigenous players in cricket and rugby union, are evidence of this. this is consistent with international research which dispels many of the racial and biological ‘natural strength’ and ‘born to play’ assumptions (see for example: pitsiladis, bale & sharp 2006; stone, perry & darley 1997). regrettably these research findings have not been widely disseminated or acknowledged within australian sporting communities. despite important academic insights into the racial and social dynamics of sport (adair & stronach 2011; godwell 2000), research has made little impact in discussions related to indigenous sport in australia. many continue to justify programs on the basis of the’ natural strength’ and ‘born to play’ propositions. for example, robert de castella justifies his ‘indigenous marathon project’ on the claim that indigenous australians have higher proportions of slow-twitch muscle fibers; while mccallister (as cited in adair, 2012) justifies his program on the basis of indigenous people having a higher proportion of fast-twitch fibers. both views have been discredited by recent research related to race and sport. the perils of ‘sport is the panacea’ proposition the ‘natural strength’ and ‘born to play’ premises and a range of other factors have conspired to produce policy which reflects faith in the power of sport as a panacea to all dimensions of indigenous disadvantage. increasing budgets, overstated claims and a distinct lack of evidence now characterise the scene. we know that sport is a valued institution in indigenous society; we also know, undisputedly, that sport and physical activity is helpful in promoting physical health – and to a lesser degree mental health. there are also theoretical foundations 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 for linking sport to broader social outcomes. these provide strong foundations for the development of sport programs and the potential for them to deliver positive outcomes. however, in the absence of a strong body of evidence to support these programs, particularly in relation to social outcomes, we need to ask whether there are also risks associated with the promotion of sport as a panacea. we now outline six perils, or risks, associated with the panacea position: the reinforcement of stereotypes; disparities in relation to indigenous youth health; promotion of only a particular type of athlete – seen but not heard; the positioning of sport as the only way to the top; the intrusion of corporate social responsibility (csr) and nfp agendas; and the diverting of attention from the day to day realities of indigenous australians. reinforcing of stereotypes indigenous athletes have been highly successful in a narrow field of sports, such as rugby league and australian rules football, as noted above. there are a number of reasons for this discussed in the literature and these are summarised as the following: there is possibility for professional careers in these sports; these sports are easier to access and cheaper compared to rowing, skiing, cycling and tennis where you need specific facilities (courts, snow) and equipment (racquets, bike); these sports are traditionally classless, unlike rugby union, cricket and tennis; these sports have an increasing number of indigenous role models; and these sports have a mass following and are mainstream sports (tatz, 1995; tatz & tatz 2000; maynard 2012; tatz & adair 2009; tonts 2005; atherley 2006). this paper has argued that indigenous athletes succeeded in the sports where they were encouraged to participate. this is perhaps best typified by the example of afl, where the current player roster has more than 10 per cent representation of indigenous players despite the fact that earlier in the vfl there were fewer than 30 players in almost a century of competition. there is considerable research (hallinan & judd 2009; cottle & keys 2010; adair & stronach 2011; hallinan et al. 1999; hallinan & judd 2012) to suggest that the success of indigenous australians in male contact sports such as australian rules football and rugby league simply reinforces stereotypes. that is, their success in these sports is based on their predisposition to excel because they are genetically superior to other races. athletes such as anthony mundine, cathy freeman and michael long have had success in the sporting arena, and whilst their prominence has lifted the profile of indigenous sportsmen and women, the inclusion and participation of indigenous athletes in professional sport has provided cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 67 ‘evidence of the persistence of racialised thinking’ (hallinan & judd 2009, p.1229). oftentimes prominent indigenous athletes are portrayed, by the media and sporting organisations alike, as symbols of what is perceived by white australia to be the continued progression of race relations in this country; whilst simultaneously being undermined by a common belief in genetic predisposition towards kicking ‘the freak goal’ or doing ‘the magical stuff’ (tatz 2012; hallinan & judd 2009, p.1228). such belief is routinely reinforced by the everyday thought of many managers, coaches and especially journalists (hallinan & judd 2009). success in sport could be a type of hegemony contributing to the malaise. further to this, we can assess how the practices of certain sporting leagues have acted to simply confirm colonial marginalisation and stereotypes through the positioning and responsibility given to those indigenous people who play or are otherwise involved in the sport (tatz 2012). in many cases, there is a significant and noticeable lack of indigenous officials placed within coaching and administration staff, whilst the indigenous athletes often characterised by speed and agility – were found to be commonly assigned positions that relied on athletic ability and not leadership and intellectual skills, which further solidifies stereotypes of indigenous inadequacies (hallinan & judd 2009). the over-representation of indigenous athletes reinforces the idea that aboriginal people are ‘only good at sport’ and that it is ‘not an aboriginal thing to be smart’ (sarra 2005, p. 11). more focus needs to be placed on a wider range of role models to dissolve the illusion that indigenous australians ‘are either good athletes or good artists’ (sarra 2005, p.6). although these successful athletes provide a positive representation of indigenous australians, a wider range of indigenous role models need to be acknowledged. stereotypes of success in sport also reinforce the view that they are a homogenous group. furthermore, all indigenous people are expected to possess the physical capabilities and talents of these athletes and thus there is pressure to meet society’s ideals and expectations which are reflected in these stereotypes. disparities with indigenous youth health issues while indigenous youth are over-represented in some sports, their health outcomes are poor. indigenous youth (aged between 15 and 24 years) were more likely to be overweight or obese than non-indigenous youth (37% and 27% respectively), and twice as likely to be obese (15% and 6% respectively). only one in twenty (5%) of indigenous youth living in non-remote areas met both the daily recommended serves of fruit and vegetables; significantly lower than the rate for non-indigenous youth (abs 2011-2012 national aboriginal and torres strait 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 islander health survey). this is largely attributable to the lower levels of fruit consumption among indigenous young people, where fewer than 20% met the guidelines for fruit consumption compared and only 15% who meet the guidelines for vegetable consumption. for indigenous australians, ‘being overweight or obese, being physically inactive and consuming a diet low in fruit and vegetables have been estimated to contribute to the high rates of cardiovascular disease, diabetes and chronic kidney disease experienced by australia’s indigenous people’ (australian institute of health and wellbeing, 2012, p.1). further, indigenous youths were 10 times as likely to have a sexually transmissible infection, six times more likely to become teenage parents, and three times as likely to be daily smokers. herein lies the paradox of the sporting panacea; given the proven links between sport, physical activity and improved health outcomes (janssen & leblanc 2010; janz et al. 2010; blair & morris 2009), it would be anticipated that indigenous sporting participation would lead to improved health outcomes. while there is some evidence that indigenous sports participation is associated with higher general and mental health rates (dalton, wilson, evans & cochrane 2014) and it is undoubted that sport and physical activity is instrumental in wellbeing, it is also clear that there has been little change in the health status of indigenous australians (australian institute of health and wellbeing 2012) despite grassroots programs, like nasca, being active in indigenous communities for more than ten years. we are yet to see comprehensive evidence of their effectiveness (australian council for educational research 2011, commonwealth of australia 2013). coulter, commenting on the sport for development movement, points out the dangers of ‘confusing potential micro-level individual outcomes with community and broader macrodevelopment impacts’ (2010, p.295). thus one issue to address is the clarity with which programs, evaluations and claims distinguish between individual and community-based outcomes. there is a risk that the panacea approach promotes the ‘micro’, individual success stories, while neglecting the ‘macro’ statistics regarding indigenous society. promotion of only a particular type of athlete in the opportunities indigenous people have had to participate in mainstream sport, they have been required to ‘tread a delicate path’ (malcolm 2007, p.1). to be accepted into mainstream australian society, indigenous athletes have been forced to simultaneously deny and celebrate their aboriginality (malcolm 2007; tatz 1995). that is, australians seem to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 69 embrace indigenous participation as an indication of improving race relations in australia. however, when these athletes express political sentiments or ‘have a voice’ they are criticised and labeled ‘un-australian’. in 1994, cathy freeman was heavily criticised for performing a lap of honour at the commonwealth games with the aboriginal flag draped around her shoulders. critics chastised her for politicising her sport, and deemed her behavior ‘unaustralian’. anthony mundine has faced a similar predicament. while revered when winning boxing bouts, mundine has faced significant criticism for speaking out about indigenous issues. notably, in october 2012, mundine appealed for a change of national anthem, as he believed ‘it was the theme song for the white australia policy’. finally nicky winmar’s protest to racist taunts in 1993 elicited this response from the then president of the collingwood football club: aboriginal people would be respected ‘as long as they conducted themselves like white people’, confirming the notion that aboriginal athletes should be seen and not heard.these incidents highlight the tenuous relationship between indigenous australians and elite sport – athletes are widely accepted and even celebrated when they are passive and apolitical, however they are condemned when they seek to highlight the historical inequities that have plagued the aboriginal condition. sport: the only way to the top it is rare for media to expose or promote indigenous people who have succeeded outside of the ‘sport’ arena, such as displaying academic success among indigenous cultures, for example kath walker, poet, or neville bonner, politician. this strengthens the notion that indigenous people are only successful in one area of society, ‘sport’, as we do not see or hear about other great things indigenous people may be successful in. this pigeon-holes indigenous cultures and therefore limits their opportunities/success among other potential professions, as there are limited role models of indigenous lawyers, nurses, doctors or teachers to break the stereotypical characteristics of indigenous people. as godwell questions, ‘the success of many aboriginal…athletes stand as a testament to individual skill and fortune. but can these efforts also be cited as evidence of indigenous peoples making gains in all aspects of their lives?’ (2000, p.13). godwell (2000) maintains that indigenous people subsequently ‘run the risk of being typecast in life as sportspeople’ (2000, p.16). thus, this emphasis on sport can limit indigenous children’s life aspirations as it can influence them to pursue sporting careers rather than other educational and career opportunities. while a significant number of indigenous athletes are 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 found in professional sport, this only represents a fraction of the total indigenous population. not only this, but most of these athletes are male. therefore there is a significant issue with the messages that arise from presenting sport as the remedy to the ills affecting the indigenous condition; not only does this disenfranchise indigenous youths who dislike sport or who do not have the potential to play at an elite level, it also presents sport as the only option for a better future. in marginalising indigenous australians into this narrow category of being, achievement in other domains, such as education, the arts or business is neglected. it also means that over time indigenous youth adjust their aspirations to their perceived chances of success. for indigenous communities sport is presented as the pathway to success. the experience of black americans warns us that there is a danger in pursuing such a focused approach (hoberman 1997). intrusion by corporate social responsibility (csr) and not-for-profit (nfp) agendas as part of a wider process of mainstreaming the delivery of indigenous social services, including many sport related community development programs, increasingly sport for development programs are delivered by not-for-profit (nfp) organisations, including organisations affiliated with major sporting codes (altman 2004; mccausland 2005). kidd also notes the role of nfp organisations auspiced by high profile olympians seeking to ‘give something back’ (2008 p.372). the increase in social responsibility activity by high profile athletes, such as ian thorpe and cathy freeman through their respective foundations, are cases in point. with this, the allocation of substantial public funding to non-governmental organisations marks a significant paradigm shift; according to houlihan and white, to the ‘service paradigm of sport for development (2002, p.218). like initiatives of government, few sport programs are evidence based. this is partly due to lack of sufficient evidence but also ongoing deficiencies in evaluation capacity within nfp organisations. this is more than a resourcing issue. in many cases, investment in evaluation has failed to compete with other nfp organisations’ priorities. as noted above there is a distinct lack of evidence that links sport participation among indigenous peoples to positive health, social and education outcomes. part of the evidence gap is due to a lack of basic data. the human rights and equality opportunity commission report notes the inconclusive nature of existing data arguing that: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 71 while there is a plethora of information available on the general number and characteristics of australian people who participate in sport and recreational activities (including age, gender, frequency and type of participation), very little data focuses on the ethnic or cultural background of participants’. (oliver 2006, p.19) little has been invested in rigorous evaluation. as much of the literature suggests, there is a lack of monitoring and adequate evaluation of the effectiveness of the expanding nature of sport for development programming (coalter 2010; donnelly, atkinson, boyle & szto 2011; levermore 2011). when evaluations are undertaken, often nfps are conflicted, seeking to prove the efficacy of their programs to ensure ongoing funding. then there is the issue of over-claiming the benefits of the programs at the outset. expectations regarding the impact of participation in sport are often high, vague and very broad. to take just one example, a research project commissioned by the australian sports commission (asc) and laureas sport for good foundation and conducted by the university of queensland academic, found that ‘learning to surf builds self-esteem of indigenous youth and enhances community connections’ (australian sports commission 2012). having such ambitious (and arguably tenuous) outcomes, for example empowerment or good citizenship, is technically challenging if not impossible to measure. as some scholars argue, such broad outcomes are difficult to measure in particular when nfps conduct their own evaluations (levermore 2011). houlihan & white explain that: given that so much of sports development activity is directed towards the achievement of complex social outcomes, such as safer communities and social inclusion, it will be difficult to identify indicators which provide valid evidence of specific contribution that sports development is making to social outcomes (2002, p. 214). as a result many nfps have uncritically adopted sport as a useful and appropriate instrument for meeting health, education and other broader ‘empowerment’ goals. with the lack of empirical and scientific claims to effectively evaluate the efforts of ngos, scholars critique the political and economic environment that substantiates the new focus on entrepreneurship (coalter 2010; darnell 2007; darnell & hayhurst 2011; donnelly, atkinson, boyle & szto 2011; kidd 2008; levermore 2011). 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 in the case of nfps associated with major sporting codes, many seek funding from large corporations. in this way, some major sporting codes have characterised their investment in indigenous sporting initiatives in terms of corporate social responsibility (csr). arguably these account for the largest non-government investment in indigenous programs in australia. investment in community sport programs provides an opportunity to contribute to individuals and communities but also has the added advantages of giving particular sporting codes the opportunity to identify and recruit sporting talent and serve to perpetuate their public image as a provider services to marginalised indigenous youth. again, these sorts of interest risk compromising the development of a rigorous evidence base for the effectiveness of programs in terms of community outcomes. the value of private and nfp managed investment in these programs may go unquestioned, or only superficially examined. conclusion while sport certainly plays an important role in indigenous communities, we must be wary of presenting sport as a panacea for the issues plaguing indigenous communities. in this paper we have examined how current perspectives are often built upon ‘natural talent’ and ‘born to play’ premises. these premises are not supported by the history of australian sporting codes, nor by international research. sports stars can be excellent role models and sporting programs clearly yield significant benefits for indigenous people; however if we tie sport too closely to indigenous success, then not only are we disenfranchising indigenous people who do not excel at sport, we are further marginalising aboriginal people into a narrow category of being (hall 1997). we have outlined six ways in which accepting sport as a panacea can have negative consequences. hallinan et al. (2004) suggest that assuming aborigines are good at sport perpetuates discourses of racialised understandings of difference, reinforcing engrained racism. we have argued that such depictions may become a self–fulfilling prophecy for indigenous people who seek to be ‘good at sport’ as they cannot see other options. placing sport on a pedestal may minimise the importance of achievement in other domains (hall 1997). furthermore, we cannot neglect funding to other program areas in pursuit of the positive, and media friendly, stories of elite indigenous athletes and grassroots sports programs in indigenous communities. to date there is a paucity of evidence to support the efficacy of the many sports programs that have proliferated in the last decade. such programs need to be built on evidence; reliance on the belief that sport is good and particularly good for indigenous australians is not enough. the relative effectiveness and cost-benefits of sport cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 73 programs, when compared to educational and social programs, must be considered. thus, while sport is certainly central to indigenous communities, it must form part of a broader cultural landscape, which includes and promotes participation and achievement in a wide range of areas. references adair, d. 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(2013). supporting healthy communities through sports and recreation programs. resource sheet no. 26 produced for the closing the gap clearinghouse. whimpress, b. 1999, passport to nowhere: aborigines in australian cricket, 1850-1939, walla walla press, sydney. zakus, d. & horton, p. 2009, ‘pasifikas in australian rugby: emanant cultural, social and economic issues’, sporting traditions, vol. 26, pp. 67-86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2012.723352 indigenous participation in australian sport: the perils of the ‘panacea’ proposition abstract introduction and background ‘born to play’: an overview of indigenous sport participation across major sporting codes the perils of ‘sport is the panacea’ proposition conclusion references haim yacobi, department of politics and government, ben gurion university of the negev, beersheba. corresponding author: yacobih@bgu.ac.il issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 haim yacobi. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(3): 5107. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5107 from ‘ethnocracity’ to urban apartheid: the changing urban geopolitics of jerusalem\al-quds haim yacobi ben gurion university of the negev abstract in the core of this article stands an argument that while ethnocracy was a relevant analytical framework for understanding the urban dynamics of jerusalem\al-quds up until two decades ago, this is no longer the case. as this article demonstrates, over the past twenty years or so, the city’s geopolitical balance and its means of demographic control, as well as an intensifying militarization and a growing use of state violence, have transformed the city from an ethnocracity into an urban apartheid. theoretically, this article aims to go beyond the specific analogy with south african apartheid, the most notorious case of such a regime. rather i would suggest that in our current market-driven, neo-liberal era, an apartheid city should be taken as a distinct urban regime based on urban trends such as privatization of space, gentrification, urban design, infrastructure development and touristic planning. i would propose that these practices substitute for explicit apartheid legislation (of a sort introduced in the south african case), bringing to the fore new participants in the apartheidization of the city, such as real estate developers and various interest groups. introduction the development of urban areas in israel/palestine has been strongly framed by an ethnonational drive for judaization, segregation and division (yiftachel 2006; yacobi 2009). hence, ethnically mixed regions in general and cities in particular are both uncommon and by nature unplanned, often resulting from a spatial process of ethnic expansion and retreat, globally prevalent in contested urban spaces. mixed cities were conceptualized as urban ethnocracies, or ‘ethnocracities’, wherein a hegemonic group colonizes, appropriates and controls a city's apparatus, producing a contested space and social instability (yacobi 2009). jerusalem\al-quds has already been defined as a clear example of an urban ethnocracy (yiftachel and yacobi 2002). as elaborated by yiftachel (2006), an ethnocracy is a distinct regime type, designed to impose and expand a dominant ethno-nation's control in multimailto:yacobih@bgu.ac.il https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5107 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 101 ethnic territories. in such regimes, ethnicity, rather than citizenship, forms the main criterion in the distribution of power and resources. consequently, ethnocracies typically display high levels of non-uniform ethnic segregation. importantly, ethnocratic regimes sometimes combine a degree of political openness and formal democratic representation with political structures that facilitates the seizure of contested territory by a dominant ethno-nation. at the same time, the dominant group appropriates the state apparatus and control over capital flows, marginalizing peripheral ethnic and national minorities. in the urban context, ethnocratic control involves forceful seizure of land, formal legislation, an exclusivist public discourse and invisible means of control. these forces are often 'muffled' under an official and legal understanding of the city as a space enabling social mobility, residence and political activism. hence, these forces seemingly enable but practically undermine the promise of the city as a democratic arena for all of its inhabitants (yiftachel and yacobi 2004). while ethnocracy was a relevant analytical framework for understanding the urban dynamics of jerusalem\al-quds up until two decades ago, this is no longer the case. over the past twenty years or so, the city’s geopolitical balance and its means of demographic control, as well as an intensifying militarization and a growing use of state violence, have transformed the city from an ethnocracity into an urban apartheid. distinguishing between the two urban regimes does not suggest that urban apartheid is essentially a different form of control, but rather a radicalization of the ethnocratic phase. the transition from ethnocratic regime into urban apartheid can be demonstrated by the way in which the palestinian ghetto (the product of urban ethnocratic policies) has been turned into a frontier. ron (2003) proposes that a frontier is a territory that is not integrated into the realm of influence of a state’s legal apparatus, thus enabling an exercise of ‘illegal’ power. a ghetto, on the other hand, despite being a space of exclusion, is still under the influence of the controlling state law. ron considers 1992 bosnia to be an example of a frontier, where violent actions included ethnic cleansing. he considers the occupied territories in the 1990s to have been a ghetto in relation to israel, and claims that despite the outbreak of the first intifada in late 1987, the rough measures taken by israel did not amount to expulsion or demographic engineering. i would suggest that this is no longer the case – for the palestinian ghetto in jerusalem is undergoing a rapid frontierization (pullan 2011), characterized by 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 escalation in state violence, collective punishment and the attempt to empty large palestinian neighborhoods of their inhabitants and at solidifying the separation between jewish and palestinian populations. such processes support the transformation of the city into a territorial entity under apartheid. in this article, i wish to go beyond the specific analogy with south african apartheid, the most notorious case of such a regime. other scholars have applied the concept of apartheid regime to cities and spaces produced, engineered and controlled along ethnic and racial lines, attempting to divide, isolate and exclude racial and ethnic minorities (massey and denton 1993; abu-lughod 1981). the reference to apartheid regimes as a wider typology of political control was well defined by the rome statute of the international criminal court, adopted in 1998 (four years after south african apartheid came to its formal end). the rome statute defines apartheid as ‘inhumane acts […] committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime’1. indeed, according to the logic of international law, apartheid ends with the elimination of legalized racial discrimination and the transformation of the racial state. however, even an examination of south africa post-1994 reveals the pitfalls of such an approach, and the necessity to move beyond the legal-liberal definition of apartheid as a form of control (clarno 2015). rather, clarno calls to adopt a political-economic understanding of apartheid regimes (yet not in the urban context) that combines ethnic exclusion and racial capitalism stemming from neoliberal agenda. in other words, in our current market-driven, neo-liberal era, an apartheid city should be taken as a distinct urban regime based on urban trends such as privatization of space, gentrification, urban design, infrastructure development and touristic planning. these practices substitute for explicit apartheid legislation (of a sort introduced in the south african case), bringing to the fore new participants in the apartheidization of the city, such as real estate developers and various interest groups. moreover, political economy analysis of current apartheid urbanism also reveals the new trends of racialization and exclusion as well as new patterns of mobility in the city. 1 http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/apartheid/ https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/apartheid/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 103 the innovation of the approach outlined above stems from the fact that contested urbanism has been studied along two separated lines which are often understood as contradicting each other, and studied separately: one is the ethno-national contested city and the other is the neoliberal city. in the former that dominates the discourse, the first generation of literature on the ‘jerusalem conflict’ focused on the city being ‘divided’, as a ‘top-down’ subject of israeli national aspirations. this literature analyzed the colonial power of the state from the perspective of its legislative, planning and military mechanisms. recently published works (e.g., pullan et al. 2013; dumper 2014) can be seen as a second-generation analysis of the city, offering a more nuanced understanding of urban processes. these present jerusalem as an arena of highly-charged power relations, a contested space that is continuously produced and reproduced by ‘bottom-up’ protest, global forces and a wide spectrum of political institutions (ngos, religious organizations, professionals). in the specific context of jerusalem, though, some of the processes discussed in the extant literature can be seen as even more radicalized: over the last few years, groups of jewish settlers have colonized new houses in central palestinian neighborhoods such as sheikh jarrah and silwan; jewish worshippers were murdered in a synagogue by palestinian residents of jerusalem; closures were imposed on palestinian villages; and more generally, israeli military forces and palestinian protestors alike were involved in escalating tension and clashes around the city. but the logic behind the increased ‘security’ measures fails to solve the conflict, facilitating, instead, the process of apartheidization, as i will elaborate presently. the making of colonial space ‘jerusalem is the eternal capital of the jewish people, a city reunified so as never again to be divided… our people's unparalleled affinity to jerusalem has spanned thousands of years, and is the basis of our national renaissance. it has united our people, secular and religious alike’ (pm benjamin netanyahu, may 21, 2009)2. the statement above, by israeli prime minister benjamin netanyahu, expresses the mainstream israeli understanding of the city as ‘unified jerusalem,’ a fixed urban space, a given subject of israeli sovereignty and ethno-national aspirations. but in fact, the city of 2 see: http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-jerusalem-holy-sites-will-remain-israeli-forever-1.276465 http://www.haaretz.com/news/netanyahu-jerusalem-holy-sites-will-remain-israeli-forever-1.276465 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 jerusalem is manufactured continuously by geopolitical practices, which include not merely military occupation but also colonial planning and demographic engineering. as widely documented and analyzed (see: pullan et al. 2013; dumper 2014), a turning point in israel's geopolitical situation occurred in june 1967, when israel occupied east jerusalem and other territories. following this occupation, and despite international objections, the israeli government issued the municipalities ordinance (amendment no. 6) law, 5727–1967, applying israeli law to east jerusalem. as a result, israel annexed palestinian land and declared the city of jerusalem to be its united capital. this stage in the colonization of east jerusalem was heavily based on legal measures in the form of expropriation of palestinian land into (israeli) state hands. the next stage in the process was the rhetorical device of incessantly declaring that jerusalem is a unified city. in this regard, planning policies have clearly reflected the paradigm of an ethnocracity; both state and city governments have pursued the same general policy, which persistently promoted the judaization of jerusalem – i.e. the expansion of jewish political, territorial, demographic and economic control. more specifically, over the past five decades, israel has used its military might and economic power to redraw borders and recreate boundaries, to grant or deny rights and resources, and to move populations around for the purpose of ensuring jewish control. these all served a common goal, which was to construct a new cognitive map for the city and thus normalize its occupation. from a planning perspective, this stage is characterized by the construction of settlements (‘satellite neighborhoods’) in east jerusalem and by an extensive building of infrastructure (pullan et al. 2007; nolte and yacobi 2015). as a complementary step, a series of master plans were drawn in order to limit the growth of palestinian neighborhoods in the city (bimkom 2013). indeed, as suggested by jabareen (2010), planning in jerusalem has been based on geopolitical strategies aiming to control demography, to expand the jurisdiction of the city through expropriation of palestinian land and to exclude the palestinian inhabitants of the city from planning processes. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 105 figure 1: har homa settlement neighbourhood under construction while the above illustrates a clear example of urban ethnocracy, i.e. using ‘neutral’ practices such as planning and its democratic façade as a legitimate tool of spatial control, in the following section i will identify a shift into a more radical policy of apartheid. this stage is linked to the construction of the separation barrier, which allowed israel to annex another 160 km2 of the occupied territories, in addition to 70 km2 annexed right after the 1967 occupation of east jerusalem. the barrier enforces israel's de facto political borders in jerusalem, and transforms it into the largest city in israel, in geographical terms. moreover, the route of the separation barrier creates a de facto cordon sanitaire between the walled city and the palestinian hinterland. the geographic continuum and functional integration of the palestinian neighborhoods are disrupted, isolating them completely from their hinterland. one of the results of this process is the escalation in the number of palestinians working in west jerusalem (shtern 2015). since 2011, almost 50 percent of the labor force of east jerusalem has been employed in the jewish sector of west jerusalem and other cities in israel. indeed, while jerusalem remains a colonial city, its strategy has also been transformed by neoliberal economic restructuring and widespread unemployment 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 (following the separation wall and the isolation of jerusalemites). this has produced a pool of unemployed workers desperate enough to accept exploitation under the neo liberal regime3. the creation of a racialized labor market goes hand in hand with radical reaction. a telling example is the activity of lehava, a radical right wing organization4 that mapped the presence of palestinian workers in west jerusalem’s main market area, or their campaign warning of mixed marriage. indeed, the logic behind the erection of the wall in order to increase ‘security’ measures does not solve the conflict. rather, it produces a new urban geopolitics which allows the vast majority of territory and resources in the jerusalem metropolitan area to be controlled by jews, while palestinians are confined to disjointed enclaves, without real sovereignty, freedom of movement, control over natural resources, or contiguous territory. furthermore, the notion of division and security is framed within a racializing discourse, which includes calls to purify the social body and to protect the personal and collective jewish identity from the risks of chance encounters with palestinians. clearly, the creation of racialized labor market and the reaction against palestinian presence in urban space marks a shift in the conflict where enmity is replaced by racism. as already noted by balibar (1991), new patterns of racism are formatted and organized around sociological signifiers, replacing biological markers. in other words, the principal factor in this form of racism is not the ‘biological’ fact that palestinians are non-jewish or non-white, but rather that idea that their mere presence in the urban space of jerusalem, as well as their uncontrolled flow through borders and boundaries, should be collectively denied. 3 since the year 2000, the number of palestinian worker in the city has increased from 40,000 to 70,000, while a significant gap in the average income between jewish and palestinian workers has been maintained. for a detailed report see: shtern 2015 4 lehava is an extreme right wing religious organization that objects to any personal or business relationships between jews and non-jews in israel. as part of its activities lehava encourages israeli jews to report to the organization the names of jews who rent to arabs or jews who employ arabs. see: http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,l-4610561,00.html http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,l-4610561,00.html cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 107 figure 2: the separation wall housing is an additional arena of the conflict in the city; the attempt to ghettoize the palestinian neighborhoods west of the wall, by declaring their surroundings urban parks is well known (bimkom 2013); as is the ongoing effort to settle jewish families inside central palestinian villages and neighborhoods. a less familiar process, stemming from the changing geopolitics of the city, is the migration of palestinians to jewish neighborhoods or settlements in east jerusalem. as detailed by yacobi and pullan (2014) french hill is the neighborhood that was the first settlement of east jerusalem that is undergoing a process of demographic transformation as palestinians, both with israeli citizenship and jerusalem resident certificates, have begun 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 moving there in recent years. this internal migration highlights the paradox of the apartheid city; on one hand the israeli settlements in east jerusalem were planned, designed and marketed as part of the attempt to judaize the city, while on the other hand palestinians who move to these districts cross an invisible boundary to become one with the ‘settlers’. this is, indeed, a characteristic of the current apartheid urbanism in jerusalem: on one hand, the forceful effect of the normalization of occupation was orchestrated by israeli law, planning and state regulations that privilege jewish citizens. on the other, the opening of the market – to all intents and purposes a normalization process – countered these policies and practices when the new districts started to attract the palestinian population. figure 3: an advertisement against selling apartments to palestinians in one of jerusalem’s jewish neighbourhoods similar to the south african case, the neoliberalization of capitalist systems has enabled some members of oppressed populations to join the ranks of the elite. for neoliberals, as suggested by clarno (2015), the shifting racial composition of the elite – along with the middle class – provides evidence that the free market can eliminate racial disparities. yet, the neoliberal language of equal opportunity and individual achievement masks the continuing cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 109 significance of racism, the declining stability of middle-class life, and the growing class divide between rich and poor. as i have shown in this section, using the term apartheid to denote this phase in the city’s politics does not suggest that a fundamentally new, qualitatively different, stage has begun. it only highlights new practices of violence and control, appropriation and colonization, identifying the role of new actors and agents such as settler movements and ngos. as i will demonstrate in the following section, the process of apartheidization advances through very banal acts, such as the ones involved in city planning. silwan: a banal apartheid silwan is a palestinian village bordering on the southeastern wall of the old city of jerusalem. it has a population of around 23,500. the neighborhood is mainly inhabited by muslim arabs and is currently part of ‘israeli jerusalem’. the village (termed ‘neighborhood’ by the municipality) is located in an area known for its archeological and religious sites, and therefore is important to muslims, christians and jews alike. figure 4: silwan: general view 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 during the 1980s and 1990s, a number of properties in silwan were declared ‘absentee properties’ (according to the absentee property law passed in 1950) and thus could be sold to the israeli development authority. these properties were supposed to be jointly managed by the development authority and the israel land administration, without discrimination based on nationality. however, according to a report by the ngo peace now, the israeli authorities used the jewish national fund (jnf) and its organ himnuta (established by the jnf in 1938) for bypassing this provision. through the jnf and himnuta, properties were transferred exclusively to jews. although the jnf cannot purchase land from or in palestinian territories, himnuta is not similarly restricted, even though it is almost wholly owned by the jnf5. thirty dunams of absentee property in silwan were transferred to himnuta by the development authority in exchange for land himnuta owned in wadi ara (in northern israel). this deal was made in order to ensure that the land in silwan came under jewish ownership. himnuta then leased these properties to jewish settlers and initiated legal proceedings for the eviction of palestinian tenants. one of the principal beneficiaries of himnuta properties is elad, a radical right-wing ngo. elad now possesses several properties in silwan, and is using them for archeological excavation, as a tourist center and for housing settlers. figure 5: jewish settler’s house in silwan 5 http://rhr.org.il/eng/2011/11/jnf-will-expel-pal-family-in-silwan-urgent-call-to-action/, http://imeu.org/article/elad-the-jewish-national-fund-the-us-taxpayer-subsidized-judaization-of-sil http://rhr.org.il/eng/2011/11/jnf-will-expel-pal-family-in-silwan-urgent-call-to-action/ http://imeu.org/article/elad-the-jewish-national-fund-the-us-taxpayer-subsidized-judaization-of-sil cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 111 it is important to mention that the forced tourist development of the area also started from the year 2000, with the expectation that israel would attract tourism from the beginning of the millennium, and with the hope to attract global capital. a promenade that surrounds the ‘holy basin’ was designed and partly developed – marking the attempt to appropriate the area and to attach it to the secured tourist’s map. within this context one should understand the case of the kedem center project, an immense visitor center designed around and over the important archaeological finds in silwan. on april 3, 2014, the jerusalem district planning and building committee approved the kedem center plan (plan no. 13542), promoted by the elad settler organization, to construct a five-story structure (in excess of 16,000 m2) in the palestinian neighborhood of silwan, about 20 meters from the walls of the old city. several appeals against the plan’s approval were submitted to the appeals committee of the national planning and building council, including by residents of silwan, various ngos and a group of 35 planners and conservation experts. an appeal was also submitted by elad and the israel nature and parks authority against the district committee’s decision to reduce of the structure’s approved height by one storey. most appeals against the plan’s approval were based on the argument that it served as a pretext for israel to promote another settlement in the heart of silwan, in violation of conservation principles regarding the old city and its surroundings. as stated in the appeals, the plan would significantly alter the old city environs, deviating from rules of conservation and planning practiced for decades, and all without the level of deep and open public debate required for decisions of this magnitude. the national planning council’s appeals subcommittee held three hearings, and on june 7, 2015 approved the plan for the kedem center, albeit with significant amendments. yet, in april 2016, after perfunctory deliberations, the full committee of the national planning council issued its formal decision, revoking the previous decision by the appeals committee. the full committee’s decision restored the april 2014 ruling of the district planning and building committee, which accepted the plan for the visitor center in full, with the modest modification of reducing the height of the building by one storey6. 6 the facts presented in this section are based on ir amim’s report see: http://altro.co.il/newsletters/show/7893?key=a7e7d4de5230480f4c74880e36013fd3 http://altro.co.il/newsletters/show/7893?key=a7e7d4de5230480f4c74880e36013fd3 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 furthermore, the kedem center is only one case in a more general effort to create a territorial continuity in jewish jerusalem, promoted by elad and supported by the state7. the continued colonization of the old city and of the silwan area clearly illustrates israel's efforts to promote the transformation of the palestinian ghetto into a frontier, as presented in the introduction of this essay. following billig’s seminal work on the banal forms of nationalism that accentuated the ways in which everyday expressions construct geographical imagination, national boundaries and jurisdictions (billig, 1995), i explored in this section the banal role of planning, policy and development in the apartheidization of the city. discussion urban apartheid is not a chance occurrence, or the reflection simply of the noncoordinated choices of millions of individuals, but has long been an intentional creation (feagin 1998, p. 10). as feagin notes (referring to the american case), urban apartheid is a product of ideology and policy. and indeed, as illustrated throughout this essay, the developing apartheid city is a result of intentional policies that aim to secure jewish control in the vast majority of territory and resources in the jerusalem metropolitan area, restricting palestinians to small parts of the city and denying them their future. this scenario is a well-documented step in the development of colonial regimes. it is driven by an ideology that views it as the right of one group to control its (self-defined) homeland, while dominating and marginalizing other groups sharing the same space (yiftachel and yacobi 2005). in jerusalem this situation resembles – though it does not replicate – the pre1994 south african apartheid system: in jerusalem too, a resident's cluster of rights and opportunities is determined, first and foremost, by ethnicity/race. and in jerusalem too, there is a continuous, concerted effort to regulate mobility and to produce a total separation between israeli-jews and palestinians, in the spheres of housing, work, politics and culture, which are constantly challenged by economic forces and dependency. the urban processes described in this essay were not evolutionary or natural. rather, they are products of a colonial project and of its purposeful actions, and they reflect the role of ideology in both the built landscape and the project of demographic engineering. this project is a common occurrence in ethnocratic contexts, where conflict with the indigenous 7 http://alt-arch.org/en/a-privatized-heritage-how-the-israel-antiquities-authority-relinquished-jerusalems-past/ http://alt-arch.org/en/a-privatized-heritage-how-the-israel-antiquities-authority-relinquished-jerusalems-past/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 113 population plays a central role in the formation of a national collective consciousness (yiftachel 2006). moreover, in the specific context of jerusalem, such spatio-political dynamics serve as a (territorial and political) basis for further radicalization, creating the necessary conditions for the establishment of an apartheid city. there might be one law but it is manipulated and implemented in different ways – according to ethnicity and national affiliation. more specifically, the apartheid city is classified discursively and represented as an ordered territory, a subject of ‘banal’ apparatuses including urban planning (as well as of other practices, not discussed in this essay, such as health, infrastructure and the like) that is dominated by one ethno-national group holding unequal power over the definition of urban citizenship. resources and services are allocated on the basis of ethnicity and race rather than residency, and urban politics are racialized. in the ethnocratic phase, which characterized the city’s spatio-politics from 1967 up to the beginning of the current century, palestinian inhabitants faced institutional discrimination whose influence was clearly felt in areas such as planning, land and housing. today, however, planning and territorial appropriation by the state and especially by its agents frontierize the palestinian ghetto and attempt to empty the city of its palestinian inhabitants. references abu-lughod, j. l. 1981, rabat: urban apartheid in morocco, princeton university press. balibar, e. 1991, race, nation, class, ambiguous identities, verso, london. billig, m. 1995, banal nationalism, sage, london. bimkom 2013, survey of palestinian neighborhoods in east jerusalem, http://bimkom.org/eng/wp-content/uploads/survey-of-the-palestinian-neighborhoodsof-east-jerusalem.pdf clarno, a. 2015, ‘neoliberal apartheid’, in soske, j. and jacobs, s. (eds.), apartheid israel: the politics of an analogy, haymarket books, chicago. https://africaisacountry.atavist.com/apartheidanalogy dumper, m. 2014, jerusalem unbound: geography, history, and the future of the holy city, columbia university press, new york. doi: https://doi.org/10.7312/columbia/9780231161961.001.0001 and https://doi.org/10.7312/dump16196 feagin, j. r. 1998, the new urban paradigm: critical perspectives on the city. rowman & littlefield, chicago. http://bimkom.org/eng/wp-content/uploads/survey-of-the-palestinian-neighborhoods-of-east-jerusalem.pdf http://bimkom.org/eng/wp-content/uploads/survey-of-the-palestinian-neighborhoods-of-east-jerusalem.pdf https://africaisacountry.atavist.com/apartheidanalogy https://doi.org/10.7312/columbia/9780231161961.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.7312/dump16196 114 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 jabareen, y. 2010, ‘the politics of state planning in achieving geopolitical ends: the case of the recent master plan for jerusalem’, international development planning review, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 27-43. doi: https://doi.org/10.3828/idpr.2009.11 massey, d. and denton, n. a. 1993, american apartheid, harvard university press, cambridge, ma. nolte, a. and yacobi, h. 2015, ‘politics, infrastructure and representation: the case of jerusalem’s light rail’, cities, vol. 43, pp. 28 – 36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2014.10.011 pullan, w. 2011, ‘frontier urbanism: the periphery at the centre of contested cities’, the journal of architecture. vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 15-35. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13602365.2011.546999 pullan w., misselwitz p., nasrallah r. and yacobi, h. 2007, ‘jerusalem's road 1: an inner city frontier?’ city, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 176-198. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/13604810701395993 pullan, w., sternberg, m., kyriacou, l., larkin, c., dumper, m., 2013, the struggle for jerusalem’s holy places: radicalisation and conflict, routledge, london. ron, j. 2003, frontiers and ghettos – state violence in serbia and israel, university of california press, berkeley. shtern, m. 2015, labor integration amidst volatile reality: east jerusalem's residents in the local labor market. jerusalem: jerusalem institute for israel studies. (in hebrew) yacobi, h. 2009, the jewish-arab city: spatio-politics in a mixed community, routledge, london. yacobi, h. and pullan, w. 2014, ‘the geopolitics of neighbourhood: jerusalem’s colonial space revisited’, geopolitics, vol. 19, no.3, pp.514-539. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2013.857657 yiftachel, o. and yacobi, h. 2002, ‘planning a bi-national capital: should jerusalem remain united?’ geoforum, vol. 33, pp. 137-145.https://doi.org/10.1016/s00167185(01)00024-0 yiftachel, o. and yacobi, h. 2004, ‘urban ethnocracy: ethnicization and the production of space in an israeli mixed city’. environment and planning d: society and space, vol. 21, no.6, pp. 673 – 693. doi: https://doi.org/10.1068/d47j yiftachel, o. and yacobi, h. 2005, ‘walls, fences and “creeping apartheid” in israel/palestine’, in: sorkin, m. (ed.), against the wall, greenwood press, new york. yiftachel, o. 2006, ethnocracy: land and identity politics in israel/palestine, university of pennsylvania press, philadelphia. statement of conflict of interest the author is not aware of any conflict of interest. funding the paper was written without funding. https://doi.org/10.3828/idpr.2009.11 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2014.10.011 https://doi.org/10.1080/13602365.2011.546999 https://doi.org/10.1080/13604810701395993 https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2013.857657 https://doi.org/10.1016/s0016-7185%2801%2900024-0 https://doi.org/10.1016/s0016-7185%2801%2900024-0 https://doi.org/10.1068/d47j from ‘ethnocracity’ to urban apartheid: the changing urban geopolitics of jerusalem\al-quds haim yacobi ben gurion university of the negev abstract the making of colonial space silwan: a banal apartheid discussion references statement of conflict of interest funding mapping progress: human rights and international students in australia andrew jakubowicz university of technology sydney devaki monani australian catholic university abstract the rapid growth in international student numbers in australia in the first decade of the 2000s was accompanied by a series of public crises. the most important of these was the outbreak in melbourne victoria and elsewhere of physical attacks on the students. investigations at the time also pointed to cases of gross exploitation, an array of threats that severely compromised their human rights. this paper reviews and pursues the outcomes of a report prepared by the authors in 2010 for universities australia and the human rights commission. the report reviewed social science research and proposed a series of priorities for human rights interventions that were part of the human rights commission’s considerations. new activity, following the innovation of having international students specifically considered by the human rights commission, points to initiatives that have not fully addressed the wide range of questions at state. introduction international students and the crisis in human rights one of the most controversial areas of global human rights debates lies in that area where state actors are called on to defend rights and prosecute breaches associated with non citizens. nowhere is this more apparent than in the case of international students studying in a country in which they do not have citizenship. furthermore all the most difficult issues are intensified in circumstances where international education is a significant industry, and international students are perceived in practice as sources of income for financially-stressed universities, colleges and schools. in many cases the students are recruited in an attempt by profit making institutions to optimise income flow. these institutions may subordinate their educational and pastoral responsibilities to the economic interests of their shareholders. in the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 61 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 andrew jakubowicz and devaki monani. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(3): 4473, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i3.4473 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i3.4473 first decade of the century, australia became very adept at developing educational programs and recruitment strategies that would attract many hundreds of thousands of students, a significant number of whom came from india. they were destined, at the ‘high end’, for postgraduate research study of great value to their countries of origin and australia, while at the less qualified level many began in secondary school, or undertook low-level english language acquisition programs, or trade qualifications. the year 2008 exemplified the rate of change and the size of the pressures on the system (australian government, 2008).in that year there were 544,000 international students in australia, about 3% of the population, a year on year increase of 21%. the largest single group, from china, had risen 20% to a total of 130,000. students from india, at number two, had increased by 54%, approaching 100,000. none of the institutions or the communities in which they were located had made any real provision for such a meteoric increase. issues like human rights and the implications of the changing population make-up were not on the agenda of the human rights commission, nor of interest to government bodies at the state level charged with the wellbeing of students, local or international. the enrolment of foreign students peaked in 2009, with china supplying 155,000 (up another 18%), and india 121,000 (up another 25%) (australian government, 2009). indian students became the focus of public attention in 2009, when there were reports of widespread attacks on them, and a number of students or ex-students were murdered. discussing this phenomenon, dunn et al. (2011a) reported evidence of a ‘curry-bashing’ subculture in parts of melbourne that clearly fits ideas of racism. singh (2011) shows that indian students and their families were involved in nearly $3 billion of transfers to australia in december 2010. they had a strong expectation of gaining permanent residence (pr) and were using education for planned migration outcomes. when the indian student crisis reached its crescendo in australia in 2009, the australian human rights commission arrived at a rather late awareness that the rights of students should be a central issue for resolution and progress. as with many temporary residents, the australian human rights debate had essentially passed international students by. occasionally they were referenced in discussion of racism, but for the most part, they had not been considered within the civil rights debate in australia. consequently, the major agencies for the protection of human rights were poorly prepared when the bashings, murders and other intimidation and exploitation of international students surfaced in 2008. the circumstances had long been 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 known to some local and state agencies, but there was no real discourse available to draw on for the students, their advocates and agencies, who were anxious to engage with government, universities and colleges. it took the racialisation of the debate, as media and political focus intensified on indian (and particularly punjabi students), to demonstrate how deeply embedded racialism was in public policy assumptions. xenophobic, rather than specifically racial, dynamics may have been at work, given the all-encompassing and indiscriminate nature of the key human rights complaints. indians were by no means the only targets (or in some cases they were also perpetrators) in the events under review. the complaints, when they appeared, were drawn out of generally wary students from a range of countries. the range of issues included experiences of racialised violence, housing exploitation, lack of transport access, employment exploitation and racial and sexual harassment. student responses in this article we want to present an overview of the responses that emerged at the advent of the student crisis. the article argues for the need for universities in australia to adopt if not all at least in part the human rights principles when dealing with international students. the 2010 debates were fuelled by three key concerns – the projections on the increasing population of australia and the impact of these projections on the student population; the baird report on state and federal governments’ management of the international student industry1 (2010); and the decisions of the council of australian governments (coag, 2010) on the presence of international students2. universities australia (ua), the sector’s umbrella and representative body, soon identified a serious lack of empirical knowledge as a major factor in its rather slow response to the issues as they affected the sector. ua approached the human rights commission (hrc), who 1 australia’s education system encompasses four diverse sectors: english language intensive courses for overseas students (elicos) which deals with preparing students with english language competency and providing pathways to other more sophisticated courses; schools, both government and non-government; vocational education and training (vet), which consists of technical colleges, dual sector universities and private colleges providing technical and apprenticeship training programs; and higher education, which is the largest sector for international students, enrolling predominantly in universities (ieac, 2013, p. 10). 2 because the vet courses in some cases gave maximum points to migrate to australia, many indian and chinese students between 2005 and 2009 chose to enrol in those courses. the courses were run and managed by the tafe sector as well as the private colleges. section 2.2 of the jakubowicz and monani (2010, p. 6) report discusses the creation of the international industry in greater depth. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 63 together with the academy of the social sciences in australia as the peak group for social science research, developed a series of symposia to identify and workshop what data there was about the international students’ plight. the hrc role was crucial, as it framed the issues within a human rights perspective, and would therefore press for human rights relevant outcomes and programs. the symposia provided the first sustained occasions where scholars and policy-makers were asked to locate the international students crisis within a human rights paradigm. social science insights predisposed analysts to examine to what extent and in what forms australian institutional racism might play a role in perpetuating and tolerating situations of violence, exploitation and discrimination towards international students. the first step in any analysis of racist institutions that might condone racist practices lies in having them acknowledge that those types of question be asked of them. the indian student crisis, as it became known, triggered widespread soul-searching and some hard-headed policy reviews in australia. the broad dimensions of these reviews included the revamping of visas, changes to permanent residency criteria, tighter controls on college and university enrolments, improved consumer rights, and the mapping out of a human rights charter of sorts covering international students. the intersection of economic issues and human rights issues has ensured that the crisis and its continuing aftermath remain pressing questions for diplomatic, trade, education, justice, health and housing portfolios of government, at national, state and local levels in australia. development of the principles to promote and protect the human rights of international students public media attention has focused on the indian students at the centre of well-publicised violence and exploitation, yet the issues continue to affect international students from many different backgrounds. moreover, problems of urban violence and corrupt exploitation of vulnerable people are features of australian society, rather than being generated by the characteristics of the national cultures of the students. the interaction of culture, opportunity, expectations and institutional practices suggests that a range of analytical approaches needs to be deployed to help develop longer-term strategies in public policy. this article draws on a report prepared by the authors (jakubowicz and monani, 2010) for three of the key stakeholders in the development of evidence-based policy, namely human rights australia (hra), universities australia (ua), and the academy for social sciences in australia (assa). the previous report set the parameters for interrogating how the university sector 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 should understand the issues for the sector and the wider society, and how social science research could contribute to both understanding and responding to the negative experiences of some international students in australia. while rapidly overtaken by events as government inquiries, delegations and crisis responses proliferated, the report underpinned what became the principles to promote and protect the human rights of international students, launched in adelaide in october 2012 (https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/stories/newinternational-students-guidelines-launched). a recent 2015 review of the ahrc principles in action has once again placed racism and racial discrimination as one of the top three human rights issues facing international students, alongside employment and accommodation challenges (ahrc, 2015, p.10). our discussion paper (jakubowicz and monani, 2010), submitted to the academy of social sciences australia, contributed to shaping the parameters of the policy debate on international students’ human rights principles developed by the australian human rights commission. here, we wish to revisit the international students’ human rights principles and present the current policy mandate on international students and human rights. this article is divided into two sections. the first describes and lays out the key features of the indian student revolt and the lived experience of international students. the second section revisits the international student debate within a human rights paradigm as adopted by the australian human rights commission. racism and the lived experience of international students: issues remain unaddressed from the moment that visuals of the indian student protest began to unfold on television here in australia and across asia, panic set in in the minds of the australian people. the protest was conducted in the wake of the screwdriver stabbing of a 25year old indian student, sravan kumar theerthala, in may 2009. students demanded safety and urged police authorities in victoria to recognise the increase in race based hate crimes particularly towards indian students. indian students as ‘foreigners’ had managed to stage a revolt never seen before by the australian public. nearly 2000 students chanted as they marched down melbourne's streets, carrying signs which read ‘i pay fees, i pay tax’, ‘i get stabbed in oz’ and’ racism is more dangerous than swine flu’. gautam gupta, a spokesman for the federation of indian students of australia cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 65 https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/stories/new-international-students-guidelines-launched https://www.humanrights.gov.au/news/stories/new-international-students-guidelines-launched (fisa), said that the protesters had issued a series of demands, which the state government needed to meet. we want a multicultural police section and we want crime statistics made public so that we know the extent of the problem. we want blanket cover for all international students, covering them for accidents and assaults and the government should run an ad campaign highlighting the positive influence that migrants and international students have made to this country. my advice to every indian student now who wants to come to australia is, please don't come (millar& doherty, 2009). criticism was mounted against the indian students by the police and the media for suggesting that indian students were victims of racial crime. instead, the victorian police downplayed the issue of racism, and suggested that indian students tended to carry expensive gadgets such as mobile phones and laptops thereby attracting unnecessary attention on public transport. others, such as the vice-president for international students in 2009 at victoria university in melbourne, andrew holloway, blamed statistics instead. he stated that: it just happens to be coincidental that there’s a large number of south asian students travelling on their own late at night time and if you look at it, the work patterns of indian students are somewhat different from other students. they tend to work at 24/7 conveniences, petrol stations, late-at-night shops, and therefore are more likely to be on the public transport network late at night time (waters and macbean, 2009). in contrast, the islamic council of victoria suggested that it seemed to be an ill-conceived idea and, in particular, nazeem hussein expressed his disappointment: i think it's one thing to help the victims look less like victims, sorry to look less indian, but i think it's another thing to really attack the core issue here which is racism. and we're seeing not as much from the police that we would have probably expected. it's only a particular type of crime that is on the rise and that's crimes against people that look indian. so really that statistic means not very much given that this particular crime is on the increase (waters and macbean, 2009). the education industry in australia was the hardest hit by the indian student events and australia gained a reputation for being an unsafe student destination. suddenly the ‘invisible international student’ was now ‘visible’ and actively speaking out. there is a gap in leadership around the issue of international students and more specifically around the tolerance of cultural diversity in australia. australia lacks a strong research base 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 about cultural diversity and racism on which to build good policy. international students’ lives, and the lives of their families in their home countries, need to be presented in the australian media in order to give locals a realistic perspective on international students and their journey to australia. instead, the media has focused on the destruction of the glass windows of the historic clocks around flinders street station. stories about student vandalism during the protests continued to be broadcast on australian television (millar, the age, 31st may 2009) while in india, images of indian students being stabbed and robbed were being repeatedly telecast (press trust of india, 15th june, 2009). both countries have had to grapple with the reality of the violent nature of the racist crimes. for australia, it has been a matter of shame, and for indians, one where fear prevails even today about australians and their attitudes towards indians. two discourses emerged simultaneously in the academic literature about international students’ experience in australia. the first focused on the discriminatory interracial conflicts amongst international students and the locals. the second emphasised the rapid commercialisation of international education in australia (nyland, forbes-mewett & hartel, 2013) as being one of the major causes for the discontent generated amongst international students (jakubowicz & monani, 2010). nelson (2013), in her research on denial of racism and its implications for local action in australia, reminds us of former prime minister kevin rudd’s visit to india, where he denied racism was a factor in the attacks, portraying indian students as victims solely of criminal intent by emphasising the ‘opportunistic’ nature of the attacks (nelson, 2013, p. 92). other studies conducted by dunn et al. (2011b) note that when some attacks were described as racist, political leaders continued to oscillate back and forth between acknowledgement and denial of racism. mason (2012 a), when analysing australian politicians’ responses3, examined an interwoven discourse of avoidance, nationalist rhetoric, and deflection. she expresses some disappointment at the strategy adopted by australian federal parliamentarians, one that neither acknowledges nor denies, whilst placing the racial attacks within a nationalist and crime-control rhetoric. this refusal to acknowledge the racial element in the attacks may have done serious harm to the victim community, and may have 3 the australia india institute (aii) was officially launched in new delhi on 1 september 2009 by the then deputy prime minister, julia gillard. in late 2009, the australian government department of education, employment and workplace relations (deewr) provided just over $8 million to the australia india institute over three years. the university of melbourne contributed $1.75 million in cash and in kind. the australia india institute aims to establish collaborative research projects on topics of mutual interest, to increase the professional linkages between australia and india and to help australians better understand contemporary india (aii, annual report, 2010). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 67 been a major barrier to effective intervention aimed at prevention of a recurrence of such events, while also rendering it less likely that authorities would successfully complete investigations if victims withheld co-operation (mason, 2012a, pp. 13-19). the police faced a number of constraints in making available to the public declarations of crimes possibly motivated by racism, often seeking to confine their comments to the evidence at hand (mason 2012b). the police’s refusal to take the racist intent seriously was problematic. some indian students interpreted this as an active sidelining of what they identified as major life-threatening events emerging during their stay in australia4. as mason (2012b) concludes, this was perhaps one of the main reasons for a may 2009 international student rally at flinders street station in downtown melbourne. mason (2012b) draws on the frustration expressed by the federation of indian students association’s president, gautam gupta, in his statement to the press: ‘how can they say that none of these attacks were racist when we hear criminals saying terms like “curry bashing”?’ (mason, 2012b, p. 46). baas (2009) suggests ‘curry bashing’ is a relatively new epithet (imported from the uk perhaps) and is significantly linked to the ‘disgust’ expressed towards indians by some white australians. he draws from the blogosphere in australia during 2005-2009 which sent out strong signals of hate towards the perceived ‘hordes’ of indian students arriving in australia. one blogger remarked that indians are incapable of moving out of anyone’s ‘bloody way’ when they walk around in groups in the city: ‘so many of these ‘f…ng indians have crowded the streets of melbourne’ (baas,2009, p. 39). racist language keeps evolving in australia according to the groups that migrate to australia; however the intent remains the same. in this case, the group happened to be fee-paying international students of indian origin. robertson (2008) suggests that between 1997 and 2009, the australian education market was the third largest export after iron ore and coal. during this twelve-year period, four million international students were educated in australia. robertson (2008) maintains that, despite the high levels of profitability international students brought to australia, academics such as birrell, healy and kinnaird (2007) continued to express resentment that students were not readily integrating into the labour market on completion of their degrees and that they were 4 the age newspaper reports that the helpline set up by mr vasan srinivasan of the federation of indian association of victoria (fiav) remains unattended. the federation of indian association of victoria receives funding to support students, because they are the peak community organisation in victoria. the fiav continues to deny that the attacks had any racist elements. see: http://www.theage.com.au/national/indian-students-fearfulafter-murder-20100105-lras.html. this article also lists the names of students who lost their lives in the melbourne attack. 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 http://www.theage.com.au/national/indian-students-fearful-after-murder-20100105-lras.html http://www.theage.com.au/national/indian-students-fearful-after-murder-20100105-lras.html not capable of gaining the necessary skills required to remain in australia. robertson (2013) criticises the way international students were characterised in both the literature and the media discourse in australia. in her most recent article, robertson (2013) claims students and student-migrant activism have been completely overlooked and overshadowed by more dominant discourses with racist undertones of international students wanting to permanently migrate to australia. nyland et al. (2013) urge ‘education suppliers’ to examine and enhance student needs and academic values. the authors send out a warning that discontent amongst international students can only make institutions further vulnerable, and pose challenges that can be potentially ‘income damaging’ (nyland et al., 2013, p. 37). the lack of quality institutions in the home countries of the international students was not adequately picked up during the international student crisis in australia. rather, international students were blamed for taking away opportunities from local students through the admission processes for certain courses because of their ability to pay higher fees. students were blamed for the rise in the rental market since australian landlords preferred international students who were willing to pay higher prices for housing close to universities. this was despite research in melbourne, showing students chose to live in suburbs that offered affordable rental options, most of which were also identified by locals as crime hubs (babacan, pyke, bhathal, gill, grossman, and bertone, 2010). nevertheless, ‘international students’ in australian society began to be looked on as ‘invaders’, as young people who were here to stay, particularly as several degrees offered pathways to permanent residency in australia. this debate left many in the australian community incapable of viewing international students as lonely and vulnerable individuals who were often unable to speak the local language, had no local social connections and were indebted to financial institutions in their home countries or their families for the only opportunity they might ever have to receive a quality education such as that offered in australia5. 5 by early 2009, the resentment and anger amongst indian students in victoria rose, and on 31 may 2009 an estimated crowd of 5000 gathered on the streets of melbourne. the placards expressed the extreme vulnerability of indian students in australia with slogans such as ‘unite against racism’ and ‘safety down under’. taxi drivers had been expressing their distress and safety concerns since 2008 (robertson, 2013, p. 1468). indian student taxi drivers were looked on as problematic elements responsible for taking jobs away from australian permanent resident taxi drivers. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 69 anecdotal evidence available through media transcripts reveals that the single biggest factor for indian international students feeling vulnerable was the lack of empathetic response from their own communities. for instance, the president of the federation of indian associations of victoria, vasan srinivasan, stated: i have been living here for the last 23 years … but have never experienced any racial slur from the australians. i have two young daughters; if they were racist, do you think i would have stayed in this country? (sharma, 2010). these sorts of comments were problematic for indian students, because mr. vasan srinivasan received significant funding for the federation of indian association of victoria to deliver an international student helpline (indian express, 2009). in doing so, the australian authorities rewarded those organisations that sided with the australians. students who were victims of racist attacks felt that by denying the racist nature of these attacks the individuals running the helpline were refusing to empathise with them. the gap between the indian students and more established indian community members widened6 further when some members publicly attended forums and described themselves as the friends of the liberal party of australia. international students themselves cannot affiliate with political parties as they are not entitled to vote, even though some doctoral students could remain in australia on an international student visa for over 10 years. when the more established communities of their country of origin flag political loyalties, the international student feels vulnerable, marginalised and under-represented. in his election policy speech in 2001, prime minister john howard declared a strict policing of immigration (howard, 2001). he asserted that ‘we’ would decide how, when, and who came to australia, and the circumstances in which they arrived. international students from asia need to present family bank account statements, land and property details, and are usually required to pay a full fee prior to arriving in australia. these policies demonstrate the desire to accept only wealthier students from developing countries. like other developed countries, australia has not extended education support to the most poor or financially needy students. however, because of the high dollar rate, even the wealthier asian and indian students can find it difficult to maintain the standards of living to which they were 6 devaki monani attended a meeting for the welfare of international students in collaboration with the australia india solidarity group, bharat times and victorian multicultural commission, on 14 june 2009 at west footscray. the meeting also had labor mp marsha thompson as an observer. the support for indian students at the meeting was lacking. the majority of the attendees was of the opinion that australia is not a racist country. 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 accustomed in their home countries. the students that australia attracts from developing countries belong to wealthy families and hence are less likely to tolerate and accept discrimination. many indian and chinese students held notions of implicit superiority, and thus, when the news broke out in many parts of the world of australia’s explicit racism, there was an instant downturn in numbers for the simple reason that students influenced their peers back in their home country with their experiences in australia. much of the 2010 debate was framed by the national strategy for international education, and was subsequently adopted by the council of australian governments (coag). during this period the australian human rights commission (ahrc) identified various limitations in the national students strategy by coag (see jakubowicz and monani, 2010, p. 19). these included: • no strategic goals associated with combating racism (except through an undefined community engagement process that places the onus on the students to become engaged); • no discussion of access to affordable transport; • no discussion of access to affordable and appropriate accommodation; • no affirmation of human rights. however, on a closer review it was clear that the strategy focused on australia’s bureaucratic, political and economic context, overlooking the international students’ needs and interests. for example, provider closure taskforces were to be established in each state to ensure rapid and coordinated support for students in the event of provider closure. yet to what extent students would be able to get full compensation for the sudden closures of private colleges was uncertain. anecdotal evidence suggests that some students remained in a limbo about their future in australia since their visas were linked to their courses of study. the issues are many, and the challenge is to ensure that there is a mechanism in place to ensure that student rights are protected; and by the same token, students also become aware of their own responsibilities. in our previous report we recommended these issues be considered at state and national policy levels (jakubowicz and monani, 2010). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 71 revisiting human rights for international students in australia australia is one of the first countries to bring the international student human rights framework into the forefront of the human rights and public policy agenda. australia is also the first country to have experienced an international student revolt in 2009, hence bringing about a human rights approach to international student education in australia is an ongoing priority. on 4th october 2012 the australian human rights commission (ahrc) issued a policy document entitled principles to promote and protect the human rights of international students. along with other colleagues, we advocated the inclusion of various aspects of the racial discrimination act 1975 into this document. in doing so, the ahrc has affirmed that ‘everyone is entitled to their human rights without discrimination’ (ahrc, 2012, 9). international students are now able to access their rights through the racial discrimination act irrespective of their visa status. in 2014, a review of the impact of the principles was conducted; the ahrc published the impact statement in january 2015. this review is timely for inclusion and discussion in this paper. when introducing the principles to promote and protect the human rights of international students, the race discrimination commissioner declared that: australia has a responsibility to protect the human rights of everyone in the country, which includes international students. this responsibility comes from a number of international human rights treaties that australia has agreed to uphold. some international students also experience discrimination, exploitation, or harassment because of their race, colour, culture, religion, language or sex. this can happen in their dealings with, amongst others, health providers, migration agents, real estate agents and employers. in many instances, international students are not aware of their human rights, how their rights are protected under australian law and what options exist for them to take action when their rights are breached (ahrc, helen szoke, race discrimination commissioner, 2012, p. 3). the principles promotes equality and non-discrimination by establishing four operational frameworks. 1. enhancing the human rights of international students – covers equal access to health, accommodation, safe and affordable public transport, crisis-management and support opportunities for issues arising in the home country of the students. 2. ensuring all international students have access to human rights and freedom from discrimination – includes information on the complaint process, governing bodies, tenancy rights and responsibilities, and access to appropriate legal advice. 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 3. understanding the diverse needs of international students – involves ethical research with international students to develop appropriate and responsive policy, research focusing on the narratives of international students’ experience of discrimination and racially motivated crime, and publicly reporting on how information about the numbers and causes of international student deaths is being utilised to ensure the safety and well-being of international students. 4. empowering international students during their stay in australia – recommends engaging with international students and various stakeholders to improve study outcomes, using social media portals and websites such as ‘study in australia’ for presenting information on resources and services, creating awareness about sexual health and well-being, increasing cultural competency, and establishing ongoing engagement opportunities between international students and mainstream local communities. several areas identified in sections 6.3 and 6.4 of our previous report have now been interwoven into this in-depth policy document. in particular, the aspect of developing a strong research base about cultural diversity and racism (jakubowicz and monani, 2010, p. 21) has now been addressed through the third human rights principle. reading the current human rights issues facing international students in australia today, ‘racism and racial discrimination’ emerges as one of the top three human rights issues alongside employment and accommodation. in particular, indian, sri lankan and nepalese students used the ahrc platform to make formal race-related complaints (ahrc, 2015, p.10). it is clear that the mechanism of a complaints process through the ahrc has now revealed that extent, nature and ethnic backgrounds of the international students. prior to the ahrc principles in action there was no real way of knowing and managing data on the international student community. hence a fully informed evidence-based approach is now being utilised by the ahrc which will ultimately impact the way in which international students are supported in australia. the principles has helped to deal with the complexity of the relationship between the state (australia) and the international student as a potential international aid recipient, citizen, consumer and exporter. marginson interviewed students about their hostile information exchanges with immigration authorities, involving significant delays on extension of student cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 73 visas, administrative inefficiency and inconsistent and incorrect advice (marginson, 2012, p. 505). the main intention of the principles has been to assist students by ensuring that they have the right to take action where they have experienced profound distress. racially based exclusion was a key dimension of foreign and immigration policy until the 1970s, and the residues of a racialised worldview remain prevalent in some parts of australian society. in section 2.1 of our report, dealing with the colombo plan and the end of white australia in the 1950s, we provide an overview of the invitation extended to international students in australia. the end of white australia occurred in a series of steps. in 1958 the old dictation test was removed and in 1965 the residency requirement for asians to apply for citizenship was reduced. in 1966 australian signed the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (icerd), and in 1967australians voted to include indigenous people as full citizens and assign responsibility for their wellbeing to the commonwealth. by 1973 the racial preferences contained in the migration act were removed. in 1976 the racial discrimination act outlawed (but did not make criminal) discrimination on the basis of race, reflecting both the icerd implementation and the australian reservation, which rejected the criminalisation of either discrimination or hate speech. this reservation continues to affect policy and government and police capacities to prosecute racism. the un cerd committee expressed serious concern about this continuing reservation during the australian government appearance before it in august 2010. despite this, the sequence of both international and national acts, often extended by state-based legislation, cemented into policy discourse the recognition that the racialised worldview of white australia, with its implicit hierarchies of colour and unchangeable barriers of cultural difference, was no longer acceptable. australia was becoming a country that acknowledged a racist past, but was now intent on building a non-racist egalitarian future (jakubowicz 1997/2010, as cited in jakubowicz and monani, 2010, p. 6). the principles (ahrc, 2012) is now another successful milestone in these series of initiatives. the principles clarifies that international student rights are not linked to the visa status of the student. in our 2010 report, we argued for a national compact between students, institutions and government that could require sign on, performance and review. the main premise of the ahrc is to work in collaboration with several stakeholders responsible for addressing the issues and concerns faced by international students. the principles offers a national compact model that consults, engages and reviews student needs on an ongoing basis along with the 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 students and a number of stakeholders (ahrc, 2012, p. 14). more importantly, the ahrc is currently struggling to ‘elevate the importance of principles to people overseas such as education agents’, and much of their work in the area of wide adoption of the principles by universities has remained largely stagnant (ahrc, 2015). according to nyland et al. (2013), the efficacy of the overseas student ombudsman (oso) remains doubtful. the oso has refused to critically evaluate the international education industry (nyland, et al., 2013, p. 26). unlike the oso, the ahrc provided scholars and stakeholders with a platform to bridge the gap with international students. the ahrc engagement strategy was a multi-tiered and collaborative approach. it did not shy away from acknowledging and accepting the flawed export education market and the humiliation that its victims experienced. marginson (2012) points out that international students are systematically excluded from entitlements available to local students, such as subsidised transport, free medical care, student loans, and higher degree scholarships. indeed there are no minimum benchmarks in relation to service quality, either for local or for international students. thus international students pay more for the same education than local students and are more vulnerable to under-provision (marginson, 2012, p. 503). universities and colleges need to engage with local radio to develop programming that can respond to international student issues. one example of good practice is 2ser radio, which is a joint initiative between the university of technology sydney and macquarie university. at the start of the student protests in melbourne, one of the authors of this paper, devaki monani, launched ‘humaari awaarz’ (our voice) in hindi on the not-for-profit, community radio station 3cr. this program covered topics of racism amongst indian and australian cricketers in melbourne, as well as the student protests, and gave representation to the voices of many indians in melbourne. unfortunately, once the producer relocated, the show could not be continued, because indian students with limited resources did not have the time or financial support to carry it forward. programs like this have great potential for indian students as they give them the opportunity to express themselves in a non-judgemental environment with a pure, not for profit intent. they can add to the stream of shows supported by the special community broadcasting service (sbs)7. 7 there has recently been an increase in everyday hindi radio live streaming of indi pop bollywood music and news from india through sbs, pop desi (sbs, 2013). however, sbs hindi radio programming only reports on local news and brings music from home to listeners in australia. what continues to remain absent is an indian cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 75 in addition to radio content development, we also argued in our 2010 report for local facebook and twitter sites to become ways of building community, developing networks and keeping information flowing. the ahrc has now implemented this recommendation in its fourth principle of ‘empowering international students during their stay in australia by using social media’ as a key component of information sharing and promotion. this move is particularly appropriate for engaging with youth as it provides a more interactive platform for students to give feedback on the information they have received. the ahrc have currently not considered working with broadcast media. in our previous report we recommended a reality tv show on international students that follows them across the world, explores their experiences, and tracks their fights against scams and exploitation, as well as showing them enjoying the benefits of international education. we would like to see this production take place with a rights focus, and see a commercial channel or an international production house taking this plan forward. hopefully, this show would do more than show indians how ‘dumb, drunk and racist’ australians are considered (see the abc show, 2012). ideally it would reflect the marginalisation of international students and challenge bureaucracy and corruption in relation to higher education opportunities for international students. the movement behind the principles is still in its infancy. however, it is bringing us closer to achieving a more humane understanding of engaging with international students. conclusion international students remain a whole-of-society challenge, because they not only generate a whole-of-society benefit, but also reflect an intense vulnerability. they often carry a burden of expectation and emotional and financial investment from family that renders them wary of testing the capacity of the australian justice and human rights system to protect them. so while there are some representative bodies that can articulate their situations, often, individual students have little if any contact with them, while experiencing a deep reluctance to use them. the dynamic around the human rights of students illuminates the critical importance of the institutions of state and civil society recognising and reflecting their radio program that offers critical perspectives about the issues faced by indian migrants to australia, particularly the more recent and ongoing arrivals of international students. 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 specific circumstances and needs, and ensuring that the structures that citizens may take for granted are in fact pro-active in ensuring the rights of student sojourners. policy determination requires open conversations, stakeholder engagement and social change policies. australian governments need to ensure that international students continue to experience opportunities in australian society as active participants in learning and social interaction. given australia’s history, whole-of-government, cross-society, collaborative action can ensure optimum outcomes for australia, specific stakeholders, and the students themselves. the principles and the commitment reflected by the ahrc and individual scholars are designed to bring this about. brand australia in international student markets will need to reflect quality, diversity, justice and rights, not 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cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 http://www.ndtv.com/article/diaspora/yet-another-indian-attacked-in-australia-4667 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2012.01204.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2012.01204.x http://www.sbs.com.au/shows/popdesi/ http://www.sbs.com.au/radio/schedule2013 http://www.outlookindia.com/article/do-you-speak-australian/264016 https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/eserv/rmit:14041/n2006029271.pdf%20accessed%201%20november%202015 https://researchbank.rmit.edu.au/eserv/rmit:14041/n2006029271.pdf%20accessed%201%20november%202015 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2011.618110 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-05-29/anger-grows-over-indian-student-bashings/1697904 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-05-29/anger-grows-over-indian-student-bashings/1697904 mapping progress: human rights and international students in australia andrew jakubowicz university of technology sydney devaki monani australian catholic university abstract introduction racism and the lived experience of international students: issues remain unaddressed revisiting human rights for international students in australia conclusion references the women against rape in war collective's protests against anzac day in sydney, 1983 and 19841 meredith burgmann © 2014 meredith burgmann. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(3): 4222,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i3.4222 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia to begin with, i am not a feminist theorist with expertise in violence or masculinity. at the time i became involved in the anzac day protests i was a feminist academic, more interested in wage fixing systems and issues around equal pay than i was in issues to do with violence against women. however because i agreed to talk to this conference about my activity in the women against rape in war collective and our protests against anzac day i have obviously begun to think about our actions and have tried to put them into context. at the start of second wave feminism, during the late 1960s and early1970s, women began to look seriously at the issue of violence against women, particularly what we then called domestic violence. of course the seventies was the time of the establishment of the first women's refuges in sydney, most famously the occupation of the site that became elsie women's refuge in glebe. so we were thinking seriously about violence against women. also, our general political views were very informed by our earlier opposition to the vietnam war and to the build-up of nuclear weapons. these anti-war sentiments and our interest in male violence coalesced. as far as anzac day went, those of us active during the sixties and seventies were just totally opposed to it. the famous play, ‘the one day of the year’, had premiered in 1960 and it pretty much reflected our view, that anzac day was about old guys sitting around reminiscing about the glories of war. although there was in fact a clause in the geneva convention which outlawed sexual assault on women in war, it was not widely known and had never been invoked in legal cases or judgements. our opposition to anzac day was not specifically about rape in war. speaking for myself, i hadn't really thought about the issue previously. the union of australian women may day float in a 1965 carried anti-vietnam slogans and a plea ‘must children suffer?’ the plight of women in war was mostly depicted as being that of desperate mothers rather than as victims of sexual assault. however some of our leading theorists began to read the works of american radical feminist, mary daly, particularly her ‘state of rapism’ material (daly 1978) and we slowly started looking at the issue of rape in war. the sydney women against rape collective was formed with three aims, to mourn raped women of all countries in all wars; to publicly raise the issue of rape; and to oppose the system that creates rape and wars. as can be seen, these objects were influenced very specifically by the writings of mary daly. and those were also the days that we believed we could do anything. the hub of the organisation was macquarie university. macquarie was the most feminised university at that time. it was the most feminised because it began to employ large numbers of staff just at a time when women were beginning to complete their postgraduate qualifications and therefore were able to compete for positions. also it did not at that time have the large male faculties such as medicine, engineering, agriculture and so on. the main organisers and ideological mentors for the women against rape collective were sabine willis (later erika) and rosemary pringle. willis was a really remarkable woman, a quaker, a total pacifist and a fiercely intelligent academic, she was on the board of the australian council of churches. i had actually known her, since we were at beecroft public school together even though she was some years older than me. the other organizer, a politically active sociology academic, rosemary pringle, really came to the issue out of a socialist feminist tradition. i was easily inveigled into being part of the anzac day demonstration – i suppose they thought it was a done deal to get me to a demonstration. i greatly admired both these women and would have done whatever they told me. now who were we in this collective? rosemary pringle says that the collective was made up of radical feminists, socialist feminists and quaker pacifists. i think that was probably pretty true. although never very interested in labels i would have identified with the socialist feminists. pringle also says that the collective worked as well as it did because of this diversity and i agree with her. everyone just wanted to have a successful protest and i remember very few endless debates about tricky bits of ideology. our collective was obviously very influenced by the actions of our counterpart organization in canberra which had begun anzac day protests in 1981. we saw ourselves as following on after these actions. the canberra women had become embroiled in a controversy about a local public order regulation which had been altered in 1981 to make it unlawful to give offence to an anzac day participant. this dispute almost subsumed their premier objective and was not resolved until labor was elected in 1983 and tom uren repealed the public order act in december of that year. in 1983 when we decided to have our protest we applied for permission to march. it was refused. the leadership of the collective challenged the refusal and there was a court case which received extensive publicity because the women were challenging ‘the one day of the year’. the women against rape collective lost that case but the publicity continued. there was a picture in the newspapers of the leaders coming out of court. the leadership decided to march anyway. we had training sessions at quaker house, still in the same place – 119 devonshire street, surry hills, a suburb of sydney. the training sessions stressed non-violent non-cooperation. to reduce the prospect of violence, we decided to march shortly before the anzac march took place rather than directly confront it. we produced a large banner which said ‘we mourn all women raped in all wars’. our demonstration was different from the thrust of the melbourne demonstration. the melbourne anti-anzac day collective had put out a press release after their protest which declared that their demonstration ‘was not conceived as a protest against women raped in war although it was represented as such in the press. our action was more broadly conceived as a protest against patriarchal war against women which has been most clearly defined in daly's analysis.’ so the melbourne group were much more heavily influenced by mary daly. the melbourne group thought that we were wimps and perhaps we were. on anzac day itself, we all met at the little park in bridge street. there were 300 of us, all dressed in black. and we sang the judy small song, ‘it's not only men in uniform who pay the price of war’. we reminded each other to stay silent and be non-violent. we didn't really need much reminder of that. most of us were very nervous about what we were about to do. we marched down bridge street into george street, and started marching up george street, sydney's original high street and one of the busiest streets in the city. we were totally silent. we were met with a phalanx of police and eight paddy wagons. we then sat down in the middle of george street. at this stage those of us who for various reasons had decided that we didn't want to be arrested, moved to one side and stayed on the footpath. the remaining women, all 161 of them were arrested silently and, they hoped, with dignity. all the women who were sitting down in the street were removed by the police and charged. there was much publicity about this action. and my memory is that a lot of the publicity was about the fact that we had disrupted the march, which of course had not actually happened. that is still the perception even after all these years. after i delivered this talk at the conference i was having a chat, to a man called jeff bagnall, who at that stage was a photographer at the sydney morning herald. he told me that journalists were coming back to the newsroom from our dignified sit-down protest and were saying how disgusting we were and that we had disrupted anzac day. when sabine [willis] and i turned up at our work in the department of history, philosophy and politics at macquarie university the next day we were told we were disgraceful by our head of school – professor bruce harris. he was mainly angry because macquarie university had been mentioned in the media. sabine was very confident about this and was prepared to take him on. i must admit i was a bit more anxious about being roared up by our boss but we certainly didn't back down about the action that we had taken. even some quakers were opposed. one quaker said to sabine, ‘people are mourning lost relatives. they don't want to be confronted by a bunch of angry women.’ we were accused by the media of attacking anzac veterans and elderly servicemen. the women were all charged with causing serious alarm and affront and sabine's was the test case. those arrested were represented by a woman barrister, an academic at macquarie university, deirdre o'connor. she was later to head the industrial commission. we were able to prove that the police were not alarmed and affronted. the police ran in to some difficulty over faulty evidence and eventually no charges were successful. the following year we marched a different route. we were not interfered with. we ended up at the war memorial and we threw flowers into the pool of remembrance. it was really rather calm and peaceful. did we think our protests were a success? there was considerable publicity about the issue, both before and after the actual protest. between the court case about the right to march and the actual march itself, some of the collective took part in a phone-in at a rape crisis centre and a man even rang up wanting to march because his daughter had been raped. and so he marched … along the footpath beside the women. this probably would not have happened in melbourne with their more hard-line stance. ‘this day tonight’, an abc current affairs program, made a program about the protests but there was continuing vitriol from men for some time to come. i remember having a discussion with an older relative, a very non-violent nice man – who simply couldn't believe that rape in war happened. it was a very uncomfortable conversation to have with a close relative. he had been a soldier in borneo during the war and he couldn't understand why anyone would want to rape those women. i believe there is a real loss of the whole story of our protests about anzac day. amy way's article (2013) indicates that young women do not know the whole history of protest about anzac day, let alone the rape in war protests. anzac day now is perceived very differently. i see the new perception as not so much glorifying war as sentimentalizing it. christina twomey in ‘trauma and the reinvigoration of anzac’ writes ‘historians have advanced various theories about the reinvigoration of interest in anzac day and the embrace of australia's war heritage: the ‘memory boom,’ the ‘new nationalism’ of the 1970s and 1980s, a need for sacred ritual in a secular society, the immense popularity of genealogy, a bridge between the generations, more inclusive commemorative practices, the parochialism that has been the strange bedfellow of globalization, the wanderlust of the young, pump-priming from government and the ‘politics of nationalism in the 1980s’’ (2013, p. 86). i think all of those elements have a bearing on the situation. i believe another contributor to this giant sentimentalizing of anzac day, leading up to 2015 is the proliferation of history documentaries, particularly on cable tv channels such as the history channel. late at night there are endless documentaries about war. while they might not necessarily be glorifying or sentimentalizing war, young people are certainly seeing much more about the two world wars, than we ever saw as we were growing up. in conclusion, how do i view our protests of thirty years ago? in retrospect, we were amazingly intrepid and actually quite brave. of all the protest movements i have been involved with it was certainly the hardest to explain to outsiders. despite our courage, we didn't properly set out our issues about anzac day but what protest movements ever do? however it is salutary to document that only fifteen years later in 1998 the un international criminal tribunal for rwanda made landmark decisions defining rape as a crime of genocide under international law. this was a hugely significant decision. to quote judge navanethem pillay, the un high commissioner for human rights who stepped down on 1 september 2014, ‘from time immemorial, rape has been regarded as spoils of war. now it will be considered a war crime’. references berkeley, b. 1998, ‘judgment day’, washington post sunday magazine, 11 october, p. 10. daly, m. 1978, gyn/ecology: the metaethics of radical feminism, beacon press, boston. twomey, c. 2013 ‘trauma and the reinvigoration of anzac: an argument’, history australia, vol 10, no. 3, p.85-105. way, a. 2013, best we forget: women, rape and protest from the anzac myth and memorial, http://makinghistoryatmacquarie.wordpress.com/2013/11/18 footnotes 1memoir delivered at ‘women against rape in war: gallipoli to coniston’ conference, cosmopolitan civil societies research centre, university of technology, sydney 29 august 2014 and published here as a non-refereed contribution. imperialism, anzac nationalism and the aboriginal experience of warfare padraic gibson university of technology sydney jumbunna indigenous house of learning abstract aboriginal protest played a key role in undermining the celebratory settler-nationalism of the bicentennial in 1988. in the lead up to another major nationalist mobilisation, the centenary of the gallipoli invasion on anzac day 2015, extensive official efforts are being made to incorporate aboriginal experiences into the day, through celebration of the role of aboriginal people who served in australia’s armed forces. © 2014 padraic gibson. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(3): 4190,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i3.4190 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia this article provides a critical analysis of the 2014 naidoc theme as a way of exploring some of the tensions in this process. the naidoc theme, ‘serving country: centenary and beyond’, presented a continuity between aboriginal soldiers in ww1 and aboriginal warriors who fought in defence of their land during the 19th century frontier wars. in contrast, this article argues that the real historical continuity is between the massacres on the frontier, which often involved aboriginal troopers fighting for the colonial powers, and the invasions undertaken by australian soldiers in ww1. new research documenting the horrific scale on which aboriginal people were killed by native police in queensland in the second half of the 19th century is integrated with studies of the political economy of australian settler-capitalism in this period. this analysis is used to demonstrate how capitalist class interests drove both the frontier wars and the development of an australian regional empire, which was consolidated by the mobilisation of australian troops in ww1. aboriginal people and anzac day the commonwealth government is making extensive preparations for anzac day on 25 april 2015, marking 100 years since australian troops invaded turkey in ww1. this mobilisation of nationalist fervour will rival the 1988 ‘australia day’ celebrations, which marked 200 years since the january 26 invasion of sydney cove. in a contribution to the collection of essays what’s wrong with anzac, mark mckenna argues that the 1915 invasion has come to occupy a more serious position in the nationalist pantheon than that of 1788. mass protests by aboriginal people and supporters in 1988 seriously tainted january 26, ‘undercutting any attempt to present australia day as a rallying point for national pride’. protests had been held on january 26 many times prior and every year since, a consistent dent in australian nationalism. prime minister bob hawke began a process of shifting the focal point for celebration of australian nationalism to anzac day on april 25 in response to these protests. john howard pushed anzac day even harder, with large-scale funding commitments to reshape teaching, research and entertainment agendas to expand the scale and reach of anzac commemoration. but the elevation of anzac has raised its own set of questions about the brutal racism suffered by aboriginal people throughout australia’s history. alongside the howard’s anzac ‘revolution’, aboriginal people who had served in australia’s armed forces became increasingly vocal about the discrimination they suffered. the formation of indigenous veterans’ associations and advocacy groups, like the coloured diggers group in redfern, helped to popularise knowledge of this racism; this racism was evident in experiences such as the exclusion of aboriginal returned service men and women from rsl clubs and honour rolls, the discriminatory restrictions on indigenous enlistment that persisted into the second half of the 20th century and apartheid-style conditions that many soldiers were forced to endure when they returned to their communities despite having ‘fought for their country’ (korff 2014). a black diggers march was started in redfern in 2007, highlighting the experience of racist exclusion suffered by indigenous soldiers. originally it was criticised as being divisive by the rsl (bibby 2007), but one outcome of the marches has been the approval now of a separate memorial to honour aboriginal servicemen and women in hyde park, set to be unveiled at the 2015 centenary (taylor 2013). humphrey mcqueen (2014) argues: anxious to bring the indigenous inside the tent, the war memorial now stage-manages – after decades of neglect – a special ceremony to honour the indigenous who served. aboriginal activist ray jackson, whose father fought in ww2, raised concerns in an opinion piece this year about the extent to which the ‘black diggers’ event was being incorporated into settler nationalism, citing the presence of many prominent politicians, the crowd standing twice for the national anthem and the dropping of references to aboriginal warriors who fought defending their lands from british invasion (jackson 2014). jackson’s last point highlights the more contentious ‘aboriginal question’ that has been raised by the elevation of anzac. why so much focus on wars australians fought overseas, when the history of warfare on this continent remains largely buried? there are thousands of monuments to australian warriors that died on foreign shores, but barely a handful marking the systematic massacres of aboriginal people or their tenacious resistance over a 150 year period from 1788. the australian war memorial promotes a ‘rich collection of material relating to indigenous service men and women’, but it has steadfastly refused to include any mention of frontier wars within the memorial (daley, 2014). henry reynolds argues in forgotten war: ‘aborigines who fought for the white man are given reverence. the many more who fought against him are forgotten’ (2013, p. 12). reynolds book was published specifically as a challenge to include serious remembrance of frontier wars through the centenary of anzac: …it will be unconscionable to indulge in a crescendo of commemoration and ignore the fundamental importance of the war between settlers and indigenous nations in australia (2013, p. 12). the 2014 celebrations organised by the national aboriginal and islander day observance committee (naidoc), made a strong attempt to bridge this divide. naidoc is well attended by aboriginal people and their supporters right across the country. nakkiah lui argues (2014) that festivities are shaped by commonwealth funding and involvement, pushing the focus towards celebration and ‘reconciliation’ rather than protest. the event poster in 2014 featured artwork showing aboriginal members of the australia army, navy and airforce (naidoc 2014). naidoc promotional material explained: this year’s naidoc theme honours all aboriginal and torres strait islander men and women who have fought in defence of country. from our warriors in the frontier wars to our warriors who have served with honour and pride in australia’s military conflicts and engagements across the globe. we proudly highlight and recognise the role they have played in shaping our identity and pause to reflect on their sacrifice. we celebrate and honour their priceless contribution to our nation. the defence force itself played a strong role in naidoc celebrations across the country. in brisbane, the adf was a major sponsor of the community festival attended by many thousands of aboriginal people, with a prominent recruitment stall. in perth, the naidoc ball had an army theme, with attendees encouraged to wear combat fatigues or other military uniforms. but this continuity, as presented by the naidoc theme, between aboriginal warriors who fought invasion and those who served in australia’s armed forces, is fundamentally mistaken. there is a real danger of the proud tradition of aboriginal resistance to british invasion being used bolster the militaristic, nationalist ideology being carefully cultivated through the anzac centenary. this paper will argue that aboriginal people fighting in defence of their land in the frontier wars were challenging the forces of settler capitalist1 expansion. in the second half of the 19th century, when the frontier wars were at their peak, the same settler capitalist class, many of whom had built fortunes by slaughtering aboriginal people and taking their land in the name of the british empire, began to develop a vision of their own sub-empire in the pacific. the australian ‘frontier’ was pushed further forward in the opening phases of ww1, with australian forces occupying a number of pacific island colonies. the deployment of australian military alongside broader british imperial forces in europe and the middle east was seen as down-payment on more strident british support for the hegemony of the australian settler capitalist regime in the south pacific. the naidoc theme also serves to mask a tragic, confronting and rarely explored fact about the frontier wars, that it was aboriginal people wearing the uniforms of the colonial forces who did some of the heaviest fighting. the history of aboriginal people in military uniform does not start with the boer war, as presented by the naidoc promotional material and the growing history of aboriginal service. as early as the 1830s, a native police force had been established in the new colonial settlement of port phillip (fels 1988), an example soon followed in other colonies. native police forces placed aboriginal people on the front lines of atrocities committed on the expanding frontier right across australia. created by parliaments in sydney, adelaide and most notoriously in brisbane, both native police troopers and their aboriginal victims were subject to perhaps the most brutalising process of the australian colonial experience. from the queensland frontier to ww1 recent research about the frontier wars in queensland has demonstrated in graphic detail the slaughter of aboriginal people on a scale and intensity beyond anything previously considered in australian acedmic history. the genocide perpetrated upon aboriginal people in queensland was almost absolute. introducing timothy bottoms (2013) conspiracy of silence, raymond evans estimates that more than 250,000 aboriginal people lived in the area now known as queensland before colonisation. by ww1 the population had been reduced to less than 20,000 (bottoms 2013). in a short conference paper in 2014, evans and ørsted-jensen presented research based on newly discovered native police files, estimating the number of aboriginal people directly killed by native police attacks in queensland at 41,000 and the number killed in violent conflict overall at over 60,000. bottoms (2013) graphically details the nature of the horrors that were perpetrated. one example given of native police atrocities comes from oral history accounts from the girramay, jirrbal and warungu people in north queensland. bottoms recounts a story told to him by ernie grant, whose grandfather willy lee had witnessed the events in question: the native police and settlers surrounded my mum and dad’s camp and shot my parents and two brothers. then we were chained up and marched towards kirrima station to horse-swamp creek. they rounded the old people up and women and children, and lined them up, children in one line, women in another and the men behind them in line. they then raised the british flag and proceeded to shoot all of the men and smash all the children’s heads against tree trunks. then they raped all the women and shot them, but one (native police) trooper went on to have sex with one of the dead women. he was unable to withdraw from her body as her pelvis had collapsed and as a result he was shot and left at the site. conspiracy of silence is important not just for its exposure of the horrors that took place in queensland, but for the way it starts to integrate this research with existing analysis of the political economy of the colony, demonstrating how the slaughter was organised and identifying the interests that were served. taking this integration further can assist with an understanding of the relationship between the expansion of settler capitalism in the second half of the nineteenth century and the contemporaneous development an australian imperialism in the south pacific. bottoms cites the work of bill thorpe, particularly colonial queensland (1996), which includes detailed study of the class interests controlling the state apparatus in queensland. thorpe argues that the key figures in the establishment of a new locus of colonial state power in brisbane in 1859, breaking away from the government in sydney, were pastoral capitalists, ‘many of whom had come north from the new england region of nsw as a ruling class’. thorpe (1996, p. 45) cites articles from the contemporary queensland press to argue: [t]hose urging separation from nsw in the mid 1850s wanted direct political control, through a queensland parliament, over the native police force, which was still under the jurisdiction of state officials based in sydney, so that ‘freeholders, occupiers of crown land’ and ‘stockholders’ could protect themselves and their property from aboriginal attacks. nsw had established a native police force in 1848. before the transition to queensland control, the white officers of the native police were already leading large scale killing missions in the areas now known as queensland, operating under orders to ‘at all times and opportunities to disperse any large assemblages of blacks’ (reynolds 1990, p.53). from 1859, the force reported directly to the colonial secretary now ruling the new colony from brisbane. under this administration they received a renewed injection of resources and political support, operating as a standing death squad for the next 50 years across the queensland frontier. leading politician john douglas, directly responsible for the force when he was colonial secretary in 1877-78, said in parliament of the native police: (they) did nothing else but shoot them down whenever they could get at them. that was the sole function of the native police. as far as could be judged from the instructions and practice, they were chiefly kept as a military force dispersing natives when they congregated and patrolling districts to drive the blacks into positions where they would not come into contact with the european settlers (reynolds 2013, p. 119). when first assembled, the chief concern of the queensland parliament was rapid expansion of the pastoral industry. the council was composed of property owners who had ambitions for more land and excess stock available for quick sale (bottoms 2013). state coffers could be filled quickly leasing aboriginal lands. strict stocking rules ensured that any lease granted must be hastily occupied by large numbers of live-stock. through the 1860s, as aboriginal peoples were destroyed at the hands of both the native police and settler parties, the queenslander boasted that ‘during no preceding time in the whole history of our colonisation here’ had there been ‘an equal breadth of new country taken up and stocked in any of the colonies’ (thorpe 1996, p. 118). as the new colony became established, these capitalist politicians became the lead actors in a process of economic development still centred on pastoralism, but diversifying into agriculature, mining and commercial and trading services in brisbane and other coastal centres. bottoms quotes thorpe’s description of the hegemony over state power in queensland held by a nexus around the businessmen arthur palmer and thomas mcilwraith, who were also both colonial secretaries through the 1870s and 80s: the palmer-mcilwraith alliance either owned, controlled or directed the major economic activities in this period: pastoralism, mining, timber milling, sugar production, banking, shipping, trade, finance, land-speculation, railway construction and the media (thorpe 1996, p. 159). in his discussion of this alliance, thorpe stresses their connections both to international financial interests and ‘colonial capitalists’ in other australian capital cities. economic historian philip mcmichael (1984) emphasises how by the late 1850s pastoralism in australia, which had always had a capitalist dynamic, had become a sophisticated enterprise, heavily integrated into international commerce through a process of profound ‘urban financial penetration of pastoralism’. this new industry structure emerged from the wake of the 1840s economic crisis, the end of convict transportation and new laws which formally commodified land. increasingly, land leases were being taken by pastoral companies, directly by banks or by powerful individual capitalists heavily enmeshed in broader commercial networks, like those analysed by thorpe. pastoralism was a central component of an ‘agroindustrial complex’ which dominated politics in colonial australia. it was the expansionist requirements of capital accumulation which pushed the bloody frontier deeper into the north and west of queensland. this increasing economic and technological sophistication of pastoral expasion was matched by similar developments in the military force being used to suppress aboriginal resistance. as bottoms notes, ‘gun technology advanced in the decades following the colonisation of queensland, and breech-loading snider carbines (used by the native police) were far more effective killing impliments’ (2013, [p. 121]). evans and ørsted-jensen (2014, p.1) say ‘during the 1860s, before this conflict had peaked, colonial observers agreed that “hundreds and hundreds were shot every year”’. by the 1870s, they were speaking in terms of ‘thousands’.’ tony roberts (2009) has described similar processes at work in the gulf country of the northern territory (nt). colonial politicians in adelaide, with extensive business interests in expanding pastoralism, resourced the frightful massacres in the gulf country in the early 1880s to secure stolen lands: these were huge stations, with an average size of almost 16,000 square kilometres. by the end of the year 1881 the entire gulf district (an area the size of victoria, which accounted for a quarter of the territory’s pastoral country) had been leased to just 14 landholders, all but two of whom were wealthy businessmen and investors from the eastern colonies… in just four years the aboriginal population of at least 4000… was dispossessed of every inch of land. successful investors included the north australian pastoral company, whose founding member was premier mcilwraith discussed above (beanland 2013) and who still hold leases in the region. the queensland native police undertook regular punitive expeditions across the western border of queensland into nt gulf country to support the suppression of aboriginal resistance to this dispossession (roberts, 2005). the settler-capitalist class which controlled colonial parliaments was becoming increasingly integrated across the australian continent and self-aware of their distinct interests. henry parkes argued to the federation conference in 1890: ‘we must make ourselves a united people and appear before the world as one. the term “going home” must die away… we are “australian” and rich men remain on the spot’ (federation conference 1890). central to the growth of this class consciousness of ‘australian… rich men’, was realisation of the need to make independent calculations about their strategic position in the region. in the second half of the 19th century there was heavier lobbying of britain for a more aggressive military posture in the south pacific (thompson 1980). the australians wanted security of trade routes and the maintenance of their own strategic position against other imperial powers increasingly active in the region, especially germany and france. in 1883, at the height of the massacres of aboriginal people on the northern frontier, queensland premier mcilwraith sent an expedition to plant the union jack at port moresby and annex new guinea to queensland, east of the line demarking dutch occupation (overlack 1979). leading australian politicians organised a ‘convention of the colonies’, to rally behind his actions. will mcilwraith, the premier’s brother, described the rationale behind his action in a newspaper editorial: the principal objects sought by the present annexation are the protection of the australian colonies from the interference or domination of a foreign power, and the conservation of our commercial interests in the southern seas and in connection with new guinea (thompson 1980, p. 55). the convention proclaimed an australian ‘monroe doctrine… declaring that “australia cannot be secure if any other power is allowed to establish itself between the australian coast and south america”’ (thompson 1980, p. 87). delegates also passed the first resolutions on the need for a federation with explicit powers over pacific island colonies. these resolutions reflect some of the concerns that led to the federation convention, which eventually lead to a united australian parliament. the queensland action was taken to try and force the hand of the british government, who had refused australian requests for annexation of new guinea. the british were worried about provoking a reaction from other imperial powers capable of retaliating in areas they considered more strategically important such as the middle east. the government in london was also under humanitarian pressure about the implications of a brutal colonial parliament like queensland ruling indigenous people in new guinea (rose, 1959). arthur gordon, the high commissioner on the western pacific, wrote he could ‘hardly conceive of a government more unfit’ for that responsibility than queensland, who regarded aboriginal people ‘as vermin to be cleaned off the face of the earth’ (thompson 1980, p. 65). eventually, after germany moved to annex the north of new guinea, the british proclaimed a protectorate over the south of the island. however, the burgeoning australian ruling class had learnt an important lesson about the need to increase their own independent strength. in the speech quoted above, henry parkes used the humiliating experience of queensland’s retreat from new guinea to bolster his calls for a federation of all australian colonies during the 1890 convention: i have no doubt whatever in my mind… if australia could have spoken with one voice in the year 1883, new guinea would have belonged to australia. australia ought to be mistress of the southern seas. the trade, the commerce… of these groups of rich islands ought to centre in our ports. and with these advantages, we ought to hold mastery of the hemisphere. that is our destiny, and it will come (munday 1968, p. 115). this destiny did indeed come, though for full fruition it would have to wait until ww1. in 1911, as it became obvious war was approaching, the now federated australian commonwealth government had drawn up plans for the full realisation of the australian munroe doctrine. new scholarship from douglas newtown shows they had plans for rapid and far reaching colonial conquest in the south pacific and south-east asia including present-day indonesia and timor (newtown 2014). when war was declared, the australian government moved immediately to occupy german colonies in the pacific. their first action in the war was the deployment of troops to occupy new guinea. six australian soldiers died in fighting near rabul in new guinea in the opening battle for the island, along with 30 germans and 33 new guineans on the german side (orsag 2014). from the beginning, there has been a strain of anzac nationalism that that remembers gallipoli solemnly, but with a strong dose of resentment. it was after all a fruitless campaign to further, not any particular australian interests, but those of the british empire.2 certainly, australian troops invaded gallipoli at british behest and under british command. the australian politicians who sent these troops to die, however, were no simple dupes of britain. the speeches of prime minister billy hughes at the paris peace conference, for example, show that his government saw the shedding of australian blood in europe and the middle east as a down payment on british and other allied protection of australian capitalist control of the whole continent and a sub-empire in the pacific. hughes still had troops occupying islands formally held by germany. he demanded these territories be subject to australian laws, including provisions to exclude non-white entry and settlement (orsag 2014). hughes played a key role scuttling japan’s attempts to have a racial equality clause in the league of nations charter. he spoke of australia’s ‘monroe doctrine in the south pacific’, in the same terms as his forefathers in the 1880s. the islands seized in ww1, while granted formal independence in the second half of the twentieth century, have never come out from under the shadow of australian colonial control and some now form part of the ‘gulag archipelago’ warehousing unwanted refugees. so the australian capitalist class, who built their fortunes waging genocidal warfare against aboriginal people to seize the australian continent, fought ww1 to guarantee a much expanded sphere of influence to secure an australian regional empire. imperialism and ‘native’ soldiers both frontier wars and australian imperialism in the pacific were part of a global imperialist system dividing up the world in the 19th century, as industrial capitalism entered a new stage of development and expansion. every single major european power needed guaranteed access to raw materials and markets for the firms based within their borders. they also coveted the military means to deprive their rivals of access (harman 2009). the height of the slaughter in queensland and the birth of australian imperialist strategy coincided with a dramatic acceleration in both capitalist development and imperialist competition worldwide. in 1875, only 10% of africa was under formal colonial control. in the quarter century to 1900 this figure increased to 90%. a majority of the fighting to secure these colonies was actually done by africans themselves, who were either conscripted or employed as mercenaries (harman 2009). a similar strategy of mobilising soldiers drawn from the ranks of colonised people was used for warfare being waged to put down anti-colonial insurgency across the world. west indian regiments composed of former slaves were a garrison force on the islands, but also in west africa (richards 2008). the british raj inherited an army of more than 200,000 indian soldiers who had fought in the service of the east india company (rettig & hack 2006). richards (2008) has shown how colonial administrators who established and maintained native police units in australia studied the british imperial experience of using ‘native’ soldiers. others, such as warburton in south australia, had active experience commanding native regiments in other colonial contexts (foster & nettleback 2012). governor bowen, the first governor of queensland, named the malay corps in ceylon (now sri lanka), the cape regiment in the cape colony (now south africa), and the native units of the indian army as inspiration for the queensland native police, in letters to the secretary of state for colonies (richards 2008). using these forces had a number of benefits for the colonial powers in many different settings across the globe, including knowledge of terrain and language and bush skills and ability to survive off the land. one of the main motivations was minimising the cost of colonial war, ‘native police forces expected less, were paid less and their overall costs was far less than maintaining european armies’ (richards 2005, p. 27). marie fels (1988) argues that the establishment of the port philip native police force in 1837, the first in australia, was in large part a ‘civilising mission’ in relation to the aboriginal people surrounding the new colonial settlement, along with the need to deal with threats to the social order coming from bushrangers and to a lesser extent aboriginal ‘outrages’. fels’s study is at pains to emphasise the ‘positive choice’ of the aboriginal men who joined the force, arguing it is ‘story of co-operation’. recruits were drawn from leaders of local clans, who sought to increase their status and influence both within ‘traditional’ aboriginal society and the colonial order and made a collective decision to enter the force. fels says records of native police activities show that these leaders also had some ‘success’ in their role as troopers, managing to ‘mediate’ antagonism between white and black, using their position to protect the kin from colonial violence while also increasing their advantages over rival tribal groups distant from port phillip. fels denies that frontier conflict in what is now victoria amounted to a war and says there is no evidence of large scale killing committed by the native police. this interpretation has been challenged, both in terms of the quality of the ‘choice’ available to aboriginal people whose way of life had been smashed and in terms of the scale of killings. whereas fels’ narrative of colonisation of port phillip is one of peaceful settlement, bruce pascoe writes about a bloody war (pascoe 2007) and the decimation of aboriginal livelihood, including the loss of extensively cultivated yam daisy in the space of a couple of years, as grazing sheep destroyed the crop (pascoe 2014). this strengthens the case of mackay (2013), that those who joined the police did so ‘as captives of a regime which manipulated their minds and controlled their bodies’. richards (2005) cites numerous scholars who argue the port phillip police did commit atrocities, particularly in gippsland, before demoralisation and sackings led to the disbanding of the force in 1851. these debates aside, all scholars are in agreement that there was a qualitative difference between the port phillip native police and the queensland experience. most striking is the explicit rationale provided for the various forces – ‘keeping the peace’ and ‘civilising the natives’ in the case of port philip, ‘shooting them down whenever they could get at them’ in the case of queensland. as argued above, a crucial factor driving these differences is changes to the political economy of pastoralism between the 1840s at the height of the port phillip force’s activities and the 1860s – 80s which were the ‘zenith of the violence’ (bottoms 2013) in queensland. this change in function also drove changes in composition of the force itself. in port phillip many native police were able to remain living with their kin, were given leave for corroborees and hunting and while on patrol were relating to other aboriginal groups that, in many cases, had long standing tribal relations with their clans. in queensland, there was an explicit policy to draft recruits from distant southern areas, already decimated by colonisation, and deploy them hundreds of kilometres to the north. commandant edric morisset reported to colonial secretary robert herbert in 1860, that ‘it is absolutely necessary to recruit in a district as far as possible from that in which the men have to serve’. there is some evidence that forces initially deployed outwards from brisbane used recruits from the murray and darling rivers in nsw, whereas operations into the north and west of queensland came to rely on aboriginal recruits from the now heavily colonised south east (richards 2008). there was also a policy of ensuring that men from similar tribal groups were separated into different units, to ensure that no aboriginal group loyalties within the ranks of a unit could compromise the authority of the white officers (reynolds 1990). in these circumstances, the impact of pre-existing tribal alliances and rivalries on the operations of the native police, which are central for fels’s study of port phillip, disappear in the case of queensland. unlike the port phillip experience, where extensive records were kept on individual native police (fels, 1988), richards could find no trace of a staff file for any aboriginal member of the native police in queensland. there were, however, records to indicate between 900-1000 aboriginal people served over the 60 year period that the queensland force was in operation (richards 2008). this is a similar number to the estimate of aboriginal people who fought in ww1. also, unlike victoria, there are no official records of the recruiting process used to bring troopers into the queensland force, outside a handful of press reports and snippets of official commentary. richards argues (2005, p. 160) that any analysis of ‘personal motivations (for joining the force) must remain speculative’. reynolds argues that native police were recruited from a cohort of survivors from dispossessed aboriginal peoples, ‘young men who were learning to survive on the fringes of white society’, who had begun unpaid work as labourers and stockmen. he quotes a ‘squatter-politician’, commenting in 1858, just before the transfer of power to queensland, ‘it’s not wild men we want for troopers, but men broken in by the squatters’. according to reynolds (1990, p. 75): while many may have been pressed into the force, there were good reasons for service as troopers, rather than work as ‘stockboys’. the queensland native police pay of 5d a day was much less than (white) constables received but it was rare for stockmen to be paid anything at all… they were also better clothed than stockmen or fringe-dwellers and better fed as well. while recruitment with promises of pay and status was one thing, retaining troopers forced to undertake the brutal work of frontier warfare was quite another. there were mass desertions recorded in virtually every year that the queensland native police were in operation and this was a perpetual source of anxiety amongst colonial administrators. a good indication of how frequent desertions were comes from a 1863 request from commandant bligh, who asked permission to recruit eighty troopers, although only fifty were required. the extra number was necessary to allow for ‘possible desertions and discharges of incurable invalids’ (richards 2005, p. 203). there was a formal policy of executing deserters, though it’s unclear how many were carried out (reynolds 1990). there is also evidence of recruits from the darling river in 1860 deserting in large numbers before even entering service, who were simply ‘recaptured’ and pressed into service (richards 2005). richards (2005) cites numerous contemporary reports to demonstrate a widespread fear in the frontier settler populations of the implications of desertions from the native police. partly, racist ideas about inherently ‘savage’ troopers fuelled this anxiety. but aboriginal people who trained in the use of firearms, deserted with those arms and then moved amongst the insurgent indigenous populations in the frontier areas, were a real threat to settler life and property. in this sense, some of the native police ended up resisting the colonial invasion in a unique way, both by disrupting the recruitment of forces and joining the resistance. in contrast to native police troopers, records exist for all the white officers who were in command of the different native police units that made up the queensland force. richards (2005) demonstrates that many were intimately connected into the networks of power and patronage of colonial society. but they rode and fought on the frontier with the men they commanded. the fact that 20 of the 150 officers he examines died while serving gives some indication of the fierce nature of this fighting. when considering the continuity between australia’s frontier wars and imperialist wars abroad, the boer war is an important turning point. as late as 1902 there is evidence of native police killing people in queensland (bottoms 2013). in the same year, lord kitchener from britain requested 50 black trackers for the boer war. the australian war memorial say there is evidence in military records of queensland providing at least four aboriginal trackers for this purpose (pianegonda 2014). the break-up of the queensland native police in the early 20th century signaled a winding down of heavy military hostilities on the frontier. however, black trackers across australia continued to be an important auxiliary for regular police work in many places. well into the 20th century, this could mean participation in violent raids against aboriginal people including at coniston in 1928, where aboriginal trackers accompanied gallipoli veteran and ‘protector of aborigines’ george murray on a murderous rampage through warlpiri and anmatjere country in central australia (midlam 2010). despite the rapidly growing body of historical work documenting frontier wars in australia, there has been no serious academic analysis of the impact that the specific experience of violence perpetrated by the native police had on aboriginal communities. the promise when native police enlisted into the queensland force, was that they would be returned to their home communities once the term of service had passed. however there exists no evidence that this ever took place (richards, 2005). more likely than making the journey thousands of kilometres home completely unassisted by government is that many of these of the former troopers had to try and make a life in the areas they found themselves once released from service. in the apartheid ‘aboriginal reserves’ policy that began to operate in queensland from the late 19th century, what historian rosalind kidd (1997) has described as a system of prisons without walls, it is very likely that at least some of these troopers and their children found themselves living amongst the very tribes they had participated in massacring. it is hard to conceive of the deep psychological scars left by this particular form of colonial brutality, both for those who did the killing, those who were killed and all of their kin. there has been extensive work done on the psychological and broader social impacts of the trauma associated with conflict on australia’s returned servicemen and women throughout history3. for aboriginal troopers, this trauma would have been compounded by their consistent immersion in the horrible social consequences of the war they prosecuted, having the history of their experience suppressed and having the colonial system they served forcing them to live under a dehumanising regime. in an intellectual climate where ‘traditional’, pre-contact, aboriginal culture is consistently blamed for the extreme rates of contemporary inter-personal violence in some communities (jarrett 2013), the implications of this trauma demand further investigation. it is hard to conceive of a more violent historical influence on aboriginal society than the colonial authorities that put guns in the hands of desperate people and ordered them to massacre entire communities in the name of progress and civilisation. invasion then and now this article has argued the clear continuity between the war against aboriginal people on the australian frontier and the rise of australian imperialism, including australia’s entry into ww1. what drove both were expansionist needs of the capitalist economy and the particular strategic interests of an emerging australian settler capitalist class. celeste liddle, responding to the 2014 naidoc theme, provided a timely reminder of another continuity – the many leading aboriginal people who continued to fight for their lands in the 20th century, while also resisting australian imperialist interventions overseas. research by john maynard (2014) into the aboriginal experience of ww1 has demonstrated how his grandfather, fred maynard, who went on to establish the australian aborigines progressive association (aapa), joined his comrades in the waterside workers union campaigning against conscription. liddle (2014) points to the activism of victorian aboriginal leader william cooper in the 1930s, who led a protest march to the german embassy against kristallnacht and growing nazi aggression. cooper went on to oppose the enlistment of aboriginal soldiers to fight in world war ii, arguing ‘the aboriginal now has no status, no rights, no land… nothing to fight for but the privilege of defending a land taken from him... without any compensation or kindness’ (hoek 2009). many of the aboriginal people who led the resurgence of aboriginal political activism in the early 1970s were active participants in the movement against the vietnam war. the ferment of struggles for liberation by colonised peoples across the world provided strong inspiration for a radical activism that took forward important struggles of aboriginal rights, such as land rights and the formation of aboriginal community controlled organisations. these activists identified with the vietnamese people who were resisting australian soldiers, and challenged non-indigenous activists in the anti-war protest movement to move into struggle against the ongoing colonial occupation of the continent they called home (liddle 2014). similarly, when john howard sent australian troops (many of them aboriginal members of norforce) into aboriginal communities, a show of force as part of the northern territory intervention, a number of activists who had been drawn into struggle against the australian invasion of iraq played an important role organising protest action against the intervention (gibson 2012). just as the historic theft of aboriginal land continues to form the basis of the settler capitalist property regime domestically, australia remains an imperialist power in the south pacific (o’lincoln 2014). the australian airforce and navy dominate the seas and sky, australian troops and federal police are stationed on islands throughout the region and australia corporations dominate the regional economy. since wwii, this position has required the support of the us imperial umbrella in place of the british, and australian troops have served in many us led wars to secure this support. indeed the current us-australian occupation of iraq will feature strongly in the upcoming anzac celebrations. the ruling class in australia takes their campaign for an imperialist australian nationalism very seriously indeed. according to james brown (2014, p. 19): all told, the centenary will cost australian state and federal taxpayers nearly $325 million. with an additional $300 million expected in private donations, commemorating the anzac centenary might cost as much as two-thirds of a billion dollars. despite the attempt to incorporate aboriginal experiences into a celebration of anzac, the history of the aboriginal experience of warfare – on both sides of the frontier and beyond – will continue to pose challenges. but as both the intensity of the official anzac ideological campaign and the experience of 1988 show clearly, recognition of this history requires a fight. references beanland, d. 2013, the queensland caesar: sir thomas mcilwraith, boolarong press, brisbane. beilharz, p. & cox, l. 2007, ‘settler-capitalism revisited’, thesis eleven, vol. 88 no. 1 pp 112-124. bibby, p. 2007, ‘it’s been a long walk: blacks unite for march’, sydney morning herald, sydney, australia, accessed 14 august 2014 http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/its-been-a-long-walk-blacks-unite-for-march/2007/04/16/1176696757591.html bottoms, t. 2013, conspiracy of silence: queensland’s frontier killing times, allen and unwin, sydney. brown, j. 2014, anzac’s long shadow: the cost of our national obsession, black inc., melbourne. daly, p. 2014, ‘indigenous australian’s in wartime: it’s time to tell the whole story’, the guardian, accessed 16 august 2014 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(eds), 2006, colonial armies in south east asia, routledge, london. twomey, c. 2013, ‘trauma and the reinvigoration of anzac’, history australia, vol. 10, no. 3, monash university epress, clayton, pp. 85-108. footnotes 1 in a recent literature review, beilharz & cox (2007, p.112) define settler-capitalism as ‘the distinctive form that capitalism took in the white settler colonies of the british empire and the temperate zones of south america… resemblances included an early and significant degree of political autonomy from the imperial power out of which they were established; the early commodification of land and hence labour, with a corresponding absence of a large peasantry … mass immigration of white settlers from the metropolitan power and the attendant physical and cultural destruction, or at least the brutal subjugation, of indigenous populations. this final characteristic was the original presupposition and condition for all the other features noted.’ 2 see for example, paul keating’s attitude to gallipoli, discussed by mckenna (2010). 3 twomey (2013) has argued ‘ultimately the traumatising effects of war, and sympathy for its victims, have become a central trope in the post-1980s incarnation of anzac’. 41 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 wai-wan chan. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(1): 4369, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i1.4369 performing work: locality, embodied practice and career mobility of chinese women bankers in hong kong wai-wan chan university of technology sydney abstract women are emerging as significant actors in international financial industries concentrated in metropolitan cities which function as national and international business hubs. based on 17 in-depth interviews with chinese women bankers in hong kong, where one finds the highest concentration of banking institutions in the world, this paper examines the interplay between locality, gender performance and the career mobility of women bankers. the author argues that branch location is embedded within hierarchical fields of power and leads to different client groups, and ultimately, to different opportunities for upward mobility. women bankers in hong kong are skilled in displaying multiple identities by using differentiated styles of language and different tongues, or languages, when interacting with different client groups in different branches. this strategy involves evaluative interpretation of perception because clients themselves make class distinctions according to different service settings. although mid-level management teams in the banking industry have recently been rapidly feminised, this paper demonstrates that the glass ceiling is still real and continues to exert its invisible, negative impact. the upward mobility of chinese women bankers is often blocked by informal barriers deeply embedded in the social structure and culture of both local society and international companies. these structural barriers and their resultant structured disadvantages for women are the consequence of the intersection, and sometimes the collusion, of ethnic politics, business or capitalist interests and social norms. factors and structural forces such as race, ethnicity and gender are intertwined with and compounded to produce deep and far-reaching effects that are often beyond the control of the individual actor. introduction financial industries in world cities are the most globalised and dominant force in the world economy. women are quickly emerging as significant actors in international financial industries. although there has been an increase in studies on female managers in international settings (adler & izraeli 1988, 1994; davidson & burke 1994, 2000; krieg 2006), women professionals who work in banking and financial industries of world cities have remained relatively invisible. ‘economic and social repercussions of financial crises are shaped by explicit and implicit ideologies and practices of gender’ (pollard 2012, p. 416). studying the experiences of female elites working in the banking sector of world cities is important as it https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i1.4369 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 will enable us to better understand the emerging ‘financializing capitalism’ (pollard 2012, p. 416) and the global phenomenon of the feminisation of mid-level management teams in service industries. the relationship between place and an individual’s performance is dynamic. ‘all people are geographical beings’ and ‘place, space, and geography exert power that is basic to every human thought and activity’ (sack 1993, p. 328). people and objects interact in space and space has an effect on these interactions due to norms of behaviour which govern the interactions. the function of distance and the meaning of landscape have an effect on spatial interaction as ‘people are always in a place, and places constrain and enable. … not only can place help mold or destroy the self, it can also liberate it’ (sack 1993, p. 329). we cannot truly understand business strategy and individual performance until we put them within a location and social contexts. the existing literature has not yet grasped the complexity of the dynamic relationship between geographical place, women bankers’ daily performance in the workplace and their career development in the globalised banking industry. this paper aims to explain how the locality of a bank lays the groundwork for differential self-identity, social engagement, work experience, and ultimately, the career opportunity of chinese women bankers in hong kong – a subject which has yet to receive substantial attention in international literature. i argue that an individual’s opportunity for career development is embedded in the social geography of work and the economic geography of firms. this research of chinese women bankers in hong kong will contribute to a deeper understanding of the international banking environment and reveal the need to maximise women’s strengths and contributions in the industry. performing work in the service industry in our everyday lives, people manage settings, clothing, words, and nonverbal actions in order to give a particular impression to others in different places, spaces or locations. thus, each individual’s ‘performance’ in the ‘presentation of self’, or ‘impression management’, creates specific impressions in the minds of others (chan & chan 2011; goffman 1959; mcdowell 1997). the commercial influences casting women as objects of desire and sexuality (hooper 1998) and the global service industry in general, increasingly demand a strong emotional connection between service providers and their clients (mcdowell 2009). body image as a disguise for the brain is a palpable tactic used in business. the skill of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 43 manipulation of body image and emotions is an integral part of selling a product (hochschild 1983). the business of banking is intertwined with social, economic, cultural and psychological conditions. understanding performance is an innovative way of understanding banking culture. ‘capitalism is gendered’ (mcdowell 2010, p. 652). research on merchant banks in the city of london focused on actual practices of bankers and found that specific forms of masculine and feminine identities were reinforced. men and women engaged in interactive service work constructed differential fictions in a professional capacity (mcdowell & court 1994; 2008). in merchant banks, success in dealing, trading, and selling are conventionally associated with masculinity, aggression, tough behaviour and ruthlessness (mcdowell & court 2008). ‘exaggerated forms of masculinised language and behaviour are still commonplace’ in the financial industry (mcdowell 2010, p. 653). appropriate gender performance, or ways of ‘doing gender’, play a key role for obtaining powerful positions in the workplace. ‘in merchant banking, as in other interactive service occupations, corporeality – in the threefold sense of anatomical sex, gender identity, and gender performance – is a crucial part of selling a service, in this case monetary advice’ (mcdowell & court 2008, p. 465). mcdowell and court argue that use of the ‘feminine masquerade’ is a common phenomenon in merchant banks. ‘feminine masquerade’ is a ‘masculine disguise’ that women use to attempt to look neutral, to act like ‘honorary men’ ‘through their clothes and their attitudes’ in order to ‘conform to the dominant image in the part of the bank in which they [work]’ (mcdowell & court 2008, p. 463). in masculinist organisations like merchant banks (mcdowell & court 2008), female bankers’ appearance, facial expressions and social skills have been evaluated as essential attributes to good work performance. their performance of womanhood plays an important role in nurturing an emotional connection with clients. locality, power and differential opportunity a city is a ‘location or a site in space where an activity or object is located and which relates to other sites or locations because of interaction and movement between them’ (agnew 2005, p. 89); it is a ‘site in the flow of social relations’ (agnew 2005, p. 91). uneven economic development has resulted in hierarchical power distribution between different cities. the relative positioning of cities within hierarchical fields of power may well lay the groundwork 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 for differential life chances and the incorporation of opportunities for individuals locally and transnationally (schiller & caglar 2009). professionals working in the financial industry form an elite group who are essential to enhancing the competitiveness of firms in world city networks (beaverstock 2014). these professionals gain ‘tacit knowledge’ which is embedded in particular social and cultural contexts (heinemann 2014) and utilise their ‘work-oriented translocality’ to build business and social networks for transferring financial knowledge (beaverstock 2002, 2014). the concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ includes the idea that knowledge practices, which is the interpretation of data and information (lee 2011), varies across different places and spaces. therefore, the ‘appropriateness and usefulness of knowledge is always defined by the specific context – the place and the time at which the information is obtained and evaluated’ (heinemann 2014, p. 26). within a city, there is also a hierarchical power distribution between different areas. on the one hand, the image and social discourse of particular areas, such as a key financial district in a city or region, has symbolic power and can be used as a tool for business development. this is known as ‘coding’ (allen 2003). on the other hand, there are many ‘contact zones’ – places where there is ‘an attempt to invoke the spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historical disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect’ (pratt 1992, p. 7). professionals in the finance service industry form a dominant social group in important financial districts and influence the ‘power of coding’ (allen 2003, p. 164) for gaining higher social recognition. networks, cultivated and maintained in ‘contact zones’ like cafés, bars and restaurants, are vital assets for business development (yeoh & willis 2005). thus, having work experience in a branch located in an important district correlates with an individual’s perceived level of ability. the higher the political and economic power of a branch, the more recognition in terms of personal ability and managerial power an individual is likely to receive. research site, research subject and methodology this paper on hong kong is part of a larger comparative cross-national study on chinese women bankers in australia, hong kong and mainland china. hong kong has one of the highest concentrations of banking institutions in the world. the global financial centres index 18, released in september 2015, reported on two significant achievements of hong cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 45 kong: the report ranked financial centres as at june 2015, and hong kong was ranked number three; and hong kong was among only eleven centres classified as ‘global leaders’ (yeandle 2015). there are 208 foreign banks with branches in this vibrant global financial centre. more than 77 percent of these overseas banks are listed among the world’s largest 500 banks (hong kong monetary authority 2015). the financial services industry plays an important role in ‘leading hong kong’s evolution into a knowledge-based economy’. it is a major source of jobs, directly employing more than 230,000 people, accounting for 6.1 percent of the total labour force (as of 2013) (financial services development council of hong kong 2015, p. 10). clearly, hong kong is one of the most important international business hubs in the world. little research has been done on banks in hong kong (fung 2002; zheng & ho 2012) compared to existing scholarly literature on banking in other finance centres (bartel 2000; beaverstock 1996, 2002, 2014; berger & mester 1997; fogelberg & griffith 2000; pi & timme 1993 ) and even less research has been done on banks in hong kong from a social and cultural perspective. women professionals are increasingly attracted to fast-growing cosmopolitan economies, and are quickly becoming important players in global business development. the first female head of the international monetary fund (imf), christine lagarde, can be viewed as an important example of increasing female participation and achievement in the world economy. in my study, a ‘chinese woman banker’ refers to a chinese woman who has worked in a bank for at least three years in at least a middle management position, such as a department head, a branch manager, a general manager or a director. my interview respondents were found though personal contacts, interviewee referrals, banking associations, community organisations in hong kong, and human resource departments in several commercial banks. using an open-ended interview schedule, in-depth interviews were conducted in 2013 and 2014 with a total of 51 respondents in australia, hong kong and mainland china. seventeen respondents were chinese women bankers in hong kong, a special administrative region of china. most of the interviews lasted between one and half hours and three hours and were conducted in cantonese and english. to facilitate the analysis, all interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. the entire set of interview transcripts was then organised and coded to identify the themes, patterns and 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 insights which emerged. the following table summarises the background information of my respondents. case no. job title years in banking age group (as at 2013) education 1 vice president (operations) 10 30-35 master’s degree 2 customer service manager 17 36-40 high school certificate 3 customer service manager 15 36-40 bachelor’s degree 4 premier relationship manager 5 30-35 bachelor’s degree 5 head of capital introductions (asia) 12 30-35 master’s degree 6 director/head of relationship management (asia pacific) 17 40-45 bachelor’s degree 7 senior branch manager 17 40-55 master’s degree 8 managing director 18 40-45 master’s degree 9 branch head 20 45-50 master’s degree 10 director, client relationship management (private banking) 25 45-50 diploma 11 vice president (alternatives and real assets) 7 30-35 bachelor’s degree 12 manager (change delivery) 13 40-45 bachelor’s degree 13 senior relationship manager (consumer banking) 20 40-45 master’s degree 14 vice president (hong kong team) 35 50-55 high school certificate 15 vice president 27 50-55 master’s degree 16 senior associate 7 30-35 master’s degree 17 associate 15 35-40 high school certificate table 1: respondents’ background information (sorted by interview days) among the chinese women bankers i interviewed in hong kong, the majority were managers or department heads with some of them in higher positions including managing directors, vice presidents, or senior branch heads. fourteen out of 17 respondents (about 82%) had been working in the banking industry for more than 10 years. the longest period of working in the banking industry was 35 years. most of the hong kong respondents were in their 30s or 40s. regarding their level of education, about half (47%) of the hong kong respondents possessed a master’s degree. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 47 biographical profile case analyses of women bankers in hong kong provides insights into the situation of women bankers working in the intersectional region of a capitalist oriented market economy and a chinese culture dominated society in a stage of transition from being a british colony. the case study examines themes, patterns and insights embedded in the career paths of chinese women bankers. before embarking on a detailed analysis of the interview contents, i first present a profile of a woman banker named daisy (pseudonym). by reflecting on various fragments and snapshots of life, this profile is meant to highlight certain features of the career development of hong kong women bankers – or contours of history in the managerial process (chan & chan 2011). while admitting that this is an edited record of an individual’s life history, it is by no means made up of arbitrary fragments; nor is it intended to fit an individual’s experience into a pre-determined ‘frame of mind’ (chan & chan 2011, p. 29). rather, this profile is a window of life and historical memory, providing us with significant information from the respondent’s past, conveying the consciousness of the individual, enabling us to make reflective conclusions regarding this person, and by extension this specific group of people. a woman banker in hong kong case: daisy (case hk7) current position: senior branch manager age: 40s place of origin: hong kong current bank of employment: one of the big four chinese state-owned banks educational background: master’s degree in law total number of current and previous banks of employment: nine jobs in eight banks marital status: single years in the banking industry: 17 years daisy was born and grew up in hong kong, and obtained her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in the united kingdom. she was working in the banking sector as a teller for two years, then for the next 15 years she ‘hopped’ among different banks to become a customer manager, a senior customer manager, an investment consultant, a team head, and a branch manager. by 2013, she had shuttled between nine jobs in eight banks, staying for as short as six months and as long as four years, changing banks on average every two years. now, she is a senior branch manager overseeing two branches in one of the ‘big four’ chinese state-owned banks. 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 figure 1 below, reflects daisy’s career path. srm: senior relationship manager; bm: branch manager; sbm: senior branch manager figure 1: daisy’s career development path on joining her first bank, daisy’s very clear goal was to become a branch manager, and she sought every opportunity and strived to achieve this, winning several awards from several banks’ internal competitions along the way. she also gained experience in banks of differing backgrounds, a local hong kong, an american, a british, a european, a singaporean and three chinese banks. she attained her goal of becoming a manager in a chinese bank after nine years. daisy’s experience in various banks and branches took her to many areas of hong kong: a very prestigious branch in the international finance centre (ifc) in central district (zhonghuan 中环); as well as lower-middle income residential districts where new migrants from the mainland china congregated, like tsuen wan (荃湾) and mei foo (美孚). figure 2 shows these locations, while table 2 indicates the median monthly domestic household income in each of these districts. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 49 (source of original: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:hong_kong_base_map.svg) figure 2: branch locations (the circle) of daisy’s previous and current employment branch location median monthly domestic household income of the district (in hk$) 1 central (中环) $40,000 wan chai (湾仔) $45,200 causeway bay (铜锣湾) $30,000 kwun tong (观塘) $20,000 mei foo (美孚) $20,800 tsuen wan (荃湾) $28,830 (source: 2011 population census, census and statistics department, hong kong special administrative region) table 2: median monthly domestic household income by district daisy strongly believed her good fortune (faji 发迹) began when she worked in central district, or central as it is usually referred to. her promotion to branch manager happened only after she had worked as a team head at a prestigious branch in the ifc, where many 1 figures refer to economically active households. economically active households refer to households with at least one member (excluding foreign domestic helpers) being economically active. the exchange rate between american dollar and hong kong dollar is 1:7.78. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/file:hong_kong_base_map.svg 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 well-known international banks and finance companies have set up their head offices in hong kong. central is an important site for key financial companies, with its strong symbolic ties to power and prestige. for bankers, such associations attract many high-level clients. daisy indicated that having a job in central was indeed the most important stepping stone for her career. after working for a mainland china state-owned bank for a year, daisy realised that the central office assigned all the district heads. it seemed to her to be ‘mission impossible’ for a hongkonger to be promoted above the branch managerial level. she concluded there was no possibility for further promotion within a big, chinese state-owned bank and became open to another move. but after eight banks, what would the next one be? daisy said she would remain open-minded and open-eyed for a better opportunity. the power of ‘central’ and impression management branch location as one of the key elements of locality is embedded within differential power hierarchies. there is a dynamic relationship between branch location, opportunity structure and career mobility. hong kong, as a city, is an important international finance centre in the asia-pacific region. but there is a centre within this centre – the central district (zhonghuan 中环), or central. central, on the north shore of hong kong island, is an important business district where many multinational financial corporations have their headquarters, many countries have established their consulates and the hong kong government has placed many of its departmental head offices. in hong kong, iconic banking and finance towers instantiate the city’s place in the regional and international financial services industry. the monument-like built environment in central includes financial and banking buildings that are particular focal points of attention, such as the ifc, the hsbc headquarters, the bank of china tower, the bank of china building, the standard-chartered bank building, citibank plaza and the bank of america building. on one hand, the ‘monumental built environment’ of the financial centre symbolises both the major agents of power housed in these buildings and hong kong’s economic acumen (cartier 1999) . on the other hand, the local elites and the international professionals in central, particularly those in finance and banking, have constructed powerful ‘spatial coding’ (allen 2003, p. 163) with which bankers gain recognition in society. to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 51 bankers, the monumental spaces of banking and finance generate a sense of membership. ‘the exclusive nature of the city as a place of finance which generates its own sense of “membership” through the sound, sight and even scent of those recognised as present is thus, in itself, an achievement’(allen 2003, p. 164). the real and symbolic meanings of central are complex and elusive. the area’s financial and banking buildings represent the central pillar of hong kong’s establishment, and are also related to powerful images of global linkage, elitism and rich diversity. the following three descriptions from chinese women bankers in hong kong point out three outstanding characteristics of central: 1. central as an enclave for headquarters and global linkage there are many local and international banks that set up their headquarters in central. no matter if it’s a local hong kong bank, an american bank, a british bank, a european bank, a singaporean bank or a chinese bank, you name it, they all have at least one branch in central (case hk7, senior branch manager, chinese state-owned bank). because the central office is our head office, so many other branches located in other areas in hong kong or other countries send their people here to attend meetings … there are many meetings for top level managerial teams in our head office building. there are also so many visitors from branches, or visitors from other countries that visit our branch (case hk4, premier relationship manager, british bank in hong kong). 2. central as an enclave for professionals and an elite class our clients in central branch have the highest expectation toward bankers and they are very demanding. they think if you are working in central, you should be among the most highly qualified staff. there is a variety of requirements from our clients. … it is very difficult to get approval to be relocated to the head office in central. you have to surmount numerous very tough tests and interviews (case hk10, director of client relationship management, private banking, chinese state-owned bank in hong kong). 3. central as an enclave of diversity and hybridity in our office in central, we have a, a singaporean; b, his parents are shanghainese, but he was born in taiwan and then moved to the us when he was 12; c is a singaporean girl; d is a mainlander; e is a half-hongkonger, half-mainlander, but she got her degree in australia; f is filipina chinese, but she was born in hong kong and then got her phd in germany; g is a mainlander but got his masters in hong kong; h is an abc, american born chinese; i’s father is taiwanese and his mum is a hongkonger but he was born in guam (case hk8, managing director, hong kong-based financial investment company, former corporate director of dutch bank in hong kong). 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 central is a pivotal territory for ‘global-local knowledge network formation’ (beaverstock 2002, p. 536). this is illustrated by hk4’s comments that the head office in central is the location of regular meetings and visits from the bank’s worldwide branch network. hk10’s comments indicate that clients believe that bank staff working in central are highly competent and well qualified. this positive ‘coding’ contributes to the relationship building with clients who are perceived to have high net worth. hk8’s comments highlight central’s role as an important ‘contact zone’ (yeoh & willis 2005) where colleagues, most of them expatriates with diverse national, racial, ethnic and social backgrounds, have daily interactions. people also associate a certain desirable image with central, that of a cosmopolitan professional who is well trained, competent, smart, with good english. success in business dealings in the banking industry, to a certain degree, is related to the level of the customers’ confidence toward the bank in general and to the banker in particular. nine out of 17 chinese women bankers interviewed in hong kong were working or had worked in branches located in central and this played a key role in their upward mobility. as previously mentioned, daisy indicated that her good fortune started in central and working in central was the most important stepping stone for her upward career mobility. bankers, lawyers and accountants are dominant social groups within central. ‘the construction of space in their own likeness’ enables these social groups ‘to dominate space in their own image’ (allen 2003, p. 164). space or place is key to their interactions; allen speaks of ‘the power of coding in finance spaces’ (allen 2003, p. 164). when individuals communicate and interact with others in society, they seek appropriate locations on the social map according to a certain taxonomy or category. in order to secure an advantageous place on the social map, one becomes entangled in power relationships between the ‘categorizers’ and the ‘categorized’ (jenkins 1996, p. 25). when bankers in central ‘make symbolic use of what is around them and turn it to their own needs’ (allen 2003, p. 165), they use their ‘membership’ to gain entry into the prestigious, highly competitive finance and banking space, which is a valuable personal asset for business development. district-based ‘language and tongue’ as a strategy for building social bonds in interactive service work, the ability to deliberately adopt different stereotypical images of femininity to suit certain circumstances and locations is a key skill for building business relationships (mcdowell 1997). the skill of manipulation of body image and emotions is an cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 53 integral part of selling a product (hochschild 1983). no matter where their branch was located, my interviewees indicated that formal dress was a must for building their professional image. a senior manager noted: in hong kong, the dress code for bank staff is more or less similar. the requirement is high. i usually wear a suit, as formal wear. my previous bank didn’t allow staff to dress in casual wear. even in the hot summer time, i always had to be in a suit. i didn’t feel comfortable sometimes (case hk13, senior relationship manager, consumer banking, chinese state-owned bank in hong kong). hk13 ‘jumped’ from a bank located in the commercial area on hong kong island to a bank located in an old industrial area in kowloon. she indicated that her style of dress did not change. for banks in hong kong, staff with managerial positions are not required to be in uniform but a formal and modest dress code is the norm. in general, my hong kong respondents gave me the impression that their style of dress was conservative. none of my interviewees dressed in bright, colourful skirts or tops when i met them. gender-neutral colours favoured by my respondents, like black, grey, dark blue and other low-key colours are paradoxically associated with masculinity. the symbolic power of these colours is socially constructed and associated with masculine characteristics favoured in the business world. by wearing these colours, many women bankers unintentionally support male hegemony by internalising the male-characterised way dressing. when i asked if they used a number of business strategies when working in different areas, women bankers in hong kong did not talk about gender differentials. rather, they emphasised the district-based ‘language and tongue’ strategy in order to service different ‘levels of clients’. case hk13 stated: i talk very differently when working in different areas. in my previous job, i worked in sai wan ho [西湾河a residential area located on hong kong island] where i had a lot of housewives as clients. i could easily chat with them if i just read a newspaper before i started my day. we would chat about the tragedy of the tour in the philippines (manila hostage crisis2). we guessed which rumours may be real. we talked about the weather and their kids’ school life. it was very easy to open a topic and get inside their heart. but after i moved here to kwun tong [观塘a formal industrial area located 2 the manila hostage crisis, officially known as the rizal park hostage-taking incident, occurred when a disgruntled former philippine national police officer named rolando mendoza hijacked a hong kong tourist bus in rizal park, manila, philippines on august 23, 2010. eight of the hostages were killed and several others injured in this incident. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 in kowloon, which has now become a second tier business area], the difference was obvious. my clients here never talk to you like my previous clients. they discuss the best time to withdraw from the stock market, they want to know your opinions about global economic developments, and they prefer you to give them updated market information. here it is more analytical and market oriented. i have to say, i have been in two very different situations (case hk13, senior relationship manager, consumer banking, chinese state-owned bank in hong kong). language is not only an important symbol used for daily interactions with others, it also reflects one’s cultural identity and intimacy with a particular country or place (tan 2004), and serves as a sign of authenticity (ang 2001). language has two aspects: the form and the content. form is about voice level, pace, tone, emotions, pitch and emphasis, and is equally important as content and substance. the form of language used and the content of the conversation reflect the business strategies which are based on the interpretation of social relationships between women bankers and their clients in different areas. this selection also mirrors clients’ preferred identity when dealing with business issues. one senior branch manager describes how she uses language as a strategy: my [current] tongue and my language are very different compared to when i worked in tsuen wan [荃湾 a former industrial area which has now been transferred into a residential mixed with industrial and commercial business area, located west of the new territories]. now i am working in wan chai [湾仔 a commercial area which has many government offices located on hong kong island]. when a district manager plans to move an army and send a general to a branch located in central, he will not consider a person who has been working in sai wan [西环 a very old residential area on hong kong island]. he knows that there will be different client groups in different areas and your level of persuasive power (ya chan gan 压场感) will [need to] be different. the client group in central is different. if you look like a housewife, what will your clients think about you? or, if you shift a staff member who has been working for 10 years in sheung shui [上水 a new town located near the border], he / she will be so stressed out when he /she works in central. location is an important matter. your tongue and your language need to change significantly. otherwise, you’ll put yourself under a lot of pressure. a manager who does well in a residential area may not be suitable for wan chai. he or she may not have enough power to control the clients here (case hk7, senior branch manager, chinese state-owned bank in hong kong). after she had been working in different banks for 17 years, this senior branch manager in charge of two branches concluded that the level of persuasive power (ya chan gan 压场感) is one of the key factors for success. to convince clients to do business with a bank and a banker and to build confidence in a banker, that banker has to ‘perform’ according to each cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 55 client’s expectations. when hk7 worked in tsuen wan, the majority of her clients were housewives or retired people. but when she worked in wan chai, her main client group was made up of elite professionals working in government offices or commercial corporations whose offices were located in the same area. the median monthly domestic household income in tsuen wan is about half of the monthly income in wan chai. deciding what identity to perform, how to construct it, and when and where to display it to interact with clients is a complex and intricate process involving understanding clients’ expectations, and using evaluative interpretation and relationship projection (chan & chan 2011). most of the women bankers i interviewed in hong kong said that they were careful and tactful in communicating with their clients in different branches. two women bankers with senior managerial positions made the following observations: in this area, our clients prefer to use a different way to communicate. in my previous bank, i contacted my clients mainly by calling them or meeting them face-to-face in my office. in this industrial-commercial mixed area, the majority of my clients are businessmen. i only contact them by email or whatsapp. i realise that they prefer to communicate using high-technology tools so they can read the message or reply when they have time. my clients in two different areas are indeed two distinct types. this is interesting (case hk13, senior relationship manager, consumer banking, chinese state-owned bank in hong kong). in my previous bank, i had many clients in their 40’s. being a mother was helpful to build some common ground for conversation with my clients. i even brought my daughter or my husband with me for business dinners with my clients. now, i work in a private bank, the emphasis for my clients is professional service, not personal relationships. now, my identity as a mother no longer functions in developing a good conversation with my clients in this private bank (case hk10, director of client relationship management, private banking, chinese state-owned bank in hong kong). for most chinese societies, business relationships will only come about after a personal, social relationship has been established (chan 2000, 2005, 2010; chan & chan 2007, 2011; chan & chiang 1994; wong 1985, 1988; zhou & lin 2005). in other words, the social bonds between individuals play a key role in building business relationships, especially in an open market where successfully closing business interactions is so difficult to achieve. social bonds are built upon two fundamental processes – intrinsic and extrinsic attraction (blau 1964; rempel, holmes & zanna 1985; rusbult 1980). intrinsic attraction occurs during an individual’s interaction with someone similar to himself/herself, where pleasure is aroused from the discovery of similar intrinsic traits between the two parties. extrinsic attraction 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 comes from complementary relationships based on a reciprocal exchange of material resources between two parties. when dealing with a group of clients who are housewives, most women bankers, intentionally, prefer to display their ‘master identity’ as a ‘woman’ in order to nurture a feeling of ‘we’, to get into the hearts of those housewives, to present themselves as one of the ‘in-group’. they can be solicitous about the personal matters of their clients. the intrinsic attraction associated with similarity here creates a feeling of closeness and so shortens the psychological distance between the individuals. but when dealing with high-level clients who have large amounts of money to invest, with the understanding that the customers themselves also seek distinction in the service setting (hanser 2005), women bankers strive to use extrinsic attraction by demonstrating their ability, knowledge, expertise, insight and competence. their emphasis is more on their identity as a ‘banker’, a professional service provider. when quantifiable achievement is the key merit for promotion in the business world, then working in a branch located in a key financial area like central, or a richer residential area like wan chai, provides a better platform for meeting high level clients who have more money to buy the bank’s products, ultimately leading to better social resources, which, in the context of opportunity structures, influences the career development of individual women bankers. for example, note the following statements: i have worked in many different branches located in mong kok (旺角), tsim sha tsui (尖沙咀), tai po (太埔) and central (中环). in terms of account amounts, there is a big difference between different areas. the money value in central is extremely high. for example, it is very rare to have a client who has 100 million dollars in our mong kok branch. but there are a lot of clients who have more than 100 million dollars in our central branch (case hk10, director of client relationship management, private banking, chinese state-owned ‘bank in hong kong). originally our bank was a family-owned retail bank. our central branch always serviced many important clients who are our big boss’s well-known friends or old, loyal clients. we often get good referrals from our clients. one client introduces another client to us. therefore, our clients know each other very well indeed (case hk14, vice president, hong kong team, french private bank in hong kong). the banking industry as a service industry involves social recognition and class distinction (hanser 2005). the woman bankers i interviewed in hong kong indicated that they adjusted their performance based on their understandings of their clients’ perceptions and expectations. the interaction between women bankers and their clients is a process associated with the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 57 ‘looking-glass self’ (cooley & schubert 1998). language is a class-coded performance. tongue is an indication of the nature of the relationship. ‘the production of class meanings and distinctions can be a key aspect of what service work is organised to produce. managers of service organisations recognise themselves in a competition for customers who themselves seek distinction in the service setting’ (hanser 2005, p. 596). identity display is according to client orientation and class inflected performance in which both women bankers and their customers seek distinction in the service setting. at the end of the day, business relationships, to some degree, are social relationships in which there are complex connections between emotions, affections and business deals. place-based stigma, identity politics within a nation and the post-colonial city although banking is a result-oriented industry, it is not merely about personal ability, it also involves power struggles which are interwoven with national and ethnicity based politics. close observation of daisy’s career development path reveals irony and a paradox (figure 1). there is a gap between her perception and the reality concerning working in a foreign-owned bank in hong kong. daisy perceived that there was equal opportunity for everyone that worked hard and was creative, no matter if that person was chinese or non-chinese, a woman or a man. she thought she would shine brightly in this open-minded environment. but this was an illusion: she could not achieve her goal either in an american bank, a british bank nor a european bank, even though she had been awarded various prizes. she jumped from one bank to another bank. she sought every opportunity and strove to do her best to make her dream come true. ironically, after job hopping six times, she finally achieved the position of branch manager in a chinese bank. according to heidrick & struggles, a global executive employment agency, among the top 10 international banks, only 30 percent of their chief executives in their offices located in asia were asian or people of asian origin (oriental daily malaysia, 25 august 2013). the senior management and top executive positions in international corporations in asian cities are still dominated by professionals who are males and share same race or similar cultural background as the banks’ chief executive officer (ceo). therefore, asians or people with asian origins face obstacles in moving into the top layer of managerial teams, and this may be even more so for asian women. 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 daisy indicated that she changed her job to a chinese bank merely to take advantage of a good opportunity. she did not want to believe that there were race issues in the foreign banks where she had previously worked. although she obtained a master’s degree in the uk and she could speak english fluently, she faced a two-layered barrier: that of race and gender. hence, it was difficult for her to climb up to a top position in foreign-owned banks in hong kong. the identity of being a ‘non-communist hongkonger’ has emerged as an additional, invisible barrier; a symbolic stigma for chinese women bankers working in chinese state-owned banks. the challenge of the ‘beijing boss’ lacking trust in local hong kong bankers is thorny. daisy stated: in [chinese] state-owned banks, for sure, the top leader will be a man, a chinese man. it is impossible for it to be a foreigner, no matter male or female, to be appointed as our top leader. they will assign a man from shenzhen or another city in mainland china. they will definitely not promote any hongkonger to be the top man. all the top leaders are sent from mainland china. (hk7, senior branch manager, chinese state-owned bank in hong kong) there is a hierarchical stratification of chinese identity in chinese state-owned banks in hong kong. chinese citizens with communist party membership have more opportunity to be promoted to the top managerial team. this story from a woman banker who had worked ‘inside’ a chinese state-owned bank in hong kong illustrates this situation: i was the personal assistant to the ceo of the investment banking section of a chinese state-owned bank in hong kong. i got this job because my mother was a friend of this ceo. in the beginning, i experienced a big cultural shock. first, there were differences between foreign banks and chinese banks. second, this chinese bank was very special as it was a state-owned bank. their whole operation system is like their head office in china. they still had some very traditional things – like [they were from] ancient china. for example, they had some ‘red head documents’ (hong tou wenjian 红头文 件). only the party members were allowed to read them. they had a special phone line which couldn’t be monitored by other people. it was directly connected to beijing when you picked it up. there was an inner circle and even my boss’hesitated to introduce me to them. … there were many political orders. many decisions were made not based on commercial consideration but political concerns. my boss was also a party member. (case hk8, managing director, private owned investment company in hong kong) the chinese state-owned banks are still heavily reliant on their policy driven business model, which puts their respective political objectives ahead of profit maximisation (subacchi et al. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 59 2012, p. 8). the politics between mainland chinese and hong kong chinese is invisible but real and blocks hong kong women bankers’ upward mobility in chinese state-owned banks. the colonial historical background is an existential index and hidden label for hong kong people. a hongkonger is another kind of chinese. for these banks to appoint a hongkonger who is holding a passport of ‘the government of the hong kong special administrative region of the people’s republic of china’ is viewed as an unnecessary risk. these politics of ethnicity and place of origin is always interwoven with gender to create a ‘triple jeopardy’ for local chinese women bankers in hong kong. conclusion the experiences of chinese women bankers in hong kong in this paper not only reflect their life courses, but more importantly provide a window to reveal the interlocking relationship between branch location and the opportunity of upward career mobility for individual professionals. place is not a value-neutral site. women bankers perform, exhibiting different identities in different locations reflecting an understanding of their client’s perceptions and expectations toward bankers in different locations. by using different impression management skills, women bankers emphasised their personal identity either as a ‘woman’ or as a ‘banker’ according to their evaluation of the preferred relationship and the class distinction that their clients were looking for. besides branch location, there are two other layers of stigma involved in place-based politics which frustrate chinese women banker’s upward mobility: being an asian and being a chinese from the post-colonial city of hong kong. as asian women working in foreignowned international banks, chinese women bankers’ upward mobility is blocked by informal but strong barriers which are deeply embedded in the culture and social structure of transnational corporations dominated by male anglo-saxon players as an ‘in-group’ – ‘a white man’s private club’, an inner circle – that is off limits to the ‘out-group’ of chinese women. although hong kong is held to be highly significant in the international financial industry, the second layer of this stigma is that within chinese owned banks, hongkongers always come second to mainlanders. as hongkongers, chinese women bankers are not seen to be ‘pure chinese’ because they have inherited an irreversible 150 years of colonial history. this irony of hierarchical stratification is the result of politics which are beyond the control of individual bankers. 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 although mid-level management in the banking industry has rapidly been feminised in hong kong, we cannot conclude that this is a victory for women’s rights or a new sense of equality in the banking industry. the barriers impeding women’s upward mobility is now faced not by the frontier women staff, but by those women in much higher levels of management, beyond the branch manager level. the career paths of chinese women bankers in this study indicate that there are factors at work that transcend the boundaries of the individual microcosm. the city and the site of a bank or a branch within a city are embedded within hierarchical fields of power. making use of our ‘sociological imagination’, we are not only able to understand the social environment and the locality that encompasses an individual, but also the relationship between them in the banking and finance field – a field which is embedded in capitalism, modernism and globalism. acknowledgements i am indebted to many people who have helped me with this paper. first, thanks to two anonymous referees for their two rounds of constructive comments and suggestions. second, thanks to prof. chan kwok-bun, prof. carolyn cartier, dr. christina ho and dr. hilary yerbury for their insightful advice and comments for the first draft of this paper. thanks also to laurence stevens for his excellent suggestions on how to polish my language and express thoughts in english. references adler, n.j. & izraeli, d.n. 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government models: a study of banking in hong kong', asia pacific business review, vol. ifirst, pp. 1-17. zhou, m. & lin, m. 2005, 'community transformation and the formation of ethnic capital: immigrant chinese communities in united state', journal of chinese overseas, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 260-84. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jco.2007.0027 and http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/179325405788639102 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.49.1.95 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031%2880%2990007-4 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/215735 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13691830802586179 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/590402 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183042000339927 http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jco.2007.0027 http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/179325405788639102 the may 2015 boat crisis: the rohingya in aceh graham thom amnesty international australia1 abstract the 2015 discovery of mass graves in thailand’s sadao district, on the border with malaysia, led to a crackdown on people smugglers by the thai and malaysian authorities. thousands of rohingya (as well as bangladeshi migrants) were left stranded in the andaman sea as smugglers abandoned their human cargo. initially pushed back by the thai, malaysian and indonesian navies, it was only after indonesian fishermen rescued three boats that approximately 1,800 people were permitted to disembark in indonesia’s aceh province. the crisis in the andaman sea brought into sharp relief the fact that the south east asia region lacks even the most basic regional protection (or cooperation) framework. while some states are still reticent, there have been attempts to improve government collaboration as demonstrated recently in the march 2016 bali declaration on people smuggling, trafficking in persons, and related transnational crime. this paper examines, however, how the ad hoc approach by indonesia’s regions, in particular aceh, to the treatment of the rohingya who arrived in aceh in may 2015, works against a comprehensive, national, rights-based approach to protect those seeking asylum in indonesia. the paper explores the reasons why aceh chose not to engage with the established practices for the treatment of asylum seekers in indonesia and the human rights impacts this has had on those rescued. it concludes that the current situation in aceh is not sustainable. the treatment of refugees in aceh should be included in a broader national approach, commensurate with the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers throughout indonesia, particularly if indonesia is to develop a structured, rights-based approach to those seeking protection. this would then play a significant role in any future regional protection framework. introduction refugees and asylum seekers coming to indonesia and seeking protection is not a new phenomenon. in recent years, however, this phenomenon has largely been associated with people smuggling operations and attempts to get people by boat to australia. the refugee populations traveling to indonesia in recent years have predominantly been from afghanistan, iraq, sri lanka and iran. they have also included a small number of rohingya arriving by 1 the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of amnesty international australia. email: gthom@amnesty.org.au issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 graham thom. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(2): 4816. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i2.4816 . https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i2.4816 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 boat. the treatment of rohingya who have arrived in aceh previously, however, varies in significant ways from the treatment of those that arrived in may 2015. previous research has identified specific concerns with the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers in indonesia more broadly, including examining the impact of australia’s regional deterrence policy in helping to shape indonesia’s policy (nethery & gordyn 2014; nethery, rafferty-brown & taylor 2013; taylor & rafferty-brown 2010a). as noted by taylor and rafferty-brown, ‘australia has posted immigration, customs, police and other officials in indonesia to assist with the interception of people heading towards australia and has poured billions of dollars in building indonesia’s border control capacity’ (2010a, p. 138). in general, these writers have concluded that the introduction of deterrence measures, for instance a greater use of detention, has significantly reduced the ability of asylum seekers to achieve effective protection, not just in indonesia but in the southeast asia region more broadly (see also nethery, rafferty-brown & taylor 2013, p. 105). as this article will demonstrate, however, it is not only indonesia’s migration management, asylum seeker and refugee policies per se that are problematic, it is the ability for the regions within indonesia to take an ad hoc approach to these policies that works against a protection based approach for refugees and asylum seekers in indonesia and southeast asia more broadly. nethery, rafferty-brown and taylor also identified discrepancies among indonesia’s regions, both with regards to the regional experiences of asylum seekers and refugees in detention (2013, p. 98) and the conditions of residence depending on where they resided (2013 p. 93). however, the impact of an ad hoc approach (not just by states but within states) has been most clearly articulated by cheung (2011) in his examination of the comparative experiences of rohingya who fled in the early 1990s to bangladesh and malaysia. as cheung notes: ‘case-by-case exceptions to the rule may arise but national treatment of refugees and asylum seekers continues to be ad hoc, depending on the nationality of the asylum seeker, regional strategic and political considerations and otherwise based on a remote sense of international obligations or humanitarianism left to the discretion of field-level immigration officials or magistrate judges’ (2011, p. 63). aceh’s most recent response to the rohingya demonstrates that this is still occurring and not only at the discretion of local officials within the region. significantly it was those governing the region itself, acting in many respects contrary to the established national practice, that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 45 undermined the rights of the rescued rohingya despite beginning from a humanitarian approach. this article is set out in six sections. the first section sets out the research methodology. the second section outlines the background to the 2015 crisis and how the rohingya came to be rescued and taken to aceh, despite the position of the national authorities at the time that they should not be brought to indonesia. this section will also briefly compare the reception faced by the rohingya with the established practice for asylum seekers arriving elsewhere in indonesia. the third section will further demonstrate the discretionary, ad hoc, approach taken by officials in aceh, by comparing the approach taken to the previous significant rohingya boat arrivals in 2012. the fourth section will examine why aceh changed its approach in 2015, from that experienced by previous arrivals, looking at some of the external and internal political drivers that help shape the recent ad hoc approach to the rohingya in aceh. the fifth section looks at the specific human rights impacts of these decisions on those seeking protection. this will compare both the initial positive local humanitarian support for the rohingya, against the measures to confine them in (at least initially) ill-equipped sites and subject to strict local laws. the final section will examine the possible future direction of indonesia’s approach to those seeking protection particularly in light of the most recent bali declaration, in march 2016. it will conclude that for indonesia to play a greater role in any regional protection framework it will need to ensure a consistent approach to protection throughout indonesia, limiting the scope for ad hoc decisions to be made in regions such as aceh. methodology the background research for this paper is primarily taken from field research i undertook as part of an amnesty international research team, conducting research in indonesia in august 2015. our aim was to document the reasons driving the rohingya to leave myanmar and bangladesh, the human rights abuses they experienced at sea, and the conditions they are experiencing in aceh. while a detailed methodology is outlined in the amnesty international report ‘deadly journeys, the refugee and trafficking crisis in southeast asia’ (2015, p. 7), the research mission included 115 interviews with rohingya refugees in aceh (both group and individual), as well as indonesian officials in kuala cankoi, langsa and lhokseumawe in aceh province. in jakarta we met with officials from indonesia’s directorate general for 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 immigration (kantor imigrasi), ministry of foreign affairs, national human rights commission and national commission on violence against women. office of the united nations high commissioner for refugees (unhcr) and international organisation for migration (iom) officials were interviewed in aceh and jakarta. staff from over a dozen local civil society organisations in aceh and jakarta, including those working directly with the rohingya in the sites, were also interviewed. we conducted a further 34 in-depth interviews with refugees (both rohingya and other refugee nationalities) in jakarta and cisarua who had been in indonesia for several months to several years. the amnesty international report primarily documented the abuses suffered by those on board the smuggling/trafficking vessels. it also highlighted a number of issues now facing those allowed to remain in aceh (amnesty international, 2015). following the release of the report, i undertook further research for this paper including interviews with both senior unhcr and iom officials in jakarta, local and national ngos in indonesia, and international ngos including the arakan project. i also had meetings with australian officials to determine australia’s engagement with indonesia during the 2015 crisis and the likelihood australia would provide assistance in case of any future crisis. national and regional media have provided further insights into the ongoing treatment of those rescued subsequent to our visit in august 2015. the rescue of the rohingya in may 2015 a considerable amount has already been published examining the background to the may 2015 boat crisis, including the amnesty international report (2015, pp. 9-14). the ongoing human rights abuses facing the rohingya have also been well documented (equal rights trust 2014; lowenstein 2015). while it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a detailed account of why people got on the boats and how they ended up stranded in the andaman sea, it is worth documenting, based on the research we undertook in august 2015, the timeline of their rescue and ultimately where they came ashore. this determined where they were to be held and the subsequent treatment they experienced. the first boat to reach indonesia was on 10 may, running aground in north aceh. the 578 people on board either swam ashore or were assisted by locals and were ultimately taken to shelters in lhokseumawe. after initially being housed in nearby meunasah (a small mosque used by a village or neighbourhood), near to where they came ashore, they were then cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 47 transferred to a converted warehouse closer to lhokseumawe. on 12 august, they were moved to a purpose built site next door at blang adoe. the site was opened by the deputy governor of aceh muzakir manaf (portalsatu 2015). on 15 may, 820 passengers were rescued by fisherman off east aceh (having previously been towed towards malaysia by the indonesian navy on 11 may). this vessel is often referred to as the ‘fighting ship’ after violence broke out between bangladeshi nationals and the rohingya. a number of the rohingya were reportedly killed in the violence and many of the rohingya were forced to jump overboard and were rescued from the water by the acehnese fishermen. most of the 500 bangladeshi nationals were quickly repatriated back to bangladesh but over 200 rohingya were taken to langsa (kota langsa) (a further 43 were taken to medan). while initially men and women were housed together in a converted warehouse in langsa harbour, the 159 women and children were moved to lhokbani (kota langsa) following concerns by aceh officials about “sexual harassment” (although when interviewed, officials noted that it was more a concern with fraternising between the men and women as opposed to unwanted advances and actions from refugee men towards the women). the men were moved from the nearby warehouse to purpose built shelters next door. on 20 may a final boat containing 409 passengers was rescued off east aceh, again by fisherman. over 300 of those rescued were taken to a makeshift site in bayeun (aceh timur). initial reports suggest this group were to be taken to langsa and housed with the previous arrivals. however, the officials in langsa stated they were already over stretched and did not allow them access. with little alternative, a makeshift camp was hastily erected in bayeun. while the women and children were housed in a converted warehouse by the time of our visit in august 2015, the men remained sharing the large tents that initially housed them (although iom has subsequently built more permanent structures for the men). as of january 2016, in addition to the four sites in aceh, the rohingya were also accommodated in three locations in north sumatra. while the first group taken to medan is in the beraspati hotel in medan, the people detained while trying to reach malaysia are (as at april 2016) either in the belawan detention centre in medan or in the immigration office in tanjung balai asahan. 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 situation facing refugees elsewhere in indonesia while not a signatory to the 1951 refugee convention relating to the status of refugees (the 1951 refugee convention), indonesia’s response to refugee arrivals has developed to enable their access to unhcr and publicly committing to respect non-refoulement obligations to those recognised in need of protection. while details of the refugee protection process in indonesia can be found elsewhere (see taylor & rafferty-brown 2010b), it is worth noting that under indonesian law it is still not possible to be granted refugee status. rather, as noted by sampson, gifford and taylor (2016, p. 5), in 2002 the indonesian immigration directorate general issued a directive protecting aliens from refoulement if they hold a unhcr attestation letter or unhcr identification card. as at june 2015, there were 4,270 refugees in indonesia and a further 6,916 individuals seeking asylum (unhcr 2015c, p. 176). while the indonesian government has implemented a mandatory detention policy for people intercepted trying to enter or attempting to leave the country illegally, mechanisms are in place to have recognised refugees released into the community, including into community accommodation centres run, for instance, by iom. once in the community, there are no restrictions on the freedom of movement of refugees within indonesia (see unhcr 2015c, p. 176; samson, gifford & taylor 2016, p. 5). for those seeking asylum, as well as recognised refugees in the community, serious issues remain. as noted by unhcr: ‘formal legal and social rights and related benefits, including access to employment, are not accessible to refugees or asylum-seekers in indonesia, and as such they are entirely dependent on support from unhcr and its partners or from relatives abroad’ (2015c, p. 176). unhcr and ngos in indonesia have highlighted the worrying trend of refugees and asylum-seekers reporting themselves to immigration authorities preferring to be placed in detention where at least they are provided with food and shelter (unhcr 2015c, p. 176). however, others have noted that despite ‘a deep sense of insecurity and transience, this does not preclude [asylum seekers and refugees] from making a life in the face of such forces’ (sampson, gifford & taylor 2016, p. 15). many of those interviewed by sampson, gifford and taylor (2016) were able to build meaningful lives despite the serious suffering and challenges they faced. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 49 even with the lack of national legislation and the at times ad hoc approach by the indonesian government to refugees and asylum seekers, the situation facing (and response to) the rohingya who arrived in may 2015 varied considerably from the procedures in place throughout the rest of indonesia. this has created a strange dichotomy whereby the rohingya were welcomed by the acehnese authorities and local population, while at the same time confined to “sites” with restrictions on their rights, including freedom of movement, that are not imposed on refugees in other parts of indonesia. before examining the human rights impact of the recent approach undertaken by the authorities in aceh it is worth examining the previous response by the acehnese authorities to the arrival of rohingya by boat. this is both to highlight the capacity for regions to take a varied and ad hoc approach to asylum seekers as well as to demonstrate, despite some similarities, the extent to which the latest approach in aceh is unique, not just in indonesia more broadly but in its own historical approach to the rohingya. previous response to the rohingya boat arrivals while rohingya have continued to arrive in small numbers to indonesia over a number of years (most often via malaysia), there were significant boat arrivals, including rescues by acehnese fishermen, in 2012-13. this followed the surge in communal violence in myanmar in june 2012 that saw an estimated 87,000 people depart the bangladesh-myanmar border area by boat between june 2012 and june 2014 (unhcr 2014, p. 1). while the intended destination of those fleeing was primarily malaysia, a number reached indonesia, including (similar to 2015) at least one boat that had been pushed back out to sea by the thai navy. in the first 6 months of 2013, unhcr registered 565 rohingya in indonesia (unhcr 2014, p. 5). at least publicly, similar to the arrivals in may 2015, indonesia and aceh’s responses to the rohingya differed from those to other refugee arrivals, with expressions of solidarity with their plight. the reasons for the different public responses, as reported in april 2013 (bachelard 2013), were reiterated by both local and international ngos we met with. these included that the rohingya were fellow sunni muslims who were fleeing religious persecution from within the region. there was further empathy in aceh where many of the officials were able to relate on a personal level, having had to flee to malaysia during the 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 conflict in aceh. however, while expressing solidarity with the rohingya people, the indonesian government (similar to 2015) attempted to seek alternative countries to settle them although these diplomatic efforts focused predominantly on the middle east (bachelard 2013). in many respects the initial humanitarian response in 2013 was similar to that experienced by the arrivals in may 2015. the local community and civil society donated food, clothing and sanitary items. iom provided food and relief supplies and unhcr interviewed them to assess their protection needs (unhcr 2013). however, unlike in 2015, the vast majority did not remain in aceh and were instead taken to medan and at least initially detained in the belawan idc. there were issues with overcrowding in the belawan idc and there was the tragic event in april 2013 when, following allegations of sexual harassment, 18 rohingya allegedly beat and stabbed to death eight buddhist fishermen, also from myanmar (bachelard 2013). various news agencies reported 15 to 21 rohingya were injured during the three hours of violence (see, for instance, gunawan 2013). interviews with both unhcr and iom highlighted that after processing by unhcr, the rohingya were generally released into the community and were either housed in iom shelters or they moved independently throughout indonesia or again engaged smugglers and travelled to malaysia. the fact that many travelled to malaysia in part explains the response to those who arrived in 2015 who were confined to ‘sites’, although it is not the only explanation. why did the treatment for the 2015 arrivals change? as the boat crisis in may 2015 unfolded, the foreign ministers of malaysia, indonesia, and thailand met in putrajaya, malaysia, on 20 may. at this meeting, malaysia and indonesia agreed to offer ‘temporary shelter provided that the resettlement and repatriation process will be done in one year by the international community’ (joint statement 2015, p. 4). it should be noted, however, that the acehnese fisherman had already rescued the three boats prior to this agreement. during our interviews in aceh in august 2015 there appeared to be a genuine solidarity with the rohingya people both from the local community, ngos, local governments and the regional government (amnesty international 2015, pp. 29 30). previous practice, coupled with the lack of resources in aceh and a lack of experience cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 51 supporting asylum seekers generally, still raises questions as to why the authorities in aceh in may 2015 decided that this group of rohingya should remain there. as noted above, indonesia in 2011 implemented a mandatory detention policy for all those arriving or attempting to leave the country illegally. however this did not occur for the rohingya arriving in aceh in 2015. instead, from our interviews with local officials and ngos, the decision to keep them in aceh appears to have come at first from the local government, that is, the municipality and regency, not the governor nor the national authorities. this decision was officially authorised when the central government, especially the president through the minister of foreign affairs, decided to give them shelter for a one year period. according to an interview with febi yonesta, public lawyer at the jakarta legal aid institute (lbh jakarta): the decision was taken by the local government after a meeting with the minister of social welfare, unhcr, iom, the rapid response unit for disaster management, and local ngos in kota langsa aceh on 24 may 2015. the local government then issued a decree on a “task force” for dealing with rohingya asylum seekers and migrants from bangladesh. the medan local government was refusing to receive more refugees, while the aceh mayor of kota langsa was more open to taking the rohingya. ultimately the decision was dependent on the head of the local government’s discretionary powers and his tendency to favour the refugees, in this case rohingya. the other factor was the guarantee from iom to provide all logistical needs, which needed the central government approval for this purpose, as iom is only partnering with the central government immigration directorate (yonesta, january 2016). it is clear from officials interviewed during our research in aceh that the authorities felt a compelling and genuine humanitarian need to provide assistance to the rohingya. for instance, officials in lhokseumawe donated land to house hundreds of arrivals in an integrated community shelter in blang adoe, which was built to house the rohingya. also, numerous civil society organisations across the region are working to meet the rohingyas’ basic needs, such as housing, food, water, medical care and education (amnesty international 2015, p. 30). 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 an argument could be made that as these individuals were rescued (rather than them having deliberately set out to enter indonesia), they had not entered illegally. the announcement by the foreign minister on 20 may further suggested they had a right to be in the country and should not face mandatory detention (joint statement, 2015). this raises questions about why the rohingya were confined to the ‘sites’. the high profile nature of the may 2015 crisis and the international response to it (with significant amounts of aid promised and largely contributed by japan, turkey, the european union, the united states of america (usa) and qatar) is likely to have played a role in the decisions by local authorities to favour the rohingya staying there. with iom agreeing to cover the logistical needs, significant international aid was provided not only to unhcr and iom but also, as indicated by ngos we interviewed in indonesia, to international and local ngos operating in aceh. as one of the poorest provinces in indonesia, this provided a much needed boost to the local economy. concerns with the treatment in aceh by moving away from national systems in place elsewhere throughout indonesia and establishing a new process, a number of issues arise which question the long term sustainability of this approach. these concerns (as outlined below), combined with the fact that the rohingya were aiming to reach malaysia and that this remains the preferred destination for most, makes the long term viability highly questionable. it is apparent that the rohingya are already voting with their feet. by the beginning of december 2015 it was reported that less than 400 of the 1000 rohingya initially rescued remained in the camps. virtually all those who have left are believed to have engaged smugglers and travelled to malaysia (vit 2015). according to unhcr in subsequent interviews, by mid january 2016 only 316 individuals remained. while human rights organisations continue to document serious concerns with the treatment of rohingya in malaysia, (see, for instance, equal rights trust 2014), the fact remains this is the country of choice for rohingya escaping myanmar by boat. in malaysia, the vast majority of refugees and asylum seekers registered with unhcr are from myanmar. at the end of september 2015, out of 153,850 refugees and asylum seekers, 142,630 were from myanmar, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 53 with 50,030 of these registered as rohingya (unhcr 2015a). there is also a significant number of rohingya yet to be registered (equal rights trust 2014, p. 15). the large rohingya diaspora, the ability to live in the community (despite still being considered ‘illegal migrants’) and practice their religion and work (albeit ‘illegally’) in the informal sector, are all factors that continue to draw rohingya fleeing persecution in myanmar to malaysia. most of the rohingya we spoke to in aceh risked the dangerous journey to get to malaysia either to reunite with family or, for the young girls and women, to meet husbands. the young men were hoping to find work to support their family or gain access to education denied to them in myanmar and bangladesh. it was clear smugglers were quick to make contact with those in the ‘sites’ in aceh, with the promise of ensuring they could reach malaysia, provided they could afford an additional fee (malay mail online, august 2015). this promise, coupled with the uncertainty and conditions in the sites in aceh, clearly provided an incentive to most to leave already. based on our interviews and having witnessed the conditions in the sites firsthand, there are a number of other concerns relating to the current response to the rohingya in aceh which have contributed to the decision for many of the rohingya to leave. task force coordination who is ultimately in charge is not immediately evident when you visit each of the ‘sites’ in aceh. the official answer is that there is a taskforce in place to administer the centres. as noted above, these taskforces were implemented following an agreement with the national authorities and local authorities on 24 may. the local mayor is nominally in charge of the taskforce with a national immigration official working on each. other members of the taskforce include unhcr and iom. however, other interested parties were also invited to participate. the lack of clarity and coordination around who was supposed to be doing what was clearly apparent during our visit, with the unfortunate consequence of an overlap of certain services for some groups of rohingya, particularly the children, while others received virtually no attention. conditions during our research we were able to visit each of the ‘sites’ in aceh and we subsequently documented concerns with the conditions in the camps (amnesty international 2015). this included ‘poor sanitation, insufficient protection from the elements, as well as unsanitary cooking facilities’ (amnesty international 2015, p. 33). the conditions varied from camp to 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 camp with those faced by the men in the bayeun site (sleeping in inadequate tents) clearly the most problematic and in stark contrast to the purpose built accommodation at blang adoe. the basic accommodation at the kuala langsa site, surrounded by pools of water, was also substandard. it was clear that many (including those who constructed the purpose built accommodation) saw the ‘sites’ as only necessary for twelve months. however, what was less clear was what was going to happen after twelve months. in addition, while a new facility is under construction in timbang langsa, with a capacity of around 300 people, there appears to be little coordination with the major agencies operating there to ensure the site meets appropriate standards. safety linked to the conditions in the sites are also serious issues relating to the safety of the rohingya confined there. concerns were raised by the men at the kuala langsa site that, due to its isolation, local gangs had entered the site on a number of occasions to rob and beat them. at other sites the rohingya had raised safety issues relating to the security guards, accused of abuse and intimidation. when searching for mobile phones, local male police officers were accused of inappropriate pat-downs, including using the pretext of searching for mobile phones to grope women’s breasts. when interviewing local officials, it was evident that they saw the primary role of security officers to stop people smugglers operating in the sites, rather than the personal security of the rohingya in the sites. sharia law adding another layer to the personal safety of the rohingya in the sites is that aceh, alone among indonesia’s provinces, has been authorised under national law to implement local sharia law. in its 2010 report, human rights watch (hrw) identified a number of concerns with two laws in particular: the seclusion law (prohibiting unmarried individuals of different sexes from being together in certain circumstances), and the muslim dress laws (imposing public dress requirements on muslims). the potential for severe punishments, including physical punishments for those found violating these laws, is highly problematic for the rohingya confined in the sites (hrw 2010). it is clear that the sharia police known as the wilayatu hisbah (wh) are operating in the sites and allegations were made to us that physical punishments for non-observance of these laws had already been meted out to the rohingya, prior to our visit. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 55 the way sharia law is being applied to the rohingya creates a dilemma for unhcr, as on the one hand refugees in any country are expected to abide by the laws of that country. however, on the other hand, the rohingya were not attempting to reach aceh. they are now being held in a confined space against their will and face severe punishments, including forced marriage, for conduct that is lawful elsewhere in indonesia (and malaysia). economic conditions the economic situation in aceh also creates concerns for the long term viability of housing the rohingya there. even if they were allowed to work, finding a job would be extremely difficult. a number noted to us that the difference in the amount they would be paid, assuming they could find a job, compared to what they could earn in malaysia, would be significantly less. it is very unclear what will happen after the twelve-month period set for a solution by the indonesian government expires in may 2016. if the rohingya have not been resettled (and it is highly unlikely they will be), will the local authorities or the national government have the funding to keep them in the sites? with record displacement around the world, how long will the international community continue to fund the specific treatment of this group of rohingya (compared to rohingya elsewhere in indonesia), particularly as the numbers in aceh dwindle? without international funding, it is unlikely that the local governments will be able to maintain the current levels of support. family reunion of the 950 rohingya initially rescued, some 328 had been identified as unaccompanied minors or separated children. while a number of the teenagers we interviewed still had family either in myanmar or bangladesh, the vast majority were trying to reunite with a relative in malaysia. this included teenage girls (including some as young as 14) trying to reach husbands in malaysia that had been arranged for them by their parents in myanmar or bangladesh. a number of the women we spoke to with children were also trying to reach their husbands in malaysia. as refugees they could not be returned to myanmar and as rohingya it is highly unlikely that the governments of bangladesh or malaysia would let them enter their countries, particularly to reunite with family that were not likely to have the legal status to be there. once again, as far as the rohingya could see, the only way to reunite with family is through people smuggling networks. 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 the jesuit refugee service in indonesia documented the situation of one family being separated in different camps in aceh after being rescued (jesuit refugee service 2015). this situation was also mentioned to us in relation to another family during our visit in august 2015. given that authorities were having difficulties in reuniting families within indonesia, this is likely to be impossible to organise across a number of countries. resettlement while it is clear there is an expectation from the indonesian government that the rohingya in aceh will be resettled by may 2016, this is would appear to be highly unlikely, even with the dwindling numbers in aceh. in reality very few countries resettle refugees out of indonesia and even fewer resettle rohingya (unhcr 2015b, p. 5). previously one of the biggest countries of resettlement from indonesia was australia, however, for the financial year 201415 australia reduced the number of refugees it resettled from indonesia to 450 people, and not one appears to have been from myanmar (parliament of australia 2015). australia has also announced it will not resettle anyone from indonesia who arrives there after 1 july 2014 (parliament of australia 2015). as such australia will not be able to play any constructive role in assisting unhcr and indonesia in resettling this group. the usa has now taken over as the key resettlement country for refugees in indonesia. for the first six months of 2015, 569 of the 590 cases submitted by the unhcr in indonesia for resettlement were accepted by usa. however, the vast majority are refugees from afghanistan or somalia (unhcr 2015b, p. 5). refugees from myanmar now make up the second biggest caseload for unhcr in indonesia and while it has stated that ‘rohingya refugees from myanmar will continue to be identified for resettlement based on particular vulnerability’ (unhcr 2015c, p. 177), in 2016 only 50 out of the 1,200 people the unhcr proposes for resettlement from indonesia are from myanmar. other than the small number of rohingya the unhcr has already submitted for resettlement from those who are particularly vulnerable in aceh (including women and children at risk), it is difficult to envisage significant numbers being prioritised from aceh given there have been other rohingya elsewhere in indonesia for a number of years. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 57 is the current arrangement in aceh sustainable? the long term sustainability of this unique response to refugee arrivals in aceh must be questioned. if the indonesian authorities wish to create a sustainable system in aceh then, in the first instance, they must address the uncertainty created by the announcement that a solution will need to be found by 20 may 2016. the uncertainty remains, not only at the national government level, but also at the local government level and among the refugees themselves. there is also little incentive for the local authorities or international donors to invest in improving the facilities if the national government could adopt a completely different approach after may 2016. even with the uncertainty, some attempts are being made to improve the conditions and the commitment from the local authorities towards the rohingya appears genuine. however, a lack of coordination, expertise and experience in responding to the needs of refugees and asylum seekers continues to undermine a more comprehensive approach that would offer a durable solution to those in aceh. at a minimum moving the most vulnerable, or those with special needs, to a more appropriate environment (including elsewhere in indonesia) would be an important first step. there are a number of key initiatives that need to be implemented if the ongoing response to the rohingya in aceh is to have any chance of success. first, it needs to be part of a national approach to refugees and asylum seekers that not only provides a clear and operational legal framework but also includes basic rights such as the freedom of movement as well as access to education and employment. as noted by amnesty international, indonesia has been developing a presidential regulation since 2011, which would appear positive with respect to the rights it will afford refugees (2015, p. 31). these need to be implemented as a matter of urgency, with a clear understanding that they also apply to the refugees in aceh. while this will hopefully lead to a number of refugees remaining in indonesia for longer periods, the international community needs to do more to support indonesia by offering meaningful resettlement quotas. currently the usa is resettling the vast majority of refugees out of indonesia and given that its approach to resettlement is based on vulnerability criteria, it is open to take both rohingya and unaccompanied humanitarian minors. other resettlement countries need similarly to increase both their overall quotas as well as expand the range of 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 nationalities that can be submitted to them by unhcr. regional solutions are also needed so those with family in malaysia can be reunited without having to rely on people smugglers. despite the fact that many rohingya who arrived by boat in 2012-13 made their way through people smugglers to malaysia, others remained in indonesia even though there was a limited opportunity to be resettled and they were considered ‘illegal migrants’ under indonesian law. while it would not stop all future boat arrivals from making their own way to malaysia, a national system that included basic rights, with a greater commitment from the international community to support indonesia through resettlement, would clearly have a greater chance of success than the ad hoc approach currently in place. conclusion following field research undertaken in aceh in august 2015, this article has examined the human rights situation facing the rohingya that arrived in aceh in may 2015, why they have been treated differently from previous rohingya groups who have arrived in aceh, and the ongoing sustainability of the current model. significantly, due to a number of the concerns raised above, the majority of those who arrived have subsequently escaped from the ‘sites’ where they were housed, having again engaged smugglers to reach malaysia. the response by the officials in aceh not only raises concerns about the treatment of the rohingya in indonesia, it also raises issues in relation to the ad hoc approach taken by regional authorities within indonesia to those seeking protection, as well as by national governments in southeast asia more broadly. the situation facing the rohingya who arrived in aceh in 2015 in many ways mirrors the response documented by cheung (2011) about the rohingya in bangladesh and malaysia in 2009 who had fled myanmar in the 1990s. as well as noting the ad hoc responses to rohingya seeking protection, shaped by domestic sentiment and fluctuating institutional practices rather than official state policies, cheung also noted that these practices are generally characterised by often punitive immigration control measures and a general reluctance to offer long term durable solutions (2011, p. 51). refugees, despite being somewhat secure from refoulement, are also short of receiving a regularised right to stay and hence ‘have suffered from the lack of formal, consistent policies’ (2011, p. 51) in the southeast asia region. the ad hoc approaches are shaped by a general migration-orientated cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 59 approach that has been coupled with a reluctance to assume responsibility for finding durable solutions for those in need of protection. when examining the way refugees and asylum seekers are discussed in regional and ministerial processes in both the south and southeast asia region in 2009, cheung noted the lack of a ‘clear reference to or foundation in the rights-based framework of protection’ (2011, p. 64). the region failed to respond using the human rights mechanisms in the asean charter, instead preferring to use the bali process that was established to enhance border control, security and law enforcement mechanisms. however, what was significantly different about the may 2015 crisis to the events of 2009 was the complete failure of the bali process. a strong contribution to this failure was the reluctance of australia (co-chair of the bali process), at least initially, to engage in any meaningful way with the crisis. the former australian prime minister tony abbott responded: ‘nope, nope, nope’ when asked if australia would offer to resettle any of the thousands caught in the crisis, believing that any resettlement would further encourage the people smuggling trade (quoted in cox 2015). still, while key asean nations eventually met to resolve the crisis, the statements from indonesia and malaysia following the meeting in putrajaya, malaysia on 20 may 2015 fell short of providing durable solutions for those rescued, again reiterating a third country resettlement solution would need to be found for those rescued. while a change in prime minister in australia in september 2015 did not see any offers of resettlement places for the rescued rohingya, it did see australia take a more proactive role in the sixth ministerial conference of the bali process on 23 march 2016. while discussions of the may 2015 crisis featured heavily at the conference, importantly the co-chairs’ (australia and indonesia) statement and the subsequent bali declaration on people smuggling, trafficking in persons, and related transnational crime (the declaration) not only highlighted the need for a review of the region’s response to the may 2015 crisis, it also acknowledged the need for a comprehensive regional approach which included a number of important protections for refugees and asylum seekers in the region. the declaration recognised ‘the need to grant protection for those entitled to it, consistent with relevant international legal instruments and in all cases, the principle of non-refoulement should be strictly respected’ (bali declaration 2016, pp. 2-3). it also welcomed appropriate local solutions, encouraging members to explore local stay arrangements for refugees and asylum seekers and explore alternatives to detention for vulnerable groups. 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 what this article has demonstrated, however, is that indonesia will not be able to contribute to a comprehensive regional approach until it implements formal, consistent policies that are both rights-based and legally binding throughout indonesia. as long as regions within indonesia are able to apply ad hoc approaches to asylum seekers and refugees, effective protection will continue to be undermined and with it indonesia’s ability to take a leadership role on these issues in the asia-pacific. references amnesty international, 2015, ‘deadly journeys: the refugee and trafficking crisis in 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cooperation’ 29 october. accessed: 5 april 2015. http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/regional-cooperation vit, j. 2015, ‘rohingya refugees vanish from indonesia,’ irin, 14 december, jakarta. accessed 25 january 2016 http://www.irinnews.org/report/102293/rohingya-refugeesvanish-from-indonesia yonesta, f. january 2016, (interview), public lawyer, the jakarta legal aid institute (lbh jakarta). http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2015.1130611 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeq034 http://www.unhcr.org/5143076c9.html http://www.refworld.org/country,coi,,,idn,,53f74c194,0.html http://www.unhcr.org.my/about_us-@-figures_at_a_glance.aspx http://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/regional-cooperation http://www.irinnews.org/report/102293/rohingya-refugees-vanish-from-indonesia http://www.irinnews.org/report/102293/rohingya-refugees-vanish-from-indonesia the may 2015 boat crisis: the rohingya in aceh abstract introduction methodology the rescue of the rohingya in may 2015 situation facing refugees elsewhere in indonesia previous response to the rohingya boat arrivals why did the treatment for the 2015 arrivals change? concerns with the treatment in aceh is the current arrangement in aceh sustainable? conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 2 2018 © 2018 vic alhadeff. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: alhadeff, v. 2018. journalism during south africa’s apartheid regime. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 10(2), 7-11. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5984 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au non-refereed article journalism during south africa’s apartheid regime vic alhadeff nsw jewish board of deputies corresponding author: vic alhadeff, nsw jewish board of deputies, 146 darlinghurst rd, darlinghurst nsw 2010, australia. vic.alhadeff@nswjbd.com doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5984 article history: received 16/02/2018; accepted 21/06/2018; published 25/07/2018 abstract vic alhadeff was chief sub-editor of the cape times, cape town’s daily newspaper, during the apartheid era. it was a staunchly anti-apartheid newspaper, and the government had enacted a draconian system of laws to govern and restrict what media could say. the effect was that antiapartheid activists such as mandela were not ‘merely’ imprisoned, they were also banned, as was the african national congress. under the law, it was illegal to quote a banned person or organisation. this meant if there was to be an anti-apartheid rally in the city – and we reported it – it could be construed as promoting the aims of a banned organisation. as chief sub-editor, i had to navigate this minefield. in addition, most english-language newspapers were antiapartheid and had a resident police spy on staff (one of our senior journalists); on a number of occasions i would receive a call from the magistrate’s office after the newspaper had gone to print at midnight, putting an injunction on a story. we would have to call back the trucks and dump the 100,000 copies of the newspaper and reprint. the challenge was to inform readers as what was happening and to speak out against apartheid – without breaking the law. south africa had its own watergate equivalent. the apartheid government understood that english speakers generally were anti-apartheid, so it siphoned 64 million rands from the defence budget and set up the information department. the aim was to purchase media outlets overseas which would be pro-apartheid, and it set up an english-language newspaper in south africa, to be pro-apartheid. it was called the citizen – and i was offered a job as deputy editor at double my salary, plus an audi. (i declined the offer, for the record). two journalists uncovered the scandal, and brought down the prime minister. keywords journalism, south africa, information scandal, john vorster, censorship, nelson mandela declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. 7 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5984 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5984 http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:vic.alhadeff@nswjbd.com http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5984 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 i was pleased to be part of the two-day conference to celebrate the retirement of professor andrew jakubowicz at the university of technology in december 2017. i am not an academic and therefore, my contribution to the festschrift is the text of my talk1, a personal reflection on my experiences of working in south africa during the apartheid regime. it is not widely known, but south africa had its own watergate. it brought down the prime minister, an entire government department including its minister and a raft of bureaucrats. and, as with watergate, the scandal was uncovered by journalists. but first, some background to the context of journalism in south africa in the 1970s and early 1980s. there were three cornerstones which underpinned the apartheid system: • the race classification act, which divided the population according to colour — whites and so-called non-whites, who comprised – in ‘descending’ order – indians, people of mixed race or coloureds, and blacks; • the mixed marriages act, which forbade marriage and relations between any of those classifications; and • the group areas act, which stipulated where people could and could not live, the objective being to keep them separate. those classified non-white had no right to vote, run for political office or use ‘whites only’ park benches, post-office doors, toilets, cinemas, public swimming pools or beaches. if injured in an accident, non-whites were left to die if ‘whites only’ ambulances were the only ones available. ‘white’ hospitals were prohibited from treating so-called non-white patients. blacks were randomly stopped in the street by police and ordered to produce an identity card, or a pass, as it was called; if they couldn’t do so, they were thrown into a police wagon and incarcerated. the law ensured that blacks received an inferior education – one that would limit their educational potential. three examples are: • school was compulsory for white students up to age 16; for asians and coloured people to age 15; for blacks to age 13; • 96% of teachers in white schools had teaching qualifications, while 15% of teachers in black schools were qualified; • black pupils received one-tenth of the funding of their white peers. in 1975-76, for example, the government spent 644 rands annually on each white pupil’s education, 189 rands on each indian pupil’s education, 139 rands on each coloured pupil’s education and 42 rands on each black pupil’s education this, the most damning statistic of all, had the effect of perpetuating a grossly inferior schooling system for blacks, who constituted the overwhelming majority of the country’s population. soweto was a sprawling black city on the edge of johannesburg inhabited by about two million inhabitants, mostly men. the majority were prohibited from bringing their families to 1 the talk has not been previously published as is; however, an 800-word extract from it was published in the australian jewish news in january 2018 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 9 live with them under a clause known as influx control. the men were mostly there as labour on johannesburg’s gold mines; many secretly brought their families to live with them from the homelands to which they were relegated, and if caught living their families, the charge would be ‘harbouring’ their wife and children. as chief sub-editor of the cape times – cape town’s daily english-language newspaper – i became an agent of what was a draconian system of media censorship. there were two official languages in south africa during the apartheid era – afrikaans and english. the afrikaans media generally supported apartheid, while every english-language newspaper – bar one – took an anti-apartheid position. operating at the helm of what was a staunchly anti-apartheid newspaper, it was a constant challenge to expose the iniquities of the system and inform the public what was really happening – without breaking the law. we were able to do it because the government respected the rule of law for whites – although i say that while noting that the country functioned in two parallel universes – one for whites, in which the rule of law applied, albeit predicated on the cornerstones of the apartheid system, tight media control and restrictions on civil liberties, such as public protests; and a despotic system for so-called non-whites, who were effectively regarded as units of labour, utilised – and exploited – by whites; whose family lives were routinely destroyed; who were classified as second-, thirdor fourth-class people. based on the above, the rule of law applied for whites in that the system respected what was said in parliament and what was said in court; i.e. speech in both forums was regarded as privileged and could therefore be freely reported. this meant that when activists were put on trial for attempting to overthrow the political system, we could report every word. the rivonia trial, which ran for eight months from october 1963 to june 1964, leading to the conviction of nelson mandela and other activists for sabotage and a sentence of life imprisonment, was clearly the most high-profile. more routinely, when the handful of progressive mps spoke in the parliament against the racist system, we could report every word. the most high-profile was helen suzman, who for 13 years from 1961 to 1974 was the only parliamentarian unequivocally opposed to apartheid. an eloquent speaker with a sharp turn of phrase, she was frequently pilloried for three issues – for being progressive, for being female and for being jewish. this in a parliament dominated by calvinist afrikaner men. she was once accused by a minister of asking questions that embarrassed south africa; to which she acidly replied: ‘it is not my questions that embarrass south africa; it is your answers.’ suzman would visit mandela on robben island and then stand up in the parliament and describe the horrific conditions. we would report it. she would criticise the inhumane conditions to which ordinary blacks were subjected. we would report it. she was harassed by police and her telephone was tapped. she had an effective technique for dealing with the phone-tapping – she would blow a whistle into the mouthpiece. as we could report every word that was said in the parliament, in this way we could inform south africans about the real plight of blacks. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/calvinism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/afrikaner 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 the government had a practice of ‘banning’ people and organisations. doing so condemned such people to a twilight existence. activists such as mandela were not merely imprisoned, they were also banned. the african national congress was banned. it was illegal for media to be seen to promote the aims of a banned organisation, quote a banned person or publish photographs of a banned person. this meant media could not quote or publish photographs of mandela and his colleagues. it meant that if an anti-apartheid rally was to be held, reporting it could arguably be construed as promoting the aims of a banned organisation. all of this meant that mandela and his colleagues were rendered invisible – were literally unseen and unheard. they were never quoted nor heard from for three decades. not only that, but the only time they were referred to publicly was by government ministers, which meant they invariably had the words ‘terrorist’ or ‘communist’ appended to them. unless, as mentioned, a progressive politician such as helen suzman referred to them within the precincts of the parliament, and the speech was picked up by media. almost every english-language newspaper had a resident government spy – a member of staff who worked for what was known as boss – the bureau for state security. we all knew who ‘our’ boss agent was. on a number of occasions, after i had sent the first edition of the newspaper to the printers at about 11.45pm, the phone would ring. it would be the magistrate’s office. he had been tipped off by our resident spy about a particular story which we were running and the magistrate was placing an injunction on the story and ordering us to pull it out. it meant the trucks carrying the papers to the regional districts would be called back, the 100,000 copies of the paper would be dumped – at significant cost – and we would pull out the offending story and replace it. some zimbabwean newspapers – which were also subjected to censorship – frequently left the space blank where the story was to have appeared, in this way making a statement of protest and letting readers know that a story had been censored. i doubt if many people in this audience are familiar with the name steve biko. biko could have been the next mandela. he should have been the next mandela. a highly articulate black man from a coastal city called east london, he was arrested one night, manacled in the back of a police van and driven for 14 hours – naked, apparently – to a police station in another city. there he was tortured and eventually murdered. so viciously was he assaulted that he was struck on one side of his head but the injury manifested on the other side; it was an injury which medical people called contra coup, where the brain is dislodged so significantly that it causes a trauma to the opposite side of the head. the killing of political activists, mainly blacks, but also some white, by security police was not an uncommon occurrence, the official explanation invariably being that they had committed suicide or fallen down some steps. biko’s death shocked the nation, however, first, because he was known to be a charismatic leader with the potential to lead his people; second, because he was healthy one day and dead in police custody and with such brutal injuries hours later. we published a series of front-page stories about his death, including a comment from police minister jimmy kruger that biko’s death ‘leaves me cold’. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 11 i wrote two books on major events in south africa. when updating one of my books for a third edition, i included a chapter on steve biko, but was advised to drop it because of the risk of the entire book being banned because of the chapter on biko. we dropped it. this was typical. one erred on the side of caution, to avoid being fined, banned or imprisoned. as mentioned at the beginning, south africa had its own watergate – journalists uncovering a government scandal which brought down the prime minister. also as mentioned, all english language newspapers were anti-apartheid. so the government reasoned that if it wanted to get through to english speakers, it needed an english-language newspaper which would support the government. so it established one. it was called the citizen. one night, one of my superiors invited me to meet him after work, which meant 2am. we sat in his car parked near the beach and for two hours he argued that the future of south africa lay in the hands of english speakers supporting the government. this, in turn, meant it was vital to establish a pro-government english newspaper. i was later offered a job as deputy editor of this new newspaper – at twice my salary plus an audi car. he was referring to what became known as the information scandal. what happened was that the government set up what it labelled the information department. it ferreted 64 million rands out of the defence budget, as no-one could question that, and did two things: it established the citizen and it sought to purchase media outlets, newspapers and radio stations in capital cities around the world, starting with washington dc. hardly anyone bought the citizen; the government printed thousands of copies daily – and secretly pulped most of them! photographers captured truckloads of copies being dumped. as with watergate, it was two journalists who uncovered the scandal, their investigations included pursuing the director general of the department of education all the way to south america, where he had taken refuge. it took months for the full extent of the scandal to unravel, but it culminated in the resignation of prime minister john vorster, minister of information dr connie mulder, his director general eschel roodie, who had fled to south america, and a raft of bureaucrats. i conclude with a personal vignette: my wife and i left south africa in 1984, while the apartheid system was still in place, and lived in israel for two years. i edited two magazines while there, and in one of them wrote a feature criticising white south africans for not speaking out more vigorously against the apartheid system. as murphy’s law would have it, the south african ambassador obtained a copy of the magazine before it was sent to the 6,000 subscribers. he immediately issued threats to the publishers about what action he would take if they distributed the magazine. i was ordered to pulp the 6,000 copies and replace the article. i did so, and a call was put through to the jerusalem post, alerting the newspaper to what had transpired. it ran the story on the front page. i declined to comment. and for the record, i never did take that job on the citizen. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 this page intentionally blank 5924-article text-27731-2-10-20180726.pdf 5924-article text-27731-2-10-20180726.pdf abstract keywords students, migrants or citizens: the violence of liminal spaces devleena ghosh university of technology sydney half a decade ago, after a spate of violent incidents in 2009 and 2010, where indian students had been assaulted and robbed and one student, nitin garg, had been murdered, indian students and taxi drivers held a big rally in melbourne which made front-page news in india. the rally followed a number of demonstrations calling for greater police action and protection. the attacks had already attracted condemnation in the indian media; for example, the influential indian news magazine, outlook, ran a cover story titled ‘why the aussies hate us’ (outlook, 2010), concluding that australia needed to examine its racial biases and the hangovers from the white australia policy. this violence happened in the context of a massive growth in education exports. in 2009, australia was host to more than 630,000 international students worth approximately $17 billion to the australian economy (marginson, 2010). students from asia and india were the largest educational consumers and more than 90,000 indian students resided in australia with almost half living in victoria. while some of these students were from wealthy backgrounds, others were exploited by unscrupulous employers, landlords and vocational education providers, living in squalid, crowded conditions and working in illegal jobs that paid below minimum wage to survive. the fact that the completion of some vocational degrees made it easier to apply for permanent residence visas led to public consternation and calls to regulate the vet sector. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 i issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © devleena ghosh. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(3): 4740, http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5130/ccs.v7i3.4740 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/%2010.5130/ccs.v7i3.4740 almost 1450 indians were reported as victims of crime during 2007-2008 in victoria (overland, 2010). the feeling in india, expressed by wide coverage in the indian media, was that these attacks were due to racial prejudice. the police force in victoria and the state government, on the other hand, claimed that most attacks were opportunistic; an opinion supported, to some extent, by a report written in 2011 by the australian institute of criminology which concluded that the location of the victims was statistically more important than their ethnicity but went on to comment: international students in the main are a particularly vulnerable group due to a range of factors including demographic characteristics and a lack of economic security together with relatively limited options of employment, housing and transport. the types of employment, areas of residence and evening activities (including both shift work and use of public transport) are specific areas of risk for international students that appear to explain some of the incidence of robbery for indian students, in particular (larsen et al 2011, p. xvi) indian students meanwhile complained that police lacked sympathy for victims and did not take their reports seriously. some claimed that officers refused to lodge reports of criminal incidents; in may 2009 the deputy police commissioner of victoria said that indian students were soft targets because they were passive, travelled alone late at night and carried expensive gadgets (johnston et al, 2009). he also advised indian students not to talk loudly in their own languages in public places (the age, 2009). bollywood star amitabh bachchan responded by turning down an honorary doctorate from queensland university of technology in june 2009 saying: ‘my conscience does not permit me to accept this decoration from a country that perpetrates such indignity to my fellow countrymen’ (doherty 2009). the cases cited above show that global trade, in intangibles such as education, raise numerous legal and human ramifications. simon marginson points out that as globally mobile people, international students fall between two national jurisdictions. they cannot gain access to citizen protections and entitlements while away from home, but they lack the rights of citizens in australia (2010). international students are taxpayers and consumers but they are not citizens, migrants or, frequently, even legal workers in the country in which they study. their fluid and liminal status, without access to most of the human, legal, civil, industrial, political and educational rights available to citizens of their host countries, makes them peculiarly vulnerable to economic and racial exploitation. as gail mason argues, the ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 reluctance, and in some cases complete refusal, of many australian institutions and politicians to directly acknowledge that prejudice is a factor in some of the violence that is experienced by indian students ‘dismisses india’s very real concern that its citizens are good for making curry, driving taxis, paying fees, serving at petrol stations or running late night convenience stores but not good enough – or important enough – to command us to acknowledge that cultural intolerance and chauvinism do exist in this country’ (mason, 2010). the articles in this issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal deal with these issues from various perspectives. amit dasgupta, consul-general of india in sydney at this time, was one of the key players in defusing potential violence in the suburb of harris park where many indian students lived. his paper is a fascinating account demonstrating that genuine conflict resolution must include the widest range of stakeholders in a community. shanthi robertson situates the so-called indian student ‘crisis’ as a case study of the local consequences of various global and regional processes including the commercialization of international education and its interlinking with labour migration; the marketization of citizenship; and the cultural imaginaries of class and mobility flowing between india and australia. heather goodall’s paper uses evidence from rural australia to argue that, despite the specific urban focus of the political concerns around the attacks, students enrolled in regional universities who work as casual and contract labourers in rural areas, are also subjected to exploitation via long term structural vulnerabilities, particularly where recruitment is racialized. michiel baas’s article draws on over a thousand media reports of that period to shed light on the position of indian students in the wider debate on skilled migration, multiculturalism and the ongoing commercialization of higher education in australia and the role of academics, journalists and others in the ‘othering’ of indian students. jakubowicz and monani consider the policy implications of considering international students as rights bearing bodies, thereby extending the humanist compact from national citizens to include a category of non-citizens who contribute to australian society economically and socially. together they provide a fascinating picture of a controversial and troubled period for both australia and india. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 iii references abc news 2009, ‘australia in damage control over indian attacks’, www.abc.net.au 1 june, accessed 15 september 2015. doherty, b 2009, ‘racist attacks force snub by bollywood great’ the age, 1 june http://www.theage.com.au/national/racist-attacks-force-snub-by-bollywood-great20090531-brpm.html accessed sep 15 2015. johnston c. & ham, l. 2009, ‘five teens charged over separate attacks on indian students’, the age, 29 may. larsen, j. j., payne, j. & tomison, a. 2011, crimes against international students in australia: 2005–09, australian institute of criminology, canberra. marginson, s. 2010, ‘international students left in the shadows’, the age, 28 may mason, gail 2010, ‘violence against indian students in australia: a question of dignity’, current issues in criminal justice, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 461-465 overland, s. 2009, ‘we are fighting a rising tide of assaults on our streets’, herald-sun, 2 june ‘police warn indians not to speak loudly’, the age, 19 feb 2009 sharma, p. (2010) ‘do you speak australian?’, outlook india http://www.outlookindia.com/article/do-you-speak-australian/264016, accessed sep 15 2015 iv cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 http://www.abc.net.au/ http://www.theage.com.au/national/racist-attacks-force-snub-by-bollywood-great-20090531-brpm.html http://www.theage.com.au/national/racist-attacks-force-snub-by-bollywood-great-20090531-brpm.html http://www.outlookindia.com/article/do-you-speak-australian/264016 students, migrants or citizens: the violence of liminal spaces devleena ghosh university of technology sydney references mental health and legal representation for asylum seekers in the “legacy caseload” mary anne kenny murdoch university nicholas procter university of south australia carol grech university of south australia abstract this article examines the legal challenges asylum seekers arriving by boat to australia experience when seeking assistance with their claims and its impact on their mental health. the authors outline the experiences of asylum seekers in the “legacy caseload” group who have been waiting up to four years to have their protection claims assessed. the complex interplay between legal assistance to support refugee claims and the way those making claims inevitably struggle to understand, engage and participate in the process is analysed. it is argued that provision of legal assistance for this group will be essential to ensuring that the refugee status determination process is fair and allows asylum seekers to understand and participate more fully in the process. recent changes to the assessment of claims combined with a reduction in funding for legal assistance create significant hurdles and combine to compound existing stress and emotional trauma leading to detrimental outcomes on the mental health of asylum seekers. introduction the following is an account from an immigration lawyer describing her interaction with an asylum seeker during a legal advice session at a community legal centre in queensland, australia. he pushed an envelope across the table that contained a letter. his weathered face apologised ‘no english help?’.... he can’t write in his own language (let alone read or write english) – the legacy of his experience of war and persecution in his home country. mary anne kenny, school of law, murdoch university; nicholas procter, school of nursing and midwifery, university of south australia; carol grech, school of nursing and midwifery, university of south australia. corresponding author: m.kenny@murdoch.edu.au issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 mary anne kenny, nicholas procter, carol grech. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(2):4976. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i2.4976 . mailto:m.kenny@murdoch.edu.au https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i2.4976 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 85 he can’t understand what this 6 page, densely written, highly official letter wants of him. we are lucky that the organisation i volunteer as an immigration lawyer with has access to interpreters. after introductions, this man tells me that he does not understand what he has to do, but he can see that he has little time to do it in – in fact just 28 days. he says he is so worried about not gaining protection from australia that he cannot sleep. then he breaks down. for the next 10 minutes, between racking sobs that he has no control over, he tells me that he has failed his wife and children. they are in danger and he cannot help them. he says he feels useless, like a child. in his culture, breaking down like that in front of a woman is not ‘done’. i ask him when he arrived at christmas island. he can’t remember. finally he says it was in 2012. he cannot recall the month or day. he has no hope of answering the 110 questions on the temporary protection application form (many of which have up to 14 sub-questions) without assistance. completing a protection application takes many hours to get down the bare basics, especially when mental ill-health is impacting as it now is for so many of these asylum seekers.1 this interaction symbolises the intersection between complex trauma, language barriers and cross-cultural differences that inevitably impact upon asylum seekers’ ability to recount past experiences. at a deeper level the interaction illustrates the difficulties of an asylum seeker understanding and engaging in a complex legal process that will determine their future. the lawyer is providing assistance pro bono and recounts the difficulty of doing this when there are no funded legal services to assist the asylum seeker. this paper examines the cataclysm facing asylum seekers who arrived in australia by boat between august 2012 – december 2013 that have come to be known as the “legacy caseload”. this group have been the subject of continuous pressure due to a number of punitive policy changes that include: waiting for several years to have their refugee claims determined; legislative changes which mean their cases are now subject to accelerated processing; removal of access to permanent residence; and, a drastic reduction in funding for legal assistance. this article explores the processes and challenges attendant upon these asylum seekers, many of whom are known to have worsening mental distress, to obtain legal assistance for their 1 a description of a client interview reproduced with the permission of the author. 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 claims. the authors set about explaining the complex interplay between legal assistance to support refugee claims and the way those making claims inevitably struggle to understand, engage and participate in the process and the profound impact this has on their mental health. background – the vulnerability of the legacy caseload globally we are witnessing the largest forced movement of people since the second world war with an estimated 60 million people forcibly displaced due to conflict or insecurity (unhcr 2015). in 2012-2013, australia had a rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers attempting to reach australia by boat with over 25,000 people arriving in one year (phillips 2014). these asylum seekers arrived in australia expecting to present their claims for protection. they have become known as the “legacy caseload”. it is well documented that after arrival in a new country asylum seekers deal with a raft of issues such as bereavement, mental health problems, cultural and language barriers (sinnerbink et al 1997, procter 2005). asylum seekers in the legacy caseload, however, are experiencing an additional and unique series of policy and legislative shifts in their status resolution “journey” in australia. this “journey” includes detention; release into the community with limited support and on-going uncertainty around their visa status. all of which ultimately culminates to imbue a detrimental effect upon their mental health. the arrival of a large number of people in australia by boat in 2011-2012 led the federal gillard labor government to seek advice from a panel of experts on policy options available as to ‘how best to prevent asylum seekers risking their lives by travelling to australia by boat’ (prime minister of australia 2012). this panel recommended the reinstatement of offshore processing for boat arrivals and the application of a “no advantage” principle to all boat arrivals. the policy of “no advantage” was to ensure ‘that those who choose irregular and dangerous maritime voyages to australia in order to seek asylum are not advantaged over those who seek asylum through regular migration pathways and established international arrangements’ (australian government 2012, p. 20). the “no advantage” policy was applied to asylum seekers who had arrived by boat after 13 august 2012. this meant that the protection claims of asylum seekers who came to australia by boat after this date would not be processed any faster than if they had remained in transit countries such as indonesia or malaysia, or in their neighbouring countries. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 87 asylum seekers who arrived by boat during 2012-13 were detained upon arrival in remote detention centres in christmas island or darwin. there is clear international evidence to indicate a relationship between mental deterioration and increasing time in held detention. a global systemic review of research into the impact of detention in australia, the united kingdom (uk) and the united states of america (usa) by robjant and colleagues, confirmed that immigration detainees evince high levels of mental health problems and suicidal behaviour which worsen over time in detention (robjant el al 2009). boats continued to arrive and pressure on the capacities of the onshore detention network and regional processing centres to absorb the new arrivals increased. after time held in detention, ranging from weeks or several months, asylum seekers began to be released from detention into the community on bridging visas (bv) without work rights while they waited an outcome on their asylum claims. families and certain vulnerable individuals were released into community detention with no right to work. simultaneously, several hundred men, women and children were sent overseas and detained in regional processing centres in nauru or manus island in papua new guinea in order to have their refugee claims processed only to be returned and released into the australian community on bridging visas during june – september 2013. several hundred more in the legacy caseload remained in detention or were returned to detention after cancellation of their bv. the ability to work while on a bv was re-instated in december 2014. those unable to work while living in the community have limited financial and case management support through the government funded status resolution support service (srss)2. studies on the legacy caseload by non-government organisations and academics indicate that these people are suffering from a number stressors including: difficulties accessing employment and affordable housing, poverty and isolation. those in the legacy caseload have been waiting for almost four years for their protection claims to be assessed. all reports identify ongoing uncertainty relating to visa status as causing significant mental distress (fleay et al 2013; doney 2014; mares 2014; australian red cross 2013, unhcr 2013). 2 details about the programme can be found on the department of immigration and border protection website https://www.border.gov.au/trav/refu/illegal-maritime-arrivals/status-resolution-support-services-programmesrss. different levels of assistance are provided according to certain bands. the vast majority of asylum seekers are in band 6, which is the “lightest” form of assistance. https://www.border.gov.au/trav/refu/illegal-maritime-arrivals/status-resolution-support-services-programme-srss https://www.border.gov.au/trav/refu/illegal-maritime-arrivals/status-resolution-support-services-programme-srss 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 these findings are consistent with research which links delays in the adjudication of an asylum seeker’s claims, the resulting uncertainty and fear of a potentially negative outcome with psychological distress above and beyond the impact of pre-existing trauma (human rights first 2016). evidence suggests that seeking asylum is both directly and indirectly a stressful and disturbing experience and, in some instances, closely related to suicide and selfharm (procter 2008). ongoing mental decline and acute distress could be factors in at least three suicides among asylum seekers living in the community over the last few years.3 this is clearly illustrated in this quote from a friend of leo seemanpillai, a tamil asylum seeker who took his own life in 2014. “he went through so much in his life, and when he came to australia he was given a visa that is filled with plenty of uncertainty, he couldn't accept that,” annan said through a translator. “leo would always talk about his visa status … he would always worry about what would happen to him.” annan spoke of the fear many of seemanpillai’s friends shared of being sent back to sri lanka. “it is always in our mind,” he said. (laughland 2014). in australia, studies comparing the mental health of asylum seekers who received permanent protection visas with asylum seekers who had been found to be refugees and received temporary protection visas (tpv) demonstrated that holders of tpvs were more likely to have clinically recognisable psychiatric conditions. the research postulated this could be due to a continuing range of events and experiences, including the experiences of detention prior to being released on a tpv but was also related to the uncertainty of their future visa status (momartin et al 2006; procter 2005). a new system of refugee status determination and the re-introduction of temporary protection further compounding the mental health and social challenges of the legacy caseload is the complexity of the refugee status determination process in australia. these procedures have 3 october 2015 an afghan, khodayar amini, set himself on fire while on a video call with two refugee advocates. he said he feared being detained again. june 2015, raza, afghan hazara, jumped in front of a perth train. he was living on a bridging visa and had been interviewed by police a day earlier. in october 2014, a 29year-old tamil, leo seemanpillai, set himself on fire outside his house. he suffered burns to 90% of his body and died in hospital. details from the australian border deaths database http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/thebordercrossingobservatory/publications/australian-border-deaths-database/. http://artsonline.monash.edu.au/thebordercrossingobservatory/publications/australian-border-deaths-database/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 89 become more difficult due to a raft of recent legal and procedural changes. in december 2014 laws were passed4 introducing temporary protection visas (tpvs) and safe haven enterprise visas (shevs) for those who arrived in australia by boat without a visa.5 the laws also introduced a new system to process protection claims made by the legacy caseload. the fast track assessment (fta) procedure will allow asylum seekers to make an application for protection to the department of immigration and border protection (‘department of immigration’). applications that are refused will be referred to a newly created independent assessment authority (iaa). reviews by the iaa will be conducted “on the papers”.6 only in ‘exceptional circumstances’ will the iaa accept or request new information or interview the applicant.7 in some cases an asylum seeker will have no access to independent review. this can occur in circumstances including where the department of immigration assesses the asylum seeker’s case to be “manifestly unfounded” or where the department of immigration finds that the asylum seeker has effective protection in another country or where the asylum seeker has produced a “bogus document” without reasonable explanation.8 when the laws were introduced several legal and human rights organisations were concerned that the system of limited review would arbitrarily and unfairly exclude procedural fairness from the protection visa process (law council of australia 2014b; australian human rights commission 2014, refugee council of australia 2014). the combined effect of these new provisions places increased pressure to ensure that the initial application is one which is as thorough and complete as possible. credibility assessment has always been a major issue in refugee determinations and its importance increases in the context of this fta processes which has severely curtailed merits review and in some cases removed it altogether (kenny & procter 2015). as refugee determinations become less reviewable, it is increasingly important to get the application right the first time (millbank 2009). this is also stressed in information provided by the department of immigration to asylum seekers. 4 these changes were contained in the maritime powers legislation amendment (resolving the asylum legacy caseload) act 2014 (cwth). 5 these are visas available to asylum seekers who arrive in australia without a valid visa by boat or by plane where it has been found that they are owed protection. the tpv is a three year visa. the shev is a five year visa. the shev allows for a person who has studied or worked in a regional area for 3.5 years to apply for certain work, study or family visas at the end of the visa. 6 according to the migration act 1958 (cwth) the iaa will generally decide a case on the basis of written information already provided and will generally not hold a hearing or interview with the applicant – migration act 1958 s 473db, 7 migration act 1958 (cwth) s 473 dd. 8 these are known as ‘excluded fast track applicants’ migration act 1958 (cwth) s 5(1). 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 under the fast track assessment process, it is extremely important to give us your protection claims early and in full. if you do not give us all of your protection claims and we refuse your application, you might not have another chance to provide these claims. [emphasis in the original text] (dibp 2016b) the processes commences when an asylum seeker is invited to apply for either a tpv or a shev.9 they are given 60 days from the date of the letter to submit their application and supporting evidence. the application form must be completed in english and they are required to provide extensive details about their identity, family (here and overseas), education, residences, travel history, employment and explain how they meet the definition of a refugee.10 the forms must be accompanied with evidence of their identity or a “reasonable explanation” as to why identity documents are not available.11 they will then attend an interview where an officer from the department of immigration will question them further about their identity and claims. there are a variety of factors that make it difficult for an asylum seeker to present a comprehensive account of their claims, including: literacy, language, culture, a lack understanding of the rsd system and the complexities of that system; limited access to legal representation and difficulty with memory recall and in telling painful and often traumatic experiences (hunter et al 2013). interviews conducted with asylum seekers trying to navigate the legal system show they find the legal process to be confusing, inconsistent and demeaning (australian red cross 2013; commonwealth of australia 2012, unhcr 2013). you have your rights and everyone is…the same, everyone is equal, but they [immigration] don’t deal with you….they deal with you as a number…do not look at citizenship just look at them as humans. they [immigration] don’t deal with you. they deal with you as a number in a file….they broke me, they destroyed me, they just turned me to dust….everything is broken… when something is broken, you can’t fix it. (interview january 8, 2012). (australian red cross 2013, 64) 9 under the migration act 1958 (cwth) unauthorised maritime arrivals are barred from lodging any visa application (s 46a(1)). the minister for immigration personally can allow for a person to lodge a visa of a specified class s 46a(2). this is known as ‘lifting the bar’. 10 form 790 (application for a safe haven enterprise visa) or form 866 (application for a protection visa). 11 section 91w of the migration act 1958 (cwth) provides that the department of immigration may request a protection visa applicant to provide documentary evidence of their identity, nationality or citizenship. the section authorises the department of immigration to refuse the visa if the visa applicant fails to produce such documents or provides a bogus document, unless they have a reasonable explanation for not having them and have taken reasonable steps to obtain them. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 91 every day there is a new law whether it has been passed or hasn’t there are all rumours around...there is the news regarding the temporary visa you can hear it on tv. sometimes we are told we are going to have work permit, sometimes they say no work permit. make a decision and tell us what it is, so we know where we stand. every day we hear the rumours and it is very distressing. [asylum-seeker] (unhcr 2013, 14) processing of the legacy caseload began in late 2015. currently, the department of immigration has invited more than 12,000 individuals in the legacy caseload to lodge claims via the fta process (robinson 2016). the department estimates it will take at least three years to get through primary processing. the upcoming processing of their cases is likely to be a trigger for further stress and distress. refugee status determination processes and social factors including uncertainty regarding status leading up to the process are closely associated with symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorders (kenny & procter 2014). processing is likely to be protracted and rejections of some asylum claims are likely. research has found that rejections of asylum claims contribute directly to ptsd (hocking, kennedy & sundram 2015). for those asylum seekers who manage to navigate the new fta process successfully, they will only be granted temporary protection for a further three years (tpv) or five years (shev). judith herman, in what is considered to be the seminal text on ptsd, outlined a three stage recovery process, the first of which was ‘establishing safety’ (1997). the tpv or shev, because of their temporary nature precludes the capacity to establish safety (fiske & kenny 2004). while on a tpv or a shev refugees are able to work, access medicare and centrelink. however they are not able to leave and return to australia nor will they be able to sponsor any family members to australia. the ongoing temporary nature of their residence status and ongoing separation from family is likely to add to deepening mental deterioration. this is illustrated by this interaction between a lawyer and his client who he describes as being “crushed” by australian immigration laws. having explained [the legal process] to hamid, i thought he was about to cry. maybe he did after he left the office. i can understand why. he is now unable to see a way of reuniting with his family in the short term, or getting a long term solution for himself and his family (murphy 2015). 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 funded legal assistance: the primary application and information service (pais) in march 2014 the abbott coalition government announced the removal of funding for legal assistance for asylum seekers arriving by boat. previously all boat arrivals had access to funded assistance through the immigration application advice and assistance service (iaaas). it was claimed the withdrawal of iaaas for unauthorised maritime arrivals would save $100 million from the budget (morrison 2014). the withdrawal of taxpayer funded immigration advice and assistance does not prevent those who arrived illegally having access to legal assistance. in addition, those who wish to provide immigration advice and application assistance pro bono are free to do so. access to any private and/or pro bono immigration advice by illegal boat or air arrivals will be facilitated by the department of immigration and border protection, with all costs to be met by the providers of these services. if people choose to violate how australia chooses to run our refugee and humanitarian programme, they should not presume upon the support and assistance that is provided to those who seek to come the right way, and they should certainly not receive additional assistance, as they did under the previous government. under these changes the government will provide illegal arrivals clear instructions in multiple languages setting out the asylum application and assessment process and will provide interpreters. this is similar to the process employed by the unhcr around the world. (morrison 2014). the minister also announced that some support would be provided by way of the protection application information service (pais) for those considered “extremely vulnerable” and unaccompanied minors (morrison 2014). current government policy is that pais is only available to a small percentage of protection visa applicants and the budget for this programme reflects this position. the budget for pais is $4.8 million per annum for each financial year from 2014/15-2016/17 (commonwealth of australia 2015, p. 54). this represents about $2000-3000 per client (depending on whether it is an individual or family) (commonwealth of australia 2015, p. 54). in theory this would amount to approximately 1520 per cent of the legacy caseload. vulnerability assessment and eligibility for pais the eligibility criteria for pais are set out in the department of immigration procedures advice manual (pam3) (dibp 2016a). assessments for pais are made by the department of immigration and there is no formal application process. eligibility is based upon an cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 93 individual being assessed to be “exceptionally vulnerable”, in the sense that the individual would lack the capacity or ability to understand and engage adequately in the protection assessment process without assistance. how vulnerability is considered in the pais context is discussed below. “vulnerability” is a term that has arisen recently in legislation and jurisprudence and it is a term that is frequently used with respect to asylum seekers. while the term is widely used, it is clear that there is no common or accepted definition of vulnerability. what is most striking is the range of applications within the asylum seeker context. the european court of human rights in m.s.s. v belgium and greece stated that asylum seekers as a group were ‘particularly underprivileged and vulnerable … and in need of special protection’ (p 251). in other legal contexts vulnerability is used to identify asylum seekers with special needs that may require a higher level of protection (petin 2016). for example the unhcr uses a vulnerability assessment framework for identifying and prioritising those most in need in humanitarian emergencies, such as in the syrian refugee crisis (unhcr 2014). in the united kingdom those considered to be “vulnerable” are excluded from their detained fast track process. the australian migration and refugee division of the administrative appeals tribunal have specific guidelines for how they conduct a hearing with “vulnerable persons” (aat 2015). it is noteworthy that individual vulnerability is likely to be also situational and contextual and it is not necessarily a static concept. the situations faced by asylum seekers and how they cope may vary over time; there may be multiple and complex sets of causes ranging from economic disempowerment to social attitudes and physical limitations (peroni & timmer 2013). there is a range of vulnerability assessment tools which examine both internal and external risks and protective factors. in the australian immigration context the department of immigration’s community status resolution officers use the vulnerability identification assessment tool (viat) to identify people who may need a higher level or oversight of support from their case managers in order to assist that person to a resolution of their immigration status.12 while not diagnostic in nature, the viat is known largely as a decision support tool designed to assist case managers to identify and describe the nature of individual 12 dibp, policy advice manual 3, p. 19/04/2016 > pam3 migration act > pam compliance and case resolution > case resolution > community status resolution service. https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp/pages/document00001.aspx https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp/pages/_document00001/level%20100006.aspx https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp/pages/_document00001/level%20100006.aspx https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp/pages/_document00001/_level%20100006/level%20200068.aspx 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 vulnerability, the presence of additional risk factors for worsening vulnerability, and other factors that may be broadly deemed protective or supportive of the individual. assessing pais eligibility initial assessments for pais are performed ‘using information on the departmental system’ (dibp 2016a) which might be information the department of immigration has gathered itself or information placed on the system by the srss provider. the difficulty is that these systems are not necessarily set up to gather standardised information and thus assessments of vulnerability are made by individual department officers in the absence of a standardised assessment tool, such as the viat. policy guidance13 is provided to officers assessing whether a person qualifies for pais, the key factor being whether the individual has a ‘functional impairment’ which impacts upon their ‘ability to engage in the protection process’. the guidelines state that an officer ‘must take account of all of the available information in relation to an individual’s circumstances, including the cumulative effect of these circumstances where the individual has a number of conditions affecting their capacity to understand and articulate their claims.’14 the policy details particular conditions that should be considered including intellectual disabilities, brain injuries and incapacitating illnesses. asylum seekers will only be eligible for assistance on mental health grounds if they have a “serious mental illness” such as schizophrenia, severe depression or post-traumatic stress disorder. it states that “less serious mental illness” such as “anxiety or less severe depression” will not normally impact upon a person’s ability to engage in the protection process. this policy analysis is problematic; people diagnosed with depression (for example) often experience difficulties in thought, feeling and emotion. changes in emotion may impact upon concentration and decision making. such symptoms form part of the assessment criteria for major depression, thus recognising that cognitive impairment is a core feature associated to this condition (sole et al. 2015). difficulties in thought and feeling, as well as indecisiveness may persist in vulnerable individuals even when depressive symptoms have subsided or resolved (mcintyre 2013). 13 dibp, assessing pais eligibility 19/04/2016 > p. 19/04/2016 > pam3 refugee and humanitarian > pam protection visas temporary protection and fast track assessment process. 14 dibp, assessing pais eligibility 19/04/2016 > p. 19/04/2016 > pam3 refugee and humanitarian > pam protection visas temporary protection and fast track assessment process. https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016 https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp/pages/document00005.aspx https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp/pages/document00005.aspx https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016 https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp/pages/document00005.aspx https://legend.online.immi.gov.au/migration/2016/19-04-2016/legend_current_mp/pages/document00005.aspx cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 95 these cognitive problems compromise an individual’s coping abilities and in turn the inhibit them articulating their protection claims and understanding the rsd process. the current emphasis on limited medical diagnostic criteria is problematic and limiting. understanding idioms of mental distress and its accurate reporting for people of diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds has been the subject of misunderstanding, neglect and exclusion from clinical practice and reporting processes within mental health and mainstream health services (minas et al. 2013). the central concern is that inaccurate diagnosis is aligned with persistent disparities in availability of and access to mental health services, quality of care and mental health outcomes for people from immigrant and refugee backgrounds. as outlined above there are many asylum seekers in the legacy caseload that may be in a desperate emotional state whether or not they meet the classification of formal psychiatric disorder. diagnosis of mental illness is not a straightforward practice for people of culturally and linguistically diverse (cald) background. there are many additional barriers such as language and access to interpreters, stigma and fear based reluctance to seek mental health support, lack of culturally competent mainstream service providers and limited access to specialist psychiatric assessment. there is likely to be untreated symptoms of mental despair as well as mental illness, for example cognitive decline, symptoms and other expressions of mental distress in this population. the pais policy criteria also fails to include a series of other factors which are significant indicators of vulnerability such as age, gender, sexual orientation, family violence, homelessness, destitution and substance abuse issues. the factors described above support the proposition that the current assessment process for determining “exceptional vulnerability” has a number of flaws. however it should be acknowledged that those working in the department of immigration have a very difficult task to determine how extremely limited funding can be allocated to 15 or 20 per cent of the legacy cohort. the reality is under current government policy the majority of asylum seekers will be excluded from this funding assistance. according to the government asylum seekers can have legal representation at their own expense; the problem is any right to representation becomes illusory if the asylum seeker cannot afford to pay. the challenge will be processing the 75-80 per cent who will not receive pais. pro bono assistance is offered across the country through 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 community legal centres and not-for-profit organisations; however they are struggling to meet the demand upon their services, especially when this reduction to funding is combined with cuts made nationally to the budgets of legal aid and community legal centres. legal assistance and fair refugee status determination in referring to the withdrawal of funded legal assistance the minister for immigration and border protection said ‘australia's protection obligations do not extend to providing free immigration advice and assistance to those who arrived in australia illegally’ (morrison 2014). a recent interaction between an officer of the department of immigration and labour senator, kim carr, during a hearing in the australian senate indicated that previous funding was perhaps a sign of australia’s largesse rather than as a reflection of any legal obligation. mr kukoc: previously [legal] assistance was provided to all illegal maritime arrivals, which was quite unique, because no other country in the world provides free-of-charge immigration assistance to refugee protection claims. senator kim carr: it may well be unique, but it was a hallmark of the way in which we treated people. (commonwealth of australia 2015, p. 46) an examination of our international protection obligations and australian domestic law in relation to a requirement to accord procedural fairness toward asylum seekers in fact indicates that australia may well have an obligation to provide access to funded legal assistance. australia’s international protection obligations are found in the convention relating to the status of refugees (refugees convention) and other human rights treaties. under these international treaties australia has agreed to abide by the principle of non-refoulement which means that australia must not return a person to a country where they would face persecution, torture or other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment. the refugees convention does not prescribe procedures to be adopted by countries in the processing of protection claims. the key international agency overseeing the refugees convention, the united nations high commissioner for refugees (unhcr), recognises that it is for each country to establish the most appropriate procedures for processing claims, including review mechanisms, although it recommends that there should be certain minimum requirements (unhcr 2005). the right to legal assistance is seen by unhcr as an ‘essential safeguard’ and that it is important that countries guarantee ‘free legal assistance and representation in first instance procedures and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 97 against negative decisions’ particularly for vulnerable groups (unhcr 2005, p. 3). the european council of refugees in exile also recommends that legal aid should be made available to asylum seekers who lack resources (ecre 2010). in australia there is no guaranteed right to funded legal assistance. however the high court has stated that in serious criminal matters the lack of legal representation can lead to procedural unfairness. in dietrich v the queen mason cj and mchugh j said: australian law does not recognize that an indigent accused on trial for a serious criminal offence has a right to the provision of counsel at public expense. instead, australian law acknowledges that an accused has the right to a fair trial and that, depending on all the circumstances of the particular case, lack of representation may mean that an accused is unable to receive, or did not receive, a fair trial. (dietrich v the queen (1992) 177 clr 292, 317) while this case referred to people on criminal charges, procedural fairness in the context of the processing of refugee status is regarded seriously by the australian courts, particularly given the gravity of the consequences for those affected by the relevant decision (crock & martin 2013). according to a number of studies conducted in other jurisdictions, a lack of representation has a major impact upon the fairness of the refugee status determination procedures. one prominent study in the us found that represented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6 per cent before the immigration courts whereas unrepresented asylum seekers were granted asylum at a rate of 16.3 per cent (ramji-nogales et al. 2007). an extensive study of more than seventy thousand decisions made by the canadian refugee protection division from 2005 to 2009 concluded that representation by legal counsel was a critical factor for successful refugee claims (rehaag 2011). the government has argued the policy of reducing funding for legal assistance will lead to significant budget savings. the law council of australia has pointed out that it may have the reverse effect in that having more unrepresented applicants will increase inefficiencies for the department of immigration in finalising claims. decision makers are likely to be faced with incomplete applications and deficient evidence. this will lead to an increase in the time they need to take to process and finalise the cases (law council of australia 2014a). rejection of claims where the processing was flawed or procedurally unfair may lead to the denial of meritorious asylum claims which will lead to applications for judicial review and associated costs or, at worst, the return of an individual to persecution. 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 the decision to significantly reduce funding to assist a group who have been waiting for over four years for the processing of their claims runs contrary to recent developments in the united kingdom and ireland where governments have been piloting schemes providing early legal assistance to asylum seekers (lane et al 2013; anderson and conlon 2015). research into these schemes has demonstrated benefits for both asylum seekers and decision makers, as the provision of legal support and assistance to asylum seekers increases confidence in the process and leads to an improvement in the quality of decisions (anderson and conlon 2015). an integrated legal and mental health approach what then would be the ideal model of providing legal support and assistance to asylum seekers from the legacy caseload? a return to government funded legal assistance to all of the legacy caseload who cannot otherwise afford to pay for a migration agent or a lawyer would be an important start. such funding needs to be adequate to allow for migration agents to prepare protection applications thoroughly. funding levels currently must be sufficient given the complexity of the task. low quality or incompetent assistance is linked to poor decision making (anagnost 2000). it has been noted previously that the administration of a system of providing legal assistance by the department of immigration may cause an actual if not perceived conflict of interest (taylor 2000). legal assistance should be provided through the attorney general’s department via the current system of funding through a national system of legal aid which also provides funds to community legal centres. for the reasons outlined above it is critical that the government also allow for the provision of adequate mental health support throughout the fta process. the therapeutic merits of an integrated mental health and legal approach have been receiving greater attention in the literature (hunter et al 2013, procter 2008, kenny & fiske 2004). the legacy caseload are presenting as a group which is experiencing pre-existing and ongoing deterioration in their mental health. they require counseling and support from mental health professionals in order to effectively present their claims. it will also be critical for mental health support to be available at critical points of the decision making process. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 99 rejection of asylum claims may be a tipping point ultimately acting as a trigger towards a trauma response. the unfortunate paradox embedded in this situation is that acceptance as a refugee may also worsen a person’s perception of their situation as their residence status continues to be temporary and their future uncertain. the consequences for some individuals may be a worsening limbo and deepening uncertainty. conclusion the recent changes to refugee status processing combined with a reduction in funding for legal assistance mean asylum seekers in the legacy caseload are facing an unimaginably complex process with limited support leading to deleterious effects on their mental health. it is the role of a legal representative to adequately explain the process in a way asylum seekers can understand. legal advice and assistance can aid the decision making process by ensuring forms are completed and the experiences of asylum seekers are documented clearly. the new fta process will present procedural and legal challenges not experienced before in the australian refugee determination system. in the context of a caseload of clients who are in a state of deteriorating mental decline, the role of legal assistance is particularly important. it is difficult to disentangle the nexus between legal and mental health related concerns for asylum seekers. current australian law does not guarantee asylum seekers the help of a migration agent or a lawyer. this fact alone presents a serious access barrier to justice given the complexities of the australian refugee status determination system. however, as outlined above, arguments that access to legal assistance is part of ensuring procedural fairness can be used to counterbalance that approach. mentally unwell and vulnerable detainees would likely benefit from an integrated legal and mental health response. the net effect would be a process that asylum seekers can place trust in, supported by professionals who they understand as prepared to advocate for their situation. legal assistance helps asylum seekers to participate and engage in a difficult process. mental health reactions by asylum seekers are inextricably linked to the stress of negotiating complex legal processes without structured legal assistance. while the legislative and policy changes present new and complex barriers to those in the legacy caseload, they also by 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 implication bring disruption to the social and community life of those in most need of assistance. references anagnost, s. 2000, ‘the challenge of providing high quality, low cost legal aid for 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http://unhcr.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2013-12-16-asylum-seekers-on-bridging-visas-in-australia-1.pdf http://unhcr.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2013-12-16-asylum-seekers-on-bridging-visas-in-australia-1.pdf https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=7877 http://www.refworld.org/docid/558292924.html mental health and legal representation for asylum seekers in the “legacy caseload” abstract introduction background – the vulnerability of the legacy caseload a new system of refugee status determination and the re-introduction of temporary protection funded legal assistance: the primary application and information service (pais) legal assistance and fair refugee status determination an integrated legal and mental health approach conclusion references anzac commemoration and the turkish perspective1 muzaffer orel © 2014 muzaffer orel. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(3): 4333,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i3.4333 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia biographical details muzaffer orel migrated to australia in 1971 from turkey. after working in a number of different factories he was employment officer for leyland australia. he then completed a diploma in education at sydney university and taught for 15 years in sydney’s inner city schools. he has been involved in voluntary community work since 1972; first with the good neighbour council as a contact worker and later as president of the turkish welfare association. during this time he was influential in introducing community languages in primary schools and in arranging for scripture teachers in schools where there were significant numbers of turkish-speaking students. he was president of the nsw council of turkish associations which in his time united 32 other associations under its banner. he chaired the australian-turkish day organising committee for 4 years and is a founder member of the turkish chapter of the auburn rsl sub-branch. he founded the australian-turkish scholarship fund which transferred funds to the turkish education foundation to help underprivileged but academically successful students in turkey using funds from a permanent account, named from australia with love. he could not have achieved this without his wife, ann. they celebrated their 50th anniversary last year. ann’s unconditional support and encouragement kept him going. both of them are now retired from teaching but involved in helping children with mathematics and reading on a voluntary basis. text of presentation this presentation was made at the ‘remembering conflicts: gallipoli, coniston and the frontiers of violence’ conference, held at cosmopolitan civil societies conference, university of technology, sydney, on 28 august, 2014. it is a reflection on the commemoration of anzac day and the involvement of the turkish community, and emphasizes mutual respect in the understandings of cultural diversity. good morning everyone, people with a turkish background, started to migrate to australia, in 1968 after the agreement signed between the governments. naturally, they were exposed to a new life. new environment, new place to live, to work, new school for the children, new language to learn... they had a mammoth task ahead of them. initially, most of them were thinking of returning as soon as they saved enough money. some of them did go back, only to find that money is not everything. after all, australia is their new homeland. they realized that this is the right place to provide a better future for their children. a lot of things changed within the last 46 years. the first generation to arrive in australia worked very hard to reach their goal; namely to provide a better future for their children. at the start, they were all factory workers; but the second and third generations are in a lot better place: there are doctors, teachers, solicitors, engineers, you name it. some of them own their own businesses and even provide employment opportunities for others. but, they are a bit slow in getting involved with politics. naturally, during this time, turkish immigrants also participated in other aspects of social life. they joined the clubs, took part in multi-cultural activities and annual events like the anzac day march. from time to time, some people from our community came together and marched on anzac days, carrying flags and a banner with some friendly messages on it. one day at a function, i met the late rusty priest, at the time president of the nsw rsl branch. when i mentioned what our people were sometimes doing, he said, "oh, it’s not fair; the anzac day march is for the members only." i took it from here and applied for membership of the rsl. because diggers and mehmets fought side by side in the korean war, turks now are considered allies. we then became a member of the rsl state branch on the 15th of april 1998. we regularly march on the day, in a more formal manner, we have done so from that year onwards. we also joined the auburn rsl sub-branch and became their turkish chapter, a few years ago. initially, there was criticism from many sections of the turkish-speaking community about participating in the march. some were against an event they perceived as glorifying war. some were unwilling to take part in an event with descendants of those who had killed their grandfathers. so, in interviews on the sbs turkish language program – the live broadcast segment – and in an article in ethnic turkish newspapers published in sydney – i explained that, though both nations had fought against each other in çanakkale, a great mutual respect and a lasting friendship had developed from the conflict. i pointed out: if our ancestors were the ones who fought and forgave; what concern is it of ours now? furthermore, the turkish community has been living in australia for over 40 years. we chose this country as our second homeland and if some of us still see australians as our enemy, what the hell are they doing staying here? we veterans are not in favour of glorifying war. on the contrary, war is a prescription for suffering, destruction, hardship and loss of life. think about war’s adverse effect for each country involved: loss of a trained workforce; loss of young lives in their prime. in some instances, the skills of an entire generation were lost. for example, in istanbul university, there were no graduates from medical school in 1915; because the gallipoli campaign had interrupted their education. as i mentioned in the newspaper article, “those who died, had an easy exit. those who returned from the conflict with their visible and/or psychological injuries, suffered along with their families for the rest of their lives... there is no way anyone who has experienced the traumas of war would glorify it.” an overview of ww1 from my own point of view the ottoman empire, known by the european powers as the “sick man of europe”, was manipulated into the war by germany’s hidden agenda. directions to involve turkey in the war were given to the german commander in charge of the whole ottoman armed forces. the plan was to prevent the allies from assisting russia and compel them to commit large forces of manpower and resources against the ottoman empire. a combined british and french fleet, attempted to force a way through the straits, to provide a supply line to russia, to occupy istanbul and force the ottomans to surrender. these çanakkale sea battles began on the 19th of february 1915 and concluded with the british-french fleet abandoning the mission on the 18th of march 1915. the çanakkale land battles began on the 25th of april 1915. sixteen battles later, the evacuation of the gallipoli peninsular started. the first on the 20th of december 1915 was from arıburnu and later on the 9th of january 1916 from seddülbahir. this brought an end to the çanakkale campaigns. in turkey, the naval victory in the dardanelles and recognition of those who died in wars are commemorated on the 18th of march while australia commemorates their day on the 25th of april each year. in turkey, as well as state organized ceremonies, schools and media always have their own programs on the day. mosques hold special evening services. hocas, that is moslem clerics, give a historical background talk about the events of çanakkale. they finish off by reading passages from the koran and saying special prayers for all who died in wars anywhere. in these services, there is no sign of hatred towards invaders who came to fight on turkish soil. it is a purely spiritual approach, remembering all those who lost their lives in war. gallipoli was only one part of wwi conflict. some people refer to it as the great war. there is nothing great about any war. according to google, in ww1 more than eight and a half million people were killed and 37 and a half million were injured. in the çanakkale campaign alone, the ottomans had more than 251,000 casualties. these include the dead; the wounded; those who were missing; those who died from illness developed in the trenches. whenever i am asked to speak at schools in connection with anzac day, i always make the point that war is an extreme tragedy. war means suffering, destruction and the loss of many lives without distinguishing young or old, men, women or even children. it’s an immense human disaster. dialogue is a better way of managing disagreements. at a personal level this is something we can practice at home, at school and in the street... talk things through. avoid using force or resorting to violence. people must learn and educate themselves in these skills in the early part of their lives when they are in school. if we achieve this, our world will be a lot safer and a better place to live in. some comments regarding cultural sensitivity more recently, citizens in sydney with turkish background have been disappointed, at some events that have occurred. in 2012 we invited professor mete tunçoku from çanakkale university to speak at a seminar organised by the sydney consul general of turkish republic and the turkish chapter of auburn rsl. one of the rsl sub-branches was presented with a plaque, containing ataturk’s words to anzac mothers (more on this later) to go on the new cenotaph they were building. the turkish chapter was to be invited to attend the opening ceremony of the cenotaph which will coincide with the 2015 centenary commemorations. we have recently been told that we would not be welcome at this event, because a majority of committee members did not wish to have descendants of turks who killed their grandfathers present at the ceremony. this is hurtful and regrettable. let’s be fair, turks were not the aggressors; they were simply defending their homeland. another recent incident of insensitivity concerns, the ‘evacuation’ art work in the australian war memorial museum in canberra. i first found out about it from an article published in the turkish ethnic press, entitled: “disrespect to canakkale spirit. looking at the picture of the statue, i was disturbed to see an anzac sitting on the turkish flag with part of the flag under his boot. in the eyes of a turk, the flag is not just a piece of material. it is a sacred symbol for the whole nation. it deserves the highest respect one can show to it and is carried above head-height at all times. in some countries, people don’t worry about wearing a pair of shorts, swimmers or even thongs made in their flag’s design. this would not enter a turkish person’s mind; not even for a second. the red colour, the crescent and star on the flag have a significant meaning from the nation’s long history. i accept that ‘evacuation’ statue is an individual’s work. if wallace anderson, instead of fighting on the western front, had experienced the respect that developed between the combatants in gallipoli; or if ataturk’s letter to anzac mothers had been written before 1926 instead of 1934, i wonder whether he would have created the same art work. i doubt it. now, i will ask my wife, ann, to read ataturk’s words to anzac mothers as i become very emotional when i read them.) “those heroes that shed their blood and lost their lives... you are now lying in the soil of a friendly country; therefore rest in peace. to us there is no difference between the johnnies and the mehmets where they lie side by side now, here in this country of ours... you, the mothers, who sent your sons from faraway countries, wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace. after having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well.” i raised the matter about the ‘evacuation’ statue being shown on the australian war memorial’s web site with dr. nelson. he replied to my letter and said that the art work was how people saw things then and assured me it was not a statement of ‘attitudes’ today. however, i strongly believe, evacuation’s display anywhere is insensitive. on a happier note, we now march with a band to ourselves on anzac day!!! with more than 10,000 people marching on the day, we found it impossible to hear the closest band and keeping in time was out of the question. redeemer baptist school were approached and asked if they would be interested in joining the march. they agreed enthusiastically and this year, 2014, they marched in front of us. everyone was very happy with the outcome, in spite of the drenching rain. they played the turkish youth march for us, at the conclusion in hyde park. the marchers joined in singing along with the musicians. it was a moving experience. we have requested they include waltzing matilda in their repertoire for the next year. i would like to conclude by saying that, although we have different backgrounds, anzac day helps unite a nation by bringing diverse cultures together and allows us to show respect for all who made the ultimate sacrifice for their countries. footnote 1.statement delivered at ‘women against rape in war: gallipoli to coniston’ conference, cosmopolitan civil societies research centre, university of technology, sydney 29 august 2014 and published here as a non-refereed contribution. editorial introduction gallipoli & coniston: conflict, colonialism and spatial power heather goodall university of technology sydney © 2014 heather goodall. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2014, 6(3): 4351,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v6i3.4351 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.6, no.3, 2014 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia in 1938, coniston was a tragedy in the invasion of australia. it was 23 years after distant gallipoli witnessed the tragedy of the invasion of turkey. in both of these disasters, many people died brutally and uselessly while those who survived were scarred for the rest of their lives. both tragedies were a reflection of global colonial expansion and the attempt by colonising western europeans to impose control over other people’s lands. the papers in this issue take new directions to address the challenging questions raised when the invasion of australia is seen to be linked to ‘modern’ international wars – argued here to be the expansions of colonial power right up to the present day. in australia, there is rising, emotive emphasis being placed on the tragedy of the fighting at gallipoli in turkey in 1915. yet coniston, which lies geographically at the very heart of australia and is more recent, is almost forgotten. it has been recognised only by the families of the survivors who still live there and who have just after so many years won the struggle to restore their power over their own lands. gallipoli is claimed to have ‘made’ the ‘nation’ as if some australian identity was created in the midst of brutality so far away. yet the brutality which established british control over the continent, without which ‘australia’ could not have existed, is ignored because it would mean acknowledging the people whose land was stolen. the power of colonial control – which was reflected in both conflicts – is almost completely unseen. this issue of cosmopolitan civil societies journal sets out to explain this selective memory of tragedy and power. the innovative essays within it ask – from different perspectives – how colonial control has been established and continues to be maintained, despite being seldom acknowledged. essentially warfare inside and outside australia in the last two hundred years of colonial expansion, competition and decolonisation has involved the carving out of ‘national’ identities and new borders – while ensuring hierarchies of control and power on national, ethnic and racial lines. the possibilities for ‘cosmopolitan’ collaboration or even communication have been constrained and distorted by the deadly conflicts generated by colonial border-making and ethnicising. the papers have arisen from ongoing discussions, begun in a conference about state-generated and militarised ‘emergencies’ and then continued in a later conference about colonial conflicts and australia’s role in them. at this second conference, researchers and community representatives from the peoples present at gallipoli in 1915 – indigenous, anglo, turkish and indian australians – came together to question how war and borders were being framed – in these four years of ww1 commemoration – as being international only, while the frontier invasion conflict in australia was ignored. together, this series of discussions resonated with wider scholarship on the control of space in past and continuing colonial contexts in africa which allowed common themes to emerge. invasions, fences, borders and checkpoints have all been aimed at establishing and sustaining power over colonised, ethnicised minorities. francis jupururla kelly spoke to frame the gallipoli-coniston conference. kelly is a walpiri man, from the lands on which the coniston massacre took place. he has spent many years working with his community to record the events of coniston and, with david bradbury, he made the film coniston to bring that story to the world. in october, 2014, after many demands, the walpiri people finally achieved full control over yurrkuru, the land on which the 1928 massacre took place. this volume therefore begins as it should with kelly’s statements: firstly his words about the conference itself, then about the film and finally his statement on the momentous achievement of land restoration. colonies and power: past and present colonial expansions in the past or the present have mobilised force and spatial power. in order to demonstrate the common strategies across settings of colonial power, annie pfingst has compared the spatialised power exercised by the british during what it called the ‘mau mau emergency’ in kenya in the 1950s with the ‘state of emergency’ imposed by the israeli government in occupied palestine in the present. in her article ‘militarised violence… over palestine and kenya’, pfingst brings tightly argued analysis together with visual imagery from the two colonial situations, separated by 70 years and half a continent but directly parallel in intention and effect. control, marginalisation and repression under the british and israeli occupations in kenya and palestine respectively have mobilised the same strategy of state-generated ‘emergency’. in fact the links are direct: the israeli government since 1947 has drawn on the precedents established under the british occupation of the same area – palestine – before 1947. australia the three papers which follow take up the challenge of linking internal, frontier warfare in australia with its external international warfare. ray kerkhove, in ‘aboriginal “resistance war” tactics’, reviews the established evidence about the ‘black war’ in 19th century southern queensland when aboriginal people were opposing invasion by british settlers. kerkhove demonstrates direct parallels on many counts with the guerrilla strategies which became familiar only in the 20th century with the conflicts in vietnam and elsewhere in situations of unequal force. strategies like sabotage and subterfuge, ambush and the targeting of economic resources along with tactical innovation are all well-documented but have seldom been compared systematically to what are now well recognised military tactics. a key component of the military power of the invading settlers, as paddy gibson points out in ‘imperialism, anzac nationalism and the aboriginal experience of warfare’, were the native police. again, this is an issue which is seldom considered in australia, but there is more extensive analysis of ‘colonial armies’ in other settings, where works by omissi, tobias, hack and others all point to the use of collaborating colonised people to conduct invasions and then maintain control. in this year of the centenary of gallipoli, there has been great concern to recognise not only the presence but the courage and professionalism of the aboriginal soldiers who fought in the australian army in both world wars and the many ‘smaller’ ones since. yet, as gibson points out, the real parallel of indigenous peoples in uniformed roles in the australian armed forces is with the native police who enforced settlement, not with the indigenous resistance fighters who were opposed them. this, as gibson points out, demonstrates the need for further research – to identify the tensions among those indigenous men who became native police, willingly or unwillingly, and the impacts on them of being the face of the invasion – as well as the effect on the defending aboriginal people who had to make sense of their resistance when the people they were fighting were their own. the third paper in this group, ‘the politics of war and the “battle of balaklava”’ by john maynard, brings the external war back home, following the lives of a family of south australian aboriginal soldiers in the years after they had returned home. demobilised aboriginal soldiers had to leave behind the relative egalitarianism of the armed forces overseas to face once more the continuing discrimination of their colonised homes. unsurprisingly, this harsh reality led to conflicts at many levels. the conflict which maynard explores around the small town of balaklava in 1925 is just one such situation were aboriginal frustration burst into open anger. turkey the gallipoli campaign had resonances of frontier conflict because it too was an invasion: the british had decided to use empire troops to challenge germany’s ally in the east, the ottoman empire. for turks, the fighting on the dardanelles was on home soil, and the massive resources needed to mobilise a military response called into being a new nationalism, opposed to the old ottoman empire, with the goal of establishing a modern and independent state. the british invasion was defeated, with the loss of many lives on all sides, but it was the turkish people who were left to bury the dead, not only turks but the new zealanders, the australians (both indigenous and anglo) and the indians who all died on those hills. it was the turks too who had to deal with the scars left on their lands and their people. the development of the new turkish nation state proceeded however, with the battle of the dardanelles commemorated on march 18 in turkey, becoming one of the symbols of this new nation in a strange parallel to the way the defeat of the invasion has been rising in significance in australia. yet, particularly since world war 2, turks have been immigrating to australia and so many turks have made a new home in the heartland of their invaders. as citizens and now long-time residents, turkish australians have had to face the complexities of being members of a country which commemorates war and service by focussing on a battle on turkish land. some have joined the conservative australian rsl (best known by its former name as the returned services league) and some have marched in the annual anzac day parade. others have refused to take part. such are the complex dilemmas with which turkish australians have been grappling and muzaffer orel, a senior representative of the auburn turkish community, offers an insight into those dilemmas in his statement to the conference in august 2014. burcu cevik-compiègne is a turkish researcher analysing the representations of gallipoli among turks, indians and australians, all of whom lost soldiers in 1915 in the dardanelles. cevik-compiègne’s paper in this volume identifies the desires for ‘modernity’ which shaped both the emerging nationalism in turkey and the enormous mobilisation of the war effort to resist the british invasion. cevik-compiègne focuses on the role of women, who not only shared the desire for a new nation with other turkish nationalists but were seeking to establish themselves in independent, economic and professional roles. in many ways this resonated with the ‘modernising’ rhetoric of the new nationalism, but in other senses it was deeply challenging not only to established turkish custom but to the leadership and directions it posed for this new nation. cevik-compiègne considers nursing – a role which is one of the few identified in australia as a legitimate female role in warfare. when gender inclusiveness is demanded in australia and other places, it has invariably been to add representations of nurses and nursing to the pantheon of masculine ‘heroes’. yet in turkey, as cevik-compiègne explains, nursing had until ww1 been a masculine profession, in which women had never been welcome. the demands of war ensured that turkish women were indeed allowed entry into wartime nursing, and as cevik-compiègne demonstrates, they fulfilled similar work to that of nurses from other countries in the war – often arduous, always tragic and sometimes heroic. yet whereas women as nurses in european warfare have been remembered and eventually celebrated, cevik-compiègne charts the process whereby turkish ww1 nurses were forgotten – overlooked when the symbols of the new nation were developed in the 1920s. it was a bitter irony for turkish women – but perhaps not a surprising one – that an archaic and marginalised symbol of womanhood, the anatolian peasant woman and mother as warrior, whose image was adopted as the ‘mother’ of the new nation. cevik-compiègne explores the path of this forgetting of ‘modern’ women as nurses and considers the challenges to the stereotype of the anatolian peasant mother/warrior which came to dominate in the fantasy of ‘nation’. war everywhere the final two essays in this collection pick up the focus on gender and warfare and return to the issue of spatial power. meredith burgmann offers a memoir which documents the peaceful challenge posed by the women against rape in war (warw) campaign to the distorted fantasies of war which had emerged around anzac day in australia. burgmann was a part of the collective of women – composed of pacifists, quakers, radical feminists and socialist feminists – who came together in the early 1980s to intervene in the commemorations of anzac day and focus attention on the fact that women were victims of systematic rape as a weapon of war. while the rape of women as a weapon of war had long been documented and recognised, and had been formally and explicitly declared a war crime by the fourth geneva convention in 1949, it has nevertheless continued and been ignored in the uncritical valorization of soldiers. the warw brought their peaceful statement into the space of the war memorial and of the parade of soldiers in demonstrations in canberra, melbourne and sydney over a number of years. burgmann discusses the common threads which brought this often disparate group of activists together and the convictions which led them to find peaceful ways to make their protest visible. she also considers why their demonstration has been remembered with such vitriol by many commentators. despite their deep commitment to peaceful methods, this protest touched very raw nerves across the still largely-masculine australian media and power structures where the presence of women and of this issue in the physical space of the war memorial and of the parade of soldiers was seen as a deeply aggressive attack. since the 1980s, rape in war – and more broadly the sexual insecurity which is caused by warfare in all settings – has been far better recognised. not only has the gendered violence of the frontier wars in australia been better understood and documented, but the systematic rape which was undertaken against ‘enemy’ women in in bosnia-herzegovina, rwanda and many other conflicts have all been widely publicized and condemned. lucy fiske and rita shackel have developed their paper, ‘ending rape in war: how far have we come?’ from extensive empirical work in tanzania and uganda in east and central africa, where women report the total breakdown of sexual safety in all circumstances once war-related instability breaks down the fabric of conventional social protection. women in this area – as indeed in many other areas facing militarised violence – report sexual attacks by everyone – enemy soldiers, by soldiers on their ‘own’ side and by ‘peace keepers’. fiske and shackel’s careful analysis shows the inverse relation so far between the growth and awareness of the legal apparatus to punish gendered violence in war and rising reports of experiences of gendered sexual insecurity. as warfare spreads, the fields where many women in agricultural societies make their livelihood become unsafe, either from attacks or landmines. increasingly women face impoverishment and so as well as the sexual vulnerability they experience from troops and peacekeepers, they may be forced into commercial sex to feed their children. fiske and shackel outline the women’s organisations in africa and elsewhere which are demanding not only recognition for gendered violence in war but real action to protect women in all spaces and in all situations of conflict. most often, this involves empowering women to enable them to intervene to protect the vulnerable in warfare, whether they are women, children, the elderly or marginalised groups who become the targets of scapegoating. such very contemporary research sheds light on all the warfare, internal and external, not only that in which australia has been involved but wherever it is occurring around the world. this journal issue opens up critical new issues which speak not only to a new way to understand past conflicts but new options for the future. bibliography omissi, d. 1994, the sepoy and the raj: the indian army, 1860-1940, macmillan in association with kings college london, basingstoke. tobias, r & hack, k. (eds), 2009, colonial armies in southeast asia, routledge, london. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 1 2017 © 2017 susan engel. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: engel, s. 2017. germany’s government-civil society development cooperation strategy: the dangers of the middle of the road. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(1), 42-59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i 1.4942 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper germany’s government-civil society development cooperation strategy: the dangers of the middle of the road susan engel university of wollongong, australia corresponding author: susan engel, politics and international studies, faculty of law, humanities and the arts, university of wollongong, northfields avenue, wollongong, nsw 2522, australia. sengel@uow.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.4942 abstract the organisation for economic cooperation and development (oecd) has been busy since the late 2000s studying the way aid donors manage their relations with development civil society organisations (csos). more than studying these relations, they have made some very detailed suggestions about how csos should be organised and how donor governments should fund and otherwise relate to them. this came out of the debate about aid effectiveness, which was formally aimed at improving both donor and recipient processes. donors have quietly dropped many of the aspects related to improving their own performance and yet a number have created new interventionist governance frameworks for csos. this is the case in germany, which has a large, vibrant development cso sector that has traditionally been quite autonomous, even where it has received state funding thanks to germany’s commitment to ‘subsidiarity’. germany is otherwise a middle of the road donor and in many ways, these ‘reforms’ are moving its relations with civil society more towards a somewhat more managerialist approach, one that is, in fact, the norm amongst oecd donors. keywords aid and development, civil society organisations, germany, oecd dac, aid effectiveness declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the university of wollongong, faculty of law, humanities and the arts provided support for this research through a study leave assistance grant. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.4942 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.4942 mailto:sengel@uow.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.xxxx 43 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 introduction there is good evidence that ‘in many countries, and in all global regions, civic space has worsened appreciably in recent years’ (civicus 2016, p.7; panel on the independence of the voluntary sector 2015). the development sector has been no different with attempts to discredit csos and reduce their space for action through regulatory and other mechanism (banks, hulme & edwards, 2015; hayman 2016). further, development non-governmental organisations (ngos) in many countries have since the 1980s been pushed in increasingly instrumentalist and managerialist directions through state policy (see inter alia banks, hulme & edwards 2015; fisher 1997; kapoor 2005; panel on the independence of the voluntary sector 2015)1. in europe overall the trend is aid shifting from going to csos to going through them for specific projects with csos being seen in instrumentalist terms (huys and de bruyn 2015, p.10). germany though is somewhat of an outlier, the state-development cso relationship did not change notably over the 1980s-2000s. however, in the 2010s cso state relations did begin to alter at least in part due to the international aid effectiveness process led by the oecd development co-operation directorate (dcd-dac, hereafter dac). the changes are subtle but they promote a technocratic view of development with csos as service delivery agents. thus, things are not quite ‘business-as-usual’ (huys and de bruyn 2015, p.13). the influence of the state varies amongst development csos, partly because they have differing degrees of autonomy from the state. this variation is related to the degree of reliance organisations have on government funding, which can range from zero to quite high levels. between countries, we see different levels of funding for, and engagement with, development csos. in 2009, for example, only one per cent of the french government’s bilateral development support went to ngos, whereas in ireland it was 37% (oecd 2011c). germany gave 12% of its aid through csos, putting it just below the oecd dac average (oecd 2011c, pp. 20-21; see also huys and de bruyn 2015). this positioning supports lancaster’s (2007, p. 182) argument that germany is a (self-identified) ‘middle of the roader’ in its overall development policy, meaning they have moved with other countries in terms the objectives and operations of their program and undertaken reform incrementally. in terms of objectives, they have gradually moved from a focus on commercial and to a lesser extent diplomatic aims, to a somewhat greater focus on developmental ones. germany’s commitment to the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ in managing social relations has determined that the government has traditionally supported cso autonomy. subsidiarity is an idea developed out of the 19th century conflict between church and state in germany, which holds that social issues should be dealt with at the most proximate level relevant to their solution. it was applied to relations between levels of government as well as in social welfare. subsidiarity also sits well with germany’s long history of relatively decentralised rule and, after the centralised dictatorial rule of the third reich, the allied powers created a 1 i distinguish between development ngos and csos here as per banks, hulme & edwards (2015, p.709), with csos as more grassroots, member based organisations and ngos as more staff-based, service delivery focused organisations. on the meaning and impacts of managerialism in development, see desai and imrie (1998). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 44 system of decentralised government, with the underlying objective of preventing a strong central authority. in social welfare, the running of social insurance and social services is undertaken by one of six very large non-profit conglomerates (anheier & seibel 1993)2. thus germany is regarded as a classic neo-corporatist state where the ‘nonprofit sector did not develop in antithesis to the state, but in interaction with it’ (anheier & seibel 1993, p. 3). subsidiarity and decentralisation help explain why german state-cso relations in development were largely unchanged during the 1980s-2000s. yet, the dac aid effectiveness agenda has brought change3. germany now has its first strategy for government-civil society cooperation in development. most other oecd donors already had these in place. in moving to a more middle of the road position in dac terms, the traditional ‘right of initiative’ of german csos regarding their activities is starting to be challenged. this article demonstrates that this strategy also starts to reframe germany’s state-cso relations in development towards more technocratic, service delivery basis and away from a focus on transformation, human rights and social justice. germany’s development cso sector is large and varied but little researched, thus the article also contributes a useful map of the sector. it has two very large church networks, a handful of big non-profit organisations (both with close relations to the state) and a plethora of smaller organisations. overall, the country has a remarkably diverse and active civil society development sector. there are now ‘several thousand’ organisations in existence (bmz 2015b). the term cso is particularly pertinent in the german context because organisations include: ‘associations, action groups, federations, working groups, solidarity groups, twinning arrangements, foundations, development-policy networks, and many others’ (bmz 2015b). the vibrant, fragmented development cso system in germany means the challenge to subsidiarity is predominately to the church and cso organisations that are most closely connected to, and funded by, the state. by contrast, the large number of small csos have seen little impact. as a review of the policy and program changes from the aid effectiveness agenda on german csos, the methodology for the article is grounded in a review of primary documents. the review used reports and documents from the german government, the oecd dac, as it was the key driver of the aid effectiveness process, and from csos. for csos, the analysis of the international response focused on the open forum for cso effectiveness along with analysis of dissident voices. in terms of german csos, document analysis focused on the formal responses of the largest development cso network called the verband entwicklungspolitik deutscher nichtregierungsorganisationen (venro)4 and the largest development csos. finally, ten interviews with large and small csos, one small network and a government agency across germany provided additional qualitative data along with 2 despite independent governance, all of the large groups have a strong dependence on public funding. the protestant and catholic church bodies play a large role in these conglomerates and these and other german churches also receive strong support through a church tax (kirchensteuer) collected by the state, though more and more people have been formally renouncing their membership of the church over the past decade. 3 on changes in europe’s big donor states see huys and de bruyn (2015). 4 attempts to interview someone from this organisation proved unsuccessful. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 45 participant observation data from attending development forums and events in the state of baden-württemberg. the first section of the paper briefly introduces the aid effectiveness agenda and the process by which it came to be applied to csos globally. the second section sets out germany’s development civil society sector and its history in relation to key aid effectiveness ideas. in the third section, the german government’s policy on csos leading to the 2014 ‘strategy on government-civil society cooperation in post-2015 development policy’ is analysed. the conclusion considers to what extent these developments have challenged the subsidiarity principle. it examines too the overall impact on germany’s development cso sector and on germany as a donor to the period up to the end of 2014. the aid effectiveness agenda and civil society organisations the dac aid effectiveness debate originally focused on bilateral and multilateral aid rather than on csos. the commitments from donors and recipients were formalised in the paris agenda on aid effectiveness (2005) and then the follow up accra agenda for action (aaa) (2008). the paris declaration sets a practical agenda designed to improve the quality and impact of aid policy and programs. it specifies five fundamental principles for improving aid effectiveness: recipient ownership of the development agenda; alignment of donors behind recipient government strategies; harmonisation of aid programs to increase aid effectiveness; a focus on results and measurement; and mutual accountability of recipients and donors for outcomes (oecd 2012). the millennium development goals (mdgs) provided the overarching framework for aid focused on poverty reduction. together, they set the overarching norms for development up to 2015(hesselmann 2011). combating poverty and improving aid effectiveness are individually sound goals, but divorced from issues of politics, they meld into an intentionally technocratic agenda that promotes expanded neoliberal governmentality (banks, hulme & edwards, 2015; ferguson 1994). the mdgs depoliticise poverty by reducing it to a set of ‘targets’ about seemingly separate development ‘problems’. the paris declaration goals are individually quite progressive, but the overall focus is on getting the right: ‘technocratic planning apparatus, based on lengthy texts, monitoring matrices and statistical information systems’ (booth 2008, p. 2; see also gulrajani 2011; mawdsley 2012). the progressive elements in the paris declaration are the reason why csos engaged with it and why it became a space of contestation. given the position of the dac as an organisation of northern donors, it is not surprising that the outcome has been the confirmation of an only slightly modified version of the neoliberal development agenda those donors hold (eyben 2012; ruckert 2008). indeed, eyben (2012, p.89) concludes that ‘the content-free nature of “aid-effectiveness” allowed the erstwhile hegemonic discourse of development as growth and basic needs to return to centre stage’. this discourse has long been discredited. still, donors progressively reduced debate on the effectiveness agenda, and by the mid-2010s, it was just a minor point in the post-2015 framework. donors’ declining commitment to the aid effectiveness agenda was reflected in a lack of progress in implementation. the 2011 oecd monitoring report found that recipients cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 46 ‘appear[ed] to have gone further in implementing their commitments… than donors’ (oecd 2011a, p. 17). by 2016, the language used by the oecd on donors’ implementation progress had softened but their limited progress was still clear (oecd 2016, p. 25) yet whilst donors’ overall progress on aid effectiveness waned, many pursued some elements of it, in particular the ‘harmonisation’ of cso programs with government ones. development csos and ngos lobbied for various aspects of the aid effectiveness agenda and urged donors to implement it (koch 2008, p. 60). over time, they became more deeply engaged with the aid effectiveness agenda, perhaps enticed by the early promise of a progressive agenda and the inclusion of some heterodox voices (eyben 2012). initially, csos did not seem to consider how or whether the aid effectiveness agenda would apply to them, but, by the mid-2000s oecd reports included calls for their inclusion, which formally occurred with the aaa (koch 2008). the 2008 accra meeting was the first with formal civil society representation and it saw increased attention to csos declaring the aim of harnessing the expertise and skills of ‘all development actors bilateral and multilateral donors, global funds, csos, and the private sector’ (oecd 2012, p. 18, emphasis added). with this, csos were for the first time officially recognised as development actors (hayman 2016).the aaa promoted increased engagement with csos and asked them to consider how they could apply the paris principles. oecd donors committed to improving: co-ordination of cso and government programmes; cso accountability for results; and information on cso work (oecd 2012, pp. 19-20). the expansion of the paris agenda to csos thus provided an opportunity for expanded state monitoring and control over the sector. by this time, however, many csos had realised the complication that, alongside some much needed focus on improving donor systems, was a technocratic agenda that could to diminish their independence and challenge their human rights based agendas. this occurred in the post-september 11 context of csos being subjected to heightened restrictions and control (clark 2011; civicus 2016; panel on the independence of the voluntary sector 2015). in addition, concerns about cso and ngo effectiveness and accountability came to the fore in this period globally in germany there was a very public debate about these issues after a scandal about unicef germany in 2008 (vijfeijken & schmitz 2011). this gave additional purchase to the debate and obliged csos to engage in it, on terms not of their own making. the aaa call for csos to make progress on the paris goals was supported by some southern csos (koch 2008; menocal & rogerson 2006; wamugo & pedersen 2007) and, as a result, a debate developed within the cso community regarding the applicability of the aid effectiveness agenda to csos. however, given their limited resources, the capacity of southern csos to engage in this debate was limited. over time, the main cso network, the open forum for cso effectiveness, focused the response to the aid effectiveness agenda on foregrounding human rights based development and staking out a clearer alternative. they developed the csos equivalent to the paris declaration, the istanbul cso development effectiveness principles and the siem reap cso consensus on aid effectiveness (open cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 47 forum for cso effectiveness 2010). this declaration promotes commitment to diversity in the cso community and calls on csos to maintain a focus on human rights, gender equality, sustainability and democratic ownership and participation as well as operating in a manner that promotes transparency, efficiency and learning. this extension of the aid effectiveness agenda required csos to consider the extent to which the goals of increased coordination, using local systems or simplifying procedures and systems and increasing systems of mutual accountability apply to csos themselves. this is important as csos are quite large donors and there is evidence that their lack of harmonisation and coordination is costly. however, in practice, these issues have been recognised by csos and scholars for some time (see inter alia hammad & morton 2011; koch 2008; koch 2009; riddell 2007; wamugo & pedersen 2007). countering the harmonisation agenda, csos argue that diversity provides opportunities for innovation and creativity and that diversity allows csos to develop genuine partnership that adapt to, and learn from, their local partners. moreover they argue that their importance lies fundamentally in the political and social relations they facilitate than in their role as (non-universal) service providers. the fourth high level forum on aid effectiveness held in busan, korea in late 2011 saw some attempt to weave the commitments of states and civil society together. this was not surprising given the growing and diverse attendance – busan attracted 3,000 delegates from donor and recipient governments, multilateral organisations, csos, private bodies and other groups. the declaration from the meeting, the busan partnership for effective development cooperation (oecd 2011b), acknowledged the slow progress in implementation and implicitly demonstrated the waning support of northern donors to progressing the overall aid effectiveness agenda5. governments committed to improving the conditions for cso operations and only encouraged them to improve their development effectiveness. priority was given to the cso’s meeting the istanbul principles rather than the paris principles (oecd 2011b, p. 6). the overall trajectory, however, was a decline in donor engagement with the aid effectiveness agenda, particularly elements that questioned their own operations. the term aid effectiveness has been disappearing from donor discourse, replaced with references to ‘development effectiveness’ and ‘the post-2015 process’. by contrast, components that increase the obligations of csos, like harmonising state-cso programs have continued. dac produced a series of very detailed reports on donor-cso relations, which were all based on a very instrumentalist, service provider view of the role of csos in development. csos were framed as program implementers with development as a top-down, traditional process where northern csos ‘do development’ for southern csos. these reports also produced some very intrusive recommendations not just outlining to oecd governments how they should manage csos, but also giving detailed directions to csos on how they should be structuring their affairs, in other words, a managerial approach. this included: collaborating 5 this was exemplified in the narrow processes proposed for the promotion of aid effectiveness post-busan (lanzet 2012). also the declaration emphasised the private sector, ‘new’ donors and south-south cooperation more than csos. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 48 with donors on project objectives and outcomes; making their reports ‘fully accountable’ to donors and beneficiaries; harmonising their systems and processes; and creating an international database of cso projects (oecd 2011a, p. 7). why csos would want to comply with these directives is not discussed. there are all sorts of issues here for csos, first what would the consequences of donor government influence on project objectives be? second, should donors get to determine what ‘full accountability’ is and will their own reporting meet the same standards? third, who will csos have to harmonise their systems with donors, partner ngos, partner states and is this possible? fourth, what would the impacts on csos freedom and security of a mega-database be? for donors, the key way they were to progress this agenda is through a civil society strategy and germany was identified as one of just three laggards amongst dac members, in not having one (oecd 2011a). in order to understand germany’s lack of a civil society strategy it is necessary to first briefly map the country’s development cso sector. the type and number of institutions and the diversity of funding sources of csos are key factors in the capacity of government to influence the sector, with more diversity leading to greater autonomy for the sector (molenaers et al. 2014). as noted in the introduction, the german development cso sector is also little researched and thus the section also provides a useful map of the sector. germany’s development csos6 german csos can be divided into three broad groups. first, the unique phenomenon of the german political foundations – each of the parties represented in the bundestag has a statefunded foundation and they receive funding from the germany aid ministry, the bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche zusammenarbeit und entwicklung (bmz), for development work. they are not discussed here as the political foundations are seen as distinct from development csos (bornhorst 2012), they are not part of cso coordination networks and the oecd dac documents on aid effectiveness do not refer to them though there is a brief mention of them in the german government’s draft and final cso cooperation strategy discussed later7. second, there are thousands of small and medium development csos including churchlinked, secular and a few business-linked groups. third, there are two big church-based development network linked to the protestant and catholic churches that receive substantial public funding. the protestant network is called evangelisher entwicklungsdienst (eed – 6 the pre-1990 situation outlined here refers only to the situation in federal republic of germany not that in the former german democratic republic (or east germany). 7 the political foundations are formally ngos, but since they are almost fully financed from the public purse, the title ngo is problematic. their funding is determined by the bundestag on a three-year basis dependent on each party’s share of votes in the last election. they receive funding from five ministries, with the bmz’s contribution expressly for development cooperation activities (oecd 2010, p. 57). total funding for all the foundations was almost us $2 billion between 1962 and 1998 (rielly 2009, p. 427) and, in 2009, the political foundations received €216 million from bmz. this is more than the funding for church-linked csos. german political foundations have had a role in a number of political transformations thanks to their connections to power holders (anderson n.d.), yet they operate largely under the public radar. they have not received the critical attention focused on the us alliance for democracy under the kennedy administration or the reagan administration’s national endowment for democracy (rielly 2009, p. 278). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 49 protestant development service) and the catholic group is misereor – hilfswerk der katholischen kirche (misereoraid agency of the catholic church). their state support dates to the establishment of germany’s aid program and ministry in 1961 under the federal republic of germany’s first chancellor, konrad adenauer, whose political party (the christian democratic union) highlighted christian values. at the time, there was no bureaucratic structure or colonial administration to draw upon and thus there was very little german knowledge and expertise about development8. the government turned to the protestant and catholic churches because of their ‘development’ experience centred on large missionary programs, especially in africa and latin america (weiland 2012). the two largest church development csos both predate the bmz misereor was established in 1958 and a protestant network, brot für die welt (bread for the world), undertook its first fundraising in 1959. this latter group merged with eed in 2012 in part to address coordination challenges but mostly in order to expand their influence on german and european politicians. bmz worked with csos as that was a core approach in (west) german post-war welfare policy built on subsidiarity (anheier & seibel 1993; archambault et al. 2014). further, germany’s post-war state privileges the catholic, protestant and jewish faiths by making ecclesiastical law constitutionally equal to public administrative law and giving a special role to specified social welfare organisations, where the churches play the major role (anheier & seibel 1993), as well as by collecting a tax to support churches (kirchensteuer). thus, the churches have a greater presence in development policy than in the majority of dac donor countries. bmz still has a special department for the churches and the two organisations receive very large block grants to support their work. indeed, the two churchlinked networks receive a larger block of government funding than all other csos put together – in 2009 they got €192 million from the government, while all other groups received only €150 million (ruck 2009). this latter funding was divided between 150 organisations, though with a few major beneficiaries. thus, outside the churches, the government’s contribution to csos is actually quite small, and this has been the subject of criticism over the years (runge & wardenbach 2009, p. 330)9. the level of government funding is said to be a key influence on cso independence (piewitt et al. 2010)10. misereor gets around 60% of its income from the government and in 2011/12, eed received almost 8 in britain, for example, a number of staff in the original ministry of overseas development established in 1964 came from the colonial office or related departments. whereas germany was a late starter in developing a colonial empire and its colonies were confiscated under the treaty of versailles in 1919, hence the limited bureaucratic structure. germany started development efforts in 1952 with a contribution to the un’s expanded assistance program and in 1956 set up its own fund but the ministry was not established until november 1961 (bmz 2015a; lancaster 2007). 9 there are also smaller amounts of funding available to csos through state governments and local government (districts, cities and municipalities). 10 the reliance of csos on government funding in germany is below the european average. in 1993, around 32% of their income was from government whereas the average in europe was 42% (woods 2000, pp. 16-17). estimating cso funding is difficult as there is little data collection. the amount they receive from oecd governments is not clear as the dac system only records direct allocations to them, not overall amounts. multilateral funding to csos is not reported, nor are food and emergency aid directed though them (woods 2000, p. 13). nevertheless, it is clear that public and private funding for csos has increased substantially since the 1970s. in 1996, it was estimated that ngo funds totalled 17% of the total bilateral official development assistance (oda) of dac members, an amount equal to twice the total oda of the uk (woods 2000, p. 9). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 50 70% of its funding from government (misereor 2012; eed 2012)11. thus, prospective changes in cso-state relations could have more dramatic impacts on these two groups. in terms of coordination between german csos, germany was a late starter but there are now a number of networks operating at the federal, state and local levels. for a long time, the sheer number of csos prevented the establishment of an umbrella organisation. however, venro, a major country-wide platform for representing development ngos and lobbying government, was formed in 199512. it has around 120 members including most of the larger csos, state ngo networks and the 16 one world networks13. smaller organisations are indirectly represented through these networks, so that venro theoretically involves 2,000 development ngos (bmz 2015b; ruck 2009). however, an interviewee from a sustainable development network around freiburg, which includes members of the one world forum, suggested that there is, in practice, little flow of information from venro to small csos (große 2012). according to critics, venro has limited coverage of the sector and this restricts its effectiveness (runge & wardenbach 2009, p. 328). along with venro, there is a plethora of smaller networks, which reflects the size of the sector and germany’s decentralised government system. there are state-based networks, indeed sometimes there is more than one network at the state level and there can be competition between them14. most state governments have their own development policy and programs and act as implementers for federal programs. local government is where policy is implemented and thus they are another focus of aid and development efforts. this decentralised political system is probably a reason for the number and diversity of german csos. amongst smaller csos, coordination issues are pronounced. most informants in this study noted there was little coordination amongst them and große (2012) noted that it is not uncommon to have a handful of groups in one area in germany all working on projects in the same country that rarely meet or coordinate (see also adra 2012; merk 2012). this section on the structure of the german development cso sector and coordination within it goes some way to explaining why it has been possible for the oecd (2011, p. 7) to make the case that: ‘dac members see the high transaction costs of dealing with many small organisations and duplication of activities between donors and csos as the main challenges’ in working with csos. however, seen in a critical light, this view of csos is based on a view of development as a one-way technocratic project of economic growth that is done by donors to recipients and, in which, csos are mere service providers. the view of most 11 in germany, as in other countries, the biggest organisations get the bulk of the funding and donations, see runge and wardenbach (2009, p. 330) and woods (2000, p. 18). interestingly, nunnenkamp and öhler (2011) found that the funding csos received from bmz was more likely to be more focused on poor countries than the funds they raised from the public for development. 12 prior to this, there were four german-wide cso networks (runge & wardenbach 2009, p. 328). most of the large csos are members of the other networks and alliances too, for example european-wide ones. 13 the one world network is mostly comprised of fair trade stores of which there are hundred across the country. 14 in the state of baden-württemberg, there are two competing groups: the federation for development baden württemberg (dachverbands entwicklungspolitik baden württemberg) established by local organisations in 1975; and the foundation for development cooperation baden württemberg (stiftung entwicklungszusammenarbeit baden-württemberg) established by the state government in 1991. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 51 progressive csos is that development cooperation is an interactive, learning process for all the parties, focused around concerns with human rights and dignity. thus such organisation regard moves to fit them into managerialist aid frameworks with suspicion. the german aid program, aid effectiveness and csos germany is one of the few countries that has a separate ministry for development policy, however bmz is only responsible for developing the overall program, international consultation and negotiations with developing countries regarding specific projects and programs. responsibility for implementation and for some areas of policy development falls to a range of organisations and agencies government, private and non-governmental – at federal, state and communal levels.15 not surprisingly then, bmz is not renowned for its coherence or for its coordination capacity (nuscheler 2007, p. 678; oecd 2010, p. 17). equally, the delivery system is very fragmented and complex, which is not uncommon amongst donor states, but the participation of so many organisations in development policy has been said to be a unique feature of german development policy (messner 2011, p. 420). germany quickly committed to the mdgs and shortly thereafter to the aid effectiveness agenda. indeed, germany became an early ‘champion’ of the aid effectiveness agenda under the then social democratic party led government (oecd 2006, p. 16). the commitment survived the subsequent grand coalition governments and the conservative coalition of the christian democratic union (cdu) and the christian social union in bavaria (csu) that came to power in 2013. however, support for the aid effectiveness agenda has waned over this time. since 2014, development policy has been based on the ‘charter for the future’ (bmz 2014a), a broad document listing eight development goals starting with ‘ensuring dignified life throughout the world’. overall policy is framed by international agreements, in particular the 2030 agenda for sustainable development and the aid effectiveness agenda (bmz 2015a). the effectiveness agenda prompted some changes in german aid delivery, indeed former federal minister for economic cooperation and development, dirk niebel, called these changes ‘the most far-reaching reform in the history of german development policy’ (bmz 2013, p. 2). bmz is now the lead agency responsible for development co-operation policy and strategy. in 2011, three of the technical cooperation agencies were merged to form the deutsche gesellschaft für internationale zusammenarbeit (giz) gmbhs16. however, there is still a distinction between technical and financial assistance and program 15for example, responsibility for emergencies remains with the foreign ministry, for the world economic system with the ministries for finance and economy and work and for environment and agriculture with the respective ministries (anderson n.d.; nuscheler 2007, pp. 672-673). 16 the three organisations were: deutsche gesellschaft für technische zusammenarbeit (gtz), german development service (ded) and capacity building international, germany (inwent). giz, like its predecessors, is owned by the federal government and is a private company run on private lines, indeed, it understands itself as a business with a development focus (messner 2011, p. 420). its role is to provide technical support and cooperation for germany’s aid program. it has around 19,000 employees, operates in over 130 countries and has revenues of almost €2 billion a year. the other main delivery body is the kreditanstalt für wiederaufbau (kfw), which is responsible for financial cooperation and spends the majority of german aid. it focuses on social and economic/business infrastructure and mostly supplies cheap credit. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 52 implementation is still carried out by a wide range of agencies (oecd 2010). the oecd dac (2010, p. 17) review of german aid found that: ‘bmz continues to be responsible for a little more than half of germany’s official development assistance (oda) – the remainder is allocated to a range of other government departments, agencies and institutions and this makes it hard for germany to maintain a coherent development co-operation policy’. germany has also made slow progress in reducing the number of recipient countries (oecd 2010, p. 17). it is clear that the german government has made limited progress in improving its aid effectiveness by dac standards. the idea that aid effectiveness agenda should apply to german csos emerged in 2009 when then csu development speaker, christian ruck (2009, p. 313), noted that german ngos had not made much progress in the harmonisation agenda17. changes to government funding for csos started, despite the fact that at the beginning of the paris agenda process there was explicit agreement between bmz and ngos that there would not be changes (bengo 2012). the dac peer review of german aid arrangements pushed for change arguing that ‘there are insufficient accountability linkages between’ ngos and the german aid ministries and that ngos need to align their activities more with partner country priorities (oecd 2010, p. 18). dac was also critical of the fact that bmz did not have a specific strategy for working with csos in development, though the foreign ministry has one for humanitarian support (oecd 2011, p. 16-18). in response to this peer review, bmz prepared a draft strategy in 2012, and final strategy in 2014. one strong indicator that the german government moved to align its support for csos more with its own aid policy is funding changes. historically, the relationship involved predictable support to the catholic and protestant csos, support for the political foundations and funding for a selection of other csos through a regular call for proposals. in 2010, a number of special purpose ngo earmarked funding programs for special topics were introduced – in 2010, a €10.0 million ngo facility for afghanistan was established, in 2011 it was the ngo facility for climate, forest and biodiversity conservation (funds: €5.0 million in 2012) and in 2012 a €3.0 million ngo facility for human rights was established. previous support for csos did not dictate geographical or sectoral priorities. bmz’s 2014 ‘strategy on government-civil society cooperation in post-2015 development policy’ (hereafter 2014 strategy) indicates that this will continue as ‘bmz endeavours, in dialogue with civil society organisations, to focus to some extent on certain sectors or regions…’ (bmz 2014b, p. 12). the merger of technical cooperation agencies in 2011, which created giz, led to changes in how the relationship between bmz and development csos is managed. in 2012, engagement global – service for development partners was created and their mandate includes linking to csos and promoting development education in germany. with the restructure, the organisation is now part of the federal government, though its staff are not tenured bureaucrats (beamter) as it is a private, non-profit, government-owned company. 17 ruck pointed out some developments around coordination in the emergency and humanitarian relief area but noted that there was no equivalent progress in development cooperation (ruck 2009, p. 313). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 53 german csos argued that it should have involved shared state/civil society responsibility instead and that some of its structure contravenes germany’s subsidiarity principle whereby activities are devolved to the lowest practical level (brot für die welt – evangelischer entwicklungsdienst et al. 2012). in particular, they pointed to development education in germany as something csos have been successfully doing for decades. there is evidence that engagement global is now requesting changes to the content of publication it has agreed to fund where content is critical of government policies (brot für die welt – evangelischer entwicklungsdienst et al. 2012; merk 2012). this was not the case in the past and indicates a shift in state-cso relations. within engagement global is ‘bengo’ the advice centre for ngos in development cooperation. bengo supports csos and private groups in accessing public funding for development. over time, they will be given some responsibility for distributing grants (bengo 2012). previously, bengo was an independent organisation under the umbrella of one of the central voluntary welfare associations (bengo 2012)18. as an independent organisation, it was a member of germany’s ngo umbrella group, venro, and participated in their working groups. however, with its incorporation into engagement global, bengo is no longer a member of venro and cannot take part in these groups. indeed, there is now a degree of mistrust as they are seen as representatives of bmz (bengo 2012). there is concern that the transfer of some responsibility for the selection of projects will further erode their relationship with csos. bmz outlined harmonisation goals in both the draft (bmz 2012) and the final 2014 strategy. both of these refer to directing cooperation with ‘partner countries’ which german csos understand as bmz’s partners (venro 2012, p. 2). the emphasis on bmz directing cso funding for partner countries was expanded 2014 strategy. this does indicate that bmz is interested in directing the geographical and sectoral priorities of its csos funding, challenging the traditional right of initiative of german csos (bengo 2012)19. venro argued the harmonisation agenda ‘must not’ be applied to ngos directly and that ngos must not be made to follow the focus sectors and priorities of the government or other donors because they are, despite some linkages, not a transmission belt for state development policy (venro 2008, p. 7; venro 2011). their emphasis is on local cooperation on the ground where they claim to be the strongest (runge & wardenbach 2009, p. 332). venro highlighted two other issues in the civil society cooperation strategy. first, civil society is often positioned as a complementary actor to the state and business and not understood as an actor in its own right (venro 2012, p. 2). second, bmz placed itself in a central role on issues of coordination, transparency, results and so on but there is no detail on how it will do this and the role for existing cso networks is vague. koch (2008, p. 70) pointed out that there is no discussion of how bmz and its associated agencies could 18reportedly, two bengo staff legally challenged their move from one limited liability company to a government-owned one (bengo 2012). 19 there is historical precedent for this as bmz had, in the past, encouraged csos to run projects in particular countries, for example those with which there were no strong diplomatic relations, including cuba (bengo 2012). such political connections are, of course, an explicit purpose of germany’s political foundations. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 54 harmonise or improve its requirements vis-à-vis csos. this final point is telling regarding the evolving donor aid effectiveness discourse – it applies only where and how donors see fit. indeed the final strategy is, under its participatory language, quite critical of csos and it identifies a range of areas where they need improvement including transparency, effectiveness, sustainability of their projects and harmonisation with local governments, structures and systems (bmz 2014b, pp. 11-12). finally, it is notable that the strategy, like the dac reports, presents development as a one-way process whereby german csos build capacity in developing countries. conclusion the aid effectiveness agenda started life with some progressive components, but donors have now abandoned most of those in favour of development effectiveness, which really means getting beyond aid (eyben 2012). the cso push for donors to progress the aid effectiveness agenda has backfired. donor states reduced their commitment to reforming their own systems, yet some have devoted increasing attention to managing development csos. in line with a technocratic, depoliticised approach to aid effectiveness, this means focussing on reducing cso transaction costs, targeting their work in countries and sectors that suit donors and applying managerial systems of outputs and outcomes. viewing these technocratic concerns outside of the larger engagement of csos with partner organisations as a mutual learning experience and a political engagement concerned to progress transformative development reduces csos to apolitical service providers for the state. this change fits in with the trend of government’s discrediting csos and is part of the general reduction in civic space, outlined in the introduction to the paper. in the german case, the history of decentralisation and subsidiarity were a key reason that development csos were not subject to the increased instrumentalism and managerialism common across other parts of the globe from the 1980s. yet, quite why the aid effectiveness agenda in the 2000s prompted change is not fully clear though the relentless logic of managerialism, combined with the intervention of an international organisation the oecd dac, goes part of the way to explaining the change. bmz has not, according to dac assessments, gone very far in reforming its own practices, yet it has made changes to its relations with the cso sector. changes started with increasing csos focus on particular countries and sectors and enlarged managerial control of grant funds but are extending to government interference in cso management. these changes are not dramatic but they do clearly bring instrumentalist and managerialist relations much more into the state-development cso sector in germany than had been the case previously. they challenge the principle of subsidiarity, which gives precedence to social issues being addressed at the local level and to independence in local and community governance and organisation as well as the right of initiative of german csos. this process has coincided with, and been reinforced by, the global trend of reduced civic space and more regulations for csos. this is a concerning combination. the diversity of the german cso sector and its range of funding sources will limit the impact of the government agenda (molenaers et al. 2014). its impacts are likely to be higher cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 55 on the large development csos, especially the church organisations, which have a very heavy reliance on government funding. it is not yet clear whether changes in funding mechanisms will affect the block grants to churches or just the competitive funding mechanisms for other csos. if it does not impact the block grants, it may act as a wedge between the two big church groups and other csos. equally significant is that germany’s political foundations seem to be exempt from the aid effectiveness debate, which may be attributable to their ‘extraordinary access to their political parties’ (lancaster 2007, p. 185). the study has demonstrated the complexity of international, multiscalar development relations, in this case where an agenda championed by a multilateral organisation, the dac, has influenced state-civil society relations in germany. the influence is clearly mediated by the history and nature of the country’s state-civil society relations based on subsidiarity. still, at the end of the day, multilateral technocratic development discourse has become that bit more entrenched in germany, where governance was historically decentralised. acknowledgements the research for this paper was started while i was a visiting fellow at the department of political science, university of freiburg, germany. thanks in particular to professor dr jürgen rüland for hosting my visit and to dr astrid carrapatoso for her friendship and guidance. thanks also to josh pallas for reading a draft of this paper and to the anonymous reviewers whose comments strengthened the paper. references adra 2012, ‘interview with erich lischek and thomas petracek’, adventist development and relief agency (adra) deutschland e. v, weiterstadt, 23 april. anderson, u. n.d. deutschlands entwicklungspolitik im internationalen vergliech, bundeszentral für politische bildung informationen zur politischen bildung (heft 286). accessed 22 march 2012, <http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/hwwqd2,0,0,deutschlands_entwicklungspolitik_im_interna tionalen_vergleich.html#art0>. anheier, h. k. and seibel, w. 1993, ‘defining the nonprofit sector: germany’, working paper of the johns hopkins comparative nonprofit sector project the johns hopkins institute for policy studies, no. 6. archambault, e., priller, e. and zimmer, a. 2014, ‘european civil societies compared: typically german-typically french?’, voluntas: 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https://doi.org/10.1080/17448689.2011.604998 http://www.diakonia.se/sa/node.asp?node=1887 https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264187849-en abstract keywords introduction the aid effectiveness agenda and civil society organisations germany’s development csos5f the german aid program, aid effectiveness and csos conclusion acknowledgements references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © james goodman and james anderson. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. editorial welcome special issue on ethnocracy this special issue of cosmopolitan civil societies journal focuses on the domination of social and political relations by ethnocracy – rule or would-be rule by an ethnic group or ethnos, as distinct from democracy or rule by the demos of all the people. ethnocracy encompasses state regimes and associated political movements and parties that discriminate systematically in favour of a particular ethnic group (or groups) and against others. when we proposed the special issue in late 2014 ethnocratic practices were as prevalent as they had ever been; and now two years later they appear to be on the increase with an ethno-populist upsurge and the election or threatened election of governments pursuing ethnocratic agendas. from india to the usa, from russia to hungary, leading politicians openly discriminate against ethnic ‘others’ to attract support from ‘their own’ ethnic groups; across the european union and in other liberal democracies they increasingly scapegoat ‘immigrants’ to hide their own inadequacies and further their political objectives. now, more than ever, it is critical that the dynamics of ethnocracy are more clearly understood. this issue documents the logics of ethnocracy in a variety of different contexts, posing questions about how it develops and how it can be challenged. ethnocracy may be formal with discrimination enshrined in law (as in apartheid south africa), or it may be more informal with apparent or formal equalities masking very unequal realities (as happened in northern ireland). as discussed later in more detail, the concept was most notably developed by the israeli geographer oren yiftachel to analyse israel-palestine and jewish-palestinian relations; and this special issue develops it further in other national contexts, including sri lanka, latvia and estonia, fiji and australia, and in the urban contexts of jerusalem and beirut. the different cases of ethnocracy point to its varied forms and degrees of severity, ranging from everyday petty or not-so-petty discrimination to statehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 sponsored military assault, its practices generally characterized by exclusion and violence actual or incipient. the issue originated in a public lecture delivered in november 2014 by james anderson during a research visit to the university of technology sydney. the lecture has been developed into the refereed ‘lead article’ where he advances a number of arguments which the other contributors were invited to consider, explore or reject, whether in whole or in part. he argues that the idea of ethnocracy can be extended and applied to different types of political context beyond the national state and urban governance for which it was developed in israel-palestine. so in addition to national and urban ethnocracy, there are imperial, ‘post-conflict’ and ‘post-national/religious’ ethnocracies, and each of the five types has its own distinct dynamics. imperial ethnocracy extends ‘back’ to earlier roots in traditional empires and their politicization of different ethnicities, defined in religious, linguistic or wider cultural terms (e.g., in the ottoman, british and french empires in the balkans and middle east). its dynamics sometimes involved three-way relationships between the imperial power, indigenous peoples, and also 'settlers' (as in the british empire in ireland, palestine, south africa and australia). then, looking ‘forward’, the concept has direct relevance in supposedly post-conflict national contexts, where lethal conflict has (mostly) been stopped but the conflict typically continues along the same ethnic lines (as in bosnia, northern ireland, and sri lanka). fifthly, and more tentatively, the concept might possibly be useful in post-national contexts where national objectives have been at least partly displaced by transnational religion as the major motivator in its own right, radical islam and fundamentalist christianity the most obvious examples. contributors respond in various ways to these ideas. oren yiftachel debates the present condition of ethnocratic theory, and reflects on the possibilities for further extensions as ‘offsprings’ of ethnocracy, demonstrating the rich insights the concept can bring. following yiftachel’s commentary, there are refereed articles that reflect in detail on the practice of ethnocracy in widely different situations. nirmanusan balasundaram discusses sri lanka, highlighting the continuing ethnocratic dynamics of an ostensibly ‘post-conflict’ society. konstantin kastrissianakis focuses on the fractious urban history of beirut, as a site of ethnocratic conflict along religious lines. timofey agarin takes us to a dramatically different cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 iii context, in the baltic states, yet one also riven with ethnic majoritarianism and geopolitical rivalry. haim yacobi focuses on the urban context of jerusalem\al-quds, debating the differences and similarities between ethnocracy and urban apartheid. sanjay ramesh documents the oscillation between post-colonial ethnocracy and democracy in fiji. andrew jakubowicz highlights the reappearance of ethnicised immigration debates in australia, and the reciprocal counter-assertion and reassertion of ethnic exclusion which this is generating. to borrow a phrase from the irish republican and marxist, james connolly, ethnocracies create their own ‘carnival of reaction’. across all the cases discussed, the dynamics of the carnival stem from the exercise or attempted exercise of exclusionary power, typically wielded in authoritarian ways. understanding the dynamics is essential for defending and extending meaningful democratic relations. james goodman1 and james anderson2 (guest editors) november 2016 1 james goodman, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney. 2 james anderson, emeritus professor, the senator george j mitchell institute for global peace, security and justice, queen’s university belfast timofey agarin, centre for the study of ethnic conflict, school of history, anthropology, philosophy and politics, queen's university belfast. corresponding author: t.agarin@qub.ac.uk issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 timofey agarin. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(3):5144. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5144 extending the concept of ethnocracy: exploring the debate in the baltic context timofey agarin queen's university belfast abstract the advance of liberal understanding of democracy with its interest in and constrained ability to interfere with citizens’ identities made cases of ethnocracy rare over the past decades. over the past 25 years, baltic politics and societies have experienced considerable change, however, as i demonstrate, considerable debate persists around the issues central to the argument about ethnocracy in the region. in the context, when discussing the central role played by state institutions in negotiating conflicts between groups over access to scarce resources of the state, it is central to see minorities as being in both the inferior numerical position as well as in a symbolically more disadvantageous place: if we see democratic politics for what they are as majoritarian politics, and if we see these as taking place in the context of state institutions designed to uphold the ethnic majority dominance, then any kind of liberal democratic politics would be a good candidate for ethnocracy. introduction when james anderson contacted me to contribute to the debate on ethnocracy in this special issue, i agreed without hesitation. since my days as a doctoral student i was exposed to discussions on the politics of managing ethnic diversity in what are today estonia and latvia. over the past 25 years, baltic politics and societies have experienced considerable change; independence from the soviet union, a period of post-communist transition, membership negotiations with the european union, eu accession in 2004, and more than twelve years of membership in both the eu and nato all have changed the nature of politics in the baltic states individually and collectively (agarin 2010; galbreath 2005). however, as i will demonstrate below, considerable debate persists around the issues central to the argument about ethnocracy in the region. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5144 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 in his opening article james anderson presents a variegated taxonomy of issues relevant for identifying different types of ethnocracy. however, beyond description of what we find in various places where one ethnic group exercises majoritarian rule over subordinate minorities, we ought to start from the beginning and determine what makes a political regime a candidate for ethnocracy. nearly all democratic regimes in europe, east and west, as well as in asia and africa, rely heavily on the liberal democratic principle of majoritarian rule. thus, in countries whose citizenries have a clear ethnic majority we should be presuming a form of ethnocratic dominance of a qualified majority population that determines and facilitates implementation of policies affecting all residents, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities. this would be the case in most countries across the globe. such generalisations however would render both the conceptual, and factual contribution that we as students of ethnic politics could make by engaging with debate on ethnocracy futile at best, counterproductive at worst: if nearly all states are ethnocracies, what good is there to single out a select few and analyse relationship between ethnic groups there as being driven by ethnic – rather than any other – issues? under these circumstances, the question of distinguishing an arithmetic majority of voters who are likely to express more or less similar opinions at the ballot box from patterns of an ethnic majority population acting systematically to undercut interest representation of the remaining, minority populations are essential. thus, we should look out for cases of discrimination against the resident minority by the numeric majority populations when ethnocratic institutional designs are de jure enshrined in national legislation. the advance of liberal understanding of democracy with its interest in and constrained ability to interfere with citizens’ identities made cases of ethnocracy rare over the past decades. this trend, however, seems to go in reverse. as the recent case of the ban on the burkini in france testifies, some states have now began promoting their ethnic identity politics as de facto politics of civic intolerance towards elusively defined minorities (reuters 2016). however, although observable in its pure form only in the rarest of instances, ethnocracy is still a useful concept. it allows us to make sense of sets of cases similar in their central features – ethnic diversity of the population at large is constrained by the dominant role of one group in political decision-making, the privileged status of that group vis-à-vis the political institutions of the state, and the culture and language being protected by the state cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 83 which all residents regardless of their ethnic background need to uphold and promote. we can start with oren yiftachel’s criticism of sammy smooha’s model of ethnic democracy as an alternative to ethnocracy (yiftachel 2006). as anderson rightly points out in his introductory contribution, yiftachel identifies ‘ethnocratic regimes as inherently conflictgenerating’. in these, inequality in access to resources of the states creates an inherently unstable political, but also social environment for co-existence of ethnic groups. it is precisely this lack of political and social stability therefore that makes ethnocratic regimes more and more committed to upholding the dominant position of one group over all others in order to provide a mirror-image of stability generating more, not less, intergroup tensions. both ethnocracy and ethnic democracy however have been widely used in the scholarship and related to politics in various regions of the world, not least to cases of estonia and latvia which i use here as critical references for the discussion in this special issue of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal. ethnic diversity has a long history in estonia, latvia and lithuania, yet contemporary state institutions are entrusted to protect identities and interests of ethnic core nations, rather than of all residents. the official narrative of statehood in the baltic states emphasizes the principle of state continuity from pre-soviet republics to the present. in so doing, it entrenches inequality between the majority, titular ethnics and the small groups of ‘historical minorities’, and those who settled in the country during the latter half of the twentieth century, the ‘russian-speaking minorities’. it is at the expense of these large groups of minorities that states have been reformed as democracies for members of the titular majority nation. as such, estonia and latvia (alongside lithuania) have been acknowledged as a fit and welcome addition to the european family of nation-states when baltic states joined the eu in 2004. regrettably, only little progress has been made to accommodate the previously excluded groups in estonia’s and latvia’s societies: in the discussion that follows i will demonstrate that both estonia and latvia turned out to be procrustean states instrumentalising the insecurities of majorities to marginalise minority communities’ participation and representation rather than as was previously believed ethnocratic polities on the stable transitory pathway towards a fully fledged democracy. *** 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 danes and swedes first, and then german, jewish and polish communities have played an important role in the baltic histories in the past, yielding crucial power over domestic populations and enriching cultural life in the region. yet, contemporary baltic societies mainly face challenges of ethnocultural diversity resulting from the soviet period in the baltic history. today, the overwhelming majority of minority groups in the baltic states speak russian as their first language (see table 1). while in everyday life we can fairly easily identify minority from the majority representatives, for the purposes of analyses it is rather difficult to come up with a conceptual definition of what makes minorities in the region candidates for the study as objects of ethnocratic rule . estonia (03/2014) latvia (01/2014) lithuania (2011) total population 1,352,399 2,180,442 3,043,400 majority nation 898,845 or 69.87 % 1,299,368 or 59.6% 2,561,300 or 84.1% russians 25.22% 26.9% 5.8% ukrainians 1.74% 2,4% n.a belarusians 0.95% 3,4% 1.2% poles n.a. 2.2% 6.6% table 1: ethnic composition of baltic states (author’s calculation from official statistical data for each country). for details see, agarin 2016. in his assessment of interethnic relations in estonia, priit järve has asked questions that are still relevant today, though rarely discussed explicitly: are baltic states ethnic democracies? can post-communist baltic states be considered hotbeds of ethnic nationalism? have political institutions failed to put societies on the pathway toward liberal democracy? (järve 2000). most of these questions are as topical today as they were 16 years ago and it is wholly insufficient to identify that estonia, and for that matter also latvia, is an ethnic democracy. there are indeed several parallels that järve et al. have identified in their comparative assessment of the situation in israel and these two baltic states: (1) ethnonationalism preceded the establishment of the nation-state after the world war i in both estonia and latvia; (2) majority ethnic nations have had a dominant role in statecraft during the interwar period of statehood, de jure also during the period of soviet inclusion, and de facto after the independence in 1991; (3) dominant groups perceive an acute threat from the minority and their external – though self-designated – homeland to be the penultimate challenge to majority led nation-state building project; and finally, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 85 (4) the dominant ethnic group have been committed to some form of democratic decision-making for in-group members albeit at the exclusion of minority groups (smooha and järve 2005, 30). for that reason, it is disingenuous – beside the reason i have set out from, i.e. that most democratic states operating democratically require a majoritarian decision-making to be in place – to infer that politics where we see ethnic dominance are not democratic as such. much more, it appears, liberal democracies require a robust set of political institutions to be in place and operational. these require a set of functional criteria to perform successfully on the entire territory of the polity, in just a selected (set of) language(s), promote allegiance of residents to state institutions, and allow participation in political process for those affected. all these criteria can be easily found in states across the globe, be it australia or austria, india or ireland, uk or us, all states committing to protection of individual liberal rights of their citizens could well be veritable candidates for ethnic democracies of sorts. we however need to acknowledge that ‘liberal democracy’ sensu strictu additionally accords resident minority groups some collective rights, either by means of affirmative action programmes (as in the us), liberal multicultural policies (as in the uk), minority rights (as in germany), language rights (as in poland for regional languages), or territorial forms of minority as majority rule (as in canada for the first nations on ‘their’ territories). all of this makes ‘ethnic democracy’ increasingly indistinguishable from the liberal multicultural democratic approach of building institutions with variegated impact on groups of non-core ethnic communities among the citizenry. indeed, while most (western liberal) democratic states have been hailed as having successfully managed their ethnic diversity by facilitating participation and representation of non-dominant societal groups via parallel institutions serving those minority groups exclusively, there is a good chance that such states should also be considered candidates for ethnocratic regimes of scale. if for no other reason then, ethnic democracy is a type of governance that is inherently democratic in design for some of its members (usually ethnic majority), while implicitly excluding the other members (usually ethnic minority) from participation in political process. this is because despite the fact that institutions of the state are not ethnoculturally defined, functionally the plain upon which visibility, participation, and representation take place are 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 tainted by the cultural aspirations of the majority and preclude minority agenda setting on their own terms (mcgarry and agarin 2014; for a more general discussion, see phillips 2007). remarkably, therefore, the state which can deliver on its promise to the dominant group must itself commit to several actors: to the international community as an active and viable state on its own right (cordell 1999), to publics as being a credible ‘service station’ for citizens (budryte 2005), to domestic political elites to allow unfettered and constitutionally consequential decision-making (galbreath 2005) and to the majority population as such as a guarantor of its continuous survival in an uncertain international environment (ehin and berg 2013). it is from this perspective that my own past work has echoed much of yiftachel’s criticism of ethnic democracy model (agarin 2015; agarin 2010; agarin 2005): it assumes that states can be formally democratic even though their policies are designed to exclude segments of population on the basis of purported identity claims of state-builders (yiftachel 2006). this is an important caveat for students of european polities, all of which have been built upon the two contradictory principles: liberal democracy for all citizens and ethnic definition of the state institutions serving primarily the dominant ethnic majority (agarin 2014; agarin and cordell 2016). indeed some critics have suggested that particularly the new and reconstituted states in the eastern part of europe have been adamant when enforcing the principles of majority rule, have circumvented consociational arrangements of formal and effective representation of minorities in official political process, as well as undermined guarantees for emergence of group-based solidarity outside the ethnically defined criteria (jackson-preece 1997). yet, after the eu accession of many post-communist states with their political institutions largely unchanged and with the european union rubber stamping nation-states of majority as having the duty to serve all residents, we could rightly claim that all european, including the eu member-states, are ethnocracies albeit of different form and disguise. *** baltic states provide an excellent point for illustration in this context. after their independence from the soviet union in 1991 the majority, state-nations of lithuania, latvia and estonia claimed to be outposts of western values and opposing the east, in particular russia. fifteen years on, eu-accession, rising standards of living and an increasingly western outlook within the baltic societies might suggest that they are on their way to catching-up with their european neighbours when it comes to respect and promotion of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 87 societal diversity. however, popular discontent with political, economic and social reforms appears to be ubiquitous with the legacies of the soviet past said to present a major impediment to greater successes. in the past, the estonian and latvian publics, press and politicians had been persistent in suggesting that the problems encountered during their transition to independent states resulted from the differences in opinions of majority and minority publics on the core issues of post-soviet development. in fact, the public eye turns most often to the legacies of the soviet industrialization policies which resulted in the migration of citizens from other soviet republics into the region (mertelsmann 2003). however, soviet nationalities policies promoted the identities of ‘titular’ groups, recognized their right to national territory and forged a shared civic identity of all residents as a part of the soviet peoples’ brotherhood (hajda and beissinger 1990; g. smith 1996). for both the majority titular nations and the soviet-era migrants, provisions for education in their native language were made to foster loyalty to the soviet state. during the soviet economic and political reforms of the late 1980s, baltic nations began to mobilize on ethnopolitical platforms to seek their republics’ independence from the soviet union, and this was formally achieved in august 1991. and so, the official narrative of statehood across the baltic states emphasizes the principle of state continuity from the original, pre-soviet republics to the present, entrusting states to protect their ethnic core nations. this effectively entrenched inequality between the majority titular ethnics and the small groups of ‘historical minorities’, and those who settled in the country during the latter half of the twentieth century. political elites in the baltic states have consistently emphasized that their states did not join the soviet union voluntarily but were unjustly occupied in 1940 and again in 1944, after the german retreat from the area. all three states, therefore, followed the principle of state restitution when re-creating their legal citizenship frameworks as independent states (van elsuwege 2008). this principle substantially affected the political rights of minority, non-titular, residents in estonia and latvia. in post-soviet estonia and latvia, only citizens of the pre-war republics and their descendants were entitled to automatic citizenship. in estonia, only citizens were allowed to vote in the first post-soviet elections in 1992. as 99.6% of the citizenry declared themselves to be ethnic estonians, minorities were not represented in the constituent parliament. since 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 the 1995 general elections, minority representatives have been running on minority party lists or for other parties. minority parties (including the constitutional democratic party, and the russian party of estonia) were represented in two consecutive parliaments from 1995 to 2003, but since then have failed to collect sufficient votes to enter parliament. non-citizens can elect and be elected at both municipal and regional elections after a five-year residency period. owing to their concentrated settlement, minorities have been continuously represented in regional and municipal administrations across northeast estonia and areas of tallinn with large russian-speaking populations. to some extent this regional dominance of russian-speaking populations has allowed them to send political representatives into municipal councils and administrations to look after their interests better. however, as the overall political process is dominated by estonian speakers and is geared toward the majority dominance, none of the qualified observers of estonia’s politics has been able to identify a shift toward more minority accommodation even in these regions dominated by russianspeaking electorates (nakai 2014; cianetti 2015). in latvia, non-citizens are not allowed to vote in either national or municipal elections. only citizens of the pre-soviet latvian state were allowed to vote in the first post-soviet elections in 1993; unlike in estonia, these included small numbers of minority citizens. although over the years naturalization of russian-speakers has considerably increased their share among the electorate, there was only a slight rise in numbers of russian-speaking political actors in latvia, most running on a minority party list (for human rights in united latvia) or an interethnic party (harmony centre). the share of russian-speakers among political elites is significantly lower than their share among the national electorate. this is due to the fact that all individuals running in national, regional and municipal elections in latvia must demonstrate the highest level of latvian language skills. most political parties representing the latvian majority continue to press for restrictions on minority participation in politics, primarily by advocating stricter language requirements, though others including the party national alliance seek to end the naturalization process. national radical organizations also frequently express support for the ‘decolonization’ of latvia by outlawing russian-speaking political representatives, stripping russian-speakers of electoral rights, and deporting sovietera migrants, including those who have successfully naturalized since 1995. indeed, this ethnocentric rhetoric focussing, even abusing the perception of the dominant majority about survival of the national, cultural and linguistic community is clearly indicating that at least cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 89 one part of electorate in latvia is considering ethnocracy in ‘their’ state a serious option. if the agenda of the national alliance and its predecessor party for fatherland and freedom have for years sought to establish the latvian state as a state for ethnic latvian members of the citizenry only, we should certainly identify latvia’s political institutions as ethnically biased and imposing the values, aspirations and not least the language of its majority upon resident minorities as a tool of ethnic control and domination akin to what yiftachel identifies as ‘ethnocracy’. the estonian citizenship law (passed in 1992), and the latvian equivalent (passed in 1995) made around thirty per cent of residents in estonia (as ‘aliens’) and around forty percent in latvia (as ‘non-citizens’) de jure stateless, only allowing acquisition of national citizenship through naturalization, despite the fact that most of them were long-term local residents, with an average 20 years’ residence, as of 1995. naturalization procedures require the applicant to successfully sit an exam testing knowledge of the constitution, history, and the national anthem; to swear an oath of allegiance to the state; and, foremost, to pass an examination testing proficiency in the national language. since 1998, children born to stateless persons in estonia and latvia can receive citizenship without this naturalization procedure if their parents apply on their behalf. after peaking in the late 1990s, naturalization rates have since fallen dramatically. in 2008, 932 individuals received estonian citizenship, while around the same number opted for russian federation citizenship. the numbers of individuals who have successfully naturalized in both states have for the first time exceeded the numbers of those still stateless in 2009. on january 1 2014, latvia’s population register counted 295,122 ‘non-citizens’ living in latvia (approx.14.25% of residents), down from approximately 715,000 in 1991. on february 1 2014, there were approx. 83,600 ‘aliens’ in estonia (approx. 6.5% of residents). all ‘aliens’ and ‘non-citizens’ are russian-speakers, the overwhelming majority declaring themselves to be ethnic russians. overall, around 1.64% of latvia’s and around 7.25% of estonia’s residents carried russian federation passports on january 1 2014 (agarin 2016). until today, perceptions of social stability in both latvia and estonia are woven together with a narrative of (ethno-) national survival. on the other hand, however, one observes the longterm impact of gradual, yet decisive developments in domestic policies of integration put into place as a result of the eu accession pressures: for example, estonia’s law on citizenship 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 was amended in 1999 allowing children born after 1992 to parents who are non-citizens to forego the full naturalisation process (pettai 2005). also, estonia’s social integration programmes were introduced first in 2000 easing the way of resident non-estonian noncitizens into an estonian-dominated public sphere; of late, language tests for citizenship applicants have been simplified in february 2015, facilitating access to estonian citizenship for the elderly. the high tensions, intensity of deep distrust and mutual recriminations between baltic majority titular nationals and russianas well as polish-speakers will require a sustained, sensitive and systematic approach to fostering good neighbourliness and greater cooperation among ethnic communities in the baltic states (kochenov and dimitrovs 2013). the russian federation, as successor state of the soviet union, claiming to be the ethnic kin state of russian-speakers in the baltic states since 1991, can easily be seen as a challenge to regional stability (agarin 2015). beside the fact that permanent de jure statelessness of a significant proportion of the population is a strain on the political representation of stateless long-term residents in the two countries, not only the formal representation in political process but much more fundamentally, visibility in the public space are themselves an issue. the status and visibility of ‘foreign languages’ – de facto all except the state estonian and latvian languages respectively – has caused outrage among russian-speakers and are central to contemporary ethnopolitical tensions (galbreath and galvin 2005; silova 2006). governments of both states initiated state language teaching programmes for russianspeakers as a gateway to citizenship in late 1990s-early 2000s, largely in response to pressures from the high commissioner on national minorities prior to the states’ nato accession in 2004 (kruusvall 2002; antane and tsilevich 1999). yet, insufficient funding, and the lack of qualified personnel, as well as the institutionalized dominance of the state languages and the requirement of language proficiency for naturalization have combined to leave many russian-speakers in a socially marginal position even after eu accession (brosig 2008; muiznieks 2010). in addition, many international initiatives were neutralized by tightened legislation concerning state language use ahead of latvia’s and estonia’s accession to the eu in may 2004 (mikkel and pridham 2005). some observers see ethnopolitical affairs as being in a state of flux in both estonia and latvia and stress emphatically the crucial role played by the eu wielding its soft power over these states’ nationalising politics (see cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 91 particularly, d. j. smith 2002). however, tensions around the rights and status of russian speaking populations have prevented even the recognition of this group in its status as minority over the past two decades. in latvia, tensions around the use of the russian language culminated in a referendum to grant russian the status of second state language in 2012 (ijabs 2016; hanovs 2016). while latvian-speakers have interpreted the referendum as a challenge to their ethnic group’s sovereignty over the state institutions, russian-speakers rallied around greater political representation of russian-speakers and inclusion into dialogue about political and social issues at the national level. though russian-speakers have succeeded in collecting sufficient signatures for the referendum to be organised by and sponsored by the state, support from the russian-speaking politicians has been meagre: support for the referendum was seen by the latvian political establishment and by the majority, state-bearing nation of the country as a clear sign of disloyalty to the state and has only further reinforced ethnic cleavage. this allowed for the latvian side of those who were eligible to cast their vote in the referendum to portray the initiative as an ‘existential issue’ (ijabs 2016, 299). the was later used by opportunistic (majority) political elites to justify an addition to the latvian constitution of a preamble designating ethnic latvians as the sole bearers not only of the statehood but also of democracy in the country, the change that was made into law on june 19 2014. overall, the lack of political representation of russian-speakers continues to undermine their capacity to communicate specific expectations in political forums and be considered viable contributors to developing social institutions of the state. as a result, voting still takes place mostly along ethnic lines, and the crisis in ukraine has complicated majority-minority relations even further. in estonia, the participation of russian-speakers in political and civic life remains very low, and there is a noticeable ethnic segmentation in the labour market in both countries. furthermore, both states have experienced significant out-migration after joining the eu, which further exacerbates fears of ethnic majority survival and insecurity about national sovereignty (duina and miani 2015; petsinis 2016). some authors point to the fragmentation of latvia’s and estonia’s russian speaking communities alongside socioeconomic markers to emphasise the potential for greater interethnic interactions in the everyday (vetik and helemäe 2011). if nothing else however, these only further limit access 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 to scarce resources of the state by the select elites of ethnic majority and those of the co-opted minority, in fact hampering the long-term democratisation of these countries. thus it is fair to conclude that the processes of nation-state building for the ethnic majority has impacted on majority-minority relations in both countries significantly and over the decades since independence additionally put the strain on development of political culture that is tolerant of, if not endorsing the dissent and criticism of public policy and decisions made by the elites. it is therefore plain and clear that the stalemate in majority/minority relations observed in estonia and latvia today is a product of, rather than a condition for, ethnonational state building. at the heart of this conclusion lays the notion of the nation-state with a clearly defined national majority, whom that state is to serve above all other groups, whose language is a state language and whose culture and history the state is to protect and promote to all residents regardless of their ethnic identities. similar to the claim of an ethnocratic nature of the state that both yiftachel and smooha make, and anderson endorses in his introduction, is the idea of political institutions serving primarily the majority and delivering democratic governance for the majority group at an expense of minority communities, regardless of their demographic, economic and political clout. in her minority rights in europe (2005), tove malloy suggested that european states whose constituent nation finds itself in a precarious position of majority often opt for nationalising policies vis-à-vis their resident minorities and in doing so invite minority resistance, the involvement of external kin states of the minority, and frequently also international organisations’ keen interest in preventing ethnically based conflicts (petsinis 2016; herd and lofgren 2001). though in principle this assessment is correct, i beg to differ. the impact minority group representation in ethnically divided societies can have on political opportunities for participation can be easily observed in the baltic states. here, we see minorities bringing forward their own concerns to challenge the state-driven decision-making and making clear that they mobilise as groups along the ethnic lines in the first instance to achieve representation of their interest in the public domain as groups but merely to have an access to and be able to participate in state-wide political process as individuals on their own agendas cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 93 (agarin 2013). this notion however is particularly challenging to the dominant mode of decision-making in contemporary liberal democracies which often do more than question the minority benevolence in challenging policies and institutions of the state as such. by inviting minority representatives into the ranks of the majority-dominated political elites, they undercut minority representation in terms that are particularly relevant for the group itself and usher in reframing of their interests in terms suitable for the ethnic, state-bearing majority. and it is precisely because minority representatives find no space for their (ethnic, cultural, religious, linguistic, etc) identities in the context of political institutions of latvian and estonian statehood, that they seek participation in politics in areas that have been previously parcelled out for the majority and have not been reclaimed in totality by the members of majority proper. these succinct and subtle processes of minority co-optation (agarin 2009), assimilation presented as integration (malloy 2009) and advocating equality in the public domain for citizens rather for the (institutionally excluded) minority ethnics (purs 2012) are indicative of the type of governance yitfachel labels ‘ethnocracy’. this is where we are coming full-circle in thinking about democratic governance for and by the ethnic majority of the state: any form of the rule of law installed for and promoted by the majority can easily go down the ethnocratic slope unless credible commitment for domestic publics is in place to keep the ethnonational foundations of governance in check when participating in decision-making. while we are examining political decision-making as a process aimed at a domestic audience and delivering domestic policy outputs, inevitably a lot of other factors are likely to pop up in discussions. in the case of the baltic states, questions of loyalty of russian-speakers towards their ‘external homeland’ have been particularly central to further consolidating domestic ethnocratic governance mechanisms, despite the fact that few (if any) russian-speakers indicate that their connection to russia trumps their affiliation with their states of residence (birka 2016; demuth 2000; dorodnova 2000). on the other hand, issues of prejudice against external – and as such unpredictable – actors (with their belligerent rhetoric, as well as their presumed meddling in domestic affairs) open space for wishful thinking where rational analysis should have triumphed. neither helps us understanding when, and crucially why, ethnocratic governance prevails and is getting entrenched in public opinions and later, via the ballot box in public institutions, becoming the only game in town. *** 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 in conclusion of my brief excursion into the contemporary baltic region, i can only reiterate my impression that an ethnocratic mode of governance is still the order of the day in both estonia and latvia. though views on the effects of ethnocracy diverge considerably among the members of the majority and minority populations in these countries, these differences can be alarming only in so far as they are representative of the mode of governance across much of the eu today. during the period of eastern enlargement, the eu had an opportunity to challenge and change domestic institutions delivering governance to the people in all candidate countries. yet, 12 years since the accession of the then eight post-communist states to the union when we ought to see european commitment to delivering an inclusive and democratic governance we find it is applied only to people already defined in domestic legislations as prime beneficiaries of state building. in the past, external observers largely overestimated the ability of the eu to challenge legal frameworks, including policies regulating access to citizenship and minority protection in the baltic region, and across much of the accession states. today more so than ever the analysis converges on the view that the eu accession process, including conditionality mechanisms sought to, and has, strengthened the institutions of nation-state along the initial pledge to protect and support the numeric (and alas, ethnic) majorities. for one part this is due to the eu’s own commitment to majoritarian decision-making, for another, it reflects the focus of supranational politics on the nation-state whose sovereignty has to be taken seriously (agarin and cordell 2016; cf. keating 2004). therefore, regardless of my personal unease (which i share deeply with james anderson) about the persistent nature of ethnocratic governance, there is little room in contemporary international politics to challenge the notion of sovereignty facilitating, if not outright inviting, the forms of democracy that cater to the majority ethnic group among the citizenry. the framework of analysis requiring our attention to ethnocracy as a form of domestic governance presupposed the secondary role of external actors in domestic process. as such, however much we would like to engage with the role both the eu and for that matter, also of russian federation as a self-style ethnic homeland of (at least some) russian-speakers in the baltic states, these are but external to domestic policymaking on the baltic region. the fact that each state has been created to serve its own citizens who can – and do – vote on whatever issue they perceive relevant for themselves and elect politicians they choose, makes the choices of demos to maintain ethnocratic regime a narrow-gauge, domestic issue. however much both the ‘external homelands’ of minorities, or any international organisations cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 95 including the eu and/or nato might be concerned about the implications of domestic instability resultant from the ethnocratic rule, there is little they can do – without powerful leverage in the form of either positive or negative incentives – to dissuade domestic political entrepreneurs from exploiting the opportunities for further consolidation of ethnocratic governance. specifically, this has been happening when the russian federation has been portraying itself as a defender of russian-speakers’ interests in the region; factually however, it has been powerless to improve the perceptions, status, and rights of russian-speaking minorities in either latvia, or estonia for 25 years. so whereas publics are welcome to think that there exists some external tool to pressure for and revise ethnocratic governance and policies to endorse minority groups participation in domestic policymaking, no serious academic should take the rhetoric of external actors to be anything else than futile rhetoric. where we should start therefore is at the concept of ‘ethnocracy’ as a tool for analysing processes of governance in ethnically diverse societies. indeed, when political scientists focus on the state as a set of political institutions which shape the everyday lives of state residents, we ought to question not their origins or their very existence, but the rationale for their change. ultimately, all political institutions are little more that the sets of rules established by means of social contract in the context of the already existing social institutions and as such, and only as such, do they acquire acceptance and legitimacy from the publics they govern. in the majority of cases, state political institutions are ‘out there’ to deliver services to taxpayers and citizens expecting something in return, not least the ability of the state to cooperate with its stakeholders. to do so effectively, institutions of the state designate a language in which they can do so most effectively and lay out sets of rules and regulations that (most often) implicitly establish the hierarchy of ethnic groups in their access to state resources. the newly (re-)established states like estonia and latvia are no different from cases of other ‘historically evolved’ states such as france or germany in their primary commitment to deliver effective services to their resident populace. though we are likely to take the ethnicised nature of those historically evolved nation-states for granted, they too at some point in the historic past have ‘chosen’ an official language, ethnocultural core nation, and 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 identified resources to be available for all speakers of ‘the’ language, but from which others, non-citizens and non-residents, were to be excluded unless these chose to compete on equal terms. in other words, the access to critical positions in and influence on state development has been reserved to individuals with distinct, predefined characteristics of the majority stock by all states, democratic or not, while presuming that others, usually the members of an ethnic minority, were excluded from equal opportunities at least at some point in the historic past. my fundamental point is that regardless of their political institutional design, democratic or otherwise, liberal or corporatist, all political landscapes are ethnicised to a degree requiring individuals of minority backgrounds to accept rules of the game established by the majority population in order to join in and compete with the majority. since the collapse of communism however, most western liberal democracies went to great lengths in facilitating minority participation on their own terms, yet none has achieved complete parity between majority and minority groups in public sphere. this i believe throws the light on what yitfatchel has been particularly adamant about in his narrower studies (yiftachel 1998) when talking about the ability of stakeholders to hamper change in institutions and as such in the form of governance. there are some additional lessons to learn from this also, on the limited ability of the actors excluded from decision-making to impact the ‘direction of travel’ in domestic politics whose outcomes those excluded might be extremely unhappy about. the lack of progress on accommodation of the cultural, social, economic and political rights of minority, non-titular, communities in estonia and latvia should be alarming to nato and eu member-states. arrangements to recognise the connection of minority groups to post-soviet states of residence, rather than to their (however tentative) ethnic kin-state should move onto the political agenda particularly following the recent developments in ukraine as elsewhere in the post-soviet region. however, when discussing the central role played by state institutions in negotiating conflicts between groups over access to scarce resources of the state, it is central to see minorities as being in both the inferior numerical position 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http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/jemie/2014/nakai.pdf https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/16/burkini-ban-defended-as-french-mayors-urged-to-cool-local-tensions https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/16/burkini-ban-defended-as-french-mayors-urged-to-cool-local-tensions https://doi.org/10.1080/14718800208405119 http://www.policy.hu/bieber/publications/2005%20serbia%20smooha.pdf https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004169456.i-585 http://www.tiesproject.eu/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_download/gid,351/itemid,142/index.html.pdf http://www.tiesproject.eu/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_download/gid,351/itemid,142/index.html.pdf https://doi.org/10.1177/088541229801200401 extending the concept of ethnocracy: exploring the debate in the baltic context abstract introduction references funding cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 2 2017 © 2017 john berteaux. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: berteaux, j. 2017. black france, black america: engaging historical narratives. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(2), 57-71. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i2.547 4 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper black france, black america: engaging historical narratives john berteaux california state university monterey bay corresponding author: dr. john berteaux, professor of philosophy, humanities and communication, california state university, monterey bay, 5108 fourth avenue, marina, ca 93933, usa. jberteaux@csumb.edu doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i2.5474 abstract abstract during the first quarter of the 20th century a small group of black intellectuals, artists, and musicians abandoned the united states for paris. the rumor was that the french did not believe in racist theories – that france offered blacks social and economic opportunities not available in the states. this paper critically examines that narrative as well as north america’s melting pot legend – an expression of the promise of america made popular in 1909 by playwright israel zangwill. the stories that we tell about ourselves as a nation are important because our moral sentiments are frequently a product of these narratives. they influence our vision of populations and their circumstances. they serve as starting points for philosophical investigation and critical self-reflection. my intent is not to prove these stories or narratives false but rather, to illustrate how their widespread acceptance has affected people’s abilities to recognize, understand, and responsibly address compelling and complex racial problems. what i recommend is the need for an on-going, comprehensive, and critical examination of socially dominant historical narratives. keywords historical narratives; assimilationism; multiculturalism; debt peonage; negrophilia; ethic of care declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this work was made possible by: provost emeritus cecil lytle, university of california san diego, department of music; and a provost global engagement grant, california state university monterey bay, college of arts, humanities and social sciences. mailto:jberteaux@csumb.edu http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i2.5474 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 introduction it is common today to display ambivalence toward history. in my philosophy classes i find students are somewhat reticent when it comes to talking about majoring in history. those who are talkative share that friends and relatives query them ad nauseam about their reasons relating that they are asked over and over, ‘what are you going to do with that?’ or advised ‘you’re not going to find a good job with a history major …’. while conventional wisdom has it that those who do not value history are condemned to repeat it, some are convinced that the practical value of history is exaggerated since people do not seem to learn from their mistakes. others believe that the infinite possibilities of human experience imply that meaningful thought about the past is impossible (muller, 1952, pp. 38–55). as expressions of motives for or against critically engaging history this list is far from complete. for example, if ethics is a discipline that defines how we are supposed to act towards others and ourselves then one might wonder whether it is possible to do the right thing without a thorough appreciation of the past. since ethical decision-making is not simply about following rules, it may depend heavily on unreflective assumptions and sentiments that are the product of historical narratives. philosopher charles mills asks that we recall the narrative once used to justify western colonialism. mills (1997, pp. 40–50) says, the basic sequence goes something like this: there were no people there in the first place; in the second place, they’re not improving the land; and in the third place – oops! – they’re already all dead anyway (and honestly, there really weren’t that many to begin with), so there are no people there, as we said in the first place. here mills suggests that, without an appreciation of the past, it is possible to simply descend into oppressive fantasy. given his specious anecdote one might see colonialism as simply a competition between nations over raw materials and natural resources. a more accurate historical account indicates that the raw materials and natural resources so readily exploited by colonial nations often came at someone’s expense through force, fraud, or violence. this difference is morally significant since either the use of such methods could render the initial acquisition of materials and resources illegitimate or suggest the wealth of those currently benefiting from the initial illegitimate acquisition should be confiscated and redistributed (kymlicka, 1990, p. 108). to put it succinctly, historical narratives can hide our true situation and real interest. consider, during the first world war (1914-1918) hundreds of thousands of african american soldiers who fought in europe returned to america from france extolling that country’s inclusiveness – its openness. they saw france generally and paris in particular as offering opportunity and social freedom not widely available for blacks in the united states, as i shall illustrate later. as a result of this early twentieth century narrative, many, to this day, see paris as ‘the city of light’, a free, open, color-blind metropolis. and yet, though this narrative endures, as recently as october of 2005, young arab and african men sparked riots that spread across france. their indictment of the french police for racial profiling as well as cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 59 their plea for jobs, education, and decent housing echoed the cries historically raised by oppressed minorities elsewhere and belies the notion that france is an egalitarian society. while the riots continued sporadically through 2008, the dissatisfaction has not dissipated and is made apparent by the burned out cars one comes across on the streets of paris (erlanger, 2009, p. a10). indeed, the new yorker magazine correspondent george packer (2015) contends that the 2015 terrorist attacks in paris were a ‘response’ to the racial inequality and injustice that has persisted, for quite some time, in paris’s ‘outer-cities’. and journalist manu saadia (2015) argues that, to understand the attack perpetrated by a group of frenchmen of algerian lineage at the batalcan concert hall in 2015 we must put it in a historical and political context that includes the paris massacre of algerians that occurred over fifty years ago 1. so too, racism has been the great failure of the united states. the american melting pot narrative advises us that populations came to the u.s. leaving behind their ancient prejudices, politics, and attitudes. the melting pot created new men and women; it created one out of many, a new race – the american race (schlesinger, 1993, pp. 23–43). and yet, in 2010 at the university of california, san diego, a group of white students made a national name for themselves when they hosted a ‘compton cookout’. women were invited to wear nappy wigs, large earrings, cheap clothing, and to speak loudly and start fights. compton is a city in southern california that is home to a large african american population (archibold, 2010, p. a-10). indeed, historian tony judt (2008, pp. 16–20) complains that in the u.s., present day characterizations of the recent past are composed of ‘manifold fragments … each of them (jewish, polish, serb, armenian, german, asian-american, palestinian, irish, homosexual ...) marked by its own distinctive and assertive victimhood … the resulting mosaic does not bind us to a shared past, it separates us from it’. in short, it seems the melting pot does not melt everybody. although i should know better by now, i often complacently take in narratives or myths about the past and file them away as historical fact. of course, there are narratives and counter narratives, narratives seen as top-level political discourse in the form of government documents, and narratives in the form of newspaper articles, or articles in scholarly journals, or simply tales passed on by family, friends, and acquaintances2. in this paper i focus on and explore two socially dominant narratives that, i insist, fail to offer an exhaustive picture of populations or society. i urge that it is important unremittingly to evaluate these narratives because they influence moral attitudes. 1 on october 17, 1961 at the height of the algerian war of liberation, the algerian national liberation front (fln) called on all algerians living in paris to go into the streets and hold a peaceful demonstration. during that demonstration, paris police attacked scores of men, women, and children. many algerians were injured and jailed and at least 200 demonstrators were killed. the bodies of those killed were thrown from the bridges over the seine and could be found floating in the river for weeks afterward. the bataclan concert hall is only a short distance from where a number of the 1961 demonstrations occurred. 2 take, for example, the irish slave narrative, a myth based on a misinterpretation of the history of indentured servitude that often appears on white supremacist web sites. the assertion that the irish were slaves just like the blacks rests on the assumption that indentured servitude and chattel slavery is equivalent and that the experiences in the aftermath was similar. it follows, then, that the irish were slaves too and ‘got over it, so why can’t blacks?’ 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 i begin by appraising france’s antique narrative of inclusion. then i critically engage america’s melting pot metaphor. again these are narratives that have consequences for a broad domain; they shape philosophical inquiry, moral sentiments, and hinder our attaining a clear-eyed vision of the nature of populations and their circumstances. in conclusion, i touch on the work of philosophers and feminist like dwight furrow, daniel engster, and nel noddings to gauge whether it is possible to resolve a legacy of racial subordination, inequality, and injustice without persistently questioning these socially dominant historical narratives. france’s antique narrative of inclusion in the novel the stone face, african american journalist, novelist, and editor william gardner smith offers an account of how the french regard race, albeit in a fictionalized format. like smith his protagonist, simeon, is an african american expat living and writing in france. having experienced racism in america, simeon is sensitive to and curious about the anti-arab racism he sees in the streets of paris. despite what simeon thinks he sees, his friends, raoul and henri, corroborate the age-old adage that the french nation is a community of individuals. one day at the touron, simeon asked raoul and henri, two french students he knew, ‘is there racism in france?’ raoul said quickly, ‘of course not. the french don’t believe in racist theories, everybody knows that. africans feel perfectly at home here. the french don’t understand racism’ (smith, 1963, p. 62). in her book, resurrecting slavery: racial legacies and white supremacy in france, sociology professor crystal marie fleming (2017, p. 11) maintains that even into the 1950s prominent french historians of colonialism claimed that the french did not believe in racist theories. she insists, however, ‘such denials of french racism are not only ahistorical and factually untrue … they are also atemporal. that is, portraying france as blind to race requires erasing french racism across time’. historian william b. cohen (2003, pp. xiv–xv) reports that ‘frenchmen have traditionally asserted that their country, unlike their neighbors and the white inhabitants of the u.s., have upheld the principles of racial equality overseas and at home’. cohen (2003, p. xv) continues, ‘official spokesmen for the french government have also pointed with great pride to what they perceive as a record of unparalleled racial egalitarianism’. in black skins, french voices: caribbean ethnicity and activism in urban france, anthropologist david beriss (2004, p. 125) says, ‘the ideal of ‘republican universalism’ defines the [french] nation as a community of individuals, not a collection of cultures’. briess (2004, p. 125) observes ‘it had long been asserted that what distinguished french culture from its european neighbors was the humanist ideal according to which anyone could become french simply by accepting french culture’. as a result, most documents in france today, including the national census require respondents to indicate only their citizenship and not their race, ethnicity, or religion (beriss, 2004, p. 125; hine et al., 2009, p. 106; packer, 2015). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 61 how did france’s antique narrative of inclusion originate? historian e.j. hobsbawn (1992, p. 88,101) reminds us that the nation state is frequently the product of conscious effort. hobsbawn claims that it is a myth that cultures suddenly mature and pass a tipping point such that they become conscious of themselves as nation states. whether it was the case of simple maturation or conscious effort, presently there is the belief that an assimilationist narrative has directed the french republic. france embraces and absorbs all those who accept the french language and culture. in their book, sixty million frenchmen can’t be wrong, writers jean-benoit nadeau and julie barlow (2003, p. 301) maintain, ‘at the time of the french revolution [1789 – 1799], france was an ethnic and linguistic patchwork. the revolutionaries developed a policy of assimilation to further the goal of centralization and create a single french identity’. the reality though it is true that the french have historically rejected dividing society up along religious, racial, cultural, or ethnic lines, it does not necessarily follow that the country has not been involved in race-making or racial discrimination. to see this, one need look no further than france’s colonial history and its involvement in the slave trade or its past and present treatment of its arab and african colonial subjects. just as hundreds of thousands of african american solders fought for the u.s. in europe during the first and second world wars, hundreds of thousands of indigenous soldiers (tirailleurs) supported france’s involvement in the franco prussian war, the first world war, the second world war, and in indochina (mann, 2006, pp. 15–22). and just as african american soldiers returned to a second class citizenship, the tirailleurs had to fight for pensions and social benefits promised long ago and awarded french citizens as a matter of course (mann, 2006, pp. 5–6; saltmarsh, 2009). harki is a term meaning ‘volunteer’ and is used to refer to french muslims and algerians who defended france during the algerian war of independence fought from 1954 to 1962. although thousands of harki fought and died for france during this war, journalists, novelists, and historians have chronicled the bleak existence of the harki during and after the algerian war of independence (werman, 2012). french historian pierre daum (khettab, 2015), in an interview on aljazeera, describes their dismal treatment both in france as well as in algeria. those few who fled to france after the war confronted racism and those who remained loyal to france but stayed in algeria after the war faced segregation and violence. daum estimates that tens of thousands of harkis were executed following france’s departure from algeria, while those who left algeria for france faced inhumane conditions in french camps. in her chapter, ‘black (american) paris and the french outer-cities’, professor of african american and diasporic studies, trica danielle keaton, explores the race question and the fallacy of color-blindness in french society. she points out that the age-old narrative, accepted by many of a ‘color-blind or race-free france’ is a fallacy. it is a fallacy that continues until today and results in the ‘(mis)representation of paris and france as sites of a paradoxical black american inclusion’. this narrative, she contends, ‘dismiss[es] and/or deny[s] the social realities of race in french society’ (hine et al., 2009, pp. 95–118). 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 in short, trica keaton’s sober analysis of france’s antique ‘narrative of inclusion’ is important in that it draws our attention to the fact that the narrative sustains a fantasy – the fantasy that france is a race-free society. moreover, the policy upon which the narrative is based explains why it is so difficult to overturn the fantasy and investigate racial inequality and injustice in france. census statistics are unavailable since the government cannot legally ask citizens about their race, religion, or ethnicity. therefore, it appears that while not counting can solidify the narrative suggesting that groups do not exist and that nothing needs fixing, essentially de facto discrimination continues to endure even as the narrative masks it. real life on the other side of the atlantic as modern day france struggles to realize its universal humanistic ideals, on the other side of the atlantic the united states labors to overcome a history that includes chattel slavery, debt peonage, segregation, and discrimination. and just as france’s antique narrative of inclusion prevents the french from attaining an honest vision of their populations and their circumstances, so too america’s melting pot thesis seems to be little more than propaganda. for example, it is possible to find historians who suggest that the reality that race played, and continues to play, in sculpting the nation’s understanding of itself and of american blacks is as much a product of the distant past as it is an invention of the eighty-year period between the end of the chattel slavery and world war ii. after all, historian douglas blackmon (2009, pp. 1–10) insists that while chattel slavery may have been irrevocably abolished with the signing of the thirteenth amendment to the constitution and its ratification in 1865, technically the end of slavery did not occur in the united states until 1941. the essence of blackmon’s argument is that it is a forgotten part of american history that, by the end of reconstruction, southern states had created a labor system that was as destructive as chattel slavery – turning thousands upon thousands of ex-slaves into convicts and robbing them of their newly found freedom. it was a labor system that destroyed families, confiscated land, and subordinated blacks. blackmon (2009, p. 7) argues: instead of thousands of true thieves and thugs drawn into the [prison] system over the decades, the records demonstrate the capture and imprisonment of thousands of random indigent citizens, almost always under the thinnest chimera of probable cause or judicial processes … instead of evidence showing black crime waves, the original records of county jails indicate thousands of arrests for inconsequential charges or for violations of laws specifically written to intimidate blacks. this was a system built first on debt peonage and then on convict labor – forms of involuntary servitude that accommodated whites’ (continued) need for free labor and gratified their desire for racial subordination. jailing more than a million black men (women and children) in this manner, the system, blackmon insists, criminalized the image of blacks in the united states – creating an image of blacks as those people one should be afraid of – those people that one should expect to be in prison or working in chain gangs along the side of the road. this was an eighty-year period in which blacks throughout the south faced laws that allowed for their being legally grabbed off the street and jailed, or sold as free labor to the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 63 highest bidder for such things as ‘riding freight cars without a ticket, engaging in sexual activity or loud talk – with white women’ (blackmon, 2009, pp. 7, 53–57). blackmon updates our understanding of race relations by demonstrating that racial inequality and injustice existed right alongside the melting pot thesis. black america, black france in 1918, 53 years after the end of chattel slavery, black american world war i veterans returned to the united states and found continuing hostility, lack of opportunity and little social and economic freedom. although they found the system looked to force them back into involuntary servitude, returning soldiers fought back (blackmon, 2009, p. 360). as a result historian eric foner (1990, p. 174) reports, ‘the last year of the war [first world war] witnessed an orgy of violence (there were eleven lynchings in georgia alone in may 1918) and a wave of repression that drove the naacp out of local communities throughout the south’. this then, was the world in which josephine baker, richard wright, sidney bechet, ada ‘bricktop’ smith and other african american artist and intellectuals came of age. josephine baker, arguably the best-known expat, left the united states heading for france in september 1925. she left the u.s. for a country that returning black soldiers characterized as ‘open and free’. professor of french literature eileen julien (2009, p. 49) observes that when josephine baker first arrived in france as a member of the dance troupe revue nègre, ‘france was in fact in the throes of negrophilia, an esthetic manifested prominently in the visual arts, music, and performance. negrophilia was a complex, ambiguous phenomenon, conflating european notions of african and african american life and performance’. julien (2009, p. 49) emphasizes that the performances of baker and others in revue nègre (1925), folies bergères (1926) and the bal nègre (1927) ‘was greeted in the french press with hysterical acclaim … not only was baker not a french colonial subject or citizen but, as a victim of american racism, she bolstered french claims to have created the premier republic of “liberté, égalité, fraternité”’. approximately twenty-five years after josephine baker arrived in france, writer james baldwin wrote encounter on the seine: brown meets black. in this short piece, baldwin offers a mid-twentieth century examination of expatriate african american life. he estimates that there were approximately five hundred ‘american negroes’ living in paris during his time there. he goes on to say that they were pretty much isolated from each other and then explores the reasons for their isolation. baldwin notes that american blacks in paris sought invisibility and emphasizes at least three reasons for this. first, he argues, they avoid each other because ‘it is altogether inevitable that past humiliations should become associated not only with one’s traditional oppressors but also with one’s traditional kinfolk’ (baldwin and jones, 2012, pp. 119-120). through those who are most like him, he [the black] comes to relive the agonizing reasons he left the united states in the first place. second, baldwin (2012, pp. 121–122) says, long before he came to paris he had acknowledged the absolute futility of blaming any one of his countrymen for the position of blacks in america. ‘american negroes’ and whites cannot discuss the past, he insists, 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 because they live and have lived in different worlds. hence, the ‘american negro’ has lost any hope of conveying to whites any of his experience. it is not about all whites being mean and ugly racists; rather, blacks and whites simply live in different worlds. conversations with europeans and african blacks generally tend to adhere to the fantasies that europeans and african blacks have constructed for themselves about the united states and the american black. the european sympathizes with the american black, while the african has not endured the alienation of self from self as have american blacks. baldwin goes on to suggest that the ‘american negro’s’ past is more complex than the histories suggest. their past ‘has not been simply a series of ropes and bonfires and humiliations, but something vastly more complex’ (baldwin and jones, 2012, p. 121). france may have remained in the throes of negrophilia but its treatment of its blacks left much to be desired and created an interesting inconsistency for american blacks. certainly, historian tyler stovall (2009, p. 185) makes us aware that the ‘rosy portrait of african american life in paris contrasted sharply … with the experiences of most french blacks’. like their counterparts in the united states, many african soldiers (tirailleurs) returned home from the first world war demanding full citizenship and were disappointed. in france, the old colonial order did not pass away after the war; rather, it endured. stovall (2009, p. 185) says, ‘in francophone africa, the new emphasis on the economic development of the colonies led to a massive increase in forced labor, often under brutally exploitative conditions’. although blacks in the french caribbean and africa may not have suffered the violence experienced by american blacks in the south, still they were not fully accepted in french society. as a result, african americans in paris were in the odd position of ‘witnessing and escaping the mistreatment of a lower caste in the city’ (stovall, 2009, p. 185). in the novel the stone face, author william gardner smith’s protagonist, simeon, an african american writer living in paris in the early 60s, finds himself caught in an awkward situation. simeon happens upon a man seemingly attacking a woman. he intervenes, attempting to help the woman. a fight ensues. the police arrive and take both men in for questioning. during the questioning, simeon learns that his adversary, an algerian called hossein, was trying to retrieve money that the woman had stolen from him. the following exchange occurs: “what happened?” he asked. “these bicots [algerians] attacked the monsieur,” a policeman said. the sergeant looked at simeon. “do you want to bring charges?” “no.” “explain what happened, monsieur.” the man simeon had fought tried to speak, but one of the policemen slapped him in the face. the sergeant said to the man, “be quiet!” then turned to simeon. “go ahead, monsieur.” the sergeant had used the familiar tu in speaking to the algerian, but employed the polite vous in addressing simeon. simeon felt extremely uncomfortable. he said, “this man was with a girl and, i don’t know, i suppose i interfered when i shouldn’t have. “lock him up. and the others, too. a night in jail will do them good.” cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 65 a policeman said, “the american too?” “no, not monsieur.” simeon looked at the algerians with a plea for forgiveness. they did not return his glance. he protested to the sergeant, “but i’m not lodging charges. i didn’t know his pay was stolen. they shouldn’t be locked up, everything was my fault.” the sergeant frowned. “listen, are you telling us how to run our own country?” “no.” “okay, get out of here.” a policeman led simeon to the entrance. simeon looked back at the algerians, who were being pushed roughly through a door in the rear. the policeman put his arm on simeon’s shoulder and said, “you don’t understand. you don’t know how they are, les arabes. always stealing, fighting, cutting people, [and] killing. they’re a plague; you’re a foreigner, you wouldn’t know. a night in jail is letting them off easy.” (smith, 1963, pp. 52–53). some time later simeon ran into hossein on the street. hossein confronted simeon asking, “how does it feel to be the white man for a change” (smith, 1963, p. 57)? in sum, then, france’s narrative of inclusion hid the sinister nature of its color blind or racefree story line in that its acceptance of black americans pointed away from its racist treatment of its own colonial subjects. france’s treatment of its arab and african subjects could not be racist – after all, look at the treatment the french afforded american blacks. without doubt, french culture is egalitarian; hence, it is superior to u.s. culture (cohen, 2003, p. xv). it allowed france to draw a distinction between ‘good’ american blacks and ‘bad’ african and arab blacks. and what is more, the difference in treatment between the ‘good’ blacks versus the ‘bad’ blacks entered everyone’s identity (american blacks, french blacks, whites, and algerians) to shape their perceptions and prejudices. in short, france’s dominant social narrative is not just a fantasy; it is an insidious fantasy. the upshot of all this is that historical narratives must be critically examined. if james baldwin and others are correct, then, it is through critically engaging the past that we make contact with the complex and inconsistent ways in which racial narratives take shape and unfold. for instance, many like to think of the new deal era of the 1930s and 1940s as a time when the united states turned a new leaf and became concerned about poverty, old age, unemployment, and the burdens placed on widowers. in discussions of the social security act of 1935, one controversial issue has been its exclusion of farm workers and domestics from coverage – targeting the disproportionately minority sectors of the work force and denying protections and benefits routinely afforded whites. public historian larry dewitt (2010, pp. 49-50) insists that this is a story line that has passed from historical narrative to historical fact. dewitt (2010, p. 49) argues ‘the racial-bias thesis is both conceptually flawed and unsupported by the existing empirical evidence … the allegations of racial bias in the founding of the [new deal era] social security program, 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 based on the coverage exclusions, do not hold up under detailed scrutiny’3. this difference of opinion has significant implications, since conscious as well as unconscious actions and the dissemination of cultural stories have institutionalized racial identities. to put it another way, novelist william faulkner (2011, p. 73) says, ‘the past is never dead. it’s not even past’. in fact, historian tyler stovall (hine et al., 2009, p. 189) claims that at the turn of the 21st century black france and black america ‘have come to resemble each other more closely, in ways that [have] rendered the transatlantic link historically constituted by african american expatriates less important’. while the rise of a large black middle class in the united states has resulted in fewer black americans who visit france with the idea of exile in mind, the changing nature of french society has led some black americans to reconsider the old notion of a color-blind france. indeed, currently the french press is filled with reports of demonstrations following the violent arrest by four police officers of a young black man (theo) in one of france’s ‘outer-cities’. the reports of police brutality, in this case, parallel incidents that have occurred in the united states in 2016 and led to the black lives matter movement. once we acknowledge how easy it is to surrender to illusion, we are left with a clear question: given a global history of racial inequality and injustice, what is it our moral responsibility to do now? ethical decision-making depends upon context. to the extent that socially dominant historical narratives provide context they may offer either an impoverished vision, or a rich, circumspect, and insightful appreciation of populations and their circumstances. if this analysis is correct it does not seem possible to resolve racial problems while simply looking past these equivocal accounts of history. reconstructing liberal theory by contrast, some are convinced that to defeat racial oppression, all liberal democracies need do is to live up to their ideals (individualism, equality, and universalism): others maintain that liberal ideals and values must be reinterpreted so as to accommodate racial groups; and still others believe that liberal ideals have been racialized and, as a result are not powerful enough to overcome racial oppression (kukathas, 1992, 1992, pp. 111–117; kymlicka, 1995, pp. 1-2; mills, 1997, pp. 9–40). in any case, i insist that liberal democracies must gauge the material as well as non-material suffering of the ‘other’ and in order to do so a comprehensive and critical appreciation of the past is necessary. but first, conventional wisdom has it that social environment is the problem. in europe, prime minister david cameron of britain, chancellor angela merkel of germany, and former french president nicholas sarkozy all responded in the same way when right-wing extremist anders behring breivik killed 69 young people on the island of utoya and set off a bomb that killed eight in norway’s capital city, oslo: the new york times reported that, while trying to avoid arguments that would expose them to possessing racially tinged views, all made speeches critical of multiculturalism. 3 dewitt (2010, pp. 49–68) offers an extensive list of labor historians who allege racial bias in the founding of the social security program. to name just a few: linda gordon, lee alston and joseph ferrier, and robert lieberman. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 67 as chancellor merkel stressed that immigrants are welcome in germany, she complained that multiculturalism ‘has failed, utterly failed’ (burns, 2011, p. 6). the dutch government went further to say it would abandon its decades-old policy of multiculturalism. according to the dutch interior minister piet hein donner, the government would step away from multiculturalism and implement a new integrationist policy (kern, 2011). despite this continuing debate in europe, on the other side of the atlantic, canadians remain unswerving in their commitment to multiculturalism while apologetically acknowledging the on-going discouraging economic and social statistics of canadian’s aboriginal communities (simpson, 2012). in the united states, columbia university humanities professor mark lilla (2016), in a new york times op-ed article, insists identity politics have proven a failure. he argues, ‘one of the many lessons of the recent [2016] presidential election campaign and its repugnant outcome is that the age of identity liberalism must be brought to an end’ (lilla, 2016). on the other hand, there are those who argue that liberals misunderstand the problem. presently, philosophers, such as dwight furrow, daniel engster, and nel noddings, highlight what they feel is an inadequacy of liberal [isms]. they warn that liberals have made a habit of conceptualizing solutions to social and political problems in terms of impartial rules and procedures. these philosophers insist that while a focus on impartial rules and procedures demands the state accord each individual equal treatment, this does not always result in its being sensitive to the unique needs of others. according to furrow (2009, p. 24), ‘a progressive liberalism is more than a simple tolerance or inclusiveness, it responds to the call of human flourishing and seeks to make for everyone the social conditions that enable flourishing’. he goes on to suggest that ‘fostering a culture of responsibility and care’ is required to create ‘the social conditions that enable flourishing’ (2009, p. 134). philosopher daniel engster (2007, p. 51) writes in his book the heart of justice: care ethics and political theory that ‘care theory roots our moral obligations to the other in our empirically verifiable dependence upon others and others depending on us’. in engster’s (2007, p. 43) view, we begin and live out our lives in a web of dependency and caring. it is not just that we depend on and probably will depend upon the care of others one day; rather, human existence is inextricably implicated in relations of dependency and caring. even when we are not immediately dependent upon the personal care of some particular individual, we will depend upon the care of many others, for our survival and functioning. basically, engster is warning that as social animals we all depend on the care of those in many fields (i.e. fields such as manufacturing, medicine, education, and the law). hence, he reports, care theorists derive moral obligations not only from abstract moral ground but also from our relations with others as dependent social creatures. if we want to act consistently, our own claims for care commits us to extend care to all other beings. while philosophers like furrow and engster insist our relations define moral obligations to others, nel noddings goes further. she maintains that a strong connection to the dependent reality we find ourselves in requires that we go beyond simply identifying with the ‘other’. noddings (2003, p. 14) writes, ‘when i am in a caring relationship, the others’ 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 reality becomes real for me’. pulitzer-prize winning author michael chabon (2012) corroborates this point when he writes: to qualify as a racist, you don’t have to go to the extreme of slurring, stereotyping, or discriminating against people of another race. all you have to do … is feel completely disconnected from them. all you have to do is look at those people in a kind of scientific surprise, as i looked at african-americans i passed in the streets of l.a. in the days after the simpson verdict, and realize you have been passing them by in just this way, for months, for years. they were here all along, thinking what they think now, believing what they now believe, and somehow you failed to notice. in making this comment, chabon urges us to try to see beyond the surface expressions of race. what is required, then, is the resolve to look beyond the barrier of one’s own experience and to strive to step into the ‘other’s’ reality. history dictates that this is no easy task. imagining the lives of others is it possible to reveal the ways in which those defined as ‘other’ experience their lives from the inside? a couple of years ago while living in buenos aires, i wrote a short piece for my hometown newspaper, the monterey herald. in the column, i asked readers to recall a scene from the movie death and the maiden. in the scene, sigourney weaver’s husband interrogates her. more than once he insists that she explain why she didn’t tell him she was raped while in custody in argentina’s ‘dirty war’. in frustration, weaver blurts out, ‘there is a difference between hearing the facts and knowing the details’. i understood her to intend that while she could give him the facts, it was details – meaning lived experience – that rendered what happened to her real and he could never absorb the depth of her experiences. along the same lines, in imagining the lives of others, psychologist paul bloom (2015) offers a critical analysis that is reminiscent of the earlier discussion of james baldwin’s encounter on the seine and sigourney weaver’s response to her husband. bloom, like baldwin and weaver, explores the limits of empathy. just as baldwin claims that american blacks and whites cannot discuss the past because they live in different worlds, bloom insists that acts of immersion in the lives of others are fascinating but have their limits. for example, bloom says, given the revelations about torture that followed the iraq war, there were journalists who decided to get themselves water boarded so that they might know what it is like. he observed, ‘i don’t doubt that they learned something from the experience, but what they couldn’t experience – was the lack of control. surely part of the terror of waterboarding is that it is done to you when you don’t want it and you have no way to make it stop’ (bloom, 2015). although i grant that it is no easy task to expose the way in which those defined as ‘other’ live their lives from the inside, i still maintain the necessity of trying to do so. a key to accomplishing this task is to reflect on and critically engage socially dominant historical narratives. a failure to do so impedes self-transparency and a genuine understanding of social realities. as charles mills (1997, p. 19) argues, ‘misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception on matters of race are among the most pervasive mental cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 69 phenomena of the past few hundred years’. he insists ‘such misunderstanding is … psychically required for conquest, colonization and enslavement’ (mills, 1997, p. 19). whether it is an antique narrative of inclusion or the melting pot thesis, narratives influence our vision of populations and their circumstances. conclusion what might this analysis require of france and the united states? one answer is the french might want to ground their ‘universal republicanism’ by first acknowledging the need for a deeper understanding of the historical reality of black france. such a profound understanding could lead them to recognize the way in which their dominant narrative results in attitudes that hide their true situation and real interests. it would acknowledge, as james baldwin suggests, that all too often life is messier than our narratives imply. on the other hand, americans might want to acknowledge the limits of the melting pot myth. they may want to concede that while many have assimilated, the social reality of race has challenged and continues to challenge and even contradict the notion that america has, without exception, made one out of many, same out of ‘other’. for example, sociologist steve martinot (2003, pp. 167–168) insists, ‘the most frequent police rationale for killing is thinking the ‘suspect’ had a weapon. when a white person pulls out a wallet or holds a cell phone or an address book, it is seen as a wallet, or a cell phone, or an address book; when a black person does the same thing, it is a weapon, leading to defensive retaliation’. but how was this negative image or idea constructed? again, if douglas blackmon (2009, pp. 7, 99, 360,) is correct, arresting and pushing hundreds of thousands of blacks into a forced labor system over an eighty year period criminalized black life and created an image of blacks in general, and black men, in particular as those people one could expect to see in prison, or working on chain gangs along the side of the road. these were individuals who could not be trusted or that should be feared. the melting pot thesis aside, it appears america’s veiled history of criminalizing black life has insinuated itself into the identity of both blacks and whites. it has resulted in a ‘structured blindness’ and the tragic killing of unarmed black men by police (mills, 1997, p. 19). to the extent that historical narratives offer a context for ‘natural caring’, philosophical investigation, and critical self-reflection they predetermine what is thought, believed, or imagined. as a result, our moral attitudes or sentiments will be the product of narratives that fail to accurately reflect society. in fact, for many of the citizens of both france and america, since their founding storylines persist as unreflective assumptions or sentiments they will find it difficult if not impossible to gain a factual vision of themselves or their circumstances. hence, it is important to keep in mind that the narratives we tell can hold us hostage. in conclusion, then, i insist that while tolerance and inclusiveness are necessary to resolve our global history of racial inequality and injustice they are not sufficient. in order to create for everyone the conditions that enable flourishing, liberal democracies must acknowledge that the material and ideological manifestations of racial oppression are only surface expressions of deeper issues – issues that it may not be possible to resolve without 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 discrediting preferred historical narratives. indeed, if this analysis is correct, it appears that socially 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(eds.), black europe and the african american diaspora, university of illinois press, urbana, pp.180-197. werman, m. & hadden, g. 2012, ‘50 years after the algerian war, harkis still wait for french apology’, www.pri.org 19 july 2012. https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-0719/50-years-after-algerian-war-harkis-still-wait-french-apology http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/qa-happened-algeria-harkis-150531082955192.html http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/qa-happened-algeria-harkis-150531082955192.html https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591792020001006 https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/sunday/the-end-of-identity-liberalism.html https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822387817 http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-other-france http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/08/31/the-other-france http://fusion.kinja.com/the-1961-massacre-that-could-help-us-understand-the-par-1793852874 http://fusion.kinja.com/the-1961-massacre-that-could-help-us-understand-the-par-1793852874 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/13/world/europe/13iht-vets.html https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/focus-first-nations-dialogue-on-self-sufficiency/article1359686/ https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/focus-first-nations-dialogue-on-self-sufficiency/article1359686/ http://www.pri.org/ https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-07-19/50-years-after-algerian-war-harkis-still-wait-french-apology https://www.pri.org/stories/2012-07-19/50-years-after-algerian-war-harkis-still-wait-french-apology abstract keywords introduction france’s antique narrative of inclusion the reality real life on the other side of the atlantic black america, black france reconstructing liberal theory imagining the lives of others conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 2 2018 © 2018 andrew jakubowicz. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: jakubowicz, a. 2018. stranger in a strange land: reflections on my first fifty years in academia. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 10(2), 1-6. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6165 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au non-refereed article stranger in a strange land: reflections on my first fifty years in academia andrew jakubowicz university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: andrew jakubowicz, social and political sciences, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. andrew.jakubowicz@uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6165 article history: received: 09/04/2017; revised: 29/06/2018; accepted: 29/06/2018; published: 25/07/2018 abstract the author reflects on engaged sociology over the past half-century, exploring the political contradictions, and social and political change. the essay expresses thoughts on his retirement, and the importance of collaboration. keywords sociology, australia, professional, engagement declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. 1 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6165 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6165 http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:mailto:andrew.jakubowicz%40uts.edu.au?subject= http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6165 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 when i finished the first draft of my phd thesis in 1974, i dedicated it to my grandmother, estera weyland, whom i described as a ‘stranger in a strange land’. she was a refugee survivor from the holocaust in occupied poland. in shanghai where she had spent 5 years the refugee community saw her as a leader; she had established and managed the refugee kitchen through the long years of war and increasing japanese control. she pushed back against a world of chastening circumstances, and she survived. both the thesis dedication and the festschrift/conference title came from a book by robert heinlein, itself taking the line from the old testament book, exodus, chapter 22, verse 2. heinlein was one of my favourite authors at the time and his hippy-era book about free love and libertarian individuality struck a chord. heinlein went on to become a much more conservative figure, who despite his advocacy of sexual liberation, became increasingly and overtly anti-communist in the 1970s. here was a time of euro-marxism, ayn rand libertarianism and alternative consciousness and lifestyle communities. these various flows swirled together in the intellectual milieu in which i first found myself. the offer of a conference and festschrift by the dean of the faculty of arts and social sciences at the university of technology sydney (uts), professor mary spongberg to mark my departure from uts took me much by surprise, both an embarrassment and a compliment; it also provided an exclamation point for my career over nearly fifty years in academia. one theme raised during the conference explores what it might mean to talk of being a public intellectual or an engaged social scientist. whenever i hear these terms they have elements of self-aggrandisement, rather too ‘look at me’ and not enough ‘look at them’. however the role of scholars in an era of post-truth, alternative-news, and the surveillance university remains one of prodding the dominant discourses that seek to frame and constrain our lives and channel our commitments. max weber, i learned early on, had drawn up the ground-rules for the role of the social scientist in modern capitalist societies, while his arch-rival in the mind-games zone, karl marx, had dictated the revolutionary practice. individuals ‘chose’ the topics on which they worked, and the passions they brought to their projects. however the scientific community verified the approaches and techniques that we applied and our peers tested the legitimacy of our conclusions. knowledge was more than hunch, prejudice, and obfuscating verbiage, though ideology permeated everywhere so that self-awareness and critical reflection were the most important tools we could apply. meanwhile we had to recognise that knowledge was always produced within a political economy and we were no less determined (but not overdetermined) by the dynamics in which we were located. of course the denouement always made reference to two more marxist tropes – we make history but not on grounds of our own choosing, and we seek to change the world, not only understand it. my doctoral thesis, undertaken at the university of new south wales (unsw), explored the transformation of inner sydney both within its historical context, and specifically through the period of the green ban movement of the early 1970s. i was guided by the late alex kondos, an iconoclast and stranger himself, whose father’s surname was chosen for him by the immigration official (it means ‘short’ in greek) in exasperation at the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 3 far too long real family name. my main supervisor was the late sol encel, also a jewish refugee from poland, and engaged sociologist par excellence, a strong anti-marxist, who found my radical edge rather undesired. i was balanced however by another recently appointed staff member at unsw, who proved to be a strong supporter of fascism. in this group were ex-priests who’d married ex-nuns, prison officers, gay rights activists, feminists, and a stream of first generation immigrants or their children. sociology had been on the outer in australia for decades; sydney university would not offr courses in it for a long time to come. sol was a political scientist, and my honours degree had been in government with henry mayer and dennis altman. however, i discovered something in the ‘social’, particularly the sociology of knowledge, which was mind-blowing, coming as i did from a refugee family living in a tight community of mourning survivors. it was possible through the application of carefully designed research to understand how social characteristics were played out in individual lives, in hierarchies of competing groups, and in the wider reaches of society. i was especially attracted by the work of karl mannheim, also a refugee sociologist who fled hungary and then germany, ahead of the wave of anti-semitic fascism across europe, finding a home at the london school of economics after the rise of hitler. mannheim managed the synthesis of marxism, phenomenology and the empirical approach emerging in the usa; he particularly discomforted those seeking unchallengeable truths, yet showed how one could approach the most satisfactory forms of explanation. his ideas had been influenced by another of my stranger friends, georg simmel, with whose work i became closely attached when i first discovered it. today simmel helps me understand the intricacies of personality and ideology in the inflammatory writings of andrew bolt and some others of the mainstream and of the alt-right. my career has been framed by five major locations – the unsw period; 18 months travelling overland through asia and europe; three years in the north of england; eight years at the university of wollongong; and then thirty years at uts (that sounds so long – and i received as a going-away gift a swarowski crystallised biro). the unsw period encompassed my doctoral project, when,, as well as working on archives and interviews, there was also a deep engagement with the urban social movements of the time. my focus was surry hills, south east of the city centre, and looking back i think the work there was important – the original plans that would have essentially demolished the suburb and replaced it with high rise towers were abandoned and the ‘village’ concept emerged. more importantly, though, was the collaboration between migrant groups, the older australians and the new ‘gentry’ attracted to the area. initiatives such as the surry hills neighbourhood information centre and neighbourhood action centre (nic nac) survive to this day in transformation at the local library, while the lessons i learned i fed into proposals for urban planning reform and migrant services (such as the one that became the migrant resource centre model). more recently the struggle over the future of the sirius building in the rocks, marks another step in an ongoing struggle over class and the city. way back before the building became a reality, i was involved in creating the social parameters, along with planner zula nittim and local activist nita mccrae, that contributed to the https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sirius_building https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/sirius_building 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 peoples’ plan for the rocks. that plan set up the ground-rules on which sirius was later conceived and built; now once more the working class tenants are being expelled and the building slated for redevelopment for profit. the ongoing and global social struggle to keep working class people in gentrified areas reflects the spatial expression of class politics in the city, and the ideological role of conservative political parties in embedding spatial inequalities. my departure from australia with a couple of small bags in 1975 took me by cargo ship to indonesia and the beginning of a long overland trek. after three months in sumatra, java and bali, having never left australia before, there was a growing sensibility to cultural difference and human similarities. having picked up some bahasa, the traces of the 1967 coup and the mass murders of leftists that had taken place less than a decade before became more evident almost everywhere i travelled. the silences were profound except where someone slipped and railed against the dead for their communist politics, chinese ethnicity, atheistic faiths, or social marginalisation. the corruption that bedevilled the society was widespread, yet the desperation of poverty gave it some perspective: a world that was composed of fierce competition for survival, yet generated enormous collaborative energy revealed in the social dimensions of every interaction. sitting with friends on the balcony of a residence for australian diplomats in jakarta, they translated for me the radio announcing the movement of indonesian volunteers into west timor, saving it from the communists and fretilin. my australian government did nothing; soon i heard the report of the deaths of the australian journalists at balibo. crossing the border into pakistan on a hot day a few months later the tone changed – as a jew i was now entering the muslim green crescent in a way that indonesia had not been. from here in the punjab the next three months would be my first time in lands where my jewish background alone would place me at a new form of risk. travelling north, however, the ‘hippy’ bus took us into islamabad after nightfall, after a long trek from amritsar, through lahore. the bus pulled up in a dark street, the driver an englishmen, hauling up the flooring, and carrying newspaper wrapped packages into a house. he returned and we headed off shakily into the darkness. he revealed that we had just smuggled pork from india to christians; probably a capital offence. from peshawar i travelled through the kyber pass into kabul, north to mazar i sharif then west again to iran experiencing the rising crescendo associated with expected return of the ayatollah homeini and the yet unexpected overthrow of the shah; then on through adventure and fright after adventure, until i reached england and found a job in bradford at the university, in the prelude to thatcherism, full of the mirpuris who had left pakistan for work in the textile mills of the city. my time in bradford led to a return to wollongong where i was engaged to establish the centre for multicultural studies. here a few people of marxist persuasion (mine was moving from karl to tendency groucho) worked to create a critical multiculturalism, informed by the struggles of ethnic and racial minorities in europe, and in my case with a much extended empathy with the extraordinary range of cultures i had encountered. the centre had a close relationship with the city and its organisations, helping to support the establishment of the migrant resource centre, while undertaking action research on issues http://www.baseline.nsw.gov.au/hpr/documents/public/241/reference/2741.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/groucho_marx cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 5 like outwork (helping in the process to change the law that had criminalised migrant women workers). in wollongong i was recruited after 1983 onto the board of the special broadcasting service (sbs), throwing me for the first time into the maelstrom of australian media politics. here someone whose experience had been community, academic and ethnic, found himself among the (moderately) heavy end of town, responsible for serious budgets, arguing real issues with significant outcomes. then came the thirty years sentence at new south wales institute of technology (which in 1989 merged with other colleges and institutes to become uts), where the cultural studies/marxist dynamic was at its height; i arrived not long after my colleagues and their students had taken the president’s desk and dumped it onto broadway. here really was the intersection of my passions – inter-disciplinarity, the concrete application of social science knowledge to real issues in social change, the tensions between materialist and idealist perspectives with which mannheim had grappled, and the opportunity to make media that conveyed my concerns. two new projects were conceived in this extraordinarily fertile environment. the first drew on my experience with sbs and the media industry and involved my colleagues from history (heather goodall), social anthropology (jeannie martin) and cultural studies (tony mitchell); we undertook what would prove to be a very timely study of racism, ethnicity and the media, just on the cusp of the internet. we were able to show how intimately implicated the media were in the structures and processes of australian society’s patterns of racism. the narratives we described reflected the hierarchies of exclusion, while the defensive protestations we reported remain still today the unconvincing voices of privilege and power. the project remains the standard work in the field, even twenty five years later. its findings still influence media industry change agents who find in its detailed engagement with aboriginal australia, gender, ethnicity and race a template against which they can test for progress. the second project became all-consuming, an exercise to document the history, sociology, politics and scholarly perspectives on the emergence of australia as a multicultural society. originally planned with a small team of partners in government and civil society to take less than a year to complete in 1990, the goal of an online interactive archive of original and curated multi-media materials continues to today, originally on cdrom, now on the internet. making multicultural australia was originally hosted by the nsw government, and is now to be found on an amazon server. it reflects for me somehow the orientation that mannheim proposed in his exploration of realities and cultures: have people explaining and advancing from their own points of view and experience how they understand the diversity with which they have been engaged, a version of standpoint theory in practice. prime ministers, premiers, bureaucrats, activists, scholars and artists all have their places, each able to be reviewed against others, the underpinning narrative reflecting different scholarship and contestations, where the audience becomes researcher. http://multiculturalaustralia.edu.au/ 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 over the past decade, in a partnership forged with sbs documentary, the influence of sociology as a system of critical reflection and exploration has been introduced into broadcast and now streaming television. here the ideas of sociology have had to be compressed into the world of ‘pitches’. the once upon a time series, a duo of multi-part documentaries, explored crime, conflict and community in suburbs the names of which had become symbolic of ethnic criminality in sydney’s inner west. cabramatta had become the centre of vietnamese refugee settlement, while punchbowl served the same function for muslim lebanese as well as the longer settled christian lebanese. ‘once upon a time in cabramatta’ (2012) builds on this simple perception, ‘in the beginning all is chaos, and the first thing to get organised is crime’. ‘once upon a time in punchbowl’ (2014) begins from the social anthropology of the mediterranean, ‘in a society of honour and shame, what happens when honour goes toxic?’ these bases provide a way of taking the ideology and utopia dynamic, in order to build an engaging but intellectually rigorous story that allows sociological perspectives to infiltrate the wider culture. while in recent years i have taken on more institutional roles, as staff representative on the council of uts (where i was signally unsuccessful in trying to have the acceptable membership of council expanded to ensure the presence of culturally diverse members) and the advisory board of the state government agency multiculturalnsw where i advanced issues of disability and lgbqti participation in multicultural priorities, the intellectual and societal challenges remain as pressing as ever. thus, in parallel with this institutional work and my continuing scholarly work, since 2011, i have written some 40 articles for the conversation, visited by some 250,000 readers. with colleagues from some five other universities we initiated the cyber racism and community resilience (cracr) project in 2012, which would report in 2017 but this time during the heart of web 2.0. frustrated by the refusal of any government body to do anything about cyber racism, the project again built on interdisciplinary methodology, with the aim of increasing both scholarly and public knowledge and impacting on policy and practice. significant submissions were made to parliamentary inquiries, using our research data to test propositions about the public acceptability of racism online. the project was chosen to be the social sciences academy contribution to the annual forum of the four academies of the royal society of nsw in 2017, delivered in government house in sydney (definitely tendency groucho). its findings and proposals continue to seep out into the wider society. ************************************************************************ could my trajectory be summarised as ‘from 1970s marxist critic to 2010s royal speaker….’? i am slightly amazed at how the consistency of my scholarly practice emerges with very little massaging of the reality. the message and the critique addressed to the forces of power remain similar, concerned with social change and the push back against uncaring power. the scholar has a brain and if fortunate, some emotional intelligence. it should be clear that the main players in this narrative remain that vast community of scholars and practitioners, whose own perspectives and insights, arguments and findings, shape and fill the sea of the people in which, as rumi would have it, i remain fortunate to swim. https://www.sbs.com.au/programs/onceuponatimein/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/the_conversation_(website) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/the_conversation_(website) 6165-article text-27737-2-10-20180726.pdf abstract keywords 1 jakubowicz attacks on indian students and the harris park protests: a consul general looks back1 amit dasgupta s.p. jain school of global management i from the end of may 2009, for about a year, academics and scholars, media, educationists, parents, students, diplomats on both sides, and the governments of india and of australia were focused on a single issue: attacks on indian students in australia. it is no exaggeration to say that the frequency and number of attacks and, in some cases, the uncalled-for viciousness, was disturbing, confusing and totally unanticipated. perhaps the single biggest failure was the collective inability of all stakeholders to anticipate the problem and to act in time. the system failure ought to have been recognised well before the keg burst. once it exploded, it overwhelmed the system like a tsunami. the intensity of the focus was largely media driven and so felt by many, including those who were not directly involved but read about it or heard it on the television news. there are accounts of australians in india who, when they disclosed their identity, were asked why indians were being beaten up in australia. an article was published in a popular indian magazine provocatively titled: why the aussies hate us. several australians i met during my tenure as the consul general in sydney said they were shamed and shocked at the events and that they went out of their way to not only say this kind of behaviour was totally unaustralian but also made special and genuine efforts to bond with indian students and to make them feel at home, through barbeque lunches and family get-togethers. i attended many 1 this is a non-refereed contribution. at the time of writing, amit dasgupta was indian consul general in sydney. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 81 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 amit dasgupta. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(3): 4659, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i3.4659 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i3.4659 of these and all the relationships that were built during that turbulent period continue to exist. this, perhaps, is the positive fallout of tragedy: not everyone subscribes to the wrong thing. the system had, however, been badly shaken. debates swirled as to whether australians were still racist, whether immigrants were undesirable or worse, whether australia was better off closing its doors. i received literally hundreds of emails every day during this period, some of which were abusive and highly racist, while others were deeply heart-warming. a part of my morning duty would be to respond to each and every email, as i felt it was the right thing to do. the racist emails were on predictable lines: why didn’t we get out of australia and, if we wished to stay, could we smell differently, dress differently, stop talking loudly, etc. the principal reason i responded personally to every email is because i believed it was important to create a dialogue, especially with the anonymous many, and to say that indians simply did not believe that australians, as a community, reject indians or any other immigrants for that matter, that this was deeply hurting the concept of multiculturalism that australia was being built upon, and that what was currently happening was rejected by the majority. i also said that i had every confidence that we would sort it out with the full support of the australian federal and state authorities. many responded to my emails and i am glad that a dialogue box was created, which permitted people to interact directly with me. one email, in particular, deeply touched me. it was brief and said that the news on the television and the conversations his parents were having about the attacks on indian students had not only deeply hurt them but that he, himself, was also very upset. he said that he wanted me to personally know that, as a young australian, he was not ‘like that’. he added that he had many indian friends and that he loved the time he spent with them and that one day he would like to visit india. the person who wrote the email was ten years old. to my mind, it was the strongest rejection of the shrill coverage, at least on one prominent tv channel in india, proposing that australians were, as a nation, racist and hated indians. having said this, there were challenges, and this paper attempts to look back on the successful handling of the situation by the government, especially in the states of new south wales and south australia, where i had the privilege of being the consul general of india. this paper approaches the problem [attacks on indian students] essentially from a management perspective [how should the situation be managed?]. how do you co-opt 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 subscribers [win friends]? how do you counteract others? what should be the communication strategy? whom do you talk to? how do you create confidence when it is waning rapidly? at what point in time do you start negotiating? ii to understand the problem, it would be useful to briefly consider the background and the context. the indian education system was proving to be increasingly inadequate to cater to the huge demand from a rapidly growing young population, hungry for the education and skills that would be necessary for finding employment. the failure to obtain admission to educational institutions became a major push factor for young indians to seek education abroad, both in the higher education space and in vocational training. indeed, by 2009, barely three years after a concerted programme was initiated to attract indian students, australia had emerged as their number one choice. the bulk of the indian students were in victoria, with the second largest concentration in new south wales. while a small number were enrolled in university courses, the majority were pursuing education in the vocational education and training (vet) sector. estimates suggest that the indian students alone contributed a little under a$5 billion, out of a total revenue of approximately a$19 billion earned from overseas students by the australian education sector. this was, indeed, good business. one principal reason behind the escalated interest in australia was the genuine belief among international students that studying in australia would result in permanent residency (pr). this made australia an attractive destination. as a result, a number of dodgy schools sprouted like mushrooms to take advantage of the influx of indian and other international students. the majority of these schools had inadequate facilities and were clearly established only as business ventures. they cut corners, compromised on quality of teachers and of teaching facilities, took advantage of gaps in the education system, exploited the students, and prospered. another ogre joined in the exploitation: illegal migration agents. they had a field day making false promises of permanent residency to the international student community on payment of large sums of money for which no receipts were ever issued. caught in a bind, the students found themselves helplessly trapped. they were all in too much financial debt to return to their home country and so most opted for staying on and trying their luck. there was also a cultural issue involved. at the time they left their villages in india to come to study in australia and, more importantly, to migrate, they had been proudly seen off by their families, their peer groups and their friends. they were showcased cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 83 as the ones who had made it. their parents had sold whatever they could and taken huge loans to fund their future. it was now a matter of izzat or prestige. it was simply not possible for them to return home with nothing to show. that would have been a huge loss of face, not only for them personally but also for their families. they had to give their all to survive. as a result, the majority of the students lived and worked within the trap they found themselves in. they worked longer hours than were permitted under the law and at wages far below what was stipulated by the government; their refusal to do so would have resulted in their starving and in not being able to pay the rent. with a sudden influx of hungry hard-working youngsters into the job market, the market value of wages fell. wages were paid only in cash. it is a matter of record that several of the attacks against indians were carried out late at night when they were returning home with cash in their pockets. some restaurants and small shops depended on the availability of cheap, hard-working labour. this was the third ogre that was born. very often, there was a nexus between all three. meanwhile, the existing australian system itself came under a severe stress across multiple sectors, including transport and housing. indeed, the housing shortage was so critical that often several students shared the same apartment, against all housing laws, and lived in pathetic squalor. some even had to go through what came to be known as ‘hot beds’, where a person was allowed to use a bed (ie sleep) for only a certain number of hours after which it was vacated for the next occupant. recognising this, several institutions of higher learning embarked on massive projects to increase student accommodation and thereby ensure not only decent accommodation but also security and safety. but, apart from these very basic requirements, the system was also confronted by a severe cultural or multicultural challenge that it was simply not prepared for. i recall an incident at harris park, which i would frequent during the problem period, and which had a concentration of indian nationals. an elderly lebanese with whom i had struck up a friendship told me that when the lebanese came they ousted the greeks, who were long-term residents in the area. greek newspapers and restaurants disappeared and the lebanese took over. now, he says, it is impossible to find a lebanese newspaper, as the people who run all the stores are either from india or from bangladesh. simon had a sense of humour. he told me that these days he is a fan of bollywood films and hopes to be able to meet the indian film actress madhuri dixit someday. 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 the seriousness of the cultural shock merits emphasis. there have been complaints, for instance, that indians talk constantly on the train, that they talk loudly, and worse, when they meet fellow indians, they talk only in their native language. all of this was quite alien to the native australian. a kindly and elderly australian lady once recounted to me, with a sense of nostalgia, how the area she had lived in since she was a child once had only aussie butchers, fresh fish shops, grocery stores, restaurants and bookstores and how, today, they have all given way to chinese, indian and vietnamese restaurants, and bangladeshi corner stores. she didn’t say so with a sense of sadness but with a sort of acceptance of how things have changed so much. when the government opened the gates of australia to attract international students, they simply failed to anticipate all of the above. even government departments, such as those of immigration and education, failed to talk to one another. as a result, dodgy colleges were able to accommodate far more students than they were officially licenced to. education departments did not have enough inspectors to visit the colleges to see if they were operating in accordance with the norms. and the rot took root and thrived. however, within a year of the spate of attacks that reached its zenith in may-june of 2009, with the horrific attack on shravan kumar theerthale in melbourne, where he was stabbed in the head with a screwdriver, and the petrol-bombing case in harris park, indian students coming to australia for studies fell by forty-eight per cent. the bubble had burst. intense discussions took place at a government-to-government level between india and australia. the australian government itself recognised that unless system corrections were urgently introduced, australia’s image, both among its own people and abroad, could be severely damaged. sadly, on occasion you need a problem to recognise that there is a problem. several measures have since been introduced and there is recognition now that such corrections are not a static process but need to be regular and constantly monitored. there is also increasing recognition that multiculturalism holds huge advantages for australia but, for it to truly succeed, immigration policies should not only be seen as the regulation of the entry of non-australians but their integration into the cultural landscape. institutions like the community relations commission, for instance, would accordingly need to be strengthened. it is now widely acknowledged that while the government and the police in new south wales and south australia were proactive and swift, this sense of urgency was simply not apparent cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 85 in victoria. there were clear examples of victorian police trying to underplay attacks. the remark by the then victorian police commissioner that indians could avoid getting attacked if they looked and behaved poor was publicly condemned in australia and elsewhere as being inappropriate and in extremely poor taste. the commissioner glibly responded that he meant it as a joke. new south wales, on the other hand, stood apart from victoria on all counts. nathan rees, as the then premier, convened an emergency meeting as early as june 2009 to put together a mechanism by which safety, security and the welfare of the international student community, in particular indian students, would be ensured. the police were tasked with working in close consultation with the indian consulate and a mechanism of regular briefings was put in place. when kristina keneally took over as premier of new south wales, she endorsed the measures of her predecessor and agreed to strengthen mechanisms further, wherever and whenever necessary. the new south wales opposition, under barry o’farrell, played a hugely positive role, liaising with the police, the indian consulate and the student community, and offering full support. in south australia, in an extraordinary gesture, the then premier mike rann personally wrote to the parents of each and every indian student studying in his state, assuring them of his personal commitment to the safety, security and welfare of their children. the success achieved in new south wales and south australia in ensuring that the problem was contained is owed entirely to the role played by politicians of both parties. without political support, there would have been no success story. this then, was the overall, albeit over-simplified, context in which the attacks on indian students need to be viewed. iii many consider the handling of the harris park demonstrations as a turning point and a success story in new south wales. it was, indeed, a turning point for multiple reasons: first, it established a clear and collaborative relationship between the consulate and all other new south wales stakeholders; second, it gave the resident community in the harris park area a sense of confidence in the consulate’s ability to deliver; third, it helped establish a more open and dialogue-based relationship between the community and the local police; and fourth, it demonstrated that problems could be resolved through trust and dialogue. on the 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 recommendation of the new south wales government, the harris park story became an australia and new zealand school of government (anzsog) case study in leadership. briefly, on 8 june, members of the indian community in harris park gathered and staged a demonstration to express their angst at what they perceived as police inefficiency. a resident in harris park had been a victim of a petrol-bombing incident on 23 may. early june saw several instances of verbal abuse and taunting of indians, particularly women, by other ethnic community members living in the area. there were also instances of rotten eggs being thrown at indians. complaints to the local police, they believed, were not being taken seriously. by then, a huge demonstration had taken place in melbourne by indian students protesting the violent attacks on indian students and complaining of police apathy. the harris park demonstration in sydney was an attempt at repeating the melbourne demonstration. on june 8th, around 150 demonstrators gathered in harris park and shouted slogans. the police stood by and watched and did not try to stop the demonstration. by and large, the demonstration was noisy but peaceful; slogans were shouted but there was no violence. the following day numbers had swelled to almost 400 and events soon got out of control, with some demonstrators throwing garbage bins on the streets, while others spoke of providing vigilante-type security to community members, since the local police were unable to do so. the local police informed them that if there were a third night of demonstrations they would take action by making arrests. the anzsog study details how all stakeholders successfully managed the situation thereafter. it is important to know why the demonstrations occurred in the first instance. you can address a problem only after you have fully understood it. partial knowledge or an incorrect appreciation will not help in finding a solution. while inspiration was indeed derived from the demonstrations in melbourne, the sydney demonstrations were not entirely motivated by the tauntings or the perceptions of physical insecurity but rather were an expression of utter frustration and helplessness over a cluster of issues: poor housing, false promises, inadequate finances, a dodgy education system, massive exploitation, and a sense of hopelessness with regard to the future. indeed, the demonstrations were a strong symbolic representation of the deep loneliness and angst that the indian student community was going through. when i and my colleague, gautam roy, who headed the consular wing in the consulate, met with large numbers of the demonstrators on the morning of 10 june, their story was agonising. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 87 the taunts and the jibes and the rotten egg attacks they were subjected to on a daily basis only reflected, in their mind, how unwanted they were in australia. they took it as a total rejection by the australian community. overtly, while they protested police apathy, it was a complaint and angst against a system which seemed to have disowned and abandoned them. they believed they were trapped and had nowhere left to turn. i realised that, unless gautam and i understood and communicated this emphatically, we would not succeed in voicing their concerns and thereby seeking a pathway to a solution. at this critical moment, they needed a lifeline and the resurrection of hope. this was lesson one. thereafter we met with a large number of the other stakeholders, in particular the police, elected representatives, restaurants and business establishments in the area, and, more importantly, the lebanese community, who were the long-term residents. we needed to know what their views were. lesson two was to co-opt everyone in the dialogue and consultation process. lesson three was to prioritise the stakeholders. some are less important than others. the restaurants and shopkeepers, for instance, many of whom were indian, were only interested in the revenue they were losing as a result of the demonstrations and also worried that, if the situation got out of hand, the students, who were being exploited and paid less than minimum wages by them, would file formal complaints with the police and other government agencies. this could trigger serious problems for them. i realised that while it was important to know their point of view, there was no need to make it a pressing concern in finding out how the demonstration issue could be addressed over the next few hours. and time was, indeed, of the essence. on the third lesson, let me also say that the lebanese community was seriously concerned, now that the consulate was involved, as to whether the compromise solution arrived at would disadvantage them or project them in a negative light. we realised that without their support, any solution would be fragile. as a result, gautam and i decided to make our temporary office in a lebanese restaurant at harris park. all meetings were held there, at the tables and chairs, outdoors and in full view of spectators. i gave my word to the lebanese elders that under no circumstances would i endorse any criticism against their community, and i gave my commitment to work with them solidly through the entire process. the elders were as taken aback as were the indians that our camp office was in a lebanese restaurant and not in the indian restaurant across the road. i believe it won many friends among the lebanese community and thus their support. so, lesson three, further amplified, would be: never 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 ignore an important stakeholder or make them feel they would be used as a bargaining chip. win them to your side. the print and visual media were already swarming in harris park, hungry to report on what might happen that night and if the police were likely to resort to making arrests, as was widely expected. in situations where the media are around, it is fascinating to watch the number of people who are happy to line up to give interviews and share their analysis of the situation. very often, these people have little contribution to make towards finding a solution and their minute in the sun is all they are interested in. like scavengers, they revel in situations like this. both gautam and i took a conscious decision not to interact with the media and, in any case, we had nothing to say at that stage. but it also taught us another lesson: too many people, with nothing to do directly with the issues at hand, were keen to become spokespersons. so, lesson four: learn whom you need to keep out. gautam and i decided that everyone outside of harris park would be kept out. this aggrieved many. i recall how many unhappy and disgruntled persons criticised us severely for having kept them out of ‘the success story’. i believed then and i believe now that our decision was the right one. we needed to find a solution, not to politicise the situation. interestingly, our decision to exclude outsiders was fully endorsed by the student community in harris park. the meeting with local area police commander, robert redfern, was critical. we needed to be on the same page. we had never met before and, if the attempt at rapport failed, police action would ensue that evening. the situation could have turned extremely messy and serious violence was not to be ruled out. there were reports that some of the indian demonstrators had hockey sticks and cricket bats with them. gautam and i had a general idea of what we could negotiate on because of the several rounds of discussion we had already had with various stakeholders. we knew that robert was an outstanding police officer with an impeccable record, but neither gautam nor i knew him personally. we were confident that the police, in any eventuality, would prefer to avoid a violent clash and that they too would hope for an amicable resolution. furthermore, robert had already had exposure to a similar situation in the cronulla riots, which were a serious and extremely violent clash between a community and the police. he would obviously prefer to avoid a repeat scenario and, more importantly, he had learnt many lessons from the cronulla incidents which could prove to be useful. as i walked into robert’s office that 10 june morning i believed that we would be on the same page. i was not wrong. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 89 robert was firm. i expected nothing else. he told me that if there were another night of demonstrations and if, like the previous night, it started getting out of hand, he would have no option but to ask his force to act. we requested his support for time to be able to negotiate and to try and stop the demonstrations. i said ‘stop’ and not ‘defer’ because it had to be nonnegotiable: the demonstrations could not continue and the grievances had to be addressed. so we tabled a series of grievances that the community had and asked if these could be addressed. robert was most forthcoming. he assured us that if there were lapses in police efficiency, he was committed to correcting them. he also said that the police were not enemies and that it was important for the community members to feel confident to walk up to the police station with their grievances. when we left robert’s office that afternoon, i knew i had a friend and an ally. he walked out with us to our parked car. this was a powerful public diplomacy gesture, as members of the indian and other communities could see us shaking hands and reported back to others. lesson five: co-opt the most important stakeholder in your game plan. without his support, the plan will fail. more importantly, make sure everyone knows he is on your side. so, what was the plan? the end objective was to not only stop the demonstrations but to also address the concerns of the community. this meant that we needed to break the ice with the community (we had done so), to make the other major community in the region feel they were not going to become the target as a result of our negotiations (we had conveyed this) and to get the police to respond to the grievances of the community (we had conveyed this and obtained the police commander’s assurances on this). was this enough to stop the demonstrations? gautam and i talked about it and our view was that the solution lay in a face-to-face meeting between the community and the police and, possibly, the local and state government representatives. it was important that all sides met and heard each other directly and not through intermediaries. this was lesson six: parties to a conflict must negotiate face to face and directly. we proposed the convening of such a meeting at the town hall (the symbol of democratic power), to openly enter into a mutually acceptable ‘agreement’. this was not going to be easy. to arrange it we met with the lord mayor, toni issa. toni is a lebanese but with very strong indian family connections. he was deeply distressed at the demonstrations and the bad press the parramatta area and harris park, which was his jurisdiction, were receiving. i believe he was among the most outstanding persons i met at 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 that very dark hour. i shared with toni details with regard to all the various meetings we had had since the morning, including the list of demands from the police and the community. toni was not entirely convinced that he was going to be able to deliver on the demands made by the community, such as improved lighting near the rail track, cctv cameras, enhanced police patrolling and so on, as most of it was going to require considerable budgetary allocations. but, like robert, he too wanted the demonstrations to end. so he agreed to the town hall meeting and, more importantly, to chair it. it was scheduled for 5 o’clock that afternoon but there was still worry about the kind of media coverage that would follow if the discussions collapsed. it is important to mention at this stage the role that was played by another outstanding person, stepan kerkasharian. as the chair of the community relations commission in new south wales, he had also been tasked with the issue of the attacks on indian students. stepan is himself an immigrant and has close links with india; he proved to be a huge asset and the role he played would be difficult to quantify. at the time the meeting was to take place, word was received that robert redfern was averse to participating. i realised that without robert, the talks would have no value. stepan spoke with robert and we realised that robert’s principal concern was the presence of media. this was easy to solve: we decided to keep the media out. and so, lesson seven: know when to get the media in and when to keep them out. we didn’t want publicity. all we needed was to get the job done. efforts at seeking interviews with me were politely declined on the grounds that i had, at present, nothing to say. with that hurdle out of the way, the meeting took place. suffice it to say that it was successful. both parties met, they talked, they pulled down barriers, they built bridges of confidence. the demonstrations were called off and the police delivered on all their promises, as indeed did the local government. one of the big lessons this taught all of us is that, more often than not, the real problem lies in our inability to sit across the table with one another and talk. this helps us to share our misgivings and our concerns. we have fixed perceptions and refuse to budge from positions we take. on the other hand, once we are able to talk, several problems can actually be resolved. lesson eight: listen to the other person’s point of view; never refuse to talk. the successful handling of the harris park incident created a special relationship between the consulate, stepan, robert and myself. with toni issa, i developed a warm friendship. the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 91 management of the harris park demonstrations created trust, which is the basis of teamwork. much of what was achieved in new south wales derived from the harris park success story. iv there were several other lessons i learnt during this period. briefly, these are as follows: 1. perceptions matter. this can be a real problem because all of us have a view about everything and we protect our view. we refuse to see any other point of view which contradicts our perceptions. our blinkered view becomes the lens through which we see everything: indians talk too loudly, the police are unfriendly, australians love to hate us, the lebanese don’t want indians in their neighbourhood. perceptions need to be addressed and should not be ignored. 2. create trust. never make promises that you are unable to deliver upon. once you let a person down, it is an uphill task to win back trust. work as a team and learn to see all points of view and not just push your own. 3. stay focussed on what you are negotiating and ensure that successful negotiation means that both sides must have takeaways. success can never be for one party alone. if you leave the other party empty handed, the battle is not over and you will need to revisit the issue again and again. mutual benefit is the way to go. loss of face is a nobrainer. 4. never lose focus after the success. it is important to follow through and to visibly demonstrate continued interest. always stay in touch because it reflects that you are genuinely interested in seeing things through. 5. communication channels should always remain open. speak to everyone, listen to everyone. you will never know what you missed until it is too late. 6. not everything you hear is true. be mindful of rumours. in the harris park incident, rumours were constantly floated about persons having been kidnapped or having been killed. don’t believe everything you hear. 7. never underestimate the power of the mobile phone. in today’s day and age, everyone has a mobile phone and all mobile phones come with a camera. before you know it, news spreads. the sms can be misused to spread rumours. 8. be selective about whom you involve in finding the solution. everyone will want to be on the bandwagon of success and to suggest solutions. be selective because not everyone is likely to be a constructive ally or partner. 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 attacks on indian students and the harris park protests: a consul general looks back0f cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 1 2017 © 2017jacob mati. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: mati, j. 2017. emergence of inter-identity alliances in struggles for transformation of the kenyan constitution. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(1), 77-97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i 1.5284 issn 1837-5391 published by uts epress https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/jo urnals/index.php/mcs refereed paper emergence of inter-identity alliances in struggles for transformation of the kenyan constitution jacob mwathi mati school of social sciences, the university of the south pacific (fiji), & society, work and development institute (swop), the university of the witwatersrand, johannesburg, south africa. corresponding author: jacob mwathi mati, school of social sciences, faculty of arts, law and education (fale), the university of the south pacific, private mail bag, suva, fiji. jacob.mati@gmail.com doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.5284 abstract struggles for transformation of the kenyan constitution brought into alliances disparate movements from below, sections of middleclass, and factions of political, economic and religious elites, in challenging the government. the emergence of these alliances presents useful cases for examining the dynamic relationship and politics between these movements, and also for probing social movement theory. specifically, given the centrality of identity consciousness in movements, how were intrinsic class, religious, gender, generational and ethnic identity interests, contestations and cleavages overcome to enable inter-identity alliances in these struggles? more critically, how relevant are the dominant social movement theories in explaining this phenomenon? is theoretical straightjacketing useful for analysing movements with such diversity? drawing from in-depth interviews and existing literature on kenyan constitutional reform struggles, this paper illustrates how alliances between the different identities and movements were forged to allow for a common struggle. the paper further illustrates that while political opportunity structures explain certain aspects of this phenomenon, framing, civic education and community organising strategies were critical enablers for collective identity formation. keywords constitution reform struggles; inter-class alliance; inter-identity alliance; political opportunity; framing; civic education; community organising; collective identity; kenya declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the university of the witwatersrand provided support for this research through a national research foundation funded postdoctoral research fellowship at swop. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.5284 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.5284 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:jacob.mati@gmail.com http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.5284 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 introduction struggles for transformation of the kenyan constitution took a series of waves of contention from early 1990s culminating in a new constitution in august 2010. these contentions were characterised by a duality of unity and fragmentation of different actors, resulting in moments of progressive actions but also inertia in addition to political violence, as was the case around the 1992, 1997 and 2007 elections. in moments of unity, these struggles brought into alliances, disparate protest movements of the poor, sections of middleclass, as well as political, economic and religious elites, in pushing for reforms. such alliances resulted in movements such as citizens coalition for constitutional change (4cs), the national convention assembly/national convention executive council (nca/ncec), and the ufungamano initiative, which exhibited both vertical and horizontal networks of relationships between different actors. dominant theories of contentious politics presuppose that divergences in the socioeconomic background of the claimants, coupled with their subjective identity consciousness stymies the possibility of inter-identity movements emerging. moreover, even when alliances between movements from below and those of middle classes emerge, resultant struggles cannot necessarily have a common coherent storyline and are beset with principlesetting challenges. in addition, literature on interclass relations reminds us that alliances between movements from below and middleclass activists are problematic, fragile and mostly short lived (see for example gurney 1994; alves 1989; clark 2004; mati 2012a; 2012b; 2015). the fragility of interclass alliances is accentuated by co-optation and patronage and therefore, the neutering of the agenda of the lower classes, or working-class interests are consistent and systematically bypassed or pushed aside by the middle-class in order to maintain a united program and front (alves 1989). this fragility is further a product of the inconsistency of the attitudes of the middleclass towards the lower classes (clark 2004; mati 2015). specifically, as has been shown in the analysis of the ambiguous relationship of movements from below and middleclass activists in kenya’s constitutional reform struggles, the middleclass leadership of these movements always embraced the less threatening alternatives each time a crisis was created by violent demonstrations in support of calls for reforms (see for example, mati 2012a; 2012b; 2015; mutunga 1999). given these cleavages, participation in social movements mostly ‘occurs along homogeneous networks and this tends to reproduce the homogeneity of a movement’ and networks of horizontal class-based movements (clark 2004, p.27). against such odds alliances across different ethnic, gender, generational and class identities did emerge and led to the crystallisation of a constitutional reform movement in kenya from the early 1990s. this movement had extraordinary mass appeal, especially among the urban poor, and a complex politics of inter-ethnic, religious, gender, generational and class relations (mati 2012a; 2012b). the multiple identity-based alliances in the kenyan constitution movement presents an interesting case for examining dynamic relationships between the various dimensions of these movements from below and middleclass formations cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 79 (sometimes with the support of factions of different elite groups) in these struggles. the empirical questions are: what necessitated these alliances? how did they evolve? moreover, given the centrality of subjective identity consciousness in movements, how were intrinsic class, ethnic, gender, religious and generational identity interest cleavages overcome to enable alliances between different identities in these struggles? these alliances also raise pertinent questions for probing social movement theory. specifically, critics charge that existing social movement theories, being products of euroamerican academies, reflect the sociology of knowledge of wherever they are developed (buechler 2000). how relevant then are theories rooted in western social realities in studying african struggles? more so, is theoretical straightjacketing useful for analysing movements with diverse class, ethnic, gender, religious, and generational identities and interests? this paper attempts to answer these questions. specifically, it aims to trace how alliances between the different actors became a reality. as such, while references will be made to what happened after these alliances were in place, that is not the primary objective. the paper is part of a larger study on the struggles for constitution reforms in kenya whose data was collected from several urban and rural sites across kenya through in-depth interviews, field observations and reviews of mass media reports. the sample for in-depth interviews included civil society activists, politicians, religious leaders, community leaders, community organisers, commissioners and bureaucrats of the constitution review commissions and ordinary citizens involved in the constitution reform contentions. these indepth interviews and field observations were conducted in three rounds (i.e. september and october 2009; march and april 2010 and finally march and april 2013). methodologically, the paper employs an eclectic mix of theoretical explanations (including political opportunity, framing, and collective identity theories) for the origins of kenyan constitutional reform contentions and their inter-identity alliance character. specifically, it is argued that while the structure of political opportunity and constraints accounts for emergence of these movements, the social construction-inspired framing and collective identity formation approaches explain the emergence of cross-class, ethnic, religious, generational and gender identity alliances in them. framing, it will be shown, was employed by activists in the kenyan constitution change struggles through mass civic education and community organising strategies of the 1990s in constructing a social category of state-oppressed citizens (irrespective of social status, gender, religion and ethnicity). this made intelligent connections between disparate struggles, and called for aggregation of resources through alliances to overcome specific identity-based frailties in challenging the state. nonetheless, framing and community organising, as this case confirms, are conditioned by the prevailing political opportunities as well as by other structural constrains in society. in the kenyan case, these societal conditioners included ethnic, class, religious, gender and generational cleavages, which, in return, made these alliances fragile (mati 2012b). 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 approaches utilising multiple theoretical explanations have been charged with conceptual poaching.1 however, the benefits of this approach for the current project are twofold. first, there are multiple limitations of applying any of the approaches separately as none can explain the overall dynamics in the generation of these alliances. at the same time, the dearth of theory from the south, and the allure of some universalism of social theories irrespective of where they are produced, means that creative deployment of certain aspects of theories generated in north american or european academies continues to offer valuable starting points for analysis of social movements in southern contexts. indeed, this is a growing feature of scholarship, even in studies of african protest movements (see for example, mamdani and wamba-dia-wamba 1995). this approach challenges straightjacketing of studies of african movements ‘within the boundaries of conceptions borrowed from a different context, and thus arrived at in a priori fashion’ (mamdani 1995, p.8). in what follows, i explain how the concept of class is deployed in this paper. this is followed by a sketch of the key theoretical postulations utilised in the paper, beginning with the political opportunity theory. this is followed by an illustration of the limits of the political opportunity theory in explaining the cohering of alliances across different identity groups in these struggles. this limitation, i argue, is redressed by looking at the role played by framing, civic education and community organising in generating alliances between the different struggles. class as an identity in kenyan constitutional reform movement at the core of the classic marxist conception of class is the notion of a society stratified through asymmetrical accumulation, and an individual’s class is determined by his/her position in the economic production process. in this paper, however, the conception of class is informed by pierre bourdieu’s (1984) proposition that in contemporary capitalist societies, class is based on differentiations in volume of access to and levels of actors’ accumulation of three forms of capital: economic (money capital, commodities), social (social connections), and cultural (education, status, ranks, titles) (fuchs 2005). for bourdieu (1984: 114) the primary differences between major classes ‘derive from the overall volume of capital, understood as the set of actually usable resources and powers…’ the social position and power of an actor depends on the volume and composition of capital (i.e. the relative relationship of the three forms of capital) that he/she owns and can mobilize. this conception of class allows a fuller understanding of the differentiations of classes (fuchs 2005), not just on the basis of economic capital, but also social and cultural capital in contemporary kenya. 1 this involves ‘appropriating the language and issues of a different paradigm and incorporating them as minor theme in a preexisting paradigm that undergoes no fundamental change in the process’ (buechler 2000, p.53). since it was first articulated in late 1970s, the political opportunity theory has employed such conceptual poaching in responding to its criticism. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 81 emergence of kenyan constitution change struggles: political opportunity explanation while different theoretical explanations have been advanced on why and how social movements emerge, the political opportunity model is chosen as the most appropriate theoretical explanation of the emergence of the constitutional change struggles in kenya because of its state centric nature. specifically, as was the case in these constitutional reform struggles, the political opportunity model postulates that the state is a movement’s primary antagonist. developed in the american academy, political opportunity theory emphasizes ‘opening and closing of political space’ in explaining how movements emerge to secure concessions and rights from powerful nation states in democratic contexts (gamson and meyer 1996, p.277). movements, according to this theory, are part of the ever-present political processes and organisations in modern democratic pluralistic societies, which compete over interests in trying to modify political institutions in their favour (tilly 1984; 1978; mccarthy and zald 1977; 1973). as such, social movements are extensions of politics by other means (tilly, 1984). political opportunities are conditions in the environment that favour or repress social movement activity. they include the degree of receptivity or vulnerability of the political system to organised protest groups, ‘relative accessibility of the political system, the stable or fragmented alignments among elites, the presences of elite allies, and the state’s capacity and propensity for repression’ (garrett 2006, p.204). for proponents of this theory, social movements are generated if there is sufficient organisation and mobilisation of resources to utilise existing political opportunities (mcadam 1982; voss and williams 2012). such resources include leadership and other ‘capabilities or objects that can be used to enhance or maintain power’ (gamson and meyer 1996, p.282). resources intersect with political context and movement’s strategic choices (and consequences) in shaping movements. the political opportunities that ignited contemporary kenyan state reform movement are traceable to ruling elite fragmentation, which peaked in the early 1990s. specifically, the moi/kanu state imploded after a faction of alienated wealthy political elites joined hands with the middleclass groups in calling for reforms to save the country from deepening dictatorship (mati 2012b). prior to this, there had been a dominant, albeit fragile, hegemonic elite faction who had ruled kenya since independence from britain in 1963. to understand the implosion of this elite faction, i offer below, a recapitulation of political developments in post-colonial kenya. the kenyan anti-colonial struggles, were underwritten by an inter-ethnic, generational and class alliance movement, which exploited existing racial antagonisms to rally african unity against the minority but economically and politically dominant white colonial elite. this movement, however, was plagued by serious contradictions emanating from conflicting visions of the purposes of state power once independence was achieved. the peasant subalterns for example, hoped that their most important grievance – access to land – would be addressed by the post-colonial state. on the other hand, the careerist african elites did not question the structural edifice of colonialism and its domination and hoped to acquire undiluted state power as a means of continued dominance. notwithstanding these 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 contradictions, the convergence of various classes and ethnicities into an anticolonial struggle illustrates that identity is both socially constructed and transient. nonetheless, as has been observed of such interclass alliances elsewhere (cf. alves 1989; dwyer & zeilig, 2012), due to the aforementioned contradictions, the ‘peasant-elite alliance outlived its usefulness as soon as it compelled [white] foreigners to hand over dominance to local brokers: the african elite’ (njoya n.d., p.3). thereafter, intransigence of elite interests resulted in differential benefits of ‘independence’ for different classes. further, ideological and later inter-ethnic tensions emerged within the dominant elite group precipitating numerous constitutional changes engineered by president jomo kenyatta so as consolidate power and checkmate his deputy, oginga odinga, and his allies. as a result of these developments, instead of transforming the fundamental contradictions of domination embedded in colonialism, decolonisation became a process of supplanting white dominant minority with a minority but dominant african elite. instead of delivering material and symbolic benefits for the masses, the postcolonial elite who inherited state power resorted to misrule and executive excesses, and irredeemably mutilated the interethnic and class covenant that had underwritten the anticolonial struggle. since then, class and ethnic fragmentations and fragility of the dominant kikuyu and later kalenjin ethnocracy has been the defining character of post-independent kenya's socioeconomic and political relations. this fragility was a result of profound disillusionment of the poor masses with the outcomes of independence. thereafter class and ethnicity became instruments for demobilisation of anticolonial movement by the dominant elite coalition, but also the basis for new mobilisations by those opposed to the dominant kikuyu ethnocracy. the oppositionist elite faction in kenya, as elsewhere in africa, was replete with similar contradictions as the dominant elite coalition; they identified the problems of independence but could not resolve their contradictions. in most instances, they held back the demands of their supporters, often switching popular anger on and off when it suited their interests (dwyer & zeilig, 2012). the fragility of the dominant elite became especially accentuated after kenyatta (a kikuyu) died in 1978 and daniel arap moi (his deputy, a kalenjin) took over. the 1980s were characterised by intensification of intra-elite antagonisms fuelled by moi’s attempt to end kikuyu elite dominance by among other things, undermining their perceived economic hegemony. moi’s tools of trade combined neopatrimonialism, oppression of political competitors and critics, and ‘mass line populism’ (currie and ray 1984, p.570). these threatened to ‘erode the financial status of both the middle and lower class’ (press 2004, p.105). what happened next challenges the structural determinism advanced by political opportunity theory especially its postulation that social movements emerge to take advantage of existing political opportunities within a democratic state (tilly 1984; mcadam 1982; goodwin and jasper 2004). instead, the kenyan case illustrates, as among others gamson and meyer (1996) chan and zhou (2009) and meyer and staggenborg (1996) argue, opportunities cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 83 can be produced, created or magnified even in restrictive conditions. this depends, as we shall see shortly, on cognitive and interpretative processes. for the case at hand, resistance led by the student-intelligentsia and movements of the landless masses emerged. the struggles of the landless masses were fuelled by grievances against the regimes’ land distribution policy that, through neopatrimonialism, favoured elites and sections of supporters while majority of the masses remained landless (currie and ray 1986; 1984; kanogo 1987; furedi 1989). their grievances intensified to a point where in june 1982 some squatters moved to occupy some large farms, in effect, threatening the landed elite interests (currie and ray 1986). on their part, the struggles of the students-intelligentsia were directed against the repressive activities of the government especially after the constitution amendment act no. 7 of june 9, 1982 that made kenya a de jure one party state. this eroded whatever had remained of basic democratic rights like free speech, assembly and association (currie and ray 1986; 1984). a leading kenyan human rights lawyer reflects on this time: the moi/kanu rule became so brutal that the difference between right and wrong was so clear. there was no longer any grey area in between. this was the sentiment that the middleclass groups used to mobilise popular opinion on the need for reforms so as to curtail the excesses of moi’s absolute and brutal powers. (ndubi, interview 24/09/2009) moi’s excesses were first tested on august 1, 1982, when a section of the kenya air force with tacit support of university students and the intelligentsia, attempted a coup against his regime, citing deteriorating economy, runaway corruption, and shrinking democratic space (mbingu 1991). the failed coup had a tremendous effect on the political environment, resulting in constrained opportunities for protest as moi clamped down on his perceived critics, detaining many without trial while many others fled into exile. rather than constraining dissent, underground movements of university students and intelligentsia such as mwakenya emerged. more importantly, the actions of the regime further alienated the middleclass and bred conditions that dispersed discontent to hitherto apolitical classes, especially lawyers and religious leaders. the legal fraternity, which had thus far maintained studious silence, was unquieted after the regime begun harassing lawyers who dared represent arrested dissidents. in the words of a kenyan constitutional law scholar turned politician, kivutha kibwana, from then on, ‘there was no more law to practice’ as they became economically and socially vulnerable forcing them to mobilise to oppose these developments. by late 1980s, the law society of kenya (lsk) was not only firmly embedded in the pro-change movement, but also played a key role in diffusion of the change agenda and in catalysing both intra-class and inter-class alliances as well as mobilising across ethnicities and gender. the role played by women lawyers through the federation of women lawyers (fida-kenya) from mid 1980s, as we shall shortly see, exemplifies this. 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 political opportunity in the form of elite fragmentation was also aided by the structural conditions of austerity of the structural adjustment programmes from late 1980s which reduced resources available for maintaining patronage leaving the regime more vulnerable. moi resorted to giving his political clients excised public land, forests and road reserves. nonetheless these measures were inadequate to arrest the increasing tide of precarity and the destruction of the middleclass who resorted to fighting these threatening developments. in addition, as if on cue, subaltern groups started encroaching into the very public land that moi was dishing out. this put the legal value of land title deeds under threat. to guarantee returns to political cronies, the regime resorted to forceful eviction of squatters. while some discontented groups of the poor utilised their grievances to mobilise against the moi/kanu state, others took advantage of opportunities offered by the existing patronage system of the single party era. specifically, the labour used in these evictions was provided by poor urban youth who had been recruited into militias such as kanu youth wingers that had become the ‘single most important "security organ" for the party, working alongside the formal state security’ (kanyinga and njoka 2002, p.90). while the kanu youth wingers were segmented along class lines, a majority were school drops outs, sons and daughters of rural peasants, of homeless, landless slum dwelling squatters who were unemployed and subsisting on 3d jobs (dirty, degrading and dangerous jobs). they took their youth winger jobs in order to appease their patrons to guarantee continued favour. the other end of the kanu youth wingers spectrum were the elite entrepreneurial young men eager to use the state to accumulate wealth and political power. this elite wing later constituted the youth for kanu (yk '92), which became singularly instrumental in the disbursement of patronage resources to mobilise support for president moi and kanu in general in the 1992 elections after the re-introduction of multi-partyism (kanyinga and njoka 2002, p.90). among the rewards for these petty bourgeoisie cronies were state land, most of it already occupied by landless squatters, further aggravating tensions due to continued evictions. the anger of the urban landless masses against widespread evictions and systematically corrupt and exclusionary land distribution policies led to the emergence of muungano wa wanavijiji in mid 1990s as a movement of dwellers of the burgeoning informal settlements in nairobi. one of muungano wa wanavijiji’s founding leaders explained the conditions that led to its emergence: the small businesses we run here [toy-kibera] were always exploited by the provincial [public] administration officers …. the land where our business stalls are built was said to be owned by a private individual and there were evictions happening every time. even when the president gave order for some public land to be given to hawkers for the construction of the kibera hawkers market, the allocations were done by the provincial administration in a very corrupt manner. we mobilised ourselves, to resist the evictions and such corruption (rema, interview 22/03/2010). despite the emergence of opposition from as early as the 1980s, struggles against the state (arguably, with exception of the student and intelligentsia whose mobilisations cut across ethnic, gender and class lines) remained divided between everyday bread and butter cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 85 existential struggles of the poor masses and those of the middleclass that centred on challenging the rule of the game to ensure even access to state power by wider elites and middleclass. moreover, different social formations and ethnicities continued to organise separately and their interests seemed contradictory. for many the wounds of the postindependence betrayal of the masses by political elites remained raw, stymieing possibilities of inter-class alliances. the critical question is: at what point did the different struggles start forming alliances? moreover, when did they transform into a constitutional reform struggle? re-emergence of inter-class alliances the moment for inter-class alliances arrived in late 1980s to early 1990s centred on a 'cult of the individual' within the emergent genre of human rights that was heavily supported by western donors who started pegging aid to political values of individual rights, defence of human dignity, good governance and rule of law. this opened political opportunities for emergent state oppositionists. this moment had several simultaneous interactive processes between struggles of the middleclass and the poor that enabled not just inter-class but also inter-ethnic, gender and generational alliances to become a reality. according to ouma in an interview, the moment was foregrounded by activities of fida-kenya, which was formed during the 1985 nairobi united nations (un) women conference by women lawyers to fight against patriarchy and women’s oppression. the reminiscences of ouma, a key civil society leader privy to these developments, after the un conference, fida-kenya organised the nairobi women non-governmental organisations (ngos) forum to explore possibilities for linking their middleclass women struggles with the experiences of the wananchi (ordinary citizens/masses) which begun emerging as a useful category in their struggles. this was born out of the realisation of the need to move away from specific constituency-based grievances to confronting larger societal challenges because the repressive state affected more than just middleclass women, and that to succeed, an alliance between different struggles was needed. the decision to reach out to poor rural women was further informed by prior experiences of middleclass women who, through the national council of the women of kenya, had started working with rural subaltern women leading to the birth of the green belt movement in 1977. such alliances, polletta and jasper (2001, p.289) argue, can ‘supply the solidary incentives that encourage movement participation, but they also represent a “free space” in which people can develop counterhegemonic ideas and oppositional identities’. in the kenyan case, the green belt movement quickly morphed into women’s empowerment and advocacy organising, working by utilising women’s agency to challenge their political, economic, and environmental circumstances instead of limiting themselves to addressing the existential threats rural women faced due to environmental degradation as it had been set to do2. the opportunity for solidarity and alliance building further developed in early 1991. it sprouted directly from the moi/state actions of detaining critics, many who were from the student-intelligentsia middleclass and a few estranged elites. utilising the increasing vulnerability of the state after the paris club of creditors in november 1990 warned that they 2 the green belt, http://www.greenbeltmovement.org/who-we-are/our-history http://www.greenbeltmovement.org/who-we-are/our-history 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 would suspend aid unless moi instituted wide-ranging political and economic changes, some mothers of political detainees and other family members saw an opportunity to demand the release of their sons and started mobilising for action. as documented by aluanga (2011) mobilisation reached across ethnic and generational gaps.3 on february 28, 1991 the mothers of political prisoners, who were ordinary rural peasants with the support of some middleclass women, most notable, professor wangari maathai founder of the green belt movement, delivered a memorandum of demands for unconditional release of their sons to the attorney general. thereafter, they staged a public protest at uhuru park. the action of the mothers of political prisoners triggered moral shock, sympathy and inter-class, gender, ethnic, religious and generational solidarity, especially after they were violently attacked by police and they responded by stripping naked (a powerful cultural form of protest by elderly women in kenya). after the attack, they took refuge at the all saints cathedral from where they continued their protest, resorting to hunger strike and prayer vigils until january 19, 1993 when all political detainees were released (maathai 2006). for these mothers and their supporters, democracy offered hope that their sons would not be arbitrarily detained by the regime due to their political viewpoints. the critical question then is why and at what point does the constitution become an important issue for such ordinary rural peasants such as the mothers of political prisoners or muungano wa wanavijiji? as illustrated below, the answer lies in the intersection of experiences and perceptions of grievances, commonly referred in social movement studies as insurgent consciousness, which is crucial in framing solutions. insurgent consciousness is a collective sense of injustice felt by certain members of society that they are mistreated or that somehow, the system is unjust and with it, a sense of ‘cognitive liberation’ (piven and cloward 1977; mcadam 1982), i.e. a sense of optimism that by ‘acting collectively, they can redress the problem’ (mcadam, mccarthy and zald 1996, p.5). for mcadam (1982), insurgent consciousness is a key determinant for ‘whether or not groups can take advantage of …political openings’ (mcadam quoted in voss and williams 2012, p.356). scholars such as snow and benford (1988), benford and snow (2000) as well as snow et al (1986), keck and sikkink (1998), have reinterpreted ‘cognitive liberation’ as ‘framing’ of shared feelings of grievance or outrage that prompts people to form collectives (see voss and williams 2012). in the kenyan case, framing was carried out under the auspices of community organising and involved conscious construction of collective action identity. 3 for some illustrations of how this mobilisation cut across ethnic and generational lines, see lillian aluanga (2011) “veronica wambui nduthu: why did they kill my son?” in the standard october 22 2011 (https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000045325/veronica-wambui-nduthu-why-did-they-kill-my-son). aulanga who profiles the reflections veronica wambui nduthu, mother of karimi nduthu (kikuyu) a university student leader arrested and jailed during the crackdown of mwakenya activists in 1986, writes of what mrs. nduthu told her: ‘“one of my sons in nairobi wrote me a letter saying i had to go to freedom corner because it was important," …about 10 days later nduthu set off for the capital to represent her ‘two’ sons karimi and his friend tirop kitur [a kalenjin and also a student leader political prisoner]…"tirop’s mother was far and couldn’t afford the fare to nairobi. but our sons were friends and therefore tirop was also my son”.’ https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000045325/veronica-wambui-nduthu-why-did-they-kill-my-son cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 87 framing, civic education and community organising framing and collective action identity construction are relatively neglected aspects in a movement’s emergence in political opportunity theory which privileges the nature of state structure in its conception of political opportunity (goodwin and jasper 1999). the neglect of interpretive processes in the cognition and utilisation of opportunity is criticized by symbolic interactionists and social constructionists who argue that grievances and opportunities do not always lead to movements. this is because ‘meanings do not automatically or naturally attach themselves to the objects, events, or experiences we encounter, but often arise, instead, through interactively based interpretive processes’ called framing (snow 2004, p.384). framing is therefore useful in the identification, utilisation and even expansion of political opportunities. framing is a fluid and variable process in social construction of grievances. it involves ‘interactive, collective ways that movement actors assign meanings to their activities’, events and conditions (buechler 2000, p.41). framing is therefore important in linking the individual’s conditions and experiences with those of the collective (della porta and diani, 2006). framing is further important in the construction of ‘injustice, agency, and identity frames’, which are the foundations of collective action and solidarity (della porta and diani 2006, p.79; polleta and jasper 2001). it has diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational dimensions (benford and snow 2000; della porta and diani, 2006). diagnostic framing involves ‘problem identification and attributions’ (benford and snow 2000, p.615). prognostic framing has strong utopian imagination and involves proposing a ‘solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan’ (benford and snow 2000, p.616). by so doing, prognostic framing opens new spaces and prospects for collective action because ‘concepts and perspectives, which might otherwise have remained marginal, are disseminated in society’ (della porta and diani 2006, p.77). motivational framing strongly connects with identity building (della porta and diani 2006). here, activists ‘employ an opportunistic rhetoric of change … to convince potential challengers that action leading to change is possible and desirable’ (gamson and meyer 1996, p.286). framing is therefore responsible for arousing insurgent consciousness that the system is unjust. framing further arouses cognitive liberation, which is a sense among insurgents that their condition is mutable. cognitive liberation is vital in the construction of shared feelings of grievance or outrage that prompts people to form collectives to challenge those that they identify as the creators of their condition (snow and benford 1988; benford and snow 2000; piven and cloward 1977). the kenyan case illustrates the relationship between construction of meaning, collective identity, and mobilization. this is because framing occurred through mass civic education programmes carried out by emergent middleclass human rights civil society organisations such as fida-kenya and the green belt movement. besides generating widespread awareness of rights, civic education greatly influenced struggles of the lower classes by making them aware that the problems they confronted were rooted in a bad constitution. in line with prognostic framing, the widespread awareness made the masses 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 exercise agency in resisting exploitation and yearn for reforms as a corrective to their situation, according to wadenya (interviewed 09/04/2010). thereafter, when middleclass-led movements like ncec made calls for ameliorative collective action to push the state to acquiescence to a new constitution as the solution to kenya’s problems, the masses poured into the streets in support. clearly, civic education served the empowerment and framing goals that played a crucial role in raising insurgent consciousness and collective action. one of the leaders behind the muungano wa wanavijiji illustrates both insurgent consciousness and the role agency of the oppressed, excluded, or exploited people in making their own history when he stated that they realised that to be effective, they needed to organise and be conversant with the fundamentals of the constitution after they had been sensitized on these matters: social struggles are fought by individuals directly affected by injustices. at first we did not have any formal organisation uniting us. but a few of us realised that the problems we were facing were not limited to kibera alone. it was the same story in all slums… we realised that we needed to get organised… start a strong movement to raise alarm on the problems of eviction of the poor and grabbing of public land. therefore, we started organising … with support of ngos such as mazingira institute, action aid, kituo cha sheria, anppcan etc. we formed the community against forced eviction and land grabbing, the predecessor to muungano wa wanavijiji. we then started educating ourselves on the constitution, we realised that the document did not protect us but only the wealthy and corrupt leaders who had title deeds to the land we squatted on in the slums. then we started educating other people in the slums (rema, interviewed 22/03/2010). rema’s narrative of the emergence of muungano wa wanavijiji is corroborated by mwachofi (interviewed 27/09/2009) who was among the community organisers who mobilised residents of 82 different slums into forming muungano wa wanavijiji as well as other grassroots movements like ilishe in mombasa and sema in taita taveta. all these grassroots groups were involved in conscientization of the masses through civic education. thereafter, ordinary people who were victims of evictions mobilised protest against these actions. overtime, these protests became sustained and organised crystallising in muungano wa wanavijiji as a grassroots slum dwellers movement4. the emergence of muungano wa wanavijiji and the connections between its struggles and those of the middleclass is also illustrative of the role of grievances in the social production of collective identity –a process where ‘individual and/or collective actors, in interaction with other social actors, attribute a specific meaning to their traits, their life occurrences, and the systems of social relations in which they are embedded’ (della porta and diani 2006, p.92). this is because middleclass professionals, drawn from the catholic church lay leaders and clergy, and human rights and social justice civil society organisations were also crucial actors in the social construction of an identity of dispossessed slum dwellers 4 exodus-kutoka network, http://www.kutokanet.com/evictions/evictions.html; similar narratives of unfair allocation of resources abound throughout the country (author interviews: rema 22/03/200; k’otieno, 07/04/2010; ong’ong’a, 26/03/2010; mwachofi, 27/09/2009; mwanyumba, 07/04/2010). http://www.kutokanet.com/evictions/evictions.html cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 89 as well as in the emergence and building muungano wa wanavijiji through issue framing in the civic education activities they carried out. these middleclass civic educators linked the problems of the urban landless to a bad constitution. even then, framing became a useful strategy for connecting struggles of the middleclass and those of the lower classes only after president moi questioned who the middleclass civil society groups challenging him for comprehensive change of the constitution represented. the answer to moi’s question, according to ouma, came in the form of ‘subaltern struggles being asked to get expression in the constitutional reform movement’. this framing by one of the leading social justice and human rights activists in kenya illustrates contradictory attitudes of the middleclass and their utilitarian solidarities with the lower classes. the actual alliance in kenya took a long and winding process of strategic use of framing to assign common meanings to different experiences, which also helped create a collective identity category of state-oppressed citizens. ouma described how the middleclass human rights civil society organisations behind these mass civic education programmes developed a master frame that reduced a series of disparate social phenomena (the deepening despotism, the law that allowed detention without trial, restricted the freedom of association, the land problems facing squatters, and the dwindling economic opportunities) to a single problema dictatorial state buttressed by a constitution that allowed for concentration of power in the presidency. the process also involved ‘negotiating’ a stake in the resultant struggles. these negotiations were not without conflicts, especially because of the different interests of the actors as mati (2012b) explains. after this, the constitution became the bearer of all the evil in kenyans lives. the middleclass went further to envision an alternative and how an alliance that aggregated interests would be useful in a struggle to overhaul the constitution and the state. a new social contract in the form of a constitution to replace the irreparable uhuru (independence) covenant, it was argued by these middleclass actors, was inevitable, and inter-class alliances would be key in forcing this. dreiling (2001, p.6) argues that alliances ‘are most likely to occur if the coalition is more likely to achieve goals or lead to a larger resource base’. in this regard, incentives for alliances came in the form of support (especially financial resources and pro-bono legal assistance) that middleclass-led civil society organisations gave to struggles of the lower classes. this was significant not only for diagnostic framing, but it also convinced and reassured the masses of the value of their protests to the larger middleclass defined goal– reform of the constitution reform. this is well captured in the words of one of muungano wa wanavijiji’s leaders: there were many restrictions, which made our work difficult. but the support we got from ngos helped us. we did not have wealth, but we had good imagination…. we joined these struggles because we wanted our voices as ordinary citizens to also be heard alongside others agitating for change in the country… their struggles resonated with our struggles. we helped them build their 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 legitimacy because they had people and movements like ours in them. (rema, interviewed 22/03/2010). it therefore seems that these poor activists were acutely aware of the limits of these alliances, while also alive to the fact that they lacked some of the forms of capital necessary to successfully take on a powerful state without them. it is this awareness together with the assurance that their everyday struggles would find solutions in a better constitution that made the offer of an alliance with middleclass struggles attractive. according to rema, further, solidarity and civic education interventions of these ngos (through for instance, participation in joint demonstrations), helped build confidence of grassroots struggles to join mainstream struggles for constitutional reforms. civic education was further useful for what keck and skikkink (1998) call ‘accountability politics’ involving activist attempts to expose the difference between the talk and the walk of their targets. in this regard, a muungano wa wanavijiji leader stated: we got skills that we used to create more awareness for people and tell them this is what the constitution of kenya says about land. we were able to talk confidently in our forums. if it is on issue of housing, it was very clear international treaties have been signed by government; we were able to know that there is a convention where the government committed themselves to what they would deliver, but were not delivering. such knowledge added force to our struggle. in that process we were also able to interact with many powerful people who helped us by participating in our demonstrations. when we wanted to demonstrate, you see we would have an mp in the protest. it was then not easy for a policeman to just start shooting or doing anything. they would start negotiating with us to stop protest. then it was easy to engage them and get our voices as ordinary citizens to be also heard and amplified. (rema, interviewed 22/03/2010) undeniably, this points to some gains for the lower classes. however, these alliances also arrested the militancy of the lower classes by channelling protests though peaceful means. indeed, rarely have the middleclass in kenya taken part in demonstrations unless they know they are peaceful and their security not threatened. one therefore wonders what the hidden costs of these human rights civic education programmes were. in many instances, human rights education programs delivered by ngos, while appearing to incite revolutionary impulses among the masses, they also can have the effect of containing the desires and energies of people profoundly excluded from the nation’s wealth. such programs are not infrequently tolerated by ruling elites as they can constrain and direct potentially revolutionary energies into much less threatening reformist directions5. kenya is replete with examples of radical militant movements and armed revolutionary uprisings including the mau mau, the sabaoti land defence force, mungiki, mombasa republican council etc. it is not improbable that movements such as muungano wa wanavijiji would have gone the same route had it not been for these middleclass interventions. 5 i am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this out to me. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 91 civic education and framing should also be viewed with concomitant community organising, which was going on in kenya. like framing, community organising is a neglected variable in the political opportunity theory (voss and williams 2012). by neglecting community organising, political opportunity theory overlooks questions of agency, especially of local initiatives (flacks 2004). with regards to kenya, community organising was a key dimension for incubating movements and alliances in these struggles. specifically, community organising helped establish the structures for mobilisation that enabled individuals to engage in collective action, and also in the cohering of various middleclass and subaltern struggles into struggles into a constitution reform movement. in this regard, mainstream churches and earlier mentioned human rights ngos were the key agents. the catholic church, for example, in partnership with the african network for the prevention and protection against child abuse and neglect (anppcan) introduced formal courses in community organising whose primary beneficiaries were the poor slum dwellers. parishes of the catholic church in the slums further formed the exodus-kutoka network that was involved in transformative framing of routine grievances against evictions into injustices around which they mobilized, and built enduring community organisations to fight against the same. in the end, framing, civic education, and community organising midwifed the development of solidarities and alliances between middleclass and lower class struggles which was particularly instrumental in helping middleclass struggles build their own legitimacy in answering moi’s question because they had ordinary people’s movements like muungano wa wanavijiji in or with them. further, despite the contradictions, this helped in validating the claim of resultant middleclass-led alliances as representing a diversity of kenyans yearning for change, who included the masses, a claim not altogether substantiated because the masses were by no means submissive partners in the formation of these alliances. the middleclass leaders of the resultant movements presented their relationship with lower class struggles as one of solidarity and interdependence. however, missing in such framing was the question of how to cure the fundamental contradictions of identity-based interests in such alliances and how these new formations might affect the direction of transformations. della porta and diani (2006, p.112) argue that cross-identity movements have to produce collective identity, which is, sufficiently specific to provide the foundations for the diversity of the movement in relation to its adversaries; but at the same time, sufficiently close to traditional collective identities in order to make it possible for movement actors to communicate with those who continue to recognize themselves in consolidated identities. the relevant question here is, what was the nature of resultant movements? were they defined by the dominant identity cleavages or was there sufficient alignment to ensure various social groups’ interests were reflected? moreover, did the leaderships in resultant movements like ncec or ufungamano initiative reflect interests of the different social groups? among others, mati (2012b), has dealt with these questions in a comprehensive 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 manner and for want of space, they do not warrant a fuller treatment here. nonetheless, it suffices to say that while the demands of the resultant movements were not exclusively middleclass centred, it was the middleclass who controlled organizational resources in the ensuing movements, imbuing them with a set of values and goals that emphasised new forms of hierarchical structure and rationality (mati 2012b). the middleclass activists played down the inherent contradictions in the ensuing alliances, yet class, ethnic, and religious-based identity and interests had led to the collapse of the first inter-class alliance immediately after independence. would this not result in similar failures? this question, though pertinent, is beyond the purview of the present paper. nonetheless, one can say here, as has been argued elsewhere, that class, religious and ethnic cleavages played a crucial role in the collapse and ultimate abortion of the constitution reform project in the 2005 constitution referendum (mati 2012a; 2012b; 2013). the tools that destroyed these alliances had class, generational as well as gender dimensions and came to be displayed at different times in the constitution reform contentions. in this regard, mati (2012b), for instance, records many class, generational and gender cleavages in within the ufungamano initiative6. in these instances, the whims of the upper classes always held sway. discontents over these developments were directly behind the rejection of the 2005 constitution draft, and two years later, ignited the post-election violence. as such, while community organising was a powerful tool in achieving certain transformations, it is essential to question whether it did contribute anything in the progressive transformation of kenya given its inadequacies in addressing structural roots of ethnic, class, gender and even religious divides. this illustrates contradictions of these middleclass ngo interventions that, as barker et al. (2013. p.22) observe, can ‘simultaneously both challenge and support broader sets of exploitative and repressive social relations – and to fashion strategies for opening up the opportunities that such contradictory forms contain’. along the same lines, alves (1998) notes a contradiction of popular power of movements, which makes them powerful but also feared by the middleclass, who, when they feel threatened by popular pressures, abandon the masses and concentrate on negotiating less threatening alternatives with those in power. the 1997 political elite bargain under the infamous inter-parliamentary parties group (ippg) agreement at the peak of the ncec engineered crisis, as does the merger of the ufungamano initiative with the state process despite fierce opposition from the lower classes are exemplars of such moments when the middleclass used the threatening power of social movements to benefit disproportionately from inter-class alliances as they negotiate for positions with the state in the official process. in addition, middleclass and elite factions in kenya have used 6 for instance, the leader of kenya women political caucus, phoebe asiyo, despite positioning herself and the group she led as a sympathiser of the ufungamano initiative, jumped ship and joined the rival government-led process as a commissioner. critics charged this was influenced by her ethnic affinity to raila odinga, the leader of the government-led process (waruku, author interview 29/09/2009). another example was during the merger process between the ufungamano initiative’s commission with and the government-led one. youth participants in the ufungamano initiative felt that rev. mutava musyimi who led the movement auctioned it to government as elite and middleclass participants dismissed the youth’s opposition to the merger as daydreaming naivety (daily nation 22/03/2001). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 93 ‘political ethnicity/tribalism’ to whip up ethnic support in what is arguably an intra-elite competition (omolo 2002; kloop 2002; lonsdale 1994). in the kenyan constitutional reform movement, class cleavages were further exacerbated by a lack of internal deliberative democracy, which stifled progress and led to the demise of the movement and the rejection of the draft constitution in the 2005 referendum. moreover, even when the stalled constitutional reform project was restarted and succeeded after the 2007 post-election violence, the resultant constitution reflects bargains around elite interests than the distribution concerns that activists from the lower classes had been pushing for (murunga 2014; mati 2013). moreover, given the lack of genuine exchange, while the interactions between different classes suggest some inter-class interdependence in these struggles, it also points to what gould (1998) calls networks of patronage where middleclass activists and their organisations act as patrons to their lower class clients (polletta and jasper 2001, p.288). this is especially so as the movement of the poor masses in the kenyan case, it seems, was basically shepherded towards constitutional movement through patronage, tutelage, manipulation and imposition. conclusion the emergence of inter-identity alliances in contentions for kenyan constitutional reforms is a complex narrative of relationships between state and society, and between different social classes, ethnicities, gender and generations in kenya. the rise of these movements and their alliances cannot be explained by a single factor or theory. the political opportunity model may explain the emergence of social struggles against the state. however, its neglect of community organizing renders it less useful in helping us understand the role of the agency of the poor as well as middleclass activists in germinating some aspects of these struggles as well as in incubating the alliance between the different struggles into a movement for constitutional reforms. in addition, the structural deterministic nature of the political opportunity model render it less useful in accounting for emergence of social movements under restrictive political conditions as was the case in kenya. the political opportunity model is also less useful in helping us analyse how existing cleavages arising from multiplicity of actors and competing interests were negotiated in the process of forming these alliances. additionally, as the kenyan case demonstrates, political opportunities can be produced and magnified. but the recognition and creation of opportunities requires insurgent consciousness, which is cultivated through framing. such framing, the kenyan case shows, involved movement activists making strategic choices in recognising and creating opportunities that they used in incubating these movements as well as alliances between different classes. specifically, the alliance became a reality through civic education, framing and community organizing processes. these alliances in the kenyan struggles suggest that while identity differences are enduring, differences can be overcome through careful framing and community organising. the kenyan case further illustrates that assumed theoretical tensions from a multiplicity of identity-based consciousness and interests are insufficient in preventing cooperative alliances in a common struggle. 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 the kenyan story confirms that there is a need for research on collective action to go beyond straightjacketed applications of theory if we are to explain the different aspects of these struggles. but this is not a peculiarly african problem in the study of social movements. indeed ‘conceptual poaching’ has been useful in the evolution of different paradigms of social movement theory. there is, therefore, a need to heed lofland’s (1993) call for ‘“answer improving” over “theory bashing”’ (cited in buechler 2000, p.55) because different models have strengths that can be applied in understanding african protest movements. what is needed to make movement theory to reflect african contexts, to borrow from voss and williams (2012), is for them to reflect on community organising and framing. it is these that produced long-term alliances in kenya. the most important factor in stimulating cooperation is effective issue framing and representative claim making. acknowledgements a draft of this paper was first presented at a colloquium “contentious politics, capitalism and social movement theory: south africa in global perspective” hosted by the south african research chair in social change, university of johannesburg, 21-23 may 2014. i wish to thank the organisers and especially trevor ngwane, for critical comments on the then draft. i wish to further thank my colleague dr. sara amin (usp), and two other anonymous reviewers of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal for their critical reviews that helped in further strengthening this paper. references 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interview 07/04/2010, voi wadenya, interview 09/04/2010, nairobi ouma, interview 07/04/2013, nairobi abstract keywords introduction class as an identity in kenyan constitutional reform movement emergence of kenyan constitution change struggles: political opportunity explanation re-emergence of inter-class alliances framing, civic education and community organising conclusion acknowledgements references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 3 2017 © 2017 irit keynan. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: keynan, i. 2017. citizenhood: rethinking multicultural citizenship. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(3), 21-39. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9 i3.5518 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper citizenhood: rethinking multicultural citizenship irit keynan college for academic studies and the institute for civic responsibility, or yehuda, israel corresponding author: irit keynan, graduate program for education, society and culture, college for academic studies, 2 hayotzrim street, or yehuda, israel. iritike@mla.ac.il doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5518 abstract in its comprehensive meaning, citizenship should ideally bestow a sense of belonging in the large social group, as well as a stake in the state’s cultural, political and economic life, topped by a sense of solidarity, which transcends ethno-religious differences. unfortunately, many nation states fail these tasks and not all of their citizens are offered such an embracing welcome. because of the massive immigrations of the last decades this difficulty has intensified and many states struggle with the problem of maintaining a sense of belonging of its citizens with the state. this article proposes a named new concept, “citizenhood”, which may provide a better way to reconcile ideas of cultural and social rights with the idea of citizenship in contemporary multicultural liberal and democratic nation states. in particular, the new concept strives to alleviate the situation of groups upon whom citizenship does not confer the sense of ‘being at home’. improving the feelings of these groups is important not only for their own well-being, but for the state as well, since their feeling of alienation from the community at large weakens social cohesion and may fuel continuous tensions. scholars have suggested different alternatives to overcome these difficulties but a solution is not yet in sight. this paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of previous suggestions and elaborates on the benefits of the proposed new concept. keywords citizenship; multiculturalism; belonging; minorities; diversity declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5518 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5518 https://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ mailto:iritike@mla.ac.il http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5518 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 introduction in recent decades, western countries have been experiencing a growing international migration, which challenges the previously homogeneous nature of many nation states and intensifies inner tensions (geddes 2016). this reality has put multiculturalism theory and politics into question (malik 2015), and it seems that despite ongoing attempts by scholars of political philosophies, a solution to the complex issues of citizenship and multiculturalism has not been found yet. the idea of citizenship in a democracy has gradually evolved over the last centuries from membership in a political community (abowitz and harnish 2006) into a multidimensional concept. the contemporary concept of citizenship includes the imposition of various obligations, combined with civil, political and social rights, such as those required to guarantee individual liberties, political participation, and the basic resources for living with dignity (marshall 2006) in a community, nation state or other collectivity (yuval-davis 1999). in recent decades, however, the original purpose of citizenship to prevent society’s division into privileged and unprivileged has been transformed into an instrument of social bordering, exclusion and hierarchy (yiftachel 2016b). nowadays, it is often used in an exclusionary way, differentiating between those who are entitled to certain rights and those who are not (joppke and morawska 2014). for many years, the concept of citizenship lacked reference to substantive issues of cultural belonging (delanty 2002). however, being a citizen in its comprehensive meaning, should ideally bestow a sense of belonging in a social group (amit and bar-lev 2015). belonging, as yuval-davis (2006) states ‘is about emotional attachment, about feeling “at home”’ (p. 197), and there is an extensive involvement of emotions in the issue of citizenship and the way it is constructed (jones 2005; mookherjee 2005; zembylas 2013). citizenship should provide a sense of familiarity and safety, as well as a stake in the state’s cultural, political and economic life, in its plans and visions for the future and in its achievements and failures, topped by a sense of solidarity — a term that conveys ‘attitudes of mutual acceptance, cooperation and mutual support in time of need, which transcend ethno-religious differences’ (banting and kymlicka 2015, p. 5), and ‘an ethic of membership’ that is the foundation for social justice (p. 4). unfortunately, in many nation states, not all citizens are offered an embracing welcome. some, usually historic or immigrant ethnic and national minorities,1 are not invited by the majority to share this sense of belonging. taylor (1998) asserts that this is an inherent paradox of democracies, whose inclusive nature of a government of all the people creates a necessity of a high degree of cohesion. this need leads to artificial calls for unity, in which citizens – usually those belonging to the majority – are encouraged by political leaders and by other citizens of their own group, to feel differently towards different groups of citizens in the public domain, based on their gender, race, ethnicity or religion, allowing ‘effective citizenship’ to impact the construction of full citizenship rights (johnson 2010). exclusionary practices deeply affect historic national minorities, as well as immigrant minorities, who are 1 historic national minorities (kymlicka 2011) are sometimes called indigenous. in the case of the discussion here, the former better expresses unique national identity of historic minorities. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 23 also typically not included in the majority’s definition of the character of the nation state, despite their identification with their receiving country. while the formers’ national feelings are usually seen as a threat to the nation state, the latters’ are often treated by the majority as infiltrators who came to exploit the state’s resources (koopmans 2010). yet another marginalized group exists, that of citizens and minorities who feel alienated from what the state stands for and even object to and resist the state’s values. all these minority groups are thus living with a constant sense of being an unwanted stranger in one’s own home. for the state, both types of marginalized groups are problematic as their exclusion weakens social cohesion and may fuel continuous tension and struggle over the cultural and national character of the state and its public sphere. it is important to stress that while the state should attempt to create a sense of belonging for all its citizens, it cannot force any of them to share this feeling, and should accept taylor's (1997b) principle of ‘deep diversity – allowing different levels of linkage to the state, without denying citizens of their rights based on their sense of belonging. scholars have suggested different alternatives to solve to this tension. but, as will be discussed later, further thinking and additional ideas are still required to find a way to overcome the animosity and estrangement between different ethnic and cultural groups who live in the same state, struggling to determine its character and nature. this paper draws on previous suggestions and proposes a new named concept ‘citizenhood’ substituting the suffix ‘ship’ with ‘hood’ thus conveying a sense of belonging to a body of persons or a particular character or class. this new concept and adhering to what it stands for, may resolve some of the above mentioned tensions or at lease hold them in balance. this idea suggests creating an additional overarching identity (or super-identity) that embraces all members of society, without requiring them to waive their distinct identities; a superordinate identity that extends the boundaries of the collective, to which all citizens can develop a sense of belonging. without belittling the importance of the name (which is significant), there is more to citizenhood than just a name change. citizenhood is a whole new concept that requires novel attitudes and actions by the government, the citizens, the academia and social groups. in what follows the paper elaborates on how this concept may provide an improved way to reconcile ideas of cultural and social rights with the idea of citizenship in contemporary multicultural liberal and democratic nation states. after discussing, in section 2, the tensions over ownership of the public sphere in divided societies, the paper analyses in section 3 the existing alternative solutions. the novelty, advantages and dilemmas of the citizenhood concept are described in section 4. in this section the paper also deliberates the difference in treatment of non-liberal minorities and the issue of historical national minorities. discussion and conclusions are set out in section 5. 2 struggle over ownership of the public sphere in recent decades, in an attempt to resolve issues related to minorities’ status and collective rights, cultural rights have become a recognized element of citizenship in democratic states (kymlicka 1995; rosaldo 1997; parekh 2000). a fundamental principle of such 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 multiculturalism is that an individual’s identity is tightly connected to her group’s collective identity, as this is the source from which individuals derive their ideas of what is appropriate for them to be (taylor 1997). isaiah berlin (1969) described the right to be a part of a culturally independent group as the ultimate recognition, without which the individual may doubt her status as ‘a fully independent human being’ (p. 23). ‘for what i am’, berlin wrote ‘is, in large part, determined by what i feel and think; and what i feel and think is determined by the feeling and thought prevailing in the society to which i belong’ (p. 23). based on this understanding, there is a wide consensus nowadays that cultural minority groups should be allowed to lead their lives and raise their children according to their particular cultural practices and norms, as in the absence of this option minorities are forced to choose between assimilation into the majority or living on the margins of society (kymlicka 1995; tamir 1998)2. collective rights, though, are not enough to solve the issue of belonging. since the nation state model remains the most viable of all, despite predictions of its ‘extinction’ (iglesias, stojanović, and weinblum 2013; yiftachel 2016), we must explore ways to enable minorities to share a sense of belonging in the collective ‘cultural intimacy’ (herzfeld 2014) without losing their independent identity. this is extremely important, as in most countries, nationwide solidarity is typically fragile, if not receding (banting and kymlicka 2015), which weakens acceptance of minorities into the ‘we-ness’ of the majority. one of the salient obstacles to the challenge of creating a reality in which all groups can feel ‘at home’ is the reluctance of each group to waive its desire to dominate the public sphere and specifically, the state’s symbols and ambiance. sometimes, as will be discussed later, a minority may try to change the country's mentality and way of life completely, imposing its own norms and symbols on the majority. usually, however, it is the majority who wants to control the state’s character, while refusing to give the minorities any foothold in its formulation. examples of such situations include the debate in european countries over the muslim niqab and the ban over wearing it in public (fernando 2010; moors 2009) and the gap between the law and actual state of arabic language in public communication in israel (saban and amara 2002). in both cases, the majority rejects the cultural presence of the minority – whether immigrant or national historic minorities – in the public sphere due to a sense of discomfort or fear of losing dominance. in such a reality, although members of minorities are considered equal citizens, it is impossible for them to feel as if they belong to the state; instead, they feel like unwanted, merely tolerated, guests in their own home. 3 is there a solution in sight? in the introduction to his book blood and belonging, michael ignatieff (2010) discusses the common belief that only national self-determination can satisfy such a sense of belonging. a similar idea is that of belonging to ‘fundamental cultural groups’ (fcgs), which mautner defines as groups that regulate comprehensive and profound aspects of their members’ lives and provide answers to existential questions such as ‘what is the meaning of life?’ ‘what life is it appropriate to live?’ ‘what is the meaning of evil, suffering, and causality in human beings’ lives?’ ‘is there a god?’ and ‘is there life after death?’ (2008, p. 283). based on the 2 the risk of legitimizing oppressive practices of non-liberal groups, which is entailed in collective rights will be dealt with below. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 25 breadth and depth of such regulation, mautner (2008) suggests that people attribute far greater importance to their belonging to an fcg than to any other identity group to which they may belong, such as gender or profession. in ignatieff's view, though, belonging can also be satisfied by what he calls civic nationalism, a sense of belonging to a community of citizens with equal rights who share a set of political practices and values rather than blood (or fcg) relations. such a sense of belonging, ignatieff (2010) says, creates a form of ‘civil patriotism’ that is more democratic than national patriotism, because it encompasses all citizens. ignatieff himself doubts the likelihood of this idea’s realization in practice, as he recognizes the fact that nationalist sentiment typically overrides all other forms of belonging, including family and friends, grounded in the belief that one cannot be protected unless one has a nation to protect him/her. nationalist sentiment is further fueled by the impact of collective memory, especially in large groups with collective trauma in their past (volkan 2001, 2004), as is the case in some of the majority and some of the minority groups. such groups tend to believe that their sovereign nationality is their only protection against existential threats that constantly await them (keynan 2015a, 2016). moreover, ignatieff's civil nationalism can be expected to increase the exclusion of and intensify the conflict with totalizing communities (coser 1974 cited in walzer 2005), which rejects democratic and liberal values altogether, and whose pious observance overrides all other forms of belonging, including close family, with the same ferocity as nationalistic sentiments. at the same time, in cases where these communities are considered part of the national majority, such as the haredi (ultraorthodox) community in israel or evangelist communities in the us, they may join forces with the same majority whose democratic civic identity they reject, to exclude ethnic immigrants or historic national minorities. the liberal center thus faces a two-fold challenge: one vis-à-vis the ethnic/national minorities and one vis-à-vis the non-liberal totalizing communities. the question is, therefore, whether it is possible to create a civic identity that is more inclusive, promotes solidarity and a sense of belonging (banting and kymlicka 2015), and at the same time does not require waiving either the separate value systems or the national statehood. the idea is to facilitate an additional, overarching civic identity, which includes both the totalizing orthodox groups and the historic national and immigrant minorities, but does not impose a choice between the original sub-group and the overarching identity. the issue of totalizing groups and the issue of historic national groups are allegedly two separate issues, but often, especially in multination states, the former includes also the latter. to promote social cohesion in diverse and ‘multinational’ societies, kymlicka focuses on the relations with the ethnic/national minorities, suggesting a ‘multination federalism’ with two main features: ‘a federation of quasi-federal sub-units in which the minority group forms a local majority, and can thereby exercise meaningful forms of self-government’ (2011, p. 6), and recognition of the minority’s language as an official state language. while recognizing the minority’s language is worth having and feasible, it alone does not solve the problem, as is well reflected in israel, where arabic is an official language but most jewish israelis do not acknowledge it as part of their citizenship or even of israeli public 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 communication (saban and amara 2002). the other element of kymlicka’s suggestion may work under what he calls ‘favorable conditions’, one of which is the territorial concentration of the historic national minority. even where this condition exists, there is no guarantee that a multinational federation will solve ethnic conflicts, as scholars have shown that ethnofederalism or autonomy arrangements have rarely worked when challenged by severe nationalist divisions (roeder 2012). furthermore, multinational federalism offers no solution to those ethnic/national minority citizens who wish to belong to the majority. in fact, it may even worsen their position – under a quasi-federal arrangement that offers local selfgovernment, the majority may feel released from any obligation to include the minority citizens while the zealous members of the minority may consider such integrative aspirations as a betrayal of their own ethnic group. federalism is also incapable of meeting the challenges posed by religious totalizing communities, which are often geographically dispersed, and frequently attempt to disseminate their beliefs among the non-pious majority, hoping to gradually impose their way of life on additional sectors of society. 4 citizenhood – the concept and its dilemmas this is where the idea of citizenhood comes in. the notion of citizenhood suggests that the state recognizes a multilevel civil identity of its citizens, not merely as a legal status, but as an intrinsic part of its overarching identity, which embraces all members of society equally, regardless of their distinct identities. the main difference between citizenhood and other theories of equal citizenship, including collective rights to all groups, is the development of an overarching civil identity. citizenhood does not settle for accepting otherness by the majority, nor for welcoming minority members to join the majority’s identity. it calls for facilitating and nourishing a top layer of a comprehensive national identity that comprises the diverse identities of the different groups, but does not replace them nor make them redundant. the idea is that the state acknowledges and legitimizes the preservation of one’s national or other fundamental cultural identity, as part of one’s additional, superordinate identity to which all citizens can develop a sense of belonging. being an overarching identity – recognized by the state – it may replace the inherently combative majority-minority power relations, with a new formula of belonging. citizenhood combines and expands on several concepts, taking them one step further to create a multilevel civil identity and sense of commitment. its main goal is to enable citizens as individuals and as groups to preserve their cultural and national tradition and belonging, while at the same time to belong to the broader circle of citizens, sharing aspirations for freedom and hope for all, and for a country with greater civic achievements – economic and cultural prosperity, a high-achieving educational system and better quality of life. a belief that such achievements are possible will enable all groups to feel pride over their country, an important notion for accomplishing and improving civil and moral goals (rorty 1998). this concept requires more than the removal of all institutional obstacles that prevent individual members of minorities from integrating in the majority if they so desire (barry 2001; fraser 2000); and more than granting collective rights to cultural minorities who wish to preserve their separate culture and tradition (kymlicka 1995, 2003, 2011). it requires a politicalcultural-educational effort that adopts rorty's (1989) view of a diverse community, joined cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 27 together by an ethos of resistance to suffering, while developing a tradition of aspiring to freedom and hope despite a history of conflicts and struggle. developing such a tradition entails the inclusion of historical and cultural heroes, which used to represent conflicting groups but are accepted as representing a society that overcame inner conflicts and to which therefore all citizens can develop a sense of belonging. in a way, this is an expansion of the collective memory of the state, to include the memories and narratives of all its groups (keynan 2015b). as fraser (2000) showed, excluded groups tend to accentuate their difference as part of their struggle to be accepted as equal. the option of ‘different and alike’, of being ‘who you are’ as a member of a sub-group, and at the same time a legitimate, accepted part of the whole, and an equal representative of whole, reduces animosity and moderates the need to emphasize differences on the expanse of solidarity. such a process does not require the abolition of one group’s narrative in favor of the other, but enables, with time, acceptance of all of them, one next to the other. the main barrier to ignatieff's idea of civil patriotism lies, as he himself puts it, in the strength of national sentiments. since citizenhood does not require the abandoning of membership in one’s own national or other fundamental group, it may increase the likelihood that this notion will promote a closer cooperation between people who believe in liberal democratic ideas but belong to different religions or fcgs. citizenhood’s concept of legitimizing the existence of multiple identities, while embracing them under the overarching identity of the state, may work also based on rawls’s concept of overlapping consensus. rawls states that while there is no one comprehensive doctrine of justice, which is accepted by all, ‘in a well-ordered society3 the political conception is affirmed by … a reasonable overlapping consensus’, which is supported ‘by the reasonable though opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines’ (2001, p. 32). this idea can be used metaphorically in the concept of citizenhood, as the different large groups in a nation state may agree on the principle of multilevel identities, although the reasoning for accepting this concept may stem from different perspectives. the problem of totalizing non-liberal sub-groups granting collective rights to non-liberal sub-groups poses a dilemma to liberalism as a theory and moral practice that rejects oppression. allowing non-liberal communities to apply oppressive practices in the name of liberalism’s own values of tolerance, diversity and multiculturalism, creates an obvious internal contradiction. the main risk, however, is the power it gives to non-liberal fcgs to deny their own members access to human rights based on cultural autonomy (jones 1999). this may turn citizenhood, just like any theory of collective rights, into a two-edged sword: on one hand, liberal values negate the imposition of these same liberal values upon non-liberal minorities, while on the other hand, they stand the risk of legitimizing oppressive practices of non-liberal groups (barry 2001; fraser 2000), thus abandoning their members to repression. 3 kymlicka (2017) challenges rawls’s argument that in developing a theory of justice we may assume that the world is divided to territorially bounded polities that have settled their boundaries disputes beforehand. this methodological dispute does not change the ideas of this paper. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 looking for a solution to these risks, kymlicka (1998) suggests that collective rights should be granted on the condition that group membership is a matter of self-identity, which is not imposed by the state or by the group itself; that no group may violate the basic human, civil or political rights of their members; and that individuals are free to question and reject any inherited or previously adopted identity, if they so choose, and exercise an effective right of exit from any identity group. the citizenhood concept adds to kymlicka’s crucial conditions. it gives members of non-liberal groups the option of multi-level identity, which may empower them to materialize kymlicka's conditions. the option to belong both to the sub group and to the overarching identity may help to relax the fear of becoming displaced, torn off the community one chose to exit with no identity to cling to. totalizing non-liberal sub-groups refuse to educate their children and youth to the basic ideas of the liberal-democratic state. this practice creates two additional problems: those who grow up in these communities are usually unaware of their options under kymlicka's conditions or the value foundation of liberal theories; being unaware of the basic rules of democracy, which they may delegitimize, some of these groups use their comparative autonomy and political representation to impose part of their values on the entire country. confronting this dilemma, walzer (2005) claims that the democratic state has a right to educate all its future citizens on the meaning of citizenship and democratic values, in order to ensure continuity of its values, and therefore totalizing communities should not be exempt from civil education. this may alarm totalizing communities that wish to preserve their segregation and separation from other communities. supporting walzer's view, the citizenhood concept may help to reduce totalizing communities' objection to such a move. the fact that citizenhood is based on multilevel identity that accepts different fcgs may ease the pressure of totalizing communities to change the character of the state, as they will be less pressured to assimilate, and perhaps more interested in keeping a modus vivendi with the liberal state (tamir 1998). achievement of this goal entails walking a very fine line and establishing a delicate balance between the right of all groups – including fundamentalist and totalizing groups – to cultural continuance, and the fact that such rights are only available in liberal-democratic societies (walzer 2005). in other words, since liberal-democratic societies are no less entitled than non-liberal groups to preserve and reproduce themselves, they should be permitted to avoid self-destruction committed in the name of their own essential values. this dilemma echoes emanuel levinas’s ethics of the ‘other’. in his book humanisme de l'autre homme (1972), levinas rejects any preference of one culture over another. at the same time, however, he considers multiplicity without universalism as ad absurdum of indifference, abandoning the other to her fate. the vulnerability of the face of the other, says levinas, exposes the responsibility of the self towards an unfamiliar other, guiding both to search for orientation which is lacking in cultural relativism (chalier 1999). the citizenhood concept adheres to levinas' view of responsibility for the other, as represented in multiplicity combined with universalism. the issue of historic national minorities historic national minorities usually do not feel connected to the nation state. in a 2003 survey by the uk home office (cited in kymlicka 2011), only several percent of irish catholics in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 29 northern ireland identified themselves as belonging to britain, in contrast to some 86% of pakistani, indian and bangladeshi immigrants and white british. similarly, in israel, the historic national palestinian minority considers itself excluded by the state’s official definition as a national jewish state (agbaria, mustafa and jabareen 2015) and therefore does not feel israeli. these emotions stem from these minorities’ past sovereignty in the territories that are now ruled by the state. their national sentiments notwithstanding, these minorities deserve collective and individual rights, as well as the right to equal citizenship, and to the individual choice of whether to embrace a sense of belonging to the state. the majority in a nation state, however, may intentionally exclude these minorities, not only from belonging but also from equal citizenship, fearing minorities’ aspirations for independence (kymlicka 2011). thus, even when these minorities are granted equal citizenship and citizen rights, they are generally excluded from the ‘we-ness’ that the majority shares, and therefore they never feel at home. exclusionary practices increase the minorities’ resentment toward the majority and the nation state, which they see as an illegitimate force that deprives them of their cultural and national independence and identity. in a vicious circle this resentment strengthens the exclusionary practices and so on and so forth. multiculturalism theories have tried to temper this tension by suggesting different versions of collective rights with or without territorial or non-territorial autonomy (kymlicka 2011; malloy, osipov & vizi 2016). while all these suggestions attempt at improving minorities relations with the majority, making their life less marginal, they do not bring a realistic option of integrating them into the comprehensive entity of the state. the citizenhood concept, on the other hand, by suggesting an overarching top level to a multilevel identity, allows all the existing identities in the country to become one whole without negating the preservation of their independent identity. this practice leads to mutual responsibilities of the state and the historic national minorities, and suggests an answer to what kymlicka (2017) defines as the question of ‘what states can rightfully demand of minorities’ (p. 2). when the state offers minorities coexistence of their separate and shared identity, it can more rightfully ask them to see themselves as full members in the multicultural state. 5 discussion and conclusion multicultural theory has not yet solved the problem of otherness and the denial of belonging from minorities. even where the nation state grants members of minorities full and equal civil and cultural rights, such rights are often granted reluctantly and are not accompanied by genuine emotional and social acceptance by the majority. this situation usually emerges also within ‘cultural liberalism’ – where the state does not impose its nationality on those who do not share it, grants certain group-specific rights or policies (as long as they operate within certain constraints of liberal justice), and at the same time allows individuals from these groups to freely express and cherish their own national identity (kymlicka 1998). emotionally based excluding practices keep marginalizing minorities, pushing them to a status of ‘tolerated guests’, excluded from a sense of belonging and the safety of being ‘at home’. the citizenhood concept addresses this problem, by transcending the notion of ‘respecting the other’ to casting off minorities’ otherness, while enabling them to remain who 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 they are. according to the citizenhood concept, both the majority and the minority fcgs share a super ordinate layer of characteristics and general rules, that creates a shared top layer of identity. on the one hand, citizenhood calls for pluralism that acknowledges the right of all groups to conduct their lives according to their particular culture, tradition, habits and norms. on the other hand, it tries to prevent the state from being a collection of isolated communities, and supports walzer's (1990) idea that pluralism without universalism is devoid of meaning, and ruins the possibility of critically analyzing non-pluralistic attitudes such as radical nationalism and sexism (sarid 2009). citizenhood is not a simple solution. it requires sophisticated and detailed political decentralization arrangements based on an agreed constitution (mautner 2011), while preserving both the rights of minorities and those of the majority. this may seem utopian. nonetheless, inevitable difficulties notwithstanding, reconciling conflicting fundamental identities under an overarching identity is possible, as evinced, for example, by efforts in israeli and palestinian civil society groups, especially among members of bereaved families. with personal trauma as their common denominator, groups such as the parents’ circle4 and combatants for peace5 have assumed an overarching shared identity as grieving victims of the palestinian-israel conflict, in addition to rather than instead of their rivaling national identifies. they have demonstrated how, by assuming this top layer of shared identity, they are able to work together to prevent both nations from suffering the consequences of the conflict in the future (keynan 2009). the work of groups such as these is a source of hope. if reconciliation is possible among individuals who have lost their loved ones to the conflict, it should be possible for sub-groups of citizens in democratic countries to harmonize their relations under a shared overarching identity. such an endeavor certainly requires serious, honest and courageous efforts by the leaders of all the country’s sub-groups. unfortunately, the likelihood that political leaderships would lead such an effort is quite low, as in situations of conflict, it is the more aggressive leaders that come to the fore and attain power (fisher 2006). political leaders typically prefer to exacerbate intergroup conflicts as a mechanism to strengthen their leadership (pittinsky and simon 2007; keynan 2009). civil society leadership on the other hand is less limited by political considerations, debts and interests and therefore may be a more promising candidate to lead such a project. the concept of citizenhood builds on the the fact that individuals and groups have ‘as many identities as [they have] relations with other individuals, groups, or social sites’ and that they ‘shift from identity to identity as they shift relations’ (tilly 2015, p. 9), and uses it as a leverage to alleviate inner conflicts between citizens who wish to remain loyal to their distinct cultural and natural groups and yet become part of the larger group's identity and aspirations. having an overarching identity to which all belong, strengthens the state’s social contract between all citizens as equal members in this alliance of individuals and 4 palestinian-israeli bereaved families for peace, http://www.theparentscircle.com/ 5 combatants for peace, http://cfpeace.org/?lang=he http://www.theparentscircle.com/ http://cfpeace.org/?lang=he cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 31 communities in their shared home, the state, thereby also encouraging cooperation between the different segments of society to promote joint interests. the majority may feel threatened by this concept, fearing it might limit their own wish to realize their nationhood in their national state. one should remember, however, that researchers of multiculturalism have continuously claimed that the majority’s cultural dominance is happening unaffectedly, by the natural course of the majority's choices (kymlicka 1995; kymlicka 2003; tamir 1998). just like any community, as long as the majority members imagine their cultural/national community (anderson 1983) as the one they wish to belong to (renan 1996), they will be able to attain their dominance simply because of their number. citizenhood does not prevent the majority from preserving its national feelings, nor the state’s representation of its symbols, though it does require room to present additional cultural symbols in the public sphere. perhaps the best way to describe citizenhood from the majority's standpoint is that instead of undermining other groups' national and cultural identities and emotions, it regulates the relationship between all groups, allowing a combination of symbols. this concept echoes kymlicka's suggestion (2011) of multination federalism, but offers instead a multi-identity federalism, whose borders are not territorial. instead of federal managerial arrangements it contains ‘federal’ identity, which similar to territorial federalism enables each group to preserve its identity, uniqueness and cultural life while conforming with the democratic values of the state. the members of each cultural group may live wherever they choose, identify themselves as belonging to this or other community according to their own choice, and change their identity if they so choose. this may calm down the struggle over dominating the state’s center and public sphere, and allow a sense of solidarity that extends the boundaries of each group. promoting an inclusive national identity may even strengthen the pride of all groups in their state, as a moral society, a necessary condition for continuous effort for national improvement (rorty 1998). to embrace all those who wish to belong to an inclusive citizenship, a nation state must satisfy three conditions: prohibition of the exclusion of minority groups from the legitimate civil partnership in the ‘we-ness’ of the majority, prohibition of oppression of individuals by their own totalizing groups, and defense of liberal-democratic values. the citizenhood notion is capable of satisfying all three conditions, provided that the defining rules apply equally to all members of the polity. these rules prohibit the exclusion of minorities by eliminating all barriers to full integration for individuals who so choose (without forced assimilation); grant collective rights to minority groups, eliminating obstacles to cultural and educational activities; and facilitate a superordinate civil identity by creating an atmosphere of inclusive citizenship. at the same time, however, these rules also prohibit non-liberal minorities from imposing oppressive practices on their own members, and limit the extent of these groups’ political power to change laws that reflect fundamental liberal-democratic laws. while supporting taylor's (1997b) concept of ‘deep diversity’, citizenhood addresses also the other side of kymlicka's (2017) question, cited above, of ‘what states can rightfully demand from minorities’. in other words, the citizenhood concept considers all individuals and groups of citizens as both equal and as part of the overall identity of the state, while asserting that this status allows both sides to demand reasonable reciprocity in their relations. 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 table 1 provides a concise summary comparison between citizenhood, citizenship and some of the more important above-mentioned theories and suggestions that have been forwarded to resolve the conflicts that arise due to multiculturalism. the theories that the table addresses are listed on the first row of the table, and the issues that are needed to be solved are listed in the first column. each cell provides an assessment of whether or not, and to what extent, the theory in the corresponding column resolves the issue in the corresponding row. for lack of space each theory is identified in this table by just one author, even though several might have shared the idea; i usually named the earliest author to come up with the idea. with seven theories and 16 issues there are quite a few comparisons to be made. in principle however, one observes from table 1 that citizenhood is better suited to resolve the problems concomitant with multiculturalism than the other theories. it provides a concrete named concept which projects a sense of belonging, whereas the other concepts might be somewhat nebulous. citizenhood is the only concept that unites all minority groups under one overarching identity with which they could identify, except for groups of totalizing minorities (for which nobody has a solution). but the paper provides suggestions of how citizenhood could even somewhat alleviate tensions between these groups and the majority. all theories assume that there are some groups that are less attached to the state and that the state must be tolerant towards them in some way. citizenhood on the other hand posits that all groups belong to the state, but each in its own manner. all the suggested theories are not yet feasible and are subject to opposition by the majority groups in the states and by the politicians. the majority might be suspicious concerning how the proposed arrangements would affect their power to dominate the public sphere. politicians, as mentioned above, are not entirely opposed to majority-minority conflicts since such conflicts could become a useful tool to enhance their leadership in a time of contesting political power struggles. these politicians would not welcome measures that would limit the conflicts. citizenhood however outlines a way whereby its adoption could become a win-win move for both the majority and the minority groups. hopefully these groups would have enough influence on politicians to induce them to embrace this concept. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 33 table 1 citizenhood compared with citizenship and alternative theories advanced to resolve multicultural issues in nation states theory features c it iz en ho od c it iz en sh ip d ee p d iv er si ty t ay lo r 1 99 7, 1 99 7b , 1 99 8 multinational federalism collective rights kymlicka m in im al is ti c a pp ro ac h fr as er , 2 00 0 b ar ry , 2 00 1 c iv il n at io na lis m ig na tie ff , 2 01 0 limited collective rights, 1998 extended collective rights, 2011 concrete concept yes yes no yes yes yes somewhat creates an overarching identity to all citizens yes no no no no no no provides minorities collective rights yes no yes yes yes no no provides minorities individual rights yes yes yes yes not necessarily yes yes provide a sense of belonging to all yes (but totalizing minorities may resent it) no no no no no only to liberal minorities 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 imposes a choice between the original subgroup and the national identity. no yes possibly yes yes yes not on liberal groups but yes on non-liberal groups promotes social cohesion yes no no no no no somewhat prevents society's division into privileged and unprivileged yes no no no no no not on liberal groups but yes on non-liberal groups could become an instrument of social bordering, exclusion and hierarchy no yes yes yes yes yes yes to nonliberal groups could lead to harmful artificial calls for unity of the majority no yes yes yes yes yes somewhat allows liberal minorities to lead their lives according to their particular cultural practices and norms yes somewhat yes yes yes yes yes eases tensions between the majority and minority groups with traumatic past yes no somewhat no no not addressed not addressed cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 35 allows totalizing minorities to lead their lives according to their particular cultural practices and norms yes, but only to the extent they do not conflict with human rights somewhat yes yes, but only to the extent they do not conflict with human rights yes, but only to the extent they do not conflict with human rights not addressed not addressed eases the exclusion of and conflicts with totalizing communities yes no somewhat somewhat yes not addressed no, may increase such tensions feasibility not negligible, but requires work yes doubtful yes doubtful yes doubtful example of partial success yes, in some few cases (shown above) yes no yes no yes no 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 references abowitz, k.k. and harnish, j. 2006, ‘contemporary discourses of citizenship’, review of educational research, vol.76, no.4, pp. 653-690. 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https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 guerra, teodosio and mswaka.this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(1): 4259, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i1.4259 knowledge and power of civil society: an empirical study of brazilian professionals working in ngos júnia fátima do carmo guerra armindo dos santos de sousa teodósio pontifical catholic university of minas gerais walter mswaka university of huddersfield abstract this study critically analyzes the way non-governmental organizations (ngos) operate in brazil and their contribution to the development of brazilian civil society. the notion of ‘power fields’ and ‘habitus’ proposed by bourdieu (1989, 1996), provides the theoretical backdrop to our discussions. this focusses largely on the recursive connection between structure and agency which resonates with the work of fligstein (2007) and giddens’ (1984) structuration theory. although there has been extensive research on ngos, there has been little academic scrutiny on the nature of outcomes of their interventions. this study therefore seeks to critically examine the learning and social practices developed by professionals in ngos in their daily activities. drawing on a qualitative case study approach in brazil, this study contributes to this debate by providing insight into the nature of the operations of ngos and the knowledge they produce, through the recursive connection between structure and agency. the results of the study show that the knowledge generated by ngos in brazil give them a certain level of power and influence in the country’s civil society. introduction many of the issues identified by civil societies today as relevant public problems in contemporary societies are also subject to controversies and debates (evers, 1995; salamon & anheier, 1997; morris, 2000; sobottka, 2003; alves, 2004; teodósio, 2014). in most cases, it is not uncommon, for example, to see conflicts between green movements, governments, corporations and the citizens regarding sustainable environmental development interventions https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i1.4259 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 65 (lewis, 1998; rondinelli & london, 2003; teodósio, gonçalves-dias, medonça & santos, 2013). in this context, knowledge becomes an important resource to mobilize other ngos and citizens in support of specific actions to develop civil society (nahapiet & ghoshal, 1998; mirabella & young, 2012; edwards, burridge & yerbury, 2013). we use the notions of ‘power fields’ and ‘habitus’ proposed by bourdieu (1989, 1996) and the recursive connection between structure and agency associated with fligstein (2007) and giddens’ (1984) structuration theory to support our arguments. this theoretical approach permits to us to critically analyze the social learning practice developed by ngo professionals in their day-by-day practices and activities. agents or groups can be defined by their relative positions in the social space. this means that the differences among social actors also define their positions in a specific social field. according to bourdieu (1989), each position or class is determined by the position it occupies within a region or social space. this allows us to identify power relations that can be attributed to each social actor. the ‘habitus’ therefore can be recognized as a practical approach created by the social actors in their day-by-day activities inside these social fields that encourage them to act and react without using a specific method (bourdieu, 1996). these two theoretical approaches are useful to understand the process of knowledge production as a resource of power and a collection of practices by these social actors, particularly the ngo professionals, in the civil society field. in this perspective, we also need to understand that the process of acquiring knowledge is based on practical learning by professionals (ribeiro, 2003; santos, 2004). this is largely as a result of interactions and practices shared by people in everyday behavior through the binding process between structure and agency (lave & wenger, 1991). this is an area that has not been sufficiently scrutinized from an academic perspective. this paper therefore seeks to address this gap in knowledge by providing insight into the knowledge produced by ngos as the possibility of expanding its power and influence in the brazilian civil society. we attempt to do this by adopting the assumption that the generation of knowledge occurs through the predisposed recursion between agents and structure, based on relational and complementary processes enabling the consolidation of power of non-governmental organizations in the civil society. in analyzing civil society organizations we cannot take a reductionist approach that allows us to treat these organizations as components of the third sector. in other words, we cannot take 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 non-profit organizations or third sector organizations as a constitutive part of civil society (sobottka, 2002; alves, 2004; teodósio, 2010). this ideological allusion to the third sector evokes two forms of distortion of reality. the first expresses itself in an attempt to ‘reduce the political aspect of civil society to transform it into a place of service in order to replace the state’ (alves, 2004 p. 152). secondly, ‘by excluding profit-making organizations from civil society, the new ideologues claims to depoliticize the market, making it only an object of technical considerations’ (alves, 2004 p. 152). in this paper, we regard civil society as a space of action for individuals and multiple types of organizations in a continuum consisting of the state, the market and the public sphere, developing political, economic and cultural frames in the same structure of social action (fischer et al., 2006; teodósio, 2010; alves, 2004). from this perspective we discuss and critically analyze the knowledge produced by non-governmental organizations (ngos) in order to explore the ways in which they can expand their field of power in brazilian civil society. these theoretical perspectives are useful for constructing a frame in which the process of knowledge production can be seen as a resource of power recognized through the set of practices developed by social actors, such as ngo professionals in civil society. from this perspective, we attempt to understand the knowledge based on practical social learning that happens through the interactions between ngo organizations and professionals of this field and how this is shared by people through everyday behavior in a social action related to structure and agency at the same time (lave and wenger, 1991; kimble, hildreth, 2004; handley, sturdy, fincham & clark, 2006; campos, mendonça & alves, 2012; yerbury, 2013; guerra & teodósio, 2014). when we consider the connection between structure and agency, we assume that the production of knowledge is generated from the predisposed recursion between agents and structure, based on relational and complementary processes, allowing for the consolidation of the power of non-governmental organizations in the civil society field. in order to shed light on these theoretical positions, we attempt to test out these abstract ideas in the social reality of brazil. we conducted in-depth interviews with professionals working in three ngos. in addition to these interviews, we used secondary data gleaned from reports, websites, books and manuals produced by these ngos. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 67 our results showed that the knowledge generated by these ngos led to the consolidation of their field of power in brazilian civil society. this knowledge production indicated that brazilian social, political and environmental problems have increased the possibilities for ngos to interact with other actors in the power fields of civil society in the country. in addition, these interactions also brought more power to these ngos in terms of capacity for action and mobilization of like-minded contemporaries in the public sphere. the structure of this paper is as follow. first, we discuss the civil society power field as a sphere of action developed by individuals and organizations for multiple purposes. after that, we discuss the notion of ‘power fields’ and ‘habitus’ proposed by bourdieu (1989, 1996) and components of giddens’ 1984 structuration theory. in the third part of this paper, we discuss the generation of practical knowledge as a way to change the power relations in the civil society field through the recursive process of the interaction between structure and agency. finally, we present the results from the research undertaken on key brazilian ngos as empirical illustrations of the theoretical ideas about how knowledge about social, political, cultural and environmental issues is generated. we envisage that our study on the generation of knowledge by brazilian ngos will advance our understanding and comprehension of the challenges, perspectives and changes in the power relations in the civil society field and contribute to current studies on studies of knowledge and power in the public sphere. civil society organizations, power field and habitus brazilian civil society is composed of a variety of agents and organizations that historically have different practices, strategies and approaches in attempting to advance democracy, ameliorate poverty, fight against the social inequalities and protect the environment. brazil’s political system was a dictatorship during the 60s, 70s and half of the 80s in the 20th century. this had a negative effect on civil liberties as well as operations of ngos. an important group of brazilian civil society organizations has since emerged with their political backgrounds based on the ideals of democracy and active citizenship (fischer et al., 2006; paula, 2005). supported by the catholic church, many grassroots organizations known as comunidades eclesiais de base – cebs were created during the dictatorship era, inspired by the ideals of liberation theology and popular education (paula, 2005). most of these civil society organizations believed in local popular and informal knowledge as a way of 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 disseminating their political and socio-economic policies to the poor and to local communities. this movement was developed as an alternative space for political mobilization to encourage popular participation in the discussion of everyday difficulties that people faced. this led to the formation of popular community leaders (paula, 2005). some groups also emerged to fight for citizenship rights, such as the movements protesting against the cost of living, unemployment, political repression and the oppression of women (gohn, 1995). in the 80s, some organizations with specialized professionals such as advisors, educators and specialists in popular mobilization appeared in the brazilian civil society field. this was the beginning of non-governmental organizations in brazil (paula, 2005). during this period, these ngos had a confrontational relationship with the political powers, because they fought against the dictatorship and had support from international ngos, such as amnesty international. nowadays, these ngos have gained significance because they are potential partners of current governments, due to their professional ability and structure (ghon, 1995). fischer et al. explain that one of the reasons for ngos being perceived as potential partners is because ‘neoliberal discourse presupposes the withdrawal of the state from a number of activities and the primacy of the market’ (fischer et al., 2006). this also has led to a reconfiguration of the funding model of ngos, with an emphasis on the self-sustainability (ghon, 1995). during the dictatorship era and until the end of the 1980s many participative spaces were created by the brazilian government to discuss public policies with civil society. thus, the role of many brazilians ngos changed during this time. in more recent years, although they continue to work for the poor, the role of the brazilian ngos has again changed. they are now focusing on providing professional, technical and managerial support to the disadvantaged members of society on issues regarding public policy and public management as well as on the preparation and implementation of policies that result in better living conditions for the population (marteleto & ribeiro, 1997; campos, mendonça & alves, 2012). according to fischer et al. (2006), these activities have highlighted the position that ngos hold within the matrix of the state, market and civil society. the partnership approach is based on an assumption that ngos can produce better and more useful knowledge and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 69 solutions to the social problems than the state and, in many cases, that even the academic world fails to address (bronzo, teodósio & rocha, 2012). so, partnerships with civil society organization could bring more effective technical and social solutions to these problems (evans, 1997; marteleto & ribeiro, 1997; selsky & parker, 2005; ospina, godsoe & schall, 2001; ospina & saz-carranza, 2005). in this context, from a bourdieusian perspective, they are assigned the task of building ‘new transversal flows’ between fragmented institutional spaces (meister, 2003; haigh & hoffman, 2012), thus enabling, in their field of training and action, symbolic intersections with the political (state), economic (market) and scientific (university and research centers) fields (marteleto & ribeiro, 1997; selsky& parker, 2005; adami, 2013; guerra& teodósio, 2014). we can use this perspective to understand the knowledge produced by ngos from the theoretical background of power fields and habitus, notions proposed by bourdieu (1989, 1996). according to bourdieu, habitus, as the word indicates, ‘is knowledge acquired’ and it can also be seen as a form of capital. in a practical sense, habitus enables agents to act and react without conscious obedience to rules (bourdieu, 1996). however, it also incorporates ‘a principle of generating and unifying knowledge which transforms the intrinsic and relational characteristics of a person’s position into a distinct way of life, ie, into a distinct set of choices’ (bourdieu 1996 p. 21-22). this capacity to establish difference is fundamental to the notion of habitus and to the notion of field. giddens’(1984) structuration theory states that understanding people’s activity is the core purpose of social analysis and he goes on further to argue that it is thus important to study practice because it can make a difference to outcomes. in this regard, the processual concept of structuration brings together ‘structure and agency ‘, which are important for understanding the arguments in this paper. in a social world constituted by different dimensions, agents define themselves by their relative positions in this space; in other words, by their differences, whether objective or subjective. each social actor is placed in a position or class within a given region of space, a field, where a set of forces are ‘imposed on all who enter this field’ (bourdieu, 1989 p. 134). these are the different kinds of power (or capital) that occur in different fields. the position of a particular agent in the social space can thus be defined by the position they occupy the different fields, ie by the distribution of powers that operate in each field (bourdieu, 1989). 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 following this theoretical approach, we highlight the relationship between the characteristic habitus of a class, ‘which is expressed in terms of universalism and formalism of its intentions’ and the logic of the field in which they are generated (bourdieu, 1989, p. 81). this approach is close to the concept of agency given by giddens (1984) that defines agents as having the power of intention and the capacity for action. with this theoretical background, we discuss the interaction between structure and agency without considering the overlap by hegemonic forces of one field on another. we contend that there is an additional and relational process, allowing for the consolidation of the power field of civil society organizations in the public sphere. we assume too that the knowledge generated by civil society organizations is influenced by social and practical processes with each recursion, and this will be discussed in the next section. social and practical knowledge produced by ngos the creation of force fields is based on power relations with objective and subjective dimensions when we consider the prevailing habitus of each field. from this dimension, ‘actors, under both stable and unstable institutional conditions, are not just captured by shared meanings in their fields, but are defined as scripts that must be interpreted by professionals or government bureaucrats’ (fligstein, 2007, p. 66). they emerge as counter narrative to the rationalist conception of action, because we ‘cannot process all the sensory data in a rational calculation that use and form concepts, based on their previous experience, in order to make decisions and act accordingly’. (carvalho et al., 2005 p. 3). considering this point of view, structure and agency are factors that determine action. they neither exist nor perpetuate themselves. neither has direct influence over the other, but the interaction between them is influenced by the interpretation of its components under legitimacy conditions (machado-dasilva, fonseca & crubellate, 2005). fligstein (2007 p. 61) extends this understanding by developing a sociological view of action which he calls ‘social skills’. according to this approach, skilled social actors must understand the perception of other actors in their group, regarding their multiple conceptions of interest and identity in specific situations, and provide an interpretation of the situation and actions that are consistent with the interests and identities of all of the social group (fligstein, 2007, p. 61). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 71 machado-da-silva, fonseca and crubellate (2005) argue that it is possible to visualize the interdependence between social structures and actions, without succumbing to the idea of linear causality between them. in other words, this means a dialectical interdependence link between objectivism and subjectivism or between mental and social structures (misoczky, 2003). this conception brings us to a dialogical and interpretive link between structure and agency, where the ngos can create knowledge in the civil society sphere. they are influenced by the habitus and the presence of social skills in the social action, given their capacity to address local social demands (guerra & teodósio, 2013). we can observe that knowledge is based on social processes and can be analyzed at individual, psychological, social and cultural levels (ribeiro, 2003; santos, 2004; bauman, 2008, schommer & boullosa 2010; guerra& teodósio, 2014). this conception is based on the social learning approach or socio-practice approach. in this sense, learning is as a result of interactions and practices shared by people, that we can find in daily behaviors. so we try to understand the cultural and social contexts in which people interact, build their shared practices, their cognitive and emotional repertoires and the necessary analysis of the individual cognitive processes of learning (schommer & boullosa, 2010). this notion of learning is based on social practice and is seen as a a praxis of action and reflection at the same time (freire, 1987; ribeiro, 2003; santos, 2004). this process is related to the ongoing restructuring of the meanings and signifiers on which specific systems consolidate learning. this, however, does not take place in an unconstrained context (schommer & boullosa, 2010, p. 21). rather, the social approach emphasizes that learning happens within social and cultural structures, where we can see the relational interdependence between subject, world, activity, meaning, cognition, learning and knowledge (yerbury, 2009). this is influenced by the historical context that is open to changes in a world that is socially constituted day by day (lave & wenger, 1991; haugh 2005; leana & pil, 2006; yerbury, 2013). based on these assumptions, we can consider that where there is knowledge production, this is generated by the habitus of agents associated through recursive processes, connecting structure and agency. silva (2004, p. 145) argues that knowledge consists of ‘information, which is relatively stable or static, and subjective characteristics in people’s minds’. knowledge generation is therefore 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 based on a dynamic nature of engaging experiences, context, interpretation and reflection. we identify two intrinsically-related knowledges. firstly, subjective knowledge, identified by the skills inherent in a person and the system of ideas and experience and secondly, perception, related to the explicit knowledge, formalized in text, graphics, tables, figures, drawings, easily organized in databases and publications in general (nonaka & takeuchi, 1997). these two types of knowledge contribute to the argument that knowledge is produced by social actors. the first, characterized as subjective knowledge, can be shown by means of perceptions and experiences of agents in the fields of power of ngos (bronzo, teodósio & rocha, 2012; guerra & teodósio, 2014). the second one, identified as explicit knowledge, considers that the knowledge can be systematized, formalized verbally and in records, emphasizing the cultural and symbolic capital of the fields which they belong. albagli and maciel (2004) highlight the importance of knowledge as the ability to process and recreate meanings, and further, the ability to convert this knowledge into action, or, more specifically, into innovation. through this theoretical perspective, it is possible to understand the possibilities for reframing diversified knowledge in their fields of power through the knowledge created by ngos. ngos try to engage social actors (agents) for their activities through mental and manual activity, action and reflection. the production of knowledge can therefore be seen as a result of acceptance of certain actions by agents, which are interpreted as legitimate. the knowledge produced by some ngos is reproduced in social practice and becomes institutionalized, being considered as desirable and an acceptable choice (bronzo, teodósio & rocha, 2012; guerra & teodósio, 2013; guerra & teodósio, 2014). ngos are involved in relational processes that allow the transformation of the field in which they operate by means of recursion, when individuals are considered social actors endowed with ‘habitus’ and interpretative ability. this perspective allows us to understand that ‘diversity [is] the power to change and engage in ways not dictated or guaranteed by the interpretive schemes of individuals and action that derives from them’ (carvalho et al., 2005 p. 20). methodology in order to gain a deeper understanding of the way brazilian ngos operate, the investigation used an in-depth case study approach (tellis, 1997; yin ,2003). face to face interviews with key informants from the selected ngos enabled us to identify valuable empirical data on a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 73 very complex area of scrutiny. the case study analysis involved a comparative analysis of three cases. two of the ngos work nationally and the remaining one has offices in different countries. these were i) cooperação para o desenvolvimento e morada humana (cdm) ; ii) grupo de institutos, fundações e empresas (gife); i) associação voluntários para o serviço internacional (avsi foundation). the selection of these cases was based on the need to illustrate the importance, diversity and representativeness of the ngos under scrutiny. these organizations were selected through our knowledge of the sector and social capital among the civil society practitioners. most ngos also collaborate with universities and scientific research centers in brazil and so this assisted us in generating a reliable data base. secondary data was collected through reports, websites, books and manuals produced by these organizations as well as government institutions. we conducted in-depth interviews with senior and operational staff working in the ngos as a way to gain a better insight into the knowledge produced by ngos. during this process, we also attempted to, identify and explore: i) the field of power in which each ngo is located and its ability to work in this environment, as the habitus and the social skills that each developed in this situation; ii) the recursive connection between staff of ngos and field structure, aligned to the knowledge produced by them; iii) the impact of knowledge they created to change the brazilian civil society field. each interview lasted for about an hour and also involved repeat visits. the data collected from the interviews was recorded, transcribed and manually analyzed through an inductive process of interpretation. this allowed us to analyze each case, generate relevant codes and identify the emerging themes (miles and huberman (1994), bryman and bell (2003), yin (2003), straus and corbin, (2008) and basit (2003)). we were then able to ascertain if there were similar patterns or themes across all three case studies that could be generalised (agar ,1980;miles and huberman ,1994). results knowledge and power of three brazilian ngos cdm is a brazilian ngo whose main goal to promote the development of the individual, their personal and social development, in order to overcome their vulnerabilities. this organization’s projects and social services provision are aimed at poverty reduction in areas marked by extreme deprivation. this organization emerged in brazil in the mid-1980s, and is 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 based in the cities of belo horizonte, salvador and rio de janeiro, which are cities in three different brazilian states. its main partners are the local communities in which it is embedded, represented by neighborhood associations and other local organizations. cdm believes that they must develop their projects in communion and harmony with the needs of the communities. cdm has many institutional partners such as the public sector (federal and local government), private sector, universities and other ngos. among these partnerships, we highlight the avsi foundation and fiat in brazil, working together in social responsibility projects for the development of the communities located in the vicinity of the car factory. in all these projects, cdm works to improve urban planning with a particular focus on areas with high concentrations of poverty. regarding knowledge generation, cdm, derives knowledge from both the exchange of information with partners and beneficiaries involved in projects such as socialization and through the systematization of knowledge that is produced through team work. this, according to one of the managers interviewed, takes place through opportunities to share practices developed through the organizations` activities. however, this latter form of knowledge is identified by the respondent as one of the greatest challenges of cdm. we have projects in separate areas with specific teams dedicated to their development. having the knowledge produced by these teams shared across teams is very difficult because people do not always need to learn about the other projects engaged in by the organization. they are committed to developing activities that people can choose to engage in. so, to get people also to participate in the intellectual heritage of the cdm is a huge challenge for us (interviewee cdm, 2013). according to the cdm manager, a significant amount of knowledge is produced by other civil society organizations, international organizations and the third sector. this is largely as a result of various interventions aimed at addressing social, political and environmental problems in brazil. in most cases, this knowledge is produced by ngos where the public sector does not develop programs, projects and actions to solve social problems. so, in reality these developments bring greater legitimacy to the actions of the ngos, because managers of civil society organizations generally have a better understanding of local communities than managers in government departments or even the managers of corporations. this came out clearly from the informant from cdm when he said: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 75 what i hear a lot, including from our technical staff, is that we always need to do a conversion, ie, the third sector should exist where the state does not have a presence. and that's a mistake. i try to fight for this sector as a legitimate expression of the society. like the private sector, it is needed by a particular group, the difference is in the perspective of financial profit as an end that is not part of the values of the third sector (interviewee cdm 2013). another ngo we studied was the avsi foundation. it is an italian civil society organization created in the early 1970s and it currently works in a number of developing countries. avsi began its activities in brazil in the 1980s mainly supporting italian missionaries who were working in the city of belo horizonte. their work was largely focussed on education and human dignity. guided by the social doctrine of the catholic church and currently headed by an italian with significant managerial experience, avsi supports a network of more than sixty (60) organizations working on different agendas of social and community development in brazil. in this network, the avsi foundation tries to share knowledge, practical learning from its work in poor brazilian communities and methods of development of social programs and projects. according to avsi’s manager, the organization seeks to achieve its objectives through a comprehensive network of relationships with local partners in different areas of brazil, a big and diverse country with varying levels of deprivation in its communities. these partners are government institutions, at both federal and regional level; big corporations; educational institutions, including universities, grassroots associations and other ngos; religious organizations, congregations, parishes and dioceses; and health institutions and hospitals. despite the involvement of these partners in the implementation of projects, avsi faces a major challenge related to the make-up of its international cooperation strategy. this is reflected by an informant from this organization when he said: we can see the reduced role of italy’s international relations ministry in their cooperation in development and in addition through the private sector involvement in the social sector. the programs cannot any more be programs offered only by the government or only by ngos, they have to be joint programs. so the main challenge is to adapt our organization to the point of view of work permeated by the division of responsibilities. this is the new economic, geopolitical and social scenario we are going through (interviewee avsi foundation, 2013). 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 according to the avsi foundation manager many problems in brazilian civil society organizations largely emanate from the lack of professional skills among the staff of these organizations. he went on to state that the ngos also suffer from an image problem in brazil, where most people see them as organizations that are run by inexperienced people. as a result many practices in brazilian ngos are largely guided by good will. there is therefore a need to improve the competence of civil society professionals, through effective management and through evaluation of social projects to attain efficiency (interviewee avsi foundation, 2013). in addition, this manager thinks that ngos in brazil currently have a bad reputation mainly due to the corruption scandals in the state-civil society partnerships that have occurred over the past 10 years. however, it is clear that both the cdm manager and the avsi foundation manager strongly believe that brazilian ngos have an important role to play in assisting the poor through the development of social projects. when asked how the knowledge produced by avsi was measured, the interviewee reported that the generation of knowledge occurs differently from country to country, state to state and city to city, due to the fact that the organization operates in over 30 countries around the world. so, currently, they are exploring how to consolidate and organize the knowledge that is generated in various countries of the world. we are creating working groups at international level where the manager responsible for each country and each sector has to coordinate and systematize the knowledge generated. this has been carried out internationally and locally. that is, someone has a responsibility in each country and there is someone to coordinate worldwide. it is not an easy process, it is an attempt to respond to global changes, and it has forced us to begin a process of changing the way we manage our own knowledge. (interviewee avsi foundation, 2013) the beneficiaries of the avsi foundation projects have a central role in the generation of knowledge, according the manager interviewed. it is useless for us to generate knowledge from what we think happens in reality. we have to see what the reality shows us. it's pointless to get into a community and carry out some training and attract international resources to activities that the community has no ability to create and sustain itself. from working together with the community, we generate knowledge for ourselves and for others. it is a practice that we have to systematize, to make it more noticeable and develop more consolidated knowledge that can be shared, in the interest of the community as well, drawing links to other projects or similar situations. (interviewee avsi foundation, 2013) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 77 the last ngo researched was the gife, a non-profit organization, headquartered in são paulo, created by brazilian private sector corporations and foundations. gife’s main objective is to invest in corporate social responsibility and programs to solve social and environmental problems in brazil. gife’s origin can be traced back to 1989 when the organization was developed, underpinned by a strong entrepreneurial focus. a group of entrepreneurs and businessmen, concerned about the problems in societies emanating from actions of corporations, began to meet to discuss ways in which these could be addressed. in 1995, the group was formally established by 25 organizations. today the organization is made up of a variety of businesses and social investors which currently stand at 130 associates operating their own projects or working in partnership with other corporations and ngos. when asked about gife’s understanding of corporate social responsibility, the respondent from the organization pointed out the role that the third sector and civil society organizations play in drawing the attention of companies to the responsibilities they have to society. ‘so, not only the state will be responsible for this kind of thing, but companies are also beginning to take charge of it, of generating social value for communities’. (interviewee gife 2013). the organization’s activities are focused on 3 key issues: mobilization, advocacy and knowledge management. according to the coordinator of knowledge, the ‘gife’s dna is in the mobilization of business men’. the objective of this area is the articulation between members in an attempt to make them talk to exchange experiences, discuss trends, challenges and also to create links with non-members, who may know other social investors. these may be from civil society, ngos, local and federal government ... may be other kinds of partner associations, can be their own private sector companies. then, the intention is to link different community actors and social investors (interviewee gife 2013). advocacy is a new activity within gife. it is concerned with representing the interests of corporations on social responsibility legislation, monitoring and influencing the regulatory environment of the third sector while at the same time improving the relationship with the brazilian government and ngos. the management of knowledge is developed through strategic projects that perform quantitative research (and sometimes qualitative research) on social investment and related 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 topics. the systematization and dissemination of knowledge produced by gife occurs through meetings among members, as well as conferences, publications, policy papers, book chapters, research and annual reports. such knowledge has the goal of promoting political institutional strengthening and improving the performance of private social investors on the issues of the social field. gife also has several partners that create databases that provide valuable information on social investment in brazil. we have partner organizations that produce knowledge about corporate social investment through research such as comunitas, ethos institute, some universities, the brazilian association of non-governmental organizations (abong), the institute of applied economic research (ipea) and the brazilian institute of geography and statistics (ibge). the ipea is responsible for writing and publishing reports about ngos in brazil. gife and abong bring the knowledge they have on the civil society sector to support the ipea in the data analysis. so it's a partnership that has worked very well for over 10 years (interviewee gife 2013). our study aimed to investigate the knowledge produced by ngos as a method with potential to expand its field of power in brazilian civil society. qualitative research allowed us to analyze the impact of the knowledge produced by civil society as opportunities for transformation and redefinition of the field in which they operate as organizations of the civil society. final remarks in our research we can see how three brazilian ngos created knowledge initiatives to strengthen their position of power in the civil society field. we can see the ‘habitus’ and the social skills in continuous action in these three organizations. although the legitimacy crisis of the civil society organization in the contemporary brazilian society is evident, it is clear that advances have been made in terms of institutionalization of the role of civil society organizations. these advances come, amongst other things, with the capacity to generate reliable knowledge about brazilian social problems. cdm and avsi foundation organize themselves and developed a kind of social action based on the idea that it is important and possible to overcome human, physical and social vulnerabilities through efficient management of social projects and through the continuous dialogue with local communities. gife started with the engagement of entrepreneurs and executives interested in responding to social demands about business, but nowadays it has strong connections with brazilian government institutions responsible for collecting and studying all the information related to social projects, ngos, corporate social responsibility actions, fund-raising, impact and efficiency of social and environmental projects. these are themes that concern the media and the public opinion in brazil and these have improved the position of power of gife in civil society. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 79 in the three ngos, the presence of professionals with social skills were vital to the operations and the expansion of their field of power within civil society as well as reproducing their ‘habitus’ within an extensive network of partnerships with other stakeholders. we can see the flows among and between fragmented institutional spaces and confluences of knowledge in symbolic intersections among social actors from civil society, state and market through the analysis of the activities and experience of these three brazilian ngos similar to those we can find in another studies about ngos (see for example marteleto and ribeiro, 1997; meister, 2003; ospina, godsoe & schall, 2001; ospina & saz-carranza, 2005; fredette & bradshaw, 2012. the analysis of cdm and the avsi foundation shows that professional staff tried to align the actions of cooperation and social development work implemented in different countries, thus promoting the visibility of multiple forms of knowledge about social problems that came from different cultures. this finding can be observed in the processes of avsi foundation that sought to develop core systematization of knowledge in each country of its operations in order to cope with the related dynamics and geopolitical transformations in which they operate as well as to reflect and learn through practice. according to fligstein (2007), the ability to influence and lead other actors to the same path is critical to the transformation of structure and this theoretical perspective is confirmed by the empirical data collected on our research. at the same time that these interactions are developed, operated and supported by the dynamics of knowledge production based through the social practice, we can understand the possibility of recursive connection between agents and structure in a social field of power in the society. this perception can be confirmed by the importance that the three organizations under scrutiny give to the knowledge that is produced from the relations with the public and other institutional partners. although we found some difficulty in transforming the practices and dynamics developed by cdm into systematized knowledge, we can see that this could be spread across teams among the actors involved (interviewee cdm 2013). we can therefore conclude that in the three cases that were analyzed, the knowledge generated by their institutional practice has improved their positions of power in brazilian civil society. from the empirical analysis undertaken in this research, we found that the knowledge produced by ngos in the brazilian context, through the recursive connection between the 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no1, 2016 actors in the fields and structures, contributes immensely to the expansion and transformation of the field in which they operate. the results show that the knowledge generated and disseminated by ngos allows the consolidation of their power field within brazilian civil society. the knowledge produced through ngo professional practices combines scientific approaches on social and environmental problems with common sense perceptions and local knowledge as shown by the analysis in this work. we hope that this study will lead to new research into the production of knowledge, the construction of fields of power and the dynamics of civil society, by comparing the realities of different national ngos or by accessing more cases and expanding the scope of our research to include different social contexts. references adami, r. 2013, ‘intersectional dialogue – a cosmopolitical dialogue of ethics’, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.5, no.2, pp. 45-62. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v5i2.3179 albagli, s. and maciel, m. l. 2004, ‘informação e conhecimento na inovação e no desenvolvimento social’, ciência da informação, vol.33, no.3, pp. 9-16. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0100-19652004000300002 alves, m. a. 2004, ‘o conceito de sociedade civil: em busca de uma repolitização’, organização e sociedade, vol.11, edição especial, pp. 141-154. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0013188032000133548 basit t. n. 2003, ‘manual or electronic? the role of coding in qualitative data analysis’, educational research, vol. 45, no.2, pp. 143-154. bauman, z. 2008, a sociedade individualizada: vidas cotidianas e histórias vividas, rio de janeiro, ed. jorge zahar. bourdieu, p. 1989, o poder simbólico, lisboa: difel. bourdieu, p. 1996, razões práticas: sobre a teoria da ação, campinas, papirus. bronzo, c., teodósio, a. s. s. and rocha, m. c. g. 2012, ‘tri-sector partnerships in social entrepreneurship: discourse and practice of the actors from the circles of action and reflection’, revista de administração (fea-usp), vol. 47, pp. 446-460. bryman, a .and bell, e. 2003, business research methods, new york: oxford university press. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v5i2.3179 http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0100-19652004000300002 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0013188032000133548 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.1, 2016 81 campos, l. c. m., mendonça, p. m. & alves, m. a. 2012, ‘from ‘‘dot.org’’ to ‘‘dot.gov’’: professional crossings in the brazilian national policy on hiv/aids’, voluntas, vol. 23, pp. 236-256. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11266-011-9195-3 carvalho, c. a.; 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journal, vol.5, no.3, pp. 1-13. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v5i3.3381 yin, r. k. 2003, applications of case study research, newbury park, ca, sage publishing. yin, r. k. 2007, estudo de caso: planejamento e métodos, 3. ed. porto alegre, bookman. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511803932 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2009.11.005 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v1i1.824 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v5i3.3381 knowledge and power of civil society: an empirical study of brazilian professionals working in ngos abstract introduction civil society organizations, power field and habitus social and practical knowledge produced by ngos methodology results knowledge and power of three brazilian ngos final remarks cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 2 2018 © 2018 vicki bamford. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: bamford, v. 2018. estranged but not strangers: challenging organisational norms of access for people with disability and people from a nesb . cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 10(2), 12-28. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs. v10i2.5938 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed article estranged but not strangers: challenging organisational norms of access for people with disability and people from a nesb vicki bamford university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: vicki bamford, school of communication, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. vicki. bamford@uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5938 article history: received 01/03/2018; revised 25/05/2018; accepted 28/05/2018; published 25/07/2018 abstract this research investigates the reasons why clients are estranged from their organisation when they expect to be the focus of communication attention. it investigates an organisations’ ability to establish the conditions necessary for inclusion of the organisation’s publics who identify with disability and who come from a non-english speaking background (nesb) to understand why estrangement occurs. an analysis of communication between the organisation and their clients aims to isolate inclusive processes by understanding power relations that facilitate voice and listening. this is achieved through a case study of a service organisation that is obliged to engage with its publics and has a strategy to do so. data were gathered from the organisation’s documentation and interviews with instigators of policies and processes. feedback from the organisation’s clients was collected focusing on their experience of being engaged and included given norms of inclusion may not be shared. a thematic analysis was undertaken of the data to isolate themes on inclusion. the themes revealed: a culture of inclusion; a policy that encouraged an exchange, and processes established by professionals with expertise to design and promote inclusion beyond their usual publics. keywords organisational communication, disability, nesb, listening declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. 12 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5938 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5938 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5938 http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:vicki.bamford@uts.edu.au mailto:vicki.bamford@uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5938 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 introduction the effective inclusion of diverse publics1 in organisational communication is challenging to achieve yet immensely beneficial for the organisation. success relies on an ability to share an understanding of the culture and kim argues shared norms facilitate the exchange (kim 2001, p.143). for this reason, publics outside an organisation’s usual culture of engagement can face norms that lead to exclusion (chriss 1998; roper 2005; hall 1992; atkin & rice 2013; davis 2006 2013; vardemann-winter & tindall, 2011; vardemann-winter, 2014). this presents a challenge for organisations and their communicators who may be adept at communicating with known publics but find they are challenged by publics who sit outside of their norms of practice (davis 2006; vardemann-winter & tindall, 2011; vardemannwinter, 2014). simultaneously, many people from diverse backgrounds report feeling estranged from their service organisations, despite being clients expecting to be the focus of communication attention (vardemann-winter & tindall, 2011, vardemann-winter, 2014, atkin and rice, 2013, davis, 2013, client 2 and 3, 2017). while organisations may make an effort to engage with their publics, listening to them to understand and facilitate their needs requires greater commitment. this is because norms of practice vary and power relations impact the exchange and often leave publics confused because meaning has not been shared (shildrik, 2012; bê, 2012; honneth, 1995; bickford, 1996; hage, 1997; thomas, 2007; davis, 2013; barnes, 2012, p.8; goggin, 2009). in this context, the current study attempted to identify the conditions necessary for the inclusion of people with disability and people from a non-english speaking background (nesb) in communication with their service provider organisation. the aim was to isolate the aspects that make inclusion possible for the publics outlined, given that ‘norms of practice’ may not be shared (davis 2013; krompridis, 2006; vardemann-winter, 2014; roper, 2005; atkin and rice, 2013). the research was conducted in an australian context using a case study of the australian communications consumer action network (accan), which is a not-for-profit organisation known for its inclusive policies and practices. accan is australia’s peak communications consumer organisation and in their role as advocate they are obliged to engage with their member publics and the broader community and have a strategy to engage with them. accan represents individuals, small businesses and not-forprofit groups as consumers of communication products and services, including telecommunications, broadcasting, the internet and online services of current and emerging technologies (accan, 2017). it is a small organisation of approximately 14 employees but its remit is australia-wide. accan’s organisational vision and mission focus on informing, enabling and equipping consumers with information to empower them to make informed decisions about the communication services they use (constitution of accan ltd, 2012, accan strategic plan, 2012-2017). this philosophy is operationalised through organisational goals and the following objectives: to act with courage, integrity and 1 in public communication literature, ‘public’ commonly refers to a group of people who share an interest and know about each other, increasing their power to act (dewey, 1927, hallahan, 2007, smith, 2013). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 15 independence; operate openly, efficiently and effectively; be accessible and inclusive; recognise relationships are critical to their goals, and value volunteers and staff (accan strategic plan, 2012-2017). the two specific publics that include people from a nesb and people with disability were selected because they each comprise a large percentage of the australian population: 19.3 per cent (ho & jakubowicz ,2013, p. 23) and 18.3 per cent (survey of disability, ageing & carers, 2016), respectively. despite their significant number, there is agreement these publics are under-represented in organisational communication, media and society (vardemann-winter, 2011, 2014; atkin & rice, 2013; davis, 2013). indeed, thill and dreher argue that their lack of recognition ‘contribute to a denial of basic human rights’ (2017, p. 2). this argument underpins the impetus for this study. reviewing perspectives that challenge a culture of inclusion. a survey of the literature was conducted to identify organisational communication processes that aim to create a culture of inclusion. with reference to the literature surveyed, public communicators establish a culture of inclusion when they hold expertise and persuade organisations to engage with all of their publics. however, if communicators are to fully explore possibilities that maximise inclusion, they need to understand the internal and external organisational communication environment as it sits within an active mediated public sphere (gregory 2012; stacks 2016; habermas 1989, 2006; macnamara 2016; daymon & demetrious 2014). a culture of inclusion challenges powerful barriers established by a ‘hegemony of normalcy’ (davis 2006). the onus to persuade organisations to broaden their remit in part falls to public communicators. their role must manage the needs of multiple publics; nevertheless, the organisation has the final say (holtzhausen, 2010). ahmed (2012) argues that organisations are easily blinkered by self-interest and must be pushed to review processes beyond an economic imperative. hallahan (1999) agrees and argues that, while the exchange maybe dialogic, it is limited by the framework it operates within. organisations need to keep abreast of changes by undertaking research to isolate publics and the organisation’s needs (stacks, 2016). more critically, a communicator’s abilities require a mix of priorities arising from the organisation and their own ethnocentric perspective embedded through historical, political, social and cultural experiences to affect their ability to include (woodhams & corby, 2007). by proactively exploring inclusion in policy and process, communicators can compare outcomes with their publics and address deficiencies. for organisations to recognise minority publics, they need to hear them. having a voice that counts means more than speaking. it requires agency to put forward a view (couldry, 2010, p. 8). voice draws attention that can lead to acknowledgement and create a space for inclusion (couldry, 2010, p. 2). yet, fraser (2008), claims many voices are either not heard or not recognised because they differ from the dominant culture. diverse publics need to be positioned so their voice can be heard. concurrently, organisations need a system that allows 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 diverse voices to be heard. scholars argue for a critique of the way voice manifests to assess ‘processes which obstruct [the] voice’ of diverse publics who are often challenged by the process (couldry, 2010, pp. 2-3; thill, 2015, p. 40). for diverse publics to be included in communication processes, they need to be valued. dreher states, ‘the promise of voice for marginalized communities without attention to political and institutional listening may not deliver’ (2012, p. 161). listening as the other side of voice, is an essential element for inclusion but it can be selective and lead to oppression when publics lack the power of positioning and become marginalised (lukes, 1978; bickford, 1996). bickford’s framing of the concept ‘political listening’ as openness, courage and continuation to value the voices of marginalised people so they have a chance to be heard, showcases the ideal environment (bickford, 1996, p. 170). whereas dreher (2010) argues institutions must initiate opportunities to listen to ethnic minorities by privileging their opportunity to be heard given they are better placed to resource the communication process, macnamara (2014, p. 9) found that while the communication field values a two-way dialogic approach to the exchange, listening is narrowly conceived as engagement and haphazardly applied by organisations as their need arises. the exchange while two-way is not equal. to be listened to only signals the intent to include. inclusion needs a process to enable, capture and include feedback. the power to exchange must be given available to all publics if the organisation wants to claim inclusion. organisations need greater focus on listening protocols for publics who sit outside their norms of practice to improve inclusion for diverse publics. analysing inclusive practice the study used a qualitative research methodology by case study to analyse access and inclusion within a service organisation (yin, 2009). the aim was to review current practice to find exemplars of best practice, and provide insight on new ways of engaging that lead to inclusion (stacks, 2016). the methodology included content analysis of organisational policy and procedure documentation, and in-depth semi-structured interviews with staff and clients of a service organisation (fink, 2010, p. 64). the analysis of inclusion provides a snapshot of contemporary practice and the way it manifests in communication policy and processes (yin, 1994, 2009; parkhe, 1993). an interpretivist paradigm aimed to capture meaning in people’s experience of inclusion and exclusion and to allow for emerging interpretations from diverse publics to be explored (frey, botan & kreps 2000). this methodology aimed to interpret the beliefs and lived experiences of multiple publics to isolate effective communication processes. the investigation used principles of constructionism as ‘constructed reality’ informed by historical, political, social and cultural experiences that affect inclusion (woodhams & corby, 2007, weerakkody, 2015). it is limited by the communicators’ ethnocentric perspective as informed by their experience. this approach aimed to determine the power relations behind ‘who is heard and who is not’ (goggin 2009; weerakkody 2015). a shift in focus on the exchange aimed to explore possibilities for minorities who are empowered to engage. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 17 data were collected from accan’s organisational documents (see table 3) and from semi-structured interviews with managers of communications, policymakers and their diverse clients between august and december 2017. the interviews with managers of policy and communication were conducted at the organisation’s office in face to face mode for between45 minutes and one hour (see table 1). interviews with accan clients were conducted over the telephone with the exception of one which was conducted in his office (see table 2). i asked managers of policy and communication a series of nine questions to obtain their opinion on how they included the publics outlined. the questions focussed on accan’s communication policy and processes. the topics included: how they engaged their members, any variation of process offered and why that did or didn’t happen, examples of success and challenges, lessons learnt, and if feedback had changed processes. i also wanted to find out how the organisation promoted the opportunity to engage because creating awareness is raised as a key issue for diverse publics. in most instances i asked interviewees to provide examples of inclusion in their own words. the account allowed me to observe differences in understanding and implementing effective access and inclusion. additionally, i wanted to find out if the organisation would extend capacity for inclusion beyond compliance according to incorporation law and human rights legislation to proactively engage these publics. finally, i wanted to know who in the organisation manages the process and understand their expertise and worldview. seven questions were put to clients to understand their experiences and their relationships with the organisation, how they were engaged and if the process was adequate. i asked whether clients were provided with a variation of access, if it was useful and how it could be improved. i also asked how they found out about the opportunity to engage and if the process was effective for them or how might it be improved. clients were asked to provide examples in their own words about having access and if those examples meant clients were included. finally i asked them to describe what successful inclusion looked like and how they measure it. the questions were analysed by content to isolate themes that occur around engagement and inclusion. a purposive sample was taken of managers (table 1). as shown in table 2, the clients were selected based on their level of engagement as members of accan and because they were self-identifying publics with disability or from a nesb. table 3 lists the documents used. 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 table 1 managers interviewee role interview manager 1 manager of operations face to face1 hour manager 2 manager of policy face to face45mins manager 3 manager of policy face to face1 hour with manager 4 manager 4 manager of policy face to face1 hour with manager 3 manager 5 manager of communications face to face1 hour with manager 6 manager 6 manager of communications face to face1 hour with manager 5 table 2 clients interviewee diverse background level of engagement with accan organisation client 1 disability active member vision australia, nsw. client 2 disability aware member ablelink, able australia, victoria. client 3 nesb active member federation of ethnic communities council australia, (fecca), act. client 4 nesb aware member westjustice, victoria. client 5 nesb latent member asylum seeker centre, nsw. table 3 documents document title available to public or only internal document 1 accan strategic plan 2012-2017 available internally and externally document 2 constitution of accan limited 31.10.12 available internally and externally three client interviewees self-identified with disability or from a nesb and all interviewees were member organisations that provided an advocacy service to their nesb and disability clients. the accan member clients were selected based on their level of engagement and to improve the opportunity to collect data that demonstrated a broader selection of views. for instance, each client was recommended for an interview based on a manager’s interpretation cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 19 of their level of engagement with accan as ‘usual’, ‘less engaged’ and ‘actively engaged’ (that is, ‘aware’, ‘latent’ and ‘active’ according to the situational theory of publics methodology, (grunig, 1997; aldoory & sha, 2009). knowing a public’s level of interest on an issue enables public communicators to design communication strategies to more effectively engage them. for example, public communicators do not use information-seeking strategies for latent publics because they do not look to engage. client 5 (nesb), said ‘i get their newsletter… they mostly email us … we just don’t need the support now’; in this case, the communicators would need to grab their attention. whereas, active publics do not need to do so because they regularly engage by sharing information and communicators can easily select one of those methods to engage with them. public communicators develop strategies to suit the publics’ specific needs according to their level of engagement by knowing their communication style using the situational theory of publics process. client 1 (disability) said: ‘…we [speak by] phone if there is a pressing issue, regularly email and call or face-to-face or teleconference type interaction…’. opportunities that expand traditional segmentation strategies by name or demographic, and that bring preconceived understanding of terms, create possibilities to extend engagement more effectively. alternative engagement processes challenge norms of engagement effected by stereotyping and are key to inclusion (miles, huberman & saldana, 2014, p. 36, grunig, grunig & dozier, 2002). this study has observed that while accan aimed to engage carefully with all publics in alignment with its advocacy position, communication with disability groups was more extensive and was more likely to be successful. for example, accan have a staff member who identifies with disability and his lived experience and that of his contacts have become key to informing their policy and processes. while there is a focus on engagement with indigenous and nesb communities, the organisation relies on grant applications where communities develop their own resources, or their member clients advise them on best processes for engaging. interviewees report their experience of inclusion and discuss the challenges interviews with accan managers and their disability and nesb client ‘member’ publics are reviewed under three themes argued to reflect ‘political listening’ as openness, courage and continuation to value the voices of marginalised people as claimed by bickford (1996, p.170). they are: a culture of inclusion; a policy that encouraged an exchange; and a process that promoted and enabled inclusion for the member organisations who represent people with disability and people from a nesb. these themes are discussed through the words of interviewees to demonstrate accan’s processes for inclusion. theme 1: a culture of inclusion managers reported that the expertise of staff to undertake research, decipher complex government reports and develop communication to engage their diverse publics showed a genuine commitment to inclusion. in addition, staff’s ability to establish and facilitate 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 advisory panels, grant schemes and attend staff training demonstrated they want to listen and be inclusive. the value of longstanding relationships with diverse clients and a commitment to engage with them is demonstrated by one manager’s response: ‘i think we’ve been married to some of those consumer organisations for so long, that we really understand what it is their constituents are actually needing’ (manager 6). simultaneously, this manager acknowledged a reliance on the community to provide culturally specific information citing an example of when they ‘... provided info about a phone card scam in the chinese community and published … it in chinese newspapers/radio’. the process was only possible because the community provided the translation and advice on where to promote the information. a good relationship is important. another client agreed saying ‘we work quite closely with [accan] on lots of different projects to provide advice on a wide variety of communities and languages other than english’ (client 3). this client organisation shares culturally and linguistically appropriate information to enable accan to better support their nesb clients. the exchange is mutually beneficial and builds a trusting relationship because the organisation has established a reciprocal process. the communities rely on accan to share resources according to a manager. the disability community uses ‘… regular spots on the radio for the print handicap (rph) to promote [accan’s] their latest reports and provide updates about [telecommunication] scams’ (manager, 1). sharing information in appropriately accessible formats for diverse and specific publics is important to reduce discrimination. a review of the format and promotional processes used is argued to improve access and lead to inclusion. accan are committed to ensure their office and events are accessible, ‘… the lifts announce what floor you’re on’ (manager 2). when an advisory forum is held, they must accommodate the people and their accessibility requirement ‘such as wheelchairs, technology and their advocate(s). it can be hard to organise’ (manager 2). accan have established a baseline of provisions. a manager said, ‘we ask people is there anything you need that will make it easier for you to participate, and we build on it’. the manager provided further examples: ‘we have real time captioning, auslan, hearing loop, everyone must use the microphone when they speak so the [conversion] technology works for those who need it’; and in addition, ‘there is someone who is speech impaired, so that person has a communication assistant’ (manager 2). accan proactively facilitates inclusion. a manager said that this means that when members attend the annual conference, they ‘don’t need to identify because it is all included’ (manager 2). in addition, accan have staff with accessibility needs, and managers work to ‘make sure, and [staff] makes sure, everything is accessible’ (manager 1). the manager said there is a shared understanding that if something is not accessible, ‘they [the clients] will tell us’ (manager 2). accan demonstrate they are open to improving inclusion. a manager described a consultation process that ‘casts the net widely to touch base with different organisations … rather than a static advisory committee’ (manager 1). this cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 21 culture is argued by ahmed to stand in opposition to ‘a fixed style that values certain cultural accomplishments’ that ‘shape what is taken for granted’ (ahmed, 2012, p. 417). staff training through sharing ideas and being exposed to a variety of communication processes was argued to inspire new ways to engage. one manager said, ‘we will look year on year for good... training initiatives. we focussed on ‘easy english’ [this year] and previously on cultural awareness with indigenous communities’ (manager 1). further, the manager commented on developing a ‘solid expertise within the staff … and encouraging staff to be active in the community sector organisations… where we’re well aligned to take on leadership roles’ (manager 1). an organisation that creates pathways for exchange demonstrates it values the exchange beyond compliance. additionally, the manager said ‘… when staff move on… we’ve got this alumni in great organisations and we can call on them and they are our contacts’ (manager 1). the organisation demonstrates it values productive and mutually rewarding relationships which are key components found in bickford’s ‘political listening’ framework (1996, p.170). most of the clients interviewed indicated that they found accan to be open to a variation of content style by language translation or format such as braille, or processes such as audio or captions, and to work collaboratively to improve accessibility. one client identifying with disability said: ‘i think accan is a good example where you do have that culture [of inclusion] that’s driven from the senior levels and permeates the organisation’ (client 1). however, not all were in agreement. another client said, ‘they are good [advocates] but they could be better … they sometimes swing a little bit more to the direction of appeasing industry’ (client 2). he qualified the comment by saying: ‘we are very aware our little corner of interest is just one part of a broader portfolio that accan has’ and must manage with limited staff (client 2). while clients agreed accan has a culture of inclusion they also acknowledged their wide remit and minimal staff were limiters as maintained by some of their clients and managers. indeed, as one accan manager said, ‘we try to be inclusive but we are human, we make mistakes’ (manager 1). this response demonstrates a manager who values honest self-appraisal. the core values emerging from managers and their clients suggest this is an organisation that encourages collaboration and in doing so, it establishes a pathway that improves engagement for their diverse clients. the process for inclusion may not be full formed but the elements applied as indicated in the interview transcripts describe a willingness to include exists. theme 2: policy that encouraged an exchange accan’s communication policy to encourage engagement is broad. while it aims ‘to represent members from a range of special interest groups and general consumers …’, it also aims to use evidence-based research of the lived experience of its members to make a case (manager 1). formal policies include: an industry engagement framework, member engagement framework, committees, formal sessions of consultation and ad hoc consultation. manager 1 stated, if needed they ‘will commission research on a topic, work with industry specialists, look through abs and advisory forum feedback … and draw on grant applications from which we’ve had 172 in the past 4 years and 9 months’. 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 the accan grant scheme is a competitive process that ‘funds projects which either undertake research on telecommunications issues, represent consumers or create educational tools which empower consumers to make decisions in their own interests’ (accan, 2017). in 2017-18, $275,000 per annum of all eligible projects was provided to ‘address systemic issues for telecommunications consumers’ (accan, 2017). the assessment of applications was carried out ‘by three panel members who have lived experience but are not representative of their sector’ (manager 1). the results of the research can impact accan, government and telecommunication policy. the process allows for community-specific data to be gathered and shared to empower others in similar situations. one accan research grant involved a queensland remote aboriginal media group. the media group found ‘a lot of people in their community falling victim to bad phone selling practices and getting in a lot of debt’ (manager 1). the researcher gathered data on why this was happening and found that while the remote community had ‘limited access to media and english language they were connected by their local radio and they used it to spread the word’ (manager 1). the grant manager said that the media group, ‘developed some great radio spots in community language … they are still playing them’ (manager 1). the radio spots informed listeners about the scam and how to address it. the community have applied for multiple grants since to develop more radio announcements having found it the best way to communicate with their remote community. in addition, ‘the radio spots have been translated into multiple indigenous languages’ (manager 1). not only did the grant outcomes help the public address their own issue, they also informed the organisational policy of the telco to address the scam and the telecommunication industry ombud (tio) to manage the process. encouraging communities to address their own issues enables them to better understand the problem and develop communication tools that are fit for their own purpose. as davis notes, norms shared challenge a hegemony of normalcy (davis, 2013). both managers and clients agree that the research grant scheme empowers communities to develop their own solutions and provides accan with evidence to drive change in government policies. insight gained from the research funded by the grant scheme is shared amongst accan members through summaries of projects in the accan weekly newsletter, blogs and promotion at events and conferences. a nesb client said, ‘we get accan’s newsletters and grant information and if it aligns with an issue we are trying to address we get involved or apply for another grant’ (client 2). accan reported their work is evidence based arising from listening to the experiences clients face and reviewing government policies. the evidence indicates the need for telecommunication organisations to improve communication, particularly with their diverse publics. a member organisation manager who provides advocacy to their client said, ‘telecommunications has inadvertently become a huge part of the lives of most deaf-blind people with the smart phone revolution. … [it has] given people access… a level of independence, but … they’ve become customers of telecommunications providers.’ (client 2). he said his members were unable to obtain customer service advice on bill anomalies because the telecommunication organisation was not set up to speak to them. they were told to come in to the office to sort out the issue. client 2 said, ‘part of what you are paying for is cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 23 this ability to access customer service when needed. you don't get a discounted rate because half the services are inaccessible.’ accessibility is an issue for people with disability because many service organisations are not equipped to manage a variation in process to enable inclusion. this may be due to a lack of understanding of the process needed to connect or an inability to provide the service. furthermore, accessibility for some publics stands in contrast to customer service protocols and human rights legislation. engagement protocols require attention. thill argues that if the voice of disabled publics is to be valued, institutions need to structure the way their voice can be heard (2015). organisations need to know how to communicate with their client publics. client 2 argues that working with accan to share experiences and find appropriate ways to contribute to policy change is a key factor. accan rely on their members to raise issues during advisory forums and feedback processes so they can seek advice on how to address discrimination from a policy and process perspective. fraser states that while it is of mutual benefit to ensure accessibility, the organisation must establish a process to bridge to the dominant culture (2008). members of accan share their experiences to build expertise. a nesb member organisation said: ‘we approached them [accan] to be involved in “bills day”’ (client 4). ‘bills day’ is a day on which publics from specific communities, often without english language skills, can bring in their utility bills to be assessed for payment and legal issues arising as a consequence of being signed up to the wrong internet plan. ‘accan helped us with information in language and advice on how to support particular communities and connect them up with the tio [telecommunication industry ombudsman]’ (client 4). the collaboration has been so successful that the model has been distributed across many communities. in this case, sharing solutions is mutually beneficial. advisory groups are another way that accan seek feedback from their members on draft policy. accan invites people with specific skills to come in person or connect online to discuss policy, such as the roll out of the nbn. they rely on the expertise of their members to raise issues of concern to their community and encourage telecommunication member organisations and government to address these issues. both managers and clients stated that the advisory groups were valuable (managers 1, 2; client 1). forecasting issues helps accan be proactive and develop processes to address issues at a time when changes can be made. client 1 said ‘accan recently contacted us and asked for feedback about the nbn, what the issues are for people with vision impairment, what peoples’ concerns are’. they were able to provide first hand advice. accan clients indicated the materials they are provided help them to do their job of communicating with specific communities. the use of case studies through the lived experience of member clients was of particular benefit. they could raise and discuss their telecommunication issues within a relatable context. while accan acknowledged they were constantly working towards more inclusive practices, some clients said inclusion was limited by the capacity of accan to provide access. for example, for people who use auslan to communicate, this provision is only available on request and not part of the usual process. 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 while accan provides multiple provisions to improve access, they are limited by budget, staff numbers and expertise. comments reveal there is an on-going need to ensure these publics’ voices are heard if they are to be included. the onus is on the client with accessibility needs. many scholars including roper, (2005), hall, (1992), atkin and rice, (2013), vardemann-winter, (2011, 2014) argue the clients lack the power and expertise to speak back in ways that effect change. dreher also agrees and calls for ‘attention to political and institutional listening’ (dreher, 2012, p.166.) the interaction with accan while open is limited by the framework offered. when publics are not fully recognised they lose their ability to engage. a review of policy priorities and ramifications for publics who require attention because they sit outside a norm of the organisation will provide further insight (davis, 2013). theme 3: a process that promoted and enabled inclusion managers of communication processes are required to design and promote access and inclusion for all their clients but the process requires expertise and an ability to address feedback. accan provides numerous access points between australian consumers of telecommunication and government, members and their clients but they are challenged by the design of communication and promotion to engage diverse publics. in the main, their ability to work collaboratively with members and individuals with lived experience enables them to develop materials that are informative and accessible for the publics identified. the accan process encourages collaboration and a by-product is that it offers a fertile space for idea generation and trouble-shooting strategies to emerge (grunig & hunt, 1984). this is seen with bills day, where the opportunity to share the process helped service providers to understand communication issues in their community (client 4). the dynamics of such a process enable engagement and inclusion without the usual protocols and are argued to challenge norms of practice (davis, 2013; barnes, 2012). a manager referred to the 2017 accan conference where the cutting-edge work of the national disability service (nds) was featured. the nds is the australian peak body representing 1100 non-government disability services. accan promoted this work to attendees by showing a youtube video called ‘the making of nadia’, an online virtual assistant developed to answer questions put to the nds by people with disability accessing the national disability insurance scheme (ndis). the ‘nadia’ system learns from the user and converts information into a format that is accessible to them. it is a technology similar to microsoft’s ‘siri’ but it specifically supports the needs of people with disability. whilst the technology is the main accessible feature, it could not have been developed without input from people with lived experience. this example demonstrates an innovation that was achieved when government, technology innovators, people with lived experience and actors combined to broaden inclusion for a multitude of users. the youtube video explains the development process of ‘nadia’ and demonstrates accan’s commitment to expand norms of practice by sharing resources and promoting innovation. (accanect, 2017). accessibility for the deaf community is important to accan. their policy officer was working with the deaf community and he identified the need to encourage wider use of https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=rswhlp3q7gc cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 25 captioning which is the translation of audio words to text. he developed a media campaign to increase awareness while trying to improve accessibility of the videos they were posting on youtube by creating auto captioning but found that people in government services and members of parliament (mp) in particular, were hindering accessibility. the manager said, ‘the captioning conversion wasn’t very good [as accents can impact translation] and it resulted in some pretty funny captions and frustration for people who rely on them’ (manager 6). accan issued a ‘this is how you fix it to mps’ to address the access issue (manager 6). accan regularly review their website and resources to ensure the format and content is accessible (managers 3, 5 and 6). a manager said, ‘we have set a baseline of standards that all documents and all our website will be accessible to people with disabilities… so all docs can be used by text-to-speech converters… the disability community know they can rely on our stuff on our website’ (manager 1, echoed by managers 5, 6). by establishing a standard the organisation demonstrates their commitment to the process, simultaneously marking a point for review. while the standard is argued to represent best practice some clients find it inaccessible. feedback from members suggests accan draws widely across their publics to inform telecommunication policies but they can struggle to engage some of their members. one client said: ‘i’ve always been able to give feedback when i wanted’ (client 1). another said: ‘we were only included because i sent them an email about something unrelated…then i was asked to comment on the telecommunication protection code’, his concern was ‘we came very, very close to not being included’ (client 2). the organisation needs a system to ensure all clients are aware they can provide feedback so their opinions are heard. by contrast, a manager said at times it can be hard ‘finding the right people with expertise’ [to provide feedback] (manager 2). manager 3 agreed adding: ‘the community sector can be so stretched… we are constantly asking for feedback… but in saying that i find the community are very generous’. obtaining feedback from members is critical to inclusion but there are barriers for people with disability and people from nesb who can sit outside a norm of practice, and an ineffective engagement process impacts whether they are included (davis, 2013). one client commented how pleased he was to be asked ‘to contribute to a teleconference about the telecommunications consumer protection code… [as] i might not have gotten to the written input stuff’. his point refers to the time taken to respond effectively using the technologies that enable him to engage. he pointed out that it takes him time to prepare a response, check materials and run through adaptive technology and this process was prohibitive for him given his workload at the time (client 1). by enabling him to give feedback verbally, his views were able to be included. the understanding that processes can take longer to adapt is another often hidden element that impacts whether the voices of diverse publics can be heard. a variation of process challenges norms of practice that, as barnes argues, is reduced to a familiar public that is positioned for communication in ways that enhance their ability to be included, any change requires significant work for the powerless (2012, p.8). 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 opportunities and challenges the circulation of monthly summaries of accan’s work was called for by client 1 to allow time to consider responses and improve awareness. another client referred to times when he was not aware consultations were being held and how that affected his community with the opportunity to give feedback. he said ‘from our point of view, opportunities to engage are so few and far between, that when we do miss them, we’re sort of very aware of that’ (client 2). while accan aim to enable engagement, the reality is the process requires the less powerful to speak up and it may not be possible for all publics. disability advocacy scholar, cate thill, states that ‘shared dialogue’ is only open to some and requires work by the organisation to structure the way voice can be heard (2015, p.40). having a voice does not always enable diverse publics to contribute effectively because context plays a role and it affects the opportunity to engage. while feedback was asked for from clients on process and policy, clients were not sure if or how it was used beyond having a list of contributors at the end of a report. dreher argues for voice to be the ‘start of an ongoing discussion, negotiation or response’ (2012, p.166). publics are bound by the organisation’s processes and if inclusion is not facilitated or the process prevents diverse publics from accessing information because of language, accessible format or as a consequence of cultural norms not being shared, then the exchange is a missed opportunity for all. it is frustrating for organisations who assume they have consulted and for publics who had hoped to have their concerns aired. i argue their voice can be captured by incorporating the lived experience of people with whom the organisation wants to engage, within a framework that is responsive to their needs. however, securing a point of view is different from inclusion which requires commitment from the organisation to establish a process that both listens and includes. building capacity of organisations and their diverse publics this paper has found ‘a culture of inclusion’ embedded in organisational policy and processes can improve organisations’ engagement with their diverse publics. while a keenness to engage is fundamental, it is critical to address the power disparity between organisations and their diverse publics so their voice is included. a focus on ‘political listening’ in order to privilege an exchange between diverse publics and managers requires facilitation by the organisation (bickford, 1996, p. 179; dreher, 2010). success lies with managements’ ability to establish a culture that proactively seeks multiple ways to engage. the data suggest that working with people with lived experience provides unparalleled insight into access and inclusion and this information can inform policies and processes. similarly, working with public communicators who have expertise in persuading management to establish processes that include all their publics is key. this case study has demonstrated that inclusion takes time. however, there is a real opportunity to build capacity of organisations and their diverse publics 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capacity of organisations and their diverse publics acknowledgements references sanjay ramesh, department of peace and conflict studies, university of sydney corresponding author: sanjay.ramesh@sydney.edu.au issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 sanjay ramesh. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(3): 5185. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5185 colonial and post-colonial ethnocracy in fiji sanjay ramesh university of sydney abstract this paper analyses colonial ethnocracy, post-colonial ethnocracy, inter-ethnic alliances and new forms of ethnocratic ethnocracy in fiji as historical sociology. utilising oren yiftachel’s theorisation of ethnocracy and location of ethnicity and race in historical structures, i intent to problematise ethnocracy in fiji as sociohistorical moments, comprising of the hegemony of the ethnocratic colonial regime, post-colonial political discourse between indo-fijian and indigenous fijians within post-colonial ethnocracy and inter-ethnic collaboration and alliances that led to the political reconfiguration of the ethnocratic polity, ethnoclass and supposedly non-ethnocracy from 2006. introduction fiji has a history of ethnic tensions where europeans, indigenous fijians and indo-fijians competed for ethnocratic hegemony. the british colonial authorities established colonial ethnocracy based on the concept of harmony of indigenous and european interests where indigenous fijian chiefs supervised indigenous cultural discourses and the europeans controlled the economy and the state. nevertheless, the colonial regime introduced ethnic complexity and brought indian indentured labourers to fiji to protect indigenous fijians from the destructive forces of plantation capitalism, based on cultivation of sugar on european alienated indigenous fijian land. by 1945, the indo-fijian population had overtaken that of indigenous fijians and europeans and by the 1960s, indo-fijian leaders pushed for independence of the colony of fiji, raising fears in the indigenous community that indofijians wanted political control to re-design indigenous land ownership. as a result, ethnic tensions increased with indo-fijian leaders giving up their quest for political control and mailto:sanjay.ramesh@sydney.edu.au https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5185 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 accepting the vision of indigenous fijian leader ratu mara, who engineered a political compromise in post-colonial fiji where indigenous fijians established political control in partnership with the europeans and indo-fijians stayed in opposition. this vision unravelled in 1987 when inter-ethnic collaboration between the two communities resulted in the loss of indigenous political control, triggering military intervention in may 1987. the military coup was followed by the racially-weighted 1990 constitution but by 1993, deep divisions among the indigenous fijian elite forced prime minister rabuka to undertake a constitutional review, resulting in the 1997 constitution. however, this constitution could not resolve underlying ethnic tensions and in 2000, there was a military coup and mutiny led by indigenous fijians at the military barracks in suva. following the mutiny, military commander, voreqe bainimarama, criticised the nationalist government of laisenia qarase and overthrew his government in december 2006. the military implemented de-ethnicisation strategies but the underlying ethnic tensions continued following the promulgation of the 2013 constitution and democratic elections in september 2014. post-independence fiji is characterised by these conflicts over ethnocracy. ethnocracy: theoretical consideration ethnocracy is a type of political regime that ‘facilitates the expansion, ethnicisation and control of a dominant ethnic nation’ (yiftachel 2006, p. 11). in such regimes, ethnicity is the key driver of the polity, including economic resource allocation, public policy, political rights, social engagements, religious constellations and social discourse. oren yiftachel (2006, p. 12) identified three major political and historical engines of ethnocracy: ‘the formation of the colonial settler society, mobilisation of power of ethnonationalism and ethnic logic of capital’. as identified, many parts of the world have settler communities which were planted by hegemonic european powers including spain, portugal, great britain, france, dutch and italy. most important and relevant of the hegemonic powers to this article was great britain which established indirect rule in fiji from 1974 to 1970 and the white settler community controlled the state and the economy. at independence, the colonial ethnocracy took a post-colonial form with ‘constant democratic and ethnocratic tensions, (yiftachel 2006, pp. 16-18). these tensions led to further ethnic segregation ‘diffused into social and political system, enhancing multidirectional processes of essentialising political ethnicisation’. in fact many post-colonial societies became cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 117 ethnonations led by the ethnoclass but these nations quickly descended into ethnic violence and prolonged ethnic conflict where ethnic armies executed ethnic coups and participated in ethnic cleansing. the civil society in an ethnonation becomes dysfunctional because of national social and cultural programming along ethnic lines with non government organisations caught in the middle as ineffective referees. the ethnicnation dictates and manipulates constitutional, legislative and committee systems to ensure that the ethnoclass continues its grip on political power. according to yiftachel (2006, p. 16), the ethnic state has a dominant ‘charter’ where the ‘ethnoclass appropriates the state apparatus and determines the outcomes of most public policies’. these appropriations are a conscious assembly of the state apparatus along ethnic lines and political discourses are controlled from above with ethnic identities the mainstay of social discourse. over time, the ethnoclass and ethnonation become synonymous and those outside the ethnic in-group face structural and systemic marginalisation, resulting in counter cultures, disruptions, protests and boycotts and eventually ethnic violence. oren yiftachel’s analysis was primarily focused on the israeli-palestinian conundrum and his analysis of the ethnoclass and the ethnonation was aimed at demonstrating the rigidities of ethnic hegemony where all aspects of social life of the community revolve around ethnic identity and ethnic considerations. the ethnonation gets trapped in its own systems and structures as inflexibility sets in and ethnic out groups find it difficult to have any meaningful engagement. while yiftachel focused on ethnoclass and ethnonation, randolph persaud (1997) located ethnocracy in a wider political discourse. for persaud (1992, p. 173), ‘colonial domination was much broader than economic exploitation. it was a form of domination which was civilisational in content and in which race played a key role’. what transpired after the colonialists left in many of the former british periphery was continued ethnic conflict and race politics. in fiji in particular, the ethnoclass remained largely indigenous fijian chiefs, indigenous commoner nationalists and europeans. the colonial-inspired constitutional structure at independence ensured that the mutated ethnoclass maintained its grip on power by invoking ethnic solidarity, thus continuing with the ethnonation and the inherited colonial systems and structures (naidu 1992, pp. 81-102). the other distinct feature of the fijian state was the military which was entirely indigenous fijian and guarantor of the hegemony of the ethnoclass. in 1987, and again in 2000, the ethnic 118 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 military intervened in politics to restore ethnic hegemony but found the ethnoclass divided and fragmented. the whole concept of ethnonation and ethnoclass was re-examined by the military hierarchy from 2003, resulting in the restructure of the fijian ethnonation from 2006 to 2014. the ethnic history of fiji provides insights into the historical moments that shaped fiji’s ethnocracy and the tensions between those in power and those on the periphery as inter-ethnic alliances led to new political configurations and social outcomes in 1987, 1999 and 2014. colonial ethnocracy colonial ethnocracy was established when indigenous fijian chiefs ceded the islands of fiji to great britain and accepted the formal arrangement whereby the british colonial rulers controlled the politics and the economy of the colony and the chiefs continued with their cultural hegemony of indigenous fijians. the colonial ethnoclass consisted of the british political administrators, the great council of chiefs influenced by later by ratu sukuna, and the european settlers. on october 10 1874, the chiefs of eastern fiji – vunivalu cakobau, ma’afu, ratu epeli, tui bua, savenaca, esekeli, tui dreketi, ritova, katonivere, ratu kini, matanitobua and nacagilevu ceded fiji to britain. the cession was inevitable, because the cakobau government (1871-1874) was bankrupt and the european community wanted a stable political authority to protect their economic interests. the provisional governor of fiji, sir hercules robinson, inherited the task of administering fijians. borrowing from the political and social organisations of eastern fiji, he grouped the islands of the colony into provinces, based on boundaries of the old fijian state, and within the province a number of divisions were created, each comprising a group of villages related by kinship. each of these administrative units – the village, the district, and the province-was placed in charge of a fijian, and here was a chain of responsibility from the lowest level to the highest (roth 1951, p. 135). the british colonial authorities at once restructured the native administrative system by giving exclusive jurisdiction on native affairs to the council of chiefs. the boselevu vakaturaga, the great council of chiefs, was a new institution, based on the collective experience of the chiefs in the failed cakobau government. despite being dominated by the chiefs from the maritime provinces, the great council became the official custodian of fijian cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 119 land, culture, tradition, customary rights and social relations. besides that, the council helped to entrench colonial ethnocratic rule in fiji by ensuring least resistance to the new political order from the indigenous masses. the great council of chiefs was also an agent of colonial propaganda. the deed of cession was interpreted in a way that created the popular myth of a protective colonial policy towards the natives. according to macnaught, ‘in the fijian popular mind the lands had been given by the chiefs to the queen vakaturaga, that is, by way of a chiefly presentation which entitled them to expect that the queen in her reciprocal generosity would return the lands to be shared and used by the people’ (macnaught 1982, p. 30). the first governor to fiji, sir arthur hamilton gordon, cemented the protective colonial policy by strengthening the social and cultural foundations of the great council of chiefs. gordon was a conservative at heart and campaigned against self-government in the north american colony of new brunswick. his apparent lack of success in british north america left him bitter and disillusioned. however, he was very well read and had intimate knowledge of the cultural destruction of the indigenous peoples of north america, west indies and australia. as a convert to preserving indigenous way of life, gordon was determined to safeguard indigenous fijian culture. but according to historian peter france, gordon’s understanding of indigenous fijian affairs was fundamentally flawed. to begin with, gordon did not speak or write fijian and was further estranged by his adoption of the position of a high chief (france 1969, pp. 104-105). gordon was an avid anglophile and mistakenly claimed that the provincial, district and village system was deeply rooted in indigenous fijian tradition. but this was not the case for all of fiji. in western viti levu, different forms of social organisation and hierarchies existed, particularly in the interior of ra and nadroga where matrilineal descent groups prevailed. nevertheless, gordon saw roko tui (the provincial chief), buli (district chief) and turangani-koro (the village head) as synonymous with the colonial administration and as a result, fijian administration, modelled by the colonial masters, was imposed on the rest of the fiji islands. indigenous fijian labour was regulated by a paternalistic tax-in-kind policy, which stipulated that every male fijian between the ages of sixteen and sixty would be liable to contribute twenty days labour on public works in his province, including road works, improving provincial offices, hospitals and gardens and these provisions were enforced by the village administrators who kept detailed account of who did what, where and how. by this arrangement, sir arthur gordon ensured that fijians worked on their land and were not 120 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 directly involved with the colonial capitalist economy, where more intensive labour was required under exploitative conditions. the deed of cession allowed the indigenous fijian chiefs, together with the colonial government, to oversee and regulate fijian land. however, by the virtue of the deed, the colonial government had absolute authority on the economic development of the colony and, as such, sir arthur gordon tapped into the existing indentured labour system operating in british colonies since 1835 and imported indian labourers to fiji from 1879 to 1916. indian labour proved quite successful in developing and extending the sugar economy. for the colonial government, indian labour gave the fijians the time needed to absorb the impact of colonial rule and embed colonial ethnocracy, thus arresting the steady decline in indigenous fijian population numbers, and enabled fijians to enjoy the unusual institutions that had given them a powerful voice in colonial policy (macnaught 1982, p. 2). the chief-gordon viewpoint was founded on two important pillars: colonial ethnocracy where europeans controlled the state and the great council of chiefs provided guidance to the colonialists on indigenous culture and land. the colonial ethnocratic state was built not only on protective native policy but on an ethnic exclusive political agenda where indigenous fijians were disbarred from developing any meaningful social contact with indo-fijians. village turaga ni koros were informed to keep an eye on any indo-fijian who may find their way into a village and if indo-fijians were detected, they were to be arrested and brought back to the coolie barracks that housed indentured labourers. william sutherland states that the ideology and the practice of racialism perpetrated by the ruling class made a large section of the fijian population see themselves primarily as fijians rather than exploited people (sutherland 1992, p. 32). by the early twentieth century, the colonial-chief alliance embedded the colonial ethnoclass that dictated social and political discourses in the colonial ethnonation of fiji. one of the most avid defenders of the colonial ethnocracy was ratu sukuna, one of the first fijian chiefs to receive western education. ratu sukuna was the district commissioner of lau and a son of a bauan chief. as the most gifted of the young fijian chiefs, he was selected to be educated in new zealand and england at the expense of the fijian people. ratu sukuna was the impetus behind the formation of the fijian affairs board and the native land trust board in the 1940s. he was dedicated and wanted to strengthen the existing colonial ethnocracy via fijian administration. ratu sukuna focused his energy on protecting and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 121 preserving indigenous fijian land and chiefly privilege and forged alliances with the europeans to ensure legislative provisions. as a result, the native land trust ordinance of 1940 was formulated to shield the colonial ethnonation from the demands of indo-fijians and their leaders who demanded political equality from 1920 to 1970 through series of boycotts, disruptions and strike. according to robert norton (2002, p. 136), ratu sukuna and the great council of chiefs was major obstacle to change on ‘proposals to extend franchise to fijians’ because the official view was that indigenous fijians were not ready to participate in politics. the ethnic hegemony of the chiefs was established in the 1960s when indigenous fijian leader and the paramount chief of lau, ratu sir kamisese mara, created a three-tier party structure to manage fiji's ethnic politics and formed the alliance party of fiji which had three distinct arms the fijian association, the indian alliance and the general voters (newton 1970, p. 33). the fijian association was active in promoting indigenous fijian political paramountcy since the 1950s when indigenous fijian chiefs rose within the ranks of the colonial bureaucracy, providing political leadership to their community. for example, the fijian association was behind the wakaya letters of 1956 wherein the chiefs affirmed ethnic hegemony of the chiefs by invoking the deed of cession of 1874, arguing that transfer of political power after independence must be from the crown to the indigenous chiefs. according to robert norton (2012, p. 522), ‘the post war fijian political bureaucratic elite was formed in rapid period of economic, social and political change’ where ‘several chiefs and some commoners acquired great official status’. in 1959 fiji witnessed challenges to the colonial authority by the multiracial fiji retail and wholesale workers union. the protest by the union ended up in riots where european properties were damaged by indo-fijians and indigenous fijian activists (howard 1991, p. 53). however, with the intervention by indigenous chiefs, ratu edward cakobau and ratu sir kamisese mara, the short lived rebellion against the colonial authority and the european business monopoly was defeated. the chiefs argued that indigenous fijians were manipulated by indo-fijian political activists to facilitate their own anti-colonial political agendas (bain 1989, p. 15). as a result, the temporary inter-ethnic alliance was broken and the two communities retreated to their ethnic and communal camps. francis west (1960, p. 49) observed that ‘the european tendency, and that of the fijian chiefs, has been to imply that if the fijians rioted, they must have been incited and egged on by alien anti-european provocateurs and by hooligans; by implication indians or outsiders’. furthermore, west 122 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 (1960, p. 53) analysed the ethnic contours that prevailed in fiji at that time: ‘there are professional indians, doctors, and lawyers independent of the government and this is one of the political strengths of the indian community. the fijians, lacking them, may find an already complex situation further complicated by the rift in political and economic consciousness which the riots already seem to show between the town and the countryside’. in fact, the indo-fijian population had quadrupled between 1921 and 1966. according to christian leuprecht (2012, p. 89), by the ‘1950s, not only the indians became an absolute majority, they had fairly young age structure’. the ideological position of indo-fijian leaders and their activism against the colonial ethnoclass were blamed for the 1959 inter-ethnic disturbances against the colonial authorities. indigenous fijian chiefs were reminded that the ‘heathen’ indo-fijian leaders were attempting to drive a wedge between the indigenous chiefly hierarchy and the commoner indigenous fijians by spreading anti-colonial and antichief propaganda. following a series of activism against the colonial sugar refining company and the colonial government for the rights of indo-fijian sugar cane farmers, indo-fijian political leaders formed the federation party following disturbances in the sugar belt of fiji. the federation party was led by indo-fijian leader a.d. patel (lal 2011) who called for land reforms so that farmers could get easy access to indigenous land on generous lease arrangements. patel was also motivated by the decolonisation movement following the second world war and advocated independence for the colony of fiji. the federation party was an extension of maha sangh (kaplan & kelly 2001), which was formed in the 1940s to fight for the rights of indo-fijian sugar cane farmers. after initially focusing on indo-fijian issues, the party formed a partnership with the indigenous fijian national party in 1969 and attempted to promote inter-ethnic cooperation but this effort was short lived as political parties fractured along ethnic lines. also, in the lead up to fiji’s independence, indigenous fijian chiefs remained suspicious of indo-fijian leaders and increasing indo-fijian population that has surpassed indigenous fijians (premdas 1978, p. 35). however, with the formation of the un decolonisation committee, the international stage was set for fiji to move towards independence (alley 1970, p. 150) despite the domestic political condition in fiji despite ethnocracy firmly entrenched in the party system. eight decades of colonial rule ensured that indigenous fijians and indo-fijians had minimum social interaction and, at all times, the colonial administration reinforced ethnic and communal identities. also, demographic changes played a key role in ethnic tensions. a majority of indigenous fijians in the 1960s cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 123 were living in rural areas and only a handful of indigenous chiefs and indigenous commoners had emerged with any significant leadership experience and education, and this group was committed to indigenous political hegemony in the new post-colonial political order. the colonial fijian administration, entrenched after the cession of fiji to great britain, allowed for social hierarchy to be cemented in villages, districts and provinces and most indigenous fijians were entirely removed from commerce or any form of social engagement with the indo-fijians. church, chiefs, customary obligations and subsistence agriculture were central to the indigenous fijian village life while politics and governance was the sole domain of hereditary indigenous chiefs and the privileged few indigenous commoners. indo-fijians had little access to land ownership and largely worked on sugar plantations and in urban factories. the indo-fijian elite had chosen non-agrarian careers and lifestyles and were predominantly middle class doctors, engineers, lawyers, accountants and public servants and some taking over from europeans in business (mamak 1978). one problem was that the indo-fijian leaders lacked a political strategy aimed at bridging the divide between the two communities and aggressively pushed for independence with the hope of working with progressively minded indigenous fijian leaders. however, the indigenous fijian leaders saw independence as a chance to reclaim the state from the crown and were united in their view that the only protection for indigenous land ownership was indigenous fijian political hegemony. despite strong nationalist views, indigenous chief ratu mara developed some working relationship with indo-fijian leader a.d. patel, but as discussed this was hardly the case at the grassroots level, where racial bias and prejudices were prevalent (brookfield 1972). before independence, the ratu mara-led alliance party of fiji won the election of 1966, but the indo-fijian leaders refused to work with indigenous fijian leaders and resigned from the parliament, forcing by-elections in 1968. indigenous fijians interpreted the behaviour of indo-fijian leaders as disrespectful and as a consequence the first significant racial tensions flared up (newton 1970, p. 34). robert norton (2002, pp. 134-137) noted that ‘the terms of decolonisation, most specifically the electoral system, became the point of acrimonious struggles between the fijian and the european leaders on the one hand, and the principal indian leaders on the other’. norton further determined that the ‘privileged position of chiefs in the colonial state contrasted starkly with government’s weak links with indians’ and, as a result, indo-fijians were looked upon with suspicion because they continuously challenged the european dominated ethnocracy and called for equality between europeans and indofijians which attacked the heart of european political and economic hegemony in fiji. also of concern was the future state of the country after political authority transferred from the 124 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 colonial authorities to indigenous fijians who saw indo-fijian leaders as agitators, continually pushing for better terms of land lease, and political equality. as a consequence, ethnic tensions increased in the lead up to independence. indo-fijian leader a.d. patel, as a result of ethnic tensions, softened some of his positions on land. ratu mara continued holding discussions with a.d. patel and was responsible for achieving consensus with the indo-fijian leadership from 1970-1972 on the future of the new independent nation. in 1969, a.d. patel passed away and siddiq koya assumed the leadership of the national federation party. koya at first adopted a more conciliatory approach towards indigenous fijians but maintained the push for ‘common roll’ (a common electoral franchise), which was supposed to enhance political equality (vasil 1972, p. 25). according to henry rutz (1995, p. 74), both communities in fiji embraced independence for vastly different reasons. ‘indians imagined a newly created “citizen” living in a civil society that subordinated the status of religion race and a particularist culture to national solidarity’ whereas indigenous fijian rhetoric was embedded in the paramountcy of fijian interest informed by ethnic or communal voting system, hegemony of the chiefs and protection of indigenous land. establishing post-colonial ethnocracy indigenous fijian leaders quietly opposed common roll and were concerned that one person one vote would ultimately lead to indo-fijian political domination. under the 1970 constitution, the senate had 8 great council of chiefs (gcc) nominees who had powers of veto over legislation affecting indigenous fijian interests. this provision of the constitution was never properly explained to indigenous fijians, who were extended voting rights from 1962 whilst indo-fijians had been electing their representatives since 1929. also under the 1970 constitution, there was a 52 member house of representatives with 22 seats (12 elected on communal roll and 10 on national roll) each for indigenous fijians and indo-fijians and 8 seats for general voters. the constitutional set up ensured that indigenous fijians and europeans would bloc vote to ensure paramountcy of indigenous fijian interest in government. following the promulgation of the 1970 constitution, the alliance party and the national federation party postponed national elections until 1972 and agreed in principle to work cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 125 towards a non-ethnic model, embracing an agreed version of the common roll electoral system. however, ratu mara did not support common roll after the 1972 election because indigenous fijians in his government equated common roll to indo-fijian political domination and, as a result, the relationship between the two parties soured in 1975 after the street commission recommendation that fiji was ready for a common roll electoral system. ratu mara remained unconvinced following strong indigenous fijian polling for the alliance party in the 1972 election against common roll. koya and mara had a falling-out and the socalled ‘fiji's honeymoon period’ premised on cooperation between two communal leaders was over (lal 1986, p. 78). also, in 1975, an alliance member of parliament caused uproar within the indo-fijian community when he called for the expulsion of indo-fijians from fiji to india, sparking accusations from indo-fijian leaders that the alliance party was actively promoting ethnocracy. sakeasi butadroka, in fact, highlighted the views and concerns of many indigenous fijians that indo-fijians were taking over the country since indo-fijian business had all but taken over from the europeans after independence. butadroka who was from the indigenous fijian province of rewa was able to successfully tap into indigenous fears and concerns caused by continued lack of interaction between the two communities (lal 1986, pp. 96-97). with the formation of the fijian nationalist party, racial politics entered a new phase in fiji as the illusion of multiracial harmony created by ratu mara’s ‘pacific way’, premised upon the concept of a happy and a peaceful multiracial society, faded. according to mara (1997, p. 282), ‘the phrase inspired his 1970 partnership with the indian opposition leader to produce a constitution whereby people of different races, opinion and cultures can live and work together for the good of all’. however, fiji was a racially stratified society where cultural isolation of the two communities reinforced prejudices and biases, which were exploited by the ethnic leaders for their personal political ends. ratu mara did not want to compromise on any form of electoral solution that compromised indigenous fijian political hegemony while koya continued to campaign for common roll. the post-colonial ethnoclass in fiji comprising indigenous fijian chiefs, indigenous fijian commoner nationalists and europeans and the ethnonation that was established through the 1970 constitution ensured indigenous fijian political control via ethnic bloc voting with the support of europeans. in the april 1977 elections, indo-fijians who supported the alliance party were unimpressed with the political position of ratu mara and so their support moved to the national federation party. also, the fijian nationalist party split the alliance party’s indigenous fijian vote allowing the national 126 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 federation party (nfp) to win power and challenge the post-colonial ethnic class. however, the split within the nfp ranks and the indecision on the part of the nfp leadership forced the intervention of the governor general ratu sir george cakobau, who appointed ratu mara as a care-taker prime minister (murray 1978, pp. 230-238). seeing the prospect of the repeat of the april 1977 results, indigenous fijian voters came back to the alliance fold. race played an important part in the second general elections of 1977 and showed that division amongst indigenous fijians could compromise the political position of their leaders. race continued to dominate fiji politics until the april elections of 1987 when the fiji labour party and the nfp coalition put forward a new multiracial vision for fiji and successfully convinced urban indigenous fijians to change their voting behaviour. another important factor besides race was that indigenous fijians were a minority by 1987, and as a minority community were concerned by the economically dominant position of the majority indo-fijian community. the minority-majority dynamics caused suspicion among indigenous fijian nationalists of indo-fijian political designs and furthermore the ethnoclass that governed fiji became increasingly concerned about losing power due to slight shifts in ethnic voting patterns. as stated before, indigenous fijian political hegemony could only be realised if the community voted as a bloc for the alliance party led by ratu mara. robbie robertson (2012, p. 511) noted that by the early 1980s, there was a ‘significant challenge to post-colonial racial divisions’ and the ‘irruption of the fiji labour party very quickly precipitated fiji’s first military coup in 1987’. militarising the ethnonation in 1987, a third-ranking colonel in the royal fiji military forces ousted the democratically elected multiracial government of late dr. timoci bavadra (lawson 1991; robertson & tamanisau 1988; lal 1988; ramesh 2007). colonel sitiveni rabuka within months was promoted to the commander of the fiji military by the late governor general ratu penaia ganilau. a military council was established with the participation of defeated politicians from the alliance government (1970 – 1987). the great council of chiefs (gcc), the methodist church and the indigenous nationalist taukei movement became the ‘traditional’ voice in support of the military takeover. moderate indigenous views on multiracial democracy were quickly expunged and prisoners were released to protest in suva against a writ filed in the fiji high court by dr. bavadra, challenging the dissolution of parliament by the governor general (kaplan 1988, p. 98). moreover, indo-fijians were attacked and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 127 harassed by the taukei movement members, who became increasingly violent after a political solution, in the form of a government of national unity (gnu), was reached at deuba in september 1987. coup leader rabuka remained unhappy with the turn of events since may and after stating publicly that ‘the objectives of the coup had not been met’ executed his second coup on 25 september of that year. following the second coup, there were reports of gross human rights violations. according to kenneth bain (1988, p. 211), indo-fijians were forced to: ‘walk naked in the street, stand for up to twenty four hours in an iron water tank, swim in sewerage ponds filled with human excrements, sit naked for hours at a time on hot tar sealed road, submit to sexual assault by soldiers often in uniform and at army check points, and walk long distances carrying heavy loads while watched by soldiers’. meanwhile, union members were harassed, detained and tortured for anti-government protests. these actions of the military led the australian and new zealand trade unions to call for an immediate economic boycott of fiji. in response to the actions from the regional trade union movement, rabuka handed authority to ratu mara and to ratu sir penaia ganilau. from 1987 to 1992 the ethnoclass in fiji evolved into a new three tier social structure with indigenous fijian chiefs, indigenous fijian commoner nationalists and the fiji military. indigenous fijian chiefs ratu mara and ratu sir penaia ganilau led the nation as prime minister and president, indigenous nationalist commoner fijians remained active and continued with their campaign for a christian state and a ban on all work on sundays via the sunday observance decree, and the fiji military under the control of rabuka continued harassing and intimidating the mostly indo-fijian political activists. in 1988, the constitution review process started, following the abrogation of the 1970 constitution in 1987. the post-coup ethnoclass ensured that the new constitution would maintain permanent indigenous fijian political control in spite of any factionalisation. to this end, ratu penaia appointed the fiji constitution inquiry and review committee (circ) led by colonel paul manueli. the committee was given four terms of reference: ‘to scrutinise and consider the extent to which the draft constitution submitted to the cabinet meets the present and future needs of the people, to facilitate the widest possible debate throughout fiji, to invite and receive representations from the people, and report to the cabinet’ (premdas & steeves 1991, pp. 158-159). in fact the circ was dominated by individuals sympathetic to the 1987 coup and the purpose of the draft was to ensure indigenous fijian political hegemony. the fiji law society explicitly rejected the draft and argued that ‘international 128 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 law recognises the principle of self-determination and the legitimate rights of indigenous races. however, it does not recognise or condone or encourage the subjugation of any race irrespective of its origin (the fiji times, 31 may 1989). joining in the condemnation of the draft constitution were academics at the university of the south pacific, unions, women’s groups, and human rights organisations. on 23 september 1989, the circ made its recommendation to the interim government, calling for ‘69 member house of representatives comprising of 37 fijians out of whom 30 to be elected by fijian provinces and 7 by fijian residents in urban and peri-urban areas; 27 indians to be elected by communal roll, 4 general electors (european descent) and 1 rotuman’ (the fiji times, 23 september 1989). despite massive protests by indo-fijians against the circ recommendation the new racially weighted constitution was promulgated by the coup makers in july 1990. the australian section of the international commission of jurists ‘criticised special powers against subversion, stating that it is a recipe for continued military intervention in the life of the community’ (the fiji times, 9 october 1990). not long after the promulgation of the constitution, four university of the south pacific lecturers, a doctor and a retired school teacher were detained for burning the constitution and one of the lecturers, dr. anuridh singh was abducted and tortured for eleven hours by members of the military. at the trial of those accused of torture, ‘the defence counsel referred to section 100 of the 1990 constitution as the accused persons were provoked in doing what they did to the complainant whom they have considered to have insulted the president, the prime minister and members of the great council of chiefs and fijian people generally’ (singh 1991, p. 53). international criticisms of the 1990 constitution were ignored by the interim government which modified public order decrees to suppress freedom of expression. in 1990, three journalists were charged for reporting the burning of the 1990 constitution, with harassments of journalists continuing well into 1991. the interim government was not only facing protests from political activists and journalists but new battlelines were drawn with the enactment of the sugar master’s award, which imposed an unreasonable tax on farmers and reduced the rate paid for burnt sugar cane. the national farmers union (nfu), led by mahendra chaudhry, went into action and organised series of harvest boycotts, forcing the interim government to withdraw the award. humiliated but not out, the government continued its onslaught on the nfu and threatened to hold cane payment and enacted labour decrees, to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 129 outlaw protests and to strip mahendra chaudhry of his influence by outlawing union officials from holding two union positions (ramesh 2015, p. 113). by 1992, indo-fijians were divided between the national federation party (nfp) and the flp with the flp refusing to contest the 1992 elections. indigenous fijian members of the flp split from the party and formed the new labour party (nlp) but failed to win any indigenous communal seats in the 1992 general election. the nfp on the other hand argued that by not contesting the elections, indo-fijians would be further alienated from the political process. led by jai ram reddy, the nfp made a come-back from the political wilderness of the late 1980s in the 1992 general elections. the 1992 election was won by the soqosoqo ni vakevulewa ni taukei (svt) party which secured 30 of the 37 communal seats. the nfp won 14 and the flp 13, effectively splitting the indo-fijian votes in half. the fijian nationalist united front won 5 seats with 2 independents. after the election, it was clear that none of the political parties had an outright majority of more than 35 seats (the fiji times, 2 june 1992). to the surprise of many, flp lent its support to rabuka, following an agreement to ‘review the 1990 constitution, revoke labour reform decrees, scrap the value added tax, and put in place mechanisms to discuss land tenure’ (the fiji times, 3 june 1992). however, flp support for rabuka did not last and soon after the election, flp staged a lightning walkout of parliament, accusing rabuka of breaching the pre-election agreement. however, nfp saw the tensions between the flp and the svt as an opportunity and embraced rabuka much to the peril of the party. the 1992 election once again highlighted that the ethnoclass established via the 1990 constitution continued to suffer from the problems that afflicted the 1970 constitutional order: indigenous fijian disunity. from 1992 to 1999, fiji went through a series of political transformations. the svt split in 1993 after members of the svt party defeated the 1994 budget. no longer with the svt, rebel members formed the fijian association party (fap) under the leadership of late josevata kamikamica. fiji went to the polls in 1994 and the svt was once again returned to office. despite the svt win, divisions within the indigenous fijians became apparent as prime minister rabuka sought to improve his failing political fortunes by seeking assistance for constitutional reforms from the nfp leader jai ram reddy. in 1995, a constitution review commission (crc) was established to review the 1990 constitution. the crc recommended drastic changes to fiji’s constitutional make up. some 130 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 of the changes were so far reaching that the indigenous fijian leadership used the joint parliamentary select committee to ‘soften’ the impact of the crc report. in the end, indigenous fijians were unhappy with the new constitutional arrangement whereas indofijians saw constitutional reforms as the only way of safeguarding minority rights in the country. the consequence of rabuka’s constitutional reforms was two-fold. firstly, a number of fijian provinces withdrew support for the gccbacked svt party and secondly, there was an upsurge in indigenous nationalism, which led to the formation of the christian democratic alliance party or veitokani ni lewenivanua vakarisito (vlv). both these developments spelt disaster for rabuka and the svt in the 1999 elections as the party was abandoned by a majority of the indigenous fijians. on the indo-fijian front, jai ram reddy’s cordial relationship with rabuka ended the political hopes of the nfp party. many indofijians saw the nfp has a ‘weak’ party unable to champion the rights of the indo-fijians. as a result, the nfp was wiped out of the fiji’s political landscape as fiji’s first indo-fijian prime minister mahendra chaudhry formed the peoples’ coalition government with the indigenous fijian fap, vlv and the party of national unity (panu) parties. the divisions within indigenous fijians were far reaching and as alumita durutalo (2000, p. 79) concluded, these divisions were played out at different levels within the indigenous community: ‘within each province there are subtle forms of competition based on precolonial vanua. in each province, for example, there are certain vanua which receive more from government than others. in the province of nadroga and navosa, the coastal nadroga people have always been favoured over the inland navosa people in terms of state resources for any development in the province’. also there existed tensions between the maritime provinces and provinces on the main land of viti levu and vanua levu. in the 1990s, ratu mara, the paramount chief of lau favoured josevata kamikamica to take over as prime minister from 1992. other chiefs particularly from cakaudrove supported rabuka. these tensions within the indigenous fijians created a weak ethnoclass. in addition, the 1997 constitution, based on preferential voting exacerbated divisions by allowing ethnically exclusive parties to form grand coalitions and adopt preference engineering against their foes. while a new era dawned on fiji’s ethnic politics, the indigenous nationalists remained unconvinced with the political outcome on constitutional reform and privately expressed shock with the election of the first indo-fijian prime minister. chaudhry, a former trade union leader and a minister for finance in the deposed bavadra cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 131 government, reintroduced some of the labour policies that had led to the coups of 1987. within six months in office, the peoples’ coalition government was heading for a showdown with the gcc and the native land trust board (nltb) over sugar lease arrangements under the agricultural landlord and tenants act (alta). capitalising on the sensitivities over land, indigenous nationalists led by george speight, with the support from a section of the fiji military, deposed the peoples’ coalition government on 19 may 2000. on 19 may 2000, armed men stormed fiji’s parliament and held cabinet members of the peoples’ coalition government hostage for 56 days (robertson & sutherland 2001). the may 2000 coup, the third in a series of coups, was executed by indigenous fijian nationalists and members of fiji’s military’s counter revolutionary warfare unit. however, unlike in 1987, the 2000 putsch caused indigenous fragmentation and paved way for further coups. like in may 1987, the 2000 coup leaders mistakenly thought that there would be overwhelming support among indigenous fijians for the takeover, following claims by indigenous nationalists that the peoples’ coalition government, led by an indo-fijian mahendra chaudhry, proposed a number of bills aimed at diluting the rights of indigenous fijians. moreover, the coup makers wanted to oust the president of fiji, ratu sir kamisese mara, who remained steadfast in his support for the multiracial 1997 constitution, after indigenous petitions for its abrogation. george speight and his supporters exploited traditional divisions and quietly negotiated with the vanua of vuda to nominate ratu josefa iloilo (burebasaga) to the position of the president and a high chief of bau, ratu jope seniloili (kubuna) to the position of vice president. the speight group argued that president ratu mara had become an obstacle to their ‘objective’ because he had failed to persuade mahendra chaudhry and his government to ‘voluntarily resign’, and ‘address the grievances of the indigenous community in the light of the 1997 constitution’ (confidential draft, george speight group, parliamentary complex, suva, 21 may 2000). george speight produced more than divisions and fragmentation among indigenous fijians. according to graham dobell (2000, p. 176), ‘there were pacific rhythms at work’ and one such rhythm involved racial violence. after the speight group failed to unite indigenous fijians behind its cause, it started exploiting ethnic and cultural divisions and ordered indigenous supporters to attack indo-fijians in areas sympathetic to the coup. susanna trnka 132 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 (2011, p. 333) during her research in fiji at the height of the 2000 mayhem observed that ‘members of the indo-fijian community that i was working among were profoundly shaken by the violence. they talked about the coup incessantly, relating accounts of physical attacks that had happened to them or to their relatives. they spoke at length about their fears that the country was going to devolve into anarchy. some foretold that this might be the beginning of ethnic genocide’. at the end of the 56 day siege of the parliament, george speight and his rebels humiliated the military, divided the great council of chiefs, and succeeded in having their own supporters in an interim government (alley 2000, p. 515). the interim government that was eventually established after the 2000 coup continued with the direction espoused by the speight group. the interim prime minister, laisenia qarase , argued that there was an urgent need to bridge the economic gap between indigenous fijians and indo-fijians and immediately implemented a ‘blueprint on supremacy’, which reinvented affirmative action programs that had existed under previous indigenous governments following the 1987 coups. steven ratuva labelled the affirmative action program under the interim government as ‘second phase’, which had two parts: ‘first the attempt by the military appointed interim government led by laisenia qarase to appease ethno-nationalists who supported and were responsible for the ethnic violence surrounding the 2000 coup and, secondly, to harness political support by the newly elected sdl government led by qarase’ (ratuva 2014, p. 142). the ‘blueprint’, after the 2001 elections, passed the legislature and became the social justice act 2001, which had scheduled 29 schemes, out of which ‘9 were discriminatory in racial terms’ (cottrell & ghai 2007, p. 24041). according to the citizens’ constitutional forum (ccf), the social justice act contained a number of anomalies that required revisions and amendments. the ccf further observed that the weaknesses in the act existed because it was promoted as a general election promise (citizens constitutional forum, 11 february 2002). according to brij lal, ‘fijian nationalists want fijian paramountcy recognised as a right, but there is no basis on which the paramountcy of fijian interests or fijian political paramountcy can be elevated into a right. but no constitution can guarantee political paramountcy of a particular ethnic group in a multi-ethnic state unless, of course, it abandons all claim to be democratic’ (lal 2000, p. 292). brian martin (1993, p. 53) also observed that ‘the use of ethnic divisions for political purposes has a long history in fiji. the labour party itself represented a challenge to this political use of ethnicity, and the coup represented a reversion cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 133 to this status quo’, both in 1987 and 2000. however, after the 2001 election, the military had started to question ethnically exclusive policies of the qarase government. after the august 2001 general elections, the sdl and the camv formed a coalition government and ensured that the flp was not allowed to join cabinet as stipulated under the 1997 constitution. as expected, the flp leader challenged his party’s exclusion from government and in a landmark judgment in 2003, the supreme court of fiji upheld the multiparty cabinet provision in the fiji constitution but allowed political parties to resolve differences and agree to a multiparty government rules. unfortunately the sdl refused to cooperate with the flp and the two parties drifted further apart. by 2003, the military commander had lost all faith in the sdl government. while initially supporting affirmative action for indigenous fijians, voreqe bainimarama, commander of the republic of fiji military forces, saw the sdl’s social justice act and the blueprint on indigenous supremacy as divisive and counterproductive for fiji. moreover, the army was equally concerned about the sdl’s support for the individuals implicated in the 2000 coup. the tensions between the army and the sdl government escalated from june 2005 with the release of the racial tolerance and unity bill (rtu), which provided amnesty to the individuals involved in the events of 2000. the government proposed not only the rtu but it had plans to enact the qoliqoli and the lands claims tribunal bills. the bills in their totality were seen by the army commander as a threat to ‘national security’. according to stephen mccarthy (2011, p. 566), ‘the perpetrators of the 2000 coup sought their amnesty and pushed for the establishment of an independent unity commission as part of a reconciliation initiative – the reconciliation tolerance and unity bill – to address causes of the crisis and resolve fiji’s ongoing political instability’. to make matters worse, the sdl supporters in the fiji military were given the go-ahead to depose commander voreqe bainimarama and in january 2006, there was another failed mutiny at the queen elizabeth barracks in suva. as fiji headed towards elections in may 2006, the sdl absorbed the nationalist camv party and went to the polls with an agenda to divide the country along religious lines. a large number of the sdl indo-fijian candidates were muslims whereas the flp candidates were predominantly hindu. this type of religion-based electioneering backfired when the sdl failed to win a single indo-fijian communal seat. seeing the country divided ferociously along racial lines, the triumphant sdl prime minister invited nine flp members to join his 134 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 government. while the flp leader mahendra chaudhry, throughout the previous sdl term, was enthusiastic about multiparty government, after may 2006 elections, his response was lukewarm and at times obscurantist. despite nominating party members to join the sdl government, chaudhry wanted to be the leader of the opposition. one cannot be part of the government and be in opposition at the same time. it is contrary to the fundamental principle of parliamentarianism. just before the 5 december coup, chaudhry remained committed to derailing the multiparty government after four flp cabinet ministers voted against the 1997 budget. chaudhry warned earlier that all nine flp cabinet ministers had to vote against the budget. however, five flp cabinet members were granted leave of absence by the deposed prime minister qarase on the day of the budget vote. chaudhry was unhappy after the 2007 budget passed with forty votes to twenty six. in a last bid to save the multiparty government, qarase on 24 november came up with a compromise. qarase proposed that he would allow flp cabinet ministers who voted against the budget to stay in cabinet provided the flp did not take any disciplinary action against the other five. this was rejected by chaudhry who argued that party directives superseded those of the cabinet in what was the final nail into the coffin of a disintegrating multiparty government. according to mahendra chaudhry: the flp, for instance, was not consulted on the formulation of the 2007 budget, especially on the imposition of an increase in the value added tax (vat) from 12.5 per cent to 15 per cent – a totally insensitive move that would have greatly intensified the hardship faced by our lower-paid workers and the poor. laisenia qarase also shunned every overture i made as leader of the flp to get bipartisan talks going on the highly contentious and divisive promotion of reconciliation, tolerance and unity (rtu) bill (a misnomer because its main objective was to grant amnesty to those convicted for their part in the 2000 coup), and the qoliqoli and land claims tribunal bills (chaudhry 2009, p.346). not only did chaudhry criticise the sdl government’s handling of controversial bill, he also was very scathing of the 1997 constitution, despite the fact that he won an absolute majority in the 1999 election under it. chaudhry (2009, p. 345) argued that the 1997 constitution was ‘flawed’ and ‘deliberately damaged by the political leadership of sitiveni rabuka and jai ram reddy when they wrote it and entrenched the communal electoral system’. the 1997 constitution of fiji required parties with 10 per cent or more of the total seats in parliament to be included in a multiparty cabinet. the electoral system was changed from the first-pastthe-post system under the 1970 constitution to alternative vote, which was to ‘promote majority victors and to encourage interethnic accommodation’ (reilly 2007, p. 62). however, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 135 evidence from the 1999, 2000 and the 2006 fiji elections showed that ‘the majority of transfers of preference votes in fiji flowed from the more moderate or centrist parties towards the more extremist organisations’ (fraenkel 2004, p. 126) as interethnic moderation, envisaged by the constitution review commission, did not materialise, leading to the failure of multiparty cabinet, and the collapse of the mid-1990s ‘constitutional engineering project’ (fraenkel 2007, p. 44). in his analysis of the 1999 fiji elections, fraenkel (2000, p. 106) observed that ‘strong opposition can provide an important check and balance in the system, particularly where this represents substantial sections of the electorate. the svt-nfp coalition might, under proportional representation, have commanded 25 seats’. in addition, there was another serious problem overlooked by constitution designers, and identified by flp leader mahendra chaudhry, and that was preponderance of communal seats (45) over national ones (25), thus continuing with the failed post-colonial political trajectory of ethnocracy, ethnoclass and ethnonation led by indigenous fijian nationalism. worse, the deposed prime minister laisenia qarase was a poor political strategist because he made futile attempts to make chaudhry a substantial stakeholder by offering him the position of the deputy prime minister in the ill-fated multiparty government, especially after the army wrenched up its anti-government rhetoric with the reintroduction of the controversial racial tolerance and unity, qoliqoli and land claims bills. instead of trying to salvage the multiparty government, laisenia qarase should have agreed to the demands of the army because there was no other way. laisenia qarase (2009, pp. 353-374) was also perhaps somewhat delusional as he believed he led a ‘genuinely representative multiracial government’ accusing mahendra chaudhry of the flp of ‘distortion and misrepresentation about affirmative action’ and further labelling bainimarama as ‘the bad guy’ who wanted to ‘evade the law’ for the alleged murder of those military officers who wanted him dead. the army commander, voreqe bainimarama, was on a path of no return and on 5 december, the sdl government was deposed in a bloodless military coup. soon after the coup, the gcc, sections of the methodist church, the ngos, and the fiji law society condemned the takeover and called for a quick restoration of democracy. previously in 1987 and in 2000, both the gcc and the methodist church supported armed takeover of government but this time around the deposed government was voted into office by more than 80 per cent of the total eligible indigenous fijian communal votes. the deposed prime minister laisenia qarase’s fight to restore the sdl government became stuck because in 2001 qarase 136 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 reiterated that democracy was a ‘foreign flower’ and that it was incompatible with the indigenous tradition and culture. the army moved quickly against its critics and in less than a month secured its grip on the country. laisenia qarase was banished to his island home of mavana in vanuabalavu, parliament was dissolved, all sdl appointed board members dismissed and dissidents silenced. on 4 january 2007, the army commander handed executive authority to the president of fiji ratu josefa iloilo, who appointed voreqe bainimarama as the interim prime minister of fiji. a new interim government was sworn in on 8 and 9 january 2007 as the 1987 coup was repeated with some slight modifications. while the sdl was entirely excluded from the interim line up, the flp and the napf were given substantial portfolios, leading to criticisms from the deposed leader of the opposition, mick beddoes and the deposed prime minister qarase. the return of veteran politician and the flp leader chaudhry to the portfolio of finance was observed with interest in both fiji and abroad. dismantling ethnocracy the military takeover in fiji in december 2006 was aimed at dismantling the ethnoclass and the ethnonation that were characteristic of the political order established at independence in 1970. as i have argued, this ethnoclass consisted of indigenous fijian chiefs, commoner indigenous fijian nationalists and the europeans from 1970 to 1987 when the ethnoclass incorporated the military in defining the ethnonation from 1987 to 2000. by 2000, the military split when forced to confront george speight and his supporters and following the failed mutiny in 2000 against military commander voreqe bainimarama, the military was effectively purged and turned against the ethnoclass resulting in the coup of 2006. robert norton (2015, p. 122) observed that ‘during the conflict with qarase, bainimarama had begun to shape the corporate identity of his army as guardian and guide for the multi-ethnic nation’. the new ethnoclass that emerged from the ashes of the 1997 constitution was based on alliance between the military, progressive indigenous fijians and indo-fijians, who for a very long time campaigned for political equality and a common name. a non-ethnic nation was achieved with the promulgation of the 2013 constitution and democratic elections in 2014 where the new ethnoclass in the form of fijifirst won 59 per cent of the votes to win government. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 137 fiji went to the polls on 17 september 2014 as overseas anti-government blog sites ramped up its anti-fijifirst party commentary, even though there was a 48 hour political campaign blackout in fiji. blog sites accused fijifirst of manipulating the election, planning curfews, buying votes, and threatening non-fijifirst participants, but the international observer group found no evidence of such activities. there were in total 590,000 registered voters out of which 496,364 (83.9 per cent) voted in the 2014 general election. the voting was carried out in 1500 polling stations where voters showed their identity cards to the electoral officers who verified their name on the voter list, marked their finger with an indelible ink and then issued them the ballot paper whereon the voter marked with a cross or a tick against his or her preferred candidates number and deposited the ballot into a secured ballot box. most of the voting on 17 september was completed before 3 pm and the provisional results were published in the morning of 18 september. the provisional election figures placed fijifirst in the lead with 60 per cent of the seats, followed by sodelpa and the national federation party. the fiji labour party, the peoples’ democratic party, one fiji and the fiji united freedom party failed to secure the required 5 per cent threshold of 24,818 votes. in the afternoon of 18 september, fiji labour party, peoples’ democratic party, sodelpa, one fiji and the national federation party issued a joint statement in a letter, arguing that there were irregularities in the conduct of the election and requested the count of the votes be suspended. the supervisor of elections responded that the allegations from political parties were too general and refused to suspend counting. on 19 september, political parties questioning the election produced a list of ‘evidence’ claiming that extra ballot papers were printed, seals on the ballot boxes were broken, counting was suspended without explanation and ballot papers were tampered with. the election office rejected the claims on 20 september and the full and final result of the election was published on 21 september 2014. while fijifirst came out on the top with 59 per cent of the votes, there were concerns that the 2014 election was rushed with very little thought given on the transition from military rule to democratic elections, including restrictions on political parties with the promulgation of electoral and political parties’ registration decrees. also, there were allegations that the nonethnic political agenda of the fijifirst was nothing more than window dressing since majority in the fijifirst government and the public service are indigenous fijians, thus a continuation of ethnocracy under the guise of non-ethnic rhetoric. however, these criticisms have been 138 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 dismissed by fijifirst as political posturing by the opposition which hopes to bring back the communal and ethnic agendas of the past. to understand the new ethnoclass in fiji, it is imperative that we visit some of the underpinning ideologies of the ethnoclass that was deposed in the 2006 coup. an analysis by stewart firth (2015, pp. 101-112) provides an insight into the exclusive ethnic trajectory that was adopted by the social democratic liberal party of fiji (sodelpa) before the 2014 election. according to firth, a minority within the indigenous fijian community see that they have ‘special rights that belong only to the descendants of fiji’s original occupiers’ and consider the ‘united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples of 2007 guarantees a form self-determination, entrenching indigenous dominance’ (firth 2015, p. 103). ratuva notes that sodelpa ‘increasingly shifted towards extreme ethno-nationalist and protectionist position’. however despite utilising the indigenous fijian supremacy template of the previous nationalist regimes, sodelpa managed to only secure ‘46 percent of indigenous votes compared to fijifirst with 50 per cent’ (ratuva 2015, p. 147). perhaps even more telling is ratuva’s assertions that it was time to move away from ethnic analysis and focus on ‘deeper intra-ethnic dynamics’ (ratuva 2015, p. 137) because a new political landscape based on ethnic equality operates in fiji. in fact, analysis of the indofijian votes in the 2014 fiji election shows that indo-fijian voters who went to flp in 2006 elections pledged their support for fijifirst (72 per cent). according to jon fraenkel (2015, p. 41) ‘the collapse of support for the fiji flp – which had obtained 81% of the first-preference votes of the fiji indian community (and 39.2% of the national vote) at the previous elections in 2006 but which secured only 2.4% of the national vote in 2014 – gave an obvious indication of one key source of fijifirst’s new support base’. beside indo-fijian votes, fraenkel (2015, p. 46) analyses in detail indigenous fijian votes by provinces and in particular highlights the support for sodelpa in fiji’s maritime provinces including bua (51%), kadavu (68%) lau (75%) and lomaiviti (58%). these provinces along with parts of the main islands viti levu and vanua levu traditionally supported candidates who advocated strong nationalist views. however, in 2014, except for namosi (57%), the rest of the provinces supported fijifirst. this shift in historical voting pattern may have been caused by the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18 and the younger generation in both urban and rural areas accepting a non-ethnic political discourse. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 139 according to patrick vakaoti, ‘for young people concerned about completing school and finding employment, fijifirst offered an element of stability and continuity, even if their track record of adherence to democratic principles was questionable. it could be argued that the reduction of the voting age to 18 years was a calculated decision, given the bainimarama government’s appeal for a new brand of politics and the many policies and forms of assistance that directly impacted on first-time voters’ (vakaoti 2015, p. 163). besides young voters, there were also other forces at play including the popularity of bainimarama, who was seen as committed to a non-ethnic nation where social policies were enacted on the basis of need and open and accountable government instead of repacking discriminatory policies of past indigenous nationalists. fijifirst called for the separation of state and religion, a common name of ‘fijian’ for all fiji citizens, allocation of state resources based on community needs instead of race, fair agricultural leases, land bank, anti-corruption measures via the fiji independent commission against corruption, reducing violence against women, affordable housing, national employment scheme, infrastructure plan, agri-business diversification, reducing bureaucratic red tape, modernising the legal framework, encouraging women in the workplace, lowering youth unemployment, being tough on sacrilege and other criminal acts, free water, reasonable rates for electricity and gas, fee-free education, investment in higher education, subsidised milk for primary school students and equal citizenry. the social democratic liberal party (sodelpa) led by rewa chief ro teimumu kepa, and supported by former prime minister laisenia qarase, criticised ‘fijian’ as a common name, wanted fiji to be a declared a christian state, preferred changes to land lease money distribution for a larger share to indigenous chiefs, sought the return of the political role of the great council of chiefs, the reinstatement of fijian affairs board scholarships, a restructured taukei land trust board, the possibility of bringing back the 1997 constitution, reforming the republic of fiji military forces, establishing indigenous fijian foreshore rights via a qoliqoli legislation, the review of all decrees between 2006 and 2014, and the implementation social justice and affirmative action programs for indigenous fijians, similar to what existed during the reign of the former sdl government (2001 to 2006). in the end sodelpa managed to muster only 28% of the vote as voters rejected its exclusionary political agenda and embraced fijifirst. the new ethnoclass of fijifirst 140 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 consisting of progressive indigenous fijians, indo-fijians and members of the military is the new fijian elite which has started work on reducing ethnic polarisation with an aim to establish a broad-based national leadership, sensitive to the needs of the people of fiji. 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post-colonial ethnocracy in fiji abstract introduction ethnocracy: theoretical consideration colonial ethnocracy establishing post-colonial ethnocracy militarising the ethnonation dismantling ethnocracy conclusion references acknowledgements statement of conflict of interest funding cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 2 2018 © 2018 ly ly lim. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: lim, l. l. 2018. a multicultural act for australia. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 10(2), 42-60. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5981 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed article a multicultural act for australia ly ly lim university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: ly ly lim, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. ly.lim@student.uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5981 article history: received 17/03/2013; revised 09/07/2018; accepted 12/07/2018; published 25/07/2018 abstract multiculturalism as a public policy framework depends on states identifying cultural differences among their citizens as salient for resource allocation, political participation and human rights. the adoption of multiculturalism as a term and a framework signifies the recognition of a politics of difference within a liberal democratic framework of identities and aspirations. yet the national government in australia unlike any other country with espoused policies of multiculturalism has chosen to have neither human rights nor multicultural, legislation. this paper argues that multicultural societies require either or both sets of legislation to ensure both symbolic affirmation and practical implementation. taking inspirations from international, australian state and territory based multicultural and diversity legislations, and modelling on the australian workplace gender equality act of 2012, this paper explores what should be included in a national multicultural legislation and how it could pragmatically operationalise in australia to express multiculturalism’s emancipatory agenda. keywords multiculturalism; law as social change; cultural diversity; legislation; australia; informational regulation; diversity declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research is supported by an australian government research training program (rtp) scholarship. 42 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5981 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5981 http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:ly.lim@student.uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5981 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 introduction the australian federal government first adopted multicultural policies in the mid-1970s, but these policies have always lacked the legitimacy conferred by legislation. since the mid1990s, australian federal multicultural policies have reflected the political orientation of the incumbent government. the trajectory has been mostly neoliberal. in this sense multiculturalism has to be restructured and revived in australia in order to express its emancipatory agendas (kinowska & lim 2017). this cannot be effectively done through measures such as anti-racial discrimination legislation. research has shown the racial discrimination act 1975 is largely ineffective against institutionalised prejudices (gaze 2015). these prejudices continue to contribute to, and maintain, racial minorities’ disadvantage while remaining out of the reach of racial discrimination laws. they manifest in employment opportunities (booth et al. 2012), subjecting victims to racism socially and in other public spheres (australian human rights commission 2015), and are reflected in the lack of representation of racialised minorities in both state and federal governments. to challenge these norms and structures of inequality and disadvantage, it is necessary to go beyond the retrospective, reactive and individualistic complaint-based system that racial discrimination laws operate in. what is required is a proactive model of legislation that changes broad-based social practices and attitudes to prevent discrimination and disadvantage from occurring. the effect is to establish new norms. this is because legislation aiming for social change can operate at both instrumental and symbolic levels, thereby changing actual practices or social understandings. the role of law in our society is to provide a unifying force and act as a reference to mediate relations among people. law also reflects societal values. the dynamism and organic nature of australian society in the twenty-first century needs a legislative foundation to unite australians. from this, all australians can identify a sense of belonging, for legislation is key to providing legal norms which infuse and shape social and systemic relationships and practices. the right to dignity, if it is to flourish in our society, must be normatively embedded in the nature and quality of the everyday relationships that constitute our lives and enable all groups to participate equitably (hyman, meinhard & shields 2011). australia’s racial discrimination legislation and racism australia’s federal racial discrimination act (rda) was enacted in 1975, giving effect to australia’s commitment under the united nations (un) convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (cerd). many have hailed the legislation as the foundation of australian multiculturalism (soutphommasane 2015; calma 2007; ozdowski 2014; parliament of australia 2013). it is likely that most australians know that direct, overt racial discrimination is unlawful. however, few would be cognisant of the unconscious bias that manifests as racism in australian society. whether conscious or unconscious, racism provides ‘built-in headwinds’ (irving 2014) that work to discriminate against racial minorities in australia, whether in employment (booth et al. 2012) or other spheres (dunn et al. 2004; cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 49 farrel 2016). this unrecognised but insidious racism permeates societal belief through the media (jakubowicz & goodall 1994) and day-to-day interactions (dunn et al. 2004). further, institutional racism is built into the social, economic, political and cultural relations between minority and majority groups in australia. this often results in the unintended consequences of policies and practices which negatively affect the members of minority groups. this is reflected in the australian government’s failed ‘operation fortitude’ of 2015 when the then federal department of border protection attempted to ‘randomly’ visa check people on the streets of melbourne city, drawing significant protests and backlash (weber 2015; keany & norman 2015). external high-level international scrutiny of australia’s implementation of its obligations under the cerd also found significant inadequacies. in its latest report in 2010, the un committee on the cerd found that australia needed to take urgent measures to address racism and racial discrimination, disadvantage and inequality. over 20 recommendations for concrete actions to address these issues were made. they included, in relation to australia’s legal framework, indigenous peoples, refugees and asylum seekers, and multiculturalism and racial harmony; the report also expressed regret that many recommendations from previous reports had not been fully implemented in australia (uncerd report 2010). a number of reasons have been postulated as contributing to the rda’s inability to address the broader effects of racism on australian society. the most significant is in the rda’s operation, which reproduces whiteness as the unacknowledged socially and institutionally embedded norm that defines the human condition. as nielsen (2008) notes, the rda is ‘designed for and skewed’ in favour of ‘the white majority’ in australia in terms of its ‘neutrality’ (nielsen 2008, p.1). its operation focuses on the individualistic, discrete experiences of discrimination based on race or ethnicity. there is no acknowledgement of the disparities that exist in the social, political and economic experiences of difference. nor does the operation of the rda take into account the variation in the social, political and economic impact of race discrimination (gaze 2015). thus, the rda addresses the atomistic individual symptoms, not the causes of social phenomena. judicial interpretations of racial discrimination cases corroborate this view (allen 2010). australian courts have been reluctant, and have even ignored, the capacity of formal equality to stabilise, endorse and reproduce dominant white privilege. instead, australian courts have applied a ‘race neutral’ and ‘colour-blind’ or ‘sameness’ principle to racial discrimination cases before them (gaze 2015; allen 2010). this defeats the underlying philosophical underpinning of non-discrimination and advancement of minority rights that the cerd espouses and on which the rda is based. this is perhaps reflective of the composition of the australian judiciary, drawn from those successful in the legal profession in which minority groups are noticeably under-represented (gaze 2015). without imputing bad faith, it is not difficult to ‘connect the dots’: comprising overwhelmingly of able bodied white anglo-celtic males, the australian judiciary is simply unlikely to understand (or perhaps, recognise) the experience of racial discrimination. 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 on a broader perspective, the rda has no impact on how racialised minorities in australia are represented in texts, the mainstream media and sports, which are owned and usually written, by the majoritarian white people. the ‘tone’ and content of australia’s mainstream media implicitly promote the discursive manifestation of whiteness as the ‘norm’. this is perhaps reflective of the time when the rda was enacted, in 1975. the focus then was on the rights of migrants (europeans) who arrived to australia since wwii and little attention was paid to the rights of indigenous australians or racialised minorities already in australia. thus it can be seen the operation of the rda ignores the importance of race in configurations of national identity, belonging and ownership – fundamental enablers of successful multiculturalism in australia. given this, its use as a tool to support diversity and enhance multiculturalism in australia is limited. the reality of modern australian society is that one could be a member of many microcommunities: workplace, neighbourhood, religious, cultural, educational or gender-based; all of which cut across one another infected with all the socio-cultural variables each individual brings with her or his membership (thornton 1990, p. 257). all of these senses of community require some ethical code; some sense of commitment to others. while there is a limit to which legislations can operate as vehicles for social change (thornton 1990, p. 260), laws can reflect the values that inform what we do, how we do it and the goals we want to achieve as a society. therefore, it is as important to embed the diversity of australian society: sociologically, ideologically, politically and legally, because legislation is about power. if values affect the exercise of power, it is very important that the diversity of values and the experience of backgrounds should be reflected (kirby 2015, 8:32), for legislation does serve important symbolic and educative functions. to realise multiculturalism’s emancipatory agenda, the continuing exclusion of racialised minorities in the discourse over national belonging must be addressed. this should involve not just sustaining the largely ineffective legal provisions protecting racialised minorities from direct discrimination (jupp & clyne 2011) through anti-racial discrimination laws such as the rda. multicultural policies need to incorporate certain values and attitudes that belong to every australian, embedded in legislation. australian multiculturalism should be about equal opportunity, valued participation, valued recognition and belonging. this goes beyond the idea of integrating new immigrants into the ‘host’ society. it implies that while newcomers are being integrated, the rest of australian society is also changing to reflect the diversity of the whole, redefining what it means to be ‘australian’. it transcends principles of tolerance and honours non-discrimination. ultimately, it involves a sense of belonging, of being a part of a larger whole (raz 1994), recognising that individuals, communities and cultures are never hermetic (donald 2007) and is not the sole determinant of identity but one subset of myriad contributing factors together with class, gender, religion, sexuality, age, education not to mention individual experience. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 51 rethinking and reinvigorating multiculturalism australian multiculturalism was devised at a time when immigrants to australia were primarily european, christian and white. they shared many traditions and commonalities with the existing anglo-celtic australian population. australian society in the twenty-first century is much more diverse in its ethnic, religious and regional composition (australian bureau of statistics 2018). it has changed dramatically including the development of ‘diversification of diversity’ or ‘superdiversity’ (vertovec 2007) brought about by later generations of australians with mixed cultures (australian bureau of statistics 2018). the impetus in making a multicultural reality is needed now more than ever (jakubowicz 2015). both governments and civil society have critical roles to play in this process (bouma 2015). this success can be created through a political framework within which all australians can express their culture, non-discrimination honoured, cultural diversity valued as a public and common good, and embraced. through such a vision, political leadership and supporting actionable policies, social cohesion, unity and solidarity can be engendered. such a vision can be realised with a legislative lever from which to shift prejudice, a federal multicultural act (ma), as the foundation to establish inclusivity of all australians from all backgrounds. that element should now be provided. an act of the australian parliament to ‘reset’ the playing field and provide the legal framework and permanent benchmark against which federal multicultural policies could be measured (southpommasane 2012). unlike the rda which is a retrospective and reactive piece of legislation, a ma would serve as a pro-active form of legislation that promotes inclusiveness as opposed to any reverse discrimination. it would be an educative form of legislation, as opposed to quotas. for a ma would reflect community standards and aspirations. when complemented with enforcement, public policy and practice, political and community leadership, public education and awareness campaigns, education and training of professionals and the bureaucracy, and community education and development, over time, this will have a potent effect in changing community attitudes and behaviour (rice 2014). the ma would not be aimed specifically at addressing past disadvantage but to minimise factors contributing to continuing disadvantage and to remove barriers to inclusion by negating difference as obstacles to equal opportunity. from this perspective, the ma is enabling legislation that provides an effective means for allowing minorities to have a greater role and voice in today’s society to eliminate requirements unrelated to ability to participate in society. such an act would also allow the government to wrest back the narrative of inclusion from detractors; to define, direct and drive the government’s policy of multiculturalism (jakubowicz & ho 2013). this would give credence to these policy objectives, a symbolic acknowledgement that australia is not only demographically diverse but an opportunity to articulate public policy implementation of that diversity (jakubowicz 2015), being the obligations and rights, and respect for the equal rights and dignity of all australians. in the words of former australian prime minister, malcolm fraser: 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 in multiculturalism, australians can find a basis which offers at once both an understanding of the present and vision of the future built upon that understanding. (fraser & simmons 2010, p. 427) importantly, legislation can help ensure the politics of belonging in australia is no longer infected with racialised or religious undertones. the impact of such a legal foundation in assisting the integration of immigrants and minorities in australia should never be underestimated. it removes barriers to their participation in australian life and can make them feel more welcome in australian society, leading to a stronger sense of belonging and pride (kymlicka 2010) in australia. it could be that the act lays the foundation for all australians, in the words of paul keating, a nation ‘sure of who we are and what we stand for’ (cited in kelly 2009, p. 157), reflecting that multiculturalism is a condition for realising a national destiny. the ‘power’ of legislation bringing social change through legislation has, and continues to be, an issue of contention for the community, policy makers, researchers, politicians and legislators alike. the debate as to whether law plays any role in changing society has been controversial (vago 2015). detractors argue the law’s ability to bring about social change is limited. the government is constrained by existing laws and institutional structures, such as the founding charter, the australian constitution, but also the preoccupation with procedure rather than substance by a legal institution that focuses on rational technicality rather than equity. all these factors can make social change slow and ineffective. further, the government is also constrained by the effectiveness of its bureaucracy. thus, among the ways to bring about social change, for some legislation is a blunt tool at best. notwithstanding that, as dr martin luther king jr noted: laws in this area will not change the hearts of men [sic], but they can restrain the actions of the heartless (king 1963). law is about power (kirby 2015, 8:25). in many areas of australian life such as education, community relations, housing, transportation, energy utilisation, protection of the environment, and crime prevention, the law is an important instrument with the power to bring about change. governments can write laws aimed at social change, and legislation can support change. this is because law is deeply implicated in our economic, political, and social worlds, pursuit of social change invariably involves an engagement with law. in liberal democracies such as australia, law is a vehicle through which a programmed social evolution can be brought about. law can play an important direct role in social change by shaping various social institutions such as the requirements to have disability parking close to entrance to public buildings. the public policy advantages of law as an instrument of social change are attributed to the fact that law is seen as legitimate, more or less rational, authoritative, institutionalised, generally not disruptive, and backed by mechanisms of enforcement (evan 1965; vago 2015; barkan 2015). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 53 the power of law is not just as an instrument of social change but to drive social change. law has been shown to transform people’s behaviour and consolidate cultural change, for law does not “only codify existing customs, morals, or mores, but also… modify the behaviour and values presently existing in a particular society” (evan 1965, p. 286). law reflects societal values, informs choice and behaviour and affects the exercise of power. take the example of the legislative public policy of smoking. the australian government’s own commissioned research (chipty 2016) has shown that the australian government’s legislative intervention against smoking through the tobacco plain-packaging laws, the tobacco plain packaging act 2011 (cth) and the tobacco plain packaging regulations 2011, has been highly effective in reducing smoking rates (chipty 2016). these findings were also supported by the world health organisation research (who 2015). prima facie, the link between the public policy of smoking and multiculturalism appear tenuous. nevertheless, a closer inspection will reveal significant similarities: both are public policy measures aim at engendering behavioural and social changes for public good, benefitting individuals and society. the changes are aimed at the cultural, social and economic levels. while the public policy on tobacco smoking has enjoyed national legislative support, australian multiculturalism and multicultural policies have not. the hawke government (1983-1992) made a tentative attempt to canvass the possibility of federal multicultural legislation in 1989 but the proposal was postponed for a perceived fear of community backlash against multiculturalism (fitzgerald immigration policy review 1988; birrell & betts 1988; gardiner-garden 1993). subsequent australian governments have demonstrated timidity in approaching the matter. a 2017 senate inquiry into australian multiculturalism strongly recommended australia enact a federal multicultural legislation (australia. parliament 2017). but the current australian senate crossbench appears to have become a permanent home to minority and protest causes. thus, the prospect of legislative intervention to support multiculturalism in australia is unlikely. however, historical developments demonstrate legislative intervention is mandatory to ensure lasting social change, evidenced by the recent 2017 same-sex marriage legislative change. evan (1965, pp. 288-291) identifies a number of conditions under which law could induce social change and promote lasting change at a deeper level. these include: (i) the law must emanate from an authoritative and prestigious source, of which the parliament of australia is such a source; (ii) the law must introduce its rationale in terms that are understandable and compatible with existing values; (iii) advocates of the change should make reference to other communities or countries with which the population identifies and where the law is already in effect; (iv) enforcement of the law must be aimed at making the change in a relatively short time; (v) those enforcing the law must themselves be very much committed to the change intended by the law; (vi) the instrumentation of the law should include positive as well as negative sanctions; and (vii) the enforcement of the law should be reasonable, not only in the sanctions used but also in the protection of the rights of those who stand to lose by violation. 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 the ideal platform to embed multiculturalism’s philosophical foundations in australian society is through constitutional endorsement. however, changing the australian constitution attracts the arduous referendum process. history shows the prospect of success is extremely low. since federation in 1901, there have been eight successful referendums out of the 44 attempted. furthermore, the incumbent federal government has shown no indication that it has any interest in pursuing multicultural legislation, which is within its power, let alone a referendum on multiculturalism. nonetheless, legislative intervention is relatively ‘easier’ to achieve compared to constitutional change. the key requirement is for an incumbent australian government to have the requisite ambition to drive the change. the philosophical foundations outlined by evan (1965) above provide useful guidance for the framework, format, content and operation of the proposed ma within this article. canada’s canadian multiculturalism act 1988 and australian state multicultural legislations also provide useful examples. authority – source of power australia’s legislative structure requires that all legislations have a source of authority. inevitably, this would directly or indirectly, be derived from the australian constitution. section 51(xxiv) of the australian constitution enables the federal parliament to enact laws which are a faithful implementation of some international treaty or convention to which australia is a party (blackshield & williams 2014; australia. parliament 1995). australia’s implementation towards full ratification of its international obligations (the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial; the international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights; and the international covenant on civil and political rights) provides the authority to enact a ma at the federal level. arguably, the ‘races power’ (australian constitution, section 51 (xxvi)) provision of the australian constitution could also provide an alternative source of power to support a ma, if the term ‘any race’ is replaced by ‘all races’, to allow the ma to be given effect for ‘the people of all races’ in australia, for it would be ‘deemed necessary to make such a special law for the advantage of all’. the inclusion of the words ‘for the advantage of all’ is aimed at limiting previous constitutional interpretations where australian courts have ruled there are no limits to the races power provision, such as in the hindmarsh island bridge case (williams 2007) and the wik case (clarke 1997). the consequence from these cases is that australian governments could legislate to the advantage or detriment of the (indigenous) communities affected. the ultimate aim of the ma is to cultivate a living, breathing culture of inclusiveness. its content and structure must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to future changes in australian society while reflecting the emancipatory philosophy of multiculturalism: to be effected through learning and recognising diversity; actively valuing and advancing inclusiveness; and to lead and embrace diversity, to be achieved through the tripartite structures of leadership, regulation and education. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 55 the objectives of the ma would be: (1) to recognise and value the lived reality of australian community as a diverse and multicultural society; (2) to outline the principles of multiculturalism that govern governmental relations with the peoples of australia, mediate cultural relations among australians and establish the new ‘norms’ of socio-cultural nation building; and (3) to establish a federal australian multicultural commission (amc) and its role in advancing federal government objectives to achieve a socially inclusive society among the peoples of australia. advocacy & leadership on social issues such as inclusiveness, symbolism and leadership remain vital to its success. this leadership can be reflected with the prime minister having the responsibility for the portfolio of multiculturalism, to be further bolstered by the prime minister making an annual statement (curran 2006) on the ‘state of the nation’ and tabling an annual report by amc on the nation’s socio-cultural health. in addition, the federal government would lead by example, through its activities, processes and policies to reflect the australian population it serves. the australian public service (aps), which represents 1.2% of the australian labour force (australian public service commission (apsc) 2016) would lead by adopting pragmatic and concrete measures in implementing diversity programs under the ma (apsc 2016). this would reinforce and reinvigorate the current (apsc act 1999, section 18) voluntary commitment of aps leadership on diversity through mandatory certification. other federally funded bodies including the courts, tribunals and educational institutions would additionally be required to do so. regulation – ‘hard & soft’ compliance with the objectives of the ma would be reflected through the centralised theme of ‘informational regulation’ (freiberg 2010). when augmented by the ‘naming and shaming’ and economic disadvantage through non-compliance of the law, they could be powerful tools to effect change. ‘soft’ regulation is best suited to achieve the objectives of a ma where the ultimate aim is to effect socio-cultural change requiring balancing pragmatism and political acceptance. implementation and enforcement of the ma’s objectives would be via the amc through a flattened ‘pyramid’ structure (see figure 1 below) – where enforcement mechanisms escalate as one moves up the pyramid in response to non-compliance (ayres & braithwaite 1992). 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 figure 1 regulation under the ma thus, the amc’s primary functions would be: • acting as an advocate for multicultural diversity • developing and facilitating a nation-wide research program to address issues facing australia, including those relating to multiculturalism, intercultural relations, youth affairs and socio-cultural nation building. • contributing to school curriculum on multiculturalism and diversity • establishing a multicultural and diversity certification program – setting minimum standards, guidelines and criteria • advising and assisting all organisations to achieve diversity certification • promoting and fostering inclusiveness through diversity education, tailored training and research, while promoting integration of all australians from all backgrounds into a multicultural australian citizenship of reciprocal recognition and obligation • providing an annual report, to be tabled in the australian parliament, naming organisations’ progress of compliance on diversity programs. this list would be maintained and updated on the amc’s website for access by interested parties. private entities certified would be advantaged tendering for government contracts. informational regulation (disclosure & education) certification (annual) hard sanctions (‘naming & shaming’, economic disadvantage) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 57 informational or ‘soft’ regulation the foundation of the pyramid, central to achieving the ma’s goals, would be its ‘informational regulation’ (howe & landau 2007) supported by the twin pillars of disclosure and education. informational regulation is premised on the idea that by requiring agencies to disclose certain information, stakeholders would then exert the necessary pressure to force compliance (freiberg 2010). certification is the formal external recognition of compliance. disclosure information disclosure requirements, of which some are already required by the apsc, provide powerful knowledge from which employees and other stakeholders can gain insight into the operation of an agency. under the ma, agencies should disclose the following information in annual reports to the amc: • current diversity status of workforce profile, of which the requirement to report on gender is already required under the workplace gender equality act 2012 (cth) (wge) – classification/rank, employment status and salary compared to the australian population; • existing diversity policies and how employees could access these policies; • strategies and measures to foster employee contribution and comment on diversity including anonymously to the amc, should they choose • diversity strategy consultation process, mode of consultation and categories of employees consulted • strategies and policies to encourage innovation to embrace diversity • monitoring and audit of diversity policies and programs including achievements and innovations; and • mechanisms for continuous/scheduled review of diversity strategies, policies and programs the ma would operate pragmatically by enforcing substantive outcomes through mandatory information disclosure, rather than by prescription such as quotas, making it politically more palatable. by requiring disclosure of information, this enables stakeholders to impose internal pressure, adding to a backup accountability mechanism even for situations where the threat of ‘naming and shaming’ may not inspire compliance. further, in enabling employees and stakeholders to have a voice, an internal voice, where discontent could be recognised early, rather criticism from afar, this may assist in early resolution of any issues identified. private enterprise while the logic of attracting the best talents through diversity is self-explanatory and selfserving to private enterprises, it has been demonstrated that diversity policies aimed at eliminating racial discrimination and promoting equality can lead to improved efficiency, productivity and profits by attracting more talented and loyal employees and reducing absenteeism (paradies et al. 2009). under the ma, private bodies with 100 or more employers would be required to submit annual reporting (adopted from part iv of the wge act 2012) on diversity to the amc. in addition, all private enterprises would be actively 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 ‘encouraged’ to comply through policies that stipulate preferential advantage in tendering for government contracts if entities are ‘diversity certified’ by the amc. one of the avenues the australian government could immediately implement actions to achieve the objectives of the ma is to lead by example by leveraging its annual expenditure in providing government services. with the australian public service expenditure exceeding $60 billion in 2015 (towell 2015) and expected to continue in the future, the federal government is armed with a significant leverage to demonstrate that the ma would be more than benign race conscious measures mandated by legislation – even if those measures are not remedial in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or societal discrimination – it would serve important governmental objectives and timetables that focus attention on progress towards non-discriminatory practices. annual report to compile its annual report to the amc, agencies would be required to inform employees, shareholders and other stakeholders of the lodgement of the annual report and must provide them with access to the report (adapted from the wge act, section 16). agencies must inform employees and stakeholders they would have an opportunity to comment on the report and they may give those comments to either the employer or the amc. if comments are submitted within 30 days after the report has been submitted to the amc, employers would be able to take those comments into account when providing additional information to the amc. likewise, comments sent to the amc within 30 days would allow the amc to consider the comments when requesting additional information as part of reviewing the employer’s certification under the act. this allows actors who are affected, namely employees and other stakeholders, active involvement and therefore would enhance the opportunity to effect cultural change internally, somewhat like a ‘feedback loop’, thus turning these actors into ‘regulators’, providing another layer of support to the amc as the government’s regulator and rectifying information asymmetry because it means the amc would not be solely relying on employers to provide information. through consultation with employees and for them to have the opportunity to contribute either internally, anonymously, or to provide a contribution separately to the amc, the ma provides an additional layer of pressure for employers to comply. the use of law to turn employees and other stakeholders into ‘regulators’ by enabling their comments on their employer’s reports may also prevent the employer from presenting its implementation and progress more favourably than the workplace’s reality, such as ‘window-dressing’ compliance. employees would now be free to reveal the truth including to the amc if they are uncomfortable raising it internally. there is potential for employees whose english is not proficient to be disadvantaged. further, not all employers would be interested in the feedback they receive from employees and other stakeholders. however, both issues could be addressed through allowing employees to anonymously provide comments to amc as external regulator, who can request further information from an employer regarding their compliance. furthermore, employees who are not confident in providing comments in english could provide comments in their own cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 59 language through confidential translation and interpreting services such as the national telephone interpreting service, to be made available via the amc. providing misleading or false information would cause the employer to be non-compliant, allowing the amc to raise concerns with the agency head, the minister concerned or both, and if the amc is not satisfied with the response, ‘name and shame’ the agency in its annual report to parliament. limitations of disclosure requirements the effectiveness of mandatory disclosure requirements would depend on the willingness of employees to engage in the process and make comments on the employer’s report. there is a risk that employees would be unwilling to provide criticism on the report for fear of jeopardising their position – this is partially addressed through allowing anonymous comments. further, there is an assumption that people would understand and be capable of responding to information. it is unlikely that all employees would have the capacity to understand the reports in the same way as information affects different groups in society differently (freiberg 2010), and would also be dependent on the complexity of the information and language capability of the actors concerned. there may also be other factors that would influence an employee’s capability to comment – including whether they have the time, or are sceptical of the impact their contribution would make, or other reasons. this is where standardisation through benchmarking criteria for certification is important. setting the benchmark as the reference standard to disclose information allows the amc to compare and evaluate the quality of information provided including any discrepancies and to seek further information, where required. education the other pillar to informational regulation involves the amc providing information on the lived reality of australian communities, promoting the benefits of diversity in order to generate attitude change, capability development and norm formation or modification (freiberg 2010). this is particularly important in achieving changes to embrace diversity, which requires challenging the attitudes and norms as well as enabling australians to build the necessary processes and knowledge. this would involve multifaceted strategies and require such tools as advice, education, training, advertising, information campaigns and legislative summaries. the amc would be the repository of expertise on diversity measures and one of its core functions would be to provide advice and assistance to all: employers, employees, members of the public and school curriculum regarding the federal government’s diversity measures and the raison d’être for these policies. for employers, the amc has a role to assist them meet the benchmark standard set for certification and providing education to their staff. 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 certification performance indicators by way of certification by the amc is the next tier above informational regulation. certification is an outward manifestation of formal recognition that the agency has reached the minimum standard required. agencies are re-certified through annual compliance with the annual report. to achieve certification by the amc, a number of steps must be implemented to demonstrate the substantive achievement in diversity: • establish a multicultural charter by issuing a diversity action policy statement to all staff • appoint a senior manager to oversee the program satisfy information disclosure requirements • review personnel policies and practices to invest in diversity • set goals for the diversity program to reflect the lived reality of the australian community • devise strategies to monitor the program and evaluate its achievements. ‘hard sanctions’ the amc would also be empowered to address non-compliance in a tiered approach. at the first instance, it could seek further information, allowing a 30-day response period. if a response is not forthcoming by the set time or is inadequate, the amc would have the option of allowing further time or writing to the agency head outlining areas of non-compliance, copying in the responsible minister. if non-compliance persisted, the amc would have the further option of listing an agency among one of two categories – in progress or non-compliant. while ‘naming and shaming’ may appear weak as a sanction and its effectiveness questioned in other legislation (thornton 2012), the amc’s annual report (to be tabled in parliament by the prime minister through an annual statement) would allow potential external scrutiny and pressure to be levied by the public, the media and other interested parties. its effectiveness would be further bolstered through the australian parliamentary process where ministers responsible for noncompliant agencies risk being asked to account for her or his agency’s non-compliance during parliamentary sessions. conclusion since its adoption in the 1970s, australian multiculturalism has operated without legislative legitimacy. government multicultural policies have been tokenistic because they lack the legislative seal of approval needed for changes to be enduring and effective. the australian government’s approach to policies on multiculturalism has been mostly a top-down, goaloriented approach designed to enhance cultural governance (jupp 2007), or as fleras argued, ‘theoretical possibility and practice of a multicultural governance without multiculturalism’ (fleras 2009, p. 115). a federal multicultural act would provide a statutory framework for the existing government multicultural policy with a clearer sense of purpose and direction. such an act would acknowledge multiculturalism as a fundamental characteristic of australian society with an integral role in the decision-making process of the government cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 61 activities and processes, directed toward the preservation and enhancement of social inclusion in australia. state and territory governments have stepped up to take leadership during moments of federal government timidity and have successfully enacted their own multicultural acts to charter multicultural policies tailored to their specific community conditions. what is required now is leadership by the federal government to champion a new proactive approach based on inclusion and community-based policies to inculcate an appreciation, and embracing of diversity. when backed by a legislative lever, multiculturalism could revive earlier successes by generating a deep and pervasive nation-wide commitment to its concept and securing a social authority sufficiently deep to transform society into a new historic project. it would provide legitimacy for a rational national response to resurgence of divisive and polarised groups. its symbolism is to acknowledge the fundamental ideas that while ‘race’ (ang & stratton 2001) exists and remnants of its power continues to operate in the national psyche for a portion of the australian public, a new sense of national unity has emerged to reflect the lived reality of the australian population (abs 2018). no law, of course, is a panacea. but a federal multicultural act would be a legislative empowerment of unapologetic insistence on the formal recognition of dignity, respect, equality and freedom as fundamental human liberties for australians of non-english speaking backgrounds. it would be a pro-active form of legislation offering an enabling framework that could provide the other necessary pillar, in concert with anti-racial discrimination laws, to engender inclusive equality for racialised minorities in australia, symbolically and in a practical sense, an identity of a place in australia. in future, the act could help cement the insistence that the cultural heritage of any particular australian does not exclude them from full participation in australian society. a future in which all australians, ‘white’ or not, can identify in a nation confident in its diversity and vibrant society with ‘courage, community and compassion’, and be ‘enlarged by those who call her home’ (shorten 2016, 29:03-29:28); in other words, an australian identity where diversity holds pride of place with commonly shared values is integral to the australia of the twenty first century. references allen, d. 2010, ‘remedying discrimination: the limits of the law and the need for a systemic approach’, university of tasmania law review, vol. 29, no. 2: pp. 83-110. ang, i. & stratton, j. 2001, on not speaking chinese: living between asia and the west, routledge, london, 2001, 28–31. 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http://theconversation.com/operation-fortitude-its-not-just-clumsy-wording-that-should-worry-us-46870 http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs339/en/ http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/auindiglawrw/2007/95.pdf 5981-article text-27734-2-10-20180726.pdf 5981-article text-27734-2-10-20180726.pdf abstract keywords introduction rethinking and reinvigorating multiculturalism the ‘power’ of legislation authority – source of power advocacy & leadership regulation – ‘hard & soft’ informational or ‘soft’ regulation education certification ‘hard sanctions’ conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 3 2017 © 2017 alanna kamp, oishee alam, kathleen blair, kevin dunn. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: kamp, a., alam, o., blair, k. and dunn, k. 2017. australians’ views on cultural diversity, nation and migration, 2015-16. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(3), 61-84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i 3.5635 issn 1837-5391 published by uts epress | mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper australians’ views on cultural diversity, nation and migration, 2015-16 alanna kamp, oishee alam, kathleen blair, kevin dunn western sydney university, australia corresponding author: alanna kamp, urban research program/school of social sciences and psychology, western sydney university, locked bag 1797 penrith nsw 2751 australia. a.kamp@westernsydney.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5635 abstract between july and august 2015, and in november 2016, the challenging racism project team conducted an online survey to measure the extent and variation of racist attitudes and experiences in australia. the survey comprised a sample of 6001 australian residents, which was largely representative of the australian population. the survey gauged australians’ attitudes toward cultural diversity, intolerance of specific groups, immigration, perceptions of anglo-celtic cultural privilege, and belief in racialism, racial separatism and racial hierarchy. in this paper we report findings on respondents’ views on cultural diversity, nation and migration. the majority of australians are pro-diversity. however, we also acknowledge conflicting findings such as strong support for assimilation and identification of ‘out groups’. the findings paint a complex picture of attitudes towards cultural diversity, nation and migration in australia. the attitudes reflect contradictory political trends of celebrated diversity, triumphalist claims about freedom, alongside pro-assimilationist views and stoked islamophobia. this is within the context of a stalled multicultural project that has not sufficiently challenged assimilationist assumptions and anglo-privilege. keywords cultural diversity; racism; multiculturalism; australia; survey; quantitative research declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the research on which this study was based was funded by the special broadcasting service (sbs). http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5635 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5635 https://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ mailto:a.kamp@westernsydney.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5635 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 introduction recent changes to australia’s social, demographic and geopolitical landscape have made the need to closely examine australians’ views on cultural diversity, nation and migration even more imperative as such examinations allow us to better understand how macro-level processes may affect intergroup relations and attitudes. data from the 2016 australian national census indicate that the cultural and religious face of australia is continuing to transform at a rapid rate. buddhism, hinduism, sikhism and islam have all experienced an increase in adherents while adherence to christianity has fallen, and almost one in two australians report that one or both of their parents were born overseas (abs 2017a). this is further supported by the finding that 27 per cent of australians speak a language other than english at home (with over 200 languages spoken across the country), an increase of 4 percent from the previous census in 2011. much of this change can be attributed to migration via australia’s migration program and humanitarian program, which see close to 200,000 permanent migrants moving to australia annually, from countries including new zealand, the united kingdom, china, india and the philippines (abs 2017a). the picture of multicultural australia provided by the census is complicated, however, by concurrent political initiatives, policy and legislative changes, grassroots social movements and media commentary that at times bolster and at other times protest the demographic reality of cultural diversity in australia. for example, migration to australia has been tempered by proposed and actual changes to australia’s migration and multiculturalism policies in recent years, most notably the abolition of 457 visas (temporary work (skilled) visas) and proposed changes to citizenship laws that would make it more difficult for residents to attain citizenship (department of immigration and border protection 2017). while proposed changes to citizenship laws failed to pass the senate in late 2017, it has been indicated that the debate continues, as a redraft of reforms is imminent (zivic 2017). fifty years since the 1967 referendum to include aboriginal australians in the census, and ten years since the highly criticised northern territory intervention into remote aboriginal communities, aboriginal people in australia continue to be marginalised politically, economically, and socially (mcgregor 2011, moore 2014). reported experiences of racism and islamophobia have remained high for several years, with a 2015 report on muslim experiences in australia finding that 57 per cent of muslim australian respondents had experienced racism (dunn et al 2015). such increases in racist incidents have coincided with a (failed) political attempt to amend/repeal section 18c of the racial discrimination act—a legislative protection from ‘offensive behaviour because of race, colour or national or ethnic origin’ (racial discrimination act 1975, s.18c). australia’s formal humanitarian intake of asylum seekers and refugees coexists alongside its policy of indefinite detention in offshore centres for asylum seekers arriving by sea, and government and media discourse that vilifies asylum seekers and feeds anti-asylum seeker sentiments (augoustinos and quinn 2003; pedersen et al. 2006; every and augoustinos 2007; mckay et al 2012, trounson et al 2015). our anticipation is that these contradictory political discourses and the demographic realities will be reflected in contradictory attitudes on australian multiculturalism. this contradiction and protest is important insofar as it contributes to intergroup tensions and intolerances. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 63 australia’s story of migration and multiculturalism has drawn the attention of researchers interested in documenting australians’ attitudes toward the sometimes polarising issues of cultural diversity, migration and nation. for example, betts’ (1996) analysis of polls on attitudes toward immigration from 1961 to 1996 indicates that opposition to immigration had remained high in australia since the 1980s. two thirds of australians polled opposed immigration in 1996 (see betts 1996, p. 10). however, this picture changed in the years following betts’ original article, and by 2002 she noted that opposition to immigration had decreased. this was attributed to lower unemployment, lowered intake of immigration, and a decrease in fears about population growth (betts 2002; see also mcallister 1993). the geographies of racism survey conducted by the challenging racism project (2001-2008) found that attitudes toward cultural diversity were somewhat contradictory. of the 12,512 survey participants, 85 per cent agreed that cultural diversity is beneficial for society, but 45 per cent of respondents believing that ethnic diversity weakens nations. these findings appear to support a much smaller-scale survey conducted over a decade previously of only anglo, australian-born respondents, in which only 42 per cent of respondents stated that multiculturalism contributed to social cohesion, and over a third of respondents indicated that it led to more intergroup conflict (ho 1990, p. 266). the research findings of ang et al. (2002) were more optimistic, with two-thirds of their national sample of 1,439 respondents stating they believed immigration had been beneficial to australia, 52 per cent supported multiculturalism and 59 per cent supported cultural diversity. perhaps unsurprisingly, support was much higher among their representative nesb (non-english speaking background) samples of filipino, greek, lebanese, somali and vietnamese speakers (ang et al. 2002, p. 9). this research story on attitudes towards multiculturalism is one that charts a movement towards broader support, but which also unearths continuing, though eroding, support for assimilation. an important factor to consider when examining public opinion on cultural diversity, nation and migration is australians’ attitudes towards stigmatised ethnic groups. dunn et al. (2004, p.415) found that despite the majority of respondents articulating that they were comfortable with cultural diversity, intolerant attitudes towards some ‘out groups’ were high, particularly toward aboriginal and muslim australians. intolerant attitudes towards these and other out groups remained high throughout the course of the project, and questions on experiences of racism found that close to one-in-five respondents had experienced racist talk. these findings indicate that racism is prevalent in australian society despite high levels of support for cultural diversity (dunn et al. 2004). another significant dataset on multiculturalism and social cohesion can be found in the scanlon foundation’s ‘mapping social cohesion’ reports, which document annual research on australian attitudes to cultural diversity from 2007. their most recent survey, conducted in 2016, found that 22 per cent of respondents were strongly positive toward cultural diversity and 10-12 per cent were strongly negative ─an increase of two percent since the previous year (markus 2016). markus (2016, p.53) argues that the small proportion of people who oppose immigration and support assimilation policies demonstrate how far attitudes have shifted since the end of the white australia policy. there were, however, outliers to the 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 broad positivity toward cultural diversity documented in the 2016 report, with almost 42 per cent of respondents indicating a strongly negative response to asylum seekers arriving in australia by boat, and a quarter of respondents expressing negative attitudes toward muslims. overall, markus (2016) identified that there was a slight increase in negative attitudes toward cultural diversity and specific out groups in 2016. in addition to reporting on the public opinion of australians, scholars have investigated why some attitudes are more prevalent than others particularly in relation to contemporary social, political and economic concerns. as mentioned previously, betts’ (1996) research illuminated that anxiety about unemployment, crime and security and population growth often fuelled opposition to immigration in the late twentieth century. the qualitative component of dandy and pe-pua’s (2010) mixed-methods research in three australian states found that cultural diversity was perceived as negative to society because of factors such as divisiveness (cultural groups ‘sticking together’ and not integrating into mainstream australian society), the existence of racism, intergroup conflict from overseas being ‘imported’ into australia, crime, and social inequality (see dandy and pe-pua 2010, p. 43). dandy and pe-pua (2010) also uncovered that cultural diversity was positively viewed by some respondents due to perceptions of cultural enrichment, a broadening of perspective and worldview, a more positive intergroup attitude, and benefits to the australian economy. such research highlights the utility of qualitative methods in investigating the nuances and complexities of australians’ perspectives on cultural diversity, racism and migration. this paper contributes to the existing body of literature by providing current and national-level findings on australians’ attitudes toward cultural diversity, nation and migration, through an analysis of participants’ responses to eight survey questions. after detailing the data collection and analysis methods and their limitations, we discuss the findings of the survey in relation to three key topic areas: attitudes to cultural diversity, the identification of ‘out groups’ in australian society, and perceptions of australian immigration intake. while we acknowledge that the standardised quantitative measures used and quantitative data analysed in this paper may not fully illuminate the complexity of australians’ attitudes and personal perspectives, our empirical findings provide an important, extensive and up-to-date basis for further investigations. method: survey data collection and analysis between july and august 2015 and in november 2016, the challenging racism project conducted a survey that gauged the extent and variation of racist attitudes and experiences of racism in australia1. the survey data were collected via an online questionnaire (provided through a commercial survey provider) with a final sample of 6 001 australian respondents2. the only criteria for participation in this survey were that participants be australian residents and 18 years of age or older. 1 this research was commissioned by the special broadcasting service (sbs) for the documentary titled ‘is australia racist?’ released on 26 february 2017. 2 the first recruitment phase took place between july and august 2015 and resulted in 5407 participants. the second recruitment phase too place in november 2016 and resulted in 594 participants. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 65 participants were recruited from the 400,000 individuals who are active panellists of the commercial online panel provider, ssi (survey sampling inc.). ssi employs rigorous quality controls, recruits participants in a variety of ways to ensure a diverse sample, and randomly selects panel participants to complete the surveys. it is acknowledged that there may be various limitations in utilising online panels in survey research such as the relationship between completion rates and data accuracy and the relationship between multiple panel memberships and data quality, however, these limitations are not yet well examined (callegaro et al. 2014; baker et al. 2010).one obvious limitation of this survey design is that participants must have access to the internet and be registered panellists of ssi. despite recruitment limitations, the final sample for this project was largely representative of the broader australian population. for example, 51.7 per cent of respondents were female and 48.4 per cent were male. this proportion closely approximates the representation of males and females in the australian population (50.7 per cent female and 49.3 per cent male according to the australian bureau of statistic ((abs) 2017b). in regards to state/territory of residence, 1.1 per cent of respondents were from the australian capital territory; 32.9 per cent from new south wales; 20.4 per cent from queensland; 0.9 per cent from the northern territory; 9.9 per cent from western australia; 7.5 per cent from south australia; 25.4 per cent from victoria; and 2.0 per cent from tasmania. again, this closely approximates the relative population sizes of the states and territories (abs 2017b). in terms of educational representation, individuals who have completed a university degree and/or postgraduate qualification were over-represented in the sample with 23.8 percent of participants having achieved a university degree and an additional 11.3 per cent having achieved a postgraduate qualification. this compares to 16.1 per cent of the australian population that had completed their education at a university or other tertiary institution (abs 2017b). the sample was also culturally and religiously diverse. the majority of participants (72.2 per cent) were born in australia, with other common countries of birth being the united kingdom (7.6 per cent), new zealand (2.4 per cent), india (2.4 per cent), malaysia (1.4 per cent) and china (1.1 per cent excluding sars and taiwan). almost half the sample (48.8 per cent) had at least one parent who was born overseas. of the total sample 2.3 per cent of the participants identified as being of aboriginal or torres strait islander background. this proportion closely approximates the total australian population who are of aboriginal or torres strait islander descent (2.8 percent as stated by the abs 2017b). the cultural diversity of the sample was also reflected in the languages spoken at home. respondents who speak a language other than english at home comprised 18.3 per cent of the sample with the most common languages (besides english) being cantonese (1.6 per cent), mandarin (1.3 per cent), italian (1.3 per cent), greek (0.9 per cent), ‘chinese’ (0.9 per cent), hindi (0.9 per cent, vietnamese (0.8 per cent), and arabic (0.6 per cent). again, this was a close reflection of the broader australian population as documented by the abs (2017b). the majority of participants claimed no religion (38.2 per cent) followed by religious affiliations with christianity (50.2 per cent), buddhism (2.8 per cent), hinduism (2.2 per cent), islam (1.6 per cent) and judaism (0.7 per cent). 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 in line with the survey’s aim, the online questionnaire included thirty primary3 questions/statements relating to attitudes towards issues such as racism and anti-racism, multiculturalism and religious diversity in australia, and migration, asylum seekers and refugees. three primary questions/statements relating to experiences of racism/racial discrimination were also included in the questionnaire as well as a variety of demographic questions such as participants’ age, level of education, labour force participation, gender, state/territory of residence, country of birth and religion (see challenging racism project 2017a for a full list of questions). in this paper we report findings on respondents’ views on cultural diversity, nation and migration by drawing upon responses to the eight questions/statements that focused on judgements on the benefits or weaknesses of cultural diversity, identification of ‘out groups’ groups (i.e. those that do not fit into australian society), and perceptions australia’s immigrant intake. in order to analyse the quantitative data, questionnaire responses were downloaded into ibm spss software and crosstabulations generated. the crosstabulations were used to summarise the relationship between various demographic variables (age, sex, birthplace, education level etc) and questionnaire responses. in some instances, crosstabulations were also used to gauge relationships between responses to multiple survey questions. the crosstabulations were subjected to statistical analyses including pearson’s chi squared (x²) test. the pearson’s chi square (x²) was used to test for the independence between variables that may be theoretically associated, this included for example being born overseas (or not) and dispositions towards cultural diversity. the sample size of the survey is such that false positive findings were possible. however, our cross tabulations were confined to tests of independence between variables that made theoretical sense (e.g. attitude on diversity and birthplace), and the x² were strong. the significance of these effects was measured at p< .05 to test whether the associations had been generated by chance. bonferroni post hoc tests were not necessary given the strength of the p values and x². attitudes to cultural diversity as part of the online questionnaire, survey participants were asked a series of four questions pertaining to their views on cultural diversity in australia. these questions sought to obtain quantitative data on participants’ judgements on the benefits or weaknesses of cultural diversity and attitudes towards assimilation (tables 1-4). these questions operationalised socalled ‘new racisms’ (that is, perceptions of differentiation and hierarchies based on cultural distinctiveness and conformity rather than biological differences) as outlined by jayasuriya (2002, pp.40-42). respondents were largely supportive of cultural diversity, with 80.4 per cent agreeing that ‘it is a good thing for a society to be made up of different cultures’ (table 1). similarly, 75.1 per cent of respondents agreed that ‘having a multicultural population has been good for australia’ (table 2). these positive findings align with recent research (since 2000) that has found that australians are generally supportive of cultural diversity (see for example dunn et 3 we use the term ‘primary’ here as several of the attitudinal and experiential questions had multiple components or ‘sub-questions’. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 67 al. 2004, p. 425; ang et al. 2006; nelson and dunn 2013; markus 2014; blair 2015 ). this is in stark contrast to the predominance of attitudes that opposed multiculturalism in the 1980s and early 1990s (betts 2002, pp.30-31). as dunn et al. (2004, p.425) suggest, such positive attitudes in recent times reflect the liberal attitudes to equality of opportunity combined with official celebratory rhetoric and education about multiculturalism (and anti-racism initiatives) in contemporary australia. participants’ own positive experiences of cultural diversity may be another important factor in such widespread support for australian multiculturalism (dunn et al. 2004, p. 425). table 1. support for cultural diversity in australia, 2015-6 it is a good thing for a society to be made up of different cultures (%) agree1 80.4 neither agree/disagree 15.3 disagree2 4.4 total 100 demographic variations3 % agree1 gender (x² 29.585; p=.000) female 82.8 male 77.7 age (x² 29.275; p=.000) 18-35 84.0 36-65 78.9 over 65 77.2 aboriginal and torres strait islander (x² 19.482; p=.000) yes 77.0 no 80.4 birthplace (x² 25.541;p=.000) australia 78.9 overseas 84.2 lote (x² 45.840; p=.000) yes 87.3 no 78.8 1includes responses for ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ 2includes responses for ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ 3probability (p) values were calculated using chi square tests with the significance threshold set at p< .05. source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. in the responses to the two cultural diversity questions, patterns across various demographic variables were seen. for example, women were more likely than men to be supportive of cultural diversity: 82.8 per cent of women agreed that it is a good thing for a society to be made up of different cultures compared to 77.7 per cent of men (table 1). similarly, 76.2 per cent of women agreed that having a multicultural population has been good for australia, compared to 74.0 per cent of men. in both instances, the gendered differences were statistically significant (x² 29.585 & 6.053) with probability values calculated to be less than .05. across the board, younger australians between the ages of 18 and 35 have more positive attitudes towards cultural diversity with statistically significant decreases in positive attitudes across the age groups (x² at 29.275 & 36.637). australians born overseas and those who speak a language other than english were also more likely to be supportive of cultural diversity compared to those born in australia and those who speak only english (as similarly found by ang et al. 2002). for example, 84.2 per cent of participants born overseas and 87.3 per cent of participants who speak a language other than english agreed that it is a good thing for society to be made up of different cultures, compared to 78.9 per cent of participants who were born in australia and 78.8 who only speak english (table 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 1). the differences in attitudes between these groups were statistically significant and a very similar pattern was evident in responses to the question ‘having a multicultural population has been good for australia’ (see table 2). table 2. support for multiculturalism in australia, 2015-6 having a multicultural population has been good for australia (%) agree1 75.1 neither agree/disagree 17.1 disagree2 7.7 total 100 demographic variations3 % agree1 gender (x² 6.053; p=.048) female 76.2 male 74 age (x² 36.637; p=.000) 18-35 78.1 36-65 74.4 over 65 71.2 aboriginal and torres strait islander (x² 7.023; p=.030) yes 67.4 no 75.3 birthplace (x² 54.936; p=.000) australia 72.3 overseas 81.5 lote (x² 92.118; p=.000) yes 86.1 no 72.7 1includes responses for ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ 2includes responses for ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ 3probability (p) values were calculated using chi square tests with the significance threshold set at p< .05. source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. the research findings also indicate that aboriginal and torres strait islander respondents are slightly less supportive of cultural diversity than respondents of nonindigenous backgrounds. in response to the question: ‘is it a good thing for society to be made up of different cultures?’ 77.0 per cent of aboriginal and torres strait islander participants agreed (11.9 per cent disagreed) compared to 80.4 per cent of participants of nonindigenous backgrounds who agreed (and only 4.2 per cent that disagreed) (table 1). similarly, when posed with the statement, ‘having a multicultural population has been good for australia’, 67.4 per cent of aboriginal and torres strait islander respondents agreed (13.3 per cent disagreed), compared to 75.3 per cent of participants of non-indigenous backgrounds who agreed (and only 7.5 per cent that disagreed) (table 2). research conducted by reconciliation australia (2016) indicated similar findings. that is, while the majority of all project participants agreed that ‘we are better off with many cultural groups’, aboriginal and torres strait islander respondents were slightly less likely to agree (56 per cent) than australians of non-indigenous backgrounds (66 per cent) (see reconciliation australia 2016, p.58). the statistically significant difference in attitudes between the aboriginal and torres strait islander cohort and non-indigenous cohort found in our study (and similarly reflected in reconciliation australia’s (2016) report) indicates uneasiness with cultural diversity that is more prevalent among the aboriginal and torres strait islander cohort. this uneasiness with cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 69 multiculturalism has been documented elsewhere and been linked to the problematic positioning of aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples within conceptions of multiculturalism which includes them as ‘just another ethnic group’(morrissey and mitchell 1994, p. 111; see also dunn et al 2010; castles 1997, p. 16; curthoys, 2000, p. 29; van den berg 2002). such placement aligns aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples and their concerns/issues with immigrant identifications that are associated with ‘multiculturalism’ and as such, erases their unique position as the first australians and consolidates their position as inferior citizens (hage 1998, pp.16-17, 24; dunn et al. 2010, p. 20). it cannot be definitely known from these data, however, whether the higher level of uneasiness towards cultural diversity is linked to the problematic positioning of aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples within conceptions of australian multiculturalism, or is linked to other factors such as increased experiences of racism (as documented by reconciliation australia 2016, and dunn et al. 2009, p. 9). interestingly, in the previous geographies of racism survey conducted by the challenging racism project (2001-2008) which also asked ‘is it a good thing for society to be made up of different cultures?’ rates of agreement were much higher among aboriginal and torres strait islander respondents and respondents of non-indigenous backgrounds (90.8 per cent and 93.1 per cent respectively) with no statistically significant difference between the two groups (see dunn et al 2010: 25). differences between the 2010 and our 2015/2016 survey may be accounted for in the differing recruitment/sampling techniques used (telephone vs. online) or to changes in australia’s social, demographic and geopolitical landscape over the past 5 or so years. further (particularly qualitative) research on aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples’ attitudes towards multiculturalism and cultural diversity would shed light on this historical shift in opinion. despite majority support for cultural diversity and multiculturalism there was somewhat contradictory support for assimilation. almost 1-in-2 respondents (48.7 per cent) believed that people from racial, ethnic, cultural and religious minority groups should behave more like ‘mainstream australians’ (table 3). when asked if ‘australia is weakened by people of different ethnic origins sticking to their old ways’, 41.2 per cent of the participants agreed (table 4). this parallels the results of the geographies of racism survey which asked participants the same question and found that over 40 per cent of participants agreed that australia is weakened by different ethnic groups sticking to their ‘old ways’ despite strong support for australian multiculturalism (see dunn et al. 2004). dunn et al. (2004) argue that such support for assimilation reflects ‘a widely held, and largely unchallenged, assumption that successful societies can only be wrought in circumstances of cultural uniformity’ (p. 426). 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 table 3. support for assimilation, australia, 2015-6 1includes responses for ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ 2includes responses for ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ 3probability (p) values were calculated using chi square tests with the significance threshold set at p< .05. source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. table 4. concern about ethnic diversity weakening nation, australia, 2015-6 australia is weakened by people of different ethnic origins sticking to their old ways (%) agree1 41.2 neither agree/disagree 28.2 disagree2 30.6 total 100 demographic variations3 % agree1 gender (x² 13.891; p=.001) female 39.0 male 43.5 age (x² 111.783; p=.000) 18-35 33.9 36-65 42.0 over 65 53.7 aboriginal and torres strait islander (x² 1.502; p=.472) yes 43.0 no 41.1 birthplace (x² 2.030; p=.362) australia 41.7 overseas 40.0 lote (x² 46.763; p=.000) yes 32.5 no 43.2 1includes responses for ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ 2includes responses for ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ 3probability (p) values were calculated using chi square tests with the significance threshold set at p< .05. source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. people from racial, ethnic, cultural and religious minority groups should behave more like mainstream australians (%) agree1 48.7 neither agree/disagree 32.8 disagree2 18.5 total 100 demographic variations3 % agree1 gender (x² 63.010; p=.000) female 44.2 male 53.5 age (x² 356.778; p=.000) 18-35 34.7 36-65 53.1 over 65 64.8 aboriginal and torres strait islander (x² 4.110; p=.128) yes 45.2 no 48.8 birthplace (x² 8.248; p=.016) australia 47.6 overseas 51.7 lote (x² 40.116; p=<.000) yes 42.9 no 50.1 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 71 the demographic patterns identified in the responses to the cultural diversity questions were replicated in responses to questions about assimilation. for example, male participants were less likely to support cultural diversity with 53.5 per cent of male respondents agreeing that people from racial, ethnic, cultural and religious minority groups should behave more like mainstream australians. this compares to 44.2 per cent of female respondents (table 3). older australians, particularly those over 65 years of age, were also more likely to support assimilation (64.8 per cent) compared to only 34.7 per cent of 18-35 year olds and 53.1 per cent of 36-65 year olds (table 3). participants who do not speak a language other than english were also more likely to support assimilation (50.1 per cent) compared to those who speak a language other than english (42.9 per cent). these demographic variations were statistically significant and a very similar pattern was evident in responses to the question ‘australia is weakened by people of different ethnic origins sticking to their old ways’ (see table 4). the misalignment between majority support (three-quarters) for cultural diversity and close to majority support (about half) for assimilation was similarly found by blair (2015). in her qualitative examination of young anglo-australian adults’ attitudes towards multiculturalism, blair (2015 p. 441) argued that while young anglo-australians are generally enthusiastic about largely cosmopolitan elements of differing cultures, this enthusiasm is more tempered for those elements of culture (e.g. goods and services) that cannot be easily consumed. with participants displaying ‘passionate possession of their anglo-heritage’ a ‘counter-discourse of fear, loss of national identity and suspicion of ‘others’’ (blair 2015, p.441) was evident in focus-group discussions of such things as conflicting religious ideologies, anglo-celtic privilege, language, and social enclaves. blair’s (2015) participants believed cultural diversity, or ‘too much’ of it, was a threat to their nation, their culture and their sense of belonging. as such, like a large proportion of our survey respondents, they expressed simultaneous and contradictory support for cultural diversity and cultural homogeneity. support for cultural and racial pluralism alongside concerns about diversity point to anxieties about cultural difference, and cultural distinctiveness, and it is thought that these relate to disquiet about the extent to which people perceive cultural diversity to be well managed (dunn et al. 2010). research has found that australians perceive the management of australian multiculturalism to involve the exclusion of groups who do not ‘fit in’ or are incompatible with the australian national imaginary or culture (see for example dunn et al. 2004; nelson and dunn 2013). as such, there are perceived ‘limits’ to multiculturalism and the extent to which cultural diversity can be successful/beneficial to the nation. it may be the case, for example, that the benefits of different groups contributing to cultural diversity are supported on the proviso that particular cultural traits (such as language) are adopted for successful integration into civic life (employment, educational institutions, legal literacy etc). such attitudes reflect an unfinished or under-developed multicultural project, in which the reach of policy and ways of perceiving australia require further enhancement. 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 identification of ‘out groups’ in order to obtain empirical evidence of the perceived ‘limits’ of cultural diversity, in our survey we asked two sets of questions that delivered data on who might be the current out groups in australian society. the first set of questions asked respondents if their feelings towards seven specific groups of australians were positive, negative or neutral (see table 5 for out group listing). when asked about their feelings towards particular groups, 31.5 per cent of respondents claimed to have ‘negative’ feelings (including ‘somewhat’ negative and ‘very negative’ feelings) towards muslim australians, and 22.3 per cent claimed to have ‘negative’ feelings (including ‘somewhat’ negative and ‘very negative’ feelings) towards middle-eastern australians (see table 5). several authors have written about what briskman (2015) terms the ‘creeping blight’ of islamophobia in australia since the september 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 (see for example morgan and poynting 2012; poynting and mason 2008; akbarzadeh 2016 ; aslan 2009). aslan’s monograph islamophobia in australia (2009) argues that in australia, islamophobia manifests itself largely as a form of cultural racism that is ‘intertwined with a widespread anxiety and resentment felt towards migration and multiculturalism amongst the dominant white anglo-celtic australians’ (p. 21). similarly, dunn et al. (2007) argue that anti-muslim attitudes in australia are ‘reproduced through racialisation that includes well-rehearsed stereotypes of islam’ (p. 564) and create a ‘culture’ rather than ‘colour’ racism. their mixed-method research draws on three data sets including qualitative and quantitative responses to three surveys and print media to show how muslims are constituted as culturally inferior, barbaric, misogynistic, fanatical, intolerant, and ultimately alien. such widespread negative constructions of muslims in public and media discourse identified by dunn et al. (2007) parallel the high rates of negative attitudes towards muslims and middle-eastern australians in our survey. table 5. attitudes towards specific groups, australia, 2015-61 1question wordings: ‘would you say your feelings are positive, negative or neutral towards the following group…’ source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. attitudinal response very positive % somewhat positive % neutral % somewhat negative % very negative % total % angloaustralians 28.8 30.9 37.3 2.4 0.5 100 aboriginal australians 21.7 28.1 39.9 8.4 1.9 100 muslim australians 12.3 17.9 38.3 21.1 10.4 100 refugees in australia 14.3 22.0 44.3 14.4 5.0 100 middleeastern australians 14.4 21.5 41.7 16.7 5.6 100 african australians 15.8 22.6 45.5 12.2 3.9 100 asian australians 22.0 31.3 39.8 5.8 1.1 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 73 respondents’ feelings towards anglo-australians and asian australians were the most positive at 59.7 per cent and 53.3 per cent of respondents reporting positive dispositions towards the two groups, respectively. given australia’s white settler history and continued privilege of anglo-australians (hage 1998), the positive attitudes towards anglo-australians are not surprising. however, such positive attitudes towards asian australians provides a counterpoint to australia’s long history of anti-asian sentiment and recent research that suggests that anti-asian sentiment, related to the cultural, geopolitical and economic swing towards asia, and particularly china in the ‘asian century’, is re-emerging (see for example rogers et al. 2017). similarly, the more positive dispositions towards asian australians found in our survey also contradicts experiential data that were collected and indicates chinese australians report experiences of racism at more than double the average for all australians: in the workplace, education, housing and other spheres (blair et al. 2017). the second set of questions that aimed to deliver data on who might be the current out groups in australian society utilised a bogardus social distance instrument (see bogardus 1933). this instrument was used to measure the degree of intolerance of specific out groups by asking about the out-marriage of a family member. such bogardus social distance measures have also been referred to as ‘comfort’ or distance indicators in other attitudinal survey work (see peach 1976; berry & kalin 1995, pp. 306-7; dunn et al. 2004) and have traditionally been analysed as indicators of (in)tolerance (dunn 2004). in our survey, respondents were asked the extent of their concern, if any, if a close relative were to marry a member of ten specific groups (see table 6). table 6. levels of concern regarding out-marriage of a relative, to specific groups, australia, 2015-61 level of concern not at all concerned % slightly concerned % somewhat concerned % very concerned % extremely concerned % total % indian, pakistani or sri lankan backgrounds 61.6 18.4 12.0 4.7 3.4 100 other asian backgrounds 70.4 15.4 9.1 3.3 1.8 100 aboriginal background 63.8 17.2 10.9 4.8 3.2 100 italian background 81.6 9.5 6.1 1.8 0.9 100 british background 84.1 7.5 5.6 1.9 0.8 100 african background 56.1 19.1 12.4 7.2 5.2 100 middle eastern background 48.6 19.8 14.3 9.4 7.9 100 muslim faith 36.9 19.7 15.6 10.4 17.2 100 jewish faith 59.9 17.7 12.4 5.5 4.4 100 christian faith 77.3 10.7 7.6 2.5 1.9 100 1question wording: ‘in your opinion, how concerned would you feel if one of your closest relatives were to marry a person of…’ source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 this second set of questions elucidated a higher degree of intolerance or negative attitudes towards specific groups of australians. for example, there is a substantive level of stated concern regarding muslim australians. only 36.9 per cent of respondents replied they would not be concerned at all if a relative married an individual of muslim faith while 27.6 per cent indicated they would be ‘extremely’ or ‘very concerned’ if a relative were to marry a muslim. this constituted one-in-four respondents. in total, 62.9 per cent of respondents expressed some degree (ranging from slightly-extremely) of intolerance/ discomfort with muslim australians further elucidating the extent of anti-islamic/islamaphobic within the australian population (table 6). middle eastern and african australians were also perceived as significant out groups. one-in-two respondents (51.4 per cent) expressed some level of concern (slight concern to extreme concern) if a relative were to marry someone of middle eastern background, and 43.9 per cent of respondents expressed some level of concern (slight concern to extreme concern) if a relative were to marry someone of african background. other significant out groups included southern asian (indian, pakistani or sri lankan) and jewish australians, with 38.4 per cent of respondents expressing some anti-southern asian sentiment and 40.1 per cent expressing some anti-jewish sentiment (table 6). respondents were also prompted to indicate their tolerance or comfort with british, christian and italian australians. antibritish and anti-italian sentiment (from ‘slight’ through to ‘extreme’ concern) were lowest across the sample at only 15.9 per cent and 18.4 per cent, respectively. anti-christian sentiment was also relatively low at 22.7 per cent (see table 6). these results indicate the culturally uneven nature of tolerance in australia and the continued and pervasive impact of ‘white’ (and christian) privilege and normalisation within the australian psyche (see goodall et al. 1994; hage 1998; wilson and gibson 2003; fozdar 2011; nelson et al. 2012; blair 2015). female respondents were generally more tolerant of inter-marriage with all the groups identified above. this was especially true for marriage with aboriginal australians, african australians and jewish australians in which the gender differences in responses was statistically significant (see table 7). for marriage with middle eastern, asian (both south and ‘other asian’) and muslim australians the gender variation was not statistically significant. male respondents were also more likely to express concern regarding intermarriage with italian australians, british australians and christian australians. older people, especially those over 65 years old, had greater intolerance by this measure, particularly in regards to middle eastern, muslim and african australians (see table 7). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 75 table 7 any stated concern regarding inter-marriage to selected ‘out groups’1, by gender and age, australia, 2015-6 gender age male female chisq p value2 1835 3665 over 65 chi-sq p value south asian % 38.7 38.2 .183 .669 38.2 36.4 45.2 24.832 .000 other asian % 30.7 28.6 3.041 0.81 27.5 28.6 37.1 32.846 .000 aboriginal % 39.1 33.4 20.542 .000 37.6 32.4 44.4 49.194 .000 italian % 20.4 16.5 15.065 .000 22.1 16.4 16.7 28.426 .000 british % 18.0 13.9 18.118 .000 20.9 14.8 8.7 78.988 .000 african % 46.6 41.4 16.902 .000 39.5 42.5 57.2 89.705 .000 middle eastern % 51.8 51.0 .407 .524 45.4 51.2 34.2 94.602 .000 muslim % 64.0 62.2 2.076 .150 56.1 62.7 78.4 143.112 .000 jewish % 43.0 37.4 19.228 .000 40.1 38.2 45.4 15.977 .000 christian % 24.6 20.9 11.495 .001 29.5 21.2 13.3 108.052 .000 1question wording: ‘in your opinion, how concerned would you feel if one of your closest relatives were to marry a person of…’ 2probability (p) values were calculated using chi square tests with the significance threshold set at p< .05. source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. perception of migrant intakes data from the 2016 australian national census indicates that one-third (33.3 per cent) of australians are migrants, having been born in a country other than australia (abs 2017). the migrant characteristic of australia’s current population is also reflected in the birthplace of parents, that is, 34.4 per cent of australians have parents that were both born overseas, and an additional 11.1 per cent of australians have one parent born overseas (abs 2017). despite the large proportion of migrants and children of migrants that make up the australian population (and not forgetting the long history of migrant intake since european settlement) there have, throughout australia’s european history, been ongoing social, political and economic anxieties about the type and amount of migrants that the nation can sustain (walker 1999). as outlined in the introduction to this article, such anxieties have recently manifest in proposed and actual changes to australia’s migration and multiculturalism policies, and government and media discourses that vilify asylum seekers, particularly those arriving by sea (every and augoustinos 2007; mckay et al. 2012, trounson et al. 2015). 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 within this climate, we deemed it important to ask survey participants how they felt about the current intake of immigrants in order to obtain empirical evidence of ‘every day’ australians’ views. while the majority (46.4 per cent) of respondents felt that intake was 'about right', 36.6 per cent felt that it was either too high or much too high (see table 8). in contrast to the previous attitudinal indicators, females, more so than males, and 36-45 year olds, more so than those over 65 years of age and those between 18-35 years of age, were more likely to state that the immigration intake was too high. it is not clear why this gender and age ‘reversal’ was produced in the results but it may point to increased anxieties within these demographic groups to perceived issues relating migrant intakes such as threats to job security/high unemployment, population growth, and social welfare issues (as discussed in betts’ (2002) explanation for shifting attitudes to immigration in australia since the 1990s). more detailed research would help shed light on this attitudinal variation. australian born and those who speak only english were also more likely to state that the intake was too high, in comparison to overseas born and those respondents of a lote background (table 8). table 8. attitudes towards immigration intake, australia, 2015-6 do you think the number of immigrants accepted into australia is too high, too low or about right? (%) too high1 36.6 about right 46.4 too low2 17.0 total 100 demographic variations3 % too high1 gender (x² 17.605; p=.000) female 38.7 male 34.3 age (x² 46.629; p=.000) 18-35 32.0 36-65 40.7 over 65 33.9 aboriginal and torres strait islander (x² 5.604; p=.061) yes 45.9 no 36.4 birthplace (x² 29.429; p=.000) australia 38.6 overseas 31.5 lote (x² 48.185; p=.000) yes 27.8 no 38.7 1includes responses for ‘too high’ and ‘much too high’ 2includes responses for ‘too low’ and ‘much too low’ 3probability (p) values were calculated using chi square tests with the significance threshold set at p< .05. source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. unsurprisingly, those participants who felt the immigration intake was too high were also less likely to hold positive attitudes toward diversity. for example, of those respondents who were positive about immigration (stating that australian immigration intake is ‘too low/much too low’), 95.6 per cent also agreed that it is a good thing for society to be made up of different cultures. in contrast, a much smaller proportion (67.7 per cent) of respondents who believed that australian immigration intake is ‘too high/much too high’ also agreed that it is a good thing for society to be made up of different cultures (see table 9). chi-square testing indicates that this relationship between perception of immigrant intake and support for cultural diversity is statistically significant (x² 458.668; p=.000). a similarly significant cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 77 pattern was seen in participant responses to the immigration question and agreement that a multicultural population has been good for australia, that is, 93.9 per cent of participants that believed immigration is ‘too low/much too low’ also agreed that multiculturalism is good for australia(x² 830.561). however, only 56.0 per cent of participants that believed immigration is ‘too high/much too high’ agreed with the benefits of multiculturalism (see table 9). in regards to the question of assimilation, the pattern remains clear: the large majority (69.7 per cent) of participants who believed immigration is ‘too high/much too high’ also agreed that ‘people from racial, ethnic, cultural and religious minority groups should behave more like mainstream australians’. this compares to a minority (21.0 per cent) of participants who believe immigration intake is ‘too low/much too low’ (table 9). attitudes about diversity and multiculturalism are associated, for many australians, with their dispositions towards migration policy and programs. table 9: relationship between attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigration intake, australia, 2015-61 immigration ‘too high’2 immigration ‘ too low’ 2 it is a good thing for a society to be made up of different cultures (x² 458.668; p=.000) agree 67.7% 95.6% having a multicultural population has been good for australia (x² 830.561; p=.000) agree 56.0% 93.9% people from racial, ethnic, cultural and religious minority groups should behave more like mainstream australians (x² 986.868; p=.000) agree 69.7% 21.0% 1data contained in this table have been drawn from three crosstabulations and their pearson’s chi squared (x²) and significance testing. the crosstabulations were used to summarise the relationship between responses to ‘do you think the number of immigrants accepted into australia is too high, too low or about right?’ and responses to the three survey questions listed in the table. probability (p) values were calculated using chi square tests with the significance threshold set at p< .05. 2question wording: do you think the number of immigrations accepted into australia is too high, too low or about right? source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. participants were also asked about their views on discriminatory migration policy via the questionnaire statement: ‘all migrants should be accepted regardless of where they come from’. just over half of the respondents (53.3 per cent) believed all migrants should be accepted to australia irrespective of their country of birth (see table 10). however, a sizeable proportion of the participants, 23.4 per cent, disagreed with this proposition. again, males (26.9 per cent) were more likely than females (20.1 per cent) to support discriminatory immigration policy, as were older participants, the australian born and those who speak only english (see table 10). higher education was linked to less exclusionary attitudes, that is, those with non-tertiary education levels were more likely to support a discriminatory immigration policy than those with a tertiary education (see table 10). 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 table 10. attitudes towards discriminatory migration policy, australia, 2015-6 all migrants should be accepted regardless of where they come from (%) agree1 53.3 neither agree/disagree 23.4 disagree2 23.4 total 100 demographic variations3 % disgree2 gender (x² 38.486; p=.000) female 20.1 male 26.9 age (x² 117.081; p=.000) 18-35 16.5 36-65 24.7 over 65 33.7 aboriginal and torres strait islander (x² 2.108; p=.348) yes 18.5 no 23.5 birthplace (x² 44.068; p=.000) australia 25.1 overseas 19.0 lote (x² 92.163; p=.000) yes 13.9 no 25.5 education (x² 22.847; p=.000) tertiary 22.9 non-tertiary 24.4 1includes responses for ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ 2includes responses for ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ 3 probability (p) values were calculated using chi square tests with the significance threshold set at p< .05. source: challenging racism project survey, july-august 2015 and november 2016. conclusions the challenging racism project survey provides one of the most recent and large-scale national-level sources of data on australians’ attitudes toward cultural diversity, nation and migration. analysis of the survey results indicate that respondents were largely supportive of cultural diversity, with the majority of the 6001 participants agreeing that ‘it is a good thing for a society to be made up of different cultures’ and ‘having a multicultural population has been good for australia’. similarly, the majority of participants were supportive of the size of australia’s current immigrant intake and the acceptance of immigrants regardless of where they come from. these positive findings align with previous research that has found that australians are generally supportive of cultural diversity and immigration. however, despite majority support for cultural diversity and multiculturalism there was contradictory support for assimilation with almost half of the participants agreeing that people from racial, ethnic, cultural and religious minority groups should behave more like ‘mainstream australians’. approximately 40 per cent of participants also agreed that ‘australia is weakened by people of different ethnic origins sticking to their old ways’. as suggested by dunn et al. (2010), such contradictory support for cultural and racial pluralism alongside concerns about diversity point to anxieties about cultural difference, and perhaps point to the ‘limits’ of multiculturalism and the extent to which cultural diversity can be successful/beneficial to the nation. further research, particularly in-depth qualitative discussions, may shed light on such apparent concerns or anxieties about cultural difference. concerns about cultural diversity were also apparent in the survey results relating to the identification of ‘out groups’. respondents indicated a substantive level of concern regarding cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 79 muslim australians. this is unsurprising given the current climate of increased islamophobia and the associated increase in racist incidents targeted at muslim australians (briskman 2015; morgan and poynting 2012; poynting and mason 2008; akbarzadeh 2016 ; aslan 2009; dunn et al. 2010; hreoc 2004; iwwcv 2008). middle eastern, african australians, southern asian (indian, pakistani or sri lankan) and jewish australians were also perceived as significant out groups. respondents’ feelings towards anglo-australians were the most positive; pointing to the ongoing normalisation of constructions of ‘white’/anglo australian national identity and belonging. such negative perceptions of particular groups within the multicultural landscape are problematic as they have ‘the potential to generate substantial inter-communal tensions in the workplaces and other public realms of australian society’ (dunn et al. 2004, p.425) as evidenced in everyday experiences of racism and marginalisation (essed 1991; essed 2002; dunn et al.2007; fozdar and terezani 2008; dunn et al. 2015; rajendran 2017). therefore, we reiterate dunn et al.’s (2004) assertion from over a decade ago that ‘the confrontation of this sociobiological and pessimistic [and narrow] understanding of nation remains an unfinished public policy imperative of australian multicultural policy’ (p.426). one avenue for change must be a more strident reimagining of ‘a culturally inclusive, diverse and dynamic articulation of nation’ that is engrained in public discourse and educational initiatives (dunn et al. 2004, p.426). overall, female participants were more likely than male participants to be supportive of cultural diversity and more tolerant of inter-marriage between various cultural groups. in general, younger australians between the ages of 18 and 35 have more positive attitudes towards cultural diversity and inter-marriage than participants over 35 (particularly more so than participants over 65 years of age). this difference across the age groups may reflect the success of anti-racist and pro-multicultural initiatives in schools (as also suggested by dunn et al. 2004) and across social media and other public spheres in recent decades. the antipathies held by the older generation of participants will be a reflection of the enduring legacies of the white australia policy era and its associated discourses of white national identity, assimilation and uneven rights to ‘belong’. further research would provide empirical evidence for such differences across the generations. while it is clear that perceptions of cultural diversity, migration and nation continue to be uneven across various demographic cohorts, the large extent of positive attitudes among the majority of participants suggests that anti-racist initiatives and multicultural definitions of national identity are having real impacts on australians’ understandings of nation and national belonging. therefore the public policy implication that education initiatives and public pronouncements advocating multiculturalism and cultural diversity have important roles to play (as advocated by dunn et al. 2004, p.426) is still highly relevant and necessary within the contemporary australian multicultural context which continues to be complicated by political initiatives 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http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/10/18/migrants-no-longer-limbocitizenship-changes-killed-senate https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1839-4655.2012.tb00250.x https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijlcj.2008.08.001 https://doi.org/10.1080/00049182.2017.1317050 https://doi.org/10.2224/sbp.2015.43.10.1641 http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/10/18/migrants-no-longer-limbo-citizenship-changes-killed-senate http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/10/18/migrants-no-longer-limbo-citizenship-changes-killed-senate 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 this page intentionally blank abstract keywords introduction method: survey data collection and analysis attitudes to cultural diversity identification of ‘out groups’ perception of migrant intakes conclusions references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 3 2017 © 2017 andrew jakubowicz. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: jakubowicz, a. 2017. alt_right white lite: trolling, hate speech and cyber racism on social media. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(3), 41-60. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9 i3.5655 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper alt_right white lite: trolling, hate speech and cyber racism on social media andrew jakubowicz university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: andrew jakubowicz, social and political sciences, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. andrew.jakubowicz@uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5655 abstract the rapid growth of race hate speech on the internet seems to have overwhelmed the capacity of states, corporations or civil society to limit its spread and impact. yet by understanding how the political economy of the internet facilitates racism it is possible to chart strategies that might push back on its negative social effects. only by involving the state, economy and civil society at both the global level, and locally, can such a process begin to develop an effective ‘civilising’ dynamic. however neo-liberalism and democratic license may find such an exercise ultimately overwhelmingly challenging, especially if the fundamental logical drivers that underpin the business model of the internet cannot be transformed. this article charts the most recent rise and confusion of the internet under the impact of the alt_right and other racist groups, focusing on an australian example that demonstrates the way in which a group could manipulate the contradictions of the internet with some success. using an analytical model developed to understand the political economy and sociology of mass media power in the later stages of modernity, before the internet, the author offers a series of proposals on how to address racism on the internet. keywords internet; cyber racism; antisemitism; australia; regulation; state; economy; civil society; social movements; trolls; alt_right, trolling declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this project was supported by an arc linkage grant arc lp 120200115. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5655 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5655 https://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ mailto:andrew.jakubowicz@uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5655 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 introduction: three online connections the spread of cyber racism has become an increasingly prominent issue, from myanmar to india, from the usa to africa, and throughout europe. an australian study, ‘cyber racism and community resilience’1 (jakubowicz et al., 2017) has recently been completed by an interdisciplinary research team from six australian universities, in partnership with the australian research council, the australian human rights commission, vichealth and the federation of ethnic communities councils of australia, and in conjunction with the online hate prevention institute (ohpi). this article draws on that study to reflect on one aspect of online racism, namely antisemitism, and the rise of online neo-nazism. while the full study covers many ethnic, racial and religious groups, antisemitism has been chosen here because the author came across a strong antisemitic attack directed towards him online, and discovered in pursuing its origins some of the real world complexities of fighting racism online. in the first half of 2017 the global social media industry was struck by an explosive break-down in its underlying business models, a predictable outcome of its underlying logic. the two behemoths that had charted the trajectories of exponential expansion for the previous decade started to freeze. both facebook and alphabet (the conglomerate covering google, youtube and many other cutting edge apps and platforms) were confronted by advertising boycotts (mostrous, 2017) and huge financial losses, as major global brands found their marketing materials served to sites closely associated with terrorist, racist, homophobic and sexist messages (alba, 2017). companies tripped up on google included pepsicola and walmart. over a period of a few weeks the algorithms that had produced billions of dollars in profit for the brands by finding consumers whose social media profiles best fitted with their products turned on themselves to begin destroying the brands’ value. while the platforms reworked their practices to some extent, much of the correction was done by staff over-riding the deeper algorithms. the verge’s nick statt reflected on this position, when he wrote in the midst of the crisis in march 2107, ‘youtube is now in the position of being structurally incapable of policing its platform and perhaps culturally hesitant even to do so with more heavy-handed moderation methods’ (statt, 2017). the deep dynamic that created these misaligned serves was compounded by payment going to the sites for the number of hits they attracted. it was when these sites tripped a minimum visits alert, that advertisers were served to the sites, and the site owners received payment from the advertisers through the platforms’ e-business model. for the alt_right (alt standing for alternate, a handle developed in the early days of the internet to describe nonmainstream newsgroups and bulletin boards) the flow of payments from facebook and alphabet had become a motivation for and an unexpected benefit of the way the internet had been developed. while the alt_right began in the usa it soon spread globally, including to 1 the cracr research team is made up of andrew jakubowicz (university of technology sydney), kevin dunn (western sydney university), gail mason (university of sydney), yin paradies (deakin university), ana-maria bliuc (western sydney university), nasya bahfen(la trobe university), rosalie atie (western sydney university), karen connelly (university of technology sydney), and andre oboler (ohpi and la trobe university). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 43 australia, where old right-wing groups soon found new followers and new impact as social media opportunities emerged that the platforms had not envisaged and could not easily control. inspired by the breitbart (amend and morgan, 2017, cadwalladr, 2017) pro-trump intervention in the us presidential election in the usa, a group of australian internet trolls adopted the name ‘thedingoes’ in mid 2016, and set up a social media network to test out how far an alt_right strategy could penetrate the australian online world through a multiple platform attack on jews, aborigines, muslims, africans and ‘multiculturalism’. their fairly marginal presence in australia compares to the central role that the alt_right has achieved under the trump presidency – thus the title of this article includes the descriptor ‘lite’, a reference to both their copying of the american model, and the comparatively low level of their political influence. even though they were small, they achieved over a short period of time front-page coverage in the mainstream fairfax press, while they established an increasingly popular and virulently hate-filled podcast site, and saw a string of their tweets screening in q&a on abc tv (@ndy, 2017, begley and maley, 2017, di stefano, 2017, di stefano and esposito, 2016). also early in 2017, following many months of damage to his own reputation while the platform had been facilitating hate speech and racism (maier, 2016), facebook head mark zuckerberg announced that after a decade of connecting people to friends and family, facebook would now expand into the business of building communities, while interfering with freedom of speech within communities as little as possible (zuckerberg, 2017). he extended this viewpoint in an interview on the cnn network in june 2017 (kelly, 2017) where he reiterated the value of community and his preference that communities set their own standards and facebook not be required to police their morality, allowing individuals to defend their personal spaces from exposure to views they detested by blocking content they did not want to see, and allowing online communities to crowd-source their boundary settings for civility. the three instances that are used here, that is, the advertisers’ boycott of alphabet and google, the emergence of the alt_right and its australian mimics, and facebook’s attempt to create a newer discourse of responsibility to relieve it of the pressures that it was facing, reveal global and local fractures in the internet. these fractures tie back into the heartland of the internet, a place now so increasingly poisoned by hate speech that even the originator of the world wide web tim berners-lee has admitted that his dream of freedom had produced a monster of hate, and his foundation should now set out somehow to put things aright (berners-lee, 2017, world wide web foundation, 2017). how the internet does its racism thing these were not unconnected events, as they reveal the layers that contribute to the experience of racism online. the internet was created in the mid 1990s, designed as a multinodal communications system that would be difficult to control (or destroy) from one central point. its technological infrastructure depends on a series of negotiated agreements that facilitate the rapid transfer of data through multiple redundant pathways, employing compatible methods. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 the infrastructure and those who manage it, the international telecommunications union (itu), remain agnostic as to what messages are carried through the system (international telecommunications union, 2017). the main globally active interventions by states relate to child sexual abuse and violence, and even in this realm there are many spaces that exist outside regulatory effectiveness. more recently there has been a growing focus on the use of the internet for the recruitment and promotion of terrorist violence, but here too interventions have not been overwhelmingly successful. while racism has moved more to the foreground since the rising racism generated in the migration crisis in europe, the role of race hate speech and its proponents in the us presidential election in 2016 have revealed the multiple layers of conflict around race and the value placed on the internet by national and transnational social movements (brookings and singer, 2016, amend and morgan, 2017, simon wiesenthal center, 2017). political economy and cultural analysis of online racism a 1994 australian study of racism and the media (jakubowicz et al., 1994) completed in the period just before the advent of the internet drew on john thompson’s model of media power in modernity (thompson, 1994) to structure its analysis through a layered exposition of the relationship between politics, economics and culture in television, cinema, newspapers, magazines and radio. while the research at that time differentiated between producers and consumers of media, it explored the political economy of the spaces in which meaning is created, that is, when the intention of the producer and the application of attention from the consumer link the two together. one of the most significant changes in media in the digital age has been the emergence of the prosumer, members of audiences who at the same time produce content – ranging from material that is highly professional through to the billions of often incoherent or sub-culturally coded posts in facebook and twitter. the media operate on a global, national and local level, both reflecting and shaping wider social perceptions, values and understandings. they operate to tie together the state (as regulator and the centre of power), the economy (huge commercial enterprises and their multitudes of satellites) and civil society (as the source of prosumers, the locus of civil interactions, and the space where social movements form). an understanding of racism in cyberspace needs to address how each of these elements magnifies the opportunities that proponents of racist hate speech have discovered. the single element that distinguishes the internet from previous media lies in the location where value is produced (fuchs, 2017, curran et al., 2012). while value is produced at the point of production, and much of the industry still manages this through wage relations, a significant part of the value that the internet economy generates comes from the unpaid labour of internet users. much of the content that draws users to platforms such as facebook, and the clumping of users is what facebook then sells to advertisers, (a key element in theories of modern media (mattelart et al., 1984)) has been generated by the users themselves through their social networking, their commentaries, their images, and their offering of interest profiles (fuchs, 2009). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 45 our research (jakubowicz et al., 2017) has described the clustering of internet users around points of attraction (we label these points ‘sticky spots’) as ‘swarming’. any process that enables such clustering into online communities (the goal so recently announced by facebook’s zuckerberg (zuckerberg, 2017)) becomes effectively sealed into the underpinnings of the internet. any actor or motivator who can create a sticky spot that enables a swarm to form and to stay attached over time becomes a value creator of significant importance in the vast universe of value nodes. while the overall capital value of the internet is probably incalculable, it remains important to understand that the internet has become a framework for the creation and circulation of capital, with the multiplicity of value nodes serving a similar function in the digital realm as the factory served in early periods of industrial capital. in one sense the ‘owners’ of internet capital comprise those with any capacity to produce sustainable swarms of users whose presence can be on-sold and whose presence can therefore be monetised, including as it turns out racists, terrorists, pornographers, and child abusers. the most manifestly successful constellations of clusters are google (and its associated alphabet entities such as youtube and capitalg) with its linking capacity between things, and facebook with its linking capacity between people. any major attempt to control the spread of racism that requires an adjustment of this political economy may well fail at the outset. the opportunities that have opened for value expressions on the internet include space for significant numbers of ultra-conservative and radically supremacist groups and individuals. nagle (nagle, 2017) has argued that the new internet culture of the alt_right also includes significant ‘learning’ from the counter-culture of the late twentieth century, a mix of geeks, libertarians and counter-hegemonic cultural warriors, washed through with disengaged psychopaths. a successful player in the race hate field has been the increasingly influential us white power community associated with the label of ‘alt_right’, a term that refers back to the earliest period of the internet with its ‘alt-’ newsgroups and bulletin boards, based on the altkey function on computer keyboards, used to specify alternative text when selected. in the next section, i explore what makes the alt_right such a pernicious and effective movement, tying together as it does psychological delight in gaming power and a commitment to ‘politically incorrect’ (or rather politically abusive) attitudes on race, gender and sexuality. alt_right and social media: the dark side of the web there is growing agreement that the internet has played such a powerful role in building the edifices of contemporary racism due to three interacting factors (klein 2017). 1. the political economy of the internet favours freedom over control, facilitated by technologies that magnify the anonymity of racist protagonists. 2. the ideology of the internet has long been flavoured with attachments to freedom without limits, boundless interactions magnified by the heavy ideological and legal commitment of the united states (us) to unfettered freedom of speech. 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 3. the particular configuration of activity on the internet, that places billions of lone individuals before their screens, interacting effectively with anyone they choose, enhances the psychological dimensions of anonymity, disengagement, and dis-inhibition, particularly where we find people whose personalities accord with the dark triad or tetrad (buckels et al., 2014). this last combined personality-oriented characteristic of web trolls has emerged as the most significant parameter in the growth of internet hate. the identification of the personality traits associated with the producers of hate speech has created a triadic association between the different personality traits, including psychological attributes of narcissism (the passionate fixation on oneself), machiavellianism (the enjoyment gained from manipulating the behavior of others), and psychopathy (lack of empathy). while in the outside world these traits can occur independently, in the digital space they appear together with ominous regularity. a fourth trait, often identified in conjunction with the others (thus the tetrad), is sadism, the enjoyment of cruelty through the inflicting of pain on others. (march et al., 2017). the pursuit of targets online has come to be called ‘trolling’ (stein, 2016). trolling has become an omnipresent part of the web experience for anyone of any celebrity (or indeed anyone based on their appearance, clothing or opinions). it began its life when social media for the first time made it possible anonymously to identify and harass other people. the heartland of trolling has been the ‘politically incorrect’ (/pol/) board of the website ‘4chan’, essentially a us-based old-style bulletin board which allows people to post ideas totally anonymously, and then see where they run (hine et al., 2016). /pol/, which serves as ground zero for the rise of cyber hate in the period of social media, has been the development space for aggressive memes, for the capture and re-purposing of pepe the frog – a meme asserting the dominance of white power online (koebler, 2016) and the strategies for bypassing attempts by major internet providers to develop automatic devices (bots) to block race hate (pearson, 2016). moreover it has been the birthplace for the alt_right hashtag and cyber group, identified publicly as overtly racist when us democratic presidential candidate hillary clinton outed the nascent movement in the us presidential elections in 2016 (chan, 2016). ‘4chan’, amongst its many other features, has published a dystopic set of ‘rules for the internet’, reflecting the gamer language and self-enhancing narcissism of its many users. while proponents of race hate have been avid users of the internet since its inception (jakubowicz, 2012), the explosion in racist demagoguery since at least 2010 has been fueled by political, economic and social crises around the world. as identity politics has deepened along the fault lines of race, gender and sexuality, so the internet has become not merely a battleground but indeed a real weapon in the conflicts over resources, power and life choices (klein, 2017). that is, the internet has been used to harass targets, including the practice of ‘doxing’ (the release of private documents), in which the real world information of targets has been revealed so that they can be further pursued, for instance, through harassment of their children both online and off. racists are more likely to exist in societies that are racially demarcated, with histories of racist oppression, and in hierarchies where race is associated with privilege or liability. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 47 metropolitan societies of former empires are very likely to generate racist hierarchies, though racially-conflicted societies clearly also exist where the remnants of colonial regimes have left unresolved inequalities. racially-associated resentments can continue for many generations where it has proved as yet impossible to ensure equity between racial groups. the us, occasionally described after the election of president barak obama as ‘postrace’, has more recently seen a re-ignition of racial conflict and racial antagonisms. seeking to frame the origins and structural continuities in racism especially for african americans, joe feigin has noted: in the united states, racist thought, emotion and action are structured into the rhythms of everyday life. they are lived, concrete, advantageous for whites and painful for those who are not white. each major part of the life of a white person or person of color is shaped directly or indirectly by this country's systematic racism (feigin, 2014). first published in 2000, feigin’s study tracks the structural impact of racism in the us and explores how that structure affects the agency, opportunities and life outcomes for majority whites and a range of ethno-racial minorities. he denies though that the country can be truly analysed as post-racial, reflecting on the 97% of americans who opted for a single racial label in the 2010 census (p.251). feigin argues that us society has been dominated by a white racial frame, such that the narrative of the society and the development of its institutions have been systemically bent towards the interests and perspectives of whites, especially white men. while australia has a much smaller historical involvement with slavery than the us (mainly in relation to indentured workers from the pacific) the idea of white framing that feigin uses may well prove helpful in reflecting on australian racism. australia has a particular constellation of histories of invasion, extermination, slavery, and exclusion – it was founded by the invasion from the united kingdom by military forces and forced settlers (jupp, 2002). thereafter governments imposed various regimes of racial oppression and exclusion, mainly but not only on indigenous people, asians and pacific islanders, such that in the formal creation of the commonwealth of australia in 1901, racial hierarchy was central to the project and its legislative priorities (williams, 2012). thus for at least three generations after the establishment of the commonwealth, white privilege drove the social, political and economic life of the country. indigenous people were effectively without recognition until the mid-1960s, a time also when white australia immigration restrictions began to erode. it was not until the late-1970s that the celebration and defence of white privilege was abandoned by government, though core values and worldviews of whiteness remained circulating within the society, as an insistent counter-narrative (jakubowicz, 1997). multiculturalism was adopted as formal policy in 1978 (jakubowicz, 2013), though there has been sustained resistance to it among many sectors of the society, which continue to bemoan the reduction in white privilege. institutions geared towards countering racism have been in place since 1976, though not without resistance and sustained hostility (soutphommasane, 2014). 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 an australian case study: the dingoes as an exemplar of gaming the system in the name of white power the example used in this article of the trolling/ 4chan approach, set up in australia during the us presidential elections, is a project of a group calling itself thedingoes. perched on a service provided by .xyz (a new service platform that hosts many thousands of clients), thedingoes exemplifies all the various elements of state of the art antisemitic and racist online presence; buzzfeed reported that the founders of the thedingoes were intentionally using as wide a range of social media as they could, skirting rules and testing boundaries, in order to normalise racist hate speech (di stefano, 2017, di stefano and esposito, 2016). typically the members remain disguised behind pseudonyms and delight in their anonymity, particularly the opportunity it gives them to ‘bant’ (banter). their use of the .xyz demonstrates a close knowledge of internet trends. the .xyz domain name was released to the general public in mid-2014, as part of a refreshing by icann of generic top-level domain names. google adopted it for its corporate alphabet site, (abc.xyz), and by june 2016 it was the fourth most registered top level global domain name after.com, .net and .org. the name is managed by a company called generation xyz, (http://gen.xyz), which describes itself as ‘a global community inspired by the internet and its limitless potential… to connect with the world in a whole new way… you can focus on connecting with your audience anywhere in the world’. it represents a further layer of defence for users, from any retributive pursuit by people they harass. thedingoes appeared online in 2016, their website registered in january, followed up with a twitter account in june. a number of the people associated with the group also joined about that time, including one tweeter whose display image contained the anti-immigration slogan ‘fuck off, we’re full’. thedingoes (once the name of a 1970s australian music band that left for the us) described itself as ‘#altright, but not in the way that violates #rule1’. here they refer to rule1, that is the 4chan /b/ rule 1, ‘do not talk about /b/’ (which is also rule 2). /b/ is the general posting board for 4 chan users. they also have ‘88’ on their page, which stands for the initials ‘hh’, a code for ‘heil hitler’. as of february 2017, thedingoes had 1,461 followers online, had posted 3,640 posts, garnered 5,507 likes, and was following 442 other tweeters; by september 2017 it had grown to 2,146 followers (gaining about 100 followers a month), with 4,615 tweets and 7,500 likes, though it had abandoned some of its followed friends (down to 420). the site followed a range of micro-nationalist groups, a raft of conservative online commentators and some ‘lulz’ (laugh out loud plural) antisemitic posters, such as one identifying as ‘goys just want to have fun’, and another as ‘dachau blues’, backed by an image of the auschwitz ‘arbeit macht frei’ sign. the 400+ twitter accounts that thedingoes follow, provide a helpful geography in australia, the usa and europe, of both the antisemitic old right and the new alt_right, that shows how fragmented and competitive and attention-seeking such groups can be. thedingoes consciously incorporate three other rules from 4chan/b/, numbers 13 to 15: ‘nothing is sacred; do not argue with a troll – it means they win; the more beautiful and pure a thing is, the more satisfying it is to corrupt it’. these rules are compounded by two other cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 49 insights (rules 19 and 28) generated by the dark triad souls who drive the machine: ‘the more you hate it, the stronger it gets’; and ‘there will always be more fucked up shit than what you just saw’. these views are nihilist rather than conservative, angry and pathological rather than intellectual or analytical. thedingoes are aligned with a number of ultra-right sites in the us, where they posted podcast interviews with former alp leader and later conservative commentator mark latham2 and national party mp george christensen3 (hosted globally on the right stuff (trs) (the dingoes, 2017). querying the christensen interview, one commentator (selfstyled as ‘rabbijoeforeskinsucker’) challenged the interviewers for focusing too much on muslims (christensen was strongly anti-muslim), declaiming: ‘lot's [sic] of talk about muslims, not much about the jew. are you guys kosher nationalists by any chance? or are you just cowards?’ the slackbastard blog, an anarchist monitor of far right politics in australia, reported that trs ‘obtained its semi-popularity on the altright, in part, by its willingness to address the jewish question, ie to name the jew as being responsible for all the (bad) things’ (@ndy, 2017). by february 2017, thedingoes had become national news, when their trs interview with christensen became a point of attack by jewish leaders on the australian prime minister malcolm turnbull, on the day benjamin netanyahu, then prime minister of israel, arrived in australia for an official visit. buzzfeednews reported that: dr dvir abramovich, whose anti-defamation commission tracks antisemitism online … was angered to hear christensen speaking to the podcast network. abramovich said ‘the right stuff’ network started one of the most prominent anti-semitic memes on the internet, which involved racist trolls putting parentheses, or ‘echo’ symbols, around the names of jewish journalists. ‘while we do not know what is in christensen’s heart, for an elected official to be interviewed on a podcast that traffics in bigoted and demeaning stereotypes is deeply troubling,’ he said (di stefano, 2017). while researching racism online this author found himself a target of thedingoes. i have a jewish heritage, my immediate family being holocaust survivors who escaped to australia, via china, in 1946. many members of my close family were murdered by the nazis in poland during the second world war. since 2011, i have been a regular contributor to the conversation, a global website publishing articles by academics from universities across the world, written for an intelligent lay audience. over this time, i have contributed over 40 pieces, mainly on multiculturalism and racism. on 6 december 2016, i published a piece on ethnocracy, applying to australia the ideas of scholars who had analysed israel and northern ireland in terms of their different populations’ unequal access to democracy (jakubowicz, 2 https://radio.therightstuff.biz/2017/02/07/the-convict-report-episode-62-mark-latham-2-dingo-boogaloo/ 3 https://radio.therightstuff.biz/2017/02/16/the-convict-report-episode-63-interview-with-george-christensen/ https://radio.therightstuff.biz/2017/02/07/the-convict-report-episode-62-mark-latham-2-dingo-boogaloo/ https://radio.therightstuff.biz/2017/02/16/the-convict-report-episode-63-interview-with-george-christensen/ 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 2016a, jakubowicz, 2016b). the article attracted 5,400 hits, and 120 published comments. among the comments (since removed by the community standards guardian at the conversation) were a number of curious posts. the first, from a clara newsom (most likely a pseudonym), asked ‘to what extent are jews like you overrepresented in positions of power?’. she followed with: ‘i want to know how many university professors are jews’. then she wrote: ‘good take on this over at the dingoes. ‘ethnocracy’ is a pretty shabby concept tbh, not worthy of a real sociologist. looks like more ethnically motivated, anti-australian animus to me!’ she then posted a link to thedingoes web page (posted on 8 december), which referred to the ‘skype-rat’ jacubowicz [sic]. the comments continued – ending with ‘what if academics of a (((certain ethnicity))), e.g. are disproportionately guilty of sowing white ethnomasochist memes such as ‘white privilege’ …. try this instead: the dingoes link’. i had not, at that stage, heard about the moves made on 4chan or trs to label people as jewish and therefore a problem, or picked up on the bracket creep ((( ))). the (((echo))) device was first launched by the trs blog in june 2016 (note its logo names it as an ‘echo free’ site), as a way of capturing jewish names ‘that echoed through history’ (fleishman and smith, 2016b). the echo brackets are supposed to represent graphically the ringing of a bell that continues over time, which therefore enhances the names inside the brackets with the implied negative impact of jewish perfidy through the ages. soon after, a related device was trialed, by altrightmedia which uploaded an extension for google chrome, called ‘coincidence detector’. the extension would draw on a list of supposedly-jewish names, regularly updated, and wherever one of the names appeared during a web search for one of its users, the name would be echo-bracketed for that user. this process was designed as a ‘jew detector for unknowing goyim’, ensuring that those so inclined could see american media and politics draped in the brackets (fleishman and smith, 2016a). so, that explained the echo brackets that newsom had used in her the conversation comment, and which re-appeared on the dingoes attack. indeed the story about the brackets had broken quickly in the us and global media some weeks before, though in resistance many people adopted the brackets as a sign of solidarity with the targeted jews. but skype-rat was something else again. as it soon turned out, a new game was being tried with google, where the trolls at 4chan had invented a strategy for identifying jews (and blacks and mexicans) through attaching proxy-labels, which were major commercial identifiers on the internet. hine and colleagues have studied 4chan, ‘the dark underbelly of the internet’, and its /pol/, the politically incorrect board. in particular they looked at ‘operation google’, a response to google’s announcement of anti-hate machine learningbased technology and similar initiatives by twitter, designed to sabotage the then extant antihate strategies (hine et al., 2016). the alt_right trolls proposed using ‘google’ to replace ‘nigger’, and ‘skype’ to replace ‘kike’ (jew). the call went out on september 22 – that day ‘google’ increased its use on the internet by word count by five times, while skype doubled. by september 26, the use had declined, though the words remained part of the /pol/ vernacular. ten weeks later the word ‘skype’ added to the old antisemitic label of ‘rat’ was up and running in australia. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 51 within two days of my the conversation article being published, the skype-rat piece had been posted on thedingoes.xyz, in their website, on twitter and on facebook, written by ‘carl’. it contained over 2,000 words focusing on the ‘jewish marxist’ race traitor motif that has been a common trope of neo-nazis (and indeed the original nazis). the post opened with my history laid out, the first being my (((polish))) parents, under an image of a canopy of photographs of jews killed in the holocaust, taken from a jewish memorial site, the yad vashem hall of names. by may 2017 thedingoes had made it onto the front page of the sun herald, a leading sydney newspaper. the article reported a forthcoming dingoes conference, where the guest speaker was to be us neo-nazi ‘mike enoch’ (aka mike peinovich) founder of trs (the right stuff) and host of the daily shoah podcast. the article concluded by quoting ‘mammon’, a dingoes’ spokesperson, as claiming australia should become a white ‘ethnostate’, a term curiously redolent of my argument which the site had attacked some months before (begley and maley, 2017). in investigating this group’s emergence, i tracked the layers of technology it had used to create the webpage. the site itself does not supply ownership information. the publishing software they use is made by ghost.org, a us firm, which describes its mission as ‘to create the best open source tools for independent journalists and writers across the world… behind the scenes, we're just a group of weird, fun-loving humans who enjoy experimenting with new technology. we believe in creating as much freedom in the world as we can, and everything we do is based on that core principle…’. in an email to me, john, the principal at ghost, responded that ‘our code of conduct covers our customers, and the user in question is not one of our customers, it’s a person on the internet who has downloaded our free-ofcharge code and made his own website with it… there’s absolutely a legal precedent for digital ocean, of whom this person is a customer, to take responsibility for what he publishes’. i then contacted digital ocean, a us company which hosts the site. despite three attempts the company failed to respond, an automated message saying ‘we are not seeing any abuse complaints’. the domain name they used, from .xyz, was not covered by anti-abuse provisions, as ‘xyz exercises no control over the uses to which a domain name may be put and no control over the content or operations of any website’. a ‘whois’ search revealed that thedingoes.xyz was created in january 2016 for eight years. meanwhile another alt_right site, xyz.net.au, accused me of being a member of the ‘regressive left’, collecting a series of descriptors from my the conversation profile (hiscox, 2016). this xyz name was chosen as the alt_right response to the abc (australian broadcasting corporation), while also acknowledging its political proximity to the us site breitbart (http://www.xyz.net.au). however xyz.net.au has no relationship to xyz.xyz. andrew anglin, founder of the daily stormer (genuflecting in its name to the nazi party’s die sturmer), described his group of alt_right thus: 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 trump-supporting white racial advocates who engage in trolling or other activism on the internet … the core concept of the movement, upon which all else is based, is that whites are undergoing an extermination, via mass immigration into white countries which was enabled by a corrosive liberal ideology of white self-hatred, and that the jews are at the center of this agenda (anglin, 2016). the bursting forth of the alt_right into the sphere of antisemitism online has been paralleled in time with the rapid rise in threats directed against jews in the real world, especially in the us. it is important to recognise that the trolling online has close similarities with the real world attacks being tried out in cities and towns, be it the rapid spread of graffiti in trains and on walls, for instance ‘jew’ scrawled on images of rats stenciled on walls in chinatowns in the us to bring in the year of the rat (chernikoff, 2016) or neo-nazi graffiti stickers that have appeared in melbourne. as part of the same coterie, 4channers have described themselves as: the people devoid of any type of soul or conscience. products of cynicism and apathy, spreading those very sentiments daily. anonymous is the hardened war veteran of the internet. he does not forgive or forget. we have seen things that defy explanations; heard stories that would make any god-fearing, law abiding citizen empty their stomach where they stand. we have experienced them multiple times and eagerly await their return4. the bizarre world of trolls and cyber nazis has become bound together with centuries old antisemitism, while the characteristics of the internet contribute to, and the personalities of the trolls may well ensure, that the hate will flourish. countering racism online: lightening the impact of the alt_right white while authoritarian regimes with strong internet controls, such as the peoples’ republic of china, have almost managed to curb unauthorised racism online (hornby, 2017), most democratic societies and their associated capitalist economies have found the challenges far greater (mcgonagle, 2012a). constrained by ideologies promoting freedom of speech above freedom from hate, and concerned to ensure economic growth and the profitability of online enterprises, governments have been loath to intervene in cyber behaviours that are not overtly criminal. indeed the australian government has rejected options to do so a number of times – most significantly in the adoption of the european convention on cybercrime, for which australia at first floated in a draft agreement, and then withdrew, acceptance of the optional protocol on cyber racism (council of europe, 2001, council of europe, 2003). two major forums in 2002 and 2010 sponsored by the australian human rights commission have heard calls for but rejected any legislative intervention on cyber race hate speech (australian human rights commission (ahrc), 2013, jakubowicz, 2010). in the launch of the 4 http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=4chan http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=4chan cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 53 children’s e-safety commissioner, the australian government noted that its concerns were for sexual abuse and psychological damage to children, carefully stating that freedom of speech priorities would apply to any cyber race hate issues affecting adults (parliament of australia, 2014). of course the same government’s relentless battles over its unsuccessful attempts to reduce the protections offered under section 18c of the racial discrimination act in the period from 2014 to 2017 reinforce the public bemusement with the commitment of the state to protecting vulnerable targets from online racist abuse. it was only in august 2017, when the 18c battle had been pushed into the background, that the e safety commissioner was able to initiate action around the threats young people experienced on the basis of race hate. the e safety commissioner found that more than half of australians between the ages of 12 and 17 had witnessed racist or hateful comments about cultural or religious groups online (giakoumelos, 2017). while the united nations and its agencies such as unesco and the itu, the european union (european commission against racism and intolerance (ecri), 2015, cerase et al., 2015) and other international bodies have recognised the social, political and economic harm caused by online racism(gagliardone et al., 2015, mcgonagle, 2012b, global forum for combating antisemitism, 2015), there has been little progress in collaboration at the global level between government, civil society and the economic actors given the resistance by the largest corporations and their agents to any mention of governmental and especially intergovernmental regulation. such collaboration will ultimately be crucial, as unconstrained vitriolic hate speech contributes to declining civility both within and between nations. potential australian initiatives however there are possibilities at the national level, and locally in countries such as australia. there are federal government agencies and departments concerned to enhance social cohesion, reduce the contributors to violence and conflict, and supportive of civil communication. meanwhile the onshore representatives of the global economic players on the internet can be brought together, while their industries are also well-organised (internet industry association, australian interactive multimedia industry association). an argument can be made that oligopolistic economic actors such as google or facebook have very significant social obligations, however uncomfortable such claims might be for the owners of those platforms. for instance napoli has argued in relation to journalism online that the preventative and individualistic approach adopted by most of the platforms in relation to their freedom to deliver content as they wish should be replaced with a public interest test for the algorithms used by the platforms (napoli, 2014). yet advancing such arguments remains constrained by the absence of national lobbies of civil society actors concerned with such a public interest test. civil society has no national peak concerned with online racism, other than the rather amorphous racism it stops with me network established by the australian human rights commission. unfortunately, the most influential civil society organisation, and one that opposes any constraints on hate speech, the institute for public affairs, has close ties to the 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 news limited print media, where the alt_right also has a base on its sky news cable channel. their links reveal the close alliance between conservative political forces and major economic actors in the media environment. logically then the broader regulatory context in australia would be well-served by a national body to promote a more civil and protected online communication space, with the authority and influence to negotiate with government and industry to support effective monitoring, responsiveness and ultimately intervention. online civil society activism depends on information about the extent, form and impact of internet racism, combined with networks that can support targets, applaud resisters, and pursue perpetrators. racism works best when it terrifies, fragments and immobilises its targets. racist propaganda travels quickly through the internet, cleansing sites of opponents, and intimidating bystanders. it can be slowed when creative interventions and systematic resistance are produced and sustained, racists called out, and their platforms pursued to deny them communication space. the anonymity of trolls currently provides them with their greatest weapon, while the preference of platforms to protect targets by allowing them to cut themselves off from attack leaves the target isolated and the perpetrator free to operate elsewhere with their defamatory and harassing posts and activities left untouched in the growing number of secret cells of private groups. governments often do not see racism as important enough an issue to provide the level of investment necessary for civil society action against it. organisations such as the online hate prevention institute, identified globally as innovators in finding and outing racism online, struggle to survive as australian governments focus on protecting children and tracking terrorist recruitment. while these other related spheres are clearly very important, racism online contributes greatly to both of them, threatening children and justifying in the minds of some their recruitment into violence against their racialised ‘enemies’. if we understand that online racism has all the characteristics of multiple conflicting and competing social movements, then a social movement model might best provide the way to limit its impact and hold both perpetrators and supporters to account. there are many civil society groups, from local churches, mosques, synagogues, temples and ashrams, through online activist groups such as getup!, to trade unions, neighbourhood committees, and sports clubs, that have an interest in a more civil and comprehending cyber sphere. within the sphere of economy there are real challenges to the internet industry where its fundamental economic logic may need to be somewhat unstitched and then recombined in ways that allow the sticky spots that attract the swarms that deliver the profit to operate with less negative impact on more vulnerable and less resourced users of the internet. while governments at the state level have recognised the importance of social media in promoting social cohesion, they have been slow to think through the systematic processes they will need to research, design, implement, review and refine. this article has sought to illuminate why action against cyber-racism has so quickly become as important as it has, while suggesting some frameworks for innovation in the context of the way the internet industry is organised. as civil society decries the rise of the cyber racists, racists are making hay as they discover ever more ways to ‘bant’ the system supposedly there to limit their impact. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 55 some current proposals in australia in this final section a summary is provided of the range of recommendations that the cracr project has made to its industry partners, namely the victorian health promotion foundation (vichealth), the australian human rights commission (ahrc), and the federation of ethnic communities councils of australia (fecca). while the partners will make their own decisions about their priorities, the range indicates the multiple levels at which cyber racism must be addressed. there are three areas of law that could be addressed. at the global level, australia could withdraw its reservation to article 4 of the international convention to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination. such a move has been flagged in the past, but stymied by relentless opposition from an alliance of free speech and social conservative activists and politicians. perhaps with the new data released by the e safety commissioner on the exposure of children to hate speech, governments and opposition parties could be led to a common cause. similarly australian law could move to recognise european legislation on cyber crime, and adopt the additional protocol as it has for the overall legislation. finally, australia could adopt a version of new zealand’s approach to cyber hate, where platforms are held ultimately accountable for the publication of online content that seriously offends, and users can challenge the failure of platforms to take down offensive material in the realm of race hate. taken together these elements would mark out to providers and users of internet services that there is a shared responsibility for reasonable civility. however there are many initiatives in civil society that would empower those who are currently the targets, and disempower those who are the current perpetrators of race hate. for organisations concerned with sustaining civility and community mental health, a multilayered approach becomes crucial. firstly, people who are targeted by racists need support and affirmation; this approach underpins the approach that the e safety commissioner has undertaken in the development of a young and safe portal. the portal offers stories and scenarios designed to build the confidence of young people, and provide them with the skills to grow. the online hate prevention institute has become a reservoir of insights and capacities to identify and pursue perpetrators. there could be a cyberline for tipping and reporting race hate speech online, for follow up and possible legal action. anti-racism workshops (some have already been run by the e safety commissioner) have aimed to pushback against hate, while building structures where people can come together online. modelling and disseminating best practice against race hate speech offers resources to wider communities that can then be replicated elsewhere. the point magazine, an online youth-centred publication for the government agency multicultural new south wales, reported two major events where government sponsored industry/community collaboration to find ways forward against cyber racism. (fares, 2016) in sydney a youtube content creators bootcamp brought together the industry with young creatives to find ways of building counter narratives. in melbourne, the federal government, focusing on countering radicalisation, collaborated with industry groups and young people in a media online hate prevention forum. however the industry participants could not see, in this 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 sort of collaboration, an ending to cyber racism: there would need to be industry and community collaboration, whatever that might mean. finally we need to recognise that the growth of cyber racism marks the struggle between a dark and destructive social movement that wishes to suppress or minimise the recognition of cultural differences, confronted by an emergent social movement that treasures cultural differences and egalitarian outcomes in education and wider society. advocacy organisations can play a critical role in advancing an agenda of civility 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https://www.theverge.com/2017/3/24/15053990/google-youtube-advertising-boycott-hate-speech https://www.theverge.com/2017/3/24/15053990/google-youtube-advertising-boycott-hate-speech https://radio.therightstuff.biz/tag/alt-right-australia/ https://ssrn.com/abstract=2144763 http://webfoundation.org/2017/02/delivering-digital-equality-the-web-foundations-2017-2022-strategy/ http://webfoundation.org/2017/02/delivering-digital-equality-the-web-foundations-2017-2022-strategy/ https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-community/10154544292806634/ https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/building-global-community/10154544292806634/ abstract keywords introduction: three online connections how the internet does its racism thing political economy and cultural analysis of online racism alt_right and social media: the dark side of the web an australian case study: the dingoes as an exemplar of gaming the system in the name of white power countering racism online: lightening the impact of the alt_right white potential australian initiatives some current proposals in australia references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 2 2017 © 2017 marju himmakadakas. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: himma-kadakas, m. 2017. alternative facts and fake news entering journalistic content production cycle. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(2), 25-40. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i2.546 9 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper alternative facts and fake news entering journalistic content production cycle marju himma-kadakas university of tartu, estonia corresponding author: marju himma-kadakas, institute of social studies, university of tartu, lossi 36-222 51003 tartu, estonia. marju.himma@ut.ee doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i2.5469 abstract processing information into journalistic content in contemporary news media creates a favorable environment for the distribution of misleading and fake information. this paper analyzes the distribution of alternative facts and fake news as a phenomenon characterizing post-fact society and how journalistic work processes may promote and legitimize the distribution of misleading content. the study looks into the backand front-stage performances of journalistic information processing that are influenced by social time acceleration and the insistence of ‘click-bait’ news criteria. we used three different methods for teaching news reporting on three different groups of estonian journalism students, and analyzed their performance using self-reflection in focus group interviews. two groups of students, whose assignments were geared toward the outcome, focused more on front stage performances and underestimated back stage performances, e.g. the evaluation of sources, background information gathering, and fact checking. one group, which was taught news reporting as a process of information filtering, perceived and reflected both front and back stage performances. the results indicate that (online) newsroom practice, which is influenced by time pressure and the continuous requirement of new content, may force journalists to skip the stages of conventional journalistic information processing and due to that create favorable environment for publishing and distributing misleading and fake news. keywords fake news, alternative facts, journalism education, journalistic role performance, post-fact society, post-truth society, news content production declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this work was supported by institutional research funding iut (20-38) of the estonian ministry of education and research. mailto:marju.himma@ut.ee http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i2.5469 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 introduction of alternative facts and fake news to journalistic practice the issue of alternative facts and fake news has received attention during a number of various topical events: riots in the u.k. in 2011, shootings in newtown, u.s. in 2012, the bombing at the boston marathon in 2013 (world economic forum 2014), the ukrainian crisis (thomas 2014; mitrokhin 2015), the brexit referendum, and the 2016 and 2017 presidential elections in the u.s. and france, respectively (desigaud et al. 2017). fake news in the context of the aforementioned events could have been interpreted as intentionally widely spread misinformation; alternative facts could have been treated as the intentional misinterpretation of factual material. fake news is also a tool in information war; in this context the distribution of false information is deliberate and uses the strategic narratives that have the components of news factors of anglo-american journalistic culture (khaldarova & pantti 2016). this sort of misinformation is spread primarily via social media, but is occasionally published by mainstream media and substantially distributed (desigaud et al. 2017) and, due to this, was validated as journalistic facts (world economic forum 2014). this leads to the focal question of this paper: how is it possible that misleading and factually questionable information passes the conventional information processing cycle in the news media? in order to address this, it is wise to begin with the conceptualization of the terms alternative fact and fake news. the terms alternative fact and fake news are controversial and ambiguous. the meaning of the noun fact is defined as ‘a thing that is known or proved to be true’ (oxford dictionaries). previously cited studies also admit that it is difficult to establish what is fake or what is fact, as sharing facts does not automatically mean sharing the perception of what is a fact. therefore, it is appropriate to return to conventional interpretations of fact construction. the definition in journalistic approach is that the fact is always proven, checked and therefore true — anything alternative to this cannot be treated as a fact. gebner treats journalistic fact as setting the focus for directing attention, emphasizing in order to signify importance, typecasting and accenting value and power which are tied together in association in the thread of action (gerbner 1973, p. 183). gerbner’s approach also denotes that democracy in itself does not guarantee the presentation of knowledge as truth. in tuchman’s (1980) interpretation, the construction of a fact is always related to professionalism and motivated by the political sphere. she also emphasizes that the fact does not exist in isolation — for signification, it needs the context of a network of other facts. in a contemporary context, this means that alternative facts or the phenomenon of fake news cannot emerge independently; they are constructed with the objective of embedding this sort of content into journalistic information processing and social media, passing off the information as journalistic content. alternative facts and fake news are components of what harsin (2015) calls the regime of post-truth, however they are not the only components thereof. in the context of constructing fact, however, the legitimization of alternative facts or fake news in journalism became key players. alternative facts relate more to the interpretation of fact construction, whether intentional or unintentional; fake news refers to intentional falsehoods that imitate journalistic facts and is distributed via social media and, in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 27 some cases, mainstream media. in this paper, both are treated on similar basis, as their embedding into mainstream media is similar. with the emergence of digital journalism, many key practices have changed and the once-conventional filters that guaranteed factual accuracy have changed as well. the scholarly discussion about the journalistic profession is emerging on the grounds of who journalists are and what do they do (hanitzsch et al. 2011; hellmueller & mellado 2015; willnat et al. 2013). according to the perspective of systems theory, journalism as a system provides society with fact-based, relevant and current information (görke & scholl 2007, pp. 651). at the same time, more contemporary approaches indicate the necessity of debate over the conventional normative construction of journalism (anderson 2011; deuze & witschge 2017). the plurality of platforms has fragmented work practices inside newsrooms and, in the process, journalists are challenged by new competitors outside the journalistic field — social media, blogs, vlogs, ‘alternative media outlets’, etc. conventional news reporting – processing information into journalistic content – incorporates various operations, the purpose of which is to exclude false and incidental information. this begins with information channels and the selection of sources, however. sigal (1973) divided the paths through which information reached the reporter into three categories: 1. routine channels (official proceeding, press releases, press conferences, nonspontaneous events) 2. informal channels (background briefings, leaks, non-governmental proceedings, news reports, editorials, etc.) 3. enterprise channels (interviews, spontaneous events, books, research etc., reporter’s own analysis) sigal (1973) admits that on-the-beat efficiency dictates the gathering of news via routine channels, but in the contemporary context of online journalism, this raises the question from which channel misleading or false information enters into routine channels. governmental officials as routine sources have been seen as trustworthy, but social media with its distribution of computational propaganda (desigaud et al. 2017) may lead to the notion of trustworthiness. the informational functions of journalists are challenged by digital media as well as by other information providers (picard 2015). the information gathering and processing practices of a ‘networked journalist’ are more connected to online and digital sources, which are easily and instantly accessible (van der haak et al. 2012). the growing amount of information is creating an information overload, which leads to ineffective information processing and poorer decision-making (jacoby et al. 1974). the problem lies not in the information or the amount thereof, but rather in the ‘filter failure,’ as clay shirky (asay 2015) states. in such conditions, journalists’ role is to be ‘the filter’: to select and process information in order to make sense of society. ‘filtering’ – conventional news reporting – 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 demands time and other resources, which often are scarce in online journalism (himmakadakas and palmiste 2017), as in deciding what becomes news and what gets published, online journalists are on the front line. misleading and indistinguishable fake news may be constructed deliberately by a person or constructed by an algorithm based on reader engagement. ‘click-bait’ headlines and emotionally loaded content enhance the financial interests of media enterprises. fake news, either aggregated by algorithms or constructed by people, fits the news logic of angloamerican journalism and is therefore successfully dispersible via (social) media. the aim of this research essay is to analyze how product-oriented work practice, which resembles the conditions in online newsrooms, influences the processing of information into journalistic content. this may explain how and why alternative facts and fake news get published in mainstream media. beginning with the professional journalistic value of trust, i will examine trust from the perspective of trust and credibility in digital media. as trust in journalism is assured through the rigorous stages of information processing, it is important to look into journalistic content production processes (section ‘information processing cycle (in legacy media)’). the empirical study of estonian journalism students inspects production processes from the aspect of the effectiveness of verifying the facts (sections ‘the outlining of information processing stages’ and ‘perception of news production process experienced’). the issue of how misleading or false information gets published in an online news portal is observed in the section ‘how news get published online,’ which is based on the reflections of online journalism students. the concluding section discusses the connections between conventional journalistic production processes and the eventualities of alternative facts and fake news being published in online news media. trust and credibility online can journalistic credibility be generated by software? the answer to this question lies in multifold research on automating journalistic content production. the algorithmic news production has been seen as cost-effective and redefining the labor (van dalen 2012; van der kaa 2014; napoli 2014) and for some time was treated as a promising development in news production (dörr 2015; clerwall 2014; carlson 2015). a more critical approach indicates that the objective of information processing will always demand human competence (linden 2016) and disconnecting journalistic decision-making from the news production process has consequences (carlson 2017), since algorithmic news production may lead to distribution of fake news. the combination of current (online) journalism practices and the decrease of audiences’ skepticism has laid the groundwork for alternative facts and fake news getting published. this, too, is nothing new: hovland and weiss (1951) exemplify how an individual, as time passes, may remember what was communicated, but does not remember who communicated it, and the journalistic source is automatically trusted. the reason behind this trust is the guarantee provided by the conventionally rigorous information processing in the news reporting, which should ensure the trustworthiness of the facts. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 29 trust can be defined as regular, honest and cooperative behavior that is deeply embedded in social context (leith 2013), similarly to journalism, which carries the ‘leap of faith’ for its editorial process that conventionally, in legacy media, lead to publishing. perceived credibility is the sum of perceived trustworthiness and perceived expertise (fogg 2003). but jessen & jørgensen (2011) develop this model in the context of digital media and add the social element to the online credibility, calling it aggregated trustworthiness (at). at consists of social validation (large-scale verifications made by others), profile (identity online), authority and trustee (brand or authority on the matter). but they also admit that at does not substitute for the critical analysis of online information. individuals translate information practices from our physical environment to cyberspace and virtual spaces (narayan 2013); from the audience’s perspective, this means that trust in tv, radio and newspaper content is seamlessly transferred to digital media as well. from the journalists’ perspective, social media contains a lot of content that has all the characteristics of news and can therefore be mistaken for journalistic content. professional roles are a key aspect in defining journalism as a profession, and the speed in which news and information travel within society increases every day. the privileged space that practitioners once had to inform different audiences is no longer the same (mellado et al. 2016). the information processing cycle in legacy media, information processing into journalistic content was controlled by ‘slot’ and ‘time-value’ (schlesinger 1978, 126-128). the ‘slot,’ determined by volume, time and deadline, exists in broadcast media and newspapers, but not on the internet. however, in the news reporting work process, online news portals still use the same logic of ‘slot-filling’ (leheste 2012; vobič&milojević 2014). this work process is partly copied from news agencies that provide information 24/7. on the internet, trying to fill the ‘slot’ results in broadening the news value filter and publishing at a rapid pace. the perpetual news cycle demands the constant mass production of content, which is routinized, fast and efficient (gans 2003, p.50). however, this influences the stages of information processing, which conventionally used to guarantee original and factually correct content. gans (1979, p.239) indicates that when time and staff are in short supply, news organizations become dependent on wire services or other news media. this also means that the information-processing cycle is always compromised by the possibility of misleading information getting into the source (e.g. news agency, news portal, blog, social media). there are a number of ways to analyze processing of information into journalistic content. for example, laakaniemi (1995) and rich (2000) address information processing from the perspective of understanding writing as a process. laakaniemi examines information processing from the point of view of newsroom practice and divides the practices into the product approach and the process approach. though laakaniemi does not outline the precise stages of writing a news story, he tackles the process in terms of problems that occur in information processing (organizing collected material, focusing, copy editing, time management, etc.). rich (2000) outlines the reporting and writing process through the selfcoaching method, which has four phases: 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 1) conceiving: the stage of developing the idea for a story, focusing it, and refocusing the material if necessary; 2) collecting: the reporting stage, information gathering, interviewing sources, and gathering additional information in the course of interviewing; 3) constructing: the writing stage, planning and organizing material, and writing a draft of the story; 4) correcting: the revision stage, checking facts, rewriting, and correcting grammar, style and typing errors. the production cycle, according to mcmanus (1994, p. 183), can be divided into three stages: discovery (series of decisions regarding how a news department will deploy its resources to learn what is going on in the community that might be newsworthy); selection (choices regarding which events and issues discovered in phase 1, discovery, ought to be reported); reporting (decisions regarding how to cover the events and issues selected to create a narrative account). meyrowitz (1985) and karlsson (2011) divide news reporting into two types of performance. back-stage performances include stages of information processing (e.g. finding the idea for a news story, gathering information, evaluating sources, fact-checking). frontstage performances focus on content production stages, such as presentation and distribution. passively obtained news, which means the full cycle of frontand back-stage news reporting, are the mainstay of news production (meyrowitz 1985; karlsson 2011); at the same time, fast, efficient and conflict-oriented news promotes reactive or passive reporting that is provided by proxies (gans 2003). passive reporting enables content which contains the criteria for newsworthy, selling and seemingly true, to pass the journalistic filter. figure 1 content production approaches cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 31 previously presented content production approaches can be visualized (figure 1) in order to outline the similarities. it is constructed on the basis on ericson’s et al. (1987) visualization of news production in the organization. therefore figure 1 is a combination of empirical study (ericson et al. 1987) and theoretical approaches (meyrowitz 1985; karlsson 2011; rich 2000; mcmanus 1994). as can be seen from the model, the stages of information processing in the content production cycle are quite similar. their difference is mainly discursive and depends on the viewpoint of the subject. method the aim behind the study of journalism students’ content production cycle was to outline the factors influencing the factual outcome, the news article, in different work situations. the data used in this paper is gathered during two periods of time, with the first period (20102011) focusing on newspaper work processes and the second period (2017) focusing on online media. in order to analyze how teaching method influences the perception of news reporting, product approach and process approach teaching methods were applied on two different groups of journalism students (1st group, n=42; 2nd group, n=38) in two years (2010 and 2011). the product approach method simulated newspaper work routines emphasizing the product — the final news article. the changes made in teaching method (process approach) for the second year took into consideration the problems addressed by laakaniemi (1995). the process approach method combined practical assignments of newsroom simulation with lectures and seminars. in lectures, news reporting was explained as a process; the seminars gave the students opportunities for self-reflection and coaching from peers. the group of students who followed the ‘online newsroom’ work process were taught according to the product approach method. similarly to newsrooms in estonia (loit&siibak 2012, leheste 2012), the group of students had to publish news ‘items’ every ten minutes during a 6-hour work shift; categories were required to be covered were foreign news, finance, state politics, culture and entertainment. one article containing at least three units of multimedia components was also required. at the end of all three courses, the students’ perception of the content production process was studied in focus group interviews (1st group, n=15; 2nd group, n=13; 3rd group, n=10); students were selected by random sampling (except the 3rd group, where all participating students were interviewed at the focus group). during the first year, the focus group interview also included suggestions for changes in teaching methods for the following year’s course. in all three groups, focus group interviews clarified the students’ perceptions of the news construction process. from the point of view of news reporting and information processing didactics, it is essential to analyze news construction as a process — as a narrative compiled by the reporter. with this, the present study contributes to the conceptualization of the unity of the newsconstructing process, examining the different stages of information processing and the perceived role of the reporter. there were two main topics in the focus group interviews: 1) the outlining of information processing stages as seen by the students, and 2) reflections on news production as a process, as it was experienced by the students. focus group interviews 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 were analyzed according to the categories outlined in figure 1. although focus group interview as a method is a quick and effective method for this sort of reflection, it also has its shortcomings in the form of groupthink or domination of topical issues, which can overshadow some focuses. the next section presents the analysis of the focus group discussions, organized thematically according to the two focuses. first, the 1st and 2nd focus group interviews are analyzed, as their teaching methods had more similarities to newspaper. the experience and self-reflection of the 3rd group of students is more focused on the content production cycle in online media, and is therefore analyzed separately. the outlining of information processing stages in the 1st and 2nd group, students were first asked to sketch the stages of information processing in the news production cycle. the first group, who were trained using production approach methods, described how news reporting for them began with reorganizing collected information (structuring material according to conventions of hard news, selecting quotes, rephrasing, selecting suitable language, etc.). two out of 15 students in the first group noted in the drawing task that it was time-consuming to find the idea for a news story. with this, they pointed to the preliminary stages of information processing — finding the idea for the story and selecting sources — which by rich and mcmanus would accordingly be categorized as conception and discovery, but in the subsequent discussion, neither finding the idea nor the focusing or framing of the material were considered to be part of the news reporting process. the stages that were absent from students’ perceptions of information processing were stages that meyrowitz and karlsson have marked as back-stage performances. this indicates that most of the students perceived the stages of information processing that were visible in the final outcome. however, there were two students out of 15 who mentioned finding the idea, but not all of the stages of these categories were reflected. this is important as the evaluation of sources and finding the idea for the story are critically important for the evaluation of the origin and trustworthiness of the information. the second group (process oriented method), whose training included lectures and discussions in seminars about different stages of information processing, described the news construction process as beginning with finding the idea for a news story or the evaluation of the newsworthiness of the material. in both groups, students emphasized that finding the idea for the story was hardest. this is somewhat contradictory, as the 1st group unanimously evaluated that finding the idea the hardest part, but at the same time did not consider it to be part of the processing of information. in the course of discussion, back-stage performances such as social communication were highlighted. the main difference between the two groups, however, was that the first group considered interviewing to be part of the reporting process only because ‘it gives one quotes for the story.’ therefore, it was seen by the first group as part of their practice, but was not perceived as a part of information processing. the second group included communication (specifically interviewing) in the news reporting process and also mentioned that interviewing was a source of direct quotes, but with the difference that interviewing and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 33 meeting with sources also provided an opportunity to gather additional background information. ‘all people as sources are equal. if this old lady is disturbed by smoke coming out of the funnel (and if she is not a lunatic) and is able to present facts for her allegations, then of course she is a suitable source.’ (kaur, fg1) the previous quotation was excerpted from the discussion on the credibility of sources. students from the first group assessed sources by news value of the story, rather than the truthfulness or credibility of the source. two of the following quotations are from the discussion over the same topic with the second group: ‘and then there is the thing that you cannot let the source influence you. you have to be equal with him.’ ‘yes, and you have to maintain a critical state of mind, so you would be able to think that all of this is pure nonsense.’ (joosep and hendrik, fg2) the issue of critical evaluation of sources was one of the clearest differences that became evident between the product approach and process approach groups of students. evaluation of source credibility is the first instance in which the exclusion of misleading information or fake news begins. front-stage performances from the collecting and constructing (rich 2002) stages were reflected through focusing in the process of selection (mcmanus 1994). here, too, were differences between two groups. most of the students in the first group acknowledged that there was ‘such thing as focusing,’ but did not reflect it as part of the news construction process they experienced. ‘actually, focusing on the material, as we have learned in school, is pointless, since it is not done like that anywhere in the newsroom.’ (madis, fg1) however, in the second group, determining the focus was utilized as a tool for decisionmaking in the collection and selection stages of the material. ‘when i have my own focus, i ask questions in the light of the focus. if the interview gets carried away, i can come back to my focus, rely on that.’ (joosep, fg2) the reporting and correcting stages were most similarly reflected in all three focus groups. as all three focus groups have been trained with knowledge and skills on how to write articles according to news genre conventions, all three groups had identical ideas regarding what the final outcome of the news should look like. the reflected criteria on structure, suitable language, quoting, technical formatting, etc., were identical. in other words, students, regardless of their perception of information processing stages, are all able to present information of any degree of factual accuracy, in the form of news. in drawing a conclusion 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 based on this, there is a point for consideration: the ‘packaging’ of false information without being aware of that is easy if the reporter does not perceive the diverse functions of information processing stages. perception of news production process experienced after sketching the process of news reporting, the students were asked to discuss how they had experienced the news reporting process during the course. the aim of this assignment was to reflect the real situation of news work they had experienced. it became evident in the following discussion that students in the first group saw news reporting in terms of practices that they had heard about or experienced during internships in media organizations. students who had experience working as interns in newsrooms were seen as experts by others in the focus group interviews, and knowledge of ‘how it is done in newsrooms’ was significantly persuasive for peers. this sort of expertise was influential for peers in both groups. ‘the news we learn to write here is like finance theory — it’s theoretical, but it doesn’t work quite like that in the real world. in real, life things work a bit differently.’ (joosep, fg2) emphasizing that the learning course was different from real practice was similar in the first and second group, but at the same time, the third group (online newsroom simulation) saw it as a very real-life situation. the differences between first and second group in perceiving ‘real’ and ‘training’ became evident when students began discussing how they would act in class and how in the newsroom. most of the students in the first group made the excuse that they disregard some stages of information processing as content production in newsrooms disregards them as well. at the same time, while all of the students in the second group acknowledged that they might occasionally neglect some of the stages of information processing, they still perceive the importance of each step of the process. value of the conflict during the first year, the teachers emphasized that hard news usually contains conflict as a news value. during the second year, the teachers did not mention the news value of conflict at all; instead, the words problem or opposition were used. other news values such as proximity, actuality, meaningfulness, unexpectedness, etc., were also knowingly emphasized on the second year. the aim of that sort of teaching was to see how much the valuation of certain news values impacts the outcome. each student was asked to name one news value that he or she considered to be most important. ‘for example, i had to find the conflict in this financial news, and i went on and on in the documents registry. but at some point i gave up, since i couldn’t dig up any conflict.’ (kärt, fg1) this quote from one of the students from the first year was quite revealing, as all her peers had similar stories. all of the students in the first group named conflict the most important news value. the students frantically tried to find stories that would include conflict, or tried cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 35 to emphasize the conflict of any sort in the final news text. the expectation of the teacher, or in real newsroom situation — of the editor — may have tremendous impact on information processing. this case of constructing conflict into the news pervaded all stages of information processing (all these that the first group had reflected). in the second group, students recorded news values such as influence (7), prominence (2), conflict (1), actuality (2), and proximity (1). therefore the expectation of an authoritative person influences the selection of topic, focusing, selection of sources, constructing the final news text, etc. understanding of this from on sides could help to decrease the pressure influencing the content production cycle. ethical considerations the fact that ethical considerations should be honored at any stage of information processing was one explicit difference between the two groups. it is important to mention that the interviewer intentionally avoided the word ‘ethics’ during both focus group interviews. the first group expressed the opinion that ethical considerations were important mainly in terms of how human sources were interpreted in the published product. ethics was mentioned only once in the context of selecting material to put into the final text; it was indirectly discussed primarily in the context of the influence that the final text might have on sources after the story had been published. in other words, ethics was part of the reporting process mainly when it explicitly appeared in the final news text. the second group did not use the word ‘ethics.’ however, it was implicitly discussed regarding almost all of the stages of information processing that follow communication with sources. taking into account a source’s previous experience in communicating with a journalist, considering the potential harm that might result from revealing information, and considering potential consequences after the story was published were just some of the examples given where ethical considerations were considered important. although ethics was not directly taught in the supplementary seminars and lectures to the second group, it was emphasized throughout the course. the main difference between the two groups was that product-oriented students only mentioned the information processing stages that were visible to readers in the final news text (e.g. selection of information, quotes from sources, editing text). the students in both groups mentioned different parts of information processing (e.g. finding the story, managing time, reorganizing the material, and communicating with sources), but the difference between the product approach group and the process approach group was that the latter was able to describe the stages of information processing separately from their personal experience of news reporting. how news gets published online the issue of finding newsworthy information and reliable sources is common in everyday work practice both in newspapers and online newsrooms. in all three groups of the study, this was considered to be the most difficult part. sources that easily provide ideas and readily 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 accessible information for articles, whether human sources, social media, news services or pr agencies, became of great value. expanding on that thought, it becomes one of the loopholes for alternative facts and fake news to enter the news flow, at least in online media where the constant demand for publishing tempts to accept any kind of provided information. the newsroom teaching methods in the third group of students were different from previous two groups. methods used in the course were mainly lectures and seminars where the theoretical overview on online journalism was given. the topics of workflows, ethics, management, practical workshops of data visualization etc. were covered. the course ended with 6-hour work shift that copied the work practices of estonian online newsrooms (leheste 2012). before the analysis of the focus group interview, it is appropriate to describe the situation in the students’ online newsroom. the work shift was supposed to start with a meeting to talk through topics and work arrangements. but instead of that, all of the students sat at their computer, searching for topics online and the meeting had no interpersonal communication. at some point during the meeting, one of the students recognized that for cooperation they needed communication, and proposed that everybody should write down their ideas into shared google document. as it was soon clear that they would not be able to work as a team without person-to-person communication, they started discussing ideas for stories. within moments, ideas were selected, extended, and the production was coordinated. this is significant, because often ‘networked journalists’ work single-handedly or in contact with colleagues online (van der haak et al. 2012). this newsroom simulation showed that collaborative and communicative work practices are efficient. the students had to publish something every 10 minutes. in addition, they had to produce and publish one multimedia story containing at least two components in addition to text. the latter requirement resulted in the perception that ‘it was something that needs to be done to get the nuisance over with’ (virgo, fg3). this expression by one of the students led everybody else to think along these lines as well. for example, the students discussed two topics about which they could have taken footage. the final selection, however, was made based upon which event takes place closer to the students’ location. ‘it is close to here, on vaksali street.’ ‘yes, but the office of the mad scientist is closer. and besides, we can take the video about the experiment he is conducting at eleven. but on vaksali street we are not even sure that we can get the video.’ (helis and kristel, fg3) the news value that began to dominate the entire production cycle was time constraint, i.e. being able to quickly cover information that is easily accessible. setting aside the multimedia story, the other news pieces published carried the same news value: getting information easily on the web. the usage of online databases boiled down to news agencies, press releases, public information announcements and referred content from foreign news media. the students reflected in the focus group that they did not think about news values or what or how influenced the journalistic work. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 37 when the students were asked about the stages of information processing that they perceived, the three stages they firmly reflected were finding a story, editing it according to conventional news genre, and publishing. the latter also meant that it was almost always necessary to correct some mistakes in the text (e.g. misspelling, typos, names, titles, links). therefore, the constructed time pressure also resulted in publishing first, checking facts and quality later. placing these sorts of influencing factors into a real-life online newsroom may yield the same results. in this example, critical stages which should eliminate false information and provide fact-based content were left vulnerable. the way in which students searched for the idea of the news story left them prone to misleading or false information. the students acknowledged that they considered for publishing pieces of information that ‘seemed like news’; due to the lack of topical knowledge or lack of time to do background work, however, they left these pieces of information aside. influencing factors, such as time pressure and a constant demand for publishing, paved the way for publishing information that was factually unchecked, but also not publishing due to the scarcity of resources needed to do research for fact-check. conclusions and discussion alternative facts and fake news are componential phenomena of a post-fact society and depend on the distribution on digital platforms. being embedded into journalistic content legitimizes their truthfulness (thomas 2014; mitrokhin 2015; khaldarova&pantti 2016; desigaud et al. 2017), which is why the study of the journalistic processing of information into news is important. in the context of online journalism, the fact that content has to be created fast and cheap leads to the usage of material that is easily accessible and corresponds to news values such as conflict and prominence (gans 2003). news factors in fake news imitate the news values of anglo-american journalistic culture (khaldarova&pantti 2016; desigaud et al. 2017) and make the misinformation, especially with the criteria of conflict and prominence, attractive for the journalist seeking easily publishable breaking news. at the same time online journalism tries to function in the legacy media information processing cycle, which paves the way for alternative facts and fake news to enter the mainstream media news flow. according to the conventional approach, journalistic fact is constructed in a complex sequence of acts (gerbner 1973) that is influenced by professionalism and motivated by the political sphere (tuchman 1980). but if we add the conditions of contemporary journalistic practice, especially in online journalism, the result of what is fact and the interpretation of its meaning may vary a great deal. the study of journalism students’ perceptions about information processing stages in the news content production cycle revealed that in conditions similar to everyday news work, many stages are not perceived at all. some of these information processing stages are vitally important to guaranteeing factual accuracy in journalism. the results of this study show that the most challenging stages of the information are related to finding the idea and focusing the information. these are back-stage performances (meyrowitz 1985; karlsson 2011), which are invisible to the audience. therefore the most 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.2, 2017 ‘insecure’ stages of information processing are the initial stages: the channels through which the information reaches the journalist. young journalists, as they were the objects of this study, lack informal channels (sigal 1973), since they have not developed their professional network. the utilization of enterprise channels is time consuming and requires also network of sources. this leaves young journalists with the routine channels as they are seen as trustworthy and efficient pipelines for on-the-beat information gathering and instant publishing. this, in turn, paves the way for legitimization of alternative facts or fake news in news journalism. the product approach in journalism practice, may it be on legacy media platforms or online journalism, diminishes the role of source evaluation and fact checking. students who were not trained to perceive the content production cycle as a process oriented themselves to those stages of information processing that were visible in the final outcome, i.e. in the publishable article. this fact is significant, as it excludes some stages related to fact-checking, and focuses on the technical stages related to the final text. conventionally, the rigorous legacy media production cycle with its various stages of information processing ensured factual accuracy. in contemporary online newsrooms constrained with time pressure and infinite ‘slot filling,’ this production cycle may not guarantee fact. solution to the problem of time pressure was seen in automated content production that would leave the journalists more time for thorough content production (van dalen 2012; van der kaa 2014), but this argument has been challenged by the demand for competence of journalistic decision-making (linden 2016; carlson 2017). since the current situation creates a favorable environment for misleading or false information to be published, the information processing cycle in online journalism demands re-examining and perceiving which stages of information processing are prone for the misleading or false 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value of the conflict ethical considerations how news gets published online references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 3 2018 © 2018 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: mcgregor, i., yerbury, h.& shahid, a. 2018.the voices of local ngos in climate change issues: examples from climate vulnerable nations. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 10:3, 63-80. https:// doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6019 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) the voices of local ngos in climate change issues: examples from climate vulnerable nations ian mcgregor1*, hilary yerbury2, ahmed shahid3 1 uts business school, university of technology sydney, po box 123, broadway, nsw 2007, australia. ian.m.mcgregor@uts.edu.au 2 university of technology sydney, po box 123, broadway, nsw 2007, australia. hilary.yerbury@uts.edu.au 3 villa college, rahdhebai hingun, male’, 20373, republic of maldives. *corresponding author: ian mcgregor. ian.m.mcgregor@uts.edu.au doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6019 article history: received 09/04/2018; revised 05/11/2018; accepted 06/11/2018; published 25/11/2018 abstract the contributions of small local non-government organisations (ngos) in countries at risk from climate change to knowledge creation and action on climate change are rarely considered. this study sought to remedy this by focusing on ngos in member countries of the climate vulnerable forum (cvf). analysing data from intended nationally determined contributions (indcs), ngo websites and email correspondence with ngo staff through a knowledge brokering typology, this study examines the ways in which local ngos in five members of the cvf (afghanistan, bhutan, kiribati, nepal and tuvalu) take action, generate new knowledge and understandings and contribute to the plans and actions of their government and the international community. the study found that local ngos are involved in the creation of new knowledge both at the scientific and community level and engage in actions to support adaptation to climate change. however, there are differences in the approaches they take when making contributions to scientific knowledge and climate change debates. the findings of this study suggest the need to reconceptualise the role of local ngos in small countries at risk from climate change. keywords ngos; climate change; climate vulnerable forum; knowledge creation declaration of conflicting interestian mcgregor and ahmed shahid declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. hilary yerbury, who is a member of the editorial committee of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, had no part in the review of the submission. funding this paper was produced without funding. 63 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6019 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6019 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 introduction in 2009, some of the countries most vulnerable to climate change formed a coalition to act together in a south-south partnership, the climate vulnerable forum (cvf), to deal with issues of global climate change. these countries include small island states, countries with low-lying coastlines and mountainous countries that are particularly vulnerable to rising temperatures. five members of this forum are at the heart of this study: afghanistan, bhutan, kiribati, nepal and tuvalu. the study is based on data gathered from a variety of sources including representatives of local ngos focussing on climate change and their websites, from the media, from reports compiled by transnational ngos and personal communication with staff. it also includes an analysis of documents produced in the context of the un climate change conference in paris in 2015 and of the intergovernmental panel on climate change, as well as data from other published studies. this study seeks to understand how local ngos in these countries take action and generate new knowledge and understandings. many discussions of global climate change tend to be coordinated at the supra-national level, with little place for smaller states and their ngos to have a voice. alliances and groupings of national governments have had considerable influence on the agendas of supra national meetings. the alliance of small island states (aosis) has given the small states a ‘voice in the political arena’ (jaschik, 2014, p. 287), so that they ‘box way above their weight’ (betzold, 2010, p. 142) in ensuring that their concerns are on un climate conference agendas. aosis has been a major force since the initial negotiations on the unfccc (un framework convention on climate change) in 1991. the cvf formed in 2009 is not a formal unfccc negotiating group, unlike aosis and the ldcs (least developed countries) groups. the intergovernmental panel on climate change (ipcc) was established in 1988 by a number of states, including the us, and by the world meteorological organization and the united nations environment program (unep). the ipcc has become the focal point for the process of establishing agreed ways of focussing on scientific knowledge in a global society (miller 2007, p. 340). yet, some of the countries most at risk from climate change have not been fully involved in this organisation and its workings. it is noteworthy that of the countries in our study, only nepal has ever participated in the ipcc process as an author (ho-lem, zerrifi and kandlikar, 2011). it would be a mistake, however, to assume that scientists and their knowledges have been the only significant players in establishing consensual knowledge or in setting agendas for action on climate change. ngos concerned with climate change and with the environment are ‘champions of online climate communication’ (schäfer, 2012, p. 530 531), active in disseminating information, increasing support for climate change action and mobilising local citizens to take action. this study explores the ways in which local ngos in these countries contribute to knowledge flows and debate about climate change. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 65 setting the scene rising temperatures and their impacts rising temperatures are impacting these countries in different ways. sea level rise is a major issue for the island states and is already having an impact on the everyday lives of their citizens. the government of kiribati has bought land in fiji so that it can relocate its population of around 100,000 in the next 30 – 60 years. tuvalu, with its much smaller population of around 10,000, is not focussing on relocation and has decided to leave the decision on relocation to its citizens and has finalised an agreement with new zealand to take up to 75 tuvaluan emigrants each year. in the landlocked, mountainous countries of afghanistan, bhutan and nepal, major issues include glacial disappearance and retreat and changes in water availability for agriculture due to reduced glacial melt and land degradation. afghanistan is facing desertification in some provinces, through land degradation, reduced water availability from glacial sources and drought from changes in rainfall patterns. the consequence of this destruction of eco-systems is that the predominantly rural population, dependent on subsistence agriculture, faces the threat of no longer being able to produce enough food. in many cases, subsistence farmers then move to urban areas where they are likely to be unemployed and live in shanty towns, which in turn can lead to disaffection and further contribute to afghanistan’s severe security issues. bhutan, because of its small population and land protection policies, may be seen as less at risk from climate change than the other countries in this study. however, temperature rise since 2000 has been measured at 1°c in summer and 2°c in winter (braasch, 2012). heavier rains have caused landslides and significant glacial lake floods as glaciers melt at a much increased rate, while at the same time in some areas less water is available for irrigation. in nepal, climate change is affecting the country’s ability to feed its population, because of changes in rainfall patterns. like bhutan, nepal also faces danger from glacial lake flooding, and farmers are reporting hotter days, decreased rain and changes in wind patterns, adversely affecting agricultural productivity. globalised knowledge studies of knowledge flows in climate change policy and implementation can assume a topdown approach to the flow of information; kalafatis et al. (2015) argue that it is important for local networks to be able to inform decision-makers with useful and usable information. weichselgartner and kasperson (2010, p. 267) suggested that ‘research on global environmental change requires a shift towards a more extended notion of scientific knowledge, namely a shift towards socially robust or context-sensitive knowledge’. welp et al (2006, p. 174) noted that in un global environmental change processes, there was no space for local ngos as initiators of dialogue, but only as stakeholders, where a stakeholder’s role was as a participant in processes driven by the un, supra-national (eg european union, aosis, ldcs) and state actors. little attention has been paid to the contributions of local community groups and ngos to the actions and debates on rising temperatures and its consequences (cf elwood, 2010, elwood and leszcynski, 2013). advocates from global ngos such as greenpeace can have a significant voice at international forums, however, and for a while, attention was focused on these global players (jasanoff, 2010). 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 local ngos and knowledge flows the literature offers little guidance on how to understand the variety of ways in which knowledge about climate change is created and flows. research studies tend to focus on the bigger picture of the scientisation of politics and the politicisation of science (eg corfeemorlot et al., 2007; hoppe et al. 2013) or on particular organisations and their work, such as the ipcc (grundmann, 2007) or the problems and issues at a very local level (eg farbotko and lazarus, 2012). rudiak-gould (2012) claims the dissemination of the knowledge of climate science is a oneway process, with government statements aimed at foreign audiences, while local ngos aim messages at their communities, attempting to foster a sense of local empowerment. following jasanoff and wynne (1998), he favours dialogue and encourages governments to avoid becoming an echo chamber, where they merely repeat arguments from western scientific literature, instead of engaging with local knowledge (rudiak-gould 2012, p. 53). szarka (2013), focusing on the work of local ngos, has proposed a hermeneutic framework setting out both the scope and the means for ngos to interact with their communities. the framework includes five key components, some knowledge-centred and some action-centred. it is based on the assumption that it is possible to go beyond awareness-raising to create links between the worlds of science and the general public and to enable opportunities for citizen actions (szarka 2014, p. 2). some studies (eg xu and grumbine, 2014) have drawn attention to the need for more open communication between experts, governments and local people. they suggest that it is the responsibility of government to support local people in bridging the gap in understanding between themselves and scientific experts and to avoid blanket solutions. they propose hybrid solutions to create adaptive knowledge by bringing together local knowledges and scientific knowledge. other studies (eg arnall and kothari, 2015), however, have shown that at the local level, perspectives on everyday phenomena, such as the timescale for change, are so divergent that there is no common ground for scientists and local people to enter into discussion. the voices involved in climate change are diverse, and their interactions are complex. jones, harvey and godfrey-wood, building on previous work by shaxson et al. (2012) and hammill et al. (2013), identified seven distinct information-focussed roles played by ngos involved in actions relating to climate change (2016, p. 10). using terminology familiar in the context of information access (see oltmann, 2009), they identify the roles of producer, broker, translator, advocate, intermediary and consumer. the knowledge producer produces data, information and documents about some aspect of climate change relevant for decisionmaking at all levels and the consumer of climate information incorporates relevant information into everyday life. to emphasise the distinction between the use of climaterelated information and knowledge at a local level and more broadly, there are two categories of broker, the knowledge broker and the innovation broker. the knowledge broker enhances the understanding and use of information and knowledge in local decision-making whereas the innovation broker is influential in the wider context, encouraging new ways of producing and using climate change related information. the policy advocate encourages changes in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 67 policy and decision-making. the information intermediary makes information accessible to local communities and potentially more broadly, through establishing libraries or through contributing to online portals. the knowledge translator plays the very important role of making information and knowledge understandable to people throughout the local community, so that they can take appropriate action. this is partly about language, but more importantly is about meaning, where the meaning structure of climate science is mediated and transformed into local contexts. the summary above does little more than touch the surface of the complexity of engagement in knowledge flows related to climate change. however, one thing that is clear is that local knowledge and local voices may be marginalised because studies do not include them and they are absent from the policy-making processes. this study seeks to remedy this oversight by focussing on ngos in five small countries, vulnerable to the effects of rising temperatures. it explores the ways in which communities and ngos take action at the local level, generating new knowledge and understandings for themselves and potentially contributing to knowledge-based communities in the wider international context. methodology this study uses five cases to demonstrate the variability of approaches local ngos take as they participate in the creation of new knowledge and the debates and actions about climate change. three of the countries have small populations and relatively few ngos concerned with climate change; the other two face issues which have made coordination of debates and actions challenging. it was assumed that in places with small populations, the distance between a government and its planning to confront the challenges of rising temperatures on the one hand and its citizens and activists on the other would not necessarily be large. thus, there was some possibility of identifying the actions of ngos in generating local knowledge and supporting local actions on climate change. a case study approach is the most common in studies related to knowledge creation and information access. selection of cases tends to be purposeful (oltmann 2009) as happened in this study, with cases selected because of their perceived similarity, rather than focussing on their distinctiveness as yin (1994) or denzin and lincoln (2003) might propose. they also tend to focus on qualitative data, gathered from participants engaged in the knowledge flow process. in this study, although qualitative data were gathered, following yin (1994), multiple sources were used, as is shown in the summary table below. information gathered through email correspondence with representatives of ngos engaged in the process and from the websites of these ngos was supplemented by analysis of unfccc documents, ipcc reports and online media reports. for each country, we used a number of strategies to identify local ngos involved in climate change and individuals associated with them, as well as documents which might show evidence of inclusion of local sources of knowledge in climate change discussions. these are shown in summary form in the table below and elaborated on in the following paragraph. 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 country local ngo indc ipcc media afghanistan aes by email yes no no bhutan rspn by email and website yes no no kiribati kiribati local government association by email kirican by email and website yes no yes nepal clean energy network by email and website wwf by email and website yes yes no tuvalu tucan by email and website; women’s council of tuvalu by email and reports; alofa tuvalu by email and website yes no yes local ngos contributing to this study using personal knowledge, suggestions from activists and the output from internet searches, we identified between one and three ngos in each of afghanistan and bhutan. in kiribati, a number of ngos are linked in kirican, the kiribati climate action network and we sought advice on which of the partners to contact. similarly, in tuvalu, a number of ngos are linked in tucan, the tuvalu climate action network. in tuvalu we also contacted an overseas-sponsored ngo. in nepal, there are many potentially relevant ngos and we chose to contact three where there was evidence that they play an active role at the local level. we invited members of the ngos and other organisations identified to take part in our study by email, using the information provided in websites and facebook pages of ngos and followed up with an email questionnaire and with further clarifications. email responses were received from one ngo in afghanistan, the afghan environmental society (aes); the only one in bhutan, the royal society for the protection of nature (rspn); the nominated member of the climate action network in kiribati, the kiribati local government association (kilga), and another climate change activist, who had been selected to take part in the pacific calling partnership program katep in 2017 and who also works in a government department; a member of tucan, the women’s council of tuvalu, the overseas-sponsored ngo, alofa tuvalu, and another local climate change activist in tuvalu who had also been selected to take part in the katep program for 2017; and two of the three ngos contacted in nepal. in 2017, after ten years in operation, alofa tuvalu report that they are no longer active. the indc documents prepared for the un climate conference in paris in 2015, along with national plans and the list of participants for each country, were analysed for mentions of involvement of ngos. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 69 from these data, the roles played by local ngos in the creation and dissemination of knowledge emerged. the two island countries and the three mountainous countries are linked together not just through the particular problems they face and the associations formed to work on them, such as cvf, but also by engagement in broader communities, yet local circumstances and contexts mean that the possibilities for actions and knowledge creation and engagement by ngos differ markedly. ngos and information-based roles ngos, knowledge and local involvement through their email responses and websites and facebook pages, the ngos identify a number of key ways in which they support knowledge flows or the generation of new knowledges in their communities and beyond. they each identify that working to inform and influence local populations about the kind of changes they may have to make to manage their immediate vulnerability to the effects of rising temperatures is a significant purpose of the organisation. the afghan environmental society (aes), one of the few ngos with a national focus that have remained active in spite of the challenging political and security situation, has as its main objective raising awareness and training those local people with influence in the community – teachers, local governors, mayors and local government officials. their email respondent indicated that people have little information and are happy to take part in programs, but ‘it takes much times to fully have people support but day by day the people are getting much involve in environmental protection issues and climate change issues’. in kiribati, kilga’s main purpose is awareness raising and capacity building at the local government level, and supporting other ngos, in particular those focussed on young people, in their climate change projects. similarly, clean energy nepal has a focus on capacity building, and works to bridge the knowledge gap among major stake holders on the one hand and to empower local people, especially youth on the other hand. the tuvalu national council of women is concerned with the ways in which climate change affects the lives of women, raising awareness of these issues throughout the islands and using its mandatory power to take the issues into the broader national debates. yet, this process of awareness-raising is not straightforward. there is evidence that of opposition to the notion of climate change because of religious beliefs (mcgregor and yerbury, in press) and the young activist from kiribati noted that ‘we know [about the consequences of rising tides] but it’s not a good topic for us to talk about’. some ngos are responsible for gathering scientific data. aes reported that in afghanistan there is no scientific organisation with authority to gather data, so that members of aes gather information directly from local communities, either through anecdotal evidence or through data collection instruments such as questionnaires. in bhutan, the royal society for the protection of nature (rspn), bhutan’s only ngo devoted to climate change, reported that there is ‘no scientifically documented database on local knowledge’ available at grassroots level. since 2014, in partnership with the international centre for integrated mountain development (icimod), they have started the assessment of climate change and its impact through an analysis of biodiversity and meteorological data; they have also extended the collection of meteorological data through the installation of automated data 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 loggers in pilot study test sites. they have enlisted the support of local people in tracking patterns of migratory birds. they note that the lack of scientific data has meant that they have been engaged in conducting pilot studies, ‘a learning process rather than knowledge sharing with partners’. they believe that a rigorous and continued working relationship is essential to the development of a knowledge sharing mechanism. in tuvalu, alofa tuvalu has worked with visiting scientists to coordinate local data collection in areas such as the development of biomass. in kiribati, the relatively small size of the population means that scientists and technical staff working for the government, for example in the department of fisheries, are also involved in climate change activism as volunteers, thus supporting a two-way flow of knowledge. the young activist from kiribati involved in kirican notes that they rely on ‘data from outside’. ngos are involved in the implementation of climate change projects. rspn in bhutan works at multiple levels within communities, some of which are in the most remote part of the country, on the sustainable management of natural resources, improvement of agricultural practices, mitigation of water resources issues and environmental education programs. cen works on ‘strengthening the role of non-state actors in climate change policy formulation’ by bridging the knowledge gap among major stakeholders in nepal and ‘facilitating a process to inform and empower nepalese people to take action towards addressing climate change issues’. it works with local communities to ‘transform villages into ecologically selfsustaining communities’, improving the ecosystem and the lives and livelihoods of the people and trains households in kathmandu in techniques for urban farming. wwf nepal is also active in implementing local actions, working recently with community-based organisations on forestry issues, as well as working to develop local and national policies. the tuvalu national council of women has run workshops on home gardening to help overcome problems of food security. they have also been involved in other projects to help villagers develop skills and expertise in growing staple foods such as pulaka (swamp yams) in pots which help to protect them from salination and the effects of inundation from storm surge. ngos emphasise their involvement with the wider society. some ngos have a strong local or national focus whereas others take a regional or even international focus. aes noted that their board was made up of members of parliament with relevant portfolios or academic staff in local universities. rspn works in collaboration with the international centre for integrated mountain development (icimod) and has a memorandum of understanding (mou) with the department of forest and park services, with its water management division being one of the key partners in recent projects. both tuvalu and kiribati take a broader approach. tucan, the tuvalu climate action network is the only climate focused ngo in tuvalu. maina talia, its secretary at the time, said in an interview before the paris conference in 2015, that ‘it is better to speak from experience’ and he emphasised his concern was that government representatives and delegates from other countries at the conference need to be made aware of the dangers to their lifestyle faced by sea level rise. similarly, in kiribati, kirican considers that a key focus is to take local knowledge and experiences into a wider societal context. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 71 as noted already, the climate action networks in kiribati and tuvalu are strong, bringing together many sources of expertise in the countries. kilga is a member of the kiribati national expert group (kneg) on climate change, the key authority on climate change in kiribati, with links to regional technical bodies such as spc (secretariat of the pacific community) and the sprep (secretariat of the pacific regional environment programme), etc. through its outward looking focus, kilga is able to present local knowledge and experience in wider forums at international meetings and conferences, by contributing to discussions and publishing newspapers and so on; and through responding to academic inquiries. similarly, the tuvalu national council of women works with local communities and encourages them to incorporate international community engagement into their discussion, as they believe that this will certainly provide them more understanding when it comes to international issues. in nepal, a country with a larger number of ngos and the active presence of international ngos, there is scope for both strong inward and outward focus. cen reports that it calls on the expertise of many key figures, from other ngos with local offices such as wwf and oxfam, from nepalese universities and government departments in stakeholder consultation workshops and in seminars. ‘whenever we need any guidance on climate change related issues, we seek help from them [a list of named individuals] and they are always ready to help us’. it is actively involved in partnerships and networking, including providing the secretariat for a coalition of nepalese youth and youth groups, known as nepalese youth for climate action. clean energy nepal (cen) has a mou with the department of hydrology and meteorology, supporting them to collect data and information which is then shared in the wider network. it also has access to information and scholarly data about climate change, not only through these networks but also through the websites of other organisations and on the basis of their own research. wwf nepal acknowledges the significance of its own global network of scientists and those with other expertise as well as its relationship with government departments, such as the department of hydrology and meteorology. wwf nepal considers information from local communities, ‘based on indigenous knowledge’, to be the primary data source of their work in nepal. rspn in bhutan collects local knowledge as already noted, for example around the migratory patterns of birds. aes in afghanistan documents local knowledge, which they refer to as anecdotal knowledge. the government of tuvalu is concerned to ensure that indigenous knowledge is documented and used in actions, and the young activist from tuvalu notes that the elders have ‘their own knowledge and skills, which they only share when they think something useful might happen’. ngos are active in making available their own information as well as information from elsewhere. the young activist from kiribati is working to set up libraries so that people can be exposed to a range of ideas on climate change; he wrote ‘i learned a lot of things out of reading and i wanted my people to learn and [be] exposed to the same thing’. wwf nepal are active in sharing their information through audio-visual means, including radio, as well as through print. although some of the material is produced in english, much of it is aimed at the local communities and is available in nepalese. like wwf nepal, cen works in english 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 and nepalese, using the printed word, and audio and video. in tuvalu, alofa tuvalu report that previously they have widely disseminated their knowledge on climate issues and their local projects over more than ten years ‘via the web, comic books translated in 15 languages, international media articles, conferences, children workshops’ and so on. their focus is both on the local community and on the international community. they note the importance of varying the focus of messages on climate change in order to maintain interest and attention on the issue in local communities. ngos and their engagement in unfccc processes the roles and responsibilities for ngos in the implementation of the actions of the indc, however, varied. kiribati emphasizes its whole-of-nation approach with its actions including the work of community groups and individual citizens; its indc goes further, not only stating the need to work closely with ngos and its citizens, but also with partners elsewhere in the pacific. afghanistan assumes the involvement of ngos for example working with rural population and the partnership between the government of bhutan and rspn is taken for granted. nepal states that several governmental, non-governmental and community-based organizations, academic and research institutions have been involved in generating and disseminating data and information on climate change and its impacts in recent years. tuvalu stands a little apart from the other countries; while it assumes the importance of involvement of local groups in actions, it places its emphasis on the importance of the involvement of the emitting countries whose actions can have a much greater impact than any actions undertaken by the small population of tuvalu. the pattern of ngo involvement in the government delegation to the un climate conference in paris in 2015 reflected similar relationships on climate change issues as were found documented in the indcs. the kiribati delegation to the un climate change conference in paris in december 2015, as might be expected from the government’s emphasis on a ‘whole of nation approach’, included representatives of five ngos, including one regional ngo, pacific calling partnership. similarly, there was strong ngo representation from nepal, including three ngos, one of which was wwf nepal; in addition, seven nepalese ngos also had observer status, each with two or more representatives. ngos from tuvalu were also well represented, with two ngos in the official delegation, one of which was the coordinating ngo for climate action, tucan; and in addition, one ngo had observer status. afghanistan’s preliminary listing for its delegation to the un climate conference in paris 2016 listed one ngo, the afghanistan environmental society, but this organisation was not on the final list of attendees because it was unable to raise the funds to attend; a representative of the french ngo, geres, based in afghanistan, attended as an observer. bhutan’s official list of delegates contained a representative of wwf, based in bhutan. establishing groupings in states becomes important (weiss and burke, 2011), as ways to demonstrate collective identity and contribute to the debates. this is clear from the states in our study; all are members of the climate vulnerable forum, the three island states are members of the association of small island states (aosis) and the small island developing cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 73 states (sids) and the mountainous states are linked through icimod. all are members of the least developed countries (ldc) group. through these memberships, they strengthen their individual messages of the effect of climate change and focus on the common threat to their physical environment, livelihoods and societies and potentially similar outcomes of rising tides and temperatures. discussion ngos as knowledge producers the descriptions of action taken by local ngos show that the importance of ways they engage in knowledge creation and interact with climate change debates. actions in all countries are focussed both on local communities and, to a greater or lesser extent, on a national or international community. ngos in the mountainous states of afghanistan, bhutan and nepal are all engaged in contributing to scientific knowledge. aes and rspn both acknowledge that they are engaged in data collection because a gap exists in the scientific knowledge, but while rspn is linked into an epistemic community through their engagement with icimod, aes, with its limited capacity in a country which for a number of years has been wracked by military and civilian violence, has fewer options available to it. in afghanistan, the country’s intended nationally determined contributions (indc) notes that the infrastructure to protect the intellectual property rights in mitigation technologies is weak and the national datasets on agriculture and food security are also inadequate. aes is doing its best to gather data, but without a strong partnership in an epistemic community, its data which is largely anecdotal is unlikely to contribute to a global scientific system. nonetheless, each of these ngos is acting as a knowledge producer, according to the typology developed by jones, harvey and godfrey-wood (2016). there appears to be no concern expressed from the respondents to this study with issues related to the politicisation of science as corfee-morlot (2007) expressed, but this may have been because in each of these countries, the links between ngos, activists and decision-makers are strong, the relationships are positive and the data produced are unique, not being contested by data from other sources. the small island states see themselves in a different situation from the mountainous countries. they cast themselves as recipients of the outcomes of the actions of others (maru et al., 2014), a negotiating position introduced into discussion by tuvalu and kiribati. in tuvalu, the key message is that people in the developed world over a considerable period of time have created the problems which have led to sea level rise and must take responsibility for this. in kiribati, a key message is similarly that the problem faced by the population is not of their making and that actions must come from other countries. this does not mean that ngos in these islands are taking no action. data is being collected in a variety of ways, with an increasing emphasis on the importance of indigenous knowledge in disaster management (www.pacificdisaster.net) has a section on the topic in its website). although there may be a perception that there is little that local knowledge can add to global scientific efforts, nonetheless, as resture (2009) noted, in tuvalu, coping strategies for disaster management http://www.pacificdisaster.net/ 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 are still largely based on indigenous knowledge, demonstrating a need for integration of this knowledge with western science. this emphasis on contributing to global scientific efforts which underpin mitigation demonstrates the significance of transnational actions (risse-kappen, 1995, p. 9), where ngos, even local ones, operate across national boundaries. although, as esguerra (2015) points out, the consensual knowledge of an epistemic community is an important factor in the development of a policy oriented system for managing climate change and its effects, in this study, there is some evidence of transnational actions, where ngos contribute to scientific data in their countries and beyond. the examples of the work of ngos in bhutan and nepal for example indicate that the claim that the voices of local ngos are not heard in climate change discussions requires more detailed consideration. not only do some local scientific advisers to ngos act transnationally and contribute to the knowledge base of an epistemic community, they also encourage local people to add their knowledge, supporting kalafatis et al.’s (2015) argument that it is important for decisionmaking to be informed by usable local knowledge. jasanoff (2004, 2010) and elwood (2010, elwood and leszcynski, 2013), in different contexts, have expressed concern that the voice of the citizen is not included in debates based on scientific knowledge. van house notes the scepticism with which those with local knowledge may be viewed in the us, at best as ‘ “expert amateurs”, people with (often considerable) expertise but no professional qualifications or training or institutional affiliation’ (2004, p.4). however, the engagement of non-scientists in data collection has become an important feature of environmental sciences, with very positive outcomes (bonney et al., 2009). in this study, the rspn in bhutan and the aes in afghanistan describe the importance of collecting anecdotal evidence from local people with particular experiences of climate change. there is no evidence in these cases of a devaluing of locally collected data or local knowledge, and it is not at all clear from the responses that these relationships create the ‘fragile collective’ that meyer and molyneux (2010) find in a context where what they refer to as amateur scientists come together with professional scientists. indeed, the work of these ngos would appear to confirm sarka’s assertion (2014) that ngos are not just involved in raising awareness at the local level; the ngos in this study demonstrate how it is possible to create links between the worlds of science and the general public, carrying out important work in gathering data, and thus substantiating larger claims. local voices, local processes by using the knowledge brokering typology as an analytical frame, it is clear that the relationships between local ngos and local communities are complex. it is not just a matter of taking messages of climate change from the government or from the scientific consensus to the local communities, as studies such as that of xu and grumbine (2014) have shown. clearly, the local ngos whose actions are explored here are policy advocates, presenting the views of stakeholders, whether women, farmers or young people in relevant forums, both within the country and in broader arenas, and encouraging sound decision-making based on this knowledge. the close relationships between activists and decision-makers potentially cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 75 make this process simpler in states with small populations; as noted above, activists and decision-makers may even be one and the same person, a point not necessarily acknowledged in previous studies. some of the ngos in this study also acknowledge the importance of their role in creating knowledge repositories; the efforts by the young activist from kiribati to establish libraries is a significant example of this, and the emphasis in afghanistan and bhutan on the need for databases of locally collected knowledge is also significant. regional organisations, such as icimod for the mountainous countries, and the south pacific regional environmental programme (sprep) for the two island states, are important through their capacity to act as knowledge portals, both collecting local resources and disseminating them to local communities and more broadly, demonstrating the role of information intermediary. in spite of the significance of repositories and portals and the role of ngos in developing and maintaining them, little attention has been paid to them outside of the literatures of computing science and information studies, where the emphasis has been rather on the technology than on the content and involvement of local people. making available information on climate change issues in languages understood by the local communities, as in nepal and tuvalu, and using radio broadcasts as well as printed materials and posters are significant mechanisms for translating climate change knowledge. translation here is not only a matter of using a language that local people speak, but also of making the information relevant to the local community. in this context, these ngos are meaning brokers, in that wider sense of translation, and their capacity to correlate climate policy with local meanings and agendas, allows them to engage the local community. alofa tuvalu wrote of the need to ensure that people were not bored, hearing the same message over and over again, and the young activist from kiribati noted that people tended to ‘turn away’ from unpalatable messages, preferring practical information that helped them to ‘enjoy the beauty of [their] ancestors’ home’. the work of the ngos in this study would seem to emulate best practice and they would appear to be leaders in the dissemination of material in the languages of their community. betzold (2015), in her review of practices in small island developing states, notes that information is often only available in english, which helps to enhance the perception that climate change is alien, not a factor in people’s everyday lives. the ngos in this study are clearly knowledge brokers, encouraging learning and knowledge sharing in their local communities and to a large extent encouraging the dissemination of local messages to other groups. however, their capacity to create links between local communities and scientists and policy-makers is limited. alofa tuvalu noted that they had been able to bring scientists from europe to work on projects with local people, but this would seem to be something of an exception. respondents from tuvalu and kiribati note the difficulties of ensuring that people living on outer islands are included in national discussions and are included in programs of workshops, and emphasise the significance of isolation in impeding the sharing of innovations, that is, of new ways of solving long-standing problems. this has been noted recently as a challenge by cambers et al. (2017). 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 the typology developed by jones, harvey and godfrey-wood (2016) also contains the grouping ‘innovation brokers’ drawing on non-specialist knowledge sets, such as indigenous knowledge. in this study, this label might be more appropriately applied to descriptions of new ways of doing traditional tasks, for example, creating raised garden beds, growing swamp yams in pots or understanding how to manage glacial melt. lauer and aswani (2009), in the context of the solomon islands, called for a practice approach to indigenous knowledge, where the ecological knowledge was not separated from the context in which it was used. local voices in unfccc processes within the unfccc processes, the voices of local ngos also contribute to the policy debates on climate change, through the indc development process and documentation. however, differences in the relationships between governments and ngos are marked. the findings in this study match newell’s observation (2000, p. 133) that some governments are more supportive of ngo involvement in policy development than others. an ngo’s capacity to influence may depend on the relationships staff have with staff employed in government departments (newell, 2000, p. 134-35). responses from the ngos in the three mountainous countries, afghanistan, bhutan and nepal, all indicated close working relationships with scientists and policy-makers in key government departments and collaborative working relationships with government. it is also evident that staff turnover in ngos and among scientists and policy-makers as identified in several cases can disrupt relationships and make it more difficult to maintain collaborations, a finding in many other studies (eg tadele and manyena, 2008; unep, 2015, p. 43). jasanoff (2004) argues for a close link between science and technology and the practice of citizenship, where the very basis of what it means to be a citizen is questioned. this is not clearly stated as a concern in the context of this study, except in kiribati, where one can see how the government of kiribati is engaging its citizens in its processes at the local level and at the same time working with and challenging ngos and governments of other countries to commit to policy changes which are significant enough to have an impact on sea level rise. local ngos affected by climate change are not easily recognisable as ‘activists’ in a western tradition of opposition, protest and disruption. they would, however, appear to take a proactive approach to contributing to knowledge and its dissemination in a variety of ways. if they take a confrontational approach, it is towards decisions made elsewhere; in some cases, both the processes of knowledge-making and decision-making are unlike the processes they would use in their local communities or perhaps even in their national contexts. overall, the typology of knowledge production we have applied here is useful because it allows a focus on contextual, situated local knowledge, and on the consensual knowledge of climate change, deriving from the principles of western scholarship, and acknowledges the need for some level of translation and interpretation for mutual understanding between the two sets of knowledge and their practical implementation. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 77 conclusion this study has shown that these local ngos have a voice in climate change discussions at the local level and increasingly in the international community. mostly, ngos contribute to the positions for action espoused by their governments, with their main actions being awarenessraising and educating around issues of adaptation. however, ngos may, as in the cases of bhutan and nepal, contribute to scientific knowledge, complementing the efforts of scientists employed in research institutions and by government and filling in the gaps in parts of the scientific knowledge base. previous studies have not taken account of the roles that those associated with ngos as volunteers or board members play in the community, and although that was not a focus in this study, nonetheless, the revelations from our correspondents about their own employment or the positions of their board members show that even these local ngos have a reach beyond their immediate communities. this study has raised questions about the complexity of knowledge flows in these climate vulnerable countries, extending existing studies. the focus on the voice of local ngos has shown that even at this local level, the flows of knowledge and information are not simple, as might be assumed. ngos bring many sources of expertise to bear on the work that they do, both from within the country and outside the country. the relationships between ngos and governments are diverse, that diversity being closely linked to the specific context of the country. the links between scientific knowledge, local and indigenous knowledge and policy priorities differ, even though the perception of climate risk may be shared. the use of indigenous and traditional knowledges may be potentially considered anecdotal or is apparently absent from discussion; exploring these ancient knowledges systematically and sharing solutions would enhance an understanding of the depth and value of knowledge in local communities. yet this study has shown that in some places, for example in tuvalu, it is clear that cultural norms prevent the sharing of local knowledge beyond a restricted local context, potentially minimising the possibility for integrating local indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge in coping with climate change events. the findings of this study suggest the need to reconsider the role of local ngos in small countries at risk from climate change. the label of ‘vulnerable’ suggests that they are at the mercy of decisions made elsewhere, on the basis of information created by someone else, and unable to take meaningful actions. however, from a perspective of transnational action, our respondents show that these ngos can have impacts on the climate change debate well beyond their local context. the external focus may mask difficulties that travelling within a country pose, giving rise to issues of isolation and marginalisation for those in remoter locations, and this should not be overlooked. this study concludes that there can be no one way of considering local action and no one way of documenting and disseminating knowledge. the ngos in the study carry out all the seven distinct roles of information-focussed action as identified by jones et al. 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https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1090-7 yin, r.k. 1994, case study research: design and methods, (2nd ed.), sage publications, thousand oaks, ca. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511598760.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.09.011 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.191 https://doi.org/10.2174/1874949601407010001 https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560910965664 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.11.006 https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2011.584721 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2005.12.002 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1090-7 6019 mcgregor et al2.pdf 6019mcgregor yerbury shahid.pdf 6019mcgregor yerbury shahid 6019-article text-29208-1-10-20181125.pdf keywords ngos; climate change; climate vulnerable forum; knowledge creation introduction setting the scene ngos and information-based roles discussion conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 11, no. 2 2019 © 2019 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: anderson, l., cummings, r. & gatwiri, k. 2019. ‘i’m a local…’: negotiating belonging with former refugees in regional australia through inclusive partnerships. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 11:2, 21-36. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i 2.6665 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper ‘i’m a local…’: negotiating belonging with former refugees in regional australia through inclusive partnerships leticia anderson southern cross university, lismore, australia rob cumings southern cross university, lismore, australia kathomi gatwiri southern cross university, lismore, australia corresponding author: leticia anderson, school of arts and social sciences, southern cross university, military rd, east lismore nsw 2480, australia. leticia.anderson@scu.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11i2.6665 article history: received 05/08/2019; revised 23/08/2019; accepted 10/09/2019; published 14/10/2019 abstract this article discusses the impact and implications of ‘i’m a local…’, an initiative developed in partnership between a regional university, a refugee resettlement community organisation and former refugees from african nations in a regional australian community. the initiative sought to improve understandings about refugees, acknowledge their contributions to australian society and support local, inclusive cultures. it included the development of public resources exploring the process of former refugees in establishing a sense of belonging and becoming ‘locals’. racialised ‘others’ continue to be excluded from ‘belonging’ within australian communities at a wide range of practical and symbolic levels, so it remains an ongoing challenge to broaden the experience of belonging, challenge the borders erected around ‘local’ identities, and work to transform australia’s post-colonial paradigm. ‘i’m a local…’ provides an instructive example of how change agents from different sectors working collaboratively can dismantle prevailing discourses and affirm more inclusive and hopeful futures. keywords belonging; identity; refugee resettlement; regional resettlement; australian localism; race and racism declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 introduction resettlement in non-metropolitan areas is a relatively recent but growing phenomenon in refugee destination countries like australia. as such, understanding of how refugees in regional areas develop and express a sense of belonging and local identity in the longer term is a critical research gap. this paper is an exploration of the impact of ‘i’m a local…’, an initiative developed in partnership between a regional australian university, a refugee resettlement organisation and former refugees in a regional town in northern new south wales, australia. most former refugees in the region were directly resettled from african nations, and have been in residence for several years. the initiative primarily sought to enable former refugees to publicly express their sense of having become ‘locals’ within this regional community. it also sought to improve knowledge about refugees, acknowledge their contributions to their community and promote a culture of respect and inclusion. this article was jointly written by an academic who participated in the later stages of the initiative (leticia anderson), an equity and diversity officer who co-coordinated the initiative (rob cumings), and an independent academic from the same institution (kathomi gatwiri). the paper encompasses a review of academic literature, a survey of publicly available information about the initiative, critical reflections upon the initiative, and draws upon resources about the initiative that were collaboratively produced by a participant and the some of the authors of this article (anderson, cumings, mendes & mapatano, 2018; anderson, brine & bell-todd, 2019). it does not, however, include qualitative research directly with participants or community members. we begin by briefly outlining the sociohistorical context which impacts upon effective resettlement of refugees within regional communities in australia, and highlight the challenges that particularly face refugees from african nations in establishing a sense of belonging in australia. in evaluating the initiative, we provide an outline of its genesis, the contributions of different partners, and consider some of its successes and limitations. we provide a descriptive account of the development of different sets of resources through the initiative, as well as the reception of these resources within the local community and consideration of the extent to which the claims to ‘being local’ asserted by former refugees were accepted and celebrated within the wider community. finally, using spaaij’s (2015) ‘process of belonging’ framework, we consider ‘i’m a local…’ as an instructive example of how change agents from different sectors working collaboratively can challenge the borders erected around ‘local’ identities, broaden the experience of belonging in australia, and affirm more inclusive and hopeful futures. regional resettlement of refugees in australia refugee resettlement refers to ‘the selection, transfer, and permanent settlement of refugees’ into a refugee destination country. in their new countries, resettled refugees must be protected against refoulement and be provided ‘with access to equivalent civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights available to nationals’ (gilhooly & lee 2017, pp. 37-8). however, the primary objective of permanent refugee resettlement is often interpreted as extending beyond the initial protection and reception of refugees, to include the facilitation of positive cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 23 long term outcomes for the refugees and for the receiving country (mcdonald-wilmsen et al. 2009, p. 98). in recent years, european and anglophone refugee destination countries have turned greater attention to the potential for nonmetropolitan resettlement. the reasons for this shift include desires to improve resettlement experiences and outcomes, geographically disperse minorities, reduce urban population pressures and revitalise declining regional communities. these objectives are not always achieved and may at times be mutually incompatible (gilhooly & lee 2017; bose 2018; schiff & clavé-mercier 2019; mcdonaldwilmsen et al. 2009; glorius 2017). in australia, the ‘regional resettlement’ approach has been heavily promoted by successive governments (see mcdonald-wilmsen et al. 2009), and is likely to be become one of the dominant ways that future refugee resettlement takes place (grattan 2019). international studies have pointed out the potential pitfalls of nonmetropolitan refugee resettlement, particularly when the ‘local’ communities refugees are settled within are culturally and racially homogenous (e.g. glorius 2017; bose 2018). in australia, there are context-specific challenges for refugees with non-european heritage in successfully settling and developing a sense of belonging if resettled in regional areas. some regional communities, for example, have rejected proposals for refugee resettlement by the australian government (kivunja et al. 2014), although other communities have expressed more enthusiastic support for regional resettlement (curry et al. 2018). research findings regarding regional resettlement in australia are mixed. in some studies, social exclusion has been found to be higher for those resettled in regional than urban areas (e.g. correa-velez et al. 2013). however, further research suggests that successful integration is better supported in some regional areas, under some circumstances, than in urban areas (collins & reid 2018). the support of local institutions is vital to successful resettlement, yet regional areas often lack infrastructure and resources to support refugees from diverse cultural backgrounds (curry et al. 2018; kivunja et al. 2014; morris and o’shea 2015; piper 2017). this paper focuses on the experiences of ‘localism’ by black african refugees who have been resettled in a regional town in australia that is predominantly white and culturally homogenous. this may pose contextual and cultural challenges for resettlement. in their research on skilled african migrants, kwansah-aidoo and mapedzahama (2018) theorised how blackness can be carried as a burden in white spaces by highlighting how ‘experiences of racism and racialisation interfere with the processes of “being local” and the resulting effect is a sense of non-belonging’ (p. 106). their analysis emphasises that within the australian context, black africans are constructed as racialised ‘others’ who are positioned as ‘a perpetual stranger who does not belong’, a finding which has implications for resettled refugees as well as migrants from african nations (p. 115). upon the establishment of the federate state in 1901, australia employed racially exclusive policies (known collectively as the ‘white australia policy’) that aimed to create a homogenous white population. these policies were progressively dismantled from 1958, and discrimination on the basis of race in immigration policy and legislation was prohibited in 1973 (elder 2007; lake 2013). the effective end of the ‘white australia policy’ by the mid 1970s led to an increase in diversity of migrants, and almost a quarter of australians now 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 have non-european heritage (ahrc 2018). despite the increasing racial and cultural diversity of contemporary australian society, dominant narratives of ‘australianness’ and belongingness continue to revolve around the centrality of whiteness and ‘anglo-celtic’ heritage to australian identity (elder 2007; walton et al. 2018). it is worth noting that australia’s colonial history significantly informs and locates meanings of ‘australian identity’ and drives the constant undercurrents of racism and prejudice that challenge many people's sense of belonging. anglo-celtic institutions, individuals and iconography continue to occupy hegemonic positions within australian society and culture (ahrc 2018), with periodic ‘moral panics’ around ‘invasion’ by immigrants and refugees, demographic change and perceived threats to ‘border-control’. such developments can be seen reflected in increasingly harsh rhetoric and policies directed towards asylum-seekers and refugees (anderson 2015; glynn 2016; killedar and harris 2017). this context contributes to the creation of particular challenges for refugees from african nations resettled in australia. challenges of resettlement for african refugees during the 1990s and 2000s, the number of refugees from african nations resettled in australia increased, but in recent years, intake of refugees from africa has been reduced, even though the number of refugees requiring resettlement from this region has risen (refugee council of australia 2017; morris & o’shea 2015). refugees face significant challenges in resettlement, including difficulties in securing appropriate housing and employment (morris & o’shea 2015), yet resettlement support has also been significantly reduced (curry et al. 2018). the challenges of ‘settling in’ can be heightened for refugees who are ‘visibly different’ within the australian context. markers of ‘visible difference’ such as race contribute to various challenges in refugee settlement in their new environment (colic-peisker 2005; colic‐peisker & tilbury 2007). colic-peisker and tilbury (2007) define ‘visibly different’ as: recognizable as different from the white, western-clad, and english-speaking australian majority in various ways: by their non-english speaking background and therefore ‘accent’ when they speak english; by skin colour and bodily and facial features; by dress and attire, often connotative of religious denomination; or by a combination of these ‘visibilities’ (p. 61). most refugees resettled in australia from african nations self-identify or are perceived as black, and in combination with other markers of ‘difference’, therefore, tend to be marked as ‘visibly different’ in the australian society. given the historic centering of whiteness as the primary identifier of australian-ness, racial difference impacts greatly on black african refugees. in recent years, for example, there have been a series of waves of heavily racialised ‘moral panics’ regarding the supposed criminality of migrants and particularly refugees of black african heritage (macdonald 2017; windle 2008). the racialised undertones underpinning the rhetoric of ‘securing our borders’ by increasing barriers to entry and resettlement for black african refugees was underscored by the proposal by senior australian government officials in 2017 to create a special refugee intake solely for white south african farmers (baskin 2018). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 25 research shows that immigrants and refugees from africa frequently report higher levels of discrimination and prejudice than other groups in australian society. in the scanlon foundation’s 2015 national survey of immigrant communities in australia, for example, 80% of respondents born in south sudan reported discrimination in police contact in the previous 12 months, and 17% reported experiencing racially-motivated physical attacks in the same period (markus 2016, p. 4). in another large research project commissioned by a public broadcaster, 21% of total participants reported agreement with the claim that ‘african refugees’ increased crime in australia (blaire et al. 2017, p. 8), and 16% of respondents selfreported negative feelings towards ‘african australians’ (p. 5). writing of her experiences as a black african immigrant, gatwiri (2019) states that ‘in australia i must manage racialised consciousness and the racial micro-aggressions when met with surprise by euro-centric others who question who i am, where i came from (where i am really from), why i am here, if i intend “to go back home’” (p. 7). considering this context, among the ‘complex challenges’ black african refugees may face in resettlement, the interplay between interpersonal, systemic and institutional racism can be significant (marlowe et al. 2013, p. 2). inclusive and welcoming reception of migrants and refugees needs to be conceptualised as a process of equal participation rather than an assimilatory process. however, there are complex factors at play which lead to ‘successful’ experiences of regional resettlement for refugees and host communities, a detailed analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper (see rather curry et al. 2018). a key finding emerging from the growing body of research on regional resettlement, however, is that ‘communities that have made the decision that they want to welcome refugees and have actively sought to attract them to their city or town are by far the most advanced when it comes to offering a welcoming community’ which leads to inclusion and integration (piper 2017, p. 6). welcoming communities: boundaries of belonging and localism we understand belonging as signifying ‘some form of emotional attachment that relates individuals to other people, places or modes of being’, and the ‘personal, intimate feeling of becoming “at home” in a place’, or having ‘a sense of being part of the social fabric’ (spaaij 2015, p. 304). spaaij’s conceptualisaton of the experience of belonging is best understood ‘as a process (i.e. becoming) rather than a state (i.e. being)’ (p. 305). as yuval-davis (2006) also posits, belonging can be conceptualised on different levels, but it is particularly important to distinguish between belonging in the sense of emotional attachment, and belonging in a political sense. she argues that an affective sense of belonging can be ‘an act of selfidentification or identification by others’, and is ‘always a dynamic process, not a reified fixity’ (p. 199). this process of constructing a sense of belonging for resettled refugees is not just about the formation of ‘individual and collective identities and attachments but also about the ways these are valued and judged’ (p. 203). when there is contestation around the boundaries of belonging within socio-political communities, yuval-davis argues that experiences of belonging shift ‘from the realm of [emotional] belonging into that of the politics of belonging’ (p. 204). this encompasses ‘struggles around the determination of what is involved in belonging, in being a member of a community, and of what roles specific social locations and specific narratives of identity play in this’ (yuval-davis 2006, p. 205). 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 as spaaij (2015) has contended, if we follow yuval-davis (2006) in conceptualising belonging as a ‘dialectic of “seeking” and “granting”’, we must recognise that the politics of negotiating the boundaries of belonging between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in particular social locations involves a range of complex factors which are never fully within the control of individuals (spaaij, 2015, p. 305). instead, they depend upon ‘a dynamic interplay between the side that claims belonging and the side that has the power of “granting” belonging’ (p. 305). for refugees in regional communities then, belonging must be considered not only in terms of individual or collective narratives of ‘belonging’, but also in terms of the extent to which claims to belonging can be considered to have been accepted by ‘host’ communities, which may be represented by indications of an increased permeability of the boundaries of belonging within that context. in the context which we are considering, the ‘locals’ with whom the powers of ‘granting’ belonging are vested are the long-term white residents of the area. the area includes a regional centre in a predominantly rural district in the hinterland of northern new south wales, that is generally typical of australian regional communities and is characterised by lower tertiary qualification levels, lower employment, and lower cultural heterogeneity than national averages (anderson, cumings, mendes, mapatano, 2018). in his analysis of local identity within this region, garbutt (2009) noted that the title of ‘local’ was usually reserved for those who had not only resided within the area for many years, but could also claim an intergenerational connection with white settler families of the region. local boundaries of belonging therefore worked to effectively exclude not only indigenous peoples, but also ‘new settlers’, who might be white but were not considered ‘locals’ (p. 97): becoming local takes time: routine, everyday time spent on the ground. there is a notion here of connection between identity and a ‘patch of dirt’, of authenticity through autochthony, of being a child of the soil, of coming from a womb and from a place, of being born and bred. being local weaves identity and place together in this most intimate fashion (garbutt 2009, p. 92). for an outsider, ‘asserting one’s own local status ignores the protocols of becoming a local: the patronage and acceptance of the established locals is the test’ (p. 94, our emphasis). such boundaries on local identity could be considered a form of what ghassan hage termed as ‘governmental belonging’ (hage 2000, p. 60). this means that within australian communities, the greatest national capital, or claim to be able to ‘spatially manage’ and accept or deny the claims of belonging of others, is possessed by those with longstanding residence, cultural congruence, and localised white settler ancestry. as offord et al. (2015) have similarly demonstrated, australian localism is expressed through ‘proprietorial’ attitudes towards identity and belonging: complex cultural and legal-rational buttresses...support anglo-celtic settlers’ localisation on the australian land mass. the result is the locals’ sense of possession of the settled places of australia, which justifies the morality of speaking and acting for places, whether at the national or the local level (p. 93). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 27 australians of white settler-colonial heritage are therefore uniquely articulated as ‘locals’ within national and localised spaces, enabling them to simultaneously reject the prior claims of possession by indigenous australians and any subsequent claims to belonging. in expressions of australian localism, not only are the boundaries of belonging implicitly maintained, but there can be an active assertion over ‘governmental’ rights towards ‘granting’ or denying claims for belonging ‘which is claimed by those who are in a dominant position and can lead to individuals or groups being silenced and positioned as ‘other”’ (spaaij 2015, p. 305). the fragility of proprietary belonging is reflected in the traditional vigilance and policing of boundaries between ‘locals’ and ‘others’ within social circles in this region as documented by garbutt (2009). yet, successive waves of ‘new settlers’ arriving since the 1970s have had significant impacts upon the region’s culture. garbutt (2014) has argued that the legacy of this history means that ‘the entwining of technologies of care, care for self and environment, have become part of cultural practice and awareness’ (p. 3). the history of accommodation to sociocultural change and valuation of caring means this region may be better positioned for the reception of refugees of different cultural backgrounds than other regional centres, despite the relative demographic homogeneity. the total number of refugees who have been resettled in the region from african nations is small. most were settled directly in the community through the auspices of sanctuary northern rivers, a local non-government charitable organisation. sanctuary has provided support for over 200 refugees from african nations to come to australia under the offshore humanitarian settlement program (kivunja et al. 2014; sanctuary northern rivers 2018; piper 2017). in addition to the cultural characteristics of the region outlined above, the support of local community organisations such as sanctuary, as well as government-funded ngos such as north coast settlement services (st vincent de paul society 2018) has probably been critical to the ‘successful’ resettlement of refugees from african nations in this regional community1. other organisations and institutions within the region have also provided ongoing support for refugee resettlement in the area. local media regularly report positively on events such as refugee week commemorations (see for example jdell 2012; johnson 2013, paterson 2017). the multi-campus university based in the region also contributes to efforts to support regional resettlement (scu 2017). this regional centre therefore displays many of the characteristics of a ‘welcoming community’ within which regional resettlement is likely to be successful. as outlined by piper (2017), these include supportive local government and nongovernmental organisations; local ‘champions’ of resettlement and ‘sympathetic local media’; and established volunteering networks, especially in regards to support for diversity and social justice in the community (p. 12). the gradual resettlement of families and individuals over some years also echoes findings from the international literature regarding 1 the process can be considered successful due to the sustained nature of settlement for many former refugees, the ability to obtain at least some employment, and high levels of engagement with local educational, sporting and other community organisations (see curry, smedley, & lenette 2018 for a more extended examination of defining success for regional resettlement). 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 factors which may lead to more successful outcomes for regional resettlement (gilhooly & lee 2017; schiff & clavé-mercier 2019). ‘i’m a local…’: a collaborative, community-based initiative in 2016, the regional university and a resettlement agency hosted a welcome event for people from refugee backgrounds who were commencing a tertiary course at the university. some participants from refugee backgrounds at the event emphasised that they had been part of the local community for some time and no longer identified as refugees. instead, they selfidentified as ‘locals’, and wished this to be acknowledged, rather than continuing to be labelled as ‘refugees’. this emphasis resurfaced during community consultations regarding the commemoration of refugee week the following year. through collaborative dialogues between former refugees and representatives of the resettlement agency and the local university, the idea for the ‘i’m a local…’ initiative emerged. these dialogues culminated in a facilitated workshop with project partners and participants in early 2017 that provided the participants with an opportunity to reflect on their sense of belonging, celebrate their achievements, and contribute to conversations that could inspire community connections. following this workshop, a set of posters about former refugees living in this region was produced and was publicly displayed during refugee week 2017 at various locations in the region. consent was received from seven former refugees who participated in the ‘i’m a local…’ workshop for their statements and their real names to be utilised in the production of posters and for promotion of the initiative. each poster contained a photographic portrait, selected details about each person’s countries of origin and refugee journey, and a brief narrative statement outlining what made them feel like a ‘local’ in the region. the launch of the ‘i’m a local…’ initiative was picked up by local, state-wide and interstate media and thus achieved considerable ‘reach’ (see for example echonetdaily 2017; burke 2017; shoebridge 2017; grant 2017). through social media and media coverage, awareness and impact of this initiative spread through and beyond the local community. public comments on partner organisation’s social media sites reflected the positive reception of and engagement with the initiative. the benefits to the community were also identifiable by the willingness of businesses, organisations and schools to give their support and the positive feedback they subsequently provided to partner organisations through formal and informal mechanisms. these various forms of feedback provided indications that the ‘i’m a local…’ initiative was achieving the aim of helping the local community to better understand the lived experiences of and contributions of former refugees from african nations living in the region. in creating a highly public local platform for former refugees to tell their stories, the initiative appeared to be successful in challenging negative narratives about refugees which have become dominant in australian mediatised discourses about inclusion and belonging in recent years. it highlighted the diversity of origins and complexity of the participants’ refugee journeys, with the intention of countering the problematic and monolithic grouping together of people of diverse national and ethnic origins with the label of an ‘african refugee community’. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 29 as was highlighted in this initiative, some participants who had been resettled locally as refugees no longer identified as refugees and instead considered themselves ‘locals’. this demonstrates that at some point in the settlement process, the ‘refugee label’ can play a less salient role in defining the personal identity of former refugees. this process was articulated clearly by one participant who said: i’m proud to be part of this community, because… people love each other, we support each other and it builds a strong community. and i feel like i need to move on. i don’t want to look back as a refugee anymore. i want to be an australian and build a new life that will shape my future (john, cited in shoebridge 2017). this experience of localism indicates the depth of engagement and belonging achieved by people who had come to the region as refugees, and affirmed that regional areas could be communities that welcomed, supported and were strengthened by diversity. it also indicated that refugees settling in a supportive regional context could maintain salient aspects of their pre-existing identity whilst having their contributions to their local community acknowledged and celebrated. statements which were printed on the posters with the consent of participants highlighted a wide range of experiences that defined their sense of ‘belonging’ as a ‘local’. cassie, for example, was born in kenya and arrived in australia in 2005. she highlighted the ability to easily access childcare services in her local area and her work as a qualified nursing assistant as contributing to why she felt she was a ‘local’. her daughter (born in australia) was the youngest participant represented in the poster series, and her mother, mary (born in south sudan), the oldest, representing three generations of one family participating in the initiative. mary’s sense of belonging was similarly focused upon everyday experiences of connection and belonging within the community. she loved her local community, she stated ‘because it has very good people and everything is so close’. participation in local organisations was highlighted by other participants, including john, who was born in the democratic republic of congo and arrived in australia in 2015. john noted his membership in a local choir and his local church as being spaces that created positive opportunities for ‘working with people…being connected to each other and supportive of each other’. anthony, who was born in south sudan and arrived in australia in 2008, also signalled the importance of being part of a supportive church congregation (scu 2017). some themes which emerged consistently for participants as forging a sense of belonging were the value of participation in local employment and activities, and above all, positive educational experiences. cassie, john and anthony all singled out their enrolment at university as crucial to their experience of ‘localism’. notably, all three were studying in order to qualify for work in care industries such as nursing and social welfare, signalling their desire to contribute to their community2. anthony’s brothers, who were also featured in the poster series, reflected that their positive school experiences and the impact of having ‘nice 2 although it should also be noted that recent migrants to australia, especially those who entered on humanitarian grounds, often find barriers to employment in sectors outside of caring and service industries (curry, smedley, & lenette 2018; morris & o’shea, 2015b). 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 warm arms that welcomed [their] family’ had made it possible for the community to become their ‘home’. cassie noted that she was a member of a local basketball team while anthony located his membership of the local soccer club as a key tool for fostering belonging. these themes echo key findings from the academic literature on successful resettlement for refugees in australia, which highlight the value of inclusive sporting, education and employment opportunities in building a sense of belonging, connection to community, and social capital (curry et al. 2018; kivunja et al. 2014; major et al. 2013; spaaij 2015). discussion: the ‘double impact’ of becoming a local a key insight that emerged from ‘i’m a local…’ was the sense in which broadcasting the self-identification of former refugees as ‘locals’ disrupted conventional narratives and definitions of ‘being a refugee’. it is increasingly recognised that policy and research regarding refugee resettlement in australia, as well as elsewhere, has been implicitly characterised by a deficit approach which discounts the resilience and agency of former refugees. the ‘over-researching’ of refugees is now a recognised issue, as is the concern that a preponderance of research is ‘about refugees’ rather than ‘with and for’ refugees and their concerns (curry et al. 2018; major et al. 2013). it is for these reasons that we have focused on the evaluation of this project via personal reflections about participation in the initiative, analysis of material about the project which was already in the public domain, and on documentation of the project’s impact, rather than taking the more traditional approach of academics producing research through interviews or focus groups with ‘subjects’. among the outcomes of this initiative were a community development practice paper (anderson, cumings, mendes & mapatano, 2018), this journal article and a short documentary film (anderson, brine & bell-todd, 2019) that were co-developed with academics, organisers and participants. this highlights the importance of more inclusive research engagement with refugees (see fleay et al. 2019). the forthright claim of former refugees in stating so openly within so many public spaces that they considered themselves to be locals may have been interpreted as a challenge or as presumptuous by some. in taking agency and asserting their own local status, the ‘i’m a local…’ participants can be considered to have violated the presumed right of (white) locals to be spatial managers within the town, to determine and police ‘the protocols of becoming a local’ (garbutt 2009, p. 94). employing hage’s (1998) concept of governmental belonging, abdel-fattah (2016) and spaaij (2015) argue that migratory tensions in the australian society are often summoned by white australians who claim exclusive rights to deny or grant ‘belonging’ to culturalised and racialised others. given the charged and contested nature of australian localism, to proclaim one’s ‘localness’ in this fashion can be considered a provocative and radical detournement, utilising the iconography and valourisation of ‘the local’ in regional australia to erode rather than reinforce boundaries of belonging. the enthusiastic participation in the initiative by a wide range of local businesses and organisations in particular signalled that there were many sectors of the community willing to publicly endorse the claims to local belonging of former refugees, and the affirmation that they were now considered and valued as locals. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 31 john, a participant in the initiative, subsequently described ‘i am a local…’ as having a ‘double-impact’, because it worked to raise awareness among the broader community about the stories of former refugees in the region, but also increased the ‘self-recognition of belonging’ for former refugees in the community. in a short documentary that john collaborated on with some of the authors of this paper, he related how participating in the initiative assisted him to connect with new people in the community, and facilitated the process ‘for finding certain type of work, because i became famous! (because the [poster] project was everywhere)’. the significance of these experiences of recognition and welcome had a strong impact on john. he said ‘when i feel like i’m belonging…i don’t need to hold on [to] my previous label as a refugee – and [i] move on to the next step of citizenship’ (anderson, brine & bell-todd, 2019). john’s narrative demonstrates the tendency of dominant discourses to inadvertently ‘fix’ or freeze the refugee subject within a static ‘refugee identity’. instead, as an emerging conceptual framework of ‘refugeity’ suggests, being a refugee may be better understood as a process, a fluid and temporary state, which many former refugees may seek to disengage from as they develop a keener sense of belonging within their new communities (marlowe et al. 2013; harris 2010). staking a claim to this more fluid sense of ‘refugeity’, as a state which settled refugees can leave behind, was intrinsic to ‘i’m a local…’. identifying as a local, as indicated by participants, was intimately connected with establishing a sense of belonging. it involved asserting a positive self-identity reflecting the participant’s origins and current location, through identification of the multitude of daily encounters and interactions which created a sense of local belonging. belonging was therefore highlighted as ‘the product of everyday practices that connect individuals and groups to the social and civic fabric of a place’ (garbutt 2009, p. 99). once a former refugee begins to develop a self-identity as ‘settled’ – as a ‘local’ – as belonging – then the task to question the continued external identification by others can commence, which can then lead to public affirmation of new identities. this is an additional challenge in ‘successful resettlement’: the ability to transcend the label of ‘refugee’ if and when this is desired, and to forge a sense of identity and belonging as ‘locals’ in new locations. this is what john refers to in his description of the process of moving from refugeeship to citizenship (anderson, brine & bell-todd, 2019). finally, not only did the initiative have an impact on resettled refugees in the region, and broader community awareness of their journeys, it also helped to establish transformational, collaborative relationships and partnerships among the organising agencies ‘based upon genuine engagement and a focus on common goals and mutual benefits’ (butcher et al. 2011, p. 29). the importance of the connections between different agencies was crucial to the success of the initiative. without trusting relationships between the initiative’s participants, co-coordinators, representatives of other partner organisations, volunteers who contributed to the production of the posters, and businesses or organisations that agreed to display the posters, the initiative would not have had the impact that it did. on reflection, a significant potential limitation of this initiative was that the focus on ‘local’ belonging in this initiative potentially risked going too far in the other direction – of determining ‘successful’ resettlement as somehow constituted by a process of ‘full 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 assimilation…and gradual alienation from the society of origin’ (glorius 2017, p. 115). the inclusion in the statements of participants’ countries of origin, and sometimes other significant locations in their refugee journey, go some way to mitigate this perspective, but this is a potentially a stereotyping approach that deserves further consideration. recent approaches to integration research, for example, increasingly focus on the possibilities in successful resettlement for ‘simultaneous integration in societies of origin and arrival and the development of transnational identities’ (glorius 2017, p. 115). whether ‘i’m a local…’ provided enough space for this more expansive sense of belonging to be expressed can be questioned, and is a possible limitation of the initiative. in reflection on other possible limitations of this project, we note further in-depth research with a wider range of community members would be required to more systematically evaluate the degree to which this positive reception was distributed throughout the whole community, or to understand how extensive the experience of belonging as a local is for former refugees resettled in this region. conclusion this paper evaluated the ‘i’m a local…’ initiative which challenged the broader regional community to see and engage with former refugees as people without ‘the refugee badge attached’ (scu 2017) and as such enabled ‘bridges of belonging to be built across existing boundaries’ (garbutt 2009, p. 104). it highlighted the various challenges of resettlement for black african refugees in regional australia and the extent to which the positive experiences of refugees can be contextualised within particular characteristics of space and place. however, further research would clarify the particular characteristics of this region which may contribute to making it a ‘welcoming community’ for refugees, and to systematically evaluate wider community attitudes towards and support for regional resettlement. the strong endorsement of ‘i’m a local…’ by some former refugees in this region from african backgrounds may also be considered to subtly reflect precarity in the sense of belonging they have been able to generate: as abdel-fattah (2016) observed, ‘to enjoy unconditional belonging means never feeling the need to assert it’ (p. 33). although the focus and scope of the initiative and composition of poster statements was directed principally by participants in collaborative dialogue with project partners, it can be questioned to what extent the core of ‘i’m a local…’ rested upon participants’ willingness to publicly perform belonging and ‘successful’ integration. extensive training and provision of program guidelines for regional resettlement service providers, and potential program partners such as regional universities, will therefore be an important consideration to support future ethical community development initiatives if regional resettlement efforts continue to expand. refugees enter new communities with unique stories, and overcome the challenges of resettlement with patience, self-discipline and resilience. the regional resettlement process can be ‘a double-edged sword’, with benefits and challenges for host communities and for those engaged in the settlement process (major et al. 2013, p. 101). this paper has demonstrated how local initiatives and research that privilege refugee perspectives ‘champions their resilience…[and] the agency to promote their own successful resettlement’ (curry et al. 2018, p. 432) and can provide transformational impetus to the challenging of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 33 boundaries of belonging within regional centres of resettlement. in this sense, ‘i’m a local…’ reflects the current potential for positive change within contemporary australian culture, in a moment of time when the politics of borders are so reactive and exclusionary. as offord (2014) argues, because australia is ‘racially imagined as white’, when the nation is ‘experienced through colour and cultural diversity’ it can lead to ‘intense conversations and dialogue that are cosmopolitan and potentially decolonising’ (p. 59). experiencing diversity through the perspectives of refugees means privileging more fluid conceptions of refugeity and re-examining the boundaries of identity within regional sites of australian culture. our work in the higher education sector particularly recognises the significance and value of creating positive educative pathways for former refugees. students from refugee backgrounds are an emerging equity group in the higher education sector as well as within other educational contexts in australia, and there is a dire need for educational institutions to increase their support for refugees and other new australians. it is particularly in this respect that the transformational nature of the partnerships underpinning this initiative show leadership. through collaboration they ‘create the possibility of generative growth and change through mutual interaction’, for the participants in the initiative, and for the wider community (butcher et al. 2011, p. 31). ‘i’m a local…’ may have ended now, yet its impact remains relevant to the community at large and to the participants of the project. among the outcomes has been integration of resources about the initiative into curricula at the local university and local commemoration of refugee week 2019. the legacy of ‘i’m a local…’ has been enduring because it effectively harnessed partnerships in supporting local cultures of respect and inclusion, and affirms a hopeful and resilient vision for future relations and wellbeing within an increasingly diverse community. in attempting to draw attention to the benefits 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revised 01/08/2019; accepted 09/09/2019; published 14/10/2019 abstract in various regions of the world, human rights defenders (hrds) often become targets for smear campaigns that seek to discredit and marginalise them. russia’s ‘foreign agents’ law which brands ngos as ‘foreign agents’ – a phrase that carries soviet-era connotations of a spy or traitor – is just one example of states’ attempts to cultivate an unfavorable image of rights defenders in society. yet, despite the global context of such stigmatising campaigns and their potential to put defenders at further risk, there is very little systematic knowledge about the way citizens react to such rhetoric and whether they express more hostility towards hrds. this paper seeks to address this gap and explores the interaction of rights defenders with the domestic society in russia. drawing upon in-depth interviews with representatives of the domestic human rights community, it demonstrates that while the wider public lacks familiarity with actors in the human rights field, certain social segments do interact with them, both in antagonistic and supportive ways. the paper argues that in the adverse conditions created by the ‘foreign agents’ law, there is a need for rights groups to expand and strengthen the links with their constituencies. keywords human rights, human rights defenders, 'foreign agents' law, civil society in russia declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i2.6615 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i2.6615 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11i2.6615 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 introduction the law on ‘foreign agents’ adopted by the russian parliament in july 2012 has resulted in an unprecedented wave of repression for the domestic human rights community in the postsoviet era and has subjected it to significant challenges. this law, officially titled ‘on amendments to legislative acts of the russian federation regarding the regulation of the activities of non-profit organizations performing the functions of foreign agents’ (n 121fz)1, required all non-governmental organizations (ngos) that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined ‘political activities’ to register with the ministry of justice as ‘foreign agents’. such organizations are also obliged to display this label on all their publications and follow detailed reporting requirements, with staggering fines following noncompliance. the law’s central term ‘foreign agent’ lacks neutrality. for the russian public, it raises deeprooted and disturbing associations with stalinist purges during the 1930s – early 1950s, when anyone who had a mere contact with a foreigner could be seen as an agent of intelligence services and be liable for arrest and punishment (chandler 1998, p.76). as opinion polls demonstrate, for the majority of russians this term still carries strong connotations of a ‘spy’ or ‘traitor’ (levada 2016). while scholars and practitioners note that russia’s example has served to inspire a larger backlash against foreign aid and democracy assistance (gerber 2017, p. 317, hooper and frolov 2016; mendelson 2015), obstacles to human rights work are indeed a rising global phenomenon. efforts to increase governmental control of ngos and their sources of funding can be observed in countries as diverse as china, cambodia, egypt, israel and hungary. in this context, ‘foreign agent’ allegations or appeals to sovereignty and national pride have become pervasive (wolf 2005). the question of the public’s response to such rhetoric requires detailed empirical exploration. scholars highlight the importance of favorable public opinion for ngo efficacy and survival (ron et al. 2017). furthermore, favorable public opinion can help human rights defenders (hrds) mobilize public support to survive state repression. in fact, public advocacy and grassroots mobilization in solidarity with rights defenders at risk are at the core of many hrd protective mechanisms, including petitions, support networks and urgent actions. however, despite the importance of the role that society can play for hrd security, the interaction between hrds and the domestic public remains unexplored. what place do rights groups occupy in a given society? do they experience public hostility and, if so, how do they cope with it? how does the interaction with key social segments affect their work, efficiency and security? do laws such as the russian ‘foreign agents’ law redefine the relationships between rights defenders and their constituencies? drawing upon in-depth quantitative interviews with the representatives of the russian human rights community, this research aims to address these questions and understand how rights 1the federal law on making amendments to certain legislative acts of the russian federation regarding the regulation of activities of non-profit organizations performing the functions of foreign agents from july 20, 2012, № 121-fz. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 3 groups’ interaction with society shapes their security and protection. following the flow of the interviews, this paper outlines hrds’ experiences and perspectives in general and, more specifically, in the context of the challenging normative and political environment created by the ‘foreign aid’ legislation. the paper argues that in the adverse conditions created by this legislation, there is a need for rights groups to expand and strengthen the links with their constituencies. perception of human rights ngos by the russian public following the collapse of the soviet union and the subsequent profound political and economic crisis, numerous human rights and social organizations emerged in order to substitute for the responsibilities of the collapsed state and provide the population with basic need services. yet, decades of ‘forced volunteering’ in various communist organizations have led to reluctance on the part of many citizens to join or support any organized groups or collectives. people generally viewed third sector organizations with mistrust and suspicion (richter 2002). they tended to avoid the public sphere and instead relied on private, informal networks of family and friends in case they needed help (evans 2015). as henderson (2010, p. 261) writes, during the 1990s, ‘many viewed ngos with hostility, mistrust, or, at best, indifference’. scholars note that the legacy of the soviet union continues to shape the civil society and still lingers in the propensity of russians to engage with civic organizations and social movements (crotty 2009). since the early 2000s, stigmatizing anti-ngo rhetoric has become prominent on an official level. officials first raised concerns that russian ngos are merely serving the interests of foreign donors, while not paying sufficient attention to society’s most acute needs (putin 2004). state-owned media upheld this rhetoric and branded hrds as ‘fighting against the traditions of russian statehood’ (lipman 2005). since 2006, legislation introducing additional registration requirements for ngos began to emerge2, largely as a response to ‘color revolutions’ and a global pushback against international democracy assistance. the 2012‘foreign agents’ law marked the peak of the efforts to discredit ngos and their funding sources. furthermore, the 2015 ‘undesirable organizations’ law3 targeted and effectively banned foreign aid donors within the country. what impact can these measures and rhetoric have on public perception of rights groups? russian national public opinion polls do not offer a precise answer, yet, they demonstrate a lack of citizens’ familiarity with ngos. according to the levada center survey, the majority of russians (52 percent) are not well-informed of ngos’ activities: 16 percent have a very general understanding of what ngos do, while 29 percent have never heard of them (levada 2013). another survey demonstrates that 24 percent of respondents are not familiar with any non-commercial organization; out of the informed respondents, 37 percent reported trust to at least some kind of non-commercial organization, with unions for the protection of 2federal law on introducing amendments to certain legislative acts of the russian federation no 18-fz, 2006 3federal law on introducing amendments to certain legislative acts of the russian federation no. 129-fz of 23 may 2015. 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 consumers’ rights (12 percent) veterans’ unions (9 percent) and trade unions (8 percent) being most trusted third-sector organizations (the russian higher school of economics 2015). studies on public attitudes towards foreign funding of ngos paint a rather unclear picture. as gerber’s research shows, russians are indifferent to foreign funding, even if organizations’ activity is expressly political (gerber 2016). on the contrary, the 2016 levada center survey demonstrates that respondents are largely suspicious of ngo foreign funding and believe that it aims to harm the country, while only 13 percent think that foreign donors help resolve social problems in russia. 49 percent of russians approve of measures and laws that require ngos to brand their materials as ‘belonging to foreign agents’ (levada 2013). while russians theoretically support measures that aim to control foreign funded ngos, at the same time, the overwhelming majority (73 percent) has never heard of the ‘foreign agents’ law (levada 2016). furthermore, an article by asmik novikova (2006) based on interviews with experts from various fields provides some insights regarding the position of human rights defenders in society. it demonstrates that suspicions in relation to rights defenders exist among russians, including those related to ngo financing. the available data and the existing legislative environment may suggest that russian citizens have largely embraced the anti-hrd rhetoric and that rights activists are likely to experience high levels of public hostility. this paper aims to explore the firsthand accounts of the representatives of the human rights community and provide an understanding of how they experience social attitudes towards themselves and interact with society. data and methods this study uses a qualitative research design and is based on interviews with human rights defenders working for human rights ngos in russia. qualitative methods of data collection and analysis were chosen as they allow the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of complex phenomena (creswell and clark 2011). interviews provide a way of obtaining information from participants and exploring their views, emotions, and lived experiences as well as the way they interpret these experiences (ibid). this approach allows the production of new knowledge and unique insights into an area with limited research. in order to conduct interviews with rights defenders, the author reached out to key russian human rights ngos in person or via email. the author’s position as a volunteer at a major moscow-based ngo was helpful for identifying participants and establishing contact with them; it also facilitated building trust and rapport. the main fieldwork was conducted in spring 2016 and follow-up interviews were conducted in spring 2017. only ngos working in the sphere of human rights were included in the sample. in order to select the participants, purposive sampling was used, which allows the interviewees to be identified according to key characteristics. the sampling was based on the author’s estimations of whether interview participants would provide information that is of interest and relevance to the research questions. in particular, the author considered whether an cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 5 organization had been included in the register of ‘foreign agents’. organizations and their leaders, whose stories and cases were especially important and appeared in the media, were of particular interest. furthermore, snowball sampling was used when some respondents referred the author to other participants similar to them. the limitation of the sampling was its inequality in terms of geographical location: the research mostly addressed the situation with moscow-based ngos. the author has not been able to reach out and explore very thoroughly the situation in the regions: traveling to other cities was difficult due to resource constraints. although the author managed to contact hrds from russia’s various cities and regions via email, the number of such interviews was lower than the number of interviews carried out within moscow, where the researcher was based during the empirical research. not only were almost all of the interviews with defenders from outside of moscow conducted via email, but also the email interviews were typically not as detailed as face-to-face interviews and mostly did not include follow-up questions. some informants provided limited information, for instance, those that were contacted during the ongoing harassment in relation to the ‘foreign agents’ law and were facing uncertainty. steps were taken to ensure that data was collected ethically. all the interviews were conducted by the author who ensured that participants were fully informed about the purpose of the research and that their participation was voluntary. considering the sensitive nature of the research project and the actual or potential obstacles and risk involved in hrds’ work, the author undertook additional steps to ensure their anonymity. due to the sensitivity of the study, written consent was not obtained in order to avoid leaving traces or signatures. however, participants provided verbal consent to participation. in order to ensure the observation of ethical procedures, before fieldwork was undertaken, the summary of the planned qualitative empirical study and the explanation of ethics-related procedures was submitted to and approved by the ethics board of the chinese university of hong kong. each interview ranged in length between 30 and 80 minutes. semi-structured interviews followed an interview guide to direct the discussions but allowed for flexibility of the conversation to explore the key emerging themes. the interview guide included questions regarding the ways rights defenders feel and experience social attitudes towards themselves in general, the ways they interact with the society in the context of the ‘foreign agents’ law and the existing challenges in their interaction and outreach to the wider public. the interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder. they were conducted and transcribed in russian, and the transcripts were translated into english. thematic analysis was used to analyze the data, which involved identifying the common ideas or themes that emerged from the interview data. first, open coding was used to identify specific themes that re-occurred across the discussions. further, axial coding identified relationships between the initial open codes. the more specific axial codes helped to develop core categories and allowed concepts with similar characteristics to be grouped into subcategories; the emerging codes were then analyzed using the method of interpretive description. 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 results perception of hrds by the russian public: ‘[w]e live in parallel’ most ngo representatives spoke about their interaction with the public specifically in the context of the ‘foreign agents’ law. the challenges posed by the law were particularly acute at the time when the interviews were being conducted and most interviewees focused on their experiences and perspectives in the context of this law. the author first asked hrds: ‘as human rights defenders, do you feel and experience any attitudes towards yourself from the russian society?’. being asked this question, some participants first posed a counter-question: ‘and what is the “society”?’ and gave their understanding of this notion. many participants did not view it holistically but distinguished two separate categories: the social majority and a thin stratum of civically engaged citizens. as the participants held: ‘there is “society” that only expects to receive help and approaches hrds when all other methods have failed. […] and there is “society” that is ready to participate, to be engaged... .’ (director, ngo12 working on historical memory and human rights) ‘in russia, there are no structures that can be called “a society”, they simply don’t exist, there are no social ties. people press a tv button and that’s it. we can only talk about ten percent of those who are civically active’. (director, ngo9 working on soldiers’ rights) thus, in terms of interaction with them, ngo representatives distinguished a small civically active stratum that engages with their initiatives and the social majority, which remains passive and influenced by propaganda. in view of many hrds, the wider russian public simply does not know about them and their work. given this lack of awareness, people do not display any attitudes towards them. as one participant noted: ‘what kind of attitude do people have towards us? we live in parallel. they don’t have any attitude towards us. i don’t think that someone loves or hates us. they simply don’t know about our existence’. (director, ngo16 working on applications to the echr) this view was echoed by other participants: ‘people do not know about hrds’ (director, ngo2) and ‘the majority of the population – those who do not face any human rights problems, those who agree with everything – don’t need anything at all’ (director, ngo9 working on soldiers’ rights). yet, the respondents further developed this thought: the lack of awareness and interest among the population remains only ‘until something happens’ – until people experience rights violations. yet, even in this case turning to hrds is seen as a last resort of limited success: ‘but when something happens, people start searching – where shall we go, where shall we run? state bodies kick them out. they try something else; they are kicked out again. then someone tells them: ‘why are you struggling here? just call or write to an ngo’. (director, ngo9 working on soldiers’ rights) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 7 several participants expressed an idea that when people turn to them as a last resort, commonly, they do so with a distorted perception of hrds and their work. hrds are often seen as ‘free lawyers or honest civil servants […] who strive in courts for people’s interests and whose obligation is to take care of the people’ (director, ngo12, historical and human rights-oriented). as this participant explained, ‘of course, hrds provide help for free and often provide legal help. but we are not free lawyers or civil servants who help to deal with bureaucratic issues: we are those who give you tools to defend your rights. and because these expectations do not coincide with our real mission, we are often perceived as “bad ones” as we don’t perform our duties and don’t take care of the people’s interests’. rights defenders had a feeling that people often approach them in a very pragmatic manner. the following quote captures their overall sentiment: ‘for the people, we are yet another option to try when dealing with the bureaucracy’. (lawyer, ngo3, multi-profile) furthermore, more than one ngo representative pointed out that people often approach them with inappropriate, non-human rights claims divorced from their real mission. as the head of the european court of human rights-oriented ngo said: ‘people approach us with all sorts of issues: their neighbors flooded them, a local governor is not performing his duties, their grandfather’s property was confiscated during the soviet times… but it’s not our problem and not a problem of the european court. we are unable to resolve it: the european convention protects only a concrete set of rights. when we didn’t have an id check point, many people came here, even saying ‘i have no place to sleep tonight’. (director, ngo16 working on applications to the echr). that these ngos are often approached with non-human rights claims was echoed by another participant, who described that “an old grandma” can make a long trip to their organization claiming she had been overcharged for municipal services. despite the fact that this issue is not this organization’s area of work, they would, of course, ‘help her to re-count those coins’ [so that she can claim back the overcharged amount]. however, the defender noted that it is not their task, they ‘have a broader mission, and such cases distract them from it’ (presssecretary, ngo5, multi-profile). apart from indifference and unfamiliarity with their work, hrds also mentioned sensing negative and suspicious attitudes from the general public. interestingly, several participants held that two contradictory perceptions may coexist in the public mind: both the compelling idea that foreign funded ngos are ‘agents of foreign influence’ and the warm feelings towards the ngo that has helped them. ‘there are a lot of funny stories, but in a sad way… a person receives help for free and then says something about foreign agents. something like: ‘you are so good, if only you maintained good relationships with the government and 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 stopped receiving foreign grants!’ or something like: ‘i don’t trust ngos, but specifically your ngo is good’. and the organization responds to him: ‘of course we are good – why are we able to help you for free? because this lawyer receives a salary from a foreign grant’. (director, ng012, historical and humanrights oriented) ‘i hear conversations about “foreign agents” and “the us influence’ from people waiting in line when they come to us for help”. (director, ngo11 working on refugee rights) this kind of coexistence of opposing beliefs in the public mind suggests that people are unlikely to abandon their suspicions that human rights ngos are ‘saboteurs and agents of foreign influence’ even after receiving help from them. two contradictory viewpoints coexist, and the strongly-held anti-ngo beliefs do not preclude people from turning to hrds for redress of their violated rights. hrds’ experiences of public hostility and support online: ‘constant abuse and disgrace’ the most immediate reaction of many interviewees was to mention hate comments online: ‘upon each publication we make, there is constant abuse and disgrace’ (ngo14, multiprofile); ‘immediately after we post a video with the director of our ngo, we see these [derogatory] comments’ (lawyer, ngo1, multi-profile). such comments mostly accuse rights activists of ‘blackening russia and trying to lower the authority of the government’. as one participant noted: ‘when we made a publication on our website about the case involving incompetence of the police [regarding the migrants’ rights] we got a lot of comments: ‘you scold russia. stop writing nasty things about the country’. but who is saying bad things about the country?’ (director, ngo11 working on refugee rights) yet, many participants were uncertain whether hate comments reflected genuine opinions of members of society or were left by ‘internet trolls’ – anonymous groups paid by the government in order to target internet users and spread misinformation. ‘is it society? or are they “trolls” working for money? […] it’s difficult to tell. oftentimes, we can’t say: “it’s all done by the trolls.” there is a suspicion, but i can’t say for sure. an atmosphere of abuse and hatred on the internet is created around us, but who is spreading it? – who knows?’ (director, ngo12 working on historical memory and human rights) ‘i have an impression that they are partly “trolls”, partly not.’(lawyer, ngo1, multi-profile) interesting discussion arose on hrds’ reaction to hate comments. defenders said they were ‘too busy to look at them’ (director, ngo19 working on freedom of press) and did not feel insulted by such comments as they understood that either trolls or ideologically hostile cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 9 individuals leave them. yet, the director of ngo11 working on refugee rights described her experience which demonstrates the importance of reacting to such comments: ‘sometimes i react to such comments. if it’s just swearing, i delete them. but if it’s something that gives an opportunity for discussion, i respond. because people need to be talked to. sometimes someone writes terrible things and then says: “i’ve looked at your website, now i have a very positive opinion of you”. i say: “well, very good, join us as a volunteer”.’ (director, ngo11 working on refugee rights) the quote above suggests that sufficient information can produce changes in individuals’ view of human rights issues. in some cases, those who exhibit an antagonistic view of hrds can be more susceptible to their message at least due to their interest in rights groups. as this participants’ account demonstrates, in the process of attitude change her direct communication with people was important in giving them a clearer picture of her human rights work and replacing their negative stereotypes. the numerous anti-hrd comments, however, do reach one major effect: they make any open discussion of human rights issues impossible among internet users, thus creating additional obstacles for hrds to promote their message: ‘even online, there is no platform for discussion, there can’t be any good independent debate. if it is not a closed community, but an open one. these ‘trolls’ who interfere, they immediately destroy everything. it's impossible’. (director, ngo12 working on historical memory and human rights). hostility offline: provocations and misunderstanding the participants’ experiences of hostility from certain social segments are not limited to the online sphere, but extend to real-world settings. hrds mentioned facing various kinds of provocations and acts of hooliganism on the part of pro-government conservative groups, such as throwing eggs at them during press-conferences (lawyer, ngo2, multi-profile), threatening messages left at their homes and offices (ngo7, multi-profile) and pickets at the doors of their organizations (ngo14, multi-profile). one participant explained: ‘from time to time, we face provocations, such as splashing water or zelyonka [green color liquid antiseptics] on us. we’ve also experienced several pickets at the doors of our organization by a group of young people who regularly “troll” human rights activists and the democratic opposition’. (pr specialist, ngo17, multi-profile) another participant (press-secretary, ngo12 working on historical memory and human rights) provided a similar account and said that when their ngo was holding an exhibition on the chechen war, a pro-government group nod [national liberation movement] picketed their organization for three days ‘with flags and posters’. similarly, orthodox activists held a picket during the ngo’s exhibition on lgbti rights. the interviewee further noted that 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 ‘these are rare, out of the common episodes. unlike our work, they are covered by the media with great enthusiasm’. hrds also mentioned misunderstanding from their family members. one defender working on prisoners’ rights said: ‘[w]e don’t talk with my elder brother. because if we start talking, the topic changes to politics, to my work. so we just stopped communicating at all’. (director, ngo20 working on prisoners’ rights) a similar account came from the lawyer of the prisoners’ rights division of ngo2. she explained that she used to face misunderstanding from her family when she began her work and ‘felt some negativity even from her closest relatives’ – her mother and sisters, who were convinced criminals and serious offenders are not worth being defended. however, her stories and concrete examples of the injustice suffered by the detainees gradually enhanced their awareness of the issue and countered their prejudiced attitudes. she said that her relatives changed their attitude towards her job and now they perceive it as necessary. the participant noted: ‘when you describe concrete cases, people’s minds broaden. if before that they had a very limited understanding, now it’s completely different. now they realize that it’s a very serious problem.’ an important part of the process of attitude change was this lawyer’s communication with her family members and specifically, through the description of stories from her practice. evidence delivered through vivid examples has been persuasive enough to transform their opposing attitudes to more supportive ones. support from society the interviewees described a variety of ways in which their organizations received support, including gratitude from their clients, gifts, volunteer labor, material donations and other kinds of donations and support. yet, they generally assessed public support of the human rights movement as rather weak. the director of ngo12 noted that ‘undoubtedly, such support is valuable’ and ‘everyone wants more [of it]’, but it is insufficient given the degree of obstacles ngos face: ‘[h]onestly, i don’t see such a strong and active support of ngos. in my opinion, all this is not enough’. yet, the respondents mostly discussed public support in the context of the ‘foreign agents’ law. the effect of the ‘foreign agents’ law on hrd-society interaction has the law affected general public’s attitudes towards hrds? one of the participants [director, ngo2] gave a rather clear answer to the question of whether, and to what extent, the ‘foreign agents’ law affected public attitudes towards rights groups. he suggested that this effect had not been significant as the social majority is unaware of the law; people will continue turn to rights groups as a last resort. at the same time, the law did not produce any changes among politically-savvy segments: it only reenforced the existing anti-hrd moods, while the more liberal segments understand the law’s cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 11 real purposes. yet, the interviewee pointed out that it may have led to an increase of hostility among some politically undecided social groups. another interviewee echoed this, stating: ‘the major campaign to discredit hrds has not happened. it didn’t appear in the major channels of communication. but if the government really needs it, it can do it overnight’. (press-secretary, ngo1, multi-profile) cooperation with partners: ‘it was just cut off’ while hrds sensed that the ‘foreign agents’ law had not reached the wider public to cause any significant shifts in public attitudes towards them, they mentioned that this label had a chilling effect on some social segments and, in particular, complicated their interaction with key domestic stakeholders. the head of the ngo working on refugee rights (ngo11) described how their long-standing partners from the domestic business sector suddenly refused to provide them with a grant, which ‘had been approved and almost settled’. the interviewee concluded that their partners ‘used to be their friends’ but refused to cooperate because of the ‘foreign agents’ law. second, the interviewee provided an example of a formal and cold response from their other partner, an organization of professional lawyers. when the interviewee’s ngo was publishing a book on the rights of refugees and asked their partners to provide information on the number of their successful cases on refugee rights, the lawyers responded with a formal refusal to be mentioned in the ngo’s book. the unfriendly response surprised and upset the ngo representatives, as they ‘were talking to friends’. in the opinion of the respondent, this reaction was due to the ‘foreign agent’ status this situation of former partners becoming unwilling to cooperate was also brought up by the director of the ngo working on adaptation of refugees’ children (ngo33). the interviewee said that in february 2016, the moscow municipal authorities terminated the office rental agreement with them, despite the fact that the organization had been occupying their premises for many years. the interviewee was convinced that these sudden changes were triggered exactly by the ‘foreign agents’ law. a similar comment on this issue came from the representative of a ngo working on freedom of press: ‘our organization previously held a school of investigative journalists. it went with great demand and success. even state structures thanked us. it was useful both for them and for us. but after this law it was just cut off. we had cases when seminars were cancelled without notification, two days before the event’. (director, ngo19). as the quotes demonstrate, hrds expressed frustration with their former partners, including business and donor organizations, municipal authorities and government officials who started to avoid talking to or working with those designated as foreign agents. it also shows that the law creates barriers for ngos to connect to the broader public as it has reduced their ability to communicate their message to the broader public. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 support in the context of the ‘foreign agents’ law: ‘we have to strongly realize the value of this help’ the ‘foreign agents’ law entered into force in november 2012, and many organizations were at first boycotting it and refusing to register under its stigmatizing label. they called it ‘slanderous’ and ‘unjust’, and russia’s ombudsman challenged it in the constitutional court, without any positive response (oleinikova 2017). since march 2013 hundreds of organizations across russia were subjected to an unprecedented wave of inspections, followed by warnings, administrative cases and staggering fines for non-compliance. the campaign even involved a criminal case initiated in june 2016 against a hrd, named v. cherevatenko (front line defenders 2017a). many ngos received staggering fines equivalent up to $10,000 usd. short of funds to pay off the escalating fines, some ngos faced the prospect of liquidation and reached out to their fellow citizens to raise the money. repeatedly, ngo representatives affirmed the importance of domestic supporters in the face of the growing government interference. according to the interviewees’ explanations, this was the most tangible indicator of societal support of the human rights sector: ‘one of the most tangible forms of public support were the funds collected to pay the fines. in our case it was 600,000 rubles’. (member of staff, ngo14, multiprofile) ‘if we measure our support base by something tangible, it’s when we gathered funds to pay off the fines levied against us. we didn’t expect to gather the whole sum, but there was a real risk that we would be shut down. so, eventually, we asked people for help. which other options did we have? we did not have any. we didn’t get any institutional support in this case. so we have to strongly realize the value of this help’. (press-secretary, ngo12, multi-profile) the interviewee explained that they appealed for help, including through a video, on their website and social media and eventually gathered the sum equivalent to $11,000 usd to pay off the fine. she also noted that their organization held a series of concerts and poetry readings, which also helped gather donations. similar accounts came from other participants (ngo2, ngo4, ngo7, ngo12) who explained that they managed to gather money from businessmen and private donations, which helped ensure their organizations’ survival. the interviewees mentioned that the donations came from a variety of domestic sources – private foundations, businesses and ‘not indifferent citizens’, including, for instance, the teachers’ union. overall, the challenges brought by the ‘foreign agents’ law show the tangible and practical value of societal support that helped ensure ngos’ continued existence. turning to their domestic constituents has been one of the key survival strategies used by organizations charged with high administrative fines. furthermore, the hrd who faced criminal prosecution for non-compliance with the law affirmed the importance of such support. she provided the following comment: ‘the criminal case against me is a separate story. local journalists reacted to this: some with curiosity, some with alertness and some with support. but there cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 13 were no negative publications in the print media of our city and in the region. publications that supported me, undoubtedly, helped, and i am grateful for that’. thus, the defender noted that the positive media attention helped her during tough times of criminal prosecution. while it is difficult to quantitatively measure the cause and effect relationship between publicity and the increased political costs of targeting of hrds, it can be assumed that the expressions of solidarity and public resonance fostered an atmosphere of scrutiny and thus contributed to the closure of the criminal case in july 2017 (front line defenders 2017b). increased social outreach: ‘it made us seriously re-think and invest in public relations’ importantly, some interviewees held that the new difficult conditions for conducting human rights work made them re-evaluate their communication strategies and increase their social outreach. one ngo representative (ngo17) said that the new legislation did not lead to increased social hostility, but on the contrary, increased public awareness and revealed the positive attitudes towards their organization: ‘the media provided strong support of our ngo within the region. in addition, the ombudsman and the governor spoke in support of our organization [being] recognized as a ‘foreign agent’ in the center for the protection of media rights. after the adoption of the law [on ‘foreign agents’], prosecutorial checks began and journalists were very worried about our fate. several times, they published articles about the work of our legal advice clinics and our lawyers’. this interviewee further added that the law did not lead to increased social hostility, but on the opposite, increased public awareness and revealed the positive attitudes towards their organization. ‘it [the ‘foreign agents’ law] made us seriously re-think and invest in public relations and explore new avenues of intersectoral communication. in the autumn of 2016, we launched an award program to celebrate those who contribute to the social life of our city and region. at the ceremony, many guests said that they didn’t know we existed and were happy to meet and get to know us’. a similar account was observed in the interview by another participant. ‘overall, the level of negativity towards our organization has not changed after this law – in some cases it even decreased, thanks to our active work and public relations projects’. (head of regional branch, ngo10, working on soldiers’ rights) the hrd further explained that their ngo did not have enough funding for the educational webinars after it had chosen to stop receiving foreign funding. in order to continue this program, it used a crowdfunding platform. the ngo leader said: ‘classical funding scheme has spoiled us. we were entrenched in the idea that not the citizens, but someone else has to pay for our work. […] we decided to attract private donations not only in emergency situations, but also for our dayto-day work. to some extent, the general background of mistrust to foreign 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 funded organizations and the campaign launched against ngos in the summer of 2014 has contributed to this and led to drastic changes in our fundraising strategy’. furthermore, the organization working on adaptation of refugees’ children (ngo33) noted its reliance on volunteers after it stopped receiving (foreign) funding. the director noted: ‘we only rely on our volunteers to sustain ourselves. we would like to broaden the pool of volunteers now. only our director and coordinator receive salaries. the rest is volunteer work’. thus, in many ngos’ experience, the ‘foreign agent’ label has not led to an increase in negative social attitudes, but on the contrary, encouraged organizations to invest in public relations campaigns and enlarge their social base. for many, private donations and volunteer work started to serve as a key resource to replace foreign grants. the participants’ accounts demonstrate that the increasing political and legal restrictions on foreign funding forced them to work more actively on their public reputation and innovate fundraising strategies that engage ordinary russian citizens. discussion generally, the empirical data derived from the interviews with ngo representatives reveal a deep disconnection between the human rights movement and the vast majority of russian citizens. according to hrds, the public ‘lives in parallel’ with them and does not hold or display any attitudes towards them. this is consistent with scholarly commentary that many russians consider rights-based approaches to be of limited success and view them as timeconsuming, stressful and unproductive (turbine 2007). furthermore, while people may turn to hrds for help, they often do so with issues that are divorced from ngos’ real missions or even from the arena of human rights. a lack of understanding of the nature of hrds’ role exists, which often leads to a public perception of rights groups as ‘useless’. highlighting the information gap between the human rights sector and ordinary citizens, the representatives of the human rights movement felt that the ‘foreign agents’ law had not reached the masses and thus had not had any adverse effect on public attitudes towards them. these estimations are supported by quantitative data: the survey conducted by the polling center levada (2016) reveals a lack of awareness about this law. in particular, it shows that the overwhelming 73 percent of russians do not know anything about it, 20 percent have heard of it, while only 2-3 percent reported detailed awareness of it. yet, some interviewees said that if the ‘foreign agent’ campaign had been more intensified and consistently appeared in the mass channels of communication, the masses would know more about it and would be likely to accept it without question. yet, the ‘foreign agent’ label has not gone unnoticed for hrd-society interaction. our qualitative research demonstrates that it has led to an increase of negative attitudes among those social segments and stakeholders with whom hrds interact more frequently. the designation as a ‘foreign agent’ resulted in antagonism towards ngos on the part of businesses, municipal bodies and other partners. for many organizations, it has led to closure cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 15 of educational and volunteering programs. given that hrds had already felt a lack of outlets and channels to disseminate their message, the barriers in their social outreach became even more pronounced. on the other hand, the challenging legislative and political environment demonstrates the importance of public support. when staggering fines put ngos onto the verge of liquidation, domestic support proved to be vital. moreover, public action on behalf of hrds is an important mechanism of hrd protection. the case of ms cherevatenko, who faced criminal charges for non-compliance with the ‘foreign agents’ law is in june 2016, is illustrative. the initiation of this case was followed by a wide campaign in solidarity with the defender, including human rights awards and national and international media attention. this public resonance fostered an atmosphere of scrutiny and solidarity and eventually, in july 2017, the case against the defender was closed. overall, can rights defenders expect to receive support from society, or do they face serious hostility? while hrds do not experience much explicit aggression, the majority of russians are unlikely to act in support of hrds simply because they are unaware of any challenges facing the human rights movement. as for the more active social segments, they do interact with rights groups through different modes of engagement: from expressly hostile to collaborative ones. yet, in cases of increased pressure, it seems that the potential threats stemming from some social segments are largely outweighed by the positive role of societal support due to its constructiveness in helping ensure ngos’ survival. in the current environment, broadening their support base may be one of the key strategies to reduce ngos’ vulnerability to states’ de-legitimization efforts (wolf, 2005). in the age of severe foreign aid restrictions, this work is especially important. scholars note that ngos that rely exclusively on international financing are in a highly unsustainable position if they fail to diversify their sources of support (sundstrom 2006). yet, our research demonstrates that with the decline of external support, the civic sector in russia began to catalyze efforts to strengthen alliances with their constituents. this finding supports the argument that the closing civic space phenomenon often correlates with organizations’ heavy dependence on external financing and their weak ties with the local populations – with foreign aid in development sphere having a particularly negative impact (medelson 2015, raine 2006). as raine (2006) notes, ‘any organization that depends on a narrow number of donors and does not have a broad base of citizen support risks losing touch with the people whom it is trying to serve’. in order to broaden their support base, it is important that activists themselves fundamentally trust their constituencies. observers have noted that russian activists are instead prone ‘to suspicion of the people and contempt for their unenlightened state’ (rochowanski 2013, np). our qualitative interviews demonstrate that while the participants did acknowledge the importance of support by some active social segments, they expressed a belief that the broader society views them with suspicion or indifference, and none of them mentioned that it might be positively inclined towards them. this finding may support the suggestion that activists themselves have little confidence in the public’s ability to effectively participate in 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 human rights and political affairs (abrams and auer 2004). western observers have long noted that russian activists ‘rarely seemed to take citizen participation seriously’ (bell 2001, p. 12) and this kind of disdain prevents them from reaching out to their constituents for political as well as economic cooperation (abrams and auer 2004). yet, hrds’ experiences demonstrate that their communication with the people, discussions and explanations about their work commonly led to changes in individuals’ attitudes. conclusion this paper presented the data from a large set of interviews with russian national ngos discussing the impact of the recent ‘foreign aid’ legislation and the wider context of their work. generally, the ‘foreign agents’ law had severe consequences for ngos and their efficiency. as oleinikova (2017) observes, this legal environment had an overall cooling effect on the civil society; it has diminished the pluralism of civic initiatives, and numerous ngos had to discontinue their work. yet, this crisis has also created incentives for rights groups to work more actively on bridging the gaps between them and the broader public and, in the longer term, to move from overseas funding to a public support base. externally-funded ngos can often become overly professionalized and elitist, and, in the process, separated from their constituencies. on the other hand, becoming more reliant on domestic funding and support can invigorate the public legitimacy of organizations. more broadly, this suggests that civil society participation is a politically reflexive process, as organizations may respond to political repression by publicfacing organizing strategies and activities. in turn, this can transform ngos from expert advocacy organizations more into social movement ngos with an active social base. it is hoped that this new environment will create more paths for rights groups to engage with ordinary russians. the ways in which hrd-society interaction develops and is manifest with the time is a subject of further research and analysis. references abrams, j. e. & auer, m. r. 2004, ‘the disappearance of popular environmental activism in postsoviet russia’, in auer, m. r. 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(ed.) equality and difference during and after state socialism, palgrave macmillan, new york. wolff, j. (2018) ‘the delegitimization of civil society organisations: thoughts on strategic responses to the ‘foreign agent’ charge’, in rodríguez-garavito, c. and gomez, k. (eds.), rising to the populist challenge: a new playbook for human rights actors, dejusticia, bogota, pp.129-137. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 19 appendix 1 – list of interviewees ngo id number ngo profile interviewee locatio n type of interview date ngo1 multi-profile and coordinating center ngo -director -lawyer moscow face-toface 3 march 2016; follow-up 14 march 2017 ngo2 moscow office of a ngo network -director -lawyer -pr specialist moscow face-toface 24 february 2016; follow-up 9 march 2017 ngo3 kaluga office of a ngo network lawyer kaluga e-mail 15 march 2017 ngo4 saratov office of a ngo network secretary saratov e-mail 21 march 2017 ngo5 perm’ office of a ngo network secretary perm’ e-mail 17 march 2017 ngo6 samara office of a ngo network -position of interviewee not identified samara e-mail 16 march 2017 ngo7 krasnoyarsk office of a ngo network -position of interviewee not identified krasnoy arsk e-mail 21 march 2017 ngo8 ngo working on soldiers’ rights (branch) -head -lawyer moscow face-toface 16 march 2016 ngo9 ngo working on soldiers’ rights (main office) -head moscow face-toface 17 march 2016 ngo10 regional branch of the ngo working on soldiers’ rights -head stpetersbu rg e-mail 11 april 2016 ngo11 ngo working on refugees’ rights -head moscow face-toface 14 april 2016 ngo12 historical and human rights-oriented ngo -director -press-secretary -librarian moscow face-toface 20 april 2016 ngo13 ngo working on deceased soldiers’ families’ rights -press-secretary moscow face-toface 29 april 2016 ngo14 regional multi-profile ngo -position of interviewee not identified bryank e-mail 18 april 2016 ngo15 major multi-profile and history-oriented ngo -executive director -secretary moscow face-toface 19 april 2016; follow-up 10 march 2017. ngo16 echr-oriented ngo head moscow face-toface 22april 2016 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 ngo17 regional human rights center and hub pr-specialist voronez h e-mail 16 march 2017 ngo18 organisation working on violations by the police public relations specialist -lawyer moscow face-toface 25 april 2017; follow-up 20 march 2017 ngo19 foundation working on freedom of press -head moscow face-toface 26 april 2016 ngo20 center working on criminal justice and prison reform director assistant of the director moscow face-toface 11 april 2016 ngo21 ngo working on violations of rights by psychiatric institutions head moscow face-toface 14 april 2016 ngo22 ngo working on monitoring detentions of those exercising rights of freedom of assembly and expression coordinator lawyer moscow face-toface 27 april 2016 follow-up 5 april 2017 ngo23 ngo working on peace-building and women’s rights head rostovon-don e-mail 6 april 2017 ngo24 regional multi-profile and electionmonitoring ngo coordinator st petersbu rg e-mail 17 february 2016 ngo25 center working on adaptation on refugees’ children -director moscow face-toface 23 march 2017 abstract keywords introduction perception of human rights ngos by the russian public data and methods results discussion conclusion references appendix 1 – list of interviewees cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 2 2018 © 2018 andre oboler and karen connelly. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: oboler, a. and connelly, k. 2018. building smarter communities of resistance and solidarity. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 10(2), 91-110. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6035 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed article building smarter communities of resistance and solidarity andre oboler1 and karen connelly2 1 la trobe university, australia 2 university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: andre oboler, la trobe law school, plenty rd & kingsbury drive, bundoora, melbourne, victoria 3086, australia. a.oboler@latrobe.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6035 article history: received 15/04/2018; revised 01/06/2018; accepted 02/06/2018; published 25/07/2018 abstract the cyber-racism and community resilience (cracr) project included an examination into features of online communities of resistance and solidarity. this work formed a key part of the project’s focus on resilience and produced a deeper understanding of a range of types of actors working in this space and how they might individually contribute effectively to creating resilience. the need for new synergies between different types of stakeholders and approaches was highlighted as an area for future work. this paper explores a design for that future work that builds and supports online communities of resistance and solidarity by drawing on and extending the lessons from the cracr research. this new work both presents a model for cooperation and explains how different stakeholders can positively engage under the model in a smarter way. that is, through a system which facilitates solidarity in moving against racism together while enabling resilience. this new approach draws on the strengths of individuals actors, but also seeks to turn points of weakness for one actor into opportunities for cooperation that strengthen the system as a whole. keywords racism, cyber-racism, resilience, online communities, solidarity society declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was supported though funding for karen connelly’s doctoral research provided by a university of technology sydney hdr stipend ($85,000) and a deakin university hdr supplement ($21,000). 91 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6035 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6035 http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:a.oboler@latrobe.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6035 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 introduction cyber racism includes both the reproduction of everyday racism by individuals on the internet and the exploitation of the internet by racist groups (jakubowicz 2012, daniels 2012, tynes, rose & markoe 2013). individuals and groups are emboldened by the openness and lack of consequences of the internet, while racist groups use it to consolidate their identity and popularise their ideology by recruiting supporters and building online communities (bliuc, faulkner & jakubowicz 2016). racist online communities engage in activities that aim to fragment targeted communities’ online presence, hindering the targets ability to develop effective communities of resistance and solidarity. academics have been raising awareness of the need for multi-faceted anti-racism responses that acknowledge the entrenched nature and varied experiences of all forms of racism in australia (berman & paradies 2010, nissim 2014, pedersen, walker, paradies & guerin 2011). anti-racist ngos have been running practical campaigns directly with the community; for example all together now focuses on encouraging people to embrace cultural diversity and to work towards the eradication of everyday racism (all together now 2017). governments have generally focused on approaches based on formal channels of communication and engagements working with targeted communities through peak community representative bodies, service provision organisations or local governments (paradies et al. 2009; office for the community sector 2013; victorian auditor-general’s office 2015). online racism, when addressed at all, has been seen as an adjunct to racism more generally (jakubowicz et al. 2017). engagement with new technology in anti-racism efforts has focused primarily on marketing (jakubowicz et al. 2017). with the growing problem of online racism, and a general lack of technological expertise by those actors traditionally relied upon to tackle racism, new actors have emerged. these new actors have created innovative approaches, reactions, responses and initiatives that are specifically focused on the problem of online racism and tackle it with digitally native responses. the online hate prevention institute (ohpi) and indigenousx are two examples. these new kinds of actors can work collaboratively within formal structures, or may be driven by grassroots activists working outside the traditional structures. new technologies enable their approaches, which are centred around online communities. these communities can be stable and long lasting, or ad hoc communities formed through existing online networks where people gather for a short and focused campaign and then disperse. past work has looked at the different approaches used, and their strengths and weaknesses, across both the traditional approaches by government agencies, local governments, community service providers, and community peak bodies, and the new approaches by natively digital civil society organisations and grassroots groups (jakubowicz et al. 2017). to be more effective, online communities of resistance and solidarity need to bring together both the flexibility and energy of the new organisations and grassroots groups and the formal authority that comes from the endorsement and support of governments and peak community representative bodies. a synergy is needed to bring together diverse stakeholders with approaches that build on their different strengths. new policy responses are cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 101 needed to facilitate this synergy in order to create more effective online communities of resistance to cyber racism and greater solidarity in the face of cyber racism. in this paper we introduce a model for cooperation that that draws on the strength of different kinds of stakeholders. we highlight how cooperation under the model we present can create a greater overall benefit, as well as directly benefiting each stakeholder. the model turns current weaknesses into points for cooperation, making them areas of strength. the model builds a smarter system, one that facilitates solidarity in moving against racism together while enabling resilience. we explain the different features of this model and then look at the way it can be practically implemented through the support of a suite of specially developed internet-based tools. the paper begins by considering the cast of actors which can play different roles in the smarter system. the strengths and weaknesses of these actors when it comes to building resilient communities are then considered. we recap on the idea of actors assisting others by being either a source or an amplifier, then introduce the smarter approach which allows integrated responses in which many actors can work together. the three elements of the smarter approach are next considered in more depth, first the concept of solidarity, then the idea of moving against racism together and finally the idea of enabling resilience. the ideas are brought together with a consideration of the integrated system and the additional benefits this brings. the concept is, however, impractical without a degree of automation. in the final section before concluding this paper we introduce fight against hate version 2 and csi-chat, the technology built to support a smarter response. the paper concludes by reflecting on the overall approach as supported by the technology. the cast of actors an online community is ‘a group of people who regularly interact with each other online, especially to share information and opinions on a common interest’ (oxford dictionaries 2017). a successful community creates a sense of belonging and fosters active engagement by its members making it a shared space rather than a publishing platform for the community manager (jakubowicz et al. 2017). communities can be focused on addressing online hate, or that may be a small part of a broader agenda. where efforts do tackle online hate, they may focus on a specific type of hate, or they may tackle online hate impacting a range of different groups in society. communities can be designed to be permanent or they can be designed to be ad hoc, bringing people together to tackle an issue of the moment. behind each community there are actors who create, promote and manage that community. these actors also frame the discussion and moderate the messages from community members. they set the boundaries that define the community. the cyber-racism and community resilience (cracr) project considered a wide range of actors engaged in building communities of solidarity and five categories of actors emerged (jakubowicz. 2017). affiliated civil society organisations, such as indigenousx or the islamic council of victoria, are civil society organisations affiliated with a particular target group. these organisations bring authenticity to the fight against racism by sharing experiences of racism and its impact on individuals in their community and on the 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 community as a whole. they can sway disengaged bystander to solidarity by creating empathy and using emotion as a strength. they often have the trust of the targeted community who see them acting in the community’s interest. peak community bodies are a special class of affiliated civil society organisation whose representative role is usually recognised both by the community and government. general civil society organisations, such as the online hate prevention institute (ohpi), all together now, and the federation of ethnic community councils of australia (fecca), are not affiliated with a particular community but rather work across many communities. fecca is a special case, being a national peak body whose affiliates are state based general civil society organisations. by contrast, both the members of fecca’s state based affiliates and feccas own associate members tend to be affiliated civil society organisations. fecca is therefore general by virtue of being an umbrella that brings together, directly and through its affiliates indirectly, affiliated organisations representing many different targeted communities. ohpi and all together now by contrast are broad based organisations that are not affiliated with specific communities and tackle racism targeting many different communities. general civil society organisations have strength as authoritative non-partisan experts able to make an objective and non-emotional assessment around issues of racism and its impact. with a wider supporter base in the general community, they are able to raise broader public awareness and engagement. they are often able to focus more narrowly on tackling racism compared to affiliated organisations who are also looking after many other needs of their community. peak bodies like fecca can play a unique role in building solidarity, allowing communities to help each other through explicit assurances of mutual solidarity which the peak body can coordinate. government agencies bring the greatest sense of formal authority but are constrained in their actions by their remit and their need to remain impartial. they have the ability to provide resources to civil society organisations and can lend their authority to those organisations by demonstrating the government’s trust in them and commitment to their work. the agencies themselves can also use their authority when providing factual information to the public, for example by listing and explaining relevant laws and individual rights. two examples of government agencies considered in the cracr project are the australian human rights commission and vichealth. academic researchers, such as the cracr team, themselves form a category of actor. academics generally do not build their own communities to combat cyber-racism, however, their work supports existing communities by giving them insight, information and a springboard for community discussion that keeps members engaged. information from academics is crucial to countering racist discourses and can help community leaders shape their strategy and act more effectively. some academics may also have other roles, for example, as board members of either affiliated or general civil society organisations and as such may belong to that category of actor when acting in that alternative capacity. grassroots groups, often forms around specific campaigns, these are the final type of actor. they differ from civil society organisations in that they are ad hoc communities created cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 103 through the actions of individuals rather than organisations. they may in time gain a sustainable structure and become either an affiliated or general civil society organisation, or they may disperse as their campaign reaches its conclusion or energy fades. an example is a grassroots group formed in 2017 around the campaign run on the gofundme platform which raised $100,000 within 24 hours. the trigger was the cancellation of a billboard advertising campaign that showed muslim girls celebrating australia day. the ads had been pulled after the operators received death threats from far-right anti-islamic groups. the grassroots group raised funds to replace the billboards in time to celebrate australia day (madigan 2017). it is important to note that all of these categories of actors can include both actors dedicated to anti-racism work and actors whose focus is in other areas, but who have a capacity to make a positive contribution to combating cyber-racism and building resilient communities. strengths and weaknesses in community building communities can proactively engage in tackling racism by promoting positive values, strengthening inter-groups relations, highlighting the harm racism causes, educating the public to better recognise racism, countering structural racism built into historical and other narratives, and promoting narratives that normalise positive intergroup relations. they can reactively tackle racism by calling out racism, working to remove racist content and disproving racist narratives. the five types of actors we have introduced have different areas of strength and weakness when it comes to these forms of engagement. table 1 and table 2 show the general effectiveness of the different actors for the different types of approaches (jakubowicz et. al 2017). table 1: reactive modes of engagement affiliated civil society organisations general civil society organisations government agencies academics grassroots group calling out racism yes. public statements. yes. public statements / educational campaigns. a little. through statements. no yes working to remove racist content yes. public statements / campaigns. yes. public statements / campaigns. yes in a limited way through the media / approaches to companies in extreme cases. no yes disproving racist narratives no yes. public campaigns. a little. through statements / speeches. yes yes 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 table 2: proactive modes of engagement affiliated civil society organisations general civil society organisations government agencies academics grassroots group promoting positive values yes yes yes no unlikely strengthening inter-groups relations yes yes yes. through event funding. no unlikely highlighting harm in racism yes. through personal narratives. yes. research & campaigns. a little. through statements. yes. research. unlikely education to recognise racism yes. introducing themselves. yes. publications. a little. online resources. a little. research but needs conversion for public impact. unlikely countering historical and other narratives yes possibly. no. yes. yes narratives normalising positive intergroup relations yes yes a little. through promoting government support. no. yes for all actors, the key challenge in creating a vibrant online community of resilience is promoting interactions and engagements by the online audience. this requires the use of the social media channel, or other technology platform, in a way that goes beyond advertising the sponsoring organisation, publishing organisational news or creating a feed of anti-racism news stories. a feature of successful online communities of resilience is their ability to create a ‘safe space’ for their audience, that is, one in which they feel protected from the abuse they may encounter elsewhere and free to participate, express their views and share their experiences. government agencies, while bringing a formal authority to anti-racism work, can face constraints in the scope of their activities and the manner in which they engage with the public through social media. this can, paradoxically, see the spaces they manage become ‘unsafe spaces’ due to a caution over government censorship if abusive voices are silenced. government agencies may also choose not to provide a community space at all and may limit public communications with them to private correspondence to avoid such problems. the policies of political parties can also have a stifling effect on the level and types of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 105 engagement by government agencies. while proposed legislative changes to weaken section 18c of the racial discrimination act were blocked by the australian senate in march 2017, watering down the protections against racial discrimination remains coalition policy (hutchens and murphy, 2017). this may increase civil servants caution in engaging with the problem and reduce the priority of combating cyber-racism when compared to similar and often related issues such as cyber-bullying or violent extremism, both of which are given far greater attention by the australian government. grassroots campaigns usually focus on a burning issue. with a native base in the technology, they are able to swiftly create large and effective communities in social media, or through online platforms such as petition sites or crowdfunding platforms. they lack the infrastructure for long term sustainability and are usually based on the unpaid efforts of a few individuals who can rapidly reach the point of burnout. grassroots group activism has a huge potential but on its own lacks the ability to fully capitalise on that potential for sustained growth or the formal authority and resources needed to move beyond online activism. without paid staff the level of activity is difficult to sustain. general civil society organisations combating online racism can apply lessons learned in tackling one kind of hate to their efforts tackling hate targeting other groups. they can attract supporters who are focused on one kind of hate when they engage with that hate, then broaden those community members’ understanding to also include other forms of online hate. not everyone will stay on that journey, but the approach allows a core of supporters to be created from across many different target groups as well as the broader community. despite having a wider base, the depth of support for general civil society organisations may, however, be significantly lower from within each target group. supporters may become aware of an issue through a general civil society organisation and promote that organisation’s work tackling cyber-racism targeting their own community, but then focus their charitable giving not on the general civil society organisation they have engaged with, but rather on an affiliated civil society organisation which is more strongly linked to their community. this can occur regardless of the relative effectiveness of the two organisations and general civil society organisations may therefore face greater sustainability difficulties. affiliated civil society organisations will generally have a broader remit than online racism and as a result may need to be selective and limit the amount of focus they give to activities combating online racism. a failure to do this may cause their audience to drift away. by only occasionally tackling online racism such organisations are able to support short high energy campaigns when the community they represent is under significant threat. these organisations may find it difficult to support campaigns targeting other communities except in exceptional circumstances. academics can play a significant role in building resilience in online communities. their strength comes from their expertise and ability to disprove racist narratives, fact check and expose the fake news that feeds racism, and educate online community members on the real harm of racism. for example, after years of academic work, the psychological and physiological impacts of racism are now well established (department of health and human 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 services 2017). without academics to share and explain this, the impact of racism is too often dismissed as nothing more than ‘hurt feelings’. academics, however, are not well placed to run online communities as the level of work involved can be very time consuming. running a community can also raise complicated questions of research ethics depending on how the community is used and managed. academics may, however, engage in these additional activities outside their academic role and while in the role of a different type of actor. from sources and amplifiers to working smarter together past work introduced actors having a supporting role in another actor’s community by serving either as a source or an amplifier (jakubowicz et. al 2017). we now further introduce these concepts, then extend upon them to create the smarter system which brings all of the actors together. actors are a source when they provide content that helps to keep an online community engaged. affiliated civil society organisations can provide details of their experiences and those of their community members. government agencies can provide information and policy statements. academics and researchers in civil society organisations can be a source of facts and expert opinions. actors serve as amplifiers when they expand the breadth of the engaged online community and help its message reach new audiences. one way this can occur is through the cross-posting of campaigns, that is, when one online community shares the campaigns of another. in this situation the organisation receiving the content and sharing it will be an amplifier while the organisation giving the information will be a source. done correctly, both organisations benefit. civil society organisations (both affiliated and general) and government agencies can use their online communities to amplify the impact of narratives that come from target groups or findings that emerge from research. while the simplest approach is to share a link, it can be more effective if the narrative or key research findings are repackaged to suit the amplifier’s audience and increase their engagement. amplifiers can take messages outside the echo chamber which can exist around a targeted community or the echo chamber of the ivory towers of academia. they can help the message reach the wider community or different segments of the community. affiliated civil society organisations may be called upon to be amplifiers by other communities, for example, in response to calls to action made by general civil society organisations or government agencies. when a particular community comes under attack, affiliated civil society organisations from other communities can become amplifiers helping to raise awareness. general civil society organisations, particularly peak bodies, can be effective catalysts for such amplification helping to create a broad network of support, empathy and cooperation. bringing together the idea of sources and amplifiers and the strengths and weaknesses of different types of actors we can produce a model of a system for improved cooperation that cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 107 better facilitates effective communities of resilience and solidarity against cyber-racism. this model is based on the idea of acting in a smarter way, that is, through solidarity in moving against racism together while enabling resilience. this approach builds on the strengths of individuals actors, while using cooperation to turn individual actor’s points of weakness into opportunities for cooperation that strengthen the system as a whole. it builds on the idea, previously demonstrated in the academic research context, that actors are most likely to engage in new processes and use new tools where they see a clear and relatively immediate benefit for themselves and on the idea that models enabling systematic reflection can facilitate this (oboler et al. 2006). the elements of the smarter approach are now introduced, followed by a reflection on the model as a whole. solidarity there is a temptation for racism and other forms of hate to be seen only as a problem for the impacted community, but the message of anti-racism is one belonging to society as a whole. nilde jotti, president of the italian chamber of deputies, for example, said in 1990 that ‘antisemitism is not a problem of the jews but a problem of all our citizens, of all their political representatives and institutions’ (gruber 1990). victorian anti-racism law also reflects this: vilifying conduct is contrary to democratic values because of its effect on people of diverse ethnic, indigenous and religious backgrounds. it diminishes their dignity, sense of self-worth and belonging to the community. it also reduces their ability to contribute to, or fully participate in, all social, political, economic and cultural aspects of society as equals, thus reducing the benefit that diversity brings to the community. (racial and religious tolerance act 2001) the various manifestations of racism against different groups are not isolated, but rather different reflections of a general problem impacting on the ‘public good of an inclusive society’, which makes it a social problem for society as a whole (oboler 2014). support for communities being targeted by online hate begins with other stakeholders recognising the manifestations of this hate. support can be broadened by highlighting why particular messages are racist and helping others to consider their impact. when describing the experience and impact of racism on the targeted group, the voice of the targeted group is needed to provide authenticity. the lack of understanding about racism targeting indigenous australians was demonstrated in the 2017 mangogate affair which occurred after the 2017 new south wales higher school certificate english examination. frustrated with their exam, and in particular with a question asking them to interpret a poem called ‘mango’ by indigenous poet ellen van neerven, final year high school students used a facebook group with around 70,000 members to post comments and memes which quickly became both racist and abusive (faruqi 2017). similar messages were then sent to the author. those who spoke against the abuse quickly became victims themselves (cockburn 2017). some students excused the actions of their peers by blaming the media for accessing the public facebook group they treated as a private 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 space (faruqi 2017). others claimed abusing people for the ‘lulz’, a concept originally coming from 4chan over a decade earlier when it was used to drive people to suicide (brown 2016), was something unique to their generation and was simply being misunderstood (faruqi 2017). while the more serious cases of abuse came from a small number of students, the culture was described by some students as toxic (faruqi 2017). the normalisation of abuse, such as when over 300 students liked a single post targeting van neerven (faruqi 2017), encouraged further abuse. the simplest way to lend support, available to all stakeholder types, is to support existing campaigns run by the affected community, for example, campaigns run by affiliated civil society group linked to the impacted community. this support could take the form of formally signing on as a campaign partner, sharing a campaign on social media without formally partnering, or issuing statements or press releases drawing attention to a campaign and encouraging others, including one’s own supporters, to support it. in the case of mangogate, the first nations australia writers network (fnawn), a peak body of indigenous australian writers of which ellen van neerven was a member, found itself acting as the affiliated civil society organisation tackling this issue of online racism, but largely without external support. the issue was instead largely addressed through educational authorities and the media. campaigns can also be initiated by general civil society organisations. these organisations may have staff or volunteers from the impacted community supporting the work, or they may receive the support of relevant affiliated civil society organisation. when the lead is taken by a general civil society organisation, the relationships described above are reversed; the impact of online hate on the targeted community may come not from the organisers of the campaign, but from individuals or organisations connected to the targeted community who find the campaign and choose to engage with in. to protect authenticity, the general civil society organisation should give these people or groups a voice, particularly when they are describing the racism’s impact. stakeholders such as government agencies, academics and grassroots groups can act in solidarity, supporting general civil society organisation’s campaigns as they would with a campaign run by an affiliated civil society organisations. an example of this is the online hate prevention institutes’ 2013 report ‘islamophobia on the internet: the growth of online hate targeting muslims’ which was produced in consultation with the islamic council of victoria. while the work is that of the online hate prevention institute, the methodology, examples of raw data and early drafts of the report were discussed with the affiliated civil society organisation as the work progressed. the final report carried a foreword from the affiliated civil society organisation’s secretary describing the impact of the hate on their community (oboler 2013). this enables solidarity in a form that empowers and supports the affected community rather than disempowering them. in the case of a general civil society organisations, building solidarity also means working with groups impacted by one type of online hate on campaigns related to other types of online hate where they are not the specific target. this can include general campaigns cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 109 against online racism. the invitation to be part of the wider community’s general efforts against online hate, or the wider community’s support of another community, reaffirms the acceptance of that community as valued part of the general community and not just a victim group. government agencies and academics should similarly include groups who are targeted by cyber-racism in consultations and campaigns where they are not in the role of victims, but rather as members of the broader community opposing racism. affiliated civil society organisations should take advantage of such opportunities. moving against racism together a better understanding of the ways the actors can reinforce each other and empower individuals can make it easier to work together more effectively. moving against racism together, however, take this further by building an integrated approach where each type of actor can play to its strengths as part of a coherent strategy to tackle racism and build resilience across society. as with the individual organisational approaches, the integrated approaches can also be divided into pro-active and reactive approaches. to move beyond solidarity and into an integrated approach to proactive engagement means moving from supporting others to working with them on multifaceted joint campaigns. such campaigns might include: (1) experiences presented by affiliated civil society organisations, (2) research into the impact of the particular cyber-racism provided by academics, (3) online engagement by the broader community through campaigns run by general civil society organisation, (4) awareness raising and empathy created through campaigns by affiliated civil society organisations from the targeted community, (5) ‘sponsorship’ by government agencies including funding, letters of support and promotion through the agencies’ social media channels. to ensure equity, support should be given to both affiliated and general civil society organisations to support their efforts tackling cyber-racism. moving forward together in this way means bringing the different actors together, knowing what each can contribute and what hurdles need to be addressed to facilitate this. it also means planning how the different activities will connect and agreeing a timetable for action to enable integration. an integrated campaign is more than the sum of its parts, the different elements can draw in a larger and broader audience, as well as creating a deeper level of engagement. reactively, the response begins when an individual sees a manifestation of online racism. the individual will often look to affiliated civil society organisations dedicated to anti-racism work as well as peak-bodies, reporting the content to them and expecting them to respond to it. the organisations, while close to those who experience the racism, often lack expertise in combating cyber-racism. in an integrated system, the affiliated civil society organisation can call upon the expertise of other actors with specific expertise in this area, for example, by passing the information on to them while remaining the communication point with the concerned members of their own community. there are different types of actors the 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 content could be passed to including general civil society organisations, government agencies, academic researchers, higher level peak community bodies (whether affiliated civil society organisations or general civil society organisations) or more specialised affiliated civil society organisations. the key factor is that the organisation receiving the information has the skills and expertise to do something positive with the information. the information may in fact be passed to multiple different actors, each of whom can use it in different ways. when the channels for handling and sharing such information is used routinely, and responses from the different actors are coordinated, the reactive approach becomes an integrated system for moving against racism together. it is the collaboration between organisations with a connection to the impacted community (with the data) and those with expertise in responding to cyber-racism (who need the data) which makes moving against racism together more powerful than solidarity alone. enabling community resilience in the context of cyber racism, community resilience refers to the way communities positively adapt to the negative impacts of cyber racism (jakubowicz et al. 2017). some strategies that have been used by communities targeted by racism include acknowledging and challenging racism, seeking support and strengthening community identity (bodkin-andrews 2013, scobie & rodgers 2015). jakubowicz (2015) also emphasises the importance of communication between community members in order to facilitate community resilience strategies. support from the wider society enhances the community resilience of targeted communities. the cracr project’s ‘plan for resilience’ sets out nine elements that could be activated to ‘move towards a non-racist civility’ in australia (jakubowicz et al. 2017). these elements relate to the cyber racism attitudes and experiences of targets, bystanders or perpetrators. each element proposes strategies that could be used to counter cyber racism. it links individual, group, community and society based strategies. communities impacted by racism should also be included as equal partners in both the general struggle against racism, and part of the broader community when supporting other targets of racism. this sends both the impacted community and the wider society a message that this community, and the people within it, are not just victims but equal and civically active members of society. this message of acceptance and inclusion in the wider struggle, not just the community’s own struggle, builds resilience by practically demonstrating a rejection of the core message of hate which waldon (2012) describes as saying people in the targeted community are not welcome and do not belong. instead, anti-racism is affirmed as a value of the wider society and the targeted community and its members are affirmed as sharing this value. when an individual is impacted by cyber-racism, referring the incident on to an affiliated civil society organisation they trust gives the impacted individual a sense of empowerment which increases their resilience. unfortunately, when not equipped to respond cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 111 to such content, the pressure this creates on the receiving organisation can lower the resilience of the organisation and its staff. in an integrated system, the information can be passed on to a range of actors who may be able to use it in positive ways. a general civil society organisation dedicated to combating online hate may for example use it to engage in advocacy, research or public education. a higher level peak community body may use the information in reports that form part of their advocacy. academics may use the information for research. government agencies may use the information in formulating policy or directing resources. by passing the information on so that some positive use is made of it, the affiliated civil society organisation that received the information is empowered and becomes more resilient. by reporting back to the impacted individual, that individual is empowered and gains increased resilience while decreasing the harm of further encounters with cyber-racism. the integrated system in the integrated system, an individual’s reports of cyber-racism can be shared with a trusted grassroots group who may then pass it on to an affiliated civil society organisation, or alternatively the individual may share it directly with an affiliated civil society organisation themselves. resilience at the personal level is enhanced when the individual has others they can trust and a support system so they can avoid dealing with an incident alone (hunter and chandler 1999). the sharing of an incident with a trusted group, whether a grassroots group or an affiliated civil society organisation, provides the network of trust and a support system that can help the individual increase their resilience. when grassroots groups approach an affiliated civil society organisation, it demonstrates broader interest and becomes a collective call for action. by acknowledging the concern and engaging, the affiliated civil society organisation becomes part of the support system for the individual and the grassroots group as they take the matter forward. in the alternative path where a victim themselves approaches an affiliated civil society organisation, there is an alternative response where the organisation provides acknowledgement, but also trust and support directly to the individual. figure 1: the individual in the smarter approach 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 to fulfil their part, affiliated civil society organisations can either use the information received themselves, or they can pass it on to others who are able to make use of it. these others might be other affiliated civil society organisations, general civil society organisations, government agencies or academic researchers. when other actors accept the information, there is an expectation that it will be used to tackle cyber-racism in some way, even if the response does not affect this specific incident. this creates a flow of support back to the affiliated civil society organisation which strengthens that organisation’s resilience by shifting them from a victim to an empowered enabler of positive action. that positive action may include research by others, based on the data they provided, and the results of that research may flow back to the affiliated civil society organisation to help them further strengthen the resilience of their community by guiding them to new policies, projects or campaigns. figure 2: actors and interactions in the smarter approach one problem with this integrated system is that the volume of cyber-racism data is large and neither affiliated civil society organisations nor the other actors have the capacity to process a constant flow of individual reports. this problem, however, can be solved with custom technology that maintains the relationships in the system, but automates the collection of data using crowd sourcing and the sharing of data among stakeholders. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 113 technology to support a smarter response to overcome the vast amount of work involved in crowd sourcing reports of online hate from the public, a reporting system known as fight against hate was developed by the online hate prevention institute (oboler and connelly 2014). this software was described in two unesco reports as one of the new innovative ways to tackle cyber-racism (gargliardone et al. 2015; bar et al. 2015). the software has since been adapted to support the smarter approach. the new software, fight against hate version 2, still allows the public to report cyber-racist content found on social media platforms and to categorise what they report based on what kind of hate it is. users can still see the history of their reports. the new version, however, differs in three significant ways. the changes support the smarter approach through the development of the new concept of a reporting gateway. participating organisations can now embed a reporting gateway, which is a simplified version of the fight against hate reporting tool, directly within their own website. this works in a similar way to the embedding of a youtube video on their site. the software and data still live on the online hate prevention institute’s servers, but community members can report to it directly from the affiliated civil society organisation’s website. the organisation can also see all the content reported via their site, along with the total number of items reported via their site and a graphical breakdown of the types of hate reported. this empowers the affiliated civil society organisation giving them access to see what has been reported without the need to individually handle each report. each gateway is unique. it knows which organisation it belongs to and can be configured according to their needs. this allows the organisation to select the types of hate their community members may wish to report. it also allows different gateways to be configured to appear in different languages. some organisation may wish to have multiple gateways configured for different types of hate or to enable reporting in different languages. fight against hate version 2 also integrates with the csi-chat (crowd sourced intelligence cyber hate and threats) analysis tool. organisations with access to the tool can now see either any item reported into a public pool of content via any gateway, or their view may be restricted to data from certain gateways they have been granted access to. affiliated civil society organisations can choose for all their reports to enter the public pool of data, or they can choose to keep the data to themselves and only grant access by arrangement. this allows a peak community body, for example, to have access to the reported items of all of their affiliates even if the data is not part of the public pool. where the data is public, organisations using csi-chat can still filter the data to only show a subset based on gateways they are associated with. csi-chat can provide not only affiliated civil society organisations but also government agencies, academics and general civil society organisations access to the data on reported content. by automating the process, an individual’s report, made to an affiliated civil society organisation, can immediately be available to a range of stakeholders who can make use of it. the affiliated civil society organisation continues to play a vital role, but the collaboration is setup in advance, mediated through the software and does not require action 114 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 each time an incident occurs. the automated collaboration can provide a basis for further work, based on analysis of the reported data, in which different actors can move against racism together. the more effectively reports from the public are handled, and the more impact reporting is seen to have, the greater the boost to resilience across society as a whole. being empowered and part of an impactful response can turn the experience of encountering racism from a blow to resilience into a boot to resilience. the new fight against hate version 2 software facilitates real time access to data by a range of stakeholders and empowers affiliated civil society organisations by giving them a new capability for their community which require minimal setup and no significant ongoing work by staff, though reviewing and being aware of what has been reported is certainly recommended. figure 3: technology’s role in the smarter approach not shown in figure 3 is a secondary connection in which individuals who experiences online hate may contact an affiliated civil society organisation directly and receive counselling or other support. in some cases a victim may share content directly with the affiliated civil society organisation outside the system, for example over e-mail. the affiliated civil society organisation may report this content to the system on a person’s behalf, or may assist the person by walking them through the process. as a user reports multiple incidents, the function of reporting, which is focused on gathering data, can be separated from the function of supporting the individual. this allows the provided support to be driven by the individual’s needs, rather than by the occurrence of incidents which may at times seem like an unending barrage of abuse. as the fight against hate version 2 reporting cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 115 tool allows the individual to view a record of what they have previously reported, including screen captures and comments they may have added, the need to immediately see someone and discuss the incident while the content remains online is removed. this reduces the sense of crisis, enhancing the individual’s resilience. it can also reduce the demand for urgent attention from affiliated civil society organisations on each additional incident, relieving pressure on their staff and increasing the organisations resilience. conclusion the growing significance of the online world in everyday life has significantly impacted on societal norms including expectations of civility. promoters of hate propaganda have been emboldened, bystanders have been hardened reducing their willingness to intervene, target groups have been fragmented and many key stakeholders have been disempowered as technology creates a barrier to their engagement (jakubowicz et al. 2017). in the online world racism has become normalised. while a third of online users encounter it, only a small minority of people report it and their efforts are often met with indifference (jakubowicz et al. 2017). the embedding of hate into the fabric of the online environment creates a background noise of hate (oboler 2014). this background noise has ‘a debilitating effect on civility, empathy and social cohesion’ (jakubowicz et al. 2017). to build online communities of resistance to racism and solidarity with those who are targeted, we need new approaches. an integrated multi-stakeholder approach to tackle cyber-racism can re-empower key stakeholders while supporting collaboration and fostering cooperation. strengthening communities in the spaces where they are attacked, that is in the online world, and addressing the background noise of racism that creates that environment is essential to enabling targeted communities to reclaim these spaces and be a full part of today’s technologically empowered society. we need resilient online communities able to operate in this often hostile environment so they can work towards change and a more civil online world. the smarter approach, built around the idea of solidarity in moving against racism together while enabling resilience, sees five different types of actors working together: affiliated civil society organisations, general civil society organisations, government agencies, academics, and grassroots groups. under this approach each type of actor uses their strengths to tackle cyber-racism while turning weakness into opportunities for cooperation which strengthen the integrated system as a whole. the resilience of individuals and online communities is increased when trusted affiliated civil society organisations are able to take their reports of cyber-racism incidents and commit to positive use being made of the information. the resilience of the affiliated civil society organisations themselves is increased when they can share these reports of cyber-racism with other actors who are able to make positive use of the information to tackle the problem of cyber-racism. a shared pool of data helps not only collaboration between organisations but also planning for integrated shared campaigns. to overcome the barriers created when racism moves online, new technology is needed. without new tools, the alternative of experts manually compiling information is too time intensive and the volume of cyber-racism makes the task impractical. version 2 of the 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 fight against hate reporting tool maintains the relationships and roles of the different stakeholders while greatly simplifying the processes and reducing the overheads involved in capturing and sharing cyber-racism information. the system allows the collection of incident reports from the public through both affiliated civil society organisations and general civil society organisations. it allows incoming data to be seen by the collecting organisation, but also allows access to see this information to be shared with other stakeholders. the csi chat system provides a suite of capabilities to work with the data from multiple sources and analyse it. this facilitates research making it easier for the data to be used in work that counters cyber-racism. with shared tools and an ability to share data, different actors can more easily come together to plan shared and integrated campaigns. the smarter approach, supported by new technology, can empower a range of actors of different types, who together are key stakeholders able to tackle the problem of racism and cyber-racism in society. in doing so in a manner that engages and supports the community, these actors can create and support stronger and more effective communities of resilience that are able to work together to create a safer and more civil society. acknowledgement the authors would like to acknowledge the support and assistance of emeritus professor andrew jakubowicz. professor jakubowicz has been an exceptional leader on the cracr project, guiding its development and research and encouraging engagement with community organisations. this engagement has resulted in collaborative partnerships such as the one with ohpi, which has contributed to the development of the smarter approach. in particular professor jakubowicz's extensive knowledge and feedback has been invaluable to the production of this article. we would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments which have enhanced the contents of this article. references all together now 2017, everyday racism, accessed 23 february 2018, http://alltogethernow.org.au/everyday-racism/ . pedersen, a., walker, i., paradies, y., & guerin, b. 2011, ‘how to cook rice: a review of ingredients for teaching anti-prejudice’, australian psychologist, vol. 46, no. 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https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/20150130-public-participation-bpg.pdf https://www2.health.vic.gov.au/public-health/population-health-systems/health-status-of-victorians/survey-data-and-reports/racism-in-victoria https://www2.health.vic.gov.au/public-health/population-health-systems/health-status-of-victorians/survey-data-and-reports/racism-in-victoria http://www.dhs.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/word_doc/0005/832172/community-collaboration-the-changing-context-of-local-government-and-community-sector-partnerships-1-july-2013.doc http://www.dhs.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/word_doc/0005/832172/community-collaboration-the-changing-context-of-local-government-and-community-sector-partnerships-1-july-2013.doc http://www.dhs.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/word_doc/0005/832172/community-collaboration-the-changing-context-of-local-government-and-community-sector-partnerships-1-july-2013.doc http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/domino/web_notes/ldms/pubstatbook.nsf/edfb620cf7503d1aca256da4001b08af/cbe6eadba4439759ca256e5b00213f28/$file/01-047a.pdf http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/domino/web_notes/ldms/pubstatbook.nsf/edfb620cf7503d1aca256da4001b08af/cbe6eadba4439759ca256e5b00213f28/$file/01-047a.pdf http://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/domino/web_notes/ldms/pubstatbook.nsf/edfb620cf7503d1aca256da4001b08af/cbe6eadba4439759ca256e5b00213f28/$file/01-047a.pdf https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674065086 6035-article text-27735-2-10-20180726.pdf 6035-article text-27735-2-10-20180726.pdf abstract keywords introduction the cast of actors strengths and weaknesses in community building from sources and amplifiers to working smarter together conclusion acknowledgement references the production of the indian student: regimes and imaginaries of migration, education, citizenship and class shanthi robertson western sydney university abstract the so-called indian student ‘crisis’ of 2009 and 2010 is often analysed in the context of how the violence against students challenged australian multiculturalism and revealed both underlying racism and denial of racism in australian society (see, for example, mason 2012, dunn, pelleri & maeder-han 2011, singh 2011). some analyses further interrogate the incidents in relation to australia’s relationship to india as one of its asiapacific neighbours and key trading partners (mason 2012). yet there was a far wider context of global transformations to regimes of immigration, education, labour and citizenship that shaped the experience of indian students in australia leading up to and after the ‘crisis’ itself. the local context and local responses to the crisis are analysed thoroughly elsewhere. what i seek to do in this paper is to situate the very presence (and the subsequent vulnerabilities) of indian students in australia within several intersecting political, economic and cultural forces operating at national, regional and global scales. the focus of this paper is thus not on the violent incidents or their immediate consequences, but rather on the specific ways that transforming immigration and citizenship regimes, global labour markets, and global imaginaries of mobility and class facilitated indian students’ mobility into australia and shaped elements of their lives while they were here. in particular, i focus on how national mobility regimes, influenced by global processes, crafted and re-crafted the subjectivities of indian students as by turns desirable and problematic. introduction the so-called indian student ‘crisis’ of 2009 and 2010 is often analysed in the context of how the violence against students challenged australian multiculturalism and revealed both underlying racism and denial of racism in australian society (see, for example, mason 2012, dunn, pelleri & maeder-han 2011, singh 2011). some analyses further interrogate the incidents in relation to australia’s relationship to india as one of its asia-pacific neighbours and key trading partners (mason 2012). yet there was a far wider context of global transformations to regimes of immigration, education, labour and citizenship that shaped the experience of indian students in australia leading up to and after the ‘crisis’ itself. the local cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 1 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 shanthi robertson. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(3): 4508, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i3.4508 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i3.4508 context and local responses to the crisis are analysed elsewhere. what i seek to do in this paper is to situate the very presence (and the subsequent vulnerabilities) of indian students in australia within several intersecting political, economic and cultural forces operating at national, regional and global scales. the focus of this paper is thus not on the violent incidents or their immediate consequences, but rather on the specific ways that transforming immigration and citizenship regimes, global labour markets, and global imaginaries of mobility and class facilitated indian students’ mobility into australia and shaped elements of their lives while they were here. in particular, i focus on how national mobility regimes, influenced by global processes, crafted and re-crafted the subjectivities of indian students as by turns desirable and problematic. while i focus in this paper on the contemporary context, such processes of the subjectivity-making of the global, mobile indian are neoliberal transmutations of ongoing historical processes. pre-federation and during the white australia policy, for example, south asian migrants in australian imaginaries occupied marginal positions as hawkers, peddler and cameleers, while from the post-white australia 1970s they were largely seen as among the most highly skilled and highly educated of emerging ethnic communities (foster and foster 1999). the rapid influx of indian students in the mid-2000s added a new layer to these historical imaginings of the mobile indian. the rapid increase in indian students studying in australia between 2004 and 2009 saw numbers jumping from less than 20,749 enrolments (6.5% of the international student population) in 2004 to 109,356 enrolments (19% of the international student population) in 2009 (australian education international 2009, as cited in sploc & lee 2009), leading indians to become the second largest national group of international students after the chinese. and, just as imperial regimes of the past became dependent on the indentured labour that formed the foundation for the modern indian diaspora, australia’s international education regime was increasingly reliant of the capital of indian students. the series of violent attacks against indian students in 2009 and 2010 and the subsequent protests in both australia and india received large amounts of media attention in both countries. these events occurred alongside increasing criticism of the quality of international education provision in australia. several private colleges that enrolled indians almost exclusively came under official investigation for breaches in training standards and allegations of immigration fraud. both the violence and the regulatory ‘crisis’ in the education industry positioned indian students as a highly visible segment of the student population, and a segment largely seen as distinct (in terms of their behaviours but also their vulnerabilities) from both international 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 students of other nationalities, and from previous waves of indian ‘settler’ migrants and second generation indian-australians. indian students thus became a particular kind of ‘problem population’ in multicultural australia, in turns portrayed in the media as ‘victims’ of racist violence and ‘profiteers’ of a corrupt migration industry (baas 2014). the intense media coverage of indian students and the visibility of their own protests and lobbying threatened australia’s branding as a ‘safe and multicultural’ destination for international students (international education association of australia 2012a, 2012b, knight 2011). locally as well as transnationally, there was much discussion around whether the violence was wrought by embedded racism or mere criminal opportunism (abc news 2009, jamieson 2010). why, however, were so many indian students in australia at this time and why were their experiences of being here different from, or at least constructed as different from, other transnationally mobile groups? why did international students in general, and indian students in particular, go from being welcome sojourners and consumers in australia to highly problematic subjects? in this paper, i seek to argue somewhat beyond the debates about the violence and racism at the national level. instead, i seek to show that the indian student ‘crisis’ was driven in a significant way by the shifting attempts of the australian immigration regime to manage mobility and shape particular kinds of migrant subjects within a particular set of global transformations in the mobilities surrounding education, labour and citizenship. as mountz (2010) asserts, immigration policies constitute strategic processes that seek to ‘script’ the identities of transnational subjects, and, further, the scripting of identities is subject to rapid transformation in the face of unintended policy consequences. as such, state authorities ‘actively reproduce narratives and practices of who is welcome within their borders’ (montsion 2012, p. 470). in looking at the so-called ‘crisis’ through this lens, this paper reveals how political attempts to manage mobility and construct the identities of mobile subjects were, in the case of indian students, shaped by a number of intersecting global cultural, political and economic processes ‘touching down’ within the policy and cultural landscape of australia. here, i focus on three key aspects of these processes: global labour mobilities, commercialised higher education and the subsequent development of the education-migration nexus; the marketisation of citizenship; and transnational cultural imaginaries of mobility and class. the following sections will address each of these in turn, analysing the situation of indian students in australia in relation to these broader processes. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 3 labour mobilities, commercialised universities and the education-migration nexus the presence of large numbers of indian international students in australia throughout the 2000s is clearly linked to the global phenomenon that has been termed ‘the educationmigration nexus’ (robertson 2013). the education-migration nexus involves the interlinking of international education and migration policy, and in most contexts involves the granting of particular privileges towards ongoing work and residency rights to the international graduates of local higher education institutions. although australia was one of the first countries to implement these policies (initially granting extra immigration ‘points’ for international students in 1998), western student destination countries around the world have implemented similar policies at various times, which either explicitly or implicitly favour international graduates as temporary or permanent migrants, and grant significant work rights to student visa holders. countries with aging populations, key skills gaps and higher education sectors with large numbers of international students were most likely to adopt some form of education-migration nexus policy throughout the early 2000s, although the nature and extent of policies have varied greatly over time and across different national and regional contexts (robertson 2013). globally, the education-migration nexus must be read in the context of two interconnected trends. the first is the global commercialisation of higher education and the subsequent need for many higher education providers in the west to attract high numbers of fee-paying international students, and the second is the increased mobility of labour in the context of the global race for skills among developed countries with skills shortages and ageing demographics. in australia, higher education began to become an export market in the late 1980s and early 1990s, largely as a consequence of the decline in public funding for the tertiary sector (marginson 2006). australia in particular was a global leader in the ‘internationalisation’ of its university sector through the enrolment of large numbers of fullfee paying international students. its location as an english-speaking country in close proximity to asian source countries positioned it within the ‘big five’ (kell & vogl 2012) of destination countries globally. by 2009, education was famously australia’s third largest export commodity, after iron ore and coal (aei 2010) and international students made up over 20% of the university student population (aei 2011). as a result of this, the viability of higher education institutions became closely linked in the 2000s to their ability to continue to attract a strong share of the lucrative global market for international students. 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 australian immigration policy during this time was heavily influenced by the perceived need for a ‘targeted’ immigration program that provided the skilled tradespeople and knowledge sector workers needed to power the national economy. the need for a large immigration program to supply labour and sustain population has by and large had bipartisan support in australia since the 1970s, and since the 1990s the focus has been on ‘skilled’ entrants (castles & vasta 2004). at the end of the 1990s, providing international graduates with preferential access to permanent migration seemed like an ideal solution to put australia ahead in the two global races for both the labour capital of skilled workers and the export capital of international student fees. post-study migration options would attract more students to study in australia, and as graduates they could then easily be funnelled into the labour market without issues of qualification recognition and social adjustment. the educationmigration nexus was thus heavily based on discourses of students as ‘semi-finished human capital’ (khadria 2001) who had the potential to be elite ‘designer migrants’ (ziguras & law 2006). as well as post-study migration, also crucial to education-migration nexus policies and the subsequent indian student ‘crisis’ was the granting of expanded work rights to those on student visas. this had the consequence of attracting more students who wanted the option of work experience while studying or needed the opportunity to gain income to balance out living and study expenses. allowing students to work, as well as creating the possibility of earning capacity after graduation through transitioning from student to migrant, made australian international education more attractive to many prospective students. these policies allowed australia to retain and expand market share despite the relatively high australian dollar for much of the late 1990s and 2000s and the high cost of living in australia’s major cities. the development of the education-migration nexus in australia also has to be seen in relation to australia’s position in a global market for both students and migrants. the relatively generous work and migration options australia provided to international students were strongly linked to the ongoing competition for students and skilled labour with other englishspeaking destination countries like canada, new zealand, the us and the uk, as well as to the rise in the midto late 2000s of asian countries in the international education market. this regional competition threated australia’s geographic advantage in comparison to european and north american destinations. overall increases in the quality and prestige of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 5 universities in east asia and pushes by asian national governments to internationalise their higher education sectors (kell & vogl 2012), such as singapore’s strategy to become the ‘global schoolhouse’, meant that whether educational quality alone could keep australia as the premier regional destination came into doubt. what australia could offer, however, which emerging regional destinations like singapore and malaysia generally could not, was the opportunity for a qualification to convert into a migration outcome. however, many competitor nations in the west, such as new zealand, canada and the uk, also began to offer post-study migration options in the early 2000s, putting further competitive pressure on australia to broaden its student market. in 2004, the vocational education and training (vet) sector was opened up to rapid internationalisation with vet qualifications, like university degrees, becoming linked to migration outcomes. offering internationalised vocational as well as university-level programs was not well established in other global hubs for education export. between 2006 and 2010, vet sector international enrolments in australia grew by 400%, with indian students representing just under half of all international enrolments in vet during the peak of 2008-09 (diac 2010). this shift in the education-migration nexus to open up a new segment of the international education market also had the consequence of shifting the identities (both real and perceived) of students coming from india as less well-resourced and more lower middle class than previous waves of students, and from regional areas rather than major urban centres (robertson 2013). while the introduction of vet sector migration pathways was politically positioned in terms of the skills shortages in trade occupations nationally, these developments have to be understood in terms of australia’s shifting relative position as an educational destination in the global marketplace. australia was not competitive for the so-called ‘best and brightest’ students from an increasingly globally significant source of skills like india, with the most elite (in terms of both class and academic achievement) indians still largely attracted to the us and the uk as the premier english speaking destinations (lane 2012). australia was also facing emerging competition regionally from asian destinations, which were often cheaper and closer to home for many students. it was these global economic conditions that led to australia opening up the education-migration nexus as a means to secure its ongoing share of the international student market. 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 the education-migration nexus in australia by 2005 now consisted of various facets of policy: the opening up of work rights for student visas holders; the overall promise of pr after graduation; and the targeting of a less elite student demographic through the vet sector. this combination of policy mechanisms, designed to attract more students to australia had, however, an unintended impact on local labour economies. student visa holders in australia became a new underclass of worker in the low skilled and service labour economies (nyland et al. 2009). some of these labour hierarchies also became highly ethnically stratified. indian students, for example, although they worked across a wide variety of roles while studying, became associated mainly with convenience store clerking, taxi driving and car washing, as well as working in ‘ethnic’ small businesses such as indian restaurants and grocery stores (baas 2010, singh 2011). the nexus thus became not just about filtering locally qualified graduates into the skilled migration program, but also about providing a ‘hidden’ stream of low-skilled labour through the student visa system (dauvergne & marsden 2014). this labour stream was particularly visible and particularly racialised in the case of indian students, whose labour became quite crucial to specific industries. the taxi industry in melbourne, for example, became so dependent on mostly indian current and former international students as drivers that a drop in indian student enrolments after the recalibrating of nexus policies in 2011 had a serious impact on labour supply (lucas 2011). the limitations on student visas around hours worked and the difficulty many students had in finding mainstream employment led to both ‘semi-compliance’ (ruhs & anderson 2010) in the labour market and increased vulnerability of students to exploitation by employers (nyland et al. 2009). these labour market positions did not magically dissipate to make way for skilled roles once students graduated – in fact, there is significant evidence that it was often difficult for former students to gain skilled work (gribble & blackmore 2012) and many had to take on any job available in order to repay study debts and finance ongoing living costs (robertson 2013, robertson & runganakailoo 2013). these labour market processes led to the stereotypical trope, increasingly common as a cultural referent in melbourne and sydney across the 2000s, of the indian taxi driver with a prestigious local mba. the introduction of the vet sector into the nexus in 2004, which placed skilled trades like hairdressing, aged care and cookery as pathways to pr, also complicated the transnational labour identities and ‘desirability’ of students, particular for indian students who represented cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 7 much of the growth in vet sector enrolments. although positioned as ‘skilled’ roles by the mobility regime because of labour shortages in these areas, these trade pathways did not have the cultural status, either in india or australia, of more ‘white collar’ skilled occupations, particularly when compared to previously popular migration pathways for indians through fields such as it, medicine and accounting. the fact that vet programs were cheaper and shorter than university degrees, yet still provided access to pr, also attracted many students who were previously on more professional career trajectories to change to trade training, regardless of whether they were interested in actually practising the trade (robertson 2013, robertson & runganakailoo 2013). the position of students within australian labour markets thus speaks to emerging complexity around global labour mobilities. classical theories of immigration and labour markets, and a great deal of existing empirical research, tend towards a simplistic duality of unskilled (and often undocumented) migrants working in the lowly paid ‘second’ sector and skilled knowledge workers with flexible and frictionless mobility occupying professional positions (samers 2009). indian students in australia, in contrast, exemplify the fuzziness and the complexity around skills and qualifications as social values rather than inherent truths (dauvergne & marsden 2014), and as characteristics whose value can vary under dynamic regimes of mobility. indian students also exemplify the blurriness of the boundaries around established categories of mobile labour globally, with permanent/temporary or skilled/unskilled no longer binary categories of migrant type, but rather constructed and dynamic identities that shift according to policy transmutations and migrants’ own agencies. within labour hierarchies in the host country such identities intersect in different ways with language, class, race and ethnicity in terms of how workers’ value and power are subsequently constructed, both within specific workplaces and within broader labour geographies (datta & brickell 2009, cook, dwyer & waite 2011). through particular modes of the management of mobility, particular structural obstacles in the local labour market, and also through migrants’ own agencies, skills and knowledge might not necessarily be mobilised in expected ways and the status of a visa category (e.g. student, skilled migrant) does not necessarily reflect the type of work that mobile subjects undertake or the type of labour subjectivities that become ascribed to them in the local cultural imagination. indian students, for example, played a complex ‘double role’ as workers in australia as students they were the cheap ‘fuel’ for the secondary economy yet they were expected to become the 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 future ‘in demand highly skilled workers’. their inability to transition seamlessly into the skilled workforce upon graduation led to significant critiques of both policy and of students’ intentions within both media and academia (see for example garnaut 2006; birrell, healy & kinnaird 2007). it was through these complex and dynamic processes of labour subjectivity-making that student-migrants moved from being seen as ‘designer migrants’ (ziguras & law 2006) to ‘backdoor migrants’ (colebatch 2010, murphy 2010). from around 2005, international students seeking pr were no longer seen as desirable migrants but problematic and opportunistic intruders who did not represent the ‘right’ kind of skilled labour (robertson 2013). indian students in particular, with their racialised visibility as unskilled labour in the community and in the media, came to particularly exemplify this discourse of ‘problematic’ mobility. as the education-migration nexus came under fire in the late 2000s, subsequent policy moves sought to further manage the transition from student to worker, generally implementing further steps in the student-to-migrant journey that would act to mould more ‘desirable’ worker identities. in 2007, 18 month temporary work visas for graduates were introduced, replacing many of the direct pathways from student visas to pr, and in 2008 the ‘professional year’ program was introduced for accounting, it and engineering graduates to gain professional skills and experience before applying for residency. in 2010, the migration occupations in demand list (modl) was scrapped altogether and replaced by a skilled occupations list (sol), which focused much more on highly technical professional skills than on trade occupations. this effectively cut off direct pathways from vet education to permanent residency. these policies were at face value a means to ‘recalibrate’ an immigration system that was seen in economic logics to have become more ‘supply driven’ than ‘demand driven’. yet they were also inherently designed to ‘remould’ desirable and selfreliant migrant-workers, rather than to actually address the fundamental issues of labour market exploitation and discrimination embedded within education-migration nexus processes. the marketisation of citizenship the education-migration nexus can also be seen as an implicit part of transformations in citizenship both in australia and in the context of global circuits of mobility. the nexus meant that for the first time since federation there was a large population of noncitizen cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 9 residents in australia, many with uncertain temporal horizons. indian students in particular typified the increasing blurriness of boundaries between temporary/permanent and sojourner/settler because, although they entered australia with temporary student visas, many were motivated to use this as a ‘stepping stone’ to pr and citizenship. these staggered migration trajectories are not entirely novel when viewed in historical context. the earliest migration circuits between india and australia, for example, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, consisted of sikh sojourners who moved back and forth between wage labour in australia and their natal villages in the punjab (dusenbury 2005). however, a settler-citizen paradigm dominated australian immigration norms and processes for much of the 20th century, and particularly since the post-war era (robertson 2014). this paradigm was significantly disrupted by the influx of indian students on ‘staggered pathways’, which both shaped and were shaped by increasingly neoliberal logics within ideologies and processes of citizenship in australia. the neoliberal transformation of citizenship is a global trend in many migrant-receiving countries. it includes the increase in highly quantified assessments of migrants’ skills, qualifications and biopolitical characteristics (often through ‘points tests’); the rise of ‘investor migrant’ schemes; the reduction in family reunion and humanitarian resettlement; and the ability for temporary workers to gain permanency through the performance of particular kinds of ‘value’ as labour, in which labour power is ‘exchanged’ for further rights in often highly unequal transactional processes (lee & pratt 2010, rajkumar et al. 2012, walsh 2011). the neoliberalisation of processes of national membership and belonging have been referred to in the literature as ‘contractualised’ citizenship (somers 2008) or ‘earned’ (van houdt et. al. 2011) citizenship. in the specific context of indian students in australia during the heyday of the education-migration nexus, however, i refer to the expansion of neoliberal citizenship logics as the ‘marketisation of citizenship’. this reflects how education-migration nexus processes involved forms of contract and exchange but also processes of consumption in relation to citizenship. international students in australia, as well as other temporary migrants, have to ‘earn’ citizenship through investments in time, money and labour as well as through the performance of ‘desirable’ migrant subjectivities that translate within the immigration regime’s quantified assessment of migrant value. the characteristics of desirability are biopolitical (for example, age and health) as well as related to specific types of human capital 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 (such as qualifications and work experience). consumption also relates to the marketisation of citizenship, with the economic contribution of international students through student fees and consumer spending while in australia also forming an implicit basis for the right to ongoing membership. the rise of a transnational industry of migration and education agents (an industry which is particularly prolific in india) furthers the marketisation of citizenship, in the sense that those with the financial resources to engage agents and lawyers are able to use this to their advantage in the citizenship ‘market’. citizenship ‘exchanges’ such as these, in which migrants have to ‘earn’ or ‘buy’ their way to citizenship, often involve different forms of violence upon the bodies of migrants. lee and pratt (2010) provide two very clear examples of this in the context of the filipino diaspora: the military service (and sometimes the death in duty) of undocumented migrants in the us as a pathway to ‘earn’ citizenship for themselves and their families, and the ‘indentured servitude’ of domestic workers in the live-in caregiver program in canada where female migrants exchange two years of intensive care labour to gain a permanent status. while the case of indian students in australia is perhaps less extreme than these examples, indian students in the years surrounding the ‘crisis’ had to invest significantly, both financially and emotionally, into the quest for pr/citizenship. this was a burden often taken on by the family unit, with loans for tuition and visa application fees often creating a transnational system of family debt that students were then expected to pay back once legal membership in australia was achieved (baas 2006, neilson 2009). the time spent away from family and the long hours working at ‘violent and precarious’ (verma 2013) jobs, as well as the time invested in study and the various costs of living were also investments expected to ‘pay off’ with the achievement of pr. students limited financial agency meant that they lived and worked in some of the ‘some of the struggle spaces of australian cities’ (dunn, pelleri & maeder-han, 2011, p. 84), which left them vulnerable to both workplace exploitation and racist violence. the marketisation of citizenship for indian students thus functioned as a highly unequal and highly unstable process of exchange, with the state always holding the power to change requirements after students had already invested considerable amounts of time, money and labour into the dream of pr. significant changes in nexus policies in 2010, for example, part of a post-crisis policy backlash, left 122,149 vet sector student visa holders without any hope of achieving a return on their investment in fees and labour in the form of a migration outcome (verma 2013), and little chance of being able to use their qualifications if they returned home (robertson & runganakailoo 2013). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 11 the highly unequal processes of marketised citizenship described above also further complicated the subjectivities surrounding international students, this time in relation to citizenship. once able to be neatly boxed as transient consumers who arrived with the primary motivation to consume australian education and stay only for the duration of this consumption, student subjectivities became far more complex. as deumert et al. (2005, p. 329) notes ‘as well as being educational service beneficiaries, cross-border students are migrants, workers, consumers and human beings’. the problem of the commercialisation of education and the education-migration nexus then became around reconciling the consumer (whose welfare and satisfaction is largely the responsibility of the service provider) with the potential or partial citizen, who is a member of the community, an active participant in the labour force, and a potential permanent settler (which implies a broader scope of responsibility for their rights and welfare involving both the community and the state). the violence against indian students and the subsequent political actions (both the ‘peace rallies’ in melbourne and sydney in 2009 and the taxi driver protests in melbourne in 2008) were some of the events that put these complex and shifting citizenship subjectivities into sharp relief. the ‘marketisation’ model of citizenship clashed here with existing ideologies of liberal inclusiveness, universal human rights, and multicultural fairness. over the first decade of the 2000s there was thus a shift, in both public attitudes and policy, to international student welfare. academic work reframed student welfare from a customer satisfaction framework to engage with ideas of civil society, global citizenship, and universal human rights (see, for example forbes-mewett 2005 and deumert et al. 2005), and various levels of local, state and federal government also began, in a limited way, to treat students as partial citizens rather than transient consumers (robertson 2013). these expansions in understandings of student welfare and citizenship were, however, still frequently undercut by marketisation logics, with both government agencies and student advocacy groups frequently linking the protection of students’ rights with the protection of australia’s ‘export’ market for education (robertson 2011). the marketisation of citizenship is also closely linked not just to local and national processes of rights and belonging, but also to global hierarchies of citizenship (lee 2008, aas 2013) which place australian citizenship and permanent residency as more valuable to the mobile subject than many non-western citizenships, including indian citizenship. the australian 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 passport has global ‘mobility value’ because of its relative neutrality as a western passport, meaning that australian passport holders often have fewer visa requirements and more general fluidity across borders, especially into other developed nation-states. for indian students, australian citizenship has additional mobility value in that it also allows dual citizenship, which gives indian nationals who naturalise the advantage of access to overseas citizenship of india (oci) status. global hierarchies of citizenship, which are constructed through an international system of mobility that privileges certain national citizenships over others for people on the move, as well as the more intangible social and cultural ‘status’ of the western or dual citizenship, make australian citizenship ‘global’ in a way that indian citizenship is not. for indian students in australia therefore, obtaining australian citizenship could signify settlement in and belonging to australia, but also strongly symbolise the capacity for transnational social capital and ongoing global mobility (baas 2010b), a type of ‘flexible citizenship’ (ong 2006). class and cultural imaginaries of mobility as baas (2010a) has shown, indian student journeys were not imagined through frameworks of ‘migration’ or ‘settlement’ or even of two country ‘transnationalism’ but rather of ongoing intraand international mobility between india, australia and various other countries – a process of becoming ‘global’ or ‘mobile’ rather than becoming ‘australian’ or ‘western’. thus, despite the deep significance of the citizenship ideologies and nexus policies described above, cultural imaginaries of mobility were arguably an equally important driver of the presence of large numbers of indian students in australia in the first decade of the 21st century. the cultural imaginaries of these students were, as baas (2010a) has clearly shown in his anthropological work, highly significant in shaping their desires for overseas education, work experience and ultimately, pr or citizenship. time spent in the west has become a highly significant rite of passage for many middle-class indian young people. this is driven not just by the tangible opportunity to accumulate particular types of social and cultural capital, like language skills, international networks and western passports, but also by a less tangible ‘imaginary’ of what it means to be an ‘upwardly mobile’ young person in india today. within this imaginary international higher education becomes ‘imbued with mediated meanings’ (caluya, probyn & vyas 2011, p. 88) and serves as a class marker (rizvi 2005) as well as ‘a marker of modernity’ (caluya, probyn & vyas 2011, p. 88). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 13 the existing post-colonial cultural relationship between india and australia, as well as the fact that australia has been a key site of settlement for the indian diaspora since the 1970s, form part of the imaginary of australia as a specific destination in the west for the mobile, global young indian. these existing cultural imaginaries were, and still are, intensified and exploited by the australian government and higher education sector, whose direct marketing towards india is also a key part of nexus processes. intensifying imaginaries of educational mobility has also proved profitable for the capitalist sector of ‘middle-men’ in both australia and india who facilitate mobility, including education and migration agents, accommodation brokers, private colleges, and loan sharks. both the desire and the opportunity for international education have also diffused rapidly over the last few decades across a broader segment of the indian middle class in a general national context of increased social mobility. while overseas education was once only the domain of a small section of the elite, urban upper middle class (gillan, damachis & mcguire 2003), australian education in particular became achievable for a far less elite middle class of peri-urban or semi-rural indian families with the opening up of the vet sector (baas 2007). aspirations for social mobility through becoming a ‘global’ indian were enabled through less costly course options, opportunities for earning capacity in australia during and after study, and increased (and aggressively marketed) borrowing options to finance overseas study through banks and other formal and informal lenders. the desirability of migrants to the nation-state is inherently linked to class privilege (sparke 2009). class thus played a key role in the shifting desirability/undesirability of indian students as mobile subjects. previous waves of elite students were seen as self-sufficient and highly resourced, and therefore unproblematic. the post-2004 emerging class of non-elite indian students were generally painted in the media as either opportunistic and untrustworthy ‘backdoor migrants’ or hapless victims of an exploitative system and racist culture (robertson 2013). a class division was also present within the increasingly heterogeneous population of indian students that reflected australian discursive anxieties about good versus bad migrants. baas (2014) notes, for example, that members of ‘older’ cohorts of indian students saw the post-2004 cohort as partially to blame for the violence for being ‘poorly adjusted’ and not speaking english well. as caluya, probyn and vyas (2011, p. 90) explain ‘the same indian who operates as a cultural other for the middle class white australian becomes a class-based other for the good indian student. this “permanent residency 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 oriented student” is then a threat to the nation of india in general, and particularly to the “good indian student”.’ the class identities of students also became important discursively, although in somewhat paradoxical forms, in media constructions of the violence. on the one hand, indian students were positioned as vulnerable because they were travelling to unskilled jobs late at night and living and commuting in socio-economically deprived suburban areas. yet they were also positioned by police spokespeople as ‘soft targets’ because they showed overt signs of wealth, such as expensive mobile phones and ipods (baas 2014). these discursive constructions of ‘desirable/undesirable’ and ‘vulnerable’ migrants as classed subjects neglect the complex agencies and motivations of indian students from varied class backgrounds, and obscure the role of the immigration regime itself in the construction of migrant subjectivities. as i have argued above, the ‘desirability’ of indian students as mobile subjects shifted in the australian cultural imaginary from ‘designer migrants’ to ‘backdoor migrants’. this was closely linked to particular media and policy discourses, but it can also be understood in relation to the contrasting cultural imaginaries of mobility that already existed in australia and india. indian imaginaries of ongoing mobility and the accumulation of flexible citizenship clashed with embedded western ideas of middle-class young people studying and working ‘abroad’. for most middle-class australians, time spent overseas is a common ‘rite of passage’ for young people, but constructions of this mobility (such as ‘gap years’ and ‘student exchanges’) centre more on ideas of self-actualisation, professional development and leisure travel (simpson 2005; wilson & fisher 2009; hirschorn & hefferon 2013) than on labour migration or the accumulation of flexible citizenship. these contrasting imaginaries made a western audience see the actions of indian students using education as a stepping stone to pr as suspect – positing them as ‘backdoor migrants’ who were not genuinely interested in education for education’s sake. yet this public attitude tended to ignore the fact that international education had not been instrumentalised as ‘earning’ a migration outcome by indian students themselves. rather, it had been instrumentalised by the market-based logics that dominated the australian higher education and immigration regimes (caluya, probyn & vyas 2011), and further intensified by the ‘brokerage’ industry – including peak national bodies like australian education international, as well as the raft of agents and recruiters working for and with australian education providers. the development of the ‘pr cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 15 factory’ college and the ‘pr motivated student’ were thus the consequence of these systems and industries, rather than some moral failing or duplicity of students themselves. conclusions in many ways the indian student ‘crisis’ exemplifies castles’ (2004) thesis of the ‘unintended consequences’ of immigration policy. meant to slip seamlessly into the labour market as ‘designer migrants’, indian students instead proved to defy, through both structural pressures and their own agencies, the intended ‘frictionless’ (baldassar & pyke 2014) and neoliberalised outcomes of the education-migration nexus. they faced significant vulnerabilities while in australia as ‘citizens-in-waiting’, as they were subject to the tangible racist violence of the streets as well as the systemic violence (žižek 2009) wrought by labour exploitation and the precarious status created by migration policy. the consequences also reached far beyond individual student migrants – the crisis sparked a series of critiques around the quality of the australian education industry, australia’s commitment to multiculturalism, and the nature of australia’s bilateral relationship to india as an emerging regional power. rather than looking at the localised debates on race and violence sparked by the crisis, this paper has sought to position the indian student crisis itself as a consequence of particular transnational and global processes, and particular modes of the national governance of mobility that are embedded within these processes. it has asked what the supposed crisis tells us about the ways in which global economic processes, national immigration regulations, and varied cultural imaginaries of mobility shape particular kinds of mobile subjectivities at different times. in particular, i have focused on three key processes that shaped the presence and position of indian students within australian society leading up to the crisis: the education-migration nexus as an outcome of the global commercialisation of higher education and the globalisation of labour; the marketisation of citizenship; and the contested cultural imaginaries of mobility and class in both australia and india. these processes intersected to lead to highly dynamic national policies around the management of mobility which made and remade indian students as desirable and then undesirable subjects. the indian student crisis was a moment of reflection for australia on its still troubled relationship with racial difference in spite of its nearly 40-year legacy of official 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.3, 2015 multiculturalism. yet, as i have tried to show, it should also remain a series of events that causes us to reflect on the way our relationship to the mobile subjects travelling and living within and across our national borders are shaped by economic and cultural forces that both transcend and are embedded within the nation-state itself. in particular, the shifting fortunes of indian students in australia across the 2000s should give us pause for thought on the discursive and political power of migration 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indian student: regimes and imaginaries of migration, education, citizenship and class abstract introduction labour mobilities, commercialised universities and the education-migration nexus the marketisation of citizenship class and cultural imaginaries of mobility conclusions references negotiating a concurrence: tracing the visible/invisible relocation within migrant-inhabited cities of china xueni peng jin baek seoul national university abstract it is essential for us to illuminate the specific role and adaptation process of china’s internal peasant-origin migrants (or the peasant flood), who have experiences not entirely different from those suffered by overseas immigrants. a number of reasons convince us to draw this conclusion, including the large gap in income compared to local workers, the fact that they share different cultural values to native residents and the noticeably lower living standards between the areas of the migrants’ origin and their destinations. migration in china is an experience that begins before people move away from their place of origin and continues long after arriving in their new home destinations. as a unique feature of migration research, national relocation is not simply a crossing of a geographical boundary, but also a transgressing of social and psychological environment barriers. our research intends to examine the underestimated or marginal character played by such outsider crowds with special regard given to the individual’s experience of unfamiliar settlements. this involves exploring the role of migrants’ transformation through the misapprehension that relocation is merely a geographical movement. we suggest that visible relocation brings other incidental replacements, such as changes in identity, psychological cognition and social cohesion. introduction population movement is not new, however the rural-to-urban migration in china has reached unheard-of levels (table 1). ‘all the world seems to be on the move’, as stated by sheller and urry (2006). however, this migration also has a vibrant element in china, especially since most fast-paced urbanized cities face similar issues of people’s fluidity. (figure 1) the word ‘relocation’ originally referred to human movement. rossi (1980) describes a ‘human move’ as: 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 xueni peng and jin baek. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(1): 4238,http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i1.4238 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ […] a shift in address […] involving a shift in location through space that can vary from a few feet in the case of a shift from one apartment or room to another within a structure to thousands of miles to another country or from one end of the country to the other” ( rossi 1980). the massive movement of people, especially migration from rural to urban areas, has been part and parcel of the tremendous economic and social transformation within china over the past three decades (figures 1 and 2). figure 1. volumes of inter-provincial migration within and among regions, 1990 (drawing by xueni peng). note: the figure clearly reveals the volumes among inter-provincial migrants amid south, central, north and west china. all flows have increased in volume, with the most pronounced flows within the eastern district and those from the central and western regions to the eastern region. source: rush a. 2011, ‘china’s labour market’, reserve bank of australia bulletin (september), pp. 29-38. available at: http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/sep/pdf/bu-0911-4.pdf chan, k. w. 2013, ‘china, internal migration’, in ness, i. and bellwood, p. (eds.) the encyclopedia of global human migration, wiley-blackwell, hoboken, nj. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 79 http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/sep/pdf/bu-0911-4.pdf in fact, there are two main causes for the increase in mobility in china, the first is the chinese government’s policy of relaxing controls on population movement from rural provincial areas to quicken urbanization; the second is the attraction of employment, education, business opportunities and a higher standard of living in the cities (griffiths 2010). since the early 1980s more than 15 percent of the country’s population has lived in places other than their home settlements, towns, or cities.1 however, the massively diverse destinations among such migrants characterize the awkwardness of their internal transitional experiences. our research provides an examination of the migrant worker community through three phases they undergo for survival, namely: confront, transform and assimilation. a number of factors make china’s rural-urban migrants more like immigrants from developing to developed counties than internal migrants within a developing country. for example, a large gap in income, and distinctly different cultural values, and living standards exist between the areas of origin and destination. more importantly, there are restrictions preventing or obstructing migrant settlements in terms of selecting destinations, ranging from labor market discrimination to china’s household registration (hukou) system – a de facto internal passport system.2 in fact, the hukou system segregating migrants from the urban population may be a much more significant factor than cultural barriers in accounting for migrant marginality and denial of their citizenship rights. in the case of china’s inner migration, hukou ‘identity’ (the household registration system) places people spatially with a rigid institutional hierarchy (shen 2013; fan 2002). stonequist, for instance, believes that being within the orbit of double hierarchal cultural milieus can result in inner strain and malaise, a feeling of isolation, of not quite belonging (stonequist 1937). hence, the term ‘psychological marginality’ has been coined to define such awkwardness in their new urban environments. chinese migrants can be depicted in the following way: ‘they come in peasants and leave marginalized people’ due to their constantly drifting life (bach 2010). 1 the latest official estimates of the ‘floating population’ in china is 211 million on 2010. source: http://www.china.org.cn/travel/expo2010shanghai/2010-07/13/content_20483664.htm 2 because of its entrenchment of social strata, especially as between rural and urban residency status, the hukou system is often regarded as a caste system of china. 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 http://www.china.org.cn/travel/expo2010shanghai/2010-07/13/content_20483664.htm it is contended here at the outset, as proposed in the abstract, that china’s internal migrants experience hardship akin to those undergone by overseas immigrants. migration is not ‘ready-made’ but instead it is a part of one’s life that endures and has relevance for years and generations to come (deaux 2009). another interpretation could describe migration as both a dynamic and a symbolic procedure instead of a separate event. in the light of such variation in the labeling of migration, i offer a general framework for discussion that is adapted from an immigration model of personality and social structure developed by thomas pettigrew (1997), whose approach led me to consider a new way to think about intra-province migration in china. in figure 3, what pettigrew terms the macro and micro levels facilitate us to understand more about the chinese rural migrant experience. here the macro level cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 81 describes a physical, social and psychological space defined in the adopted destination migrants arrive at. at the micro level is the individual migrant at discrete transitional points that, is in the face of varying situations and experiences, and how he/she negotiates and adapts to the changing circumstances. i seek to develop a framework that can foresee some of the systematic challenges that the chinese migrants encounter, which is akin to the hardship that immigrant also face in a new culture. descriptions of china’s internal migration and migrants with china’s implementation of economic reform over the past 20 years, the process of urbanization has been based on and accelerated by mainly the rural-to-urban migration flow. by 2011, the number of off-farm migrant workers in china totaled 253 million, which was an increase of 4.4% (11 million) compared to 2010 (human resources and social security department 2011). by 2030, china’s urbanization rate is projected to reach 65% (ieas, 2010), in turn the number of rural migrants is expected to swell to approximately 400 million (lian 2012). it is important here to note that the vast majority of migrants in china are from its farming or peasant class. for some time now, peasant-related migration, or the 'peasant flood' as it is termed in china, has created a large number of new and unexpected of social and economic issues for the country. figure 3. main elements of migration process examination 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 what distinguishes china's recent mobility change is not only the large size of the ‘tidal wave of rural migrant labor’ (mingong chao), but the type of rural-urban migrations accompanying the transformations of rural life, the large gap in wages and standards of living, and the restrictions preventing the settlement of migrants (roberts 1997). at the administrative operational level in china, migrants can thus be identified as being of two types (chan & zhang 1999), hukou migrants – migration with ‘local’ residency rights (bendi hukou), usually open only to a very select group (currently, the rich or the highly educated) and immediate family members of residents with local hukou (chan & buckingham 2008); non-hukou migrants – migration without hukou residency rights. some scholars concerned with exploring experiences as ‘outsiders’ differentiate them further into permanent migrants and temporary migrants according to different resident statuses (fan 2002). let me begin this new path of enquiry with three basic questions: what is the migrant confronted with? how does the migrant transform? how does the migrant deal with this new life? in choosing these questions, i am suggesting that migration goes beyond the crossing of a geographical boundary and involves more of a switching of social and psychological environments. what is the migrant confronted with? the invisible periphery my understanding of ‘invisible periphery’ stems from what michel foucault proposes as the ‘techniques of the self’ (foucault 1990) concerning how people are perceived as ‘selves’ by ‘others’ (individuals) and ‘themselves’ (in society), and finally how they allow a separate ‘self’ to regulate their behavior, their attitudes to the mainstream. thus, through this awareness, the community is projected within ourselves and shows who we are to ourselves and to other people. individuals behave and act according to their day-to-day experiences within such guidelines (foucault 1990). following this, ‘invisible periphery’ can also be considered as a part of the emotional conflict through which rural migrants find their identity and self-esteem are weakened socially and psychologically by trying to blend easily into a new urban community. from a migrants’ standpoint, working with one’s group in some form of collective action is more likely to be a choice. more specifically, ‘invisible periphery’ can be considered as a community that is experienced differently by locals and non-locals. with perceivable differences, both locals and nonlocals will locate their selves and others in their cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 83 separate urban environments. finally, this ‘invisible periphery’ influences their subsequent behavior physically and mentally. as an outsider, the invisible periphery reinforces emotional conflict and, in turn, rural migrants are further weakened by attempting to identify themselves as part of the existing urban fabric. reception in the majority of rural migrant destinations in china is reflected in widely different ways, ranging from willing acceptance from some local governments to absolute refusal by local residents. researchers have suggested that the source of the difficulty lies essentially with the government’s attitude to ‘non-natives’, particularly rural strangers, who are always treated with jaundiced eyes. correspondingly, rural migrant workers are vulnerable in the urban environment of china due to institution-based segregation regarding housing and because of the fact that they can be allocated by the government hukou system to the poorest clusters or residential areas for living. such conditions involve a low level of physical housing facilities, more restricted opportunities for residents, fewer opportunities at achieving financial success in society and a higher level of mental vulnerability as plummer found in her study of poverty in vientiane (2001). the local population’s exclusive attitude and discriminatory segregation cannot merely be attributed to a lack of local facilities and resources, but also to the concern for security. the root cause for the difficulties that migrants face can be traced to one sole policy which was first introduced in the late 1950s, and which was intended to restrict the mobility of china’s population, namely, the household registration system, hukou (wu and treiman 2006). however, its most weighty consequence is the creation of a potential hereditary system that has divided china’s agricultural and non-agricultural populations and effectively bound the peasantry to the land they tilled. the constraints of the hukou system have in their own way caused a rural/urban segregation pattern to emerge. this segregation of residency status significantly disadvantages most migrants and relegates them to a second-tier ‘temporary’ civic status. even though the chinese government emphasizes social harmony as an important national development goal, in many cases, migrants’ unprotected legal status leads to their vulnerability and social exclusion, such as having no right to social welfare or educational opportunities. local governments tend to set stringent entrance conditions (credentials regarding their residence, employment, social insurance enrollment, birth 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 planning policy compliance, and health conditions) to discourage rural migrants from accessing most welfare programs, such as the minimum living security scheme (zui di shenghuo baozhang jizhi), which can provide relief to poor residents, and housing support programs like economic and comfortable housing (jingji shiyong fang) and low-rent housing (lian zu fang), which can provide housing subsidies to individuals facing housing difficulties (li, 2009; fan and peng, 2009). the realization of local non-rural residential identity is accordingly a vital stage for the citizens considered migrants towards escaping the vulnerability they are confronted with and towards achieving a better living standard. furthermore, such discriminatory institutions in essence intensify geographical duality in china and have deepened the conflict between the city and the countryside (cheng and selden 1994). such a reality, at the same time, toughens and shapes the identities of the outsiders. in addition, most migrants fail to seek assurance of their own worth from their host community. the social categorization of migrants as outsiders stems from these institutional obstacles which by extension entail exclusion from their place of origin. this exclusion includes urban society’s rejection of specific groups of migrants, particularly off-farm migrants (which is most of rural to urban migrants). such discrimination against migrant groups is mirrored in terms of urbanites’ attitude of exclusion, disparate treatment and refusal to build equivalent social relationships with the outsiders. what is more, the urban community bestows little social worth, recognition or sense of belonging on migrants. therefore, for the floating migrants, their social links and community participation as well as their subjective awareness of social belonging are likewise discouraged or dampened due to being part of the invisible periphery. communal psychological effect – group-oriented versus individualistic adaptation at the regional level, the rural/urban division is highly confronted by the deep-seated assumptions of the pattern of urbanization, as jones (1997) claims, namely that urbanization has essentially to do with the psychological detachment of rural and urban existence and daily routines, and the spatial location of the proletariat. earlier, in evoking a precise understanding of urbanization, wirth (1938) also captured the challenges of such a change – it no longer signifies simply the process by which persons are involved in a place entitled ‘metropolitan’ and assimilated into its system of life. it denotes also the collective highlighting of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 85 features characteristic of the manner of life which accompany the growth of cities, and lastly the varieties in the life patterns accepted in a city (wirth 1938). adapting to such a shift toward urbanization is also reflected in chinese migrants’ own situations. owing to the strengthening of exterior and interior sensual stimuli in the city, in contrast to a rural environment, the city nurtures a condition where one must buffer him or herself from a continually varying atmosphere. namely, lives turn out to be matter-of-fact, with little attention to emotional concerns. as simmel (1903) wrote more than a hundred years ago, life in the city compared poorly with the individual connections characteristic of smaller settings. in other words, superficially chinese migrants gradually transfer from their home rural settlements to establish city lives and engage in urban occupations, but their elemental identity and family network remains grounded in village culture. migration, put more broadly, involves relocation or a transfer procedure that bridges individual(s) and spaces―not only for persons who migrate but also for their family relation network. that sense of adherence to community of origin can be regarded as contributing to the floating population and its long-standing safekeeping may be maintained in exchange for cash remittances (graves and graves 1974). affiliation within the migrant group is founded principally on kinship – with brothers, sisters, and relatives from the migrants’ origin at the core. it is a basis from which we can demonstrate that family life in our culture is crucial to the development of social relations. in addition, scholars working in the field of chinese migrants have explored the emotional and communal experience of migrants in urbanized spaces, probing into how their community sentiments are built upon the axis of differences and transformations (liu et al. 2010). however, the above mentioned works concentrate on documenting migrants’ emotional experience in given situations rather than considering the different social formation as the key factor underlying the inevitable intergroup conflict. when individuals relocate, it is not a simple concern for oneself or selves. as migrants, they experience the act of mobility in a spatial dimension, with those incoming establishing contact with the unknown which in turn compels individuals to build new identities (moghaddam 2002) and participate in the compromising of their individuality over time. for many older (first)-and neo (second)-generation rural migrants in china, the dialogs regarding identity are frequently manifested by a push-and-pull phenomenon (a financial push towards 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 the city to find employment and earn money, and an emotional pull to return to their home communities and loved ones), with binary opposites, such as barbarous versus etiquette, rural versus urban, fail versus succeed (mukora 1999), leave versus carry on, and custom versus innovation. these paradoxes are an essential part of their self-formation. referring to wirth, whose description of influential urbanism as a way of life depicts how urbanism is a form of social organization that is harmful to culture, and who characterizes the city as a ‘substitution of secondary for primary contacts, the fading of ties of kinship, and the waning social meaning of the family, the vanishing of the neighborhood, and the discouragement of the traditional foundation of social unity’ (wirth 1938, pp. 3-5). to emphasize this, it is important to note that the countryside and the city are the specific sites where the cultural differences between rural chinese and urban chinese are most clear-cut. at this point, it is pertinent to revisit an image of the family in the eyes of the chinese. family, jia for chinese people, is more like a symbolic place of kinship. the ideal family is in fact an extended family living under one protecting roof. in china’s countryside, until now this family type stands for the permanence of a family’s full lineage. it is generally well maintained by a populous, extended family, often with more than a dozen members, or may include all inhabitants in a hamlet who have the same surname (fukuyama 1996). people in the countryside grow up and live surrounded by the group; they do not prefer to be alone. in terms of the village encircled by the city i am concerned with the rural home of china as an archetype. the rural represents the kinship (clan) family-based social structure while the city mirrors the inclination of a relatively individual-dominating social order; so to speak, the rural and the urban of china translate into i-location, that is, ‘who we (kinship family) are’ and ‘who i am’. one great challenge that newly-urbanized rural people face is understanding the notion of the individual (or rich self-image) and entering into the spirit of the city. however, on the basis of this comprehension we understand the individual as someone who does something from the ‘me’, and someone who focuses on the problem he or she finds themselves in, however, rural people also seem to lack a strong self-identity or central self. individualism in the context of chinese history and culture is a deviation from the behavioral norm expected of most chinese (smith 1992). to a certain extent, the traditional chinese concept of a person is not presenting the self as an individual person but as one who is inescapably immersed in a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 87 group – the family. in that sense, the rural and urban parts control a number of differently respective dimensions. to shed further light on some of the mental states undergone by migrants, and to apply ilocation to our case study, we can say that the ‘i’ is formed out of the self-consciousness of one’s activities and this leads to the formation of a clear self-entity. in turn, although a chengzhongcun (hereafter czc), as, a village encompassed by the city boundaries, is wellreceived by both rural migrants and the urban poor, its dwellers have a tendency to consider themselves as an isolated group and fail to interact successfully with locally-born residents. such a solo i-oriented city lifestyle, does not exist in the society of the countryside. for people living in a czc, social life takes place in migrant groups there and does not involve those outside the czc. this fact is illustrated by the comments that settlement house dwellers made about their lack of expectation to have affection for this area—which can be identified as signifying ‘an absence of a self-belonged group’. this passive appraisal of one’s settlement is also reflected in other opinions on living in a czc: expressing a sense of insecurity due to the lack of a ‘village unit’ organization or a management model and crowds of unknowns; no public services. barriers in observing the actions and attitudes of others generate encumbrances in contacting individuals with whom they are not fully acquainted, and this results in czc dwellers restricting their interaction to peer groups3 in which the daily risks can be minimized to a degree. passive or negative, the czc dwellers have considerable difficulty in feeling that people are organized in a cooperative group activity. perhaps a czc resident can see, observe, and describe this action; but they do not view themselves as an integral part of the community. standards, for instance, equivalence, reliance, and mutuality are considered as only applying to their origin-based community relationships instead of outside of these peer groups. for these migrants, the peer group is a routinized congregation of a community with a restricted range: kin-relatives and people from the same location. this narrow living circle, of course, impedes cooperative activity. resources are not shared within a framework of reciprocal norms which means that migrants need to contribute their own resources to swell the adaptive potential of the group as a whole. czc dwellers, for 3 the basic structure of migrants’ lives in a host city is peer group sociability. peer group may be defined as a group of people who, through homophily, share similarities such as age, background, and social position. 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 instance, take a minimal number of steps to improve the community where they are housed, or they are not interested in making improvements, because, being outside of their peer group, they want to make money and save their energy for their own family-oriented behavior within their peer group. certainly, there is no denying that some other likelihood still exists, according to the national population and family planning commission in 2008, the firstgeneration migrants are thrifty and they save up as much as they can in order to support their children, whereas the neo-generation migrants tend to change in different ways having stayed in the city for a period of time. influenced by urban consumer culture, some of them live from paycheck to paycheck spending on their daily activities, such as food and clothes, rather than give every penny they have to their parents – they are sometimes referred to as ‘the moonlight group (yueguangzu). such a living circle constitutes the typical adaptive mode of many cooperative, kin-based rural communities and contrasts with the individualistic strategies more common within the urban community. it can be argued that these different dimensions we see now do not just bring inevitable emotional conflicts; this definition of self-cognition, together with migrants’ role and location in work and at home, makes the czc seem like a new beginning. there is a tendency to assimilate aspects of the new system with components of the old, even creating ground for conflict. in positing a multidimensional concept of assimilation, such assimilation is accomplished through alterations happening in community on both sides of the ethnic periphery through boundary crossing, obscuring and transforming (alba & nee 2003). the picture we saw in a czc in china is familiar to those who have read the urban villagers by herbert gans, published in 1962. it is a neighborhood that suggests an ideal type of cultural adaptation to city life that reproduces distrust of authority and self-protection. in this sense, the czc in china is doomed to be a physical entity that witnesses the assimilation and hybrid of going-between, in which a modern urban identity and a traditional rural identity coexist in the process of urbanization. moreover, a similar study appears to reveal that residents’ subjective awareness of exclusion (fukuyama 1996), emotional encounters and weakened community networks significantly reduced any positive influence on cohesion in a city. also, such factors had a noticeable effect on the diminishing degree of trust in a wide variety of social relationships. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 89 how does the migrant transform him/herself? who am i? due to their geographical movement, individuals encounter their own identities both combining and clashing with other identities that are significant to the self. deaux (2009) claims that issues like individual choices, interpersonal encounters, and reconstruction of cognitive and passionate anchors are indispensable for accepting how floating populations become accustomed to a new destination and are composed of separate identities. these adaptive procedures are demonstrated by migrants themselves in terms of a series of strategies by which they mainly rely on to facilitate the transformation from being a local to being an outsider at the level of encounters between migrants and natives. nevertheless, the so-called alternative strategies which are naturally engaged in to cope with the transition of self-definitions can be classified into four groups: 1) from floating to permanent migration; 2) from leaving the land but not the countryside to leaving the land first and then the countryside; 3) from the first generation of migrants to the neo or second generation of migrants; 4) from temporary dweller to permanent resident. ‘from leaving the field but not the village’ to ‘leaving completely both the field and the village’ the real life of a rural place is related to the farm work undertaken by peasants, but the truth is that many people defined as peasants have little experience of or have spent little time on agricultural activities. for example, in the rural areas of jiangsu province, 55 per cent of the occupations of local peasants is in non-agricultural employment but they continue to dwell in villages, known as litu bu lixiang – leave the field but not the village. such temporary migration or repeated migration by china’s first rural-urban workers was common because on one hand, the working area was close to the countryside, and on the other hand, they provided a significant contribution to household labor during the farming seasons. this pattern of transitory labor flowing in-and-out, we might note, is concentrated in the eastern part of china, the prosperous coastal regions. and labor migration is likely to be of the ‘leave completely the field and village’ pattern, litu you lixiang. this describes the rural migrants’ status as leaving behind their attachment to rural homesteads for their new lives in their host cities. the first condition gives rise to the maintaining of strong bonds with their community of origin while another type contributes heavily to their individualistic 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 development, or to creating barriers to their long-term return home. the larger a migrant’s network of urban kinsmen becomes, the longer he remains away, and the higher tendency there is to permanent unreturning (graves & graves 1974). as a result, due to large number of the rural population who continue to flow into the steadily developing urban areas, despite the geographical distance, the urban employment structure has given way to a patchwork of variously labor-intensive areas in the city which appear like paddy fields of activity from a rural setting. from first-generation migrant to neo-generation migrant in terms of age selection, the first migrants in our study are defined as people who experienced rural-urban migration in their 30s, starting in the 1980s with their hunt for labor work in the city. the second group of migrants was born after the 1980s. at present, the neo rural-urban migrant generation occupies 58.4 per cent of the total rural-urban migrant population (nbsc, 2012). this community, is now known as the ‘neo-generation migrants (xinshengdai nongmin gong) in china, in recognition of their reluctance to stay in rural areas and desire to start their own ‘gold rush’ after a basic education. unlike the older generation of migrant workers, the majority of them experienced their passage into adulthood in the cities and hoped to become urbanites someday. the generation born in the 1980s who started their city migration journey just after finishing junior high school has followed a difficult pathway into adult life, experiencing a more unsteady labor-market casualization, and worsening housing-market circumstances. certainly, their presence has been traced from initially being fortune seekers, and it has been argued that many of them are entering the social order through the in-between manner and have become more individualized in realizing their own happiness, and independence (li 2001). from floating (liudong) to permanent settlement in china, few scholars or policy makers recognize that chinese rural migrant workers, nonmingong, have in fact predominantly formed permanent settled groups, yimin, within urban centers. this distinction designates the floating population as individuals who have never been categorized as neo urban settlers, xinyimin, remaining instead rural-to-urban transients, zanzhuzhe. within this description, the movement of people across rural or provincial borders has been assumed as a temporary relocation. however, during the past three decades, and especially cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 91 nowadays, the neo-migrants, xinshengdai, have shown their strong will and intention to become real urbanites permanently. from this perspective, the past decades witnessed the transformation of their definition of self – floating to permanent settlements4. solinger (1999) points out that for a chinese conception, the ‘floating’ has been a matter of geographical temporary mobility (flowing in and out), rather than seeing themselves as ‘migrated’, qianyi, (they are not, and will not become, an eternally settled community). in contrast to the process of migration worldwide, purely moving from place of origin to a new destination and settling down there for a specific period is not regarded as migration in chinese terminology. from temporary dweller to permanent migrant throughout the period covered, almost 3.38 million migrants with their entire families have moved their residence away from their home areas and migrated to the city (solinger 1999). substantial attention has been devoted to this family-based movement, while referring to seasonal migration as the “leave the field but remains in the rural area” pattern. this presents strong evidence that the longer migrants stay in one city, the more likely they are to be reluctant to leave, and the more eager they are to become permanent migrants. in this case, permanent migration has in fact already occurred on the part of family migrants. a migration decision-making process is also considered a family project; for men, this typically meant acquiring more financial assistance with an urban job; for women it meant emancipation in terms of traditional restrictions and household status. this does not mean that family migrants lost interest in their original community, a great pool of research presents proof that social networks evolve around the triple sphere of ‘blood, kinship and geography’ even though there is a large geographical distance (fan, 2002; deaux 2009). rural migrants rely on this triple-based relationship throughout their motive lives despite the geographical separation. 4 this group can be divided into two typical communities. the first one is, colloquially called, the ‘ant group’: 蟻族 (lian 2009) and was originally used to define a mass community of the post-80s generation of those with better education or a well-trained background. although full of dreams, they have to face a harsh reality. they live a poor life without stable dwellings, normally living in collective dormitories, which are shared with other ‘ants’, but they have dreams in their hearts of the big cities of china. within this community, the low-waged it workers became known locally as the chinese ‘ant tribe’ due to the nonexistence of formal housing where they are living and their suffering a situation of poor personal hygiene. the second group is, colloquially named, beipiao: 北漂 (chen 1991), literally “beijing vagabond”, and this refers to the community of people who do not have a beijing hukou (household of permanent residence), and who migrated to beijing from other places in china pursuing the beijing dream—opportunities for a better future. beipiao is also the lifestyle of a drifter in beijing. 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 the proportion of permanent rural migrants in cities has been progressively growing (table 2), age, heredity membership, sibling order, rights to traditional titles (graves & graves 1974), and so on have all been cited as significant determinants of who is most likely to stay at home; who leads the chain migration; and who will finally finish the household migration and the whole process of rural-to-urban movement. likewise, other scholars (chan 2013; knight & song 1995) have found that migrants mainly came from part of a limited-resource and dissatisfied stratification system, and their absence has in turn strengthened the semi or completely undeveloped village structure. put starkly, the floating dwellers will leave their rural community forever and finally evolve to be permanent migrants in their host urban areas. however, when due to institutional reasons they cannot become urban residents, especially for migrants with low abilities, in the face of city life without dignity, no doubt homecoming is a decisive endpoint or their best and only choice. how does the migrant deal with this new life? to be a migrant when migrants move to a city as a temporary destination or as a permanent settlement, the new physical setting forces migrants to experience a physical, social and psychological shift to adapt. their migration and living experiences reflect their transforming identity status in china. the term ‘adaptation’ is currently giving way to an observation of rural-urban migrants as a more dynamic mediator in shaping his/her social conditions. adaptation facilitates these floating populations to enter urban life, but allows them to maintain an option to return to their own origins. owing to this, the adaptations which follow upon the migration of rural workers to an urban destination are the products of exclusion and negotiation in three modes: close-fitting mode; negotiating identity (deaux 2009) mode and assimilated mode. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 93 to shed light on chinese migrants’ adaptation patterns, we make use of the 2010 interview information of 300 migrant workers living in six selected czcs in beijing, respectively mingguang, shiliuzhuang, guanzhuang, yamenkou, e’fang, and zhongtan, located in six different districts (figure 4). these 300 interviews, while not representative of all intranational migrants, provide insights into how some migrants can or cannot combine their identity transformation into the adaptation of ‘changes’. the migrants interviewed include first and neo-generation migrants and those reaching middle age (age range 20-45). such migrant examples would need to consider their negotiating careers in the context of migration and transforming social networks, new opportunities availability, the confrontations with hostile or supportive members of resident host communities and diminishing expectations of a satisfying living environment cannot be avoided to deal with the new life as a migrant. close-fitting mode to the rural social matrix the first mode copes with discriminatory treatment by relying on a closed system, a rural enclave, which functions as a supernumerary for elements of the home culture left behind in rural parts of china. here, we see the close-fitting mode as a survival-maintaining choice when the migrant’s network structure is only connected via a small number of bridging ties – total and remaining traditional (burt 1992). at the group level, it involves the community of elderly rural migrants restricting itself with a closed network, consisting of closely linked figure 4. distribution of six-selected czcs in beijing city. (source: chaoyang planning bureau, modified by authors) 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 members that are inclined to endorse the norms, morals, faith and social sustenance within the group (burt 1995; coleman 1988). a migrant community closely fits the rural social matrix and does not interact with its host society in anything other than rudimentary or stereotyped methods. this index refers primarily to the scope to which migrants are dispersed within the main chain circles―family, social networks and habits of their origin to make available the strength and security desirable to handle and challenge the estrangement experience. on the one hand, migrants may not be easily altered or modified to fit conditions; on the other hand, adhesion to the community of origin is a means of lessening individual(s) risk and conflicts between their internalized expectations based on their backgrounds. in turn, they also receive emotional and informational support from this narrow social bond that has already been established in the destination places. this reflects the reciprocity relationship which exhibits a logic and source of social networks in facilitating migration. with this interpersonal attitude, the lack of a cordial relationship then strengthens the communal barricade; makes both communities unapproachable to each other, and worsens the boundaries of differences between us and them. that is to say, no matter how they build and enforce their social network, they are accustomed to and likely to continue to maintain access to resources within their own group, which may function as an association of fellow provincials, tongxianghui. nevertheless, immediate responses displayed by these kinds of associations affect the problems that strengthen the obstacles confronting rural migrants and their host cities while social assimilation continues on a minimal scale. for example, mr. liu has been in beijing for five years, and he is now working in a beijing restaurant. his answer was recorded to stress migrants’ real living situation: i always regard myself as part of my original household in the rural areas. i make frequent visits to my home place, and feel some obligation to extend financial assistance to those left behind. in addition, while conducting my research, i was joined by another two girls from zhejiang who came to beijing in 1998 when they were 23 years old. they told me that, kinship ties and native-place networks played a significant role in sustaining the migratory flows and especially in the early formation of the zhejiang migrant community in beijing. the traditional social networks facilitate the organizational framework for our rural migrants’ social life and private business. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 95 likewise, despite rising migration, the majority of chinese rural migrants are still tied closely to their native resources. for most chinese migrants, migrating in a city means moving to a less safe and poorer quality neighborhood. a 32-year-old respondent who lived alone in a beijing czc said: ‘i have little attachment to the places where i find work. i enjoy coming home to “a friendly environment”’. indeed, much more widely accepted is the fact that the migrants’ home or origin unit keeps providing different support from employment information, to psychological comfort. the trend and emphasis seem to be on the prevailing attitude towards rural migrants as permanent second-tier sojourners in urban society (fan 2002) which causes their network ties to deteriorate. as a result of migrants’ cohesion being grounded in the lower levels of society and in the long absence of stable support or protection from the host setting, such residents have naturally formed themselves into self-sufficient groups (zhang et al. 2003). negotiating identity—the in-between or rootless social lives in our interviews and conversations, a large majority of migrants frequently present themselves as strangers in a rootless mobility. most of them can tell stories about what awkward situations they face. one sichuan couple expressed strong aspirations to adjust to the new way of life in the city: […] for us, what we found here is what we were searching for. but we still feel the city is not a place of our own. we don’t interact with the locals, they look down upon us because of our non-native identity and un-standard mandarin. the locals always give us hard life, poor employment and education opportunities. with respect to this point, i asked them whether they considered themselves as native residents. they replied, we think that all the time, but the dilemma for the migrant workers is we become out-of-place outsiders both in urban life and at home. we are wondering where our home truly is or whether we still have a residence titled ‘home’. as hall (1987) pointed out, migration is a one way trip; there is no ‘home’ to go back to. migrant groups form bridges to their host community through balancing their inclination for group differences. in the case of this mode, the presence of young migrants is paramount as a 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 representative of imagining an ‘ambiguous negotiating identity’. the negotiating identity mode has a different profile compared to the first mode according to the category of a migrant group. the majority of this rootless group is second generation migrants, who develop their relationship to the world from simply dealing with the land to making a livelihood without land and agriculture. the essence of this negotiating of life is the attempt to bridge their rural background to the more open system of urban society. this group is not familiar with their host destination, nor do they have intimate local kin ties or friendship networks, or make a complete transformation to living a life surrounded by unfamiliar people and new things. successful adjustment requires a considerable amount of flexibility and skill. more significantly, it requires the ability to deal with the conflicting requirements of two different systems. but in truth, the life of this mode turns out to be peripheralized and marginalized, involving a more negative resolution of bi-cultural tension. this marginal lifestyle is exhibited by inferiority complexes, social isolation, feelings of powerlessness and ambivalence to personal identity. the lack of a sense of identity results in the rootless involvement and community attachment, as illustrated by another wuxi woman with higher education who works in a design company: quite a different respect is to have a mental blank. i don't know if you have seen the movie lost in translation but i felt like one of the characters (without the romance), alone in a big city. i saw great things and learned a lot but i didn't have anyone with whom to share these experiences i was having. actually, negotiating careers in the context of migration and the diminishing expectations of satisfactory situation is necessary. for example, a man working in a government department in beijing describes his position: a migration decision was my family project, my parents are first-generation migrants, i am one of the neo-generation. i am not isolated within the rural migrant community, i also maintain contact with the beijing mainstream. that is the merit of our neo-generation. i know both sides equally. furthermore, one predicament arises―the state of not actively being involved in either the rural community or the receiving host society. on the one hand, migrants encounter exclusion from their host society; and on the other hand, their identification with rural society becomes weaker and weaker. this ambiguity involves a double negation, that of non-identity with both urban and rural life which occurs with the majority of migrants. finally, the migrants face the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 97 dilemma of ‘non-survival in a city or non-return to the countryside’ both of which are not feasible. assimilation of adjustment polzer et al. (2002) began by defining identity negotiation as an aspect of adaptation. the true nature and challenge of full assimilation in a new living environment is highlighted by the awkwardness of the youngest migrants with their background in their adaptive community. for this minority, the rural background does not have any practical significance; instead it is symbolic and even a burden. they are dubbed ‘second-generation migrants’ in literature and the essence of a number of this group is they started their urban migrant life at birth. also this generation spent their childhood in the city, often they dropped out of school after finishing elementary or high school, and started to imitate the path of their parents’ life course to start their ‘gold rush’ at a tender age (aged 16). owing to this context, they prefer to speak the language of their host destination, and have limited knowledge of their home (rural) culture and dialect. compared to their parents’ generation, this group who migrated here in early adulthood or was born in the host city has an inclination to expand their abilities to assimilate to their host culture. many neo-generation migrants effectively are included in this type, reciprocating the assimilation for living in the host cities. during our interview, my conversation with many neo-generation migrants who were born in the host city frequently involved their perceptions of beijing and the meaning of belonging to the city. however, in reality, many of this younger generation of assimilated migrants face barriers to their entry into urban society and their participation in their origin community through distant family ties. assimilated young migrants have more urban friends of diverse backgrounds as their emotional source and social connections. most seek jobs in the urban mainstream. they live in various locations in the suburbs with urban ways and culture. their only ties to its countryside are historical and can be traced to their parents’ hometown. even though they may identify themselves as rural migrants by intention, this leaves them in a state of conflict: there are forces in their origin and community from which they find psychological support, but they also sense that in some instances, they may attempt to hide their origins in the case where they experience discrimination. it is true that ‘lonely psychological support’ is a reasonable response to the prejudiced situation in their host cities. i asked young migrants who were born in beijing 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 whether they thought they have to be assimilated to adapt to life in their host city. they explained as follows: […] we were born here, we speak mandarin or prefer to speak mandarin instead of our parents’ home dialect. we live in the city environment instead of the rice field, we have social networks in the city, and follow the social and cultural norms of our host city. my life is quite different from my parents, i don’t expose myself to the rice fields every day. i really like living in beijing. i try to adapt myself to the host culture. mianzi (face) and social expectations from friends and relatives inspire me a lot. unlike their parents (the first migrant generation), neo migrants are likely to have long-term plans in the city, which is viewed as a place which is their hometown, their place of occupation, a source of earnings and a place of dreams. as one insurance salesman who was born in beijing said: my social life is strongly based in this city. i think that my life patterns and thinking style follow exactly the urban mainstream. after all, assimilation cannot be avoided. migrant networks are more likely to engender a community that connects on a small scale, for example, with other migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties of ‘kinship, friendship, and shared community origins’ (massey et al. 1999). so migrants cannot integrate into the city, instead they are reluctantly involved. but from another perspective, migrant networks are more prone to be narrowed down within groups of geographical origin due to their low-level of trust in each other in the urban setting, so urban exclusion might also come from migrants’ ‘internal’ bond to their villages or the ‘external’ restraints put upon them by their urban environments. conclusion: relocation is beyond spatial movement on reflection what does our study of the experiences of migrants tell us about their shifting interface and their process of adaptation in their adoptive cities of china? also, what are the implications of comprehending both the impact of internal migration and its differentiated processes? cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 99 while chinese internal migration has maintained strong social and cultural divisions built upon institutionalized inequality, both cognitive knowledge and evaluative attitudes (related to cultural norms) have forced adjustment among migrants. for chinese migrants, internal migration supplies a permanent/temporary migration choice. the adjustment procedure extends to many dimensions of experience: survival in isolation, mediating through biculturalism, and full assimilation. in other words, chinese rural-urban migration is a process of active geographical and psychological negotiation that turns natives into outsiders and an in-system into an out-system. in a different national context (aside from china) migrants may face fewer systematic challenges; have greater access to social backgrounds, and face noticeable discrimination. nevertheless, in china, distance and spatial borders that once functioned as constraints to migrants have been reduced to a much lower level. some of the previous obstacles presented by rural life are nowadays moderated by the influence of globalization, and the long distances to travel to the city have been shortened by more progressive communications which enable those separated to maintain social and emotional connections. when migrants relocate to a new destination, rural and urban areas are like two societies within one country (whyte 2010), and rural migrants definitely experience a radically new physical, social and psychological space defined by a set of unfamiliar parameters. through the interviews conducted in our study we gain a more vivid sense of the individual experience – of the choices, the obstacles, the prospects, and the accomplishments with both a place of origin and a place of residence, and the fact that transnational activities concordant with this dual identification are feasible as well (itzigsohn et al. 2005). the differences in generation also imply that there is a varied adaptation across migrant populations. for the migrants themselves, negotiation of their social and psychological life is a continuing process and part of locating oneself. one clear feature seems to be the fact that first-generation parents are more likely to endorse a close-fit approach to the hometown community. such a connection would be conducted with limited dependence on the outside environment by this first-generation group, instead there would be a tighter connection with the rural community than their (second-generation) children would have, but their offspring in turn have been more effective adapting to the host city environment. these psychological processes and value orientations move us from a description of what level of adaptation exists 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 to an understanding of the pattern of migration experiences. consideration should be given not just to the views of migration in the host society, but also to the estimation of the migrants themselves, and these two perspectives reflect the possible match or mismatch of migrants to their living environments. in this case, the migrant community was not natural, fixed, or in an eternal place; rather, it was constantly made and remade through political and economic struggles in space and time. reference alba, r & nee, v. 2003, remaking the american mainstream: assimilation and contemporary immigration, harvard university press, cambridge, ma. bach, j. 2010, ‘“they come in peasants and leave citizens”: urban villages and the making of shenzhen, china’, cultural anthropology, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 421-458. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1360.2010.01066.x burt, r. 1995, structural holes: the social structure of competition, harvard university press, 1st paperback edition. chan a. 2002, ‘the culture of survival: lives of migrant workers through the prism of private letters’, in link, p., madsen, r. and pickowicz, p. 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http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-1317.2003.00491.x cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.1, 2015 103 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3094807 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2547220 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1043-951x%2801%2900041-4 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1043-951x%2801%2900041-4 http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6273930.pdf http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6273930.pdf http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.habitatint.2012.10.004 http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/a37268 http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/217913 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-1317.2003.00491.x negotiating a concurrence: tracing the visible/invisible relocation within migrant-inhabited cities of china xueni peng jin baek seoul national university abstract introduction descriptions of china’s internal migration and migrants what is the migrant confronted with? how does the migrant deal with this new life? to be a migrant conclusion: relocation is beyond spatial movement reference cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 12, nos. 2–3 dec 2020 © 2020 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: morrar, r. and sultan, s. 2020. the donor driven model and financial sustainability: a case study from palestinian non government organizations. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 12:2–3, 20–35. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6771 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper the donordriven model and financial sustainability: a case study from palestinian nongovernment organizations rabeh morrar annajah national university, west bank, palestine suhail sultan birzeit university, west bank, palestine corresponding author: rabeh morrar, faculty of economics and social studies, annajah national university, p.box 07, nablus, palestine. rabeh.morrar@najah.edu doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6771 article history: received 15/09/2019; revised 05/06/2020; accepted 07/07/2020; published 12/02/2021 abstract this study presents factors that encourage palestinian ngos to embrace financial sustainability employing modern ideologies that encompass community engagement, voluntarism, collaboration, and businesslike practices in order to meet societal challenges. the study explores the reliance of palestinian ngos on external funds (donor driven funds) and the environment impact of their attempts at financial sustainability. data were gathered using semistructured interviews with 22 ngos in the west bank and gaza in 2019. the data were analyzed through thematic analysis using the computer software maxqda. key findings were that palestinian ngos need to alleviate the dependency on a donordriven model by functioning independently from donors’ agendas; and that palestinian ngos need to collaborate with each other to centralize their efforts and avoid fragmentation. further, the palestinian government needs to revisit the relevant laws to regulate the civil society sector and avoid competition between ngos and private sector on the one hand, and ngos and governmental institutions on the other hand. keywords ngos; sustainability; civil society; palestine; donordriven; voluntarism declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 20 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6771 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6771 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:rabeh.morrar@najah.edu https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6771 introduction palestinian ngos and other civil society organizations have played a major role in the palestinian national movement over the last three decades (particularly following the oslo accord and the establishment of the palestinian authority (pa) in 1993), and this represents a distinctive and unique model in the arab region. this could be explained by the uniqueness of the political, social and economic environment in palestine. the observer can see the role of the palestinian civil society organizations in all facets of palestinian life. the absence of a public sector for a long time after the israeli occupation of the west bank and gaza in 1967 has created heavy economic and social demands on the palestinian government after the oslo accord in terms of providing public services for all citizens and creating real economic development; this situation opened the doors for an extended role for ngos in civil society to participate in the development process and in building the institutions for the state of palestine (analoui & samour 2012). it is no secret that there is a pervasive view among policy makers and the local community in palestine that ngos have failed to achieve their objectives in realizing real development for people and society, and in creating sustainable model for themselves. while the international community has been supporting palestinian ngos for decades, the impact of their funds has been questioned by policy makers and society members (nakhleh 1989; ngos’ development center 2009; atia & herrold 2018). thus, financial sustainability is a challenge that most ngos in palestine must address in an evolving and fluctuating funding landscape with ngos competing to enable effective contribution in social development and improve wellbeing in a politically complex and rapidly changing environment like palestine (okorley & nkrumah 2012). financial sustainability for nonprofit organizations is associated with the risk of their reliance on external funding sources and streams, their ability to prompt community engagement and voluntarism, and whether they consider formalized collaborations a way to respond to dynamic changes in the resource environment (e.g. cutbacks in the donor funds) and to decrease the competition between nonprofit organizations for funding resources (sontagpadilla et al. 2012). this study mainly focuses on the association between the volatility or instability of external funding and the financial sustainability of palestinian ngos. this paper does not intend to shed more light on the already welldocumented palestinian civil society or the role of ngos during the different periods of israelipalestinian conflict. instead, it will explain how the financial sustainability of palestinian ngos is doubtful in an evolving and unstable funding landscape and the almost complete reliance by ngos on external funding sources and streams and it will provide strong evidence that financial sustainability is a challenge that most ngos in palestine must address to serve the desperate need of communities and help promote and sustain programs and services. the second section presents a brief literature review, setting out the definition of civil society and the development of the concept of sustainability in this sector. the third section provides the research methodology. the fourth section discusses the development of ngos in the palestinian context and how ngos drive the development process in palestine. the fifth section discusses how to create a sustainable ngos sector that enables the enhancement of the role of ngos in palestinian society. literature review the increasing number of ngos in many countries is a consequence of public sector failure to cope with social and economic challenges, alleviate poverty, and cope with bureaucracy and corruption (booth 1994; fisher 1998; nelson 1995; clarke 1998, lewis 2001). ngos are less bureaucratic than government institutions, more connected to the citizens’ needs and concerns, and able to introduce new solutions for development plans and attuned with the required social changes (bebbington 1997; howell and pearce 2001). morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 21 in developing countries, there has been recognition in the last two decades that the liberalizations of markets have failed to respond to the social and economic development challenges. ngos have gained new impetus in playing an increasingly significant role in development discourse and practice. therefore, we find an increasing focus among academics and development theorists about the actual role of ngos in the development movement in developing countries (korten 1990; smillie 1995; mensah et al. 2017). historically, civil society has been one of the main sectors in palestinian society and a key stone in the socioeconomic development process. salem (2012) discussed the reality of palestinian civil society during the 1990s using three main assumptions. the first assumption is that civil society did not exist before the formation of an independent palestinian state. this argument states that israeli occupation as well as the fragmentation of palestinians severely hampered the creation of a strong and wellstructured civil society. the second assumption states that civil society exists to play a prominent role in confronting the burdens emanating from the absence of a palestinian state by providing health, agricultural, educational and social services alongside other partners. the main view in this approach is that ngos in the 1980s and 1990s were not a deviation and distraction from the endeavor of palestinian people for freedom and an independent state. the third assumption suggests that palestinian civil society is in transition from the old domestic (alahli) society to new civil society organizations, which is consistent with the transition from occupation to an independent state. in other words, the role of civil society has changed from being under implementation to being complete in the presence of a palestinian state. ngos have constituted the backbone of civil society in palestine. they play a prominent role in the service delivery and socioeconomic development process (ngos’ development center 2009), mainly for the more disadvantaged and marginalized segments of the population. according to the palestinian central bureau of statistics data (pcbs) that pertain to palestinian ngos, there were almost 3,600 ngos in the west bank and gaza in 2015, which provided more than 40,000 job opportunities (around 10% of jobs in the labor market)1. palestinian ngos are defined as organizations or entities that are designed on a voluntary basis outside of the market relationships and beyond the parameters of the state, family or official working times. ngos in palestine may be divided into three main groups (abuiyada & abdulkarim 2016). the first group consists of welfare ngos (e.g., the community rehabilitation centre for children), which are the simplest and oldest type of organizations, established at the beginning of the twentieth century. the second group is the second generation of palestinian ngos, dating back to the late 1970s, which consists of developmental ngos (e.g., the union of health work committee). these ngos arose in response to the israeli policies of ‘dedevelopment’ in the occupied palestinian territories so as to integrate palestinians within the israeli economy. that is, the development of ngos aimed to build stepping stones for palestinian institutions under occupation (roy 1995). the third group consists of empowerment organizations (e.g., women’s affairs technical committee), which emerged in the beginning of the 1990s in order to contribute in the foundation of palestinian democratic government and build the palestinian national authority institutions after the oslo accord in 1993. among the main tasks of these organizations were to ensure transparency, empower good governance and pluralism, and enhance advocacy (bishara 1999). financial sustainability is a challenge that most ngos must address (sontagpadilla et al. 2012; diaz & rees 2020) as it is central to organizational function (bowman 2011). financial sustainability for nonprofit organizations enables them to maintain the ability to be financially agile over the longrun in order to serve highneed communities that have consistent and continual demand for services while developing resilience to occasional shocks in funding resources in the short term (sontagpadilla et al. 2012). thus, the capacity 1 http://www.pecdar.ps/en/article/979/mohammedshtayyehlabormarketindicatorsareveryworrying morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 22 http://www.pecdar.ps/en/article/979/mohammed--shtayyeh--labor--market--indicators--are--very--worrying of ngos to provide consistent and quality services to beneficiaries is based on their ability to achieve financial sustainability (nanthagopan et al. 2019). it is crucial for civil society organizations to seriously consider the financial sustainability of their funding programs and policies (okorley & nkrumah 2012), by focusing on their missions rather than on the tools that keep them surviving as this will enable citizens to claim their rights and draw the attention of those who hold the political and economic power (hayman 2016). many civil society organizations are ill prepared in maintaining their services to vulnerable groups due to the increase in the political and economic constraints (hayman 2016), which arise either from poor communication or from poor strategic planning (analoui & samour 2012). the patronage relationship between funder and grantees was well discussed in the literature (walker 1983; brulle & jenkins 2005; goss 2007; reckhow 2016); this relationship occurs when ‘organizations lose their autonomy and become dependent on their funders, and increasingly implement their funders’ agendas’ (atia & herrold 2018). much of this literature considers that ngos express loyalty to the agenda of the funder in order to obtain funding (shatzmiller 2001; brulle & jenkins 2005). in palestine, the majority of ngos are donordriven organizations where their patronage comes mainly from foreign aid (atia & herrold 2018). although, this patronage relationship makes them more professional and well regulated, yet the ngos remain accountable to donors and hold greater affinity for their donors’ agenda than for the needs of their communities (atia & herrold 2018). the objectives for many of the palestinian ngos are externally defined through the funder, with very limited involvement of indigenous palestinians in the definition of these objectives and allocation of funds (nakhleh 1989), and this has created unequal relationships between donors and grant recipients and depoliticized the ngos sector, leading to crises in their sustainability and legitimacy (nakhleh 1989; ngos’ development center 2009; atia & herrold 2018). this has reinforced the discussion in palestinian society about the efficiency and real objectives of the ngos programs, and has kept the financial sustainability of the palestinian ngos strongly associated with reduction of external funding to the palestinian territories. in addition, the volatility of palestinian ngos stems from the legal and administrative challenges which mainly result from the israeli blockade to gaza and the control of monetary transactions between the west bank and gaza as well as with other countries. the division between the west bank and gaza where each area is controlled by different authorities has limited the registration and funding to organizations that are affiliated with their political parties. above all, the continuous financial crisis of the palestinian government has limited the accessibility of ngos to public funds because donors’ funding is not enough for these organizations to sustain functionality on their own (analoui & samour 2012). after the oslo accord, some changes have been incorporated in the nature and distribution of international funds to palestinian ngos, such as, an increase in professionalization and specialization, less solidarity funding, a decrease of regional funding at the expense of foreign funding, and stricter rules for funding mechanisms (challand 2009). however, these changes have created unfavourable side effects; they hampered the available space for ngos to set priorities for their communities and allowed for international donors to dictate these priorities. also, many activities of palestinian ngos are still devoted to relief and aid programs (abu odwan 2013), while failing to emphasize sustainable development concepts. therefore, in the light of the substantial cutbacks in the donor funds associated with the large number of competing ngos in palestine, the main question is how does the dominance of the donordriven funding model (adopted by the bulk of palestinian ngos) impact the ngos’ financial sustainability while maintaining their communitybased services and responsiveness to the palestinian needs? morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 23 research methodology in order to answer the research question on how to understand ngos in palestine from the perspective of sustainability, the authors employed a qualitative research method, using interviews (saunders et al. 2017). in this study, indepth interviews were carried out in 2019. each interview lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. the interviews were recorded and transcribed, an important step in capturing the interview data effectively. questions were focused on understanding and analyzing the interrelationship between the donordriven funding model and financial sustainability for palestinian ngos. although some of the interview questions may have been considered controversial according to the individual political preference of a typical palestinian, the response rate was quite satisfactory, with twentytwo of the twenty three targeted ngos participating. it is important here to note that palestine is a small society, and the researchers are known in the ngo sector. table 1. interview questions and themes emerging question themes describe the degree of impact of ngos on the development process in palestine • the role of ngos in the service delivery and socioeconomic development process in palestine • the expansion of ngos sector in palestine in response to the increasing societal challenges what are the main challenges that face the ngos sector in palestine? • ngos and political challenges in palestine • the increasing demand for ngo’s services • the conditions attached to funding • the difficulty in abandoning the donor driven model • fragmentation of ngo sector • ngos and bureaucracy • ngos and the question of efficiency and accountability do you think that palestinian ngos play a significant role in dealing with the economic and social challenges that face vulnerable groups in palestine such as, youth, women and refugees? • the ability of ngos to respond to the increasing economic and social challenges in palestine • the ability of ngos to target vulnerable groups in palestine how do you see the future of the ngos sector in palestine within the dynamic changes in the political, social and economic environment in palestine? for example, the cutting of usaid funds to the palestinian government and ngos by the trump administration. • the response of ngos in palestine to the changes in the political environment • political changes and the financial sustainability of ngos in palestine morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 24 table 1. continued question themes do you think that the palestinian ngos should change their donordriven business model to gain more elasticity in dealing with the increasing societal challenges and dynamic changes in the political, social and economic environment in palestine and the world? why? • unequal relationships between donors and grant recipients • ngos and the question of sustainability and legitimacy what are the alternatives for palestinian ngos to achieve financial sustainability and independence from local and international donors? • tradeoff between the dominant donor driven model and financial sustainability do you think that the palestinian ngos should adopt a profitoriented model beside their present servicefree social model? why? • new business model for ngos which allows for revenue generation • the feasibility of servicefree social model in the ngos sector describe the relationship within ngos and ngos and the government? is it based on collaboration and integration or competition and fragmentation? • fragmentation of ngos sector • the relationship between government and ngos in palestine: integration or competition • overlapping and duplication of ngos projects and the question of sustainability the interview transcripts were analyzed using thematic analysis (attridestirling 2001). table 1 above summarizes the questions and lists a sample of the themes that were derived. pseudonyms were allocated to participants. results and discussion ngos between the risks of reliance on external funding and financial sustainability this section draws attention to an aspect of the data suggesting that palestinian ngos should rethink their objectives and programs in the context of sustainability in order to override the funding constraints and to alleviate the heavy burden of donordriven strategies. nonprofit organizations in lowincome communities are tasked with creating a balance between ‘(1) meeting the expectations of mainstream funders and/or governing bodies and (2) staying connected to the local community and being perceived as genuine’ (sontagpadilla et al. 2012). the interview data indicate that many of the ngos in palestine have failed to create this balance and have become vulnerable to the fluctuation and volatility of external funding. such vulnerability has brought grave challenges to the sustainability of their schemes and projects as expressed by more than half of the interviewees in the study. for instance, suha, an employee in an international ngos in gaza, stated: ‘unfortunately, palestinian ngos depend totally on the donor’s funding, which creates many challenges for our ability to provide our services’; while lara, a project coordinator in one of the international ngos in education and social business noted: ‘many of the ngos do not work within the developmental objectives in palestine, since they mainly are governed by the morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 25 donors’ objectives’. perhaps most starkly, in an interview with salma, a director of a wellknown ngo for women affairs in gaza, she said: ‘the development and growth of the ngos were not determined based on societal needs assessment, rather based on the agenda of donors and what they think it is important for the beneficiaries.’ suha’s, lara’s, and salma’s views are recurrent across the data and are consistent with current literature that explicate the ways that the relationship between donors and grant recipients in palestine are unequal, and that ngos are used to dictate the agenda of the international donors in an unsustainable way (nakhleh 1989; ngos’ development center, 2009; atia & herrold 2018). many of the ngo leaders who participated in the study (such as sami, zaher and rani) think that the increasing number of ngos after the oslo accord in 1993 was unreasonable and ineffective. for example, sami expressed his resentment about the number of ineffective ngos: ‘unfortunately, we are currently talking about 3000 ineffective institutions, no more than 500 effective institutions, the remaining are small grass root institutions… the institutions in the west bank and gaza, which are active, do not exceed 500700 institutions’. the ineffectiveness of ngos is apparently explicit in further interviews with zaher and rani, who are both directors of wellknown nongovernment research institutions. zaher stated that: ‘the development and growth of the ngos were not determined based on societal needs assessment, but as a direct consequence of the generous funding from the international donors in the last twenty years’, that has left adverse implications for the autonomy of palestinian ngos and has become, as zaher added: ‘controlled by the agenda of donors and what they think it is important for the beneficiaries’. this view is shared by suha, who asserted that: ‘ngos in palestine obtain huge funds, but unfortunately, the highest share was not employed in an efficient way, which hampers a lot the social development’. rani introduced two opposite observations about the reconstitution and growth of the ngo sector in palestine in the last 20 years. in the first observation, rani found that the growth of ngos is important and has two main imperatives: ‘first, to bridge the gap in public services in many sectors like agriculture, health and education. second, many of the ngos are grassroots, well connected with the local community and unbiased to any region or political group which make them preferred by the international donors to work in socioeconomic development issues for vulnerability groups’. the second observation is similar to zaher’s and suha’s views; rani believes that: ‘the massive flow of donors’ fund created the reasons for the steady and unjustified growth of many of the ngos which were established based on small projects or seed funds.’ the discussion of financial sustainability among palestinian ngos is not new, but it was fueled recently after the u.s administration stopped its aid program to the palestinians in west bank and gaza, including the mass fund for palestinian ngos2. this important contextual fact was a key reference point during the interviews. most of the stakeholders included in this study think that the ngos in palestine have become worried about how to preserve the continuity of their services, and showed concern for the need for a new hybrid form of organization that is able to sustain activities when external funding is withdrawn or severely curtailed, or in the case where funds are conditional. for example, salma confirmed that: ‘palestinian ngos follow the agenda of donors without any considerations for sustainability… we are all at high risk if we do not sustain our services and organizations, the solution is to search for new organizational structures that can create social value while generating revenues.’ here, salma speaks of adapting to this new and challenging funding environment. sixteen of the twenty two interviewees in the study stressed the need to rethink their business model in the light of the dynamic changes in the political and economic environment at the local and international levels. in this way, salma 2 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middleeast/uspalestinianaidcutsisraeloccupiedwestbankgaza usaida8758456.html morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 26 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-­east/us-­palestinian-­aid-­cuts-­israel-­occupied-­west-­bank-­gaza-­usaid-­a8758456.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-­east/us-­palestinian-­aid-­cuts-­israel-­occupied-­west-­bank-­gaza-­usaid-­a8758456.html and others expressed views that cohere with the broader sector, that sustainability is crucial in order to handle the reduction and removal of external funding for palestinian ngos, and to strengthen the role palestinian ngos play in positive social change to effectively face the surrounded threats and challenges (the coordination council for palestinian ngos 2016). a further theme within the data relates to conditional funding (see hailey 2014) and the tensions around the respective agendas of funders and fund recipients; a tension that creates a dilemma for many of the palestinian ngos by shaping their plans and projects, questioning their sustainability, as well as influencing their impacts on society. suha explicates this point: ‘ the ngos follow the agenda of donors without any considerations for the sustainability, therefore we find that social impact is still absent for many projects.’ awad, a director of local ngos in one of the refugee camps in the north west bank, has also raised the concept of ‘conditional funding’ to stress the unequal relationship between donors and grant recipients: ‘conditional funding is one of the main obstacles we face in serving vulnerable groups, in many cases, donors predetermine the type of projects that should be supported...many times they refuse to fund socially innovative ideas which might create financial sustainability for our organization and instead support projects that are not a priority for the society and vulnerable groups.’ suha and awad’s points of view here assert that funders are invested in agendas that may not be sensitive to the local context, and therefore not suitable to addressing service sustainability and social issues. many international donors impose conditions on how the beneficiaries dispense the funding money. although some of these conditions are important for showing transparency and accountability (kilby 2006) and ensure that donors’ money will not be channeled to production and administration cost, yet they impede ngos from being sustainable. promoting community engagement to drive financial sustainability it is well documented that international funding altered the philosophy of voluntarism that was predominant in most of the palestinian ngos for many years (hammami 2000; the coordination council for palestinian ngos 2016), orientating staff towards wage labor and, eventually, towards highly paid salaries with heavy monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. this also pushed many of the palestinian ngos to amend their approach into more specialization and professionalism which created unfavourable effects. it decreased the space available for ngos to define priorities for their communities and it allowed international donors to define and change priorities (challand 2009; abu odwan 2013). this issue was discussed in depth by sami who emphasizes the high costs of such an approach in the absence of voluntarism: ‘ the problem that we faced as ngos is that some or all of us started out from public bases and affiliations, therefore, these institutions took on a similar nature of societal movements such as youth, women and student movements. as a result of donor pressure, it has become necessary to raise the professional level of these institutions, as it was no longer possible to get support without having the internal, administrative and financial capabilities. therefore, pressure has been exerted towards governance and administrative and evaluation systems… most institutions have not been able to maintain a large level of youth base and to move into professional institutions’. morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 27 at times, as sami continues his talk about the shift in the idea of development for steadfastness that predominated the business model of palestinian ngos over the period from the 1970s to 1993 and development for the construction of a new state, he explained: ‘after oslo and the illusion of an independent palestinian state there was a shift in the idea of development (development for steadfastness into development for the construction of a new state), some believed that we have moved from national liberation into a stage of a new state under construction. this caused a merging between those development strategies mentioned above and many institutions started working towards [building and capacity development of farmers, teachers], and also many human rights institutions started emerging to support governance… if the ngos cannot adapt to the reality and develop themselves in different sections, they will eventually disappear’. sami attributes the comparative successfulness of his and some other palestinian ngos to the development approach they follow (development for steadfastness). in his view, it is important to create a link between development work and relief work in a creative and distinct manner, as well as to the culture of voluntarism they have adopted: ‘we consider ourselves a sustainable ngo as we have plenty of volunteers who help us in our core business.’ this relationship between voluntarism, steadfastness and financial sustainability was made explicitly in further interviews with salah, the director of an ngo in one of the refugee camps in the south of west bank, which receives volunteers from many foreign countries. he stated: ‘the voluntary work is very important for the sustainability of our projects, we cannot afford big salaries and administrative cost’. he stressed the role of student volunteers from the local universities or international volunteers in implementing entrepreneurial projects in cooperation with vulnerable groups. sami’s and salah’s views are consistent with the current literature (see bray 2010; sontagpadilla et al. 2012) which demonstrates that the contribution of volunteers in lessresourced communities to maintain financial sustainability of nonprofit organizations and fostering support from the community are key factors in the enhancement of community engagement. volunteers can complement existing staff, offer expertise that nonprofits may not have readily accessible, and enhance productivity and program delivery (sontagpadilla et al. 2012). for example, more than half of the nonprofit organizations in usa in 2009 relied on volunteers in order to enhance current operations and address financial sustainability during a period of economic downturn (bray 2010). financial sustainability in a changing and complex environment many of the civil society organizations are illprepared in sustaining their services to vulnerable groups in the increasingly challenging political and economic conditions (hayman 2016). ngos in palestine are not working in a void, they are highly affected by the changing and complex environment which is also characterized by huge socioeconomic challenges and political instability (the coordination council for palestinian ngos 2016), mainly due to the continuation of israeli occupation since 1967. these factors may not be controllable and are beyond the ngos’ control, which makes the attainment of financial sustainability a complex task. thus, ngos must have the wherewithal to react to these environmental stressors in order to prompt financial sustainability. moore (2000) argues that the fit between the internal capabilities and the challenges and opportunities of the environment in which it is operating is crucial for an ngo to achieve sustainability of funding. for example, zaher, a senior researcher in civil society and research officer in a local palestinian ngo, talked about the repercussions of israeli occupation as one of the most uncontrollable factors that constrains ngos who seek implementation of social innovation projects in the agriculture sector for vulnerability groups in the west bank: morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 28 ‘we consider social innovation projects in agriculture and agribusiness as a priority in our support, it is a national issue too… there are more than 4400 handicapped people from the israeli persecution, also thousands of families who miss their main dependents in the israeli prisons, therefore the social innovation can increase their resilience…but, the confiscation of palestinian agricultural land by the israeli occupation to build settlements restricts the exploitation of this land from the palestinian farmers or entrepreneurs for social innovation projects’ hanadi, a social entrepreneur working in an ngo for youth entrepreneurship, explained how the occupation has led to severe fragmentation of the entrepreneurship and innovation system in palestine: ‘occupation is the big challenge for social entrepreneurship, the movement between west bank and gaza is very hard due to the israeli siege against gaza since 2007. this makes the innovation system in palestine even more fragmented, constrains the mobility of entrepreneurs and ideas between the two regions, and complicates the collective work and the exchange of resources, and hardens the process of innovation and startups mainly in gaza strip.’ in the last two decades, the dynamics in the political environment in palestine has left marked disruption in the flow of donor funds to palestinian ngos. for example, the winning of hamas in 2006 election (the main party in palestine with religious roots) has led to the drying up of international funds to both the palestinian government and ngos (de voir and tartir 2009). salma documented her experience with the political or conditional funding: ‘some international donors stopped their fund to the ngos in gaza strip for political reasons, which was also consistent with the siege imposed by israel since 2006’. the continuation of the israeli occupation of the palestinian lands in the west bank and gaza that began in 1967 has negatively affected the successful functioning of the institutions of a future state of palestine (samara, 2000) reflected in a weak regulatory environment and the continuation of work on obsolete laws and regulations. for example, there are several laws regulating the work of ngos, some of which are old as the jordanian companies’ law no.12 of 1964, which is still the applicable law in the west bank with some amendments and additions (paltrade 2014; abdeen 2015), especially with regard to nonprofit companies and the preparation of special bylaws which was enforced in 2010 (abdeen 2015). while in the gaza strip two laws from the british mandate are still applicable: the companies law no.18 of 1929 and the ordinary companies’ law no.6. of 1930 (paltrade 2014). sami is critical of the operation of ngos under different legal systems. the inadequacy of the regulatory environment in palestine was demonstrated by 15 interviewees out of 22 (including salma, sami, lara, and sohaib). for example, sohaib and lara who seek to enhance financial sustainability in their institutions by prompting social innovation projects expressed their dissatisfaction about the regulatory framework in palestine and the way it inhibited support for social innovation projects. sohaib, who is the general director of a local ngo for sustainable development and an expert in ictbased social innovation, stressed that: ‘ you cannot go and register a social innovation enterprise. our law is not adapted to this kind of organization. for example, our organization had an opportunity to obtain $200,000 from external donors to invest in private projects or companies, but the palestinian laws did not allow us to invest because we are registered as nonprofit organizations. palestinian law does not allow us to generate revenue, they don’t want us to invest and generate revenue. therefore, we will lose this kind of funding’ he continued ‘in palestinian law there is no difference between charitable and development organizations, all of them are under the umbrella of charities ... this highly limits the work of ngo’. morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 29 lara confirmed sohaib’s view: ‘i don’t think that the government is aware about social innovation, because there are no laws and regulations here. a government’s role is important in accreditation, laws and regulation to support social innovation.’ sami raised the multiple legal systems that dominate in palestine, hampering the activities of ngos in palestine: ‘we operate under the israeli regime in jerusalem and the israeli military regime in area c, in addition to hamas control in gaza and the palestinian authority in the west bank. these four legal systems exert pressure on ngos’. nonprofit organizations are experiencing increasing pressures to be more businesslike and to focus on incomegenerating projects to prompt financial sustainability and growth (mcdonald 2007). innovation in nonprofit organizations is important as one of the best ways to face the growing environment of uncertainty and competition ( jaskyte 2004; jaskyte & dressler 2005; choi 2014). nonprofit organizations can play a prominent role in innovations addressing social issues or social innovation (dover & lawrence 2012). we find many ngo stakeholders across the data who are eager to promote the idea of social innovation to prompt financial sustainability; many of them (including salma, zaher, lara, and sohaib) think that the sustainability of funding is linked with the extent to which ngos are able to differentiate their activities and to build their funding strategies on innovative projects to avoid repetition and duplication. for example, salma calls on ngos in palestine to ‘search for innovative and entrepreneurial ideas’, she criticized the duplication of ideas and projects: ‘the market is now saturated with traditional projects such as embroidery and classical handicrafts’. however, salma again posed a question which demonstrates the hindering legal and institutional framework in palestine, and the tension between the palestinian ngos and government institution: ‘how can our projects generate money and achieve profit? laws and regulations are not flexible in palestine if we would like to start an innovative project that generate profit.’ use partnerships and collaborations to build capacity to achieve financial sustainability palestinian ngos were on the top of the list of many international donors, but the situation has been drastically changed in the last few years as other countries were added to the list such as syria, yemen, iraq, libya. this has been aggravated by the intense competition between palestinian ngos for the shrinking donor funds, fragmentation and duplication of ngos programs (ngos’ development center 2009). in this context, suha stressed that ‘there is a destructive competition between the ngos in palestine’. this competition between ngos hampers the financial sustainability of the nonprofit sector in palestine, as zaher stated: ‘one of the main obstacles for financial sustainability of ngos in palestine is the fragmentation and duplication of projects… we don’t want to duplicate efforts and waste money.’ he suggested that: ‘ngos should undertake project mapping to avoid overlapping; not all ngos do that, this depends on how honest they are in their development approach.’ nonprofit organizations face financial challenges and dynamic changes in the funding climate during turbulent economic times, therefore many of these organizations have begun to consider formalized collaboration and partnerships as a strategy to respond to the changing resource environment and increased competition between nonprofit organizations for donor funds (connolly and york 2002; renz et al. 2010). roseackerman (1982) predicted high expenses for fundraising in a competitive market with free ngo entry. an ngo can increase its fundraising if an additional ngo enters the market and the amount of overall donations is assumed to be fixed (aldashev and verdier 2010). however, collaborations provide capacity building for nonprofit organizations and help them to obtain critical resources and reduce the risks morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 30 associated with financial uncertainty as well as improving their abilities to efficiently and effectively meet the needs of their communities (sontagpadilla et al. 2012). most of the ngo leaders who participated in this study are convinced that the idea of collaboration and working together does enable ngos to meet the expectations of beneficiaries because of the role this plays in their financial sustainability. for example, sami stressed that ‘an important factor that has played a significant role in our successful financial sustainability is our partnerships and integration with other stakeholders; we do not work individually, since we aim to create real partnerships between us and other institutions to integrate and join forces’. rita, an executive director of an ngo for women’s empowerment, was quite passionate about collaboration: ‘collaboration can create a miracle, it can also create a great change’. however, ngos stakeholders (such as sami, sohaib, and jad) were critical of the relationship between government and ngos by pointing out that the relationship is not based on complementarity and collaboration, but rather on changes between competition and skepticism, which negatively affects the endeavor of the financial sustainability of ngos. for example, sami summarized this point explicitly: ‘we are facing competition between some departments of the institutions of the palestinian authority and civil society institutions through the transition of some ministries from being an incubator and umbrella for ngos’ activities to having a decisionmaking role. some are convinced that as long as the authority has been formed and we have ministries, there is no need for civil society institutions.’ jad, a project director in leading an ngo for agricultural development, was dissatisfied with the government role and the weak collaboration with local ngos in palestine: ‘ the government should respect the social contract with the community and ngos. it should introduce stimulus packages such as tax exemptions, direct subsidy, monitoring, followup, and partnerships.’ an ngo is financially sustainable if its core work will not collapse, even if external donor funding is withdrawn. however, most palestinian ngos working in a development context are donordriven and are not meeting the needs of their beneficiaries in the long term. therefore, a sustainable approach to funding is an important strategic objective that palestinian ngos need to seriously consider. conclusion in the absence of public funds, weak connections and limited support between the private and government sectors and ngos, most palestinian ngos find themselves completely dependent on international funding. as shown earlier in this article, because of the volatility in international funding sources due to political and economic reasons, palestinian ngos have encountered many challenges during the last twenty years in their pursuit of financial sustainability. this has pushed many to sharply decrease or wind up their activities in the post oslo accord period (1993 – present). the situation is such that political and legal notions and conditional funds, put more pressure on ngos and civil society organizations to be more proactive and demand oriented. this requires that these organizations work together, share resources and avoid duplication and refrain from competition. to maintain sustainability, ngos need to revert to the voluntarism that was dominant in palestine in the 1970s and 1980s. in addition, palestinian ngos might need to keep their social aims but at the same time start thinking of incomegenerating projects. further progress may also rely on establishing social solidarity and working to strengthen the social bonds in the country, while at the same time achieving an economic goal of providing products and services at low prices. a core contribution of this paper is its rich illustration of how the financial sustainability of palestinian ngos is doubtful in an evolving and unstable funding landscape and the almost complete reliance by ngos on external funding sources. this study also provides strong evidence that financial sustainability is a challenge that most ngos in palestine must address to serve the desperate need of communities and morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 31 help promote and sustain programs and services. palestinian ngos need to ensure sustainability through stakeholders’ involvement and focusing on their target groups in building their programs and services. while the findings of this research are based in the current climate, further research in this endeavor could certainly unveil other key factors impacting the sustainability of palestinian ngos. as stated earlier in this article, palestine is a complex and rapidly changing political context, and this is ever more the case as we move further into increased us support for israel a likely further term of a netanyahu administration and a europe that is both reticent to hold israel to account for its oppression of palestinian civil society and also financially stretched in the midst and aftermath of the covid19 crisis. these are unpredictable and potentially even more challenging times in many senses, the likelihood is that many of the challenges documented here will be exacerbated and palestinian ngos will need greater resilience and innovation if they are to work towards a meaningful sustainability. 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a review of the literature, rand corporation report. document no. rr-121-ymcap. https://www.rand.org/pubs/ research_reports/rr121.html walker, j. l. 1983, ‘the origins and maintenance of interest groups in america’, american political science review, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 390-406. https://doi.org/10.2307/1958924 morrar and sultan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 35 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr121.html https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/rr121.html https://doi.org/10.2307/1958924 asylum seekers and refugees in indonesia: problems and potentials muzafar ali independent researcher linda briskman swinburne institute for social research lucy fiske university of technology sydney abstract asylum seekers and refugees in indonesia increasingly experience protracted waiting times for permanent settlement in other countries. they have few, if any, legal rights, coupled with extremely limited financial resources and no access to government provided services. in response to the prospect of living for many years in this difficult and liminal space, a small community of refugees in the west java town of cisarua has built relationships, skills and confidence among themselves and with host indonesians to respond to identified needs. this paper outlines the main political and policy frameworks affecting the lives of refugees in indonesia and then draws on research interviews and participant observation to illustrate the resilience and agency utilised by the community to mitigate uncertain futures. the major focus is on education for asylum seeker/refugee children. introduction increasingly protracted situations confront forced migrants in indonesia. this cohort includes asylum seekers (awaiting determination of their refugee status) and those who have been granted asylum (refugees) who are awaiting third country resettlement1. the time of waiting can extend for several years and is marked by marginality – of attaining a level of immediate safety, but with no realisable rights beyond an assurance of non-deportation. asylum seekers 1 at times the terms asylum seeker and refugee are used interchangeably in this paper, to reflect the literature and common usage. linda briskman, faculty of health, arts & design, school of arts, social sciences and humanities, swinburne institute for social research, swinburne university of technology. lucy fiske, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney. corresponding author: lbriskman@swin.edu.au issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 muzafar ali, linda briskman, lucy fiske this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(2):4883. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i2.4883 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 23 and refugees in indonesia face a broad range and intersecting web of problems and obstacles; this forms the ‘problems’ section of the paper. yet, despite (or perhaps because of) these obstacles, asylum seekers and refugees in indonesia are exercising creativity, resilience and resourcefulness to create community spaces through which they are able to meet basic needs and build lives which provide purpose and fulfillment beyond mere survival. this paper focuses in particular on the educational needs and rights of refugee and asylum seeker children in cisarua, a west java township 70 kilometres from jakarta, and the ways in which the community has organised to ensure their children’s education is not disrupted during the protracted wait for refugee resettlement. we first present an outline of indonesian policies towards refugees and the effects of these policies on the daily lives of refugees living there. we then outline some recent changes in australian refugee policies and the impact of these policies on the situation for refugees in indonesia, before shifting to look more closely at the afghan and pakistani hazara community in cisarua (west java), including the reasons for their displacement and, more particularly, the initiatives they have developed to partially overcome their social, legal and political exclusion. methodology this paper uses a mixed methodology, drawing on participant observation of muzafar ali’s lived experience and qualitative research undertaken by co-authors linda briskman and lucy fiske. ali is a hazara man, originally from afghanistan and now a permanent resident in australia. briskman and fiske are academics with extensive experience in conducting research with asylum seekers and refugees. ali was a participant in the research described below, conducted by briskman and fiske. they subsequently met again at the symposium forming the basis of this special issue of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, in september 2015, at which time they decided to jointly write this paper, drawing together both academic and experiential material to build a richer exploration of life for refugees in indonesia than either account could achieve separately. in recent years there has been a burgeoning of academic interest in asylum seekers and refugees in transit in indonesia. nethery et al. (2015) explore immigration detention in that country. briskman and fiske (2016) discuss how australia’s policies have the effect of criminalising asylum seekers and refugees in indonesia. sampson et al. (2016) discuss interviews that reveal how agency is exercised in situations of protracted precariousness. in empirical research in three indonesian provinces, missbach (2015) includes accounts of daily 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 hardships for those in a situation of limbo. our research takes an innovative methodological direction. it combines an auto-ethnographic approach (ellis et al. 2004) whereby the lived experiences of muzafar ali inform the wider political and social context, with interviews conducted by the other authors. before seeking asylum, ali’s most recent employment was with the united nations assistance mission in afghanistan (unama) and the united nations development program (undp), working in a disarmament program monitoring political, security and human rights issues; through which he developed research skills. largely due to this work, in 2012 he became a refugee, fleeing with his family via pakistan and malaysia to indonesia. he spent one year and eleven months living in indonesia with his wife, young daughter, mother, sister and three other relatives until they were resettled to australia in 2015. during his time in indonesia, ali directly experienced the difficulties outlined in this paper. he was a cofounder of the cisarua refugee learning centre (discussed later in the paper). he was active in the community in cisarua, forming friendships with fellow refugees, indonesians and international visitors, attending community meetings, and participating in key community development activities. ali kept records of his experiences both in afghanistan and during his refugee journey, including his time in indonesia. ali’s records, created contemporaneously, include films, photographs, minutes of community meetings, emails and a personal journal. these records are drawn on as a source in this paper. in keeping with our combined methodology, the paper recounts ali’s lived experiences and documentation of his and other refugees’ lives in indonesia and draws on a research project conducted by briskman and fiske titled informal protection space in indonesia. this was a small qualitative research project with fieldwork conducted in december 2013 through semistructured interviews with 30 refugees and asylum seekers living in cisarua, and with representatives from organisations working with refugees and asylum seekers in indonesia, including unhcr, international organization for migration (iom) and legal services. refugee research participants included 13 women and 17 men, and represented refugees separated from their families by refugee flight, as well as those living in family groups both with and without children. all participants were adults and came from afghanistan, pakistan, iran and sri lanka. both individual interviews and focus group discussions were conducted. interviews were semi-structured with questions designed to elicit information under the broad thematic areas of safety, health, education, livelihood, housing, family and cultural life, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 25 information sources and decision-making processes. all interviews and focus group discussions were transcribed and thematically analysed. indonesia: asylum seeker policies and effects indonesia is the world’s fourth most populated country, spread over more than 14,000 islands. indonesia is predominantly sunni muslim, but it is also religiously, ethnically and linguistically diverse, with over 700 different languages and dialects spoken, over 300 different ethnic groups and significant populations of christians, hindus and buddhists (cia 2015; uscirf 2013, 1). although indonesia is south east asia’s biggest economy and a member of the g20 group of countries, half of its population is living in poverty with limited job opportunities (handayani 2012). health and higher education is mostly unaffordable for ordinary indonesians. while indonesia is developing rapidly, its public infrastructure, including schools, clinics, hospitals and roads, is greatly overshadowed by the public need (oecd 2015). indonesia is not a signatory to the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees (known as the refugees convention); nor is there domestic law in place to protect refugees. indonesia is a transit country (rather than a destination country), where many asylum seekers and refugees previously intended to stay for only a short time before travelling onwards to australia. as a non-signatory to the convention, indonesia does not conduct refugee assessments, nor offer any pathways for refugees to attain permanent residency there. nonetheless, indonesia hosts more than 13,000 refugees and asylum seekers; mostly from afghanistan and pakistan, but also from myanmar, iraq, iran, sri lanka and other countries (unhcr 2016, p. 1). refugees and asylum seekers arrive in indonesia either by plane (for those with travel documents and access to a visa) or by boat, most commonly via malaysia. asylum seekers pay between usd5,000 – 10,000 to people smugglers who facilitate their risky journey to indonesia. typically a refugee will fly to kuala lumpur, and then travel on fishing boats to north sumatra in indonesia by crossing the strait of malacca. the smugglers pay bribes to malaysian and indonesian authorities to give their passengers a safe passage through airports and other checkpoints. on their way to indonesia, asylum seekers are soft targets for local smugglers and authorities. all three authors met refugees who reported that malaysian authorities took away all their 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 belongings including their cash, mobile phones and watches and they searched the women for jewellery. other refugees reported that local smugglers had stopped their journey and demanded more money from the refugees. once refugees have arrived in indonesia, most travel to the capital, jakarta, where they register with the united nations high commissioner for refugees (unhcr). refugees are issued documentation by the unhcr which identifies them as asylum seekers2, which offers them protection against possible deportation. registration also begins the refugee status determination (rsd) process. the unhcr invites them to an rsd interview and determines whether they will be granted refugee status according to the 1951 refugees convention. in august 2015 the waiting period for an rsd interview was up to twenty months, with a decision on the outcome coming some time after that. for people recognised as refugees in indonesia, resettlement is the only available durable solution as return is impossible and indonesia does not permit local integration. precise time frames for this process are difficult to establish due to changing politics of refugee displacement and resettlement. resettlement seldom takes less than two years and may take very much longer. briskman and fiske interviewed several sri lankan refugees who had been advised by the unhcr to expect resettlement in six years3. in november 2014, then minister for immigration scott morrison announced that any refugees registering with the unhcr in indonesia after 30 june 2014 would be ineligible for resettlement to australia (abc 2014b). the changes in australia’s asylum seeker and refugee policies, alongside the diversion of unhcr funds to respond to the syrian refugee crisis, have caused significant extensions to the processing and resettlement times for refugees applying from indonesia (unhcr 2015b, 52). thus a newly arrived refugee can now hope to be resettled in a third country five years or more after arriving in indonesia. living arrangements for asylum seekers and refugees during this time of waiting vary, including in immigration detention centres and community centres in jakarta and on other indonesian islands. there is a large community of between 3,000 and 5,000 refugees and asylum seekers living in cisarua. they rent accommodation from local indonesians and 2 an asylum seeker is a person who has applied for recognition as a refugee, but who is awaiting a decision on that application. 3 interviewed december 2013. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 27 frequently experience overcrowding to defray rental and associated costs. apart from a minority receiving a small allowance from the ngo, jesuit refugee service, most of those living in cisarua rely on remittances from their families and friends abroad, which results in a struggle for the basics of life such as food and health care. yaqub4 told us in an interview that his friend in afghanistan sends him money when he can and a contact in australia also provides some help. others told us similar stories but shadowing this was a sense of shame and guilt as they had hoped to be able to support their families back home and not to be recipients of charity or a burden on families whom they know to be impoverished. a group of sri lankan asylum seekers, including families with children, reported that it is only through extensive sharing of food, money and accommodation, and additional food support from a nearby hindu temple that they are able to meet their basic needs.5 the implications of extended waiting periods are explored in further detail in a later section of this paper. unhcr the unhcr is under-staffed and its budget is insufficient to adequately deal with refugee issues in indonesia (unhcr 2015b). our conversations with asylum seekers suggest that unhcr case officers are often young indonesians, often lacking sufficient knowledge about the asylum seekers’ country situation or of complex protection needs of some refugees6. as a consequence, people in need of protection may in fact be refused by the unhcr due more to inadequacies in the system, such as inexperienced case officers, but also including a lack of legal assistance for asylum seekers, advice (sometimes incorrect) circulating within asylum seeker communities and inadequate systems for identifying individual vulnerabilities such as mental health problems or cognitive impairments. the situation is not static. refugees continue to arrive in indonesia. at february 2016, there were 13,829, the vast majority from afghanistan (unhcr 2016), reflecting ongoing instability in that country. australia’s closure of resettlement opportunities for refugees in indonesia has made the unhcr’s task of resettling refugees more difficult as it must now convince other resettlement countries further afield (such as the usa, canada and sweden) to resettle refugees through its indonesian operations. on a global scale, unhcr’s projected 4 all names have been changed to a pseudonym. interviewed december 2013. 5 interviewed december 2013. 6 lucy fiske has on file a december 2015 job advertisement for a ‘protection associate’ position responsible for refugee status determination decisions which requires a ‘minimum completion of secondary education but preferably a university degree in law, political science or related disciplines.’ 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 resettlement needs for refugees in 2016 is 1,150,000, an increase of 66% from the estimated needs for 2014, with much of this increase attributed to the syrian conflict. the 80,000 resettlement places made available by member nations in 2015-16 will fail to meet this need (gifford 2015). higher numbers of arrivals and the limited number of departures from indonesia result in a refugee crisis, in terms of limited capacity for processing, support and resettlement. the indonesian government, unhcr and iom have limited resources for refugees and, as we explain later, the wealthy neighbouring country of australia lacks political will. australia: asylum seeker policies and effects unlike indonesia, australia is a signatory to the refugees convention and therefore has international legal obligations toward refugees and asylum seekers who arrive on australian shores. australia has implemented a raft of policies aimed at preventing asylum seekers from arriving in australian territory. as a staging post for asylum seekers en route to australia, the consequences for indonesia and those seeking asylum within that country is a steady increase of people in protracted situations. stopping boats has underpinned australian asylum seeker policy since 1992 when mandatory immigration detention was introduced by a labor government with bipartisan support. it is beyond the scope of this paper to document full details of the stringent policy domain but information is readily available7. the overall policy thrust is encapsulated in the 2013 words of then immigration minister scott morrison: ‘let me be clear. i’m trying to stop people illegally entering australia by boat. that’s our objective’ (cited in abc 2013), and backed up by messaging devices to target would-be arrivals, including a poster showing a small boat in the ocean, specifying: ‘no way by boat: you will not make australia home’ (fleay et al. 2016, 3). in september 2013 former australian prime minister tony abbott launched operation sovereign borders (osb) and it continues today (in 2016). osb has had significant negative impacts on refugees’ lives in indonesia. osb is defined by the department of immigration and border protection (dibp) (nd) as ‘a military led operation supported and assisted by a wide range of federal government agencies.’ through this policy, boats are intercepted and turned back to source and transit countries such as indonesia; the capacity of offshore 7 see for example http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/fact-sheets/, http://www.asrc.org.au/resources/factsheet/#1375939566-2-31 http://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/fact-sheets/ http://www.asrc.org.au/resources/fact-sheet/%231375939566-2-31 http://www.asrc.org.au/resources/fact-sheet/%231375939566-2-31 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 29 detention in nauru and papua new guinea (manus island) has extended; and, although no longer operational, purchasing and deploying specially designed orange lifeboats to turn back asylum seekers who were transiting in unseaworthy boats. not only have the turn-backs had a devastating impact on returned asylum seekers, but australia’s relationship with indonesia has been put at risk through breaches of indonesia’s maritime borders by the australian navy (acbps and adf 2014, para 10). muzafar ali explains the direct impact of osb on asylum seekers in indonesia based on his personal experiences of living and working with the refugee community in cisarua: prior to osb, refugees and asylum seekers would rush to find a people smuggler to take them to australia as soon as possible. they still registered with the unhcr and got identification papers but only to avoid arrest by police and having to pay bribes. because once the asylum seekers register to unhcr, they get an id card and asylum seekers can stay in indonesia as long as their rsd and resettlement process is ongoing. the authorities usually do not arrest asylum seekers with unhcr cards. refugees would move frequently in order to avoid arrest, and because of the regular departure of roommates, their life was full of chaos, fear and restlessness. the smugglers had a grassroots network within refugee communities and exploited the situation in order to find more clients to fill australia-bound boats. constant rumours of new boats leaving reverberated through the community, and smuggling agents would gather payments and arrange transportation to the south coast of java where most boats left for christmas island. often these boats failed even before leaving indonesian waters. one of the most important effects of the constantly changing and chaotic environment, and the rumours and misinformation purveyed by smugglers’ agents, was that refugees were fearful and didn’t trust anyone. the lack of trust within the community made forming any kind of self-help or positive development impossible. osb mostly stopped boats leaving, but it did not stop refugees arriving in indonesia. rather, refugee arrivals of hazara increased due to the increasing instability in afghanistan. taliban activity had increased and the targeted killings of hazara continued when two blasts within 40 days killed at least 250 people in quetta city. more recently, hundreds of myanmar’s rohingya muslims, iraqi and syrian refugees 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 have come to indonesia. the community was growing as the arrivals continued but departures all but stopped. people had increased financial difficulties as they have to wait for many years to get resettled. many refugees who could not find support from anywhere, turned themselves in to indonesian authorities, asking to be put in detention to get food and shelter. within a year, detention and community centres were filled beyond capacity and hundreds of refugees camped outside immigration centres waiting to be accepted. some refugees voluntary deported themselves to afghanistan. in one particular case, a prominent young hazara singer, aref shadab, returned to afghanistan and was subsequently kidnapped by the taliban on his way to his home while travelling on the kabul-kandahar highway8. he was kidnapped along with his friend dilshad (also a singer), the driver and two passengers, all hazara. aref was released after paying a substantial ransom9. among those refugees who remained living in the community in cisarua, some leaders began to emerge, determined to rebuild trust among the community and to develop ways of supporting one another. some refugees with more education and with language and other specialist skills started to arrange volunteer interpreting and counselling services. relationships began to build within the community as the refugees came together to discuss and solve problems. this community building was a big change from how refugees lived in indonesia previously and true refugee communities started to establish. education was the perfect issue to bring refugees closer and to develop practical solutions to their problems. it was one of the most important issues for refugee parents. many educated refugees in the 8 a number of hazara news sources have reported his abduction as occurring on 16 june 2015, including hazaras in indonesia, mulla sarpalas, and humayoun behzad and khama press http://www.khaama.com/gunmen-kidnap-two-singers-in-ghazni-3491 9 aref shadab recalls his account in a telephone interview with an afghan radio station “radio payam javan jaghori” published on its facebook page https://web.facebook.com/radiopayamjavan/videos/1065350080172831/ (in hazaragi) and in a video interview with geo hazara channel https://web.facebook.com/253796511472069/videos/494479644070420/ (in hazaragi). his friend dilshad and another passenger were killed by the taliban a few hours after they were kidnapped. the taliban accused aref of singing and of having five brothers in australia. they threatened to kill him unless he paid the ransom. he was eventually released in zhob, a town in the balochistan province of pakistan. news of targeted kidnapping in afghanistan is plentiful, with hazaras among a number of identified targeted groups. see for example, goldstein, j and shah, t., 2015, ‘afghan kidnappers prey on hazaras’, the new york times (15 november). accessed 17 april 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/asia/kidnappings-escalate-in-afghanistan.html?_r=0 http://www.khaama.com/gunmen-kidnap-two-singers-in-ghazni-3491 https://web.facebook.com/radiopayamjavan/videos/1065350080172831/ https://web.facebook.com/253796511472069/videos/494479644070420/ http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/world/asia/kidnappings-escalate-in-afghanistan.html?_r=0 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 31 community were willing to serve through their skills and they discovered that that this was an issue they were able to solve themselves. the community building and self-help actions of the hazara community in cisarua is explored in detail after a brief explanation of the causes of displacement for hazara people from afghanistan and pakistan, and an overview of life for refugees in indonesia (hazara and other nationality and ethnic groups). ethnic hazaras a large percentage of refugees in indonesia are ethnically hazara; shi’ite muslims originating from sunni dominant afghanistan and pakistan. they are physically distinct from other ethnic groups in both afghanistan and pakistan, and are therefore readily identifiable. historically, hazaras have been subject to systematic persecution in afghanistan. there have been more recent slayings, including when the taliban carried out brutal mass killings of hazaras in 1990s when they captured the areas of bamyan, yakawlang and mazar-e-sharif. one of the most brutal attacks against hazaras occurred on 8 august 1998 when the taliban massacred over 2,000 hazara men, women and children in mazar-e-sharif (hrw 1998). after experiencing brutality during the taliban regime, hazara people supported international community efforts to install a democratic and more progressive government in afghanistan. many are now paying the price of supporting the international community. as the taliban strengthens its grip, in conjunction with the withdrawal of international forces, the taliban has conducted what many hazaras believe are revenge attacks including the kidnapping and murder of hazaras. many hazaras fled afghanistan to quetta city in pakistan from the late 1990s onwards. there they are increasingly the subjects of targeted killings based on their ethnicity and religion by the extremist religious groups, lashkar-e-jhangvi and jaish-ul-islam, linked with taliban and al-qaeda. in 2011 lashgar-e-jhangvi issued a statement declaring their intention to rid pakistan of hazaras saying, ‘as in the past, our successful jihad against the hazara in pakistan and, in particular, in quetta is ongoing and will continue in the future. we will make pakistan the graveyard of the shia hazara’ (cited in ahmed 2014). some hazaras, particularly those with an education, worked for us and australian forces, or with local and international aid agencies engaged in security, aid and development interventions in afghanistan. while many were motivated by a desire for transformation in afghan politics 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 and society, the lack of ‘success’ in afghanistan and the resurgence of the taliban has arguably increased the risks of persecution against the hazara people. consequently, it is likely that hazaras and other afghans are likely to continue to seek asylum in refugees convention signatory countries over the coming years. asylum seeker life in indonesia indonesian policy towards refugees and asylum seekers is best described as one of tolerance. while indonesia has thirteen long term and twenty short term immigration detention centres, refugees are generally permitted to reside in the community while their cases are processed by the unhcr (global detention project 2015). in august 2015 there were 4,273 people of concern to the unhcr held in indonesian detention centres (unhcr 2016, 2). while undergoing unhcr processes, refugees are not entitled to social security, to work or start their own businesses. this is understandable, given that half of indonesia’s population is living at or below the global poverty line. engagement by refugees in income generating pursuits may be seen as competing with indonesian livelihoods. refugees in indonesia must find ways to sustain themselves. refugees face many challenges when they arrive in indonesia. the major difficulties raised by refugees (regardless of their nationality or ethnicity) during interviews conducted in december 2013 included: livelihood and financial difficulty, health, safety and security, lack of legal rights, mental health problems, boredom and education for their children. financial problems create significant hardship. according to ali the monthly cost of accommodation, food and transport for one refugee in jakarta or cisarua is approximately usd130. health, clothing, education and other basic needs add to the costs. refugees rely on savings, sell whatever valuable items they may have brought with them (such as jewellery or watches) or are supported by relatives overseas. with an average wait for resettlement of approximately five years, this becomes a massive burden on their savings and their relatives, who are very often living in economically marginal and precarious situations themselves. ‘savings, exchangeable articles of value and remittances usually did not last very long and, sooner or later, support from friends and kin ran out’ (missbach 2015, 101). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 33 the cost of living for many years without income in indonesia has led some refugees to selfsurrender to immigration detention centres, despite knowing about the poor living conditions. in detention, refugees are typically kept in locked cells and sometimes subject to mistreatment by the authorities (missbach and sinanu 2013). health and sanitation conditions are extremely poor and doctors are slow to respond to refugee health issues (hrw 2013). with detention centres and iom community housing spread across different islands, staff from the unhcr visit on a slow rotation, delaying the resettlement process. waiting time for refugees in detention is often longer than for those in jakarta and cisarua. many refugees in indonesian detention centres are distressed. deprived of freedom of movement, locked up for long hours, away from their families, poor living conditions, lack of recreation and long and unclear resettlement times add to this stress. in these circumstances, 20 year old ali mohammad, a hazara refugee, committed suicide in a detention centre in surabaya on 10 february 2015 (hazara asylum seekers 2015; beyond foreignness n.d.). ali points out that health facilities in indonesia are often too expensive for refugees struggling to meet the costs of food and rent, resulting in reluctance to seek treatment. many children are undernourished and there are many refugees and asylum seekers suffering from depression who require psychological and mental health support. in some cases, unaccompanied young refugees are infected with sexually transmitted diseases due to a lack of knowledge about hiv/aids. in fieldwork interviews conducted in december 2013, we found that asylum seekers and refugees adopted creative ways to ensure that there was at least minimal access to health care. asylum seekers and refugees with a health qualification were willing to diagnose and make suggestions for treatment in cases that did not require hospitalisation. more concerning was the interview participant who told us that although he was untrained, he had previously held an administrative position in a hospital in pakistan and was sometimes called on to diagnose and recommend pharmacy-available medications to fellow community members. he explained that ‘sometimes i go to the apotek10 looking for the formula... sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t.’11 he further explained that he uses the internet, including auto-translation programs, to identify possible medications and their names in bahasa indonesian. 10 term for pharmacy 11 interviewed december 2013. 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 refugees and asylum seekers are from different cultural groups from host communities. living and adjusting to a community with a different language, social norms, cultural practices and religious rituals is an added challenge for the refugees. a majority of the indonesians are sunni muslim while many refugees are shi’ite, a different denomination of islam. while the majority of indonesians are accepting of people of other faiths, there has been a significant rise in fundamentalist sunni islam (known as wahabism) in recent years (von der mehden 2014; bachtiar 2013). consequently, many refugees cannot practice their religion freely. their fear is not unfounded. a series of attacks on shi’ite communities in indonesia led the united nations high commissioner for human rights, navi pillai, to approach the indonesian government in november 2012, urging it to take action to protect religious minorities in the country including through repealing blasphemy laws and through more pro-active protective measures (agence france 2012). as recently as december 2015, indonesian police arrested a ‘terror cell’ planning attacks against shi’ite muslims and christians (al jazeera 2015). nonetheless, asylum seekers and refugees in cisarua enjoy relative freedom of movement and report generally good relationships with their indonesian neighbours. despite not being permitted to work in indonesia and notwithstanding language communication problems, relationships with local indonesians are mostly harmonious and respectful. while some refugees told us of arguments or violent incidents with indonesians, most of the people we interviewed in cisarua in 2013 said that relationships with indonesians were positive. nonetheless they considered they had to keep a low profile, to be ‘under the radar’ and try to meld into the population as discreetly as possible (agier 2008, p. 20). issaq explained the situation well, saying: we feel safe if we go to the bazaar. we don’t think that ‘this person will kill me, this one kill me, this one kill me.’ no. in quetta, when i go to the bazaar, most of the time i am afraid, scared. in here i don’t have this problem. … but here we could not perform any activity like muharram (an important shi-ite celebration). we are just sitting in our home, sitting in one site, quiet, because it could be a problem if we celebrate our muharram12. refugees and asylum seekers in cisarua live in a liminal zone of tolerance and exclusion. as mohammad explained: 12 interviewed december 2013 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 35 indonesia…temporarily provides us safe haven. we are living here, but we’re not. we feel more secure than we did in our country, but we are still very vulnerable. we can be stopped by the police and they can get a bribe to release us. we can be looted. we can be treated like animals. [we cannot] report to the police because we think that if we report to police, the police will prefer the statement of the local people13. as asylum seekers are not permitted to work or conduct any income generating business, interview participants spoke about being forced into dependency on relatives overseas, community members or charities. some asylum seekers earned very small sums of money through producing goods for sale within asylum seeker and refugee communities, such as by making afghan bread. the overwhelming consensus among the thirty people interviewed, and through ali’s participant observations, is that refugees and asylum seekers generally feel safe from physical attack, but are acutely aware of their non-belonging and try to ‘stay quiet’ and invisible. a large number of refugees are families with children. education remains one of the biggest concerns for their parents. children recognised by the unhcr as refugees are permitted to attend local indonesian schools, but those still considered asylum seekers do not have this entitlement. in parts of indonesia, some school principals permit asylum seeker children to enrol; nonetheless the majority are left without access to formal education (missbach 2015). classes are delivered in bahasa indonesian and children must learn bahasa before enrolling. there are no subsidised bahasa courses available and private lessons are beyond the means of all families that we met. language is thus a key barrier. for children, exclusion from education for many years is a major loss and will likely compound social and economic disadvantage for years to come, restricting their ability to fulfil their potential in later life. as noted by the unhcr (2012) ‘refugees value education and place it high on their priorities. quality education that builds relevant skills and knowledge enables refugees to live healthy, productive lives and builds skills of selfreliance.’ indeed, all of the parents interviewed expressed great concern about disruption to their children’s education. in addition to skills and knowledge development, education has significant emotional and mental health benefits, providing the children with structure, 13 interviewed december 2013. 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 purpose and goals to work towards. education is a challenge the refugees in cisarua have stepped up to provide. education in cisarua when briskman and fiske conducted interviews in cisarua in 2013, the consequences of children missing out on schooling was causing great distress to parents. although an indonesian ngo had suggested that children learn bahasa and seek entry to local schools, there was general reluctance. asylum seekers and refugees saw cisarua as a temporary transit site and engaging in the formal education system would arguably signal that they might be putting down roots. this was despite the knowledge that their situation was likely to be protracted. for example, one family told us that the unhcr had warned them to expect a six-year waiting period. they desperately wished for their children to be educated in english as they believed that english language skills and education would better prepare them for a good future, whatever that might be. despite the long period of waiting, they resisted nonenglish alternatives14. to compensate for such scenarios, educated asylum seekers and refugees with high levels of english gave their time and skills to set up informal classes for children but this only went part-way to resolving the education situation. it was after we left that a new initiative, the cisarua refugee learning centre (crlc) emerged and, as one of the founders, muzafar ali describes its background and operation: the crlc is a school established and managed by the refugees to provide education for their children. the school is informal and not registered with the government and its establishment was important in boosting the community's confidence. they did not rely or wait for any organisation to start assisting them. they came together and acted on their own initiative and discovered that they could act collectively and independently to support their needs. the crlc changed the misconception that refugees cannot engage in any kind of social activities, and that refugees are not allowed to teach and learn. it also provided a space where the community could meet and share their concerns. it has become a very important social and cultural space for the community. later on these communities started to organise social events, including birthdays, funerals and religious gatherings. 14 interviewed december 2013. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 37 once the community started the school, they decided to teach in english because most of the countries of resettlement are english speaking. establishing the crlc there are more than 500 children living with their families in cisarua and no school for refugees. existing indonesian schools teach in bahasa, indonesian language, making it nearly impossible for the refugee children to attend. without school the children spent their days on the streets doing nothing, and not sleeping until late at night. with nothing to occupy them they became very affected by the depressed situations in their homes. in october 2013 some young refugees started to organise regular and formal meetings to discuss the community’s challenges. they held meetings in different areas of cisarua to encourage other refugees to join and share their own experiences. it took almost a year to build up trust and understanding. in this time they established networks, identified problems and discovered the refugees’ capabilities and limitations. eventually, due to rumours, misinformation, and fear of jeopardising their asylum application with unhcr, most of the refugees left the group. those remaining decided to start a school for refugees in cisarua in august 2014. they rented a small house with two rooms and a corridor. they started this school with three classes and seven teachers, all of them women because male teachers feared jeopardising their asylum claims. thus, women showed more courage to teach the children than the men who held private classes for other male refugees. within one week the school had more than 50 students. some parents even moved from jakarta to enrol their children. the parents contributed 50,000 indonesian rupiah (equivalent of aud5.00) per student to buy carpet, a white board, markers and a few notebooks. after this initial contribution, the parents paid 15,000 rupiah (aud1.50) per month per student. this amount was enough to buy potable water, gas and to pay electricity accounts. parents would clean the school and help the school run on a daily basis according to a roster. the school runs classes from 9.00am to 1.00pm, monday to thursday. all the teachers are volunteers and do not receive any salary. the parents organise weekly meetings and this is an opportunity for them to share information and to discuss social issues. soon 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 the school became a trusted place to discuss serious issues. those parents, who did not know each other before the school, became close friends. the children loved to come to school because they enjoyed learning and playing with other refugee children. the crlc was more than a school for the community. it provided them with activity, a sense of pride, enjoyment, togetherness and comfort. it would not be a stretch to say it gave them their very identities back. they moved from faceless refugees hiding in the shadows, to being teachers, students, managers, sports co-ordinators, carpenters, bookkeepers and parents who were providing for their childrens’ futures. the children formed soccer teams and soon the women, mostly teachers, made two teams of their own. for many of these women it was their first time playing soccer. in pakistan and afghanistan women playing soccer is unusual; this was a very new experience for everyone. it was like a revolution for a fearful, depressed and newly established community to open up and express their existence with education and sport. the students at crlc are mostly hazaras from afghanistan and pakistan. but other students are from iraq, iran, myanmar and sudan. the management decided to teach an australian curriculum in the english language. teaching in english was a great challenge because the children are from different countries and backgrounds, but the crlc has played a big part in bringing parents from different countries closer to each other. there are now another three learning centres for refugee children in cisarua and jakarta, replicating the crlc model, and nearly 300 children benefit from education on a regular basis. when crlc started on august 2014, it was very hard to find teachers to volunteer, but now there are more than 30 teachers across all the learning centres. the initial group of refugees who established the crlc were inspired and motivated by an australian couple based in jakarta and an indonesian woman working for a refugee organisation. an australian couple pledged to pay the rent for the school building and provided more stationery and materials needed for the school. they also facilitated a good friendship between the crlc and the australian independent school (ais) in jakarta. the refugee children were provided with the opportunity to perform cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 39 on stage at ais and the cultural performance was highly appreciated by the ais students, teachers and parents. the australians gave their camera to refugees to film and take photos of their daily life, which refugees did enthusiastically and effectively. there are now many short films and hundreds of photographs of refugee children and their school. the refugees started a facebook page and other online sites for the crlc, and shared their activities in and outside the school. soon it started to attract attention from australians, many frustrated by their government’s osb policy. they began to visit the school and donated books and stationery. in a few months, crlc had a small library with more than 1,000 books. the students take these books on a daily basis and study and share them with their friends at school. dozens of australians from different backgrounds have so far visited crlc which include academics, researchers, students, teachers, journalists, filmmakers and ordinary citizens. the new south wales teachers’ federation with the collaboration of australian teachers’ union sent two teachers from australia to train crlc teachers, as they were inspired by the work crlc was doing for refugee children. the indonesian woman referred to above also played an important role because she was guiding and mentoring teachers about indonesian customs and law. she helped to wake up the sleeping leaders within the refugee community by organising a living values workshop and retreat and encouraged them to lead in challenging situations. she identified leaders and enhanced their capabilities by attending the meetings and discussions. the crlc succeeded because refugees worked hard to establish it. it took a year of meetings, discussion and planning before inauguration. it is an example of the resourcefulness of refugees and proves they are capable and motivated. they not only established the crlc but also a community which other refugees replicated. it was a pioneering step for all the refugees in indonesia. the school and education for refugee children was the sacred cause, which removed all differences, overcame initial mistrust and brought them close to each other to help in running the school. 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 refugee women proved to be brave and bold to take risks in difficult situations. they gave women a new hope in a challenging time. they eventually became an integral part of the community with the massive contribution of educating the children. the crlc uses social media in a very effective way in order to establish a good network of friends and followers outside indonesia, particularly in australia15. the facebook page was a chance for australians to see what refugees can achieve if they are given opportunities. online, australians and refugees came face-to-face, perhaps for the first time. it is a window for both sides to develop better understanding and friendship. australians have had a massive share in crlc’s achievements over the past two years. they have donated money, books, toys, stationery, provided teacher trainers, office equipment, carpets and tables for the school. the success story of crlc is also a success story of australian people and their love for refugees. it proved that they understand the situation from their own perspective in a realistic way, rather than relying on mainstream media outlets. the importance of the crlc was observed by australian phd student, carly copolov, on a recent visit to the school. she noted the dedication of the volunteer refugee teaching staff and observed the joy of the children: ‘i had never seen children so excited to learn and the amount of respect they had for their teachers was impressive’ (copolov 2016). concluding remarks despite the hardships caused by their limbo status in indonesia and the increasingly long waiting period for resettlement, refugee communities have been able to find opportunities in the uncertainty of their situation. while refugees have restricted rights in indonesia and do not have a pathway for permanent residency there, they are nonetheless able to build relationships and mechanisms through which they can meet some critically important needs. for bauman (2004), refugees are outcasts not knowing if their situation is temporary or permanent. ‘even if they are stationary for a time, they are on a journey that is never completed since its destination (arrival or return) remains forever unclear, 15 crlc has a facebook page at https://www.facebook.com/cisaruarefugeelearningcentre/ and a website at http://cisarualearning.com/#intro https://www.facebook.com/cisaruarefugeelearningcentre/ http://cisarualearning.com/%23intro cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 41 while a place they call ‘final’ remains forever inaccessible. they are never to be free from the growing sense of the transience, indefiniteness and provisional nature of any settlement’ (bauman 2004, p. 76). while these sentiments cannot be denied, there exists an alternative story narrated by asylum seekers and refugees. as ali noted above, skill sharing and solving of problems collectively had benefits for displaced communities residing in cisarua. here they were motivated to overcome hardship by working together to find their own unique solutions to the despair confronting them. arguably, there are difficulties of participation in constrained environments (clarke 2010, p. 120). refugees in indonesia face constraints politically, economically, socially and from their status as outsiders with liminal legal status. yet, inspiringly, the establishment of the cisarua refugee learning centre demonstrates how a community-based approach can harness human agency and spirit to overcome structural limitations and build strong community connections, both within like communities and across linguistic, cultural and national divides. references abc news 2013, ‘immigration minister scott morrison defends use of term 'illegal arrivals', plays down png police incident’ (21 october), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-1021/immigration-minister-scott-morrison-defends-use-of-illegals-term/5035552 accessed 14 february 2016 abc news 2014a, ‘indonesia to raise australian asylum seeker policy with united states’, (14 february), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-02-14/australias-ambassador-injakarta-summoned-by-indonesian-governm/5261466 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http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c4b8.html http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocpdfviewer.html?docid=4af7e71d9&query=education http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendocpdfviewer.html?docid=4af7e71d9&query=education http://www.unicef.org/education/index_44870.html%20accessed%2014%20february%202016 http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/indonesia%20factsheet%20%20october%20%202013%20finalrev.pdf http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/indonesia%20factsheet%20%20october%20%202013%20finalrev.pdf http://www.mei.edu/content/map/saudi-religious-influence-indonesia asylum seekers and refugees in indonesia: problems and potentials abstract introduction indonesia: asylum seeker policies and effects unhcr australia: asylum seeker policies and effects ethnic hazaras asylum seeker life in indonesia education in cisarua concluding remarks cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 13, no. 1 2021 © 2021 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: bhu-anantanondh, n., kanyajit, s., suwannanon, a., and sinloyma, p. 2021. solving bangkok’s traffic problems. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:1, 46–61. https:// doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7265 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper solving bangkok’s traffic problems nualmanee bhu-anantanondh1, sunee kanyajit1, apasiri suwannanon2, patchara sinloyma3 1 mahidol university, nakhon pathom, thailand 2 rajabhat suan dusit university, bangkok, thailand 3 royal police cadet academy of thailand, nakhon pathom, thailand corresponding author: nualmanee bhu-anantanondh, mahidol university, 999 phuttamonthon 4 road, salaya district, nakhon pathom province 73170, thailand, suneekanyajit@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7265 article history: received 10/06/2020; revised 11/01/2021; accepted 06/05/2021; published 25/05/2021 abstract bangkok is reported to have the worst traffic in the world, a situation that has a detrimental effect on the economic, social and financial development of the city. this mixed-methods study of the enforcement of thailand’s road traffic act, b.e. 2522 (1979) surveyed drivers in bangkok and interviewed police traffic officers. the results reveal negative perceptions of drivers towards traffic police officers, poor law enforcement and disparity in policing practice. they also show that drivers lack road discipline and do not fear the consequence of any wrongdoing because they perceive that the act merely prescribes petty offences and traffic police officers only impose light punishments. to support the cultural changes necessary to alter these perceptions, and enhance the economic and social development of the city, a range of strategies will be necessary, including training and development among drivers and law enforcement officers and strengthened legal provisions. keywords bangkok; road traffic law; police traffic officers; drivers; consequences of traffic congestion declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 46 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7265 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7265 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:suneekanyajit@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7265 introduction the road fatalities rate of thailand is ranked as the second highest in the world, next only to locations of conflict and lawlessness (like libya). when solely considering the motorcycle death rate, thailand is ranked first in the world (beech, 2019). according to the thailand road safety policy foundation, thailand witnessed the most road deaths in southeast asia between 2000 and 2009 (marukatat 2018; taekratok 2015). the number of road accident deaths comprises 36.2 people per 100,000 people, as represents an average of 24,326 people per year (marukatat 2018; world health organization 2018) or 60 people per day. this makes thailand the country with the highest number of such deaths in asia (world health organization 2018). bangkok, the capital city of thailand, has often been denoted as having the worst traffic congestion in the world alongside a high number of traffic accidents and related fatalities (mark 2019; phulsarikij 2018; fernquest 2017; kasikorn research center 2016). traffic problems have been a complicated and growing problem for bangkokians for many years, with the thai road safety collaboration having found that the highest number of traffic accidents in thailand occur in bangkok (thai road safety collaboration 2020). table 1. number of road accidents, deaths and injuries in bangkok between 2016 and 2019 outcome 2019 2018 2017 2016 accident 52,582 (cases) 47,215 (cases) 41,524 (cases) 34,131 (cases) death 586 (persons) 615 (persons) 646 (persons) 604 (persons) injury 61,867 (persons) 55,669 (persons) 48,622 (persons) 39,909 (persons) (source: http://www.thairsc.com/p77/index/10) the number of cars on the road in thailand has continuously increased and the public transport of the country has remained inadequate. alongside this, drivers have been seen to frequently drive without self-discipline and often in violation of the law (chitsawang & chitsawang 2014). these aspects, in combination, cause traffic congestion and traffic accidents. such outcomes are considered a serious problem in thailand as they cause direct and indirect loss which could evolve to obstruct the economic and financial development of the country. as a consequence, many government agencies give priority to urgently resolving this context. the problem is complex, because there are four laws governing vehicles and road operations in thailand: the road traffic act, b.e. 2522 (1979), land transport act, b.e. 2522 (1979), vehicle act, b.e. 2522 (1979) and highway act b.e. 2535 (1992). the road traffic act, b.e 2522 (1979) (hereinafter “the road traffic act”) is a major law which has been instituted to govern traffic in thailand, including in bangkok, and aims to ensure the safety of both drivers and pedestrians (chitsawang & chitsawang 2014) and is the focus of this study. although the road traffic act has been in place in thailand since 1980, frequent violations occur that often lead to serious accidents, injuries, disabilities and death. while a few studies on this traffic law have been produced, none has specifically considered the road traffic act in relation to bangkok – which is therefore the aim of this present exploratory research. here, the study denotes the problems of, and level of understanding held towards, the enforcement of thailand’s road traffic act which is done by traffic police, as these are perceived indirectly to have a significant impact on the city and its development. this study seeks data which may be used to reduce traffic congestion, lower the rate of road accidents and road deaths and enhance the efficient development of traffic law enforcement in thailand, so that this barrier to economic and social development is removed. bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202147 http://www.thairsc.com/p77/index/10 literature review theoretical approaches relevant to this study several theoretical approaches are relevant to this study. from criminology, we draw on deterrence theory, from policing practice on law enforcement theory and from sociology, on social learning theory. deterrence theory illuminates the thinking processes of humans towards the committing of a crime – where they weigh the potential benefit gained from the wrongdoing, the potential to receive punishment for that offence and the law enforcement efficiency perceived for that area (such as the severity, swiftness and certainty of the potential punishment). deterrence theory holds that crime is prevented when the law is strictly enforced with suitable and proportional punishment (maneepakorn 2010). this theory also holds that misconduct will be take place when individuals do not fear the consequences and when law enforcement is poor. from a policing perspective, law enforcement theory can be divided between the notions of crime control and due process. the crime control notion emphasises the importance of an efficient justice system and focuses on the control, deterrence and suppression of crime as a priority – with the efficiency, swiftness and certainty of law enforcement agencies being essential here. the due process notion conveys how law enforcement provisions must be maintained in the judicial proceedings instituted within every step of the justice system. it can be said that this aspect emphasises law enforcement in relation to the occurrence of justice and the protection of personal rights. to explain how these two processes can be balanced in practice, it could be said that in the case of a serious crime having occurred, law enforcement officers tend to predominantly apply crime control theory with due process theory as supplementary. however, in communities with a lower crime rate, law enforcement officers tend to primarily apply due process theory with crime control theory as supplementary. social learning theory argues that social behaviours are cognitively based, the result of learning through observation in a given context. through watching others, both actually and through vicarious experiences, people come to learn that some actions are rewarded and others are punished, and, further, that some actions that one might expect to be found unacceptable and perhaps a focus for punishment are not subject to that punishment. deviant behaviour can be learned through social relationships and through imitation of the behaviour of others (agnew 1991). prior research into the traffic law and its enforcement chanthrasukho (2013) in studying the relationship between the factors which relate to the violation of traffic law among motorcyclists in the phutthamonthon province of thailand, has found that such misconduct derives from both a lack of traffic knowledge and a disrespect for the road traffic act among drivers. phophan (2014), in studying traffic law enforcement in the nakhon sawan province of thailand, similarly found that people (including drivers) lack an understanding of traffic law, leading them to break the law and this was paralleled with a failure to enforce the traffic law in this area. yodsurang (2017) has found that that law enforcement practices towards drink driving under the provisions of the road traffic act are inadequate, for two reasons: the act is not strictly enforced and the punishment of offenders is not stringent enough. consequently, drivers continue to be on the road when they are drunk – and this leads to road accidents. yodsurang has therefore suggested that the penalties held towards drink driving under the road traffic act must be revised and increased in severity. loha (2012) focussed on the requirement to produce a driving licence under the road traffic act, and found that the penalty in the case of a failure to produce a valid licence was inappropriate, since it only comprised a relatively small monetary fine (not exceeding 1,000 thai baht – approximately £25). this inability to impose severe punishment meant that people neither respected nor feared the law, with bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202148 the consequence of traffic law violations and ineffective law enforcement. the study also found that the misconduct of police traffic officers when requiring the presentation of a driving licence raised negative attitudes among drivers, further reinforcing the ineffective enforcement of the law in this context. loha therefore suggested that the road traffic act must be revised to increase the severity and proportionality of the liable punishment if a failure to present a driving licence is encountered. khamkeaw (2013) also found ineffective enforcement and lack of proportionality in the potential punishments set out in the road traffic act and suggested that, instead of police traffic officers assuming responsibility for enforcing this traffic law, all traffic offences should proceed to the court whereupon a decision would be made and a traffic violator would be penalised in a suitable and fair way. sumonthip chitsawang and nathee chitsawang (2014) have studied the effectiveness of the law enforcement used when punishing traffic offenders under the road traffic act, b.e. 2522 (1979), land transport act b.e. 2522 (1979), vehicle act, b.e. 2522 (1979) and highway act b.e. 2535 (1992). here, they found that people viewed a traffic violation as a petty offence, that traffic law enforcement was lax and that traffic law violations were not to be feared. the swov institute for road safety research (2013) reported on the punishment of traffic offenders and found that an increase in the penalty rate imposed would benefit the respecting of traffic rules (such as the wearing of seat belts, obeying the speed limit and adhering to traffic lights). the severe punishment imposed by the courts would also lead to a change in driver behaviour and would reduce drink driving. finally, increased penalty rates and the strict enforcement of traffic law could reduce incidents of reoffending. despite the research set out above, the conclusions held are limited as to traffic law enforcement and no study directly relates to thailand’s road traffic act for bangkok drivers. it is thus this direction that the present exploratory research takes. methodology this study comprises a mixed-methods approach. a questionnaire was used to collect data from a sample of individuals who hold a legal driving licence from the department of land transport of thailand and who live in bangkok. quota sampling was employed to gain a sample of 500 individuals aged between 25 and 60-years-old. the sample constituted 217 males, 262 females, 7 transgender woman and 10 lesbians. the questionnaire consisted of two parts. the first part pertained to the personal information of the respondent – such as their age, gender, occupation, education level and marital status. the second part pertained to the respondent’s understanding level of the road traffic act, the problems of enforcing it and the potential to develop it. the questionnaire asked closed-ended question, where a scale rating was used to measure the opinion given. the respondents could choose only one answer for each question. subsequently, the researcher evaluated the data, used descriptive statistics (such as mean and standard deviations) to analyse the data and then presented the results gained. qualitative data was gained through the conducting of in-depth interviews among traffic police officers and traffic officers with over five years of work experience in the field of traffic and the enforcement of thailand’s road traffic act. this sample comprised 28 males and 2 females between 35 and 52 years old. the questions asked within each in-depth interview related to 2 distinct areas. the first area focussed on personal information, such as the respondent’s age, gender, marital status, educational background and occupation. the second area related to the respondent’s understanding level, the problems of law enforcement and the potential to develop the road traffic act. each interview had an approximate duration of 60–90 minutes. the researcher would conduct an interview again if the data was inconsistent. the data from the in-depth interviews was analysed and the results presented. bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202149 results the findings from the survey indicated that the understanding of thailand’s road traffic act among the sample was relatively low, as is shown in table 2. although the level of knowledge of traffic signs or signals was quite high the respondents, that is drivers in bangkok had a very low level of understanding of the spirit and objectives of the road traffic act, and only a slightly higher level of understanding of what constituted an offence under the act and what penalties could be imposed. their understanding of the duties and responsibilities of traffic police was also limited. table 2. level of understanding held by respondents towards the road traffic act area of understanding x – . s.d. understanding level held 1. offences and penalties held under the road traffic act 2.46 0.82 less understanding 2. traffic regulations held under the road traffic act 2.92 1.13 moderate level of understanding 3. spirit and objectives of the road traffic act 2.20 0.54 less understanding 4. powers and duties of officials provided under the road traffic act 2.61 1.06 less understanding 5. traffic signs or signals 3.98 1.52 high level of understanding table 2 sets out the enforcement problems encountered in relation to the road traffic act in bangkok. when considering each problem, the most problematic condition identified was that drivers tend to have a bias against traffic police officers. a second problematic condition was the view that traffic police officers misunderstand traffic law. a less problematic condition was that traffic police officers cannot enforce traffic law effectively. table 3. enforcement problems as to the road traffic act in bangkok enforcement problems x – . s.d. opinion level 1. many public agencies in the area of traffic law enforcement do not share the same policies, performance and direction. 3.16 0.94 moderate problem 2. people (including drivers) think that traffic offences are petty and not as serious as those offences set out in the thai criminal code. 3.44 0.97 problematic condition 3. people (including drivers) think that thailand’s traffic law is outdated and unsuitable in responding to contemporary traffic problems. 3.32 0.86 moderate problem 4. traffic officers do not understand traffic law correctly. 3.55 0.90 very problematic condition 5. people (including drivers) are biased towards traffic police officers. 4.07 0.70 very problematic condition bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202150 the findings demonstrate that for the efficient development of the road traffic act’s enforcement in bangkok, what is most needed is the creation of public awareness as to traffic discipline, with this being followed by the reforming of traffic law and its related violation penalties as shown in table 4. table 4. efficient development of the road traffic act enforcement in bangkok efficient development means x – . s.d. development level 1. cultivating public consciousness as to traffic discipline 3.93 0.84 most development 2. reforming traffic law and its penalties 3.91 0.77 most development 3. improving the provisions of traffic police officer and/or related authorities 3.79 0.80 most development 4. conducting a public relations campaign as to traffic law 3.58 1.02 most development the findings from the survey, presented in the tables above, can lead to the conclusion that people (including drivers) do not understand the spirit and objective of the road traffic act and that a lack of understanding is held towards the offences and penalties held under the road traffic act. the prejudice and negative perceptions of drivers hold towards traffic police officers causes problems for the enforcement of the road traffic act. importantly, drivers view traffic offences as being liable to attract only trivial penalties. drivers also perceive that to effectively implement the road traffic act, focus should be given to cultivating public consciousness as to traffic discipline, to reforming traffic law and to improving the performance of traffic police officers and other relevant authorities. in the interviews, traffic police officers reported that the problems encountered in the enforcement of the road traffic act derived from drivers possessing stereotypes and prejudice which shape their negative perceptions towards them. participants expressed the opinion that these negative perceptions arose from drivers having witnessed or being aware of police misconduct. an important factor was seen to emerge from the disparity in policing practice which led to some people encountering stricter enforcement of thailand’s road traffic act than others, a consequence of police officers being empowered to perform their duties with discretion – such that some drivers were able to avoid arrest. moreover, it was also reported that some police officers have no self-discipline and did not abide by the traffic law, behaviours that could undermine the enforcement of the law by others and even lead to some drivers not to comply with the law. another significant problem in regards to the enforcement of thailand’s road traffic act is that the law is poorly drafted and has multiple loopholes. an obvious example is found in section 140 of the road traffic act, wherein it is stated that “when the traffic officer or competent official finds by his or her own means or by using any device that the driver violates or fails to comply with the provisions of this act or any other law concerning such a vehicle, he or she may give a warning or issue a traffic ticket requiring the driver to pay [a] determined penalty fine”. this means that the act permits traffic officers to give warnings to traffic offenders. consequently, most offences committed in relation to the road traffic act result in a warning being given by traffic officers and/or a fixed traffic fine being paid by the offender. thus, drivers tend not to fear the penalties and are unaware of the consequences of their behaviours, which they are then likely to repeat. since the the offences relating to the road traffic act are deemed to be be characterised as mala prohibita, whereby such acts are prohibited by statutory law rather than being wrong by their very nature, bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202151 light or no punishments are imposed when compared with the provisions held for offences listed under the thai criminal code. in addition, there is no genuine enforcement of this act. this adds to the problems with the law and its enforcement, already detailed above, that most drivers not only lack knowledge and an understanding of the road traffic act, that the behaviours of traffic police officers appear to excuse violations of the act, but also because of the positioning of offences under this act as mala prohibita, drivers do not fear the consequence of any wrongdoing, given their perception that the road traffic act is not concerned with serious offences and any violation will only be met with light punishments. appendix 1 sets out the penalties under the act. there are five offences under section 157/1, section 159, section 160, section 160 bis and section 160 ter where traffic police officers or traffic officers cannot give a warning and a fixed fine must be imposed upon traffic offenders in accordance with section 140. these offences must be progressed to the court for a decision to be made and a penalty imposed (such as imprisonment, fine, both imprisonment and a fine and/ or the suspension or revocation of the offender’s driving licence). these stand out as being different from the majority of violations listed. changes to enforcing thailand’s road traffic act in the bangkok metropolitan region the findings presented above from drivers and traffic police officers indicate that that solving bangkok’s traffic problems, and thus removing the barriers these cause to economic and social development is not a simple matter. for any improvement, changes to the enforcement of thailand’s road traffic act must focus on three significant factors: the drivers, their knowledge and attitudes, the provisions of the law itself and the policing practices through which the traffic law is enforced. a big challenge will be in building an understanding the road traffic act of thailand and in developing the self-discipline of drivers in bangkok. it will be very important to build a moral sense among drivers and the wider population as early as possible. this is a project which could engage most people in the community. raising awareness and educating people may be possible through the provisions of educational institutions. furthermore, use of the media, such as radio, television and social media, will be important in cultivating a culture of compliance towards the road traffic act. such a project could also give drivers and pedestrians an opportunity to engage with traffic officers and gain a better understanding of what their duties and responsibilities are. it might even be possible to recruit volunteers who help traffic officers. these are several measures through which, directly and indirectly it could be possible to build an understanding of the road traffic act and to highlight the importance of traffic law compliance, both in the context of respect for the law of the country, but also for the economic and social development of the city. the burden from potentially avoidable traffic accidents is very high. changing the perceptions and knowledge levels of drivers and pedestrians will not be enough to solve the problems arising from enforcement of the law. the findings of this research also indicate that there is a need to reform thailand’s road traffic act and to implement new legal provisions that institute consistent rules and regulations which meet international standards. since the severity of penalties plays a major role in the efficiency of law enforcement, the legal measures and severity of punishment held under the road traffic act should be revised to allow genuine and strict enforcement. for instance, increased punishment may be imposed upon repeat offenders and administrative measures (such as point deduction penalties and licence revocations) could be employed against drivers who commit traffic law infringement. overall, the punishments available under the road traffic act should be strengthened so that drivers fear this punishment or at least wish to avoid its consequences; such a situation will produce a basis for law enforcement that is more effective. bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202152 to reinforce the knowledge to be developed in drivers and pedestrians, advanced technologies, common in cities in other parts of the world, such as speed cameras, lane change cameras and red-light cameras, can provide concrete evidence of infringements of the road traffic act being committed. not only would this demonstrate that violations are not identified at the discretion of traffic police officers, but it could result in equal punishment being imposed on all offenders and could decrease the disputes that arise between traffic officers and drivers. finally, the findings demonstrate that traffic officers are crucial to the solution of traffic congestion, lowering the toll of injuries and death, and thus helping to minimise the social and economic problems which ensue. some traffic officers lack knowledge of the road traffic act and some are known to have committed violations of the law, setting a bad example for other drivers. thus, there is a need for training by the royal thai police, which would provide greater consistency in knowledge of traffic operations and the implementation of the law to traffic officers; this in turn would improve the performance of such officers, as well as enhancing their credibility and their capacity to enforce the law efficiently. in addition, there is evidence that the integration of cooperation and collaboration among government agencies and private sectors is important for improving law enforcement efficiency, but that is beyond the scope of this study. discussion the findings of this study, from both the survey and the interviews, support the findings of previous studies. people possess a low knowledge level and understanding of the road traffic act of thailand, poor driving behaviour is caused by a lack of traffic law knowledge (phophan 2014) and that such ignorance is related to traffic law violations (chanthrasukho 2013). thus, at one level it would seem appropriate to assert that if the public is educated as to the offences and penalties held under the road traffic act and are subsequently aware of the necessity of obeying this law, greater public compliance will be achieved. as a result, effective law enforcement will be witnessed as the public’s knowledge and understanding of the law will be applied in practice. thus, as the public begins to see the benefits of this, through a lessening of traffic congestion, fewer injuries and deaths, and an easing of some associated economic and social problems, they will maintain that behaviour over time. however, driver respondents in this study, (as based in bangkok also possessed stereotyped attitudes and prejudices which shape their negative perceptions of traffic police officers. this could be related to the occurrence of police misconduct, disparity in policing practice and the prevalence of police officers accepting bribes (of money or other benefits) in exchange for not furthering legal proceedings identified in the interviews. consequently, drivers do not comply with the commands or orders of traffic police officers, with this leading to ineffective law enforcement. this is in line with the findings of loha (2012), who explained that the poor duty performance of police officers caused prejudice and bias (including discrimination in law enforcement) and this, ultimately, resulted in inefficient traffic law enforcement. the study also shows that the road traffic act itself is a major cause of ineffective enforcement. this is due to the act having loopholes that empower police traffic officers or traffic officers to give warnings to drivers when a traffic law violation occurs, instead of a stronger penalty. this is a major problem as offenders who are merely warned do not develop a fear of subsequent law violations and law enforcers can use this channel to accept bribes for not furthering legal proceedings. this leads to the ineffective enforcement of traffic law in bangkok. moreover, since the offences held under the road traffic act are deemed to be characterised as mala prohibita, such acts are prohibited by statutory law and are not wrong by their nature. this invokes the provision of light sentences and punishment provisions when compared with those associated with the offences detailed under the thai criminal code and means that people do not fear the consequence of breaking this law. these findings mirror previous research that has explained that without suitable punishment provisions the road traffic act is unable to frighten drivers (yodsurang bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202153 2017; chitsawang & chitsawang 2014; khamkeaw 2013; loha 2012). it can be said that the loopholes, offence characteristics and light penalties found within the road traffic act, b.e cause ineffective traffic law enforcement in bangkok. this results in continued traffic congestion and high road accident/fatality rates in bangkok. the findings are presented from a deterrence theory perspective, which, as stated above, notes that crime prevention can be achieved if an effective law is enforced with rapid and suitable penalties. this approach is also consistent with the research of the swov institute for road safety research (2013) which has indicated that the increasing of penalties (such as in imposing higher fines) will enhance the compliance with the road traffic act and more severe punishments being imposed by the courts will change driver behaviour for the better as well as reducing repeat traffic offences. an implication of the findings of this study is that the provisions of the road traffic act must be revised to allow genuine and strict enforcement that corresponds with the current situation faced., the revision of this law can eliminate confusion and contradictions in this area. this aim is in accordance with the previous research which indicates that the law should be revised by increasing the severity and proportionality of the liable punishment and thereby ensuring it meets the international standard (yodsurang 2017; loha 2012). from this deterrence theory perspective, stricter penalties, including higher fine amounts and longer imprisonment terms, would leave drivers afraid and unlikely to violate thailand’s traffic law. as a result, the behaviour and discipline of drivers would be improved, the enforcement of the road traffic act would be enhanced, traffic congestion would be reduced and road accidents and road deaths in bangkok would be minimised. however, a deterrence approach alone is not enough to bring about these desirable changes. social learning theory holds that people’s behaviours are not merely reactive to punishment and reward but are based on what individuals know and what is widely believed in a community. this study has shown that governmental agents (such as police traffic officers) also cause problems for the effective enforcement of the road traffic act; they too possess inadequate knowledge of this law and cannot explain correctly its legal content, offences and penalties to drivers. furthermore, police misconduct, disparity in policing practice and the occurrence of bribery among police traffic officers and relevant government agencies has resulted in a lack of trust among drivers leading to a failure to comply with this law and the orders of traffic police officers. this is another important factor that causing ineffective traffic law enforcement, a conclusion consistent with the research of loha (2012). to find an appropriate theoretical approach to guide other solutions which will lead traffic officers and drivers to change their behaviours, we can turn to social learning theory (ref). this emphasises the importance of formal learning as well as learning from observation of how others behave in similar circumstances; it also notes that deviational behaviour also results from learning processes enacted through imitating the behaviour of role models such as family members, friends and teachers. this is in line with the research of chanthrasukho (2013) and the description of how ignorance relates to traffic law violations. social learning theory cannot propose quick solutions to social problems. drivers must develop a moral sense towards driving and are required to hold an understanding towards thailand’s traffic law. ideally, such self-discipline would be instilled in people since childhood as this will heighten their compliance with the law. furthermore, there is a need to cultivate a culture of traffic law compliance via the media and to allow civilians to participate in such law enforcement. this is a longer terms solution, requiring collaboration among relevant agencies to provide activities which enhance the moral sense of the public towards driving and the civilian knowledge of road traffic act and change the perception that the consequences of infringing this law are of little or no importance. this study has shown that the factors behind bangkok’s traffic congestion and the high rate of accident and injury are complex, involving a weak law, inadequate use of technology, the lack of knowledge of drivers, bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202154 the inappropriate behaviours of traffic police and the weak moral position within society regarding statute law. this reflects the conclusion of sombat treewatsuwan (2015) who noted that that promoting road safety and decreasing of road traffic fatalities requires cooperation among the relevant agencies and the people. this study has shown that taking only a deterrence theory approach will not result in the changes in beliefs and behaviours essential for minimising traffic congestion and reducing injury and death. the study has also shown how the knowledge and behaviours of drivers and pedestrians need to change, but so too do the knowledge and behaviours of traffic officers. while social learning theory may be relevant to understanding the strategies to be undertaken for both groups, it is also important to recognise that the programs targeting traffic officers should be in line with the concept of crime prevention and suppression, whereby the prevention of crime is understood to require the use of certain measures and methods (such as in eradicating the root causes of wrongdoing, eliminating the desire for crime commission and reducing the opportunities available to commit crime). notably, this reflects the research of chitsawang & chitsawang (2014) and its finding that law enforcement and the policing of offenders is obstructed due to the ignorance of the law and lack of skills held by traffic officers. conclusion the findings of this study have shown that people (including drivers) possess a low level of understanding and lack knowledge towards the road traffic act and, furthermore, hold biases and negative attitudes towards police traffic officers. moreover, the problems associated with the enforcement of the road traffic act are seen to derive from drivers, the law itself and governmental agents including traffic police officers or traffic officers. significantly, the road traffic act has a number of legal loopholes and imposes light penalties, as results in the ineffective enforcement of traffic law in bangkok. thus, action needs to be taken on these three fronts. the effective enforcement of the road traffic act requires the possession of accurate knowledge and understanding among drivers in thailand as well as the cultivation of traffic discipline among this population when they are young. at present, most people in bangkok disrespect traffic rules, lack knowledge and consciousness as to this area and do not fear the light penalties. thailand’s traffic police must provide knowledge as to such traffic rules to students in schools, while such knowledge should also be conveyed via the curriculum and/or through radio, television or social media. this shall allow thailand’s youth to understand and be aware of the importance of complying with the road traffic act. this need for compliance should also be promoted and publicised among the general population as it would heighten the cooperation of the population with the law. for officials or practitioners, regular training as to the road traffic act and modern law enforcement technology is necessary as this will allow those entities to better enforce the law, will make people recognise and trust the performance of traffic police officers and will ultimately lead to greater compliance with thailand’s traffic law. moreover, it has been noted that an increased number of traffic police officers and the improving of their allowances and benefits are important factors in manifesting effective law enforcement in this area. as further important aspect in gaining effective law enforcement relates to the reform of thailand’s road traffic act to make it consistent with international standards. the revision of the penalties must respond to the current situation and lead to stricter penalties or administrative measures being imposed upon certain offenders, such as those that re-offend. this three-pronged approach is essential in solving a problem which has given bangkok an unwanted and undesirable position as having among the worst traffic congestion in the world and being number one for motor-cycle accidents. unless action is taken, traffic congestion and high road accident/death rates will continue to be witnessed in this city, and economic and social development will continue to be hampered. this study is concerned with more than the enforcement of the road traffic act. the problem bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202155 of traffic congestion leads to problems of ill health, noise and pollution, but it also leads to higher costs for travel, results in lost income from time spent waiting, but also significantly affects the fragmentation of communities as people do their shopping in locations that are convenient rather than local and take their meals at conveniently located fast food outlets, instead of local restaurants. references beech, h. 2019, ‘thailand’s roads are deadly; especially if you’re poor’, new york times, 19 august 2019. available from https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/world/asia/thailand-inequality-road-fatalities.html chanthrasukho, p. 2013, ‘factors relating traffic violation of motorist’, academic service journal, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 110120. https://journal.oas.psu.ac.th/index.php/asj/article/view/172/114 chitsawang, s. & 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https://so01.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/ajpu/article/view/63809 https://so01.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/ajpu/article/view/63809 appendix 1 examples of offences and penalties under the road traffic act offence penalty under the road traffic act actual penalty using a conveyance which is not in a firm and secure condition on the road (section 6, paragraph 1) incompletion of engine, accessories and/or components in accordance with the law on vehicles (section 6, paragraph 2) a fine not exceeding 500 baht warning or a fine of 400 baht not following traffic signals and/or traffic signs (section 22) a fine not exceeding 1,000 baht warning or a fine of 500 baht driving on the wrong side of the road (section 41) a fine not exceeding 500 baht warning or a fine of 200 baht using a mobile phone or mobile phone device while driving (section 43, clause 9) a fine of 400-1,000 baht warning or a fine of 500 baht taking over and passing by such as when driving up a steep slope, bridge or on a curve (section 46) a fine of 400-1,000 baht warning or a fine of 500 baht turning or reversing a vehicle on a road with signs prohibiting this (section 53) a fine of 400-1,000 baht warning or a fine of 500 baht driving over the speed limit (section 67) a fine not exceeding 1,000 baht warning or a fine of 500 baht not wearing a helmet while driving (section 122) drivers or passengers not wearing a helmet passengers not wearing a helmet a fine not exceeding 500 baht a fine not exceeding 1,000 baht warning or a fine of 400 baht not wearing a seat belt (section 123, paragraph 2) a fine not exceeding 500 baht warning or a fine of 400 baht bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202158 offence penalty under the road traffic act actual penalty failure to comply with the order of officers (section 157/1) warning and a fine by a traffic police officer or traffic officer is not allowed fails to comply with the order of an inspector demanding the driver to be examined for narcotics or psychotropic substances (under section 43 bis), a fine not exceeding 1,000 baht fails to comply with the order of an inspector demanding the driver to be tested for alcohol or other intoxicants (under section 43 ter) a fine not exceeding 1,000 baht moreover consuming narcotics under the law on narcotics, or psychotropic substances under the law on psychotropic substances, while driving (section 43) an additional one-third more of the penalty prescribed under the law on narcotics or the law on psychotropic substances consuming narcotics under the law on narcotics, or psychotropic substances under the law on psychotropic substances, while driving and then causing physical or mental injury to another person (section 43bis, paragraph 1) imprisonment for a term between one year and five years, and a fine of between twenty-thousand baht and one-hundred-thousand baht. the court shall also order the suspension of the offender’s driving licence for a period of no less than one year or can revoke that licence. consuming narcotics under the law on narcotics, or psychotropic substances under the law on psychotropic substances, while driving and then causing serious injury to another person (section 43 bis, paragraph 1) imprisonment for a term between two years and six years, and a fine of between forty-thousand baht and one-hundred-and-twentythousand baht. the court shall also order the suspension of the offender’s driving licence for a period of no less than two years or can revoke that licence. consuming narcotics under the law on narcotics, or psychotropic substances under the law on psychotropic substances, while driving and then causing death to another person imprisonment for a term between three years and ten years, and a fine of between sixty-thousand baht and two-hundred-thousand baht. the court shall also order the revocation of the offender’s licence bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202159 offence penalty under the road traffic act actual penalty fails to comply with an official’s order to move away from a vehicle which is stopping or parking in violation of this act (section 159) fails to comply with an official’s order or obstructs them in the moving or using of a device for locking damages, destroys or deteriorates or makes useless the locking device used by an officer to prevent a vehicle from moving without this having been permitted by the officer imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine not exceeding five-thousand baht, or both warning and a fine by a traffic police officer or traffic officer is not allowed section 160 warning and a fine by a traffic police officer or traffic officer is not allowed fails to drive a vehicle or to control an animal and thereby causes damage to another person or the property of another person and not provide assistance (section 78) imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine of between two-thousand baht and ten-thousand baht, or both. fails to drive a vehicle or to control an animal and thereby causes damage to another person or the property of another person and not provide assistance which consequently causes serious injury or death to another (section 78) imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, and a fine of between five-thousand baht and twenty-thousand baht, or both. -driving while being incapable of driving (section 43(1)) imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine of between two-thousand baht and ten-thousand baht, or both. -driving in an abnormal driving manner or with poor visibility (in the front or rear) (section 43(5)) imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine of between two-thousand baht and ten-thousand baht, or both. -driving without being aware of the safety or trouble of others (section 43(8)) imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine of between two-thousand baht and ten-thousand baht, or both. bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202160 offence penalty under the road traffic act actual penalty section 160 bis car racing on the road or promoting car racing on the road except when permitted in writing by a traffic officer (section 134) imprisonment for a term not exceeding three months or a fine of between two-thousand baht and ten-thousand baht, or both. the court shall also order the suspension of the offender’s driving licence for a period of no less than two years or can revoke that licence warning and a fine by a traffic police officer or traffic officer is not allowed section 160 ter warning and a fine by a traffic police officer or traffic officer is not allowed -driving while intoxicated by alcohol or another intoxicant (section 43 (2)) imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine of between five-thousand baht and twenty-thousand baht, or both. the court shall also order the suspension of the offender’s driving licence for a period of no less than six years or can revoke that licence. driving while intoxicated by alcohol or another intoxicant and then causing physical or mental injury to another person imprisonment for a term of between one year and five years, and a fine of between twentythousand baht and one-hundredthousand baht. the court shall also order the suspension of the offender’s driving licence for a period of no less than one year or can revoke that licence. driving while intoxicated by alcohol or another intoxicant and then causing serious injury to another person imprisonment for a term of between two years and six years, and a fine of between forty-thousand baht and onehundred-and-twenty-thousand baht. the court shall also order the suspension of the offender’s driving licence for a period of no less than two years or can revoke that licence bhu-anantanondh, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202161 people seeking asylum in australia and their access to employment: just what do we know? caroline fleay, anita lumbus and lisa hartley curtin university abstract public and political claims about the employment of people from a refugee background in australia do not always reflect the research findings in this area. for example, recent claims by a senior coalition government minister about people seeking asylum who arrived to australia by boat during the previous labor government’s terms in office (2007-13) posit that many have limited employment prospects. however, given there is little research or government reporting on the experiences of asylum seekers who arrived during this time, and none that focuses specifically on their employment, there is no evidence to support this. a review of research on the employment experiences of people from a refugee background, and australian policies, suggests a more nuanced picture. this includes research that found while initially people from a refugee background are more likely to be unemployed, have temporary jobs and lower incomes than other newly arrived immigrants, over the longer term second-generation refugees have higher levels of labour market participation than the general population and refugees and their families make significant economic and community contributions to australia. research also highlights that refugees may experience a range of barriers to accessing employment, including discrimination, and a review of australian policies indicates these are likely to have exacerbated some of these barriers for asylum seekers who arrived to australia by boat. in addition, given previous findings that public attitudes can be influenced by representations made in public and political discourses, the public statements of senior ministers may be further deepening barriers to accessing employment faced by asylum seekers who arrived by boat. introduction the employment prospects for people from a refugee background in australia periodically emerge as a site of public and political contention. however, claims made by some media commentators and members of parliament do not reflect the research findings in this area. for example, during a television panel discussion in february 2016, sydney radio broadcaster neil mitchell claimed that there was a 97 per cent unemployment rate for refugees in australia (abc 2016). while later acknowledging that he meant to say the unemployment rate was 93 per cent, the study he cited as evidence (jenkinson, silbert, de maio & edwards 2016), does not make any such conclusion (hartley & fleay 2016). erroneously citing the caroline fleay, faculty of humanities, curtin university. anita lumbus, health sciences, curtin university. lisa hartley, faculty of humanities, curtin university. email: c.fleay@curtin.edu.au issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 caroline fleay, anita lumbus, lisa hartley. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(2): 4969. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i2.4969 . https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i2.4969 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 same study, minister for immigration peter dutton claimed in may 2016 that many refugees arrive to australia illiterate and innumerate (see ramsay & fiske 2016) and that if more refugees were accepted by australia than the current quota, they ‘“would be taking australian jobs”’ and, paradoxically, many ‘“would languish in unemployment queues”’ (quoted in bourke 2016). people who come to australia by boat to seek asylum have been subjected to particular contention in the public domain (rowe & o’brien 2014), including in relation to their employment prospects. for example, in a may 2015 interview arguing that greater efforts were needed to ‘integrate’ asylum seekers who had arrived to australia by boat during the previous labor government’s terms in office (2007-13), the former social services (and former immigration) minister scott morrison suggested that many would not find employment. morrison claimed that ‘many’ asylum seekers who had arrived during the term of the labor government ‘were poorly educated, had no english, hailed from very different cultural backgrounds and had limited economic opportunities’ (maley 2015). without policies that actively ‘engaged’ this group, he warned that their next generation may become ‘marginalised from mainstream life’: ‘“at best, these consequences are long-term unemployment and welfare dependence and at worst gangs, violent crime and even terrorism”’ (quoted in maley 2015). while morrison’s comments acknowledge that government policies can play an important role in enabling the effective settlement of refugees, he ignores that some policies imposed on asylum seekers who arrive by boat have prevented their employment. as with dutton’s recent comments, morrison’s claims about access to employment were also made without the provision of supporting evidence. given that political discourse has been found to play an influential role in producing and reproducing prejudice and racism towards groups constructed as the ‘other’ (van dijk 1997), ministers’ comments (and those of others in the public domain) need interrogation. in this paper, in recognition of the particular attention given to people who come to australia by boat, we focus on the claim about the limited employment prospects of the ‘many’ asylum seekers who arrived by boat since 2007. the term asylum seeker refers here to a person who has arrived to a country of asylum but whose refugee status is yet to be determined. according to the united nations (un) convention relating to the status of refugees (refugee convention), a person is found to be cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 65 a refugee if it is considered likely they would face persecution in their home country due to their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. as at the time of writing (may 2016), there is no published research or government reporting that specifically documents the employment experiences of asylum seekers in australia who arrived by boat between 2007 and 2013. much of the research of the employment experiences of people from a refugee background in australia focuses on those who arrived under the offshore component of the refugee and humanitarian program (rhp). as in research conducted in other industrialised countries (connor 2010), australian studies have found that people from a refugee background are more likely to be unemployed, have temporary jobs and lower incomes than other newly arrived immigrants (hugo 2011). however, there are many valid and interrelated factors that underpin these findings, including that the data are influenced by recency of arrival and the relative youth of the population (hugo 2011), lower levels of english proficiency and employer discrimination (colic-peisker 2009; marston 2004). despite such constraints, australian and international research highlights the skills, talents, drive and entrepreneurship that people from a refugee background bring to the host society and the economic and community contributions they make over the longer term (betts et al. 2014; hugo 2011). we explore these findings and the relevant research in other industrialised countries, the australian policy landscape, and the limited available research about asylum seekers who arrived to australia by boat since 2007, in order to critique the claims of their limited employment prospects. in addition, we discuss the literature that explores the influence of political discourses on community attitudes to asylum seekers, to highlight the impacts that ministerial statements may have on broader australian community perceptions of asylum seekers, including potential employers. from this, we outline the conclusions that can be drawn in relation to people seeking asylum and their employment prospects in australia, and where further research is needed. policy overview asylum seekers arriving by boat to australia have been subjected to punitive policies over the past few decades (rowe & o’brien 2014, p. 172). this is in direct contrast to policies that apply to people from a refugee background who do not arrive by boat. while all people 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 accepted as refugees by australia are done so under the rhp, the program has offshore and onshore components. the offshore component makes resettlement visas available to people recognised as refugees who are not in australia. the onshore component is for people who arrive to australia without a valid visa (predominantly those who arrive by boat), or with a valid visa and then apply for refugee status. while an annual quota is set by the australian government for this component, since 1996 a link has been made between the onshore and offshore components. this means that an increase in visa numbers granted to people found to be refugees who arrived onshore results in a decreased number of visas offered to offshore refugees (mckay, thomas, & kneebone 2012). punitive policies that apply to asylum seekers who arrive to australia without a valid visa include being subject to mandatory detention while their refugee claims are processed. since this policy was enshrined in federal legislation in 1992, other punitive policies have also been adopted. of most relevance here are those of the former labor government (2007-13) and the current coalition government. from 2007 to 2014, 52,106 people arrived to australia by boat seeking asylum (phillips 2015a), most having fled afghanistan, iran, pakistan, sri lanka or iraq (phillips 2015b). up until the department of immigration and border protection suspended the processing of refugee claims of those who arrived by boat following the coalition government’s election in september 2013 (rcoa 2014), the department’s statistics from the previous five financial years show that 95 per cent were found to be refugees and granted protection visas (phillips 2015b). while the labor government won the november 2007 election on a platform that included more humane asylum seeker policies than those of the previous coalition government (evans 2008), punitive policies were soon introduced in response to the increasing numbers of boat arrivals. from 2009 australia’s immigration detention network was extended to detain increasing numbers of asylum seekers for lengthy periods of time. while the labor government finally released the majority of men, women and children from detention into the community in 2011-2012 (bowen 2011), many had been detained for much more than a year by this time (department of immigration and citizenship 2011). they were released and either issued with a bridging visa that included the right to work, or placed into ‘community detention’ which meant greater access to accommodation and support services but without the right to work. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 67 further punitive polices were adopted by the labor government as numbers arriving by boat continued to increase. asylum seekers who arrived after 13 august 2012 were sent to the reopened sites of immigration detention on nauru and papua new guinea’s manus island (first established by the howard coalition government in 2001 and closed by the rudd labor government in 2008). as more asylum seekers continued to arrive to australia by boat than could be sent to the regional sites of detention, increasing numbers were held in australian immigration detention centres. in november 2012 the labor government declared that all people who had arrived by boat since 13 august 2012 and not been sent to nauru or manus island could be released from australian immigration detention centres into the community, but with limited entitlements (cullen 2012). most who arrived by boat after 13 august 2012 and were released from detention were issued a temporary bridging visa e (bve). this visa allows asylum seekers to remain lawfully in the community while they wait for their refugee claim to be processed. but it had a condition attached that denies the right to work and only allows access to minimal financial assistance (89 per cent of the national welfare payment for those in severe financial hardship). while bve holders are entitled to study, they must pay international student fees, and they do not have access to english as a second language (esl) classes provided under the rhp. instead they have only been able to access an abridged version of these classes (hartley & fleay 2014). these policies continued after the election of the coalition government in september 2013, and further restrictions were imposed. at the end of january 2015, there were 26,168 asylum seekers who had arrived by boat and were living in the community with limited entitlements (department of immigration and border protection 2015). the majority had arrived after 13 august 2012 and continued to be denied the right to work. while those who arrived before this date were issued with bves that did allow the right to work, many of their visas had lapsed by this time. this meant that they too no longer had the right to work. while the authors have received reports in 2016 from some asylum seekers that visas are now being renewed, it is unclear when all will be reissued. in addition, visa renewal now requires a ‘code of behaviour’ to be signed. this allows for the cancellation of the visa if the holder has criminal charges laid against them, they are considered to engage in ‘antisocial’ behaviour, or they do not cooperate with all ‘reasonable requests’ from the department of immigration and border protection (morrison 2013). 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 in march 2015 the department finally re-commenced the processing of asylum seekers’ refugee claims. however, the coalition government has denied access to funded migration agent assistance for the majority of asylum seekers who arrived by boat. this means that many are now forced to prepare and present their refugee claims to the department with minimal or no legal assistance. federal legislation in december 2014 has also introduced an expedited claims process and significant limitations on the capacity for decisions to be independently reviewed. in addition, only temporary protection visas will be issued to those recognised as refugees, which will include the right to work but not the right to family reunion nor travel outside of australia (rcoa 2015). given the processing backlog faced by the department, it is estimated that it will be at least three years before all asylum seekers’ claims will be finalised. in the meantime, some policy shift in relation to the right the work is evident. as part of a deal to ensure cross-bench support for the government’s legislation in december 2014, the coalition government announced that the minister for immigration and border protection could allow asylum seekers living in the community the right to work while they wait for their claims to be finalised (yaxley, norman & gul 2015). while this process has been administratively difficult, by september 2015 there were reports that 22,800 asylum seekers had finally been granted the right to work (toscano 2015). policies imposed on asylum seekers who arrived by boat have had implications for their access to employment. periods of time spent in immigration detention, and that those arriving after 13 august 2012 were denied the right to work for several years, are the most obvious policies that have had a detrimental impact on access to employment. we now turn to the relevant research on employment and people from a refugee background to consider what conclusions may be drawn from their findings in relation to the employment of asylum seekers who arrived since 2007. literature overview while some studies have explored the employment experiences of refugees both in australia and elsewhere, there are few that focus on the employment experiences of asylum seekers who arrived to australia by boat. the following provides an overview of the findings of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 69 australian studies that do include asylum seekers as participants, and other studies of relevance, and draws some tentative conclusions as to the employment prospects of those who arrived by boat since 2007 as well as where further research is needed. skills and employment experiences of asylum seekers upon arrival to australia while little has been documented about the skills and employment experiences of asylum seekers who arrived to australia by boat since 2007, a number of earlier studies conducted a skills audit of refugees in australia, including people who arrived by boat. these studies indicate that at least some asylum seekers who arrived to australia by boat came with significant employment skills and experiences. for example, marston (2004) interviewed 39 men and 12 women from a refugee background who had arrived by boat, and fifteen service providers in victoria in 2002 and 2003. most of the refugees interviewed were living in the community following detention for more than two years. more than half were unemployed, a quarter studying and a quarter employed in mostly part time, casual or temporary work. however, the study found that 14 of the men had arrived to australia with high levels of education, and professional backgrounds such as teaching, engineering and information technology (marston 2004). on a smaller scale, scull and woolcock (2001) found high levels of education but great variation in skills and experiences in a study of 27 refugees in brisbane who had spent time unemployed, including twelve refugee men and one woman on temporary protection visas from iran, iraq and afghanistan who had arrived by boat. their time in detention was considered as time unemployed. their variation in skills and experiences appears to have depended on the life stage of participants who were aged from 22 to 53. as such, some were starting out in their working life while others had left their home countries with established careers (scull & woolcock 2001). while it is not clear if any of the participants in another study had arrived by boat, its findings similarly indicate that asylum seekers with substantial skills and experience do arrive to australia (croucher & dutertre 2007). the study involved an audit of 211 asylum seekers on bves without work rights and highlighted that many had substantial skills, tertiary qualifications and experience prior to coming to australia. this included 16.5 per cent with a university qualification and 32 per cent with a trade or semi-professional background (croucher & dutertre 2007). 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 very little is known about the previous employment of asylum seekers who arrived to australia by boat since 2007, although two small studies indicate that at least some who arrived from this time had considerable skills and experiences. one study exploring the experiences of asylum seekers who arrived by boat in 2010-11 found that four of the eleven participants had arrived to australia with building construction employment experience, two with hospitality management experience, one with information technology qualifications and experience, and another with engineering qualifications and experience. all had endured lengthy periods of time in immigration detention (between 15 and 21.5 months) during which they were unable to utilise their employment skills (fleay, hartley & kenny 2013, p. 481). another study discussing the experiences of asylum seekers who arrived by boat since 13 august 2012 found that most of the 29 participants ‘had employment and/or higher education study experience prior to arriving in australia’ (hartley & fleay 2014, p. 17). as outlined earlier, however, those who arrived by boat since 13 august 2012 and were released from immigration detention into the australian community were denied the right to work until at least 2015. thus, for those who arrived during this time, upon their release from immigration detention they did not have the legal capacity to try to access employment that may have utilised their skills and experience. downward occupational mobility and deskilling despite the arrival to australia of people from a refugee background with significant employment skills and experience, and some with high-level educational qualifications, a recurring theme in the literature is that they experience downward occupational mobility and deskilling, particularly in the early years of settlement (hugo 2011). while most of this literature focuses on refugees who arrived to australia as part of the offshore component of the rhp, one study that included asylum seekers who arrived by boat made similar findings. one example of the australian studies that focused on the experiences of offshore refugees is correa-velez, barnett and gifford (2015). their longitudinal study highlighted the problem of downward mobility as many of the 233 refugee participants had tertiary qualifications and professional backgrounds yet 95 per cent worked in manual labour roles in australia. another study of offshore refugees found that those employed tended to be younger with stronger english skills, yet worked in lower paying positions (australian survey research group cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 71 2011). despite low unemployment in australia and skill shortages in a number of industries, colic-peisker (2009) found that 150 offshore refugees of working age with english language skills who were employed or looking for work, with most having been in australia for more than five years, were similarly concentrated in low skilled areas of work with poor pay and insecure conditions. as part of a large study on the contribution of humanitarian entrants to australia, hugo (2011) assessed the employment experiences of more than 600 first and second generation people from a refugee background. he found they face institutional and discrimination barriers to participation in the formal labour market, with this being the case even if english language skills and education are controlled, and that their employment is ‘disproportionately concentrated in low income sectors’ (2011, p. xxiv). hugo also concluded, however, that while refugees worked in unskilled roles they were filling labour gaps not filled by other migrant groups (2011, p. xxiv). a number of studies in other industrialised countries have made similar conclusions. a recurring theme in the uk literature is the high levels of education among forced migrants, although this was dependent on country of origin with migrants from zimbabwe in particular having high education levels (bloch 2006; doyle 2009). many forced migrants worked in professional roles in their home country yet were unable to enter the job market as professionals/specialists in the uk, and had experienced insecure, poorly paid employment and deskilling. the respondents of a canadian study of more than 500 adults with refugee status similarly found high levels of education, including women who represented more than half of the interviewees (krahn, derwing, mulder & wilkinson 2000). while the majority had been employed after arriving in canada, they were underemployed in temporary and part time roles at higher rates than the canadian population, and experienced downward occupational mobility (krahn, derwing, mulder & wilkinson 2000). jackson and bauder (2013) interviewed 17 refugee claimants in canada and also found that their employment opportunities were restricted to short term work, including in the informal sector, despite participants having resided in canada for many years. 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 while most of the relevant australian studies have focused on refugees who arrived through the offshore component of the rhp, their findings are supported by marston’s (2004) study that included refugees who arrived by boat. the refugee participants in his study tended to be concentrated in low skilled roles in australia, even though some had arrived to australia with high levels of skills, education and experience (marston 2004). in the absence of research about the employment experiences of asylum seekers in australia who have more recently arrived by boat, the findings of the studies outlined here suggest they may similarly experience downward occupational mobility and deskilling. fears of deskilling were expressed by some of the interviewees in hartley and fleay’s (2014) study of asylum seekers without the right to work who were worried that their skills would fade. given hugo’s (2011) finding that deskilling is a major factor leading to the unemployment of refugees, government policy that allows for the long-term detention of asylum seekers, and policy that has denied the right to work for thousands of asylum seekers who arrived to australia since 13 august 2012, is likely to have compounded other barriers they may face in accessing employment. barriers to employment for asylum seekers and refugees studies focused on the experiences of people from a refugee background both in australia and other industrialised countries suggest that people who arrived to australia by boat to seek asylum since 2007 may face further barriers to accessing employment. australian studies that highlight these barriers include those focused on the experiences of offshore refugees as well as some that include asylum seekers who arrived by boat. a commonly cited barrier in the australian literature is the lack of australian work experience (colic-peisker 2009; marston 2004; scull and woolcock 2001), while marston (2004) also highlights the lack of qualifications recognition. both hugo (2011) and marston (2004) identified limited english language skills as a further barrier faced by refugees and asylum seekers to finding employment in australia, although correa-velez, barnett and gifford (2015) found that english language proficiency and overseas skills recognition were not predictors of employment in their study. many of the 233 offshore refugee men in south east queensland interviewed in this study worked in low status roles where strong english language skills were not necessary. australian studies also highlight that women can experience additional barriers in searching for employment due to family commitments, including not having the assistance of an extended family network or access to affordable childcare (wilmsen 2013, p. 256). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 73 being granted temporary protection visas compounded the barriers to employment experienced by refugees who arrived to australia by boat during the coalition government’s 1996-2007 term in office (marston 2004). similar policy has had an impact on access to employment for asylum seekers who arrived to australia more recently by boat. fleay, hartley and kenny found that most of the eight asylum-seeker men they interviewed who were living in the community in 2012 on a bridging visa ‘identified the temporary status of being on a bve as a significant barrier to finding work’ (2013, p. 485). studies in other industrialised countries highlight similar barriers. for example, focusing on first generation refugees in the netherlands, de vroome and van tubergen (2010) accessed national survey data from more than 3,000 respondents to consider their employment and occupational status. access to post-migration education and work experience, proficiency in the language, and ‘bridging social capital’ or the connections made with the host community, were found to improve chances of employment. conversely, health problems and a longer stay in a reception centre were associated negatively with economic integration (de vroome & van tubergen 2010). uk studies highlight the importance of providing tailored support to increase chances of employment and the need to address barriers such as discrimination, removing the legal barrier to work for asylum seekers and recognition of qualifications from overseas (bloch 2008, p. 34). given that asylum seekers who arrived to australia since 13 august 2012 have endured at least several years without the right to work, effectively limiting their capacity to gain local work experience, and have had minimal access to english language classes, the studies outlined here suggest that government policy has contributed to barriers to accessing employment. the findings above also suggest that remaining on a temporary visa even after being granted the right to work is a further barrier to accessing employment. while many who arrived between 2007 and 13 august 2012 were finally granted permanent visas and the right to work, many had been subjected to lengthy periods of immigration detention and thus they too have had their capacity to gain local work experience limited. prejudice, discrimination and the influence of public representations about asylum seekers australian studies also highlight that discrimination can be a barrier to the employment of people from a refugee background, and that public attitudes can be influenced by 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 representations made in public and political discourses. it is difficult to assess the presence of discrimination as it is often based on how people perceive they are being treated (colicpeisker & tilbury 2006). discrimination can also be structural or institutional, for example, the lack of qualification recognition for refugees. however, while acknowledging the complexities in identifying discrimination, it has been considered a significant barrier for refugees in australia, preventing their upward mobility (hugo 2011, p. 27). colic-peisker found that structural discrimination ‘reinforced by mainstream prejudices and negative stereotyping of racially and culturally different immigrants and refugees by employers’ was a barrier to labour participation and led to poor labour market outcomes (2009, p. 67). in her study, refugees of middle eastern background, predominantly iraqis, had the highest rates of unemployment despite having the highest level of education among the three groups in this study. they also reported the most discrimination in the job market (colic-peisker 2009, p. 74). in canada, jackson and bauder (2013) found that public discourses were perceived by 17 asylum-seeker participants to contribute to barriers to their employment. the public discourses of the ‘bogus refugee’ and ‘queue jumper,’ perpetuated by the media and politicians, were perceived by the participants to create an environment of hostility and were partly attributable to their employment in ‘refugee jobs’ (jackson & bauder 2013). the ‘institutionalised under-utilisation of their skills and experience’ (p. 377) was considered by those interviewed to reinforce public narratives that viewed refugees as having a ‘particular place’ in the labour market, leading to their employment in jobs considered undesirable to the local population. other research explores the influence on public attitudes of representations made in public and political discourses about people seeking asylum. some studies have sought to understand how ‘powerful’ elites, including politicians, shape public opinion through discursive frameworks of the ‘other’ and how the mechanisms of such discourse may produce and reproduce prejudice and racism. for example, van dijk (1997) identified a number of discursive mechanisms used by politicians in europe and northern america to justify prejudice, racism and the negative treatment of immigrants. this includes ‘positive selfpreservation’, where the nation is constructed in a positive light; for example, having a long tradition of being ‘hospitable’ and ‘fair’ while discussing the importance of restricting cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 75 immigration (van dijk 1997; see also goodman 2008). it also includes ‘negative-other presentations’, where migrants are constructed in a negative light; for example, when people from a refugee background are positioned as a security threat (suhnan, pedersen & hartley 2012) or illegitimate/non-genuine (pedersen, watt & hansen 2006). other research argues that political discourse that includes negative-other presentations of asylum seekers can negatively impact community attitudes. for example, studies concluded that community members who were more prejudiced against people seeking asylum endorsed the same negative-other representations identified in political discourse, such as ‘queue jumpers’, ‘illegals’, and ‘not genuine’ refugees (pedersen, watt & hansen 2006; suhnan, pedersen & hartley 2012). it should be noted, however, that the relationship between political discourse and prejudice is likely to be bi-directional. that is, politicians can influence the community’s prejudice levels; alternatively some people may use political rhetoric to justify their own prejudices (pedersen & hartley 2015). this highlights the powerful role that political discourse can play in producing and reproducing prejudice and racism within the community, which includes potential employers of asylum seekers. claims made by the former minister for social services that many asylum seekers will not find work, and the minister for immigration’s recent claims about employment and refugees more broadly, are examples of negative-other presentations. given the research findings outlined above, these claims may be reinforcing other negative representations that have been made by politicians of asylum seekers as ‘illegitimate’, ‘illegal’ and ‘queue-jumpers’ (mckay, thomas, & kneebone 2012; pedersen, watt & hansen 2006; rowe & o’brien 2014). this suggests that such public and political discourse could be contributing to further barriers to employment for asylum seekers who arrived to australia by boat since 2007. economic impacts of refugees in australia public claims that many people from a refugee background, including those who arrived by boat, do not find employment suggest that they are an economic burden to australia. however, research is scarce on the economic impacts of refugees in australia and only one exists to our knowledge that focuses on those who arrived by boat (stillwell 2003). some studies highlight the initial negative financial impact of offshore refugees to australia who do have the right to work. access economics (2008) examined the impact of new 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 migrants to australia on the commonwealth government budget using ‘the migrants’ fiscal impact model’ with projections over a twenty years period. in contrast to most other migrant groups, offshore refugee entrants were found to have a negative contribution for the first twelve years of settlement in australia due to their low labour force participation and use of government services (access economics 2008). however, the authors noted that it was important to consider the age structures of migrant groups, with offshore refugees representing younger age cohorts compared with the overall australian population (access economics 2008). of the 2006-07 migrant intake, 43 per cent of offshore refugees were aged 0-14, compared with 19 per cent of the population, and they would therefore draw on the costs of education and other government services to a greater extent in their earlier years (access economics 2008). another study similarly found that while offshore refugees were more likely to be unemployed after five years of settlement, they were also more likely to be engaged in education and ‘strongly focused on creating a new life’ (australian survey research group 2011, p.2). however, caution is needed when drawing conclusions from findings that highlight initial negative impacts between different migrant groups given that it is ‘illogical to compare economic contributions between these groups at one point in time, since they are at different stages of their educational and working lives on average’ (parsons 2013, p. 6). applying an alternative net present value approach, people from a refugee background may make greater economic contributions in the long term compared to other skilled migrants, as this takes into account the longer working life ahead of someone of younger age and acknowledges that relative benefit will depend on a person’s earning capacity (cully 2012, p. 7). in a similar vein, a number of studies concluded that the length of time in australia is a predictor of employment for offshore refugees (correa-velez, barnett & gifford 2015; hugo 2011). for example, hugo found that while offshore refugees experienced difficulties engaging in the workforce in the initial period of settlement, in the long term many experienced upward mobility and second-generation refugees have higher levels of labour market participation than the general population (hugo 2011). studies have also highlighted particular benefits that refugee employment can bring. hugo found that the resettlement of offshore refugees in regional areas can address labour shortages and their continued resettlement in these communities has the potential to contribute to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 77 significant regional growth (2011). this was the experience in the victorian town of nhill following the resettlement of 160 karen refugees in 2010 (ames & deloitte access economics 2015). specifically in relation to people who arrived by boat, stillwell concluded that afghan refugees had ‘made significant economic contributions’ to the new south wales town of young (2003, p. 247). in addition, there is growing recognition of the importance of remittances sent by refugees to families in their country of origin for the economic development of these regions (hugo 2011; nunn, mcmichael, gifford & correa-velez 2014). therefore, in the absence of research that explores the economic impacts of asylum seekers who arrived by boat since 2007, the studies outlined here suggest that there may well be positive economic benefits for their resettlement in australia both for their host country and for their communities in their country of origin. what can we conclude? a few tentative conclusions can be drawn from the studies outlined above in relation to the access to employment of people seeking asylum who arrived to australia by boat since 2007. while little has been documented about their skills and experience, the few small-scale studies there are indicate at least some have come to australia with considerable skills and qualifications. however, as has been the experience of people from a refugee background more generally, overall they may experience downward occupational mobility and deskilling. given that people who arrived by boat since 2007 have been subjected to mandatory detention (with some having experienced lengthy periods in detention), and those arriving since 13 august 2012 forced to endure several years without the right to work and minimal access to support services, their deskilling is likely to have been exacerbated. these policies would also have limited the ability of those who arrived by boat since 2007 from gaining work experience in australia and access to english language programs; further barriers to gaining employment for people from a refugee background that studies have highlighted. the issuing of temporary bridging visas to those who arrived since 13 august 2012 (and who face the prospect of a temporary protection visa should they be recognised as a refugee) is likely to be another barrier to their employment. in addition, given the studies that highlight discrimination can serve to further restrict the employment experiences of people from a refugee background, and that public attitudes can be influenced by representations made in public and political discourses, asylum seekers who arrived since 2007 may face further challenges to accessing employment. 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 this suggests that government policies have had a detrimental impact on the ability of asylum seekers who arrived from 2007 to access employment. integration can be understood as a two way process where both the host country as well as refugees have responsibilities (phillimore & goodson 2006; strang & ager 2010). this means that governments need to enact policies to facilitate rather than impede the ability of people from a refugee background to resettle in the host country, including the provision of services and supports that enable access to employment (correa-velez, barnett and gifford 2015; da lomba 2010). further research is clearly needed into the experiences of asylum seekers who arrived by boat since 2007 in relation to accessing employment. this is particularly relevant given that research conducted in sweden found there were significant differences in the employment and integration of people from various migration categories, including that asylum seekers achieve faster employment integration than resettled refugees (bevelander 2011). as others have identified, further research is needed into the economic contributions of people from a refugee background more generally (correa-velez, barnett & gifford 2015; parsons 2013), including longitudinal research on employment outcomes (rcoa 2010). research that focuses on the experiences of women who arrived by boat is also needed. very few of the studies cited above included interviews with women and only a small number of studies have focused specifically on refugee women’s experiences (for example, casimiro, hancock & northcote 2007). in addition, research into the experiences of asylum seekers that recognises and elevates the diversity of their experiences and the impacts of intersectionality (as soldatic et al. 2015 argue), would allow for a greater understanding of the complexities of employments experiences to be gained. in the absence of further research, the former minister for social service’s assertion of the need for policies that actively engage asylum seekers cannot be based on assumptions that asylum seekers who arrived to australia since 2007 have ‘limited economic opportunities’ (maley 2015). the employment and language skills of people seeking asylum who arrived by boat since 2007, and their employment status, are largely unknown beyond the few smallscale studies outlined above and anecdotal reporting. but the minister’s claims also ignore the body of research that points to a range of barriers to employment that people from a refugee background have faced, as well as the impacts of government policies on the capacity of people seeking asylum who arrived by boat to access employment. that labor and coalition government policies have continued mandatory detention, and denied the right to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.2, 2016 79 work to thousands of asylum seekers who arrived by boat since 13 august 2012, is particularly pertinent here, in addition to considerations of the impacts on broader community attitudes to asylum seekers by ministerial statements. the minister’s public statements about asylum seekers who have come to australia by boat do not acknowledge the broader impacts of australian policies on asylum seekers over the past five years. studies highlight the negative mental health consequences of long term detention (for example, see newman, proctor & dudley 2013). another suggests that being forced to live in the community without the right to work, with only minimal financial assistance and access to support services and ongoing uncertainty about their future, also has negative mental health consequences (hartley & fleay 2014). importantly, there are findings that highlight the positive contribution that gaining employment can make in reducing the experiences of negative mental health for asylum seekers (fleay, hartley & kenny 2013; hocking, kennedy & sundram 2015). there are numerous australian and international studies that show people from 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receive work rights after years living in forced destitution’, sydney morning herald, 25 september, accessed 6 may 2016, http://www.smh.com.au/national/more-than-20000-asylum-seekers-receive-workrights-after-years-living-in-forced-destitution-20150924-gjtvnx.html van dijk, t. a. 1997, ‘political discourse and racism: describing others in western parliaments’ in s. h.riggins (ed.), the language and politics of exclusion: others in discourse. london, sage, pp. 31–64. yaxley, l., norman, j. & gul, j. 2015, ‘temporary protection visas: senate votes to bring back temporary visas after deal to get children off christmas island’, abc news, 5 december, accessed 12 february 2016, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-1205/senate-agrees-to-reintroduce-temporary-protection-visas/5945576 statement on conflicts of interest the review process for this article was managed by the editorial committee according to the cope guidelines and the authors, as guest editors for the issue, had no involvement in it. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0811114032000113635 http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq046 http://www.smh.com.au/national/more-than-20000-asylum-seekers-receive-work-rights-after-years-living-in-forced-destitution-20150924-gjtvnx.html http://www.smh.com.au/national/more-than-20000-asylum-seekers-receive-work-rights-after-years-living-in-forced-destitution-20150924-gjtvnx.html http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-05/senate-agrees-to-reintroduce-temporary-protection-visas/5945576 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-12-05/senate-agrees-to-reintroduce-temporary-protection-visas/5945576 people seeking asylum in australia and their access to employment: just what do we know? abstract introduction policy overview literature overview statement on conflicts of interest cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 12, nos. 2–3 dec 2020 © 2020 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: lin, h. m., pang, c. l., and liao, d. c. 2020. work, life, and identity negotiation in a foreign land: a study of taiwanese working holiday makers in belgium. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 12:2–3, 51–66. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6946 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper work, life, and identity negotiation in a foreign land: a study of taiwanese working holiday makers in belgium hsien ming lin1, ching lin pang1,2, da chi liao3 1 ku leuven 2 university of antwerp 3 national sun yatsen university corresponding author: hsien ming lin, interculturalism, migration and minorities research centre, faculty of humanities and social sciences, ku leuven, parkstraat 45, 3000 leuven, belgium. hsienming.lin@kuleuven.be doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6946 article history: received 16/11/2019; revised 17/09/2020; accepted 08/10/2020; published 12/02/2021 abstract this study examined the living and working experiences of 14 taiwanese working holiday makers (whms) in belgium as they negotiate their identity and social lives while they live overseas, using both participant observation and semistructured interviews. the study demonstrates that the low salary level and high work pressure in taiwan are two of the major factors pushing these young taiwanese to leave their homeland and work overseas. however, the majority of these taiwanese whms face difficulties in speaking belgium’s local languages, and their opportunities for work are further limited by the temporary visa regulations. workplaces run by mainland chinese, especially in the hospitality industry, have become vital places for taiwanese whms to negotiate their ethnonational identity. although they only have limited social lives and networks in the host society, they claim that they have developed intercultural competences and a greater openmindedness by living in the multicultural and international environments of brussels or other belgian cities. keywords belgium; chinese catering industry; ethnonational identity negotiation; taiwanese; working holiday makers (whms) declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 51 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6946 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6946 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:hsienming.lin@kuleuven.be https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.6946 introduction in this study, the work experiences, social lives and ethnic identity negotiation practices of taiwanese working holiday makers in belgium were examined. there are several reasons for conducting this study. firstly, facilitated by the rapid development of globalization and international business, several new migration schemes are emerging for taiwanese youths, such as the working holiday programs that have been mutually constructed by taiwanese and foreign governments. since 2004, the taiwanese government has established working holiday program contracts with many foreign countries. the first contract was signed with the australia and up to the middle of 2020, the taiwanese government had signed contracts with 16 other countries, including new zealand, japan, south korea, canada, the united kingdom, ireland, german, slovakia, poland, hungary, austria, czech republic, france, luxembourg, the netherlands and belgium. although the regulations along with work and life conditions vary among the countries, they generally seek to attract and offer taiwanese young people, aged between 20 and 30, the opportunity to live and work overseas for a year. among the different contracts, the united kingdom offers a twoyear working holiday visa and australia allows them to remain for a second year if they fulfil certain requirements regarding the special credit accumulation system (chi & lin, 2017). a mutual working holiday contract between the taiwanese and belgian governments was signed in 2013, and it allows taiwanese young people to work and live in belgium for up to a year. the belgian government offers the visa to a maximum number of 200 taiwanese youths annually. the working holiday programs have become a popular migration pathway for taiwanese youths not only to work and live overseas, but also to experience ‘exotic’ lifestyles. the programs have already attracted over 200,000 taiwanese youths to migrate overseas temporarily according to statistical data from 2004 to 2019. in terms of demographics, the average age of the taiwanese working holiday participants is 26.3, of whom 70% are female. moreover, these taiwanese youths are generally highly educated, with 85% of them having a bachelor’s degree or higher. accordingly, taiwanese whms are mainly educated females. since the salaries in most western countries are higher than those in taiwan, working and living overseas is attractive to many taiwanese youths. however, the youths often face challenges when arriving in their host countries in terms of finding official employment in a job with a reasonable salary and work conditions. the average salary that taiwanese whms earn in a year is approximately us$12,000, while their annual expenses are around us$7,670. accordingly, the real amount of money they can save annually is only us$4,300 (commonwealth magazine, 2016). approximately 70% of taiwanese whms choose to work and live in australia, because the program regulations are simpler and less strict and the working and living conditions are appealing. as a result, most of the identified studies have focused on australia and other englishspeaking countries’ experiences, with only a limited study identified for europe and none found for belgium. as the programs become an increasingly important mobility avenue for taiwanese youths, this study aims to fill that gap by examining belgian taiwanese whms’ work and life experiences and the related issues of ethnonational identity negotiations that they experience while work and live overseas (chi & lin, 2017). it investigates their motivations for choosing to leave their homeland and work overseas, their experiences in searching for employment, their social lives and interpersonal relations while abroad, and the relevant issues regarding their ethnonational identity negotiations. moreover, the special location of brussels and its multicultural societal atmosphere further make belgium’s case deserve more consideration. the case of belgium is interesting because of its central geographical location in europe and, above all, because brussels is the official seat of the european union, supporting global governance and sustainability. this study will further demonstrate how taiwanese whms discover these values during their stay so that their journey not only improves their economic livelihood but also has a deep imprint in their personal growth and their views on diversity, sustainability, equality, and accountability. lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 52 literature review taiwanese immigrants are underrepresented in and absent from many mainstream societal domains, including migration policy, the labor market, the mass media, daily discourse, and academic debates. in this regard, pang (1999) utilized the word invisible to describe the disadvantaged social position that chinese/ taiwanese immigrants face in belgium’s host society. in a similar vein, lin (2018) advocates for more studies on taiwanese immigrants and thus supports this study that provides a case study of taiwanese in belgium. it is important to point out that the social positions of taiwanese whms in the host societies, whether in belgium or other major working holiday destinations, especially australia, are fairly different. in australia, taiwanese youths constitute a major part of the working holiday labor market, as taiwan ranks as a topfive country of origin of whms in 2020 due to the fact that there have been tens of thousands of taiwanese youths applying to work as whms in australia annually (department of home affairs australian government, 2020). in this regard, taiwanese whms are more visible in australia’s mainstream society and its labor market. on the contrary, in belgium, working holiday makers get little attention because they are small in number and scale, with only hundreds of participants. accordingly, based on the arguments made by pang (1999) and lin (2018) and the different demographic structures and social positions that taiwanese whms hold in belgium and other major working holiday destinations, the case of taiwanese whms in belgium deserves more exploration, both from empirical and theoretical viewpoints. the working holiday scheme of mobility originated in western youth culture, as many western youths choose to travel, work, and live overseas for their ‘gap year’ before graduating or entering employment. the concept of a gap year for western youths is that youths aged between 18 and 25 backpack or participate in a working holiday program to experience different cultures and lifestyles outside of their home country. as such, the main purpose of a gap year or participating in a working holiday program for western youths is not to earn money but to experience an ‘exotic’ life, explore their future ambitions, and foster self development. in western cultures, the gap year is regarded as an important period for transitioning from adolescence into adulthood. moreover, the gap year is a vital component of youth mobility in western culture (amit, 2012; cohen, 2011; clarke, 2004). in the asian context and, more specifically, taiwanese society, there is no tradition or culture of a gap year. few taiwanese youths elect to escape from their school life to have a gap year, travel, or work and live overseas. accordingly, the reasons for participating in working holiday programs for taiwanese youths are different from those of their western counterparts. while the exploration of ‘exotic’ lifestyles and cultures and the ensuing transformative growth of the self during that journey loom equally large in the minds of western and taiwanese youths, one of the main differences in those participating in whm programs is the importance of earning money during their time away from home. for many western youths, working and making money is not the main goal but a collateral necessity to support their travel expenses. in contrast, taiwanese and asian youths intend to find employment abroad since salaries abroad are significantly higher than in their home countries (bui et al., 2013; kawashima, 2010; stephenson & hughes, 2005). the outcomes of existing research into taiwanese whms generally concentrate on englishspeaking countries and are mainly focused on taiwanese youths’ motivations and the push and pull factors that attract taiwanese youths to participate in the programs and leave their homeland (ho et al., 2014), their intercultural communications and foreign language learning experiences (chi & lin, 2017), their job searching experiences (peng & hebbani, 2014), and their personal growth and selfrealization during the journey (tsai & collins, 2017). however, few studies have examined how taiwanese whms negotiate their ethnonational identity or how they organize their social lives and make friends while working and living abroad (li, 2020). as existing studies on taiwanese whms are concentrated on specific geographies and research topics (yoon, 2014), the authors of the present study believe that this study could expand and lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 53 deepen the understanding of taiwanese whms’ work and life experiences by probing into their professional lives, interpersonal relationships, and leisure activities abroad. taiwanese whms in foreign lands face many challenges, including finding a job and adapting to the work and private life of a foreign country with a different tongue and different cultural practices. thus, this study explores how taiwanese whms negotiate intercultural differences and how they identify themselves culturally and ethnically, since working holiday youths originating from taiwanese society are likely to have a strong confucian cultural imprint. in this study, cultural and ethnic identity are used interchangeably as these two theoretical concepts share similar meanings in some migration studies (zhu, 2017). they both refer to how people identify themselves culturally and ethnically. it is important to note that people’s cultural and ethnic identities are dynamic, fluid, and context specific rather than static or unchangeable. scholars such as barth, eriksen, and others believe that people’s cultural and ethnic identities are not only determined by themselves but are subject to change based on interaction with other actors in societies. people may further use both tangible and intangible markers for drawing boundaries to distinguish ‘us’ from ‘others’ in cultural and ethnic ways (barth, 1969, 1994, 2000; eriksen, 2001; eriksen & jakoubek, 2018). when encountering unfamiliar cultures or people with different ethnic backgrounds, most people become entangled in complex identity negotiation processes in order to foster a sense of culturally and ethnically belonging to a group in a new environment or under a specific interaction context (tingtoomey, 2005, 2010). moreover, since societal and workplace cultures and ethnic contexts in belgium are more diverse than those in taiwan, young taiwanese whms may have more opportunities to meet people with cultural and ethnic differences when living in belgium. therefore, in this study, the authors explore how taiwanese whms negotiate their ethnic identities as well as their work and personal life experiences while living and working in the superdiverse belgian society (der bracht et al., 2014; kenny & briner, 2013). research methods and data analysis this study applied both netnography and semistructured interview methods for data collection (berg, 2009). the first author had conducted online participant observation during the period of 2017 to 2019 on several virtual communities (on facebook) constructed by taiwanese whms in belgium. these communities include the office of taiwanese working holiday makers in belgium, the student alumni of taiwanese working holiday makers in belgium, and the selfhelp association of taiwanese working holiday makers in belgium. these three virtual communities have approximately 500, 2,000, and 1,500 online users, respectively. it is important to mention that the first author not only acted as a lurker; instead, when he was accepted to participate in the communities, he posted selfintroduction information to let other online users know his academic background and research intention and asked for consent on the part of the research participants. by conducting fieldwork and participant observation online, these virtual communities provided opportunities to access different social groups of taiwanese people in belgium. during the process of conducting the netnography, after receiving authorization from the online information providers, the relevant information was downloaded, along with screenshots. in addition to conducting fieldwork online, active users in the virtual communities were invited to participate in semistructured interviews on the online platforms after a detailed explanation of the research aim and the subject of the study were given and written consent was received. subsequently, appointments were made with each participant for further online and offline interviews (kozinets, 2002, 2012). both purposive and snowball sampling methods were applied in this study for the recruitment of research participants. in total, 14 taiwanese whms participated in the research. the age of the informants was between 23 and 30, and 12 of them (85%) were female. most research participants worked in panchinese or related ethnic business sectors. eight participants worked as parttime attendants at restaurants in belgium that were mainly operated by mainlandchinese employers; a few of them worked for taiwanese lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 54 restaurateurs; one participant worked at the delhaize supermarket as a salesperson; two participants worked as salespeople at dutyfree shops in brussels where customers are mainly chinese or asian tourists; two participants worked as sushi chefs at a japanesestyle restaurant and a bubble tea shop in brussels, both of which were operated by mainlandchinese immigrants; the remaining participant worked at a chocolate shop in brussels as a parttime assistant. most research participants worked as parttime employees, with some combining several parttime jobs to support their living and traveling expenses in belgium and europe. different online platforms, including facebook, skype, line, and wechat, were used during the interviews. all interviews were conducted in mandarin and after obtaining each informant’s approval, the first author used a pen coder to record the interview. subsequently, the interviews were transcribed and translated into english for further analysis. in terms of data analysis, the constant comparative method was used, which generated findings and themes after a series of analyzing and coding procedures was completed. all textual data was read in detail, then the three steps of coding methods (open coding, axial coding, and selective coding) were adopted to generate research themes and findings. all the research participants’ information presented in this paper is anonymized so as to protect participants’ privacy rights (alhojailan, 2012; maguire & delahunt, 2017; mcgrath et al., 2018). by employing the coding methods outlined above, three main findings and research themes connected to taiwanese whms work life and ethnic identity negotiation experiences in belgium emerged. findings and analysis taiwanese whms’ work and live experiences during the program taiwanese whms, similar to their western counterparts, value the experience of travel and exploring foreign cultures, and consider working overseas an opportunity to better grasp their future goals and foster the quest for the meaning of life. the taiwanese whms in this study focused more on the importance of earning money during the process. donna, a 26yearold female who was interviewed in 2018, shared her story, including her motivation to leave taiwan, why she decided to participate in the working holiday program, and her experiences of working at several parttime jobs while in belgium. she said: before i came to belgium, i had already worked as a hair designer in a hair salon in taiwan for about six years. however, you know, i did have to work, on average, between 10 and 12 hours per day, but i barely got about nt$30,000 to nt$35,000 (€800 to €1,000) each month … you know, this was not a high salary level since i had to spend the majority of my time working … so, after six years of working, i felt tired of work and life in taiwan, and i wanted to try something new  … and at the time, many of my taiwanese friends encouraged me to be a working holiday maker overseas. they told me that  … working overseas can make you grow [and] feel free, [and that you can] experience different cultures and lifestyles and, most importantly, earn much more money than in taiwan … you know, their narratives and experiences really did attract me … and, as i like europe’s history and cultures, that was why i came here [belgium]. an economic consideration is possibly one of the main reasons encouraging taiwanese youths to leave taiwan and work overseas. according to 2016 statistics, in the hairdressing industry in taiwan, the average monthly salary was approximately nt$27,219 per month (€800 to €900), representing merely half of the national average salary of nt$48,490 (€1,600 to €1,700). moreover, employees in the hairdressing industry have to work an average of 200 hours per month, which is 1.14 times higher than the national average of 175 working hours per month (taiwan labor front, 2016). the figures given above corroborate this research participant’s views that the hairdressing industry in taiwan is a highworkinghour and low payment economic sector. in fact, low salaries do not only exist in the hairdressing industry. in 2019, the lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 55 average monthly salary of taiwanese youths was nt$31,603 (roughly €900 to €1,000), which made 31.2% of taiwanese youths want to change jobs to earn more money (ministry of labor, 2020). this confirms that taiwanese youths apply for whms programs not only to experience different and ‘exotic’ cultures, lifestyles, and travel, but also to earn more money. it also explains why many taiwanese whms come from lower and middleworking classes rather than economically advantaged families (chang, 2014). however, the predeparture image of their overseas lives does not always concur with their lived experiences, as many of them struggled to find fulltime or official employment in the mainstream labor market. this may be an outcome of the working holiday visa’s time limitation and participants limited proficiency in speaking belgium’s most widely spoken local languages, dutch and french. at the time of the interview in 2018, lan, a 28yearold female had just obtained her master’s degree, with a major in art history, from a university in the united states. she explained the difficulties she faced in finding official and fulltime employment in belgium despite her english language skills and her master’s degree: you know, it was really difficult to find a fulltime job here [in belgium] … after i got my master’s degree, i thought it would be wonderful for me to work in europe since the art industry here is quite popular and famous. so, i applied to the working holiday program and came to belgium … however, i immediately found that employers here do not like to hire people like me who are only allowed to work and stay in belgium for a maximum of a year … i sent more than 10 job applications to local companies in the art industry; however, i got no responses … it really made me feel frustrated …, and after waiting for months, since i really needed money to support my cost of living and [my] expenses here, i had no choice but to give up on finding an official position and tried to get several parttime jobs at the same time to earn money. this research participant’s jobsearching experiences are not an outlier, as the same issue was experienced by many research participants. the unfamiliarity of the status of whms in belgium might explain the reluctance of employers to recruit whms. in 2017, only 190 noneuropean union whms worked in belgium (oecd, 2019). in addition, the oneyear limitation of the working holiday visa might also narrow the chances of finding a fulltime job in the mainstream labor market. furthermore, language presents another obstacle, as taiwanese whms do not master the local languages of dutch, french, or german. in sum, unfamiliarity with the whms’ status, the shortterm visa, and language issues present significant obstacles for these young people in finding fulltime employment (dustmann, 1999; robertson, 2016). as a coping strategy, they seek work opportunities in the panchinese ethnic business sector, particularly in the catering industry. the panchinese immigrant communities are relatively few in number compared with two other ethnic minority groups, moroccans and turks, which each total over half a million people. in contrast, the panchinese immigrant communities (in this study, the panchinese immigrant communities include mainland chinese, hong kong chinese, and taiwanese) in belgium contain less than 50,000 people; among them, 45,000 from mainland china and 400 from taiwan. although the number of panchinese immigrant communities in belgium is small, the panchinese catering industry has a 100year history, as the first chinese restaurant in belgium was established in 1920 by early chinese immigrants from south eastern provinces of mainland china who resettled in antwerp. subsequently, the panchinese immigrant communities expanded, mainly after the 1980s, as the mainlandchinese government implemented a series of economic reforms and opendoor policies that allowed its citizens to emigrate overseas. since then, an increasing number of mainlandchinese people have chosen to emigrate to belgium to search for a better life (pang, 2002, 2008). interestingly, approximately 80% of the immigrants from mainland china are found in the catering industry and operate restaurants for a living (song, 2011). according to a calculation conducted by pang (2002), there are more than 1,000 chinese restaurants across belgium. consequently, as taiwanese whms share cultural, ethnic, and languageuse similarities with immigrants from mainland china, it is easier for taiwanese whms to find work opportunities in the panchinesedominated catering industry (smith & elliott, 2002). lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 56 after struggling to find employment elsewhere, many of the research participants shared similar experiences of finding a job position in the chinese catering industry or other small and medium ethnic business sectors. baibai, a 29yearold male, shared his jobsearching experiences and how he obtained work as a sushi chef at a japanesestyle restaurant operated by immigrants from mainland china. you know, it is really difficult for people like me [temporary whms] to find an official and fulltime job here [in belgium] … however, as i really needed money at that time, i tried to find a job and a chance to work in the catering industry as i knew there were a lot of restaurants operated by the chinese here. it is much easier for me to find a job and work at a restaurant operated by chinese [people] since we speak the same language … at that time, i used both facebook and wechat social media platforms to search for jobs  … you know, some people will post hiring advertisements on there, and at that time, i saw that a chinese employer was seeking to hire a sushi chef to work in his japanesestyle restaurant in brussels … then i got the chance of an interview, so that’s why i’m here … it is really much easier to find a position when the employers come from mainland china or have a chinese ethnic background. similar experiences were shared by other research participants. weiting, a 24yearold female, shared her experiences of finding employment in a dutyfree shop in brussels that was operated by mainlandchinese people. you know, many taiwanese whms, especially female, are working in the dutyfree shops located in the center of brussels that are operated by mainlandchinese employers  … since the shop’s main customers are chinese tourists, the shop does need to hire employees who can speak chinese … and they are always hiring because the majority of staff at the shop are similar to me [temporary migrant workers] … staff here usually change …, which means the employers always need to find new people …, and it was really easy for me to get this job since the employers only did a 20minutelong job interview, then i got the job. notably, the research participants’ occupations in belgium were mainly at panchinese ethnic and related small and medium business sectors, albeit in casual, precarious, or parttime positions. although the taiwanese whms shared similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds with their mainlandchinese employers and coworkers, these intimacies had both positive and negative effects on the taiwanese whms. the positive effects are evidenced by the cultural closeness and shared language between taiwanese and mainlandchinese people, allowing the taiwanese whms to obtain employment more easily. many research participants mentioned the importance of these similarities in their jobsearching experiences. several of them indicated this: it is too difficult to find a job when the majority of your employers and customers speak dutch or french and i can only speak chinese and english … thus, it is easier to find a job in chineserelated industries, like restaurants, massage shops, nail shops, grocery stores, dutyfree shops, and so on, since many of those shops and businesses are owned and operated by chinese immigrants, and we have no problem communicating as we all speak the chinese language (kaikai, a 26yearold female). before i worked as a sushi chef, i tried many times to search for work in companies or businesses operated by locals or belgians … however, i have to say, it is too difficult to find a job for people like me since i can only speak chinese and english, but employees are required to communicate with customers mainly in dutch or french … in contrast, finding a job working at a business operated by other chinese people is easier, so that’s why i chose to work here [a japanesestyle restaurant operated by a mainlandchinese employer] (baibai, a 29yearold male). another participant, vencia, a 29yearold female, compared her jobsearching experiences in belgium with her working holiday experiences in australia. lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 57 i think the job search and work experiences here [in belgium] and in australia are quite different  … in australia, the working holiday program is just like in an industry  … there are plenty of whms in australia [and they] work for both local and international employers … unlike in belgium, in australia, people can easily find jobs and work for local employers (like local farms) ranging across different industries … however, here [in belgium], the situation is different. first of all, the number of whms is not so many compared with australia, and second, as we face difficulties finding jobs in the belgian mainstream job market and work for local or belgian employees because of the language barrier, the majority of taiwanese working holiday youths in belgium have no choice but to work for chinese or related businesses. the quotations above indicate the significant differences between being a whm in belgium and in australia. the language barriers and the ‘invisible social position’ of whms reduces the possibility of them finding work and integrating in the belgian host society. in australia, however, these limitations are not present because the number of whms is much higher and they are considered a vital and supplementary labor force in australia’s mainstream labor market and especially in the agricultural sector in rural australia. thus, whms find employment in the mainstream labor market more easily in australia than in belgium. moreover, the narratives shown above demonstrate significant differences of whms’ jobsearching experiences between englishspeaking countries (especially in australia) and belgium (brennan, 2014). however, the negative effects of sharing ethnic and cultural backgrounds with their mainlandchinese employers and coworkers are mentioned by research participants in terms of working conditions and ethnic stereotyping. research participant alex, a 28yearold male, shared his experiences of exploitation by his mainlandchinese employers while working at a chinese restaurant. alex said: they [mainlandchinese employers] totally know that people like me [ whms] really want to earn money to stay here and travel overseas … so, they ask me to do a lot of work … sometimes they even asked me to come in earlier than other fulltime employees to help them to open the doors and do the preparation work … however, even though i have already done a lot of work, they do not give me the money that i deserve as they want to evade tax payments … you know, the situation of tax evasion is quite common in the chinese catering industry. the first author then further asked alex why his mainlandchinese employers like to do so, and alex explained his point of view from a cultural perspective: in addition to the fact that i need money … i thought, why they dare to treat me unfairly is because they know that, culturally and ethnically speaking, people from confucian societies, like me, are less likely to complain compared with westerners, even [when] we are treated unequally or unfairly … so that is why they dare to treat me or us [other taiwanese working holiday youths] like this … however, i have to say that i really do want to complain, but [the reasons] i did not do so  … [are that] first of all, i thought i would only stay at their restaurant for maximum of a year, then i would go back to taiwan, [and] i did not [want] to make the situation become embarrassing  … so i tolerated it, but this did not mean that i really accepted it …, and i have to say that maybe it is a negative part of working in a chinese or related industry, since most of the mainlandchinese employers share similar cultural and ethnic backgrounds with taiwanese whms, and they would use the similarities to take advantage of us. taiwanese whms face the dilemma of most migrants, namely whether or not to accept injustice. out of pragmatic considerations, they do not resist since they need the money, and the work is short term. in trying to understand and contextualize the uneven relations in workplaces, they rationalize the negative experiences through confucian values. however, the accumulation of these negative labor relations and exploitation experiences cause taiwanese whms to rethink and renegotiate their perceptions of ethnic relations and cultural differences while boundaries between themselves and their mainlandchinese counterparts become lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 58 increasingly prominent. therefore, these panchinese ethnic businesses and workplaces unintentionally become vital sites for negotiating different ethnonational identities and identifications between taiwanese whms and their mainlandchinese counterparts, reflecting the geopolitical identity politics between mainland china and taiwan (li, 2017). ethnonational identity negotiation in the catering industry in the past two decades, taiwanese people have experienced significant changes in their ethnonational identities and the way they identify themselves and consider their relationships with mainlandchinese people both culturally and ethnically. the development of ethnonational identities in taiwan is increasingly moving away from a (pan)chinese ethnic identity and identification with mainland china. the national chengchi university conducted a longitudinal survey (2020) over the past two decades with regard to identity and identification issues in taiwan. the first survey results, announced in 1992, indicated that only 17.6% people in taiwan identified themselves as taiwanese, while 25.5% of people identified themselves as chinese and 46.4% of people considered themselves both chinese and taiwanese. accordingly, in the early 1990s, the chinese ethnic identity label was acceptable to most taiwanese people. when taiwanese society started to experience rapid developments in both political democratization and identity localization in the late 1990s, the abovementioned percentages started to change significantly. in 2009, 51.4% of taiwanese people regarded themselves as taiwanese, only 4.4% regarded themselves as chinese, and the remaining 39.8% of people in taiwan identified themselves as both taiwanese and chinese. moreover, in the latest survey, announced in june 2020, taiwanese identity achieved a peak of 67%, while chinese identity decreased to 2.4%, and dual taiwanese and chinese identity decreased to 27.5%. recently, the term ‘naturally independent generation’ (tiān rán dú, 天然獨) has become popular in both taiwanese public discourses and academic debates. it refers to the phenomenon that the young taiwanese generation (those born after the 1990s) overwhelmingly regard themselves as taiwanese and refuse to use the chinese identity label to describe themselves. in addition, they do not consider china as taiwan’s ‘brother’ or ‘family’, but rather as something that is ‘other’. in addition, another survey, conducted in 2019, further revealed that 82.4% of the young taiwanese generation (aged below 30) considered themselves taiwanese, and that the chinese identity label only attracted 12.4% of taiwanese youths’ acceptance (cabestan, 2017; fifield, 2019; zhong, 2016). some scholars believe that taiwanese and mainlandchinese ethnonational identities are in conflict with different perceptions of ethnonational identity and ethnic affiliation between taiwanese and mainland chinese people. this not only affects the quality of the interaction between them, but also influences how they see each other culturally and ethnically (liu & li, 2016; zhong, 2016). these identity and identification issues are also at play in our study when taiwanese whms work for mainlandchinese bosses. markers of difference for taiwanese whms center around language— more specifically, different accents and vocabulary. for example, baibai shared: i can easily distinguish [between] who is taiwanese and who is mainland chinese since we do have pretty different accents even though both of us are speaking mandarin chinese … the mainlandchinese [speakers] have harder tongues, but we taiwanese have softer tongues when speaking. moreover, when first interviewed in 2019, wei, a 27yearold male working at chinese restaurant, shared his interaction experiences with mainlandchinese colleagues at the workplace, saying: you know, how my mainlandchinese coworkers found out i came from taiwan … that was based on my chinese speaking accent … i remembered very clearly that when i first [spoke] to my chinese colleagues, lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 59 they were surprised and said, ‘ your chinese is so … soft and tender’ …, and they said this three times that day. although mandarin chinese is spoken in both taiwan and mainland china, the different accents held by taiwanese and mainlandchinese people have become crucial cultural and ethnic markers of difference (liao, 2008). when it comes to discussing the issues of ethnonational identity and ethnicity affiliations, most taiwanese whms understand the sensitivity of these issues and often tend to ‘downplay’ identity and identification topics in order to avoid conflicts. wei shared his experiences as follows: you know, many mainlandchinese [people] are interested in chatting or discussing issues of ethnonational identity with us [taiwanese] … they regard us as chinese … however, we do not, we (especially [the] young generation) see [ourselves] as taiwanese  … taiwanese and mainlandchinese [people] do have pretty different ethnonational identity perceptions, therefore, it is easy to find conflict with them when talking about these issues  … so i do not like to talk about these things with them since the main reason for me coming here was to earn money and enjoy the life here … it is not necessary to end relationships with them because of these unsolvable problems  … therefore, when they try to talk about these topics with me, i reply in funny ways … for example, i will say, ‘i’m a money person; the main goal for me is to make money’ … or sometimes i will say, ‘i’m an earth person (地球人)’ so as to avoid talking about these embarrassing issues. several other research participants apply similar downplaying strategies to wei’s while discussing these sensitive issues with their mainlandchinese coworkers in the workplace. in this regard, avoidance is a useful method to prevent further polarization and escalation of conflict while interacting with their mainlandchinese employers and coworkers (tajfel & turner, 1986). moreover, different political ideologies held by taiwanese whms and their mainlandchinese employers and coworkers regularly become important ways to distinguish between each other. hsien, a 29yearold male, worked at an asian grocery store operated by a mainlandchinese employer, and he shared how different political ideologies make him feel different to his mainlandchinese counterparts: i admit that we [taiwanese] do really share many similarities in cultures, histories, and ethnicities with mainlandchinese [people] since both taiwan and mainland china are significantly influenced by the traditional chinese and confucian cultures and we speak the same language  … yes, in those ways, we are similar  … however, when we talk about political ideologies, for example, freedom, democracy, human rights, and so on  …, then i find that we [taiwanese] do really have different perceptions and mentalities toward these issues compared with them [mainlandchinese people]  … but i will not say [that] we [taiwanese] are right and they are wrong … because i know we do really have very different lives and growingup experiences, since the political systems in taiwan and mainland china are still quite different. based on the above, the different language accents and political ideologies held by taiwanese and mainlandchinese people are vital references for taiwanese whms to reflect on their own ethnonational identity and distinguish themselves from their mainlandchinese counterparts, although they admit that there are shared commonalities. moreover, hsien does not judge the different political systems. interestingly, many research participants held similar views and experiences to those of hsien, demonstrating that belgian taiwanese whms’ international mobility and interpersonal interaction experiences with their mainland chinese colleagues at workplaces not only make those taiwanese youths realize the differences between themselves and mainlandchinese youths, but also further make them strengthen their initial taiwanese ethnonational identity. consequently, the interaction experiences between those taiwanese working holiday youths and their mainlandchinese coworkers do not cause ethnic boundary crossing or blurring, but boundary consolidating (li, 2016; light et al., 1993). lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 60 limited social life in the host society the present study finds that most of the research participants indicated that working and living overseas enabled them to become more openminded to and tolerant of cultural and ethnic differences. one participant, baibai, compared the level of cultural and ethnic diversities between taiwan and belgium and shared his views of their meanings while working and living in belgium. he said: i think here [in belgium] is quite different from taiwan  … you know, in taiwan, our culture is significantly influenced by the traditional chinese and confucian cultures (中華文化), and the majority group in taiwan is constituted by the han people (漢人) … and of course, in taiwan, we do have some other minorities since taiwan has 16 different aboriginal group of peoples, and also has about one million immigrants from southeast asia. however, their cultures are not as popular and dominant as the han culture and group … so, in taiwan, the cultural atmosphere for me is greater homogeneity … however, here [in belgium], it is quite different. on the street, you can encounter people from different countries and with various cultural and ethnic backgrounds … the diversity in belgium is quite impressive. he added: i think my staying and working experiences in belgium have changed me a lot. i have become more open minded in exploring, trying, and accepting different cultures, perspectives, and so on … for example, in taiwan, people regard tattoos and street graffiti as bad or criminal  … however, after i came here and lived in belgium  …, i gradually knew that these subcultures have their own meanings and cultural backgrounds … we can’t see them on the surface; we have to learn about them from their contexts and deeper ways … i think due to the fact that belgium is a multicultural country and its capital, brussels, is also [an] international city … thus, living and working here really [allowed] me [to] have more opportunities to meet with different people from all around the world, and to access and experience different cultures that i did not know before … in this sense, i think staying and working here has really made me grow [and] become an openminded person, and [has] also eliminate[d] some of the cultural stereotypes that i had before. in addition to baibai, many other taiwanese working holiday youths shared similar narratives; for them, their overseas working and living experiences have also given them more opportunities to experience other cultures and encounter people from different places and cultural and ethnic backgrounds in the superdiverse host society. thus, for these research participants, working and living in belgium did really change their cultural mindset and make them become more openminded and more willing to accept cultural and ethnic differences. therefore, baibai and other research participants’ working and living experiences have helped them to gain intercultural competences and foster cosmopolitan identities (kawashima, 2010). despite the issues between the taiwanese and chinese, the research participants mainly interacted socially with the chinese. a 25yearold female research participant worked at a bubble tea shop in brussels, operated by a mainlandchinese employer, with most of her coworkers being from mainland china as well. she shared friendships with her mainlandchinese counterparts and other taiwanese friends. she said: you know, my colleagues were mainly from mainland china, so in my work life, i interacted with them a lot … however, in my private life and after work, i did have some taiwanese working holiday friends who i knew and met on facebook  … i did not experience serious conflict with them  … we were quite peaceful when we got together  … however, the problem was that it is quite difficult to maintain and cultivate such friendships since people come here with different purposes and [their stays are] mostly temporary; thus, people come and go, and it is difficult to say i had good friends here … it is quite uncertain. lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 61 some research participants’ interactions with local belgians brought to the foreground the intercultural differences between the taiwanese and the locals. viviana tried to make friend with locals, but during the interactions, viviana further realized that she is quite different from her belgian friends. yes, i did try to make friends with local belgians; through introductions from my taiwanese or mainland chinese friends, and using the tinder app, i did successfully make and meet up with some belgian friends … we were okay hanging out together … however, in the process, i still realized that we do really have quite different cultural thoughts and issues  … because of this, sometimes i felt embarrassed when interacting with them since we did not have common topics to chat about … therefore, sometimes, i felt like ‘i’m an outsider’; i could just laugh like a fool since i really did not understand what they were talking about … maybe we hung out several times, but the relationships did not last long. making friends during the short span of one year is difficult, fleeting, and uncertain. these types of friendships are neither easily maintained nor cultivated. most research participants had limited belgian friends, and the majority of the friends they did have were from mainland china or taiwan. even when opportunities arise, as in the case of viviana, it is hard to bridge the perceived intercultural divide as manifested in different lifestyles, smalltalk topics, every day leisure practices, and so on (yang & wen, 2016). conclusion and discussion this study examined belgian taiwanese whms’ work and life experiences and the related issues of ethnic identity negotiations while working and living abroad. in addition to the lure of experiencing ‘exotic’ lifestyles and cultures and having more opportunities to travel, the low salary level of the young generation in taiwan is one of the main factors that pushed them to work overseas. since earning money is one of the main goals of these working holiday youths, it was found that most of their time is spent working, and thus their overseas experience diverges greatly from that of their western counterparts, who prioritize the experience of foreign cultures over earning money. because working and earning money constitutes a major part of their overseas stay, after arriving in the host society in belgium, taiwanese whm spend considerable time searching for jobs. however, the unfamiliarity of the whm visa among local employers, the oneyear working visa, and language issues form the major hurdles in finding an official fulltime job in the mainstream labor market. given these limitations, taiwanese whms often find themselves working in the ethnic business sectors mainly operated and constituted by the mainland chinese, specifically in the catering industry. therefore, it is not surprising that most of their superiors and coworkers are mainland chinese, transforming the workplaces into a site where ethnic identity, identifications, and negotiations are taking place between mainlandchinese and taiwanese people. their workplaces might give rise to potential friction given the divergent cultural and ethnonational perceptions of themselves and each other, most notably among the younger taiwanese generation. to avoid awkward situations and conflicts, a downplaying strategy is often adopted as an identity negotiation strategy. although the taiwanese working holiday youths in this study drew clear boundaries between themselves and their mainlandchinese counterparts through the markers of different chinese language accents and political ideologies, they refrained from making judgments and discussions. as an unintended outcome, many of the taiwanese working holiday youths’ working experiences strengthened their own identity rather than closing the cultural or ethnic gap between them and their mainlandchinese counterparts. in addition, the taiwanese whms only have limited social interactions with belgians as they do not work in the mainstream labor market. even when they have the chance to interact with locals, different lifestyles, chatting topics, and cultural backgrounds prevent the formation of acquaintances and friendships. interestingly, although they are minimally involved in lin, pang, and liao cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 62 socialization with locals and feel an inability to develop strong ties and robust networks, they demonstrate a strong aspiration to become more openminded and to have developed intercultural competences by living in the multicultural and international environments of brussels and other cities. a theoretical contribution that this study could make is that the research findings in the study further transcend the methodological nationalism criticized by glick schiller and others (wimmer & glick schiller, 2002; wimmer & glick schiller, 2003). the findings demonstrate a mix of transnational disposition as well as negotiating a place in a panchinese ethnic labor market. their transnational disposition entails that the whms see themselves as global migrants rather than insisting on rooting their identity affiliation merely within a specific national border, even though most of them work in an ethnic market and do only have limited local networks while working and living in belgium due to language barriers and other limitations. so, these taiwanese whm are not privileged cosmopolitans empowered with different capitals— financial, social, and cultural capitals— nor do they claim to belong to the precariat or working poor (weenink, 2008). by participating in a working holiday program, a scheme that particularly encourages mobility in young people, taiwanese whms can construct new personal identities and (inter)subjective meanings with regard to their international movement and overseas working and living experiences. this study has focused on taiwanese whms’ experiences beyond englishspeaking countries, specifically in belgium. we delved into their work and personal lives, ethnic identities, and identification negotiation experiences while they work and live overseas. in so doing, we gained some glimpses into their life world. the study did not include the voices of their peers working in and outside the chinese business sector, nor those of their employers, so these 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how the notion of formal cross-sector policy frameworks (beginning with the 1998 ‘english’ compact) was socialised within policy communities as a preferred policy response to problems with the relationship; the role played by key policy actors (including collective or institutional actors) in the promotion and diffusion of ‘compacts’ and similar policy instruments; and the connexion between political events, the 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol. 7, no.2, 2015 issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2015 john butcher. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2015, 7(2): 4467, http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i2.4467 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v7i2.4350 opening (and closing) of ‘policy windows’, and the political salience of formal cross-sector policy frameworks. the case studies, which included each of the constituent ‘countries’ of the united kingdom, canada, australia (including federal, state and territory governments) and new zealand, confirm that the policy drivers contributing to the adoption of cross-sector policy frameworks were markedly similar in each of the different jurisdictions. however, the study also revealed that the particular political and institutional milieu in which cross-sector frameworks were framed had significant bearing on their eventual form, durability and effectiveness. although the policy frameworks considered in each of the fifteen jurisdictions under study had their provenance in the ‘third way’ policy discourses that characterised the first blair labour government in the united kingdom, none exactly replicated the seminal ‘english’ compact. new zealand’s relationship accord is a case in point. the clark labour government (19992008) proposed a formal settlement with the country’s ‘third sector’ based on the 1998 compact. however it was not until 2012 that the key national government (2008-present) formalised its kia tūtahi relationship accord. that the accord was over a decade in the making was due in large part to the reticence of the principal national umbrella organisations operating in the community and voluntary sector policy space. over the course of this protracted policy discussion, political and ideological factors weighed heavily in reframing both the form and scope of the policy framework – away from a ‘compact’ along ‘blairite’ lines to a vague ‘accord’ with new zealand communities. this paper charts that policy journey and highlights the importance of key political events and the ways in which policy actors exploited windows of policy opportunity associated with those events. we conclude that new zealand’s institutional and political milieu over the past three decades – whilst providing the catalyst for radical public sector reform – has nonetheless offered an unstable platform for policy discourse around cross-sector relations. this research draws upon a number of semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted by the author in late 2012 with senior policy actors in new zealand, including executive officers of four national intermediary organisations and senior government officials in the (former) office for the community and voluntary sector (ocvs) and the department of internal affairs. consistent with bevir et al. (2003) and soss (2006) the study adopted an interpretive cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 33 approach based upon ‘thick description’ to make sense of the policy process. insights gained from the interviews were triangulated with relevant primary documents (including numerous official reports, cabinet documents, policy statements, official websites, ministerial press releases and speeches, etc.) and scholarly literatures pertaining to the roles played by nonprofit organisations in the mixed economy of social welfare. the ki tūtahi relationship accord in context new zealand was an early and enthusiastic adopter of neoliberal approaches to public administration that would come to be called, collectively, new public management (larner 2000). the economy-wide reforms initiated by the lange labour government (1984-1989) provided a platform for the transformation of public sector management (evans et al. 1996). these included an increased reliance on market-oriented strategies such as deregulation, privatisation, outsourcing, the structural separation of purchasers and providers, an enhanced emphasis on performance measurement and management, a shift from input to output-based funding, and the delivery of public services by third parties under contract (boston et al. 1996; boston et al. 1999; boston 2008). it was considered that competition would result in greater efficiency, responsiveness and choice in these newly established human services markets and the contract would be the principal instrument by which this competitive turn in service provision would be achieved (smith 1996; nowland-foreman 1997; ashton et al. 2004; larner and craig 2005). the implementation of contracting and tendering regimes for the provision of health and human services gathered pace under prime ministers bolger and shipley (1990-1999) whose national governments, according to larner (2000, p. 17), exhibited a more recognisable ‘authoritarian version of neoliberalism and neo-conservatism’. by the mid 1990s, however, the national government had begun to reconsider its embrace of pure principal-agent approaches to public service delivery. an incoming government brief prepared by the department of social welfare in 1996 sounded a warning that ‘current arrangements with the sector based on purchase-of-service contracting may not, in themselves, be sufficient to maintain a healthy not-for-profit sector’ (cited in nowlandforeman 1997, p. 22; department of social welfare l996). a view began to emerge that contractual governance was beset with a number of problems and might lead to greater 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 fragmentation of both policy and service delivery; the co-optation of community and voluntary service providers as mere agents of the state; and a lack of focus on the needs of citizens (smith 1996: p. 16; nowland-foreman 1997, p. 34; aimers and walker 2008, p. 48). the ground was thus prepared for a resurgent opposition labour party to foreshadow proposals for a new settlement with new zealand’s community and voluntary sector in the lead-up to the 1999 general election. on taking office in december 1999, the clark minority labour/alliance government (1999-2002) signalled a shift away from the ‘free market purism’ of the nationals towards a ‘social development’ approach based on partnership, inclusion and joined-upness (small 1999; larner and craig 2005; aimers and walker 2008; prestidge 2010). prime minister helen clark stated her government’s intention to ‘develop a compact with the voluntary sector to facilitate and guide the relationship between us’ (clark 1999) and established a working party comprising community, community and voluntary sector and state services sector representatives ‘to consider the scope of a proposed agreement between government and iwi/māori community and voluntary organisations’ (cvswp 2001). the labour/alliance coalition government wasted little time in establishing high-level working groups with a broad remit to consult across the voluntary and community sector (as well as across the iwi/māori community) about the matters that should be taken into account in any formal relationship framework. during this time the government also established a ministerial portfolio for the community and voluntary sector, and enunciated a statement of government intentions (sogi) (new zealand 2001) as an expression of the government’s commitment to building strong and respectful relations with the sector. the labour/progressive coalition government that followed (2002-2005) continued the process of policy review and implementation. however, signs had begun to emerge that the community services sector and the government had divergent views: whereas the government clearly wanted to develop a framework document along the lines of the compacts then in place in the uk, the sector hedged, having concluded that the time was not right for a formal agreement on an equal footing with government (cvswp 2001). the government established a community sector taskforce to consult with the sector and to provide independent advice to government about progressing recommendations flowing from cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 35 the earlier working groups (o'brien et al. 2009). the relationship between the taskforce and the government was sometimes difficult, owing in part to the former’s firm commitment to embedding the government-sector relationship within a broader tiriti/treaty of waitangi framework (o'brien et al. 2009, p. 20). in 2004, then minister for the community and voluntary sector, tariana turia quit the labour government over proposed legislation affecting māori title to new zealand’s foreshore and seabed. turia went on to co-found the māori party. following the 2005 general election, the labour/progressive coalition government continued to address cross-cutting issues of practical concern to the sector. by 2007, perhaps sensing a possible change of government at the next election, the community sector signalled that as ‘our “official” knowledge of the tangata whenua, community and voluntary sector is very much greater now than it was when the statement of government intent was released’, it was now time for the sogi to ‘become a formal basis for action and accountability and a reflection of genuine partnership’ (angoa 2009). the government funded the association of non-governmental organisations of aotearoa (angoa) to undertake an assessment of government responsiveness to the sogi (o'brien et al. 2009). however, angoa’s final report was not completed until 2009, after the election of john key’s national-led government. framing the problem by the time of the 1999 election the ‘neoliberalisation’ of new zealand’s community services sector was well underway (o'brien et al. 2009, p. 26). this new dispensation based on marketisation and contractual governance introduced a range of problems. the administrative and compliance apparatus of contracting imposed operational burdens and practical constraints on the sector (o'brien et al. 2009, pp. 28-29). although government came to depend on community and voluntary sector providers as never before, the influence of the sector as a collective policy actor was simultaneously eroded by its engagement in the new contract culture. the election of the clark labour government presented an opportunity to re-set government’s relationship with the sector. new zealand’s inaugural minister for the community and voluntary sector, steve maharey spoke of the ‘almost complete breakdown’ of the 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 relationship between government and the community and voluntary sector. this he attributed to: unthinking adherence to a rigid contracting model, centralised needs identification and programme specification, and an unwillingness to acknowledge the independence of sector groups over the last decade (maharey 2000d). shortly after coming to power, the clark government established a community and voluntary sector working party (cvswp) ‘to consider the scope of a proposed agreement between government and iwi/māori, community and voluntary organisations’ (cvswp 2001). the cvswp noted ‘deep levels of frustration, mistrust, cynicism, anger and burnout’ arising from ‘community experience of dealing with governments over the past two decades’ (cvswp 2001, p. 3). even so, the cvswp concluded that ‘the time is not right’ for an overarching framework agreement (cvswp 2001). a community-government relationship steering group (cgrsg) was subsequently established ‘to oversee a work programme to develop strategies and practical solutions to the concerns identified’ in the first report (cgrsg 2002). the report of the steering group reiterated the observation that ‘[t]hroughout the 1980s and 1990s the community sector felt it was bearing the brunt of the economic market reforms, picking up an ever-increasing load with little recognition and support from government’ (cgrsg 2002). the cgrsg also noted that the relationship-building process initiated by the clark labour government ‘provided an opportunity to begin to effect a fundamental change in that relationship and in the culture of central government’ (cgrsg 2002). in its first term the clark labour/alliance government accepted the need to strengthen the capacity of the community and voluntary sector to enter into a conversation with government about a formal relationship framework. the government also committed to implementing a number of the recommendations set out in the commissioned reports prepared by the cvswp (2001) and the cgrsg (2002). however, momentum gradually stalled and specific recommendations concerning processes for monitoring and accountability of governmentsector relationship were not acted upon (nowland-foreman 2010). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 37 umbrella organisations such as the association of non-governmental organisations of aotearoa (angoa) continued to highlight the adverse impacts upon the sector of organisational fragmentation in government and the inconsistent application of policy (angoa 2009, pp. 35-36).1 the sector claimed that state sector reforms served to entrench organisational silos in government by reducing the oversight role traditionally performed by central agencies such as treasury and the state services commission (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 december). the trajectory of the government-sector relationship from the 1980s is encapsulated in figure 1 below. the policy discourse by the late 1990s policy actors within and outside government were cognisant of the impact of new public management-inspired reforms on new zealand’s community and voluntary sector (nowland-foreman 1997). furthermore, policy initiatives afoot in the united kingdom 1 it should be noted that the charge of ‘fragmentation’ to some extent flies in the face of practical realities. as noted by the controller and auditor-general, procedural guidance ‘cannot be applied equally in all circumstances’ and attempts to apply uniform processes can ‘sometimes be counter-productive’ (office of the auditor general 2006). figure 1 – timeline and synopsis, nz government-nfp sector relationship 1980s 1990s 2000s lange labour government elected in 1984 embarks on economy-wide structural and micro-economic reforms leading to the ‘neoliberalisation’ of the state services sector, including extensive privatisation and the marketisation of a range of public services. community and voluntary organisations, once ancillary to state-provided public services, are enlisted as state service delivery agents. neoliberal reforms continue under the bolger/shipley national governments, but with a more ‘authoritarian’ caste. community and voluntary organisations are pressed into service as contracted service providers with little input into either public or operational policy. state service sector ‘purchasers’ are paternalistic and focussed on compliance. compliance regimes impose operational burdens and transaction costs on nfp sector service providers. clark labour government introduces a partnership narrative to government’s relationship with the nfp sector and sponsors working groups comprised of sector representatives to advise on a way forward. the sector concludes that it is not ready to engage with government around a formal framework. although progress is made over the course of the labour government, a formal bilateral framework is elusive. in 2011 the national government presses forward with a largely unilateral relationship accord, much against the wishes of national umbrella organisations. 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 and canada to establish more constructive relationships between government and the third sector sharpened the concerns of new zealand policy actors about the implications of continued policy neglect in the not-for-profit policy space (maharey 2000d; prestidge 2010).2 minister for the community and voluntary sector (1999-2002), steve maharey – an enthusiastic advocate of a blairite ‘third way’ (maharey 2003) – announced that ‘[p]artnership is set to become the defining characteristic of the fifth labour government’ (maharey 2000b). maharey publicly repented new zealand labour’s embrace of neoliberalism and argued that the lange labour government had ‘lost its way in trying to find an alternative between the heavy handed statism of muldoonism, and the free market anti-statism of the new right’ (maharey 2000c). maharey advocated a ‘genuine and active partnership’ with community-based social service providers, noting the ‘mistrust and insecurity’ that had characterised government relations with the community sector (maharey 2000a). he encouraged the sector to ‘seize this opportunity to work in genuine partnership with the government’ (maharey 2000a) and outlined the task ahead in the following terms: the challenge for this government, and for community-based providers, is to build a strong professional relationship based on trust, accountability and respect. we need to clearly assign accountabilities and responsibilities and to secure the right of both parties to hold independent views (maharey 2000a). the sector, however, harboured reservations about the prospects for a compact. new zealand’s national umbrella organisations had come to the view that that no one organisation, or even a coalition of organisations had the authority to make commitments on behalf of the wider sector. as one sector representative put it: 2 steve maharey, minister for social services and employment from 1999-2003 made the following observations: ‘in the united kingdom, high level agreements have been achieved between the government and the voluntary and community sectors in england, wales, scotland and northern ireland. each of these agreements (called ‘compacts’) has been developed along similar lines but through consultation processes better suited to each region. the implementation of these ‘compacts’ has been dropped down to the local government level and it is there that their future will be determined. canada has taken a different route to consultation by establishing joint tables, which have outlined a series of methods to encourage development of the sector and promote collaboration with government. community and voluntary organisations in both countries have been drawn to these approaches in response to central government’s withdrawal from providing a range of services. along with this expanded role for the not-for-profit sector has come the demand for increased accountability from government and the pressures that brings. these pressures have placed substantial strain on the whole voluntary sector infrastructure. in new zealand, the government has already flagged a need to re-examine the nature of contracts in dialogue with community and iwi organisations. in addition, a project to find practical ways to minimise funding compliance costs is also in progress.’ (maharey 2000d) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 39 new zealand’s too small – you can’t have a stuart etherington3, at ncvo, who does nice deals with the politicians and says ‘here it is’ … the sector wasn’t ready... [w]as the federation [of voluntary welfare organisations] or was angoa going to sign off on something with a government and then look around and get beaten about the head and ears by everybody else in the sector? high risk, no way, not achievable (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 december). a community and voluntary sector working party proposed in 2001 that the labour government ‘demonstrate its commitment to a new way of working with the sector’ through the articulation of ‘clear objectives for government agencies in restoring an improved relationship with the community sector’ in a ‘formal government statement of intent’ (cvswp 2001, p. 143). accordingly, the clark government issued its statement of government intentions for an improved community-government relationship (sogi) (new zealand 2001). jointly signed by prime minister helen clark, and minister maharey, it set out in about 600 words the overriding goal of achieving ‘strong and respectful relationships between government and community, voluntary and iwi/māori organisations’ in recognition of their ‘unique and vital role in new zealand society’. the sogi encouraged state sector agencies to develop better relationships with their community and voluntary sector partners, but lacked concrete actions or measures to ensure compliance (prestidge 2010, pp. 75-76). in 2002 maharey committed the labour government to ‘practical and workable steps that will make a real difference for people who work in the community sector’ (maharey 2002). the sector, however, called for ‘holistic’ reform which included coupling any future framework agreement with ‘political and constitutional issues relating to the iwi-crown treaty relationship’ (cgrsg 2002, pp. 7-9).4 although a consensus of a kind did emerge from the various deliberative processes commissioned by government to provide advice, that consensus seems to have asked more of 3 sir stuart etherington has been the chief executive of britain’s national council of volunteer organisations since 1994. 4 the steering group’s report and recommendations might have been seen by the government as a case of letting the genii out of the bottle as they seemed to go beyond the initial brief to address three priority areas: improving participatory processes around developing and making policy; reviewing resourcing and accountability arrangements; and strengthening the community sector itself (maharey 2001). 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 the labour-led government than it was prepared to risk. this set the stage for the national-led government elected in 2008 opting to by-pass national umbrella groups by engaging directly with communities and community-based organisations. the politics of cross-sector rapprochement until the 1980s, new zealand had a reputation as an archetypal ‘welfare state’ and a pioneering ‘social laboratory’ characterised by generous social payments, industry subsidies and high levels of regulation (tennant et al. 2008). from the 1950s through to the 1970s new zealand consolidated and extended its welfare state. during this period funding for community and voluntary sector organisations increased dramatically – in the process greatly expanding both the number and diversity of organisations established to fill perceived gaps in service provision or to advocate on behalf of particular groups or causes (tennant et al. 2008). this new generation of politically assertive not-for-profit organisations was more prepared than the older established charitable bodies to challenge the status quo and offer criticisms of government policy (tennant et al. 2008, pp. 27-29). meanwhile, a sector-wide voice failed to coalesce, possibly owing to a general acceptance at that time of the central role of the state in ensuring the welfare of citizens (twyford 2008). thus in 1975 the new zealand council of social service (nzcoss) was established under the department of social welfare act 1971 as a quasi-governmental organisation to provide advice to the minister for social welfare and to encourage the formation and coordination of regional councils of social service (twyford 2008). it was not until 1986 that nzcoss became a fully independent national umbrella organisation alongside others such as the new zealand federation of voluntary welfare organisations (formed in 1969) and the new zealand council of christian social services (formed in the 1960s) (twyford 2008, p. 2). in the late 1970s new zealand was buffeted by the twin shocks of britain’s entry into the european economic community (eec) – thereby removing the principal market for new zealand’s agricultural produce – and the opec oil crisis. the national party government of robert muldoon, then in its third term and increasingly unpopular, was defeated at the 1984 general election by a resurgent labour party led by david lange. labour, elected with an absolute majority, initiated successive waves of profound structural and public sector reform cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 41 that eventually thrust the community and voluntary sector into the frontline of service delivery. beginning in the mid-1980s contracts steadily superceded untied grants as the preferred mechanism for directing government funding to community and voluntary organisations (tennant et al. 2008; o'brien et al. 2009). the ascendancy of procurement approaches to service delivery, coupled with resource scarcity, severely tested community and voluntary sector organisations, many of which felt that state requirements increasingly shaped their priorities and subverted their mission and values (tennant et al. 2008, p. 31; o'brien et al. 2009, p. 15). the advent of partnership discourses in the uk and canada, and the adoption of formal cross-sector frameworks in both countries (butcher et al. 2012) awakened interest in a reappraisal of the sector’s relationship with the state (o'brien et al. 2009, p. 14). by the end of the 1990s there were indications that the bolger/shipley national government (1990-99) had begun to accept the importance of improving the relationship with the community and voluntary sector (o'brien et al. 2009). with the change of government in 1999 labour lost no time making its mark in this policy space. remarking on the ‘mistrust and insecurity’ that had come to characterise the relationship between government and the sector, steve maharey, declared: we want to move past the narrow focus on what is in the contract and develop strong relationships that ensure the provision of effective programmes meeting real needs (maharey 2000e). the 2002 general election saw the formation of a labour/progressive coalition government.5 labour’s tariana turia was appointed minister for the community and voluntary sector and she reiterated the government’s intention to ‘continue to develop a more effective relationship with volunteers, and the communities they support’ (turia 2002b). although not as senior in the labour hierarchy as maharey6, turia was proactive in her new role. she oversaw the development of a government policy on volunteering (turia 2002a) and the establishment in 2003 of an office for the community and voluntary sector (ocvs). the ocvs would, inter 5 labour had called an early election on the pretext of the collapse of its junior coalition partner the alliance party. following the election, labour governed with the support of the left-wing progressive coalition, and with a supply and confidence agreement with the united futures party. 6 although maharey relinquished the community and voluntary sector portfolio in 2002, he continued to hold senior cabinet-level portfolios. in october 2007 maharey announced his intention to resign from cabinet to take up a position as the vice chancellor at massey university (trevett 2007). 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 alia, ‘play a lead in working with other government agencies to develop relationship plans with the ngos they work with’ (turia 2003a; 2003b) and provide guidance for public servants on good community engagement practices (turia 2003c).7 turia also brought to her role a long-standing commitment to iwi/māori affairs and she sought to make a closer connection between community and voluntary sector issues and issues affecting tāngata whenua. however, in 2004, turia broke with the labour party over proposed legislation to vest ownership of the country's foreshore and seabed in the crown – a move which she asserted ‘confiscates what little māori have left’ (hansard 2004).8 turia was dismissed from the ministry in april 2004 and resigned from the labour government in may (clark 2004; beehive n/d). she went on to co-found the māori party and was re-elected to the parliament at a by-election in july 2004 (beehive n/d). from the time of turia’s dismissal until the change of government in 2008 a succession of labour ministers served in community and voluntary sector portfolio. however, there is little evidence of policy innovation or impact during this time. paradoxically, the 2008 election saw turia return to government, this time as the deputy leader of the māori party under the terms of a coalition agreement with the national party led by john key. as a condition of the coalition agreement turia was re-appointed to the portfolio the community and voluntary sector portfolio and this helped to give a new lease of life to the policy goal of a relationship framework. thus it was she who received angoa’s report on the sogi (angoa 2009). turia observed at the time: eight years on [from the sogi] it is entirely appropriate that we reflect on the structures and the processes that have been built to create strong and respectful relationships with each other – and evaluate progress made, and developments yet to occur (turia 2009). 7 the establishment of the ocvs was initially welcomed by the sector as a gesture of the government’s ‘determination to improve the relationship between government agencies and community, voluntary and tangata whenua organisations (ocvs 2003). however, the ocvs was later criticised as ‘a small, low-level unit’ with ‘neither the status, nor the resources to address the new zealand public sector’s lack of capacity for collaboration and coordination across agencies and departments’ nor the ‘levers’ to achieve a ‘whole of government’ approach (angoa 2009). its situation (initially) within the ministry of social development (msd) ‘reinforced, in the minds of the public as well as government, a very narrow understanding of the sector as charities delivering social services to the needy’ (angoa 2009: p. 4). 8 the object of the foreshore and seabed act 2004 was to ‘to preserve the public foreshore and seabed in perpetuity as the common heritage of all new zealanders in a way that enables the protection by the crown of the public foreshore and seabed on behalf of all the people of new zealand, including the protection of the association of whānau, hapū, and iwi with areas of the public foreshore and seabed.’ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 43 in march 2010, with cabinet approval, turia established a joint community-government steering group to oversee the development of a relationship agreement and to lead an associated consultation process (cabinet 2009; cabinet social policy committee 2011). the result was the kia tūtahi relationship accord, launched in 2011. the kia tutahi/standing together relationship accord in 2009, on the heels of angoa’s review of the sogi,9 tariana turia sought approval from the cabinet social policy committee to begin the process of developing a draft relationship agreement. cabinet invited turia ‘to seek endorsement of a community-government relationship agreement, and principles for effective engagement with citizens and communities’ (cabinet social policy committee 2010). although turia noted that there had since 2001 been ‘a sustained conversation between the community and voluntary sector about what constitutes a healthy, strong relationship’, she also drew attention to indications that ‘community-government interactions do not sufficiently reflect good engagement practices’ (cabinet social policy committee 2010). turia also linked the ‘principles and intent’ of the relationship agreement to ‘strengthening trust’ in central government services as well as ‘clarifying the government’s approach to social sector issues’ (cabinet social policy committee 2010). in march 2010, turia established a steering group comprising key government officials and a selected cross-section of persons from community and voluntary sector to oversee the development of, and lead public consultation on a draft relationship agreement. co-chaired by hori awa, chief executive of waahi whaanui trust and don gray, deputy chief executive of the ministry of social development, the kia tutahi standing together steering group (ktsg) would oversee development of a draft relationship agreement and lead a national consultation process (ktsg 2011; ocvs 2012a). 9 it should be noted that funding for the review was approved by the then labour minister for the community and voluntary sector, ruth dyson, in mid-2008, not long before the change of government. angoa’s report, good intentions (angoa 2009) set out 15 recommendations to which minister turia responded in her cabinet paper (cabinet social policy committee 2009). among its recommendations, angoa advocated the establishment of a ‘treaty of waitangi commission’. the national-led government announced in 2010 that it would undertake a wide-ranging review of constitutional matters, including the size of parliament, the length of the electoral term, māori representation, the role of the treaty of waitangi and whether new zealand needs a written constitution. the review would occur over three years (english and sharples 2010). 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 a number of national umbrella organisations harboured strong reservations about the legitimacy and authority of those appointed to speak on behalf of the community and voluntary sector. the minister’s decision not to invite representation from the national umbrella organisations in the steering group was regarded by them as a political strategy to break the policy stalemate around the scope of any framework agreement (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 december). an exposure draft of the proposed relationship agreement was released for public consultation from july to september 2010. the consultation process included 17 regional assemblies, or ‘hui’ convened by the steering group; an invitation to make written submissions; and on-line forums. the draft was revised in light of feedback obtained during the consultation process and reissued for final comment in november 2010. in april 2011 the ktsg submitted its final report in which the revised document – renamed a relationship accord – was commended as ‘both a base from which the future communitygovernment relationship can be developed and another step forward in a continuing conversation’ (ktsg 2011). the ktsg acknowledged the ‘level of frustration expressed by national and umbrella community organisations that the agreement did not reflect concerns discussed over a long period, in particular, funding and government consultation practices’ (ktsg 2010). for her part, turia described the draft accord as ‘an aspirational document that lays a foundation for building strong relationships between the communities of aotearoa new zealand and the government’: one which ‘provides a platform for enhancing communitygovernment relationships across a wide range of portfolios’ (cabinet social policy committee 2010). a framework document at last a revised document received cabinet approval in may/june 2011 (cabinet 2011; cabinet social policy committee 2011) and on 1 august 2011, the kia tūtahi standing together relationship accord (the accord) was signed on behalf of the government by the prime cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 45 minister, the minister for the community and voluntary sector and the associate minister for the community and voluntary sector at a ceremony in the grand hall of the new zealand parliament. unlike the sogi, the kia tūtahi relationship accord included a mechanism whereby nongovernment signatories could signal their endorsement by electing to ‘sign-on’ to the accord. at the ceremony a number of government officials endorsed the accord and persons from ‘communities’ were invited to sign (ocvs 2012b). it was expected that the chief executives of government entities would also sign-on to the accord and the heads of crown entities and state owned corporations would be encouraged to do so. a kia tūtahi reference group comprised of nine community and government members was established to guide implementation of the accord. the reference group, which held its first meeting in march 2012, would provide advice on accord communications and document examples of good practice. even before the accord was launched, however, the government was proceeding apace with major systemic reforms. in february 2011, following a machinery of government review by the state services minister at the request of the minister for the community and voluntary sector (minister of state services 2010), the staff, resources and functions of the ocvs transferred from the ministry for social development (msd) to the department of internal affairs (dia). not long after, the ocvs ceased to exist as a separate office and its functions were integrated within existing operations of the dia. a week after the accord was signed, the government announced its intention to disestablish new zealand’s charity regulator, the charity commission, and transfer its functions to the dia from 1 july 2012 (dia n/d) leading the sector to claim that kia tutahi had ‘failed its first test’ (scoop 2011). an accord, but between whom? unlike formal cross-sector relationship frameworks in other jurisdictions, the accord does not take the form of a bilateral framework agreement. rather, it is presented as being ‘between the communities of aotearoa new zealand and the government of new zealand’ and is described as ‘an important symbol of commitment between the government and 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 communities to engage effectively to achieve social, economic, cultural and environmental outcomes’ (dia 2015a). during the course of the consultations leading to the accord, comvoices, an informal coalition of national community sector organisations, posed the question, ‘can our sector have a strong relationship agreement, when one party is effectively all the people in new zealand? (comvoices 2011). social development partners,10 representing a network of community sector organisations, expressed a preference for ‘a document that spells out the respective roles and responsibilities of parties, and has considerably more substance’ (social development partners 2010). the ktsg acknowledged an ‘apparent difference in view on who comprises the parties’ and noted the preference of national and umbrella community organisations for an agreement between the government of new zealand and the ‘community and voluntary sector’ (ktsg 2010). in answer, the ktsg asserted that a more ‘inclusive definition’ of the parties – the ‘communities of aotearoa new zealand’ – neither dilutes nor diminishes ‘the significant role of the national organisations and umbrella groups’: a broader definition of ‘parties’ aligns with the steering group’s two phase approach. first, getting an overarching agreement in place. second, working on the specifics of implementation in respect of particular relationships with parties that are already positioned to act (ktsg 2010: p. 1). moreover, the steering group claimed that those attending local and regional forums expressed a clear preference for the term communities because it ‘encompasses organisations, families and individuals’ (ktsg 2010). a senior official with the ocvs echoed this view: it’s not what a lot of people expected, but, it did get a lot of support around the country ... quite a few people have an affinity with the word ‘communities’ and feel more allied to that concept, in terms of their contributing to their communities, than they do to the term community and voluntary sector (2010, senior official, ocvs, pers. comm., 14 december). the same official also observed that people and organisations located outside new zealand’s metropolitan centres, or situated within māori and pacific islander communities, would not necessarily recognise themselves as being part of a community and voluntary sector: rather, 10 formerly the new zealand federation of voluntary welfare organisations. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 47 they see themselves as a community (2010, senior official, ocvs, pers. comm., 14 december).11 the decision to frame the accord as a covenant between the government and ‘communities’ is, in part, a reflection of new zealand’s distinctive political culture in which central government is dominant and national umbrella organisations are relatively weak. this is not to suggest that there is not a vibrant civil society sector in new zealand. however, it appears that many community and voluntary organisations consider that they have a direct relationship with central government unmediated by peak organisations purporting to represent the collective views and positions of the sector. this is both a legacy of new zealand’s bold experiment with orthodox principal-agent contracting and a reflection of the practical reality of the ‘coalface’ relationships between civil society actors and central government functionaries in regions and local communities. it was clear throughout the consultation period that key national umbrella organisations had no great love for this proposed framework. it has been suggested that national umbrella organisations wanted an agreement that would set out an implementation framework in the form of an action plan to resolve a checklist of historical grievances in a way that binds ministers and the government (2010, senior official, dia, pers. comm., 15 december). certainly, the form and direction taken by the agreement-making process departed significantly from what was envisaged by previous cross-sector working groups. sogi and the relationship accord compared if anything, the accord is expressed at an even greater level of generality than the sogi as indicated in a submission on the initial draft: 11 the relationship between government, the nfp sector and the ‘tāngata whenua’ is a ‘vexed’ one with constitutional and sovereignty implications for māori. although there has been strong community sector support for ‘separate and related māori and non-māori work streams’ in relation to government-sector relationships this has ‘always been resisted by the government’ (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 december). according to the sector, it is only with the advent of contracting that one sees the emergence of māori organisations that are not ‘iwi based’ (ibid). and although some māori engage with policy processes via pakeha organisations, more ‘traditional’ māori regard the treaty of waitangi as their primary relationship with the crown – a relationship that in the eyes of māori is about shared governance (2010, senior government official dia, pers. comm., 15 december). in that light, instruments such as the relationship accord are considered to be largely irrelevant to their interests (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 december). 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 the 2001 statement was already at a relatively high level of generalisation on these commitments, allocating just a brief summary paragraph to each, and needed to be put into more specific and hence accountable commitments. however, in most cases they disappear, or (at best) are reduced to even more vague sentences in the draft relationship agreement (nowland-foreman 2010). observing that the draft ‘notably fails to take up any of the 15 recommendations from the 2009 review [by angoa]’, nowland-foreman concluded that ‘we are no further forward than the 2001 statement’ (nowland-foreman 2010). never intended to serve as a vehicle for systemic and structural reform, the accord’s purpose is expressed largely in aspirational terms: communities and government are increasingly working together to navigate the cultural, social, environmental and economic challenges for our society. in this context, the relationship accord supports the building of strong relationships between communities and government, with benefits accessible to all, so that we can jointly achieve our vision (ocvs 2012a). by invoking principles of individual and collective conduct that transcend the governmentsector relationship, the accord goes beyond the narrow instrumentalist aims of relationship frameworks in other jurisdictions. yet, the aspirational terms in which it is expressed render it ineffective as a policy lever. the core differences between the sogi and the accord are subtle. for example, the former outlined a communitarian project in which government, community, voluntary and iwi/māori organisations would work together to achieve shared goals. although the accord does talk about government and communities working together to navigate cultural, social, environmental and economic challenges, overall its language tends to reinforce the hegemony of government. the words ‘partner’ or ‘partnership’ do not appear. whereas the sogi recognised community sector leadership, the accord de-emphasises community and voluntary sector organisations whilst elevating the value of voluntary effort. the sogi contained broad commitments to achieve change in areas such as the culture of government, a whole-of-government approach, participation in decision-making, funding and building sector capacity. apart from a undertaking to ‘jointly resolve longstanding matters of concern, such as, participation in decision-making around policy and service delivery issues, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 49 and funding arrangements’ the accord sets out no priorities for action. neither document makes any commitment to a process for implementation or on-going stewardship/governance of the framework. the accord contains undertakings to be respectful and honest, act in good faith, work cooperatively and pursue good practices, and in this respect it more resembles a guide for good manners than a relationship framework. nevertheless, as one representative of a national umbrella group observed: negotiating the agreement is more important than the agreement … this is a process – the relationship agreement isn’t actually all that important – because in the process we have made huge gains … so you can just keep this bloody thing going, you don’t need an end-point because relationships are improving (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 december). these sentiments echo a widely shared view that the need for a formal relationship framework has been gradually overtaken by real improvements in the government-sector relationship (2010, roundtable discussion with representatives of national umbrella organisations, pers. comm., 13 december). whither (or wither?) kia tutahi? following the november 2011 general election that led to the national party retaining government (albeit through confidence and supply agreements with act, united future and the māori party) the newly appointed minister for the community and voluntary sector, jo goodhew, affirmed the government’s commitment to the accord: i see kia tūtahi as a lever for positive change where some government organisations may be lagging behind others to engage and work with the nongovernment sector. many agencies will find, as some have already found, that the accord is easily embraced into the way they do things from developing policies right through to the delivery of services to people around new zealand (goodhew 2012a). the accord, she said, establishes a framework and sets expectations for how the government and community groups can work together more effectively (goodhew 2012a). the dia was directed to ‘focus on improving efficiencies for community organisations by providing better access to grants, reducing compliance costs, and streamlining grant funding 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 processes’ (goodhew 2012b). the government also announced a cross-government project led by the ministry of business, innovation, and employment (mbie) aimed at streamlining compliance standards for community and voluntary organisations that receive funding from multiple government agencies, and reducing ‘duplication in compliance costs and contract management processes’ (goodhew 2012b). but what of the accord? has it taken hold as a ‘lever for positive change’? apart from the prime minister, the minister for the community and voluntary sector tariana turia and associate minister for the community and voluntary sector hekia parata, whose signatures appear of the version of the accord launched in august 2011, as of december 2011, 16 officials and two members of parliament had endorsed the relationship accord. as of 1 may 2012 – ten months after its launch – only 82 individuals and representatives of organisations had signed the accord. by 2014, the association of non-governmental organisations of aotearoa had concluded, ‘kia tutahi has not gained the level of involvement or profile that the writers hoped for’ (angoa 2014). the government announced that the dia would, in late 2014, ‘begin scoping discussions with stakeholders and review overseas approaches to improve government engagement practices’ as a precursor to a review of the accord in 2015 (state services commission 2014). the review would focus on ‘government engagement practices and relationships with communities’ (dia 2015b). at the time of writing the results of the review are not yet known. conclusion it is clear that by the end of the 1990s the community and voluntary sector and the opposition labour party were in broad agreement that the relationship between the new zealand government and the community and voluntary sector had become dysfunctional. there was also broad agreement that the solution might lie in a new and revitalised settlement. over the ensuing decade the prospect of a formal relationship framework between the new zealand government and the community and voluntary sector was kept alive by the opening of successive policy windows. moreover, it appears that the nature of new zealand’s electoral system, based on multi-member proportional representation (mmpr) helped to keep the policy window wedged open – as evidenced by tariana turia’s return as minister for the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 51 community and voluntary sector after the 2008 election. in this regard, new zealand’s experience differed markedly from that of australia where majoritarian parliaments are the norm (see butcher 2015). the first such policy window was the 1999 general election that saw the return of a labourled government after a tumultuous period of economic and public sector reform by both labour and national governments. the clark labour government took immediate steps to give effect to its commitments to address problems with the relationship, including the creation of a dedicated ministerial portfolio for the community and voluntary sector. in a speech to the auckland chamber of commerce in june 2000, then prime minister helen clark made the following proclamation: ours [is] a classic third way government – committed to a market economy, but not to a market society. new zealand is, after all, a nation, not just an economy. and advanced nations must address broader hopes and aspirations for inclusion, participation, empowerment, fairness, opportunity, security, and identity – as we are doing (clark 2000). the inaugural minister for the voluntary and community sector, steve maharey was instrumental in placing a framework agreement on the policy agenda. however, the government and the sector had divergent views about the model and the scope of any settlement. the community and voluntary sector wanted a settlement, but two important factors placed a compact out of immediate reach: first, it was concluded that the sector in new zealand was not sufficiently developed to enter into a compact on equal terms with government; and second, there was an entrenched view among national umbrella organisations that any settlement with the sector must occur as part of a broader settlement with iwi/māori and would therefore entail a long-term program culminating in profound institutional reform. the policy window opened once more when tariana turia took over the portfolio in 2002. although turia was not driven by adherence to ‘third way’ ideology in the same way as her predecessor, she nevertheless continued the reform path begun by maharey and kept alive the prospect of a relationship framework. the policy window might well have closed with the 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 change of government in 2008 had turia not split with the labour party in 2004 to help form the māori party, thus allowing her to resurrect her ministry within a national-led government. as the deputy leader of the māori party and a signatory to a confidence and supply agreement with the government, tariana turia was in a unique position to influence the policy agenda of the national-led government. credited as the driving force behind the relationship accord, turia seized the opportunity to finish the job begun when she held the same portfolio in the clark labour government (māori party 2008). however, it seems that the national umbrella organisations overreached by seeking to bind the government to a comprehensive settlement that included treaty issues and institutionalised mechanisms for compliance and monitoring. as a result, turia by-passed the national umbrella organisations and sought a new consensus by pitching the proposed relationship agreement/accord directly to communities and organisations working at the coalface. the role of the already politically weak national umbrella organisations was thus demoted to that of just another stakeholder with no formal standing in the deliberative process. in the end the national government supplanted labour’s aspirational ‘third way’ rhetoric with an emphasis on pragmatic administrative and systemic reforms. although the kia tūtahi relationship accord’s evocations of community are infused with a kind of conservative romanticism, there are as yet few indications that the accord has resonated with communities, the community and voluntary sector or the state sector. references aimers, j. & walker, p. 2008, ‘developing a pluralist approach to organisational practice and accountability for social service and community organisations’, third sector review, vol. 14, pp. 35-49. association of non-governmental organisations of aotearoa (angoa) 2009, good intentions: an assessment of the statement of government intentions for an improved community-government relationship. available: http://web.archive.org/web/20100526015509/http://angoa.org.nz/docs/goodintentions.pdf accessed 5 august 2015. association of non-governmental organisations of aotearoa (angoa) 2014, 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http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/civil-society-aotearoa accessed 4 march 2013. turia, t. 2003b, launch of office for the community and voluntary sector available: http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/launch-office-community-and-voluntary-sector accessed 4 march 2013. turia, t. 2003c, office for the community and voluntary sector launched available: http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/office-community-and-voluntary-sector-launched accessed 4 march 2013. turia, t. 2009, angoa presentation of good intentions available: http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/angoa-presentation-good-intentions accessed 7 march 2013. twyford, c. 2008 nzcoss: the story of a national social service umbrella organisation. unpublished work. available: http://www.communityresearch.org.nz/wpcontent/uploads/formidable/twyford1.pdf accessed 4 august 2015. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.7, no.2, 2015 59 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/release-briefing-minister-community-and-voluntary-sector http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/release-briefing-minister-community-and-voluntary-sector http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/civil-society-aotearoa http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/launch-office-community-and-voluntary-sector http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/office-community-and-voluntary-sector-launched http://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/angoa-presentation-good-intentions http://www.communityresearch.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/formidable/twyford1.pdf http://www.communityresearch.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/formidable/twyford1.pdf new zealand’s relationship accord: a case study in the politics of cross-sector rapprochement john butcher australian national university abstract introduction the ki tūtahi relationship accord in context framing the problem the policy discourse the politics of cross-sector rapprochement the kia tutahi/standing together relationship accord a framework document at last an accord, but between whom? sogi and the relationship accord compared whither (or wither?) kia tutahi? conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 12, nos. 2–3 dec 2020 © 2020 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: zappalà, g. 2020. meaningful evaluation: a holistic and systemic approach to understanding and assessing outcomes. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 12:2–3, 1–19. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7034 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper meaningful evaluation: a holistic and systemic approach to understanding and assessing outcomes gianni zappalà university of new south wales, sydney, australia university of technology sydney, sydney, australia corresponding author: gianni zappalà, centre for social impact, university of new south wales, level 7 science engineering building (e8), high st, kensington, nsw, 2052. g.zappala@unsw.edu.au doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7034 article history: received 22/01/2020; revised 21/04/2020; accepted 07/07/2020; published 12/02/2021 abstract the concept and practice of social impact and social impact assessment has developed and matured over the last decade. despite this growth, confusion still exists with respect to definitions of social impact as well as which tools and frameworks are most appropriate. central to the concept and practice of social impact is a focus on outcomes. this paper argues that a discernible albeit problematic pattern and approach has emerged in outcomes measurement within the social impact field. after briefly reviewing some of the key problems with how outcomes measurement is practised, it presents some recent approaches from the evaluation field that attempt to address some of these concerns before introducing a new approach to understanding and evaluating outcomes – meaningful evaluation (me). a pilot meaningful evaluation of volunteer ethics teachers in the primary ethics program in nsw is used to illustrate the approach. me combines the map of meaning (mom) with insights from next generation evaluation approaches to understand and assess outcomes. informed by appreciative inquiry perspectives, it provides a means to bridge the divide between positivist and interpretivist approaches in evaluation. key to me is the assumption that it is more likely that immediate outcomes lead to medium and longterm outcomes (changes in behaviour) that are sustainable and lead to impact if participants experience program interventions as ‘meaningful’. meaning is an important internal outcome that is essential if longerterm external outcomes are to declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 1 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7034 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7034 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:g.zappala%40unsw.edu.au?subject= https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7034 occur. it also shifts the focus to capture unintended outcomes, key to developing holistic and systemic rather than linear and mechanistic theories of change. keywords map of meaning; meaningful evaluation; outcomes measurement; social impact assessment; theory of change introduction the field of social impact and social impact assessment has developed and matured over the last decade spawning a wide range of specialist consultancies, practitioner networks, university centres and courses, and publications (onyx 2014a; b; oecd 2015; bloch 2012; epstein & yuthas 2014). the development has also occurred with respect to practice within the social sector itself, witnessed by the popular usage of terms such as theory of change (toc), the publication of social impact reports and philanthropic grants that focus on impact (callis et al. 2019). despite this growth, confusion still exists with respect to definitions of social impact as well as which tools and frameworks are most appropriate (onyx 2014b; grieco 2015; ormiston 2019). the lack of consensus on the definition of social impact and its assessment is problematic for both theory and practice (maas and liket 2011; ormiston 2019). the confusion is often due to the different ways various stakeholders within the social sector understand the term (wallmanstokes et al 2013; ormiston 2019). some scholars caution against impact assessment. apart from the resources required in terms of the money, staff, and expertise to undertake such assessments, the different types of complexity that beset social problems mean that what is trying to be tracked and measured is often elusive, and metrics often suffer from a lack of validity and reliability (zappalà 2011). ebrahim and rangan’s (2010) framework, for instance, suggests that notforprofit (nfp) organisations should only devote the time and resources to demonstrating their social impact when their programs are underpinned by a complex causal logic and operational strategy, and where an organisation can exercise sufficient control over results to attribute any impacts to its work. in practice, many nfp organisations apply relatively complicated, time consuming and expensive measurement approaches that attempt to quantify and/or monetise impact to relatively simple and straightforward programs, where measuring inputs and outputs and at times outcomes would suffice (ebrahim & rangan 2010, 2014; gugerty & karlan 2018; zappalà 2011). nevertheless, a coming together on definitions and key aspects of social impact has emerged (oecd 2015; hearn & buffardi 2016). central to the concept and practice of social impact is a focus on outcomes. outcomes, of course, have always been of interest to evaluators, but the growth of a specialist social impact discourse and approach over the last decade, especially promoted by philanthropic and government funders, has led to a rhetoric rather than reality of outcomes measurement (mackeith 2011). indeed, many social purpose organisations question the quality of the outcomes measurement they do undertake (callis et al. 2019). a discernible albeit problematic pattern and approach has emerged in outcomes measurement within the social impact field. this paper briefly reviews some of the key problems with how outcomes measurement is practised, then reviews some recent approaches from the evaluation field that attempt to address some of these concerns before introducing a new approach to understanding and evaluating outcomes – meaningful zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 2 evaluation (me). a pilot evaluation of volunteer ethics teachers in the primary ethics program in nsw is referred to in order to illustrate aspects of the me approach (zappalà 2019)1. the main aim of the pilot was to help primary ethics better understand the experience of their volunteer teachers in order to suggest potential areas for program improvement and contribute to the development of their broader theory of change. while not a key target beneficiary group, the volunteer ethics teachers are key to the program’s success and sustainability as they are the delivery vehicle of the primary ethics program without whom it would not exist. understanding the perspective of the ethics teachers was critical for primary ethics’ goals of scaling the program in terms of volunteer recruitment and retention. the problem with current approaches to outcomes there are at least five problems in current approaches to outcome measurement: 1) an over reliance on the impact value chain; 2) the decontextualisation of outcomes; 3) the monetisation of outcomes; 4) the focus on external outcomes; and 5) a positivist approach to validity. over reliance on the impact value chain in evaluation, an outcome is the change that occurs in a person or program participant resulting from an intervention. outcomes usually result from achieving a particular program’s outputs. outcomes measurement refers to the measurement of change resulting from an initiative, program or organisation. measuring outcomes provides evidence of whether programs and organisations make a difference to program participants (flatau et al. 2016). there is generally consensus that the term impact refers to long term results at the end of an impact value chain (see figure 1). figure 1. the impact value chain source: clarke et al. (2004) impact is distinct from ‘outputs’ – which are the direct products resulting from the implementation of intervention activities – and from ‘outcomes’. outcomes are sometimes broken down into immediate, medium and longterm changes in the target group(s) who have been engaged in the intervention and which precede, and are usually a precondition for, impact. impact is usually defined either as outcomes less what would have happened without the intervention (as in figure 1 where outcomes and impact are similar 1 primary ethics, an independent nfp, is the sole approved provider of ethics classes to nsw public schools. its mission is to ‘support children to develop skills in ethical reasoning, critical thinking and respectful discussion’. it has developed an integrated ageappropriate curriculum for all of the primary school stages (kindergarten to year 6) which is delivered free of charge via a network of specially trained and accredited volunteers. since its establishment, ethics classes are available in almost 500 schools in nsw, with approximately 45,000 children in ethics classes, delivered by a network of almost 2,800trained volunteers. zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 3 kinds of effects), or as significant longterm sustainable change (outcomes and impact are different kinds of effects) (peersman et al. 2016). the ‘ifthen’ causal logic inherent in the impact value chain often oversimplifies and reinforces the view that change is linear, predictable, straightforward and mechanistic. in other words, the problem specification, intervention and any resulting outcomes lie within simple and/or complicated rather than complex domains (glouberman & zimmerman 2002; kurtz & snowden 2003). the assumptions underlying the logic as to why a shortterm outcome will lead to a mediumterm and then a longterm outcome and eventually impact are often not clearly articulated, nor whether the change is sustainable. the aspirations of the program participants that lie beneath the logic model’s intended impact are often unrealistic and simplistic given the uncertainty and unpredictability of the realworld context. the decontextualisation of outcomes the second problem of current approaches to outcome measurement is that outcomes are usually identified and analysed outside of their contextual background. many social impact frameworks (e.g. social return on investment sroi) describe, analyse and present outcomes as single line items along a spreadsheet or outcomes map, seen outside of their broader holistic context (onyx 2014a). the insights from realistic evaluation, that outcomes will depend on how mechanisms are enacted in any given context by people working with constraints, either are forgotten or ignored. it is not programs per se that make things change but that people embedded in their context (and exposed to programs) do something to activate mechanisms and achieve change (pawson & tilley 1997). context not only effects how outcomes and impact should be measured, but the ‘more contexts vary, the more likely it is that a rigid approach displaces a more insightful one’ (ruff & olsen 2016). a problem in social impact assessment is that ‘foundations and nonprofits often jump to collecting data and setting up measurement systems without thinking about their surrounding environment (read context)’ (coffman & beer 2019). indeed, to do this requires ‘contextual intelligence’, the ‘ability to quickly and intuitively recognize and diagnose the dynamic contextual variables inherent in an event or circumstance’, especially in situations characterised by uncertainty, ambiguity, and nonlinear causal relations (kutz 2008, pp. 67). the monetisation of outcomes the third problem of current approaches to outcome measurement is the desire to monetise outcomes. giving a monetary measure to social impact is seen as appropriate and something the sector should strive for, ‘…as it helps to translate impact assessment results into the common language: the dollar sign!’ (radeke 2016). this trend to give outcomes a financial value, such as in sroi approaches, gives those doing the analysis the incentive to focus on those outcomes that are more amenable to monetisation while ignoring the qualitative and relational aspects of outcomes (onyx 2014b). several studies have now highlighted the problematic nature of using financial proxies, the risks of commodifying social value, as well as ignoring the qualitative and social aspects of outcomes (arvidson et al. 2010; onyx 2014b; zappalà & lyons 2009). the focus on external outcomes the fourth problem of current approaches to outcome measurement is the tendency to focus on external or socalled ‘hard’ outcomes that are more easily measured, tangible and quantifiable (e.g. tenancy for a homeless person, a job for an unemployed person). the trend is to discount socalled ‘soft’ or internal outcomes that are less tangible and embodied in processes rather than explicit in external outcomes (e.g. perceptions, attitudes, meaning, personal skills). the term ‘soft’ devalues internal changes that usually need to occur within people if they are to meet longerterm goals and are usually the external manifestations zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 4 of internal changes. shifts in attitudes, beliefs, and skills are often the necessary preconditions (and the missing assumptions in impact value chains) for longerterm sustainable change to occur (mackeith 2009). positivist approach to validity the fifth problem of many current approaches to outcome measurement is the positivist approach to validity. positivist approaches usually treat program participants as passive ‘objects’ when collecting and measuring outcomes data rather than valuing the usefulness of the data collection tool for program staff and clients. such an approach assumes an objective, verifiable truth that is separate from the researcher. the validity of an outcomes measurement tool is about assessing the tool against other ‘objective’ measures and assessing its own consistency (reliability) over time and across users. in contrast, phenomenological (interpretivist) approaches see human beings not as passive receivers of an objective reality but acknowledges that they interpret and understand their world by creating stories that make sense to them (mackeith 2011; liamputtong 2013). ‘truth’ is constructed through subjective experience and is not separate from the person having the experience. the subject is seen as an active agent constantly involved in ‘sensemaking’ and whose actions will be informed by their evolving understanding. other shortcomings of current approaches to outcome measurement include the short timeframes for evaluation (impact usually only occurs in the longerterm), the assumption that all programs should measure impact and the push to develop a standardised approach to measuring value and impact (ebrahim & rangan 2010; mulgan 2010; zappalà 2011). next generation evaluation many of the problems of outcome measurement noted above plagued the broader field of evaluation well before the mania with ‘social impact’. a more recent challenge has been responding to the increased complexity of both the environment and the nature of interventions designed to deal with social problems (kahane 2004; kania & kramer 2013; 2014). as was noted previously, a problem of current approaches to outcome measurement is that outcomes are usually specified as resulting from contexts that are primarily simple or complicated in nature. people and social systems, however, usually behave like complex adaptive systems (cas) (patton 2011). complexity results from the interaction of many adaptive agents who, pursuing their own plans, adapt to the feedback and behaviour of others. complex systems are characterised by nonlinearity, unpredictability, and instability. they are less amenable to being controlled, they cannot be broken down into more simple parts and emerge through selforganisation. it is difficult to predict the emergence of outcomes from complex environments (kania & kramer 2013; 2014). rogers captured the dilemma of the implications of complexity for evaluation: ‘life is not simple, but many of the logic models used in programme theory evaluation are. is it a problem to represent reality as a simple causal model of boxes and arrows, or should the logic models we use address the complexity of life – and if so, how?’ (rogers 2008, p. 29) the response of socalled ‘next generation evaluation’ approaches, which are seen as complementary rather than replacing traditional evaluation approaches and methods, was to embrace complexity (gopalakrishnan et al. 2013; preskill et al. 2014). some approaches have attempted to either build more sophisticated logic models (funnel & rogers 2010; fujita 2010), introduce systems thinking and systems concepts (rogers & williams 2010; cantywaldron 2014), or bring logic models and systems thinking together (renger et al. 2011; renger et al. 2019). appreciative inquiry (coglan et al. 2003), participatory inquiry (heron & reason 1997) and developmental evaluation (gamble 2008; dozois et al. 2010; patton 2011) are also important responses to dealing with greater complexity. some of the key differences and focus between traditional and socalled next generation evaluation are summarised in table 1. zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 5 table 1. key features and focus of traditional and nextgeneration evaluation traditional nextgeneration accountability learning compliance capacity building formative/summative developmental logic models systems approach accounting for impact demonstrate learning/adaptation to change evaluator as external/objective evaluator as facilitator/coach predetermined goals shifting goals/adaptation fixed plan variable/emergent plan anticipated outcomes unintended outcomes individual outcomes holistic outcomes source: adapted from various sources cited above this paper introduces another approach (still in its infancy) consistent with aspects of ‘next generation’ evaluation approaches, termed ‘meaningful evaluation’ (me). the author first developed and used the me approach in his graduate demonstrating social impact course at the centre for social impact, university of new south wales 2. subsequently, the me approach was trialled by several students enrolled in the graduate certificate in social impact at unsw as part of their field project assignments (2014 – 2016). in 2019, the me approach was applied in a pilot evaluation to understand the experience of volunteer ethics teachers in the primary ethics program in nsw by the centre for social justice & inclusion at uts (zappalà 2019). the evaluation identified the main pathways along which meaning occurs as well as any imbalances or barriers to meaning. aspects of this evaluation are highlighted throughout the remainder of this paper to illustrate the approach. meaningful evaluation arose from a desire to address some of the problems with existing outcomes frameworks discussed above and wanting to deal with complex social phenomena in a holistic and systemic manner. meaningful evaluation combines the map of meaning (mom) framework with some of the key principles from next generation evaluation approaches. as meaning is a subjective phenomenon, meaningful evaluation acknowledges the importance of focusing on the subjective experience of participants and their active participation in any program evaluation, although it is also applicable with more positivist approaches. the next section provides a summary of the mom framework upon which me draws. the map of meaning the map of meaning (mom) is a simple yet profound model originally developed to engage with meaning and purpose in work (lips wiersma & morris 2011). based and validated on empirical research in cross national settings, a community of mom practitioners has developed over the last twodecades, applying the mom successfully in counselling, coaching, leadership, organisational and community change, and 2 ‘complexity and social impact – undertaking meaningful evaluation’, unit 11 presentation for demonstrating social impact, csi, unsw, 2014. zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 6 most recently through the author’s own work, in evaluation3. a brief summary of the mom follows with particular focus on its relevance in an evaluative context. there are three main elements or dimensions to the map of meaning (mom) (see figure 2 below). the first element comprises the four pathways to meaning4: i) developing the inner self 5(reflect): for an activity, event or participation in a program to be meaningful, it usually enables a degree of selfdevelopment and personal growth that comes from inner reflection. three main subthemes comprise this pathway: a. moral development – the ability to distinguish between different values, perspectives and right and wrong; b. personal growth – the ability to learn new aspects of ourselves; and c. being true to self – the ability to be and act authentically in all situations. ii) unity with others (connect): meaning is relational and for an activity, event or participation in a program to be meaningful, there usually needs to be a sense of connection with others. connection does not necessarily imply conformity, but experiencing unity even when diversity is present. three main subthemes comprise this pathway: a. working together – the sense of being able to achieve more with the support of others, whether colleagues or coparticipants; b. shared values – the ability to raise and make values public; and c. belonging – the sense of being part of a larger community or tribe with whom we feel connected. iii) service to others (respect): for an event, activity or participation in a program to be meaningful, people need to feel they are serving others through contributing to the wellbeing of others, including the broader environment. two main subthemes comprise this pathway: a. making a positive difference – the ability to improve things for others; b. serving the needs of humanity and the planet – the need to feel that what we are doing is useful to the wider context, be it a social cause, the global community or the planet. iv) expressing full potential (express): an event, activity or participation in a program is meaningful to the extent that it enables people to utilise and demonstrate their unique gifts, talents and skills. in contrast to the ‘developing the inner self ’ pathway, which is reflective and generally passive in nature, this pathway focusses on active, external outcomes. three main subthemes comprise this pathway: a. creating – the ability to be creative and discover new ways of doing things; b. achieving – the sense of accomplishment that comes from completing a job or task; and c. influencing – the power and ability to affect change in something or someone. 3 the author began accredited map of meaning training with lani morris in october 2013 and is a certified practitioner of the map of meaning (www.themapofmeaning.org). 4 the word in brackets that follow the pathway headings are the author’s abbreviated headings for the respective pathways. 5 in a revised version of the map this pathway was renamed ‘integrity with self’ although the substance and subthemes of the pathway remained the same (lipswiersma & morris 2018). zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 7 http://www.themapofmeaning.org figure 2. the map of meaning source: lipswiersma & morris (2011)6 the second element of the mom emerges from the intersection of two key dimensions inherent in the human search for meaning. on the horizontal plane in figure 2, the relational tension between the needs of the self (the need to develop and express ourselves as individuals) and the needs of others (the need to make a difference and contribute so we feel life has been worthwhile). on the vertical plane in figure 2, is the ‘presencing’ tension between the need for being (the inner need to reflect and contemplate) and the need for doing (the need to act and do, the outward expression of being). these tensions need to be in balance to sustain meaning in our work, lives and to participate in any program. the third element of the mom is the bigger realm within which meaningfulness takes place, the space between the inner and outer circles in figure 2. at the centre is ‘inspiration’, what gives people hope and purpose, ideals and visions for the future. at any particular point in time, however, the realworld pressures and circumstances test and limit these ideals. an event, activity or participation in a program is meaningful therefore to the extent that people are authentic and accepting of the context within which they find themselves at any point in time. the mom framework suggests that the key to greater meaning lies in achieving a more balanced and holistic state across the four pathways, addressing the dual ‘relational’ and ‘presencing’ tensions, and keeping true to the values and inspiration within the reality of the current situation. 6 used with permission from the authors and the map of meaning international trust (http://www.themapofmeaning. org) zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 8 http://www.themapofmeaning.org http://www.themapofmeaning.org meaningful evaluation in brief applying the mom to evaluation and social impact analysis is a simple yet profound framework to capture complex, emergent, internal and unintended outcomes7. it can inform program design; evaluate existing programs; and develop more holistic and systemic rather than linear and mechanistic theories of change, hallmarks of bestpractice outcomes measurement (bagnoli & megal 2011; ógáin et al. 2012). as noted above, evaluators define outcomes as the changes that occur in a person resulting from an intervention as part of participating in a program. most definitions of social impact are based on a ‘logic’ or ‘impact value chain’, where outcomes are delineated along a spectrum as falling into short, medium and longterm results, with impact defined as significant and sustainable change in longterm outcomes. assumptions as to why shortterm outcomes lead to longer term outcomes often do not capture the complexity and inner drivers that shift human behaviour. applying a me approach is a process to program design and evaluation assumes that: 1. it is more likely that immediate outcomes lead to medium and longterm outcomes (changes in behaviour) that are significant and sustainable, that is, achieve social impact, if the experience/s from participating in a program are ‘meaningful’ (mcneil et al. 2012); 2. meaning is an important internal outcome, needed for longerterm external outcomes to occur. longerterm change and the accomplishment of socalled ‘hard’ outcomes often requires shifts in attitudes and meaning (mackeith 2011). important aspects of inner change also include intangible and tacit changes embodied in relational processes (edwards et al. 2012; onyx 2014a); 3. capturing meaningful unintended outcomes is just as important as capturing intended outcomes, especially where people did not experience those intended outcomes as meaningful (wallman stokes et al. 2013; hearn & buffardi 2016). simply stated, me puts in play a process that uncovers the extent to which participants in any given program experience the various activities and outcomes of a program as ‘meaningful’ as defined by the mom framework. by doing so, it enables the identification and assessment of the sustainability of any outcomes experienced, captures the inner process of change and any unintended consequences of the participation or program intervention. the approach of me is to identify and examine the main sources (pathways) along which meaning occurs as well as any imbalances or barriers to meaning. the more balanced and extensive is the experience of meaning across a program the more likely that any intended outcomes achieved are long lasting and lead to impact. even if program participants may not have achieved the intended outcomes, the focus on ‘meaning’ is an important ‘feedback’ loop in a threelegged approach to assessing impact that is more likely to capture unintended outcomes, also important to achieving social impact (twersky 2019). key issues explored in the me of primary ethics volunteer ethics teachers, for example, included: whether and how participation in the primary ethics program led ethics teachers to experience a sense of self development and personal growth (reflect pathway) while participation in the program had led to some moral development for ethics teachers in terms of thinking about ethical issues, it had particularly influenced their thinking, perspectives and skills in a variety of personal and work contexts and in some cases had challenged participants’ own norms and worldviews. in particular, volunteering as an ethics teacher enabled participants to: • have a better understanding of different ethical and social perspectives; • increase their selfawareness; 7 simple in this context refers to the mom framework itself rather than the domain being examined. me can be applied to simple, complicated and complex domains. zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 9 • improve their emotional intelligence; • improve their critical thinking and reasoning; • improve their people management and relationship skills; • improve their ability to assess events and situations; • improve and change their approach to parenting. these were important, albeit unintended outcomes of the program, ones that were experienced as ‘meaningful’ by the ethics teachers and therefore ones that were likely to lead to longterm impact in terms of personal and professional development for the volunteer ethics teachers (zappalà & smyth 2020). they also provided insights for ensuring the longerterm sustainability of the program for primary ethics in terms of improving volunteer recruitment and management. these included: • promoting and marketing the potential benefit for volunteer ethics teachers to develop the above skills, increasingly seen as key to success in the modern labour market (fya 2015); • developing a simple template to assist volunteer ethics teachers reflect on their role as teachers and any associated skills and personal growth that may arise from that role; and • exploring the possibility of offering a competencybased professionaldevelopment training pathway for ethics teachers. whether and how participation in the primary ethics program enabled a sense of connection and unity via working together, sharing values with others and creating a sense of belonging (connect pathway) the evaluation suggested that while the connect pathway was generally a positive source of meaning for ethics teachers, it also contained barriers to meaning, which if not addressed have the possibility of undermining the longer term sustainability of the program. some volunteers, for instance, did not feel supported in their role as ethics teachers (the ‘working together’ aspect of the ‘connect’ pathway) due to a lack of support from the school. some volunteers felt unsupported by primary ethics itself, especially where ethics teachers were in schools where the ethics coordinator role was vacant, or where they felt the person acting in that role was ineffective. this meant that the teachers themselves had to take on the coordinator duties and reduced the opportunities for ethics teachers to engage with each other in some formalised way. there was also a sense of working in isolation among many of the ethics teachers, of being in the front line without ever seeing or feeling connected to other parts of the organisation. others felt isolated in their role (the ‘belonging’ aspect of the ‘connect’ pathway) due to the infrequent and ad hoc nature of meetings and communications between the ethics teachers in a particular school. the sense of belonging felt by ethics teachers was primarily to the school community rather than to a primary ethics community or a ‘community of ethics teachers’. the analysis highlighted a desire on the part of many volunteers for a greater degree of interaction and ‘collegiality’ with other ethics teachers in their school and schools in their local community. these findings highlighted the importance for the program to have an effective ethics coordinator role in schools who could ensure, for example, that formal regular meetings of volunteer ethics teachers occurred. whether and how participation in the primary ethics program provided ethics teachers the opportunities to serve and assist others (respect pathway) the evaluation found that the sense of giving something back through either making a positive difference to the children they taught or through contributing to a more informed and selfaware society was a, if not the most, significant source of meaning for the volunteer ethics teachers. closely related to this, the program also enabled volunteers to feel that they were making a material difference to the children (the ‘influence’ aspect of the ‘express’ pathway). comparative analysis of the data related to the meaning pathways (an integral part of the me approach) illustrated the strength of meaning and satisfaction that zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 10 volunteers derived from seeing how the children in their classes changed through their engagement with the curriculum content. key findings included: • ethics teachers’ belief that they were making a positive difference to children’s learning outcomes; • a recognition that the benefits of participating in the program were cumulative and more apparent as children progressed through the program; • that the program changed how the children considered and evaluated issues by developing more critical thinking and reasoning skills; and • that the program developed the children’s confidence to express themselves in class discussions. although an assessment of whether participation in ethics classes leads to improved student learning outcomes was not an objective of the evaluation, the findings from the ‘respect’ pathway provided supportive evidence that primary ethics were achieving some of the key intended outcomes of the program, namely, supporting students to become critical thinkers with a strong capacity for questioning and inquiry. in other words, volunteer ethics teachers derived their main source of meaning in areas consistent with the main aims of the program. these findings also contribute to the literature exploring the relationship between the teaching of philosophical ethics and the cognitive, educational or learning outcomes that may result (zappalà & smyth 2020). whether and how participation in the primary ethics program enabled the expression of ethics teachers’ full potential through creating, achieving, influencing others (express pathway) similar to the ‘connect’ pathway, the analysis of data relating to the ‘create’ aspect of the ‘express’ pathway highlighted that it was both a positive source of meaning as well as a potential barrier to meaning. ethics teachers experienced creativity in their role through the delivery of the curriculum; managing classroom behaviour and modifying the teaching script without altering the content. nevertheless, there was a vocal and strong desire from ethics teachers for greater flexibility and autonomy in how they delivered the curriculum, in particular, to enable them to respond to the different contexts and situations that arise in the classroom and for a greater variety of class activities. while most ethics teachers understood the need to ensure the delivery of a consistent highquality curriculum for all students, the me approach revealed a strength of sentiment with respect to this aspect of ‘meaningful activity’ that led to recommendations to introduce elements of flexibility to the content and delivery of the ethics curriculum without undermining program consistency, quality and accountability. people’s need and ability to express themselves through unique and creative ways is a key part of finding an activity meaningful, and the findings suggested that the relative lack of flexibility and autonomy in curriculum delivery had a detrimental effect on some of the volunteers’ overall satisfaction and indeed saw some exit the program as a result. what inspired people to become volunteer ethics teachers? as the subjects of the evaluation in this case were volunteers, the inspiration element of the mom closely related to people’s motivations for becoming ethics teachers for the program. motivations and inspiration included a strong belief in the importance of secular ethical reasoning and critical thinking skills for their children’s education as well as the contribution it makes to a healthy and vibrant society. the opportunity to teach their own children in ethics classes for potentially all of the primary school years was also a key motivating factor. zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 11 how was the inspiration mediated/constrained by the reality or boundaries of the program and how it affected the overall experience of meaning? the ‘reality of self and circumstances’ (or context) of the program was the reality of the classroom, in particular the short time frame of the weekly lesson (30 – 45 minutes), the culture of the school, and the challenges of behaviour management for a group of around twenty primary school aged children. these factors provided the boundaries and context within which a volunteer’s motivations were contained. the key constraint that emerged from the analysis was disruptive behaviour in the classroom, ethics teachers’ ability to manage it and the demoralising effects it had on the class as well as volunteers’ own sense of satisfaction and meaning. most volunteers accepted this reality and accommodated their motivations and inspiration within it. for many, the skills of keeping class discipline and managing disruptive behaviour improved with their experience as a teacher (which was a potential source of personal growth), and as such, had a less deleterious effect on the meaningfulness of their overall experience. in some cases, behaviour management was a deal breaker for volunteers, this ‘reality’ dampening their initial inspiration and motivations, leading them to question the value of continuing with the teaching, dissatisfaction and ultimately exiting the program. in summary, using the me approach to explore and evaluate the ethics teacher component of the primary ethics program was able to paint a rich and nuanced picture of their experience, that was able to capture elements of the complexity and tensions that existed in their role and avoid many of the problems with understanding outcomes identified previously. the me uncovered the extent to which participants experienced their role as ethics teachers as ‘meaningful’, and by doing so, enabled the identification and assessment of those outcomes that were most likely to be sustainable because they were the most meaningful, aspects of the inner process of change and unintended outcomes from participating as volunteer ethics teachers. barriers to meaning were also identified which enabled the pinpointing of potential fault lines in the program that could hinder the longerterm sustainability and impact of the program. using a linear logic model framework, for instance, would most likely have missed many of the insights captured, such as personal growth, issues around connection with others, and the importance of feeling a degree of creativity. indeed, me based on the mom is explicitly circular and holistic in nature, with the different pathways and the component aspects mutually interacting and reinforcing each other in multivalent ways. the me approach was able to explicitly contextualise the volunteer ethics teachers’ experience by examining how the activities and process of teaching ethics were constrained by the reality of the program circumstances, show how teachers adapted and responded to their context, and highlight the implications this had for how they experienced meaning. the focus was as much on the inner process of change, how meaning often comes from the intangible and tacit aspects embodied in relational processes as it was on outer manifestations of program delivery. finally, the evaluation captured meaningful unintended outcomes, such as the personal and professional changes that occurred within ethics teachers themselves. measuring meaning the process of how participants experience activities as meaningful as defined by the mom leads to the issue of how meaning is measured. informed by appreciative inquiry perspectives, me provides a means to bridge the divide between positivist and interpretivist approaches to evaluation, and has an open approach with respect to how data on meaning is collected. that is, me does not prescribe any one method or inquiry paradigm for collecting or analysing data on the issues listed above but rather can be adapted to suit the principles of the inquiry paradigm adopted by the researcher or the nature of the evaluation undertaken. under a positivist paradigm, for example, one can use a structured questionnaire that aims to capture and measure the extent of meaning experienced along the four pathways as well as tensions. the authors of the mom have developed and used such a questionnaire to measure meaningful work for example zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 12 (lipswiersma & wright 2012). in the primary ethics me, for instance, previous data sources including story transcripts and openended comments from exit surveys of volunteer teachers were coded using a framework informed by this questionnaire and adapted to the program context. even though these data were in different formats and collected for different purposes, analysing them through the mom framework cast initial insights into which pathways were most salient in providing volunteers with a meaningful experience, and alternatively, which experiences reduced meaning. this also assisted with the development of the interview protocol as well as subsequent analysis of the interview transcripts. constructivist paradigms of inquiry are concerned with how individuals interpret, understand and experience their social world. they explore the meanings and interpretations people give to their subjective experiences. methodologically, a qualitative approach describes and analyses from the point of view of research participants. under this paradigm, for example, using the mom framework to inform interview and focus group protocols or guide most significant change (msc) analysis is flexible, responsive and generates rich descriptions of phenomena (liamputtong 2013; mason 1996). in the primary ethics evaluation, for instance, primary data came from facetoface indepth interviews with volunteer ethics teachers, using an interview protocol based on the mom and informed by the previous coding8. although a structured interview schedule guided the interviews, the researcher was responsive to and explored issues raised by the interview participants.9 interview transcripts were coded and analysed using nvivo with the mom providing the primary framework for analysis. as outlined in the previous section, the analysis of the combined data enabled the identification of the key sources as well as barriers to meaning for the volunteer ethics teachers, which enabled the identification of key outcomes (intended and unintended) and the making of several recommendations for program improvement. the validity of an outcomes measurement tool in constructivist approaches is about assessing the tool against the subjective experience of workers and service users and about the usefulness of the tool in addressing practical problems (mackeith 2009). participatory assessment and measurement (pam) approaches such as outcomes star, for instance, treat participants as active agents and validate their experience and perception of the change process. a person receiving a service is an active agent in their own life, inner change is key to achieving outer change, and data on change is collected collaboratively by participant and program worker (i.e. measurement is ‘coproduced’). the process of participating in an assessment can itself result in change (through engagement and reflection) (mackeith 2011). ethics teachers in the evaluation, for instance, often remarked at the end of the formal interview how the process and nature of the questions had led them to reflect and identify issues about themselves and the program that they had not previously thought of (at least not consciously). several sent followup emails to the author with further information they had recalled as they reflected on the questions post interview. this process of ongoing ‘emergence’ and inner reflection has been found to occur in other cases where the mom has been used as a framework (lipswiersma & morris 2011; 2018). similar to the outcomes star model, standard measures of ‘distance travelled’ for each meaning pathway or the relationship between program outcomes sought and each pathway can be developed to quantify any relative change in meaning for program participants (see figure 3 & table 2). in this way each point on the scale is defined for each meaning pathway with the scales constructed around a model of change appropriate for the program being evaluated. in this approach the pathways are discussed between case workers and/ 8 see zappalà (2019) for further details on the characteristics of the volunteer teachers interviewed. 9 all interviews were conducted in person at a location convenient to the volunteer, usually the school where they taught ethics, their home or a local café. interview duration was between 40 and 70 minutes, with an average interview length of 48 minutes; interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed. zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 13 or evaluators and participants and plotted on the mom to provide an overview of the ‘meaningfulness’ of outcomes. figure 3. distance travelled and meaningful evaluation the process can be repeated longitudinally to provide a dynamic analysis of change as a well as a point in time snap shot. these data can also be aggregated across all participants to provide program level outcomes. this approach not only enables the collection of richer and deeper data on the sources of meaning, it allows the knowledge about meaning to be ‘coproduced’ between evaluator (and/or case worker) and participant (mackeith 2011). meaningful evaluation is also consistent with participatory inquiry paradigms, which favour collaborative forms of action and cooperative inquiry (heron & reason 1997). table 2. using distance travelled with meaningful evaluation distance travelled map of meaning pathway & relationship to program outcome sought 1 (static) no change in the particular pathway as a result of the program 2 (awareness) person recognizes the need or opportunity that the program provides to change in that particular pathway 3 (some change) person can recognize and takes concrete steps to make changes in that particular pathway 4 (tangible results) the person is able to demonstrate & report positive changes in that pathway and link it to the program’s activities 5 (significant/sustained change) the person reports longer sustained changes in that pathway as a result of the program zappalà cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 14 conclusion next generation approaches in evaluation have made significant inroads in dealing with the increased complexity and richness of social systems. many of them go some way to addressing the problems noted with current trends in outcome measurement, namely: an over reliance on the impact value chain, the fragmentation and monetisation of outcomes, the focus on external outcomes and a positivist approach to validity. this paper introduced another approach consistent with next generation models to understanding and measuring outcomes – meaningful evaluation. meaningful evaluation is a simple yet profound framework to capture complex, emergent, internal and unintended outcomes. it can inform program design; evaluate existing programs; and develop more holistic and systemic rather than linear and mechanistic theories of change. the aim of me is to examine the extent to which participants in any given program experience the various activities and outcomes of a program as ‘meaningful’ as defined by the mom framework. meaningful evaluation seeks to identify the main sources (pathways) along which meaning occurs as well as identifying any imbalances or barriers to meaning. the process of me identifies outcomes that are significant and sustainable, that is, achieve social impact by uncovering the ‘meaningfulness’ from participating in a program. meaning is an important internal outcome, needed for longerterm external outcomes to occur, and capturing meaningful unintended outcomes is just as important as capturing intended outcomes, especially where people did not experience those intended outcomes as meaningful. informed by appreciative inquiry perspectives, me provides a means to bridge the divide between positivist and interpretivist approaches, and has an open approach with respect to data collection and analysis on meaning. while a practitioner community has developed around applying the map of meaning across a range of areas, its application to evaluation and social impact assessment is relatively recent and thus requires further testing and refinement10. initial findings are promising, and we invite others who have similar concerns with some of the directions of outcomes measurement practice to consider the meaningful evaluation approach. acknowledgements i thank mitra gusheh at the centre for social justice & inclusion, university of technology sydney, and the two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier version of this paper; and primary ethics and mitra gusheh for agreeing to pilot the approach to evaluate the role of volunteers within the program. i also thank marjolein lipswiersma and lani morris for 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is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: feng c. 2017. the ngo law in china and its impact on overseas funded ngos. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(3), 95-105. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9 i3.5601 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper the ngo law in china and its impact on overseas funded ngos chongyi feng university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: chongyi feng, social and political sciences, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. chongyi.feng@uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5601 abstract the law of the people’s republic of china on administration of activities of overseas non-governmental organisations in the mainland of china (overseas ngo law), adopted at the 20th meeting of the 12th standing committee of the national people’s congress on 28 april 2016, came into force on 1 january 2017. the chinese authorities explained that this new law is a major step “to standardise and guide the activities of overseas non-governmental organisations” in line with the objective of the chinese communist party “to comprehensively promote the rule of law and to build a socialist country under the rule of law” . however, foreign ngos in china have reacted to the new law with grave concern and anxiety. this article provides an analysis of the main features of the law and assesses its intention, impact and consequences. keywords ngo; law; china; civil society declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5601 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5601 https://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ mailto:chongyi.feng@uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5601 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 introduction the law of the people’s republic of china on administration of activities of overseas nongovernmental organisations in the mainland of china (overseas ngo law), adopted at the 20th meeting of the 12th standing committee of the national people’s congress on 28 april 2016, came into force on 1 january 2017. the chinese authorities explained that this new law is a major step ‘to standardise and guide the activities of overseas non-governmental organisations’ in line with the objective of the chinese communist party (ccp) ‘to comprehensively promote the rule of law and to build a socialist country under the rule of law’ (yang 2016). however, foreign ngos in china have reacted to the new law with grave anxiety (south china morning post 2016). the major concern is that, rather than providing a constructive legal framework for the safe and smooth operation of foreign ngos in china, the new law has turned some of the damaging extra-legal measures into explicit legal rules that further empower the security apparatus to control and harass foreign ngos. the main features of the overseas ngo law the overseas ngo law consists of 54 articles in 7 chapters and covers a multitude of aspects, including principles and policies for overseas ngos, legal responsibilities of overseas ngos, the regulation of registration and filing, the regulation of activities and the regulation of supervision and management, and operational guidelines (the standing committee of the national people’s congress 2016). it is stipulated in article 2 of the overseas ngo law that ‘this law concerns overseas ngos carrying out activities within china. ‘overseas ngos’ refers to non-profit, non-governmental social organisations such as foundations, social groups and think tanks that have been lawfully established outside of mainland china’. instead of using the concept of ‘foreign ngos’, the term of ‘overseas ngos’ (jingwai feizhengfu zuzhi) also covers ngos in hong kong, macau and taiwan. the first comprehensive regulation of foreign ngos in china, the law is characterised by its major provisions to control ngos and restrict their activities. since china’s entering into its ‘reform and opening’ era in the late 1970s, thousands of foreign ngos have carried out programs and activities in china, contributing to china’s development and engagement with governments, business, civil society and the general public of the outside world. as china has never released any official data on the exact number of foreign ngos in china, no one really knows how many of these organisations are operating in the country. at a press conference during the 12th national people’s congress on 4 march 2016, fu ying, former vice foreign minister of china, revealed that ‘there are more than 7,000 foreign ngos operating in china’ (fu 2016). but this figure may not account for many foreign ngos which, as a strategy to survive within the unfavourable regulatory regime, are registered as commercial entities or not formally registered at all. the regulation and operation of ngos, both domestic and foreign, are extremely messy in china. in strict legal terms, there are no legal domestic ngos in china. they are either legal but not an ngo or an ngo but not legal. the chinese party-state officially refers to a whole range of domestic not-for-profits organisations as ‘social organisations’ (shehui zuzhi), cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 97 an equivalent to ngos in the west. the categories used by the party-state to register these organisations include mass organisations (qunzhong zuzhi), social associations (shehui tuanti), professional associations (zhuanye tuanti), social service organisations (shehui fuwu jigou), civil non-enterprise institutions (minban fei qiye danwei), foundations (jijinhui), philanthropic organisations (cishan zuzhi), and public service units (shiye danwei). the peculiar regulatory framework of the party-state entails that, if legally registered, these social organisations are either a quasi-governmental agency or an extension of the party-state (feng 2001; feng 2006). the ‘dual management system’ established by the regulations on the registration and management of social organizations in 1989 (revised in 1998) has been a fatal restraint on the development of ngos in china (the state council 1998). the ‘dual management system’ requires social organisations to seek prior approval by and affiliations to a government or party body as the ‘professional management unit’ (yewu zhuguan bumen) responsible for their operations. after approval is granted, they must register with the ministry of civil affairs or its local bureaux, which acts as the ‘registration management unit’ (dengji guangli jiguan) responsible for their supervision and annual review. the regulations also stipulate that applicant organisations must undergo a lengthy application and approval process and comply with a wide range of other requirements, including achieving the quota of at least fifty individual members or thirty institutional members, a fixed location and office, and minimum assets of 100,000 rmb. furthermore, while there are many liabilities but no incentives for a government or party body to sponsor an ngo, the ministry of civil affairs or its local bureaux may rely on a wide array of reasons to deny registration. over the last few years, local governments in some provinces have been experimenting with ways to lower barriers to entry. they have reformed the ‘dual management’ system to waive the requirement of sponsorship for certain categories of service social organisations such trade associations, chambers of commerce, science and technology associations, and public welfare and charitable organisations. in reality, there are on the one hand quasi-governmental agencies disguised as ngos, often referred to as government-organized ngos (gongos), with legal status, and on the other hand genuine ngos without legal status or proper registration. public service units are obviously quasi-governmental agencies, generally established and funded by the government and staffed with government employees on state payroll. public universities, research institutes, public schools and hospitals fall in this category. in the same way, the traditional ‘mass organisations’ such as the communist youth league, the trade unions, the women’s federation, the federation of industry and commerce, the association of science and technology, the association of social sciences, and the association of writers and artists, are organised directly by the party-state and remain firmly part of the party and government apparatus. even those new self-funded professional associations officially established in the reform era, such as the association of entrepreneurs, the association of individual labourers, the chamber of commerce, and the association of lawyers, are also an extension of the government apparatus and their key managers are appointed by the party-state. those genuine grassroots ngos independent from the government either choose to legally register 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 with the bureau of industry and commerce as a for-profit business, or operate without formal registration and legal protection. it is widely estimated that only one-tenth or two-tenths of ‘social organisations’ are registered legally or properly in china (watson 2008; deng 2010). according to the white paper on the development of the human rights undertakings in 2012 issued by the press office of the state council of the prc, there were approximately half a million legally-registered social organisations in china by the end of 2012 (liu and tian 2013). this means that currently there are as many as 5 million domestic ngos and gongos operating in china. the situation of overseas ngos in china had been similar to domestic ngos. there were a tiny few elite ngos, which were treated by the party-state as friends in accordance with the united-front strategy, finding their special ways to collaborate with a chinese government institution in a special arrangement. this privileged minority included trade and commercial groups such as the u.s.-china business council and european chamber of commerce, top universities such as new york university and stanford university, and giant foundations such as the bill and melinda gates foundation and the li ka shing foundation. rather than overcoming the daunting difficulty of the ‘dual management’ system and registering a representative office, the large majority of overseas ngos either chose to register as a business entity, or remain unregistered and work under the radar through chinese partners in a regulatory grey area. the new overseas ngo law has made the life of these ngos even harder in terms of both registration and activity. the ‘dual management’ system has been maintained and shifted for the worse. overseas ngos are now required to register with and report to the ministry of public security or its provincial bureaux instead of the ministry of civic affairs or its local bureaux. article 7 of the law stipulates that ‘within the scope of their authority, the public security organs of local governments at the county level or above are responsible for supervision, management, and service provision for the activities of overseas ngos within china’. this change has put overseas ngos under direct supervision by the police. the new law is a very strict regulation that gives overseas ngos only two legal channels for operating in china: register a representative office in china for approved activities or ‘file a record’ to carry out ‘temporary activities’ regardless of the nature or length of those activities. the overseas ngo and its chinese partner will need to file the required materials about their collaboration and any necessary approvals with the police. they will also be required to file reports on their activities to the police. the law authorises the police, in conjunction with relevant government departments, to decide the areas, scope and projects for the activities of overseas ngos. in particular, the new law bans overseas ngos from engaging in ‘religious activities’ and ‘political activities’ (article 47), which are very vaguely defined and can be interpreted by the hard-line police to including everything done by ngos. article 47 of the law also stipulates that the police will enact severe administrative or legal punishments against overseas ngos if they are involved in a wide range of activities such as advocacy inciting resistance against the enforcement of laws and regulations, collecting state secrets, spreading rumours or other ‘harmful information’, and ‘other activities that undermine state security and harm national interests or societal public cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 99 interests’. the punishments include revocation of registration certificates, confiscation of property, freezing of bank accounts, and criminal charges. another area of concern is that the law goes a step further to raise barriers for accessing foreign funding of ngos in china. over the last few years, there has been increasingly closer regulatory oversight over foreign funding to chinese grassroots ngos. in the meantime, the civil affairs authorities in charge have sometimes chosen to take a lenient approach in enforcing those regulations and leave a grey area for chinese grassroots ngos to receive foreign funding. under the new law, all foreign ngos operating in china are to file reports on all of their chinese partners, funding sources, and activities to the public security apparatus. this requirement intensifies restrictions on funding to those unregistered or not properly registered grassroots ngos in china and funding from those politically ‘sensitive’ international ngos, such as the national endowment for democracy and the open society institute. intention, impact and consequences what is the purpose or intention for the chinese authorities to enact such a draconian new regulation? do they want to raise the barriers and drive foreign ngos out from china? on behalf of the standing committee of the national people’s congress, fu ying told the world that the new overseas ngo law was not to stop the activities of overseas ngos in china. on 1 april 2017, china’s government-run xinhua news agency published an article claiming that the registration procedure under the new law was ‘more convenient, efficient, and simple’. (liu 2017). even dr shawn shieh, who has worked in the independent grassroots ngo sector in china and hong kong for over a decade and has published extensively on the difficulties facing civil society in china, agrees that, apart from expanding the administrative authority and resources of the police, ‘another intent of the law is to require more transparency and accountability on the part of the implementing authorities, and the ministry of public security in particular’. he points out that without this law ‘public security organs and local governments already have the authority to close down many of the foreign ngo projects and offices in china that are unregistered or improperly registered’ (shieh 2017). shieh’s optimism is shared by other researchers who believe that ‘the goal of the chinese government is not to destroy the ngo sector and civil society, but instead a tactical move in a long term strategy so that the state can gain as much benefit (and minimise as much risk) from the ngo sector as possible’ (hsu and teets 2016). there is no doubt that a clear and constructive legal framework is needed for healthy operation of foreign ngos in china (yin 2009). ever since the start of ‘reform and opening’ in the late 1970s, there have been constant calls for the chinese government to enact specific laws tosafeguard the freedom of press and the freedom of association, which are enshrined in the chinese constitution. even the tiananmen massacre in 1989 did not put an end to these aspirations. under the tenures of jiang zemin and hu jintao between 1990 and 2012, there was an effort to accommodate the chinese civil society, which re-emerged on the partystate’s partial withdrawal from society after 30 years of totalitarian rule (feng 2001). the development of civil society and the rule of law were regarded as an integral part of ‘good 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 governance’ in china (yu 2012). however, the dominant priority of the chinese communist rulers since 1989 has been ‘stability preservation’ (weiwen), or, to be more accurate, communist regime preservation, at expense of the development of civil society and the rule of law. the rising rights consciousness, the emerging civil society and the convergence of the chinese democracy movement and rights defence movement have led to an increasingly harsher response from the chinese communist regime, overwhelmed by the sense of insecurity (feng 2013b). this retrogressive response by the chinese communist ruling elite to the growing democratic aspirations and activism has culminated in the rise of the xi jinping dictatorship (lam 2015; ringen 2016). the new overseas ngo law has disappointed the expectations of offering legal remedies for and improvements on past poor practices, precisely because the current paramount leader xi jinping is much more stubborn in defending the leninist party-state and more seriously obsessed with the agenda of preventing soviet-style collapse. in xi’s series of speeches since his rise to the top at the end of 2012, there are stunning emphases on ideological purity and dazzling calls for ‘great struggles’ against the internal and external threats to ‘regime security’ (mudie2017; lampton 2015). xi’s major concerns are succinctly summarised in the ‘communiqué on the current state of the ideological sphere’ (widely known as document no. 9), which identifies the promotion of ‘western constitutional democracy’, ‘universal values’, ‘civil society’ and other ‘false ideological trends’ as major attacks launched by ‘western anti-china forces and internal dissidents’. the document lashes out against the ‘hostile forces’ at home and abroad: ‘their goal is to use western constitutional democracy to undermine the party’s leadership, abolish the people’s democracy, negate our country’s constitution as well as our established system and principles, and bring about a change of allegiance by bringing western political systems to china’. it is also pointed out in the document that ‘advocates of civil society want to squeeze the party out of leadership of the masses at the local level, even setting the party against the masses, to the point that their advocacy is becoming a serious form of political opposition’ (the general office 2013). the western conspiracy to instigate ‘colour revolutions’ for regime change tops the list of the major threats perceived by the xi leadership, who are actively establishing a comprehensive control state in china. i tend to argue that the new overseas ngo law serves well the united-front strategy of the ccp, allowing or even encouraging ‘friends’ of the international ngo sector to make financial and other contributions to the party-state while exercising vigilance and control on ‘external hostile forces’. indeed, article 53 of the law makes an allowance that ‘where overseas schools, hospitals, scientific and engineering technology research institutions or academic organisations engage in exchange and cooperation activities with schools, hospitals, scientific and engineering technology research institutions or academic organizations within china, relevant state regulations shall be applied in handling such activities’. activities in these areas are simply free gifts to the party-state. by the same token, the party-state is also more than happy to accept funds and services of emergency relief, poverty alleviation, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 101 disease control and other charitable activities of international ngos who provide needed help to ease responsibilities and financial burdens of the government. the overseas ngo law is a state security law, mainly targeting grassroots ngos working on sensitive areas such as rights protection, advocacy and religion. by moving management from the ministry of civil affairs to the ministry of public security and granting police broad powers over foreign ngos, it is obvious that the primary goal of the new overseas ngo law entails stricter control over foreign ngos in china (chin 2016). this new law is another typical bold act taken by the current chinese administration under xi jinping. compared to its immediate predecessors, the xi jinping leadership is characterised by a stronger sense of entitlement, confidence and mission to exercise despotic power and to use formal laws as a more effective tool for political repression. responding to the thorny issue about the competing authorities of the party and the law, xi categorically dismisses the issue as a ‘false proposition’, reiterating that in china the party establishes the law and the law embodies the party’s viewpoints (xi 2015). for xi, not only does the party stand above the law but the party is the law. in line with the party’s principle of ‘governing the country according to law’, the xi administration has waged a series of fierce campaigns against civil society and foreign influences in the country. the administration has adopted new securityoriented laws one after another to provide stronger legality for its campaign against political dissent, including the anti-espionage law in 2014, the counter-terrorism law, the national security law in 2015, and the cybersecurity law in 2016. the overseas ngo law is hailed as an important component of this new ‘system of national security laws’ (mo 2017). these new laws have been used for the repression of ngos, human rights and labour activists, and lawyers on blanket charges such as ‘illegal operation (feifa jingying)’, ‘picking a quarrel and provoking a dispute (xunxin zishi)’, and, more extremely, ‘subversion of state power’ or ‘inciting subversion of state power’. the national security commission chaired by xi was created in 2014 to coordinate all these efforts. in the second part of 2015 starting at midnight on 9 july, about 300 lawyers and rights activists were interrogated, detained, harassed or arrested by police on charges of political crimes such as accepting funding from overseas and ‘endangering state security’. several foreigners who had been working for chinese and foreign ngos were convicted under these laws. in january 2016 a swedish citizen, peter dahlin, appeared on state-run television and ‘confessed’ to his guilt of violating chinese law and ‘hurting the feelings of the chinese people’ through his work with an ngo that supported chinese human rights lawyers, a group the government called an ‘illegal organization that sponsored activities jeopardizing china’s national security’ (phillips 2016). the first overseas ngo worker arrested in china since the new overseas ngo law came into effect was rights activist lee ming-cheh from taiwan, who was ‘disappeared’ (secretly detained by chinese political police) in march 2017, formally arrested for ‘subverting state power’ in may 2017 after being held incommunicado for 68 days, and stood trial on 11 september 2017 (bbc 2017; horton and buckley 2017). it is true that the chinese security apparatus, including both the ministry of public security and the ministry of state security, has already routinely taken extra-legal or criminal measures to harass both domestic and foreign ngos in china. what has been achieved by the 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 new overseas ngo law is to openly bring those extra-legal or extra-judicial practices of chinese security apparatus against the ngo sector into the formal legal system. armed with the new overseas ngo law, the chinese authorities can legally punish dissenting groups and at the same time demonstrate to the outside world that they are strengthening ‘law-based administration’ (yifa xingzheng) and ‘governing the country according to law’ (yifa zhiguo). they have followed the authoritarian tradition of imperial china in ‘governing the population’ with severe punishment under strict laws (simon 2013; teets 2014; feng 2016). as coined by one researcher, the new rulers in china are creating a ‘perfect dictatorship’, a dictatorship so sophisticated and working so well that it in many ways does not even look dictatorial (rengen 2016). in its control over ngos, the party-state has adopted a strategy much more sophisticated than a simple ban, favouring ngos engaging in charity and social services, monitoring ngos of particular sensitivity, guarding ngos engaged in advocacy and legal assistance, and punishing ngos engaged in ‘subversive’ political and religious activities. the new law has serious consequences for foreign ngos in china. their fate is settling in three broad categories. the first group are the tiny minority who achieve successful registration for legal operation in china. six months after the new law took effect, only 82 foreign ngos had completed the registration as required by the new law, accounting for about 1% of the 7000 foreign ngos believed to be operating in mainland china. most of them are business associations and chambers of commerce who previously registered with the ministry of civil affairs or the ministry of commerce. many of them are uncertain how strict their government supervisors will be and whether they will be able to carry on working as before (gan 2017; shi-kupfer and lang 2017). the second group are those who choose to suspend their operations or abandon china altogether as they are working in politically sensitive areas such as human rights, the rule of law and church-related activities. some of them have tried to register but run into a variety of problems, such as difficulties in convincing potential government sponsors to work with them due to a lack of incentives and fear of the potential risks. as an example, the american bar association, which helped train hundreds of chinese lawyers since 2004, has relocated from beijing to hong kong. the third group are the overwhelming majority, those grassroots small ngos in the areas of environmental protection and labour rights in particular, who still choose to work in china in an informal way, continuing their work without formal registration despite the law. some of them have scaled down their operations, turning their programs into temporary activities and terminating new funding to their chinese partners (shi-kupfer and lang 2017). conclusion given that the new overseas ngo law formally places foreign ngos under the supervision of the police and gives the police broad powers to question their workers, inspect their offices, look into their documents, confiscate their assets and even arrest their chinese partners, the safety of foreign ngos in china is a legitimate concern. it is naïve to believe that the law will be able to limit the discretionary power of the security apparatus by providing a detailed framework, procedures, and responsibilities for regulating foreign ngos. over the last four decades, hundreds of good laws have been transplanted in china cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 103 from the west for the safeguard of legal interests and rights of citizens. however, the partystate has also enacted ‘evil laws’ in violation of basic human rights and has been extremely selective in enforcing its own laws. overseas ngos as well as domestic ngos in china need new laws for protection rather than regulations for further restriction and punishment. it is unfortunate that the overseas ngos law, which places the registration and supervision of overseas ngos and their activities in china directly under the ministry of public security instead of the ministry of civil affairs, is a mechanism of state control rather than protection and facilitation for foreign ngos. worries about regime security are the major drivers behind the law’s establishment and timing. drawing negative lessons from the collapse of communist states in eastern europe and the ‘colour revolutions’ in the former soviet union and in the arab spring uprisings, xi jinping and his associates have taken resolute measures against foreign ngos funding social forces in china that may eventually develop into an organised opposition. the post-totalitarian regime in china has made the absence of organised opposition, disorganisation of society and atomisation of individuals the preconditions for the survival of the party-state. based on the calculation that communist one-party rule will survive as long as isolated popular protests are not organised as a nation-wide campaign and can be suppressed one by one, the ruling elite have banned political opposition and restricted the development of civil society. they want to make sure that there is no space for diverse and genuine ngos to thrive and the incipient civil society to reach its full potential. the ‘dual management system’ and other control mechanisms have been devised to set the scope and limitations for the development of civil society, which is welcomed when it provides needed services to the party-state but not allowed to function beyond state control (feng 2013). 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http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5613&cgid https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139839396 http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0511/c385475-26978527.html http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2039279/overseas-ngos-china-uneasy-about-new-oversight-law http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2039279/overseas-ngos-china-uneasy-about-new-oversight-law http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2016-05/31/c_1118938323.htm abstract keywords introduction the main features of the overseas ngo law intention, impact and consequences conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 1 2017 © 2017 steve kwok-leung chan. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: chan, s. 2017. prostrating walk in the campaign against sino-hong kong express railway: collective identity of native social movement. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(1), 20-41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i 1.4986 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper prostrating walk in the campaign against sino-hong kong express railway: collective identity of native social movement steve kwok-leung chan sim university, singapore corresponding author: steve kwok-leung chan, school of human development and social services, sim university, 461 clementi road, singapore 599491. corresponding author: sklchan@gmail.com doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.4986 abstract occupation, blockage and storming are not rare in social movements a decade after china resumed sovereignty in hong kong. the organizers and participants usually involve locally born young people. some of them are secondary school students in their teens. they are known as the fourth generation or post-1980s born hongkongers. the paper examines the cultural context of social movements involving these youth activists. it focusses on the campaign against the sino-hong kong express railway development project. the project called for the demolition of the tsoi yuen village, a small rural village located on its designated route. since then, the role of the younger generation in social movements has been recognized more broadly. social media are widely employed in all stages of the movements with citizen journalists actively involved. the impressive ‘prostrating walk’ imitating tibetan pilgrims has become a symbol of these youth activists. it has kept appearing in other campaigns including occupy central in hong kong in 2014. this paper argues that the rise of nativism, advancement in ict technology and the shift towards new social movements contribute to the dominant role of youth in recent social movements of hong kong. collective identity of hongkonger in response to the top-down assimilation by china strengthens the movement. keywords prostrating walk, new social movement, nativism, youth activism, hong kong, sino-hong kong express railway declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.4986 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.4986 mailto:sklchan@gmail.com http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.4986 21 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 introduction the rise of direct actions by youth activists in the form of transgressive movements gradually emerged in 2006, a decade after china resumed sovereignty in hong kong. the campaign organizers and participants usually involve locally born young people. some of them are secondary school students in their teens. they are known as the fourth generation or post1980s born hongkongers. the paper examines the cultural context of social movements involving these youth activists. it mainly studies the campaign against the sino-hong kong express railway development project in 2009 and 2010. this single railway project needs to be understood in the context of the top-down assimilation by mainland china of hong kong. economic fusion, tightening social control and prohibiting further democratization play together with this cultural pattern. this paper attempts to introduce the discourse of collective identity of youth activism in connection to the rise of nativism. the framework of the new social movement was also adopted in collaboration with the notion of collective identity. in particular, the ethnography of post-1980s ‘prostrating walks’ imitating the tibetan buddhists and koreans during the korean peasants’ anti-wto protest in hong kong is examined. ’prostrating walks’ appear in other campaigns including occupy central in 2014. this study argues that the collective identity discourse on the rise of nativism, advancement in ict technology and shifting towards new social movements contribute to the youth activism in post-colonial hong kong. new social movement at a glance, social movements are collective actions, initiated and organized by social groups or organizations. they address a single issue or wider social and political institutions. in some instances, social movements are not a short-term campaign but last for a period of time or even one or more generations. some social movements aim to achieve social and institutional change. diani (2006) defines social movements as: networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities. macadam (1997) emphasizes social movements happening ‘outside institutional channels’. usually, a series of contentious performances, displays and campaigns are used by groups and organizations to express their collective views (tilly, 2004). the idea of new social movements emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in response to economic structural changes in western countries. the class-based, specific group interest oriented social movements were gradually not able to cope with new issues in the postindustrial world. the motivations of people taking part are not restricted to materialistic and self-interest goals (calhorn 1993; melucci 1985; offe 1985, rose 1997; touraine 1985). new movements in developed countries cover themes of feminism, civil rights, environmental protection, peace and anti-nuclear and the like. sometimes they are known as new social movements. they are usually centred on issues that go beyond social class. offe (1985) regards it as a shift from ‘class-basis’ to ‘issue-basis’ movements. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 22 the expansion of the middle class also broadens the range of concern. more and more professionals and middle class have become involved in new social movements, namely peace movements, environmental movements, women’s movements, and civil movements. for example, greenpeace, the well-known environmental group favouring direct action, consists of members with higher incomes and college educations than the average us citizen. ‘leadership of these movements is drawn even more disproportionately from the professional middle class’ (rose 1997, p.464). however, offe (1985) points out the heterogeneity of new social movement membership. there are more middle-class individuals taking part, but the membership is more diverse. also, many of the supporters are new middle class coming from the personal-service sector, with high educational status and economic security. most importantly, there is greater participation from the new middle class in these movements, but ‘the demands (and thus beneficiaries of such demands) are highly class-unspecific, dispersed … universalistic in nature …’ (offe 1985, p.833). furthermore, old and new social movements can be distinguished in terms of their orientation, goals and values, participants as stated above, but also the mode of action. the organization of new social movements is more ‘informal, ad hoc, discontinuous, contextsensitive, and egalitarian’ (offe 1985, pp.829-830). this flexibility is to cope with the complexity of post-industrial society that brings about the rise of new forms of social movement. this shift of social movements away from highly differentiated industrial society is coherent with offe’s (1985) ‘de-differentiation’ of the internal mode in new social movements. [n]ew social movements do not rely[…] on the organizational principle of differentiation, whether in the horizontal (insider vs. outsider) or in the vertical dimension (leaders vs. rank and file members)[…] strong reliance upon dedifferentiation[…] the fusion of public and private roles, instrumental and expressive behavior, community and organization, and in particular a poor and at best transient demarcation between the roles of members and formal leaders (offe 1985, pp.829830). in the hong kong context, lui and chiu (2000) mentioned briefly signs of new social movements in the 1980s and 1990s. there existed small-scale environmental movements and women’s campaigns. but the environmental groups were institutionalized, under government and corporate sponsorship to offer mainly education programs. while the grassroots women’s actions did address wider political and social causes (lee 2000), in the last two decades, before the 1997 handover of hong kong, there were more protest activities and their scale grew gradually. however, lack of trust and little cooperation was the norm between political parties and civil society organizations. such ad hoc alliance is effective but seldom able to accumulate enough resources in order to bring institutional change (ma 2009). after the outbreak of a new strain of infectious disease in hong kong in 2003, the panic created new societal values for hongkongers, not based on materialism1. more emphasis was given to environmental and health issues. the shift of values led to the rise of post-materialist youth activism which challenged the government’s economy first 1 an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (sars) in 2003 in hong kong led to a number of deaths. it then spread to other countries in the region, thereby creating panic. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 23 development practice and procedural justice in public policy processes (yew & kwong 2014). cheung (2014, pp.429-430) regards the tsoi yuen village resistance as a new kind of social movement because it was able to ‘exert huge political pressure on the government’. he also employed the term ‘new social movements’ in describing the transgressive mode of action, using ‘confrontational, uncompromising and unorthodox strategies’ beyond institutional channels (or & lau 2014). the actions involve innovative collective action performed by newly identified political actors. transgressive actions are usually regarded as rebellion and radical, in some instances (moyer et al. 2001; cheung 2014; or & lau 2014). sometimes protest involved minor scuffles as well as direct body contacts between petitioners and the police, though scuffles never happened (cheung 2014). cultural politics and collective identity a split in society is usually the origin of social movements though resource mobilization theorists de-emphasize the factor of grievance in triggering contentions. touraine (1985) distinguishes different types of social conflicts, namely: i. the competitive pursuit of collective interests; ii. reconstruction of a social, cultural or political identity; iii. a political force which aims at changing the rules of the game; iv. the defence of a status or privileges; v. the social control of main cultural patterns; and vi. creation of a new order. among them, cultural identity (type ii) and cultural pattern (type v) are not restricted to new social movement theories, but also widely adopted in arguments of framing and postmodern politics of resistance. for example, the resistance of occupational groups during economic restructuring and ethnic groups defending their rights involve both political and economic goals. while the social control of the main cultural patterns implies the ruling classes imposing cultural values on the masses, the hierarchy here reflects the political relationship of the system. further, this subordination may determine patterns of resource allocation and lifestyle. the resistance becomes a cultural struggle where activists ‘translate their demands into a cultural code’ (touraine 1985). movements don’t exist only in their cultural message; they are also social organizations, and they confront political systems when choose public mobilization… collective action acts as symbolic multiplier… [it] challenges the operational logic of technocratic-military apparatuses and questions the bases of their power… it makes the power visible (melucci 1985, p.813). does the cultural-turn depoliticize social movements? early theories of new social movement claim that the main conflict in post-industrial society has shifted from the material to the cultural production of society. it is the conflict or historicity in the sphere of civil society, instead of class position in the structure and economic demands that triggers social movements. the struggle becomes focussed on the ‘cultural means of social production’ (staricco, 2012). however, the shifting of the struggle from economic recourses and social cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 24 class structure to identity politics involves the defense of civil society against the manipulation of cultural resources by the performance power. also, social movements politicize the cultural field which previously comprised non-politicized areas of social life (evers, 1985; kauffman, 1990; 2012). in some instances, cultural struggle involves collective identity building. individuals negotiate with others, groups and the external environment to form their identity. this identity or identities gathers together like-minded people to form groups and act together for common ends. it is not a static process. social identity theory suggests social identity is a sense of group membership, in which individuals perceive their own identity or which they accept as defined by other group members. the discovery or build-up of social identity involved categorization, identification and comparison processes (tajfel & turner 1979). collective identity is found in the shared feelings, values and norms of a group which contribute to group cohesion. in negotiating with the wider society beyond the group, collective identity can be both defensive and offensive. in a conflict situation, where identity and its materialistic (resources, wealth and income) or non-materialistic derivatives (folkways, values and institutions) are under threat, the group will take action to respond. polletta and jasper (2001, p.285) define collective identity as ‘an individual’s cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution’, which comprises but is not limited to cultural material, including lifestyles, religions, symbols, languages, and the like. popular schools in social movements have a diverse focus. collective behaviourists explain the process, the resource mobilization school relies on individuals’ rational calculation, and political process theorists are concerned with political climates and opportunities. collective identity has also been employed in explaining how movements emerge, participants’ motivation, strategic choices and the cultural effects of social movements. collective identity in social movements predicts organization forms and decision-making modes, which are coherent with new social theories. collective discussion helps to build consensus in the less institutionalized environment, while ‘shared leadership’ in the ‘horizontal organization’ facilitates participation (fominaya 2010, p.396). identity construction through political activism can be proactive and reactive. it is a reflexive process through which identity is produced and reproduced while the individual takes part in direct action. a reducing reflexivity would result in the identity of activists being shaped largely by their environment (or ‘society’). an expanding reflexivity would arise from the activists shaping their own identity, norms, and images, according to their will and own design which subsequently gets the recognition of the predominant group and the society at large. in reality, identity construction is a bidirectional and ongoing process with the activists negotiating with people, organizations and social structure back and forth. as such, involvement is crucial. the motive for participation can be altruistic impulse or response to grievances. but in the early days, activists were believed to be psyches seeking ‘displacement of dissatisfaction experienced in other spheres of life’ (lasswell, 1960, cited in teske, 1997). later, the resource mobilization approach suggested a quasi-quantitative calculation of costs and benefits and emphasized agency and the promotion effort of professional organizers or ‘political entrepreneurs’ (teske, 1997, p.19). but identity construction is about ‘certain cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 25 qualities instantiated in [the activists’] […] actions and lives. as such, the motivation to act is to identify that ‘one is certain kind of person’ (teske, 1997, p.121). as to the construction of collective identity, one way is to manipulate signs and symbols by assigning meanings to them ‘in order to fabricate the world and to subsume it to the signs with which we express (or do not express) it’ (melucci, 1996, p.131). these symbols, icons and images are signifiers transmitting emotions. emotional packages consisting of affection, excitement, pride, joys and/or sorrows help to motivate participants as well as win public sympathy (eyerman 2005; goodwin and jasper, 2006). emotions underpin collective identities; which can be shared among activists and promote solidarity (hurd, 2014). they sometimes speak more loudly than words and impress bystanders in the society at large. a more systemic way to spread the message among activists and to the public is through rituals. for example, routledge’s (1997) study on the campaign against the construction of a new motorway through the pollock park in scotland finds that besides conventional ways of marching and occupation, a series of symbolic challenges were used. for example, the activists declared the construction site they occupied as ‘free state’ and issued ‘passports’ for the ‘state’. a tree house was built on the ‘state’s territory’. the message of challenges to the planning of space was spread through media with the assistance of cultural symbols and signifiers (jones et al., 2004). rituals, a specific form of signifier, sometimes appear in social movements characterized by formalism, traditionalism, invariance, rule-governance, sacral symbolism and performance (bell, 1997). they provide the action ‘with narratives[…] [which] embodied collective remembering[…] [t]his moral-social identity implies both a shared past and a hopeful future’ (hurd, 2014). furthermore, rituals in social movements affirm the identities and beliefs of participants. as the performance of these rituals involves the physical presence of activists and audience in public spaces, emotional energy can be created through face-to-face social interactions. ‘rituals synchronize the action and develop symbolic and moral representation’ (goodwin and jasper, 2006). the new social movement theory has its critics. nash (2000) points out that new social movement theory downplays the importance of social movements mobilized on issues less than systematic transformation. also, touraine’s analysis has focused too much ‘on ideology in the framing of identity’ (taylor, 2010, p.109). further, the proponents place too much emphasis on the social aspect and downplay the economic or political aspects. however, social issues originate in the existing social and power structure and many organizations involved in new social movements are, actually, existing formal organizations which provide fewer chances for members to participate. touraine presumes that social movements happen in societies reaching a certain stage of development. this eurocentric approach limits the theory in explaining activism in developing and authoritarian states. for example, in authoritarian states, the social control limits the public space for civil society. in fact, in many developing countries, the regimes are oligarchies manipulated by a dictator, a single political party, a dominant group and their cronies. the struggle for public space, lifestyle, the environment and the like inevitably exerts challenges to the regime and vested interests. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 26 the rise of nativism in hong kong hong kong is a former british colony, with the people’s republic of china resuming sovereignty in 1997. the city became a special administrative region of china under a mini-constitution, known as the basic law of hong kong. according to the basic law, the chief executive (selected by an election college) has replaced the former british governor as head of the government. the legislature is a semi-elected body with half of its members elected by functional constituencies. the guiding principle is ‘one country, two systems’, with hong kong citizens governing the city under a high degree of autonomy. it is worth mentioning the rise of nativism in the post-1997 era after china has resumed its sovereignty of hong kong. there is a growing number of residents in hong kong claiming that they are ‘hongkongers’, rather than ‘chinese’2. the sense of native identity has become stronger and stronger to distinguish themselves from mainland chinese. (figure 1) figure 1. hongkonger versus chinese identity source: modified from table: people’s ethnic identity survey, public opinion programme, university of hong kong (public opinion programme, n.d.). with reference to the chart above, the divide between hongkongers and chinese became wider after 2008 when the old pier of star ferry was demolished. the incident led to a confrontation between the government and post-1980s youth activists who campaigned for the conservation of this urban heritage structure. however, the star ferry pier and its clock tower erected in 1958, by no means can be regarded as a historical building. its only real significance was its pre-1997 cultural identity (tsui 2007). the emergence of de-sinofication sentiments summarizes the effects of the reaction to china’s manipulation, incompetent 2 according to the longitudinal studies of the public opinion programme of the university of hong kong, 67 percent and 31 percent of the respondents identified themselves as ‘hongkongers’ and ‘chinese’ respectively. in the survey conducted in june 2014, both ‘hongkongers’ and ‘chinese’ had a broader sense, such that the former consists of a choice of either ‘hongkonger’ or ‘hongkonger in china’ and the latter either as ‘chinese’ or ‘chinese in hong kong’. (public opinion programme 2014) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 27 governance by the hong kong government, cultural conflicts between local residents and mainlanders, economic downturn due to deindustrialization and the like. the consequence is a rapid rise of nativism. the post-1980s youth activism was disconnected from their older generations who were apolitical and worked hard to earn a living in hong kong. the post-wwii, older generations were migrants from the mainland of china, who positioned themselves as ‘transient citizens’ of hong kong during the old days of this british colony. they had a ‘refugee mentality’ (matthews, ma & lui, 2007 p.38), in which hong kong was one of their stepping stones in the diaspora. for most of these newly arrivals from the mainland of china, with limited choices, they settled down temporarily in this british colony of hong kong, waiting for an alternative and just regarding it as ‘a borrowed place on borrowed time… [which] could never be home’ (fowler, 2015). the next cohort is native born hongkongers from the1960s and 1970s, who are referred to by my term ‘hidden citizens’. they grew up in the transition period between a couple of contradicting political events3. it was not a social and political change in one direction of development but fluctuated up and down. on the one hand, this cohort was influenced by their parents to stay away from politics. on the other hand, they were confused by their life experience. among them, some are the middle class who have emigrated to western countries before the handover. they then sojourned back to hong kong as returning migrants entitled to dual citizenship (marston and mitchell, 2004). another group became expatriates working in mainland china or they are small and medium enterprise business people trading with or relocating their production plants to the pearl river delta. the rest remained the silent majority in domestic politics, continuing their routines from dawn to dusk. in contrast, the cohort born post-1980s comprises active citizens, without the same political culture as their previous generations. they are ‘netizens’ spending less time on gradually self-censored mainstream local news media. rather, they are well-informed via the internet and connected by social media either through their tablets or smartphones. spoon feeding by state influenced, traditional media in the post-colonial period did nothing to control their minds. all communication modes in their dictionary took two approaches. this nurtured their outspoken attitude, bottom-up approaches and participatory culture. many of them witnessed, and some joined, the demonstration against the treason law on 1 july 2003. more than half a million people turned out to oppose the legislation imposed by china on hong kong. the incident also led to the stepping down of the chief executive of the city a year later. this generation has become aware of their citizenship rights and is cautious against various controls gradually imposed by china. to be a hongkonger implies an active citizen role in local affairs. ‘local identity can only be created through the continuous recreating of hong kong society’ (ma & liang, cited in kaeding 2011, p.5). it is now important to position this typology of citizenship in respect of migration and political culture changes. the early work of almond and verba’s (1963) distinction of political culture into parochial, subject and participant societies provides some hints. people in each type of society have a different level of concern for their citizenship rights and level 3 these events are namely the riot in 1967, economic reform adopted by communist china in 1978, sino-british joint declaration on the future of hong kong in 1984, the crackdown of the movement in tiananmen square in beijing in 1989 and finally, the british handover of hong kong to china in 1997. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 28 of participation in politics4. as hong kong is an immigrant community5, it is worth taking the factor of migration into account in this model. citizenship is more than a legal concept6. the possession of a citizen identity card does not necessary mean the entitlement of full citizenship rights. citizenship formation and practice is an ongoing process in space over time (marston and mitchell, 2004). first-generation immigrants who were born in the sending country some may take the time to integrate into the receiving country, while other may even refuse to or be blocked from integrating. the study of wiley et al., (2013) on firstgeneration latino immigrants in the northeastern united states suggests that ethnic-based rejection has unique implications for identification and ethnic political engagement. ethnic chinese raised in british hong kong have nurtured a dual and transitional identity of liminal citizenship7, which ‘relate[s] to a transitional or initial stage of process[…] occup[ing] a position at, or on both sides of, a boundary or threshold’ (cheung, 2007, p. 87). during and soon after the british negotiated with china the handover of hong kong, some affluent middle-class hongkongers emigrated to britain, canada and other english-speaking, developed countries so as to retain their way of life, and subsequently sojourned back to work in hong kong. they are ‘transmigrants’ holding dual citizenship who ‘live bi-nationally, setting up homes and places of work in more than one nation-states[…which] confers identity within a national community without the necessary of residing or working in that community’ (marston and mitchell, 2004, p.106). these different national identities, interests and connections contribute to differential civic engagement to local and political affairs in hong kong. finally, the concept of active citizenship is distinguished from legal and statist citizenship which is determined top-down solely by the authority. citizenship is no longer taken for granted, but as something that needs to be perceived actively ‘by individuals through participation in governance and sharing responsibility for the defence of citizenship rights’ (jones et al., 2004, p.142). it is grounded in civil society (friedmann 2002), expanded in the public sphere (rose 2000) and mobilized through social movements (miraftab and wills, 2005). this paper claims that native-born hongkongers in the 1980s and beyond choose to engage actively in various social events and try to make some changes. the 4 parochial societies are those in which the majority people have little concern for their citizenship and the state. they do not care about politics and public affairs or generally ‘neither the desire nor the ability to participate in politics’. subject societies consist of people in some instant, who understand and passively observe politics, but remain less participative. people of participant societies are true citizens. they are aware of politics and eager to stand up for their rights. they have ‘political competence and political efficacy’. (almond and verba 1963, p.79) 5 more than half of the population of hong kong was internal migrants from the mainland of china during the post-wwii period until the end of the touch-base policy in 1980. the policy was adopted by the british hong kong government in 1974, and it allowed immigrants from the mainland of china to claim hong kong citizenship once they reached the urban areas of the british colony of hong kong. 6 the different in legal concept citizenship between hong kong and china also leads to confusion. hong kong follows the british legal practice of jus soli, or the ‘right of soil’ which is the principle of birth-right citizenship. china citizenship is based on jus sanguinis or the ‘right of blood’, in which citizenship is acquired by inheritance, according to the blood origin. 7 skeiker (2010, p.13) suggests liminal citizens as those ‘who live in a host community for a significant period of time without becoming a legal citizen of that community’. the concept relates to flexible citizenship, global/complex citizenship, and cultural citizenship when legal citizenship becomes insufficient in describing the situations in the context of a globalized world and increasing mobilization of people across national borders. some studies on international students acquiring higher education overseas employ this concept. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 29 response is different from the passive attitude of their former generations. these post-80s native activists negotiate with their peer group, the vulnerable, social organizations, and the structures of authority. active engagement nurtures a participant culture; the processes reinforce each other.8 the following figure summarizes the above argument on citizenship types and the explanation of migration status and political culture (table 1). table 1. typology of citizenship, migration and political culture source: the author the anti-express railway campaign demolition of star ferry and queen’s pier it is worth mentioning several pioneer campaigns to illustrate activism by the youth of this generation. these can be regarded as the origin of native movements when the ad hoc organization adopted the name ‘local action’. the model of transgressive movements gradually emerged. these youth participants employed direct actions, including the occupation of piers, blocking demolition workers and chaining themselves up in resistance to the police removing them. the actions were basically peaceful, in a passive manner with minor bodily contact with the police, such as swarming. these actions share a common theme of heritage and conservancy. the most wellknown campaigns are against the demolition of edinburgh place ferry pier (star ferry pier) in 2006 and queen’s pier in 2007. both piers were located in edinburgh place, the waterfront of central on hong kong island. the clock tower of star ferry was the landmark of central since being erected in the 1950s. queen’s pier was listed as a ‘grade 1 historical building’ by the antiquities advisory board of hong kong. these structures are part of the collective memory of hongkongers. the development was for reclamation and construction of roads to ease the congestion in central, the central business district of hong kong. the theme of the campaigns concerns culture and heritage. but the opposition was also linked to wider social and political causes. the spirit of ‘anti-central values’ arose first, representing opposition to distorted development, top-down urban planning, nepotism favouring giant developers and an undemocratic political system9. 8 the timing is relevant because britain and china had reached the agreement in 1984 in determining the handover of hong kong under the rule of china in 1997. 9 the ‘central’ here refers to the central government of china in beijing. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 30 sino-hong kong express railway project the sino-hong kong express railway project related to this study is, to be exact, the construction of the hong kong section of the ‘guangzhou–shenzhen–hong kong express rail’. (figure 2) this involved the selection of the railway terminus which was planned to be on reclaimed land on the western side of the kowloon peninsula, next to the central business district of hong kong. an alternative was suggested for construction in kam sheung road of the new territories near the border with china as proposed later on, by the nongovernmental think tank, professional commons. figure 2. route map of sino-hong kong express rail link source: guangzhou–shenzhen–hong kong express rail link (c) altt311 (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/guangzhou_shenzhen_hongkong_express_rail_link_ en.svg ), gnu fdl the railway will link hong kong closer to china, with a journey time from kowloon terminus to shenzhen, the border city of china for only 14 minutes. most importantly, it incorporates hong kong into the national-wide construction of a high-speed railway network in china. the project will bring about employment opportunities for both mainland china and hong kong, especially after the global financial crisis in 2008. when the railway comes into operation, the improvement in transportation will promote the economic integration of hong kong into the pan pearl river delta region of southern china. however, the high-speed railway project itself is controversial in both hong kong and china. the length of the hong kong section is only 26 km, but the construction costs are up to us$8 billion (in 2009 prices), which has been cited as being the most expensive railway per kilometre in the world. even this budget was believed to be underestimated10. the location of the terminus and land resumption cost along its route have inflated the cost 10 the hong kong government applied again to the legislative council additional budget for the project in 2015. hk$20 billion (us$2.56 billion) is requested to top-up making the budget of the whole railway project reach hk$85 billion (us$10.9 billion) (lo 2015). https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/guangzhou_shenzhen_hongkong_express_rail_link_en.svg https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/guangzhou_shenzhen_hongkong_express_rail_link_en.svg cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 31 considerably. however, the maximum operating speed of this short section can only reach 200 km/h. this poor speed makes it only marginally regarded as a high-speed railway11. the rapid expansion of high-speed railways in china has put the railway ministry in debt. its affordability by the majority of peasant workers is doubtful. the train production, quality of electronic control system and human factors in operations are worrying, as a fatal accident happened in wenzhou city in china in 2011. a high-speed train collided into another head-on, killing 40 people. the railway minister stepped down the following year and was eventually found guilty of corruption for taking advantage of his numerous railway projects12. the resistance of tsoi yuen village the plan to demolish tsoi yuen village, a small village on the railway route triggered the campaign13. tsoi yuen village is located in the middle of the new territories, hong kong. the railway development of hong kong had been concentrated on the eastern coast14 and western plain15, leaving the mountainous central area outside the range of urbanization. the neighbourhood comprised 150 households, scattered over an area of about 27 hectares. with a few exceptions, almost all the houses were unlicensed cottages, unauthorized to be erected on farmland. according to the existing cottage policy, these residents are neither entitled to any land nor tenure rights. in the case of public land resumption, no compensation is possible, but ex gratia allowances for moving home will be considered on a case-by-case basis (legislative council secretariat 2000). the villagers were not eligible to be allocated public rental housing flats. in the case of indigenous inhabitants of the new territories, upon clearance residents are entitled to land for rebuilding their houses. but tsoi yuen village was not an indigenous village. in 2007, the mass transit railway of hong kong adopted an initial plan to build a section of high-speed railway in hong kong connecting with shenzhen city in mainland china. as the route of this planned railway would pass through tsoi yuen village, the hong kong government announced the clearance of the structures and resumption of public land to be effective in october of 2010. prostrating walk the most impressive image of the performance in the protests against sino-hong kong express railway project was the ‘prostrating walk’16. the term ‘prostrating’ simply means kneeling down and worshipping by bowing. the word in chinese carries the meaning of ‘bitter’ or ‘bear the bitter burden’. prostrating walk is common in buddhist practice. the most prominent example of prostrating walk is by tibetan pilgrims. they travel a very long 11 data are drawn from the express rail link website of its parent company mass transit railway corporation of hong kong. 12 information is drawn from the report of the guardian and the independent. 13 tsoi yuen village is also known as tsoi yuen tsuen or choi yuen chuen. 14 kowloon and canton railway line, in the east along the coastal area of tolo harbour, was developed at the beginning of the last century. 15 western railway line and light railway, in the west on the plain of yuen long, was developed by the end of the last century. 16 different english translation terms for the procession are used, such as ‘bitter walk or kuxing’ (fong 2011), ‘penance walkers’ (lam and ip 2011), and ‘prostrating walk’ (ma 2012). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 32 way from their home to worship in the potala palace, in lhasa. on their way, the tibetan buddhists kneel down every few steps and bow until their hands, head and finally their whole body touches the ground. the performance is repeated and repeated, making the whole journey much longer than if just walking on foot. this is to demonstrate their devotion and willingness to bear the bitterness of a long walk toward the holy land. however, the immediate idea for the post-1980s prostrating walk came from the antiwto protest in hong kong in 2005. the experienced korean peasant petitioners did not show their hardline protesting method to hong kong but also performed ‘three steps, one bow’ (pronounced as ‘sambo ilbae’ in korean) (hadl, 2005)17, − kneeling down and bowing every five steps along the main streets of hong kong island. the alternative hard and soft tactics attracted the media and drew the sympathy of local hongkongers. this new matching style eradicated the violent image of the clash between south korean farmers and hong kong police as well as gaining sympathy among the general public of hong kong (sheoin and yeates, 2009; kim, 2011). some of the youth activists participated in the anti-wto protest. they modified the actions of the korean peasants and designed their own prostrating walk. once again, it impressed many people in hong kong and drew large numbers of like-minded young people to turn out. the protest performance appeared in several large-scale campaigns repeatedly, even up to the umbrella movement − occupy central in 2004. when the budget for the construction of the express railway was submitted for approval by the legislative council of hong kong in december 2009, youth activists called for a siege of the council. the protestors clashed with the police on some occasions when the pro-establishment legislators left the council at night after a whole day’s session. most of the time, the rally proceeded peacefully. there were art and music performances outside the council. they called it a ‘resistance carnival’ (fong 2011). in one impressive scene, the youth activists demonstrated their prostrating walk surrounding the council. several pictures of prostrating walk were retrieved from the internet. the images shown are as follows. a small team of demonstrators walked very slowly in single file. the first person held a small vertical banner with a few words showing the theme of the procession, such as ‘against the express railway’ or ‘prostrating walk against the express railway’ or ‘prostrating walk by university and college students’. a few demonstrators wore clothes with the same written message. some of the demonstrators walked in bare feet. (figure 3 & 4) 17 the ‘three steps, one bow’ style, is known as ‘sambo ilbae’ in both korean and mandarin chinese. the matching style consists of walking three steps forward, prostrating, rising, and then repeat the steps again and again. there is a tradition for korean buddhist monks and nuns to walk in this way so as to ‘shed the three poisons— greed, anger and delusion’ (hadl, 2005). the performance also spread to thailand during the protest against thai-us free trade agreement (kim, 2011). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 33 figure 3. the first person held a small vertical banner source: anti-express railway and the grassroots: a discussion with chu hoi-dick（c）inmediahk (https://www.flickr.com/photos/47024905@n08/4499903170/), cc by-nc 2.0 figure 4. demonstrators in single file source: express railway campaign newsletter (chinese edition) (inmediahk, n.d.) the whole team walked at a very slow pace. every 26 steps, they knelt down together. then they stood up and walked for another cycle repeatedly. the 26-step cycle represented the length of the express railway in hong kong. each time they knelt down until their hands and forearms touched the ground. they put some rice in their palms, representing a reconstruction of the relationship between humans, land and agriculture. (figure 5) a drummer followed the team at the back. he hit a korean drum infrequently at almost one-minute intervals. the beat guided the pace of the procession. demonstrators kept silent all the way with no talking or shouting of any slogans. they all had serious expressions on their faces. the only sound was the drum beat. the low tone, deep sound and slow rhythm of the drum beat produced a solemn atmosphere, making the procession akin to a religious ritual. https://www.flickr.com/photos/47024905@n08/4499903170/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 34 figure 5. 26-step cycle and kneeling down source: anti-guangzhou-shenzhen-hong kong rail oppositions jan 2010 protest (c)hkfotopoint (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6e/promotion_activity_of_hk_80_night_antiexpress_rail_link_01.jpg), cc-sa-3.0. after the success of the first prostrating walk, appearing in front of the legislative council during the budget which won a significant amount of sympathy (fong 2011; lam & ip 2011; ma 2012), there were several more rounds of prostrating walk. one reached all five regions of hong kong, greatly assisting the movement. another visited a university campus to recruit more students to participate in the later actions of the movement. discussion rituals are seldom employed in protests in hong kong. prostrating walk is a buddhist ritual which can be easily understood by hongkongers. the post-80s activists adopted the ritual for the campaign against the express railway, because some of them had joined the anti-wto protest the year before and had been impressed by the korean farmers’ ‘three steps, one bow’. also, the general public and mass media seemed quite attracted to the korean farmers’ ritual. as such, the activists designed the rules and performance and assigned meanings relevant to the campaign’s theme against the express railway. the communication effects of prostrating walk are three-fold: mass media, the internet and direct contact. first of all, it won back coverage of the mass media. the unique image and features of the protest performance attracted tv cameras and newspaper photographers. the message was able to reach the general public. before that, mainstream media turned a cold shoulder to the voice of villagers from tsoi yuen village and there had been little coverage of the campaign against the express railway. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6e/promotion_activity_of_hk_80_night_anti-express_rail_link_01.jpg https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6e/promotion_activity_of_hk_80_night_anti-express_rail_link_01.jpg cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 35 most importantly, images of the prostrating walk were captured by many mobile phones and digital cameras. these were shared among social networking websites: facebook, online photo albums and blogs. although whatsapp and lines over mobile networks had not yet been introduced in 2009, other instant message services over the internet, including windows live messenger which consisting photo sharing capability was very popular among youths. the information and especially, the images of the prostrating walk were able to be disseminated widely to some sectors of society. finally, the youth activists performed prostrating walk directly in all regions of hong kong and university campuses. the audiences witnessed the procession as if they were in the actual scene of resistance and protest. the symbolic meaning was that the express railway project was not far away from everyone. the repeat performances transmitted these messages everywhere. actions spoke louder than words in this situation. the actions of these youth activists in this campaign distinguished them from their pandemocrat politicians and trade union predecessors18. the dual tactics of transgressive direct action and the prostrating walk were new to the public and participants. this was also learnt from the korean peasant protester during the wto summit in hong kong. besides, the calm and peaceful prostrating walk, another transgressive mode of actions was also employed though with lesser frequency. the latter consisted of refusing to stay in the designated protest areas, storming the police lines, blockage of entrances to the legislative council building, and the like. they had entered a new era of social movements in hong kong which was not the same as those campaigns organized previously by political parties and trade unions. the new identity provided supporters with fresh feelings, new hope and expectations. the activists set up ad hoc, single issues and an informal organization to mobilize the movement. they recruited participants via the internet and at the scene. the demarcations between members and non-members, leaders and participants were blurred. roadside audiences were able to take part and quit at any time. at the least, taking a picture and sharing it on facebook, a blog, and other internet websites is a kind of participation in the movement. the ‘online discursive community’ and ‘affection mobilization’ over the internet facilitated the dialogue, participation and agenda setting (lam & ip n. d.; ma 2012). the label, ‘post1980s’, in fact, was applied by mainstream media to these youth activists. the participants of the various campaigns in 2009 and 2010 consisted of a wide age group, as well as the middle to old aged villagers. there were also meetings and discussions at the scene. topics ranged from decisions on next steps to be taken or whether to break through the police lines or not, to more conceptual meanings of the campaign. a participatory and deliberative type of movement replaced the top-down, representative type of action organized by pan-democrat political parties and trade unions19. the internal mode of action of the youth activists demonstrated the vertical (between leader and participants) and horizontal (between members and non-members) de-differentiation pinpointed by offe (1985, p.829) regarding new social movements. the de-differentiation mentioned above shortened the social distance between activists and the masses. an ‘us’ feeling emerged, no matter whether the participants were in their 20s 18 the pan-democracy camp refers to the democratic party and their alliance in hong kong which demands for democracy, including the universal suffrage of the chief executive and the legislative council. 19 the democratic party is well-known for its ‘big brother’ (top-down) culture. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 36 or not. they shared a common identity of this post-1980s youth activists or ‘us’. many turned out on 18 december 2009 to form a large crowd to besiege the legislative council of hong kong (12.18 besiege of legco action) to demonstrate against the budget for construction of the express railway. the prostrating walk first appeared on that day and became an icon for students and youth activists, and one step forward, the symbol of the campaign. the prostrating walk further spread to all five regions of hong kong and university campuses in the next year to strengthen and widen this collective identity. there is no doubt that it played the role of ‘a symbolic resource as a signifier of collective identity’ of post-1980s youth activists (fominaya 2010, p.396). the sino-hong kong express railway signified the fusion of the economies of mainland china and hong kong. a pro-establishment legislator even pushed it into the political sphere by claiming that the express railway was the demonstration of china’s sovereignty in post-colonial hong kong. the application of ‘main cultural patterns’ (touraine 1985) or legitimate identity (castells 2004) toward hong kong had stirred up the opposition to the railway. in fact, the collective identity of hongkongers was slowly and gradually built up during the post wwii development of the british colony of hong kong. after the the 1997 handover, the hongkonger identity formation is switched to an accelerating pace. doubtlessly, the formation of the hong kong identity stems from “economic achievements, cultural sophistication and democratic values” which demonstrates a “superiority over or difference from china” (kaeding 2011, p.16). the previously mentioned ‘typology of citizenship, migration and political culture’ provides the basis for the claim of nativism. those native born in the 1980s and beyond are active citizens of hong kong. they adopted a native identity together with the culture, lifestyle and freedom in a natural way. in addition, the collective memory of historical events helps to internalize the negative connotations associated with communist china, and the chinese identity imposed, to name a few, the 1989 beijing tiananmen massacre, the establishment of the provisional legislature20 in 1997 and the attempt to introduce the treason law in 200321. the latter triggered the largest-scale demonstration in the history of hong kong. more than half a million people turned out on the street, which led to the government dropping the proposed ordinance. campaigns for the conservation of the star ferry and queen’s pier in 2006-07 described in the early part of this paper aimed to protect the cultural heritage of hong kong. these historical structures were symbols signifying hong kong’s value and lifestyle. their demolition implied a ‘hegemony of the development ethos’ and the vested interests in existing institutions, [i]n which economic or infrastructure development was perceived as having overriding priority over other values or considerations… lopsided governance system in which developers’ interests were protected by the functional constituencies and the vested interests in the election committee (cheung 2014, p.437). 20 beijing abolished all popularly elected councils of colonial hong kong immediately after the 1997 handover and appointed provisional legislature and subordinate councils. it was known as destroying the ‘through train’ (of political institutions) after china’s resumption of its sovereignty over hong kong. the last governor of british hong kong opened up more seats for universal suffrage at all levels, which angered china. 21 according to article 23 of the basic law (mini-constitution of hong kong), the hong kong special administrative region ‘shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason’. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 37 similarly, the resistance of tsoi yuen village and campaign against the express railway in 2009-10 ‘called for rediscovering hong kong’s identity and rethinking how people are linked to land’ (yew and kwong 2014, p.1099). although new social movements in western countries are characterized by less concern with state-level or governmental politics, the post80’s campaign against express railway inevitably challenged local political relations and beijing-hongkong relations implicitly and indirectly. after all, touraine’s (1981) claim about the decline of state influence in everyday life is not borne out in hong kong, where there has been increased political and social control by china since the 1997 handover. the following figure illustrates the concept of various changes in post-colonial hong kong triggering an adjustment in collective identity which leads to the rise of nativism and youth activism in the perspective of new social movement. (figure 6) figure 6. origin and sustaining collective identity and native youth activism source: the author conclusion tsui yuen village was a small agricultural village in hong kong, a highly urbanized metropolis. the demolition of the village to pave the way for the construction of an express railway used to be a ‘normal’ development practice. but with the cultural shift towards nonmaterialism during the post-industrial period in hong kong, people have rethought the existing ‘central district (cbd) value’ and ‘economic first’ development strategy. new social movements have emerged, replacing old social movements. campaigns are no longer class-based, but issue-based. the mode of action, social movement organizations, values and actors are not the same. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 38 the rise of youth activism is a consequence of new social movement emergence. the new collective identity has also contributed to the native social movements in hong kong. the momentum has been built up gradually during the early campaigns in relation to the star ferry pier and queen’s pier in 2006-07. the civic organization of youth activists, ‘local action’ was recognized. but these ad hoc, single issue and informal organizations do not last for long. the de-differentiation of the mode of action implies highly flexible and less clear demarcation between leaders and participants. with the advancement of the internet and communication technology, the youth activist movements are flourishing. the impressive prostrating walk was a ritual tailor-made for this campaign because of its emotional appeal, which also helped to distinguish the post-80s activists from those organized by pan-democrat politicians. it also signifies the native identity in social movements. such rituals and approaches had not been seen in the various actions organized by political parties and trade unions before. nativism serves to explain the hongkonger identity growing rapidly in response to the top-down assimilation by china. it reactively responds to the rising conflict with the social control of main cultural patterns and attempts to reconstruct a social, cultural and political identity of hong kong proactively. post-1980s youth activism is not limited to the revolt of a group of radical young people. it is the shift of the values and orientation of a whole generation. they are native born, active citizens of hong kong, different from former migrant generations. their identity and culture can only be reproduced through active participation. acknowledgements i acknowledge the insights from the anonymous reviewers which have helped me to strengthen this paper. references almond, g.a. & verba, s. 1963, the civic culture: political attitude and democracy in five nations, princeton university press, princeton, n.j. doi: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400874569 bell, c. 1997, ritual: perspectives and dimensions. oxford university press, new york. castells, m. 2004, the power of identity, 2nd edition. blackwell publishing, malden, oxford. cheung, c.y. 2014, ‘hong kong’s systemic crisis of governance and the revolt of the “post80’s” youths: the anti-express rail campaign” in cheng, j.y.s. 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creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: madueke, k. l. & vermeulen, f. 20120. urban inequalities and the identity-topolitics link in the netherlands and nigeria. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 12:1, 21-42. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1 .7024 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper urban inequalities and the identity-to-politics link in the netherlands and nigeria kingsley l. madueke university of jos, nigeria/ university of california, irvine floris vermeulen university of amsterdam, the netherlands corresponding author: kingsley l. madueke, university of jos, p.m.b 2084 jos, plateau state nigeria/ university of california, irvine, irvine, ca 92697-7075. kingsmadueke@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.7024 article history: received 17/01/2020; revised 21/04/2020; accepted 12/06/2020; published 20/06/2020. abstract this article examines the entanglements of diversity, urban inequalities, group politics and conflict in advanced and emergent democracies. though advanced democracies are considered to be generally more egalitarian than their emergent counterparts, there is need for further understanding of the specific ways in which the dimensions and parameters of diversity and inequalities resemble or contrast in the two contexts. in this article, we explore the repertoires of interactions between diversity, inequalities and local politics in amsterdam (netherlands) and jos (nigeria). we suggest that whereas in amsterdam an anti-muslim discourse, more so than group level inequalities, led to the politicization of immigrant groups, in jos group politics is driven by a strong overlap between ascribed identities and inequalities. while immigrant groups in amsterdam articulate and pursue their interests within the confines of a regulated political space dominated by formal institutions, groups in jos deploy violent strategies in pursuing their interests because of the prevalence of weak institutions. the conclusion reiterates a few key insights derived from this cross-fertilization. keywords urban inequality, conflict, minority politics, amsterdam, jos, netherlands, nigeria declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research was supported by an international fellowship awarded by the urban studies foundation (usf). mailto:kingsmadueke@gmail.com http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.7024 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 introduction changes in levels of inequalities across the world in the last five decades are attributed to shifting global trends. in particular, economic globalization is noted to have prompted developments that led to large-scale dis-industrialization along with an expansion of the service sector. this in turn decreased the demand for unskilled labour and increased opportunities for professional jobs (iversen & cusack 2000; bradley et al. 2003). these shifts, it is pointed out, have resulted in rising levels of unemployment, poverty and social exclusion with groups historically known to suffer educational and cultural disadvantage at the receiving end (chossudovsky 2003). though the human development index (hdi) has seen a stable rise across both advanced and emergent democracies in the last three decades, levels of inequality have not changed in any significant manner. for example, the netherlands climbed from 0.883 in 2009 to 0.934 in 2018 while nigeria moved from 0.452 to 0.534 within the same period (undp 2018). in the netherlands, pre-tax income inequality among the top 10 percent has been on a steady increase since 1980 though it has seen a slight decline in the bottom 50 percent. for nigeria, levels of income inequality have not seen any remarkable change either, fluctuating between 12.5 and 15 percent1. we suggest that though factual, macro level interpretations often give a simplistic picture that understates the contextual dynamics that shape how inequalities are produced and sustained in different societies, it also plays down the agency and relevance of key local actors and factors and ultimately leads to policy and solutions that are not context-sensitive. while acknowledging the pervasive and debilitating implications of globalization on local economies and resultant rising levels of unemployment, poverty and inequalities, our primary goal is to draw attention to country and city-specific drivers, patterns and topologies of group level urban inequalities. diversity and inequalities are generally portrayed as important drivers of conflict and violence (stewart 2016; langer 2005). we propose that the interaction between these variables is complex, non-linear and to a large extent depends on the prevailing institutional environment. our suggestion is that inequalities may not lead to major incidents of conflict and violence in urban contexts where the political space is well regulated and dominated by strong formal institutions. however, in settings where weak and informal institutions prevail, inequalities and contentious politics will easily translate in violent conflict. the first objective of the article is to embark on a review of theoretical and empirical perspectives on urban inequalities in advanced democracies in the global north and emergent democracies in the global south. though advanced democracies are considered to be generally more egalitarian than their emergent counterparts, there is need for understanding the specific ways in which the parameters of inequalities resemble or contrast in the two contexts. the convention has been to compare inequalities in terms of scale and degree (see glaeser, resseger & tobio 2008, 2015). the finer details of differences in patterns and configurations of inequalities across contexts have eluded scrutiny. in this article, we explore how different contextual conditions interacting with external stimuli such as global political and economic shifts can 1 income inequality, netherlands, 1980-2016 https://wid.world/country/netherlands/ accessed on 17 april, 2020). https://wid.world/country/netherlands/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 23 give rise to (dis)similar patterns of inequalities, social categories and minority politics in socalled egalitarian and non-egalitarian societies. quite apart from studies that focus on gdp and other macro indicators such as the hdi – even though we draw copiously from them, our aim is to distil contextual and noncontextual similarities and dissimilarities in the parameters, dimensions and processes of urban inequalities between non-immigrants and immigrants in amsterdam (the netherlands) and so-called indigenes and non-indigenes in jos (nigeria). we are aware of the academic and public discussions related to these categorizations, stigmatization and labels (schinkel 2017) but for the purpose of this article, turkish immigrant community refers to first and second generation immigrants – that is the immigrants that came from turkey and their dutch born descendants. in the case of jos, we use immigrants interchangeably with nonindigenes, a term that in nigeria-focused literature denotes internal immigrants that migrated and settled relatively recently in any part of the country other than their patrilocal place of origin. these social categories receive further clarification in the section on jos. our second objective is to look at how immigrant politics play out in two cities – one in an advanced democracy in the north (amsterdam, the netherlands) and another in an emergent democracy in the south (jos, nigeria). in particular, we are interested in how the identity-to-politics link plays out in each of the cases. as a premise, the identity-politics link supposes, ‘individuals who share a demographic label – e.g., african american, latino, asian american, arab american – will also share common political goals and interests and act in concert to pursue them’ (lee 2008, p. 458). this rather uncritical summation has been questioned. focusing primarily on the us, lee (2007, 2008) has called for ‘unpacking’ of this link by focusing ‘on core relationships, or constitutive processes, that link demographic identities to group politics’ (lee 2008, p. 458). similarly, scholars in europe are also expressing this scepticism. most recently, a study of immigrants in belgium, germany, switzerland and the united kingdom critically examined this ‘presumed relationship by analyzing how voting probability is affected by social identification in combination with other elements – namely, perception of shared grievances and group resources’ (kranendonk, vermeulen & van heelsum 2018, p. 43). these critical views show that the identity-politics link is much more complex than the literature had hitherto acknowledged. lee (2008) identifies and explains five distinct processes that characterize the identity-to-politics link: (1) definition, (2) identification, (3) consciousness, (4) venue selection, and (5) choice. while this notion has come under increasing scrutiny in the west, it is yet to be examined in nonwestern contexts. in part, our work aims to bridge this gap and, in so doing, highlight aspects of the identity-to-politics link that are constant across the contexts under review and those that are specific to a particular setting. the cases we have chosen could not be any more different. apart from being geographically poles apart, the two cases are radically different in terms of politics, history and culture. as the largest dutch metropolis, amsterdam falls in that privileged category of so-called global cities (rath et al. 2014). on the other hand, jos is one of nigeria’s secondary cities, an emblematic african metropolis with a colonial history and all its characteristic political, demographic and infrastructural pressures. at a surface level, bringing 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 these cities together is relevant for advancing the discourse on the interrelation between systems of democracy, quality of institutions, inequalities and patterns of minority politics. beyond this, however, one of our primary objectives is to initiate a discussion of the forms and parameters of diversity, urban inequalities, group politics and conflict across advanced and emergent democracies. this responds to calls for a framework for urban studies that embraces a wider range of cities (robinson 2004, p. 17). in addition, looking at how minority groups self-organise in the face of group level imbalances in these distinct contexts promises to be relevant for the burgeoning literature on the identity-to-politics link. while this link has been studied in advanced democracies, it is yet to be examined in emergent democracies. our task is not a comparison in a strict sense but primarily an attempt to explore the formal and informal institutions and practices through which inequalities are produced, sustained and contested. informal here simply refers to institutions that are ‘created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (helmke & levitsky 2004, p. 725). formal institutions are explicitly codified and operate on the basis of regulations supported by constitutional clauses and laws. unlike their informal counterparts, formal institutions are protected and guaranteed and protected by state agencies. on the other hand, informal institutions exist solely on the basis of their effectiveness and utility for the actors involved. while both formal and informal institutions are generally known and recognizable, the former is laid down in writing but the latter is not (lauth 2000, p. 24). to be clear, the term informal does not connote low standards. we align with the view that informality can be a source of innovation that promotes efficiency and collective good (crush, chikanda & skinner 2015; parnell & robinson 2012). this article is primarily based on a review of extant literature but also draws from the authors’ research in amsterdam and jos (vermeulen 2006; 2008; 2013; 2019; madueke 2018a; 2018b; 2019; madueke & vermeulen 2019). it integrates insights from more than ten years of research on immigration, immigrants, urban politics and inequality in amsterdam, and about five years of intermittent fieldwork on contentious group politics between urban groups in jos. in looking at these two cities side by side, the article adopts an integrative framework that aims to synthesize ideas, insights and lessons from two disparate urban settings. though the article mainly focuses on urban politics in both cities within the last 20 years, it occasionally travels further back in time to provide a background to recent political and social dynamics. the last 20 years represent a period of upsurge of minority politics in both contexts. for nigeria, the transition to a democratic system of government in 1999 prompted a lot of political mobilization by minority groups to challenge longstanding inequalities and injustices (madueke 2018a). the 1990s were equally eventful in the netherlands. the residue of pillarisation was releasing its hold as the most pillarized political parties, the christian democratic appeal (cda) and the labour party (also known as “partij van de arbeid” pvda), lost their majority in the parliament in 1994 leading to the emergence of a completely secular government since 1918 (lucardie 1999, p. 154). the rest of the article proceeds in four steps. following this introduction, the first part surveys key theoretical perspectives on urban equality. the main task here is to scrutinize and draw insights from prominent interpretations of urban inequalities in the global north and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 25 global south. the second part zooms in on how minority groups mobilize in the face of urban inequalities in amsterdam and jos. though the article mainly focuses on urban politics in both cities within the last 30 years, it occasionally travels further back in time to provide a background to recent political and social dynamics. in doing this, we highlight the key processes in the identity-to-politics link in the two cases. we show that these processes are similar in both contexts but lead to dissimilar outcomes mainly because of some sociopolitical and institutional differences. the conclusion highlights a few key findings and their relevance. theorizing urban inequalities in the north and the south the modern city is s site of diversity, inequalities, struggles for social emancipation and equilibrium. this is true for cities in the advanced democracies of the global north as much as for the emergent democracies of the global south. social scientists across disciplinary lines have been concerned with the question of urban inequality for the academic perplexities that it warrants as well as for policy and practical purposes. there are identifiably three prominent theoretical lenses that have been used in interpreting urban inequality. one of these perspectives is the global city theory. it originates from the work of sassen (1994, 2002) and focuses on global economic restructuring and its effects on global cities. according to this framework, the last few decades saw a process of major economic change characterized by an internationalization of production and businesses (also see rugman 1980; li & reuveny 2003). the new pattern of international investment concentrates economic opportunities in urban locations that operate as sites of financial and corporate control otherwise known as global cities (kennedy 2011). these global cities attract financial services and other highly specialized professions. however, they also attract migrants because there is also a high demand for low wage labour. because of this economic structure and the migratory pattern, the global city is a socially polarized urban context where the rich and poor coexist side by side (musterd et al. 2017; sassen 1991). in line with this position, discourses of urban inequality in europe have in the last decades emphasized how major economic changes in the post-war period have precipitated inequalities between non-immigrants and immigrants. these studies reiterate the role of globalization in (re)shaping labour markets, employment and local economies across the world. scholarly works in european cities, including amsterdam, berlin, and paris have focused on the social and spatial dimensions of diversity, immigration and inequalities (nell & rath 2009; vermeulen, tillie & van de walle 2012; kühn 2015). it is generally believed that many european cities have in recent decades seen a major increase in levels of inequalities (sassen 1991). these increasing inequalities, it is argued, are brought about by de-industrialisation on a mass scale (kempen & murie 2009, p. 377) as well as economic globalisation, capital and labour flexibility and welfare restructuring (cassiers & kesteloot 2012, p. 1909). the second perspective on urban inequalities is known as the mismatch theory. it argues that the relevant process in most cities is not social polarization but professionalization (wilson 1999; 2012). in agreement with the social polarization theory, the mismatch 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 argument points to economic restructuring and increasing global competition as the basis for social inequality. however, the point of departure for the mismatch theory is that the shift in the global economy warranted a post-industrial economy where the demand for professional jobs increased exponentially while the demand for low wage jobs shrunk due mainly to the disappearance of industries and the expansion of the service sector (wilson 2003). large populations of people living in american inner cities do not have the educational qualification required to work in the service sector. these populations, mainly african americans, were therefore hit by high levels of unemployment (chaddha & wilson 2011). the mismatch is that these people who reside in the inner city do not have the requisite education to be employed in the city and they reside faraway from places where the few remaining industrial jobs still exist (wilson & aponte 1985; wilson 2003). in their study of four large american cities – atlanta, boston, detroit and los angeles, o'connor, tilly and bobo (2001) discuss urban inequality against the background of the shift from a factorybased economy to one that is more global, decentralized and based on finance, services and technology. this has had far-reaching implications for the levels and type of education required to be employed and ultimately what sections of the population are included or excluded in the labour market. this shift affected ethnic and racial groups differently. minority groups subjected to longstanding educational disadvantages were disproportionately affected by the decline in high wage manufacturing jobs. most of them did not have the requisite qualification to access employment in the ‘new economy’. the main beneficiaries of this economic system were those with access to ‘premium education’ many of them with college degrees to show for it (o'connor, tilly & bobo, 2001). the social and economic effects of globalization have also featured prominently in the inequality literature in the global south. in particular, there is a large consensus about the impact of global economic trends as a precipitant of inequalities in urban africa (weatherspoon, cacho & christy 2001; ibrahim 2013; dollar 2001; galbraith 2007, 2010). according to this perspective, african countries and their counterparts in other less industrialized regions seem to be disproportionately affected by international economic changes which have cumulatively increased levels of poverty and inequalities (prempeh 2017; swinnen 2007; verick 2006). for example, in the late 1970s, south africa experienced a shift from industrialization based on import-substitution to export-led growth due largely to international market forces and local factors (beall, crankshaw & parnell 2000). this development however neither halted the decline of the manufacturing industry nor stemmed the country’s generally poor economic performance at the time in any real sense. around this period, and perhaps ever since, the country’s primary and secondary sectors of agriculture, manufacturing and mining have witnessed steady decline in levels of employment whereas the service sectors of government and finance have been thriving. in a sense, south africa reflects the de-industrialization and social polarization patterns seen in more advanced industrialized countries but with a comparatively higher unemployment rate estimated at about 30 per cent. these high rates of unemployment have a strong racial dimension. demographically, most unemployed south africans are black africans. because they are the least educated, they are the ones worst affected by the shrinking of the manufacturing sector (beall, crankshaw & parnell 2000, p. 110). the case of urban india follows a similar pattern. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 27 from the 1980s and early 1990s, urban india started experiencing serious wage inequality mainly due to rapid increase in demand for skill labour as a result of ‘skill-biased technological changes within industries’ (kijima 2006, p. 97). though the social polarization and the mismatch theories have been used somewhat universally, there is some criticism of this universalist tendency and a call for a more situated african urbanism (lawhon, ernstson & silver 2014). based on this, a substantial body of scholarly works on urban inequalities in africa have their basis in the postcolonial tradition (penvenne 1995; lloyd 1974; myers 2010). this perspective emphasizes the enduring aftereffect of colonialism (miraftab 2012). for example, dill & crow (2014) trace inequality in the access to water in urban east africa to the segregationist colonial policy. they maintain that while access to water is a major problem for most residents of dar es salaam and nairobi, the problem is more acute in the informal quarters that have their origin in the colonial period. they however conclude that though rooted in colonial rule, lack of access of water is exacerbated by contemporary discriminatory land policies and other complications. similarly, in chronicling the difficulties facing post-apartheid johannesburg’s metropolitan government in terms of high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality, beall, crankshaw and parnell (2000) point to the enduring socio-spatial legacy of apartheid in the form of poor quality housing, deprivation and inadequate basic amenities in former black townships. in the same vein, most inequalities in contemporary urban nigeria have their basis in the country’s colonial history (ukiwo 2005; mustapha 1986). before amalgamating the northern and south protectorates, the colonial government ran the two as separate administrative entities each according to a distinct set of policies. the south had a head start in western education because of its proximity to the coast and encountering westerners much earlier than the north through the trans-atlantic trade (fafunwa 2018; davis & kalu-nwiwu 2001). the north, which had been in touch with north africa and the middle east, only had islamic schools (lovejoy 1979). though this educational disparity was incidental at an initial point, it became a matter of political expedience for the colonial administration after it amalgamated the two protectorates into a sovereign entity. the southern nigerian educated elite had by this time become politically active and a source of concern for the colonial administration (falola & heaton 2008; afigbo 1991). to prevent a similar development, western education was stalled in the north as a matter of policy (umar 2006; mustapha 1986). while crucially relevant, the postcolonial literature sometimes overstates the legacy of colonialism and obscures our understanding of other equally important factors that could be at play. here, we suggest an approach that acknowledges all the prevailing factors considered in the existing literature including the colonial legacy but we pay particular attention to contemporary issues. along this line of thought, for instance, we reflect on the enduring effects of colonialism not as scaffolding but as a dimension that interacts with a host of other contemporary factors, including global economic trends, formal and informal institutions, everyday practices and the ever-changing contours of local ethnic politics and power relations. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 urban inequalities and group politics in amsterdam amsterdam provides a robust case for studying immigrant political mobilization because the netherlands’ electoral system gives the option to cast preferential votes for individual candidates, which makes the already diverse capital city especially open to minority political participation. the main minority groups in the city include the turkish, moroccan, and surinamese communities, each of which has distinct characteristics. we have chosen to focus on the turkish community because it has a rich collection of civic networks and its levels of political participation is considerably higher than the other immigrant groups that can be used for political mobilization (vermeulen 2006; 2014; 2019). as the largest dutch city, amsterdam is one of the most diverse in terms of racial, religious and class categories in the country. increasing disparities in levels of wealth, education, employment, housing, health and civic capacity tend to manifest along group boundaries across two main divides – the non-immigrants and immigrant communities, here referring to first and second generation immigrants. the inequalities in the different social domains are often strongly correlated and lead to structural intergenerational inequalities. for instance, the relative high level of unemployment among immigrants is a reflection of lower education levels that characterize areas with high percentages of immigrants in the city (vermeulen 2019, p. 119). but it is also attributed to other factors such as differences in social capital among minority groups (tillie 2004). global economic trends have been shown to play a major role in driving inequalities in employment in the city (van der waal & burgers 2009). kloosterman (1996) observes that this polarization in amsterdam is partly driven by globalization and the expansion of producer and consumer services, contraction of manufacturing and the shifts in earnings distribution it warranted. these levels of inequality remain relatively significant today as amsterdam is much more international now than twenty-five years ago and levels of inequality remain relatively significant. it should however be pointed out that the city is wealthier now and average income has increased for the entire population including immigrants2. beyond education and employment, inequalities also penetrate the domain of state policing. for example, a system of targeting particular places and persons by local police forces results in the production significant inequalities among youths with immigrant background in amsterdam (van der leun and van der woude 2011; de koning 2017). similar trends can also be found in recent local counterterrorism measures creating suspect communities of inhabitants of especially muslim background (vermeulen 2014, 2016). in terms of civic and political inequalities we find similar patterns in amsterdam. neighbourhoods with higher percentages of immigrants display on average lower densities of social organizations, making it more difficult for inhabitants of these neighbourhoods to fully participate in civic life (vermeulen, tillie & van de walle 2012). even though since 1985, immigrants with residence permits or those that have lived in the netherlands for five years are allowed voting rights, levels of participation in local elections remain very low among a 2 world inequality database, income inequality, netherlands, 1980-2016 https://wid.world/country/netherlands/ (accessed 17 april, 2020). https://wid.world/country/netherlands/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 29 large majority of immigrants. so also, in the civic and political realm we find stark inequalities in amsterdam in which the distinction between immigrants and non-immigrants are very relevant (kranendonk, vermeulen & van heelsum 2018). the main question of lee (2007) in such circumstances of group inequalities is whether individuals who share a demographic label will also share common political goals and interests and act in concert to pursue them. to answer this question for the amsterdam context in a brief manner, we need to focus on first and second generation immigrants of turkish origin. this immigrant community meets the requirement of what breton (1964) once labelled ‘institutional completeness’. an immigrant community can be considered institutionally complete when separate immigrant organizations can provide most social and civic services for the community themselves. within such institutionally complete communities we tend to find stronger identity-to-politics links as described by lee, because within these communities members have a stronger sense of common belonging and common interests. we will briefly describe the elements of the turkish community in amsterdam and explain how the opportunity structure of the city produced particular outcomes and ways for turkish and other predominantly muslim immigrants to pursue certain interests in particular venues. lee (2007) argues that the link between identity and politics varies across contexts and groups. amsterdam, on average, provides a favourable political context for immigrant groups’ political engagement and representation. elections occur through a party list system, with pure proportionality and very low thresholds. parties submit lists of candidates, and seats are allocated to each party in proportion to the number of votes. it is possible to cast preferential votes, which means that on the day of election, voters not only choose a party, but also a specific candidate from the party. each party predetermines the candidate list order, though voters can select a candidate ranked anywhere on the list. and, as mentioned, the netherlands began in 1985 allowing non-citizens to participate in local elections after five years of legal residence in the country. it is not even necessary to register as a voter; the municipal administration automatically mails voter registration cards to all entitled inhabitants (michon & vermeulen 2013). this means that in theory a group-based political strategy in which there is a strong correlation between identity and politics is possible. it depends on particular elements of immigrant groups to take advantage of these opportunities. the turkish community in amsterdam is characterized by strong ideological polarization between religious and secular groups, different ethnic subgroups, and various religious denominations; at the same time, a majority of members strongly identifies with national origin. turks have also formed the most immigrant organizations in amsterdam and are densely connected through inter-organizational networks (vermeulen 2013). despite the ideological differences, as noted earlier, at least 85 percent of the members of the turkish community identify as muslims (huijnk 2018, p. 30). they are significantly more often members of an immigrant organization than other immigrant groups are (vermeulen, michon & tillie 2014). these networks and organizations provide the turkish community the opportunity to mobilize and activate a large part of its population during elections. this leads to higher turn-out rates, a larger percentage of voters voting for a co-ethnic candidate, which 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 leads over time to higher levels of representation in the amsterdam city council compared to any other immigrant group in the city. however, at the same time, mainstream political parties became in the last years more cautious and also less receptive to the claims and ideas of politicians of turkish background, especially if these politicians have strong links with immigrant communities (vermeulen 2013). in short, the turkish community in amsterdam did take advantage of the amsterdam opportunity structure, which resulted in high levels of civic and political participation, which in turn resulted in high levels of political representation. for many turkish immigrants in amsterdam, their demographic label led to shared common political goals and interests that led them to vote in disproportionally high numbers for co-ethnic candidates. this immigrant representation did not lead to political influence. influential political positions did not go to candidates with turkish backgrounds. these positions went mostly to politicians without an immigrant background or to politicians with an immigrant background, but other than turkish. this was to make sure that executive positions were not held by politicians with a strong link to a particular immigrant community (vermeulen 2013). the turkish community has displayed this strong sense of community since the nineties and their organizations have played similarly an important role in local politics (fennema and tillie 1999). this has translated into the emergence in 2016 of a successful political party, denk – a word that means “think” in dutch and “equal” in turkish. the party represents the interests of immigrants, especially those of muslim background – the group that has suffered most from different forms of inequality in amsterdam (vermeulen 2019). this success cannot be understood without taking into account the focus in the dutch political debate, just as in many other european countries, on religion and islam in particular (see also brubaker 2017). in these debates, politicians, and not only right-wing populists, have argued that muslim immigrants do not share the liberal values of dutch society and that they took advantage of the open political context to live their separate lives, to nurture their illiberal ideologies and develop their own religious institutions (vermeulen 2019). muslim immigrants across europe, including the netherlands, are categorized and have been stigmatized by this discourse on a daily basis, exacerbating existing suspicion, discrimination and isolation. this led to a stronger sense of belonging among muslims in amsterdam and a sense that they as a group displayed common interests. in other words, social economic inequalities that persisted since the arrival in amsterdam of first generation muslim immigrants in the seventies and eighties did not lead to a stronger sense of common political goals among this group; the stigmatization as conservative muslims, a category that was reinforced externally by the discourse, in a rather secular context, did. the absence of political influence among muslim groups became an issue, more than before, because particular political decisions concerning religious issues became more pertinent and pressing, such as a possible ban on ritual slaughtering, or the possible curtailing of islamic religious education that was protected and made possible by the dutch constitution. this led individuals who self-identify as muslims also to increasingly share common beliefs and interests. these particular interests could no longer be represented by the secular progressive mainstream parties, especially labour party, that they used to support. these progressive cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 31 secular parties through the political focus on islam had taken over part of the discourse that problematized conservative muslims. a new party that represented the specific interests of muslims was needed and the emergence of denk can be seen in light of this wish. politicians of turkish background with strong links to the conservative and active part of the islamic turkish community took a leading role in this party (vermeulen 2019). for amsterdam we can argue that increasing group inequality in itself did not directly lead to a stronger link between identity and politics. stigmatization and external categorization as conservative muslims in a rather secular progressive context did increase this link. the relatively open amsterdam political system for minority representation in combination with the mobilizing capacity of the turkish muslim community led to the electoral success of a new party, denk, that represents the interest of this particular group. the group ends were pursued through political parliamentary means, providing a party in the dutch parliament and in the amsterdam council fiercely resisting the discourse that islam presents a problem for amsterdam or dutch society. the party argues that the political focus should not be on religion but instead on the different forms of inequality, social, economic and political, that immigrants of muslim background are subjected to (see foner & alba 2008; verkuyten 2017). paradoxically, they do this by emphasizing and mobilizing support through a muslim identity that also reinforces the idea that a muslim background leads to common goals and political interests. urban inequalities and group politics in jos as noted earlier, in relation to jos, urban inequality is understood on the basis of two distinct identity classifications: indigenes and non-indigenes. though these terms do not correspond to non-immigrants and immigrants in an exact sense as in the case of amsterdam, they are jos’ nearest equivalents that can provide us with the distinguishable social categorisations that define access to material and non-material resources. that said, the terms nonimmigrants and immigrants to some extent are applicable and not farfetched in relation to jos when the import of indigenes and non-indigenes is considered. this is because non-indigenes as a label refers to groups that migrated and settled in another part of the country other than their patrilocal origins. in other words, non-indigenes, otherwise known as ‘settlers’ in nigeria, are intrastate immigrants. as noted, this of course does not correspond with the case of immigrants in amsterdam but it provides us with a reasonably similar scenario for exploring urban inequalities and the dynamics of group politics. intrastate immigrants, nonindigenes or settlers as they are variously called are subjected to significant inequalities reminiscent of immigrants in amsterdam. non-immigrants or indigenes are generally considered either autochthonous or the first people to make their home in a particular patrilocal community whereas non-indigenes are populations that migrated from another part of the country relatively more recently. to be categorically clear, both indigenes and nonindigenes are citizens, however, the former have access to material and nonmaterial resources usually denied the latter (sayne 2012). a certificate is issued by local government officials confirming that the bearer is from a particular village, local government and state (fourchard 2015). though this dichotomy has its roots in colonial policy, it has renewed salience in 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 contemporary nigeria because it is used as basis for including and excluding individuals and groups from partaking in distributable goods (higazi 2007; madueke 2019). to start with, immigrants or non-indigenes, if you like, are discriminated against in the distribution of appointable political positions such as ministerial offices, heads of parastatals and agencies and advisers and special assistants to governors and parliamentary representatives. these positions of influence are considered the exclusive reserve of indigenes. apart from political appointments, employment into the state civil service is also discriminatory. before being employed or appointed into certain positions, individuals are required to present their indigene certificates (kendhammer 2014; adamolekun, erero & oshionebo 1991). moreover, non-immigrants are also given priority over immigrants in admissions into tertiary institutions. further, university students that are indigenes have access to scholarship and bursaries that are closed to those deemed non-indigenes. among groups labelled as immigrants in jos, the hausa warrants special attention. this is because apart from having institutional completeness like the turkish community in amsterdam, it is the only group in jos that has contested the non-indigene label and lay claim to non-immigrant or indigene status with all the accruable rights and privileges enjoyed by the indigenes (madueke 2019; madueke & vermeulen 2018). also, members of the hausa community in jos have been more politically active than other immigrant groups such as the igbo and yoruba. to unpack identity politics among the hausa in jos, we turn to lee’s (2008) explanatory model of the identity-to-politics link. according to this framework, this link is characterised by definition, identification, consciousness, venue selection, and choice. we start by considering identification in terms of the extent to which individuals accept the categories they are placed in. to start with, though generally conceived as homogenous, the hausa in jos is more of social category with internal diversity than an ethnic group. it is made up of the descendants of hausa, fulani, kanuri, beriberi, nupe and other less known ethnicities who have adopted the hausa language and way of life and practice islam as a shared religious identity. for example, the fulani have on several occasions come out to identify themselves as a distinct group not to be subsumed under the hausa category. moreover, there are factions within the hausa community in jos such as hausa-fulani community development (hfcd) that do not seek to access the indigene rights. besides this internal diversity, there is a discrepancy between how the hausa are labelled and how they self-identify. in rejecting the label of settlers, the hausa in jos distinguish themselves from the hausa population in the country’s northern region where their ancestors migrated from a century ago and stress their affinity to jos by self-identifying as ‘jasawa’, a coinage meant to denote their ‘hausaness’ and ‘josness’ at the same time. this illustrates the relevance of differentiating between ascriptive identification (how groups are defined and labeled as distinct from how they view and define themselves) and self-identification (how individuals think of and identify themselves) as noted by lee (2008). the 1990s mark a pivotal moment in the politicization of the hausa identity in jos. certain developments took place during this period that entrenched group consciousness, solidarity and, consequently, intensified political participation among the hausa of jos. the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 33 first was the creation of jos north local government area (lga) in 1991 by the ibrahim babaginda military government. prior to the creation of the new lga, a group of indigenes known as the berom elders council wrote to both babangida and the military governor of plateau state at the time requesting for the creation of jos metropolitan lga out of jos lga. the hausa-fulani community also wrote a letter to the president asking for the creation of a new lga from jos lga. based on the boundaries of the proposed lgas, it was impossible to create both. on 30th september 1991, the federal military government announced the formal creation of jos north lga with boundaries exactly where the hausa had suggested. the indigenes tried to get the administration to review the boundaries but their efforts did not yield any meaningful response. the general feeling among the hausa was that they finally had an lga they could call their own, therefore, the next goal was to assert and consolidate political dominance. one way to do this was to ensure a member of the hausa community emerged as the lga chairman. there was therefore massive campaigns and mobilization to make this a reality. the efforts paid off and a hausa, sama‘ila mohammed, won the chairmanship elections. this victory was indicative of the high levels of group consciousness and political participation among the hausa (madueke 2018a, 2019). a series of controversial and contested appointments further politicized the jasawa as a social category. the first incident was the appointment of one hausa, aminu mato, as sole administrator of jos north lga by the then military governor of plateau state in april 1994. the appointment was later reversed after a series of protests by the indigenes (madueke 2019). a large number of hausa protesters took to the streets to register their dissatisfaction with the reversal of the appointment. the protest soon were out of hand leading to violent clashes between members of the two groups. two years later, in 1996, the indigenes protested against the nomination of a hausa man, ado ibrahim, for the position of secretary for the local government council. the governor was quick to reverse the decision once he noticed the indigenes were strongly against it. following these events, nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 after decades of military rule intensified intergroup competition and further engendered group consciousness and solidarity among the hausa. the divisive rhetoric that characterized the campaigns for the 1999 elections contributed to deepening group consciousness among both indigenes and the hausa (madueke 2018b, 2019). despite massive campaigns and mobilization, the hausa lost out in the elections and an indigene emerged the local government council chairman. by the turn of the century, hausa was a highly politicized social category. the appointment of a hausa man as coordinator for a federal government poverty alleviation scheme in july 2001 resulted in confrontational exchanges between the indigenes and hausa, which culminated in major violent riots less than two months later in early september (madueke 2019). this violent outcome results from a relatively unregulated political space dominated by weak and informal institutions and signifies a key difference between jos and amsterdam (see table below). 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 dimensions of diversity, inequalities and politics in amsterdam and jos amsterdam jos democracy advanced emergent dimensions of diversity/ identity markers racial, religious, country of origin ethnic, religious, state of origin categories non-migrants/migrants indigenes/non-indigenes effects of global trends on urban inequalities far-reaching relatively limited institutional environment strong, formal weak, informal migrant politics strongly regulated relatively unregulated outcomes of migrant/nonindigene political struggles new political party violent riots one of the key steps in lee’s model is venue selection. the question here is whether individuals who choose to act in pursuit of group-based interests coordinate and agree upon a common venue for their collective action. this idea has particular importance for the case of jos because though the indigenes and the hausa have prominently engaged in political mobilization and electoral campaigns, they have also deployed violent action in pursuit of their interests and goals (madueke 2019, 2018c). we identify two mechanisms to explain why this is so. first, we suggest that local politics in jos operates on a winner-takes-all basis. groups that wield political power ensure that groups that are perceived as rivals are excluded in totality. for example, the conventional practice is that when an individual is elected or appointed as lga chairman, that person immediately appoints his co-ethnics as members of his or her cabinet. this is indicative of the absence of a local power-sharing arrangement, a factor that has been identified as one of the underlying causes of violent conflict in jos (bunte & vinson 2015). second, violence is considered a necessary option because the political system is usually rigged by whoever is in power. electoral bodies are largely financed and controlled by those in government and therefore lack the needed autonomy and independence to coordinate a free and fair electoral process. the judiciary and electoral tribunals are also compromised. thus, aggrieved individuals and groups who are not satisfied with the outcome of an election feel they have no recourse to justice. violence then becomes the main channel for expressing dissatisfaction and venting against the system and members of the rival group. the controversial 2008 jos north lga elections illustrates this. after a controversial change in the venue for collating votes by the electoral commission, supporters of the hausa candidate became suspicious and started a series of violent protests even before the result was announced. the hausa felt jonah jang, the governor of plateau state at the time, an indigene and a devout christian, had used his influence to rig the elections in favour of his kinsman (madueke 2018a; ostien 2009). the issue of indigene status is contentious not least because the very concept is illdefined and the process for issuing certificates is shoddy. the nigerian constitution defines an indigene in an arbitrary manner. who qualifies as indigene and who does not is prone to misinterpretations, both deliberate and otherwise. left at the discretion of local government authorities, the decision of who qualifies as indigene and the issuing of certificates is usually cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 35 subjected to abuse and corruption (fourchard 2015). whoever controls the local government council decides the criteria for being an indigene and by implication who ends up with a certificate and who does not. for example, when a hausa man emerged chairman in 1991, he indiscriminately issued indigene certificates to members of the hausa community. in 1999, an indigene emerged chairman and immediately stopped the issuance of indigene certificates to members of the hausa community. because the individual that heads the local government council can expressly change the criteria for indigene status, the position of the lga chairman in jos is usually hotly contested and a source of conflict and violence between indigenes and the hausa. conclusion this article focused on the intersection between diversity, urban inequalities, group politics and conflict in amsterdam and jos. specifically, we explored how these factors interact in an advanced democratic setting dominated by formal institutions and an emergent democracy where informal institutions are relatively more prevalent. we also paid attention to the identity-to-politics link among non-immigrants and immigrant communities in amsterdam and indigenes and settlers in jos. this conclusion further highlights and discusses some noteworthy aspects of the findings. to start with, in terms of diversity, there is a strong overlap of two or more identity markers that define migrant groups in both cases. amsterdam’s turkish migrants are distinguishable on the basis of national origin, race and religion. hausa migrants are distinct from the indigenes in terms of ethnic, religious and regional identity. in combination, these overlapping identity markers reify and further concretize group differences. however, whereas diversity in amsterdam is conceptualized in terms of country of origin and, consequently, racial differences, the term is framed along ethnic and religious lines in the case of jos. in the case of amsterdam, inequalities in education, employment, civic participation and other spheres are driven by global economic trends that have differential effects on non-immigrants and immigrant communities. however, cultural and linguistic factors as well as local policy also play a role, especially in placing immigrants in a position of disadvantage in both education and employment. while both cases harbour inequalities minority struggles play out differently. because amsterdam’s political space is well-regulated and dominated by strong formal institutions, immigrant groups channel their grievances through bureaucracies that do not lead to immediate or concrete changes. while dealing with urban inequalities, migrant groups from predominantly muslim destinations such as turkish migrants are confronted by a growing anti-muslim discourse. it is this anti-muslim sentiment, perhaps arguably more than the longstanding inequalities but certainly not unrelated, that have spurred them to collective political action. with limited options for seeking change, they have been compelled to organise themselves into political parties like denk that can guarantee them a place in decision making. in jos the (mis)management of diversity and urban inequalities are characterized by illdefined policy and ascribed identity markers that discriminate between indigenes and non36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 indigenes. though both groups are citizens of nigeria, indigenes have access to distributable resources that are inaccessible to non-indigenes. the impact of global economic trends on patterns of inequalities in jos cannot be entirely written off, however, such an impact is not immediately obvious at the local level. these factors thrive in a social environment dominated by informal and weak institutions. state security enforcement agencies, the judiciary and election commissions are either incompetent or partisan and lack public trust. most times electoral results are rigged in favour of the ruling party. groups therefore easily resort to self-help in the form of violent collective action in pursuing their objectives. contentious group politics have therefore resulted in several episodes of violent clashes in jos over the last twenty years. in the case of amsterdam, it remains to be seen whether formal political strategies are in the end proved useful. a pertinent question to ask is what will happen if political strategies are no longer seen as productive? a key factor in this process most likely is the overlap between group level inequalities and perceived common interests. the stronger the overlap and the less useful conventional political channels are perceived to be (as in the case of jos), the more we can expect violent reactions. it is generally believed that why diversity does not translate into conflict and violence in advanced democracies is because, among other things, they are more egalitarian. in this article, we have shown through the example of amsterdam that indeed migrant groups are at the receiving end of longstanding inequalities, fuelled by the differential effects of global trends but also by local politics and discriminatory policy. these have not translated into major incidents of violence because there are strong institutions that regulate the political space and check group excesses. this insight has important implications for cities like jos where efforts aimed at preventing or responding to violent conflicts mainly focus on restoring order 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the experience of the czech republic. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 11:1, 1-26. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6065 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au article (peer-reviewed) towards a disinformation resilient society? the experience of the czech republic ondřej filipec department of politics and social sciences, palacký university olomouc, křížkovského 511/8, 771 47 olomouc, czechia. ondrejfilipec@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6065 article history: received05/09/2018; revised 05/02/19; accepted 14/02/19; published 28/03/2019 abstract disinformation is currently an important threat to modern democratic societies and has a critical impact on the quality of public life. this article presents an organic approach to understanding of the issue of disinformation that is derived from the context of the czech republic. the approach builds on the various similarities with virology where disinformation is compared to a hostile virus that is spread in a certain environment and may penetrate the human body. contribution is providing czech experience in eight areas related to creation and spread of disinformation and analyzing obstacles for building disinformation resilience. keywords disinformation, propaganda, fake news, information warfare, hybrid warfare, resilience, czech republic declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. 1 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6065 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6065 mailto:ondrejfilipec@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6065 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 introduction since the early history of humanity, information and warfare have been connected. every conflict between states, nations, groups, people or even animals may be understood in the terms of information. decisions and actions of any subject entering into interactions are based on information. controlling the flow of information and its character may represent an important power in shaping relations or influencing the attitudes of the targeted subject. in other words, information may be used as a weapon helping to pursue specific interests or even domination. the main aim of this article is to present an ʻorganic approachʼ to public resilience vis-à -vis information warfare and present several proposals contributing to resilience which is simply understood as the mental capacity and ability of citizens to recognize and work more efficiently with manipulative information. the approach and proposals were derived from the context of the czech republic. the presentation of an organic approach may contribute to a better understanding of the environment in which information warfare takes place and identify key areas for supporting resilience. in this sense, the contribution may serve to stimulate discussion about preventing propagation of disinformation that may be considered as one of the elements of information warfare. only a democratic information warfare resilient society may prevent political, economic and potentially also military damage. the main claim of this article is that disinformation can be understood by using the organic approach which offers perspectives for intervention in order to create a more resilient society and undermine the environment in which propaganda thrives. there are two principal research questions: first, how might virology be useful in providing an analytical framework for information warfare? second, what measures should be adopted to make society more resilient to disinformation? the research questions presented aim to identify key determinants for resilience and answering them is necessary for developing measures for strengthening the resilience of the society. from the methodological perspective, this article can be considered a theoretical case study dealing in a general way with the environment in which information warfare takes place and disinformation occurs. however, it is not aimed at the description or application of a theory, but rather at theorizing the context of disinformation and deriving key principles and lines of actions to counter disinformation so as to build a society more resilient to information warfare. the central issue of the article is the disinformation that might be recognized only in the context of truth. nevertheless, the definition of truth and its manifestation is problematic in itself. despite the empirical and analytical approach used, the author of this study presumes that the truth has a non-consensual nature and operates out of binary system (true or false). the truth may be relative but shall be always in line with empirically verifiable facts. anyway, the relation between truth, knowledge and belief is always problematic (see conditions based on plato's meno and theaetetus and its discussion in gettier 1963, pp. 175-177). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 3 there are various definitions and overlapping concepts which may significantly vary due to different contexts. for this purpose it is worth defining what is meant by ‘disinformation’ and related terms. at least in the czech context the word ‘disinformation’ is used much more often than, for example ‘fake news’. the czech ministry of interior distinguishes between disinformation, understood as a ʻsystematic and intentional spread of false information mainly by state actors or its affiliates against foreign state or media with the aim to influence decision-making or opinions of those, who adopt decisions’ and misinformation which refers to ‘incorrect or misleading information, which is not spread systematically nor with the intention to influence decision-making or the opinions of those who adopt decisionsʼ (ministry of interior 2019). in this sense, both might be part of propaganda, which can be generally defined as the intentional and systematic spread of information and thoughts with the aim to enforce or support political objectives. in comparison, the notion ‘fake news’ is much more complex. similar to disinformation, fake news is endemic to the information society (marshall 2017, p. 1) and can be defined in both a positive and negative way. regarding the first approach, hunt allcott and matthew gentzkow (2017) defined fake news as ʻnews articles that are intentionally and verifiably false, and could mislead readersʼ (allcott and gentzkow 2017, p. 213). from the negative perspective, it is possible to define what fake news is not. according to shu et al. (2017) fake news is not (1) satiric news with proper content without intent to mislead or deceive consumers and with little probability of being misperceived as factual; (2) rumours that did not originate from news events; (3) conspiracy theories; (4) misinformation that is created unintentionally; and (5) hoaxes that are only motivated by fun or to scam target individuals (shu et al. 2017, p. 25). however, in many cases the five exceptions listed above do not work as they might be part of the disinformation programme. rumours might well be transformed into disinformation, behind many individual disinformation cases there may be some sort of conspiracy that is then developed into a more or less established conspiracy theory, misinformation may be part of a more complex disinformation scheme and the line between hoaxes and disinformation or misinformation may be very blurred. with respect to the above set of positive and negative criteria the reality in the czech republic suggests, that the form and content might be much vaguer. in reality, fake news might be not be related only to news articles as it may have a form of falsified or wrongly translated documents, edited pictures, videos or evidence intentionally shared by e-mails or published on blogs and vlogs. manipulation of the content may vary from intentional omission of some truthful aspects to mixing false information with reliable facts put into a fully truthful and trustworthy context. disinformation in fake news may be logically organized and be supported by empirically verifiable facts with some indication of easy to believe conspiracy. some disinformation within fake news in order to be better consumed by more critical readers may involve intentional flaws which ought to be discovered and as an effect lead the consumer in the desired direction. an example could be when set of information is composed of empirical facts that are both truthful and unknown to the target but at the same time there is obviously false information which is easy to recognize. as a result the target may reject the whole set of information as a false. 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 citizens may be simply manipulated to make decisions which are against their own interest1 and the interest of the state and thus cause damage. typical examples can be seen in the brexit referendum in the uk or the us presidential elections, which changed the geopolitical situation (see timmer, 2017; lexmann, 2017; naumescu, 2017 or inkster, 2016). in both cases, fake news and disinformation played an important role. for example as noted by the marketing company 89up, russian bots delivered over 10 million potential twitter impressions during the referendum and articles published by kremlin-owned channels had thirteen times more impressions for all content shared by the leave.eu website (89up, 2018). moreover, information is not easily evaluated and, at least in the case of the eu referendum, to understand the issue requires a more complex knowledge not to fall into the trap of the dunning-kruger effect (see kruger & dunning 1999). however, next to disinformation, misinformation and fake news there are also other terms such as ‘information warfare’ that involves all the previously mentioned manipulations on a larger scale. as noted by stephen blank, information warfare may be understood as a new means to conduct large-scale political warfare in order to reshape the thinking of the entire political community (blank, 2013). for example according to nichiporuk (1999), from a military perspective, information warfare is the process of ‘protecting one’s own sources of battlefield information, and at the same time, seeking to deny, degrade, corrupt, or destroy the enemy’s source of battlefield informationʼ. information warfare is composed of ʻsix preexisting sub-areasʼ, which are: ʻoperational security, electronic warfare (ew), psychological operations (psyops), deception, physical attack on information processes, and information attack on informational processesʼ (nichiporuk 1999, p. 188). as pointed by tomáš čižik (2017) this definition underestimates the civilian perspective, as information warfare also involves the manipulation of information on the internet, social networks, media or manipulation of information in propaganda, which according to him creates a huge part of today’s information warfare. in other words, contemporary information warfare is conducted mainly in the social arena, where the main targets are civilians and their capability of differentiating between correct and incorrect information with the intention of confusing them. in other words, a single hashtag may be more destructive than a bomb dropped from a plane2. moreover, information warfare has a significant individual effect as it is undermining confidence in one's knowledge and thus has implications for individual security (see buzan 2009, p. 50). in other words, information warfare may serve the purpose of influencing one individual political decision such as voting in a referendum but may lead also to more complex irreversible changes in the information environment, political culture and cause changes in identities with a direct impact on societal security. information warfare is a sub-part of hybrid warfare, where hybrid warfare can be defined as a use of conventional and unconventional measures in conducting military operations. according to andrew monaghan who assessed the russian hybrid warfare in terms of the gerasimov doctrine (2016, p. 67), hybrid warfare is ‘tantamount to a range of 1 this situation is different from advertising as deceptive/false advertising is, in many states, considered an illegal practice and falls under consumer protection law. 2 for example, facebook played an important role during the arab spring and in fuelling rohingya genocide (al-jazeera 2018). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 5 hostile actions of which military force is only a small part, or measures short of war that seek to deceive, undermine, subvert, influence and destabilize societies, to coerce or replace sovereign governments and to disrupt or alter an existing regional orderʼ. a different definition of hybrid warfare is offered by the international institute for strategic studies (2015), which describes hybrid warfare as ʻsophisticated campaigns that combine low-level conventional and special operations; offensive cyber and space actions; and psychological operations that use social and traditional media to influence popular perception and international opinionʼ (international institute for strategic studies 2015). nato allied command transformation defines a hybrid threat as – ʻthose posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectivesʼ (nato 2011). as the nato definition continues, it describes the hybrid threat as an ʻumbrella termʼ, which encompasses ʻa wide variety of existing adverse circumstances and actions, such as terrorism, migration, piracy, corruption, ethnic conflict etc.ʼ (nato 2011). as evident from the nature of these threats, hybrid warfare is considered an important part of military doctrines in the 21st century (see bachmann & gunneriusson, 2015). however, many experts argue that hybrid warfare cannot be considered a new concept, because all conflicts in human history have combined conventional and nonconventional measures. basically, hybrid warfare exploits the strengths of the first state (or the other actor) and weaknesses of the other state (or the other actor) to achieve maximal gains and strategic goals. the very same logic and tactics was described by sun tzu in his art of war many centuries ago: ʻhence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fightingʼ (sun tzu 2000, p. 8). however, it is necessary to state that the recent security environment – information era, globalisation, development of the internet and social media – has equipped state and non-state actors with a whole set of new tools, which they can use in their favour. hybrid warfare was always present, what has changed are the tools of hybrid warfare and the context. the czech context to disinformation the czech republic has become a ‘laboratory of russian hybrid warfare’. the czech intelligence service (bis) warns in its annual report (bis 2017), that the country is the target of russian information warfare and that russia is conducting influence operations, mainly via pro-russian disinformation webs. however, these webs are covered by ʻa smoke screen’ as ʻthe vast majority of disinformation webs are in the czech language and are operated by czechs, who are ideologically motivated and persuaded about the harmfulness of nato, eu, usa, liberal democracy or citizens, who are not supporting russian interests. these citizens use their laws and freedoms to spread what they believe is the truth ... their web projects are used and misused by russia to spread propaganda and disinformation in support for other components of the hybrid strategy’ (bis 2017, p. 8). due to the czech language and operation of disinformation webs by czech citizens who spread disinformation and propaganda on an ideological basis, propaganda and disinformation is well adapted to the czech political, economical and social context. in this sense, the czech republic is not an exception. 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 however, there are other factors in the czech republic that help to spread disinformation and propaganda including an underestimation in the area of media literacy education and education in civil affairs and a lack of critical historical reflection in historical classes. as a result, the pro-russian interpretation of history inherited from communist times is being taught at schools (see bis 2017) and history teachers are more likely to focus on medieval history, rather than events following the second world war. when teaching about the communist era, they prefer to emphasize the dates and pure facts instead of providing the full context and links. in other words, students leave school with a rather incomplete perspective on history. this is mainly caused by the fact that history classes are not considered the most important among teachers and there are many requirements regarding the scope of topics covered compared to the time allocated for teaching. nevertheless, among many czech historians and politicians there is an increasing tendency for revisionism to relativize past events (čtk 2019). media literacy education is almost absent at high schools and when it is present teachers do not know how to teach. a czech ngo people in need made a survey among 280 teachers who were dealing with media education in the czech republic. some 72 % of them never completed media-education training. according to the majority opinion, media education requires too many competences and knowledge (81%) or media education is not considered as an important topic (80%). it is also alarming that 8% of those teachers are using information from disinformation ‘alternative webs’ such as parlamentní listy (parliamentary letters) or aeronet and 27% of teachers ‘tend to trust’ or ‘fully trust’ such media. moreover 26% of teachers ‘do not know’ what media to trust (břeštan 2018). this data implies that teachers are sometimes ‘part of the problem’ and have to rely on their intuition that might be strongly influenced by personal political preferences. as a result, about 50% of students are unable to distinguish between commercial advertisements and news and 43 % of students believe that the disinformation web parliamentary letters are regulated under public broadcasting act (čápová 2018). the public survey agency stem published information that 25.5% of czechs believe the disinformation broadcast and 24.5% believe in disinformation media more than the traditional media; for example 50.2% of czechs believe that the usa is behind the influx of migrants from syria to europe (ministry of interior 2016). to sum up, the disinformation media has a great influence in the czech republic and this has important implications for the quality of democracy. the impact of disinformation in the czech republic started to increase in 2008 when the bush administration planned to place part of its anti-ballistic missile defence in the eastern europe: radar into the czech republic and anti-ballistic missiles into poland (gregor, vejvodová & zvolsi info 2018). since then the method and tools developed but until the annexation of the crimea, russian hybrid warfare was not considered a major threat in the czech republic (see daniel & eberle 2018, p. 913). the peak of disinformation activities might be considered the presidential elections of 2018 when in the second round there was competition between two candidates: the incumbent clearly pro-russian and anti-liberal president miloš zeman and pro-western and more liberal candidate, former head of the czech academy of sciences professor jiří drahoš. according to analysis published by the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 7 centre for risk prevention in virtual communication of the palacký university in olomouc the ratio of disinformation present in public space was 30:1 against drahoš (czech radio 2018). during the 2018 presidential campaign, supporters of current president miloš zeman were spreading disinformation and misinformation targeting opposition candidate jiří drahoš which in the end created an environment in which supporters of miloš zeman were assured that jiří drahoš is the wrong choice. it is very hard to find out how supporters of miloš zeman reacted on disinformation about him due to the already mentioned large disproportion of disinformation. however, similar us based research by craig a. harper and thom baguley discovered that us liberals and conservatives are equally susceptible to fake news, however for different reasons (see kaufman 2019). however, ‘equal suspicion’ may vary in the society with different media culture and varying media literacy among segments. the experience from the czech republic seems to be that supporters of miloš zeman were almost immune to disinformation and misinformation spread about their own candidate. on the contrary, attacks on their candidate made them more persuaded about the correctness of their choice. for example one disinformation claimed that 72 year old zeman would soon die because he had cancer. nevertheless, his voters generally accepted that his health is not in a good condition. this was expressed on social networks as ‘it is better one year with zeman than five years with drahoš’. generally, disinformation favoured zeman and showed drahoš in a negative light. chain e-mails played a very important role in this regard. the content from disinformation webs was spread in the form of chain e-mails in order to increase the trustworthiness of the message as e-mails are spread mainly among family members and friends. according to analysis, up to 90% of czechs over 65 years of age receive emails containing hoaxes and disinformation. according to researchers from palacký university in olomouc, e-mails containing warning (migration, islam etc.) are spread by 35% of people between 55 and 64 and 47% of people older than 65 years. the last group of people are forwarding disinformation six times more often than younger groups3. moreover, the study revealed that among university educated pensioners only 25% of them do not verify the truthfulness of the content while among high school educated or pensioners with practical education it is about 50% (kopecký, szotkowski, kožíšek, kasáčková 2018). as a result, the majority of czech pensioners are attacked daily by disinformation which changes their perception of reality. a tragic example of this campaign is the ‘first czech terrorist’ – a pensioner who cut two trees down on to a railway in order to cause an accident4. after the attack, he spread around leaflets indicating that the attack was made by islamist terrorists. the aim of the pensioner was to blame islamists for the attack and ʻwake up’ the czech nation to take decisive action against islam and the ʻinvasion of immigrants’. tragically, there are only a few moderate and well-integrated muslims in the czech republic (approx. 20,000 in a country with 10.5 million inhabitants) and this country is reluctant to accept any 3the majority of chain e-mails are adapted to seniors: written in big letters, using colours and highlights. moreover, seniors have a lower level of digital and media literacy. 4 despite the label ‘first czech terrorist’ he was not the first one in the czech republic as in 2014 there was zbyněk průša, an unemployed drunk man, who was found guilty of threats to blow up the government. 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 refugees, for which it is often being criticized by other eu partners. it is thus a paradox that the first terrorist sentenced in the country was not a radical islamist but rather an islamophobic pensioner influenced by disinformation and performing disinformation. nonetheless, this particular example illustrates the complexity of the issue. the disinformation webs help to spread fear that is exploited by populist, nationalistic or even extremist parties which are against membership of the eu, nato and a liberal democracy as such. due to the geographic position of the czech republic and its past, ʻless europe’ automatically means ʻmore russia’ which is dissatisfied with its position within the international system and seeks any advantage to increase its influence in the parts of its former empire. in this sense the politics of fear is in line with russian national interests and is well utilized in russian disinformation with the aim of creating the desired emotional response in the target countries, which might be effectively translated at the political level to support subjects critical towards opponents and friendly to russian foreign policy goals (e.g. to accept the annexation of the crimea, ease sanctions etc). moreover, attitudes against russia are not helping russian economic interests in the czech republic such as winning the bid over finishing the nuclear power plant in dukovany or temelín: an investment worth billions dollars and shifting power dependency of the country closer to russia. from this perspective, information warfare has its inherent geopolitical dimension. towards the organic model of information warfare at first sight it seems that human communication is different and much more developed when compared to animals, insect, vegetation or microorganisms. however, basic principles often remain and the natural world may bring us some inspiration to analyse and fight information warfare. penetration of natural sciences concepts into the social sciences and topics is not rare. for example, olsen points out that the concept of virology has been used and developed to create models for analysing europeanization that also deals with the spread of information or values among citizens in a certain environment or area (olsen 2002). moreover, virology provided a great source of inspiration for meme theory and memetics, which focus on memes as a viral phenomenon (see dawkins 1989; lynch 1996; brodie 1996; blackmore 1999 and others). despite the fact that this article does not use the meme theory context, it asks a legitimate research question, how might virology be useful in providing an analytical framework for information warfare? from this perspective virology may be an inspiration also to dealing with information disinformation and basic premises from virology (see dimmock et al. 2015) may be used to develop an ʻorganic modelʼ for analysing disinformation as there are some parallels summed up in table 1. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 9 table 1: parallels between virus and information premises content 1 similar to viruses, disinformation and misinformation occur naturally or intentionally in the environment. disinformation and misinformation are somehow created and remain in the environment. moreover, like viruses, disinformation and misinformation may mutate. 2 similar to viruses, disinformation and misinformation are also spread in the environment by carriers. in the case of viruses, we can talk about human-human transmission, animal-human transition etc. in the case of information carriers, carriers are citizens, public media or politicians. 3 similar to viruses, information is also spread within a certain environment which might enable or disable the transmission. the virus may spread or disappear similar to information. in the case of a virus, the environment is characterized for example by temperature, humidity, light etc. similarly, information has a different impact in different societies, which are characterized by the level of education, income, historic experience etc. 4 in defence against a virus, immunity is important, which might be natural (e. g. genetic predisposition) or artificially created (for example by vaccination). in the case of information, the vast majority of people5 are not naturally immune to disinformation, however immunity may be created by education, experience and so on, which act like a vaccination. 5 there are many kinds of viruses: some of them are persistent in the environment, easily transmissible and very aggressive. so are some kinds of disinformation. every virus or disinformation has some inherent properties creating an individual character. some viruses are more persistent than others, some are good at hiding, some are easy to be transferred or easy to be defeated etc. 6 for effective transmission, there are other important factors, such as the time of exposure. increased exposure to a virus increases the chance of infection. similarly, exposure to disinformation may increase the likelihood of infection. thus, the level of exposure, timing etc. may play an important role in its effect. 7 similar to viruses, some disinformation may not be harmful and practically have no impact. on the other side, there are viruses with significant impact depending on the organ within the body hit. similarly, some disinformation is more harmful than others due to the political, economic or social target. for example, disinformation about gender issues, homosexuality and transgender issues will be more effective in a more conservative environment than in a liberal one. some disinformation may be directly targeted at individual targets: politicians, experts and academia, public broadcasting, the judiciary etc. 8 viruses may cause changes in the body that are observable even after a successful cure. similarly, disinformation leaves a footprint, which might be clearly observable even when the disinformation has been debunked. it is one of the golden rules of communication that every communication is unique and not repeatable. viruses may leave increased levels of an antibody. similarly, disinformation may leave changed values, opinions or attitudes. similar to a virus, disinformation changes people’s behaviour making their actions more or less effective and this has social consequences. 5 there might be some exemptions such as people with very low iq or mental diseases who are immune due to inability to work with the information content in the complex way. 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 in the following sections of the paper, the premises are further developed in the czech context from which recommendations are derived. the above premises create a complex system in which information (virus) plays an important role. the above premises are linked to other topics related to the fight against the spread of disinformation and misinformation. 1. the creation of disinformation and misinformation disinformation and misinformation are present in every society, however their significance varies. most civilized countries have adopted laws regulating behaviour connected with disinformation and misinformation in order to protect victims and punish attackers. finding the right balance within liberal democracies is not easy as there is on the one hand freedom of speech and freedom of expression and protection of personal rights on the other. censorship is not acceptable in liberal democracies6, but on the other hand there is a law aimed at the protection of individuals. unfortunately, the czech legal system does not recognize the term ‘disinformation’ or ‘propaganda’ and thus the facts of the crime are not defined. the act may be punished under the criminal code – chapter ii (criminal offences against freedom, personal and privacy rights and confidentiality of correspondence) only in the case of§ 181 infringement of the rights of another, § 184 defamation, § 345 false accusation, § 355 defamation of nation, race, ethnic or other group of people, § 356 instigation of hatred towards a group of people or of suppression of their rights and freedoms, §357 spread of alarming news, § 364 incitement to criminal offence, § 365 approval of criminal offence or § 404 expressing sympathies for movements seeking to suppress human rights and freedoms according to act no. 40/2009 coll. from 8 january 2009 (criminal code). the paragraphs mentioned above provide legal protection against the most important effects of disinformation or misinformation, but do not address the real substance of disinformation or misinformation. in reality, misinformation is hard to punish as the content is not considered too harmful or, matching criteria for crime as defined within criminal code, misinformation has an unclear origin and is spread by a large number of persons. moreover, a considerable amount of misinformation targets political representatives or political institutions where a certain degree of criticism is welcome or even vital for democracy and politicians as public persons can expect greater interference in their personal life than normal citizens. the situation has been quite strictly solved by malaysia which passed a bill that allows the punishment of persons spreading fake news (defined widely as: ʻnews, information, data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false’) with a prison sentence of 6 years or a fine up to us$123,000 (liao 2018). nevertheless, similar laws may severely limit public discussion and be used for the suppression of freedom as it raises the issue of an evaluation process which might be simply misused by government to suppress criticism. 6 this does not mean that it cannot be limited in order to protect the rights of minorities, human rights etc. in many countries, it is not acceptable to deny the holocaust or to agitate for movements and political parties suppressing human rights and freedoms. as stated, there is a guaranteed freedom of speech, but not freedom after the speech. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 11 2. the issue of vectors the creation of disinformation and misinformation is closely related to its vectors. in some cases, authors might act as vectors. from this perspective, we can distinguish between primary vectors, among whom information originates, and those who are secondary and only share the information previously communicated to them. however, similar to a virus vector, there might be several types of them, some types more dangerous than others. like the spread of the disease, the most important for effectiveness is the role of the vector and its reach in the community. in this sense, we can distinguish mainly between citizens, media and politicians (or other publicly known people who have better access to the media). thus, the behaviour of each set of actors shall be the subject of different regulation. the behaviour of citizens shall be the subject of public law, the role of media shall also fall under legal regulation and the role of politicians in democratic societies shall be regulated in some aspects by legal norms and social instruments such as morality. in other words, the wellbalanced regulation of the environments relevant for communicating information is the key. in a well-functioning state, politics is controlled by journalists and by the public in the terms of accountability and responsibility. unfortunately, lies have always been part of politics and so is disinformation. media in the czech republic are under increasing pressure from illiberal parts of the society. czech tv, regulated under the public broadcasting law, has to be, according to law, objective in terms of providing balanced views. despite an attempt to fulfil the law, the broadcaster faces strong public criticism that it is not providing enough space for people and politicians with ‘alternative opinions’ (including also disinformation or misinformation). as a result, there is a call to change the law to pay compulsory fee for public broadcasting7 as some citizens have the impression that czech tv favours only certain groups of people supportive of a liberal democracy. due to pressure czech tv on the one hand tries to invite well recognised experts and on the other to balance it with people who are considered ‘experts’ by dissatisfied citizens. as a result, a paradoxical situation occurred: in a live interview, there was an internationally distinguished professor and us foreign policy expert igor lukeš from boston university together with ladislav jakl, who is a controversial politician who has presented a very simplifying (disinformation) contribution about the us foreign policy and one which has helped spread disinformation (czech tv 2019). as an obviously offended lukeš pointed out, ʻgiving 4 minutes to truth and 4 minutes to lies’ during an interview is not the way to guide viewers to create their opinions. the case of expert lukeš is an illustrative example of how czech tv was trying to approach critical citizens who are desperate to watch programmes which confirm their views. some tv stations (regulated under private law) like tv prima or tv barrandov use this advantage and focus on this segment of society by providing space for anti-liberal politicians 7 concessionary fees for public service broadcasting are compulsory for all owners of a radio or tv. it is later used as a financial resource to cover expenses of subjects regulated under the public broadcasting act establishing a strict control mechanism of independence. however, these subjects are increasingly attacked by illiberal groups as not being objective and thus not worth financing from public money. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 and controversial politicians who verifiably use lies much more often8. then the evaluation process goes political. in other words, there is some form of alliance between this anti-liberal media: offering visibility to controversial politicians to present their often disinformation opinions (often without real counter-argumentation) in exchange for higher ratings. the effect is multiplied by airing purposely emotional news very critical towards refugees or the european union. as an example, a leaked record from tv prima showed one of the managers appealing to employees to respect the opinion of the employer and report about refugees in a negative light (hlídacípes.org, 2016). with the agenda setting and the spreading of fear these media influence public opinion and provide an advantage to the parties who address the topics raised by these media. despite the fact that private tv channels are required to comply with the law and ensure objective and balanced news reporting (§ 31 of the act 231/2001 coll.), in this case the controlling body, the council for radio and television broadcasting, did not find any violation. there is a similar situation with on-line websites providing news. while some disinformation websites are at first sight very alternative and,due to the presence of many conspiracies, not trust worthy, others try to adopt an image of the serious well-established media; however regardless of the presentation, they give space for disinformation and propaganda and as such are listed on the official list of the ministry of interior which identifies approx. 40 disinformation webs among them also ac24, lajkit, new world order opposition, aeronet, parliamentary letters and their sub portals. some provide news and a presentation platform for ʻalternative’ opinions and presentations of critical, anti-liberal or even radical politicians and the voice that we can label as ʻuncivil civil society’9. the official list of state authorities is a good source for orientation in media. however, it it is naive to expect that people with low media literacy read the official reports of the ministries. moreover, due to the dissatisfaction with democracy they often see state institutions as a part of the conspiracy trying to keep the real truth from the people and present their preferred disinformation on websites. 3. the environment as mentioned earlier in the previous section, it is evident that disinformation spreads more easily among older people and people with no or minimal media education (kopecký, szotkowski, kožíšek, kasáčková 2018; břešťan 2018). education matters also in the selection of a tv channel. for example the share of viewers with a university degree watching the news channel of the czech tv – čt 24 (regulated under public broadcasting law) is 16%, while those watching the privately owned tv barrandov10 is about 9%. 8 there is an excellent project in the czech republic called demagog: a team of media analysts who fact-check all statements made by politicians and count the number of truthful statements, lies and unverifiable statements (demagog.cz 2018). 9 as defined by rumford, the uncivil society is ‘a catch-all term for a wide range of disruptive, unwelcome, and threatening elements deemed to have emerged in the spaces between the individual and the state’ (rumford 2001). 10a private tv channel which is mainly associated with czech business man and media magnate jaromír soukup. on his tv channel, he provided considerable space for interviews with people with illiberal positions. he personally moderates several tv shows, including: my news, week of jaromír soukup, instincts of jaromír soukup, arena of jaromír soukup, issues of jaromír soukup, week with the president, duel j. s., jaromír cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 13 similarly, the share of people with high school education watching čt24 is 40% while tv barrandov has a share of 31% (kartáková 2011). in other words, people with lower education tend to watch tv barrandov rather more than more serious čt 24. as noted by czech journalist erik tabery in his book, society is divided into two nations: while the first part takes advantage of travelling, is educated, publicly active, enjoys freedom and has quite a good standard of living, the second part is living rather on the periphery, has a lower level of education and has more material needs. each of the group appreciates different values. while the first group is in favour of freedom, the second group favours security and certainty. this is not only about the conflict between the centre and the periphery, but also about generational conflict crosscutting families (tabery 2017, p. 176). however, both aspects played an important role in politics as it was very visible during the last elections to parliament in 2017 and the presidential elections of 2018 (lebeda & lysek 2018). while the first group supported mainly parties affiliated to liberal democracy, the second favoured rather illiberal forces, including populists, nationalists or communists (czech statistical office 2018). these divisions in society are also visible in a civic dimension. while for people showing support for a liberal democracy, the issue of human rights, showing solidarity with refugees or helping ngos are labelled by illiberal groups the ‘prague coffee house’ (pražská kavárna)11 or havloids,12 ‘sunny people’ (sluníčkáři),13 lepšolidi14 or simply ‘refugee welcomers’ (vítači), the second camp is associated with anti-liberal tendencies, anti-immigration, islamophobia and people from the village pubs – sometimes labelled simply as ‘islamophobes’ or ‘horšolidi’15. academia and intellectuals are considered the ‘prague coffee house’ and generally labelled as indoctrinated by a ‘neo-marxist multicultural propaganda’16. from a broader perspective, this may be considered one of the effects of the post-truth age and decreasing respectability for experts vis-à -vis alternative information available to all. the division of society including that in the media and political arena plays an important role in the spread of disinformation due to the socialization effect. as put by sloman and fernbach: ʻmuch of our decision-making stems not from individual rationality soukup live and ‘that's how we live here’ tv show. it is not surprising, that contemporary czech president miloš zeman agreed to a weekly interview on this medium and tv barrandov was one of the preferred tv stations for his pre-electoral communication. 11 the label matches the stereotype of capital-based liberals with higher education and income, posh behaviour, people associated with ngos, pro-western foreign policy and uncritical thinking about the helping of refugees. 12 followers of the political and humanist line as presented by the former president václav havel. 13 with the very negative connotation referring to very naive people who are endangering the survival of the czech nation with multiculturalism and an open attitude to refugees while totally underestimating (and not understanding) the security implications of migration. 14 lepšolidi refers to ‘better people’ – a group of people who consider themselves better than others. the term, however, has a very ironic connotation and has entered public discourse after the ‘christmas speech’ of president miloš zeman, who use the term lepšolidi to label his (mainly liberal) opponents. 15 horšolidi (worse people) was created as a counter-term to lepšolidi. 16 this is an exaggerated simplification: ngos, multiculturalism, human rights or solidarity (e.g. with refugees) are in reality uncritically associated as leftist values and thus generally and very simply labelled as ‘neo-marxist’ without any assessment of what the term means. the label ‘neo-marxist’ in this sense has nothing to do with czech history or the communist era except some intuitive presence of internationalist dimension. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 but from shared group-level narrativesʼ (sloman & fernbach, 2017). in other words, there are ‘trenches’ in czech society separating both groups. in this sense, the media (social networks, printed, broadcast or on-line) has adapted to the existing segments of society and continues to keep the segments divided. opponents may suggest that this opposition exists in every type of democratic regime. however, disinformation gives an advantage that is on the side of the critics and attackers. as shown by the mit scientists, truth cannot compete with lies as the lie is spread on the social networks on average six times faster than the truth (mainly due to its romantic or emotional character) and has much greater reach (see vasoughi, roy & aral 2018, p. 1146-1151). as put by former czech president and philosopher václav havel: ‘it is a natural disadvantage of a democracy that it ties the hands of those who wish it well, and opens unlimited possibilities for those who do not take it seriously’ (havel 1971). the scope of the problem of division within czech society may be present also in other related attitudes towards mainstream media and democracy itself. as the globsec analysis (2017) discovered, 49% of czechs do not trust the mainstream media. the czech sociological institute published a survey (2016) that showed 16% of the respondents are persuaded that the best solution is to get rid of parliament and elections and to have a strong and effective ruler (cvvm 2016, p. 3). in other words, approximately half of czechs do not believe in mainstream media, and every sixth person is, in principal, in opposition to democracy. combined with the low media literacy, this contributes to the vital environment of disinformation and propaganda. it is however hard to define what is behind the distrust as the distrust may be present among both segments of czech society. while the segment associated with liberal democracy may distrust public media due to the amount of space it provides for too many illiberal ideas, the illiberal segment may simply distrust public media due to the presentation of too many liberal ideas, and thus find it not objective. however, media literacy is generally a positive ability. 4. fostering immunity as with vaccination, immunity of citizens might be fostered by the development of media education, critical thinking or promoting interest in civic affairs (see pinto, portelli 2009). civic education involving education in areas such as human rights is, however almost totally missing in the czech republic. media-education is only a ‘crosscutting topic’ in czech education and at high schools, it is mainly taught only four hours per year. however, half of the schools do not verify whether media education was taught, approximately 65% of teachers lack any qualification to teach media education, and most of them (90%) prepare their own materials (kaderka 2018, p. 15). media education is an issue for the ministry of education, the national institute for education and for the council for radio and television broadcasting; however there is no coordination and there is uncertainty of who has responsibility in this area. a similar issue concerns digital education. on the one hand, there is a strategy on digital literacy for 2015-2020 (sdg) aimed at the adult population and a strategy on digital education until 2020 (sdv) developed by the ministry of education, but cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 15 the implementation is far behind expectations (kaderka 2018, p. 13). moreover, strategy on digital education is getting old and does not address actual needs. on the other hand, the gap is slowly being filled by ngos and individuals who provide textbooks (often on a commercial basis), and materials and information on how to teach media education. lecturers and universities provide assistance or volunteers (initiative zvolsi.info) and the ngo people in need organizes the week of media education. some webs contribute to the field with the fact checking of political speeches (demagog.cz), and are aimed at debunking political disinformation (manipulatori.cz) or hoaxes (hoax.cz). in recent years, there have also been valuable books written by experts on disinformation and propaganda, which are not fully academic but have a popular style in order to reach a larger audience. in this way, the role of civil society and active individuals play an important role in the fight against disinformation and propaganda as they help to reveal and debunk the disinformation and contribute to media literacy at least within the selected segments. moreover, approximately since 2018 there are ‘czech elves’ present on the social networks who fight ‘russian trolls’. as pointed out by elven anonymous speakers: ‘we know that they are dividing our society and that support of extremes is intentional, backed by foreign interests. activities are made by variously motivated enemies of our values ... we are not indifferent to the division of our society, that is why we want to defend our state and fight against russian propaganda’ (aktulne.cz 2018). however, the czech environment is different from that of the baltic states where people are more aware of russian influence. for example while elves in latvia have approximately a five year long tradition and elves are counted in hundreds, in the czech republic society is divided and there are just dozens of elves (aktualne.cz 2018). it is too early to evaluate the presence of czech elves on the internet as the real effects remain hidden. the presence has been notified also by its critics who consider elves as the agents on the side of the censors as they help to fight disinformation. the czech environment is also different in another aspect. due to the direct experience of older people with communism, these groups think they are more immune to modern propaganda and they are indifferent to accepting advice on the issue. for example during the lectures about propaganda for retired people they quite often say: ‘we know what propaganda is and we are able to recognize it. it is because we were used to reading the red law (rudé právo)17. we knew that truth was somewhere else... that is why we learned to read in between the lines and search for the truth somewhere else’. their experience is correct but naturally drives them to depart from the mainstream media and seek some additional information which is easier to understand or which better matches their views. (in this respect, they are more prone to certain information, as some bodies are more prone to certain viruses.) moreover, such desired information is then often present on disinformation webs. it gives the readers the good feeling of finally discovering more truthful and interesting sources of information. finding such information reinforces what they initially thought, which is more pleasant than recognizing that they were wrong or than adapting their opinion in line with the information that they originally received. as pointed out by baum, lazer and 17a censored daily newspaper in communist czechoslovakia. 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 mele: ʻindividuals tend to accept new information uncritically when a source is perceived as credible or the information confirms prior views. and when information is unfamiliar or comes from an opposition source, it may be ignored’ (baum, lazer & mele 2017). in other words, contemporary propaganda is using techniques that it is almost impossible to detect and even experts may sometimes fall into the trap when thinking they can detect it and demarcate it. however, media education and critical thinking may foster immunity to less complex disinformation and decrease the likelihood of becoming a full victim of propaganda. the internet has created a challenging environment, as it is easy to run your own disinformation webpage adapted to the demands of users. thus, the disinformation media adapted according to the readers, and the readers have available to them media matching their opinions which enables critical reflection and adjustment of opinions according to a factual basis. some scholars such as gleb tsipursky and zachary morford (2018) proposed the establishment of a pro-truth pledge (ptp) in order to address the behaviour that leads to the sharing of fake news, which is generally vital to limit the spread. at the protruthpledge.org users may agree to abide by the twelve practices in working with information (tsipursky & morford 2018). unfortunately, people creating and spreading disinformation or misinformation are often persuaded, that they ʻshare, honour and encourage’ truth and many disinformation webs label themselves as the most trustworthy and objective; this does not help to solve the issue. 5. inherent properties there are some inherent properties of viruses and disinformation as well. usually, the disinformation is well prepared for consumption, to a certain degree it is prepared to be more attractive for the consumer. usually, it has some good potential to be spread due to its interesting content. however some disinformation is prepared by accompanying text which adds to the importance and urgency of the communication often with some degree of conspiracy: ‘please quickly forward to all your friends before they delete it’ or ‘...and (mainstream) media is silent about this’. however, this strategy does not work on all groups as they are less likely to be forwarded by younger age groups and university educated persons (kopecký, szotkowski, kožíšek, kasáčková 2018). very aggressive disinformation is simply hidden in between a truthful factual context and mixed with truth and facts. typical examples are the so called ‘euromyths’ which are spread by disinformation servers and generally believed in society. here, they make use of already existing beliefs that have been politically active and reliably effective in attracting attention. all of them may be labelled anti-eu propaganda based on the misinterpreted aims of eu regulations or activities (see filipec & hurtíková 2014). in general, people are critical towards the eu due to already established beliefs and thus are less cautious about critical news and comments towards the eu as it matches their own personal attitude. as knowledge about the eu and its structure is minimal in the czech republic, people simply believe what they read, regardless of the correctness of its content when linked to the negative discourse related with the eu. in other words, they lack the basis to verify the truthfulness of the information, their basic knowledge is already built on disinformation or the basic knowledge may be inaccurate or the disinformation exaggerates it. moreover, in the case of a very complicated issue such as the eu and its cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 17 policies, it is easier to do so. this automatically leads to the rejection of positive communications about the eu which is simply associated only with the dominating negatives (migration crises, crises in eurozone, dictates from brussels, stupid regulations of bureaucrats etc.) while the broader context of the common market, prosperity, peace and stability is missing or secondary. unfortunately, only a little can be done with the inherent properties of disinformation as it is spread by different means of communication, such as new technologies and state of the art of modern propaganda and to try and cut technology or limit it are often seen as very controversial moves. to give an example: currently there is an ongoing discussion in the czech republic about the law that will not technically allow the deletion of shared posts and comments from facebook. it is a paradox that mainly illiberal parties and politicians support the act. this is because facebook often blocks their profiles due to the sharing of problematic content or spreading fake news and in this sense giving them ‘ammunition’ against censorship18. passing the law prohibiting censorship on facebook may untie their hands and increase the impact of disinformation. 6. exposition the long term exposure to a virus without being immune increases the probability of being infected or becoming a carrier. similarly, being exposed long term to disinformation may cause changes in perception. some exposed people who have fallen victim to disinformation and propaganda are hard to cure. the reasons are merely psychological and political. first, it is harder to persuade someone to accept that they are wrong or have made a mistake than to persuade someone who is just slightly mistaken; and second, and what is more important, is that the issue of disinformation and propaganda is very politicized in the czech republic. as noted by petra vejvodová, a czech political scientist, the debate in the czech republic on disinformation started in relation to russia after the annexation of the crimea and the war in ukraine and disinformation and propaganda linked to russia leave the doors closed to the target group (which may have a positive attitude to russia). in her opinion, the way to fight disinformation and propaganda is to depoliticize the issue (vejvodová 2018). this is, however, a very demanding undertaking in liberal society, which provides individuals with enough space to remain in their ‘entrenched positions’. the example given above of the ‘first czech terrorist’, jaromír balda, is a good example on how exposure to disinformation increases the level of radicalization which may result in violent behaviour. at the beginning, he changed his behaviour and for months every evening spent time on his computer, browsing disinformation webs. balda was scared of immigration19 and became a sympathiser of the czech nationalist, anti-immigration and very populist party, spd (freedom and direct democracy). the party is known mainly for its 18 it is part of the so called paradox of tolerance as developed by karl popper. society cannot tolerate those without tolerance because if they would get power the tolerance in the society w ould disappear. popper points out, that the paradox may be resolved by the limited toleration of those not tolerant (popper 1966, p. 266). 19 as noted by president of the judiciary senate, balda had nightmares about immigrants and, from a certain point of view, was a victim of manipulation made by the people who spread extremist ideas in the society (čtk 2019). 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 uncompromising negative attitude towards migration, warnings on the ‘islamization of the czech republic’ and hard censorship20 on social networks in order to keep its sympathisers disinformed and supportive. balda later became a very active supporter of spd and started to act. his attack against two trains was well planned and prepared (svobodová 2019). one example of course does not prove that increasing exposure to disinformation leads to radicalization, but certainly changes the information basis on which the opinions and positions are built. disinformation webs thus change and enforce the preferences of voters who search for political parties and leaders addressing the issues. it is thus not surprising that the spd party has paid 7.4 million crowns (us$350,000) to play net agency for its electoral campaign. the play net agency is personally linked to tv barrandov and two disinformation webs: parliamentary letters and first news (sattler 2018). the case of spd opens a debate about possible alliance between anti-liberal parties and disinformation webs. 7. impact the impact may be measured by the scope of infection (epidemic, pandemic etc.) or the importance of infected bodies. in relation to disinformation, we can measure it online. in conducting such an analysis, it is important to work with very large data volumes. františek vrabel has made a very valuable contribution, a large data analyst and co-founder of the semantic vision company, which analyses 90% of www content worldwide. his company analyses more than 1 million articles posted per day, out of which approximately 25% is dedicated to politics. according to the analysis of the czech environment, there is 8-10% of content which is part of the enemy disinformation campaign or propaganda. this content is increasing by 2 to 3 % per year (vrabel 2018). in the czech environment, there is a relatively small number of disinformation webs, estimated between 20 and 30. in total 22 of such webs are responsible for 60% of the propaganda targeted against the state. moreover, as vrabel claims, it is easy to find their ties to russia (vrabel 2018; see also kundra 2016). this content is later adopted by social networks which act as multipliers and allows adaptation (see gross 2017). scores of russian agents21 are distributing content and manage activities. moreover, there are hundreds of czech citizens who are variously motivated to spread the content (vrabel 2018). unfortunately, russian disinformation and propaganda is much more complex and targets areas that may also indirectly support national interests. the main aim is to create an emotional reaction in the target countries, which is transformed into political unhappiness exploited by anti-liberal, nationalist or radical parties having an uncritically pro-russian attitude. promoting unhappiness and frustration among the target population is thus indirectly supportive to the russian national interest. good examples are fuelling the debate about 20 people posting factual information on their facebook wall in order to debunk disinformation are banned. as a result they create their own group on facebook where they publish the reasons why they got banned. as of february 2019 the group having a thousand members is blocked by facebook. 21 the russian embassy in the czech republic is permanently overstaffed and provides cover to agents. at the russian embassy in prague, there are 140 employees, 53 of them having diplomatic status (for comparison at the us embassy there are just 70 people). as pointed out by the czech intelligence service (bis), russian intelligence has a high quality network of influence contacts and is using czechs for the mining of sensitive information. up to 2/3 of people employed at the russian embassy are said to be engaged in espionage (lidové noviny 2016). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 19 ‘transgender issues’, or promoting the conspiracy regarding health issues (vaccination may cause mental disabilities; you can cure your cancer with swimming pool cleaners etc.). russian trolls are present on the internet fora for mothers where they act as ‘good sisters’ providing ‘advice’ to mothers taking part in the discussion (alvarová 2017). some propaganda is targeted at the energy sector with the aim of criticizing renewables, which decreases energy dependence on russian fossil fuels. a good target is the eu, nato or the west as such, or public authorities and universities (because they develop critical thinking). experts presenting information on the radical impacts (such as leaving the eu where approximately 85% czech export flows) are attacked and propaganda calls for ‘common sense’ (in the meaning of simple thinking) which is unfortunately not the best approach on how to deal with very complex issues. educated people in general are targeted as trolls often with the claim that the ‘university of life’ is a much better form of education than that of a formal education22. for this reason, education reform in the czech republic is one of the most sensitive topics. is it not surprising that illiberal leaders and political parties, in line with pro-russian propaganda, call for the limiting of social sciences or humanities (for example gender studies in the czech republic is under unprecedented criticism) and are supportive of technical education. this is rational, as people educated in social sciences, legal studies or humanities in general have a better predisposition to understand international politics, history, civics, the role of law in society. as a result, the level of education and type of education is also one of the factors resulting in the polarization and division of czech society as noted earlier. 8. leaving a footprint like viruses when healed disinformation also leaves changes or at least marks of their former presence. this is most visible in the electronic footprint, as articles published on the web usually remain present after the campaigns are over, chain-emails are stored on servers and broadcasts archived. especially in cyberspace, it is possible to track the origins of disinformation and users who spread them. for example elves focusing on chain-mails observed a higher intensity of forwarded e-mails during presidential elections and are persuaded that there are scores of people who are able to send e-mails on a mass basis. these people found some way to be heard and increase their impact. after the analysis of language, elves discovered that some of them are using russianisms in the czech language (aktualne.cz 2018). in other words, it is possible to track e-mails back to their source. for example, due to the significant increase in the number of disinformation chainemails, czech journalist, jan novák discovered one of the creators, oldřich lukáš. he created dozens of disinformation e-mails and forwarded them to retired people usually as a power point presentation or a word document. e-mails were adapted for an older population: letters written in bigger size fonts are highlighted with colours and there are many exclamations in the text. mr. lukáš, when confronted with the facts, defended himself saying 22 referred to in the czech context as selský rozum’ (farmer's logic), this highlights the need to trust in basic, conservative logic and basic assumptions over too complicated issues which are seen as unclear, unreliable or too risky to follow. 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 that he has thousands of resources from various countries, but unfortunately yesterday someone went into his computer and deleted all the reliable resources proving that he is right (czech tv 2018). nonetheless, people like oldřich lukáš are rather problematic activists who are using information from disinformation webs to create their own misinformation and disinformation and unfortunately, on the same side as russian propaganda. czech history and the feeling of some citizens for the communist past creates an almost inexhaustible reservoir of potential supporters for russian national interests in the czech republic. although there is evidence and links have been revealed, the issue of disinformation is politicized in the divided society. the division is reflected also in the medial and political level that prevents effective measures dealing with disinformation. conclusions the main aim of this article is to present an ʻorganic approachʼ to public resilience vis-à-vis to information warfare and present several proposals contributing to improving resilience to it. the approach and proposals were derived from the context of the czech republic, which is targeted by russian disinformation and propaganda. the presentation of the organic approach may contribute to a better understanding of the environment in which information warfare takes place and identify key areas for supporting resilience to it. however, instead of providing a complex explanatory model the organic approach may serve as a framework for enabling the presentation of the state of play in several domains attributed to disinformation. in this sense, virology may be useful for structuring the environment and thinking about disinformation. this article focussed on eight parallels between a virus and disinformation in the czech context. as presented in the article the czech republic has in its penal code definitions of various offences related to disinformation and propaganda. however, selected crimes are do not touch the essence of the problem. the situation is more complicated as society is divided into two large segments structured by level of education, income and age. this dichotomy also has implications for politics and the media landscape. there seems to be an alliance between the disinformation media and political parties critical of liberal democracy and the pro-western orientation of the country. disinformation is easy to spread in the czech republic and has been increasing over time. this has been caused by the critically low level of media and digital literacy. it is a paradox that civil society, which is often under attack from the side of the disinformation media, is filling the gap in media and digital literacy by providing materials and courses for students or teachers in order to enhance the level of their media literacy. on a state level, clear responsibility, cooperation among key actors and comprehensive strategy are still lacking. moreover, some attempts aimed at improving the situation (such as the removal of the non-factual pro-russian interpretation of historical events from history classes) is being politicized, similar to disinformation. nevertheless, increasing digital literacy among seniors and media literacy among all groups within the population seems to be the right sort of medicine, continuing the virus metaphor. data from the czech republic shows that education plans need to be better balanced and adjusted to contemporary issues. moreover, it is necessary to equip teachers cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 21 with the appropriate knowledge and skills related to disinformation instead of leaving them with a free hand, which may turn them into part of the problem and reinforce the use problematic media. the issue of education is much more complex, and calls for an increase in the support of technical fields and practical education at the expense of social sciences, history or civic education may serve as a vital element in the spread of disinformation and pro-russian propaganda. because disinformation in the czech republic is linked to russian hybrid warfare it is a politicized issue. attempts to solve the problem naturally alienate citizens who have feelings for the communist past and pro-russian attitudes. approximately half of the czech population does not trust mainstream media and every sixth person is in favour of a regime change to some undemocratic form. these settings limit the manoeuvring space in the political arena and, as a result, also the adoption of effective measures to address the issue of disinformation because the opponents of regulation will always protect themselves with the argument of freedom of speech and stress that censorship is not allowed. in other words, they will use the advantage of a liberal democracy to spread anti-liberal opinions and disinformation. acknowledgements i would like to gratefully thank mr. ian bell from the faculty of law, palacký university in olomouc, czech republic, for his help with the language proofreading. i would also like to thank mr. tomáš čižik, the director of the centre for european and north atlantic affairs for various consultations and advice regarding the previous draft of this article. special thanks should also be given to the anonymous reviewers who provided very detailed comments and constructive criticism that, in the 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https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 james anderson. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(3): 5143. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5143 lead paper in a special issue on ethnocracy ethnocracy: exploring and extending the concept james anderson queens university belfast abstract ethnocracy means ‘government or rule by a particular ethnic group’ or ethnos, sometimes contrasted with democracy, rule by the demos or the people in general. the concept was primarily developed as national ethnocracy for regimes in contemporary national states which claim to be ‘democratic’. it was mainly pioneered by the israeli geographer oren yiftachel to analyse the ethnically-biased policies and asymmetrical power relations of jews and palestinians in israel/palestine, but it needs to be further developed in other geographical settings and in different types of political context. yiftachel himself extended it ‘down’ to city level and a specifically urban ethnocracy, and we can further explore how cities and city governance can sometimes moderate national state ethnocracy. going beyond the national and the urban, and the particularities of the israeli case, we can also enrich the concept by extending it to three other types of context each of which has its own specific dynamics: firstly, ‘back’ to imperial ethnocracy which often preceded and gave birth to national ethnocracy; secondly, it can be extended ‘forwards’ to the (usually mis-named) ‘post-conflict’ or power-sharing stages of ‘peace processes’, to what we might call shared or ‘post-conflict’ ethnocracy; thirdly, and more speculatively, it can be extended to contemporary religious-political conflicts which are at least partly transnational in character, to what could be called religious and ‘post-national’ ethnocracy. these five main types of ethnocracy and their inter-relationships can help tie together different features of ethnic and ethnonational conflicts. however questions remain: about, for instance, ethnicity and its sometimes problematic components; about where and how to draw the boundary between ethnocracy and democracy; and about rival concepts such as milder ‘ethnic democracy’ and harsher ‘apartheid’. introduction ethnocracy basically means ‘government or rule by an ethnic group’ or ethnos, and more precisely rule by a particular ethnos in a multi-ethnic situation where there is at least one other significant ethnic group. ethnicity and group self-awareness can be specified in terms https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5143 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 of religion, imputed ‘racial’ features, language, and/or a shared history and culture more broadly defined, components which vary and sometimes in problematic ways. ethnocracy is often contrasted with democracy or rule by the demos, ‘the people’ in general in a given area or territory – demos originally denoted a place-based community, so democracy was spatial or geographical from the start. it too can be problematical – for instance ‘the people’ in athens’ fabled democracy did not include women or slaves, and some people are still routinely excluded because of their youth or other reasons; decisions taken by simple majority vote can leave nearly half ‘the people’ dissatisfied; and if this is systematically repeated it becomes ‘majoritarian’ democracy or a negation of democracy (not the demos deciding but the same ‘50+%’ of voters). nevertheless, despite such problems, democracy is seen as preferable to ethnocracy and indeed to most if not all the other alternative types of rule, though some of these overlap or mingle with democracy and ethnocracy. these alternatives include autocracy (rule by a single dictator or tyrant as in ancient greece), aristocracy (… by big land lords as in feudalism), plutocracy (… by the rich), meritocracy (… by people chosen on merit), bureaucracy (… by officials), or technocracy (... by technocrats or technical experts who ‘know best’). there is indeed the growing complaint that our democracies are being turned into plutocracies (most obviously in the us) and more widely into technocracies, bringing the threat that present-day ethnocracies may face democratic deficits on several fronts simultaneously. ethnocracy was generally applicable to traditional empires where a coherent ethnic group conquered and spread its rule over culturally diverse populations, though significantly the concept did not apply to the later roman empire which granted citizenship to its inhabitants irrespective of their ethnicity or location within the empire. it still loosely applies to tribebased politics, but it has been developed from a general imprecise label into an analytical concept, initially for understanding national state regimes. ali mazrui in soldiers and kinsmen in uganda: the making of a military ethnocracy (1975, p. 4), defined ethnocracy more precisely as ‘a distributive system which allocates or divides political power primarily on the basis of ethnicity and kinship real or presumed’, and he used the concept to analyse the nature of general idi amin’s dictatorship. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 3 however, it was primarily developed for analysing national ethnocratic regimes in contemporary national states which claim to be ‘democratic’. this was pioneered by the israeli geographer oren yiftachel to analyse israel’s ethnically-biased policies and the asymmetrical power relations between jews and palestinians. particularly in ethnocracy: land and identity politics in israel/palestine (2006), he analysed the various ways in which the jewish ethnos has trumped the demos of all the people, when in israel ‘proper’ (pre-1967 borders) about 20% of the population are muslim and christian arabs or palestinians, with of course many more in the illegally ‘occupied’ palestinian territories. brave in my opinion to call his country an ethnocracy when the national state claims that israel is ‘the only democracy in the middle east’ and when this is perhaps the ‘legitimising narrative’ of its national government when criticised for its mistreatment of palestinians. moreover, yiftachel extended the concept ‘down’ from the national level to the sometimes milder urban ethnocracy of cities and city government, along with colleagues like haim yacobi (in, for example, his the jewish-arab city: spatio-politics in a mixed community, 2009). drawing on urban theory and the distinctive ‘politics of urbanism’, we can elaborate more fully on statecity differences and why cities can sometimes moderate national ethnocracy. we can also question how ethnocracy relates to perhaps alternative or rival concepts and categories, such as the more extreme-sounding apartheid on one side and the milder ethnic democracy on the other. or are these better subsumed as variants of ethnocracy? when the states claim to be democratic (as most now do), there are questions too about where and how to ‘draw the line’ between democracy and ethnocracy: when, for instance, does democratic decision-making by simple majority voting spill over into majoritarianism and systematic discrimination against an ethnic minority; or how would we recognise if ethnocracy was actually ended, especially where it is mostly informal or de facto rather than de jure and explicit in state laws? set the ‘democratic’ bar too low and anti-democratic discrimination goes unchallenged; set it too high and perhaps most contemporary democratic states would become defined as ethnocracies which rather dilutes the concept or renders it vacuous. it can be explored in other national and urban contexts beyond the particularities of israelpalestine, in cases such as belgium, bosnia or northern ireland, for instance; or in this special issue, as well as jerusalem, the cases of australia, beirut, estonia, fiji, sri lanka (as indeed yiftachel – 2006, pp. 20-33 – shows with short excursions to sri lanka, estonia and australia). but more importantly, the concept can also be enriched by going beyond the 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 national and the urban to other types of socio-political situation and each of these has its own distinctive dynamics. i suggest three further extensions. firstly, we can extend it ‘back’ to imperial ethnocracy, which often preceded national ethnocracy, and which, despite having fewer, if any, pretensions to democracy, could paradoxically be less oppressive than successor national ethnocracies which claim democratic status. secondly, more speculatively and briefly, we can extend it ‘forwards’ to the (usually mis-named) ‘post-conflict’ or powersharing stages of ‘peace processes’, to what we can call shared or ‘post-conflict’ ethnocracy, and here democracy – or rather preventing or reducing damaging majoritarian democracy – is a central concern. thirdly, it can be extended (some might think over-extended) to contemporary religious-political conflicts. religion, with its well-developed institutions and transnational or universalist ethos, is often much more than a mere ethnic or ethno-national marker, and in what we might call religious and ‘post-national’ ethnocracy it can move centre-stage as ‘the’ motivator or goal in its own right. so the politics, like the religion, may aspire to be at least partly transnational in character. so-called ‘islamic fundamentalism’ is the clearest example; it is also literally post-national to the extent it emerged from the wreckage of ‘arab nationalism’; and here democracy may be conspicuously absent. these five variants of ethnocracy – national, urban, imperial, ‘post-conflict’ and ‘postnational/religious’ – and their inter-relations help tie together different aspects of ethnonational conflicts involving contested states and divided cities1. the inter-relations vary: national and urban ethnocracies generally coexist in the same space and dealing with both together can point up the urban dimensions of ethno-national conflict and how cities have shaped the conflict (as well as vice versa). in contrast, relations between imperial and national ethnocracies are historically sequential with the former often though not always giving birth to the latter. ‘post-conflict’ ethnocracy typically follows a conflict where national ethnocracy was an important cause; and similarly ‘post-national’ ethnocracies may have roots in imperial and national variants. in this historical perspective, and assessing ethnocracy’s inherently conflict-generating, de-stablising and changeable character, we need to see the concept in fluid and flexible terms. unless constrained by internal forces, or more likely internal forces with crucial external support, ethnocracy is prone to intensification – 1 a version of this article was given as a public lecture at the university of technology sydney in november 2014. my interest in ethnocracy started a decade earlier researching ethno-nationally divided cities – see acknowledgements for more details. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 5 becoming more extreme, more authoritarian and less democratic. it seems deluded ethnocrats have the rallying cry ‘if you’re in a hole, keep digging’! national ethnocracy in our current era of national states, the dominant form of ethnocracy is national, in sovereign states and moreover states which usually claim to be ‘democratic’: like israel, and northern ireland before the 1998 belfast/good friday ‘power-sharing’ agreement, and in other situations where claims to be a ‘democracy’ are even more questionable, like apartheid south africa. it is often assumed or implicit that ethnocracy applies only to contemporary national states with an element of democracy, but our understandings of the concept are sometimes over-determined by particular cases and this is too narrow. the concept applied to idi amin’s dictatorship over the national state of uganda; and, as argued below, it can usefully be extended to forerunner imperial ethnocracies where democracy was weak or nonexistent. oren yiftachel (2006) honed his understanding in the particular context of israel, which, like most contemporary ethnocracies, does indeed have a nominally-democratic regime, though not in the territory occupied since 1967, while within israel ‘proper’ it systematically discriminates in favour of the dominant ethnos rather than ruling even-handedly on behalf of the demos of all the citizens. with liberal democracy now a global ‘norm’, ethnocratic regimes usually depend on ‘democracy’ claims for their legitimation, with subordinated groups having some, generally more limited, access to democracy. here it is important to stress that where formal democracy occurs in ethnocracies it is not merely ideological camouflage or ‘window-dressing’: on the contrary, in the current era the dominant ethnos typically demands democracy, actively wants it – at least for itself. thus these national regimes are not simply authoritarian: they typically have parliamentary assemblies and periodic elections, for instance, and perhaps a (sometimes ostensibly?) independent judiciary, and a (supposedly?) free media. these can give the appearance of ‘ordinary democracy’ but they hide a ‘deeper structure’ which is profoundly anti-democratic in that the democracy applies only or mainly to politics within the dominant ethnos, not to the demos of all the people in the state territory. rule is mainly or solely by members and representatives of that ethnos, it is they who are in charge, making the major decisions: 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 ethnos and demos are conflated but the ‘democracy’ is disproportionately and sometimes exclusively available to the favoured ethnos. and it is this political cleavage between the ethnic groups which defines the character of the state as ethnocratic rather than democratic. national ethnocracy basically works by (con)fusing the nation-state ideal of the people’s ‘right to self-determination’ in their own territory with ethnic ‘self-determination’ in territory which is ethnically shared. as yiftachel (2006) points out, typical features include an essentialising, general and all-encompassing ‘ethnicization’ of society – seeing it as a hierarchy of ethnic groups; and using a variety of political, cultural, social, economic, moral and legal frameworks to determine the distribution of power and resources disproportionally in favour of the dominant ethnos. but this ‘ethnicization/hierarchization’ can spread ‘out of control’, extending or spilling over into exacerbating divisions within the dominant ethnicity, a further source of instability (e.g., the ‘ethno-class’ divisions within israeli jews between the ashkenazim of european origin who established zionism and for long dominated the state, as against the generally lower class mizrahim of ‘oriental’ origin, though since the 1970s the latter have got a greater share of state-power through more extreme right-wing likud governments2). labour and housing markets are major arenas for ethnocracy. even where officially ‘open’ without any legal restrictions they tend to be segregated and stratified in terms of ethnonation and ethno-class: indeed they are key arenas for de facto ethnocracy which is an important element even where ethnocracy is de jure, enshrined in law as in israel, and they dominated in the northern irish case which was very largely de facto (though resting on a legal territorial framework designed to give a permanent protestant majority – see below). for the working class dependent on state-provided housing, who got housed where depended on religion; and in the labour market workers were subject to segregation in terms of quite intricate job gradations (even within the same workplace) in terms of the pay, the reliability and the conditions (e.g. dirtyness or health hazards) of different jobs. in most cases the protestant/unionist workers benefited, at least in relative terms (often the only terms recognised), while the workers as a whole were divided and put at a disadvantage. for example, dockers were segregated between those working on cross-channel boats which sailed to/from britain on a daily basis and hence provided very regular employment, and 2 a recent example of damaging divisions within the dominant ethnos is the israeli police discriminating against jews of ethiopian origin. (guardian 31 august 2016) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 7 dockers who worked on deep-sea cargo boats where employment was more spasmodic. not difficult to guess which were the protestant and which the catholic dockers. ‘ethnic democracy’ or ‘apartheid state’? officially israel sees itself as a ‘western liberal democracy’, though sometimes with an acknowledgement of ‘flaws’ in the treatment of palestinians (even within israel ‘proper’, never mind the ‘occupied’ territories of the west bank, east jerusalem and gaza). trying to come to terms with the harsh realities, other more critical israeli analysts saw systematic ethnic bias and prefer the designation pioneered in 1990 by sammy smooha, ‘ethnic democracy’ (yiftachel 2006, p. 87). this could fit another official characterisation of israel as ‘jewish and democratic’, intended to be read as unproblematic, but smooha (2002) explicitly recognizes that israeli democracy is limited, ambiguous and ‘second-rate’. nevertheless he puts what we will see are questionable arguments: that it is ‘robust and stable’, and that israel retains an overall democratic framework which guarantees basic civil rights and allows minorities to make incremental gains through democratic and peaceful struggle. he affirms its designation as a democracy, albeit an ‘ethnic’ rather than a ‘liberal’ one but a democracy not an ethnocracy. some analysts prefer the term ‘ethnic democracy’ because it is less critical of a regime (in some cases their own country), and it can be argued that it is appropriate where ethnocracy is comparatively mild, the discrimination not very severe. however, it cannot cover other contexts where democracy may be unimportant or non-existent, such as imperial ethnocracy; and in national ethnocracies it is an oxymoron where there is the anti-democratic reality of systematic majoritarian discrimination against an ethnic minority or minorities. in the israeli case ‘democratic state’ is contradicted by a ‘jewish state’ which systematically discriminates de jure against resident palestinians. and that includes all the palestinians under israeli military rule in the west bank as well as in ‘israel proper’, for israel-palestine in reality is now a single state – already israel’s ‘single-state solution’ – despite its fragmentation into separate, legally distinct territories reminiscent of apartheid south africa (a fragmentation which has undermined and now blocks the possibility of an independent palestinian state and the so-called ‘two-state solution’). therefore, and because of the political opprobrium attached to it, some analysts prefer to characterise israel as an ‘apartheid state’ instead of using the more ‘academic’ concept of ethnocracy. however, the two terms are not mutually 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 exclusive; ‘apartheid’ with its connotations of rigidly separate and grossly unequal development (implemented by the minority white population in the case of south africa) is best treated as a more limited sub-category of ethnocracy to signal a particularly harsh form of it3. as for ‘ethnic democracy’, the designation ‘jewish and democratic’ would be akin to demanding a ‘protestant and democratic northern ireland’, another unacceptable contradiction in terms which would cause outrage. ireland was partitioned in 1920 with the border drawn so as to give northern ireland a built-in ‘2 to 1’ protestant majority/catholic minority, and in 1969 its ‘majoritarian democracy’ or ‘dictatorship of the majority’ led to the three decades of low-intensity warfare – ‘the troubles’ – for which the official antidote is now formalised consociational power-sharing, or ‘post-conflict’ ethnocracy (below) (see mcgarry and o’leary 1995). a statement by its first prime minister that northern ireland had ‘a protestant parliament for a protestant people’ did indeed cause outrage at the time and is still quoted in outraged tones over ninety years later. with ethno-national division and systematic exclusion its over-riding feature, ethnocratic northern ireland barely qualified as a democracy, ethnic or otherwise, and certainly not a ‘western liberal’ one (despite the ‘catholic nationalists’ having full voting rights). ‘ethnic cleansing’, expansion and conflict-generation according to michael mann in the dark side of democracy: explaining ethnic cleansing (2005; the main title could perhaps more usefully refer to modern ethnocracy in general rather than only to ethnic cleansing), the removal of native arabs from ‘israel’ was most murderous in the late 1940s. it happened partly under nominal british empire rule before the zionist movement established its own independent national state: its regime was thus ethnocratic from ‘before the start’, and indeed intentionally so from zionism’s beginnings at the end of the 19th century (see anderson 2013, p. 206). but some national ethnocracies (e.g. the turkey of the young turks; newly-independent sri lanka in the 1950s) were initially 3arguing informally, i have defended yiftachel’s use of ‘ethnocracy’ on the grounds that ‘apartheid’ is a narrower, more specific or limited, though more politically-charged, category. he himself (yiftachel 2006, p.92, pp.125-8, pp.303-4) suggested israel experiences ‘a process of creeping apartheid’ which increases ethnocracy; and he preferred ‘creeping apartheid’ to ‘full apartheid’ because ‘israel proper’ still retained substantial democratic elements. as argued above, however, a democratic element is not necessary to qualify as an ethnocracy – idi amin’s dictatorship or autocracy was an ethnocracy. apartheid is best seen within the wider context of ethnocracy which is more analytically useful and flexible especially when extended to other situations beyond the national (and a similar argument applies to ethnocracy vis à-vis the more limited ‘ethnic democracy’). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 9 democratic in inspiration but can then slide into authoritarianism and ‘murderous ethnic cleansing’ (and indeed face accusations of genocide, as of armenians and sri lankan tamils4); though again some ethnocracies are established without significant violence (e.g., in estonia vis à-vis its sizeable russian-speaking population after 1990). but yiftachel notes that the establishment of israel did involve ‘a massive ethnic cleansing’ – the 1947-48 nakba or palestinian catastrophe – in which over 700,000 muslim and christian palestinians were removed into exile, many terrorised into leaving by selective massacres by the paramilitaries of irgun led by menachem begin (later the founder of likud), and the stern gang (whose leader yitzhak shamir also became a likud prime minister). the palestinians were killed or for the most part driven out according to pre-prepared ‘plan d’ (or dalet) and were replaced by jewish settlers from europe, and also from arab countries (see pappe 2007, pp.39-40, pp.86-126; anderson 2013, pp.207-8). yiftachel also sees settler ethnocracies as premised on ethno-national expansion. this certainly fits the case of israel and its territorial expansion, initially across israel ‘proper’ and then in the west bank, east jerusalem and gaza after their 1967 ‘occupations’. but we need to be careful not to over-generalise. ethnocracy is not necessarily driven by a ‘settler society’, nor does it necessarily include ethnic cleansing, at least not of the murderous sort – post-1990 estonian ethnocracy is a case in point where the ‘settlers’ are in fact members of the russianspeaking and arguably relatively oppressed minority. conversely, northern ireland does have a ‘settler society’ in some ways comparable to israel’s at least at an ideological level (see below, and anderson 2013) but the unionist regime was not territorially ‘expansionist’ in any real sense, and in general was more intent on defensively retaining what it had5, rather than expanding or deepening its ethnocracy. so ‘ethno-national expansion’, at least in a territorial sense, is not a necessary feature of ethnocracy. on the other hand it does occur in many cases. there is no ‘settler society’ involved in the sri lankan conflict in that both the northern tamil and the dominant sinhalese communities have co-inhabited the island for at least two 4on sri lankan genocide, see balasundaram in this issue. in general, however, mann’s (2005, p.17) term ‘murderous ethnic cleansing’ is preferable. ‘genocide’, although a legal term, is problematic, requiring proof of intentionality to kill a particular group, and involving the question of whether it can apply to only a part of the group, and how large a part that has to be. it clearly applies to the nazi genocide of jews and also roma, but not to the ‘murderous ethnic cleansing’ of palestinians which primarily aimed to remove not kill them (see pappe 2007, p.3). 5the central issue/mechanism was countering the generally higher catholic birth-rate and retaining the ‘2 to 1’ protestant majority by using employment discrimination to force disproportionate numbers of catholics to emigrate to find work. 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 millennia. yet the post-war expansion of sinhalese settlement into tamil areas, often on land taken over by the army for supposedly security reasons, has been both an outcome of ethnocracy and an ethnocratic instrument to further weaken the tamils politically. for example, it drove a ‘wedge’ of sinhalese settled territory between the tamils in the jaffna and the trincomalee regions (interestingly with advice from the israelis, past masters in the use of territoriality for political purposes)6. yiftachel rightly characterises ethnocratic regimes as inherently conflict-generating: they give and ask for trouble, and hence are inherently unstable. left to themselves they are prone to intensification, becoming more rather than less ethnocratic, ‘digging’ a deeper ‘hole’ for themselves: conflict generates a reaction and further conflict in a downward and often violent spiral. for example, israel’s zionist nationalism and the supporters and also the opponents, of the regime have all become increasingly ‘extreme’ over time. in sri lanka the ethnocracy of the majority sinhalese escalated steeply to all-out war against the northern tamil population with massive oppression and loss of life, but from relatively mild and almost trivial beginnings some fifty years earlier largely instigated by an ambitious but thwarted sinhalese politician, mr. bandaranayake who used pro-sinhalese bias in order to become prime minister. in the downward spiral even the ethnocratic regime itself can lose effective control through what can sometimes seem like self-inflicted political stupidity. in northern ireland the protestant majority unionist government generally defined all the catholics as ‘disloyal’ supporters of a ‘united ireland’, but by the 1960s this traditional objective actually had very little real support even in catholic nationalist heartlands (a friend from nationalist west belfast said only 5% of his secondary school class had supported it). yet despite this, the regime persisted with its blanket assumption that catholics were ‘disloyal traitors’, and after five decades of ethnocracy and then failed reforms (seen as ‘too little, too late’) that would become a ‘self-fullfilling’ prophesy, proof for many that northern ireland was ‘unreformable’, when the three decades of low-intensity warfare – the ‘troubles’ – erupted in 1969. political 6in february 2015, shortly after the mahinda rajapaksa government was replaced by maithripala sirisena promising reforms, i interviewed and got a wealth of information from twelve tamils – politicians, journalists, business and professional people mainly in jaffna in northern sri lanka but also in colombo. despite the ‘tamil tigers’ secessionist war ending in defeat in 2009, the sri lankan army continues as an ‘army of occupation’ in the tamil north and for reasons that have little to do with ‘security’ but everything to do with consolidating ethnocratic oppression and exploitation. the army is involved in commercial enterprises; much of the land it confiscated has not been returned to the rightful owners. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 11 stupidity aside, the ethnocracy had a strong class dimension in keeping the working class divided and protestants away from socialism, but most sections of society, nationalist and unionist, lost out. ironically, perhaps none lost out more than the once relatively privileged protestant workers who often failed to adapt to de-industrialisation and the new (un)employment circumstances. countering ethnocracy halting or breaking the downward spiral – reducing ethnocracy, reducing instability, increasing democracy – usually depends on the inevitable internal opposition getting external help and support in the form of effective pressures to force reforms. this often fails to materialise, or in sufficient measure. it happened to some extent in the case of estonia with an easing of ethnocratic policies towards the minority russians (many of whom did not have estonian citizenship), under pressure from international human rights organisations and as a condition for estonia being granted eu membership in 2004 (though pressure seems to have diminished again since membership was gained and the eu’s external leverage was reduced). it happened with northern ireland’s 1998 good friday agreement, particularly through support and pressure from the european union and the usa. but even in this comparatively fortunate case, external help took a long time to have effect and changing ‘internal affairs’ from the outside still has its limitations. it has still not even begun in israel-palestine where the main external player, the us, has the means but not the will to insist on meaningful reforms (and another important player, the eu, lacks both means and will). in sri lanka it has happened only to a very limited extent: the tamils were defeated militarily and could exert less pressure themselves; but the victorious regime of rajapaksa was deemed by the us and india to be too friendly towards china and was replaced by the less-overtly ethnocratic regime of sirisena; in reality, however, it was not very different and now there is less external pressure to reform ethnocracy because the perceived geopolitical threat from china has diminished, at least for the time being7. 7the tamil interviewees welcomed rajapaksa’s overthrow, but were not sufficiently confident about future developments to have their names made public. they were sceptical about sirisena’s ability to deliver a meaningful reduction of ethnocracy because of his continued reliance on sinhalese votes, and the continued presence of the effectively sinhalese army in tamil territory. we visited a tamil family living on infertile sandhills because its farmland remained confiscated six years after the war ended. to date the scepticism about sirisena’s reforms seems fully justified. 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 on the other hand, the tensions or contradictions of ethnocratic regimes and their inherent instability point towards how ethnocracy might be weakened or transcended by internal forces. rather than simply (unthinkingly?) accepting the dominant terms of reference of ethnic or ethno-national protagonists, the relative importance of their ‘foregrounded’ ethnic divisions can be questioned. ‘backgrounded’ or neglected social divisions which cross-cut and under-cut them can instead be encouraged by, for example, mobilizing around what some would argue are more important class, gender, and ecological issues. these are typically down-played and often actively obscured in ethnocracies, but this can lead to popular discontent and public protests against ethnic politics and its politicians, as happened in 2014 with urban riots in croat and bosniak parts of bosnia largely around economic and unemployment issues. in lebanon ethnocracy is now being confronted by a new left alliance, ‘beirut madinati’, which is organising not around ethnic issues but people’s living conditions, health and safety, affordable housing, environmental sustainability and social justice. looked at comparatively – at different national cases and at the same case getting better or worse over time – the methods and degrees of ethnocracy can vary widely on spectrums from ‘authoritarian’ to ‘democratic’, and de jure to de facto. ethnocracy is relatively easy to recognise and assess where de jure, explicit in state laws, as in israel or apartheid south africa; sometimes less easy to recognise or ‘prove’ where it operates de facto or informally in civil society. thus in northern ireland ethnocracy was (or is?) almost entirely de facto (even in its pre-1960s heyday there were no laws explicitly discriminating in favour of protestants, they were favoured more subtly)8; and tracing its decline is complicated and contested. direct intervention from london from 1969, and especially its imposition of ‘direct rule’ closing down the local assembly in belfast in 1972, set the scene for gradually – some would say very gradually – dismantling the structures of ethnocracy (e.g. removing local authority control of housing allocation; outlawing forms of ethno-national discrimination in the labour market). but at the same time the british ministry of defence set up the ulster defence regiment which armed one section of the community – the unionists – for its battle against the ira and in effect against the nationalist population more widely. one 8however, non-explicit de facto ethnocracy is often obvious, as when goan christians find the supply of beef has been reduced and prices have rocketed because of the actions of the indian hindu nationalist government – the christians are beef-eaters while hindus supposedly are not (goan herald 24 march 2015). it seems the ‘bjp’ regime of narendra modi is beginning to turn the world’s largest democracy into an ethnocracy. sometimes, however, the biases are ‘hidden’ within the state apparatus and only emerge later, as when recently released british state papers for northern ireland in the 1980s confirmed suspicions that supposedly ‘neutral’ british civil servants were strongly pro-unionist: they believed they had ‘to depend on unionists’ to run northern ireland – see imperial ethnocracy, below (irish news 31 august 2016). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 13 part of the state can be anti-ethnocratic while another is ethnocratic. however, by 1998 and the power-sharing agreement, ethnocracy had undoubtedly been substantially reduced, though discrimination has been so embedded in local society over centuries that detailed research would be needed to identify when or if it has ended (perhaps it is now simply ‘shared’ – see below). similarly, in de jure terms we can easily conclude that israeli ethnocracy has significantly more democratic content than apartheid south africa – hardly difficult, not least because the ruling ‘whites’ were a clear minority of the total population (and the designation ‘white and democratic’ would have been a totally unconvincing oxymoron). however when we turn to de facto geopolitics, or the social realities of labour markets, things are not quite so simple. firstly, israel as a geopolitical ally and supporter was indirectly implicated in apartheid south africa (as in sri lankan ethnocracy). secondly, whereas the economy of apartheid south africa was totally dependent on the labour of the black majority and there was never any question of ‘ethnically cleansing’ or excluding them (except to the nearby phoney, separate ‘homelands’ within south africa), israel in contrast consciously replaced whatever small dependence it once had on the cheap labour of palestinians, employing new settlers instead, and latterly using temporary or unenfranchised migrant workers (increasingly a potentially important new ‘third party’ inserted into ethnocracies). from an israeli economic viewpoint the palestinians are dispensable (see piterberg 2008). this trumping of economics by demographic considerations is unusual because oppressed minorities are typically seen as ripe for exploitation, and it goes some way to explaining the severity of israeli ethnocracy. urban ethnocracy the extension of the concept to ethnically-divided cities and city government generally applies within the context of national state ethnocracy (see bollens 2007)9. but the dynamics are different and outcomes crucially depend on the relations between state and city. on the one hand, urban centres can have considerable scope or relative autonomy to modify or moderate the national ethnocracy and associated conflict. the demographic ‘balance of forces’ in a particular city may be radically different (e.g. either more or less favourable to the minority) than that at state level; but in general the capacity to moderate stems from the 9scott bollens has carried out several detailed studies of urban governance in national ethnocracies. urban ethnocracy also occurred in imperial ethnocracy but that is not dealt with here. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 specifically ‘urban’ character of cities. and so in northern ireland various power-sharing arrangements were pioneered in city and local governments long before they ventured onto the ‘national’ stage of the regional government assembly. on the other hand, city autonomy can be severely curtailed or nullified, especially when at the mercy of states which believe they are fighting for their own survival. cities have always to be seen in their national and indeed wider international contexts, and they can either reduce the severity of ethnocracy and conflict or exacerbate it, depending largely on national circumstances and wider interference or support. it is in the character of cities, and sometimes especially capital cities, to attract conflict: they are prime symbolic and material targets for violent attack, prizes to be won in the conflict of ethnically-divided societies. few prizes come bigger than jerusalem, central to three major world religions and the putative and disputed capital for israeli jews and for the palestinians. but all cities are also relatively easy to disrupt (e.g. can be brought to a standstill by strategically placed car bombs, real or hoax). antagonistic urban groups living at relatively high densities and in close proximity can make for intense and on-going conflict. yet, other urban features point in the opposite direction – unless there is full scale conventional warfare and the city is subject to ‘urbicide’ (coward 2004). this ‘killing’ or total destruction of a city is however often an exaggeration or in reality quite exceptional for ‘divided cities’ in ethnocratic conflicts (notwithstanding the all-too-frequent images of urban devastation from gaza, iraq or syria). in most cases, the contending forces are, or have resident supporters, in the same shared city. for it to function reasonably ‘normally’ as a city there has to be at least some minimal social interaction and co-operation across and between the city’s different parts, activities and communities; and most of the city’s residents most of the time have a strong vested interest in that continuing – longing for ‘normality’, i.e. non-conflict, is often a popular refrain. this ‘urban functional imperative’ to co-operate can often undercut or at least modify ethnic divisions and conflict, and the message from urban ethnocracy is often relatively encouraging compared to its national counterpart. it is not coincidental that northern ireland power-sharing started at city level; nor that the anti-ethnocratic lebanese beirut madinati alliance is city-based. while generally applying to cities within national ethnocraticies, urban ethnocracy is a distinctly different type, not simply ‘national ethnocracy writ small’, just as cities are a qualitatively different type of entity from states. urban ethnocratic regimes generally cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 15 encourage ethnic segregation, but they have less control than states over issues such as economic development, migration, and private sector profit-driven housing provision (an ironic example is middle class palestinians paying above average prices to move into new jewish ‘colonial neighbourhoods’ which were intended to further jerusalem’s judaisation – see yacobi and pullan 2014). the relative ‘openness’ of urban housing and employment to economic market criteria can in some circumstances weaken ethnic priorities or allow a comparatively milder ethnocracy – as arguably occurred in what by today’s standards seems a very harmonious jerusalem under mayor teddy kollek, from 1965 until he was replaced by a right-wing likud mayor, ehud olmert, in 1993 (see dumper 1997). as yiftachel (2006, pp.189-190) puts it, the ethnocratic city ‘… offers a more open and porous spatial ethnic arena, where some of the ethnocratic boundaries and hierarchies may be undermined .... on the one hand, it is an officially open and accessible space, on the other, it is segregated, controlled, and hierarchical....it is increasingly part of a globalizing culture and economy characterised by international migration, development bursts, and discourses of human rights, civil society, and democracy…. yet...it is a product of the nationalist, expansionist logic of purified ethnic space.... urban informality becomes a common planning strategy in such settings, allowing both orderly and modernist planning to proceed while containing the tensions and preserving the control over the unplannable elements in these cities.’ here he is referring to ethnocratic urbanisation which has given rise to informal or illegal urban developments (e.g., unauthorised squatting, undocumented workers, unlicensed trade). however, these features – ‘grey areas’ or ‘gray space’ – are in fact more general to cities in the ‘developing world’ which are not ethnocratic, and they are not necessarily replicated in western ones which are. but they do point to the importance of urban planning and land-use controls as tools of ethnocratic city management (see bollens 2007). the features of ‘informality’ are prominent in the particular case of israeli urban planning where a technocratic veneer masks a minimization of palestinian power through the gerrymandering of municipal borders, and a strategy where illegalities are condoned or even facilitated as a way of containing ‘the ungovernable’. the actual result is unserviced and deprived communities where planning agencies and tools ostensibly supposed to promote social amenities and welfare are in fact used to contain and oppress the marginalised. 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 the distinctiveness of urban regimes is partly explained by yiftachel in terms of the logic of capital accumulation as a driver of urban transformation vis-à-vis the logic and the limitations of ethnocratic control. that is a useful distinction but it does not fully account for the distinctiveness of ‘the urban’. after all, the logic of capital applies throughout the whole of society and to the state, not only to cities. rather, the city differs from the state partly in terms of its formal government being subordinate to national state government, but also – as an element of that – what we can call its ‘partial de-politicization’. there is in capitalism a partial, institutionalised separation of ‘politics’ from ‘economics’, and one expression of it is a ‘division of labour’ between state and city. while the state monopolises the so-called ‘high politics’ of sovereignty, security and the exercise of legitimate violence, the modern city’s usual focus is more on economic, social and cultural issues and their associated ‘low politics’. seeing like a city not like a state we can elaborate further on this by drawing on urban theory and the distinctive ‘politics of urbanism’ to discuss state-city differences more fully and how cities can sometimes moderate national ethnocracy. at the same time we have to recognise that ethnocracy itself can reduce the distinctiveness of urban politics and reduce their moderating effect. however, first it helps to see urban politics in so-called ‘normal’ (i.e. non-ethnocratic) circumstances as fundamentally different from state politics, as warren magnusson argues cogently in his politics of urbanism: seeing like a city, 2013. the contrast he draws is between a state politics of basically singular sovereignty in a more-or-less bounded national territory, compared to the essentially unbounded character of the city and its city-to-city networks (which often cross the territorial borders of the state). specifically urban politics relate not to a single source of authority (like ‘the’ state) but to multiple sources, mainly economic and cultural as well as the conventionally political. and thereby the city opens up possibilities for comparatively greater flexibility and moderation in the exercise of ethnocracy. to summarise his main points, magnusson makes a persuasive case that: ‘urbanism is ultimately uncontainable, and that means that its politics always exceed the regulatory efforts of the highest authorities …. urbanism and statism are always at odds, since statism ... is inspired by the ideal that everything can be cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 17 contained or controlled by a higher authority …… to see like a city is to focus on what happens between people, what enables urban life, what questions arise within it, what solutions are developed, what conduct develops and to what effects. to see the political in these terms is to refer back to these practices rather than to the ones by which people are ostensibly “ruled”. the question of rule is secondary, because it only arises as a threat or a possible solution – in a context in which people are always engaged in making their own lives work, under conditions in which they are thrown together by their own aspirations or by the immediate necessities of life… if the state emerges in response to the problem of sovereignty, the city has different origins and a different political order is immanent in its own rationalities. if the state requires a monopoly of legitimate authority to persist as a state, the city as city does not. the city depends on the intricate pattern of government and selfgovernment...and hence on multiple authorities in different but not necessarily inconsistent registers. the effect of the city is to hold sovereignty in suspense, defer its application, and perhaps render it redundant… one might argue that what typifies the city is not the imposition of an overarching authority, but the multiplication of challenges to existing authorities of all sorts… the city ... is not organized on the sovereignty principle, but instead on the principle of selforganization which in turn implies a multiplicity of authorities operating under conditions of rivalry and inter-dependence.’ (magnusson 2013, p.24, p.34, p.109, p.117, p.118) this very interesting perspective10 points to the punchline that the city should be a major, even the major, site for attempting to transform ethnocracy and ethno-national conflict, as important as the state and in different, sometimes complementary ways. unfortunately however things are not quite that simple. the punchline has to be qualified because ethnocracy itself reduces what makes urban politics distinctive from state politics and hence reduces the city’s moderating effect. ethnocracy tends to negate what in nonethnocratic circumstances is the modern city’s ‘partial de-politicisation’ with respect to sovereignty – indeed this negation can be seen as one of the defining characteristics of the ethno-nationally divided city. holding ‘sovereignty in suspense’, deferring or rendering it ‘redundant’, hardly applies to the highly-politicised city caught up in conflict about statehood. far from sovereignty issues being removed from city to state level, they are often central to ethno-nationally divided cities, and right down to conflicts at neighbourhood level (for example, fights for local territory in belfast are intense because they act as proxies for the struggle over national territory). this type of (‘high’) politicisation is indeed one important 10it is an anarchistic ‘anti-state’ perspective, and it can be argued that it seriously underplays the role of states in over-seeing if not dictating urban policies. nevertheless it captures the fact that power in cities is much more decentred, and the basic ways in which ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’ urban politics are qualitatively different from those of the state. 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 way of distinguishing the ethnocratic city from so-called ‘normal’ cities or modern ones in general. nevertheless, cities are generally very important as sites for potentially moderating or reducing ethnocracy. the associated conflicts, like contemporary populations, are now largely urbanised. the urban features identified by magnusson, particularly the city’s ‘multiple authorities’ and the ‘multiplication of challenges to existing authorities’, continue to exist under ethnocracy. here jennifer robinson’s (2006) concept of ‘ordinary cities’ is useful, and in two respects. firstly, she argues against the limiting, debilitating compartmentalisation of urban studies, divided up into different world regions or cities in ‘developed’ as distinct from ‘developing’ countries: the former tend to be privileged as the focus or source of urban theorising while the latter are relegated to residual categories. instead all cities should be understood as ‘ordinary’, all have innovative potential, especially as all now interact with more global forces. this has clear relevance for urban ethnocracy for it can and does occur in cities across the globe – across the conventional ‘compartments’. secondly, compartmentalising has the strong implication that cities have to be understood and explained primarily in terms of their particular ‘compartment’ and factors particular to it. instead they should all be treated as ‘ordinary’ in the first instance, all subject to the same or similar general processes, and at least partly understandable in terms of the same general insights. thus ‘ethnocratic cities’ can be seen as ‘ordinary’, subject to many of the same general or ‘ordinary’ urban processes (e.g. (de-)industrialistion, (sub)urbanisation, gentrification, marketization and so forth) as many other, non-ethnocratic cities. and this especially needs to be remembered in cities riven by ethnic and national conflicts where there is a tendency to try and ‘explain everything’ in terms of the conflict, as caused by it or by the ‘other side’ (it sometimes seems as if ‘nothing normal’ ever happens in these conflict-divided places). sometimes the real explanation is more mundane, to be found in ‘ordinary’ urban processes. at the same time, however, it is undoubtedly true that ethnocratic cities are shaped by (and shape) ethnic conflict, and to that extent they have to be seen as ‘extra-ordinary’. their reality is both more complex and more interesting: they are simultaneously ‘ordinary’ and ‘extra-ordinary’ and they have to be understood in terms of how the two facets interact. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 19 imperial ethnocracy if urban and national ethnocracies clearly coexist in the same time-space, relations between imperial and national variants are more complex, combining coexistence and historical sequence. while national ethnocracies mostly stem from imperial ethnocracies, and traditional empires were eventually superceded by national states, imperialism and nationalism in fact overlapped and interacted with each other over two centuries, from the french revolution to the post-world war ii era, and each took on characteristics of the other (see anderson and o’dowd 2007). in studying ethno-nationally divided cities in contemporary ethnocracies11, we found that nearly all of them originated at the insecure and often contested frontiers of traditional imperial ethnocracies (e.g. trieste in the austrohungarian empire, mostar in the ottoman, danzig in the prussian, belfast and montreal in the british, while the muslim uyghur city of kashgar in china’s xinjiang province – literally ‘new frontier’ – is a contemporary ‘throw-back’). in frontier regions (e.g. in the balkans, the middle east) imperial control was often over-extended, or brutal methods substituted for efficiency, and /or there were interventions by rival imperialisms (e.g. spain and france in ireland; austria-hungary in the ottoman balkans; and the 19th century british almost everywhere). the ruling imperial powers typically politicised ethnic groupings, sometimes governing through them (e.g. in the ottoman millet system where religious leaders became the political leaders of their communities); and imperial ‘divide and rule’ strategies based on a hierarchization of competing groups (as in ireland) often spawned and exacerbated later ethno-national conflict. belgium and its capital brussels are a rare exception to this historical sequence. there were no region-based differences of religion (most belgians were at least nominally catholic), but instead a general opposition of ‘progressive’ liberals to ‘religious’ conservatism. here language-based regional differentiations and eventually national ethnocracies only emerged in the late 19th century over half a century after state freedom from the austrian habsburg empire had been engineered, largely by external powers. belgium’s ethno-national linguistic differentiations had no real political precedents in the empire (who cared what the nonenfranchised majority of the people spoke?), even though the empire had favoured french as its language of administration, followed by the upper classes irrespective of which region they lived in (see hepburn 2004, pp. 136-140). despite romantic theories of nationalism 11 see acknowledgements below. 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 making language central, it mostly became important as a practical political issue and ‘marker’ only with the introduction of compulsory primary education in the later 19th century, for that immediately raised the issue of which language or dialect should be used in schools and by extension in society generally. another, perhaps only partial, exception to national ethnocracy having imperial roots is sri lanka where the british tended to favour generally better educated northern tamils over the majority sinhalese for state administration jobs. but it was at most a weak ethnocracy; the sinhalese and the northern tamils were broadly united in opposing british rule; and national sinhalese ethnocracy only really started becoming a serious factor in the 1950s about a decade after national independence. in some cases (e.g. palestine, ireland, and australia, though not sri lanka or lebanon) the imperial and subsequent national ethnocracies are further complicated by substantial ‘settler colonialism’. this produces its own dynamics in three-way relations between ‘settlers’ and ‘natives’ (e.g. between zionist jews and muslim or christian palestinians), and thirdly the ruling ‘metropolitan’ or imperial power. it would be misleading to simply project back the contemporary two-way relationship (e.g. between zionists and palestinians) or play down (if not ignore) imperial ethnocracy. it, after all, was generally the key agency in creating both the settler colonialism and the later national ethnocracy. imperial ethnocracy had its own overall ethnic biases, contrary to its commonly projected self-image of ‘honest broker’, though this ideology did have some partial basis in reality. the three-way relations involved ‘divide and rule’ strategies where imperial control depended on playing off ‘settlers’ and ‘natives’ against each other, mostly favouring the former though occasionally the latter; and this undoubtedly had a moderating effect, compared to the simpler and often harsher two-way ‘settler-native’ juxtaposition in the national ethnocracy which followed (despite the latter’s much greater lip service to democracy). this applied to a lesser extent in australia because the indigenous people posed much less threat to the state than did the contending forces in palestine or ireland for instance, and there was therefore less need to partially accommodate them. but is it not significant that it was australia’s own national federation which from 1901 formalized the ‘white australia policy’ and the forced assimilation of so-called ‘aborigines’? in pre-1948 palestine with its very substantial, active in-migration and a zionist settler society, and earlier in ireland with historical migration and now a ‘quasisettler’ ideology or mentality among many northern ireland protestants, the british imperial power played an cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 21 absolutely key role in jewish and protestant populations achieving separate statehood. thanks to the british, both achieved it despite being demographic minorities. they were favoured partly because palestinian nationalism (initially at least) and irish nationalism (mainly catholic in composition) were seen as the greater threat to the british status quo. ‘dictatorships of the majority’ in a democracy are bad enough but courtesy of the empire and non-democratic imperialism, palestine and ireland got demographically improbable ethnocracies based on ‘dictatorships of the minority’! (see anderson 2013). ethnically biased ‘balancing acts’ by the british, and also by the french with respect to the maronite christians of mount lebanon (see traboulsi 2007), ensured that minorities succeeded in carving out their state territories contrary to the wishes of the great majority of the respective pre-partition populations in palestine, ireland and greater syria. and they did it perhaps too ‘greedily’ in northern ireland and lebanon, for the protestants and maronites would eventually lose their demographic pre-eminence. in palestine the british made expedient wwi promises both to the palestinians and to the zionists, but they were committed to a jewish ‘national home’ on palestinian land through the balfour declaration of 1917 which was then written into their subsequent league of nations mandate. in the words of jerusalem’s british governor in the 1920s, they wanted to create ‘for england a “little loyal jewish ulster” in a sea of potentially hostile arabism’ (a self-serving imperialist logic still alive in the usa, though americans now increasingly have to question israel’s ‘loyalty’). up to 1939, the british had seriously weakened the palestinians politically and militarily before they were faced with ethnic cleansing in 1947-48, while in contrast half of the opposing zionist forces had had military training from the british army. their ‘plan d’ ethnic cleansing actually began before independence because the british effectively abdicated and left the palestinians to their fate (see pappe 2007, and piterberg 2008). imperial power has to negotiate the three-way relations involving ‘settlers’ and ‘natives’, or it has to ‘divide and rule’ a plurality of indigenous ethnicities, but either way imperial ethnocracy is rarely a simple matter of unambiguously supporting one ethnic group. instead, while seldom ‘even-handed’, it typically has to alternate in supporting different groups (and in consequence may be distrusted by all of them). national ethnocracies in contrast generally have no such ‘balancing’ constraints: national self-governing ‘democratic majorities’ typically have the simpler, less mediated, two-way relationship against the ‘minority’ – as in 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 independent post-british israel; and in northern ireland where the british government effectively left ‘local matters’ to unionist rule – or rather ‘mis-rule’ – until things ‘blew up’, literally, in the late 1960s. although national ethnocrats are more concerned about projecting democratic appearances, their regimes of bias are often less restrained and more authoritarian than imperial forerunners. there is thus the general paradox of imperial ethnocracy often being ‘milder’ than its national ‘democratic’ successors. however, this paradox is only partial and has to be qualified. some imperial powers clinging on desperately before departure in the face of local opposition resorted to extreme brutality and very ethnically-divisive tactics (e.g., the french in indo-china and algeria; the british in malaya, kenya, cyprus and aden). this, happening last, is often what is remembered locally, rather than more peaceful imperialism in its prime, and so a nasty lasting legacy was left for successor national regimes, including ethnocratic ones. ‘post-conflict’ or ‘shared’ ethnocracy more speculatively, i’m suggesting two further extensions of ‘ethnocracy’: to the usually mis-named ‘post-conflict’ stages of ‘peace processes’, and, even more tentatively, to ‘postnational’ and religious ethnocracy. these variants are speculative or tentative largely because of their overlapping, ambiguous or shifting relations with national ethnocracy, and particular regimes or movements may move into and out of the categories. ‘post-conflict’ or shared ethnocracy is a continuation of national ethnocracy but it constitutes a distinct category as it now involves two (or, as in bosnia, three) distinct and conflicting ethnicities with access to state power though on a shared basis. in the new consociational, power-sharing arrangements they continue to compete but they are also under pressure to cooperate. so this variant has its own distinctive dynamics, or in some cases a lack of them: there may be mutual blocking of ‘the other’s’ initiatives, or ‘gridlock’ because of institutional guarantees which were originally designed to counter damaging majoritarian democracy and end violent conflict. typically power-sharing has to be imposed or at least strongly encouraged by external powers – dominant ethnocrats do not willingly agree to it. examples include the 1995 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 23 ‘dayton agreement’ for the territorial and governmental relations between the serbs, croats and muslim bosniaks of bosnia, and the 1998 good friday agreement for northern ireland. they have had the great merit of very largely ending lethal conflict, but inevitably with negative aspects. institutional guarantees have been necessary to get the armed fighters to stop fighting, but that almost inevitably builds dysfunctional rigidities, even ‘gridlock’, into the political system. it can help perpetuate, or indeed accentuate, the very ethno-national divisions which feed the conflict and were a cause of it in the first place, despite being wellintentioned. old ethnocratic ways of thinking die hard anyway, but, harder if they are actively encouraged and perpetuated by consociationalism. not surprisingly, its critics have latched onto this truth, some thinking to ‘demolish’ the very idea of consociationalism. but they in turn need to be reminded of the other truth that there once was an armed conflict which had to be stopped: here the framing of the original settlement obviously requires care and foresight but in reality there are no easy answers – undefeated fighters have to be given guarantees to persuade them to stop fighting. power-sharing between groups already defined in ethnic terms inevitably puts ethnic identity and ethnic politics centre-stage, and this tends to crowd-out other identities, other politics. it may confirm separate ethno-national electorates with each ethnic group voting for its own ethnic representatives, and little ‘cross voting’; and little scope for dealing properly with issues which straddle the ethnic divisions, such as those of social class, poverty, inequality, the environment, non-ethnic forms of discrimination, and so forth. these get systematically neglected which is what led to rioting in bosnia and helped motivate madinati in beirut. the main democratic or inter-party competition tends to be within more than across or between the main ethno-national communities, and that often results in the more ‘extreme’ representatives (or self-styled ‘defenders’) of the ethnic groups winning their respective intraethnic competitions. sometimes – as in the division of bosnia into the republica srpska for bosnian serbs, while the other two ethno-national groups share the territorially separate croat-bosniak federation – the continuing ‘post-conflict’ divisions are reinforced spatially and territorially. but even without territorial reinforcement there tends to be ethnicallydivided and hence often dysfunctional government. so in northern ireland people say that rather than having a ‘power-sharing’ government, we have a ‘sharing out of power’, or what can be seen as a sharing between two ethnocratic parties. the biggest parties from each ‘side’ – here the irish nationalist sinn fein and the 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 ‘paisleyite’ democratic unionist party (dup) – ‘share out’ the most important government ministries between themselves, with often secret ‘horse-trading’. but that can break down especially before elections, and ‘stupid ethnocracy’ returns. (the dup for instance behaving as if northern ireland is still the unionist ethnocracy of their memories or dreams, though alternatively, there’s the local joke that ‘irish unionists are too stupid to know when they’ve won, and irish nationalists are too smart to admit they’ve lost’.) the previous (actually quite clever) leader of the dup did argue that unionists had ‘won the war’, the good friday agreement of 1998 confirmed the continuation of the union with britain, only a minority of catholics now supported a united ireland, and the hence the dup should now be open and welcoming to catholics. but that original ploy fell apart when (presumably for electoral purposes) he and his party helped ferment a petty, purely symbolic but toxic dispute about flying the british union jack over belfast city hall 365 days a year – a dispute which they predictably lost. so, unstable ethnocracy can have a third outcome – not simply the continuation of lethal conflict, nor the ending of it in genuine democratisation and sharing, but something inbetween: a consociational ‘shared post-conflict ethnocracy’ where conflict is (mostly) nonlethal but the reality (inverting the aphorism of clausewitz) is that the politics is the war continuing ‘by other means’. ‘post-national’ and religious ethnocracy so far we have proceeded without looking at the slippery nature of ethnicity and the divisive problems that can arise from how it is defined and used for political ends. it seemed enough to ‘know’ that the sri lankan majority are sinhalese who are sinhala-speaking buddhists while their minority tamil opponents are tamil-speaking hindus. but while a language may symbolise an ethnic or ethno-national group identity, perhaps not all putative members actually use or even understand it. for some it is mainly or merely a tokenistic badge or marker of a particular political nationalism (despite often being in fact transnational). for others, however, language is mainly of value in its own right, an end in itself rather than a means to an end, and perhaps more important than nationalism – they are sometimes called ‘cultural nationalists’ or are language activists rather than ethno-national activists. obviously the lines are blurred – indeed the same person or group may move from one category to the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 25 other (and back again) – but ‘ethnic politics in the service of language’ clearly has a different logic from ‘language in the service of ethnic politics’12. the same applies to religion, and indeed more so. it is generally more important and more problematic as the basis of ethnocracy. it may be used simply as a marker of a particular ethnic group, but it is generally transnational or universal in ethos with strong objectives of its own. most ethno-national conflicts are not centrally about religion per se – many participants are irreligious – nevertheless religion is often an important factor in shaping these conflicts – and their intractability. religions have a material institutional existence rooted in everyday life, and they can erect strong social boundaries between groups (e.g. a religious equivalent of bi-lingualism is beyond most people’s imagination though some indian hindus managed it). while often supporting peace and reconciliation, religions also have substantial historical associations with violence. ideologically they tend to deal with ‘matters of life and death’ and in dogmas of ‘absolute truth’ which can preclude a useful or peaceful discussion of disagreements. arguably this can encourage violent conflict, sometimes with largely religious motivation (see o’dowd and mcknight 2015)13. so, not surprisingly, relations with nation and national ethnocracy are complex, ambiguous and shifting: religious ethnocracy is an unsettled variant developing through different routes. for example, it may come from combining religion with tribal conflict, as in kaduna, nigeria; it may ‘spill over’ from national ethnocracy, as in israel-palestine; or it may spring ‘postnational’ from the failures of secular nationalism, most obviously from the ashes of the panarab national movement. religion-based ethnic conflict and ethnocratic ‘solutions’ may arise to some extent separately from national movements. this was the case in kaduna, although the british empire, by creating nigeria with its north-south, muslim-christian split, and the unequal treatment of different ethnic groups by imperial ethnocracy and then the nigerian state, provided the crucial context. the present sometimes violent conflict in kaduna since the 1980s has been 12for example, the gaelic league established in 1893 to restore the irish language was initially neutral in party political terms believing the language belonged to all, irish unionists as well as nationalists. but between 1912 and 1915 it was effectively taken over by its dominant nationalist component to further the specifically political aims of irish republicans. 13for our ‘divided cities’ project, (see acknowledgements), we had an international workshop on ‘religion, violence and cities’ with a special issue of space and polity organised by liam o’dowd and martina mcknight (2015). it is perhaps not coincidental that our two least violent divided cities, brussels and montreal, are the two where language rather than religion constitutes the main dividing line. 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 fuelled by hostilities between pentecostal christianity and reform islam but has centrally been about differential tribal access to socio-economic resources, (un)employment, and state positions and power (see harris 2013). it is partly about getting/keeping control of the existing state, not an ethno-national struggle to re-shape or partition the state on religious lines, though it could conceivably transmute into such a struggle (perhaps similar to sudan’s). religious motivations, objectives and justifications are increasingly mixed in with national secular ones within some national ethnocracies. we see this in israel-palestine where orthodox and ultra-orthodox religious radicals who comprise less than 30% of the total jewish population have become increasingly powerful since the 1970s; they make up nearly all the west bank settlers, and have been pushing towards a theocracy. and secular palestinian politics have also experienced religious radicalisation (see yiftachel and roded 2010). although the main conflict is still clearly ethno-national, religious factors sharpen it but also sometimes ‘spill-over’ to become more important than secular ones. where religious institutions have a long history of active involvement in sometimes violent politics (e.g., the croatian catholic church), differentiating ‘religious’ from ‘national’ objectives, or distinguishing different types or historical stages of ethnocracy, can be difficult, a merging of priorities and continuity the apparently dominant realities14. nevertheless, such differentiations are important for understanding ethnocracy. thus in the case of some islamic groups, the political reassertion of religion has been directly at the expense or as a consequence of failed or partly failed secular nationalist movements (e.g. secular pan-arab nationalism, whose last representatives have included saddam hussein, colonel gaddafi, and now assad in syria, hardly a reassuring trio). the over-used term ‘post-national’ does seem appropriate for their radical islamic successors or opponents. there is also the fact that the traditional muslim concept of the ummah, or the whole community of islam, is trans-ethnic, transnational and potentially universal in character, and this is to some extent reflected in the non-territorial politics of some jihadists who fight under such banners as al qaeda. 14 the croatian ultra-nationalists who led the 1991-95 war against serb forces with active backing from the croatian catholic church harked back to the 1941-45 nazi puppet regime of the ustashe fascists. as well as murdering several hundred thousand people, mostly serbs but also jews, roma and others, the ustashe attempted to forcibly convert orthodox serbs to catholicism. after 1995 the mountain top from which croat forces had bombarded the muslim section of mostar (its famous old bridge included) became the site of a huge mountain top cross, mimicking the corcovada statue in rio but with its own unsubtle message to the muslims below. --- cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 27 however the inverted commas around ‘post-national’ are retained because ours is still an era dominated by national states and nationalisms, and to a varying extent these groups (e.g. hamas, hezbollah, the afghan taliban, al-shabaab, islamic state) are sometimes quite nationalistic or at least territorially particularistic in their objectives. often there are tensions between religious objectives on the one hand, for example the widespread or ‘universal’ application of sharia law in opposition to ‘western or christian imperialism’, and, on the other hand, more immediate political objectives such as the creation of an islamic coalition government in a particular territory, with the issues further complicated by groups acting as proxies to advance the geopolitical ambitions of particular regional powers, perhaps ‘dressed up’ in religious garb. the shia hezbollah of southern lebanon got a lot of political kudos and leverage as the national defenders of lebanon against israeli invaders; and geopolitically it is an active proxy army for its major funder shia iran, more recently in the syrian conflict. so religion as a marker and component of ethno-national belonging may transmute into something much more substantial. the categories are fluid rather than fixed and we need to be alive to the possibility that movements or regimes may switch category. while the dominant historical trajectories have been for some ethnic groups to transmute into ethnonational ones, and religion to go from being a pre-national force in its own right to becoming a national marker, there is no reason to believe that history is one-directional. on the contrary, it clearly is not. while historical processes are never literally reversed or repeated (change is not merely cyclical or ‘circular’ for there are always new elements involved, and ‘spiral’ is perhaps a better metaphor), nevertheless there is widespread evidence of a reassertion or rejuvenation of religion as an end in itself, a political force on its own behalf across different faith groups, most notably in radical islam but also in christian fundamentalism. the concept of ethnocracy and its five variants help unify different aspects and situations of ethno-national conflict and ethnically-biased regimes into a more coherent whole: national and urban ethnocracy in relation to contested states and divided cities; the cities’ origins at the edge of traditional territorial empires, and the often formative influence of imperial ethnocracy on later national or post-national developments; the continuation of more muted ‘post-conflict’ ethnocracy in consociational power-sharing situations; and the possibilities of a ‘post-national’ ethnocracy and religious motivations predominating over national ones. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 with all five types we find they are as much the cause as the consequence of conflict, often operating in zero-sum terms which are ultimately self-defeating and damaging for all sides. so we need to understand their conflict-generating and unstable character, and their inherent tendency to deepen conflict unless countered by internal and external forces. understanding how they operate in terms of their specific dynamics in the different situations can help in reducing conflict or transforming it into something more positive. less optimistically, the relevance of the concept may become more prevalent if reactions against perceived ‘outside forces’ continue to mobilise around the chauvinistic ‘purities’ of ethnic identity. references anderson j. 2013, ‘imperial ethnocracy and demography: foundations of ethno-national conflict in belfast and jerusalem’, in pullan w. and baillie b. 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(eds.) the fundamentalist city? religiosity and the remaking of urban space, routledge, new york, pp. 177-207. acknowledgements the main basis for my work on ethnocracy was the research project “conflict in cities and the contested state: everyday life and the possibilities of transformation in belfast, jerusalem and other divided cities” www.conflictincities.org [and uk funding by esrc large grant res-060-25-0015 is gratefully acknowledged]. wendy pullan in cambridge and mick dumper in exeter led the jerusalem team of researchers; a queen’s university colleague liam o’dowd and myself led the belfast team. we had phd students in all three universities who did theses on ‘other’ ethno-nationally divided cities, including brussels, mostar, nicosia, beirut and kirkuk; and we touched on other places like sarajevo, vukovar, montreal, and historic danzig (gdansk) and trieste. my thanks to all project members, and to oren yiftachel and alexander koensler and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. statement of conflict of interest i am a guest editor of this issue. the reviews of this paper were managed by my co-editor james goodman and were conducted offline by anonymous reviewers. funding my thanks to the university of technology sydney for a distinguished visitors scholarship which helped to finance a three-month visit to australia in 2014-15. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2013.857657 http://www.conflictincities.org/ lead paper in a special issue on ethnocracy ethnocracy: exploring and extending the concept abstract introduction national ethnocracy ‘ethnic democracy’ or ‘apartheid state’? ‘ethnic cleansing’, expansion and conflict-generation countering ethnocracy urban ethnocracy seeing like a city not like a state imperial ethnocracy ‘post-conflict’ or ‘shared’ ethnocracy ‘post-national’ and religious ethnocracy references acknowledgements statement of conflict of interest funding konstantin kastrissianakis, department of geography, durham university corresponding author: konstantin.kastrissianakis@durham.ac.uk issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 konstantin kastrissianakis. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(3):5155. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5155 exploring ethnocracy and the possibilities of coexistence in beirut konstantin kastrissianakis durham university abstract in response to james anderson’s article “ethnocracy: exploring and extending the concept”, this article revisits some of the extensive discussions of lebanon’s political sectarianism through the prism of ethnocracy to the extent that it contributes to an analysis of the socio-political structure of the lebanese capital, and vice-versa. after a discussion of the relevance of the notion of ethnocracy to the lebanese context and anderson’s “extensions” of the concept, the paper will briefly introduce recent developments in the country that point to growing and organised contestation of the political system and what it reveals about the lebanese model’s “resilience”. introduction it was an early spring day of 2015, and i was listening to the car radio while travelling across lebanon’s capital, beirut. the snow of the mountain range that makes up lebanon’s border with syria was melting and there was speculation that this would facilitate the movement of fighters engaged in syria and flare up the war front with the lebanese army. as is often the case, the press both local and international laid out yet more scenarios for lebanon’s imminent implosion. i asked marwan, who was driving, what he made of all this, as he has been alarmed by the situation for a few years now. but he said ‘the more they talk about war, the less it is likely to happen’. i took this to mean that when politicians and the press beat the drums of all-out war, they effectively delay it. since the signing of the ta’if agreement in 1989 that ended the 15-year long civil war, lebanon has been said to be ‘on the brink of war’ numerous times. at the same time, the ‘lebanese model’ has proven more resilient to substantial shocks, both internal and external, mailto:konstantin.kastrissianakis@durham.ac.uk https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5155 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 at least to the extent that it manages to perpetuate itself – at the cost of the public good. this model of political sectarianism or confessionalism that at times has given way to discussions about ethnocracy or consociationalism is said to be at the root of the state’s dysfunction while at the same time it is defended as a viable – if temporary – system for the safeguarding of lebanon’s diverse communities. in response to james anderson’s article in this issue ‘ethnocracy: exploring and extending the concept’, this article revisits some of the extensive discussions of lebanon’s political sectarianism through the prism of ethnocracy to the extent that it contributes to an analysis of the socio-political structure of the lebanese capital, and vice-versa. after a discussion of the relevance of the notion of ethnocracy to the lebanese context and anderson’s ‘extensions’ of the concept, the paper will briefly introduce recent developments in the country that point to growing and organised contestation of the political system and what it reveals about the lebanese model’s ‘resilience’. ethnicity in the lebanese context anderson defines ethnocracy as ‘government or rule by an ethnic group or ethnos’ specified by religion, language, ‘race’ or other criteria, contrasted to democracy which is rule by the demos or people. the concept has only recently received widespread attention, mainly following the work of the israeli geographer oren yiftachel on israeli ethnocratic practices. he applied the concept from national to urban contexts, and anderson extends it further to apply to ‘imperial’, ‘post-conflict’ and ‘post-national’ regimes. in trying to assess the extent to which a broader understanding of ethnocracy applies to the case of lebanon, this paper will discuss national ethnocracy, the imperial roots of ethnonationalism, and post-conflict and post-national ethnocracies, considering the implications of each for the lebanese capital. at different levels, the case for an extended concept of ethnocracy in the lebanese context is at once revealing and concealing with respect to a complex series of political and urban arrangements that have undergone numerous reiterations and are still openly contested. but first, one of the difficulties when writing about ethnocracy is the definition of ethnicity, particularly in the lebanese context. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 61 ethnicity or ethnic group is related to the classification of people and group relationships (eriksen 2002) and, as such is also the subject of continuous debate over the nature of those relations and boundaries. as abner cohen writes, however, ‘the question is not which definition is the most valid but which is most helpful in the analysis of certain theoretical problems’ (2001 p. ix and in the case of lebanon, the use of the notion of ethnicity has been limited. the lebanese constitution speaks of sects or denominations (al-tawa’if) that are distinguished on the basis of religion of which 18 are officially recognised in lebanon. ethnicity is sometimes used to signify the difference between arabs, armenian and kurds who are also linguistically differentiated, but even here, the category of ethnicity is seldom used to describe political sectarianism or confessionalism. in the cases where ethnicity is used to describe the confessional groups that make up lebanon, it is either defined fairly broadly (nagle 2015) to incorporate colour, language and religion, or to signify the politicisation of confessional identities as samir khalaf (2012) argues, explaining that the ethnic group then also becomes ‘for itself’, self-conscious”. in a similar vein, as’ad abukhalil ‘claims that the subjective stress on distinctions, however concocted and artificial, is so strong as to warrant the designation of “sectarian ethnicities”’ (1988 in farha 2016). while it is clear from anderson’s treatment of ethnicity that he takes a broad approach to the term to include religion, it is important to note that in the case of lebanon sectarian distinctions do not immediately translate into ethnic ones, whether the assumption is that these categories are constructed or not. ussama makdisi (2000) argues that it is precisely the conflation of religion and ethnicity by colonial powers and ottoman administrative reform that led to the development of a ‘culture of sectarianism’. this approach to sectarianism, however, is contested by mark farha (2016) who argues that while sectarianism may be less about religious doctrine than about communal memory, it precedes early 19th century colonialism and is inherent to the politico-religious relations of the levant. moreover, alongside the sect, there is also the political group, which in many cases is an assemblage of overlapping sensitivities and loyalties that do not immediately overlap with sectarian identities, and sometimes even contradict them. this is particularly significant when analysing the implications of an ethnocratic approach to lebanese government, as sectarian categories are constantly contested and fragmented by shifting alliances and oppositions that 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 respond to changing imperatives (kastrissianakis 2012; kastrissianakis 2015). as max weiss convincingly explains in his book in the shadow of sectarianism, the negative connotations and characterisations of sectarianism – after all, no one positively calls themselves sectarian – are preventing an understanding of the processes of production and reproduction of sectarian boundaries (weiss 2010). while a comprehensive discussion of sectarianism is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to emphasise that ethno-sectarian categories are fluid and permeable, though they can also harden through institutionalisation and in the face of acute tensions. the confessional group, cannot be essentialised but ought to be seen as an instrument in a context that makes it a conducive vehicle for political organisation (weiss 2010). as such, the notion of ethnocracy may sit somewhat uncomfortably in the lebanese context where ethnicity as a category is seldom used and a multiplicity of shifting religious, sectarian, clan or political solidarities articulates a complex set of alliances and enmities. at the same time, as constructed and socially contingent as sectarian identities may be, they play a powerful role in the formation of political subjectivities and organising the social, economic and political spheres. in an urban context, such as beirut, the ebb and flow of those relations organises the socio-spatial geography of the city, and conversely, the city redraws political relations. national ethnocracy: from fragile to negotiated majority the modern iteration of lebanon’s system of political sectarianism (communalism or confessionalism) is commonly situated in the mid-19th century, when the ottoman empire granted the maronite christians in the mount lebanon area the mutasarrifyia, designating it as a semi-autonomous region which became an independent christian state mainly under french protection. the mount lebanon mutasarrifate was the expression of a libanist approach to the nascent nation-state to which, the muslims, and particularly beirut’s and tripoli’s sunni elite, opposed an arabist perspective that saw the area of modern day lebanon firmly part of the syrian provinces1. under french mandate (1920-1943) and with its support, the mutasarrifya became the state of grand liban, ‘a nation-state for the christian lebanese people’, and a terre d’asile for the persecuted christians of the orient who had suffered violent attacks between 1840 and 1860, culminating in the massacres of 1860 in mount lebanon, damascus and aleppo (makdisi 2000, kassir 2010 & ziadeh 2006). 1 for a detailed discussion of the different arabist views on lebanese state formation, see sulh 2004. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 63 by the mid-1930s, backed by arab and british influence, the muslims recovered some of the political initiative which was met with the will to compromise within the growing ‘pragmatist’ christian camp led by bechara el khoury. the old maronite-druze formula that had dominated this ottoman province until then, defended by the maronite nationalist lebanese elite represented by emile eddé and the free french, would be replaced by a maronite-sunni duumvirate led by an arab-oriented, pro-british, intercommunal elite (ziadeh 2006). the national pact of 1943 would cement the new arrangement, based on a double negation, in which the christians renounced french tutelage and protection, while the muslims renounced their struggle for a union with syria. this oral pact sanctioned and extended the confessional allocation of political, judicial and administrative positions that was presented as temporary in the constitution of 1926. it also gave the presidency to the maronites, the post of prime minister to the sunnis and of speaker of parliament to the shi’a and introduced the six christians to five muslims ratio for parliamentary seats and throughout the state administration. this ratio was based on the 1932 census – also the latest – which showed that christians represented a slim majority within the then grand liban with maronites constituting the largest christian denomination. this majority would not only be reversed later, rania maktabi (2007) argues it was already uncertain in 1932. as maktabi and hanna ziadeh (2006) explain, the then maronite leadership – with french support – sought to maintain christian supremacy while annexing to the new state areas populated by muslim majorities. by expanding the contours of the new state, however, they also diluted christian claims to a hegemonic position2. the conduct of the 1932 census would therefore be a complex exercise in citizenship formation, as maktabi argues somewhat controversially: ‘neither territorial amputations nor population displacements were effected as a result of unequal ethnic demographic distribution, as seen by some christian political leaders. the carrying out of the 1932 census and the application of citizenship policies in the aftermath of the census should, however, be seen within a perspective where certain steps were undertaken in order to preserve and buttress 2 the population of the sanjak in 1911 totalled 414,800 of whom approximately 80% were christians, with the maronites comprising 58%. in the areas annexed to the sanjak, the christians comprised 35% of the population after 1920, with the maronites comprising a mere 14% (maktabi 2007, p. 230). 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 christian hegemony over the state. what were perceived as unfavourable demographic realities were sought to be controlled through citizenship policies that differentiated between desirable and undesirable members of the lebanese state’ (maktabi 2007, p.232). concurring with anderson’s description of imperial ethnocracy, european powers and christian ottomans deployed ethno-sectarian identities to carve out the lebanese state, as well as secure a dominant position for christians, and particularly the maronites, in the nascent state. in the process they also reversed the order of privilege from sunni muslims to maronite christians, and embraced missionaries as mediating agents of the state’s social services (thompson 2013, p.77)3. furthermore, the definition of national ethnocracy as a set of prerogatives that favour the dominant ethnos is relevant to the lebanese system of political sectarianism as established by the 1926 constitution which gave christians, and maronites in particular, an advantage at all levels of state institutions, be they civilian or military. in fact, rania maktabi borrows the term from nils a. butenschøn who defines the notion of ethnocracy in 1993 as: ‘a political regime which, in contrast to democracy, is instituted on the basis of qualified rights to citizenship and with ethnic affiliation (defined in terms of race, descent, religion, or language) as the distinguishing principle. the raison d’être of the ethnocracy is to secure that the most important instruments of state power are controlled by a specific ethnic collectivity’ (1993, pp. 5-6 in maktabi 2000, p. 153). the national pact offered what was then deemed an acceptable formula for a christian dominated independent state, but this pact among elites would also regularly be destabilised and was the object of regular negotiation and at times the cause of violent confrontation. in fact, whereas the constitution and the national pact favoured christians, and maronites in particular, christian hegemony was moderated by constant negotiation among the zu’ama the communal political elites that sought to maintain a public order from which they mutually benefitted. as will be discussed below, the system of consociational democracy that was taking shape hinged – and still does – on the client system that the zu’ama maintained and the political patronage they could distribute. 3 at the same time, sunni opposition to the creation of an independent lebanese state, which translated into the boycotts of the 1921 census and limited participation in the administration despite french efforts to appease them by offering sunni elites key positions, accentuated the marginalisation of muslims. between 1920 and the mid-1930s, sunni leadership vacillated between acquiescence, collaboration and resistance to the mandate authorities and their maronite counterparts. however, they participated fully in the 1932 census in the hope that they may constitute a majority and accede to the presidency. for a detailed discussion of those shifting relations during the french mandate, see (atiyah 1973; thompson 2013). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 65 post 1943 beirut: a socio-spatial order reproducing and challenging strict ethnocratic order in the years that followed lebanon’s independence in 1943, the economic boom fuelled by the flow of capital and skills from other arab countries, the agricultural crisis in south lebanon, and the laissez-faire policy of public authorities, prepared the ground for the extremely rapid expansion of beirut’s agglomeration along main arteries, swallowing up the beaches and crawling up the mountains. beirut metamorphosed into a relatively outsized capital city that accounted for 45% of the country’s population by 1975, but this growth did not bring about a reduction or dismantling of sectarian spaces that had organised the city’s immediate periphery. ‘on the contrary, migrants moved in along social, economic and topographic mechanisms that reproduced or reconstructed relatively homogenous confessional spaces’ (nasr 1979). as michael johnson explains, the psychological and societal difficulties associated with rapid urbanisation even intensified ‘a sense of ethnic nationalism’ and territorialisation processes along confessional lines, particularly for the more disenfranchised sections of the population: ‘shi’a migrants to beirut in the 1960s became far more conscious of their confessional identity in response to the social and psychological pressures of urban life’ (2001, p.18). while the inter-communal elite shared an interest in maintaining public order, developing a horizontal cross-confessional consociationalism, this was not always the case among the poorer sections of the population. since the late 19th century, the menu peuple, who gathered in more homogenous clusters that were animated by communally shared grievances did not always share the enthusiasm of the new mercantile elites for inter-communal relations. to the pudeur des communautés, (‘the decency of the communities’ (beydoun 1984)) the less privileged had opposed the communal cold war (kassir 2010, p.232). horizontal conviviality among elites and vertical communalism organised urban and national political life into a relatively stable consociational model, despite regular challenges to its ethnocratic tenets. for arend lijphart (1969), the national pact actually had established a relatively successful consociational democracy, but one that could be destabilised by internal socio-economic inequalities and external pressures, as was the case in the second half of the 1950s. 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 this consociationalism hinged on a client system organised around the zu’ama, a new type of political leadership that emerged in the mid 19th century. the za’im (pl. zu’ama) was a socially prominent patron who could grant political protection if necessary. as political relationships between the zu’ama became more heated, they would have recourse to the vertical support they could muster through their street bosses (qabadayat), whether just as a show of force, or to actually secure elected seats. competition for communal seats of power was fierce among za’ims, and was at times the source of intra-communal fighting orchestrated by the za’ims and their qabadayat. while, over time, the client system became more institutionalised, via institutions of a confessional character providing health services and education, qabadayat were still mobilised to secure votes for national and municipal elections. in fact, this system outlasted both the ottoman period and the french mandate, and is still a key feature of urban life in beirut (johnson 1978; johnson 1986). in 1958, the country saw the first sustained violent confrontations since its independence, opposing, on the one hand, the pro-western, pro baghdad pact president camille chamoun supported by armed militias (phalangists), and, on the other hand, nasserists and arab nationalist movements in support of the united arab republic. the more destitute sections of the sunni population in beirut, facing mounting unemployment and rising inflation, but also the petty bourgeoisie that could not effectively reap the larger benefits of the clientelistic system in the new republic, had turned against christian hegemony finding a voice for their grievances in nasserist policies and arab nationalism: by imparting a sense of dignity to people of low social status, he [gamal abdel nasser] provided a focus for a broadly based movement of the muslim urban poor which, stimulated by political and economic grievances, played an active role in 1958. […] the guts of the revolution were taxi drivers, young butchers, bakers and welders. in tripoli something that approached the paris commune was achieved: a revolutionary city controlled by itself. the same was true of the basta quarter of beirut (johnson 1986, p.131). during this period, the city centre that had once been dominated by the institutions of imperial and colonial powers started to take on the symbols of an independent republic permeated by the attempt to reconcile distinct attachments to libanist and arabist views of the role of lebanon. in 1957, a bronze statue of pan-arab leader riad el-solh assassinated in 1951 for having bought into communal compromise was erected on the former al sour square, renamed riad el-solh square. in 1960, president fuad shehab inaugurated the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 67 martyrs’ statue commemorating the martyrs killed in the fight for independence from the ottoman empire in 1915-1916. it replaced yussef hoayek’s limestone sculpture which depicted a muslim and a christian woman facing each other, their arms outstretched towards each other, gazing and mourning over an urn sitting between them, a symbolic container of the martyrs’ ashes (volk 2010, p. 55). the new statue in bronze stood at the centre of the square, with an allegorical couple on an elevated square platform, the woman representing liberty and a man a step behind her representing the nation. underneath them, two fallen men with european features struggling against an invisible enemy represent the martyrs, ‘the actual struggle, and the standing figures represented the values that made their struggles worthwhile’ (volk 2010, p. 99). the victory memorial that had replaced a mournful one, was also an attempt to look forward to a heroic future as opposed to a tragic past: ‘in the case of lebanon, the allegory of liberty replaced two other female statues, which had represented balance between ethno-religious communities. by losing the local reference point, lebanon’s national symbol had become more modern and more european. the message was that a modern nation moved beyond attachments to ethno-religious differences’ (volk 2010, p. 102). the main thrust of the period between 1950 and 1975 in beirut was one of redefinition of urban space to represent the newly independent state, the city’s ‘third period of urban modernisation’ as it were (verdeil 2010). echoing mohammad naciri’s statement that with every social upheaval affecting rural or urban space, the state has reacted by a greater investment in spatial planning this wave of modernisation followed the 1958 clashes (1987, p. 53 in cattedra 2002). the 1960s were thus marked by the presidencies of statists fouad shehab (1958-1964) and charles helou (1964-1970) and their challenge to the clientelistic system that dominated lebanese politics. fuad chehab initiated a number of interventions on urban infrastructure, including highways and ring roads, official street names, traffic lights, public institutions in buildings of internationalist architecture and a public university, all in the name of state-building.4 4 however, a number of related projects did not materialise due to the high cost of expropriation and the start of the war in 1975. these include the cité gouvernmentale projected in bir hassan, or the ghalghoul-saifi project of urban renewal in pericentral beirut. for a more detailed discussion see (verdeil 2010). 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 the ecochard 1964 masterplan, would seek to organise the rapid and haphazard sprawl of the city that was accommodating waves of refugees and rural-urban migration, primarily composed of palestinians and shi’as from the south and the bekaa, within what journalists and planners liked to call a ‘misery belt’ in dire need of modernisation. the rapid transformation of this area was, in a large sense, the indirect product of the formation of the state of israel, and the modern state of turkey before it. the armenian genocide in 1915, the naqba of 1948 and the naqsa of 1967 pushed large numbers of armenian and palestinian refugees into lebanon, and due to the cutting of economic relations with historical palestine, pushed many shi'a families from the jabal amil towards beirut’s eastern and southern suburbs. this belt of tin-roof sheds wrapped around the city from the qarantina in the east down to the southern suburbs of beirut was extending the concentric growth of the city beyond its municipal boundaries and with it road traffic and congestion without the infrastructure to support it. however, fuad chehab’s and ecochard’s plans were obstructed by beirut’s landowning elite pushing for a more flexible building code and the privatisation of public land. they agreed on highways connecting the centre with the suburbs that favoured their economic and commercial interests. the purpose of these roads was not only to facilitate the bypassing of the centre but also to cut through the urban fabric and weaken the internal cohesion of neighbourhoods with a strong confessional identity and putting them in relation with each other. instead, they provided these neighbourhoods with stronger delimitations and sharper edges, turning the neighbourhoods inwards (kassir 2010). the wide boulevards that were built by the late 1970s would be the sites of regular mass demonstrations mobilised by kamal jumblatt’s front of national and progressive parties and forces at different stages of the build up to the civil war against the maronite-dominated sectarian order. in the poverty-stricken suburbs and the palestinian camps that the growth of the tourist and banking sectors did not reach, mounting tensions translated into sporadic fighting until april 13 1975, when in ain al-remmaneh, a maronite working-class phalangist stronghold of beirut, the phalangists shot at a bus carrying palestinians returning from a political rally. this shooting, which had followed the attempted murder of the phalangist leader pierre gemayel, is generally said to signal the start of the 15 year long civil war. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 69 post ta’if and doha agreements: shared ethnocracy and political gridlock by the time the ta’if agreement was signed to end the war in 1989, beirut had suffered great destruction, particularly in the city centre and along the green line which demarcated the city into what became a majority christian east beirut and majority muslim west beirut, but also in every other part of the city, where fighting followed the different cycles of shifting alliances and enmities. by 1984, the lebanese army had been disbanded, the plo had been pushed out and the israeli army had withdrawn south of the litani river, the syrian military occupied the beqaa, and the international peacekeeping mission had left the country. militias fought over streets in beirut, rural territories, and the country’s resources, fighting yesterday’s ally alongside tomorrow’s foe. a new brand of leadership dominated the lebanese political landscape, with warlords supported by a myriad of foreign powers fighting their own proxy wars. the second half of the 1980s was a period of fighting for the control of sectarian groups, pitting hezbollah against amal, and lebanese forces against the phalangists. the communist party, which had been aligned with the mostly muslim lebanese national movement coalition and the palestinians, was now fighting against islamists in tripoli and against amal in beirut. the overarching ideologies that had momentarily articulated the two sides that initially polarised the country had broken down to reveal the power struggles of ever smaller spheres and their hold over an ever more fragmented city5. the ta’if agreement and the 1991 amnesty law did not challenge the gains made by militias, but rather would allow their leaders to enter into formal politics, legitimising and consolidating their hold over their respective communities. this agreement legitimated syrian military presence and hegemony for a period of two years, demanded the disarmament of all militias – except hezbollah, which was fighting against israel’s occupation of southern lebanon – and introduced amendments to the national pact of 1943 with regards to the confessional distribution of public office posts and parliament seats. ta’if formulated a collective intercommunal government that reflected a shift in the balance of power, the result of new demographic, social and regional realities. it also ‘aimed to transform the political system from a hierarchical communal partnership among the major communities into a 5 for comprehensive analyses of the civil wars between 1975-1990, see in particular (hanf 1994) and (picard 2002). on the fragmentation of lebanese sovereignty and economy, see (hannoyer 1999; traboulsi 2012; harik 1994). on the premises for the breakdown of the lebanese state, see (el-khazen 2000). 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 consociational, intercommunal collective partnership’ (ziadeh 2006, p. 140). the ta’if system shifted executive power from the maronite president to the council of ministers and changed the ratio for parliamentary seats and positions in public administration from 6 christians to 5 muslims to 5:5. the agreement did not challenge the paradox ‘of claiming an absolute citizen-based equality at the same time as an all-encompassing communal system of rights and privileges was rebuilt’ (ziadeh 2006, p. 145). instead of the hierarchy of communal rights, the president of the republic (maronite), the president of the council of ministers (sunni) and the speaker of the parliament (shi’a) formed a troika that decided on the basis of consensus. however, that consensus was subservient to syrian hegemony that was indefinitely extended and often consensus within the troika led to stalemate, creating a geopolitics of separate territories governed, most prominently, by the (maronite) lebanese forces, headed by elie hobeika; the (shi’a) amal movement of nabih berri and hezbollah; and walid jumblatt’s (druze) progressive socialist party6. but as fawaz traboulsi argues, the end of the war had also seen the marginalisation of a sunni community left without a strong leadership (traboulsi 1993), which opened a vacuum for rafiq hariri to fill7. for much of his tenure as prime minister between 19921998 and between 2000 and 2004, hariri did not confront the post-ta’if elites, but circumvented them, using beirut’s urban reconstruction as his main political instrument to dominate the lebanese, and particularly the sunni, political landscape (gervais 2012). as proposed by james anderson, the post-conflict or shared ethnocracy of consociationalism succeeds in ending lethal conflict but brings about rigidities that typically perpetuate or accentuate ethno-national divisions. it is, as he writes, ‘shared dysfunctional ethnocracy as the war continuing by other means’. it is a sobering approach to the indeed often mis-named post-conflict periods, where as we see in lebanon, sectarianism has only become further entrenched and territorialised, although rather subdued under syrian tutelage. after hariri’s assassination on 14 february 2005 and the syrian military pull-out, those divisions came to the fore and were rearranged along pro-syria (march 8 coalition) and anti-syria (march 14 coalition) camps, respectively led by hezbollah and saad hariri (rafiq’s son). what had been 6 alongside these larger factions, the political leadership also incorporated representatives of the alawite militia of tripoli and a leader of the ahbash (the radical sunnis of beirut) (picard 2005). 7 the same can be said of the christian community whose leadership was either killed during the war, in exile or imprisoned. moreover, the 1992 electoral law divided the mount lebanon governorate in six electoral districts, thereby weakening the christian vote. for more details on the place of the maronite leadership post-ta’if and the controversies surrounding the electoral law, see (baroudi & tabar 2009; knudsen 2005; nagle 2015). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 71 dormant lines of division rapidly became animated, turning the city into a stage for the demonstration and exhibition of political and confessional affiliation, and the sites where they meet into spaces of sectarian and political confrontation. in beirut, this would translate into the ‘new demarcation lines’ but this time between sunnis and shi’as. these two coalitions polarised lebanon over the coming years, their boundaries cutting across traditional religious lines: ‘no more is the classic christian-muslim divide relevant; nor the narrow sunnimaronite divide, which dominated the squabbles of the lebanese political elite in pre-war lebanon. the two new camps have crystallised along lines that are rather new to the history of the lebanese conflict’ (as’ad abukhalil in haddad 2009). a new urban order was now being drawn up, no longer defined by the east-west demarcation of the war, nor based on a centre-periphery hierarchy. instead, the city had become a metropolitan region within which historical and new centralities were redrawing the urban structure, within which territorialities became bastions of competition between march 8 and march 14, pro and anti-assad coalitions respectively. the regional context of rising tensions between saudi arabia and the us, on the one hand, and iran and syria, on the other, amplified the sectarian undertones of the political polarisation in lebanon, and sharpened divisions between sunnis and shi’as in beirut. after 2006, the maronites split between, on one hand, the phalangists and the lebanese forces with march 14 and, on the other, the free patriotic movement (fpm) led by former general michal aoun, who in early 2006 signed a memorandum of understanding with hezbollah to bolster his chances of becoming president of the republic. reminiscent of the disagreements between nationalists and pragmatists that divided the maronites on the eve of the lebanese state’s independence, the split between the phalangists/lebanese forces and fpm is however no longer about whether maronites should share power more equality, but with whom they stood a better chance of securing what remained of the maronite hold on the state and the extent to which this would involve the syrian regime. the war between hezbollah and israel in july 2006 only accentuated divisions. in december 2006, the march 8 opposition demanded the resignation of the march 14 government by staging a peaceful protest under the prime minister’s office in the old city centre that eventually turned into a ‘tent city’ that occupied riad el solh square and the southern part of 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 martyrs’ square for nineteen months. escalating tensions between sunni and shi’a, as well as between shi’a and maronite areas of beirut burst into armed confrontations in january 20078, and peaked with the clashes of may 2008, the worst fighting since the civil war, when militias led by hezbollah took over west beirut and confronted a weak to non-existent resistance, from saad hariri’s future movement9. the instability that has characterised the post-2005 period has been also accompanied by a more pervasive marking of urban territory. neighbourhoods became more clearly demarcated as being under the control of the different political factions, with flags, banners, posters, and symbols saturating the urban environment and marking public space. this ‘territorialisation’ of beirut was not new, but the intensification of confrontations since 2005 has turned the city, and particularly west beirut, into a site of open and constant contestation. more than the temporary signs of political animosities, the marking of territory is the most explicit emanation of a more continual process of territorialisation that has become the most dominant feature of beirut’s urban order, organising the socio-spatial structure of the city. the 2008 doha accords, that suspended the escalation of violence between the opposing camps, stipulated that the next president would be a consensual one (general michel suleiman); and that an interim national unity cabinet would serve until the june 2009 parliamentary elections held on the basis of the 1960s electoral law, whereby smaller voting constituencies – the qada – were institutionalized in electoral redistricting. these seemingly rather harmless decisions in fact reinforced the grip of sectarian leaders and the sectarian logic. while the lebanese electoral system allows for cross-voting and, in fact, candidates often have to rely on cross-confessional support to be elected, the redistricting into smaller voting constituencies has diminished the extent to which candidates needed to reach outside their confession. in imad salamey’s words: ‘the doha agreement delegated significant power to sectarian elites, charging them with the task of agreeing over vital national issues. the role of the elected parliament was significantly marginalized. it turned into a superficial 8 a scuffle between students in the cafeteria of the beirut arab university escalated into an armed confrontation, leaving 4 dead and 35 injured. the university is in the sunni neighbourhood of tariq el-jdideh (bakri & fattah 2007). 9 hezbollah’s show of force followed the government’s decision to expel the airport’s commander of security, accused of working under the orders of hezbollah, and to disable hezbollah’s communication network. these decisions, the government led by the future movement had argued, were taken following suspicions that hezbollah was planning the assassination of a pro-government figure who would use the airport. for more details on the may 2008 events, see (shehadi 2008; fregonese 2012). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 73 rubberstamping institution dedicated to approving elite arranged agreements over almost every aspect of its political jurisdictions: drafting electoral laws, electing the president, and approving the formation of the council of ministers’ (salamey 2013, p. 175). in january 2011, the then government led by saad hariri was brought down when the eleven march 8 and the president’s four ministers resigned as the special tribunal for lebanon was preparing to indict five hezbollah members for rafiq hariri’s assassination. an interim government was then established with najib mikati nominated by march 8 at its helm. in 2013, as the conflict in syria was in its second year, mikati submitted his resignation in the context of intensifying tension between the proand anti-assad camps and was succeeded by tammam salam. the ‘caretaker’ government led by salam has remained in place since february 2014, amid a renewal of the parliament’s mandate and the postponing of elections. in effect, the current parliament has rarely met and has enjoyed limited legitimacy, reinforcing the political role of communal leaders and “the street”. moreover, while the country had been without a president since may 2014, as this paper goes to print, general michel aoun was elected president by the parliament at its 46th electoral session on 31 october 2016. the president is elected with a two-thirds majority vote in the parliament. however, the two coalitions had consistently refrained from supporting each other’s candidate, repeatedly postponing the president’s election. beirut madinati: challenging the ethnocratic system regional developments and the war in syria in particular have had a significant impact on lebanon, which has always been porous to external influence and interventions. the already dysfunctional and weakened state has therefore been further paralysed, and this was only made more obvious by the garbage collection crisis that started in the summer of 2015. the naameh landfill, which had been beirut’s main landfill since the mid-1990s, had been active for seventeen years instead of the initially planned six. this landfill was to be a temporary solution before a comprehensive garbage-processing plan could be devised. instead, it came to represent the country’s corrupt and fractured leadership and administration. when in july 2015 naameh’s inhabitants demanded the landfill’s closure by blocking the road to the garbage trucks once more, beirut filled with the city’s uncollected garbage causing an environmental and health crisis. the mobilisations around the garbage crisis brought rarely seen numbers of protesters to the streets, particularly youth, and spawned a 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 series of mobilisations demanding a solution to the crisis. the garbage crisis and the government’s inability to resolve it highlighted the government’s severe shortcomings and corruption, which propelled the movement towards more far-reaching demands, including the end of the sectarian system and the removal of the entire political class. while the movements had limited success as far as the garbage issue was concerned, they brought about another response, this time at the level of municipal government. beirut madinati (beirut my city) emerged in march 2016 as a political campaign led by a list of 24 independent candidates stemming from civil society, academia, marketing, architecture, medicine, the arts or the fishers’ association. it had an equal number of christians and muslims, men and women. a rare sight in lebanese elections, bm also put forward a 10point programme, which included measures on public transportation and spaces, affordable housing, pollution, poverty alleviation or municipal governance. after two months of public debates, awareness raising and campaigning with very limited means, bm got around 40% of the vote in the municipal elections of may 2016 – the first elections since the parliamentary ones of 2009 –, but no seats on the municipal council because of a winner-takes-all election system. the list that won the municipal elections is a collection of candidates from the two, otherwise opposing, political coalitions, march 8 and march 14. with national level institutions largely under the control of political parties and in continuous gridlock, the municipal and city levels are seen as key scales of government where a more technocratic governance can be exercised to address immediate needs and gain legitimacy. it is also, pragmatically speaking, a scale at which a group with limited resources can effectively dent the hold of entrenched party politics. while the response to the campaign was largely positive, even if sometimes met with cynicism, and did a lot to open room for a challenge to the client-based sectarian system, this very system showed how when faced with an existential threat, otherwise belligerent partisans closed ranks to preserve their prerogatives. as the head of the democratic gathering, walid jumblatt, allegedly said to saad hariri about the need to elect a president: ‘go ahead and elect any president, even aoun because the important part is to save the system’ (saleh 2016). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 75 post national or religious ethnocracy in the case of lebanon, transnational solidarities and political relations that challenge a selfcontained, centralised idea of the state have been part of its very foundation. as we saw above, the territory of lebanon was expanded during the french mandate to include muslim majority areas into the grand liban. at different times before and since 1943, christians and muslims have relied on foreign patrons to weigh in to support their political projects. often identified as a destabilising factor, regional and international actors have been part of a complex web of relations, but here too, it is not possible to isolate sectarian identity or religion as the only defining criterion guiding local and international political activity. even the decline of arab nationalism and the rise of islamism cannot be said to describe a postnational order since both share the same disdain for national borders. one could say that lebanon has to some extent always been ‘post-national’, but also that islam and christianity have been ‘lebanonised’, i.e. religion has been more about religious identity essentialised and instrumentalised by political sectarianism, than it has been about religion per se. waddah charara even speaks of sectarianism ‘as nothing less than the organising principle of lebanese society, the “real religion” of the lebanese in the words of late maxime rodinson (farha 2016). moreover, as salamey and tabar argue, lijphart’s consociational model, has always been challenged by ‘the phenomena of “deterritorialization” and “denationalization” amid globalization and, consequently, the overwhelming interconnectedness of ethnopolitics reaching out beyond the nation-state’ (salamey 2008, pp. 239-240). in other words, lebanon’s process of state building was always tied to a complex and changing set of regional political axes and its neighbours’ regular upheavals, while at the same time transnational religious identities never neatly guided internal political relations. transnational sectarian solidarities are confronted and renegotiated, amplified or moderated, according to the local, national and regional power struggles. in this regard, my position would be that what we see is not so much the return of the religious, which anderson describes, but as peter sloterdijk describes it, the ‘recognition of the immunitary constitution of human beings’: ‘something is indeed returning today – but the conventional wisdom that this is religion making its reappearance is insufficient to satisfy critical inquiries. nor is it the return of a factor that had vanished, but rather a shift of emphasis in a 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 continuum that was never interrupted. the genuinely recurring element that would merit our full intellectual attention is more anthropological than ‘religious’ in its implications – it is, in a nutshell, the recognition of the immunitary constitution of human beings. after centuries of experiments with new forms of life, the realization has dawned that humans, whatever ethnic, economic and political situation might govern their lives, exist not only in ‘material conditions’, but also in symbolic immune systems and ritual shells’ (sloterdijk 2013). the ‘symbolic immune systems and ritual shells’ that sloterdijk mentions are not only the political, legal or military tools that people mobilise in order to inhabit the world, but the way they constitute meaningful interiors. in his “spheres” trilogy, peter sloterdijk (2011, 2014, 2016) presents what he terms “spherology”, the study of morphological and cosmological interiors that humans produce to inhabit the world. in the lebanese context, this is not only articulated around sectarian, political or familial spheres, but around a whole array of practices and spaces that make life in the context of instability and uncertainty possible. the boundaries drawn in beirut, both physical and metaphysical, articulate a “political habitat” within the city, building on everyday habits and practices, but also arising from the built structures of the city. this is not to say that the contours of urban worlds and territories do not change. rather, they are constantly drawn and re-drawn, and utilize the city, its infrastructure, and architecture, the roads, the overpasses, the walls and spaces to delimit those worlds (kastrissianakis, 2015). urban or national divisions, enmities and alliances are not based on persistent primordial attachments, but a complex web of meaning and relations that one can inhabit. in this sense, post-national ethnocracy in lebanon may be less about religion, and more about the constant re-articulation of habitable interiors10. conclusion by bring peter sloterdijk’s comment to the lebanese situation, this article seeks to underline that identities and the constructions of sects or political groups are not only contingent on a multiplicity of factors, but also that their relevance and power rests on the extent to which they are seen to secure one’s place in the country or region. political sectarianism and ethnocracy have been deployed in the case of lebanon at various stages in different ways, but as more recent scholarship on lebanese sectarianism has shown, it is a modern political phenomenon as much as it is a socio-political reality that is not only perpetuated by a self 10 for a more detailed discussion of peter sloterdijk’s immunological spheres and its relevance to the lebanese context, see (kastrissianakis 2015). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 77 serving leadership, but also a population that draws meaning and security from a system reinforced by patronage and clientelism. ethnic or sectarian demarcations have been mobilised by the lebanese, by imperial powers and regional actors, in various ways to serve different purposes. this is not to say that those demarcations while being constructed are not also social realities. rather they are moved around, foregrounded or pushed to the background to include and exclude, bring closer or push further apart. in the tired context of lebanese sectarianism, they are indeed overshadowing pressing issues such as class, gender and ecological issues, as anderson argues. nevertheless, the sectarian system and the political leadership that sustain it still hold sway despite growing inequalities, ecological disasters, poor infrastructure and public services. by brandishing the spectre of all-out-war made all the more immediate with developments in the region, the political class manages to still render itself relevant despite its continuous disregard towards economic sustainability, social justice, youth employment or liveable cities. while we have seen how ethnocracy may offer a relevant framework in the lebanese context, i would also say that the lebanese could contribute a few points to the extension of ethnocracy and urban ethnocracy in particular. whereas cities are said to either facilitate coexistence or heighten conflict between diverse communities, the way the consociational system is articulated in beirut presents a more nuanced situation. as we have seen, political leaders have for the most part shared an interest in maintaining public order, developing a horizontal cross-confessional consociationalism while maintaining strong ties with their coreligionists through patronage, clientelism and sectarian patriotism. as michael johnson, a marxist in search for class consciousness and working class struggles, had to concede, the more destitute layers of society were more vertically integrated with their patrons than they could ever be with a proletariat, horizontally cutting across religious denominations and client networks (johnson 2001). this political system not only facilitates victories – however hollow – at the ballot box. it also in many ways organises conflict and coexistence in the city. this remains the main challenge that the likes of beirut madinati face, for beyond the immediate gains (and heavy cost) of clientelism and patronage, this vertical relation is constantly renegotiated and redefined ‘to save the system’. an ethnocratic understanding of government could gain from a deeper engagement with what constitutes the architecture of 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 those vertical relations for their significance is what makes them so resilient to horizontal challenges. references abukhalil, a. 1988, the politics of sectarian ethnicity: segmentation in lebanese society. phd thesis, georgetown university, washington, dc. atiyah, n.w. 1973, the attitudes of the lebanese 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2010, memorials and martyrs in modern lebanon, indiana university press, bloomington, indiana. weiss, m. 2010, in the shadow of sectarianism, harvard university press, cambridge, ma. ziadeh, h. 2006, sectarianism and intercommunal nation-building in lebanon, hurst & co., london. acknowledgements the author would like to thank james anderson and james goodman, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their valuable remarks and comments. statement of conflict of interest no potential conflict of interest was reported by the author. funding this article is based on research funded through the economic and social research council of great britain (res-060-25-0015) and through the european research council (erc2011-adg-295392). that support is gratefully acknowledged. https://mideastwire.com/page/article.php?id=61466 http://www.dx.doi.org/10.4000/books.ifpo.2101 exploring ethnocracy and the possibilities of coexistence in beirut abstract introduction ethnicity in the lebanese context national ethnocracy: from fragile to negotiated majority post 1943 beirut: a socio-spatial order reproducing and challenging strict ethnocratic order post ta’if and doha agreements: shared ethnocracy and political gridlock beirut madinati: challenging the ethnocratic system post national or religious ethnocracy conclusion references acknowledgements statement of conflict of interest funding cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 13, no. 2 2021 © 2021 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: kamada, h. 2021. when accurate information harms people: information on covid-19 infection clusters in japan. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:2, 60–72. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13. i2.7544 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) when accurate information harms people: information on covid-19 infection clusters in japan hitoshi kamada kyoto notre dame university, japan corresponding author: hitoshi kamada, kyoto notre dame university, 1 shimogamo minaminonogamicho, sakyo ward, kyoto, 606-0847, japan. hkamada@notredame.ac.jp doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7544 article history: received 20/12/2020; revised 13/05/2021; accepted 25/05/2021; published 19/07/2021 abstract the covid-19 pandemic has triggered the generation of a large amount of information not just directly about the virus but also about its various societal impacts. this paper describes the atmosphere that the pandemic has created in the japanese society and examines the information spread about infection clusters. besides misinformation and disinformation, the paper highlights another problem in information dissemination during this pandemic. regardless of the legitimate intention of reporting this type of information, people reacted by blaming or discriminating against those who were associated with clusters. the information on infection clusters has brought to the surface the privacy issues and has brought attention to emerging issues that concern information and media literacy. understanding how people interact with information in a particular social or cultural setting, not just from an objective but also from an emotional perspective, becomes more important for enhancing people’s information literacy. keywords covid-19; pandemic; information; blame; information literacy declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 60 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7544 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7544 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7544 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:hkamada@notredame.ac.jp http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7544 introduction the covid-19 pandemic has affected every sphere of the society across the world. the foremost impact was the sheer number of people who died or suffered from the symptoms caused by the novel coronavirus. medical practitioners who took on the duty of treating a large number of patients have been put into dire straits. large scale lockdowns and many restrictions such as the closure of businesses, public institutions and schools have made a significant impact on the society in japan and in other countries. people have been forced to change their lifestyle, and many have struggled with sustaining their livelihood. amidst this uncertainty, people have sought a wide variety of information to understand what is going on and figure out what to do about this situation. people seek information to find answers, reduce uncertainty, or make sense of situations (case & given 2016, pp. 83-87). in this pandemic, people became emotionally engaged with information. this covid-19 pandemic may be the first case of a large-scale pandemic in the information landscape where available information has become enormous (world health organization 2020). this is also the first large-scale pandemic in the information landscape where social media is abundant ( jaeger & taylor 2021, p. 19). this pandemic has generated not just a sheer amount of information but also kinds of information that were not widely distributed in the past. widespread misinformation and disinformation in the current pandemic have highlighted the importance of health literacy among people. this situation has brought to the surface an increased need to understand people’s information behavior pertaining to health information (xie et al. 2020, p. 1421). lawal and bisto (2020, p. 231) identify health information literacy as one of the critical research areas for information literacy. while health information literacy draws attention prominently, the current pandemic has brought about a unique information environment that calls for increased attention to overall information or media literacy. among a large amount of information disseminated during this pandemic, one kind of information had become widespread in japan. public and media disclosure of infection clusters, which was intended to alert the public to where clusters of infections were occurring, has caused adverse effects in japan. this paper examines the issue that the information on infection clusters has surfaced in light of information ethics and analyzes it in the context of information literacy. information and emerging social atmosphere during the pandemic since the outbreak of covid-19, various media such as broadcasting, newspapers, and the internet have disseminated information about this previously unknown virus, including the nature of the virus, how it spreads, the severity of symptoms, and possible treatments and prevention. people have also shared this information. information overload has become increasingly a significant issue in the information-heavy society (savolainen 2007, pp. 611-612). overabundance of information was already prevalent in the society. then, all of sudden, people became inundated with and had to sift through this large amount of information generated by the pandemic. the information contained differing messages as the society was uncertain about the new virus and its societal impact. the uncertain situation triggered the generation of misinformation, which is unintentional false information. this pandemic has also highlighted the recent issue of disinformation or fake news. infodemics has become the word that characterizes the abundance of such information (world health organization 2020). in japan, people reacted to the information that toilet paper rolls were disappearing from stores. a shortage of masks caused by the spread of the virus was falsely associated with a possible shortage of paper. tv broadcast scenes in stores where there were few or no toilet paper rolls. people inundated stores to purchase toilet rolls, even though media reported that this association was false and sufficient stock was available in the country. media coverage of this situation played some role in accelerating people’s reaction (fukunaga 2020, p. 18). the country repeated the previous paper buying panic kamada cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 61 during the oil shock in 1973, as people reacted to the rumor, or the actual situation of scarce supply realized by the rumor. toward spring 2020, the concern over the virus continued to increase in japan. mass media continued to report the increasing severity of the epidemic in and outside of japan with daily counts of the number of infections and deaths. media also began reporting infected cases among celebrities. a couple of celebrities died from the virus, which also added to the fear among people. in april, the national government declared a state of emergency. it requested the closing of businesses, schools, and public institutions as much as possible except for essential services. over the course of the pandemic, the nature of the virus has gradually unfolded. one characteristic of this virus is that many of the infected people have no or mild symptoms (world health organization n.d.). people who get infected, but have no symptoms, move around and may possibly spread the virus to others. this has crystalized a message that you should behave as if you were infected; you should wear a mask, limit socializing and traveling around. this message has inundated the media, and people were exposed to this message every day. media reported on a survey of people from different nationalities by japanese researchers. it found that the japanese were less tolerant with those who got infected with this virus than people in other countries. the japanese respondents tended to think that the people who got infected should be held responsible (‘shingata korona’ 2020). this suggests that the japanese may have a greater tendency to blame infected people, as they think that infected people should be held responsible for being careless by attending gatherings in events, parties or dining out. also, people who travel have become a target for blame as they are considered potentially spreading the virus by traveling. this tendency seems to come from the presence of strong peer pressure to conform to the societal or group norms in japan. in japan, many people voluntarily started to wear masks and followed newly emerged rules such as social distancing without strong enforcement. even though the state of emergency declaration was not backed by legal power, most people complied. social conformity is considered strong in japan. (kondo et al. 2010, p. 361). miller and kanazawa (2018, chapter 2) discuss that stronger attachment to groups in the japanese society has fostered people’s tendency toward conforming behavior. the pandemic has tightened this societal pressure to conform to social norms. this can arise from people’s fear of getting isolated from the group they belong to (isono 2020, pp. 63-64). as a result, people who do not seem to follow became the target for blame. one newspaper article mentioned this atmosphere with the headline, ‘japanese stew on feeling forced to social distance, wear a face mask (kawashima 2020)’. this force may have been effective in slowing the spread of the virus, but it has stifled people. a heavy dose of this message by mass media, while considered necessary to contain the spread of the virus, has created an atmosphere where some people consider those who got infected should be the ones to blame for not just getting themselves infected but also possibly spreading the virus. for example, children playing outside became a target for blaming during the time schools were closed (manabe 2020, pp. 6667). some ‘pachinko’ parlors, which offer japanese-style slot machine gambling games, continued to stay open during the state of emergency in spring 2020. the businesses that stayed open and their customers became the target of criticism and media attention as being irresponsible. this happened despite no reported infection clusters associated with pachinko parlor business during this time (‘why have no covid-19 clusters’ 2020). anxiety and fear in the society have made medical facilities and practitioners a target of defamation despite the fact that they are the frontline people who fight against this pandemic by treating people and saving people’s life. shimizu and lin (2020) described this situation as follows: healthcare facilities and hcws [healthcare workers] were seen as epicenters, which triggered widespread irrational prejudice and discrimination against hcws. they were denied use of public buses, taxis, and even urged to vacate rental housing (p. 1). kamada cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 62 as this situation grew, the japan newspaper publishers & editors association and the japan commercial broadcasters association jointly put forth a statement that any harmful act, such as defamation and discrimination, should not be tolerated and mass media should work toward avoiding prompting such acts (nihon shinbun kyōkai & nihon minkan hōsō renmei 2020). information on infection clusters during the pandemic, the word ‘cluster’ emerged as a keyword in japan. a cluster is a location where a group of infected people were identified. the japanese government took the strategy to follow up clusters to curtail the spread of the virus (‘govt looks for clusters to stop virus’ 2020; amengual & atsumi 2021). the media began broadcasting a number of news stories about newly found clusters. reacting to the information about clusters, some people discriminated against those people involved in clusters and began blaming people associated with clusters. they made phone calls, wrote defaming messages on paper and posted on buildings, or sent defaming messages on social media. some people even attempted to track down the identity of the people associated with a cluster. a newspaper article was headlined, 'covid-19 reports sparking boorish behavior in communities’ (‘covid-19 reports’ 2020). another newspaper article reported an early case of an infection cluster at a university and people’s subsequent reaction (‘univ. with infected students flooded with threats, slander’ 2020). blaming and discrimination went beyond those who actually got infected within a cluster. other members of businesses or institutions were impacted. in government and media reporting, the information about the infected individuals is kept anonymous, with some limited information such as age categories. on the other hand, information about the institutions or businesses where clusters have occurred is protected less, since it is not about individuals’ privacy. for example, an infection cluster was found in a university athletics team. after this was reported by media, some students at this university were prevented from working in part-time jobs or denied teaching internships at public schools. a newspaper editorial article about this incident was titled, ‘people infected with coronavirus should not be subject to defamation’ (‘people infected’ 2020). some people demanded an apology from the university. a newspaper article reported that the mayor of the city where this university was located responded that the university should not be forced to make an apology (‘university need not apologize’ 2020). the students who were denied work and school teaching internships just happened to be the students at the same university and were not associated directly with the athletics club where the cluster of infections occurred. further, the cluster infection happened during summer university recess. regardless of no substantial risk that they might be infected, they received unfair treatment just because they were the students at the university. this is not fake news nor unsubstantiated rumors. it is factual, accurate information about where infections were occurring. this may be legitimate information to be reported for public health purposes. however, in a situation like this, it also functioned as hurting some people, not just giving psychological distress but actually causing tangible harm such as the denial of a teaching internship. there has been so much information available during this pandemic. among this large amount of information, people can see the information about where and how many people get infected in much more detail than before and people can act on such information. other kinds of information can also have this function of causing people to blame others. news about public figures’ misconduct can cause peoples’ blaming reactions. people involved in criminal or socially undesirable conduct can become a target of such attacks when the news about such conduct comes out. in this case, the information on infection clusters during this pandemic made any ordinary individuals or groups a potential target of harassment, discrimination or attacks. they did not do anything wrong, just became infected or happened to be associated with clusters. provision of information, in the ideal sense, should be for the good of society. during the pandemic, providing accurate information is important. however, this accurate information can kamada cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 63 cause people harm. the information on infection clusters has highlighted the societal harm by the provision of accurate information, not just misinformation and disinformation. this effect has put even more strain on the society during the pandemic. cluster information and information ethics this pandemic has brought to the surface the issue of protecting individual privacy on several fronts. one aspect of the privacy issue was what individual data to collect when implementing a contact tracing system that attempts to capture people’s whereabouts to follow-up infection spread. fahey and hino (2020, pp. 2-4) reviewed different approaches to treating individual privacy in developing tracing systems, from one end of approaches forcing collection of privacy information and the other putting more privacy protection on collecting individuals’ data. this is one area where balancing public health needs to contain the epidemic and individual privacy has come to be an issue (subbian et al. 2021, p. 186). in reporting infection clusters, information about cluster locations, not the information about individuals, is disclosed. in such a case as a live concert cluster, the concert organizer and people who attended the event were susceptible to receiving blame from the public. this blaming may not be limited to a particular location identified as a cluster. for example, the night entertainment business in one district in tokyo received media attention as infections were concentrated in the district. in this case, all the businesses in this area, not just particular venues, received criticism (osaki 2020). sometimes, clusters are temporal such as people gathered at a live concert, but they can be permanent groups or organizations. for example, the information on a hospital cluster carried the name of the hospital. it triggered public blaming on whoever belonged to that hospital (denyer & kashiwagi 2020). in another case, such as the aforementioned university athletics club cluster, the information about the cluster included the name of the university. people’s reaction to the information on clusters extended to other members of the same group outside of the members involved in the cluster. this situation invokes a concept that a group, not just individuals, can have privacy (floridi 2017, pp. 97-99). taylor, floridi, and van der sloot (2017) discuss the importance of group privacy in the current networked environment where a large amount of data is available, shared, and used for various purposes. in the case of infection clusters, the privacy of groups is exposed when the information on a group is disclosed by media or public authorities. as a result, individual members of a group can become victims of blaming or discrimination. besides the tangible harm done to some people, such as the students denied teaching internships, all members of the group might have suffered psychologically. thus, the group as a whole could suffer, as a consequence of the information disclosure. japan’s ministry of health and labor put together the guidelines regarding information disclosure when an infectious disease classified as being in class 1 occurs (kōsei rōdōshō kenkōkyoku kekkaku kansenshōka, 2020) an official contact by the ministry sent to regional health authorities stated that the information disclosure of coronavirus patients should consider the guidelines. according to this official contact, location information should be disclosed under the conditions set forth by the above guidelines, and it does not require consents of those who were involved. this document also underlines the need to protect personal information (kōsei rōdōshō shingata korona uirusu kansenshō taisaku suishin honbu 2020). however, this document is not clear about the effects of disclosure of location information. decision on disclosing the information on clusters has been left to local governments. for example, shizuoka city announced their own guidelines about when to disclose cluster information (‘dōi nakutemo’ 2020). this newspaper article reported that more than 100 citizen requests were made to the city for disclosing cluster information in the past. okinawa prefecture government had not disclosed past infection clusters, and a newspaper article reported it as an issue (‘okinawa’ 2021). according to this article, the prefecture government had not yet established guidelines for disclosing cluster information but said that kamada cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 64 the government had considered factors such as the types of groups, expected effects on curtailing the virus spread by information disclosure, and impact on privacy. local governments recognize the negative effects by disclosing cluster information and at the same time are faced with public demand for information disclosure. xie et al. (2020) raise the need to protect privacy of people such as patients while information disclosure is important in the pandemic situation. they also discuss that information science should work ‘against negative stereotypes and hostile behaviors toward innocent people who may not even have anything to do with the spread of the virus’ (p. 1422). in this, they quoted hostility towards chinese immigrants. the issues in information on infection clusters highlight the juxtaposition of these two issues; privacy versus public heath necessity of information disclosure and negative impacts suffered to people. information literacy implications in the current digital age, various versions of literacies about information and media are advocated (polizzi 2020, p. 2). these literacies have been considered increasingly important for people in current society where information, media, and technology tools are abundant (koltay 2011, pp. 211-212). the library and information science profession has long advocated for information literacy, as a literacy that people should be equipped with. the american library association (n.d.) defines it as an individual’s abilities to ‘recognize when information is needed and have the ability to locate, evaluate, and use effectively the needed information’. media education has also long advocated for media literacy. media literacy is concerned with ‘the ability to think, process, evaluate, understand, and produce the media in all forms’ (de abreu 2016, p. 9). these information and media related literacies have been evolving as the information environment has become more complex. reflecting this, a more recent definition of information literacy has been established as ‘the set of integrated abilities encompassing the reflective discovery of information, the understanding of how information is produced and valued, and the use of information in creating new knowledge and participating ethically in communities of learning’ (association of college and research libraries 2015, p. 8). as different media have become more interrelated as digital information, the different literacies have also become interrelated. for example, leaning (2017, pp. 3-4, 124-127) calls for more integration of information literacy and media literacy in education. he argues that critical evaluation of information should have more emphasis in information literacy (leaning 2017, pp. 45-47). unesco’s notion of media and information literacy recognizes this increasing interplay of these literacies in the current digital environment (unesco institute for information and technologies in education n.d.). evaluating information content or media messages calls for critical thinking (cook 2018, chapter 4). in doing so, people’s ability to understand the context within which information content is produced and received is increasingly considered important. in the past, when media and information producers were limited to authoritative mass media such as tv and publishing, evaluating information contents for credibility and accuracy was relatively straightforward, although of course information from traditional media is not always trustworthy. however, current society is inundated with a large amount of information produced on the internet, not just by traditional media, but also by many different players including individuals. this has created an increased need for these literacy skills, especially in terms of evaluating information content critically. recent problems of fake news have increased the focus on this issue. some advocate for situating information literacy into people’s daily lives, such as leisure activities, beyond education and work-related settings where information literacy has been primarily concerned (lawal & bisto 2020, p. 237). when information literacy is situated in daily life, ‘emphasis is given to information literacy for preparing life-long learning and informed citizens who can contribute toward a strong community and the overall well-being of the society’ (martzoukou & sayaad abdi 2017, p. 21). information kamada cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 65 on infection clusters and other issues such as fake news posed by this pandemic highlight the need for enhancing information and media literacy among people in their daily life. people use information for mundane daily activities but also for coping with critical situations such as illness and disasters. a pandemic can be one of these critical situations. while critical thinking is important, this pandemic is posing difficulties in seeing information content critically. widespread fear and uncertainty may blur their ability to examine information critically. history shows that people became susceptible to rumors and fake news when a large-scale societal disruption occurs. this pandemic has resulted in situations where people may react based on uncertain or misleading information, just like the aforementioned toilet paper incident in japan. this has posed issues of how to encourage or sustain people’s critical mindset toward information amidst the extraordinary situation caused by the pandemic. unlike discerning fake news, the information about infection clusters is in itself accurate and legitimate information, when this type of information is evaluated in terms of the concepts of information and media literacy. the issue in this case is not about the information content but how people react to it. people’s reaction to the information has caused harm. people’s emotions play an important role in their behavior and understanding regarding information (fourie & julien 2014). examining information content objectively in isolation of individuals and contexts may not sufficiently cover this aspect. julien (2019, p. 27) points out the difficulty in making people see the context surrounding information, which challenges critical evaluation of information. one recent movement emphasizes the importance of information literacy for civic engagement, since effective political participation requires accessibility to and appropriate use of information among people. critical thinking once again plays a major role when people evaluate political information. lenker (2016, p. 514) states that people are not always rational when consuming information as posited by dervin (1994), suggesting that people may not view political information rationally. baer (2020) discusses the need for critical information literacy that employs the concept of ‘intellectual empathy’. it calls for empathetic aspects in critical thinking, not just objective aspects. the need for an empathetic attitude is emphasized when interacting with political information, where the viewpoint may not be in agreement with one’s own (pp. 54-58). although lenker’s and baer’s discussions focus on how people process political information, this introduces the importance of paying attention to emotional aspects when people receive information. information on infection clusters is posing a similar issue of how people react to information emotionally. it poses a challenge for information literacy education with regard to how it can help people see the context in which certain information is disseminated. seeing the context helps increasing the ability to reflect on their reactions with an empathetic mindset toward other people that are involved in this information. with regard to ethical aspects in information literacy, bawden and robinson (2020) examine the possible incorporation of the concept of privacy as proposed by floridi into information literacy. in reviewing existing information literacy frameworks, they indicate that more recent frameworks increasingly deal with ethical aspects of information literacy. among these recent frameworks, a framework known as metaliteracy deals with privacy issues prominently. in metaliteracy, privacy is listed as one of the elements that people should be aware of when interacting with information. these literacy frameworks may not yet treat privacy of groups but there is a potential for incorporation (bawden & robinson 2020, pp. 10391040). metaliteracy not only covers traditional information literacy aspects such as evaluating information but also deals with other aspects of literacy required for sharing information in online environments (mackay & jacobson 2014, p. 1). this is especially important in the current environment where more and more information about people becomes available, and people can more easily produce and spread information that might affect privacy. when they share or react to information, such as the information on infection clusters, helping them consider possible consequences to others has become an important aspect of information literacy. kamada cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 66 okan et al. (2020, p. 11) raise a concern about adverse consequences if people do not have high trust in health information, especially during the current pandemic when information is abundant and may contain misinformation and disinformation. while increasing people’s health literacy is important, information providers such as governments, health authorities, and media have to send trustworthy, effective messages to the public (okan et al. 2020, p. 13). information literacy education including health literacy is longterm effort and may not be able to address immediate information issues. information producers’ effort at effective information dissemination should consider the current situation where there is information overload and fear and anxiety are prevalent. wahl-jorgensen (2020, p.2), in the preface to the japanese translation of her book, states that media coverage about the covid-19 pandemic has reflected emotions caused by the pandemic. the sensational tone was especially evident in the early stage of the pandemic, as she noted in the article published in february 2000 (wahl-jorgensen 2020a). this poses an information literacy challenge, when people attempt to make sense of such information in this extraordinary situation. besides critical, objective evaluation of information, awareness of emotions in both information content and people themselves should draw more attention in an attempt to understand what information is disseminated and how people interact with information. despite this issue, mass media and public media campaigns have a significant role as a more immediate means of remedying this situation characterized by the information on infection clusters. public campaigns have started at both national and local levels against this phenomenon of defaming people associated with the virus. as the ministry of justice in japan states, it is against human rights (hōmushō n.d.). one incident in japan characterized people’s attitudes towards the infection spread that called for a public intervention. iwate prefecture had no case of infection for the longest time since the beginning of the virus outbreak in japan. the governor of iwate prefecture had to make announcements that the first new patient in the prefecture should not be blamed, even before the first case was finally reported (‘iwate, with no virus cases’ 2020). in this relatively less populous region, a strong pressure not to have the first case had formed among people. residents became overly protective against any activity or people’s movement that might bring the virus into the region, which necessitated the governor’s statement. this pandemic has resurfaced the importance of designing effective public communication campaigns. however, public media campaigns are not always effective in getting the message across to people. this has been a long-acknowledged issue (dervin & frenette 2003, p. 234). especially in this pandemic situation, protecting oneself takes priority and a fear of catching the virus is widely spread among people, so that people may not readily accept the message by public media campaigns against defaming those who are infected or are potentially close to the virus. formal information channels are not always effective for fulfilling people’s information needs such as to how deal with life situations, and informal, personal information is considered valuable to them (martzoukou & sayyad abdi 2017, pp. 33-34). this turns attention to how informal information sources can be treated in understanding and enhancing people’s information literacy. affective aspects of informal information can play an important role in bringing about restrained reaction to information among people during a situation like this pandemic. regarding the information on infection clusters, people have also shown support and compassion towards others such as those who were involved in infections. for example, the shizuoka shinbun newspaper reported discriminatory treatments made to workers and their family members when their company was reported as a cluster (‘shizuoka’ 2020). according to the article, while they were not allowed to visit local clinics and their children were not permitted to go to school, the company received supportive messages from some people. local communities also showed support. when a starbucks café temporarily closed due to an infection case, some customers wrote supporting messages on the closure announcement placed on the entrance door (‘sutaba’ 2020). despite some people showing negative reactions on social media, it is also a place where people post supporting messages to those who became infected. encouraging broader dissemination of these positive, kamada cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 67 supportive messages may counteract the negative reactions some people post. research and practices in information literacy have a potential for enhancing this situation. local communities and social media can be a place to facilitate either blaming people or supporting people during a situation like this pandemic. what information is disseminated and how in both local communities and the internet become important in moving society in the right direction to steer through this pandemic. information literacy can play a role as it is also increasingly concerned with people creating and sharing information for the good of themselves and for the society. miller and kanazawa (2018, chapter 9) posit that the social structure in japan that induces people to conform to group norms have fostered people’s low trust of other people, since the affiliation with groups gives protection and reduces the necessity to trust others. this can provide a possible explanation about the way people behaved when seeing information about other people getting infected. hoechsmann & poyntz (2012, p. 140), in discussing emerging literacies, state that any literacies from past to present are bound by societal situations or relationships and the way people make meaning differs by societal settings. thus, information literacy education should recognize the influence of social and cultural situations (montieloverall 2007, p. 53). the issue that this paper has considered shows the importance of seeing societal or cultural contexts in people’s interaction with information. conclusion the current covid-19 pandemic has generated a large amount of information not just about the spread of the virus but about other various impacts it has made on the society. in japan, one segment of this huge array of information was the reporting on cluster infections. wide dissemination of this information through media has added to the problem that people who became infected or were associated with clusters became the target of blaming and discrimination by other people. this situation has highlighted the unique instance that correct and legitimate information can have a function of harming a large number of ordinary people. during previous large-scale pandemics in history, this type of information was not widely disseminated. however, the current information environment produces a far greater amount of information. this environment also provides many people with opportunities to spread information and post their reactions on the internet. the incidents caused by the information on infection clusters have brought to the surface the issues of privacy and people’s reaction to such information, which can be influenced by societal conditions. as information literacy, which is now more interrelated with other literacies such as media literacy, has become situated with people’s daily lives interacting with information, critical understanding of information among people has become more important. anxiety and fear during the pandemic have produced a unique context in which people deal with such information. the dissemination of information on infection clusters sheds light on the privacy aspect of information literacy and the need to examine emotional aspects of people’s interaction with information, as shown in recent information literacy movements. further, this pandemic has reinforced the need to devise effective and appropriate dissemination of information in order to minimize adverse societal effects amidst of fear and anxiety among people. understanding how people may react to information and conveying messages through putting them in appropriate context, which is also influenced by cultural and societal settings, become increasingly important. as more people participate in disseminating information in current society, the importance of information literacy for producing and sharing information becomes increasingly evident. not only disseminating accurate information, but helping people understand information and communicate about it appropriately becomes crucial in order to live through a situation like this pandemic in a less devastating manner. kamada cosmopolitan 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emerging journalism practices for fighting antisemitism. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:1, 62–78. https:// doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7421 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper don’t feed the trolls? emerging journalism practices for fighting anti-semitism caryn coatney university of southern queensland, springfield central, queensland, australia corresponding author: caryn coatney, university of southern queensland, springfield campus, 37 sinnathamby boulevard, springfield central, queensland 4300, australia, caryn.coatney@ usq.edu.au doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7421 article history: received 11/09/2020; revised 23/03/2021; accepted 06/05/2021; published 25/05/2021 abstract this study applies the concepts of interpretive communities and conversational interactions to show how investigative journalists initiated a relatively new method of reporting and generated support among their colleagues for becoming anti-nazi activists and troll hunters. it draws on a sample of journalistic reporting and related media items to examine investigative reporters’ self-reflexive acts and the responses of journalism communities in australia, the united kingdom and the united states from 2015 to 2020. investigative journalists initiated open conversations to show that they were enthusiastic activists in retweeting, confronting and quoting neo-nazi trolling by interviewing the perpetrators. other journalism communities signified they were pursuing activist-like agendas as they magnified this work through informal networks, social media and news commentaries. journalists reconsidered their professional boundaries to allow for cooperative conversations about their experiences in a fresh effort to denounce hate speech and begin collective initiatives to enhance social cohesion in civil society. keywords investigative journalism; interpretive communities; social media; neo-nazism; trolling declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 62 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7421 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7421 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:caryn.coatney@usq.edu.au mailto:caryn.coatney@usq.edu.au https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7421 introduction ‘don’t feed the trolls’ has become a common theme in social media research. the slogan has often referred to individual journalists’ efforts to label offensive online users as trolls and block the perpetrators from their social media accounts (binns 2012; mackinnon and zuckerman 2012; malmgren 2017). their work has quickened in response to the rise of far-right trolls who have targeted journalists with the use of social media, anti-semitic vitriol and holocaust denial sites (anti-defamation league 2016; confronting holocaust denial with david baddiel 2020; jakubowicz 2017). journalists often decide and establish the boundaries of their profession through informal conversations. they have been viewed as an ‘interpretive community’ who may develop conversational networks to agree on new professional boundaries (carlson 2016; zelizer 1993). using the concepts of interpretive community and conversational interactions, this study sought to answer the research question: how have investigative journalists and journalism communities responded to the recent anti-semitic trolling threats including holocaust denial? this article explores the innovations in journalists’ relations with audiences within the boundaries of social media. it reveals how investigative reporters have initiated exposés to generate support within the journalism community for confronting trolls and challenging the traditional boundaries. this study demonstrates that investigative journalists developed new practices of exposing, interviewing and denouncing neo-nazi trolls including holocaust deniers. journalists retold their trolling experiences through their investigative performances of the exposé, satire and eyewitness accounts (gorman 2017a, 2017b, 2019; ioffe 2016a; katz 2016a, 2016b; mandel 2018; weisman 2016a, 2016b, 2018). the media coverage of holocaust denial has been a particularly extreme example that shows there are occasions when daily reporters’ practice of objectivity and balance may interfere with the need to correct a myth. for instance, the media would at times portray the holocaust as a matter of public debate between pseudoacademic deniers and intellectuals on talk shows by broadcasting such headlines as ‘myth or is it truth’? (lipstadt 2012, p. 2; moldavan 2005). in contemporary terms, holocaust denial has become pervasive on neo-nazi online sites through the perpetrators’ attempts to underestimate and justify genocide. in contrast, investigative reporters are distinguished as an influential section of the journalism community who do not merely seek to repeat ‘both sides’ of a debate (glasser & ettema 1989). investigative journalists aim to reveal hidden truths for the public interest (allan 2013; carson 2020). this study has found that the investigative journalists openly shared their experiences and new practices in a fresh initiative to challenge the boundaries that separated trolling. they empowered other journalism communities to engage in a cooperative search for solutions to confront hate speech and trolling treats on facebook and twitter (goldberg 2016a, 2016b; inside facebook: secrets of a social network 2018; knaus et al. 2019; newton 2019; rosenberg 2016; swisher 2018a, 2018b; victor 2016). their experiences exemplify the real-world possibilities of collective action to create conversational, public spaces that allow for the promotion of greater social cohesion in civil society. journalists’ online interactions social media have been viewed as an unexplored realm where journalists may freely venture outside their traditional boundaries to experiment with new practices that will involve more audiences. news organisations have encouraged journalists to use self-disclosures and promote their personal views on twitter to develop an affinity with their audiences (holton, coddington, lewis & de zúñiga 2015; molyneux, lewis and holton 2018; molyneux and mourão 2019; neilson 2018; sacco & bossio 2017). jukes observes that ‘news organisations are succeeding in drawing on twitter as a tool to engage audiences’ (2019, p. 256). boundary work has become a popular concept to examine journalists’ use of social media that have challenged traditional boundaries ( jukes 2019). as zelizer notes (1993), journalists will collectively interpret and establish the boundaries of their profession. for berkowitz and terkeurst (1999), media coatney cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202163 spaces can become cultural sites where meanings are constructed by members of the interpretive community. lindlof (2002) has found that interpretive communities use social networks to create conversations that help to establish their shared identity. unstructured social media spaces have provided a strong trigger for innovation, particularly for journalists to act as a cooperative community. for instance, political journalists have posted more discussions while trying to evade controversial topics on twitter. they have experimented with quote tweets, which allow the users to add their comments when retweeting other people’s messages ( jukes 2019; molyneux & mourão 2019). investigative journalists have pioneered more adversarial reporting to perform an activist-like agenda, leading to a new era of collaboration (di salvo 2020; graves & konieczna 2015). some other daily reporters have extended this role to become what hedman and djerf-pierre (2013, p. 382) call enthusiastic activists by living a ‘media life extreme’ and being fully connected and tweeting continuously during their work. the cooperative investigative projects have aimed to improve democratic life by departing from the traditional ideal of the solitary, rivalrous watchdog (carson & farhall 2018; di salvo 2020; graves & konieczna 2015; price 2017). contemporary research has also shown an uneasiness with an uncritical valorising of close journalistaudience interactions due to the rise of abusive online users. individual journalists have been responsible for expelling menacing online users and maintaining protected online sites (binns 2012; lewis, zamith & coddington 2020; wolfgang 2018). increasingly, social media have become sites of struggle for journalistic authority in online spaces too often full of trolls (molyneux and mourão 2019; robinson 2010). as lewis and molyneux (2019, p. 2584) opined, ‘what if, as increasingly appears to be the case, being on social media has predominantly meant putting oneself at the potential mercies of the “twitter mob”’? research has shown that journalists have responded differently to trolling attacks. for example, molyneux (2015) has found that political journalists would retweet their hate mail to demonstrate a desire for transparency, but they avoided engaging with their critics. the extreme trolling of some female journalists has produced a chilling effect by silencing their voices (ferrier & garud-patkar 2018; lewis, zamith & coddington 2020). charitidis et al. (2020, p. 1) have remarked: ‘journalists are multipliers of societal discourse and their relative prominence, and high audience reach makes them vulnerable to hate speech.’ the contested spaces indicate that the boundaries are ripe for renegotiation (artemas, vos & duffy 2018, p. 1004). conversational interactions in uncertain times, journalists will engage in informal conversations about the professional direction they should take (alexander 2004; carlson 2016; lindlof 2002). the decisions that journalists make about the boundaries of their profession are not simply imitative and formulaic (allan 2013; revers 2014). as revers (2014, p. 40) explains, ‘there are no more or less “actual” constructions of boundaries’. journalists draw upon shared vocabularies to interpret the boundaries within their profession. according to allan (2013), investigative journalists often spontaneously improvise with new media techniques and share their experiences to serve the public good. allan remarks, ‘it is much more improvisatory than is typically acknowledged in academic scholarship’ (p. 145). this work is self-referential, as journalists openly talk about their experiences, and it is infused by civic ideals (lindlof 2002; revers 2014). such talks allow journalists to ‘make vivid the invisible motives and morals they are trying to represent’ (alexander 2004, p. 532). satirists’ performances have also been likened to the role of investigative journalism as they develop spontaneous conversations to expose problems affecting society (holm 2017). as peterson (2008, p. 8) states, ‘if “speaking truth to power” is part of the journalists’ role, it is the satirist’s primary mission – a higher calling, in fact, than merely being funny’. news satire has become a journalistic genre that exposes hidden truths and serves the public interest (koivukoski & ödmark 2020; madison & dejarnette 2018). the interpretive journalism community may widen the professional boundaries to accept fresh approaches in news reporting (allan 2013). coatney cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202164 objectivity debates differing from investigative journalists, contemporary daily reporters have grappled with traditional notions of objectivity. according to schudson (2001, p. 150): ‘objective reporting is supposed to be cool, rather than emotional, in tone. objective reporting takes pains to represent fairly each leading side in a political controversy.’ the practice of objectivity has been criticised for the use of a neutral tone that moderates between opposing views and lacks a requirement to check the facts (cohen-almagor 2013). for example, rosen (1993, p. 50) asserted: ‘objective reporting is a way of getting you to accept my account by saying, “look, i don’t have any passions. i don’t have any convictions … i’m just telling you the way it is, you see, so accept it because this is the way it is”’. many daily reporters initially avoided posting comments on facebook that might appear to tarnish their objectivity (robinson 2010). more recently, journalists have become transparent about how they have performed their work (craft 2017; craft and heim 2008; molyneux & mourão 2019; mourão 2015; vos & craft 2017; vos & moore 2020). according to vos and moore (2020, p. 28): ‘the principle of transparency acknowledged journalists had opinions and life experiences, and hence owed it to their audiences to be open about their subjectivity’. in contrast, investigative journalists have often tried to expose factual disputes that have been glossed over in the traditional reporting of ‘he said, she said’ accounts (graves and konieczna 2015). some journalists have recently reconsidered their practice of objectivity when faced with such hate speech as holocaust denial (whine 2020). researchers have often cast the media portrayal of holocaust denial as a battle between authoritative sources over the truth (cohen-almagor 2013; lipstadt 2012; moldavan 2005; zandberg 2010). lipstadt has noted (2012) that the rise of online holocaust denial was especially worrisome because some commentators tended to present this as a balanced view and it was attracting younger audiences. modern anti-semitism became a template for the current post-truth era with its emphasis on emotive appeals rather than facts, which enabled holocaust denial to become a full-time industry (d’ancona 2017). more recently, journalists have unfavourably reported on online holocaust denial. by 2020, whine stated: ‘[t]he sometimes-substantial media coverage of deniers’ convictions acts as a deterrent and reduces the frequency of denial, at least in the form of the justification or glorification of nazi crimes’ (p. 63). yet sorce (2020) has found that german journalists remained reluctant to become anti-nazi activists on twitter due to their ideal of objectivity. even so, social media platforms have been viewed as having a liberating effect by freeing journalists from the shackles of false balance and allowing them to express their views more forthrightly. lewis and molyneux (2018, p. 15) assert: ‘it is assumed that journalist-audience interactions are generally positive in part because such interactions contribute to diminishing the much-maligned mask of objectivity, neutrality, and detachedness behind which journalistic work is blackboxed to public view’. this article contributes to research into investigative journalists’ development of innovative practices by showing how they challenged traditional boundaries and confronted trolls, allowing for a cooperative effort to enhance social cohesion in civil society. methodology this study has analysed news articles relating to journalists’ exposure of neo-nazi trolling with the use of quantitative and qualitative media content analysis techniques. the study conducted a factiva search of articles during the rapid upsurge of far-right political movements in australia, the united kingdom and the united states between 2015 and 2020. the initial search centred on the keywords of journalism and holocaust denial as an extreme form of anti-semitic hate speech, and this yielded more than 7470 results. the search was refined to an analysis of the keywords of journalism and holocaust denial on facebook and twitter. the two platforms were selected because these have been the most widely used social media sources for journalists and their audiences at the time (von nordheim, boczek & koppers 2018). the refined search generated 141 unique articles in influential news outlets that publish investigative journalism. coatney cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202165 these included the australian newspapers, the age, the canberra times, the courier mail and the sydney morning herald. the uk publications were the bbc online, financial times, the guardian and the times including the sunday times. the us outlets included the new york times and the washington post as well as the cnn, national public radio (npr) and verge websites. the news articles were subjected to a close reading and qualitative content analysis to identify the ‘hot moments’ or turning points in the news portrayal of anti-semitism on social media (zelizer 1993, p. 224). this analysis allowed for identifying investigative journalists who acted as eyewitnesses with first-hand experience in confronting either anti-semitism, neo-nazi trolling or holocaust denial on social media. zelizer (2007, p, 410) remarks that, ‘eyewitnessing offers members of the journalistic community a way to reference what journalists do, should do, and ought not do’. the eyewitnesses were selected on the basis that their first-hand accounts were prominently cited by their colleagues. most journalists seek to be cited authoritatively by other media professionals to promote important stories (graves & konieczna 2015). most news articles have not been cited, however, and many journalists’ tweets have not been retweeted (molyneux & mourão 2019). since reporters have rarely cited their rivals, this study selected prominent eyewitnesses whose reporting was cited or included in related articles in other news organisations. they included investigative journalists ginger gorman, julia ioffe and jonathan weisman who have attracted neo-nazi trolling during their day-to-day political reporting. this study also focused on reporters who were trolled while investigating anti-semitism or holocaust denial. they involved bethany mandel and matt katz as well as news commentator and comedian david baddiel, based on peterson’s (2008) definition that a satirist’s role may comprise investigative journalism techniques by speaking the truth to power. this analysis also included investigative journalist kara swisher’s reporting of holocaust denial and trolling on facebook. the study examined 25 media items relating to their experiences that appeared in their twitterfeeds, videos and other publications (all in with chris hayes 2016; baddiel 2020; confronting holocaust denial with david baddiel 2020; gorman 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2019; gross 2018; ioffe 2016a, 2016b; katz 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; lampert 2020; mandel 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2018; swisher 2018a, 2018b, 2020; valentish 2019; weisman 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2018). this study examined the self-reflexive messages in the 25 media items by considering the journalists’ position and the reactions within the wider journalism profession, as well as the conditions and context of their creation, sharing and distribution in other publications (carlson 2016; marchi 2019). aldridge and evetts (2003, p. 560) state that: ‘journalism is an intensely reflexive occupation which constantly talks to and about itself ’. this analysis included news articles citing the eyewitnesses’ experiences from the same range of australian, uk and us news outlets as well as from dujour, the atlantic and new yorker magazine articles that referred to holocaust denial. therefore, this sample involved 221 articles citing the eyewitnesses plus 141 articles relating to the portrayal of holocaust denial on facebook and twitter. altogether, the final analysis included a total of 362 articles and another 25 eyewitness media items to ascertain how journalists came together to reconsider their traditional boundaries to allow for more activism against holocaust denial and neo-nazi trolling. expanding journalism’s boundaries this study has found that journalists quickly formed a supportive network to show their solidarity for investigative reporters being trolled by neo-nazis (victor 2016; williams 2016). the investigative journalists increasingly acted as performers within a community who interpreted, trialled and refined their strategies to deal with the upsurge of hate speech on social media (gross 2017; gorman 2019; ioffe 2016a; katz 2016a, 2016b; valentish 2019). in retelling the experiences, other journalists signified that the targeted investigative reporters were curators and interpreters of neo-nazi trolling (bixby 2016; luce 2016; new york times editorial board 2018; victor 2016). for example, the investigative journalist julia ioffe was portrayed as ‘served up on social media in concentration camp garb and worse’ for her magazine profile of melania coatney cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202166 trump during the us presidential campaign in 2016 (ioffe 2016b; weisman 2016a, p. 3). the future first lady had criticised ioffe for intruding into her family background while writing a gq magazine article. melania trump (2016) responded to the article by publishing a facebook post that used familiar keywords from trump’s campaign messages to denounce journalism (cnn 2016). she posted: ‘the article published in gq today is yet another example of the dishonest media and their disingenuous reporting. julia ioffe, a journalist who is looking to make a name for herself, clearly had an agenda when going after my family’ (2016a). afterwards, ioffe (2016a) initiated the practice of using quote tweets to start conversations that shared the neo-nazi trolling about her article. usually, journalists would avoid discussing controversial personal topics on social media ( jukes 2019; molyneux and mourão 2019). ioffe added and curated satirical comments such as, ‘good morning, from your neighbourhood trump trolls’, in a rare effort to create an online conversation that would confront abusive readers (2016a). although ioffe’s magazine article was not an investigative report, she invoked the principles of investigative journalism by using the exposé. the innovative quote tweets departed from the traditional notion of blocking and silencing cyberbullies. other journalists and commentators retold ioffe’s story, giving credibility and authority to her practice of exposing trolls. they announced that melania trump’s facebook post triggered the neo-nazi tweets about ioffe (borchers 2016; north 2016). the washington post’s eric wemple (2017) reported: ‘that cued the anti-semitism – murderous threats that became so worrisome that ioffe had to file a police report’. cnn’s noah berlatsky (2019) recounted: ‘the trumps were unhappy with the profile – as were many of their far-right fans. the latter deluged ioffe with anti-semitic slurs and death threats, including recordings of hitler’s speeches left on her phone’s voice mail’. as the times’s columnist daniel finkelstein (2016, p. 29) remarked: ‘twitter, facebook and youtube are the common room of the fascists, the water cooler of the racial supremacist, the cocktail party organiser of the nazis’. melania trump (2016) distanced her role from the controversy during an interview with dujour journalist mickey rapkin. he jokingly asked her if she would denounce any people who might paint a swastika on a picture of his face after reading his article about their interview. she replied: ‘i don’t control my fans … but i don’t agree with what they’re doing. i understand what you mean, but there are people out there who maybe went too far. she [ioffe] provoked them’ (rapkin 2016). the journalists’ open conversations indicated a desire for greater activism against neonazi trolls. cnn news anchor wolf blitzer aimed to further the online fight against trolling during donald trump’s presidential campaign by asking him to respond to the story of a neo-nazi network that supported him. blitzer asked: some of your supporters have viciously attacked this woman julia ioffe with anti-semitic attacks, death threats. these people get so angry, what’s your message to these people when something like that happens? (cnn 2016). the interview extended beyond the tone of objectivity by denouncing what glasser and ettema (1989, p. 17) have called the ‘discreditable’ sources that originate outside the traditional news domain. during the interview, trump replied to blitzer: ‘i don’t know about that … i don’t have a message to the fans’ (cnn 2016). trump also remarked: ‘i haven’t read the article, but i heard it was very inaccurate article and heard it was a nasty article’. in his response, he used the rhetorical strategy of tu quoque to avoid the controversy by blaming media hypocrisy (mercieca 2019). rival commentators were united in their criticisms of trump’s official version when they posted their online curated views about the interview (gross 2018; o’brien 2017). for example, wemple (2017) opined: ‘to this blog’s eyes, that looked quite like a ‘chance’ to denounce anti-semitism’. cnn commentator dean obeidallah (2018) added: ‘here was trump’s opportunity to send a clear, passionate message to his supporters that there was no place for anti-semitism in american political discourse.’ journalists may become interpreters who, in berkowitz’s words (2019), ‘know how the story should go’. after ioffe’s tweets (2016a), commentators acted as interpreters during coatney cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202167 file:///d:/works/mtc/uts_epress_internals/2021/0518/ccs%2013(1)/javascript:void(0) file:///d:/works/mtc/uts_epress_internals/2021/0518/ccs%2013(1)/javascript:void(0); file:///d:/works/mtc/uts_epress_internals/2021/0518/ccs%2013(1)/javascript:void(0); a struggle over the political meaning of the trolling attacks (berlatsky 2019; borchers 2016; cnn 2016; gross 2018; north 2016; o’brien 2017; obeidallah 2018; rapkin 2016; wemple 2017). similarly, the new york times journalist jonathan weisman extended the practice of the investigative exposé to mock the trolls who barraged him with neo-nazi messages (2016a, 2016b, 2018; gross 2018). he had attracted trolling for posting a quote tweet in support of a washington post column about the rise of american fascism (2016c). while his quote tweet was not an investigation, he developed the performance of the exposé to share the online trolling that he had encountered. journalists sympathetically reported on his decision to retweet the hate messaging of self-identified trump supporters after he could not persuade twitter moderators to remove the anti-semitic posts (goldberg 2016a; lizza 2016; victor 2016; weisman 2016b). in an interview, weisman indicated to national public radio (npr) host terry gross that he was trialling a new method: i thought, i want people to see this. and so i would retweet them. i would send them out into the world. and i think in some ways, i only invited more attacks because, hey, somebody who has 500 followers were – was being rebroadcast by somebody who had 50,000 followers. so in some ways, i was empowering these people. but i also really did want people to see how ugly it was out there. so i may have done a bad thing, may have done a good thing. i still don’t know. but i certainly wanted to get the point across. and i think i did (gross 2018). weisman’s self-reflection indicated that he was experimenting with a relatively new practice to combat the concerted twitter bombing. journalists created a shared symbolic vocabulary to reaffirm weisman’s response by mockingly adding the neo-nazi symbol of triple parentheses to their names on their twitter accounts to signify their collective support (adkins 2016; goldberg 2016b; katz 2016a; mitchell 2016; obeidallah 2016-2018; rosenberg 2016; victor 2016; weisman 2016b; white 2016). previously, many alt-right sites had been posting journalists’ names inside triple parentheses, which became neo-nazi code or echoes for identifying jews. for example, the new york times journalist, daniel victor (2016), circulated rival tablet magazine writer yair rosenberg’s humorous tweet. rosenberg (2016) appealed to the public by asking: ‘want to raise awareness about anti-semitism, show solidarity with harassed jews & mess with the twitter nazis? put ((( ))) around your name’. the atlantic editor in chief, jeffrey goldberg, posted another call to action: ‘thanks to everyone participating in this act of (((cultural appropriation)))’ (2016b). social media allowed journalists to develop collaborative news initiatives (graves & konieczna 2015; jukes 2019). after weisman’s tweets, journalists came together to mock neo-nazi symbolism and confront the trolls’ virtual baying (goldberg 2016b; victor 2016). journalists were engaging on social media in boundary work, which zelizer (1993), vos and moore (2020) explain as the social and cultural interactions to decide appropriate professional practices. moreover, investigative journalists became self-designated troll hunters while speaking openly about their experiences (gorman 2019; katz 2016b; weisman 2018; washington post 2019). for example, npr journalist matt katz (2016b) interviewed investigative reporter bethany trump about her decision to buy a gun after receiving memes that portrayed her as a holocaust victim. both katz and mandel were trolled while they were investigating neo-nazi rhetoric during the us presidential campaign in 2015 and 2016 (all in with chris hayes 2016; katz 2016c; mandel 2015, 2016a, 2016b). katz told listeners that mandel ‘has faced thousands of anti-semitic messages online, mostly from self-identified white nationalists who are big trump supporters’ (2016b). evoking a scene of pathos, katz portrayed mandel as a ‘full-time mom who works from home’ while it was ‘naptime’ during the broadcast. he also showed his empathy by talking about his experience in interviewing one of the trolls, a trump supporter and holocaust denier who was stalking him online (katz 2016c). katz explained, ‘i tweeted back to see if he would do an interview, and he gave me his number’. later, katz said: ‘i just wanted to know, why?’ (2016b). the investigative journalists used the tweets to perform dramatic narratives about themselves and their political reporting for their colleagues and coatney cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202168 their audiences (mahler 2016; mandel 2018; weisman 2016a). the interview served to suggest that they were members of an interpretive community who were uniting to craft a narrative on trialling new practices. similarly, the age investigative journalist, ginger gorman, invoked the role of an eyewitness as she reflected critically on her decision to seek out and interview a man whom she called a troll for his neo-nazi online posts (2016, 2019). she recalled her purpose to ‘shine a light under the dark bridges and crevices of the internet’ (2017a, p. 1, 2017b, p. 13). the man began to stalk her online after her interview with him. she reflected: ‘he might be chatty and ask me media advice or rant about free speech. or he might tell me, the descendent of jews who fled the holocaust, that it never occurred’. she concluded about her experience: ‘there’s no longer any demarcation of where the journalism ends and the rest of my life begins’. during an interview, she recounted some activists’ reactions to her decision to confront trolls: they said, ‘all they want is power. why are you engaging with them?’ i found that incredible. i’m engaging with them because i want to know what they want. i don’t condone what they do, but you have to ask the question: ‘why are they doing this?’ (valentish 2019). she explained her aim to act as a voice for the trolls’ victims by remarking: ‘we can’t have marginalised voices driven out of these spaces’ (valentish 2019). such tactics suggested alexander’s conception of professional practices that ‘make vivid the invisible motives and morals they are trying to represent’ (alexander 2004, p. 532). journalists engaged in open discourses that broadened the definition of an investigative journalist to include enthusiastic activism in confronting trolls (fitzsimmons 2020; hardy 2019; moody 2019). the boundaries between journalism and trolling further eroded when british media commentator and comedian david baddiel generated popular news coverage of his interview of a holocaust denier for his highly publicised documentary (confronting holocaust denial with david baddiel 2020; ellen 2020; long 2020; midgley 2020; rifkind 2020). journalists portrayed baddiel as an eyewitness with first-hand knowledge of holocaust deniers who were trolling him even before his documentary aired on the bbc. baddiel reflected that he decided to interview one of the twitter trolls, dermot mulqueen, who had invited him to read a holocaust denial book. when baddiel retold his experience, he mocked mulqueen for boasting about publishing a ‘lovely picture of adolf hitler’ on a holocaust denial page on facebook (feay 2020). baddiel (2020) recalled a scene in his documentary when he interviewed prosecuting lawyer anthony julius, who asked him: ‘why are you doing this? you’ll just be giving deniers more airtime’. as baddiel reflected: ‘he may be right, but things have changed … the gatecrashers, as they always will, now dominate the party: social media is today more defined by antisocial media’. furthermore, he explained his activist intentions in a news interview by declaring, ‘holocaust deniers are a very extreme example of trolls and ignoring them has not worked’ (lampert 2020). his reflection suggested a growing willingness to overturn the traditional practice of silencing trolls. journalists applauded baddiel’s interview, treating him as a colleague (feay 2020; rifkind 2020). as the times’s dominic maxwell (2020, p. 21) reported: ‘baddiel is a words man, a precision man, and a comedy man’. baddiel used the journalistic technique of the exposé to reveal a hidden truth about holocaust denial that was in the public interest. the journalists’ reaction suggested that the documentary met lindlof ’s definition (2002) of a successful media practice that is recognised and valued by professional members of the interpretive community. the expanding investigative journalism communities united with other journalists and commentators to define appropriate practices in confronting the sources of holocaust denial (naughton 2018; nunberg 2018; new york times editorial board 2018; the new york times 2018; zraick 2018). for example, investigative journalist kara swisher (2018a) generated widespread news coverage of her interview of facebook chief executive mark zuckerberg. swisher questioned zuckerberg’s reasoning to host hate sites on the social media platform. zuckerberg attempted to use self-disclosure to gain support for allowing holocaust denial sites on facebook by saying: coatney cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202169 i’m jewish, and there’s a set of people who deny that the holocaust happened. i find that deeply offensive. but at the end of the day, i don’t believe that our platform should take that down because i think there are things that different people get wrong. i don’t think that they’re intentionally getting it wrong’. after the interview, swisher reflected that she tried to stifle an instinct to interrupt zuckerberg, but she decided to interject briefly to ‘stop this runaway train of thought’ (2020). her interruption departed from the traditional notion of professional detachment, and her comment to zuckerberg was later emphasised in boldface type in her published interview: ‘in the case of the holocaust deniers, they might be [getting it wrong]’ (2018a). using the journalistic style of reviewing a performance, commentators described that zuckerberg appeared comically tripped up during the interview because his response was somewhat muddled and weird, provoking a storm of protest (bbc news 2018; ford 2018; naughton 2018; zraick 2018). in a follow-up email, zuckerberg sought to clarify his apparent ambivalence towards holocaust denial: ‘there’s one thing i want to clear up. i personally find holocaust denial deeply offensive, and i absolutely didn’t intend to defend the intent of people who deny that’ (swisher, 2018b). moreover, news outlets publicised their competitors’ investigative journalism projects, including the contentious use of undercover reporting, which exposed a lack of moderating and banning hate sites on facebook (inside facebook: secrets of a social network 2018; kolhatkar 2018; naughton 2018; newton 2019; osnos 2018; the new york times 2018). the news narratives promoted the rhetoric of investigative reporting that ‘went undercover’ to expose online moderators’ secret lives and reveal a so-called covert plot allowing facebook to host the ‘holohoax’, or holocaust denial, as well as racially abusive content and other neo-nazi sites (knaus et al. 2019; statt 2018). other commentators sought to distinguish between facebook and ‘good’ journalism that allowed for investigative exposés to denounce hate speech (bennett 2018; cnn 2018; finkelstein 2018). guardian columnist john naughton (2018) opined: ‘facebook is zuckerberg’s monster. unlike frankenstein, he is still enamoured of his creation … but it’s becoming increasingly clear that his creature is out of control’. the washington post’s tracy jan and elizabeth dwoskin (2017) noted that: ‘facebook has long resisted being a gatekeeper for speech’. later, they added: ‘among the most challenging issues for facebook is its role as the policeman for the free expression of its two billion users’ (dwoskin & jan 2018). the commentaries also signified journalists’ optimism in filling a void in social media to counter hate speech. for example, journalist marvin kalb commented in a cnn interview: when a lie is a lie, say it is a lie. the words themselves have enormous power in the social media world. and there is an extra responsibility on journalists because we are there for everybody to be very careful. and when you use the word, be absolutely certain that it’s right (cnn 2018). kalb added, ‘when the lies accumulate and the misrepresentations accumulate … journalists have to stand up’ (cnn 2018). journalists extended the new style of cooperative journalism by agreeing to shine a light on hidden, troll-filled spaces on social media networks. conclusion high-profile investigative journalists openly challenged their traditional boundaries to allow for more open, activist exposés to confront holocaust hate speech. their performances resembled enthusiastic activists by being connected and twittering during the ‘hot moments’ of challenging holocaust denial. this pursuit was particularly evident during the us presidential campaign in 2016 and its aftermath as investigative journalism became a political act in a struggle over the meaning of neo-nazis’ roles on social media networks. coatney cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202170 other journalism communities responded to the investigative journalists’ self-reflexivity by reaffirming and magnifying their performances. these communities were involved in an ongoing process of challenging the social media boundaries of their profession. they discarded their support for the boundaries that separated them from trolling to pursue activist-like agendas that focused on exposing neo-nazism as well as the myths involving holocaust denial. through informal networks, their performances showed their continued experimentation to begin turning back the tide of trolling. investigative journalists indicated the liberating potential for more direct, open challenges to antisemitism and holocaust denial in the media. their roles as anti-nazi activists and troll hunters marked a turning point in the struggle to start overturning the chilling effect of trolling and online hate speech. the innovative exposés generated other journalism community members’ support to engage in a cooperative search for fresh solutions to promote greater social cohesion within the online networks. their work suggests investigative journalists’ crucial leadership in initiating a collective call to action to enhance the inclusive community ideals of civil society on popular social media networks. acknowledgements i would like to thank the editors and reviewers of cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal for their valuable recommendations which have strengthened this paper. references adkins l. 2016, 3 june. accessed 11 september 2020, https://twitter.com/laura_e_adkins/status/738833631565729792 aldridge, m. & evetts, j. 2003, ‘rethinking the concept of professionalism: the case of journalism’, the british journal of sociology, vol. 54, no. 4, pp. 547-564. https://doi.org/10.1080/0007131032000143582 alexander, j.c. 2004, ‘cultural pragmatics: social performance between ritual and strategy’, sociological theory, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 527-573. 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https://twitter.com/morningmoneyben/status/688442842256158720?lang=en https://doi.org/10.1177/1464884918762362 https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443709350095 https://doi.org/10.1080/15295039309366865 https://doi.org/10.1080/07393180701694614 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/technology/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-holocaust-denial.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/technology/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-holocaust-denial.html cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 1 2018 © 2018 james goodman. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: goodman, j. 2018. contesting accusations of ‘foreign interference’; the new agenda for australian civil society. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 10(1), 63-84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ ccs.v10i1.5934 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper contesting accusations of ‘foreign interference’: the new agenda for australian civil society james goodman university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: james goodman, social and political sciences, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. james.goodman@uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i1.5934 article history: received 26/02/2018; revised 14/03/2018; accepted 16/03/2018; published 29/03/2018 abstract in 2017 the australian government announced a raft of measures designed to combat ‘foreign interference’ in the australian political system. the measures propose new constraints on civil society advocacy and threaten to seriously curtail democratic rights. they form part of global trend towards the increased regulation of international non-government organisations (ingos), driven by fears of ‘foreign’ political influence. in response to the shrinking ‘civic space’, ngos are defining new agendas. recently in australia and elsewhere ngo advocates have gained some traction in extending the legitimacy and scope for political advocacy. the new rhetoric of countering ‘foreign interference’ threatens ngo advocacy, but also creates new political possibilities. this article surveys the international trends and australian contexts; it analyses recent legislative proposals in australia to combat ‘foreign interference’, and outlines the public debate. the double standard for ingos and multinational corporations is highlighted as a key theme, and the article ends with a concluding discussion about emerging possibilities for new political obligations for corporations in australia. keywords ingos; advocacy; ngo regulation; democracy; australia declaration of conflicting interest james goodman is a member of the editorial board of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal. he has had no involvement in the review of this submission. funding this paper was produced without funding. mailto:james.goodman@uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i1.5934 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 introduction non-government organisations (ngos) are the institutional bedrock of civil society, both domestically and internationally. the concept of the ngo as the carrier of democracy, rather than the political party, became established in the 1970s and 1980s through multiple struggles against authoritarianism. this ‘third wave’ of democratization, as huntington, the conservative political scientist, called it (1991), unseated autocratic elites in eastern europe, south america and east asia and was in large part driven by mobilisation through ngos. subsequently, in the context of globalised corporations and the emergence of new forms of unaccountable political authority at international levels, international ngos (ingos), aligned with social and political movements, became established channels for globalization and democratic engagement ‘from below’ (steger, goodman and wilson 2014). alliances of ingos and movements created constituencies, constituted influence and exerted leverage: they exposed and stalled corporate and government initiatives, and established new forms of global governance and regulation (goodman 2016). the international and domestic impacts of ngos did not go unnoticed, and from the 2000s there was a concerted effort to rein-in their power. one important claim was that ngos exert political influence but are relatively unaccountable. this challenged their democratic legitimacy, presenting ngos as elitist and self-interested. the challenge came from the ‘free market’ right, in the form of ‘public choice’ theory that asserted a ‘free market of ideas’ as the precondition for optimal political decision-making, defining ngos as an illegitimate distortion of formal representative politics (see staples 2008). a parallel criticism of ‘ngo-ism’ came from the left, which defined dominant ngos and especially ‘branded’ ingos as extending elite control against (and parasitic upon) genuinely democratic grassroots social and political movements (see hirsch 2003). into the 2000s the critiques from the right found purchase in government attempts at imposing restrictions on ngo activity, as reflected in several countries, including australia, where the government embarked on a multi-faceted effort at ‘silencing dissent’ (see hamilton and madison 2007). the attempted imposition of new constraints on ngo activity has certainly threatened the vitality of democracy, chilling public advocacy across many countries (see successive reports from civicus, for instance 2016). in several places, including australia, attempted impositions have politicized the regulation of ngos and produced a public backlash that in some instances has had the ironic effect of expanding the realm of civil society activity. this is an important lesson in the australian context, where the howard government’s efforts to constrain ngos in the 1990s and early 2000s helped to galvanise the sector, and subsequently forced new commitments from government agencies not to constrain ngo advocacy. the commonplace imposition of a ‘gag’ order for any ngos receiving government funds, for instance, was contested across a range of contexts, leading to legislated commitments, including the 2013 ‘not-for-profit sector freedom to advocate act’ at the federal level and various ‘social compacts’ to respect ngo autonomy at the state level (butcher 2015). government attempts to tighten the definition of charitable status, and hence constrain access to tax-deductibility, was likewise highly contested and culminated in a high cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 65 court case that established the public benefit of political advocacy (the ‘aidwatch ‘ case, discussed below; staples 2012; ccs journal 3(3s) 2011). in the current period, the stand-off over ngo regulation has taken a new turn, which again may have unexpected consequences. following the global financial crisis, and the persistent economic downturn, a wave of openly nationalist political forces have gained power across several countries (gonzalez-vicente and carroll 2017). this has coincided with something of an inter-regnum in geopolitics, with new challengers, principally china, russia and india, gaining political influence. there has been increased concern about cross-national collaboration between nationalist forces, for instance to secure the exit of britain from the eu, and to help put donald trump into the white house (see dodd et al 2017; ccs journal 9(2) 2017). in australia there are rising concerns about the influence of chinese authorities, channeled through affiliated advocacy ngos or think-tanks, and through direct donations to political parties – chinese corporates account for the vast bulk of overseas donations to australian political parties (uhlmann 2018; hamilton 2018). the fear of the rising powers has legitimised a new political concern about ‘foreign political interference’ and a related desire to defend the sanctity of ‘political sovereignty’. this new anti-foreigner sentiment has been recruited, very effectively, to the wider campaign against ngo political advocacy. the result, in australia, and replicated in many other countries, is a raft of measures that are ostensibly designed to ‘protect’ democracy from outside interference. the rhetoric subsumes ingos as potential threats to political democracy, but the effect is to constrain the democratic process by delimiting ngo influence, both domestic and international. in 2017, on introducing ‘foreign interference laws’ in australia, the prime minister referred to the need to criminalise non-disclosure of ‘ties to a foreign principal’, as a ‘disinfectant’ for the political process, along with powers to ban foreign funding and political interference, to ‘surgically’ remove risks to the democratic system (turnbull 2017). senator brandis, attorney-general and long-time advocate of tighter constraints on ngos, stated his government was ‘committed to ensuring that our political system is free from foreign interference’, detailing legislation that would extend across all aspects of political life, covering any ‘foreign sources … seeking to influence australia's government and political processes’ (brandis 2017). the heady mix of anti-foreigner rhetoric and democratic sentiment may have unexpected consequences though, in terms of politicising the role of ingos: there has certainly been a strong backlash in australia (and elsewhere where similar proposals have been tabled). the backlash reasserts the legitimacy of international links for ngos, and their importance for the political system. in the process, the assault on ingos may create the foundations for a stronger challenge to nationalist populism. this article outlines proposed changes in the political regulation of ngos in australia and their implications. the article addresses a range of issues, across charity status, tax deductibility, foreign donations, and foreign influence. all have direct implications for domestic as well as international ngos. in large part the australian measures extend parallel initiatives underway in other countries, and this international context is addressed first by way of background to the australian experience. this is followed by an overview of recent efforts at regulating the political activity of ngos in australia, and how they have been 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 countered, for the most part successfully. governmental restrictions are found to galvanise the sector, inspiring a ‘collective effort to resist the government’s agenda’ (crosbie 2017). this has affirmed and in some respects widened ‘civic space’. the article then analyses recent government efforts at constraining ‘foreign interference’, focusing on implications for ngos in australia, and outlining, again, how these measures have been very effectively opposed. the article echoes three other papers published in this journal, covering the russian, chinese and indian contexts (sector into see oleinikova 2017 and feng 2017; and talukdar, this issue), in particular their discussion of how the measures have been justified and resisted. an international ‘chill’? the globalisation era led to an ‘explosion’ in ingo activity through the 1990s (josselin and wallace 2001, p.1). in 2002 the undp stated that twenty percent of the 37, 000 ingos in place in 2000 had emerged since 1990, and that these had generated more than 20,000 ingo networks, a ‘revolution [that] parallels the rapid growth of global business over the same period’ (undp 2002, p.102). the growth continued into the 2000s, with 56,000 in place by 2010, showing a ‘stable consolidated growth pattern’ (kaldor et al. 2012). ingos drew on their legitimacy as representatives of public opinion in confrontations with corporations and governments, establishing something of a ‘pro-ngo norm’ (reimann 2006). reflecting this, the globescan global trust survey found that ngos attract much higher levels of trust than either corporations or government: in 2015 nearly 80 per cent of respondents were found to agree that ngos would ‘operate in the best interests of our society’ (globescan 2015). demonstrating their legitimacy, coalitions of ingos have played a key role in global policymaking, exercising a ‘potential to catalyse change’ (undp 2002). a recent example is the role of ingos in contesting the united nations ‘green economy’ agenda at the world summit on sustainable development in 2012 (goodman and salleh 2014). more positively, ingos have become key agents in instigating and encouraging the emergence of inter-state normative and policy regimes (reimann 2006). ingos have been key players in a ‘new public diplomacy’ where governments exercise power with an eye to normative ingo agendas (vickers 2004). their activity has especially exposed the close regulatory relations between corporate interests and governments, and the creation of ‘private international law’ (goodman 2014). in recent years an increasing number of countries have introduced specific obligations to rein-in the power of internationally-funded ngos. there is a variety of preexisting national schemes that regulate the political role of foreign entities: the united states (us), for instance, bans overseas donations to political parties and has had a registration system for ‘foreign agents’ since the 1930s. the ‘foreign agents registration act’ (which in 2018 was set to be more heavily enforced) requires registration for individuals and organisations, including corporates that act ‘in a political or quasi-political capacity’ and do so ‘under the control of’ foreign entities (see jenner and block 2018). the specific regulation of ingos, as against political parties, is becoming more commonplace. in 2014 the british government introduced measures preventing ngos, dubbed ‘third party’ organisations, from receiving overseas funding for any spending designed to influence voters during an election campaign cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 67 period, and capped their total allowable spending (gouk 2014). in doing so the uk joined the growing list of countries, mainly low and middle-income countries, which have imposed limitations on ingo political spending. just three such countries had such limitations in 1993; thirty-nine had restrictions in 2012. often these are low-income countries motivated by concerns about political interference by ingos from high-income countries (dupuy et al. 2016). in contrast, as discussed below, similar initiatives in high-income contexts are in part motivated by concerns about offshore interventions from those self-same middle-income countries, such as russia or china. all such measures have a ‘chilling effect’ on democracy, including in the uk, where new rules on spending ensure that ‘many ngos are more cautious about campaigning on politically contentious issues because they fear breaking the law or the reputational risk of vexatious complaints’ (commission on civil society and democratic engagement 2014, p.10). concerns about the impact of new ingo obligations on the democratic process have been voiced for some time, including at the united nations. in 2013 the united nations human rights council approved a resolution on ‘protecting human right defenders’ that stated ‘no law should criminalize or delegitimize activities in defence of human rights on account of the origin of funding...’ (human rights council 2013, para 9b). in a commentary on the resolution, human rights watch asked ‘why is it wrong for ngos to solicit financial support from foreign friends?’, and pointed to a double standard: ‘bolstered by foreign funds, governments routinely advance their political agendas. militaries and businesses do the same. why should ngos be singled out for restriction?’ (human rights watch 2013). since 2013, a wide range of agencies have taken up the issue. the economist reported on the trend in 2014 as follows: 'more and more autocrats are stifling criticism by barring non-governmental organisations from taking foreign cash’, citing hungary, egypt, azerbaijan, mexico, pakistan, russia, sudan and venezuela (economist 2014). in 2015 the carnegie foundation reported that: 'just in the past two years, china, india, and russia, along with many smaller countries – such as cambodia, hungary, and uganda – spanning all ideological, economic, and cultural lines, are stepping up efforts to block foreign support for domestic civil society organizations’ (carothers 2015). numerous international organisations have raised concerns at the growing impacts on ‘civic space’, including (ironically enough) the corporate-led world economic forum, which in its 2017 ‘global risk report’, referred to the emerging global double standard for businesses and ngos, asserting that ‘in some countries, for example, businesses and civil society actors have different reporting requirements – for example, civil society actors may be prohibited from receiving foreign donations, while businesses are encouraged to seek foreign investment’ (world economic forum 2017, para 2.2). civicus made a similar point in its 2016 ‘civic space: rights in retreat’ report, citing israel, india and russia as key examples in the ‘onslaught on foreign funding’. like the wef, it highlighted ‘considerable hypocrisy’ where ‘governments that decry foreign support for csos are more than happy to accept foreign funding themselves, including support from donors for their national budgets, or by courting foreign direct investment in the private sector; indeed, the restriction of civic 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 space can in part arise because a government sees csos as competitors for resources' (civicus 2016, p.5). despite these concerns, the trend has been extended and deepened, and appears to be in danger of become self-reinforcing. an ostensible concern about ‘foreign’ interference in domestic political affairs has in the process become a proxy for restricting the power and influence of the non-government sector more generally. the danger of an emergent ‘antingo’ norm is clear, but it is also opening up new debates, about double standards especially, for corporates as against ngos. the new constraints, and contestation over them, has the potential to become the vehicle for new political forces and agendas. one very good example is in india, where the government’s arbitrary attack on environmentalists has served to both delegitimize the government and highlight environmental concerns (talukdar, this issue). the backlash in australia, as noted, is having a similar impact. the recent history of failed attempts to constrain ngo advocacy in australia, as outlined in the following section, suggests the government is surprisingly vulnerable on this issue. australian contexts in the australian context non-corporate ngos are regulated in a variety of ways. membership-based associations can be created informally, but to enter into contracts, including to be insured for as an organisation for public events or as an employer, they need to become a legal entity. for this, associations apply for status as a ‘cooperative’ or as an ‘incorporated body’. this does not come with limitations on political expression, though it does require organisations to be accountable to a membership, and report on finances to the office for fair trading. one issue for incorporated bodies is that while board members are not individually liable for debts they remain exposed to vexatious and politically-driven allegations of wrong-doing, such as defamation and libel. to minimise this, some organisations choose instead to be constituted as not-for-profit companies – which can offer greater protection for board members in terms of liability, but can also prevent boards from being challenged by, and being accountable to, any formal membership. not-for-profit companies pay some forms of tax, but, as discussed below, are free from the widening range of governmental constraints being imposed on ngos. limitations on political expression are indeed much more explicit for ngos that seek status as charitable organisations, whether as incorporated bodies or not-for-profits (nfp). charitable status exempts an ngo or nfp from income tax and fringe benefits tax, and from tax on sales and investments; there is also a range of exemptions from state taxes. charitable status can also be very important for organisations that rely on grants from charitable foundations and other tax-deductable trust funds. until recently, charities in australia were required to demonstrate, under the british-based common law of charities, that they did not have a ‘dominant political purpose’. a disqualifying dominant political purpose could be determined from an organisation’s practices as well as from its constitution, the rationale being that a dominant political purpose was by definition non-charitable. the common law requirement was lifted with the 2010 aidwatch case (see ccs journal 3(3s) 2011). the case established that, under australian constitutional law, charities cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 69 could have a dominant purpose of influencing and engaging in public ‘"agitation" for legislative and political changes’ (high court 2010, para 45). the decision applied the right to freedom of political communication in australia, which the australian high court had previously defined as a constitutional precondition for representative democracy. in the aid/watch case the court found that ‘the generation by lawful means of public debate … itself is a purpose beneficial to the community’, adding that ‘in australia there is no general doctrine which excludes from charitable purposes "political objects"’ (high court 2010, paras 47 and 48). the judgement was later expressed in the 2013 charities act, which recognises that any charity with aims ‘beneficial to the general public’ can have a sole purpose of: ‘promoting or opposing a change to any matter established by law, policy or practice in the commonwealth, a state, a territory or another country’ (coa 2013, s.12.1.l). under the act charities may not have ‘the purpose of engaging in, or promoting activities that are unlawful or contrary to public policy’ (public policy here refers to the constitutional system and the rule of law). nor can charities have a ‘purpose of promoting or opposing’ political parties or candidates for office, though they may distribute information and advance debate through assessments, critiques and policy rankings (coa 2013, s.11.a+b). at the time of the 2013 act the ‘australian charities and not-for-profits commission’ (acnc) was established to oversee the sector. since 2014, the acnc has had responsibility for disqualifying organisations that fail to comply with the political regulations, and has a ‘compliance’ team that actively investigates complaints from the public about specific charities. the acnc itself is known to have received politically-driven complaints about specific charitable bodes, and in 2016, arising from twenty-seven such complaints, officially initiated seven investigations, all of them into support for political candidates (acnc 2017). this is a very small proportion of the 54,000 charitable organisations, but the threat of investigation alone produces compliance, and the acnc is seeking the right to disclose targets of investigation to strengthen that effect (knaus 2017). yet, still, to date no organisation has been disqualified for breach of the political disqualifier, although there is political pressure to test the grey areas. in this respect a key issue may be whether ‘promoting… unlawful’ civil disobedience, or support for a political party or candidate can be imputed as a ‘purpose’ under the 2013 act, as against simply an activity. in parliament the opposition’s liberal-national coalition had opposed both the 2013 act and the creation of the acnc. when it came to power under prime minister (pm) tony abbott the coalition sought to abolish the acnc, but a hard-fought public campaign led by the charitable sector ensured abolition was blocked in the federal senate (crosbie 2017). the government opted instead to change the acnc ‘from within’, and in late 2017 it appointed gary johns as its new commissioner. gary johns had made a career of challenging the legitimacy of advocacy ngos. formerly of the neoliberal think-tank, the institute of public affairs, where he set up ‘ngowatch’, johns frequently criticised the charitable sector, including in his 2014 book, the charity ball, self-described as an attack on ‘political activism by state-funded charities’ (johns 2014). he has also made specific demands that the 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 government delete advocacy from the definition of public benefit under the 2013 charities act (which would violate the high court position). soon after the appointment of the new commissioner the acnc embarked on its fiveyearly independent review. in its submission to the review the acnc commissioner recommended two new purposes for the acnc, namely to ‘promote the effective use of the resources of not-for-profit entities’, and to ‘enhance the accountability of not-for-profit entities to donors, beneficiaries and the public’ (acnc 2018). these would be in addition to the existing three purposes, namely to maintain ‘public trust’ in the sector, to ‘support and sustain’ it, and to reduce regulatory ‘red tape’. no evidence was presented by the acnc that the charitable sector was failing to effectively use its resources, nor that it was unaccountable, or that the existing purposes did not adequately cover the two proposed additional responsibilities. peak sector organisations condemned the proposal as ‘bizarre overreach’, suggesting the acnc was planning to regulate against what it may deem ‘ineffective’ use of resources, namely political advocacy (karp 2018b). at the same time, with the question of charitable status relatively settled, attempts to undermine ngo advocacy had shifted into the field of ‘deductable gift recipient’ (dgr) status. dgr status allows an organisation, usually a charity, to collect tax-deductible donations from the general public. tax-deductible donations are an important source of revenue for the ngo sector. 28,000 organisations are registered, and dgr donations reduce tax revenue by a total of about $1.3billion (treasury 2017). organisations apply to be placed on a dgr register relevant to their sector and must comply with its particular conditions. the five registers are held in variety of federal departments, and from mid-2019, were to be transferred to the acnc, which in december 2017 was granted additional funding to ‘improve governance, reduce complexity and boost integrity’ of dgr (michael 2017, p.1). leading up to this decision there was a series of reviews of dgr status. in 2015 the environment minister established an inquiry into the register of environmental organisations (reo) under the government-controlled house of representatives standing committee on the environment. the inquiry was focused on the definition of 'environmental organisation' in the reo and whether or not there should be a requirement to engage in ‘onground environmental works’. it received 685 submissions and held a number of public hearings, including one in sydney in october 2015, where a lively public demonstration was held by about 500 people to highlight the impacts on advocacy. the inquiry recommended the register be transferred to the tax office, that organisations be required to submit annual reviews, and undertake a quarter of their expenditure on ‘environmental remediation work’ (rather than advocacy); further, it recommended that organisations on the reo should be made responsible for the unlawful activities of members and ‘others without formal connections to the organisation’ (coa 2016). in early 2017 treasury initiated its own inquiry into dgr status, issuing a discussion paper on ‘tax deductible gift recipient reform opportunities’ (treasury 2017). the paper made a bid to bring dgr registers into the tax office (which has a prime responsibility for maximizing revenues), and to more closely police access to dgr, including to delimit the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 71 scope for advocacy, especially under the register for environmental organisations. there are already indirect political restrictions embedded in a number of dgr registers, which require organisations to be engaged in direct provision as their predominant purpose. this is the case for the register of ‘public benevolent institutions’, held at the ato and later at the acnc, which requires a pbi to ‘have benevolent relief as its main purpose’: pbi’s may only be engaged in ‘ancillary or incidental’ advocacy (acnc 2016). this means that welfare advocacy organisations, for instance, cannot claim dgr status under the pbi. in this case, dgr status assists in addressing the symptoms of poverty, not its causes. the pbi is probably the most restrictive of the several dgr funds, although others have specific limitations. the ‘overseas aid gift deduction scheme’, for instance, which falls under the department of foreign affairs and trade, requires that organisations deliver ‘overseas aid activities’ (dfat 2016). under the scheme, aid can be used to address the causes of poverty, in the form of development assistance, as well as its symptoms, through direct humanitarian relief, and aid may flow to overseas advocacy organisations with the proviso they not be agents of political parties. the treasury paper proposed a specific revision to the dgr reo. for an organisation to be on the reo it must be engaged in ‘the protection of the environment’, which may include ‘the provision of information or education, or the carrying on of research’ (treasury 2017). advocacy for policy change, as it relates to the environment, is not explicitly defined as a purpose, but neither is it ruled out. in its paper, the treasury floated the proposal from the standing committee on the environment that environmental organisations be required to engage in ‘environmental works’ in order to be eligible for dgr status (treasury 2017). its effect would have been to disqualify organisations from accessing dgr that had a predominant or sole purpose of engaging in political advocacy, and was widely criticized by a range of ngos. treasury also suggested that there should be new requirements for dgr recipients to report to the acnc to ensure their advocacy activities did not fall foul of the charities act. in the event, with over 2,500 submissions to the inquiry, the status quo was maintained. in late 2017 the government announced it would not ‘mandate a level of remediation by environmental organisations’, and instead of transferring administration of dgr registers to the tax office, it placed them under the acnc. further, rather than seek to directly police forms of advocacy, it announced the acnc would simply report political expenditure by charities to the australian electoral commission (aec). in another climb-down, the government revoked earlier legislation that would have limited overseas expenditure by charities (the ‘in australia’ rule) (o’dwyer 2017). the debate exposed the need to more clearly entrench the advocacy as a public benefit and charitable purpose in the dgr registers. arguably, any requirement to limit activities to the direct provision of services undermines debate for ‘legislative and political changes’, chills democracy, and is potentially unconstitutional. it would be possible to simply carry across the charity law provisions into the various dgr registers, as part of the ‘unfinished business’ of establishing the specifically australian constitutional right to freedom of political communication in the regulation of dgr status. indeed, given the public benefit of 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 all charities, extending access to dgr status to the whole sector would by definition be in the public interest (this was proposed by some agencies at the time). this would dramatically cut ‘red tape’, a key responsibility of the acnc. such a tax cut for donors to the charitable sector would arguably be of much greater economic benefit than the government’s proposed (much larger) tax cut to corporations. the impacts in terms of lost revenue would likely be more-than compensated-for through a resultant expansion in economic activity associated with the charitable sector. the impacts in terms of enhanced community well-being would be extensive. the ‘foreign interference’ legislation in 2017 the australian government introduced a raft of proposals to curtail ‘foreign interference’ in the australian political system; these dovetail with on-going measures to curtail public advocacy by domestic ngos. the foreign influence legislation comes in three forms. first, there is proposed legislation requiring organisations that seek to exert ‘political or government influence’, and which also have any links with overseas political organisations, to register their interests and report publicly any donations or communication (coa 2017b). second, under ‘electoral legislation’, there is a proposed direct ban on any overseas funding to ngos engaged in ‘political activities’, ostensibly to prevent foreign funders influencing electoral outcomes (coa 2017a). and third, there is a series of changes to ‘national security’ legislation which seek to ban ‘foreign interference’ directly (coa 2017c). these proposals, and the debate around them, are discussed in turn. (i) naming agents of foreign influence the question of ‘foreign interference’ in australian politics has opened up a new front in the battle for and against advocacy ngos. as noted, the current period of great-power rivalry, set in the context of an unprecedented interlocking of informational systems under globalisation, facilitates new forms of consensual paranoid nationalism. not unlike the mobilisation of anti-communist states against their internal ‘fifth column’, the ‘enemy within’, the current political hysteria over political interference could enable a whole new raft of limitations on the democratic process. in interesting ways this is an instance of ‘geopolitics as usual’, a conflict between global elites, vying for influence. the political dynamic can be unstable. there are, not least, deep contradictions, with would-be nationalists creating new alliances of convenience, for instance, between russia and the brexit campaign. in australia the debate about foreign interference came into focus after the 2016 election on the issue of electoral donations. following concerns at the manipulation of the 2016 us election, a political consensus emerged about the need to revisit the issue of political interference in australian elections. this was manifest most clearly at the federal joint standing committee on electoral matters, which in september 2016 established an inquiry into ‘all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 federal election its inquiry into issues arising from the conduct of the 2016 federal election’. the inquiry quickly became focused on the issue of political donations and in march 2017 released an ‘interim report’ on foreign political donations (coa 2017d). this report, and the ensuing legislation on regulating ‘foreign donations’ are discussed in the next section. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 73 at the same time as seeking to regulate donations the government introduced legislation designed make transparent ‘foreign influence’. the proposals have received relatively little public scrutiny, possibly because they entail ‘political transparency’ rather than a direct prohibition or limitation on political activity. the inquiry into the proposed legislation, under the joint committee on intelligence and security received only 64 submissions, and little media exposure. yet the legislation proposed a major change in the regulation of political activity in australia, which is likely to have a range of unanticipated effects. like many of the schemes in other parts of the world, notably in russia and the us for instance, the proposed legislation would require individuals and organisations to disclose of international political relationships. such relationships would be ‘registered’, with details of the activities made public. the legislation is remarkably broad (see coa 2017b). it requires any individual or organisation undertaking activities ‘on behalf of a foreign principal’, to register as an agent of ‘foreign influence’. acting ‘on behalf of’ encompasses any joint arrangement, including collaboration or funding. a ‘foreign principal’ is defined as anybody who is not an australian citizen or permanent resident. a ‘registrable arrangement’ may include any kind or arrangement, written or unwritten, and may or may not entail any activity. the political activity itself may be to influence a section of the public, not simply the government. all activities must be reported to the registry, and may be released to the public. non-compliance carries a heavy prison term, which could conceivably be imposed, for instance, ‘on a person seeking a meeting without registering as an agent of foreign influence’ (acfid 2018). the upshot is that all organisations with any international linkages will either cease those undertakings or register as the agent of a ‘foreign principal’. such a designation clearly carries with it a range of negative associations, what the australian council for international development calls an ‘inherent reputational risk’, which directly undermines the legitimacy of organization or individual (acfid 2018). the acnc raised similar concerns, suggesting it is possible that: ‘…where a charity is part of a wider family of charities… which has links to an international grouping of entities, the charity may be required to register… should the group all decide to draw attention to the same transboundary issue, for example wealth and income inequality, or global environmental issues’ (acnc 2018, p.3). as a result of these and other pressures, the acnc stated that ‘it is likely charities will be less inclined to engage in public discourse which is an important element of charitable activity and purpose’ (acnc 2018, p.1). stressing that foreign ties should generally be encouraged, not penalized, the law council of australia recommended a focus on the ‘recipients of foreign influence’, rather than on those said to be agents of it (law council 2018); it also emphasized the failings of the us approach under the foreign agents registration act, which was cited as the model for the broader australian approach. the exemptions in the proposed legislation are themselves highly revealing. the proposed legislation is principally targeted at ngos and individuals (though some ngos are exempted, such as in the aid, humanitarian, legal, media and religious sectors). unlike its us counterpart, the australian model creates a blanket exemption for business entities registered in australia, including wholly-owned subsidiaries of multinational companies, thereby 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 rendering it largely ineffectual. australian-based companies with international commercial dealings are also exempted provided the international relationship is business-related (although some ‘sensitive’ business dealings are not exempted, such as in public infrastructure, defence and national security). in its submission to the inquiry, the community council drew attention to these imbalances in the application of ‘transparency’, highlighting the escape-clause for corporations, noting it would allow ‘any foreign company to engage in any activity in support of their international commercial interests, but seeks to restrict most others’ (community council 2018, p.5). this likely discriminatory impact reflects the underlying political drivers of the overall ‘foreign interference’ package (and may be its undoing). (ii) banning foreign political donations the issue of political donations raises the question of who or what is defined as a political actor in the electoral process, and how their role is distinguished, if at all. the key recommendation in the committee on electoral matters inquiry’s interim report was the implementation of an across-the-board blanket ‘prohibition on donations from foreign citizens and foreign entities to australian registered political parties, associated entities and third parties’ (coa 2017d, recommendation 3). this approach stemmed from opinion, not evidence: as the committee stated, it was ‘of the opinion political entities, be they parties, associated entities, third parties or other actors should all be subject to the same rules’. the problem with this ‘level playing field’ approach is that the three sets of ‘players’ are quite different entities and by definition ‘play by their own rules’. as staples has pointed out, ‘politicians and their parties form governments, and governments have the executive power to enact legislation that materially advantages or disadvantages organisations and individuals; she adds that, in contrast, civil society cannot pass legislation… it is the engine of ideas in our democracy’ (staples 2017). a consortium of ‘peak’ charitable ngos, in responding to the interim report, made a similar point, stating ‘there is a categorical difference between political parties and charities’, from ‘a risk mitigation perspective, there is no argument for applying the same restrictions to charities as are applied to political parties’ (charities consortium 2017). imposing the ban across the board has the effect of writing ‘rules’ for political parties and extending these across civil society as a whole. this does not reflect the ways in which these organisations are treated currently, as distinct entities with distinct purposes and responsibilities. nor does it reflect their purposes. the australian electoral commission defines the three sets of entities – political parties, their affiliates and third parties – as potential ‘participants in the electoral process’, but does not suggest they should be treated the same (aec 2018). within liberal democracy, political parties have a very particular role. donations to political parties can enable them to gain access to political power and, hence, can have a corrupting influence. reflecting this, they are subject to specific forms of regulation, for instance as regards transparency, that reflect the role of political parties in the political process. there is considerable debate about whether or how to ‘keep money out of politics’, or simply to ensure the public can find out where political parties source their funds. counter to this is the strong incentive for party political donors to conceal their donations, for instance by channeling them via obscured cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 75 ‘associated entities’ (see guardian 2018). the debate about party political funding reflects the particular role of parties in the system, as representative bodies seeking to win elections and form government. yet, increasingly it spills over into debates about the regulation of party affiliates, and wider ngo players, defined as ‘third party’ participants by the aec. expenditure by affiliates of political parties may be used to garner votes for the affiliated party – but also may not. this hinges on the definition of ‘affiliation’: some trade unions for instance are officially ‘affiliated’ to the alp, but that does not mean that all their political activity, and all their income, for instance in the form of membership dues, is directed at promoting the electoral prospects of the alp. affiliated non-party organisations have multiple purposes, and it may be difficult to distinguish party-political purposes, and this reflects the fact that they are not solely or largely devoted to electoral gain. they are, as such, distinct types of organization, different from political parties. when it comes to ‘third-party’ political players, the scope of interference in the electoral process is even less clear. there is no necessary link to the political process as reflected in an affiliation for instance. yet clearly there are many ‘third party’ bodies which spend considerable amounts of money, both during and outside elections, to influence voters. expenditure by business associations is a good example. such associations do not support all political parties equally and they do regularly mount public campaigns, for or against specific government agendas, and are funded to do so from corporate donations. the resulting expenditure is often directly ‘political’ and has a bearing on the electoral process. yet these ‘third party’ players have a distinct role where they act as ‘political entities’; crucially they do not seek votes as parties do, nor do they declare a particular affiliation. as noted, third party organisations and affiliated bodies are variously constituted as incorporated bodies, charities, cooperatives, not-for-profit companies, mutuals or for-profit companies. each of these types of entity has distinct characteristics and purposes, and often its own regulatory frameworks. all are fundamentally different from political parties. charitable organisations are a good example. as noted, charities have a specific regulatory regime under the acnc, through the 2013 charities act. importantly, the act recognizes that engagement of charities in the political process to influence legislative outcomes is in itself a public benefit. foreign donations that help charities advance their political advocacy, and thus advance public benefit, should be obviously be welcomed, and certainly not restricted. the federal inquiry’s insistence that all political players should be treated equally flies in the face of their very different roles and responsibilities. most important, while there may be concerns about the influence of overseas donations on political parties, with anecdotal evidence to support such concerns, there is no in-principle reason why such donations to ‘third party’ organisations such as charities should be curtailed. the inquiry heard some anecdotal evidence of violation of requirements on political activity, for instance as presented by the minerals council of australia in relation to environmental charities, issues which already which come under the acnc remit (mca 2017). there was no sector-wide evidence offered, nor provided, and no claim that any current disqualifying activity could not be dealtwith by the acnc. despite this, the committee took the view that foreign funding of 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 political activity in australia, including charitable advocacy, by definition undermines national sovereignty: it stated simply that ‘only those with a direct standing interest [should] participate in australian democracy’. the problem for the committee was that political advocacy is already recognised as having a public benefit, and that there is no reason why such advocacy cannot be funded by overseas donations. in fact, insofar as foreign donations advance public benefit, they should be encouraged, not banned or otherwise restricted. in late december 2017, the inquiry’s recommendations surfaced in the proposed electoral legislation amendment (electoral funding and disclosure reform) bill (coa 2017a). the inquiry’s remit was extended to address the proposals and through this process considerable evidence has been provided on the likely impact of the proposed ban on foreign donations, especially for ‘third parties’. the sector has used the political process to digest and publicise what is proposed, and the committee’s hearing and submission process have become a lightning-rod for concerns. in late 2017, for instance, a range of ‘peak’ organisations, including the australian council for international development (acfid), the australian council for social service, the human rights law centre and the community council, established a ‘save our charities’ campaign ‘united in opposing the federal government's attempt to undermine the benefits many australians receive from philanthropy and to silence their voices’ (acfid 2017b; slezak 2017). even the acnc, under its new commissioner, raised serious concerns about the ‘unnecessary regulatory burden’, stating the penalties for non-compliance would discourage qualified staff and directors; it also cited legislative ’inconsistencies’, in terms of constraining ‘allowable political activity’ under charities law, ‘reducing the avenues available for them to achieve their charitable purpose’ (acnc 2018b, pp.1-2) the proposed legislative arrangement is indeed highly complex, and backed by extensive sanctions. the key point is that under it foreign funding for any ‘political purpose’ will be criminalized (with a penalty of up to ten years in jail for the financial controllers of organisations). ‘political purpose’ is broadly defined to include ‘public expression… of views on an issue that is, or is likely to be before electors in an election’ (replicating the definition for the reporting of ‘political expenditure’ to the aec, as previously expanded under 2017 legislation). as it cannot be predicted what issues will arise in an election, this essentially covers any and all forms of political advocacy. organisations with such political purposes are required to register as ‘political campaigners’ if their ‘political expenditure’ is over $100,000 annually, or if they are charities, as ‘third party campaigners’ with ‘political expenditure’ above $13,500. designation as a ‘campaigner’ may have serious consequences for an organisation, in terms of ‘delegitimizing’ political comment (compounded by the requirement to disclose the party-political affiliations of senor staff; see hrlc 2018, p.8). further, the legislation proposes to widen the aec’s definition of ‘associated entity’ to any organization that spends funds predominantly to oppose the policies of a registered political party or to ‘benefit’ another party (and, interestingly, any association can be ‘inferred from negative campaign techniques’) (coa 2017, p.14; coae 2017, p.21). depending on how this is implemented (and tested in the courts), many advocacy ngos could find themselves linked to a political cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 77 party. the aec does not currently have powers to infer party political association: aec designation of an ngo or ingo as having a party political association would have a direct and probably negative impact. importantly, the bill shifts the burden of proof on these issues: organisations have to prove they do not have political purposes as defined by the act in order not to be registered. perhaps most important, under the act’s foreign funding rules, it will become imperative for all ‘third party’ organisations that are in any way involved in public advocacy to distinguish between australian and non-australian donations. political campaigners will not be permitted to receive foreign donations; charities, unions and ‘third party’ campaigners will have to ‘ring-fence’ foreign donations to ensure they are not used for ‘political purposes’. under the legislation all donors giving more than $250 annually to a ‘third party’ involved in advocacy will have to produce a statutory declaration or otherwise establish their status as an ‘allowable donor’. for large donations, above $13,500, details of the donors will be published by the aec, including names and addresses of trustees. the effect of this (and it is highly likely this is the intended effect) is that third party organisations involved in political advocacy will be forced to either cease seeking public donations or vacate the political field. in either case, in aggregate, as the acnc points out, ‘it is likely that there will be less funds available for charities to undertake advocacy work’ (acnc 017b, p.7). this does not just apply to charities but to any organisation seeking to be engaged in the political process: as the human rights law centre points out, organisations will have to ‘choose between political advocacy and international funding’ (karp 2018a; see also acfid 2017a). choosing political advocacy will incur a wide range of funding and disclosure obligations that are not only onerous but will bring with them the significant risk of imprisonment or the imposition of large fines. the legislation thereby creates new incentives, one might say imperatives, to keep out of politics and to exit civil society. in the process the australian democratic process would be dramatically circumscribed. by february 2018, some of the government’s key allies were publicly denigrating the proposed legislation. as noted, the acnc itself had been critical. ironically enough, the institute for public affairs condemned the legislation in late january 2018 as a ‘dangerous restriction on freedom of speech’ (koziol 2018). the federal parliamentary library observed in february that ‘the perception in the not-for-profit community is that the end result of the provisions will be to make it difficult for not-for-profit organisations to advocate on issues that are subject to political debate’, adding, ‘it appears that the bill will struggle to gain the support of the broader community’ (muller 2018, p.28). in this context, political debate became focused on whether or not the legislation could be successfully amended. regardless of the outcome, the episode demonstrates how the threat of ‘foreign interference’ is being recruited into the political struggle over political advocacy in australia. this is already having unanticipated impacts, in terms of the political backlash, and may have further to run in terms of the emergence of new political agendas. 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 (iii) criminalising foreign political influence finally, and briefly, the third tranche of proposed ‘foreign interference’ legislation proposed to create a new class of criminal offences related to foreign intimidation and ‘threats’. these appeared as part of a wider strengthening of offences in relations to ‘treason, espionage…and related offenses’, thereby conflating ‘foreign interference’, including ‘collaboration’, with much more serious offenses of spying and treason. the actual measures broaden offences and create enhanced penalties if they are committed ‘in collaboration with a foreign principal’ (coa 2017c). the definition of ‘sabotage’, for instance, is extended to include actions directed at public infrastructure, including any ‘facility’ that provides or relates to providing the public with utilities….of any kind’ (whether privately or publicly owned). collaborating with a foreign principal to interfere with such infrastructure, that ’limits or prevents access to it or any part of it by persons who are ordinarily entitled to access it’, carries a maximum penalty of 20 years (coa 2017c, pp.6-10) this means, for example, that an individual engaged in blockading a coalfired power station, seeking to close it down perhaps in collaboration with ingos on an international day of action on climate change, can be imprisoned for the equivalent standard non-parole imprisonment period for committing murder. the new specific proposed offences for foreign interference were no less punitive. covert, deceptive or threatening behaviour to exert political influence ‘in collaboration with a foreign principal’ carries a penalty of 20 years; seeking to influence another person, described as ‘the target’, in the exercise of their political rights or duties, while failing to disclose ‘collaboration with a foreign principal’ carries a penalty of 15 years (coa 2017:32-36). surprisingly, this legislation, which is much more extensive than the provisions on foreign funding, has received little public attention. there were thirty-eight submissions to the joint committee on intelligence and security, and minimal media attention beyond the possible impacts on journalism and wider ‘free speech’. of the submissions that were received, there was a tendency to focus on one or other aspect, rather than the whole package. the australian human rights law centre and the australian human rights commission, for instance, both focused on secrecy provisions; the law council did offer a series of recommendations across the board, including measures to lessen the impact of the ‘foreign interference’ provisions, stating it did ‘not support’ the new set of offences in their current form (law society 2018b: 50). concluding: shifting the focus to corporates? the recent history of attempts to delimit political advocacy in australia has established a pattern of contestation that in some respects has expanded the field. some rights to advocacy have been strengthened – though of course in other respects civil and political rights have dramatically narrowed (for instance in relation to ‘terror’ offences). central to this has been the political agency of ngos, both international and domestic, in defending and expanding australia’s ‘civic space’. as with previous attempts to restrict political activity by ngos in australia, we may yet see new demands coming onto the political table as a result of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 79 recent ‘foreign interference’ proposals, which are increasingly looking like another instance of political overreach. reflecting the international debate on this issue and the self-evident drivers and bias of the proposed legislation, the issues are most likely to centre on the question of corporate political activity. the attempt to impose new tighter regulations on ngos has served to highlight the absence of obligations for corporations, which are in large part free of any limitations on political activity or indeed ‘interference’. it is often argued that charities are subjected to specific regulations, around political activity for instance, by virtue of their special taxexempt status. corporations also have special tax-exempt status, in terms of limited liability for instance, but it is noteworthy that there are no blanket requirements around political activity for corporations. some very narrow exceptions exist – for instance for property developers in nsw, which are not permitted to donate to political parties. this restriction was upheld by the high court in 2015, in the mccloy case, as a reasonable and proportionate limitation on the constitutional requirement for freedom of political communication. in its judgement, the high court emphasised that ‘equality of opportunity to participate in the exercise of political sovereignty is an aspect of the representative democracy guaranteed by our constitution’, adding, ‘the risk to equal participation posed by the uncontrolled use of wealth may warrant legislative action to ensure, or even enhance, the practical enjoyment of popular sovereignty’ (high court 2015, para 45). such restrictions could be justifiably extended, for instance to mining, pharmaceutical or tobacco companies, where abuses are already self-evident. beyond this, there is a need for corporate-wide obligations, similar to those required by the high court for charities, given considerable evidence that corporations are choosing to use their revenues to influence the electoral process, either directly or via industry associations. as noted, the recent proposals on regulating foreign interference have noticeably sought to exempt corporations, yet internationally-networked corporations regularly seek to influence the political process and are no less ‘political actors’ than the charitable sector. the minerals council of australia (mca), for instance, plays a major role in influencing australian political outcomes, not least with its 2010 campaign to defeat pm kevin rudd’s proposed resource super profit tax. the mca’s ‘keep mining strong’ media campaign reportedly cost $22m (though in that year the mca only reported $4m in political expenditure to the aec) (abc 2010). the resources tax subsequently agreed by pm gillard saved the largely foreign-owned sector $35b over ten years. corporate players in australia appeared to learn the lessons, with a subsequent spate of corporate-funded public campaigns targeting legislative proposals, often led by overseasowned companies (cook 2013). clearly, regulating political expenditure by civil society would have a serious dampening effect on democratic life; combining this with the existing ‘open cheque’ policy for business would further skew the political process. political regulations are already in place for political parties, affiliated bodies and for charities. given the special status of corporations, and their recent demonstrated capacity to influence the political process, it is reasonable to require corporations to adhere (at minimum) to the same standards on political interference as charities – that is, corporations should not be permitted to directly support or 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 oppose political parties or candidates for office, including through donations. as for charities, should they wish not to abide by such standards then their corporate status should be ‘disqualified’. the raft of ‘foreign interference’ legislation inadvertently lays the groundwork for the development of political claims of this sort in australia, that may address the prevailing and intensifying ‘risk to equal participation posed by the uncontrolled use of wealth’ (high court 2015, para 45). acknowledgement i wish to acknowledge the formative impact that involvement in aidwatch, a small australiabased ngo, has had on this research. since 1998, i have been a member of the management committee of the organization, and was directly involved as chair in its challenge to the revocation of charitable status, which was successful in the high court in 2010. this role has been supported by my faculty at the university of technology sydney. the article also draws indirectly on submissions i have made to the senate inquiry into environmental dgr, the treasury inquiry into dgr and, in two instances, to the joint standing committee on electoral matters, and from related appearances at hearings. references australian broadcasting corporation 2010, ‘what’s yours is mine’, abc 4 corners, 7 june https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1bkm65n.11. australian council for international development (acfid) 2017a, submission to ‘inquiry into and report on all aspects of the conduct of the 2016 federal election and matters related thereto’, 1 september, acfid: canberra. australian council for international development (acfid) 2017b, ‘silencing australians: the result of the federal government’s proposed donations ban’, australian charities press release, 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(ed.), more or less: democracy and new media, future leaders, melbourne. steger, m., goodman, j. and wilson, e. 2013, justice globalism: ideology, crises, policy, sage, london. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270080 talukdar, r. 2018, ‘sparking a debate on coal: case study on the indian government’s crackdown on greenpeace’, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol.10, no.1. treasury 2017, ‘tax deductible gift recipient reform opportunities’, discussion paper, june, treasury, canberra. https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/tax-deductible-giftrecipient-reform-opportunities/ uhlmann, c. 2017, ‘chinese donors to australian political parties: who gave how much?’ abc news, 8 june. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-21/china-australia-politicaldonations/7766654 un development program (undp), united nations development program 2002, human development report: deepening democracy in a fragmented world, undp, new york. http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2002 un human rights council, protecting human rights defenders: resolution / adopted by the human rights council, 12 april 2013, a/hrc/res/22/6, http://www.refworld.org/docid/53bfa8564.html world economic forum 2017, global risks report, wef, davos. https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2017 https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/nov/27/charity-coalition-hit-back-over-election-advocacy-restrictions https://johnmenadue.com/joan-staples-government-targets-international-philanthropy-for-civil-society/ https://johnmenadue.com/joan-staples-government-targets-international-philanthropy-for-civil-society/ https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446270080 https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/tax-deductible-gift-recipient-reform-opportunities/ https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/tax-deductible-gift-recipient-reform-opportunities/ http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-21/china-australia-political-donations/7766654 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-21/china-australia-political-donations/7766654 http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-report-2002 http://www.refworld.org/docid/53bfa8564.html https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2017 abstract keywords introduction an international ‘chill’? australian contexts the ‘foreign interference’ legislation (i) naming agents of foreign influence (ii) banning foreign political donations (iii) criminalising foreign political influence concluding: shifting the focus to corporates? acknowledgement references aec, australian electoral commission 2018, ‘third parties incurring political expenditure’, financial disclosure, source: http://www.aec.gov.au accessed 25 february. crosbie, d. 2017, ‘advocacy, politics and mowing the lawn’, pro bono news, 25 may. www.probonoaustralia.com.au accessed 1 march 2018. gonzalez-vicente, r. and carroll, t. (2017) politics after national development: explaining the populist rise under late capitalism, globalizations, vol.14, no.6, pp. 991-1013. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2017.1316542 hamilton, c. and madison, s. (eds) 2007, silencing dissent: how the australian government is controlling public opinion and stifling debate, allen & unwin, sydney https://doi.org/10.1017/s1035077200000092. huntington, s. 1991, the third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century, u of oklahoma press, norman. jenner and lock llp 2018, ‘the revival of the foreign agents registration act: what you should know and what to do next’, lexology blog, 27 february. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=07c267c6-0759-458f-9ccb-b0fabcf634d1 accessed 13 march... karp, p. 2018b. 'bizarre overreach': charities fear regulator wants to control their spending’, the guardian, 24 january. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/jan/24/bizarre-overreach-charities-fear-regulator-wants-to-control-their-spending knaus, c. 2017, ‘charity regulator to crack down on political advocacy after complaints’, the guardian, 15 march. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/mar/15/charity-regulator-to-crack-down-on-political-advocacy-after-complaints koziol, m. 2018, ‘ipa joins forces with getup! to condemn 'unprecedented and dangerous' donations law’, sydney morning herald, 29 january. https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/ipa-joins-forces-with-getup-to-condemn-unprecedented-and-dangerous-donat... oleinikova, o. 2017, ‘foreign funded ngos in russia, belarus and ukraine: recent restrictions and implications’, cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol.9, no.3, pp.96-105 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5637. slezak, m. 2017, ‘charity coalition hits back over election advocacy restrictions,’ the guardian, 27 november. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/nov/27/charity-coalition-hit-back-over-election-advocacy-restrictions accessed 14 march 2018. staples, j. 2017, ‘government targets international philanthropy for civil society’, 6 december, https://johnmenadue.com/joan-staples-government-targets-international-philanthropy-for-civil-society/ accessed 24 february 2018. treasury 2017, ‘tax deductible gift recipient reform opportunities’, discussion paper, june, treasury, canberra. https://treasury.gov.au/consultation/tax-deductible-gift-recipient-reform-opportunities/ cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 3 2017 © 2017 olga oleinikova. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: oleinikova, o. 2017. foreign funded ngos in russia, belarus and ukraine: recent restrictions and implications. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(3), 85-94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9 i3.5637 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper foreign funded ngos in russia, belarus and ukraine: recent restrictions and implications olga oleinikova university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: olga oleinikova, school of communication, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. olga.oleinikova@uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5637 abstract the opportunity for public participation through ngo action in post-communist societies is continuously starved by legal framework. since the collapse of the soviet union, ngos in russia, ukraine, belarus and other post-communist states have traditionally looked abroad for their funding, and are dismayed at recent legislation setting up new barriers to this practice. this paper discusses the new laws and restrictive amendments to legislative acts on the operations of foreign funded ngos in russia, belarus and ukraine, adopted since 2011. keywords ngos; foreign funding; regulations; russia; belarus; ukraine declaration of conflicting interest the author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding no funding was provided for the writing of this paper. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5637 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5637 https://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ mailto:olga.oleinikova@uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5637 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 introduction the opportunity for public participation through ngo action in post-communist eastern european societies is continuously starved by legal frameworks. since the collapse of soviet union, ngos in russia, ukraine, belarus and other post-communist states have traditionally relied on financial support from abroad – mostly from the united states and british government bodies – all working on various aspects of institutional development, such as helping to promote human rights, freedom of the press and independent media, and establishing pro-democracy groups, as well as trying to activate citizens’ participation in post-soviet space. today the situation has changed slightly. the majority of foreign funded ngos in ukraine, belarus and russia receive their financial support from the private sector and individual donors – private western donors, the national endowment for democracy (ned) and open society foundations. in the last five years with the change in the foreign donorship landscape and continuous turbulence of democratization processes in postcommunist states, russian, belarusian and ukrainian governments have adopted new sets of legislation and amendments to laws on the operations of foreign funded ngos. the scholarly mainstream democracy and civil society literature (zielonka & pravda 2001; mendelson & glenn 2012; carmin 2010; wedel 2015; dimitrova & pridham 2004) contains very little about foreign funded ngos and limitations to their operations in postsoviet eastern europe, like that set of new laws and amendments recently adopted in ukraine, belarus and russia. this paper fills that void by describing the new laws and restrictive legislative acts adopted since 2011 in russia, belarus and ukraine and discusses the effects such laws have on the operations of the ngo sector and broader democratization processes in these three post-communist countries. through a comparative perspective, this paper argues that the recent restrictive legislation creates new barriers to ngos’ operations and relationships with foreign partners (e.g. in russia and belarus) and damages the potential for ngos to organize mutual aid and provide support for democratic efforts to a young unstable democracy (e.g. ukraine). furthermore, this new legislation is argued to affect the marketization of the ngo sector in ukraine, belarus and russia, pushing ngos to adopt the approaches and values of the private market, which risks harming the fragile democracy and fails to create and maintain a strong civil society. the strong civil society, understood as ngos, think tanks, movements and civil actions, is one of the key elements of democracy (keane, 2013). pospieszna (2014), and mcfaul (2010) argue that in the process of undermining authoritarian communist regimes in eastern europe, civil society and its actors, such as ngos, play an important role. thus developing civil society and supporting ngos is likely to assist those eastern european nations struggling for democracy. in this way, the crucial relationship between civil society and democratization, as well as aiding foreign donors’ focus on civil society as they assist in the struggle for democracy, makes civil society and ngos a critical component of postcommunist transformations in russia, ukraine and belarus. to develop and support this argument, the paper first explores russia’s ‘foreign agents’ law on ngos adopted in 2012 and the implications of this law in russia. secondly, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 87 it investigates the circulation of foreign funds in belarus and the new laws adopted in 2013. thirdly, the paper discusses the most recent ukrainian law on ngos that signposts a rollback of anti-corruption efforts and may slow down the democratic development in ukraine. finally, the paper draws a comparison between these three cases and summarizes the risks such new laws and restrictions may have for further operations of ngo sector and democratization of the post-communist states. russia’s ‘foreign agents’ law on ngos the ‘foreign agent’ law, officially titled ‘on amendments to legislative acts of the russian federation regarding the regulation of the activities of non-profit organisations performing the functions of a foreign agent’ [федеральный закон 121 "об иностранных агентах"], is a law that was adopted in 2012 in russia that demands those ngos that receive foreign funding and engage in vaguely defined ‘political activity’ to register and declare themselves as ‘foreign agents’. such ngos must be listed on the ‘foreign agents’ register, which is administered by the ministry of justice. the term ‘foreign agent’ covers a very wide range of meanings. in a number of post-soviet eastern european countries the term ‘foreign agents’ is used to identify individuals or organizations engaged in domestic political activity on behalf of a foreign state and their activities are subject to restrictions. due to the fact that foreign agents are also called ‘spies’ and ‘traitors’, the phrase ‘foreign agent’ in the russian language has a negative connotation and strong associations with cold war-era propaganda and espionage. the ‘foreign agent’ law has been widely criticized both in russia and internationally as a violation of democratic ethics, human rights and as being designed to chilling civil society and counter opposition groups that receive funding from the west. russia’s ngos faced difficult times and protested against the law calling it ‘unjust’ and ‘slanderous’, arguing for free engagement and vital debate between russia’s citizens and those in power to ensure russia’s international human rights obligations and commitments. vladimir lukin, russia’s then-federal ombudsman, has challenged this law in 2013 in the russian constitutional court. however, in 2014 the court supported and retained the law with no further amendments having found no legal or constitutional grounds for the use of the term ‘foreign agents’ in a negative sense and finding no intention ‘to persecute or discredit’ foreign funded ngo organizations (human rights watch, 2017). the court also recognised that the ‘foreign agent’ label was ‘in line with the public interest and the interest of state sovereignty’ (human rights watch, 2017). this law has impacted foreign funded ngos in russia in several ways. ngo’s had two choices: (1) to continue accepting funding from overseas and being labelled as ‘foreign agent’ or (2) discontinue partnership with foreign funders and donors and rely on domestic funding and presidential grants. the ‘foreign agents’ law has made the receipt of foreign funding a high-risk activity. the government has indicated that ngos can use overseas funding, but it will cost them their good reputation and bring potential legal risks. some human rights activists argue ‘it was the plan from the very beginning – to cut off foreign funding and then give domestic funding only to loyal organizations’ (amnesty international, 2016). cutting off overseas funding and making russian ngos reliant on domestic funding 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 might make ngos in russia less free and more prone to self-censorship in order to guarantee their operations and continued funding from the state. basically, the main source of ngos operations and survival in russia – foreign funding – has turned into an insecure source that automatically puts those organisations that engage in what is deemed to be political activity in a position where they have to face legal consequences for failure to comply. as of 11 october 2016, there were 226,995 ngos in russia and by 24 october 2016, according to a report by human rights watch, the list of active ‘foreign agents’ included 105 ngos. of those, ‘four registered as ‘foreign agents’ voluntarily and at least 58 were prosecuted for not doing so’ (human rights watch, 2017). the offices of numerous ngos, including well-regarded international ngos the likes of transparency international, amnesty international and human rights watch, were targeted by russian law enforcement officers to confiscate documents and records related to their activity. amnesty international says that ‘russia's controversial ‘foreign agents’ law is an assault on freedom of expression’ (amnesty international, 2016) that caused numerous ngos to restrict their operations with more than 27 closed down. these ngos have played a significant and necessary role in defending the rights of ordinary people and ensuring their needs are addressed. these ngos delivered services that the state has failed to provide, such as ‘legal representation or psychological support for victims of discrimination or violence and environmental monitoring’ (amnesty international uk, 2016). belarusian restrictions on foreign funding circulation of foreign funds in post-communist countries was always difficult, especially in belarus. however, before 1999 there were no limitations on foreign grants and support; western partners could freely cooperate with belarusian organisations on any projects and fund them. ngos in belarus ‘have always been not the most beloved actors for the regime’ (chulitskaya & chavusau, 2013, p. 1). human rights focused ngos have been targeted by restrictive laws in an attempt to constrain their capacity to drive accountability advocacy (matonytė & chulitskaya, 2012). registration difficulties, various restraints, ‘persecution and even imprisonment are always one step behind the organizations that are not loyal to the belarusian government’ (matonytė & chulitskaya, 2012). after the adoption of a set of restrictive legislative amendments to a number of belarusian legislative acts in 2011, the operation of belarusian civil society groups, especially human rights ngos, has become ‘severely restricted by a number of limitations on freedom of assembly and association’ (civil rights defenders, 2011). since 3 october 2011 the operation of ngos in belarus has been officially limited by a set of restrictive legislative amendments to a number of belarusian legislative acts adopted by the lower house of belarusian parliament. particular limitations scrutinised the operations of foreign funded ngos. among the key restrictions that came into effect in october 2011 are ‘mandatory registration of donor aid in state institutions with criminal liability introduced in autumn 2011 for violating rules of receiving foreign aid, along with tightening previous administrative sanctions’ (chulitskaya & chavusau, 2013, p. 4). ngos are also restricted from holding accounts in foreign banks. all the money transferred from abroad has to be cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 89 approved by belarusian government; so foreign ngos and sponsors cannot transfer money directly into the belarusian bank accounts of their belarusian partner ngos (pospieszna, 2014). many foreign organisations found it impossible to track their money because the political situation forces them to transfer funds to the bank accounts of private individuals or to deliver funding in cash. the international community has reacted to the new law with grave concerns and anxiety about the proposed legislative changes for the operations and funding of belarusian ngos. article 21 ‘prohibits belarusian ngos from keeping funds in banks and other financial institutions on the territory of foreign states’ (human rights watch, 2011). importantly, administrative penalties can be applied to those ngos that accept financial support from overseas ‘in violation of law’. in a similar manner, the criminal code of belarus, as amended, establishes ‘criminal liability for receiving any foreign grants or donations in violation of the belarusian legislation’ (human rights watch, 2011). the international community has signaled that such regulations may result in indiscriminate persecution of any activist or civil society group that receives overseas funding. for years, belarusian civil society groups have been ‘forced by the government to operate in increasingly difficult conditions and struggle with arbitrary registration procedures’ (chulitskaya & chavusau, 2013, p. 3). by creating further restrictions in relation to receiving funding from abroad, the new legislation inevitably pushed civil society groups to the margins of the law and made their operation in belarus close to impossible. furthermore, receiving foreign funding subject to the authorization procedures of the state authorities ‘made it virtually impossible for many to obtain support legally (e.g., for the belarusian helsinki committee)’ (matonytė & chulitskaya, 2012, p. 237). interestingly, as matonytė & chulitskaya (2012) has pointed out, anonymous donations ‘were made equal by the law to foreign ones and are subject to the same rigid authorization procedure’. along with the above mentioned, criminal liability has been ratified for violating rules of receiving foreign donations (e.g., using foreign donations without registration). the only legal source of funds for ngos in belarus, uncontrolled by the state, is donations from individuals. article 356 of the criminal code suggests a ‘new expanded definition of ‘espionage’, which will include ‘intelligence gathering activity’ or ‘any form of other assistance to a foreign state, foreign organization or their representative in carrying out activities to the detriment of the national security of belarus’ (human rights watch, 2011). this broad definition was argued by international community to be potentially used for targeted persecution by the authorities of ngo activists and civil society leaders. additionally, international ngos expressed serious concerns about the amendments to the law on state security agencies, which allowed for substantial extension of the powers of the state security committee (kgb). consequently, the new law had serious consequences for foreign funded ngos in belarus. as a result, ‘the necessity to show their loyalty to the government in order to be able to function made belarus less non-governmental’ (chulitskaya & chavusau, 2013, p. 4). 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 ukraine’s new law on ngos: a roll-back of anti-corruption efforts despite the fact that ukraine has progressed further in its democratic development than belarus and russia with no restrictions around overseas funded ngos, some of the new laws give warning signs of a roll-back of the recent democratic reforms and anti-corruption efforts of pro-democracy groups and ngos in ukraine. in early 2014 there was an attempt to introduce in ukraine a law similar to russia’s ‘foreign agents’ law that failed by not getting any government and public support. however, the most recent controversial legislation around anti-corruption ngos has been passed in ukraine giving a signs of democratic rollback. on 27 march 2017, a strong majority in ukraine’s parliament (266 of 423 legislators) passed the controversial legislation, and president petro poroshenko signed a series of amendments to ukraine’s law on the prevention of corruption. these revisions require members of ukraine’s anti-corruption ngos to release their financial e-declarations. according to the law, every person who received funds or property within the international framework of delivering programs (projects) or technical assistance in ukraine, including permanent assistance in the field of anti-corruption policy and implementation of such policies (directly or through third parties) is required to submit financial declaration. such a requirement immediately elicited a response from civil society groups and the investigative journalist community. this controversial legislation provoked ‘a considerable backlash by political proponents of the amendments, as well as some segments of society who felt that the amendments would promote more transparency amongst ngos involved in combatting corruption’ (opendemocracy, 2017). following the maidan mass protests in 2013-2014, ukraine’s political leadership pledged ambitious anti-corruption reforms to create a more transparent government to achieve a stronger democratic state. one of the key reforms has required ukraine’s state officials to publicly declare their assets annually through an online filing system. anticorruption legislative reforms were among the conditions the ukrainian government agreed to fulfill to meet requirements for visa-free travel by ukrainians to the european union’ (human rights watch, 2017). several opponents of the amendments immediately condemned the new legislation. josé ugaz, chairman of transparency international, proclaimed that: ‘these amendments are a vindictive retaliation by lawmakers who are angry that they are required to declare their wealth. there is no justification for singling out anti-corruption groups.’ transparency international in ukraine has made an official call on ukrainian authorities to abolish controversial amendments to the law on prevention of corruption that appears designed to intimidate and target anti-corruption activists. transparency international has pointed out that ‘the initial law was introduced to inhibit corruption and allow for public scrutiny of the wealth of those in power to ensure people did not abuse their official positions to increase their assets beyond their salaries’ (transparency international, 2017). it was emphasised that the law has no relevance to anti-corruption ngos and activists who are not paid by the state. ‘this new requirement is a slap in the face for ukraine’s anti-corruption activists and its cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 91 international partners who have been calling for a more transparent government’, said tanya cooper at human rights watch. key to understanding this restrictive new reality for ngos and activists in ukraine is a series of clauses that amend ukraine’s law on the prevention of corruption. the amendments ‘target individuals and representatives of ‘anti-corruption’ organisations that are involved in any activities, which are related to the prevention of corruption’ (opendemocracy, 2017). experts and lawyers have argued that the wording in the amendments is too vague and this makes it very difficult to predict which particular organization will fall under declaration. perhaps this will be limited only to transparency international, the centre for combating corruption, the anti-corruption headquarters, and so on, whose statutory documents accurately state that they are engaged in the fight against corruption. or maybe the bureau of journalistic investigations will also fall under this law along with the ngo ‘our money’ which carry out journalistic investigations but de facto conduct activities to fight corruption. the absence of a precise definition (or any definition at all) of ‘what ‘anti-corruption activities’ entails, or which individuals or entities are subject to this law, drew the ire of both ngos and donors alike’ (opendemocracy, 2017). the above mentioned concerns come from the grey areas this law leaves for the authorities to use vague definitions to prosecute civil society activists according to the subjective explanation of the law. the main argumentation against the new law is that it obscures the main idea of establishing financial declarations of public servants’ incomes and assets — namely, ‘to enable the ukrainian public, journalists and civil society to hold officials accountable’ (opendemocracy, 2017). conclusion as democratization has travelled east and passed through regime change in the post-soviet states of eastern europe, it seems to become more obviously intertwined with external international actors and their involvement in the ngo sector. a key point of the analysis given above is the discovery that the dynamics in the ngo sector in russia, belarus and ukraine have experienced some stagnation since 2011, when the new restrictive legislations on foreign funding and operations of ngos was adopted by the governments of these three post-communist states. this new legislation has created a significant domestic counter ‘push’ against the international western ‘pull’ towards democracy. the situation with foreign ngo funding in russia and belarus is much different from ukraine, with strict laws on ‘foreign agents’ and harsh regulations on foreign money transfers and aid. any restrictions on foreign funded ngos and such laws as the ‘foreign agents’ law have been recognised by international community as having a damaging effect on individual rights, the quality of civic discussion and pluralism of opinions and social and political groups. such a push away from western financial support in russia and belarus is reminiscent of the flight away from the western ‘subordination’, typically seen in these two countries as undermining their national sovereignty. this new legislation has impacted the efforts of civil society groups and ngos to democratize post-communist social, economic and political spheres in russia and belarus in the following ways: 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 • ngos had to discontinue partnership with foreign funders and donors and search for other sponsorship opportunities and presidential grants inside the countries. such dynamics have diminished the pluralism of civic initiatives and various interest groups, caused marketization of the ngo sector to serve the interests of particular interest groups and fight counter opposition. • the underfunded condition has caused a cooling in the civil society and opposition movements and groups that received funding from the west. • a significant number of the foreign funded ngos had to discontinue their work, which had immediate effects on pluralism, diversity and the general progression towards a democratic vector of development. the situation in ukraine is different from that in russia and belarus. foreign funded ngos, foreign investments and pro-democracy groups have long been pillars in ukraine’s civic society, facilitating the dissemination of the nation’s wealth fairly and justly during the past 27 years (sornarajah, 2017). the recent legislation adopted in 2016 in ukraine does not imply any restrictions on the acceptance of foreign funding by ngos and the civic sector in ukraine, though it imposes some regulation on their operations and enforces the framework of preventative measures to ensure transparency and accountability of civic activists and groups in the country. this new law has received considerable criticism for having too many grey areas, but if it the case that a more strict financial declarations and transparency from civic groups and activists are something the ukrainian public truly wants and feels the need for its accountability, ‘then a reasonable and practical legal framework should be developed’ (opendemocracy, 2017). it is too early to conclude that there are signs of a democratic rollback in ukraine’s civil society sector. however, the recent restrictive legislation has created a significant amount of new barriers to ngos’ operations and relationship with foreign partners in russia and belarus and in ukraine, it has the potential to damage the possibilities for ngos to organize mutual aid and support the development of the young unstable democracy. references amnesty international (november 17, 2016), ‘agents of the people: four years of foreign agents law in russia’: https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/agents-of-the-people-fouryears-of-foreign-agents-law-in-russia/ amnesty international uk (november 18, 2016), ‘russia: four years of putin's foreign agents law has 'shackled and silenced' ngos new report’: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/pressreleases/russia-four-years-putins-foreign-agents-law-has-shackled-and-silenced-ngosnew-report carmin, j. 2010, ‘ngo capacity and environmental governance in central and eastern europe’, acta politica, vol.45, nos.1-2, pp. 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(ed.) ukraine on its way to europe, interim results of the orange revolution/ed. peter lang, frankfurt am main, pp. 177-194. spiegel (march 26, 2013), ‘ngo law monitor: russia’, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/russian-authorities-raid-germanfoundations-and-ngos-a-890969.html transparency international 2017, ‘proposed amendments to a law that targets ukrainian anticorruption groups must be abolished’, https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/proposed_amendments_to_a_law_that _targets_ukrainian_anti_corruption_groups wedel, j. r. 2001, collision and collusion: the strange case of western aid to eastern europe. st. martin's press. zielonka, j., & pravda, a. (eds.), 2001, democratic consolidation in eastern europe: volume 2: international and transnational factors, oxford university press, oxford. https://doi.org/10.1093/019924409x.001.0001 http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/russian-authorities-raid-german-foundations-and-ngos-a-890969.html http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/russian-authorities-raid-german-foundations-and-ngos-a-890969.html https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/proposed_amendments_to_a_law_that_targets_ukrainian_anti_corruption_groups https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/proposed_amendments_to_a_law_that_targets_ukrainian_anti_corruption_groups https://doi.org/10.1093/019924409x.001.0001 abstract keywords introduction russia’s ‘foreign agents’ law on ngos belarusian restrictions on foreign funding ukraine’s new law on ngos: a roll-back of anti-corruption efforts conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 9, no. 3 2017 © 2017 kyungja jung, bronwen dalton and jacqueline willis. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: jung, k., dalton, b. & willis, j. 2017. the onward migration of north korean refugees to australia: in search of cosmopolitan habitus. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 9(3),1-20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9 i3.5506 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper the onward migration of north korean refugees to australia: in search of cosmopolitan habitus kyungja jung university of technology sydney, australia bronwen dalton university of technology sydney, australia jacqueline willis university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: kyungja jung, social and political sciences, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. kyungja.jung@uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5506 abstract based on assumed common ethnicity, language and culture, and generous settlement programs, south korea is believed to be the best country for north korean defectors to restart their lives. this is, however, not necessarily the case. since the mid-2000s, 2000 to 3000 north koreans have allegedly settled in the uk, canada, the us, australia and eu countries. despite this trend and its broader implications, the onward migration process of north korean refugees, together with their motivations and lived experiences, remain poorly addressed in academic research. drawing from the unique experience of north korean refugees’ onward movement to australia, the paper suggests that discarding a north korean identity and habitus and gaining cosmopolitan habitus are the main reasons behind north korean defectors’ onward migration. the paper is the first empirical study on north korean refugees resettled in australia to adopt habitus as a theoretical framework, and thus provides new insight into migration studies.. keywords north korea; north korean refugees in australia; onward migration; refugee policy and settlement policy; habitus; cosmopolitanism declaration of conflicting interest associate professor bronwen dalton reports that she is a member of the editorial team of cosmopolitan civil societies. she was not involved in the editorial or double-blind peer review process which was managed by another editor from the editorial team. funding the australian research council grant 1030098 provided support for this research. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5506 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5506 https://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au/ mailto:kyungja.jung@uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i3.5506 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 introduction north koreans are on the move after they have fled their country. first, they head for china. estimates of the number of north koreans in china are broad, ranging from 60,000 to 300,000. in particular, since famine struck north korea in the mid-1990s, hundreds of thousands of north koreans, dubbed ‘exodus’ of north koreans (lankov 2006, p. 110), have crossed the tumen river into northeast china. problematically, concerned about the destabilising effects that the crossing of a large number of north korean refugees into china might have on north korea (cohen 2012), china does not recognise north korean defectors1 as refugees, but illegal economic migrants. china also has bilateral treaties with north korea, such as those of the early 1960s and 1986, which require the return of all illegal north korean migrants in china to north korea (charny 2004, p. 81). since the mid-1990s, china has allegedly repatriated tens of thousands of north koreans. due to this situation in china, a significant proportion of north koreans have resettled in south korea or another country. north koreans’ situation in south korea is far different from refugees settling in other countries. as the south korean government considers itself to be the sole legitimate authority on the korean peninsula, north korean defectors are seen as south korean citizens, not refugees (lankov 2006). some 27,810 north koreans have settled in south korea between the end of the 1950-53 korean war and early 2015, with numbers increasing markedly following the mid-1990s famine period (ministry of unification, 2015). to deal with this sharp increase, the south korean government enacted the north korean refugees protection and settlement support act 1997. under the act, a series of support programs aimed at north korean refugees only, ranging from protection, education, employment, accommodation, medical care and support for minimum living standards, have been implemented (ministry of unification 2015). despite assumed common ethnicity, language and culture and generous settlement programs, some north korean refugees in south korea have attempted onward migration by seeking refugee status in the us, canada, australia, europe and other countries, particularly since the implementation of the us north korean human rights act (nkhra) in 2004. according to the united nations high commissioner for refugees (unhcr 2016a), the number of north korean refugees around the world in 2015 (not including south korea and china) amounted to 1,089, with most going to the united kingdom (608), canada (126), germany (101), russia (72), the netherlands (56), belgium (46), australia (26) and the united states (19). some north korean defectors made refugee claims to more than one country (kim 2013). this has prompted concern on the part of the south korean government as to the effectiveness of its resettlement programs. internationally, countries such as australia, canada and the us are grappling with how to deal with serial refugee claims by north korean defectors who have already been granted citizenship in south korea. 1 the north korean defectors referred to are asylum seekers in australia, but in south korea, they have already been granted refugee status. in this paper, we thus use the three terms: defectors, refugees and asylum seekers interchangeably. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 3 theoretically, the onward migration of north korean refugees challenges findings that suggest that onward moves are largely motivated by economic concerns. most research understands onward migration to be motivated by the pursuit of improved economic conditions and wellbeing, or an effort to overcome a range of difficulties, including discrimination and racism in a first settled county (ahrens et al. 2016). yet, very little attention has been paid to non-economic factors, such as the habitus of migrants (or for north korean refugees, the acquisition of cosmopolitan habitus), as a potential driving force behind the onward move. although we cannot deny that there are structural and economic reasons behind onward migration, attention needs to be paid to how structural inequality has played out in the embodiment of resettled migrants and how this might affect onward migration decisions. using bourdieu’s concept of habitus as a theoretical framework, this paper thus addresses the motivations and experiences of north korean refugees’ participation in onward migration processes. data are drawn from interviews with north korean defectors living in australia and legal cases involving north korean defectors. interviews with north koreans resettled/living in australia due to their invisibility in australian immigration statistics, the number of north korean refugees or asylum seekers in australia is uncertain. data from the unhcr (2016b)2 indicate that 159 north koreans applied for refugee settlement visas to australia between 2000 and 2015 – thirty-three successfully – making australia one of the key destinations for figure 1: north koreans seeking asylum in australia (2000-15) 2 some figures from 2014 and 2015 have been redacted to protect applicants’ anonymity. cells marked by an asterisk and figures with an asterisk indicate redacted figures (unhcr 2016b). 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 north korean asylum seekers. according to the interviewees for this study, between sixty and seventy north koreans were living in sydney in 2011, decreasing to around forty following a hardening of the department of immigration and citizenship’s (diac) position on illegal north korean asylum seekers in early 2012. this is in line with unhcr data in figure 1. however, one australian media report indicates that in 2012 alone, seventy north korean asylum seekers were staying in australia illegally after failing to obtain a refugee protection visa. some face deportation to south korea (stewart 2012). this study is based on a small, convenience and snowball sample: all participants were based in sydney at the time of interviews and consented to be interviewed. given the small number of north korean refugees living in australia and their undefined legal status, it was hard to recruit research participants. we contacted organisations such as korean community churches, migration agents and asylum seekers centres that were understood to have frequent contact with north korean refugees in australia and asked them to help with the recruitment of potential participants. with the help of these groups and snowballing techniques, we conducted semi-structured interviews with seven females and seven males staying in australia from april 2012 to january 2013 and in april 2014. interviews took place at times and in locations convenient to participants, lasted two to three hours and were recorded with participants’ consent. interview questions included the motivations behind their decision to leave south korea, why australia was chosen, and the experiences of living in australia (education, housing, social services and other social activities). our interviewees are highly educated and comparatively young. ten of the fourteen interviewees are college graduates or currently studying at university. four are in their twenties, four in their thirties, two in their forties and four in their fifties. identifying details have been omitted to protect participants’ privacy. to complement the small number of research participants, we have also analysed forty-one refugee review tribunal (rrta) cases, one federal magistrate case and two federal court (fca) cases involving north korean defectors from 1996 to 2014. this has been combined with interviews with four support workers, media reports, participant and non-participant observation at north korean refugee events, and a detention centre visit. onward migration and cosmopolitan habitus onward migration, such as the secondary movement of refugees and asylum seekers, is often perceived as a problem to manage rather than a process to study and understand. unlike earlier refugees and migrants who moved to one country and established themselves there permanently, nowadays refugees and migrants often feel compelled to move to another country, so that they can operate between opportunities and constraints. yet research on this area is very rudimentary and suggests that the reasons behind onward movements are various, but contradictory. research has found that the main push factors to drive onward moves are a range of difficulties faced in a first settlement country. a study with naturalised eu citizens suggests that onward migration is largely due to the discrimination and racism experienced in the previous country of residence (ahrens et al. 2016). similarly, van liempt’s (2011) study on the emigration of dutch-somalis to leicester and london in the uk shows cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 5 disappointment with the netherlands as the reason for the onward move. a study on twelve somalis who left denmark for the uk after first gaining citizenship as refugees, found that onward migration decisions were largely based upon dissatisfaction with life in denmark (bang nielsen 2004). the research on iranian onward migrants in sweden shows that ‘the majority have faced difficulties in securing meaningful employment’, and that limited employment and income may have prompted their decision to move (kelly 2011, p. 21). however, the existing research does not offer further detail on why, and on which grounds, the refugees and migrants experienced difficulties and discrimination. for example, research in the us has found that migrants who speak english well, have graduate-level education and high-income levels, still made multiple international moves (takenaka 2007). this research implies that the researchers need to go beyond the economic motivations thesis in dealing with onward migration. some researchers highlight, in the highly globalised world, the significance of mobility itself in migrants’ lives and regard onward migration as being a way for people to exercise their limited capacity for agency by moving on to places that better meet their social, economic and cultural needs (kelly 2013; skeggs 2004). mobility itself is a resource that is not equally available to everyone, but is facilitated by unique personal histories, diasporic consciousness, diasporic networks and high levels of education and skill. attention needs to be paid to the non-economic factors driving refugees to undertake onward migration. therefore, bourdieu’s (1984; 1990) concept of habitus provides a new perspective on migration studies. habitus is a collection of culturally and historically specific knowledge, values and dispositions. through habitus, one internalises the legitimacy of one’s inclusion or exclusion in a given society. habitus is a structuring principle that shapes our everyday practices, but is mediated and reproduced only through individual bodily experience. one’s habitus affects the body in the form of clothing, grooming, in the ways of walking, talking, standing, looking, sitting, interacting and so on. in this way, habitus is the product of history and accumulation of knowledge and experience of members of a given society who have a common social positioning (lechte 2003, pp. 103-104). habitus also includes taste as bourdieu (1984, p. 190) explains that ‘the body is the most indisputable materialisation of class taste’. that is, the body and its presentation are the manifestation of the tastes, values and cultural capital of a class or group. cultural capital appears in lifestyles and habitus and is reproduced through being a member of a given class/group or in a given material circumstance. not only are social class and material possessions critical for migrants to adjust to a new country, but so too is embodied habitus. when migrants/refugees move to another country that is radically different from the one that shaped their primary habitus, they feel out of place and displaced. in the crisis of a sudden change in place or space, migrants’ habitus becomes dysfunctional as they are unable to perform as expected. their refugee and migrant status (mostly low social and economic status) as well as different habitus (accent, taste and embodiment) serve as a source of discrimination and isolation. 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 bourdieu (1990) emphasises the potential for habitus to be reconstructed or changed in the event of encounters with the unfamiliar, such as resettling in a new country. he defines habitus as ‘a complex interplay between past and present’ (reay et al. 2009, p. 1104) and notes that rather than being fixed, habitus is learned, acquired and transformed, both through new experiences in one’s social environment and the process of socialisation. as reay et al. (2009, p. 1104) explain, although an individual’s past experiences and history play a fundamental role in shaping their habitus, habitus is simultaneously ‘permeable and responsive’ to new experiences and encounters. exploring this reconstituting potential, reay et al. (2009) consider the experiences of working-class students undertaking education at an élite institution. they find that the schooling is ‘particularly effective’ in resocialising the students and reshaping their habitus (reay et al. 2009, p. 1105). in a similar vein, we pursue this line of enquiry using the example of north korean defectors, exploring the extent to which they are able to reinvent their old habitus when encountering new social fields through onward migration. north koreans who have settled in south korea wish to rid themselves of their north korean habitus and learn south korean habitus. resettled north koreans have also become aware that to be like south koreans, they need to acquire cosmopolitan habitus which includes experience of living overseas, foreign language competency (in particular, english), and studying/living abroad. in the era of globalisation, such competencies are a necessary requirement of being a member of the global community, and one cannot truly fit in, or be competitive, without such skills. according to weenink (2008), cosmopolitan habitus encompasses both physical and mental proclivities and proficiencies that equip individuals to be successful global citizens. while living and engaging in cosmopolitan/transnational spaces, individuals learn to embody cultural tastes and discourses, giving them ‘a competitive edge’ (weenink 2008, p. 1092). north koreans, in general do not possess cultural capital to give them cosmopolitan habitus. moving again to another country might be the only option to construct cosmopolitan habitus for themselves and their children. cosmopolitan habitus specifically relates to both a ‘global’ skill and mindset, which individuals can draw on to successfully negotiate global communities. this entails cultural tastes and knowledge that increase global competitiveness and participation (weenink 2008, p. 1092). attaining english language competency, for example, constitutes a skill that would serve to bolster one’s cultural and cosmopolitan capital, increasing the chance of upward social mobility and success in the global arena (bourdieu 1986; weenink 2008). this also involves demonstrating a sensitivity and acceptance of difference and diversity, both in mind and practice (beck & sznaider 2006). cosmopolitan habitus also tends to foster a global outlook whereby individuals work to understand their realities and experiences from a global, rather than local, perspective. this engenders mental and physical flexibility that encourages fluid/ hybrid identities and promotes a sense of not being tied to any geographical or ethnic location (giddens 1991; hayden et al. 2000). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 7 north korean habitus in south korea perceptible differences in their use of language, differences in fashion, comportment and other social behaviours set north koreans apart from ‘the cosmopolitan, image-conscious socialites’ of the south (bell 2014, p. 103). upon arrival in south korea, north korean refugees undergo three months of ‘training’, offered by the south korean government, during which time they learn about the south korean political and economic system, and other practical skills, such as driving and ‘correcting’ their north korean accent (choo 2006, p. 583). nonetheless, for the majority of north korean refugees, life in south korea constitutes ‘the polar opposite’ of life in the north (bell 2014, p. 102). north korean refugees must also deal with being the subjects of negative stereotypes which depict them as ‘cold-blooded communists … unfeminine women workers, and … starving and helpless refugees’ (choo 2006, p. 590). the abovementioned differences in language, dress and manner serve to perpetuate these stereotypes and separate north korean refugees from mainstream south korean society. they also present obstacles to successful integration and resettlement as north koreans are constantly presented as ‘other’, reinforcing a national discourse that has distinguished north koreans from south koreans since the division of the peninsula (choo 2006, p. 590). in seeking to remove such noticeable distinctions, north korean refugees attempt to shed their accents (choo 2006; bell 2014), obtain cosmetic surgery and adopt south korean styles of living and self-presentation (taste and make up), including the conspicuous consumption of high-end brand items (bell 2014). as a male participant in his early forties recalled: ‘we were working really hard to earn money sufficient enough to buy a good car. we bought the most expensive car in our neighbourhood so that we were not looked down upon as north koreans by our south korean neighbours’. in acknowledgement of the stigmatising potential of the north korean accent, the south korean government provides south korean accent lessons as part of its three month education package offered to north korean refugees (choo 2006, p. 591). refugee testimony even indicates that some go to a special accent correcting institute to obtain the ‘perfect seoulite accent’, mastered by holding a pen between their lips (cited in choo 2006, p. 590). despite such efforts, this conspicuous and noticeable north korean habitus results in a level of mistreatment, discrimination, alienation and suspicion that presents a genuine obstacle to resettlement (sung & go 2014). testifying to these difficulties, a report found that 45.6 percent of south koreans surveyed held prejudice and stereotypes about north korean refugees based on their distinct embodiment and accent (nhrc 2014). another korean educational development institute (kedi [2011]) survey found that 10.7 percent of a total 429 elementary and middle school north korean refugee students admitted to being subject to either discrimination or ostracism on account of being north korean. in another study based in the workplace, north korean refugees reported receiving similar reactions from their co-workers and superiors. this prejudice and stereotyping has limited their opportunities, including employment, making it virtually impossible for north korean defectors to move up the social ladder into the middle or upper-middle classes. a survey of 1,785 refugees living in south korea showed that in 2014 only 53.1 percent were employed and that 19.8 percent 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 were employed as casuals (korea hana foundation 2014). both of these statistics indicated a worse situation for north koreans than the country as a whole, with south korea’s total employment rate sitting at 60.8 percent, and its casual employee rate at 6.1 percent. employed defectors also work more than the average south korean work week of 44.1 hours, clocking in forty-seven hours per week. they are also not as generously renumerated as their south korean counterparts, earning on average krw1.47 million per month, compared to the national average of krw2.23 million (us$1=krw1,100). many north korean refugees feel alienated and isolated in south korean society, finding it difficult to build relationships, or associate with, their south korean peers (kim & lee 2013). to survive in south korea, north korean refugees often hide their identity while trying to learn south korean habitus. when asked, 58.4 percent of young defectors voiced a reluctance to admit their north korean origins (korea hana foundation 2014). similarly, fifty-four percent of surveyed primary and middle school north korean refugee students disclosed that they would hide that they were north korean if given the opportunity to transfer to a different school (kedi 2011). all interviewees for this study indicated their desire not to be noticed as north korean and to raise their children without the stigma of being north korean, which could not be escaped while living in south korea. two interviewees working as welders in australia mentioned that in order to avoid discrimination in south korea and secure employment, they had to pretend that they were from the south korean border province of gangwondo, northeast of seoul, where the accent and dialect are similar to those of north korea: we rang the agencies and they asked us if we were chinese koreans. we said, ‘no’ then they told us ‘come to the office’. … they interviewed us and found that we had a north korean accent. they told us that they would give us a call. that’s the end of the story. in addition to facing discrimination from their south korean peers, their easily noticeable ‘north koreanness’ also exposes them to north korean spies, threatening their safety and that of their families in north korea, as well as their psychological wellbeing. one female interviewee in her thirties said: i am always worried about the family i left behind in north korea. north korea is very close to the south. information about us could be easily collected by north korean spies. that might cause my family to be punished and suffer retaliation. i want to live far away from north korea. these same concerns are reflected in many of the refugee review tribunal cases analysed (see rrta 2004; rrta 2005; rrta 2007, for example). north korean refugees wish to move far away from the koreas with the hope to not be seen as north korean, to shed north korean habitus, and to reconstruct a new identity in a new country. north korean habitus, deeply embedded in their body and identity through accent, taste and social interactions, is a major push factor driving north korean defectors’ decisions to leave for another country. north koreans want to rid themselves of their distinctive cultural cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 9 characteristics and transition to modern/cosmopolitan individuals. more than sixty years of separation and division have led these two groups to live in totally different social spaces and espouse divergent political ideologies. gaining legal citizenship does not necessarily make north koreans become like south koreans. north korean habitus serves as a distinct marker of difference and a major obstacle to north koreans remaking themselves as south korean citizens. in pursuit of cosmopolitan habitus: global aspiration and ‘english fever’ in south korea in the era of globalisation, south korea is enveloped by an ‘english fever’ whereby english education is highly valued as a symbol of prestige and high social standing (lee 2014, p. 21). for koreans, learning a foreign language, such as english, constitutes a type of ‘cosmopolitan knowledge’, providing influence potential in the form of social and cultural (cosmopolitan) capital (weenink 2008, p. 1092). as a much sought after symbol of class distinction, english has become crucial to upward social mobility and competitiveness in the global market (rizvi 2005; waters 2008; kenway & fahey 2014). working to ensure its international competitiveness, south korea invests heavily in education. in 2012, nearly twelve percent of all consumer spending was devoted to education, and principally to english language tuition (icef monitor 2014). in the mid-1990s, middle and upper-class south korean parents began to send their children to primarily englishspeaking countries in rapidly expanding numbers (lee & koo 2006). some families have even decided to emigrate to teach their children english from an early age. this trend has been dubbed gyoyukimin (educational immigration), so pervasive that the term entered the korean language as a neologism in 1997, defined as ‘immigrating to a foreign country in order for children to be educated in a better environment’ (lee 2014, p. 28). another phenomenon arising from english zeal in south korea is gireogi gajok (wild goose family) middle-class transnational families. children, accompanied by their mother, study overseas in english speaking countries, while the father supports the endeavour financially from korea (shin 2014, p. 100). the fathers of such families are dubbed gireogi (wild geese), as these animals fly long distances, often across oceans, to form their families (lee & koo 2006). a survey conducted by south korean newspaper dong-a ilbo found that a quarter of all south koreans strongly aspired to partake in ‘educational immigration’, while 21.8 percent had desires for their children to study abroad. similarly, twelve percent of all respondents indicated a willingness to be a gireogi family (lee 2014, pp. 28-29). these findings were echoed in another survey of 1008 south koreans, which shows that 44.7 percent of respondents would send their children overseas for the purposes of education if financially capable of doing so (bae 2007, cited in lee 2014, p. 29). it is no exaggeration to say that ‘the whole nation has an inferiority complex about english’ (choi 2005, cited in lee 2014, p. 45). there is certainly an ‘english divide’ and social division created by differing levels of access to english language tuition (shin 2014, p. 100 – emphasis in original). 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 under the north korean songbun caste system, foreign language learning is only available to those privileged enough to find themselves at the top of the social hierarchy. though, the motivation to study english is relatively limited given the lack of real-life application potential imposed by the government’s restrictions on overseas travel. those unlikely to gain permission to travel from the government place little clout on learning other languages and are not overly inclined to make the effort required to gain foreign language skills (the guardian, 5 february 2015). without the required cultural capital to compete, rigid social stratification and fierce competition in south korea exacerbate the divisions between south koreans and north korean refugees. english competency has thus become one of the most challenging issues, especially for young north korean defectors in south korea. more than a quarter of north korean defectors who entered universities in seoul and gyeonggi province through the special admission process, dropped out due to the language barrier (chosunilbo, 5 october 2010). the realisation that they could not compete with south korean-born peers and had no job prospects has been a motivating factor for the onward move of many north korean defectors (oh 2011). two empirical studies on the onward migration of north korean refugees suggest that the desire to acquire cosmopolitan habitus has influenced defectors’ decisions to seek asylum in english-speaking countries, such as the us and uk. a study based on eleven north korean refugees found that they left south korea for the us because of discrimination and hardship, and in the hope of better opportunities, education, and in particular, learning english (see shin 2008). another study of thirteen north koreans who had left south korea for the uk also found english education was one of the main motives for their onward migration, along with poverty, insecurity, discrimination, prejudice and a lack of social network (oh 2011). therefore, some defectors have sought asylum in english-speaking countries like australia to increase their competitiveness, employment prospects and ensure a better future for themselves and their children by acquiring cosmopolitan habitus through learning english and cross-cultural experience. all interviewees for our research highlighted access to immersive english education as the main reason for their move to australia. north korean refugees who are unlikely to have the social, cultural or financial capital to study abroad and send their children overseas, take this onward migration opportunity seriously. many north koreans use a refugee application as a way of learning english free of charge, or providing that opportunity to their children. one male interviewee in his forties remarked: i decided to come to australia for my children’s education. south koreans send their children overseas to study english, but i can’t afford that. i thought even if my application for asylum was unsuccessful, my family would have stayed in australia and my kids could have experienced australian life, such as learning english, at least for the period the application was being processed. in this way, the decision to move to australia though applying for another refugee protection visa is seen as a strategy of transnational education migration for them and their children to become cosmopolitan citizens in the era of globalisation. another female participant in her thirties emphasised this point clearly when she said: ‘i want to raise my kids as world-class cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 11 citizens. unlike me, i want to give them the chance to learn english and experience many countries, so that one day they can be global elites regardless of their north korean origins’. north koreans who have settled in south korea wish to rid themselves of their north korean habitus and be like south koreans. resettled north koreans have also become aware that to be like south koreans, they need to acquire cosmopolitan habitus which includes experience of living overseas, foreign language competency (in particular, english), and studying/living abroad. as most north korean refugees have limited economic, social and cultural capital, repeated refugee claims might be their only option to construct cosmopolitan habitus for themselves and their children. challenges to acquiring cosmopolitan habitus the question remains whether onward migration to australia has fulfilled the desires of north korean refugees and provided them with opportunities not available in south korea. despite desires and efforts to reinvent themselves through onward migration, most north korean asylum seekers in sydney are first hampered by undefined legal status. australia has pursued a hard line on granting asylum to north koreans arriving from south korea (bell 2013)3. to be granted a protection visa, a north korean applicant must meet the criteria specified in the 1958 migration act. a person must have a justifiable fear of persecution in their national country and, for whatever reason, not be able to seek protection from that country. north korean defectors must also contend with the fact that australian law considers north koreans to be dual citizens of both north and south korea. thus, the common argument not to grant a protection visa to north koreans is that since they also have south korean nationality, they cannot be protected by australia. as such, north korean defectors are typically deported to south korea within fourteen days (stewart 2012). in 2011, eighty north koreans found themselves in this situation, after the high court of australia ruled that protection could not be extended to refugees by australia if they were already eligible for protection in a third country (piotrowski 2013). stringent definitions of what constitutes persecution in australian migration law present a further challenge to the onward migration of north korean refugees to australia. our analysis of court cases reveals that a common argument not to grant a protection visa to north korean defectors in australia is that the difficulties they may experience in south korea, including in finding employment ‘do not amount to persecution’ (rrta 2007, para. 74). this same reasoning is applied to north korean applicants’ claims of psychological harm. the fact that some north korean defectors employ unlawful methods also presents an obstacle to their seeking asylum in australia. in this regard, brokers, often north korean refugees who have resettled in other countries, play an important role, offering information 3 some eu countries, as well as the uk and canada, have also recently implemented increasingly rigorous screening procedures with respect to north korean refugee claimants, so as to filter out fraudulent claims. as in the case of australia, the uk government has rejected the applications of north korean refugees with south korean citizenship, requiring fingerprinting of refugees in order to check whether they lived in south korea before coming to the uk (choi 2011). 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 and help with refugee applications, or even encouraging the use of unlawful methods. research found that those with high levels of cosmopolitan capital acted as brokers providing those lacking such capital with the opportunity not only to gain knowledge and capital, but to exercise influence in their local communities (weenink 2008). the three participants in this study who arrived in australia directly from china recounted having received a broker’s help. among those interviewed, four said that they falsely claimed that they had come to australia directly from china, concealing the fact they had been granted south korean citizenship. three of the remaining interviewees came to australia directly from china, two via the uk and one via canada, after having previously settled in south korea. another concern is to assess if the applicant is a genuine north korean refugee. in some claim cases analysed, such as zhou v minister for immigration and multicultural affairs (mima) (fca 2000), applicants were found to be ethnic korean chinese, not north korean nationals. these ethnic koreans from china study north korean specifics, such as its history, songs, and politics. some even present official documents such as birth certificates. others offer north korean bank notes, or kim il sung badges as evidence of their supposed origins, though these are not considered valid evidence of nationality, as this kind of north korean ‘merchandise’ can be purchased online (choi 2011, para. 3). the fact that north korean refugees often spend considerable lengths of time in china before migrating onward, further hampers discerning north koreans from ethnic chinese koreans. for example, seven participants in this research had lived in china for more than three years after they fled north korea and spoke chinese fluently. this suspicion concerning the legitimacy of claims makes securing protection difficult. one interviewee argues that not a single genuine north korean refugee has been granted a refugee protection visa in australia, and that all of those who had received visas were ethnic koreans from china. however, analysis of forty-one refugee review tribunal cases between 1996 and 2014 suggests two instances of genuine north korean refugees being granted protection visas. the first successful case analysed was in 1996. the applicant was born in north korea, though later escaped and became a south korean citizen. he made the onward move to australia in 1984, where he discovered he had living relatives still in north korea. he initiated contact with them via telephone with the assistance of relatives in china, maintaining communication for approximately nine years. despite already holding south korean citizenship, he was granted protection on account of south korea’s strict national security law, which prohibits unauthorised contact with north korea, including relatives. noting that the south korean government is ‘highly sensitive about contacts between the north and south’ and deeming there to be ‘a real chance’ of ‘treatment amounting to persecution,’ including interrogation or imprisonment if the man returned to south korea, he and his wife were granted protection visas (rrta 1996, para. 83). the second successful case analysed was in 2000. the applicant arrived in australia unlawfully from china, with no identification. he claimed to have defected as a youth by crossing the amnok river into china after the death of his father as a political prisoner caused him to suffer much ill-treatment. he lived in china as a farmer for many years, though a crackdown on north korean refugees and the fear of repatriation saw him leave china for cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 13 australia. the determination that he ‘face[d] a real chance of being returned to north korea’ in china, and punished by north korean authorities saw the applicant granted a protection visa (rrta 2000, para. 43). yet these cases are not the norm and both were ruled on prior to the diac crack down on north korean refugees in 2012. the majority of cases are denied. highlighting the difficulties inherent in the process, by april 2014, five of the fourteen people interviewed for this study had already left australia for south korea after their refugee applications were rejected. this uncertain legal status exacerbates north korean asylum seekers’ hardships in australia. while their refugee protection visa applications are being processed, they are eligible to apply for financial support, health care and legal services. however, once their applications are declined they can no longer access these services. interviewees lived in fear of deportation, and did not qualify for social welfare services such as health care and free education. one male participant working as a cleaner said he could not visit a doctor when he got sick because of his unsettled legal status. a couple with two children aged two and four years old were concerned about their children’s education as they could not send them to childcare or kindergarten. another participant who worked as a house painter said that he only had a few coins in his wallet and could not afford to buy milk and nappies for his two small children, let alone take them to a hospital for vaccinations. realities of living as a cosmopolitan: the precariousness of life in australia interviewees mostly supported themselves and their families by doing labour-intensive, mostly casual, precarious and cash-in-hand work, working fifty to seventy hours per week. due to these often physically intensive and long hours of work, north koreans in australia hardly found time for leisure or other social and cultural activities, let alone learning english. in response to the question of whether he enjoyed living in australia, one male interviewee said: there is nothing i am satisfied with here in australia. i get up at five in the morning and come back from work after six in the evening. then, i take a shower, have dinner, watch a korean drama, and go to sleep again. this is my daily routine. there is no space in my mind where i could think about whether i am happy or unhappy. another male participant, a graduate of north korea’s premier university, kim il sung university, revealed that his life as a nogada (blue-collar worker) in australia was even worse than his life in north or south korea, saying: i made a living by giving public lectures in south korea, mostly in seoul. i used to give one or two lectures every day which paid me between aud 180 to aud 700 per lecture. in south korea, i owned a house [the south korean government provides housing as part of a settlement package] and i never did any physically intensive work – not even in north korea. i was a company executive in north korea and had my own chauffeur. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 in spite of access to casual jobs, the precariousness of their jobs and high living expenses meant that interviewees’ living arrangements were basic. renting an entire apartment was well beyond their means. two of the homes visited during the interview process revealed how poor living conditions were. one house was run-down, contained little furniture, and was run as a boarding house by a female refugee. another tiny unit did not even have beds. highlighting the financially precarious situation of north korean refugees in australia, a male participant who worked as a cleaner in a big supermarket said that he had sent hardly any money to his family in south korea recently. ironically, language incompetency presents a major obstacle to adjustment in australia. north korean refugees’ lack of english competency constrains their employment opportunities and social interactions. those interviewed mostly socialised with other north koreans, chinese koreans and korean australians and were socially isolated from so-called mainstream australian society. one fifty-year-old male refugee said: ‘although we live in australia geographically, we still live in south korea’. those who attend an english language school are juggling work with study to financially support themselves and their family members. the majority of interviewees were working in informal sectors such as cleaning, painting, shop-keeping, child-minding, waitressing and tiling, mostly in australiankorean–owned small businesses, which do not require legal documents or english language skills. their language competency and unfamiliarity in australia have led most to live in areas where there are large korean communities, and near railway stations where many korean businesses and shops are located. eleven of the fourteen participants shared a unit with other people, usually other north korean refugees and chinese koreans, or lived in a boarding house, often run by a north korean refugee. the north korean asylum seekers are thus consigned to marginality in the australian labour market and society due to not yet attained legal status and cosmopolitan habitus (in particular, language competency). cosmopolitanism, transnationality and ‘asian’ identity: ‘i wish to live here no matter what’ despite these challenges and lower quality of life (poor housing, precarious employment and social isolation), all those interviewed wished to stay and live in australia if possible. during their stay in australia, although brief, they seemed to develop ‘a cosmopolitan sensibility and a willingness to be, or the experience of being, transnationally mobile’ (maxwell & aggleton 2016, p. 781). most of those interviewed talked about transnational mobility as a central part of their future trajectories. five whose refugee protection visa applications were declined were seeking other ways of staying legally in australia, such as marrying australians, being enrolled in a university or college, or waiting for their children who were born in australia to reach their tenth birthdays. once ten, their children gain australian citizenship4, and there is a possibility that parents can obtain permanent residency through their children. a cosmopolitan outlook and orientation was evident among those interviewed. interviewees actively explored opportunities to move on to another country by using their 4 according to the australian citizenship act 2007, a person born in australian must be ‘ordinarily resident’ in australia for ten years following their birth to be an australian citizen (office of parliamentary counsel 2016). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 15 skills, such as welding, and by collecting relevant information about schemes such as working holiday visas and refugee protection programs. they also made recourse to their north korean diasporic networks (brokers, friends and acquaintances who have attempted onward migration). this ability to exercise agency challenges a prevalent view of north koreans that sees them as ‘fundamentally deprived of the human nature of self-autonomy and self-promotion presumed in liberal capitalism’ (sung 2010, p. 127). living in australia seems to provide north korean refugees with new sensibilities, or ways of understanding situations through a different lens. through a global lens, they seemed to see south korea and south korean policy in a more objective/positive way. they came to realise that their idealisations of australia as a better country for refugees were not true. all of the participants clearly stated that the settlement programs the south korean government provided were better and more generous than the ones in australia. in particular, housing and cheap and efficient medicare services were the most praised programs in south korea by the interviewees. encounters and experiences with the ethnic ‘other’ in australia gave most north koreans interviewed the opportunities to learn cosmopolitan values (egalitarianism and multiculturalism) to experience open-mindedness towards different cultures. they found australia’s multicultural ambience and egalitarian culture appealing, as a female interviewee in her thirties mentioned: i have experienced no discrimination here. when i introduce myself as north korean, people become very curious about me and try to help me and often translate what i say to other people. because australia is a multicultural society, people all look different and come from different cultural backgrounds. i am seen as one of them, not north korean, and australians cannot distinguish between south korean and north korean. the identities of those interviewed seem to be no longer anchored to one location, either south korea or north korea. specifically, north korean refugees developed de-territorialised identities, such as ‘asian’, and formed multiple belongings. they are able to adopt transnational practices while located in a transnational space (fauser et al. 2012) and retain transnational ties with families and friends in south korea, china and even north korea by sending remittances, phone calls and instant messaging. information and communication technologies (icts) play a critical role in enabling this cosmopolitanism and transnationality by facilitating transnational networking and a sense of belonging beyond geographical boundaries (nedelcu 2012). their onward moves have also led to the creation of new forms of transnational families out of the international movement of north korean refugees. one couple interviewed had left two adult children in south korea and supported them financially. one male participant sent money to his wife and two children living in south korea. they maintained close relationships with their family members and talked to each other almost daily via katalk (an instant messaging system), emails and international phone calls. 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 conclusion: onward migration, a self-realisation strategy to be cosmopolitan mobility is significant in the lives of migrants and offers an important avenue through which they can access agency as they search for a place that satisfies their social, economic and cultural needs (skeggs 2004; kelly 2013). however, while mobility itself is a valuable resource, it is unfortunately not one that is evenly distributed or accessed. often only available to a privileged few, migrants wish to capitalise on the benefits of onward migration, but lack the economic, social and cultural capital (including the diasporic consciousness, diasporic networks and levels of education and skill) to successfully do so. for north korean refugees in south korea, in particular, who typically have never enjoyed freedom of movement, either nationally or internationally, onward migration presents as perhaps the only means through which to pursue cosmopolitan habitus. in this way, onward movement, and potentially even multiple refugee claims, constitute an opportunity to secure newfound freedom and live a cosmopolitan life. onward migration for north koreans was also regarded as the means of escaping their visibility as north korean and ridding themselves of their habitus. for most north koreans, moving to another developed country seems to be their only opportunity to break free from their old north korean identity. no longer perceived as north korean, they are able to reconstruct their identity as korean, or even cosmopolitan beyond the territorial boundary of south korea, avoid stigmatisation and marginalisation and participate in cosmopolitan education, including english learning. in providing cosmopolitan habitus, the chance to learn english, live abroad and experience other cultures, ultimately offers an opportunity for upward social mobility for them and their children. although at times their onward migration attempt fails, the temporary experience of living overseas itself serves as a valuable chance to taste cosmopolitan life and attain cosmopolitan habitus. foreign language skills also see them better positioned in the global labour market in south korea and elsewhere. the small number of participants makes this study a preliminary one. however, the paper is the first empirical research on north korean refugees resettled in australia to adopt habitus as a theoretical framework, and thus provides new insight into migration studies, which focus predominately on the economic and material motives driving onward migration. drawing from the unique experience of onward movement among north korean refugees, the paper suggests that discarding a north korean identity and habitus and gaining cosmopolitan habitus, and a new flexible identity, are the main reasons behind north korean defectors’ onward migration. cosmopolitan aspiration, such as the zeal for english education in south korea, has also pushed north koreans to move on to australia. this implies that reasons behind onward migration can vary according to the political and socio-cultural context of the first settled country and the origin of refugees. furthermore, the paper argues that onward migration is not necessarily an indicator of unsuccessful integration or inadequate settlement programs in a first asylum country, but rather indicates that refugees have nurtured the ability to act on their own behalf and facilitate their own integration by continued and multiple movements. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.3, 2017 17 distress for north koreans does not necessarily end after fleeing their country of origin. mobility has been crucial in reshaping the lives of north korean refugees, some of whom have recently resettled in the uk, canada, the us, australia, and eu countries. although their lives in their newly adopted countries are far from what they dreamed about when they left south korea and other first asylum countries, north korean refugees construct cosmopolitan lives by living across more than one country, adopting fluid identities beyond a national boundary, and retaining transnational families and networks. yet, some north korean refugees have been left living in limbo as a result of inconsistencies in refugee review criteria and countries’ interpretations of these. internationally consistent policies need to be developed urgently to deal with this matter, and humanitarian solutions found for north korean refugees, who have survived extraordinary circumstances, such that their ‘arduous’ journey might finally end. references ahrens, j., kelly, m. & van liempt, i. 2016, ‘free movement? the onward migration of eu citizens born in somalia, iran, and nigeria’, population, space and place, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 84-98. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.1869. australian government 2016, australian 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m.-h., 2014, ‘resettling in south korea: challenges for young north korean refugees’, asan institute for policy studies issue briefs, 8 august, accessed 15 may 2016, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/resettling-in-south-korea-challenges-for-youngnorth-korean-refugees . sung, m. 2010, ‘the psychiatric power of neo-liberal citizenship: the north korean human rights crisis, north korean settlers, and incompetent citizens’, citizenship studies, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 127-144. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621021003594783. takenaka, a. 2007, ‘secondary migration: who re-migrates and why these migrants matter’, migration information source, 26 april, accessed 30 october 2017, http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=597 the guardian. 2015, ‘ask a north korean: do you learn foreign languages?’, 5 february, accessed 22 march 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/05/northkorea-learn-foreign-languages. unhcr (united nations high commissioner for refugees). 2016a, unhcr 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http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-31/an-north-korean-family-in-australia-fears-deportation/4343578 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-10-31/an-north-korean-family-in-australia-fears-deportation/4343578 http://en.asaninst.org/contents/resettling-in-south-korea-challenges-for-young-north-korean-refugees http://en.asaninst.org/contents/resettling-in-south-korea-challenges-for-young-north-korean-refugees https://doi.org/10.1080/13621021003594783 http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?id=597 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/05/north-korea-learn-foreign-languages https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/05/north-korea-learn-foreign-languages http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.605 https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038508096935 abstract keywords introduction interviews with north koreans resettled/living in australia onward migration and cosmopolitan habitus north korean habitus in south korea in pursuit of cosmopolitan habitus: global aspiration and ‘english fever’ in south korea challenges to acquiring cosmopolitan habitus realities of living as a cosmopolitan: the precariousness of life in australia cosmopolitanism, transnationality and ‘asian’ identity: ‘i wish to live here no matter what’ conclusion: onward migration, a self-realisation strategy to be cosmopolitan references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 11, no. 1 2019 © 2019 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: mason, g. 2019. a picture of bias crime in new south wales. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 11:1, 47-66. https://doi.org/10.5130/ ccs.v11.i1.6402 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au article (peer-reviewed) a picture of bias crime in new south wales gail mason sydney law school, university of sydney, eastern avenue, camperdown campus, the university of sydney nsw 2006, australia. gail.mason@sydney.edu.au doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6402 article history: received 20/12/18; revised 18/02/19; accepted 25/02/19; published 28/03/2019 abstract bias crime is crime where the victim is targeted because of an aspect of his or her identity, including race, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation. it is an extreme manifestation of cultural tension and conflict. bias crime remains under-researched in australia. while there has been some investigation into different types of bias crime, such as racist and homophobic offences, there is little analysis of the nature and extent of bias crime across these categories. for the first time, this article presents the results of a study into official records of bias crime held by the new south wales police force. the study shows that crimes motivated by bias based on the victim’s race/ethnicity and religion are by far the most common types of bias crime reported in nsw. people from asian, indian/pakistani and muslim backgrounds are the most likely victims to report bias crime. the study also shows that there is much work to be done to encourage bias crime reporting amongst marginalised communities and improve the capacity of police to identify and accurately record bias crime. i argue that civil society has an important role to play in building partnerships with police to achieve positive change in the policing of bias crime. keywords bias crime, hate crime, racism, cultural diversity, australia, multiculturalism declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research is supported by the australian research council (dp110101888) 47 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6402 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6402 mailto:gail.mason@sydney.edu.au https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i1.6402 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 introduction in may 2017, four muslim women wearing headscarves were randomly attacked in the inner city of sydney, australia. the suspect was charged with two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and two counts of common assault. according to media reports, the suspect told police that she was motivated by hatred of muslims, stating at her first court appearance that ‘“the only thing i did was take a bull cut to a muslim lady. i don’t see any problem with that”’ (gibbs 2017). on the day the suspect appeared in court, the new south wales police force issued a media release stating that their ‘investigation into the alleged assault determined that it was a bias-motivated crime’ (nsw police force 2017). bias crime is crime that is motivated by prejudice, bias or hatred towards a presumed characteristic of the victim, such as race, religion, sexual orientation, disability status or gender identity (nsw police force 2019). it is also known as hate crime. bias crime is an extreme manifestation of intergroup tension, conflict and animosity. it is a sign of the failure of the nation state to provide targeted groups with the safety and sense of belonging that is intrinsic to full citizenship (keynan 2017). civil society has long sought to monitor and minimise the impact of bias crime on marginalised communities (asquith 2012; chakraborti and garland 2015). in contrast, state authorities have downplayed the prevalence of bias crime (mason 2012; baas 2015). in australia, this is apparent not just in political and media discourse but also in law enforcement, where only two police services have enacted distinct policies or procedures to address bias crime at the frontline of policing. police data represents the ‘official’ record of crime. it defines the problem and provides intelligence about its nature and distribution. governments rely on police data to set policy and allocate fiscal resources. this points to the importance of robust and reliable police data on bias crime. in australia, such data is rare. virtually everything we know about bias crime comes from victimisation studies conducted by community organisations and academics or from inquiries by human rights agencies such as the australian human rights commission (hreoc 1991; poynting 2002; asquith 2004; hreoc 2004; noble 2009; tomsen 2010; baas 2015; benier, wickes & higginson 2015). this article presents the results of the first study of bias crime data held by the new south wales police force (nswpf). the nswpf, which serves the state of new south wales (nsw), has the longest-standing bias crime initiative in australia. their data provides a unique picture of the kinds of incidents that the public report and the police record as bias crime across the state of nsw. in contrast to victimisation surveys, which usually document one form of bias only, police data enables comparisons across multiple categories of motivation, such as race, religion and sexuality. to date, there has been only one study of police bias crime data in australia. this research examined records of ‘prejudice motivated crime’ held by victoria police (mason et al. 2017). the current article builds on this by providing more detailed analysis of the characteristics of bias crime victims. it compares the nsw and victorian data to offer the most comprehensive picture of reports of bias crime in australia. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 49 the article begins by considering existing research on cultural diversity, bias crime and police responses. following an explanation of the methods used to study bias crime data held by the nswpf, it presents an overview of nearly ten years of data, from july 2007 to january 2017, identifying the average number of bias crime reports made to police. the article then focuses on a more detailed subset of data, from july 2013 to june 2016, to analyse key variables, including: the type of bias; victim demographics; type of offence; and situational variables such as location and time of day. the analysis shows that reports of bias crime in nsw are low, but no lower than victoria. it also shows that crimes motivated by racial/ethnic and religious bias are the most common and victims are most likely to come from asian, indian/pakistani and muslim backgrounds. police are the public face of the criminal justice system. in a multicultural nation, all victims of crime should feel equally confident to turn to police for fair and respectful assistance. yet the results of this study suggest that bias crime is under-reported and underrecorded. civil society has an important role to play in enacting change in this domain. the creation of sustainable police-community partnerships is key to building community confidence to report and police capacity to record bias crime. cultural diversity, bias crime and policing in australia australia is a culturally diverse nation. participants in the 2016 national census identified over 300 separate countries of ancestry, with only 67% of the population having been born in australia (abs 2017a). of those born overseas, 39.7% were from asia, 33.9% were from europe, 10.7% from oceania, 5.1% from sub-saharan africa, 4.9% from the middle east and the remaining 5.6% from other regions (abs 2017a). a little over 2.6% of australians identify as aboriginal and/or torres strait islander (abs 2017b). although 52.1% of australians identify broadly with christianity, a total of 8.2% identify with other religions, including islam (2.6%), buddhism (2.4%), hinduism (1.9%), sikhism (0.5%) and judaism (0.4%) (abs 2017c)1. both islam and hinduism have been identified as ‘emerging major religions’ in australia in the last decade (abs 2017c). the 2014 general social survey found that 3% of the adult australian population identify as gay, lesbian or an ‘other’ form of sexuality (this is likely an under-estimate due to the hesitancy of many gay and lesbian australians to identify as such) (abs 2015). although there is great variability in severity, it is estimated that 20% of the australian population has a disability (abs 2016). research shows that while australians’ attitudes towards ‘others’ continue to improve over time, there is still much cause for concern (markus 2016; kamp et al. 2017). for example, a recent national survey (kamp et al. 2017) found that australians are largely supportive of cultural diversity but some groups continue to attract a substantial degree of negativity. by far, the group that attracts the highest rate of negative attitude is muslim australians (31.5%). middle eastern, african, south asian (indian, pakistani or sri lankan) and jewish australians are also perceived to be ‘significant out groups’ (kamp et al. 2017, p. 1 religious affiliation is the only optional question in the australian census. approximately 10% of people do not answer this question, meaning that these figures may not be an accurate representation of the distribution of religious beliefs. 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 79). the groups that are viewed most positively are anglo-australians and asian australians (kamp et al. 2017). although australian attitudes to homosexuality also show significant change over time, 21% of people still believe that homosexuality is immoral (morgan 2016). notwithstanding the fact that 61.6% of australians recently ‘voted’ in favour of legalising same-sex marriage, 38.4% of respondents were against legalisation. this rate was much higher (up to 74%) amongst some cultural groups, notably ‘working-class, non-european overseas-born, religious communities’ (jakubowicz 2016, para 12). negative attitudes towards cultural diversity translate into negative life experiences for minority communities. these experiences of islamophobia, antisemitism, homophobia and other forms of prejudice are well documented in australia (poynting 2002; hreoc 2004; noble 2009; ahrc 2015; dunn et al. 2015; executive council of australian jewry 2018). yet, there is less empirical research focusing specifically on the criminal manifestations of this prejudice. the 1991 national inquiry into racist violence (hreoc 1991) was the first comprehensive investigation of any form of bias crime in australia. it found that marginalised cultural groups within australia were subject to, and lived in fear of, racist violence, intimidation and harassment. the most vulnerable groups at the time were indigenous, vietnamese, and middle eastern people. in 2005, a victimisation survey further confirmed that vietnamese and middle eastern people were over-represented as victims of such crimes (johnson 2005). more recently, research has revealed a problem of violence against indian nationals studying in australia (baas 2015; mason 2012). a 2015 survey of lgbti australians found that almost 75% of respondents reported bullying, harassment or violence at some point during their lives due to their sexuality or gender identity (ahrc 2015). while violence and abuse towards australians living with disability is a well established problem (sherry 2010), it remains one of the most under-investigated forms of bias crime. bias crime does not only have an adverse impact on individual victims. it can also cause fear and alienation in the victim’s community and, in so doing, undermine multiculturalism (chakraborti & garland 2015). the way in which police respond to bias crime is thus a barometer of the relationship between police and minority communities in cosmopolitan society (mason et al. 2017). research shows that minority groups tend to have less confidence in police and lower levels of trust than non-minorities (sivasubramaniam and goodman-delahunty 2008; murphy and cherney 2011). this is pronounced amongst minority communities with histories of over-policing and/or recent experiences of abuse of authority. these include indigenous people, racial and religious minorities, recent immigrants and lgbti communities (cunneen 2001; murphy and cherney 2011; poynting & noble 2010; sivasubramaniam and goodman-delahunty 2008; tomsen 2010). research also shows that, for their part, police continue to hold negative perceptions, suspicions and stereotypes about some minorities (miles-johnson and pickering 2018). this mutual mistrust means that members of minority groups are less likely than non-minorities to report victimisation or contact police if they need assistance (murphy and cherney 2011). this has direct implications for bias crime, which is less likely to be reported to police than parallel crime (wiedlitzka et al. 2018). one uk study has estimated that less than 30% of bias crime is cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 51 reported to police (perry 2001). the impact of under-reporting can be far-reaching. without regular and consistent reporting, it is difficult to measure, monitor and understand the nature of bias crime and how best to combat it. police in international jurisdictions, such as the us and the uk, have attempted to overcome some of these challenges by introducing dedicated bias crime policies and procedures (mason et al. 2017). in 1999, the nswpf became the first australian police service to begin recording bias crime (nswpf 2011)2. a bias crime coordinator was appointed in 2007 and this capacity was expanded into the bias crime unit (bcu) in 20153. the function of the bcu is to monitor and review reports of bias crime, deliver training and provide intelligence to local area commands. nswpf standard operating procedures define bias crime as a criminal offence that is: motivated, in whole or in part, by an offender’s bias against an individual’s or group’s actual or perceived: race, religion, ethnic/national origin, sex/gender, gender identity, age, disability status, sexual orientation or homelessness status (nsw police force n.d., p. 7). although bias crime is not a specific offence in nsw – there is no ‘bias crime’ which police can use to charge suspects – a biased motive on the part of an offender is an aggravating factor at sentencing (crimes (sentencing procedure) act 1999 s 21a(2)(h)). this places an obligation on frontline police to record complaints of potential bias crime. the bcu then collates, categorises and evaluates these reports. this categorisation process is discussed in more detail in the next section. the research study this article presents the results of the first study of bias crime data held by the nswpf. the aims of the study were, first, to analyse the extent and variation of reports of bias crime to the nswpf and, second, to extrapolate from these official reports to construct a picture of bias crime in nsw. for the purposes of the study, the nswpf provided monthly files on bias crime reports from july 2007 to january 2017. as noted above, these reports had already been reviewed and categorised by the bcu. once an investigating officer flags an event as a potential bias crime, the bcu then determines which category of bias (e.g. race, religion or sexual orientation) best characterises the complaint. the bcu applies a schedule of 10 indicators (some with multiple sub-indicators) (nswpf n.d.) to the available evidence to evaluate whether the event should be classified as a bias crime, suspected bias crime, bias incident or not a bias crime at all. these are defined as follows: • bias crime – if there is sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the offenders were at least partially bias motivated 2 victoria is the only other jurisdiction in australia to have introduced a distinct bias crime initiative. for a detailed analysis of victoria’s approach to bias crime see mason et al. (2017). 3 at the time of the study, this unit had been recently subject to an internal restructure, relocating it from operational programs to the newly established fixated persons investigation unit, within the counterterrorism and special tactics command. 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 • suspected bias crime – if there is insufficient evidence but reasonable grounds to suggest that the offenders were at least partially bias motivated • bias incident – if the incident does not amount to a criminal offence, but sufficient evident shows that it was bias motivated • not a bias crime – if there is no or insufficient evidence that the incident or criminal offence was not at least partially bias motivated (nsw police force n.d., p. 42). the process of second tier review undertaken by the bcu brings a degree of validity to the data provided for this study. nevertheless, there are limitations to this data4. reports of bias crime have been collected over a period of nearly ten years, during which time the nswpf modified its computerised recording system, altered the definition and categories of bias crime and made changes to the way bias crime is recorded (nswpf personal communication 29 may 2017). in addition, there are gaps in this data. most notably, no data is available for the period june 2009 to august 2012, when the bias crime coordinator role was not staffed5. these limitations and gaps preclude detailed analysis of trends over time in relation to the 2007-2017 data. in july 2013, the bcu began recording more comprehensive information on reports of bias crime. files from this point on contain information on key variables such as type of motive, victim demographics and circumstances of the incident (eg: time and location), as well as qualitative case summaries. for this study, a subset of files for the three-year period from july 2013 to june 2016 was selected for analysis. this data was ‘cleaned’, collated and recategorised to maximise comparability and consistency across variables6. this subset of data forms the bulk of analysis presented in this article. all analysis was undertaken using descriptive statistics, including the use of crosstabulations to gauge relationships between variables (eg: bias motivation by victim race and religion). certainly, the picture of bias crime presented by this study is imperfect. underreporting means that police reports ever only provide a partial profile of victimisation (giannasi 2015). in addition, analysis is largely constrained by the categories adopted by the nswpf to record and review bias crime. it is not always clear how such categories are defined and distinguished from each other. for example, categories such as ‘asian’, ‘indian/pakistani’ and ‘middle eastern’ are used by the bcu to record a victim’s race but there is no further information available as how the unit makes this determination. some anomalies are apparent. for instance, the targeted victimisation of jews is interpreted by the nswpf as a form of religious bias whereas the executive council of australian jewry (2018) describes antisemitism largely as a form of racial bias. in addition, individual discretion inevitably plays a role in the categorisation process. one case from august 2013 4 no data was initially available for 2015. this data was provided later for the purposes of this study in a distinct format and with less detail for some variables than data for the immediately preceding or following year. 5 other periods where no bias crime data was available are december 2007 and march-april 2014. 6 in some periods, data was still missing for core categories, such as offender motive. this required the study to make its own classifications drawing on information provided in the case summaries. remaining variables with sizeable missing data have either been excluded from the analysis or flagged as such. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 53 involved a group of suspects sitting near a sikh temple and throwing eggs at cars. when a priest from the temple tried to stop the suspects, they punched him in the head. this event was classified as a ‘suspected bias crime’ rather than a ‘bias crime’. while the categorising officer may have had ‘reasonable doubt’ that the event was partially motivated by bias, this is certainly a matter on which reasonable minds might differ. despite these limitations, police reports provide an invaluable source of information about patterns of bias crime, reporting practices and recording decisions. the current state of knowledge about bias crime in australia is largely limited to victimisation surveys and qualitative studies. the results of the present study build on this by providing official ‘evidence’ of the problem. results number of bias crime reports 2007-2017 between july 2007 and january 2017, a total of 2,467 reports were determined by the bcu to fit the criteria of a bias crime, suspected bias crime or bias incident (see definitions above). this represents an average of 34 reports per month (excluding missing months). of these, 760 (30.8%) were categorised as bias crime, 1058 (42.9%) as suspected bias crime and 649 (26.3%) as bias incidents (figure 1). several observations can be made about these reports of bias crime. first, 34 cases a month is not a large number. indeed, looking only at reports that meet the threshold of a criminal offence (excluding bias incidents), the average drops to 24.9 bias crimes or suspected bias crimes recorded across nsw each month. this is comparable to reports of bias crime made to victoria police, which averaged 22.5 reports per month between january 2000 and june 2014 (mason et al. 2017). second, the fact that a greater proportion of cases are categorised as suspected bias crime rather than bias crime suggests a shortage of evidence to support the 31% 43% 26% figure 1. bias crimes, suspected bias crimes and bias incidents nsw, july 2007-january 2017 bias crimes: evidence beyond reasonable doubt suspected bias crimes: insufficient evidence but reasonable grounds bias incident: not a criminal offence 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 initial bias crime flag by the investigating officer. this raises questions about the capacity of frontline police to gather the necessary evidence to support the bias crime categorisation or to correctly identify bias crime. this is consistent with data from the study that shows that a high proportion of events initially flagged by frontline officers as bias crime were subsequently determined by the bcu to not be bias motivated. such data was available for 2013 and 2015, where 26.9% and 40.1% of recorded cases respectively were evaluated by the bcu to be misidentified. this is a high rate of misidentification and supports existing research which points to the need for sustained training and guidance for operational police (miles-johnson and pickering 2018). it was also observed that the proportion of bias incidents gradually increased between 2007 and 2017, while proportions of bias crimes and suspected bias crimes fluctuated considerably. it is unclear whether this trend is due to actual changes in victimisation, changes in reporting by victims or changes in recording by frontline police officers (eg: victims may have become increasing prepared to report and police increasingly prepared to record minor incidents that do not meet the minimum threshold for a criminal prosecution). the 2007-2017 data is important because it shows the frequency of bias crime reports over a period of almost ten years. however, as explained above, the 2013-2016 data subset is more consistent and comprehensive, enabling analysis of the characteristics of these reports. a total of 1,050 cases between july 2013 and june 2016 were assessed by the bcu as amounting to a bias crime (22%), suspected bias crime (40%) or bias incident (37%). the subsequent sections of this article analyse this 2013-2016 data subset. type of bias motivation 2013-2016 of all 1,050 cases recorded as a bias crime, suspected bias crime or bias incident in the threeyear period from july 2013 to june 2016, 44% were categorised by the bcu as motivated by religious bias, 37% by racial/ethnic bias and 14% by bias towards the victim’s sexual orientation/gender identity (figure 2). other categories of motive recorded by the bcu include disability, age and politics. however, these types of bias were identified in very few cases. events determined by the bcu to be motivated by religious bias (44%) were the most common during this period. an example of a religiously motivated event involved a public school that received harassing messages on its facebook page in april 2016. the messages asked if there was ‘an influx of illegal refugees’ enrolling as students, if they held ‘aussie values’, and if they promoted ‘rape, beheading, child marriage and other aspects of sharia law’. events determined to be motivated by race/ethnic bias (37%) were the second most common. two examples taken from the case summaries serve to illustrate this type of bias crime. in one case from september 2013, a suspect shouted ‘go back to your own country this is my country bitch go back to where you came from’, before throwing the victim’s phone on the ground, kicking her and attempting to punch her. in another case from march 2016, asian victims reported having equipment stolen from their business in circumstances cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 55 where the suspect stated that they deserved to be robbed because asians were ‘monkeys’ stealing australian jobs. bias towards the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity represented the third largest category. one example of such a complaint involved a victim who reported receiving a message on his windscreen saying things like ‘park somewhere else you dirty old faggot’ and ‘fuck off out of our neighbourhood. we're watching you now cocksucker. see you in the morning and will fuck your car’. race/ethnicity cases by victim’s race 2013-2016 data on the victim’s characteristics enabled the study to delve further into the kind of racial/ethnic bias reported to police. however, this analysis must be prefaced by some caveats. first, classifications of the victim’s race/ethnicity are those adopted by the nswpf. it is unclear how these categories are defined or distinguished 7. they evidence some problematic assumptions. for example, the concept of ‘middle eastern’ is not generally understood to represent a distinct racial or ethnic identity. second, this data does not prove the nature of the suspect’s racial bias but simply points to the kind of victim characteristic that the suspect may have targeted. of all racial/ethnically motivated cases over the 3-year period, the most commonlyreported victim race/ethnicity was asian (28%), followed by indian/pakistani (20%), middle eastern (14%) and white/european (13%) (figure 3). the data points to a gradual increase in cases involving middle eastern victims during the three-year period. 7 except for the category ‘other’, which the study created by grouping together some categories with very small values. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 race/ethnicity religion sex orient/gender identity age disability political mutliple motivations pe rc en ta ge figure 2. bias motivation, july 2013 june 2016 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 religion cases by victim religion 2013-2016 of all cases categorised by the bcu as motivated by religious bias over the 3-year period of the study, the most common victim religion was overwhelmingly muslim (73%), followed by jewish (14%), and christian (9%)8. the graph below (figure 4) compares the proportion of each recorded victim religion in all religion-motivated cases. 8 the nswpf data contains much more detailed categorisations of the victim’s religion. due to small values, some categories have been collapsed (eg: four categories of islam and five categories of christianity were grouped into one overall category for each). 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 pe rc en ta ge figure 3. racial/ethnic bias cases by victim race, july 2013 june 2016 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 muslim jewish christian other pe rc en ta ge figure 4. religion bias cases by victim religion, july 2013 june 2016 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 57 during the period under investigation, the data showed an increase of approximately 20% in religiously-motivated cases against muslim victims and a 20% decrease in christian victims. the high proportion of religiously motivated bias crimes recorded against muslim victims may reflect the high rate of islamophobia in the community (kamp et al. 2017). it may also reflect a higher reporting rate amongst muslim targets. for example, wellestablished avenues for reporting antisemitism to civil society organisations (executive council of australian jewry 2018) may mean that the jewish community is less likely to report incidents to the police unless they are severe. type of offence 2013-2016 from july 2013 to june 2016, the main offence types included assault (29%), street offences such as public verbal abuse (18%), property damage (16%), communications offences such as online harassment (12%) and intimidation/threats/harassment (10%) (figure 5)9. assault consistently remained the most common type of offence recorded throughout the three-year period. this is roughly consistent with bias crime data from victoria, where ‘crimes against the person’ are the main offence type recorded (mason et al. 2017). the type of offence differed depending on the type of biased motive. for example, assaults were the most common type of offence in racially motivated cases (38%) and sexual orientation/gender identity cases (40%). in some contrast, religiously-motivated offences were more evenly spread across offence types. the most common offence type for religiously-motivated offences were communications offences (21%), such as harassment via mail or social media, with assaults constituting 17% of cases. this pattern appears to reflect a solid body of incidents targeting religious institutions, such as mosques and synagogues, as well as individuals. 9 offences that did not match any of these categories were classified as ‘other’ (14%). 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 pe rc en ta ge figure 5. types of offence, july 2013 june 2016 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 victims 2013-2016 for those cases where victim gender was recorded, males (61%) were more likely to be targeted than females (29%)10. this pattern was consistent irrespective of the type of bias except for cases of sexual orientation/gender identity bias where 17% of the victims were transgender people (male-to-female). for those cases where victim age was recorded, the most common age was 30-65 years11. these demographic characteristics are comparable to the bias crime data from victoria, where men (63.4%) were much more likely than women to report bias crime and the most common age for victims was between 30 and 59 years (mason et al. 2017). suspects 2013-2016 very little reliable information about suspects was recorded in the files under analysis. however, one variable is worth noting. the bias crime data contained a category for events that were linked to organised hate groups. in only 31 of the 1,050 cases was there enough evidence for such a link to be recorded. these groups (eg: australian knights of st george, australian defence league and right wing resistance) were mostly linked to cases involving communications, harassment or property damage, for example where the offenders left text claiming the group’s responsibility. this data suggests that organised hate groups claim responsibility for only an insignificant proportion of events. region, location and situational factors 2013-2016 most reports of bias crime came from the metropolitan areas of the city of sydney, with less recorded cases in regional areas12. this geographical pattern is roughly consistent with the distribution of reports in the state of victoria (mason et al. 2017). notably, regional areas of nsw reported higher levels of racially-motivated cases and lower levels of religiouslymotivated cases than metropolitan areas. ‘public open areas’ were a common location for reports of assault (29.7%), intimidation/threats/harassment (17.1%), property damage (22.9%) and public order (33%) offences. however, retail areas and public transport also featured. property damage was also likely to be reported in a private residence (28.6%) or religious venue (20%). most cases occurred between 2pm-10pm (48%), followed by 6am2pm (32%) and lastly 10pm-6am (20%). discussion this study of bias crime data held by the nswpf provides the most comprehensive picture of the patterns of bias crime in australia to date. largely, the scholarly literature has been confined to victimisation surveys that compartmentalise the problem of bias crime to 10 victim gender was only recorded in 45.6% of cases. 11 victim age was only recorded in 40.5% of cases. 12 the regional breakdown is as follows: 29% in central metropolitan; 29% in south west metropolitan; 17% in north west metropolitan; 11% in northern region; 9% in southern region; and 5% in western region. religiously-motivated cases were particularly prevalent in the south west metropolitan region and sexual orientation/gender identity cases prevalent in the central metropolitan region. for detail on areas encompassed by the nswpf regional classifications see: https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/regions_local_area_commands https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/about_us/regions_local_area_commands cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 59 individual forms of prejudice, such as islamophobia or homophobia. the results of the present study fill a gap in this literature by enabling comparisons to be made between different forms of bias crime, particularly in terms of which types are more likely to be reported to police. in providing the first inter-jurisdictional comparison of bias crime data, the article reveals general patterns in the commission of bias crime across the two most populated states in australia, nsw and victoria. yet, it is important to acknowledge that there are limitations to the study. there were inconsistences and gaps in the data provided by the nswpf. where possible, these disparities have been ameliorated, for example by filling missing data with information available in the case summaries. remaining variables with sizeable missing data have either been excluded from the analysis or flagged as such. while differences in recording systems have made detailed comparisons with victorian data difficult, some macro-level observations have been possible. it must also be kept in mind that neat distinctions between different bias motivations fail to capture the complexity and ambiguity of negative inter-group attitudes. for instance, bias towards muslim australians is categorised here as a form of religious bias but in reality perpetrators may be driven by a cocktail of hostile attitudes around culture, heritage, language, skin colour, immigration, politics, terrorism and so on (poynting 2002; noble 2009; dunn et al. 2015; kamp et al. 2017). correctly identifying and categorising bias crime remains a persistent challenge for police (giannasi 2015; mason et al. 2017). the process of categorisation used by the bcu provides a level of confidence that each event initially flagged as bias crime by frontline officers has been further evaluated according to a set of established indicators. however, as noted earlier, some uncertainties and anomalies in the process of categorisation used by the bcu meant that accurate and consistent measurement of bias crime is still yet to be achieved in nsw. despite these limitations, the data has proven sufficiently robust to provide a picture of the patterns of bias crime victimisation as well as relations between police and vulnerable communities. the results of the present study validate existing victimisation studies that show that bias crime continues to be a problem in australia and one that is experienced primarily by minority groups. approximately one bias crime, suspected bias crime or bias incident is reported in nsw every day. although a fair proportion of these reports (26.3%) involve incidents that are unlikely to meet the threshold required for a criminal prosecution, such as verbal abuse, they provide a source of intelligence that police can draw on to identify potential hotspots and engage in proactive outreach with stakeholder communities. this is important in light of research that shows that even minor incidents can be devastating for minority communities who interpret them as a sign of risk and vulnerability (chakraborti and garland 2015). for example, many muslims in australia feel the need to constantly regulate their movements in public space in anticipation of potential threats (perry 2001; noble and poynting 2010). en masse, this can culminate in a ‘geography of power’ that dictates the safety of entire communities (haas institute 2017). the study provides a picture of the most common types of motive behind bias crime. together, crimes motivated by racial/ethnic or religious bias make up the clear majority (81%) of all bias crime reports to police. sexual orientation/gender identity bias is a distant 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 second (14%) while bias against disabled people is rarely recorded. although cases motivated by religious bias outnumber cases motivated by racial/ethnic bias, there is likely to be much overlap or conflation between the two. the exact motive for victimisation may not always have been obvious to the bcu, much less the suspect. for example, in a case from march 2016, the suspect asked the victim where he was from. the victim answered that he was pakistani. the suspect then hurled verbal abuse at the victim, saying ‘go back to your own country’ and ‘fucking terrorists’. this incident was classified as motivated by religious bias despite apparent overlap with racial bias as well. as discussed above, and as the category of ‘multiple motivations’ (4.5%) suggests, some suspects may be motivated by jumbled resentments and bigotry towards indistinct groups of ‘others’. it is notable, however, that the 2007-2017 data does show a gradual increase in reports of religious bias during this period. it is difficult to compare these patterns with those in the state of victoria, as very different classification systems are used. in general, however, racial, ethnic, cultural, religious and political bias also form the vast majority (76%) of bias crime reported to police in victoria, with reports of sexual orientation/gender identity (12.6%) at a rate comparable to nsw (mason et al. 2017). minority communities are over-represented as victims in this bias crime data. with regards to cases involving a racial/ethnic motivation, asian, indian/pakistani, and middle eastern people are all key targeted groups. this is consistent with research that shows that a proportion of australians hold negative attitudes towards people from the middle east (kamp et al. 2017). it also lends support to previous research documenting violence against ‘indian students’ (mason 2012; baas 2015). yet, the high rate of victimisation against asian australians is at odds with research which shows that asian australians tend to be viewed much more positively than some other minorities (kamp et al. 2017). hence, it is not clear whether asian australians do experience higher rates of victimisation or, instead, have greater confidence to report crime to the police (which could be the case for more established asian communities). muslim australians make up only 2.6% of the australian population (abs 2017c), but 73% of victims in the religiously-motivated cases in this study. this aligns with research showing both that muslim australians are consistently viewed in a negative light (markus 2016; kamp et al. 2017) and are at increased risk of violence and abuse since the 9/11 attacks (hreoc 2004). assault, property damage, street offences, harassment, and communications offences emerge as the main types of bias-motivated crimes in nsw. while some australian victimisation surveys and reports (ahrc 2015; executive council of australian jewry 2018) show harassment to be more common than physical violence, this is not reflected in the nswpf data. nor is it reflected in the victorian bias crime statistics, which also demonstrate a higher proportion of assaults (mason et al 2017). this is not surprising, given that victims are likely to interpret events involving physical violence as sufficiently serious to warrant police investigation (chakraborti and garland 2015). to some extent, the type of offence reported appears to be dependent on the type of bias motivation: victims in anti-lgbti cases mostly experience assault; victims in raciallymotivated cases mostly experience assault and harassment; and cases involving a religious cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 61 bias include a wider range of offences. there is also a relationship between the type of bias motivation and the location of the event, with higher rates of racially motivated cases and lower rates of religiously motivated cases in regional areas. while this may reflect regional variation in the concentration of minorities and/or the distribution of racism in nsw (dunn and mcdonald 2001), it is difficult to be certain without more comprehensive analysis. religiously motivated cases are particularly prevalent in the south west metropolitan region of sydney. although this region contains pockets of significant muslim populations, prior research notes that young muslim people commonly face discrimination in some sections of this region (eg: sutherland shire) (itaoi 2016). cases related to sexual orientation and gender identity are particularly prevalent in areas of sydney that contain key entertainment and residential districts for members of the lgbti community (tomsen 2010). public areas are common locations for all forms of bias-motivated offending. the results of the study suggest that bias-motivated victimisation (or at least the reporting of it) is gendered to a significant degree, with men being over-represented as victims in these records. this is consistent with data from victoria (mason et al. 2017), indicating that this is not simply a demographic representation peculiar to nsw, but rather a broader pattern. although there was insufficient evidence to link organised hate groups directly to the majority of cases, this finding must be treated with caution. even where a suspect is an active member or a passive supporter of such a group, police may not have the evidence to attribute the commission of the offence to this group. just because no organised hate group claims credit for an event does not mean that an individual suspect has not been encouraged or incited by the rhetoric of such groups, particularly given their online influence (jakubowicz 2017). the study found that, on average, there are 34 reports of bias crime per month to the nswpf. on the one hand, this demonstrates that targeted communities in nsw are willing to report bias crime to police. on the other hand, it is likely that these reports are only the tip of the iceberg. international research comparing official reports of bias crime with victimisation studies demonstrates that bias crime is ‘massively under-reported and under-recorded’ (giannasi 2015, p. 332). drawing on a national probability sample, recent australian research also shows that bias crime is less likely to be reported to police than non-bias crime (wiedlitzka et al. 2018). there are many reasons people do not report crime to the police (eg: language barriers, feelings of shame, apathy or the failure to recognise the incident as a crime at all). to report a bias crime, a victim must be familiar with the concept itself, be able to identify that an offence against them is motivated by bias and be willing to communicate these suspicions to the police (wiedlitzka et al. 2015). the experience in victoria is illuminating on this point. despite the introduction of a dedicated bias crime policy by victoria police in 2011, a recent analysis of police data recorded between january 2000 and june 2014 found that the strategy had ‘little influence on reporting behaviour’ (mason et al. 2017, p. 128). drawing on focus groups with stakeholders from vulnerable communities in victoria and a survey of victoria police recruits, the research attributes this lack of impact to: poor community understanding of the meaning of bias crime; mistrust of police amongst 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 minority groups; and the failure of frontline officers to identify bias crime, despite dedicated training (mason et al. 2017; miles-johnson and pickering 2018). the present study suggests that there is also much work to be done before minority communities in nsw feel confident to report bias crime to police. police are the first point of contact for communities seeking recognition and support for victimisation based on their race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality or other forms of cultural difference. many of these communities have experienced discrimination or abuse at the hands of police (asquith 2012; poynting 2002). under-reporting of bias crime must be partly attributed to the lack of trust these communities place in police (murphy and cherney 2011; wiedlitzka et al. 2018) and, indeed, in agencies of state regulation generally. members of minority communities need to feel confident police will treat their reports of crime in a sympathetic and respectful manner (murphy and cherney 2011; wiedlitzka et al. 2018). the more symbiotic the relationship between police and a community, the more likely bias crime is to be reported (grattet & jenness 2008). yet, research suggests that members of minority communities are more confident to report victimisation to civil society organisations than to police (asquith 2012; chakraborti and garland 2015). in australia, platforms such as the online hate prevention institute, the islamophobia register and the executive council of australian jewry play indispensable roles in recording and documenting bias crime and abuse. this places civil society in a unique position to encourage targeted communities to report bias crime to police and strengthen police capacity to respond. for example, asquith (2012) advocates for third party reporting schemes where civil organisations act as facilitators and negotiators between police and vulnerable communities by allowing victims to report an event to the civil organisation, usually through an online portal, which then transmits the data to the relevant police service. this calls for police and community stakeholders to build strong and sustained partnerships. such partnerships have operated in the united kingdom for some years and provide a framework for dialogue with communities about the meaning of bias crime and the importance of reporting it. they also provide a framework for dialogue between community stakeholders and police. the results of the present study suggest that police capacity to correctly identify bias crime and gather supporting evidence is not strong (ie: rates of misidentification are high). civil society organisations can enhance understanding and cultural competency amongst police by contributing to specialist training programs (milesjohnson & pickering 2018) and advising police on how best to monitor and ameliorate anxiety about bias crime in their local communities. bias crime undermines cultural cohesion. it sends a message of exclusion and alienation that prevents minorities from ‘being at home’ (keynan 2017). police have a role to play in reducing this sense of alienation by delivering fair, respectful and equal service to all sectors of the community, irrespective of their cultural background. police hold the power to apply the label of bias crime (asquith 2012) and they produce the official picture of bias crime that governments rely on to develop policy and distribute resources. this picture needs to be as accurate and comprehensive as possible. this requires sustained partnerships between police and civil society. responsibility for initiating and sustaining these cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.1, 2019 63 partnerships rests with police. however, civil society must be prepared to meet them half way if the trust deficit that inhibits bias crime reporting and prevention is to be addressed. in this way, civil society can exert the kind of leverage on government that is necessary to bring about genuine and sustained change in bias crime policing. conclusion in theory, the nation state grants minorities ‘full and equal civil and cultural rights’ (keynan 2017, p. 29). yet, bias crime demonstrates that such rights ‘are not accompanied by genuine emotional and social acceptance’ from all (keynan 2017, p. 29). responsibility for documenting and recording bias crime in australia has largely fallen to civil society organisations and academics. this striking neglect on the part of many law enforcement agencies to monitor and measure bias crime can only be interpreted as indifference by governments across the country. this makes the small amount of bias crime data presented in this article all the more valuable. the picture of bias crime painted by the present study shows that crimes motivated by bias based on the victim’s race/ethnicity and religion are by far the most common types of bias crime reported in nsw. people from asian, indian/pakistani and muslim backgrounds are the most likely victims to report bias crime. the study also suggests that civil society has an important role to play in encouraging bias crime reporting amongst marginalised communities and contributing to the capacity of police to identify and accurately record bias crime. acknowledgements i would like to thank the bias crime unit of the nswpf for providing the data for this research and rachael stanic and jessica bi for research assistance. references asquith, n. 2004, ‘in terrorem: with their tanks and their bombs, and their bombs and their guns, in your head’, journal of sociology, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 400–416. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783304048383 asquith n. 2012, ‘vulnerability and the art of complaint making’ in bartkowiak-théron, i. and asquith, n (eds), policing vulnerability, the federation press, sydney, pp. 165180. australian bureau of statistics 2017a, cultural diversity in australia: 2016 census data summary, australian bureau of statistics, 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mazerolle l., fay-ramirez s. & miles-johnson t. 2018, ‘perceptions of police legitimacy and citizen decisions to report hate crime incidents in australia’, international journal for crime, justice and social democracy, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 91106. https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v7i2.489 http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6872-plebiscite-voters-who-say-homosexuality-is-immoral-march-2016-201606301142 http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6872-plebiscite-voters-who-say-homosexuality-is-immoral-march-2016-201606301142 https://doi.org/10.1177/0004865811405260 https://www.police.nsw.gov.au/crime/bias_crimes https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2010.513083 https://doi.org/10.1080/10345329.2002.12036246 https://doi.org/10.1350/ijps.2008.10.4.094 https://doi.org/10.5204/ijcjsd.v7i2.489 abstract keywords introduction cultural diversity, bias crime and policing in australia the research study results discussion conclusion acknowledgements references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 2 2018 © 2018 zofia kinowska and jan paulski. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: kinowska, z. and pakulski, j. 2018. polish migrants and organizations in australia. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 10(2), 29-41. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs. v10i2.6002 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed article polish migrants and organizations in australia zofia kinowska1 and jan pakulski2 1 institute of political studies, polish academy of sciences 2 university of tasmania corresponding author: zofia kinowska, institute of political studies, polish academy of sciences, polna 18/20, 00-625 warsaw, poland. kinowska@isppan.waw.pl doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6002 article history: received 16/04/2018; revised 20/05/2018; accepted 28/05/2018; published 25/07/2018 abstract the social profile and the organizational landscape of polish diaspora, known as ‘polonia’, in australia has been undergoing a significant change: sociodemographic (ageing), sociocultural (diversification) and sociopolitical (integration and assimilation). the ‘wave-type’ immigration (1947-56 and 1980-89), combined with the sudden decline in immigration after poland’s independence (1989) and accession to the eu (2004), resulted in the rapid shrinking, ageing and internal differentiation of the polish community. the pre-1989 ‘ethno-representative’ and ex-servicemen organisations have been withering away. the ‘culture preserving’ ethnic organizations, as well as religious/church groups also weaken, due to their shrinking demographic base. the australian ‘polonia’ is diversifying, as well as internally dividing, the latter process accelerated by widening political-ideological divisions in poland. under the impact of social diversification and globalization, and in the context of evolving multicultural policies in australia, new forms of organization and social activism emerge. interethnic, integrative and ‘bridging’ organizations and initiatives, anchored mainly in metropolitan social circles of melbourne and sydney, attract the most educated immigrants and their offspring and break the mould of ethnic exclusivity. next to traditional polish associations, multiplying senior clubs and still numerous polish schools there also appear some nationalistic groups, active mainly in social media. these general trends: numerical decline, ageing and diversification (combined with political divisions) reflect the changing conditions in the australian and polish societies, as well as the processes of migrant adaptation and integration. keywords australian polonia, ‘wave-type’ immigration, polish migrants in australia declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. 29 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6002 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6002 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6002 http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:kinowska@isppan.waw.pl http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6002 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 introduction polish-born immigrants-settlers in australia form a small and shrinking segment of a broader ‘polonia’ or ‘polish diaspora’ encompassing polish immigrants and their descendants often referred to as ‘the polish ethnic community’1. the australian ‘polonia’ has four interesting characteristics: • it has been formed mainly through the post-wwii (1945+) ‘wave-like’ migrations that strengthened the ethno-religious bonds and facilitated group or collective (rather than individual) adaptation and integration; • strong links with the homeland combined with intense politicisation and, more recently, political-partisan polarisation. due to the ‘political’ and crisis-triggered origins (the takeover of poland by the soviet-controlled communists, persecution of political dissidents and solidarity activists before 1989), and due to the cyclical political crises in poland, the australian polonia has been intensely politicized. most of polish immigrants still see themselves as a political diaspora, and many of them identify themselves as ‘refugees’ and ‘political immigrants’; • rapid ageing – a reflection of reorientation of polish migration after 1989, and especially after 2004, towards europe, as well as declining birth rates – and, finally, • social diversification and widening political division, again, in line with the rapid diversification of the post-communist polish society and with increasing political polarisation in poland during the last decade. all these distinctive characteristics – as well as the accompanying changes in organisational forms and identities – have to be seen in the context of the processes of demographic transition, social adaptation and integration and cultural assimilation, the latter most pronounced among the children of immigrants. the post-wwii (1947-56) wave of polish ex-servicemen, displaced persons (dps) and political exiles formed initially a socially cohesive, politically united and organisationally fecund ethnic communities. this cohesion – still quite strong among the older migrants – has been weakening with the inflow of the ‘solidarity immigrants’ in the 1980s, and with the ongoing social integration of the post-wwii immigrants and their children. in fact, this weakening-cum-diversification has been so strong, that the term ‘ethnic community’ should be used with caution in relation to today’s polish minority. while the number of polish-born immigrants shrinks, the young, australian-born members of the polish diaspora integrate and 1 the term ‘polish immigrants’ refers to australian residents born in poland, as well as those who were born of polish parents-refugees and displaced persons in exile. the post-wwii polish immigrants included persons who identified as ‘polish jews’, ‘polish ukrainians’ or just ‘jews’ and ‘ukrainians’ – hence the difficulties in estimating precise numbers. the term ‘australian polonia’ or ‘polish diaspora’ – like all socio-cultural (especially ethnic) categories – is also fairly imprecise. it refers to permanent residents of australia who are, and who describe themselves, as persons of polish descent and who remain attached to polish culture and traditions (e.g., speak polish) strongly enough to identify as members of polonia (e.g., markowski and kwapisz williams 2013, p.14). the concept of ‘ethnic community’ assumes a high level of internal cohesion. as argued below, the polish diaspora not only includes multiple ethnic ‘identifiers’, but also shrinks, diversifies socially and politically, thus becoming less and less cohesive and uniform in its identities and lifestyles. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 35 adopt hyphenated identities (e.g., ‘polish australian’ or ‘australian-polish’). they are better educated and skilled than their ageing parents; their interest in poland declines and changes into ‘ancestral’; and they seldom preserve a good command of polish – something regarded in the past as the ethnic ‘core value’ and main differential of polonia. there is also intense social, cultural and ideological differentiation within the polonia. independence-stressing, strongly religious (roman catholic) and socially conservative postwwii polish refugees distance themselves from more secular, pro-democratic and liberal polish immigrants from the ‘solidarity wave’. moreover, with the ‘solidarity consensus’2 rapidly evaporating in poland and among the polish migrants, intensely religious and anticommunist ethno-nationalists (narodowcy) separate themselves from more secular, cosmopolitan and pro-multicultural liberals and social-democrats. as a result, the formerly socially cohesive and politically united polonia gradually transforms into socially differentiated, politically diverse and loosely integrated ‘ethnic diaspora’. these general processes and trends are neither unusual nor unique for the polish diaspora. social and political differentiation and demographic shift are, in fact, typical of many ethnic minorities, especially those formed through wave-like migrations. migratory waves, as widely recognized and argued below, are conducive to creating socially distinct and internally homogeneous socio-political segments within migrant communities. such segments, in turn, sustain and enhance internal differentiation by spawning highly (and sharply) differentiated outlooks, identities and organisations. in order to describe and (at least partly) explain these general processes, we look briefly at the general social profiles of the two constitutive waves of polish immigration, chart the processes of immigrant adaptation and integration, comment on the progressive social and political differentiation, and, finally, outline the main changes in the organisational profiles of the australian polonia. polish immigrants in australia the most recent census (2016) lists 45,370 persons as born in poland. that is more than 13% decrease in 10 years. polish language, according to the 2016 census, is used at home by about 48,000 people that indicates the persistence of polish exiles born abroad – a category specific for ethnic diasporas experiencing political turbulences – as well as a high language retention within the australian polonia (e.g., smolicz 1988). the number of polish speakers is only 10% lower than 10 years ago (2006). polish ancestry, often in combination with other ethnic ancestry, is declared by about 180,000 australians, though we can only speculate about the link between this censusdeclared ancestry and ethnic identity. however, there is the obvious correlation between strong polish identity, polish birthplace and recent immigration. predictably, indications of polish ancestry as the first response fell by 2.5% in the last 10 years, while the declaration of 2 during the 1989 round table negotiations between the communist authorities and solidarity leaders both sides reached an agreement, often referred to as ‘solidarity consensus’ that paved the way for liberation and democratization in poland. 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 polish ancestry as the second response increased by over 37% – a typical process of ‘ancestral dilution’. as one could expect, a majority of those who declared polish ancestry as the second response are young people (new generation of polish immigrants) – 73% of those are under 50 years old (see table 1). table 1. australian residents of polish ancestry: census of population data number of people born in poland number of people who speak polish at home number of people with polish ancestry 1st response number of people with polish ancestry 2nd response 2006 52,254 53,391 103,484 60,318 2011 48,677 50,695 103,501 66,853 2016 45,370 48,080 100,818 83,153 data source: www.abs.gov.au the polish diaspora remains very religious but it is also secularizing fast. about 70% of polish-born australians declared their religious affiliation with western catholicism in 2016, which was a high percentage. but it is also 16% less than 10 years ago. moreover, the proportion of non-religious people has doubled, in line with other ethnic communities, and similar to the general population in australia, as well as general population of poland. as expected, the number and proportion of jewish poles have declined as a result of ageing, declining migration from poland, and the increasing migration of polish jews to israel (see table 2). table 2. major religious affiliations amongst poland-born australians catholic jewish secular beliefs and no religious affiliation number of people born in poland 2006 43,082 (86.7%) 2,872 (5.7%) 3,690 (7.4%) 49,644 2016 31,979 (70.4 %) 1,623 (3.5 %) 6,512 (14.3 %) 45,370 data source: www.abs.gov.au the high level of australian citizenship (85%) testifies to a generally high level of national and civic integration of the polish immigrants, though only less than 2/3 of polishborn australians speak english well or very well. their identity has also been changing rapidly. while the early immigrants often identified as ‘poles’ (or ‘polish exiles’) and harboured hopes of swift return to (liberated) poland, the more recent immigrants adopt more readily a hyphenated identity (‘polish-australians’ or ‘australian poles’) and they see themselves as ‘polish settlers’, who arrived with the intention of staying here for good. polish-born australians live most frequently in victoria, new south wales, western australia, and south australia, with a small, rapidly ageing, but still very well organized polonia in tasmania. the organizational life of polonia has been most advanced in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 37 melbourne and sydney, where the vast majority of polish-born persons and their descendants resided. the decreasing number of people born in poland reflects not only the declining immigration from poland but also the ageing of the australian polonia. with the eu accession (2004) and the schengen treaty (2007) the immigration from poland to distant australia was rapidly reduced, while migrations of poles to europe increased. during 200116 australia was accepting, on average, only about 300 polish immigrants per year. the rapid ageing follows the demographic trend affecting all immigrants from the post-wwii waves. in 2016 the average age of the poland-born persons was 58 years, compared with 45 years for all overseas-born and 37 years for the total australian population3. as expected, the most numerous cohorts are those over 55 years old (reflecting the arrival of the ‘solidarity wave’), while the school-age cohorts of polish-born are very small, and this means that polish schools are attended by the australian-born children of polish immigrants. this demographic profile reflects low fertility in the polish diaspora. a typical polishborn family in australia has less than 1.5 children – which is less than the national average of 1.8. this low fertility has many causes: the increasing prosperity, the unsettling and conception-delaying experience of migration, delayed marriages, and popularity of family planning. because of rapid ageing, polish immigrants have one of the most rapidly increasing proportion of retirees and pensioners, and – consequently – relatively low (and declining) incomes. ageing also means – as we mention below – the proliferation of senior clubs and welfare committees among polish organisations. but the high number of new retirees from the ‘solidarity wave’ (as reflected by the numerous cohorts 55+) also means that the australian polonia is likely to experience in the next decade a temporary (decade-long) boost in organisational membership and activism. this changing sociodemographic profile, as mentioned earlier, is a product of a specific ‘wave-like’4 immigration pattern; and to this pattern we must turn now. the two waves there have been numerous historical and sociological studies of the origins and formation of the australian polonia. the conclusions of these studies can be summarized in a few points. the pre-wwii immigration from poland was small and diverse, including mainly polish jews, protestant silesians, and largely orthodox ukrainians from the eastern provinces5. until 1947 there was practically no polish ethnic community in australia, though some 3 the median age was over 59, with 14% of polish-born persons over 75 years old, and 36% over 60. 4 this wave-like migration, one must add, is typical of polish migration in general. like ireland, poland spawned waves of mostly political migrants-refugees during every major political (typically accompanied by economic) crisis and upheaval. this is why migrants are seen at home – and identify themselves – as refugees, even if immediate motives of migration are economic. this specific ‘politicized’ identification, though, is seldom transmitted to the second generation of australian-born children. 5 in 19th century there were a number of polish travellers and explorers including the well-known pawel edmund strzelecki (a surveyor) and only a small polish settlement in polish hill river, which disappeared in 1914. 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 ephemeral ‘polish’ organisations and initiatives were noted by historians (e.g., paszkowski 1962)6. the post-wwii (1947-56) wave of polish soldiers-refugees, displaced persons, family reunion immigrants and few escapees from communist poland laid the foundation for a powerful and relatively ethnically (and religiously) homogeneous, strongly pro-independence and anti-communist polish diaspora. at its peak in the late 1950s and early 1960s it numbered at about 65-80,000 organized in ubiquitous polish associations, ex-servicemen organisations (spk and women auxiliaries), as well as the affiliated polish schools, folk singing/dancing ensembles, religious/church organisations and dozens of other organisational entities, many still active today7. the main function of these organisations was ethno-political and ethno-cultural representation. the early polish migrants formed effective ‘ethnic lobbies’, anti-communist political pressure groups and pro-welfare groups aiding social adaptation and cultural transmission (see e.g., zubrzycki 1988, pakulski 1988). adaptation of the early polish immigrants to the new life was difficult. they arrived well before multicultural policies changed australian institutions and the attitudes of ‘old australians’ towards non-british ‘new australians’. moreover, the post-wwii polish immigrants had limited social and cultural capital. they had, on average, low education – or a type of education that had limited application (job relevance) in post-war australia – and they seldom spoke good english. even if they did have professional education, skills and experience, these were not recognized in australia, thus forcing immigrants into frustrating occupational degradation and into low skill, mainly manual, jobs. moreover, most of the early (1947-8) polish immigrants were professional soldiers, or de facto professional soldiers who after nine years of war had minimal civilian skills. they also had minimal contacts outside their ethnic communities (except for military contacts through ex-servicemen associations and rota). finally, many were forced to sign 2-year contracts for manual labour as the condition of sponsored migration and had very restricted opportunities for upward occupational mobility. in spite of these challenges and difficulties, by the late 1950s the post-wwii polish migrants settled down successfully. soon they recognized their ‘refuge’ was not temporary, and that that they were to stay here for good. they started to create ethnic associations, clubs, schools, folk groups and churches, published polish journals, and started to transform from a migrant category and into a coherent immigrant community, with a rich, complex and strong 6 as noted by markowski and kwapisz williams (2013, p.18), ‘the census of 1921 provides the first official data concerning the number of people of polish origin living in australia. out of recorded 1780 persons, more than half arrived before the establishment of the common-wealth of australia in 1901 (harris, smolicz 1984, p.48). it is estimated that over 80 per cent of those arriving from poland in the 1920s were ethnically jewish (price 1964, p.361).’ 7 as noted by markowski and kwapisz williams (2013, p.19), ‘the federal council of polish associations in australia was established in 1950 and by 1991 it had 30 member organizations, grouping 200 smaller associations fulfilling numerous social, cultural and educational functions. although it is estimated that no more than 5 to 10 per cent of poles in australia participated actively in polish organizations (lencznarowicz 1994, p.402), numerous associations, foundations and societies offered diverse forms of social and cultural engagement, organizing festivals of polish culture, establishing theatres and cabarets, folk dance groups and sport clubs, and publishing a weekly polish language.’ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 39 organisational structure (sussex and zubrzycki 1985; lencznarowicz 1994; markowski, kwapisz williams 2013; włodarczak 2005). the solidarity movement that started in poland in 1980, triggered a deep crisis, and ultimately defeated the communist regime. it resulted in a mass out-migration of nearly one million poles, about 20,000 of whom came to australia. these new polish immigrants differed considerably from their post-war predecessors. the ‘solidarity wave’ consisted mainly of young, educated families. they were ambitious and career-oriented immigrants, and they pursued both skilled manual, as well as white collar and professional employment and careers. above all, the ‘solidarity wave’ immigrants sought freedom and prosperity, and they integrated fast. they also represented a much broader spectrum of orientations, beliefs and lifestyles than the older immigrants8. the new polish immigrants experienced a sudden liberation and democratisation of their homeland. poland unexpectedly re-gained both freedom and democracy in 1989. soon, it became the champion in post-communist transformation, a nato member and a part of the enlarged eu. polish migrants turned rapidly from condemned-at-home refugees into a proud polonia, whose members were admired abroad and recognized as an integral part of the polish nation ‘at home’. with this strengthened connection came also political-ideological divisions, as well as a rapid enhancement of ‘political-ideological identity’. this identity embraced the notion of politically-motivated migration as an escape from the communist victimisation and persecution. the new polish migrants harboured a sense of political mission: informing others about the communist oppression, even if this oppression has ceased. they also developed a sense of victimhood, a view of migration as a sacrifice, even when they succeeded in their new lives and careers. from adaptation to integration the first stage of immigration and settlement in new country is often described as adaptation, that is, the initial social adjustment to the new life in the new environment. the early polish immigrants experienced an unsettling and often traumatic social adaptation via the resettling/refugee camps, the famous ‘silver cities’. but they longed for normal life, for regular jobs, families, own houses and settled communities. to fulfil these dreams, they had to create their own adaptive networks, hence the tendency to form self-supporting, often closed and exclusive, ethnic networks and communities. the internal bonds of ethnic solidarity grew strong, and with them developed a high degree of political consensus and ideological-cum-religious unity and cohesion. the typical organisational forms emerging in this stage were territorial polish associations and clubs, often in close proximity to polish churches9, the ubiquitous ex-servicemen associations (spk and rota), polish 8 the similar differentiation could also be found in the solidarity movement. see also jupp (1988), sussex and zubrzycki (1985), pakulski and markowski (2004). 9 since there were no ethnic parishes, most poles congregated around the ‘share’ churches where polish services were offered regularly by the well-entrenched polish priests. many of those priests played the key role in establishing polish organizations and in sustaining strong ethno-religious bonds of solidarity. 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 saturday/sunday schools, and polish folk groups, mainly music, dancing and singing ensembles. these organisations reflected not only the adaptive needs but also the strong patriotic, pro-independence ethos and identity. the early polish immigrants treated migration as a refuge from communist-dominated poland. therefore, the aims of the early polish organisations combined the adaptive concerns with a drive to sustain polish cultural values, religion, language and national traditions – all of them seen as threatened at home. they regarded migrant communities as repositories of the polish culture. they considered their war experiences as ‘witnessing’ of suffering and sacrifice of all poles. they also publicized the injustice of the post-war ‘yalta order’ that left poland – a faithful and loyal ally of the western powers – at the mercy of stalin and his communist servants. intense anticommunism, patriotism and religiosity (which often identified closely catholic faith with polishness) constituted the unifying ideological basis of the emerging polish organisations and communities (zubrzycki 1988). the later polish immigrants (1980+) did not experience adaptive problems of such magnitude – and never achieved such a high level of unity. they did compete for scarce jobs in australia in the early 1980s (following the 1982 recession), but they had an advantage of coming to the already multicultural, migrant-friendly australia. most of the new arrivals enjoyed numerous government-provided adaptive and integrative facilitations (language tutoring, skill upgrading, etc.), used assistance of multicultural ngos, and benefited from wide assistance by their co-nationals organized in dozens of well-functioning polish organisations. their children could attend the already established polish schools and cultural organisations. this better start enjoyed by the ‘solidarity immigrants’ sometimes caused some social friction, a sense of envy-cum-resentment on the part of the ‘early immigrants’ who considered the more recent polish immigrants as privileged10. the new arrivals were privileged by circumstances – and they were typically more successful than their predecessors in adapting to the new environment and integrating with the australian society. moreover, they also had an escape route – if they failed in adaptation and integration, they could always return to poland, where living conditions started to improve very rapidly following the reforms introduced by the solidarity governments in the 1990s. therefore, their integration was faster and more comprehensive: they were getting career jobs, joined political organisations and participated in the anglo-australian cultural activities. many promptly naturalized, embraced an australian (often hyphenated) identity, usually supplemented by the proudly declared ‘polish ancestry’ – the ancestry associated with widely admired solidarity movement and its nobel prize winning leader, lech wałesa. such a swift and successful integration was also found among some early polish immigrants, but it was more typical of their children and grandchildren, as well as the solidarity wave arrivals. 10 one must stress that not all polish organizations welcomed the ‘solidarity poles’. some conservative leaders of polish organizations were deeply suspicious of new immigrants and treated them as ‘tainted’ by their allegedly ‘communist upbringings’ and (liberal-democratic) ideological preferences. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 41 the changing polonia and its organizational landscape the organizational landscape of the australian polonia reflects these trends and regularities. the number of polish ethnic organizations – that grew rapidly in the post-war decades – started to decrease in the late 1980s. between 1986 and 2012 alone, the number of active organizations in the polish community dropped by about 50-70%11 . the ‘solidarity wave’ polish immigrants were ‘joiners’, rather than ‘organizers’. they were more interested in swift economic adaptation and social integration than in creating new ethnic organizations. only when their children started to grow and reach the schooling age, they joined the older generation in organizing polish schools and some culture-preservationcum-transmission groups. according to estimates, only some 0.5% of all polish immigrants of the 1980s engaged in public activity in australia (pleskot 2014, p. 87). this downward trend seems to have slowed over the last 5 years, possibly due to the inflow of polish retirees into the ranks of polish organizations. the most affected by this organizational depletion are ex-servicemen associations, regional polish associations and formerly ubiquitous polish clubs. interestingly, there are also newly formed groups and initiatives, such as proliferating senior clubs and welfare committees, as well as more openly political groups, some of which are visible mainly (if not exclusively) in/through the social media and the internet. one must stress that some of the traditional ethnic-representative organizations, now run by the second generation and the retired immigrants, still persist and operate. there is a vibrant federal council (rada naczelna) of australian polonia12, as well as some state-based federations of polish organizations. there are numerous local polish associations, as well as multiplying polish seniors’ clubs and welfare committees. but, invariably, the ethnicrepresentative organizations find it difficult to attract new members, especially from the new generation of children (and grandchildren) of polish immigrants. the current (2017) organizational landscape of australian polonia reflects these sociodemographic trends. let us start by looking at the overall number of ‘polish ethnic organizations’. the web lists between 100 (the national council) and 200 (consulate general) such organizations, ranging from the regional polish associations (25) and polish houses (16) to rapidly proliferating polish senior clubs (40), as well as diverse cultural 11 a list prepared by pakulski and czernkowski during 1984-86 contained over 210 active polish community organizations in australia (pakulski and czernkowski 1986). but it was an incomplete list, restricted to mainstream ‘polonia organizations’, that is, polish associations, clubs and their ‘organizational supplements’. the comparable more recent list (directory of polish organizations 2012) available on the internet shows only 16 polish community organizations, four newspapers and schools, eight folklore groups and two scout organizations. this is also an incomplete list. the inventory published by the federal council mentions some 70 active polish community organizations, but it is also partly incomplete (the nsw organizations are largely missing, probably due to the absence of federation website. the lists published by the polish consulate general in sydney are more comprehensive, but they are seldom verified, and may contain many ‘dead souls’. a more detailed survey of polish organizations in tasmania conducted by jan pakulski shows a rapid decline from nearly 30 organizations (24 in hobart) in the early 1980s to less than 10 in 2018. 12 according to the calculations by the president of federal council currently it includes some 24-26 polish organizations (some of them are federations) with some 5 thousand members. this represents approximately 8% of all australians born in poland (or polish refugee families). 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 groups (26) and initiatives (8). the current president of the national council of polish organizations in australia estimates the number of active polish organizations at 161. they include relatively new ‘bridging’ organizations/initiatives/groups promoting polishaustralian economic and cultural collaboration, whose number ranges from 6 to 12, depending on the classification criteria. they are not exclusively polish in their membership and focus, so their number is difficult to establish, but almost all of them are very successful in their respective fields of activity. a good example of such a relatively new (though now defunct) integrative initiativecum-organization was help poland live (hpl). it aimed at aiding poles at home during the economically disastrous 1980s. hpl proved a great success in both mustering economic aid for impoverished poland (estimated at about 3 million dollars), and in integrating polish immigrants, as well as many australian supporters. another example of such ‘bridging’ (polish-australian) organizations is polcul foundation, currently renamed jerzy boniecki polcul foundation. it collected multi-million dollar funds in australia and granted over 1600 financial awards, initially (1980-89) to polish pro-democratic dissidents and solidarity activists, and then (1990+) to philanthropic activists in poland. australian ‘polculs’ (known also as ‘kangaroos’), have been playing a very important role in pro-democratic transformations in poland, as acknowledged by all free polish governments. it still operates successfully and enjoys a patronage of the australian government. one should also mention the australian institute of polish affairs, known as aipa. the member-funded institute, established in 1991 by the most prominent members of the ‘old’ (post-wwii) and ‘new’ polish immigrants, is not only ‘bridging’ but also ‘trans-ethnic’. it accepts non-polish members and conducts its affairs in english. its aims include strengthening the relations between the two nations (poland and australia), publicizing the achievements of the polish post-communist transformation, and conducting polish-jewish dialogue13. aipa’s activities – in australia and poland – represent a specific form of public diplomacy in the ‘transnational public domain’. over two dozen distinguished polish guests were invited by aipa to australia and ‘networked’ with the members of australian political, cultural and economic elites. at the same time, the institute organizes public lectures, academic symposia involving prominent australians, and book launches in poland. conclusions the australian polonia is ageing, shrinking in size and rapidly differentiating – some would say ‘normalizing’. the organizational ‘core’ of the australian polonia, increasingly managed by children of polish immigrants, still presents a united front in cultural and social debates by avoiding conflicts and carefully bracketing political and generational differences. but more recently polonia started to show signs of growing division that mirror the divisions in polish society. the new sources of this division are located ‘at home’, in poland, where the new 13 aipa is too universalistic to be called an ‘ethnic organization’. yet it attracts people who are interested in poland and polish-australian relations, maintains very good contacts with the australian and polish cultural, media, economic and political elites, and, above all, is very active organizing regular promotion events both in australia and in poland. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 43 right-nationalist government is taking an ‘illiberal turn’. the public and social media – increasingly global and accessible – disseminate the division worldwide. the traditional ethnic organizations formed by the post-wwii immigrants – polish associations, ex-servicemen organizations, polish saturday schools, and church groups – are either withering away or changing their functions. they are turning gradually into senior clubs and de facto ethnic ‘welfare committees’ that direct voluntary help and state-sponsored assistance to ageing polish immigrants. there are also well-functioning polish associations, as well as polish schools and some cultural groups (typically folk dancing groups), but their number and membership are dwindling. the ‘solidarity wave’ has stimulated these ethnorepresentative and culture-sustaining organizations, but the impetus seems to be reaching its end. the australian polonia changes gradually from immigrant community into ‘people of polish ancestry’ and this trend is likely to continue in the absence of renewed mass migration from poland. people of polish ancestry develop hyphenated identities (‘polish-australian’) that tend to grow stronger when poland enjoys a good reputation, and that dwindle when poland’s the international reputation suffers setbacks. polish organizations are likely to continue their transformation from ethno-specific (particularistic) towards more universalistic, ‘transcultural’ or ‘bridging’. the traditional ‘ethno-representative’ organizations, such as regional polish associations, as well as the ethno-religious organizations (church committees, rosary circles, etc.) are likely to gradually wither away, due to a rapid secularization and differentiation of polonia. equally uncertain is the future of polish schools and folk groups. all ethnic schools, for example, face not only escalating costs and shrinking subsidies, but also a growing competition from webbased courses that are cheap and accessible. one may also mention a growing impact of proliferating and widely accessible in-country courses in poland. such courses prove very attractive to young australians with polish ancestry, and they become more accessible due to grants and declining cost of long-distance travel. the most rapidly growing polish ethnic organizations in australia in the first decade of the 21st century are various senior clubs and welfare committees catering for ageing and ailing polish immigrants. this high demand for ethnically-specific old-age services, however, is likely to decline due to the demographic trends. by contrast, the general ‘bridging’ organizations prosper, and look robust. obviously, their future success is conditional on the ability of their leaders to negotiate a shift from hierarchical ‘ethno-representative’ bodies to more horizontal ‘partnership-collaborative’, ‘bridging’ and ethnically plural bodies. 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 references besemeres, j. 1988, ‘the conditions of poland’, in jupp j. 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(eds.) 1985, polish people and culture in australia, department of demography, institute of advanced studies, australian national university, canberra. włodarczak, k. 2005, proces adaptacji współczesnych emigrantów polskich do życia w australii, cmr working papers 3/61, centre of migration research, university of warsaw, warsaw, poland. zubrzycki, j. 1988, soldiers and peasants: the sociology of polish migration. orbis books, london. zubrzycki, j. and gilson, m. 1967, the foreign-language press in australia, 1848-1964, australian national university press, canberra, australia. https://doi.org/10.2307/3002629 zubrzycki, j. 1964, settlers of the latrobe valley, australian national university press, canberra, australia. https://doi.org/10.2307/3002926 https://doi.org/10.2307/3002629 https://doi.org/10.2307/3002926 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 this page intentionally blank 6002-article text-27605-2-10-20180726.pdf 6002-article text-27605-2-10-20180726.pdf abstract keywords introduction polish immigrants in australia the two waves from adaptation to integration the changing polonia and its organizational landscape conclusions references james goodman, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney; wahid razi, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney. corresponding author: james.goodman@uts.edu.au issn: 1837-5391; https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia © 2016 james goodman, wahid razi. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: cosmopolitan civil societies journal 2016, 8(3): http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5313 . afghanistan: military occupation and ethnocracy james goodman wahid razi university of technology sydney abstract the 2001 invasion and subsequent occupation consolidated ethnicity as a political force in afghanistan. interethnic elite bargaining instituted an ethnocratic oligarchy, grounded in the occupation. against this, everyday politics in afghanistan has centred on social clientelism, founded on kinship networks rather than ethnicity. at the same time, formal political structures, expressed in the 2004 constitution, are grounded in islam and nationalist statehood rather than ethnicity. in recent years sharp disjunctures have emerged between ethnic elites and would-be constituents, creating some electoral fluidity and ethnic de-alignment. the paper addresses the relationship between occupation and ethnocracy in afghanistan. it takes an historical perspective on the present, debating contending foundations for political solidarity and identification in the country. afghanistan is an illustrative case of all the three aspects of ethnocracy identified in the opening article to this special issue of cosmopolitan civil societies journal. first, the country is an artefact of imperial rivalry, initially as a buffer between british and russian spheres of influence, and latterly as a stake in the cold war us-soviet rivalry. it became a us protectorate in 2001, and since 2014 has become autonomous, but remains a site of political intervention for regional powers. second, it is currently an ostensibly post-conflict society, where the political process centres on overcoming insurgency and reconciling former rivals. under the 2004 constitution inter-ethnic conflict is subsumed in an effort at establishing multi-ethnic political solidarity through religion and nationalism. in practice though, afghanistan’s post-conflict politics has strong power-sharing aspects, centring on informal structures of ethno-military parity. third, the politics of afghanistan is grounded in forms of religious solidarity. all law is to be consistent with islam, defined as a civic responsibility, with provision for different sects and for non-islamic faiths. the 2001 invasion, occupation, and subsequent anti-taliban war have created a strong pressure to ethnocratic rule in afghanistan. the logic of alliance-building and countermailto:james.goodman@uts.edu.au https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v8i3.5313 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 169 insurgency after the 2001 invasion forced a heavy reliance on ethnically-defined militia groups. yet, ethnocracy, defined as rule by the dominant ethnic group, albeit in alliance with subordinates, does not align well with afghan political traditions. the identity of the afghan state has historically centred on an interaction between regional or tribal solidarity, nationalism and islam, rather than ethnicity per se. this article discusses the interaction between these forms of solidarity in afghan history. it offers a brief history of ethno-national politics in the country, and discusses other forms of socio-political solidarity centred on clientelism and kinship networks. it outlines the ethnicisation of elite politics during the occupation, as the military alliance introduced an informal model of inter-ethnic powersharing into the workings of the afghan state. in its final sections, the article assesses postoccupation political dynamics, beyond ethnicisation. it argues that pressure for inter-ethnic bargaining and for non-ethnic political contention appears to be strengthening in the context of a would-be pluralist state, as defined by the 2004 afghan constitution, and with the formal end of the us occupation. the article ends by assessing possibilities for ethno-political dealignment, for enabling political contention within a broadly nationalist and islamic political field. afghanistan and empire whilst never colonised, afghanistan is an artefact of imperial rivalry. this is a critical factor in understanding its prospects. in the first instance, imperial power defined its territory. with the british failure to incorporate afghanistan by invasion, the eastern border of afghanistan defined the limit of the british empire in the nineteenth century. british efforts focused on delimiting the state through territorial acquisition. the eventual loss of eastern territory from afghanistan to british india was defined in a one-page document in 1893 that established the ‘durand line’ (biswas 2013). nineteenth century british-russian rivalry was mirrored in the 1970s and 80s with the pakistan-us alliance against the soviet backed afghan government. a soviet military guarantee for the afghan government in 1978 enabled the us to lure the soviets to ‘into the afghan trap’, to ‘give the ussr its vietnam war’ (as brzezinski, president carter national security advisor put it; see gibbs 2000). the effect of this was to create a decade-long civil war, in which the us armed warlords and islamists (which later rebounded on the us with the formation of al qaeda). the assumption that foreign policy manipulations could only have consequences for the people living in those contexts was rudely shattered. the ensuing war on terror very clearly demonstrated the extent to which 170 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 the us and its allies were threatened by al qaeda insurgency (goodman 2013). the unsanctioned goal of rooting-out governments hosting al qaeda or groups deemed to be its associates was interpreted by the us as a green light to invade taliban-held afghanistan, and led to a more-than decade-long us occupation of the country (williamson 2001). this brought the us and its allies into new state-building roles in afghanistan, and the country has remained highly internationalised. again the future of afghanistan sits at the centre of global empire – its future circumscribed by external forces. not least among these is pakistan, which was rehabilitated as a us partner in the war on the taliban; concerns about military dictatorship and nuclear proliferation were set aside, and even the ongoing collaboration between elements of the pakistani state and the taliban was overlooked. in the process, a neighbouring country that has a strong interest in a weakened afghan state has gained an important role in influencing the future of the country (fair and gregory 2013; maley 2016). pakistan, in fact, may exercise a veto power on state stability in afghanistan. since 2005 these issues have been brought into sharp focus with the growing power of the taliban, which has repositioned itself as a national liberation movement at war with the occupying forces, and their appointees (kamel 2015). reflecting this, the afghan government opened negotiations with the taliban for the transition to us withdrawal in 2014. a key element of this was recognition of de facto taliban control over large segments of the country. the taliban continues to strengthen its hand by alternating between political violence and negotiations, and this has persisted since the 2014 us withdrawal, partly driven by external interests (maley 2016). a brief ethno-political history as a crossroad between different civilisations connecting east, south, west and central asia, the afghan region has been a melting pot of many ethnic groups who came to the country as invaders or settlers during the pre-modern era. these groups included aryans, persians, arabs, turkish-speaking people from central asia, people from mongolia, the xinjiang region of western china and ancient macedonia. according to archaeological discoveries in the north and south of the country, in about 1500 b.c., the aryans invaded the land which is known today as afghanistan. in the mid-500s b.c., persians invaded northern afghanistan, a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 171 region then called bactria. the persians ruled bactria until about 330 b.c., when the greeks and macedonians led by alexander the great conquered the region and much of the rest of afghanistan. in about 246 b.c, the bactrians formed a kingdom that lasted about 150 years, until the kushans of central asia seized the whole region (holt 2012). sasanians from persia invaded afghanistan in the 200 a.d., and white huns from central asia defeated the kushans and sasanians in the a.d. 400s. the region became part of the arab muslim world in the late 600s, with the muslim dynasties of tahirid, samanid, and saffarid to the 900s. turkic-speaking peoples from eastern persia and central asia ruled afghanistan from about 900 to 1200, and afghanistan was conquered by mongols, led by genghis khan in the 1200s and by timur, also called tamerlane, in the 1300s. safavids from persia and mughals from india struggled for control of afghanistan from the mid-1500s to the early 1700s. by the eighteenth century the country had become a site of geopolitical tension between persia and india, shaping migration flows, settlement patterns and affiliations. modern afghanistan emerged under the persian empire in the mid eighteenth century, with kabul as its capital from 1775. internal conflict between the ruling tribal elites culminated in the rise of dost muhammad khan, a tribal leader, who gained control as amir (prince) in 1826. dost muhammad's descendants then ruled the country for the next 150 years (axworthy 2009; barfield 2010). during the nineteenth century afghanistan became a competing ground for geopolitical influence between the british and russian empires (fremont-barnes 2014). russia invaded large parts of central asia, including the northern parts of afghanistan, seeking access to the indian ocean (tripodi 2010). trying to insulate colonial india, british troops invaded afghanistan in 1839, and were defeated, withdrawing in 1842. with russian advances into central asia, the afghan amir signed a friendship treaty with the russians, precipitating a second british invasion in 1878. afghanistan became a protectorate of the british empire in 1880 under a treaty assigning control of the country’s external relations to the british, and later, in 1893 the amir recognised the ‘durand line’ which consigned half of the country’s territory, and half of its pashtun population, to british india, and rendered afghanistan landlocked (balaachandar 2010). in the early twentieth century afghanistan embarked on its own national development program. in 1919 the amir precipitated the third anglo-afghan war, which ended 172 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 afghanistan’s protectorate status, allowing the country to become fully independent. the constitution was drawn up in 1923, based on the french model, and the amir (now king amanullah khan), sought to westernise the country, including the adoption of a european dress code. the islamic authorities opposed the new dispensation, and in 1929 overthrew the king with the help of the army (and supported by the british) (hiro 1995). within the year a new king was installed, nadir shah, and the country was renamed the ‘islamic state of afghanistan’. the king was assassinated in 1933 and his son, zahir shah, ruled until 1973. in this forty years of political stability, 1933-73, afghanistan experienced some degree of modernisation, although the country remained one of the world’s least developed. the king introduced a constitutional monarchy under the 1964 constitution with free elections, allowing the formation of elected governments under the monarchy. during world war ii afghanistan was neutral, and in the cold war it was closely aligned with the soviet union. at the same time the united states developed close military ties with pakistan. in 1973 a former prime minister, daoud khan, staged a successful coup against zahir shah, installing a republican administration while the king was in italy (remarkably, the king was to return to the country to legitimise the transition of power after the us invasion in 2002, and died in 2007). daoud khan was ousted in 1978 in a military coup led by the marxistleninist ‘people’s democratic party of afghanistan’ (pdpa) (rubin 1995; dimitrakis 2013). once in power, divisions in the pdpa started to emerge, mainly between the urban elite and more radicalised rural cadres with strong links into the military. fearing the collapse of the regime, the soviet union signed a treaty of friendship with the government in 1978, guaranteeing military assistance in the event of a threat to the country’s territorial integrity (krivosheev 1997). the regime became further destabilised with the forceful transfer of power from one faction to another, and was increasingly threatened by hostile forces internally and on the pakistan border (khan 2011). the soviet state bolstered the regime, sending ministerial appointees and military advisors, and at the end of 1979 several thousands of troops were sent as direct military ‘assistance’. a new more pro-soviet president, babrak karmal, was installed after the incumbent was finally killed (hassan 1995). the soviet-backed regime sought to align socialism with islamic social justice, using russian financial aid to extend social services. however, the presence of over 120,000 russian troops in afghanistan inflamed nationalistic sentiments, and forceful resistance was unified into the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 173 afghan ‘mujahideen’, backed by the pakistan state. the ensuing nationalist war displaced more than six million afghans into surrounding countries. from 1985, under mikhail gorbachev, the soviets encouraged power sharing with the ‘mujahideen’ and in 1986 installed muhammad najibullah as pdpa president to negotiate a truce and put in place a new constitution. this was to allow the soviet forces to be withdrawn, which they were in 1989 (kaplan 2001). the constitution was revised in 1990 to remove references to communism, re-founding afghanistan as a ‘unitary and islamic state’, and najibullah remained in power until 1992 when russian aid ceased. his execution in 1996, after four years of civil war, announced the arrival of the taliban regime. in his in-depth study of the russian occupation and the civil war period, sharma suggests a transition from ideological politics to identity politics, directly linked to militarisation (sharma 2017). in this he highlights how ethno-regional identity was mobilised against the russian invasion and then later used a resource against political islam, in part through external proxy-formation. this legacy directly shaped elite-formation post-2001. the ethno-political history of afghanistan, to the rise of the taliban in 1996, demonstrates the country’s political lineage as a crossroads or meeting point between global ideologies of nationalism, liberalism and communism, in a local context embedded in islamic traditions and regionalist or tribal political formations. the polity has oscillated across combinations of nationalism and islam, with institutions variously centred on monarchical, democratic and theocratic power. the history sheds light on the current constitutional arrangements and institutional practice, which, initially centred on post-conflict clientelism and related ethnocratic institutional structures. the meaning of ethnicity in afghanistan the concept of ethnicity in dari, the dominant afghan language, is most closely expressed in the term ‘qawm’, which refers to a group of people who have a common ancestry, common language and culture, and a shared history and heritage. however, in afghanistan, more markedly than in many other places, the meaning of ethnicity is blurred and shaped by other forms of identification. as schetter observes, through the nineteenth century, ‘identities [were] derived from tribal origin, religious or sectarian belonging, social status and profession’, noting these ‘societal boundaries and group formation altered in place and time’ (schetter 2005a, p. 5). despite strong cross-border ethnic links, for instance for pashtuns into 174 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 pakistan, for tajiks in tajikistan, and uzbeks with uzbekistan, there has been no serious movement for secession or irredentism in afghanistan (unlike in other post-colonial contexts). regional powers have intervened to support ethnicised proxies, pakistan for pashtuns, iran for hazarras and tajiks, but this has not translated into an irredentist political project. afghan nationalism, in this respect, is dominant. despite the recent decades of military conflict, many people remain unaware of their presumed ethnic background and simply call themselves muslims without thinking about their ethnicity (schetter 2005a, p. 6). pashtuns are often said to be the biggest ethnic group in afghanistan, at approximately forty to sixty per cent of the population. yet pashtuns are highly diverse, regionally, politically and culturally. while the pashtun language, pashto, is dominant, many pashtuns speak dari, which is the language of the tajiks, who are said to be the second largest group in the country. both languages are officially recognised, but there are more people speaking dari on a daily basis than pashto – and many pashtuns cannot speak pashto. the culture of ethnic groups is likewise highly diverse and syncretic. there has been much internal migration, inter-mixing and cultural exchange. there are elements of pashtun culture, for instance, which have been adopted by other groups in afghanistan. for example the pashtuns’ dance, attan, has become a national dance for all ethnic groups in afghanistan and the pashtuns have equally adopted elements of other cultures in the arts, food and language. certainly, since world war ii the country has been more influenced by european assumptions about political identity, but these were often constructed. there are claims, for instance, that some of the names for afghanistan’s ethnic groups were invented by european observers. schetter, for example, notes how ‘anthropologists such as schurmann invented ethnic groups such as the pashai, tajiks, mountain-tajiks or farsiwans’, creating the term tajik, ‘which was usually used in social interactions only in a negative sense for somebody who did not belong to any group but merely shared the belief in a common tradition, implied an anti-ethnic notion in general…’ (schetter 2005a, p. 5). reflecting this, regional and tribal affiliation is often a stronger market of identity: in afghanistan people often identify themselves by where they were born, a locality that they identify with, such as charikarie, kabuli, their tribes and clans such as barakzaie, alokzaie, or by their occupations. ethnicity is still not a primary category of everyday identity. if people do make reference to their ethnicity, it is often for the purpose of formally defining ancestry with the authorities. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 175 despite decades of conflict, it is significant that afghanistan has never ‘suffered from a secessionist movement, even though there have been serious conflicts between groups’ (adeney 2008, p. 539). the civil conflicts have hollowed-out national elites: the soviet invasion in 1979, with the subsequent civil war and eventual installation of the taliban in 1996, saw an exodus especially of urban middle classes into neighbouring refugee camps in iran and pakistan; 4 million people returned after the 2001 invasion, but, as noted, under occupation the country’s elites failed to generate economic autonomy and instead became increasingly orientated to international aid flows. as the security situation deteriorated from 2005, the exodus began again, increasing numbers to 3 million in pakistan alone (which announced mass forced repatriation in 2016; admadi and lakhani 2016). with ethnicity mobilised at the elite level, kinship is more central in everyday life. afghanistan has been in a state of war and conflict for decades, and during this time it is not ethnicity that has sustained communities. rather, it is been much more everyday structures of kinship and clientelism that have enabled survival: ‘informal social security systems have been of critical importance in afghanistan’ (schütte 2009, p. 479). family and kinship is the major means of support in the times of crisis, and offers a foundational form of identity, linked with regional and tribal affiliations. in a country where civil society and the state are weak, kinship governs the individual’s life and activities (wimmer and schetter 2003). in afghanistan when people refer to their family they generally mean their extended family, often across a kin-based network with several hundred members, linked through strong social and economic bonds (tapper 1991). kinship links with wider clientelist structures. these have their origins in the originally feudal system of arbab wa rayat, or ‘client and patron’. in this system, family or tribal leaders, landholders or employers, provide protection for the individuals that depend on them. such protection creates an obligation for the rayat or client, who must show their absolute loyalty to the arbab or patron, when required. there also more informal structures of community duty for the well-off. in most neighborhoods there are individuals who support their locality, as part of their religious observance. under the name of khairat or baraie khada (charity in the name of god or because of god), respected and wealthy members of a locality devote an amount of their daily income to the poorer members of their neighborhood. 176 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 with the breakdown of state authority and civil conflict since 1979 dependence on these systems of mutual obligation has spread, so that many afghans are now somehow connected a powerful patron. sharan argues these relations ‘characterise the daily politics of contemporary afghanistan… in which selective benefits are distributed to individuals or groups in exchange for loyalty or political support’; they then ‘link factional elites and their regional-ethnic or tribal clients to the state’ (sharan 2011, p. 1119). he characterises the postinvasion political settlement as centring on the accommodation and legitimation of ethnoregional elites, producing a heightened ethnicisation of politics. in the context of on-going military conflict, kinship, clan membership, tribal relations, religious obligation, local codes of honor and customary means of conflict resolution have become more important. as schetter argues, ‘the permanent conditions of war since 1979 did not impair the significance of family, but the increased insecurity strengthened the role of kinship and clientelism. distrust grew to such an extent that clientelism spread to almost every sphere of the afghan society’ (schetter 2005a, p. 10). in the cities informal sources of social obligation have been weaker, especially amongst those internally displaced by conflict, leaving ‘a deep sense of insecurity for the urban poor’, and approximately eighty per cent of the urban population relying on informal sources of livelihood and shelter. (schütte 2009, p. 479). informal clientelism as a social practice is distinct from state corruption, which is extensive and has deeply corrosive effects (braithwaite and wardak 2013). rangelov and theros found that the ‘system of governance gives rise to an acute sense of injustice among ordinary afghans, as they witness the contrast between their own deprivation and daily struggle for survival, and the growing wealth of a privileged group of officials and power brokers’ (rangelov and theros 2012, p. 236). state security is contracted to foreign security companies, which employ local sub-contractors, often former mujahidin commanders and warlords, who have the power to enforce bribery. funds are routinely exported: in 2011 us$4.6 billion of declared funds left afghanistan via kabul airport, an amount equivalent to the country’s entire state budget for that year (rangelov and theros 2012; see also shahrani 2015). another consequence of the decades-long internal conflict is the emergence of strong informal justice systems. this ‘legal pluralism’ reflects the lack of trust in an often corrupted cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 177 state, or simply the absence state of state authority (wimpelmann 2013). the rule of law established post-2001 has been set up in combination with tribal and islamic sources of legal authority. more or less institutionalised, informal justice varies across regions and population groups. afghan pashtuns, for instance, live under three regimes afghan law, the tribal rule of pashtun wali, and the islamic sharia – with community judges arguing all three are compatible. often considered the ideal type of informal justice is the image of the jirga (barth 1959; carter and connor 1989, 7; rzehak 2011). jirga is a pashto word for a purpose-specific gathering of entrusted men tasked to make a decision or resolve a dispute. through discussion, the representatives agree upon a settlement to restore honour, to which the parties are expected to adhere; women rarely participate and may themselves become part of the compensation package, a practice called baad (boesen 1983). since 2001 various efforts at reforming and formalizing these ‘hybrid’ arrangements have not been successful, forcing a continued pragmatic use of informal structures in the context of the on-going taliban insurgency (wimpelmann 2013). from warlordism to ethnocracy when global and regional powers intervene in afghanistan they have invariably assumed the existence of ethnic division. one example is tomsen’s account of us diplomacy in the region, which highlights great power manipulations in the country: in doing so it exposes assumptions about ethnic rivalry, especially in the immediate post-communist civil war (tomsen 2011). intervention, whether to favour one ethnic group over another, or to ‘manage’ inter-ethnic relations, preempts the possibility of other foundations for political solidarity, be they tribal, religious, regional or national. often external observers assume that ethnic groups have a clear and distinct identity, and read local conflicts as ethnic disputes. one journalist recently replicated the recurrent claim about afghans, that ‘historically when they haven’t been united fighting outsiders, they’ve been fighting each other’ (campbell 2013). certainly, political institutions are dominated by pashtuns. under the british empire, pashtun elites were favoured as a bulwark against russian influence: ‘pashtuns were privileged in all areas and dominated the military; tajiks were left with the economic sector and the educational institutions, whereas the hazaras were marginalised in general’ (schetter 2005a, p. 7). political power since the eighteenth century has almost exclusively been held by 178 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 pashtuns, and the creation of a pashtun state extending into pakistan has been pursued by the leadership, for instance under prime minister sardar muhammad daoud khan, 1953-1963. reflecting these legacies, political conflict is often attributed to pashtun domination, and assumes primordial ethnic identification. such accounts then drive policy, especially in relation to state-building efforts by the soviet union after 1979, and later under the us from 2001. consecutive soviet-aligned governments in kabul had warned people of foreigners’ plans to divide the country on ethnic lines. there was some degree of truth in this as both iran and pakistan had an interest in ethnicising the war, and funded ethnic proxies to achieve this (pstrusinska 1990). iran supported mainly hazaras, based on their religious connection, and the tajiks because of their language and cultural connection; pakistan supported pashtun groups because of their shared pashtun heritage. warlords themselves, seeing no other basis for their legitimacy, would assert ethnic leadership to convince foreign donors they had a broad constituency within afghanistan. the soviet union labeled the rebel groups as the agents of foreign countries aiming to divide afghanistan on ethnic lines. once again, there was some truth in this as many of the so-called mujahedin were in close association with foreign funders. with the soviet invasion, fear of ethnic conflict was commonplace: the regime attempted to de-ethnicise the state, but pashtun elites persisted (roy 1986). the collapse of the pdpa regime from 1992 led to civil war, but it was not a war between ethnic groups, rather between rival warlords and their respective militias (giustozzi 2012). during the civil war thousands of people lost their lives but ethnic groups kept relative peace with each other. the main ethnic victim of the civil war was the hazara shia minority, although anti-hazara attacks also reflected religious sectarianism. post-1996 the taliban regime was pashtun-led, and systematically repressed shia muslims and in particular the hazaras in a number of cities in afghanistan, on a sectarian basis. with the collapse of the taliban government and the u.s war in afghanistan in october 2001, there was once again speculation over the possibility of ethnic war. yet since 2001 there has been relatively little in the way of ethnic conflict, especially given the scale of dislocation and conflict in the country. ethnic displacement that had occurred in northern afghanistan under the taliban, in favour of pashtuns, was reversed, with the expulsion of an estimated 20,000 pashtuns from 2001 (schetter 2005b). another exception concerns a number of clashes between the nomadic pashtun tribes and hazaras around bamyan, reflecting intensified competition between the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 179 groups for access to water and land, and a range of sectarian anti-hazara attacks, including by taliban militants on hazara refugees in pakistan. the relative absence of ethnic conflict contrasts with the ethnicisation of state power. following the us invasion, the new architects of the state sought to unify the polity and publicly downplayed ethnic division. the international community, the united nations and supporting ngos sought to ensure that all ethnic groups would have a role in the political and social life of the country (wafayezade 2015, p. 15). in practice, though, state power was used to translate the power of contending militias into modes of ethnic leverage: power blocs were de-militarised, but also ethnicised. as schetter argues, ‘every afghan was assigned to a certain ethnic affiliation: the ‘uzbek dostum’, the ‘pashtun karzai’, the ‘tajik rabbani’ or the ‘pashtun zahir shah” (schetter 2005a, p. 10). the unsc resolution 1378, adopted on 14 november 2001, had defined the framework for the post-taliban administration, giving ‘strong support’ for a government that was ‘broadbased, multi-ethnic and fully representative of all the afghan people’ (un 2001). afghan allies of the us met at the international conference on afghanistan in bonn on 5 december 2001, selecting hamid karzai to head the afghan interim authority. the conference drew up an ‘agreement on provisional arrangements’ which stated the interim administration had to have ‘due regard to the ethnic, geographic and religious composition of afghanistan’. reflecting this, karzai’s cabinet was informally a form of power-sharing, composed of 11 pashtuns, 8 tajiks, 5 hazaras, 3 uzbeks, and 2 members of other ethnic groups. once installed in government as legitimate rulers, these ethno-military leaders then positioned themselves as ethnic representatives with a call on government posts (mukhopadhyay 2014). as outlined by ali, the breakdown was follows: ‘ahmad shah massoud's and burhanuddin rabbani’s northern alliance became today’s jamiat-eislami, a primarily tajik organisation. uzbeks organised under rashid dostum’s junbesh-e-milli. abdul ali mazari’s followers were now under the hazara hezb-e-wahdat. and pashtuns followed gulbuddin hekmatyar's hezb-e-islami… the mujahidin, the resistance who fought against the communist government, was fractioned into groups aligned to ethnicity as well. for instance, mainly tajiks followed ahmad shah massoud, hazaras were led by abdul ali mazari, uzbeks and turkmens were behind abdul rashid dostum, and pashtuns were with gulbuddin hekmatyar’ (ali 2015, p. 10). as discussed below, there was no necessary public consensus behind these 180 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 political blocs. many afghans actively oppose the leadership of these organisations. for example in 2003 hezb-i-islami was banned as a terrorist organisation by the un, and gulbuddin hekmatyar, dubbed the ‘butcher of kabul’ for his actions during the civil war, was barred from entry into afghanisatan. his accord with the afghan government in 2016 has led to his attempted rehabilitation, though there is little evidence of public support amongst pashtuns or nonpashtuns (rasmussen 2016). ethnicity and the constitution the 2001 bonn meeting that defined the framework for the post-invasion polity was heavily influenced by would-be ethnic leaders who (ironically) stressed the need to prevent ethnic conflict in the country. a prominent role in all peace negotiations was granted to these leaders, who then built an ethnic oligarchy within the structure of the state, sharing government positions between them while selling other lucrative positions within government departments to clients. this informal ethnic power-sharing structure is entrenched in state authority and is viewed with disdain by the wider public, which is generally excluded from its material benefits. this informal accommodation was a legacy of alliance-building under the us occupation, and contrasted with the formal constitutional arrangement post 2004. the formal constitution was promulgated at a national deliberative conference, a loya jurga, held in afghanistan in late 2003, and explicitly sought to institutionalise nationally-shared foundations for solidarity, beyond ethnic loyalty. in the first instance the constitution was grounded in religious solidarity, as the key foundation for political solidarity. it centralised power in an ‘islamic republic, independent, unitary and indivisible state’ (a.1), and defined a civic islamic political culture, embedded in non-authoritarian models of islam, allowing for religious freedom for other religions as well as across islamic traditions, shia, sunni, sufi. the constitution expressed a mode of inclusive political islam in contrast with doctrinaire political islam, in non-civic mode, where one interpretation of religious culture is asserted above others. the constitution grounds its legal authority in islam – it is only sovereign insofar as it is compatible with islam. it was declared in the year 1382 on the islamic calendar and names afghanistan as an ‘islamic republic’, requiring all law to conform to islamic ‘tenets and provisions’. the constitution asserts a version of sharia law (religious law) that is compatible cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 181 with human rights norms: provisions for the supreme court state that ordinarily it acts in ‘pursuance of hanafi jurisprudence, and, within the limits set by this constitution’ (article 130) hanafi is a school of sunni law practiced in much of central asia where law is interpreted by both secular as well as religious authorities (warren 2013). reflecting this, the six members of the supreme court are appointed by elected politicians (named by the president, endorsed by parliament), not by the religious orders. legal pluralism is accommodated, with the courts required to ‘apply shia jurisprudence in cases involving personal matters of followers of the shia sect in accordance with the provisions of the law’ (article131). the framework for education exemplifies the model, in requiring a ‘unified educational curricula based on the tenets of the sacred religion of islam’, along with ‘curricula for schools on the basis of existing islamic sects in afghanistan’ (article 45). freedom of religion is asserted within this framework, with article 2 stating the ‘followers of other faiths shall be free within the bounds of law in the exercise and performance of their religious rituals’: with the ‘bounds of the law’ defined by islam, religious freedom rests on respect for islam. as such, political parties may only be established that do not ‘contravene the holy religion of islam’ (article 35). there is support for ethnic diversity, but tribalism and sectarianism is outlawed. while centralizing power, the 2004 constitution recognised afghanistan as a multi-ethnic country (article 4). at the same time it explicitly forbids tribalism and sectarianism, stating the ‘formation and operation of a party on the basis of tribalism, parochialism, language, as well as religious sectarianism shall not be permitted’ (article 35). ministers were not to ‘use their positions for linguistic, sectarian, tribal, religious or partisan purposes’ (a80). with the state defined as impartial, the constitution recognises ethnic identities, at article 4 stating ‘the nation of afghanistan shall be comprised of pashtun, tajik, hazara, uzbek, turkman, baluch, pachaie, nuristani, aymaq, arab, qirghiz, qizilbash, gujur, brahwui and other tribes’. article 6 then recognises the equal status of ‘all ethnic groups and tribes’. this is reflected in language policy which institutionalises pashto and dari as first and second languages and any local language as third language (article 16). the national anthem ‘shall be in pashto with the mention of “god is great” as well as the names of the major ethnic groups of afghanistan (article 20). this recognition of local languages and tribal affiliations was, interestingly, one of the most contentious issues at the constitutional loya jirga, precipitating a walk-out by forty per cent of the delegates (adeney 2008). 182 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 despite recognition of ethnic diversity there is no entrenched requirement for regional autonomy. a structure of provincial district and municipal councils is established, only with devolution of power as required (article 137). since 2004 provincial councils have been constituted and have sought increased powers and resources, though they remain relatively weak, and exist at the behest of the central state (adeney 2008). they may, though, develop to displace centre-peripheral tensions from ethnicised competition for central resources into regionally-grounded aspirations and priorities. these local versions of the state offer the possibility of cultural provincialism, local democracy and hence legitimation, in the exercise of devolved local powers within a unitary state. in practice, though, and reflecting the military occupation, effective power has remained centralised in the presidency. beyond religion and ethno-regional identification, the constitution also vests its authority in national political solidarity. here the foundation for solidarity is the state itself, legitimised as an expression of the afghan nation. legitimacy may be claimed in terms of a value commitment, vested in human rights norms and national citizenship, and in terms of representation as expressed in elected national assemblies and the elected presidency. in terms of representation the 2004 constitution vests considerable power in the directly-elected president, who selects two vice-presidents, appoints ministers, defines policy and appoints provincial governors. it also establishes a directly-elected lower house ‘of the people’. the parliamentary electoral system is majoritarian, with more than one candidate per constituency, elected under the single non-transferable vote system. in addition, an upper house ‘of elders’ is constituted from provincial and district councils, with a third of its membership appointed by the presidency. the lower house holds the legislative power; the upper house takes a more advisory role. judicial authority is vested in an independent supreme court, which has the responsibility to enforce constitutional protections for the citizenry. the court is to entrench human rights, non-discrimination and civil and political freedoms, qualified by undefined ‘duties’, and by a broader ‘public interest’ (aricles 22, 23 and 24). national identification is bolstered by a development mandate, with some guarantee of social security. at article 6 the state is committed ‘to create a prosperous and progressive society based on social justice, preservation of human dignity, protection of human rights, realisation of democracy, attainment of national unity as well as equality between all peoples and tribes and balance development of all areas of the country’. health and education is a special focus cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 183 with a commitment to ‘free preventative healthcare and treatment of diseases’ (article 52) and for the provision of ‘educational institutes free of charge by the state’ (article 43). beyond this there is some declaratory commitment to help develop industries and agriculture (article 17). set against this, some key clauses seem more directed at the interests of the occupiers than at the impoverished population. under article 10 the constitution requires the state to ‘encourage, protect as well as ensure the safety of capital investment and private enterprises in accordance with the provisions of the law and market economy’. this neoliberal constraint on policy is bolstered by article 11 which imposes a requirement that the central bank be independent and article 40 which protects property from confiscation. under article 41 foreign ownership of immovable property is not permitted, but leasing ‘for the purpose of capital investment’ is. and perhaps most important, security crises can trump the constitution, with the president, as head of state, explicitly vested with a specially-defined power to declare a ‘state of emergency’ where ‘protection of independence and national life become impossible through the channels specified in this constitution’ (a143). overall, the 2004 constitution clearly seeks to define and entrench cross-national solidarities, whether islamic or nationalist, recognizing local, tribal and ethnic identification within the framework of the state. ethnicity is subsumed into the national structure, and outlawed as a basis for political mobilisation. on this basis the country has so far embarked on three electoral cycles, with elections in 2004, 2009 and 2014. the outcomes of these elections in terms of de-ethnicisation are hotly debated. democracy and cross-ethnic de/alignment the role of the central state mapped out in the 2004 constitution is one of managing and correlating ethnic identifications. as noted, in the context of the taliban insurgency pragmatic alliance-building led to informal power-sharing structures for rule. as with powersharing arrangements more generally, these informal arrangements have had the potential to ethnicise the state as an ethnocracy, institutionalising what may be more fluid identifications (see lijphart 1977). as noted, the 2004 constitution is explicitly aimed at overcoming ethnic division and preventing ethnocracy, and articulates an amalgam of islamic and national solidarity to achieve this. arguably, the implementation of the constitution could open up 184 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 new possibilities for cross-ethnic bargaining and allow the creation of new forms of nonethnicised national-level political antagonism. electoral outcomes, and the extent to which afghan voters have become more or less aligned into rivalrous ethnic blocs, are a crucial measure of this. a strong narrative of de-ethnicisation, as reflected in voting patterns, is widely claimed. the majoritarian electoral system is said to encourage cross-ethnic alliance-building in the presidential election given that the dominant pashtun group only claims at most forty percent of the national electorate. nonetheless, ethnicisation in the 2004 presidential election was extensive. this serves as a baseline, directly reflecting the initial ethnicisation of formal interparty politics. in 2004 the overwhelming majority of voters cast their vote for a co-ethnic candidate: ninety-five percent of pashtuns voted for karzai, ninety percent of uzbecks for dostum, eighty percent hazaras for mohaqiq; there was a similar ethnicisation in the 2005 parliamentary election. giustozzi argues that the main drivers for this were the absence of ideological disputation in the country’s first election since the taliban regime, along with weak class formation, low state capacity and the impact of external influences (giustozzi 2015). the relative lack of political antagonism in the context of the taliban insurgency may have been a contributing factor. the 2009 election was seriously corrupted by the incumbent president, with about a fifth of the votes invalidated. mobasher’s forensic analysis of cross-ethnic voting, between 2004 and 2009, province-by-province, reveals a complex structure of inter-ethnic bargaining, initiated by president karzai and built into the structure of the state (mobasher 2016). against this, some observers claimed strong signs of ethnic de-alignment between the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections. dubow for instance analysed the ethnic and spatial distribution of votes from 2004 to 2009, finding a significant shift away from ethnic blocs; the 2009 parliamentary election even superseded sectarian conflict, for instance with a shiite hazara candidate receiving the majority of his votes from sunnis and non-hazaras (dubrow 2009). the 2014 presidential election was also extensively corrupted, requiring a full recount. yet it is also seen as signaling a new departure, as mobasher notes, ‘the scale of cross-ethnic voting in the afghan election of 2014 was extraordinary’ (mobasher 2016, p. 369). in this context inter-ethnic bargains appeared to unravel in a wider context of political contention. dealignment was encouraged by a change in electoral rules in 2013 that required presidential cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 185 candidates to gather 100,000 signatures or two percent of those enrolled, across twenty provinces. partly reflecting this, the only candidates to nominate were from the larger pashtun and tajik ethnic groups. in the election most hazaras voted for the tajik candidate, and most uzbeks for the pashtun candidate. in the presidential poll the pashtun vote split between a tajik candidate, dr abdullah (formerly of northern alliance militia, also favoured by tajiks and hazaras), and a pashtun candidate, dr ghani (who also attracted uzbek support). in the context of a corrupted electoral commission the formal vote was never released and the two candidates resolved to exercise power in tandem, with ghani as president and abdullah in a (non-constitutional) ‘chief executive’ role. interpreting the outcome is itself part of the political dynamic: one person’s ethnic bargaining is another person’s cross-ethnic collaboration. mobasher for instance emphasises inter-ethnic bargaining rather than cross-ethnic de-alignment, stressing the ‘persistence of ethnic voting and mobilization’ (mobasher 2016, p. 412). in contrast, sharma points to the 2014 election as demonstrating the ‘failure of neat ethnic homogeneity to stabilise, in spite of long years of armed bloody mobilization along ethno-political lines’ (sharma 2017). the disagreement turns on the interpretation of inter-ethnic voting patterns and associated political accommodations at the elite level: at one level they entrench ethnic division; at another level they introduce new lines of non-ethnic antagonism. in this respect sharma argues that ‘political alliances… have not followed the neat simplistic ethnic logic of the kind often projected as the eternal fact of afghan social political life’ (sharma 2017, p. 151). rather, they have a life of their own, shaped by a wide range of contingent, non-ethnicised matters. for sharma, ethnicity is seen as a changing resource, with post-2001 demands for ethnic parity positioned as a political manoeuvre. certainly ethnicity has become more salient in elite bargaining, but at the same time islam and the idea of the nation have strengthened as identifiers. the result is a potentially complementary set of national, ethno-regional and religious solidarities, producing an amalgam, a co-national ethno-religious identification. conclusions in 2010 the us defence secretary and the us brigadier general in afghanistan debated their reliance on what they termed ‘thugocracy’ in afghanistan, as a necessary evil in their 186 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 struggle against taliban-style ‘theocracy’ (quoted in shahrani 2015, p. 296). one question that arises in the context of the 2014 election and the 2015 us military withdrawal is whether that us-sponsored ‘thugocracy’ is now in transition to ‘ethnocracy’ or ‘democracy’. the signals are mixed, but there is certainly evidence of a changing political landscape. one key factor, as argued here, is the relative weakness of ethnic identification in afghan society, both historically and in the current period. non-ethnic and localised affiliations appear to have gained greater social importance in the context of on-going civil conflict. in contrast, ethnic identification is more confined to elite-level bargaining, where it serves as a proxy for military rivalry. at the same time, the constitution, and growing autonomy following the us withdrawal, appears in some respects to have facilitated cross-ethnic bargaining, disrupting bloc formation. as inter-elite rivalry gives way to strategic alliance-building we can expect stronger cross-ethnic ideological engagement, especially on national development concerns relating to gender and poverty. from this perspective afghan politics may be moving into a post-ethnocratic phase, and towards the form of islamic democracy envisaged under the constitution. afghanistan’s long history of inter-ethnic relations, overlaid with religious and national solidarities, and hingeing on local-level loyalties and obligations, has not readily embraced ethnicised politics. despite the ethnicisation of militias and elites, and a history riven with social dislocation and conflict, the country has not, as a rule, experienced ethnic conflict on the scale common in parallel contexts. the long period of externally-funded warlordism, civil war, and then occupation, instituted a model of inter-ethnic and ethnocratic rule, yet this appears to have been only weakly entrenched in afghan society. the logic of us occupation, of sustaining a military alliance against an increasingly nationalist taliban insurgency, underpinned the continued ethnicisation of politics. as argued here, there is some evidence that this model of political rule may be receding with the end of the occupation and the return of political independence. this suggests a strong relationship between occupation and ethnocracy, potentially relevant to other contexts. certainly, wider research points to the corrupting effect of military occupation, especially in undermining prospects for strengthened identification with national-level elites (braithwaite and wardak 2013). post-occupation there are signs of a revival of national-level political culture. against this, there are inherent dangers of ethnic hegemony in the centralised winnertakes-all model, as reflected in the electoral system and the presidential structure. in this cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.8, no.3, 2016 187 context adeney argues there is a risk of ethno-regionalist alienation, and argues for much stronger guarantees of multi-ethnic power-sharing (adeney 2008). this approach assumes (and we would argue, imputes) abiding ethnic identification, and may have the effect of institutionalizing inter-ethnic rivalry. the informal elite model of ethnic-military accommodation established in 2001 may be now be in the process of being superseded by new forms of political bargaining and national level contention. in this context new political blocs may emerge, grounded in the deep structural stratification of afghan society, claiming the capacity to displace the militarised ethnocracy of the occupation period. as the afghan people gain greater control of their political destiny, after decades of occupation and militarisation, there appears to be a new dynamism. acknowledgement we are grateful to the anonymous reviewers whose advice helped us to strengthen this paper. references adeney, k. 2008, ‘constitutional design and the political salience of ‘community’ identity in afghanistan: prospects for the emergence of ethnic conflicts in the post-taliban era’, asian survey, no. 484, pp. 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https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.1002 https://doi.org/10.1080/02634937.2013.835200 afghanistan: military occupation and ethnocracy abstract afghanistan and empire a brief ethno-political history the meaning of ethnicity in afghanistan from warlordism to ethnocracy ethnicity and the constitution democracy and cross-ethnic de/alignment conclusions acknowledgement references statement of conflict of interest funding cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 13, no. 1 2021 © 2021 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: norman, h., apolonio, t., and parker, m. 2021. mapping local and regional governance: reimagining the new south wales aboriginal sector. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:1, 1–14. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7644 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper mapping local and regional governance: reimagining the new south wales aboriginal sector heidi norman, therese apolonio, maeve parker university of technology sydney, sydney, australia corresponding author: heidi norman, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia, heidi.norman@uts.edu.au doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7644 article history: received 24/03/2021; revised 27/04/2021; accepted 11/05/2021; published 25/05/2021 abstract with reference to four case study localities in new south wales, this paper offers new insights into calls from indigenous australians for recognition within the national political discourse. examining the literature on the history of the aboriginal sector that emerged following the 1970s self-determination policy era, this paper argues earlier conceptions of the ‘aboriginal sector’ are insufficient and do not grasp the wider shift that aboriginal people seek within the political life of the nation. instead, the four case studies reveal aboriginal initiative and interest in creating a sense of association and being, drawing on pre-colonial patterns of identification and shaped by new imaginings of ‘nations’ and ‘political communities’. keywords aboriginal voice; governance; new south wales; policy; representation declaration of conflicting interest professor heidi norman reports that she is a member of the editorial team of cosmopolitan civil societies. she was not involved in the editorial or double-blind peer review process which was managed by another editor from the editorial team. funding this research was funded by aboriginal affairs, nsw, department of premier and cabinet. the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and may not reflect those of aboriginal affairs or the new south wales government. 1 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7644 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7644 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:heidi.norman@uts.edu.au https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7644 introduction federal and state governments are presently considering forms of recognition that will enable a different relationship between australia’s first peoples and its political institutions, and the processes and outcomes that should flow from this recognition. it is widely held that the recognition or acknowledgement of indigenous peoples within the national political discourse is the outstanding business that will right the long legacy of denial and policy failure. treaty and agreement-making are the leading mechanisms through which this process of recognition or acknowledgement is being advanced (norman, hunt & howardwagner 2021). in this paper, we explore the ways that aboriginal people are going about the business of looking after their people. as we will show, we found the range, diversity and character of aboriginal organisations in these four urban and regional sites prompts an undeniable legal and political shift with real opportunities emerging that advance conceptions of sovereignty and which call for new ways of thinking about aboriginal organisations from an earlier conception of ‘sector’ to one of ‘polities’ and ‘nations’. in this paper, we canvas the history of aboriginal policy and rights recognition before turning to consider the possibility and limits that broader recognition, and aboriginal initiative, might yield in the spaces of nsw where colonial violence has been most sustained and where new ways of coming belonging are being forged. from self-determination to normalisation across australia, significant shifts in aboriginal policy have occurred at every level of government from the 1970s as the post-colonial architecture of government sought to accommodate indigenous worlds. political scientist will sanders (2018) characterises the past fifty years of federal aboriginal affairs administration in terms of two key policy shifts: the adoption of aboriginal self-determination from the 1970s and secondly, the abandonment in 2005 of the statutory authority, the aboriginal and torres strait islander commission (atsic). the self-determination policy and the atsic model had encouraged communitybased indigenous organisations in the delivery of services, the holding of assets and political representation. these organisations marked out what tim rowse (2005, p. 207) refers to as a unique ‘indigenous sector’ that shares some features of civil society organisations. will sanders (2002) offers a more elaborated and transformative character of aboriginal organisations saying they represent ‘an indigenous order of australian government’. the strengthening trajectory of the emerging aboriginal order of government is widely considered to have diminished with the abolition of atsic, the mainstreaming of indigenous programs to functional departments and then outsourcing via competitive contractualism, mainstreaming/normalisation and welfare reform (hunt et al. 2008; sullivan 2011). from a high point where an aboriginal ‘order of government’ (sanders 2018) was growing in capacity and confidence, by 2013 the only aboriginal voice or input on policy and decisions was reduced to an indigenous advisory council handpicked by the prime minister. senior aboriginal bureaucrat and policy reform advocate, pat turner, captured the circumstances aboriginal people now find themselves in their relationship with governments as ‘on our knees’. recognition of aboriginal polity in this context, changing the australian constitution to recognise aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples emerged as a key strategy by aboriginal peoples to secure a rightful place in relation to the australian state. the sustaining argument by aboriginal peoples is that because its ancient pre-colonial law and governance have not been adequately recognised, aboriginal people have neither a clear nor a just relationship to australian political institutions (langton 2001). momentum was renewed in late 2010 when the gillard government appointed the expert panel on constitutional recognition of aboriginal norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 20212 and torres strait islander peoples to investigate how to give effect to constitutional recognition (mcquire 2019). australian governments are currently canvassing ideas, models and views to help drive significant transformations in their relationships with aboriginal australians. the nsw government’s stated aim is to ‘fundamentally change the relationship between the government and aboriginal peoples from one that began as unilateral to one of bilateralism/multilateralism’ (aboriginal affairs nsw 2019, p. 7; aboriginal affairs nsw 2017; thomas et al. 2019). in victoria in 2019, treaty planning was underway and governments in northern territory and queensland also announced plans for treaty. the deliberative dialogue process adopted by the referendum council sought to build an informed consensus among aboriginal people on the way forward and was delivered in 2017 ‘to the nation’. the uluru statement from the heart outlined three central reforms: ‘voice, treaty, truth’; a first nations voice, to be enshrined in the constitution; a commission to supervise a process of agreement-making between governments and first nations; and ‘truth-telling’ in recounting australia’s first nations’ history (norman, 2019). in october 2019, the australian minister for indigenous australians, ken wyatt, appointed a senior advisory group (sag) to develop a structure, membership and functions of the indigenous voice to parliament and how local, regional and national interests will be best captured. the sag have proposed possible models for the indigenous voice in an interim report released in october 2020, which is currently subject to public consultation (national indigenous australians agency 2020). ‘political communities’ we now turn to present the initial phase of our case study research where we mapped aboriginal organisations as illustrative of aboriginal peoples’ continued interest to realise governing ambitions. the four case studies of urban and regional localities demonstrate the complexity of aboriginal governance in nsw, reflecting local histories and concepts of place, along with the impacts and structural requirements dictated by contemporary government aboriginal affairs administration. above all, we observed aboriginal people, through a multitude of organisations and programs, seeking to create places of belonging and attachment to country and kin. in various ways, these intentions reveal an interest in ‘acting like a nation’ and can therefore be understood as a re-emergent aboriginal polity that focus on shared connections, belonging and community accountability (cornell 2015). we mapped aboriginalrun organisations in the four localities in the period august-october 2018. the localities overlayed local government areas (lga) and were selected on the basis that they represent different regions across nsw: urban, coastal, rural/regional central and south west. methodology our research was limited to publicly available information that we compiled to form a detailed database of aboriginal organisations in each locality. the sources used to inform these lists include those organisations registered under the corporations (aboriginal and torres strait islander) act 2006 (cth), the native title act 1993 (cth) and the aboriginal land rights act 1983 (nsw ) (alra); information held by the office of the registrar of indigenous corporations (oric), funded organisations listed in the australian government’s indigenous advancement strategy (ias) (2014-2018) and businesses registered with supply nation. we also studied a broad selection of sources including media, social media, literature, directory listings and aboriginal community service listings, government records including hansard, local government minutes, newsletters and reports, and official communiqués. these sources aided in the compilation of profiles of the organisations, and the characterisation of their purposes and activities, in each locality defined as aboriginal run and/or controlled. in some instances, we counted programs running within government norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 20213 departments or those which were a subset of larger non-government organisations (ngos), where we were able to confirm significant aboriginal involvement and leadership. in these cases, we used communitymanaged websites as sources to confirm aboriginal-run programs in mainstream organisations and checked with local informants. we finalised the list of aboriginal organisations operating in each locality in october 2018. we shared the list for feedback from leading aboriginal community members with detailed ‘on the ground’ knowledge of their communities. the purpose of our desktop mapping was to quantify at a ‘moment in time’, the number and self-identified purposes of the organisations that make up the aboriginal sector, to inform discussions of the aboriginal polity. this method runs the risk of missing smaller organisations which do not have an internet presence, and less formally constituted community groups. the next step in this study will see ethnographic research undertaken that will provide much needed detail. for each locality we detailed the number of organisations, their funding sources, functions, character and governance structures. we also looked at the ways these organisations interact with governments, each other and non-aboriginal society. findings we identified the following number of aboriginal organisations operating in each locality: 46 in the western sydney lga, 35 in the mid north coast nsw lga, 47 in the central west lga and 21 in south-western nsw lga. the most striking finding was the diversity of the aboriginal organisations identified. the majority of aboriginal organisations in each locality were unique; they also varied in size, purpose and governance. some serviced specific language or family groups, others were pan-aboriginal services. the de-identified case studies localities shared both similarities and striking differences. each of the locations included organisations dedicated to human services (health, housing, education, childcare and justice), the presence of peak bodies, and organisations promoting broad themes of belonging and inclusion in aboriginal worlds characterised in the literature as ‘community building’ and ‘nation building’. in each locality, at least one aboriginal organisation functioned as an interagency for several organisations, facilitating networks and disseminating information to the wider aboriginal community. membership or participation in organisations is voluntary and key personnel were present in several organisations. these individuals were often leading community members active in several organisations, holding memberships of multiple organisations and serving on several boards. similarities across the case studies unique organisations in all case studies, there was a high proportion of organisations that were distinct to the locality. we refer to these as ‘unique organisations’ as they only exist at that site. unique organisations are not aligned to an umbrella or peak body. for example, in western sydney 77% of organisations only functioned within that lga; on the mid north coast and in south-western nsw, unique organisations made up 88% and 54% respectively. ln the central west, the proportion of unique organisations was 79%. we suggest these unique organisations arise from the interaction between community leadership and drive – sparked by burning norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 20214 issues or needs – and the extent of available funding. as these organisations are generally small and tend to be funded by small, one-off competitive grants, they are forced to be entrepreneurial, gaining funding from multiple sources (government, private, philanthropic) and relying on pro-bono assistance. the presence of peak bodies in each of the lgas examined, ‘peak bodies’ were active. for our purposes, ‘peak bodies’ are defined as aboriginal organisations with a state or national identity and a network of local and/or regional offices. they often have an overarching central structure which co-ordinates local and regional offices, provides administrative support, allocates funding, liaises with local and state governments and has an advocacy function. we identified the following ‘peak bodies’: • nsw aboriginal education consultative group (aecg) • aboriginal land council (nswalc) • aboriginal employment strategy (aes) • nsw/act aboriginal legal service (als) • wirringa baiya [state-wide aboriginal women’s legal service] • link-up aboriginal corporation • aboriginal child, family and community care state secretariat (absec) • aboriginal health and medical research council (ahmrc) • first peoples disability network (fpdn) • nsw aboriginal tenants advice and advocacy services (nswataas) • nsw coalition of aboriginal regional alliances (ncara) and the • nsw aboriginal cultural heritage and arts association nsw (achaa). several of the peak bodies have operated continuously since the 1970s; they vary in role and purpose – ranging from ‘shopfront’ service provision such as the als, to those comprised of members or partnerships like aes, fpdn or absec. in other cases, the state body comprises local committees who contribute to furthering each other’s interests through information sharing and advocacy (eg. ncara). each of the case studies featured one or more aboriginal community controlled health service (acchs) (naccho n.d.)1. acchss are represented by the peak state body, the aboriginal health and medical research council of nsw (ahmrc), and the national peak body, the national aboriginal community controlled health organisation (naccho). in one instance, a regional body had been formed to represent the interests of acchs across specific territories, but it remains aligned within both peak bodies (bila muuji aboriginal health organisation n.d.). the peak bodies mostly rely on recurrent government funding. this reliance can at times curtail their capacity to best represent their constituents. this is the case with the als which has faced significant fluctuations in its funding since it began in 1970 (nitv 2017). the nsw aboriginal land council network is an exception: the funding base for the 120 local aboriginal land councils and operations of the state office and its elected council was established by statute in 1983 and is now self-funding (norman 2015). in 2018 the ‘coalition of peak aboriginal organisations’ (capo) formed and includes the nswalc, absec, link-up (nsw ), nsw aecg inc., als nsw/act, ahmrc, and fpdn (capo, 2018). 1 naccho is the national peak body representing 143 aboriginal community controlled health services (acchss) across the country on aboriginal health and wellbeing issues. it has a history stretching back to a meeting in albury in 1974. in 1997, the federal government funded naccho to establish a secretariat in canberra which greatly increased the capacity of aboriginal peoples involved in acchss to participate in national health policy development (naccho n.d.). norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 20215 capo explains its purpose as providing a ‘united voice’ for its member organisations and negotiating with government (allam, 2018).2 regional alliances three out of the four case study localities hosted regional alliances. these are organisations which have partnered with the nsw department of aboriginal affairs under the local decision making (ldm) accord (aboriginal affairs nsw, 2013). the ldm accord takes a place-based approach to agreement making, distinguishing it from the previous ‘one-size fits all’ approach. commencing in 2013 with three pilot sites, ldm uses existing networks and alliances between aboriginal organisations to facilitate negotiations between local aboriginal communities and the nsw government about the design and delivery of services to communities3. the governance structure of each regional alliance varies and is determined through internal negotiations. for example, in one locality the regional alliance is comprised of local aboriginal land councils (lalcs), another emphasises representation by clan and nation representatives, while others bring service agencies together. advisory boards and councils in each locality, we identified aboriginal and torres strait islander member advisory boards or councils with relationships to institutions including local government and universities. these advisory boards offer advice and guidance related to institutional governance through to high-level policy and protocol.4 organisations have multiple functions a key finding was that many of the organisations identified were site-specific and were based on local priorities. although many organisations had a primary and self-identified purpose, they also often served other purposes outside this explicit activity. many of the larger organisations serviced a range of community needs. in the south-western nsw lga, one organisation was significant as it provided several functions to a community. originally constituted in the early 2000’s to house historical and cultural material as part of a local research project and exhibition, the organisation had since expanded to provide cultural, genealogical and environmental services, such as cultural heritage assessments, arts, sports, carers and education programs. this organisation had received two ias grants: $950,000 of which the bulk went towards a forest management project and the other $270,000 towards a project relating to community well-being and prevention of family violence. in the mid-north coast nsw lga, a profitable tourism enterprise was using part of its revenue to fund another aboriginal organisation dedicated to youth services and cultural education. many organisations also engaged in some level of advocacy, as was the case with this organisation. differences across the case studies local history and aboriginal polity in western sydney lga locality, we identified 45 aboriginal organisations and 1 torres strait islander organisation. these organisations had a stated objective to address the impact of dispossession through 2 we note that the national and nsw governments announced in july 2020, as part of the ‘refresh’ with new targets and commitments of the closing the gap strategy, the role of capo in leading community discussions and fora. this approach announces shared decision making between the leading organisations and nsw government and will be taken up in subsequent work. 3 as of 2020, there are nine aboriginal regional alliances across nsw. the regional alliances are significant as they take a site-specific approach to forming relationships between government and aboriginal communities. 4 at the time of writing western sydney university did not have terms of reference listed on their website, although all other committees did. see https://www.westernsydney.edu.au/about_uws/leadership/board_of_trustees/board_standing_committees_and_advisory_councils. accessed 13 april 2019. norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 20216 https://www.westernsydney.edu.au/about_uws/leadership/board_of_trustees/board_standing_committees_and_advisory_councils https://www.westernsydney.edu.au/about_uws/leadership/board_of_trustees/board_standing_committees_and_advisory_councils cultural revival and activities centred on fostering a sense of belonging. cultural education centres, health services with a broad focus on healing and wellbeing and a resource centre to facilitate connections to family, all operated in the locality. the organisations in this region declared a focus on supporting young people and encouraging young leaders. while there were many services dedicated to creating a sense of belonging in the community, eight organisations bore the name of their family group or invoked the original peoples of the area. in mid north coast nsw lga, we identified 35 aboriginal community-controlled organisations. here, there were eight organisations focused on (coastal) land management and activities associated with connection to country. this locality has had native title rights recognised and a traditional owner corporation has formed to manage those rights. the boundaries of the south-western nsw lga have negotiated traditional owner interests in relation to the local river and the surrounding red gum forests. the use of the traditional languages by traditional owners in the area is an important aspect of their connection to country. this is reflected in the high proportion of organisations which engage in activities relating to the revitalisation of language and culture. there were several ‘on country’ language projects within the study area and five of the 14 organisations identified have an interest in language revitalisation. the other key priority in the area is land management. the river system is an especially significant aspect of country for the two traditional language groups and the wider region. six of the fourteen organisation in the area either participate in or were specifically constituted to manage lands in and around the lga. in central west nsw lga, we listed 45 aboriginal organisations. compared to the other localities studied, this region had the highest number of aboriginal organisations and the highest representation of indigenous business (individual enterprises comprised 22% of the total number of organisations). the central west lga is the service centre for several regional and remote towns. as such, the locality is a key site for aboriginal service delivery and a preferred government pilot site for new programs and services. as one senior aboriginal community member and public servant surmised, this contributes to a high turn-over of organisations and programs in trial phases. in this region, we also noted 13 non-indigenous organisations, operating in the aboriginal focused services that competed for commonwealth indigenous advancement strategy funding and aboriginal service users. these included ngos with youth and community development services and private enterprises with adult training and employment programs. limited government and aboriginal community-controlled partnerships the four case studies identified a total of 149 organisations. of these, we identified 19 organisations that worked in partnership with government, had on-going funding and a five-year plan. we defined these organisations as ‘leading organisations’. they were different from ‘peak bodies’, as they did not have state or national reach. leading organisations tended to have a working partnership with government and were likely to be formalised through a ‘regional plan’, ‘memorandum of understanding’ or funding agreement. in these partnerships, the government devolves limited powers to a leading organisation, which allows a greater degree of autonomy and reduces reporting requirements. the leading organisation may also gain more responsibilities, such as supervising smaller organisations in the region as a devolved government function. partnerships with government are usually accompanied by a long-term funding commitment. leading organisations tend to have a single and consistent source of funding. while funding sources varied, in our case studies funding was frequently designated through the non-competitive streams of the federal government’s indigenous advancement strategy or through other government departments such as aboriginal affairs nsw or nsw health. norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 20217 in the western sydney lga, we identified six leading organisations; eight in the mid north coast nsw lga; two in south-western nsw lga and three in the central west nsw lga. across these four localities, leading organisations were diverse in character and included lalcs, regional alliances, health and well-being services, social enterprises, language and culture centres, and coalitions of nations formed around water interests. lalcs will be considered in detail below. local aboriginal land councils (lalcs) local aboriginal land councils (lalcs) were included as leading organisations. lalcs operate in each locality and receive an annual allocation from the peak body, the nswalc. there are 120 lalcs across the state and while the aboriginal land rights act outlines, in part 5, provisions for lalc constitutions (ss 49-50), objects (s 51) and functions (s 52) each lalc pursues priorities set by its members and reflecting local circumstances, capacity and resources. we can see in the ‘objects’ (s 51) lalcs are required: to improve, protect and foster the best interests of all aboriginal persons within the council ’s area and other persons who are members of the council. lalcs operate independently of the nswalc, albeit with ongoing compliance and reporting requirements; they are always embedded in place. each lalc within the case study localities had diverse activities underway. as a group they had very different portfolios of property and recovered lands. the graph below shows the aboriginal land claims in nsw from 1983-2018. these are organised in relation to the local aboriginal land council (lalc) boundaries – rather than the local government areas (lgas) of our case studies – and show the number of land claims granted, as well as land claims awaiting government action. in central west nsw the lalc has successfully repossessed 29 land parcels and six await determination. on the mid north coast 42 land claims have been approved and 27 await approval. in south-western nsw the lalc has had 11 land claims approved and in western sydney 178 land claims have been approved over several lgas and 1278 await nsw government action. in each of the lalc areas it is apparent that land recovery provisions have been highly constrained and are yet to achieve the intentions of the alra. table 1. data arranged by lalc as at october 2018 lalc granted/ part land claims undetermined land claims central west nsw 29 6 north coast 42 27 south western nsw 11 0 western sydney 178 1278 while it is beyond the scope of this study to detail the history of the development of land rights and the rationale that informed the structure of the aboriginal land council network and defined their operations, it is useful to highlight the limited land recovery achieved to date and the and disaggregation of land recovery from recognition of aboriginal polity. the alra was configured as a social justice package that included a model of aboriginal power that would interface with government. lalcs are member based and therefore have some claim as representatives of aboriginal voices. however, the interests and roles of norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 20218 lalcs do not always coincide with understandings of traditional connections to place, nor do they define connections to country (other than in relation to joint management of national parks). several lalcs are experimenting with ways of layering membership that reflect patterns of movement and traditional owner rights and obligations. lalcs have a statutory obligation to undertake a host of roles including the management of land and development of enterprises for the benefit of their members. while by no means exhaustive, we identified a range of publicly listed lalc activities in each of the case study locations. in the western sydney, the lalc is actively engaged in local development and planning, including in areas where significant public infrastructure projects are underway. the lalc are participating members of the statutory planning and development commission for the region. while they are the largest single private land holder in the region, the delays in land claim approvals continues to limit their ability to utilise their land holdings for the benefit of their members. the mid-north coast lalc has 54 social housing properties they manage for members, as well as offering environmental service contracts, land management and site survey work. in south-western nsw, the lalc reports that it organises and runs cultural camps aimed at connecting their young people to country, local history research and a program supporting children’s transition to school and access to disability services, funded by the ias scheme. this lalc also runs a government service portal accessible to the whole community. the central west lalc reports duties in the provision of social housing and assists with linking aboriginal members with aboriginal service providers and social support networks. although this is by no means a detailed account of the activity of lalcs, it does illustrate the place-based function and objectives of lalcs and their diverse activities relative to their land holdings, opportunities and member priorities. in this research project, we have offered an account of the organisations within each case study locality and have developed a schema for grouping them. this has been in terms of peak bodies, unique organisations and leading organisations. indigenous advancement strategy we identified trends in relation to funding secured under the indigenous advancement strategy (ias). introduced in 2014, the ias is the federal government’s mechanism for managing the $1 billion fund for aboriginal programs and services run through a central grants process located in department of prime minister and cabinet. funding is available through both open competitive and closed non-competitive streams. aboriginal organisations must submit a grant application to be eligible for competitive funding. in the western sydney lga site, 22 ias grants had been awarded (as at december 2019), totalling $6,413,420.95. just under half, 49%, had gone to indigenous organisations whereas 51% went to nonindigenous (including schools and local councils). in western sydney, churches and ngos were also awarded grants to run programs for the aboriginal community. in the central west lga site, 17 ias grants had been awarded totalling $4,4672,239.18. indigenous organisations received 54% of the total and non-indigenous organisations 46%. large grants were awarded to non-indigenous organisations including a government health agency that administered funding to partner acchs, a public school, and a private business offering indigenous employment and training programs. in the mid-north coast nsw lga, organisations received seven grants totalling $1,356,882.16 and in the south-western nsw lga, three grants totalling at $1,479,489.98 awarded. in both these lgas, 100% of ias funding was allocated to indigenous organisations. norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 20219 interaction with all levels of government and aboriginal organisations the case studies demonstrate that while the aboriginal organisations identified interact with all levels of government (local, state and federal) the extent of engagement varies. however, beyond the provision of grant funding, we found little evidence of interaction between the federal government and local aboriginal community organisations. in each of the sites studied, interaction between governments and aboriginal communities was typically facilitated by a consultative committee, advisory group or interagency. the level of recognition of aboriginal organisations by local councils varied from locality to locality. in the mid-north coast nsw lga, there was an aboriginal consultative committee which had been active since 1997. its self-identified purpose was to act as a formal channel of communication between the local government and the local aboriginal community. in the central west nsw lga, an interagency was specifically dedicated to facilitating networks between all aboriginal public servants in the region. in the western sydney lga, the local council has an aboriginal community development worker who is responsible for co-ordinating meetings with an aboriginal advisory committee. in the south-western nsw lga case study, however, we found no specific aboriginal advisory or consultative body with this role. at a state level, interactions can occur in a number of ways. as noted above, peak bodies and regional alliances provide an interface with the nsw government, particularly in relation to advocacy, for peak bodies, and the co-ordination of service delivery for regional alliances. organisations also interacted with specific government departments. this was particularly so for circle sentencing, a restorative justice program in which aboriginal elders work with presiding magistrates to decide on the sentences of aboriginal offenders, which ran in partnership with nsw department of justice, and for the acchs, which often had close relationships with the various nsw area health services. similarly, traditional owners or elders groups often worked on land management with various state government departments including local land services, the national parks and wildlife service or the department of primary industries (in relation to marine parks). for example, in the mid-north coast nsw lga study a partnership had been formed between a university, several nsw government departments (environment and land management), and a local elders group. funded by a grant from the nsw government environmental trust, the resulting project centred on knowledge sharing, the recording of the traditional fishing and harvesting practices and the development of conservation land management practices within the local marine park. in western sydney, one traditional owners group had recently repossessed a site of cultural and historic significance from the early contact period. after many years of debate, this site had been transferred by government to the group who had registered as a charity. conceptualising aboriginal polity in each of the four case study sites we found a high uptake of what can be characterised as ‘nation building’ activities (cornell 2015). before relating this concept to the four case studies some discussion of the term is necessary. nation building is a concept attributed to the scholarship of the harvard native american research program. through rich ethnographies, it describes indian community interests ‘acting like a nation’ despite being subject to marginalisation, dispossession and dispersal (cornell 2015). nation building is broader than looking at traditional pre-settlement nation groupings, but rather accounts for historic connections between people and place forged up until today. it differs from notions of ‘self-determination’ or ‘self-management’ which refer to the right or authority of indigenous peoples to determine their own future. instead, it refers to the doing of self-governance (cornell 2015, p.1). nation building is less concerned norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202110 with how governments account for indigenous rights, and instead focusses on how indigenous peoples themselves assert those rights, particularly where governments fail to recognise them (cornell 2015, p.2). over half the organisations in the mid north coast case study were underpinned by nation building-like purposes and were constituted by traditional owners or elders of the region. in south-western nsw we found 43% of organisations promoted ‘nation building’. in the western sydney lga, eight organisations were focused on ‘being a nation’. nation building in this urbanised location was complicated by colonial dispossession and an ongoing lack of legal recognition of the area’s traditional owners. nation building momentum, however, had been restored through a land handback in 2017, some 200 years after its dispossession. the nation building-like character of some organisations in this region also facilitated identification and attachment to place for young people who grew up away from their own traditional country, a process identified as key to their sense of belonging and self-knowing. we found a distinct and common pattern, from the city to the bush and the coast, of old people creating opportunities for their young people to grow through knowledge and belonging. these activities did not appear to be framed as political, nor were they designed to contest settler sovereignty. cornell (2015, p. 1) in his ‘processes of native nationhood’ contends that indigenous communities living within larger polities are reclaiming indigenous self-governance as an indigenous right and practice. some elements of this include to ‘act like a nation’; to focus less on what ‘they’ (government, settler society) want indigenous communities to act, instead on what ‘we’ do; and doing it (cornell 2015, 16-18). the process of nation building implies a collective sense of self which, we argue, is characteristic of many of the organisations identified in this study. this sense of the collective self might draw on pre-colonial concepts, or the reclamation of cognitive processes requiring intentionality and creativity. consequently, nation building is broader than traditional pre-settlement nation groupings and can cover historic connections between people and place forged right up until the present. while nation building involves a connection to place, it is not necessary that organisations have land holdings, but that they operate within a specific locality. communities of interest one further concept that could provide a useful framework for considering our findings is the ‘communities of interest’ model of aboriginal government introduced by the 1996 canadian royal commission on aboriginal people. the report of the commission contributed the concept to explain the phenomenon of aboriginal peoples living in urban centres with ‘ties to different nations, who share common needs and interests arising out of their aboriginality, [who] may associate voluntarily for a limited set of governing purposes’ (canadian royal commission on aboriginal peoples, 1996, volume 2, p. 235). the concept resonates with the dynamic character of organisations within the aboriginal sector in nsw. we have observed that aboriginal organisations and peak bodies are in a constant process of forming and reforming, growing and dissipating, unifying and dividing for a variety of reasons. conclusion the argument we have developed in this paper is that the british and settler australian government history of denial of aboriginal polity has been met by strategies developed by aboriginal people to variously continue to survive as a distinct political community within the life of the of the nation-state, as unique and to an extent, self-governing. an appreciation of aboriginal agency and resistance has long been a feature of historical inquiry, however, more subtle forms of exercising and realising aboriginal polity are often overlooked. the structures that came from the self-determination era have surely been undermined, norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202111 but do continue to provide a basis for aboriginal people to organise collectively. and to this end, the aboriginal land council members who spend their weekends in community meetings, all in a voluntary capacity, devising ways to manage their land, create opportunities for their community and return benefit to members; the members of regional alliances who innovate to reproduce nation-based like affiliations to oversee a range of service delivery in their regions: these and countless others are illustrative of the conviction to continue and constitute aboriginal polities. we have highlighted the shift from organising as a community to one of a ‘nation’ and therefore a ‘political community’. there is now a near 50-year history of aboriginal community everyday effort to create, rethink, navigate and negotiate the terms on which government constitutes one’s interests and governance. in our study of four separate localities we identified enormous local level effort, that has little comparison in wider australian society, to organise as a polity, or emerging polity, in the management of lands and local economy and the delivery of services. it is these subtle and enduring actions that require closer attention to appreciate the larger and more substantive reforms needed. acknowledgements our thanks to the research and evaluation unit at nsw aboriginal affairs, especially trish malins who read and commented on earlier versions of this article; feedback from reviewers has been very useful and we thank you sincerely for your suggestions. we are also grateful to our colleagues at the indigenous land and justice research hub and the centre for aboriginal economic policy research (caepr) for comments on drafts and to local informants who checked the accuracy of our community profiles. the authors disclose receipt of funding from 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(eds), new south wales aboriginal affairs nsw, 2019, ‘preamble’ in does the media fail aboriginal political aspirations? 45 years of news media reporting of key political moments. aboriginal studies press, canberra. norman, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202114 cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 2 2018 © 2018 indra mckie. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: mckie, i. a. s. 2018. navigating mixedness: the information behaviours and experiences of biracial youth in australia. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 10(2), 61-83. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5941 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed article navigating mixedness: the information behaviours and experiences of biracial youth in australia indra ayu susan mckie university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: indra mckie, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. indramckie@gmail.com doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5941 article history: received 02/03/2018; revised 05/282018; accepted 29/06/2018; published 25/07/2018 abstract in the current racial climate of australia, biracial australians are left to choose between two or more identities on how to behave in attempts to fit binary racial groups and expectations. in an effort to understand the lived experience of biracial youth in australia, this paper presents data from interviews with asian biracial youth from across sydney, all analysed through the lens of information behaviour theories, with the premise that information about themselves and their culture plays a key role in identity formation. the interviews explored how this group has confronted race while developing their own identities during adolescence, as well as how their understanding of being “mixed” has developed over time. in exploring their complicated racial identity, i draw on auto-ethnogaphic accounts from my own racialised experiences as a biracial youth to address emergent themes from my findings. i found that participant stories of isolation, belonging, and confusion towards their racial mixedness often led to information avoidance and also “satisficing” in school, family and social life. such practices revealed how participants internalised their inherited intersection of racial persecution and privilege; their identity was in a continuous state of reconstruction in their struggle to find balance between the external validation of others and their driving agency to be themselves. keywords racial identity; mixed race; information behaviours; autoethnography declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. 61 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5941 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5941 http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:indramckie@gmail.com http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5941 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 introduction in a world of blending faces, the biracial adolescent is overloaded with culturally contextualised information from more than one world. racial identity refers to a sense of belonging to a collective racial group, based on the perception of shared racial heritage (helms in, tatum, 1992, p. 9), but split between the two cultures of their parents, how does a person of mixed race heritage decide on their own hyphenated racial identity? for the first time in australia’s history, the 2016 census revealed that the country is home to more asian migrants than those from europe. china, india and the philippines top the list of countries of birth for 5.1% of australians (australian bureau of statistics, 2017b). intermarriages between white ‘anglo-celtic/european’ (perkins, 2004, p.181) australians and these migrants have produced children of mixed race, who are forced to situate themselves in the diasporic lifestyles of their migrant parent, whilst trying to comfortably maintain an australian identity. as their families are an epicentre of clashing information about culture, food and language, this becomes even more difficult. it is up to the individual to choose what knowledge they take away from their mixed family in sustaining and curating a racial identity at school, university, workplace and even at home. it is important to note how this study on racial mixedness advances discussions of cosmopolitanism. as described by andrew jakubowicz, cosmopolitanism refers to, ‘a philosophical or ideological take on the form of social relations suited for a complex and culturally diverse society or world’ (jakubowicz, 2011, p.70). in this paper, i hope to portray the lived experiences of biracial asian-australians with their unique and complex racial identity to provide a unique perspective on how one navigates within a culturally contrasted body, persevering through instances of racial discrimination, confusion and displacement within a culturally diverse and cosmopolitan city such as sydney. this paper reports on an honours research project that asked, ‘what are the information behaviours of biracial asian-australian youth, and what role do they play in how they experience their racial identity?’ the study was limited to australian youth with a mixed asian and white australian background, one of the fastest growing demographic of racially mixed people in australia. background i am biracial australian, a product of my anglo-australian father and indonesian mother. my two sisters and i we were fortunate to take many vacations to bali, indonesia, where for two weeks each year we could cultivate meaningful relationships with my mother’s side of the family. in reflection, i did not make the most of the limited time with my indonesian family, as it was something i was not accustomed to back home in australia. i was used to a small family of five, until the annual trip overseas where i was bombarded with the smiling faces of thirty to forty relatives. in 2016, i decided to challenge myself and live in bali for a month without the reassuring presence of my mother. she had always acted as a sort of bridge, transmitting cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 69 foreign information to her three young daughters. we were not completely balinese and not entirely strangers either. no more asking mum what this word meant, who this family member was; no more, ‘mum, what are we doing today?’ or ‘mum, have you asked tante mang (my aunty komang) if she is working today?’ i learnt to be confident in my ability to speak bahasa indonesian, engage with family members and decide how i wanted to spend my time on the beautiful island. the time spent alone with the asian side of my family encouraged in me a deeper connection to my indonesian heritage, when i realised that perhaps half of my racial identity had been suppressed by my australian upbringing. in australia mum encouraged my sisters and me to be catholic, to me it felt like a forced practice, assimilating into the rituals of the white majority. but in indonesia, i admired my family’s dedication to religious ceremonies such as daily sambayang, which is performed in a small temple that is present in every balinese home. in this stone sanctuary balinese families give thanks to their hindu gods as well to the spirits of our family ancestors. in australia, i knew i was guaranteed a tertiary education if i kept up with my schoolwork, whereas for my cousins overseas, it was never a guaranteed option, but something attainable only by a few. this affected my attitudes towards school and work; my cousins did not need to work until they had graduated from university whereas i was used to working from when i was in a high school. whilst my cousins lived in the family home till they married, i was free to live independently from a young age. the intense disparity between these two divergent realities makes racial identity even more complex for biracial youth like myself. literature review this literature review briefly outlines literature related to racial identity and also information behaviours and makes a case that one’s racial identity is formed through one’s interactions with information through childhood, youth, and through adulthood. information behaviours and lived experience when a biracial individual is continually forced to identify through some form of racial categorisation, they curate their own definitions of race and consequent self-regulations. these are based on their everyday exposure to transient race-fuelled encounters, experiences that are immediately embodied. from our immediate surroundings, what information do we seek to make our own decisions about who we are and who we want to be? in short, what are our information behaviours? information behaviour is the ‘totality of human behaviours with reference to information including unintentional or passive behaviours such as glimpsing or encountering information’ (wilson, 2000, p.49) as well as ‘purposive behaviours that do not involve [information] seeking, such as actively avoiding information’ (johnson & case, 2012, p. 5) alongside serendipitous encounters of sharing and using information (case, 2006). for the purposes of understanding how information behaviours play a role in experiencing a mixed-race identity, i found it useful to examine the ‘lived experience’ of asian-australian biracial youth. ‘lived experience’ is defined as ‘personal knowledge about the world gained through direct, first-hand involvement in everyday events rather than 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 through representations constructed by other people’ (chandler & munday, 2016, para. 1). lived experience studies can contribute to our understanding of cosmopolitanism, for ‘[they] lead to a self-awareness that acknowledges the integrity of an individual life and how separate life experiences can resemble and respond to larger public and social themes, creating a space for storytelling, interpretation, and meaning-making (boylorn, 2008, p.490). racial categorisations organising information (through classification, categorisation, taxonomies etc.) is a fundamental concept that makes information intelligible (narayan, 2014), for the most strange and remarkable characteristic of information is that it can only be understood through the idea of organisation (morin, 1992). for example, psychologists tell us that babies' brains organise images into categories such as faces or foods, and that small children do a lot of organising during play (taylor, 2004). given that categorisation and classification is a natural urge with human beings, it is imperative to acknowledge that terms used to categorise race such as white, black, and asian are simply attempts to categorise the world around us, to ascribe a “fixedness” to them that equally defies categorisation just as ‘mixedness’ does. that said, there is some difficulty in theorising the asian-australian identity, which when ‘unlinked by a hyphen, attests to a separation of identities’ (chakraborty, 2012, p.5). the term race is used for broader categorisation such as asian, whereas ethnicity refers to the national ‘origin or heritage groups within the pan-asian label’ (johnston-guerrero & pizzolato, 2016, p.905). additionally, race as a concept is difficult to place within an asian context, as asia covers several colourful and distinct countries with their own unique national identity (teng, 2017, p. 83). even more so, it is also difficult to establish which countries are considered asian depending on the operating public discourse (ang, 2001, p.113). for example, the indian subcontinent is commonly neglected within australian literature, whilst in a us or canadian context the indian subcontinent is essential to what is known as south asian or east indian (chakraborty, 2012, p.1). in this paper, i identify the background of the parents of my subjects to provide some localised context behind their responses, so as to not subsume their cultural narrative under the umbrella of asian unthinkingly. furthermore, it is even more difficult to ascribe the label of australian to a distinct identity story. from the results of the most recent 2016 national census, the australian government stated, ‘[a]ncestry represents the cultural or ethnic group that a person most closely identifies with, rather than just their place of birth’ (australian bureau of statistics, 2017a, para. 13). whilst more than 300 ancestries were recognised, it was apparent that most australians identified with white-majority western countries. the most popular ancestries stemmed from europe with british, irish, scottish and italian at the top of the list. this is understandable given the nation’s formation and migrant history. this only becomes a problem when ‘the west’ is, ‘a name always associating itself with those regions, communities, and peoples that appear politically and economically superior to other regions, communities and peoples’ (sakai 1989 in, ang, 2001, p. 4). as australia has moved towards becoming a more multicultural and civil society, essences of western arrogance endure. countless expressions of racism towards non-white australians are captured in literature, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 71 news and social media. the responses from participants in this study also confirm this. thus, a paradoxical experience arises from identifying oneself as a person of eastern and western descent. the idea of racial categorisation is so heavily integrated into our communities that within those communities, to live ‘without racial identity is to be in danger of having no identity’ (luke & luke, 1999, p. 237). as scholars have aspired to ascribe ideas of racial fluidity (nagel, 1994, pp. 154-7), hybridity (ang, 2001, p.3) and dynamic forms of race identity (hall, 1996. p.2), it seems that discourses of racial categorisation are inescapable to this day. navigating identity emerging from the literature is the theme of negotiation, which extends from hall’s conceptualisation of identity as a continuous ‘process of articulation’ (hall, 1996, p.2). as biracial youth react to social, cultural and political events we need to consider their personal agency in materialising a biracial identity that supports their values and encourages a positive sense of self. nagel introduces the concept of racial negotiation through the metaphor, ‘a portfolio of ethnic identities’ (1994, p. 154) available to the mixed race person; this ‘perceived strategic utility and symbolic appropriateness’ (p. 155) influences their material and performative exhibitions of racial identity. matthew’s analogy of identity credentials (2007, p.42) fits well within the subjective interpretations of racial identity, where like any other form of id, race determines what you get access to. a biracial or multiracial person may voluntarily assume a monoracial identity for whatever purpose, although not everyone has the means, resources, or sometimes the skin colour, to do so. matthews (2007) describes the eurasian persona as cosmopolitan chic; ‘ever smiling, she is biculturally competent, benign and tolerant. neither black or white, asian nor caucasian, she is ambiguous, intriguing, exotic and exciting’ (matthews, 2007, p. 49). because the basis of being eurasian is being mixed, eurasians are subject to a mix of racial experiences, including on the one hand oppression and exclusion and on the other, a reinforced chicness. matthews’s study reiterates that different contexts play a part in how this eurasian chic is perceived. as i have found, a person’s understanding of their mixed race identity is informed by contextualised information from others and their environment. methodology sections of reflexive autoethnographic writing have been woven into this paper where it resonates with my own lived experience as a biracial asian-australian. the research project described in this paper was inspired by my own sense of identity, as well as my determination to validate this label by talking to others similarly categorised. triangulation of autoethnographic writing with the theories of human information behaviours, as applied to the findings from my interviews with other biracial youth, offers a holistic understanding of what it means to live with a complex mixed identity. 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 autoethnography reflexive autoethnography as a method ‘primarily focus[es] on a culture or subculture, [where] authors use their own experiences in the culture reflexively to bend back on self and look more deeply at self-other interactions’ (ellis & bochner, 2000, p. 740). autoethnography is a method of investigation where the researcher is a member of the social reality being studied (adler & adler, 1987; anderson, 2006); it can extend sociological understanding through highly personal accounts that draw upon the experience of the author/researcher (sparkes, 2000, p.21). swan (2008) critiques such methodological practice in social science literature, saying ‘it leads to narcissistic obsession with the self; second, it imagines the self to be the source of social problems and solutions; and finally, it individualises social and collective problems’ (swan, 2008, p. 386). in response, as ellis and bochner stress, autoethnographic writing is meant to expose the writer in a vulnerable state, through the intersection of the ‘personal to the cultural’ and the writer may, ‘move through, refract, and resist cultural interpretations’ (2000, p. 739). hence, my experience, just as my participants’ experiences, is socially and culturally produced within a context, and hence not just my special knowledge, for ‘it is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience’ (butler & scott, 1992, p.25-6). as such, portions of my own ethnographical writing are woven into the discussion of this paper. these highly personal entries stem from both positive and negative experiences as a biracial asianaustralian. interviews for my data collection, i conducted semi-structured interviews, one-on-one, on experiences of racial mixedness with six young adults aged between 18 and 25. participants included people of mixed asian and white australian heritage, decent or ancestry, who identified as being asian-australian. implied in this is that the participants have a separate and distinct racial identity from either of their parents. lacking a sense of ownership of one parent’s homeland, they nevertheless inherit a subdued sense of belonging to this parent’s traditions and cultures. as the children of a diasporic generation, like ang’s diasporic intellectuals, my subjects and i, ‘may in fact be especially well placed to analyse this complicated entanglement because it is embodied in [their] own life trajectory’ (ang, 2001, p.3). these individuals are not first-generation australians but rather the generations that follow. ommundsen (2011, p.507) described a generational difference where second and beyond generation australians may not necessarily share the same perspectives on cultural identity with their migrant parent or their australian parent. asking my participants to retell moments from their everyday life and what information they used in the process of constructing their own identity will highlight specific instances that the participant feels contributed significantly to the development of their racial identity. as i lay out a non-linear narrative of my participants’ and my own experiences, luke & luke’s evaluation of interview as a methodology for describing encounters of racialised misplacement, resilience and making sense of information has had a strong influence on this study: ‘people’s narrativisation in the interview context of their histories, experiences, and interpretations – are the only texts available to us with people’s sense-making and blending of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 73 cultural values and practices, and how racialising practices are experienced, reinterpreted, and retold, sometimes played up and sometimes played down’ (luke & luke, 1999, p.246). findings and discussion in this section, each participant has been anonymised, and given a pseudonym, rather than referring to them as participant 1, participant 2, etc. this practice means that their last name as a racial identifier was lost in this study although it may be inferred to some extent from table 1. the interviews were analysed, using a coding frame incorporating the various types of information behaviours such as information seeking, information searching, information sharing, information use, serendipitous information encounters, and information avoidance. table 1: ethnic origins of participants meet indra during my high school years, i approached my social landscape with a heightened awareness of race. subtle association of the social groups that formed, and the shared characteristics of the people in their groups led me to believe that people generally liked to hang out with those who looked and acted like them. my best friend throughout high school was another biracial asian-australian girl. perhaps my instant bond with another mixed asian-australian reinforced my view of racialised cliques at school. i fitted so comfortably in her house, which closely resembled my own, with asian-inspired art untastefully scattered across her walls, the familiar set up of the kitchen, where all the sauces and utensils were on display, and the drifting aroma of my favourite foods. an array of thongs and shoes lay haphazardly around the front door. we used to say jokingly that she was half filipino, and i was half indonesian, but together we made one white girl. we were attracted to the same type of guys who never did well at school because their parents were not as strict as our mums were. her mum loved having me around and her father notoriously absent, a mirror to my own state at home. then my parents split up and i moved further out west. between us was a forty-minute drive. at my new school, there was no other half asian child, no person to validate my half asian-australian existence. on my very first day, two pacific-islanders approached me. after the general round of personal introductions, they ask if i am one of them. i say ‘no, i am half balinese, half australian’, my standard response to this question. now that i think about it, it wouldn’t matter what country i told them – i was brown enough to be one of them. gender father mother naomi f filipino australian valerie f australian filipino samantha f australian thai jacob m chinese australian harry m australian vietnamese seth m nepalese australian 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 from then on, they were whom i associated with for the next two years. after their acceptance, the rest of the school felt that it was finally safe to approach me. associating with other brown skinned people potentially obscured any assumptions that my father is white, but this seemed unimportant to my classmates. i have always wondered if my school experience would be any different if i was a fraction less brown and more asian looking. as we were part of a small handful of brown people in a predominantly white school, my group was known to everyone. if anything, my association with this group helped me meet a lot of people and allowed me to participate in things i thought i would never do. i performed a traditional samoan dance at multicultural day, i spent weeks learning a tahitian dance routine on another occasion. i was asked to learn the new zealand national anthem instead of another white male singer, because it would sit better with the audience. at the same time, my classmates criticised the squint of my eyes and rallied together in a car park trying to one-up each other with their asian insults. i felt compelled to take a math class that i knew was too difficult for me, just so i wouldn’t be too much of a disgrace to my mum. these key moments in my own reflection resonated throughout the responses of my participants; a heightened awareness of racial groups and subsequent social boundaries, the affirmation of a having best friend/s who were similar in racial composition and the embodiment of a mixed identity that flipped between contrasting racial expectations. to investigate the prejudices and racism affiliated with race-specific experiences, i consider how people are informed by information from others and their environment, for ‘a person is likely to come across a great deal of useful information just in the process of interacting socially and physically within the relevant milieu’ (bates, 2002, p. 5). meet the interviewees you might have experienced it yourself, navigating your way through different groups congregating across a school playground. what kind of unspoken structures determined your participation with different groups during recess and lunch? from my own experience, high school groups were arranged by taxonomy of race. meet my participant seth, his grandfather migrated from nepal to australia in the late 1940s. now, 25 years of age, seth’s insights on the implications of being mixed race are heavily based on his experiences of school and growing up. his recollection of the evolution of his schoolyards over the years illustrates the visibility of racial divides: i'd probably say when i was about 13/14, prior to that there were no racial conversations. up until [school] year 6, it wasn't even on anyone's agenda, well for me anyway. it was more like who's wearing the best shoes at school. but high school, that's when people really start to draw the lines with ethnicity, well that's what i found. asians hanging out together, middle easterners, so on…seth, european australian/nepalese undoubtedly for most, the confines of school serve as the first location where children are forced to engage with others outside of their home/family circle. the congregation of racial groups are not simply serendipitous encounters, but rather the result of physical or cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 75 electronic proximity. moving across a shared space such as the school playground, people continually monitor their environment for clues and signs that direct them to people with similar values and interests, undirectedly browsing the landscape, zooming in to focus on bites of information that interest them after their initial glimpse (kwasnik, 1992). meet samantha, half thai and half white european australian, now 20 years old, who remembers her forced friendship with the only other asian girl in her class. below is her reasoning of why this occurred in her preschool class: i remember sitting in class, and the only person that wanted to sit next to me was a chinese girl… the other kids had some sort of unspoken ritual, where they wouldn’t want to share with my friend and i. we were best friends all of primary school because of that, it’s weird. samantha, european australian /thai nagel (1994) explored the importance of external validation in the construction of ethnic identities, arguing that our understanding of identity is built upon the external motivations and definitions of others. meet 21-year-old naomi, also half filipino and half european australian, whose experience supports samantha’s response to the impact of racialised groups on the biracial adolescent. in a release of bottled-up frustration, naomi confesses that she felt dehumanised due to the constant labelling by other students: just because you have a different ethnic background to someone, or you don’t fit into one particular group, doesn’t mean that you’re any less of a person, or don’t deserve anything. naomi’s eyes brim with tears and her voice chokes up as she continues… i’m sorry, i’m like, it wasn’t that i didn’t deserve anything. i felt like they deserved more than me or that i didn’t really fit in with them, so i didn’t deserve to be their friend. naomi, european australian/filipino reinforcement of external validation means living up to the expectations of others who do not necessarily understand the complexities of being mixed race. complications of categorisation luke and luke (1999) define ‘othering’ as a dangerous practice that places binary boundaries onto real-world experiences. the infinite textures of reality are consequently tied up in classifications as society attempts to know one another, rather than how one might relate to each other (law, 2004). the constant labelling of white, black, asian etc. further propels the materialisation of racial divides to the point where luke and luke argue that the discourse of ‘white is a colour too’, has emerged as a product of white invisibility in white hegemonic societies (1999, pp. 247, 8). this is an important point when theorising the lived experiences of asian-australian biracial youth, as their white characteristics are often downplayed by extrinsic audiences, thus undermining one half of their racial identity, minimising their access to their white privilege and containing their narrative to one set of racial boundary. being denied access to their white privilege was socially enforced for most of my subjects, as constant racial labelling saturated their childhood, and continued into their 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 adolescence. ‘chingaling’, ‘ling-ling’, assumed to be blind on account of the shape of their eyes; these insults are nothing new to the asian-australian biracial person. my participants spoke about the exhausting friction brought upon by their resistance to these remarks, as well as their determination to prove to others that they were half white, and shouldn’t be exclusively labelled and limited to otherness (luke and luke, 1999). i was always labelled. i was always at the brunt of the asian comments, like “she’s chinese” or something, even though i wasn’t even though i knew i was half white. valerie, european australian/filipino however, as i speak to them today as young adults, they are noticeably more passive towards such discrimination. sometimes, people ask me if i’m chinese. and i would be like, sure, why not. just because i don’t feel like explaining myself anymore. naomi, european australian/filipino this passive acceptance is the result of society’s tolerance of racial discrimination as a tool for racial disparity, enforcing a dichotomy of us and them. consequently encouraging the invisible powers of white privilege in majority white countries such as australia. young adults such as my participants have now moved past the initial confrontations of school and are now free to structure their lives around people who support and empower their identity rather than feel embattled every time someone tries to categorise them. dealing with racism naomi's painful experience of racism within her immediate family is something that she discussed during the interviews. amid the discussion about her relationships with different members of her family, naomi described the hostility she had received from some of her white cousins. maybe… jokes that are meant to be funny, but they’re not. you can tell that they are targeted and meant to hurt you, and i’m very sensitive and don’t like to be around that. growing up you realise that getting older, things that you do say, or things that you are doing you shouldn’t be around people that are perpetuating the kind of stance that where there’s and “us” and there’s a “them” and not a “together”. thrown off by the racial tormenting from her own family, my initial shock was countered by naomi’s liberal approach to the situation: … they’re just so much older than me. so, they have that ingrained mindset that’s very traditional, there’s no excuse for that obviously. but it’s going to take me time to converse with them and tell them, “maybe if you looked at it this way you might not have that opinion”. naomi, european australian/filipino naomi’s determination to initiate change through meaningful conversation, rather than distancing herself from some of her family, offers an enlightening solution for dealing with racism. naomi has a greater chance of filling any information gaps for her cousins that led cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 77 them to make such racially discriminating jokes. in other words, individuals ‘tend to seek information that is easily accessible, preferably from interpersonal sources such as friends, relatives or co-workers rather than from institutions or organisations, unless there is a particular reason for avoiding interpersonal sources’ (hakim, 2006, p. 265). as effective as these conversations might be, there are many affective and cognitive components that need to be addressed before an individual can process information, ‘affective aspects, such as attitude, stance, and motivation, may influence specificity, capability, and relevance judgements as much as cognitive aspects, such as personal knowledge, and information content’ (kuhlthau, 1991, p. 363). naomi's cousins may or may not be empathetically inclined to attune their assertions of racial ‘norms’ just because they are family members. but perhaps, frequent exposure to information about the experiences of individuals of a mixed race might be enough to initiate the development of better personal constructs (savolainen, 2015) focused towards inclusion and equality. coming to terms with biracial identity so far, i have critically examined the impact of external forces such as othering, and the social privileges or disadvantages implicated in being half asian in australia through the accounts of navigating between categories of race. as described by many identity theorists (amdahl, 2004; bonovitz, 2009; hall, 1997), identity is a by-product of the combinations of external validation and internal agency. everyone has the opportunity to manufacture a presentation of themselves to be digested by the public gaze, ‘the individual’s selfidentification and outsiders’ ethnic designations – i.e., what you think your ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is’ (nagel, 1994, p. 154). ethnic identity, then, is the result of a dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, where ‘racial features function as important identity markers around which people organise their social interactions, and which do not necessarily match the identity or “selfconceptualisation” of a person of visible racial/ethnic difference’ (luke & luke, 1999, p. 233). with a few simple makeup touches, i can slip into the features that i want to embrace on any particular day. the moment my bottle of foundation runs out, i am forced to contemplate how i wish to be viewed and perceived. negotiating between the two points on the spectrum of colour i inherited from my parents, sometimes i use a whitening cream, or some days i choose to lie on the beach and erase my previous attempts to be whiter. i get to select my skin colour, often the deciding factor in how i think other people decode my skin tone, and where i am from. with powders, pigments and technical skill i can make my nose look smaller, my face less round. after puberty, i have always had issues about my weight as asians are expected to be thin and fragile looking. some mornings i struggle to get dressed because the shape of my body doesn’t match the clothes that were designed for the average australian woman and buying clothes in indonesia is an impossible task. growing into my womanly curves, i have grown accustomed to my mother’s constant comments about my body; it is still emotionally stressful, but it is okay, because i believe that i am not completely asian. 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 within the conceptual frame of human information behaviours, the concept of satisficing helps explain motivations behind the manipulation of information in constructing racial identity. as discussed, individuals are empowered in adopting certain racial characteristics to into their appearance in order to provide informational clues to others on who they want to be perceived as. this validates the outcomes of their everyday experiences, and how they internalise their perception of self-worth and self-esteem. satisficing is the process in which, ‘an individual decides when an alternative approach or solution is sufficient to meet the individuals’ desired goals rather than pursue the perfect approach’ (simon, 1971, p. 71). for my participants, a holistic image of an asian-australian biracial does not yet exist in australia. thus, satisficing caters to the fulfilment of information gaps in the construction of a positive identity. fashion, makeup, weight, hair colour, and even facial hair, are historically recognised markers of race. attached to these markers are assumptions and expectations of racial identities in conjunction with other social identities relating to class, sexuality etc. daily changes to these features (sims, 2016) only add to the complexity of the ambiguous biological phenotypes of the asian-australian biracial. meet participant samantha, who tells me that she identifies as a chunky asian, and doesn’t mind being mistaken as colombian when she hits the town: …when i go out i like to wear fitted skirts and no one associates my chunkiness with asianness… samantha, european australian/thai flitting into the accepted appearance of a south american woman, even just for moments at a time, allows room for samantha to revaluate her attitudes towards her body. if it is socially recognised that women from another racial group are allowed attractive thicker, curvier bodies, why not someone who is considered asian? nagel wrote about the authority of external influences of culture that determine the ‘options, feasibility, and attractiveness of various ethnicities' (nagel, 1994, p. 161). favourable characteristics of different racial identities are eroticised and preferred, depicting socially accepted images of race, in turn demonising characteristics that do not fit these images. so, if samantha can feel better about her appearance by embracing the social connotations of being south american, who is to stop her? inheriting information from cultural gatekeepers as i mentioned earlier, i had never completely embraced my asian heritage until i spent time alone in my mother's home country. over the period of my lifetime, my connection to my asianness stemmed from my gradual increase in linguistic capability, as well as propinquity to my asian relatives and my interest in studying indonesian history in my spare time. one could deduce that my interest in learning indonesian bahasa was determined by my intimacy with the cultural gatekeepers within my family and community. in the study of human information behaviours, gatekeepers, ‘interact and network within their reference group and with clusters of other gatekeepers for purposes of sharing information and maintaining linkages outside their immediate sphere of influence’ (liu, 1995, p. 129). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 79 it can be difficult for the asian-australian biracial young person to access the ideologies and histories that these cultural gatekeepers share when their language capacities are underdeveloped and/or they are limited in physical/electronic proximity to these people. for example, samantha reflects on how she learnt about parts of her thai heritage: mum used to make me go to the temple. i didn't really understand what it was for, because she couldn't really explain it to me, even in thai, because it's different, the words that apply to it. they don't apply to anything else, so i'm not going to use them all the time, so i don't know what they mean. so, i guess at school, when i studied it, i kind of understood what my mother meant, like i needed to actually read it in english…samantha, european australian/thai unfortunately, samantha felt that her deficiency in conversing in thai impacted her relationship with her mum. language barriers exemplify the potency of relationships with gatekeepers, and consequently, one’s accessibility to information in another language strongly impacts how one experiences race: as i grew older i realised that my mom is so important to me, so i wanted to speak to her in thai, and now it’s just a habit. samantha, european australian/thai now that samantha has improved her linguistic capabilities, she has greater access to english and thai sources. from there samantha is able to make justified choices about the information provided to her. the biracial asian-australian is prone to feelings of alienation and dissatisfaction when their access to language and culture is denied by their cultural gatekeepers. an example of this imbalance was observed when naomi told me how she confronted her father after realising she had been missing out on aspects of her filipino culture. naomi’s father had abstained from teaching her tagalog, the national language of the philippines, as he felt that knowing the language wouldn’t be of any benefit to her life in australia: you’re in australia, speaking english, and i didn’t want to make you feel more different… naomi, european australian/filipino naomi recalls how her father’s heavy accent and poor english provoked many instances of belittlement and judgement from others. his experiences have left naomi’s father to doubt his own identity as it was continuously dismissed and discriminated against due to the hostile prejudice that exists towards immigrants in australia. by denying her access to aspects of her filipino heritage, he has consequently created a barrier in accessing the information essential to developing naomi’s racial identity. twenty-five-year-old participant jacob, with a chinese father and an anglo australian mother, made the deliberate decision not to learn his father’s native language. jacob’s family in china speak cantonese; however, jacob is convinced that learning mandarin would be a more practical and valued language to learn to complement his career in finance. jacob described this feeling of potential betrayal in our interview, 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 but i don’t feel right learning mandarin for the sake of it being practical because it’s kind of like a spit in the face to my heritage… jacob, european australian/chinese his lack of contact with his father’s side of the family in china had previously led him to believe that learning cantonese would be a waste of his time. to understand this component of jacob’s lived experience the concept of information avoidance can be applied to jacob’s dismissal of learning either language. as narayan, case and edwards have described, ‘sometimes people avoid information, if paying attention to it will cause mental discomfort and cognitive dissonance, or increase uncertainty, irrespective of the utility of the information’ (2011, p. 1). for jacob, the uncertainty of knowing which language would complement his asian-australian identity as it stands, means that he is left to endure feelings of missing out, and hence avoids learning his father’s language. the importance of passing on the native language of the asian parent is present in seth’s consideration of being a cultural gatekeeper for his future children: i have thought about it for the benefit of my own kid in the future. you know like this is where you come from, this is the language you speak. in an ideal world, my grandfather would have passed on one of his languages, that would have been nice, so i at least i could pass it on…seth, european australian/nepalese for seth, he feels that his limited knowledge of the language and culture of nepal will impact on his ability to act as an authoritative gatekeeper to nepalese culture. his reflection highlights the potency of information gatekeepers in affirming connections to racial groups as well as in constructing a positive asian-australian identity. family funerals as information grounds building on the potent influence of gatekeepers on asian-australian biracial youth, another theme that emerged in the interviews is the recurring setting of the funeral. for seth and harry, it was the death of their grandfathers that instigated an emotionally loaded discovery of information. the nature of information seeking is described as episodic (prabha et al., 2007), where stimuli drives the individual to search, seek and browse for information in order to satisfice their information needs. in the case of my participants, the setting of a family funeral acted as information grounds, where the excessive cultural stimuli and the congregation of gatekeepers from collective racial groups sparks an episode of information sharing, separate from the original purpose of the funeral. in 1999 pettigrew coined the term, defining an information ground as an, ‘environment temporarily created by the behaviour of people who have come together to perform a given task, but from which emerges a social atmosphere that fosters the spontaneous and serendipitous sharing of information’ (pettigrew, 1999, p. 811). this is an important space for the asian-australian biracial person in constructing experiences of race, as funerals are saturated in the culture and traditions of the deceased’s own cultural identity. i distinctly remember my first balinese ngaben (cremation ceremony), and how completely different it was compared to my idea of traditional christian australian funerals. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 81 dressed in a traditional kebaya and kamen, i was met with smiling family members that i had never met before. instant membership into this group via my mother was refreshing, but as the fair skinned foreigner, there was always an awkward stare or two, but it did not matter, as i was learning so much about my balinese culture in the space of three hours. loud rhythmic music from the gamelan played as the parade of gatherers made their way from the family’s home to the cemetery. for the balinese, ngaben is treated as a celebration of the deceased’s life and the day is filled with feasts, dancing and singing. the way different cultures treat their dead encapsulates essences of their religion, ceremonies and history. saddened though that i was at the price of someone else’s life, i nevertheless got the opportunity to experience what it meant to be balinese. before entering this ephemeral information ground i had felt uninspired to investigate my balinese heritage. the instant transference of knowledge through simple observation and listening surpassed anything i had learnt from reading the limited english texts on authentic balinese culture. for harry, watching his vietnamese grandfather being lowered into his grave, buried in full military honours, sparked an episode of information seeking. for seth, mourning his nepalese grandfather, he met for the first time the nepalese side of the family. over the course of the funeral he could converse with cultural gatekeepers whom he never normally had access to. information grounds are context rich, ephemeral settings that may inspire associations of engagement and belonging to a community based outside of ordinary places of home, work or school – family funerals certainly function as one. allyson hobbs, author of the book a chosen exile: a history of racial passing in american life (2014) frames the story of biracial americans who pass (for white) as a story of loss, for ‘the family jokes, the oral history every family has, and repeats and passes down, those things are lost to people who pass’ (bates, 2014). it makes me wonder how my own descendants will learn about my struggles with identity, and how they will deal with their own. conclusion in 2012, chakraborty asked what may they be? ‘if asian australian is a category that offers completely new, perhaps contrary, ways of configuring asianness … what might they be?’ (p.9). this examination of asian-australian youth was an effort towards understanding an identity that is formed through navigating mixedness. the lived experiences of this group foreshadow the lives of future generations, born into an exponentially multiracial cosmopolitan society. different manifestations of asian-australian emerge as the traditional categories of asian and white australian become increasingly complex. critically engaging with the information behaviours of this group can identify how young people harness information from their racialised environments. behaviours such as avoidance, seeking, and satisficing were observed within their daily experiences of school, family and social life. from this study, the asian-australian identity is the experiences of these people – stories of isolation and resentment towards their mixedness, as well positive experiences with ambiguous appearances and increased opportunities. 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 apart from future research in australia with various such mixed race youth, research is also needed to investigate the experiences of mixed asian-australian youth who have been raised in an asian country, for it is sure to produce an even more racially nuanced understanding of this identity. location will also influence whether their asianness or their whiteness is perceived as the majority or the minority. different geographical contexts will have their own set of social, cultural and economic expectations that the asian-australian youth will need to navigate through. nonetheless, information behaviours can apply an analytic lens to any context, helping to unpack the asian-australian identity. that said, perhaps we can apply the same information framework towards anyone who does not identify within the racialised categories that are offered in the civil societies of today. acknowledgements i thank the 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introduction background literature review methodology findings and discussion meet indra conclusion acknowledgements references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 13, no. 2 2021 © 2021 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: nga, j. l. h., ramlan, w. k., and naim, s. 2021. covid-19 pandemic and unemployment in malaysia: a case study from sabah. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:2, 73–90. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7591 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) covid-19 pandemic and unemployment in malaysia: a case study from sabah janice l. h. nga, wijaya kamal ramlan, shafinaz naim universiti malaysia sabah corresponding author: janice nga, universiti malaysia sabah, jalan ums, 88400 kota kinabalu, sabah, malaysia. janice@ums.edu.my doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7591 article history: received 06/02/2021; revised 13/05/2021; accepted 15/06/2021; published 19/07/2021 abstract covid-19 not only exposed the vulnerability of most industries especially industries that relies on air travel and tourism but resulted in the exponential increase of unemployment in malaysia. at the same time, online business or trade and ‘gig’ economy increased exponentially. the sudden and unexpected loss of jobs had dire consequences for many people. this paper examines how policies enacted during the covid-19 pandemic affected unemployment in malaysia by focussing on the situation in sabah, one of the three remaining partners in the formation of malaysia. it draws on data from the family, women and youth survey conducted online towards the end of 2020, as well as secondary data. the study shows that hardship has been faced by many people, especially those previously in professional roles, and those who are younger. the widespread damage to the economy, and to social cohesion, will require significant collaboration between business and industry, the government and the people. keywords covid-19; employment; unemployment; malaysia; sabah 73 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the support of the research management centre of universiti malaysia sabah and grri-hosei (grant no. gkp 0020-2018) is gratefully acknowledged. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7591 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7591 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:janice@ums.edu.my http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7591 introduction covid-19 was initially a localised health crisis, but it expanded into a global health crisis with severe economic impact, with the speed and scale of which the world has never seen before. economists have yet to comprehensively measure the effects of the pandemic since the chain of reaction is still progressing and spreading around the world in the form of 2nd and 3rd waves (chan & king 2020) or even 4th waves (ravindran 2021; whyte 2021). covid-19 not only exposed the fundamental flaws in all industries in malaysia, with the exception of industries in glove-making and pharmaceuticals, but also exposed the fragility of employment. many companies and industry players have adopted unpaid leave and layoffs to reduce their operational costs so that the company could have sufficient liquidity to tide over this difficulty. some of these former employees managed to survive in the challenging situation. however, some of them could not withstand the loss of their jobs and choose to commit suicide instead. blustein et al. claim that unemployment has damaging effects at both individual and community levels, in the aspects of psychological, economic, and social well-being (blustein et al. 2020; ferreira et al. 2015). the lockdown or movement control orders (mco) initiated by the government to flatten the infection rate also added to the depression of being retrenched as feelings of isolation also accompanied the lockdown. the initial shock from the pandemic distinguished the covid-19 recession as one of the worst ever pandemics (ferguson et al. 2020). while previous economic hard times, like recessions, were mainly caused by a series of unfortunate economic or financial policies, by 2020, the adversely impacted labour market was severely disrupted, triggered by the emergence of a new virus, worldwide. by the second quarter of 2020, millions of employees were moved into a temporary job loss category. the record-high in temporary unemployment percentage dwarfed previous recessions, which typically begin with an increase in permanent layoffs (elsby et al. 2010). the path of job vacancies has also been unusual: while vacancies fell throughout the first half of 2020, the drop was much smaller than is typical observed in most recessions due to the everincreasing popularity of the ‘gig’ economy (umar et al. 2020; lim 2021). in fact, vacancies at the lowest point were similar in 2015, when the labour market shrank (altig et al. 2020). while the beveridge curve – the negative relationship between vacancies and unemployment – usually ‘loops around’ during and after a recession, the rise in the unemployment rate was much greater than the related decrease in work vacancies in the early months of the covid-19 recession. pandemic and unemployment economic hard times caused by historical pandemics will enable us to establish a long-term impact on health derived directly from the current pandemic’s mortality trends. but what about the ramifications due to the disruption of everyday economic life when people become unemployed? the rapid, severe, and widespread economic disruption caused by the implementation of the mco to reduce the daily infection spike caused by the spread of the covid-19 virus is one of its most prominent features in this pandemic. this pandemic may have less in common with other pandemics such as h1n1 swine flu 2009-2010, or the spanish flu 1918 in this regard (newman 2020). for example, the 1918 pandemic’s immediate economic damage pales in comparison to the damage triggered by covid-19 currently. while this pandemic can provide an insight into long-term social and psychological health effects (direct effect), we need to look elsewhere to consider the long-term consequences of pandemics because of economic downturns, particularly for employment (blustein et al. 2020; su et al. 2021). according to the definition of the international labour office (ilo), employment comprises of “work performed for others in exchange for pay or profit” (ilo 2013). with that, “employed persons include those who, in their present job, were ‘not at work’ for a short duration but maintained a job attachment during their absence” (oecd 2020a). the ilo has reported that there are trends of income inequalities in terms of gender and age. however, different regions may vary in the level of differences for these criteria in the nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 74 access to employment. for instance, the female labour force participation rate globally is 47% as compared to 74% for their male counterparts (ilo 2020). it should also be pointed out, that the youth face challenges in the labour market such as the growing trend of temporary employment. unemployment involves individuals with the expected total duration of absence of more than three months or where there is no or unknown expected date for returning to work, and these individuals do not receive any portion of salary or wage from their employers (oecd 2020a). theoretical modelling of the interaction between pandemics and economic dynamics has been examined by eichenbaum et al. (2020). this theoretical model suggests that reductions in consumption and work will slow down the spread of the covid-19. unfortunately, these measures also increase the severity of economic recession. it is reported that offline consumption in china dropped by an average of 32% hitting hard across the board (chen et al. 2020). this reduction in offline consumption cost china over 1.2%of its 2019 gdp in the twelve-week period of initial lockdown, giving a significant estimate of the impact and magnitude faced. other countries have reported experiencing similar situations (chen et al. 2020). as covid-19 continues to spread across the globe, the expected decline in consumption has since become a reality with unemployment reaching nearly 10 million in march 2020 (wolfers 2020). martin et al. (2020) claimed that three months of lockdown during the pandemic recorded an increase of about 17.1 to 25.9% in the poverty rate in san francisco bay area with significant decreases in household saving and consumption. long recovery times have further exacerbated the slowdown of overall economic activity by low household consumption due to changes in consumption behaviours. sobieralski (2020) projected that job loss in the airline industry during times of air travel instability, due to most countries restricting or closing their borders to curb the spread, was approximately 7%of the airline workforce. although air travel was not completely halted, the covid-19 pandemic caused most airlines to ground their planes and retrench a major portion of their workforce. the covid-19 pandemic also impacted other economic activities around the world. de vito and gómez (2020) reported the fear of lockdown resulted in a change in consumer demand for products and services. this situation has affected the production and service supply chain at domestic and international levels. the pandemic has caused job losses that led to a reduction in consumer demand and resulted in a global economic recession (oecd 2020b). investment activities were also affected as investors tried to discount the liquidity risk in stock prices. in this regard, the liquidity of listed firms across 26 countries showed a drop of 50%in sales for a full operating firm, with a partial operating firm facing up to a 75% drop in sales (de vito & gómez 2020). it was suggested that government fiscal policies, tax deferrals and bridge loans are the most practical policies to overcome the issue of a massive problem with cash flow, a cash crunch. pandemic, unemployment and mental health unemployment may be generally viewed as an economic issue, but its impacts are actually greater than that as it affects mental health, stress levels and consequently an individual’s quality of life, as well as having an impact on community. as it is, staying employed during economic hard times is one of the most challenging things in life, and when unemployment is prevalent, finding work is doubly difficult. unemployment is regarded as one of the major discrete and objective life events that necessitate some social or psychological adjustment on the part of the individual in the stress literature (wheaton 2009). the stress process model (pearlin 1981,1989) is a common explanation for the relationship between unemployment and mental health that is significant in the present scenario. although the theoretical model in its original study was based on the effects of stress by people with parkinson’s disease, its findings are useful and applicable in explaining the stress caused by unemployment due to the covid-19 pandemic. pearlin claims that being unemployed increases the likelihood of experiencing stress-inducing factors such as a lack of resources, limited opportunities, and low self-esteem, nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 75 as well as limiting access to privileges and security (pearlin 1989). that is, unemployment is likely to result in a variety of losses, including social ties and economic stability, and these losses may be stressful in and of themselves (pearlin 1981). as a result, unemployment raises the risk of poor mental health. achdut and refaeli (2020) through a hierarchical linear model demonstrate that contextual stressors related with the covid-19 outbreak such as worries and fears of family members being infected, and financial strain might further reinforce the strain caused by unemployment. additional stress would be in the form of lack of social services for mental health that most government in third world countries are hard pressed to provide. this situation compounds the problem. methodology primary and secondary data were utilised in this paper. primary data were collected through two separate sets of questionnaires conducted by the family, women and youth survey (see tey 2020). the survey was conducted online between 13 november and 5 december 2020. data were collected from 2503 respondents from all districts in sabah. the data were collected using stratified sampling method to achieve a representative sample. in that, the number of respondents for each district was pre-determined proportional to the population size, and stratified according to gender, ethnicity, and age of the respondents. secondary data were mainly sourced from various official agencies and organisations especially online publications and reports. this paper is structured with an introduction of the background concerning the issue and relates it to theoretical discourses. it continues with methodological and limitations issues, and a discussion on employment in the airlines industry as the most vulnerable industry under threat. while the airline and hotel industries which makes up the bulk of the hospitality part in the tourism sector, were directly affected in this pandemic, many other downstream industries felt the brunt as well. thus, the general employment situation needs to be examined to assess the impact of the pandemic. for that purpose, this paper includes a discussion about employment in malaysia as a whole, utilising secondary data. it then scales the discussion to the employment situation in sabah based on findings from the primary data collected and corroborated to the secondary data. sabah is selected as case study because of the importance of the tourism sector in its economy, ranking third in the hierarchy of contributing sectors to the economy of sabah. limitations while this paper attempts to make a first inventory about the covid-19 pandemic effects on the employment sector, it does have its limitations. arguably, it is still relatively early to make any determination about long term effects, whether from national government policies or from global contributions. currently as the pandemic rages on throughout the world, many companies are trying various attempts and measures to survive, with or without laying off staff. some experts have warned that with the emergence of variants, covid-19 may become endemic. however, it is hoped that the vaccination process currently underway, worldwide, will put a halt to the spread and in due time, reverse the damage done. nevertheless, this paper will be a valuable contribution if and when we find ourselves in a post-pandemic era. the vulnerable airline industry according to sobieralski (2020), the travel restrictions put in place by governments have greatly affected the movement of peoples around the world, while having a negative impact on numerous downstream industries such as the tourism, hospitality and the transportation industries. the issue of flight cancellations and capacity reductions have made the airline industry fight for survival. some locally grown airlines, for example malindo air, had thrown in the towel due to various cash flow problems over the one-year nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 76 lockdown period, resulting in the majority of its staff losing their jobs, with only 1000 staff remaining employed (ram 2020; birruntha 2020). for airlines, a reduction in the workforce was unavoidable. it was estimated that nearly 7% of the airlines’ workforce was trimmed with an upper limit of over 13% with major airline workers being most impacted while regional and low-cost workers were the least affected (sobieralski 2020). the work a person didalso plays a part here. an airline employee who handled flight operations and passengers was the most affected while management employees were relatively little impacted during this period. it is projected that the recovery of this industry will take around 4 to 6 years to return to precovid-19 situation provided government support via plans and financial assistance are forthcoming. as airlines are the most directly and immediately affected by the travel restrictions put in place by governments, employment in the airline industry is the focus of discussion here. at the beginning of the pandemic, airlines management opted for unpaid leave and pay cuts for its employees. unpaid leave was seen as a temporary measure to help airlines reduce the cost burden, but it could not reduce the pressure for the potential risk of unemployment to employees. during the period of unpaid leave, the most affected employees were aircrew members, who were not able to work from home like other employees because the nature of their jobs has been serving passengers on flight or in the airport. during the mco, they had to survive with their existing savings, and they may have needed to find other ways of making ends meet. as the airline industry could not operate normally during this period, some aircrew members who had been flying for many years chose to start their own businesses to earn an income to supplement their daily needs. the first mco in malaysia was imposed from 18 march 2020. according to a report in malay mail, a pilot named johan md rosnan took the unpaid leave program from the beginning of the mco (zikri 2020). since the international borders of most countries and regions closed, this pilot, who flew international flights, has not had any job assigned to him. it is fortunate that johan, his wife, and his friends had started a plan prior the announcement of the mco to sell their homemade rainbow bread and coffee bread. as there had been an increase in sales orders for the bread, he decided to open a physical store before mco in johor to earn income during the pandemic period. this bakery business not only helped him significantly financially during the pandemic, but it has also helped him psychologically. since the mco brought a lot of financial pressure to everyone, his business has helped to keep him busy. similar situations were found in sabah as well. an example is that of stewardess wendy radin who had her last flight in april 2020, and is now a full-time financial planning consultant in unit trust sales (inus 2021). she shared her experience and recruited others to the industry to earn some income to support their family, including those who could not afford to invest themselves. investment in unit trusts has been encouraging when the government announced the i-sinar programme. this programme was aimed at those who were affected during the mco and it allowed eligible depositors of the employees’ provident fund (epf) to withdraw a certain amount from their respective account 1 with a ceiling of rm10,000 for those depositors with rm100,000 or below; and maximum 10% or rm60,000 for those have more than rm100,000 in their account 1 (azman 2021). there were success stories for some but not for all. the airasia group berhad has gone through several cycles of layoff. the first cycle of layoffs in air asia involved more than 333 employees to reduce operational cost under difficult circumstances (aroff 2020; bernama 2020). the 333 comprised 111 cabin crew members, 172 pilots and 50 engineers across malaysia. from that number, it was reported 50 of the laid off staff were based in sabah (micheal 2020). the majority of those terminated in sabah has been working for 10 to 15 years in air asia. it was claimed that those involved had not received any information about the layoffs prior to the announcement. the sudden news of layoffs had caused the affected employees to panic and feel helpless. this number was a significant proportion because it represented about one sixth of the total laid off staff. hence, it reflected the importance of air asia’s presence in the air travel industry, especially in sabah. with tourism being one of the dominant sectors in sabah, the pandemic has severely affected the sabah economy. tourism is the third largest contributor to the economic sector in sabah prior to the pandemic, representing 23% of its nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 77 total labour force with rm8 billion (usd 1.85 billion) generated in 2018 (chan & king 2020). thus, the repercussion to be felt as the pandemic progressed throughout the year 2020 were severe. retrenchment brings people into financial hardship, especially those with families to support. as the breadwinner of the family, the loss of a job means the loss of one’s self-identity, besides losing the only source of income for the family, resulting in mental and psychological stress. according to another news report, the stress of losing a job had forced a former pilot to jump to his death from an apartment in kuala lumpur (bernama 2020). this 36-year-old man, a former pilot with local airline, had taken such drastic action due to the pressure of unemployment. one might ask, in relation to the retrenchment exercise, whether, prior to the airlines laying off its employees, they conducted an exit interview with the personnel involved. if the action of exit interviews were undertaken, the airlines could identify vulnerable employees and taken immediate steps to remediate the situation. in general, companies need to address some or all of the problems and elements related to layoff. as companies plan and communicate the layoffs, it would be useful to maintain a record of the actions taken to help the employee adjust to the new situation. the elements involved in planning layoff can be divided into three sections which are layoff pre-planning, layoff notification planning, and post-layoff notification planning. in the context of covid-19, there are questions over whether these processes were followed. were the unfortunate employees prepared mentally and emotionally to face this new challenge in their life? for instance, what kind of package or program would be offered to the laid off employees or to employees offered early-retirement? this kind of package or program offered may include subsistence e.g. their daily needs like money, financial advice, but the most important issues were emotional and mental support. did the airline offer any kind of psychological need for their employees? these processes would help the airline determine if the employee had enough resources to face retrenchment. unfortunately, the evidence is that these processes were lacking as many terminated staff claimed that they were given short notices i.e. 2 days, and offered unfair compensation (micheal 2020). there is evidence from several sources that there was a significant need for psychological support for people facing hardship at this time. according to the police records, from 18 march 2020 (when the mco started) to 9 june 2020 there were 78 suicides across the country that reflects a spike as compared to 64 suicides reported in the same period for the previous year 2019 (astro ulagam 2020). a study conducted by the malaysian think tank centre in april also found that 45% of 1084 malaysians surveyed experienced anxiety and depression during the partial lockdown (astro ulagam 2020). referring to the department of statistic malaysia (dosm), the unemployment rate in malaysia for may rose to 5.3%, and 826,100 malaysians were unemployed that month. losing a job can easily make people lose the will to live. although unemployment can lead people to a dead end, it may also bring a new opportunity to learn new things such as new business ventures. the national health and morbidity survey 2019 found that the prevalence of depression in sabah was 4.0%, higher than the national prevalence of depression at 2.3%. it also revealed that bumiputera sabah, the indigenous people of sabah, ranked highest among all ethnicities with score of 5.2% for depression (iph 2020). thus, the consequences of mental threat due to the covid-19 pandemic posed a significant threat to people in sabah especially the indigenous people. recognising the potential threats and risks, mental health psychosocial support teams were established in every district throughout sabah at the early stages of the pandemic. however, information about accessing this support was somewhat lacking. the survival of airlines is dependent on travelling passengers. as such, tourist arrivals is an important factor to examine. while there are other means to reach sabah such as by land (from other parts of borneo island) and sea (from west malaysia), air travel remains the popular method of travel, especially for international tourists, that accounted for 95% of the total arrivals (chan & king 2020). thus, it is a relevant indicator and a useful reference point to explain the situation in sabah and its relationship to the nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 78 employment situation in sabah. in other words, employment is explained through the data of visitor arrivals that is directly indicative of the vitality on the airlines and hospitality industry, subsectors of the tourism sector that forms a major part of the sabah economy, and other industries that service this sector indirectly. in sabah, the total tourist arrivals experienced a drastic reduction for the year 2020 due to the covid-19 pandemic and its corresponding measures to curb the spread such as border closure and movement control orders (mco) of which there were various kinds: conditional movement control order (cmco), recovery movement control order (rmco), enhanced movement control order (emco), targeted enhanced movement control order (temco), administrative enhanced movement control order (aemco), and full movement control order (fmco) or ‘total lockdown’ that each has a separate set of standard operating procedures (povera & harun 2020 ). currently, the fmco has completed its first phase 1st -14th of june 2021 and has been continued with its second phase of implementation from the 15th-28th of june 2021 that may be further extended if necessary. as early as january 2020, sabah was the first state in the country to ban all flights from wuhan as part of its preventive measures (bernama 2020). a few days after this ban was imposed, the government of sabah took another bold step to ban all china-sabah flights on 30 january 2020, a decision that was opposed by several quarters (fmt 2020; matta 2020). the concern raised may have been due to the fact that tourists from china comprised 42.3% of the total foreign tourists in 2019. the decision was a serious blow to revenue from the tourism sector and its related subsectors. the ban on china-sabah flights has affected 127 weekly flights involving airlines including airasia (60), china southern airlines (21), malindo air (20), malaysia airlines (9), xiamen air (7), shanghai airlines (7) and loong air (3). it is clear that air asia has played a dominant role in sabah tourism, being the main air carrier for chinese tourists. as a result, sabah had managed to remain free from the covid-19 while other places in malaysia started to record cases of covid-19. sabah maintained its record at zero cases until 12 march 2020 when its first case of the covid-19 was reported (kee 2020). the patient zero for sabah had attended a religious gathering at sri petaling, kuala lumpur. over time, further restrictions were imposed as the situation changed. by the middle of march 2020, special approval from the government of sabah was required for non-sabahan malaysians to enter sabah, with the provision of medical certificates and polymerase chain reaction (pcr) swab test results, while all foreign tourists and visitors were banned from entering sabah (geraldine 2020). table 1. domestic and international tourist arrivals, 2015-2020 total domestic arrivals total international tourists total tourist arrivals 2015 2,197,800 978,426 3,176,226 2016 2,299,132 1,128,776 3,427,908 2017 2,449,556 1,235,178 3,684,734 2018 2,517,846 1,361,567 3,879,413 2019 2,726,428 1,469,475 4,195,903 2020 797,176 180,284 977,460 source: sabah tourism board (stb), 2021 by comparing the data available from the year 2019, the total tourist arrivals in sabah decreased 76.7% from 4.2 million in 2019 to less than a million in 2020 i.e. from 4,195,903 (2019) and 977,460 (2020) nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 79 respectively (sabah tourism board 2021). total international tourist arrivals observed a greater decline than domestic arrivals. there was a reduction of 87.7% for international tourist arrivals from 1,469,475 in 2019 to 180,284 in 2020; while domestic arrivals decreased 70.8% from 2,726,428 to 797,176 for the same period. prior to the pandemic, total tourist arrivals in sabah have been rising steadily over time (table 1). when mco was declared on the 18th of march 2020, the decline became noticeable. for the year 2020, tourist arrivals from january to march represented 71.3% of total visitors for the year while april to december the proportion recorded was 28.7%. it was particularly obvious for international tourists with 97.5% of them visiting sabah during the period from january to march 2020 while only 2.5% of the total international visitors arrived during the remaining months of the year (sabah tourism board 2021). this indicates a vast shrinkage in foreign arrivals, bordering on an almost total absence in sabah from april 2020 onwards. while we understand the situation of the tourism sector in sabah, we must now explore this situation with regards to the general employment situation in malaysia. employment situation in malaysia in malaysia, the covid-19 pandemic has affected the labour market. job losses and reduction in working hours implemented by employers as cost-cutting measures were observed in almost all industries affected by unemployment for the year 2020 at 711,000, increased from 508,200 for year 2019 or unemployment rate increases to 4.5% (2020) from 3.3% (2019) as reported by the department of statistics malaysia (2020). it has been observed that the ratio of labour force participation for male is higher than female for all ranges of age. while these data might be a decade old as the census in malaysia is taken on a 10-year cycle (census 2010, as shown in table 2) they are useful as a benchmark. table 2. labour force participation rate by gender, 2010 male female total 10-14 7.4% 5.4% 6.4% 15-19 21.1% 15.7% 18.4% 20-24 73.3% 57.8% 65.6% 25-29 84.3% 62.7% 73.7% 30-34 90.0% 56.9% 73.7% 35-39 92.3% 55.8% 74.0% 40-44 92.6% 52.8% 73.8% 45-49 93.5% 45.8% 71.3% 50-54 90.0% 43.4% 68.5% 55-59 76.3% 39.0% 58.8% 60-64 64.2% 33.8% 50.8% 65-69 53.3% 38.1% 45.5% 70-74 49.6% 30.8% 39.4% 75+ 47.9% 26.6% 37.6% total 49.6% 31.7% 40.9% source: department of statistics malaysia (dosm) nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 80 figure 1. monthly loss of employment in malaysia, 2018 – 2020 source: eias, 2020 the major motivations for people to work are ranked in order as follow: to sustain cost of living, seeking attention, addressing pressure from one’s surrounding peers, family and relatives, making one feeling comfortable and having peace of mind by working. for youth aged 20-29 years old, the main factor for them to work is to sustain their cost of living or cover their daily expenses (39%), follow by seeking attention (26%), addressing pressure from their peers, family and relatives (22%), feeling comfortable (8%) and obtain peace of mind (5%). this ranking order of factors are consistent with other age groups, as well as for both genders and regardless of whether one is with or without dependent (see table 3). table 3. motivations for working, by age, gender, and dependents, 2020 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 male female with dependent without dependent pressure (peers, family etc) 22% 25% 19% 12% 24% 19% 19% 22% seeking attention 26% 25% 22% 23% 25% 24% 26% 23% sustain cost of living 39% 38% 40% 41% 38% 41% 40% 39% peace of mind 5% 4% 6% 10% 4% 7% 6% 5% feeling comfortable 8% 8% 13% 14% 9% 10% 9% 10% source: credit counselling & debt management agency (akpk) adapted by: institute of youth research malaysia (iyres) the year 2020 was a challenging year for most countries around the world. besides the airline industry, many industries in malaysia were also affected by the pandemic. figure 1 shows the loss of employment (loe) in malaysia for the year 2020. loe in malaysia refers to individuals who are insured with the employment insurance system (eis), who had lost their job, but it does not include compulsory retirement, voluntary resignation, expiry of a fixed-term contract, and retrenchment due to misconduct. while it does not include all individuals affected by the pandemic such as those that did not sign up for the eis, it is a nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 81 significant point of reference to examine the impact in due course. the implementation of the movement control order (since the18 march 2020) has resulted the number of loe to drastically increasing in tandem, peaking in june and july 2020 as can be seen in figure 1. the data also indicated that most industries were affected by the mco, with the top three most affected industries being the manufacturing industry, followed by the wholesale and retail industries, and finally the accommodation and food and beverage sectors. many other industries underwent a similar retrenchment process but to a lesser extent as shown in figure 2. the main causes for these losses were downsizing, constituting 28% of total loe, followed by business closure (25%), voluntary/mutual separation schemes (23%) (vss/mss), company financial problems (15%) and other issues (9%) as shown in figure 2. figure 2. loss of employment in malaysia by industry and causes, 2020 source: eias, 2020 in terms of occupations affected by the loe, professionals top the list, follow by technicians and associate professionals, various categories of managers, service and sales workers, plant & machine operators and assemblers, and finally clerical support workers and others (see figure 3). figure 3. loss of employment in malaysia by major occupation category, 2020 source: eias, 2020 it is important to note that most loe involved those earning a relatively lower income. it shows a tendency for lower salary earners to face a greater risk of having their employment terminated in a challenging economy. as such 40.1% were those earning below rm2,000, while 62.2% of the loes have an income less than rm3,000 or 78.1% were those below rm4,000. those with relatively higher incomes nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 82 were not spared from being laid off. table 4 demonstrates the income levels of loe in the year 2020 that may well reflect the income disparity and further increase the gap between the rich and the poor, worsened over time by the covid-19 pandemic. table 4. loss of employment by wage level in malaysia, in number and in percentage, 2020 wage level number of loe % 1% <1000 7,819 7.3% 7.3% 1000-1499 19,632 18.3% 25.6% 1500-1999 15,439 14.4% 40.1% 2000-2499 13,170 12.3% 52.4% 2500-2999 10,471 9.8% 62.2% 3000-3499 8,205 7.7% 69.8% 3500-3999 8,862 8.3% 78.1% 4000-4499 7,556 7.1% 85.2% 4500-4999 4,293 4.0% 89.2% 6000-7999 4,702 4.4% 93.6% 8000-9999 2,362 2.2% 95.8% 10000-12999 1,819 1.7% 97.5% 13000-15999 958 0.9% 98.4% >16000 1,606 1.5% 99.9% revision stage 130 0.1% 100.0% total 107024 100.0% source: eias, 2020 figure 4. loss of employment by wage level in malaysia, 2020 source: eias, 2020 employment situation in sabah the case study for sabah was examined and compared with the situation at the national and international levels. further data requested from social security organization (socso) in malaysia, revealed that 74.6% of those suffering loss of employment (loe) in sabah are workers earning below rm2,000 (socso nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 83 2021). while the trend is consistent with the loe trend in malaysia that lower income earners are the major casualties in employment, the situation in sabah is relatively more severe than the situation in malaysia as a whole (40.1%, refer table 4 above). loe over time in sabah was found consistent with the trend of loe in west malaysia, peaking in june and july 2020 (see figure 1 and figure 5). figure 5. monthly loss of employment in sabah, 2019 – 2020 source: socso, 2021 the main reasons for job losses in sabah were due to business closure (17.9%), financial problems of companies (17.4%), downsizing (15.2%), other issues (10.2%), partial closure (6.4%), vss/mss (5.5%), and several other categories that were below 4% (socso 2021). in comparison with the overall malaysian situation, the businesses were hard hit and relatively more difficult to sustain under the circumstances due to the fact that many companies in sabah were relatively more engaged in economic activities pertaining to the tourism sector or have a higher business overhead cost in sabah. with the implementation of mcos to curb the spread of the disease, this overhead cost became unmanageable (idris 2021). it was also interesting to note that the loe on vss/mss in sabah was relatively much lower in sabah as compared to malaysia as a whole (23%). this disparity may well reflect that fewer people have the option to ‘select’ or ‘choose’ the circumstances under which they would become unemployed, or rather this was not an option available to them. although these may be unsubstantiated claims, this situation is well known anecdotally. as such, it would be interesting to establish its extent via further investigation into the wellbeing of workers as well as industry players in due course. on the type of industries that top the list for loe in sabah was accommodation and food and beverages (21.6%), wholesale and retail (17.2%), administrative and support service (16.3%), construction (15.1%), manufacturing (4.6%), real estate (4.5%) while other industries accounted for less than 4% in each of the categories (socso 2021). the industry based loe composition in sabah was very different from the west malaysia situation where manufacturing sector had the highest loe. this corroborates the fact that tourism plays a dominant role in the economy of sabah. in following section, some relevant primary data from the family, women and youth survey, conducted online between 13 november and 5 december 2020, were analysed. while these data did not specify the tourism sector, it is useful considering the main sector affected by loss of employment were mainly those related to tourism directly or indirectly as discussed above. table 5 shows the distribution of respondents under unmarried and married sample categories that cover all districts in sabah. nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 84 table 5. respondents by gender and districts in sabah unmarried married district male female total male female total beaufort 15 21 36 11 14 25 beluran 19 10 29 21 19 40 keningau 20 52 72 32 35 67 kinabatangan 22 25 47 34 27 61 kota belud 5 33 38 14 20 34 kota kinabalu 73 117 190 88 86 174 kota marudu 11 30 41 13 12 25 kuala penyu 4 5 9 2 5 7 kudat 5 20 25 21 11 32 kunak 5 18 23 13 10 23 lahad datu 31 47 78 41 36 77 nabawan 4 9 13 8 4 12 papar 20 51 71 21 28 49 penampang 15 34 49 20 25 45 pitas 9 5 14 5 7 12 ranau 14 44 58 23 12 35 sandakan 62 87 149 76 78 154 semporna 8 31 39 28 26 54 sipitang 4 14 18 6 7 13 tambunan 5 17 22 5 9 14 tawau 55 104 159 71 82 153 tenom 12 9 21 10 10 20 tongod 9 4 13 8 5 13 tuaran 18 45 63 19 20 39 putatan 9 16 25 11 13 24 total 454 848 1302 601 601 1202 source: tey et al. 2020 from the data collected from 2503 respondents at the end of 2020, 779 respondents (31%) reported that they were forced out of their jobs, comprising 438 female respondents and 341 male respondents. in terms of marital status, 443 unmarried respondents and 336 married respondents had lost employment due to the implementation of mco (see table 6). the findings demonstrated that more unmarried respondents had their jobs terminated as compared to married respondents. unmarried respondents are relatively younger nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 85 that married respondents on average. hence, this is also in line with the claim that younger workers are facing greater risks of losing their job than more experienced workers. besides, it may well be that marital status has been one of the factors considered by employer in retrenchment. however, this claim needs further verification. table 7. loss of business due to mco in sabah description unmarried total % married total % unmarried & married total % male % female % male % female % male % female % mco_loss_ business no 328 72% 684 81% 1012 78% 457 76% 452 75% 909 76% 785 74% 1136 78% 1921 77% yes 126 28% 163 19% 289 22% 144 24% 149 25% 293 24% 270 26% 312 22% 582 23% total 454 100% 847 100% 1301 100% 601 100% 601 100% 1202 100% 1055 100% 1448 100% 2503 100% source: tey et al. 2020 table 6. loss of employment due to mco in sabah description unmarried total % married total % unmarried & married total % male % female % male % female % male % female % mco_loss_ job no 283 62% 575 68% 858 66% 431 72% 435 72% 866 72% 714 68% 1010 70% 1724 69% yes 171 38% 272 32% 443 34% 170 28% 166 28% 336 28% 341 32% 438 30% 779 31% total 454 100% 847 100% 1301 100% 601 100% 601 100% 1202 100% 1055 100% 1448 100% 2503 100% source: tey et al. 2020 table 8. reduction in income due to mco in sabah description unmarried total % married total % unmarried & married total % male % female % male % female % male % female % mco_ income_ reduction no 135 30% 253 30% 388 30% 205 34% 200 33% 405 34% 340 32% 453 31% 793 32% yes 319 70% 594 70% 913 70% 396 66% 401 67% 797 66% 715 68% 995 69% 1710 68% total 454 100% 847 100% 1301 100% 601 100% 601 100% 1202 100% 1055 100% 1448 100% 2503 100% source: tey et al. 2020 the survey also investigated the loss of businesses as a consequence of implementing the mco. a total of 582 respondents or about one quarter of respondents reported that they have loss businesses. detailed figures on loss of businesses due to mco are shown in table 7. these primary data were consistent with the analysis of the secondary data presented in earlier section. with the imposition of mco, it is noticed that majority of the respondents or more than two-third of respondents experienced a reduction in income (see table 8). thus, we can extrapolate that whether it is the loss of businesses or employment, most respondents were impacted financially under mco. this claim is consistent when comparing the loss of employment for year 2019 and 2020 in sabah, a significant increase that loe in 2020 has doubled from year 2019 or 104.2%, i.e. from 2123 cases to 4344 that was recorded by socso (socso 2021). nga, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 86 conclusion the pandemic of covid-19 has affected working hours and the earnings of workers around the world. the international labour organization (ilo) has compiled the list of industries affected and urgent government policy is needed to address the situation. this crisis is expected to affect 6.7% of working hours around the world, which is equivalent to 195 million full-time workers (ilo 2020). around 81% of the global workforce of 3.3 billion was exposed partially or fully by this pandemic. thus, comprehensive policies are needed to focus on, but not limited to, the following four aspects: supporting enterprises, employment, and incomes; protecting workers in the workplace; stimulating the economy and jobs; and using social dialogue between government, workers, and employers to find the solutions. as malaysia enters a new phase of the covid-19 wave, it is unknown where the peak is as new highs are reported daily. thus, it is important to prepare the community in facing the new challenges, financially and psychologically by evaluating and revisiting the strategies employed over the last one year. if the pandemic is prolonged and continue to impact the bread and butter of the people, fatigue will set in, resulting in the malaysian society putting aside the current standard operating procedures (sop) in the covid-19 prevention strategies or measures. we have seen this happen in countries like indonesia and india, where livelihood has trumped covid 19 prevention sops. indecisiveness in policy, political uncertainty and politicians behaving as if they are above the law in complying with sop, will result in the erosion of the people’s trust as the situation of covid-19 and economy continues to worsen over time. with uncertainty ahead and the declaration of emergency, the ruling pn-government may have been able to avoid a ‘vote of confidence’ in parliament, however, the ruling government cannot prevent the declining of ‘voice of confidence’ in the government. with the news of the availability of vaccines for the covid19 after successfully passing the mandatory clinical trials, being made available in malaysia, the situation is looking favourable. however, effective measures to address the economic issues are still lacking. it is generally accepted that the people’s confidence in the government is closely related to the well-being of the economy. as shown in the survey conducted in sabah and in the secondary data obtained from government agencies at the national level in malaysia, the findings pointed to one common ground i.e. the hardship faced by the majority of malaysians in the time of this pandemic covid-19. government roles and engagement with various communities and industries are essential especially when it involves retrenchment, loss of employment and/or loss of businesses in due course. supports and measures for employers and employees need to be emphasised to overcome the challenges in this difficult time for all. acknowledgments the support of the research management centre of universiti malaysia sabah and grri-hosei (grant no. gkp 0020-2018) is gratefully acknowledged. the authors would like to thank socso for additional data provision and unfpa through if066-2019 (ums-tlk2019) for sharing primary data. references achdut, n. & refaeli, t. 2020, ‘unemployment and psychological distress among young people during the covid-19 pandemic: psychological resources and risk factors’, international journal of environmental research and public health, vol. 17, no. 3, 7163. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17197163 altig, d., baker, s., barrero, j.m., bloom, n., bunn, p. chen, s., ... & thwaites, g. 2020, ‘economic uncertainty before and during the covid-19 pandemic’ university of chicago becker friedman institute for economics 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https://codeblue.galencentre.org/2021/04/19/malaysias-fourth-covid-19-wave-inevitable-epidemiologists/ https://www.sabahtourism.com/statistics/ https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trip.2020.100123 https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2021.1912627 https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677x.2020.1862688 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511984945.013 https://www.webmd.com/coronavirus-in-context/video/eric-topol-fourth-wave https://www.webmd.com/coronavirus-in-context/video/eric-topol-fourth-wave https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/upshot/coronavirus-jobless-rate-great-depression.html https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/03/upshot/coronavirus-jobless-rate-great-depression.html https://www.malaymail.com/news/life/2020/ cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 1 2018 © 2018 john buchanan and meera varadharajan. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: buchanan, j. and varadharajan, m. 2018. poor understanding? challenges to global development educations. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 10(1), 1-25. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i1.57 56 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper poor understanding? challenges to global development education john buchanan university of technology sydney, australia meera varadharajan university of technology sydney, australia corresponding author: john buchanan, school of education, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo, nsw 2007, australia. john.buchanan@uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i1.5756 article history: received 17/09/2017; revised 06/02/2018; accepted 21/02/2018; published 29/03/2018 abstract as members of a global community, we cohabit a metaphorically shrinking physical environment, and are increasingly connected one to another, and to the world, by ties of culture, economics, politics, communication and the like. education is an essential component in addressing inequalities and injustices concerning global rights and responsibilities. the increasing multicultural nature of societies locally, enhanced access to distal information, and the work of charitable organisations worldwide are some of the factors that have contributed to the interest in, and need for, understanding global development education. the project on which this paper reports sought answers to the question: to what extent and in what ways can a semester-long subject enhance and extend teacher education students’ understandings of and responses to global inequalities and global development aid? in the course of the project, a continuum model emerged, as follows: indifference or ignorance ➝ pity and charity ➝ partnership and development among equals. in particular, this paper reports on some of the challenges and obstacles that need to be addressed in order to enhance pre-service teachers’ understandings of global development education. the study, conducted in australia, has implications for global development education in other developed nations. keywords global development education; globalisation; intercultural education; global partnerships declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research on which this paper was based was funded in part by world vision. mailto:john.buchanan@uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i1.5756 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 introduction we inhabit an increasingly globalized society where local and global issues, causes and consequences have become inextricable. moreover, while some global phenomena have existed for millennia (e.g. el niño/la niña weather patterns), our knowledge and understanding thereof has expanded, thus abetting, and demanding, more informed responses to increasingly complex problems. the increasing mobility of goods, services people, ideas and ideologies presents both challenges and solutions to global issues. further, as human populations increase and technologies advance, the impacts of human actions, both socially and environmentally, increase accordingly. traditional definitions of citizenship and civics now transcend national perspectives to include world and global perspectives. as members of a global community, we cohabit a metaphorically shrinking physical environment, and are increasingly interconnected by ties of culture, economics, politics and communication. our survival and wellbeing depend on ‘our capacity to understand and deal responsibly and effectively with other peoples and nations and with a variety of issues that cut across national boundaries’ (zong, 2009, p. 617). education is an essential component in addressing global inequalities and injustices. the increasing multicultural nature of societies locally, enhanced access to distal information and the work of charitable organisations worldwide are among the factors contributing to the interest in, and need for, understanding global development education (gde) (buchanan 2013). the project on which this paper reports sought answers to the question: to what extent and in what ways can a semester-long course enhance and extend teacher education students’ understandings of and responses to global inequalities and global development aid? during the project, informed in part by andreotti’s (2014) soft and critical approaches to global citizenship education, a tripartite continuum response model emerged, as outlined below: indifference or ignorance pity and charity partnership, responsibility and development among equals andreotti (2010) proposes a post–critical as well as postcolonial approach to global education, one which helps learners to cope with complexity, ambiguity, imperfection and unresolved problems, to interrogate assumptions and perspectives, and to ‘dream different dreams, to confront fears and to make ethical choices about their own lives and how they cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 3 affect the lives of others by analysing and using power and privilege in ethical and accountable ways’ (p. 241). this paper reports particularly on the challenges and obstacles to enhancing pre-service teachers’ understandings of global development education. we hope that teachers and their students might progress towards a disposition that embraces both ideologically and practically equal partnerships with people in developing nations. in the following literature review, we highlight briefly some existing global inequalities, then examine some responses within the bounds of gde, a subset of global education. review of the literature wealth and access inequality are rising, both within and between nations. according to oxfam (elliott & pilkington, 2015), ‘the share of the world’s wealth owned by the best-off 1% has increased from 44% in 2009 to 48% in 2014, while the least well-off 80% currently own just 5.5%’. oxfam predicts that on current trends, the top one percent will soon own more than the remaining 99 percent of the world’s population. this has implications for the extent to which and ways in which the rich can disregard and infringe the rights of the rest, either inadvertently or deliberately, through their purchasing power. gde aims to educate citizens about their role and capacities in a globally interdependent world and to assist them in critically exploring concepts of development, sustainability and globalisation. it seeks to ‘develop the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes required so that people can participate actively in their own development and in the development of local and global communities’ (mccormack & flaherty, 2010, p. 1333). gde promotes critical thinking about our role and place in the world and ‘promotes openmindedness…with a predisposition to take action for change’ (australian government, 2011, p. 2), while recognising international power inequality. thus, developing empathy complements critical thinking skills to take action towards desired development outcomes. in short, gde should encompass cognitive, affective and conative, that is, action-related, dimensions. gde is a dynamic and evolving field recognising the linkages between globalisation and development. bourn (2014, p. 12) argues for gde to ‘provide a pedagogical framework for implementing global learning in schools’. merryfield (2000) points out the limited capacity of ‘ethnic majority’ teacher educators to understand marginalisation. an increasing use of terms such as ‘global learning’, ‘global citizenship education’ and ‘global mindedness’ reflects a growing interest in the ‘significance of transnational mobility for the formation of a global outlook’ (andreotti, biesta, and ahenakew 2014, p. 1). it also 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 responds to the ‘new cultural, social, and economic contexts of a globalised world’ (bourn, 2014, p. 11), as well as a shift from an ‘aid-giving’ mentality to a social justice outlook. while individuals may adopt a charitable mentality and a positive predisposition towards development aid, gde aims to outgrow such standpoints, progressing towards a recognition of power and inequity in the world, deriving from neo-colonialism and consequential fault lines between the global north and south (connell, 2007), and seeking means to address these. this is arguably a shared responsibility between developed and developing worlds. such an approach also aspires to instil an open-mindedness to a broader global vision encompassing social justice and solidarity towards fellow humans (bourn, 2014). acknowledging the economic and power differentials between and within nations, o’connor and zeichner (2011) argue that gde targets ‘politics of recognition’ wherein teachers and students ‘appreciate the complex relationship between and among modes of domination and oppression’ (p. 524) and whose voices are being heard (or unheard) to effect change. such transformative thinking can confront educators and learners with ‘their own view points, their sense of place in the world and how they should respond’ (bourn, 2014, p. 6). gde presupposes critical reflection, thinking and dialogue, and necessitates challenging dominant and pre-existing assumptions and beliefs about oneself and others. bourn calls for a ‘shift in consciousness…that alters our way of being in the world’ (p. 29). and yet, education has its limits. rodell olgaç (2013) noted that teaching about issues such as the holocaust and the un declaration of human rights did not distinctly result in changed attitudes towards romani people. according to the continuum described above, gde initially raises awareness of inequalities, and challenges indifference to such issues. andreotti, biesta and ahenakew (2014) advocate transcending mere changes in personal conceptions and perceptions, progressing to understand others and appreciate their perspectives. they draw attention to the ‘wider social and political dimensions that shape the conditions for (mis) understanding and (dis) connection’ (p. 2). they also call for a global mindedness, with its capacity to engender ‘embodied possibilities for action’ (p. 9) that will help individuals to ‘engage ethically and productively’ (p. 12) ‘with otherness and difference in contexts characterized by plurality, complexity, uncertainty, contingency and inequality’ (p. 9). another important gde factor is the development learners’ efficacy and agency; that is harnessing and directing young people’s idealism, goodwill and energy by reassuring and educating them of their capacity to effect change (buchanan, 2013; healy & link, 2012). if true and equal partnerships are to materialise, this sense of efficacy and agency should also extend to people in developing cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 5 nations, as they set about developing their own liberation, and the means for its achievement, in our attempts to understand and combat the global and local dynamics that constrain such liberties. strategies should also be devised to equip teachers and their students with a resilience that will enable them to persist against apparent disappointments with regard to the extent of change emerging from local political and other actions. challenges to the delivery and success of global development education are multiple. public knowledge and attitudes, and, as a subset of this, student attitudes and knowledge, are crucial in global development education, including foreign policy, aid and international relations (cassidy, brunner & webster, 2014). milner and tingley (2013), however, question an inherent assumption that the public either knows nothing or cares little about foreign aid. in an increasingly multicultural society where people from all over the world form the public, this notion can become even more complex. individual perceptions are not only influenced by, and influence, personal choices, beliefs and understandings about other people and countries, but also derive from external factors such as unremitting information (including misand dis-information) via the media, including social media. various media play a pivotal role in portraying disproportionately negative and disturbing images of war and political crises. this, in turn, can sap the public will for global development. portrayals such as the ‘africa as the continent of helplessness and starving babies’ can be very powerful and difficult to displace in an attempt to address the more critical questions of the role of power, justice and equality (bourn, 2014, p. 10). similarly, government and aid agency propaganda can serve to influence public attitudes concerning global development, with ‘compassion fatigue’ displacing optimism (cameron, 2015). nevertheless, public and media constructs of negative geopolitical circumstances in recipient nations cannot entirely be dismissed as imagined or ill-informed. consequently, the public may be hesitant to assist aid organisations due to a reality and/or perception of corruption or oppression prevalent in some recipient countries or a limited capacity to implement programs effectively and accountably (davis, 2011, p. 403). this might be due to, among other factors, poor and disintegrating infrastructure and rule of law. it needs to be noted, however, that factors such as compassion fatigue and mistrust might also serve as convenient cover stories and as camouflage for inaction. moreover, the media can serve an important education and mobilisation role. geopolitical events locally and globally influence attitudes about global development aid, and can serve to undermine related confidence and empathy. funding earmarked by wealthy countries for global development, might instead be diverted to internal defence and counter-terrorism programs (crowe, 2014). the australian government (2014) defends its 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 expenditure on the grounds that global development aid can be diverted to fund extremist or terrorist aims and aspirations. by contrast, if development aid contributes to political stability, representative democracy and rule of law at the site of delivery, this serves australia’s, the region’s and the world’s interests, as well as local needs (australian bureau of statistics, 2007). gde and human rights education have tended to be ad-hoc affairs in schools, with references to global perspectives largely limited to the civics and citizenship curriculum areas. bourn (1997) emphasised the need for a global dimension as part of everyday school life so that all teaching is premised upon core human values of justice and equity. burridge, buchanan and chodkiewicz (2014) reached similar conclusions in a nationwide australian study; even within subjects such as history, implementation of human rights education tends to be sporadic. nevertheless, some recent events have lent weight to the importance of global education (bourn 2014). these include the launch of the un millennium development goals in 2000 and sustainable development goals (unesco, 2015), rapid advances in technology and instant communications, and the increasing public global ‘worldview’. a further potential contributing factor is the rise of international terrorism. according to bourn (2014, p. 11) gde has progressed from ‘the margins…to being central and important to school curriculum’. learning about development and global issues is now accepted as integral to ‘developing a more global outlook in schools…and pupils as global citizens, with the skills to live and work anywhere in the world’ (p. 11). the australian curriculum civics and citizenship subject (acara, 2015) ‘explores ways in which students participate in australia’s civic life and make a positive contribution as local and global citizens’. the australian government’s (2011) overseas aid program, recognises and promotes the relevance of global education across all learning areas and aims to serve as a resource and a reference point for teachers and students. its framework for global education outlines the values, skills, knowledge and opportunities for action that encompass five interconnected learning emphases reflecting recurrent gde themes: interdependence and globalisation; identity and cultural diversity; social justice and human rights; peace building and conflict resolution; and sustainable futures (p. 5), with supporting resources. the success of global education initiatives depends on the level of engagement and collaborative action both at school level and with the local and broader community to create partnerships and links (p. 25). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 7 the observations above raise the question as to how well prepared teachers are for delivering gde. the study reported on here investigated challenges to the development of an empathic stance with regard to people in developing nations, and to an effective gde. the literature has informed the conceptual framework for this paper, which seeks to investigate impediments to global development education such as the (perceived) scale and complexity of global inequalities, and overcoming wilful or other ignorance or indifference, to shape a gde that instils in young people the requisite skills, attitudes and knowledge (mccormack & flaherty, 2010), as well as predispositions, to act, emboldened with a sense of agency and efficacy, and emanating from a sense of social justice, rather than mere sympathy. methodology this study set out to ascertain the extent and nature of changes in knowledge, understanding and attitudes of a cohort of australian pre-service primary (k–6) teachers, through a onesemester subject in social and environmental education. while the subject necessarily concerns itself primarily with matters of related content and pedagogies, it also strives to imbue students with a critical understanding of globalisation and its effects. the subject also deals with prejudice and exclusion. one of the subject’s stated goals is to equip students with pedagogical strategies to address social injustices personally and internationally. elements of this are referred to by student respondents in the findings section. other related activities and prompts include a discussion of prejudice using romeo and juliet as a springboard, sexism in advertising, and viewing laos unexploded landmines (global education project, n.d.). we note here in passing that funding has since ceased for the global education project (flitton, 2015). all aspects complied with university’s human research ethics committee and with world vision australia’s related protocols to conduct the research. (world vision provided funding for the research project.) participants were provided with information explaining the nature and purpose of the research, and consent forms. data collection the study involved the administration of near-identical before-and-after surveys (see appendix 1) to a cohort of pre-service education students in the first semester of their third year of four, of a bachelor of education (primary) degree in nsw, australia. in all, 79 students responded to the first survey, and 63 to the second one. the pre-service teachers were each in one of four classes, all undertaking the second of two compulsory classes in social and environmental education. informed by the literature and problems raised therein, 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 the survey posed questions such as whether australia should provide global development assistance, how important it is for australia to do so, definitions of effective aid and the like (see findings, below). the survey sought to elicit both knowledge and attitudes from the respondents. supplementing the survey information, as part of the second survey, students were invited to take part in a semi-structured focus group to explore the issues and questions further. regrettably, only one student responded to this invitation. as a result, the subject coordinator emailed all students who had attained a distinction grade or higher, approximately one quarter of the cohort, and another four students subsequently responded, one of whom subsequently responded by email to the focus group questions. the focus group members are referred to by their pseudonyms in this article. other references to ‘a student’ or similar, refer to survey responses, which were anonymous. survey responses informed focus group questions. (see appendix 2.) this paper focuses in particular on impediments identified by the pre-service teachers, or inferred from their responses, to their understanding and appreciation of global development assistance, and, by extension, their capacity to deliver gde to their students. data analysis numeric and other data from the surveys were analysed and compared, for indications of change or similarity in the responses to the beginning and end-of-semester surveys. means were calculated for some numeric data, and open-ended data were subjected to content analysis (vaismoradi, turunen, & bondas, 2013) to identify scatter and cluster in responses. digital recordings of the focus group were transcribed, and then similarly coded according to emergent themes, consistent with grounded theory (strauss & corbin, 1990). limitations the focus group cohort is small, and from a non-random sub-group. this considerably limits the confidence with which their responses can be generalised. the focus group responses are not entirely consistent with the overall cohort responses from the surveys. this could be due partly to the anonymous nature of the surveys. some focus group participants admitted their incorrect responses to the anonymous survey question on the proportion of gross national income australia commits to global development aid. the subject is coordinated by one of the authors, john buchanan, who also taught one of the four classes. we concede the position of power and privilege that this accords, and acknowledge the corresponding potential for response bias. also, in future research, in-class observations and/or interviews with teaching staff could elicit new perspectives, and confirm cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 9 or otherwise some of the findings, which are outlined below, under categories including justifications for increasing, decreasing or eliminating aid, current mis/understandings, and the contribution of education. findings justifications for contributing global development aid or not the students were asked if australia should provide global development aid. responses are outlined below, in table 1. survey 1 survey 2 yes 77 (97.5%) 61 (96.8%) no nil 2 (3.2%) maybe 2 (2.5%) table 1. should australia provide global development aid? interestingly, the proportion of students recommending that australia provide aid actually declined slightly by the end of semester, but the difference is insignificant. moreover, the figures remained very high across the semester, at over 95 per cent. at the beginning of the semester, the main reasons provided for giving aid were: • it’s a duty for australia, since we are a wealthy country (16 responses, 20.3%); • it is a moral or god-given responsibility (7 responses, 9.9 per cent). at the end of the semester, clustered responses were as follows: • a duty as a wealthy country (17 responses, 27%); • obligation to help others (11 responses, 17%); • to improve the quality of life in developing countries (4 responses, 6%). most of these responses equate to the charity phase of the continuum outlined above. the main reservation with regard to international development aid (from those who said ‘yes’) referred to possibly corrupt regimes, or those in breach of human rights (3 responses, 5%). one student commented that money should not be given to countries with homophobic regimes or policies. at the time, some african countries were implementing draconian regulations restricting homosexual activity. the main reason for withholding aid was the need to focus on helping those less fortunate in australia (3 responses, 3.8 per cent). as one student commented, ‘we need to sort 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 out our own financial woes’. another referred to budget cuts from health and education domestically. by contrast, one student observed, ‘as an advanced country, we have the privilege of meeting the basic rights and needs for the majority of our population’. some students responding ‘no’ offered concessions such as: ‘if it is used effectively’, ‘only if it is used properly’ and, ‘it depends on what extent and the country’s government’. one respondent appeared to suggest that development aid could be largely the responsibility of ‘private organisations’. following the question about current amounts of aid, the participants were asked whether australia should contribute more funds for global development aid. responses are set out in table 2. survey 1 survey 2 more 48 (61%) 50 (79%) less 6 (8%) nil same 19 (24%) 11 (17%) no response 5 (6%) 2 (3%) don’t know/vague response 1 (1%) nil table 2. should australia give more, or less, money for development aid? substantially more students called for an increase in aid at the end of the semester, the figures rising from 61 per cent to 79 per cent. this is perhaps explained by their better appreciation of the actual amount by semester’s end. no one called for a decrease in aid at the end of semester. the five focus group participants appeared genuinely convinced of the benefits deriving from international development aid. nevertheless, they noted some possible counterarguments, their own and others’. the respondents were asked to nominate any objections they or others might have to providing aid to other countries. sarah observed, ‘take care of home…there’s a lot of communities in regional australia that i think also need help, so there’s got to be a balance.’ heather expressed this as ‘thinking internally about australian society’, and added possible concerns about having insufficient money. it appears that the students’ recent completion of a subject focusing on australian indigenous issues and education has influenced their views, but not necessarily to the benefit of global development aid. as sarah recounted, ‘just hearing about the places aboriginal cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 11 people live and the conditions they live in – it would be on a similar spectrum to the facilities and the resources that they [disadvantaged people in developing countries] have access to.’ ursula added, there’s a shortage of health [services] in a lot of regions. there’s a lot of areas that don’t have gps, so simple things and dentistry and optical, so those facilities aren’t available to them – there are a lot of ear issues and things like that because nothing has been checked earlier and also [they’re] not educated in what things are available to them as well. lucy asserted that such problems aren’t restricted to remote areas, having undertaken professional experience (practice teaching) in a disadvantaged area of sydney: [it was] half an hour from my house. the difference between the education i had when i was in school and what they have now – it is better, but things just like healthcare for example – a lot of the kids do not come from homes where they’re educated because it was a high refugee count in the school so obviously their parents aren’t aware. the reference to the high proportion of refugee students is significant, and perhaps serves to highlight the plight of some people in developing nations. what appears sub-standard to an australian tertiary student, may well be significantly better than conditions experienced by the family concerned prior to arriving in australia. heather raised concerns about money being spent ‘frivolously’, adding, ‘the only misgivings i have about money are that it may not be put to good use and will be wasted at the expense of those who needed it to be put to good use.’ issues of race might contribute to some people’s objections to providing gd assistance. ursula commented: there’s racial things as well; especially it’s all coming up now. there are probably some australians that would be like, ‘yes okay, i’m okay with giving aid to this particular country but not this one because of certain people or what’s happened in that country’ or if they don’t believe in their religious beliefs or they don’t like how certain things have happened in that country. lucy questioned the merits of recent australian funding for cambodia ‘as a trade-off for taking refugees’, suggesting that the cambodian government is not very trustworthy. ursula also shared concerns about giving money directly to some foreign governments, ‘because it’s probably not getting in a lot of places to the people that need it [and] a lot of people would be reluctant as well because they’re not sure that their money is going to where it actually needs to go’. the legitimacy or otherwise of the views or assumptions set out above (e.g. ‘a high 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 refugee count in the school so obviously their parents aren’t aware’) could be questioned, and could provide a starting point for discussion in class. nevertheless, while such views persist, they will serve as impediments towards increased global development aid. the (perceived) complexity of global development assistance appears to be a further stumbling-block to related efficacy and action. ursula summed this up, saying, ‘it’s so deep. there are so many layers’. sarah spoke of the dilemma of competing needs, such as health and education, given that each benefits from the other. when asked about the prominence of literacy as opposed to ‘survival skills’, ursula responded, ‘it’s tough. what is it, the chicken or the egg that comes first?’ the focus group was asked to offer adjectives describing ‘effective’ development aid (see also buchanan, 2015). when asked about effective development aid meeting local needs, ursula argued: why maybe it doesn’t work in some cases is that it’s not wanted in some places or not the right type of – you know like their [local people’s] consideration isn’t maybe being put into place … so it’s more about the ideals of the people coming in rather than what will suit the people that are actually there. sarah added: i’m quite sceptical of the difference that can be made by some of the programs [with people who] go over to cambodia for a week and help build an orphanage and…you’ve got a bunch of 16-year-olds; they don’t have the skills to build. you’d be better off sending builders there. she continued: it will enrich the kids that go over but how much help will they be able to provide and also specially working with kids [local orphans] if you’ve got new faces coming and going every week it’s like, ‘oh, they’re here – oh, they’re gone’. lucy added, ‘that would have a big impact on kids, especially in an orphanage, like no one is staying aside from the staff. it would be a hard thing.’ lucy suggested that sending tafe carpentry students to developing communities to assist in building would produce a two-way benefit. ursula was critical of short-term, hit-and-run development projects, preferring, ‘a goal-driven sort of thing; so, not just going in and helping for a short time and then leaving. it’s more about setting up communities so that they can provide for their community.’ this appears consistent with the goal of autonomy mentioned previously. lucy noted that, during the focus group discussion, our ‘word pictures’ with regard to how, hypothetically, to help those in need, tended to stereotype them as rural people. ‘what about people in cities?’ she asked. she added that this reinforces the necessity of finding out cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 13 what particular people and communities need. when asked to respond to her own question, lucy responded, ‘it’s harder – obviously sanitation and access to water are still really important like the video on india [slumming it, (bunce & simpson, 2010)] we watched and i’ve been to cambodia as well, its streets are lined with rubbish’. she added that opportunities for growing one’s own food are limited in the city. sarah observed that people are surviving in the cities, which presumes a certain level of independence to start with. their comments suggest an engagement with partners, rather than recipients or victims, and informed by local intelligence. mis/understandings of current circumstances the students were asked to indicate the proportion of gross national income that australia currently devotes to global development aid. responses are set out in table 3. survey 1 survey 2 < 1% 12% 25.4% 1-5% 37% 28.6% 6-10% 14% 9.5% 11-25% 31% 9.5% 25%+ 10% 1.6% not enough 1.6% don’t know 6% table 3 what proportion of gross national income does australia commit to global aid? as can be seen, the original ignorance of current levels of global development aid commitment is problematic, particularly if this is indicative of mis/understandings among the broader population, including educated elites and leaders, such as schoolteachers. the proportion of students who had close-to-correct answers (i.e. less than 1% of gni) more than doubled by the end of semester. those furnishing highly inflated answers declined considerably. two students understated the amount, both at the beginning and end of the semester. nevertheless, the proportion of incorrect responses remained disconcertingly high, given that the information was provided to the students during the semester. the focus group participants were asked to recall the survey question about the proportion of gross national income devoted to development aid. there was general agreement that they had expected the figure to be higher. ‘i think i put like four percent or 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 something,’ said lucy. heather conceded that government funds need to be spent wisely, but lamented that, ‘australia does not give out nearly as much as it could in terms of foreign aid.’ incorrect knowledge of current global development assistance levels serves as a poor basis for making decisions as to whether those levels are appropriate or not. as sarah observed, ‘i think people’s objections would be based on an unrealistic idea of how much we’re giving away, but if they knew how little it was…’. the students were also asked if they believed that numbers of people living in poverty had increased or decreased in the previous 30 years. responses follow, in table 4. survey 1 survey 2 increased 47 (59%) 25 (40%) decreased 12 (15%) 24 (38%) remained the same 15 (19%) 11 (17%) no response 4 (5%) 3 (5%) don’t know/vague response 1 (1.3%) 1 (1.6%) table 4. have numbers in poverty increased/decreased? as can be seen in the table above, the proportion of students who correctly responded that numbers had decreased, rose significantly by the end of the semester. there was a corresponding reduction in the proportion responding that numbers had increased. perceptions of numbers of people living in poverty are likely to be a powerful mediator of agency and efficacy with regard to addressing related challenges. contributions of education the focus group members were asked where they felt that provision of education might fit into prioritising development aid. heather referred to maslow’s (1943) hierarchy of needs, citing, ‘safe and healthy living accommodations for children and their families, proper sanitation, regular food and everyday living supplies, and clean drinking water’. only once these have been met, argued heather, ‘steps towards improving education can be achieved’. she added that education was not limited to formal schooling. educating locals on the importance of clean drinking water, and how to obtain it, are of central importance for her, as ‘it goes back to making them self-sufficient’. potentially, the conversation itself, and the question that prompted it, ‘how to help’ is paternalistically premised. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 15 the survey respondents were asked about their recollections of global development aid from their own school days. responses are summarised in table 5. survey 1 survey 2 none 29 (37%) 17 (27%) no response 7 (9%) 16 (25%) poverty 12 (15%) 6 (9.8%) collections for crises 11 (14%) 3 (4.9%) natural disasters 6 (7.5%) 2(3.3%) developing countries 6 (7.5%) 2(3.3%) climate change/global warming 8 (10%) table 5: recollections of global development aid from school interestingly, the number of students who could recall no school-related issues decreased during the semester. presumably the contents of the semester prompted some memories, and/or clarified in the minds of the students what global development pedagogy might encompass and look like. by contrast, the ‘no response’ rate increased, and other specific recollections declined. this may be because students felt they had furnished the answer previously, or may be a casualty of end-of-semester fatigue. to the extent that fatigue (as opposed to end-of-semester inspiration) is a factor, this needs to be considered by teaching staff. specific recollections of learning about global development at school included studies on mexico city, poverty in south america, unrest in cairo, natural disasters, relief, peacekeeping, slavery, racism, the holocaust, environmental concerns, struggles for women worldwide, make poverty history, millennium goals, china and the one-child policy, civil rights movements, poverty, a project with ngo compassion, micro-funding, starvation in africa, income inequality, fair trade, videos of developing countries, the un, and the work of world vision. in legal studies, one student recalled studying indigenous peoples, asylum seekers and child trafficking. students recalled studying the cultures of india, papua new guinea and bali. while more details would need to be known about the school experiences in the table and discussion above before confident inferences could be made, it appears prima facie that these initiatives tend to privilege problems over partnerships. and yet, minimising problems may also lead to indifference and inaction. 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 the small focus group noted few meaningful inclusions of global development aid during their professional experience (‘practice teaching’). heather referred to ‘mild videos in hsie classes, and mildly illustrated picture books which describe the living conditions which some individuals live in. these would be followed up by student presentations which i was not around to see as i finished my pe’. on a hopeful note, ursula explained: i see it as an important one, just as to educate children about global issues and global development – things that are happening outside their little bubble. i felt that was something that i didn’t really get educated on and i see that my daughters are getting quite a good one on it and they’re much more aware of things than me. ursula stressed that it is important to introduce her students to ‘things that are happening outside their little bubble’. she added that her own school education was lacking in this regard. heather made reference to teachers’ ‘responsibility to provide information to our students of the issues reflecting those which occur overseas, such as poverty and famine’. in terms of elements of the social and environmental education subject that had changed or challenged their views, the focus group students referred to: • a documentary slumming it (bunce & simpson, 2010), featuring children in the slums of mumbai. sarah said in response, ‘i was really taken back by that. i think that to me has changed my view towards it’. • a feature film, paper clips (berlin & fab, 2003) about which ursula remarked: i love the idea of all that. i don’t think at this stage of my learning or teaching i would have the confidence to do something like that but i hope that as a more experienced teacher and as i learn more that i would love to come up with something like that with the kids and have them feel that they have a voice. • a story titled ryan’s well (cook, n.d.), as an inspiring example of a young child who made a difference raising money. the focus group members referred to the energy, idealism and ‘sense that anything’s possible’ that some children have, again, underscoring the importance of efficacy. other elements of the subject that resonated among focus group members included: an interactive exploration of homelessness and refugees, incorporating the picture book the silence seeker (morley, 2009); and a guest interactive session by a world vision staff member. the focus group students also commented without prompting on the thoughtcosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 17 provoking nature of the focus group itself, an implication of which might be the implementation of similar problem-solving and/or systems thinking group work in class. discussion and conclusions these students arguably commenced as an educated and empathic elite concerning global development aid. the subject appears to have reinforced and emboldened their views, and to have provided new insights into the ‘global condition’ including their own place, privilege and potential therein. nevertheless, their related knowledge is not universally high. the survey results and focus group discussion indicate that the students typically progressed along the abovementioned ‘indifference/ignorance – charity/pity – partnership/development’ continuum, which is heartening, even though few progressed to the highest level. this continuum will be presented to future students for their consideration, and may help them step outside themselves and monitor their status or progress. if the overseas aid program (australian government, 2011) can be taken as another yardstick against which their understanding can be measured, their thinking appears to encompass four of the five goals: cultural diversity; justice and rights; peace building/conflict resolution; and sustainable futures. the fifth, interdependence, appears to elude most of them, with the possible exception of the focus group members. arguably, it is only this fifth element that is ‘critical’, as opposed to ‘soft’ (andreotti 2014). a critical as opposed to a soft approach investigates causes rather than merely symptoms, recommends equal partnerships as opposed to a ‘helping hand’ and sees justice versus compassion as a motive for action. some of these differences are outlined below. the findings of this study, contextualised in the literature, raise a number of tensions, which are addressed in turn below. each has implications for students’ progress along the continuum outlined above. they constitute an attempt on our part to become comfortable (but not too comfortable?) with andreotti’s (2010) complexity, ambiguity, imperfection and irresolution. critically literate scepticism versus generosity andreotti (2014) favours critically literate scepticism over instinctive generosity. accordingly, it is important for students to exercise intellectual and cognitive, as well as affective, caution, reflection and scepticism. and yet, countering world poverty may at times oblige on our part an immediate, no-questions-asked generosity. 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 whose and which human rights? while the argument of ‘fixing our own problems first’ is arguably a cliché, real and pressing problems persist in australia. if life expectancy of indigenous australians can be taken at approximately 71.4 years (australian government institute of health and welfare, 2016), this places it slightly below that of bangladesh (world bank, 2016). nevertheless, more government funding, approximately one per cent of gdp (parliament of australia, 2012), is specifically dedicated to aboriginal wellbeing, than to international development aid. disadvantage is not limited to indigenous communities and individuals, however. it finds a home in rural and remote areas, and in our largest cities, as observed by the focus group members. compounding this problem is the reality or perceptions of corruption in some regimes. yet it is the citizens of such regimes that may be most in need of assistance, again raising the prospect that a no-questions-asked generosity might be an appropriate response, at least in the short term. things are improving/deteriorating despite rising inequality, (elliott & pilkington, 2015), extreme poverty has decreased worldwide. the united nations met its ambitious millennium goal to halve extreme poverty five years before its self-imposed deadline. and yet, welfare organisation campaign materials typically portray chronic, bottomless crisis. helpful or helpless? the complexity of gd programs and related outcomes can be overwhelming, perhaps conveniently so. it is possible that true partnerships among equals in such endeavors may be an impossible, ideological ideal. nevertheless, heeding local intelligence regarding greatest needs, as part of a mutual flow of information, may point to workable solutions. any of the above is arguably an avoidance strategy or cover story, to justify a reluctance to share our toys with others in the global sandpit. it is reasonable to invest in humans. it is also reasonable to expect a return on our investment, even if the political left and right might quibble over whether that return should be primarily fiscal or social in nature. while a vast prosperity gulf persists, it seems reasonable for those with overabundance to share with those lacking necessities – regardless of whose fault this lack might be, or be deemed to be. classroom and extracurricular critical literacy should remain free to operate in holding nations, organisations and individuals, and ourselves, to account, and to prompt and inform related actions. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 19 the results discussed here present several challenges to broader public understanding and acceptance of global development aid by the globally wealthy. these include: an initially poor understanding of current levels of development aid, and of numbers living in poverty, which is perhaps particularly disconcerting in an educated and educating elite; scant or unfavorable recollections of schooling experiences; bewilderment borne of the complexity of addressing challenges, and resulting retreat from concern and action; and, it is conceded here, plausible, competing demands on public funds, including health and education needs, particularly for indigenous and other disadvantaged groups locally. an ignorance of or indifference to needs will also impede effective global development. we accept the validity of many of the students’ reservations regarding global development aid, which have also been reported elsewhere (e.g. tschirgi, 2004), and the implications this has for delivery of the subject, including permitting space for airing such reservations, along with counterarguments, in class. nevertheless, as part of gde, it is reasonable to ask educators to assume bold leadership in contributing to a futures-, fairnessand peace-oriented education, and to a more socially just world, and to 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(list up to five). 6. give three adjectives to describe what an ‘effective’ or ‘good’ aid program looks like. 7. in your own schooling, did you experience any teaching on global issues? if so, can you give any examples (e.g. topic, activity, content)? 8. in the last 30 years the proportion of the world population living in extreme poverty has… (circle one) (a) increased (b) remained more or less the same (c) decreased 9. how likely would you do one of the following activities to help address global poverty? i would certainly do this i would probably do this i would probably not do this i would certainly not do this write a letter to a member of parliament donate money to an aid / development organisation collect signatures for a petition post an article on social media buy fair trade products 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 sponsor a child speak to friends / family take part in a peaceful rally 10. how interested are you in the following? very interested quite interested not very interested not interested at all what is happening in your local community australian politics social issues in australia environmental issues global poverty issues human rights issues 11. what does the term ‘global citizenship’ mean to you? 12. i am willing for this information to be used, without identifying me, in research publications.  (if this box is unticked, answers will only be used for teaching evaluations.) 13. do you believe your views about global development have changed during this semester? yes  no  if yes, can you identify any reasons (course content – be specific if possible), current affairs etc. 14. if you are willing to be in a focus group to discuss this further, please write your first name and phone number below. or you can email [lecturer] … cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 25 appendix 2 focus group question protocol focus group questions for global development project 1. do you think it is important for australia to provide aid for developing nations in the region or more broadly? why/not? 2. would you say your views about this have changed in recent times? 3. if so, what might have caused these changes? prompts: current events? this course? hsie subject/s? other subject/s? other – personal etc? 4. if you think we should give aid, what do you think should be prioritised, and why? (and where?) 5. what do you think some of the main objections to australia giving international development aid are? how valid or otherwise do you think these arguments are? 6. how confident or otherwise are you that global development aid can make a difference? has made a difference? prompts: if so, how and why, if not, why not, and what might change this? 7. do you think most people overor underestimate the amount currently gives in aid? 8. are there any things you do support or promote international development aid? prompts: writing to an mp, lobbying, online campaigns, collecting for charity etc.) 9. in any of your pes, have you observed the inclusion of global development in teaching and/or school undertakings/events? prompts: hsie teaching. literacy/books read/shared, fundraising events etc. 10. what, if any, role does education have with regard to global development aid? what, if any, do you see as responsibilities specific to teachers (including yourself as a teacher) in this regard? 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.1, 2018 this page intentionally blank abstract keywords introduction review of the literature findings discussion and conclusions references references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 11, no. 2 2019 © 2019 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: williams, m. & allan, j. 2019. reducing smoking in australia: how to include aboriginal and torres strait islander people. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 11:2, 37-54. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i2 .6642 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper reducing smoking in australia: how to include aboriginal and torres strait islander people martin williams university of technology sydney, sydney, australia john allan university of queensland, brisbane, australia corresponding author: martin williams, faculty of arts and social sciences, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo nsw 2007, australia. martin.williams@uts.edu.au john allan, faculty of medicine, university of queensland, st lucia, queensland 4072 australia. j.allan3@uq.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11i2.6642 article history: received 24/06/2019; revised23/10/2019; accepted 30/10/2019; published 27/11/2019. abstract australia has succeeded in lowering the overall prevalence of tobacco smoking in the last four decades and has enjoyed a worldwide reputation for innovative policy. however, this success has not extended to indigenous australians. using a narrative review and critique of literature from government, public health, health promotion, marketing and communication on smoking cessation in australia, we first consider the history of government anti-smoking measures including legislation and communication initiatives including advertising and sponsorship bans, health warnings and ‘no smoking’ rules affecting anti-smoking norms, culminating in the banning of branding and the advent of tobacco plain packaging. we also review the effects of excise increases and smoking cessation aids such as quit lines and nicotine replacement therapy. for each type of intervention, both population-wide and those specifically directed at indigenous people, we consider the probable reasons for the failure to reach aboriginal and torres strait islander people or alter their smoking patterns, and make suggestions for improvements in interventions and their evaluation. we conclude that the history of antismoking initiatives in australia suggests that community-based health initiatives are likely to be more effective in addressing indigenous people and helping smokers to quit. keywords aboriginal and torres strait islanders, smoking behaviour, health promotion, community based intervention declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. mailto:martin.williams@uts.edu.au mailto:j.allan3@uq.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11i2.6642 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 introduction with a weight of evidence about the dangers of smoking, and the costs to health systems, the australian government has prosecuted its case against smoking arguably as strongly as any nation. anti-smoking measures enacted since the 1970s have included mass media quit campaigns, advertising bans, price increases via taxation, and restrictions around smoking in public spaces, and together have achieved dramatic reductions in the prevalence of smoking. in 2008 all governments in australia – state, territory and federal – signed a national healthcare agreement (steering committee 2009) re-ratified in 2012. these initiatives were expected to reduce adult smoking prevalence to 10% by 2018, while cutting the proportion of daily smokers among aboriginal and torres strait islander people by 50%. however, national anti-smoking measures have had less impact on aboriginal and torres strait islander people, and specifically aimed programs have been less effective and the results of different interventions less easy to measure. smoking prevalence among indigenous people remains alarmingly high, recorded at 39% in 2014–15 (abs 2016). indigenous people aged 15 or over are 2.6 times as likely to smoke as other australians (abs 2014; ahmac 2015) and indigenous women are four times as likely to smoke during pregnancy as other women (myers & vickers 2015). australia’s indigenous population may be among the most disadvantaged indigenous populations in the world (hill, barker & vos 2007), and socio-economic disadvantage is in itself a predictor of higher smoking rates (cancer council victoria 2013). additionally, smoking patterns are also likely to reflect cultural aspects particular to this population, including the traditional customs of sharing and kinship bonding (ivers 2001). smokers from disadvantaged groups also tend to have higher levels of dependency on nicotine, smoke more cigarettes each day and smoke for more years than the general population (cancer council victoria 2013). thus, the health consequences are profound. for aboriginal and torres strait islander people, tobacco smoking is the most preventable cause of ill health and early death. smoking is responsible for around one in five deaths and for a third of cancer and cardiovascular disease incidence (vos et al. 2007). comprehensive tobacco advertising prohibition in 1994 initiated a slide in smoking from over 24% of the population to approximately 20% in 2000 (see figure 1) (national preventative health taskforce 2008). subsequent bans on smoking in dining areas, followed by graphic health warnings on packets, hastened the decline to about 15%. after a 25% increase in excise on cigarettes in 2009 the rate fell to just over 13% in 2012. although it is difficult to attribute the effects to individual measures, since 2005 the combined impact of multiple excise increases, the removal of branding from packaging and point-of-sale restrictions together led to dramatic decreases in rates of smoking to just under 13% in 2014, the lowest smoking prevalence ever recorded in australia, and just over 13% in 2017–18 (greenhalgh, bayly & winstanley 2019). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 39 figure 1: prevalence of daily smoking for australians 14 years or older and key tobacco control measures implemented in australia since 1990 (age-standardised to the 2001 australian population). (source: adapted from abs 2015 and 2019.) however, these national figures mask the unequal impact of anti-smoking measures on aboriginal communities. although efforts have been made for many years to reduce indigenous tobacco use, the delivery of tobacco action programs is marked by limited resources and a lack of coordination (ceitc 2008; ivers 2011). the tackling indigenous smoking initiative, announced in 2008, represented a significant commitment to indigenous tobacco action, but funding was cut in 2014 by $130 million over five years, which will lead to aboriginal deaths. this paper begins from the premise that in a country which promotes policies of social inclusion, this inclusiveness should be observable in all aspects of life. the marginalisation of any group is a cause for concern, and the further marginalisation of indigenous people because of the burdens of poor health resulting from smoking is a matter of national significance. we review the literature on smoking cessation from government, public health, and health promotion, through the lens a health professional and a marketing and communications expert, rather than indigenous or torres strait islander people. the paper asks why policies and interventions that have been successful in the australian population at large have not been successful among indigenous people, and what approaches, if any, might go some way towards redressing the balance. measures adopted in the population at large to reduce smoking advertising and sponsorship bans mandatory health warnings for radio and television cigarette advertisements were introduced in 1972, and health warnings appeared on cigarette packs in 1973. in september 1976 tobacco and cigarette advertisements on television and radio were banned. from december 1989 locally produced print media advertising was banned. the tobacco advertising prohibition act 1992 prohibited almost all forms of tobacco advertising, including sponsorship of sporting and cultural events, by 2007. ‘no smoking’ rules affecting anti-smoking norms anti-smoking norms, especially in the workplace, have a profound effect on the frequency of consumption as well as the uptake of smoking. smoking bans originated from occupational 40 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 health and safety concerns about passive smoking, leading to progressive restrictions, and spread beyond government and corporations to hospitality venues and public places (chapman et al. 1999; walsh, tzelepis & mckenzie 2002; borland, winstanley & reading 2009). combined with the growing evidence about the health effects and social costs of smoking, these restrictions contributed to a growing anti-smoking sentiment among the population at large. bans were then extended to sporting and outdoor venues and places where children could be influenced, for example by queensland’s tobacco and other smoking products act 1998. however, those who were not working or who were spending their time in unregulated environments were less affected by these changes. point-of-sale advertising bans mounting research evidence on the effects of point-of-sale promotion resulted in banning of display of smoking products at point of sale altogether. from 31 december 2010 all retailers were required to store smoking products in special lockers, out of consumers’ sight. the effects were significant as figure 1 shows. however, there is little evidence that point-of-sale policies had an impact among indigenous people, possibly due to the less stringent application of laws governing display among some communities (upson 2015). total bans on cigarette pack branding the 2012 government policy known as ‘plain packaging’, the most radical legislation anywhere in the world, prohibited the use of tobacco brand logos, colours, imagery or promotional text on cigarette packaging. further off-putting additions included graphic images of the effects of smoking, information about the chemicals in cigarettes, and australia’s annual smoking-related death rates (australian government department of health 2019). treasury data posted on the health department’s website showed dramatic results. sales slid and the proportion of the population smoking daily fell still further. however, similar results were not evident within marginalised groups. anti-smoking mass media advertising campaign effects substantial international scientific evidence demonstrates that government anti-smoking mass media campaigns have helped smokers quit and prevented children from smoking. national advertising campaigns, taxation and smoke-free legislation have together been successful in the general australian community. however, there is little evidence for the effectiveness of mass media campaigns in reducing smoking rates among indigenous australians (power, grealy & rintoul 2009; ivers 2011, 2014). the tobacco project in the northern territory demonstrated no significant reduction in tobacco use across all communities, with substantial variation between communities (thomas, johnston & fitz 2010). mass media anti-smoking campaigns generally address behaviours in large audiences. however, where audiences lack the resources to change, or where the campaigns do not contain the triggers relevant to the social context of audiences, people may be less disposed to respond. thus writers have advocated for more attention to indigenous groups, for example by employing indigenous health workers to work directly with families (digiacomo et al. 2011). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 41 in 2011, indigenous leader professor tom calma, the australian federal government’s national coordinator charged with tackling indigenous smoking, argued that mainstream campaigns were not getting through: what people want is something that they can relate to and so this [the indigenous tobacco control project] is an attempt to be able to do that. a punitive-type message is not going to help. what we need to do is educate people so that they understand the relationship between smoking and poor health and disease and death (calma 2011). he argued that any future campaigns should help aboriginal and torres strait islander people learn more about the support that is available to help all australians quit smoking. research evidence of anti-smoking quit campaigns up to 2015 points to more frequent recall of warning labels, news stories and advertising commonly associated with worry about health and wanting to quit. however, frequent advertising recall was more association with believing that society disapproves of smoking, but less impact on quitting (nicholson et al., 2015). although the subsequent anti-smoking 2015 national tobacco campaign performed well amongst the majority of the population on most advertising awareness measures, no significant reduction in cessation among aboriginal people was recorded (myers & vickers 2015). researchers concluded there was little evidence that mass media campaigns were effective in reducing smoking rates among indigenous australians (ivers 2011, 2014; minichiello et al. 2016), which may be due to lack of consistent messaging, difficulty in addressing remote communities, language barriers and so on. a number of campaigns using alternative media, such as apps, dvds and facebook (‘quit for you, quit for two’, ‘blow away the smokes’ and ‘sticking it up the smokes’) advocated in the closing the gap policy have been initiated in aboriginal and torres strait islander communities since its declaration in 2009. however, relatively little attention has been given to the way anti-tobacco messages are communicated to aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples (gould et al. 2013). for mass media, achievement of sufficient population exposure is vital, especially among disadvantaged adult smokers, as television remains the primary channel of access to them (wakefield, loken & hornik 2010). however, the use of inappropriate creative content that may not resonate with the highly addicted is a factor that may explain why quit advertising has had less effect in aboriginal smokers (gould et al. 2016). while evidence from the talking about the smokes project 2014 also supports the importance of using targeted advertising, (thomas et al. 2015) and though the success of social media strategies in health promotion among indigenous people is scant (briggs, lindorff & ivers 2003; brusse 2014), recent evidence of social media use, at least among young indigenous people, is encouraging: indigenous young people expressed that they are more drawn to multimedia, video, social networking, animation, music and mobile phones than traditional anti-smoking marketing campaigns. these multimedia forms are more widely accessible because they minimize language and literacy barriers (wright et al. 2019). 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 pricing effects on smoking cessation while excise had been increasing since the 1960s, the excise on large packets of 25 cigarettes increased substantially after tax reforms were adopted in 1999. taxes increased again substantially in the following years (see figure 1). by 2017 government excise had grown to approximately 69% of the retail price. in 2020 australians will pay a$40 for a packet of 40 cigarettes. this means that it will cost over a$7000 a year for someone smoking 20 cigarettes a day. economists and others have concluded that virtually all the reduction in tobacco consumption in australia between 1962–63 and 1995–96 could be attributed to increases in price, resulting mainly from increases in tax levels (bardsley & olekalns 1999; wakefield et al. 2008). however, wakefield et al. found that price increases from excise rises had less impact on reduction of consumption in lower income groups. price rises can cause financial hardship in households where smokers do not quit (hoek & smith 2016), and tax increases can stimulate tobacco company arguments about regressive effects and encourage illicit trade (hirono & smith 2010). a uk-based analysis of tobacco industry submissions to government against excise hikes, found tobacco companies employed the concept of health inequalities to criticise cessation services and tax increases for not addressing underlying causes of disadvantage (clifford, hill & collin 2014). further, there is evidence that tobacco companies implement variable cigarette pricing in poorer communities, making cigarettes cheaper (dalglish et al. 2013), than the then retail equivalent cost of approx. 75 cents australian on average per cigarette. thomas et al. (2013) made an assessment of the impact of a 25% tax rise on tobacco sales in aboriginal communities in remote australia and explored local perceptions about tobacco tax rises and their impact. the study found no significant reduction in total tobacco sold in a store in the seven months after the price increase, compared with the seven months before the price increase, confirming the lack of pricing effects in the researched community. at the same time, cigarette price hikes have had compounding negative effects, for example increased demand for sharing cigarettes, together with increased reliance on those with more money to purchase cigarettes for other smokers (thomas et al. 2013). in conclusion, policies to reduce smoking in the population at large have different effects on indigenous people, among whom price rises may fail to be a disincentive but result in undesirable knock-on effects (bryant et al. 2011b). quit lines and their success several large studies all concluded that telephone quit lines, together with counselling, increase quit rates (abrams et al. 2010; stead et al. 2013). the cost effectiveness of telephone counselling has usually been associated with nicotine patches in the us as well as in australia (miller, wakefield & roberts 2003), while at least half the nicotine replacement therapy programs aimed at aboriginal and torres strait islander communities have focused on smoke-free pregnancy (gould et al. 2014). however, randomised trials of the relative effectiveness and cost effectiveness of different protocols are limited (bryant et al. 2011a). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 43 in australia, most quit lines employ some aboriginal counsellors, and when respondents identify as indigenous, same-sex and culturally appropriate counsellors are available (gould, bittoun & clarke 2015). the national tobacco strategy, the closing the gap strategies and the national aboriginal and torres strait islander health plan all recommend comprehensive holistic, long-term approaches (cancer council victoria 2013; holland 2018), involving full participation of aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples and their representative bodies in all aspects of addressing their health needs, including those communicated by radio, television and social media, through mobile phones. although several sources of support also involve new media, not all smartphones operate in remote areas, and users may have trouble with recharging or affording prepay in order to make use of telephone counselling. nicotine replacement therapy systematic reviews have shown nicotine replacement therapy to be effective in increasing cessation rates. replacement therapy may work well in indigenous populations, particularly for pregnant women, who can receive prescribed patches free, but even these programs are not without problems that affect compliance, such as the time taken for supplies to arrive in remote areas, individuals running out of patches because they share with other family members, and the cost to those who are not eligible for subsidies (gould et al. 2014). aboriginal respondents perceived nicotine replacement therapy as expensive and an ineffective substitute for smoking (bryant et al. 2011b). however, nicotine replacement therapy supported through programs is a preferred option voiced by these indigenous communities and should be a focus of long-term, multifaceted and high-intensity quit programs (carson et al. 2014). based on concerns raised by health staff and community members, the acceptability of some unmodified activities by health workers around their personal propensity to smoke, as well as organisational barriers within the health system may be contributing to the reduced effectiveness of tobacco control. in this setting interventions to support government nicotine replacement initiatives appear to stand a better chance of success when combined with more complete advice, including counselling (johnson & thomas 2010) that is culturally appropriate (martin et al. 2019). tobacco interventions in indigenous communities since ivers’s original 2003 review of tobacco interventions in indigenous communities in australia and new zealand found mixed responses to various trials, she has continually stressed the need for anti-smoking programs to be evaluated comprehensively (ivers et al. 2006). hudson’s 2016 research at the centre for independent studies in sydney, australia noted a lack of evaluation of indigenous programs in general as a significant problem: of the 1082 indigenous health, cultural community and early child hood programs identified, only 88 (8%) had been evaluated, while of the 490 programs delivered by aboriginal organisations, only 20 were evaluated (4%) (hudson 2016). in fact, critical evaluations of the various programs undertaken in aboriginal and torres strait islander communities are sparse and have been limited by small samples and problems of research design with relatively few examples of programs with publicly available outcomes or impact evaluations (muir & dean 2017). 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 little research considers the appropriateness and transferability of initiatives elsewhere to aboriginal and torres strait islander contexts (van der sterren et al. 2016), while there is a need for indigenous-specific research regarding: the impact of pricing measures; interventions to reduce tobacco use among adolescents and pregnant women; the effects of the introduction of smoking bans in prisons; and linguistically diverse indigenous people. there is also a need for indigenous-specific evidence regarding interventions using social media and mobile applications, electronic cigarettes, and how to protect communities from industry interference (chamberlain et al. 2017). robertson et al.’s 2015 systematic review of trends in indigenous australian tobacco research from 2004 to 2013 found that, despite a surge in research output in 2008 relating to indigenous tobacco control, there were still few intervention studies available to guide future efforts. these authors strongly advise rigorous outcome evaluations, particularly of secondary prevention programs and comprehensive community-wide programs, be they delivered by aboriginal organisations or by government departments. demaio, drysdale and de courten (2012) recommend culturally appropriate health promotion, which strives for understanding, empowerment and respect of communities. according to gould et al. (2014) and tane, hefler and thomas (2018), clinician involvement is essential, with more thorough education for medical professionals, including specialists, in the cultural mores of these communities required. before members of socially excluded groups are able to demand substantive changes in unequal social relations that undermine their health, they need to see themselves as active agents capable of acting to improve their lives (world health organisation report 2010, p.8.) campbell and scott (2011) discuss factors that undermine assumptions of individual agency that include unconscious factors, socially constructed peer norms, and power inequalities arising out of social relations, including gender and poverty, where disadvantaged people have experienced far more insecurity, uncertainty and stressful events in their life course, that affects social inequalities in health. further, there is a growing recognition of the limitations of traditional health promotion in favour of community strengthening. thus, health campaigns should aim to facilitate types of social participation designed to empower people to resist the impacts of unhealthy social influences (closing the gap report, modified 2019), where previously health campaigns and communication have generally overlooked the benefits of participatory forms of communication that are commonplace in marketing goods and services. despite these negatives there is hope. a recent review concluded that more effective multifaceted interventions which incorporate indigenous leadership, partnership, engagement and cultural tailoring are necessary to reduce the burden of tobacco-related disease among indigenous peoples (chamberlain et al. 2017), in australia. however, specific intervention strategies, principles and priorities have tended to be more related to process, while assessment of the outcomes of the interventions have been less well recorded. a community-based approach does not rule out one-to-one interventions in healthcare (o’brien et al. 2010). though marley et al. (2014) found no significant benefit from a multidimensional smoking cessation intervention, be our ally beat smoking (boabs), the metacosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 45 analysis of it and an earlier study of pregnant women (eades et al. 2012) has shown that in a in a primary healthcare setting in encouraging smoking cessation one-on-one intensive intervention was more effective than usual care. importantly, when delivered by, and provided to aboriginal and torres strait islander people, such practices can be equally successful in remote areas. however, these programs have to be seen in the light of controlled trials, thus the effectiveness of programs based on close personal support to quit smoking in a real world setting, require to be implemented. as a consequence of their findings, o’brien et al. (2010) posed the questions: do experimental interventions work in practice? are they cost-effective and sustainable? what are the enablers and barriers to the integration of such programs into primary health care for aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples? in summary, then, evidence on how to design services to attract aboriginal and torres strait islander people, whether by media, direct intervention or use of specific cessation tools, is scant. the question therefore remains: what interventions might provide possible solutions for indigenous people in particular? recommendations hill et al. (2007) advocated attention to the way anti-tobacco messages are being developed amongst aboriginal and torres strait islander peoples, particularly in the absence of any consistency of approach. the report next steps for aboriginal health research lays down methodologies of approach, noting that some mainstream services were unresponsive to feedback from aboriginal people and participants felt that ‘no one was listening’ (king & brown 2015, p. 27). while communication within the public service hierarchy extends to acknowledgment of cultural differences that perpetuates the power of ‘the dominant culture’ (downing & kowal 2011), fredericks (2006) argues that training in any intervention must include anti-racism strategies where support for those involved allows them ‘to take action within themselves, their work environment, the system […] and within the broader society’ (p. 95). particular reference is made to the language surrounding some of these programs, which is offensive to aboriginal people, such as ‘closing the gap’: some aboriginal commentators have exclaimed, ‘what gap?’ (mick gooda, nsw office of aboriginal affairs research agenda seminar, 1 march 2018, university of technology sydney business school, sydney). thus, the risk of propagating the discourse that casts aboriginal people as problematic, and reinforces stereotypes of dysfunction (raven et al. 2016), must be addressed by policymakers. further research is warranted to investigate messaging that has resonance within marginalised aboriginal populations where language and literacy have so far posed barriers to communication, and thus to knowledge and understanding of quit processes in particular. so, any health or public service communication or evaluation report should acknowledge particular contexts, the community and the specific protocols and relationships that need to be developed to maximise trust and foster genuine partnerships, before programs stand a chance of success (raven et al. 2016). 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 in aboriginal and torres strait islander communities, the barriers and obstacles to quitting smoking involve psychological, social and cultural factors, including sharing habits (bryant et al. 2011; gould et al. 2013). thus, researchers advise adoption of a more ‘bottom-up’ process (gould et al. 2014; ivers 2014). such an approach in healthcare mirrors the best practice in customer relationship management (buttle & maklan 2015), where a targeted, comprehensive customer-centric (as opposed to organisation-centric) approach has been found successful. while some recommend mass media campaigns (gould et al. 2013), the weight of research tends to favour quit campaigns focused on face-to-face contact (carson et al. 2014; minichiello et al. 2016). in both approaches the campaigns must be culturally targeted. in these circumstances one-to-one contact may be dependent on mobile phone applications (johnston et al. 2013) and text messaging with appropriate response devices, in a communication mix that may also include social media (brusse et al. 2014; hefler et al. 2019) as part of the overall communication strategy. carson et al.’s reviews (2014) of smoking cessation and tobacco prevention studies tailored for indigenous populations around the world have a particular focus on aboriginal and torres strait islander people in australia. a list of factors involved in successful interventions can be drawn from the work of carson et al. (2014), ivers (2011, 2014), martin et al. (2019) and upton et al. (2014). key among these factors are: • multi-faceted interventions that observe various aspects of tobacco use at once, such as biochemical addiction, habit, cultural reasons for smoking, stressors, and psychological reasons for smoking • interventions carried out among people who are already highly motivated to quit smoking, such as those with acute illnesses, who have family members with tobacco-related illnesses, or who want to quit for their children • use of pharmacotherapy, particularly champix (varenicline tartrate), zyban (bupropion hydrochloride) and nicotine patches • use of incentives (e.g. ‘quit and win’ competitions) • programs that train health professionals in smoking cessation and motivational interviewing techniques • behavioural support services that take account of cultural practices, traditions and language • interventions involving health professionals in addition to community partnerships with community health organisations and culturally tailored campaigns • training for the local healthcare workers in culturally sensitive interventions weston et al. (2009) and couzos et al. (2015) have recommended approaches that combine community-owned policies with access to quit support services at the individual level, including access to behavioural and pharmacological therapies, provided by a local workforce trained in culturally sensitive interventions. upton et al. (2014) state that when the local community has ownership, commitment to the policy is strengthened, enabling smoke-free policies to be more effectively implemented. they found this to be especially true in remote and rural settings, and more recently with high-intensity counselling and other brief interventions supplemented with nicotine replacement therapy (davey et al. 2015; lancaster & stead 2017). thus nicotine replacement should be a focus of necessarily longer-term, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 47 multi-faceted quit programs of higher intensity within these communities (kuehn 2010; carson et al. 2014). action of course requires quit programs that are well funded, resourced and managed and, above all, well evaluated, so that lessons can be learnt for future programs. as tom calma, in his role as aboriginal and torres strait islander social justice commissioner and race discrimination commissioner, pointedly stated in 2008, it is not credible to suggest that one of the wealthiest nations in the world cannot solve a health crisis affecting less than 3 per cent of its citizens. research suggests that addressing aboriginal and torres strait islander health inequality will involve no more than a 1 per cent per annum increase in total health expenditure in australia over the next ten years. if this funding is committed, then the expenditure required is then likely to decline thereafter. sadly, commissioner professor calma’s calls appear not to have been met. a 2017 report by the australian institute of health and welfare, measuring longer timeframes concluded the gap was in fact widening: … life expectancy at birth increased for both indigenous males and females during the … period … 2001–2005 to 2011–2015 … however, greater increases in life expectancy at birth occurred for non-indigenous males and females, meaning that the gap in life expectancy between indigenous and non-indigenous australians widened during the reference period (aihw 2017, p. vii). this review has emphasised the disparity in success rates of quit smoking campaigns between the general public and indigenous people, especially those in rural and remote communities. it has underlined the normative approach in the literature, written from the perspective of health professionals, policy-makers and those with expertise in marketing and media communications. it has demonstrated the importance of culturally sensitive communication between health service providers and aboriginal and torres strait islanders and highlighted the paucity of indigenous voices on the issue. professor calma has placed emphasis on this aspect of the health crisis which sets indigenous people apart from the wider population. professor calma’s focus on a small increase in health funding, is surely small price to pay for a projected decline in smoking and ill-health and early deaths attributed to smoking among indigenous people, a topic of increasing urgency, that casts this important 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https://www.who.int/social_determinants/corner/sdhdp2.pdf wright, c.j.c., schwarzman, j., dietze, p.m., crockett, b. & lim, m.s.c. 2019, ‘barriers and opportunities in the translation of mobile phone and social media interventions between research and health promotion practice in australia: a qualitative study of expert perspectives’, health research policy and systems, vol. 17, no. 1, p. 5. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12961-018-0406-x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-842x.2002.tb00363.x https://doi.org/10.1080/10398560902948738 https://www.who.int/social_determinants/corner/sdhdp2.pdf https://doi.org/10.1186/s12961-018-0406-x abstract keywords introduction measures adopted in the population at large to reduce smoking tobacco interventions in indigenous communities recommendations references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 11, no. 2 2019 © 2019 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: brown, c. 2019. resisting the far-right: indigenous perspectives, community arts and storybased strategy. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 11:2, 55-73. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11.i 2.6765 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper resisting the far-right: indigenous perspectives, community arts and storybased strategy chris d. brown centre for social impact, swinburne university of technology, australia corresponding author: chris d. brown, centre for social impact swinburne, level 2, agse building, cnr john and wakefield streets, hawthorn, victoria, 3122, australia. cdbrown@swin.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11i2.6765 article history: received 12/09//2019; revised 14/11/2019; accepted 03/12/2019; published 19/12/19 abstract this article explores how we might resist anti-immigration and anti-refugee politics by addressing the socio-historical wellspring from which they emerge and take sustenance. in doing this, i draw upon the concept of story-based strategy and the idea that our potential to address this issue relies on our capacity to fundamentally shift the dominant ways in which people understand and engage with it. this discussion occurs with reference to one practical application of story-based strategy – a community-arts project titled stories of hope and migration – which attempted to re-frame the migration and refugee debate in australia by funnelling it through a localised indigenous perspective. in so doing, this article challenges the way in which early british migrants and their descendants have continually excised themselves from the rhetoric of migration. furthermore, it suggests that through a more nuanced conversation regarding the migration stories of all non-aboriginal people, we might better promote a more historically aware, compassionate and inclusive society. keywords far-right, story-based strategy, indigenous perspectives, community arts declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the stories of hope and migration project was carried out by yarkuwa indigenous knowledge centre and was funded by arts nsw and multicultural nsw. mailto:cdbrown@swin.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v11i2.6765 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 introduction anti-immigration and anti-refugee sentiment have long been a potent force in australian politics. crucially, though, one of the most striking aspects of the overall migration and refugee debate in australia is its disconnection from indigenous perspectives – as if the migration issue, and the dominant claims made by white australian political elites, can and should be made without reference to indigenous histories and experiences. in response, this article explores how we might resist and confront such damaging and discriminatory politics by addressing the social and historical wellspring from which they emerge and take sustenance. in doing so, i draw upon the concept of story-based strategy and the idea that our potential to address this issue relies on our capacity to fundamentally shift the dominant ways in which people understand and engage with it. with reference to one practical application of story-based strategy – a mixed-genre community-arts project titled stories of hope and migration – this article explores how we might re-frame the migration and refugee debate by funnelling it through a localised indigenous perspective. this project was carried out by the aboriginal-owned community development organisation, yarkuwa indigenous knowledge centre, in the rural town of deniliquin in south-western new south wales. as part of the project, aboriginal people and migrants were interviewed, and archival research was carried out. these research results then formed the basis for a theatre script, which was performed by a group of community volunteers, and generated material for a historical and photographic exhibition, both of which sought to shift some of the dominant understandings and assumptions that undergird the refugee and migration debate in australia. this article proceeds by first exploring the idea of narrative power analysis (npa), the first component of reinsborough and canning’s story-based strategy. using the npa lens, i critically evaluate, using archival material gathered throughout the project, some of the primary stories and assumptions which animate and underpin anti-immigration and antirefugee politics. following this, i outline reinsborough and canning’s idea of the battle of the story, where activists concentrate their energies on controlling the broader frame through which people perceive an issue. subsequently, i discuss the community exhibition and documentary theatre production as practical examples of story-based strategy, and then conclude with some thoughts on its effectiveness as a social change approach. narrative power analysis many methods have been used to resist the anti-immigration and anti-refugee politics of the far-right in australia. importantly, though, there is often a focus on formal and institutional methods. these methods, such as legal attempts to prevent ‘hate speech’, or parliamentary efforts to bolster the official rights of the marginalised, may well result in some significant gains, but they often overshadow the availability and potential of other grassroots approaches. moreover, these formal methods, in their focus on laws and policies, are limited in their capacity to meaningfully address the concealed histories and discriminatory attitudes which have continually given rise to anti-immigration sentiment in australia. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 57 with this in mind, another method deserving of further attention in resisting the far-right is storytelling. the creative sharing of stories has long been a key plank in the activist repertoire. the power of stories as a social change tool derives from the way in which narratives are able to emotionally engage people in ideas, possibilities and lived experiences beyond their own (green, strange and brock 2002; mayer 2014). as solinger, fox and irani put it, ‘storytelling facilitates “thinking freshly” in places where groups are locked (when we’re lucky) in verbal wars over political truths’ (2008, p. 214). amidst the proliferation and popularisation of storytelling, there are numerous works which explore, detail and conceptualise it as a social change tool (davis 2002; solinger, fox and irani 2008; vandecarr 2015; zingaro 2016; bell 2019). of particular utility to grassroots groups and activists is the story-based strategy (sbs) framework developed by patrick reinsborough and doyle canning (2010). this flexible framework is concerned with crafting compelling counter-narratives which work to perturb dominant narratives and the assumptions that underpin them. sbs begins with a process called ‘narrative power analysis’ (npa) (2010, pp. 17-40), which asks certain questions: ‘which stories define cultural norms? where did these stories come from? whose stories were ignored or erased to create these norms?’ (p. 20). by asking these questions, npa is designed to uncover what reinsborough and canning label as the ‘dominant culture’, described as ‘stories that validate … political agendas’ and which have ‘become invisible as they are passed from generation to generation – carrying assumptions that become “conventional wisdom”’ (p. 20). and it is an important process because, in identifying these dominant myths and assumptions, activists are better placed to counter them. in 2011, the local deniliquin paper, the pastoral times, published a near full page letter to the editor – headlined ‘silent feet’ – which captured some of the key narratives that the stories of hope and migration project sought to confront. the letter argued that ‘we have a different set of values and respect for life to those who come here to disrupt our way of life and daily routine’ (trist 2011, p. 9). furthermore it argued that: those who are responsible for terrorism are well settled in the community, but they have not assimilated into our way of life and are unlikely to do so at any time in the future. in time they will want to build more mosques and will want their children educated in muslim schools…those who have a criminal background are prepared to wait patiently in the shadows while they meticulously plan acts of terrorism aimed at inflicting maximum casualties against the country that provides them with welfare, housing and an income to support their families; without ever giving anything back (p.9) the letter concluded by imploring everyone to ‘fly the australian flag at your home. continue to support australia day … protest loudly when minority groups want to change our culture to suit theirs … (and) instill into the younger generation the values and pride in being a fair dinkum aussie and the reasons we need to retain our own identity’ (p. 9). this letter to the editor, printed in a small rural newspaper, is, of course, a localised expression of the anti-immigration, anti-refugee and anti-muslim rhetoric that had, by 2011 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 when it was published, long characterised australian politics. in the sections below, i identify and challenge three particular assumptions which undergird these kinds of arguments. the analysis is not intended to be extensive, but rather, seeks to highlight the initial process of narrative power analysis that helped to generate and inform the community arts project which was to follow. british migrants? australia is commonly considered an immigration nation. what is interesting about this, though, is to whom the term migrant usually refers. people with chinese, italian or lebanese heritage, for example, are often ascribed as migrants in the australian context. at the same time, however, we rarely describe or depict people of british heritage as descendants of migrants. indeed, white australia has, by and large, managed to distance itself from the concept – as if the term migrant does not really apply to the white australian experience. this short-sighted and ahistorical perception of australia’s migration history has long been a feature of the dominant white-australian mindset. beginning with the arrival of the first colonists, british migrants moved rapidly to establish a hierarchy which wedged, elevated and distinguished themselves above those who were here before them, and those who sought to come after them. we have, in the rural town of deniliquin, a rather vivid documentation of this process. in 1882, the pastoral times printed an article entitled reminiscences of old deniliquin which captured the way in which the local aboriginal people were viewed and treated in the mid-nineteenth century: the snuff of a candle and the life of a blackfellow were of about equal importance, and the law upon the matter was so beautifully ineffective that wholesale massacres passed off then with as little comment as a kangaroo battle or wallaby drive does now. at perricoota the manager had by some means become possessed of a small cannon, and with that implement of destruction he used to practice upon the aboriginals on high days and holidays. there are yet several living in the district who can recollect jimmy maiden’s cannon, and who used to envy the owner of such a useful implement of warfare in those exciting times (pastoral times 1882). as this snippet suggests, the new settlers were ruthless in their opposition to continued aboriginal presence in the region. crucially, though, this violent claim to the land was rarely seen as an unjust or brutal imposition by newly arrived migrants. rather, it was viewed as an assumed right or privilege, simply because those doing the claiming had deemed the land legally unoccupied, or terra nullius. in assuming this right to the land, early european settlers were equally ruthless in protecting it from a subsequent wave of chinese migration. in 1878, the pastoral times published the following on what they called ‘the asiatic race’: it is hardly conceivable that an english woman would be so lost, as to debase herself by a union with a chinese. a regard for the future of our race condemns such a course. how can we bear to think of our children’s hair being blackened, their eyes elongated, their noses flattened, their fair complexions yellowed? and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 59 the mind, doubtless, degraded in the same degree as the body (pastoral times 1878). this british disdain towards chinese migrants, their economic ambitions, and their cultural differences, was enacted with minimal or no reflection upon the british migration experience, and the way in which they had, and continued to impose, violently, their own culture and economic agenda upon those who were here before them. in more recent times, this dominant pattern of thinking regarding migration has been reinforced by political elites. former prime minister (2013-2015), tony abbott, who was appointed the special envoy for indigenous affairs after he was deposed as leader of the liberal party, said the following in relation to the first fleet’s landing: as we look around this glorious city of sydney, as we see the extraordinary development, it's hard to think that back in 1788 it was nothing but bush. the marines and the convicts and the sailors that straggled off those 12 ships, just a few hundred yards from where we are now, must have thought they had come almost to the moon … everything would have seemed so extraordinarily basic and raw, and now a city which is one of the most spectacular cities on our globe (in henderson 2014). and in 2014, whilst launching the 100 defining moments in australian history project, abbott argued that ‘the arrival of the first fleet was the defining moment in the history of this continent. let me repeat that, it was the defining moment in the history of this continent. it was the moment this continent became part of the modern world’ (in dingle, 2014). abbott describes european migration to australia – via boats – as a magnificent historical occasion and achievement which overcame, modernised and civilised what he describes as nothing but a basic raw environment of bush. and yet, at the same time, some australian political elites are openly questioning the legitimacy of asylum-seekers, particularly those who arrive by boat. of course, those crafting and communicating the anti-asylum-seeker narratives pay scant regard to the events of 1788 – that supposedly defining moment in which newcomers first came to these shores – as if they do not count on the migration ledger. or if they are acknowledged, as in abbott’s comments, it is argued that such a process should be seen only in a positive, modernising and emancipatory light, despite the well-documented brutality and cultural destruction it wrought. the point here is that colonisation set in train a two-part attitudinal pattern that still dominates today. first, a refusal or disregard for who was on this land before they migrated – a process which rapidly enabled european colonisers to think of themselves not as migrants, but as privileged, rightful and benevolent owners of the land. and second, a disdain for anybody who strove to migrate to australia after – ultimately, a disdain for anyone who tried to do or claim anything that they had already done. an enlightened multicultural success story? another dominant narrative which often accompanies anti-immigration and anti-refugee politics is that contemporary australia represents a multicultural success story. in this 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 narrative, proponents tend to ignore the historical snippets of the type highlighted above, drawing attention only to what they see as successful examples of migration, and, accordingly, the generosity and openness of australians. in trist’s (2011) letter to the pastoral times, for example, he writes: at previous australia day ceremonies i have attended, speakers have paid tribute to those migrants who have established their market gardens, and other enterprising business people who have worked extremely hard, often under the most arduous and primitive conditions, seeking to earn a living and raise their families in their new homeland. the italians, greeks, poms and eastern europeans have all been great migrants and contributors to this country and have all assimilated well. as a nation we are extremely generous and tolerant. some would say we are too generous and charity begins at home (p. 9). another way in which the multicultural success narrative is framed, often by political elites, is to minimally acknowledge certain aspects of australia’s history on race relations, but then present these aspects as relics of a discredited past – as if we are now a more compassionate, inclusive and enlightened society. prime minister scott morrison encapsulated this when, talking on the issue of migration, he noted: ‘sadly, white supremacy in sections of australia is not new … it's been around for well over a century and at one time in australia's history it could even be argued that it held some sort of mainstream position. thankfully that's no longer the case’ (in sbs news 2019). the resurgence of many far-right parties and groups in australia over recent years provides one example which contradicts this comfortable assertion that white supremacy is no longer a mainstream or common position in australia. when pauline hanson, leader of the one nation party, first came to the senate in 1996, she warned of the dangers of being ‘swamped by asians’ (hanson, 1996). two decades later, in a subsequent speech to the senate, she narrowed her concern, focusing on blocking the entry of muslims into australia, and in 2018 put forward a senate motion that ‘it’s ok to be white’ (in karp 2018). in the same year, then senator fraser anning voiced support for the white australia policy and its reinstatement, and called for a ‘final solution’ to muslim immigration (anning 2018). these are, of course, the comments of the far-right which have largely been critiqued and disowned by most of the parliament. and yet, whilst mainstream political leaders perform a kind of principled opposition to these ideas, there is little acknowledgement of the way in which anti-boat-people rhetoric, since the tampa crisis1, has laid a conducive foundation for the resurgence of far-right and islamophobic politics (aly 2019; barton 2019). indeed, one does not have to look too far to find examples which highlight the troubling relationship between mainstream politics and anti-immigration sentiment in australia. during the 2019 nsw state election, footage was released of the labor candidate, michael daley, who said, in 1 in august 2001, the liberal government of john howard refused permission for a norwegian freighter, mv tampa, to enter australian waters after it had rescued over 400 asylum-seekers from a sinking fishing vessel. the ordering of the australian defence forces to prevent the ship from docking in christmas island to discharge its passengers caused a diplomatic incident with the norwegian government. the incident led to a rise in support for the government’s stand against asylum-seekers arriving by sea. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 61 regards to housing affordability, ‘our young children will flee and who are they being replaced with? they are being replaced by young people from typically asia with phds’ (in visentin 2019). one year earlier, his predecessor, luke foley, used the term ‘white flight’ to express his concern over western sydney suburbs such as fairfield which was experiencing a large influx of syrian and iraqi refugees (in sas and gerathy 2018). this comment received vocal support from pauline hanson who noted that she had ‘been saying this for years’ (in sas and gerathy 2018). federal liberal mp peter dutton has been vocal in his criticism of ‘african gang violence’, suggesting that ‘people are scared to go out to restaurants of a nighttime because they’re followed home by these gangs’ (in hunter and preiss 2018). and he has accompanied these comments with a call for supporting white farmers from south africa, arguing that they require support and protection from ‘civilised countries’ (in the guardian 2018). what is interesting, though, is that the strongest proponents of exclusionary politics often lay claim to the multicultural narrative, often using it to rebuke those who accuse them of racism. far-right groups such as reclaim australia, for example, try to combat the racism and antimulticultural critique by highlighting how their movement has members from a diverse range of backgrounds and cultures. john saffran, in his book on the australian far-right, notes that the leadership and constituency at certain far-right meetings displayed a cultural diversity that many well-intentioned organisations/groups would envy (saffran 2017). most commonly, though, proponents argue that they have no issue with particular races, cultures or religions, but are concerned only with those who, having come to this country, cannot or will not ‘integrate’. trist (2011), in deniliquin, deploys a quote often attributed to australia’s first prime minister, edmund barton: in the first place, we should insist that if the immigrant who comes here in good faith becomes an australian and assimilates himself to us, he shall be treated on an exact equality with everyone else, for it is an outrage to discriminate against any such man because of creed, or birthplace, or origin. but this is predicated upon the person’s becoming in every facet an australian, and nothing but an australian. (p. 9). for dutton, africans in general are not a problem, it is just the ones who ‘haven’t integrated’ or are not ‘abiding by our laws’ or ‘don’t adhere to our culture’ that ‘are not welcome here’ (in hunter and preiss, 2018). there is a contradiction, of course, between the claim that australia represents a multicultural success story, and the assumption discussed above that those new migrants arriving on australia’s shores need to ‘integrate’, else they render themselves unwelcome. one might suggest that the notion of integration does not have to involve the abandoning of cultural difference, and that such cultural diversity can and should sit alongside a genuine integrative engagement with and obedience to local laws, culture, customs and language. notably, though, this demand foisted upon new migrants that they strike some kind of acceptable and non-threatening (to elites) balance between the maintenance of their culture, on the one hand, and their integration with the dominant society to which they have come, on the other, is one that was never placed upon the early british colonists. they were, it seems, free to intrude, distort and dominate as they saw fit. and the contemporary descendants of this process still, 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 by and large, ignore this historical reality, whilst ensnaring new migrants within their own concocted rules. indeed, when former prime minister john howard infamously argued, at the time of the tampa affair, that ‘we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come’ (howard, 2001), it was not part of the national conversation how this self-evident right of current inhabitants was not extended to aboriginal people at colonisation, and has never been allowed to intrude on white people’s privilege. a glorious pioneer or an illegitimate economic migrant? another dominant narrative used to frame asylum-seekers in australia is one which depicts them as nothing but illegal and unjustified economic migrants. ‘let’s just face some facts here’, declared previous prime minister kevin rudd, ‘a whole bunch of people who seek to come to this country are economic migrants, who are seeking to comport themselves as refugees’ (in hawley 2013). similarly, scott morrison, when he was immigration minister, said of tamil asylum-seekers that their ‘passage to australia here is nothing more than an economic migration seeking to illegally enter australia’ (in barlow 2014). the assumption guiding this narrative is that people, having disguised themselves as asylum-seekers, will gain entry into australia and subsequently soak up the welfare system, or otherwise exploit the economic opportunities they find, much to the detriment of ‘our’ standard of living. research provided by the refugee council of australia (2016) highlights that the claims around economic migration and refugees are spurious. they note that between january 1976 and june 2015, 69,602 asylum seekers arrived by boat. of these, 37,491 asylum seekers had their claims processed, and 81% of them were found to be genuine refugees. that is, their decision to travel by boat to australia had, according to the australian government’s processes, nothing to do with economic motivation, and everything to do with escaping a genuine fear of persecution in their home country. beyond the factual inaccuracy of this narrative, however, lies a deeper and pernicious doublestandard. economic migration, tainted as it is these days, seems only to have taken on this problematic connotation in relation to non-european migrants. rather than recognise any broader economic disparity and injustice which might underpin migration between countries, those migrating to australia from poorer countries have routinely been depicted as sneaky, money-hungry people who threaten local jobs and overall standards of living. in stark contrast, the british early settlers are framed in a rather different light. these settlers, or pioneers as they are often called, often made the decision to migrate to australia for financial reasons. and on arrival, these settlers ruthlessly sought out lucrative agricultural opportunities that were denied to them in britain. for this journey of economic adventure, and for the so-called work they did in shaping contemporary australia, these british economic migrants continue to be glorified, their courage, endeavour and initiative all celebrated as something which has made this country what it is. in deniliquin, these celebratory ideas and attitudes regarding the economic migration of british settlers play out in a very striking way. george peppin, for example, one of the early settlers in the region, made the (economic) decision to migrate to australia when ‘farming cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 63 was at a low ebb in england’ (hone 1974). at the time of his death, peppin had amassed great wealth and had become well known for the unique breed of sheep he helped develop – the peppin merino – which was very much considered a key component of the early sheepbased australian economy. for these economic efforts, peppin is widely recognised, and his name is given to the local (peppin) heritage centre. what is significant, though, is the way in which the heritage centre, and australian political discourse more generally, remains so comfortable in recognising and celebrating the so-called work and legacy of these early economic migrants. for, at the same time, elitist politicians and far-right proponents continue to condemn asylum-seeking as little more than an illdisguised and unjust attempt at improving economic position. this hypocrisy is particularly pertinent when funnelled through an aboriginal perspective because in deniliquin, as across all of australia, there remains a huge disparity between the wealth and well-being of those families who directly descend from these early settlers, and aboriginal people. british economic migration, whilst framed as a courageous and inspiring tale of hard work and deserved reward, primarily served to secure lives and lifestyles for some, and poverty for others. and crucially, this dominant narrative ignores or distorts this result of british economic migration, and instead spruiks a history of supposed generosity and benevolence from white australia. so, whilst trist (2011) confidently asserts that ‘we’, presumably white australians, ‘have a different set of values and respect for life of those who come here to disrupt our way of life and daily routine’ (p. 9), he ignores the ‘disruption’ caused by settlement, and the ongoing impacts it continues to have on the “way of life and daily routine” of aboriginal people. changing the frame: foregrounding indigenous perspectives having identified and analysed the dominant narratives and assumptions pertaining to the migration and refugee debate in australia, the stories of hope and migration project then sought to challenge and re-frame them. this component of story-based strategy is called the battle of the story. in describing this idea, reinsborough and canning (2010) contrast it with the ‘story of the battle’, which they describe as a story-telling approach/tactic that is designed to mobilise supporters ‘who already share much of your worldview and core values’ (p. 43). the battle of the story, by contrast, operates outside the comfortable circle of core supporters, seeking to persuade others not already bound by similar values or convinced of certain assumptions. as they explain: the battle of the story is the larger struggle to determine whose stories are told, how they are framed, how widely these stories are heard, and how deeply they impact the dominant discourse. the battle of the story is the effort to communicate the why—the interpretation and relevance of actions and issues— that helps a social change message reach a broader section of the public. to succeed in changing the dominant culture’s framing of an issue, our movements must win the battle of the story. it is, of course, no small task to try to re-frame what is a damaging and dominant national, indeed global, debate. and whilst this project makes no claim to having succeeded in this 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 elusive goal, what it did try to do was to downsize and localise this challenge. to do this, it foregrounded a local indigenous perspective, prompting people to consider the migration debate, and their own personal histories, not through the lens of the australian nation, but through the lens of the wamba wamba perrepa perrepa nation. below i discuss some of the extracts from the play, as well as the historical and photographic exhibition which accompanied the performance, which highlight this approach. historical and photographic exhibition the exhibition presented various historical documents and photographs in an attempt to productively perturb the kinds of narratives highlighted above. the primary concept behind the exhibition was to capture the many waves of migration that have occurred to deniliquin, and in particular, to pictorially depict europeans as one of these many migrating communities, rather than allowing them to remain, as they often are, as some kind of privileged resident that sits outside or beyond the notion of migration. to express this idea, the exhibition began with a collection of local aboriginal artefacts and cultural works which were designed to highlight long-term aboriginal presence in the region. these artefacts and cultural works included grinding stones, coolamons and woven baskets, as well as a use and occupancy map of the werai forest. in providing these artefacts and cultural works as the first component of the exhibition, our intention was to frame the viewer’s experience of the rest of the exhibition through this acknowledgement and celebration of long-term aboriginal ownership and custodianship. image 1: pastoral times article image 2: james maiden statue the second section of the exhibition introduced that very significant first wave of migration – european colonisation. to this end, the exhibition presented the faces of early european settlers in the region, many of whom are well-known in the town, and, as noted above, recognised and celebrated through various public buildings and artworks. crucially, though, our exhibition framed these migrants, not in the usual romantic and celebratory fashion as brave and industrious pioneers, but as the region’s first migrants who, upon arrival, disregarded the culture and presence of the local aboriginal people. for example, the face of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 65 the early settler james maiden was shown alongside a large printed version of the 1882 ‘reminiscences of old deniliquin’ article from the pastoral times (see image 1 above). this is significant because maiden is known as the founder of moama (a nearby town) and is recognised through a public sculpture at the local children’s park (see image 2). importantly, though, maiden is also the ‘jimmy maiden’ talked of in the article which reports how he, 'on high days and holidays', liked to shoot his cannon at the local aboriginal people. in the same section, we displayed a range of images which present not just european migration, but the way in which these migrants dominated, transformed and exploited the local people, land and culture. the exhibition provided sketches from john phillips, an early squatter in the region, whose artworks of the time, now stored in the state library of nsw, depict burgeoning homesteads and the unwanted and uncomfortable presence of aboriginal people on their fringes (see image 32). provided also was an early agricultural map from 1877 (see image 43), intended as a contrast to the use and occupancy map already presented. the agricultural map, through its ever-thickening maze of property lines and names, highlights how wamba wamba perrepa perrepa country was, within only a few decades of european migration, bought, sold and divided up as private agricultural plots. in addition, the exhibition provided a photograph which shows a man leaning upon a tree on the riverbank, surrounded by the unique breed of sheep that was developed in the area. rather than highlighting the development in agriculture, however, this image captures the european overriding of aboriginal people, for on the tree, against which this settler so proudly leans, is a scar, where bark has been taken from the tree to create most probably a canoe – evidence of long-term aboriginal presence and use of the land that was now seen by the british as little more than grazing pasture for commercial wool production. the following section of the exhibition depicted subsequent waves of migration to deniliquin. in particular, the exhibition provided a number of portraits of chinese community members who lived and worked in the deniliquin region from the late 1800s until the mid1900s. in presenting these images, our intention was to highlight a degree of similarity between the british and chinese experience of migration in deniliquin, where people from other places and cultures made a difficult journey in search of greater prosperity. at the same time, the exhibition sought to emphasise an important difference between the power and wealth accumulated by early british migrants, and the discrimination and disdain that was endured by the chinese. accompanying the portraits of chinese community members, for 2 image 3: ‘cobran station’ by john phillips (courtesy of the state library of nsw) 3 image 4: squatting map, 1877 (courtesy of the state library of nsw) 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 example, was an 1878 article from the pastoral times which wrote the following of the chinese: there are a few people who appear to think highly of them in some respects, and endeavour to combat the opinion of their inferiority by pointing out their immense numbers, their love of order, and the length of time that their empire has continued. but such shallow arguments can easily be disposed of. and, flies, and mosquitoes are even more numerous than chinese, yet no one thinks of comparing them with men. ants, too, have very much of the same methodical routine in their habits, and seem to thrive as well by it; but we do not compare their instinct with our enlightened reason (pastoral times, 1878). in addition, the exhibition provided an 1897 article from the pastoral times which outlined the conditions by which chinese migrants could enter the colony of new south wales in the lead up to the white australia policy: one chinese allowed to every 300 tons of registered tonnage of the vessel, but each must pay the poll tax. master liable to a penalty of £100 for each in excess of above … poll tax of £60 on each chinese arriving both by sea and land. naturalisation is not allowed on any ground whatever, and on chinese returning to the colony they come under the provisions of the act (pastoral times, 1897). in conclusion to the exhibition, the final artwork was a large photograph of a scarred tree in deniliquin, emblematic, as noted earlier, of indigenous ownership and presence prior to european migration (see image 74). the photograph of the scarred tree, though, was a digitally-created mosaic made by combining all of the many other people whose face or story appeared, in some form, in the project. in presenting this image, the project sought to frame the deniliquin community, both its history of migration, as well as its contemporary cultural diversity, as something that sits within an indigenous history and landscape. accompanying this final artwork was the question: ‘what’s your migration story?’. by posing this question, we hoped viewers would leave the exhibition recognising themselves and their families not as some kind of uninvolved outsider to the concept of migration, but instead, as (privileged) participants in a long history of migration. indeed, by foregrounding indigenous presence and ownership, the project sought to frame all non 4 image 7: scarred tree mosaic cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 67 aboriginal people as migrants, and to use this lens as a more inclusive, compassionate and productive framework for thinking and decision-making into the future. documentary theatre script/performance the primary intention of the documentary theatre script was to establish a juxtaposition between the ideas and narratives of the far-right, on the one hand, and the stories of a local aboriginal elder (jeanette) and a muslim refugee (salah), on the other. the local stories, which are detailed further below, were collected through recorded interviews. in order to capture the ideas of the far-right in the script, we selected pauline hanson’s 2016 senate speech, extracting segments which epitomised the narratives and assumptions highlighted above. also included were snippets from the pastoral times, which were often used in contrast to the personal stories and reflections of the local aboriginal elder. each of these roles – jeanette, salah, hanson and the pastoral times – were played by community volunteers in a performance (rehearsed reading) which was held on harmony day in 2017. by juxtaposing hanson’s words with the stories and perspectives of a muslim refugee, the script did, on one level, what numerous creative and theatre works have done – to challenge and contrast anti-immigration and anti-refugee assumptions or ideas with the actual stories and experiences of migrants and refugees (wake, 2013). for example, hanson (2016) argues: radicalisation is happening on our streets, in our suburbs and mosques. yet, our leaders continue to tell us to be tolerant and embrace the good muslims. but how should we tell the difference? there is no sign saying “good muslim” or “bad muslim”. how many lives will be lost or destroyed trying to determine who is good and who is bad? this simplistic sentiment – that australians are obviously good, and muslims, by and large, not, or even if they are good, cannot be treated as such because it is too hard to distinguish them from the baddies – is nuanced by salah, the iraqi refugee, who recounts his own asylum journey. salah’s story subverts the simplistic good-bad binary that hanson feels justified in pursuing. in discussing his time in an australian detention centre, salah (2016) notes his distress and confusion with the australian guards: ‘when you’re in the detention centre you think australian people are no good. if we asked questions, they’d get angry with you and hit anyone who spoke to them. push you, tell you to go! australians, we thought, are crazy people’. in another example, hanson (2016) argues that, in the muslim community, ‘antisocial behaviour is rampant, fuelled by hyper-masculine and misogynist culture’. at the same time, salah (2016) tells the story of his son who, upon completion of high school, chose to study nursing at university. importantly, though, this playscript sought not just to question the claims of anti-immigration politics, but to challenge the assumptive foundations upon which they are built. it does this by contextualising hanson’s comments with those of jeanette, a local aboriginal elder. hanson, for example, stridently demands that new migrants learn, respect and adapt to the pre-existing culture of the place to which they have travelled: 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 australia had a national identity before federation, and it had nothing to do with diversity and everything to do with belonging. tolerance has to be shown by those who come to this country for a new way of life. if you are not prepared to become australian, obey our laws, respect our culture and way of life, then i suggest you go back to where you came from. if it would be any help, i will take you to the airport and wave you goodbye with sincere best wishes (hanson, 2016). what is of particular note, however, is how hanson and her allies never acknowledge that early british migrants never engaged in such respect and adaptation. as jeanette notes, ‘it’s always disconcerting to me to hear people talking about “newcomers”’ (crew, 2016). so, whilst hanson claims that ‘newcomers’ need to show tolerance and adapt to a new way of life, jeanette responds by noting: ‘well, you didn't learn our language, or respect our culture, values or laws when you came’ (crew, 2016). hanson (2016) also argues that ‘governments, both state and federal, have a duty of care to the australian people’ and that they should ‘clean up your own backyard before flooding our country with more people who are going to be a drain on our society’. the play script, however, sought to disrupt this claim, deconstructing the so-called australian people she talks of, as well as questioning who exactly is or has done the ‘flooding’ and ‘draining’ in our society. are, for example, those who have been ‘flooded’ and ‘drained’ the local aboriginal people who, as jeanette highlights, remain ‘the poorest people in town, the least educated, the least qualified, the sickest, the least employed’ (crew, 2016). or, are they, as hanson claims, the descendants of those people who migrated, in large numbers, to this country a couple of hundred years ago, and who have since drained, or claimed and stolen, so many of the goods of the country at the expense of the prior owners? throughout the course of her political career, hanson has made clear her position on aboriginal people. in her early election campaign, hanson said she ‘would be fighting for the white community, the immigrants, the greeks, whoever, it doesn't really matter-anyone apart from the aboriginals and the torres strait islanders’, and she subsequently dedicated her election victory to the ‘white community’ (in moran 2002, p. 671). moreover, during her 1998 election campaign, hanson voiced her frustration at what she saw as the denigration of (white) australia for its supposedly benevolent civilising of the aboriginal population. the aboriginal people, she argued, ought to be grateful for the process of colonisation (moran 2002). by propagating these kinds of belittling, pejorative and dismissive narratives regarding aboriginal people, hanson and her many far-right allies remain emboldened in their framing of the migration and refugee issue as only a recent phenomenon in australia. but jeanette’s concluding comment in the play dislodges this kind of unreflective arrogance: a lot of comments about the migration stuff, and the current boat people, a lot of these negative comments are coming from what we, as traditional owners, consider to be newcomers to australia, or new australians. the white colonisers were boat people. it wasn't that long ago that your people were in the same boat, literally, so how can they sit in such judgement? (crew, 2016) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 69 conclusion in attempting to reframe the migration and refugee debate in australia through the foregrounding of indigenous perspectives, the stories of hope and migration project makes no claim to having presented any new or original content. indigenous people, in numerous ways, have long articulated the hypocrisy of settler narratives. what this project did seek to do, however, was to apply the story-based strategy framework to this complex and contentious issue, and more importantly, to adapt and develop the framework so as to allow for greater engagement and resonance with the targeted local community. this primary adaptation came in the form, style and length of the stories or narratives that were presented. for reinsborough and canning (2010), activists, having identified the narratives and assumptions that they are up against, need to build a compelling counternarrative which, ideally, involves (what they see as) the five key elements of storytelling: ‘conflict, characters, imagery, foreshadowing, and assumptions’ (pp.38-40). interestingly, though, the focus of story-based strategy, or at least the practical applications of it they discuss, tends to emphasise the importance of encapsulating any such compelling narrative in the short form of what they call a meme – catchy slogans, images, phrases and symbols which ‘can act as capsules for stories to spread virally through cultures’ (reinsborough and canning 2010: p. 33). whilst reinsborough and canning provide a range of examples where memes have indeed had great impact, there remains a tension between a strategy which, on the one hand, focuses on the sharing of compelling stories, and on the other, zeroes in on reducing these narratives into short and catchy messages. does, for example, a decision to rely upon such catchy slogans and messages offer an advantage to power-holders with media skills and substantial resources? does the focus on creating and distributing slogans and messages strip out the necessary nuance and complexity of stories, particularly when dealing with entrenched issues and hostile audiences? the key point here, perhaps, is that practitioners of story-based strategy need to identify the scope of change they seek, and then adjust or adapt the style, form and length of their story strategy accordingly. in the stories of hope and migration project, where we were confronting the entrenched, complex and socio-historically embedded issue of migration in australia, a catchy message or slogan was not, in itself, sufficient for generating the engagement of those currently hostile or uninterested. whilst the exhibition did conclude with the meme-like question, ‘what’s your migration story?’, it only resonated as a result of the more complex narratives that were told and depicted before and around it. in this sense, the meme became not the primary result or tool of the project, but a complementary one. further, it was a tool that could only be built from, and combined with, long, complex and nuanced stories that sought not to reduce, but to expand the ideas and vocabulary with which this contentious issue was engaged and discussed. in sharing these stories around the issues of migration and refugees, we thought closely about which stories could/should be told, as well as the way in which these stories could/should be presented. in particular, we considered how best to scrutinise and challenge the far-right position. in some ways, the decision to use hanson’s speech as a cornerstone for criticism felt 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 problematic and simplistic. opponents of one nation, and far-right populism in general, have long mocked the party, its leader and its damaging politics. pauline panstdown, for example – a character created by simon hunt – satirised hanson with his songs ‘i don’t like it’ and ‘back door man’. by splicing together various spoken words from hanson, hunt delivered lyrics like ‘please explain, why can't my blood be coloured white, i should talk to some medical doctors, coloured blood is just not right’. these songs were an important salve and much needed reminder that whilst the political process could not only throw up someone like hanson, but actually have them elected, we did have people in our community who saw the ridiculous absurdity – and could mock and make us laugh at their bigotry. at the same time, however, hunt’s songs were never intended to engage with or bring on board those who were aligning themselves with hanson’s politics. to use sbs terminology, it was a story of the battle approach which, through humour, sought to invigorate and activate already-existing supporters. i note this kind of dynamic because at the time when the stories of hope and migration project was initiated, much media commentary noted a kind of elitism on behalf of those who were critical of the far-right. these people were, it was increasingly argued, seemingly content with their so-called progressive political bubble and in-jokes, but not properly or respectfully engaging with or understanding the increasing amount of support for this kind of politics that was occurring outside their general sphere of engagement. whilst important questions remain as to whether, and if so, how, racist politics should be respectfully engaged with, this project acknowledged that a more conducive way of prompting discussion on this topic was possibly not to ridicule something that people might believe or assume, but to genuinely hold that belief or assumption up to critical scrutiny. to this end, hanson was not mocked or presented melodramatically. rather, her words, representative of the ‘stock narratives’ we hear on refugees and migration, were placed alongside the often ‘concealed stories’ (bell,2019) of an iraqi refugee and an aboriginal elder from the local community. in this way, audience members were offered the chance to assess both for their legitimacy and credibility. at the same time, at the project’s conclusion, one of the first comments received was that, given the attending audience on the night, the project was ‘preaching to the converted’. if this was the case, then the project didn’t succeed in fulfilling the battle of the story approach. and yet, as the group reflected on the viewer’s comment, a more nuanced and encouraging analysis was offered by one of the volunteer performers. her argument was that the project was successful in moving beyond the so-called converted, because it was able, through the participation of various community members/groups, to draw in audience members who would otherwise have never attended such an event. according to this project participant, the attendance of her parents-in-law was powerful proof of the potential for such a process to engage community members who were, at best, apathetic to the issues raised in the performance. their attendance was, of course, secured only through the involvement of their daughter-in-law as a performer, but it was a community engagement model, she argued, that was replicated many times over for the other volunteer performers who had taken part. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.11, no.2, 2019 71 by integrating the sbs framework with a community arts approach, this project was able to engage a variety of community members with a range of stories that undercut many of the dominant assumptions held regarding migrants and refugees in australia. in doing this, our project was not, of course, ever going to single-handedly shift the foundations of the refugee debate whilst simultaneously re-working the power asymmetry between aboriginal and nonaboriginal people in australia. but it did work to spark constructive community conversations that operated on more historically-aware foundations, and in so doing, strove to dry up the wellspring from which far-right politics too easily emerges. acknowledgements i thank jeanette crew, david crew, jennifer townsend, brian martin, kate butler, karen wilson and two anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback on this article. the stories of hope and migration project was carried out by yarkuwa indigenous knowledge centre and was funded by arts nsw and multicultural nsw. references aldorki, s. 2016, interview: stories of hope and migration. aly, w. 2019, 'the most dishonest thing would be to say that i'm shocked', sydney morning herald, 16 march, 2019. available at: https://www.smh.com.au/world/oceania/themost-dishonest-thing-would-be-to-say-that-i-m-shocked-20190316-p514q2.html. anning, f. 2018, 'full text: senator fraser anning's maiden speech', sbs news, 15 august 2018. available at: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/full-text-senator-fraser-anning-smaiden-speech. barlow, k. 2014, 'scott morrison says 157 tamil asylum seekers are 'economic migrants' not in danger of persecution in india, calls labor and greens 'surrender monkeys'', abc news, 28 july 2014. 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https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315419930 abstract keywords introduction narrative power analysis changing the frame: foregrounding indigenous perspectives conclusion acknowledgements references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 3 2018 © 2018 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: yang, o.2018. state responsibility toward a perpetual minority: amerasians in south korea. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 10:3,19-40 .https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6054 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) state responsibility toward a perpetual minority: amerasians in south korea onjung yang university of sydney, nsw 2006, australia. oyan1801@uni.sydney.edu.au doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6054 article history: received 30/04/2018; revised 13/08/2018; accepted 22/08/2018; published 25/11/2018 abstract this paper analyses historical processes to explore socially constructed discrimination and inequality against amerasians, who were born to korean women by us army service personnel in us military camp towns (‘gijichon’) around the time of the korean war, fromthe perspective of korean government policies. i shall discuss the elements that influenced the development of the situation of amerasians by analysing various sources, including in-depth interviews and documents from their community. the significant finding of this study is that the korean government contributed greatly to the presence of amerasians by promoting the sex trade in gijichon. however, they were not recognised as koreans under the nationality act, and their presence was officially concealed. a number of them were adopted into families overseas under the government policy of promoting international adoption. moreover, the government separated them from the mainstream society by establishing honhyeolin (mixed-blood) schools and legally exempting them from military service. the situation of amerasians is still fragile, as they are excluded from unprecedented support systems for ethnic minorities, reflecting structural violence according to galtung’s theory (galtung, 1969); therefore, special consideration from the korean government is required. keywords south korea; ethnic minorities; amerasians; policy towards amerasians declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding..19 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6054 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6054 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 introduction korea has experienced demographic changes with the presence of an increasing number of foreigners in recent years. following this multicultural explosion with a large number of foreigners mainly guest workers and married migrants, social problems such as embracing cultural differences and human rights of foreigners have appeared in its society. thus, making multicultural discourses to address the issues related to ethnic minorities surfacing in the korean context is a considerable challenge for scholars as well as for the government. the government has introduced various support systems to enhance ethnic minorities’ human rights such as the employment permit system for foreigners (2004), grand plans for supporting female marriage migrants and multi-ethnic people (2006), multicultural families support act (2008) and so on. however, some culturally or racially distinct groups such as the huaqiao –overseas chinese – and the amerasians, who have been resident in korea before or since the very early stages of the establishment of the korean government in 1948, have been isolated from such supports or benefits. especially, the discourses on the issue of the amerasian minority have serious shortcomings in terms of political system as well as in the literature. more specifically, very few studies have been carried out regarding a theoretical interpretation of the interrelationship between government policy and the amerasians’ situation. in this respect, this paper brings an innovative approach to the theoretical interpretation of the amerasian community taking into account korean government responses toward them and their experiences. definition of the amerasian the characterisation of amerasian is widely known as ‘honhyeolin’ in korean society and the term honhyeolin literally means ‘mixed blood people’. following this definition, all children born to married migrants in today’s korean society could theoretically be called honhyeolin. however, the term honhyeolin is not used in that sense in korean society because the term has developed negative connotations as the word originated to describe children who were fathered by us army service personnel and whose mothers were korean women, most of whom were prostitutes in gijichon. for this reason, in 2006 the korean government introduced legislation against discrimination on the grounds of race and encouraged the use of alternative terms to describe these people such as ‘children in multicultural families’, ‘children of international marriage family’ and ‘multicultural children’ (hwang & eom, 2006; korea, 2003). yet, people who were born to korean women from us army service personnel in gijichon around the korean war (1950-1953) do not correctly fall under the category of ‘children in multicultural families’, ‘children of international marriage family’ or ‘multicultural children’ as they appeared in korean society prior to mixed-race children by married migrants emerging. thus, the term ‘amerasian’ coined by pearl buck, which is a compound word formed from the words ‘american’ and ‘asian’ (kim, 2000; nam, 2008), is used in this study to designate a person who was born in gijichon to korean women from us army service personnel in order to distinguish them from a number of multi-ethnic people who were born of international marriages in recent years. people who have korean and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 21 american parents by international marriages in recent years are not included in the classification of ‘amerasian’ for this study. as a matter of fact, international marriage in korea effectively began as us army servicemen married korean women, many of whom had been sex workers (lee, 2010, p. 39). the estimated number of marriages between korean women and us soldiers in seoul averaged over 4,000 per year in the late 1970s, and around 2,000 per year into the late 1980s (jo,1989). yet, the number of amerasians has never been accurately estimated for the following reasons: 1) most amerasian children did not belong to and were not recognised by any formal institutions, as the majority had been born out of wedlock. 2) the birth mothers tended to be in unstable circumstances, and were often on the move. 3) both mothers and children were reluctant to respond to questionnaires. 4) the children were not entered into official family registers due to adoption (kim, 1982). for these reasons, the governmentestimated number of amerasian children in 1981 was 680 while us forces in korea (hereafter ‘usfk’) officials estimated the number at 3,000-5,000 for the same period (kim, 1982).on the other hand, according to statistics put out by the ministry of health and social affairs, the number of amerasian children born in 1968 was 7,857 (kim, 1995; son, 1968). according to national human rights commission of korea, the number of amerasians was some 3,300 in 1973, 433 in 1999 and approximately 400-500 after 1999 (korea, 2003, pp. 42-43). the report also pointed that as this number is based on registered amerasians, the actual number of amerasians must be much greater. purpose of this study even though the population of amerasians is not statistically significant, their case provides a framework for understanding historical and institutional legacies that define contemporary vulnerability of a particular minority group, amerasians. in detail, the first aim of this study is to reveal the government policy related to amerasians in historical perspectives. this will provide a basisto determine what factors have affected the presence of amerasians in korean society. based on this finding, the second purpose of this study is to interpret theoretically the interrelationship between the government policy and the contemporary vulnerability of the amerasian community. it focuses on how the vulnerability has formed and what situational changes the amerasians have experienced. finally, this study aims to discuss the state responsibility toward amerasians by focusing on how the korean government can enhance their vulnerability. this aspect of the study is especially important, as examination of state responsibility, reflected in the contemporary vulnerability of amerasians, comprising their experiences and situations, is the key to explicit understanding of korean society. this helps in contributing to understanding the expansion of rights and legal protection for ethnic minorities. significance first of all, there is an obvious paucity of research on the state responsibility toward amerasians, with this analysis from the time of establishment of the korean government being one of the very few. amidst large-scale demographic and social change within korean society, studies on ethnic minority communities are growing exponentially, supported by 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 many government-funded research institutions. most of the existing literature regarding ethnic minorities focuses on their daily lives, the situation of their human rights, their identity and so on. most of the studies on ethnic minorities in korea either remain at the level of the introduction of western countries’ policies and political theories, or simply compare each country’s policies. in-depth discussion of the state responsibility toward ethnic minorities based on their substantial experiences is seldom achieved. in particular, few studies have been carried out regarding amerasians. this paper includes an in-depth examination of government policy toward them as crucial for understanding the context of minority communities in korean society. therefore, this study contributes to a further discussion on ethnic minorities in korea while the country faces a challenge to change its ideology from one of homogeneity to embracing diversity and respecting differences. secondly, this study has significant implications for policy makers and social workers of other countries with emergent multi-cultural discourses such as korea has. it discusses the elements that influenced the development of the amerasian community. the case of amerasians is especially significant, as they were assumed to be the first ethnic minority group in korean society except for the huaqiao (overseas chinese) before the waves of migration started in the late 1990s. their case illuminates the societal and institutional problems that historically have involved ethnic minorities. it appears to be a significant case study for the societal movement for better understanding contemporary society, in which ethnic diversity has been clearly visible in recent years. their case especially demonstrates that the korean government’s response to otherness was not always justifiable. the panorama of the history of ethnic minorities in korean society can be imaged through the case of the amerasians. the experiences of the amerasians can help to address ethnic diversity wherever particular ethnic minorities are still excluded from equal treatment. thirdly, this study contributes to establishing a base of relevant social studies. it is expected that the theoretical framework and findings of this study can be used to design comparative studies on amerasians in other countries. the case of the korean-amerasian is also comparable to that of the japanese-amerasian in okinawa (shimabuku, 2010). comparative social research is a useful method to establish or interpret sociological theory for analysing social contexts. even though some scholars are critical that the model of comparative work is not able to reflect social realities as contemporary societies have experienced rapid structural changes, it has been one of the most useful research strategies for understanding general human value systems from as early as the 1930s (øyen, 1990). i will leave these areas as a considerable challenge for further explorations. finally, this study offers motivation to embrace ethnic minorities with more open attitudes by providing a new point of view on the state’s responsibility toward ethnic minorities. as noted above, the issue of amerasians and state responsibility toward them is largely absent from the literature. as a result, it is typically assumed that the ethnic minorities’ quality of life is determined by individual capability within a family structure. the notion that the secure social status of ethnic minority groups is a responsibility of the government and members of mainstream society has scarcely been developed or has been ignored. in this regard, this research provides a novel contribution to the existing sociological cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 23 literature by exploring the interrelationship between the situation of amerasians and government policy toward them. i believe that the situation of amerasians as reflected in government policy based on empirical evidence could enhance the development of current multicultural discourses, such as on the human rights and quality of life of ethnic minority groups. data collection i collected initial data from a diverse range of sources: legislation, journal articles, survey records, personal interviews with central figures of the amerasian community and documents from their associations. government data offered by the korean ministry of government legislation were used to examine government policy in the past and present. interviews were conducted with eight key informants, at least two interviews with each person for an in-depth empirical analysis, from august to september 2012 and from april to may 2014 using the snowball sampling method (see table 1). semi-structured qualitative interviews were used to guide the communicative nature of the conversation. direct questions related to discriminatory experiences were avoided during the interviews with members of amerasians as that might remind interviewees of painful past memories. archival and literary materials such as survey reports and newspaper articles were used to demonstrate discriminatory experiences of amerasians. however, i did not exclude conversations where such matters were raised spontaneously during the interviews, because of their significance for impartial analysis. the interviews were conducted in korean and then were translated into english. the names of interviewees were romanised following korean pronunciation. names of interviewees were designated as initials based on their last names. if more than one person had the same initials for their last name, the second person’s name was abbreviated as the initial of their given name. conditionally, some of the korean language such as the name of the regions and organisation is romanised following the notation of korean roman notification no. 2000-8 of the ministry of culture and tourism, korea. additionally, my approval to conduct the interviews was granted by the university of sydney human research ethics committee (hrec). table 1 list of interviewees name position mr b the current president of the korea league of international families mr p formal president of the amerasian community (hapa korea) mr s an adopted amerasian child to america mr k the principal of amerasian christian academy ms l a member of the amerasian community mr j an amerasian singer mr o former amerasian singer ms o the current secretary general of the women migrants’ human rights centre 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 the history of amerasians behind korean government policy the history of amerasians is closely related to the history of the relationship between korea and usfk. in the wake of the korean war and its conclusion – that is, the division of korea into north and south – a number of us military servicemen have been stationed in korea until the present time. koreans experienced the horrors of war for three years, suffering massive damage and many casualties. as a consequence of their suffering, a deep-seated fear of starvation and anti-communist sentiment ruled their lives and contributed to the justification for the raison d’être of the usfk. there were an estimated 327,000 us army service personnel in korea during the war, and some 70,000 have remained since 1957 (byeon, 2005; kim & choe, 2003; park, 2000). however, unfortunately, the effect of usfk was mostly epitomised by the hundreds of red-light districts that formed around us army bases1 (cumings, 1992). tens of thousands of korean women worked in the sex trade during the korean war, and over 20,000 registered prostitutes serviced 62,000 us army servicemen through the late 1960s (lee, 2004; moon, 1997). there were an estimated 8,000 prostitutes just in bosan-dong (dongducheon-si of gyeonggi-do) servicing the 1970s-era base of a single us army unit (us troops in korea in 50 years, 1995). in the case of camp stanley, in uijeongbu, there were 10 bars for us army personnel, with 70 female barmaids, even though the resident population of the town was fewer than 300 (kim, 1995). paradoxically, while prostitution and sex trafficking had previously been banned by korean law, a number of women participated in sex trafficking lawfully, under the korean government’s supervision (moon, 1997). the prostitutes in gijichon, assumed as the root of most amerasian births, were registered as ‘special entertainers’ and issued permits by the korean government authorising them to comfort the usfk there. the government suspended enforcement of the anti-prostitution law for sex workers transacting with foreigners in certain areas in the form of the establishment of the korean tourism service in 1962 (choi, 1996; lee, 2010). in detail, there were 104 districts designated as special prostitution areas – special tourist zones – and such districts were supported or tolerated by three separate government departments; the health department, the ministry of justice and the ministry of home affairs (byeon, 2005; korea, 2003; lee, 2010). the special prostitution areas numbered32 in gijichons at itaewon, dongducheon, uijeongbu and so on. moreover, gisaeng2 parties for tourists were allowed to be held without restriction, and they were not bound by curfews3 by special government permits. in order to provide the very best service for tourists, refinement lectures and classes were conducted for korean gisaengs (lee, 2010). 1 the gijichon at bupyeong-gu of gyeonggi-do was formed by the us military government following the korean war. the us military established headquarters there for all 61 us divisions, in order to facilitate logistics, supplies, and transportation. housing for local labourers supporting the camp expanded rapidly, and it was the first gijichon in korea (lee, 2004) 2 the korean version of japanese geisha. 3 korea enforced a curfew from 12am to 4am for 37 years from 1945 ( ha, 1994). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 25 as a consequence, a decadent culture of tourism as a large scale adult entertainment industry was widespread in korean society. bruce cumings (1992) illustrated this situation: the culture of camp towns, prostitution as a way of life, and sex tourism has nothing to do with korean culture. it is an integral part of korea’s subordination to japanese and american interests through most of this century; the military base in the itaewon area, after all, was japan’s for four decades and now it has been ours for four decades. in 1945 the camp towns just switched patrons. this patent subordination is obvious to anyone with eyes to see, or ears to hear (p. 174). he stated that ‘i haven’t been to seoul since 1985, but at that time the camp towns were still going strong, and the only difference in the downtown hotels was that japanese men now competed with americans for the available women…and probably paid better wages’ (cumings, 1992, p. 175). such a decadent culture of gijichon was expressed by nam (2008) with the phrase ‘a lawless world’. a number of amerasians were born in such ‘a lawless world’ without any institutional protection or restrictions. a number of amerasians were born to korean women who had been raped by usfk members or who had been involved in sex trafficking for a living. one of my interviewees, mr b, who is a member of their community, stated: most amerasians in korea are offspring of the un forces from the korean war. my mother was raped by an italo-american soldier during the war when she went to marketplace to sell agricultural products that were harvested by her for her livelihood. my mother lived in busan and the italian military was stationed in busan to support for medical treatment during the korean war. unfortunately, i was born by accident and my mother was thrown out with me and my sister from her husband’s home after my birth. according to mr b, a number of korean women who lived in gijichon were exposed to sexual violence by us army personnel or members of the allied forces and a number of amerasians were born as a result. he stated: during the war, many people’s livelihoods were in danger and people gathered around gijichon to find some food. many women were sent to the town for food by their families and were then faced with an ordeal. another respondent, mr p, also provided the background to his birth: i was born in 1952 [in the heat of the battle]. my mother worked at a wash house in a nearby gijichon. she washed military uniforms for us military servicemen for the family’s livelihood. at that time, my mother’s husband was fighting in the war, so she was the only breadwinner for the whole family, which included the older disabled brother of her husband, her husband’s aged mother, her daughter and her son. i don’t know whether my mother was raped, but i think my father gave some food and some money to my mother. thinking about her situation, she lived from hand to mouth. she had no choice. 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 after the war, the bias directed toward children born to korean women with american fathers had a considerable effect on the life of amerasians and their mothers. state responsibility toward discrimination and inequality against minority groups although amerasians were born in korea to korean mothers and have a korean identity, a number of amerasians have experienced discriminatory treatment from the mainstream society not only in the government policy or people’s attitudes but also in public and private services as well as in daily activities.the discrimination and inequality against certain minority groups have long been a central issue in sociology and politics in accordance with widespread recognition of the necessity of a new social order able to cope with an increasing number of ethnic minorities. furthermore, the issue of state responsibility in relation to ethnic minorities has featured widely in struggles over democratic policies under the conditions of globalisation. the process of social transformation which has occurred in many countries since world war ii has been accompanied by cultural and racial conflicts with many different ethnic minorities. in any case, a number of ethnic minorities have been struggling for administrative and legislative equality over recent decades. states that host various ethnic minorities are forced to manage ethnic diversity effectively. finding an appropriate ideological interpretation for policies on ethnic minorities has emerged as an urgent challenge for these states. as a result, many scholars have proposed political theories that distinguish various state responses toward the ethnic minorities. significantly, kymlicka claims that the fair way to distribute powers in order to compensate for the systemic disadvantages of minority cultures, which are rendered invisible by the idea of ‘benign neglect’, is to ensure that all ethnic minority groups have the opportunity to preserve their cultural distinctiveness. kymlicka (1996) correctly argues that since ethnic minority groups are more vulnerable to determinative state responses than are dominant groups in society, they need to be protected by way of more extensive political institutions to support their marginalised position (kymlicka, 1996). taylor (1992) also argues that every individual identity and every ethnic group has rights not only to maintain its characteristics but to be recognised as of equal value within a legitimate political framework. as not all countries have the same type of minority groups or the same historical or sociological background, the political justification for minority rights appears to be formulated on a case by case basis, each of which takes account of various contexts. on the other hand, galtung (1969) presents the theory of violence and peace by categorising the concept of violence into two types, personal or direct violence and structural or indirect violence. he theorised ‘the type of violence where there is an actor that commits the violence as personal or direct, and violence where there is no such actor as structural or indirect’ (galtung, 1969, p. 170).while personal violence is often accompanied by the use of a physical object that causes injury to the body, structural violence could be seen as psychological violence and this could be understood as social injustice.young (1989) suggests the articulation of special privileges for minority groups to reduce oppression and disadvantage as well as to promote social justice and equality. while some groups are treated cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 27 as second-class citizens through oppression and exclusion, some other groups are privileged under the influence of the principle of equal treatment (dusche, 2004). this suggests that theories of minority rights are constructed in and through political contestation. therefore, specific concepts and practices of minority rights should be constructed in relation to the political framework to take account of the various contexts surrounding minority groups. although various approaches and political models have appeared within culturally or ethnically diverse societies as a way to establish control over immigrants, the universally accepted notion of ethnic minority rights stresses the importance of different treatment. without special privileges, it is difficult to have equality for the members of ethnic minorities including education and work experiences in line with universally acceptable justification (kymlicka, 1996, p. 127). however, even if justice is an important motivation in supporting ethnic minority groups, we may still feel that something must have been left out in the case of amerasians. they are not classified as ethnic minorities within the framework of those theories as they neither have distinctive cultures nor different languages from mainstream society. to seek an answer to the question of how to understand this group, this paper turns to the consideration of the identity of the amerasian. the identity of amerasians in order to understand the situation of amerasians, their identity should be examined because of their biological distinction from other korean people. however, it is impossible to discuss the identity of amerasians briefly, because the concept of identity has been the subject of considerable research and writing in recent years. despite their distinctive appearance, whether amerasians fall under the category of ‘ethnic minority’ is debatable, because there is no universal agreement on the definition of ‘ethnic’. indeed, the term ‘ethnic’ is elusive because recently it has been used to mean a variety of things. it is, moreover, a politically sensitive term, in part, because of its derivation from the greek word ethnos, or ‘heathen’, which continues to be felt in the negative connotation that it carries for many’ (magocsi, 1999, p. 304; williams, 1985). malik (1996) depicts ‘ethnicity’ as a mutable distinction created by changeable cultural characteristics while ‘race’ is an immutable distinction created biologically. giddens also delineates ethnicity as being defined by cultural characteristics: members of ethnic group see themselves as culturally distinct from other groupings in a society, and are seen by those others to be so. many different characteristics may serve to distinguish ethnic groups from one another, but the most usual are language, history or ancestry (real or imagined), religion, and styles of dress or adornment (cited in malik, 1996, p. 175). miller (1995) also sees ethnic groups in relation to culture with the definition that ‘an ethnic group is a community formed by common descent and sharing cultural features’ (p. 19). such variations of definition highlight the fact that there is nothing objective about the meaning of ethnicity. if ‘ethnic group’ refers to a community based on sharing cultural features created by ‘wholly learned’ practices (malik, 1996, p. 175; miller, 1995) and implies a possibility for change, the amerasian in korea may not be eligible to be seen as an ethnic minority. 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 instead of ‘ethnic minority’, k. elizabeth mcdoland used the term ‘transculturals’ to explore identity for people who are ‘individual[s] who spend a significant part of their formative years in one or more countries other than their country of origin because of the international work and life choices of their parents’ (2010, p. 39). according to her study, transcultural individuals appear to be ‘highly functional members of a global society’ as a result of their cultural experiences, while they tend to feel confusion about their identity, alienation, depression, and conflict in their inner sense of self as a result of moving from one country to a culturally different one. this kind of identity is also applicable to multi-ethnic individuals, which is made clear in jeffreys and zoucha’s paper examining multi-ethnic individuals in the us (jeffreys & zoucha, 2001). according to this paper, multi-ethnic individuals are assumed to belong to two or more distinct cultural groups, creating a unique culture with multiple cultural heritages. the authors stated that ‘acknowledging the uniqueness of multiple heritage individuals, without attaching pity, stigmatization, alienation, marginalization, or lowered social status, is an important first step in making this “culture” truly visible and fully appreciated’ (jeffreys & zoucha, 2001, p. 83). on the other hand, moon (1997) examines the relationship between korean government policy and prostitutes which was assumed as the root of most amerasian births, in her book sex among allies: military prostitution in us–korea relations. she alleges that prostitutes in military towns not only facilitated usfk, but also played the role of informal diplomats contributing to a friendly relationship between korea and the us.the government contributed greatly to the presence of the number of prostitutes by promoting the sex trade as one part of the tourism policy, although korean law previously banned prostitution and sex trafficking. a number of women participated in sex trafficking lawfully, under korean government’s supervision. amerasians were born in such a paradoxical situation and spent their childhood in gijichons. thus, amerasians do not meet the definition of transculturals according to the theory presented by mcdonald, because they are not a migrant generation and so do not have a mother country outside of korea. also, ‘multi-ethnic individuals’ may or may not be applicable to the context of amerasians according to jeffreys and zoucha because it is doubtful whether they have multiple cultural heritages from each parent following the stereotype of racially mixed people. one of my interviewees said: we are absolutely korean. my mother is korean and so is my family. even though many korean people don’t allow us to belong to their society, we are members of korean society, and thus we have the same rights as other members of society. he emphasised that he wants korean people not to ignore amerasians’ national identity as koreans even though their status is that of a minority. another respondent, mrl, expressed his opinion with regard to their identity: i think amerasians are one hundred percent koreans in terms of language and culture but just have different looks. it can be said that our experiences and attitude could be a little bit different from other koreans because we have experienced difficulties [living] as a minority. even though there is an american culture at cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 29 gijichons, we cannot speak english, and most of us have had no connection with our [biological] father. although there is a distinctive culture in the us military camp towns where amerasians spent their childhoods, it is not a culture of the amerasians’ own, only of the camp towns as a whole. given the paucity of literature related to amerasians, it is difficult to find a theory that represents the identity of amerasians. the amerasians have a distinctively different history and experiences from the other ethnic minorities who have newly immigrated to korea for a better life, such as guest workers and married migrants. many korean scholars identify them as a ‘gijichonhonhyeolin (mixed-blood person)’, which means ‘honhyeolin in a us military camp town’ or ‘war honhyeolin’. yet, these terms do not necessarily emphasise the term ‘mixed-blood’, which contains negative implications and ignores their shared experiences. therefore, the most permissible usage to identify them is ‘amerasian’, and their rights might be discussed differently from other ethnic minorities, taking into account their shared experiences. in the same vein, amerasians can be classified as ‘mixed race people’ according to malik’s theory, but they are korean people and share korean culture. the government policy toward amerasians nationality act amerasians are not viewed as koreans under the korean nationality law established in 1948 and their presence has often been officially concealed despite the state having a great responsibility with regard to the presence of amerasians. since the korean nationality law rested on the principle of jus sanguinis a patre, children with an american father and a korean mother were not allowed to be granted korean citizenship. the korean nationality act (1948) provides the requirements to be a national of korea in article 2 as follows: 1. a person whose father is a national of the republic of korea at the time of his or her birth; 2.a person whose father was a national of the republic of korea at the time of death, in cases where the father died before his or her birth; 3.a person whose mother is a national of the republic of korea at the time of his or her birth, in cases where the father is unknown or has no nationality… (1948). according to this act, amerasian who was born by miscegenation between us military service men and korean women could not be placed on an official family register unless their father is unknown or has no nationality. therefore, they had to be registered as part of their mother’s male family member or sent to the orphanages without being registered. one of myinterviewees, ms l stated: on paper, my age is 50 but my actual age is 53. when i was born, a single mother could not register their children as their offspring because of the family register act. i entered primary school without any family registration because elementary school was compulsory education. but in the case of middle school, nobody could enter without being on a family register [as it was not compulsory education at that 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 time]. i was registered belatedly when i reached middle school age for my schooling in my mother’s family register as a daughter of my uncle. the current president of ‘korea league of international families (hereafter, ‘klif’) said that: most amerasian children were registered as a son or daughter of their uncle. but the children of mothers who did not have any male relatives, or were not allowed to be registered by the male relative, sent their children to orphanages. in other cases a number of amerasians did not receive formal school education even though primary school education was compulsory. the nationality act was finally revised in 1998 and jus sanguinis a patre were amended to simply jus sanguinis in both the paternal and maternal line (ji, 1997; kim, 1997). the revised law allowed children with either a korean mother or a korean father to acquire korean citizenship. more innovatively, a child born to a korean parent was permitted dual nationality until the age of 20 (choi,1997). however, most amerasian children did not benefit from this belatedly amended act and were adopted overseas without registration under the government policy which encouraged international adoption in order to remove them from the society. act on special cases concerning adoption for orphans kadushin (1970) claims that the best place to nurture a child is the country in which he or she was born. adoption is irrelevant until every effort has been made for children and their family to live together in a sound child welfare system. even if adoption becomes a necessity for children, it should be within their mother country with full involvement from the state (chung, 2011; kadushin, 1970). fredericksen and mulligan also states that every child should have ‘the kind of care he needs, aids and services’ as well as ‘affection, approval and a sense of belonging’ for his security (fredericksen & mulligan, 1972, pp. 2-3). however, the korean government established hangook adong yanghoho, the child placement service, as an independent institution within the social department, to assist the international adoption of amerasian children (kim, 2009). in order to manage international adoption in a legitimate manner, the act on special cases concerning adoption for orphans was passed in 1961. the international adoption efforts were prompted as a way to address the problem of a number of orphans created by the korean war. yet, article 2 of this act defined orphans as: 1) children whose parents or guardians are unknown and who are under 18 years of age. 2) a child whose parents or the guardian consents to the adoption and those who are under 18 years of age (1961). in fact, a number of amerasian children whose parents had consented to the adoption were designated as orphans and were adopted overseas under this act. a number of single mothers who could not register their children into their family register under the former nationality law inevitably consented for their children to be adopted overseas. surprisingly, it was estimated that approximately 70% of the children adopted overseas were not orphans but were raised by a single mother (won, 1990). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 31 as a result of the government effort to promote adoption rather than institutional care, the number of children being accommodated in state care fell from over 60,000 in 1960s to 23,000 in the 1980s (tahk, 1986, p. 86). the current president of klif argued that: some 30,000-40,000 honhyeolin children were abandoned after the korean war. [the first president of korea], syngman rhee was very embarrassed by the increasing number of honhyeolin because it undermined the governing principle of korea, pure blood supremacy. the korean government tried to devise a way to send honhyeolin to america, and invited harry holt [a baptist] and pearl buck [a human right activist] who were influential on american policy to be involved in the international adaption. ‘holt children’s services’ and ‘pearl buck foundation’ were established in korea by a baptist, harry holt and pearl buck. also, the seventh day adventist adoption service was established by missionaries, george h. rue and grace rue, in 1955. these institutions assisted with arranging the adoption of korean war orphans and amerasians overseas. (chung, 2011; kim, 2009; won, 1990). because of the government policy focusing excessively on overseas adoptions with little concern for child welfare, the government could not escape severe criticism by a number of foreign media, drawing negative attention to korea. the new york times (chira, 1988) carried an article explaining that korea was the number one nation in the world in the proportionate number of orphans adopted internationally. it was titled ‘babies for export: and now the painful questions’ and noted that some 60% of children adopted in the us were of korean ancestry sent by the government’s encouragement of international adoption. it noted: six thousand korean children a year— given up for adoption by unwed mothers or abandoned by their parents— are adopted by american families alone. unlike other countries, where black markets for infants have sprung up, south korea goes by the book. indeed, the government supports the idea of foreign adoptions and oversees each step of the adoption process, licensing adoption agencies and the unwed mothers’ homes that supply them with babies. it figured that over 5,700 korean children were adopted in 1987 and over 6,000 korean children were adopted in 1986 by american families according to state department immigration. the progressive (rothschild, 1988) also reported this matter in an article entitled ‘babies for sale’ with subtitle ‘south korea make them, americans buy them’. it reported that 6,000 korean children were adopted overseas annually, and the korean government saw an influx of $15-20 million in foreign currencies annually as a result. this seems to be demonstrated by article 20 of act on special cases concerning the promotion and procedure of adoption which states that adoption agencies can claim from adoptive parents the expenses attendant to adoption (1996). also, according to the enforcement decree of the act on special cases concerning the promotion and procedure of adoption, the claimable charge to adoptive parents included expenses for adoption agencies, child rearing expenses, expenses 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 for adoption procedure, the operating expenses of adoption organisations and promotional expenses (1999). according to the new york times,(chira, 1988) the adoptive parents pay some us$4,000 including payments to korean foster parents and adoption agency progressing costs while the progressive (rothschild, 1988) revealed a figure of us$5,000. most amerasians were adopted or otherwise allowed to emigrate to the us under such circumstances, and the social issues facing them have since been largely forgotten. school for amerasian children for remaining amerasian children, the government organised a special structure, the children’s welfare committee, for official discussion about segregated education for amerasians in 1952 (2003). the committee, which had some twenty members from the government, local schools and welfare organisations, reached the conclusion that amerasiansneeded to be educated separately in order to protect them from discrimination and to prepare them for international adoption (korea, 2003). as a result, a primary school for amerasians, the younghwa municipal primary school, was established by the government in 1962 (school for honhyeolin 2009; younghwa primary school 1962). the president of klif stated that: the younghwa primary school was established by the government because honhyeolin were assumed not to lead a normal school life with other korean children in local schools. the government and the mothers of honhyeolin children thought it was the only way to protect them from discriminatory treatment by society. however, the younghwa municipal primary school was transferred to a local school after a heated controversy about the pros and cons of providing separate education for amerasians. another factor in the transfer of these students to a local school for nonamerasians was the smaller number of students compared with the normal local school. there were 74 students in younghwa primary school when it transferred to a local school in 1964 (korea, 2003). according to national human rights commission of korea, the rate of amerasians leaving middle and high school was over six times as large as other korean students (2005, p. 17). while the ministry of education designed a plan to provide one billion won for alternative schools in 2006, the amerasians were excluded from this plan as there were no alternative schools for them (ha, 2006). the president of klif mentioned: i desire to establish schools for honhyeolin to protect them from social discrimination and provide safe educational environments, so that our suffering from social discrimination and bullying is not passed down to our next generation. currently, there are two educational institutions for amerasians at dongduchon, the dongduchon american community academy and the american christian academy. both of these institutions were established in 1999 by korean-american principals. one of the principals, one of my interviewees, stated: cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 33 our institution is managed by christian organisations and has received some scholarship donations from america, australia and some european countries. there is no support system from the korean government that provides financial aid or administrative support. the principal of the alternative school for north korean defectors stated that the establishment of alternative schools for amerasians is an urgent task for the korean government as a number of them have been marginalised from the basic human right to an education (ha, 2006). to embrace amerasians and to guarantee their human rights, it is important to offer equal opportunity for education under the institutional support component. military service act as the amerasians who were born during the korean war came of age for military service, the government introduced article 136 of the enforcement decree of the military service act to exempt them. it prescribed who should be exempted from military service: (a) a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor between one year and less than 2 years…(b) a person of mixed-blood who may be plainly distinguished in appearances and who was not raised up in the house of his father… arguably, amerasians who have different skin colour from koreans and were raised without a father were legally exempted from military service according to this act. according to a survey conducted by the korea league of international families, over 80% of honhyeolin were raised by a single mother (2005, p. 15). one of my interviewees, mr s argued that: the only purpose of the korean government was to send the honhyeolin to other countries by means of international adoption. therefore, military duty was an interruptive dimension because it would defer international adoption or immigration for young honhyeolin. so, the government bulldozed the act which prescribed honhyeolin’s exemption from military duty. thus, as many honhyeolin as possible were sent overseas. at the same time, amerasians were also excluded from fair competition in terms of job opportunities. indeed, the government established the support for discharged soldiers act which stated that men who were discharged upon completing their military service could get extra points when applying for jobs4 (article 9, 1999; article 8, 1998). this meant that it was much more difficult to find a job for amerasians because they competed with other people who had extra points. the state responsibility toward amerasian in south korea it was argued in the previous section that, although state responsibility for minority rights has been interpreted differently in different contexts, a central principle of democratic policy justifies special privileges for minority groups at a government level in a systematically 4 this was abolished in 1999 after heated controversy over gender discrimination. 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 legitimate manner. however, the amerasians have often experienced exclusionary government policies intended to restrain them from engaging in the korean public sphere and to keep them separate from the rest of society, which would constitute institutional violence according to galtung’s theory. such unprivileged status of the amerasians, in turn, brought about serious problems regarding their quality of life. most amerasians experienced suffering in their life because of poverty caused by the lack of opportunities for both education and employment. according to the national human rights commission of korea, just 6.5% of amerasians are house owners while the corresponding figure for average koreans is 53.3% (korea, 2005, p. 17). durebang, a support centre for prostitutes, former prostitutes and women living with us soldiers, reported that the average family monthly income of amerasians is one million won (us$908) compared with that of the average korean in seoul, which is 2.8 million won (korea, 2003, pp. 78-85). most amerasians over 14 years old, who were at an ineligible age for adoption, were halfeducated and could barely find a job. the klif reported that over 70% of amerasians are working as simple labourers without any special consideration from the government (byeon, 2005, p. 15). many of them found work in the gijichon and did odd jobs or worked as labourers such as, plasterers, brick makers, drivers, welders, plumbers, repairmen, personal assistants, and typists (jo, 2006; kim, 1982; oh & cho, 2010). one of my interviewees, mr o, a former amerasian singer, recalled: a number of my friends acted as american because it was easier to find a job as a singer. in my case, i worked as a singer at a bar, and i was often introduced as an american singer because koreans in the past have preferred american songs to korean. so, i learned english to pretend to be an american. even though i honestly said that i am a korean, nobody trusted my word [because of my appearance]. as jung et al. stated, ‘south korea is enveloped by an “english fever” whereby english education is highly valued as a symbol of prestige and high social standing’ (2017, p. 9). in the same vein, american pop culture became widespread in korean society as a significant part of youth culture throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and many amerasians were engaged as singers in nightclubs and received publicity. yet, mr o now works as a simple labourer having left his flourishing singing career behind. the lack of job opportunities caused a lack of socialisation with other members of mainstream society, a situation brought on by the fact that amerasians’ status was largely marginalised. to overcome such marginalised status, the association of amerasians established the corporation of the klif. the establishment licence of the klif provided by the president of the klif declares its purpose is to protect rights and interests and to promote the welfare of amerasians, international families, and returned overseas koreans. one of my interviewees, mr j, stressed: korean law prescribes the benefits for men of national merit and their family in various ways. we were not born to the soldiers of enemy troops but to the soldiers of combatant nations who fought on behalf of south korea during the war. when cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 35 korea was in a precarious situation our fathers came to korea in order to help the korean people. but the korean government has treated us as alien. different facial features or skin colours and birth places are not the conditions of being guaranteed the right for pursuit of happiness. but we are always excluded from such basic rights and have never been treated as korean citizens by the government. he claimed that amerasians should be classified as family members of national meritorious men and as equal to others whose family members participated in the korean war. according to the act on the honourable treatment for war veterans of merit (2009), which is prescribed by the act on the honourable treatment and support of persons, etc. of distinguished services to the state, foreign soldiers who enlisted in the national army or armed forces of the united nations as a national of the republic of korea and participated in the korean war can be recognised as persons who have rendered distinguished services to the state. thus, amerasians are eligible to be recognised as family members of persons who have rendered distinguished services to the state. according to the act, various financial supports, such as payment of compensation, allowance for adjusting living conditions, nursing allowance, education assistance for off-spring, and vocational assistance, were offered by the government for persons of national merit and their family. however, in order to register as war veterans and therefore be recognised as persons who have rendered distinguished services to the state prescribed by the act, it is necessary to be permitted by the ministry of patriots and veterans affairs (article 5, 2009). amerasians who have lost contact with their fathers are excluded from recognition as a family member of a person of national merit. the president of the klif argued: when the state was in danger, the government overcame the crisis with active support of the u.n. forces. a number of foreign soldiers were killed or wounded during the war, and their offspring who have remained in korea are suffering from discriminatory treatment by the government. it doesn’t make sense. our appearance is the evidence, but the government has ignored our existence. while the government has allotted huge amounts of money for multicultural families, the government has never designed the social security system for us who actually need and are qualified for the support. instead of support, the government has treated us harshly throughout my life time. the klif is struggling to find a way to pass down a better life to their children and has made claims for the government to support their livelihood in various ways. the klif claims that it is the korean government’s responsibility to compensate for the depressed economic status of amerasians as follows: 1. honhyeolins were born in a situation of absence of public security. 2. honhyeolins were not protected by the government. 3. the government and the society overlooked discrimination and exclusion toward honhyeolin… 1. 8. the mothers of honhyeolin were victims of national interests… 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 2. 10. there was no measure against discriminatory treatment toward employment and promotion of honhyeolin. 3. 11. the government has a responsibility to provide livelihoods to live like a decent human being and to regain the impaired reputation for honhyeolin and their family (provided by the klif). the klif claimed the right to manage the pearl buck memorial hall, which is currently managed by bucheon city hall and the establishment of a special act for amerasians in order to guarantee their livelihood. however, the government has been silent on their claims that their rights as children of usfk or un forces were not guaranteed by existing juridical frameworks. moreover, while a number of supporting organisations for married migrants and guest workers have been established since the early 2000s, when an extensive inflow of married migrants began, there is no supporting system or organisation for amerasians. the current secretary general of the women migrants’ human rights centre stated: our aim is that married migrants’ lives should be without practical discrimination, thus enhancing their human rights. anyway, i don’t think there is an organisation to support amerasians. there is a support centre called durebang but actually it is an organisation for mainly prostituted women at gijichon. they provide various services for sex workers to find a new way of life. but they do not provide any services separately for amerasians. i think because many amerasians have left korea [in the form of international adoption], their situation is not an issue at all. although a number of organisations that support various ethnic minorities have managed with some financial assistance from the government, amerasians have been excluded from such various support systems and their situation was largely neglected by the government. their voice is still excluded from the mainstream society, while those of ethnic minority communities such as married migrants and guest workers are broadcast day after day on the media. when the dominant society fails to show equal recognition of a particular group, the members of the group can suffer real damage, and the opportunity for a free choice of identity can be lost, which can be seen among transculturals and people of mixed race (cf mcdonald, 2010, p. 39). their rights are often suppressed by the host society through a lack of recognition of their identity as well as by discriminatory policies or institutional disadvantages showing the case of structural violence according to galtung (1969). therefore, the human rights of minority groups are always deeply attached to state responsibility because they require support and special privileges. in order to find an acceptable manner to reconcile with amerasians, some compensation for the discrimination they have long faced in the past, which is not the case of the other minority groups recently arrived in korean society, should be considered in the form of special privileges. conclusion amerasians have experienced discriminatory policies from the government and the effect of the policies on their legal status has made them quite vulnerable. amerasians’ presence was officially concealed until the nationality act was revised as their registration was not cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 37 properly permitted. a number of amerasians, whose status was unstable, were adopted into families overseas under the government policy of promoting international adoption in their earliest childhood years. this contributed to amerasians being excluded from the dominant society without recognition of their korean inheritance. the life of amerasians was distinct from other local people and reified by institutional problems related not only to their birth register but also military service. amerasians were exempted from military service, resulting in fewer job opportunities compared with other people. most amerasians experienced suffering in their life because of poverty caused by the lack of opportunities for both education and employment. this clearly violates egalitarian liberal principles, and their experience is now becoming a part of the dark history of korea and has been concealed by the 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https://doi.org/10.1086/293065 https://doi.org/10.1086/293065 ccs 6054 -yang.pdf 6054-article text-29205-1-10-20181125.pdf abstract keywords introduction definition of the amerasian purpose of this study significance data collection the history of amerasians behind korean government policy state responsibility toward discrimination and inequality against minority groups the identity of amerasians the government policy toward amerasians the state responsibility toward amerasian in south korea conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol.9,no.1 2017 ©2017 farhat tasnim. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (ccby4.0) license (https://creativecommons.o rg/licenses/by/4.0/),allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and toremix,transform,and build upon the material for any purpose,even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and statesits license. citation: tasnim, f.2017.politicized civil society in bangladesh: case study analyses. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal.9(1),98-123. http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i 1.5247 issn1837-5391 publishedbyutsepress https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/jo urnals/index.php/mcs refereed paper politicized civil society in bangladesh: case study analyses farhat tasnim university of rajshahi, bangladesh corresponding author: farhat tasnim, department of political science, university of rajshahi, bangladesh. tasnimpol@yahoo.com doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.5247 abstract although civil society in bangladesh is recognized for its vibrant performance in social development, it is often criticized for its inability to influence good governance and democracy. the aim of this paper is to point out the reasons for this failure of civil society. through performing case studies upon five civil society organizations (csos) representing different sectors and levels of the civil society, the paper concludes that csos in bangladesh are often politicized and co-opted by different political parties. in a typical scenario in other countries, civil society can provide a counterbalance or even monitor the state both at the national and local levels. however, in bangladesh, often csos have compromised their autonomy and politicized themselves to certain political parties or political blocks. in such a vulnerable position, civil society can hardly play its expected role to ensure good governance and strengthen democracy. keywords civil society, democracy, bangladesh, political party, politicization declaration of conflicting interest the author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to other search, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was first written during the period of the author’s post doctoral fellowship awarded by japan society for the promotion of science (2011-2013). http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.5247 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v9i1.5247 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:tasnimpol@yahoo.com cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 99 introduction bangladesh is often called a ‘development show-case’ where civil society organizations are found to be successful and active in micro-credit, empowerment and social development initiatives. it is also often cited as a success story for the neo-tocquevillean school1 (diamond 1999; fisher 1998; hulme and edwards 1997). however, the political system is still struggling with a poor economy and, as a fledgling democracy, is marked by confrontation and violence. the vibrant civil society is often criticized for its weak contributions to democracy (lewis2004; quadir 2003; ahmed 2011). the case of bangladesh forms a stark contrast to the neo-tocquevillean assumption that a strong civil society fosters democracy, holds the state in check, and contributes to development (howell and pearce 2001, p. 40). civil society is considered central to both the promotion and maintenance of democracy (diamond 1999, p 239). naturally, the question arises as to why the vibrant civil society in bangladesh fails to contribute to the institutionalization of democracy there. this paper seeks to discover the reasons behind the weakness of bangladesh’s civil society. it begins with the hypothesis that most civil society organization (csos), both modern types such as development-oriented non-governmental organizations (ngos) and conventional types such as professional groups, trade unions, and citizen’s groups, are politicized and coopted by the major political parties. due to this co-optation, csos fail to function autonomously in their interactions with the state, whether in acts of cooperation or of negotiation. with the help of individual case studies of five csos representing different sectors of the civil society, this paper argues that civil society in bangladesh often compromises its ability to monitor the state and politics and become politicized. in most cases they become compelled to come to such situations just to survive, achieve their primary organizational objectives, or earn personal gains for their leaders. this paper is based on empirical research. the first section gives a theory-based explanation and description of politics, civil society and its politicized nature in bangladesh, using the most accurate theoretical lenses available. the second section comprises five case studies of csos representing different sectors of the civil society. the case study analyses verify the politicized and compromized vigilance of civil society in bangladesh inferred in the theoretical section. 1de tocqueville (1873) conceived of civil society as a sphere of mediating organizations between the individuals and the state. neo-tocquevillean scholars not only argue for the positive link between civil society and democracy but also advocate for building and strengthening civil society in order to build democracy and ensure good governance in third world countries. while de tocqueville saw civil society as the site of decentralization for democratic governance, neo-tocquevilleans view civil society as a supporting structure in the state’s democratization. associational life is thought to provide social infrastructure for liberal democracy; supply the means to limit, resist and curb the excesses of the state and market; present an alternative when they fail; facilitate service delivery at the local level; assist in conflict management; deepen democracy; provide a voice to disadvantaged groups; and promote economic development (alagappa, 2004, p. 41). according to the neo-tocquevillean model, efforts to produce democracy through civil society and civic engagement are believed to effect change in three ways: first, changes at the micro-social level will produce macro-political results; second, in a society, disposition and practices shaped in one association will have spill over effects in other circumstances; and third, the same associational structures will operate in similar ways in different sociohistorical contexts (armony, 2004, p. 7). for detail consult (tasnim 2012, p 156-157). 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 civil society and politics in bangladesh: the search for a theoretical lens from a general sense, civil society is considered as the sustained, organized social activity that occurs in groups that are formed outside the state, the market, and the family (schwartz & pharr 2003, p.xiii). civil society is considered to represent the public voice and to influence the process of achieving and maintaining democracy by acting at the national and grassroots levels. a vigilant civil society in a developing country may contribute to better governance and democracy in different ways: through providing civic education, increasing interest articulation, monitoring the state apparatus and markets, and ensuring better participation and representation of all segments of the society in decision making, aside from the polls (tasnim 2012, p.161). neo-tocquevillean literature generally considers civil society in idealized terms: autonomous, democratic and rich in social capital and civic engagement, always enhancing democracy (diamond1999; putnum 2000; salamon 2003). in explaining this theory, diamond (1996, p210) emphasizes the necessity of a vibrant civil society to bring institutional reform and fight against corruption and clientelism in a new democracy. civil society is also expected to supplement political parties by stimulating political participation, building a better citizenry, and providing leadership training. ultimately, experience with associational life may enrich other democratic values, such as tolerance, moderation, compromise and respect for opposing views. these ideal theories give the impression that the flow of influence is strictly one-way, from civil society towards political society. however, in real life, civil society is often observed to be influenced by political society and the traditional norms embedded in the social life. in bangladesh, for example, it is true that group-based micro credit, community-based education and health awareness systems introduced by ngos have had direct positive impacts on poverty eradication, literacy and health management (ullah and routray 2003; amin 1997; dowla 2006; diamond 1999). ngos actually created a public resource distribution system outside the nation state (nobusue 2002, p 34); in this way, civil society in bangladesh has supplemented the state development policy. however, it is also fact, that civil society influenced by conflicting political parties often has become polarized, corrupt and ineffective in democratic terms (quadir 2003). moreover, csos, including the development ngos in bangladesh, appear to have entered the long patron-client chains running from top government leaders down to the periphery of bangladesh; similarly, ngos have often been accused of becoming new patrons for the poor (lewis 2004;white 1999; hashemi 1996). although bangladesh is ethnically homogenous and casteless, its society is vertically constructed and politically polarized. here, civil society, instead of forming bonds and bridging social capital among different groups, helps sharpen existing political divisions (quadir 2003), which have their origins in historical circumstances and have been strategically used and generated by political parties (tasnim, 2007). thus, in bangladesh, civil society has been behaving in the opposite dimension of what is ideally expected from it in relation to democracy. moreover, civil society is often observed to be compromising its cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 101 essential watchdog status due to the strong influence of political forces and its accompanying loss of independence. for bangladesh, neo-tocquevillean assumptions have thus proven to be partly true but ultimately inadequate. this requires further exploration for alternative lenses or models through which to understand civil society in bangladesh and, above all, the reasons for its failure to contribute to bangladeshi democracy. although not entirely opposite to the neo-tocquevillean school, the gramscian model of civil society provides a better method to understand its relevance to the state and political forces. drawing on but differing from marx, antonio gramsci sees civil society not as a counter to the socio-economic base of the state but as part of the political superstructure (alagappa 2004). gramsci’s hegemony encompasses both the consensual basis of an existing political system within civil society and the advancement to a level of class consciousness where class is understood not only from an economic point of view but also in terms of a common culture and intellectual and moral awareness (adamson 1980, p. 170-171). gramsci’s conception of civil society includes all social institutions that are non-productionrelated, non-governmental, and non-familial, ranging from recreational groups to trade unions and from churches to political parties, meaning that there is both a separation and overlap between civil society and political spheres. he believes that civil society creates the ideological hegemony in the state’s favor. his analysis is clearly historically specific, and his main interest is the role of civil society in making capitalism politically viable in cooperation with the state’s political apparatus (khan1998). gramsci equates the state to the sum of political and civil society where both parts are in touch with hegemony. in a capitalist society, the state itself oscillates between three positions in relation to civil society, simultaneously contrasting with, encompassing and being identical to it (anderson 1976, p. 12-13). with the state’s consent, civil society is the manufacturer of and contributor to the political hegemony that may be considered the state’s ideological control mechanism. political hegemony is hidden within cultural and ideological discourses and the state’s disciplinary method. in explaining his war of position, gramsci has described the possibility of counter-hegemony, where civil society fights not only the coercive methods of the state but also its cultural and ideological codification. gramsci’s idea of civil society may provide a better model to understand civil society in bangladesh, particularly in its relationship with the state and politics and its role in democracy. as mentioned above, civil society in bangladesh often mixes with political society. this may be understood better in gramsci’s framework on the state, civil society, political society and hegemony, as well as counter hegemony. politicization is a common concept often used in a negative meaning to describe political involvement or exertion to control an institution, organization or an administrative process, which is ideally thought to be neutral and free from political influences. moreover, government dictates and strong party control upon the organization challenging its autonomy is another feature of politicization. most often, politicization takes place through ideology, patronage, corruption and clientelism. when a civil society organization takes politically motivated decisions as directed by a party or government and is politically colored by the 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 political affiliation of its members, withholding original objective and interest on which it was formed, we may term it as a politicized cso. partisanship of the members of the organization has a role to play in the politicization process. partisanship is the party identification of citizens. such identification leads to predictable relationships with their perceptions, evaluations and actions in the political process. at present, bangladesh is a liberal economy; however, democracy has yet to be stabilized. political society and political parties are the most powerful and influential institutions. the political parties have control over all sections of political, social and even economic life. civil society is no exception. these institutions use vertical means such as corruption, patronage, nepotism, and violence to strengthen their support and their control on all institutions espousing alternate political ideologies. in the process, civil society has been violated, penetrated, polarized, and controlled by political parties (tasnim, 2007). factionalism and patron-client networks have prepared the basis of social organization (jahan 2005, p. 199). these cultures have developed over centuries in rural society and moved into urban areas with migration of the rural elites and their entrance into national politics (broomfield 1976, p. 41-60). while the present ruling elites of bangladesh (belonging to all parties) have a moral commitment to western political philosophies such as democracy or socialism, in practice, they rely on the patron-client relationship to run the state and political parties (islam 2001, p. 429). the political leadership of the country, irrespective of ideology and party, belongs to the intermediate class that has links both at the urban and rural levels2. political parties co-opt patrons in various localities, who in turn divert their clients’ votes or support to particular political parties. because clients owe allegiance to the patron and not to the party, these parties compete with each other to increase their support group of patrons (jahan 2005, p 200). who are these patrons? in most cases, they are local elites, local council members, and more recently leaders of csos and development ngos. they are clients to the political parties, the brokers between the government and people. in this manner every segment of society, including csos, are politicized both at the rural and urban levels. according to bourdieu (1986, p. 249) in all groups there is a system of delegation where a single agent or a small group becomes the plenipotentiary, accumulating the totality of social capital gained from the collective endeavor. this may be case for a major portion of csos in bangladesh, where the cso leaders, for their personal interest and political gain, turn themselves into such brokers for the political parties. in contemporary bangladesh, very few csos may be termed neutral. party loyalty, communalism and class distinctions tend to split most csos. a vast majority of social organizations operating within the private sphere are simply front organizations for various political parties. instead of representing the collective interest of the people, these csos are mainly engaged in the practice and promotion of the ideas and interests of a given brand of 2historically, bengal’s feudal agrarian society was always hierarchical. the agriculture-based vertical patronclient and kinship network that developed in rural areas was extended to urban areas. the same rural elites who influenced the social and economic life of the peasants later became the urban political leaders and have served as an intermediate political class. during and after the british colonial period, bangladesh society was penetrated by formal political institutions headed by these politicians, who used their vertical networks to maintain their influence in society (broomfield, 1976, p. 41-60). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 103 politics (quadir 2003, p. 432). in the process, it appears that civil society has become politicized and has compromised its vigilance and autonomy, which is negatively affecting the democratization process. political parties and politicized civil society in bangladesh in the first 18 years of independence, bangladesh politics faced government turnovers and military coup d’états with no party competition; for this reason, there was a monopoly of a section of politicians, bureaucrats, military leaders and their parties. insecure political and economic institutions led the different factions to use patronage and clientelism to build and maintain an organizational base. after the end of the autocratic rule of general ershad in 1990 and the reintroduction of the parliamentary system of government, a competitive but confrontational party system has been observed in bangladesh. the two major parties are the left-centric awami league (al), which is aligned with other, smaller left-wing parties, and the right-centric bangladesh nationalist party (bnp), which is aligned with other islamicminded parties (hossain 2000, p. 520, n. ahmed 2003, p. 60). both parties had an equal probability of winning a general election and forming a cabinet with their coalition partners if the election was free and fair. since 1991, bnp and al have served as the government twice each alternately (bnp, 1991-1996 and 2001-2006 and al, 1996-2001, 2008-present) with their coalition or supporting partners. however, in 2014 through a controversial general election, al continues its regime. because both major political parties are centrist, they seem to have converged into catch-all parties3 (katz and mair1995; kirchheimer 1966) with no radical or identifying ideologies concerning national and/or foreign policy. these parties now attract supporters from all segments of society who show allegiance to their policies. both parties accept a capitalist economic system and democracy. the ideological differences among them are not based in liberalism or socialism but rather in history and the debate over the inclusion of religion in politics. political culture or practice has yet to reach the level where the parties are ready to engage in politics within democratic rules and norms. they calculate politics as a zero-sum game. therefore, these parties always underestimate each other’s political strength and seek to establish monopolistic rule by simply knocking out the other party, believing that the losing party will simply fade away (hossain 2000, p. 521). at the end of each party’s term of office, several factions appear that struggle internally for their share of patronage, power and party tickets to contest the next election. 3kirchheimer (1966, p. 185) argued that class line parties and integrating mass parties (duverger, 1978) have gone through a transformation and become more effective in electoral terms. these parties have turned into catch-all parties embracing a nationwide clientele. they began to make broader appeals, trying to gain supportfrom all classes (katz and mair 1995, p. 12). only major parties can become successful catch-all parties. the catch-all party finds its permanent clientele among the interest groups although they also represent citizens beyond group activities (kirchheimer, 1966, p. 194). in third world countries, nationalist mass parties often transformed into catch-all parties as they gained victory over colonial powers, were elected to rule, and engaged in state and nation building. 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 moreover, the internal organization and decision-making processes of each party are neither democratic nor decentralized. practically, parties are organized around the center of their symbolic leader, who uses the charisma of his or her predecessor. the chair persons of most parties enjoy widespread powers, including the power to take unilateral action (ahmed 2003, p.61, jahan 2015, p. 148). instead of a formal and horizontal relationship with these parties, civil society seems to maintain a vertical, informal relationship (tasnim 2007, p. 24). the local leaders, csos, and ngos are clients to the state and patrons to the citizens and villagers (islam 2001,p. 213). such relationships bring csos favors for the group, such as project sanctions, financial grants, and jobs, as well as personal favors, including government loans, employment, promotions, business grants and licenses, government contracts, legal aid, and even medical help. in return, the government and political parties receive loyalty and support from different sections of the social strata, financial and logistic support during elections, control over different institutions and even the media, and ensure the necessary organizational base for staging mass protests. such politicization, as opposed to political penetration, is observed among all types of csos, urban and rural-based, traditional and modern. traditional organizations such as labor unions, professional associations, university groups, chambers of commerce and even newspapers are identified primarily by their political affiliations. with few exceptions, most of these csos belong to one of the major three ideological campssecularist, nationalist and islamist (quadir and tsujinaka 2015, p 11). the ruling party, whether the al or bnp, has shown through its decisions and actions that it gives special support and rewards to those csos that gave positive assistance in helping that party win its election, and acts directly against the csos that collaborated with the opposition. labor union leaders, rather than promoting workers’ interests, are motivated to take undue advantage from their position or concentrate on forming links with political parties or higher government functionaries (zafarullah 2003, p. 295). political penetration is also observed in rural society. in their study on the change in the contemporary rural power structure in bangladesh, faruque et al. (2007) revealed interesting changes where links with political parties were shown to be the most important factor in rural power sources; previously, it was the possession of landed property, family heritage, and wealth. another significant change within rural society is the emerging new type of grouping and rivalry, reflecting the polarization and confrontation found in national politics. modern development ngos and their apex organization, the association for development agencies in bangladesh (adab)4, were considered neutral or apolitical to a point. however, political conflict ultimately led to divisions within this ngo community too (hossain 2006). while the ngos at the national level are politically divided, at the local level they have been identified as the new patrons of the poor, both as direct providers of microcredit and as mediators between the poor and other power structures. among the intellectual 4 adab at present is totally dysfunctional, instead the federation of ngos in bangladesh (fnb) http://www.ngofederationbd.net/index.php (accessed 4 november 2016) has earned the position to represent all the institutions. http://www.ngofederationbd.net/index.php cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 105 and professional groups, it is the university professors and lawyers who are at the extreme of political division and factions. professors join the conflicting political blocs for personal gain and power as well as ideology and thus lose the strength to monitor the university administration or the government. the lawyers’ associations in bangladesh are equally politicized. our discussion so far gives us an overview of the politicized civil society at the national level. these matters, however anecdotally true, have yet to be empirically investigated and analyzed. the present study will avoid extreme cases, instead examining typical csos belonging to important sectors of civil society and working at the periphery level, to analyze their politicized nature. methodology among different case study strategies, basically the ‘explanation building through multiple case studies’ method (yin 2003, 121-2)5 has been adopted for this research. to verify the propositions about politicized civil society in bangladesh, this paper systematically uses indepth observation, newspaper reports, documents provided by csos, information revealed through interviews and group discussions with cso personnel, members and leaders of four csos in the district of rajshahi, known as the centre of the north zone of bangladesh. the rajshahi district was selected because it best represents bangladesh civil society at the periphery and meso level in terms of urban-rural distribution, social composition, education, economy, and administrative importance6. these case studies were conducted in addition to a survey on csos where 504 csos from eight categories were interviewed with structured questionnaire7. to validate the quantitative survey data8, it was necessary to conduct in depth 5 in a multiple-case study, one goal is to build a general explanation that fits each of the individual cases, even though the cases will vary in their details. the objective is analogous to multiple experiments (yin 2003, 121). 6because rajshahi is a divisional town, divisional headquarters of all administrative offices, as well as district branch offices of private companies, banks, educational institutions and ngos, are found here. again, because the district is the center for higher education in the northern zone and strata, it provides a space for associational activities. csos that are active here, particularly in the urban areas, represent the csos active at the meso level of the nation. again, like almost all of bangladesh, rajshahi’s economy, in spite of being a divisional district, is mostly agrarian (19.5%), with little significant industry (7%) or business. agriculture at the national level contributes 20.4% to the gdp. seventy-six percent of the national population lives in rural areas; similarly, 67% of households in rajshahi are farm households. the national literacy rate in 2006 (45%), resembles rajshahi’s literacy rate (47.4%). naturally, rural and community based societies in rajshahi have a high possibility of representing the peripheral area of bangladesh(source: statistical year book of bangladesh, 2004, 2005). 7all registered or enlisted csos in the district, representing eight categories—cooperative organizations, voluntary social organizations, ngos, youth groups, labour unions, trade organizations, professional associations, and university-centric organizations—were regarded as the survey population, totaling 3,768 organizations (tasnim, 2007, p. 11). the sample size was selected through a stratified random sampling process: 1,227 organizations were selected randomly, representing 30% of each category. ultimately, representatives of 504 csos were interviewed, resulting in a return rate of 41%. each cso was directly interviewed using a structured questionnaire that included 30 questions along with sub-questions and long lists of answer options. questions were specifically designed to reveal the policy influences and interests of the target groups and their relationship with the government, political sphere and other important sectors of the society and political system. 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 case studies. these four csos were carefully9 selected for representing the most common types of csos as well as both service providing and advocacy groups active at the local level. rajshahi sugar mill labor union represents the trade unions, pahar pur ideal farmers’ cooperative represents the cooperatives, thengamara mahila shobuj shongho represents the ngo sector and movement to protect rajshahi city represents the local advocacy groups. to represent professional csos, a nationally-based movement was selected; a movement for genuine and logical demands by the society’s most respected but powerless professionals – primary school teachers of bangladesh. selected supplementary and follow up interviews were conducted in 2012 to confirm the data collected in 2006. with these five case studies, this paper attempts to reveal the actual relationship between civil society and politics and identify the reasons behind the weak contributions of bangladesh’s civil society to its democracy. selected case studies this section provides brief case studies of five types of csos: trade unions, cooperatives, development ngos, citizen groups and professional groups. all five cso types are very different from one other in nature, function, size, and membership, and each represents the interests of a different segment of society. each case study among the first four (trade union, cooperative, development ngo and citizen group) focuses on four main points: an overview of the cso, membership patterns and election, the relationship between leaders and members, and the nature of its interactions with politics and/or the government. these points were selected with the intent to understand the democratic nature of csos, their autonomy, and their positions in relation to local or national politics and democracy. the fifth case study is on a movement of a professional group, primary teachers, at the national level that is responding to some very basic demands that they have yet to fulfill. the movement reached its peak in 2006. this case study is mostly based on content analysis of newspaper reports and articles published on the movement and the issue raised in 2006 and later. through these very different case studies, the paper shows that, at whatever level civil society is working and with whatever degree of human and financial resources, political links are always important for an individual group’s existence, maintenance and success. in the process, groups often lose their independence and compromise their watchdog roles. what is true for an individual cso is also true for a nation-wide cso movement. 8 quantitative analysis of the survey data gathered from the 504 csos has been published in another research paper (tasnim 2012) in 2012. the present paper and the paper published in 2012 (tasnim, 2012), both are based on author’s phd research titled ‘civil society in bangladesh: vibrant but not vigilant’. 9 after going through the answers in the filled in questionnaires, the survey notes submitted by the surveyors and their daily reports during the time of the survey, these four csos from different categories were purposively selected for further in-depth study. they were purposively selected as these four csos had been considered best, for their size, structure, functions, membership and objectives, among the surveyed csos to represent each category. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 107 i. rajshahi sugar mill labor union10 the rajshahi sugar mill labor and workers union has been registered under the ministry of labor and employment since 1967 and represents 1,234 members. its main objective is protecting the workers’ interests and bargaining with the authorities for improved wages, pensions, financial security, and insurance for ill and injured workers, which they achieve through a variety of methods, including striking. the union’s major funding sources are membership fees, entrance fees, monthly fees, special fees, subsidy from the authorities and income from union property. the union liaises with the other sugar mill labor unions, which are joined under a federation, and the labor unions of other industrial sectors. all laborers and workers at the rajshahi sugar mill, with the exception of security guards and office assistants in the confidential section, are eligible to become voting members of the union with the right to run in union elections. the union is run by a 23member executive committee, 17 of whom are elected directly by the general membership every two years. the committee, following constitutional rules, works to implement union objectives. the executive committee is responsible for the union’s financial affairs and recruiting necessary staff to run the union office. financial decisions are made by a majority vote of the committee; they also have jurisdiction over matters not directly addressed in the union constitution. however, the most important responsibility of the committee is bargaining with the mill authorities. the elected president of the executive committee is called the collective bargaining leader. he is very powerful and has immense influence over the workers and other mill officers. upon election, he no longer works in the mill and maintains a well-furnished office superior even to the office of the mill’s general manager. the status of the elected leader and committee members is very different from that of a normal worker. members of the committee bargain on behalf of the rest of the workers for higher wages and other perks. however, the voting system brings a democratic atmosphere in the union, especially during elections, which are conducted by secret ballot. practically, it has been observed that the labor leader who supports the ruling party or those who are supported by the ruling political leaders usually take over the actual power of the union and sometimes control of the whole mill management. even if these leaders do not hold an elected post within the union, their influence and power are found everywhere. the de facto presence and power of these politically linked elected and non-elected labor leaders often challenges the de jure legitimacy of the elected committee. each department of the mill administration has to move according to the wishes of the labor leaders. it has been found that this particular trade union is neither totally controlled by the political parties nor is it independent of them. during executive committee elections, slates are formed based on party lines that reflect national politics. however, although one slate 10 this case study is based on field visits, interviews with the labor union leader, group discussions with other workers and officers and union documentation (e.g. union constitution, election results) provided by the rajshahi sugar mill labor union office. 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 may be marked as bnp and another as al, candidates supporting other political parties (like some communist factions, for example) may also be found on these slates. in most cases, the ruling party slate has significant influence among union members and the administration. however, there is no permanent voters’ bank for each slate. the voters’ decisions change with changes in national politics and the performance of the union president11. examining the list of elected members and their political affiliations for 2001, 2003 and 200512 shows that the election results reflected national politics: in 2001, when al was in power, 10 of the elected members were from the al while 6 were from the bnp. conversely, when the bnp was in power in 2003 and 2005, the distribution was just the opposite, with 9 bnp and 7 al candidates elected in 2003 and 13 bnp and 4 al candidates elected in 2005. central political leaders of the rajshahi district such as parliament members and local mayors have a direct influence on the recruitment process, determining sugar prices and calling tenders for selling sugar. naturally an oligarchic tendency, intensified by high profile political links, develops within the executive committee. the rajshahi sugar mill labor and workers union represents a medium-sized, hardly profitable government industry labor group that is active in a region far from the nation’s central production zone. their financial power is far inferior to that of labor unions working in the political and economic center; however, they are still highly politicized and controlled by political powers. power and control of those labor leaders blessed by the ruling party (which has alternated every five years since 1990) indicates its lack of autonomy. when government-supported leaders control the administration, their bargaining power for the common workers and labor is lessened. these leaders are often found to be more concerned with their own (close inner circle’s) personal benefit and patronage than with the collective interest of the labor community. ii. pahar pur adarsho shomobai krishok samity (pahar pur ideal farmers’ cooperative)13 in bangladesh, there are several varieties of cooperatives with different statuses and financial power at different levels of rural and urban society, although their most common purpose is to provide loans. these cooperatives are generally organized in two tiers, with village cooperatives at the periphery and a central cooperative located in each sub-district. the central cooperative committee is elected by the periphery cooperatives. such cooperatives are mostly made up of farmers but also by poor laborers, workers, fishers, small businessmen and even the destitutes. primary cooperatives are formed by 20 to 40 members at the village level; these groups each elect one member to the college of electorate, which ultimately elects the members who are sent to the central committee at the union level14. in rural areas, a prime objective of cooperatives is providing small loans (5 to 20 thousand bdt)15to farmers, fishermen, and small businessmen. the cooperative examined here is a typical periphery 11 group discussion with mill workers and mill engineer during a field visit on 26th september 2006. 12 as provided by the office of the labor union. 13 the case study was developed based on a field visit to bagmara during september, 2006, information provided by the chairperson in a survey questionnaire, and through personal interviews, participation at the cooperative meetings as well as observation note provided by the surveyor responsible for surveying this particular cso. 14 interview with the brdb officer, poba sub-district, 9th october, 2006. 15bangladeshi currency named -taka valued at approximately usd 70-300. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 109 cooperative of 35 members, all of whom are male farmers. the cooperative is active in the bhobanaigonj union under the bagmara sub-district in rajshahi. it was established and registered in 1984. paharpur cooperative is supervised by the local officers of the bangladesh rural development board (brdb). it is a stable and long-running cooperative with a yearly budget of 150,000 tk, approximately usd 20,205. this is rather a large budget compared to the budgets of other cooperatives in the area. first, the 35 farmers had to form a common capital stock with their personal savings, at which point they began to receive loans from brdb with the supervision of the brdb officers. members use their loans mainly for agriculture and irrigation purposes. election rules specify that a 6-member committee for the cooperative shall be elected every year. however, there have been no elections for some time, and the cooperative has been run by the same chairperson for many years; the chairperson is a popular figure and was elected by his fellow members to the electoral college. he was ultimately elected as the chairperson to the central cooperative active at the bagmara sub-district, rajshahi. the cooperative is involved in social activities unrelated to granting loans, such as planting seedlings and sending members for skill training. compared to other members of the cooperative, the chairperson, an active supporter of the ruling political party, is relatively better off economically and socially. with the help of brdb officials and his personal connections to political leaders, the chairperson brought significant sums of money and social projects to the cooperative, something that has been possible chiefly due to his position in the central cooperative and his relationships with outside political figures. because the chairperson of the paharpur cooperative is directly involved in politics, he also led the cooperative into political participation. the cooperative chairperson and members were involved in different election-related functions, such as supporting and campaigning for a particular candidate and participating in programs to raise political awareness. however, their activities and functions never lead them to participate in policy-making. rather than forming coalitions with other cooperatives or sending petitions, they prefer to take their problems directly to the leaders of the ruling party, the brdb office or the sub-district administrative office. the cooperative members have virtually no network or understanding with other local social or economic actors, even with local ngos. the chairperson admitted that before they were politically connected, the cooperative faced problems such as corruption, a lack of government cooperation and bureaucratic obstructions over loans and registration. these problems were solved when they showed their political support to the ruling party. the chairperson admitted frankly that the political identity of the cooperative and/or its leader does matter in official decisions to sanction loans and provide other government services. in most cases, cooperatives represent the farmers who contribute the most to the agrarian economy of bangladesh. however, their associations hardly act as any strong pressure or professional group. cooperatives are scarcely involved in advocacy activities because their members’ main objectives are economic benefit, not networking or civic engagement. according to the cooperative rule of 2004, in its initial two years of existence, 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 no cooperative has the right to make any demand to the government. in addition, farmers’ ignorance and the strong political pressure on cooperative leaders have led to weak cooperatives in relation to participation, vigilance, and democracy. local csos, such as cooperatives and local welfare clubs, have the potential to develop collective unity, social and political consciousness among citizens, but they lack the necessary resources and guidance. civil society researchers and donors have hardly considered them as a force for civil society, but they have been successfully targeted by political parties as a means to penetrate rural society. iii.thengamara mahila shobuj shongho (tmss) [thengamara (name of a particular area in northern bangladesh) women’s green group] 16 thengamara mahila shobuj shongho (tmss) is a well-established development ngo. it was first formed in 1980 by local organizers and later received foreign funding and support. tmss is neither as large nor as famous as bangladesh rural advancement committee (brac) or the grameen bank, but is one of the top ten ngos of bangladesh (stiles 2002, p. 50). although it has its origins in the northern region of the country, it is now working nationwide in traditional micro-credit and other social welfare activities, including, health, micro-finance, business promotion, education, and human rights and gender equality. the interest rate for a tmss loan is 12.5% and 10% for the extremely poor. among its 47 development partners, 16 are international development agencies or foreign embassies. at the local level, like other development ngos, micro-credit and other social services are provided collectively to a small group of beneficiaries. each basic group is made up of 10-30 women. weekly meetings are held where micro-credit as well as other social issues, such as sanitation, the environment and women's rights, are discussed. tmss is centrally governed by an executive committee of 15 members who are elected by the general members of tmss every three years; the general committee includes the chair of every tmss basic group that has been active for at least three years, plus one or two local elites from each area in which tmss is active. members of the general committee representing all zones, vote for the members of the executive committee. although the process seems to be reasonably democratic, a closer look at the member list in the 2005 tmss annual report shows that only two genuine beneficiaries working at the periphery have been able to enter the executive committee. practically, regardless of what the system is, the charisma of the founding director, professor hosne ara begum, plays an important role in managing and expanding the ngo, which is true of many other large ngos in bangladesh. charisma plays an important role in the health and development of large organizations in bangladesh, just as it does in bangladeshi party politics. as understood from conversations and field visits, tmss works similarly to other development ngos, with a hierarchical management system in which field workers are trained in the central or zonal offices and then sent to the fields. at basic group meetings, the 16 the case study is based on a visit to the tmss rajshahi zonal office, an interview with the officer in charge on 12th october 2006, the 2005 tmss annual report, and the tmss website, http://www.tmssbd.org/index.html (accessed 5 august, 2007). the updates are made from visiting the ngo’s website and information collected from the electronic media. http://www.tmss-bd.org/index.html http://www.tmss-bd.org/index.html cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 111 assigned tmss field worker coordinates the meeting agenda, decides how the meeting will proceed, and collects the members’ weekly contributions and loan installments. ngo staff functions do not provide any scope for considering the beneficiaries as equal members of the ngo staff, nor can staff consider themselves equal to members; the relationship is more akin to that of a service provider and receiver. theoretically, it is expected that through the efforts of the ngo staff over time, the economic empowerment and development awareness of the beneficiaries will allow groups to function autonomously. practically, there are very few instances of such independence. the same comment may be made for the basic unit groups of other development ngos. tmss maintains all of the necessary formal relationships with the government, participating in monthly coordination meetings with administrative district and sub-district heads and also at the national level with the ngo bureau. the ngo often exchanges opinions and share problems and advice on rural development with the administration, as well as submitting formal reports. however, this is done in a hierarchical way: field workers convey their opinions to the branch managers, who pass them on to their managers. in this way, opinions are carried to the zonal and central offices and finally into consultation with the relevant government agencies and donors. tmss belongs to a group of ngos known as federation of ngos in bangladesh (fnb). from the point of view of national politics and the politicization of ngos, according to ngo officials interviewed, tmss tries to remain neutral. they admitted, however, that it has become difficult to work in a politicized and polarized environment. naturally, large ngos enter into significant contracts with the government on different social welfare projects. often such joint ventures by ngos are considered as political actions by the opposition, and when the opposition comes to power, ngos who cooperated with the previous administration are blacklisted by the new one. parties cannot carry all the blame here; ngo leaders have also made politicized decisions, and there are tensions between different ngos themselves. moreover, ngos are neither totally transparent nor free from internal problems. taking all these together, it may soon become impossible to run a ngo without the shelter of a major political party. interviews were originally undertaken during the bnp regime. under the present al regime, when the tmss website was revisited, it was found that tmss is maintaining good relations with the present regime and inviting ministers and top al leaders to their workshops and other events in 2012. in a recently televised popular talk show (tritiyo matra, 2016)17, tmss leader hosne ara begum, who is considered as a highly successful ngo personality, through her conversation, has reaffirmed the same position of the ngos and situation of politics, politicization and corruption at the national level. after 2001, donor backing was not sufficient for ngos to pursue their projects uninterruptedly. moreover, at the local level, political divisions have created a panic among the small ngos. in this situation, ngos must please their patron-donors as well as the ruling and opposition parties and avoid all actions that may go against the interest of either party. 17 also available on youtube accessed in 20 october, 2016 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hpqmwsorn0 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4hpqmwsorn0 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 naturally, this limits the ngos’ freedom of action, especially in regard to participation and democracy. in the meantime the ngos have entered their new phase of marketization and hybridization where the small ngos depend more on their micro-credit business and big ngos have entered the private sector in the name of social business (lewis 2016, pp26-27). such finance oriented professionalism has brought the ngos away from their advocacy and participatory performance. tmss, like other big ngos (such as asa, brac etc.) have entered into social businesses including tertiary education18. iv. rajshahi rakkah shangram parishod-rrsp (movement to protect rajshahi city) rajshahi rakkah shangram parishod-rrsp (movement to protect rajshahi city) is a local citizens’ group organized by the middle class and elites of rajshahi city with the aim of protecting the interests of the area, particularly rajshahi city. the movement began in 1997, and the group advocates for the provision of basic services, including medical treatment, water supplies, power supplies, and gas supplies for the people of rajshahi, as well as for concerns over local environmental degradation and against government decisions to move important offices and building out of rajshahi. the groups also indicate irregularities, corruption, and administrative failures. they articulate their interests through petitions, press conferences, round tables, seminars, public meetings, rallies, sit-ins, hunger strikes, and allout strikes19. in addition to membership fees, other sources of finance include donations from prominent local businessmen and sponsor organizations such as banks, enterprises and national dailies. originally, rrsp was formed by a few merchants in the town, but it has come to attract members from all types of professionals, including teachers, intellectuals, journalists, lawyers and other educated citizens. the membership pattern, executive committee, and advisory committee are governed by a written constitution. the executive committee is elected every two years by the members. any citizen of rajshahi may become a member of rrsp, although only 140 citizens are formal members. it also has a 20-member advisory committee comprised of local elites from rajshahi city. in addition, rrsp is able to ensure the participation of a considerable number of members and prominent citizens in the different events and activities organized by rrsp (proceeding of the round table meeting, rajshahi rokkah shongram parishad, 2006) rrsp is a group of like-minded citizens belonging to the same social class, and the relationship between the leaders and members is thus mostly congenial. it has been observed that many members are not active within the organization. the executive committee makes decisions to organize seminars and rallies and stage protests. all petitions sent to the authorities are also decided by this committee. when the rrsp faces any difficulties, it turns to its members’ personal networks and the organization’s relationship with other professional groups such as bar and teachers’ associations, as well as consulting with its advisory 18 tmss runs a good number of private tertiary educational institutes, colleges and university in the fields of medicine, nursing, vocational, it technology, commerce and so on. 19 interview with the convener, rajshahi shohor rokkah shongram porishad, rajshahi, 28th september, 2006. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 113 committee. in 2006, it was the convener and not the chairperson who was the most active in the name of rrsp. the same person has been found to be the most active leader in 2012 and 2016. although this citizen group is working in the interest of rajshahi, in 2006 it had found itself in an antagonistic position in relation to the rajshahi city corporation, governed by the elected mayor, who was a member of the ruling bnp party. in 2005 and 2006, rrsp had become active in pointing out the irregularities found in the administration and protested against government policies concerning rajshahi. it further came into direct conflict with the administration by protesting patient maltreatment in private clinics. the convener was even arrested and tortured by law enforcement forces20, which attracted the attention of the national media. the organization claims that they have relationships with neither political parties nor any political blocs; rather, they say they have come forward for the interest of the citizens of rajshahi because the political parties have failed to do so. to counteract the popularity of rrsp, the ruling party in 2006, have supported the formation of new citizens’ groups; however, those groups lack proper organizational strength and the necessary citizen support. rrsp has an excellent relationship with the press and other non-political groups. the organization has gained recognition and media attention for its efforts to bring natural gas supply to the city. if we examine the rspp’s advisory committee membership lists, we see the presence of well-reputed citizens of rajshahi city who represent both the bnp (but not jamat-iislami) bloc and the al and left wing bloc, although most members belong to the latter (proceeding of the round table meeting, rajshahi rokkah shongram parishad, 2006). the secretary of rrsp, despite claims of being non-political, was an elected member of the board of directorates of the rajshahi chamber of commerce during the al regime (annual report 2002) and had relationships with left wing organizations as a youth. in 2006, he was in a position of confrontation with the bnp and jamat-led administration. during conversations with other citizens about rrsp, it was discovered that the organization and its actions have been praised by the citizens, but the presence of larger numbers of al and left bloc members has discouraged bnp-aligned and religious citizens to engage with the group directly. for example, in the seminars organized by rrsp, significant numbers of al-left bloc university professors participated as presenters. additionally, the elites and civil society leaders who supported the ruling coalition are already favored by the government and administration and, due to the loyalty they sold for personal benefit, have prevented them (bnp and conservative blocs) from joining any movement that protests government policy. the polarization that has divided society has also barred citizens from organizing systematic, united movements. unless there is a balance among both the blocs and truly non-political citizens groups are established, there can be no real change. in 2012, under the al regime, rrsp is still active; however, it now enjoys the blessing of the local parliament member representing the leftwing (bangladesh worker’s party) coalition of the al block (prothom alo, nov 13, 2012). the citizen group enjoys same type of blessing in 2016 as the same party is in power and the member of the parliament for the local area is also the same person. 20 as admitted by the secretary of rajshahi rakkha shongram parishod, interviewed on 28th september 2006. 114 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 v the primary school teachers’ movement of 2006 21 in bangladesh, movements formed by people and groups taking to the streets and agitating to make their demands heard, have always been considered democratic and as an important way of establishing rights and bringing about change. this gramscian tradition in bangladesh is older than its birth. the government and administration in bangladesh have failed to develop into responsive institutions. among the political and social movements taking place from 1990 to 2006, this section shall focus on a particular professional organization’s fight for its interests: the primary school teachers’ movement of 2006. the movement’s uniqueness lies in its polarized character and the way it was handled by the government. the primary school teachers’ association is considered to be a highly organized and well-networked group in bangladesh. such associations are found in every sub-district, district and division, all the way to the national level. they also have geographically based ranked leadership within the various primary school categories, including government schools, non-government schools, community schools, and madrasas. elections are held regularly among these organizations, and each group is factionalized along party lines. since independence, the school teachers’ community has engaged in movements of varying scales on different issues, though most often for pay raises. bangladeshi school teachers are poorly paid, with little or no allowances for housing or medical treatment. however, because school teachers’ groups are active and networked from the national to the local levels and because teachers are the traditional opinion leaders in rural areas, they have attracted the attention of local elites and national political parties. the 2006 protests focused on demanding better salaries and facilities and the nationalization of non-government primary schools. after the reintroduction of democracy in 1990, the school teachers first approached the government (at that time, the bnp) with their demands in 1994. the opposition leader, the chairperson of the al, promised association leaders that the al would fulfill their demands if elected to power. once the al was elected in 1996, however, no initiative was taken to solve the teachers’ problems; consequently, teachers began agitating for change in 2000 as the al’s tenure was drawing to a close. the authorities entered into negotiations with the teachers, which ultimately ended in the authorities’ favor. thus, the teachers began protesting again, staging large demonstrations and hunger strikes (ittefaque, 6 june 2001). the opposition leader, then the chairperson of the bnp, promised to fulfill teachers’ demands if the bnp was successful in the 2001 election22, and in september 2001, the bnp formed the government. in 2006, the final year of the bnp-jamat government, the teachers’ groups were 21 a search of the ittefaque, daily star and jugantor newspapers from may to august 2006 finds 69 reports and editorials on the primary school teachers’ movement. 29 of these reports were removed from the sample due to their duplicate reporting, leaving a sample size of 41 reports. this newspaper analysis is based on hardcopy newspaper reports were collected from public library, national press institute and national library & archives, dhaka, in 2007. the updated section is based on newspaper reports available online. 22 again in 2006, at the critical stage of the primary teachers’ movement, the opposition, al and its left-wing allies, showed support to the leaders and promised to realize all their demand if elected. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 115 still engaged in negotiations with the government for providing higher salaries and other facilities, but they found that the draft national budget (the last budget before the election) had not allocated the necessary funds for meeting their demands, leaving the teachers once again as little more than tools used by a party to win the next election (jugantor 18 june 2006). this time, however, the teachers were prepared for an all-out movement. organized by 41 apex teachers’ associations, about 800,000 teachers were involved, directly or indirectly, in the 2006 movement. they arranged enormous demonstrations at the capital and sit-ins in front of the secretariat, hunger strikes at important squares of the city and lastly, went on a full-fledged strike, keeping 25,000 schools closed throughout the country for 30 days and depriving 15 million children of their school time. they also attempted to block the roads and waterways in every district, which is a tactic common to violent labor unions, students, and anomic groups. the teachers’ key demands, which by this time encompassed primary, secondary and madrasa teachers, were 1) the nationalization of non-government primary teachers’ jobs; 2) matched government salaries for teachers in non-government secondary schools and colleges; 3) the elimination of wage discrimination in favor of government primary school teachers; 4) the nationalization of community primary schools; and 4) the incorporation of ebtedayee (a type of small private madrasa) teachers into the national pay scale (daily star 5 july, 2006). different groups within the teachers’ coalition also harbored specific demands. the teachers’ coalition included groups linked to both the bnp and al, and daily news briefings on the protests indicate that each of the different associations harbored factions that leaned towards the ruling party or the opposition. although these factions were all fighting for the same cause, they announced programs separately and carried out events in different public squares in the capital. for example, when the community school teachers declared a hunger strike to the death, the pro-bnp faction observed it in muktangon (open square), while the pro-awami league faction started their strike in the central shaheed minar (monument square) (daily star, 20 june, 2007). these all-out protests were the result of teachers’ long neglect by the party government, both the bnp and al. the teachers’ demands gained strength when they were supported by the opposition party, which made electoral promises that it never kept. during the 2006 movement, the opposition al and its aligned left bloc backed the teachers, giving more force to the movement. for its part, the bnp-jamat government allowed the violent movement to continue unchecked for months, hampering national education throughout the country because 2006 was the final year of its five-year term. the government could not meet all the teachers’ demands, the costs of which ran to approximately 1 billion 500 million bdt, a sum that the state exchequer was not ready to provide. the government instead took the policy of delaying through dialogue with the protesting groups. the education minister took the approach of meeting with different factions separately and agreeing to demands conditionally. naturally, bnp-linked factions accepted the government’s halfhearted response to negotiations, while others did not. some sections of the teacher’s group went back to school empty-handed after their long strike; others lost the strength to remain in the streets. the unity of the movement was broken. a handful of non-government primary school 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 teachers’ groups linked to the al remained in the streets until september, but the movement had lost its force. media attention refocused on more violent protests by other anomic groups on different issues and the street politics that the opposition had just begun when the 8th parliament had only a few remaining days. update: from january 2009, the newly elected al formed the government, however, this new al regime failed to fulfill their election manifesto to regularize the jobs of the nongovernment primary school teachers. naturally, again the primary school teachers of 24000 schools had to call for a strike, and came down to the streets with long processions, which were met with brutal police obstruction leading to injuries. finally, dialogue took place on 23 september 2012 between the ministry of education and school teachers with no tangible result (the daily star, 16 january, 16 may, 17 may, 18 may, 5 october, 2012,). however, on 10 january 2013 the announcement came from the prime minister’s side, on the government’s decision to nationalize 26,193 private primary schools within 2013 (daily star, 10 january, 2013). it should be mentioned that at this stage, in 2013, it had become an interest for the government to nationalize the primary schools for the sake of reaching the un millennium development goal on education and it was the final year of the national parliament and the government had to begin its preparation for the general election that was to be held less than a year later. this update only ensures that there is no improvement to the situation in civil society and its political relations23. case study summary the case study findings may be summarized by the following observations related to politics and democracy found among the csos at the periphery of bangladesh, despite their widely varying composition, functions, budgets and membership. 1. whether the cso is a traditional labor union, a modern development ngo or even a small cooperative, it requires informal political connections to survive and manage its organization. further, political blessings, especially from the government party, are essential for the csos to proceed with their interests and expand their functions and projects. 2. in all cases, there are specific, well-structured and seemingly democratic systems to elect executive committees and ensure member participation. however, in reality, these written systems are only de jure formalities. practically, in most cases, internal democracy and equality among all members are poorly maintained. for example, in the case of the labor union, the leaders supporting the government party actually enjoy 23 from 2013, the process of nationalizing the private primary schools is going on face by face. however, there are allegations on process of selecting and inspecting these schools for approval that is, deciding which primary schools shall be brought under government regulations and be declared public schools. moreover, the salary of government primary school teachers has also increased. however, the teachers and head masters still rank very low (third class gazetted officer) in the national pay scale system for which they have again begun different types of symbolic movements (the daily star 5 october, 2015 http://www.thedailystar.net/country/primaryteachers-suspend-movement-152227 accessed on 4 march, 2017.) http://www.thedailystar.net/country/primary-teachers-suspend-movement-152227 http://www.thedailystar.net/country/primary-teachers-suspend-movement-152227 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 117 most of the union’s power. elections are not held regularly among the cooperative members or the citizen groups. even for a development ngo, the driving force is the charisma of the founding leader. such charisma is more important than elections at different levels. 3. in all cases, there seem to be differences between the position, power and status of the cso leader versus the general membership. the leader always enjoys greater status in relation to political links, financial resources and social position. 4. violence and protests are more common among conventional csos like labor unions and citizen’s groups. conversely, the presence of government pressure, ‘red tapeism’, and political control are found among all types of csos, particularly among those organizations that are engaged in state monitoring, address large budget projects or control a large number of general voters such as citizens’ groups, labor unions or large development ngos. 5. political interventions, often lead the professional groups to factionalism. the faction leaders often compromise their group interest to the interest of the political bloc they affiliate with. only when the government interests and csos’ interest have some common proponents, civil society advocacy and movements may reach a positive outcome. otherwise, civil society in most cases is controlled and used by the political blocks. after the field work in 2006, a decade has passed. in the meantime there have been changes in nature and function of the ngos and some other civil society organizations as well as their relationship with the government. the conclusion of the paper restates and re-establishes the arguments of the present research about the politicized civil society on the basis of the case studies analyzed and with the updated information available from the press and recent references. conclusion the neo-tocquevillean school presumes that the more associations there are in a country the greater the possibility that democratic institutions will improve. diamond (1996) is optimistic that civil society movement and actions may make it through the undemocratic environment and contribute to better democratic atmosphere in multiple ways like fighting against corruption, nurturing democratic values, bringing an end to clientelism, bringing unity among social cleavages and so on. the bangladesh case has proved such expectations from a civil society to be unrealistic and normative. in contrast to the neo-tocquevillean model, the situation in bangladesh better resembles the gramscian model. civil society is found to be enmeshed with the political structure. csos have been found to be actually engaged, intentionally or unintentionally, in executing the ideological hegemony of the state, the government and mostly the political parties. csos have often failed to remain neutral and are often controlled by a political party or bloc. compromising their independence and vigilance, they are working instead as agents to ensure the political agenda of the party with whom they indirectly identify. regardless, they may be termed as organizations working to ensure 118 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 political hegemony. however, because civil society is partitioned along competing party lines and the government generally ignores peaceful protests and formal petitions, csos sometimes engage in protest, including strikes that may be compared to anti-state hegemony. articulations of interests through violence and strikes do not imply a strong civil society. rather, it implies a lack of proper harmony between the state and civil society and the presence of deprivation and extremism. the reason behind the emptiness of civil society is because it is politicized. in the last decade there had been a good number of violent protests from the garment’s workers24 for wage rise, protection and other issues. for a long time, trade unions were banned in the garments sector to avoid violence and disruption to the largest dominating industry of the nation. again, the highly politicized and factious transport owners and workers’ groups in bangladesh often call on strike and use the means of vandalism to press their demands that may or may not be rational. however, it is the economy and the citizens who have to pay most, due to such strikes and violence25. through the case studies, the politicization of the csos, the influence of the ruling party, the divisions within civil society and the societies’ alignments along party lines have been shown to be factual. it was revealed that for csos, whether rural or urban, large or small, survival requires political connections. without political blessing, it is not possible for csos to move forward. systems for internal democracy are often fractured along national party lines. any advocacy that may go against the regime is generally met with strong resistance from the state. in the last five years, a good number of incidents took place at the national level that have attracted international attention, and depict an intolerant regime towards the vigilant section of the civil society. we may mention the conflict between nobel laureate professor yunus, founder of grameen bank, and the government26, arrest of the secretary of the human rights organization odhikar27, passing a more strict foreign donation regulation bill 2016, in reaction to a report by transparency international bangladesh (tib) criticizing the performance of the parliament in 2015 (amnesty international public statement, 2016). however, this same foreign funded ngo tib was successful in influencing the government to pass the 2009 right to information act (lewis 2016, p 124). 24 garment’s industry and ready made garments export is vital to bangladesh’s economy and development, this sector contributes 81.2 % to the national export (bgmea website, 2017). but often this industry is hit by accidents like fires and building collapses and the production is set back by violent protests from the laborers for their due wages. in most cases, the owners and guilty persons remain above the law due to their strong political connections with the higher ups. 25 this reference provides only a recent example of such violence, ‘countrywide transport strike underway’, dhaka tribune, 28 february 2017, accessed 6 march 2017 at http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/02/28/countrywide-transport-strike-underway/. 26 professor yunus was removed from his post as the managing director of the grameen bank, after allegations of irregularities in its operation. professor yunus, an outspoken critic of corruption, had angered the senior politicians in 2007 by briefly floating a political party. the government had been very aggressive, in their campaign against him which had not been well-received internationally ( bbc news 2011;burke 2011). 27 a leading human rights activist and secretary to the human rights organization named odhikar, adilur rahman khan, had been arrested on charges of falsehood about violence by state security forces in 2013. his organization is always critical about state administered human rights violation. again, khan is a lawyer and former deputy attorney general. he served in this prestigious post during the rule of opposition party -bnp. naturally, he had always been under the keen scrutiny of the party in power (hammadi 2013). http://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/02/28/countrywide-transport-strike-underway/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.9, no.1, 2017 119 this means, that, in recent years, few large and advocacy ngos have tried to come out from the political influence and emerge as watchdogs to the government performances. conversely, the authorities are not prepared yet to tolerate or welcome such civil society activism. however, with the advancement of the electronic media in the last ten years, and with the help of a relatively free press, apparently an environment of free movement of information had been observed within the society. this is expected to lead to a liberal government committed to transparency, accountability and responsiveness. in contrast to the situation, editors are being blasted and facing court cases for sedition28 that only weakens the civil society. nevertheless, at the local level, organizational strength and the ability to form collective opinions of the csos have attracted local elites and political parties towards them. the leaders of the central cooperative are often targeted by political leaders because of the large amounts of loan money they manage and distribute and the influence they enjoy with their members. patterns of membership and participation within non-political citizens groups also reflect the political divide in the society. so it may be understood that politicization and control is evident both at the periphery and at the core of civil society. instead of monitoring the state apparatus, they are contributing to the misdeeds of the government and political parties. since 2006, there have been hardly any changes to the political trend and divisions among the professional groups and intellectuals. rather, new factions came to compete among the divisions found in the csos. if they continue to bend under political pressure and remain divided among themselves along party lines, csos can hardly gain the necessary independence and strong character to emerge as vigilant forces. lacking such vigilant power, a civil society, no matter how vibrant, cannot contribute to the 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oaks. zafarullah, h. 2003, ‘globalization, state and politics in bangladesh; implications for democratic governance’, south asia: journal of south asian studies, vol. 26, no.3, pp. 283-296. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/0085640032000178899 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7660.00119 https://doi.org/10.1080/0085640032000178899 abstract keywords introduction cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 3 2018 © 2018 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: eckstrand, n. 2018. the ugliness of trolls: comparing the strategies/ methods of the alt-right and the ku klux klan. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal. 10:3, 41-62. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6026 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) the ugliness of trolls: comparing the strategies/methods of the alt-right and the ku klux klan nathan eckstrand department of philosophy, fort hays university, 600 park st, hays, ks 67601, united states of america. eckstna@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6026 article history: received 09/04/2018; revised 03/09/2018; accepted 17/10/2018; published 25/11/2018 abstract the alt-right claims that while the ku klux klan’s methods were ad hoc, its own positions are not. this allows them to accept the philosophy of white nationalism while rejecting comparisons with prior white nationalist organizations. i challenge this by comparing the methods of alt-right trolls and the kkk. a comparison of the methods of alt-right trolls and the kkk shows that each uses threats to police behavior, encourages comradery around ethnic heritage, and manipulates politics to exclude voices from public deliberation. differences between alt-right trolls and the kkk originate in the technologies they use, not out of a concern for responsible advocacy. keywords alt-right; trolls, ku klux klan; race; gender; technology; internet; politics declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding.41 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6026 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10.i3.6026 42 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 introduction the internet allows both anonymity and groupthink mentality. studies show that people feel more comfortable making vicious attacks if they never have to pay a penalty for what they say or see the effects of their actions (awan and zempi, 2017; daniels, 2009a). in the 2016 election season, the spread of false news, the number of personal attacks, and the proliferation of hate speech online reached new highs (anti-defamation league, 2016a; antidefamation league, 2016b; piggott, 2016a; and piggott, 2016b). much of this hate speech was associated with the new ‘alt-right’ movement, which targets certain groups (like racial minorities and adherents of non-christian religions) and ideologies (like feminism, diversity, and international cooperation) that the alt-right identifies as being un-american and dangerous (guynn, 2016 and romano, 2016). the term ‘alt-right’ was coined by richard spencer (wallace-wells, 2016) in 2008 as a way of distinguishing a brand of conservative thinking from the conventional right-wing views that encourage free markets, globalization, immigration reform, and pro-war policies (spencer, 2008). since then, the term has developed to incorporate a series of heterogeneous perspectives, policy positions, and ideologies. the southern poverty law center (splc)’s description of alt-right ideologies references: a break with establishment conservatism that favors experimentation with the ideas of the french new right; libertarian thought as exemplified by former u.s. rep. ron paul (r-texas); anarcho-capitalism, which advocates individual sovereignty and open markets in place of an organized state; [and] catholic traditionalism, which seeks a return to roman catholicism before the liberalizing reforms of the second vatican council… (splc, ‘alternative right’) many articles point out how the ideas of the alt-right are repetitions of the old racisms and sexisms that have plagued our society for generations (west, 2016; willis, 2016; allen, 2016; drum, 2016). according to these articles, the alt-right is motivated by the same vision of society that motivated organizations such as the ku klux, klan, the nazi party, and the confederate states of america. similarly, the articles say the alt-right, a movement composed almost entirely by whites and largely by males (kitchener, 2017), claims that women are inherently inferior and men are necessarily dominant. often these pieces try to prevent the rebranding of racist and sexist thought under the guise of a new political group. they claim the alt-right is actually putting forth a dangerous ideology that, if carried to its logical end, will produce a highly segregated and discriminatory society along ethnic, racial, and gender lines. this belief leads the authors to the conclusion that the alt-right must be confronted more forcefully in the future. although the alt-right sometimes separates itself from racist organizations of the past, at other times it readily embraces them (possibly the most notorious example of this so far is alt-right organizer richard spencer’s ‘hail trump’ chant, accompanied by nazi salutes [lombroso & appelbaum, 2016]). many participants in the alt-right movement acknowledge their ideas are related to those of sexist and racist organizations, but they argue that their movement is distinguished by its approach. they claim that unlike the nazi party and ku cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 43 klux klan, alt-right advocacy is measured and responsible (barge, 2015; londen, 2014), and that the alt-right is engaging in the democratic process by advocating for its beliefs respectfully while forcefully confronting those with whom it disagrees. this is the argument put forth by a number of avowed followers of the alt-right, including daniel barge, who says that the problem with the kkk was not its ideology, but that its solution was ad hoc and the result of not repatriating the emancipated black slaves after the civil war (barge, 2015). similarly, john londen says that it is the nazification of nationalism – ‘a larger, generic idea that has empirical validity for all peoples’ – that is dangerous because it allows a ‘moderate’ and ‘natural’ idea to be seen as extremist. the symbols, figures, and experiences of hitlerian national socialism were ‘a result of the specific circumstances in germany and europe at that time.’ the alt-right, existing in the twenty-first century must ‘confront the problems facing white people in the 21st century’ (londen, 2014). it is not enough to connect the ideology of the alt-right to racism or sexism, because those in the alt-right admit to the similarity but argue that their methodology is different. they claim that their movement is condemned for doing what it is supposed to do in a democratic society. we must challenge this assertion. a deeper analysis shows that while some advocates of alt-right ideas are respectful and responsible, large segments of the altright movement operate exactly as previous racist organizations operated. first, i will clarify some poorly defined and ambiguous terms. second, i will explore the methodology of the ku klux klan to illustrate how it carried out acts of racism. third, i will discuss the methods used by people who engage in hate speech online, focusing on those who disseminate alt-right ideology. finally, i will compare the two methods and show that the differences between the kkk and the alt-right arise from the technologies and social forces that they had access to. i will also point out numerous similarities to illustrate that the contemporary dissemination of hate speech online bears a striking resemblance to the dissemination of hate speech in the past and represents a clear threat to the social health of our society. terminology alt-right essayist brett stevens explains that the alt-right movement is based on four centrally held tenets: • nationalism—promoting ‘the historical definition of related groups of people indigenous to a land,’ a concept that includes ‘culture, values, morality, religion, [and] heritage’, • decentralization—opposing both ‘centralization and the replacement of natural developments with human intentions,’ or trying to enforce common interests through government, • traditionalism—preserving ‘what achieved the best results in the past’ on the belief that some truths are unchanging, and • natural law—organizing people around what’s natural, and then asking ‘how you can educate/brainwash them (same difference), force them to comply with laws and incentives, and otherwise control people’ (stevens, 2016) 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 stevens’ focus on national identity, coupled with a competitive vision of nature, is hostile to egalitarianism and diversity. although stevens ignores it, the composition of the alt-right as a largely white male movement has produced an ideology that is white nationalist and patriarchal, or, as the splc puts it, ‘a loose set of far-right ideals centered on “white identity” and the preservation of “western civilization”’ (splc, ‘alternative right’; romano, 2016). for the purposes of this paper, i will use the term alt-right to refer to this broad description put forth by stevens and the splc. the term trolling, has a remarkably loose meaning. the oxford english dictionary defines trolling as ‘to post a deliberately erroneous or antagonistic message on a newsgroup or similar forum with the intention of eliciting a hostile or corrective response’ (troll, v.). some acts of trolling are relatively innocuous, such as providing a link to a site that redirects someone to another site they did not want to visit. such acts are mischievous, but rarely cause any long-term negative outcomes. trolling also consists of hate speech, such as using racial slurs or posting sexist images, creating anger and antagonism. trolling is spread on many online forums, such as emails, comment threads, posted videos, or statements on social media. trolling is always done to elicit an unfriendly reaction, and the venue for it is always the internet. in this paper, i will focus on trolling to disseminate hate speech online (hate speech being ‘speech that offends, threatens, or insults groups, based on race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other traits’ [debating the ‘mighty constitutional opposites’: debating hate speech]). methods of the ku klux klan i want to review how i will discuss the ku klux klan, as the organization’s various iterations have operated differently in different time periods. while i am mostly focused on aspects of kkk methodology that have stayed the same over time, there will be points where i will want to describe how tactics changed. for the sake of simplicity and concision, rather than to incorporate the entire history of the kkk into this paper, i will focus on the three eras when the kkk was most popular. these are the eras william katz, emphasizes in his book invisible empire: the ku klux klan impact on history (1986): the reconstruction era (approximately 1863-1877), the late 1910s and 1920s, and the time of the civil rights movement in the 1960s (which i will respectively refer to at times as era 1, era 2, and era 3). my comparison in the next section will examine the alt-right’s similarities to the kkk in these eras rather than the kkk as it exists presently. the ku klux klan started as a social club sometime between december 1865 to august 1866 to provide members with fun and adventure. several former confederate soldiers felt that the club should provide a sense of mystery and intrigue, and so rather than call it ‘the merry six’ or ‘pulaski social club’ (two suggested names), chose a name derived from the greek word for ‘circle of friends,’ kuklos. for the same reason, they decided to hide their identities, names, and voices through disguises, nicknames, and using children’s whistles for communication (katz, 1986, pp. 7-8). the club gained popularity and spread. as it did, a new goal emerged in response to the situation in the south. in the reconstruction era, many in the club felt it was unjust for schools to educate black children. a den in athens, al seized a cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 45 black student who had ‘been too friendly with his teacher’ and threw him into an icy river (katz, 1986, p. 9). while doubtless it was not viewed as such by the student, this act was considered at the time to be a minor prank and not the work of a dangerous organization. the klanwatch project staff of the splc write that much of the klan’s early reputation may have been based on almost frivolous mischief and tomfoolery. at first, a favorite klan tactic had been for a white-sheeted klansman wearing a ghoulish mask to ride up to a black family’s home at night and demand water. when the well bucket was offered, the klansman would gulp it down and demand more, having actually poured the water through a rubber tube that flowed into a leather bottle concealed beneath his robe. after draining several buckets, the rider would exclaim that he had not had a drink since he died on the battlefield at shiloh. he then galloped into the night, leaving the impression that ghosts of confederate dead were riding the countryside (klanwatch project staff, 2011, p. 10). over time this so-called mischievous social club became politicized by the events of reconstruction, in particular the fighting between president johnson and the congressional republicans over policy towards the south. while johnson sought areas of compromise with the old leaders of the confederacy, the republicans in congress pushed for stronger measures to penalize members of the confederacy and enfranchise former slaves (katz, 1986, 21). as time went on, the republicans gained the upper hand and passed laws creating a new socio-political order in the south, including increased rights for women and blacks, a higher tax burden on the wealthy, integrated schools and workplaces, and the enfranchisement of the poor (katz, 1986, p. 24). in response, the kkk’s identity changed from an adventurous social club to a band of militants dedicated to protecting the south, and members started arming themselves (katz, 1986, p. 27). dens were mostly decentralized, with bands operating independently yet unified by purpose. a loose hierarchy organized and administered overarching codes and goals. because they were carrying out illegal actions such as attacking others, making death threats, and damaging property, the group purposefully avoided putting any notes on paper (katz, 1986, pp. 25-27). groups of men carried out attacks, making sure they outnumbered their targets and using, ‘death threats, random violence, and finally systematic torture and murders to instill fear and shock…’ (katz, 1986, p. 27). in this way, the kkk methodology took shape. to police behavior, the kkk planned actions to intimidate and cause harm. for participants, the kkk encouraged comradery and a unified identity focused on ethnic and cultural heritage. within society, the kkk influenced politics by excluding ‘undesirable’ people and ideas from public deliberation. violent action is the best known of the kkk’s tactics of intimidation, but this was not the only form it took. during reconstruction, intimidation strategies included threats posted in local newspapers; in-person warnings given to black and white republicans considered foreigners; masked gunmen walking the streets of town; and setting fire to barns, homes, town halls, and other spaces (katz, 1986, 31). many of these tactics persisted throughout the 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 other eras of the kkk of concern in this paper (katz, 1986, pp. 90-92, p. 135). additionally, blacks were the main, but not the only, target of aggression. the kkk’s plan to promote southern identity meant targeting all groups that did not fit. after reconstruction this meant targeting northern ‘carpet baggers’ and other republicans who were there to encourage the new order. during the second era of the kkk, a significant effort went towards opposing new immigrants. with presidents at the time voicing disdain about mixing races and cultures, the kkk began to target catholics as well as blacks and northerners. in addition, adulterers, teenagers who disobeyed their parents, and people who did not attend church were regularly targeted (katz, 1986, pp. 90-91). finally, during the civil rights movement, targeting groups that ‘did not fit’ meant targeting journalists who reported on kkk activities as well as whites who supported the struggle of southern blacks. jews and communists were also pursued (katz, 1986, 136). undercover fbi informant gary rowe jr. reported several such events. once, when the kkk gathered to confront the freedom riders coming into town, it was not just the blacks, or even just the white sympathizers, who were attacked. rather, ‘everybody who got off the bus was clubbed, kicked or beaten. there was fighting everywhere; blood spattered in the streets…the mob surrounded a photographer who came up to take a picture and beat him to his knees’ (rowe, 1976, p. 43). of course, much of this intimidation and violence was done anonymously. in the early years of the kkk, the night rides were done fully costumed to disguise the identities of the riders and intimidate the victims (parsons, 2005, p. 819). at public events, many kkk members wore white robes that covered their entire bodies and sometimes their faces. some meeting places required people to appear without masks, but the kkk got around such laws by leasing land for short periods of time when they planned to hold a rally (rowe, 1976, p. 20). kkk violence did not always involve wearing robes, especially during the civil rights movement, but it was always conducted with members avoiding the use of each other’s names and while using euphemisms for their actions (such as ‘skinnin’ heads’ for fighting) (rowe, 1976, p. 19-20). violence was clearly intended to control the behaviors of the population of the south and maintain the social order. one of the kkk’s most brutal tactics, lynching, was widely used in the first two eras of the kkk, but not in the third. it is notable that lynching was often a social event. the lynch mob included both kkk members intent on killing but also ‘respectable’ women and men as well as children. often, a core group would carry out the act (which could include shootings, stabbings, beatings, and hangings) in plain view of many citizens. law enforcement rarely intervened, and in some cases even allowed the mob access to a victim who was already in jail waiting for trial. in many instances the body of a hanging victim was left displayed to the town for days (lynching). detailed knowledge of these acts was widespread, authorities who could have stopped the bloodshed were obstructed by the citizens who witnessed it because they refused to pass along any knowledge that would have allowed for those who committed the act to be punished. as ida wells-barnett writes in southern horrors: lynch law in all its phases, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 47 men who stand high in the esteem of the public for christian character, for moral and physical courage, for devotion to the principles of equal and exact justice to all, and for great sagacity, stand as cowards who fear to open their mouths before this great outrage. they do not see that by their tacit encouragement, their silent acquiescence, the black shadow of lawlessness in the form of lynch law is spreading its wings over the whole country (wells, 1892). the violence of the kkk was neither simply a private affair nor a matter of extremism. it was condoned and encouraged by the public. the next tactic of the kkk was to encourage community along ethnic and cultural lines. in the first major era of the kkk members became part of a ‘brotherhood’ that had its own codes, secrets, and traditions. these benefits of membership attracted people to the kkk throughout its existence. codes, secrets, traditions, and targets changed over time, but a member’s sense of belonging was a constant part of the kkk’s operating procedure. as william katz says, ‘…klansmen built on the us male’s need to belong. a large amount of klan success lies in its creation of a club where protestants found fellowship with their “own kind”’ (katz, 1986, p. 86). rowe’s account gives a sense of how this worked, as he describes an elaborate initiation ritual complete with special dress, a room adorned with numerous christian and american symbols, rituals akin to a religious ceremony, a set of ten questions which all initiates must be asked, and an oath of loyalty everyone had to take (rowe, 1976, pp. 11-12). among the questions asked were ‘do you believe in clannishness, and will you faithfully practice same towards klansmen?’ and ‘do you believe in and will you faithfully strive for the eternal maintenance of white supremacy?’ (rowe, 1976, p. 196). yet it was not just the formal practices that encouraged community. members regularly put their lives in other members’ hands and trusted them with personal information. rowe mentions how he would judiciously show his kkk membership card to police (rowe, 1976, p. 12), presumably as a way of getting favors. additionally, one of rowe’s most devoted advocates in the kkk worked tirelessly to keep him there, against the desires of other members, because of what rowe and his advocate had been through together (rowe, 1976, p. 28). the kkk’s third tactic was to manipulate politics by excluding certain people and ideas. over time, the kkk became a force that politicians and political institutions could not ignore. katz describes how, early on, the kkk directly intervened in the political process by intimidating blacks and white republicans to keep them from voting. some black families hid out in the woods for weeks before the election for their own safety (katz, 1986, p. 32). during election day, armed kkk members patrolled the streets, moved election locations to places known only by democrats, and seized ballot boxes to remove votes for republican candidates (katz, 1986, pp. 33-34). eventually, the kkk became such an important political force that these direct interventions were less necessary and the kkk could wield power from a distance. within several years of its formation, it became an ‘invisible government that state officials could not control’ in several counties (klanwatch project staff, 2011, p. 14). in the second era of the kkk’s existence it wielded power on a national level, holding numerous rallies and marches in washington, dc, including one in 1925 that had 40,000 robed men and women walking down pennsylvania avenue (katz, 1986, p. 103). the kkk 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 was so popular in the 1920s that few politicians from the south ventured to speak in opposition to its goals, including some who had denounced it not long before (katz, 1986, 99). in indiana, grand dragon david stephenson knew the governor, directly influenced many elections, participated in the crafting of important legislation, and famously declared ‘i am the law in indiana’ (katz, 1986, p. 101). stephenson was so committed to carrying out the kkk’s goals that he created his own private police force to intimidate other politicians, disenfranchise potential voters, and otherwise electioneer the vote. he almost ran for president, but was convicted of rape and murder (abbott, 2012). although the national prominence of the kkk diminished by the time of the civil rights movement, the tactic of influencing politics continued. rowe’s personal account of the kkk details numerous examples of the kkk’s political influence in the 1960s. rowe describes how the heads of the kkk purposefully avoided violence so as to ‘create a respectable public image’ and consistently voiced the claim that ‘the kkk does not condone violence’ (rowe, 1976, pp. 6-7). additionally, those seeking political office at times sought the kkk’s endorsement (rowe, 1976, p. 118), and white citizen’s councils applied legal and economic pressure on government to prevent integration at the same time as the kkk carried out its violent activities (rowe, 1976, p. 132). although the specifics changed across three eras, the idea of influencing politics was a constant. the final point relevant to my discussion of the kkk is not a tactic, but a condition that allowed the kkk to successfully operate and upon which the kkk depended. this is the cooperative relationship between the kkk and regulatory agencies that might have otherwise held them in check, exemplified by the police allowing kkk-instigated mobs to operate or the kkk working to get sympathetic politicians into office. it is important that the kkk received help both from authorities who refused to interfere with its activities and from officials who actively helped them out. the support given by local police was the most notable, and occurred in all three eras of kkk activity. early in the kkk’s existence, the police protected the kkk, and would even feed information to the kkk about potential targets and actions. katz says that this protection was more significant for the kkk than hoods because many kkk members were publicly known. as long as ‘some lawmen listened to citizens who reported crimes, and routinely passed all information on to the local kkk’, it was able to get away with many illegal activities (katz, 1986, p. 34). rowe confirms this in his account of the kkk during the civil rights movement. he rode with the police on a regular basis as part of a ‘goodwill’ effort on behalf of the kkk (rowe, 1976, pp. 18-19), and saw up close how the police worked with and fed information to kkk members during the freedom rides and protests in birmingham (rowe, 1976, pp. 39 & 92). other law enforcement agencies were limited in what they could do. for the first and second eras of the kkk’s activities, the army had too much territory to cover and conflicting orders. in addition, many army officers were sympathetic to kkk activities (katz, 1986, p. 34). during the civil rights movement, the fbi’s jurisdiction prevented interference with day to day police activities. even given the will to do so, fbi agents could not have intervened to stop kkk attacks on protestors in montgomery, birmingham, and other places (katz, 1986, pp. 132-133). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 49 the media often supported the kkk, particularly in the first and second eras when multiple newspapers published stories glorifying kkk activities. in the reconstruction era, newspapers that were critical of the kkk were even attacked (katz, 1986, p. 35). in the 1920s and 1930s, a fledgling advertising industry made it possible for the kkk to use new advertising techniques to get friendly copy. one kkk official at the time said ‘we have been given fifty million dollars’ worth of free advertising by the newspapers’ (katz, 1986, p. 81). while glorifying coverage lessened during the civil rights era, and more newspapers covered kkk atrocities, the kkk still had a neutral relationship with numerous members the press. the kkk’s tactics were not restricted to violence. the kkk had a much more complex relationship with society that enabled the organization to tailor its message and behavior to specific audiences using contemporary methods. we now turn to the similarities and differences we will see with alt-right trolls when we apply this framework. methods of trolls a potential objection to my analysis is confirmation bias, a fair concern given the difficulty of analyzing trolling in a systematic way. i address this worry by referring to studies of trolling behavior to show that the descriptions in this paper are representative of larger trends within the online community. additionally, i will now illustrate that the framework of the kkk’s methodology is explicitly advocated by the alt-right, and that this means well-known philosophical methods make comparison feasible. first, the alt-right lauds, as matters of self-defense and justifiable retribution, actions that intimidate opponents. james lawrence, a contributing editor to one of the alt-right’s most popular blogs, says the alt-right ‘should…make the most of the internet’s formidable power to terrorise the left and the false right...’ (lawrence, 2016). this ‘transgressive trolling’ is valuable for its ‘shock and awe’ effect that throws adversaries off balance, preventing them from doing other work since they are so busy ‘[putting] out fires.’ another writer praises trolling’s ‘simplicity, repetitiveness, purity spirals, puerility, anonymity … [and] virality (shock value)’ as a ‘gateway drug’ for the alt-right’s more serious ideas (liddell, 2016). the idea of trolling as a gateway drug illustrates the second strategy of comradery. trolling is a simpler version of the ‘hard stuff’ the alt-right wants to addict people to, in this case, whiteness or western values. greg johnson, editor-in-chief of the self-identified altright publisher counter-currents publishing ltd., says as much in an article contrasting those focused on white nationalism with those interested in western values (what he calls the ‘altlight’). white nationalists should see the ‘alt-light’ as an ‘opportunity, not a threat,’ as ‘our movement can only grow by converting people who do not already agree with us. that requires that we talk to people who do not already agree with us’ (johnson, 2017). using the internet is an important part of this strategy, as ‘[the alt-light] was created by conservative clickbait websites like breitbart’ (wallace, 2016) and is able to spread rapidly when it employs social media (wallace, 2010). 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 finally, the alt-right makes clear that one of their larger goals is developing a politics of exclusion. colin liddell, chief editor of the blog alternative right, writes that social media has helped ‘extreme and aberrant’ ideas like ‘gay marriage’ to become popular (liddell, 2014). now ‘lazy, frustrated, self-centered loners and losers, largely cut loose from real society’ can bypass ‘ordinary people’ who ‘tend to be more conservative.’ liddell links to an article that claims, ‘if everyone is spinning everything shamelessly and sensationally, people can just pick the spin they like the best ...’ since objectivity was ‘always more of a charming fiction than a reality’ (donovan, 2014). taken together, these articles argue that the alt-right’s views are normal, that any indication otherwise is the result of media bias, and that the best strategy is to advocate shamelessly for what one wants since factual accuracy is a fantasy. excluding alternative views from politics is justified since such views are just propaganda produced by ‘freaks’ and the media. the three-part strategy used by the kkk of intimidation, comradery, and manipulating politics is advocated by people throughout the alt-right. although the kkk is an organization and the alt-right is a movement, we can still draw parallels. the kkk was supported by a movement (white nationalism), and the alt-right is promoted by organizations (breitbart news and richard spencer’s national policy institute, just to name two). the phenomenon of the kkk cannot be separated from the white nationalist movement, nor the alt-right from its organizations. my analysis examines the set of practices and relationships that accompany each. there is a clear connection to the genealogical method described by foucault, who says power operates through many ‘instrumental modes,’ for example ‘threat of arms, by the effects of speech, through economic disparities, by more or less complex means of control, by systems of surveillance, with or without archives, by rules, explicit or not, fixed or modifiable, with or without the material means of enforcement’ (foucault, 2001, 344). some of these instrumental modes are performed by organizations, and others are social practices. my comparison describes a type of power that operates with different ‘instrumental modes’ when applied to the kkk versus the alt-right, but nevertheless uses the same overarching methods. as a final note before beginning my analysis, the logical form of my argument is inductive analogy, as it describes the methods of the kkk, then the methods of the alt-right, before concluding that the two groups are similar in that they use the same methods. the commonly accepted criteria for a good argument by inductive analogy is that (1) the similarities between the analogues should be relevant, (2) there should be a good number of similarities, (3) the dissimilarities should be few or irrelevant, (4) one should survey a healthy number of primary analogues, (5) there should be diversity among the primary analogues, (6) and the conclusion should be as specific as the evidence warrants (hurley, 2010, pp. 510511). all these criteria are satisfied by my argument. the methods each group uses are relevant to my claim that they use the same methods (#1), and my conclusion is quite specific inasmuch as i demonstrate they use many of the same tactics before concluding as much (#6). similarly, i examine the kkk during all three eras in which it was strongest, citing studies that describe patterns among all the kkk’s groups (#4 and #5). the number of similarities found is also quite strong (#2), as i show that three of the kkk’s most commonly used tactics are also used by the alt-right. the criterion my argument is weakest on is #3, as there are cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 51 definite differences between the kkk and alt-right. the specific insults used, the places each group conduct their attacks, and the how the groups organize themselves are examples of their dissimilarities (though these same differences can be found in the kkk at different eras of its existence). i address this by making my conclusion more cautious. i do not claim that the kkk and the alt-right are the same; my conclusion is that they use many of the same methods. i believe that even though i do not thoroughly parse out all the differences, the evidence strongly supports this conclusion. the differences i have uncovered (e.g. the altright threatens people online, while the kkk did so in person) are irrelevant to my conclusion. trolling began on online bulletin board systems in the 1990s with the practice of flaming. gizmodo journalist ashley feinberg says ‘the introduction of anonymity not only made users feel free from the repercussions that might otherwise give them pause, but it also dehumanized potential targets. in other words, the internet gave all our worst impulses just what they needed to thrive’ (feinberg, 2014). watching ‘flame wars’ on sites like usenet gave birth to trolls who were entertained by igniting often pointless debate and disagreement. those who enjoyed online arguments become known as ‘net.weenies,’ or ‘the kind of people who enjoy insulting [sic] others, the kind of people who post nasty messages in a sewing newsgroup just for the hell of it’ (usenet: from flame wars to killfiles). the first recorded use of the term ‘trolling’ came in 1992, when someone wrote on the alt-folklore-urban board the statement ‘maybe after i post it, we could go trolling some more and see what happens’ (feinberg, 2014). the term first referred to minor pranks, such as speaking admiringly of the ‘para-homosexuality’ found in american fraternities in the hopes of upsetting many people (brown, 2016). in time, individuals who engaged in trolling began to connect with each other on message boards, in particular the usenet group alt-tasteless as well as 4chan’s /b/ board, and the character of trolling changed. rather than simply posting statements to get a response, actions became more extreme. in 2011 a troll mocked the deaths of several uk youths and taunted their families, while other trolls bullied youth into suicide or made 911 calls to send a swat team to an unsuspecting person’s house (brown, 2016). trolls also changed their identities from people who do things ‘for the lolz’ to those who do things ‘for the lulz,’ the difference being that the former do things for laughter, and the latter for laughter at someone else’s expense. as trolling developed, more collaboration became possible. 4chan’s /b/ message board, which allows for the posting of anything save that which is explicitly illegal (like child pornography), is responsible for numerous well-known acts of trolling carried out by many individuals at the same time. examples include getting a swastika to appear on google’s hot trends chart, hacking sarah palin’s email during her vice-presidential run, fabricating the death of steve jobs, and allegedly telling justin beiber fans to slit their own wrists to support the singer. fernando alfonso iii says, ‘[4chan’s] influence is vastly understated in the media because 4chan is known as the place for misogyny, racism and pedophilia. because of this dark side of the site, its influence often gets shrugged off by the mainstream media’ (suberjenkins, 2016). while trolling has now spread across the internet, it began on sites that encouraged mischievous discriminatory behavior at others’ expense. 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 trolling has expanded significantly since its beginnings, and as mentioned above, some examples of it are innocuous. the trolling done by the alt-right is anything but, and exemplifies the same methods of the ku klux klan. to see these methods at work, i will examine each using examples drawn from news reports and studies. both the alt-right and the kkk use threats and hateful language to create fear and influence people’s behavior. recently, alt-right trolls threatened members of government they felt were infringing their rights, just as the kkk threatened republicans during reconstruction. on november 19, 2013, everest wilhelmsen, a man associated with the christian american patriots militia, wrote on facebook that his group has the ‘authority to shoot obama, i.e., to kill him’ (morlin, 2013), while in november of 2014 another alt-right troll wrote a series of threats on facebook, saying ‘i think we all need to get our guns and shoot all of these out of control congressmen and senators and obama!’ he went on to call for their bodies to be hung in the street for a week, a clear reference to lynching (morlin, 2015). just like the kkk, these threats are phrased as a form of self-defense against elected leaders who have committed ‘treason’. in these instances, the individuals’ names are known; however, online hate speech is more often done in secret or by so many people that identifying those responsible is an impossible task. reddit (a company that runs many online message boards and encourages sharing online content) ceo steve huffman experienced this when he tried to enforce the site’s anti-harassment policies. when he attempted to increase monitoring of hateful speech and shut down a particularly nasty discussion board spreading conspiracy theories, he was attacked so viciously that he apologized and undid his actions (williams, 2016). many of the insults were sent directly to him, and are thus not publicly accessible, though in his apology huffman implies they contained pornographic images. two unrestricted examples of the messages huffman received are ‘that is a horrendous ethics violation for a ceo. fire yourself’ (the admins are suffering from low energy have resorted to editing your posts. sad!) and ‘resign you cuck’ (the admins are suffering from low energy have resorted to editing your posts. sad!) (‘cuck’ being short for ‘cuckservative,’ a derogatory term used by white supremacists to describe a fake conservative). in another example of untraceable hate speech, chobani yogurt founder hamdi ulukaya received multiple racist messages and death threats when brietbart news announced that he employed more than 300 refugees in his factory and was starting a foundation to help migrants (gelles, 2016). as of this writing (september 2018), ulukaya has not changed his policies, although that is the goal of those making threats and advocating a boycott (peterson, 2016). it is not just executives who receive anonymous threats, but non-white groups as well. one study shows how visible markers of a non-white identity, such as wearing a hijab, make one a ready target for direct threats, intimidation, insults, and derogatory comments (awan and zempi, 2017, pp. 370-1). the authors of this study describe how anonymity helps normalize this abuse by allowing trolls to escape detection, making them feel ‘safe to express hate messages in the cyber world’ (awan and zempi, 2017, p. 365). studies such as daniels (2009a) and jakubowicz et al. (2017) document the parallels between online racism and the racism of the past, such as the use of hate speech (daniels, 2009a, 36) for the purpose of ‘offending, insulting, humiliating, intimidating and advocating the expulsion from the country of, or advocating violence against’ someone (jakubowicz et al., 2017, p. 179). just cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 53 like the kkk, alt-right trolls threaten anyone who doesn’t fit their white and western identity. these attacks are designed to intimidate for the purpose of policing behavior and are often executed anonymously, which again reveals a disturbing similarity with the kkk. and while it is true people of all races, genders, and ethnicities are attacked online, studies show that a disproportionate number of those attacks target women and minorities (duggan, 2014). research shows that there are more white supremacist hate websites on the internet than those supporting other races, and the exact number of those sites is difficult to calculate (daniels, 2009a, p. 5). while the exact cause of the harassment is difficult to determine, some speculate that it stems from lack of diversity in silicon valley industries, which are only 27% female, 3.3% african-american, and 5.1% hispanic (houston, 2015). the result is that certain parts of the internet are ‘marked’ as hostile to anyone other than white males, and people may hesitate to make certain statements for fear of retribution. to explore how alt-right trolls develop comradery along ethnic or cultural lines, we must examine how social media operates. reddit’s ‘about’ page mentions three actions that all users are encouraged to perform: share, vote, and discuss. these mean, respectively, creating themed discussion boards where users can share ‘content including stories, links, and images;’ voting on which stories and comments they like best; and adding their own perspective to ongoing discussions (reddit). people use facebook ‘to stay connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to them’ (facebook-about). in short, social media allows individuals to share and discuss matters of concern to them with the online community. rather than encounter a plurality of viewpoints and individuals, studies show that the people tend to connect to others with similar political viewpoints (douggan and smith, 2016) and racial identity (anderson and hitlin, 2016). using social media as a primary news source means that one will only see and discuss the views of those with similar outlooks and identities. for the alt-right community, this means encountering many views stating that western identity is under attack. alt-right radio host alex jones, who maintains the site infowars, is noted for claiming that a ‘new world order’ is responsible for the tragic shootings in sandy hook and orlando (hananoki, 2016) and argues that a ‘civil war is coming’. the latter was said after infowars contributor jerad miller went on a shooting rampage while parroting talking points from jones’s show. jones claims he is being set up, even though miller’s facebook page displays numerous positive references to jones’s site alongside the statement ‘get informed or get stupid’ (neiwert, 2014). only seeing views that present the west as under attack creates a community that is hostile to alternative perspectives. trolls on twitter illustrated this sense of comradery recently when they harassed a 7year-old girl from aleppo who was documenting the deteriorating situation in syria. rather than ask for evidence that this girl was who she said, she was reflexively attacked for being a ‘terrorist’ and putting forth ‘propaganda bullshit’ (corbett, 2016). social technology disseminates falsehoods rapidly and also contributes to a feeling of comradery among the believers. the widely discredited claim that the first slaves were irish, not black, spread rapidly through social media sites like facebook and twitter (amend, 2016). the alt-right’s 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 claim that we are in an ethnic war, and its development of images, rhetoric, and slang which promote that contention, bear eerie similarities to the kkk. the same message sent by the kkk oath (‘do you believe in and will you faithfully strive for the eternal maintenance of white supremacy’) is contained in the common alt-right slogan: ‘why the hell do i have to press 1 for english? did america move?,’ (phone frustration). this tactic of alt-right trolls fit into an epistemology commonly used online by whitesupremacists. the lack of expert gatekeepers combined with search tools that are easy to exploit make it simpler for white supremacists to claim that they speak the truth. jessie daniels (2009b) discusses this in the context of ‘cloaked websites’ that pretend to give unbiased knowledge while actually providing propaganda to support a political agenda. daniels says that ‘the fact that cyber-racists have laid claim to ‘truth’ via the internet challenges the basis for any assertion about racial equality, because it calls into question what constitutes the ‘truth’ that we say we know about ‘race’, racism and racial inequality’ (2009b, p. 674). daniels concludes that ‘the cloaked websites examined here are a small piece of a broader social landscape in which propaganda, advertising, politics and cyber-racism are converging in new ways that make it increasingly difficult to parse facts from political spoofs and marketing ploys’ (2009b, p. 676). daniels’s analysis does not just apply to cloaked websites, but to the way alt-right trolls disseminate information on social media. reddit, 4chan, and other sites used by alt-right trolls claim to speak the truth and manipulate online tools to support their assertions. they encourage dialogue within the group to build a collective identity. and because they make finding other evidence so difficult, challenges to one’s epistemology become easier to ignore than to check via the arduous work of critical thinking. the alt-right’s epistemology actively encourages comradery as a way to preserve their ‘truth’. this jury-rigging of online media to support one’s aims bears a clear resemblance to the kkk’s use of newspapers to get out their message (though there are several differences between the ways the media are used, some of which daniels covers in her book). alt-right trolls manipulate politics to exclude people and ideas, starting with the domain where they spend most of their time, the internet. while alt-right trolls have at times affected national governance, most of their energy is devoted to the online body politic. they are known to engineer behind-the-scenes the stories, images, and ideas that are ‘trending,’ and thus are highlighted on influential platforms like google, facebook, and twitter. these manipulations push forward hateful symbols and ideas, preventing other stories from getting attention. in 2008, the site 4chan was probably responsible for putting the image of a swastika to the top of google’s ‘hot trends’ page. i say ‘probably’ because records are not available to confirm with certainty who was behind it, although investigators say it is the most plausible scenario (sarno, 2018). similarly, the microsoft chat-bot tay, an artificial intelligence programmed to interact and learn from twitter users, ‘learned’ in less than a day to spout conspiracy theories, speak admirably of hitler, and compare president obama to a monkey (hunt, 2016). though definitive evidence is again impossible to find, the fact that tay worked well in tests led investigators to conclude that a ‘coordinated attack by a subset of people exploited a vulnerability in tay’ (lee, 2016), while several twitter accounts took cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 55 credit for having ‘taught tay to be really racist’ (hunt, 2016). trending social media content like this is reminiscent of the anonymous kkk official who boasted about free newspaper advertisement. one outcome of such trolling is an aura of fear that damages health both online and off. awan and zempi document how anti-muslim hate online produces ‘isolation, depression, loneliness and a sense of rejection from wider society’ (2017, p. 374) as well as a feeling that one must always keep one’s guard up. these effects spill into the physical world, where online racism hurts the possibility of muslims finding jobs, feeling comfortable doing everyday tasks like walking down a street, displaying their identity openly, and even leaving the house (p. 375). as arwan and zempit summarize, ‘whether in cyber or ‘real’ world, antimuslim hate crime creates ‘invisible’ boundaries, across which members of the muslim community are not ‘welcome’ to step’ (p. 376). the effect of online hate on emotional wellbeing is further documented by tynes, who shows a direct link between individual discrimination and depression or anxiety (2008, p. 568), and jakubowicz et al., who show that ‘microaggressions’ (a broad term that includes acts of trolling) can be more damaging than blatant racism and have a significant impact on one’s well-being (2017, p. 211). given that 63% of adolescents and teenagers experience racism online (tynes, 2008, p. 568), this harm pervades society. just as the kkk’s election day actions led black families to fear for their lives, the actions of alt-right trolls create anxiety and depression in those who they target. trolls can influence how people involve themselves in us politics. one notable example is how shooter dylann roof was radicalized by reading blog posts on the council of conservative citizens site (cohen, 2015), which publishes user-submitted news stories with little to no verification. daniels writes an insightful account of how radicalization works, saying that white-supremacist sites have both passive and active users (the latter add content to the site, the former do not). the participation of both passive and active users can vary from just visiting the site out of curiosity to supporting it with money and good reviews (2009a, pp. 50-51). through their attempts at creating comradery and an exclusive politics, white supremacist sites change passive members into active ones, or casual visitors into loyal ones. by using ignorance about racial issues to make their radical position sound normal, they get people to join their cause. in one case from the website stormfront, a user named kojac67 described the racist views of john adams as logical before concluding ‘who are we to know better?’ daniels says ‘here kojac67 uses moderate-sounding rhetoric and an appeal to the nation’s founding ideals to make a point that runs counter to democratic ideals of equality for all. in this way kojac67 shifts white supremacist rhetoric away from extremist expressions and places it within the more mundane, everyday expressions of white identity’ (daniels, 2009a, p. 53). while roof’s radicalization is perhaps the most notorious example of how trolls are affecting politics, it is not the only one. in 2014, a movement to overthrow elected leaders was organized on social media sites like facebook and tea party nation (gettys, 2014). actions like these, which attempt to exclude those they deemed opposed to american values (chabba, 2016; amsel, 2014; and oas submission to congress [demands/grievances, articles of impeachment]), are reminiscent of the kkk’s continual 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 efforts to bring whites to their side while driving others away. from taking down a major microsoft project to shaping national news, it is clear trolls affect politics online (rauch, 2013 and bartlett, 2014). finally, just as the kkk had a collegial relationship with government for most of its existence, trolls have not often been confronted by the administrators of social media. until recently, facebook had unclear community guidelines, did not hire enough people to monitor all accusations of hate speech, and claimed that hate-speech laws do not apply to them (ingram, 2016; shahani, 2016). twitter also dragged its feet when responding to accusations of hate speech (jeong, 2016). only recently have both sites taken actions to address the proliferation of hate speech trolling (guynn, 2016; oltermann, 2016). reddit has yet to take any substantive steps, and has even allowed self-identified misogynist trolls to moderate its boards (philips, 2012). compounding the problem is that many government agencies refuse to take substantive actions. numerous individuals in positions of authority either identify with the ideology being put forth or see no need to address hate speech online, and only a few governments (like that of germany) are taking legal action (rupar, 2016; elias, 2013; neiwert, 2014). because of this, alt-right trolls are able to thrive. conclusion the methods of the alt-right have significant similarities to those of the kkk, making the altright’s claim that it only uses the ideas, and not the methods, of the kkk untenable. beginning as mischievous groups interested in pranks, alt-right trolls and the kkk each grew into larger movements. each mobilized hate-filled language, threatened people in what were supposedly safe spaces (homes or personal email/social media accounts) as well as in public, validated its own actions as a form of self-defense or justifiable retribution, used a decentralized organization where groups act independently of one another, developed elaborate and widely discredited theories which legitimated its vision of cultural superiority, created practices and images specific to them as a form of identification, and were able to rely upon the friendliness or indifference of the media as well as other authority figures. there is an additional parallel between the southerners who saw lynching as a form of entertainment and those today who view racist trolling as a side-show. perhaps it is a small portion of the population who hack email accounts, send death threats, and perpetuate false stories about the ‘oncoming civil war,’ but society seems to have accepted their presence as minor troublemakers. few politicians speak about trolling except in broad platitudes, and leaders in silicon valley dismiss the idea that trolling and false posts could affect national politics (shontell, 2016). the strategies of the alt-right are not less ‘ad-hoc’ and more conscientious than those of their forbearers. nor are they tamer and more caring. they are the reinvestment of the same practices over the new medium of the internet. rather than inscribe hate onto the bodies of african-americans and women, alt-right trolls inscribe it onto the online personas of minorities and women. the example of actress leslie jones is illustrative here. for her role in an all-female reboot of the movie ghostbusters, she was viciously attacked online to the point of quitting twitter, posting ‘i leave twitter tonight with tears and a very sad heart. all this cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.3, 2018 57 [because] i did a movie’ (rogers, 2016). similarly, muslim woman laila alawa received online harassment after an article on a conservative website implied that she thought 9/11 was a positive thing (she said that 9/11 changed the world ‘for good’, i.e. permanently, not ‘for the good’). while she has reported thousands of intimidating tweets to twitter, less than a dozen have been removed. ‘this has been really difficult,’ she says, as she worries not only for her safety but for her ability to successfully run a business when online searches for her name display these falsehoods first (o’brien, 2016). such digital lynchings are not as physically harmful as stringing someone up at the nearest tree, but when a person’s online persona is destroyed or controlled by others, they are not virtually alive. black people are disproportionately marked by trolls as being un-american, terrorist, aberrant, and worse (anderson and hitlin, 2016). similar attitudes are taken towards women, muslims, and other disenfranchised groups. this is particularly harmful because it is impossible to delete or erase all the false information and because it takes place in a global forum that allows the actions of the alt-right to be broadcast worldwide. references abbott, k. 2012, ‘‘murder wasn’t very pretty’: the rise and fall of d.c. stephenson,’ smithsonian magazine, august 30, 2012, http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/murder-wasnt-very-pretty-the-rise-and-fall-ofdc-stephenson-18935042/ ‘the admins are suffering from low energy have resorted to editing your posts. sad!,’ 2017, https://www.reddit.com/r/the_donald/comments/5ekdy9/the_admins_are_suffering_fro m_low_energy_have/dad5sf1/ allen, i. 2016, ‘‘alt-right’ is not a thing. it’s white supremacy,’ the nation, november 23, 2016, 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http://mediamatters.org/blog/2016/08/25/what-alt-right-guide-white-nationalist-movement-now-leading-conservative-media/212643 http://mediamatters.org/blog/2016/08/25/what-alt-right-guide-white-nationalist-movement-now-leading-conservative-media/212643 ccs 6026 eckstrand.pdf 6026-article text-29207-1-10-20181125.pdf abstract keywords introduction terminology methods of the ku klux klan methods of trolls conclusion references cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 13, no. 2 2021 © 2021 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: wearring, a., dalton, b., and bertram, r. 2021. pivoting post-pandemic: not-for-profit arts and culture organisations and a new focus on social impact. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:2, 44–59. http://dx.doi.org/ ccs.v13.i2.7729 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) pivoting post-pandemic: not-for-profit arts and culture organisations and a new focus on social impact andrew wearring, bronwen dalton, rachel bertram university of technology sydney corresponding author: andrew wearring, university of technology sydney, 15 broadway, ultimo nsw 2007, australia. andrew.wearring@uts.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/ccs.v13.i2.7729 article history: received 21/05/2021; revised 15/06/2021; accepted 15/06/2021; published 19/07/2021 abstract while the australian arts and cultural sector has been adept at shaping the national conversation around its economic significance, the covid-19 pandemic has brought multiple and serious challenges. weakened by years of government defunding, the sector now faces the shocks of shutdowns and social distancing on their bottom line. post-covid we propose that arts and culture organisations in the not-for-profit sector express their contribution to society as social impact, in order to access more diverse sources of funding. this paper looks first at established ways of assessing economic value, then discusses the broader social value of arts and culture organisations. it then explores methods by which this can be measured and reported. lastly, a review of relevant literature and best practice approaches to social impact measurement is provided, outlining a framework to produce evaluations that both strengthen their programs and enhance their ability to communicate their value to funders. keywords social impact; evaluation; arts and culture; not-for-profit; covid-19 44 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research was produced with funding from the nelson meers foundation. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/ccs.v13.i2.7729 http://dx.doi.org/ccs.v13.i2.7729 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:andrew.wearring@uts.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/ccs.v13.i2.7729 introduction australians are aware of the importance of the arts, and regularly participate in arts and cultural activities. according to a survey of 3,000 people conducted by the australia council (2014), some 95 per cent of australians engaged in the arts in some way in the 2013. in addition, nearly half participated as creators in at least one art form. some 85 per cent of people agreed the arts makes for a richer and more meaningful life. while the arts and cultural sector has been adept at shaping the national conversation around its economic significance, the pandemic brought multiple serious challenges. weakened by successive years of government defunding, not-for-profit (nfp) organisations face the enormous challenge of surviving the immediate consequences of covid-19 pandemic shutdowns and social distancing on their ability to operate, as well as the longer-term effects of an economic recession that is affecting the capacity of consumers to pay and influencing government funding priorities. the central role of arts and culture has rarely been more evident than as the world responded to the covid-19 pandemic. people turned to arts and culture to cope – not just to pass time in isolation or while socially distanced but, fundamentally, to feel more connected. perhaps more than other fields of activity, arts and cultural organisations create experiences that have a deep and emotional impact on individuals, communities and society. at a personal level, arts and culture can illuminate our inner lives and enrich our emotional world. at the local level, they can be a source of social connection and community renewal. more broadly, arts and cultural organisations make a crucial contribution to creating shared experiences that build a sense of common identity and, by extension, a more vibrant and connected society. like so much of australian life, many arts and cultural activities need subsidies in the form of government grants or private or corporate donations. this means that governments and donors can find themselves in the position of making judgements about whether arts and cultural activities are deserving of funds relative to other public goods, and which types of arts and cultural programs merit support. this places organisations under constant pressure to articulate their value to society, extending beyond statements regarding the broader, less tangible notions of arts and culture enriching daily life. increasingly, funders expect organisations to demonstrate their economic contribution as well as specific social impacts. in terms of the overall economic contribution, the statistics are impressive. in 2016-17, cultural and creative activity – referred to variously as cultural industries, arts and culture or the ‘experience economy’, and including activities related to the arts, media, heritage, design and fashion – contributed $111.7 billion to gdp in australia, representing 6.4 per cent of economic activity (bcar 2018). even so, the sector must constantly fight for government support. according to christopher farrell ‘artists are significantly and vastly underestimated contributors and generators of local economic growth’ (farrell 2003). that means it is critical to build capacity to make compelling, evidence-based cases for support – cases that go beyond economic statistics (browne 2020). this requires empowering the sector to work towards a stronger advocacy position and profile within the broader economy. now, more than ever, is time to ask: what is behind the numbers? what do we need to know to be able to communicate the true depth and breadth of our social impact? with declines in the ability to generate revenue from patronage, post-covid we propose that australian arts and culture organisations in the not-for-profit sector pivot to expressing and demonstrating their contribution to society by rigorously measuring their social impact in order to gain greater access to more diverse sources of funding. this paper looks at the established ways used to assess the economic value of arts and culture, discusses the broader social value of arts and culture organisations, and explores methods by which this social value can be measured and reported. we begin by defining arts and culture: two separate, but inextricably linked, ideas. we then explore the political and economic landscape driving evaluation practice within the sector. lastly, we provide a review of the literature on the measurement of wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 45 the social impact of arts and culture programs and activities. it is envisioned that the main audience for this paper will be practitioners in arts and culture programs, often not-for-profits (nfps), interested in measuring the outcomes and impact of their programs and to help build a case for funding. other interested parties may include government and other funders interested in how to assess potential grant recipients or developing arts and culture policies. lastly, evaluators and academic researchers may find such a review useful. defining arts and culture to picasso art was ‘the lie that reveals the truth’; for goethe it was ‘the magic of the soul’ – other definitions focus on particular artistic forms (ramachandran 2004). philosopher john dewey defined art as encompassing a range of human activity that creates modes of expression such as visual arts, literary arts and performing arts (dewey 2005). ‘culture’ is perhaps an even more contested concept. anthropologists use the term to refer to the universal human capacity to classify experiences and to encode and communicate them symbolically (ingold 1994). holden defined culture in terms of institutions and funding: ‘the arts, museums, libraries and heritage that receive public funding’ (holden 2006). problems with institutional definitions arise when we try to distinguish cultural activity from the arts, however. for example, in australia the public institutions we generally refer to as state and national art galleries are in countries such as the united states referred to as ‘art museums’, to distinguish them from commercial, sales-focused galleries. while the content of ‘art museums’ remains visual art, the term itself raises questions around the motivations of visitors – are they there for the educational opportunity or to appreciate art? these are important questions as the purpose and intent of a program within a cultural institution determines which measures of success should be evaluated – especially when the intent extends beyond art appreciation into achieving social outcomes such as education or social inclusion. a recent study by the think tank a new approach found that people in their focus groups responded best to the term ‘art and culture’ as a single idea, concluding it side-stepped any elitist notions associated with just ‘the arts’ (fielding & trembath 2020). for the most part this report will treat arts and culture as intertwined and overlapping. much of the debate around defining arts and culture very quickly turns to the debate about their ‘value’ – a debate that shifts between economic, social and aesthetic understandings. the arts are often perceived as luxuries worth supporting in good times but hard to justify when the economy takes a turn for the worse. this has been evident in the covid-19 induced recession in australia. how best to challenge this attitude? one way is to change the question being asked from ‘how much is this benefit worth?’ to ‘what is the impact of this?’. holden (2006) argued for a broadening of how we value the arts highlighting three areas of value: intrinsic value, being the subjective effect arts and cultural experiences have on someone; instrumental value, including outcomes such as employment, tourism, education or wellbeing for individuals and communities; and institutional value, placed on arts and culture by society as a whole and reflected in how arts and cultural institutions interact. while instrumental value may be the focus of government funders, arts and culture proponents need to consider methods through which they can accentuate intrinsic and institutional value as well. it is clear that instrumental value is the main focus of government funders. however, arts and culture proponents might want to accentuate intrinsic and institutional value. organisations can make the intrinsic value of their activities less abstract by conducting methodologically robust evaluations, evidencing a relationship between intrinsic value and tangible, beneficial outcomes such as improved education, mental and physical wellbeing, and social cohesion – in a sense, making the intrinsic also instrumental. the next step is to make a clear case that arts and culture can change lives and communities for the better, and that they are needed more than ever during economic downturns. wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 46 the social impact of arts and culture the concept and practice of social impact and its assessment has developed and matured over the last decades. it is generally understood as the sum effect of any intervention or program implemented to address social disadvantage or an environmental issue. impact is distinct from ‘outputs’ – which are the direct products resulting from the implementation of intervention activities – and from ‘outcomes’. outcomes are sometimes broken down into immediate, medium and long-term changes in the target group(s) who have been engaged in the intervention and which precede, and are usually a pre-condition for, impact. despite this growth, confusion still exists with respect to definitions of social impact, as well as which tools and frameworks are most appropriate. central to the concept and practice of social impact is a focus on outcomes (onyx 2014; grieco 2015; ormiston 2019; zappalà 2020). with roots in the early program evaluations of the 1970’s (sharp 2003), evaluations of the social impact of arts and culture came into their own at the turn of the millennium. an early influential contribution to the measurement of social impact in arts and culture was completed by françois matarasso for english research consultancy comedia, (matarasso 1997). based on a previously completed pilot (landry et al. 1993), this comprehensive study surveyed 60 european projects including 600 participants through interviews, focus groups and observation. while acknowledging the pioneering nature of this work, eleanora belfiore (2002) points out that, though matarasso had stressed in a prior working paper from the project the need to establish a causal link between activity and outcome (matarasso 1997), he waved away any responsibility to do so in the final report. in what should be an unsurprising turn given the name, ‘social impact assessments’ by arts and culture researchers are usually focussed on the social, and rarely consider aesthetic or artistic outcomes. belfiore suggests this is because the assessments are reporting against funding objectives, which tend to be aligned with social inclusion strategies (belfiore 2002), but another factor is how meaningful the results will be to stakeholders: most often the general public. an example might be a majority government-funded feature film. this is especially relevant during the pandemic, as australia’s less severe pandemic environment has meant that several large budget films have been attracted here over the last 12 months (donoghue 2021; nothling 2021). typically, the film’s success would be measured in economic impact: jobs created for creatives, crew and support staff, box office earnings, and so on. an evaluator, however, may ask what would aesthetic impact look like? favourable reviews from critics? is favourable too loose a criterion? should it be restricted to reviews which deemed it to have artistic merit? would you need to consider influence on subsequent film makers, and how might that be assessed objectively? the subjective, uncertain nature of these issues goes some way to explaining why assessors prioritise instrumental value over intrinsic value. some studies are only interested in investigating the positive, indirect impacts of programs. one study of the impacts of a college choir used a questionnaire to ask participants about how participation improved their physical, mental, emotional and spiritual health, but asked no questions about the creativity of singing. the same paper raised the possibility of negative health impacts of producing music, albeit for professional musicians. all items in their survey however skewed towards discovering positive impacts, relegating the only discussion of negative impacts to the study’s limitations (clift & hancox 2001). this is not to say neutrality is necessarily the ideal, or simple to accomplish. matarasso noted the consequences of simply neutralising the tone of questions asked with the example of a question about whether a particular cultural event had changed people’s feelings about the place they lived. some answered no, but luckily the researchers followed this with the question ‘if so, in what way?’ these participants replied that they had always loved where they lived, in part because of such cultural events (matarasso 1997). so, impact should not only be considered in terms of change but can also be about the important work done wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 47 to maintain good situations and environments. this episode also highlights the importance of extra data, especially descriptive, qualitative data, in order to interpret the other results one obtains. some authors describe a tension between research that is ‘purely academic’ and adheres to the rigours of correct methods, and research that is used for primarily advocacy, either by the sector to seek funds or by government to deny them. belfiore (2016) cites examples of this zero-sum thinking, such as jim mcguigan (mcguigan 1996) and oliver bennett (bennett 2004), but point out that they underestimate the impact that research has been demonstrated to have (bastow et al. 2014; lingard 2013). the sector the shape of the sector arts and cultural organisations assume many forms, from collectives and co-operatives through to companies limited by guarantee. they may be incorporated as public, private or nfp entities. governmentrun institutions include national galleries, libraries, war memorials, sites of historical importance and local government arts programs. arts and cultural organisations in the private sector include for-profit commercial galleries, theatres and music venues. nfp entities include opera australia, the sydney symphony orchestra and the australian ballet. australian statistics are difficult to unpack because the australian and new zealand standard industrial classification describes ‘arts and recreation’ very broadly, including creative and performing arts but also sport and gambling. at the same time, it does not include publishing, broadcasting, film and sound recording, library and other information services or heritage activities, as these fall into the information media and telecommunications classification (abs 2013). according to the australian bureau of statistics, in 2019 there were 40,822 arts and recreation businesses, representing 2 per cent of all businesses. but given the imprecise classification the percentage that are arts and cultural organisations is not immediately clear. the australian charities and not-for-profit commission includes a category for organisations whose activity involves ‘advancing culture’. in 2018 there were 1,208 organisations registered with the stated purpose of ‘advancing culture’, including theatre groups, orchestras and charities promoting australian indigenous culture and customs, among others although, by definition, this only covered registered charities and nfps. these organisations had a combined revenue of $1.13 billion (acnc 2020). between january 2017 and december 2019: $300 million was cut from the federal government’s cultural budget; 65 arts organisations lost australia council funding; the book council lost $6 million in funding; and national broadcaster the abc lost $100 million a year in direct and indirect funding (ana 2019). the state of the sector the arts and cultural sector has been hit by successive years of significant cuts to its government funding. other policies have had an indirect but serious negative impact – from the decision in 2014 to no longer fund the australian bureau of statistics to collect arts and sport data (darcy & dalton 2014), through to the virtual exclusion of arts and cultural workers from the jobkeeper program (pma 2020). aimed at supporting people during the covid-19 pandemic, jobkeeper was problematic for the sector because its structure focused on traditional forms of employment. the australia council has described the impact of covid-19 on the australian arts community as ‘catastrophic’ (australia council 2020). venues had to shut their doors with little or no notice and organisations had to cancel programs and activities. as a consequence, hundreds of thousands of arts workers suffered significant negative effects on their immediate and future livelihoods. artists are the wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 48 original ‘gig’ workers. according to the making art work study, the vast majority (81 per cent) are selfemployed or freelancers, mostly relying on contracts for fixed amounts (43 per cent) along with royalties and advances (35 per cent) (throsby & petetskaya 2017). by april 2020 a reported $330 million was lost in work and contracts, with 470,000 workers being affected across arts and entertainment and related sectors (i lost my gig australia 2020). a national, crossindustry survey by the australian bureau of statistics in march 2020, as covid-19 shutdowns took hold, showed that more than half of all arts and recreation businesses had ceased trading – the highest proportion of the 17 industries analysed. some 73 per cent of arts and recreation businesses reported their business had been adversely affected by covid-19 in the previous two weeks, second only to accommodation and food services businesses (78 per cent). the most common adverse effect was reduced local demand (93 per cent of those affected) followed by staff shortages (49 per cent) and reduced international demand (32 per cent) (abs 2020). support for federal relief is strong across all states and voting intentions (browne 2020). in april of 2020, the morrison government announced a $27 million emergency relief fund for the arts (fletcher 2020a). the package targeted regional and indigenous organisations and included the ‘repurposing’ of $5 million of the australia council’s existing pool for small, quick-release grants. after intense lobbying from the sector, in june 2020, the government announced a further $250 million that included $90 million in governmentbacked concessional loans for new productions (fletcher 2020b). there have also been initiatives at local, state and sector levels, such as the abc’s fresh start fund to support australia’s production industry (abc 2020). this may go some way to ease the pain but, at the time of writing, thousands of arts and cultural organisations are still struggling to survive. many of the issues facing organisations are not new. organisations are familiar with lack of funding, the true value of their work being underestimated and the assumption that art and culture will always be there. the fallout from the pandemic has intensified a longer-term pattern of decline in support for the arts in australia. as we emerge from covid-19, nfp arts and culture organisations need a new strategy in order to revive and thrive. the landscape most social impact measurement occurs because it is required by government funders, so it is important to understand government structures and motivations. governments have a long history of intervention in the field of arts and culture, and a propensity to exert influence through levers ranging from tax policy to signals on sector wages. another way they influence policy is through the individuals that the government places in charge of art and culture, and even where the portfolio sits within the assigned ministry. after a ministerial reshuffle in 2019, arts was demoted to an ‘office’ within the federal department of infrastructure, transport, regional development and communications – a portfolio title that provides no indication the arts portfolio is to be found there. many in the field, including the australian writers’ guild, live performance australia and the national association for the visual arts, argued strongly that this showed the government assigned little importance to arts and culture (watts 2019). in state and territory governments, the location of the arts and culture portfolio varies. in western australia, for example, it falls into the department of local government, sport and cultural industries, while tasmania’s cultural and tourism development division is part of the department of state growth. demand for accountability in this neoliberal age there is an impulse among governments and management to emphasise accountability. at its simplest, this can be an accounting for dollars spent. more broadly, there is pressure to be able to wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 49 explain the benefits of funded programs and to establish the legitimacy of particular approaches to specific problems. however, a tension exists between accountability, resourcing and program delivery. whitney watriss, director of smithsonian organization and audience research, the central planning, research and evaluation office of the smithsonian institution in the united states, makes an observation that will be familiar to many in the arts and culture sector: the two major measures right now are audience numbers and fundraising, and right now [this museum] has very little capacity to raise money. instead, what should be measured is: what has changed as a result of what you are doing? is the world a better place? have you inspired people? when they leave do they continue to research the exhibition or follow up on things they want to know about? do they have a different perspective on how they see the world? (francis 2018) for many, the things more easily measured do not necessarily tell us much about what is important. there is a sense that not only are the impacts of arts and culture greater than the economic, but they are also more meaningful. with this increased demand for accountability and reporting, an opportunity exists for government to shape measurement by providing standardised frameworks and guidance on measures for social impact evaluation. many initial forays encountered resistance, however, with the criticism being that the frameworks were too prescriptive, resulting in a poor fit for measures. one solution government funders are exploring is the use of broad, generalised frameworks within which specific, often bespoke, measures can be used. it is an area where the cultural ministers council, now disbanded but still convening as the meeting of cultural ministers (mcm 2011), developed some policy. they established a statistics working group to work with state and national bureaus of statistics to establish common indicators of output. the framework they produced can be divided into three major themes: economic development, cultural value, and engagement and social impact. these indicators are set out in table 1. table 1. common indicators of output economic development cultural value engagement & social impact cultural employment economic contribution of cultural industries government support for culture household expenditure on cultural goods and services private sector support for culture visitor expenditure on cultural goods and services voluntary work in arts and culture cultural assets cultural identity global reach talent (human capital) innovation (new work/ companies) cultural attendance cultural participation access education in arts and culture source: adapted from cmc (2010) the annual australian state and territory meeting of cultural ministers has also influenced policies adopted by individual state and territory departments. for example, in 2019 western australia’s department of local government, sport and cultural industries published social impacts of culture and the arts wa, which refers back to the council framework and provides a guide to measuring social impact in arts and culture (dlgsci 2019). wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 50 sector response in this environment, arts and cultural organisations have dual motives for measuring impact. on the one hand, they have a sense of the importance of their work to society and seek to demonstrate this to facilitate greater exchange and play a more integrated role in the community. on the other hand, measurement often comes down to the very practical need to convince funders, especially government, to continue supporting this work. as the authors of one paper put it somewhat cynically: ‘what the cultural sector really wants from research is the killer evidence that will release dizzying amounts of money’ (scullion & garcía 2005). the sector should be careful, however. assuming that proof of social impact will secure funding can have unhelpful consequences. belfiore and bennett (2007) argue this approach just validates and perpetuates the argument that arts and culture need to have a larger social impact to be worthy of funding, and incentivise organisations to hunt for proof of assumed or desired impacts rather than understanding what the impacts really are. this has steered arts and culture evaluations towards financialised metrics of success. governments value and encourage this approach, but it can result in practitioners neglecting the opportunity to measure other impacts. this is consistent with the current trends in outcome measurement such as in social return on investment (sroi) approaches, to monetise outcomes while ignoring the qualitative and relational aspects of outcomes (onyx 2014). economic measures it has been suggested that, even for economists, the conviction that arts and culture improve society is ‘visceral as much as analytical’ (goodwin 2005). while economists often acknowledge the positive externalities of arts and culture, they still find it difficult to explain the sector’s impact on society beyond economic terms (belfiore & bennett 2007). figures tracing the economic footprint of arts and culture, such as the bureau of communication and arts research, department of communications and the arts (2018) statistics cited above, are important to highlight the impact of the sector, although even they are always open to criticism. a similar accounting of arts and culture in the uk revealed that the heaviest concentration of arts and culture jobs were in the metropolis (o’brien & feist 1995), leaving critics to complain that it mostly served inner city elites. funders often advocate a holistic assessment of the benefits of arts and culture that goes beyond the economic to encompass the wellbeing, social and educational value. even then, however, the consideration of the wider contribution of arts and culture investments becomes a cost-benefit analysis of sorts, as it still weighs the cost of something against its benefits – however defined. to compare ‘apples with apples’ the units of measurement tend to be standardised into monetary terms, assigning a dollar value to arts and culture that is incomplete at best, crude and damaging at worst. the arts and culture sector can be especially suspicious of this kind of bean counter who knows, to borrow a description from lady windermere’s fan, ‘the price of everything and the value of nothing’ (wilde 1893). social impact measurement is complex and highly contested. experts do not all agree on which approaches are correct and valid, but stakeholders still expect providers to decide on an approach and allocate resources to it (onyx 2014; grieco 2015; ormiston 2019; zappalà 2020). arts and culture organisations should also keep in mind the sometimes faustian bargain they agree to when considering the economic worth of their output. it could be argued that, in agreeing to describe the impact of a program in economic terms, organisations acknowledge the validity and priority of economic concerns, which are not always aligned with a program’s goals. one study examined figures from the cultural data project, which contains records from around 5,000 nfp arts and cultural organisations, to assess the use of financial measures in evaluating program success. it found that financial attributes are indeed linked to program outcomes, but that some of the factors that contribute to financial stability and efficiency have no or even negative relationships with program outcomes (kim 2017). wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 51 measuring social impact it is in this environment that the sector and individual organisations must build a body of evidence demonstrating their social impact. it will not be enough to assume this contribution is self-evident, and it will require overcoming the challenge of measuring and articulating this sort of impact. making a valid, reliable and rigorous case for the true value of their work will not only enhance organisations’ ability to secure government or philanthropic funds, but will also reinforce the sector’s broader social licence to operate. there is a growing preference among government and other funding bodies to express arts and cultural value in terms of the sector’s contribution to the economy. instrumental value may be the main focus of government funders, but arts and culture proponents are likely to benefit from accentuating their intrinsic and institutional value as well. while metrics-based approaches and the provision of a set of numbers are often expected, in many cases it is not feasible or methodologically valid or reliable to express social impact in quantitative terms. having a clear understanding of the intended outcomes of a program is the starting point for designing an evaluation that will collect useful and meaningful data. what is being done and why? the aim is to produce an evaluation that both strengthens the program and enhances the ability of the organisation to communicate value to funders. while a comprehensive guide to conducting a social impact evaluation is beyond the scope of this paper there are resources available online, including the social impact toolbox which the authors of this paper have contributed to and which can be found at https://www.socialimpacttoolbox.com. aimed at building the social impact evaluation capacity of small to medium nfps, the social impact toolbox provides free access to information, learning and validated tools, allowing organisations to measure the impact of their work regardless of their size or resourcing. the suite of resources available includes online courses, interactive evaluation templates and a repository of reliable, verifiable and validated measures, collated in an open digital platform. who is being impacted? the impacts of arts and cultural programs extend from the individual to society as a whole, from improving individual health and wellbeing to building community cohesion and the cultural and economic strength of communities. when we speak of the value and impact of art and culture it is vital to be clear about who is being impacted and how. this allows us to refine our evaluation scope and target our evaluations appropriately. while some literature looks specifically at social impact and arts and culture it is, however, limited when it comes to focusing on the subject of impact. as such, we propose the following stakeholder typology. when considering the impact of arts and cultural programs, stakeholders can be segmented into three categories: creators, audience and society. first, let us talk about the ‘creators’; the people who participate in creating arts and culture. they could be an artist, actor, curator, arts teacher, museum guide – someone who has played a role in producing the end result. we will call this group the creators and consider them separately because the effect that creating a work has on them will be different and much more personal than for the audience. a creator might be referred to as an ‘artist’, as they contribute directly to the production of art. but professional staff, who might be referred to as ‘facilitators’ to distinguish their role, can also be considered creators, in helping to deliver the overall experience. next, we can consider the impact on the ‘audience’; the people who attend an event, visit a venue, view a film, and so on. this segment captures those who are present to consume arts and culture – those who are in the theatre audience, visit a museum or attend a festival. it should be noted that these first two segments can wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 52 https://www.socialimpacttoolbox.com become blurred when we consider program participants who may fall into creator, audience or both. this will depend on the intended program outcomes. finally, we can consider the impact of a program on ‘society’ at large. this segment is much harder to define but very important when considering social impact which is, by definition, concerned with larger, longer-term effects and which is usually of interest to government funders who want to know the instrumental value. while scope may need to be limited in some way, impact could range from a consideration of the effect on very local areas all the way up to state and national outcomes such as the contribution to economic activity, employment and tourism. one way of thinking about these segments is to use an example from the work of australia’s public broadcaster, the australian broadcasting corporation (abc). in 1987 the then managing director famously announced that the abc costs each of us 8 cents a day, a value everyone was able to understand and generally willing to pay – although after years of swingeing cuts, the abc’s chief financial officer recently put it at the equivalent of half that in 2018 (thomsen 2018). now consider a report by its current affairs program, four corners, on live-baiting in the greyhound racing industry. it can be seen that one piece of art and culture output had wide ranging impacts across these three segments, the effects of which are still being felt today. the creators of the story ‘making a killing’ included the journalists, crew and interviewees, all of whom were directly impacted by the story – some receiving the walkley award for excellence in journalism (burrowes 2015). the audience who watched the program were moved by the animal cruelty portrayed in video evidence and recounted in interviews. society was impacted by the ensuing public debate and political to-and-fro, as new south wales first banned greyhound racing then backflipped to reinstate it after intense lobbying by the industry and intervention by talkback radio host alan jones (kembrey 2016). how are they being impacted? a range of qualitative methodologies are available to measure the change that has occurred for those in an arts or cultural program. researchers break down the impacts of arts and culture in a number of ways but matarasso’s early and comprehensive list is still useful, with 50 impacts in six domains as outlined in table 2 (matarasso 1997). in the domain of personal development, improvements to self-esteem and related psychological constructs are often cited in relation to arts and cultural programs, as well as to employment and education – but it is important to be careful when attributing cause to effect (winner & cooper 2000). with regard to social cohesion, we have already touched on inclusion in general, but there are studies that focus on particular aspects, such as criminal justice (hughes 2009), community development (kay 2000), and urban renewal (evans 2005). it could be argued that what matarasso categorises as community empowerment and self-determination, local image and identity, and imagination and vision are just different aspects of social cohesion. wellbeing is an umbrella term used to encompass everything from happiness to physical and mental health but is more theoretically defined as including hedonic wellbeing, or ‘feeling good’ and eudaimonic wellbeing, or ‘functioning well’ (meeks et al. 2017). this is usually measured subjectively by asking someone how they feel and relying on their answer. there are a number of issues with this, but it is still considered useful and some iteration of wellbeing will appear in nearly every social impact assessment (wheatley & bickerton 2017). one study sought to prove a causal link between cultural engagement and physical health. researchers asked a large pool of swedes questions about their cultural engagement and health, then followed up with them after about a decade to measure any variance in perceived health. controlling for things such as income and education, they found an increased risk of impaired health for those who decreased their cultural engagement (o’neill 2010). other studies have considered the impact on participants of health (staricoff 2004), with some focusing on mental health (white & angus 2003). wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 53 table 2. domains impacted by arts and culture domain outcome personal development increase people’s confidence and sense of self-worth extend involvement in social activity give people influence over how they are seen by others stimulate interest and confidence in the arts provide a forum to explore personal rights and responsibilities contribute to the educational development of children encourage adults to take up education and training help build new skills and work experience contribute to employability of people help people take-up or develop careers in the arts social cohesion reduce isolation by helping people to make friends develop community networks and sociability promote tolerance and contribute to conflict resolution provide a forum for intercultural understanding and friendship help validate the contribution of a whole community promote intercultural contact and cooperation develop inter-generational contact help offenders and victims address issues of crime provide a route to rehabilitation and integration for offenders community empowerment build community organisational capacity encourage local self -reliance and project management help people extend control over their lives be a means of gaining insight into political and social ideas facilitate effective public consultation and participation help involve local people in the regeneration process facilitate the development of partnership build support for community projects strengthen community cooperation and networking provide reasons to develop community activities local image and identity develop pride in local traditions and cultures help people feel a sense of belonging and involvement create community traditions in new towns or neighbourhoods involve residents in environmental improvements provide reasons to develop community activities improve perceptions of marginalised groups help transform the image of public bodies make people feel better about where they live imagination and vision help people develop their creativity erode distinction between consumer and creator allow people to explore their values, meanings and dreams enrich the practice of professionals in the public and voluntary sectors transform the responsiveness of public service organisations encourage people to accept risk positively help community groups raise their vision beyond the immediate challenge conventional service delivery raise expectations about what is possible and desirable wearring, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 54 conclusions australia’s arts and cultural organisations are familiar with having their true value underestimated yet live with a broadly held assumption that they will always be there. the fallout from the covid-19 pandemic, however, has accelerated a longer-term pattern of decline in support for the arts in australia. there is a growing preference among government and other funding bodies to express arts and cultural value in terms of the sector’s contribution to the economy, yet the impact of programs extends beyond the economy to society as a whole –from improving individual health and wellbeing, to building community cohesion, to contributing to our collective cultural strength. just as the arts and cultural landscape is dynamic and constantly evolving, so too is evaluation theory and practice. social impact evaluation is a relatively young field and, as such, it is complex and highly contested. experts do not all agree on which methods are valid, but stakeholders still expect providers to decide on an approach to measurement and allocate not inconsiderable resources towards it. research supports the crucial role arts and cultural organisations play in our communities. social impact evaluation of arts and culture often responds to political and economic drivers, with the current trend of financialised methods of analysis being championed by government and funding bodies. social impact measurement is important, not just because it is expected by government and philanthropic funders, but also because it is a way to be transparent with participants and staff. organisations need to make more informed choices about social impact evaluation. instrumental value may be the main focus of government funders, but arts and culture proponents might want to accentuate intrinsic and institutional value as well. while metrics-based approaches and the provision of a set of numbers is often expected, in many cases it is not feasible or methodologically valid or reliable to express impact in quantitative terms. it is vital organisations are clear on what they are doing; why they are doing it; and assess whether it is working using metrics that are relevant to community. having a clear understanding of the intended outcomes, and of evaluation practice itself, empowers organisations to collect useful and meaningful data, avoid resource wastage, and enhance their ability to communicate the value of their work to funders. when these align, social impact measurement can help programs realise deep and lasting positive social change. given the exogenous shocks of covid-19 on pre-pandemic revenue streams, it is critical for arts and cultural organisations to adopt a new strategy in order to revive and thrive within a post-pandemic context. the arts and culture organisations in the not-for-profit sector pivot to expressing and demonstrating their contribution to society in order to gain greater access to more diverse sources of funding. social impact capacity building will be 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purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: hillmann, f. & pang, c.l. 2020, editorial: migration-led regeneration: on how cities become more inequal with mixed population flows. (special issue) cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 12:1, ixii. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1 .7297 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au editorial migration-led regeneration: on how cities become more unequal with mixed population flows felicitas hillmann humboldt-universität berlin, germany technische universität berlin, germany ching lin pang universiteit antwerpen, belgium katholieke universiteit te leuven, belgium corresponding author: felicitas hillmann, georg-simmel center for metropolitan studies, humboldt-universität berlin, unter den linden 6, 10099 berlin. felicitas.hillmann@huberlin.de doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.7297 article history: published 29/06/2020 professor felicitas hillmann and professor ching lin pang are guest editors for this special issue of cosmopolitan civil societies; an interdisciplinary journal, 2020, 12, 2. abstract it is timely to reopen the discussion on inequalities in connection with migration-related processes. our special issue might be a first step in shedding more light on this issue which had all but vanished at the discourse level but that has not ceased to exist. it presents an international and interdisciplinary selection of scholars that are concerned with questions of urban transformation, diversity and inequality. keywords diversity, cities, inequality, migration declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. mailto:felicitas.hillmann@hu-berlin.de%20b mailto:felicitas.hillmann@hu-berlin.de%20b http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.7297 ii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 introduction we write this editorial in the days of heavy riots that erupted as the 46 year-old black man george floyd died due to the disproportionate police violence in minneapolis in the us. the act of the state and the following protests of the civil society reveal the tension built up over time, disclosing deep division, multilayered and multi-directional discontent in society, demonstrating a new quality of confrontations. it is timely to reopen the discussion on inequalities in connection with migration-related processes. our special issue might be a first step in shedding more light on this issue which had all but vanished at the discourse level but that has not ceased to exist. it presents an international and interdisciplinary selection of scholars that are concerned with questions of urban transformation, diversity and inequality. changing cities since the 1990s cities all over the world have undergone major transformations as a result of globalisation and neoliberalism – and they have become the main drivers for the transformation itself, increasingly pushing for an active role on the global scale. in a first uncritical phase of ‘simple globalisation’ (beck 2000) – spanning the last decade of the last millennium – diversity and cosmopolitanism were embraced by many as ‘magic’ tools to bring forth economic growth, personal wealth and opulent lifestyles. within this narrative diversity applies mostly to active internationalisers, a summary concept that includes the skilled transnational workers (beaverstock & smith 1996), their children (pang 2000), international students, tourists and other privileged elites mostly from the global north but also from the south, opening asymmetric transnational spaces for migrant actors (hillmann, van naerssen & spaan 2019). not only have migration pattern and mobility flows changed over the past 20 years, but new information technologies and new transport systems translated in what thinkers like urry (2009) identified as the mobility turn (see also büscher and urry 2009) have emerged. the spectrum of mobile people fitting into the new infrastructures of migration and mobility is extreme: it now ranges from cruise-tourists on the one end towards those that flee war and poverty on the other. authors such as creswell (2006) and sheller (2018) observed a new mobility regime, provoking also adjustments in the way cities tried to organise their renewal and their regeneration. now, cities had to redefine their position in a transforming urban hierarchy worldwide (sassen 1991). this has led to the rise of the ‘city region’ model (rodriguez-pose & crescenzi 2008; herrschel 2014), mostly in europe. here, city regions have increasingly become key players beyond their referential nation-states generally with the intent of strengthening the local competitiveness or engaging in community building aimed at greater autonomy from the nation-state (calzada 2015). while the 1970s economic crisis opened up the city as a laboratory for neoliberal experiments, the global financial crisis in 2008 reinforced “the role of cities as strategic sites for global capital accumulation” and regulation. fiscal austerity led to an even stronger focus on a few strategic priorities, the strengthening of city partnerships with public and private stakeholders, financial innovation and involving local stakeholders in rethinking problems and solutions (oosterlynck and gonzales 2013: 1080). the emphasis of many cities worldwide now was even more on chasing highly qualified personnel for the sake of their urban economies and on attracting well-monied cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 iii visitors such as international students or tourists. the beautification programs of the cities on the inside foreshadowed the smartening of heritage, while migration infrastructure such as new terminals and ports was renewed and adapted to the needs of accelerated flows of people. also, in most cities a highly diversified population structure had arisen. while parts of the immigrant population that came in as industrial workers became marginalised, a vibrant, somewhat multicultural local reality became visible, adding to the cosmopolitan appeal of the city (zukin, kasinitz & chen 2016). immigrants started making claims (kivisto 2020; hillmann & samers forthcoming) and migrant entrepreneurship replaced traditional wage labor opportunities (rath et al. 2020, p. 460). at the same time, new communication tools allowed for an intensification of transnational contacts and social configuration. it has been since the late 1990s that the municipal managerialist approach to urban planning and social welfare provision tended to be replaced by an increased role of the private sector at the local level, pushing for worldwide entrepreneurial city management (leary and mccarthy 2013, p. 7). the now pursued promotion of high-profile developments through events and grand projects changed the tenor of public debate around the built form and on regeneration projects (keith 2013, p. 175), focusing on business improvement strategies, city growth strategies and cultural and creative industries around fashionable business school gurus (keith 2013, p. 169). the old structural imbalances due to economic restructuring in the cities had not been touched by those newer policies and remained for some time in the shadow of the more compelling promise of diversity and superdiversity (vertovec 2012) and also multicultural heritage (karmowska and shaw 2004). one might think that the intellectual connection between these two poles of urban development was literally missing. martin (2020, p. 205) describes this very vividly when comparing demographic and economic inequalities with positive and negative battery poles: ‘nothing happens until a connection is made’. this is what we face at the moment, so it seems. there is no universally endorsed definition of what ‘inequalities’ entail, neither is the term ‘migration’ sharply delineated. from an urban planning perspective, fainstein (2010) came up with a vision of the ‘just city’ by proposing the three criteria of equity, diversity and democracy (cited after dlabac 2020) to understand inequalities in cities. she refers to the trade-off between growth and equity in favour of social benefits and investment in human capital (equity/redistribution); the promotion of reproduction of and respect of group differences without oppression, rather than forcing assimilation (diversity/recognition); and citizen participation with fair representation of interest and disadvantaged groups (democracy) and here points to the shifting principles in terms of housing, land-use/urban renewal and public services over the past 20 years. the consequences of the invisible choices made in past decades seem to have become all the more visible. we now see more clearly that the upbeat birds’ eye -view grand narrative of success and ‘creative classes’ has conveniently glanced over the inconvenient reality at the quotidian level, where vulnerable groups of workers and migrants have left their families to toil in foreign cities or to do care work for other families. the globalisation from below (benton-short et al. 2005; mathews et al. 2012) or the world’s other economy (mathews et al. 2012, yuan and pang 2019) unravel the underbelly of the global cities. neoliberal iv cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 economies have accelerated mobilities both of people and material culture (pang and mo 2018; wang, pang c.l. & leutner in press). it might have generated a cosmopolitan momentum, but this does not necessarily translate into a genuine cosmopolitan outcome. thus, it should not come as a surprise that in many cities we find mixed neighborhoods of newcomers and even enclaves. in contrast, smaller cities and rural areas lose population and the population shows hostile attitudes towards newcomers. while many cities have to cope with an increasing social and economic polarisation of diversity internally regarding the stock-population, they reach out for such promising flow-populations that come into the city with resources (be it financial capital as in the case of the tourists or professionals skills or cultural capital as in the case of the academic middle classes). they also can build on translocal and national networks, as in the case of refugees, businessmen or civil society. one evolving imaginary frames the stockand flow-population as the ‘somewheres’ and the ‘anywheres’ (goodhart 2018) as part of this urban transformation that is also accompanied by new dividing lines of open versus closed cities (sennett 2018) as well as between larger cities and their smaller neighbours. not only do we observe increasingly internal inequalities in cities and between cities, we also see established inequalities in the way cities share their ways of dealing with migration. in europe, for example, the capacity of being part of supranational knowledge networks (such as metropolis, eurocities, intercultural cities) became a crucial element in finding local ways to deal with migration and integration. does this mean that cities become more standardised in their approaches towards migration or what are the consequences of those supranational policies? very often there is a spatial dimension to this. as hall and rath (2007) have shown, cities have to deal with many various forms of migration and mobility at the same time if they want to be successful. we might think of processes of migration-led urban transformation (hillmann 2019), meaning that we find all over the world similar moments of the interaction between the mainstream societies and differentiated flows of people in the cities. and we can observe, that the degree of action that cities are willing to take is profoundly changing – as if we were seeing a dysfunctional nation-state level that is increasingly fading and losing its power to act in the face of the concrete actions of cities (barber 2014). in this way, the glocalisation long announced by theoreticians may be taking shape. in dealing with the refugee crisis in europe, for example, local authorities are making great strides in initiating supranational policies through local policies, provoking new inequalities (bendel et al. 2019). this special issue focusses on the various ways inequalities are (re)produced through the variations of migration that is proceeded in the cities. as we noted above, there is not one definition of ‘inequality’ and a plethora of forms of migration and mobility exists, the focus of research represented in the different articles is heterogeneous by nature. this was an editorial decision on purpose, as it contradicts the tendency to reduce complexity for the sake of theory. the editors believe that there is no such a thing as the one single one-size-fits-all approach to understanding the current changes in urban settings, but that heuristic instruments are needed and that the formulation of research questions is the best way to generate new knowledge in the field. it is far from clear what outcomes are developing from the current ‘cosmopolitan momentum’, what they entail and how they will further develop in cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 v the near and not so near future. (beck 2010). some of the papers compare different struggles in different urban settings of the world – even comparing the global south with the global north, making use of what robinson defined as the ‘comparative gesture, and thereby seeking to overcome methodological nationalism (robinson 2011), while others concentrate on the neighborhood level within cities. comparisons of immigrant cities in the global north are already an exception (rath et al. 2014), comparisons between cities between the global north and the global south have yet to become a common topic of research. it has long been known that the places in which migrants live are also the most unequal, the most marginalised places in town. the jewish ghetto in the medieval town reminds us of this constant of urban development, as do the huguenot colonies all over western europe which were expressions of social innovations. regulating the ‘outsiders’ in many cases meant appeasement policies to calm the majority population. economic regulations on who is allowed to run which business at which time and with which resources are an asset of all urban policies aiming at regulating the contact between the newcomers and the established ones, and certainly part of the social capital embedded in a web of power and inequality in cities (blokland & savage 2016). often, the context of the neighbourhood is the frame of reference (yuan & pang 2018), rather than the city level, because migrants tend to settle in certain places in town. the ‘city’ as such is nothing other than a labyrinth of many different, smaller places that are populated by different milieus and provided with different resources, forming volatile alliances and coalitions of interest for some time. still, the cities have to react to the outside, the municipalities have to come up with policies that respond to the diversity within the cities and that, for example, mediate between and among state institutions and the resident population when processing migration. the ongoing challenges in the city are being exacerbated and accelerated by the covid-19 pandemic and thus providing opportunities for more and deeper observation, reflection and analysis. this journal issue is just one step in this process. based on the above-mentioned considerations, the city is brought into focus as the central unit of analysis, because it is here that the global processes processed locally can be understood most adequately. we’d better think of: migration-led regeneration urban development policy, a volatile alliance of the most varied actors with different powers of action, is increasingly faced with the dilemma described above between, on the one hand, integration efforts and, on the other, the exploitation of the diversity which may only have arisen as a result of former migration episodes (hillmann 2019). for in many cities the migrant population already resident (the stock population) is now attracting new immigrants (the flow population). neighbourhoods that are home to international residents and thus a multitude of interesting restaurants, shops, services and networks become magnets for further immigration and are interesting for all kinds of visitors. as a result, productive places of migration-related diversity can also be read as a major visible spatial manifestation of inequalities. many of the policies that western-european cities use for example to react to inequalities act inwards, i.e. in the existing neighbourhoods, to counteract the still existing marginalisation of the migrant population and to try to prevent social exclusion processes of particularly vulnerable groups through social programmes. these policies differ from vi cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 proactive diversity strategies, which aim to build up collective identity and are often commercialised, betting on the benefits of the “look and feel” of a mixed neighbourhood and promising leisure time and cultural events. at the same time, cities are acting externally – nationally and internationally – by means of attempts by actors such as universities and business associations to control their activities, for example by providing special housing or by making them more attractive to short-term visitors, especially tourists. thus, we observe an emerging dilemma between integration efforts on the one hand and the exploitation of diversity on the other. in recent years, these institutional sponsors have increasingly organised themselves through transnational city networks (oomen et al. 2018) and have selectively implemented international best practices through the exchange of experience – as we stated above. a very good example for this shift in the way cities deal with the issue of migration towards the outside is the marrakesh mayors’ declaration1 ‘cities working together for migrants and refugees’ that was presented at the intergovernmental conference to adopt the global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration and the united national general assembly to adopt the global compact on refugees in december 2018. the mayors and city leaders claim and declare, that migration remains primarily an urban and local phenomenon. they ask for urban diplomacy and joint advocacy and they even speak of migrant-led advisory bodies to be integrated into local policies. cities, so the declaration says, should work with international city networks to improve multilateral cooperation and should become integrated into decision-making processes much more. increasingly, research challenges the question of how the position of the mayor influences migration-led regeneration (dlabac et al. 2020) in many of the western countries top-down approaches that focused on migration issues have been developed, and they have worked out differently locally. however, there is a growing number of bottom-up practices in urban renewal processes initiated by immigrants and civil society itself. often it is particularly migration-influenced places, for example arrival quarters, which develop above-average dynamics through the production of their everyday living environments. depending on the neighbourhood, a certain mix of instruments is therefore relevant in dealing with migration-related issues on site. what can be learned from these locations with regard to migration-related regulation? as briefly outlined above, the regeneration practices of the cities cum grano salis refer to three dimensions: the physical and building structure, the socio-economic texture and the symbols and models used. it is now possible to analyse at which points urban development policies aimed at immigration meet migrant practices, migrant agencies. at first glance, it seems as if the boundaries between what the cities wish and are happy to take up and what they also have to cope with in terms of integration problems are blurring and merging into an arbitrary diversity. however, a detailed analysis of migration-related regeneration practices shows that the non-simultaneity in the degree of participation and involvement of the different groups persists. figure 1 shows that many existing migration-related activities can 1the mayors’ declaration can be found at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5df133ed5c523d063ce20693/t/5ea5fe595aaf842048077e95/15879368575 84/marrakech+mayors+declaration.pdf). https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5df133ed5c523d063ce20693/t/5ea5fe595aaf842048077e95/1587936857584/marrakech+mayors+declaration.pdf https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5df133ed5c523d063ce20693/t/5ea5fe595aaf842048077e95/1587936857584/marrakech+mayors+declaration.pdf cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 vii be initiated top-down, but are then adopted bottom-up, for example, through intercultural associations or initiatives against discrimination. but often it is the other way round: a folkloric initiative can be turned into a carnival of cultures. in the following we will therefore discuss the significance of such overlaps between top-down and bottom-up initiatives. figure 1 heuristic framework of migration-led regeneration regeneration dimensions of the urban physical structure socio-economic texture, policies symbolics and representation regeneration starts with built environment socio-cultural fabric culture and images expressions of migration-led regeneration top-down policies -setting-up of migration architecture (arrival architecture) -icon buildings -refugee centres -sectoral initiatives (housing, work, education, health, ict & technology) for disadvantaged strata of the population -welcome-centre -migration officer -integration concepts intercultural weeks and similar vision of diversity -welcome brochure -urban citizenship activities -competitions and tenders on diversity migrant practices and bottom-up agency -migrant economies -intercultural associations, festivals, sport events, -theatre and arts migrant-tours creative industries -festivals and parades -open prayers and interreligious discourse -campaigns for diversity, hybridisation of food culture migrant use of social media like bloggers, hillmann 20202 2 this heuristic framework has been developed in the context of “urban regeneration practices, migration and the production of socio-spatial disparities in european cities”, a major project at the leibniz-institute for research on society and space (erkner) in the years 2015 – 2019. the focus was on the role of migration related to processes of urban transformation. it looked at four secondrank, postindustrialized cities with outspoken regeneration policies over the past 15 years and a high share of immigrant population. all cities reacted in a different way, but faced similar problems when it came to the lines of conflict. viii cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 the heuristic framework of migration-led regeneration presented here gives us a possibility to move away from stereotypes on the interplay of migration with urban regeneration strategies as it asks at which points migration and mobility step up as change agents within urban transformation. it allows for international comparison as it includes re-active and pro-active action in regard to migration and includes top-down and bottom-up initiatives into the focus of research. we assume that cities that are able to offer a wide array of instruments to organise the fluid population in their cities are best prepared to master future challenges. the better top-down and bottom-up approaches intertwine and allow for exchange, the higher is the probability of social innovation and urban regeneration for the inhabitants and the cities (hillmann 2019, pang & li in preparation; gielen 2018). what this special issue offers to the reader for this special issue, that is conceived as going a first mile to understand better the nexus between migration, diversity and urban development with special emphasis on the dimensions of inequality, we invited authors with an interdisciplinary background, mostly positioned within urban studies. this special issue does not neatly align with the framework proposed above and is in a sense biased as the contributions reflect the state of the art of western academia. we chose to integrate authors that look at different aspects of this nexus and that make use of different methodological approaches. two papers take a closer look at structural inequalities by considering immigration politics and policies. ron hayduk’s contribution asks what shapes immigrant integration and what could produce greater equity? he suggests defining immigrant incorporation as successful when immigrants achieve a status of well-being on par with each other and similarly situated to the native-born members of the population in the us. foreshadowing the protest after the murdering of george floyd in minneapolis in may 2020, he assumes that still today ethnic and racial minorities, many of whom immigrants, make up the majority of the working class and that there is an ethnic make-up of the us by new immigrants creating opportunities for overcoming structural racism and economic exploitation. actually, in the us foreign-born afro-americans are doing better economically and socially than us-born afro-americans as in the case of george floyd. kingsley madueke and floris vermeulen also start with observations on the macro-level. they elaborate on how immigrant politics play out in two cities – one in an advanced democracy in the global north (amsterdam) and one in an emergent democracy in the global south (jos, nigeria) – by taking into account the forms and parameters of diversity, urban inequalities, group politics and conflict across advanced and emergent democracies. by comparing the ‘global’ and maximally diverse city of amsterdam with the secondary city jos, they identify that similar processes in each context lead to dissimilar outcomes. in the case of amsterdam group inequality in itself did not directly lead to a stronger link between identity and politics. by comparing the policies directed to the turks in amsterdam and the hausa in jos they state that the parameters and pattern are different in the two contexts. they concentrate on the role of group-identities, ascribed or self-given. while in the well-regulated political space of amsterdam resistance cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 ix against stigmatisation was expressed and debated, in jos within the setting of weak institutions violent strategies in addition to political action were taken by political parties. many of the tensions are still rooted in the colonial history, they conclude. here migrationled regeneration results in being entangled with the possibility of negotiating group identities in democratic contexts. two of the articles in this special issue point to the importance of institutions to govern immigration. the article of mike raco and tuna taşan-kok highlights how city governments more consciously aim to make use of diversity management to fulfil their expectations of regeneration. by comparing migration-led policies in super-diverse london and toronto, they observe a shift from local ‘diversity management’ towards global management practices which lead to new forms of curation. in the two cities ethnic diversity is associated with various forms of inequalities, whose narration by the city governments changes over time. they show how public bodies try to use their powers to provide role models for the public sector, producing selective image-building and representations of diversity, that can lead to simplifications that produce further marginalisation for some groups. they pronounce that diversity politics in cosmopolitan societies are under constant pressure for reform and direction. similarly, the contribution of caio teixeira focuses on the changing policy responses cities give to address migration-related diversity. he questions if there is such thing as a “template model” for immigrant incorporation which travels among cities via international city networks. he emphasises the eurocities integrating cities charter, that was designed to build an institutional frame of policy learning for policies on the city level and to develop practices to integrate newcomers. he speaks of soft policies that increasingly merged with tactics of city branding. again, learning from and among the city governments, networked governance, takes place as a political regulation strategy and aims at providing a roadmap for policy makers, but with the consequence that regulatory practices can result in the othering of migrant groups. two contributions in this special issue deal with the way diversity is lived in mixed neighborhoods and both reflect the situation in neighborhoods in berlin (germany). the paper of anna steigemann reflects on how streets businesses in neukölln work as sites for the practices of local communities and inclusion and at the same time reflect larger trends of urban renewal. her empirical research shows that the perception of trust is high among the shop-owners with ‘cosmopolitan experience’, but there is stark mistrust against more formalised players such as chain stores. steigemann points to the disconnectedness of the visions of the planners and urban renewal agents on the future of the ‘ethnic’ streets and the newcomers in search of niches of survival. the contribution of ceren kulkul takes a very different angle of migration-led regeneration by focussing on the exclusion of newly arrived well-educated young turks in neukölln and kreuzberg, fleeing the political consequences of the gezi-protest in turkey since 2013. even situated in these extremely diversified places in town, the highly-qualified migrants interviewed by the author faced social exclusion and translocal experiences – but at least had the possibility of fostering a sense of belonging in the new town. kulkul reminds us that the daily experiences are trans-local experiences, that are based on the capacity of building bonds in at least two urban realities. the migration paradox, x cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 that each migrant compares his or her actual situation with what might be his or her sociopolitical situation in the country of origin, fully applies in this case of the highly skilled turks. they rather learn to cope with exclusionary practices than thinking to turn back to their place of origin. as delineated above, this special issue is conceived as a first step to re-opening the discussion on the relationship between migration and urban development as we feel that inequalities have become part of the new urban mix in the shadows of the diversity-debate. we hope that the reader will find inspiration and food for thought. at no time did we expect to capture the full picture, however. we thank the authors for their work and their patience in the covid-19 situation, 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(ed.), the new blackwell companion to social theory, blackwell publishing, malden, pp. 477-495. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444304992.ch24 vertovec, s. 2012, ‘“diversity” and the social imaginary’, european journal of sociology / archives européennes de sociologie / europäisches archiv für soziologie, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 287–312. wang, j., pang, c.l. & leutner, p. (eds) (in press) contemporary aesthetics, cultural anthropology and fashion studies, renmin university press, beijing in collaboration with royal collins, montreal. yuan, d. & pang, c.l. 2019, ‘south-south migrant trajectories: african traders in china as guoke’, in hillmann, f., van naerssen, t. & spaan, e. (eds) 2019, trajectories and imaginaries in migration. the migrant actor in transnational space, routledge, new york. zukin, s., kasinitz, p. & chen, x, 2016, global cities, local streets: everyday diversity from new york to shanghai, routledge, new york. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2010.00982 https://doi.org/10.1080/00343400701654186 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444304992.ch24 abstract keywords introduction changing cities we’d better think of: migration-led regeneration what this special issue offers to the reader references article (refereed) continuing the limited authority of the majelis rakyat papua; a missed opportunity a. sakti r. s. rakia1, hermanto suaib2, kristi w. simanjuntak3 1 university of muhammadiyah sorong, sorong city, west papua, indonesia, ramdhansyah44@gmail.com 2 university of muhammadiyah sorong, sorong city, west papua, indonesia, suaib@gmail.com 3 university of muhammadiyah sorong, sorong city, west papua, indonesia, kristiwarista98@gmail.com corresponding author: a. sakti r.s. rakia, university of muhammadiyah sorong, pendidikan street no. 27, malaingkedi, sorong city, west papua 98416, indonesia. ramdhansyah44@gmail.com doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7915 article history: received 29/09/2021; revised 28/11/2021; accepted 02/12/2021; published 26/01/2022 abstract the papuan people’s assembly (majelis rakyat papua-mrp) is a cultural representation of the papuan people, which has an important role in protecting the rights of the papuan people in the fields of customs and culture, empowering women, and religious harmony. so far, the authority of the mrp is quite limited because it is not supported by a strong legislative function. in 2021, the papua special autonomy law, which has been in effect since 2001, underwent significant changes. in this study, we conclude that the amendment to the special autonomy law for papua does not reflect the aspirations of the papuan people, especially the consideration of strengthening the mrp institution. we also provide several reasons why the mrp institution should be strengthened so that changes to the papua special autonomy law can benefit the province of papua. keywords majelis rakyat papua; the papuan people’s assembly; papua special autonomy; papua province; regional legislative function cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 13, no. 3 2021 © 2021 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: rakia, a. s. r. s., suaib, h., simanjuntak, k. w. 2021. continuing the limited authority of the majelis rakyat papua; a missed opportunity. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:3, 34–50. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7915 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 34 mailto:ramdhansyah44@gmail.com mailto:suaib@gmail.com mailto:kristiwarista98@gmail.com mailto:ramdhansyah44@gmail.com http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7915 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7915 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7915 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs introduction the provinces of papua and west papua are two of indonesia’s territories that have been granted special autonomy. the legal basis for implementing special autonomy for the province of papua is law 35 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the special autonomy law). the granting of this special autonomy is in order to provide welfare for the papuan people, especially with regard to the mechanism of regional regulation in particular. one of the special things that characterizes the special autonomy law is the existence of the papuan people’s assembly (majelis rakia papua – mrp). the mrp is a cultural representation of indigenous papuans (papuan orang asli – oap), which has certain powers in the context of protecting the rights of indigenous papuans based on respect for customs and culture, empowering women, and strengthening religious harmony (bauw 2018). therefore, the position of the mrp in papua is very important in developing aspirations to be further shaped into strategic policies for the survival of the papuan people. the position of the mrp as an institution that represents the existence of the papuan people is also very important in conveying the aspirations of the papuan people. however, the mrp is considered not to have worked optimally. the mrp has not been able to answer the challenge as a representative of the papuan community because it cannot carry out its functions and authorities as a cultural institution (suebu 2019). the mrp has also not been able to play an important role in representing papuan indigenous peoples and has not fully affirmed its legitimacy in its contestation with other representative bodies (haryanto, lay and purwoko 2018). the mrp is considered not to have fully provided protection to the papuan people, due to the slow pace of the provincial government and the people’s representative council of papua (dewan perwakilan rakyat papua dprp) in forming a perdasus that regulates operational technicalities in carrying out the duties and authorities of the mrp mandated by the special autonomy law (priyani 2019). the terms perdasus, perdasi and raperdasus will be explained below. one of the obstacles faced by the mrp is its very limited authority in the formation of the papua special regional regulations (perdasus). in carrying out its legislative function, the mrp is limited because it only has the authority to give consideration and approval in the formation of a perdasus (rakia 2021). the mrp does not have a “veto power” that can be used when a draft perdasus (raperdasus) is not culturally appropriate to the needs of the papuan people. with this situation, it is difficult for the mrp to adjust the raperdasus according to the needs of the papuan people because it does not have the authority. in 2021, the special autonomy law was changed to law number 2 of 2021. this change aimed to accelerate welfare development and improve the quality of public services as well as the sustainability of development in the papua region. this was an effort to continue and optimize revenue management in the context of implementing special autonomy for the papua province in an accountable, efficient, effective, transparent and targeted manner. amendments to the special autonomy law were also presented in the context of strengthening the arrangement of provincial areas in the papua region in accordance with the needs, developments, and aspirations of the papuan people. even so, the amendment to the special autonomy law does not seem to have focussed on overcoming a number of problems related to the authority of the mrp as a cultural representation institution for the papuan people and has met with opposition from the papuan people. the purpose of this study is to find out how the mpr has functioned as a cultural representation institution for the papuan people so far, and how the results of changes to the papua special autonomy law, may strengthen the mrp institution. methods in this discussion, the type of research used is a normative-juridical type of legal research, which refers to the legal norms of statutory approach, as well as legal theories and principles as supporters. this research is descriptive-analytical, using qualitative analysis methods. rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 35 the concept of implementation of special autonomy for papua province the indonesian constitution states that the indonesian state adheres to a unitary state system in the form of a republic. in the past, indonesia had adopted a federal and parliamentary system as a result of the renville agreement, marking the end of dutch colonial rule, which tended to be unfavorable to the new state of indonesia (khaldun & suparjan, 2021). the indonesian people believed that a federal system of government was not implemented purely because the renville agreement was motivated by divide and rule politics (ginting 2017), so all regions decided to join indonesia which was then formed under the provisional constitution of the republic of indonesia 1950 (uuds 1950). furthermore, the development of the regional government system in indonesia in the context of the characteristics of a unitary state system did not go well, so that there was constant pressure from the people (rasyid 2017). in the development of an appropriate model of government, president abdurahman wahid applied (1999-2001) to implement the concept of a federal system without changing the indonesian system of a unitary state, thus giving birth to the concept of regional autonomy. the concept of regional autonomy is divided into ordinary regional autonomy and special autonomy which is usually termed asymmetric decentralization (susanto 2019). the constitutional basis for the implementation of special autonomy for the papua province comes from the provisions of article 18 paragraph (1) of the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia, namely, “the state recognizes and respects regional government units that are special or special in nature regulated by law”. on november 21, 2021, the special autonomy law was first enacted with the nomenclature “law number 21 of 2001”. the philosophy of the special autonomy law aims to achieve independence and physical and spiritual well-being, both economically, politically, and socially for the papuan people (gani & aituru 2018). in addition, the special autonomy law is a very important and fundamental political compromise with a view to responding to demands for self-determination by the papuan people (mutaqin 2014). the enactment of the special autonomy law in papua province can be regarded as granting exclusive authority compared to the more general regional autonomy in indonesia (musa’ad 2010). the fundamental elements that make up papua’s exceptional autonomy are: first, the rules of jurisdiction between the government of indonesia and the papua provincial government, as well as the specific application of this authority in the papua province; second, the requirement for the recognition and respect of indigenous papuans’ basic rights, as well as their strategic and fundamental empowerment. the third element is the achievement of excellent governance through: a. people’s greatest engagement in the formulation, application, and monitoring of government administration and improvement through the involvement of representatives from adat (customs), religious, and females; b. the realization of advancement that is focused on meeting the fundamental requirements of the papuans specifically and the community of the papua province broadly, while adhering to the focus on environmental conservation, equality, and immediate benefits to the society; c. transparent and accountable governance and development (rakia 2019; reumi 2020). based on the three factors listed above, it is apparent that the special autonomy law 2001 had the goal of providing papua region exceptional autonomy privileges, in order to provide great advantages to the citizens of papua. as a result, offering the papua provincial government a particular autonomy mandate is more than merely a conditional practical political promise (citrawan 2012), but a strategic policy for the survival of the papuan people. in spite of the indonesian unitary state system, the partnership between both the central government and the province of papua is governed by a complex set of rules. in terms of local government authority, rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 36 papua province has had power across all aspects of government, with the exception of foreign policy, defense and security, fiscal and monetary policy regulation, religious, and the judiciary, as well as certain additional authorities prescribed by statutory rules. for example, the papuan local government is also given the authority for international agreements, or international cooperation, that is beneficial to the provincial government of papua and the papuan people. in terms of regulation, the province of papua can form two unique regulations that are not permitted to other local governments in indonesia, namely special provincial laws (perdasus) and provincial laws (perdasi). perdasus is a regional regulation enacted by the papua province in order to enforce certain articles of the papua special autonomy law, while a perdasi is a papua province regional regulation in the context of implementing the authorities regulated in laws and regulations. in terms of regional finances, it is stipulated in the old special autonomy law that the source of revenue for the papua region is obtained from regional original income (pendapatan asli daerah-pad); dana perimbangan (fiscal balance transfers from the central government to regions); revenue from the provinces in the context of exclusive autonomy; regional loans; and other legitimate regional income. meanwhile, pad is obtained from regional taxes, regional retributions, regional company profits, the results of regional natural wealth management, as well as other legitimate income. the presentation of profit sharing between the papua provincial government and the papua regency/city government are: a. tax results: • land and building tax of 90%. • personal tax of 20%. b. results of natural resources: • forest products by 80%. • fishery sector by 80%. • general mining by 80%. • petroleum mining by 70%. • mining of natural gas by 70%. the provision of special autonomy funds for papua is regulated in the regulation of the minister of finance of the republic of indonesia number: 196/pmk.07/2013 (revised in 2013), amounting to 2% of the total annual national budget. meanwhile, the natural resource revenue-sharing fund between the central government and the papuan government is regulated in the regulation of the minister of finance of the republic of indonesia number: 09/pmk.07/2012, namely: a. petroleum mining is 55% of the estimated total state revenue originating from the papua province petroleum natural resources. b. natural gas mining is 40% of the estimated total state revenue originating from the papua province natural gas natural resources. the authority of the papuan people’s assembly in the context of implementing the provisions of the special autonomy law, papua province is given the authority to form supporting institutions in the context of implementing the content of the special autonomy law. the regional institutions that have been formed have characteristics that are not shared by other regions in indonesia which only get ordinary regional autonomy. in accordance with the specialized autonomy regulation, the governor of papua province must come from the papuan community so that there is no possibility for non-papuan residents to serve as governor of papua. in terms of legislation, papua rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 37 province can form the people’s representative council of papuans (dprp) which is equivalent to dprd in other regions. in addition, the papuan people’s council (mrp) also exists in papua province as a cultural institution that represents the papuan orang asli (oap). the mrp has several powers in implementing the special autonomy law in papua. the powers of the mrp are as follows: a. offer consideration and agreement to the dprp’s nominees for governor and deputy governor; b. consider and approve regional delegates representing papua province suggested by the dprp as candidates for the people’s consultative assembly of the republic of indonesia; c. consider and approve the dprp’s drafting perdasus, which was created in consultation with the governor. d. provide advice on proposed cooperation agreements being considered and approved in papua province and also on the provincial government’s dealings with third party companies in papua province, particularly in relation to the protection of indigenous papuans’ rights; e. listen closely and convey the aspirations of the people, indigenous people’s complaints, the views of religion congregations, women and society as a whole concerning indigenous papuans’ rights, as well as facilitating follow-up settlements; then f. consider the dprp, governor’s office, the city/ regency dprd as well as the mayor/ regent regarding matters relating to the safeguarding of indigenous papuans’ rights. in addition, the mrp also has several rights under the special autonomy law, namely: a. enquire with the provincial government, regency/municipal governments in matters pertaining to the protection of indigenous papuans’ rights; b. enquire about a perdasi review or a decree of the governor which is considered to be contrary to the safeguarding of indigenous papuans’ rights; c. propose the mrp expenditure budget estimates to the dprp as an essential component of the papua province regional revenue and expenditure budget; and d. stipulate the mrp rules of conduct. these powers are only general authorities which are further spelled out in more detail in the perdasus as the legal basis for the mrp’s authority in the implementation of regional government in papua province. one of the mrp’s key powers is the authority in the field of legislation. the legal basis for the mrp legislation is article 20 paragraph (1) c, namely, considering and approving the draft perdasus provided by the dprp in collaboration with the government. however, this article has a weakness because it does not provide wider access to the mrp in carrying out its legislative functions. in the formation of a perdasus, the mrp is only given legislative authority to the extent of “giving consideration and approval”, without having the right to veto the draft perdasus (raperdasus), if the perdasus is deemed to be contrary to the substance of the perdasus. the weakness of the mrp’s authority in the legislative function can affect the involvement of the mrp in determining local government policies. legislation functions of the papuan people’s assembly after the amendment to the special autonomy law amendments to a law in indonesia are made based on law number 15 of 2019, as well as presidential regulation number 87 of 2014 as a guide in the formation of legislation, including procedures for amending a law (rakia, 2021). in the provisions of article 10 paragraph 1 b of law 15 of 2019 it is stated rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 38 that the formation of the content of the law must reflect “fulfilling legal needs in society”. then in article 96 of law number 15 of 2019 it is stated that “the public has the right to be involved in the process of forming laws”. in the context of the changes to the special autonomy law, it makes sense that the changes to this law should involve the participation of the papuan people as an important part of the new articles compiled in these changes. the process of public participation in the formation and amendment of laws in indonesia is carried out by means of (i) public hearings; (ii) working visits; (iii) socialization; and (iv) seminars, workshops or discussions. the process of amending the special autonomy law was carried out openly, and was broadcast on the official television owned by the dpr ri (dpr ri 2021). however, such public implementation and broadcasting cannot always be interpreted as “participation” because it is carried out based on a number of rules and limited authority. this means that not all parties were involved in the process of consultation involved in changing the special autonomy law. this affected the amount of papuan community participation, which was represented by a small number of officials and stakeholders. previously, the governor of papua had proposed five main frameworks that the central government and dpr ri should pay attention to as revision guidelines, namely aspects of authority, institutions, finance, development policies, as well as classical issues related to politics, law, and human rights in papua (fretes, 2021). these were not taken into account in the discussions. there are some significant changes in the amendments to the special autonomy law. it was argued that there were several inadequate provisions in the law. the changes included: establishing a legal basis to ensure the sustainability of the awarding of special autonomy grants for the papua province, as well as to accelerate development and increase equitable development in papua; the addition of new legal provisions that are in accordance with the political, economic, and socio-cultural conditions that develop in the community; changes in the amount of special autonomy funds and financial mechanisms and governance to make the special autonomy funds more effective and efficient. the changes related to financial amounts as well as financial mechanisms and governance are not only directed at improving the governance of the special autonomy funds, but also to promote development synergies between the central government and local governments, papua provincial governments, and regency/city regional governments. other changes included reinforcing the central government’s alignment with papuan indigenous people, by encouraging the preparation of a master plan for education, health, and community economic empowerment in order to improve community welfare; reducing the gap between regions in papua by opening a bottom-up and top-down regional management approach based on the principles of democracy and efficiency; in order to protect and improve the dignity of the papuan indigenous people, a new article was added relating to the regency/city house of representatives (dprk). previously, the members of the regency/city dprd had been elected through general elections, but through this new mechanism members will be appointed as a proportion of the available seats. further, a special agency is to be established to synchronize, harmonize, evaluate, and coordinate the implementation of the special autonomy law and development in the papua region as an effort to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of development in papua, to be chaired by the indonesian vice president and with an office in the region. previously, based on the special autonomy law 2001, the papuan people could form local political parties by prioritizing indigenous papuans. however, this provision has been removed because for 20 years, no local political party has existed in papua. instead, in the amendment to the special autonomy law, every national political party in papua is obliged to prioritize the papuan people. this is seen as watering down the autonomy of the papuan people. from all the changes that have been made, it is known that there are no significant changes to the development of the mrp’s authority in the field of legislation. in the 5 main frameworks recommended by the governor of papua, the authority of the institution should have been prioritized. however, instead of rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 39 enhancing the mrp’s legislative function related to the formation of the perdasus, in the latest amendment to the special autonomy law, the mrp’s authority has been reduced. one aspect of this concerns the mrp’s approval of members’ candidates for the republic of indonesia’s people’s consultative assembly (mpr ri) as delegates to the province of papua region as suggested by the dprp. it is argued that the revocation of this provision is understandable because in the indonesian constitutional system, members of the mpr ri consist of a combination of the republic of indonesia’s people’s representative council (dpr ri) and the republic of indonesia’s regional representative council (dpd ri). practically, every member who joins the mpr ri does not need approval from anyone. however, this further weakens the mrp. the effect of amendments to the papua special autonomy law on the legislative function of the mrp in fact, the mrp’s authority is a dilemma in itself. on the one hand, the mrp is given the authority related to the aspirations of the papuan people. this is a special authority that other regions in indonesia do not have (gani & simanjuntak 2019). but on the other hand, the mrp does not have the support of a powerful legislative authority. in the establishment of the perdasus, the mrp’s legislative authority is confined to ‘providing consideration’ and ‘giving consent’. therefore, the mrp does not have the authority to veto the raperdasus formed by the governor of papua and the dprp. one study stated that the mrp was quite effective in forming the perdasus (bonso & lawelai 2020), however, it should be remembered that forming a perdasus is not within the mrp’s authority, because the mrp is only given the authority to ‘give consideration’ and ‘give approval’. the change in the name of irian jaya to papua based on the indonesian unitary state system was actually to allow for a different regulatory pattern that is quite pluralist (wospakrik 2020). this is also very much in line with the concept of asymmetric decentralization used by the indonesian state (kesuma nasution 2016). this is the basis for thinking about the establishment of papuan special autonomy. however, the changes to the special autonomy law in 2021 have not reflected this, as changes seem to treat papua as any other province in indonesia. further, the position of the mrp remains unclear, with the question of whether it is a legislative, semi-legislative, or just a cultural institution. the legislators seem to have overlooked this anomaly, so the position of the mrp has not changed, with the result that it cannot make much of a contribution in relation to the formulation of regional policies because of its limited authority to do so. previously, papua had an institution with the nieuw guinea raad (ngr) nomenclature which was established in 1961. this institution had the authority, including among others, the right to petition or submit applications, the right to interpel or request information and the right to provide advice on laws and government regulations (meteray 2016). with this right, ngr could control the implementation of government if the government process was not carried out based on the needs of the papuan people. the rights of the ngr were quite strong compared to the mrp with regard to the formation of regulations in the province of papua. the authority to form the perdasus is given to the governor of papua and the dprp. basically, these two institutions have strong political influence because they are elected through political party procedures. this is different from the mrp whose members are selected from the indigenous papuan people. we can say that compared to the governor of papua and the dprp, the position of the mrp is more representative of the papuan people. amendments to the special autonomy law, which do not review the strategic position of the mrp in the portion of the perdasus formation, do not significantly change the establishment of papuan special autonomy. an analysis of data that describes the effect of the mrp policy in favor of the papuan people concluded that, in fact, many of the recommendations from the mrp were not implemented in the formation of government policies, because they were influenced by unclear legislative policies and an unstable election process in the context of filling government positions (ningmabin 2009). rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 40 although it is recognized that the implementation of special autonomy is quite complicated because it has experienced several sociological and political obstacles, such as in sabah and sarawak, malaysia (salleh, puyok & bagang 2019), or in aceh, indonesia (cahyono 2016), the need for regional development in papua in the momentum of changing the law relating to special autonomy (also known as otsus) should be carried out with full appreciation of the constitutional order. the effectiveness of the implementation of special autonomy in papua is quite weak because it is also influenced by the formation of an inefficient and ineffective perdasus (rochendi & saleh 2017). papuan community responses constraints that occur in the process of forming laws do occur in almost all countries. the formation of laws that directly involve the community is minimal, as for example in the city of tyumen, russia, which shows the lack of community involvement in the legislative process (mamontova & gladun 2021). in australia, the amount of community involvement is also quite small so that the government was encouraged to be more aggressive in conducting surveys of community aspirations (aulich 2009). a further example is the existence of the european citizens’ initiative (eci), which questions the extent to which people’s aspirations are considered (vogiatzis 2017). weak public participation in the formation of regulations and policies is influenced by the politics of the government bureaucracy which tends to be stronger. at least, public participation can be seen if the process of changing the law is carried out over an extended period of time, sufficient to accommodate consultation with the entire community. the debate about the ‘participation’ of the papuan people in the changes to the special autonomy law is indeed diverse. this encouragement came from various parties so that the transparency of changes to the special autonomy law could be beneficial, especially for the papuan people (okezone 2020). based on information from the government, the mechanism for amending the special autonomy law was implemented based on legal mechanisms, including in terms of absorbing the aspirations of the papuan people (dpr ri 2021). however, west papua senator filep wamafma, once said that he hoped that in the process of amending the special autonomy law the government would involve the papuan people’s assembly (majelis rakyat papua-mrp) and the west papuan people’s assembly (majelis rakyat papua baratmrpb) in discussing the revision of the special autonomy law ( jpnn,2021). all of these debates are expressed in person or through local and online media, which essentially questions the urgency of changing the special autonomy law, because several things that are recommended in the amendment to the special autonomy law, such as supporting the people and women of papua, natural resources, and affirmations to the people of papua, must be considered (detik 2021). the change in the papua special autonomy law may be good, but that does not mean that the change is a change that the papuan people want. indeed, there has been strong opposition to the changes, through protests and a petition signed by 714,066 papuans and 112 organisations (asia pacific report 2021). changes to the special autonomy law made with legal legitimacy naturally have to be carried out under the old special autonomy law, because there are provisions stating the time limit for the validity of several articles in the special autonomy law to be extended. however, this framework itself did not provide for the significant changes needed to strengthen the authority of the mrp, which was also one of the main frameworks recommended by the governor of papua, along with recommendations for resolving human rights issues in papua. the changes to the special autonomy law tended to focus only on the government bureaucracy and regional institutions. many parties have questioned the purpose of the changes in the special autonomy law because the community had high expectations for improvements in all sectors in papua. problems in papua do not only consist of problems with local government bureaucracy, but also involve how to resolve conflicts in papua. the governor of papua, lukas enembe, said that the changes to the special autonomy law were not in rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 41 line with the expectations and needs of the regional government and the papuan people (papua 2021). the chairman of the mrp, timotius murib, also said the same thing about the changes to the special autonomy law, that it was not in line with the wishes of the papuan people (nasional tempo 2021). in an experiment conducted on potential conflicts in indonesia, it was concluded that inter-group reconciliation can effectively be carried out with a strong collective emotional approach (mashuri & leeuwen 2020). this means that if the indonesian government is serious about resolving the papuan conflict, then this method could be used with a brotherly approach, because the character of the papuan people values a collective, participatory approach (lumenta 2021). the implementation of special autonomy for papua as a form of implementing the concept of asymmetric decentralization has the aim of overcoming the separatist conflict. the indonesian government was quite successful in resolving the conflict in aceh, because it involved separatist elements in designing the agreement, but negotiations in papua were limited (lele 2021). therefore, the papuan church council (wpcc) has strongly supported negotiations between the indonesian government and the united liberation movement for west papua (ulmwp) to find a peaceful solution in papua ( jubi 2020). the problems that occurred in papua might also be overcome if the mrp were to be given wider authority in the formation of special regional regulations (perdasus) and provincial regulations (perdasi). perdasus and perdasi have a strategic position to form regulations that can benefit the interests of the papuan people, because perdasus and perdasi are implementing regulations for the special autonomy law and are different from other regional regulations in indonesia. these regulations can be formed by accommodating the interests of the papuan people (saiba 2019). the position of the mrp reflects the territory of papua as a country, or at least as a state in the federal government system (ronsumbre, deliarnoor & mulyawan 2020). however, in the amendment to the special autonomy law, the authority of the mrp was not considered. as a consequence, the mrp has become merely a cultural institution representative of the papuan people, with limited authority. this means that the solutions and aspirations of the papuan people represented by the mrp are also limited in the governance and legal framework. perdasus and perdasi to implement regional government with the authority vested in special autonomy, the province of papua (and west papua) is given the authority to draw up special regional regulations (perdasus) and provincial regulations (perdasi). basically, perdasi is similar to a number of regional regulations (perda) in other regions in indonesia. however, the perdasus is somewhat different because the preparation of the perdasus must go through the stages of consideration and approval by the mrp. in other words, it must take into account the interests of indigenous papuans. perdasus is one of the regional regulations of the papua province which was formed in the context of implementing the special autonomy law (ariyanto 2021). therefore, the perdasus has a special position because it is a special regulation used in implementing the special autonomy law; thus, it is certain that the provisions of the special autonomy law would not be implemented if the special autonomy law did not exist. both perdasus and perdasi are drawn up at the provincial government level by the governor and the dprp, but the formation of a perdasi does not require the consideration and approval of the mrp. at least, there are 14 provisions in the special autonomy law which provide delegation to the perdasus to regulate a number of matters in the context of implementing the special autonomy law (rakia 2021). various aspects identified in the special autonomy law that must be further regulated in the perdasus are: a. regional symbols, regional flags, and papuan regional anthems; b. special authority arrangements for the province of papua (and west papua); c. municipal and district authorities in papua (and west papua); rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 42 d. defense spatial policy; e. election of governor and deputy governor; f. mrp membership number; g. implementation of mrp tasks; h. institutional rights and membership of the mrp; i. mrp obligations; j. special allocation fund; k. an economy that utilizes natural resources, community rights, guarantees legal certainty for entrepreneurs, environmental conservation, and sustainable development; l. special attention and handling for the development of isolated, remote, and neglected tribes in papua province; m. legal supervision, political supervision, and social control; n. transitional provisions regarding the authority of governors, regents and mayors. from the description above, it is clear that the position of the perdasus is very strategic in the implementation of papua’s special autonomy because these provisions contain many of the main substances of the special autonomy law itself. however, in the formation of the perdasus, the role of the mrp has been very small because the mrp’s involvement was only limited to ‘giving consideration and approval’ to the draft special regional regulation (raperdasus) proposed by the governor and the dprp. in other words, the mrp cannot ‘veto’ if there is a raperdasus that is deemed not to represent the interests of the papuan people whom the mrp represents. the weak involvement of the mrp in the formation of the perdasus could have an impact on the interests of the papuan community, for example in economic development for indigenous papuans (ariyanto 2017), protection of customary land in papua (suharyo 2019), or the formation of a local political party in papua (wessyau & waas 2018), as a form of implementation of democracy in papua. the formation of the perdasus is considered slow enough to implement a number of provisions in the special autonomy law (muryantini 2018), which is also influenced by the performance of local government (ardy 2021). there is an opinion that the mrp’s position is quite strong in the preparation of the perdasus because the perdasus cannot be promulgated if the mrp does not approve the raperdasus (bauw 2019). however, this view should be corrected because in article 20 paragraph (1) point c, it is stated that the mrp only gives consideration and approval to the raperdasus. in full, article 20 paragraph (1) point c states that, ‘to give consideration and approval to the draft perdasus submitted by the dprp together with the governor’. from the provisions of article 20 paragraph (1) point c, there is no phrase that says that the mrp can ‘veto’ the raperdasus. in addition, sometimes in the process of forming a perdasus, the dprp and the governor often do not follow nor consistently implement the provisions for the formation of a perdasus (indey 2017). the mrp’s authority in giving consideration and approval to the raperdasus is not strong compared to that of the governor and the dprp, as noted above. the mrp’s authority could be said to be strong if the mrp were to be given the authority to stipulate a raperdasus into a perdasus equivalent to that of the governor and the dprp. relations between the government of indonesia and papua under the last 20 years the draft law on special autonomy for papua was drafted during the time president abdurrahman wahid served as the third president of the republic of indonesia, changing the name of the province from irian jaya to papua (lefaan, nugroho & mudiono 2012). furthermore, the papua special autonomy law rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 43 was first officially promulgated on november 21, 2001, by the indonesian government when president megawati soekarno putri served as the fourth president. however, at the end of megawati’s term as president, the implementation of papua’s special autonomy was still problematic, because at that time the mrp’s performance had not been maximized and this had an impact on the slow formation of perdasus and perdasi, so that the implementation of papua’s special autonomy was considered not optimal (rohim 2014; muryantini 2018). dialogue between the government of indonesia and papua during the tenure of president susilo bambang yudhoyono and president joko widodo was carried out with a non-military approach (numbery 2021), but there has been a misconception in the dialogue process. to this day, a number of conflicts in papua have not been handled properly, so the negotiation process for the papuan conflict involves internal actors (central/regional government, kkb/opm, tribal/religious leaders and civil society) and external actors (freeport company) with the main demand being for papuan independence (kaisupy & maing 2021). the conflict in papua has actually not only occurred since 2002 after the enactment of the special autonomy law, but has been on-going since 1963. among the various conflicts that have occurred in papua, the issue of human rights and traumatic interactions with the indonesian military were most expected to be resolved (tebay 2016), thus triggering the movement of the “persatuan gerakan pembebasan papua barat” (united liberation movement for west papua-ulmwp) or free papua movement (organisasi papua merdeka-opm) groups. an analysis states that the indonesian government’s militaristic approach based on implementing a counter-insurgency (coin) strategy has failed and has created new conflict dynamics (ramdhan 2021). therefore, many people suggest that conflict resolution in papua must be carried out in accordance with the wishes of the papuan people themselves (bhakti & pigay 2016), because they must pay attention to historical aspects, regional needs, and the latest political situation in papua (suparno 2018). in the momentum of changes to the special autonomy law, the governor of papua has proposed several main frameworks that should be considered by the indonesian government in making changes to the special autonomy law. as noted above, these included issues of authority, institutions, finance, development policies, politics and law, and the settlement of human rights in papua. however, it turns out that the changes to the special autonomy law do not take all these needs into account so that the changes to the special autonomy law tend not to be accepted well by the papuan people. changes to the special autonomy law are seen as reflecting the wishes of the indonesian government, not the wishes of the papuan people. this can weaken the papuan people’s trust in the indonesian government, because the basic aspirations of the papuan people are not fully accommodated to resolve conflicts and the needs of the papuan people. moreover, in the amendment of the special autonomy law, there are no significant changes that strengthen the authority of the mrp as a cultural institution for the papuan people. why strengthen mrp legislations? in article 1 point (g) of the special autonomy law, it is stated that ‘mrp is a cultural representation of indigenous papuans, who have certain powers in the context of protecting the rights of indigenous papuans based on respect for customs and culture, empowering women, and strengthening religious harmony’. within the mrp institution, there are working groups (kelompok kerja-pokja), which consist of a customary working group (pokja adat), a women’s working group (pokja perempuan), and a religious working group (pokja agama). the three working groups seem to have been formed based on the provisions of article 1 point (g) of the special autonomy law, namely the phrase ‘respect for customs and culture, empowering women, and strengthening religious harmony’. why should mrp institutions be strengthened? there are several reasons. first, the mrp is an institution with great significance in the context of implementing papua’s special autonomy, but with limited rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 44 authority. the number of working groups (pokja) is minimal and the formation of working groups is limited to those areas singled out in the special autonomy law for special attention. each working group formed under the mrp institution has faced a number of problems because regulations to maximize the authority of each working group are lacking. one of the problems in the case of the pokja adat, according to its chairman, demas tokoro, is that there was concern about the declining population of papua in terms of the development of the papuan community (melmambessy & achmady 2020). from the pokja perempuan (women’s working grup), already several years ago, in the indonesian government’s efforts to implement gender responsive planning and budgeting (pprg), which is a strategy taken by the government to support efforts to accelerate gender mainstreaming in development, it was still necessary to transform the mindset so that the public, especially public officials, understood the concept of gender properly and correctly, so that pprg could be applied properly (susiana 2015). meanwhile, from the religious working group, identity politics has gained prominence after the stipulation of the city of manokwari as the city of the bible (saputra 2017); the population of manokwari is predominantly christian, but as in other places where bylaws based on religion have been implemented, minorities are marginalised or discriminated against. these problems cannot be directly addressed by the mrp due to the limited authority of the mrp institution itself. second, the number of pokja within the mrp institution is very limited in number, although there are quite a number of important matters regulated in the special autonomy law. problems in papua arise not only from issues of custom, women, and religion, but also issues of human development, human rights, settlement of human rights cases, the economy, local institutional authority, international cooperation, defense and security, or local politics. attention to these problems requires a larger number of pokja than currently exist. the formation of new pokja in the context of implementing the special autonomy law is very necessary because of the wide range of problems in papua that must be resolved institutionally. this would revive the dynamics of democracy in papua and would not conflict with intention or provisions of the special autonomy law, because article 1 point g already gives the mrp a number of powers with the phrase ‘...has certain authority’, which means broader authority over customary matters, women and religion. third, as a cultural institution that represents the interests of the papuan people, the mrp requires a number of regulations to carry out its authority in the field of protecting the rights of the papuan people. however, the mrp is not given broad powers in terms of legislation, as already explained. juridically, the mrp can only establish non-public internal regulations. a solution would be to give the mrp the same authority as the governor and the dprp, including in the case of submitting a raperdasus, as well as regarding its stipulation and promulgation. fourth, it is necessary to clarify the legal position of the mrp institution, namely whether the mrp is only a cultural institution, or a legislative institution at the level of the dprp. the problem of the weakness of the mrp in legislation is also influenced by the unclear status of this institution, because there is no clear legislative authority. in china, under chinese law, the autonomous region of the people’s republic of china is granted more flexible legislative powers, as a means to achieve effective autonomous governance, including in terms of protecting minority rights (feng 2017). this means that legislative institutions in the regions that have special autonomy authority have flexibility in forming regulations according to their needs. however, in the case of the mrp institution, the unclear status of this institution, whether it is a cultural institution or a regional legislative body, also results in the weakness of the mrp’s legislative function. fifth, the involvement of mrp members in resolving cases of human rights violations in papua is essential. the special autonomy law explicitly orders the establishment the fact and reconciliation commission (komisi kebenaran dan rekonsiliasi-kkr). in article 46 paragraph (2) of the special autonomy law, this commission is tasked with clarifying the history of papua in order to strengthen the unity and integrity of the nation in the unitary state of the republic of indonesia, as well as to formulate rakia, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 45 and determine reconciliation steps. however, until now the kkr commission in papua has not been implemented (dewi 2021). in a number of statements, the west papua church council (wpcc) has encouraged the indonesian government to coordinate with the mrp in establishing the kkr commission. this is appropriate because the mrp is an institution that represents the papuan people, so that it could play an important role in meeting the aspirations of the papuan people, especially with regard to cases of past human rights violations in papua. conclusion although there are innovations in the changes to the special autonomy law of papua, it seems that the modifiers of the special autonomy law did not consider the importance of strengthening the legislative function of the mrp institution. this may result in weakening the papuan people’s trust in the central government, because the mrp is well trusted by the papuan people as an institution that can represent their aspirations. amendments to the special autonomy law needed to consider extending the authority of the mrp by strengthening the legislative function for the perdasus, so that the mrp’s contribution to the formation of papuan regional government policies could be implemented according to the spirit of the papuan people represented by the mrp. already, the papuan people have expressed their concerns with the amendments to the special autonomy law, which have been passed by the central government of indonesia. one way that this situation could be remedied is for the president to issue a perpu (government regulation in lieu of law) to review the strategic position of the mrp in the context of developing papua province that is more in line with the mandate of the special 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article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: adamec, j., gatwiri, k., renouf, j. 2021. lived experiences of slovak and czech immigrants to australia: a phenomenological study. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:3, 51–67. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13. i3.7952 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) lived experiences of slovak and czech immigrants to australia: a phenomenological study jozef adamec1, kathomi gatwiri2, jean renouf3 1 southern cross university, southern cross drive, bilinga qld 4225, australia, j.adamec.11@student.scu.edu.au 2 southern cross university, southern cross drive, bilinga qld 4225, australia, kathomi.gatwiri@scu.edu.au 3 southern cross university, military road, east lismore, nsw 2480, australia, jean.renouf@scu.edu.au corresponding author: jozef adamec, southern cross university, southern cross drive, bilinga qld 4225, australia. j.adamec.11@student.scu.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7952 article history: received 09/11/2021; revised 02/12/2021; accepted 02/12/2021; published 26/01/2022 abstract after world war ii, an estimated five million people were on the move in czechoslovakia. between 1954 and 1970, over 16,000 of them immigrated to australia. this paper is part of a larger research project that provides an in-depth inquiry of the lived experiences of 18 post-world war ii emigrants from czechoslovakia, who are now australian citizens. findings reveal emigrants’ significant emotional reflections about their life in czechoslovakia and provide vivid phenomenological accounts of their views about their original country’s political and economic context and life within it, as well as challenges related to leaving the country and their lived experiences as displaced persons in foreign countries and displaced persons camps. keywords lived experiences; australia immigration; czechoslovakia; phenomenology; displaced persons 51 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research is supported by an australian government research training program (rtp) scholarship. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7952 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7952 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:j.adamec.11@student.scu.edu.au mailto:kathomi.gatwiri@scu.edu.au mailto:jean.renouf@scu.edu.au mailto:j.adamec.11@student.scu.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7952 introduction in 1948, czechoslovakia became československá republika under the leadership of klement gottwald. however, the problematic ideology of the communist party, alongside its totalitarian regime, subsequently created an atmosphere of discontent within the population, prompting many to leave the country, hoping to return after their country was freed of communism. between 1945 and 1947, an estimated five million people were on the move in czechoslovakia. the following communist coup d’état in 1948 resulted again in a wave of emigration when about 250,000 people left the country. then, between 1961 and 1970, including the suppression of the 1968 ‘prague spring’, another wave of emigration saw 164,500 czechs and slovaks flee the country mainly to austria, germany, canada, and australia. two more decades of an authoritarian period of ‘normalization’, resulted in yet another 100,000 people fleeing the country (horakova 2000). in 1945, australia’s first federal immigration portfolio was created, the primary impetus being to implement a large‐scale migration program. in 1954 australia also ratified the united nations convention relating to the status of refugees. it allowed resettling of vulnerable refugees based on response to any humanitarian crisis. then after the 1968 invasion of czechoslovakia by the soviet union, australia resettled around 6,000 persons (mence, gangell & tebb 2017). in exchange for their passage from europe as displaced persons (dp), they were bound by a two-year employment contract with the australian government. today they are naturalised australians working in a variety of occupations (adelaidia 2019). in 1977 the australian government developed a specific refugee policy (‘australian humanitarian program’) tailored to the needs of asylum seekers. in january 1993, under the keating government, a comprehensive refugee humanitarian system was set up within the immigration portfolio separate from the general migration program (phillips, klapdor & simon-davies 2010). the primary focus of this paper is to shed light on the lived experiences of czech and slovak emigrants after wwii until the split of czechoslovakia into czech and slovak republics in 1993. the paper explores emigrants’ experiences before leaving czechoslovakia, why they left and became displaced in europe, and why they chose to immigrate to australia. this process involved enquiring about their life under the communist regime and the subjective experiences that informed their emigration decision. theoretical framing migration is a complex and dynamic process that ‘goes beyond demographic, economic, and spatial considerations’ (leloup 1996, p. 101). it includes adaptation to many changes, all of which have a significant effect on people’s lives. for an emigrant, the decision to migrate rests upon numerous variables which inform the subjective experience of seeing, knowing, and being throughout the migration process. as such, migration is a boundless field of lived experiences that is worth exploring theoretically, focusing on the entirety of the experiences while also searching for the essence and meaning-making process of the experiences (moustakas 1994). while the existing literature has given attention to relative challenges of migration and re-settlement (anderson, cummings & gatwiri 2019; massey et al. 1993; stark & wang 2000), less attention has been paid to the emotional aspect of the meaning-making processes that inform migrants' lives and their lived experiences during the migration process. to address this gap, this study utilises interpretive phenomenology, discussed below, to enter into the lived world of respective emigrants instead of just investigating it. given that migration experiences are subjective, the frameworks of phenomenology and interpretivism are particularly useful for this study. phenomenologically, knowledge is based on the subjectivity of the experience and the meaning allocated to the experience. and because every experience is created through the social, cultural, and political meaning attached to it, similar experiences can invoke different phenomena and meanings. therefore, all experiences and knowledge cannot be generalized (guba & lincoln 1994) adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 52 rather, they need to be interpretive. interpretivist thinking is grounded on the tradition of hermeneutics, that is, the theory of methodological interpretation and social phenomenology. interpretivism asserts that ‘human behaviour unlike that of physical objects, cannot be understood without reference to the meanings and purposes attached by human actors to their activities’ (guba & lincoln, 1994, p. 106) and therefore seeks to understand the ‘meaning’ within social phenomena (schwandt 1994). adopting an interpretive phenomenological analysis (ipa) within this study made it possible to centre the participants’ lived experience and their knowledge as subjective due to the unique interpretation accorded to each narrative. the usefulness of ipa is based on two essential commitments: 1) ‘to give a voice’ to participants and 2) ‘to make sense of the concerns’ of the person taking part in the study (larkin, watts & clifton 2006, p. 102). as such, investigating the ‘lived world’ and re-examining the often-forgotten past experiences centralises both the person and the story, and excludes the assumption that people’s narratives are separate from the person (kafle 2011; laverty 2003). ipa therefore, goes beyond the core concepts of the experience, by seeking, understanding, and clarifying the ‘essential meanings’ of participants’ actions. it does so by exploring the humanness of being in their world. interpreting and transcribing the lived world of immigrants characterized within embedded meanings would not be possible without experiencing ‘people’s behaviour, their gestures, and other embodied expressions in a direct relationship with the phenomenon’ (dahlberg 2006, p. 4). it was paramount not only to hear participants but also to see their emotions, gestures, and embodied expressions that displayed the depth of the phenomenon and its context. mertens (2005, p. 12) argues that ‘reality is socially constructed.’ employing a constructivist theoretical approach, researchers can conceptualise new understandings within knowledge, integrating with what they already know. interpretive constructivism pays more attention to meaning and values. using the interpretive constructivism paradigm ‘the human aspect of research activity is realized and interactions between the researcher and the researched world are foregrounded’ (tribe 2001, p. 13). constructivism is a theory of knowing (von glasersfeld 1998). constructivists do not adhere to the viewpoint that reality is ‘discovered’, as such reality is constructed by individuals who are a part of the research process. the researcher and the interviewed participant must be working together not independently of each other, to make a sense of the research topic (guba & lincoln, 2000), so that each brings their values and interpretations of experiences, creating a unique understanding and interaction. subsequently, the constructivist must construct the meanings and the ‘building blocks must be abstracted from individual experience; and their interpersonal fit’ (von glasersfeld 1998, p. 12). the leading author, is one of them, understanding the researched reality. as an interpretivist/constructivist, he could get involved in interviews as a ‘passionate participant’ and facilitator of ‘multi-voice’ reconstruction (guba & lincoln 1994, p. 115). methodology, design, and reflexivity research process this paper is a part of a larger qualitative research project named ‘freedom voices: slovak and czech immigration to australia after wwii’, which was approved by the southern cross university human research ethics committee (approval no. 2020/147). a qualitative approach was employed to study immigrants' experiences and actions ‘as lived ’ after their relocation to australia. the tentative questions guiding the broader study included: • who is the participant, and what were their family and home like? • what were their country's political, economic, social aspects, and the life within like? adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 53 • why and how did they leave their country, and choose australia as their new home? • what were their experiences as dps, between the time of leaving their country and arriving in australia? to capture and accurately reflect emotional and complex journeys, one-on-one, face-to-face, semistructured, in-depth interviews between the lead author and participants were used to collect participants’ stories. the stories formed the basis for the qualitative thematic analysis. the interviews were structured to collect information about varied experiences in many aspects of the participants’ social and personal lives. open-ended questions provided insights into the context and the meaning created through these experiences. the emphasis was on a holistic approach focused on open and honest communication. the intention was to guide the participants, not to lead them. participants were positioned as the experts of their lives, who willingly told their life stories, which is not just a matter of responding to the specific topics of the researcher’s interest. the researcher became a student and a learner of these experiences and a vessel through which participants could bring to life the phenomenon of their complex life experiences (smith 2003). sample and recruitment the sample selection has a profound effect on the quality of the research (coyne 1997). the sample was a purposive sample according to the needs of the study. the selection criteria required a range of rich experiences in the researched phenomena, and the ability to communicate researched experiences reflectively. 29 participants were recruited as willing and suitable participants for the study. for various reasons including the covid-19 pandemic and the emerging restrictions, only 18 people, five females, and 13 males participated in interviews. that included 15 individuals who came to australia as adults and three individuals who came to australia as young children with their parents. the majority of participants were aged between 75 and 79 years old at the time of the interview. interview process the interviews were seen as dialogues, whereby the researcher sought to understand the phenomenon under investigation from the interviewee’s point of view (larkin, watts & clifton 2006), to theorize the meaning within the experiences. the interview is essentially a conversation with a specific purpose (kvale 2006) where the trust and rapport between the interviewer and the interviewee are often needed to obtain ‘disclosure’ of private life personal experiences. however, since the interviewer acquires information to achieve some specific goal, referring to the interview as dialogue may be misleading, and power dynamics can play an important role, greatly influencing the findings. in this study, interviews were initially planned based on open conversations about migration experiences, but considering that some interviewees preferred a more structured approach to contain the narratives, a semi-structured approach was adopted. though there was a structure to the interviews, the intention was not to follow a strict questioning format. instead, interviews were designed to be conversational to allow participants’ embedded expressions to come alive in the stories. many of the participants were openly grateful for the opportunity to tell their stories, reminisce, and share their emotional experiences. to aid this interview process, a mind map was utilised (figure 1). the mind map was offered to each participant before the interview to be adopted as a road map of what would be contained within the interview. the mind map provided a clear overview to deal with the complexity of the data, facilitating and speeding the research process, and helped to contain both the conversation and the data produced (herman 2004). it also helped to transcribe both verbal and nonverbal aspects of the interaction, giving a realistic interpretation of all aspects of this interaction. mind adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 54 mapping was also instrumental during the analysis of the collected data as it allowed the researcher to ‘bracket’ any preconceptions by setting aside any presuppositions, focusing on the analysis of experience, and rendering the studied phenomenon explicit (gearing 2004),this being an essential requirement in doing phenomenological research (tattersall, wats & vernon 2007). reflexivity the researcher's positioning within research can be affected by the researcher's stance, including personal experiences, beliefs, and presumptions regarding the researched topic. the lead author is a czechoslovak figure 1. the mind map designed for interviews of participants adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 55 emigrant. he immigrated to australia from czechoslovakia in 1968. similar to other immigrants in europe, he had become a displaced person after escaping czechoslovakia. as an ‘insider’ to this experience, he carries embodied knowledge and an understanding of behaviours, values, and nuances of the cultural idiom of the related challenges and processes of immigration. it is possible that as an insider, his position could influence interviews, and therefore, it was essential to employ the self-reflective process of ‘bracketing’. his insider status was also considered a ‘soft entry’ to the conversations with interviewees who considered him ‘safe’ to share their experiences with, some of which had not been publicly shared before. his familiarity with the experience of emigration from czechoslovakia made it possible to have nuanced discussions with interviewees about the essential meanings of participants’ experiences without fear of judgement or criticism (lindseth & norberg 2004). the other authors of this paper are also emigrants. one is a french and swiss citizen who emigrated to australia in 2014, and the other is a kenyan citizen who emigrated to australia in 2012. both are australian citizens now. the second and third authors acknowledge all qualitative research is contextual, and within this specific context, they remain insider-outsiders. that is, as insiders, they understand the processes of leaving home, which includes the emotional suffering of leaving behind people they love, the smells, and rhythms of their home countries. however, as outsiders, they also do not have embodied knowledge of ‘escaping’ their countries or being persecuted for holding certain political belief systems. they occupy privileged status as migrants, who navigate australian migranthood with more nuanced ease. while each migration is different, this allowed them to develop a sense of shared experience about the participants’ journey, but they relied on the lead author’s insights and familiarity with the czechoslovakian culture and history to more fully interpret the data. analysis because access to migrants’ experience during interviews is only partial and complex, the first objective was to interpret and construct an informed description of the events as close as possible to the respective participant's view. the second objective was ‘to develop more overtly interpretive analysis’ of the described event (larkin, watts & clifton 2006, p. 104). such analysis allowed interpretation of the participant’s claim, to describe what it meant for the participant to express such feelings and concerns in the specific situation. therefore, any discoveries made had to be based on the relationship ‘between the researcher and the subject matter’, identifying the researcher as ‘an inclusive part of the world they are describing’ (larkin, watts & clifton 2006, p. 107). during analysis, the focus was on two issues namely: 1) the transcription that involved interpretation, and 2) bracketing of researchers’ preconceptions, although sometimes the subjective view of the experience played an important part in the understanding and analysing of a phenomenon (merleau-ponty, 2013). using the inductive approach alongside the 6-stage thematic analysis process developed by braun and clarke (2012), the authors reviewed the data and identified common themes. they familiarized themselves with the data, by reading and rereading the transcripts of interviews and then generating codes, looking for patterns of meanings, and systematically collating the data according to the objective and questions of the study. authors then systematically searched for and reviewed the emerging themes and subthemes while naming and collating them. the process proved to be a recursive one with the mind map used in interviews becoming a helpful tool in identifying main themes and sub-themes and any interconnections between themes and subthemes. the reflexivity journal used in interviews also became useful during analysis. researchers were able to be more specific in how to interpret respective themes, directly relevant to the question, allowing them to go back and rework the themes when needed. the concept of bracketing was adopted before initiating research by using the mind map with broad open-ended questions so as not to influence the collection of data and the analysis process (chan, fung & chien 2013). adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 56 findings and themes the findings from interviews were thematically coded. the themes underscore the richness of the lived experiences of all participants. considering the age, gender, background, period, and other attributes between participating interviewees, it was essential to analyse what commonalities or differences emerged from the interviews. the following overview of findings is grouped in commonly recurring themes. theme 1: navigating complex emotions of grief and loss familial cohesion contributes to family members’ emotional well-being across varying social circumstances. family experiences are some of ‘the most important sources of both well-being and distress’ (vandeleur et al. 2009, p. 1205). in this study, participants' affection for family evoked painful memories of the loss of loved ones. a sense of closeness or ruptured family relationships, characterised by grief and loss, was powerfully depicted in every interview. although most participants were aged between 75 and 79 years old at the time of the interview, participants’ first comments in interviews included emotional expressions of strong affection for their parents and families. however, it was not only the verbatim and emotional outpourings but also participants’ facial expressions, nuances, and body language that depicted moments of loss, grief, and love concerning family relationships. milos, a 71-years-old participant, for example, showed significant emotion when he remembered his mother singing ‘their’ song with tears rolling down his face during the interview. while describing his love for his mother, milos closed his eyes, describing how he imagined holding her in his arms and singing softly to her ear a little song about how ‘he will come back one day.’ the grief depicted by milos is a typical universal and inevitable aspect of a highly emotionally distressing human experience (lewis, havilandjones & barrett 2008); however, the lack of closure highlighted in the relationship between milos and his mother remained a powerful depiction of how forced migration can impact families and relationships across a lifetime. another participant, marka, who was only 9 years old when she left the country, expressed the grief by illuminating her home with specially arranged family pictures and flickering candlelight at the corner of her living room. pointing at the pictures, ‘my special mementos’ she said. ‘i was only four years old hiding scared behind some drums in my parents’ factory when the german gestapo rushed in and took my parents, my grandma, and many workers away. they were taken to auschwitz. i will never forget it.’ similarly, peter was only five years old when he witnessed the murder of his father. subsequently, peter’s mother became very sick, grief-stricken, and died at only 39 years of age. peter reflected, ‘it was 66 years ago, i was only 14 when she died, but i will never forget it.’ john, another participant, was not even five years old when he also witnessed the murder of his father during the postoloprty massacre in 1945. then, four years later, john saw his brother being taken by the police as a political prisoner to jachymovite uranium mines, which caused the consequent death of his 40 years old grieving mother in 1950. after his brother made his daring escape to west germany in 1951, john, feeling lost and alone and living with his grandparents, was continuously making plans to escape and be with his brother. in 1968, john escaped from czechoslovakia and reunited with his brother in germany, and together they both immigrated to australia. john recalls, ‘i hated communists for killing my father, imprisoning and torturing my brother, and also for being responsible for my mother’s death. in australia, we were free and together with my brother until he died in 2009.’ discourses of grief and loss constitute certain social rules that suggest that grieving is a ‘private matter that should be resolved so individuals can resume their normal lives’ (clarke 2020, p. 14). as such, listening to participants' stories recounting their experiences, interlaced with loss and grief, with immense love, was adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 57 an experience of great humility (backhouse & graham 2013) and it encapsulates how subjective processes of grief and loss are. theme 2: the burden of the socio-political and economic context the sense of hardship in participants’ lives before emigrating was another recurring emotional subtheme discussed by participants. participants reflected that after the communists came into power, life as people knew it has changed. for example, in 1948, agriculture was collectivized, creating state-owned cooperatives, which was part of a program to isolate the ‘capitalist element’ in the country (rychlík 2014, p. 188). small farms became unsustainable and could not support families, and this hardship forced many to look for work in czech industrialized towns, consequently breaking up the family home life. reflecting on this change, jano described working with his father and brothers on a small farm as not enough to live on ‘i had to go to ostrava to work in steelworks for the family to survive,’ he said. in addition to the disruption of family livelihood, the political distrust among the people in the communities meant that majority lived in fear. the country's political, economic, and social fabric, as well as rampant corruption and communist authoritarianism, were mentioned by all participants, reflecting on the ‘burden’ it placed on their daily lives. participants shared that the anxiety and fear emanating from general distrust among people in the communities was influenced by the fact that more than 100,000 police collaborators were informing police on their fellow citizens. the ‘recruitment of informers was very systematic’ and all candidates were ‘made to sign a written promise to inform’ (celp 1992, p. 24). a participant, janka, recalled how her parents always reminded her not to say anything about the regime in public: ‘you must not trust anyone, we can all end up in jail’, she mimicked their words, during the interview. the anti-communist movement was widespread in big workplaces, but there were severe consequences for any outright resistance. jano also reflected how scared he felt while working in steelworks, where he saw ‘many of my co-workers [being] taken by police for anti-communist speeches, some never came back, just perished’. disregarding the consequences, another participant, traves, reflected that he believed that open rebellion was the way to ‘beat the system’. he recalled how pervasive the spying system was, remembering how one day he and two friends ‘were drinking in a pub having fun and carrying on silly’ about how they could ‘steal a plane and escape’. two days later, the police came to his home and took him away. ‘i went to jail for three years. somebody informed the police’ he said. corruption in czechoslovakia created a burden and existed at all levels. it had a profound effect on culture and values (naxera 2018). participants branded corruption as a generally accepted way of life, common everywhere, including in the education system, employment, health system, and practically all administrative places. peter was very vocal about the ‘bribe culture’ and how he could not get to university because of his father’s german background. he said, ‘it cost a lot of money bribing communist pigs.’ corruption within the education system was also rampant. lidia reflected: the good thing, education was free. students also earned money, for good marks. however, getting to university was not always easy. you often needed someone influential to get to the university of your choice or bribe the right people. graduating from university was not always a guarantee to get a better job, and neither was a ‘clean record’. ‘good jobs’ were granted and often depended on the content of the individual’s file records kept by communists (celp 1992). marian reflected how he was never involved in anything anti-communist, and yet after finishing his studies, he was refused the job he was qualified for and was told he had a ‘black mark’ on his record without knowing. he later found out that his ‘older half-brother, escaped to canada a few years earlier. i had nothing to do with it, yet communist bastards held it against me’. many participants also adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 58 commented upon the corruption within the health system. drazen witnessed his wife’s father almost die from not getting proper care in the hospital. he reflected: ‘there were no doctors’ fees or health insurance to pay, but you did not get the proper attention without paying a bribe, and bigger the bribe, meant better attention’. with these significant cultural and political ‘burdens’, most participants commented the way to prosper in life was to become active members of the communist party which was often a prerequisite to acquiring a ‘good job’. some participants like lidia still engaged in a dignified resistance. she reflected: ‘i did not study for 16 years to become a decorated communist. i wanted to achieve something in my life not just sitting in a comfortable chair in an expensive office, pushing people around.’ other participants commented that it was not unusual for top jobs to be held by communist party members, often with low-level education. talking about his experiences when installing some equipment for a business in prague, a participant reiner commented, ‘the chief of the business was so stupid, he did not even know the difference between ac and dc. but he was chief of the communist party. all he knew was how to swear and push everybody around.’ for some participants, solitude and unhappiness with no prospect of any brighter future made them leave the country. stella was a teacher in a small town. her mother had died and her father was an alcoholic who ‘always got in trouble with the police.’ stella reflected, ‘i just could not see any future for me in the communist regime. i just wanted a better life.’ mirek was only a young child when their family escaped. he gave a lot of credit to his parents, allowing him to get his education in australia and have a better life than they did. mirek was reflecting how his father’s ambition was suppressed because he did not want to join the communist party. ‘we left because father wanted me to do more with my life than he was allowed to do. i am grateful for giving me the opportunity’. interviews showed that participants mostly left the country for political, economic, and social reasons. these included economic hardships factors, obstacles to career growth, and the prospect of criminal prosecution for anti-regime propaganda because anti-communist activists were considered enemies of the country (stefancik & nemcova 2015, p. 92). theme 3: challenges and promises related to leaving the country anguish and fear for their lives were emotionally depicted as a painful challenge during the ‘leaving the country timeline.’ being ordered out of their home in the middle of the night, heinke mirrored the expulsion of her family from czechoslovakia by czech paramilitary to nazi atrocities during wwii. very emotional, often pausing for a few seconds, she remembered: we had to be out at two o’clock at night and (pause) everything was taken (pause) then in the morning we had to get on the train (emotional pausing for a few seconds) it was a (pause) train for coal (pausing looking up to the ceiling, tears rolling down her face). marka was very happy after her parents returned from auschwitz after the war. but her happiness was short-lived. when communists confiscated her family business during the 1948 nationalization, fearing for their lives, the whole family escaped to italy. reflecting on how it took a long time for her parents to recover after their suffering in auschwitz, she said: ‘they were terrified by possible repercussions by communists, and the concentration camp memories still very raw, we left everything behind and left.’ reiner, was also only seven years old when his family escaped to switzerland in 1948, fearing for his father’s life. he reflected: ‘my father was tortured by communists. they would have killed him. we had to leave.’ however, the family closeness, a love for their country, and the hope the political system would change were described by participants as vital issues that kept many from leaving the country earlier. they ‘learned to bear up patiently under the imposed regimes’ (rose 1997, p. 130). as peter reflected: adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 59 constantly thinking about communists responsible for the death of my parents my hatred towards the regime was intolerable. i was secretly hoping it will all change one day, but the russian invasion in 1968 brought in the final blow to my hope. i had enough and left my country decimated by communists. mike also believed the communist system couldn’t survive forever, hoping it must eventually collapse because power-hungry ‘narcissistic idiots’ ran it and that was not sustainable. he reflected: it was not easy you had to do the best you could. the country was full of narcissistic idiots, with a lot of power often with very little intelligence. i was hoping that sooner or later, people will have to wake up and take a stand against communists and the system will go down. travelling abroad was not an easy task. escaping to non-communist countries required careful planning, ingenuity, and risk-taking. using her experience from a previous holiday in yugoslavia, stela reflected how her friend in yugoslavia, living close to the austrian border, helped her: ‘he showed me a safe spot to swim across the river to austria ... from there i hitchhiked to west germany. in germany, i intentionally married another emigrant to qualify for refugee status.’ drazen, another participant, had family friends in yugoslavia. he explained how he took his wife and two young children on holiday to belgrade and how his friends helped them to get across the border by bribing corrupt officials on the border to austria. he explained, ‘my friends took us to the border at night during changing of shift. after we crossed the border, a car was waiting for us to take us to vienna.’ a participant, luke, was a czechoslovakian air force pilot. he commented how having a job he liked was also not enough for him to tolerate the regime. in 1967 he was transferred to russia to train with the russian air force. in august 1968, luke flew his mig during the warsaw pact invasion of czechoslovakia. however, he was also unhappy with the russians invading his homeland, and he escaped with his mig to west germany. he reflected, ‘i went along with the regime because i liked my job, but to attack my homeland was too much to ask of me’. some of the daring escapes from czechoslovakia also included group escapes. in 1969 milos and his two friends, members of swazarm1, organized an excursion bus trip from prague to bratislava, vienna, and budapest, for members of swazarm only. there were three busses with over 100 other members on board, but none of them knew that milos and his friends were using the trip to escape. describing how everything went smoothly crossing the border in bratislava, with plenty of beer on board, drinking and pretending to be happy as young members of a political organization singing political songs, milos reflected: in vienna, my two friends and i parted with the group not knowing what happened to others thereafter. later, in australia, i learned that the three busses came back to czechoslovakia empty with bus drivers only. all of the trip participants used the opportunity to escape. physical escape from czechoslovakia was an ‘exceedingly difficult act during most of the cold war’ (giustino, plum & vari 2013, p. 252). numerous examples of escape often included state-driven activities where official and unofficial interests came together to make the escape successful. the outcome was contingent on the circumstances and ingenuity of the people involved. theme 4: practical and emotional considerations of being in transition after wwii, over eleven million people ended in many dp camps around europe. thousands of czechoslovakian emigrants were also among the dps (persian 2012). participants in this study were among 1 youth communist paramilitary political organization adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 60 them. recurring themes in participants' reflections on experiences of those days included: money and language issues, joy of freedom, distancing from communists, and apprehension. czechoslovakian currency had no value abroad, being not convertible for any western currency. participants described buying western currencies on the black market before leaving and associated risks during the border inspection, often ending with currency confiscation and prosecution. marian, who managed to buy only a few german marks before he left, commented, ‘luckily there were charities in vienna that helped us with some cash we needed.’ mike, who also had only a few shillings, commented, ‘by speaking good german i was able to get a small job as a cleaner in a hotel that paid me some cash.’ unlike marian and mike, janka recalled: we had quite a lot of german marks with us that we got over-time as tips and bought some in karlštejn restaurant from customers. that is why we went to vienna in our friend’s taxi, and before we left czechoslovakia, we hid the money in panels of the taxi. our friend did the same and left the taxi in vienna in a car park. education in communist czechoslovakia included a compulsory study of languages. russian language from grade four and a choice of a second language from grade nine. german was the most popular second choice. the language was an issue only for those who did not speak german. jano reflected, ‘i had to ask other immigrants from czechoslovakia who spoke german, to help me when i needed.’ lidia spoke german very well. she described that there were communist spies among emigrants collecting personal information. she said: ‘people who did not speak german were often revealing personal information to communist spies, and any such information was then used to the detriment of their relatives in czechoslovakia’. german language spoken in austria often had another unwelcome effect on emigrants from czechoslovakia. describing the processing stage in traiskirchen, questioning, fingerprinting, as well as the presence of security guards with guns, milos compared the situation to the nazi occupation of czechoslovakia during wwii, commenting: ‘from the beginning, it was frightening in traiskirchen. there were soldiers with guns and … they spoke very harshly in german … it brought in memories of the war.’ most participants commented that to get away from communists as far as possible was the primary reason for choosing australia as their new home. janka reflected: ‘we were not choosing much … my husband said we will go to australia because austria is too close and russians will come there too.’ having a choice between canada, the usa, south africa, australia or stay in austria, marian compared south africa's racist regime to the communist regime, saying ‘australia is a warm and free country, it would be an advantage to start in a warm place far away from communists.’ james was also appeased by the distance from the communist regime, freedom, and a warm climate and reflected: ‘i was not prepared to stay in austria with communists being just on the other side of the danube. being far away in free and warm australia, i was prepared to sleep under a bridge in the worst-case.’ although participants depicted several issues, about why they did not like to stay in dp camps, these were overshadowed by the happiness of leaving the communist regime behind and looking forward to freedom elsewhere. janka, described how she happily tolerated conditions in the place she was transferred to after being processed as a refugee. she said that having only one toilet for 400 people and terrible food was challenging, but ‘we were happy to put up with it knowing it will be only for a short time and we will be free far away from communists.’ however, as the time of departure to australia was getting closer, the happiness of looking forward to freedom was often affected by apprehension. participants started questioning if they were doing the right thing. james recalled: adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 61 yes, it was very exciting once being granted refugee status and the time of flying to australia was set. but i often wondered if i was doing the right thing leaving czechoslovakia, it was my home, and i knew that my family would be victimized for my escape. for many participants, it was the first time in their lives that they travelled overseas. emotions associated with lack of money, language issues, and living conditions were overshadowed by the promise of freedom. however, all participants echoed the extremely emotional issue about leaving their families behind, knowing they may never see them again. discussion this paper presented some personal insights into the migration process from various perspectives of participants. firstly, it was essential to reflect on the process of this research and how the insider positionality of the first author was navigated within the analysis. adopting an interpretive constructivist paradigm from an insider position based on the tradition of hermeneutics aimed towards a greater understanding of participants. the choice of the interpretive constructivist methodology was ‘vital to the credibility’ of the research (reiners 2012, p. 3). being aware of the relationship between the researcher and the topic under investigation can shape the inquiry, it was important to place participants’ stories in the foreground and the researchers’ knowledge and experiences into the background. as patton (2002, p. 64) suggests, ‘self-awareness [of ] political, cultural consciousness and ownership of one’s perspective' was paramount in this study. to manage the possibility of additive assumptions of ‘what stories were told’, the researchers were mindful that the ‘wording of questions shapes how participants respond to them’ (bowleg 2008, p. 314). hence, relaxing the structure of interviews, by giving participants the mind map, as described earlier, offered participants freedom of broader expression without the researcher ‘soliciting’ stories. with less structured questions, participants shaped the interviews themselves, volunteering the richness of their personal experiences and their meanings attributed to them. the depth and richness of the narratives shared, both verbally and through gestures and embodied expressions, was ‘understood’ by the first author’s knowledge of what certain symbols, gestures, and body languages represent in slovak cultures. this constructivist approach allowed for the elucidation of the invisibility of participants' complex embedded meanings coded within emotionally charged experiences during analysis. (ratner 2002, p. 3). this research revealed a diversity of concerns and distinct challenges and how the participants navigated them. although participants had different family backgrounds and reasons for relocation, common concerns emerged. the complexity of migration and its implications on emigrants’ lives is difficult to tease out. it is an emotional process that affects everything that matters to people and is never ‘quite over’ even when the desired destination has been reached successfully (demireva & quassoli 2019). therefore, the analysis of migration dynamics needs to consider emigrants' decisions made before emigration and allow ‘how these change with time and affect each other’ (leloup 1996, p. 101). lee (1966, p. 49) in his theoretical analysis of migration summarises ‘the decision to migrate and the process of migration’ into four categories. these are: 1) factors associated with the area of origin, 2) factors associated with the area of destination, 3) intervening obstacles, and 4) personal factors. in this study, these four factors were evidenced through participants’ narratives. for example, there were many ‘push factors’ that motivated participants to leave czechoslovakia. the majority repeatedly commented that before the communists came to power, life in czechoslovakia was hard, but people were set in their lives and dealt with problems collectively as families. participants asserted the communist regime changed their way of life, destroyed lives, and broke families. markham (2019, p. 21) argues, the introduction of united agricultural cooperatives (uac) for collectivisation of agriculture, proved to be a ‘source of dissatisfaction among people after february 1948’. the resulting systemic infrastructural change in czechoslovakia ‘mobilized real tension between individuals’ ( just 2012, p. 709). adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 62 participants also described the pre-eminence of the communist party, secret police informers, stress, and fear as major factors for their emigration. czechoslovakia was known for the surveillance of the population by secret agents, with the mission to identify citizens whose political convictions conflicted with the official stance of the communist party. similar to what mrvová (2019) argued participants in this study described how challenging it was to live with the fear that at any moment’s notice, for disagreement with the regime, the communist government could harm or take them as political prisoners. the relentless surveillance had stressful consequences on people’s psyches (stan 2011). secret police infiltrated almost every institution, and meticulous records were maintained by the ministry of interior (cepl 1992). besides the tens of thousands of agents, an estimated 140,000 people were secret police informers (pehe 1991, p. 8). this issue resonated with participants to this study, who experienced their country turning into a police state, with many people becoming secret informers, spying on their friends, relatives, co-workers, and neighbours, despite the general hatred towards communists (stan 2011). furthermore, the widespread corruption in all aspects of life was also pointed out by participants as being intolerable. this study shows that communist authoritarianism promoted a culture of corruption where ‘entire population[s] had been socialized into norms and expectations that made corruption part of their way of life’ (sandholtz & taagepera, 2005, p. 127). participants in this study depicted their reasons for emigration as being intrinsically intertwined with the respective political order of the nation-state. participants described the ‘undemocratic character of the political regime’ as one of the many ‘push factors’ for emigration (stefancik & nemcova 2015, p. 90). some personal factors also had a significant effect on a participant’s decision to emigrate. although the communist regime's ongoing injustice was perceived by participants as an act of violence, resulting in profound dissatisfaction and hatred of the regime, to take the opportunity to escape involved complex decision-making that was personal, in nature. despite the attraction of moving, many participants also spoke of the ‘dilemma of relocation’. the decision to emigrate would mean that participants would be separated from members of their family, community, and culture. the decision to escape therefore could have a detrimental effect on their relationships but also affect the escapee’s relatives left behind as it was considered a criminal offence to escape and the remaining relatives were persecuted (drbohlav 1994). most participants reflected that despite embracing the choice to leave czechoslovakia, leaving their family members behind was an emotionally excruciating experience. however, as participants depicted, while there are stages in life where positive factors at the origin are overwhelmingly important and limit emigration, sometimes such bonds can become ‘slackened with some catastrophic suddenness’ (lee 1966, p. 51). people have significant attachments to their countries of origin where they spent the formative year of their childhood, which can lead to overstated hope and ‘overvaluation of positive elements in the environment and an undervaluation of negative elements’ (lee 1966, p. 51). hoping the communist regime would collapse, participants delayed their escape even though they identified strong reasons to leave. snyder (2002, p. 269) describes hope as a ‘personal rainbow in the mind’, and a ‘way of thinking, with feelings playing an important, contributory role’ to people’s decision-making processes (snyder 2002, p. 249). however, russia’s invasion during the prague spring of 1968, was referred to by participants as the ‘final blow’ and ‘too much to ask’, consequently affecting participants’ sense of hope and hence became the final push factor to leave. another factor informing the emigration experiences of participants was the destination. australia was considered an attractive destination by participants because it was ‘far away from the communist regime’. many reflected that emigrating to european countries was not ‘far enough.’ australia, therefore, represented numerous ‘pull factors’ such as political freedom, better economic conditions, a better education system, and an opportunity to ‘start over.’ however, numerous obstacles can be experienced during this process of relocation. individuals’ perceptions of the pull and push forces influence actual migration. as lee (1966, p. 51) argues, the effect of intervening obstacles depends upon the impediments with which the migrant adamec, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 63 is being burdened and the ‘balance in favour of the move must be enough to overcome the natural inertia which exists’. participants’ stories were filled with comments such as: ‘i will never forget it as long as i live’ or “i will always remember it’ demonstrating the persisting grief and deep emotions held across decades of time post emigration. although many decades have passed since participants left their homes, the majority did not recover from their loss. price (2010) argues that this form of grief is a complex emotion and should be thought of as ‘an emotional process, which passes through several distinct phases’ from the initial phase of shock followed by searching, despair, ending with recovery when the person has adapted to the loss (price 2010, p. 30). conclusion while this study corroborates the current body of scholarly literature, it adds new depth to the understanding of the emigration from communist czechoslovakia, subjective to the deep emotional experiences dominated by individual participants' personal feelings, opinions, and partialities. through the use of ipa, a focus was maintained on each participant individually, but it also allowed for the individual findings to be balanced as commonalities, considering what was shared’, across all participants (reid, flowers & larkin 2005, p. 20). ipa allowed for the lived experiences to be understood through the shared meanings that participants reflected upon. using a specially designed mind map during interviews, allowed for an open uninterrupted, and authentic exchange of information in a form of conversation allowing participants to express their feelings and profound emotions. and, because sorrow restricts articulation (erdemir et al. 2018), to capture and understand participants’ lived experiences, it was important to make the space safe enough to hear both the verbal and the non-verbal aspects of the narratives. this study helps to better comprehend the emigration process, more specifically the impact the emigration has on the lives of emigrants. it highlighted the diversity of concerns of the emigration, reflecting on participants' different life circumstances and risk 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revised 25/05/2020; accepted 12/06/2020; published 29/06/2020. abstract in major cities across the world policy-makers are searching for new ways to represent and govern their increasingly diverse populations. in this paper we analyse the ways in which authorities in two global cities, london and toronto, have drawn on corporate, public management, strategies as their principal mode of diversity governance. in both we see a shift in policy making as a conscious attempt to reframe and re-imagine cities as corporate-like structures that can be conceptualised, represented, and managed through the lens of diversity management. in both cities specific representations of the city and its populations are curated to fulfil wider policy objectives. city governments present both as iconic centres of diversity, super-diversity or hyper-diversity, that embody and represent an era of progressive globalisation and new forms of contemporary cosmopolitan living. the presence of diversity is celebrated and seen a key component of ‘success agendas’. this paper is based on empirical evidence derived from a policy-oriented research project in both cities. policy analysis and critical discourse analysis are conducted in both cities on the basis of review of policy documents at national, local and community scales, and interviews with policy makers. the paper first frames diversity as a technology of description, where we explain how diversity has become a curation strategy in public management within the framework of growing mobility of management frameworks and shifts in framing diversity in urban policies. we will then provide a comparative analysis of london and toronto. keywords diversity; urban governance; public management; curation; global cities declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this project has received funding from the european union’s seventh framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 319970 divercities. the views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the european commission. mailto:m.raco@ucl.ac.uk http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.6835 44 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 introduction in major cities across the world policy-makers are searching for new ways to represent and govern their increasingly diverse and cosmopolitan populations. an intense and polarised academic and political debate has emerged. some view the growth of diversity as a threat to place cohesion and collective identities and economic well-being (goodhart 2017). governments, it is argued, at multiple scales should work to limit diversity and focus on meeting the needs of local population groups. others argue, conversely, that new forms of inclusive (urban) cosmopolitanism are emerging and that this is stimulating dynamic economic growth and new forms of socio-cultural vibrancy, inclusiveness, and urban vitality (borén & young 2013). what both groups of writers agree on is that the growth of sociocultural and economic diversity is presenting new challenges for the governance models that have been used to plan for the growth of cities and the role and structure of welfare states. during the 1990s and 2000s public management [pm] frameworks have expanded, within which public welfare agencies have increasingly looked to private sector practices and systems-management models to govern and implement social policy programmes. the growth of diversity has created new challenges for such approaches as the demands of populations have become more varied and complex. in this paper we comparatively analyse the ways in which authorities in two global cities, london and toronto, have sought to navigate a policy path to meet these new challenges. in both we see the implementation of reformed, but more intense, pm approaches being rolled-out and a conscious attempt to reframe and re-imagine cities and their diverse populations as corporate-like structures. by drawing on private sector narratives this approach, we show, has required the mobilisation of specific and carefully selective curations of diversity and its role in generating both economic competitiveness and an enhanced cosmopolitanism. these curations view the presence of diversity as something to be made visible, celebrated and valued. moreover, they seek to marginalise broader concerns and conflicts over the impacts of demographic change and direct attention towards more consensual cultural narratives such as ‘vibrancy’, global city ‘branding’ and enhanced economic performance. such policy fields are relatively safe in political terms. they are highly instrumental and focus on ‘collective benefits’ and the contributions that diversity makes to economic growth and cultural life. in our case study cities, the curation of ‘diversity’ has therefore been brought into being as a vehicle for both describing new ‘realities’ and generating managerial techniques and technologies to govern them within the frame of a success agenda. moreover, diversity discourses can be seen as a new corporatized version of cosmopolitanism, that enables policy-makers to bypass structural issues such racism and inequalities, and instead, focus on operational terminologies over the presence or absence ‘of diversity’ amongst population groups and labour markets (bhanot 2015). this shift displays a form of bridging institutional entrepreneurship, which, according to management literature, allows combining aspects of established institutional logics to create new forms of hybrid logics (tracey et al. 2011). from this point of view, we argue that while diversity is curated as a public celebration through new forms of hybrid logics, a pm approach is deployed to allow policy makers to cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 45 downplay issues like growing inequality, polarization and poverty along racial and ethnic lines in each city; or to put selective emphasises on other social phenomena. in short, it represents the extension of managerial systems theory to the governance of cities and urban populations in which more challenging policy questions concerning, for instance, the impacts of migration on housing, employment, and local politics remain firmly off mainstream political agendas and become residualised. the discussion draws on a major international research project to develop a comparative analysis of the relationships between urban policy agendas and content curating policy discourses in london and toronto, two cities in which policy-makers have made strident claims over their ‘successes’ in managing and promoting beneficial forms of sociocultural diversity. they provide a powerful contrast and comparison for this article. both have undergone structural quantitative and qualitative demographic changes since the 1980s. city authorities have sought to curate notions of diversity as core components of their inward investment and economic development strategies. the uk and canada have also been at the forefront of pm reforms since the 1980s and more recently have adopted post financial crisis agendas that are designed to boost growth and inward investment into their built environments. our selection of case studies and our intensive research methods were designed to bring out the comparable policy trajectories evident in both cities, while also addressing specific place-based contextual factors that influence implementation (peters & fontaine 2020). we show that in both, the corporatisation of urban diversity seeks to depoliticise many of the contested aspects of demographic and socio-cultural change, and has met with limited success. on a wider canvas we use the research to reflect on the ways in which pm agendas of the 1980s and 90s are expanding into the governance of new fields of social policy, such as those relating to diversity and its effects. such agendas are premised on top-down models of governing that lack contextual awareness and conceive of policy problems and solutions as generic projects to be identified and tackled through the application of abstract instruments (lascoumbes & le galès 2012). governing cities, the new public management and the shift towards diversity curation urban planning and social policy have long been concerned with fundamental questions over diversity, cosmopolitanism and the spatial configuration of different groups of citizens and communities. during the 1990s and 2000s various terms were used in many eu cities to promote multi-cultural visions and pluralist forms of thinking that saw diversity as something ‘permanent’ and to be welcomed (borén & young 2013). specific policy interventions were called upon to support different needs, with diversity presented as a natural consequence of the demographic changes and economic realities brought into being by heightened globalisation. the most influential early writings on the topic in the 2000s were produced by the anthropologist steve vertovec (2007; 2010) and his conceptualisation of ‘super-diversity’ that addressed the shifting form and character of complexifying urban diversity especially in relation to migration, and offered an operational frame of analysis (see also wessendorf 2013). again, reflecting on the complexity of diversity conceptualizations, some others incorporated intersectionality (foner et al. 2019; mccall 2005), seeking to move beyond the 46 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 traditional focus on ethnicity or class. looking from a more governance-oriented perspective, a hyper-diversity approach emphasized the possibility of various identities acting simultaneously in individuals, emphasising the importance of capturing dynamics and patterns of behaviour, lifestyles, and activities in the life cycle of individuals through community-oriented policy framings (taşan-kok et al. 2013). while these discussions provided influential frameworks of analysis, a combination of economic and political crises during the 2010s has re-shaped the landscape of european migration politics and has moved the scholarly focus from urban diversity and identity towards broader questions of governance, (neo-liberal) welfare reform and growing inequalities (raco & taşan-kok 2019). optimistic cosmopolitan writers saw growing diversity as a direct challenge to traditional, nationally-organised forms of citizenship and identity (see delanty 2006; held 2006). for a group of post-political writers and thinkers the future seemed to be inexorably associated with multi-culturalism and the expansion of progressive politics (giddens 1994). governments and populations had little alternative but to accept that globalisation was here to stay, and that growing urban diversity was a core component of it. in rancière’s (2010) terms, a new millennial thinking dominated imaginations in which the continued existence of racism, prejudice, and conflict in cities became elided with the ‘backwardness’ of specific interests and the failure of sections of society to understand the pervasiveness of the new realities unfolding around them (goodhart 2017). at the same time, the structures of urban governance in many western cities, especially in the uk and north america, were being systematically re-configured by systems-led public management theories and practices (clarke & newman 2012). all public bodies became subject to corporate systems-approaches and the extension of target cultures and private sector practices. these approaches were principally developed during the 1950s in the fields of organisational studies and management sciences and their transfer to the public sector has been a complex and contested process (mirowski 2002; thrift 2005). they represent an attempt to synthesise and analyse the breaking down of governance problems and challenges into logical and effective compartmentalisations and hierarchical structures of order (ackoff 1990; kast & rosenzweig 1972). under pm reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, public institutions responsible for planning and urban policy were required to re-imagine themselves as corporate-like, private sector agencies delivering services to citizen-as-consumers, defined through ‘a narrow conception of the consumer, imagined in neoliberal terms as a rational self-maximising economic individual’ (bevir & trentmann 2007, p.1). through the application of such practices and techniques, governance processes, it was argued, would become more efficient and effective and better able to deal with the day-to-day challenges facing governing authorities (pierre 1999). however, the growth of cosmopolitanism and diversity poses a significant, yet underresearched, challenge to these pm models. the presence of citizens with a broader range of material needs and socio-cultural outlooks has required the introduction of new systems and approaches, if management reforms are to be effective and seen to be legitimate. during the 2000s policy makers and planners have therefore increasingly looked to private sector models cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 47 of ‘diversity management’ for solutions to the growing challenges that they face. the term first emerged in the us corporate management textbooks of the 1980s and 1990s and was used in that context to highlight the advantages that could accrue to employers that sought out more diverse teams of employees and managers (lauring 2009). there are two elements that are particularly significant for our discussion. first, diversity management adopts a supply-side perspective with the claim that businesses obtain a competitive advantage by encouraging greater diversity within their workforces (see rose & miller 2010; swan 2010; syrett & sepulveda 2012). contemporary management texts call on firms to re-shape their recruitment practices to take account of the practical consequence that people from different cultural backgrounds may have different belief structures, priorities, perceptions, assumptions about future events, beliefs about the role of information, and information-processing methods (das neves & melé 2013). global management consultancies such as mckinsey’s (2015) have produced publications including why diversity matters to implore their client companies to establish ‘talent pipelines’ to manage the diversity of their workforces: ‘companies in the top quartile for racial and ethnic diversity are 35% more likely to have financial returns above their respective national industry medians’ (p.3). second, managerial narratives have also focused on demand-side factors and meeting the needs of citizens-as-customers. demands, it is argued, are becoming increasingly linked to cultural and social diversification and by establishing new forms of diversity awareness, companies are able to vary their approaches to management and open up more successful ‘customer-focused’ outlooks. a more visibly diverse workforce also establishes new possibilities for corporate branding and the explicit promotion of a corporate social responsibility agenda. influential texts such as gundling and zanchettin’s (2011) global diversity, set out a series of measures to help managers navigate increasingly complex markets consisting of diverse consumers. it claims that ‘the consistent winners in the marketplace are firms offering products adapt to fit local variations in needs and tastes that are presented by people who know how to use the buyer’s own language’ (pp. 2-3). it is in this context that reformed pm theorisations and practices are emerging founded on both a re-assertion of systems theories of management and the creation new frames of reference around the managerial concept of content curation, both of which are being adopted from the private sector. the rise of optimistic, managerial, and de-politicised visions of diversity have become increasingly influential for policy-makers, particularly in global cities, with firms such as pwc and other consultancies publishing good practice guides for how to govern and manage change. in framing cities as ‘diverse’ or ‘cosmopolitan’, policy-makers are able to develop a managerial focus around which to organise systems, policies, and projects. diverse cities can be re-imagined and governed as corporations, that are simultaneously diverse and bounded entities. the managerial practices surrounding ‘content curation’ have played a growing role, particularly in the wake of growing economically and culturally diverse populations. in the same way that domains such as ‘the economy’ are brought into existence through the use of economic theories (cf. rose & miller 2010), so curations such as ‘urban diversity’ are being used to generate representations of urban 48 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 populations and convert them into manageable spaces of governance for, and to whom, pm systems of governance can be applied. the emphasis on curation as taken from the private sector seems to address a number of governance problems simultaneously: meeting increasingly diverse social and cultural and welfare needs; promoting economic growth; and generating new forms of engagement and inclusivity. while these policy frames are presented as inclusive and empowering, the real challenges of responding to the diverse claims of increasingly complex urban societies are hidden behind them. curations do not simply describe places and populations but play a role in bringing them into existence, by creating objects and transforming them into ‘realities’, subject to governmental action. in corporate management, communication is an important aspect of the act of managing. corporations manufacture content of communications by the official communicators (corporate curators) in diverse ways but the main idea is to push the essence of the company strategy to the public and employees with a ‘content curation strategy’. by following these strategies large corporations communicate their products through interactive and collaborative methods with their customers and employees, and create a perception that diverse voices are heard in the strategy making process. in this way, content curation in corporate terms functions in the form of a technology of representation (ahmed 2012), which is deployed to frame imaginations and visualisations of cities. content curation is about framing a relevant content and then sharing or presenting it to audiences in a targeted and optimised way. in corporate management, the quality of the product is defined on the basis of the curated content (ibid.) and while much of the literature on place-marketing examines how ‘almost all major cities now apply these [marketing and branding] strategies to improve their image’ (boisen et al. 2018, p. 1), there is less emphasis on how specific and selective curations of diversity are developed and operationalised. however, the intensification of pm systems through forms of curation generate new tensions in the governance of contemporary cities. rather than accepting that modern populations generate complex demands that could act as a source of conflict, there is a danger that a post-political managerialism acts to ‘to simplify the world, attempting to gain for itself the powers of expertise by resolving it into simple forces and oppositions’ (mitchell 2002, p. 34). technical and managerial policy narratives can rapidly descend into simplified characterisations of the essential characteristics of groups of citizens and communities who have little say over how they are assigned and what these representations consist of. lived places become spaces of governance in which ‘institutions and rules appear separate from the supposedly material world they govern’ (p. 8). indeed, for critics such as bauman (2013), managerial visions of diversity ‘act as a catalyst triggering the production and selfperpetuation of difference, and the efforts to build a community around it’ (p. 77). in some instances, the desire to present an ‘accurate’ picture of diversity, leads to ‘recognition wars’ between groups that require combatants to absolutise their differences (bauman 2013). the result, as michaels (2016, p. 33) notes is not only that ‘the successes of the struggle against discrimination have failed to alleviate inequality, but that they have been compatible with a radical expansion of it’. a focus on tolerance and diversity legitimates neo-liberal capitalism ‘because it is exploitation, not discrimination, that is the primary producer of inequality cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 49 today’ (p. 34). these material inequalities have expanded in almost every society despite decades of civil rights legislation and even within the corporate sector diversity narratives have co-evolved with management practices of downscaling and flexibilization, and have played a part in creating greater labour market inequalities (zanoni & janssens 2004). in the next sections we draw on our case work in two diverse global cities, london and toronto, to analyse the curations of diversity that have been deployed by public authorities and some of the managerial technologies that are used to implement these strategies. our research consisted of three parts in both cities: a detailed critical discourse analysis of the core strategies and policy frameworks relating to diversity planning, social policy and economic development strategies; over 60 semi-structured interviews with practitioners, business representatives, civil society groups; and focus groups with key players. we divide the discussion into two parts to examine forms of curation that are designed for different audiences. in the first, we examine the externally-oriented curations, which are part of globally-focused pm competitiveness agendas that seek to build ‘corporate identities’ for the two cities, in ways similar to those deployed by private sector companies. the second section, conversely, covers the internally-oriented curations that are designed to play an important political role in reducing conflict over diversity and cosmopolitanism within the cities. techniques of managerialism are used such as the selective curation of quantitative data metrics and an instrumental emphasis on the ‘benefits’ that diversity brings. here we discuss how policy-makers curate public services in the cities are ‘models’ for private sector action and use diversity narratives to legitimate shape potentially controversial reforms. we show how curations of city governments as model employers have been introduced (a form of supply curation) along with a new emphasis on establishing responsive governance systems that are more ‘in touch’ with diverse populations (a form of demand curation). we begin by giving some context to contemporary policy challenges in both cities. the growth of diversity in london and toronto: policy challenges for public managers toronto and london are amongst the best examples of a new generation of socially and culturally diverse global cities. in 2016 toronto had an estimated population of about 2.81 million greater in its census metropolitan area (cma). it is the most populous city in canada and nearly half of its population is foreign-born. this gives toronto the second-highest percentage of foreign-born residents of all world cities after miami although, unlike miami, it possesses no dominant culture or nationality, which also makes it one of the world’s most ethnically diverse cities. just under half (49%) of the population belong to a visible minority group (compared to 14% in 1981), and visible minorities are expected to hit a majority of 63% of the toronto cma population by the 2020s (toronto population, 2020). london has similarly been defined by writers such as as a city of ‘super-diversity’ (vertovec 2007). the 2011 census revealed that out of a total population of 8.17 million, 2.6 million (31%) were born outside of the uk. moreover, 55% of respondents defined themselves as other than white british (including both residents who hold a foreign passport and british citizens from black and minority ethnic backgrounds). this proportion has risen from 31% in 1991. the 50 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 city is home to 41% of all non-white british residents of england and wales, to 37% of all residents born outside the uk and to 24% of all non-uk nationals. alongside this ethnic and cultural diversity, socio-economic inequalities have also expanded relentlessly in both cities in the wake of neo-liberal welfare reforms, economic change, and shifts in housing markets. diversity has become associated with a growing divergence in life chances, opportunities, and incomes. as douglass et al. (2012) argue, global cities have become increasingly associated with new forms of ‘enclave urbanism’ in which powerful elites live in exclusive and increasingly gated and gentrified parts of the city (atkinson 2019). dorling (2014) similarly draws on numerical evidence to show that inequalities in ‘diverse’ global cities are now higher than at any time since the nineteenth century. despite london’s overall economic vitality, 28% of the population live in households that are in poverty (after housing costs) compared with the uk figure of 22%, covering more than two million londoners. both cities are also in the grip of housing crises, particularly in relation to affordability (jacobs & manzi 2019). increasing numbers of citizens are finding it impossible to access housing and overcrowding has become a growing problem. so, while there has been a significant growth of socio-cultural diversity in both cities, this has gone hand-in-hand with growing inequalities and political conflicts. similarly, hulckhanski’s (2007) work on toronto clearly shows how the city is segregated along the lines of race and income, and how poverty has moved from the centre to the edges of the city. the proportion of low-income neighbourhoods went up from 19% in 1970 to 53% in 2005 and it has the highest rates of poverty and child poverty amongst canada’s 20 largest cities. the share of low-income households is 19%, which is significantly greater than in canada (14.9%). poverty and income segregation also have a strong racial and ethnic component. a 2018 toronto child & family poverty report notes that 84% of indigenous families with children live in poverty. moreover, 33.3% of children from minority backgrounds in live in poverty, while this figure is much lower for other groups (15.1%). within this framework, in both cities ethnic diversity is the focus of attention, with less attention given to its intersections with growing material inequalities and power structures. however, as we demonstrate in the next section dominant policy narratives and instruments are moving in different directions, bypassing these challenges and focusing on less politically-divisive and carefully curated entrepreneurial notions of diversity and cosmopolitanism. we focus, in turn, on the externallyand internally-oriented forms of pm curation that are being mobilised. forms of diversity curations in london and toronto externally-oriented curations of diversity and cosmopolitanism city governments in both london and toronto have used selective curations of diversity as a means of promoting their cities to external audiences and to encourage externally-financed forms of economic growth. the presence of ethnic diversity takes centre-stage and takes on some of the ‘work’ given to the term in private sector managerial narratives. most cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 51 significantly, the diversity has been re-defined and commodified and acts as a cornerstone place-marketing tool to attract direct foreign investment and mobile consumers, such as tourists and students. it is used as a narrative to encourage investors and skilled workers to inmigrate in ways that go beyond the simplifications associated with decades of urban placemarketing. in both, direct references to ‘creative class’ agendas with the presence of sociocultural diversity elided with visions of competitive labour markets and used as a springboard to attract investment in high-tech and ‘creative’ industries. diversity and openness are equated with a ‘talent agenda’, with policy-makers and economic development strategies openly drawing on the language and rhetoric associated with millennial visions of open, global economies and new types of economic activity. openness to a diversity of people, it is claimed, has allowed firms to attract workers at all levels, from the higher skilled professions to lower skilled workers, often at relatively little cost to employers. the promotion of diversity therefore brings social and economic policy objectives together, as the curation of a ‘welcoming’ city acts as magnet for further immigration. in toronto, for instance, dominant narratives of social policy are framed around the city’s adopted motto of ‘diversity: our strength’. these curations apply not only to newcomers but to a wide range of groups and individuals, including: seniors; youth; women; lgbt lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and queer; persons with disabilities; ethnic minorities; the homeless; and indigenous peoples (ahmadi & taşan-kok 2013). the current toronto official plan (2015) presents a vision for the city with ‘diversity and opportunity’ as one of the underlying principles, which is frequently cited regarding the city’s success agenda (özogul & taşan-kok 2016). it notes that ‘diversity is our strength because it means vibrancy, opportunity, inclusiveness and adaptability – it is a fundamental building block for success. to be successful, our future must also be diverse, inclusive and equitable’. central toronto is described as ‘toronto’s image to the world’ with comfortable, cosmopolitan, civil, urbane and diverse living conditions. in recent years the focus of immigration policy shifted from building citizenship to importing economic capital as an asset-based approach to diversity. following the predecessor’s ‘strength’ motto, the ‘progressive conservative’ mayor john tory’s city government approach also curated diversity as part of a success agenda but with a ‘technology’ twist. as advocate for innovative economy, the tory administration emphasises gender and ethnicity diversity especially for tech innovation. the economic agencies that are financially connecting the city to the global economic networks also frame diversity as a strength. these agencies, either as part of the city administration or independent, has become especially important for the ‘innovative economy’ agenda of the tory administration. in 2016 the mayor created a position for an ‘innovation chief’, officially announced as ‘advocate for the innovation economy’ (galang 2016). according to tory, this ‘[…] will encourage collaboration between the tech sector, government, and corporate partners and encourage more diversity within the sector’ (ibid.). in june 2017, the city of toronto’s economic development commission’s chair and councillor (galang 2017) framed diversity as a ‘big part of what makes toronto’s economy unique and competitive’. in the same event mayor tory indicated that ‘diversity and inclusion are a huge part of our 52 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 value proposition and i will be supporting and championing those events that help build that reputation at home and globally’ (rider 2017). similarly, several marketing, investment and branding agencies were used in toronto (such as invest toronto, toronto global, clear space) to define the diversity as an ‘unmatched pool of talent, skills and experience’ for the city. in support of these claims, the toronto region is marketed as one of the most educated populations in the world, with a ‘diverse labor pool’. here, diversity is framed through the curated advantages of its large immigrant population, which ‘attracts and creates investment in new areas with the ability to do business in your native tongue’ (toronto global 2020). these marketing and branding efforts frame toronto and its surrounding region as a welcoming home to all cultures and ethnicities and this labour-force oriented approach seems to embrace diversity for increasing the competitive advantage of the city. however, next to the growing inequality, polarization and poverty along racial and income lines in the city (see http://neighbourhoodchange.ca/) housing conditions have also been worsening, with a lack of access to affordable housing, especially for minority groups and low and middle income workers, becoming a divisive and growing political fault line. the rental vacancy rate is 1.2%, which is actually 0.9% for larger units for families; as the rents went on a historically high level, apartment viewings attract hundreds of people at once, and affordable housing lotteries are organised to select among thousands of households to be located in a few available units (collie 2018). this trend is mostly a result of increasing production of owneroccupied residential units in the form of condominiums through financial market mortgage tools mainly concentrated in the downtown and waterfront areas but also elsewhere in the city (rosen & walks 2015). although rental construction is reported to be slowly rising in the city, the average rent for two-bedroom housing units is the highest in the city as reported in october 2018 at $2,173/month in central toronto and ranging between $1,100-$1,800 in the outer suburbs. in london, similarly, there has been an attempt to use pm narratives to demonstrate that the city’s ‘success’ rests in large part on the presence of cosmopolitan diversity and the contributions that migrant workers play in supporting its economy. in a direct challenge to national policy agendas and the rise of anti-migration rhetoric, there has been an attempt to curate the benefits of cosmopolitan openness. in 2017 the mayor launched a london is open agenda that was explicitly designed to counter ‘hostile’ narratives surrounding brexit and the policies of national governments. as the mayor stated, ‘i want all londoners to be in no doubt: london is open and no matter where you’re from, you will always belong here’. a concerted effort has been made to brand the city as a type of coherent corporation, competing in global markets and citing its diverse ‘labour force’ as a core asset. however, the importance given to diversity and cosmopolitanism in these externallyoriented curations downplay some of the divisive issues that surround globalisation and the internationalisation of investment in the city. the property and investment market, particularly in regard to real estate, has been booming but in ways that are helping to fuel a crisis of affordability for many existing residents. the average house price in london is £478,853 (gov.uk), beyond the research of many residents, encouraging more to move into the private rented sector, which is also experiencing rapid inflation and has grown to an http://neighbourhoodchange.ca/ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 53 average of £309/week (wheatley et al. 2019). as in toronto, the inequalities generated by these processes and the presence of high-income, high-skilled workers are downplayed and subsumed under a ‘united’ curation in which the cities are represented, in the words of one interviewee in london, as being ‘like a plc [public limited company]’, or a corporate body that is competitive and united. both cities are represented as commodities to be sold in global markets and which possess dynamic labour forces and skills. however, both have struggled to manage the material consequences of increasing diversity and inequality, which requires extra attention under market-driven planning models that both cities follow. evidence of this is found in toronto city’s current official plan that underlines the need for private sector involvement, resulting in massive reinvestment in up-marketing the existing housing stock through increased deregulation of planning (özogul & taşan-kok 2018). these tensions between the focus on externallyand internally-oriented curations are particularly acute in the attempts to implement new pm agendas in the two cities and it is to these that the paper now turns. internally-oriented curation strategies in london and toronto within both cities there is a remarkable degree of commonality in the discourses of diversity that are adopted, in large part reflecting the implementation of systems-based forms of pm, taken directly from management narratives and practices within the private sector. in each, there is an attempt to curate diversity through the construction of concerted strategies underpinned by measurable, quantitative targets and ‘corporate strategic actions’. through such measures it is imagined that the cities can be treated like corporate bodies, with diversity converted into a field of targeted governmental intervention crossing a range of social and economic policy fields. diversity-awareness and its promotion are designed to cover the ‘full range’ of government activities and act as a focal point for policy-making and practice. figure 1 sets out the city of toronto (cot)’s corporate strategic actions (2012, p. 3). these curate diversity as being at the heart of a governmental vision statement, highlighting that diversity is ‘valued and celebrated’ and diverse ‘communities are a source of pride’ in seeking to advance the city council’s vision, mission, and goals. cot’s strategic plan 20132018 establishes core priorities, and these are supplemented by sectoral plans for core areas (such as public health strategy, aboriginal employment strategy, children’s services plan, and equity, diversity & human rights, etc.) as of 2019. the strategic actions document highlights six strategic themes namely city building, economic vitality, environmental sustainability, social development, good governance, and fiscal sustainability with the ambition to integrate planning and performance frameworks within the complex governance structure of cot. this highlights diversity as a benefit for the economy. for instance, while setting the goals to accelerate economic growth, it aims to leverage ‘toronto’s diversity as an economic driver and asset’. the document makes it clear that cot ‘strives to provide high quality and affordable services that respond to the needs of our communities and invests in infrastructure to support city building’ (p. 3). these curations are reflected and reproduced in an integrated planning model, that seeks to guide the ‘service planning and budgeting process’ (p. 6). in the same vein, referring to toronto as a ‘complex city’, the strategic plan (2013-2018) 54 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 highlights that providing ‘customized solutions that reflect the diversity of character and social profile…will require both intra-divisional and inter-divisional involvement and broad public engagement’ (p. 33). cot claims that by incorporating diversity through such pm structures, it facilitates an ‘all-inclusive’ approach, with ‘participatory practices’ becoming a part of daily governance practices. figure 1: toronto’s corporate strategic actions strategic priority corporate strategic actions advance toronto’s motto diversity is our strength • developing and implementing a social procurement policy • implementing accessibility for ontarians with disabilities act • seeking community advice and input on access, equality and diversity • ensuring that access, equity and diversity are advanced through all city services, policies and programmes enhance the city’s capacity to serve toronto’s diversity • increasing the diversity of toronto public service • integrating diversity objectives into corporate-wide structures • developing an equity, diversity and human rights corporate model • standardising and improving the city’s measurement and reporting of progress • aligning access, equity diversity and human rights objectives with the development of a common management framework, workforce plan and performance measurement and indicators system develop and implement a workforce plan – a talent blueprint • strengthening employee engagement • ensuring public service reflects the population we serve and values and champions diversity • building workforce capacity to ensure adaptable and high-performing employees with the right skills are in the right job at the right time to meet our current and future needs • developing effective leaders • modernising critical human resource systems and services source: strategic plan (2015) however, despite the highlighted attempt to embed the ‘consistent application’ of diversity principles into ‘policy development, program delivery, evaluation, and reporting’ at all levels, market-oriented priorities shadow the discursive claims to be principally focused on addressing diverse community needs. in direct mimicking of private corporations, the 2015-2018 strategic plan produced by equity, diversity & human rights division identifies formal service outcomes that focus on becoming an ‘employer of choice’, ‘customer service excellence’, and ‘increased public confidence’ (shakir 2015). this will be delivered through an integrated functions model and a division strategy map that extend performance cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 55 management and target-setting to the full range of corporate strategic actions outlined in figure 1. figure 2 similarly outlines the core features of mayor of london’s (2017) vision for a diverse and inclusive city set out, in highly managerial terms, ‘priority areas for action’ (p.8). the strategy represents a set of tensions between the need to establish compartmentalised, structured and closed systems of governmental practice to be managed and the realisation that the objectives of diversity planning are stretched so broadly that the number of policy fields has multiplied. their plurality now includes mixed housing, small business premises and support networks, poverty reduction, education and skills provision, quality training, enhanced community and citizen engagement, accessible labour markets, affordable transport networks, and the impacts of crime and security. in each, communities have taken on the role of acting as both the subjects and objects of policy with the objective of creating an ‘empathetic city’, in which greater tolerance and understanding will ‘ensure that our growing diversity strengthens, rather than erodes, the social fabric of our neighbourhoods’ (mayor of london 2018, p.5). figure 2: themes and policy actions in mayor of london’s vision for a diverse and inclusive city theme policy action a great place to live • affordable, accessible decent homes • places where people and businesses can prosper • an inclusive city • strong, connected communities a great place to grow up • child poverty reduction • inclusive and accessible education • a skilled future workforce • healthy childhoods a great place to work and do business • a skilled workforce • decent jobs • inclusive employers • thriving businesses getting around • affordable transport • inclusive transport network • healthy streets • safer journeys a healthy, green, safe and enjoyable city • healthy londoners • cleaner air and better access to green spaces • a safer city • inclusive arts, culture and sports • digital inclusions leading by example • an inclusive employer • a responsible procurer • an open and engaged organisation source: taken from mayor of london (2017) 56 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 there are two distinct elements of curation that are present in the development of these strategies. first, in creating strategies and ‘measurable’ programmes of action the emphasis is on the creation of calculable representations of diversity that convert it into a problem of government to be addressed through managerial practices and actions. in the london case there is even a curation of the mayor’s social evidence base that will allow the city authorities ‘to track the specific impact of policies and projects’ and enable policy-makers to ‘plan strategically to improve social integration and invest more in the initiatives that are working best’ (mayor of london 2018, p.68). more significantly the collection and representation of london-wide data is designed to act a basis to promote a greater sense of awareness and integration in the city: ‘the importance of collecting data on social integration goes beyond measuring success. improving the evidence base can also be a way of promoting social integration. it allows londoners to become aware of how social integration affects our wellbeing and prosperity’. moreover, in governmental language ‘it puts into context the powerful contribution that all londoners make to the success of our city…and find collective solutions’. (p. 68). such binding curations are important in the city as recent evidence shows that in terms of cross-cultural social networks london is the least integrated region of the uk (social integration commission 2014). they also play a role in generating externally-oriented forms of curation. the creation of a comprehensive social database, for instance, is designed to ‘make the social evidence base widely available to others…to allow individuals and organisations, nationally and internationally, to benefit from london’s work and the mayor’s focus on social integration’ (mayor of london 2018, p. 14). similarly, in toronto, the focus of policy is increasingly targeted towards the development of new statistical and managerial representations that describe and prescribe policy goals, systems, and targets. indices and statistics are used as a form of curation to show sceptical groups that ‘all’ stand to benefit from the promotion of diversity and cosmopolitanism and that an urban policy focused on the ‘requirements’ of such groups would be for the benefit of all. objective representations including reports, strategies, census data, and other materials are used to ‘demonstrate’ and calculate the value of diversity in quantitative and sometimes qualitative terms. in this way, the politics of diversity has been converted into a technical discussion in which policy deliberations focus on how to extract maximum benefit from socio-economic changes. in mitchell’s (2002) terms city economies and territories became constituted through ‘a set of practices that put in place a new politics of calculation’ (p.8). the perceived value of such managerialism is that it provides legitimacy for a more positive conception of diversity and can be used to demonstrate to sceptical groups that policy-makers are ‘in control’ and are managing the wider impacts of enhanced diversity. by curating the two cities as corporate-like bodies, there is little direct reflection on the broader politics of diversity, other than a belief that by creating new representations, more integrated and cohesive forms of governmentality will emerge, as individuals and communities think of themselves as part of a collective urban whole. it is also clear that both the subjects and objects of diversity governance are to be citizens and communities who are the only ones that ‘can make a real difference…and give us a renewed sense that we are united as neighbours, as citizens, and as londoners’ (mayor of london 2018, p. 5). the idea cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 57 of a ‘united identity’ through an entrepreneurial discourse is also emphasised to ‘unite this city as one toronto’ as a ‘place where there is opportunity for all’ by the mayor of toronto (tory 2014). the policy towards diversity is, paradoxically, focused on establishing representations of difference and divergence between individuals and communities, but then seeking to manage their interactions and develop them through a social integration strategy consisting of four parts: relationships, participation, equality, and evidence. each is compartmentalised and broken down into a series of measurements, themes and numbered policies and priorities, and seek to convert the qualitative outlooks and relationships that exist between individuals and communities into quantifiable and measurable sources of data. and yet, despite this reframing of management systems as ‘output-focused’, respondents in both cities were candid about their lack of authority to deliver on their diversity strategies. in london it was noted that policies relating to diversity were generated and implemented across local and national government departments, making it difficult to coordinate and delivery policy at the city (and sub-city) scale. similarly, in toronto government actors highlighted their limited capacities to deliver on a range of policies, especially those relating to structural labour market and neighbourhood changes. such sentiments were widely shared in our research and indicate that despite the deployment of managerial systems and carefully curated representations, the underlying reality is one of making trade-offs and taking potentially divisive decisions over resource allocations and policy priorities. their role, it was noted, was often to ‘encourage’ other organisations to work collectively towards meeting broader strategic targets, but as with all local government spending, agencies working at the urban level are facing significant budget cuts, many of which are instigated by central government in the wake of the global financial crisis. at the time of writing [2020], the city of toronto was facing dramatic budget cuts with a c$1.5billion proposed reduction. severe reductions are expected in welfare capacities that would see over 40,000 child-care subsidies disappear, the closure of over 60 community centres, library branch closures and dramatic reductions in other services (pagliaro 2020). this would directly impact on the ability of government departments to deliver the diversity strategy, whatever the positive curations presented to different audiences. similarly, in london, centre for london (2019) research shows that local government spending has suffered a reduction of 17% from 20102019, from £879/capita to £729/capita, or approximately 35% when inflation is considered. as they note, this has led to cutbacks in services and infrastructure required for the delivery of diversity programmes, with even deeper cuts occurring in poorer boroughs. but most significantly the new agendas also seek to reform public services to be more ‘in-line’ with the diversity of citizens and to use visible curations of diversity to achieve this. as cot’s director of the diversity division claims, ‘we will…create a public service that is representative of the population it serves, while harnessing the intellectual capital of a diverse workforce for the benefit out our city’ (shakir 2015, p.1). both authorities are using their powers as employers and procurers to try to shape the governmentalities and practices of others. again, there is a remarkable degree of consistency between the cases, reflecting and reproducing the corporate management literatures on ‘effective’ diversity strategies. the cot’s strategic action 17 seeks to ‘enhance the city’s capacity to serve toronto’s diversity’ 58 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 that explicitly draws on ‘developing an equity, diversity, and human rights corporate model’, and ‘aligning’ these objectives with the development of a ‘common management plan, workforce plan, and performance measurement and indicators system’. in corporate language the cot claims that ‘a public service workforce that reflects the diversity of its community best serves its customers’ (city of toronto 2014, p. 12, emphasis added). the emphasis on citizens as ‘customers’ is further reinforced in the claims that ‘a good understanding of our customers leads directly to a high quality customer service’ and ‘a diverse workforce better understands the needs of the pubic from the public’s perspective, engages better with different communities, expands organisational creativity, improves outof-the box thinking and increases our ability to cope with change’. this will be implemented through an equity survey, followed by the introduction of evidence-based managerial actions, outcomes, metrics and programmes. in london the mayor’s strategy has the explicit objective to ‘lead by example’ and become ‘models of inclusive employers, responsible procurers and open and transparent organisations, engaged with all the communities we serve’. much of the policy discourse is taken directly from the language of management consultancy firms, such as the named shapiro consulting (2011), whose narratives are used in claims such as ‘recruiting diverse workforces and supporting them with inclusive cultures will give us the basis for that level of performance and innovation’ (p. 41). creative environments, it is argued, will emerge through the implementation of formal, managed, and prescriptive management systems targeted on diversity-led objectives and outcomes. procurement and the compliance of subcontractors are seen as integral components of the diversity strategy as they ‘support diversity and inclusion, economic fairness, and social integration by widening out [sic.] of skills, training and employment opportunities’ (p. 41). public bodies in london and toronto are also using their influence as employers to provide role models for the private sector and what are seen as progressive labour market practices. for instance, the greater london assembly’s recruitment advertisements since 2011 have carried the following explicit statement of intent, ‘london’s diversity is its biggest asset and we strive to ensure our workforce reflects london's diversity at all levels. applications from black, asian and minority ethnic candidates will be particularly welcomed as they are currently under-represented in this area of our organisation’ (greater london assembly 2015, p.4). in the case of london some of the most significant reforms have been undertaken to public services that have been at the forefront of interactions with socially and culturally diverse groups. one of the most significant fissures between the state and minority communities has concerned policing and the activities of london’s metropolitan police service. for decades these relations have been at the centre of debates over social cohesion and disconnection in the city. recent reforms have established an explicit commitment to ‘create a police force that reflects and understands london’s diversity so it can continue to effectively policy a growing metropolis’ (metropolitan police service [mps] 2017, p. 2). policies, explicitly cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 59 drawing on the work of consultancy deloitte (2011), aim to ‘build a more diverse met that understands far better the city it serves…with more officers from every community in the capital’ (ibid.). in order to achieve this stated ambition a recruitment policy has been introduced that limits applications for new recruits to london residents only. the city’s territorial population is thought of in corporate terms, with a clear distinction made between those within and external to the city’s boundaries. this spatial targeting has gone hand-inhand with the rolling-out of clear targets with the ambition that 40% of new recruits should be from a ‘minority background’. almost identical language is used in the case of toronto demonstrating the influence of policy transfers and the international character of managerial systems approaches. the police service has a dedicated diversity and inclusion unit that is tasked, amongst objectives, with the requirement to help create a service that ‘reflects the diverse community it serves at all levels/ranks…provide[s] a bias-free service to the community, [and in which] all members develop and demonstrate effective diversity and inclusion skills’ (toronto police service [tps] 2015a, p. 1). while such agendas appear to be openly pluralist, they are also driven by a pm culture of targets and the enlistment of subjects in the carrying out of public policy. in toronto this is explicitly stated by the tps who openly claim that ‘diversity and inclusion contributes significantly to the bottom line’ and ‘creating knowledgeable organizations that shares experience and skills; developing cross-cultural capabilities that facilitate operations in culturally complex environments; and implementing innovative service deliveries and strategies for diverse communities’ (tps 2015b, p. 1). moreover, in language that is corporate in form and content the argument is used that ‘changing demographics makes it more important to select, retain and manage a diverse workforce that is not only reflective of the communities we serve, but also harnessing the talents, experience, knowledge and skills of all members’ (ibid.). such words are mirrored in london where it is claimed that ‘a police service is more effective if it reflects the society it serves’ (london assembly 2017, p. 1). consequently, ‘a more diverse workforce can lead to better decision-making, bring a broader range of skills and improve operational capabilities’ (ibid.). the emphasis is on how the service can become a more effective body if managed in a diverse way. this will also have other effects by making ‘the service better placed to gain the trust of communities and improve police legitimacy, which determines whether people cooperate with the police’ (ibid.). such approaches highlight a complex set of citizen-state dynamics. on the one hand, there appears to be a clear recognition of difference between cultural groups who may experience public services and social environments differently from one another. both cities’ populations are re-imagined as market-places in which citizens consume the services on offer, but in diverse ways. on the other hand, the approach is directly concerned with individualisation in which, to cite the tps (2015b): ‘organizations have broadened their understanding of what constitutes difference so that diversity is about acknowledging any difference that can impact on the fair or equitable treatment of people — this can include differences in gender, race, age, culture, disability, religion, sexual 60 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 orientation, or any other characteristic that helps to shape a person’s perspective. diversity in this context can encompass the many ways that make each person different from the other, and how we deal with individuals within communities’ (p. 1). there is less of an emphasis on collectivities and groups and a concern with individual consumer-citizens and the ways in which policing services respond to market pressures and demands. conclusions in this article we have shown that diversity is curated in global cities, such as london and toronto, by reframing existing discourses mainly around social-cultural and ethnic diversity to promote multiple governance agendas: first, to draw on management systems and technologies to establish new and selective representations of the cities as centres of ‘diversity’; second, to give a new look to the success agenda of increasingly entrepreneurial urban governance primarily to external investors and mobile consumers; and third to implement new governance programmes that are designed to create a ‘role-model’ or ‘beacon’ status on behalf of the city’s governing authorities and mayors. we examined ways in which increased diversity is presenting new challenges for city governance and being used to underpin reforms across government departments. in both cities, there is a tendency to focus on selective policy framings around ethnicity or migration to present diversity as a social phenomenon to celebrate, even by using scholarly notions like super-diversity in the background to express a constructive attitude while diverting the attention to reinforce a selective agenda. this attitude allows reverting to pm systems approaches and reinforcing managerialism through strategies, targets, plans, while also promoting more positive qualitative curations of diversity. moreover, while managerialism has a tendency to (re)produce strategies and action programmes or plans, it shifts attention away from more structural problems (like affordable housing), and disconnects responsibilities from the powers and/or resources provided for policy implementation, especially in the wake of broader funding cuts. in both cities, despite ostensibly taking a positive and all-inclusive approach to diversity, systematic inequalities and segregation along racial lines continue to exist due to the policy mismatch between macro-level discourses and the local implementation of policies at the neighbourhood level (taşan-kok & özogul 2017). this is also because of policy shifts over recent decades that approach diversity as a marketable asset. since spatial organization depends strongly on market-led urban development tendencies, social and spatial policies are becoming increasingly disconnected from each other, especially in neighbourhoods that do not provide attractive locations for new development. within this framework, we can summarise our findings under three principal conclusions. first, we show that curation techniques represent the extension and evolution of pm agendas into new fields of economic and social (urban) policy. the growth of more diverse and cosmopolitan populations in global cities has created new challenges of governance as demands have become more complex and existing models of relatively homogenous (rosen cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 61 & walks 2015). the introduction of curation techniques and management frameworks has acted as a template for the corporatisation of diversity and cosmopolitanism and their conversion into objects, subject to quantitative measurement, strategies, targets and bounded forms of policy intervention. we have argued that external curations play a role in supporting broader place-marketing/branding agendas and that internal curations seek to build a sense of corporate solidarity and cohesion around management targets and frameworks. narratives of diversity that dominate private sector management discourses and forms of (curated) imagebuilding, have been adopted and applied to the management of cities. there has been a strong focus on re-imagining cities as corporations in an attempt to generate policy agendas that promote competitiveness and cohesion (through diversity-driven public service reform). but unlike a corporation, cities are more complex and the powers of city governments to act as ‘managers’ are relatively limited. moreover, as shown, ‘selective’ representations of diversity and the simplifications that they produce can exclude or marginalise population groups and generate new fields of conflict. second, we show that there are clear implementation deficits that limit the effectiveness of such strategies and seek to reduce the political spaces in and through which conflicts in global cities are able to be aired. in both cases, pm agendas and implementation strategies do not match each other. diversity and cosmopolitanism are curated as descriptions to be promoted and celebrated, while acting as a platform for the implementation of flexible government programmes that are able to respond to the unique needs of different communities. in reality however, such measures have only produced new sources of division and conflict. their ineffectiveness is exemplified by the affordable housing crises affecting both cities. the article has highlighted the limitations of curation-based pm programmes to do much more that bring some of the challenges around diversity and inequalities into the public realm and apply strategies to ’tackle’ them, while lacking core resources and powers to bring about structural changes. and third, as debates over diversity policy in major cities become increasingly politicised on both the left and the right, policy-makers face new dilemmas over how to govern and manage populations that are becoming increasingly diverse in material and sociocultural terms. as we emphasised in this article the need to understand how governance framings of diversity are mobilised and instrumentalised is of growing importance. however, as diversity is curated in complex multi-scalar policy environments, policy actions are not necessarily synchronised or based on effective and directly relevant regulations. as we note elsewhere (raco & taşan-kok 2019), there is much evidence to show that urban planning and policy for diversity can make a significant difference to the politics of place but a clear understanding is needed in this fragmented multi-scalar policy landscape. the diversity politics in cosmopolitan cities is under constant pressure for reform and the direction, and the response of states and governments to these demands will have a significant role in shaping urban areas. 62 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 acknowledgements the authors would like to thank felicitas hillmann and two anonymous referees for their constructive and supportive comments on an earlier draft. this project has received funding from the european union’s seventh framework programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 319970 divercities. the views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the european commission. references ackoff, r. l. 1990, ‘redesigning the future: strategy’, systems practice, vol. 3, no.6, pp. 521–524. 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by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: calcutt, b. 2021. she’ll be right mate: australian complacency and national responses to wicked social problems. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:2, 91–96. http:// dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13. i2.7443 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs commentary she’ll be right mate: australian complacency and national responses to wicked social problems bill calcutt bushfire & natural hazards co-operative research centre (bnhcrc), australia corresponding author: bill calcutt, bushfire and natural hazards co-operative research centre, 340 albert street, east melbourne vic 3002, australia. wgc447@uowmail.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7443 article history: received 25/09/2020; revised 10/03/2021; accepted 13/05/2021; published 19/07/2021 abstract as the 6th largest country by land mass but 55th by population (exceeding 25 million), and ranked 13th by gdp per capita by the oecd, australia is often characterised as an affluent developed western democracy, and seeks to project an international image as a progressive, ethical, fair and tolerant society. this commentary explores inconsistencies between australia’s idealised identity as a modern egalitarian society concerned with the welfare of all and the economic and social reality for a significant and growing number of citizens; it highlights how the covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated these discrepancies. the commentary attributes contradictions in the australian character and culture to the absence of a national charter of core values that institutionalises respect for the principles of human dignity and equality. keywords core values; human rights; respect; racism declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 91 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7443 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7443 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7443 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:wgc447@uowmail.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7443 historical context the cambridge english dictionary defines society as “the state of being together with other people”. a society is formed when individuals coalesce to pursue their mutual interests, and the relationship between the individual and the collective can be conceptualised as a social contract that imposes costs and benefits on both entities. values are enduring principles and convictions on what is important (and morally right) that can guide and motivate individual and collective actions and attitudes, and shared core values can be highly influential in facilitating community collaboration for a common social purpose. after a millennium of conflict and unimaginable violence, two developments in western history reshaped the social contract and redefined the foundations for collective power. the mid-17th century treaty of westphalia articulated the principles of national autonomy, independence and equality, thus establishing the sovereign state as the dominant mode of social and spatial organisation. more than a century later, western philosophers proposed the enlightenment values that would ultimately be codified in the american declaration of independence and the french declaration of the rights of man and citizen. the american and french declarations assert the inalienable rights of individuals to life, liberty, equality, dignity, property, justice (due process of law), government by and for the people, and personal autonomy and the pursuit of happiness. with reason supplanting belief and divine rule, enlightenment values reflect a commitment to individualism, rationality, constant progress through innovation and scientific discovery, and a repudiation of the role of monarchy, religion, superstition and tribalism. the same reasoning illuminated the nature of the social contract as an agreement between the secular state and the individual on the benefits and obligations of social participation, and clarified the source of state authority as the collective will (consent) of its citizens (democracy). in the shadow of the second world war these same enlightenment values were embodied in the universal declaration of human rights (udhr), adopted by a fledgling united nations in 1948. the udhr preamble acknowledges that respect for the inherent dignity and worth and the equal and inalienable rights of men and women are founding principles for a free, just and peaceful world. the declaration’s thirty articles enunciate a set of fundamental human rights to balance the interests of the individual and the powers of the state. in the context of the horrors of the war and the abhorrent actions of some nations, the declaration was an emphatic reassertion of individual rights in response to the abuses of power by authoritarian states. there were initial hopes that the udhr would be transformed into a globally-binding international bill of rights, however the aspirations for a new world order were dashed with the outbreak of conflict between the democratic capitalist west and the autocratic communist east (the cold war). as the prospects for agreement on an international bill of rights faded, two international treaties were subsequently adopted by the united nations in the mid-1960s, to come into effect a decade later. the (individual-focussed) international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr) was supported by the west, and the (collective-focussed) international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights (icescr) was supported by the east. throughout the four decade-long cold war (leading up to the fall of the berlin wall in 1989), developed western nations championed democratic principles and formalised (through domestic legislation) their commitments to dignity, equality and social justice, while seeking to balance civil liberties with national security. these latter policies included protections for individual privacy, access to freedom of information, avenues for administrative appeal of government decisions, demands for increased transparency in the operation of government bodies, and constraints on the highly intrusive mass surveillance activities of security and intelligence organisations. during this period effective national leadership was often equated calcutt cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 92 with and measured against the defence of shared core values, sometimes in the face of great social and global challenges. australian values australia’s contemporary status as a developed, pluralist, liberal democracy belies its relatively short european history. established as a british penal colony in the late 18th century through the forced and sometimes violent dispossession of the sixty millennia-old first nations people, the country was populated through racially selective (white) european migration for almost two centuries. this policy was formally abandoned in the mid-1970s, and in the period since a non-discriminatory migration policy has seen australia’s population grow from around 14 million in 1975 to over 25 million in 2020. this unique heritage has created a set of exceptional social challenges. while australia played a central role in the post-war establishment of the united nations and in the formulation of the udhr, it has since assiduously avoided a commitment to a set of shared core values in a formal national charter (such as a bill of rights) that institutionalises respect for the principles of dignity and equality in legislation. while australia ratified the icescr in 1975 and the iccpr in 1980, neither international treaty has been incorporated into domestic law. eminent constitutional lawyer george williams observed in 2009 that ‘australia is now the only democratic nation in the world without a national charter or bill of rights’, noting that ‘without a charter of rights, freedoms can be ignored or taken away too easily’. shared core values can be highly influential in defining and shaping national character and are central elements of a country’s distinctive cultural identity. in his 2006 australia day address, then prime minister john howard contended that the strength of australia as a cohesive multicultural society is founded on a balance between tolerance of diversity and respect for our european cultural heritage. howard described australia’s ‘dominant cultural pattern’ as ‘judeo-christian ethics, the progressive spirit of the enlightenment, and the institutions and values of british political culture’. howard praised that ‘no institution or code lays down a test of australianness’, and warned of the potential constraints on the parliament of a legal instrument like a bill of rights. while shared core values can provide powerful motives for social collaboration and can influence national leadership, their absence can contribute to anomie, complacency and social atomisation. in the absence of a national charter of core values that institutionalises respect for dignity and equality, australia is largely reliant on subjectively interpreted, implicit and informal values, and the politically expedient mediation of an evolving, volatile and sometimes amorphous national narrative. australia’s fluid national narratives include conceptions of mateship (solidarity), egalitarianism (equality and scepticism of authority), a ‘fair go’ (consideration), and ‘she’ll be right mate’ (complacency). the anzac legend adds the values of courage, endurance, resilience, mateship, sacrifice, ingenuity and good humour to the idealisation of the national character. australian responses to wicked social problems this detailed context is provided in order to examine australia’s national responses to a number of wicked (highly complex) social problems in the absence of institutional respect for dignity and equality (and ambiguous formal support for a range of related core values like equity, justice, integrity and accountability). examples of wicked social problems confronting australia in the 21st century include: • formally acknowledging and addressing the multi-generational and continuing abuse and neglect of australia’s first nations people, who were not officially recognised as equal australian citizens until calcutt cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 202193 1967. australia’s ambivalence and inertia on this issue is exemplified by official inaction on the 339 recommendations of the 1991 royal commission into aboriginal deaths in custody, and in the intervening period more than 400 first nations people have died in custody. national complacency was again reflected in a muted official response to the grace and wisdom embodied in the 2017 uluru statement from the heart that provides a rationale and pathway for indigenous constitutional recognition. • the maintenance since 1992 of a policy of mandatory detention of people seeking asylum in australia without a visa (who are designated as unlawful non-citizens). the policy is contrary to article 9 of the udhr (no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile) and article 14 (everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution). the policy was hardened in 2001 by the decision to process offshore, that is, in some other country, all asylum-seekers arriving by boat (unauthorised arrivals), and in 2013 by the decision that asylum-seekers arriving by boat would never be resettled in australia. these policies mean that some asylum seekers and accepted refugees remain in indefinite detention offshore. • the systemic physical and emotional neglect and abuse of many of australia’s elder population through their warehousing in industrial-scale for-profit aged care facilities. • a latent but deep vein of racism and bigotry in australia, possibly as a residue of the former racially selective white australia policy, and a long history of distrust of non-european neighbours in the asia-pacific region (xenophobia). • the widespread tolerance of incompetence, inefficiency and a lack of accountability in the delivery of vital public services across australia, and in the government regulation of the private sector. deficits in regulatory capability have exacerbated the social, economic and environmental harms caused by the failure of the private sector and free market to fairly and effectively deliver essential public services. a series of (expensive) public inquiries over recent decades have forensically examined the causes of often catastrophic system failures in a range of vital public services, with inquiry recommendations on essential reforms often ignored, and responsible officials rarely held to account. • diminishing community trust and confidence in a range of important government and political institutions and democratic processes, due in part to ambivalent official support for systems that uphold ethical behaviours (including protection for whistle-blowers) and ensure transparency, accountability and integrity in public office. effects of the pandemic the sudden and unexpected emergence in early 2020 of a global pandemic, and the resultant imposition of community-wide constraints on basic personal liberties like freedom of movement and association in order to limit disease transmission, have reshaped the relationships between the citizen, community and government in a time of existential crisis. widespread community acceptance of these constraints in australia may in part be due to the severity of the threat to life posed by the covid-19 virus, assurances as to the limited duration of their imposition, and the broadly acknowledged authority of scientific experts who have played a central role in the national response to date. as the course and consequences of the pandemic have evolved throughout 2020, the longer-term implications for australian society are beginning to emerge. the long-established relationship between the federal, state and territory governments has evolved following the formation of a national cabinet to coordinate an expert-driven response to the pandemic. significantly, states and territories have asserted their right to their own territorial sovereignty and closed their borders to non-residents, preventing freedom of movement across australia. the federal government has devolved national responsibility for human quarantine to the states and territories, effectively limiting the capacity of citizens overseas to return to australia. traditional partisan and ideological enmities have subsequently emerged between the federal calcutt cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 94 government and particular states over their respective roles and performance, and between states with governments of different political persuasions. perceptions of strong and decisive action to protect particular communities from the covid-19 virus have provided significant political advantage to incumbents, with an apparent rise in populism, parochialism, nationalism and authoritarianism. the pandemic has necessarily transformed long-standing social, economic and environmental priorities, both revealing and further exacerbating existing systemic weaknesses in many of australia’s most important social systems (including aged care, disability support, indigenous advancement, mental health, child welfare, gender equity, racial discrimination, family violence, public housing and support for the unemployed). the absence of institutional respect for dignity and equality has most recently been reflected in: • a rise in anti-asian sentiments in australia due to prejudicial media and political references to a ‘chinese virus’. in the context of a level of latent racism in australia, these sentiments have been further exacerbated by growing tensions in the strategic relationship between the australian and chinese governments. in november 2020 the lowy institute conducted a survey of the attitudes and experiences of over 1000 chinese-australians, and the subsequent report titled ‘being chinese in australia’ revealed that 37% of respondents had been treated differently or less favourably because of their ethnicity, 31% had been called offensive names, and 18% had been physically threatened or attacked. • catastrophic failures in the public systems dedicated to protecting and caring for australia’s most vulnerable elderly citizens. the potentially preventable deaths of hundreds of elderly residents in a profit-driven aged care industry due to failures in publicly managed infection control measures may be one of the most tragic legacies of this pandemic. the final report of the royal commission into aged care quality and safety, handed down in february 2021, concluded (p.78) that ‘our examination of systemic problems in the australian aged care system cannot help but paint a gloomy picture. the current state of the aged care system is a fairly predictable outcome of the various systemic problems we have identified. this is why significant change is required. the delivery of aged care in australia is not intended to be cruel or uncaring’. in the absence of a national charter of core values that safeguards the dignity and equality of all australians, the systemic failures in a range of vital social systems may be overshadowed by rising frustration and anger amongst a growing number of citizens who have become socially, economically and politically marginalised in an increasingly unequal, unjust, insecure and divided nation. references australian war memorial n.d., ‘hall of memory – stained glass windows’. accessed from: https://www.awm.gov.au/ visit/visitor-information/features/hall-of-memory/windows budhwani, h. & sun, r. 2020, ‘creating covid-19 stigma by referencing the novel coronavirus as the “chinese virus” on twitter’, journal of medical internet research, vol. 22, no. 5, e19301. https://doi.org/10.2196/19301 howard, j. 2006, australia day address to the national press club 25 january 2006. accessed from: https:// pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-22110 lowy institute 2020, being chinese in australia. accessed from: https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/chinesecommunities royal commission into aboriginal deaths in custody 1991, final report. accessed from: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/ other/indiglres/rciadic/ calcutt cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 202195 https://www.awm.gov.au/visit/visitor-information/features/hall-of-memory/windows https://www.awm.gov.au/visit/visitor-information/features/hall-of-memory/windows https://doi.org/10.2196/19301 https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-22110 https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-22110 https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/chinese-communities https://interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/chinese-communities http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indiglres/rciadic/ http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/indiglres/rciadic/ royal commission into aged care quality and safety 2021, final report. accessed from: https://agedcare. royalcommission.gov.au/publications/final-report uluru statement from the heart 2017, accessed from: https://ulurustatement.org/the-statement universal declaration of human rights 1948, accessed from: https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declarationof-human-rights williams, g. 2009, a charter of rights for australia. evatt foundation. accessed from: https://evatt.org.au/papers/ charter-rights-australia.html calcutt cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 96 https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/final-report https://agedcare.royalcommission.gov.au/publications/final-report https://ulurustatement.org/the-statement https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights https://evatt.org.au/papers/charter-rights-australia.html https://evatt.org.au/papers/charter-rights-australia.html queer sovereignty: the gay & lesbian kingdom of the coral sea islands 128 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 queer sovereignty: the gay & lesbian kingdom of the coral sea islands judy lattas abstract what can the spectacle of gay nationalism tell us about the reality of our cosmopolitan dream? my suggestion in this paper is that it challenges the assumption that simply invoking cosmopolitanism, or indeed embodying it as a style and a politics, is enough to secure the rights and recognition that were previously obtained by means of territorial claims and independent flag waving. it teaches us in order to reach an end – that of cosmopolitanism it may be necessary to recommence at the beginning. the gay & lesbian kingdom (glk) seceded from australia in 2004. emperor dale parker anderson declared independence upon raising the rainbow pride flag on the coral sea island of cato. the decision to secede was made as a response to the australian government’s 2004 action in presenting the amendment of the marriage act 1969. in giving my account i draw on a 2007 interview, correspondence with emperor dale and other ethnographic material concerning the glk. among other articulations, i consider its secessionist move in light of linda bishai’s critique in forgetting ourselves (2004). this is that for all its liberationist motivation, secession is essentialist in its conception, and inherently anti-democratic; her prediction is that its preoccupation with state formation is making it irrelevant in the age of “rhizomatic” community networks. in its micronationalist “queering,” however, i find secessionist politics more relevant in late modernity, not less, as the pluralising democratic politics of identity and representation are increasingly unable to contest key outcomes of “family values” and “national values” rhetoric in the 21st c. while bishai calls for an end to secession, my suggestion is that it is precisely in the secessionist moves of contemporary micronationalism that the “new cosmopolitics,” a politics aimed at the “renewal of international law” (derrida 2002 p. 3) might be witnessed. my presumption in this paper is that the peculiarities of gay nationalism in australia can teach us something about cosmopolitanism. it is that the ideal of cosmopolitan civil societies, like any internationalism, remains a fantasy and a questionable one if it is imagined as something that can be reached without some ongoing engagement in the politics of nationalism. it can give a false sense of inclusion. it can have us believe we have arrived at an end, when it is necessary to go back to the beginning. one of the champions of gay nationalism, brian walker, urges us to give its mission the same serious consideration we would give other nationalisms. ‘at first sight’, he says, ‘gay nationalism may seem like nothing more than a parodistic mimicry of “real” nationalism…queer nation might be seen by some as nationalism’s ironic other, offering a moment of carnivalesque bemusement before we return to the more serious problems involved with weighing the relative merits of real ethnic claims’(walker 1998, pp. 518-519). walker’s suggestion is a good one, but in my paper i want to do both. that is, take seriously the political project of gay nationalism, and keep in mind its ironic otherness, as an essential part of what it presents to us. cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 129 the micronation that i focus on is itself an odd one in relation to others, in australia and around the world. the gay & lesbian kingdom of the coral sea islands (glk) is very distinctive in its political platform, in its geographic platform, and in other features. one of the points that i want to make here, however, is that while it is distinctive, and in many ways the odd one out, it should not be considered the exception when it comes to political philosophy, in its current focus on questions of sovereignty in the 21st century (see brown 2006). what i have called ‘queer sovereignty’ is a phenomenon that articulates an increasingly common intuition, i suggest, even in its most uncommon gestures of secessionist refusal and withdrawal. micronations are tiny countries declared by ordinary people in an act that repeats the establishment of sovereign nations, at least in some of its protocols. at the same time that it repeats the enactment, it relocates it. it relocates it onto a scene that is not part of its conventional fiction; the contemporary scene of an individual assertion of personal interests or rights within a pluralistic modern democracy. in the conventional fiction, even when it is as it always is an individual signing the nation into being in the performative act of declaring independence, such as jefferson in the case of american independence, it is not the individual as one among many, but as the one within whose representative hand the many may be singularised in a chain of reference and deferral that ultimately goes back to god, the only one not dependent on an other and able to represent all others in his name, as derrida reminds us in his essay ‘declarations of independence’(2000a). micronations carry within them the spectre of multiplication to the point where everyone can sign his or her own declaration of independence, everyone can be the sovereign or prince, everyone’s lounge room can be declared a new country. they push at the limits of our political notion of a right to secede, and our metaphysical notion of the sovereign individual. i have engaged in an ethnography of micronationalism over the last few years, through my ongoing contact with local protagonists. in this work i have come to consider the secessionist move as a technique – and i mean this in the broader sense of a technique of the self, as well as a simple paralegal technique of remaining in dispute with the authorities of government. there is an insistence on presenting oneself before these authorities that belies the etymological meaning of the term 130 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 ‘secession’. linda bishai informs us that ‘the original root of the word is latin – secedere: to withdraw…the origins of the root presuppose that the action is done unilaterally by the self – se-ceder or “self-cession”’(2004, p. 18). in my account, the act of secession in its micronationalist production is not an act of withdrawing the self, but of presenting and re-presenting the self, in courts of law, in administrative tribunals, in bureaucratic offices and all the theatres within which may be played out a contesting of the authority to manage. the gesture of secession is one of refusing to withdraw oneself, refusing to cease, pushing oneself forward, getting ‘in your face’. micronationalists feature strongly among those ‘vexatious litigants’ whose obdurate presence in the courtroom and the corridor threatens to jam up the system, making it unmanageable. there is a curious kind of sovereignty betrayed in this phenomenon of seeking to remain in dispute. it is both a curious idea and a curious practice of sovereignty. it betrays a structural need and a furious insistence upon recognition by the other, a locking into the structure of mutuality even as it announces its secessionist break with that relationship. it is like those bitter and obsessive divorce cases where the couple remain locked into the very bond with one another that they had come into the public theatre of a courtroom to cut. what is witnessed is not any declaration of independence, but the suspended moment of confrontation and demand within a dyadic relation of co-constitution and co-dependency. of the court cases and bureaucratic campaigns of micronationalists, whatever they begin as, they end up taking the form of a shouting match with the state-appointed authorities, who become frustrated at their inability to close things down. recognise me and my legitimacy! no! recognise me and my legitimacy! no! don cameron, for example, self-proclaimed supreme court justice and archbishop of the independent sovereign state of australia, jailed as a vexatious litigant in 1996 after filing 13 actions against westpac, has been pursuing this kind of argument in recent years in the downing centre local court in sydney, against the commissioner of taxation, on behalf of istvan nagy, a citizen of his micronation. cameron is the consummate australian bush lawyer who is determined to remain in dispute with those who would see their power and dignity reflected in his clear lack of proper training and credentials. his challenge to their position is only partly brought by the cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 131 stack of quasi-legal proofs and claims that he presents as evidence to the courts, and that they dismiss as nonsense. the greater part of his challenge to their power and dignity lies in the obstinate way that he wants to mimic their routines, to act out their roles and be a player in their game. this is of course what all micronationalists do, to greater or lesser effect; the ones who present themselves as game players, and the ones who do not. their activity articulates the rules, the rituals and the symbols of the nationalist claim, making it recreatable, and by extension recreational. they foreground the technical exercise of national sovereignty, reducing the legacy of its idea to a set of steps and scripts that can be reproduced and acted out in a new setting. always a performance, the declaration of independence is made subject here to a reproduction that can have the effect of ‘queering’ it; and by this i mean, putting it at odds with itself. a tacticalised sovereignty is staged – or put on, before a real or imagined audience in a way that opens it to something other. to illustrate this effect i turn now to the glk. it has taken the queer nation idea to the point now where we might speak of something like queer sovereignty in practical as well as theoretical terms. ‘queer’, of course, is an expression from radical gender theory. it takes its first point of reference from the everyday meaning of queer as homosexual, picking up on the long standing challenge that effeminate men or mannish women make to our naturalised clear distinction between the sexes. but it goes beyond this first meaning, just as the thought of ‘queer sovereignty’ goes beyond the thought that we have here, on a first apprehension: that the king is a queen. it goes beyond the novelty of this turnaround, to a turnaround in the categories of a broader conceptual domain, of interest to the political philosopher. these are the categories of nationalism and internationalism, the two mutually regarding terms that i want to track as they come under the queering effect of this micronationalism. what i want to suggest, from my study, is that a third term is indicated in the wake of this queering: that of the new cosmopolitanism being talked up in contemporary european philosophy. i am talking here about the conversations between jürgen habermas and jacques derrida in recent years (borradori 2003; derrida 2000b, 2000c), for example, and to a limited extent within secession theory the post-nationalist cosmopolitan vision of writers like linda bishai. 132 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 it is with bishai that i first take issue, in this paper. her contention is that there is no place, in our post-modern world, for the movements of nationalist secession, and she predicts their passing with a clear approval. ‘secessionist politics would become increasingly irrelevant’, she writes, ‘as states become less dominant as the sole validative fora and the politics of pluralizing democracy expanded through the growing organic ties of the rhizomatic structures’ (2004, p. 158). by rhizomatic structures, bishai is referring to something like the diasporic bonds forged by the community of gay people who have nothing in common, or nothing that could be called essential or pre-given, like blood, or a native soil. for allied writers like judith halberstam, the queer subcultures in which gay people live in the big cities of the west exemplify the cosmopolitan ideal that she invokes with reference to jean-luc nancy in his 1991 book, the inoperative community. halberstam writes (2005, pp. 153-154) that queer subcultures develop as alternatives to kinship-based notions of community…[they] provide a vital critique of the seemingly organic nature of "community," and they make visible the forms of un-belonging and disconnection that are necessary to the creation of community….community, generally speaking, is the term used to describe seemingly natural forms of congregation …[nancy’s] reminder that quests for community are always nostalgic attempts to return to some fantasized moment of union and unity reveals the conservative stakes in community for all kinds of political projects and makes the reconsideration of subcultures all the more urgent. the key question that i want to pose to bishai, in her call for an end to secession, and to halberstam, in her celebration of the spatial politics of gay and lesbian subcultures, is the question of why. specifically, in regard to the gay and lesbian kingdom of the coral sea: why should the most cosmopolitan of social groups get into the game of nationhood? when that pursuit is so ‘ontopological,’ as bishai puts it, citing derrida; so theological, so reliant on the idea of an essential bond and essential unity, so doomed to failure as the spectre of difference imposes itself on the fantasy of internal harmony and natural affiliation. this is the question that i set myself to answer, in my study. sydney’s mardi gras, for example, appears to confirm the happy place of australia’s gays and lesbians in the cosmopolitan city. here they have visibility, they cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 133 have acceptance; and more than acceptance, they have celebration, within and by the mainstream. in the sydney morning herald , the success and magnitude of 2007’s parade was reported in a contrast back to the small political protest with which mardi gras began: ‘“the whole event is about seeing the city of sydney, for one night at least, united in a way the people who first marched down oxford street could only ever dream about”’ said one man (keith donaldson cited by cuming 2007). why then secede? or, to formulate my question in deconstructivist terms: what, if anything, is the supplement of subculture required in today’s australia? in the interview i conducted in january 2007 with dale parker anderson, emperor king of the gay and lesbian kingdom of the coral sea, the answer he gave to this question was the clear need that he and others felt to take some kind of action not possible within the current accommodation of gay and lesbian people. this was action against the tide of new legislation and anti-homosexual moralising, like the formal ban on same sex marriage, being carried in the ‘family values’ rhetoric of the increasingly conservative howard government (in office at the time). the intuition of anderson and his friends was that in order to do this, and also to respond to the oppression of gays in other parts of the world, access had to be gained to the international forums and courts. as dale explains, … that was the whole idea of the project from way back…like, the gay community has got so far and australia has wound back the laws… it’s the first time in australian history that legislation was introduced in australian parliament that actually physically discriminated against a certain section of society. … we felt, how can we take on australia? …and do something that would look at changing and making the world…a lot better for gay people? and the reason that a lot of…harsh countries that have death penalties against gay people…the reason that it’s allowed, is because the international court only sovereign states and territories can access an international court. so …we can’t as a community take on iran and say, look, why did you, you know, kill those two teenage boys last month because they were gay …we thought, if we have a sovereign, if we have some type of sovereignty that could access the courts and give gay people a voice on the international stage, whether it be through the un or [whatever]…then why not look at doing that? (anderson 2007) 134 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 the intuition of anderson and his friends was that what was required was a ‘new cosmopolitics’, to use a phrase from derrida (2002 ); a politics aimed at the ‘renewal of international law’ through appeals that could be heard above the present constraints. this new cosmopolitics is not lost on observers of the project, as shown this newspaper report: ever heard of gay government? there soon could be a new nation on the planet. it's called the gay & lesbian kingdom of the coral sea islands. this potential new country is noteworthy not for its supposed advancement in gay rights, but for how it came about: globalization. we are entering a stage in the 21st century where internet users and connected people can not only express their opinions freely, but also easily find others like them. get enough people together, and a community is born. the internet obviously offers a number of communities for gays, but now the internet is doing more. it is offering people a chance to turn interest into action. using the internet to raise awareness, australian gays (with support from all over the world) could raise enough money to begin formalizing the process toward independence…. they are connected, part of the wired world that makes them able to do anything from chat about politics, art, or even find what it takes to create a gay kingdom (fagaly 2005). the intuition was also that in order to get to this higher plane of an international stage, it would be necessary to pass once more through the westphalian idea of a declaration of independence, on behalf of a nation. there had to be some kind of replay of the nationalist moment, that is; a doing of it again that would be a doing of it differently. it is this staging and this doubling of the nationalist challenge that i am trying draw out of the micronationalist paradigm. so it is very interesting for me, for example, to know that this emperor king, dale parker anderson, is an identical twin. he is a double of his brother; alike in all ways, except that dale is gay, while his brother is straight. and there are other uncanny doublings and displacements, woven into this story. dale and his brother are of royal descent. he is distantly related not only to the gay king of england (king edward ii), but to one of the principal players of the mutiny of the bounty (warrant officer william purcell is his great grandfather). he has adopted the iconography of these cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 135 family connections into his micronationalist kingdom. but the iconography is also, as seen in the gay & lesbian kingdom website, that of an ordinary aussie bloke in his boardshorts and thongs. this is the kind of queer sovereignty that i have in mind, and that one can see in footage taken by the gay & lesbian kingdom of its landing on cato island. the footage consists of still photographs which give way to a live recording of the 2004 visit to cato by seaplane (accompanied by the fantastic music of handl’s zadok the priest: god save the king/long live the king/may the king live forever/amen, amen, alleluia, alleluia, amen, amen). some of the images on its website are reproduced below. (a new glk website is under construction; the archived one can be accessed at http://web.archive.org/web/20070627181837/http://www.gayandlesbiankingdom. com/.) one might notice, for example, the sense of playing for an audience, or for history, that is part of this chronicle, in its faithful recording of the formalities and ceremonial drama of a nationalist claim. these include the journey over sea, the stepping upon consecrated soil, the flag raising, the reading of the plaque inscription, and so on. view of cato island from the seaplane upon landing http://web.archive.org/web/20070627181837/http:/www� 136 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 a member of the landing party on the beach emperor dale raises the flag of the gay and lesbian kingdom…. the gay and lesbian kingdom plaque is laid to commemorate the declaration cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 137 a letter is formally posted from the kingdom stamps issued by the gay and lesbian kingdom. at one point in the video footage the approach switches from a home movie style of recording complete with family commentary to a news reporter voiceover (‘this is so-and-so, on location at cato island’). the narration is self-conscious and staged, imagining and so claiming its place in the nationalist archive. it is in the assumption of the protocols of nationalist assertion that its sovereign gesture is ‘queered’. emperor dale enacts or performs the inauguration of sovereignty, that is, but he does it in a way that doubles and displaces it, opening it a reproduction, or to a recreation, that is at odds with its conventional operation. 138 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 the video recording keeps the focus for some time on the spectacular shipwreck that stands out starkly against the uninhabited, untreed landscape of cato island. it evokes an abandoned project of european imperialism. the empire-building played out here in its contemporary version is a repetition that revises, signalling an empowerment of the non-elite (a chartered sea-plane for the landing; digital cameras for the recording; the formalities conducted informally, in dress and speech) and a ‘crossing out’ of the will-to-power of the earlier nationalist projects. the queerness of its enterprise is also drawn out in naturalist terms, in the sexual references of the gay and lesbian kingdom project’s narration and iconography. the vagina shape of cato island features centrally in the photographic record; it invokes the sexual and maternal origin that is forgotten in patriarchal accounts of the birth of nations. gender inversions are drawn to attention throughout. the narrator exclaims of the booby, ‘he’s happy, he’s sitting on his eggs’. under the title ‘welcome to heaven [declared capital of cato],’ the website points out the affinity of coral sea wildlife for its queer nation guests, ‘a highlight for most gay and lesbian visitors would be swimming with the graceful green and loggerhead turtles which can be seen all year round and learning that most of the marine life in the reef are transsexual, the clown fish, made famous by the disney movie finding nemo is typical of many of the reef fish who change sex, when the dominate [sic] female dies a male clown fish changers [sic] his sex and takes her place.’ the playful distance of humour and parody is kept in play in the glk text, while the faithful operation of its gay nationalism is made to apply to the cause of homosexual marriage in australia. it is here that a new ‘cosmopolitics’ might be witnessed, i propose; one which has none of the complacency of assumptions that the gay and lesbian subcultures, in their non-essentialist logic of formation, already dwell at the cosmopolitan ‘end’ of claims to sovereignty. recognition is not a game that is won once, and for all; there are losses and gains for each new set of players. micronationalism is a technique of engaging the many authorities of today’s ‘pluralising democracies’ in an ongoing theatre of recognition, a way of calling on the law, in its national and international operation, to attend to the human rights claims that have yet to be secured, or founded properly. we are returned to the beginning, to the unmarked virgin soil or sand upon which the steps of sovereign gay nationhood may be impressed. a particularly australian trope has come to feature in the cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 139 representation of the gay and lesbian kingdom of the coral sea islands; i will leave my invocation of its project with the buoyant lightness of this image. bibliography anderson, d.p. 2007, 'interview 8 january', personal communication, brisbane. bishai, l. 2004, forgetting ourselves: secession and the (im)possibility of territorial identity, lexington books, lanham. borradori, g. 2003, philosophy in a time of terror: dialogues with jurgen habermas and jacques derrida, university of chicago press, chicago. brown, w. 2006, 'sovereignty and the return of the repressed', viewed 1 august 2008 <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/kadish/workshop_2006/ brown.pdf> cuming, a. 2007, 'out on the town 300,000 revellers ', sydney morning herald, 4 march 2007, viewed 1 august 2008 <http://www.smh.com.au/news/arts/outon-the-town--300000-revellers/2007/03/04/1172868820082.html>. derrida, j. 2000a, 'declarations of independence', in e. rottenberg (ed.), negotiations: interventions and interviews, 1971-2001, stanford university press, stanford, california. derrida, j. 2000b, 'globalization, peace, and cosmopolitanism', in e. rottenberg (ed.), negotiations: interventions and interviews, 1971-2001, stanford university press, stanford, california. derrida, j. 2000c, 'the right to philosophy from a cosmopolitan point of view', in e. rottenberg (ed.), negotiations: interventions and interviews, 1971-2001, stanford university press, stanford, california. derrida, j. 2002d, on cosmopolitanism and forgiveness, trans. m. dooley & m. hughes, routledge, new york. fagaly, r. 2005, 'globalized gays', the california aggie, 15 february, viewed 1 august 2008 <http://www.californiaaggie.com/home/index.cfm?event=display articleprinterfriendly&ustory_id=bcc1d625-a644-46e0-bce1-c7b003543222>. halberstam, j. 2005, in a queer time and place: transgender bodies, subcultural lives, new york university press, new york. walker, b. 1998, 'social movements as nationalisms or, on the very idea of a queer nation', in j. couture, k. nielsen & m. seymour (eds), rethinking nationalism, university of calgary press, calgary. http://www.smh.com.au/news/arts/out-on-the-town--300000-revellers/2007/03/04/1172868820082.html%3e� http://www.smh.com.au/news/arts/out-on-the-town--300000-revellers/2007/03/04/1172868820082.html%3e� http://www.californiaaggie.com/home/index.cfm?event=displayarticleprinterfriendly&ustory_id=bcc1d625-a644-46e0-bce1-c7b003543222%3e� http://www.californiaaggie.com/home/index.cfm?event=displayarticleprinterfriendly&ustory_id=bcc1d625-a644-46e0-bce1-c7b003543222%3e� cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 10, no. 2 2018 © 2018 devaki monani. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 unported (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: monani, d. 2018. at cross roads: white social work in australia and the discourse on australian multiculturalism. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 10(2), 79-90. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6077 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | http://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed article at cross roads: white social work in australia and the discourse on australian multiculturalism devaki monani charles darwin university, australia corresponding author: devaki monani, discipline of social work, school of health and human sciences, charles darwin university, casuarina campus, brinkin, darwin, nt 0909, australia. devaki.monani@cdu.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6077 article history: received 15/05/2018; revised 07/07/2018; accepted 09/07/2018; published 25/07/2018 abstract the profession of social work intervenes in the lives of the vulnerable and marginalised. in the majority, social work policy and practice in australia has been founded on a western practice paradigm. recent and rapid developments in the migratory trends of migrants and refugees places additional demands on social workers to practice with and for diverse communities. this article argues that the profession of social work is reluctant to embrace the multicultural face of australia and lacks the intellectual apparatus to respond to diversity. the article underpins professor andrew jakubowicz’s analysis to multiculturalism as a powerful platform for social work academics and students to critically engage with by challenge existing racism and discriminatory trends towards multicultural communities that may possibly arise in social work practice. keywords social work; multiculturalism; social policy declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. 79 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6077 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6077 http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au http://mcs.epress.lib.uts.edu.au mailto:devaki.monani@cdu.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.6077 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 introduction andrew jakubowicz is a professor of sociology and media studies in australia. his commentary, activism and in-depth radical analysis on multiculturalism, government policy and race relations in australia are comparable to noam chomsky’s ideals on us foreign policy. jakbuowicz is one of the most powerful intellectual figures in australian academia, forcing public policy to engage with the less popular and controversial topics of the intersections of multiculturalism, racism and violations of human rights in australia with meaning, rigour and empathy. as an early career academic in social work, i draw inspiration from jakubowicz’s ideologies to explore the possibility of resolving emerging tensions in social work education and practice. these continue to exclude minority and indigenous radical voices from its curriculum and practice. aspiring social work professionals and students work with a view to intervene in the lives of some of the most vulnerable and distraught members in the community (maidment and egan, 2009). social work academics find solace in offering traditional social work theoretical models of systems theory or anti-oppressive practice (ife, 2016) with a particular focus on social justice in the classroom. despite the fact that these discourses offer constructive methods to practice, they fail to offer constructive critique of the dominant western white social work discourse. social work is fearful of embracing the new emergent multicultural australia. jakubowicz’s analyses intersect public policy, disability studies and exclusion based on race both past and present. these can present significant value for social worker scholarship and practice in australia. acknowledging social work as a white profession in australia in australia, social workers were historically trained on the british model that embodied the social causes of poverty, shifting away from the clinical american model. based on the underpinnings of the british model, australian social workers played a key role in reforming the welfare sector from the historic charitable distinction between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving poor’. social work is also problematised because of its concentration in large bureaucracies (mendes, 2005, p.125). mendelsohn (1979, p.126) in a review of ‘the condition of the people: social welfare in australia 1900-1975’, as cited in mendes offers an accurate description of social workers in australia as being ‘jargonistic white witchdoctors, involved in social control and personal career aggrandisement’(mendes, 2005, p.125). scholar and social work advocate john tomlinson who worked for several years at act council of social services who advocated for universal basic income is worthy of mention here. tomlinson (2004) published a review of philip mendes’s book on australia’s welfare wars, the players, the politics and the ideologies (mendes, 2002). i recommend the book to my students when teaching social policy courses. john tomlinson’s (2004) expert book review in the australian journal of social issues, points to the insufficient regard given to ‘indigenous social justice’ and ‘refugee asylum seeker issues’ in the text by mendes (2002). tomlinson (2004) however provides an additional critique of the mendes (2002) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 89 book by suggesting that it was written in a manner ‘that will not distress the “lady bountifuls” enrolling in social work courses’. it is a book he describes which is meant for ‘the study not the barricades’ (tomlinson, 2004, p. 476). this is an interesting observation, the oxford dictionary meaning of ‘lady bountiful’ is a ‘woman’ who engages in ostentatious acts of charity to impress others. when we reflect on the term ‘ostentatious acts of charity’ it is important to note that we are talking about an immense difference in the power relations dynamics. although, a feminist analysis (weeks & monani, 2002) of tomlinson’s remark can reveal its sexist nature, what is implicit is the great divide that can possibly exist between a social worker and client through the act of charity. my primary concern as a social work academic who is also a migrant is around this existential power dynamic that tomlinson (2004) is referring to when he mentions ‘lady bountiful’ involved in making life changing decisions about families, and in most cases, mostly children. however, like elsewhere in the australian professional context they can be predominantly white, middle class and angloceltic. mendes (2005) argues that despite the australian association of social workers apologising for past practices related to the removal of aboriginal children, little has been recorded or mapped about the actual details of the actions of social workers. similarly, weeks (2000), as cited in mendes, highlights the historical emphasis in social work practice with an undue emphasis on psychoanalysis and casework at the expense of alternative theories and methods such as sociology and community development (mendes, 2005, pp.127-128). for social workers, the study of sociology is especially important, in particular for those who are exposed to vulnerable and marginalised clients from multicultural and linguistically diverse backgrounds. the emphasis in training on cultural competency has often caused white social workers defensible distress. as revealed in dominelli (2018, p. 11) social workers are struggling to transform social work practice with multicultural clients using an ‘anti-racist’ praxis as they struggle to rise beyond ‘individual interventions’ to formulate collective strategies. this is evident in harrison and turner’s (2011) research on cultural competency. harrison and turner (2011), in their research on cultural competency in social work practice and education, shed light on the extent to which it remains a ‘murky’ concept for practitioners. their qualitative study focused on interviews with practitioners based on few questions: what does the term cultural competence mean to you? can you give examples from your own practice? and how does the organisational context of your work impact on this type of practice? in reviewing the findings for the purpose of this paper, it is revealed that the majority of social work professional participants in the harrison and turner (2011) study recognised their clients as the ‘other’. to be more precise, below are some of the common views that were shared. for me, when i think about it in a work context, it means cultures other than white anglo-saxon. (social worker practising in the corrective services, harrison & turner, 2011, p. 341). 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 people tend to think of culture as country specific or race specific or ethnic specific…i think that (social work cultural competency training) creates a barrier in someone’s head. (speaker 1, harrison & turner, 2011, p.343). certainly within the system that i work in, there are time frames … you have to have a diagnosis by this time, or you have to have a report written up by this time. so there’s a lot of external pressure on us to perform that isn’t necessarily congruent to the way we need to work with people from different backgrounds. (social worker practising in hospital services, harrison & turner, 2011, p.343). harrison and turner (2011) acknowledge in their analysis of public policy and social work organisations that merely enhancing workers’ cultural awareness is not enough to address significant ‘disparities’ in health status and service delivery, especially since the disadvantaged position of some minority groups is determined by structural factors rather than cultural difference (harrison & turner, 2011, p. 348). this brings me to the original purpose of the commentary in this paper. social work discourses do not engage with the history of multiculturalism. the discourse on multiculturalism does not particularly form part of a white social workers world view (dominelli, 2018). here, i would like to bring in jakubowicz’s socio-historical analysis of white australia’s tensions with multicultural communities as critical to the understanding of this ‘white backdrop’ of social work practice. jakubowicz’s critical reflection and historical review on the ‘white noise: australia’s struggle with multiculturalism’, points to australia’s inability to either engage or deny its colonial-settler history. moreover, ‘white’ plays a central part in the historic mythology of australia. the great australian dream when entering into the twentieth century was one of a ‘white, democratic, egalitarian society, without hierarchies of entrenched inherited privilege and one mostly without an underclass of helots or coolies’. jakubowicz points to the fact that in its own imagination ‘[australia] was intensely fair and decent for all those allowed to share the wealth, however stubbornly intolerant of those deemed other and unacceptable. since the lifting of the white australia policy, this dream of course has not been realised, it however remained etched in popular memory (jakubowicz, 2002, p.108). the remnants of this legacy are evident in the staffing and the curriculum of the social work schools in the oldest universities in australia. the majority of social work academics, heads of social work departments in australian hospitals, australian charities and managers of human services are predominantly white anglo-saxon or of british descent. this positioning of ‘white privilege’ in social work practice is described by dominelli (2018, p.79) through the classic example of how privilege manifests in grassroots practice: ‘white social workers are unable to accept black foster carers as bonafide carers’, so far the exchanges involving children has been one way: black children only ever go to white families, white children are never placed with black families (dominelli, 2018, p.79). the historical evidence presented by jakbuowicz is compelling, in recognising that from early to mid-80s alongside the complex debates over immigrant settlement of indochinese communities, this period also coincided with aboriginal claims for land rights and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 91 the spiritual importance of ancestral lands in aboriginal lives. jakubowicz argues that it is important to recognise this period in contemporary australian history that normalised the emergence of a racist discourse for both these marginalised communities (jakubowicz, 1985, p.3). policy discourses surrounding indigenous communities and immigrant communities have continued to evolve since this early period. a decade ago on 13th of february 2008, the then prime minister kevin rudd offered a national apology to australia’s indigenous people. this step was in the direction of reconciliation and acknowledgement of past mistreatment based on race and culture and the removal of aboriginal and torres strait islander children from their families. the apology remains deficient when we closely look at social work intervention and public policy in the area of removal of indigenous children. for instance a most recent study from western australia has revealed that indigenous children were ‘eight times’ more likely to enter out-of-home care than non-indigenous children (o’donnell et al., 2016). in addition, australia has highlighted indigenous over-representation in the national child protection framework, 2009-2020 with a view to reduce child protection intervention. we are nearing the end of the national child protection framework, 2009-2020 with little or no effect in the reduction rate of intervention in indigenous families. it becomes problematic when professions such as social work downplay the effects of racism and historic systemic discrimination toward certain communities. the impact of racism is significantly overlooked by creating theoretical frameworks that examine cultural competency and offer discourses on effective parenting as the ideal underpinnings of the united nations convention on the rights of the child. this lack of understanding or reluctance to understand the conceptual frameworks underpinning racism is the crux of the inadequacy that emerges in white social work practice (dominelli, 2018, p.95). it is highly likely that newly settled african communities of refugee backgrounds in australia such as those from somalia, eritrea and ethiopia, alongside the skilled migrants belonging to the indian muslim bohra community, are likely to face harsh interventions similar to the indigenous communities. female genital mutilation (fgm) will become the single biggest cause of child removal or child protection intervention in these communities (costello 2015, p.231). despite interventions by groups in several communities and by women’s health groups, social workers are still lagging behind in understanding this conversation (costello 2015, p.232). bohra muslim parents had received a seven year gaol sentence in 2016 for engaging in fgm practice toward their daughters in nsw. these communities will remain on the radar of child protection services, more so than others. social workers in australia and abroad have been complicit in harsh implementation of the child protection policy, for example in norway social workers removed indian children from their parents. these parents were middle class information technology workers hired by a norwegian company, they were qualified and worked on temporary work permit holders in norway. social workers perceived that the family was force feeding the children using hands rather than cutlery and that the parents chose to co-sleep rather than provide for children to sleep in a separate nursery. here we need to reflect that eating with hands is part of indian cultural habit, many parents view feeding their children with their hands as a form 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 of bonding with the child, the same applies to co-sleeping (monani, 2015, p.44). dominelli (2018, p.93) reminds white social work practitioners to become culturally aware by not using ‘value judgements’ that presuppose white superiority. dominelli calls for social workers to explore the privilege of white power in relationships with people of diverse backgrounds (dominelli, 2018, p.93). here, i reflect on professor andrew jakubowicz’s landmark paper developed for the australian human rights commission on australia’s migration policies: african dimensions (2010) that focuses on african australians and their experience of human rights and social inclusion in australia. this paper is critical in understanding the struggles of african-born australian residents attempting to reorient their lives in australia. in particular, jakubowicz highlights the intense reactions of some australians that are marked by anger and suspicion toward cultural and physical difference. this is compounded often with violence and remains a significant barrier to full racial equality. jakubowicz offers significant historical detail and foresight in dealing with issues and challenges experienced by some african families. of utmost importance to the field of social work is dealing with horn of african families where fgm has occurred. the paper is of tremendous value to students and practitioners of cross cultural social work in australia intervening in the lives of african communities. as such no in-depth studies have been focused on the experience of social workers intervening in african communities, this is a significant gap in social work research in australia. now, i would like to draw on further tensions in the profession. mcdonald, harris and wintersteen (2003) highlight that social work, despite its popularity as an occupational group, plays no role in building the intellectual apparatus of the australian welfare regime. they shed light on the marginal ‘status’ of social work arguing that despite repeated attempts ‘social work’ has been primarily ‘unsuccessful’ in gaining state recognition through formal registration. here they argue that the problem continues to remain with social workers identity as a clinical role within mental health, counselling, juvenile justice, disability that exclude social workers from engaging in the larger conversation around social justice, human rights and cultural diversity. instead, social work continues to remain a key player in diversifying the human services labour market (mcdonald, harris and wintersteen, 2003, pp. 201-203). these findings remain consistent with recent studies on registration and the profession of social work in australia (fotheringham, 2018, p.8). fotheringham (2018) reveals that social work is a ‘self-regulating profession’. social work is not governed by the national registration and accreditation scheme (nras), which came into effect in 2010 and is delivered by the australian health practitioner regulation agency (ahpra). social workers were not included in the nras despite being the largest group of allied health professionals in australia (healy, 2018, p.206). fotheringham (2018. p.14) calls for further research into the role and impact of registration in the social work profession in australia. healy (2018, p.213) argues that the capacity of the australian association of social workers (aasw) to effectively regulate the profession has mostly been weakened by the relatively low uptake of ‘professional membership’ by social work practitioners and students. the registration conundrum brings us back to the historical relationship between government departments and social services. historically, these were located in the realm of strengthening cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 93 the services delivered by centrelink as first recommended in 1941. lyra taylor an experienced social worker was appointed in november 1944 as chief research officer. according to research by fitzgibbon (1999) on social work in a corporatised environment draws on the earlier department of social security definition of social work. the primary objective of the social work service is to promote the wellbeing of departmental clients by working towards the social objective of preventing and relieving hardship and suffering to promote and facilitate the access of clients to departmental income support programs and community resources with particular attention to the needs of disadvantaged people; to provide supportive social work services to departmental clients in situations of crisis and distress; to promote and facilitate the sensitive delivery of the department’s service to clients; and to promote and facilitate the development of income support and community services to meet the needs of departmental clients (the department of social security social work handbook, p.1 as cited in fitzgibbon, 1999, p. 179). thus, social work in australia for a number of years maintained its visibility not through advocacy but through its partnership with several governmental departments, more so, with those such as centrelink that are primarily interested in the ‘assessment of social and personal circumstances for payment and service eligibility’ (fitzgibbon, 1999, p.183). this history is somehow overlooked when social work continues to be linked to child protection, rather than the management of human services such as centrelink. more recently, morley and ablett (2017, p.11) in their study on radical social work are equally concerned with the neoliberal contexts emerging from centrelink practices, within which social work services become more conservative, and are often privatised, resulting in many areas of practice emerging as industries to be mined for profit (morley and ablett, 2017, pp.1-13). i have personally struggled with this identity of social work as a profession. as a migrant social work academic educated in australia, the trajectory of social work enmeshed in the realm of bureaucracy and ‘policing’ of vulnerable communities, often celebrated by social workers as special status, can become a cause of heightened anxieties for members of migrant communities. here, the earlier intellectual piece offered by professor andrew jakubowicz in 1989 on the state and the welfare of immigrants in australia offers a historical repertoire of capitalist and assimilationist welfare policies in australia targeting immigrants. the argument in the article almost 30 years old remains true today, particularly, as australia embraces the arrival of a newer set of migrants and refugees. jakubowicz (1989, p.31) maintains in his analysis the extent to which provision of welfare becomes a platform for white hegemony to thrive. divisive tactics are implemented through categorisations of ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ poor and the subsequent impacts of these decisions on newly arrived immigrant communities. social workers are at the heart of this debate and are complicit in the disintegration of the welfare state, through their non-committal attitude towards advocacy and over reliance on the clinicalisation and bureaucratisation of social work practice (mcdonald, harris and wintersteen, 2003). 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 viewing immigrant stories through the lens of professor andrew jakubowicz social work academia and curriculum is largely underpinned by the australian social work education and accreditation standards; the practice standards for social workers alongside the code of ethics. these are published, evaluated and accredited by the australian association of social workers. walter, taylor and habibis (2011, p.14) were alarmed in their literature review to find only three articles on white social work practice in a scopus search, for the terms ‘whiteness’, ‘social work’, and ‘australia between the period of 2000-2010. a further gap was that none of these articles was published in the core social work or social policy journals. the research of walter, taylor and habibis (2011) is mainly concerned with indigenous communities, social work and whiteness. this leaves us with a significant knowledge gap on white social work practice and multicultural communities. with the lack of academic research focusing on the critique of white social work and its relationship with australian multiculturalism, current and future students of social work are at considerable risk of losing out on contemporary debates in australia on race, multiculturalism and the social work response to the changing face of australian society. here, i want to shed light on professor andrew jakubowicz’s contribution to enhancing the visibility of immigrant and multicultural stories. these are excellent resources for social work students and staff in engaging with visual material drawing on case studies of specific communities. professor jakubowicz has been a series advisor on the sbs series, ‘immigration nation’ (2011), and series advisor on ‘once upon a time in...’, a three season project for northern pictures and sbs, of which ‘cabramatta’ (2012) and ‘punchbowl’ (2014) have been released. he developed the concept for ‘the great australian race riot’, a three episode series for sbs made by essential media and broadcast in 2015. once upon a time in cabramatta : resource for the social work classroom for the first time an australian television documentary focused on the history and tensions in the early days of the end of the white australia policy. more importantly, it depicted historic images of the arrivals of the vietnamese refugees in 1978. in particular, from the social work point of view, the narrative is a reminder of the trauma of loss of family, displacement, poverty, social exclusion due to racism and lack of english language, and unemployment. the film is mostly powerful for social workers’ viewing as it depicts counter-transference of trauma from parents to second generation, in this case it is the vietnamese community of cabramatta and the impact on their families, challenges that emerge from these traumatic situations such as drug addiction and youth crime. thus, the documentary has all the intersectional elements that social work students need to become aware of. jakubowicz (2016, p.145) aptly describes the documentary to include social movements and contemporary politics that have shaped the conversation of the refugee story and the ‘reelection’ of pauline hanson and other one nation party senators. social work academics engaged in social policy analysis need to become engaged with these past and present cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 95 australian realities that shape social policy and polity in australia. in addition, the film also depicts in-depth interviews with a vietnamese social worker and his impressions of the challenges faced by vietnamese refugee youth in the cabramatta community in the early 90s. these narratives are great learnings for both social work academics and social work practitioners. ‘once upon a time in cabramatta’ needs to form part of the curriculum when teaching cross cultural social work. a recent study from canada on settlement of syrian refugees in canada published in the prestigious international social work journal by drolet et al. (2017, p.5) urges social workers and social work academics to engage in practice with immigrants and refugees by bringing greater awareness in practice of structural racism, and building knowledge of political practices that oppress, whilst recognising the impact of historical and ongoing colonial processes. the study emphasises that social work has a distinct contribution to make to the important area of immigrant resettlement, particularly the refugee settlement process. here, the evidence presented in ‘once upon a time in cabramatta’ can provide reflexive narrative and case studies for social workers to rely on in building the case for good practice approaches in refugee settlement and the importance of advocating good practice frameworks with multicultural communities. conclusion: uncomfortable realities for social work practice in the multicultural space professor andrew jakubowicz’s impression on multiculturalism and refugees provides social work with an impetus to ground policy and practice frameworks that are inclusive, reflexive and competent. these are grounded in critical understanding of australian political history at the centre of which is the discourse on the importance of ‘welfare’ for multicultural communities. jakubowicz’s (2016, p.160) stark reminder of the double standards of refugee policy in australia is worth reflecting on here, he argues that more often ‘it is the cultural background of the refugees that is the problem, not merely their method of seeking refuge’ (jakubowicz, 2016, p.160). social work is grappling with the concept of ‘culture’ and dealing with cultural difference. this is evidenced in the writing of a number of scholars aspiring to good practice approaches with multicultural communities. chomsky (2017, p. 77) when talking about the role of intellectuals emphasises that ‘it is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and expose lies, in the western world’. chomsky describes academic power as coming from political liberty, access to information and freedom of expression’. in synergy with chomsky’s ideals, jakubowicz throughout his academic career has sought and revealed the challenging aspects of australian multiculturalism. this has been a difficult conversation for australian public policy and the wider audience. jakubowicz has fulfilled his responsibility as an academic and public intellectual. his works can be deemed of great value to social work policy and practice in australia and all those countries grappling with the changing face of their respective social orders. this brings me back to the original intent of the article which is to raise the question to what extent can white social work practice engage with the multiculturalism debate with genuine interest and empathy rather than through the lens of ‘distrust’ and ‘policing’. white 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 anglo frameworks of social work policy and practice will need to find ways of developing ‘inclusive practice’ rather than demonstrating mere cultural competence. inclusive practice will only thrive if practitioners and policy makers stop resisting change (and there is evidence about the extent to which white social workers do resist change). global migratory trends such as temporary workers, migrant workers and the refugee influx will continue to place demands for inclusive practice. to what extent white social work policy and practice frameworks will embrace this challenge will depend on their ability to engage with information external to their realm of comfort. afterword: personal notes: for the last two years, i have taught human rights and social justice (undergraduate level); law and policy for social workers (both undergraduate and postgraduate) and cross-cultural practice (postgraduate level). from anecdotal evidence and personal teaching evaluations it has become clearer that undergraduate students are excited, enthusiastic and were more willing to embrace the narratives presented in once upon a time in cabrammatta. they could engage with the various case studies and conceptualise social issues that could arise as a result of poor public policy, social exclusion, language barriers and lack of support services for multicultural clients. there is interest in studying social work in australia by international students. in particular, students from nepal, india, kenya, nigeria, brazil are enrolling in social work degrees. social workers in australia would benefit from gaining cultural understanding from these students. there is potential for these students to continue to reside in australia and contribute to practice within a trans-national social work context. references abrams, l.s. and moio, j.a. 2009, ‘critical race theory and the cultural competence dilemma in social work education’, journal of social work education, vol.45, no.2, pp.245-261. https://doi.org/10.5175/jswe.2009.200700109 chomsky, n. 2017, the responsibility of intellectuals, the new press, new york. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230375048_4 commonwealth of australia, department of social security, 1996, social work handbook, australian government publishing service. commonwealth of australia, department of social services, 2009, national framework for protecting australia’s children 2009-2020. canberra. https://www.dss.gov.au/ourresponsibilities/families-and-children/publications-articles/protecting-children-iseveryones-business costello, s. 2015, ‘female genital mutilation/cutting: risk management and strategies for social workers and health care professionals’, risk management and healthcare policy, vol.8, pp.225-233. https://doi.org/10.2147/rmhp.s62091 dominelli, l., 2018, anti-racist social work, 4th ed. palgrave, london. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53420-0 https://doi.org/10.5175/jswe.2009.200700109 https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230375048_4 https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/families-and-children/publications-articles/protecting-children-is-everyones-business https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/families-and-children/publications-articles/protecting-children-is-everyones-business https://www.dss.gov.au/our-responsibilities/families-and-children/publications-articles/protecting-children-is-everyones-business https://doi.org/10.2147/rmhp.s62091 https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53420-0 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.10, no.2, 2018 97 drolet, j., enns, r., kreitzer, l., shankar, j. and mclaughlin, a.m., 2017, ‘supporting the resettlement of a syrian family in canada: the social work resettlement practice experience of social justice matters’, international social work, published online 17 august 2017, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020872817725143. fitzgibbon, p. 1999, ‘social work and the human services in a corporatised environment: the case of centrelink’, in o’connor, i., smyth, p. and warburton, j. 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(eds), issues facing australian families, (3rd ed.), pearson education, frenchs forest, pp.119-136. weeks, w. and monani, d. 2002, ‘expanding our horizons: understanding the complexity of violence against women’, women against violence: an australian feminist journal, vol. 11, pp.66-71. https://search.informit.com.au/documentsummary;dn=591689409517306;res=ielhea https://doi.org/10.11157/anzswj-vol29iss2id407 https://doi.org/10.11157/anzswj-vol29iss2id407 https://anzswjournal.nz/anzsw/article/view/283 http://dx.doi.org/10.11157/anzswj-vol29iss2id283 http://dx.doi.org/10.11157/anzswj-vol29iss2id283 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chiabu.2016.07.011 https://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people/apology-to-australias-indigenous-peoples https://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/our-country/our-people/apology-to-australias-indigenous-peoples https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1839-4655.2004.tb01196.x https://doi.org/10.1080/0312407x.2010.510892 https://search.informit.com.au/documentsummary;dn=591689409517306;res=ielhea 6077-article text-27736-2-10-20180726.pdf abstract keywords introduction acknowledging social work as a white profession in australia viewing immigrant stories through the lens of professor andrew jakubowicz conclusion: uncomfortable realities for social work practice in the multicultural space afterword: personal notes: 7 monani cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 14, no. 2 2022 © 2022 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: shi, t. 2022. visualized trauma, sensitized resistance: urban art among the french hmong community. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:2, 40–51. https://doi.org/10.5130/ ccs.v14i2.8089 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs 40 article (refereed) visualized trauma, sensitized resistance: urban art among the french hmong community tian shi katholieke universiteit leuven, leuven, belgium, shitianchina@hotmail.com corresponding author: tian shi, katholieke universiteit leuven, oude markt 13, 3000 leuven, belgium, shitianchina@hotmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i2.8089 article history: received 06/02/2022; revised 06/02/2022; accepted 15/06/2022; published 27/07/2022 abstract various types of urban art emerged and prospered in recent decades when degenerating cities were embracing art as a marketing strategy. this urbanrejuvenation approach sheds less light on the agency and motivation of artists. this paper examines how ethnic artists represent traumatic memory, reflect nostalgia, and mobilize individuals to collaborate with one another to build resilience. this study contributes to the literature that explores the agency and creativity of underrepresented ethnic minority artists in a global society at large. keywords urban art; graffiti; trauma; refugees; hmong; france declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research was financed by the china scholarship council [grant no. 201606230152]. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14i2.8089 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14i2.8089 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:shitianchina@hotmail.com mailto:shitianchina@hotmail.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i2.8089 introduction over decades, young people around the world have embraced urban art to protest domination and express themselves, redefine the spatial territory of urban space, negotiate representations and practice citizenship (ferrell 1996; macdonald 2001; fieni 2016; baker 2015; awad & wagoner 2018). since the 1980s, french youth have expressed their struggles through graffiti, rap music, and break dance. their urban art practices have represented nostalgia, solidarity, and resilience in urban spaces (bourderionnet 2011; debras 2019; see hammou’s review 2020). in recent years, urban authorities have turned the accusation of ‘vandalism’ on urban art into ‘cultural diversity’ as one of the marketing strategies for cities. bruce (2019) has revealed the republican imperatives for inclusion and capitalism’s motive in organizing legal graffiti festivals in france. however, this marketing strategy ignores artists’ motivation and agency in regard to managing identitymaking, resisting societal oppression, and struggling against structural violence. moreover, the available research is insufficient to provide a detailed picture of urban artists with ethnic backgrounds in contemporary france. in this paper, i scrutinize how ethnic artists represent traumatic memory, reflect nostalgia, and mobilize individuals to collaborate with one another to build resistance. i mainly focus on three french hmong artists and their creations, namely, oil paintings, sand performances, and graffiti – although several other artistic mediums are used by these artists. i use ‘urban art’ 1 to refer to artworks with nontraditional tools/ skills delivered in an urban space. some hmong artists have trained in fine art colleges; others are self trained artists. their efforts and endeavors reveal the multiple facets of urban art as a means of identity making and resistancebuilding in contemporary french society. this paper focuses on three french hmong artists and their artwork, analyzes the significance of their work and examines the audiences’ comments. their work was showcased in the ‘hmong de france aujourd’hui’ community on facebook2. artworks recommended by the hmong community attracted me and i made contact with artists. i used a number of sources to collect data on their work and its reception in the hmong community. for example, i conducted a semistructured interview with txeuying vang during my fieldwork in france in april 2017. in addition, i collected comments and recommendations from my interlocutors about hmong artists during my ethnographic fieldwork between 2016 and 2019. the covid19 situation prevented further fieldwork based in the community, so i conducted online semistructured interviews with jinlee and other artists in december 2021. i also collected news reports, publications, magazine articles, posters, and business brochures. considering their fame and businesses, i withhold the legal names of these french hmong artists, referring to them by the names they use as artists and use anonymity in reporting comments from community members. the main method used in this research consisted of the content analysis of artwork, interview transcripts, media coverage, and written documents. content analysis is an appropriate methodological tool for ‘‘making valid references from data to their context’’ (krippendorff 1989). content analysis enables urban art researchers to interpret specified messages in visual representations within its societal context. in this paper, content analysis was carried out to examine the messages delivered by french hmong artists within the french societal context. this paper examines how hmong artists share painful memories, empathize with audiences, and mobilize younger generations to build resistance. this paper is divided into three sections. the first section examines how french hmong artists grew up in french society. the second section analyzes how their artworks 1 previous studies use ‘contemporary art’, ‘urban art’, and ‘street art’ interchangeably (perera, 2019). the term ‘urban art’ is more of an umbrella term for ‘any art in the style of street at, style writing or mural art’ (blanché, 2015). 2 https://www.facebook.com/hmongdefranceaujourdhui/ shi cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202241 https://www.facebook.com/hmongdefranceaujourdhui/ https://www.facebook.com/hmongdefranceaujourdhui/ https://www.facebook.com/hmongdefranceaujourdhui/ represent multiple themes, mobilize readers and passersby, and encourage resistance against social injustice and invisibility. the third section summarizes the main arguments of this paper. settling down and growing up in france in 19611975, the laotian hmong pledged their allegiance to different political elites and the cia (yang 2003). after the vietnam war, the laotian hmong fled to thailand to escape persecution. from 1975 to 1987, france received 115,693 refugees from cambodia, vietnam and laos (hassoun 1988). the lack of data on the ethnic origin of frenchborn second and thirdgeneration migrants in france is due to the french republic’s regime that banned the ethnic registration of french citizens with a migration background (see simon 2015). social scientists have had approximate figures based on their own investigation and estimates, from 13,000 (vang 2018) to 15,000 (lemoine, 2005; vang 2016). the french hmong community is scattered across the country because of the resettlement and integration policies (gauthier 1996, p. 26). these newcomers received shortterm vocational training and began working in factories. they have encountered various challenges – language barrier, education inefficiency, low employment and social immobility (hassoun 1988, 1997; marceaux, 1996). educational attainment and achievement among the 1.5 generation and second generation is not very high (yang 1995), especially among the women. according to yang’s study (1995), and confirmed by my fieldwork, french hmong women are less committed to pursuing advanced degrees than to entering endogamous marriages. over the past 40 years, the french hmong community has suffered the dual violence of social immobility and invisibility due to low education achievement at the higher education level (yang 1995) and, later, in professional domains. in france, refugees from southeast asia were absent in the political discourse of immigration in the 1990s (billion 2001). their trauma, sacrifice and sufferings have not been recognized openly, publicly and widely. they do not have access to directly address their pain and trauma in the current ‘colorblind’ society. thus, members of the young generation of laotian hmong descendants seek alternative ways to express their frustration and anger (shi 2022). urban art enables hmong youth to raise awareness in their visual voices, and call for resistance against structural violence. the rich literature on hmong folk or traditional art focuses mostly on textile art or paj ntaub (symonds 2004; craig 2010; shi 2020), but previous research has paid little attention to other types of art, for instance, selfdocumentary (koltyk 1993). this paper focuses on urban art among the french hmong community. the second generation of hmong refugees in france has received primary and secondary education in local schools (yang 1995). some of them have been trained in art schools or professional colleges. for example, comicanimation artist patricia lyfoung has obtained her baccalaureate in literature. after that, she has obtained a degree in illustration and then trained in animation at the gobelins school, combining formal art training with the inspiration from the japanese cartoons of the 1980s3. patricia’s career path is an example of formal art education, but others are selfeducated artists. for instance, sculpture artist noël ly has obtained a baccalaureate in metal structure and has worked in the metal industry for more than 15 years4. he owns his business ‘nocas metal art’ and has obtained several awards. in general, patricia and noël’s artworks are rooted in the context of art education and cultural consumption in france. three artists and their artwork will be examined in this paper. they grew up in france, witnessed the struggle of parents and the entire hmong community, and finally motivated themselves to express opinions, 3 patricia lyfoung’s bio profile at an art exhibition (june 19, 2021, bibliothèque saintcorneille compiègne, france). 4 noël ly’s bio profile at an art exhibition (july 231, 2019, lambesc, france). shi cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202242 feelings, and visions through art. meanwhile, they have taken to new media – facebook, youtube, and instagram – and promoted themselves to the global public. jinlee has labeled himself as a ‘multidisciplinary artist’ who practices sand performance, light painting, singing, rap, and theater. jinlee claimed, ‘i think that a single discipline cannot express all of my personality; that is why i made the choice to practice several artistic forms of expression’5. tennch tcha is a designer and graffiti artist. when he was a teenager, he enjoyed hiphop culture and took a training course taught by a graffiti artist. since then, tennch has learnt more about graffiti and turned himself into a selfemployed artist. he is also recognized as someone who has trained teenagers to express themselves through art6.much of tennch tcha’s artwork is murals and largescale decoration, but as a commercial artist, he also paints graffiti on cars, house walls, domestic spaces, and business spaces according to customer demands. txeuying vang was born in sayaboury, laos and fled to thailand with his parents in 1975 when he was three years old. his family moved to france in 1979. txeuying became a designer and an art teacher at a local school after finishing his college education7. all three artists presented in this paper produce pieces on commission, including murals, graffiti, oil paintings and small size portraits. the perception of graffiti has gradually changed from an act of vandalism or criminal damage in the 1970s and 1990s (ferrell, 1996, pp. 106116) to an innovation and artistic creation, which was prompted by the tourism and advertising industries (mokrasgrabowska 2016; kramer 2017, pp. 7273) and the promotion of global/creative cities (brighenti 2017, p.120; perera 2019). in france, as fieni (2016) reviewed, the debate on the legitimacy and aesthetic value of graffiti is ongoing, and the french public has gradually begun to tolerate graffiti. catlin bruce (2019) documented the unique scenario of the ‘meeting of styles (mos)’ festival in a small city in southern france. in bruce’s observation (2019, pp. 125129), in addition to several showcases of graffiti, this festival included social space for drinking and chatting, food trucks, a small library of works about hiphop and urban art, a cultural center, film screening and dance parties. bruce’s observation revealed that the discourses of creative cities and urban renewal make the mos the encountering space for governance and issues with the bourgeois, cultural consumption and tourism. this marketing strategy on ‘urban art + tourism’ works as a key in the process of transforming ‘vandalism’ to ‘city charm’. for instance, jinlee performed at la fête de la francophonie, which was organized by the high commission of canada & embassy of france in 2017 (at giftland mall, guyana). another performance was arranged at rendezvous de la francophonie (in 2017, in paramaribo, suriname), which was organized by the french embassy, the high commission of canada and the general consulate of haiti. aligned with canadian singers and haitian artists, jinlee and his performing partner contributed to the ‘show’ of cultural diversity in francophone countries. however, the actual vibe of his performance was difficult to determine in such aggregated scenarios. thus, current studies need to take a close look at urban art in the city via the presence of discourses that harbor the struggles and tension of urban art in its various forms. the ‘show’ of cultural diversity sprinkled in media coverages remarks the reinterpretation of street art. in france, articles intensified the creative aspect of art and marked a media tone on youth culture. in 2014, the article ‘jin lee entre rêve et féerie aux zest’ivales, samedi’ featured the sensation, mediation 5 jinlee’s personal website: http://www.artistejinlee.fr/ 6 pierrelouis augereau, ‘il faut croire en ses rêves: artiste, graffeur, le montreuillais tennch tcha aime partager sa passion.’, october, 31, 2014. journal le courrier de l'ouest, https://www.ouestfrance.fr/premium/?article_id=f1c7240b f0e04991ae885800299b3068 7 personal communication, april, 19, 2017. shi cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202243 https://m.facebook.com/photo.php/?set=o.1143521532348413&fbid=10155066568340283 https://www.ctguyane.fr/ctg-celebre-francophonie/ http://www.artiste-jinlee.fr/ https://www.ouest-france.fr/premium/?article_id=f1c7240b-f0e0-4991-ae88-5800299b3068 https://www.ouest-france.fr/premium/?article_id=f1c7240b-f0e0-4991-ae88-5800299b3068 and creation elements of his multimedia art performance, exception of jinlee’s own journey towards art8. in an interview in 2014, the journalist showed great interest in tennch tcha’s art journey and the benefits of ‘turning passion into a job’. undoubtedly, these coverages would provide useful information to make connections with artists’ careers and products. but it might eliminate the understanding of agency, motivation and struggle related to these artworks. thus, to fill the gap, this paper sets out to articulate how the traumatic experiences of hmong diaspora emerged in their art creation and how the concerns on immigrants’ status and social issues contributed to their visual repertoire. visualizing trauma, delivering voice many hmong refugees have struggled with depressive disorder, traumatic brain injuries and other refugee related mental health problems since their arrival in refugee camps and resettlement in a third country (westermeyer 1988; adler 1995;westermeyer and her 2007:381). many times, i have heard the elderly individuals recall their ‘lost home’ by saying ‘thaum peb nyob saum roob…’ (when we lived in mountains…). they also remember their refugee experience, during which they fled out of laos in various ways. unfortunately, these stories have not been heard in the mainstream media, nor have the struggles of these individuals been paid attention to by the public. in france, these elderly individuals have suffered the pain of ‘voicelessness’ when they seem marginalized. in 2015, txeuying decided to create paintings about hmong culture, including a reed pipe player (txiv qeej) playing the qeej (reed pipe), a hmong soldier saying goodbye to his girlfriend, and a hmong boy trying to swim across the mekong river with his younger sister but failing (figure 1). those paintings made his fame in the hmong community around the world. 8 "jin lee entre rêve et féerie aux zest'ivales, samedi", december, 18, 2014. https://www.ouestfrance.fr/paysdelaloire/ lepoiresurvie85170/jinleeentrereveetfeerieauxzestivalessamedi3069690 figure 1. drama mekong reproduced courtesy of txeuying vang shi cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202244 https://www.ouest-france.fr/pays-de-la-loire/le-poire-sur-vie-85170/jin-lee-entre-reve-et-feerie-aux-zestivales-samedi-3069690 https://www.ouest-france.fr/pays-de-la-loire/le-poire-sur-vie-85170/jin-lee-entre-reve-et-feerie-aux-zestivales-samedi-3069690 in the painting drama mekong (figure 1), a young man holds his younger sister and roars his sorrow, pain and anger. behind his back, the sky is overcast with clouds; the dark, cheerless, and cold water threatens to swallow his freedom. this painting reveals a haunting memory of fleeing out from laos. between 1975 and 1980, thousands and thousands of laotian hmong scuttled across the jungle, were lost over the cliffs, and swam across the mekong river. some of them never had the chance to arrive at thailand. those who did make it, suffered from and were haunted by nightmares (adler 1995;westermeyer & her 2007). txeuying’s paintings visualize the traumatic memory of laotian hmong refugees. txeuying said he still remembers what happened with the diaspora, so his paintings afford his personal memories and the experience of his family. the emotion in txeuying’s paintings on refuge illustrates the traumatic experience of the hmong diaspora and reflects ‘secondary traumatization’ (baranowsky et al. 1998; dekel & goldblatt, 2008), known as the ‘intergenerational transmission of trauma’ (danieli, 1998). by revisiting their traumatic experiences (van der kolk and fisler, 1995; also see robinett’s summary 2007), trauma survivors can share their stories to reaffirm the relationship between the common narrative and their lived experiences (robinett, 2007). in txeuying’s paintings, mobilizing the traumatic experience of the diaspora makes references to the social suffering of being invisible and marginalized in a french society that does not officially recognize the diversity of the population. viewing nostalgia, building resilience the french republicanism assimilates immigrants into french society and has eliminated spaces for the ‘social visibility of ethnic minorities’ over decades (amiraux & simon 2006; montague 2013). youth among the french hmong seem to lack the social or symbolic capital to become involved in local politics (billion 2001). graffiti enables french hmong artists to reach out to various viewers and foster resistance against such sociopolitical invisibility. jinlee has also claimed, ‘i have created different works on social issues’9. by criticizing social issues, urban art achieves its triumph to mobilize young citizens to resist against social injustice. aligned with illustrating traumatic memory, some artists represented the nostalgia of french hmong community in their creations. nostalgia is the deep emotion in diasporic groups that they can’t return to their ‘homeland’ (lévy & olazabal, 2015). during fieldwork in the french hmong community, i have continuously heard elders say, ‘when we had lived in laos…. (thaum peb nyob nplaug teb)’ or ‘kuv tseem nco txog kuv lub tsev nyob saum roob (i always miss my house in the mountains)’. the poster of the cultural event ‘la semaine culturelle sur le peuple hmong’ (2015) illustrates green mountains, trees and small houses as the symbol of hmong culture. mountains, forests, and houses are also the key elements in jinlee’s sand performances. for example, elephants, giraffes, trees and bushes illustrate the serenity of an african safari (figure 2). the serenity makes viewers forget about the conflicts, violence, and wars in africa. most of jinlee’s performances focus on the ephemeral beauty of the rural, countryside, and the natural world, more like a utopia. for the hmong audience, jinlee’s performance can carry them back to their ‘rural villages’ and ‘lost home’ where the war did not happen. thus, having access to such a nostalgic mood serves as a key resilience that help these survivals to keep going in a third country. their nostalgic narrative could help them build resilience against trauma and ‘voicelessness’. 9 jinlee’s personal website: http://www.artistejinlee.fr/ shi cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202245 http://www.artiste-jinlee.fr/ figure 2. sand performance by jinlee, video screenshot, reproduced courtesy of jinlee jinlee’s sand performances have also depicted traumatic war stories – couples separated, husbands who went to war and died, and parents losing their son, among other subjects. through performances, jinlee visualizes trauma and its tragic influence on ordinary people. he said, ‘as a child of political refugees, an inhabitant of workingclass neighborhoods and a child of globalization, i felt the need to cry out, to express myself ’10. given its importance, such traumafocused performances should not be simply interpreted as ‘cultural diversity’ or the ‘decorated flowers of a city tour’. jinlee explained, ‘i’m so sad that we (hmong people) don’t have a hmong country and we are apart in different places. the young generation of hmong in france don’t understand their parents and the older generations. that’s the reason i would like to use rap, the street art to call them. rap is the music of the street; everyone listens to it. it’s like a battle11.’ for him, rap, graffiti, and other types of urban art connotates with historical memory and suffering, even though it has not yet been fully presented in the mainstream media. tagging urban space, sensing resistance in the 1980s, hiphop culture has become popular in france (fieni 2016:188). rap artist abd al malik has acquired ‘unusual visibility’ both among ethnic audiences and in the mainstream media ( jouili 2013) by using his own experiences growing up in a suburban area, with former deviant activity, and a personal philosophy on religious choices (bourderionnet 2011). graffiti, a crucial part of hiphop culture, has attracted hmong artists into its territory. noël ly recalled, ‘when i was younger, i practised break dance and then drawing…… i like pop culture’12. jinlee has also claimed, ‘it was in the 90s that the first big hiphop wave arrived, and i naturally found my place in it. break dance, graffiti, and rap would be my playgrounds’13. graffiti, rap music and break dance encouraged hmong artists to express passion, opinion and emotion. tennch tcha remembered how he was immersed in hiphop culture through break dance when he was 12 or 13 years old. tennch recalled, ‘my hmong culture reminds me the immigrant status i 10 jinlee’s personal website: http://www.artistejinlee.fr/ 11 personal communication, december 13, 2021 12 noël ly’s bio profile at an art exhibition (july 231, 2019, lambesc, france). 13 jinlee’s personal website: http://www.artistejinlee.fr/ shi cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202246 http://www.artiste-jinlee.fr/ http://www.artiste-jinlee.fr/ belong to and the obligation of building something in a country where you had nothing before’14. for him, graffiti provides ‘infinite’ potential to navigate the world and make a creation. the techniques and skills of graffiti writing were evolving and diversifying in that styles and color palettes changed from realistic to cartoonish and from representational to abstract (kramer 2017, pp. 1219). french hmong artists acquired mature and practical knowledge of creating graffiti. using letters, drawings, sprayings, characters, and colors, ‘you can create anything; there are no limits’, tennch claimed15. much of their artworks employ multiple tools and styles, writing, painting, tagging, and stenciling. moreover, tennch’s commissioned work stands for the concerns on social issues, for example, immigrant issue in france. figure 3. the collaborative mural by tennch tcha, the jamet brothers, alexandra bombled genneteau and tchuj tcha; reproduced courtesy of tennch tcha in one of their collaborated murals, tennch and other graffiti writers illustrate the current ‘race & immigrants’ politics in france. this mural (figure 3) follows the tradition of political graffiti that echoes social issues and movements. in the french context, graffiti was used in the battle for immigration, social reform or lgbt activism (debras 2019). this largescale mural created by tennch tcha and other artists shows a sarcastic dinner composed of various religious followers and ethnic minorities in front of the politician marine le pen, who is staring out at them. this mural combined two different worlds. one is the ordinary world, where people enjoy eating and drinking against the scenery of green farmland and country houses. smiles emerged from jew, muslim, buddhist, black and asian guests. the other world is shown from marine le pen’s angle, which looks down at the ‘joyful’ individuals. this ‘looking down’ angle also connects to the metaphor ‘big brother is watching you.’ it is not hard to make the connection with marine le pen’s political propaganda, which conveys her agenda to expel immigrants. the issue of immigration was a controversial and primary focus of public 14 personal communication, june, 12, 2022. 15 pierrelouis augereau, ‘il faut croire en ses rêves: artiste, graffeur, le montreuillais tennch tcha aime partager sa passion.’, october 31, 2014. journal le courrier de l'ouest, link : https://www.ouestfrance.fr/premium/?article_ id=f1c7240bf0e04991ae885800299b3068 shi cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202247 https://www.ouest-france.fr/premium/?article_id=f1c7240b-f0e0-4991-ae88-5800299b3068 https://www.ouest-france.fr/premium/?article_id=f1c7240b-f0e0-4991-ae88-5800299b3068 attention during the 2017 presidential election in france. some politicians blamed immigrants and migrant workers for taking jobs and causing violence. several debates that focused on this issue urged consideration of many concerns, which are demonstrated in this mural. tennch said, ‘the customer would like to echo the slogan ‘everyone is welcome to be with us’ as well as the rejection of the extreme rightism embodied by marine le pen’16. this merit of resistance remains in graffiti culture because writers have included historical references and political indexicality in graffiti. ferrell (1995) has suggested that graffiti writers practice alternative ways of collective activity and interethnic collaboration. tagging, piecing, and incorporation serve as intertextual conversations and support for ethnic youth. similarly, tennch tcha has collaborated with other artists to create largescale murals. such collaboration could be seen as an alternative approach to resistance. conclusion forty years after the resettlement in france, the second generation of hmong refugees is grown up and is using various strategies to negotiate its ethnic identity and cultural heritage. artists express their opinions, feelings and visions through a variety of artistic creations (shi 2022). some urban art visualizes the traumatic experiences of the hmong and calls upon the audience’s reflection. appreciation of oil painting, sand performance, and graffiti provides a visual space in which audiences are connected through trauma, sadness, and the yearning to return to the ‘homeland’. the secondgeneration artists, as evidenced by the analysis presented in this paper, engage in the diasporic experience and collective memory of trauma, but they also deliver calls for resistance against the dominant culture. urban art helps them address their concern that social invisibility and immobility have profound effects on marginalized groups and shows that they seek to address this imbalance in the french context. underrepresented young people around the world now incorporate urban art into their handling of local representations (latorre 2018; smith 2018). the three artists whose work is the focus of this paper have worked with young people in the hmong community to develop their skills in various genres of urban art. urban art, as campos et al. (2021) demonstrated, stimulates the energy and power of ‘disenfranchised youth’ to shape strategies, participate in global politics and create an aesthetic intervention. urban art promotes disempowered groups in creating alternative spaces of agency, narratives and representations through various techniques, skills, and styles. in this paper, i demonstrate that french hmong artists and their artwork visualize the traumatic memories and suffering and also go beyond that. these artists spread messages that encourage young people to come together and call for resistance against social invisibility and immobility. this study contributes to the literature that explores the agency and creativity of underrepresented minority artists in a global society. acknowledgments i am grateful for the comments and suggestions of the anonymous reviewers and editors on earlier drafts of this article. i would like to thank txeuying, louchia, jinlee, tennch, the european hmong community and all those who have made this research possible. this paper is based in part on my dissertation at ku leuven, belgium. this research was financed by the china scholarship council [grant no. 201606230152]. references adler, s.r. 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(cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: viltoft, c. d. 2022. deconstructing gangsterism in south africa: uncovering the need for gender-sensitive policies. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:3, 1– 14. https:// doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.7985 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) deconstructing gangsterism in south africa: uncovering the need for gender-sensitive policies clara dybbroe viltoft university of cape town, cape town, south africa corresponding author: clara viltoft, kramer law building, wilfred and jules middle campus of south africa, rondebosch, cape town, 7700, south africa, claraviltoft@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.7985 article history: received 23/11/2021; revised 02/06/2022; accepted 22/07/2022; published 15/12/2022 abstract although the dawn of democracy promised a new beginning in south africa, lingering effects of apartheid remained, including the struggle to address gang violence and gender-based violence amidst the backdrop of widespread organised crime and corruption, social inequality, a sluggish economy, and poor service delivery. the last policy national anti-gangsterism strategy (2017) required implementation at provincial level. this study examines the western cape policy content and deconstructs the concept of gangsterism. the paper shows that sustained anti-gang strategies and interventions demand structural obstacles and inequality are addressed in the context of the spill-over from the apartheid era. notably, it will be concluded that there are long-term benefits of reframing the problem of gangsterism in the western cape as ‘a youth-at-risk-crisis’ with specific attention gender-sensitivity to contribute to local peacebuilding by focusing on youth to exert agency and become empowered in pursuit of individual and community resilience and active citizenry. keywords gang violence; organised crime; gender-sensitive; policy; south africa 1 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.7985 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.7985 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:claraviltoft@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.7985 introduction gangsterism has been an on-going problem in the western cape province of south africa since before the end of the apartheid regime. although the dawn of democracy promised a new beginning in south africa, lingering effects of apartheid remained, including the struggle to address gang violence and gender-based violence amidst the backdrop of widespread organised crime and corruption, social inequality, a sluggish economy, and poor service delivery. the last policy national anti-gangsterism strategy (2017) required implementation at provincial level. cape town, the country’s second largest city and metropole of the western cape province, exemplifies this problem more starkly than elsewhere, as apartheid spatial planning relegated the historically disadvantaged to the limits and outskirts of society, where they still remain, but the city of cape town perpetuated the relegation of the poor and working class to the verges. in 2019, the provincial government took some significant steps in policy development to address the problem. this paper will assess the western cape policy content and deconstruct the concept of gangsterism so as to discuss the measures best suited to bring about change in society. it will show that sustained anti-gang strategies and interventions demand structural obstacles and inequality are addressed in the context of the spill-over from the apartheid era. notably, it will be concluded that there is long-term benefits of reframing the problem of gangsterism in the western cape as ‘a youth-at-risk-crisis’ with specific attention gendersensitivity to contribute to local peacebuilding by focusing on youth to exert agency and become empowered in pursuit of individual and community resilience and active citizenry. the purpose of this study is to assess the assumptions of the key policy document ‘strategic roadmap towards implementation of the national anti-gangsterism strategy in the western cape – provincial response to the national anti-gangsterism strategy (nags) 2019’ (hereafter nagswc), to identify what gangsterism is assumed to be. this document was written by don pinnock and romaney pinnock (2019) for the western cape department of community safety (docs). understanding what gangsterism is in this context will be achieved by employing carol bacchi’s (2009) ‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ approach (wrp). this paper will begin with a brief introduction, including an overview of the nags and the nagswc. this will be followed by the research question and the policy context within which the study was conducted, after which the methodology is explained. finally, the findings are presented. background south africa’s transition to democracy in 1994 ushered in a new dispensation based on democracy, equality, and the rule of law. it represented a break from apartheid governance, which was based on racial segregation. the country’s constitution encompasses a range of civil and political rights, such as human dignity (s10) and freedom and security of person (s12) (the constitution of the republic of south africa 1996) (hereafter ‘the constitution’). the south african police service (saps), previously known for human rights abuses during the apartheid era, underwent major reforms to align itself with democratic and human rights principles including basic needs provision, as enshrined in the constitution. the issue of gangs, and ensuing gang violence, predates democracy in south africa. however, after 28 years of democracy, gang violence continues to affect safety and security of many communities in south africa, and the ways of cape town and the western cape are not an exception. the nascent democratic government and newly recalibrated police forces have, in other words, struggled to address gangs and gang violence effectively amidst the backdrop of widespread organised crime and corruption, social inequality, a sluggish economy, and poor service delivery. despite the constitutional human rights framework, including policing as a preventative as well as an investigative and public security institution, the state’s response to gang violence has primarily relied on criminal justice approaches, characterised by forceful policing tactics (stemmet 2006). this approach ranges viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 20222 from the periodic deployment of the south african national defence force (sandf) into the areas of the so-called cape flats1 as well as the (re-)creation of an anti-gang unit which consists of: ‘members from specialised units in the police services …whose focus is to weaken the capacity of gangs and to disable the criminal economy linked to gangsterism and drug and firearm supply lines’ (dougan 2018, para. 5). south africa is not unique in this regard; several countries are struggling with gang violence disproportionately centred in the urban environments. nor is it the only developing country struggling to provide or uphold basic needs to socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens. globally, gangs are present in both the global south and the global north, and in developed and developing countries alike. gangsterism is further affiliated with other societal problems, such as dysfunctional families, disorganised communities, drug and substance abuse, as well as the deficient provision of basic needs (south africa constitution 1996; alexander 2010; pinnock 2016) often linked to the inability to access prosocial opportunities, including employment. informal social structures and perilous livelihoods are both conditions of and amplified in areas marked by relative poverty and high inequality (ikejiaku 2009). coupled with the fact that areas with little or no social cohesion are more vulnerable to intergroup conflict, it is no surprise that such areas tend to experience higher levels of direct/physical violence (seedat et al. 2009). the government is obliged to commit to equality regardless of origin, gender, ethnicity, and/or socioeconomic status or other inalienable characteristics. yet, 28 years after the abolition of apartheid, gangs in the western cape disproportionately impact livelihoods of people on the cape flats. both the national government of south africa and the provincial government of western cape have taken steps to develop policies to address gangsterism and its effects. the policy documents the justice, crime prevention and security cluster ( jcps) approved the national antigangsterism strategy (nags) as ratified by the jcps cabinet committee on 2 june 2016. the strategy was adopted by the western cape provincial cabinet in 2017. the details of nags, the national strategy framework, are still (2022) to be made public. what is known about it is that it aligns with the national development plan to ensure that all south africans feel safe and their community can live free of fear (emphasis added). based on a four-pillar foundation, it seeks direct intervention through human development, social partnerships, spatial design, and criminal justice process (payne 2017). nags further calls for a holistic approach to address issues that feed gangsterism at community level and additionally, a national interdepartmental antigang strategy that addresses both current impacts of gangsterism as well as prevention efforts (more details on nags to be presented later in the material section) (pinnock & pinnock 2019). docs began to develop its own provincial response to the nags, (named ‘strategic roadmap towards implementation of the national anti-gangsterism strategy in the western cape – provincial response to the national anti-gangsterism strategy (nags) 2019’) in april 2018. the western cape policy was concluded after five workshops held during 2018/19, facilitated by don pinnock on behalf of docs. in these workshops, a provincial task team ‘developed principles, plans, strategies and interventions to create a framework for policy and action to radically reduce the impact of gangs on communities’ with the following workshop agendas: 1 the cape flats (or the flats) refers to the areas southeast of the central part of city of cape town. during the apartheid regime, black, coloured, and indians were forcibly removed from the inner-city residence out onto the flats under the infamous group areas act of 1950 (act no 41 of 1950). viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 20223 • establishment of definitions and areas of focus; • creation of a youth development platform to develop plans to reduce the impact of gangs on communities; • identification of game changers within each area of focus and development of approach principles; • unpacking best practices and learnings of existing or past programmes. putting together a draft action plan for the strategy; • final drafting of a framework to reduce violence and the impact of gangs on communities. the process brought together high-level inputs from government and civil society members – the task team specifically included experts from different government departments (from the premier, the departments of community safety, health, education, and social development), south african police service (saps) officials, gang researchers, rehabilitation and reintegration organisation workers and other relevant ‘frontiers’ from organisations including local non-governmental organisations and civil society organisation. the chapters on place making and community cohesion and the appendices on drugs and on firearms and gun violence highlight, in line with the literature, how gangsterism is inherently linked to the issue of drugs as a form of organised crime. nagswc emphasises the disproportionate effect on youth and on communities, which can be interpreted as a further commitment to the preventative approach. the control of drugs paves the road to control of an illicit and profitable economy and is viewed as a significant protective factor against offending among youth in the communities. the nagswc goal to ‘develop plans for designing and adapting physical spaces that promote social cohesion and safety’ can be said to expand on earlier policy ideals of inclusions of ground level actors such as safe schools to provide safe and prosocial alternative for youth. what is suggested in nagswc is that mid-level collective actors, neighbourhoods and communities, as well as intentional spatial design, together constitute a front against gangs by disempowering and preventing their ability to organise and engage youth. the policymaking approach and its context evidence-based policymaking, such as the nagswc policy formulation, is increasingly used in preventative approaches to criminality and is more commonly viewed as a best practice model for interdisciplinary and multi-stakeholder public policy (esbensen et al. 2013). but what exactly does that mean? generally, the research on gangs in south africa includes critical definitions, identification of risk factors, and criminological/ sociological explanations for gang behaviour. however, little attention has been given to how the effectiveness of approaches and interventions and their impact on gang crime and violence reduction might interrelate with the policy formulation process and the scope of change policy allows for. given that we know a lot about gangs but have less evidence-based knowledge about how the impact of gang prevention and disruption effectively address the related issues, this paper aims to contribute to the generation of such information by exploring means and ends in nagswc. over the past years, gang violence has spiked upwards and generated challenges in different spheres and on different societal levels in south africa, and in the western cape in particular. as the literature reveals, multiple risk factors are involved: anti-social behaviour, substance abuse, mental health problems, victimisation, and negative/traumatic life events as well as safety and violence issues in or in relation to family, education, peer group and community (pinnock & pinnock 2019). thus, in contemporary south africa, the realisation that multisectoral and cross-sectoral interventions is much needed, and also should include community engagement in tandem with police enforcement and justice that is essential in curbing gang violence (portfolio committee on police 2018). viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 20224 the lack of public engagement with nagswc has provoked criticism. the militarised approach to gangsterism in the western cape was criticised by the south african drug policy initiative in autumn 2019, as the government was called out for ‘sitting on its own report that calls for the demilitarisation of the police and the legislation of all drugs to help tackle the drug-related crime’. (‘western cape government slated for “sitting on its own anti-gangsterism report”’ 2019). the debate has led to accusations of the lack of willingness to engage with the issue further and publicly but also calls into question the value of a national strategy relying on a provincial implementation. subsequently, and crucially, it prompted other questions: what is nagswc suggesting? what aspects of the broad issue of gangsterism are included in it and which are not? as the term gangsterism (as well as anti-gangsterism) lacks a common definition, it is valuable to assess the problem representations within the strategy, as they impact the way in which gangsterism is governed provincially, since each province must develop an implementation of nags that account for localised and tailored responses. but what exactly does that entail in western cape? the research question social policy initiatives contain within them assumptions of what the problem to be addressed it. using carol bacchi’s (2009) ‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ approach (wrp), this study deconstructs the notion of gangsterism presented in the policy document ‘strategic roadmap towards implementation of the national anti-gangsterism strategy in the western cape – provincial response to the national anti-gangsterism strategy (nags) 2019’ written by don pinnock and romaney pinnock (2019) for the western cape department of community safety (docs)to answer the overarching research question: • what is the problem of gangsterism in the western cape represented to be in nagswc? this over-arching question includes the following sub-questions: • what presuppositions or assumptions underpin this representation of the ‘problem’? • how has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about? • what is left unproblematic in this problem representation? where are the silences? can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently? • what effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’? • how/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated, and defended? how has it been (or could it be) questioned, disrupted, and replaced? the interest in deconstructing gangsterism in nagswc further stems from the author’s involvement in the provincial strategy formulation from may 2018 to february 2019. as nags requires each province to develop individual strategies to better cope with the distinctive or localised issues of gangsterism, this analysis allows for engaging with the problem of gangsterism in nagswc to really understand how the phenomenon is problematised in the western cape and further, how that has formed the proposed strategies outlined in the policy. ethics clearance was obtained from university of cape town granted by the law faculty’s research ethics committee for a period of 12 months covering the time that i participated in the formulation of the nagswc. methodology carol lee bacchi’s ‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ (2009) approach (wpr) is concerned with the role of those formulating policy in shaping certain problems and how the characters of these problems are constructed. it is grounded in the idea that policy generally claims to solve problems that need to viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 20225 be addressed (bacchi 2009, p. xi). hence, issues in policy are problematised in specific ways; they are presented to us in a certain way and put forward as ‘problems’ in a certain way. this is bacchi’s motivation for studying how issues are thought of as problems and in what way they reduce complexity or divert from reality (osborne 1997). bacchi draws on feminist traditions in questioning power relations and truths and so. wpr as a method has been used in social sciences’ critical tradition since the 1990s, especially within postmodern and social constructionist research. from early on, bacchi compared affirmative action in policies in different western countries and concluded that affirmative action had different meanings depending on which ‘time and space’ was examined. for example, it was noted that the same problem was problematised as ‘special treatment’ for ‘disadvantaged groups’ in some places but as ‘social justice’ in others (bacchi 1996). her methodology differs from traditional policy theory and draws on discourse theory by acknowledging the historical development of conceptual logics that forms a specific understanding of a problem (bacchi 2012). wpr can therefore, with benefit, be utilised when one wishes to deconstruct texts or discourses to understand how ‘meaning is made’. to do so, it makes visible the contradictions between what is said and how it is said, question truths, false binaries, and dichotomies. wpr is therefore also a form of discourse analysis, which acknowledges that policy significantly impacts lives and is not merely a paper that solves a political issue. bacchi’s method is now well-established and widely used to understand the effects of politics and how, and to what extent, policy addresses the problem it claims to solve. bacchi’s wpr has been used in a variety of different discourse analyses of policy but has not yet been applied to the topic of gangs or gangs in south africa. the wpr approach to policy analysis is a very concrete methodological toolbox that addresses a set of questions, where the objective of the analysis is to figure out how language and problem representations shape meaning and knowledge (bacchi 1996). however, the interrelatedness of the questions still allows for a flexible application to fit the chosen material and thus the method does not have to be applied sequentially. findings in nagswc, gangsterism is categorised as a ‘wicked problem’ and said to manifest in several key areas: policing and justice, peer groups, families, place making and community cohesion, health and youth wellbeing, education, and safe spaces. the spectrum which binds these societal spheres together is violence. nagswc thus purposely broadens the definition of a gang from the intersection of crime and violence to a spectrum, which allows for intervention areas to address gangsterism at different societal levels. by doing this, it is possible to utilise other knowledge and intervention systems than those that fall within law enforcement and military engagement, namely ‘the public health and public safety fields as well as multi-disciplinary, multi-sector responses.’ although the report was still pending approval at the time of writing, nagswc is envisioned to replace the 2008 policy, ‘social transformation, gang prevention, and intervention strategic framework’ (2008 policy). crime analysis is based on a problem-oriented approach, that is, a focus on the public security problem at hand. as we have seen, in south africa, this includes collaboration between law enforcement, such as saps, and other organisations and local actors within preventative and repressive intervention frameworks. in effect, this means that local problems handled by the police ideally reflect regional and national outputs. but how does that happen, when the national framework (nags) remains under wraps and the commitment to utilise the provincial framework (nagswc) seemed only to become present when the report was publicly viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 20226 shared2. notably, nagswc recognises that effective policing is more than crime control and at the same time, that there is a need to address community violence, thus asserting that policing of gangs should have a broader reach than it does at present. this is somewhat reflected within a community’s perception of ‘good’ law enforcement; this safety, however, requires well trained officers, high standard of discipline, and proper management directed by good governance. while it is understandable that sensitive matters, ie intelligence, require a level of secrecy, it is questionable whether this is as progressively attained as the politicians contend it to be done when the intention to move forward with nagswc was only communicated after the report was leaked in autumn 2019. it certainly is hard to believe that during the latest deployment of the military in the western cape, it was not possible to note that high-level stakeholders had been working on furthering a new integrated approach to gangsterism. whether lack of political will, bureaucracy, inefficiency or all three, are to blame, it seems fair to assert that it has yet to be determined whether the use of resources and capacity to develop nagswc will impact real life change on the ground. it has so far been identified that the dominant representation of the problem of gangsterism is youth at risk and that the main solution lies in building individual and collective resilience at community level by reducing neighbourhood violence. the central strategies to achieve this are understood to lie in the creation of both responsibility and accountability, firstly managed by a provincial hub but decentralised into neighbourhood safety hubs to secure localised responses (wpr question one). at present, however, it is apparent that the conceptual foundation for strategy has not managed to include proper channels for the commitment to coordinated violence prevention and social transformation, as envisioned in both the applicable law and the previous strategic framework (wrp question two). this is further rooted in the historical, social, and cultural governance and policing context, which has maintained a militarised discourse, where political will and adequately sustained efforts have not been present (wpr question three). the previous part has attempted to address what has been said, how, and why (wpr questions one to three). now, the paper will turn its attention to what has not been said (wpr question four) and what effects this might bring about (wpr question five), and how we might think about the problem differently and whether there are other apparent nuances or solutions to consider (wpr question six). although nagswc has afforded considerable attention to social violence and how to cope with the immense effects of gangsterism on communities and the disproportional impact on youth, there is less emphasis on how the different groups in the communities relate to one another and play into on-theground conflict and hostility. south africa can be positioned as a strong state with excellent legal provisions for democratic rights, including so-called positive rights that provide for human rights and basic needs as a primary device for governance, yet the high levels of inequality, poverty and unemployment render most underprivileged population groups, largely along apartheid era racial groups, in perilous conditions. the analysis also showed how nagswc echoes the work of other scholars when stating that prevention of organised crime act (no 121 of 1998) (poca) is not a helpful instrument in addressing gangsterism. as the earlier analysis showed, nagswc uses the concept of social violence to engage multifaceted solution to a so-called ‘wicked problem’, a problem with no definitive formulation. here it may be beneficial to apply the concept ‘resource stress’, which is used to describe the emerging perceptions of resource access in society to be disproportionately reserved for certain population groups and is embedded within protracted social conflict (psc). azar & moon (1986) developed this theory to highlight the fact that root causes for conflicts in ‘multi-communal’ societies are to be found within and across, as opposed to between, nation states. though psc has generally been studied in the context of armed 2 the anti-gangsterism strategy was handed to the department of community safety in february 2019. in cape town – the sa drug policy initiative (sadpi) has slammed the western cape government for ‘sitting on its own report that calls for the demilitarisation of the police and legalisation of all drugs to help tackle drug-related crime’. see: western cape government slated for ‘sitting on its own anti-gangsterism report’ (url: https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/westerncape-government-slated-for-sitting-on-its-own-anti-gangsterism-report-35706643) viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 20227 https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/western-cape-government-slated-for-sitting-on-its-own-anti-gangsterism-report-35706643 https://www.iol.co.za/capetimes/news/western-cape-government-slated-for-sitting-on-its-own-anti-gangsterism-report-35706643 conflict, it seems relevant for this study as situations of protracted social conflict are marked by hostile contact between communal groups rooted in one or more factors, such as race, ethnicity, religion, or culture. in psc according to azar & moon, arguably the most useful unit of analysis is viewing gangs as not just a non-state actor but as both a communal and identity group. moreover, by paying attention to the individual and group levels of analysis, the impact non-state actor(s) can have on the continuation of violence is recognised and examined. this makes psc applicable to gang violence since it relates to intergang conflict, to conflict between state and gangs and between gangs and civil society groupings as well as the impact these conflicts have on communities and individuals – some affiliated with gangs themselves, some not. psc shows that relative poverty amplifies and prompts hostility to escalate into (violent) conflict to eliminate the competition. the lack of inclusion into the formal economy coupled with both perceived and real hindrances to political representation and participation generate frustration and increase lack of trust in the government and its agencies and, thereby, create a fluctuating upsurge in violence in communities with high levels of gang activity. issues of poverty, inclusion, and the right to self-determination – resource stress – propagate other issues such as for example ethnic, racial, interpersonal and gender-based violence and highlight the broader socioeconomic inequality in the western cape. the absence of consecutive and uninterrupted anti-gang initiatives indicates that there is a disconnect; either political will or capacity to commit to strategies long-term at local and provincial level. in the western cape in the cape flats, gang violence has involved immediate and almost uninterrupted suffering for non-gang population groups with the same immobilised socioeconomic status since apartheid. everyday gang activities result in violence, such as murder, violent attacks, and deprivation due to inaccessibility of basic human needs, although these are rights that are enshrined in the constitution. additionally, parallel informal development includes both anti-social, deviant behaviour and informal economies that generate and perpetuate conditions prone to organised crime – significantly, the presence of alcohol and drug dealing at high and low levels magnify inability to pursue life chances where gangs maintain control. as the south african literature on gangs also noted, it is no surprise that it is hitting hardest in the communities on the cape flats – that is, in communities that lack social cohesion devised by forced removal legislation during apartheid (see for example pinnock 2016). the fact that peoples’ needs cut across sectors and have been shown to extend over multiple years require both urgent, responsive, and longterm solutions, encompassing more than merely criminal justice agency involvement. what is perhaps less explicit in nagswc is the fact that many young people in gangs are part of larger networks that resemble armed groups because they are engaged in crime and violence, operating outside of the law. what nagswc is suggesting, however, is to target the high-risk youth, disengaged but parallel to dealing with institutionalised, organised crime syndicates. this distinction is very definitive for the violence prevention framework that nagswc is proposing. what perhaps is the issue at hand is that such a response gives less of an immediate outcome, less of a visible outcome for government in comparison, for example, to the deployment of the military. the risk is that calls for ‘demilitarisation of anti-gang strategies’ and ‘regulation of drugs’ is more commonly perceived to mean ‘no military or law enforcement’ and ‘free drugs.’ this harmful counter-narrative is increasingly provoked by the missing public commitment to nagswc by politicians and the provincial government. the empirical work on gangs in the western cape, though conducted at different times and in different areas, established certain things about gangs in south africa: first, while not necessarily particularly organised at street level, gangs are inherently affiliated with organised crime in the country and beyond the country’s borders and are (highly) dependent on the illicit drug trade. second, gangs in the western cape are largely structured around ethnic heritage due to the demographic segregation during apartheid. this further renders the cape flats areas prone to gangsterism, as social disorganisation provides optimal conditions for informal, or vigilante, justice and service provision controlled by gangs because many lack basic needs. third, gangs provide a form of security in certain areas, even though this security often relates to viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 20228 organised violence and insecurities for others. and finally, gangs are a part of the communities – as children, as parents, as siblings, or friends and therefore, an intrinsic part of the social fabric of those communities, which disproportionately affect youth (pinnock 2016). gangsterism in the western cape is linked to organised national and transnational crime, making gangs increasingly able to maintain territorial and social control – especially considering inadequate criminal justice efforts and prevalent corruption and lack of social cohesion. to an extent, any reform government strategies may prove less effective than desired as the ‘breaking the ability of gang cooperation’ is key in disempowering gangs. it is increasingly clear that it is difficult to separate criminal use of violence and armed violence as part of an intergroup conflict with gang actors. these are issues linked to drugs, gang control, transnational characteristics of organised crime in south africa, as well as the socio-economic aspects, and all amplify the hostility between gangs. here it should be noted that threats to physical security and gang violence are both an expression of hypermasculine group culture, which condones or encourages violence as a legitimate or necessary custom to safeguard illicit or informal practices to sustain authority or monetary activities, as well as a tool to contest pushback from real or perceived threats, including government, other gangs, and community actors. it should be noted that high levels of corruption in society – present amongst elites as well as in informal settlements – are key in securing webs of safe passage for criminal and violence activities. such cooperation also suggests shared interest and benefits for gangs as well as affiliated non-gang actors. while it is not necessarily possible to establish direct linkages from transnational crime to all gang violence in western cape, it certainly is clear that hostile competition for control of the drug market would amplify violence between gangs. in the western cape, most known gangs consist of male youth – and generally alongside apartheid racial groupings, coloured and black, due to its unique spatial configuration, shaped by the apartheid era legislation. stereotypes of ‘the gangster’ needs to change across government communications if a youth-at-risk centred approach is to include the communities. if communities and youth feel labelled as stereotypes, there is little chance that others can convince them that they are not, especially given the well-established culture of hypermasculinity which promotes violence and serves as a pull-factor for gang membership. given the structural inequality and relative poverty, the gang landscape has diversified since the transition to democracy in lieu of persistent high levels of violence crime and fragmented societies, where street gangs constantly resort to secure their turf, even when the people are caught in the crossfire. ‘by labelling the behaviour of certain people gangsters, societies often make the mistake of pushing the child at risk further downstream into the hands of gang leaders. there are situations where force has to be used to contain some of the more violent gangs across the province, but these gangs are usually in the minority. adopting strong anti-gang measures invariably drive the younger gang members into the hands of the hardened minority’ (western cape government). so far, much attention has been afforded male youth as they are thought to be the key demographic and target group. it has been established in nagswc that gang activities impact especially on youth as peer groups and that the pervasiveness of violence in especially the cape flats affect whole communities. however, the focus on women and girls is almost nowhere to be found. in a testimony from the khayelitsha commission report (2014), the principal of chris hani senior secondary school, a public school counting about 1,300 learners between grades 8 and 12, described how deeply entrenched gang violence is at the school, thus inflicting harm on girls too. he noted that learners are hiding dangerous weapons in their uniforms, some saying they do so ‘for self-protection’. children in gang areas in the western cape are therefore not only at risk of being forced or drawn into gangsterism due to the severe lack of basic needs, such as food and shelter, but also that their routes to school and their learning environment, are highly marked by gang violence. viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 20229 in addition, south africa has one of the highest rates of violence against women on the entire continent, a rate five times the global average and it is estimated that one in five women has been exposed to physical abuse (smith 2019). while high levels of rape and sexual violence are by no means restricted to gangsterism, it has many times over been documented to be embedded in gang culture. as with studies on gangs elsewhere and across studies on different types of gangs, it has been documented that hypermasculinised groups both celebrate and encourage physical and sexual violence as symbols of power. although men are understood and proved to commit more violence and are found more likely to engage in criminal behaviour due to the negative influence of deviant peers, the lack of addressing girls and women in nagswc is worth looking at. studies and news show that the role of women and girls is increasingly entering the gang landscape – no mention is of this made in nagswc (see for example shaw & skywalker 2017). the role of women and girls is noted as either victims of sexual or domestic violence, as disrespected family members or as mothers in need of healthcare preor post-natally. the fact that women, young women, or girls are not explicitly envisioned a place or a space might prove problematic at ground level, especially if local offices – the so-called ‘neighbourhood hubs’ – are not equipped to deal with gender specific issues amidst the hypermasculinity which is intractably linked to gang culture. through the lens of resource stress (wpr question six), it has become clear that those who are most disadvantaged are those most at the highest risk of being affected or affiliated with gang crime and violence. significantly, this was noted in relation to youth. moreover, it became apparent that a negative labelling discourse perpetuating the coverage of gangsterism as an unintended effect emerged, which further resulted in the legitimisation of hard solutions (wpr question 5). the lack in the report is that of reference to women and girls, which means the report structures the problem of gangs with the absence of a representation of solutions for women and girls, as separate from men and boys in nagswc. this could result in gender insensitivity during implementation stages given what we know about gender issues in the western cape and in south africa (wpr question four). summary of findings first, the presence of gang violence and the fear and risk of gang violence can be said to fuel and be fuelled by intergroup conflict. in this sense, gangs can be viewed as groups of (young) people with the same socioeconomic status who live in the same neighbouring areas but are experiencing differential opportunity to attain safety and security and livelihood needs. in addition, structural violence in the form of unequal access to basic needs further widens the gap between people of different socioeconomic status and further, fuels intergroup conflict and violence, especially in former township areas between other groups than gangs as well (misago 2011; buthelezi & mofokeng 2015). as has been mentioned, gangsterism in the western cape is usually associated with the cape flats coloured south africans, which further complicates the gang landscape to focus on black and coloured residents, rather than people who are historically marginalised and disadvantaged due to their area of residence and not their colour. it becomes even more complex as intergroup and multi-communal communities – which the cape flats are – are more prone to have hostility escalate into physical violence, which impacts whole individuals and communities. second, the cumulative lack of access to basic needs and insecure livelihood hits hardest among the urban periphery, notably marginalised and underprivileged population groups on the cape flats. these groups are shown to be trapped in an intergenerational poverty cycle, which disproportionately affects individuals and communities, born out of apartheid’s discriminatory policy and protracted by capacity challenges, politicised, and scattered anti-gang strategies. moreover, the lack of (human) needs provision can amplify hostile and violent behaviour among young people in communal groups and in gangs that compete for the same real or perceived means. the literature on gangs in south africa shows that a key factor for gangs to maintain territorial control is that they can viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202210 provide access to basic needs, for example, as modes of income generation or in the form of protection from violence perpetrated by other gangs (adhikari 2008; petrus 2014). azar’s psc theory highlights that those basic needs do not merely encompass food and water, clothing, and shelter but also security, fair access to political institutions and economic participation (fisher 2001). protracted gang violence has involved immediate and almost uninterrupted suffering for non-gang population groups. often people with the same socioeconomic status in the western cape on the flats experience murder, violent attacks, and deprivation due to inaccessibility to basic and human needs which are all rights that are enshrined in the constitution. even though gang activities cut across sectors, so do the needs of youth at risk. this requires urgent and long-term solutions, encompassing more than merely criminal justice agency involvement and must therefore include resilience building among individuals, especially youth, and at community level in general. nagswc emphasises the power of building youth and community resilience (pinnock & pinnock 2019, pp. 21-33). yet, it gives less attention to the gendered aspect of agency and empowerment, even though local conflict and gang violence does not only severely impact male youth in disadvantaged areas but has devastating consequences for women and girls. this has been considered particularly significant, as the toxic hypermasculinity has been deemed intractable from gang culture and violence and translates into high levels of sexual and interpersonal violence. this finally brings about a more general question, ‘what is the role of youth when working towards reduction and eradication of gang violence in the western cape?’ when wishing to establish neighbourhood hubs to address local gang issues. if the youth is at the centre of the issue of gangsterism, surely, they should be engaged more explicitly than they are now. agency and capacity building mechanisms leading towards empowerment and influence as an aspect of community engagement, anchored in local knowledge and ownership, will be essential. conclusion gangs and gang violence have been a persistent feature of contemporary south africa. perhaps no city has been affected more by gangs than cape town, in western cape province. despite a legal framework promoting human rights and multiple on-going interventions by law enforcement, gangs and gangsterism have generated and continue to generate crime and localised conflicts that disproportionately affect many of the region’s residents, especially those in high unemployment and low-income areas, such as the cape flats. the national anti-gangsterism strategy requires provincial implementation and in 2018, the western cape government developed their response under the direction of department of community safety through a collaborative policy formulation process and developed the western cape policy response, referred to as nagswc throughout this paper this strategy is aimed at reducing gang violence and preventing youth from joining criminal gangs. this paper has sought to understand how gangsterism has been problematised and represented in the development of the nagswc through utilising carol bacchi’s ‘what’s the problem represented to be’ approach to policy analysis to discover how the problem is understood and represented and thus, analyse which discourses and material responses are generated, and which are not. when applied to nagswc, the six interrelated wpr questions brought about the following findings. first, gangsterism was represented as a ‘wicked’ problem with many problem feeders, rendering disadvantaged youth most vulnerable to join gangs or at risk of gang activity or violence. of significance here are the presumptions policy makers have made about the problem of gangsterism and interventions to curb gang violence and youth joining gangs. second, the ambitious goals within nagswc might not be new or impossible to implement but the plan does require long-term commitment and political will, resources, and capacity to see effect. third, the gap between creating an action plan and implementing it poses significant challenges, as those involved in the collaborative formulation process had no possibility to control the adoption or implementation once the process was finished. fourth, it is not possible to say for certain why nagswc was not utilised prior to viltoft cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202211 covid-19, as there was more than a year for processes to be implemented before the pandemic. the fact that docs and the western cape government have apparently not begun adoption and implementation suggest that there was a problem of gangsterism producing a political pressure to ‘show action’ – hence the lack of public engagement regarding nagswc stands in stark contrast to recent (and not new) deployment of military into gang-ridden areas alongside the re-launch of anti-gang unit, which represent the militarised, ‘tough-on-crime’ approach to gangsterism. the militarised response, which seems the only long standing approach, should be questioned if one takes into consideration findings from the empirical research on gangs in south africa, the applicable law, and policy, notably nags, that requires ‘a holistic approach, which includes diverse issues rooted in communities which feed the gang problem’ (pinnock & pinnock 2019, p. 7) and ‘national interdepartmental anti-gang strategy requires not only the phenomenon and impact of gangsterism to be addressed, but also prevention of gangsterism’ (p. 8). fifth, although nagswc does mention the high impact of violence and the vulnerability of women and girls, it is surprising that the progressive report does not employ more gender sensitivity given gender inequality and extreme rates of sexual abuse. moreover, although the guiding principles for the section ‘peer groups’ does outline principles for working effectively with youth, nagswc has not explicitly created a forum for youth engagement and inclusion in the development of the anti-gang interventions, for example, in the suggested neighbourhood hub. sixth, even though the action steps are carefully thought out and most likely would create meaningful results, the evidence-based model did arguably prompt the idea that this strategy would (or will) succeed where previous policies have not – despite the acknowledgement of the impact of (transnational) organised crime on gangs and subsequently, illicit drugs, issues that require solutions beyond both provincial and national levels. additionally, the protracted social conflict lens as well as the previous research on gangsterism highlighted that the socioeconomic inequality, shaped by apartheid legislation, still poses one of the greatest challenges with regards to youth at risk of joining gangs. the paper has argued that there is a discrepancy between what is articulated in policy and plans and what is carried out in practice despite current and ongoing efforts, as the nagswc recommendations do not appear to have been utilised. it has been suggested that lack of public engagement with nags and a lack of political commitment to utilising the recommendations of the report aids the discourse and practice of militarised, short-term responses as adequate solutions despite research and evidence suggesting otherwise: namely, that to effectively address the conditions that foster gangsterism, more attention should be given to structural conditions, especially inequality, to effect transformation through sustained antigang interventions. considering these findings, the paper concludes that more attention should be given to transforming conflict conditions in areas with high levels of gang violence as opposed to focusing on how these areas can adapt to society, just as nagswc proposes in devising a two-tiered model with neighbourhood level intervention. such an approach would allow room for both groups and individuals, affording attention to youth, to gain or maintain agency and realise more active and participatory forms of 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the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: teixeira, c. p. 2020. networked technopolitics: immigrant integration as citybranding. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 12:1, 67-82. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1 .6966 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper networked technopolitics: immigrant integration as city-branding caio penko teixeira university of milano-bicocca, milan, italy corresponding author: caio penko teixeira, department of sociology and social research, university of milano-bicocca, piazza dell'ateneo nuovo, 1, 20126 milano mi, italy. c.teixeira@campus.unimib.it doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.6966 article history: received 23/12/2019/; revised 20/06/2020; accepted 27/06/2020; published 20/07/2020 abstract the article explores the role of network-led policymaking with a focus on immigrant integration. drawing on the eurocities integrating cities charter, it sheds light on how immigration-related diversity governance plays a part in the city-branding strategies. the relevance of policy advocacy through the lens of cosmopolitan urbanism is instrumental for studying the governance of migration and diversity in the age of integration paradigm. contemporary local policymaking in immigrant integration shaped by city-to-city cooperation tell us about policy models associated to cities’ image. therefore, city branding strategies framed on behalf of networked technopolitics represent a challenging way to study the immigrant integration approach. this exploratory study is based on desk research with an emphasis on literature review and documentary analysis. keywords immigrant integration, city-branding, policy network, governance, diversity declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.6966 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.6966 mailto:c.teixeira@campus.unimib.it https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.6966 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 introduction cities, towns and municipalities, rather than countries, are increasingly becoming the major actors of immigrant integration policies. concurrently, growing concerns over the social inequality and a lack of inclusive communities in western societies have stimulated policies that are aimed at promoting active forms of immigrant integration. the interplay between migration and inequality has highlighted the impact of uneven urban development on people on the move. inequality in income, earnings, and wealth concerns in a globalised world assess the connection between the economy and political regimes (milanovic 2016; picketty 2014). transnational migration is clearly intertwined with a wider picture in the making of social inequality (faist 2016; black et al. 2005). the link of inequality and migration ‘suffers from profound methodological nationalism’ (bastia 2013). for bastia (2013), the economic and social inequality analyses within migration study scholarships had under-explored the place-based context of inequalities, privileging data on social inequality and stratification collected mostly at a national level. it is important then to look at local integration policies. although the point is not to make a claim in favor of a ‘methodological localism’ (zapata-barrero et al. 2017), it is necessary to highlight the policy responses that have attempted to address the link between inequality and migration on a local socio-spatial scale (cassiers & kesteloot 2012). in european cities, attention has been paid to inequality and immigration (trenz & triandafyllidou 2017; zapata-barrero et al. 2017; alba & foner 2015; hackett 2013). recent literature on inequality in the face of greater ethno-racial diversity, for example, highlights the relations between immigration strategies, policies and forms of integration governance (duszczyk, pachocka & pszczółkowska 2020). a significant part of global urban injustice in its contemporary form builds on international migration (schiller & çaǧlar 2009). diversity, equality and social inclusion have become an integral part of local integration policies against social inequality. cities are not only developing but also sharing practices and initiatives towards immigrant integration. this approach may be viewed as part of the wider ‘local turn’ in migration-related diversity governance (zapata-barrero et al. 2017), which establishes a breeding ground for city-to-city cooperation. many cities are now taking a long-term approach to address the socio-economic differences that target immigrant populations, focusing on issues of diversity and nondiscrimination. such a long-term approach may be associated with local integration policies that offer ‘concrete strategies and measures of urban development’ (hillmann 2018, p. 87). this view suggests that integration policies are linked to urban development approaches under a variety of migration-led regeneration initiatives (hillmann 2018). integration policies are embedded in a larger dynamic urban hierarchy in today’s globalisation, which clarifies how global integration of cities involves international migration of highskilled and lowskilled workers (sassen 2005). it is a strategic component of cities in the world economy that creates novel forms of power and politics. in the european context, carmel and cerami and papadopoulos (2011) have pointed out the co-existing modes of integration and segregation, in which labor market conditions and welfare provisions play an instrumental role in how immigrants’ inclusion and integration are shaped, so that ‘the interaction of welfare regime, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 69 informal and formal labour markets (and their relationship), and immigration and citizenship regimes combine to form distinct national migrant integration regimes’ (papadopoulos 2011, p. 42). immigrant integration relates to city-branding strategies. city-branding is a process by which the ‘city is given ontological status as a “personality” with identity and values’ (stiegel & frimann, 2006). it is instrumental to look at processes and dynamics of how immigrant integration is impacting city-branding strategies. the extent to which integration policies play a part in city-branding strategies matters because this tells us about how international migration became a local government effort. in this wider context of migration-related diversity governance, many transnational city networks are emerging (oomen 2018). the eurocities integrating cities charter is an illustrative case of a capacity building initiative program with a network-oriented approach that enables city-to-city cooperation. this case informs us about the role of policymaking communities and how networks of policy advocacy incorporate a rhetoric of neutrality establishing standardised policy objectives. this exploratory study is based on desk research with an emphasis on review of the literature and documentary analysis. it covers a broad range of research reports, articles, policy briefs, case study findings, social media, webinar and other documents, and draws attention to city-branding strategies in local immigrant integration policies under networked technopolitics. in this article, i argue that the eurocities integrating cities charter (hereafter the charter) is not merely capacity-building and cooperation-inducing network; it is also a political regulation strategy, as it explicitly calls for adopting and implementing a specific integration model in response to immigrant-related inequality. integration policies at the local level are turned into what eurocities has been calling a ‘good governance’ approach, shaping signatory cities’ integration models. at stake is the ‘fast-traveling policy models’ (peck & theodore 2015) and its implications for city-led solutions to immigration and diversity management. the networked technopolitic help us to have a better understanding of contemporary migration governance. i structure the article as follows. the first section introduces the charter, outlining how this policy network works to foster immigrant integration model shaping policies and practices at the local level. the second section explores the intersectional approach between inequality and migration that frames the integration as part of the cities’ response to global dynamics of social inequality involving immigration. the third section examines the branding literature in urban studies (dinnie 2011; vanolo 2017) looking at cosmopolitan urbanism (sandercock 2006). cities are creating an urban brand of immigrant integration, which is based on (imported or borrowed) policy models and designs. finally, future directions for research are suggested before concluding remarks. immigration governance in a moving world immigrant integration involves several complexities including challenges to governance and policymaking through a set of institutional interactions that stretch across scales and can be traced analytically in documents, discourses, practices, regulations. the question of how to 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 improve the ‘management’ of immigrants as a local level effort has been mobilising great power between european cities. city-to-city cooperation can be seen through the ‘transnational city networks’ fostering immigrant integration. oomen (2019) talks about immigration-related ‘transnational city networks’ exploring the impact of these arrangements into local governments. these networks provide support and guidance and they are facilitating the mutual exchange of information based on their experience in integrating refugees and migrants. importantly, ‘networks allows cities to decouple their local policies from those developed nationally, and their pragmatic, symbolic, and jurisgenerative activities enable them to better manage migration, to contest the current migration regime, and to even modify it’ (oomen 2019, p. 22). among other 'transnational city networks’, the charter, launched in 2010, includes 39 signatory cities addressing immigrant integration policies and practices. city-to-city cooperation lies at the heart of this network and serves as the basis for influencing the decision-making process at the subnational level regarding immigrant integration. it aims to frame city-level policies and practices for diversity management based on research evidence and policy model adoption that targets non-discrimination and equal opportunities for city residents, particularly immigrant needs (eurocities 2017, 2013, 2012). it builds on policy learning, standards monitoring, evaluation and implementation procedures to integrate newcomers characterised by the city-to-city cooperation between localities experiencing common issues on migration-related diversity (eurocities 2017, 2013, 2012). this policy network establishes key features for policy design and initiatives to assess in standardised terms of quality and performance with the purpose of enhancing migration diversity management outcomes. by supporting city-level responses to migration-related diversity governance issues, it puts the city-to-city cooperation with focus on monitoring and peer learning at the centre of the local immigrant integration policy model. by analysing the charter, moloney and kirchberger (2010) argued that peer reviewing and benchmarking are the key tools for mutual learning that reveal a mobilising strategy, coordinating efforts. their analysis found that the charter pushes an agenda on immigrant integration policies and allows cities to play a meaningful role in the network, and consequently, the network itself also has significant influence over a city’s agency. the charter has been disseminating good practices of comparable policies based on benchmarking approach between signatory cities. it monitors and evaluates local policy performances and its achievements. this process of peer reviewing and benchmarking assumes a discourse of political neutrality which applies adequate instruments and standardised procedures informed by an evidence-based policymaking agenda. this policy network defines a model for inclusive city building. such a model identifies priority areas to improve policy integration and draws from practical solutions and challenges faced by the signatory cities, including stakeholders such as non-profits and local communities organisations. as a policy network, it recognises the crucial role of actors at the local level and how cities are the front lines of immigrant integration. it establishes shared policy objectives to create a model of inclusive urban policies and local services to newcomers. within the ‘integrating cities’ rhetoric, it sets out a vision over long-term steps in the realm of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 71 migration-related diversity policies towards coordinated approaches. the signatory cities receive recognition for their efforts to create inclusive cities. hambleton (2014) argued that the charter might be seen under the local integration strategies by which guidelines offered a common background of policy commitment and practical lessons learned. this enabled mutual learning as a promising model for an inclusive response to the context of inequality through urban placemaking of diverse communities (hambleton 2014). the charter has influenced the local approach to integration in different ways. for example, ‘nuremberg, who signed the charter in october 2015, uses the charter as a benchmark to evaluate its policies’ (eurocities 2015, p. 16). aspects of the charter included into the political representatives’ discourse shows that helsinki ‘promoted the charter within the city and the broader metropolitan area through speeches and official presentations at seminars and other events’ (eurocities 2013). further: ghent used the charter as a basis for the action plan on diversity 2020 which sets the objective of 30% of employees with a migrant background. it has also been used to raise awareness on implementing equal opportunities and poverty reduction in local policy with training for current employees. leipzig used the charter to foster the integration process in general and to promote the implementation of measures, actions and recommendations. in oslo, the charter underpins city policies, especially for the oxlo guide for equal access to services and the oxlo business charter (eurocities 2018, p. 18). the charter plays an important role in shaping local integration policies. the implementation of these policies involves a branding-strategy with emphases on diversity and welcoming as part of the city’s identity and reputation. there is a branding aspect of the process that has become one significant component of policy shift in integration discourses and practices. the policy network adds ‘value’ to the local public policymaking. and the policy network calls for greater regulation of immigrant integration policies at the local level to ensure program effectiveness, which remains a task deeply structured in technocratic approaches to policy design in the areas of cooperation and sharing. examining the charter, we understand how immigrant integration policies respond to immigration-related inequality. intersecting migration and inequality the rising social and economic inequalities across the world remains a central issue at the level of the nation-state (milanovic 2016). as kerbo (2003) indicated, inequality encompasses class, race and gender and it is also about a condition of unequal access to resources related to broader processes of social division, hierarchy, and social differences. inequality does not reduce an apolitical distribution of wealth and income. rather, it is socially constructed through social relations of exploitation, contradictions and political power. within this debate on global inequality, some studies focused on western european countries indicated the fundamental link between inequality, labour market changes, and financial globalisation (heath & cheung 2007; long 2014). long (2014) considers the impact of migration on inequality and challenges the assumption of migration as a driving force to inequality. for her, migration had potentially important effects to address certain features of the rising inequality in western societies. she outlined the potential benefits of 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 labour migration and labour mobility to address social inequality in which the exclusion of immigrants from the formal labour market is implicated as one key feature. the international migration movements are part of a wider frame of uneven wealth distribution that contributes to greater social inequality between the richest and poorest countries. the relation between migration and inequality may consider not only an economic perspective but often includes a traumatic context of social changes, such as authoritarian political regimes, civil war, persecution, environmental hazards. as migration occurs in deep poverty and violence, the migrant labour exploitation in global north countries is framed through precarious lifeworlds, in which immigrant experience of vulnerability becomes subject to neoliberal work and welfare regimes, engendering global inequality dynamics (lewis 2015). forced migration has played an important role in inequality studies. crucial to an understanding of international migration movements is the awareness that the precarious life worlds of migrants are linked to geopolitical dynamics of uneven urban development under neoliberal globalisation. inequality demonstrates an instrumental economic side, through which it reveals the social logic of exploitation. income inequality holds social implications. inequality is not a subject outside the historical processes of wealth accumulation and political power established by dispossession, displacement, and abandonment. social inequality concerns the ways in which income inequality implies power relations through which people are organised in terms of domination and oppression. this means that the logic of social inequality is inherently a political matter related to social vulnerabilities. more recently, the debate about social inequality has been concerned with migration-development interplay. the intersectional perspective on migration-development considers how internal and cross-border migration can be analyzed through the lens of urbanised globalisation. for bastia (2013), the perspective of intersectionality informs us about how oppression and privilege outline different categories of disadvantage related to social inequality. social inequality as a dynamic process is integrated with gender, class, ethnicity, and race issues. such a viewpoint has considered inequality not only as ‘historically grounded’ but also assumes a ‘context-specific analysis of social relations of difference to avoid depoliticising and simplifying complex realities’ (bastia 2013, p. 245). the inequality-migration interplay leads to another central point about the way in which migration can have a negative or positive correlation with inequality. according to bastia (2013), the relation between migration and inequality is always contextual, so that it is necessary to explain which type of inequality is at stake. she highlighted the importance of inequality and transnational migration beyond income-based measures. having said this, inequality is closely connected to organising positions of privilege where people gain and maintain material and non-material unequal distributions of wealth, rights, and recognition. the migration-development nexus lies in an analysis in which social inequality refers to sites where multiple forms of oppression or privilege intersect, including material and social measures (bastia 2013). policymaking in immigration, integration and social cohesion continue to frame key debates on social inequalities and have more significant leverage in integrating immigrants cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 73 into the economic and social spheres. these policies are formulated, operationalised and implemented in line with development theories and broader ideological perspectives, focusing on the role of immigrants in their host communities. to think about the charter, the migration-development and social inequality perspectives have helped to understand the way inequality shapes immigration and integration policies. under the charter, cities are seen as part of a wider diversity-management governance that uses a bottom-up approach for managing social inequalities, emphasising a welcoming city image to bolster local economies through a combination of local-based practices and policy coordination between signatory cities. an intersectional view of social inequality is also significant for migrant integration policies. the charter has made it a priority to address immigrant integration as a social and economic task ranging from labour market issues to anti-discrimination policies to enhance the public perception on migration and diversity. in this way, immigrant integration is part of the response to social inequality. networking, integrating and branding integrating immigrant newcomers as part of the nation-building processes in europe have been debated for a long time (favell 2003). the nationalised idea of integration is about an inclusion of a newcomer immigrant or a member of a marginalised group into a ‘society’ while it is ultimately bounded by a nation-state in terms of a national identity project (favell 2003). the goal of integration policies involves the management of ‘ethnic’ immigrant populations, who are non-europeans. it is a matter of government practices and discourse, an ideal linked to the nation-building process under the growing condition of cultural diversity (favell, 2003). there has been a great debate on the role of local authorities and different local actors in the immigrant integration approach. in view of this, cities have been playing an important role in integration policies (zapata-barrero et al. 2017). according to this view, the governance of migration-related diversity has its clearest expression at the city level, where conflicts arise from social inequalities, power relations and racism. schinkel’s critique of immigrant integration clarifies the way integration discourses reveal forms of imagining society. it talks about integration and the unit, social cohesion, and importantly, the matter that is jeopardising it (2017, 2018). schinkel argued that society vis-àvis ‘immigrant community’ ‘only ever exists through an active work of the difference, separating a supposed “inside” from an “outside”, of circumscribing – by means of a work of power-knowledge – who and what is and is not “part of society”’ (2018, p. 9). schinkel (2017) argues that integration is both the political way of separating populations and identities as ‘others’ and afterwards of determining how to include them into a prescriptive and standard account of society. on the one hand, immigrant integration becomes a tool for ‘othering’ people through its forms of governing that are constructed on group-based differences and forms of identity in social life (schinkel 2018). on the other hand, how local governments deal with issues of immigration, diversity, and integration is essential for economic growth and urban development: ‘diversity, if managed well through immigrant integration, is seen as an opportunity to create and foster an image of the city, which makes it attractive for foreign investment, tourism, and increased consumption’ (hadj abdou 2019, p.5). diversity is central to understanding the extent to which the governance technique of 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 immigrant integration and the knowledge produced around it: ‘tend to reproduce and reorganise ‘race’ in the city through processes of racialisation and a re-making of the racial subject’ (hadj abdou 2019, p.6). the charter acts as an illustrative example of this governance model of ethno-cultural diversity for cities. this immigrant integration model considers the migration-inequality nexus at the local level through policy network embedded in the cosmopolitan approach. for sandercock (2006 p. 39), cosmopolitan theorising helps us to clarify the discourse ‘around managing our peaceful coexistence in shared spaces’. rather than insisting on fostering some ‘sense of belonging and the imperative of peaceful coexistence’, sandercock (2006) argues that cosmopolitan urbanism might be based on agonistic democratic politics. cosmopolitan urbanism has a political dimension regarding the right to difference in the city dealing with conflicts not accommodating them for the sake of economic strength of the city (sandercock 2006). it is concerned with the (utopian) politics of an urban imaginary structuring political life and managing cultural diversity (sandercock 2006). the charter may be associated with a wider branding strategy of cities, which has been translating a cosmopolitan imaginary into discourses and practices of migration-related diversity governance. this underlines that cosmopolitan urbanism works as the background of the city branding strategies to promote a model to shape policy practices for managing immigrant integration under the umbrella of migration-related diversity policies. the strategies and tactics of city branding influence governmental choice in migrationrelated diversity governance. integrating becomes a brand for cities, which mostly take a rights-based perspective regarding institutional discourse, practices, and policies that shape the urban imaginary of cities. place branding is related to international politics in the global policy process (van ham, 2008). branding-strategies lead cities to adopt new strategies and tactics in delivering a message that involves values, goals and desires through propaganda and public diplomacy (van ham, 2008). place branding is arguably, at its most basic level a political value-set that is concerned with the practice of image-making and reputation management (van ham, 2008). this proves useful in understanding the relevance of the governance of migrant-related diversity. at the broadest conceptual level, city branding strategies are also an aspect of soft power related to policy processes of immigrant-related diversity. soft power concerns the nature of power relations and it results from a voluntary process of regulation, co-option, and cooperation between actors. nye (1990) coined the term ‘soft power’ to analyze the american international politics after the cold war, characterised both by attraction and persuasion. soft power influences decision-making and shapes policies and policy regimes and its ‘softness’ describes the processes of governing without explicit coercive tools (nye, 1990). it implies, somehow, a kind of ‘free and voluntary’ joint action among social actors (nye 1990). in a more recent view on soft power, nye (2019) extended the concept by including non-coercive methods of negotiation including public diplomacy, global image and influence. for hayden (2012), soft power is articulated in public diplomacy in the international system. both as discourse and practice, soft power puts communication and information at the heart of public diplomacy (hayden 2012). however, soft power is no cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 75 longer only a matter of the country’s national level shaping the agency of political actors via foreign policy tools. indeed, subnational soft power and local public diplomacy cities are at the forefront on a wide range of policies in democracies and we need to understand and advance the critical role of local governments in networked field of transnational political action, such as city-to-city cooperation. city-to-city cooperation is often intimately related to the various processes that exemplify soft power in shaping cities’ images. this cooperation involves branding-strategies as a way for rethinking policymaking through policy models. policy models embedded in both networks and within multiple local contexts have been articulated in western european city-regions. from the perspective of the soft politics of city branding, the significance of horizontal networking, transnational linkages and city-to-city cooperation initiatives among local and regional states and other non-central governments and non-for-profit organisations in navigating and negotiating difference becomes clear. it is no surprise, therefore, that city branding influences policymaking processes. bookman (2018) notes that cities as branded entities gain distinction in terms of urban culture, social life, and consumption, and this is the case for many postindustrial urban regeneration strategies. research has shown how the discourses of cities and local governments are working for the promotion of immigrant entrepreneurs and fostering a welcoming environment in terms of the use of public space and city services (aytar & rath 2012). for cities experiencing ‘super-diversity’, migration, ethnic minority groups and cultural diversity become key themes for a local agenda with policies of integration: ‘an awareness of the new super-diversity suggests that policy-makers and practitioners should consider new immigrants’ plurality of affiliations’ (vertovec 2018, p. 117), not just their ethnicity. jordan and schout (2006) argued that eu policy coordination was based on a networked governance structure that was less dependent on the power of hierarchical rulemaking authorities. importantly, networked governance relies on the cooperation through joint action. in doing so, networked governance frames a political, procedural and legal regulatory arrangement that shapes policy formulation and implementation (jordan & schout 2006). this regulatory arrangement can be considered not only as networked but also as an experimentalist form of governance that focuses on soft power and voluntary commitment (maggetti 2015). this leads to the last point. place branding strategies play an important role in the ‘soft power’ dynamics over policymaking via ‘policy models’ as a result of advocacy and persuasion. for peck and theodore (2015), the policymaking field has become influenced by ‘best practice’ and ‘paradigmatic models’. this means that policy change often is driven by models of best practice, which is ‘those social practices and infrastructures that enable and sustain policy “mobility,” which enable the complex folding of policy lessons derived from one place into reformed and transformed arrangements elsewhere’ (peck and theodore 2015, p. xvii). according to this view, a policy transfer process carried out through ‘discursive frames and institutional frameworks perform[s] a “preceptorial” function, licensing some cognitive and political behaviors, shaping policymaking imaginaries, and enabling certain patterns of “learning,” while disciplining or even excluding others’ (peck & theodore 2015, p.27). 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 many cities seeking to change their urban brand are supported by policy networks. in immigration-related diversity governance, the role of place branding can be seen as a transnational regulation strategy. the action of branding cities as integrative cities sets out political values and an aspirational framework for immigrant integration as it may and should become. although not from a top-down perspective, this policy network provides practical tools and conceptual insights for migration and diversity policies. these practical insights contribute to the city’s image, and immigrant integration is viewed as a relevant element of branding. an immigrant integration policy aligned to the policy network standards has a significant identity-shaping function over signatory cities in such a way that it cannot be understood as merely a technical process or considered an allegedly neutral tool or approach. transnational city network characterised by ‘fast policy’ (peck & theodore 2015) follows the perspective of post-political modes of governing. mouffe (2016) notes that under the postpolitical order, the conflictual dimension of democracy is addressed by ‘good governance’. seen from this perspective, public policy models using tools of soft power are described at a surface level as taking an evidence-based approach. yet, in reality, this approach is what is driving changes in local policy and at the same time defining what renders this policy a (politically) successful response to local conditions. in recent years, the rise of the interplay between migration-related issues and local policymaking processes has become more apparent in the european literature, exploring ‘whether and to what extent a trend towards convergence can actually be identified’ (caponio & borkert 2010, p. 21). city branding can help us with this issue. for gebhardt (2014, p. 12), ‘many cities are leading the way in setting up local institutions and services to reflect the diversity of those they serve, and in promoting an inclusive local identity’. as noted by gebhardt (2014), this is the case for copenhagen, in which the city’s strategy of becoming europe’s most inclusive city included projects, training and campaigns promoting the institutionalisation of diversity in various fields of the city’s services. drawing on amsterdam and rotterdam, belabas, eshuis & scholten (2020) argue that ‘the institutional embedding of place branding influences policy goals and content’ (p.3). the point is not only bringing the city’s residents together but also how to benefit from place branding to push the city-making process to greater innovation, greater competitiveness, and greater prosperity: [p]lace branding does not only fulfil an ‘internal’ function of representing the entire urban population and helping all residents to identify with their city, but also an ‘external’ function, oriented towards businesses and tourism. branding policies often function as a tool to increase economic development and international competitiveness instead of enhancing social cohesion or providing a shared sense of belonging amongst residents (belabas, eshuis & scholten 2020, p. 4). these cases illustrate the promotion of diversity and equality in local policies combined with efforts of (re)branding a city’s identity. these cities demonstrate commitment to managing immigrant-related diversity through services, policies, awards, campaigns, posters, and festivals. branding-strategies are therefore to be encouraged as a tool guide for city’s government to approach the analysis, formulation, evaluation and measurement of performance that informs decision-making in order to foster economic and social benefit cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 77 from the immigration and integration policies adopted. ultimately, the charter reinforces the ‘fast-traveling practices’ (peck and theodore 2015) of how integration in society should be done, in its simplest formulation, with immigrant integration as a matter of policy model adoption. by influencing the policymaking process and merging a set of political values at the local level, transnational city networks play an important role in a city’s brand and how it should be implemented and formulated to achieve the desired goals of the network. this also opens a channel for exchange of ideas, information, and techniques offering a roadmap for policymaking within immigration-related diversity governance. on top of these considerations, benchmarking, best practices, and peer-to-peer learning are a set of ‘soft tools’ shaping (local) policymakers and stakeholders, which carries within its regulatory practices, somewhat depoliticised forms of othering groups of people. concluding remarks the eurocities integrating cities charter helps us understand how a ‘transnational city network’ shapes local policy responses, particularly through the lens of ‘fast policy’. it highlights the need for analyzing the link between city branding-strategies and policy change. further, through the field of immigrant integration policies, it demonstrates that it is vital to interrogate the significance of transnational city networks and the apparent policymaking consensus that shapes the city’s image. in a global economy which has driven cities to compete for global investment and tourism, which are framing inequalities in the urban setting, scholarly work to further explore the immigration-integration-city’s image matrix remains to be done. the challenge is to find ways of studying how transnational city networks are handled by local government agencies and their street-level bureaucrats and shaped by immigrant organisations and grassroots organising groups standing up for rights. it is time to acknowledge that more research and informed debate on immigrant integration and its normalization of racial otherness is needed to generate new, interdisciplinary insights about policy models. therefore, policy networks are set to play a key role in (re)producing models and making it vital for critical migration scholars to build knowledge about issues of international migration, societal diversity as well as related public policies. in these discussions, it is relevant to understand to what extent transnational city networks can foster transformative, community-driven alternatives to immigrant integration. as is clear, there is room for analyzing how themes such as participatory arrangements, accountability and social control can shed light on immigrants’ political participation in the local policymaking arena, and how we read this process of institutional and policy change through the lens of deliberative democracy. we might challenge the binary divide of integration versus segregation. it is therefore prescient to interrogate migration policy and foster an interdisciplinary research agenda on new municipalism, institutional learning, spaces of social innovation and experimentation, which underpins the complexities of and the implications for urban agency, city-making and (im)migration governance in globally linked city-regions. work within these perspectives deals with theories from a range of disciplines and involves methodologies used 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 in this field (e.g. action research, participant observation, longitudinal ethnographic research and so on). at a time when debates on immigrants’ rights, refugees and policy responses continue to spread hostility toward or about people on the move, such an interdisciplinary research agenda can provide much-needed clarity and important analysis which will be of interest to city-makers, policy makers, activists and other stakeholders, including but not limited to the fields of urban studies, city planning and social protection studies. the commitment of a city to immigration and diversity governance cannot be detached from its branding-strategies. transnational city networks play an instrumental part in influencing a city’s image and its surrounding discourse. although forged and configured as a post-political condition, immigrant integration models relocate political power and decisionmaking at the local level; they consitute a political program intricately enmeshed with cities. peck and theodore (2015) argue that ‘networked technopolitics’ shapes contemporary policymaking and, by so doing, it calls for democratic deliberation and popular control. following this line of thought, i have argued that the ‘transnational city network’ based on ‘fast policy’ is also a governance technique. while others might argue that traveling (that is, transferable) models of policy development and technocratic designs of immigrant integration are examples of how transnational politics can be involved in the production of cosmopolitan urban spaces, i suggest that we perhaps need to recast our understanding of city-branding within immigration governance under a heading of ‘networked technopolitics’ (peck and theodore 2015). taken from this perspective, the governance technique of immigrant integration reveals how the ethnic difference of the cosmopolitan ‘other’ is managed through its connectedness to transnational networks, and this is far from a matter of technical knowledge for policymaking. acknowledgement i am grateful for the comments from anonymous reviewers and from the editors of this special issue, which have greatly improved the manuscript. references alba, r. & foner, n. 2016, ‘integration's challenges and opportunities in the wealthy west’, journal of ethnic and migration studies, vol. 42, no.1, pp. 3-22. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2015.1083770 aytar, v. & rath, j. 2012, ‘introduction: ethnic neighbourhoods as places of leisure and consumption’, aytar, v. & rath, j. 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https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315660660 vertovec, s. 2010, ‘towards post-multiculturalism? changing communities, conditions and contexts of diversity’, international social science journal, vol. 61, no. 199, pp. 83–95. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2451.2010.01749.x zapata-barrero, r., caponio, t. & scholten, p. 2017, ‘theorizing the “local turn” in a multilevel governance framework of analysis: a case study in immigrant policies’, international review of administrative sciences, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 241–246. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852316688426 https://doi.org/10.1515/nor-2017-0241 https://doi.org/10/1080/1369183x.2016.1251013 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315660660 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2451.2010.01749.x https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852316688426 abstract keywords introduction immigration governance in a moving world intersecting migration and inequality networking, integrating and branding concluding remarks references age related ethnic residential segregation in the united kingdom cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 15 ethnic residential segregation in the united kingdom by age group: the case of bradford david mcevoy abstract there is a long running debate on the significance of ethnic residential segregation levels in britain. these phenomena have been related to the extent of community cohesion in british cities, and particularly to the riots of 2001 in the north of england. further light is cast on these issues by examining ethnic segregation by age in the case of bradford, the location of the largest riot. both the dissimilarity index and the exposure index are used to consider relations between the white british and the largest minorities at ward level and at census output area level. the level of segregation is shown to vary with age, usually in a consistent direction. the direction varies between ethnic groups however. introduction in the summer of 2001 a series of riots erupted across the north of england. the denham and cantle reports to national government on these events identified a lack of community cohesion as a contributory factor (home office 2001a, p. 119, 2001b). the cantle report identified ‘the depth of polarisation’ between ethnic communities as a major context of disorder: ‘the physical segregation of housing estates and inner city areas … compounded by so many other aspects of our daily lives, was very evident. separate educational arrangements, community and voluntary bodies, and employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, means (sic) that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. these lives do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges’ (home office 2001b, p. 9). ignorance of other communities grows into fear, which is exploited by extremist groups. both cantle and denham drew on ouseley, a report for bradford city council, as evidence of the segregated situation in bradford (ouseley 2001). it appeared to confirm that community relations in the city were dangerously polarised: ‘communities are fragmenting on racial, cultural and faith lines … intolerance towards differences is growing’ (2001, p. 6). both ‘white flight’ and ‘self-segregation’ were identified as contributors to this situation (2001, pp. 9-10). ‘different ethnic groups in bradford are increasingly segregating themselves from each other and retreating into “comfort zones” made up of people like themselves’ (2001, p. 16). 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 alexander (2005) argues that these reports ‘placed the origin of the disturbances in ethnic and racial segregation and cultural difference’. similarly, fortier (2007) observes that british public policy discourse more generally understands community cohesion in a localised way: mixing between ethnic groups requires spatial proximity. community cohesion can thus perhaps be understood as a geographically defined version of social cohesion. neither alexander nor fortier endorses this spatial interpretation of riot causation. indeed alexander accuses the reports of ignoring the effects of historical context, structural inequalities, deindustrialisation, racial discrimination, far right political activism, racist attacks and police harassment. other authors have amplified many of these other factors (amin 2003; husan 2003; kundnani 2001; mcghee 2003; renton 2003; webster 2003). simpson (2004) is perhaps the most sceptical critic on the role of segregation. he is particularly critical of ouseley’s identification of ‘the legend’ of self-segregation, and of its repetition in government reports and news items. this legend used racialised language: ‘flight’ is the term used to describe white movement, while ‘selfsegregation’ is reserved for other groups (2004, p. 677). ‘[i]t is not the geography but the analysis which is racially patterned’ (2004, p. 679). despite these objections there are however grounds for affording spatial demographic patterns some role in the analysis of the riots. the largest riot occurred in bradford on july 7th. most of the rioters involved were young muslim men of pakistani ancestry, in their teens and twenties. many were arrested on the basis of video evidence captured by the police. following trial and conviction substantial prison sentences were imposed (allen 2003). the columns of the bradford daily newspaper, the telegraph and argus saw a flood of letters approving of the punishments. the names of the signatories and the content of the letters allow the reasonable inference that most of these correspondents were whites of middle age and older. moreover the addresses of the convicted rioters and of the letter writers indicate a distinct geographical pattern, with the former residing in inner urban areas, and their critics in the immediately surrounding areas (mcevoy 2007). cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 17 this not only supports the official diagnosis of poor community cohesion, but also raises the question of whether age is an exacerbating factor in increasing segregation and limiting contact across the ethnic divide. teenagers do not normally spend their leisure time with older age groups. most older people are gratified that this is so, and prefer to associate with their contemporaries. each generation makes most of its friends among people of broadly similar age, and patronises stores, bars, restaurants and events where its tastes are catered for. in situations where society is already segregated by ethnicity it may be that age-differentiated migration patterns produce situations where members of an ethnic group find that most of their neighbours of another ethnic group are the wrong age for social interaction to be likely. burgess and wilson (2003) showed that in much of britain schools are not ethnically mixed. they also linked the riots to high levels of ethnic segregation. they suggested that the riots occurred in urban areas where the segregation of south asian pupils was highest according to the two types of segregation measure discussed below. in conjunction with a co-author they later moderated this claim, and noted that the coincidence of rioting and high segregation levels is not complete, since there were no riots in leicester, a city with comparable segregation levels. they were however able to demonstrate that the concentration of non-whites in schools is at least six times greater than would be expected on the basis of a random allocation across schools in their local education authority (johnston, wilson & burgess 2004). bradford bradford is a city with a long history of immigration. in the nineteenth century considerable numbers of irish, jews and germans arrived as wool textile manufacturing boomed. after the second world war east european refugees were welcomed as a cheap and compliant labour force, and recruitment was then extended to the indian sub-continent, particularly pakistan (jackson 1992). this attempt to shore up a declining industry failed in the face of global competition. chain migration and high birth rates have nevertheless built up a substantial population of pakistani origin in the city, with smaller communities from india and bangladesh. table 1 shows that by 2001 14.5 per cent of residents were ethnically pakistani, with 2.7 per cent indian and 1.1 per cent bangladeshi. the ‘other white’ group, including the 18 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 city’s east europeans, makes up 1.5 per cent of the total, and the white british majority 76.0 per cent. a variety of other minorities constitute the remaining 4.2 per cent. table 1. the population of bradford by ethnic group 2001 no. % white british 355684 76.0 white irish 3499 0.7 white other 6855 1.5 mixed white & black caribbean 2636 0.6 mixed white & black african 478 0.1 mixed white & asian 2932 0.6 mixed other 950 0.2 indian 12479 2.7 pakistani 67977 14.5 bangladeshi 4953 1.1 asian other 2971 0.6 black caribbean 3062 0.7 black african 987 0.2 black other 321 0.1 chinese 885 0.2 other ethnic group 1035 0.2 not white british 112020 24.0 total 467704 100.0 source for data used in all tables: census 2001. census output is crown copyright and is reproduced by permission of the controller of hmso and the queen’s printer for scotland within bradford the ethnic geography is very uneven. the 30 wards vary between 22.9 per cent white british in the inner-city university ward to 96.8 per cent in peripheral craven. among the 1457 output areas identified by the census the variation is from 100 per cent white british in 26 localities to 2.9 per cent. the latter is also the output area with the highest proportion of pakistanis, 89.4 per cent. in contrast 557 output areas, 38 per cent of the city, have no pakistanis whatsoever. when the population is differentiated by age as well as ethnicity the marginal statistics become even more extreme. at ward level in ilkley 95.4 per cent of the under-5s are white british, and 98.3 per cent of those 75 or older. in university ward only 6.2 per cent of cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 19 the under-5s are white british, and only 52.9 per cent of the over-75s. on the output area scale 644 vicinities, 44.2 per cent of the total, are entirely white british among under-5s. meanwhile 52 output areas have no white british children under 5. there are also 937 output areas, 64.3 per cent, with no pakistanis aged 0-4, and 11 output areas where all of this age group are pakistanis. there are also 9 output areas where all of the over-75s are pakistani, and 1275 (87.5 per cent) where there are no pakistanis of this age. 909 areas are 100 per cent white british among over 75s, while 44 areas have no over-75 white british. segregation measures the two most common measures used in studies of ethnic segregation are the dissimilarity index (id), and the exposure index (p*), also referred to as the isolation, interaction or probability index. the dissimilarity index measures the proportion of an ethnic group which would have to move to another spatial unit in order to match the geographical distribution of another ethnic group. if all of a city’s minority population reside in a single quarter, and none of the majority population live there, then the two populations are totally segregated from one another, and the dissimilarity index has a value of 100, indicating that either the minority population or the majority population would have to totally relocate in order to match the spatial pattern of the other group. if on the other hand the index has a value of zero this is an indication that the two populations under review exactly match each other’s geographical distribution. the dissimilarity index is sometimes scaled to run from 0.00 to 1.00. many studies compare the distribution of a particular minority with that of the rest of the population, a version of the dissimilarity index known as the segregation index (peach & rossiter 1996, p. 119). in this paper the dissimilarity index is used mainly to compare the distribution of minorities with that of the white british, the dominant ethnic group of the united kingdom, and of bradford. in this way each minority is compared with the same set of figures, rather than with a rest of the population which differs for each minority. we will therefore be studying the segregation of ethnic minorities in a standardised fashion. 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 many ethnic minorities in britain are continuing to grow, as a result of both continued immigration and natural increase, the latter being a consequence of relatively youthful age structures (table 2). one implication of growth in the same areas is that over time the typical member of a minority finds that more of his or her neighbours are from the same ethnic group. concurrently the same individual finds that the proportion of whites in the neighbourhood is falling. this experience is captured by the exposure index. the idea of this statistic is that it captures the asymmetric experience of segregation in a way that the dissimilarity index does not. let us consider a relatively small group such as black caribbeans (0.7 per cent of bradford’s population) in comparison with a much larger group such as the white british (76.1 per cent). the dissimilarity index gives us a single measure indicating that 42.5 per cent of either group would have to move wards for that group to match the distribution of the other. for most of the white british this means that they live in areas in which black caribbeans are a small minority. in contrast most black caribbeans find that they live in areas where the white british are by far the largest group. the p* index records this differential experience. black caribbeans find that on average 65.4 per cent of their ward’s residents are white british, whereas the white british find that on average only 0.6 per cent of their ward’s population is black caribbean. table 2 age structure of ethnic groups in bradford percentage of ethnic group in age group age groups all people white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi 0-4 7.1 5.7 3.1 7.5 13.5 16.1 5-15 14.8 13.1 6.1 15.6 22.3 24.2 16-29 20.5 17.7 19.9 26.7 32.2 33.6 30-49 27.6 28.7 26.7 30.8 22.1 17.6 50-74 23.3 26.6 28.0 17.5 9.0 8.0 75+ 6.7 8.2 16.1 1.8 1.0 0.5 total 100.0 100.0 99.9 99.9 100.1 100.0 a useful way of thinking about the exposure index is to consider it as the average percentage of one ethnic group in each spatial unit, weighted by the spatial unit’s share of a second ethnic group in the whole city. this defines the chances of the second ethnic group finding that its co-residents in a spatial unit are from the first cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 21 group. those who are unfamiliar with this measure will find a succinct technical explanation in peach and rossiter (1996, p. 126). like the dissimilarity index the exposure index can be scaled to run from 0 to 100, or from 0.00 to 1.00. as with the dissimilarity index, many of the exposure index values reported in this paper relate to comparisons between other groups and the white british. some comparisons are however made between pakistanis and other groups. an important feature of the dissimilarity measure is that its value increases as the size of the geographical areas used in its calculation decreases. the differences between ethnic population distributions at ward level are still present if the data are reexamined at a finer scale, such as the output areas used by the british census, but these smaller areas add more detail, which adds to the measure of unevenness between the distributions. it is worth emphasising however that most of the segregation measured by an output area index is already captured by the ward level index. for example in the case of bradford the ward level dissimilarity index between the white british and indians is 53.4, and the output area value is 66.8. since there are 30 wards in the city, but 1457 output areas, an almost 5000 per cent increase in the number of spatial units adds only 25 per cent to the segregation measure. the exposure measure does not always change in a consistent manner with scale, as we will see below. given that most of the segregation measures in this paper are reported at both the ward and output area scales, it is important to avoid including groups in the analysis which were so small that part of the measured segregation might be the result of their being too few group members to allow their distribution across all areas. since the majority of the population live in a family or household of more than one member it was decided to confine the analysis to groups with populations which exceed the number of output areas by a minimum of three. by coincidence this criterion identifies those groups amounting to more than 1.0 per cent of the population. the groups selected are therefore: white british, pakistani, indian, other white and bangladeshi. (members of other particular ethnic groups are included in the calculations when either the total population, or the total population which is not white british, is referred to). 22 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 age and ethnic dissimilarity a first step in examining the impact of age on ethnic segregation was to establish whether age groups are in fact spatially segregated from one another. this is demonstrated in table 3. it is confined to comparing, by means of the dissimilarity index, those aged 0-9 in each of six ethnic groups with those of successively higher ten-year age bands. the calculations have however been completed for all ethnic groups and all decadal pairs, and the 0-9 figures are not in any way atypical. the first column of values shows the situation for the population as a whole. the dissimilarity in ward level distribution between children aged 0-9 and 10-19 year-olds is only 3.4. as 0-9 year-olds are compared with each higher age group the dissimilarity value generally increases, reaching a maximum of 18.1 for the comparison with those aged over 80. this implies a theoretical redistribution of young children ranging between 3.4 per cent and 18.1 per cent if the distribution of other age groups were to be matched. table 3. selected ward level dissimilarity indexes by age group. bradford 2001 age groups all people white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi 0-9:10-19 3.4 3.2 26.4 14.5 3.0 11.1 0-9:20-29 6.2 7.6 36.7 12.5 3.3 4.8 0-9:30-39 10.5 4.5 15.6 7.8 4.2 10.4 0-9:40-49 17.4 8.6 22.3 13.9 5.2 15.1 0-9:50-59 17.4 8.8 22.1 12.7 5.3 13.8 0-9:60-69 14.3 8.9 28.6 16.2 8.6 11.6 0-9:70-79 15.8 9.7 28.9 23.4 8.0 25.0 0-9: 80+ 18.1 13.7 30.3 30.4 14.0 73.1 the same general pattern of increasing segregation as 0-9 year-old are compared with successively older cohorts is repeated for each of the specific ethnic groups covered by the table. no attempt is made to explain the lower values for the white british and pakistanis, and the higher values for the other three groups. the point is to establish that age groups are somewhat segregated from one another both within ethnic groups and in the total population. cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 23 it can be seen by comparison with table 4 that dissimilarity index values between age groups are generally lower than between ethnic groups measured at the same scale. the first column of table 4 gives the index values between the white british and the other selected groups at ward scale. white others have the lowest dissimilarity with the white british at both scales. indians are next in order of segregation, then pakistanis, and finally bangladeshis. for the latter the output area figure indicates that 89 per cent of bangladeshis would need to live elsewhere if they were to match the distribution of the white british population. table 4 dissimilarity from white british for selected ethnic groups. bradford 2001 wards output areas white other 23.9 40.1 indian 53.4 66.8 pakistani 63.6 79.9 bangladeshi 69.7 89.4 although it is an attractive idea to analyse ethnic population data in terms of the 10year age cohorts used above, it proves impossible to do so in practice at both the geographical scales reported by the census. because the average output area contains only 321 residents there is a risk that if too many census variables were to be crosstabulated information about individuals might be revealed. as one of the measures adopted to eliminate this risk the census only reports ethnic group populations at output area level in seven age bands: 0-4, 5-15, 16-29, 30-49, 50-retirement age, retirement age to 75, and 75 plus. retirement age is not the same for men and women. it is 65 for men but 60 for women. categories with different age boundaries for men and women are not clearly the best for examining age segregation. the seven categories have therefore been reduced to six for the purposes of this paper by creating a 50-75 age group. in order to permit comparisons across scales the ward level data, although available in much finer age detail, has been aggregated to these six categories. 24 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 the interaction of age and ethnicity is introduced in table 5. this table reports dissimilarity values within age groups. unlike table 3 it does not examine relationships between age groups. so in the first cell of the white other column the figure of 31.1 indicates that this is the percentage of white others under five who would have to change ward if they were to match the geographical distribution of white british under-fives. in the upper part of the table, covering the ward level computations, two clear features appear. first, the pattern of segregation revealed in table 4 is repeated in the individual age bands. dissimilarity from the white british is lower in every age group for the white others, followed by indians, pakistanis and bangladeshis. table 5 dissimilarity from white british by age group. bradford 2001. wards age groups white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 31.1 53.6 64.8 71.3 57.4 5-15 24.6 55.6 65.2 70.5 56.1 16-29 39.3 49.9 59.2 65.8 53.2 30-49 18.2 51.8 64.1 68.1 50.2 50-74 22.7 57.8 66.9 74.7 46.1 75+ 30.6 55.5 64.8 86.0 34.9 all ages 23.9 53.4 63.6 69.7 52.4 output areas age groups white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 94.5 88.3 80.0 95.1 70.8 5-15 89.0 79.0 81.0 94.6 69.8 16-29 82.1 74.3 80.1 93.1 72.5 30-49 61.9 66.7 79.2 94.2 61.5 50-74 65.7 79.2 83.1 97.5 58.2 75+ 81.5 95.8 93.7 99.8 69.2 all ages 40.1 66.8 79.9 89.4 65.7 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 25 the second clear feature is the falling level of segregation with age when the contrast between the white british and all others combined (‘all not white british’) is examined. for under-4s the dissimilarity index is 57.4, but the figure declines for each successively older cohort, reaching 34.9 for the over-75s. when the figures for individual ethnic groups are examined however there is an apparent tendency for the higher age groups to display higher dissimilarity figures, the reverse of the general case. remembering that the specific groups in the table are much larger than those not listed, we cannot attribute this seeming paradox to the statistical influence of unreported data. in any case these figures have been calculated, and with the exception of the irish, show the same puzzling contrast with their collective trend. a possible explanation may lie in the segregation of these groups from each other. to the extent that these ethnic minorities locate in somewhat different parts of the city from one another, and that their component age groups are somewhat separate from one another (table 3), it would seem that their collective dissimilarity from the white british distribution disaggregates into specific group components differentially across age bands. the need for such an explanation is however rendered questionable when the lower, output area, portion of table 5 is considered. the column for all groups not white british is utterly devoid of trend, and although the over-75s have the highest figure for three of the four specific groups, it is difficult to interpret this as an age-related trend in any of the cases. the ward level sequence of ethnic groups within age bands also disappears in the output area data. although the bangladeshis retain their position as the most segregated group at every age, the order of the other three ethnicities seems completely random. this is probably connected to the very low average numbers per output area for white others, indians and bangladeshis. even for indians the average figure is only 8.6, and for white others and bangladeshis 4.7 and 3.4. when these small numbers are spread across six age bands it becomes clear that the very high dissimilarity figures for these groups are largely the product of the very large number of output areas where the presence of these groups is necessarily zero. it is sensible to conclude that the dissimilarity figures at ward level are more robust than those at output area level. 26 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 low numbers per output area may also explain an intriguing feature of the output area figures in table 5: the level of the dissimilarity figures in the all ages row are generally well below the figures for their component ages. in the bangladeshi and white other columns the all age figures are lower than any of the specific age figures, very much lower in the white other case. this feature does not apply to the more reliable ward figures. age and ethnic exposure when we turn to examining exposure indexes the problem of large numbers of zeros at output area level does not recur. if for example we are calculating the exposure of the white british to bangladeshis or the exposure of bangladeshis to the white british, the only places entering the calculations are those where both some white british and some bangladeshis live. places where one, or theoretically both, groups are absent do not influence figures representing the two groups chances of interacting. there are five sets of exposure indices reproduced: the exposure of the white british to their own group and to other groups; the exposure of other groups to the white british; the exposure of pakistanis to their own group and to other groups; the exposure of other groups to pakistanis; and the exposure of each group to itself (tables 5-9). in order to keep the tables easily comparable some figures are replicated in three tables: for example the white british column in table 6 is the same as the white british column in table 7 and table 10. exposure of the white british table 6 examines the chances the white british have of sharing their geographical unit with members of other groups. the upper set of figures describes the situation when wards are the geographical units in question, and the lower set of figures when output areas are considered. clearly the figures for the exposure of the white british to their own group are very much higher than those indicating their exposure to other groups. for all ages combined, and on average, the white british share their ward with a population which is over 83 per cent white british, not quite 9 per cent pakistani, and some small percentages of white others, indians, bangladeshis, and smaller groups not tabulated. cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 27 when we turn to the figures for specific age groups at ward level we find considerable variation around the all age averages. the youngest white british children see that about 76 per cent of their contemporaries are white british, but the over-75s have neighbours who are almost 93 per cent white british. meanwhile the youngest white british children have contemporaries who are almost 14 per cent pakistani, but for the over-75s the figure is under 2 per cent. between the youngest and oldest age groups white british exposure to their own group generally, though occasionally unevenly, increases with age, and their exposure to pakistanis, and other ethnic minorities, generally decreases with age. table 6 exposure of white british to own group and other groups (wb p* x) . wards age groups white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 76.3 0.7 2.2 13.9 1.5 23.7 5-15 79.7 0.6 2.2 11.5 1.1 20.3 16-29 76.7 1.3 2.8 14.0 1.3 23.3 30-49 85.0 1.4 2.4 7.1 0.5 15.0 50-74 89.8 1.7 1.6 3.8 0.3 10.2 75+ 92.6 3.3 0.6 1.7 0.1 7.4 all ages 83.3 1.4 2.1 8.8 0.8 16.7 output areas age groups white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 83.8 0.7 1.7 8.3 0.7 16.2 5-15 85.7 0.7 1.7 6.8 0.5 14.3 16-29 83.7 1.4 2.3 8.4 0.6 16.3 30-49 88.1 1.4 2.0 4.7 0.3 11.9 50-74 91.8 1.6 1.3 2.5 0.2 8.2 75+ 94.5 2.5 0.4 1.2 0.0 5.5 all ages 87.2 1.4 1.7 5.7 0.4 12.8 28 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 the lower part of the table shows that the white british typically find that over 87 per cent of their output area neighbours are white british. for under-5s the figure is lower, just below 84 per cent, and it generally increases with age to over 94 per cent for the oldest group. at the same time, white british exposure to pakistanis averages under 6 per cent, and generally decreases from over 8 per cent for under 5s to just over 1 per cent for the over 75s. white british exposure to other ethnic minorities is very low, but still decreases with age. the lowest figure in the table, 0.0, indicates that on average white british who are over 75 find that less than one twentieth of 1 per cent (less than 1 in 2000) of the population of their output areas are bangladeshi. in output areas averaging about 321 people this is quite reasonably rounded to zero. it may be noted that when the figures in any row of table 6 in the white british column and the ‘all not white british’ column are added together they amount to 100 per cent. to put it another way, if one’s neighbours are not white british they belong in a separate ethnic group. the ‘all not white british’ figures incorporate the figures for the specific minorities listed in the table, and for the other groups not shown. as with specific minorities the figures in this column generally decrease with age. at wad level the average white british under 5 has neighbours who are almost 24 per cent, nearly a quarter, from other ethnic groups at ward level. for output areas the equivalent is just over 16 per cent, or approaching one sixth. for those over 75 white british chances of finding a neighbour of differing ethnicity fall to somewhat over 7 per cent at ward level, and to under 6 per cent for output areas. without examining the relationships shown in the following tables it is premature to make a judgement on the significance of table 6 for the understanding of community cohesion. we may nevertheless observe that for the average member of the white british group in bradford the experience is of living in areas which are predominantly co-ethnic. moreover only younger people are likely to find that any specific minority amounts to more than a small proportion of their local co-residents. experience of a multi-ethnic presence is more visible for the white british when all minorities are considered as a single group. exposure to the white british cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 29 table 6 looked at white british chances of encountering others; table 7 examines the chances of others encountering the white british. the meaning of the white british column remains the same, but the other columns tell a different story. in a city with a 76 per cent white british majority the chances of minorities having white british neighbours are substantially greater than the white british chance of minority neighbours. thus at ward level white others find that on average 72 per cent of their neighbours are white british; for indians the figure is 59 per cent, for pakistanis over 46 per cent, and for bangladeshis over 54 per cent. when output areas are considered, the figures become respectively, and approximately, 73 per cent, 50 per cent, 30 per cent and 29 per cent. thus for white others the change of scale increases the chances of finding white british neighbours, but for the three south asian groups it reduces them. across the two scales we can say that white others have a chance of white british neighbours approaching that of the white british themselves. indians have a lower chance, but they are still likely to find over half their neighbours are white british, and for pakistanis and bangladeshis the white british make up round about a half of their neighbours at ward scale, but rather less than a third at output area scale. table 7 exposure to white british (x p* wb) wards age groups white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 76.3 64.4 46.4 30.4 37.2 36.4 5-15 79.7 70.6 51.1 35.5 44.5 42.2 16-29 76.7 56.1 52.6 39.9 47.6 44.2 30-49 85.0 78.8 63.0 48.0 57.4 56.8 50-74 89.8 84.3 67.7 59.0 68.0 69.1 75+ 92.6 86.8 79.5 76.5 75.5 83.8 all ages 83.3 72.0 59.0 46.1 54.4 53.0 output areas age groups white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 83.8 57.6 35.6 18.2 16.6 24.7 30 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 5-15 85.7 68.3 39.7 21.0 20.2 29.6 16-29 83.7 60.7 42.8 24.0 21.8 31.0 30-49 88.1 78.0 53.6 31.8 34.1 45.0 50-74 91.8 80.3 57.2 38.1 37.3 55.8 75+ 94.5 70.2 55.4 49.5 32.6 66.8 all ages 87.2 73.3 50.3 29.6 28.5 40.7 when we examine age groups exposure to the white british increases with age for each group at both scales. there is no difference between the white british themselves and minority groups in this regard. this is a difference from table 6. there we were measuring the exposure of the white british to a series of different groups, but here we are measuring the exposure of several different groups to one group, the white british. exposure to the white british increases with age because the proportion of white british in the population increases with age. in table 6 however the exposure of the white british to other groups declines with age because these other groups are generally a smaller proportion of successively older groups. the fact that table 6 measures the exposure of the white british to other groups, whereas table 7 measures the exposure of these other groups to the white british also explains why the white british and ‘all not white british’ columns in table 7 do not sum to 100. the exposure values of individual ‘not white british’ groups are not additive components of the final column of the table. the ‘all not white british’ figures are actually a weighted average of the individual groups (both shown in the table and not shown). exposure of pakistanis tables 8 and 9 are similar to tables 6 and 7, but with pakistanis, the largest minority group, in place of the white british. table 8 looks at the exposure of pakistanis to themselves and to other groups. at ward scale the average pakistani finds that almost 39 per cent of their neighbours are also pakistanis, but that these are outnumbered by about 46 per cent of white british. when we switch to the output area scale this relationship is reversed, pakistanis find that over 54 per cent of their co-residents are also pakistanis, but only a little under 30 per cent are white british. in table 6 the white british found that they were much more exposed to their own group than to any other group, but here pakistanis, though experiencing a considerable presence of cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 31 fellow pakistanis, also have substantial numbers of white british neighbours. in this table, as in table 6, the remaining ethnic groups make little impact. the age group figures in table 8 show that pakistani exposure to the white british increases with age. at ward level the white british make up just over 30 per cent of co-residents of a similar age for pakistanis aged 0-4, but this increases to over 76 per cent for the over 75s. at output area level pakistani under 5s find that only about 18 table 8 exposure of pakistanis to own group and other groups (p p* x) wards age groups white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 30.5 0.5 3.9 54.2 1.5 23.7 5-15 35.5 0.5 4.4 49.8 1.1 20.3 16-29 39.8 1.8 4.8 44.3 1.3 23.3 30-49 48.0 1.4 5.8 36.5 0.5 15.0 50-74 59.0 2.3 6.5 25.4 0.3 10.2 75+ 76.5 7.0 2.8 10.3 0.1 7.4 all ages 46.1 1.7 4.9 38.9 0.7 16.7 output areas age groups white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 18.1 0.5 3.8 66.7 4.5 81.8 5-15 21.0 0.5 4.8 64.1 3.6 79.0 16-29 23.0 1.2 5.1 60.2 3.5 76.0 30-49 31.8 1.2 6.2 51.9 2.3 68.3 50-74 38.1 2.4 7.4 44.6 2.3 61.9 75+ 49.5 9.2 3.0 34.2 0.9 50.5 all ages 29.6 1.4 5.3 54.4 3.1 70.5 per cent of their local contemporaries are white british, but for pakistanis over 75 the figure is almost 50 per cent. pakistanis’ exposure to their own group behaves in the opposite way to their exposure to the white british at both scales: it falls with age, reflecting their successively lower proportions in successive age cohorts. thus at ward 32 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 level the youngest age group finds just over 54 per cent self exposure, but at output area scale average under-5 pakistanis have nearly 67 per cent co-ethnic contemporaries. for the oldest pakistanis exposure to one’s own group is much lower, only just over 10 per cent at ward scale, and about 34 per cent at the output area level. in general it may be seen that for pakistanis in younger age groups more of their contemporaries are pakistani rather than white british, but for older pakistanis the opposite is the case. this applies at both scales, but only the over-75s experience a white british plurality more locally, while it applies to those aged 30 or older at the ward scale. exposure to pakistanis in table 9 exposure to pakistanis is assessed. the figures for pakistanis are of course as in table 8. for the white british the figures are a repeat of those in the pakistani column of table 6. so pakistani self-exposure can be seen to be several times higher than white british exposure to pakistanis at both scales, and both sets of values decline with age. the new elements of this table are the figures for the exposure of other minorities to pakistanis. for white others exposure to pakistanis falls from about 17 per cent for wards to about 14 per cent for output areas. in contrast, for table 9 exposure to pakistanis (x p* p) wards age groups white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 13.9 23.2 37.9 54.2 46.1 48.5 5-15 11.5 19.2 33.5 49.8 39.8 43.3 16-29 14.0 28.6 31.7 44.3 36.2 40.1 30-49 7.1 11.7 22.6 36.5 28.0 29.0 50-74 3.8 7.3 18.2 25.4 18.2 17.9 75+ 1.7 4.2 8.1 10.3 10.2 6.0 all ages 8.8 17.3 26.6 38.9 30.6 32.8 output areas age groups white white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 33 british british 0-4 8.3 18.7 37.4 66.7 49.4 56.8 5-15 6.8 15.7 35.6 64.1 46.8 53.0 16-29 8.4 18.2 34.0 60.2 46.3 50.8 30-49 4.7 9.7 24.0 51.9 41.9 37.9 50-74 2.5 7.5 20.1 44.6 33.0 27.2 75+ 1.2 6.1 8.4 34.2 18.1 33.3 all ages 5.7 14.2 28.7 54.4 42.3 45.9 indians, bangladeshis, and the ‘not white british’ collectively, exposure increases as we move from wards to output areas. the indian figures are lower than those for bangladeshis at both scales, and both are lower than the collective figures. the higher level of collective exposure to pakistanis is explained by their incorporation of the self-exposure experience of the relatively large pakistani community. the effect of age on these values is negative; that is exposure declines as age increases at both scales. two exceptional features of the age group results occur for the two oldest age groups for white others, and for the youngest indians. the older white others are slightly more exposed to pakistanis across output areas than across wards, unlike other white other age groups. the youngest indians are slightly less exposed to pakistanis for output areas than they are for wards, unlike other indian cohorts. exposure to own group table 10 presents the final set of results the self-exposure of each the ethnic groups. we have already seen the white british and pakistani data. here the higher figures for the white british are apparent for all age groups, and at both scales. the increase in self-exposure with age for the white british can be contrasted with the pakistani experience, where self-exposure declines with age. we can also see that self-exposure increases for both groups as we switch from wards to output areas. this also applies to the other ethnic groups in the table, figures which are not reported previously. at both scales however the white other figures are very low, indicating that members of this group generally live in areas dominated by other groups. the other group of similar size, bangladeshis, also have very low self-exposure at ward level, but the figure increases to about 18 per cent for output areas. this suggests a group somewhat clustered in particular parts of several different wards. indian self-exposure is low at ward level, and remains modest for output areas. for the ‘not white british’ aggregate category self-exposure is however quite substantial. if you are not white 34 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 british you find that 47 per cent of your neighbours at ward level are also thus classifiable, and for output areas the figure increases to about 59 per cent. the impacts of age on self-exposure are uneven. as for the white british and pakistanis values decrease with age for ‘all not white british’ at both scales, and for bangladeshis at ward scale. for bangladeshis across output areas however selfexposure increases in both directions from a minimum in the 30-49 age band. this table 10 exposure to own group (x p* x) wards age groups white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 76.3 0.9 4.9 54.2 6.0 63.6 5-15 79.7 0.7 5.5 49.8 4.7 57.8 16-29 76.7 2.5 5.7 44.3 4.4 55.8 30-49 85.0 1.6 6.0 36.5 2.1 43.1 50-74 89.8 2.1 6.2 25.4 1.7 30.9 75+ 92.6 5.3 2.8 10.3 0.6 16.2 all ages 83.3 1.7 5.3 38.9 3.2 47.0 output areas age groups white british white other indian pakistani bangladeshi all not white british 0-4 83.8 13.3 17.2 66.7 24.0 75.3 5-15 85.7 7.0 14.7 64.1 23.7 70.4 16-29 83.7 7.9 13.7 60.2 21.7 69.0 30-49 88.1 4.1 13.9 51.9 14.8 55.0 50-74 91.8 6.0 15.1 44.6 18.1 44.2 75+ 94.5 19.6 25.2 34.2 26.7 37.2 all ages 87.2 3.0 11.8 54.4 18.2 59.3 feature is replicated for the indian output area results, but with the minimum among those aged 30-49. on the ward scale indian self-exposure declines in both directions from an admittedly low maximum among 50-74 year-olds. for white others there is a minimum among those aged 30-49 for output areas, and a totally random pattern at cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 35 ward level. explanations for these variations may lie in the detailed history of immigration, settlement and relocation of the different age bands within these ethnic groups. for white others for example the figures for older ages may be related to refugee immigration from eastern europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s, while for younger ages migration from the same area following the collapse of the iron curtain may be significant. at intermediate ages both the children of the former group, and migrants from other countries may be significant. conclusion this paper addresses a very general question: do age divisions exacerbate the significance of ethnic segregation? the question arose from the very specific context of a riot in one city, and has been explored on the basis of demographic data from that city. in order to answer the general question we need to ask whether bradford is in any way atypical, and the answer to this is that it might be. the city has the highest proportion of pakistanis of any local authority in the united kingdom, and because of the numerical dominance of the white british and pakistanis in the city, it is less diverse in its ethnicity than many london boroughs and several other cities and towns such as leicester, birmingham, manchester and luton. it is however reasonable to see bradford as part of a continuum of ethnic profiles rather than one which is different by an order of magnitude. so it may be fair to infer that the effects of age on segregation in bradford are likely to recur elsewhere in the country, but not necessarily to the same degree. an overall summary of the situation we have examined might be that the multicultural experience in bradford is more apparent to members of ethnic minorities than it is to the white british, but that this experience is modified, but not necessarily exacerbated by age. the average white british person lives in an environment which is very much dominated by their own group, and this applies even more on the very local scale than it does at ward level. for most ethnic minorities however the average experience is of living in localities where the white british are either numerically dominant or a considerable presence. on average only pakistanis find themselves more numerous in their vicinity than the white british, and this only applies to some age groups at both spatial levels. the two youngest bangladeshi age groups also outnumber the white 36 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 british at output area level, but the main interethnic exposure of bangladeshis is to pakistanis, particularly among younger people. the modification of the experience of exposure to other ethnic groups according to age is sometimes to increase it, but also sometimes to decrease it. among the white british younger people have a greater chance of interethnic exposure, and therefore of potential contact. among pakistanis the chances of interethnic exposure are generally higher than for the white british, but they are higher for older pakistanis than younger. this is entirely a consequence of greater exposure to the white british. the exposure of other minorities to the white british also increases with age. exposure to pakistanis decreases with age for these groups. we can perhaps draw some tentative conclusions on the relevance of ethnic separation, and the presumed decrease in community cohesion, for the explanation of bradford’s main 2001 riot. the most numerous participants were young pakistanis and we have seen that the self-exposure of the 16-29 pakistani age group was over 60 per cent for output areas. exposure to the white british was only 23 per cent. opportunities for familiarity with neighbours across the ethnic divide were therefore limited. but segregation alone cannot fully explain why the riot broke out. the reasons identified by alexander (2005) may have been more fundamental, but segregation may have amplified their impact. if you are unemployed or underemployed, and have experienced discrimination, the feeling of being separate from the majority of society cannot contribute to harmonious relations. moreover it is clear that the savage confrontation with the police that was the core event of the bradford disturbances, and resulted in most of the arrests and heavy sentences, broke out at precisely the place the city centre ended and pakistani residential space began. having been directed away from the city centre by police manoeuvres young pakistanis became more aggressive as ‘their’ territory was entered by the police. to the extent that lack of inter-group ethnic contacts contributed to the riot we cannot be optimistic about the future. for those too young to have participated in the riot the indications of ethnic separation in the preceding tables are greater than for the rioters’ age group. moreover the younger south asian age groups are larger. this doesn’t cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 37 guarantee a recurrence of the disturbances because other factors may have changed, but it does not help. it may have been noticed that the index of dissimilarity has been ignored in this concluding discussion. the technical inadequacy of the measure when applied to many small areas and to small population sub-groups is one reason for this. the main reason however is that the asymmetrical experiences incorporated in the various exposure measures is much more helpful in understanding segregation means. this paper has by no means exhausted the possibilities of analysing the interaction of age and segregation. quite apart from the multiplicity of other cities and other ethnic patterns that could be examined there are also other technical possibilities within exposure techniques. first the census’s intermediate scale of super output areas might be examined. secondly a more thorough consideration could be given to interminority relations. third, since the index values quoted here have all been citywide, it would be possible to take a closer look at the situation in specific parts of the city. the experience in inner city zones will clearly be different from in the most peripheral suburbs. finally, and perhaps most productively, the analysis could be extended to relations between age groups across the ethnic divide. bibliography alexander, c. 2005, 'embodying violence: “riots”, dis/order and the private lives of “the asian gang”', in c. alexander & c. knowles (eds), making race matter: bodies, space and identity, palgrave macmillan, basingstoke, pp. 199-217. allen, c. 2003, fair justice: the bradford disturbances, the sentencing and the impact, forum against islamophobia and racism, london. amin, a. 2003, 'unruly strangers? the 2001 urban riots in britain', international journal of urban and regional research, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 460-463. burgess, s. & wilson, d. 2003, ethnic segregation in england's schools, cmpo working paper 03/086, centre for market and public organisation, university of bristol, bristol. fortier, a.-m. 2007, 'too close for comfort: loving thy neighbour and the management of multicultural intimacies', environment and planning d: society and space, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 104-119. home office 2001a, building cohesive communities: a report of the ministerial group on public order and community cohesion (the denham report), home office, london. home office 2001b, community cohesion: a report of the independent review team, the cantle report, home office, london. 38 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 husan, r. 2003, 'critical remarks on cultural aspects of asian ghettos in modern britain', capital & class, no. 81, pp. 103-133. jackson, p. 1992, 'the racialization of labour in post-war bradford', journal of historical geography, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 190-209. johnston, r., wilson, d. & burgess, s. 2004, 'school segregation in multiethnic england', ethnicities, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 237-265. kundnani, a. 2001, 'from oldham to bradford: the violence of the violated', race & class, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 105-110. mcevoy, d. 2007, 'community cohesion and the 2001 riots in the north of england', paper presented to the 12th international metropolis conference, melbourne. mcghee, d. 2003, 'moving to “our” common ground a critical examination of community cohesion discourse in twenty-first century britain', sociological review, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 383-411. ouseley, h. 2001, community pride not prejudice, making diversity work in bradford, bradford vision, bradford. peach, c. & rossiter, d. 1996, 'level and nature of spatial concentration of minority ethnic populations in great britain, 1991', in p. ratcliffe (ed.), ethnicity in the 1991 census, volume three: social geography and ethnicity in britain: geographical spread, spatial concentration and internal migration, hmso, london, pp. 111-134. renton, d. 2003, 'examining the success of the british national party, 1999-2003', race & class, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 75-85. simpson, l. 2004, 'statistics of racial segregation: measures, evidence and policy', urban studies, vol. 41, no. 3, pp. 661-681. webster, c. 2003, 'race, space and fear: imagined geographies of racism, crime, violence and disorder in northern england', capital & class, no. 80, pp. 95122. bradford white british total percentage of ethnic group in age group segregation measures age structure of ethnic groups in bradford bangladeshi age and ethnic dissimilarity age groups age and ethnic exposure exposure of white british to own group and other groups (wb p* x) exposure to white british (x p* wb) wards exposure of pakistanis to own group and other groups (p p* x) exposure to pakistanis (x p* p) wards output areas exposure to own group (x p* x) wards output areas conclusion cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 15, no. 1 2023 © 2023 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: jurema, b., oliveira, m. c. 2023. the indigenous struggle against ‘new’ extractivism in the peruvian amazon. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 15:1, 126– 138. https://doi.org/10.5130/ ccs.v15.i1.8543 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) the indigenous struggle against ‘new’ extractivism in the peruvian amazon bernardo jurema1,*, m. cecilia oliveira2 1 research institute for sustainability (rifs) potsdam, bernardo.jurema@rifs-potsdam.de 2 research institute for sustainability (rifs) potsdam, cecilia.oliveira@rifs-potsdam.de corresponding author: bernardo jurema, research institute for sustainability (rifs), berliner straße 130, 14467 potsdam, germany, bernardo.jurema@rifs-potsdam.de doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8543 article history: received 09/02/2023; revised 11/03/2023; accepted 05/04/2023; published 25/05/2023 abstract at the root of much of the deforestation, land rights violations, human rights abuses and ultimately the continuation of unequal, neocolonial north-south relations are the twofold phenomena of global market pressures for extractivism and mass production of resources and the militarization of response to social conflicts created by these activities. we will investigate the ‘new’ extractivism economic activities from the perspective of the violence perpetrated by assemblages of power against indigenous protest movements in the peruvian amazon region. specifically, we will probe a grassroots’ response to the way peru’s elites have integrated the country within the global economic system: we focus on indigenous peoples’ protests in 2008-9 against the new regulation to open the amazon for development of resources by private companies carried out by peru’s president alan garcía, on the grounds that it represented a threat to their natural resources and livelihood. keywords new extractivism; assemblage; indigenous protests; militarization; resource conflict 126 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8543 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8543 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:bernardo.jurema@rifs-potsdam.de mailto:cecilia.oliveira@rifs-potsdam.de mailto:bernardo.jurema@rifs-potsdam.de https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8543 introduction what does the term new extractivism add to the debate regarding extractivism? what light does this framing shed on the debate over the impact and consequences of extractivism on earth systems and affected communities? the incipient but growing literature on new extractivism characterizes the term, in sum, as burchardt and dietz (2014) propose: ‘new or (neo-) extractivism partially breaks with the neoliberal strategy of privatising the export of raw materials, an idea known as classic or conventional extractivism and which has been dominant in latin america in the past few decades’ (p. 469). most of these scholars generally claim that since the state takes on a larger role in extractivist activities, that leads to a regime different enough as to require a new designation, or at the very least a qualifier. however, it is not clear, as this paper argues, that the term grapples with analyses of extractivism’s political economy that expound the new market dynamics and even of neoliberal rationality itself. the addition of the operator new before the operand extractivism implies a novelty, in the sense that it is something substantially different from how it was carried out before. it makes it seem as though one form of extraction of natural resources took over another. we argue that that is not the case. until now we think of extractivism as a longstanding and localized economic activity operated by and for the benefit of foreign interests that, while benefiting certain groups, harm the living conditions of others by environmental intervention (acosta 2013). our paper shows that in fact, one overlooked element of new extractivism literature is the security apparatus that complements the economic activity against affected populations. for this reason, we affirm that there is no new extractivism activity without calculated mechanisms of localized social constraints and the use of force. the criminalization and regulation of security apparatus against target groups, maximizes the social and legal circuits directly connected not just with local, but with the upscale of new extractivism domains. it is true that the phenomenon is now more complex than it used to be. there are more actors involved in the different stages of extraction processes. there are state companies’ apparatuses alongside private companies, supported by international finance through loans, acting on pressures to feed a global production chain, the need to finance debt services, and the imperative to keep a positive balance of trade which requires foreign direct investment, while protest against extractivist activities is criminalized in order to keep the system going (acosta 2013). crucially, extractivist activities bear substantial and unequally distributed environmental impacts and generate a backlash in the form of social conflicts that require the deployment of force by the state and by the companies involved (acosta 2013, pp. 74, 79). that is why we propose the use of the concept of assemblage of power relations to better analyze and understand extractivism practices, in order to take into account the disaggregation and reconfiguration of power structures and relations that traditionally had been carried out under the auspices of the state. under neoliberal rationality, these roles and structures have been renegotiated with other local, transnational, international, and global sources of power, law and governing practices. we will look into the wave of indigenous-led protests against extractivist activities that swept the peruvian amazon in the latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, in order to show the limitations of the new extractivism approach and the potential of the assemblage of power relations concept. in the next section, we will critically review the literature on new extractivism and propose a theoretical framework that can more adequately grapple with the complexities of extractivist activities under neoliberal rationality. in third part, we briefly discuss our method of literature review and case study. we then move to our case study in part 4, whereby we lay out the wave of anti-extractivism protests in the peruvian amazon in 2008-2009 and the assemblage of power relations that were involved in the activities targeted by the protests as well as in the violent response to them. in the fifth part, we aim to apply our proposed theoretical framework to scrutinize the case study. finally, we conclude showing that commodities exports, jurema and oliveira cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023127 linked to extractivism, remain key in latin america, but also shedding light on the current dynamics and actualizations of security apparatus accompanying the political economy of extractivism. overview of extractivism and assemblage of power relations the first decade of the 21st century saw a sharp increase in global demand for raw materials. this coincided with the rise to power of several left-of-center governments across latin america, the so-called ‘pink wave’ (panizza 2009). the commodities boom buoyed the latin american progressive governments’ budgets, allowing them to spend in social programs while at the same time avoiding distributional conflicts with the upper classes. on the other hand, indigenous, peasant and other frontline communities were faced with increasing pressure from the ever-expanding frontier of extractive capital. environmental conflicts intensified, ‘engaging communities in a continual battle against natural resource exploitation and the forces of global capital, resulting in repeated and widespread clashes, violence, repression and human rights abuses perpetuated by the state or security forces’ (raftopoulos 2017, p. 388). it is in this context that uruguayan social scientist eduardo gudynas coined the term ‘new extractivism’ in 2009. gudynas formulated 10 theses regarding extractivism under the progressive latin american governments in the first decade of the 21st century, which can be summarized as follows: 1) extractivism remains a relevant sector in the development strategies of pink tide governments; 2) but under these leftof-center governments, it is a progressive style of neo-extractivism; 3) the state plays a more active role in the extractive sectors; 4) the new extractivism is subject to commercial-financial globalization, thus keeping south american countries subordinated to the whims of global markets; 5) territorial fragmentation ensues as a result of a network of enclaves connected to different global markets; 6) the key difference under progressive governments is that the ownership of sources tends to be by the state, whereas rules and operations of productive processes continue to follow classic efficiency criteria of competitiveness, profitability and the externalization of social and environmental impacts; 7) social and environmental impacts continue unabated; 8) a greater proportion of the surplus is taken over by the state, which in turn funds social programs, thus appeasing social pressures and generating legitimacy for the state and the extractivist industry broadly; 9) new extractivism, therefore, is elevated as a key driver of economic growth and social welfare; and 10) new extractivism is a novel component of the current iteration of south american developmentalism (gudynas 2009). the new extractivist literature probes the intensification of nature and human exploitation connected to the development of specific economic value chains based on colonial doings. this scholarship revitalizes the political debate on extractivism. but this paper shows we need to challenge our own endeavor to critically understand the power relations of extractivism in the present, so as to deal with the present political complexity of extractivism. as we will discuss in the following sections, we inquire whether new extractivism amounts to a novelty, and we interrogate how a different, strategic approach would provide the scholarship with a broader use and new avenues of a research agenda on extractivism. burchardt and dietz (2014) define the concept as referring to a development path specific to ‘the post-neoliberal policies of progressive governments’ in latin america, consisting of: ‘(1) extracting raw materials and natural elements such as minerals, energy carriers, and forest and agricultural goods; (2) exporting raw materials; and (3) using revenue to improve living conditions’. the authors argue that under this regime, extractivism plays the role of providing funds for national development, poverty alleviation programs, economic diversification and political legitimation, all of which, taken together, amount to a revival of the developmental state (onis 1991, p. 109; woo-cumings 1999). the authors add that the ecological distribution conflicts under this regime involve subaltern groups such as indigenous communities and traditional family farmers against a coalition of state and non-state jurema and oliveira cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023128 agents, which leads to a reconfiguration of roles across a given territory (burchardt & dietz 2014, pp. 469471, 479). veltmeyer, petras, and albuja (2014) point out that extractive capitalism has gone through several mutations since the time of the european invasion up to today’s corporate-finance nexus. they define new extractivism as ‘the form taken by extractive capital and extractivist imperialism under current and changing conditions of a system (capitalism) and a model (neoliberalism) in crisis’ and as a ‘development trap’ since it is predicated on foreign direct investment (fdi) and with accommodation with extractive capitalists. in addition, the authors point out that new extractivism’s neoliberal character, restrained by some degree of state intervention but without nationalization, bred distributive conflicts around land and wages and against extractive activities and their environmental impacts more broadly (veltmeyer, petras, & albuja 2014, pp. 3, 8 & 10). bashirov (2021), one of the few authors to apply the term outside of latin america, writing about azerbaijan, notes that this form of development emerged in latin america under nationalist governments in the 1990s with the aim of using resource extraction as an economic development policy, by various means of state intervention in extractivist activities, leading to a reconfiguration of state-transnational capital relations more favorable to the former (bashriov 2021, p. 1831). this assessment contradicts most of the literature by claiming a larger role for the state than most of the authors writing about this topic. a case in point is farthing and fabricant (2019), who describe the term as a model in which the states take a larger share of profits generated in extractivist activities than had previously been the case. they add that concomitantly there is also an intensification of the exploitation of natural resources and an expansion of the extractivist frontier, whose financial windfall fund the governments’ response to repressed demands of the poor in a context of high international demand for commodities (pp. 6-7). tetreault (2020) narrows his definition down more than other authors, by specifying that this ‘inclusive’ development strategy has been pursued by left-of-center governments in south america starting in the first decade of the 21st century, consisting of using the public revenue stemming from natural resource extraction to fund social programs aimed at the lower societal strata. he notes that in a sense, this is not a new phenomenon. however, he refers specifically to the fact that gudynas’s definition includes agriculture, forestry, and fishing, which have long been part of foodstuffs and raw material sourced from south america for global markets (tetreault 2020, p. 1). the state, security practices and assemblage of power we propose the concept of assemblage of power to more accurately grasp what is at stake in contexts such as the south american case whereby extractivism plays a central role in economic and political life. the concept, which was first coined by deleuze and guattari (1987), ‘designates a contingent ensemble of powers that operate across different scales and political mappings’. building on that notion, other authors (ong & collier 2005) have expanded the concept to highlight ‘the way that new assemblages of power tend to reconfigure state territory and authority rather than completely displacing them’ (mezzadra & neilson 2013, p. 197). as mezzadra and neilson have noted, forms of powers that used to be well established within the realm of the state have been disaggregated and reconfigured ‘in specialized assemblages that mix technology, politics, and actors in diverse and sometimes unstable ways’ (mezzadra & neilson 2013, p. 195). sassen (2008) has insightfully noted that the state is not going anywhere and continues to be a key player in global processes, but that increasingly that takes shape in the form of assemblages of power in which the state is an important, but not the only or even the main, actor. in addition, she emphasized that the integration of the state within such assemblages has led to significant changes in terms of its roles and structures. neoliberal globalization has undermined the assumed role of states in exercising power exclusively within a given circumscribed territory, as progressively the state must negotiate its power and jurema and oliveira cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023129 sources of law with other local, transnational, international and global sources of power (sassen 2008). one important way the role of the state has been reconfigured is by means of a strategy of regulated security practices, whereby an ever-expanding range of social issues, circumstances, and practices are seen through a security prism in an effort to guarantee access to scarce resources. in sum, governmental practices under security apparatus ensues when an issue becomes a referent object to be protected, frequently by means of speech acts, in which an agent can claim the right to use force vis-à-vis a particular event or phenomenon in the name of security ( jurema 2022, p. 16). importantly, grove (2019) reminds us that such assemblages are ‘not a closed system’ and in fact consist of overlying and interposed assemblages that exert fluctuating degrees of influence over each other (p. 70). that is to say, there are neoliberal, security, extractivist, political and so on, assemblages which condition or impact one another in different intensities at various times. the case study to assess whether gudynas’s concept is helpful to understand the contemporary south america – and the global south more generally, as we have seen in the literature review that the term has been employed to analyse africa (ayelazuno 2014; sánchez-ancochea 2021; hamouchene 2022), asia (bashirov 2021) and even europe (del mármol & vaccaro 2020, pp. 42-49) – we chose to use a case study approach from peru (burchardt & dietz 2014). peru’s economy is amongst the fastest growing in the world (‘peru gdp growth rate 1961-2022’ n.d.). its most valuable exports are copper ores and concentrates, gold, refined copper, refined petroleum oils, and inedible meat flour, amounting to 51.4% of the country’s overall exports (workman n.d.). this export matrix, and peru’s insertion in the global market, is at the root of the social conflicts in the regions where these commodities are extracted (hughes 2010). in the following section, we will explore the indigenous protest of 2008 and 2009 against alan garcía government’s natural resource policy in the amazon region, based on private capital development of oil and gas, mining, forestry projects, water resources, and biofuel, and their aftermath in the subsequent years. our hypothesis is that peru’s case shows that extractivism is intrinsically entwined with neoliberal logic. extractive capital and rentier capitalism dictate the exploitation of natural resources in peru, in which the state plays a crucial role in enabling the operations of extractive capital by concessions (veltmeyer, petras & albuja 2022, p. 2). our hypothesis is that the case of peru shows the complementarity of economic intensification based on extractivism, coterminous with specific security apparatuses. the latter, while driving the economy linked to the international market, also intensifies security practices: either by coercion against affected groups or by regulation of circulation (of minerals, of capital, of cooperation between government and private companies). the violence carried out by the state in extractivist frontiers such as the peruvian amazon is directly associated with extraction with the objective of guaranteeing access to natural resources to multinational companies in search of profit maximization and as the state seeks to acquire a steady source of capital to finance debt services and to keep a positive balance of payments. however, in seeking to extract its natural resources to fill the demand of the world market, ecological distribution conflicts and changes of social relations ensue. this means that ‘national development models based on raw material extraction are constantly producing new social structures determining economic success or failure’ (burchardt & dietz 2014, p. 478). we aim to map how neoliberal rationalities to environment have created and normalized specific political economy for extractivism using an explicit security apparatus. we believe that there is not a ‘new’ element in extractivism but the actualization of global capitalism to incorporate and naturalize specific approaches that justify and amplify security. if scholars tend to use the concept of new extractivism as a term to emphasize exploitation and inequalities, they cannot ignore the transformations on controlling specific groups that jurema and oliveira cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023130 extractivist dynamics accommodate within affected populations. in mapping out these transformations, we hope to understand: i. how is civil society re-patterned or integrated into the extractivist mechanism or eliminated when defined as enemy? ii what tensions or contradictions emerge in this nexus? the indigenous-led protests against extractivism in peru we focus on the wave of protests against extractivism led by indigenous communities in peru in the latter half of the 2000s. the protest here was the ultimate social act of resistance. it refused a specific power relation dynamic based on extractivist activity that is inherent in peruvian history. the participants of these particular protests are used to the violent response of the police and its criminalization. for this reason, compared with many other kinds of protest, indigenous groups in peru reveal the thin line between resistance and the mechanisms of the current routes of extractivism. although the felling of the peruvian amazon forest dates back to the 1940s, it was not until forty years later that the agricultural frontier expanded apace. intense in-migration set in, driven by deliberate policies that incentivized settlement of the amazon region. at first, this was a result of governmentfunded colonization projects, market support and infrastructure expansion, and was later compounded by an influx of settlers escaping violence in the andes region and attracted by the economic opportunities of monoculture tree plantations, land titling and large road development projects. by the turn of the century, an estimated seven million hectares of the peruvian amazon had been clear-felled (about 123,000 hectares destroyed per year) (marquadt et al. 2019, p. 82). throughout the 1980s tens of thousands of people were killed or jailed on misleading or false charges of having links to the shining path (martinez-alier 2002, p. 118). government agrarian policies on forests and the promotion of intensified cash cropping as an alternative to traditional swidden agriculture and non-forest policies and processes, such as demographic change, structural and political variations, and transformations of economic regimes, alongside forest conservation programs that aim at strengthening forest boundaries, are often driven by market and capital accumulation logics. large scale capital intensive agricultural land interests and populational pressure on forest boundaries squeezed out indigenous or traditional forest-based subsistence practices. in sum, ‘government policy of agricultural intensification and the promotion of cash crops have played a facilitative role and contributed to this development’ (marquadt et al. 2019, pp. 98-99). since 2000, peru’s forest policy had been centered around the forest and wildlife law no. 27308 which set out as its key objective the ‘sustainable use and conservation of forest resources’ (article 1). the peruvian amazon consists of a sizable area of woodland, containing high biodiversity, substantial concentrations of hardwoods in high demand in global markets (such as mahogany and cedar), and extensive illegal logging as a result. this makes the peruvian amazon ‘an important arena in efforts to promote sustainable commercial logging’. peru’s legal logging concession system was further reinforced by the 2009 us–peru trade promotion agreement (tpa). this agreement was molded after the north american free trade agreement (nafta) and the central america free trade agreement (cafta), including labor and environmental standards (mcarthur & tucker 2010). one study has found that it is precisely this concession system’s regulatory documents, set out in the 2000 forestry law and strengthened by the us–peru tpa implemented in february 2009, which have enabled ‘widespread illegal logging’ which ‘continues to threaten all forested areas, including protected areas and indigenous territories’ (finer et al. 2015, p. 1). under peru’s legal logging concession system, out of the 609 concessions (up to september 2013), 68.3% were under investigation for jurema and oliveira cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023131 significant breaches and 30% were cancelled due to violations (finer et al. 2015, p. 1). the authors state that their findings ‘lead us to conclude that the regulatory documents designed to promote sustainable logging are instead enabling illegal logging’ (finer et al. 2015, p. 4). from the very beginning the implementation of the 2009 trade agreement was a highly controversial topic within the peruvian political elite and civil society. on 30 october 2007, three days before the agreement had to pass the lower house of the united states congress, alberto pizango choto, the president of the interethnic association for the development of the peruvian amazon (aidesep), which represents 350,000 indigenous people in peru’s amazon region, published a letter in which he advocated against the free trade agreement (fta): ‘… the f ta will give incentives for further and irreversible destruction of virgin rainforest, which will in turn increase global warming and displace our communities from their home territories. this is an absolutely unacceptable outcome for our planet, and particularly for the territory where our communities live, as we collectively work to reduce the threat of global warming. ... (t)he peru f ta, if approved, would threaten every aspect of our livelihoods and sustainable development program. we are very preoccupied that the administration of president alan garcía is auctioning off peru’s amazon at a breakneck speed to foreign firms ranging from hunt oil to occidental petroleum and beyond.’ (aidesep 2007) the peruvian state is responsible for subsurface resources and governs mining and hydrocarbon concession procedures, under the 1993 hydrocarbon law 26221. in the same year, peru’s ratification of the international labor organization’s convention 169 granted indigenous communities the right of free prior and informed consent (fpic) regarding any actions to be undertaken in their lands (orta-martínez & finer 2010, p. 212). the alan garcía government’s natural resource policy in the amazon region, based on private capital development of oil and gas, mining, forestry projects, water resources, and biofuel, is at the center of the indigenous protest of 2008 and 2009. on december 20, 2007, president alan garcía published law 29157 in the peruvian congress, delegating extraordinary legislative powers to the executive branch on various subjects related to the fta. in the next eighteen months, president garcía signed 108 decrees related to the implementation of the fta (peinhardt, kim, & pavon-harr 2019, p. 60). the most controversial decrees with regards to the environment were ten decrees on the privatization of forestry for foreign investment. in particular, decrees 1090 and 1064 were highly contentious. the decrees were meant to stipulate that a minority of communal land holders could push a vote to parcel off and privatize lands. this decree would have undermined communal tenure of land and would have evolved, according to indigenous organizations and other civil society actors, to the opening up of 45 million hectares, more than half of peru’s rainforest, to foreign investment in timber, oil, and mining exploitation. in june 2008 president garcía signed the decrees as part of his executive power to implement the fta and refused to withdraw the decrees when a parliamentary commission declared them to be unconstitutional. in response to garcía’s refusal to take back the decrees, the aidesep organized a national campaign of strikes and road blockades. the protests – in the form of roadblocks and occupation of oil and gas facilities – began in august 2008, with the main demand being that the two decree laws allowing private investment in indigenous land be revoked, the reinstatement of a 1979 constitutional clause forbidding the sale of communally owned land in indigenous territory, and compliance with the ilo convention 169. a main target of the protests was the hydrocarbon industry. one of the drivers of the government’s declaration of a state of emergency in may 2009 was the threat posited by the protests vis-à-vis hydrocarbon production (stetson 2012, p. 80). as a response, the alan garcía government declared a state of emergency in three peruvian provinces, banning public gatherings and suspending free movement, and sent the army to disband the protests, including jurema and oliveira cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023132 with military overflights. prime minister jorge del castillo justified the government’s actions pointing out the need to protect a gas pipeline and the camisea gas project: ‘we are not provoking native communities but safeguarding areas that are of strategic importance for the country’. vice president luis giampietri characterized the protests as ‘subversive activities’ and argued that ‘they are undermining the foundations of democracy’. meanwhile, the aidesep president, alberto pizango, stated, ‘the government has declared open war on indigenous people’ (mcarthur & tucker 2010, p. 1). in fact, between february 2008 and july 2009, there was a series of protests and road blockages across the country, many of them directed at the legislative decrees related to the fta implementation, as the timeline below shows. a protest campaign led by indigenous peoples’ organizations began in august 2008. in the face of what these organizations described as a lack of dialogue, it intensified in april 2009, when roadblocks were put in place across the amazon region. the government sent the police and the military to clear a blockade in the northern province of bagua on june 5, 2009, leading to several people getting killed under murky circumstances (mcarthur & tucker 2010, p. 2; orta-martínez & finer 2010, p. 215). official accounts of the disturbances claimed that 10 civilians and 23 police officers were killed; however, indigenous groups contested these figures, putting indigenous casualties at 40 (stetson 2012, p. 77). several judicial processes involving protests were launched in the criminal court of bagua. the last of them started in 2014 and ended two years later. the 53 protestors on trial, most of whom were from the awajun and wampís communities, faced sentences ranging from six years to life in prison. the court absolved all 53 defendants, ‘because the defense of the environment’ was a ‘superior purpose’, and the evidence presented by the prosecution was flimsy. all the other cases also ended with the protesters being cleared of any crime or wrongdoing. however, the security forces and the political authorities responsible for the police operation in bagua were never held accountable (amnesty international 2014; ‘dozens of indigenous absolved in peru’s 2009 ‘baguazo’ massacre’ 2016). the indigenous protestors bore the brunt of the full force of the judicial system. a human rights watch report about the troubles in the bagua province, which came to be known as the baguazo, had found that security forces under the garcía administration had ‘opened fire indiscriminately against a crowd of demonstrators, injuring several of them, including a well-known indigenous leader and activist’ (human rights watch 2009). the special commission named by president garcía amounted to an attempt to whitewash what had happened there and ‘to validate the government’s version of the root causes of the events’ (aiello 2010).the protest movement succeeded in pressing the garcía government to jurema and oliveira cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023133 backtrack on legislative decrees 1015, 1073, 1090, 1064. in another victory for the protests, the peruvian congress approved the law of the rights to prior consultation for indigenous and original peoples as recognized by ilo 169 in august 2011, which was signed into law by garcía’s successor ollanta humala (stetson 2012, pp. 90-91). as noted above, the garcía government was forced to overturn decrees 1090 and 1064 and prime minister yehude simon resigned from office. president garcía admitted that his government failed to consult with indigenous communities before signing the ten decrees. government officials reassured the public that revoking the decrees would not jeopardize the fta and would not put peru under u.s. sanctions, a statement which turned out to be true. despite these incontrovertible gains, legal and illegal mining increased 35 percent immediately after the fta implementation, as the government auctioned land for mining that included awajun and wampis lands (mcarthur & tucker 2010, p. 3). discussion up till now, we have thought of extractivism as a local economic activity with foreign interests that while benefitting certain groups damages the living conditions of others by environmental intervention. our paper shows that in fact, one overlooked element of new extractivism literature is the security apparatus that complements the economic activity against affected populations. for this reason, we affirm that despite narratives of mechanisms of consultation and the integration of affected communities, new extractivism activity incorporates the use of force and diverse pathways to employ violence and regulation control over the political economy of extractivism. the criminalization, use of force and dispossession against targeted groups, maximize the social and legal circuits directly connected not just with local, but with the upscale of new extractivism domains. the violent history of extractivism in peru also shows that the extractivist economy activates a series of constraints against specific groups. besides conventional forms of direct violence, such as the use of the police and of force against protests, we have specific economic and judicial implications that keep exploiting or harming these groups, and the violent separation of humans from their former environment, in a mechanism which was already described by marx in capital volume one in the chapter about primitive accumulation (‘ursprüngliche akkumulation’). the peruvian case is also a story of how neoliberal practices actualize the extractivist system, particularly as has been pushed by the us-peru fta, which has been described as ‘groundbreaking’ (office of the united states trade representative n.d.) in environmental terms and as ‘environmental stewardship’ by hillary clinton (carlsen & feffer 2009). it raises questions over the liberal assumption that free trade agreements export social and environmental standards from specific territories to other domains. the case of peru also questions the model of development introduced by left-of-center government in latin america in the 2000s. while social programs brought millions out of poverty it also was always based on extractivism, violence against indigenous people and a strong dependency on international markets. in this case study, we analyzed this contingent interaction playing out in the peruvian amazon. these assemblages of power reconfigured the peruvian amazon region and governmental rule rather than fully displacing them, highlighting forms of power that are managed and implemented beyond the auspices of the state and have in the neoliberal era been disaggregated and reconfigured. this case also confirms that state monopoly of force takes shape in assemblages of power alongside other actors connected to international financialization, such as extractive companies, foreign governments, private security firms and so on. this happens in the context of neoliberal globalization, in which the state’s exercise of power is constantly in negotiation with environmental development narratives and other local, transnational, international and global sources of arrangements. jurema and oliveira cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023134 we identify security as key in extractivist activities. the securitization of the extraction of natural resources, that is natural resources as the referent object to be protected, means that the social protests in response to these activities are seen through and dealt with through a security prism. this security apparatus occurs alongside what we term power assemblage, encompassing social and political dynamics that occur at multiple scales, as is illustrated in this case study as private corporations extract natural resources in the amazon, protected by state economic privileges and private security, to fulfill international economical circuits and demands for commodities in order to allow the peruvian state to service its debt to international finance and to have a positive balance of payments (brady 2014; jensen 2022). all this calls into question the usefulness of the new extractivism concept, as there seems to be not much that is really new. our case study is the result of the intersection of new extractivism with assemblage of power relations. instead, we propose that researchers apply the assemblage approach, as it better grasps the complexities at play in the extractivist economy, whereby different assemblages – extractivist, security, financial, and so on – interplay across several geographical scales and political territories. conclusion in this paper, we have used the case of the peruvian amazon in the period between 2007-2009 to assess the main claims that comprise the literature of the ‘latin american (neo-) extractivism’ regime, which can be summarized as ‘the exploitation of nature serves to secure national development and sovereignty, to reduce poverty, increase social participation, to diversify local economies and to guarantee political stability’ and thus legitimizing a ‘new development project’, all of which amount to ‘the renaissance of the developmental state’ (burchardt & dietz 2014, pp. 469-471, 479). we have showed that the peruvian case neatly fits the model described by veltmeyer, petras and albuja (2014), in which huge corporate conglomerates are allied to finance capital whose interests the state (both national and foreign) plays a central role in protecting along a convergence of interests – for the national government, it is especially a matter of accruing foreign direct investment; for the foreign governments, it is about ensuring access to natural resources; and for corporations and finance, the main goal is to ensure profit-making (veltmeyer, petras, & albuja 2014, p. 3, 10, & 18). that is precisely why the concept of assemblage of power better grasps how extractivism plays out, in which state territory and authority are reconfigured rather than displaced, whereby forms of power heretofore exercised within the realm of the state have been disaggregated (deleuze & guattari 1987; mezzadra & neilson 2013, p. 197). furthermore, with this case study, we have shown that extractivism is intertwined with neoliberal governmentality. the peruvian state plays a key role in ensuring that extractive capital can operate in frontiers such as the amazon forest, allowing for profit maximization for the private sector, and foreign reserves for the state to meet its obligations with international finance. finally, it is important to highlight that social conflicts related to extractivist activities remain latent in the country, in particular in the regions of predominantly indigenous populations – one study indicates that about two-thirds of all social conflicts in the country consist of socio-environmental conflicts (sícoli pósleman & sallan 2019). in sum, our inquiry into ‘new extractivism’ literature has led us to conclude that there is nothing new per se in the extractivism regime under progressive governments in latin america, but rather a modern iteration under neoliberal logic and responding to specific social demands – or what has been termed ‘neoliberalism with state intervention and without nationalization’ (veltmeyer, petras, & albuja 2014, p. 3, 10, & 18). we propose that the concept of assemblage is more adequate to grasp extractivism in latin america as a phenomenon that has led to protests by local and indigenous communities over the enclosure and capitalist exploitation of land, water and mineral resources and the subsequent 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(ed) 1999, the developmental state, cornell university press, ithaca, ny. https://doi. org/10.7591/9781501720383 workman, d., n.d. ‘peru’s top 10 exports’, world ’s top exports, retrieved 2022-10-12. https://www.worldstopexports. com/perus-top-10-exports/ jurema and oliveira cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023138 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104714 https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501720383 https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501720383 https://www.worldstopexports.com/perus-top-10-exports/ https://www.worldstopexports.com/perus-top-10-exports/ cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 14, no. 3 2022 © 2022 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: asmara, t., noho, m. d. h. 2022. religion and cosmopolitan society: religious conflict settlement based on legal culture. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:3, 46– 60. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8166 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) religion and cosmopolitan society: religious conflict settlement based on legal culture teddy asmara1,*, muhammad dzikirullah h. noho2 1 universitas swadaya gunung jati, cirebon city, indonesia 2 universitas hasyim asy’ari, jombang regency, indonesia corresponding author: teddy asmara, universitas swadaya gunung jati, jalan terusan pemuda no. 01 a, cirebon city, west java 45132, indonesia, teddyasmara25@yahoo.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8166 article history: received 27/04/2022; revised 01/11/2022; accepted 18/11/2022; published 15/12/2022 abstract conflicts occur when people believe that they are different from others and conflict in religion is no different. religious conflicts in poso and conflicts between sunnis and shiites in east java have the effects of conflict, including protracted social friction, which prevents the development of a cohesive community. this research uses a socio-legal approach, where the study of law combines the approach of legal and social sciences. establishing a way to settle religious conflicts is done by drawing up a legal basis for a settlement that accommodates human rights and democracy, emphasizing horizontal relations between religious communities. the existence of a legal culture becomes a meeting point for religious views, namely, prioritizing human rights. so, in the future, resolving conflicts based on legal culture in a cosmopolitan society is recommended. keywords religious conflict; cosmopolitanism; settlement; legal culture declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 46 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8166 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8166 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:teddyasmara25@yahoo.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8166 introduction conflicts between religious communities could be as old as religion itself; realistically, the phenomenon of conflicts between religious communities can be traced through various existing historical records (yunus 2014). differences in concepts in religion that are embraced and even differences in concepts in religion are the source or origin of the emergence of religious conflicts. for instance, religious people have a propensity to attempt to justify their respective religious teachings, even though some do not comprehend the admirable qualities included in the religion they defend. on the other hand, the fierce spirit has occasionally humbled other individuals who disagree with him even though they are members of the same religious tradition. therefore, there is the potential for disagreements to arise between adherents of one religion and those of another (okeke, ibenwa, & okeke 2017), as history has shown us. one of the best remembered in the west may be the conflict between muslims and christians in europe known as the crusades (10951291 ad) (gada 2017). other conflicts recorded in history between 623-1090 ad between muslims and byzantium, persia, egypt, yemen, syria, turkey, and others, were also religious conflicts, as much as territorial or political conflicts. aside from variations in religious beliefs, additional variables that might lead to conflict include disparities between individuals, variances in culture, divergences in interests, and the fast pace at which society is changing. conflict arises when we believe that our beliefs are superior to others and that, by implication, we have the right to suppress the beliefs of others and we cannot find common ground. however, it does not stop there; the belief in these differences is equipped with a feeling that what they believe is the absolute truth and must be fought for, sometimes even at the risk of life (koenig 2012). the religion they believe in teaches the truth, but each religious believer feels that their truth is superior too other truths (king 2010). departing from individuals or groups who consider their beliefs or religious ways to be the most correct and superior to others, then it causes division in religion. at first glance, the main problem in this discourse is the absolute truth of one belief, but individuals and groups’ differences or innate characteristics could be the real issues. the characteristics in question can be physical, knowledge, customs, beliefs, and so on. (mckay & whitehouse 2015). the unavoidable interactions of individuals and groups, plus differences in characteristics, eventually lead to frictions of interest, both individual and group. it should be understood that conflict cannot be avoided and is common in social interactions, but it is not common for conflicts to lead to acts of violence, especially those that violate other human rights (kakar 1996). coleman (1994) argues that divisions between groups are, in many ways, only the opposite of consensus within groups. when someone experiences a strengthening of identity in a group, whether ethnic, religious, or national, they tend to separate themselves from groups not identifying in the same group as themselves. separating in this context also means distinguishing, which incidentally has two meanings; choosing and judging, following what is considered good and refusing to follow what is considered harmful, and distinguishing also has the meaning of excluding, preventing and establishing boundaries with other groups. the differences between religious groups eventually lead to stereotyping of people of other religions ( jackson & hunsberger 1999). stereotyping triggers negative views of other religious groups, resulting in repressive efforts against other groups, such as invasions of houses of worship and prohibition of religious rituals. examples include the destruction of churches in aceh, and the attack on the ahmadi mosque in kalimantan. stereotyping and conflicts of religious communities will not seem to meet in the form of equilibrium, namely peace, as shown in prolonged conflicts in several parts of the world, namely myanmar (the rohingya muslim group), islamic state of iraq and syria (isis), and the philippines (the moro conflict), and many others. as a country with diverse cultures and beliefs, indonesia is inhabited by at least 1,340 ethnic groups. indonesian society, in general, adheres to six significant religions including islam, protestant, catholicism, asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202247 hinduism, buddhism, and confucianism (seo 2012), but among the diversity of ethnic groups, other beliefs are held, including kejawen, kaharingan, malim, sunda wiwitan, marapu, and others. the abundance of various religions and beliefs has led indonesia to experience a lot of social friction. the stereotypical differences between religion and belief cause religious conflicts, for example, in aceh, which applies islamic sharia law strictly, conflicts between muslim and christian communities were triggered. this conflict spread to efforts to demolish the houses of worship of the christian community in aceh (marshall 2018). poso, in central sulawsi, is the site of a religious conflict that began in the 1990s.originally, poso was home to many muslims; however, the dominance of islam began to shift to christianity with the influx of migrants from other places, causing social friction that triggered conflict between adherents of the two religions (islam and christianity). the poso conflict has developed not only as a religious conflict but has been colored by economic, social, cultural and political motives (aragon 2001). clashes between muslim and christian youth organizations marked the beginning of both the first and second phases of the conflict and riots that broke out in poso. on the other hand, it is speculated that a great number of additional elements played a role at the beginning of the religious struggle that resulted in massacre, damage, and displacement of the population. among these factors are the following: • economic competition between the indigenous population of poso, which is predominantly christian, and migrants from bugis, buton, makassar, and transmigrants from java, who are predominantly muslim; • competition between government officials regarding positions in the bureaucracy—in terms of the division of power in the regions between christian and muslim elements; and • political and economic instability following the fall of suharto’s new order regime. religious conflicts can occur between two religious groups and groups of different sects within one religion; this happens because of a lack of respect, appreciation, and tolerance in religion. an example is found in the sampang conflict involving ahlus sunnah wal jamaah (sunni) and shia islam followers. the sampang conflict began in 2004 and was followed by burning of a house belonging to a shia sect (hilmy 2015; ida & dyson 2015). (sunni muslims believe that an agreement can be reached about selecting the prophet’s successor. the fact that they adhere to the prophet’s example, known as the sunnah, is the most vital component. the shia school of islam maintains that the position of caliph should be reserved exclusively for muhammad’s offspring.) the conflict resulted in the burning of 9 houses of shia worshipers and their places of worship. the destruction was carried out by 500 residents who claimed to be members of the ahlus sunnah wal jamaah (sunni). based on this, it can be seen that conflicts of belief are not only experienced by different religions but also within the same religion. this further shows that the problems that arise are related to religion and the “ego” of individuals or groups of absolute beliefs that are also believed to trigger problems. indonesia’s religious and cultural diversity can be a blessing or a curse (palmer 2005). the blessings of this diversity will be realized if the community simultaneously has a sense of belonging and equality with each other so that the different feelings that create a gap between one group and another can be eliminated. conflicts that lead to destruction of social cohesion, damage to property and livelihoods and even death are the curse of this diversity. those conflicts especially between religious communities, stem from differing attitudes and views that are formed from the interpretation and misinterpretation of religious beliefs and practices, in addition to low cultural tolerance and excessive emphasis on individual or group ‘ego’. moreover, they (followers of religion) identify themselves with their religion or belief and feel that the distinguishing factor between them and others is their religion, belief or sect and that it is important to control others, for example through practices of segregation. these different feelings lead to social asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202248 segregation that may in turn lead to conflict, such as happened at the state vocational high school 2 padang, which forced non-muslim students to wear the hijab. segregation is an expression of social inequality within the city area, which is indicated by the separation of people in certain residential areas due to policies, differences in socio-economic conditions, ethnicity, and race. the handling of conflicts between religious communities, especially in indonesia, needs to be carried out with a new approach that involves realizing a feeling of togetherness and equality, which is realized through the adhesive factor that unites various perceptions held by adherents of religions, beliefs and sects. legal culture can be an alternative in building the resolution of religious conflicts because it talks about views, attitudes, and responses to the law, which can ultimately be a factor in increasing cohesion that can reduce and resolve conflicts between religious believers. this paper offers a conflict resolution approach which is expected to be a bridge for the very diverse indonesian people to form a true cosmopolitan society. research methods the approach used in this study is the socio-legal approach. socio-legal studies are studies of law using both legal and social science approaches (creutzfeldt, mason, & mcconnachie, 2019). seen as an alternate method to legal studies, it looks at the doctrinal study of law and how it will function in society. sociolegal studies, then, explore how the law will work in society (empirical) (boulanger 2020). the sociolegal approach is used to obtain data, both from the perspective of legal science and social science, in an interdisciplinary way, so that more in-depth and meaningful analysis can be carried out on the phenomena that the researchers put forward. this is done because the approach taken by textual analysis alone is not comprehensive enough, because the law is more than the written text. as a result, support from fields of study within the social sciences is required to analyze the law, particularly in the context of efforts to develop law for the future. in this study, qualitative approaches are used to analyze the data. these approaches emphasize theuse of deductive and inductive inference processes and the dynamics of the link between observed events and the application of scientific logic. most qualitative data are presented in the form of narratives, stories, written and unwritten materials (pictures and photos), and other non-numerical formats. after conducting a qualitative analysis of the data, the next step will be to derive conclusions using deductive reasoning. results and discussion religious conflicts in indonesia: the current situation the dynamics of human conflict, especially those with religious nuances, can never be separated from human life (stenschke 2016). conflicts in human life can occur in a short or long time with various background motives, both purely religious and political, social, and economic motives (rifa’i 2010). the motives of conflict with religious nuances in indonesia have developed in a reasonably complex direction, as happened in the religious conflict in poso, the sunni and shia conflicts in east java, or other conflicts with religious nuances in indonesia. although they are said to be religious, the conflicts mentioned above have other dimensions and aspects that need to be considered (amal 2020). religious conflict in poso is a conflict that was initially limited to conflicts between individuals, which eventually developed into conflicts at the religious level. if examined further, this conflict is motivated by cultural factors, including ethnicity as well as religion. the two elements collaborated to become a time bomb that never got the right solution. after the riots in the poso area subsided, the national police established an operations field command and carried out several operations, one of which was operation sadar maleo (2000) (gogali 2008). in 2004 the joint forces of the indonesian national army and the asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202249 indonesian national police conducted operation sintuwo maroso. the finding of the joint forces was that there was friction between the two religious groups that could not be suppressed. this then led to terrorist groups such as that formed by abu wardah, also known as santoso. in 2015 this first operation was followed up with operation camar maleo which lasted until january 2016. through operation camar maleo, at least 24 terrorists were arrested, and 7 members of the east indonesia mujahideen led by abu wardah alias santoso were shot dead. santoso was eventually killed, and basri (the leader of the east indonesia mujahideen after santoso) was apprehended through the tinombala task force operation in 2016. in addition, religious conflicts can also develop and impact economic issues such as food and fuel shortages, as experienced by the poso people in the conflict. the impacts of conflict, protracted social friction and inappropriate resolutions can develop conflicts into acts of terrorism, as demonstrated by the east indonesia mujahidin group in poso. the poso conflict is just one of the instances of nuanced religious conflicts in indonesia which do not even involve groups with different religions, such as the conflict between sunni and shia sects in east java. the conflict between sunni (ahlus sunnah wal-jamaah) and shia sects in east java is another example. the province of east java, where most of the muslim community adheres to the nadlatul ulema tradition, is one of the bases for spreading sunni islam. meanwhile, in the 1980s, the shia da’wah movement began to appear in areas known as tapal kuda, or the horseshoe, a tronghold of madurese culture, which is also located in east java province (pasuruan regency, probolinggo regency, probolinggo city, lumajang regency, jember regency, situbondo regency, bondowoso regency, and banyuwangi regency). these areas had previously been the base of the sunni sect. differences in historical background and beliefs between the two sects eventually led to conflicts between sects in the tapal kuda area, especially areas with a solid “nahdliyin” base such as the island of madura. the emergence of clashes between shia and sunni sects in indonesia can be identified after the issuing of a fatwa from the indonesian council of ulema, which states that shia sects in indonesia must be watched out for because the shia ideology values are not the dominant ideology in indonesia, which is sunni. shia sects began to attract public attention after the shia-sunni conflict in sampangan, madura, east java, in 2012. although early signs of conflict between shia-sunni in sampang were apparent since 2003, with local leader, tajul muluk, actively spreading shia ideology, it was still limited. the heating up of shia-sunni relations in sampangan, madura, led to the physical violence that tajul muluk suffered when celebrating the prophet’s birthday in 2011. on the one hand, tajul muluk was considered to have violated the agreement made in 2008 regarding the cessation of the group’s da’wah activities; on the other hand, tajul muluk felt that he disagreed with the ulema’s insistence on stopping their da’wah activities. the argument used by tajul muluk is that da’wah activities are only aimed at the followers of the group and are aimed at strengthening their own shia group internally. the actions taken by sunni against the tajik muluk group were unconstitutional and did not comply with law no. 39 of 1999 concerning human rights. article 24 of the human rights law stipulates that everyone has the right to assemble, and associate for peaceful purposes. moreover, every citizen or community group has the right to establish non-governmental organizations or other organizations to participate in the course of government and state administration in line with the demands for the protection, enforcement, and promotion of human rights by the provisions of laws and regulations. tensions continued to escalate until, at the end of 2011, groups acting in the name of the sunni sect carried out attacks and arson against the islamic boarding school belonging to the shia karang gayam. furthermore, the sampang clerics with the local government held a closed meeting with the tajul muluk group, which ended with the decision that the tajul muluk group had to stop all activities and return to the teachings of sunni islam; the group was required to leave the sampang area without compensation for the asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202250 land/assets they own, and if these two conditions were not fulfilled then all followers of shia sampang must die. from this, it can be seen that sunni actions against shias not only violate the right to assemble and establish organizations but also violate the constitutional right, namely the right to life, which is regulated in article 9 of law 39 of 1999 concerning human rights which states that everyone has the right to live, sustain life and improve their standard of living. in addition, everyone has the right to be peaceful, safe, happy, physically and mentally prosperous. further, they engaged in violence and damage to property which was clearly against the law, as well as proposing remedies that were themselves illegal. the conflict continued until 2012, marked by the continued violence against shia in karang gayam. in mid-2012, a group of sunni muslims carried out attacks, vandalism and burning of the homes of shia followers. the impact of the attack and destruction resulted in nine houses being burned and two residents dead (manan & paran 2020). the sunni-shia conflict that occurred in sampang finally forced the expulsion of the shia group, known as tajul muluk, from karang gayam. the expulsion of the shia group was driven by intimidation, hate speech and terror against the shia group. the issue of the attack on the shia group finally became a national concern until finally the governor of east java asked the police to make persuasive efforts to resolve the conflict using an understanding of the religious issues. the governor of east java rejected the ulema’s insistence on banning shia preaching in east java because the central indonesian ulema council did not prohibit the existence of shias. the efforts made by the governor of east java are appropriate because they carry out constitutional rights as regulated in article 12 paragraph 2 of law number 39 of 1999 concerning human rights, which states that the state guarantees freedom of religion, the independence of everyone to embrace his religion and belief. the resolution of the shia-sunni conflict in sampang by expulsion cannot be separated from the question of the legitimacy of giving tajul muluk a heretical status, in a declaration issued by local mainstream religious figures (ramadhan 2022). religious figures used the fatwa issued by the east java indonesian ulema council to deceive shia tajul muluk; the claim of heretical status was also issued by the nu sampang branch manager and one of the chairpersons of the east java nahdlatul ulema regional board. although the statements issued by the regional administrators contradicted the statements of the central management, the legitimacy given by local mainstream religious leaders encouraged intimidation and persecution of the tajul muluk shia. in addition to the two conflicts outlined above, other conflicts have attracted public attention, such as the religious conflict in aceh; the conflict between muslims and buddhists in tanjung balai as a result of protests by buddhists of chinese descent against the volume of mosque loudspeakers, where the protest led to the actions of the public who vandalized eleven monasteries and two buddhist religious foundations on july 20, 2016; the cutting of the cross tombstone at the public cemetery in the purbayan area of kota gede, yogyakarta; conflicts between religious communities in papua in the form of demands for the demolition of the al-aqsa sentani mosque tower by the fellowship of churches in jayapura regency; and so forth. the significant conflicts presented above all started from minor conflicts, namely between individuals as members of a religion, showing that conflicts between religious communities cannot only be defined as large-scale or long-term conflicts. the examples of conflict with religious nuances shown above ironically cannot be said to describe the conflict between religious communities in indonesia. referring to the index of religious harmony in indonesia in 2021, based on survey data, shows a high level of harmony (72.39/100), but on the other hand, intolerant acts and religious conflicts still occur in indonesia. there are similarities in the factors that cause conflicts between religions in indonesia, namely the tendency to blame or justify one belief against another in religion. the tendency to justify these beliefs encourages an attitude of demeaning and excluding religion or other beliefs that can cause friction between the two religious communities or even conflict. in addition, religious asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202251 belief will be used as a form of power to force the acceptance of religious concepts on other, often minority, people who are not of the same belief. according to armahedi mazhar (garaudy 1993), people who have excessive belief in a sect or religion have the potential to demonstrate the characteristics of absolutism, exclusivism, fanaticism, extremism, and aggressiveness. these traits are manifested in intellectual arrogance, social arrogance, emotional arrogance, exaggerated and transgressive responses to physical responses. conflicts between religions stem from the tendency of religious people to try to justify their beliefs about the religion they believe in. adherents of each religion or sect insist that the religion or belief they profess is the most correct and reasonable. there are still those who do not have a strong understanding of the values of their beliefs. claims that have the potential to create or thicken the boundaries of human interaction create or widen the gap between religious communities, all of which contribute to the creation of different views on people or followers of other religions, which are sometimes followed by forms of coercion. the widespread action taken by members of the islamic defenders front against the usage of christmas elements in numerous shopping center sites in indonesia is one illustration of the assertion made above. attitudes of imposing belief on other parties can be traced from religious doctrines, which contain calls to go to the path of salvation and encourage or invite other parties to participate in that goal. there is nothing wrong with salvation and an invitation to salvation. however, if these attitudes are accompanied by the justification that their belief or religion is the most correct, then this becomes a dangerous mix and actions that trigger conflicts between religious communities will emerge, especially if these frictions are used for specific purposes. the diversity of religions and beliefs in indonesia certainly conflicts with religious nuances. in indonesia, conflicts between religious communities are resolved through non-litigation channels that prioritize deliberation and consensus, while acts classified as criminal acts will be tried as the law applies in indonesia. however, of course, this approach is still not practical, as shown by the protracted conflicts between religious communities in indonesia, such as the poso conflict seen as lasting from 1992 to 2001, but which, until now, it is continuing with the emergence of the east indonesia mujahideen; the shia-sunni conflict that lasted for nine years with the resultant expulsion of the shia sect from their village in east java; or minor conflicts that occurred in aceh and several other areas in indonesia. although these non-litigation steps reflect the values of the indonesian people, which prioritize deliberation and consensus, even so, there are things that must be taken into account, in establishing this approach. first, there are differences in perceptions between parties in conflict concerning the law (both their religious law and national law), especially those relating to conflict resolution; second, the conflict resolution process in its most minor parts, namely the stages of how the settlement is formulated and executed above, still does not reflect respect for human rights, especially freedom of religion, but not forgetting the other rights possessed by humans. religious conflicts in the view of a cosmopolitan society religion in modern human life is transformed into an individual and collective identity (dobratz 2001). however, religion can also develop towards a cosmopolitan orientation, especially since globalization is a destructive variable in religious concepts. these developments can be carried out in a cosmopolitan society through tolerance between one another, while in the era of globalization, it can be done through meetings between countries to create a public space that will protect the cosmopolitan rights of each actor. it must be admitted that there has been a “rigid” relationship between religion, its laws and teachings and its adherents; this relationship tends to be patriarchal and promotes intolerance (adeney-risakotta 2014). for example, all women are required to wear the hijab to enter certain schools, so that the regulation applies to non-muslims. many women feel safer wearing the hijab, but investigations show that the hijab does not prevent women from being harassed or even raped. this is because the hijab is not the only way to prevent asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202252 or prevent someone from being sexually harassed. prevention of conflict must arise collectively with respect and respect for others (sulaiman & raifu 2020), going beyond the adoption of standards of dress. in a cosmopolitan view, intolerance is present as a manifestation from the perspective of religious adherents who make religion their primary identity as human beings (bennett 1986); with this view, there is a tendency to separate or secularize religion in modern development and globalization. this view assumes that the modern state must separate itself from religion, because religion is a personal matter for each person or group that cannot be regulated equally in a modern state. from this ideal view, religion is valued as a separate, distinct and unique entity from modern society, which refers to a collection of personal values and activities. in the context of modernity, it is customary to distinguish religion as a social system and faith as one’s initial response to divinity. in the past, religion gave standard meaning to humans when looking at nature and life. religion answered the problem of death, suffering, and disaster, albeit with deceptive explanation. in the last few centuries, the position of religion has been sidelined by science. what was once answered by religion is now answered by science. religion lost its authority, first in explaining nature and finally in giving life instructions. natural science has replaced religion in understanding the world, and psychology has replaced subjective human experience. conflicts with religious nuances arise due to the failure of the internalization process of religion. for example, the failure of religious education is because islamic religious education concentrates more on cognitive theoretical problems and lacks attention on how to change cognitive knowledge into “values” that need to be internalized in students through various means, including the media, as well as forums. the discussions have always revolved around religious issues that are ritual-formal in nature and aqidah/ theology that seem exclusive. more substantial religious issues are not exposed critically, for example, piety in a social context. as a result, religious messages that are eternal are buried behind exclusive religiosity. the texts are read every day, but their true meaning is neglected. so far, our national education system is believed to be more focused on knowing the religious text, while the understanding of the meanings and the ability to apply the principles from the affective and psychomotor aspects have been neglected. this will lead to internal conflict in students; they know the texts, but their attitudes and behavior are not socially appropriate. they do not reflect the achievement of the value of islamic religious education. cosmopolitanism describes a broad term in which aspects of moral and sociopolitical philosophy are defined in various ways but generally emphasizes the concept that all of humanity can or should even be part of one community (dallmayr 2003; binnie et al. 2009; etinson 2010). this means that cosmopolitanism recognizes that all human beings must be subject to the same moral standards regardless of their identity. the boundaries that distinguish nations, countries, cultures, or socio-societies are morally irrelevant. in this case, there is no known concept of nation, religion, race, community, or culture that is dominant over other cultures however, how this community can be formed and realized is still debated, with a focus on whether secularism is endorsed or not. being one community carries the meaning that the community is homogenous; in this context, they share a common humanity, but humans in particular and social forms are endowed with differences from birth. social interaction and the formation of values or norms, including morals, occur through these differences; cosmopolitanism is present and offers a concept to go beyond social interactions that can be an obstacle to the unification of the community. in the case of inter-religious conflicts, the known obstacle is intolerance (regus 2020). conflicts that are correctly processed to have a good resolution will give birth to a constructive consensus; it could be that conflicts between religious communities can be a bridge to a cosmopolis society. the concept of a strong identity in the perspective of cosmopolitanism is a sign that these community groups still have a long way to go to become a cosmopolitan society. a strong sense of identity is more likely to create or encourage destructive conflict (haynes 2009), as happened in poso and sampang. it should be understood asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202253 that although the use of the notation “identity” is strongly related to the individual, identity can also be used to represent the collective concept of a group, community, or state with various relationships formed in it, both ethnic, religious, and cultural entities. identity is also often used as a marker of the value of a person or group in conflict, so it can be ascertained that there is friction or collision of values with one another, likewise in the concept of religious conflict, which can be explained as the friction of believed identities, values, and religious norms. when explored more deeply, intolerance in religion is rooted in the perspective or understanding of the law or religious teachings that tend to be rigid. the rigidity of these perspectives or views increases tension between religious communities or, in other words, tensions between individuals or groups who have different perspectives or understandings. these tensions eventually widen the gap that exists as a result of differences. this is different from cosmopolitanism, which seeks to unite humanity into one unified community called “world society” (mcmurran 2013). uniting all human beings also means eliminating boundaries between individuals and groups because these boundaries are the inhibiting factors for achieving a single community, a “world society” (mayall 1990). a single community is formed or established based on humanitarian principles. imagine the individual as a circle so that a group formed from individuals consists of small circles united by “one” the same factor, either values, understanding or other factors. in the perspective of cosmopolitanism, the individual circle should have no shape or form but a universal circle formed by human beings in the world (parekh 2003). the resolution of religious conflicts in the eyes of cosmopolitanism is said to prioritize human rights through a democratic process. so, has the resolution of religious conflicts in indonesia reflected the intended solution? the resolution of the conflict in poso has gone in the intended direction, even though the results obtained do not seem to be able to reflect the priority of human rights and democracy. this is shown by the military operation that still had to be carried out after the negotiations for peace between the conflicting parties were carried out in 2001, which is a strong indication that one party was still not satisfied with the results of the negotiations. this is where democracy should play a role, as stated by emanuel kant who proposed that democracy is a bridge to peace. the same thing was shown in settlement of the shia-sunni conflict in sampang, which ended with the expulsion of the shia group from the area. the resolution of this conflict contradicted the protection of human rights and led to a loss of democracy. the democratic process is essential in conflict resolution that prioritizes respect for human rights, especially in diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious societies. accepting the cosmopolitan concept does not mean denying the existence of diversity; although diversity can be a barrier to the achievement of a single community, this diversity can also be a source of change (green 1999; norris & inglehart 2009). diversity and conflict can be factors to move a community, form a new consensus, to build a new set of values and morals to reflect this diversity. one concept that can be used to describe diversity is the american metaphor of a salad bowl (leslie et al. 2020). this metaphor was chosen to describe the different sets of democratic values and multicultural ideologies full of tolerance. unlike the melting pot metaphor, the salad bowl metaphor does not see differences as barriers. this metaphor echoes equality and justice based on the law, which sees that every individual has equal rights and obligations even though they have a cultural background or, in this context, a different religion, sect, or belief. from this perspective, the differences do not exist. the necessary shared perspective is that everyone has equal rights and obligations. conflicts, especially in religious communities, often occur due to the increasing tension between followers (syarif 2019). resolving conflicts means also elaborating on the existing tensions; in the view of cosmopolitanism, unravelling these tensions begins with realizing that, in the end, we are human beings who have equal rights and obligations. itis this that seems impossible to realize, and for this a balance between asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202254 the perspectives must be achieved (zürn & de wilde 2016). the balance in question is a perspective that respects other perspectives about social interaction as a basis and social conflict as a continuation (lincoln 2000). different perspectives on religious law and teachings, leading to conflicts between religious communities, must be united by one binding agent (wibisono, louis, & jetten, 2019). differences in religions exist, it is true. this argument is not formed to reject these differences but is made to form a more flexible approach to the perspectives of other individuals or groups. the binding agent in religion referred to here is the teaching of love and compassion that prioritizes compassion, peace, and mutual respect over the calls for violence and intolerance. the important aspect is the development of the balance between tolerance and intolerance, especially through scholarship on the topic. building a legal culture of conflict resolution between religious people through the arguments made, it is understood that differences and rigidities in the perspectives of adherents of religions, sects and beliefs are a source of conflict between religious communities and a perspective that tends to be more flexible in disentangling the rigidity of these perspectives is needed (davies & thate 2017). moreover, conflicts with religious nuances are becoming more intensive because they tend to deviate from the direction of settlement or even deviate from constructive goals and potential for socialization. indonesia is devoting significant resources investigating these conflicts and mediating differences of opinion, even among officials, thus directing energies away from the development of a nation based on shared social values. this tendency arises because of the superposition of emotions, facts, and different perspectives. conflict resolution with religious nuances often does not produce results because it focuses only on the goal or result rather than the process that is carried out and must be carried out. this is where a legally based conflict resolution process must be given priority. as described in the examples of conflicts between religious communities in indonesia, a single formula cannot be found to resolve the conflict. repressive efforts are no longer relevant in conflicts with religious nuances, especially in the concept of cosmopolitanism, because in their implementation, there is often a neglect of the rights of the conflicting parties (haynes 2020). a restorative conflict resolution approach is considered more relevant because it has an approach that prioritizes the equality of the rights of the conflicting parties, which is in line with the concept of cosmopolitanism which encourages equality of rights (woodhouse & ramsbotham 2005). conflict resolution between religious communities through a restorative justice approach emphasizes conflict resolution efforts by forming a collective agreement with a neutral mediator who does not make decisions or conclusions for the parties but supports the facilitator for the implementation of interparty dialogue with an atmosphere of openness, honesty, and exchange of opinions. in other words, the problem-solving negotiation process is a process in which impartial and neutral outside parties work with the disputing parties to help them reach a consensus that prioritizes the equal rights of the parties to the conflict. conflict resolution is by the principles of restorative justice, where restoration or repair is an alternative way to bridge the perpetrators of the violations, victims and the community (sukardi 2014). resolving conflicts between religious believers can be achieved by building awareness of a sense of brotherhood towards various cultures, religious teachings, and existing sects. by prioritizing this, we can minimize the tension that exists between religious communities (harpviken & røislien 2005). this goes beyond accepting that the law should treat all faiths equally, to a deeper social understanding. however, it is fundamental that processes for resolving conflicts between religious communities need to have a solid juridical basis. legal culture is the key to resolving conflicts between religious communities; according to friedman (1975). for him, legal culture is related to prioritizing individual rights, which in this case can focus on asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202255 human rights. if resolved properly by prioritizing human rights through a democratic process, religious conflicts can become a vital bridge in the realization of a cosmopolitan society. for this reason, a new approach to conflict resolution is needed, especially one that can increase horizontal bonds in society. for black (1976), legal culture is a symbolic aspect of people’s social life, including accommodating definitions of what is good and evil and what is right and wrong, in a similar way to the way that religion regulates what is right and good or wrong. these two opinions can be the basis for developing religious conflict resolution, namely that legal culture can be a meeting point for various perspectives and values held by the community. against which law? namely, on the law that regulates conflict resolution that prioritizes human rights and regulates a democratic settlement, the law does not depart from localization values or norms but, in a modern nuance, prioritizes human and democratic rights. legal culture refers to perspectives, attitudes, to behavior toward legal instruments or rules, which in this case are not only limited to religious laws and teachings but are presented in a world that is easier to imagine by the public that encourages rational thinking and commitment to realizing equality and justice— desired society. the legal culture here is not limited to what develops in the general public but also to law enforcers; in friedman’s theory, what is meant is external and internal legal culture is meant because it is understood that law enforcement in the context of conflict resolution between religious communities is one of the critical agents in unravelling the conflict. developing a legal culture that embraces restorative justice according to this argument is a priority because it is directly related to the perspective that is considered the starting point for the emergence of conflicts between religious communities. the convergence of religious views can be brought together through such a legal culture. it was reaffirmed that a restorative justice approach is flexible, that is, flexible in dealing with different perspectives in religion. this perspective is one that can suppress irrationality, exclusivity, intolerance, discrimination, and focus on the understanding that all human beings have equal rights. the legal culture in question would be able to soften the arrogance of adherents of all religions who start from the point where respect for human rights becomes a shared priority. such a legal culture would become the meeting point of commitment for all elements of religious communities. conclusion one thing that leads to conflict is when people of one religion make assumptions about people of other religions. all over the world, people of different religions have tried to attack each other, kill each other, and burn each other’s houses of worship and other important places. in the last few decades, many people of other religions have said that muslims are radical, intolerant, terrorists, fundamentalists, and have a very biased view of the truth of other religions. equally, christians are often seen as aggressive, ambitious and powerful in a community. religious conflicts in poso, in aceh and in east java have shown the damaging effects of conflict on local communities. everyone can or should even be part of one community in a cosmopolitan society. this sense of being one community contains within it the understanding there will inevitably be differences in social forms and interactions. to overcome the potential for escalating conflicts, and establish a basis for settlement of religious conflicts, a restorative justice approach is proposed. in setting up this approach, human rights must be prioritized in a legal culture that has a solid juridical basis. this means that anyone who escalates a conflict, even if they do not use religious symbols, must be punished firmly and fairly within the law. as a first step, law enforcement, in this case, the police, must respond right away to all religious conflicts by investigating each one quickly, firmly, impartially, and thoroughly; this is essential, so that the problems do not spread and become more complex. second, the people involved should be able to protect themselves, but at the same time not exacerbate the problem. indonesia was built on the idea of bhineka tunggal ika, which says that a country should be made up of people from different races, religions, and ethnic groups. the process asmara and noho cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202256 of restorative justice should reinforce the idea that, under this principle, as citizens, it is our responsibility to look out for each other, control ourselves, and learn to respect and tolerate those different from us. third, the draft law on religious harmony needs to be ratified quickly to be used as a legal framework for regulating relations between very different religious communities and resolving religious conflicts from a legal perspective. there is scope to be optimistic that in the future, there will not only be a society where everyone has the right to follow their religion and worship as they see fit but also a society where everyone respects each other and has a high level of tolerance so that indonesia can remain united and whole. religious harmony is made up of relationships between different religions based on tolerance, mutual understanding, and respect for equality in how they follow their religious teachings and work together for the good of society, nation, and state. a legal culture, including processes of restorative justice, to support this ideal will be essential. acknowledgements we would like to thank universitas swadaya gunung jati for their assistance with this research. references adeney-risakotta, b. 2014, dealing with diversity: religion, globalization, violence, gender and 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https://jurnal.ar-raniry.ac.id/index.php/substantia/article/view/4930 https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016.1207741 cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 13, no. 2 2021 © 2021 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: mansourian, y. 2021. bonsai in the time of covid: the miniature, the social and the solitary. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:2, 12–27. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7588 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) bonsai in the time of covid: the miniature, the social and the solitary yazdan mansourian charles sturt university, wagga wagga, australia corresponding author: yazdan mansourian, charles sturt university, boorooma street, wagga wagga, nsw 2678, australia. ymansourian@csu.edu.au doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7588 article history: received 03/02/2021; revised 13/05/2021; accepted 04/06/2021; published 19/07/2021 abstract the study sought to find out to what extent engagement with serious leisure, in this case bonsai growing, can help people deal with challenging times, such as a global pandemic. in particular, it was concerned with how bonsai enthusiasts use their hobbies to manage uncertainty and stress during the lockdown and how they have shared their lived experiences via social media. the researcher employed a user-generated content analysis approach to address the research questions and explored a collection of comments from a sample of the most visited bonsai videos posted on youtube during the first nine months of the covid-19 pandemic. the serious leisure perspective has been used as a theoretical framework to conceptualise the data based on the qualities that differentiate serious leisure from casual leisure. the findings showed that engagement in this hobby helps bonsai enthusiasts to develop social connectedness and cope with their stress caused by the pandemic. keywords serious leisure; wellbeing; social engagement; bonsai growing; covid-19 pandemic declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 12 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7588 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7588 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:ymansourian@csu.edu.au http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i2.7588 the glory of gardening: hands in the dirt, head in the sun, heart with nature. to nurture a garden is to feed not just the body, but the soul. alfred austin introduction positive impacts of leisure engagement on people’s physical, mental and emotional wellbeing have been widely reported in the leisure studies literature (e.g. kuykendall et al. 2015; mansfield et al. 2020; tian et al. 2020). among various kinds of leisure involvements, serious leisure has a unique position because of its durable personal and social benefits. robert stebbins coined this term in 1982 to differentiate it from unserious or casual leisure. according to his definition, serious leisure includes amateurism, hobbyist pursuits, and career volunteering. the notion of seriousness in this term comes from a combination of six qualities: perseverance and commitment, the potentiality to turn into a career, significant personal effort based on specific knowledge, durable personal and social benefits, unique ethos within a social world and developing new identities associated with the chosen activity (stebbins, 1982). as figure 1 below shows, serious leisure includes three main categories including amateurism, volunteering and hobbies. each category has its sub-categories. for example, hobbyists might engage in various activities such as collecting (e.g. coin collecting, antiquing, phillumeny), making and tinkering (e.g. tapestry, quilling, origami), activity participation (e.g. fundraising, dancing, community activism), sports and games (e.g. squash, hiking, fishing) or liberal arts pursuits (e.g. art history, astronomy, pub quiz). engagement in any of these activities need long term commitment and acquiring new knowledge or skills. figure 1. the serious leisure perspective developed by hartel (2013) based on the work of robert a. stebbins. retrieved from the serious leisure perspective website: www. seriousleisure.net mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 13 http://www.seriousleisure.net http://www.seriousleisure.net during the past four decades, research shows that engagement in serious leisure brings several benefits for the participants, such as self-actualisation and social engagement (siegenthaler and o’dell 2003; gould et al. 2011; kim et al. 2016; mansourian 2021). however, it is not always easy and straightforward, and numerous contextual elements can potentially hinder leisure engagement. for example, since the beginning of the covid-19 outbreak in march 2020, many group activities have faced limitations. since then, experts in leisure studies have discussed several links between the leisure sector and the pandemic (anderson 2020; de miranda 2020; ling 2020; son et al. 2020; van leeuwen et al. 2020; giles and oncescu 2020; young 2020, kaushal and srivastava 2021). this paper explores bonsai growing, as an example of serious leisure, during the covid-19 outbreak to find out to what extent engagement with a hobby can help people deal with challenging times. the paper adopted the serious leisure perspective as its theoretical framework to conceptualise the findings. bonsai growing as a popular hobby bonsai is a japanese term meaning the art and practice of growing trees in pots or small containers to resonate natural scenery in miniature size (stevens, curl and wilson 2015). bonsai is a japanese version of the original chinese art called “penjing” or “penzai” (zhao 2012). the word “bonsai” includes two parts. “bon” means a shallow container such as a pot or tray, and “sai” means planting. therefore, in a simple definition, “bonsai” is a tree planted in a shallow container. however, not every potted plant is a bonsai! bonsai combines sophisticated horticultural techniques, traditional artistic skills and philosophical principles to create, shape and preserve a wide range of trees to represent an ideal form of nature with aesthetic features (warren 2014). while some tropical trees can be grown indoors, most popular bonsai trees are grown outdoors. they require judicious watering, trimming, feeding, and root pruning (cochrane 2006). bonsai growing requires special skills beyond gardening. from around the ninth century, it had become a “chic” horticultural hobby by the edo period (1603–1868) in japan. this hobby was introduced to the west later and received more attention from western societies by the latter half of the 1930s (suga 2019). nowadays, bonsai is a popular hobby worldwide because it has various aspects ranging from gardening to meditation and mindfulness. it embraces creativity, leisure, and art within one activity, positively impacting physical and mental health and well-being (hermann and edwards 2021). in general, bonsai is a multifaceted pastime and provides people with a rich fascination and source of meaning in life. warren (2014 p. 9) highlights this characteristic of bonsai growing and writes: from a western perspective, bonsai falls between many cracks. it is neither purely art, nor horticulture; neither craft nor science. bonsai requires an open mind and the adaptation of all these aspects in order to create beauty and meaning. this practice is a form of serious leisure because it requires perseverance and commitment and can turn into a career. it also needs significant personal effort and potentially can produce durable personal and social benefits for the participants (stebbins 1982). as a hobby, bonsai also creates valuable opportunities to boost social engagement. that is why bonsai enthusiasts have local, regional and national communities and share their skills and experiences with like-minded people via various channels such as social media, exhibitions and workshops. during the covid-19 time, like everyone else, bonsai communities had to cancel their public events. however, they used virtual platforms, such as youtube, to stay in touch and keep sharing information. youtube is popular because it is a multimedia platform and provides tutorial videos and people can learn new skills by watching videos. mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 14 literature review the inevitable impacts of the covid-19 on the leisure sector have already appeared in the leisure studies discourse (e.g. anderson 2020; young 2020). ling (2020) reports that leisure sports became one of the most important lifestyles of ordinary people during the pandemic, and home leisure sports products were selling well. people paid more attention to leisure sports, and it reminded the wider society of the fitness value, entertainment value, and social interaction value in people’s lives. van leeuwen et al. (2020) found out that as people spent more leisure time at home during the lockdown period, the psychological impact was visible, such as stress, anxiety, and confusion. the most significant pressure was felt by people personally affected by the virus or with family members who needed hospitalisation due to the disease. at the same time, lockdown periods increased social media-related leisure activities such as gaming. moreover, since many leisure facilities were closed, self-organised outdoor leisure activities like running and cycling became more popular. anderson (2020) observed people’s leisure behaviours during the first six months of the pandemic across the united states. he concluded that leisure needs can be mapped onto four domains of physical, cognitive, social, and emotional aspects, with spirituality included as an aspect of wellbeing. in terms of the physical element, people worked more in their gardens and enjoyed some leisure actions done individually or with small groups like running, cycling and birdwatching. also, some people did more house cleaning or home improvement projects. in terms of the cognitive dimension, people realised they needed much more than just watching the media news to occupy their minds. therefore, they spent more time on casual leisure at home, such as reading, crossword puzzles, learning new languages, attending online courses, and sharing food recipes. in particular, the individuals who did not have other home-based commitments, such as those who were not required to home-school their children, had more free time for their leisure activities. regarding the social aspects, the more time people spent at home isolated from family and friends, the more they realised how important it was to maintain social connections. they connected through phone, social media, and other communications platforms. some discovered new forms of communications. for example, neighbours kept a physical distance while talking over the fence or across the street. from the emotional point of view, anxiety, uncertainty and depression increased. young (2020) observed changes and challenges of leisure activities during the outbreak in south africa. she reports the pandemic forced almost everyone to revisit how they live, work and play. people changed and adapted their leisure pursuits to fit the situation and used technology more frequently to stay in touch and pursue leisure activities. people spent much more time at home than ever before. simultaneously, the lack of physical activity affected their physical and mental wellbeing. leisure and entertainment activities that did not require social contact showed success (van leeuwen et al. 2020). though it is still too early to evaluate the long-term impacts of the covid-19 outbreak on people’s leisure activities, it is evident that the patterns of many leisure activities have drastically changed. the restrictions limited most group leisure activities and pushed many people toward more indoor and personal hobbies such as bonsai growing. bonsai is a trendy hobby globally. the volume of information about this hobby is enormous and exists in multiple formats (e.g. books, magazines, handbooks, websites, tutorial videos, and podcasts). nonetheless, the research on bonsai, as a form of serious leisure, is still limited. however, we do not know whether this is the case only in the english language literature, or whether it is limited generally. however, as bonsai is a type of serious leisure, the existing knowledge about similar activities is relevant. furthermore, some evidence-based articles support the benefits of bonsai from other perspectives. for example, ochiai et al. (2017) reported that visual stimulation with bonsai trees in a group of male patients with spinal cord injury reduced their pain and increased their sense of comfort, and relaxation. their mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 15 findings support the hypothesis that engagement in bonsai growing can potentially improve health and reduce mental stress. similarly, park and mattson (2009) stated that viewing plants during the recovery period positively impacted surgical patients’ health outcomes. the patients in rooms with plants had more positive physiologic responses, evidenced by lower blood pressure and lower pain and anxiety ratings. their findings confirmed the therapeutic value of plants as a non-invasive and inexpensive complementary treatment. using bonsai as a kind of mindfulness practice has also appeared in the literature (e.g. toll and orabone 2016). furthermore, some bonsai enthusiasts shared their experiences about how bonsai growing helped them to be successful in other aspects of life. for example, baum (2018, p. 256) reports: it is not easy to raise and care for a bonsai plant, just as it is not easy to start, grow, and maintain a medical practice. if we can successfully nurture a bonsai plant-and it is not easythen we can also manage to care for and nurture a medical practice. the endeavours are similar in many ways. (p. 256) nevertheless, the literature review revealed there is little research about bonsai as a hobby. however, regarding its popularity, there is a need for some research about bonsai hobbyists’ lived experiences to find out more about their motivations, stories, and achievements. research questions the current study addresses the following research questions: • rq1: to what extent does engagement with serious leisure activities (in this case, bonsai growing) help people deal with the covid-19 pandemic? • rq2: how do serious leisure participants (in this case, bonsai growers) use their hobby as a coping strategy to deal with uncertainty and stress during the covid-19 pandemic? • rq3: how do serious leisure participants (in this case, bonsai growers) typically share their lived experiences of the covid-19 pandemic via social media (in this case, youtube)? research method this study is based on a sample of user-generated content posted by bonsai enthusiasts in response to the most visited bonsai youtube videos posted during the first nine months of the covid-19 pandemic (between march and december 2020). the user-generated content is a popular data collection tool in different research areas such as tourism, hospitality and marketing (lu and stepchenkova 2015; narangajavana kaosiri et al. 2019; huete-alcocer 2017; arora and lata 2020). it is also known as usercreated content or electronic word of mouth and includes all forms of feedback and comments created by social media users in reaction to the online materials in these platforms. therefore, users’ comments on facebook, instagram or youtube are examples of this kind of data. scholars in a range of research areas employ user-generated content as a convenient and robust data collection tool to explore an echo of people’s lived experiences, everyday practices, and social engagement in specific contexts. however, like any other tools, it has its strengths and weaknesses. it is a reliable tool to collect a massive volume of authentic data as users post their feedback freely. as they can remain anonymous, their comments usually represent their real feeling and perception. moreover, other users can use this information for various purposes. for example, it is a supporting information source for tourists to plan their travel and make travelling decisions. this user-generated content is also a source of data for instant and reliable information (narangajavana kaosiri et al. 2019). mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 16 nonetheless, while most scholars confirm the trustworthiness of user-generated content as a credible data collection tool, some are still sceptical about its credibility. they believe it relies on several contextual factors, such as sender-receiver relationship, channel variety and presentation of content, opportunities for information solicitation, message retention capabilities, and content provider motivation. therefore, we need to be more cautious when using this kind of evidence (tham et al. 2013; zeng and gerritsen 2014). another challenge is creating reliable links with everyday practices, lived experience, and social engagement. by acknowledging these limitations, the current study avoids any over claiming in the findings. to identify the most visited videos in this context, the researcher searched youtube with a combination of keywords such as “bonsai and lockdown”, “bonsai and covid”, “bonsai growing and pandemic” and “indoor bonsai”. after removing non-english results, which were not many, he selected a sample of ten most visited and most commented videos. the researcher focused on the top ten sites in each search because the number of visits shows the videos’ popularity, and there were more comments for analysis. the total number of comments in the final sample was 1687 comments posted under the most visited videos. in the next stage, he mapped the data onto serious leisure perspective to determine the extent to which these theoretical frameworks can help us identify concepts in the dataset. table 1 provides some details about the number of views, comments, likes and dislikes reaction to the selected videos. as the table shows, 459k viewers visited the most popular video, and the least popular video in the sample received 10k visits, which is still considerable. the paper does not provide the titles and links of the selected videos to keep the commenters’ identity confidential, a requirement of ethical research. the collected data has been analysed through a content analysis method, which is an embedded part of data collection and analysis in studies using user-generated content. some studies employ a quantitative approach to measure various variables or test their hypotheses (e.g. christodoulides et al. 2012). in contrast, some adopt a qualitative approach to gain a deep understanding of a little understood issue (e.g. chutikulrungsee 2020). further, some studies use both quantitative and qualitative data to depict a more comprehensive picture of the topic under investigation (e.g. chatterjee 2019). the researcher analysed the 1687 comments. single-word comments, such as excellent, awesome, brilliant were removed from the sample, as were, emojis and irrelevant reactions, so that the investigation was based on meaningful comments with enough text to analyse, ranging from phrases and clauses to complete sentences and even paragraphs . a descriptive level of quantitative analysis identified the range of views, likes and comments, as shown in table 1. table 1. the number of views, likes, dislikes and comments on the selected youtube videos min. max. sum number of views 10k 193k 459k number of likes 0.3k 4.7k 14k number of dislikes 12 58 0.2k number of comments 18 412 1687 findings the commenters were from everywhere around the world, although mainly from countries in north america and europe. they were mostly from countries where english is widely spoken as the first or second language, probably because the study’s videos were limited to english. some of them knew each other due to participation in bonsai-related events or clubs’ membership as they referred to their shared experiences. mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 17 however, the majority of the commenters appeared to be total strangers to one another, having a shared interest of bonsai connected them as a virtual community. they had a chance to discuss their hobbies via the youtube platform, enhancing social engagement via this virtual space. we’ve been in lockdown with our choices good and bad …, i’m feeling better now than i was 3-4 months ago. a lot of that started with identifying that new routine, that new reason to put on pants in the morning and get moving. bonsai has helped in this no doubt but has been one of the rebuilding blocks in the overall puzzle here. don’t give up guys and gals. if it wasn’t for the lockdown, i may not have started learning bonsai. i just got the stuff for doing some cuttings (bring on the lockdown) i have around 6 weeks to pass! most of the comments show that bonsai enthusiasts have found this hobby delightful, calming, joyful, fulfilling, rewarding, stress-relieving, and immersive. the findings show engagement in this hobby develops a form of social identity for people. for me, i think there are three main components: the hobby, including things like technique, tools, maintenance, and so on. the artistic creativity and appreciation of natural aesthetics and growing things. and lastly, feeling connected with nature on an individual level, being dependent on it, and being dependent on you – not so much forcing it through self-indulgence as realising and accepting it, which is peaceful. others focus on “process and practice” of bonsai growing and less about the “product”. apart from the end result, the process is also an interesting one, the journey is never short and to get a good tree, at least 5-10 years are required if you are training them young. each season, you see your trees develop and evolve in each season, there are the joys and struggles (i.e. waiting for your tree to leaf out or the slight fear that your tree may not survive the winter somehow) and that is part of the process which makes it interesting. the key findings are presented in three parts. the first part provides examples of comments that show bonsai enthusiasts’ motivations to spend time on this hobby. the second part offers what confirms bonsai growing is a form of serious leisure. the third part includes various reactions of the bonsai enthusiasts to the pandemic, reflected in their comments. motivations of bonsai growers a qualitative content analysis of the comments shows people have various motivations for spending time on this hobby ranging from pure pleasure and relaxation to miniaturising the trees and recreating a natural image. however, exploring the comments show that since the beginning of the lockdown there has been a visible emphasis how bonsai helps the participants to exercise mindfulness and creativity. some comments and provided specific details about the viewer’s motivation. the excerpts below are just a few examples of the extensive number in the data: love of trees, seeing things grow, stealing of time (making trees look like they have been growing for hundreds of years), for beauty and peace, relationship (the tree needs us and gives back), the artwork, pure enjoyment, also it helps me with growing normal plants. the awe and wonder of nature captured in a single tree, to contemplate the life of that tree and how you participate in sharing life with a living gift of our world amazes me. mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 18 in a world which has become increasingly frantic and demanding instant gratification bonsai offer the exact opposite. they require patience, thoughtfulness, creativity and learning always more learning. some comments indicate that bonsai growers see bonsai as a representation of nature in their house and they enjoy this connection with nature through engagement in this hobby: i see bonsai as a representation of nature and when you have a bonsai tree, you are trying to recreate a natural image in nature whether it is a strong mighty old tree or a persistent tree struggling to survive, it makes the creator feel more in tune with nature as you can create environments that seem so natural and you can actually feel like that you are in that zone but yet you are still in a synthetic environment. this is the beauty of it that allows us to connect with the natural world without having to be there physically. motivations for involvement in leisure activities are diverse and the social benefits derived vary (shupe and gagné, 2016). this study similarly confirms that we need to study motivations considering the contextual and fluid nature of factors that encourage people to be involved in leisure activities. bonsai growing as a form of serious leisure the researcher mapped the data against the serious leisure perspective to identify the extent to which the sample of comments matches this conceptual framework. he found extensive evidence to match the six criteria of serious leisure including perseverance and commitment, the potentiality to turn into a career, significant personal effort, durable personal and social benefits and unique ethos within a social world, and personal and social identity (stebbins, 1982). the compatibility between the collected data and the conceptual framework confirms that bonsai growing is a form of serious leisure, bringing with it, therefore, the outcomes associated with serious leisure. the following sections provide more details with examples of the comments and how these characteristics are significant in a period of lockdown. perseverance and commitment success in the bonsai hobby needs patience and commitment. bonsai trees can live for hundreds of years and can be lifelong companions or even a legacy for the next generations. bonsai trees grow slowly, and as a result of that, a successful bonsai grower needs to be very persistent and patient. it is a long-term goal and requires years of dedication. some comments explicitly declare that bonsai is an excellent chance to learn how to be more patient, something that everyone needs to learn during a lockdown. bonsai is the best hobby that can make you really happy, i love my olive trees, and i feel well when i look at them, i have lost tons of trees, but i don’t give up ... after all these years i gained patience, and i appreciate the results. i grow bonsai for more than 30 years …. i buy a book about bonsai and starting to grow it. creativity is one of the main points. to do something from seed or from seedling to grow a big tree is fascinat[ing]. i try to do bonsai from a little seedling or from a seed. patience is very important. this helps me in my business, bonsai teaches me that things can go better, and this needs time, perseverance, and view in the future. i retired last year and moved to ... in our new garage i discovered some empty bonsai pots, which intrigued me and led me to research bonsai. that is how i found your videos which were very helpful in not only being instructive and inspiring but helped me through the stress of the pandemic. … i was even planning to travel to your nursery to get some first-hand advice in a workshop, but due to covid have had to postpone those plans. mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 19 potentiality to turn into a career there is a global market for bonsai, and anyone who enjoys this hobby can continue her/his passion as a fulltime career. most professional bonsai growers usually began their career as a hobby first, and after a while, they turn it into a career. during the pandemic, when many people lost their job and looked for a career shift, bonsai growing as a job was an option for some bonsai enthusiasts. it’s an amalgam of horticulture and art! it is fascinating and gives me immense pleasure! i am 23, and i ask myself where do you see yourself in next 15-20 years, in your late 40s? the answer always is having a garden with lots of bonsai trees, i want these as a part of my family. short answer absolutely. i started by gathering the most interesting saplings from around the yard in april when my job went remote. after my job was eliminated in november, i’m planning to get more creative and do more training now that my plants are established. significant personal effort bonsai growing is not an easy task. it requires persistence and personal effort. as a result of all the steps to create a bonsai tree, bonsai’s ornamental value is usually more than ordinary potted plants. during the lockdown, when people had to stay home and engage in fewer activities, spending time on bonsai trees helped them stay active, because these tiny trees need constant attention, pruning, trimming, watering, potting, repotting and so on. moreover, while some hobbies are often temporary activities, bonsai growing imposed a different timeframe. it requires a very long-term commitment, which is more like a discipline, a routine, or a responsibility to some other living entity, like pet ownership. what i like about bonsai is that when you look at the plant, you can see how much effort and thought went into making it. at the same time, you know that you don’t see all of it, because a lot of perfectly formed branches may have been cut off just to make the tree better. all my trees are quite young and not far off on that journey, however, it is always nice to see bits that you have put effort into making and shaping. my living room is like a greenhouse. sorry, no money for heating up to 25 c and better for my health. so, my delicate bonsais are hold like pets they get outdoor sunshine and when there is no freezing, they enjoy also night trips outside. personally, i cope well with covid-19 lockdown by having built a largely self-sufficient life, both externally and internally, physically, mentally and spiritually. i think you cope very well with life not only because of your genetic makeup but also because of your largely self-sufficient life. it is not easy but is worth it. durable personal and social benefits the findings confirm that bonsai growers enjoy various personal and social benefits from this hobby. for example, it connects people to nature. residents of large cities who do not have easy access to nature need bonsai to bring a green element to their home. taking care of a bonsai tree is a good practice of caregiving and can potentially boost subject wellbeing. people who do not have enough space for a garden can enjoy having a bonsai tree in a small apartment and at the same time enjoy the benefits of connecting with nature through these tiny trees. discovering bonsai over the past year has been such a fantastic milestone in my life. i’ve been fortunate enough that staying at home (due to covid) and finding this amazing new art happened at the same time. mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 20 it’s an expression of creativity, you are growing a sculpture, a living, breathing sculpture and you have to learn to work with it, not against. you have to learn a lot about nature, seasons, the individual needs of the plants. it connects you with nature in a way that one season plants can’t. … it fascinates me to have plants which can live easily twice my age. they grow with you. i have a little oak, and the seed took from the gravestone of my grandfather. … this oak could see the grandkids of my niece if we don’t kill it by mistake. they not only enjoy their trees but also enjoy appreciating the plants of others. sharing the results of their effort can be a source of inspiration for members of the community. inspiring! love your work and am so appreciative of your continued sharing of such in-depth knowledge for this craft. i’m totally flashed every time i see what you do to such nursery material. amazing and inspiring! truly amazing what you can do. when family and friends see my bonsai garden i am always asked if i sell my trees, i always say no. it’s an escape for me that is priceless. seeing my little trees waking up after a cold winter and pines developing candles, the feeding, the watering, repotting, absolutely a beautiful place full of excitement. the unique ethos within a social world bonsai is a combination of horticulture, philosophy and art. therefore, it is like a ‘living art’, and the product is an ‘artistic statement’. successful bonsai growers are also proud of their trees and want to show the results of their efforts to others. that is why there are several bonsai exhibitions around the world each year. most of these exhibitions went online during the pandemic, and people share their stories from home. i see bonsai as a metaphor of life. when i see a bonsai tree, i see the twisted trunks, dead branch, or trimmed branches as the journey through the life of the tree. our lives also have twists, turns, deaths. i see an old bonsai tree as a symbol of strength, hardship, beauty, and survival. bonsai to me is receiving the care that nature gives us, and i try to give back that same nurturing that nature provides us in a way it’s like having a child that you care for and watch it grow strong and healthy alongside me! lol but the older i get, the more broken i become but, the older the trees get, the stronger they become!! it’s so exciting in spring to see the new growth coming and to watch this living part of the world expand and thrive. the journey and the end result combined allows the creator to experience something that is truly different to anything else and that is what makes it so unique as not only does it allow us to express ourselves through this piece of work, it also reflects what nature has provided for us and combining those two elements creates an environment which is truly unique and it allows both the creator and the view to relate and zone into and experience it for all its glory. personal and social identity there is a strong link between identity development and leisure engagement. people develop and affirm their personal and social identities in various ways, including selecting and participating in leisure activities. on the other hand, there is a social consensus regarding the identity images connected with a leisure activity (haggard & williams 1992; liu et al. 2021). any long-term association with a special hobby or volunteer activity that requires learning specific skills and new knowledge has an inevitable impact on the participant’s identity. in the context of this study, the findings reveal that engagement in bonsai growing needs patience mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 21 and passion at the same time, and a combination of both contribute to developing a form of a new identity for the bonsai growers. as i get ‘in the zone’ tending to my trees daily i find myself becoming more aware of the little things, more mindful in the rest of my life, but it is also my happy place and provides a sense of grounding that has been missing from my life. for me, bonsai is so important because it’s a company in the long journey of life. not just styling trees, it’s taking care of them every day, trying to raise them at the best i can. in the same way i could do with a pet or, why not, a son; i suffer if they die, i am happy if i see them healthy or aesthetically improved. trees are silent old friends, always there for helping to relax and spending good time with, to love and admire. maybe for someone it could be stupid, but i don’t hide that practicing bonsai helped me in a hard and long period of my life. i watched this video a couple of times because like most people i’ve been struggling with covid. in this dark hell we’re all currently in, one of the bright spots, at least for me has been bonsai. it’s affected me so much that there is a difference in me even my wife notices and i’ve been trying to figure out what this is. to make sense of it because it’s actually one of the few good traits i’ve been showing during this period. bonsai benefits during the pandemic the findings showed bonsai clubs reacted to the pandemic in very similar ways. most of them moved their workshops and exhibitions to the digital platform and uploaded their videos to various social media such as youtube. the findings also revealed most of the viewers, who left comments, found the videos useful. many comments confirm the viewers adopted bonsai as a coping strategy to deal with the stress caused by the pandemic: our club had to cancel our 2-3 may 2020 exhibition due to the lockdowns caused by covid-19. as a club, we have come up with a way for our members to show their trees and give a little talk about their bonsai on display. they will share a bit of history and general information about their trees. this is part 8 of hopefully many videos to come, and we hope our members plan to share videos of their trees. the videos are so valuable to calm and inspire during this madness. you are an essential service, in my opinion. bonsai growing can be like a coping strategy for bonsai enthusiasts. the findings show engaging with this hobby helped them to find new sources of purpose and passion. your bonsai videos helping me to calm down and getting over the day, but this conversation in particular helped me to get a little bit more focused and feeling a little bit better. i would really love to hear more from you like this. the best thing i can think of for me is regardless of your desired end result or level of experience, bonsai gives us all some form of purpose. we live in this era of chaotic nothingness. we’re all been forced more or less to turn inwards and close off the outside world, stop interacting with friends. how can most people find the purpose to keep moving if you haven’t needed to wear pants in 6 months? sometimes, you just need a spark to get out of bed. bonsai, for me, is one of those sparks. i see that it helps the mind to slow down and observe what is right in front of it, right now. it also helps give a visceral experience of the passage of time. there’s some zen and taoism in there. mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 22 undoubtedly, the covid-19 outbreak imposed immense adversity on the personal, social and economic aspect of life across the world. nevertheless, some bonsai enthusiasts seized this opportunity of having more free time at home to continue bonsai growing during the lockdown. i started making trees again for the first time in ten years at the start of covid. i’m a potter by trade and sometimes it’s difficult to work precisely and creatively when i have anxiety about the political and global climate. just going out and watering and observing my small collection of trees each morning has been a huge boon for me. the findings also demonstrate bonsai enthusiasts used this hobby to manage their stress during a stressful time like the covid-19 outbreak. many comments in the collected data confirm people found this hobby very useful to reduce the level of their stress during this challenging time. bonsai has definitely helped me deal with stress and other demons, not just through lock down but with life in general. working on my trees and just watching them is my way of meditation during these stressful times. as i am sure, you are aware we have double the stress here with covid and the recent election, although one of the stressors may slowly be resolving itself. but yes, getting away from it all and losing myself in my trees is such a relief. bonsai helps me deal with stress but also depression and anxiety. it’s a powerful passion that can really keep you calm, make you appreciate nature and allow you to express some creativity. according to the comments, some people joined bonsai clubs because of their friends’ recommendations. great video! i personally became interested after seeing mr. miyagi shaping bonsai in the karate kid movies when i was a kid myself. i forgot about it for more than 30 years until friends suggested to join a bonsai workshop together. i got hooked again since i discovered for me it’s the perfect way to express creativity and to create a never-ending piece of art. my interest in bonsai started with a gift from a friend who could no longer care for a trident maple. bonsai is horticulture, creativity, and discipline combined and refined into living art. the findings revealed that bonsai enthusiasts look at bonsai growing either as a process of engagement with a hobby or as a product of a hobby. those how to enjoy the process and are not concerned about the product want the practice more. primarily, in the course of lockdown they have found it very enjoyable: i feel the most important aspect is immersing yourself in the art and nurturing rather than just having a masterpiece. i felt the need to connect again with bonsai during the lockdown when you couldn’t go and walk through vast landscapes but could visualise this by looking and losing yourself in the miniature. i had a eureka moment and realised what i needed was a hobby that parallels life. nurture, impermanence, success, failure, focus, attention, patience, creativity and everything in between. nothing is stagnant and permanent. bonsai is a great example of that. some of the commenters were excited and felt fortunate that they can learn this hobby and can communicate with like-minded people via this platform because of the internet: i got (back) into bonsai as a way to reconnect with my dad 5 years after he passed. he taught me as he learned when i was young. still a beginner and less than a year studying and practicing again (after 20 years without) i am excited and so fortunate that internet exists for us to learn this exotic and growing rapidly in popularity at form. mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 23 discussion based on the findings, the results show engagement with serious leisure activities in this case, growing bonsai has helped people deal with the covid-19 pandemic. the remarkable capacity of serious leisure to link people in the crisis time is one of the key themes identified in this study. people from different parts of the world created a “virtual hub” around bonsai. they had a shared interest to talk about and communicate with each other. without this hobby, it was almost impossible to gather this group of people and encourage them to speak to one another and share their experience and knowledge. the findings also indicate benefits of bonsai are not limited just to the bonsai enthusiasts who grow them. a wide range of people who are somehow related to this hobby also enjoy the process and products. for example, bonsai supporters who are not directly involved in producing the trees enjoy learning about this hobby’s history and observing these amazing creatures. the findings revealed that serious leisure participants, in this case bonsai growers, actively used their hobby as a coping strategy to deal with uncertainty and stress during the outbreak. the findings also address the third research question of how serious leisure participants typically share their lived experiences of the pandemic via social media. they usually form communities of interests and share their knowledge and lived experiences. this is one of the outcomes of serious leisure that can create a community of interests and provide people with durable personal and social rewards. there is a meaningful connection between social engagement created through serious leisure engagement, and the overall wellbeing of the leisure participants. social links influence health in part through health behaviour, and impact health habits, at various life stages (umberson and karas montez 2010; umberson, et al. 2010), and serious leisure provides a context for creating and boosting these social links. moreover, comparing this finding with the leisure studies literature shows that people involved in other leisure activities had a similar experience. for instance, young (2020) observed that people shared fitness tips over social media during the pandemic, using fitness apps, or participating in online fitness classes. this study also showed how a solitary pursuit helped people confront the solitude of lockdown; and how that engagement with a miniature world acted as a surrogate for the real world that people could not engage in under lockdown. notably, this form of engagement seemed more important for vulnerable people like the elderly. for instance, son et al. (2020) report staying healthy during the pandemic is significant for older adults due to their susceptibility to the disease. current literature about ageing frequently revealed that social isolation and loneliness are among the main challenges, impacting social and emotional wellbeing and physical health of the elderly (brooke and jackson, 2020). hebblethwaite, et al. (2020) report that older adults’ social isolation has been a critical public health issue before the pandemic. the current crisis has deteriorated the situation. although the study did not set out to consider the age of participants, it is clear from the comments that many have been engaged in bonsai growing for years or even decades, and therefore are probably older adults. the findings of this study confirm the value of shared leisure experiences and the importance of this particular hobby in creating significant opportunities for social connectedness. conclusion the paper concludes that engagement with bonsai growing as a form of serious leisure can help people deal with challenging times like the recent pandemic and lockdown. the findings also revealed that bonsai growers typically share their lived experiences via social media (in this case, youtube) and learn from each other. the six quality of serious leisure play more significant roles during this challenging time: they provide the hobbyist with durable benefits when they need it more than ever; they help them stay more active mansourian cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 2 2021 24 when it was not possible to leave home; and to stay connected with other like-minded people when it was impossible to meet them in person. nevertheless, this paper’s findings are based on a limited dataset from the social media platform, and the findings cannot be generalised. we need further qualitative studies to understand the social world in bonsai growing and some quantitative measures in broader scales would be useful in validating some initial findings. nonetheless, the results based on this relatively small dataset can inform future studies to investigate bonsai growers’ activities from different perspectives. accordingly, the paper calls for further research in this context. qualitative studies with rigorous methods such as ethnography or phenomenology will help to understand bonsai growers’ motivations and lived experiences, shedding further light on the ways in which this form of serious leisure may minimise the effects of externally imposed stressors. acknowledgements the author would like to express his appreciation to the editor and reviewers for their insightful and constructive comments. references anderson, s. 2020, ‘covid-19 and leisure in the united states’, world leisure journal, vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 352-356. https://doi.org/10.1080/16078055.2020.1825259 arora, n. & lata, s. 2020, ‘youtube channels influence on destination visit intentions: an empirical analysis on the base of information adoption model’, journal of indian business research, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 23-42. https://doi. org/10.1108/jibr-09-2019-0269 baum, n. 2018, ‘lessons i learned from a bonsai plant about practice management’, journal of medical practice management, vol. 33, no. 4, pp. 256-258. brooke, j. & jackson, d. 2020, ‘older people and covid-19: isolation, risk and ageism’, journal of clinical nursing, vol. 29, no. 13-14, pp. 2044-2046. https://doi.org/10.1111/jocn.15274 chatterjee, s. 2019, ‘explaining customer ratings and recommendations by combining qualitative and quantitative user generated contents’, decision support systems, vol. 119, pp. 14-22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2019.02.008 christodoulides, g., jevons, c. & bonhomme, j. 2012, ‘memo to marketers: quantitative evidence for change: how user-generated content really affects brands’, journal of advertising research, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 53–64. https://doi. org/10.2501/jar-52-1-053-064 chutikulrungsee, t. 2020, a phenomenological study of other-generated disclosure in online social networks, phd thesis, charles sturt university, wagga wagga, nsw. cochrane, c. m. 2006, ‘bonsai’, in taylor, p. 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https://doi.org/10.1080/16078055.2020.1825252 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tmp.2014.01.001 cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 13, no. 1 2021 © 2021 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: basir, s., and prajawati, m. i. 2021. moral responsibility and wholeheartedness: a source of cohesion in javanese society. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:1, 15–27. https:// doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7617 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper moral responsibility and wholeheartedness: a source of cohesion in javanese society basir s universitas indonesia, jakarta, indonesia, salemba raya street no. 4, jakarta, 10430, indonesia maretha ika prajawati universitas islam negeri maulana malik ibrahim malang, gajayana street no. 50, malang, east java, 65144, indonesia corresponding author: basir s, universitas indonesia, salemba raya street no. 4, jakarta 10430, indonesia, basir@ui.ac.id doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7617 article history: received 07/03/2021; revised 11/04/2021; accepted 06/05/2021; published 25/05/2021 abstract in social life, humans cannot be separated from social interactions with others. this is based on the fact that humans are social creatures, which in their lives cannot live alone but need help from others. this makes people need help and assistance in solving problems in their lives. in javanese culture, collaboration that is carried out collectively is known as soyo. soyo is carried out as an effort to be able to lighten work and is evidence of harmonious life in a community. this study examines the soyo phenomenon from a social and cultural perspective. the findings show that social learning is important in the continuation of the soyo tradition and that moral responsibility and wholeheartedness are essential features of engagement in the practice. keywords moral responsibility; wholeheartedness; soyo; social capital; social learning declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the authors would like to thank universitas indonesia for funding this research through puti grant with contract number nkb-2085/ un2.rst/hkp.05.00/2020. 15 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7617 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7617 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:basir@ui.ac.id https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i1.7617 introducing soyo in a country that has a pluralistic society like indonesia, it is important to build and increase the value of solidarity and a culture of helping each other. the indonesian state works from a firm base because the behaviour of mutual cooperation existed long before this country was established. mutual solidarity and helping each other are born from the collective behaviour of a society that arises from the cultural habits and customs of the archipelago. these values are then transformed into a spirit and characteristic for the people of indonesia (hodriani et al. 2018). however, the incidence of various conflicts between ethnic groups, religions of community groups, even between government elites are evidence of the weakness of social solidarity which affects the behaviour of community solidarity. humans are social creatures, who cannot be separated from their social interactions with others, meaning that they cannot live alone and often need help from others when solving problems in their lives. a form of collaboration that is carried out collectively in java is known as gotong royong. gotong royong is carried out as an effort to lighten the work of others and it has become evidence of a life lived in harmony within a community. gotong royong can be interpreted as a form of social solidarity that emerges when assistance is forthcoming from other parties with personal or group interests. this regulates attitudes of each member of society to the group as a whole and can lead to members acting as one unit (taslin & yusuf 2017). gotong royong, which is a form of mutual assistance, is a characteristic of genuine mutual cooperation (bintarto 1980). many types of mutual cooperation can be found in society including in the domains of matters of death, marriage, home decoration, mosques and community service. today, there are shifting cultural changes, one of which is the cultural shift in terms of mutual cooperation. this was demonstrated by cultural values are slowly being abandoned as forms of modernity and modern life-styles, due to changes in attitudes, behaviour and mental changes brought about by increasingly modern technology (projodikoro 1993). changes in terms of a more modern lifestyle also make society more individualistic, consumptive, hedonistic, and opportunistic (hodriani et al. 2018). currently, not many people still engage in mutual cooperation in the community. in a country that has the characteristics of a pluralistic society such as indonesia, it is important to pay attention to building and maintaining the values of solidarity and the culture of gotong royong to implement a more democratic life order. gotong royong is born from the collective behaviour of the javanese community and society that arises from the customs and habits of the culture as a whole. these values are then transformed into a unique spirit and the characteristics of indonesian society. one area that is still thick with the culture of mutual cooperation is in the village of pesanggrahan in eastern java. the forms of mutual cooperation include community service in the construction of houses and places of worship. community service is an activity of directing personnel without payment or wages for a project that is beneficial to the public (koentjaraningrat 1990). mutual cooperation in the construction of houses and places of worship in the javanese culture of this village is called soyo while people who do it are called sayan. in soyo, mutual cooperation activities are carried out spontaneously and without payment or wages for work that is useful for the public interest in society. one of the characteristics that stands out in soyo, is where community members voluntarily come together with other communities to work without any reward. this practice is becoming uncommon and not many residents do it. currently, many of the characteristics of mutual cooperation in society have begun to shift to a position where all work is done by masons who receive wages when the job is finished. in the perspective of javanese culture, social life in javanese society is known as a proverb with the phrase, sepi ing pamrih rame ing gawe. “don’t expect anything in return for what you can do for other people” or “people are quiet but do lots of good (quality) work” or. “expect no reward, but be serious at work”. that is the free translation of the javanese philosophy above. from this philosophy, we are taught to work optimally basir and prajawati cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202116 without expecting too much reward from the job. the point is sincerity in everything. this ancient javanese philosophy describes someone who does not appear in the distribution of awards and praise, but who is always there and enthusiastic when they work. furthermore, they are often very quiet and always work hard in silence. in today’s terms, they are a very rare species. most people are not like this: if they are given a job to do and there is the chance of getting paid, immediately everyone comes claiming to be the most meritorious. this proverb contains a deeper meaning implying that humans always need other people and cannot live life by themselves. the values a person holds can be determined by society itself. these values can be measured from the standard of a norm, namely obedience to the prevailing norms and fulfillment of obligations in society. soyo’s activities cannot be separated from the philosophy of life of the javanese people. javanese society as one of the largest components of society in indonesia has a unique culture (oka 2003). daryono (2006) states that javanese culture is generally categorized as having three features, namely: 1) basing itself on harmonization; 2) more likely to be following the functional structure paradigm and 3) highly appreciative of transcendental things or values. although the work carried out in soyo activities may be paid work in other contexts, it cannot easily be considered from a management perspective. not all modern management theories, which mostly refer to the results of western thinking, can be applied in indonesia. in the practice of implementation, management, and the completion of a job do not fully use modern management techniques or methods but are often found combining them with simple management or what is commonly known as traditional management (lukiyanto 2016), that is, management that is developed from the cultural heritage of a nation. these include actions, behaviours, and activities that are always taught to the next generations, that develop from generation to generation and refer to community relations, values, and knowledge, intuition, and practice in the local or national environment ( jackson 2013). gotong royong could also be considered in the context of the western concept of social capital, those societal links that lead to trust and solidarity in a community (coleman1988; putnam 1993). a recent study in java has analysed the workings of gotong royong in a rural setting and closer to an urbanized area (rosyani et al. 2019) and demonstrated its similarities to social capital. however, the workings of soyo take it beyond the western concept of social capital. soyo is based on moral values, including the value of togetherness, mutual assistance, prioritizing public interests, fulfilling welfare, and efforts to adjust between personal interests and public interests. besides moral values, soyo also contains religious, cultural, and economic values (koentjaraningrat 1990). in soyo, a form of mutual cooperation is a form of social solidarity. this culture ultimately applies from generation to generation so that it forms real social behaviour and can then form a social order in society (hodriani et al. 2018). traditionally, soyo individuals or groups of soyo do not receive a salary or wages for completing their work but they work selflessly regardless. supardan (2009) argues that the solidarity that exists in society is based on a sense of collective awareness which demonstrates the totality of the beliefs and sentiments of community members. in mutual cooperation activities, the division of labor that arises creates an interdependent community structure. in mutual cooperation, it can therefore be seen that there is a division of labor that is a part of solidarity in society. the soyo that is done by the community is a form of solidarity in human social life. taylor (2015) states that the use of the term solidarity refers to the activities carried out by the community based on sympathy for other communities. currently, it is important to continue to preserve community social activities such as soyo. according to barkin and lemus (2014), activities undertaken to build the social activities available in the community are carried out to withstand the destructive impact of the times on social welfare. the cooperation that is carried out within the community requires reciprocal cooperation based on decisions to ensure the welfare of the community members. this study examines the soyo phenomenon from a social and cultural perspective. basir and prajawati cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202117 method this qualitative study uses a phenomenological approach. a phenomenological approach is a philosophical approach to studying individual experiences that are subjective and shaped by the context in which they live (zigmund and babin 2007). it was conducted in the village of pesanggrahan, kota wisata batu, in east java. pesanggrahan, in ancient times, was a place where royal officials rested on their travels. it is said that the kings, queens, dukes, and courtiers of the kingdom, including the king of mataram and his concubines, often bathed in the hot springs of songgoriti and then mesanggrah (rested) in what is now pesanggrahan village. geographically, the pesanggrahan area, which is located at the foot of the slopes of mount panderman, with a beautiful panorama and very cool weather at that time, made a special attraction for anyone who was on their way to rest in this place, so in the end, this area was called desa pesanggrahan or pesanggrahan village. the increasing rate of population growth and the increase in social and cultural development with the norms of community life which are regulated based on government structure, has meant that pesanggrahan village is divided into several small areas called “hamlets” with names which are also taken by following the history of its origin. researchers chose the research location because almost every week, on saturdays and or sundays, soyo activity was found. people who are active in soyo activities or who had been the beneficiaries of soyo activities took part in in-depth face to face interviews. identifying participants was not straightforward. pre-observations were made to determine key informants from the inhabitants of pesanggrahan village. the pre-observation was carried out by conducting light interviews about the profile and activities of soyo. however, in the pre-observation conducted on 15 people in pesanggrahan village, 4 informants were not willing to be interviewed. of the remaining 11 people, 5 people gave the same answer so that information saturation occurred. finally, 6 key informants were found. the key informant profiles in this study are: 1. sumadi (sd), sumadi is a native of pesanggrahan, 55 years old, self-employed. 2. mudik (md), mudik is a native resident of pesanggrahan, 48 years old, he works as a head craftsman every day. 3. yono (yn), is an elder in the pesanggrahan village, 58 years old, his job is as a freelance worker. 4. bowo (bw ), bowo, who has lived in the pesanggrahan village since he was a child, is 55 years old, working as an entrepreneur. 5. slamet (st), slamet is one of the pesanggrahan village officials who is also a native of the pesanggrahan, 50 years old. 6. qodir (qr), qodir is a native resident of the pesanggrahan, 47 years old, his job is as a freelance worker. data collected from this core of key informants was complemented by observations from other members of the community. soyo mechanism the data gathered from participants demonstrated that the practice of soyo is not only a local tradition that promotes the continuity of solidarity and the tradition of mutual cooperation but also is evidence of efforts to maintain community togetherness and solidarity in today’s modern life developments. people described how mutual cooperation arises from the encouragement of awareness, and enthusiasm to be able to do and bear the consequences of work, especially in circumstances that happen collectively, with many tasks happening simultaneously and in a busy atmosphere, without thinking about or prioritizing benefits basir and prajawati cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202118 for oneself, but focussing on mutual happiness. the findings demonstrated how gotong royong is the charity of all for the benefit of all of the efforts of all for mutual happiness. the principle of mutual cooperation contains the awareness of working spiritually as well as physically in a joint effort or work to emphasize the importance of a shared social life with each other. so far, soyo has been practiced at the community level and also at the family level through the assistance of money, goods, and labor to relatives who are building houses. an example is the soyo mechanism put forward by an informant: “my house was built with the community through soyo. sunday is the right day, because on sundays many people do not work. i invited several people to be able to help me by visiting their house. i will tell you how many meters the building will be built. this is important because it relates to the number of people who will invite to soyo. this cooperation is mutually beneficial between me and the community around us. this means that when they come to my house to do soyo, then in return i will also come to help if they organize soyo.”(interview, sd, 2020) the statement above shows that soyo is a culture that has existed from ancient times and still exists today, done in this case to ease the work of building his house. at a broader level, the example shows the involvement of someone in the house construction process without formal information, and using word of mouth to disseminate information that will culminate in other villagers helping to build houses. therefore, other people come because one of them has agreed to take part because of the spirit of mutual cooperation and kinship. the informant md showed how his approach complemented other soyo mechanisms: “like for my house, i invited 25 people inearly in 2000, but there were almost 60 people who came; the system, in the morning, gives you food with glutinous rice, a pack of cigarettes, lunch can be chicken, rawon, rice, crackers, tempe. we do not spend money, in soyo we don’t need to command people, we just say “let’s do it”. we work out what expertise people have or what they have done before, who can mix cement, who can lift bricks, mix well ... you know, you know.” the figures below show soyo activity in pesanggrahan, first in constructing a mosque and next in building a house. figure 1. soyo in building a mosque basir and prajawati cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202119 figure 2. soyo in building houses the statement above shows that there is so much mutual cooperation in the community when a member of the community holds a soyo. as noted by the informant md, in soyo, you will usually be given snacks in the morning as well as meals during the day. there is also no formal division of tasks, but rather togetherness where people take on the tasks they can do, for example stirring cement, which they will voluntarily do without waiting for someone to take on a leadership role and tell them to do it; and everyone takes the same approach. one could say that this is a workforce consisting of one mason and several community members. good and mutual cooperation exist between the head craftsmen who provide directions to the community to carry out work in house renovation activities. the community members carry out work following the direction of the head craftsman and collectively complete the construction of houses. in this case, the form of cooperation in mutual cooperation activities is needed because without cooperation, the activities would not be able to take place well. cooperation and coordination are important, to minimize misunderstandings in the community on the implementation of activities so that activities continue and follow common goals and expectations. the nature of mutual cooperation among the people of pesanggrahan village is still very strong, one of which is the tradition of soyo activities, where the initiator is called sayan. the association of the village community which is still communal has become a fertile ground for the growth and development of the soyo tradition which is based on the strong principle of mutual help among its fellow citizens. the main factor in the existence of soyo in pesanggrahan hamlet, batu city is tradition, those habits that have been practiced for a long time and have become part of the life of a community. local traditions in our society basir and prajawati cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202120 today, especially rural communities in all corners of the country, are still being maintained and are still being practised. moral responsibility soyo, as a type of social solidarity, is formed because of the help from other parties for personal or group interests. a reciprocal sense of moral responsibility underpins this help and is evident in loyalty to the collective. “we, the term in javanese, must be care with the other, that is, a kind of village leader. let me tell you, for example, if there are people who want soyo i listen to them, i will, yes because of this heart. what do we have time for if it is not used to help others, right? even though i wasn’t told to do it, because i heard about it ... it has become a tradition, so it is still being done ...” (bw) from the statement above, we can see that soyo is done because villagers have a friendly attitude towards other people, thus as long as they have time and they know that a soyo will be held, other community members will attend. when a soyo is performed and a member of the community is unable to attend, the person concerned still shows a moral attitude by visiting his neighbor’s house, as stated by informant yn: “at that time a neighbor was going to do soyo, i happened to be unable to attend because i had a family event to attend. i don’t feel good if i don’t come because my house was built with soyo too. so, the night before the soyo was performed, i went to the house and told me honestly that i could not participate in soyo because there was a family event that i could not leave. however, i still provide assistance as a form of our awareness and concern for living in society.” this statement explains that even though someone might have conflicting commitments that coincide with the presence of soyo in the village, that person will still participate in soyo even if only for a short time. they do this to avoid feelings of embarrassment and to demonstrate their awareness of being a neighbor in the community. another aspect of the importance of taking part in soyo was disclosed by informant bw: “for me, i’m tired from working all day long, but tomorrow there will be a soyo in must try to come. getting there is difficult... most of the soyo is done on sundays ...” this explains that people feel an obligation or responsibility to be there: if there is a soyo, as much as possible people will come to take an active role, even though the previous day the person concerned might have worked hard for the whole day; this is done because of the togetherness and friendship that must be maintained within the community. wholeheartedness soyo must be based on the spirit of sincerity, willingness, togetherness, tolerance, and trust. in short, the value of soyo is more intrinsic in nature, arising from social interactions with a background of non-economic interests or rewards and participation in it must be wholehearted. as stated by informant st: “what drives me is my heart. even if those who have a desire [for a soyo] do not order it i feel reluctant [not to take part], i do, because i am sincere, i feel sincere, in our small hearts we must participate ...” the statement above implies that soyo is done out of sincerity towards the attitudes and beliefs of the community. informant qr made a similar statement: “ the urge to do soyo, the first is sincerity, sincerity is doing work without expecting anything in return.for example if they forget to invite me to soyo, because of busy or some other reason, i smile calmly, it doesn’t basir and prajawati cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202121 matter to me, i will still come. because we live in society, we must work together. if you are far away, with whom we are neighbors, then it will be the closest relative to us.” this statement emphasizes that soyo is done because togetherness is most important; mutual cooperation is upheld as a value which is carried out based on wholehearted sincerity to participate in soyo together and cooperate with other members of the community. discussion the javanese people have various kinds of cultures that are rooted and believed to have existed in the community along with their existence more widely in java, but with the development and consequence of modernization, these cultural products have begun to change and tend to be abandoned. this culture has values that are very beneficial for the survival of its people. one of the traditional customs that are still often carried out is the soyo activity which was born as a result of “marriage” and the blending of local culture and islamic culture. the findings have shown that, until now, in the batu city area, namely in pesanggrahan village, the tradition of soyo, for the building of houses still exists. the nature of mutual cooperation in the people of pesanggrahan village is still very strong. the association of the village community which is still communal has become a fertile ground for the growth and development of the soyo tradition, which is based on the strong principle of mutual help among its fellow citizens. explaining how the tradition still exists, in spite of the significant changes that have happened in recent times, is difficult. a possible answer lies in social learning theory. currently one of the most important concepts in social learning theory is the notion of community in society, which describes a learning theory which has a strong relationship with the construction of social knowledge. social learning theory holds that people learn attitudes and behaviours from those around them, imitating what they see and hear, and passing that learning on to others. in small, stable communities, social knowledge can grow and flourish as people share their experiences and mutually reinforce the values that underpin this knowledge. all parties involved in soyo are encouraged to have the same spirit of equality, (rahayu et al. 2015). people are encouraged to have a spirit of mutual help, so that everyone can optimize their abilities to develop themselves and their social life. the spirit of work is the main element for social solidarity, humanity, and unity. the values and enthusiasm in soyo are positively utilized in people’s lives, and work to mobilize community solidarity. the more people engage in soyo, the more it functions to build and instil a sense of solidarity and equality (koentjaraningrat 1988) among the people. from a social learning perspective, the unconditional mutual cooperation behaviour fosters togetherness. soyo acts as a form of social solidarity, and is manifested in various ways, including building houses, building and maintaining mosques, building and maintaining village offices, building farm roads, constructing clean water reservoirs, and so on. in the understanding of javanese people, soyo is a cultural form that shows a sense of togetherness in the implementation of community activities. the implementation of soyo, especially in the construction of public facilities, is a tradition that has been carried out from generation to generation in social life. several informants explained that cultural cooperation is the hallmark of the indonesian nation and argued that this culture must be introduced to the younger generation to counter the onslaught of global currents that have reached indonesia. recent cases show that social inequalities are occurring in our community, especially among teenagers, who are attracted by the glamour shown in the media, leaving to one side that sense of social solidarity that underpins what it means to be indonesian. the move towards contemporary urbanized values seems to parallel the waning of gotong royong (rosyani et al. 2019). in a few places, communal relations, such as soyo activities, still exist and these are needed in the modern era in urban communities. it may not be fanciful to believe that this can become a platform for the basir and prajawati cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202122 development of mutual help and mutual cooperation between members of an urban community. in this case, traditional factors (zulfadrim et al. 2018) have a very important role in maintaining and preserving the culture of cooperation that are found in soyo activities. furthermore, local wisdom contained in this tradition, such as religion, togetherness, tolerance, and happiness have the potential to make it sustainable in the community (aghsari et al. 2018). the attitude of help and mutual cooperation in javanese society is a community binding system that must be maintained. in gotong royong, there exist elements of reciprocity, of giving and receiving. every individual wants to help others with a sincere heart without expecting anything, either praise or material benefit. therefore, this practice has the potential for a considerable influence on society, especially in aspects of dedication and social participation. in soyo, there is an attitude to work without reward, generated by free will and without compulsion (bourdieu, 1986; lin, 2001; salehudin et al. 2013; simarmata et al. 2019). soyo cannot be done if people do not want to offer up their best abilities and skills for the benefit of others (duwata 2013; simarmata et al. 2017). the social integration that is developed in soyo is a form of social integration that is heavily influenced by togetherness among citizens, and involvement in it, which is done voluntarily, is a way to show integration and community concern. in soyo, there is an attitude of doing social services that are integrated with individual voluntary actions (purna & wahyuningsih 1996; thomas et al. 2011). groups of people who have the same local traditions will interact with each other through various forms of communication. this communication is itself a form of social interaction, so communication and social interaction can be seen as a social process. social communication is the basis of all social life; without social communication, there can be no social life. social communication ensures a dynamic relationship, which involves individuals and groups of people. a harmonious environment will nourish the community; when one member of the community is in trouble or needs assistance, other members of the community will readily provide help. good and harmonious social relations like this can be built if the community is willing to carry out mutual cooperation activities. gotong royong can foster good social relations in the community. as a result, the relationship between community members will be even more harmonious. the culture of mutual cooperation in soyo as a moral value has philosophical roots in academic studies. it is shown that in the culture of mutual cooperation, the values of social capital which are necessary for the progress and welfare of society are attached. this value is reflected in the concern of the residents and their enthusiasm for soyo in the village, such as in community service activities and at fund-raising events for weddings (rewang). this concern is not only with the material (the practical aspects of donating money and/ or goods), but also with the non-material (being present and working together). the value of togetherness is one of the values in soyo which can be seen from the cohesiveness of the community in completing work that is useful for the public interest; it can also be seen in the efforts of the community to continue to preserve mutual cooperation. the emergence of mutual cooperation in soyo in society is something that cannot be denied. mutual trust is a key aspect of soyo. when people practise soyo, they are demonstrating sharing a goal for work to be successful. the results of this cooperation at the same time produce good moral principles in the community. without these good moral principles, there is no guarantee that job performance will be done well. soyo is active participation from each individual, who adds positive value to objects, problems, or needs of the people around him (rochmadi 2012; simarmata et al. 2017). this active participation can take many forms, including material, financial, physical, mental, spiritual support, skills, constructive ideas, or advice. active participation in soyo arises from awareness as part of a meaningful group (rahayu et al. 2015). soyo can only occur if people are sincerely involved in various activities held in their community (brahmana et al. 2009). basir and prajawati cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202123 the youth as the nation’s next generation cannot be separated from the success of their parents in instilling the values of mutual cooperation. education aims to make youth become part of society and to encourage them to take part in future development. social capital is attached to the belief and belief in values. this means that social capital contains values of trust (mutual trust) which are rooted in cultural factors, such as ethics and morals. when trust becomes a guideline in social interaction, the community has instilled moral values, as a way to develop values which are authentic and honestly held. local social networks have a positive impact on improving economic welfare and development in local areas and play an important role in environmental management. another value that appears in the activities of soyo is the value of civility. solidarity is a condition that indicates closeness between members in a community group. the conception of solidarity is always associated with a sense of togetherness and sharing the same fate. the strength of solidarity is influenced by the activities of soyo which are followed by individuals in society who have their respective functions according to their roles in society. of course, these differences in roles do not affect the course of soyo’s activities. if members of the community can communicate well with each other, then the ability to unite differences to be able to build high solidarity from every activity carried out by the community can be realized. as people with different roles become open to each other so that one can complement another, civility exists and the difference in roles in society is not an obstacle in strengthening solidarity. soyo activities demonstrate how the community can maintain stability. soyo is togetherness. without togetherness, there is no soyo activity. togetherness must be based on social action and social solidarity. with the togetherness engendered in soyo, everyone will work together to achieve the agreed mission (koentjaraningrat 1984) and live together in the community. when it is put into practice, soyo demonstrates a dynamic understanding that describes charity, collective work, the struggle to help without coercion and doing hard work for good, as well as the happiness of everyone involved (adeney-risakotta 2014; godwin 1991). it aims to achieve the expected results from groups sharing a common interest, implying togetherness, equality, justice, care, and well as acknowledging those shared interests (geertz 1983; rochmadi 2012). these shard interests are also related to mutual benefits and mutual welfare in bearing and sharing each other’s burdens (braithwaite 2011; geertz 1983; halabi 2009). soyo can be seen as involving hard work, but it is more than that as it also implies solving problems from a working group to achieve the same goal (bowen 1986; duwata 2013; laban et al. 2015; mccarthy 2014). it can also be interpreted as a planned joint action, organized in certain ways to achieve agreed goals to reduce work, or cooperation to create and meet common needs. living together is the reason why soyo is passionate about social action and social solidarity. in soyo, each member of the group work has their own duty and role to fulfil, and this creates a bond of togetherness (dewantara 2017). soyo activities in the implementation of building houses or public facilities can provide economic benefits as follows: 1). soyo activities carried out in the construction system can help ease the burden on families who build houses and 2). soyo activities can provide benefits through public facilities to the community in the village and to residents of neighboring villages. due to this economic aspect, the implementation of the soyo tradition can also be considered as an increase in the capacity of social capital in a society. however, in this case, tonkiss (2009) reminds us that social capital only has economic value if it can help individuals or groups, for example, to access financial sources, get information, find work, start a business, or minimize transaction costs. furthermore, tonkiss said that, in reality, social networks cannot simply create physical capital and financial capital that did not exist. and yet, social capital is similar to other forms of capital, in that it is also productive. social capital can be explained as a product of human relations with each other, especially intimate and consistent relationships. social capital refers to networks, norms, and beliefs that have the potential to increase the productivity of society. however, social capital differs from financial capital, because social capital is cumulative and self-reinforcing (putnam 1993). therefore, social capital will not run out if it is used but will increase. observing the principles contained in soyo, it is clear that the basir and prajawati cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 1 202124 aspects contained in social capital are present. social capital is conceptually characterized by the willingness of individuals to prioritize common interests and to accept moral responsibilities. the wholehearted willingness (conviction and awareness) that can generate cumulative energy results in performance that contains social capital values. this is clearly reflected in the rural community, especially the javanese. although it tends to appear at certain times, the value of mutual cooperation and social care is still found in javanese society. over time, technological advances have influenced the mindset of the people but did not obliterate the values that have been instilled long ago and can still be found today. the soyo tradition of the people of pesanggrahan village is evidence that the values of mutual cooperation and social care are still active. conclusion the activity of the soyo community at pesanggrahan in batu city is an important event that reaffirms that communal practices based on social values can still be found in rural communities. the loss of social ties, especially in urban communities, has weakened the culture of mutual cooperation. however, the findings show that the social system can reinforce the noble values and local wisdom that have been passed down from generation to generation even in modern times through the spirit of social responsibility and sincerity in working together in society. soyo, which draws on a sense of moral responsibility by all community members, and of wholehearted conviction to the sincerity of others, is an ancient tradition which can 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license. citation: getahun, s., keynan, i. 2022. from exclusion to leadership: the case of the ethiopian community in israel. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:3, 15– 29. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8055 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) from exclusion to leadership: the case of the ethiopian community in israel simcha getahun, irit keynan* the kibbutzim college, israel corresponding author: irit keynan, the kibbutzim college, mordechai namir rd 149, tel aviv-yafo, israel, iritike@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8055 article history: received 01/12/2021; revised 21/06/2022; accepted 22/07/2022; published 15/12/2022 abstract israel comprises diverse groups (mostly jewish), between whom the differences are sometimes greater than the similarities. this frequently leads to social exclusion and discrimination that damages the very basic sense of human security. scholars agree that cultural misrecognition or exclusion has a deeply negative impact on a person’s mental well-being and sense of security. in this paper, we show how the case of the ethiopian community in israel reinforces the understanding that a cultural group’s experiences of exclusion and non-belonging undermine its members’ sense of personal security and has detrimental effects on their well-being. groups however can sometimes change the course of development. we show that 40 years after the first wave of immigration (operation moshe), the ethiopian community in israel has chosen a track of change, in which it slowly moves from exclusion to leadership. this idea calls for further study. keywords ethiopian community; israel; multiculturalism; cultural security; leadership declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 15 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8055 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8055 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:iritike@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8055 introduction since the mid-twentieth century, culture has been defined as an assemblage of ideas, mechanisms, and beliefs that direct individuals’ behaviors according to their belonging to a certain social group, or as a set of basic values that allow a society or group to jointly cope with their situational and environmental challenges, using methods that may be similar to or different from methods used by other societies or groups. this basic set of values, through which the world is perceived and represented, produces views on an ideal life and the standards for determining norms and values (goodenough [1951] 1961). every individual belongs to multiple cultural groups, yet as mautner (2008) shows, one group surpasses the others in weight and significance, and this is the individual’s ‘cultural primary group’. mautner explains that the foundational group regulates deep questions pertaining to their members’ lives (such as the meaning of life, and the existence of god), reinforces their identity and offers the means to interpret the society in which they live. an individual’s sense of belonging to this group is far greater than to any other group to which the individual belongs (mautner 2008). primary groups are typically groups of cultural and ethnic identity that shape the consciousness of its members more deeply and generate greater commitment than all other groups and provide members with cognitive perception and a moral view of the world and of their place and status in it (mautner et al. 1998). the primary group becomes entwined with the individual’s sense of self and may lead to the labels that the individual assumes for herself or himself and the way they present to others their cultural identity, identifications, and shared values. israel has always been a target of immigration: its very establishment was based on its conceptualization as the homeland of all jewish people, a country that all members of the jewish nation could join in time. indeed, most of its immigrants belong to the jewish religion. as a result, israeli society comprises diverse groups whose shared foundation is not based exclusively on religion, but also on a wide sense of nationality and tradition. these facts distinguish between the case of the ethiopian community in israel from other cases of immigrants and host societies. the new immigrants share with established israelis (residing in israel for many years, or born in israel) their religion, their nationality, their 2000 years yearning for jerusalem and the holy land and some of their rituals and traditions. they also share the hebrew language. although most of the immigrants do not speak modern hebrew, and do not use it as a daily form of communication, hebrew is their language of prayer and holy books, and it is used during holidays and religious rituals. in fact, both established israelis and ethiopian immigrants share the same ethnicity, in its weberian interpretation as a subjective belief, disconnected from the question of the existence (or not) of blood relations (weber 1978), that goes back to the times of king solomon and the queen of sheba. ethnicity ‘is connected to birth and blood, but not absolutely so’ (horowitz 1985, p. 52). rather, it is rooted in myths of collective history and ancestry (horowitz 1985). at the same time, however, established israelis and the jewish immigrants from ethiopia, also differ from one another, not only because of their skin color, but also because of disparate cultural features, some believed to be innate. established israelis, therefore, hold mixed feelings towards the jewish ethiopian immigrants. on one hand they see them as their long-lost brethren (and sisters), whose coming to israel fulfills the biblical promise of shivat zion (the coming back to zion, the land of israel), and the fundamental mission of the state of israel to be a refuge and haven for all jews. on the other hand, many israelis see the ethiopian immigrants as inferior and treat them with hostility and suspicion, based on prejudice towards their african origin and their skin color. these israelis believe that the differences are irreversible, and that they are greater than the similarities, a belief, which frequently leads to social exclusion and discrimination (moutner, sagi, & shamir 1998). such exclusion damages the very basic sense of human security. although the definition of human security remains subject to debate (paris 2001), scholars concur that cultural misrecognition or exclusion has getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202216 a deeply negative impact on a person’s mental well-being and sense of security (taylor 1994). this cultural aspect of human security, which is discussed in this paper, is especially important in view of the significant role that culture and cultural identity play in people’s lives and their function as ‘an integral part of them, like their face or name (sagi 2006, p. 185). our aim in this paper is to establish two main arguments. the first is that a cultural group’s experiences of exclusion and cultural non-belonging undermine its members’ sense of personal security, as shown via the case of the ethiopian community in israel. our second main argument is that groups can sometimes change the course of development and move from exclusion to leading change. towards the end of our paper, we show that 40 years after the first wave of immigration (operation moshe), the ethiopian community in israel has chosen a track of change, in which it slowly moves from exclusion to leadership. this idea calls for further study. human security is regarded as a fundamental value, from which other issues flow (mclntosh & hunter 2017). within these issues, the concept of cultural security still awaits a more profound understanding. while cultural exclusion is widely researched, the relation between such exclusion and the personal sense of security has not been studied enough. this paper adds an important layer both to the concept of cultural security and to the overall research of human security. after discussing the importance of cultural identity and belonging and the sense of personal security among immigrants, the third section deals with the effects of social exclusion on immigrants. the next section examines these issues in the case of the israeli-jewish-ethiopian community (ijec) in israel, and the following one looks at a new and promising trend among young members of ijec to begin a journey of moving from exclusion to leadership. the paper ends with a summary and conclusions. a note on the theoretical framework in this paper we occasionally use the term ‘racism’, as do many of the members of the ijec and many established israelis, and as does the israeli establishment that tries to fight it. in the scholarly literature, the term racism is often used in a generalized way to describe the hostility, negative feelings, and discrimination of one ethnic group toward another (fredrickson 2015). however, as shown above, in the case of the jewish ethiopian community, the term ‘ethnicity’ itself is ambiguous, and the two groups have a shared and a different ethnicity at the same time. also, there are big differences between racism in this meaning, and what fredrickson (2015) calls ‘overtly racist regimes’ (p. 1), which, according to him, existed in the 20th century against blacks in south africa under apartheid, and in the south of the united states during the jim crow era, and against jews and roma in nazi germany. this is not to say that there is no ‘new racism’, which is ‘a way of thinking about difference that reifies and essentializes culture rather than genetic endowment, or in other words makes culture do the work of race’ (fredrickson 2015, p. 141). in the ‘new racism’, allegedly deep-seated cultural differences are used as a justification for hostility and discrimination especially against newcomers from the third world to european countries (ibid). while we are aware of the racist elements in some of the attitudes towards the ethiopian immigrants, based on the above remarks, we found that, in this paper, the theoretical framework of cultural exclusion is more suitable than that of racism. cultural identity and belonging the relationships between groups in a society might evolve along several scenarios on a continuum between cultural conflict — withdrawal, negation of others, and hostility — to a process of ‘permeation,’ in which each culture adopts motifs from other cultures. these scenarios are evident mainly in the public spaces of cultural activity (the media and the arts), but also in the private sphere, where intercultural encounters are conceived in terms of acculturation. the term acculturation (berry 2003) signifies a process in which an getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202217 individual from a minority group adopts traits and characteristics of the dominant culture, expanding her or him competencies for adapting to their new society without relinquishing their own ethnic identity. to discuss the connection between the cultural identity and the sense of security of minority group members, we must take into account the acculturation strategy minority group members use as a response to their encounter with the majority group. encounters with the dominant cultures that differ from the minority group’s original culture, often lead the latter to adopt a broad range of behaviors, attitudes, and values that challenge their identification with the culture of origin. such cultural encounters put to a test the individual’s experience of an integrated ethno-cultural identity, which reflects the extent to which she or he lives in harmony with their ethno-cultural identity (phinney 1990; phinney et al. 2001). according to a model proposed by berry (1970, 2003), four types of acculturation strategies may be adopted to resolve the tension between an individual’s desire to maintain her or his cultural identity and her or his wish to adopt aspects of the majority culture: (a) assimilation, in which the individual gives up her or his culture of origin; (b) integration of the cultural identities of the majority and the minority; (c) separation, in which the individual maintains her or his minority cultural identity only; (d) marginalization, which is the only strategy in which the individual, through her identity, identification, and lifestyle, rejects both her culture of origin and the majority culture; as a result, the individual finds herself outside the cultural and social circles of both cultures, which exacerbates her sense of isolation and detachment. to better understand the significance of these strategies, it is important to examine the extent of group members’ interest in their cultural heritage or history, and their active participation in ceremonies and customs that characterize the group’s culture of origin (phinney 1992), or in other words, the extent to which group members feel they are part of their culture and group and the extent to which they feel that their culture and group constitutes a part of themselves. similarly, to obtain a more complete picture of an individual’s ethno-cultural identity, it is also important to examine her identification with other groups’ customs, traditions, and practices, including language and social media use (phinney 1992). in their review of research, berry and sam (1997) found that integration is the preferred strategy of acculturation for most minority groups across the world, although according to them, this strategy is feasible only if several preconditions exist, including broad acceptance of multiculturalism by the majority culture (a positive multicultural ideology), relatively low levels of prejudice (low ethnocentrism and minimal discrimination), and shared positive inter-group attitudes by all ethno-cultural groups. a general shared sense of attachment, or identification with society among all individuals and groups, is also necessary (keynan 2017). the feasibility of implementing the integration strategy is also constrained by additional conditions such as visibility of inter-group differences such as distinctiveness in physical appearance, which heighten prejudices and discrimination (berry et al. 1989). in other words, integration is a mutual process; the minority group cannot integrate without being accepted by the majority. as we see below, ethiopians in israel are making efforts to implement a strategy of integration by adopting aspects of the majority society, while preserving aspects of their culture of origin (korem & horenczyk 2013), yet these efforts remain unreciprocated. immigrants’ sense of security one’s need for personal security, understood in the broadest sense as economic, food, health, and community security, is a basic motivator in people’s lives (keynan & harboun 2020), and constitutes a key factor in decisions to pack their possessions and leave their homeland for a place that they believe offers security for them and their loved ones. the recent migration landscape indicates a move from countries with extremely low personal security for citizens to countries that guarantee a dignified standard of living and maximal achievement of personal security. immigration is a complex, multi-dimensional process, and while motivated by a desire for personal security, this is a challenging life event that compels migrants to cope with multiple getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202218 stressors and high levels of stress, leading to mental and physical distress (yakhnich 2014). the greater the changes that an immigrant experiences, the greater the level of stress. in the immigration experience, immigrants may feel confused and hopeless because they are no longer able to apply the rules and norms of their culture of origin while not yet having acquired the norms of their host society (fisher 2005). the challenge of decrypting the social and cultural codes of their new environment, and the irrelevance of old schemas and structures, feed a sense of helplessness and uselessness that negate their self-esteem. these feelings that are exacerbated in the transition from countries with a traditional culture to those with a modern culture, is the experience of the majority of migrants in recent decades, including ethiopian jews immigrating to israel. berry (1997) emphasizes that immigrants’ integration challenges are especially compounded where cultural differences are significant. these challenges are extremely problematic for ethiopian immigrants, whose culture of origin is rural and traditional yet their target society in israel is urban and modern. the transition from the former to the latter marked for ethiopian jews a radical cultural change, accompanied by the dissolution of the cultural, family, economic, religious, and social conventions and norms that had structured their lives in ethiopia for generations. at the same time, the new immigrants were forced to adopt unfamiliar values and norms that frequently caused confusion and disorientation (fisher 2005). as a result of the sharp transition, many experienced severe crises in all areas of life. already in the 1980s, israeli immigration authorities understood that when absorption efforts disregard immigrants’ cultural specificity, absorption becomes a process of submission and renunciation of one’s identity, which diminishes immigrants’ self-esteem and increases their sense of humiliation (dotan 1985). however, the administrative decision making has proven to be inflexible, and no substantive changes were made to absorption policies. moreover, the 2016 summary report of the inter-ministerial team on eradicating racism against ethiopian jews clearly indicates that the ethiopian immigrants in israel frequently are subject to racism and exclusion, as well as discrimination and offensive attitudes at the hands of government institutions. these obstacles and challenges create a sense of non-belonging that is experienced more intensely as age increases. the desire to become similar to, assimilated and integrated into, the majority culture — and for migrants from traditional cultures, the desire to adopt patterns of behavior typical of western liberal cultures — is especially fierce among children and youngsters, while adults have a different pace of adjustment and greater commitment to the values and customs of their culture of origin. this age-related difference creates an additional challenge for the lives of immigrant families, as parents, who not being exposed to the same elements as their children, view their children’s desire to quickly integrate and adopt the cultural traits of their new society as a threat to their parental authority. a vicious circle of intergenerational tension and detachment is created and may even lead to domestic violence (sewell-coker et al. 1997, cited in bustin 2007). the difficulty to preserve the traditional patterns of parental authority and supervision over children, which were customary in their country of origin, generates frustration and conflict both within immigrant communities, and between immigrant communities and government agencies that do not consider immigrants’ cultural norms as legitimate. these clashes undermine immigrants’ sense of security in their parental role. it is reasonable to assume that these experiences diminish the newcomers’ personal sense of security and subvert efforts at successful absorption and adjustment, which require that immigrants identify with their new environment (fisher 2005) and feel at home. immigrants and the effects of social exclusion social exclusion is defined as marginalizing certain groups, distancing them from the center of social power, and preventing them from taking part in significant activities, while also using oppression mechanisms toward them as part of covert social constructions (osem & hertz-lazarowitz 2012; hills 2004; getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202219 eisenberger, liberman & williams 2003). wesselmann et al (2016) define social exclusion as the experience of being kept apart from others, physically or emotionally, and they specify two main categories of exclusion: ‘rejection (defined as direct negative attention suggesting one is not wanted) and ostracism (primarily characterized by the experience of being ignored)’ (p.3). exclusion is a complex, multi-dimensional process that relegates the excluded to a position of inferiority relative to society’s dominant power centers, resources, and values (barnes 2019; estivill 2003). excluded groups are marginalized and prevented from fully participating in the life of the society in which they live (doron 2006). the exclusion practices drive the excluded to narrow their cooperation with integration opportunities and diminish their identification with the excluding society (roer-strier & rosenthal 2001). exclusion’s adverse psychological and economic effects have been repeatedly demonstrated in decades of research (e.g. barnes 2019, aranda & vaquera 2015; fraser 1995; taylor 1994). there are myriad techniques of exclusion. they may be inflicted through legal, social, ethnic, economic, or other means, and they reflect the failure of social, legal, political, and economic institutions, which are expected to facilitate civil society’s cohesion (roer-strier & rosenthal 2001). exclusion effectively prevents excluded individuals from ‘feeling at home’ and denies them the satisfaction of one of the basic needs of human beings – the need for belonging (keynan 2017). the yearning for belonging is a primary human motivation that propels individuals to establish and maintain social ties and to adopt social identities as a means of satisfying this basic need. non-belonging may have powerful adverse effects on the functioning of excluded individuals (leary & baumeister 2017). baumeister et al. (2003) show that social exclusion’s effects are not limited to emotional functioning, but also affect cognitive functioning. findings of this study, which compared pupils from excluded and from non-excluded groups, identified no differences in reading comprehension but found significant differences in pupils’ ability to recall and apply information. one of the study’s conclusions was that while the excluded pupils’ lower-level cognitive functions were unaffected, their high cognitive functions, such as logical reasoning, problem solving, and judgement, were negatively affected by social exclusion. moreover, exclusion also triggered self-defeating behaviors, which reinforced exclusion through a vicious circle of increased antisocial behaviors, such as aggression toward others (including but not limited to the ‘excluders’); withdrawal, such as a decline in willingness to help others; and a tendency to assume excessive risks and make dangerous choices (baumeister et al. 2003). some of the cognitive impairments were related to time misperceptions, specifically the inaccurate perception of the amount of time that has elapsed: time passed more slowly for excluded individuals, compared with socially involved individuals who are active in social settings (baumeister et al. 2003). the researchers also found that a lack of preparation for and orientation to the future decreased willingness to sustain losses or make sacrifices in the short-term for the sake a significant long-term gain. this is an indication of the ability to delay gratification, is related to self-regulation, and has important implications for the capacity to adjust to changing conditions. the authors note with concern that similar outcomes of disrupted time perception and a decline in the capacity to sacrifice in the present for a better future were also obtained in studies on individuals with suicidal tendencies (baumeister et al. 2003). the emotional effects of exclusion are equally serious, and there is growing awareness of social belonging’s effect on mental health and well-being (greenaway et al. 2015). although emotional responses to exclusion tend to be disguised by excluded individuals’ defense mechanisms, and they prefer to describe their emotional state as ‘emotionless’, the consequences are serious. failure to satisfy the basic drive to belong to a group creates cognitive dissonance and efforts to minimize the difference between their self-perceptions and their perceptions of the reference group. one of the disturbing outcomes is that the excluded individuals themselves obliterate the differences between their individual identity and the collective identity of the hegemonic group, not only from the perspective of the excluders, but rather from their own perspective (baumeister et al. 2003), which causes emotional detachment. getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202220 according to one explanation, this emotional detachment is an unconscious strategy designed to erase the pain and frustration stemming from exclusion and from society’s representations of the differences between the excluded individuals and society. taylor (1994) believes that nonrecognition or misrecognition may imprison individuals in a reduced and distorted mode of being. indeed, debasement of one’s culture of origin is also lowering of the self, because, as sagi (2006) argues, culture is an integral part of the individual and not a mere supplement affixed to human existence: without culture, a person is not a human being. ‘people are born into culture and not into existence disconnected from culture, and culture establishes their identity as concrete entities and establishes their language and most of the mechanisms through which they experience existence. culture provides the material of memory and shapes one’s consciousness, and it plays an important role in determining the patterns of hopes and the future (sagi 2006, p. 185). ethiopian immigrants in israel according to the central bureau of statistics (2017), 144,000 ethiopian jews lived in israel in 2016. they arrived in israel in several waves of immigration beginning in the late 1970s (the jewish agency for israel, n.d.). as mentioned above, although immigration may constitute an opportunity, it also contains a threat of stress and pressures that are manifested in mental distress and adjustment problems. in effect, most findings concerning ethiopian jews in israel reveal adjustment problems and personal crises (korem & horenczyk 2013). some of the reasons for these effects are rooted in the traumatic immigration experience of many ethiopian immigrants. families were torn apart when several family members emigrated, and others were left behind. for many, the immigration process involved a long, arduous, and dangerous journey on foot and a lengthy stay in a refugee camp. after their arrival in israel, ethiopian immigrants’ roles and status changed radically, leaving them helpless. for example, their former occupations (mainly traditional farming and handiwork) and the tools they developed for survival in ethiopia were no longer useful or relevant in israel. such a radical transition generates shock accompanied by a sense of helplessness, described by m in an interview conducted by fisher (2005): ‘in ethiopia i could be a teacher and a guide… now, everything that i knew is worthless: identity, food, attire, speech […] like a baby, blind, deaf, and dumb’ (p. 5). where an immigrant’s culture of origin and host country culture are significantly different, immigrants are precluded from applying the rules and norms of their society of origin, even though they have not yet acquired the customs of their host society. as a study among junior high school students found, this is the major cause of the higher degree of passivity that has been found to characterize ethiopian students: ethiopian students were found to be more bashful and speak more timidly than their israeli peers (ringel et al. 2005). in general, ethiopian jews in israel are considered restrained, introverted, and shy (shechtman & tsaghun 2003), but these traits cannot function as effective adaptive strategies for integration because they might be interpreted in israeli society as passivity and naivete. the reasons for the problems experienced by ethiopian jews in israel are not only individual but are also rooted in the general and group exclusionary practices noted above. these were found to be salient in established israeli residents’ attitudes toward israelis of ethiopian origin. as salamon (1998, in korem & horenchik 2013) demonstrated, from their arrival in israel, ethiopian jews encountered a system that supports ‘perpetual racial differentiation between blacks and whites’ (p. 56), where skin color is a ‘dominant category’ and the weighty factor in their life experiences. this evaluation is also supported by a report by the team for eradication of racism (2016), which includes examples from testimonies of ethiopian jews. in one example, ethiopian women recounted their humiliation when a hospital acceded to other patients’ requests to move them to a different room in the maternity ward due to their skin color, which getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202221 was supposedly justified by the hospitals’ desire to ‘understand and be considerate of other patients’ wishes’ (team for eradication of racism 2016, p. 3). the hospital’s admission confirms that these incidents were not merely subjective experiences but rather were the results of actual policy: the public hospitals in question found nothing illegitimate in such patient requests or in their own accommodation of these requests. the fact that the incidents were grounded in policy compounds the offense and its effects, by underscoring that the women’s humiliation was the result of institutional rather than random prejudice. the report indicates that ethiopian jews in israel are subject to pervasive racism and exclusion that stem from prejudices and stereotypes based mainly on skin color, and lead to marginalization and isolation. another example of racist and exclusionary practices toward ethiopian jews in israel is the denial of access to ethiopian youngsters by many clubs across the country, despite a law that prohibits owners of public venues from discriminating against customers (the association for civil rights in israel 2009). these practices cause ethiopian youngsters to feel unwanted, subjecting them to one of the above-mentioned categories of exclusion: rejection (wesselmann et al. 2016). this heightens the young ethiopian israelis sense of non-belonging and undermines their self-esteem and identity development compared with their peers. this example is especially important as an indication of the unilateral efforts by ethiopian jews — in this case, youngsters — to assimilate into the majority society, including its modes of leisure and entertainment. their rejection from venues frequented by other israelis feeds a sense of humiliation, alienation, and non-belonging. as noted earlier, the preferred strategy of minority immigrants is integration (berry 2003). this is also the case for ethiopian jews in israel. in their study of youth counselors from various cultural groups in israel, getahun et al. (2016) found that the majority (76.7%) of ethiopian youngsters shared a preference for an integrative strategy. for the sake of comparison, the strategy of separation was dominant among arab youngsters and youngsters of former soviet union origin. as the examples brought above and in the report by the team for eradication of racism illustrate, in their efforts to implement the integration strategy, established and new ethiopian immigrants encounter a host of obstacles posed by the host society, which prevent the desired integration. obstacles to integration are encountered as early as elementary school. warko-menegisto and horenchik (2018) present findings of youngsters of the ethiopian community, some of whom attend school, some are ‘concealed dropouts’ of the education system, and others are disengaged. these findings show that although parents encourage them to remain in school, the youngsters speak of the difficulties they encounter as a result of the discrimination in the system. the dropouts reported their sense of alienation in their former schools, the disengaged youngsters reported ethnic racism. the youngsters in school also reported group discrimination (although described fewer reports of having personally experienced discrimination). both learners and concealed dropouts report having few friends outside their group of origin, and the disengaged youngsters reported having no non-ethiopian friends. military service in the israel defense forces (idf), which is typically considered an ‘admission ticket’ to israeli society, also poses barriers to integration: ethiopian soldiers are excluded from high-status positions and are channeled into simple, low-skilled assignments. in a discussion held in the israeli parliament (knesset) foreign and security committee on equality day for the ethiopian community, commemorated by the knesset, exclusion and labeling of ethiopian soldiers were harshly criticized. mk (member of the knesset) pnina tamano shatta (a member of the ijec) stated (cited by bender, 2018): we are being told fantastic tales, that we may become better if they put us into separate groups in courses and conferences. i have received complaints that we asked to close the separate tracks, but [the tracks] are not the problem! our community loves the army, and the conscription rates prove this, but the army isn’t tackling the existing discrimination. the community is capable of serving getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202222 not only in menial jobs. i believe in our children, and the state of israel should also start to believe in them. in the same discussion, attorney awaka zena, head of the government unit for coordination on antiracism, stated, ‘according to the idf, based on current data, almost every second ethiopian soldier has a kaba score below 45 […] this means that we are retarded […] there are graduates of preparatory courses who matriculated with 10 units in science-related subjects and were placed as military prison guards’ (cited in bender 2018). clearly the discrepancy between their desire to integrate and the rejection they experience pushes ethiopian jews to select a strategy of social marginalization, which entails a rejection of both their culture of origin and the host culture (berry 1970, 2003). peled-elhanan (2012) analyzed representations of ethiopian jews in school textbooks, using a multimodal modality approach to examine the contexts in which messages are conveyed, and therefore she studied text alongside other visual symbol systems including images, graphs, diagrams, colors, fonts, and maps. her conclusion unequivocally pointed to a racialized discourse surrounding ethiopian jews in textbooks, which stems from ‘ignorance about the pupils, their culture, their language, and traditional modes of learning, and from the problematization of ethiopian jews’ (p. 36). peled-elhanan argues that textbook representations of individuals of ethiopian origin reflect expectations of complete assimilation and relinquishment of most of their original culture and heritage. according to her, it is the dominant culture’s intransigent attitude to the minority culture that creates encounters in which ‘inter-group differences are not accepted by the dominant group but are rather conceived as problems that must be resolved’ (p. 40). these attitudes by the army and in school textbooks subject the young members of the ethiopian community to the second category of exclusion: ostracism (wesselmann et al. 2016). it seems that ethiopian immigrants of all ages in israel clearly experience a deep sense of cultural exclusion and nonbelonging, two elements that are significant in undermining their sense of personal and community security. from exclusion to leadership in april 2015, a distressing video had been disseminated in the social media, showing a police officer together with a police volunteer forcefully beating demas pikada, a young soldier of the ijec. as a result, hundreds of young israeli-jewish-ethiopians started furious demonstrations all over the country. they demonstrated against the excessive and racist attitude of the israeli police towards them and their community members. at first, it seemed that the demonstrations were successful, as the policeman carrying out the beating was suspended, and the volunteer was expelled from the police (eli 2015); the government started several programs for improving the integration of the ijec members; and also set up a team for eradication of racism against ethiopian jews, whose report was presented in 2016 with harsh criticism against the authorities and a list of important and serious recommendations (team for eradication of racism 2016, p. 3). however, less than four years later, in january 2019, two youngsters of the ijec were shot and killed by policemen. the death of yehuda biadga and solomon tecka re-ignited the demonstrations, which were more furious and more raging than those in 2015. this was not the first time that members of ijec had protested against government policies. in 1996, 2006, and 2013 there were demonstrations against the policy of the ministry of health and the mda (the israeli parallel organization to the red cross) not to take, and sometimes to take but not use, blood contributed by members of the ijec; and over the years there were demonstrations against the exclusion of pupils of the ijec from certain schools, or against the objection of some citizens to the purchase of apartments by ijec families in their building or neighborhood, claiming it would lower the monetary value of their own apartments. the difference, however, is the atmosphere and the message of the demonstrators in 2019. both in 2015 and in 2019, the demonstrations expressed the long term restrained rage of ijec members about the overall failure to integrate the community in israeli society, and the long-drawn getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202223 exclusion, discrimination, and racism (abebe 2015). while some of the demonstrators resorted to violence in opposition to the organizers’ intentions (both in 2015 and in 2019), most of them kept their self-control. more importantly for the topic of this paper, in 2019 the demonstrators spoke from a different position: that of strong young israelis, and not from the inferior stance of weakened new immigrants, and they succeeded in recruiting vast support among the general israeli population. journalists, members of the knesset, and ordinary established israelis of diverse background, joined the demonstrators, to show their identification with the community, but also to express their rage over the police behavior in a wider context. thus, in addition to the country-wide demonstrations, 20,000 people gathered in tel aviv, demanding that the policemen who carried out the shooting should immediately be put on trial, and that the police adopt a new set of rules to fulfill its role as a defender of the citizens and civil security (mk ilan gilon, chairman of the lobby against police violence in the knesset, see, gilon 2019). what we wish to emphasize here is that these demonstrations marked a new path for the ijec youngsters, who said out loud that a new generation has emerged, and that this generation stands on the shoulders of a glorious culture, on the one hand, and sees itself as proud israelis, on the other hand. in multiple interviews in the media, the leaders of the demonstrations emphasized their connection to the past and the blessing they received from the spiritual leaders of the jewish ethiopian community. these events mark a whole new phase in the self-esteem and self-identity of young members of the ijec. in complete opposition to the coping methods of the community in previous years, these youngsters have chosen to put an end to the segregation: they began a process of becoming leaders, by adopting the customary tool in all democratic countries, and a popular one in israeli society in fighting for civil rights. in their rallies, however, the young members of ijec not only demanded their rights, but also demonstrated their ancestors’ tradition of struggling to preserve their culture in a non-accepting majority society. all differences notwithstanding, it is our conviction that it is this tradition of taking the community’s destiny into their own hands, that empowered these youngsters. born in israel to the ethiopian community, they mix the old culture with the modern one and set an example to their brethren counterparts established israelis. their choice to fight for change, shows their understanding that they must create their place in israeli society by themselves, while leaning on the power of their community’s historic heritage. it is hard not to connect the youngsters’ new way of coping with exclusion to other changes in the community, among them the establishment of the center for ethiopian jewish heritage (a state corporation established in 2012, after years of joint effort by all the different organizations of and for the ijec). the center’s mission is to bring to the members of ijec and to the general public the heroic history of the jewish community in ethiopia (beita israel) for over 2000 years. since its founding, the center’s activity has gained the attention of history and culture researchers as well as the vast public, thus bringing to light the uniqueness of jewish ethiopian culture. gradually, the ijec heritage is revealing itself as a source of pride to its members. indeed, it seems that the new generation leadership is tied to the leadership of the jewish community in ethiopia before immigrating to israel, over its long history as a minority of circa 300,000 among a non-jewish majority of about 100 million. during their history, they endured continuous pressure from missionaries and perpetual attempts, often violent, of the ethiopian authorities to convert the jews to christianity. a letter from ababa baruch adhan, the leader of the ethiopian jewish community in gondar, written in 1862 to the jews of jerusalem and france, echoes this pressure: ‘we have severe problems with the authorities. atze tiodros is forcing ethiopian jews to convert to christianity. times are very hard, and we fight to remain loyal to our belief ’ (cited in tzegahun 2010, p. 12-13). while, in this respect, the history of ethiopian jews resembles that of jews in other countries who had to fight to keep their judaism, it is important to mention, that the fact that ethiopian jews kept their getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202224 faith is even more impressive. the reason for that is that there were many similarities between ethiopian christianity and biblical judaism (erlich 2013), a fact that made it very easy for jews to cross the fence and integrate in christian society. their insistence on remaining jewish may be explained in the backdrop of moutner’s (2008) theory of the intensity of cultural primary group. nevertheless, the tradition passed on by the elderly of the ijec is a tradition of inner strength, of taking the community’s destiny into its own hands, and of setting an example to others both by sticking to jewish values and by leading them towards a better future. empowered by history and tradition, on one hand, and by the new options of a democratic society, on the other hand, these youngsters decided to take action to improve their situation and at the same time began influencing the larger group of activists in israel. born in israel, they do not carry the huge burden of first-generation immigrants, the weight of leaving families behind, and the disappointment of the nonwelcoming majority, while at the same time having to fight for their daily bread. the young generation therefore is freer to integrate the old and the new, thus beginning its journey from exclusion to leadership. this can be seen in their success in recruiting not only their own community, but also other groups, including journalists and mks who identify with their cause and extend it to the larger context of society. summary and conclusions minority group members use several acculturation strategies as a response to their encounter with the majority group. one of the dominant reasons for their choice of strategy is the nature of the social and cultural dialogue between them and the host society. in all societies individuals are shaped by the culture into which they are born and in which they live. yet they are also engaged in dialogues with other cultures to which they maintain ties over time, and they ‘build their identity through their ties to the various individuals and groups with whom they come into direct or indirect contact’ (sagi 2006, p. 186). when no dialogue takes place, minority group members are forced into a strategy of marginalization, leaving them in a state of ‘limbo’ — a forgotten, excluded enclave where the ground is unstable. as a result, they usually withdraw and isolate themselves both from their culture of origin and from the dominant host culture. when the dialogue with the dominant host culture is dominated by negative, inferior images of the culture of origin, the minority group finds itself subject to racism, humiliation, exclusion, and misrepresentations with which they cannot identify. in these conditions, not only is the strategy of integration closed off to the minority group, neither isolation nor separation are viable strategies, due to the dissonance between the community members’ self-perception and their misrepresentation by the dominant culture as inferior and contemptible. on the other hand, relinquishing the culture of origin in favor of assimilation is equally impossible because the host culture denies them this strategy. in the case of israeli-ethiopian jews, their skin color labels them and impedes assimilation, even at the high price of detachment from their culture of origin. this situation is especially acute among youngsters who encounter a formal education system that lacks a deep cultural understanding of the ethiopian community. many education teams have adopted a collective stereotyped approach to pupils of the ijec and forgone any chance of assisting them to advance within the system or to cope with their problems and the challenges they face (israeli association of ethiopian jews 2003). beyond the school system, ijec youngsters are frequently humiliated and denied access to entertainment venues that could potentially function as a common ground with the members of the dominant group, where shared traits might evolve, and are humiliated by government and public officials, including the police. added to this is the emotional tension between the youngsters and their parents, which is heightened by the specific absorption practices in israel, which frequently led to children’s placement in boarding schools away from home (warko-menegisto and horenczyk 2018). the heightened postgetahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202225 immigration tension between children and teenagers and their parents eclipses parental respect, one of the key culture values that young ethiopians reported (korem & horenczyk 2013). this painful picture underscores the fact that when minority groups suffer from exclusion and their efforts to belong to the host culture are rejected, they fail to satisfy their basic desire for a sense of belonging (baumeister et al. 2003) and are forced into social marginalization, which inevitably erodes their sense of psychological security. it is therefore inspiring and hopeful to see the emerging power of the young israeli-born ethiopian jews. the new strength that these youngsters find in themselves is an impressive example of the second strategy in berry’s model of acculturation (berry 1970, 2003): integration of the cultural identities of the majority and the minority. interviews and conversations with elderly leaders and young activists of ijec (carried out by one of the authors) show that the new method of action embraces the democratic principles of their new home, while standing on the shoulders of the community’s heritage. this is a heritage of determined insistence on the community’s jewish values, culture, and customs, which eventually led the local population in ethiopia to respect the jewish leadership (interviews and conversations with elderly leaders of the ijec in different dates during 2020). it is also a tradition of leading towards values of humanism and social justice. in the words of the kes ababa baruch adhan to his followers on his deathbed: ‘be those who make peace among people, stick to values of helping others, of truth and social justice … be genuine leaders, set example to the next generations’ (tzegahun 2010, p. 12-13). in today’s phrasing this would be called valuesbased leadership, which highlights what is right or wrong and not who is right or wrong’ (rao 2017). the young leadership of ijec decided to pursue this new path, refusing to silently accept exclusion and discrimination, and instead taking responsibility and action to strengthen their community in order to achieve their lawful rights. it is difficult to combat exclusion, and the way to do it requires a broader action, a combination of education and political activism against injustice (giroux & mclaren 1994). in the case of ijec, as seen in the demonstrations of 2019, the younger generation has begun to adopt political activism not only as a weapon to fight injustice, but also as a basis for mobility from exclusion to leadership. acknowledgements irit keynan wishes to thank the faculty of education, university of barcelona, for a wonderful semester, which allowed her to quietly work on this article. references abebe, a. d. 2015, ‘the problem is also yours’, 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[hebrew] getahun and keynan cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202229 https://doi.org/10.1177/074355489272003 https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00225 https://doi.org/10.22543/0733.102.1185 https://doi.org/10.22543/0733.102.1185 https://doi.org/10.1177/0020872805048709 https://doi.org/10.1093/sw/46.3.215 https://doi.org/10.1093/ptr/kph030 https://doi.org/10.1093/ptr/kph030 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-26403-2_2 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33033-4_1 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33033-4_1 cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 12, nos. 2–3 dec 2020 © 2020 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: seet, a. z. 2020. surviving the survival narrative part 1: internalised racism and the limits of resistance. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 12:2–3, 36–50. https:// doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i23.7154 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs refereed paper surviving the survival narrative part 1: internalised racism and the limits of resistance adam z. seet university of melbourne corresponding author: adam z. seet, melbourne graduate school of education (mgse), university of melbourne, kwong lee dow building, 234 queensberry street, parkville vic 3053. aseet@student.unimelb.edu.au doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7154 article history: received 22/04/2020; revised 28/07/2020; accepted 27/08/2020; published 12/02/2021 abstract the concept of internalised racism (ir) has been criticised for its potential utilisation to perpetuate ‘victim blaming’. in describing the racialised subject’s indoctrination to racist beliefs about themselves and/or their group, the concept of ir has been a point of difficulty for scholarship which sustains a hyperfocus on racialised resistance towards structural racism and its effects. some scholars have highlighted that this hyperfocus on resistance is connected to a political stance which essentialises racialised subjects as always resisting. in this article, i further this argument by demonstrating the limitations within resistance strategies employed by some racialised subjects. i utilise participants’ narratives from a wider study to highlight three forms of limitations (conscious renouncing, inadvertent complicity, and nonresistance) in resisting racist ideology. i then draw on these examples to problematise scholarship that sustain a hyperfocus on resistance, one that may inadvertently foreclose the deeper impact of racism upon the racialised. keywords internalised racism; identity politics; australia; racism; resistance declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 36 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7154 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7154 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7154 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:aseet@student.unimelb.edu.au https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i2-3.7154 introduction in this article, i examine and problematise a dominant form of contemporary race and postcolonial research that occurs in the scholarly literature. it is one which can be seen to sustain a hyperfocus on how racialised communities and individuals resist structural racism and its effects, limiting or invisibilising considerations to the material and psychological effects of racism and colonisation. i do so by utilising the concept of internalised racism (ir), generally defined as the racialised subject’s indoctrination to racist beliefs about themselves and/ or their group. utilising contrasting examples, i first illustrate the tension within contemporary forms of postcolonial and race scholarship that i aim to problematise. then, i describe the concept of ir to demonstrate its salience and utility in examining this dynamic of hyperresistance within the literature. by applying the concept of ir to the contemporary lived experiences of racialised subjects, i demonstrate clear limitations in the ability of the racialised to always resist. as shall be seen, this troubles the model resistor stereotype upon which, as i will demonstrate, the hyperfocus on resistance rests. in recognising these limitations, i then return to the examples presented, suggesting a cautionary requirement for race scholars who reproduce such forms of scholarship. in a recent study of a small rural town called wilcannia in rural nsw, australia, built in the mid to late 19th century on barkindji country, forsyth and gavranovic (2017) set out to examine how the local indigenous communities have survived the effects of settlercolonial capitalism and its logic of elimination (wolfe 2006). for the authors, ordinary ‘resistance’ is too simplistic a term to describe the mechanism of indigenous survival. they see it as reflective of an ad hoc measure to colonialism that does not account for what they view as a structure of survival. they write that their study has identified not only the ‘themes of creative cultural and economic adaptation in wilcannia’s history’, but also interpret this as evidence of ‘a more coherent, systematic and subversive logic at work in barkindji engagements with the settler economy’ (pp. 3). they offer, as a counter to the logic of elimination paradigm, the notion of the barkindji’s ‘logic of survival’. they interpret this as part of a barkindji worldview, that is, a ‘structural dimension of barkindji society that, like capitalism and settler colonialism, fundamentally shaped the colonial encounter’ (p. 11). this logic of survival allowed the barkindji and their descendants to continuously have ‘incorporated the things they found themselves doing after invasion into these highly flexible structures, turning the very weapons of invasion into the tools of survival’ (p. 11). the authors give several examples of this barkindji ingenuity, often injecting into their analysis the ambiguity inherent within postcolonial discourse. the authors capture this logic of survival within the phrase ‘the bush is there to nurture you’, a philosophical perspective that allowed the barkindji to adapt to changing circumstances in the land. it is this mechanism of survival that allowed the barkindji, according to the authors, to subvert the colonial system. this could be seen in the ‘humpy settlements’ which were on the outskirts of wilcannia, where the barkindji utilised materials ‘constructed literally from the debris of settler society’ to form their accommodation. to this, the authors write that: ‘in the barkindji space which segregation inevitably (yet quite incidentally, and even inconveniently) produced, the barkindji found a lifegiving opportunity. segregation too, it turned out, could be there to nurture you’ (p. 19). it is unclear from the description whether or not forsyth and gavranovic intended this particular philosophy of adaptation to be unique specifically to the barkindji, or more generally to australian aboriginal cultural groups. although the authors do write that ‘[a]sserting this logic of survival does not, however, essentialise barkindji culture’ (p. 19), it is difficult to understand how a nonessentialised view of the barkindji would explain the authors’ argument of an underlying structure that the barkindji have all been inculcated with, even contemporarily. this would also seem to contradict what seem like more essentialist statements such as ‘[t]he remarkable response of the barkindji was rooted … in a recognisably seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 37 indigenous stance to the world’ (p. 19). more concerningly, however, i suggest that the authors’ framing of the segregationist colonial structure of apartheid as also a method of barkindji subversion may be problematic. indeed, if ‘segregation too, it turned out, could be there to nurture you’, then it is not clear what is so negative about the material impact of colonisation upon the barkindji. in contrast, take fanon (2004 [1961]), in his influential wretched of the earth, who similarly discusses the issue of colonial ‘segregation’ that forsyth and gavranovic (2017) utilise to demonstrate the adaptational quality of the barkindji. fanon’s focus, however, is on the destructive dynamics of colonialism upon the colonised, and is worth quoting at length: ‘this compartmentalized world, this world divided in two, is inhabited by different species. the singularity of the colonial context lies in the fact that economic reality, inequality, and enormous disparities in lifestyles never manage to mask the human reality. looking at the immediacies of the colonial context, it is clear that what divides this world is first and foremost what species, what rac[ialised group]e one belongs to’ (p. 5). fanon articulates a similar apartheid structure to that which forsyth and gavranovic (2017) describe in the colonial paradigm of wilcannia and its humpy settlements. yet his focus is on the overt discrepancies within the apartheid structure of colonialism, one that constantly seeks to, and indeed does, supplant the colonised, at least materially. the above is emblematic of the tension between these two focuses within the contemporary post/ settlercolonial and race literature. scholars like forsyth and gavranovic are focusing on the agentic will of the racialised/ colonised, and their strengths in the face of a colonising/ racist force. scholarship like that of fanon, however, highlights a more structural impact of colonisation/ racism upon subjugated peoples, often demonstrating its negative material and psychological impact. against this view of the current state of the literature, i want to consider this dynamic specifically through a less examined concept, that of internalised racism (ir). it is one that i believe will allow a unique insight into this conceptual tension, a point to which i will return at the conclusion. the model (racialised) resistor: on the politicisation of racialised identity the phenomenon of ir has been primarily studied within the field of psychology, where it can collectively be defined as ‘the individual inculcation of the racist stereotypes, values, images, and ideologies perpetuated by the white dominant society about one’s racial[ised] group, leading to feelings of selfdoubt, disgust and disrespect for one’s race and/ or oneself ’ (pyke 2010, p. 553). since the inception of the concept in the 1970s within research on black americans (lipsky 1977), research has evolved to explore a similar effect of racism upon other racialised groups across national contexts (see for example padilla 2001; pyke & dang 2003; seet, 2019). the literature has been helpful in highlighting key areas where ir can manifest for racialised subjects. particularly salient to the argument made in this article are the manifestations of ir in which racialised subjects desire and/ or attempt to acquire markers of whiteness. for instance, hooks (1995) has suggested that the colourcaste system amongst black americans, that is, the valuation of lighter over darker skintones, is attributed to how white slave owners would treat their lightskinned slaves better. this refers to a concept known as colourism ( jones 2000) which describes the preferences of racialised groups for lighter skintone. montalvo (2005) has also highlighted the significance of colourism that impacts latinx communities in the north american context. as it concerns asian americans, some scholars have connected blepharoplasties (or more colloquially what has become to be known as ‘asian eyelid surgery’) as connected to the desire to achieve less ethnically asian features and acquire a ‘whiter’ aesthetic (mok 1998). these manifestations of ir, of course, need to be contextualised within a racialised social system seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 38 wherein whiteness (and its subsequent markers) is constructed as a hegemonic standard (for better social mobility and material advantages). understanding the aetiology of how ir exists as a phenomenon is important for how we, as race scholars, may better appreciate its impacts upon society. as such, whilst racialised subjects do perpetuate forms of structural racism (i.e. white supremacist ideals), it is the inculcation of a white supremacist framework within their weltanschauung that causes them to do so. as alluded to here, whilst having some contemporary currency within race scholarship, the concept of ir is thus not without significant criticisms. one critique that will be useful to connect us to the above scholastic consideration is what sociologist karen pyke (2010) has referred to as consideration of the ‘politics of knowledge’ (p. 552). this critique of ir as a concept refers to the potential utilisation of the concept to allocate racialised subjects blame for the (self ) perpetuation of a racist structure. because ir highlights the potential for racialised subjects to not resist, or sometimes inadvertently contribute to maintaining a racialised and racist structure (cf. speight 2007), its very conceptualisation is fraught with difficulties for a particular essentialised view of the racialised subject. pyke (2010) suggests that this particular construction is based on a politicisation of racialised identity, which she attributes to the infiltration of a particular ‘identity politics’ within sociological race scholarship. this frame, according to pyke, is a politicallydriven perspective amongst some scholars, one that implicitly evokes the notion of authentic experience of oppression amongst the racialised. that is, to be a member of a racialised group is to simultaneously also know what it means to be oppressed, to supposedly have firsthand experience and conscious knowledge of systems of oppression, and to ultimately utilise such knowledge ‘to forge resistance’ (p. 562). she argues that the fixation on resistance within race scholarship can be traced to the political events of the 1960s and 1970s where ‘organized struggle seemed capable of bringing great change in society, such as the end of jim crow and the war in vietnam’ (p. 560). because of the inability to ‘sustain grand narratives of revolution, insurgency, and emancipation’ by the end of the 1970s, theorists turned towards the ‘everyday forms of resistance’ (p. 560) in order to maintain this political stance. pyke suggests that such narratives which are constructed (and articulated) through a political register tend to reduce ‘the agency of the subjugated … to resistance: to act is to resist’ (p. 562). in this sense, the racialised subject is reduced to a model resistor stereotype. writing from outside the academy, douglas murray (2019) notes that politicisation of social identities in predominantly anglophonic western societies, such as racialisation, are often essentially paired with a political ideology. one where ‘you are only a member of a recognized minority group so long as you accept the specific grievances, political grievances and resulting electoral platforms that other people have worked out for you’ (p. 154). given the popular conflation of blackness (and other nonwhite racialised groups) with a democratic party political affiliation in the north american context, murray gives of an example of widespread social commentary declaring musician kanye west ‘no longer black’ for having openly supported the republican party’s contemporary trump administration. the voiceofcolour thesis, as a core tenet of the critical race theory (crt) framework, is an apt example to illustrate the above argument as it manifests scholastically. as a racialised form of feminist standpoint epistemologies, the voiceofcolour thesis purports that ‘minority status … brings with it a presumed competence to speak about race and racism’ (delgado & stefancic 2012, p. 10). with the principle of charity in place, it is clear that this theoretical orientation embodies a politicallyrequired essentialism as a show of strength and resistance amongst the racialised. such a notion has, of course, been contested within the field of crt itself (e.g. kennedy 1989), and recently by paradies’ (2018) more general critique of the efficacy of standpoint theories in the contemporary ‘posttruth’ zeitgeist. beyond the intellectual veracity of such a stance, however, it is nevertheless understandable that those with such political proclivities would find the concept of ir concerning, to say the least, given that it is through such a concept that one understands hegemonic racialised domination as relying on the complicity of the racialised. as such, pyke argues that scholarship generated through what she terms the grand narrative of resistance is often reflective more of the seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 39 political orientation of the theorist than the actual nature of structural forms of oppression, and that such a political stance ‘forecloses attention to complicity, accommodation, and the maintenance and reproduction of domination’ (p. 560) amongst the racialised. she does, importantly, maintain that recognising the effects of ir amongst the racialised should not be viewed as a point of blame, but rather as an inherent part of any hegemonic form of domination. whilst the notion of blame itself may not be entirely useful in conceptualising the effects of racism on the racialised specifically, and upon the society in which it manifests more generally, the notion of ir does importantly have to contend with its potential misunderstandings and subsequent misuses. in particular, that it is important to maintain a focus on the dynamics of causation; that it is the structures of racism which cause ir amongst racialised subjects. i have elsewhere, for instance, demonstrated how we can study the effects of ir upon the psychological dimension (i.e. the individual), whilst still maintaining a focus on the sociological dimension (i.e. the generative structures of society; seet 2019). more importantly, however, it is here that we can see the utility of the concept of ir in examining the conceptual tension described in the previous section. in particular, the debate between the concept of ir, demonstrative of how the racialised can inculcate aspects of their structural domination, and the grand narrative of resistance, which constructs the racialised as always resisting such structures, connects the concept to the notion of resistance itself. in this article, i interrogate this notion of resistance, its salience as a political tool, and its impact on the study of the effects of racist ideology upon racialised individuals and communities. i do so by examining what seem to be tensions between acts of resistance, yet paradoxically, also complicity within racist structures, as glimpsed through the lived experiences of asian australian subjects from a larger study. it is apparent within these participants’ narratives that there exists both the desire to resist hegemonic white supremacist ideology, what i term the willtoresist, and also the difficulties that seems to be generated by the adopting of such a position. as elaborated below, these difficulties can take a form of conscious renouncing, whereby an acknowledgement of the desire to relinquish embedded forms of ir is met with what seems like a habitualisation. ngo’s (2016) separation between the cognitive and somatic forms of racist habits can offer a clarity here. another difficulty lies in participants’ inadvertent complicity with the racist structures they are attempting to resist. chen’s (1999) elaboration on strategies of resistance which unintentionally contribute to the perpetuation of racism is useful here. i then outline a third limitation in resistance which highlights the racialised subjects’ denial of racism whether in its interpersonal and/ or structural forms, what i term nonresistance. methodology i draw on data from a larger study that examined the significance of the concept ir to understand issues of racialisation and racism in contemporary australian society, through a sociopsychological lens. as primary researcher, i conducted 3 individual facetoface semistructured, narrativebased interviews with each of the 17 participants (totalling 50 interviews, as one participant could only make it to 2 interviews), over the course of 2018. participants were controlled on factors of racialisation (all selfidentified as asian australians from various east and southeast asian ethnicities), gender (9 female and 8 male), and generational status (all were either born or primarily raised in australian society). they ranged from 18 – 46 years of age at the time of interviews. all interviews were audio recorded and i, as primary researcher, subsequently transcribed, coded, and analysed them thematically. all participants and their narratives were deidentified through the use of codes, where f stands for femaleidentified, and m stands for male identified participants, along with an arbitrary numerical code assigned to differentiate among them. questioning was only directive in terms of reframing dialogue to discuss experiences that participants seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 40 themselves felt concerned dynamics of racialisation and racism. as such, interviewing relied primarily on the participants leading the majority of the qualitative content of the discussions. the study identified ir manifesting for participants in a number of ways. as it concerns how ir can impact one’s selfidentity and how one may be perceived by others, ir can be seen as impacting their sense of acculturation in terms of national and ethnic identity development, their inculcated sense of (white) racialised standards of attractiveness, and racialised romantic preferences (predominantly for white men amongst asian female and samesex attracted male participants). further, ir can also be seen manifesting in terms of participants’ denial or minimisation of racism. in this article, i utilise various examples from the themes above to examine the participants’ narratives for the limits inherent within their strategies of resistance toward hegemonic racist ideology. conscious renouncing: on the habitualisation of racist habits the first difficulty in resisting the internalisation of racist ideology for some racialised subjects concerns what i term conscious renouncing. it involves not only a recognition that one has inculcated aspects of a white supremacist framework, but also a recognition of the difficulty involved in divorcing oneself from it. that is, racialised subjects who attempt to resist hegemonic racist ideology here end up being confronted by a feeling of embeddedness. as such, helen ngo’s (2016) theory of racist bodily habituation, explained in more depth below, will be fitting as a conceptual tool through which such a dynamic can be understood. for ngo, habits are both (in a narrower sense) habitual, involving repetition and sedimentation, and are also (in a wider sense) habituated, describing a bodily orientation towards such racist habits in the form of gestures or responses (e.g. racialised desire). although written specifically about whites’ inculcation of racist bodily habits, the theoretical essence seems transposable to examining this aspect of ir amongst the racialised. in this section i draw, in particular, on the theme of racialised romantic preferences, through which notions of bodily habituation often seemed to be described. an understanding of the dynamics that were reported for the female and samesex attracted male participants’ specific racialised romantic/ sexual attraction to white western men, and aversion towards asian men (see also seet, 2020), will help us to understand this particular limitation of resistance. discussing his experience within the nightclub scene when he was younger, m05, a 26yearold australian man of singaporean malay and chinese descent, remembers feeling ‘intimidated’ by what he refers to as ‘pure aussie’ women, referring in particular to those he identifies as ‘white’ and ‘blonde’. interviewer: did you ever feel as if that was hanging over your head when you were trying to date? the stereotypes against asian males in particular. m05: no, actually i wanted to prove it wrong. um, at the start, i did, i did feel a bit you know, intimidated to go up and approach a white person. in fact, like, i could approach any other race like, african, even the, the european australians [australians of south and eastern european descent – as] but not the pure aussies… but after a while, you just don’t give a shit (laughs). yeah. but at the start you do feel a bit intimidated like, oh, shit she’s like you know white, she’s blonde, yeah. interviewer: so, you would go and try to pick up these women? m05: […] you just wanna like… and i dunno why but in, in ah, um the minorities’ heads in australia, it’s like, whenever you see a minority with a white girl you feel like ‘damn, man!’ it’s like, ‘this guy is a good playa!’ (laughs). seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 41 the form of resistance demonstrated by m05 concerns, in part, his relinquishing of the negative stigma carried by asian male bodies in western society. unlike some other male participants, m05 did not, or rather, worked against the internalisation of an inferiorised notion of asian male masculinities, instead attempting to ‘prove it wrong’. however, the emphasis placed on feeling the need to congratulate other racialised men for dating a ‘white girl’ seems to signify an internalised notion of hegemonic white femininity, embodied in the archetypal white australian female, as bearing higher racialised and sexual capital. this highlights the presence of dominant racialised and racist ideology, wherein white women are perceived as relationally of higher value than ‘any other race’. whilst he has otherwise confessed his desire to move past this racialised attraction at the time of the interviews, he still recognises having an embedded sense of wanting to congratulate ‘minority’ men for acquiring a ‘white girl’. i suggest that this residual or lingering effect of m05’s manifestation of ir demonstrates the difficulty in conscious renouncing of white supremacist ideology. after all, the standard of attractiveness internalised by m05 is one in which phenotypical racialisation seems the primary indicator of sexual desire; it is the quality of blondeness and a ‘pure aussie’ essence that he specifically mentions. a similar dynamic can be recognised for m06, a 31year old australian man of hong kongchinese and singaporeanchinese parentage, describing his specific racialised attraction towards ‘caucasian people’. m06: mmm… tsk, well if we start with sexuality, i would say it’s […] still the case. no matter what i think of cognitively, [i’m] still much more attracted to caucasian people than asians. that’s not something i like at all. in fact, i really, really despise that fact. but um, you know, it feels like, it feels like something that is extremely difficult if not impossible to change. it feels hardwired in me, even though i, i think it’s because of socialisation, but again. socialised so deeply that it feels hardwired. m06 is explicit with recognising an incongruity between what he thinks ‘cognitively’, as compared to the bodily impulses that seem to govern his attraction. it is a tension he realises occurring between what seems like a bodily habit of desire, where he is ‘much more attracted to caucasian people than asians’, yet recognising that such a habituation is derived within a framework of white supremacy, one in which he wants to relinquish. the tension that appears above describes an incongruence between a cognitive and somatic response, the latter of which feels difficult to remove from one’s bodily repertoire. this is indicated by m06’s feeling of whitepreference/ asianaversion in attraction as ‘hardwired’. it is here that ngo’s (2016) perspective may help illuminate the difficulty experienced by these participants. on my reading, ngo’s (2016) theory synthesises the issue of racist sedimentation (i.e. feeling the difficulty of renouncing bodily habituations of racism), along with a recognition of agency on the part of the subject to counteract this feeling that it is ‘hardwired’. ngo (2016) locates agency within the idea of habituated racist somatic (i.e. bodily) responses in an individual, cultivating an understanding that there is ‘uptake involved in such racist orientations’ (p. 8). that is, the idea that one participates in the habituation of racist bodily responses allows a recognition of responsibility on the part of the racist actor, or more specifically, for my purpose, the racialised subject who has internalised aspects of a white supremacist ideology. recognising this allows her (and us) to ask, how do these racist bodily responses become embedded in one’s reactionary bodily repertoire in the first place? to answer this, ngo makes use of the concept of an acquired orientation, what signifies recognition of the responsibility on the part of the racist actor to have engaged and participated in repetitive racist gestures over time that have indeed been sedimented within their bodily repertoire. this sedimentation, however, is a narrow focus on what a racist bodily habit is. for ngo, it is the acquisition of multiple reiterations of racist habits performed by the subject, incorporating racism into the very fabric of their bodily repertoire, that has given the body a kind of racist disposition. as she explains, ‘such racist seeing speaks to an underlying perceptual orientation; one inhabits this mode of racialized perception’ (p. 13). referring to racialised perception as one of the racist bodily gestures that can be acquired by the actor, ngo writes that ‘the rigid insistence of a perceptionthenresponse logic obscures the way in seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 42 which our processes of perception are themselves developed throughout embodied and lived experiences’ (p. 9). put simply, the very idea of racialised difference and how it is marked (visually) is a priori conditional to our perception of, and thereby reaction to, racialised others. the internalisation of this same dynamic would therefore explain how participants above perceive both whites and their fellow coethnics. so how does this theoretical perspective help the understanding of the difficulty involved in the conscious renouncing of ir for the racialised subject? although ngo’s argument of racist bodily habits aimed to locate responsibility upon the (white) racist actor, i instead focus on her concept of acquired orientation to demonstrate the difficulty in the cognitive/ somatic incongruence displayed above. of course, it is important to note that the ‘split’ here between the cognitive and the somatic is more for conceptual purposes, rather than actually arguing for an understanding of mind and body as nonoverlapping magisteria. ngo’s argument demonstrates that a critical consciousnessraising of the mind is only a partial aspect within the willtoresist. that is, conceptually speaking, there needs to also be a critical consciousnessraising of the body. and herein lies the difficulty. one can clearly have a critical consciousness of the cognitive kind but fail to allow this to impact critical consciousness of the somatic kind. utilising this conceptual frame, take f03, a 21yearold woman with a chinese and european heritage, who provided an indepth account of her romantic/ sexual desire for white men contemporarily, despite now being samesex attracted. although she describes no longer having a romantic/ sexual preference for white western men, f03 still finds herself desiring to be desired by them: f03: […] i don’t want to, like, touch […] white men, but i still want them to think that i’m hot. i want them to want to be with me even though i don’t want to be with them. this excerpt can be read through ngo’s concept of acquired orientation. it suggests that the body is habitualised through repetition, suggesting that one (unintentionally) participates in the inculcation of one’s racist bodily habits. f03 can be seen as communicating her seemingly contradictory desires. on the one hand, she expresses a desire to not want to date white men. yet on the other, she wants them to desire her. interpreted through the ngo’s perspective, f03 can be seen having cultivated critical consciousness of the cognitive kind. this can be seen in her stated desire to not date white men in particular, the specific attraction of which she views as her inculcated sense of white (heterosexual) patriarchal supremacist ideology. yet, in expressing that she still wants them to desire her, f03 can be seen as demonstrating her uncultivated critical conscious of the somatic kind. this does not only indicate the habituation of racist desire within f03’s bodily repertoire but suggests that she still inadvertently engages in repetition of the habit, thereby, in part, contributing to the sedimentation of her racialised desire. participants here can be seen to demonstrate the difficulty in acquiring both the willtoresist of the cognitive and somatic kinds. what ngo’s perspective has shown is that racist bodily habits, or ir in the participants’ case, can be resisted, and are not totalising despite feeling sedimented. of course, the argument here is not to highlight how the racialised have simply overlooked an area of resistance, rendering them even more culpable in the maintenance of racist structures. on the contrary, it is to demonstrate the difficulty inherent in the act of resisting, especially when the dynamics of habituation are taken into consideration. inadvertent complicity: the maintenance and reperpetuation of racism this section demonstrates a second kind of difficulty in resisting racist ideology that is similar to, yet differing from, the dynamic of conscious renouncing seen above. it is similar in that it contains a conscious apprehension, by the racialised subject, of the need to relinquish aspects of white supremacist ideology that they have inculcated, through which they recognise that they are devalued. yet, it differs from it in that the seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 43 subject may not recognise, or be aware of, how their resistance strategy paradoxically reproduces the racist ideology they intended to resist. i term this the limitation of inadvertent complicity. this is evident in part of an interview with m08, a 34yearold man of chinesemalaysian descent. in the excerpt below, he can be seen reacting to a conversation with a platonic (white) girlfriend regarding his attractiveness. m08 recounts of how it ‘pained her’ to be able to see him as attractive, a situation he remembers as prompting his own reflection: m08: […] am i unattractive or is it because i’m asian? […] one of the ways that i sought to address that was just to become like, really beefcake. so, as soon as i finished high school, i, um, yeah like, my first year out of high school i just joined the gym. m08’s willtoresist is demonstrated here through his own individualised response to feeling a lack in masculinity, one which led him to join the gym and become ‘really beefcake’, that is, to gain more muscle mass. note that it is not important here whether or not m08’s female friend did indeed have this perspective, but rather, to focus on the fact that m08 interpreted it as being so. i suggest that m08 devalued his own masculinity by drawing on the hegemonic discourse surrounding racialised masculinity in white westerndominant societies, a standard within which asian men tended to be relegated to a lower rung (cf. chen 1999). this is evident in the connection m08 makes between being asian and being unattractive, as the two potential reasons he believes himself to be undesirable by his female friend. this alludes to the fact that the standard of masculinity he subscribes to does bear a racialised component. hence, m08’s intention to gain more muscle mass may be a reaction to disproving the stereotypical notion that all asian men are ‘less’ masculine, demonstrating an act of resistance. yet, it is here that a limitation within this strategy of resistance can also be seen. that one feels the need to constantly represent a more positive understanding of an otherwise stigmatised identity category, as a racialised subject, is understandable from a sociological perspective (cf. schwalbe et al. 2000). conceived through a white supremacist frame, for instance, m08’s asian subjectivity may be felt to be overdetermined with an inferiorised meaning, one in which he has to contend with daily in society. yet as chen (1999) points out in his study on the impact of ideas of hegemonic masculinity upon asian american men, one can engage in several strategies to relinquish the stigma of their inferiorised racialisation, most of which are inadvertently complicit with hegemony. the strategy of ‘compensation’, wherein one is ‘aware of the negative stereotypes about [one]self and consciously tries to undermine them by conforming par excellence to the hegemonic ideal’ (chen 1999, p. 592), seems relevant here. by attending the gym to gain muscle mass (something he did, in fact, achieve), m08 is inadvertently accepting first, that a supposed homogenous ‘asian’ male body lacks the required marker of masculinity that is present to the dominant form of hegemonic (white) masculinity he desires (i.e. ‘asian’ men as essentially lacking muscle mass). second, the implicit acknowledgment that larger muscle mass is, in fact, a marker of a superior standard of masculinity. another aspect of the participants’ narratives that could be understood as communicating a form of resistance towards white supremacist ideology, albeit still inadvertently perpetuating and maintaining racist structures, is the desire to specifically be ‘half’. f02, a 27yearold australian woman of chinese singaporean heritage, who remembers perceiving what she terms ‘halfies’ as ‘attractive’: f02: mmm… i guess sometimes especially when i moved to melbourne, i saw being asian as a negative thing? like, i don’t know, a lot of times i found myself wishing that, ‘fuck! why wasn’t i just half ?’ interviewer: a halfwhite? f02: yeah, yeah, yeah. i always used to look at halfies and think like, they were always like, attractive? seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 44 at least when she was younger, f02 desired to embody what she terms ‘halfies’, which in her usage, specifically signifies a person with mixed ‘chineselooking’ phenotype (i.e. ‘asian’) and traditional western european phenotype (i.e. ‘white’). one could read into this a form of resistance, in that f02 does not want to be white, but to utilise its markers to her advantage in navigating a space saturated with white supremacist ideology. yet, it is important to notice that the logic of hybridisation as a strategy of resistance relies on a visual register that is not only racialised, but one that is also sexualised – that is, as a form of attraction. this register takes phenotypical traits as communicating something essential about the epidermalised subject. indeed, f06, a 46yearold australian woman with anglo australian and chinese malaysian parentage, gives weight to this notion with her specific racialised amalgamation, and the effect of her phenotype in a predominantly ‘chinese’ setting on her sense of ‘eurasian’ self: f06: […] i have a very positive eurasian identity. and that’s because i grew up around the chinese. […] i’m lucky, it’s good being halfchinese. you know. chinese considered me more attractive because i was halfwhite, i had a nosebridge and i have large eyes. […] i was positioned as more beautiful and more clever […] because i was eurasian. if f06’s recounting is to be believed, then the dynamic that occurs within asian/ chinese communities wherein ‘halfwhite’ people were considered superior may have some relevance in explaining f02’s desire to embody a ‘halfwhiteness’. that is, f06 demonstrates that the widespread internalisation of white/ eurocentric supremacist ideology amongst her chinese community, which in her case concerns both physicality (i.e. ‘more beautiful’) and intelligence (i.e. ‘more clever’), acted both as a form of difference and social capital accrued to her. that is, this difference, the ‘halfwhite’ in particular, was not treated as a deficit but glorified instead. yet this alone does not seem to explain why it is the emphasis on white hybridisation, as opposed to notions of white purity, that is foregrounded by the above participants. to answer this, a more complex understanding of the dynamics of white/ eurocentric supremacy must be introduced, one which will help to highlight elements of ir embedded in such a desire. the construction of whiteness and its connection with (and through) european colonisation must be accounted for here, especially when dealing with the colonised other as an object of both fear and desire (bhabha 1994). mckinley’s (2008) explanation of representations of maori women and the colonial construction of the ‘primitive female’ as objects of sexual desire can help understand the participants’ desire to embody a ‘half asianness’. commenting on common artwork produced during european colonisation, mckinley (2008) writes: ‘while postcards and pictures serve as ethnographic representations, others project images of fantasy and desire, promiscuity and eroticism, exotic and alluring. i have argued elsewhere that most of the women found in the fantasy pictures were ‘hybrids’, that is the products of mixed racial relationships. the pictures feature women with a physical appearance of large eyes, flowing dark hair, light coloured skin, aquiline nose, oval jaw, and a sweet, passive and vulnerable gaze. the women in the pictures are not chosen for their ‘maoriness’ but for their conformity to a particular european taste in female representation— a fine boned facial structure and the pale skin contrast with her otherness of dark hair, eyes and native costume’ (p. 963). the above is suggestive of the resolution to a colonial fear and desire of the racialised other. it is seen through the representation of a european, and i would add, male ‘taste’ in female representation, which embodies this part familiar, part exotic quality. i suggest that the white hybridisation as a form of attractiveness, seen amongst the participants above, could be read as an internalisation of this particular racialised standard of sexualised attractiveness, one that, at least as an originary construction, was through a white/ european (colonial) male’s racialised gaze. seen through this postcolonial dynamic of sexual racism, it is possible to read into the desire for being halfwhite as a manifestation of ir. this renders racialised seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 45 subjects inadvertently complicit with the racialised (and gendered) representations of (female) attractiveness through a white supremacist framework. whilst this suggests the difficulty of resisting hegemonic ideology through its subconscious inculcation amongst racialised subjects, it also raises an interesting consideration regarding the racialisation of the arbitrary markers of attractiveness. this is especially so when they implicitly valorise an ethnic european/ white aesthetic through the acquisition of desirable body parts. is it possible to divorce the markers of attractiveness, arbitrary as they are, from signifying whiteness as a construct of coloniality/ racist ideology? that is, do markers of attractiveness always have to be racialised and more specifically, racialised as white? it seems like the narratives demonstrate, at least in part, that a simple answer to this is no. that is, qualities of attractiveness and whiteness, insofar as it conjures up the image of an angloceltic/ other ethnic european subject, do not have to be synonymous. indeed, m05’s discussion of his desire to be seen as attractive was due to the fact that he felt desirable, with no considerations to racialisation as a factor impacting his feelings of being attractive: m05: […] yeah, but nah, i actually never felt bad about myself. i just, i actually felt good that’s why i was like ‘why can’t white women approach me for once?’ (laughs). so, no i don’t feel bad about myself. interviewer: (laughs) ok but, did that [being an asian man – as] have anything to do with you being obsessed about the gym? m05: no. it [going to the gym] was just because i had never been with a white woman. […] it’s pretty silly, but yeah. racialisation did not factor into m05’s own perception of himself, in that he did not see himself through a lens that devalued his racialised self. for example, m05 did not apply common strategies of condescension to himself (i.e. he was not ‘attractive for an asian’) but simply thought he was an attractive man and desired to be recognised in this fashion. whilst he still viewed the acquisition of white women as the ultimate confirmation of his physical attractiveness, his perception of his own attractiveness was divorced from any hegemonic notions of racialisation, and more specifically, notions of hegemonic white masculinity. whilst separating markers of attractiveness from whiteness is clearly possible, at least partially, i suggest that it would be careless to sustain a hyperfocus on this dynamic which only accounts for a narrow impact of ir upon the racialised. indeed, whilst m05 divorced muscular bodies from their racialisation as nonasian, he still attempted to acquire forms of hegemonic masculinity through the acquisition of white women in particular. this is evident in part of an interview discussing f02’s recent blepharoplasty, and her intention to acquire more surgical enhancements cosmetically. f02’s desire for attractiveness was also, according to her, divorced from any desire to ‘look white’, referring to markers that signify the common image of an angloceltic or western european body. f02: yeah! i mean i guess definitely, the nose probably like cuz’, oh, i wouldn’t even say that white people have nice noses though. i just honestly think like asian people do it because they want like a higher bridge. and like more like a pointier nose or whatever. but i don’t think like necessarily white people have that nose. like, it’s not like i think, like, ‘oh that girl has a really nice nose’. like, you know, i wouldn’t go to a plastic surgeon and be, like, ‘hey, give me delta goodrem’s nose’. one could read into the above, and i suggest, should see an element of the willtoresist. this takes the form of (perhaps subconsciously) identifying the archetype of the dominant standard of beauty, in this case the (positively) stereotyped white/ eurocentric female body, and choosing not to conform to this particular image, whatever that may be for this specific participant. f02 wants a specific kind of nose, described only seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 46 through the nonspecific comparative term ‘higher bridge’. she chooses to divorce this characteristic from the white archetypal body that she has identified as the standardised norm of attractiveness, wilfully supplanting the power of the body part from the dominant imaginary of the constructed white body itself. in this sense, she resists, and resists well. however, with closer examination, such lengths gone to acquire supposedly nonracialised (nonwhite/ eurocentric) markers that speak to her sense of attractiveness cannot fully be removed from identifying the presence of an internalised (covert) racism. it is one, that in f02’s case, insidiously shields the racialised component that animates certain preferred body types and types of body parts, whilst operating as if her own body, an ‘asian’ body, can never attain such features without invasive cosmetic procedures such as the blepharoplasty and rhinoplasty. this makes sense, of course, when one realises that racialised groups are partially constructed upon shared phenotypical differences. as race philosopher adam hochman (2014) writes, ‘it is a misconception that antirealists about biological race believe that ‘race’ is totally uncorrelated with any biological difference: we just believe that it does not capture very much biological difference, and that it does not capture that difference very well’ (p. 81). for instance, eye shape is often a marker of (inferiorised) asianness in contemporary australian society (hollero 2007), that could very well be correlated with asian (cosmetic) blepharoplasty. what is therefore the more important sociological focus here is recognising the framework of attractiveness through which these body parts derive their value. i suggest that what has been seen so far in this section demonstrates how attempted resistance towards white supremacist ideology, such as in f02’s case, can still inadvertently and covertly perpetuate such structures. the desire for a ‘higher’ nosebridge implicitly takes as its reference a white/ eurocentric standard of attractiveness which includes archetypal features of the ethnic european phenotype. importantly, it is a standard which f02 is explicitly trying divorce herself from, and indeed believes she does (i.e. ‘i wouldn’t go to a plastic surgeon and be like ’hey, give me delta goodrem’s nose’’). the above suggests that strategies of resistance, whether in compensating for one’s perceived lack in (hegemonic) masculinity, attempting to navigate racialised spaces through embodying racialised ambiguity, or in divorcing markers of attractiveness from signifying whiteness, can still render one inadvertently complicit in maintaining racist, or more specifically, white supremacist structures. nonresistance: blind spots in resisting racism beyond the conscious renouncing where one recognises the difficulty of habituated white supremacist ideology, or inadvertent complicity with racist structures, a much more general limitation of studies with a hyperfocus on resistance can be glimpsed from the participants’ narratives. this can be seen as a ‘blindspot’ of resistancefocused scholarship, since, as i demonstrate, there are instances where the racialised simply do not attempt to resist hegemonic racist ideology. i simply term this limitation a form of nonresistance. the limitation discussed here can be understood as such; if one cannot or will not recognise the existence of a problematic, one cannot be expected to develop an effective resistance towards it. take m02, a 33yearold australian man of filipino descent, who can be seen expressing his view that in contemporary australian society both interpersonal and structural forms of racism are absent: m02: […] for me growing up in melbourne and melbourne sort of being […] a very big cultural hub, racism as a systematic form […] doesn’t necessarily exist. […] i feel there’s no actual um, systems in place that really stops an asian australian, specifically, from pursuing um, opportunities. […] i think a lot of the […] incidences that people would sort of deem racist or be called racist is really, i would almost call it, incidental or almost um, an isolated incident. because it’s not the attitude of most australians. seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 47 i utilise this excerpt here to illustrate that m02, and others who embody this particular manifestation of ir, clearly do not recognise a problematic of racism. the matter of resistance toward racism, whether in its individual, interpersonal, or structural forms is therefore rendered moot in cases such as this. some may argue that, in regard to racism’s existence, the act of sublimation can be seen as a resistance strategy towards the psychological impact of racism. there certainly seems to be truth to this, at least for m02, who may not want to mar his sense of belonging to his imaginary of the australian nation, something that the recognition of the existence of antiasian sentiment certainly would affect. however, such arguments would also require the positioning of one’s notion of resistance as an individualised response to interpersonal racism (i.e. the willtoresist), as opposed to one with any structural awareness of how racism proliferates. hence, it would certainly be a strategy of resistance that is limited in scope given that a denial of racism would ultimately contribute to its perpetuation. the three categories of conscious renouncing, inadvertent complicity, and nonresistance explicated above do not only highlight the limitations within acts of resistance for racialised subjects. i submit that it is also reflective of the difficulty to sustain a grand narrative of resistance, whereby to be a racialised subject as a politicised identity is therefore also, as an a priori, to resist racism. resistance strategies, whilst potentially useful at the individual level, can and in the above cases, do contain an element of complicity at a structural level. at least within this study, the participants’ narratives demonstrate that resistance is not always a given dynamic, and when present, not always effective. as such, if the raison d ’être of contemporary race scholarship is to altogether dismantle racist structures, or at least begin to weaken its impact upon the racialised, then foreclosing the issue of ir through the hyperfocus on resistance seems counterintuitive to antiracist efforts. as such, in following this line of argumentation in the final section, i identify the problem within contemporary scholarship that sustains a hyperfocus on resistance. conclusion at the beginning of the article, i presented a conceptual tension within contemporary postcolonial and race scholarship. i highlighted scholarship which sustained a hyperfocus on the dynamic of resistance, and that which focused more on the negative material and/ or psychological consequences of racism for the racialised/ colonised. to this, some may argue that scholarship like fanon’s (2004), and forsyth and gavranovic’s (2017) is aimed at different purposes. the former problematises the structural nature of colonisation and the intent of the colonisers to appropriate resources, imperially or otherwise. the latter has a microlevel focus, whereby the strengths and ingenuity of colonised, racialised, or other oppressed groups are foregrounded. it is within this glorification of survival of the colonised groups within an oppressive paradigm, then, that i want to problematise this idea of genuine poesis. in this sense, feminist media and cultural studies scholar angela mcrobbie’s (2009) work may help to further the argument, insofar as she questions the utility of these particular narratives of resistance. in particular, she interrogates their efficacy within a capitalist system of consumerism. she recalls feminist scholarship that engaged in ‘celebratory connections with ordinary women’, who ‘created their own, now seemingly autonomous pleasures and rituals of enjoyable femininity from the goods made available by consumer culture’ (p. 3). here, mcrobbie questions the validity of discursivity as an act of subversion (i.e. ‘the meanings of the goods and values’) within a hegemonic system of dominance (capitalist patriarchy, in this case). for the subjugated, a discursive reinterpretation of meanings of their structural positioning within an oppressive system distracts from the absence of any structural changes; the affective dimension may perhaps be altered, but one’s position remains a position of structural subjugation. this has important consequences for understanding the tension between resistance as an individualised act, as seen in the participants’ narratives, and its impact upon the structures that each act is supposedly subverting. if this is so, it is seet cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 12, nos. 2–3 december 2020 48 concerning that contemporary scholarship (cf. pyke 2010), and perhaps society more generally (cf. murray 2019) seem to place more emphasis on narratives of racialised resistance and survival, especially when it seems to be so at the cost of a wider and deeper understanding of racism and its impacts. as stated earlier, one of its manifestations is through the politicisation of racialised identity, and a corresponding identity politics that positions the racialised subject as a model resistor. indeed, as the data demonstrates, it is not always the case that racialised subjects succeed in resisting, or sometimes even recognise the need to resist in the first place. taken together, i suggest that an overt focus on resistance within race scholarship serves to bulwark the ability of scholars to examine the full extent of the impact of racism upon the racialised in all its reaches, through a premature foreclosure of the problematic. a particular concerning area is the inability to then treat the phenomenon of ir with gravitas. if hegemonic dominance depends upon dynamics of consent and complicity amongst subjugated groups and individuals, then any study of racism will be incomplete without recognising how the racialised, through ir, help perpetuate and maintain a racialised system. as such, focusing on the limitations within the acts of resistance has demonstrated two things. it is in part a notion that can acknowledge the agentic willtoresist of the racialised to be able to offer a bulwark against a racist structure that aims to be totalising. yet it also allows an understanding which moves beyond the overt strengthsbased focus of how the racialised resist and resist well, to recognising that resistance can, and indeed within this study, does, remain a problematic enterprise that is not without its own challenges for the racialised. i maintain that resistance scholarship is of import to recognise the strengths that reside within racialised communities in the face of their racialisation, and as such commendable in its humanising efforts. however, an essentialist framework that understands all racialised subjects as either experts on their racialisation and/ or in a state of always resisting is one derived from a politicised view of racialised identity, one that may blind us to the more insidious impacts of racism. race scholars would do well, then, to bridle their political aims when approaching the realm of intellectual inquiry, or risk inadvertently silencing a deeper meaning to be heard when the ‘voicesofcolour’ speak. acknowledgements the author wishes to thank professor yin paradies of deakin university, and the two anonymous reviewers, for taking the time to read early drafts and provide immensely useful feedback. references bhabha, h.k. 1994, the location of culture, routledge, london. chen, a. 1999, ‘lives at the center of the periphery, lives at the periphery of the center: chinese american masculinities and bargaining with hegemony’, gender & society, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 584-607. https://doi. 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https://doi.org/10.2105/ajph.90.8.1212 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11422-008-9128-7 https://doi.org/10.1037/1099-9809.4.1.1 https://doi.org/10.1300/j051v13n03_02 https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453715623320 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v10i2.5980 https://doi.org/10.1525/sop.2010.53.4.551 https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1022957011866 https://doi.org/10.2307/2675505 https://doi.org/10.2307/2675505 https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783319882087 https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2020.1831458 https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000006295119 https://doi.org/10.1080/14623520601056240 cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 12, no. 1 2020 © 2020 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: hayduk, r. 2020. migration and inequality: a structural approach. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 12:1, 1-20. https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1 .7026 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://mcs. epress.lib.uts.edu.au refereed paper migration and inequality: a structural approach ron hayduk san francisco state university, san francisco, usa corresponding author: ron hayduk, department of political science, san francisco state university, 1600 holloway ave, san francisco, ca 94132, united states. rhayduk@sfsu.edu doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.7026 article history: received 20/01/2020; revised 16/06/2020; accepted 16/06/2020; published 29/06/2020 abstract migrants are omnipresent in cosmopolitan societies. so too are steep increases in economic inequality. these changes have pushed immigration to the top of the political agenda in the u.s and many other cosmopolitan societies. in response to the migrant crisis in the u.s., conservatives seek to erect walls, restrict immigration and deport the undocumented, while liberals seek amnesty, sanctuary policies and other measures to advance human rights. both sets of policies, however, primarily address consequences rather than underlying causes of external drivers of migration and internal dynamics of inequalities that animate populist revolts on both the left and right. in this paper, i employ an analytic framework that highlights structural factors that contribute to immigration patterns and growing inequities in the u.s. the paper examines how u.s. immigration and immigrant policy interacts with the political economy in ways that shape unequal immigrant incorporation processes and outcomes. i conclude by pointing to contemporary social movements that promote policies aimed at producing more egalitarian outcomes for migrants and citizens alike. given that immigrants and their offspring comprise nearly one in four people in the u.s., addressing such inequities is theoretically important and a pressing political concern. keywords migration, immigrants, inequality, structures, incorporation, equity, united states declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this paper was produced without funding. mailto:rhayduk@sfsu.edu http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v12.i1.7026 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 introduction how do we understand patterns of immigration and growing inequalities in cosmopolitan societies? what policies might produce greater equity? this paper seeks to address these questions focusing on the u.s. migrants are omnipresent in cosmopolitan societies. today, more human beings are migrating from countryside to city, from city to city, and from country to country than at nearly any time in human history. fueled by poverty, violence, and environmental disasters – and the promise of a better life elsewhere – mass migration has raised the proportion of immigrants in the u.s. to its highest level since the 1920s (14.8%) (batalova, et al. 2020), with 4.8 million of the 50.7 million foreign-born residents arriving within the previous five years (imo, 2020). upon arrival, migrants encounter political controversy about their impacts on everything from labor markets and crime to electoral outcomes and national identity. just as in the past, nativist responses have led to a host of measures restricting immigration, expanding border security and limiting access to public benefits. meanwhile, liberals celebrate immigrants’ economic contributions, advocate increased pathways to citizenship and advance human rights (hayduk & garcía-castañon 2018). yet both liberals and conservatives tend to agree that immigration policy should limit ‘future flows’ of migrants, and many support ‘merit-based’ or ‘points-based’ immigration policies that limit admissions to ‘talented’ immigrants – those with higher levels of education and skills – or to temporary guest workers. such policies, while designed to ‘promote economic growth’ and meet ‘labor needs’ of an aging population (chishti and bolter 2019) instead tend to exacerbate inequalities between and within migrants and citizens.1 such policy proposals appear at the same time we see steep increases in economic polarization (picketty 2014). in the u.s., growing inequalities exist in income, wealth, health care, housing, and education, inequalities which affect life chances for immigrants and 1 i use ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ – and ‘left’ and ‘right’ – in general terms as they apply to the u.s. context. while simplistic, these terms are useful for analysis of policy differences manifest in dominant u.s. political parties and politics. for example, ‘liberals’ aligned with the democratic party tend to view immigrants relatively favourably, pointing to migrants’ economic and cultural contributions, and favour policies that promote social rights and immigrant integration. ‘conservatives’ aligned with the republican party tend to see immigrants as having negative economic and cultural impacts, and favour policies that restrict immigration and seek to deport unauthorized migrants. to be sure, there are important differences and nuances within each broad ideological framework and within the democratic and republican parties in the u.s., ranging from more ‘leftwing/progressive’ factions within the democratic party associated with bernie sanders’s brand of ‘democratic socialism’ now popular among many segments of the population (especially young people and latinos) to more ‘conservative’ factions associated with michael bloomberg, as well as more ‘moderate’ pro-immigration factions within the republican party associated with former president bush and mitt romney to more ‘rightwing’ factions associated with president trump. moreover, these terms have different meanings – or are not applicable – in other countries and other contexts. for example, in 2019 danish social democrats economic policies would be considered much further to the ‘left’ in the us even though they also support greater restrictions on immigration. similarly, in ireland, sinn féin’s recent platform contains social democratic economic policies and nationalist/populist restrictions. these immigration programs would be considered quite conservative in liberal/left discourse in the u.s. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 3 citizens alike (saez & zucman 2016). today, although immigrants occupy a wide variety of occupations in the u.s., studies show distinct patterns. a higher proportion of immigrants than citizens work in jobs that call for high levels of education, such as in technology and medical science, while simultaneously, a greater proportion of the foreign-born are represented in the lowest-paying jobs, such as waiters, agricultural workers and private household workers. immigrants also account for a disproportionate number of workers in small business occupations that require little education but more job skills, such as tailors, dressmakers, and jewelers. although immigrants in the u.s. today are remarkably heterogenous (waters et al. 2014), the majority of the foreign-born tend to score lower than citizens on most social indicators of well-being, including income, poverty, housing, hunger, and education (card et al. 2013). we see similar disparities among citizens along class, race and gender lines (gordon 2013). yet, immigration policies advocated by political leaders in both the democratic and republican parties tend to downplay the role of the political economy and u.s. immigration policies which contribute to such inequities. conservatives embrace the state to erect walls, restrict immigration and detain and deport the undocumented. liberals, even as they critique conservatives for their failure to protect human rights, or the economic needs of aging populations, promote legal remedies – such employment based visas, sanctuary policies, or so-called ‘amnesties’ – to respond to u.s. economic needs as well as a humane response to the ongoing migration crisis. while laudable, however, liberal responses do not address underlying causes of both migration and inequality, and thereby, fall short of producing more effective solutions. neoliberal policies promoted by both parties have fostered the displacement of millions of workers and small farmers, both in the global south and within the u.s. in the face of these forces, borders and walls do not deter desperate migrants (massey 2009; bacon 2014); nor do they attend to the economic needs of growing numbers of poor and working-class citizens in the global north (ness 2011). in the context of a shrinking middle-class and declining social mobility, these factors have become fodder for political factions on both the left and the right. the notion that ‘immigration problems’ begin with capital accumulation and government policy has yet to fully penetrate liberal and conservative circles, but it is becoming more commonplace within progressive circles. immigrant rights and labor advocates, for example, argue that both conservative and liberal regimes – which tend to ignore or downplay these dynamics – have contributed to the loss of public trust and ongoing crises fueling populist revolts evident across the globe (guskin & wilson 2017). without addressing economic and social structures at the center of migration and immigrant incorporation processes, both conservative and liberal policies will continue to fall short of their own stated goals of achieving shared economic prosperity and political stability (alperovitz 2013; wright 2019). in this paper, i argue for such a structural approach to these issues. focusing on the u.s., i advance an analytic framework that highlights the role of economic, social and 4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 political factors that shape growing inequalities between immigrants and citizens. in so doing, i examine immigration and immigrant policy in relation to changes in the political economy, assessing their impacts on unequal patterns of immigrant incorporation within and between groups2. the paper concludes with an examination of contemporary social movements that promote alternative policies aimed at achieving more egalitarian outcomes. given that immigrants and their offspring comprise nearly one in four people in the u.s., addressing these issues is theoretically important and a pressing public policy concern. immigrant incorporation social scientists employ different definitions of ‘immigrant incorporation’. some scholars posit immigrant incorporation as ‘a process’ while others describe it as ‘an outcome’ by which immigrants become ‘more like’ citizens over time (waters & pineau 2016, p. 3). some studies focus on socio-economic dimensions of inclusion or exclusion while others focus on political dimensions. some focus on ‘first generation’ or ‘foreign-born’ immigrants while others focus on ‘second generation’ immigrants. some focus on particular immigrant groups while others focus on immigrants as a whole. some scholars argue immigrants should be compared with citizens to assess incorporation, while others argue immigrants should be compared with certain ethnic or minority groups, or to people within the same class status. some assess the level of immigrant incorporation in terms of socioeconomic attributes, such as educational attainment, income or social mobility. immigrant political incorporation is examined in terms of legal status, naturalization, voting, representation and policy, and importantly, on ‘the capacity for sustained claims making about the allocation of symbolic or material public goods’ (hochschild et al. 2013, p. 16). still others focus on cultural dimensions, such as language acquisition or patterns of behavior. the time frame for when incorporation ‘begins’ and ‘ends’ is also debated. some view ‘incorporation as attainment’ or ‘advancement’ and ‘intergenerational attainment’ is gauged by socio-economic outcomes of descendants over time (de souza briggs 2013, p. 325). in seeking to account for divergent patterns of immigrant incorporation, much of the scholarship tends to focus on socio-economic characteristics or other factors intrinsic to immigrants themselves (or immigrant groups), such as education levels or employment skills and credentials. and while immigrants enter the us with various socio-economic characteristics that provide advantages or disadvantages, which may reflect conditions in their country of origin, their pathway to prosperity or hardship is significantly shaped by particular ‘conditions of reception.’ some characterize immigrant incorporation as ‘partial’ or ‘acquiescent incorporation’ or ‘coercive incorporation,’ where immigrants appear to ‘accept’ discrimination and marginalization as facts of life. for example, gerstle argues german immigrants in the u.s. during and following wwi were ‘forced’ to downplay their culture, suppress use of their 2 a useful distinction can be made between ‘immigration policy’ and ‘immigrant policy’. ‘immigration policy’ determines which immigrant groups are permitted to enter the us and in what numbers. ‘immigrant policies’ refer to federal, state, and local laws regarding the integration or the treatment of immigrants after they have arrived. the federal government sets us immigration policy while us immigrant policy is comprised of various state and local provisions and programs. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 5 language, which ‘inflicted a mortal cultural wound’ but which yielded economic and social benefits by doing so (2013, p. 307). by contrast, ‘transformational incorporation’ is depicted as protesting and challenging discrimination and marginalization, and which instead seeks to disrupt established power relations aimed at and reconfiguring patterns along the lines of greater equity and social justice. during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, industrialists wanted cheap, pliable and dependable labor with ‘model’ employees – ‘punctual, diligent, hardworking, followed instructions’. however, some workers ‘rebelled and organized,’ seeking to transform and/or overthrow existing relations of production and power, which achieved valuable reforms benefiting the working classes in economic and political terms. the point of such a ‘transformative incorporation,’ as eugene v. debs famously put it, is to challenge and change existing relations so that one can rise ‘with the ranks, and not from the ranks’ (polner & woods jr. 2008). in other words, to rise with one’s class, not from one’s class (as social mobility models posit). in this paper, i argue for such a transformative model of immigrant incorporation3.drawing on the work of other scholars, i define immigrant incorporation as a process occurring when immigrants achieve a status of well-being on par with each other and similarly situated citizens of the population over time in economic, social and political terms (mollenkopf & pastor 2016; waters & pineau 2016; hochschild et al. 2013). further, if ‘attainment’ is a key marker and achieving ‘equality’ is an overarching goal of immigrant incorporation, then incorporation processes should be examined not merely in terms of whether migrants are fitting into existing and unequal economic systems, social relations, and political institutions, but by how those structures are challenged and transformed to generate greater equitable immigrant incorporation outcomes4. a structural analytic framework helps illuminate processes and mechanisms that produce unequal economic systems, social relations, and political institutions, which form the conditions or terrain on which immigrants must navigate to survive and thrive. the next section will consider what is the shape of that terrain and how it affects patterns of immigrant incorporation in the u.s. today immigration policy and american politics it is common to hear that the u.s. immigration system is ‘broken’. although there is debate about what exactly is not working well, mainstream analysts usually point to the large flow of 3 i use the terms ‘incorporation’ and ‘integration’ interchangeably. 4 there are key differences between these notions of immigrant incorporation versus the problematic concept of immigrant ‘assimilation’. scholars concerned with ‘assimilation’ usually focus on social and attitudinal characteristics of the sum of individuals, ‘such as language acquisition, educational attainment, labor market participation, health behavior. if conceived or analyzed at the level of groups, it is often in terms of whether groups converge or diverge in outcomes compared with each other, such as comparing mexican and cuban immigrants. some scholars of immigrant assimilation debate whether immigrants from particular countries enjoy occupational mobility; or whether different national origin groups are converging or diverging in outcomes such as intermarriage, residential dispersion, and educational attainment’ (ramakrishnan 2013, p. 31; wong 2013, p. 100). indiscriminate use of these terms – immigrant incorporation, integration and assimilation – can contribute to what some scholars have described as ‘conceptual stretching’ and ‘conceptual parsimony’ (ramakrishnan 2013, p. 29), or a ‘conceptual muddle’ (minitte,2009, p. 49). like most contemporary scholars cited below, i reject offensive assumptions and expectations of ‘melting-pot assimilation’ or ‘angloconformality assimilation’ endemic to these and earlier studies (portes & zhou, 1993; brubaker 2003; alba &nie, 2009; waldinger & catron, 2016). 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 immigrants into the u.s., rising number of the undocumented and a litany of ills that immigrants allegedly bring (from disease to crime). employers, faced with an insufficient pool of legal workers, employ unauthorized workers. american workers see their standards of living stagnate or decline and (wrongly) blame immigrants for their plight. police and federal agents chase farmworkers, busboys, and nannies. enforcement policies keep immigrant families marginalized or separated from loved ones. similarly, there is debate about what to do. business groups want to expand foreign worker visas to match employers with willing workers. labor groups want workers to be brought out of the shadows and given amnesty so that they can enjoy the same protections as other workers. religious and ethnic groups call for reform to speed the reunification of families and end inhuman treatment of immigrants in detention and deportation proceedings. security advocates call for greater border security and technocratic solutions to identify and apprehend the undocumented. a majority of americans indicate in public opinion polls that they prefer a realistic, comprehensive and fair approach to immigration reform, one that includes a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants (guskin & wilson, 2017). yet, these differences have largely produced a political stalemate, blocking comprehensive and coherent policy formation. as scholars have noted, the history of u.s. immigration policy is characterized by long periods of such political stalemate, punctuated by periods of policy reform (tichenor 2002). political gridlock occurs, in part, due unique features of american federalism which fragments power and provides numerous veto points that can block policy reform, unlike unitary governmental systems common in most other countries. into the current stalemate, donald trump and a resurgent conservative movement stepped, stoking fear and hatred of immigrants during the past several years. the trump administration has promoted a nationalist ‘america first’ policy, further restricting the flow of migrants to u.s. and criminalizing immigrants within the country, while democrats, hoping to retake power, promise to regulate immigration better and more humanely. comprehensive immigration reform (cir) this political stalemate belies periods of policy and political convergence. during the early 2000s, a bi-partisan immigration reform legislation nearly passed both branches of congress to obtain the signature of a sitting president (george bush, jr). the framework, usually referred to as ‘comprehensive immigration reform’ (cir) consisted of three elements: (1) limited legalization requiring the undocumented to return ‘home,’ pay significant fines, get in line, and hope to get back to the u.s. at some unspecified time in the future; (2) strict enforcement and increased security, including construction of walls along the us/mexican border, workplace raids, detention and deportation; and (3) a guest-worker plan for temporary workers. while cir was not enacted, members of both parties continue to adhere to the cir framework, reflected in legislative proposals proposed and debated in congress to date5. 5 the migration policy institute (mpi) maintains a database of cir information at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/topics/comprehensive-immigration-reform https://www.migrationpolicy.org/topics/comprehensive-immigration-reform cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 7 many immigrant rights and labor advocates, however, criticize components of this framework. they object to the guest worker program, which leaves immigrant workers with few labor rights, and to detention and deportation policies that lead to the separation of families. instead, immigrant and worker rights groups advocate for greater labor protections and pathways to legalization. although some variations of guest worker plans attempt to provide limited labor protections for immigrant laborers, most unions and human rights advocates oppose guest worker programs because they can exploit immigrant workers and keep them vulnerable. instead they promote a range of policies, including: (1) swift, practical, inclusive legalization, (2) the establishment of an independent body to determine labor needs, along with guarantees that all workers who come to the u.s. get full rights and an option to become permanent residents, (3) extension of the social safety net to all workers, (4) the protection of civil liberties and civil rights for all, and (5) the clearing up of the application backlog for legal immigration with a priority on family unity (stanley-becker 2013). and while this framework is a marked improvement over cir, it contains flaws from a standpoint of equity. for example, immigration enforcement is at odds with enforcement of labor laws, because it allows raids targeting immigrant workers that create widespread fear, which make it nearly impossible for those workers to report abuses or otherwise defend their rights. increased enforcement more to the point, while neither cir nor advocates’ proposals were enacted, enforcement provisions within cir have been largely put into place. immigration restrictionists successfully lobbied to greatly expand the number and kinds of violations migrants can be charged with, as well as more than doubling immigration enforcement capacity. the department of homeland security’s budget rose from $3.3 billion in 2003 to $7.6 billion in 2019, and during the same time, the customs and border patrol rose from $7.6 billion to $17.1 billion (american immigration council 2019). moreover, u.s. immigration enforcement operates far beyond its borders, including throughout the interior of the country and into other countries. in fact, u.s. immigration enforcement has long acted beyond its own borders, reaching into sending and intermediate states. beginning in the 19th century, for example, u.s. immigration authorities created a system of medical inspections, visas, and passports that turned consular offices and shipping companies into frontlines for immigration enforcement. these extraterritorial boundaries became significant obstacles to entry by creating overseas mechanisms that thwarted wouldbe migrants from departing their home (young 2018). today, the u.s. has enlisted governments in mexico and central american to block migrants from leaving their countries or rerouting them southward. internally, the number of migrants who are detained within the u.s. and deported has increased markedly. president obama deported 3 million immigrants while president bush jr. deported 2 million and president clinton deported 900,000, a fact that earned obama an infamous reputation among immigrant rights advocated who dubbed him as the ‘deporter in chief’. president trump is on track to exceed that record (ong hing 2018). increased enforcement – which state and local officials also enact – has led to the blurring of 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 immigration law and criminal law, engendering growth of a new field within immigration studies, called ‘crimmigration’ (stumpf 2006; hernández 2017). this level of enforcement, which affects the approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants in the u.s. today, is multiplied by the fact millions of additional citizen relatives live in these same households. approximately 8 million citizens live in ‘mixed status’ families, including over 1.2 million who have naturalized and 6 million children who are citizens (mathema 2017). in addition, increased immigration enforcement practices have racialized immigrant groups, particularly affecting arab and latino migrants (zepeda-millán 2017). a range of practices ‘reinforce racialized anxieties’ by focusing attention on physically distinctive and economically marginalized minorities who are defined as the nation’s immigration ‘threat,’ made increasingly salient during the past decade (provine & doty 2011; armenta 2017). more recently, nationalist groups have used the covid pandemic to stoke anti-asian sentiment and violence. labor needs and future flows immigration policy has largely been guided by the goal of meeting u.s. economic needs. rather than labor groups, however, ‘economic need’ has largely been defined by business and political groups. from the early expansion of the u.s. westward and through its industrialization, employers have successfully lobbied congress to infuse u.s. immigration policy with provisions tailored to meet their needs for particular kinds of labor (ness 2011). more recently, business groups have fought to win enactment of employment visas, such as the h1-b program that began in 1990, which allows employers to recruit high skilled, high educated migrants (trimbach 2016). in addition, the u.s. enacted and expanded visas for investors (rose 1992) and students, which similarly recruits migrants with more resources, as well as providing employers with a steady stream of graduates in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (stem) (bound et al. 2009). at the other end of the income scale, agribusinesses have won provisions to import and employ low-skilled, low-wage laborers such as via the h-2a visa program (ross 2000). today, business and political groups have advanced proposals that would affect the character of ‘future flows’ by modifying u.s. family unification policy, replacing it with a point system to qualify for entrance into the u.s. a point system, if enacted, would allot points to immigrants who possessed a combination of education, job skills, wealth, english proficiency, and only immediate family connections (as opposed to extended family as it now stands). that is, people with greater economic resources, job skills, education, and command of the english language would be awarded more points and thereby have greater possibilities to enter and remain in the us (gafner & yale-loehr 2010). low skilled, poorly educated, non-english speakers – even with family ties – would essentially be denied access and citizenship. the trump administration and a growing number of members of congress support changes to the family unification policy and introduction of a point system. pointsbased systems are used in the united kingdom, australia, canada, and other developed countries (harker 2013). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 9 scholars point to negative consequences of point systems. point systems tend to privilege migrants who possess resources (capital, skills, education) while relegating lowskilled and low-educated migrants to the lower social orders, and thereby contributing to both so-called ‘brain drain’ and brain gain’ phenomena that exacerbate inequalities in both sending and receiving countries (freeman et al. 2013). for these reasons, many immigrant advocates, labor groups, and progressives oppose such points-based provisions. they note that elites of both parties are happy to let businesses cross borders, but when low-skilled immigrant workers try to do so, they are often stripped of their rights on the job and in the political sphere (guskin &wilson 2017). the argument is not simply that the freer the movement of people would ‘benefit’ economies or that current restrictive immigration policies pose a fetter to sustained economic growth. rather, the contention is that these policies produce greater economic inequalities between as well as within countries, negatively affecting both migrants and citizens alike. asylum and ‘public charge’ the trump administration recently blocked asylum seekers from entering the u.s., particularly at the southern border, and launched new ‘public charge6’ rule enforcement. the ‘public charge rule’ restricts the admission of poorer noncitizens based on the likelihood that they will become dependent on government support. in addition, the public charge rule has a chilling effect on legal immigrants in the u.s. who fear that if they access public assistance, that would jeopardize their legal status and lead to their deportation. studies show the major effect of the new rule is to ‘chill’ noncitizens from enrolling in public benefits such as health programs (medicaid) out of fear of negative immigration consequences (makhlouf & sandhu 2020). in addition, public charge puts at risk documented immigrants who access nutrition or health benefits (food and health assistance) because migrants and/or their children who forgo needed health or nutrition assistance have worse health outcomes (perreira et al. 2018). these ‘chilling’ effects have only worsened during the pandemic (makhlouf & sandhu 2020). taken together, these immigration policies have increased inequalities between immigrants and citizens as well as within immigrant groups, exacerbating the ‘hour-glass’ shape of u.s. society composed of a sizable and growing number of poor and working-class residents, a shrinking middle class and a miniscule but extremely wealthy elite. it is towards the internal characteristics of these domestic changes and policy responses that we turn our attention next. immigrant policy and american politics a separate but related set of immigrant policies, designed and implemented at the state or local level, similarly affects patterns of immigrant incorporation. immigrant policies govern how immigrants are treated after their arrival. like immigration policy, immigrant policies can constrain or facilitate immigrant’ effort to achieve their goals. 6 the ‘public charge’ rule prevents migrants from accessing funds from certain welfare programs, while the family unification policy allows an immigrant who becomes a us citizen to petition for their relatives from outside the country to gain entrance and obtain a permit to work legally in the u.s 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 immigrant policy is characterized by divergent approaches and politics, from enforcement-oriented programs that seek to promote migrants’ ‘self-deportation,’ to welcoming programs that seek to facilitate immigrant integration on an equal basis (newton 2015; williamson 2018). leaving aside anti-immigrant enforcement policies, which tend to produce downward pressure on migrant’s wages and other low-skilled and low-educated workers, as well as other negative impacts on immigrant families and the racialization of immigrants discussed above, many locales have adopted welcoming programs that seek to help newcomers adjust and integrate. policies that seek to integrate immigrants include refugee settlement programs; language programs for english language learners, such as english language classes and translation services for public services; access to health care programs; job training programs and assistance for small business development; a variety of legal services such as sanctuary policies, legal defense counsel, licensing for professions and naturalization; education opportunities, from pre-k programs and bilingual education to funding opportunities for undocumented students to attend colleges; housing opportunities, access to drivers’ licenses, and access to some public welfare benefits such as food stamps (bloemraad & de graauw 2012; newton 2015; de graauw 2016; williamson 2018; papademetriou & benton 2020). such programs help mitigate challenges immigrants face as they seek to survive and thrive in the u.s., producing important improvements to the daily lived experience of thousands of migrants. yet, most states and localities provide few of these programs and opportunities, and if they do, these are modestly funded or poorly implemented, often failing to meet migrants’ needs. and while nonprofit community organizations have sought to fill these gaps, again meeting vital needs and even producing laudable immigrant empowerment outcomes (de graauw 2016; hayduk & garcía-castañon 2018), the number and capacity of nonprofit groups is limited and often corresponds to the same states and locales where public programs exist, leaving many immigrants without needed support (de graauw & bloemraad 2017). even so, such programs can be seen as efforts to ameliorate negative consequences produced by restrictive immigration policy and the workings of labor and housing markets that tend to marginalize migrants. worse still, many states and locales instead have implemented a ranged of anti-immigrant or enforcement policies that produce opposite impacts (varsanyi 2011; newton 2015), compounding and multiplying concomitant national policy. the concluding point to be made in this paper is that to adequately address unequal patterns of immigrant incorporation, deeper fundamental change is needed. a structural analytic framework ‘studies of the incorporation of immigrants need to turn away from accounts of individual or group skills and toward a consideration of structural inequality with its different rewards of local labor markets to individuals with different bodies but similar skills’ (goodwin-white 2008, p.329). drawing upon such scholars, i argue that efforts by immigrants to achieve integration and empowerment are either constrained or facilitated by several fundamental cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 11 structures: (1) pre-existing ethnic and race relations, (2) labor markets and related institutions, and (3) government policies (reitz 2002). unequal patterns of immigrant incorporation are best understood as an aggregate, cumulative product of historical and contemporary economic, social, and political factors. such an approach sheds light on how powerful economic, social and political structures interact with individual-level and group-level characteristics of migrants, which when taken together, can better account for patterns of immigrant incorporation over time. elevating structural elements illuminates similar factors that shape patterns of inequality found among citizens in america. a structural analysis can also aid immigrant advocates and policy makers craft more effective programs capable of producing more egalitarian outcomes, along the lines of universal and inclusive programs that exist in many eu countries and canada. to be clear, this approach does not view immigrants (or citizens) as hapless victims of circumstance. rather, the argument is that immigrants – like citizens of various ethnic and racial backgrounds – are born into circumstances that condition options for action. labor markets, social structures, public policies, gender roles, legal status and other factors form the basis for individual and group level activity at the center of processes shaping urban life for immigrants and citizens alike. indeed, such an approach recognizes that immigrants play an active role in their own incorporation process, embracing some aspects of their host society and resisting other aspects, as well as being agents engaged in various forms of civic and political activity aimed at shaping outcomes. as ewa morawska has argued, ‘(im)migrants’ activities are the products neither of structures nor of their agentic volitions but of the time and place-specific contexts of the interactions between the two’ (2013, p. 141)7 .this framework centers the crucial role played by economic structures in shaping fundamental conditions and options for collective action, along the lines of insights reflected in karl marx’s famous maxim, ‘men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past’8. economics and immigration status historically, the growth of manufacturing jobs and labor union density provided a ladder of mobility for many firstand second-generation european immigrants (gerstle & mollenkopf 2001), even while locking out asian, mexican, native americans and blacks from such opportunities and relegating them to the lower social orders (liu et al. 2006; paul ortiz 2018). recent economic restructuring and the loss of unionized jobs associated with 7 morawska continues, ‘how much agentic power individuals can derive from their sociocultural resources is contingent on the influence of other macroand micro-structures that support particular orientations: dynamism or stagnation of the economy, an open or segmented labor market, the restrictiveness of sender and receiver state immigration policies and the ‘gaps’ created by their imperfections, civic-political pluralism or exclusiveness of the receiving society, parochialism or cosmopolitanism of the host culture….the structures/agency (re) constitution is an ongoing process…’ (ibid.). 8 the eighteenth brumaire of louis bonaparte (1852). the passage from marx continues, ‘the tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.’ 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 globalization have narrowed employment options for immigrants, particularly those with low levels of education or work skills and credentials. broad changes in the global economy after wwii, which have been variously characterized as shifting from a ‘fordist’ to ‘post fordist’ or from a ‘keynesian’ to ‘neoliberal’ model, have largely reversed the growth of the middle class in the u.s. and instead put downward pressure on wages for working people nearly everywhere. as peter rachlef (2018) summed up such developments: the very forces which drove down wages and benefits and undermined working conditions in an industry like meatpacking have also driven workers and peasants in southern mexico, guatemala, el salvador, bosnia, india, pakistan, and many, many other places to leave their home communities and find their way to jobs in meatpacking and poultry processing plants, or behind the wheels of taxi cabs, pushing gurneys in hospitals and mops in commercial skyscrapers, from the metropolises of new york city and los angeles to the small midwestern towns of worthington and willmar, minnesota…. by imperiling the economic security of native-born workers in industrialized countries, neoliberalism has also fanned the flames of nativism and xenophobia, providing fearful and angry workers with immigrant scapegoats as the objects of their furor. meanwhile, immigrants who arrive with valuable work experience, skill sets, educational credentials, social capital and access to capital, can more easily make their way into rising economic sectors and favorable social structures, accessing citizenship and greater opportunities, and achieving desirable outcomes. research shows that the distribution of immigrants in the u.s. economy, their class position, is strongly tied to education levels and job skills, contrary to earlier periods of mass migration to the u.s. when these factors mattered less. for example, the wage income of foreign-born asians is highly polarized, reflecting the bifurcated distribution of educational and skill levels of asian immigrants that both u.s. immigration policy and the global economy privileges, which allows highly skilled professionals entry via various visas. according to a pew research report: ‘from 1970 to 2016, the gap in the standard of living between asians near the top and the bottom of the income ladder nearly doubled, and the distribution of income among asians transformed from being one of the most equal to being the most unequal among america’s major racial and ethnic groups. in this process, asians displaced blacks as the most economically divided racial or ethnic group in the u.s…’ (kochhar and cilluffo 2018, emphasis added). hispanic wage income, particularly for mexicans, is more highly concentrated at the lower ranges, reflecting lower levels of education, professional credentials and capital of most latino immigrants, which similarly reflects unique features of u.s. immigration policy (massey 2009; durand and massey 2019). of course, for both asian and latino groups, and other migrants denied legal entry, life without papers tends to produce the worst outcomes in economic and social terms. scholars have found a range of similarities and differences in other countries (hochschild et al. 2013). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 13 these national patterns are largely replicated in the states and cities where immigrants are concentrated. in new york city, for example, while many immigrant groups work in low-wage occupations, most immigrant groups have some members who work in a wide range of jobs. according to david kallick, immigrants make up ‘between 25 and 80 percent of virtually all occupations, from the bottom to the top of the economic ladder,’ including big and small business owners and workers in nearly every sector (2013, p. 81). yet, there are stark inequalities among immigrant groups. certain immigrant groups make up sizable portions of upper income occupations: 28 percent of management analysts, 30 percent of all ceos, and half of all accountants are foreign born, not to mention a sizable number of celebrities and sports stars. nearly half of all immigrants living in new york city work in white-collar jobs (as do 75 percent of u.s.-born new yorkers). immigrants that fare well come disproportionately from three countries: india, hong kong, and russia, who together comprise about three-quarters of workers in white-collar jobs, matching the share for u.s.born workers (kallick 2013). however, most immigrants work at the lower end of the spectrum, concentrated in lowwage jobs. a third of receptionists and half of building cleaners are immigrants. less than a quarter of mexican or ecuadorian workers are in white-collar jobs; pakistani cab drivers, chinese apparel workers, mexicans working in the back of the house in restaurants, and 82 percent of taxi drivers living in new york city are foreign-born, as are 90 percent of sewing machine operators and 67 percent of food preparation workers. to be sure, there is a wide range in the middle, for example, about half of jamaican and guyanese workers labor in midrange white-collar jobs, but most immigrants fall into lower-level occupations (kallick 2013). u.s.-born blacks and latinos in new york city (mostly puerto ricans) and immigrant latinos all have equally low incomes, while u.s.-born whites and asians have the highest incomes (mollenkopf and pastor 2016, p. 33). similar patterns exist in other metropolitan areas across the u.s. with some interesting differences. in los angeles, for example, u.s.-born latinos fare better than blacks while immigrant latinos do about as well as u.s-born blacks. conversely, in chicago, immigrant latinos outpace u.s.-born blacks but fare worse in phoenix, arizona. immigrant asians fare worse than asians who are citizens in los angeles and new york city, but do better in phoenix and charlotte, and in san jose, ca, asian’ incomes exceed u.s. born whites’ incomes. again, we see similar and different patterns in other western societies (hochschild 2013). even before the coivd-19 pandemic, immigrants and their children faced a challenging economic environment, but ever since, economic conditions have deteriorated substantially. and because immigrants work in many sectors considered ‘essential,’ such as healthcare workers and in food supply, the pandemic exposes them to increased risk of contracting covid. the undocumented in particular are loath to access health care services for fear of arrest by immigration enforcement officers, thus putting themselves and their families at greater risk of infection, as well as other workers and community members. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 in sum, to explain unequal patterns of immigrant incorporation, it is critical to take into account how individual or group characteristics, such as level of education, and behavior interact with economic and social structures in ways that shape outcomes. moreover, a structural approach can help immigrant advocates and elected officials craft better policies capable of producing more egalitarian outcomes. challenging structural inequality the election of donald trump accompanied partisan polarization and increased conflict in the u.s. political system. in response, new organizations and social movements emerged, including vibrant immigrant rights campaigns, the fight for $15 an hour, a wave of labor strikes, a resurgent women’s movement and a radical environmental movement. according to kauffman (2018), at least 15 million people have participated in thousands of protests since the 2016 presidential election. these burgeoning social movements have advanced a political realignment, which if it expands and deepens, could advance progressive policies challenging structural inequities and create more egalitarian patterns of immigrant incorporation. these social movements have propelled progressive officials into government positions at every level. indeed, states and cities have enacted a range of policies addressing inequalities, including sanctuary laws, funding for legal services, universal pre-kindergarten classes, paid sick days, increases to minimum wages, protections and expansions of affordable housing, community health centers, and participatory programs aimed at increasing pathways to immigrant inclusion and empowerment (gonzales 2017; colbern & ramakrishnan 2018; pastor 2018). these developments, in turn, open further possibilities to advance more progressive policies aimed at reversing inequalities, including opening up possibilities to forge multiracial class-based alliances capable of overcoming a politics of competition across borders (ness 2011; flecher & gapasin 2008; hayduk & jones 2008). if such developments grow and succeed in shifting the balance of power, then the prospects for a more egalitarian form of immigrant incorporation will similarly expand. to be sure, such outcomes are not axiomatic. although many immigrants share similar economic and social conditions with african americans and poor and working-class whites, alliances do not naturally occur. they must be organized. common class interests may exist but unless connections are forged and coalesce, differences will continue to divide. as history shows, race consciousness can impede class consciousness; nationalism can impede internationalism. the current anti-immigrant climate provides fertile ground for workers of all colors to displace anxieties about rising costs, stagnating wages and an uncertain future onto immigrants. the ‘presumed alliance’ among working-class people of color has not been axiomatic (vaca 2009). as marx would argue, this class ‘in itself’ has not yet become a class ‘for itself.’ jane guskin and david wilson (2017) rightly point out that well-intentioned efforts by liberals to promote immigrant rights in terms of the contributions of immigration to economic growth often fails to convince u.s. citizens that immigrant workers do not put downward pressure on their own wages. instead, they contend, this can contribute to a distrust and cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 15 resentment toward better off immigrant rights advocates, and worse, can distract attention from the real issues of ‘the super-exploitation of immigrant workers, and the common interests of immigrants’ and citizen workers against their bosses and forces of capital. they suggest properly diagnosing problems afflicting poor and working citizens and the foreignborn, not in terms of individual failings or as the cause of immigrants, but rather in terms of systemic features of the political economy and current social and political arrangements. recent political developments have set the stage to do just that. the 2018 election cycle saw a host of progressive women of color and left-populist candidates elected to office in many metropolitan areas. far-reaching proposals to increase taxes on the rich and regulate corporate behavior promoted by several presidential candidates have gained traction that, if enacted, could fund public health programs, tuition-free higher education, a green new deal and ambitious pro-worker and pro-immigration policies capable of shifting the balance of power in profound ways. socialism is viewed favorably by a significant portion of the american population (40%) for the first time since the early 1900s, according to public opinion polls (gallup, 20 may 2018). since 2018, democrats took control of the house of representatives and passed several bills that would provide a path to citizenship, such as for ‘dreamers’ and residents with temporary protective status (tps). more recently, pushed by immigrant rights advocates and social movement activists, democrats have embraced proposals to modify immigration and labor policies, including a path to citizenship for the undocumented and raising minimum wage. the covid-19 pandemic and deepening economic crisis, coupled with the massive protests in response to the killing by a police officer of george floyd, an african american, in may 2020, have produced greater volatility in the american political system. yet, it has galvanized a multiracial, multiethnic movement for racial and economic justice not seen in decades. if the democrats regain power in 2020 and a deepening progressive political realignment ensues, enactment of policies promoted by immigrant advocates and social movements could help produce more equitable immigrant incorporation outcomes that would also benefit other poor and working-class residents, policies such as expanding rent control, land trusts, affordable housing, worker cooperatives, public health and education programs, public transportation and infrastructure, and participatory budging and planning practices (alperovitz 2013; gonzalez 2017; wright 2019). similarly, if the u.s. joins other international groups, such as the united nation’s migrant worker convention and the international labor rights forum and helps advance reforms these organizations promote, these could reduce inequities. in the final analysis, people will continue to move regardless of the plans of political parties. whether because of changes in technology, wars, economic crises, or the effects of climate change, migration will exist in the future. in such moments, people do not leave their homes lightly, but usually begrudgingly and en masse. politicians of all persuasions need to face the reality that immigration will not end in the future. immigration law should be flexible within broad parameters along the lines of the us farm bill, which is debated and renegotiated every five years. like farming, changes in conditions necessitate updating laws at periodical intervals, and not on an ad hoc basis. empowering workers across borders is the 16 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 best single fix for the immigration system, along with creating flexible legislation that adapts to periodic crises and problems that drive migration. this paper has sought to elevate structural roots of inequities in america and posit a transformative model of immigrant incorporation. equitable integration of immigrants is predicated on changing key structures that shape unequal incorporation processes and outcomes. further research is needed to shed light on how incorporation works in different contexts. acknowledgements i would like to thank susanna jones, anthony pahnke and victoria finn for their helpful comments as well as the two anonymous reviewers whose feedback and suggestions have enabled me to strengthen this paper. references alperovitz, g. 2013, what then must we do?: straight talk about the next american revolution, chelsea green publishing, vermont. american immigration council 2019, the cost of immigration enforcement and border security. washington d.c. https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/thecost-of-immigration-enforcement-and-border-security 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http://elischolar.library.yale.edu/applebaum_award/5 20 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.12, no.1, 2020 varsanyi, m. 2011, ‘neoliberalism and nativism: local anti‐immigrant policy activism and an emerging politics of scale, international journal of urban and regional research, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 295-311. waters, m. & pineau, m. (eds.) 2015, the integration of immigrants into american society. national academies press, washington, dc. https://doi.org/10.17226/21746 williamson, a. 2018, welcoming new americans?: local governments and immigrant incorporation, university of chicago press, chicago. wright, e. 2019, how to be an anti-capitalist for the 21st century, verso, new york. young, e. 2018, ‘beyond borders: remote control and the continuing legacy of racism in immigration legislation’, in marinari, m., hsu, m. & garcía, m. (eds.) a nation of immigrants reconsidered: us society in an age of restriction, 1924-1965, university of illinois press, urbana, pp 25-44. zepeda-millán, c. 2017, latino mass mobilization: immigration, racialization, and activism, cambridge university press, cambridge. https://doi.org/10.17226/21746 abstract keywords introduction immigrant incorporation immigration policy and american politics immigrant policy and american politics a structural analytic framework challenging structural inequality acknowledgements references cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 issn: 1837-5391; http://utsescholarship.lib.uts.edu.au/epress/journals/index.php/mcs ccs journal is published under the auspices of utsepress, sydney, australia 63 the reconfiguration of civil society through ethnic communal development walter lalich macquarie university abstract the large scale post-war migration impacted beyond the change of the demographic structure of australia. the dynamics of migration impact is also felt beyond the immediate intent of particular ethnic communal developments in a place of settlement. migration affected civil society in australia too. civil society is not a given good (keane 1998, p.49) as it is also grounded in exogenous factors that are in this case identified as immigration effects. cosmopolitan features of australian cities have their foundations in fragmented ethnic voluntary collective actions. these social effects of post-war migration are contextualised through analysis of the diverse impacts and consequences of migrant collective acts undertaken to satisfy their own perceived needs through appropriation of communal places in sydney. this article explores that part of the ‘ethnic third sector’ that relates to the activities of ethnic community organisations who established a place (building) where the religious, educational, recreational or welfare needs of immigrant communities in australia were met. utilising the concepts of bonding and bridging social capital to explore the social relations that developed in these migrant places and spaces, this article thus attempts to explore an important chapter in story of how post-war migrants have contributed to civil society in australia. introduction australia has more immigrants of a greater diversity of ethnic background than most western societies today. once in australia, many immigrant groups have formed ethnic community associations, based on region of origin, religion, language or some other commonality. these ethnic community organisations, together with not-for profit organisations delivering migrantspecific programs and services, constitute the immigrant or ethnic component of australian civil society organisations. many ethnic community associations in australia have an impact on the built-environment of australia cities and towns through the buildings they construct, buy or lease in order to provide venues for the range of religious, educational, recreational and community activities that they engage in as part of australia’s ‘ethnic third sector’. indeed, the appropriation of communal places by fragmented ethnic collectives is among the key signifiers of the expanding australian civil society in the past six decades of post-war australian immigration. migrant communities have thus actively shaped the built environment and social environment of their new society and the neighbourhoods in which they settle. this was often because they were either excluded from, or not really welcome in, the social spaces and places of white anglo-celtic australia or because the existing collective spaces did not provide the religious instruction, sport, language instruction, social space or health service that new immigrant communities were seeking. they have thus undertaken steps to ameliorate their own situation and provide pales and spaces for their community to meet, gather, worship, play and learn. through their own collective efforts migrants thus found a way to participate in civil society. they have done it through the establishment of institutions and organisations, establishing organisational structures, social and cultural resources, and developing or appropriating necessary communal places. through this process numbers of participants, consumers and volunteers within australia’s ethnic communities expanded, leadership emerged and new employment opportunities were created. a sense of belonging in the australian neighbourhoods where they settled was established. 64 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 this article explores that part of the ‘ethnic third sector’ that relates to the activities of ethnic community organisations who established a place where the religious, educational, recreational or welfare needs of immigrant communities in australia were met. utilising the concepts of bonding and bridging social capital to explore the social relations that developed in these migrant places and spaces, this article thus attempts to explore an important chapter in story of how post-war migrants have contributed to civil society in australia. these are among the key indicators of migrant impact on civil society in australia. this is a major social contribution of people who often arrive without anything but their culture and high hopes. changing dynamics of ethnic social capital, solidarity and mutuality had a key role in this process. initially developed to provide public spaces and places as an oasis for immigrant communities to meet (ie, as exclusive bonding social capital), these buildings over time have evolved into communal places where immigrant community members mingle with other members of their neighbourhood (bridging social capital), generating contacts wit, and providing services to, the broader community, an important but under-researched story of immigrant inclusion in the cultural, built and social environment through an expanded civil society. ethnic communal development and civil society this contribution documents migrant institutional development through appropriation of ethnic communal places in sydney, their scope, established functions, generated activities, social consequences and interaction (jupp 2002, p. 28)1 . migrant grassroots non-profit associations developed in pursuit of the common good provide a dynamic impetus to the earlier established civil society patterns. ethnic non-profit associations are located between migrants and their families and the rest of society, including the civil society, and, often in the relation to the rest of their own ethnic community. these mediating organisations add to the infrastructure of an expanding civil society and create the foundations of a cosmopolitan city. post-war sydney and australian social development was greatly effected through appropriation of communal places that were perceived as necessary to satisfy migrant needs during settlement in an unknown and often hostile social environment. the unique set of data generated from this sample of ethnic communal organisations is indicative of the confluence of migration and civil society. data briefly document the process of appropriation itself and its impact on civil society through satisfaction of the immediate collectively perceived communal needs. through the process of the appropriation of communal places, migrants actively participate in diverse communal activities, in communal life, generating a new sense of belonging in the place of settlement. active involvement in communal life fosters migrants` individual and collective participation in civil society. this process generates communication flows across ethnic and social boundaries as well and expands migrants` role in a place of settlement. diverse set of data presented in the second part of this contribution tell how civil society is impacted and reconfigured as a consequence of fragmented migrant collective appropriations of communal places that were deemed necessary to improve the quality of communal life during settlement in sydney. civil society is inevitably impacted by migrant participation in diverse communal activities that germinates a new sense of belonging and expands communication space beyond the community boundaries. 1 by 1977 there were at least 2,000 ethnic organisations in australia according to jupp. there are several thousand ethnic community organisations in sydney alone, and many rent and share communal places appropriated by other co-ethnic collectives or the mainstream institutions. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 65 civil society the understanding of civil society implies voluntary participation by people having moral conviction in public life (ahrne 1998), in this case of migrants who organise to satisfy their social and welfare needs. a contemporary comprehension of civil society is located in delineation of “multiple spheres and discourses” that are distinct from state authority and the market, but also from the immediate pursuit of self-interest (jacobs 1998, ehrenberg 1999, p.235, cohen & arato 2003). migrants` pursuit of personal self-interest is often interlinked with joint action towards satisfaction of a communal or group interest, irrespective of their character, that is political, religious, educational, leisure or welfare needs. although differentiated, civil society is inter-related with the state and other spheres of social activity; its institutions and organisations are bound by the constitution, traditions, obligations and the laws the state lays down (shils 2003). civil society as an emergent condition cannot be taken for granted, and is defined within the process of social differentiation and changing boundary relationships between spheres. towards the end of the last century ‘the question of possibility and demands of civil society have evidently been reinvigorated’ (tester 1992, pp.20-25) due to social changes in modernity, including the recognition of cultural diversity in urbanised world, intensive migration and consequent policy changes towards multiculturalism (tester 1992, p. 33; sandercock 1998, pp. 28-29, sandercock 2003, pp.4, 8, 25-27 ). under different conditions of migration, vaclav havel observes that civil society means a society that makes room for the richest possible self-structuring and the richest possible participation in public life (elshtain 2001, p. 277). the implication is that civil society is a repository of sequences of human actions in response to the material, social, cultural and moral environment through which thousands of individual actions or “choices” may act to the benefit of a community as a whole (jacobs 1998, p. 139, elshtain 2001, 264). associational life civil society is expressed through collective action that is voluntary rather than compulsory and persuasive, rather than coercive (walzer 2003, ehrenberg 1999, p.218, elshtain 2001, p. 263). it includes diverse organisations, from churches to voluntary civic associations established to support family, faith and secular interests. such organisations are often established by migrants, ethnic groups, through their own collective action, and some are capable of appropriating their own facilities to satisfy a perceived communal need. to ahrne (1998, pp. 85-86) and anheier (2005, pp. 9, 58) modern civil society is the sum of diverse institutions and organisations which are considered to be the most natural organizational form of human interaction associated with civil society. associations are a major source of information and place of education, representation and alternative governance (cohen & arato 2003, pp.42-45). through a process of creation and access to collective resources, obligations are created, rights acquired and feelings of belonging and empowerment generated that enable sharing of resources and communication with the rest of society too. civil society, considered as the outcome of a long and complex process of historical transformations (keane 1998, p.50) reflects the multiplication and diversification of needs that appear during migration and settlement. to satisfy their own perceived needs, migrants collectively make choices and create communal organisations. migrants appropriate their own collective resources institutionalising solidarity and mutual assistance to gain access to otherwise unavailable 66 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 resources. through development of their own communal organisations, media2 and commercial enterprises migrants find their own place in the local social environment, making their voices heard while creating the foundations of pluralist society (castles 2000, pp. 132, 139). social capital civil society is a product of social capital, of trust and solidarity, of mutuality. the expanding social capital, understood as a combination of norms, trusts and networks (coleman 1990, pp. 300-307; putnam 1993, p. 67; bourdieu 1993, pp.32-33; onyx & bullen 2000, pp. 105-109) among migrants (portes 1995, pp. 12-16) is a key factor in the creation of associational life, in engagement for a common good and in access to the public sphere. migration and settlement experience creates ties among people facing similar constraints. it generates bonding social capital (putnam 2000, pp.22-23) that enables collective action, and is itself energized through development of associational life. migrants create networks and find ways and means to respond to perceived needs and scarcity of resources. out of informal groupings various communal organisations emerge, some capable of appropriating common goods necessary to satisfy a collectively perceived communal need. the development and consumption of communal places of worship and leisure, schools and aged care by migrant collectives is made possible through enhanced bonding or exclusive social capital. bonding capital is further intensified through the generated feeling of belonging and participation in diverse communal activities during settlement in australian society defined by a sobriquet ‘the quarantined culture’ (williams 1995, pp. 2-14), and in a city, sydney, until recently considered as a homogeneous british outpost (freestone 2000, p. 125) at the edge of the pacific. the application of migrants` social capital, together with material and human capital, for socially productive purpose (putnam 2000, p.22) made collective action and creation of communal places possible. through the satisfaction of own their social needs, migrants` impact on civil society. the final product of this development is in the emergence of bridging or inclusive social capital (putnam 2000, p.22) that reaches towards the other segments of society and impacts on civil society beyond the ethnic and collective boundaries. bridging and bonding social capital across the ethnic, generational and social divide are a prerequisite of social cohesion, a flourishing civil society and organisational sustainability. through intensive interaction with their own social, human and material capital many migrant collectives made sydney, and many other urban environments, a nicer place to live. this is reflected in beautiful buildings, a generated sense of belonging in a new environment, migrant participation in community life, in a multitude of experienced activities, expanded communication flows and in civil society dynamics. australian social dynamics after a failure to attract large numbers of migrants from britain, australian authorities turned their sights to a war-ravaged continental europe, to refugees, displaced persons and other potential migrants. this had dramatic impact on demographic, social and cultural structures in a society grounded on the transferred cultural and social institutions from the british isles aitkin 2005, pp. 2, 7). during the 1970s the white australia policy was abandoned, and 2 there are over 100 non-english periodicals and 23 community and commercial radio and tv stations, besides sbs, registered currently by the community relations commission for a multicultural nsw (www.crc.nsw.gov.au/ethnic_media). cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 67 patterns of migration expanded from refugees, chain migration and family reunion to permanent and temporary skilled migrants, and to new sources of migrants in asia, africa and latin america. the number of inhabitants in australia increased to 20 million in 2001 from 7.7 million in 1947. the continuously changing patterns of migration structure increased the share of inhabitants of non-english speaking background from 2.2 per cent of 1, 7 million inhabitants to 23.4 percent of 4 million in the most popular destination, sydney, during the same period (abs 2001). australian society at the edge of modernity was least of all prepared for the diverse needs of new settlers who had to turn to themselves to solve most issues outside of employment and dealings with the government. post-war settlers arrived in a country that was described by horne (1978, p. 21) as having an indolent social climate, general prosperity and a philosophy of happiness, ‘but life was dismal…with drink, sport, and money as the main diversions apart from their family life’. australia was preoccupied with growth, not diversity (rickard 1988, p. 227). the prevailing exclusionary system was not tolerant of differences (greig, lewins & white 2003, p. 188; horne 1978, p. 18)) and public use of other languages ‘marked the limits of xenophobia and hostility in the public realm’ (murphy 2000, p. 161). the ‘momentous change’ (murphy 2000, p. 166) generated out of a large scale diversified immigration brought social and cultural changes, opened public space, and introduced new elements of civil society in a ‘provincial nation’ with the self-focused civil society organisations (horne 1987, p. 114; horne 1980, p. 65). the field of social interaction changed due to the immigration process and subsequent migrant collective actions expressed through communal development. government interventions the major elements of the australian vision of the state and its role in society was conceptualised until recently (kelly 1992, pp. 1-2; altman 2006, p. 18) around the issues of white australia policy, welfare state based on industry protection and wage arbitration, state paternalism, and imperial benevolence. public authorities had a paramount role, including as ‘the creator of civil society’ from the earliest days of modern settlement (castles 1989, p. 42). australia was considered to be a welfare society imbued with the egalitarian credo, therefore inclusive of a key principle of a modern civil society (cohen & arato 2003, p. 285). towards the end of the twentieth century these constitutive elements of social construction and sense of social cohesion mostly disappeared from the centre of public policy, as material issues and the individual privileges superseded the sense of social solidarity (mackay 1993, p. 271; aitkin 2005, p. 207; altman 2006, p. 12, 27, 53, 77). the welfare system in a ‘lucky country’ (horne 1978, p. 217) based on protectionism, exclusion and white male domination ignored the marginalised categories well into the 1970’s (macintyre 1993, p. 321; greig, lewins & white 2003, p. 180, 183). it was hardly a ‘fair go’ society for aborigines, to women (horne 1970, p. 121; rickard 1988, p. 229; mackay 1993, p.24), and to migrants who were subject to assimilation pressures, as well as social and cultural marginalisation (biskup 1982, markus 1982, weeks 2000). the civil society in australia needed an impetus, and it came through migration and migrant communal development also. australian governments of both colours were a key driving force in fostering post-war migration and development of settlement policies and were, much more than the prevailing public opinion, positively disposed towards increasing and diversifying migration intake. the 68 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 department of immigration established the good neighbour movement in 1949 with an aim to support the settlement and welfare of new australians and to circumvent local difficulties for its ambitious immigration programme (lopez 2000, pp. 45, 95; murphy 2000, pp. 162164). however, within the prevailing assimilation ideology, ignoring diverse migrant cultures and experiences (jordens 1995, pp. 77-79), the movement lost its purpose as it communicated mostly with the british migrants and was terminated in 1978 in a new climate of multiculturalism. nevertheless, the attention eventually became focused on society`s responsibility towards new migrants, and, in 1971, the minister of immigration lynch (1971, p. 16; 1970, p. 13) emphasised that migrants must ‘become full and equal partners in our national life’. among other changes, authorities started providing short term funding to migrant organisations from the late 1960s. very soon in the 1970s authorities established diverse institutions such as the ethnic affairs commissions, ethnic community councils, and sbs radio and television service in state capitals with the intent to improve communication across cultural differences (jupp 2002, pp. 80-81; jordens 1995, p. 88). however, due to cultural and social differences and settlement strains deprivations persisted. the findings by the henderson commission in 1975 (pp. 269-281) indicating the destitute position of many migrants corroborates other research findings (jakubowicz 1989, collins, j. 1991, cox 1975, jupp 1991, jupp, 1986, martin, 1975, martin 1978). the disadvantageous position of most southern europe migrants who mostly did not benefit from the assisted passage scheme was further enhanced because of limited opportunities for english language tuition. this has dire consequence today for many ageing european migrants as many have difficulties in their communication with the rest of society (collins & lalich 2004, pp. 29-31). also, many elderly asian migrants are in a similar situation as they encounter limited possibilities to learn english. in such a situation many migrant collectives had to find their own solutions for some urgent social problems. they secured provision of necessary services through the appropriation of their own communal places. the situation prior to the acknowledgment of cultural diversity and introduction of multiculturalism is best described by the finding of the fraser governmentappointed galbally committee of review of post arrival programs and services to migrants in 1978 that migrant organisations are ‘…the best channel for provision of support to ethnic communities’ (galbally 1978, p. 64). this is the best acknowledgment of the role of migrant communal organisations in society and of the migrant contribution to the development of civil society in australia. the inevitable social changes that found their expression in policy initiatives that were gradually introduced from the mid 1970s culminated in the recognition of cultural diversity and the introduction and adherence to multicultural policies. these developments affected the quality of life of migrants and broke the obvious cultural and communication gap. new policies, based on the principles of equity of access to public resources, maintenance of culture, self-help, creation of culture-specific services for migrants and consultation with clients (jupp 2002, p. 80), became instrumental in opening a space for the inclusion of migrant communities in civil society too. further changes of education, child and aged care policies (hartley 1995, marginson 1997, brennan 1998) impacted development and maintenance of ethnic childcare, schools and aged care places too. hence, the observation by cope and kalantzis (2000, pp. 80-83, 288, 339) that the watershed of civic pluralism was being reached towards the end of the last century, as an extension of participatory democracy cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 69 based upon cultural democracy and expressed through multiculturalism, including the creation of multicultural citizenship. migrant collective action in sydney and civil society post-war australian experience confirms observation by walzer (2003, p.321) that civil society is sustained by small groups of people that are necessarily fragmented and localized as they are incorporated. migrant voluntary collective action generated out of self-help, solidarity and mutuality at grass roots level is instrumental in expanding civil society through the creation of their own non-profit communal institutions. it enables collective appropriation of communal places that facilitate the everyday life of people who found themselves in a disadvantageous position during settlement. migrants interact and strengthen the sense of responsibility as they create institutional elements of civil society through collective acts. migration experience creates a habitus (bourdieu 2000, p.148; 1990, p.52) that is advantageous for community development as the exigency eventually ‘triggers action’. migrant needs, cultural differences, the inability and unwillingness of local introspective institutions to support settlement provides impetus for grass-roots collective actions. the appropriation of around 450 communal places by diverse ethnic organisations in sydney to satisfy collectively perceived needs makes it possible to identify and quantify investment into appropriated common goods and its outcome, including participation and activities through which such participation is exercised in community life and in civil society. this experience is framed by the continental divide and the role of government in economic and social life (pusey 1998, p.52; greig, lewins & white 2003, p. 194; aitkin 2005, p. 11). migrants participate in different forms during the appropriation, consumption and representation of communal places. although volunteers are considered as a critical constraint in community organisations (light 1972, p. 135, drucker 1985, p. 182), claims that ‘there are volunteers available according to the organisational need’ and ‘people help on request’ indicate the high propensity of migrants to volunteer and that volunteering is a factor of the urgency (lalich 2004, p.265). the acquisition and maintenance of appropriated communal places are made possible through voluntary collective commitment that differs within the organisational life cycle through provision of finance, material, labour and time. the significance and the extent of migrant participation in ethnic communal organisations are difficult to estimate (portes & bach 1985, p. 307; light & bonacich 1991, p. 290). through engagement for the common good, the otherwise under-utilised migrant human resources participate in fragmented collective endeavours to alleviate social problems. voluntary labour was of key importance in the development of religious and leisure facilities in the early postwar decades, otherwise it would not have been possible. today, nearly 18,000 volunteers actively engaged in ethnic communal places in sydney represent just a segment of the local migrant volunteer participation. besides volunteers, in these organisations are employed around 5,000 people with diverse skills who are not necessarily co-ethnics (lalich 2004, p.281). most voluntary involvement is in places of worship (as much as 65.3 per cent), 20.0 per cent is in leisure, 3.2 per cent in education and 11.5 per cent in welfare organisations. this underlines the importance of religion to migrants and community life; educational organisations have a smaller participation rate due to their management by professional staff. volunteers in welfare organisations include second generation well-educated professionals serving on boards, are indicative of the importance of these organisations beyond the 70 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 generational change. the appropriation of material assets with estimated value of around six billion dollars in sydney (burnley 2006, p. 40) which generated annual income of at least 190 million dollars in 1997/98 (lalich 2004) is the key outcome of interaction of human capital with the newly-created social capital at a time of exigency during settlement. the significance of volunteering by 17,780 recorded volunteers is best illustrated with the application of data on average hours that australians devote to voluntary work per week, which ranges from 0.70 to 3.3 hours (lyons 1994, pp.37-38; ironmonger 2000, p. 61). if it is assumed that they volunteer on average at least two hours per week, or around 100 hours a year, the total amounts to a million and three quarter volunteer hours in sydney in 2000. full appreciation would have to take into account that most of it is after work-hours and over the weekends, and at the expense of family time and alternative life opportunities. foundations of a cosmopolitan city ethnic collectives appropriated a wide range of communal places dispersed across the sydney metropolitan area. migrants developed over half a million square metres of space where the needs of around two hundred thousand persons can be met at any given moment. such development represents a major social value and is the best signifier of migrants’ capability to satisfy collectively perceived communal needs through grassroots collective action. the beginning of this process was located in a time when sydney, according to horne (1978, p.11), did not ‘yet possess a really sophisticated city life, although it is beginning to imitate one’. the development presented in table 1 shows the outcome of migrants’ collective endeavours, fragmented due to cultural, linguistic, regional and ideological differences. it is identified in the creation of community capital that permeates communal life, developed sense of belonging, participation in diverse activities, and creation of new communication flows. table 1 ethnic communal places: developed capacities, sydney, 2000 estimate (persons, sqm) institutions religious1 (n206) leisure2 (n94) education3 (n39) welfare 4 (n47) total (n386) developed space5 209,656 103,117 56,345 104,373 473,491 user place6 119,819 48,081 10,751 2,2704 180,962 regular users 191,983 117,412 9,8207 2,1977 321,4127 source: walter f. lalich, ethnic community capital: the development of ethnic social infrastructure in sydney, unpublished phd dissertation, university of technology, sydney, 2004, p 207. notes: 1. any religious building, including halls and attached classrooms. 2. social and sports clubs, community halls and centers. 3. includes child-care facilities; some new schools were not filled to capacity. 4. including retirement and nursing homes (40 units). 5. square metres. 6. persons, excluding football stadium places. 7. adjusted for volunteers and employees would be 11,568 and 6,002 persons or total of 326, 965 regular users. these capacities were developed through the actions of often small groups that experienced intensive social capital formation that made possible their disposition towards joint action for a common purpose. such collective acts create tangible referents in social space ‘that buttress the meaning of experience and shape the character of reciprocity’ (fernandez-kelly 1995, p.220). table 2 shows this process during the post-war period with data divided into two subperiods: the first (1950-1980) roughly covers the earlier assimilation period that terminated with the landmark recognition of ethnic communal organisations by the galbally committee in 1978 (galbally 1978, p. 64). the second period, from 1980, parallels the development of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 71 multicultural policies and provision of public financial support to ethnic organisations, primarily to schools, childcare and aged care. table 2. the development of ethnic communal places1: intensity of development, by type and period, sydney, 1950-2000, estimate (n=units) periods religious2 leisure3 education4 welfare5 total 1950-1970 28 12 2 6 48 1961-1970 31 15 5 6 57 1971-1980 31 21 11 4 67 total 1950-1980 90 48 18 16 172 1981-1990 51 31 18 17 117 1991-2000 67 15 8 14 104 total 1981-2000 118 46 26 31 221 total 1950-2000 208 94 44 47 393 source: walter f. lalich, ethnic community capital: the development of ethnic social infrastructure in sydney, unpublished phd dissertation, university of technology, sydney, 2004, p 209. notes: 1. data relate only to respondent organisations representing about 84 per cent of the total field. 2. any religious building, including halls. 3. social and sports clubs, community halls and centres. 4. includes child-care facilities, but schools make 55 % of development. 5. retirement and nursing homes make 77% of all development. the apparent cultural differentiation in the post war years forced migrants` to secure badly needed religious and leisure facilities. the experienced cultural differences and inadequate existing public places were, alongside the assimilation pressures, major influences on the development of many clubs and places of worship. the development in the later years was influenced by increased investment capability, and migrant physical and social mobility, unlike in the earlier decades when the development was primarily influenced by diversification of continuous migration flows and persistence of cultural differences. the gradual stagnation of the development of leisure places in the 1990`s is indicative of social changes and the development of services in a cosmopolitan city capable of satisfying needs of new migrants. the expanding hospitality industry offset the growing needs of migrants, local inhabitants and tourists towards the end of century. consequently, many migrants from asia, africa and latin america, instead of clubs, opened restaurants for which there was increased demand in the mainstream society too. also, some ethnic clubs encountered new opportunities. many latin american migrants joined the leading italian migrant social and sport club marconi. the sydney croatian club, located in punchbowl, is often used by lebanese and macedonian migrants, while the restaurant in the spanish club in the cbd attracted many asian students and tourists until recently when it closed down. sydney, today, differs from the one at the mid-century, when european and asian restaurants were a rarity. the intensity of the appropriation of places of worship continued over the whole period due to the arrival of people with different religious background and the economic empowerment of many religious collectives. religious organisations often provide language tuition, education and welfare services either at their own premises or through development of new facilities. new and larger places are being built, like the greek orthodox all saints church in belmore that stands beside the old wooden church, now a library and youth club. furthermore, many 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 churches and meeting places built earlier were appropriated and preserved as heritage and public places; the croatian catholic church st anthony in summer hill was a congregational church, while a former masonic hall in ashfield is now a chinese buddhist and taoist temple. the development of education and welfare facilities increased significantly in the second period, indicating changes in perceived social needs, expanding cultural diversity, increasing living standards and analogous policy changes. multicultural policies and concurrent social policy changes have effected the development and daily financing of ethnic day schools, childcare and aged care services since the late 1970’s onwards. this communal development is a symbolic identifier of arrival, presence and permanency, but also a symbol of social success, created sense of belonging and affirmation of the transferred cultural heritage. moreover, it is also a symbol of resistance (pile & keith 1997, routledge 1997, pp.70-71) to assimilation pressures and of social capital generated in a time of exigency applied towards enhanced communal benefit. the significance of many communal places appropriated by ethnic communities is in their higher level of expected sustainability in comparison to commercial edifices and home residencies. many are expected to survive social and generational changes, and remain as key communication nodes of a cosmopolitan city (lalich 2004, pp.324-330). civil society expansion the significance of ethnic communal places in civil society is discussed through the generated sense of localized belonging and participation in communal activities that enable communication within collectives and across cultural and spatial boundaries. ethnic communal places in cosmopolitan space identify the diversity of civil society, but, despite political changes, many ethnic organisations encounter problems either from neighbours or officials (lyall 1990, bouma, daw & munawar 2001, dunn 2001). many ethnic organisations still experience expensive litigation in an attempt to proceed with development. now, many locate in semi-industrial zones to escape prejudices and parking difficulties, as well as court cases, while making the best use of public transport for their ageing members. participation the appropriation of ethnic communal places or capital was a strategy used by migrant collectives to satisfy community-perceived needs at the time of settlement, responding not only to exigency and crisis motives but also to the perceived future needs. such motives differ due to culture and settlement experiences, and time of arrival, but determine the future consumption patterns. the consumption of these places could be defined by the density of a flow of people who use created resources through developed functions and organised activities. the flow of people is a prerequisite of civil society (ahrne 1998, p. 94). the undertaken appropriations as a consequence of ‘functional imperatives’ reflect ‘the pressures of scarcity of time, opportunity and resources in the object situation’ (parsons, shils & olds 1951, p. 177). the registered development in sydney is focused on manifested or intended functional categories that have a crucial role for the ‘continuous existence of a society’ (giddens 1997, p. 561-2). the established functions of migrant communal places define the intent of a particular collective, and secure conditions for continuous participation in communal life. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 73 functions impact the activities or events that can be realised within the defined limits of a place. appropriated places differ according to their function(s) and their ability to affect other systems (katz & kahn 1966, p. 62), including other segments of civil society. a functional place can host unintended or latent activities too (giddens 1997, p. 562) due to the everpresent scarcity of public and community space, and because life in a new social environment initiates a concentration of diverse activities. the established functions also define the symbolic representation of places and ethnic communities as well as identify their embeddedness in a place of settlement. although 40 per cent of respondent religious and 34 per cent of leisure communal places have only one function, some 34 per cent of religious and 37 per cent of leisure places have at least one additional function, and the rest more than three functions each. however, a recorded 206 religious organisations developed 197 additional functions, of which 37 per cent indicated education and 21 per cent a role as a community centre as their secondary function (lalich 2004, pp. 306-308). diversity of functions and appropriation of various roles makes many religious places key factors in community life and displays their vitality. places of leisure identified 105 additional functions indicating their functional diversity, besides their primary role as gathering places. only 56 per cent indicate being a social club, while the rest indicate sports club, a place for recreation, and a community centre as their major function. differences in their attributions represent a response to changes in society, in perceptions of community needs and the capability to produce a satisfactory response. such changes emphasise culture, education, welfare and charity as key functions of these communal places appropriated during the 1990’s. communal activities this development process enables unimpeded occurrence of relevant events or activities making a particular place a living one. activities define the significance of a place to the particular collective as it is in the focus of everyday experience, however, access to and opportunity for activities would inevitably differ (golledge & stimson 1997, p. 282). places of worship and of leisure offer more opportunities and generate more activities than other categories. respondent religious organisations identified over 3,000 activities or around fifteen different activities per unit, while leisure organisations identified at least 1770 activities or around nineteen per unit. education and welfare organisations identified 305 and 465 registered activities respectively, or approximately ten per unit. altogether, at least 5,540 identified activities enable participation and communication in diverse directions (lalich 2004, pp.310-312). some activities are organised even by outside bodies, not necessarily the co-ethnic. it is essential to distinguish newly generated activities from generic ones that directly relate to the original function of a place. generated activities make up more than half of all activities across categories indicating their importance in community life. among generic activities are functional, administrative and social ones. the administrative activities enable the functioning of the community and the management of appropriated places, while the social ones include the opportunity for gatherings, meeting friends and social events. the third set of activities is clearly defined by the key function, such as the act of worship, participation in sport and looking after children. all other activities are deemed to be unintended generated activities. their intensity is much more dispersed, and are mostly identified as commercial, cultural, educational, entertainment, 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 religious, welfare, and as age, gender and youth oriented activities. the diversity and intensity of experienced activities is of vital significance for the future of these organisations, as not all members display an equal degree of interest in participation in activities generated within and even out of a particular communal place. although this development reflects feeling of sameness and internal group solidarity its impact is not limited to these places, as the creation of multiple activities originates opportunities for contacts across the cultural divide. belonging it is argued by gupta and ferguson (1997, pp. 36, 39-41) that the sense of community refers both to a demarcated physical space and to clusters of interactions and that it could be highly ‘localized’ in a social sense. migrants develop a sense of attachment to a specific communal place which they have appropriated, where they associate, create friendships and develop loyalties deakin 2001, p. 60). in these communal places are embedded diverse phenomenological and functional attributes of significance to concerned communities. these identify a generated sense of belonging in a new environment which is the essence of civil society and citizenship. a sense of place or belonging, and ascribed social and community values, is best identified by the richness of functional and relational signifiers attached to developed places, such as: home, hub of community, part of homeland, own place, ours, binding, belonging, island, mother, sacred (lalich 2004, p. 320). their social value is found in the understanding that it was ‘worth getting’ or ‘having it’ (bond 1983, p. 1). fortier describes appropriated physical spaces as ‘migrant belongings’ or terrains constituted for the creation of a collective sense of belonging (2000, p. 2). such places enable a way of life in the new social environment and generate closer community relationships of sameness and togetherness. the main reason behind the appropriation of communal places was to establish the conditions for creating a home for a transferred culture and a meeting place where people could meet without intimidation. this development facilitates the congregation of people besides established key religious, leisure, education and welfare functions. these communal places are neither inherited nor a product of a planned urban development, but reflect a collective response to perceived needs at the time of exigency in the encounter with social deprivation and indifference in a new social environment. in a dynamic city defined by spatial and social mobility the only relevant fixed and defined nodes for many citizens are their own communal places where they feel at home. these migrant appropriated communal places compensate for a home left behind, but as localized homes to transferred cultures they create key attributes of civil society and of a cosmopolitan city as well. communication through sport the past discrepancy between demand and supply is best illustrated through the development of football as a major mode of recreation for many migrants and its acceptance as one of the major sports by the mainstream after a half a century of struggle. to post-war european migrants local sports were unfamiliar, unlike football to which they could relate, develop further, and organise and mobilise human and material resources around it. football provided a vehicle for communication within and across the communities and with mainstream society. sports clubs provided grounds for the affirmation of identity, community support, and are, as major social outlets (cashman 1995, p. 163; mosely et al. 1997, p.xv; mosely 1997), key communication nodes in the sydney metropolitan area. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 75 during this process, ethnic collectives established over 70 sports grounds; besides football grounds these include bocce, pelota and petanque grounds, and air rifle ranges. some ethnic clubs underwent a process of expansion and modernisation to suit the needs of increased demand and membership needs, as ‘the post-war generation of immigrants gave way to a new generation of australian-born’ (hughes a. 1997, p. 109). towards the end of last century football clubs were subject to pressures to de-ethnicise to improve possibilities for the game (miller 1992, p. 109; mosely 1997; taylor & toohey 1997). many clubs eventually changed names. in more recent years, governments supported the reorganization of the national competition on the basis of commercial franchises at the city level. subsequently, the original leading national football clubs were relegated to the state level competitions with a detrimental effect on their futures. ethnic football had a major role in the creation of civil society and enhanced the sense of social cohesion and belonging despite severe structural constraints. football created new social opportunities. nearly half a century ago, charlie perkins, an early aboriginal activist, played for budapest and croatia football clubs in adelaide and later for the pan-hellenic in sydney in the 1960s (horne 1987, p. 74). the captain of the national football team during the 1970s, johnny warren, instead of joining other well established local football codes, associated with ‘wogs, sheilas and poofters’ as he aptly puts it on the cover page of his unofficial biography of football in australia (warren, harper & whittington 2002). the sentiments changed radically in 2006 during the world cup, when footballers acquired the status of national heroes. these expanding forms of cross-cultural communication stand in sharp contrast to the concurrent nostalgic parochial sentiments in a country whose identity is defined by sporting success manifested by the way in which media commentary on international sporting events is reduced to almost total concentration on the australian competitors (altman 2003, pp. 47-48). similarly, various other introduced leisure patterns and sports facilitate cross-cultural communication creating the foundations of a cosmopolitan city, generating conditions for communication across ethnic, cultural and spatial limits. the examples abound through joint use of sportsgrounds, halls and mixed team membership. mixed crews of dragon boats clearly show that one among the major impediments to local civil society, the white australia policy, has disappeared for good. concluding remarks the appropriation of communal places by fragmented ethnic collectives is among the key signifiers of the expanding australian civil society. migrant communities did not wait for opportunities to facilitate inclusion in society, and have undertaken steps to ameliorate their own situation amidst scarcity and diverse constraints. through their own collective efforts migrants found a way to participate in civil society. they have done it through the establishment of institutions and organisations, despite existing cultural and linguistic differences, and limited resources. migrants established organisational structures, social and cultural resources, and appropriated necessary communal places. through this process numbers of participants, consumers and volunteers expanded, leadership emerged and new employment opportunities are created. a sense of belonging in a place of settlement was established. these are among the key indicators of migrant impact on civil society in australia. through active civic participation and generated bonding and bridging social capital, migrants contribute to civil society. 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.2, no.1, 2010 the enhanced sense of community together with innumerable opportunities for social interaction and civic engagement generated by migrant direct participation in communal life has fundamental implications for democratic communities (cohen & rogers 1995, p. 45; elshtain & beem 2002, p. 37). it is a major social contribution of people who often arrive without anything but their culture and high hopes. ethnic social capital, solidarity and mutuality had a key role in this process. out of bonding, exclusive, social capital evolved communal places and bridging social capital, generating contacts with the rest of society and inclusion in the cultural and social environment through an expanded civil society. references ahrne, g. 1998, ‘civil society and uncivil organizations’, in j. c. alexander (ed), real civil 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cambridge university press, melbourne. welfare4 cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 14, no. 1 2022 © 2022 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: nkrumah, b. 2022. think tanks and democratisation in south africa. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:1, 17–31. https://doi.org/10.5130/ ccs.v14.i1.7722 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) think tanks and democratisation in south africa bright nkrumah university of the free state, south africa corresponding author: bright nkrumah, center for human rights, university of the free state, 205 nelson mandela dr, park west, bloemfontein, 9301, south africa, bright.nkrumahup@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7722 article history: received 13/05/2021; revised 19/01/2022; accepted 15/02/2022; published 31/03/2022 abstract as policy and research institutes, think tanks have advisory and monitoring mandates that could be channelled towards consolidating democracy. yet, although south africa has some well-established think tanks (wett), their presence has not translated into enhancing race relations and living conditions. there is therefore the need to explore why these institutions have been unable to sufficiently influence policy and practice, mainly in the area of social cohesion and socio-economic welfare. it is against this backdrop that the paper looks at the evolving nature and works of two wetts. the paper considers their capacities and challenges in strengthening race relations and social protection. proposing a persuasive argument for the creation of an enabling environment, the paper draws from political theories in suggesting ways of enhancing a vibrant think thank sector in contemporary south africa. keywords think tanks; south africa; democratisation; social justice declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 17 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7722 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7722 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:bright.nkrumahup@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7722 introduction since its transition into democracy in 1994, south africa continues to experience major setbacks in the area of enduring racism, poverty, and inequality (buccus 2021; moll 2021; moosa et al. 2021; rossouw & greyling 2021; sihlobo 2021). even though citizens have, for decades, adopted different coping strategies, racial tension and largescale deprivation abound. in the end, the ability of any regime to transcend these challenges is dependent on what measures and how well political figures contain, forestall, and manage these setbacks. in pursuit of this objective, the supportive role of think tanks towards substantive political change and social equality (democratization) is critical (fraussen & halpin 2017). the role of these organizations is especially relevant in contemporary times as the platform for promoting socio-economic justice is increasingly being dominated by advocacy and partisan agents who seek to drive their narrow agendas (kelstrup 2020). in the sphere of political and social studies, very few concepts remain as contentious as the notion of ‘think tanks’ (handy 2020). in the main, these institutions may be construed as private institutions, which seek to promote the public interest by churning out ideas to shape policy design and operationalization (stone 2000). as a result, their activities are tailored towards shaping policy and implementing ideas, in addition to their primary function as knowledge hubs (savage 2016). this triple role may be summarized as networkers, thinkers, and implementers. be that as it may, insomuch as some perceive these institutions as neutral agencies responsible for using their research and capacities for the politico-economic advancement of the host state, others conceptualize them as playgrounds used by external actors to reform or stabilize a country’s socio-political status quo (scott 1999; anderson et al. 2017; fraussen & halpin 2017; nylen 2018). to an avid reader, the claims of the latter might be tempting as most have longstanding relations with external actors, often termed donors. this suspicion is further aroused by grants, which critics argue ensures that the development and implementation of research strategies by these institutions are shaped by the priorities of these donors. in other words, these critics counter the popular romantic notion of autonomous think tanks by passionately asserting that it is these funders who drive the agenda of these institutions, determine what strategy to be used or what information to be gathered to monitor political development in the concerned state (hearn 2000, 2001). still, think tanks have overarching mandates which could be used to influence the framing and operationalisation of progressive policies. as an illustration, the contribution of these bodies towards a racially diverse national leadership and a good socio-economic policy will, on the one hand, promote social cohesion, and on the other, foster economic prosperity through job creation, food security, and quality health care. however, despite the proliferation of these institutes in contemporary south africa, the marginalization of vulnerable populations and racial tension thrives. this development raises a burning question: what factors hinder these think tanks from sufficiently influencing policy and practice, mainly in the area of social cohesion and socio-economic welfare? in seeking answers to this question, the paper surveys in greater detail the evolution, thematic areas, roles played, and challenges faced by think tanks in their quest to influence policies. nonetheless, inasmuch as all local think-thanks might pursue a common agenda of contributing towards democracy promotion, the exertion of influence or impact across policy spheres may differ, be unequal, uneven at the (sub)national level and within different constituencies. as a result, one must exercise caution in making general claims about the impact of these organizations on political and socioeconomic policies. nevertheless, since some of the most pressing issues facing south africa are not so much of its external relations, the paper will limit itself to two well-established think tanks (wett) engaging in domestic issues. excluding the present introduction, the paper is structured in three parts: (i) the historical evolution of think tanks in the apartheid regime; (ii) the role they played towards south africa’s peaceful transition into democracy; and (iii) the remote and immediate factors that have contributed to their continued growth nkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202218 in numbers. this is followed by an overview of the contemporary activities of two think tanks and their influence (if any) towards an inclusive society and social assistance. under this discussion, focus will be placed on the activities and challenges of the institute of race relations (irr) and the black sash. to this end, the contributions and challenges of these two bodies, dominant in these spaces, will be highlighted. finally, the paper turns its attention to examine the challenges faced by these organizations and what strategies could be used to improve their effectiveness. the rise of think tanks and subsequent growth think tanks may be construed as autonomous research institutions that translate academic concepts into policy and practice (fraussen & halpin 2017). as compared with some that undertake cross-cutting projects covering good governance, human rights, and women’s rights, others adopt a more focused approach (handy 2020). nonetheless, understanding the emergence and current role of think tanks needs one to familiarize her/himself with two social movement theories: political opportunity structure (pos) and resource mobilization (rm). whereas rm can link the emergence and proliferation of think tanks to the availability of donor funding, pos ties their growing number to the opening up of political space for such institutions to emerge and thrive. a practical illustration of pos could be traced to the gradual emergence of think thanks in the early 20th century when the apartheid regime somewhat relaxed strict regulations governing the formation and funding of such bodies. to a great extent, the viable political space was engendered by increased international pressure for the apartheid regime to transition towards democratic governance and enhance race relations. after a while, the escalation of human rights abuses between the 1970s and the late 80s, equally fostered rm, with a number of donor agencies providing logistics for the proliferation of think tanks to serve as checks on the powers of the government. under this era, these bodies fell into two camps: conservatives and liberal/reformists. on the one hand, the reformists advocated for a radical transition to majority rule. the black sash (previously women’s defence of the constitution league) and irr used study projects, setting up libraries and quarterly journals to highlight the apartheid government’s injustices and deprivations faced by marginalised natives. these two bodies, for example, gained considerable financial assistance from international charity organisations such as the carnegie corporation of new york (habib & taylor 1999). on the other hand, the conservatives sought to entrench white minority rule. to this end, an egalitarian organisation such as the afrikaner broederbond launched the south african bureau of racial affairs (sabra) as an alternative to the irr and black sash. although disbanded, the bureau was the intellectual powerbase of the apartheid regime, as members of the institute used research, conferences and lectures to provide ideological justification for racial and socio-economic discrimination against non-whites. the ideological differences of these two distinct groups were most evident in the 1970s, which was a watershed for civil agitation. to be exact, the 1976 soweto massacre launched renewed awareness of the suppressive system of government under which the majority of the black population lived (hlongwane 2007). in terms of rm, the media reports of atrocities perpetrated against women and children which found their way into western media mobilized the international community to not only impose economic sanctions on the country but channel considerable financial support to local organizations interested in pursuing the anti-apartheid agenda (taylor 1990). as a consequence, external funding witnessed a considerable increase in post-1976, with norway and sweden as the lead actors (habib & taylor 1999). this effort led to the international isolation of the apartheid regime with the imposition of sanctions and nine-year financial support from the us and europe totalling $340 million to think tanks and other reformists till the end of the transition process (hearn 2000, p. 817). nkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202219 but, regardless of the enormous contribution made by these external actors, there is still a paucity of data on the specific amount given by each country to think tanks, not least in light of the covert nature of that assistance. this global support was complemented with domestic assistance from civil associations, residents’ associations, cultural, women’s and youth associations, trade unions, and religious groups. a disproportionate percentage of this domestic assistance was channelled to recently released political prisoners, activists with ‘struggle credentials’ (having been engaged in the anti-apartheid struggle), and young graduates to form think tanks to survey and devise strategies to overcome segregation and racial domination (gurney 2009). still, although, the airing of the massacre (in the western media) attracted widespread solidarity for the liberal or reformist institutions, these institutions faced considerable hurdles on the ground. primarily, the political system was neither enabling nor democratic for the institutions to flourish, specifically as the tax regime, security, and legal environment were unfavourable to their activities. when in fact the state excluded some from major policy processes and co-opted others into silence, few continued in their anti-apartheid agenda. two of these organisations which constantly pushed back the government’s repression are the irr and black sash. having said that, the palace coup that was orchestrated by f.w. de klerk, which led to the overthrow of pw botha in the early 1990s, opened up many political opportunities with the removal of latent restrictions on the operations of reformist organizations (hopkins 2003). for example, the state repealed the 1978 fundraising act (fa) that imposed restrictions on the ability of these think tanks to source external funding (habib & taylor 1999). this development also gave impetus for the proliferation of new think tanks. in the lead-up to negotiations for majority rule in 1990, the prevailing racial blocs of anti-and-pro-apartheid organisations somewhat became hazy, as pro-apartheid organizations began to cross the carpet to the opposing camp (habib 2005). since the country’s first democratic election in 1994, the previous friendlyhostile relationship on racial lines seems to have further eroded, with new relationships forged more on left-right ideological lines. to some extent, the shift indicates that a change in a system of government often affects the relationship of institutions that seek to safeguard human freedom and welfare. yet, despite this new freedom, many think tanks were still in dire financial stress as (domestic and foreign) donors redirected their resources to the post-1994 mandela administration. there has not been a detailed account of this turn of events to the extent that it affected the operations of these institutions. there is uncertainty over how much funding was rechannelled to the state, how much was lost by these organizations, and to what extent this setback redefined their priorities. to provide needed resources to struggling organizations, parliament adopted the 1997 nonprofit organisations act (npo) as a means of assisting those with valid audit records (hendricks & wyngaard 2013). subsequently, registered think tanks were granted tax exempt status with the reform of the tax regime in 2001, and the national lottery commission and national development agency were formed to provide extra financial support to these organizations (heinrich 2001). this was complemented with the establishment of a unit in the department of social welfare to coordinate the relationship between government and think tanks. thus, the transition to democracy in 1994 was accompanied by an improved political, financial, and legal environment, which has fostered and encouraged the growth of think tanks, and collaborative engagement with the government. in most instances, those who receive support from the state, and those outside this bracket, but with relevant expertise, are often approached by the state to provide advice on a social problem or to undertake monitoring and evaluation of projects (hearn 2000). occasionally, this undertaking attracts the attention of donors who may approach a competing organization or private consulting firm to carry out a similar exercise to supplement the efforts of the state. but should one be worried about this ‘cordial’ relationship between the institutions and state? responses to this question can be grouped into two camps. to the first camp, an overly friendly relationship could compromise the ability of these institutions to tailor their research towards scrutinizing the operations of nkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202220 the government and to address the needs of marginalized communities who might not be on the priority list of the state (hendricks & wyngaard 2013; almiron 2017). by being recipients, these organizations may embark on research commissioned or mandated by the state, which in most cases will seek to justify rather than critique the government’s (in)action on issues relating to budget monitoring, extractives, and women’s rights. reflecting this, many think tanks have shifted their agenda towards issues relating to abstract notions of socio-economic rights, with few focusing on the question of state accountability, which has not fared well in contemporary times. the second camp, however, contradicts the opinions of the first group by arguing that such partnerships with the state can strengthen policy influence as politicians treat with suspicion recommendations advanced by institutions perceived as critics (habib & taylor 1999; habib 2005). regardless of these contentions, the contemporary political environment is certainly more enabling than in the pre-democratic era. as a result, by the end of 2019, there were 92 registered think tanks in south africa, making the country a hub of the largest number of think tanks in the african region (mcgann 2020). in sum, changes to the normative and institutional frameworks have to a greater extent encouraged the operations and proliferation of think tanks in the country. but has the sheer increase in number contributed to their influence in shaping and enhancing democratization? in seeking an answer to this question, the next section will assess some of the detailed activities of two think tanks, analysing what impact they have had on democratic consolidation, and what militates against their continued influence in this regard. the primary roles of think tanks since transitioning to a democracy nearly three decades ago, the rainbow nation has experienced the challenge of appreciating the contributions of think tanks, and what impact they could make to the country’s political and economic landscape. are these institutions relevant or do they hold the potential for shaping democratic discourse and improving standards of living? since embarking on the journey towards becoming national institutions, the country’s think tanks have directed their resources to three activities: knowledge creation, policy advice, and monitoring of government programs. these functions establish their legitimacy and credibility as they aspire to set standards for others across the region. of these three roles, this paper is focused on the monitoring role and on how think tanks seek to use research and advocacy to promote two fundamental principles of democracy: social cohesion and public welfare. but before that, there is a general description of the three roles of these bodies. at the top level is policy framing. a high percentage of think tanks continue to provide cutting-edge analysis and recommendations for improved decision-making and operationalisation. this speaks to their core mandate of providing technical advice to (non)state actors on the procedures and strategies for overcoming democratic challenges. the institutes channel internal resources (secured through grants) to examine crises and develop diverse approaches to communicate their recommendations to power holders, democracy activists, and practitioners. this role serves as an entry point to building norms and sometimes institutions, which progressively stimulate debates around ways of consolidating the country’s democracy. the resulting communication channels help in establishing a set of aspirations and ideals between society and authority, thus shaping the conduct of government. the second level is the electioneering process. by serving as the bridge between academe and practitioners, these institutions participate in drafting policy, conducting training workshops for personnel, and monitoring the voting process. their role in providing technical expertise and as impartial observers has often contributed to enhancing the transparency and legitimacy of local elections as the suitable means for handing over political authority and power in a democratic state like south africa. through their research and training workshops provided to traditional leaders, opinion leaders, members of major political parties, bureaucrats, and pressure groups, these institutions play a key role in the successful transition of power and resolving problems of factionalism within particular political parties. nkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202221 the third level of influence for think tanks is in watch-dogging. in their capacity as purveyors and repositories of knowledge, think tanks serve as external reviewers of the democratization efforts of the government. in applying their expertise to monitor the state’s compliance to basic tenets such as the rule of law and separation of powers, these institutions provide a third-party evaluation of the conduct of the executive, members of parliament, and the judiciary in promoting or hindering access to justice and in promoting of fundamental rights of marginalized people. under this discussion, they may engage in discussions with relevant state agencies or use litigation to improve the conditions for the constituencies they represent. to better illustrate this contribution, the following analysis situates it within the context of two specific think tank case studies. these allow clear-cut analysis of thematic areas of focus, primary activities, and challenges that hinder aspirations. although it would have been useful to discuss all the registered institutions, due to limited space the focus here is on the two selected think tanks, that continue to use research and advocacy to foster social cohesion and socio-economic welfare. the institute of race relations ranked as the 25th top think tank in sub-saharan africa, the irr has a long tradition of working towards racial cooperation (mcgann 2021, p. 76). established in 1929, the institute produced research and policy papers relevant for national, provincial, and municipal administrators in the apartheid era (heyman 1972; rich 1981). following the country’s transition into democracy in 1994, the irr (2021) continued to pursue its objective of fostering racial liberalism. it is presently affiliated with a number of universities, individuals, religious and social organisations. in spite of the fact that its leadership composition somewhat lacks an element of diversity, the president and vice-presidents are arguably some of the most liberal-minded individuals in contemporary south africa (irr 2021). the presidential position is occupied by russell lamberti, with theo coggin and roger crawford as vice-presidents (irr 2021). in seeking to enhance social cohesion, the body has continued to conduct surveys and scientific research, producing publications, lectures, and conferences in thematic areas (irr 2021). despite its noble ambitions, the body is handicapped by a lack of funds. in the early years of its formation, it was heavily funded by the rhodes trust, the phelps stokes fund, and the carnegie corporation of new york (hore-ruthven 1937). unfortunately, in post-apartheid south africa, these substantial contributions have been replaced by crowd financing, with modest support from individuals and private entities such as julian ogilvie thompson, johannes van der horst, and lombard insurance company (irr 2021). more devastatingly, the economic impact of the covid-19 pandemic has further plunged the institute into debt, forcing it to close its library and offices in johannesburg (irr 2021). a reader will agree that regardless of one’s profession, it is often difficult to excel in a resource-scarce environment. funding shortages bedevil the group, undermining its ability to undertake rigorous research, or frame novel strategies capable of realising the overarching mandate of addressing racial discord and strife (irr 2021). this setback is most visible in its public invisibility, explicitly in terms of limited outreach activities such as seminars, lectures, pamphlets, and funding of young graduates for fellowships or postgraduates’ research on racial cooperation (irr 2021). more disturbingly, due to the limited resources, the think tank has not been energetic in initiating some kind of national dialogue, nor has it paid close attention to race relations. it is, therefore, not ironic to witness the disintegration of race relations in post-apartheid south africa, with major political figures engaging in harsh racial rhetoric and slurs (nkrumah 2018a). whereas inter-racial tensions are latent in most communities, they escalate in the lead-up to elections or parliamentary debates. illustrations from four key figures might suffice. whilst the founder of the main opposition party (the democratic alliance) was temporarily suspended for alleging that colonialism had its merits, the then-presidential aspirant of the nkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202222 ruling african national congress (anc) and current minister of cooperative governance and traditional affairs, equally asserted that the land of native africans had been looted and stolen by whites (pather 2017; irr 2021). further, in the course of a campaign, the current president came under the spotlight for decrying that the deprivation faced by indigenous people has its roots in the destruction of their asset base by persons of european ancestry (irr 2021). perhaps, the most scathing outburst came from the fiery leader of the economic freedom fighters (eff), julius malema, who rode on the populism of seeking to give back to black communities the land looted by whites (nkrumah 2021a). the irr has not been successful in preventing these inter-racial tensions and in positioning itself as a body that policymakers could look up to. nor is it engaged in framing a comprehensive strategy to forestall similar tendencies among the citizenry. because of that, one could conclude that the influence of the irr in enhancing social cohesion, or in simple terms, racial tolerance, in post-apartheid south africa has not been impressive. it is, therefore, imperative the institute consider alternative means of intensifying its research capacity to effectively engage with national and municipal actors in enhancing social cohesion. such engagements could be deepened with rural education and courses for policymakers on race relations. in a nutshell, the current predicament of the irr seems to suggest that a viable political environment and favourable political opportunity structure are not sufficient to guarantee the robustness of the institute. arguably, the opportunities need to be complemented with more extensive resource mobilisation, as it currently relies on limited funding to run the daily operations of the institute and its staff. the black sash the black sash institute was borne out of a series of demonstrations in 1955 when the apartheid regime sought to disenfranchise a section of the ‘coloured’ population (burton 2010). following an initial unsuccessful attempt to secure a majority vote for the amendment of the constitution, the national party sought to increase its representation in parliament by enlarging the senate (nkrumah 2018b). to contest this cynical action, the women’s defence of the constitution league was launched. composed of a small intrepid group of (white) middle-class women from johannesburg, the body organised a range of political activities, including demonstrations across major urban centres, collecting signatures for petitions, organising vigils and marches, and wearing black sashes (bank 2019). the sashes which finally gave the group its current name ‘the black sash’ were used to signal mourning for the looming breach of civil rights (ambrogi 2018). by the 1980’s the institute had widened its agenda and joined forces with marginalised communities in pressing for universal suffrage, equal rights, and an end to discrimination (burton 2010). naturally, the country’s transition to democracy in 1994 necessitated reforms across many different facets of the country’s political and socio-economic landscape. the black sash was no exception. it embarked on two key reforms: first, to diversify its membership; and second, to shift from political to social protection. needless to say, this focus has remained to this day (torkelson 2020). however, although it works towards poverty reduction and inequality, much emphasis is placed on social security for the most vulnerable, mainly women and children. in its 2019 submission to the un general assembly, the institute alluded to its mission of ensuring access to social assistance (cash transfers or grants) for every impoverished person (black sash 2019). this aspiration is drawn from section 27 of south africa’s 1996 constitution. a major component of black sash’s strategy is research, training, and advocacy (black sash 2019). even though the body has made some strides in the first two strategies, perhaps its notable achievement is in the realm of advocating for good governance in the payment of social grants ( jili & maloka 2019). in 2012, the minister of social development (msd) contracted a service provider, cash paymaster services (cps), to oversee the disbursement of social assistance over five years. but this privatisation of the payment system resulted in unlawful deductions and plunged many into dire straits (black sash 2019). following an application by an aggrieved party, the constitutional court in 2014 nullified the contract and ordered a renkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202223 run of the tender process (constitutional court, all pay vs sassa 2014). having failed to comply with the order, and the (invalid) five-year contract with cps coming to an end, it was evident that there was great uncertainty among the grant-recipient community. against this backdrop, the black sash in march 2017, again approached the constitutional court with a request to grant an order obliging the msd to ensure a seamless transition to a new payment system, without interrupting beneficiaries’ allowances. the constitutional court upheld the claim at the eleventh hour, and extended cps’s contract (though invalid) for another 12-month while consultation was ongoing for the nomination of a new service provider (nkrumah 2018b). certainly, the court’s decision was a landmark victory for the institute and the constituency it represents, as the delay or non-payment of social assistance could have had a devastating effect on recipients and their dependants (adesina 2020). unlike the irr, the black sash has attracted considerable financial support from local and international partners. aside from the australian high commission, it receives funding from the foundation for human rights, london school of economics, open society foundation, and the old mutual foundation. its latest report indicates that the institute has a healthy financial backbone, with a surplus of r856,318 (approx. us$59,000 at the time) after expenditure (black sash 2019, p. 30). nonetheless, it appears that sufficient resources (rm) alone without political influence over the relevant government department would not be sufficient in bringing about the needed policy or institutional reform to enhance the welfare of its constituency. for instance, the use of an adversarial approach (through the court), rather than dialogue or lobbying symbolised a hostile relationship between black sash and the department of social development. over time the institute is likely to seek avenues to rehabilitate its relationship with the department, as litigation can have its demerits. as highlighted in the failure of the department to comply with the court’s initial decision, continuous hostile engagement can induce noncooperation from the government department, and undermine the socio-economic entitlements of the citizenry the institute represents. in addition, an important subject overlooked by the institute is the exclusion of a disproportionate percentage of the population from accessing this social assistance. to be eligible, a person needs to meet at least one of five criteria, that they are either under 18 or over 60, that they are a war veteran, disabled or are a caregiver (nkrumah 2021b, p. 126). as might be expected, this benchmark excludes a disproportionate percentage of the population, for the most part, the able-bodied unemployed, and expectant mothers (nkrumah 2019a). giving the dietary requirements at the time of pregnancy, black sash ought to broaden its scope and advocate for the inclusion of this sub-population in the conventional cash transfer system. such intervention could be channelled towards the nutritional needs of the mother-to-be and her foetus, and to the health of new-borns. more disquietingly, it was hoped that the black sash would use its resources to advocate for the introduction of a universal basic grant (ubg) following the closure of the covid-19 related r350 social relief of distress grant in march 2022 (ensor 2021). although the grant has been reinstituted, the body has withdrawn to the background in terms of ongoing debate about the launch of the ubg (nkrumah 2020, 2021b; gilili 2021; peters 2021; schüssler 2021). to help establish the ubg, the institute ought to adopt a multi-pronged approach of blending litigation with lobbying and in-depth research for a better understanding of how funds could be mobilised for such an initiative. having identified some of the specific challenges faced by these think tanks, the next section turns to consider some of the general problems shared by a disproportionate percentage of think tanks across south africa. aside from the age-old problem of financial constraints, there is a prevailing barrier of intra-think tank ideological contestation on the one hand, and ideological conflict between think tanks and the state. the extent to which these setbacks militate against institutional effort for democratisation and social justice is elaborated in the next section. nkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202224 challenges confronting think tanks and strategies to address them similar to the apartheid regime, the evolution and influence of think tanks in contemporary south africa are still dependent on the two key variables: rm and pos. in most instances, the absence of rm (funds for relevant logistics) and dissonance (lack of pos) between the state and think tanks, or among institutions with similar agendas, could hamper efforts towards attaining the objectives of fostering democratic principles. this section will highlight a few of these barriers. insufficient rm the first major challenge facing local think tanks is the lack of resources. indeed, quality research, gathering data, and disseminating research outputs require considerable capital injection, which many lack. due to this impediment, employees with expertise are often poached to accept positions in academic institutions or international organizations with better work packages, which to a greater extent impact the quantity and quality of research generated (christoplos et al. 2015). this challenge is experienced by a disproportionate percentage of think tanks, as there is no independent agency responsible for sourcing external funding to support their initiatives. although the state provides some financial assistance to registered think tanks, this support is arguably insufficient in light of their important role in democratic life. on that account, continued dependence on external donors seems inevitable. as illustrated by irr, some have budgets exceeding r30 million (approx. us$2m.) which the state cannot bear alone. to that end, continued reliance on foreign donors becomes important if think tanks are to sustain their staff and maintain their research agendas. for this reason, bodies such as the irr and black sash continue to rely on limited support from nordic countries and intergovernmental bodies, and they sometimes have to compete for this with many others in the sector. within this context, efforts by the african union through the african capacity building foundation and nepad in providing some funding for think tanks in south africa are laudable (christoplos et al. 2015). this assistance helps the institutes to undertake research around economic policy, sustainable development, and democratization, but it also excludes emerging initiatives and institutions from equally accessing such grants for their operations. conversely, the emergence of many fly-by-night operators (fbos) is a cause for concern, mainly as they compete with credible think tanks for meagre resources. despite the fact that some donors may be able to discern which think tank is credible, in some instances the distinction becomes hazy as these profitseeking institutions (psis) and one-man organizations (omos) depict themselves as serving the interests of ordinary people. inevitably, this development requires the (inter)national donor community to undertake a thorough background check of these institutions before awarding grants, and perhaps blacklist those identified as fbos, psis, or omos (hailey 2000). moreover, in the process of assisting think tanks, it is imperative for donors not to impose conditions but rather encourage input from the institutions in framing the terms of reference for assistance. such joint partnerships can play an important role in fostering local ownership of projects, as it induces a sense of guardianship among the local researcher’s staff, who will see the project as their own and thus, have a sense of urgency to see it through ( james & caliguire 1996). more importantly, whilst relying on donor funding is essential, local institutions should also look for exit strategies, as this support might decrease in the coming years, especially considering the global economic impact of covid-19. also, with the upsurge of political instability in neighbouring countries such as zimbabwe, lesotho, and drc, donors may shift their resources to focus on these countries. of course, major cuts of core funding from donors in the global north will be devastating for these institutions in south africa, and perhaps plunge them into disarray. such a measure will likely lead think tanks to seek nkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202225 funds from fragmented sources, with its negative impact of short-term contractual basis, loss of timelines, delivery inefficiency, and greater transactional costs. an immediate exit strategy from dependence on international donors will not allow a soft landing for institutions like the irr and black sash (as they mainly depend on such sources).yet those with strong internal capacities could perhaps transition into traditional research institutions, with income raised for instance from general tender bidding or grant seeking through the national research foundation, or through commercializing publications, or by seeking support from local philanthropists and churches. pos (think tank and state ideological contestation) aside from the age-old problem of insufficient funding, some institutions continue to face an ideological clash with the state. despite, as suggested in the second part of this paper, some progress in calming the adversarial relations between think tanks and post-apartheid government, unfortunately not all has been rosy. even though they are operating within a less restrictive environment, there still exists some degree of hostility between these two actors, and within the institutions themselves. aside from the tense relationship between the black sash and department of social development, a more evident adversarial relationship is between the government and narrow-nationalist (action) think tanks, such as the afriforum which draws on its research and advocacy platforms to criticize the government on land expropriation, farm murders, and anti-apartheid issues (mbolo & mabasa 2019). a think tank’s ideological orientation, reflected in its homogenous staff and narrow racial focus, can exacerbate conflicts. this is more for afriforum which is perceived as an agent of the defunct apartheid regime (vahed & desai 2021), and as seeking to restore colonial-apartheid rule rather than promote the rights of the (white) minority groups they claim to represent (modiri 2019). a growing number of state officials are critical of afriforum’s operations, especially in light of their recent tweet of a picture of the old apartheid flag (head 2019). to a section of the black community, the flag is a reminder of the atrocities endured during that era (ke-schutte 2020). the institute’s operations are, thus, treated with suspicion, often placed under surveillance, which to a greater extent limits its ability to freely contribute to national development (modiri 2013). clearly, for power holders, the most suitable partnership between think tanks and the state is one grounded on collegiality. accordingly, some institutions have to take the route of adopting quiet diplomacy or closed-door negotiations with politicians in finding solutions to local challenges. to achieve the mantra ‘local solutions to the local problem’, the state and afriforum must both make concessions. the government must open its doors for the institute to find common grounds for the integration of all south africans in the country’s democratic processes. but before this can happen, afriforum must also take a step back and ask whether its distinct research agenda or priorities undermine social cohesion. in pursuit of this, perhaps it might be useful for afriforum to draw from international best practices and broaden its scope to advocate for all south africans, regardless of the colour of their skin. this issue deserves some consideration as constructive engagement between the institute and the state may hold some benefits for both. put simply, afriforum requires a considerable amount of budget support for sustenance, which the state might be in a position to provide, whereas the former might draw on its research unit to provide much-needed policy guidance on reconciliation and socio-economic reconstruction. pos (internal think tank ideological contestation) as think tanks share a common objective of promoting democracy, there exist grey areas of conflict, which need highlighting. ideological contestation as discussed above does not only exist at the state level but also descends to the local level where think tanks clash based on different ideologies. even though the nkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202226 focus areas of these institutions are largely cooperative and mutually reinforcing, their crosscutting themes somewhat create rivalry and tension between some institutions. one such tension worth citing is the case, nelson mandela foundation trust and another v afriforum deadlock where the former filed a lawsuit against the latter for the gratuitous display of the apartheid flag (equality court 2019). indeed, in the pursuit of their objectives, different institutions may adopt different theories and strategies that create internal tensions, thereby militating against the prime objective of collective effort to consolidate democratic gains. this rivalry may also stretch to what approach they perceive is best suited for promoting social justice. despite the possibility that some might lean towards equal access to state resources as means to enable economic empowerment, others might advocate for positive discrimination (nkrumah 2019b). such a contestation could revolve for instance around the broad-based black economic empowerment (bbbee) as a means to uplift historically disempowered populations (pooe 2013). in summary, research, advocacy, and training have been a strong focus of think tanks in contemporary south africa. the irr and black sash continue to use research and advocacy to foster race relations and social protection amidst a number of challenges. the most fundamental challenges were insufficient capacity for rm and an ideal pos. in terms of the former, it was identified that insufficient funding limits the ability of think tanks to undertake ambitious strategies towards fostering social cohesion, whereas, in terms of the pos, it was evident that adversarial relations among think tanks, and with the state, hampers collective effort towards advancing social protection and race relations. to this end, think tanks must address three cardinal issues: first, consider novel strategies for sourcing funds; second, manage internal division and cooperate towards attaining a common goal of improving the conditions of all south africans, rather than a select few; and third, adopt a multi-pronged approach of liaison with the state. in seeking to improve race relations and social protection, think tanks may consider avenues such as conferences and short courses where public officials are provided with insights into why reform is needed, which section of the population ought to be targeted, and how to sustain such interventions. in the end, the role of think tanks in consolidating democracy cannot be disputed, but for them to fully realize their objectives, they ought to consider alternative means of funding, resolve their internal differences and build cordial relations with the state. conclusion south africa’s political capital as a beacon of democracy is gradually depreciating, amidst widespread poverty, racial tensions, and exclusion from state-sponsored social protection programs. this article has argued that to keep its credibility intact, the state must work with non-state actors in framing a proactive approach to contain these challenges. it was observed that in light of their research and advocacy capacities, think tanks could be important partners in this regard. partnership with, or subcontracting to, these institutions will not only complement the state’s limited capacity but also ensure that long-term objectives are not sacrificed on the altar of short-term benefits. think tanks are instrumental in the realm of translating democratic ideals into practice. by becoming policy advocates, they straddle the line between state and non-state actors in their role as service providers and technical advisers. think tanks can offer alternative routes for policy implementation, and more direct engagement in the area of training workshops, or policy guidance for practitioners and state institutions. by using their resources to assess, recommend, and develop the capacities of civil and public servants, these institutions can make a more meaningful contribution to south africa’s democratization process. moreover, the research and training provided by these institutions can serve as conduits through which democratisers and practitioners subject the state to account for lapses in race relations and social protection. in reality, the expertise of think tanks such as the irr and black sash could be harvested in drafting social nkrumah cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202227 policies and developing capacities of state agents to ensure that the benefits of these policies are realized for marginalized communities. this paper, however, finds that while think tanks could collaborate and provide an overarching solution to the country’s democratic challenges, they are divided on ideological fronts, amidst insufficient funding. it is especially noted that in light of the ongoing covid-19 pandemic and its global economic impacts, it might be important for these institutions to consider alternative sources of funding. for 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https://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-radio/safm-market-update/proposed-national-social-security-fund-not-the-solution/ https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2013.v4n14p635 https://doi.org/10.1080/00020188108707566 https://doi.org/10.1080/00779954.2021.1904439 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13384-015-0185-0 https://www.moneyweb.co.za/mymoney/retirement/a-universal-basic-income-grant-isnt-the-solution/ https://www.moneyweb.co.za/mymoney/retirement/a-universal-basic-income-grant-isnt-the-solution/ https://doi.org/10.1080/13510349908403625 https://doi.org/10.1080/03031853.2021.1892992 https://doi.org/10.1080/13600820050008421 https://doi.org/10.1080/00358539008453979 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2019.104711 https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2020.1863931 cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 15, no. 2 2023 © 2023 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: mitskaya, e. 2023. fighting corruption in kazakhstan by force of criminal law. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 15:2, 1– 18. https://doi.org/10.5130/ ccs.v15.i2.8346 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) fighting corruption in kazakhstan by force of criminal law elena mitskaya m. auezov south kazakhstan university, shymkent, kazakhstan corresponding author: elena mitskaya, m. auezov south kazakhstan university, tauke khan avenue, 5, shymkent city, 160012 republic of kazakhstan, elenamits@inbox.ru doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8346 article history: received 03/09/2022; revised 12/02/2023; accepted 02/03/2023; published 30/07/2023 abstract the anti-corruption component of kazakhstan’s state development has been elevated to the rank of state policy. despite the comprehensive fight against corruption, kazakhstan, having achieved progressive and radical changes in legislation during the years of independence, has not yet managed to achieve significant results in the fight against corruption. the current increase in the number of corruption-related criminal offences, including those committed by high-ranking officials and directors of a number of kazakh companies, is due to a stronger political will on the part of the head of state to decisively confront corruption. this intention allows attention to be given to criminal law measures, which occupy an important place in the complex of measures to combat the systemic vice of the state, which threatens national security. this study focuses on assessing possible adjustments to kazakhstan’s criminal law to strengthen the fight against corruption through criminal law measures. the potential of criminal law in anti-corruption policy has not been exhausted. in the author’s opinion, the proposed changes allow us to hope that they will ultimately serve the useful purpose of kazakhstan’s anti-corruption policy as well as open the ground for an informed discussion on the further fight against corruption. keywords kazakhstan; corruption; criminal law 1 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8346 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8346 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:elenamits@inbox.ru https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8346 introduction corruption undermines any state’s foundations. a high level of corruption makes it impossible to speak of a state that is governed by the rule of law as such. if this is the case, it is difficult to talk about ensuring human rights, the strength of democracy, and the development of civil society in a state. a particular danger is that corrupt leaders are law enforcement officials. an attempted coup d’état in january 2022 was not without their support. the indignation of common people over rising gas prices in western kazakhstan and their protest about the deterioration of their lives against the contrasting immense enrichment of the expresident’s family, including his relatives who headed large companies and held high positions in the state authorities, resulted in mass disturbances across the country. the indignation of common people was joined by the formation of armed bandit organisations, who responded in the same way: attacking police officers, seizing administration buildings, destroying everything, causing terror, and producing disorder. the january events were made possible by corrupt high-ranking authorities. the events demonstrated the inefficiency of the country’s security structures and their fusion with criminal structures. the national security committee failed to prevent the mass riots both at the stage of preparation and when they took place. as the experience of previous years shows, the structures designed to ensure the country’s security are capable of acting in the interests of certain individuals or groups, to the detriment of the state (obshestvenniy fond strategiya 2018). corruption is difficult to fight, even though people all over the world have a negative attitude towards it (myint 2000). there is no doubt that the fight against corruption has a global dimension (razzante 2000; the white house 2021). corruption can undoubtedly be countered within one state by combining the efforts of the whole society and the state. it is not only the will of citizens to resist corruption, but also the will of the state, defined by anti-corruption policies. today, it does not require any proof that corruption is destructive to the entire social capital of society (zimelis 2011; rothstein & uslaner 2005; rothstein 2005). corruption combines the private and the public (karklins 2002; zimelis 2011); officials, as beneficiaries of public power by virtue of their official position, satisfy their private interests through corruption by obtaining certain benefits illegally. they can also be corrupted by citizens who are not civil servants. corrupt officials have a vested interest in the bureaucratisation of governance in the state (myint 2000). as it becomes a system (rothstein 2005), it reduces the ability of citizens to be honest and resist its spread (rothstein & tegnhammar 2006). a vicious circle is created whereby governance in the state cannot cope with corrupt officials (lopez-claros, dahl, & groff 2020). this is the reason why kazakhstan, in establishing its sovereign state policy, has chosen the fight against corruption as one of its main priorities. kleptocracy is ‘gaining strength’ in kazakhstan. the corruption of public authorities has become a significant challenge to the national security of kazakhstan as a democratic, legal, secular, and social state. most of the actual accomplishments have been limited to decreasing low-level, petty corruption rather than institutional and political malfeasance (freedom house 2022). the level of corruption in kazakhstan does not allow for complacency. every year, the condition of the fight against corruption is represented in the national report on combating corruption, which allows a comparison of the ’downsides’ and ‘upsides’ of the anti-corruption policy followed. it is important that the strong political will of kazakhstan’s leadership to eradicate corruption enables broad public participation in the search for options to counter corruption. the purpose of this study is to assess proposed changes to kazakhstan’s criminal law to determine which ones might help strengthen the fight against corruption. because of the lack of kazakhstani research on the harmonisation of the promise/offer of a bribe and consent to its receipt into criminal law, my study is an attempt to reflect on how these constructs will ‘take root’ in kazakhstani soil, which may well be of interest to anyone who cares about anti-corruption. this paper will begin with a brief overview of the state of corruption in kazakhstan, followed by a summary of anti-corruption measures taken over the years of mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 20232 independence and a suggestion of possible changes in criminal legislation that could strengthen the fight against corruption. the state of corruption in kazakhstan in the kazakhstan 2050 development strategy adopted in 2012, the leader of the nation, nazarbayev, drew attention to the fact that ‘corruption is not just an offence’. it undermines faith in the efficiency of the state and is a direct threat to national security. ‘in order to achieve our ultimate goal of eradicating corruption as a phenomenon, we must dramatically step up the fight against corruption, including by improving anticorruption legislation’ (strategiya ‘kazakhstan-2050’: novyy politicheskiy kurs sostoyavshegosya sostoyaniya 2012). the anti-corruption strategy 2015–2025 and anti-corruption policy concept 2022–2026 have been adopted. kazakhstan must move away from the routine countering of corruption to a radical change in public consciousness and a conscious rejection of all forms of corruption and nepotism by the population, as outlined in the national development plan 2025. public money, instead of being used for the social prosperity of the people, is being taken from the hands of unscrupulous officials. noted by kazakhstani experts, as a result of ideological fragmentation, general moral decay, and unresolved social problems, kazakhstani society is vulnerable to the negative influences of groups interested in destabilisation (obshestvenniy fond strategiya 2018). strategic objectives for state development include combating and eliminating corruption. the goal is set, and kazakhstan has a strong intention of achieving it. however, statistics on the number of corruption offences committed over the past five years do not reveal any significant success or a reduction in the level of corruption in the country. of course, it is crucial to realise that figures are only based on reported offences. in any country crimes will go undetected; it is only ever feasible to report on the crimes that came to the attention of authorities. further, it is important to acknowledge that the rise and fall of corruption offences reported or detected could be attributed to several variables such as: political will; increase in resources directed towards the detection of corruption; new laws; a change in personnel; better coordination between departments and so on. the figures are like a seesaw, with the amount of offences detected swinging up and down. for instance, in january-march 2018, there were 928 corruption offences, which were down by 9.2 %compared to 2017. for the same period in 2019, 1020 corruption offences were committed, an increase of 9.9% compared to 2018. in 2021, there was a drop in corruption offences compared to 2020, but in 2022, there were 26.5% more offences than in 2021 (committee on the legal statistics and special accounts of the state office of public prosecutor of the republic of kazakhstan 2022). kazakhstan has only once had the best score in transparency international’s rankings in all the years of its independence. that was in 2020, when it was ranked 94th. in 2021, kazakhstan’s position dropped to 102nd place out of 180 nations in the corruption perception index (transparency international kazakhstan n.d.). kazakhstan failed to preserve its 94th-place finish in 2020, passing russia, turkmenistan, tajikistan, uzbekistan, and kyrgyzstan. by comparison, kazakhstan was placed 113th in 2019 and 124th in 2018. unfortunately, despite a thorough anti-corruption policy aimed at fostering integrity and an anti-corruption culture in society, it has failed to preserve or even improve its 94th position in the corruption perceptions index. the top 10 most corrupt civil servants in kazakhstan in terms of convictions for 2021 are as follows: • 159 ministry of internal affairs • 143 local executive authorities (akimats, including akims) • 34 employees of the state revenue committee of the ministry of finance • 28 ministry of defence • 15 ministry of agriculture mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 20233 • 20 committee of the penal system of the ministry of internal affairs • 16 ministry of health • 7 national security committee • 5 ministry of emergency situations. it is interesting to note that the amount of damage caused in criminal corruption cases has been increasing over the past three years (anti-corruption agency of the republic of kazakhstan 2022b). in other words, corrupt officials have started committing crimes for large amounts of money. one in five corruption offences is committed in public procurement, including by artificially inflating procurement prices and signing fictitious certificates of work performed. when the number of corruption offences in january-march 2022 and 2021 are compared, one-third of them are bribery. bribe-taking in 2022 increased by 48.2% compared to the previous year, while bribe-giving increased by 14.5%. as can be seen from table 1, there is no decrease in most of the corruption offences, on the contrary, there is an increase (rothstein & tegnhammar 2006). moreover, in the last three years, 30 judges have been prosecuted, 15 of whom have been sentenced to imprisonment. this is more than in the previous eight years combined. this situation demonstrates to citizens that their rights to justice in terms of public goods and social relations are directly infringed. corruption is an affront to justice (murray & spalding 2015), thereby alienating citizens from the state. corruption does not promote social consolidation. the alliance of the state, represented by officials and citizens, does not work; there is no common bond between them. when the rule of law and the meaning of the rule of law are devalued, there is a real threat to national security (gabov & kist 2016, p. 12; zhumagulova & abdikalykov 2020). admittedly, there has never been any comprehensive research and analysis undertaken in kazakhstan by independent kazakhstani non-governmental organisations (greco evaluation report on kazakhstan 2022) to determine the systemic dangers of corruption, its extent, and in various domains. corruption crime is relatively latent (abilkairov, kamnazarov, & rakhmetov 2014). therefore, the statistics on reported corruption criminal offences may not reflect the complete picture (berlybekova 2020, p. 85), but the data does provide information on the existence of such a systemic problem as corruption. this is concerning and highlights the subject of increasing anti-corruption measures and, in particular, strengthening the criminal justice system as an indicator of the efficiency of anti-corruption initiatives. measures taken to counteract corruption it must be mentioned that for many years, since 1991, kazakhstan has developed a very good framework for combating corruption. kazakhstan has signed the istanbul action plan to combat corruption (within the organization for economic cooperation and development (oecd) network) and joined the group of states against corruption (greco), allowing it to form a special anti-corruption instrument based on international anti-corruption principles and standards. consistent implementation of kazakhstan’s international commitments is vital to preserve national security, which is endangered by corruption. the attainment of national interests to increase the standard of living for the public is hampered by corruption, since it is widely recognised that in this state, the standard of life for the average person is poorer the more corruption there is (chong & calderon 2000; gupta, davoodi, & alonso-terme 2002; zucman 2015). incentives were introduced for reporting a corruption offence, sharing information about the location of a wanted perpetrator of a corruption offence, or providing other assistance subsequently relevant to the detection, suppression, identification, and investigation of a corruption offence in order to strengthen public assistance in combating corruption (republic of kazakhstan 2015d). 147 individuals received rewards in 2021 at a cost of 46.5 million tenges (for comparison, the average monthly wage is 250,000 tenges). a mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 20234 significant role was played by administrative reform, which improved the state apparatus by eliminating duplicative functions and expanding the provision of public services to the population in an electronic format that excludes direct contact with an official (solodov 2006). while public service reform is a daunting task for governments (repucci 2014), and no single theoretical model of public service exists for all states (scott 2011), modernisation of the public service has been undertaken (republic of kazakhstan, ministry of justice 1997, 2015a; mitskaya 2008). under the un convention against corruption, there is a specialised state anti-corruption body that reports directly to the president of the republic of kazakhstan (republic of kazakhstan 2019). as a result, the body has complete autonomy. the implementation of table 1. number of reported corruption offences in kazakhstan. january-march 2022-2021. 2022/03 2021/03 growth total 725 573 26.5% passive bribery (art. 366 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 246 166 48.2% active bribery (art. 367 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 198 173 14.5% misappropriation or embezzlement of property entrusted to someone else (para. 2 part 3 art. article 189 (3) of 367 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 88 67 31.3% abuse of authority (art. 361 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 65 46 41.3% fraud (para. 2 part. 3 art. 190 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 49 56 -12.5% excess of power or authority (para. 3 part. 4 art. 362 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 28 19 47.4% failure to act on duty (art. 370 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 16 4 300.0% mediation in bribery (art. 368 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 15 10 50.0% forgery in office (art. 369 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 12 22 -45.5% misfeasance (art. 450 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 4 4 0.0% excess of power (para. 2 part. 2 art. 451 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 2 raidership (para. 2 part. 3 art. 249 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 1 illegal involvement in entrepreneurial activities (art. 364 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 1 3 -66.7% economic contraband (para. 1 part. 3 art. 234 criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan) 3 mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 20235 income disclosures for civil servants has made it easy to limit their expenditure when it does not match their income. this should have strengthened the transparency and openness of public authorities, but in reality, this has not happened because the declaration system is not sufficiently backed by appropriate mechanisms to respond to the facts of major gaps between expenditures and incomes. this inconsistency in the fight against corruption is more understandable from a retrospective perspective, because corruption (before the events of bloody january 2022) was used not only to enrich members of the presidential family personally but also to maintain authoritarian control of the state (baker 2005, p. 62). in criminal proceedings, the search for stolen assets and their return to the state budget have turned out to be secondary to the proof of the crime and are usually poorly covered by the investigation due to the difficulty of proving the criminal origin of the property (anti-corruption agency of the republic of kazakhstan, 2022a). it is therefore quite natural that anti-corruption issues are actively discussed by kazakhstani scholars and practitioners. such issues as eradicating or reducing corruption in the private sector (karazhanova 2017), the influence of civil society on reducing corruption (panzabekova, turgel & imangali 2022), social aspects of corruption (sadvokasova et al. 2017), and others have become the subject of research by kazakhstani scholars. of particular note is the fact that the de-bureaucratisation of public service delivery by converting it into an electronic format (republic of kazakhstan, ministry of justice 2017) is based on the best practices of singapore (quah 2007) and other developed countries that have eradicated corruption as a way of life. the provision of public services has become fast and unburdensome. in 2020 the share of e-government services is 90%. digitalisation has significantly increased the transparency of public administration while helping to optimise the fight against corruption (andersen 2009; santiso 2022, p. 4). the judicial system has also been overhauled. digitalisation has also become widespread in the administration of justice: automatic video recording of all court proceedings; videoconferencing with participants in proceedings (rules for technical application of audio and video recording equipment ensuring recording of a court session; storage and destruction of audio and video recordings; access to audio and video recordings, 2015); texting proceedings; filing documents with the court via a portal; and posting court decisions on the supreme court portal (except for materials classified as secret). it is known that good laws along with an efficient judicial system can reduce corruption (baker 2005, p. 251). in kazakhstan, sadly, there are examples of court judgements in favour of people in power. every year, kazakhstani judges are caught receiving bribes. the state and human rights defenders are continually aware of issues relating to the quality of the administration of justice (botagarin 2022; kaudyrov & nazarkulova 2017; konusova & kanieva 2019). judges who have committed major infringements of the law in their cases are reprimanded by a specifically formed body, the judicial jury, or referred to as the judicial quality commission for recertification (republic of kazakhstan 2000). the modernisation of the judicial system, including the selection of judges, the judiciary, and judicial procedures (ablaeva 2018), has strengthened the transparency and independence of the judiciary and the impartiality and professionalism of the judiciary. the construction of an institutional structure to combat corruption was based on the adoption of a number of laws and by-laws. these include legislation on anti-corruption, public services, state control and audit, public procurement, public councils, access to information, and others. the duty of all officials to prevent corruption is established in legislation. the reform of legislation to boost the fight against corruption is still underway. in kazakhstan, it is now conceivable to undertake criminal processes electronically (republic of kazakhstan, ministry of justice 2018). this is primarily due to the greater protection of human rights and freedoms in criminal procedures, but also to the elimination of corruption schemes during the investigation of a criminal case. there is a gradual move towards a three-tiered model of criminal procedure: the police detect, suppress, and identify those involved in criminal offences; they collect and collate evidence; the procedural prosecutor issues an indictment, brings it to court, and supports the prosecution in court; the court issues a sentence (republic of kazakhstan 2020). before the formation of the three-tier model, the prosecutor’s office was only responsible for supervising the lawfulness during the mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 20236 pre-trial and trial stages of criminal cases. nowadays, the procedural prosecutor manages the entire criminal case from the moment a criminal offence is registered (akhpanov & khan 2022), thereby controlling conformance with the rule of law from day one and having the authority to investigate a criminal offence. the combat against corruption, although there are still considerable legislative problems, is gaining legal certainty. kazakhstan has legislated on what to deem a gift. the anti-corruption act stipulates a ban on the acceptance of material payment, gifts, or favours not only by civil servants who accept anti-corruption limitations, but also by their family members (republic of kazakhstan 2015a). illegal receipt of gifts or other benefits by civil servants and persons executing public obligations in the fulfilment of their official tasks is punishable under criminal, administrative, or disciplinary law. disciplinary responsibility for a corruption offence includes a reprimand for incompetence, up to and including dismissal. repeated commission of a corruption offence within one year of the imposition of a disciplinary sanction for the first disciplinary offence shall lead to dismissal from a public office (republic of kazakhstan, 2015b). the liability of managers for subordinates who commit corruption offences has been recognised. the supervisor must resign. however, on a national basis, these are isolated cases. unfortunately, dismissal on the grounds of loss of trust as a unique institution of anti-corruption law has not been frequently applied. the institute of resignation has no objective assessment; it is not transparent. therefore, no objective practice has yet established across the country. the provision of illegal material remuneration by individuals and the receipt of illegal material remuneration by a person authorised to perform public functions or a person with equivalent status (republic of kazakhstan 2014) duplicate two criminal offences: bribery and its receipt (republic of kazakhstan, ministry of justice 2014a). there should be no redundancy, and the competing aspects in the administrative offence of receiving illicit remuneration should be eliminated (republic of kazakhstan, ministry of justice 2016). kazakhstan’s criminal legislation has moved in the direction of increasing responsibility for corruption offences since independence and continues to do so currently. throughout this approach, the state works to prevent corruption from reproducing in society. thus, various exceptions were introduced to extend the state’s humanity towards corrupt officials. a ban has been established on awarding them probation. a conditional sentence consists of relieving a person from serving a sentence in jail. in the current environment, when kazakh kleptocracy ‘gathers power,’ a conditional sentence is considered as an opportunity to avoid imprisonment for a corrupt crime. therefore, the adoption of a ban on probation for corrupt officials is highly appealing. conditional release for grave and especially grave crimes of corruption is now possible only for pregnant women or women who have small children or have reached the age of 58; for the men who are bringing up small children alone or have reached the age of 63; for the disabled of 1 or 2 groups; and for the convicted persons who signed a procedural agreement on cooperation and fulfilled all its terms. it is unlawful to exclude corrupt authorities from criminal responsibility on the grounds of reconciliation between the parties and the installation of a guarantor. release on the grounds of active repentance was only allowed for first-time offenders. penalties for bribery of judges and law enforcement officials, as well as for receiving, giving, or serving as an intermediary in offering to pay or receiving a bribe, were increased, fines were increased; and the upper limit of imprisonment was raised from five to seven years. mandatory confiscation of property and lifelong prohibition from holding specific posts in state agencies and organisations are mandatory sentences for corruption offences (republic of kazakhstan, ministry of justice 2015b). in the backdrop of the intense combat against corruption, the establishment of these regulations appears fair. undoubtedly, corruption as a social phenomenon can exist in any state, and the political resolve to minimise it is particularly crucial, since anti-corruption law enforcement becomes a political issue (murray & spalding 2015). it is the president of kazakhstan who calls attention to the necessity to expand the mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 20237 conceptual framework of anti-corruption standards, as ‘current legislation and the institutions inherent in kazakh law have untapped potential to resist corruption’ (republic of kazakhstan, ministry of justice 2014b). the state’s ability to implement an effective anti-corruption policy through revisions to the penal legislation must be realised. if the state cannot take away the right to corruption (murray & spalding 2015), then it is able to influence the right so that it is highly unfavourable to exercise it under the prospect of punishment for it. we propose to present possible modifications to the criminal legislation in order to appreciate their benefits for enhancing the fight against corruption and to engage interested parties in this conversation. proposals for modernising the criminal law to combat corruption offences kazakhstan is continually developing its criminal legislation, using the finest practices of international states in their fight against crime. nevertheless, kazakhstan’s criminal law has norms that either have a low degree of practical implementation or are not enforced. for example, mediation in criminal cases has not taken root (mitskaya 2020). the fraction of criminal cases in which mediation is utilised is minimal compared to the application of mediation in civil matters. further research into the usage of mediation in criminal cases in the setting of all courts in the country and practice of mediation community is needed to clarify the reasons behind this. unfortunately, there are no such studies in kazakhstan. another example is the exemption from criminal liability with the installation of surety, which is not used in practice. even with a theoretical grasp of the grounds for establishing bail, this rule creates a number of issues (mitskaya & saidahmetova 2016). there are regulations in criminal law that have concerns with legislative construction. as an example, one can use the norm of the criminal law, which fixes the exclusion of a person from criminal liability for inflicting harm during operational searches, counterintelligence activities, or covert intelligence investigations. this is not the only example (mitskaya & shkabin 2021). this situation is worrying and underscores why we need to be very serious about criminalising offers and promises of improper remuneration and influence peddling. the existing criminal law does not have such offences. but their adoption is indicated in the anti-corruption policy in the immediate term. with the criminalisation of promise or offer of a bribe and consent to it being built into the criminal law, it is not easy. at present, criminal intentions that are not externally embodied, i.e., not objectively expressed, are not subject to criminal prosecution. therefore, a person who has even promised a bribe or offered to give one will not be held criminally liable unless the bribe is actually accepted. when proving the promise or offer of a bribe and the consent to receive it, it will be necessary to provide evidence of a precise and unambiguous offer of a bribe as well as the consent to receive it. securing such evidence will be extremely challenging. even at the entrance to court buildings, prosecutor’s offices, and police stations, mobile phones are left in designated lockers. and the provision of video materials includes procedural peculiarities for recognising such evidence as admissible, dependable, and so on. the issue is the possibility of a reverse effect from the possible implementation of a new rule. it may be introduced only if it is implemented, which would not have the same striking anti-corruption effect as intended. in addition, the criminal law provides the institution of voluntary refusal to commit a crime, which does not imply criminal liability. this standard cannot in any way be linked to the illegality of the promise or offer of a bribe and the permission to take it. voluntary withdrawal as an unconditional exemption from criminal liability has a long-standing basis in the criminal law, and it is unlikely that it will be withdrawn for the sake of not contradicting the new rule. by putting a voluntary waiver into the criminal law, the state promises the offender immunity from prosecution and thereby encourages them not to engage in criminal activities. if the promise and offer of a bribe are criminalised, the voluntary renunciation will also apply to them. consequently, the person will not be held criminally accountable. the identical question is posed by ferguson: whether a voluntary rejection would in this situation relieve a person from criminal liability? (ferguson 2018, p. 143-144). mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 20238 the absence of knowledge, purpose, or intention of the bribe as objective factual conditions is a defence, unless knowledge, intent, or purpose can be shown in another way (ferguson 2018, p. 144). it is vitally important that the proof of an offer or agreement to accept a bribe be a precise purpose and not a broad anticipation or general wish (ferguson 2018, p. 147). the circumstances that exclude prosecution are considered physical coercion or on the basis of necessity (ferguson 2018, p. 148). these qualifications make it obvious that the best practice in the developed world on the accusation of permission to pay or accept a bribe does not exclude consideration of all the diverse circumstances of the case but, on the contrary, draws attention to the fact that they must be taken into account. proof of guilt is not such a simple thing, but in this situation, as always, the most developed governments act on the assumption that the rights of the accused themselves are not violated. another difficulty with the criminalisation of promise or receipt of a bribe is that the systemic notion of liability for each of the steps of the act is shattered. the promise of giving or receiving a bribe is covered by the preparation of the crime. preparation is illegal only for grave or especially grave crimes and preparation for a terrorist offence. bribery is currently classified according to its degree of public danger into grave, medium-gravity, and especially grave crimes. it is not possible to classify all of the elements of bribery as especially serious crimes; this would violate the established system of categorising crimes according to their degree of public danger. the responsibility for the preparation comes with the commission of grave and especially grave crimes, while the responsibility for the attempted commission additionally covers crimes of medium gravity (tuleuova 2019, p. 204). if preparation is criminalised under the constituent elements of bribery, which are crimes of medium gravity, then there will be no distinction between preparation and attempt. not only does the entire theory of criminal law on the stages of a crime become ineffective in this case, but the entire practice of establishing criminal responsibility for the deed based on the formal and material characteristics of its objective aspect and the totality of all the elements of a crime is destroyed. obviously, the procedural provability of the promise of a bribe and the offer of a bribe, even if they are considered to constitute the final offence, is not clearly expressed; it is vague. it is difficult to distinguish between the offer and promise of an illegal reward as an offence and the preparation of a bribe. this is because, in the preparation of bribery, the offer and promise of an unlawful reward are covered by the discovery of intent (sidorenko 2017). in addition, it is currently not possible under current law to distinguish between permissible imitation and provocation of bribery (republic of kazakhstan 2015c), which also carries all sorts of corruption risks. in practice, the application of a promise to give or accept a bribe will be complicated by the problem of distinguishing this action from minor actions that do not give rise to criminal liability. a minor act may formally contain signs of an act stipulated by the special part of the criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan (republic of kazakhstan, ministry of justice 2014b), but due to its insignificance, it does not represent public danger. no socially dangerous consequences will occur when promising to give or receive a bribe, even if expressed aloud and recorded on video, but with no real intention to do so and no real receipt of a bribe. the situation is ambiguous as to what to do. will the provision of the criminal law of insignificance not apply to the promise or receipt of a bribe? if so, then in all other cases, the rule of insignificance will be applied. any law used as a means of governance in the state should have a clear legal basis. in our opinion, in the case of criminalising the promise to give or take a bribe, the kazakhstani legislator’s thought that is already fixed in the criminal law would become unclear because logical connections and consistency of criminal law regulations with respect to various deeds would be lost, and the uniform understanding of the criminal law would be violated. kyrgyzstan, moldova, azerbaijan, and georgia have already introduced criminal offences for offering and promising illegal bribes. whether these states have achieved the desired preventive effect of criminalising the offer and promise of a bribe remains an open question. some of their scholars explicitly say that difficulties arise in proving the criminalised act (kazinyan, 2012; sydykova & sulaimanova 2016). russian mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 20239 scholars criticise the criminalisation of promising or offering to mediate in bribery (‘ugolovniy kodeks rossiyskoy federatsii ot 13.06.1996 no. 63-fz (red. ot 29.12.2022’ 1996). they note that this contradicts the most important principle of criminal law expressed by the famous roman jurist ulpian ‘cogitations poenam nemo patitur’, they believe that due to the high latency of corruption crimes there is not yet enough practice of applying these norms to understand their effectiveness in combating corruption (kozhukharik & kudryavtseva 2014). on this basis, the criminalisation of the promise or accept of a bribe requires a very precise approach in terms of specifying the basis of liability and determining when the offence ends. on this basis, the criminalisation of the promise or acceptance of a bribe requires a very precise approach in terms of specifying the basis of liability and determining when the offence ends. unfortunately, there are currently no in-depth theoretical studies by kazakh scholars on how to reconcile the existing norms and the criminal law system with the possible criminalisation of these actions. the vaguer the law, the greater the possibility of corruption. ambiguities in the law create opportunities for ambiguous interpretation of its norms, and therefore, they carry a risk of corruption. thus, the fear arises that introducing the promise or acceptance of a bribe into the criminal law will only harm the state’s fight against corruption and the law itself will create the conditions for it to flourish. will these innovations help to reduce corruption cases and corruptionrelated crime? doubtful. no, there is no certainty about that. now, when criminal penalties for corruption crimes are toughened, they do not go down, and with the ambiguous interpretation of the law, there can be no reduction in corruption offences. corruption will continue to grow because legal uncertainty makes it possible to obtain illicit rewards legally. it is important to pay attention to the fact that the exemption of corrupt officials from criminal liability has not been ruled out. a person may be excused from criminal liability on the grounds of active repentance. the criminal law makes a voluntary surrender and the commission of an offence alone, and for the first time, a prerequisite for such release. the court must take into account the characteristics of the perpetrator, their participation in the detection and investigation of the criminal offence, and the restoration of the damage caused by the criminal offence. only the court shall release corrupt officials in conjunction with their active repentance (republic of kazakhstan, ministry of justice 2014b). although the existing legislation does not enable corrupt authorities, as well as all persons with criminal tendencies, with the possibility to benefit from exemption from liability numerous times, it varies from most developed countries, in which active repentance only mitigates the punishment. thus, active contrition allows for more delicate and potentially more compassionate treatment of the offender (tasioulas 2006, p. 320), but does not exempt from it (gonchar 2020). release is also attainable for those who have entered into a plea bargain or a cooperation arrangement. the latter is only available for collective offences. when the statutory limitation period has ended – ten years after the commission of a corruption offence, a minor or medium crime, and fifteen years after the commission of a particularly terrible crime – a person is also freed from criminal liability. the analysed categories of exemption from criminal liability suggest that in kazakhstan’s criminal law, with respect to corrupt officials, humanity prevails over the inevitability of their liability. the consequence of the inevitability of liability is somewhat mitigated. according to scholar zhunusov (2005), humanism reveals itself in a reduction in the punitive effect of criminal law, but this does not entail a retreat from the necessities of justice. in my view, such broad exemptions from criminal liability for corrupt officials under conditions of systemic corruption are not consistent with justice. when there is an exemption from criminal liability, the introduction of new definitions of promise or receipt of a bribe, coupled with the obvious difficulties in putting them into practice, gives the impression that, on the contrary, favourable conditions are being created for corrupt officials. unintentionally, this concept occurs as an example – corruption offences were not subject to the statute of limitations, but some time later this convention was modified. because of that, it is also challenging to return to kazakhstan roughly 140-150 billion dollars of unlawfully exported mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202310 financial assets, which is similar to the foreign debt of kazakhstan. the statute of limitations on the offence may be upheld while the illegality of its origin is being demonstrated. let me stress that there have been no studies undertaken by kazakh scholars on how the new legal frameworks would be merged into criminal law. there are infrequent examples of kazakh academicians who agree with the criminalisation of promising and taking bribes. for example, khasenova proposes to criminalise the promise and offer of a bribe in mediation (khasenova 2019). rakhmetov advises accepting them without analysing how these legal structures would be implemented into the criminal law (rakhmetov 2017, p. 106). tuleuova alone admits that the introduction of the promise to give a bribe and the promise to accept it is possible, but this would require a special note to the article ‘bribe-giving,’ according to which the rules of the institution of preparation would apply to this article (tuleuova 2019, p. 205). however, she does not provide a comparable footnote to the article ‘bribe taking’. of course, in such a circumstance, the kazakh legislators would break with the traditional techniques of interpreting the stages of the crime. tuleuova proposes, by means of a reservation, to somehow adapt the new constructions to the existing system of criminal law. an exception to the general rules would be made by means of a special clause. still, tuleuova understands the problematic nature of introducing the promise or offer of a bribe and says that it is difficult to assess these norms unambiguously as they directly depend on the legal traditions formed in the course of the social realities of the state (tuleuova 2019, p. 204). one could presume that the kazakh legislator could make a reservation, and the pledge to provide or accept a bribe would be viewed as preparation for a crime. but since greco advises incorporating them into the criminal law as a crime, i do not imagine that there will be a reservation. most likely, the description of bribery would simply include the phrases ‘promise to provide or accept a bribe’. a promise or offer will not be viewed as preparation for or an effort to commit a crime. they would constitute a completed offence. time will tell how the practices of its application will develop. it will be essential to integrate these criteria with other norms of the current criminal law. the supreme court is expected to provide clarifications on this, as otherwise the new norms will be impossible to apply. the only thing that is obvious now is that the lack of uniformity in the creation of rules and their ambiguous meaning will do nothing to improve either the law or the practice of its execution. the desire on the part of the state to obtain positive outcomes in the fight against corruption offences as swiftly and efficiently as possible are understandable, but at what cost? problems arise due to the creation of corruption risks in proving the essence of the criminalised act, the limits of its criminality and the guilt of the perpetrator. in addition, the criminalisation of the promise or receipt of a bribe does not prevent criminals from avoiding liability by virtue of their voluntary repudiation or active remorse, i.e. those rules that would apply to all delicti of bribery. the introduction of these into criminal law requires extensive research into its consistency with other provisions of criminal law and scientifically substantiated conclusions about its future application in practice. possible introduction of legal constructs may disturb the balance of the criminal law system and make decisions about a person’s guilt depend on the discretion of investigators, including the court. criminal law provisions on voluntary withdrawal, stages of premeditated crimes and acts of insignificance run counter to these legal constructions. they pose a threat to the effectiveness of anti-corruption norms, creating conditions for corrupt decisions because of non-systemic, inconsistent norms of criminal law and all the ensuing negative consequences. it is clear that it is impossible to defeat corruption by changing legislation alone, as it requires the combined efforts of the state and society as a whole. however, well-designed and enforced laws are a necessary complement to any reform (rose-ackerman 2010, p. 217). thus, one of the first amendments to the criminal legislation should be the expansion of the subject of bribery in the criminal code. according to modern kazakhstan doctrine and practice, any non-property mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202311 benefits or intangible benefits are not recognised as bribery. therefore, non-pecuniary benefits are not covered by the criminal code or the explanations of the supreme court (republic of kazakhstan 2015c). the social danger of non-pecuniary benefits, such as receiving a positive recommendation or characteristic or a guarantee of support in resolving an issue affecting, for example, promotion, concealing an unfavourable situation in reality or the incompetence of someone or others, is not lower than that of pecuniary benefits. therefore, non-property benefits as the subject of illicit enrichment should also be criminalised. the subject matter of bribery must be expanded in the criminal code. in order to do so, it is necessary to introduce non-material goods as the subject matter of bribery, as well as the creation of undue advantages as a result of their receipt. this would bring the understanding of bribery in line with international anti-corruption standards because the understanding of the subject of bribery as exclusively material benefits would be eliminated. by establishing non-property advantages as the subject of a bribe, the provisions of the criminal code in this respect will correspond with the norms of international conventions to which kazakhstan has acceded. thus, the internal inconsistency of criminal code provisions will be eliminated when article ‘bribe taking’ covers only tangible benefits and article ‘abuse of office,’ article ‘forgery in office,’ and article ‘omissions in office’ stipulate that a guilty person may receive benefits and advantages without specifying what benefits they are, hence both tangible and non-tangible ones. in addition, there will be consistency between the national legislation – the law on combating corruption – and the criminal code. the law defines corruption in terms of illegal property (non-property) benefits and advantages for oneself or a third party, while the criminal code does not define the scope of corruption in all cases as property and non-property benefits and advantages. a prohibition of exemption from criminal liability due to expiry of the statute of limitations should be introduced. this would be an example of progressive practice of strengthening the fight against corruption by the rules of criminal law. such a ban would give full effect to the inevitability of punishment as an anti-corruption principle. at present, criminals may leave the country and continue living off unjust enrichment. they can calculate the statute of limitations for bringing them to criminal responsibility and, when it has expired, calmly return. in either case, they have a chance of going unpunished. unfortunately, this prohibition was removed from the criminal code in 2018. its absence is not in line with the adopted national anti-corruption strategy. this is why there should be a ban on exemption from criminal liability in connection with the expiry of the statute of limitations for corruption offences. article 247 of the criminal code of kazakhstan states that ‘receipt of illegal remuneration’ should be classified as a corruption offence due to the need to extend anti-corruption rules to the private sector as well. as well as article 216 ‘committing the actions of issuing invoices in the absence of the actual performance of work, services, shipment of goods’, article 217 ‘(creating and managing a financial (investment) pyramid’)’ should be fully attributed to corruption and extended to non-public service in commercial and other organisations. it is not clear why the law of 12.07.18 amending the criminal code removed two crimes from the list of corruption offences: article 216(2) (4) and article 217(3). the perpetrator of these offences is a special subject – a civil servant. a corrupt official shall use their power of public authority for private gain. through their position, they receive certain benefits, privileges, advantages, or other advantages. consequently, the subjects of corruption offences are officials who have discretionary powers. this power creates the conditions for the commission of corruption offences. this is the reason the criminal law specifies, as a qualifying or obligatory feature, that the offence is committed by a public official using their official position. in this case, the crimes under paragraph 4 of part two of article 216 and under paragraph 3 of part three of article 217 of the criminal code fall under the category of corruption. however, the legislator did not explain formally why the two above-mentioned offences had been excluded from the list of corruption offences, even though they met the elements of corruption offences. mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202312 illicit enrichment of officials should be criminalised if the increase in their property or property rights significantly exceeds their lawful income, which the person cannot reasonably justify under article 20 of the un convention against corruption. the introduction of unjust enrichment seems possible without singling it out as a separate corpus delicti. as one of the options for adjusting the criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan, a new version of article 218 ‘legitimisation (laundering) of money and (or) other property obtained by criminal means’ can be proposed. its title should be changed to ‘legitimisation (laundering) of illegal enrichment’ and the phrase ‘if as a result of these actions the total income of the official and (or) their spouse, children or relatives is exceeded’ should be added at the end of the existing text in paragraph 1 of part 3. this would enshrine the unjust enrichment of the official and their relatives. one of the inconsistencies of the criminal code with international anti-corruption standards would then be eliminated by establishing criminal liability for unjust enrichment. to ensure consistency of the norms and achieve logical consistency of the norms of criminal law to strengthen the fight against corruption offences, following the abolition of parole for grave and especially grave corruption offences, a ban on the possibility of commuting the sentence to a milder one for the perpetrators of corruption offences should be introduced. since abolition of parole for grave and especially grave corruption offences will not aggravate the situation of convicted corrupt persons, there is still the possibility of commuting the sentence. the introduction of this prohibition is in line with the intransigent struggle against corruption crimes. in addition, it is necessary to remove from the code of administrative offences the corpus delicti establishing liability for unlawful material remuneration: the provision of unlawful material remuneration by individuals; the receipt of unlawful material remuneration by a person authorised to perform state functions or by a person similar to them, as they duplicate similar corpus delicti of bribery in the criminal code of the republic of kazakhstan. such duplication is not in line with international standards. the indication in the code on administrative offences that they apply in the absence of criminal offences is not sufficient to distinguish the actual corpus delicti of these offences from each other, which consequently does not exclude corruption risks in qualifying these acts. conclusion due to the fact that corruption in kazakhstan is systemic in nature, it needs to be countered by systemic measures. among the significant and important measures is the improvement of legislation, including criminal legislation. kazakhstan has consistently been bringing existing criminal legislation in line with the current needs of combating corruption offences, step by step. in kazakhstan, corruption prevents the establishment of the rule of law and the building of a truly rule-of-law state. this makes it necessary to reconsider the potential of criminal law as a means of countering corruption. at present, kazakhstani scholars and practitioners have not developed scientifically grounded legal bases for criminalising promises and offers of bribes, which would be consistent with the existing norms of criminal law. possible adoption of them into the criminal law, therefore, would be complicated by problems of practice in their application, which would intensify the substantive counteraction against corruption. in order to improve the efficacy of the implementation of anti-corruption policies, it is important to fully exhaust the internal resources of the criminal law for its improvement. the system of anti-corruption provisions of the criminal law, the potential of which does not seem to have been exhausted yet, should be evaluated. the measures for its improvement proposed in this article may minimise the amount of corruption in kazakhstan and, consequently, boost the level of protection of national interests. we hope that these recommendations will be useful for those states that are likewise engaged in fighting corruption, which hampers the rule of law and the progressive development of society and constitutes a threat to national security interests. insistence on the rule of law is essential for the development of an equitable and just society. mitskaya cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, 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the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: murrey, a., jackson, n. a., volonterio, m. 2023. social licence to operate: the role of an idea in the colonial logics of extractivism. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 15:1, 1– 18. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8334 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) social licence to operate: the role of an idea in the colonial logics of extractivism amber murrey1,*, nicholas a. jackson2, matías volonterio3 1 school of geography & the environment, university of oxford, south parks road, oxford, ox1 3qy, u.k., amber.murreyndewa@ouce.ox.ac.uk 2 ronin institute, 127 haddon pl montclair, nj, 07043-2314, usa, nick.jackson@ronininstitute.org 3 matipvolonterio@gmail.com corresponding author: amber murrey, school of geography & the environment, university of oxford, south parks road, oxford, ox1 3qy, united kingdom, amber.murrey-ndewa@ouce.ox.ac.uk doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8334 article history: received 25/08/2022; revised 22/01/2023; accepted 30/01/2023; published 26/03/2023 abstract in this intervention article, we cultivate an anticolonial critique of the ideational genealogy and conceptual materialisation of the social licence to operate (slo) in the extractive industries in order to open a conversation about the racialised and colonial logics underlying its enactment and discursive practices. slo functions to restrict the emergence of imaginary political potentials within communities impacted by extractive projects. we focus on the role of academics and social science researchers within and beyond the space of the university in engineering, shaping, and promoting dominant slo frameworks, and endorsing the power and mythology of slo. we do so in conversation with decolonial orientations that simultaneously analyse the colonial logics within corporate practice and galvanise epistemic justice beyond colonial and epistemic extractivism. the university, as a site for the refinement and promotion of hegemonic concepts like slo, is an important space for postextractive struggles. keywords social licence to operate; colonial logics; extractivism; social scientists; epistemic violence 1 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the project, ‘extraction and the social scientist’, was funded by a john fell fund award (award number 0011004) from oxford university press. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8334 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8334 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:amber.murrey-­ndewa@ouce.ox.ac.uk mailto:nick.jackson@ronininstitute.org mailto:matipvolonterio@gmail.com mailto:amber.murrey-ndewa@ouce.ox.ac.uk https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8334 introduction in the late 1990s the social license to operate (slo) idea emerged and began creating buzz within corporate extractive circles. a simple concept in appearance, it proposed that corporate enterprises require not only formal licence to carry out their operations, but also informal and communitybased (i.e. ‘social’) forms of clearance and acceptance. slo holds that various groups of people, their representatives and/or the wider civil society will have interests and concerns in extractive projects and that, therefore, industries will need to be active and responsive to these groups, particularly to anticipate and curtail conflict, friction and resistance. slo, as an emergent concept, was embedded in the larger ecosystems of corporate response to popular and community opposition to mining and petroleum industries. as with other procorporate ideas circulating within corporateowned and dominated spaces, accepting the premise of this idea was contingent upon seemingly straightforward notions of capitalist benevolence that date back to earlier colonial epochs. among them was the powerfully seductive and historically enduring premise that corporate and capitalist appetites not only should be compatible with fulfilling the needs of peoples, places and fauna writ large– but that they are so (thomson & boutilier 2011). having emerged somewhat casually (as we discuss below), the notion of slo circulated and was refined within flexian1 industryacademic arenas, ultimately gaining prominence and status as an inevitable ‘common sense’ within business ‘best’ practices (gehman, lefsrud, & fast 2017). however, its premise and practices have been continuously challenged as onedimensional and exposed as lacking by critical scholars and activists (owen & kemp 2013; eaton & enoch 2021; see also styve & gilbert 2022). as with other cornerstones of corporate gumption, slo was informed by the existing power dynamics and capitalist structural configuration in which it emerged. a critical component of projects for advancing epistemic, economic and ecological justice is exposing the violent operations and relations embedded within forms of colonial ‘common sense’ that facilitate and legitimate the dispossessions of extractive capital. in this article, a thought piece based on ongoing common research interests of the authors grounded in different disciplinary viewpoints, we aim to present a critical discussion of the conceptual and practical implications of social science engagements with slo. this paper is part of a larger project where we theoretically and empirically examine what sawyer terms ‘that clammy, sticky space’ of corporate exploitation as an ecosystem of legitimization, justification, and material compulsion or coercion in the face of ‘opposition or consent’ (sawyer 2004, p. 12). in other work, we have explored slow violence and dissent, neoliberalism as spectacle and the contested academy, racialised localwashing and corporate constructions of community, and flexian governance networks through public and private institutions (corporations, universities, governments, think tanks, etc.) ( jackson 2011; murrey 2016). we engage with slo as part of that larger study, focusing in particular on that character of slo which makes it, as owen (2016) describes it, ‘one of the most saleable sustainability concepts in the mining industry’. yet it is ‘based on nothing more than nothing itself ’ (owen 2016, p. 103). limited space and the reality that slo is inseparable from the larger ecosystems of corporate response mean that we position this paper as a thought piece, constructing a framework around which students of extraction and corporate forms more generally can locate encounters with slo as a concept, presumptive quality or sales pitch for corporate citizenship. as such, we focus on the ideational genealogy and conceptual materialisation of the term, seeking to show how it is infused with those racialised colonial logics that characterise corporate discourse and practise more generally. in doing so, we invite debates about what social licence really means in the context of both promotion of and opposition to corporate extraction especially. if it is more than 1 flexian is a term introduced by wedel (2011) to describe ‘bordercrossing likeminded individuals’, unaccountable by virtue of their institutional fluidity across governments, corporations and the academy (lewis & mosse 2006; see also murrey & jackson 2020). murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 20232 ‘nothing itself,’ what evidence sustains that? is slo an effective platform for use by movements in dissent, such as divestment movements? we hope that this piece will contribute to the ongoing critical dialogues about the concept and its enactment. by colonial logics, we mean the ordering and worldmaking frameworks, founded on racial and gender difference, through which the unequal relations of dispossession and exploitation within extractive capitalism are governed, perpetuated and tethered (gómezbarris 2017; murrey & jackson 2020). in extractive paradigms, there is a sustained relationship between the deployment and reproduction of colonial logics and attendant forms of epistemic and extractive violence. critical scholarship and scholaractivism continue to expand the concept of extractivism (and to demand acknowledgement and redress for its cognate violence) – including the ways in which extractivism extends far beyond the extractive industry realm within the global capitalist economy (murrey & mollet forthcoming). extractivism figures as a set of fundamental organising relations between groups of people, between humans and nonhumans, and between humans and the earth. extractivism is condoned, maintained and conducted through sets of global and governing relations, as much as through particular knowledge and legal systems. important recent work has sought to fundamentally upend the colonial logics within regimes of financialisation and upon which the coloniality of extractivism and racial capitalism are predicated through robust theorisations of the functions of racial and colonial difference (bhandar 2018; tilley & shilliam 2021). this work demonstrates emergent but sustained attention to the entanglements of empire, coloniality, racial capitalism and racial difference within extractive capitalism (arboleda 2020; gómezbarris 2017; guerisoli & mandirola 2022; murrey & mollet forthcoming; svampa 2018). these scholarly attentions are not merely perfunctory moves about ‘additive value’ (van sant, milligan & mollett 2021) – they are of tremendous weight given the historical elisions to the functions of racialisation within scholarship on business, administration and finance in the majority world (daley & murrey 2022; rutazibwa 2020; tilley & shilliam 2021). scholars have recently examined the language of political risk to unmask the forms of ‘colonial panic’ nested in corporate jargon, particularly in the extractive sector through industry state relations, regulatory statutes and mining laws (styve & gilbert 2022). in their work demystifying the language of ‘political risk’ as a racial vernacular, styve and gilbert (2022) explain that such conceptual frameworks allow for forms of ‘derisking for investors’, while simultaneously ‘creating categories of seemingly objective political risk analysis that saturate the mining finance market’. importantly, these socalled ‘objective’, ‘transparent’ and/or ‘common sense’ components of corporate assessment and practice do political and extractive work by providing a vocabulary through which colonial and racial anxieties are assuaged. in this sense, we believe that slo is indicative of what jen preston (2017) refers to as ‘racial extractivism’, understood as intertwining of racial imaginaries of white superiority with the development of colonial capitalism. we argue that slo is among the central contemporary ideational components of the global racial capitalist order, assisting in the normalisation of corporate domination and working to ‘naturalise, order, enable and rationalise’ colonial extractive violence (preston 2017, p. 353). we draw upon decolonial praxis to disavow the violence within longstanding colonial systems of meaningmaking, focusing particularly upon the functions of racialised logics within corporate discourse and practice. colonial logics are not static; a feature of their durability has been their adaptability, intentional ambiguity and murkiness (appel 2019). work in postcolonial and subaltern geographies has long demonstrated the ways in which language and epistemic frameworks operationalise power, including through denial, obfuscation and presumptions of ‘neutrality’ (daley 2020; jazeel 2017) and objectivity. the illusions thus fostered are central to their operational power: through obfuscation, deception, manipulation, seduction and fantasy, colonial logics do the work of persuading, distracting, and disempowering which are fundamental to global capitalism, given its actuallyexisting violence on a planetary scale (arboleda 2020). as political and environmental activists remind us: we are not to be misled by the seemingly neutral murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 20233 or apolitical language of corporate and colonial entities; transnational mining corporations continue to sanction and even encourage punitive acts of extreme violence and force when challenged (brock & dunlap 2018; simpson 2017) and the global extractive industry is responsible for egregious, albeit normalised, levels of ‘slow violence’ (murrey 2015; nixon 2011). decrypting and dismantling the relationship between knowledge, power and violence continues to be a key area of interrogation within anticolonial and decolonial projects. in this article, we look at the ways in which proponents of slo seem to presume it would be enacted in corporate projects through various forms of lighttouch and ‘localcentric extraction’, including through consensus and compromise (murrey & jackson 2020). indeed, we argue that it functions to restrict the emergence of imaginary political potentials within the communities where extractive projects take place, ultimately curtailing antiextractive dissent (saenz 2019, p. 4) and muting anticipatory futures. in this way, slo acts as a modified form of epistemic violence (spivak 2010) within the longue durée of colonial capitalist power relations and the coloniality of knowledge that has long silenced subaltern and indigenous peoples and sanctioned the exclusions, appropriations and exploitations resulting from extractivism. as a result, slo functions to further abet the violent processes of empire and extraction. while advancing an anticolonial critique of the conceptual lineage of the term, we interrogate the role of academics and social science researchers within and beyond the space of the university in engineering, shaping and promoting dominant slo frameworks and, therefore, further propagating planetary extractivism. the article proceeds as follows: we first consider the stakes of advancing anticolonial and antiextractive critiques within and towards the academy. we then outline our methods. next, we trace the genealogy of the slo concept, highlighting its emergence alongside other evolving corporate taxonomies. turning our attention to the roles of social scientists, we focus on exposing four epistemological implications underlying slo that we believe are in need of demystification. firstly, we address how some of the authors who developed the concept worked closely or maintained contact with corporate actors, and how some implicitly or explicitly seemed to ratify viewpoints of corporate interests. with this, we problematise the position from where the concept was conceived. secondly, we analyse how, in many conceptualisations of slo, capitalism is portrayed as a quasinatural, and therefore universal, desire. thirdly, we discuss how liberalism (presumed to be an ideal model of organisation which can be emulated to redress ‘ineffective governance’) underpins the development of the concept. finally, we show that slo emerged within and is complicit with neoliberalism, in particular through a faith in market selfregulation. proponents of slo maintain that corporate entities – operating beyond state or formal regulation – have the will and means to more genuinely address communities’ needs and to more equitably manage common goods. slo polices the scope of community action and interaction within extractivism, limiting possibilities for racialenvironmental justice and repair. we close the article with a call for robust analyses that address the nuances of slo and open up on further potential lines of inquiry. the stakes of advancing anticolonial critiques what is at stake when advancing – or presuming to advance– an anticolonial and even decolonial critique? the question demands that we first address the tendency within academic spheres to superficially apply and dangerously misappropriate critical concepts that emerge from the labour and energy of indigenous, black and marginalised scholars (tuck & yang 2012). our engagement is carried out through our shared dedication to collaborative and targeted anticolonial, antiimperial and antiracist illumination and unmasking of the institutions at the forefront of contemporary colonial violence, especially corporate and military entities and the knowledge regimes that empower them. our aim in this article is to contribute to the powerful body of scholarship demanding a reckoning with the roles of social scientists in coloniality and extractivism. murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 20234 methodologically, we performed a comprehensive literature review of slo. we identified nine key works (of which seven were peerreviewed) on the basis that they were some of the most widely cited works on slo in the social sciences and/or were developed by key figures. we defined key figures to include people with strong connections to industry and with considerable academic profiles and influence in their fields. we looked at how some of the concepts proposed by these authors were reproduced and/or picked up in other studies. we reviewed the scholarly publications that engaged with these central (9) texts. we also reviewed the expansive literature in the social sciences critical of slo. we were interested in determining the parameters of social science research on slo. we spent time investigating the origins of such research, in particular tracing connections (if any) between researchers and corporate entities, through in/formal collaboration, networking and exchange, or research funding. in the next section, we trace the emergence of the idea, emphasising the ways in which it played into existing racialised logics and colonial worldviews. we argue that slo discourse operates within the extractive sector as both an aspirational model and legitimising narrative for continuing forms of extractivism that disproportionately impact indigenous people and people racialised as black and brown living in the majority world and which effect forms of epistemic violence ( jackson 2017). as styve and gilbert (2022) argue, ‘when working with powerful elites well versed in selfpresentation and reputational risk management, it is necessary to place the knowledge gained from interlocutors in the mining finance industry within the larger global context of how the mining industry operates, and the violent and conflictual nature of extraction where mining actually takes place’. the corporate inception of slo slo developed in the late 1990s, in the context of corporate exploitation, including moves toward privatisation and corporate control of production and social welfare programs. coined in 1997, slo developed within the mining industry as a set of corporate strategies to direct and manage corporate defined stakeholder response and involvement in operations (moffat & zhang 2014, p. 69). most recognise former placer dome (a canadian mining company) vc jim cooney as the initiator of the term (black 2013; boutilier 2014). cooney describes slo as a response to ‘local communities’ attracting ‘support and assistance from influential allies abroad’, thus risking ‘potential financial and reputational damage’ (cooney 2017, p. 198199). the concept was subsequently picked up within world bank exchanges between the mining, finance and university sectors, first appearing in print (at the request of the editor of mining journal) in a june 1999 article authored by mining consultant susan joyce (cooney 2017). after its emergence, slo gained traction in australia, a central space for corporateuniversity relations and from where scholarconsultants have written peerreviewed publications on informed consent (macintyre 2007), corporate reports about development (filer 2012) and more academic volumes about political ecology and corporatecommunity relations in general (biersack & greenberg 2006). from there, slo narratives travelled with mining industry reps and researchers throughout wider oceania, to africa (dauda 2022) and latin america (e.g. brazil via santiago & demajorovic 2016; colombia via bustillocastillejo & de la espriella 2019; and peru via escobedo sánchez 2011; saenz 2019). critical scholars have simultaneously mobilised the term to critique the extractive industries (de jong & humphreys 2016; svampa 2018, 2021), including slo’s attention to superficial and minimum standards of care (mulhern et al. 2022). echoing cooney’s (2017, p. 200) description of the term’s ‘relative ambiguity,’ owen (2016, p. 103) argues that slo is ‘perhaps the leading example of a term that in itself has no directly observable meaning’. scholars have revealed the ways in which the slipperiness of a hegemonic term seems to add to its material weight and strategic usefulness (e.g. foucault in the order of things, 1970 and edward said’s culture and imperialism, 1993), allowing language to function in ways that erase processes and relations of violence from the public purview. yet, even critiques are advanced in somewhat superficial fashion, sometimes artificially murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 20235 inflating the significance and impact of the concept within the mining sector (owen, 2016). thus, for owen, slo is currently ‘one of the most saleable sustainability concepts in the mining industry’ (owen 2016, p. 103). rather than being a ‘hard concept’ that signifies legality within risk management, the lack of demonstrable organisational change means that ‘perceptions [become] primary and actual development contributions or outcomes [are] secondary’ (owen & kemp 2013, p. 33; see also parsons et al. 2014; jackson 2014). reviews of the emergence of slo emphasise ways in which corporate entities employed the concept in an effort to be increasingly responsive to civil society ‘dissatisfaction’ with the ‘consequences of their operations’ (moffat et al. 2016, p. 478) and imbalances within industrycommunity or industrystakeholder relations (moffat & zhang 2014, p. 61). a number of associated but distinctive initiatives, including corporate social responsibility (csr), free, prior and informed consent (fpic) and sustainable development models2, evolved alongside slo as hegemonic responses to public outcry regarding the racial and environmental violence and frictions produced by the mining industry (parsons & moffat 2014; prno & slocombe 2012). scholars have exposed the ‘racist colonial imagination’ embedded within these liberal capitalist paradigms, emphasising how such bureaucratic orders function to institutionalise and sanction ongoing coloniality (penados, gahman, & smith 2022). penados, gahman, & smith (2022, p. 3), for example, write that ‘fpic protocols’ are best understood as ‘racial “straightening devices” [facilitating] structural and slow violence’ while legitimating ‘a colonial (re)ordering and (mal)development of [otherwise indigenous] ecosystems’. however, unlike sibling concepts like fpic3, slo professes to accept the power of communities to make decisions about corporate extraction while moving away from the relatively more formalised consentmaking mechanisms of fpic. thus, slo emphasises ‘acceptance’ and ‘approval’ rather than consent. scholars, consultants and representatives of intergovernmental development organisations have sometimes argued that fpic is unworkable because of community complexity and ambiguity combined with the reality that sovereignty lies with the state (macintyre 2007). however, csr is perceived as necessary because corporations must take over social welfare functions normally performed by the state but neglected due to ‘weakness’ of governance and corruption (friedman 2007; vogel 2006). academics and management then narrate slo as a return to communities as the base of legitimacy. scholars and practitioners thus implicitly and explicitly play slo off other corporate approaches with communities (especially fpic; ‘weak’ but sovereign state forms; and corporate response to social movement opposition). in this interplay, slo – as a metaphor and boundarydefining legalistic discourse – has a distinctive role in suggesting that corporate entities are constrained by community opposition, even to the point that they may trigger cancellation of projects (banerjee 2008; heffron et al. 2021; parsons & moffat 2014). that is, communities may not have express or direct ‘veto power’, but they can exercise forms of nonverbal ‘veto power’ that render extraction impractical or unprofitable for corporate or state actors. importantly, these seeming tensions and frictions do not amount to the suspension of extractivism but a performative tweaking of particular projects, policies and practices. these strategies are indicative of the changing public facade of colonial arrangements, as corporate and hegemonic entities seek nonetheless to engage in permanent extractivism (penados, gahman, & smith 2022). the language, jargon and taxonomies of corporate extractivism have undergone continual revisions – 2 while similar, each of these conceptual projects is distinct and can have much longer timelines. for example, the right of indigenous people to resist forms of information manipulation and to have informed consent have historical precedent in legal cases in the 1970s. 3 a legal right recognised in the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples that acknowledge indigenous people’s entitlement to know about impactful development projects in their land and which also emerged as a response to indigenous and popular struggle against corporate dispossession. murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 20236 particularly as movement terms are appropriated and reconfigured – yet change has been incremental and colonially derivative. as such, power imbalances remain. these conceptual tools function to disguise coloniality and authorise corporate action. syn (2014, p. 319) argues that slo rose to prominence precisely due to failures within csr and fpic, writing that these ‘so far failed to make the meaningful, widespread difference to those on the ground that was promised’. yet, rather than signalling a departure from preceding corporate practices, scholars have shown that slo was merely the ‘latest instantiation of a discourse that appears to represent a shift in power relations while actually entrenching them’ (italics added, parsons & moffat 2014, p. 347; see also banerjee 2008). slo frames as binding and legitimate what are nonformalised, nonbinding and intangible forms of acceptance granted by community representatives to extractive projects. syn (2014, p. 319) explains, ‘[s]ocial license is generally understood as an intangible representation of ongoing approval or acceptance of a project by affected communities, which can be withdrawn at any time, distinct from a legal or regulatory license granted by a government’. these public declarations and arrangements of social licence are made in return for corporate commitments to social and economic projects perceived as important by some community representatives or members (boutilier 2014). therefore, determining and anticipating the level of community opposition or, on the other hand, acceptance, is a key component of the aspirational orientation of guaranteeing or achieving forms of slo. the role(s) of social scientists within and as part of the ecosystem of corporate response to resistance and criticism, slo works with broader contradictory moves of hegemonic narrative and governance. sympathetic researchers and corporate consultants may have conceived of slo as an instrument capable of determining the actions that corporations might take in order to gain acceptance or approval from the communities to work in their territories and to avoid potential conflicts (hall et al. 2015; syn 2014). indeed, the university and scientific labour have figured as important collaborators within extractive regimes. in this section, we interrogate the role of social sciences researchers and scholars in refining the concept. we look at some of the interplays between academic/researcher and corporate figures as pertains to engagements with slo. in doing so, we critique slo as a form of epistemic violence within coloniality and stress the importance of the university in refining, circulating and endorsing extractive logics. in this interplay, mining consultants with close links to academies can have prominent roles. we focus on how slo has been developed using methodologies that account chiefly for the discourse of corporate representatives. of particular importance to our analysis are the racialised representations of otherness which are embedded within academic work claiming to speak to stakeholder dialogue, community benefits and what ‘communities need to understand to accept’ extractivism (fanon 1952; macintyre 2007). this is part of a broader concern regarding the ways in which the academy legitimises slo, which works as a dispositif for erasing the voice and knowledge of communities affected by extractive projects. that the academy has participated in the construction, reproduction and dissemination of disparaging or dispossessing narratives and imaginaries about the global south is not new. postcolonial and decolonial authors highlight how scholars in the social sciences and humanities helped to embed certain features of nonwestern people in racist and colonial popular imaginaries. such imaginative geographies were important aspects of the epistemic violence that aided the development of the colonial enterprise (spivak 2010). as spivak powerfully reminds us, ‘...the intellectual within globalizing capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help consolidate [capitalist neocolonial relations] of ‘concrete experience’ [as] the model’ (italics added, spivak 2010, p. 2728). we argue that this epistemic movement is reflected in some interventions of the scholars engaged in researching and theorising the idea of slo. murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 20237 refining knowledge at the service of extractive interests slo emerged as a means to address corporate fears of dissenting communities and their international allies. consultants and academics contributed initially by ‘plumping up the term with meaning’ (owen 2016, p. 103). the contribution of scholars to the development of the concept often occurred handinhand with corporate representatives, as researchers and extractive actors met, mingled and exchanged ideas at conferences, workshops and multilateral meetings. our review of key literature revealed that the role of researchers with links with corporations – the flexians within neoliberal capitalism (wedel 2011) – has often been to refine, promote and legitimise the concept. indeed, the conceptualisation of slo within social science research has frequently been based on the insights of corporate members and subsequently laundered through peerreview and other publication processes of the academy. robert boutilier’s (2014) article, frequently asked questions about the social licence to operate, is a good example of this practice. with more than 8,000 views and 197 cross references, it is a key reference on the topic in english. as the author discloses, he drafted the article based on his participation in events sponsored all or in part by extractive industries or their financiers, where mainly management, consultants and other corporate members participated, as well as academics and students (boutilier 2014). he is not alone in working in this way to further the concept. scholars have used grounded theory and inductive reasoning to isolate and theorise patterns that inform the concept. some proposed concepts touch on the importance of forging relationships with stakeholders; the relevance of local communities to grant the licence; and the close relationship between slo and csr. hall et al. (2015) argue that clarifying how industries perceive and use the concept is important because otherwise ‘slo risks not being a credible concept for the purposes for which it is most often used: understanding engagement, corporate communication or responsible development’ (hall et al. 2015, p. 304). jacqueline nelsen argued that slo should be the dominant ‘“vision” for companies to recognise and embrace in order to acquire economic certainty with respect to new projects’ (nelsen 2006, p. 161). consultants embraced similar opinions. leeora black, who was listed as a business consultant on ‘sustainable development and risk’ on her linkedin profile, was more straightforward regarding why slo should be important for corporations. in her monograph marketed for a corporate audience, she states that slo is ‘all about managing risk’ in order to avoid potential obstructions to extractive projects (black 2013, p. 31). during a 2019 event on the future of mining, dr. nicky black (director at the international council on mining and metals) focused her talk on the importance of fostering community trust in gaining social licence to continue mining operations (future of mining 2019). similarly, two social scientists and mining consultants working in australia, moffat and zhang, developed what they call an ‘integrative model’ of slo, arguing that ‘community acceptance’ hinges largely on the community’s ‘inferred trustworthiness of the company’ (moffat & zhang 2014, p. 61). they drew from close interactions with a coalseam gas company which provided funding, access to company documents, assistance with development of the evidentiary survey, and access to the stakeholder database that comprised the surveyed community (moffat & zhang 2014, p. 69). the methodological stance of the authors of the articles reviewed here show an orientation towards the interests of corporations. this ethical and logistical stance is problematic from the very inception of the concept. in our review of central social science scholarship, we see that the confidence in the slo discourse has been contingent upon an interrelated (and sometimes conflicting) series of sociopolitical assumptions within racial capitalism and their presumed ethical solutions. in the next sections, we outline this collection of inferences, assumptions and presumptions. we show that these presumptions echo long standing colonial practices of spectacle, whereby managers direct slo (as a corporate narrative) not toward local communities, but rather to investors and consumers. within a context of investor ‘fears about project murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 20238 disruptions… the unspoken implication is that, properly managed, communities cannot stop [extractive] projects’ (italics added, boutilier 2014, p. 266; see also apter 2008; mulhern, mulhern & perreault 2022; owen & kemp 2013). unstated assumption: capitalism as shared desire the first set of unstated assumptions embedded within slo is the conviction that capitalist economic development will lead to broad forms of betterment and that it is in the best interests of communities to ‘sign on’ to extractive projects. most scholars publishing and speaking on slo agree that one of the most important factors that communities will weigh when deciding to grant (or not) an slo will be related to economic gains, financial growth, or other capital improvements. for example, in their model, boutilier and thomson (2011) envisage slo as a continuum of acceptance where economic benefit is the most basic form of engagement between corporations and local communities. similarly, in an article about the emergence of slo and its practice in canada, jason prno and scott slocombe argue that aboriginal communities tend to mobilise in the face of extractivism for two reasons: (a) asking for more respect to environmental standards by the extractive industry or (b) because they were unsatisfied with results and demanded ‘greater benefits and more say in development outcomes’ (prno & slocombe 2012, p. 353). césar saenz and jhony osto’s (saenz & osto 2021) contribution to the conceptualisation of slo focuses on understanding possible factors of conflict underlying community rejection of projects. in this sense, they highlight (a) community perceptions that benefits are not fairly distributed; and (b) the clashing of different outlooks regarding local development. these conclusions echo liberal tropes embedded in development discourses, wherein the core of the liberal argument is that individuals are rational and selfinterested persons, committed to enhancing their wellbeing through market relations (freeden 2015). critics of postdevelopment have argued that the reality is much more nebulous, and that communities have mixed positions regarding modernity and capitalistic development (asher & wainwright 2019). social scientists sympathetic with extractive industries make strategic use of the awareness of social complexity by focusing on empirical data that shows the ways in which certain community members are interested in economic benefits and development, and they universalise this as a fixed desire of people. in this, slo is perceived not as an imposition, but as a moreorless mutually agreed upon endeavour although sometimes conflictive, given the inequalities in economic distribution. therefore, what is needed is some economic redress rather than a cessation of extractivism. these logics foreclose certain futures; they are ahistorical and obfuscate the violence of global racial capitalism. in this way, slo situates communities as already malleable, amenable and receptive to forms of participation within extractive paradigms. from our view, this aspect of slo parallels the colonial logics embedded in development discourse (esteva 2010; escobar 2012) and negates alternative ways of being and administrating common resources (esteva & prakash 1998). unstated assumption: ‘ineffective’ governance and complex communities a second unstated assumption within slo is that communities have been underserved by ‘ineffective’ governance strategies; therefore, extractive actors necessarily bypass governance mechanisms to connect directly with the community. slo stands in as a licensing mechanism in places where the state is presumed (by the extractive sector) to not provide sufficiently for community welfare. the notion of licence implies an official right. as a tool of tacit consent or negative governance, however, slo is portrayed as less official and yet more valuable than sovereign government agreements. for example, corporations that are said to hold an extractive licence can have it revoked by local communities, even if the contracts with states have been upheld (syn 2014, p. 318; parsons & moffat 2014, p. 341342). slo thus renders informal and voluntary the explicit and binding contract which governance organisations argue is properly held only at murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 20239 the state level but nevertheless abandoned by ‘weak’ state structures. an important body of scholarship has shown that the discourse of ‘weak’ or ‘ineffective’ state governance is profoundly racialised and dismisses the sovereignty of the majority world (pierre 2020). such discourses have paved the way for a politics of expertise that legitimise the governance plans of external institutions and intergovernmental finance and development organisations (murrey & jackson 2020; tilley 2021), including the international monetary fund and the world bank. at the same time, slo operates in concert with the unstated assumption that communities are ‘too complex’ or too internally diverse to allow for broad forms of consensus necessary for fpic ( jackson 2014; macintyre 2007). according to this colonial logic, communal or citizen consent is an illusion. that is, rather than being a way of understanding differing perspectives and internal frictions that can be resolved and overcome, inherent group diversity becomes a justification for disallowing formal consensus mechanisms. corporate representatives narrate communities as ‘too diffuse’ to speak for themselves, except through street protests or acts of differential violence against the people and properties of extractive corporations. when popular actions cannot be ignored, they serve as a form of community rejection of the project – but are dismissed as being irrational, motivated by emotion, externally driven, and even antisocial or anti democratic (crowley 2014; newman 2014). for corporate managers, therefore, fpic is not possible, not normatively justified, and not ‘cost effective’ (macintyre 2007; murrey & jackson 2020). as a result, proponents of slo deem contract theories and democratic liberal procedures best suited to obtaining slo. having identified communal diversity as a challenge for consensusbuilding, authors highlight the relevance of democratic procedures for sorting out conflicts and for the agreement necessary for slo. although this may seem to be a good faith argument, it represents an entrenched vision of democracy that does not account for local communities’ needs. lacey and lamont’s (2014) argument in favour of understanding slo as a form of social contract is a good example of such work. drawing from john rawls, lacey and lamont interpret how slo is analysed in the literature and argue that it maintains the features of a justicebased contractual political philosophy. they base their claim on the argument that slo practices in the coal seam gas industry in australia exhibit the main characteristics of justicebased contractual theory (though with some flaws). these characteristics include things like (a) understanding that those who participate in slo arrangements do so in a way that is reasonable for others. this is because each party considers the other parties’ diverse, implicit, inferred or proclaimed interests/reasons for partaking in the agreement. these arrangements are even more important because they are (b) based on certain moral principles presumed to be shared by all the parties involved. they recognise that these agreements need to be framed by sociopolitical institutions that respect the minimum principles of justice. also, it is believed that (c) individual choices should (and can) consolidate into a general choice that benefits the most. a final feature is that (d) decisions are reached through just procedures (lacey & lamont 2014, p. 832– 835). ultimately, slo is presented as a democraticbased tool through which communities may fairly come to agreement regarding the terms of extractive projects. together with economic development discourse, this reference to democratic procedures in the social science research on slo reinforces the idea that extractive projects are agreed to by communities. this reading is problematic for two reasons. firstly, the perspective embraces a representation of communities as made up of political actors who embrace (and are embraced by) liberal discourse. as a result, and secondly, it does not account for other possible rationalities and cosmologies, as silvia riveracusicanqui (2018) points out. slo functions to silence other ways of knowing extraction and ways of being beyond and outside extractivist worldviews. murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202310 unstated assumption: corporations function best when selfgoverned and selfpoliced a third structuring premise of slo is that corporations function best when selfgoverned and selfpoliced. this is demonstrated by ‘voluntary’ programs of community support. unlike the provision of social welfare and community initiative embodied in csr and sustainable community development, slo carries with it not only underpinnings of corporate empathy and philanthropy, but also inferences of legal sanction as if lack of measurable resistance confirms the right (i.e. licence) of the corporation to remain in the space. scholars often assert that slo is a requirement that goes beyond legal and regulatory obligations (parsons & moffat 2014, p. 341), as if it transcends these mechanisms in a positive way. for example, syn writes, ‘that the term ‘social licence’ was coined by the industry suggests external recognition of this shift of at least some power from the state to the communities, and a slow acceptance that what is legal is not necessarily right’ (syn 2014, p. 333). going further, parsons and moffat comment that, ‘organizations must gain community credibility and full trust to achieve higher levels of social license’ (italics added, parsons & moffat 2014, p. 347; see also thomson & boutilier 2011). on the other hand, slo is a metaphor, drawing on the ‘conjuring power of legal liberalism’ by ‘adopting the term license’ in order to persuade through mobilizing ‘unconsciously formed sets of beliefs, attitudes and values’ (appel 2019, p. 92; parsons & moffat 2014, p. 346). persuasion is weaker, of course. it does not carry with it the enforcement powers of direct sanction held by state organisations. as a corollary, it is not clear how slo is communicated. ‘it is theoretically possible that the company formally applies’ but it is also entirely plausible that ‘a license may be inferred by an absence of significant opposition, or if dissenters can be marginalised’ (parsons & moffat 2014, p. 351). this is both a bold statement and an echo of colonial silencing. the apparent absence of opposition is embraced as a key indicator of acceptance by company representatives and consultants. in an interview, the former canadian ambassador to tanzania and president of mcalister consulting corporation (see ‘ex canadian ambassador of tz seeks to wrestle mining deal from barrick’ 2018; government of canada 2004; linkedin 2023) andrew mcalister answers a question about how it is possible to know if a company has been granted social license by saying that ‘it’s a lot easier to know when you don’t have it than when you do…’ (italics added, uongozi institute 2018, 3:29). he continued, asserting that the only way to know if slo is maintained is through forging ‘good relationships’ and constant consultation with communities. the bonds between corporations and local communities are dressed up in the language of trust, honesty, and legitimacy. the repeated reliance on trust in the social science literature is telling about the cynicism that sustains colonial relationships from the perspective of corporate actors. as katherine hawley states ‘[w]hen you trust someone, you make yourself dependent upon her, giving her a certain power over you: a trusted person enjoys a great deal of discretion in her actions’ (hawley 2017, p. 70). in the context of slo, the notion of trust further tightens capitalist and uneven relationships. other authors have rendered trust synonymous with communities ‘coidentifying’ with extractive companies (moffat & zhang 2014, p. 62; thomson & boutilier 2011) – an assertion that seems to expose the penultimate fantasy of slo. a key aspect of an emancipatory political moment is the possibility of dissensus. but disagreements are only possible when different visions are contrasted in the public arena, allowing oppressed subjects to raise their voice against dominant voices (rancière 1999). for slo proponents, trust and honesty seem centred in the publicfacing discourse. however, in the context of the gross imbalance of power of colonial and capitalist relations, the possible parameters of dialogue are already rigidly set to eliminate radical alternatives otherwise. extractive development is always already decided as the paradigm for the immediate future. murrey, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202311 conclusion: universities beyond extractivism in the face of substantial political critique in response to the unremitting violence initiated by extractivism, corporate entities have frequently called upon researchers, consultants and scientists to provide changing imaginaries and material frameworks through which extractivism can be conceived of in ways perceived as more banal, friendly and sympathetic to community needs. this has occurred even as such projects commit massive forms of ecological, environmental and social violence. our critique of the ideational genealogy and conceptual materialisation of slo has revealed the racialised and colonial logics underlying its enactment and discursive practices. given that slo seems to be highly dependent upon these logics, its conceptual engineers have been of particular significance to our analysis and for decolonial critiques seeking to move beyond them. the trend for social scientists to work with and rely on corporate members’ opinions to build a conceptual framework risks producing scholarship that is inherently partisan. the relationships between scholars/researchers (including research, teaching and ideas) and the extractive industry brings much more urgent ethicalpolitical problems to the fore (kirsch 2022; murrey & jackson 2020). at stake here is whose interests the knowledge produced in universities serves, and which perspectives are considered in the building of that knowledge. these queries are not new in postcolonial, decolonial and feminist reflections on research and knowledge creation. as many authors have signalled, historically research has been instrumentalised to support the relations of domination that preceded and facilitated the development of imperial capitalism (grosfoguel 2016; murrey 2018; smith 2012). from this conceptual and ideational lineage, slo is situated within a powerful tradition of social science research that produces knowledge in service of colonial relations. the university has been implicated in endorsing the power and mythologies of slo. social scientists have sometimes been complicit by providing ancillary support for the concept. therefore, the academy is an important space for decolonial struggles beyond corporate extractivism. given our analysis, we argue that it is necessary to confront the routine and seemingly banal arguments regarding the importance of academics having a ‘seat at the table’ (or ‘inside the fence’; owen & kemp 2017, p. 60) as well as the extractive sponsorship of university research and events. these arguments and acts function as forms of implicit and explicit social licence for extractivism within the university. while we understand that these unfinished arguments, as our reviewers rightly pointed out, will be provocative and unwelcome to some within the university, the significance and implications of social science research of and within the extractive industry demands uncomfortable, even painful, selfscrutiny. we do not hold ourselves above this scrutiny. we simultaneously understand the complexities and the multiple motivations and incentives that researchers have to maintain relations with industry actors and the institutional contexts that normalise varied forms of complicity with extraction; this has not been the focus of this intervention article. our purpose has been to incite more critical and candid interrogation of the roles of social scientists as complicit in condoning or advancing the conceptual and ethicalpolitical frameworks necessary for the maintenance of global extractivism. the diffusion of slo across geographies of knowledge production will probably continue into the immediate future. thus, it will be important to pay attention to how this plays out, not only as a tool of corporate risk management but also to underpin arguments against extraction. in this context, although cautiously, we see a possible opportunity within movements, including among students and faculty, in provisionally appropriating the withdrawal of slo as an ethical statement in support of university (and broader) divestment from extractive corporations, in the context of broader discussion that are taking place about extractive industries and their role in the academy and beyond (klein 2015; 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ukrainians is determined by its influence on consumers of informational and industrial products in a non-muslim country. the objects of our research are semantic components of the islamic narrative in ukraine. the subject of the study is islamic marketing of communications. the research objective is to analyze the communicative dynamics of islamic narrative found in the popular ukrainian media. the research methodology is based on the current scholarly approaches to religion narratives. the results show that the islamic narrative has consisted of two different narratives, the first related to ukrainian muslims, and the second related to muslims of other countries. the analysis of the narratives revealed that since the beginning of the military confrontation with russia, a battle of ideologies has emerged in which the successful business narrative was first rooted in soft power strategy, then turned into a strategic narrative, and has eventually become a weaponized narrative. keywords islamic narrative; religious marketing; strategic narrative; weaponized narrative cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 14, no. 3 2022 © 2023 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: klymentova, o. 2022. islamic narratives in ukraine: analyzing communicative dynamics. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:3, 61– 78. https:// doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8227 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs 61 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. mailto:klymentovaov@ukr.net https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8227 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8227 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8227 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs introduction at least since the beginning of the 21st century, sociologists have argued that religion would continue to penetrate the public sphere and that scholars can no longer ignore the implications this has for scholarship and policy (davie 2006, p. 294). a special role in this process is given to islam, which is showing the tendency to strengthen its position in many countries, including non-muslim ones, like, for example, ukraine. there are dynamic changes in religious communication in the many denominations operating in ukraine, whose religious map is being transformed under the pressure of political, economic and cultural factors. ukraine is considered to be a country with a relatively small muslim population: according to different estimates, followers of islam make up from 600 thousand to 2 million people. and their number is growing rapidly due to a high birth rate. at the same time, muslims have lived in predominantly christian ukraine for a long time and belong to indigenous peoples, such as the tatars. the traditional territories of their settlement were the southern (crimean peninsula) and eastern regions of ukraine (including the donetsk and luhansk regions). these territories have also become a new homeland for chechens who disagree with the regime of incumbent chechen president ramzan kadyrov. who will own the territories, where ukrainian muslims traditionally lived? this is one of the important questions and the war between russia and ukraine is likely to give an answer. media practice shows that extraordinary events in muslims’ lives have laid the basis for promoting islamic content, something that was previously unimaginable in predominantly christian ukraine, where local muslims were assimilated, often not expressing their religious beliefs and ethnically positioning themselves primarily as ukrainians, with an emphasis on the tradition of exceptional tolerance for all faiths. in very recent times, these events include the annexation of crimea that forced many tatars to leave their homeland, the eviction of muslims from places of their traditional residence in donbas, the participation of kadyrovites and other foreign muslim mercenaries in the war between russia and ukraine and so on. unexpectedly for ukrainians, news from the islamic world has the ability to determine ratings of ukrainian media and encourage ukrainians to discuss passionately this news, especially those news posts that arouse fear. in almost all european countries, the islamic narrative belongs to a strategic narrative, or ‘compelling story lines which can explain events convincingly and from which inferences can be drawn’ (freedman 2006, p. 22). these strategic narratives tie the local to global events and although they exist in a cognitive dimension, they have very real consequences’ (archetti 2017, p. 3). what does this mean for ukraine? it may seem to be a rhetorical question, because ukraine is located in the center of europe and is currently applying for eu membership. yet it is this question that is the focus of this paper. until recently, it was still possible to structure the islamic narrative in ukraine into two types: the first delivered the position of local muslims, while the second represented the position of muslims from other countries as a political marketing factor. in the pre-war period, the second was represented mainly by projects related to soft power strategies, business initiatives, cultural, educational and tourism activities. at the same time, the war with russia has fundamentally changed the foreign islamic narrative in ukraine, and islamism has become one of the strategic priorities, since the intra-islamic conflict directly has begun to affect lives of ukrainian muslims, and indeed the lives of all ukrainians. monitoring ukrainian mass media enables us to identify at least three strategic epistemes that have fundamentally changed the concept of alien in the ukrainian islamic narrative. these are the project of the global islamic world, the confrontation between islam and the west and muslims’ participation in the war waged by russia on the ukrainian territory. researchers usually support the project’s characterization with quotes from qutb’s books (1974), from bin laden’s propaganda texts or the al-qaeda manifesto. the rhetoric of these texts literally is alien to ukrainians who have been living in a multi-ethnic, multicultural klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202262 and multi-confessional society for centuries. in general, ukrainians are not well versed in intra-islamic conflict; after a long period of atheism and in the conditions of the politicization of scholarship, nonpartisan islamic studies in ukraine are at an early stage of development. the idea of confrontation between the values of islam and the west is being developed by the ukrainian mass media, without delving into the position of muslims. media framing of islam in ukraine is not balanced in terms of reproducing the complex and multi-level value paradigm of this religion. in ukraine, the media offers a ‘strange mixture of islamophobia and tatarophilia’ (yakubovych 2020), in which the causal contexts are regulated by today’s security priorities, including relations with america and european countries. ukrainian mass media is using the aggressive characteristics of islam as markers for recognizing the concepts own and alien, because at the current stage of development, euro-atlantic integration and the standard of living of western countries determine priorities in many spheres of ukraine’s life. this can be construed as an attempt to replace an islamic identity and culture with western norms and values (rane 2010, p. 11). indeed, fear impedes the promotion of the values of islam, and restricts opportunities for the development of business and economic ties. the ukrainian experience confirms these considerations because here, in addition to the military confrontation in which western countries provide huge assistance to ukraine, the fight against islamic terrorism unfolds in the field of communication and includes ideas, values and perceptions as well (archetti 2017, p. 3). this paper is written during the second six months of the war in ukraine in 2022. it explores the discursive dynamics of the islamic narrative in modern ukraine, comparing the pre-war islamic narrative the one developing as the war continues. religious narrative religious narratives are new subjects for linguistic inquiry. from the point of view of modern approaches, a religious narrative is a complex discursive phenomenon where political, religious and media features are fused to produce a hybrid construct (farwell 2012). it is assumed that technologically efficient story-telling, frequent media representations and epistemic cohesion entail a suggestive effect of narratives. owing to these factors, the efficiency of narrative suggestion does not necessarily depend on real-life events. for understandable reasons, this turns a narrative into a particularly convenient form of religious influence. much research has also focused on the compelling nature of jihadist narratives, which succeed by drawing from stores of cultural and religious values, or by offering both material and spiritual incentives in which the material world is explained by religious ideas (bindner 2018). important for understanding the technology of creating a religious narrative is the contribution of halverson et al., who in their book the main narratives of islamist extremism argue that despite differences in locally embedded narratives, there are master narratives that override these local narratives in importance. (halverson, goodall jr. & corman 2011) this finding pertains fundamentally to islam and muslims, where the master narrative is found to constitute elements derived from ‘sacred texts’ and history (halverson, goodall jr. & corman 2011, p. 396). it is also argued that master narratives are not static communicative phenomena, but are the result of constant reconsideration of individual and collective perception of religious experience. investigating the communicative dynamics of the islamic narrative in ukraine, it is important to emphasize that, despite the genre, thematic and content diversity of the texts involved in the creation of the narrative, these texts are rooted in a certain interpretive version of the muslim sacred texts. their language culture is based on the intention to form linear or non-linear orientations within the ethical paradigm of islam. therefore, even advertising or sales texts have a religious connotation. the pragmatics behind the use of religious narratives lie in the fact that, along with political, cultural and other narratives, they help control public opinion, voters’ behavior and people’s emotional state. at the same time, religious narratives are specific because the intention of the doctrinal influence for all constructs klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202263 in religious communication is fundamental and its fusion with political components gives the influence a special power, which, in particular, can have very destructive consequences. this results in the strategic nature of religious narratives. in the globalized world, these narratives become powerful weapons in hybrid wars. in general, the selfsufficiency of religious experience is destroyed, this experience becomes dependent on political views. in ukraine, the high-speed modification of religious narratives carried out in propagandistic media flows has revealed new strategic aspects of their use. an example can be seen in the break between the ukrainian orthodox church and russian orthodoxy. this institutional self-determination became part of the political conflict between russia and ukraine. at the same time, each of the churches tries to ‘appropriate’ god and argues its strategy by referring to the sacred text and christian commandments. the use of contemporary media amplifies the power and influence of the language used in religious narratives. the implications of this use of language are of particular relevance in this study there are relatively few studies into the numerous modern forms of religious communication with their tendency to communicative dynamism. in the category of religious communication falls religious marketing and the related areas of religious advertising, religious naming, religious tourism, religious internetcommunication with its well-developed genre network and specific memes, tags, and so on. according to the global principle that organizes religious discourse, all these communicative constructs are marked for a certain religion and contribute, on the one hand, to renovating semiotic codes of religious communication and, on the other hand, to perpetuating epistemic elements of a religious narrative, which helps believers to recognize them easily and to decode them. thus, religious banner advertisements in support of the idea of a national church displayed in the streets of large and small cities as part of ukraine’s 5th president poroshenko election campaign produced real cognitive shock. on the one hand, these billboards destroyed the long-lasting tradition of separating church and state that had formed a language culture of intimacy of experience and embodiment of religious feelings. on the other hand, the high level of politicization of ukrainians helped this idea take root in the worldview of ukrainians as a manifestation of ukrainian identity, where faith in god occupies an important place. a religious narrative is a hypertext generated by a powerful set of communicative means used to objectify a religious picture of the world, a religious identity and a religious axiological paradigm. during the russian aggression against ukraine, the islamic narrative has been drastically transformed in response to political changes and new formats of social solidarization; it has been objectified in understandable and simple messages sent by religious leaders to their communities. within the framework of this research into religious narrative, we also focus on religious advertising as a component of islamic narrative, and, therefore, we also analyze its suggestive potential, in particular its capacity to present the acceptable and the unacceptable (naseri & tamam 2012, p. 69). methodology the islamic content used in this study drew on materials from institutional islamic sites, internet advertising, and popular ukrainian periodicals. to explore the linguistic phenomenology of religious marketing, we chose fairclough’s methodological approach, the critical discourse model comprising three dimensions: 1) oral or written texts, 2) discursive practice, which extends to the production and interpretation of the text and 3) social practice (fairclough 2003, pp. 454-456). the study also employs van dijk’s socio-cognitive approach. van dijk regards narrative as a discourse of action, which is formed by intentions, goals (effects, results) and actors (van dijk 2008). labov’s model (labov 1972, pp. 365-370) is based on the assumption that narrative is formed by the following constituent parts: abstract, orientation, complicating action, evaluation, resolution, coda. these approaches to narrative are used to present the analyses of the pre-war and the war-time narratives. the constituent parts offer a version of how an event klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202264 happened and what happened before; who participated in it, when and where; what actually happened and what was its result; what should be our assessment of this event and understanding of its meaning. our analytical approach distinguishes between islamic religious narratives used in times peace and those used recently, in the time of war in ukraine. ontological status of islamic narrative abstract the majority of ukrainian muslims are local people, whose ancestors have been living for centuries in the south and the east of ukraine. as it is well-known, during the soviet times, this identity, just like other religious identities, was almost completely blotted out with ideological dogmas that emphasized the atheist worldview. the collapse of the soviet union opened up certain opportunities for islamic revival in ukraine as an independent state. to that extent, the life of local muslims reflected in the islamic narrative, is always related to the concept of own, that is, of belonging. active institutional involvement of ukrainian muslims is objectified through the official recognition of their rights in independent ukraine and, simultaneously, through the readiness for a dialog with other religious communities. the ukrainian muslims’ charter states: ‘ukrainian muslims support and promote economic and cultural cooperation of ukraine with countries of the islamic world, and with western countries, because they believe that european integration of ukraine will improve protection of freedoms and rights of its religious minorities’ (vlaskor 2016). to some extent, islamic identity was ensured by active economic and cultural cooperation with countries of moderate islam, free access to religious services and goods, joint projects in religious education, and religious tourism. the narrative of foreign muslims was presented fragmentarily, in accordance with the intentions mentioned above. these different narratives interacted without conflict. there was almost no information about another, militant, islam in the ukrainian mass media. yet, this revival of the life of local muslims, within the context of the nation of ukraine was interrupted by the annexation of crimea and the armed conflict in the donbas region, its epicenter covering territories of muslims’ traditional residence. that is why islam is being covered in ukrainian media with an emphasis on political identity centered around the concept of ukrainian independence. the following two sections will present the analyses of the islamic narrative during the peace period and during the time of war. islamic narrative of the peace period orientation islamic narrative was developed primarily by engaging new channels to spread religiously relevant information. these channels were mostly political and educational platforms including those targeted at children and young people, such as islam.in.ua; islam.ua; umma.in.ua; amu.org.ua; channel islamic media ukraine; channel nashid records; raum channel; islamic library; children’s development center; al-irshad school; and al-maher school of hafiz. the main marketing strategy was informational: it was employed by objectifying local intentions that were important in political, cultural and educational contexts. this adds persuasiveness to the texts since ukrainians have little trust in their own institutions with responsibility for objective assessment. for example, a certification in standardization centers is a common procedure in the halal industry, the text representation of their names, their location, and so on in advertisements aimed at ukrainian mass media consumers may be perceived as an instance of the wellknown suggestive technique of reference to authority. intentions of religious influence on the part of ukrainian muslims were objectified exclusively through messages that contain concepts of moderate islam and are in line with the ukrainian interreligious dialog, freedom of religious beliefs and the ukrainian spiritual tradition where islamic motives play a prominent role. the identification function was actualized by the accentuated appeal to traditional islamic values represented primarily in the quranic text. anti-islamic messages were analyzed by providing examples klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202265 that do not match this principle. thus, there were cases of inaccurate terminology, concept substitution, the phrase ‘ukrainians and muslims’ that implies the division into us and others – as if ukrainians cannot be muslims or, vice versa, muslims cannot be ukrainians. the islamic narrative was rooted in pacifist theology. its semantic content had no epistemes of identity conflict. aims compared to other religions, islam in ukraine, until recently, held a stronger position in the sphere of food products. it is necessary to mention that a religion, which makes its way through the use of commercial channels, daily food products and the beauty industry, is a brand new phenomenon for ukraine. the focus of christianity, and orthodoxy in particular, on spirituality regard attention to the needs of the body and stomach as sinful. the market segment, religiously marked by christian theology, of food, clothing, household items, hygiene, and so on traditionally remains vacant. this difference with islam in the attitude to the needs of the body and the intersection of neoliberalism and capitalism in the economy of ukraine make islam more ‘marketable’ and consumer focused. in addition, the separation of the church and the state in ukraine did not create the conditions for a deep penetration of christian ethics into the social activities of ukrainians, and in particular into business activities, which are primarily regulated by laws. however, there is evidence that ‘islamic ethics is capable of coordinating and adjusting all social relations … the characteristics of ethics are education, self-discipline and ethical value-oriented coordination’ (liu 2011, p.19). at the same time, this created good prospects for the latent strengthening of islamic influence in ukraine, the poorest country in europe in terms of economic indicators, where control over hygienic quality of raw materials and food products exists in statements (verkhovna rada of ukraine 2005). unfortunately, eco-friendly manufacturing and ethical businesses are a desirable prospect rather than a ukrainian reality. besides, ordinary ukrainians know almost nothing about the islamic world. this situation obviously offers many benefits for cognitive marketing (see, for example, works by kahneman & tversky 1979; edwards & von winderfeldt 1986), which literally ‘creates’ its consumer through the transfer of knowledge about the product, teaches the consumer the ‘correct’ use of the product, forms standards and consumption culture. information taken for granted in a muslim country is perceived differently in ukraine. market promotion of product offerings relevant to the values of islam combines developmental information strategies with marketing objectives. linguistic research into communicative features of islamic marketing makes it possible to identify a large number of verbal suggestive means that ensure a high level of loyalty to the market offerings of this group, such as the identification of a product as halal, that is, lawful. in ukraine, the market for halal food and products was flourishing. according to experts, ‘special labelling is no longer just a sign of belonging to a specific religion, but a marker of a lifestyle, of a value system’ (negoda 2021). minimalist advertising strategies usually emphasize verbalizers for the halal concept: halal, translated from arabic, means ‘permissible’, ‘acceptable’. however, the term halal has long moved beyond the meat industry; it is not only about goods and services. halal food is one of the incentives for muslim identity and a counterbalance to the influence of western culture and globalization (armanios & ergene 2018). it can be assumed that the attractive media image of halal in ukraine was partly formed as a reaction to the loss of the high quality of ukrainian food. this is a kind of philosophy that regulates the idea of a healthy lifestyle and nutrition. recently, halal has become an additional guarantee of quality. halal products are being increasingly purchased not only by muslims, but also by individuals who care about their health, as they begin to better understand this issue. thus, the target audience is defined in a generalized manner: all people who care about their health. in cognitive terms, this philosophy expands the possibilities of a positive impact on human life. actors/consumers a study of the impact of halal labeling on consumer choice argues: ‘the effects of religiosity on consumer behaviour seem to be even stronger in the case of halal products’, and ‘another research demonstrates, however, that the issue of halal products can potentially provoke ambiguous klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202266 attitudes among non-muslims’ (floren, rasul, & gani 2020). but these results have not been confirmed in ukraine. halal products were presented in ukraine as healthy, organic, useful without any reference to religion. there was even an emphasis on the lack of religious argumentation: ‘there is no need to be a true believer to eat halal meat’, ‘not only for believers’ (negoda 2021). at the same time, generalizations in favor of the perfect islamic world were also expressed in mass media texts: ‘if you see a package marked halal, it means that the product at least does not contain chemicals, gmo, carcinogens, nitrates, harmful dyes that are strictly prohibited. this is an organic product since islamic norms absolutely match modern environmental requirements’ (negoda 2021). at the explicit level, these text representations verbalize the semantic relation of a binary opposition good vs evil, which facilitates the secular identification of meanings on the emotive ‘positive – negative’ scale. in addition, at the implicit level this approach distinguishes the communicative tactic of sacral symbolization in the background of religious values peculiar to manufactured goods and their consumption typical of the islamic world and its system of ethical values (adibah 2013). according to naseri, the significant difference between marketing in islamic countries and marketing in secular countries is the influence of shari’a, the islamic comprehensive code of conduct, that governs all muslims, in all areas of life, including marketing and commerce (naseri & tamam 2012, p. 69). although it is recognized that there is a view that activities related to commercial purchases and economic behavior should be studied using theory derived from islamic intellectual history and ethics, (al-daghistani 2016, p. 402), these ‘ethical principles’ were popularized in a simplified cognitive version by the pre-war ukrainian mass media. at the same time, the promotion strategy was provided by the tactics of positive presentation. these tactics activate implicit positivity in perception processes, which is realized here by using only such words and references to sources that encourage a positive interpretation of information, while in fact there is a lack of evaluative judgments about the objects of analysis. as an example, paventko states: example: ‘the organization and conduct of business is based on ethical principles that focus not on profitability and the amount of risk, but more on the reputation and moral image of companies and the moral qualities of their management’ (payentko 2022). this cognitive style has been used to demonstrate business principles, relationships between producers of products and services, product characteristics, islamic financing of international projects, and so on (payentko 2022). in this approach, the means of persuasion are based on suggestion, when the objects of media influence propose ideas as the only appropriate ones. incidentally, we should note that in economic content, ukrainian media tend to choose a ‘downgrade’ strategy from the tactics of ‘minus’ analysis, which implicitly activates negative assessments, calls for denunciation, accusations, and so on. appeals to christian morality within the framework of this rhetoric are not used in mass media, with the exception of cases when they represent the last emotional argument or hope for a miracle. as a result, the objective markers of belonging to one’s own (christian) and the others’ (islamic) world are reinforced by negative/positive connotations that promote tolerance of others. therefore, in marketing communication, there is no open coexistence of religious concepts in information space, and the discourse of tolerance to islam in a non-islamic country is ensured without conflict, by using cognitive phenomena that contribute to the process of changing perceptions. in the world of the nonmuslims to whom this marketing communication is addressed, positive evaluations of objects relevant for islam are constructed. the culture of halal consumption occupies a special place here. as noted above, the significance of halal for muslims cannot be overemphasized. however, for a christian country, when daily consumption products are isomorphs of a religious concept, this is a promising innovation. among such product offerings in ukraine are the meat of birds and animals, their products, oils, sweets, hard rennet cheeses, as well as medicines, body care products, and so on. these are accompanied by the trademarks of certified manufacturers, presented on the website of the certification center. (unfortunately, it is necessary to mention here that there are also cases of unauthorized use of halal markers.) klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202267 communicative strategies to represent halal goods use tactics such as an emphasis on the benefits arising from certification and are implemented through reference to values such as recognition, cooperation and independence. examples include for recognition: ‘our organization is accredited by jakim (malaysia) and eiac (uae), so our certificate is recognized worldwide’ (emphasis added); for cooperation: ‘our halal certified manufacturers successfully export their products to countries around the world’ (emphasis added); for independence: ‘assessments performed by the specialists of the halal certification center are always objective’ (emphasis added). the high quality of halal products sold or even manufactured in ukraine is always guaranteed by islamic, rather than secular ukrainian, institutions, as the following statement from the halal certification center attests. ‘halal certification center is the only official certification body in ukraine, which is supported and controlled by the spiritual administration of muslims of ukraine (dumu). halal certification center is a recognized certification center of the global halal industry, the high level of which has been confirmed by the world-renowned accreditation bodies jakim, eiac and muis. the logo of the halal certification center has become the business card of ukrainian manufacturers on the world market, demonstrating not only the compliance of their products with “halal” requirements, but also their high quality’ (halal certification center, n.d.). such ‘laudatory verbal description’ in the ukrainian context aims at convincing, since ukrainians have little faith in their own institutions authorized to make objective assessments. this adds persuasiveness to the texts. if certification in standardization centers is a common procedure in halal industry, the text representation of their names, their location, and so on. in advertisements created for ukrainian mass media consumers may be viewed as the well-known suggestive technique of reference to authority. further, when advertising halal products, ukrainian media also used the positive forecasting tactic: the islamic narrative was disseminated by quoting the high rate of economic development, with reference to the considerable investments in economies of various countries, by the steady increase in export production of halal goods, including meat and poultry, honey, seafood, and so on. this cognitive style served the image strategies of the islamic world and contributed implicitly to its attractiveness. media emphasized that ukrainian export of poultry to muslim countries was on the rise, and that technologically innovative construction of factories to process and produce halal meat products in ukraine was funded by muslim countries. advertising texts that reported these processes in ukrainian media contained a large number of axiological verbalizers that traditionally described the quality of halal goods: the highest standards of sanitary norms, quality assurance, grown in non-polluted regions, does not contain harmful ingredients, antibiotics, hormones of growth and is safe and of high quality (negoda 2021). the news rhetoric of institutional sites is formed by phrases that confirm the conformity of the product to muslim traditions: slaughter of a special type, absence of any blood in meat. the exclusivity of the goods proposal was objectified with the frequent use of verbal markers of novelty or ‘foreignness’: newly built factory, modern workshop of boning, packing, cooling, a turkish line of vacuuming and modern refrigerators. the advertisements also employ slogans, for example, ‘consume halal’. along with mouth-watering photos of their products, specialized internet stores contain numerous favorable customer reviews (see for example ukr halal (ukr-halal) n.d.). a prominent place in the islamic narrative in ukraine was taken by halal cosmetics whose marketing texts contain mainly stylistic properties mentioned above. their informative intention is to objectify the most important features of halal beauty industry that distinguished it from other products offered in the market. the informing strategy correlates first of all with the media tactic of emphasizing advantages which is based on numerous verbalizers of norms peculiar to islamic business ethic, as the following example shows: ‘does not contain pork or its components, narcotic, hormonal, psychotropic substances, is made of mostly klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202268 natural raw material, there are peculiar requirements to the personnel, processing, transporting, packing, halal cosmetics is a combination of concern for nature, animals and humans, etc.’ (nadobenko 2019). the texts combine factual arguments with emotional ones. an attractive emotional correlation makes it possible to latently strengthen the objectification of islamic values in the non-muslim worldview. one of the most promising branches of ukraine’s marketing development was tourism. the visa-free regime introduced for citizens of saudi arabia, bahrein, kuwait, oman and some other muslim countries opened up ukraine for many muslim tourists. this made numerous kyiv hoteliers and restaurateurs add new services and dishes, translate menus into arabic, renovate interiors according to muslim tourists’ tastes. good prospects for the development of religious tourism in the pre-war period provided ukrainians with new jobs and legal, competitive salaries. thus, in the pre-war period, the islamic narrative was formed primarily by these marketing messages. it did not belong to the strategic priorities. the influence of negative stereotypes such as ‘islam is an aggressive religion, the qur’an calls muslims to violence’ and ‘christianity and islam are irreconcilable religions’ was neutralized in ukraine with the help of media activity of islamic institutions, openness of ukrainian society to foreign islamic business, religious tourism, a large number of muslim students, business growth, international partnership with representatives of moderate islamic countries. at the same time, on the level of communicative specificity, this process of strengthening positions was facilitated by the fact that a high level of loyalty to the islamic segment was ensured by the active use of suggestive language in the information interaction with recipients. the linguistic analysis reveals that the cognitive style of these mass media materials is rooted in the system of faithand value-based reference points peculiar to the ideological code of the islamic world. its substitutes and first of all sensory perceptions are reinforced on the level of everyday needs and merge with psychologically comfortable emotions. this contributed to the fact that process of introducing ukrainians to islam took place not only at the mental level, but also at the everyday level, with the objectivation of various forms of sensory experience and was accompanied by positive emotions. taking into account the time perspective, the combination of these factors created a solid basis for the conflict-free presence of the islamic values in ukraine, maintaining their high standards and forming an attractive image of islam in a non-islamic country. complications of the action the war with russia has completely changed the format of meaningful principles of the islamic narrative in ukraine. to justify mobilization and the use of force abroad during the military invasion of ukraine, russia employs the narrative of fighting fascism. mobilization of muslims from dagestan, tatarstan, the north caucasus and other muslim regions of russia, participation of chechen armed groups in the violent confrontation (lelich 2022), the aggressive media campaign with overt intimidation of ukrainians by kadyrov’s soldiers (pislya povidomlennya pro zagybel ‘kadyrivtsiv’ na hersonschyni kadyrov zagovoryv pro dgyhad 2022), the presence of the islamic revolution guards corps in the captured territories (schmitt, gibbons-neff & ismay 2022) and propaganda of militant islam have forced ukrainian muslims to set their priorities in the new circumstances. islamic narrative during the military confrontation between ukraine and russia resolution military units of ukrainian muslims have become part of the ukrainian army. according to the religious leader of ukrainian muslims, the ex-mufti of the spiritual administration of muslims of ukraine ‘umma’ sheikh said ismagilov, who had to leave his native donetsk with his family after being included in the ‘kill lists’: ‘for muslims as believers, faith is, of course, more important, but love for their country, their people, and a happy future not only does not contradict faith, but is a derivative of faith. if you believe in god, if you believe in high moral values – you must wish prosperity to your country and your people, your klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202269 neighbors, your city, all your loved ones, your friends and all people in general! that is why in islam our love for the motherland is like a continuation of our religious faith’ (sheikh said ismagilov 2022). all institutions of ukrainian muslims in the media have reaffirmed their solidarity with fighters against the large-scale russian invasion on ukraine and called for unity in order to give a consolidated rebuff to the russian aggressor. as part of this approach, the leaders of ukrainian muslims and the leaders of the muslim diaspora in europe clearly start to distinguish between peace-loving and militant islam. the events in ukraine have shown that the doctrinal conflict within islam allows politicians to play on the threat of islamic extremism in multi-confessional or predominantly christian countries. in modern political marketing, islamic narrative is used as a convenient tool of influence in national contexts that are distant from the islamic world. so, to garner public support, russia uses an old narrative proven in world war ii: ‘russia is liberating the world from fascism’. the conflict escalating, the anti-fascist narrative is getting reinforced by the ‘this war is a jihad for muslims around the world’ narrative. in russian mass media, the anti-fascist narrative is used primarily for the general mobilization of the population to participate in the war. at the same time, the call for jihad is used in the countries of the islamic world to seek political and financial partnerships, recruit mercenaries and support the international image of russia as a country that respects religious feelings of muslims. unlike the ukrainian media, russian propaganda media are well embedded in the information space of the islamic world. as a result, the political image of the war is formed as an event of systemic confrontation between the value paradigms of islam and the collective west. this representation of the war turns the religious component into the priority, and the subjectivity of ukraine in deciding the fate of its own state is generally weakened. the position of ukrainian muslims, who stand up to defend their territory, is shared by ukrainians as representatives of christian denominations and is sanctified by the text of the qur’an as legitimate, since its purpose is defense. at the same time, its retransmission in the islamic world is complicated by the asymmetry of efforts russia and ukraine make in their foreign policy image. russian muslims, whose hero in media representations is primarily r. kadyrov, are portrayed as those who trust their religious leaders and are aware of the goals of the war. however, the leader of ukrainian muslims, ismagilov, believes that russian news reports on events at the frontline emphasize religiosity solely to mobilize foreign mercenaries who are hesitant about whether participation in this war is ethical from the point of view of islam. (lelich 2022) in particular, muslims – ukrainian muslims and russian muslims – are currently fighting on opposite sides, and this feeds both political and religious narratives. the stance of local muslims is a part of the national-patriotic narrative. muslims of ukraine are fighting to live in a tolerant country where they can safely practice their religion, publish islamic literature, open islamic centers and be a full-fledged part of a free society. this stance stems from the natural desire of people to protect their families and homes from the aggressor. evaluation during the war, the main influential actors in the information space are religious leaders. sheikh said ismagilov has lent his voice to this worldview. he offered ukrainian muslims his understanding of the goals as well as the moral and ethical value of muslim participation in military actions. for russian and foreign muslims, participation in military action is a way to give meaning to their own lives, for which no worthy goals have been found at home. the situation in ukraine confirms that strategic narratives can mobilize and influence public support for military missions (freedman 2006; ringsmose & børgesen 2011). but as the conflict is continuing, the time for final conclusions has not yet come. in this study, we are trying to close this gap by analyzing strategic narratives presented in the ukrainian mass media and paying special attention to the fact that the dominant narrative and balanced public support are relevant. klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202270 local muslims and the national-patriotic narrative it should be noted that the strength of ismagilov’s narrative stance and at the same time the lack of adaptation to the practice of ukrainian media have been used by other active media actors for their imagebuilding purposes in their struggle for influence over the electorate during the war with russia. that is why its media distribution and influential functions have been strengthened by the rhetorical activities of ukrainian radicals and ideologues of militant orthodoxy. it is noteworthy that before the russian invasion, ukrainian society as a whole was tolerant of a wide range of opinions and radicalism did not have much support, although it was represented in diverse political standpoints. the success of the radical narrative lies in its resonating with the idea of ukraine’s independence, which is seen primarily as a way out of russia’s political, economic and religious protectorate. within this approach, ukrainians and russians oppose each other. the interests of national and religious minorities, and in general other factors of the war, are absorbed by the ethnic confrontation, which has a strong foothold in ukrainian history. this provides the narrative with a high capacity for self-reproduction. in communicative manifestations of the islamic narrative, this convergence is often objectified as a practice of public humiliation of the enemy’s religious feelings for propaganda purposes. for example, ukrainian soldiers threatened muslim opponents that they would wrap their corpses in pig skins so that their enemies would not enter paradise after death. for the same purpose, it was claimed that ukrainian soldiers would also grease bullets with lard and use them in battles with muslim invaders. thus, ukrainians have shown complete disrespect for those muslims who support russia’s invasion on ukraine. the interpretation frame is decoded by activating the recipient’s background knowledge. the use of the word ‘lard’ [pig fat], which is one of the most famous ethno-markers of ukrainian national cuisine, helps us to understand the implicit episteme of ukrainian unity in this struggle. another interpretive frame is deciphered as a curse from ukrainians, which would block the soldiers’ way to paradise even after death, because they would be defiled with pork. it is clear that this display of anger is unacceptable to the civilized world and may seriously damage ukraine’s political image. for this reason, a presidential adviser has addressed ukrainians on social networks and asked them to avoid insulting muslims in this way, to refrain from viewing all muslims as enemies and to distinguish between those who fight on the side of russia (kadyrovites) and other muslims who help ukrainians in every possible way. the response of ukrainians to this call has been a propaganda expression that draws on the phraseological resource of the ukrainian and russian languages, deprived of any religious contexts: the image of a can with the inscription ‘kadyrovtsi in their own juice’ appeared on social networks. the literal meaning of the phrase ‘in their own juice’ corresponds to the fact that this method of preserving the product does not involve the addition of spices or liquid. conventionally speaking, ‘juice’ becomes a liquid for preservation; in this liquid, life processes stop. the use of the expression found as a label on canned food is a metaphor for the level of consciousness of enemies, a metaphor that implies narrow-mindedness of kadyrov’s soldiers, because the ukrainian idiom ‘in its own juice’ means ‘being stuck within one’s own life/ interests/work, working/living without communicating with others’ (bilonozhenko et al. 1993, pp. 51-52). it should be noted that the ukrainian phrase1 ‘in its own juice’ has a negative connotation, as it also means the loss of ‘clear, vivid characteristics’ (matuzkova & dibrova 2019, p. 203). muslims fighting on ukraine’s side say the ukrainian war is a continuation of the second chechen war (2009). they point out that the chechens are unable to continue the struggle in ichkeria, so they will fight with russia wherever possible, ukraine being one of the locations. it is worth noting that sheikh mansour’s battalion is manned not only by chechens but also by fighters from other caucasian nations. 1 the english expression, “to stew in one of own juice”, which means “being left to suffer the consequences of one’s own [misguided] actions alone” (brewer’s 1999); is certainly different from that of the ukrainian idiom. klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202271 other influential muslin clerics, such as abu umar sasitlinsky, believe that the participation of muslims in the war on the side of russia is a violation of the islamic law because islam protects the unjustly humiliated. sheikh umar sasitlinsky emphasized that there is no islamic interest in this war, it is a conflict between christian countries (sasitlinsky 2022a, 2022b). ukrainians believe that this is their liberation war against the russian aggressor. this war has its own communicative parameters. the rhetoric of the euphemization strategy used by russian media is opposed to ukraine’s strategy of controlling the interpretation of information. ukrainian news messages do not report of russia’s special operation in ukraine, they talk about russia’s full-scale aggression, destruction, terrorism; neither do media speak of russian warriors but rather russian aggressors. one can hardly find in ukrainian media the words dismissal, the overthrow of the ruling junta, bandera regime. instead, there are the lexemes such as attack, bloodshed, support of ukraine. in addition, denazification and demilitarization (as targets of russian aggression) are concepts not used by the ukrainian media. solidarity with the ukrainian people is expressed with verbs that denote positive procedurality and empathic subjectivity: to help, protect, provide, cooperate, unite, create (initiative groups), show the best human qualities, not stand aside. this vocabulary lies at the core of the mobilizing potential in ukrainian muslim texts. in addition, verbalizers of ideological concepts are represented by ‘protection of muslims’ rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘struggle’, ‘volunteers’, ‘interreligious dialog’. these words help to objectify the seme ‘ukrainian muslims’ political loyalty’ in numerous local media contexts. as a result, these media representations depict the religious identity of ukrainian muslims as secularized and partially absorbed by their political identity. nevertheless, in order to stress initiatives put forward by ukrainian muslims, nouns such as protection, evacuation, coordination, organization, solidarity, unity, integrity, peace intensify positivity. possessive pronouns are used primarily to differentiate like-minded people from others, to identify a group and to express solidarity: ‘our mosques and islamic cultural centers are ready to become points of humanitarian aid ’. the narrative of pro-russian muslim participants intentions the role and features of media support during military conflicts has been explored by dimitriu who claims that, as the conflict deepens, perception of events by the local population and the international community gains significance. this explains the unique influence of dominant strategic narratives on the course of events and, ultimately, on a combatant’s victory or defeat (dimitriu 2012). muslim participants’ motivation in the war on the side of russia (that is, kadyrov’s army and others) is rooted in russia’s strategic narrative. the active practice of using suggestion by the russian media and the strong position of the concept of victory over fascism in the russian picture of the world ensured support of the local population for the military invasion of ukraine. the narrative replicates itself through the mythology of unity among all peoples, including muslims, in the struggle against fascism. within this framework, the communicative specificity is manifested in the propaganda strategy of labeling, semantically relevant to the crimes against humanity attributed to the ukrainian regime and the army. the influence of the russian strategic narrative in international and domestic mass media is determined by the label ‘fascists’ used refer to ukrainians. the concept of fascism is easily deciphered all over the world as a crime against humanity, it has a moral and mobilizing potential, it helps find sympathizers of various ‘anti-fascist initiatives’, without delving into the essence of the problem, except at the expense of emotional arguments. therefore, in russian propaganda news and other official reports, ukrainian soldiers are depicted as neo-fascists, killers, ‘nazis’ (from nationalists), radicals, who use civilians as human shields, and the ukrainian government is called a ‘fascist junta’. at the same time, the concept nationalism has been actively used in media to influence the russian audience. brought up within the soviet system of values, people of the older generation are especially klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202272 sensitive to this kind of influence. within the framework of the soviet mythology, the movement of ukrainian nationalists against the soviet regime led by stepan bandera (1909-1959), an ideologist of ukrainian radical nationalism, was fascist. bandera’s followers have entered the history of ukrainian nationalism as ‘banderivtsy’. even now, the attitude of ukrainians to this historical character is ambiguous: from condemnation to cult. the critical discourse is based on the historical facts of massacres of jews, poles, russians and ukrainians by the participants in the movement in order to cleanse ukraine of all kinds of enemies. from this perspective, bandera is a tragic figure, he is a ukrainian anti-hero. the followers of the modern bandera ideology, in their turn, define bandera as the archetype of the father for the ukrainian political nation that owes him its birth, with certain sacrifices and mistakes admitted. for them, bandera is a national hero, a symbol of the liberation movement. ‘bandera is our father, and ukraine is our mother’ are the words from a ukrainian popular song and the slogan of numerous flash mobs in support for political independence of ukraine. although a scholarly biography of bandera has not been written in ukraine yet, since many historical materials related to the ukrainian nationalist movement of the 1940s and 1950s still remain classified, this does not prevent ukrainian politicians from creating bandera’s heroic mythology (center for strategic communications and information security 2022). russian politicians, on the other hand, use this character as a symbol of ‘betrayal of their people, homeland, the idea of liberation from bolshevism,’ and so on (ari 2014; banderovtsy: fakty i mify n.d.; banderovtsy. mify i fakty 2014; kiknadze 2022). russian media attach the label ‘banderovtsy’ to all contemporary ukrainian defenders. kadyrov’s propaganda also features references to these concepts as a motivational argument in favor of muslim participation in the war and the justification of the denazification of ukraine. at the same time, the motivational components of russia’s strategic narrative are manipulatively disguised with religious concepts. so, mufti talgat tajuddin, who is the supreme mufti of russia and the head of the central spiritual administration of russia (verhovnyy muftiy pf v kurban-bayran podderzhal voynu s ukrainoy: u soseda parazity, polchischa neonatsistov, nam spokoyno zhit nevozmozhno 2022), mufti of chechnya salah mezhiev (muftyi chr obyasnil deystviya v ukraine s tochki zrenya religii 2022), mufti of moscow albir krganov and others say that the war in ukraine is a blessing for muslims and for those who will die in this war because they will ‘certainly become shahids’ (those who die in the way of allah). they have been supported by other islamic leaders loyal to the government of the russian federation. viewed from this perspective, the participation of local ukrainian muslims in the war against russia, which aims to liberate ukraine from the nazis, is haram. the same position, embodied in the rhetoric of threats, intimidation and religious intolerance, is exhibited by kadyrov (pislya povidomlennya pro zagybel ‘kadyrivtsiv’ na hersonschyni kadyrov zagovoryv pro dgyhad 2022). for the islamic world, then the war in ukraine is primarily a war against the collective west. this is a trigger that is well understood in muslim countries. thus, in the context of ukrainian events and the associated narratives, the islamic values have been radically transformed and the interpretative frames of the concepts of shahid and haram, and jihad have been revised, to the point where they can be seen as a brand (archetti 2010). their representation in the russian mass media and support by foreign proponents of the war have transformed the islamic narrative into a part of ukraine’s conflict discourse. the main features of this narrative fit the description of the general trend identified by jackson (2014) where he argues that the central terms, assumptions, labels, narratives and genealogical roots of the language and knowledge of ‘islamic terrorism’ are unhelpful, not least because they are highly politicized, intellectually contestable, damaging to community relations and practically counterproductive. klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202273 the third position or consensus formula finally, there is a third approach which we believe is a part of the religious narrative. here, the participation of muslims in wars between christians is haram, a religious sin, a source of shame, and a betrayal of islam. for this reason, muslims need to find various ways not to participate in the war in ukraine. muslims can sympathize with one of the parties to the conflict, be critical of its causes and goals, but should not take part because it is not a war for the islamic world. within this approach, almost all the questions that structure the narrative have the same answer: ‘who is the hero in this fight?’ ‘christians’; ‘who opposes the hero?’ ‘christians’; ‘who helps the hero, who are these ordinary observers of this confrontation?’ ‘christians’; ‘what does victory look like?’ ‘like the victory of some christians over others’. hence, the third approach is built on referring to oneself and others by using religious labels. coda: what does it all mean? thus, the semantic components of the islamic narrative in ukraine, which are relevant to the russian invasion, leave every muslim the right to choose a certain worldview, emotional attitude and behavioral response to this event. in this case, all alternatives are based on emotional considerations: the first and the second options (ukrainian muslims and their allies against russian muslims and their followers) are antagonistic, whereas the third option is an attempt to choose the least of the evils. it should also be noted that the islamic narrative in ukraine is heterogeneous. the ontological status of its main components is changing dynamically. prior to the war with russia, the islamic narrative had not been considered a high-priority security threat in ukraine, and now it is one of the most important strategic factors. the content specificity of the ukrainian version of islam lies in its vivid convergence with ukrainian politics since the latter partially absorbs and secularizes religion. at the same time, the experience gained by muslim communities in the critical conditions of contemporary ukraine is vital in the global context because it lays the basis for the conscious worldview choice in favor of a secular multi-religious state where muslim citizens enjoy all the rights granted to ukrainian citizens and have all the legal opportunities for self-actualization, including religious values. analysis of the communicative specificity of the islamic narrative in ukraine confirms this observation. in general, the communicative specificity of the islamic narrative is now determined by military rhetoric and conflict strategies. these are able to completely destroy the positive image of islam, which until recently ensured the successful implementation of islamic values in a predominantly christian country. at the same time, and just as importantly, the aggressive islamic narrative and the conflicting christian narrative complement each other. conclusions until recently, up to february 24, 2022, the day when the war broke out in ukraine, ukraine’s islamic narrative had been semantically monolithic, which resulted from the fact that almost all text representations resonated with the principles of islamic ethics. within this tendency, attention was paid to the cognitive mechanisms aimed at positioning islamic values in a non-islamic state. most institutional resources made use of educational and commenting tactics to inform their communication strategy. regardless of what was being promoted (information products, goods), the notion of islam was primarily represented with the concept halal. halal, in its turn, was explained with the help of several synonymous notions: natural, organic, healthy, safe. in the ukrainian picture of the world, they all contain a positive connotation and have no semantic relations with religious values. but in terms of persuasive power, this approach to presenting information was quite promising for the covert creation of the desired effects. yet, this textual representation was grounded on the resonance between explicit and implicit aspects of a text where the explicated text is used as a container to promote stimuli, which are, in this case, islamic values. klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202274 in order to build a positive image for islam, informational and advertising representations were consistently filled with topics of ethical priorities, of high quality, safety, positivity, usefulness, and so on, and were disseminated through the tactic of emphasizing advantages. the main technique to secure their suggestive effect was the intense use of terms to counter any negative connotations, employed in positive self-presentations of islam. the semantic code of these messages was interpreted with the help of the tactic that displays the advantages of islamic values and evokes positive emotions. the rhetorical expression of image-making messages was carried out by using many means of verbal suggestion. this guaranteed a great impact on consumers of information and the corresponding attractive image effects. the islamic content in texts of institutional sites and ukrainian media was marked for tolerance. it complied with the values of moderate islam and, simultaneously, was convergent with social priorities of ukrainians. this correlated with ukraine’s policy of open interreligious dialog aimed at establishing close relations with muslim countries. however, the war has radically changed the ukrainian media space, including the islamic narrative. under the new circumstances, this narrative has been absorbed by politics, losing its positive developmental and economic potential. the pro-ukrainian muslim narrative was objectified primarily by various forms of institutional solidarity with the struggle against the russian aggressor. for security reasons, the heroically portrayed characters are absent from the media representations of this narrative. instead, in the russian media the antagonistic tendency is based on cognitive mechanisms aimed at intimidating ukrainians and creating an image of a muslim aggressor who is invincible, mentally alien and indifferent to the values of ukrainian society, and who has his own religious goals in this war. this aggressor is mythologized in the person of ramzan kadyrov and his supporters who ‘save the world from fascism and ukrainian nationalism’. thus, instead of market competition, we have a battle of ideologies. a successful business narrative was first rooted in a soft power strategy, then turned into a strategic narrative, and has eventually become a weaponized 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https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2020/09/10/7265985/ klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202278 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2809-15#text https://islam.in.ua/ua/suspilstvo/hartiya-musulman-ukrayiny https://islam.in.ua/ua/suspilstvo/hartiya-musulman-ukrayiny https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2020/09/10/7265985/ cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 15, no. 1 2023 © 2023 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: mazoni andrade, r. 2023. impact of dam collapses on violence in minas gerais, brazil. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 15:1, 53– 77. https:// doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8297 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) impact of dam collapses on violence in minas gerais, brazil rafael lara mazoni andrade minas gerais public safety observatory corresponding author: minas gerais public safety observatory, 4143 mg-010 road, belo horizonte, brazil – zip 31630900, rafaelmazoni13@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8297 article history: received 23/07/2022; revised 25/02/2023; accepted 06/03/2023; published 26/03/2023 abstract the mining sector, over a number of centuries, has become a strong cultural attribute of minas gerais. due to its mining reserves, the state has the biggest concentration of tailings dams built to retain mining waste. this led to largescale accidents in the last decade – in mariana (in october 2015) and in brumadinho (in january 2019). these accidents have shifted the debate about mining in the region, and more widely changed the leading forces among society, bringing a new equilibrium to social relationships. the objective of this paper, as part of a monitoring effort, is to assess the impacts of these accidents on crime and violence as a new face of extractivism. the results can be used to design better responses in terms of welfare programs or compensation efforts, leading to a better and more responsible extractivism. keywords tailings dam disaster; extractivism; violence; impact assessment; brazil 53 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8297 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8297 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:rafaelmazoni13@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8297 introduction minas gerais state, in southern brazil, is known because of the biggest concentration of tailings dams built to retain mining waste, according to data from brazilian national agency on water. this concentration has led to largescale accidents in the last decade. on november 5th, 2015, fundão’s mining dam, managed by samarco, collapsed in mariana, 150 kilometres from belo horizonte, killing nineteen inhabitants of bento rodrigues, and destroying up to three hundred houses. the accident had impacts through the rio doce water basin, affecting thousands of people from minas gerais to espírito santo, at the atlantic ocean. on january 25th of 2019, mina do feijão’s mining dam, managed by vale, collapsed in brumadinho, 50 kilometres from belo horizonte. this massive accident killed almost three hundred people, representing not only a humanitarian disaster, but also one of brazil’s worst environmental disasters. the collapse destroyed forests and polluted rivers across the region. these accidents have changed the way in which civil society sees the mining sector both in the minas gerais region and in the wider country, breaking the usual royaltybased partnership with the big players in the mining sector. further, these accidents have changed the leading forces among society, bringing a new equilibrium to social relationships. due to the changed social relationships, these accidents have also had an impact on crime and violence in these regions. the objective of this paper, as part of a monitoring effort, is to assess the relationship between the accidents and the incidence of crime and violence in the local towns of mariana and brumadinho, as reflecting the new face of extractivism in the region. the context of minas gerais as its name denotes, the state of minas gerais (‘general mines’) has relevance because its territory is rich in minerals. throughout the 17th century, the portuguese crown sought new sources of income in its colony, which led to the discovery of minerals in its interior regions. in turn, there was an influx of miners in the valleys and mountains of minas gerais, in search of wealth and motivated by the roman principle of uti possidetis, which advocated territorial occupation (del priore & venancio 2010). together with its geology, this ideology was a fundamental factor in the attraction of immigrants to minas gerais, creating a marked predisposition to mineral extractivism in the locality (carvalho filho 2008). the mining sector, through all these centuries, has become a strong cultural attribute of minas gerais. the state has attracted many entrepreneurs since then, such as vale, samarco, anglo gold, usiminas and many others. in 2017, the industry and mining sector represented 22.28% of minas gerais’ gross domestic product, up to four times bigger than agriculture, forestry, and livestock altogether, as shown in table 1. table 1. minas gerais’ gross domestic product by sectors in 2017 sector gdp (in millions of r$) % agriculture and livestock r$ 28.712 4,98% industry and mining r$128.377 22,28% services r$347.811 60,38% taxes r$71.300 12,37% sum r$576.000 100% source: joão pinheiro foundation (fjp), board of statistics and information (direi). brazilian institute of geography and statistics (ibge), brazilian national account coordenation (conac). mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202354 due to its mining reserves, the state also has the biggest concentration of tailings dams built to retain mining waste, according to data from brazilian national agency on water. the map below (figure 1) presents the dam density in brazil, highlighting the centrality of this region. figure 1. density of dams in brazil, highlighting the state of minas gerais source: the author, with data from national mining agency (2019) this concentration has led to major accidents in the last decade, as in mariana in 2015 and in brumadinho in 2019. exploring data from mariana and brumadinho more than one year before the second big accident, coelho (2018) points to what he calls ‘mineraldependence’. in these cities, the development of mining activities comes at the cost of other activities that could be explored in the local economy. according to coelho, the fiscal needs of both the state and the mining cities shortened time horizons. economic activity centered on mining has been reproduced for decades, sometimes centuries, following the mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202355 same trend trajectory, despite the problems caused. the state of economic inertia of these economies is only changed when mineral reserves are exhausted or extraction becomes economically unfeasible, or, in more extreme cases, when major disasters occur, such as tailings dam ruptures (coelho 2018). social change and violence as noted, recent mining accidents have been associated with crime and violence in the region. among the explanations for the occurrence of a crime, environmental criminology has emerged as a reflection of the maturation of spacesocial theories – whose touchstone is the statement that all criminal acts occur in some space. in part inspired by oscar newman’s early physical approach (newman 1972), discussions on this issue today are characterized by a more integrated conceptualization, considering several aspects that may influence different types of crime, going beyond the approaches that concern the reasons why criminals are engendered, to think about the circumstances in which crime is carried out (beato filho 1998; clarke & eck 2003; gartner 2008; guillén 2013). clarke and eck provide a concise and useful statement: most criminological theories focus on what makes people criminals. they find causes in distant factors, such as childrearing practices, genetic makeup, and psychological or social processes. these theories are very difficult to test, are of varying and unknown scientific validity, and yield ambiguous policy implications that are mostly beyond the reach of police practice. but […] the theories and concepts of environmental criminology (and of the new discipline of crime science) are very helpful in everyday police work. this is because they deal with the immediate situational causes of crime events, including temptations and opportunities and inadequate protection of targets (clarke & eck 2003, p. 26). this area of study of environmental criminology developed in the late 1980s, based on studies by paul and patricia brantingham, considering contextual and related factors related to the surroundings to explore how opportunities for criminal practices and antisocial behaviours are produced (gartner 2008; guillén 2013). the fragmentation of the territory, its privatization and the emptying of public spaces perpetrate the feeling of insecurity – which is consistent with private security solutions in the form of buildings and walls, as stated by caldeira (2000), siqueira (2016) and figueira (2016). as guillén (2013) outlines, environmental criminology is based on three premises: (i) the environment significantly influences the deviant behaviour, (ii) offences are not randomly distributed in space and time, focusing on some concrete places and moments, so that it is possible to establish specific areas that are more likely to occur in a crime – so called hot spots, and (iii) strategies based on interventions in urban space can help to respond to the problem of insecurity and violence. at the heart of environmental criminology is the theory that the characteristics of criminals – such as their affiliation, genetics, and social and psychological processes – cannot explain criminal dynamics. instead, it uses the analysis of routine activities of victims, temporally and spatially located, to explain these criminal dynamics (clarke & eck 2003; sapori & soares 2014). originally formulated by lawrence cohen and marcus felson (1979), this approach suggests that crime occurs when a probable offender and an appropriate target converge at the same time and place, without the presence of a skilled guardian – be it a human actor or a security outfit (clarke & eck 2003; sapori & soares 2014). from this, one can illustrate the theory of routine activities through a triangle that brings with it each of the factors listed above, the location, the criminal and the target, as well as its controls – respectively, the mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202356 manager, who controls the behaviour of the people in that place, the supervisor, who knows the aggressor and exerts some control over their actions, and the guardian, who protects the victim (clarke & eck 2003): target or vic�m offender crime place figure 2. the problem analysis triangle source: the author, inspired by clarke & eck (2003, p. 26). thus, as sapori and soares (2014) suggest, lifestyles and habits define the time people allocate in each activity, deriving the risk of victimization from the following five factors: • exposure to public places, in the time allocated to contacts and social interactions, • proximity between victim and aggressor and frequency of contacts between them, data their places of residence, characteristics of age and sex and interests, • protection capacity, related to the lifestyle of the victims since the lower the contact with possible aggressors, the lower the risk of being victimized, • attractiveness of the victims, related to the impossibility of resistance or related to the expected return of the crime, • nature of the crime, which determines the proportion of each factor to the probability of victimization. however, given the social impacts related to dam collapses, it is necessary to broaden the view on the motivation for crimes. in a situation of limited freedom and increased social isolation, in the context of uncertainty related to the collapses and the risk of economic setbacks, individuals may be subjected to negative stimuli – such as stress – that could lead them to experience a series of negative emotions that, uncontrolled, can lead to the commission of a crime (agnew 1992). the mineral technology centre (cetem), cited by fontes and lopes (2017), listed increased violence as one of the socioeconomic impacts of mining activity, along with a range of other impacts, such as the proliferation of diseases, labor problems with mining companies, land use issues, disordered growth of the municipality and lack of infrastructure to serve the population, low economic and social growth of the municipality, increased prostitution, impoverishment of the population in general and child labor. the tendency to increased violence in society is associated with territorial insecurity and the remanagement of entire communities to carry out mining activities, often in a forced manner. against this background, the mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202357 following study investigates the extent to which mining accidents are likewise associated with an increased incidence of crime and violence, focusing on the affected towns of mariana and brumadinho in minas gerais. in this context, it would be expected to observe a rise in all the kind of crimes. according to agnew (1992), a situation of stress impacts on a rise of interpersonal violence, what would be represented by a rise in homicide and injury occurrences. for the crimes against someone’s property (such as theft), it is hard to assume the expected trend: it could either drop or rise, depending on its specific aspects. this kind of crime depends on a situational aspect, based on opportunities to commit the crime: ‘for environmental criminologists, “opportunity makes the thief ” is more than just a popular saying; it is the cornerstone of their approach. they believe that if opportunity increases so will crime’ (clarke & eck 2003, p. 28). following these opportunities, there is a list of crime facilitators that help offenders commit crimes or acts of disorder, grouped by type: physical, social and chemical. physical facilitators augment offenders’ capabilities or help to overcome prevention measures. social facilitators enhance rewards from crime. chemical facilitators make offenders ignore risks or moral prohibitions (clarke & eck 2003). based on these facilitators, clarke and eck (2003) list twentyfive techniques of situational crime prevention, whose objectives are to increase the effort to commit a crime or disorder, to increase the risk to be got, to reduce the reward, to reduce provocations and to remove excuses: table 2. twentyfive techniques of situational crime prevention objective techniques increase the effort, making crime more difficult to commit 1. target harden 2. control access to facilities 3. screen exits 4. deflect offenders 5. control tools/weapons increase the risk of being apprehended 6. extend guardianship 7. assist natural surveillance 8. reduce anonymity 9. use place managers 10. strengthen formal surveillance reduce the reward that offenders seek from their crime 11. conceal targets 12. remove targets 13. identify property 14. disrupt markets 15. deny benefits reduce provocations 16. reduce frustrations and stress 17. avoid disputes 18. reduce arousal and temptation 19. neutralize peer pressure 20. discourage imitation remove excuses 21. set rules 22. post instructions 23. alert conscience 24. assist compliance 25. control drugs and alcohol source: the author, based on clarke & eck, 2003, p. 86. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202358 methods and data to assess the impacts of the mining accidents on timespatial scales of crime and violence in mariana and brumadinho, as a new face of extractivism, we accessed public crime data from the minas gerais’ justice and public security secretariate1 and undertook a time series analysis of the changes in crime and other violencerelated problems in both before and after scenarios, for both locations. for mariana, we considered as the ‘before scenario’ the 47months period between january 2012 and november 2015; and as the ‘after scenario’ the 78months period between december 2015 and february 2022. for brumadinho, we considered as the ‘before scenario’ the 85months period between january 2012 and january 2019; and as the ‘after scenario’ the 40months period between february 2019 and february 2022 we also drew on timelapse data from satellite imagery to show the extent of the devastation in each location. we obtained these images from google earth engine and treated it on opensource app qgis. we analysed violent crimes2, the number of victims of homicide, and the number of occurrences of completed theft and injury over time, across the region, before and after the accidents. to evaluate the data, we performed significance tests for two means (stevenson 1981). a mean test in two samples is used to decide whether the two means of two populations – or two sets of data – are statistically equal or not (stevenson 1981). from this, it can be affirmed whether the observed differences are meaningful or merely casual. for this kind of crime analysis, it is relevant to explore statistical robustness in order to assess the actual impacts of a measure or an event such as disasters. in other words, applying to the specific context of this paper, it is necessary to test these differences to confirm whether there are real impacts of the accidents on crime trends, or whether the changes in data are simply part of the seasonal variation of the phenomenon. returning to the statistical test, triola (2001) advocates the need to explore the data before starting a hypothesis test. thus, from the collection of the data, we followed four procedures, including: (i) source descriptive statistics for each of the datasets, including the number of occurrences (n), mean, and standard deviation. (ii) create boxplot charts of the two datasets, on the same scale, to allow graphical comparations of statistics. (iii) generate histograms of the two sets of data, to compare the distributions. (iv) identify behaviours outside the trend – or outliers where the analysis of the graphs showed some values outside the limits. after analysing the descriptive statistics, it is possible to do the statistical tests. from this point, we followed the five procedures recommended by triola (2001). results for mariana on november 5th of 2015, fundão mining dam, managed by samarco, collapsed in mariana, 150 kilometres from belo horizonte, killing nineteen inhabitants of bento rodrigues, destroying all three hundred houses at the village situated 5.6 km from the dam (saadi & campos 2015), as described above. the biggest in 1 data available online on: http://www.seguranca.mg.gov.br/20180822133906/dadosabertos 2 considered as the sum of all the occurrences of thirteen different problems, such as completed sexual assault, attempted sexual assault, completed sexual assault with underagedvulnerable victim, attempted sexual assault with underagedvulnerable victim, completed extortion, attempted extortion, completed extortion through kidnapping, attempted extortion through kidnapping, completed theft, attempted theft, completed kidnapping and private prison, attempted kidnapping and private prison, and completed homicide. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202359 http://www.seguranca.mg.gov.br/2018-08-22-13-39-06/dados-abertos the world until brumadinho’s break, the collapse of fundão dam in mariana released more than 50 million cubic meters of ore tailings into the environment (omachi et al. 2018). this accident had impacts across the rio doce water basin, affecting thousands of people from minas gerais to espírito santo, causing pollution with mining waste along a trajectory of 668 km, extending to the atlantic ocean (mura et al. 2018). omachi et al. (2018) estimate the resulting atlantic forest loss of 457.6ha. figure 3 provides a visual sense of the full impact across the region. figure 3. timelapse of satellite imagery from mariana before and after the dam collapse – 2015 2016 source: the author, with data from google earth engine timelapse (2022). mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202360 studies into the impacts on the environment showed significant damage. pintocoelho (2015) discusses the extensive impacts of the accident on vegetation and fauna – especially fish – as well as water quality. the water quality of the rivers was immediately affected by the wave of tailings (victoria et al. 2019). silva, ferreira and scotti (2015) analyzed the wide impacts on the soil and its characteristics, such as fertility. partly because of the accident, mariana continues to have its local economy focused on mining activity until the last period with available data, as seen below: 3.6 3.7 3.9 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.4 4.3 88.3 85.6 92.5 93.3 89.4 90.9 92.2 95.5 96.4 95.1 95.1 93.7 93.2 90.6 92.8 90.5 80.8 93.5 77.8 68 74.2 77.4 74.7 77.6 68.2 82.1 84 81.8 81.2 79.2 68.5 68.3 73.5 75.3 77.9 81.7 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 minas gerais mariana brumadinho figure 4. percentual of the mining sector on the tax added value for mariana, brumadinho, and minas gerais, between 2003 and 2022 source: joão pinheiro foundation (fjp), board of statistics and information (direi). note: the value added tax (vaf) is an economicaccounting indicator used to calculate the municipal participation index in the transfer of revenue from the tax on operations related to the circulation of goods and on the provision of interstate and intermunicipal transport and communication services (icms) and the tax on industrialized products (ipi). the percentage of the municipality’s fiscal added value from the mineral extraction industry includes extraction, processing, and support activities. the economy in the region has been affected in several ways, from agricultural activities that have been impacted due to the damage caused by the mud wave (with the impossibility of using water for irrigation and for livestock) to small local shops. the interruption of mining production in the municipality of mariana also affected the economy (victoria et al. 2019). economic alternatives such as agriculture and fisheries have been decisively impaired, limiting the desired local productive diversification (coelho 2018). dias júnior and verona (2020) explored the impacts of the collapse in mariana through demographic aspects. with data from the national system of live births (sinasc) for the years 2013 to 2018, their results show that there was a fall in the number of live births in mariana between 2015 and 2017. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202361 the disaster had strong direct impacts on people. the damage caused was classified into three subcategories related to: i. effects on public health and fundamental conditions of safety of persons. ii. damage on the symbolic elements and access to education of the affected population. iii. impacts on the forms of social organization of the population involved. the damage to the population was varied, implying from the need to care for the wounded to important concerns about the psychological health of those affected, in addition to, obviously, dead and missing. this is added to problems relating to the safety of the affected population, linked to their temporary conditions of shelter (lacaz, porto & pinheiro 2017). as for social impacts, the disaster generated a loss of heritage of the population – as houses and shops and public and historical assets. the residents of mariana received support from the civil defense of minas gerais regarding the shelter, material goods such as mattresses, hygiene kit and cleaning and basic items, as well as water supply. residents also received humanitarian donations from several ngos and different states of brazil (victoria et al. 2019). according to the brazilian environment agency (ibama), the affected sites had an interruption of many public services – such as health, epidemiological, sanitary, environmental and worker health surveillance. these sites can become vector points of diseases such as dengue, chikungunya, zika virus, schistosomes, chagas, leishmaniasis and problems with venomous animals. due to water contamination, despite alerting the population and the creation of new water collection sites in some places, the affected population runs the risk of heavy metal contamination, generating serious health risks (victoria et al. 2019). the affected population had their entire lives drastically changed, having lost personal possessions, the source of sustenance and many have lost friends and relatives, as well as the landscape of the place where they lived. this whole situation has caused psychological shock in many people (victoria et al. 2019). these people experienced, abruptly, the departure of the severely affected territories, and experienced several situations of violations of rights, such as loss of residence, loss of material and personal property, loss of civil documentation, in addition to loss of productivity and income, and family, social ties, and cultural communities (gomes 2021). according to lacaz, porto & pinheiro (2017), they also worry about how the definitive relocation will be, doubting whether they will return to their usual daily life. in addition, there is a strong sense of insecurity due to the fear of the disruption of other dams. some vulnerable populations – such as ribeirinhos (traditional people that live on the riverbanks and margins, and who have artisanal fishing as their main survival activity), native brazilian indians (such as the krenak tribe, that dwells on the banks of the doce river and depended closely on the river to survive) and other farmers (aleixo & andrade 2016; césar & carneiro 2017) – have been significantly affected. this description of the impact of the disaster on the local population sets the context for the analysis of crime statistics, in the approach proposed by clarke and eck (2003). for this study the monthly incidence of violent crime, such as the number of victims of homicide and occurrences of theft and injury, were transformed into monthly rates – dividing the sum by the population, creating comparable data per 100,000 inhabitants (clarke & eck 2003). the graph below (figure 5) presents the rate of occurrences of violent crimes for each 100,000 inhabitants for minas gerais and for mariana – both before and after the collapse. it shows a drop in both mariana and minas gerais in a period that starts just after the collapse: mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202362 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 ja n12 ju n12 n ov -1 2 ap r13 se p13 fe b14 ju l-1 4 d ec -1 4 m ay -1 5 o ct -1 5 m ar -1 6 au g16 ja n17 ju n17 n ov -1 7 ap r18 se p18 fe b19 ju l-1 9 d ec -1 9 m ay -2 0 o ct -2 0 m ar -2 1 au g21 ja n22 violent crimes minas gerais violent crimes mariana before violent crimes mariana a�er figure 5. rate of violent crimes per month, for minas gerais and mariana – 20122022 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the graph below (figure 6) presents the rate of occurrences of homicides for each 100,000 inhabitants for minas gerais and for mariana – both before and after the collapse. it appears that mariana observed a rise in homicides right after the collapse, followed by a drop in 2019: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ja n12 ju n12 n ov -1 2 ap r13 se p13 fe b14 ju l-1 4 d ec -1 4 m ay -1 5 o ct -1 5 m ar -1 6 au g16 ja n17 ju n17 n ov -1 7 ap r18 se p18 fe b19 ju l-1 9 d ec -1 9 m ay -2 0 o ct -2 0 m ar -2 1 au g21 ja n22 homicides minas gerais (rate) homicides mariana before homicides mariana a�er figure 6. rate of homicides per month, for minas gerais and mariana – 20122022 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the graph below (figure 7) presents the rate of occurrences of theft for each 100,000 inhabitants for minas gerais and for mariana – both before and after the collapse. it shows a drop in both mariana and minas gerais in a period that starts just after the collapse. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202363 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 ja n12 ju n12 n ov -1 2 ap r13 se p13 fe b14 ju l-1 4 d ec -1 4 m ay -1 5 o ct -1 5 m ar -1 6 au g16 ja n17 ju n17 n ov -1 7 ap r18 se p18 fe b19 ju l-1 9 d ec -1 9 m ay -2 0 o ct -2 0 m ar -2 1 au g21 ja n22 the� minas gerais (rate) the� mariana before the� mariana a�er figure 7. rate of thefts per month, for minas gerais and mariana – 20122022 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the graph below (figure 8) presents the rate of occurrences of injury for each 100,000 inhabitants for minas gerais and for mariana – both before and after the collapse. it shows a drop in both mariana and minas gerais in a period that starts just after the collapse, followed by a rise in occurrences in mariana in 2020 and 2021: 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 ja n12 ju n12 n ov -1 2 a pr -1 3 se p13 fe b14 ju l-1 4 d ec -1 4 m ay -1 5 o ct -1 5 m ar -1 6 a ug -1 6 ja n17 ju n17 n ov -1 7 a pr -1 8 se p18 fe b19 ju l-1 9 d ec -1 9 m ay -2 0 o ct -2 0 m ar -2 1 a ug -2 1 ja n22 injury minas gerais (rate) injury mariana before injury mariana a�er figure 8. rate of injuries per month, for minas gerais and mariana – 20122022 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202364 to proceed with the tests described by triola (2001), it is necessary to calculate the descriptive statistics for each of the datasets separately, including the number of occurrences (n), mean, and standard deviation, and these are presented in table 3 below: table 3. descriptive statistics for mariana dataset data n mean stand. dev. violent crimes – before 47 26.2048 10.2844 violent crimes – after 78 18.3937 11.5852 homicides before 47 2.0722 1.6095 homicides – after 78 1.7862 1.8754 theft – before 47 16.6696 8.9549 theft – after 78 11.8994 9.5509 injury – before 47 25.3971 8.2656 injury after 78 25.5730 6.9444 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the next step in the methodology is to create boxplot charts of the dataset, on the same scale, to allow graphical comparations of statistics. the use of boxplot charts is an interesting analysis tool due to the visualization of different parameters in a same chart – such as mean, median, quartiles, and outliers. figure 9. boxplot for all the dataset source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202365 it is possible to see big differences in the distribution for violent crimes, in general, and for theft. for the other problems, there is no big differences – except the fact that there are no outliers after the collapse. to assess it in a better way, it is necessary to generate histograms of the sets of data, to compare the distributions. after analysing the descriptive statistics, it is possible to do the statistical tests if the means are equal or not for the significance level of 99% (α = 0.01). the table below presents the results for each variable: table 4. results of the ztest for the mariana dataset variable zstatistic interpretation violent crimes 3.9197 outside of acceptance region (2.575, 2.575), which means that the means are statistically different homicides 0.9034 inside of acceptance region (2.575, 2.575), which means that the means are statistically equal theft 2.8130 outside of acceptance region (2.575, 2.575), which means that the means are statistically different injury 0.1222 inside of acceptance region (2.575, 2.575), which means that the means are statistically equal source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the results of the statistical test of averages allow us to affirm that statistical differences exist between the means before and after the dam collapse for violent crimes, in general, and thefts, specifically. the social changes imposed by the collapse seem to cause the averages of the parameters treated to be statistically different from the means before the collapse in mariana. in other words, these differences do confirm there are real impacts of the accidents on crime trends, and that these changes on data they are not simply part of the seasonal variation of the phenomenon. results for brumadinho on january 25th of 2019, mina do feijão mining dam, managed by vale, collapsed in brumadinho, 50 kilometres from belo horizonte. this massive accident killed almost three hundred people – most of them workers at the mine, representing not only a humanitarian disaster, but one of brazil’s worst environmental disasters. the collapse destroyed forests and polluted rivers across the region. despite the difficulty in mapping the impact, due to the forest density that ‘hides’ the directly affected area (freitas 2021), the collapse appears to have severely compromised the geomorphological dynamics of paraopeba river, with the complete burial of the bottom of the valley (carvalho, magalhães júnior & barros 2021) – as seen in the imagery shown in figure 10. the paraopeba river provided drinking water to 3 million people, but the highdensity of minerals following the tailings spill, meant the river water was impossible to drink. the resulting social impacts were widespread (cyrne et al. 2020). because it is a recently occurred tragedy, at the time of writing in 2023, its impacts have not yet been fully measured, but it is possible to observe the change that was promoted in the landscape of the place. figure 10 provides a visual indication of the reach of the impact: mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202366 figure 10. timelapse of satellite imagery from brumadinho before and after the dam collapse – 20182019 source: the author, with data from google earth engine timelapse (2022). mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202367 the collapse is still the subject of many studies – as an example, there is an entire journal issue about the case3. as in mariana case, the economy in brumadinho’s region has been affected in several ways – from the loss of buildings to the pause on production. in the affected area there were small properties of family farmers, rural communities and indigenous peoples who lived on the banks of the river. among the main productive activities were the production of vegetables and fruits to supply urban centers located in the region; inns for tourist service; and other leisure facilities. the impacts caused, thus, the loss of several fundamental rights, such as: land use, housing, water, light, mobility, among others (silva et al. 2019). as in mariana case, the disaster had strong direct impacts on people, specifically on public health and safety, damage on the symbolic elements and access to education and on the forms of social organization. as an example, antunesrocha, hunzicker and fantinel (2020) show the impacts of the collapse for the provision of public services in brumadinho – specially on public education. beyond the hundreds of dead people – some of them still missing in the mud – , there are problems relating to the safety of the affected population, specially concerning its sheltering. the un’s sustainable development goals (sdg) provide a useful analytical tool to show the impact of the disaster on life and livelihoods in brumadinho (carvalho et al. 2019). thus, the authors analysed the impacts on sdg 1, 2, 3, 8, 11 and 16, drawing also on the work of carvalho et al. (2019). • sdg 1 – no poverty: despite the efforts to provide emergency aid to the citizens of brumadinho, carvalho et al. (2019) affirm that poverty has been aggravated in the municipality, given that the disaster destroyed the source of income of hundreds of people. • sdg 2 – zero hunger: agriculture is one of the most important productive activities of any nation, as it guarantees food production, supplies raw materials for fuel manufacturing and generates jobs. in brumadinho, although the main economic activity is mining, agriculture plays an important role in the revenues of hundreds of local entrepreneurs. according to data from ibge, of the 20,500 hectares of cropping land, 17,000 were from individual producers, but the mud from the dam affected much of the rural area of the municipality. • sdg 3 – good health and wellbeing: the results obtained pointed to the possibility of outbreaks of infections, the worsening of chronic diseases among those affected, the worsening of their mental health and problems such as domestic accidents and respiratory diseases resulting from mud toxicity. the disaster also caused an overload on the health system, contraction of health professionals, in addition to what already exists in the municipality with a cost of more than $300,000 per month. another effect was the increase in the consumption of 80% of drugs to treat anxiety and 60% of antidepressants, that is, a mental impact on the local population. • sdg 8 – decent work and economic growth: economically dependent on mining, brumadinho lost about 50% of its production after the collapse. for tourism, the reflections of the disaster began at about the same moment the dam broke. the inhotim institute, one of the largest openair museums in the world, for example, remained closed for nearly ten days in respect for the victims. the tourism sector had been recovering from the impacts generated by a yellow fever outbreak in 2018 (a 50% drop in visitor numbers). before the tragedy, the average occupancy rate of hotels and inns in brumadinho was 85% and, after the tragedy, it is estimated that the negative impact on tourism 3 the brazilian journal ciência & cultura published a special issue one year after the disaster in brumadinho. the publication compiles articles by brazilian researchers that deal with the socioenvironmental impacts of the disaster, as well as reports on topics related to the cultural and scientific universe. the issue is available online on https://revistacienciae cultura.org.br/ mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202368 https://revistacienciaecultura.org.br/ https://revistacienciaecultura.org.br/ has reached 90%. the municipality of brumadinho has its main economic base sustained by mining activity, corresponding to 60% of the municipality’s revenue. vale alone generated about 2,000 jobs, which were affect by the collapse. • sdg 11 – sustainable cities and communities: among the impacts of the disaster it is possible to mention the isolation of rural communities, which have lost access to the city and services because roads and trails have been destroyed or interrupted by mud. • sdg 16 – peace, justice and strong institutions: the brazilian justice accepted, on 14/02/2019, the complaint made by the public ministry of minas gerais (mpmg) about the rupture of the dam. in addition, the accused will answer for qualified homicide and are also accused of crimes against fauna and flora, and crimes of pollution. as happened previously in mariana, the affected population in brumadinho had their entire lives drastically changed, having lost personal possessions, the source of sustenance and friends and relatives, as well as the landscape of the place where they lived. this is also the case for the vulnerable populations – such as ribeirinhos, native brazilian indians and other farmers. again, for this study, data before and after the dam collapse were collected, for violent crime, number of victims of homicide, occurrences of completed theft and injury, and the incidence per 100,000 inhabitants was calculated (clarke & eck 2003). figure 11 presents the rate of occurrences of violent crimes for minas gerais and for brumadinho – both before and after the collapse. it shows a drop in brumadinho after the collapse, following a general trend to drop across the province of minas gerais. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 ja n12 ju n12 n ov -1 2 ap r13 se p13 fe b14 ju l-1 4 d ec -1 4 m ay -1 5 o ct -1 5 m ar -1 6 au g16 ja n17 ju n17 n ov -1 7 ap r18 se p18 fe b19 ju l-1 9 d ec -1 9 m ay -2 0 o ct -2 0 m ar -2 1 au g21 ja n22 violent crimes minas gerais violent crimes brumadinho before (rate) violent crimes brumadinho a�er (rate) figure 11. rate of violent crimes per month, for minas gerais and brumadinho – 20122022 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the graph below (figure 12) presents the rate of occurrences of homicides for minas gerais and for brumadinho – both before and after the collapse. it shows that brumadinho observed a drop in homicides right after the collapse, followed by a rise in last months of 2020. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202369 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 ja n12 ju n12 n ov -1 2 ap r13 se p13 fe b14 ju l-1 4 d ec -1 4 m ay -1 5 o ct -1 5 m ar -1 6 au g16 ja n17 ju n17 n ov -1 7 ap r18 se p18 fe b19 ju l-1 9 d ec -1 9 m ay -2 0 o ct -2 0 m ar -2 1 au g21 ja n22 homicides minas gerais (rate) homicides brumadinho before (rate) homicides brumadinho a�er (rate) figure 12. rate of homicides per month, for minas gerais and brumadinho – 20122022 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the graph below (figure 13) presents the rate of occurrences of theft for minas gerais and for brumadinho – both before and after the collapse. it shows a drop in both brumadinho after the collapse, following a general trend to drop across the province. 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 ja n12 ju n12 n ov -1 2 ap r13 se p13 fe b14 ju l-1 4 d ec -1 4 m ay -1 5 o ct -1 5 m ar -1 6 au g16 ja n17 ju n17 n ov -1 7 ap r18 se p18 fe b19 ju l-1 9 d ec -1 9 m ay -2 0 o ct -2 0 m ar -2 1 au g21 ja n22 the� minas gerais (rate) the� brumadinho before (rate) the� brumadinho a�er (rate) figure 13. rate of thefts per month, for minas gerais and brumadinho – 20122022 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the graph below (figure 14) presents the rate of occurrences of injury for minas gerais and for brumadinho – both before and after the collapse. it shows a drop in brumadinho in a period that starts just after the collapse, followed by a rise in occurrences in the final part of 2019: mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202370 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 ja n12 ju n12 n ov -1 2 ap r13 se p13 fe b14 ju l-1 4 d ec -1 4 m ay -1 5 o ct -1 5 m ar -1 6 au g16 ja n17 ju n17 n ov -1 7 ap r18 se p18 fe b19 ju l-1 9 d ec -1 9 m ay -2 0 o ct -2 0 m ar -2 1 au g21 ja n22 injury minas gerais (rate) injury brumadinho before (rate) injury brumadinho a�er (rate) figure 14. rate of injuries per month, for minas gerais and brumadinho – 20122022 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. as before, to proceed the test showed by triola (2001), it is necessary to calculate the descriptive statistics for each of the datasets, including the number of occurrences (n), mean, and standard deviation, presented in the table below: table 5. descriptive statistics for brumadinho dataset data n mean stand. dev. violent crimes – before 85 23.6104 8.9365 violent crimes – after 40 11.9243 5.9644 homicides before 85 2.2787 2.4849 homicides – after 40 2.0201 1.9892 theft – before 85 14.1909 7.7794 theft – after 40 5.4200 3.9328 injury – before 85 17.1493 8.3860 injury after 40 16.0135 7.7149 source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the next step in the methodology is to create boxplot charts of the dataset, on the same scale, to allow graphical comparations of statistics. again, the use of boxplot charts is an interesting analysis tool due to the visualization of different parameters in a same chart – such as mean, median, quartiles, and outliers. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202371 figure 15: boxplot for all the brumadinho dataset source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. it is possible to see big differences in the distribution for violent crimes, in general, and for theft and injury, with a significant fall. for homicides, there is no big changes. to assess it in a better way, it is necessary to generate histograms of the sets of data, to compare the distributions. after analysing the descriptive statistics, it is possible to do the statistical tests if the means are equal or not for the significance level of 99% (α = 0.01). the table below presents the results for each variable: table 6. results of the ztest for the brumadinho dataset variable zstatistic interpretation violent crimes 8,6412 outside of acceptance region (2.575, 2.575), which means that the means are statistically different homicides 0,6244 inside of acceptance region (2.575, 2.575), which means that the means are statistically equal theft 8,3679 outside of acceptance region (2.575, 2.575), which means that the means are statistically different injury 0,7464 inside of acceptance region (2.575, 2.575), which means that the means are statistically equal source: occurrences: armazém sisp (official data warehouse for minas gerais state public security system). demographic data: ibge. the results of the statistical test of averages allow us to affirm statistical differences between the means before and after the dam collapse for violent crimes, in general, and thefts, specifically. in other words, the social changes imposed by the collapse seem to cause the averages of the parameters treated to be statistically different from the means before the collapse in brumadinho. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202372 conclusions as its name denotes, the state of minas gerais (‘general mines’) is a territory rich in minerals and dependent on mining. due to its mining reserves, the state also has the biggest concentration of tailings dams built to retain mining waste, according to data from brazilian national agency on water. as noted, the region experienced major tailings dam accidents in the last decade, in mariana in 2015 and in brumadinho, 2019. these disasters cannot have their impacts reduced to the municipalities of occurrence and those affected to the immediate number of deaths and injured or even the loss of homes. its impacts go further and include the contamination and environmental changes they produce in the areas and rivers affected, as well as the abrupt change in social organization and ways of living and working historically constituted in the territories, with effects on health. in addition to the numbers of ‘affected’ traditionally defined by civil defenses (displaced, homeless, dead, injured, and sick) and recorded during the rescue and relief period, one should consider all those who had their living and working conditions affected in the different territories (freitas et al. 2019). to assess the impacts of these accidents on time scales of crime and violence in mariana and brumadinho, as a new face of extractivism, we accessed public crime data organized by minas gerais’ justice and public security secretariate and undertook time series analysis of the changes in crime and other violencerelated problems in both before and after scenarios, for both locations. the results of the statistical tests corroborate the hypothesis presented by authors such as sapori & soares (2014), that it is more important to understand the spatial and social circumstances in which crime is practiced, beyond the approaches that concern the reasons why criminals are engendered (clarke & eck 2003). the disaster had strong direct impacts on people, such as effects on public health and fundamental conditions of safety and health of persons, damage to the symbolic and cultural elements and access to education of the affected population and impacts on the forms of social organization of the population involved, many of whom were taken to shelters instead of being able to stay their own houses and becoming dependent on donations from various ngos and from the government (antunesrocha, hunzicker & fantinel 2020; carvalho et al. 2019; gomes 2021; lacaz, porto & pinheiro 2017; silva et al. 2019; victoria et al. 2019). these impacts disproportionately affected people who were already in a vulnerable status (aleixo & andrade2016; césar & carneiro 2017). as stated by these authors, the social changes imposed by the two collapses would seem to have changed the conditions in which criminals and their victims coexist in a specific location, even though neither can be identified in advance – raising questions of what causes crime trends to change. these changes cause the averages of the parameters treated to be statistically different from the means before the collapse in both mariana and brumadinho. these observed differences on means do confirm there are real impacts on the incidents of crime trends, and that these changes in data are not simply part of the seasonal variation of the phenomenon. in other words, the social changes imposed by the collapse of the tailings dams do seem to cause the averages of the parameters treated to be statistically different from the means before the collapse in both cities. the theory of sapori and soares (2014) provides a useful reminder that there are factors that can affect activities and victimization, including exposure to public places, proximity between victim and potential offender, protection capacity, attractiveness of victims or targets and nature of the crime. it is possible to affirm that there has been a decrease in the exposure to public places, in the time allocated to contacts and social interactions, in the contacts between victims/targets and probable offenders, as well as on attractiveness of the victims or targets – which may explain the drop of theft occurrences. mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202373 according to agnew (1992), we expected a rise of violence in society associated with the remanagement of entire communities, due to the stressful situation which the affected population would experience. many of the affected people lost their houses, and had to start living in a shelter, experiencing conflicts with other families. the data analysed showed that there was a slight drop in homicides in both cities. brumadinho had a mean of 2.27 homicides per month before the collapse. after the incident, it dropped to 2.02 homicides. in the recent year, the city has experienced a rise in this kind of crime, which may lead to different results in the future. in mariana, despite the spike observed in 2017, there was a mean of 2.07 homicides before the accident, which dropped to 1.78 homicides per month after the collapse. the data on injuries had different effects in each of the cities. brumadinho experienced a fall in the monthly mean – from 17.14 cases to 16.01. for its turn, mariana experienced a slight rise in the monthly mean – from 25.39 cases per month before the collapse to 25.57 after it. this rise occurred mainly during the covid19 pandemic, starting in 2020. this can be explained by the different impact of the collapse in mariana – while the collapse in brumadinho was abrupt and fast, killing more than 300 people, the collapse in mariana killed fewer people, but destroyed a bigger part of the human settlement, which lead to a larger number of people living in shelter and temporary settlement. thus, in mariana, this was likely to have a bigger impact on crime. the data on theft (which leads the total of violent crime, because theft represents about 85% of the total) show a drop in both data sets. mariana experienced a significant fall from a monthly mean of 14.19 occurrences before the collapse to 5.42 after it. brumadinho experienced a smaller drop, from 16.66 occurrences to 11.89. again, this can be explained by the bigger impact of mariana’s collapse on human settlements, compared to brumadinho. it is possible to affirm that, especially in mariana, due to the impact of the collapse on human settlement, there was a change in the situational aspects for crime presented by clarke and eck (2003). in other words, it is possible to affirm that the resettlement of people in shelters or temporary houses increased the effort to commit crime and the risk of being caught and the collapse itself diminished the amount of available goods to be taken. the bigger part played by the state and the mining companies in everyday lives may have impacted this, extending the guardianship and the formal surveillance over the goods, that led to a greater enforcement of law and rules. using the work of clarke and eck (2003), this study has shown how a rates of violent crime are affected by mining disasters. these results can be used to design better responses in terms of welfare programs or compensations effort in disasters. one way is to strengthen the situational prevention measures (shown in table 2). the state – represented by its agents, such as government officials, the police, municipal guards, and so on – has an important role (as described by the brazilian constitution and other laws) as guardians and law enforcers. if it is well done, it is easier to assure the wellbeing of the mining communities. it is also necessary to prioritise certain objectives, such as (i) remedying the damage; (ii) restoring the biophysical environment to a desired prior state; (iii) restoring or improving the livelihoods of those affected; and (iv) compensating for damage that cannot be remedied (sánchez et al. 2018). references agnew, r. 1992, ‘foundation for a general strain theory of crime and delinquency’. criminology, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 47–88. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.1992.tb01093.x aleixo, l. s. p. & andrade, p. g. g. 2016, ‘o rompimento da barragem em mariana: impactos na comunidade indígena krenak à luz da jurisprudência interamericana’, revista da faculdade de direito do sul de minas, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 283296. https://revista.fdsm.edu.br/index.php/revistafdsm/article/view/188/189 mazoni andrade cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 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access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: mai-bornu z. l., allen, f. 2022. chosen trauma, emotions and memory in movements: the ogoni and ijaw in the niger delta. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:1, 49–62. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7912 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) chosen trauma, emotions and memory in movements: the ogoni and ijaw in the niger delta zainab ladan mai-bornu1,*, fidelis allen2 1 university of leicester, united kingdom, zmb2@leicester.ac.uk 2 university of port harcourt, nigeria, fidelis.allen@uniport.edu.ng corresponding author: zainab ladan mai-bornu, university of leicester, university rd, leicester le1 7rh, united kingdom, zmb2@leicester.ac.uk doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7912 article history: received 27/09/2021; revised 10/01/2022; accepted 04/03/2022; published 31/03/2022 abstract this paper presents a critical analysis of ‘chosen trauma’ theory and its applicability to social movement responses to oil resource extractive activities in nigeria. volkan’s (1985, 1997, 2005) formulations on ‘collective calamity of groups’ ancestors, defined in terms of shared pains suffered at the hands of an enemy is explored using the case of ogoni and ijaw movement activities against the federal government and oil companies operating in the niger delta. the framing of traumas focuses on the role played by leaders of both groups in their protests against calamitous environmental problems resulting from the activities of oil companies in the region. for the ogoni, the memory of trauma is adaptive to non-violence while, for the ijaw it is a fluid construction between non-violence and violence. volkan’s theory is analytically helpful, but at the same time demands refinement to better explain the nuances in these cases. keywords niger delta; chosen trauma; environmental problems; oil production 49 declaration of conflicting interest fidelis allen is a member of the editorial board of the journal but has had no part in editorial or peer review processes associated with this paper. funding funding for the phd research was provided by the petroleum technology development fund, nigeria. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7912 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7912 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:zmb2@leicester.ac.uk mailto:fidelis.allen@uniport.edu.ng mailto:zmb2@leicester.ac.uk https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7912 introduction how does application to the niger delta struggle strengthen or weaken theoretical assumptions underpinning ‘chosen trauma’ theory? in this paper, we explore this question in relation to two case studies: the leadership of both the ogoni and ijaw movements in the niger delta of nigeria. the case studies demonstrate that even reparative leaders use collective identity, as they recall chosen traumas and, in the process, they talk about the humiliation suffered by their groups and the exploitation of their group by another group. we examine the means they adopt to deal with their situations and the ways in which they employ different strategies to address their chosen traumas. in what follows, we argue that volkan’s (1985, 1997, 2005) ‘chosen trauma’ theory does not take this possibility into account as it seems to suggest that either there is a strong identity emphasising ‘chosen trauma’ and destructive leaders, or reparative leaders who de-emphasise collective identity and therefore de-emphasise ‘chosen trauma’. what does ‘chosen trauma’ refer to in the ogoni and ijaw movements? what role does such memory play in the framing of a ‘chosen trauma’ by the leaderships in the two cases? how do the two sets of leaders preach ‘chosen traumas’ to their respective supporters? we examine the ways ‘chosen trauma’ is framed by leaders and how it can lead to either violent or non-violent collective behaviour, an aspect that is yet to be sufficiently discussed by scholars who use the ‘chosen trauma’ concept. this paper reports on research conducted between 2013 and 2017 in the niger delta, it draws on structured, elite interviews with key actors who shaped the two movements1. context for the study the niger delta is the oil-producing part of nigeria. the region is also known for its rich gas deposits and several other natural resources. there are over 600 offshore and shore-based oil fields in the region. despite the huge revenues the government derives from the production of oil and gas in the region, the people of the region have continued to agitate for improved living standards related to basic social amenities such as good roads, access to electricity, health facilities and schools (osaghae 2008; mai-bornu 2020a; helbert & o’brien 2020). often depicted, as the third largest delta area in the world, the niger delta is a region of nigeria defined by the delta of the niger river. it is an enormous marshland stretching over a large span of territories crisscrossed by springs, rivers, rivulets, and other natural topographical attributes (anele & nkpah 2013; oboreh 2010). through crude oil extraction and exportation, it is the key provider of over 90 percent of nigeria’s foreign exchange income (ikein 2009). it is home to over 40 ethnicities including the ogoni and ijaw (icg 2006). the extremely close proximity of the communities to the oilfields and pipelines that crisscross their country brings about several associated environmental, health and socioeconomic problems. the glaring economic disadvantage of the oil producing region as against the resources spent for its advancement, has seen massive structural imbalances and is indicative of a productive arena for several forms of grievances and community anger. at the outset of this paper, it is important to be cognizant that the ogoni and ijaw share similar lived experiences, but have had very different trajectories and made different choices in engaging their perceived enemies (see also mai-bornu 2017, 2019, 2020a, 2020b). culture plays a crucial binding and social cohesion role among the various dialect communities and was a defining aspect of common identity until crude oil emerged as a source of contestation between the groups as part of an overall structure of agitation within the central nigerian state. wide international attention came to the region in 1995 following the hanging of nine ogoni environmental activists by the military government of the late general sani abacha. among the persons 1 some aspects of this research have been published in articles in 2019, 2020 and a phd thesis at the university of bath, 2017. however, the focus of this paper is on the chosen trauma theory advanced by vamik volkan. a different perspective on trauma, emotions, and memories in the niger delta story. mai-bornu and allen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202250 killed was kenule (ken) saro-wiwa who was the president of the movement for the survival of ogoni people (mosop). the global condemnation of the hanging of the activists sparked an intense debate about the environmental, economic and political conditions of oil-producing communities in the niger delta (osaghae 2008; ukiwo 2007). the ogoni crisis created an atmosphere for other groups in the region, including the ijaw youth council, to begin to intensively organise against oil companies and the government. the hanging of ken saro-wiwa and eight others by the nigerian state under the late general sani abacha served a significant lesson for the ijaws who were reminded of the symbolism of the crushing of the early uprising of their predecessors against perceived marginalization and negative impact of an emerging oil economy on the people of the region. the movements’ narrative included the neglect and exclusion of the communities from the significant benefits of oil and gas production whilst suffering the destructive impact of the activities of oil companies (afinotan & ojakorotu 2009). regular oil spills in marshes, soil and rivers and continued gas burning caused serious environmental pollution in the communities (saro-wiwa 1995). community profits in the oil and gas sector appear to have been limited to symbolic gifts from the oil companies’ corporate social responsibility units. for example, some of the oil majors like shell gave food items as christmas gifts and selectively offered contracts to loyal community leaders (interview 1)2. it is important to note that oil and gas resources in nigeria are legally owned by the federal government, however, communities have consistently contested the government’s ownership, claiming that ownership rights naturally belong to them. in response to these claims, the nigerian state established development agencies such as the ministry of niger delta, niger delta development commission (nddc) and other programmes to respond to the peculiar problems of the region. unfortunately, corruption and the lack of political will to fully implement programmes and policies in order to reach set goals made the agencies ineffectual. theoretical literature review vamik volkan (2001, 1997) described the ‘collective calamity’ of ancestors of groups with the term ‘chosen trauma’, to mean ‘the shared mental representation of a massive trauma that a group’s ancestors suffered in the hands of an enemy’ (volkan 2001, p. 79; 1997, p. 48). he argued that the psychological regression of a large group prompts a reactivation of chosen trauma with the tendency for destructive results. such regressive tendencies within groups enables the urgency of response and shared emotive emphasis on ways traumas are constructed and meanings assigned to events that link the past to the present. large group leaders emphasise a sense of loss, pain suffered by their groups, concerns and potential, to either continue in a regressed state or to make efforts toward progress (volkan 2002, p. 457). volkan’s formulations provides a conceptual tool for exploring the significance of memory in the struggle for social change, which contributes well in that direction even in this research, despite known limitations. one striking quality of the theory observed in the study discussed in this paper is its amenability to an interdisciplinary approach to the analysis of social movement politics and activities of environmental justice groups. on the whole, volkan’s ‘chosen trauma’ theory has assisted by complementing studies aimed at promoting concepts that facilitate the understanding of meanings that groups attach to collective experiences and identity (volkan 1985, p. 219; bruner 1987; davis 2002; hinchman & hinchman 1997). volkan (2001) proposed that ‘chosen trauma’ introduces a feeling of closure and bounded identity that demarcates a friend from an enemy group. volkan’s theory paints images of loss, pain or helplessness of a group in a past event during a conflict (volkan 2001). this leads to a shared sense of trauma, which then transforms into a collective memory, and peaks with meanings that push a group into re-examining its 2 interview with egi youth, port harcourt, 12 december 2016. mai-bornu and allen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202251 identity and aspirations (hirschberger, 2018). members of groups have a mental picture of a chosen trauma, which they pass to the next generation with emotions of hurt, shame and related defences through leaders. group narratives, however, comprise countless frames that translate into meanings based on diverse perspectives. this depends on the story frame employed, and on how a frame fits into broader metanarratives about identity (feldman 2001). volkan (1997) traces how the emotional description of identity situates inherited memory, trans-generationally connected between a past and existing situation, in what he termed as time collapse. thus, ‘the interpretations, fantasies, and feelings about a past shared trauma are fused together, weaving the correlation between trauma, memory and emotions. individuals may ‘intellectually separate the past event from the present one, but emotionally the two events are merged’ (volkan 1997). volkan notes that group leaders can make unconscious choices, choose consciously to psychologise and mythologise traumas, but they do not consciously choose to be victimised or suffer humiliation (volkan 1997, 2001). as a process, groups evoke memories of a persecutory incident and assign to it an inordinate quantity of historic and emotional magnitude (western 2018). in some of his works, volkan refers to chosen trauma as a conscious choice of leaders for manipulation of large group aggression (see volkan 1997) and in others as an unconscious choice of the traumatised large group (volkan 2005). on the one hand, volkan says chosen trauma is transmitted generationally. on the other hand, he also argues that the way large group leaders frame the memory associated with a past conflict could be different and can lead to different collective behaviours depending on how the chosen trauma itself is framed and preached to the group. we note the suggestion that a chosen trauma is distinctive. the lessons gained, however, can be universal. for instance, serb elites in the balkan region have utilised threat narratives to incite a security problem (chapman 2014). in this case, it appeared like a strategy for waging a war. slobodan milosevic used it within the background of the 1389 battle of kosovo to stir a nationalistic passion as manipulator and mobiliser (volkan 1997). these genres, put forward by volkan, offer a means for linking the fundamental meaning structure of a narrative to its construction and acceptance ( jacobs 2001). a picture of tragedy that promoted anticipation of failure was applied. this was also seen as the background into which historical accounts of race, class, and urban space were narrated in the aftershock of the 1992 los angeles uprising ( jacobs 2001). some interpretations of the concept of ‘chosen trauma’ have been criticised as prejudiced and not fully consistent (martirosyan 2014). volkan himself acknowledges that some have taken exception to the term ‘chosen trauma’ because groups make a conscious decision to be humiliated or victimised, but he emphasises that large groups also make unconscious choices. some scholars argue that a ‘chosen trauma’ leads to renewed violence, whereas, volkan maintains, leaders behave differently, depending on how a trauma is framed. western (2018) suggests that leaderships could take on extreme forms as seen in the rise of destructive terrorist networks, or moderate forms, as observed in religious orders and monastic communities, where religious followers take on asceticism and sacrifice worldly pleasures in order to ‘do good in the world’ (tariq 2016). this suggests that ‘chosen trauma’ can be used in different ways. while volkan himself suggests that leadership plays a crucial role, more understanding about this concept and the role of leadership is needed. volkan (1997) advances two kinds of leadership in the theory: reparative, which capitalises on traumatic incidents to rouse group members and solidify identity without harming another group, and the destructive, which exploits an escalation in a sense of victimhood, denigrates a real or imagined enemy and revives dormant ideologies (tariq 2016; volkan 1997; western 2018). here, volkan makes two straightforward distinctions between destructive and reparative leaders, because, he suggests, destructive leaders use ‘chosen traumas’ to create a strong sense of identity (volkan 1997). he uses the analogy of tents to buttress this. people under tents sometimes do not remember this reality. individuals do but not always as a collective in mai-bornu and allen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202252 this situation. however, at other times, especially when there is regression (volkan 2002), destructive leaders emphasise these common tents and emphasise also the fractures and the division vis à vis other groups in other tents or groups in another tent. people tend to see themselves as enemies or friends depending on the tent they stay under concerning those of other groups. volkan discusses the traits of destructive leaders much more than those of reparative leaders (see volkan 2002). he shows that reparative leaders de-emphasise this collective identity, allowing people to go back to their individual and family identities. reparative leaders lead their followers to move beyond ‘chosen traumas’ and do not strengthen group identity by emphasising them (volkan 2002). this is not necessarily the case, because reparative leaders also evoke ‘chosen traumas’ and construct/strengthen their group identity to make claims in the name of the collective group, but they do so through different means and for different purposes. for instance, to achieve legal recognition and rights but not to dehumanise the enemy. hence, this necessitates more in-depth analyses of the traits and strategies of reparative leaders. how ‘chosen trauma’ theory is perceived and framed by the two sets of leaderships in the niger delta and thus offering an influential modus for preaching to their followers using both the reparative and destructive narratives was investigated. the study located its exploration in the context of possibly one of the most complex resource-related conflicts in sub-saharan africa, the niger delta. in this sense, this paper demonstrates that the conscious adoption of volkan’s concept occurs even in groups charting a non-violent course of action, which directly experience traumatic events, and are left feeling victimised by the state and multinational oil companies. in response, the ogoni and ijaw leaders drew on mental representations and emotional meanings specific to their groups, expressed however within the contexts of both non-violence and violence. for instance, in the case of india with gandhi and the ogoni with ken saro-wiwa, it was peaceful resistance. it has been argued that individuals decide to participate in movements because they correspond with who they are and influences the methods of protest they adopt based on their collective identities (polletta & jasper 2001). polletta and jasper argue that strategic choices that made movement leaders choose between different forms of courses suggests a deliberate gauging of environmental opportunities and limitations and overlook the basic reality that strategic decisions may be inherently appealing. they mirror ‘what we believe, what we are comfortable with, what we like and who we are’, to identify who you are is to be positioned in a moral space (taylor 1989). case study analysis the first category of ‘chosen traumas’ rests with ogoni leaders such as the late ken saro-wiwa, who persistently reaffirmed the meaning of the land by linking its spiritual and economic importance to the degradation instigated by oil and gas extraction and exploitation (saro-wiwa 1992). the ogoni are located in the easternmost part of the fertile plateau bordering the eastern half of the niger river delta in nigeria (kpone-tonwe 1997, p. 1). to the ogoni, the land is so powerful that they view anything that interrupts the serene nature of the land as exceptionally distasteful, hence accentuating the significance of claiming back their land from exploitation but without the use of force. this profound association with the land suggests that the ogoni ascribed immense divine status to the environment, trusting it to be the foundation of their communities as well as a habitat of their sacred deities. the ogoni present themselves as a distinct ethnic group in the niger delta, an oppressed minority within a minority as the region is considered within the central nigerian state. the ogoni deployed identity and focused on their specific lived conditions, as a distinct nation confronted by enormous economic and political troubles (okonta 2008). as far back as the 1980s the ogoni under the leadership of the late ken saro-wiwa started making strong demands on the nigerian state within the broader context of global discourses on social justice and environmental and human rights (obi 2009). the awareness of their minority status led the ogoni leaders to opt for a strategy mai-bornu and allen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202253 of internationalization, by positioning their struggle within internationally acceptable norms acceptable, specifically, those promoted by the united nations. the ijaw construction of ‘chosen trauma’ fits quite well into a second category. ijaw is the fourth largest ethnic group with diverse dialect groups and languages within the nigerian state. their grievances are based on the severe ecological destruction and perceived inadequate benefit from the oil economy (watts 2003), as well as the socio-cultural and political relegation of youths, spearheaded in the 1960s by isaac adaka boro (osha 2006; watts 2003) from kaiama in rivers state. the ijaw national struggle for self-determination marked the early prominent violent revolt in the region. the late 1990s witnessed the emergence of some moderate youth leaders in the persons of felix tuodolo, isaac osuoka, t.k. ogoriba and others, who, mirroring the ogoni, focused on the wellbeing of the niger delta people (afinotan & ojakorotu 2009). however, the 2000s saw the emergence of more vocal and radical leaders like asari dokubo, tompolo and boyloaf, whose leadership style became more direct and confrontational. for these radical leaders, challenging the federal government of nigeria with arms became necessary for the emancipation of the ijaw from state oppression. dokubo, for instance, accentuated the decades of oil exploration and poverty accusations at the grassroots level, in which he found cooperative groups of youth in the communities, who were already disenchanted with the establishment, ready to engage in a domain of violence. the fluidity between the employment of violence and non-violence in the ijaw movement suggests a curious feature that distinguishes between leadership styles in the niger delta. worthy of attention here is that, while the ogoni focused on international legitimacy for their movement, the ijaw agenda was not initiated on a pan-ijaw ethnic platform, as they did not engage internationally, although a few direct engagements were undertaken on individual levels. while in the ogoni case we are able to identify a strong set of leadership, it is not the same in the ijaw case. it is understood that leadership is important in determining whether a potential trauma is transformed into a chosen one and for what purpose. if volkan’s theoretical framework assumes that traumatised groups do not have the emotional means to secure a lasting peace due to constant and intensified level of anxiety (formosa 2013), then we see groups prepared to react with violence to any threat to its security and, specifically, survival. the emotional, cognitive, and moral association of individuals with a wider community (polletta & jasper 2001, p. 285) could be imaginary as an alternative to direct experience. this can be and is conveyed through diverse forms, including narratives and cultural materials. these are the sites that link the micro to the macro, where collective memory is shaped, contested and negotiated (duckworth 2015). these memories are viewed as resources of identity and legitimacy, creating a connection to the past (gongaware 2010; kubal 2008). the collective memory of dehumanization, victimization, fear and hatred becomes a powerful representation and an active means to intensify the ethos of the dominant conflict. the ogoni and ijaw leaderships demonstrated how collective memories were used to connect the past to the present and the ways in which these memories functioned as motivational inspiration for group leaders, particularly ethnic groups that identify as economically threatened, and forced to adopt either a violent or non-violent course of action in order to defend their legacies (kubal 2008). the ‘rally around the leader’ phenomenon can indicate chosen trauma, but duckworth (2015) argues that simply rallying around the leader of one’s group, without other indicators, alone probably does not establish the presence of ‘chosen trauma’. using a comparative case studies approach, we illustrate how grievances of the past are preached to groups using two lines of argument. 1) the framing of the narrative of war versus narratives of human rights and peaceful protest. 2) leaders’ actions and symbolism. we argue that a chosen trauma does not lead to a clear-cut path on its own, it depends on how it is mediated, constructed and framed. therefore, a ‘chosen trauma’ is constructed, and the way it is framed by leaders is what constitutes a ‘chosen trauma’. this paper contributes to resource, development and conflict debates. it offers a deeper and nuanced understanding of how minority ethnic group leaders memorise, frame and construct a ‘chosen trauma’ that leads to non-violent theorising (peaceful resistance) in the ogoni case and violent theorising mai-bornu and allen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202254 within the ijaw movement. narratives and leadership styles will be used in each empirical section to re-discuss the ‘chosen trauma’ concept within minority ethnic group movements. the use of primordial narratives amplifies how a group distinguishes itself as a minority within a minority. narratives as a form of representation, entail a sequence of events, a manner of speaking about the events (as a discourse), and a verbal act in a social transaction extremely sensitive to context (martin 1986). specifically, the paper will demonstrate the processes through which the traumas were chosen, theorised and used to mobilise group members in the two cases. chosen trauma: the ogoni case the ogoni case offered an opportunity to reflect on how trauma, emotion and memory are connected in resource-based conflict. as ganz and mckenna (2017) wrote, movement leaderships utilise narratives as a technique to accessing, framing and cultivating emotional resources entrenched in collective values, means that are essential to face disputes with resilience, courage and agency (see also mai-bornu 2020b). the employment of narrative indicates the motivational values that characterise group and individual identities and the urgent need to act can be experientially articulated as a story of self, a story of us, and a story of now, or public narrative (ganz 2009, 2011). the book, genocide in nigeria: the ogoni tragedy, narrates a traumatic story that leaps up before his eyes in every page, letter and word saro-wiwa wrote, having lived through the painful experiences as an ogoni (saro-wiwa 1992, p. 7). building on the united nations definition of genocide as ‘the commission of acts with intent to destroy a national, ethnic-racial or religious group’ (sarowiwa 1992, p. 9), saro-wiwa explains the process through which the ogoni were dehumanised through a wide range of negative emotions toward the group, watching helplessly as they were systematically ground to dust through the combined actions of the shell petroleum development company, the murderous ethnic majority in nigeria and the country’s military dictatorships (saro-wiwa 1992, p. 7). saro-wiwa uses the word genocide to describe his views on violations of the rights – political, economic and environmental – of the ogoni. the discovery of oil and gas in the country marked a major shift from other sources of international income (human rights watch 1999, p. 6). the emphasis on resource extraction mainly served the interest of a minority group of elites as against the benefit of the ordinary nigerian citizens (human rights watch 1999, p. 6) and in particular, the oil producing communities. the nigerian constitution gives the central nigerian state sole ownership rights over all natural resources including oil and gas. in particular, the petroleum act of 1969 cap 350, and the land use act cap 202 (obulor 2009) are examples of the legislation legitimising the strong hold of the state over resources above and below the land. as a result, the power to engage in discussions with multinational oil companies about when and how oil extraction takes place is beyond the local oil producing communities. the dominant international player in the extraction business in the delta was shell, controlling almost a half of the oil and gas resources alongside other national and international companies such as texaco, elf, chevron, mobil and agip each playing roles in the business (obulor 2009). years of extraction activities carried out by these multinationals had seen distressing effects on the environment through oil spills and gas flaring, which in turn interfered with the sources of livelihood of predominantly farmers and fishermen. for saro-wiwa, oil under ogoniland belonged to the ogoni and not the nigerian state, which is why the state should have paid royalties for extractive activities (see saro-wiwa 1993). this exploitation, he claimed, dated back to the colonial era in which shell-b.p was issued the oil mining licence (oml) (saro-wiwa, 1992:24). saro-wiwa’s point suggested the beginning of the trauma suffered by the ogoni. the exclusion of the landlords in the various negotiations, discussions and agreements signed between shell and the state became a memory that upsets the group to this day (see also mitee, 1999:431). saro-wiwa referred to this as the foundation of ogoni extinction (saro-wiwa, 1992:24), which their leaders were not mai-bornu and allen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202255 aware of at that time. the interview with nbete (27 july 2015) underscored the unceasing activities carried out by multinational oil companies that posed major risks to the health and wellbeing of the communities, but has also ruined ogoni farms and ecosystems (see also okonta 2008, p. 3). he cited the example of shell which controlled the oml 11, situated in ogoniland, ahead of even the nigerian national petroleum corporation (nnpc) (see also watts 1999, 2003, p. 22). this paved the way for a campaign of non-violent resistance centred on environmental impacts of the activities and the lived experiences of the group that transformed into ‘chosen traumas’ and memories. the collective memory of victimization and dehumanization has become a powerful symbol as well as an efficient way to construct the trauma chosen by the ogoni. saro-wiwa used the politics of trauma to represent specific historical events in such a way that these events obtained a desired significance in the groups’ collective imaginary (zembylas 2007) particularly, how they shattered the basic fabric (hirschberger 2018) of the ogoni society. here, saro-wiwa had asserted that the attainment of political autonomy as well as the entitlement to expend a significant portion of resources for the advancement of ogoniland was a moral obligation of all ogoni, but without the use of violence (saro-wiwa 1995a, pp. 74-75). the ogoni leaders recalled traumatic experiences and painful memories of the past thereby creating a social and political space in which group members could listen and reconstruct memory by perpetuating the pain (zembylas 2007) of the tragedy that befell their communities. to saro-wiwa, it was none other than the operation of either a true federation in which each ethnic group would have autonomy and be directly responsible for its salvation, a confederation of equal states based on its ethnic groups or the complete disintegration of the country with each ethnic group left to fend for itself. under saro-wiwa’s guidance, the options were laid bare to the group; they voted for the autonomy option, deciding to put the nigerian state to the test (saro-wiwa, 1992, p. 93). saro-wiwa’s autonomy option to the ogoni was based on the emotion that the tribulations suffered would not end unless they took their fate into their own hands (saro-wiwa, 1992, p. 92). saro-wiwa took this further by preaching to the ogoni that issues that centre on their environment and resources were important, they could not be forfeited in any situation or for any replacement (porat et al. 2016). in this regard, saro-wiwa chose historic traumas by framing the question of autonomy in the principles of ethnic autonomy, control of resources and the environment. the autonomy option sought by saro-wiwa saw the framing of the historical ogoni traumas into a bill of rights (obr) that was ignored by the nigerian state (saro-wiwa, 1992, pp. 92-103). the obr called attention to how colonisation had served as the precursor to their sufferings starting with the forced administrative division of opobo 1908-1947, which then snowballed into the discovery, exploration and exploitation of oil resources and a request for political autonomy (saro-wiwa 1992). these forms of genocidal violence practiced against weak and defenceless peoples demean the human race (volkan 1985). in reaching out to the international community, as well as to the nigerian people, the ogoni realised the importance of having enemies as well as allies. the obr exemplifies the deliberate effort by the ogoni leaders who cling ever more stubbornly to these violations of their rights as producers of the oil which are then interconnected with their experiences of ethnicity, nationality and other identifying circumstances (volkan 1985). here, saro-wiwa unconsciously expands the concepts of ethnicity and nationality within the context of the ogoni. as volkan (1985) suggests, members of the ogoni ethnic group may be seen to share some step-by-step primal sentiments they experienced over the years. however, putting the state to the test required rolling out the ogoni ‘chosen trauma’ in a systematic process that began with a collective trauma, which transformed into a collective memory, and culminated in a system of meaning that allowed groups to redefine who they are and where they are going (hirschberger 2018). collective trauma interconnects the personal, the public, and even the political through lived visualisations of both indirect and direct trauma experiences. mai-bornu and allen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202256 chosen trauma: the ijaw case ancestors like isaac jasper boro, and his ijaw friends, who led the initial ijaw struggles for resource control in the immediate post-colonial era of the country, are easily remembered as heroes. the crushing of that initial uprising in what has been termed the ‘six days revolution’ by the federal government is well seated in the memories of many men and women from ijaw land. the symbolic representation of that era is traumatic in many ways. the initial fears of those early leaders of the struggle have happened over time. the day of 11 december 1998 remains momentous in the history of the niger delta. it was the day 500 youths from 40 clans gathered in kaiama, bayelsa state, to issue a quit notice to all oil companies operating in the region (nwajiaku 2005). the articulation of the reasons and demands, expressed in speeches and contained in what is today easily referred to as the ‘kaiama declaration’ provides a lot of insights into the question of chosen trauma, emotions, and social movement activities. oil was, as it is now, the common enemy (allen 2012a, 2012b, 2018). participants spoke with emotion, passion, and determination, and asked the companies to leave the region not later than the end of december 1998. the kaiama declaration attracted a violent response from the federal government through the deployment of the military, which led to violence and the killing of several youths. it also led to the formation of the ijaw youth council (iyc), which became a key platform for activism against the government and the oil companies (nwajiaku, 2005). the framing of the message both to the government and oil companies was based on emotions about the destructive impact of the oil industry. pollution of the creeks, rivers, forest and its impact on the livelihoods of local community people, in which the industry had already been implicated in the last few decades in nigeria was highlighted. what happened in umuechem, where the military was deployed to terminate peaceful protests by community people against shell for violating the environment, and the hanging of the founder and leader of the movement for the survival of ogoni people (mosop), ken saro-wiwa, and eight other leaders of the movement by the federal military government under the late general sani abacha in 1995, were influential traumatic memories. young people were traumatised by those incidents. the moments of the hanging were the most traumatic experiences, for ogoni people; and the ijaw had emotionally concluded that this could well happen to them if nothing was done to undermine the threat and reduce the risks already associated with the oil industry. the framing of the declaration, which also related to a national political and economic context in which ownership rights of oil in the niger delta as a whole belonged to the federal government by law, and decisions about exploration, production, and distribution of benefits such as employment and revenues excluded local communities were seen as a violation of human rights. the hanging of the leader of mosop and others, sat comfortably in the memories of ijaw leaders not only to remind them of the evil day but also to start from where boro left off when he warned about the destructive impact of the emergent oil industry on ijaw communities and their destinies. ijaw youths, however, were to take a different approach to nonviolence. but as the theory of non-violence would suggest, non-violence attracts the violence of the state. thus, the declaration was interpreted by government security and oil companies as threats to the oil establishment, which needed to be crushed with force or contained as soon as possible. even from the earlier responses of the government in the case of umuechem and ogoni, ensuring uninterrupted oil production was seen as a national security issue. it was therefore not surprising that a national security perspective would also inform the government’s response with the deployment of the military in search of ijaw youths they saw as trouble makers and enemies of the country. going by volkan’s (1985) argument, that enemies and allies serve developmental goals for identity groups, the action of the ijaw youths through the declaration may be seen as ‘chosen trauma’, playing out through shared experiences of the impact of the oil industry and the violent response of the state to perceived threats. the declaration and the violent response by the government contributed emotionally to fuelling the conflict. the protests and demonstrations that took place across bayelsa state invited thousands of mai-bornu and allen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202257 soldiers under general abusalami abubakar’s federal government. with several persons dying from the militarisation, the stage became set for further confrontations (human rights watch 1999). the struggle would intensify from then on, following from the model set by the ogoni. the ogoni had issued an ogoni bill of rights, outlining their demands and questioning their political and economic fate with the oil industry and the nigerian state. the ijaw leaders were aware of the nature of the aftermath of the declaration and subsequent peaceful protests and demonstrations based on what happened to the people of ogoni. the emergence of armed groups in the late 1990s, with members from across the niger delta, attacking oil facilities and government security, and taking hostage oil workers, transformed the conflict. the impact on the safety of people and investments in the region was a key concern. worse, the nigerian economy came under severe threat from a drastic drop in daily barrels of crude oil production, precisely from 2 million to 700,000 barrels, because it relied on the commodity for the bulk of its national income through revenues and foreign exchange (amnesty international 2009; bamidele 2017; helbert & o’brien 2020; newsom 2011; ugo & ukpere 2010; undp 2006). to say that the struggles on the side of the ijaw strengthen some aspects of the formulations of the ‘chosen trauma’ theory then makes a lot of sense. the connection with the peoples’ shared sense of identity and pain from interacting with the oil establishment and the forces that have shaped decisions in the industry in exclusion of the group was crucial. the emotionality around the loss of means of livelihood and response of the state when grievances were articulated brought about policy changes such as the establishment of special development agencies including the niger delta development company and the ministry of niger delta affairs. at the same time, the government kept coercion or violence as a major approach that escalated the conflict until the economy became the main national security issue as seen in 2009, when the federal government initiated an amnesty programme for militants involved in the attack of oil facilities, government security and hostage-taking. the militarisation of the region meant that the safety of the region was at stake and invited more violence. conclusion the central discussion in the paper focuses on volkan’s (2001) theory of ‘chosen trauma’, in the context of struggles by two groups in nigeria’s niger delta, where oil extraction has caused severe environmental problems to rivers, creeks, mangrove forests, air and soil. the victimhood and non-violent framing of the problems suffered and non-violent agitations that attracted violent response of the federal government in the cases of ogoni and ijaw communities support the idea of selective pain utilised for a demand on the state and oil companies, which should not necessarily lead to destruction. the destruction that followed through the violence of both groups on the one hand, and the government on the other hand, are signs that the theory provides a partial explanation for the experiences of the niger delta groups. their deployment of collective memory relates to the death of ken saro-wiwa and eight other prominent ogoni people who died due to the actions of angry youths protesting against environmental impacts of oil extraction and lack of development in the community. in the same vein, ijaw youth leaders under the ijaw youth council deployed the same memory, as a preventive measure, but seriously remembered the initial sacrifices made by isaac boro and the resistance he and his team suffered at the hands of the federal government, when they expressed fears of marginalization of the ijaw groups in an emerging political economy of oil production. the paper has discussed these issues to address four inter-related questions. the analysis shows that, in the case studies described in this paper, oil was an underlying factor in the social and political relations that resulted in chosen trauma. case studies of the ogoni and ijaw communities in the niger delta have both negative and positive narrative effects. this is evident in references to non-violent and violent actions and responses by local groups and the government. the mai-bornu and allen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202258 people who serve as examples in the analysis consider oil as much as its impact on their environment as a disturbing problem that has not been completely solved. references allen, f. 2012a, ‘oil and security in the gulf of guinea: reflections on the external and domestic linkages’, journal of sustainable development, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 132-140. https://doi.org/10.5539/jsd.v5n4p132 allen, f. 2012b, ‘the enemy within: oil in the niger delta’, world policy journal, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 46-53. 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revised 02/03/2023; accepted 06/03/2023; published 26/03/2023 abstract this paper explores the repatterning of civil society, the social technologies of persuasion and information, and the role of sociopolitical contexts in narrabri (an australian country town, in western new south wales), and its surrounding region between 2018 and 2020. in narrabri the consequences of carbon oligarchy are observed, as the oligarchy promoted new gas fields and expansions of a coal mine in the region. this expansion is justified by supposedly offering a solution to narrabri’s apparent economic, agricultural and population decline problems, but for many local people, it worsens those problems. conflict has been generated as a result, and the town has suffered painful fractures making the problems seem harder to solve because of the resulting disunity. the paper explores how the contest to justify the extraction also reduces the legitimacy of that extraction. keywords energy transition; coal; gas; rural nsw; community dispute 106 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research was funded by the australian government through the australian research council future fellowship grant, ft160100301. the views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the australian government or the australian research council. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8425 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8425 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:jon.marshall@uts.edu.au https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8425 the ‘new’ extractivism and civil society the conflict being described centres on ‘extractivism’ in narrabri in new south wales (nsw ), australia. extractivism involves removal of materials or life forms for largely external profit. it produces eco destruction and pollution as part of its normal processes, and these rarely deduct from the profits being made. extractivism is rarely limited by anything other than the availability of the substances being extracted. with oil this may soon happen, but not in time to prevent destructive climate change (bardi 2014). in extractivism, nature appears to be conceived as a set of commodifiable and removable ‘resources’, or as a potential sink for pollution. in extractivism resources become private property, appropriated, or enclosed, by the extractor, often with little compensation for the local people and their loss. this situation is often intensified as the extractors usually have no permanent connection to the area being extracted from. as kröger et al. compactly argue ‘extractivism ... may be understood as embodying the antithesis of sustainability’ (2021, 240). the destruction requires state approval, legalisation, and often assistance, towards the privatisation of these resources. for the state, the reward is the promise of ‘development’ (canterbury 2018), with the usual reduction of unenthusiastic people to ‘obstacles’ (hirschman 1965). extractivism organises a mutual reinforcement of state and corporate power (nygren et al. 2022, p. 741) to overwhelm local resistance, and to persuade, or force, some local people and local authorities to support the extraction. the consequences (intended and unintended) of this process in narrabri is the main subject of this paper. it seems quite difficult to distinguish ‘new extractivism’ from the old ‘imperial extractivism’. the destruction of ecology and people to transfer wealth elsewhere, was marked in the new world in the spanish extraction of silver and gold, as it was in the irish famine and in congo under the belgians. however, the situation seems to have been intensified by the increasing global demand for resources since 2000 to enable standard practices of development (nygren et al. 2022, p. 734). since 2000, the scale and universality of the activities and their ‘accidental’ destructiveness has increased. even in europe, people are still being dispossessed to expand lignite (brown coal) mines, despite traditions of rural conservation (del mármol & vaccaro 2020; schuetze 2023). extractivism can affect people almost everywhere; in the us fracking can occur inside relatively large towns (briggle 2015). the major differences between older extractivisms and more recent ones are that the world seem to be reaching the limits of what can be extracted without breaking planetary boundaries, taking more energy than can be released, and causing cascading harmful consequences: ‘extractivisms today, whether “local” or “global”, are among the key causes of global climate change and... ecological breakdown’ (kröger et al. 2021). we might wonder if extractivism also promotes social breakdown, as societies are tied into their ecologies and face challenges with ecological breakdown. a secondary front is that the new extractivism promotes the claim of local benefits as a justification for the potential destruction, rather than using simple force (nygren et al. 2022, p. 740); although something similar may, perhaps, be seen in previous ideas that colonisation civilises. however, promotion of local benefits opens further possibility of contestation over why the compensation does not arrive (or has not arrived in previous ventures), and whether compensation is enough for the foreshadowed destruction. processes of ‘selling’ the venture and pretending locals have choice, may make it seem that civil society discussion forums appear structured in favour of extractors and hence lose legitimacy (valencia 2022). however, unless locals (people, land and ecologies) are capable of effective protest, they still seem expendable, or it is assumed that extraction will be good for general development. this mixture of persuasion and force seemed present in narrabri as did the threat of ecological destruction, particularly of water, which could end the town, no matter what prosperity was involved. this led to considerable ‘hurtful’ fracture among locals, and indeed helped generate social dynamics and the forms of argument and perhaps some level of breakdown. information rarely cross boundaries between pro and anti groups, becoming a further cause of fracture and building of loyalties against the other. for example, reasonable fears of destruction of water and farming, largely come to be ignored by those in favour of gas extraction. marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023107 research in narrabri narrabri, and its surrounds, lie in generally dry farming country in north western nsw australia – as usual the land was originally stolen with force from the local aboriginal people, in this case the kamilaroi people. we did not manage to interview any aboriginal people at this time, so that is a lack in the paper. the research reported here took place between 2017 and 2020, although research continues up to the present, and this later research also informs the paper. other aspects of the research project have been published in goodman et al. (2022) and marshall (2022). narrabri was selected for research as it has been the focus of largescale proposals to newly mine coalseam gas, and extend coal mining. both of these proposals have now been approved by the governments. the town demonstrates the problems of what has become an existential and unnerving contestation. while the paper studies what is often called ‘civil society’ it does not define ‘civil society,’ or even use the term much, as the reality is too fluid (dalton 2014). ‘civil society’ can be taken as a process which intersects with the state, but is largely separate and can be informal. consequently, public action against the combined force of fossil fuel companies and governments (federal, state and local council) – what i’ve called ‘carbon oligarchy’ – may not be conducted through formal organisations, although they are present, and organisation can increase effectiveness, conflict and connections. local solidarity seems ‘fluid’, although people may be pushed into temporary solidarity or faction by external threats (bamyeh 2009). conflict can extend to attempts to gain external support from other people – although ideas of externality can shift. in this situation, informational disorder based in power differentials seems heightened, leading to further complications, disputes and confusions. the carbon oligarchy’s motivations seems to be to increase government support through promises of development, lockin the regional infrastructure, and boost sales of fossil fuels before opportunities end. the struggle in narrabri centres on a viable future for rural society. this makes the issue ‘existential’ and adds to the potency. rural towns in australia have been perceived as depopulating for decades, due to droughts and ageing populations. a general desperation for new jobs to prevent young people leaving makes these towns susceptible to mining sector promises of a prosperous future (cf coffey et al. 2018). however, while it is disputable how many new jobs will arise, coal and gas mines potentially heavily impact on agricultural lands and water, thus changing the region and its capacity for survival, especially given agriculture was previously recognised as driving the local economy. the very existence of narrabri seems to be at stake, whatever is done. the paper reports on a series of locallevel interviews, street surveys, informal focus groups and background reading, by a group of researchers and students in a research experience program. the research continued by the academics over a couple of years, into a new project on transition to renewable sources of energy in narrabri, which will be reported upon in later paper. the number of people surveyed and metwith is small compared to the general population, and hence this report constitutes a provisional and uncertain narration. uncertainties are an inherent part of social research which have to be acknowledged rather than ignored, as social processes cannot be seen as a whole, and much remains hidden. interpretation of data is central, and statements from members of the society are not necessarily accurate, or even representative, no matter how often they are replicated. hence the use of provisional statements pointing to this uncertainty. this paper could not exist without the generosity of local people freely giving us their time and considered opinions, and i hope that people from narrabri will respond with new interpretations and further information, to help expand the complexities of their situation. before visiting narrabri the research team expected that the relevant social antagonism would be between those who supported renewables and those who supported fossil fuels, under the conditions of climate change. this was not the case. the main conflict was over fossil fuels themselves: between affected farmers and mining companies; between town and country; and between activists and miners. during this initial marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023108 phase of research, renewables or climate change, were rarely brought up in conversation, unless prompted, although longterm drought made climate change a significant context. this has now changed, with both renewables and climate change appearing to have become more significant in the local discourse. the paper begins by describing the social context of the carbon oligarchy, its fight for more fossil fuels, and its uncertainties. the field section begins with farmers doubting the benefits of mining (section i); points to the importance of water (section ii); analyses the role of ‘sustainability’ and economic growth in local perceptions of crisis (section iii); reports the deep and painful fracturing of regional social life (sections iv and v ), and the disorders of information (section vi). the final section (vii) addresses the issue of renewable energy: the extent to which it did, or did not, figure in the local contest at the time of study. a further paper will be required to deal with the more recent activity around renewables in greater depth. context: carbon oligarchy the modern world came into being through the harnessing of cheap, easily available, fossil fuel energy. fossil fuels are perhaps the most efficient, and portable, sources of energy. they enabled the rapid deployment of military action, long global supply lines, large scale appropriation and global trade. coal is also important for steel manufacture, which is important to much of modern life. the ownership and control of fossil fuels has generated riches which accumulated in very few organisations and people, together with massive pollution and ecological damage (kenner 2019). this control over riches, together with the dependence of states and corporations on fossil fuels for ‘development,’ has led to what we can call a ‘carbon oligarchy’ (marshall 2022) in which state encouragement and protection of fossil fuels and their extraction is routine and privatised. the oligarchy faces a paradox, as the processes which generated modern global life are also destroying it. the mining and burning of fossil fuels are major causes of climate change; and governments across the globe are supposedly committed to diminishing fossil fuel emissions under un climate agreements. as the international institute for sustainable development (iisd) reports: according to a large consensus across multiple modelled climate and energy pathways, developing any new oil and gas fields is incompatible with limiting warming to 1.5°c. global oil and gas production and consumption must decrease by at least 65% by 2050 (iisd 2022, p. iv, emphasis added). however, many governments and businesses seem equally committed to supporting conventional development and growth through increasing emissions, undervaluing the costs of destruction, claiming emissions can be stored, or by claiming emissions from the fuels they provide, but which are burned elsewhere, are not their responsibility. support extends to increasing subsidy. authors for the imf write: globally, fossil fuel subsidies were $5.9 trillion or about 6.8 percent of gdp in 2020 and are expected to rise to 7.4 percent of gdp in 2025…. just 8 percent of the 2020 subsidy reflects undercharging for supply costs (explicit subsidies) and 92 percent for undercharging for environmental costs and foregone consumption taxes (implicit subsidies) (parry et al. 2021, p. 3). research from the oecd and international energy agency (iea) (iea 2022), states that overall government support for fossil fuels in 51 countries worldwide almost doubled to 697.2 usd billion in 2021, from 362.4 usd billion in 2020. the more dangerous the situation the more support for the cause of danger. in australia, all major political parties support fossil fuel extraction. australia is one of the largest coal and gas exporters in the world with substantial unaccessed fossil fuel reserves (geoscience australia 2021a, marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023109 2021b). the coalition government (liberal and national), who were voted out in 2022, moved from a ‘technology neutral approach’ (designed not to penalise fossil fuels) to a ‘gasled recovery’ from covid (designed to benefit fossil fuels), which led to the approvals for mining in narrabri. the new (labor) federal government, despite being friendlier towards renewables, continues to open paths for more fossil fuels. narrabri during this research period, the narrabri region had both an operating coal mine (with an extension to be decided) and potential gas fields. it was unclear at the time whether more mining would be allowed, but the coalition governments’ support for gas (at both state and federal level) made it extremely likely. farmers and fossil fuels farming has historically been the main driver of the local economy. however, farming is possibly in decline as a mass activity. farmers suffer the brunt of problems arising from fossil fuel mining, along with sustained droughts and more recently floods (probably intensified by climate change). this adds to rural suicides and the difficulties of intensive farming in australia (csiro 2022; hanigan & chaston 2022). farmers can experience fossil fuel mining as destroying their capacity to live and farm, through concerns about coal dust, risks to bore water, noise and health effects. alternatively, monetary income, from gas wells on their property, could help them in times of difficulty while potentially risking land and water (cf hunjan 2018). people often worry farmers are leaving the area: our business group is made up of a considerable number of the farming population and they’re all young people and they don’t want to be forced into a position where they’ve got to pack up and go1. we were told several times that 6070 farming families had left the area of one neighbouring town. due to economic pressures, farms have increased in size forcing other farmers out. sherval et al., while discussing these pressures in the narrabri region, and how these pressures have ‘diminished farmers’ ability to work together’ quote a local farmer as saying ‘the family farm has stopped be[ing] the traditional family farm. it’s now either a corporate farm, so it’s owned by a corporatetype structure, or it is a corporate family farm.’ (2018, pp. 105, 106). all these losses, increased technology, and reduced farming incomes have apparently affected farmers’ use of local labour, services and goods, breaking interdependence and connection with local towns, which seems important to the dynamics of opposition to mining. bores and water water allocations are, as implied, allocations of water to plots of land, which can be sold on (nsw government nda, ndb). people can also buy and sell excess water, and mining companies can outbid local farmers for this excess water. we were told that the coal company would buyout farmers near the mine, establishing a buffer zone and acquiring water allocations. people also claimed that miners could legally ‘accidentally’ open water sources in their mines, gaining water without charge and further depleting water available to farmers. to farmers, water seems to be lost to the mines. the threat of future mine expansion also reduces land value and ease of farming. some people assumed that the mines would continue to expand at the expense of farmers, as in the nearby hunter valley region which is allbut sacrificed to mining interests (cottle 2014; mcmanus & connor 2013). this threat adds to inducements for farmers to leave. 1 all indented quotations, unless given a source, are from the interview material. these quotations have been made anonymous, which is important given the previous fractures in the town. marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023110 potential loss of water is significant to the area, given the long drought, later followed by heavy flooding, which adds to the stress of agricultural life: ‘people just can’t live here, that’s all there is to it’. one person explained that the region does not have mountains or snow melts, and relies almost entirely on rain and bore water. some farmers said that water levels and quality have declined since mining started, although this was denied by other people. it is clear there are frictions over water, and hence over existence. the local gas deposits are primarily coalseam gas, which is often found together with water in the seams. it requires drilling many wells, spread across the region due to limited productivity of each single well. an activist from a nearby town explained: coalseam gas is trapped in fairly horizontal seams and so it’s not naturally moving up, it’s just sitting there. so you’ve got to drill many, many wells to get [to it] because this one will collect from a small area and their lifespan’s five years or something like that and then you have got to sink another one and then another one all over the place. that’s one of the reasons [people oppose it] and the other reason is because… [the gas and mixedin water] has all this toxic stuff in it and you’re going through the water tables. gas is brought up through the watertable to the surface, which plausibly creates a toxic risk at the surface, and in the watertable, even if the gas is a long way beneath the table. concrete and metal tubing should seal off the well from the watertable, but as an activist who is also a small farmer, said: they’re thinking that oh the science is proving that it’s alright; they’ll look after us; those well casings will last. they won’t last! how about 500 years down the track, you know… the precautionary principle is not being used for this industry. this farmer elaborated: we’re going to have 850 holes right through the [good] aquiferbearing rock into the poisonous [gas filled] aquifer that’s below, connecting the two, indefinitely into the future…. we should be asking ‘what’s the halflife of concrete’. there were supposedly microorganisms in the area that could eat concrete (anon 2012). the coalseam is… an ecosystem, even though it’s anaerobic, it’s full of all these... we’re talking protocyanobacteria... they can actually tolerate anaerobic conditions a little bit, you know? but they will sit on the outside of the well casing and eat the steel. they eat the steel and the concrete. protocyanobacteria do not eat concrete as far as i know, but the bacteria problem is recognised by the industry (lines et al. 2021). the large numbers of bores add to the risks of mixing the levels of gas and water, and also make it harder to check for breakdowns. one prominent business supporter of coalseam gas, directly contested claims about contamination: contamination of water. absolute lie…. the coalseam gas bores are at 1000 meters…., nothing to do with the alluvials….. they’re putting… high grade marine concrete steel all the way… the water that’s coming off the coalseam here is saline… that’s all. it’s not poison, it’s saline water. he continued, dismissing claims that gas could pollute bore water: [there’s one farmer] complaining about his water being contaminated by the gas company…. i have a friend who lives next door to that bloke…. it’s really brilliant water out there, it’s really sweet water…. he tests it all the time the water content has not changed. another local person told me that good bore water sources can be close to bad ones. but it’s clear there is a problem here, not only with conflicting information but with risk. without bore water narrabri is also likely marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023111 to suffer, and it risks polluting the major underground source water in inland australia – the great artesian basin (sherval et al. 2018, p. 1089). economic growth and sustainability for many people, including local councillors, the most obvious and pressing concern was a perceived decline in population. however, this does not seem entirely borne out by census figures. the population of the local government area in 2011 was 12,925, 13,084 in 2016 and 12,703 in 2021 (abs 2012, 2017, 2022). obviously if a claimed population decline continued, narrabri would die. this topic arose in casual conversations, street surveying and interviews, so whether accurate or not, it seems deeply felt. for many local people ‘growth’ and ‘sustainability’ meant more jobs, with education and training, to keep their children and grandchildren in the region. this emphasis on retaining local young people, was expressed in a number of ways by the councillors: it’s really up to us as a council along with the rest of the community to ensure that we have that growth and expansion in the future as an end result to keep our children here. and another: the core to achieving results in a country town like ours is retaining our children. this led some to conclude that the region needed to diversify away from farming: we need to grow the town in an industrial way, so that we are able to retain our youth and give them a future…. this kind of argument helped justify gas project, in terms of finance. in 2020 the local newspaper reported ‘narrabri shire council is preparing for a massive $7 billion investment by businesses and government across the shire over the next seven years.’ the gas project would make a ‘significant chunk’ of this investment (courier 2020). some local business people and local councillors tended to be supportive of the shift to an industrial growth strategy centred on fossil fuels, given the difficulties faced by agriculture and the apparent need to retain youth. one business person said: the most important thing is survival... economical [sic?] survival. agriculture now doesn’t employ the largest amount of people here anymore, because [people are] mining. that’s good, but not good. shires like ours lose around two full coach loads of their best quality young people every february. given the focus on young people, our student volunteers talked to a group of final year high school students. despite varied family backgrounds, all students were adamant they would not stay in the town after finishing high school ‘there’s no future here’. one student blamed the defensiveness of local business for the town’s decline: the town is just not growing at all, like all the businesses, they’re not letting any other businesses come into the town because they know they’re going to lose money to them… so many [businesses] have come up and then they just stop, it’s sad. while the school had arranged for local fossil fuel companies to deliver presentations on prospects for employment, these students were not generally enthused. overall, mining and drilling, while giving hope, exploit and exacerbate an alreadyexisting sense of marginality and decline in rural areas. clearly, gas wells, including exploratory wells, can bring royalties marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023112 for farmers and employment for towns and thus appear beneficial. however, the community risks water quality in return for this temporary subsidy. agricultural precarity deriving from climate change and mining, produces selfreinforcing feedback loops pushing people away from the region, making these towns, potentially unviable in the future whether they accept mining or not. claims that mining always brings jobs for local people were also open to dispute. while we met few local coal workers, coal mines seem to be becoming highly mechanised and staffed by temporary ‘flyin’ workers housed in outoftown villages closer to the mines. the villages are selfcontained for supplies and may not employ local people to provide services. officially workers are encouraged to move into the town by the mine companies, which can benefit local people who can rent out properties but displace lower income renters from accommodation, causing more dislocation. the high levels of vacancy in miners’ villages is offered as evidence for workers moving into town, but this could also indicate lack of jobs in particular phases of mining. some people claimed that temporary workers are counted as ‘locals’ for employment statistics purposes if they are in town on census night, or hold a local po box, irrespective of how much time they spend in the area. as one interviewee said in this context, the companies ‘exploit all of the loopholes and no one regulates and checks’. adding to the confusion, there are allegations that mining companies inflate the number of jobs they promise and provide. a councillor claimed: ‘if they have one job and that job is filled by 5 people in a year, they say that’s 5 jobs.’ there may be fewer local mine workers than generally believed. local businesses can find it difficult to attract and retain staff; as one councillor outlined: staff left to work in the mines because they were getting better money. which means that our businesses and community lacked the tradies and the skilled people just to service us. many mines only operate for relatively short periods of time, and thus do not give long term prosperity. a councillor recognised this dilemma: even though it only lasts 20 to 30 years, you use that time to take advantage of that circumstance and build your community so that at the end of the day, you have got something that’s sustainable… [other towns] are suffering dreadfully. businesses closing down, and… the foreseeable future isn’t great either. we are sustained by these opportunities that have landed on our lap in reality. what do you do? this whole process appears likely to generate a cyclical economy with an influx of wellpaid workers forcing up the cost of housing locally, boosting some businesses but causing hardship for others and for some local residents. after the construction, the employment may fall leaving economic damage. if the workers leave, or do not bring families, then the population declines again. these employment and residency effects produce instability, which disrupts an already fragile local community. some farmers emphasised that the council’s local survival strategy was settingup the region for destruction, accelerating the loss of farmers and farm labour, although providing shortterm work for people who would not stay in the region when the mines closed. another possible harmful feedback loop is that as the locality becomes increasingly defined as a mining region, it may be designated as suitable for more mining, which facilitates the expansion of mining well beyond the limits that locals assumed were in place. expansions require new forms of infrastructure, in transport, piping, land use, training and education, all correlated with the miners’ demands, and perhaps promoting more destruction of other industries, such as farming and tourism, which rely on clean air and water. the mining companies have little local loyalty and will move out when the mines are exhausted. marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023113 social background to the dispute people in narrabri seem bitterly split both over the mines and over relevant information. there was no apparent way of clarifying the informational dispute within ‘civil society’ under carbon oligarchy. initially local people seem to have been accommodating to fossil fuel interests. a number of interviewees stated that, as late as 2008, many people who became environmental activists (primarily through protecting forests) viewed gas as a viable ‘transition fuel’ beyond coal. some of these people supported the pilliga forest being declared a state forest rather than a national park, so that gas prospecting could proceed, and others apparently bought shares in the original gas company that took the mining rights. this implies a relatively recent unity in the town, with support for gas. perhaps there was less conflict about mining, and less sizable extraction, as a few people claimed the original coal mine owners were much more considerate of farming interests. more recently, with the experience of gas fields in queensland, with international concerns about the impacts of gas extraction on water supplies and with expansion of extraction, gas has become more problematic. members of a national activist organisation (later gaining members in narrabri), lock the gate (ltg), focused on encouraging farmers to lock out gas exploration in their areas. several state governments adopted moratoria on coalseam gas, and in nsw several proposed gas projects (such in the northern rivers area), and one near central sydney (st peters), were successfully blocked by local campaigners. disquiet in narrabri also appeared to grow following experiences with exploration and pilot wells. a leaking pond that contaminated an aquifer with uranium at levels 20 times safe drinking guidelines is still being used, despite coalseam gas operator santos knowing it was faulty more than two years ago (hasham 2014). activists and conservationists pointed to local areas they claimed were damaged by leaks from gas wells. people suggested the contamination, even on a small scale, had longterm destructive impacts. as one local farmer put it: up on the north side of the forest everything died… and it’s pretty much dead, just a few hectares…. but if you have a look there now, and see the rehabilitation, all there is, is about three or fouryear old regrowth nothing on the ground, no big trees, no nothing. when this spill was pointed out to the government, the apparent response was to tell the activists to send the information to the company. that’s standard procedure i think for government departments, they’re very reluctant to take on issues that they haven’t themselves already raised. they don’t want to take on community issues that they haven’t identified. i think it puts them in questionable legal position too. this is also a way of the government avoiding conflict with the mining companies, which is one indirect way of supporting the companies. while shire councillors were aware that other rural towns had been destroyed by mining, they suggested their town was smarter and would solve the problems. while clearly towns can learn from the bad experiences of others, and the council may have conducted studies of this form of the ‘resources curse’, no one mentioned long term plans; the engagement seems to remain founded on hope. mining companies seem to make their pitches most directly to town dwellers, counterposing the presumed interests of towndwellers against the interests of farmers. disputes over mining thereby exploit and exacerbate preexisting antagonisms, deepening the ‘rift’ between town and country. the distribution of gains and losses is presented as if some gain and some lose. but ultimately, though, the entire community suffers from land degradation: mining is a negative sum game. another problem, emphasised by a number marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023114 of people about the gas, was the social consequences of the dispute, and the lack of benefit from gas so far. one person remarked: we’ve seen a lot of fracturing of the community. we’ve seen… both environmental impacts and social impacts, but we haven’t seen the economic promises delivered. fracture country towns are often quite small in population, and characterised by longterm relationships between people. any proposal for largescale structural change in a region will potentially disrupt existing social relationships and imaginings of futures, and plans for how the region should be organised, especially if it has potentially harmful consequences. several brief encounters can only offer limited insights. however, we were struck and surprised at the depth and pain of division that were aired in our discussions. we heard of longterm friendships being lost, and people needing to leave the region for their own wellbeing. one interviewee would not meet us in a public place for fear of being seen talking with researchers. we did not witness any active dispute (although people did criticise other people to us), so i can only report on what people said had occurred, without knowing how accurate these reports are, although the distress in these narrations was obvious. one councillor said: csg [coal seam gas] in our area has been very divisive… it’s putting friends against friends, siblings against siblings. socially it has really taken a toll in our community…. we [as councillors] don’t have a social licence to speak on [the communities’] behalf in terms of this issue, because there are so many differing opinions. it effects a hell of a lot of people. another councillor said: i have had people who are good friends of mine that have actually come up to me and said … this other person, he is now no longer a friend of mine.... when it comes to severing friendships that have been there since childhood or whatever, that’s just absolutely ridiculous. another person said the problem had come close to destroying their longterm friendships and could not be discussed if one was to preserve those friendships. you don’t bring up a topic with someone you’ve known for forty years... you don’t want to make waves. fracture also threatened voluntary organisations. members of a bush walking club proposed that the nsw premier be invited to see the pilliga forest threatened by gas exploration. some members fiercely denounced the idea and this diminished the club’s membership. both sides said there had been intimidation from the other side and gave anecdotes of such behaviour. these anecdotes, while possibly magnified, seemed to be based on real events, but involved radically different interpretations and narrations – sometimes so different that i initially thought i was hearing different stories. people were reported to be in stress from the mining developments and its effect on farms. as one farmer recounted: some people have been just really, really destroyed. it’s been very, very bad on their mental health they’ve been physically ill… because they are so distressed about what they see as… the consequences or potential consequences of having a coal mine or a gas mine nearby. marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023115 people who supported gas could argue that the sicknesses attributed to gas were psychosomatic, resulting from stress and imagination, in a similar way to the way ‘wind farm syndrome’ is rejected by supporters of renewables (marshall 2018). the gas company cultivates its presence in the town with a shop front, constant promotion and largesse for local organisations. this largesse could be seen as bribery, and so increased the fracture. for example, money was given to a local sports club, with team members required to wear the company logo on their sports tshirts and shorts. some parents removed their children from local teams as they did not want them promoting the mining company. the largesse can also be resented: our previously selfsufficient community sports groups are now reliant on handouts. we’ve lost that social capacity within the community, so that’s a real negative. the largesse is also reputedly used to curtail local opponents’ activities and the information they can spread: the antigas meeting was at the golf club and then we found out that apparently what happened is that the gas company rang the golf club and said that if they let us have our meeting there, then they were going to pull all the sponsorship. someone else commented: [a local farmers’ organisation] tried to go into the high school to talk and i think it was like the principal said ‘yes’ initially but… within 24 hours got back and said ‘oh, actually, no, really sorry’. so this person pursued it higher and higher up and was told at every level, ‘no, no, it’s the rules, it’s the rules.’ they were never told what the rule is, but the gas company was let in the next week to talk. regular fullpage advertisements paidfor by mining companies, alongside positive reporting from local journalists, can be viewed as an exercise in community engagement, but for opponents it’s manipulation. as one person stated, it had turned a viable local news outlet into the ‘mining company courier’: [advertising] has been a windfall for the local newspaper. so all the information that comes through what should be an independent publication is actually quite biased. more broadly, repeated allegations were made that the fossil fuel companies distorted information: refused to answer questions, presented evidence in the most favourable manner, emphasised certainty when there was inherent uncertainty, and stopped affected farmers from speaking through the confidentiality agreements required for compensation payments or land purchase agreements. whether all these reports are accurate or not is irrelevant: the company can be seen as using its largesse to monopolise and constrain information, and hence attempting to constrain and guide civil behaviour away from positions hostile to it. progas supporters, while sometimes admitting there were wellknown problems with mining in queensland, could state these problems would not arise in nsw, because of more stringent regulation, or that the problems were exaggerated. one councillor said: there’s horror stories that are coming out of queensland about certain circumstances but when you talk to the queensland government, the csiro base down at queensland, they seem to have predicted the issues in and around coalseam gas [and they] weren’t as bad as they expected. however, regulations and fines after the event, will not remediate water table damage, if it occurs. the council appears to present itself as overcoming these fractures and as bringing people together by restating local unity, despite disagreement, stating that disagreement was more intense in the past, and restating the importance of prosperity and sustainability for the town, and repeatedly pushing the fracture marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023116 away. this peacemaking action indirectly supports the established fossil fuel presence, whatever people might feel about it, thus leading to a general sense that events are out of their hands. this helplessness is reinforced as approval or refusal of development depends on the profossilfuel state government, not the local council. information disorder a key issue was suspicion of corporate obfuscation, misinformation and meaningless consultation. as one person complained: they say, you know, ‘community consultation’ – well we’re consulted out… processes are so opaque.… they just keep obfuscating. they just keep putting up obstacles in front of us... like we get a document and most of it’s redacted. you know they’re just these black documents kind of stuff. information opacity, and apparently foreclosed consultation, is not just a problem specific to the mining industry, or to narrabri, but to capitalism in general. business inherently hype their products, through pr and advertising, and downplay any problems, or objections to protect sales, so their information is often unreliable. there is no capitalist cause in claiming the information you are presenting is ambiguous or uncertain, unless that adds to persuasion. however, in a small country town, the possibility of ordinary people having the capacity, or time, to become fully informed, on highly technical matters, from independent sources, is unlikely. for example, people repeatedly told us they had a mere 42 days to go through the gas project’s 7,000 pages of environmental impact statement. it was ‘almost impossible’ or ‘nothing short of ridiculous’, to read in the time, never mind analyse, or checkup. this kind of mass of information can be seen as a screen, for hiding information. nevertheless: 23,000 people wrote in about that eis. that’s the biggest amount of, not just objections, but submissions, to an eis ever in the state and… 21,900 or something opposed it. progas advocates dismissed this largescale opposition to the eis as coming from outsiders, given the regional population is much smaller than 23,000. obviously, the gas and coal companies could also be seen as outsiders, although rarely by progas people. protestors against the project were likewise demonised as violent and dirty ‘ferals’. they were, by definition, not respectable local people. for example: one of the things that we were hearing from some of the procsg people in town was that ‘these bloody protesters getting paid to come in from byron bay to riot in the streets’. another person demonstrated this blame: a lot of people who are against coalseam gas don’t even live in the shire... people supporting it, except for gas company representatives, all live within the shire…if you come over from byron bay to damn straight up and down my main street i’m going to tell you to bugger off.... regardless of whether i’m pro, whether i support what you are on about or not. don’t come here. and another: the wilderness society pays a lot of them protestors, 400 bucks a day, they didn’t come for nothing... the wilderness society paid for all the accommodation out there…. and when they get locked up they pay for their fines. there’s no one from the shire that’s ever been fined or locked up, no one. these claims may be an attempt to situate being antigas as marginal to narrabri identity, while portraying the local area as more unified, and more in favour of fossil fuels than it may be. it also delegitimises protestors as paid for their presence. marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023117 progas people claimed to have science on their side. a businessoriented councillor said: science is the only thing we can go on when it comes to controversial things like this.… in queensland… coalseams [are] close to water tables…. but out here you’ve got two hundred metres of the rock down, then you go through the aquifer, 150200m water there, then you have got 600m rock to get to the coal seam. so…. from the scientific point of view, the risks are very low….. i just go with science, and if the science is there, i support it. and equally if the science wasn’t there, i wouldn’t support it. another business person claimed: the pro coalseam gas people will only work on facts. it’s all you’ve got…. you blokes said that we were going to have contaminated water 5 years ago. where is it? people might claim that you had to trust the science and go with the gas, but it appeared that the science available was largely provided by the gas company, and did not include climate science or reference to the need to cut greenhouse gas emissions. other people complained the corporate science was not neutral: we’ve seen things like the developer of a model is the same person that peer reviews that model. you know, that’s really poor practice. despite claims of official allegiance to science, pollution monitoring was difficult because much of the pollution could occur underground, or be invisible (as with methane emissions) but even above ground, with the coal mine, it was difficult, partly because of lack of support: we’ve been lobbying government, we’ve been lobbying mines for 3, 3½ years, for an independent dust monitor here [in a small town near a coal mine] which noone will agree to and, when the figures come out, they always point the blame at… the farming community… and neatly sidestep everything. in this case, the coal mining company was alleged to have ‘have broken heaps of their limits to air quality’, but again there seemed little publicly available data. it is unclear to what extent legal issues also control information flow, but one of our informants had a confidentiality agreement with a company and had to interrupt themselves, to think about what it was possible to say without breaking that agreement. this indicates that many difficulties faced by farmers may not be in public circulation, also helping the cause on both sides, namely suspicion, and ignorance. this undermines peoples’ capacity to assess the risks when it comes to decision making. it is difficult not to think that this is the purpose of such agreements. people also complained that companies broke their promises. for example, in the small town near the coal mine: there was going to be… a mining presence in the main street, and that would therefore attract personnel to the main street immediately.... we were supposed to see a 10 to 15 per cent population spinoff…. [they were] going to build 12 houses in town but the problem was that they bought the blocks of land and they knocked 12 houses down. and they’re not built yet. marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023118 the same person pointed out that the coal company had promised 450 jobs and yet were now talking about a fully automated mine… ‘if it’s an automated mine, where are the 450 jobs going to go?’ later the council rescinded its support for the coal mine expansion. a report prepared for the council stated: the figures used to calculate these [job] figures appear flawed and the purported economic benefits to the community… seem unlikely to materialise… (murphy, 2019). broken promises on job creation is a critical concern; another person commented: they tell us we’ll have 1,300 jobs during construction [of the gas fields], and 200 ongoing jobs.… but… the shire doesn’t have the workforce that are skilled enough to work in large numbers in the construction site phase of the gas industry, so only 200 jobs are going to go to local people. this inability to gain informational clarity meant that people tended to define truth by group loyalties, connections and group allocated interests. both sides claimed that their group’s position was clearly supported by the facts, and that the other ‘side’ were mistaken, lying, corrupt, or under the thrall of outsiders who did not have narrabri’s best interests at heart. there does not seem to have been much real dialogue across divisions, and that may be an intentional consequence of the lobbying. there is no external, generally recognised, reference point for valid knowledge, that ‘stands above the fray’, and no generally respected experts who were defined as neutral; partly because only desired responses were acceptable. external bodies themselves are drawn into the conflict and positioned as on one side or another. for example, the commonwealth scientific body, the csiro, was funded by the gas industry (the gas industry social and environmental research alliance gisera cf gisera 2018) to do local research and, as a result, seems to have lost its local reputation for impartiality amongst antigas campaigners (ltg 2020). renewables: grounds for consensus? renewables appeared to play little part in the struggle over fossil fuel extraction in the region. within the framework of jobs and survival, energy was evaluated almost completely in terms of jobs, with fossil fuels seen to be as useful as renewables. when prompted, advocates of fossil fuels would generally state they supported all energy production, emphasising that fossil fuels and renewable energy could both help support the region and provide jobs. there was some scepticism about renewablesbased jobs, as they appeared few and low paying, with one interviewee stating: ‘they might be locals employed to build it. but maintenance afterwards is just not visible.’ another local business person and gas supporter claimed: ‘there’s less than 20 jobs in the whole of the new england despite all those wind farms’. critics of mining could claim that renewable energy offered a more viable and sustainable alternative, but in practice focused on the impacts of mining on agriculture, community health, and conservation values. some of these concerns could also apply to renewables. renewables was at this time unopposed but apparently often seen as irrelevant. there seemed very little enthusiasm about wind or solar farms, despite the potential installation of 264mw of solar panels in three farms in the area, and despite frequent claims the region had one of the highest uptake of solar panels in the state. for example, a councillor said: ‘i am pretty sure the shire is one of the top shires as far as household solar.’ the formal household uptake on the australian photovoltaic institute map is 61.8% (api 2022). for the supporters of mining, renewable energy was simply another form of energy, and as such was to be welcomed. as one mining advocate put it: renewables have benefits. australia is crazy if it doesn’t go renewables. no one is going to argue that. but don’t use that to knock the other energy source… fossil fuels… are more efficient. they’re instant, they’re 24 hours, and they provide that much employment it’s not funny. marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023119 the most common response, when pressed, was to be in favour of both fossil fuels and renewables to the extent that each brought jobs. people in the street of the main town, who were approached for a general survey by our students were often reluctant to declare a preference for either fossil fuels or renewables: they did not necessarily see a conflict between them, tending to favour both. for example, 85% of the 70 respondents, supported renewables based on anticipated jobs, low environmental impact, and low cost, while having issues with reliability. simultaneously, 70% supported coal and 66% supported coalseam gas. few in any age group opposed renewables while younger respondents were more likely to oppose coal and gas than older people. when people were asked about future preferences there is much more clarity about not depending on fossil fuels for everything. specifically, 69% stated that narrabri should develop over the next decade on the basis of ‘local farming and food culture’; 42% favoured ‘communityowned renewables’ and ‘locally owned tourism’; 31% cited ‘largescale renewable energy’; 29% favoured ‘largescale coal and gas’. this may demonstrate people’s aspirations for the region, as against what they believe they have to accept. again, there was intergenerational variation, with support for coal and gas falling from 32% for the over 55’s, 15% for those aged 3555 and almost zero for the under 35’s. the lock the gate organisation conducted a much more thorough house to house survey around the same time, declaring that: • 97% of people supported renewable energy as a way to provide longterm jobs. • only 28% of people were in favour of the coalseam gasfield in the pilliga forest, • 52%, of people opposed the gasfield and 20% were unsure • 55% said they were very, or somewhat, concerned about the gasfield and only 24% said they were unconcerned (ltg 2018). none of the council members we talked with expressed the levels of enthusiasm for solar or wind that some expressed for fossil fuels. installation of solar seemed almost irrelevant to council. the council has little input into solar farms as they are proposed by external corporations and approved by the state government. the proposed energy farms operate independently of the town and generate little local interest. when asked, no one at the council saw renewables as an alternative to fossil fuels that could boost the town without threatening agriculture and ecology. approval for the narrabri south solar farm, to be built by canadian solar came through in december 2018 january 2019 (nsw government 2018; vorrath 2019a). the silverleaf farm was approved in april 2022 (nsw government 2022). these companies appear unconcerned about local engagement, making no observable claims about local jobs, or supplying local energy. connection between the renewable industries and the town was marginal. even those people who provided household solar, were out of town until late 2020. perhaps, consequently, some activists seemed more concerned about conserving forest land, than in supporting renewable operations which might have some impact on land and land use. in late 2020, a not forprofit organisation, geni.energy, began a push to set up community renewable energy in the region, and this may well focus attention on different ways of action, which i hope to discuss in a later paper. conclusions the struggles in narrabri centre on fossil fuels and exist within the contexts of the ‘carbon oligarchy’, the effects of climate change (long scale droughts, followed by massive flooding) and the apparent decline of agriculture. agricultural decline seems to be arising partly through climate change and partly through displacement, or fear of displacement and loss of bore water, through mining. the importance of longterm marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023120 drinkable, and useable, bore water supplies for agriculture and life is obvious. as well as longterm risks to bore water, there are also risks of surface and air pollution through coal dust and watermineral leaks at the gas mine heads. pollution seems largely unmonitored. burning these new fossil fuels (wherever they are burnt in the world) will also increase the effects of climate change in narrabri. the situation for the region at the end of this research appeared incredibly difficult. people are caught between demands for developmental survival and demands for physical survival. civil society was fractured by dispute, perhaps largely generated by the interventions of the mining companies, whether intentional or not. it seems hard to repair the fracturing, although new local organisations may be appearing, because of the strong reaction to the mining companies’ apparent attempts to shut down and ignore opposition. fracturing also helps to give the companies more power, as they can work with one side and essentially ignore the other, as well as work with the state, which provides the frameworks in which extraction and approved ecological destruction, or risks of ecological destruction, exist. fossil fuels are supported by the state and by some local business interests. the mine expansions and the new coalseam gas fields have been approved, although there are still some delaying court challenges. the nsw government has also recently begun a process which they hope will lead to an energy intensive manufacturing site in narrabri, powered by gas from the gas fields (again ostensibly boosting local jobs and development), but also supporting gas company profit (nsw government 2021). the gasfields are being given an artificial salespoint as we might expect in a carbon oligarchy. these contexts make the disputes in narrabri existential. there is a threat that the town could decline, a perception which is exacerbated by fossil fuel company claims to be narrabri’s saviour. perceived decline is a direct threat to the residents’ existence and likely to heighten and polarise responses. the oligarchy approved solution of fossil fuels, may bring some jobs and finance to the town although it is unclear how many of those jobs will eventuate, or how many may go to existing locals or to temporary workers from elsewhere. it is also unclear how long these jobs and the gas industry itself will last. there will likely be many jobs during construction of the gas fields, but they will be temporary, and largely go to outsiders, as the local population is small, and does not necessarily have the required skills. we have also seen how, probably due to the population size, the highpaying jobs in the mines can lower the workforce available for the town, and the loss of farmers can increase dislocations between town and country as interdependence is broken, and it would not be unreasonable to suggest that narrabri is further weakened as a result. the mining in narrabri is short term, and likely to lead to boom and bust. the gas fields are limited even if the company is permitted to expand its operations into agricultural lands nearby. fossil fuel mining is also under pressure from the possible resolution of ambiguities of state policy, through states taking serious climate action against climate change and phasing out fossil fuels. this adds to the possibilities that fossil fuel mining may not guarantee a good future for narrabri, and indeed may help destroy that future both in terms of the town’s economy, and the local ecology. in other words extractivism can possibly cause social breakdown. the existential nature of the dispute, and its polarisation, is encouraged by the oligarchy, as it frames the dispute not only in terms of town vs country, with objectors as outsiders, but by framing fossil fuel mining as the only, and inevitable, way forward. in the fracture, normal civil society processes collapse and people rarely cross the ‘ideas divide’. mining companies also appear to control, or promote, most of the information that local people will find easily, for instance, through the local newspaper growing dependent on their advertising. this mining company information accelerates the polarities. the companies also have the ability to fund the community and community events and clubs, and this can appear to obstruct the presentation of counter knowledges and counter proposals, fuelling suspicion and heightening the polarity. the whole marshall cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023121 of what we might call civil society, is inhibited and changed by this fracturing and the fear of speaking. the pain of the dispute does not seem beneficial for local problemsolving. it may be worth investigating whether the dispute has hampered the region’s response to the crises of climate change, or whether those crises lowered the friction as people ‘pulled together’. in contrast with the fossil fuel industry, the renewable industry has, until 2020, appeared to distance itself from the area. its plans are not well known, seem covered in unintentional secrecy, and seem unintegrated with local business. this has rendered renewables marginal to the debate, and until recently there has been little locally organised support for renewables. arguably the only way forward for a renewable alternative locally is through local organisation, and local support – not so much as a way to attack fossil fuels but as a way of promoting autonomy, resilience and cooperation through renewables. this will be the subject of a future paper. it can be suggested that it is important to heal the town/country disjunction, connect the country with the town’s workforce again, connect with independent information, and build increased communication, and opposition to the oligarchy. however, this is much easier said than done, as the sides are not equal in their abilities to influence events, or in their external connections. the carbon oligarchy will push the mining approval process, and easily available information is likely to support the oligarchy and its requirements. however, climate change threatens the oligarchy as much as it threatens everyone else and its future position is ambiguous and uncertain. this ambiguity would seem to be common across the world, as it becomes more obvious that the oligarchy is causing not only local but global destruction through its extractivism and its commodities. this is worldwide. therefore, it is possible that local people, joined with others (perhaps experiencing the same kind of fragmentation and existential fear), 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its license. citation: klymentova, o. 2022. religious advertising in ukraine: political and social contexts. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:1, 32–48. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7969 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) religious advertising in ukraine: political and social contexts1 olena klymentova taras shevchenko national university of kyiv, ukraine corresponding author: olena klymentova, taras shevchenko national university of kyiv, volodymyrska st, 60, kyiv, ukraine, 01033, klymentovaov@ukr.net doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7969 article history: received 18/11/2021; revised 17/01/2022; accepted 11/02/2022; published 31/03/2022 abstract religious advertising is a new phenomenon in the ukrainian media space. starting from 2019 to the time of writing, it has been right in the middle of political battles as a public platform that represents the idea of the independent ukrainian church. religious advertising with a strong political component has become part of the conflict discourse and is qualified by experts as manipulation. in religious advertising with its social convergence, the creative impulse is mainly formed with verbal means that shape a new cognitive style of gaining religious experience. the new features are represented in god’s speech behavior, speech style, communicative situations with his participation, role distribution, genre preferences and the emotional background of communicative interactions. ukrainian religious advertising strives to balance short-term political interests and long-term social interests along with eternal values. keywords ukraine; religious advertising; political contexts; social contexts 1 an earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2nd world conference on research in social sciences 19th-21th of march, 2021 budapest, hungary. declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 32 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7969 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7969 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:klymentovaov@ukr.net https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i1.7969 introduction religious media is an innovative object of ukrainian scientific research, which leads to scholars’ growing interest in the mass-media phenomenon. according to petryshkevich, the author of one of the first monographs in ukraine on religious media (2011), religious communication has a complex structure. it is associated with religious traditions and canons, but it must also adapt to the dictates of time. technical means of transmitting information, namely the press, radio, television, the internet, new media, cause transformations in religious communication. manifestations of religiosity are becoming more varied, bringing secular and religious communication closer together. modern religious media closely interact and create a kind of symbiosis that helps to increase the influence of mass communication on the individual. the new media, especially social networks with their enhanced dialogicity and mass audience, are the closest to this essence of religious communication. the radio and the press are different in that they preserve their one-way communication patterns. they maintain their communicative traditions and continue developing classical religious communication, since they are based on the spoken or written word. the use of digital media draws religious issues into the field of mass communication and destroys the spatial, social and religious boundaries between people (petrushkevych 2018). therefore, this study focuses on the features of religious advertising that use typical language-based approaches. from a communications perspective, the goal of the study is to explore the evolutionary dynamics of semiotic codes of religious communication that are used in the ukrainian christian advertising. according to the current statistical data on changes in religious self-identification of ukraine’s population, the number of believers is constantly growing: the overwhelming majority of ukrainians (73%) consider themselves orthodox christians and 9% think of themselves as greek catholic, while 7% claim to be atheist (kyiv 2021). consequently, it is christian advertising that performs the representative function of communicative dynamic in the religious sphere. to understand the cognitive meaning of these semiotic codes, the main epistemologies of advertising of christian denominations in ukraine are analyzed; factors and consequences of the impact on consumers of religious advertising are qualified linguistically; the cognitive significance of the phenomenon of christian advertising in the ukrainian media space is outlined. religion and religious advertising it is necessary to note that religious advertising is a completely new phenomenon in the ukrainian media space. however, the emergence of religious advertising is a natural course of events predicted by researchers of discourse. thus, an expert at freedomart (halyuta 2013) argues that religious communication in general and brand communication as a form of advertising representation in the modern socio-cultural sphere have many features in common. some scholars develop this point of view and propose several explanations of this peculiarity. first, the current situation may be the result of the advertising integration process in all areas of social reality. second, it may be connected with the fact that religion has consciously or unconsciously been using marketing techniques from the very beginning of its existence. after all, advertising in the form of announcements of heralds, posters and albums existed as far back as in ancient rome. at present, religious institutions borrow from advertising many new means to exert influence on their audience. third, what is happening can be explained as a necessity caused by modern realities when consumer loyalty can be secured only with the help of advertising (dmitrieva & shusharin 2013). the problem that remains unresolved lies in that religious discourse is undergoing a radical change. at the current stage of its development, religious discourse in ukraine is being transformed simultaneously by several sources of influence. this is primarily an institutional renewal, which has diversified believers’ confessional feelings and interpretations of church doctrine and increased the tendency to socio-political klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202233 correction of processes in the religious sphere, including the field of communication. nowadays it is obvious that initially religious advertising used to function as an information board. starting from 2019 to the present, it has been right in the epicenter of political battles as a public platform that represents the idea of an independent ukrainian church. under the current circumstances, the communicative peculiarity of religious advertising is defined by anew semiotic code as a system of strict guidelines, rooted in both political propaganda and religious values. therefore, in the framework of our study, we consider it important to analyze the epistemological potential of religious advertising messages. religious communication has acquired innovative features, typical of mass media advertising. determined both by extralinguistic and linguistic factors, the evolution of its semiotic code creates new perspectives for the research into religious concepts in general and their postmodern representations in particular. the range of expressive means that provides the basic religious ideas is changing noticeably. consequently, we believe it is vital to study religious advertising in terms of mechanisms of influence and marketing effects. at the same time, we emphasize that lack of knowledge about media literacy can lead to communicative manipulations. the linguistic profiles of the entire manipulative communicative process are, however, rather hard to identify. in general, verbal manipulation is manifested in texts which correlate with lies, deception, aggression, conflict, invective, fiction, illusion, fake, and so on. yet, it should be noted that peculiarities of communicative influence are distinguished in different informational spheres and in the religious space in particular. when it concerns religious advertising, we mainly associate it with verbal suggestion. therefore, in the analysis, the focus was on the linguistic mechanisms used. thus, understanding the linguistic mechanisms of religious advertising expands knowledge about how mass media functions as an object of religious communication. unfortunately, scholars pay insufficient attention to hybrid types of influence in modern religious communication and its innovative genres in particular. from our point of view, religious advertising is an important factor to stratify values that, on the one hand, shape one’s spiritual life and, on the other hand, are used through mass media as means of influence in the modern society. we can view religious advertising as a media practice that translates a religious message from an archaic language into a modern one so that the recipient may perceive it as a personal experience of communion with god. the emergence of christian advertising has given an impetus to the development of advertising of other denominations. it suddenly became clear that marketing could help smaller denominations be more successful in the market for religious ideas and goods. what will happen next? what will success bring: an interreligious dialogue or a war of religious narratives? obviously, further research in the field of religious marketing will clarify the answers to these questions, which are beyond the scope of this study. finally, it is our deep belief that religious advertising is quite specific. new advertising goals impose new requirements on the creators of advertising, in particular on their media literacy. it is vital to remember that in religious communication we can distinguish between pathogenic and therapeutic text technologies, productive and habitual manipulations, explicit meanings and hidden intentions, established conventions, symbolic and hybrid codes and other aspects of media literacy. from a social point of view, prospects for the development of the media genre lie in the anthropocentric understanding of the phenomenological essence of religious advertising which can be actualized only in a dialogue with society. it seems to us that the ukrainian experience of such a dialogue can be useful for those countries that are struggling to resolve identity conflicts and whose governments are seeking a new format of religious narratives in the palette of social, political and cultural values. experience has shown that the social demand for rethinking the functions of religious discourse has been formed by now in almost all eastern european countries as well as in other parts of the world. it can be perceived that this is due to the needs of the globalized information space, in which ethnic groups and countries are trying to distance themselves from some forms of life and, conversely, to associate with other, more promising evolutionary models of life. klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202234 methodology the sample for the study of the evolution of semiotic codes in ukrainian christian advertising consists of 30 billboard advertisements, used in ukraine in 2018-2020. twenty advertisements are hybrid political and religious texts that were part of petro poroshenko’s program during the 2019 presidential election. the efficiency of these billboards resulted not only from their extraordinary abundance in ukrainian cities, but also because they were aggressively broadcast by all media during the election campaign. these advertising presentations marked the formation of a new religious institution, the ukrainian local church, which is not affiliated with the russian orthodox church. within the framework of poroshenko’s election campaign, breaking from russian orthodox christianity was presented as a spiritual breakthrough, as the ultimate formation of the institutional independence of ukrainian orthodoxy. so, although petro poroshenko lost the election, the church was established, and this radically changed the map of ukrainian denominations, which invests these advertisements with a historical significance and justifies them as the valuable material for our analysis. ten examples contain texts that appeared in response to this massive advertising attack. they were created by various christian denominations to remind politicians and believers of spiritual priorities in activities of church institutions. due to its linguistic nature, the research focused on analyzing the most expressive examples from this group and those with an accentuated verbal rather than visual component. all the analyzed advertisements were part of the first wave of ukrainian religious advertising. it should be noted that, since 2019, religious advertising has almost disappeared from the streets of ukrainian cities and moved to the internet. the new channel has required new communicative codes and expressive means, which makes the first stage unique and worthy of a special study. in 2021, statistical surveys confirmed the importance of these two groups of advertising. in particular, the idea of a local church is theoretically supported mainly by young people and people under 50 years of age. according to analysts, this is immediately related to the impact of advertising. out of 1,200 people who took part in the survey, 67% consider themselves believers, but less than 10% attend church regularly and associate themselves with a particular religious community (kyiv 2021). this gives grounds to hypothesize that for the remaining 57%, faith in god is more of an inner state and is rooted in a set of subjective perceptions rather than in a particular ministry and various forms of activity. the research applies the methodology of interactional sociolinguistics (gumperz 2003) which is grounded on the theory of situational inference in the anthropological perspective. to explain that: the motivational nature of communicative interaction is considered in its connection with cultural and social factors and is related conceptually with goffman’s theory of framing. the methodology is based on a set of discourse analysis methods aimed at identifying and analyzing situational meanings. the ultimate objective of the study lies in exploring discursive strategies. the research draws on the approach put forward by erving goffman (goffman 1974), who views an interaction frame as the matrix of some events and a set of roles. this model of interaction is created in interactions and perceived differently by each participant. interactional framing is close to the idea of “type of activity” or speech activity. contextual framing correlates with interpretation framing. according to goffman, an interaction consists of frames. the behavior of each communicator is associated with a certain scenario, while the dynamic of a role is regulated by behavior patterns expected from participants of various statuses. results and discussion creative impulse of religious advertising and its communicative peculiarities are based on strong convergent tendencies that correspond to political, social and marketing discourses. klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202235 religious advertising and political convergence within the political project of former ukrainian president p. poroshenko (2019), religious advertising was used to introduce and promote the concept of an independent ukrainian church. in order to provide the necessary historical background, it is relevant to mention that ukrainian orthodoxy has been split for a while already. from 2000 to 2018, de facto and de jure, there were three large orthodox churches. the first is the ukrainian orthodox church of the moscow patriarchate (uoc-mp); this orthodox church in ukraine is a part of the russian orthodox church, yet it is granted self-governance and rights to broad autonomy. the second is the ukrainian orthodox church of the kyiv patriarchate (uoc-kp) that emerged in 1992 in opposition to the russian orthodox church and demanded full autonomy from russia. the third is the ukrainian autocephalous orthodox church (uacc) that represented believers of ukraine’s orthodox tradition preserved by the ukrainian diaspora of north america and western europe. conceptual discrepancies in ideological doctrines of the abovementioned churches were fueled by russia, radical-minded ukrainian political circles and the ukrainian diaspora. in december 2018, the project introduced by ukraine’s then president poroshenko united the ukrainian orthodox church (kyiv patriarchate) and the ukrainian autocephalous church to establish the orthodox church of ukraine (ocu) that obtained what is known as a tomos of autocephaly from the ecumenical patriarchate in january, 2019. this tomos is one that grants it autocephaly or self-governorship. the new ukrainian church became the 15th independent local church in the world. it began positioning itself as the uniform national church, from the time that ukraine proclaimed independence after the collapse of the soviet union. yet, as early as may 2019, under the influence of numerous factors, the kyiv patriarchate revised its decision to recognize the new church institution as legal, qualifying its creation as manipulation and deception of believers. now the kyiv patriarchate has been defending its position in court and demanding the return of its status and property. in general, ambitions of clerical leaders, political protectionism, reputational damage of poroshenko as the national leader, aggravating inter-church strife, numerous cases of forcible takeovers and redistribution of church property, the russian annexation of a part of ukraine’s territory, the change of power from poroshenko to zelensky, among other factors, prevented the ocu from becoming the single platform of ukrainians’ spiritual unification. the ideological intention was to transfer uoc-mp clergy and parishioners inspired by the national independence movement to the ocu. however, the plan has worked out only partially. at present, the most active participants in the inter-church strife remain the uoc-mp that is still supported by believers because it emphasizes spiritual rather than political values and the ocu that has the tomos of autocephaly. yet, the russian jurisdiction of the uoc-mp weakens this church due to the dramatic deterioration of ukraine’s relations with russia which has led to military confrontation at the time of writing in 2021. the division between the orthodox churches persists, but the new church is getting stronger. thus, political actions and religious advertising of the innovative idea to establish a ukrainian local church have proved to be fruitful. the new semiotic code was created within the advertising campaign and was developed during the race for the presidency in 2018. that was an ideological code where the fundamental aspects of the ideology of state independence and the religious basis of church independence were used in the diffusive interaction on the idea of ukrainian statehood. in our case, national identity, political identity and religious or confessional identity were united within the framework of the ideological code (stepanov 2012). then, if this advertising arose during a presidential election campaign, why is it religious advertising? first of all, because ukrainian priests and believers were the objects of influence of this advertising (fig. 1). religious beliefs played a significant part in shaping their social behavior. thus, in modern orthodox identity, the cultural factor tends to dominate. orthodoxy is moving towards cultural identity due to the ideological vacuum in society, weak civic awareness, challenges of globalization and the soviet atheistic heritage (boreyko 2017). klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202236 figure 1. ‘tomos for ukraine!’ source: vybory.pravda.com.ua it is necessary to note that ukraine is a predominantly christian country. under current conditions, the tendency to a high level of declared religiosity of the population persists (boreyko 2017). religion is an element of culture that pervades every aspect of a society. it should be noted that cultural dimensions are very dynamic in a society, but religious tenets form a stable and static social basis. this condition of stability and manageability attracts politicians who want support from a stable and manageable religious electorate (fig. 2). figure 2. ‘we are ukraine. the local church is the key to independence. petro poroshenko’ source: starovina.livejournal.com ukrainians have also shown increased attention to the intentional level of this hybrid advertising and recognized the manipulation. this draws linguists’ attention to language markers of manipulation. manipulative influence was based on verbalizing the attention-drawing correlation of the concept ukrainian church and the concept independent ukrainian state. as a result, a new version of ukrainian identity was suggested to the citizens of ukraine, as is shown in figure 3. this understanding of identity has become a major epistemology of ukrainian conflict discourse. the hybrid advertising (both political and religious) klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202237 https://vybory.pravda.com.ua/ http://starovina.livejournal.com helped deliver the politically important information about the ideological confrontation between ukraine and russia that marks the present stage of their relations. however, the demarcation line was drawn in the spiritual sphere. as a result, the new strategic narrative reconstructed the ‘we/our vs they/their’ opposition. figure 3. ‘we are ukraine. the army defends our land. the language defendss our heart. the religion defends our soul’. petro poroshenko’ source: vybory.pravda.com.ua figure 4. ‘tomos 2018’ source: spzh.news klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202238 http://vybory.pravda.com.ua http://spzh.news figure 5. ‘for where is your treasure, there your heart will be! lipetsk confectionery factory “roshen”. matthew 6.21’ source: politeka.net thus, the new connotations of axiological components in the structures of the analyzed concepts formed the new evaluative meanings associated with the binary oppositions, including ‘war vs peace’, ‘enemy vs patriot’, ‘freedom, democracy vs slavery’, ‘past vs future’, ‘fake vs truth’, ‘russian language vs ukrainian language’, ‘russian orthodox vs ukrainian orthodox’, ‘righteous person vs sinner’, ‘believer vs unbeliever’, and so on. in this case, both the ideological worldview and the religious worldview merge into the new worldview, written in black and white mental codes with the same pragmatic potential as is seen in figure 4. within this approach, the concept of ukrainian church has acquired some signs of socio-semantic concepts that correlate with certain political references in particular. in the textual representations, such concepts are loaded with a believer’s self-identification followed by their further identifying with a group that has developed its own ideological categorization, on the one hand. on the other hand, the meaning is determined by the religious references and arguments based on differences in interpretation of church doctrine. in addition, these three components, namely, self-identification, group identity, and ideological categorization, are combined with marketing inventory that controls the believer’s interpretations of symbols and signs within manipulative communicative strategies. personal aspects that accompanied the processes of political identification, were objectified by the content of religious media. as part of such propaganda, the following was explained to ukrainians: ‘where is god in ukraine? who does he support? who among the leaders of ukrainian churches hears his voice better and brings the truth to people? what language is to be spoken in church? does the bible translated into modern ukrainian remain a ritual text? what language should be used in confession, prayer and repentance? which of the churches is the house of god – kyiv patriarchate or moscow patriarchate, ukrainian orthodox church or russian orthodox church?’ among others matters. massive religious advertising has erased soviet atheism from ukrainians’ social consciousness and made people reconsider their personal relations with god. in this sense, religious advertising as a mass media phenomenon has proved its cultural uniqueness. the next type of religious advertisement is of an intertextual nature and is also constructed according to the manipulative strategies and tactics of political discourse (see figure 5). speaking about the close connection of such advertising with political aims, we rely on the key values in the ukrainian worldview. the attitudes to the army, language and faith are transformed into imperative for ukrainians. all these klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202239 http://politeka.net values stem from cognitive processes of conceptualizing the ukrainian reality and its religious spectrum in particular. fighting in some regions of ukraine, conflicts over language, the struggle of churches for parishioners have caused changes in lives of ukrainians and forced them to reconsider their life priorities. the advertising representations appeared in the context that explicated the binary oppositions mentioned above, which, in its turn, actualized ukrainians’ values. however, the presence of the president’s name in the advertisement changed the semantic vector of text decoding. in this case, the oppositional semiotic principle was used in other religious advertisements. the tendency to fuse political and religious meanings in an advertising text for the sake of ironic modalities is represented in the text that appeared in cherkassy: “for where is your treasure, there your heart will be!” lipetsk confectionery factory “roshen”. matthew 8.21. (fig. 5) the purpose of the advertisement lies in eroding poroshenko’s political image. this advertisement is a kind of provocation, anti-advertising; it attempts to draw the target audience’s attention to the declarative nature of the presidential program and spurs emotional protest against his position. the allusion to the sacred text, the gospel of matthew, is used as subtle yet easy-to-decode hint at the president’s financial well-being in the state with weak economy and poor people. the text lipetsk confectionery factory “roshen” is the implicit reference to poroshenko, who has some business interests in the country-aggressor of ukraine. hence, there is an obvious verbalization of such values as goodness, god and truth, honour and money. the advertisement employs the communicative tactic of exposing double social standards. the allusion to the holy scripture as a specific form of intellectually and emotionally marked continuum which correspond to god and truth is quite explicit. there are such key words in this part of the mass media message as treasure and heart. the word treasure is used in its primary meaning, but the word heart is actualized in its figurative meaning the essence. the complex stylistics of the advertisement based on the specific connection of the sacral text rhetoric with the speech nominative sentence: “lipetsk confectionery factory “roshen”” determines the effect of the protest perception. the interpretation frame of the advertising message is also based on the oppositional-semiotic principle and is realized as a conflict of goodness and evil, truth and falsehood that the advertisement implicitly correlates with the president’s activity. the author’s intentions are objectified as a polycode text which includes three semantic components for values categorization: religious, political and moral. among various types of communicative models, it is the inferential model that assumes that when communicators are interpreting or receiving a message, the informative intention they must infer or recognize is what their interlocutor wanted to communicate or share with them (scott-phillips 2015). within the framework of this approach, different popularized versions of advertising perlocutions were created in the ukrainian media sphere. as a result, the frequency of lexemes that verbalize the ukrainian church concept in the political slogans of then-president poroshenko (for example, “army, language, faith!”, “the church is our civilization right!”, “the tomos is our historical choice!”, “we are ukraine. the army defences our land. the language defences our heart. the religion defences our soul. petro poroshenko”), its functional encumbrance in the program manifestos of the players (local ukrainian) became a characteristic feature of the ukrainian presidential campaign in 2019. so, the means of expressing positive or negative attitudes, verbalization of such concepts as good and evil, the categories of “owe/our” and “they/their” were implemented into the manipulative strategy of influence on the electorate. in this case, “totalitarianism” (as it is interpreted by kaftandzhiev 2005) of political propaganda and “totalitarianism” of religious ideology merge to produce the technology of verbal influence. at the same time, the concept of political orthodoxy not only became part of the ukrainian information space, but was also institutionalized through this advertising. however, the stylistic palette used in texts of religious advertising demonstrates that religious banner advertising in ukraine has managed to overcome the limitations of political contexts. it has not turned into a propaganda resource of ‘political religion’, ‘nationalist religion’ or ‘civil religion’ (kormina 2017, p. 131) klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202240 that are located in the functional grey zone compared to the world religions. instead, ukrainian religious advertising is an epitome of the communicative dynamic peculiar to the modern stage in christian religious discourse. religious advertising and social convergence one of the crucial challenges that this advertising has succeeded in resolving is modernization of communicative codes used to transmit, receive and store the communicative experience with god. as a rule, this communicative experience of existential contact is systemically determined as ‘transfer of the sacred doctrine’. in our view, convergence to the social problematic is the most natural for religious advertising. at present, there are two tendencies to reproduce information about god in religious communication. the first is the conservative direction, related with the content of canonical ideas, and the second is the dynamic trend to update the communicative code in accordance with the general tendency towards informative interaction. it has become a major research topic for media linguistics in recent years to solve this contradiction by setting up new standards of understanding the functionality of religious messages. in our opinion, achieving any pragmatic goals in modern religious media is impossible without promoting the development of a new cognitive style adapted to the general media specifics and formed according to the innovation of technologies and current people’s needs. figure 6. ‘jesus blesses travelers’ source: https://credo.pro/2011/04/4433 modern tendencies in advertising text building are enriched with such a new category as a “narrative mask” that is created according to a concrete situation and speech behavior of different narrators. it should be noted that religious registers of communication with god were determined by the sacred textual tradition and canonical conventions. within the framework of traditional approaches, we can define the following narrative masks: “lord”, “father”, “fair judge”, “creator”, “god the defender” and so on. in such klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202241 https://credo.pro/2011/04/4433 a case, a narrator can be represented with the help of anthropic visualization and appeal to the sacred text. there are cases when we can see such religious advertising in ukraine (eg figures 6 and 8). figure 7. ‘let’s meet on sunday ... god’ source: vlasti.net/news/210827 figure 8. “noah’s days” source: hromadske.ck.ua ukrainian media reality confirms the fact that, while retransmitting religious ideas, mass culture has replaced systematic knowledge with a set of relevant constructs that are offered to consumers of this culture. in the context of information overload, clip-perception, drastic decline in book-reading, advertising is an instrument of de-mythologizing that introduces into everyday consciousness of the ukrainian orthodox believer artificially constructed stereotypes based on binary oppositions originating from the depth of folk tradition (boreyko 2017, p. 330). here belong also binary oppositions of the religious picture of the world and the axiological paradigm. hence, this advertisement contains an image of god with the iconic allusion, klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202242 http://vlasti.net/news/210827 http://hromadske.ck.ua transparent symbolism of a ritual gesture; the textual component is a biblical paraphrase that best simplifies and facilitates understanding of the religious message. meanwhile, powerful effects of the most resonant religious advertising are generated by the postmodern rejection of the traditional cultural ways of textual representation of the primary sacral source. the range of deviations may vary but is inevitably perceptible. note that in ukrainian religious advertising the characteristics of god’s substitution and various evaluative connotations were modernized not by appealing to modern anthropic visualizations of god (famous advertising images of god-baby, god-rock musician, and so on) but by using markers of ukrainian reality. thus, church representatives condemned the introduction of a system of identification numbers for ukrainian tax payers. the advertisement shown in figure 8 emphasizes the idea of god’s wrath through the use of 666, the symbol of the antichrist. another approach is connected with the process when adopting patterns of modern everyday conversations helps to substitute for the religious reality. within the framework of social convergence, the creative potential of religious advertising is explicated by a deviation from standards of religious communication which represents the substitution for god. in our opinion, religious advertising can serve as convincing example of the dynamic matrix that complements the static matrix, as they are defined by pocheptsov (2011). in this regard, linguistic analysis should focus on the new techniques to refer to the distinct concepts “we/our” “they/their” as they are expressed in religious advertising. besides, in accordance with these approaches, the function of the main correlates of meaning “own” is embodied by characteristics of god’s linguistic personality which corresponds to the national worldview. according to dubchak’s viewpoint expressed in his doctoral thesis (2009), entitled conceptual opposition “we/our” –“stranger” in the ukrainian language model of the world, the core of concept ‘we/our’ is formed by the basic segments ‘ownership’, ‘kinship’ and ‘spiritual unity’. it has three context levels: physical space, family space, and spiritual space. these units of meaning are very stable for the national language consciousness. they support information and value structure at all historical stages in the ukrainian language model of the world. the units of meaning ‘own space’, ‘own faith’ and ‘own language’ belong to its core, whereas lexical units ‘usually’, ‘habitual’ and ‘normal’ are on the periphery. these lexemes do not have a direct lexical meaning ‘we/our’, but they are able to express it in context and through synonymization with the key words in relevant syntagmatic relations. the awareness of ‘our’ objects in the ukrainian language model of the world is represented as positive or neutral (dubchak 2009). in modern ukrainian banner advertising, meanings are creatively represented in god’s speech behavior, speech style, communicative situations with his participation, role distribution, genre preferences and the emotional background of communicative interactions. the semantic characteristics are contained mainly in the prosody of speech and the intonation model, which are determined by speech genres. contemporary connotations arise here from the way god speaks. god demonstrates a partner style of communication, and at the same time, it is an inspiring, caring, friendly, and open talk. for example: “i love! i love! i love! god” (fig. 9) and “let’s meet on sunday ... god” (fig. 7). it is necessary to note that stylistically, both of these examples are of colloquial nature. the former is a love note, and the latter is a friendly invitation. these are the so-called secondary genres (cf., not a love confession, but a love note, not a business proposal, but an utterance from an everyday dialogue). they are used primarily in informal communication and marked by the background of contacts. the addressor of the advertising message is god. alston, the author of perceiving god: the epistemology of religious experience (1991), notes that it is important to differentiate between sensory and non-sensory experience in perception. non-sensory experience has much in common with an image that contrasts with abstract thinking in the same way sensory perception does, yet it lacks a sensory component (alston 2010, p. 200). however, the non-sensory experience may be turned into a religious narrative with the help of advertising. this substitution of klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202243 god as ‘our’, based on the postmodern deformation of his linguistic personality does not agree with the canonical assumptions but it does agree with ‘faith’. communicative effects of this advertising facilitate the transformation of the invisible into the visible through emotions and bodily experiences that arouse this process in a believer (orsi 2006, pp. 73–74). the semantic code: “god is love” is used in the first text. it is actualized by the communicative tactic of emotional influence which draws on the biblical idea that correlates with one of the most fundamental human needs. the communicative tactic of emotional influence is carried out with the help of the verbal predicate with positively estimated value: love. the suggestive effect is achieved by reiterating thrice the emotionally marked regulative verb. it is known that the need to be loved is the biopsychological, social, and spiritual need of the human. substituting the figure of god for an emphasis on love arouses in recipients of the advertisement the pleasant feelings of high self-esteem, peace, security, care, associated with god as the subjective source of these states. in the advertisement “let’s meet on sunday ... god”, the substitutive function is actualized by god’s informal register that corresponds to the meanings “belonging”. it is also developed within the frame ‘god is ours’. as we can see, god’s communicative style corresponds to the meanings “friend” or “comrade”. in this case, mental units such as acquaintance, like-minded person, colleague, accomplice, comrade, friend, brother correspond to different levels of their incorporation in ‘our’ circle (dubchak 2009). the pragmatic effect of the utterance determined by the content and the form of the advertising message can certainly be interpreted in a very wide range of communicative situations. however, in our opinion, figure 9. ‘i love! i love! i love! god’ source: atanoissapa.livejournal.com klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202244 http://atanoissapa.livejournal.com the syncretism of the ethical, cultural and religious components of the national worldview will determine perceptions that ukrainian people hold. god’s linguistic personality, implicitly modeled by the characteristics of “our”, “close”, “loving”, “safe”, “native”, “partner”, “open”, “accessible”, “friendly”, etc., creates the basis for the appropriate identification of god, which, on the one hand, corresponds to the intentions of traditional approaches to the transmission of religious experience, and, on the other hand, modernizes the narrative content, making its style up to date. in the advertisement, the substitution is represented as a complex of the sensory experience verbalizations of the concept, own, and the variety of verbal techniques of creating intimacy. this type of substitution causes the comfortable feelings of high self-esteem, relaxation, security, care, associated with god as the subjective source of these states. as a result, renewal of subjective perceptual model of communication with god are achieved. the social perception of god, through the objectification of his virtual presence in informal interpersonal interaction, including sexual, domestic, cognitive, and so on is also enriched. due to this, the level of tolerance in society to various manifestations of deviations from traditional normative ideas (religious, ethnocultural, gender, etc.) is growing. instead, the ecumenical, cross-cultural, cross-spiritual components of the cognitive process are developing. in turn, violating the rules of ritual speech leads to the language play effect: god appears to participate in communication and to display the hybrid communicative behavioral model. in the advertisement, the positional role of god in human life with its behavioral standards, canonically defined, ritually fixed and rhetorically decorated by the culture of sacred text, merges with the situational role and its everyday communicative manifestations. this fact changes the nature of god’s speech, because everyday speech is determined by genre forms in general. in our case, the examples belong to colloquial genres. it should also be mentioned that, in these examples, genres are markers of a profane locus which, according to evaluation parameters, is in opposition to the sacred world. thus, the nature of the communicative situation in both advertising texts indicates a contextual framework atypical for the discourse in general, since there is no differentiation between the sacred and the profane zones. the role structure of the communicative situation, nevertheless, follows the norm for religious communication where the subject of communication is god and the human acts as a silent listener. all this feeds the intrigue of the advertising representation and enhances its attention-drawing function and influence on recipients. this technique produces an illusion of the reduced distance between god and recipients. apparently, the most effective way to establish the contact between god and the human is to use a communicative genre which is the best for close, informal, private relationships. thus, the necessary foundation for the implementation of god image as “our” is created. religious advertising and marketing convergence in addition, we should not forget that religious advertising is a tool of religious marketing. at the same time, it is also an innovative object of marketing linguistics, which has positioned itself as a new applied science. in this context, it is worth mentioning mara einstein, an associate professor of media studies at queens college and a professor at the business school at new york university, who points out that modern marketers should be familiar with psychological methods of working with an audience. prior to teaching, the researcher worked as a marketing executive for nbc and mtv networks as well as for a number of major advertising agencies. she argues that “to get consumers to buy mostly unnecessary products, advertisers became experts in psychology — at first through the use of surveys and other quantitative methods, and later through more sophisticated qualitative methodologies, such as focus groups and personal interviews” (einstein 2008). in this regard, the question of what religious advertising sells is objectified. in our opinion, religious discourse, and advertising in particular, must be realized through the continuous positive interaction klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202245 between church representatives and consumers. researchers point to the positive role played by religious media in the development of discourse in general. new media actively promote identity affirmation, including religious group identity; they have a pronounced humanistic aspect: religious figures, priests, who in traditional culture have always been distanced from the flock (mentors, bearers of wisdom, in fact, the voice of god) appear as ordinary people open to communication and willing to help, removes a kind of communicative fear in such an interaction (lawrysh 2017). however, at the present stage of development of religious advertising conceptualization, the study has revealed the significance of the self-referential model of perception (alston 2010) of religious experience. it should be noted that within this approach, there are remarkable differences between traditional churches and newer denominations (klymentova 2018). at the same time, despite its ambivalent nature and unconventional features, such experience can be of great value. of course, if it is difficult to understand the events of the outside world and there are different interpretations of them, people may be more likely to trust their inner feelings. the research supports the views of other modern experts who believe that communication studies and religious advertising have much to offer to each other and that findings may be mutually beneficial. marketing linguistics provides analysis of religious advertising with scientific resources that enhance the accuracy of its self-understanding as well as with effective methods to achieve the desired goals. what appears to be vital here is to establish a dialogue. in this regard, it is important to emphasize that religious marketing is based on psychographic data about hopes, needs and fears of people. in the modern ukraine the church institutions are able to satisfy the needs for security and respect, fear of loneliness, giving people faith in life after death, forgiveness and understanding. in fact, it is widely believed among people that religious communication is a separate informational continuum associated with the locus of god. although the environment of religious marketing communication is getting better and great progress has been made in new media, the road ahead is still beset with difficulties, requiring the concerted effort of various religious, political, social, cultural, educational institutions and the entire society. it is important to establish a dialogue that will fill the gaps in the ukrainian media landscape, in accordance with modern standards of psycho-environmental informative interaction. conclusion the study has revealed a new phenomenon, namely religious advertising, in ukrainian information space that used to be dominated by atheistic propaganda. to understand the cognitive significance of religious advertising for ukrainians, it is necessary first of all to identify some of the qualitative factors of its influence on the consumers. the research has shown that religious advertising is implemented in different forms in the communicative activities of the political and religious forces. religious advertising with a strong political component has become part of the ukrainian conflict discourse and, in a certain sense, an activator of many further processes. since the beginning of the war in late february 2022, the religious map of ukraine has been changing rapidly. thus, the uoc of the moscow patriarchate (this orthodox church in ukraine is a part of the russian orthodox church, yet it is granted self-governance and rights to broad autonomy), which before the war retained a fairly large number of loyal people and emphasized spiritual rather than political priorities, is currently experiencing a split. it is divided between those who support the russian invasion and those who side with ukrainian soldiers. but there is also a separate ‘donetsk position’, which cannot be reliably represented due to lack of information, but it can be assumed that this special position is rooted in very fierce battles for the jurisdiction of donbass and huge human losses. the war created a situation in which this church was forced to become politicized and to choose between russia and ukraine as political subjects. at the same time, the position of those who sympathize with ukrainian soldiers is motivated by klymentova cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 1 202246 the idea of protecting their native land, by the desire to convey to putin and to the people from the russian federation the pointlessness of a fratricidal war, and not by hatred for everything russian. in turn, this radical militant stance and appeal to anger distinguishes the ocu. the study of religious advertising with social convergence has revealed that the visual expression of advertising representations is very restrained. the creative impulse of religious advertising is formed primarily by verbal manifestations in which mental meanings are produced by emotional components. the dynamics of expressive means in religious advertising indicate the formation of a new cognitive style in the processes of obtaining religious experience. at the same time, within the traditional approaches to text retransmission of sacred knowledge, the projection of the religious worldview serves as a reminder to people of the eternal values. there are not only peculiarities based on different understandings of doctrine but also specific national features of religious advertising that constitute for ukrainians the core of their spiritual priorities. within this trend, religious narratives correspond to the consensus formulas of various communicative spheres. thanks to the ‘storytelling metaphors’ of god image as “ours”, consumers reveal the problematic aspects of religious communication as a socialization activity. as we can see, the epistemological potential of religious advertising is multi-dimensional. in fact, ukrainian religious advertising strives to achieve a balance between short-term political interests and long-term social interests along with eternal, timeless values. in this context, the phenomenon of religious advertising is a convincing example of communicative dynamism peculiar to contemporary religious discourse, its mass media segment 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https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/semioticheskie-kody-v-reklamnom-tekste cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 13, no. 3 2021 © 2021 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: hillmann, f. 2021. coming of age: migrant economies and social policies in germany. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 13:3, 1–17. http://dx.doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7928 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) coming of age: migrant economies and social policies in germany felicitas hillmann institute of urban and regional planning, tu berlin corresponding author: felicitas hillmann, intitute of urban and regional planning, tu berlin, straße des 17. juni 135, 10623 berlin, germany. hillmann@tu-berlin.de doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7928 article history: received 08/10/2021; revised 10/11/2021; accepted 08/12/2021; published 26/01/2022 abstract this paper analyzes the policies for migrant economies as part of broader social and labor market in germany. it points out that the current fragmented and contradictory policy action can be identified as an outcome of former ambiguities and the delegation of responsibilities within a complex governance grid. accordingly, its focus is on the inter-related dynamics of policy interventions, knowledge production and the impact of migrant agency within cities. the paper gives a condensed overview on theory and background of migrant economies, pointing to de facto barriers that persist until today. it then concentrates on the way labor market policies in respect of migration were framed in public discourse. its empirical focus is on the web of policies and instruments that have been directed towards migrant entrepreneurship. here, in-built ambiguities of all actions are identified as a general feature of german labor market policies. keywords migrant economies; cities; diversity; government policies; germany 1 declaration of conflicting interest felicitas hillmann is a member of the editorial board of the journal but has had no part in editorial or peer review processes associated with this paper. funding this paper was produced without funding. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7928 http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7928 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:hillmann@tu-berlin.de http://dx.doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v13.i3.7928 introduction by now germany has turned into a fully-fledged immigration country. not only is a quarter of its population of migrant origin, in most urban centres, even in small towns, migrant economies are present and accepted as a ‘normal’ part of urban economies and reveal its migration history. since 2015, when a million refugees came into the country, the debate on the impact of migration on the labor markets has seen a revival – after years of stagnation. today, some publications even frame migrant entrepreneurship as a role model for the rest of the nation and attribute a special gene to the migrants, which renders them innovative and flexible and thus better prepared for stiff, post-industrial competition (bertelsmann 2020). finally, it is accepted that migrant entrepreneurship contributes positively to the german economy and that entrepreneurship differs for the various generations of migrants (david et al. 2021). yet, such rather global statements still obfuscate to some extent the manifest difficulties and structural barriers that continue to characterize the relationship between migrant self-employment and labor market policies in germany. a plethora of initiatives and policies came into being, leading to the formation of a contemporary highly fragmented and contradictory governance setting. what has evolved is a policy field that risks becoming stuck in a jungle of multi-level-regulations between municipalities, the states and national welfare policies. this rapid shift from narratives of neglect towards narratives of acceptance of migrant economies needs some academic attention. as will be shown here, the socio-political entangledness of migrant economies with broader labor market policies is still rarely addressed – and there are good reasons for this research lacuna. even though migrant entrepreneurship had replaced traditional wage labor opportunities in germany, as it is the case in many european cities (rath et al. 2020, p. 460), existing studies seldom make the link to social policies and the welfare state. only exceptionally is migrant entrepreneurship perceived as embedded in a larger changing global and migratory landscape (solano 2019, p. 2067) or as part of globalizing urban economies and urban restructuring (brenner and keil 2014). already in 2016, when comparing ethnic entrepreneurship in european cities, rath and swagerman (2016) noticed that the development and the implementation of active support measures for ethnic entrepreneurship was not a self-evident feature of urban economies. local action in respect of migrant entrepreneurship was rarely analytically connected to the wider economic agenda, which also contributes to the given opportunity structure for the migrants. in contrast, cities had started adopting a mix of generic and specific policies to work on the issue of migrant entrepreneurship in a pragmatic way. the authors claimed that in a mixed-embeddedness-logic, the urban economies produced de facto a complex and dynamic system, a political economy of the city itself. in their overview on policy measures and support schemes by country and region, the uk topped the list concerning the number of policy measures (32 in total). cities in germany ran second (22 measures), followed by the netherlands (16) and belgium (11). it is intriguing that in their study, germany, a nation that had revolved around the notion of the guest-worker system for decades, could rank so high in international comparison. germany with its highly regulated economy always prioritized occupation in a salaried job as a standard pattern (see also pécoud 2003, p. 11) and explicitly rejected self-employment of immigrants – so how can we explain such proliferation of policy action? and why do we find so little academic research on this situation? this paper thus analyzes the policies for migrant economies as part of the broader social and labor market in germany. it points out that the current fragmented and contradictory policy action can be identified as an outcome of former ambiguities and the delegation of responsibilities within a complex governance grid. accordingly, its focus is on the inter-related dynamics of policy interventions, knowledge production and the impact of migrant agency within cities. the paper traces governmental rules, regulations, policy actions and, accordingly, non-actions to support or hinder migrant entrepreneurship. special attention is given to the history of labor market regulations and policies for foreigners as we find the origins of the major hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 2 contemporary conflicts rooted within this history. next to this, the structural social context for migrant entrepreneurship, including networks, institutions, norms and values of migrant entrepreneurship within a fully-fledged welfare state, are considered. special attention is given to the impact of migrant agency for political action. the paper starts with a condensed overview on theory, and background of migrant economies, pointing to barriers that persist until today. it then concentrates on the way labor market policies in respect of migration were framed in public discourse. its empirical focus is on the web of policies and instruments that have been directed towards migrant entrepreneurship. here, in-built ambiguities of all actions are identified as a general feature of german labor market policies. the following section focusses on the importance of urban transformation shaped by migrant agency and entrepreneurship. the conclusions integrate the findings and give hints for adequate policy action within an outspoken immigration country. methodology the paper draws on existing academic literature in the field, as well as analyzing policy documents and policy-oriented publications. importantly, it makes use of empirically grounded academic research. the interpretation of this material is enhanced by the expertise of the author, both in the fields of migrant entrepreneurship and in research which has influenced policy development regarding labor market integration of migrants in berlin and brandenburg. further, to validate the interpretations, a small number of expert interviews have been conducted online in march and april 2021. here, experts within the field of the iq-network (integration through qualification) have been interviewed (4) as well as experts who observe the field of labor market integration in berlin-brandenburg on the municipal level (7). these key informants were asked to give insights into the migration-related dynamics on the labor market since the so-called migration crisis (2015 – 2017). perspectives from scholarly literature a substantial body of literature on migrant entrepreneurship and migrant economies in the german language exists. however, from the outset, policy-oriented and scientific knowledge production rarely related to each other and made little use of the respective findings for further research. early on, the upswing in the activities of migrant entrepreneurs was attributed to the specific consumer demands of the turkish population. studies spoke of an additional labor market, claiming that turkish businesses nearly exclusively served the needs of the ‘ethnic colony’, perceived as a niche economy (blaschke & ersöz, 1987). to explain the self-employment of the (turkish) population, the notion of ‘ethnic resources’ was activated. the argument went like this: forms of economic solidarity and consumption, rotating credit systems and familial and ethnic bonds, which together would reflect a ‘bazaar-like mentality’, were at work. the authors of the 1980s reported the classic features of migrant entrepreneurship as described by middlemen theories of us-origin, applying them in the case of germany: most entrepreneurs had obtained their funding capital through friends and relatives and they employed co-nationals (see also bonacich 1973). it was stated that for many entrepreneurs, self-employment meant a way out of unemployment and reflected missing opportunities for upward mobility in the labor market. goldberg and șen (1997) argued that migrant entrepreneurship finally would work as an intermediary between the turkish minority and the majority population. unlike their colleagues in the uk, they did not explain growing self-employment among the minorities by the structural flexibilization of labor markets that took place in these years (barrett and jones 2005). instead of pointing to the needs and difficulties of these marginalized strata of the labor market, they pronounced the relevance of ethnic ties. however, a more international perspective was presented by morokvasic (1988). she observed that immigrants started their own businesses in sectors where barriers to entry were low. she pointed to the patriarchal structures of communities that enabled the capitalization hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 3 of ethnic resources and, as part of this, stressed the importance of unpaid female work and the gendered structure of this segment of the labor market – a feature that only ten years later was revealed to exist in the german context, too (hillmann 1999). when the discourse on the self-employment and small businesses of immigrants was launched in germany in the late 1990s, immigration was still framed as being of transitory nature, not meant to last. accordingly, the literature on migrant entrepreneurship made use of concepts that had been developed in the usa, the netherlands or the uk – countries with migratory regimes that either were based on the incorporation of migrants into their economies (usa) or that were former colonial states that had to cope with the inherited minority populations, discussing implicit or explicit variations of multicultural policies (rath & kloosterman 2011; ram & jones 2005). in line with the manifest increase in number and visibility of migrant enterprises in the 2000s, academic output on the topic gained momentum in germany (ross-strajhar 2008). for many years, policy-near scientific production uniformly had repeated three explanations when framing migrant entrepreneurship theoretically, borrowing from the us literature: cultural difference, niche or supplementary to the main market as well reactivity (floeting et al 2004). in contrast to this focus on the characteristics of the migrant group and its relationship with the national labor market, scientific production started to shift the focus of research towards an international dimension by underlining transnational ties or it was seen as part of flexibilized labor markets. for example, studies emphasized the transcultural potential of the turkish entrepreneurs regarding their performance on the labor market (pütz 2004) or the role of transnational workers for the cross-border trade between poland and germany (miera 2007). other studies emphasized transnational trade patterns that had emerged for wholesalers of the first generation. vietnamese opened small shops and ended up depending on their co-nationals that were active in gross sale. (schmiz 2011). while spatial concentration of entrepreneurship was known from the uk and the netherlands, its existence in german cities was not necessarily seen as a feature of the business activities of immigrants1. often, the stereotype of a migrant economy applied only partly, as the ethnic clientele was the exception, but employment of co-ethnic workers turned out to be a valuable characteristic (berwing 2019). building on the mixed embeddedness approach of kloosterman and rath, research now started to focus on the integration of african shop-owners into transnational circuits (2011). studies revealed that their transnational contacts did not reach back to african countries of origin, but to european middlemen in countries with established migrant economies in europe – meaning that germany as a late-comer in accepting migrants as entrepreneurs had to rely on its european neighbours. when taking migrant entrepreneurship as a starting point to analyze shifts in the overall labor market, another study, investigating the sector of hairdressing, portrayed migrant self-employment as an integral part of the flexibilization and downgrading of an entire sector. the emergence of more migrant businesses indicated lower standards for producers as well as consumers had developed over time (yildiz 2017). the author proves wrong the notion that there is a fundamental difference between the smaller shops of migrants and the native population regarding turn-over and profits. instead, gender differences were found to be a decisive factor when it came to the flourishing of migrant economies. it was the combination of being male and migrant that led to having more employees, while long-standing residents as well as migrant women employed fewer staff. the study put center stage the role of the professional and trades associations, providing evidence to show how they contribute to a poorer performance of migrant entrepreneurship as these bureaucracies tended to slow down entrepreneurial activities. more recently, taube (2019) presented a study on migrant entrepreneurship that analyzed the labor market integration of recent spanish immigrants. it turned out that the european 1 berwing (2019: 24) presented a spatial analysis for köln, stating that nearly half of the businesses were located in neighborhoods with under-average shares of residents with migrant background, hinting to a highly dispersed spatial pattern. hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 4 migrants worked in highly precarious migrant-run restaurants and cafés while seeking access to positions according to their academic education. such findings point to the increasing entangled layers of migrant entrepreneurship, which contribute to the diversity we observe today within urban economies. pattern: definitions, statistics, features in germany, statistical information on migrant entrepreneurship is fed by a few, not very precise and scarcely connected data sources. no coherent definition of ‘migrant economies’ exists. an implicit and vague definition categorizes self-employment of people with a migrant background with co-national employees, rooted in a specific migrant milieu as such (reimann & schuleri-hartje 2009, p. 503, on definitions see also rath et al. 2020, p. 460). more simply, policy documents label all those who are self-employed or run a business and have a migrant background as migrant entrepreneurs (kommission integrationsfähigkeit 2020, p. 141, david et al. 2021, p. 6, leicht et al 2021)2. shortcomings in data-production are predicted by the differences in the definition of who is characterized as having a migrant background, varying from municipality to municipality. further, the data on business registrations is organized on the level of länder (that is, states or provinces). data on employers, on the characteristics of the enterprises and on their spatial context is incomplete or missing altogether (berwing 2019, p. 25). there is neither data on the degree of integration into social security systems of the migrant businesses, nor on the corresponding sociodemographic features of those who run the business. since 1996 a register of the business registrations and cancellations that differentiates between natives and foreigners exists, but it does not include the statistical category of ‘migration background’. the soep (socio-economic panel), instead, uses the data of the microcensus. as the census of 2011 is hardly comparable to earlier data, much information must be deducted from other registers or sources, making comparisons over time difficult. in 2005, the federal ministry for economic affairs commissioned the first quantitative report, now adopting the newly introduced statistical unit of the ‘migrant background’. this ifm (institut für mittelstandsstudien) study highlighted that self-employment of immigrants, then labelled ethnic economies, was organized mostly in the form of micro-enterprises. concentrating on the available data on national groups (turkish, italian and greek) it underscored the economic benefits for german society at large (leicht et al 2006)3. additionally, in 2010 a report published by the expert council on integration and migration (sachverständigenrat, svr) depicted a highly diverse picture of migrant self-employment and investigated the respective support infrastructure. for the first time data was gathered to identify discrimination against the national background of migrant entrepreneurs. according to the findings of this study, the features of migrant economies identified by kloosterman and rath as ‘mixed embeddedness’ also best captured the german situation: it was mostly sectors with low entrance barriers, high competition and minimal profits that accommodated the greatest number of the migrant entrepreneurs. summing up the findings of the quantitative studies of svr, ifm and bertelsmann, six features of contemporary migrant economies can be identified: first, migrant enterprises among the owner-owned businesses made up about a fifth of all enterprises, and the number of self-employed migrants had tripled between 1990s and the mid of the 2010s. current estimates speak of as many as 3.4 million people involved (kommission integrationsfähigkeit 2020,p. 141, leicht et al. 2021). second, in 2018, 773,000 enterprises of self-employed persons with migration background were registered, of which 61 percent worked without additional employees. the majority was male (66 percent), nearly 90 percent of whom had an active 2 the term ‘migrant background’ has been discussed for a long time. on 20 january 2021, the ‘commission on integration’ recommended its abolition. a majority of the experts was in favour of a change as this would be more in line with germany self-identification as an immigrant country (2021, pp. 213ff.). 3 further ifm-studies followed (2009, 2012, 2013/2014). most german studies mainly used a large-scale perspective on migrant entrepreneurship and did not specify regionally (nuissl & räuchle 2018, p. 12). hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 5 migration history, meaning that they were first generation immigrants – a share that had remained stable since 2005. third, the migrant population in germany is younger in age than the native population, and this was mirrored also in self-employment (46 years vs. 51 years among the natives). fourth, the level of qualification was on the increase since 2005, 20 % of all migrant entrepreneurs were classified as ‘highly skilled’. fifth, the distribution of the enterprises according to the various sectors of the economy still differed in comparison to the native population: the majority of migrant entrepreneurs was active in public and private services as well as in food and beverage industries and trade. especially, the construction sector showed high percentages of migrant self-employment, probably hinting at the misuse of subcontracted work, mostly from east european eu-countries. sixth, the average income-level of the migrant entrepreneurs was lower when compared to native entrepreneurs (3.099,00 vs. 4.442,00 €) and for them the risk of working in precarious conditions was higher (berwing 2019). in sum, most characteristics pointed to persisting constraints for migrant entrepreneurs. the purpose of the studies of ifm and bertelsmann was to explore what the benchmarks for self-employment of migrants in specific sectors could be, especially in the production sector. the report saw potential for an increase in all states, except the city-state of berlin (bertelsmann 2020). as will be shown in the following two sections, it has been a long journey before migrant entrepreneurship finally became accepted as an essential part of the german overall economy. there were narratives of exclusion, focussing on the ‘foreigner’ and ‘anti-diversity’, and policies that accompanied the discourses on migration and that hindered the development of migrant economies for the whole of the 20th century. without an understanding of the historical situation the current dynamics of migrant economies within social policy dynamics are difficult to comprehend. narratives: migrant workers placed centrally on the margins from the times of industrialization germany had relied on an imported workforce. the first laws on foreigners were developed as part of general law; prussia, for example, in 1890 established rules of control, including forced return, employment bans and employer-bound contracting. migrants were kept at a distance from natives, legislation allowed germans to denounce foreigners as ‘disturbing’, which could lead to their expulsion. during world war i the presence of 2.5 million prisoners on the territory justified further systematization of explicitly exclusive labor market policies. during the weimar republic, nationalised labor market policies with their three main instruments of recruitment, deportation and prioritization of the native workers were enforced. then, the nazi-regime introduced a central statistical unit on foreigners, working closely with security and deportation units. during world war ii openly racist policies against jews, foreigners and all ‘others’ were based on an ideology that considered the homogeneous composition of the population as a stronghold. millions of forced workers were kept isolated from the local population. after world war ii, when germany split into east and west, economic recovery in the western part was made possible through the massive import of workers. the building of the berlin wall had dissipated the flow of workers from eastern germany, the cohorts born during times of war were small and trade unions had successfully reduced working hours and gained longer vacations. longer periods of vocational training were introduced, setting an end to the war-bound educational system. on top of that, the inclusion of women into the labor market was not considered an option to fix the shortages of workers – germany stuck to its male breadwinner-model. given these circumstances, the import of foreign labor took off in the 1950s and 1960s. the now established guest-worker regime was based on rotation, that is, on contracts that were valid only for one or two years. in this way they helped to fill the 3-d-positions (dirty, dreadful, dangerous) and allowed for the upward social mobility of native workers. until the stop-policies of 1973 and even afterwards, the official narrative of the government on foreign workers was that there was ‘integration on a temporary basis’ and, accordingly, in 1983 80 % of the resident population wished that the millions of immigrants would return home (herbert 2003, p. 241). the import of workers was a feature of the two german nations. the former gdr brought in foreign labor, in total 95,400 persons by hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 6 1985 (van der heyden 2013, p. 140) and equally followed special policies to control entry, performance and return of the migrant workers (here mainly stemming from mozambique, angola and vietnam). in the two germanies the position of foreign workers was depicted deliberately as a dependent employee. it was certainly not framed as an entrepreneur (see also pécoud 2003). in this spirit, integration meant ‘labor market integration’ within social security schemes. in the aftermath of the oil-price-crisis of 1973, the western-german government reacted with programs that could ease the return of migrants (and their families) in 1982, sending a clear signal to the guestworkers and their descendants, that they were not considered as part of the nation. such policies of neglect were reflected in the tiny numbers of examples of migrant entrepreneurship until the mid of the 1980s, though millions of migrants had arrived in germany until then. apart from some italian gelaterias, pizzerias and greek restaurants, mainly in the outskirts of suburbs, for example near the factories of mercedes benz near stuttgart, the number of registered self-employed turks in germany was about 100 in 1975, increasing to estimated 20,000 persons ten years later (goldberg and șen 1997, p. 65). with reunification in 1989/1990, labor market policies changed profoundly. in the western states selfemployment of migrants was an upcoming trend. in contrast, for the eastern states reunification meant a standstill on questions of immigrant labor market integration until 1997. only then was the existing legal vacuum abolished. in this situation, self-employment constituted, for many migrants in the former gdr, the one and only way to stay and to survive. it was during the years after reunification that the share of foreign labor in total employment shrank and unemployment among foreigners grew sharply (rudolph & hillmann, 1997, p. 15). in many cities, the total number of self-employed among migrants/ethnic minorities increased. first mom-and-pop stores of turkish immigrants mushroomed in some of the city centers, partly replacing the classic retail trade in those neighborhoods (reimann and schuleri-hartje 2009, pp. 498ff.). self-employment then became substantial in numbers in the early 2000s and visible mainly in places where many migrants lived. rates of unemployment were regionally twice as high as among the native population (in 2008: 18.9% vs. 8.6%, erler et al 2008, p. 352). these very clear trends of increasing marginalisation put pressure on the authorities. they now aimed at curbing further problems with integration of in the labor market with the help of a newly established social infrastructure (iq-network). until then, migrant self-employment was still clustered in a limited number of sectors and activities. by most institutions and actors, self-employment was considered as a second-best solution for those who could not make it in the highly regulated labor market. it comes as no surprises that for most of the 1990s there was little acceptance for the self-employment of migrants and bureaucratic hurdles continued to be high (leicht & langhauser 2014, p. 11). formal regulations were judged as anti-immigrant and as adding to already incoherent labor market policies for migrants, tout court (erler et al 2008). establishing policies within non-policies in many sectors opaque regulations made it impossible for migrants to set up and own businesses. foreign degrees were accepted only in exceptional cases and terms and conditions of recognition remained unclear (erler et al 2008, p. 58), for example migrants setting up trades-based businesses such as hairdressers or tailors were in need of a special degree (meisterprüfung). even after the citizenship law reform, starting in 1999 and enacted in 2005, paternalistic approaches to migrant entrepreneurship dominated welfare policies (reimann & schuleri-hartje 2009, p. 505). it was the first commission on migration and integration (unabhängige kommission zuwanderung, known as the süssmuth commission), installed in 2000, that worked as a game-changer. roughly after 30 years of stop-policies with few exceptions, germany accepted having become a country of immigration on the political level. now, large-scale studies were funded to understand better the dynamics and potentials of this segment of the labor market (see above). an hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 7 important driver for political response was the many immigrants who had started to set up businesses – against all odds. they simply could no longer be overlooked in the public realm. the svr-report (2010, p. 45) shed light on the then existing support structures for migrant entrepreneurship, identifying severe differences in the quality of the services. as a consequence of being a poor fit, many of the opportunities created for consultancy were underused by the migrants. established migrant entrepreneurs normally said that, when looking for advice, they counted on the opinion of their tax advisor and not on consultancy provided by public administration. also, few migrant entrepreneurs made use of official banks to secure funding. again, migrant businesses continued to face more structural difficulties than those run by natives. more often they came into life from a situation of unemployment or because of missing perspectives. also, they failed more often. about one third of all newly founded enterprises gave up within three years, a share that is still higher among migrant enterprises than among the native population today (bertelsmann 2020, p. 36). without doubt, the above outlined quantitative studies of ifm, svr and bertelsmann spurred political acceptance. they raised awareness of the relevance of migrant entrepreneurship and inspired policy measures in favour of migrant economies – as did the national plan on integration (nationaler integrationsplan 2006). yet, the reports – even if pointing to a more fragile situation for migrant businesses – did not frame migrant economies within globally changing economies. their explanations drew the larger national picture by portraying the benefits of migrant entrepreneurship for the german economy and by looking for recipes to heighten the labor market performance of the migrant population. there was no explicit strategy on how to deal with immigration, since social policies continued to be designed as national policies, with limited relevance in the provinces. when analyzing the existing documents and when speaking with experts, it seems as if there was only one way out of the dilemma. only contradictory action could help to work around the utmost ambivalent situation. actors and strategies for a long time, germany’s multi-level governance system on migration and integration prioritised the federal level. eighty percent of all programmes were financed here, even though this funding went into projects that were located all over germany. until now (2021), the topic of migrant entrepreneurship is mostly handled in the federal ministry for labor and social affairs (bmas). this ministry has had a focus on this topic for the past 15 years and has pushed selective policies for vulnerable groups, for example through support for migrants seeking to stay in germany (bleiberechtsnetzwerke) since 2005, as well as an image campaign since 2007. among its main programmes were xenos4 as well as the iq-network, which is detailed further below. in addition, the federal ministry for economic affairs and energy (bmwi) sporadically integrated the topic into its portfolio, even though it considers it to be of rather marginal interest. further ministries that run migration-centered projects were the federal ministry of education and research (bmbf) with kausa5, the federal ministry of the interior, building and community (bmi) with ‘soziale stadt’6 and the federal ministry for family affairs, senior citizens, women and 4 2008 – 2014, integration and diversity, a nationwide programme that engaged against exclusion and discrimination in schools, in the labor market and the administration. 5 between 1999 and 2019: 965 actions in cities, nationwide, focussing on neighborhood management and local development. since 2020: “sozialer zusammenhalt – zusammenleben im quartier gemeinsam gestalten”. this programme was located in the departments of social affairs of many towns. the proactive integration of ethnic entrepreneurship into these social policies became a pillar of the funding framework, later it became entangled closely with the labor market-oriented projects of the iq-network. 6 2008 – 2014, integration and diversity, a nationwide programme that engaged against exclusion and discrimination in schools, on the labour market and the administration. hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 8 (bmfsfj) with los7 and stärken vor ort. recently, the federal government commissioner for migration, refugees and integration started to dedicate attention to migrant economies. it must be mentioned that the operational level referred mainly to projects on the municipal scale, while the statelevel was often ignored. indeed, most länder introduced coherent programs focussing on integration (integrationskonzepte) only after 2015. accordingly, the regional ministries for social affairs, the ministries for the interior, the integration councils and a range of migrant interest groups and integration officers started to involve them more strategically into their policies. still, even now, integration policies often continue to be voluntary and legally non-binding at the state-level. experts depicted the current structure of support in the form of the iq-network in germany as unique for and in europe. some interview partners from this network pointed to the dangers of self-referenced action of the different involved stakeholders going along with such a complex bureaucratic infrastructure. as such the highly fragmented and projectdriven field deserves further explication. the next subsection thus points to the instruments adopted in the field. european instruments to counterbalance national policies robust attempts to develop formal instruments for immigrant economies date back to the early 2000s (2002 – 2007), when the equal-network was adopted under the auspices of the federal ministry of labor and social affairs (bmas). it was run through development partnerships (inbez, integra.net, kumulus, migranet, nobi, pro qua) in 72 projects all over germany. these projects started from the assumption that migrants in many cases constituted a ‘problematic group’ – and pointed to the need to support these groups through specialised projects, emphasising the resources these groups could bring. designed according to the requirements of the european union, the projects of the network made use of european social funds. the initiative sought strategic partners in politics, among the enterprises and in the labor market in order to guarantee for a functioning, extended network enhancing the integration of the migrants into the different segments of the labor market. it must be underlined and emphasised in bold font that the equal-programme on the european level worked in a counter-logic to the national programmes that were launched by the federal employment agency (bundesagentur für arbeit), which did not see the need of treating migrants as a group on its own. indeed, one of the interviewees suspected that the iq-network had been set up precisely because the federal employment agency refused to work on certain, sensitive, topics. after the reforms in the labor market and thus in the social welfare system in 2002 (hartz-reforms), this institution had explicitly excluded affirmative policies for selective groups. however, the newly introduced social reforms had severe repercussions especially on elderly employees and on migrant workers (erler et al 2008). there was an urgent need to fix the situation. in the 2000s in practice a paradoxical situation arose: big institutional players engaged in the field, but many other institutions stuck to their position of turning a blind eye to migrant-related activities, especially to migrant entrepreneurship. the federal agencies as well as many of the chambers of trade and commerce rejected group-centered policies while the equal-projects, financed at least partly with european money, worked with this approach. additionally, established migrant organisations advocated for migrant entrepreneurship. from the outset, a major goal of iq was to allow for exchange between the projects operating in different cities. yet, in spite of that, the majority of projects still operate often in isolation from one other – as the interviewed experts said and explained this with the extrawork cooperation implies. by 2010 a confusing landscape of consultative services had emerged, especially in urban settings with high shares of migrant population. the respective funding for the project-based services normally came 7 2003 – 2008, a nationwide programme that concentrated on socially deprived areas, promoting and funding local projects to integrate people who had few opportunities on the labour market due to missing qualifications. hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 9 from a mix of stakeholders. in many cases it stemmed from private entrepreneurs or came through the membership fees of migrant organisations, sometimes from local sources. only in 2 per cent of the cases did funding come directly and exclusively from the federal level. a mosaic of 56 chambers of trade and commerce across germany offered consultations for migrants wishing to set up a business – but the majority of the chambers of trade and commerce did not. this situation reflected the political scission revealed above. most chambers rejected the idea of treating migrant entrepreneurs as a group on its own as it would mean to advantage them over their regular, native clientele (svr 2010, bundesministerium für verkehr, bau und stadtentwicklung 2012)8. further, the established support structure deliberately moved away from the many programmes that had been set up as part of social programmes of the ministries such as ‘soziale stadt’ (social city programme). nevertheless, cooperation in the field was encouraged on the project-level. when such activities became important locally, many municipalities started to pronounce the importance of migrant economies in their local integration concepts dating from 2007. in 2012 half of all municipalities in germany considered migrant economies, often labelled as ethnic economies, to be relevant for their local economies, even though the landscape of support remained opaque to them. in that period, the intercultural opening of the german institutions became a major task. it has remained, according to insiders, on the to-do-list since then. the law on recognition (anerkennungsgesetz), inacted in 2012, put emphasis on the qualifications that the migrants would bring to germany – an element, that until then was not included in the exiting categories of the bureaucracies, one of the experts stated. early on the association of german cities (deutscher städtetag) recommended that migrant entrepreneurship should be more strategically integrated into local programmes. however, few municipalities were interested in enhancing the self-employment of migrants on purpose, many pointed to the availability of other mainstream programmes (soziale stadt, xenos, los). it was mostly in cities with high rates of unemployment (over 7 percent) and high shares of migrant population that strategies and instruments were developed. the exchange between the cities on issues of migrant entrepreneurship continued to be the exception, as was the further exploration of the potentials of transnational cooperation though the international entrepreneurs (bundesministerium für verkehr, bau und stadtentwicklung 2012, pp. 97ff ). parallel to the evolving institutional policies, the activities of the migrants became more formalised. first, associations of migrants in the 1980s sought outreach into the ethnic communities, but after 2005 increasingly business associations mushroomed. the newly built migrant ngos turned out to be as heterogeneous as the migrants that were engaged in them (richter 2015, p. 63). step by step their representatives were included in the roundtables of the authorities, they were acknowledged as multipliers and their presence added to general acceptance of migrants within society. the five big welfare organisations integrated migrant-related consultancy into their portfolio – while consultancy from the side of migrantrun-organisations made only little progress. resolving political contradictions through fragmentation the above-mentioned european programme equal had worked as a forerunner paving the way for the mainstreaming of the migrant economies within later versions of the nationally organised iq-network. after a period of networking and pilot-projects for consultation and qualification (2005 – 2007), the iq-network started in 2007 to transfer and expand projects and measures and to disseminate them (2008 – 2010). in consequence it became part of the national integration plan (nip). before, sparse policies prevailed and no centralized organization for the support structures for immigrants planning to become self-employed existed. consultancy services worked in an erratic manner, support was about formal 8 the svr-study identified a total of 411 projects active in supporting migrant businesses, with the city states hamburg, bremen and berlin taking the lead (svr 2010, p. 16ff.). hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 10 questions, empowerment approaches were not yet known (erler et al 2008, p. 240), somewhat fragmented incrementally adjusting policies were enacted. the iq-network, reworked in 2012, then shifted its focus of attention on the recognition of foreign vocational qualifications for the funding period (2013/2014). only when integration concepts were introduced at the state-level, around the year 2015, did coordinators start to actively promote exchange between the partners – a period of expansion of the iq-network started (71 contact points for the recognition of certificates, 240 sub-projects in the 16 states and the establishment of competence center (fachstellen), job training schemes in the context of the recognition act were set up. one of interview partners in this study spoke of a ‘representation gap’, meaning that federal policies repeated mantra-like ‘integration is a local event’ (‘integration geschieht vor ort’) to indicate where action was supposed to take place. ironically there was no governance frame within the states that could coordinate or control the requested local activities. despite the harsh critique on programmes that referred to the ‘migrant status’ as a starting point, today a plethora of projects is active under the label of ‘iq-network’. the now addressed target groups are adults with migration history as well as newly arriving legal migrants. what is knew, is that the iq-network finally seeks to alter existing structures by offering intercultural training for staff in job centers and for local authorities, thus putting the focus on the hosting society. now, native small and mid-sized enterprises are trained to establish a culture of welcome and appreciation9. since 2018 the iq-program develops model approaches for the advice on “fair integration” for refugees. a next major focus is on the acceptance of skilled migrants in sectors that urgently need (foreign) labor. since 2019 the programme has been complemented by regional structures that concentrate on the efficient labor market integration of skilled migrants (fachkräftesicherung, e.g. physicians and business accountants). the programme with its 400 sub-projects is again co-financed by the federal ministry of labor and social affairs and the european social fund (esf)10. migrant entrepreneurship is still somewhat in the focus, but the emphasis is clearly on newcomers in sectors that are in need of workforce and thus have to rely on creating a more welcoming working environment. in the meantime, similar strategies are found in smaller cities, too. a next priority of the current funding period touches upon the standardisation of the highly fragmented support structure between the local, state/regional and federal level (see figure 1). in germany’s 16 states all regional iq-networks are run by different institutions and do vary in the way the federal programme is finally handled. within the iq-network, five competence centers (fachstellen) exist, among which is the iq competence centre on migrant entrepreneurship (ism). its main task is to ‘support migrants to set up a business, to secure the success of their enterprises and to raise appraisal for migrant economies in germany’. the service unit offers guidelines, seminars, workshops and support for promotion. at present, 18 projects in 12 states are handled. (https://ism-mainz.de/projekte/arbeitsmarkt-und-sozialpolitik/iq-fachstellemigrantenoekonomie-im-foerderprogramm-integration-durch-qualifizierung-iq). all work in the iqnetwork is done on a project-basis – from 2005 onwards. there has been one evaluation of the iq-network in 2007, for the rest reports on monitoring are available. the here presented, very rough overview, already shows the in-built dangers of the established grid of competences: the manifold projects are neatly linked to the expectations of the policy-makers and the planning horizon of the people involved in the projects is on a short-term basis, implying high rates of turn-over among the personal and thus a loss of knowledge and tacit knowledge on the situation. 9 over the past two years (2019-2020) more than 1.200 training sessions with 15,000 participants took place. 10 a total of 3,762 qualification measures had been arranged, mostly as individual training (89 percent) or classes (11 per cent) to reach full recognition of the imported qualification. hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 11 https://ism-mainz.de/projekte/arbeitsmarkt-und-sozialpolitik/iq-fachstelle-migrantenoekonomie-im-foerderprogramm-integration-durch-qualifizierung-iq https://ism-mainz.de/projekte/arbeitsmarkt-und-sozialpolitik/iq-fachstelle-migrantenoekonomie-im-foerderprogramm-integration-durch-qualifizierung-iq the interviewees highlighted that against all the lip-service paid to the intercultural opening of the institutions, this continues to be the exception. it was reported that there seems to be a strong wish to raise awareness in the institutional setting, but that the nationally focussed chambers of trade and commerce would continue to pursue policies of reluctance. one interviewee pointed to the scarce public and academic attention attributed to the topic. the holders of the 140 academic chairs in the field of entrepreneurship established since 1998 would be concerned with specific groups such as family enterprises, women, venture capital and start-ups, but not with migrant entrepreneurship. also, it has been reported that younger entrepreneurs felt stigmatized by the official programmes and were avoiding them. they claimed not to consider themselves as a migrant: ‘i am not a migrant!’ (husseini de araújo and weber, 2014, p. 370). cutting across: diversity as an urban practice early on, big cities such as munich, berlin, stuttgart, frankfurt, bremen and hamburg offered services to the migrant population by changing information strategies, introducing integration guides and by addressing the migrants in their language of origin. in many smaller towns, the social city programme was not known to the migrant entrepreneurs even years later (räuchle et al. 2017). rural peripheries still lagged behind, too (große et al. 2013)11. 11 until today eastern and western germany differ remarkably in their migratory structure and in the local governance of migration. große et al. (2013) speak of a situation of institutional neglect within a changing landscape of economic activities of the migrants. figure 1. the policy framework source: iq-network, adapted from iq-website (www.netzwerk-iq.de) hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 12 http://www.netzwerk-iq.de dating back to 2005, when policy-oriented research on migrant entrepreneurship was focussing on the question of what the dimensions of migrant economies were and what the potentials for the national overall economy could be, the german institute of urban affairs (difu) launched a study that highlighted the potential of socio-spatial integration through migrant entrepreneurship (floeting et al. 2005). the study revealed that migrant economies stabilized disadvantaged neighbourhoods, stimulated local development and fostered social integration (reimann and schuleri-hartje 2009, p. 501; schnur et al. 2013, fischerkrapohl 2011). from the late 2010s onwards, when local economies got into the focus of urban policies, studies increasingly made use of place-based approaches, too. many investigated the neighborhoods that were the subject of local programmes such as neighborhood management (richter 2015). more and more, studies linked urban renewal and gentrification to the presence of migrant entrepreneurs, understanding them as promoting ‘practised diversity’. there seemed to be no more need to ‘activate the migrants’ through special policies (devries 2019, p. 151). in urban practice the new phase of migrant entrepreneurship had long begun under the surface: now it was the children of the migrant entrepreneurs that had started to invest precisely into migrant neighborhoods (celik 2020). they judged such neighborhoods as an optimal choice for their investment because they were located in the center of the city and their built infrastructure often left flexibility for further use. most important, they had become home for them. ironically, it was precisely informal planning that had worked here as a starting point for establishing a local identity – and not the myriad official social policies. shops on the spot had transformed from supermarkets to delicatessen, tailor-shops became boutiques, local networks transferred into more formalised institutions representing the neighborhoods outside the local sphere. here, urban upgrading, gentrification, went along with the social mobility of the second and the third generation of migrants. especially in the times with a high influx of syrian refugees (2015 – 2017), these migrant neighborhoods were the places that attracted many of the refugees. often, high rates of migrant entrepreneurship were to be found. at first, the interplay between the practices of migrants in combination with transnational dynamics led to new spaces of solidarity, later contestation became more marked and conflict between the different generations of migrants arose (toğral koca 2019, p. 579ff.) conclusions and political recommendations the analysis presented in this paper suggests that it took about a decade (1985 – 1995) for a discursive field to emerge, in which migrant entrepreneurs were finally recognised as being part of the german society. still, another decade was needed to inspire political action (1995 – 2005). only after accepting to be a country of immigration, were relevant but fragmented, project-based policies developed and implemented (2005 – 2015). yet, it took roughly twenty years for the lukewarm welcome of the german authorities towards migrant entrepreneurship to be translated into the current capillary system of support for migrant workers in a wide range of professions. historically, the 2000s were the decisive years for the socio-political turn-around concerning migrant economies. the fading integration of migrants into the formal segments of the labor markets (in the aftermath of reunification, de-industrialisation and ongoing welfare-reforms) could no longer be counterbalanced by the national labor market reforms. upcoming pro-migrant advocacy was in tune with the joint initiatives of the european commission. by adopting such funding of the european social fund, the prevailing national policies, which were less supportive of affirmative action for marginalised groups, could be bypassed, resolving a strategic conflict that had existed within the german authorities and the chambers of trade and commerce for many years. some of the findings presented are in line with the findings of rath and swagerman (2016): the main focus of the policies adopted were providing services to immigrants, enhancing human capital of (aspiring) hillmann cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 13, no. 3 2021 13 entrepreneurs by providing information, counselling and education at the level of the cities. few measures focussed on structural issues, such as the barriers by the way of bureaucratic rules and regulations. in most cities, an integrative figure that could bring together the different interest groups on the various levels in favour of the migrant entrepreneurs was missing. the mixed-embeddedness perspective, adopted in this analysis, helped to generate three explanations for the relatively slow progress made in the field. first, it was, historically, the explicit, and later the implicit narratives of labor market policies that contributed to the neglect of migrant economies. migrant work was accepted only when functional for national labor market policies – but not as an internationalizing element of german society in general. second, inner political contradictions in the governance of migration hindered activities and migrant economies risked ending up stuck in a pronounced multi-level governance. third, different types of knowledge production hardly spoke to each other. the focus of the policynear publications was either directed towards the potentials of migrant economies for broader national economic trends or pointed to the potentials that migrant economies could have to stabilize deteriorating neighbourhoods for a given time. here, again, the acceptance of migrant entrepreneurship was based on the benefits of the host society. as delineated above, much of the academic literature put center stage the transnational ties or somehow considered their role in the flexibilization of urban economies – and stayed away from the complex practices of the established support structure for the migrants. in a nutshell, germany’s ranking second in international comparison when it came to the number of activities around migrant economies – as emphasized in the introduction – comes as no surprise. it is a main finding of this paper, that nowadays proliferation of projects can be interpreted also as the solution of an existing inner conflict and a protracted ambivalence of the german socio-political system itself. for many years, political action took place on a cosmetic level in the form of project-tied initiatives, while structural changes to instigate migrant entrepreneurship were avoided. a critical reflection on the program has yet to come, only monitoring reports do exist. with new legislation germany could now easily collect and bundle the evolved capillary structure, which is unique in europe. this structure is ready to be integrated it into a more flexible setting that puts migration center stage in a situation of demographic transition. germany would do best not to repeat the major pitfalls of its migration history and to think a little outside of the box for formulating innovative strategies that see migration and migrants as more than a function of its national labor market, for example as a part of urban transformation and societal change. migrant economies work as a crucial element in this transformation, for the migrants themselves and for the places they live in. acknowledgements i wish to thank jan rath for his remarks on an earlier version of the paper as well as my interviewees for their time and patience to answer my questions. i thank juliane kessler and anne güller-frey for their valuable annotations to this article and for their insights into the iq-program and sophie sommerfeld for her remarks. further, the paper benefited from the comments of two anonymous reviewers. references barrett, g. & mcevoy, d. 2005, ‘not all can win prizes: asians in the british labor market’, in: spaan, e., hillmann, f. & van naerssen, t. 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https://doi.org/10.1515/transcript.9783839417652 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-01048-5 https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2018.1559999 https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2018.1559999 https://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/svr_bosch_2010__05_201111.pdf https://www.svr-migration.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/svr_bosch_2010__05_201111.pdf https://doi.org/10.14361/transcript.9783839419380.209 https://doi.org/10.14361/transcript.9783839419380.209 https://doi.org/10.2478/rara-2019-0023 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783839441572 measuring and comparing civil societies cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 71 measuring and comparing civil societies mark lyons abstract: in most countries (australia is an exception) the term ‘civil society’ is widely used by social researchers, activists and government officials. however its analytical value is limited by its great variety of meanings. the article proposes that if ‘civil society’ is to be of any use analytically it should be capable of being measured. it outlines two related efforts to measure civil society and to compare it cross nationally and identifies several problems with those approaches. the recent popularity of ‘civil society’ the term ‘civil society’ has had a long history, used at different times and with different meanings by, among others, ferguson, hegel, marx and gramsci (ehrenberg 1999). however, until the 1980s the term was not widely used. that is no longer the case. no longer is ‘civil society’ only a topic for philosophical discussion; it is widely invoked by activists and appears in the policy documents of many national governments and international organisations. this current popularity is largely a product its adoption in the 1980s by activists in eastern europe, latin america and asia who were struggling against oppressive communist regimes or military dictatorships. they referred to ‘civil society’ to describe what they were and what they were trying to enlarge(cohen & arato 1992). civil society was people acting as citizens, freely, collectively and for a wider good; it was also the sphere where such citizen activity took place. the success of these activists, especially in eastern europe, led to the popularity of the term not only in those societies but in the united states, both among social science academics and many us foundations. in this process, civil society also acquired a normative dimension; it became something to be encouraged. it became entangled with the discovery of social capital and tied in with wider projects to extend tolerance, democracy and good governance and to end corruption. for a time, it was adopted by the world bank. it came to be seen as a pre-requisite for successful social and economic development. for some it acquired a global dimension, representing a vision of a less violent world and the organisations, institutions and processes that might bring it about (keene 2003). 72 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 eva cox first introduced australians to ‘civil society’ in her 1995 boyer lectures, entitled a truly civil society (1995). as her title indicates, she gave the term a normative dimension; identifying the characteristics of a ‘truly civil society’. however, the term has never achieved wide recognition or use in australia. almost a decade later, at the conclusion of a major ten year study of australian institutions, geoff brennan and frank castles regretted that they excluded the institutions of civil society. they attributed this exclusion to the reluctance of australian scholars to study these institutions, though more accurately it was their failure to discover and incorporate the research that was being conducted (brennan & castles 2002). elsewhere the popularity of the term among social science researchers, activists and government officials has created a major problem. as frequently happens in politics and the social (but not economic) sciences, concepts that acquire popularity also acquire many and varied meanings. this has led some scholars to warn that the term will soon fall into disuse unless some agreement over meaning can be reached. michael edwards was one who embraced the term but has more recently sounded the alarm. a development practitioner and writer, he had been in charge of research for the uk based development charity save the children and then, for a short while in the 1990s was senior civil society specialist at the world bank with the responsibility for helping the bank understand civil society (and social capital). he then moved to the ford foundation where until late 2008 he ran their governance and civil society unit. in 2004 he published a book civil society (edwards 2004) in which he addressed the proliferation of uses of the term and suggested that as a working definition civil society might be thought of as having three dimensions: • associational life, • the ‘good society’ and • the public sphere or an arena for public deliberation. the first dimension refers to the private nonprofit associations that most people belong to and support, through which they cooperate with others and, in some cases, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 73 participate in the political system (or societal governance). this is the most common use of ‘civil society’. the second dimension refers to the features of the good society. generally it is taken that this encompasses a core of values shared by everyone living in a particular society and polity, but where there are arguments about interpreting and prioritising these values. this is what people have in mind when they talk about, when they enumerate the features of, a civil society. generally such features include values such as tolerance, social justice and equality. the third dimension of civil society refers to the spaces and media where views about the features of a good society and related arguments about the policies to be pursued by a country are advocated and resisted. this includes the various publicly available media and parliament itself. concerns that ‘civil society’ may soon fade from use may be misplaced. some terms have a long and virtuous life without ever being clearly defined. indeed their vagueness and flexibility seems essential to their continuing popularity. ‘community’ is an example. whatever collective we might describe as a ‘community’, wherever we might put the boundaries to encompass ‘community’, it is clearly a ‘good thing’. so too is ‘democracy’. but ‘civil society’ is not in their league. its entry into the language of advocacy and governance is new. its wide acceptance is hindered by its ambiguities. if its use is to become more than mere rhetoric or claim making; if it to become embedded in the discourse of government and the media it will need to be capable of measurement. but what is measured will need to encompass much of the present variety in uses of the term. perhaps measurement and conceptual clarification can advance together, in a dialectical way. measurement the search for ways to measure a phenomenon is both an interesting scholarly exercise and an essential aspect of advocacy. measurement is important if actors want to use a term to summarise, to publicise and to advocate for more of the reality it is describing – in this case for a more or for a stronger civil society. it is often said that for governments these days if a phenomenon cannot be measured it does not exist. 74 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 these days, in the international arena, jockeying for attention from the world media and from international agencies, advocates for causes such as poverty relief or press freedom appear to believe that their cause is helped by constructing an index. the huge growth of indexes (eg the united nations development program’s human development index, freedom house’s freedom index, transparency international’s corruption perceptions index or reporters without borders’ worldwide press freedom index) is clearly an interesting product, or sign, of globalisation, but for people who wish to champion civil society, it provides another incentive to get an agreed meaning, and thus some measurements for ‘civil society’. only thus can claims that civil society is growing or declining or that civil society is stronger in certain countries or under certain types of economic or political regimes be verified and in that way legitimised. this paper reviews two efforts to provide such measurement, one originating within the activist community, the other in academia. they are: • the civil society index (csi) developed by civicus, an international organisation that describes itself as a world alliance for citizen participation, with its main offices in south africa (heinrich 2007) and • the global civil society index (gcsi) developed by the center for civil society studies at the johns hopkins university in the united states (salamon & sokolowski 2004). previous efforts to measure civil society before turning to the development of the two indexes, a little history is necessary. it illustrates the influence (some would say the distorting influence) of the popularity of ‘civil society’, in its ‘associational life’ dimension among us and european foundations prepared to fund social science research. around 1990 lester salamon at the johns hopkins university assisted by helmut anheier, then at rutgers, gathered together researchers from 12 countries in europe, latin america and asia and began the comparative nonprofit project (cnp), a project designed to develop and apply in these various countries a common definition and ways of measuring nonprofit organisations (or nonprofit sector) in those countries. salamon, a political scientist, was one of a growing group of united states scholars (mainly economists, lawyers cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 75 and sociologists) that since the 1980s had been seeking to understand the extent but also the aetiology and dynamics of nonprofit organisations – ie private organisations that were prohibited from distributing profit to members or other stakeholders. the cnp achieved a common definition, an industry based classification system and set of measures, mainly of the economic dimensions of the sector (such as employment, income, sources of income and contribution to gdp). it also developed an agreed way of taking account of the contribution of volunteers to nonprofit organisations. the cnp went through several phases (australia was part of the second phase) and salamon subsequently persuaded the united nations statistical division to endorse a set of rules for the preparation of a nonprofit institutions satellite account to a country’s set of national accounts (department of economic and social affairs statistics division 2003). much of this work has been funded by us and european foundations. but in the late 1990s, as the term civil society became more and more popular, salamon and anheier began talking of the project as a civil society project. this is clearly indicated in the title of the book that reported the results of the second phase of the cnp: global civil society: dimensions of the nonprofit sector (salamon et al. 1999). it appears that that the change was a response to the changing interests of funders: foundations were now much more interested in funding research into civil society rather than the nonprofit sector. this was especially true of research being conducted in former eastern bloc countries or less developed nations: to keep the cnp on the road required a name change. this conflation of civil society with nonprofit sector was viewed sceptically by associates from many participating countries1 . in 1998, anheier left the project to become director of the centre for voluntary organisations at lse. he soon renamed it the centre for civil society and began work on a project designed to conceptualise and measure civil society. one of the products of this work, finally published in 2004 as civil society: measurement, evaluation, policy (anheier 2004), was a proposal that there were many indicators for the different aspects of civil society and that these could be individually measured and grouped into four dimensions which could in turn be portrayed as a diamond. thus 1 the author of this article was australian associate for the cnp and along with other country associates was present at a conference where the gcsi was revealed. 76 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 although he did not propose that the state of civil society in any one country could be reduced to a single indicator, he did argue that it could be compared graphically as a diamond with different shapes according to the strength of civil society along each dimension. it also left open the prospect that the area of each country’s civil society diamond could be used as a proxy for a single index number. most of the indicators he specified were similar to the data collected for the cnp, but went further to encompass other national accounting type data and survey data similar to but more extensive than that undertaken by the world values survey. civil society index (csi) at the same time, civicus was looking for a way of lifting the profile of civil society within each of the over 60 countries from whence it drew its membership and globally. in the early 1990s, not long after its formation, civicus had published an overview of civil society in each of the world’s major regions (de oliveira & tandon 1994). interestingly, although the book was titled citizens: strengthening global civil society and the first chapter spoke of an emerging global civil society, most chapters described the nonprofit sector or independent sector or third sector (the exception was that on civil society in asia and the pacific written by a philippine activist). then in the mid-1990s, civicus commissioned and published a set of profiles of civil society in 60 countries (civicus 1997). finally, and responding to a growing trend by international government agencies and advocacy groups to publicise their cause by producing and publishing an annual index, civicus leaders decided that it would be useful to develop a civil society indicator or index (csi) for each country that could be released each year with considerable publicity. they gave initial encouragement to anheier’s work on the civil society diamond, but then were persuaded by others that such a methodology was too ambitious and would be impossible to apply in most countries. what emerged was a methodology for discussing civil society within a country and for raising awareness of it. civil society was defined as ‘the arena outside the family, the state and the market where people associate to advance common interests’(heinrich 2007, p. 4). in practice this meant nonprofit organisations, conventionally the organisational form used to advance common interests, their membership and activities. the methodology was structured around the four cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 77 dimensions of anheier’s diamond: structure, values, environment and impact. within each dimension there were a number of indicators of civil society (structural and values), of the support or hostility of its environment and of its impact. in the pilot stage these indicators were mostly used to structure discussion (and for consciousness raising) among groups of leaders of nonprofit organisations or ngos (described as civil society leaders): charities, advocacy groups, unionists. in some cases, where data was available for some of the indicators (eg percentage of population who were members of associations or who volunteered or took part in protest rallies or boycotts) this was presented to groups to shape their deliberations. no attempt was made to generate any aggregated numerical indicators along the various dimensions. however, after reflections on these pilots, in 2003 it was decided to launch a more ambitious project which since then has been operationalised across 53 countries. the primary goal of the project was to ‘generate a contextually valid assessment of the state of civil society in a given country’ (heinrich 2007, p. 3). however, responding to the interests of many groups, including the foundations that funded most of the work, ‘the csi also seeks to achieve cross-country comparability of its findings’ (heinrich 2007, p. 3). altogether there are 74 indicators that are grouped into 25 subdivisions which are in turn grouped into the four original dimensions. subdivisions in the structural dimension include strength and depth of citizen participation, diversity and resources. the values dimension tries to measure the extent of commitment and practice of certain values within civil society organisations; subdivisions include democracy, transparency, gender equity and poverty eradication. subdivisions in the environment dimension include political context, basic freedoms and state-civil society relations. the impact dimension tries to measure the level of civil society influence on public policy, responsiveness to social needs and empowering of citizens. the process works thus: a researcher pulls together what can be found from secondary data; primary research is then carried out consisting of a specialist population survey, media analysis and regional consultations. results from these are then drafted into a report which is then reviewed by a national advisory group of civil society leaders from across the variety of fields where civil society is to be found. indicators are 78 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 scored on a 0-3 scale by the advisory group using a citizen jury methodology and aggregated into subdivisions and then the four dimensions, allowing the construction of a diamond. these scores or ranks are then reviewed by a national workshop which also uses the analysis of civil society to identify potential activities to strengthen civil society (heinrich 2007, pp. 4 10). below, the diamonds prepared for two rather different counties illustrate the end result of the project (heinrich 2007 p. 271 and p. 369 respectively). global civil society index (gcsi) cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 79 the gcsi was first developed by lester salamon and wojciech sokolowski in 2002 as a response to the pilot phase of the civicus project. basically it involved utilising data already collected via the ongoing cnp. it justified this by noting that while ‘disputes rage about the outer boundaries of the civil society concept’, there was ‘reasonable consensus’ about its central core: ‘the basic private associational life of a society’(salamon & sokolowski 2004, p. 65). the gcsi is formally more rigorous than the csi. arguing that their approach was ‘theory driven’ salamon and sokolowski focussed attention on three dimensions, not of civil society but of what they called ‘the civil society sector’: its capacity, its sustainability and its impact (2004, pp. 67 77). for capacity they identified four indicators, including employees of civil society organisations (read nonprofit organisations) as a percentage of the economically active population; the volunteer employment (expressed as equivalent full time employees) as a percentage of the economically active population; the level of giving by individuals companies and foundations as a percentage of gdp and the degree of diversification of the civil society sector, measured as the distribution of civil society workforce (including volunteers) in different fields of activity. for sustainability they used another four measures: self generated income; government support; popular support reflected by numbers volunteering (as percentage of adult population) and legal environment. the last was an amalgam of twenty measures; each measure being the presence or absence of particular legal requirements that either gave confidence in the transparency of civil society organisations or affected the ease with which they could form and operate. these raw scores were then weighted by country scores from two of the world bank’s governance measures: government effectiveness and rule of law. this was done in recognition of the possibility that the presence of legal provisions in a particular country did not mean that they were enforced. the popular support score was double weighted ‘to counteract the effect of having several indicators in the index that reflected the size of the formal components of the civil society sector’. 80 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 the impact dimension also contained four indicators that were thought to provide an adequate proxy of the impact of civil society organisations. once again, these indicators reflected the data that were available. one was the overall value added by the civil society organisations to the economy for which they use the wages paid to employees of civil society organisations together with the imputed wages of their volunteers, as a percentage of gdp. a second measure was the contribution by civil society organisations to human services, measured as the percentage of total employment in health, education, social services and culture and recreation. a third sought to measure the contribution of civil society to advocacy and expression, measured as the number of employees and volunteers mobilised by civil society organisations primarily engaged in what it describes as expressive activities: advocacy groups, professional associations, unions, environmental protection and culture and recreation. this number was expressed as a proportion of the adult population. a fourth indicator was popular commitment, measured as the percentage of the adult population claiming membership of voluntary associations (as reported by world values surveys). at the end of this process for each country there were a set of 12 numbers. whilst these were comparable for each indicator (most were expressed as a percentage of a country’s gdp or adult population), to derive an index, the hopkins’ researchers had to aggregate all the indicators, and to do that they had to be normalised. for this process, for each country, each indicator was expressed as a percentage of the highest score achieved by one country. at the end of this process each country had a twelve scores ranging between 0 and 100% (in reality between around 30 and 100%). these were then averaged for each dimension and then the scores attained within each dimension were totalled and averaged to give a single index. for the record the netherlands had the highest score of 74, followed by norway (65) and the united states (61). sweden scored 60 and the uk 58. australia came in at 49, dead heating with france. south korea scored 35. pakistan had the lowest score: 19. much of the data was drawn from that collected for the stages 2a and 2b of the cnp and applied to various years in the last half of the 1990s. to illustrate the sensitivity cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 81 of indicators to choices of data and points of comparison (and to add a parochial note), australia was marginally held back by the use of the “economically active population” as a denominator in several indicators. especially in the mid 1990s, australia’s workforce participation rate was among the lowest of the oecd and this meant that when nonprofit employment was expressed as a percentage of the labour force, australia was higher than say the uk and almost on par with the us, but when expressed as a percentage of the economically active population (in effect of the entire population of work force age), australia slipped behind. more importantly, australian volunteering data was drawn from the abs 1995 voluntary work survey, which the abs later acknowledged significantly underestimated the percentage of the population volunteering and the hours they contributed2 . evaluation despite its methodological sophistication and use of “objective” measures that can be obtained in almost any country, the gcsi can only be accepted as a measure of civil society if one accepts that civil society is synonymous with nonprofit organisations. this means accepting that civil society is captured by only one of the three dimensions that michael edwards outlines; that of associational life. even then, it gives only a limited account of that, omitting variables which can be derived from the world values surveys, such as the percentage of associational members that participate in political activities of varying kinds. more, it overemphasises the contribution of highly professionalised charities such as mission australia, st vincent’s hospital, the kings school or the walter and eliza hall institute compared with neighbourhood associations, local footy clubs or environmental protest groups. this is because it counts employment in nonprofit organisations and wages in two of its indicators. these are important measures of economic impact, but are not so clearly measures of civil society and while it counts numbers of volunteers (expressed as full time employment equivalents) and the imputed value of volunteer wages as well, this reduces volunteers to being members of a workforce, which is an economic measure rather than a civil society measure. this conflation of civil society with the economy illustrates the absence of a readily agreed theory of civil society that focuses on measures that are unique to civil society rather than inappropriate substitutes. the 2 the author of this article, as country associate for stage 2a of the cnp contributed the data for australia, but several years before the data was used to create the gcsi. 82 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 gcsi indices offer only one measure, the legal environment, which might be viewed as part of mike edwards’ public sphere dimension. there are no measures of the good society dimension. for example, to take account of that dimension would require identifying and allocating a negative score to those associations that encourage intolerance and inequality. it would require much else as well. on the other hand, while civicus’s csi attempts to cast a wider net, it appears to rely overmuch on the impressions and judgements of groups of people viewed by the compilers in each country as leaders of, or knowledgeable about civil society. to be sure, in rating performance on many of the 74 indicators, they are presented with independently generated data, including survey data, but as the civicus team acknowledged, despite training, many of the advisory group found it difficult to score objectively, ‘without letting their preconceptions and views influence their scores’(heinrich 2007, p. 10). it should be acknowledged that many other global indexes, for example the freedom index, rely on the judgements of a few selected experts. in a paper published before the results of the civicus csi survey were published, but written after the methodology for that had been put in place, finn heinrich, the leader of the civicus csi team, proposed measuring civil society along two dimensions: the structural and cultural (heinrich 2005). these approximate to the structural dimension and the values dimension in the original civicus csi. in this iteration, the structural dimension seeks to describe the make up of collective citizen action in terms of individual actions and organisational presence: using measures such as organisational membership, volunteering, demonstrating, and the existence of networks, of inter-organisational cooperation and the resource base of civil society organisations. he wants the cultural dimension to capture civil society as a ‘public sphere where a plurality of social norms are nurtured, practiced and promoted’(2005, p. 218). this would presumably include the way in which civil society organisations practice norms of participation and transparency. this still omits edwards ‘good society’ dimension, though the values component could presumably encompass that. it also omits the environmental and impact dimensions (such as the extent to which a nations laws and their enforcement facilitate of discourage citizen action) which are important in both the csi and the gcsi. it also continues to omit a manifestation of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 83 civil society as public sphere that many would consider important: the media of mass communication. at the very least, the media is a central component of the public sphere – the place where ideas and opinions are expressed (or excluded). the media is also the vehicle whereby actions and views expressed in other places – eg a demonstration outside parliament are selected and communicated to a wider public. its controllers thus significantly shape the issues that are debated in the public sphere and the way they are debated. in conclusion, while neither of these efforts to measure and rate civil society comparatively are convincing, the goal is an important one. those activists who claim an importance for ‘civil society’ are pointing to an important reality. but more effort needs to be devoted to discerning and obtaining agreement on the dimensions of civil society, so as to give it a clear identity within the plethora of other important (but vague) concepts such as democracy, governance and social capital. that process will require theorising but also recognition that measurement is important. if a concept cannot be measured, albeit with what are clearly understood and accepted to be proxy measures, then it is unlikely to survive in the world of fast changing intellectual fashions. bibliography anheier, h. 2004, civil society: measurement, evaluation, policy, earthscan, london. brennan, g. & castles, f.g. (eds) 2002, australia reshaped: 200 years of institutional transformation, cambridge university press, melbourne. civicus 1997, the new civic atlas: profiles of civil society in 60 countries, civicus, washington. cohen, j.l. & arato, a. 1992, civil society and political theory, mit press, cambridge, mass. cox, e. 1995, a truly civil society, abc books, sydney. de oliveira, m.d. & tandon, r. (eds) 1994, citizens: strengthening global civil society, civicus, washington. department of economic and social affairs statistics division 2003, handbook on non-profit institutions in the system of national accounts, united nations, new york. edwards, m. 2004, civil society, polity press, cambridge. ehrenberg, j. 1999, civil society: the critical history of an idea, new york university press, new york. heinrich, v.f. 2005, 'studying civil society across the world: exploring the thorny issues of conceptualisation and measurement', journal of civil society, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 211-228. 84 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 heinrich, v.f. (ed.) 2007, civicus global survey of the state of civil society, volume 1 country profiles, vol. 1, kumarian press, bloomfield conn. keene, j. 2003, global civil society?, cambridge university press, cambridge. salamon, l.m., anheier, h.k., list, r., toepler, s., sokolowski, s.w. & associates 1999, global civil society: dimensions of the nonprofit sector, the johns hopkins center for civil society studies, baltimore. salamon, l.m. & sokolowski, s.w. 2004, 'measuring civil society: the johns hopkins global civil society index', in l.m. salamon, s.w. sokolowski & associates (eds), global civil society: dimensions of the nonprofit sector, volume 2, kumarian press, bloomfield conn. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 14, no. 2 2022 © 2022 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: shen, z. 2022. street art on tiktok: engaging with digital cosmopolitanism. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:2, 80– 92. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i2.8017 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) street art on tiktok: engaging with digital cosmopolitanism zheng shen zhejiang scitech university, hangzhou, china corresponding author: zheng shen, zhejiang sci-tech university, no.8, taikang rd. donghu st., linping district, hangzhou, china, janeshen@zstu.edu.cn doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i2.8017 article history: received 14/12/2021; revised 25/07/2022; accepted 31/10/2022; published 30/11/2022 abstract with the rapid development of digital technology, digital cosmopolitans are engaging in street art from the real world to a range of social media. in this study, tiktok, one of the new and important communication channels, is the main source of data to explore how to increase transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. to limit data to be studied, jingxuan peng, who is a tiktok influencer, was observed and used as a case study to understand the relationship between street artists and digital cosmopolitans. as a result, a total of 243 videos and corresponding engagement responses were collected and investigated through text mining analysis. the findings show that tiktok can help increase social interactions between street artists and digital cosmopolitans, and that its content has varying levels of positive impact on transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. keywords street art; digital cosmopolitanism; tiktok; transcultural engagement; text mining 80 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research was supported by zhejiang provincial philosophy and social sciences planning project (23ndjc151yb). https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:janeshen@zstu.edu.cn introduction street art is considered a form of selfexpression that is freely presented to the audience in the public realm (hartley 2013). previous research has shown that street art is an enhancement to contemporary urban life and has a significant impact on the cultural and social order of communities (austin 2010). existing literature further confirms that street art offers expressive forms of cosmopolitanism that reclaim voice and reciprocity in the city (christensen & thor 2017). however, street artists are less likely to be visible in the community due to the contentious nature of the creation and perception of street art in community and policy discourses, limited space, and norms of governance. related studies have concluded that street art has gained some social acceptance in public places, but it remains neither officially recognized like public art, nor institutionally tolerated like traditional art in museums (visconti et al. 2010; bacharach 2015; chang 2018). fortunately, advances in digital technology begin to change this dilemma, and further facilitate the spread of street art because of its nature. snyder (2006) highlights that through digital technology, particularly websites and blogs, street artists are able to upload their work, create their identities, and build their reputations among audiences beyond the streets. the rapid development of technology has advanced the role of art, artists, and the acceptance of art in the urban public space as cosmopolitan articulations. zuckerman (2014) introduces the concept of the digital cosmopolitan and explains how the internet can lead us to connect. also, ponzanesi (2020) interrogates new forms of digital cosmopolitanism by investigating how digital connectivity operates in the everyday lives of digital cosmopolitans. while there has been a recent increase in research on digital cosmopolitanism, there is still limited research on the role of social media in facilitating digital cosmopolitanism among street art, street artists, and communities on social media. most studies on cosmopolitanism have focused on the original stoic philosophy, presupposing a predominantly western approach to history and modernity (delanty 2018). with the growing influence of social media on digital cosmopolitanism, it is insightful to explore how street artists use their aesthetic art on social media to successfully interact with transcultural communities and form digital cosmopolitanism. in this context, this study supports the view that that street art is an expressive form of aesthetic cosmopolitanism, and regards street artists as aesthetic cosmopolitans because they are concerned with aesthetic receptivity and seek out art appreciators in the universal community. it explains the notion of cosmopolitanism in the digital age from the perspective of media and cultural communication rather than the politics of previous studies. the focus of the study is to investigate how street artists employ street art on social media to achieve digital cosmopolitanism. data were collected from jingxuan peng’s 243 short videos and corresponding engagement responses (likes, comments, and shares) on tiktok, and analyzed through text mining, which has been used to a limited extent in previous research methods. these videos record her performances of street art that includes playing different musical songs on the guzheng in the streets of europe. the results show that aesthetic appreciation and social interaction have a significant impact on transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. therefore, this study contributes to filling a gap in the limited analysis of street art and digital cosmopolitanism on social media, and provides practical insights into the engagement of street artists with digital cosmopolitans. contextual background aesthetic cosmopolitanism from real to digital throughout history, there have been many different perspectives on cosmopolitanism, including political, economic, cultural, aesthetic, and moral cosmopolitanism. but regardless of perspectives, the core concept shen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202281 of cosmopolitanism is that all people, regardless of political affiliation, do (or at least can) belong to a single community, and that this community should be nurtured (formosa et al. 2014). based on this definition, previous research has more often associated cosmopolitanism and communitarianism with politics (de wilde et al. 2019). as cicchelli et al. (2019) point out, aesthetic cosmopolitanism is a relatively new term that refers to the aestheticization process of everyday life. hence, aesthetic cosmopolitanism has not been adequately studied. the existing literature on aesthetic cosmopolitanism is still primarily concerned with the political perspective. researchers substantiate that street art such as graffiti and poprock music is an expression of aesthetic cosmopolitanism, and further investigate the transversal relationship between aesthetic expression and political organization (regev 2013; christensen 2017). recent research on aesthetic cosmopolitanism has been expanded to include digital cosmopolitanism with the development of digital technologies. balabanova (2014) claims that the development of cosmopolitan sensibilities has always tended to be associated with new technologies of communication. also, delanty (2018) supports that this aestheticization process could previously be found in many contemporary films, shorts, music videos, and advertisements, and is now becoming the norm on new media platforms and social media. with this in mind, cosmopolitan researchers have begun to explore aesthetic cosmopolitanism from real to digital. the existing literature has vigorously debated whether digital technologies contribute to cosmopolitanism. on the one hand, zuckerman (2014) argues that the digital flow of interactions and ideas has the potential to create and facilitate diverse networks across cultures and many groups, but what actually happens is that the flow of information remains within the bordered, homogenous, and local networks of one’s own environment. on the other hand, according to christensen and jansson (2015), digital online activities can lead to connections with other groups that are different from ours, which enables cosmopolitan tendencies. in short, digital cosmopolitanism is defined as a new world whose citizens have global interactions marked by the use of social networks (ponzanesi 2020). more importantly, these debates in previous studies call for a recalibration of the concept of cosmopolitanism in the digital age, given the currently limited analysis of digital cosmopolitanism (leurs & hirata 2020). transcultural engagement and social media whether aesthetic cosmopolitanism is real or digital, transcultural engagement is considered to be at the heart of cosmopolitanism. previous studies confirm that active, ethically conscious transcultural engagement and inquiry is a crucial activity for cosmopolitans: they argue that such exchanges promote greater inclusion, understanding, and empathy across cultures (appiah 2007). aesthetic cosmopolitans are thus defined as those who use art appreciation as a form of transcultural engagement to develop a worldwide aesthetic receptivity and appreciation through their characteristic art objects and corresponding artappreciative practices (rings 2019). similarly, robbins et al. (2017) believe that connectivity emerges as a fundamental feature of cosmopolitanism in the digital age. delanty (2018) emphasizes that the future of digital cosmopolitanism depends on the sociotechnical capacity of the internet not only to mediate, but to reciprocate and bridge transcultural connections and networks within and beyond national boundaries. therefore, digital cosmopolitanism aims to act as the power of the internet to engage with others and shape new networks of solidarity, promoting intercultural exchange and new types of activities (leurs & hirata 2020). engagement is a tangible, twoway value creation process and has an impact through positive interactions that lead to behavioral affinity (hollebeek et al. 2014). existing studies show that social media helps build networkbased online communities that enable people to develop their social identities and meet social needs (lai 2019; sutapa 2019; sohn 2022). social media are webbased communication platforms in which participants have uniquely identifiable profiles, publicly express connections, and consume, produce and interact with usergenerated content (ellison & boyd 2014). examples of social media are facebook, instagram, and tiktok. most extant research has focused on transcultural engagement on facebook shen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202282 and twitter (read et al. 2019). with the rapid growth of social media, scholars have recently become more interested in research related to tiktok (called douyin in china), an emerging and increasingly popular social media (vinerean & opreana 2021). the app reportedly has more than 800 million active users worldwide, making it one of the most downloaded apps in the google and apple app stores (cervi 2021; savic 2021). although tiktok is a trending app on a global scale, there is limited analysis related to transcultural engagement in cosmopolitanism studies. existing research has focused on digital entertainment platforms such as netflix and spotify (elkins 2019). as such, it is necessary to investigate digital cosmopolitanism on social media, especially tiktok. methodological intervention in cosmopolitanism studies as far as the methodology of cosmopolitanism studies is concerned, previous studies exist with a large number of theoretical claims about what cosmopolitanism is and what it is not (lindell 2014). most concepts of cosmopolitanism originate from the kantian idea, which in turn derives from the original stoic philosophy. due to its western genealogy, insufficient attention has been given to nonwestern parts of the world in the existing literature (delanty 2018). given this problem, researchers have explained cosmopolitanism through world varieties of cosmopolitanism, such as sugimoto (2018) who makes an argument for cosmopolitanism in the japanese concept of kyosei (きょうせい), and rofel (2018) who discusses cosmopolitanism in the chinese notion of tianxia (天下). the major structural shifts in globalization and transnationalization have led researchers to climb down the ladder of theoretical abstraction and venture into the difficult task of cosmopolitanism in quantitative research. however, researchers often rely on secondary data from survey companies, e.g. world values survey, or online surveys, which fail explicitly at measuring cosmopolitanism (roudometof 2018). therefore, the field of cosmopolitanism is in deep need of a methodological solution to understand contemporary digital cosmopolitanism. regarding the above issues, this study intends to understand digital cosmopolitanism by examining western and nonwestern transcultural engagement on tiktok through text mining analysis. it focuses on the following research questions: (1) what constitutes digital cosmopolitanism on social media? (2) how do street artists digitally increase the transcultural engagement with the cosmopolitan community on social media? (3) how can text mining analysis help broaden the methodology of cosmopolitanism studies? although previous studies have involved investigations of street art and aesthetic and digital cosmopolitanism, they have focused on the interpretations of transcultural engagement in aesthetic and digital cosmopolitanism. this study further classifies the types of transcultural engagement, and clarifies that different types have different effects on transcultural engagement with cosmopolitan communities on social media. compared with previous studies, all of the above helps this study contribute to a better understanding of the role of street art, street artists and communities in digital cosmopolitanism. method the study used text mining to collect and analyze short videos on the street art of jingxuan peng on tiktok and the corresponding engagement responses. the study focuses on the engagement with jingxuan peng’s short videos on tiktok through mentions and likes, as well as the text associated with her videos. jingxuan peng, a 25yearold student studying in france, plays the guzheng (a chinese plucked zither) in hanfu (the traditional style of clothing worn by the han people in china) on the streets of europe. this performance leads to the popularity of her street art in europe including switzerland, france and spain, which is the basis of her aesthetic cosmopolitanism. in addition, while playing she records her performance and later uploads it to different platforms (e.g. tiktok, bilibili and youtube), which further sparks her global popularity. as of december 7, 2021, she had 9,170,000 followers and her short videos received shen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202283 https://www.douyin.com/user/ms4wljabaaaa7zexwwwn7l3zpdgene8c5nwmwtcs4vjiypu2mdmwpka more than 110 million likes on tiktok. according to tiktok’s reports, peng was recognized as one of the top 10 art promotion officials on tiktok in 2020. also, she was awarded the title of ambassador of international students by campus france (the french agency for the promotion of higher education and international mobility), and was invited to perform at the united nations on world mother language day. she is considered not only as a street artist, but also a transcultural communicator and innovator. hence, the investigation of her short videos helps to understand how exotic street art can shape transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. according to the information resources management association in the united states (2018), using various text mining techniques to monitor social media texts is an indispensable tool. the existing literature highlights three reasons for employing text mining in academic research: (1) extracting unknown and valuable information from text data; (2) discovering patterns by classifying texts; (3) reducing time and efforts for data exploration (weiss et al. 2020). consequently, supported by the methodological framework for text mining on social media (salloum et al. 2017), the coding process was carried out in the following manner. first, the text data including caption words, hashtags, mentions and comments in tiktok posts were extracted for tokenization, a process that separates text into a representation of each word, known as a token. subsequently, the tokens were filtered to remove stop tokens such as definite articles and pronouns, which are not meaningful for the research analysis. afterwards, the remaining tokens became the basis for the thematic categories. finally, the engagement responses were analyzed according to different thematic categories to understand the transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. regarding engagement responses, previous research supports that likes, comments and shares as the three key predictors of social media engagement (kim 2016). likes are interpreted as followers accepting the views of the post and holding positive attitudes (antonopoulos et al. 2016). comments can be considered as a communication tool that helps to understand followers in advance, as followers need to spend more energy expressing their thoughts, attitudes and feelings when commenting than simply clicking the liking button (levon & steinfeld 2015). shares require higher activation energy, and elicit more feedback by allowing others to continue sharing in the same follower communities (mcclain 2019). accordingly, this study considers the levels of social media engagement from low to high as liking, commenting and sharing respectively. hence, this study used them as three variables to code the levels of transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. table 1. coding variables and definitions engagement levels variables definition reference low liking it indicates that the view of street artists is received by transcultural communities and they have positive attitudes. antonopoulos et al. 2016 medium commenting it means that street artists and transcultural communities have an active and positive relationship. levon & steinfeld 2015 high sharing it shows that street artists have a positive impact on transcultural communities and their subcommunities. mcclain 2019 shen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202284 results overall, jingxuan peng has posted 244 short videos on tiktok so far. among them, one short video was not related to street art and was excluded from the study. therefore, a total of 243 short videos were analyzed in the study. on average, each short video has 340580 likes, 9779 comments, and 5789 shares, although there is a large divergence between the number of each for the least popular and the most popular videos as table 2 shows. the detailed descriptive statistics were presented in table 2. table 2. engagement with the videos n(videos) minimum maximum mean std. deviation likes 243 29000 2588000 340580 448851 comments 243 83 67000 9779 13930 shares 243 39 53000 5789 11180 by mining peng’s posts, the tokens were divided into three thematic groups: fully exotic, partly exotic, and a combination of local and exotic art (please see figure 1). specifically, group 1 contains songs identified as fully exotic art. these songs are featured by chinese cultural characteristics and are likely unfamiliar to westerners, as evidenced by their comments on these posts. therefore, they are considered fully exotic art. this group includes songs such as ‘serenade of peaceful joy’, ‘serenade of peaceful joy’, ‘he yige’, ‘# liu genhong girl’, ‘compendium of materia medica’, ‘cao cao’, ‘pearl of the orient’, ‘the sea and the sky’, ‘wan jiang’, ‘# peach blossom smile’, ‘zen rhythm’, ‘my chinese heart’, ‘fahai’, ‘unchained melody’, ‘dream catcher’, ‘happiness’, ‘wukong’, ‘moonlight’, ‘# immortal sword’, ‘fearless warrior’, and ‘under the sea’. group 2 contains songs identified as partly exotic art. these songs also have chinese cultural characteristics, but they are more likely to be well known around the world because they have been translated into different languages such as english, french, german and japanese. hence, they are regarded as partly exotic art for digital cosmopolitans. this group includes songs such as ‘the butterfly lovers’, ‘#jay chou’, ‘green flower porcelain’, ‘dragon fist’, ‘the bund’, ‘lonely warrior’, ‘the moon where are you’, ‘the hottest ethnic trend’, ‘# the journey to the west’, ‘sing a folk song to the party’, ‘jianghu’, ‘huo yuanjia’, and ‘drunken fist’. group 3 contains songs that combine local and exotic art. these songs feature western cultural characteristics, but they are performed by jingxuan peng’s guzheng, presenting a combination of local and exotic art. this group includes songs such as ‘someone like you’, ‘# michael jackson’, ‘croatian rhapsody’, ‘see you again’, ‘les jardins’, ‘#believer’, ‘love you’, ‘smooth criminal’, ‘#as you wish’, ‘rolling in the deep’, ‘richard clayderman’, ‘hey jude’, ‘east meets west’, ‘#lavender’, ‘provence’, ‘see of flowers’, ‘ten thousand gods’, and ‘doraemon’. here, given the transcultural engagement, the concepts of exotic and local are defined according to the cultural background of the street artist jingxuan peng and the western audience on the streets of europe, which is an important basis for her worldwide popularity on tiktok, as previously mentioned. the study was concerned to identify whether there was any relationship between the group of songs and the type of engagement. thus, a oneway anova test was performed. the final results are shown in table 3. the results substantiate that thematic categories of short videos on street art have a significant effect on the liking, commenting and sharing behavior of transcultural communities in digital cosmopolitanism. in terms of liking, the result of group 3 (local & exotic) is positive and significant (mean difference=773396, 617242), indicating that the combination of local and exotic art positively affects the liking behavior of transcultural communities in digital cosmopolitanism. likewise, for commenting and sharing, the results of group 3 (local & exotic) are positive and significant (mean difference=24398, 19585, 18682, 16717). that shen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202285 is to say, the combination of local and exotic art positively affects the commenting and sharing behavior of transcultural communities in digital cosmopolitanism. in addition, the results of mean difference (see table 3) show that the combination of local and exotic art has the highest influence on the behavior of digital cosmopolitans, with partly exotic art having the next highest influence and fully exotic art having the lowest influence. to summarize, the results confirm that the combination of local and exotic art has the highest level of engagement for the transcultural communities in digital cosmopolitanism. table 3. corresponding engagement responses of digital cosmopolitans dependent variable (i) group (j) group mean difference (i-j) std. error likes local & exotic fully exotic 773396* 102938 partly exotic 617242* 102938 comments local & exotic fully exotic 24398* 3142 partly exotic 19585* 3142 shares local & exotic fully exotic 18682* 2557 partly exotic 16717* 2557 *. the mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. figure 1. the frequency of songs mentioned in peng’s posts shen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202286 discussion and conclusion digital cosmopolitanism: social media and social interactions to answer the first research question, the statistically significant results of likes, comments, and shares and their relationship to songs in group 3, local and exotic, suggest that tiktok helps street artists engage with the digital cosmopolitan communities, which relies heavily on the nature of social media. social media is seen as bringing a new way of interacting, communicating and participating in online communities, so its strengths are interactive and social (barger et al. 2016). compared with street art performances in public places, with the help of social media, street art can be seen by more people without the limitation of space and others as mentioned earlier. among social media, tiktok has its distinctive strengths. the short video format is friendly to street art performances. this study clearly presents the best parts of jingxuan peng’s performances, from her typical chinese clothes and music to the reactions of the live audience and more. all of these have led to more discussion in digital cosmopolitan communities. example 1: ‘playing the guzheng is really painful. i played it before and i did not stick to it because it hurts.’ ‘when your fingers are calloused, you will be fine, and it won’t hurt for a long time.’ ‘maybe you don’t have nails? if you use nails to play the guzheng, how will it hurt?’ for instance, example 1 is from the comments for the song ‘lonely warrior’, (from group 2, partly exotic) which is also one of the typical discussions in peng’s comments. the example shows that they discuss how painful it is to play the guzheng. they did not know each other before, but the topic of the pain of playing guzheng brought them together and led to a heated discussion on tiktok. other topics including wearing veils and music content have also sparked social connections in digital cosmopolitan communities. besides, the unsolicited questions and peng’s responses in the comments added to the social connection. for example, peng often asks people in the comments how they feel (e.g. ‘this is an adaptation. how do you like it? please hear it all because there are layers of emotion’). this example question has 443 separate responses in the comments of ‘lonely warrior’, which people also share with their friends to further increase the scope and number of social connections. that is to say, social media like tiktok play an important role in the social connection between street artists and their audience in digital cosmopolitanism. furthermore, social interactions in digital cosmopolitan communities can be also developed through hashtags and mentions, which are distinctive functions of social media. past literature supports the use of hashtags and mentions to predict people’s perceptions of social media communication (buarki & alkhateeb 2018). in the study, peng often uses key words as symbols to link digital cosmopolitans through the identification of symbols through hashtags such as #guzheng, #cultural heritage, and #promoting folk music. hashtags are described as widely used symbols on social media around the world (page 2012). with the help of hashtags, the visibility of posts can be increased through relevant searches. as such, it is recommended that street artists apply hashtags and spread their street art on social media to increase social connections in digital cosmopolitanism. moreover, this study reveals that peng’s audience often uses mentions in the comments and actively shares posts with others (see example 2). example 2: ‘@qkk do you know how to play?’ ‘@ne @yunzhe truly amazing!’ ‘@ღ°wanfeng i can do it as well!’ example 2 shows the comments of peng’s audience on the song ‘green flower porcelain’, (from group 2, partly exotic). many audience members who comment, as the three in example 2 did, often use mentions to get their friends involved in the comments. the mentions then link to more people participating in the shen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202287 discussion, which gives rise not only to social connections but also to electronic wordofmouth. electronic wordofmouth is characterized by a manytomany electronic communication process that delivers a large amount of information to a large audience in a timely manner. namely, in the study, peng’s audience connects with their friends via mentions and strangers via comments on peng’s street art on tiktok. these friends and strangers then connect to more friends and strangers through mentions and comments. these social connections are constantly cyclical, which ultimately lead to the popularity of peng’s street art on social media. in short, this study supports the idea that tiktok can help street artists increase the visibility of their street art and engage with digital cosmopolitan communities through social interactions. transcultural engagement: media content and aesthetic appreciation regarding the second question, the study shows that social media content has a differential impact on transcultural engagement with digital cosmopolitanism. previous studies have noticed the different impacts of social media content (chahal & rani 2017). dolan et al. (2019) state that rational appeals in social media content are superior in promoting active and passive engagement of social media users, while emotional appeals facilitate passive rather than highly active engagement behavior. as mentioned earlier, there is limited analysis of the different effects of social media content from the perspective of street art in digital cosmopolitanism. also, different types of social interaction are underinvestigated in the research on street art in digital cosmopolitanism. for this reason, this study analyzed the thematic content of peng’s posts on tiktok. the results show that peng’s short videos can be classified into three thematic groups: fully exotic, partly exotic, and a combination of local and exotic art. the study further finds that the combination of local and exotic art has the highest level of engagement in digital cosmopolitan communities while fully exotic art has the lowest level. overall, the study indicates that aesthetic appreciation is considered to explain the differences in the level of engagement. appreciating an artwork requires the appreciator to have some appropriate response to the artwork, to its characteristics, or to what it represents. according to rings (2019), art appreciation takes place across cultural boundaries and is referred to as cultural talk. that is to say, the street artwork presented by artists is featured by artists’ own cultural characteristics. appreciating artwork requires the appreciator to become familiar with these cultural characteristics by perceiving or otherwise experiencing the artwork in a manner appropriate to its medium. as such, the appreciator can recognize these cultural characteristics and appreciate the artwork. example 3: ‘in foreign countries, play some western classical music from time to time to promote the charm of chinese instruments.’ ‘play more european and american music they know in order for them to appreciate the charm.’ ‘occasionally an english song to the french to have some resonance.’ for instance, example 3 exemplifies the comments from ‘see you again’, a song in group 3, local and exotic. these comments reveal that all people think that peng can play more western classical music through the guzheng, and agree that by doing so, westerners can better recognize their native culture and thus more easily appreciate peng’s street art. for this reason, there are differences in the level of transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. also, aesthetic appreciation accounts for the low level of transcultural engagement in fully exotic art. in other words, jingxuan peng’s short videos ‘serenade of peaceful joy’, ‘cao cao’, ‘wan jiang’, and other unknown chinese folk songs with chinese cultural characteristics are fully exotic to westerners. in this case, it is difficult for them to establish transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. therefore, this study implies that both social media content and aesthetic appreciation positively affect transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. shen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202288 last but not least, in terms of the third research question, this study demonstrates that text mining techniques help in analyzing cosmopolitanism studies, especially digital cosmopolitanism studies. specifically, in addition to surveys, text mining analysis can help collect firsthand data in digital cosmopolitanism studies, and be explicit in measuring digital cosmopolitanism through transcultural engagement. in conclusion, it is helpful to apply text mining analysis to broaden the methodology of cosmopolitanism studies. theoretical and practical implications theoretically, this study makes a threefold contribution to the existing literature. first, this study adds to the extant literature by identifying how street artists digitally use street art to manage digital cosmopolitanism from the perspective of media and transcultural communication. previous research has concentrated on exploring graffiti as performative cosmopolitanism from a political perspective (christensen 2017). this study thus contributes to further discussion of the currently limited analysis of music as aesthetic cosmopolitanism from a media and transcultural perspective. the study supports previous studies (formosa et al. 2014; christensen 2017; de wilde et al. 2019) that openness and connectedness are reasons for digital cosmopolitanism, and it further reveals that aesthetic appreciation is also important for transcultural engagement with street art in digital cosmopolitanism. second, this study particularly focuses on how to increase transcultural engagement in digital cosmopolitanism. existing research calls for a reconceptualization of cosmopolitanism in the digital age (leurs & hirata 2020). as transcultural engagement is central to aesthetic cosmopolitanism (rings 2019), this study further explores the role of art, artists and communities in digital cosmopolitanism. previous research has argued that digital technology has not enabled communities to cross borders and form cosmopolitanism (zuckerman 2014). however, the study confirms that social media helps street artists to positively engage with street art for the communities in digital cosmopolitanism, which is inconsistent with the previous findings. instead, it supports that social media engagement such as liking, commenting, and sharing can lead to connections with other groups that are different from ours, and enable cosmopolitan tendencies. third, the use of text mining analysis in this study provides a methodological framework for related studies. previous studies have applied case studies, ethnography, hypotheses, etc. to research methodology, while analysis using text mining has been limited (cicchelli et al. 2019). therefore, this study opens up a new methodological dimension to the analysis of street art in digital cosmopolitanism. also, this study provides insights for street artists in the age of the internet on how to increase the acceptance of their performance. that is to say, street artists are encouraged to use tiktok to present their performances along with their street art. this study supports that using local and exotic art on tiktok has the highest level of transcultural engagement of street art in the digital cosmopolitan community. street artists can manage their thematic content of street art to further increase the visibility and engagement in community. finally, the use of tiktok can help provide a solution to limited space and management norms that have been a problem in previous street art performances. it can help reduce the tension between street artists and local perceptions of street art in community and policy discourses. limitations and future research directions the study is subject to several limitations, which provide insights for future research. the first limitation is that this study exemplified street art in digital cosmopolitan through jingxuan peng’s short videos on tiktok. future research could consider exploring different street art and social media platforms to test the findings of this study and create a comprehensive framework for street artists’ transcultural engagement with street art in digital cosmopolitanism. second, this study is restricted to the investigation of transcultural shen cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202289 engagement based on liking, commenting and sharing behavior. previous research indicates that empathy’s ability also motivates cosmopolitan behavior (faulkner 2017), so future research could consider including the addition of empathy analysis of communities in transcultural engagement. moreover, another limitation is that this study analyzed street art with chinese characteristics in the west. in future research, it will be interesting to compare street art with western characteristics in 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https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650219856510 https://www.indianjournals.com/ijor.aspx?target=ijor:ijrss&volume=9&issue=6&article=025 https://www.indianjournals.com/ijor.aspx?target=ijor:ijrss&volume=9&issue=6&article=025 https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer16070145 https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer16070145 https://doi.org/10.1086/652731 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34555-0 cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 14, no. 3 2022 © 2022 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: nasir, g. a., saptomo, a. 2022. customary land tenure values in nagari kayu tanam, west sumatra. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:3, 30– 45. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8099 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) customary land tenure values in nagari kayu tanam, west sumatra gamal abdul nasir1,*, ade saptomo2 1 universitas muhammadiyah tangerang, indonesia 2 universitas pancasila, indonesia corresponding author: gamal abdul nasir, universitas muhammadiyah tangerang, jalan perintis kemerdekaan, tangerang city, banten 15118, indonesia, g.nasar95@yahoo.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8099 article history: received 21/02/2022; revised 24/06/2022; accepted 22/07/2022; published 15/12/2022 abstract the transfer of rights or transactions does not exist in customary land tenure because it is a common property; thus, it can never be transferred to another party. on the other hand, in the minangkabau indigenous community, west sumatra, there is a shift in the concept of ulayat land tenure that occurs through two forms of change with six values: religious-magical, self-existence, socio-kinship, cultures and customs, structural and socio-economic asset values. this research will present the concept of the customary land tenure, which is based on these values. the study uses the socio-legal method with sociological approaches, including historical and case approaches. this research shows that there has been a change in land tenure values, moving from communal ownership to individual ownership. there has been an interaction between the laws, the incorporation interaction. it becomes the right concept for the customary land tenure in the future. keywords customary rights; land tenure value; indigenous people; adat law declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 30 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8099 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8099 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:g.nasar95@yahoo.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i3.8099 introduction problems regarding land are experienced by people everywhere, but the problems are usually more acute for indigenous people. the concept of authority over customary land is strongly related to value changes in the authority over the land. in nagari kayu tanam, which is the location of this study, the authority has been followed and carried out from generation to generation. for the minangkabau people of west sumatra, the land is one of the critical elements in its matrilineal organization. land in the culture of the minangkabau community is very highly valued by most people. it is regarded as one of the criteria determining their dignity in the nagarian (traditional village) life. a person who owns customary land is considered a native in the nagari, and they have more rights for respectability there (syarifudin, 1984). nagari kayu tanam is a village-level administrative area in west sumatra, where the concept of communal ownership of customary land gave way to the concept of private ownership. wali nagari or ninik mamak is the traditional chief of nagari kayu tanam, with administrative responsibility for village-level governance and accountability for the survival of the indigenous communities in the area. nagari kayu tanam is situated in the 2x11 kayu tanam district of padang pariaman regency in the province of south sumatra. four villages make up the 2x11 kayu tanam subdistrict: anduriang, guguak, kapalo hilalang, and kayu tanam. nagari kayu tanam has a population of 5,000 and is situated on 15,26 square kilometres near to oil palm fields. the nagari kayu tanam community is anchored in the minangkabau group’s traditional values (the indigenous people of west sumatra). even though customary land or ‘tanah ulayat’ has been recognized internationally and nationally, indigenous people still face various limitations exacerbated in the law, not to mention inconsistencies in its implementation. internationally, the recognition of customary land law is explained in the indigenous and tribal peoples convention by ilo (27 june 1989). indonesia acknowledged indigenous people’s customary land through article 18b clause (2) of the republic of indonesia’s 1945 constitution and article 3 of the law on agrarian principles no. 5 of 1960 (citrawan 2021). the state’s power over land has also been regulated in the stipulations of article 33 clause (3). the land is part of the earth; thus, it is under the state’s authority (hayati 2019). the statement, ‘under the authority of the state,’ means that the state manages it. the state has the power to manage and administer the land to maximize the welfare of society (rejekiningsih 2016). the acknowledgement and the rulings on customary land are stated in the legislation as follows in article 18b clause (2) of the republic of indonesia’s 1945 constitution (atmaja, 2018): the state acknowledges and respects indigenous people’s social units and their traditional rights so long as they still live under the social development and the principles of the republic of indonesia as regulated in the national law. nonetheless, the position of the indigenous people as subjects of indigenous law and customary land is still terribly weak, as it is still constrained by these limitations: under the social development and the principles of the republic of indonesia. the limitation is an indication that there is an inconsistency in the recognition of the customary rights of indigenous peoples. another limitation is presented in article 3 of the law on agrarian principles no. 5 of 1960 (laturette 2017): considering the stipulations in article 1 and article 2, the implementation of the customary land and the related rights of the people, the indigenous people, so long as they still exist, must be carried out according to the national and the state interests, based on national unity. that is, customary law may continue to apply if it is not in conflict with legislation at higher levels. the actualization of the above constitutional rights is also subject to limitations, as it must be: according to the national and the statebased interests, based on the nation’s unity, and it cannot be contradictory to the laws and regulations at higher levels (fransisco 2021). nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202231 according to hazairin (1976), cited in hartono 1999), the customary land of an indigenous people is the right for the whole area of that people, which can never be exiled to other social groups, nor revoked from the aforementioned indigenous people. however, the land and the law will stay as the indigenous people’s collective right, passed on from generation to generation. the writer suggests that there is currently a change in the values of authority over the customary land (supriyati, saptana & supriyatna 2012, cited by iswantoro 2012a). in substance, there should be no transaction over customary land, as it is communally owned and cannot ever be owned by other parties. nevertheless, based on the preliminary research of this study, it is shown that the transfer of land tenure rights from communal to private has taken place, especially among the minangkabau people of west sumatra. this change happened through two primary processes that occur internally and are influenced by external factors. the first internal change occurred to the nagari customary land through the process of customary deliberation. the indigenous people are divided into customary tribes. then, the customary land of the tribe is divided into customary groups through customary deliberation. then, again through customary deliberation, the customary group’s land is divided according to the people who have the right to that land. meanwhile, the second change happened due to external factors arising from collaboration with the oil palm plantations. in this case, indigenous people could become oil palm farmers who obtained the right to farm two hectares of oil palm plantation. this led to a change in the ownership system, from the category of authority over the land (nagari customary land) to ownership (private land). in this case, individuals were involved in converting the land’s legal system from communally-owned land to privatelyowned land and this is a revolutionary change. those two changes in the concept of authority over customary land show the impact of inconsistencies in customary land law in indonesia. those inconsistencies multiply the existence of individual ownership in customary land. normatively, individual rights in the concept of ulayat land are limited to communal utility and not ownership. the shift in the minangkabau people that strengthens the concept of individual ownership endangers the existence of customary lands as a whole. in these conditions, it is possible to buy and sell land to other parties, or at least the land can be utilized by parties outside the indigenous community, such as the oil palm company in minangkabau. using the example shown by the minangkabau people, we can now examine how national recognition describes its half-hearted commitment to indigenous people’s customary land tenure, which can lead to complicated conflict involving customary land conflict. from this perspective, the existence of individual ownership denotes a non-harmonized interaction of customary and national law. there are six values of the customary land tenure in nagari kayu tanam, which have become the parameters of the authority over the customary land: the religious-magical, self-existence socio-kinship, cultures, and customs, structural and socio-economic asset values. these are used as an analytical tool to explore customary land tenure values, comparing the values of nagari kayu tanam with a situation where there is no individual ownership. methodology the empirical approach of this study is based on socio-legal research that aims to find the theories on the process in which the law exists and runs in society (irianto et al. 2012). an empirical study on the law will result in theories on the existence, the change, and the functions of law in the society, due to the changes in the people’s behaviour which results in the changes in the law (mather 2011). theoretically, this study draws on ehrlich’s notion of living law and on positive law. according to ehrlich’s theoretical approach, communities have laws or ways of doing things that exist separately from the legislation of the state. law in this context is not set down as a statute, but exists in customary processes. thus, according to the living law approach, law exists in two forms, customary law and state law (iswantoro, 2012b). in positive law, the specific rights of a group are set out in legislation. the usage of this socio-legal method is aimed to provide nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202232 a stepping stone in highlighting the problem from the perspective of the legislation (the positive law approach). it will also analyse the behaviour and attitudes of the indigenous people to present a perspective on the living law. taken together, these will be used to answer the research problems. this research begins by identifying the problems that occur in the research location based on initial findings indicating that there has been a change in the value of customary land tenure rights. based on these initial findings, the research objective is to answer the problem formulation based on the conditions of norms/rules and implementation/concrete. changes in the value of land tenure with customary rights will be seen empirically, namely by collecting primary data, and the concept of land tenure can be formulated juridically by looking at several national laws that regulate customary land tenure whether it is in line with the values of land tenure that have developed so far in society. the theory of living law will be used to identify whether the values of customary land tenure matches the theory, and positive legal theory to identify the extent to which state laws go hand in hand with customary law, in which there are values of customary land tenure which are believed to be accurate by the local customary community. thus, a linked theoretical basis is needed, along with a multi-disciplinary approach, drawing on juridical, sociological, cultural and philosophical studies. alongside empirical data, these studies will support the socio-legal approach of this study. results and discussion the concept of customary land tenure is based on the values of customary land tenure according to the provisions of the dutch domein verklaring, which are listed in agrarischewet with stb. 1870 no. 55, with the main principle being the state domain; all land that cannot be proven to have eigendom (ownership) rights on it, then is a state domain (owned by the state) (santoso 2017). meanwhile, land controlled by indigenous people (customary land) has never received legal eigendom rights. so, state land is all land to which a person cannot prove his or her ownership rights (mujiburohman 2021). on the other hand, the customary land is land that is not subject to the rules of eigendom (property rights) or, in other words, the customary land is land that a person does not own with eigendom rights (syarief 2014). the state can deprive a person of ownership. this stems from two legal grounds: the eigendom right as stated in article 570 of the civil code, which is the legacy of agrarian law 1870 (agrarische wet) and the 1960 basic agrarian law articles 6, 18 and 27. article 18 states, ‘for in the public interest, including the interests of the nation and state as well as the common interests of the people, land rights can be revoked by providing appropriate compensation and according to the method regulated by law’. the contents of eigendom rights and customary land rights are nearly identical, but they do not receive the same treatment because eigendom rights are directly recognised in land law while customary lands really are not. according to western land law, land can be freely owned. this is sourced from the dutch burgerlijk wetboek, originally based on the french civil code. the philosophical basis of the french civil code adheres to the liberal-individualistic concept, which was the foundation of european bourgeois society in the nineteenth century (syarief 2014). according to bahari (2005 cited in syahyuti 2016), indonesian land law, where land has a social function, is the antithesis of western land law. the implication is that land is not owned freely without state intervention. the reasoning seems to be that if individuals are given the freedom to own and control land without any intervention from the state, there will be a practice of unlimited land accumulation that develops into a monopoly of land control for a few people and unequal land tenure and use. the social element tries to prevent accumulation of land by a few people and monopoly over land. the trick is to include elements of society or togetherness in use. individual freedom is reduced, and togetherness nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202233 is included in individual rights. so, in individual rights, there are collective rights. this is referred to as the principle that ‘land has a social function’. so, the state has the authority to limit individuals and legal entities in controlling large amounts of land; therefore, land reform regulations were born; for example, people may not own more than five hectares of land (in java) or be absentee landlords. the state’s task, which represents the common interest, becomes wider in seeking to increase just and equitable prosperity or referred to as the welfare state (harsono 2003). the understanding of the meaning of the paradigm is divided into two camps based on two separate articles in the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia. first, there is the state’s power to regulate agrarian resources, as defined in article 33 paragraph (3) of the republic of indonesia’s 1945 constitution of indonesia, and second, the acceptance of customary law, as defined in article 18b paragraph (1). (2) of the 1945 constitution of indonesian republic. article 33 paragraph (3) of the republic of indonesia’s 1945 constitution of indonesia introduces the phrase ‘managed by the state’, which can be construed as ‘statebased management of agrarian resources,’ which indicates state-based management of agrarian resources, yet article 18b paragraph (2) demonstrates the acknowledgment of indigenous peoples and the laws that apply therein, which has implications for the recognition of the notion of communal ownership. in terms of land ownership, the two notions are in conflict; on the one hand, the state has administrative jurisdiction over the entire country’s territory, while indigenous peoples have their own authority over customary land under the concept of community ownership. in general, according to purbacaraka and halim (1984), customary land rights found in various ethnic groups in indonesia can be divided into two forms, namely: ‘ulayat rights’ and ‘use rights’. ulayat rights are rights to gather or collect forest products and the right to hunt. in this communal ulayat right, in essence, there is also an individual right to control part of the object of control of the ulayat right. for a time, a person has the right to cultivate and control a piece of land by taking the proceeds, but that does not mean that the customary rights to the land will be erased because of it. customary rights continue to overlay or overcome these personal or individual rights. the ulayat rights will only recover when the person has relinquished his control rights over the ulayat land. at the same time, the right to use allows someone to use. a plot of land for his interests, usually for rice fields and fields that have been opened and worked continuously for a long time. meanwhile, van dijk (purbacaraka & halim 1984 ) divides customary land rights into three forms: partnership or lordship rights, individual rights, and the right to collect land products. the differences are as follows: • partnership or mastery rights have external and internal consequences. the internal consequences include allowing members of the alliance (ethnic, sub-ethnic, or family) to take advantage of the land and everything on it, such as building houses, hunting, or herding livestock. permits are only used for the needs of family life and themselves, not for trading. the result of exit is a prohibition on outsiders to take advantage of customary land, except after obtaining permission and after paying the recognition fee, and the prohibition of restrictions or various binding regulations on people to obtain individual rights to agricultural land. • individual rights to customary land consist of customary property rights (inland bezitrecht), where the person concerned has his energy and business continuously invested in the land so that its power is increasingly real and recognised by other members. the power of the clan or alliance is diminishing while the power of the individual is getting stronger. this property right can be cancelled if it is no longer cultivated, the owner leaves the land, or the imposed obligations are not fulfilled. • third is the right to collect land products (genotrecht) and the right to withdraw the results. this land is principally the communal property of the ethnic unit, but everyone can collect the product nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202234 or take whatever is produced by the plants on the land. the customary land tenure was initially not encouraged to be registered because of ownership rights. land ownership begins with occupying an area by an indigenous community called communal land (shared land). in rural areas outside java, the land is recognised by unwritten customary law based on ancestry or territory. along with changes in socio-economic patterns in each community, this jointly owned land of the customary community is gradually controlled by community members through rotating cultivation. the individual ownership system then began to be recognised in the communal ownership system. this situation has continued in the kingdoms and sultanates since the 5th century and developed with the arrival of the dutch colonialists in the 17th century, who brought their concept of land law (pakage 2012). during the dutch colonial period, individual land ownership led to a dualism of land law, namely lands under customary law and lands subject to western law. according to dutch land law, jointly owned customary land and individual customary lands are under the control of the state. individual rights to land, such as property rights, are recognised as limited to western law. this property right is generally granted to urban and plantation lands in rural areas. ownership of customary land is an understanding of property rights in a broad sense so that in order to try to find a general understanding of ownership rights, the term ownership rights will be described. the term property rights is essentially more concrete because it leads to the understanding of an object that someone will own (pakage 2012). the customary land tenure registration, which produces a certificate on the land’s ownership rights, has long become a problem in the west sumatra area, including nagari kayu tanam. those who object to this registration suspect that the registration of the customary land tenure will cause the loss of the commonality of this land. worse, they believe that it will eradicate the existence of the customary land as it will turn into individually-owned land. the land registration, proven by a certificate, is deemed the process of individualising the customary land initially communally owned. this perspective is supported by van vallenhoven’s argument, as quoted by simarmata (simarmata, 2018), that stated that the right to customary land (beschikingsrecht) is independent. as an independent right, the customary land of which the management is based on customary law is adequate to become the guidelines in managing the customary land usage for the members of the customary people and other parties. the management of the customary land as an independent right is strengthened by the community independence, which may be seen from the saying, ‘adat salingka nagari’ (inherited rules) (yulisman, 2018). this saying gives a strong understanding on the autonomy of indigenous people, where the rulings on the customary land, which is based on the customary law, are a system of rights applied in the scope of the nagari area. the choice of land acknowledgement in the form of a certificate eases this customary land for economic interests, as it has a more substantial basis in civil law. article 32 clause (1) of the governmental decree no. 24 of 1997 on land registration states that the certificate works as a vital instrument of evidence. apart from showing the certainty on the land tenure, it also eases the quantitative measurement of the land’s price, providing its physical data. the certificate may be collateral to the bank to receive some funds as an economic instrument. the study results of the team of customary land bill formulation in 2001 showed that from the 400 people interviewed, 295 people or 73.75% agree that the certification of ownership should be carried out on customary land. a further 80 people or 20% disagreed, and the rest, 25 people or 6.25%, did not answer (kelompok studi pembaruan agraria, 2001). this phenomenon must be interpreted as the indigenous people’s openness towards developing values, such as issuing land certificates, without ignoring the land tenure values inherited from the ancestors. nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202235 with the perspective of legal pluralism, ade saptomo (2010) stated that behind a certificate, the assumption of incorporation is born between the customary law and the national law, where the former accepts part of the latter’s legal elements and vice versa. it means that some people in an area agree to accept the elements of national law, and the national law does not mind accommodating the people’s interests. in several periods, the state has been inconsistent in implementing the constitutional acknowledgement of customary rights such as the customary land tenure rights. it is seen from the limitation of authorities on the customary land as written in the derivative laws from the constitutional stipulations or the ministerial decrees. modern legal stipulations such as the laws, decrees of the ministry, and the regional regulations on the customary land still tend to limit the customary authorities in managing their customary land. the law enforcement on the customary land certification becomes a solution to the polemic regarding the customary land status. unfortunately, it also results in new problems for the indigenous people regarding the ownership rights of that land (wright, 2011). ownership rights may be viewed as the right for the land object. this right gives the right-holder the power to obtain and use the results of that land as a whole. the holder also has the right to use that land as an eigenaar (owner) by still considering the local customary law regulations and governmental decrees. the person who owns the ownership rights may act as they wish so long as he/she does not violate the local customary law nor violate the limitations established by the government. that person has the right to sell the land, use it as collateral, and hand it over to another person as a gift. when the owner dies, the land becomes the right of the descendants. the (customary) ownership right is the most vital individual right, where the right-holder has an extensive right towards the land, with the condition that he/she must take care of the customary land so long as it exists. the right-holder must also consider other land-owners’ rights, the stipulations that exist, and other regulations (mutangadura,2004). the problems and legal implications of the interaction between customary law and national law the contents of the national law were strengthened in the regions, following the issuing of various legal policies on the control and the usage of natural resources, where the national law becomes the basis for juridical consideration. it means that there are two or more different legal orders in a location, for example, the local cultural order and the national structural order. the main problem that must be carefully analysed may go beyond the interaction between these laws, because of the potential influence of a global perspective. thus, the question is, ‘what is the meaning behind the interaction between national and local law.’ here, the cultural order is defined as not only the organisation which takes care of the culture, but it is also local culture as an institution. the first definition must be touched on, considering that before regional autonomy was applied in areas in the whole archipelago, the village was the last geographic unit, which is viewed as a governmental unit with a state authority. thus, villages became the central reference channel for all social, political, economic, and legal activities. there is the term nagari in west sumatra, and there are other various terms similar to a village to increase the welfare of the local people; original villages as culture-owners are viewed as the frontline social unit which has a local power that is the reference point in every social, economic, political, and legal activity. the presence of more than one normative order in the same area, where both are regarded as proper orders in terms of living laws, will cause interaction between these orders. theoretically, this interaction is likely to result in one of these five changes: first, integration, which is the combination of the state law, the local law, and other similar laws; second, incorporation, which is the adaptation of part of the state law to the local law and vice versa; third, conflict, where the state law and the local law oppose each other; fourth, competition, where the state law, the local law, and other laws run on their own in accessing the natural resources; fifth, avoidance, where one of the existing laws avoids the enforcement of the other. nevertheless, nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202236 if the two laws are accepted as living laws, the logical consequence is incorporation. in this incorporation, one of the laws may weaken while the other strengthens, which will result in changes. this also means that behind the action of land certification in this area of west sumatra, it may be interpreted that there is the localisation of global order, considering that it becomes the meeting point for the global and the local paradigms. because of that, in the global perspective, the conflict between the newcomers and the local people in the oil palm plantations, for instance, is deemed a conflict between two great global order ideologies, which are individualism-capitalism and collectivism-socialism, which is ‘facilitated’ by the state towards the local people. koesnoe (1992) has took a different perspective on global power. he stated that there is a point of contact between local and global power, in that both try to reach their goals of material prosperity in their people, considering that both accept modernism. nevertheless, if modernism is perceived from its non-physical aspect, there are differences between the customary and the global powers (saptomo, 2010). there are differences between the customary and global life philosophies, such as collectivism versus individualism. the two are not new rights, considering that legal experts have analysed the opposition of these two powers since the ancient greek era. nevertheless, two life orders in the same area will interact as mentioned above. there is a saying in customary philosophy, ‘serapat-rapat orang membuat pagar tentu ada butulannya’, (if people build a fence, of course there is a need), which means there must be flaws in each system. such a phenomenon may be seen from the strength of the local power, which resides in the customary land among the minangkabau people of west sumatra. the local power lives side-by-side with the global power, facilitated by the state. it makes the local power integrate with the state or the global power, including regarding the land tenure status. such a situation causes the local power to submit to the global power. this means the orientation of the global power will push into the body of the local power. the regional law no. 6 of 2008 on customary land and its usage, especially the chapter which regulates the registration and the legal subject of the customary land, are concrete and current examples of what has been explained above. article 8, chapter v of this regional law regulates the customary land registration and legal subject. it states that to guarantee legal certainty and fulfil the need for land data, the customary land mentioned in article 5 may be registered to the city/regency land agency. as the customary land is not an object of land registration according to the governmental decree no. 24 of 1997 on the land registration, thus the customary land may be registered according to the rights for land tenure, which is regulated in law on agrarian principles, which becomes the object of land registration. understanding the series of local wisdom in general and the customary laws in particular has theoretical implications for the development of legal studies and the growth of indonesian law. in the context of knowledge development, there are always two approaches. the first is the formal, rigid, stagnant approach on one side and the second is a dynamic and fluid approach. it is undoubtedly unsatisfactory to use the former approach in developing legal studies, as the law becomes uninteresting and cooped up in the past. it eradicates the character of opened knowledge and becomes closed. the republic of indonesia’s constitution as mandated in article 18b, clause (2), of the republic of indonesia’s 1945 constitution acknowledges and respects the units of indigenous people and their traditional rights so long as they still live and so long as they are according to the social development and the principles of the republic of indonesia as regulated in the law (bedner & huis 2008).this article has a profound meaning for the development of legal studies and state law, considering that there are societies that live in villages and that the customary archipelagic laws apply in these villages. legal practitioners have also been given the room to develop it in the pragmatic world. a judge’s verdict will become positive law. because of that, an excellent positive law must be in accord with the living law so that it may have high enforceability. nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202237 such laws are grown and developed even more with legal protections, as can be seen in the case of the minangkabau people, described above. thus, the local laws which embrace the wisdom mentioned above may be revitalised. in such context, the living law theory developed by austrian legal expert eugen ehrlich (1913) is as follows: the law may only be correctly understood from the sociological context. this theory implies that the law of legal experts is only one of the normative orders developed by society. all social processes such as marriage, inheritance, and business relations come before the state regulations, and they may only be understood from their social backgrounds. according to ehrlich (1913), the norms which regulate social life are reflected in the sources of customary laws, such as the law and the case verdicts. there is an undeniable gap between the positive law and actual practices. thus, the living law is the practised law, but it combines the official law and the society’s values, perceptions, and strategies, creating a new hybrid. the law is behind social practices, but members of the society oppose these practices in some cases. ehrlich emphasises that state law can never be the only source of law. nevertheless, this critical fact has been forgotten or, more precisely, marginalised from time to time. there has never been a time when the law published by the state becomes the only law, even in the court and other authorities; thus, there is always an undercurrent that tries to uphold an equal position for non-state laws. this theoretical approach results in significant problems in legal understanding. first, ehrlich emphasises that understanding the living law of a community requires us to see further beyond the manifestations of the ceremonial law and concentrate on how people live in society. second, ehrlich minimises the significance of the state and its legal institutions as the source of law. for him, the state’s formal legal laws are determined as only one of the social controls. he views that local customs and cultures, family and groups, morality and norms of certain groups contribute to the living law. third, there is the emphasis on the critical elements in structures of norms that are formally published as law or which exist informally as social order, which are imposed with social pressures. according to ehrlich (1913, p.142), the living law concept, just as the law, is created from the influences of various social powers as stated as follows: ‘the living law is the law which are not determined in legal statements, but are dominant in life. sources of knowledge are above all modern legal documents, but also its direct application in life, in trade, in other activities, habits, cultures and customs and all organisations, all those which are acknowledged by the law and those which are ignored or marginalised, even those which are legally unaccepted.’ if the law is approached formally, the question is whether or not the law, usually called the customary law, is still believed by society as an adequate facility to resolve legal problems that emerge among them. it is undoubtedly not the case. an example is the disputes on water and land resources among the minangkabau people. during the dispute and its settlement, the local values were viewed as that which is deemed as right (sembiring 2018, p.21). diagonal conflicts, that is, differences in perspective on an issue, and negotiations on the agrarian dispute have implications for legal development, considering that the local people’s cultural channels have started to gain power in the current regional autonomy era. the customary land tenure often faces disputes, usually due to the unclear ownership status. this is one of the things which motivate the customary land certification. the difference in the customary land dispute resolution in west sumatra results in an idea that can be applied to the land certification program. this land certification is a manifestation of the agrarian law stipulations. one of the main objectives of the law on agrarian principles no. 5 of 1960 is to create the basis to give legal interests on the land tenure rights for all citizens. article 19 of this law regulates land tenure through the efforts of administrative nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202238 order, which is carried out by establishing land registration for all of indonesia. this is to guarantee the legal certainty of the land through the customary land certification. the law renewal and the interactions between the laws, between localcustomary law and state-national law law renewal includes forming new legal regulations and refining the existing ones so that they are according to the people’s interests in a particular legal field. this legal renewal is related to the law’s role as an instrument or a facility of social renewal. this law renewal is adopted from the theory that states, ‘the law is a tool of social engineering’. in indonesia, this opinion was first popularised by mochtar kusumaatmadja, who stated that: ‘the law as a tool of social engineering means that the law’s role in the development is to guarantee that this change happens in an orderly manner, which is the change though good legal procedure, both in the form of legislations or verdicts of courtly institutions.’ (1986, p. 415) the law renewal is necessary as the law’s performance in the society is often behind the phenomenon it regulates, as the people’s interests experience developments according to its era (het recht hinkt achter de feiten aan) (mertokusumo 1986). there is an interaction between the law and social change in the law’s development process. how far can the other fields become changed by the law, or how far can these other fields change the law? satjipto rahardjo, as quoted by andi nuzul (2016, p.63), stated that legal development has two meanings: a. it may be defined as an effort to renew the positive law itself so that it is according to its aim to give service to the society in its maximum updated development level. it is a definition that is often called legal modernisation. b it may also be defined as an effort to functionalise the law in the development era by participating in social changes as needed by the developing society. the preamble of the 1945 constitution states the vision of the indonesian nation to create its law which is a result of the characteristics of the indonesians. rumonda nasution (nuzul 2016, p.84), further stated that: a. to achieve the indonesian’s vision as stated in the 1945 constitution’s preamble, in line with the development in other fields, thus in the legal concept, the indonesians will not be behind. b. according to society’s legal awareness and human rights, the law renewal from the colonial law to the national law becomes the vision of the nation. thus, the law renewal means creating what is nonexistent and refining and completing what exists. the law renewal is necessary due to social renewal, which runs rapidly due to increased human needs and interests. romunda nasution added that: the development of knowledge and modern technologies results to highly meaningful impacts to life, thus the law must be renewed and this is where there is relevance for law renewal to create a national legal order which has the core of justice (nuzul 2016, p. 84). nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202239 based on the description above, it can be concluded that for a developing country such as indonesia, development in the various legal fields may be carried out through law renewal as one of the facilities in achieving the nation’s legal visions. according to moores, as cited by ade saptomo (2007), interaction between law occurs when state and local law interact in the same local community, resulting in multiple possible interactions. the interaction in question may result in the integration of state and local laws or a potential conflict between the two sets of laws. the interaction between customary law and state law can be observed in the transformation of the concept of tenure over customary land, as has occurred in the nagari kayu tanam. the concept of customary land tenure is fundamentally based on communal ownership, but the existence of state law (permitting individual ownership) has prompted the concept of customary land tenure to change. one of the administrative regions in west sumatra, nagari kayu tanam, exemplifies the interaction between the concepts of communal ownership based on customary law and private ownership based on national law. in nagari kayu tanam, the interplay between national law and customary law is founded on principles that are closely tied to minangkabau culture. these values connect to mystical religious ideals as well as values of self-existence, social kinship, tradition, structure, and socioeconomic assets. although these values may change from one nagari to another (village level government), the variation still reflects the initial fundamental principles. religious beliefs in supernatural beings that have a mystical effect on people are strongly related to values held in accordance with their religious traditions. this influence can be seen in the sanctification of a number of plots of land that are seen to be closely related to their beliefs in order to impose limitations on the activities that can be done there. the depletion of this value has a significant impact on the idea of using land in a customary way, particularly when the idea of private land ownership is present. this leads to the loss of the sacred culture of using land in a customary way and the creation of opportunities for private use and ownership. self-existence is a minangkabau cultural value that relates to respect for fundamental human rights, especially nagari kayu tanam. these principles emphasise the need for humans to respect one another (individual rights), and in the context of indigenous communities, individual rights are not permitted to conflict with customary interests. the deterioration of this value is more evident in the abolition of communal rights; in other words, there is an increase in the respect for individual rights, making it feasible to construct private property rights on customary land. it is demonstrated that this social phenomenon occurs in the nagari kayu tanam community. in the nagari kayu tanam customary society, the interplay between customary law and national law is also demonstrated by the deterioration of the social value of kinship. this value alludes to the concept of communal tenure, in which kinship is derived through the shared usage of customary land. if a person is a member of a customary community, he or she may utilise the customary land for his or her own profit (but not for commercial purposes) as if they were all related, notwithstanding the absence of a direct blood tie. this virtue is eroding due to the growth of the concept of individuality in relation to private property. consequently, non-relative individuals can no longer benefit from land (once customary land) owned by others. in the context of customary land ownership in nagari kayu tanam, cultural values are not spared either. inasmuch as each customary behaviour is rooted on the community’s religious beliefs, there is a significant association between traditional values and magical religious ideals. this decline in worth is also associated with the loss of sanctity on customary lands. in the domain of customary land ownership, one of the values that has changed is the value of social structure. the decline in the integrity of traditional heads (ninik mamak), particularly in nagari kayu tanam, indicates deteriorating structural values of indigenous peoples. the decline in integrity refers to nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202240 the poor effort of the customary head in preserving these values, which no longer adheres to the notion of communal ownership of customary land. moreover, the decline in the customary head’s integrity diminishes the public’s faith in him. among indigenous peoples, socioeconomic values appear to be the most dominating values undergoing change, particularly in nagari kayu tanam. this transition is determined by alterations in social contact prompted by the modern era and the economic dynamics of the community. existence of a people’s nucleus plantation cooperation agreement (pir) indicates a shift in socioeconomic values, notably for oil palm commodities. nagari kayu tanam, which borders oil palm plantations, and indigenous peoples receive the opportunity to become plasma farmers with 2 hectares of land rights, if the land comes from customary land that is converted into oil palm plantations because it is deemed to provide substantial economic benefits. the land, which was initially communally owned, was thereafter transferred to private ownership. figure 1. interaction between the customary law and the national law. nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202241 through the change in customary values that affects the concept of land ownership (from communal to individual), it is possible to discern the relationship between customary law and national law, particularly in regards to land ownership law. these connections can take the shape of positive or bad interactions, depending on one’s perspective, but they reflect a merger of customary law and national law in particular (seeing the facts that occurred in nagari kayu tanam). moreover, this integration is demonstrated by the issuance of regional regulation no.2/2007 on nagari government, the regional regulation no.6/2008 on customary rights and its usage, regulation of the national land agency no.35/2016 which is changed to the regulation of the national land agency 12/2017 on the acceleration of the land certification. the following chart outlines some of the potential interactions between local and state law. from the figure above, it can be concluded that the interaction between customary law and national law, especially with regard to customary land tenure rights, is religious-magical, self-existence, socialkinship, customs-culture, and socio-economic especially in nagari kayu tanam. it must accept part of the national law or the positive law, including the 1945 constitution, the agrarian law, and the governmental decrees no. 24/1997 and 40/1996. on the other hand, the national law accepts sources of customary law. the interaction between the two laws produces an incorporation model that can create a new national legal provision that accommodates customary law. some of these provisions include regional regulation number 2 of 2007 concerning nagari government; regional regulation number 6 of 2008 concerning customary rights and their use, as well as regulation of the national land agency no. 35 of 2016, which was changed to regulation of the national land agency 12 of 2017 concerning acceleration of land certification. its application must go through the process in the local customary law order. the creation of land tenure right certification of the customary land may become a concept of the customary land tenure pattern, which in the future must be based on the values which live within the customary people. all people may effectively accept the law or all human beings; it is sourced from the people and from religious teachings. law is ‘social law’. it is formed through habit. the habit gradually binds and becomes a practical order. furthermore, life goes on according to that order. the state’s authority does not determine the binding power of the ‘living law.’ it does not depend on the competence of the leaders in the state. indeed, all laws from an external perspective can be regulated by state agencies, but from an internal perspective, the relationships within social groups depend on the members of that group. the living law is legal norms (rechtsnormen) (rahardjo, 2000). in this case, the government must not make mistakes again in making laws and policies detrimental to indigenous peoples in indonesia, but carry out consistently what is good already, regulated in-laws and regulations that protect the lives of indigenous peoples, especially in the control of customary land rights. what has happened before the 1998 democratic reforms can no longer continue to happen. in the future, the government should not make regulations or policies that prioritise certain groups, groups, and ethnicities for investment and other interests but must return to the goal of the state, which is to achieve prosperity for all indonesian people. the community must continue to care and comply with the value of customary land tenure rights, which as long as it grows and develops in a community and is believed to be true, can maintain the harmony of the pattern of life of the community itself. strengthening the role and integrity of the customary head led by ninik mamak (honourable men) or penghulu (the village head man), the customary head must be determined or chosen correctly and responsibly. the elected customary head must be an honest person of high-integrity who can maintain and implement customary values in a particular community. in the value of customary land tenure rights, the customary head must have no interests other than maintaining the customary dignity, which upholds morals and ethics and is not easily tempted by the lure of material, position, power, and other interests. although currently there has been a change in the value of land tenure with ulayat rights, in terms of the principle of changing ulayat land tenure, it must involve the participation of the customary head, especially in approving applications, acknowledgements, or through the affirmation nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202242 of rights to customary land or for land with ulayat rights to become property rights. as has been indicated, among other alterations in attitudes related customary land ownership, the significance of social structure and the role of customary heads are also crucial elements. customary heads play a crucial role in preserving customary values, both in terms of customary practises and customary ownership, as is well understood. the customary head has the authority to deny the release of customary land for non-customs-related commercial or personal interests. however, the customary head can also relinquish communal rights to customary land for certain purposes, such as the conversion of land functions into oil palm plantations, as occurred in nagari kayu tanam. the house of representatives, both at the central and regional levels, in making laws and regulations governing the control of customary land rights must involve indigenous peoples. the laws and regulations that currently regulate the control of customary land rights include regional regulation no. 6 of 2008 concerning communal land and its utilisation and perkaban no. 12 of 2017 concerning acceleration of complete systematic land certification; it is necessary to make changes and not make articles that have multiple interpretations and weaken the existence of customary land rights. however, it is necessary to make laws and regulations that accommodate the noble values of customary land tenure that live in the community and provide legal certainty and the welfare of indigenous peoples. the value of land tenure with ulayat rights can still be maintained by being accommodated in the new laws and regulations that will regulate the control of ulayat land rights. conclusion the concept of customary land tenure must be based on the values that live within the customary people so long as they are deemed right. it is found that there are six values in the land tenure. in this case, the government cannot create constitutional regulations regarding customary land rights, in one-direction or top-down. on the contrary, it must consider the objective and benefits of creating those regulations aimed at the maximum welfare of the people. it must also consider the local wisdom values that have existed for centuries. the values of the customary land tenure must be accommodated in the national law so that the new laws created may be implemented and obtain support from the indigenous people. in essence, the legal development in the society becomes beneficial if the law may honestly and realistically absorb the life values which exist in the society; thus, the law will become the guidelines for all members of the society. in the end, it will become a culture where one day the law is not needed anymore as the legal morals and ethics will be carried out and complied with. this research has not been able to explore all the problems of land tenure rights that occur in the kayu tanam village in particular, and in general in indonesia. therefore, further research to analyse the problem of land tenure with customary rights so that it does not continue to become a conflict between indigenous peoples will be necessary. it must position customary law communities as a subject that must be heard and photographed in all aspects of culture, social life, customs, and local wisdom as what is believed to be confirmed by the community. acknowledgements we would like to express our gratitude to the universitas muhammadiyah tangerang and universitas pancasila for their assistance with this research. nasir and saptomo cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202243 references atmaja, g. m. w. 2018, ‘legal pluralism politics towards recognition of social unity in 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interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 3 202245 https://doi.org/10.20961/yustisia.v5i2.8744 https://doi.org/10.20961/yustisia.v5i2.8744 https://doi.org/10.33331/rechtsvinding.v7i2.251 https://doi.org/10.33331/rechtsvinding.v7i2.251 https://doi.org/10.21082/fae.v24n1.2006.14-27 cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 15, no. 1 2023 © 2023 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: seigngoura, y. 2023. toward a petrodevelopmental state? merits and demerits of the chadian rentier state. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 15:1, 78– 90. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8424 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) toward a petrodevelopmental state? merits and demerits of the chadian rentier state yorbana seigngoura university of neuchâtel, institute of sociology corresponding author: yorbana seign-goura, university of neuchâtel, faubourg de l’hôpital 27, 2000 neuchâtel, switzerland, syorbana@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8424 article history: received 26/10/2022; revised 02/12/2022; accepted 02/12/2022; published 26/03/2023 abstract the discovery of oil in chad in the 1960s and its subsequent exploitation triggered the idea by international institutions that oil extraction would lead to sustainable development. furthermore, chad in tackling the resource curse would use rents to solve social, economic and security challenges on its territory. i argue that the state is the main actor in the resource curse, and its power derives rents from natural resources extraction. the curse emerges under local or international institutional pressures even if political outcomes are contextual and based on local norms. drawing on theories of rentier state and developmental state, this paper seeks to critically explore local and international pressures that pull the state towards rentier behaviors resulting in poor local development outcomes. keywords resource curse; chad; oil; rentier state; developmental state 78 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8424 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8424 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:syorbana@gmail.com https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8424 introduction in 2003, chad became an oilexporting country. the main actors in the extractive sector were exxon mobil, china national petroleum corporation international chad (cnpcic) and glencore (angloswiss firm). this conglomerate of petroleum actors formed the association of petroleum exporters of chad (apec) with the intention of pooling together their resources, claiming to be tackling longstanding crises in the oil sector associated with the resource curse (exxonmobil 2015, p. 5). the first oil project named chadcameroon development project started in 2000, and the fields were predicted to produce a billion barrels of oil in 25 years. within two decades, the oil windfall came to bolster chad’s budget, which at the time was one of the poorest countries in the world. the world bank decided to support the $4 billion project to test the potential for an oil project to alleviate poverty, maintain environmental standards, and minimize the impact on indigenous people (esty 2001), in short, to promote sustainable development. chad is a particularly interesting case as it had witnessed the consolidation of multinationals from three continents: american, asian and european. a new asian actor (china national petroleum corporation international in chad, cnpcic) interacted with the more established european and american international corporate actors. this time, however, the interaction was characterized in theory by the private petroleum sector’s contribution to sustainable development. the common denominator of the multinationals’ presence in chad is the oil rent that they produce, which is managed by the state in a public private partnership aimed at improving development outcomes. according to the international crisis group (icg), between 2004 and 2014, the chad state budget had ‘more than quadrupled, from approximately $670 million to more than $2.8 billion’ (icg 2016, p. 15). the petroleum sector thus contributes nearly 80% of the state budget, making chad a rentier1 state. rentier states have long been controversial due to the presence of corruption and poverty, authoritarianism, and poor governance, and therefore implicated in what developed countries have described as the resource curse (karl 1997; le billon 2005; ross 2012). however, in chad, the world bank proposed a novel framework for managing oil revenues, establishing a ‘revenue management plan’ (rmp) to isolate chad’s project revenues and direct them to poverty reduction programs. this poses the question of whether the extractive sector was indeed driving chad toward a sustainable form of development. this article explores the trajectory of the chadian state since the beginning of petroleum exploitation in the country. it analyzes the policies and practices of the regime in a context dominated by the rent produced by various actors, especially by the multinational oil firms, along with world bankpromoted antipoverty measures, set in the wider local context of poverty in which the chadian petroleum projects arose. the study contributes to the ongoing debate about the contribution of the extractive industries to sustainable development. using literature reviews, indepth interviews with oil actors in chad, especially chadian authorities, oil workers, local community representatives, oil corporate representatives, civil society members, and research consultants, i gathered information about extractive sector outcomes after more than a decade of oil extraction. oil archives in chad from multinationals, the state, and civil society organizations were also consulted within the framework of this research. i further used the qualitative data collected on the management of oil revenues from march 2014 to december 2017 while i was as ph.d. student researching the responsible management of the oil sector in chad. based on the data, the article argues the state is the main actor and derives its power from resource rents in the context of international agencies and local players. to explore this, this article first discusses the nature of the chadian state and its potential transformation from a rentier to developmental logic; second, it traces the trajectory of fossil fuel development in the country and discusses implications of the analysis. 1 the term ‘rentier state’ here refers to a state in which a large part of the resources is the product of a rentier activity (such as the exploitation of raw materials, foreign aid) as opposed to rent from a production system of a country (private, public companies in the country). seign-goura cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202379 unveiling the chadian state: from rentier state to a developmental state? rentier state theory hussein mahdavy (1970) was the first scholar to use the term ‘rentier state’ to characterize the situation of rent seeking that prevailed in iran in the 1960s. hazem beblawi and giacomo luciani (1987) have then employed this term in analyzing economic and political situations throughout the arab world considering arab countries’ wealth from oil and oil revenues use. their analysis makes clear that gulf countries, rich in oil and gas, are rentier states that accumulate rents from the sale of oil to external partners, and redistribute such wealth to varying degrees, often unevenly throughout society. with the crises and conflicts, analysts have observed the economic importance of oil and the paradoxes of its economic impact and transformational policies at the local level in resourcerich countries. in addition to spectacular enrichment, oil producing countries suffered from political instability and democratic deficit, which contrasts with their rentier wealth (karl 1997; ross 2012; van der ploeg & venables 2011). other scholars combine the rentier state with the neopatrimonial state, a system of governance centered upon a leader and/or elite that has monopolistic control of rents resulting in predatory forms of politics (bach 2011). this elite rests on a patronage network and nepotistic system. the theory of neo patrimonialism is defined by the fact that everything revolves around a single leader who is a monarch or a president and who manipulates the elite to their personal benefit (bach & gazibo 2011). hence, the rentier system has paradoxical effects throughout society, including the illicit enrichment of the political and economic elite, with rampant corruption and mismanagement, clientelism, poor economic development, and a democratic deficit. the combination of neopatrimonialism and the rentier state underpins the ‘resource curse’ theory (stevens et al. 2013; stevens 2015). corruption, embezzlement, and mismanagement are evidenced in the extractive sector, and rentier states often invest more in repression and security than in social, political, and economic development (mailey 2015, p. 101). many criticisms were raised about the extractive industries transparency initiative (eiti)2, which centered on promoting transparency through the publication of information related to the extractive value chain. the initiative did not prevent ongoing mismanagement and rampant corruption in the extractive sector (hilson & maconachie 2009; hoinathy & jánszky 2017; keblusek 2010; mailey 2015). while raising questions about the developmental outcome of eiti, rustad, le billon, & lujala (2017) suggest that this initiative should be assessed by looking at each objective set by the international organizations. along similar lines, some countries rich in natural resources have put in place development strategies that focus on a centralized state, a central element to the developmental state theory and its effects. this brings us to developmental state theory and its relevance in chad. developmental state theory the concept of developmental state theory was introduced after world war ii. it refers to state intervention in the economy to support economic growth and development. the second world war left countries devastated, and a new type of economic policy took hold. this new policy focused on the growth of heavy industries and saw state planning as key to economic recovery and success. the main actor in this recovery was thus the state, which incorporated and executed economic policies imposed by large postwar financial institutions. as loriaux (1999, p. 24) put it: ‘the developmental state is an embodiment of a normative or moral ambition to use the interventionist power of the state to guide investment in a way that promotes a 2 the extractive industries transparency initiative (eiti), active since 2002, works to promote transparency and accountability in countries rich in natural resources to allow enhanced value and a more efficient use of resources being extracted. seign-goura cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202380 certain solidaristic vision of the national economy’. this interventionism is executed via industrialization policies, of which the state is the central actor, with everything revolving around the state to ensure these sovereign functions. developmental state theory has experienced ‘ups and downs’ as stated by fritz and rocha menocal: ‘the developmental state was encouraged in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly during the period of reconstruction. the 1970s and the early 1980s, however, it saw an evolution toward what ultimately became the washington consensus, which focused on marketbased policies and structural adjustment programs (saps). the success of several asian states in the 1990s, however, led to a reevaluation of these policies. international financial institutions (ifis) still encourage countries to rely on free markets, though combined with good governance as methods of socioeconomic stimulus and development’ (fritz & rocha menocal 2006, p. 6). there is an ongoing debate about whether african states which gained their independence in the 1960s and adopted a set of policies based on state intervention in the economy, industrialization policies and then neoliberal policies (with mixed results) are developmental states (mbabazi & taylor 2005; mkandawire 2001). some scholars critical of orthodox development thinking suggested the term postdevelopment to refer to the focus of african countries on policies promoting social justice, equity and redistribution of growth by a green state (death 2016). considered together, developmental states, particularly those rich in natural resources, therefore rely on a development strategy that coincides with decades of advice promulgated by ifis, compounded by rentier income. in this way, the chadian regime as a resourcerich country for more than a decade can be said to be rentier state, effectively a petrodevelopmental state. rentier state and developmental state theories had derived concepts of petrodevelopmental state or petrostateleddevelopment that would also confirm this interpretation. as well, ovadia (2016) developed the theory of the petrodevelopmental state, which focuses on how resourcerich countries use rents for their socioeconomic development. the state, in this case, is the principal actor in terms of rentierfinanced public policy and its means are the rents from natural resources extraction. similar development paths were taken by rwanda and tanzania recently, but not by kenya (nwapi & andrews, 2017). overall, ovadia and wolf (2018) have shown the benefits of using a case study method to explore the petrodevelopmental state in africa. the chadian state is experiencing such structural dynamics with the oil extraction, and this would be a good case study. the political economy of petroleum extraction in chad oil was discovered in chad in the 1960s but because chad is landlocked, a pipeline needed to be constructed for this extraction project to materialize in a challenging geographical, social, and political environment. in 2000, a consortium of companies (exxon mobil, chevron, texaco, and petronas) came together to initiate this project with the support of the world bank group. in this consortium, exxon mobil3 was to retain 40% of oil rights and the malaysian company petronas carigali 35%, then chevron 25% in a concession contract with the state (gary & reisch 2005). as of 2014, chad’s national oil company, la société des hydrocarbures du tchad (sht the hydrocarbon society of chad) has retained 25% of what was formerly chevron rights. this consortium of companies exploits oil in the kome, miandoum, moundouli, and bolobo fields in the southern part of chad. the second key actor in this domain is china national petroleum corporation international chad (cnpcic); a chadbased subsidiary of the chinese national oil company. cnpcic acquired its stake 3 in chad, esso or essochad are local names used to refer to exxon mobil. seign-goura cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202381 in 2006 by taking concessions from cliveden and encana, and today is active in oil fields throughout the country, including mimosa, ronier, baobab, doséo and others. in 2011, cnpcic built a refinery in djarmaya, a suburban area at about 40 kilometers from the capital of n’djamena, which refines oil that belongs 60% to cnpc and 40% to the chadian state (kummer & urech 2017, p. 9). another important player in this oil field is glencore, which saw the metamorphosis from the canadian caracal energy, to griffith, and to a petrochad limited conglomerate. the transformation of these entities was finalized in 2014, when glencore, which had initially arrived in chad in 2013 to sell chadian oil, bought shares in petrochad limited. since 2014, these entities have operated with a shared production contract in the doi, dob, doh, borongop, and chari east doséo blocks in the southern chad. last but not the least actor is chad’s national petroleum company, the société des hydrocarbures du tchad (sht), who plays a significant role in the chadian extractive sector. a 2006 law4 established the national petroleum company, which is 100% stateowned and is explicitly dedicated to commercializing state petroleum5, to assuring activities in upstream and downstream oil production, and underpinning the refining, stockage, and distribution of refined petroleum. in practice, the sht manages the petroleum activities of the state but also plays a commercial role. the history of petroleum exploitation in chad is particularly interesting in terms of how it materialized. in 1999, there was an agreement among international financial institutions (the world bank and international monetary fund), multinational oil firms, and the governments of chad and cameroon to establish mechanisms that would prevent the emergence of a resource curse in the region. this ambitious project was to occur in one of the world’s poorest states, marred by conflict and a democratic deficit (winters & gould 2011, p. 231). given the domestic political climate, the international financial institutions encouraged chad’s government to comply with certain normative standards of the international community, resulting in a set of good governance initiatives and policy reforms. the world bank project was regarded as an ambitious ‘experiment’ reflecting an ostensibly post neoliberal development philosophy that recognized the need for state regulation to prevent a recurrence of the resource curse phenomenon, which had affected most resourcerich countries in the developing world (winters & gould 2011). the strategy adopted by the world bank was to create publicprivate partnerships, to create synergies beneficial to all stakeholders. the expected objective of the project was to avoid the oil curse and all provisions were geared to achieving this objective. how were these policy provisions executed in chad’s extractive projects? the following brief discusses how the chadian state became a major player in extractive governance but has not achieved the expected goal of poverty reduction. chadian state petroleum governance challenges at the inauguration of the komé site in 2003, chad’s government promised to fight against poverty and to build a stronger future for upcoming generations. a key issue here was to design policy that would serve as a restraint for a rentier regime. the world bank played a crucial role in funding chad and cameroon the project on the condition that the government would adopt good governance policies (esty 2001). however, in chad the upper layers within the state administration and the main institutions managing oil revenues were under the control of the president. in 2004, the president appointed his brotherinlaw as the director of the central bank in chad. members of the central bank’s committee in charge of oil 4 law no 27/pr/2006 is the law establishing the creation of the national company in charge of the hydrocarbon exploration, development, and commercialization. 5 it should be remembered that in chad’s productionsharing contract with glencore, chad is entitled to sell the crude oil belonging to the country. seign-goura cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202382 revenue allocations and control, ccsrp6, were not independent as most of them were from the president’s circle, except for the representatives of civil society organizations (hansen 2017, p. 73). the personalization of state control over oil revenues was thus pervasive. these practices reflected the presidential nature of chad’s regime and the neopatrimonialism in the country. this is also the analysis of marchal (2016, p. 4) who noticed that after a decade of oil extraction ‘idriss déby’s regime looks like an old family kingdom as his sons, brothers, and inlaws have been appointed in state positions that give them access to wealth, power and coercion’. similar issues of patronage and clientelism were reported by other scholars (kummer & urech 2017; tubiana & debos 2017). multinational firms became a lifeline for the regime, controlled by a family, instead of contributing to alleviating local poverty. as coll (2012, p. 367) puts it, projects in chad allowed ‘exxonmobil and its partners to generate several billions of dollars of topline revenue, to forge a path to profitability just as world oil prices spiked, and embedded themselves with déby’s regime, positioning the corporation for additional oil deals beyond those covered by original bargain’. yet, this mode of regime governance did not prevent the state from advancing developmental discourse and policy. during the first decade of petroleum exploitation, the chadian regime demonstrated a series of characteristics endemic to resourcerich developmental states. its oil development strategy was presented under the guise of institutional change and came with specific policy changes. in the first instance, chad’s government was successfully able to manipulate various actors to increase its petroleum rents. the demands of chad’s government led to conflicts with its partners, sometimes leading to overt disagreement. pemunta & tabenyang (2016) claimed that the country used its enormous wealth to boost its standing among central african countries and the sahel, torn by violent conflict and endemic poverty. as well, the national strategies and associated programs of combating poverty in chad did partly materialize, funded from oil revenues. however, the president and other elites had a nearly monopolistic control of development policies and failed to enable economic diversification, or to expand investment in the agricultural sector and in rural development (hansen 2017; tubiana & debos 2017). the regime’s policy posturing highlighted the misuse of oil revenue. in 2006, the antagonistic situation culminated in the world bank pulling out of chad, (as noted below), giving the state additional control over the oil projects and the rents. this created more opportunities for resource nationalism and for the populist appeals to the local population in terms of the use of oil extraction for poverty alleviation and to bolster state security. this confirmed the assertion of andreasson (2015) who has shown that resource nationalism is a key tool for oil producers in subsaharan countries to reaffirm sovereignty and control over their resources, with the support of the local populations (whether manipulated or not). discussion: issues and perspectives the merits of the chadian state following a decade of petroleum exploitation, by 2015 government coffers were inundated with oil funds. according to the imf (2016), chad had received over $10 billion in revenues from the petroleum industry between 2000 and 2013. another report from swissaid (see kummer & urech 2017) estimated oil revenues amounting to $13 billion from 2003, equivalent to 65% of government revenue. in some cases, this revenue served to help build social and economic infrastructure, though the overall input into these sectors remained weak compared with other developing countries in the region. according to the central bank’s oil revenue overseeing and control committee, the ccrsp, of the nearly $1.9 trillion in oil revenue obtained 6 ccsrp stands for collège de contrôle et de surveillance des ressources pétrolières. it is a committee overseeing the use of oil revenues in chad. seign-goura cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202383 between 2004 and 2014, 75% was allocated for priority sectors7, 20% went to the public treasury, and 5% was intended to go to the public in the production region (ccsrp 2014). poverty in the country though, was not appreciably reduced. petroleum income therefore played an important role in chad’s gdp and chad’s state budget, but it did not have a significant impact on reducing poverty in the country (hansen 2017, p. 79; pegg 2009). another merit of the regime during this oil era was the important development of norms, laws, and decrees to secure the petroleum industry and to manage petroleum revenues. this, however, led to a series of conflicts between chad and its partners, including the implementation of law no. 001/1999 that codified the creation of a future fund; when the government reversed this law in 2006, the world bank pulled out of the project. in addition, a series of laws within the petroleum sector were introduced to increase government revenue from the sector: the mining law (updated in 2018), the petroleum law, the hydrocarbons law, and certain decrees concerning the management of petroleum revenue (concerning contract renegotiation, tax reform, social conflicts, debt issues). under the socioeconomic plan, the chadian state promoted job creation that arose from the petroleum sector. during the deluge of oil income, administrative institutions in charge of infrastructure were privileged, absorbing 50% of budgetary credits intended for priority sectors (ccsrp 2013). new schools, hospitals, care homes, universities and institutes, paved roads, and public spaces popped up in the capital of n’djamena and in other chadian provinces. these changed infrastructural aspects of the country, especially in the urban space, be it in the capital city or in some rural areas (electrification of doba oil city for instance). another use of increased funds was to construct large statues of soldiers in victorious memory of the country’s military heroes. situated just in front of the presidential palace in n’djamena, the statues serve as a reminder of the country’s military might. (the place is called ‘the nation square’) economic growth, as planned by the international financial institutions, did indeed increase, though temporarily. according to the imf (2015), real gdp increased by 3.6% in 2013, against 8.9% in 2012, while the nonpetroleum gdp growth fell from 11.6% in 2012 to 5% in 2013, due largely to a particularly successful agricultural year followed by a return to a more normal agricultural output. in parallel to those achievements, the official discourse was about economic diversification in chad and the probable end of the oil extraction era. under the political and geopolitical plan, chad became a state at war, both in terms of internal security and in the region, largely in terms of combatting boko haram in neighboring countries (republic of central africa, cameroon, nigeria, niger, and sudan) as well as in mali alongside the french army (pemunta & tabenyang 2016, p. 307). the focus of the chadian regime on security issues was consistent with donors’ policies of development securitization, requiring donor support to address local, regional, or international insecurity or threats (fisher & anderson 2015). revenues from petroleum also permitted the regime to divert revenue from development via illusive narratives, institutional reforms, and a few infrastructure projects. according to the discourse of the official regime, however, these all constituted forms of development. certainly, oil projects in chad have triggered social and economic changes, but the twodecade record is very mixed (leonard 2016; winters & gould 2011). mitigated impacts (or demerits) of the chadian rentier state. the strategies adopted in chad did not fully succeed in spurring sustainable development or reducing poverty the initial stated goals of the oil projects (clausen & attaran 2011). the independent evaluation group (ieg) of the project concluded in its report that ‘the oil revenue windfall was associated with a 7 priority sectors included education, health, agriculture, and security. seign-goura cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202384 resurgence of civil conflict and a worsening of bad governance’ (international advisory group 2009). the privatepublic model implemented for fighting poverty was a failure (leibold 2011; pegg 2006). for instance, regarding social policies, some argue that the poverty rate did drop due to growth in petroleum revenues. the poverty rate of chadians living under the national poverty line fell from 54.8% in 2003 to 46.7% in 2011. unfortunately, the revenue sharing mechanisms adopted by the state led to an uneven distribution of power and income between those in urban and rural areas. the number of people living in poverty during this time was also affected by demographic growth of 3.5% annually. this growth alone accounts for the increase in the total number of people living in poverty from 4.1 million in 2003 to 4.7 million in 2011 (imf 2014, appendix iii). the ccsrp therefore observed that, of the total population of 11.2 million people, the poverty rate in 2003 was estimated at 55%. however, 87% of that number were living in rural areas. while it is true that the average poverty rate decreased between 20032012, there nonetheless exists an extreme disparity among those living in rural compared with those in urban areas. the united nations program for development (undp) confirms these findings and in their human development index (hdi) report of 2016, it classified chad as 186 out of 188 countries, with the hdi still very weak, only rising from 0.29 in 2009 to 0.39 in 2016. furthermore, according to mabali and moundigbaye (2017), the rural recipients of the 5% government petroleum revenue have seen a real increase in poverty. reflecting this, another study found that public investment was centered in urban areas, exacerbating existing inequalities (gadom et al. 2017). the global drop in oil prices in 20142015 has shown the ups and downs of the rentier state. in response to this price crisis, chad’s president instituted several austerity measures that cut government spending to manage the crisis. these policies have resulted in fewer scholarships for students, the halving of certain salaries, the cutting of bonuses, and the overall reduction in state capability to carry out basic functions (hicks 2016). the austerity measures are reminiscent of the structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s and have exacerbated discontent among chad’s people. during the government move to adopt such policies, the chadian people protested and attempted to block the implementation. these protests were largely driven by an increasing dissatisfaction with the government’s handling of petroleum income, as enriching the elite rather than advancing sustainable economic growth for all. according to marchal (2016, p. 2): ‘oil revenues were used to build infrastructure, but a closer glance proved that most contracts were allocated to first feed the patronage networks of the presidential couple’. furthermore, corruption and the reliance on markets have also eroded the social system and demonstrated the poor quality of institutions in the country. the situation of oil revenue management in chad demonstrates how the privatization of a public good by a political elite had been driven by nepotism. additionally, the loan that the government contracted with glencore allowed it to acquire shares of chevron in the doba field in 2014 but soon this became a burden that asphyxiated the regime financially. these practices, for some scholars, confirmed the state’s lack of capacity in managing the oil sector in chad for development (fisher & anderson 2015; icg 2016). in terms of governance, oil revenues have fueled the quest for regional domination, with implicit support of the international community providing the regime with financial and technical support. beginning in 2013, chad has been sending troops to participate in the peace mission in the central african republic. in support of france, it sent soldiers for military actions called berkhane in mali, and chad also sent troops as part of the regional coalition for the fight against boko haram in the lake chad region (hicks 2016). this reflects a strong interest in gaining regional influence. the waves of military commitments reveal the power of a seasoned army to wage wars, and the characteristics of a belligerent state. the chadian regime has invested heavily in its army using oil resources8 instead of investing in a social safety net to save its 8 lena guesnet showed in her paper how the chadian regime uses oil rents to buy arms instead of investing in fighting poverty. see more on http://www.digitaldevelopmentdebates.org/issue12poweroppressionchadoilforarms.html. seign-goura cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202385 http://www.digital-development-debates.org/issue-12-power--oppression--chad-oil-for-arms.html population from rampant poverty. today chad is considered a regional, even international military power: its military intervention in mali, then in nigeria against terrorism, have enhanced the international image of chad and its president (pemunta & tabenyang 2016; tubiana & debos 2017). external observers and analysts consider the chadian regime as the defender of stability in the sahel and the central african region. however, some have noted that the ambiguous attitude of chad in the conflict in the central african republic contradicts the image of chad as a stabilizer among countries in the subregion (herbert, dukhan, & debos 2013). under the guise of fighting terrorism and promoting security in the sahel, france and the united states have supported the chadian regime to strengthen the capabilities of its army and to become the largest army in frenchspeaking africa, to the detriment of social development (fisher & anderson 2015, p. 137; icg 2016, p. 5). the international crisis group (icg) noted that chadian military units had been ‘dispatched in mali in january 2013, in the central african republic from the end of 2012 to april 2014, against boko haram from january 2015 and up to present, in proportions unknown, within the coalition put on by saudi arabia to combat the houthi combatants in yemen’, suggesting ‘the chadian army today serves as a showcase outside the regime’ (icg 2016). oil revenues are being used to enable regional hegemony, to the detriment of economic and social investment. furthermore, this massive military expenditure makes chad appear much stronger than it is in reality. according to a study, chad’s military spending increased from 35,398 billion cfa ( over us$69m.) in 2004 to 275,717 billion cfa (over us$516m ) in 2008, an increase of 240,319 billion cfa (us$447m.) over four years, or a 7.79fold increase (behalal & margerit 2012, p. 25). such a significant amount of funding towards weapons has been justified by the regime by stating that security is more important than development (baldy 2016, p. 256; behalal & margerit 2012, p. 47). oil revenues have thus been used to strengthen the rentier regime as a militarized state, founded on the nexus between oil revenues and military spending (icg 2016; tubiana & debos 2017, 2014). with regime legitimacy faltering, in april 2021 the chadian president was assassinated by a chadian rebellion group against the regime (leyotha ngartebaye 2022). in sum, more than a decade of oil exploitation has turned chad into an economy dependent on oil revenues. international financial institutions and bilateral partners are jostling for support amid austerity measures. an interviewee during my field study in 2016 said that this crisis changed companies’ policies toward cost reduction. as he put it: ‘cost reduction and cost avoidance are their main concerns. all the rest is bluff.’ international institutions and other bilateral donors have chosen to support the state and have strengthened the elite that is eager for rents – to the detriment of the people, impoverished by the effects of oil crisis. in 2006, for instance, the reform of law no. 001 led to the elimination of the future generation fund that had been seen as critical to sustainable development. the situation in chad clearly illustrates the paradox of the policies of the state and of the international financial institutions, (ifis) which value growth as a development strategy. these policy prescriptions, in vogue today, are at the heart of the oil extraction project in chad. during the oil era, there was a renewal of conflicts in chad and at its borders (the darfur crisis, the conflict with sudan, the intervention in the central african republic, the fight against boko haram), and finally rebel assaults in 2006, 2008, 2013 and 2021 culminating in the death of the president idriss déby itno. his son mahamat idriss déby has automatically replaced him, and was endorsed by france, the colonial power, with the aim of perpetuating the rentier regime, moreover a dynastic one. concluding remarks this study has shown the case study of the extractive industry in chad over two decades and clearly indicates the challenges linked to the exploitation of natural resources for sustainable development and the seign-goura cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202386 central role of the state in these outcomes. the chadian case reveals the shadows surrounding the oil sector and its potential impact on sustainable development. it calls into question the various actors involved – the international financial institutions, the chadian government, the multinationals – and the development strategies adopted, centered on sharing the proceeds of growth induced by foreign direct investment in the oil sector. this situation calls for a reexamination of policies aiming at valuing natural resources for development: the management of oil rents undermined the fragile political context in chad, with pervasive corruption, nepotism and mismanagement (olivier de sardan 2008). the publicprivate partnerships, with a constellation of new actors such as multinationals, of former traditional donors, including the united states, and united kingdom, switzerland and emerging donors such as china share responsibility for the outcomes. findings reveal that official governing norms in the oil sector were clearly adopted and integrated into chadian laws and decisionmaking processes, but these were not successful in overcoming the impact of the resource curse. narratives that referred to official norms by the stakeholders with the focus on resource nationalism, diversification of the economy, and other petro developmental models, served to obscure the real process of regime consolidation, statemilitary spending and rentier state dependence. however, there have been positive dynamics such as the overall increase in the government budget, the strengthening of state resources for military interventions, a reconfiguration of the context of development cooperation actors including ifis and traditional donor countries as well as emerging countries, along with the integration of a new development actor, the multinational and its corporate diplomacy. here the state has played a central role with regard to the governance environment created by the different actors, be they local or international. the road to the petrodevelopmental state model has still some way to go but we can say with some certainly that the chadian state has failed to implement the sacred model of oil wealth for poverty mitigation. overall, this research has contributed to the debate about the politics of resource curse, rentier state and developmental state by showing that only by addressing formal norms of governance, be they mismanagement, corruption, embezzlement, might it be possible to reverse the resource curse in the resourcerich countries. the chadian failure has shown that antecedent practical 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https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080511-111003 https://www.jstor.org/stable/23033732 https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01702009 https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01702009 a geography of racism in nsw cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 1 cities of race hatred? the spheres of racism and anti-racism in contemporary australian cities kevin dunn, james forrest, rogelia pe-pua, maria hynes, karin maeder-han abstract cities are indeed places of everyday racism, experienced as ethnocentrism, prejudice and ethnic-based hatred. drawing on an australia-wide telephone survey of respondents' experiences of 'everyday' racism in various contexts, conducted in 2006, we examine forms of racist experience, as well as the contexts and responses to those experiences for sydney, melbourne and perth, australia’s main immigrant-receiving cities. results show that between 1 in 10, and 1 in 3 respondents, depending on their background and situation, experience some form of ‘everyday’ racism. however, this particular aspect of urban incivility is shadowed by everyday good relations. there is what might be called a ‘geography of cultural repair’ and cultural maintenance within the cosmopolitan city. there is strong support for anti-racism policy. where action is taken in response to racism, it is determined by everyday confrontations and attempts at direct reconciliation. formal complaints and reports are much rarer forms of anti-racism. in this paper, we advocate a pragmatic on-going, agonistic politics of cultural exchange and tolerance. racism and anti-racism the nature of racism in australia has been acknowledged in a series of government reports, and in some incisive ethnographic work. also, there has been an extensive qualitative investigation of the mechanisms through which intolerance is reproduced, most notably through a critical analysis of news media and the statements of opinion makers, including political leaders. however, there is a lack of comprehensive data on the nature of racism in australian society. to assist in remedying this gap, we have sought to generate comprehensive empirical data on the extent and variation of racist attitudes and experiences of racism, to inspire or guide anti-racism initiatives. thus challenging racism: the anti-racism research project (hereafter the challenging racism project) has been able to establish, empirically, that there is a recognisable problem with racism in australia (dunn et al., 2004). there is evidence that over the last few years, the number of racist incidents in australia has grown. in the wake of the new york 11th september 2001 and the bali 12th october 2002 terror attacks, the islamic council of new south wales found that reports of racist violence and incivilities against australian muslims dramatically escalated (icnsw, 2004; also poynting & noble, 2004). the human rights and equal opportunity commission (hreoc) ismaع inquiry (2004, pp.54-57), for example, heard evidence of considerable discrimination and ‘race talk’ against arab and 2 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 muslim australians. poynting and noble (2004, p.6) found that 75 per cent of respondents in their survey of muslims and arabs had experienced higher rates of racist abuse or violence since 9/11. other reports confirm that such incivilities against muslims in public places are all too common. in 2001, we commissioned a telephone survey of residents in new south wales and queensland (n = 5056) on attitudes towards cultural diversity, specific cultural groups and racism (forrest & dunn, 2006). the survey also included some pilot questions on experience of racism. we found that ‘everyday racisms’ were more prevalent than institutional forms. institutional forms of racism included the workplace, educational settings, dealings with police and when seeking housing. the experience of racism in these settings impacted upon close to one in six australians (dunn et al., 2005). however, almost a quarter of australians experienced ‘everyday’ forms of racism, encountered in shops, restaurants, at sporting events, or in the form of disrespectful treatment on the basis of ethnic identity, or name-calling. the most frequent experience of racism was in the form of disrespectful treatment and name-calling. similarly, loosemore and chau (2002, p.98) found very high rates of racist experiences by asianaustralians in construction workplaces, principally including ‘racist name-calling’ (66%), ‘racist jokes’ (67%), ‘ racist material’ (64%), ‘segregation’ (56%), ‘offensive gestures’ (49%) and ‘physical abuse’ (56%). they concluded that “racism is seen [by their respondents] as an inevitable consequence of working in the construction industry, one that is largely ignored by managers and accepted and tolerated by workers”. during 2003, the racism monitor collected data from community organisations on the experience of racism, and found that acts of discrimination, verbal abuse and violence were commonplace for australian muslims (browning et al., 2003). such incivility was so widespread that islamic organisations had come to see it as an ‘ordinary experience’ of australian life: “it happens so often and goes unnoticed, therefore we have learnt to accept this sort of bad behaviour” (quoted in browning et al., racism monitor, 2003, p.7). these findings were confirmed in the targeted report on the experiences of racism in sydney following the september 11th terror events (dreher, 2005, pp. 23-25). the experience of these forms of racist behaviour constructs fearful social environments that can deprive people of their freedom of movement, expression and affiliation. the national inquiry into racist violence (human rights and equal opportunity commission, 1991, pp.387-388) pointed out that such racism generated a "threatening environment". thus “(w)hat is seen and heard in schools and neighbourhoods … shapes understandings of self” (amin & thrift, 2002, p.292). an environment in which certain groups are repeatedly denigrated through racist talk and other racist cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 3 incivilities can fundamentally undermine the sense of citizenship and belonging of those disparaged. in circumstances where such talk becomes common, the uneven dispensation of citizenship and belonging becomes normalized, unquestioned, and harder to challenge. what emerges has been described by kobayashi and peake (2000) as the ‘normalcy’ of racism, where racism is almost unnoticed or seen as an aberration (mcguiness, 2000). certain forms of exclusive situational norms are generated. in the urban context, such circumstances provide the makings of cities where racial hatred is insidiously normalized. data gathered in the surveys has also targeted tolerance or beliefs that might be considered antiracist. our most recent data base uses experiences of racism rather than attitudes, and we report on some of those findings here – on experiences of racist behaviour – with an emphasis on ‘hate talk’ versions of racism. yet we also agree with thrift’s (2005) assertion that there are substantial, and largely unreported, feelings about anti-hatred in the city, what he referred to as ‘repair work’. so, while there is a good deal of everyday racism in the city, there is also evidence of everyday antiracism. both aspects are reported on here. our focus upon these issues marks a transition in the challenging racism project, from the study of racism towards the study of anti-racism. method and purpose collection of data on the experience of discrimination is an innovative approach to developing indicators on the extent of racism, and derives in part from work conducted by a research team at the university of michigan, usa (the university of michigan, institute for social research, 2001). such forms of indicators on the extent of racism have not before been empirically applied in the australian context. between 24th january and 24th march 2006 a telephone survey was undertaken of 4020 residents across australia (with the exception of tasmania). drawing on the results of that survey, we focus here on just over 1700 responses from australia’s three major immigrantreceiving cities – sydney (with some 38 per cent of new arrivals in recent years), melbourne (27 per cent) and perth (9 per cent) (department of immigration and multicultural affairs – dima 2005). today, for example, 43.2 per cent of sydney’s population is of non-english speaking background ancestry, compared with 41.4 per cent in melbourne and 30 per cent in perth. some new survey questions were developed within the categories of race talk, exclusion, unfair treatment, and physical attack. data were also collected on the context of racist incidents with respect to location, actions and reactions of victims, victims’ feelings and outcomes, (such as impacts on sense of belonging, expressions of regret and the like). opinions on the need for anti4 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 racism initiatives were also examined. a national survey, as such, cannot produce insights available from other in-depth approaches to understanding the experience of racism, such as qualitative methodologies (see lamont et al., 2002, p.395). however, survey data does have advantages of scope, and facilitates assessments of breadth and variation. modood (2000, p.180), when commenting on the 4th national survey of ethnic minorities in britain, observed that the “survey has the potential to offer what small-scale ethnographic studies, armchair theorising, and political wishful thinking can not”. surveying facilitates a stronger grasp of the extent and variation of the experience of racism, and produces data that are more easily defensible in the public realm. as a consequence, surveys retain strong currency within discussions of policy. nevertheless, this national survey did collect some more nuanced qualitative data on the feelings associated with the experience of racism. there are three broader purposes of the challenging racism project that should be outlined before moving on to discussion of results. firstly, a central conviction is that while racist attitudes and the experience of ‘everyday racism’ are quite prevalent in australian society their occurrence varies noticeably from place to place and in often quite specific ways (forrest & dunn, 2006, 2007). place (context) matters. this regionally varied frequency and nature of racism means that anti-racist initiatives need to be geographically sensitive. yet the spatial variations in racism have been largely overlooked by anti-racism campaigns in australia. to assist with the consequential need for the local development of anti-racism initiatives, our findings have been posted within a university website since december 2004 (see http://www.uws.edu.au/social_sciences/soss/research/challenging_racism ). this includes data on racist attitudes and experiences arranged by statistical districts including some ethnicity data drawn from the 2001 abs census. our intention is that these data, and pdfs of publications, will assist local governments and grass roots groups in the development of anti-racism strategies. the site is up-dated on an on-going basis. at this point, mention should also be made of an emerging form of political correctness that proscribes the discussion of racism (see hall, 2000, p.222; hesse, 2000, pp.5-10; warren, 2000, pp.145-54). activists who draw public attention to racism are often accused of ‘playing the race card’, or of themselves being racist. through a clever discursive turn the opprobrium associated with racism has shifted somewhat to those who expose it. nonetheless, there is a need for the realities of racism to be acknowledged. this is essential for enabling public policy responses; antihttp://www.uws.edu.au/social_sciences/soss/research/challenging_racism� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 5 racism. “conflict avoidance”, evasiveness, and the downplaying of racial inequality are key means by which racism is reproduced (warren, 2000). the everyday experience of racism (2006) around one-in-five (20 to 22%) survey respondents in sydney, melbourne and perth indicated that they had experienced forms of race hate talk (table 1). this included, for example, verbal abuse, name-calling, racist slurs, or ridicule based on a person’s cultural background. this finding accords well with earlier, pilot results which showed that 25 per cent had experienced racialised insults (dunn et al, 2005). the recent survey results are the most specific in the wording of the question, and they more carefully operationalise specific forms of racist incidents. at any rate, experience of race talk was the highest of the four categories of racism experienced by our respondents. for racist exclusion the rate varied between 12 and 14 per cent; rates for unfair treatment and forms of physical attack were lower again. in each case, sydney, with more of the post-white australia (post-the early 1970s) immigrants in its population mix, emerges as slightly more exposed to racist experiences than the other two cities. however, perth, which has become an important immigrantreceiving city over the past decade or so, is close behind sydney in some forms of experience, such as racist talk and the most severe form of experience, physical attack. table 1: experience of racism in major immigrant-receiving cities, sydney/melbourne/perth across four major categories of ‘everyday racism’, 2006 category of racist incident yes no & refused have you: n % n % experienced racist talk, for example, verbal abuse, name-calling, racist slur, or ridicule, based on your cultural background? sydney melbourne perth 169 131 67 22.1 19.7 20.7 594 534 219 77.7 80.2 79.3 experienced exclusion, e.g., making you feel like you don’t belong or you are inferior, or people are avoiding you because of your culture? sydney melbourne perth 108 86 32 14.2 12.9 11.6 655 579 244 85.8 86.9 88.4 experienced unfair treatment, e.g., denied service or employment, treated badly or with suspicion because of your cultural background? sydney melbourne perth 80 49 20 10.5 7.4 7.2 683 617 256 89.5 92.6 92.8 experienced attack, for example, physically attacking, abusing or threatening you or your property because of your cultural background? sydney melbourne perth 48 30 18 6.3 4.5 6.5 715 636 258 93.7 95.5 93.5 source: the challenging racism project experiences of racism survey, 24.1.2006 24.3.2006. 6 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 the experience of hate speech for about 69 per cent of the people who had experienced racist talk, this took the form of being called an offensive slang name for their cultural group (table 2). other race talk categories included: verbal abuse (62%), stereotypes (61%), offensive gestures (56%) poor portrayal of cultural group (54%) and racist jokes (52%). table 2: specific forms of ‘race talk’ experiences in sydney, melbourne & perth, 2006 % of race talk experienced % of all respondents you have been called an offensive slang name for your cultural group? 69.2% 14.5% you have been sworn at, or verbally abused, because of your cultural background? 61.6% 12.9% you have heard or read comments that are stereotypical of your cultural group? 61.1% 12.8% you have heard talk or read something that portrays your cultural group in a poor light? 54.1% 11.3% you have been a target of racist jokes, songs, or teasing? 52.4% 11% someone made offensive gestures towards you because of your cultural background? (hand gestures, etc). 51.5% 10.8% source: the challenging racism project, experiences of racism survey, 24.1.2006 24.3.2006. these everyday racist events were not necessarily rare. we asked 76 respondents in the three main cities who had been called an offensive slang name because of their cultural background how often that race talk occurred. nearly half (some 42 per cent) said it occurred occasionally or more often, while 58% indicated that it was rare or had only happened once (table 3). table 3: the frequency of being called an offensive slang name for a cultural group, sydney, melbourne and perth, 2006. frequency no. % very often 3 3.95 often 3 3.95 occasionally 26 34.21 rarely 29 38.16 once only 15 19.74 source: the challenging racism project, experiences of racism survey, 24.1.2006 24.3.2006. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 7 cultural unevenness in our pilot work we had found that everyday racisms experienced by indigenous australians were much higher than for non-indigenous respondents, with forty-three per cent responding that they had been treated with disrespect on the basis of their ethnic background, and 37 per cent the recipient of racist abuse (dunn et al., 2005). close to one-in-two respondents who spoke a language other than english (lote), representing those with a non-english speaking background cultural heritage, at home or in the community, had reported being treated disrespectfully or abused on the basis of their ethnicity. on this basis our expectation in the current survey was that the experience of racism, including racist talk, would be culturally uneven, and that in general, non-angloaustralians would report higher rates. table 4: experience of racist talk, australia-wide, by cultural categories, 2006 have you experienced racist talk, for example, verbal abuse, name-calling, racist slur, or ridicule based on your cultural background? yes % do you speak a language other than english (lote) at home or in your community? lote 32.38 non-lote 15.30 what is your religion? christian 17.44 non-christian 33.46 no religion 19.69 inadequately described 34.68 what is the cultural heritage of your mother/father?* oceania – australian 15.51 oceania – atsi 62.82 oceania – other 33.10 european 28.29 asian 36.36 nth african & mid eastern 45.26 people of the americas 42.86 sub-saharan african 32.08 *respondents identified the cultural heritage of mother and father separately. multiple cultural heritage responses were therefore recorded (n:4368) exceeding total sample. source: the challenging racism project, experiences of racism survey, 24.1.2006 24.3.2006. from the general question of whether respondents had experienced race talk, 33 per cent of lote respondents stated that they had, compared with only 15 per cent of non-lote respondents (table 4). there were similar variations across the religious divide between christian and non-christian, with non-christians more likely to experience racist talk. indigenous australians (see oceania – atsi in table 4) were much more likely to experience racist talk than other australians 8 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 context of offensive slang names respondents were asked to provide details about the context of racist incidents, relating to location, (re)actions of the victim, feelings of the victim, and outcomes (impacts on sense of belonging, of regret). of 247 respondents who reported that they had been called an offensive slang name for their cultural group, 76 were randomly selected and asked to provide detail on this experience. close to half of the locations of these incidents were public spaces, such as in the street, or in shopping centres, clubs or at sporting events (table 5). after that, educational settings and the workplace were key sites of such race talk. table 5: locations where people were called an offensive slang name for their cultural group, 2006 (melbourne, sydney, perth) specific location no. category no. % street 23 shop or in a mall, shopping centre, market 16 pubs, clubs, bar, disco, nite-club 10 sporting event (player or spectator) 5 public space 63 42.57% public transport 4 other public space (beach boating) 3 fast food place (e.g. mcdonalds, kfc, subway, food courts) 1 restaurant 1 high school 18 education 31 20.95% primary school or earlier education (child-care) 13 workplace 21 workplace 21 14.19% social event (party, event, get-together, bbq) 9 own home (not party) 3 private space 15 10.13% friend's or relative's home (not party) 3 in hospitals health centres, nursing home or gp’s room 1 1 applying for a position (eg. at interview) 1 1 other answer given 16 other 10.81% total (of locations provided) 148* the total number of locations exceeds the total sample because multiple locations could be recorded. source: the challenging racism project, experiences of racism survey, 24.1.2006 24.3.2006. thus the picture emerging from these data is that the city exhibits a strong element of race hatred. these cities are also a places of strong cultural diversity. racism (or at least race hate talk) is also more frequent within the public realms and spaces of the city. these racisms are ‘everyday’ in the sense of their informality, and the ways in which they can insidiously become seen as expected or normal. for example, one of our respondents stated in the survey that “after a while it [the racist experience] was accepted as a likelihood specific to that particular area”. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 9 anti-race-hatred i: responding to racism there are number of approaches to anti-racism. some have a primary emphasis on improving attitudes to cultural diversity and difference, and improving dispositions towards specific cultural groups. these actions are intended to minimise the propensity for racism. secondary level antiracism targets those who have been identified as likely to be involved in racist behaviour. in previous work we have examined attitudes, and commented on social and spatial variations in problematic attitudes and dispositions. and we have speculated on what that means for targeting anti-racism effort. tertiary level anti-racism responds to actual racist events, we have examined this at the level of individuals who had experienced racism. of the 76 major city respondents who were asked for further details about being called an offensive slang name for their own cultural group, just under 70 per sent, did nothing about the incident (table 6). on the one hand this might suggest that the racist incident was of a lower order and impact, negating the need for a response. however, the literature on the impacts of response on victims suggests that this finding is quite concerning. a report released by the victorian health promotion foundation (2007, pp.19,27-29,52) includes a review of literature on effects on health and well-being of the experience of racism, including research on how victim response feeds into morbidity, especially in terms of mental health. a clear finding is that those people who take action in response to an experience of racism are at lesser risk of morbidity, and those who take no action are more likely to suffer health ill-effects (paradies, 2006, pp.893-5). we asked those respondents who had experienced racism if they had ever regretted those occasions where they did not do anything about it. twenty-eight per cent did have such regrets, although 55 per cent did not. the open response comments of those who had experienced racism provide an insight into the wellbeing effects. “[i felt] angry. and like – lashing out. but you can’t, because it doesn’t make any difference, and only reinforces the racists’ ideas about your people”. “a bit sad, but i just don’t let it bother me too much or else it makes me think negative thoughts”. “a bit upset, but not too worried because i'm going back to my country”. “[i felt] very satisfied that i didn’t just take the abuse. i stood up to them then and there”. 10 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 the effect of racism on health is primarily pertains to sense of self and mental health (see begg et al., 2007; paradies, 2006, pp. 895-6). what we have referred to as non-response has been characterised in the literature as ‘passive responses’, and include such things as the internalising of racism through unfavourable self-evaluations and stress associated coping mechanisms that involve health-damaging behaviour (smoking, alcohol use etc). the findings on non-response provide insights into the way that race talk can become normalised and unchallenged, and the deleterious social effects of that. the nature of the actions taken by those who experience race hate talk is informative. only some 6 per cent officially reported the matter or consulted /confided with someone about it. the most frequently mentioned active response (22%) was to confront the perpetrator in some manner, usually in a non-violent way, and in some circumstances to use humour or ridicule. this finding provides some clues as how best to support anti-racism that is targeted against race talk. everyday racism needs everyday anti-racism. methods to empower individuals (principally rhetorical strategies and discursive materials) in their confrontations with racism are critical. the policy responsibility has to be about leadership, to role modeling, and to the insertion of counter-racist norms and tropes. we need rhetorical tools that have everyday comprehension at the street level, in the changing room and in the school-yard. these could be, for example, antiracist catch phrases that are nationally-endorsed, easily deployed; and that rob commonsense racism of their power. table 6: responses to being called an offensive slang name for a cultural group, sydney/melbourne/perth 2006. response no. category no. % ignored / pretended didn't happen or hear / did nothing 78 got used to it, put up with it 12 nothing 99 68.75% left/resigned from the committee/group 7 laughed it off/laughed 2 confronted perpetrator (non-violent) 20 used humour or ridiculed the perpetrator 6 confronted 32 22.22% physically confronted perpetrator /self-defence 5 initiated a reconciliation / reasoning 1 report to police 2 report to their employer/teacher/referee 1 reported 4 2.78% report to anti-discrimination authority/agency 1 confided / discussed with friend/family/close colleague/neighbour 4 consulted 4 2.78% other 5 other 5 3.47% total (number of responses recorded) 144 * *the total number of responses exceeds the total sample because multiple responses could be recorded. source: the challenging racism project, experiences of racism survey, 24.1.2006 24.3.2006. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 11 anti-race-hatred ii: attitudes in other surveys we have detected strong levels of support for cultural diversity among the australian population. there was a sound rejection of the so-called ‘old racisms’ of racial supremacy and racial separatism (dunn et al., 2004). we found that a significant majority of the population (83%) acknowledged that there was ethnic prejudice in australian daily life (dunn et al., 2004, pp.418-420). however, we also found that many fewer people acknowledged that they were personally prejudiced (12%). nonetheless, those findings for nsw and queensland generally indicate strong levels of public recognition that racism is a problem, which might well imply support for anti-racism. survey data for victoria (victorian health promotion foundation, 2007) and the act (dunn & white, 2008) demonstrated similar findings for the people of those jurisdictions. in our national experiences survey, we asked city respondents for their views on the need for antiracism and on its likely efficacy. results reveal that the overwhelming majority of respondents support the need for anti-racism (table 7). only five per cent saw no need for such action. we also asked respondents to comment on whether much can be done about racism. this was put forward as a despondent proposition: “nothing can be done to minimise or fight racism in australia”, to which 84 per cent disagreed, indicating their belief that something can be done to reduce racism. almost 10 per cent thought that nothing could be done, and the remainder were unsure. these findings suggest that there is a substantial capacity for anti-racism initiatives in the city. table 7: support for anti-racism initiatives in sydney/melbourne/perth, 2006 % agree something should be done to minimise or fight racism in australia 86.4 % disagree nothing can be done to minimise or fight racism in australia 83.82 source: the challenging racism project, experiences of racism survey, 24.1.2006 24.3.2006. negotiating pessimism & optimism theory on cross-cultural relations in the city paints a mixed picture on the inevitability of racism. the chicago school theorists thought racism was a temporary phenomenon that would dissipate with the assimilation of new migrant cohorts. racism was therefore expected, but ephemeral. other theory points to the structural bases of racism, and often its inevitability, where racism is anticipated 12 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 in a capitalist or patriarchal society, or in a world ordered by independent and competitive nation states. much of the policy talk on racism continues to perceive it as something that can be completely overcome. too often in public policy discussions, anti-racism is discussed as a finite project (see a critique by paradies, 2005, p. 4-5). that is, it is assumed that through some abstract or macro intervention, such as the proclamation and implementation of a policy of multiculturalism, we can erase racism. the logic that assumes there can be a one-off (often structural) fix to racism can be observed in the statements of some anti-racism conference aims such as in the title, “the national conference to erase racism”, and in legislation such as the united nation’s international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (cerd), as well as private and ngo (non-governmental organisation) initiatives, such as “let’s kick racism out of football”. we do not deny that these are laudable aims, and often useful interventions. the poetics of promising an end to racism probably have an effect (but perhaps less so with each reiteration). however, it is now quite clear from theory and empirical research that erasing racism would probably require the erasure of ethnic groups and ethnic differentiation. this is not likely, nor would the erasure of difference be desirable. the aim of anti-racism, then, should realistically be the amelioration and reduction of racism. it should be to enhance the celebration and valuing of difference. anti-racism needs to be omnipresent, but it must also be varied, to address the every where (and every where different) manifestation of racism (forrest & dunn, 2006, 2007). furthermore, racism requires ongoing, long term policy attention, public action and development. this also allows a more realistic view on the strategic and dynamic nature of anti-racism. it is not necessary for everyone, everywhere, for all time, to reach agreement on how we ought to live our lives, and to embrace all ways of life. it would be enough to have mutual obligations and strategic agreements about what should be tolerated, and what we will have to ‘put up’ with in our cities. thrift (2005) reminds us there is as much capacity in the city for construction and repair as there is for destruction and injury. our data point to the strong capacity for anti-racism, whether in the form of responses to racism or preparations against it. acknowledgements we would like to acknowledge the professional data gathering of the hunter valley research foundation. we are also appreciative of the funding from the australian research council (dp0345263), and are indebted to the 4020 australians who shared their insights and opinions through the telephone survey. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 13 bibliography amin, a. & thrift, n. 2002, 'cities and ethnicities', ethnicities, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 291-300. browning, j., jakubowicz, a. & gold, a. 2003, 'what can we say about racism in australia? discussion paper no. 1', racism monitor. begg, s., vos, t., barker, b., stevenson, c., stanley, l. & lopez, a.d. 2007, the burden of disease and injury in australia 2003, australian institute of health and welfare, canberra. dreher, t. 2005, targeted; experiences of racism in nsw after september 11, 2001, university of technology sydney press, ultimo department of immigration and multicultural affairs 2005, longitudinal survey of immigrants to australia wave 1, dima research section, canberra. dunn, k.m., forrest, j., burnley, i. & mcdonald, a. 2004, 'constructing racism in australia', australian journal of 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un/settled multiculturalisms, zed books, london, pp. 209-241. hesse, b. 2000, 'introduction: un/settled multiculturalisms', in b. hesse (ed.), un/settled multiculturalisms, zed books, london, pp. 1-30. human rights and equal opportunity commission 1991, report of the national inquiry into racist violence in australia, australian government publishing service, canberra. human rights and equal opportunity commission 2004, ismaع listen: national consultations on eliminating prejudice against arab and muslim australians, human rights and equal opportunity commission, sydney. islamic council of new south wales 2004, challenges for australian muslims: discrimination, anti-terrorism and the media, islamic council of new south wales, chullora. kobayashi, a. & peake, l. 2000, 'racism out of place: thoughts on whiteness and an antiracist geography in the new millennium', annals of the association of american geographers, vol. 90, pp. 392-403. lamont, m., morning, a. & mooney, m. (2002) ‘particular universalisms: north african immigrants respond to french racism’, ethnic and racial studies, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 390414. loosemore, m. & chau, d.w. 2002, 'racial discrimination towards asian operatives in the australian construction industry', construction management and economics, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 91-102. mcguiness, m. 2000, ‘geography matters? whiteness and contemporary geography’, area, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 225-230. modood, t. 2000, 'anti-essentialism, multiculturalism, and the ‘recognition’ of religious groups', in w. kymlicka & w. norman (eds), citizenship in diverse societies, oxford university press, oxford, pp. 175-195. 14 cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no. 1, 2009 paradies, y. 2006, 'a systematic review of empirical research on self-reported racism and health', international journal of epidemiology, vol. 35, pp. 888-901. poynting, s. & noble, g. 2004, living with racism: the experience and reporting by arab and muslim australians of discrimination, abuse and violence since september 11, 2001, report to the human rights and equal opportunity commission, centre for cultural research, university of western sydney. thrift, n. 2005, 'but malice aforethought: cities and the natural history of hatred', transactions of the institute of british geographers, vol. 30, pp. 133-150. victorian health promotion foundation 2007, more than tolerance: embracing diversity for health, victorian health promotion foundation, melbourne. warren, j.w. 2000, 'masters in the field: white talk, white privilege, white biases', in f.w. twine & j.w. warren (eds), racing research, researching race: methodological dilemmas in critical race studies, new york university press, new york, pp. 135-164. understanding community: thoughts and experiences of young people online cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 85 understanding community: thoughts and experiences of young people online hilary yerbury abstract this ethnographic study of members of generation x and generation y seeks to explore the ways they understand and experience community. their comments and stories were gathered through interviews collected towards the end of 2006 and the early part of 2007. these provide richly textured evidence of their need to belong, to maintain everyday relationships and to collaborate with others at the same time as they commodify relationships or share information but not necessarily beliefs and values. consequences of globalisation such as individualisation, transience in relationships, immediacy in communication, the blurring of boundaries between work and leisure, between public and private and the reliance on information and communication technologies are part of their everyday lives. some study participants feel dis-embedded from their traditional social relationships and seek to establish new ones, whereas others feel comfortable joking with anonymous others. their intellectualised constructs of community and descriptions of the lived reality of community find reflections in a range of theoretical constructs in the literature, both reinforcing and shifting scholarly understandings of the concept of community. introduction in spite of the predictions of scholars in the 1960s and 1970s that the concept of community was obsolete (bell & newby 1974) community is still the focus of many studies; it also appears to be a concept we cannot live without. zygmunt bauman comments that community is something we consider fondly, it is the ‘kind of world which is not, regrettably, available to us – but which we would dearly love to inhabit and which we hope to re-possess’ (2001, p. 3). significant changes have affected the world we live in since the late twentieth century, impacting on the relationships we have with others and potentially leading to new forms of association. some of these changes have been fostered by changes in communications technologies, such as the widespread use of the internet and phone technologies. these have made the world seem smaller by compressing time and space and they have turned some of what was extraordinary into the commonplace. in such a world, people can expect to move between countries to live, study and work, and form social relations wherever they are, communication technologies can keep them connected, no matter where they are at any given time, thus leading to a sense that social relations exist across the world, independent of physical location and face to face interaction. at the same time, these 86 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 changes are perceived to put social relations under strain, weakening face to face connections and undermining the social fabric of community and associational life. some writers have acknowledged these changes by modifying the term ‘community’. appadurai (1990) has explored the notion of the diasporic community and the efforts that people make using information and communication technologies to overcome the dislocations of being spread around the world. rheingold (1994) introduced the phrase ‘virtual community’ to encapsulate the notion of an environment where people create a sense of community but without a physical location and without embodied co-presence. others such as cohen (1985) and anderson (1983; 1991) have suggested that the focus of the term community itself has shifted. others again, such as wittel (2001), have proposed that the very nature of the relationships inherent in community have changed. this study seeks to investigate the ways in which the intellectualised constructs of community and descriptions of the lived reality of community find reflections in a range of theoretical constructs in the literature, both reinforcing and shifting scholarly understandings of the concept of community. its particular concern is with the understandings and conceptualisations that young people have, exploring the assertion that, as a concept, community is obsolete. the question is significant because, without ways to understand lived realities and conceptualise them, the opportunities for rethinking social relationships are limited. the paper presents an overview of the literature, presenting shifts in the conceptualisations of community. it briefly describes the methodology before setting out the range of conceptualisations found in the descriptions participants give of their lived experiences and in their intellectualisations of community. its conclusion returns to the question of whether community as a concept is obsolete and what this might mean for contemporary scholarship and for civil society. community a solid core and fuzzy boundaries? the concept of community has been variously described as having a ‘solid core’ and ‘fuzzy boundaries’ and the use of these terms symbolises the conceptual issues from the past. the term ‘fuzzy boundaries’ uses the metaphor of location to express the idea that the concept of community is not experienced in the same way by everyone. originally, cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 87 it was used more literally to indicate that members of a locally based community interacted with individuals from outside of that community. now, the same phrase is used to indicate that the very ideas that make up the notion of community interact with other ideas, that different terminology is used and at the edges, there may not be agreement that a word or an idea is actually a part of the notion of community. the metaphor of the ‘solid core’ suggests something unyielding, unchangeable, dependable and expresses that there is something essential to the notion of community. the ‘solid core’ usually refers to a sense of something shared – ideas, beliefs, values, information. it also incorporates a notion of togetherness, as community is as much a process as an entity. the ideas behind these two different metaphors pervade the contemporary literature. there is a strong scholarly tradition supporting the notion that community can only be known or explored by being inside it and focusing on others who are also or who could be inside. the 1990s were seen as times of uncertainty, when people began to oppose the fragmenting effects of liberalism and capitalism and to re-think the values which guided public and private life. a renewed emphasis was placed on the importance of sharing and a number of books and articles focusing on communitarianism and supporting the notion of civil society were published (eg etzioni 1995, 1997; putnam 2000). the focus of these works was a lament for the potential loss of values and a sense of insecurity for the future. putnam’s writing brought the phrase ‘civil society’ into popular use and sparked reconsideration of notions such as democracy, the role of government agencies and non-government agencies and reinforced ideas that through associational membership people could take part in activities of civic engagement (putnam 2000). anthony cohen argued that community still existed and had not been rendered ‘obsolete’ by the various changes and challenges (1985, p. 117). he proposed that the most effective way to understand the notion of community is to understand how people use it, not to analyse its structure from the outside, but to look outwards from its core [emphasis in the original](1985, p. 20). he argued that ‘people construct community symbolically, making it a resource and repository of meaning and a referent of their identity’ (1985, p. 118). drawing on the work of schwartz, cohen explored the relationship between community and identity, suggesting that people find both 88 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 commonality and difference in their ‘occupancy of the community’s social space’(1985, p. 109) and that through their outward focus, they become aware the boundaries which separate them in their community from others, outsiders. thus, for cohen, the term, community, marked both belonging and exclusion, symbolising both the groups’ solidarity and its contrasting identity and relationships with other groups. it was this contrasting which ‘makes the notion of ‘boundary’ so central to an understanding of community’(1985, p. 109). shifting the boundaries benedict anderson’s books, entitled imagined communities: the origins and rise of nationalism, (1983; 1991) popularised the phrase ‘imagined community’ and were important for the conceptualisation of community as he showed how a sense of relationship could be established through the sharing of ideas. in particular, he showed how what people read and what ideas they share can shape a community or a nation. although anderson’s starting point was the introduction of printing with movable type in europe and its contribution to the creation of nationalism, and he was concerned with instruments such as legislation, the census, museums and mapping, the principles have carried across easily to the impact of other media which link together people who may never know each other in person irrespective of any geographic relationship. the widespread availability of information and communication technologies has changed the ways in which people relate to each other, helping to remove barriers of time and place as people read the same media content, listen to the same music, see the same video clips and experience similar marketing and other policy strategies. information and communication technologies have changed the ways that people interact. there are many descriptive studies of group processes and communications supported by computer networks and the term, virtual community, denoting such groups rapidly entered into everyday speech. rheingold (1994) takes this idea of using information technologies to create community further and claims that community, by which he means affiliation, support and a sense of belonging, can exist online among people who are not linked in other ways except by interest. for him, ‘[v]irtual communities are social aggregations that emerge from the net when enough people carry on ... public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 89 of personal relationships in cyberspace’ (1994, p. 5). this definition from rheingold carries echoes of the work of clifford geertz (1993) and shows the close relationship between community and culture. different forms of relationships albrow and eade (1994) noted that the theoretical problems with the concept of community have not been resolved, but the focus has shifted because of the deterritorialisation brought about by globalisation. writers such as appadurai (1990) have studied ethnic minorities and local communities in britain and have introduced the notion of the diasporic community, where formerly integrated and potential close-knits groups of people related by ethnicity or language, have moved or been re-located to many different communities, but have still managed to maintain social interactions and maintain a sense of community. appadurai is concerned with a sense of continuity, whereas giddens focuses on the separation and the re-embedding, which brings about new relationships. he has approached the issue of changes in the nature of community from the perspective of the wider society, proposing that social relationships could be ‘disembedded’ and still continue to exist regardless of the constraints of time and place (1990). albrow and eade (1994) create a parallel between the concept of community and the concept of culture. they note that this relationship between community and culture was inherent from tönnies’s distinction between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft (1974). it shifted when raymond williams argued that culture could have three meanings: culture as the process of human perfection; culture as high culture and culture as a way of life. williams’s definition of culture as a way of life was first published in 1961 and this conceptual development strengthened the link between culture and community for many writers (1961), including clifford geertz. albrow and eade imply that it is culture that is the core of the dispersed and polycentric new forms of association, ‘with different temporalities and spatialities, fleeting forms of encounter, in which dense and varied meanings flow’(1994, p. 28). 90 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 a form of association? wittel argues that a new form of association is emerging, which can be understood in its contrast to community and which will become ‘the paradigmatic social form of late capitalism’ (2001, p. 71). he dubs this network sociality and links it to the disembedded social relationships identified by giddens, where the focus is likely to be on exchanging information or ‘catching up’(2001, p. 51). he proposes that network sociality comprises five features. individualisation, a consequence of the disintegration of traditional community, means that people have to create their own relationships with others, developing social bonds through work or through their interests and constantly maintaining them. transience and intensity in social contacts, fostered by the ease of travel and possibly stemming from a work-based focus on projects, means that people rarely spend much time with others. closely related to the consequences of social interactions existing around the demands of mobility and time pressures is the shift to a focus on information, a mode of communication which is quick and focused but which has no place for stories, for narratives created over time. the fourth feature is the blurring of boundaries between work and leisure time, with work contexts becoming playful and work colleagues being seen as friends. the fifth feature is technology, without which the de-localised interactions of network sociality would not be able to take place. these include transport, information and communication technologies and those technologies which support relationships with friends and colleagues, replacing address books. methodology this ethnographic study explores the views of twenty-four young people on what community is and how it is created both through the use of information and communication technologies and ‘in real life’. it presents their views on community as an intellectual construct and as an aspect of social life. the participants were identified through a snowball technique, which began initially with four people aged in their late twenties or early thirties. these were selected because of their involvement with civil society and actions for social change and their use of online information and communication technologies. when several participants noted that those five or so years younger than them would have a different perspective on community and online interactions, a fifth snowball was begun, initiated by a twenty-one year old. thus the cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 91 participants were all members of so-called generation x and generation y. twenty three participants were interviewed face to face in sydney or canberra between september 2006 and april 2007 and the twenty fourth, who was overseas, responded by e-mail. the participants were all highly-educated, with some having already completed masters degrees or honours and the rest still studying at undergraduate level; nine were female and fifteen were male. .although data on ethnic origin was not collected, it was apparent from physical and social characteristics that almost half (11/24) are not of anglo-celtic origin. the unstructured interviews invited participants to explore their understandings and experiences of community and of civil society and raised questions of whether these understandings and experiences were similar online and offline. each interview lasted approximately one hour, was recorded using an mp3 player and subsequently transcribed. the transcriptions were analysed and pattern coded using nvivo’s free node function. there is no single view of community, expressed by the young people who took part in this study, yet all are able to define community, presenting a view of it as an intellectual construct, and to describe or comment on techniques which foster its creation or development or factors which harm it online and offline. intellectualising community participants in the study intellectualise the concept of community. the responses to the question of what community meant often sounded like the answer to an examination question of the ‘short answer’ type. rachel acknowledged this notion of the learned response with her exclamation of ‘ah, the biggest question!’ for tom, community has a social focus, perceived by those who are part of the group. ‘a community is a group of people who self-identify. they have something in common, whether that’s an interest or a geographic location.’ for anna j., on the other hand, community is based on common interest or collaborative action. ‘community is people coming together to share a common interest or to support one another or to do activities with the aim of reaching a common goal.’ 92 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 angela described community as: ‘a group of people who have certain things in common, which are information, [connection] with each other and general support as well, in a general sense that’s what i think community is’. isaac began with an apparently learned response before pausing and commenting: ‘it’s really hard [to answer] because you can be part of many communities at the same time and communities overlap and they can interact with each other in quite diverse ways, so it’s quite a broad question really, so it’s hard for me to answer’. isaac’s comment indicates that not only does he acknowledge multiple definitions of community and the existence of many communities, but also that a single individual can belong to more than one community. annette, in measured tones, acknowledged that whatever answer one gave, any definition of community could be contested: ‘i think it’s difficult [to state a definition] because there has been a lot of academic debate about it and there’s a lot of debate in different communities about what it means to belong to one or to another. for me, it’s about a sense of belonging, about being with people that you have some sense of familiarity with and shared values and shared identity, a sense of recognition and of being able to be that identity within that space in quite a comfortable way.’ all but two of the participants seemed to look inward towards ‘people that you have some sense of familiarity with … a sense of recognition’ (annette). alastair and brett both took the opposite view. brett observed that ‘it can collectivise us because we have a common enemy’ and alastair noted: ‘community can form around people hating each other’s guts because then you get the supporters and the peacemakers and all the various ecological niches of cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 93 human beings that make up any society, fitting around a schism in their community’. living community throughout the interviews, participants in the study gave examples from their own backgrounds and experiences, which in many instances gave a clear picture of the way they lived the notion of community. the seven examples presented here represent a range of perspective. thérèse has lived a sense of community based on geographic proximity and centuries of tradition and now in sydney experiences its absence: ‘not having gone to school here, i don’t have family networks here … i’m kind of lacking a connection … coming from a small rural background where community was very definitely ‘in this place’ and these people and my family have lived in this house for however many … 200 years or something’. now the reality of living thousands of kilometres away has ‘probably challenged my notion of community’. thérèse explains how she has deliberately gone about getting to know people socially and professionally. she has joined a surf club and met ‘a whole lot of australian women … i guess that’s the community of interest thing’. however, she has recognised that her geographic community had a life ‘around the local church or the local farmers’ association or whatever’ and that she has had to ‘go out and construct a civil participation, rather than feel naturally linked to it, but i think that’s probably something people do in the big metropolitan centres’. her volunteering with amnesty international and oxfam international youth parliament and her work in civil society organisations has led her ‘over time … [to] become part of this community of practice’. through her work in it, she has also become part of online communities. james uses the metaphor of the handshake which he explains was developed by ros diprose [associate professor at university of new south wales] to symbolise community as a reciprocated relationship. he has established the commons institute, a website promoting the concept of the commons, so that there would be a space for 94 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 people to share ideas outside of the context of ‘economic man and the utilitarian’. through this venture he ‘has tried to engage in the debates’. he ‘[doesn’t] believe that we naturally form communities with anyone or civil society relationships with anyone, just based on a form of recognition … you need to keep working at it. … i think it has to be active or we just become strangers and i think that explains why we woke up one morning, why a lot of progressive australians woke up one morning and saw tampa and couldn’t understand why that had happened, you know, why the australian public turned their back on some people who were really struggling.’ james reiterates the two inter-related ideas, that communities don’t form naturally and that we have to be active to keep a sense of connection. in reference to the commons institute, he comments ‘i’m working at it … you have to be active’. in isaac’s experience, too, it is possible for community to form online even when postings are anonymous. he gives the example of 4chan/b/. 4chan.org is an imageboard site, largely concerned with anime and manga. it contains many discussion boards, on topics from cooking and weapons to animated pornography, in addition to the anime and manga boards. the /b/ discussion board is ‘random’ and is based on the nijiura board of the japanese imageboard futuba channel. /b/tards, people who post regularly on /b/, develop memes, ‘which i think comes from linguistics, units of a culture’ such as the well-documented ‘loooooong cat’ which has ‘a guy holding up a cat. and the cat is stretched out’. the memes begin with an idea or image that catches the imagination and ‘all of these other people … try to reply to that, they would change it and make it into something else and it would become a kind of in-joke, and a recurring theme, which appears over and over and this becomes a meme’. for isaac, through this exchange of information, a sense of community can exist, even though ‘[people] might not have a unified set of morals or ethics’. sunil, like james, sees the online environment as a kind of public sphere. here, he ‘can meet and engage with people with similar interests and viewpoints as [him]self rather than being forced by the limits of current media ownership to particular opinions or http://www.4chan.org/� cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 95 paradigms’. because he is able to read different perspectives or points of view, he does not feel as marginalised as he otherwise might be by ‘mainstream media’. he believes that ‘much of australian media ignores people like me, who are labelled ‘of ethic appearance’ or more insidiously ‘of middle-eastern appearance’’. here, his bodily identity does not intrude into his relations with others. unlike isaac, who is not concerned by not knowing who he is interacting with, sunil has found himself in situations online ‘which were more disturbing than in real life… as you could never know if the new person you were interacting with wasn’t the same person you’d asked to leave you alone, except with a new user name’. sunil recognises the potential anomaly of his position and relates this fear of not being able to see someone’s face to the debate taking place in britain at the time about whether muslim women in public positions such as teaching should be able to wear the niqab, which obscures the face. ‘in the uk … there’s a debate about the wearing of the niqab, the full-face veil worn by some devout muslim women. some politicians, like the former foreign secretary jack straw and the prime minister tony blair (as well as john howard) have raised concerns that being unable to see someone’s face makes it difficult to relate to them personally. in many ways, the internet still suffers from this.’ katherine, who considers that community is ‘a sense of commonality or togetherness based on certain criteria and recognition of that by those involved and … some tangible way of expressing that’, has ‘never experienced a sense of community’ online. she likens the interaction on a discussion board to: ‘an interaction on a noticeboard at university. i’ll post my room for let flyer and someone might deface it or they might respond to it or someone will stick their bed for sale flyer over mine … but … [you have to] actually see the person that tacked their flyer over someone else’s flyer … i think that would lead to an element of intrigue or perhaps community. and then you could say “oh, it’s that girl with the red hair i wonder what she does” rather than “oh, it’s a piece of paper saying bed for sale”.’ in her view, the computer-based communication is impersonal and you may never get to know ‘the true person’ because written communication allows one to ‘create what 96 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 you want others to see or think, it’s not so immediate and spontaneous as speaking to someone directly.’ rachel has a long-standing involvement in online communities, and believes that they ‘evolve organically’, and that ‘to become a true community, [people] need to voluntarily create links to one another’. yet she also notes that she often facilitates connections between people, trying ‘to bring all of my contacts together, using the internet and using e-mail’, giving people ‘the opportunity to be part of that bigger thing’. for tristan, physical co-presence or its possibility is important for him to establish a relationship online with someone, although once he has made an acquaintance, he attempts to keep up contact. one of his ‘bizarre ethical rules’ is that he does not have any friends online that he has never met or is unlikely to meet. he thinks it is ‘bordering on creepy’ to make contact with someone just because they share the same interests and he favours common experience even if the experiences were not shared. he recognised this might not seem logical to an outsider: ‘if you both like the same tv shows and movies you are probably going to have a fair amount in common, whereas if you both happened to have lived in sydney, there’s four and a half million people here and those connections aren’t as strong, whereas in my mind they are.’ communication technologies are important to tristan as they are fundamental to maintaining the notion of community: ‘communities were all about knowing what the other person was doing, feeling some connection to what they were doing’. this information would just be about ‘ordinary things’, like knowing that a friend ‘just got up, very tired, had a big night last night’. this superficial level of community is matched by the transience of relationships. tristan’s ‘community changes all of the time, like at university, friendships aren’t generally formed based on long sustained interaction at the start, they are fleeting – you really only know someone for a ten to twelve week period.’ cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 97 conceptions of community the concepts of community intellectualised by the participants reflect the literature. it may, therefore by no coincidence that the responses sound like answers to an examination question, mirroring points that participants have learned formally. annette refers directly to her knowledge of the scholarly debates, isaac shows his understanding of the link between community and identity and angela, without acknowledging it, presents the three components which rheingold (2000) considers are fundamental to community. the participants come from a variety of study backgrounds, taking different degrees from different universities, so that the prevalence of the examination answer style of response is not a feature of a shared academic background, but may be a reflection of one of the guiding principles of their social interactions. the seven lived examples of community can be analysed to show the overlaps with and divergences from the concepts of community documented in the literature. thérèse’s experience of community has been one of stability, based on locality and commonality, with a long tradition of social relationships. she makes the point that community and civil society were one and the same for her. this seems to fit with the traditional view of community. yet, when she came to sydney as a migrant, she found herself disembedded, individualised because of the disintegration of that traditional community and thus, as wittel (2001) proposes, she found herself in a situation where she had to take steps to construct a new set of social relationships and where for some time, her social network grew out of her work network. she also makes the point that she found it necessary to volunteer with organisations in order to re-establish herself in civil society. james’s emphasis on the reciprocated nature of community was, as he explained, linked to ros diprose’s metaphor of the handshake and also to marcel mauss’s idea of the gift, underpinning exchange relationships. this also has elements of a traditional view of community. the establishment of the commons institute derived from his concern with common ownership over ideas and the expression of ideas, again, potentially a notion that derives from a traditional view of community. yet, his concern with the need to work at maintaining community has elements of wittel’s notion of ‘catching up’ with people, swapping news, updating the exchange of information (2001). it also 98 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 has something of nancy’s notion of the need to constantly strive against the disintegration of society (1991), so that in the future, social relations that do not need to be mediated can once again exist. isaac’s lived community is one that is based on the sharing of information, from which something new is created, and where there is no expectation that people will share values or beliefs. this might seem to be a close match for wittel’s notion of network sociality. however, this community is also one which in its relatively short history (since 2003) has created a number of stories and narratives, which have become part of the mythology of the community and beyond and this might place it alongside sennet’s narrative sociality, closer to traditional notions of community (2001). sunil’s experience of community online mirrors anderson’s notion of the imagined community (1983; 1991). he is linked through what he reads to others whom he will probably never meet and feels a connection to them that overcomes the marginalisation he senses in his everyday life. katherine’s concern is for the way in which people, with their emotions and vivacity, can so easily be removed from interactions, transmuted into information, as in her example of the ‘girl with red hair’ being replaced by a ‘piece of paper’ and commodified in an exchange process which values written communication above the spontaneity of conversation. her concern with commodification, this time her own, is apparent in her description of her reasons for not persisting in her membership of the chinese social networking site (knorr cetina 1997). rachel is not so much upset be the notion of the commodification of relationships, rather her community is one based on exchange, where what is exchanged is her social relationships, commodified and technologised into the contents of her e-mail address book or her ‘myspace friends’ (knorr cetina 1997). tristan’s lived experience of community closely parallels wittel’s overview of network sociality (wittel 2001). four of the five features that wittel identifies are evident in tristan’s description of his lived community. the use of information and communication technologies is fundamental to tristan’s way of life. he is constantly cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 99 creating social relationships and maintaining and updating them. his relationships with people are transient and he rarely gets to know people beyond a superficial level, exchanging information on trivial matters. he is not yet in the full time workforce, so it is not possible to comment on the blurring of the boundaries between work and play. conclusion community is a concept that the participants in this study intellectualise, which they can discuss in abstract or theoretical terms. it is something that they think about, which preoccupies them. this suggests that community is a phenomenon that still has a place in the scholarly repertoire, which needs to be thought about, considered and discussed. it is not obsolete, nor is it irrelevant as an intellectual construct. there is not necessarily a direct parallel between the intellectualised definitions of community and the lived experiences and stories the participants tell. the definitions, mainly given as short answers, rarely contain contradictions or logical anomalies. the lived experiences of community, which emerge over the course of each interview, do not fit a single concept of community, yet this does not mean that they present a fractured or disjointed view of community. the explanations, justifications and actions of the participants all show that the notion of community is not only expressed in intellectual terms but is experienced strongly by them. it may not be over-stating the case to suggest that the stories of the lived experiences give insight into the notion of the ‘good society’ which giddens (2000) suggests we seek as a result of being disembedded. that community exists as an intellectual construct for the young people in this study is significant because without the capacity to think community, there is no capacity for them to discuss it nor to reflect on differing perspectives. these intellectualised constructs around community, however, are not merely scholarly niceties; they are related to social action and political practice in everyday life, even though the intellectualisations and lived reality may not always be a close match. gender does not seem to have been a significant factor in shaping the understandings of community, although age and education level do appear to have been important. 100 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 there is support from the literature (eg onyx et al. 2005; shah, kwak & holbert 2001) for the conclusion that, to a large extent, members of generation x and generation y experience community and related relationships differently from members of previous generations. yet, there are also challenges to the way of thinking which allows this difference to emerge. jenkins, for example, argues that ‘giddens privileges the preoccupations of an affluent intellectual elite as definitive of the late modern human condition’ (jenkins 2000). the participants in this study could be seen as ‘intellectual’, (although they might deny being ‘affluent’). further research among young people engaged in civil society online who do not have a university education could shed light on whether they are understand and experience community differently, as could research among participants who are similar in all characteristics except age. another aspect of this study that could warrant further exploration is the relationships that these young people have with knowledge. they use the thoughts and ideas of scholars almost as the common currency of conversation. they appear to seek information avidly through the internet and other sources for gaining additional perspectives or making decisions on their choices of social action. this information then appears to become part of them to some extent; they take on a role as a knowledgeable person and sometimes become reflexive. beck proposes that scholarly information is used as a substitute for personal experience, particularly by ‘wealthier and more protected groups’ (2002, p. 53). he also suggests that, when people are faced with a plethora of interpretations, ‘personality characteristics and personal networks tend to increase in importance for the practical application and utilisation of these interpretations’ (2002, p. 182). further research may be able to offer insights into the interplay of the three elements mentioned by beck, that is, having limited personal experience because of living in a protected position in society, having limited personal experience because of youthfulness and using personal networks to suggest an appropriate meaning and action when faced with too many interpretations. there is certainly much to indicate that participants value elements of community generally reckoned to be traditional. these include the sense of belonging, of commonality, of recognising and being recognised, of sharing a past whether through stories or experiences. this can be seen to reinforce existing scholarly notions of community. cosmopolitan civil societies journal, vol.1, no.1, 2009 101 yet at the same time, there is evidence of the need to shift the boundaries of those understandings. each of the stories told here shows evidence of one or more of the elements which follow from the disembedding of individuals from their social relationships and shows to a greater or lesser extent how a person may react. these stories suggest that three possibilities for a concept of community emerge: an extension of anderson’s imagined community, which is perhaps strengthened through involvement in social networking sites such as myspace; the network sociality proposed by wittel as the ‘paradigmatic social form of late capitalism’ (2001, p. 71), or the constant striving against the disintegration of society suggested by nancy (1991). bibliography albrow, m. & eade, j. 1994, 'the impact of globalization on sociological concepts: community, culture and milieu', innovation: the european journal of social sciences, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 371-390. anderson, b. 1983, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, verso, london. anderson, b. 1991, imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, rev. edn, verso, london. appadurai, a. 1990, 'disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy', in m. featherstone (ed.), global culture: nationalism, globalization and modernity, sage, london. bauman, z. 2001, community: seeking safety in an insecure world, polity press, cambridge. beck, u. 2002, risk society: towards a new modernity, trans. m. ritter, sage, london. bell, c. & newby, h. 1974, 'introduction', in c. bell & h. newby (eds), the sociology of community, frank cass, london. cohen, a.p. 1985, the symbolic construction of community, tavistock, london. etzioni, a. 1995, the spirit of community: rights, responsibilities and the communitarian agenda, fontana, london. etzioni, a. 1997, the new golden rule: community and morality in a democratic society, basic books, new york. geertz, c. 1993, 'thick description: toward an interpretive theory of culture', in, the interpretation of cultures; selected essays, fontana, london, pp. 3-30. giddens, a. 1990, the consequences of modernity, polity press, cambridge. giddens, a. 2000, 'the second globalization debate', the third culture, <http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/giddens/giddens_index.html>. jenkins, r. 2000, 'categorization: identity, social process and epistemology', current sociology, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 7-25. knorr cetina, k. 1997, 'sociality with objects: social relations in postsocial knowledge societies', theory, culture and society, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 1-30. http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/giddens/giddens_index.html%3e� 102 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no. 1, 2009 nancy, j.-l. 1991, the inoperative community, trans. p. connor, l. garbus, m. holland & s. sawhney, university of minnesota press, minneapolis. onyx, j., wood, c., bullen, p. & osburn, l. 2005, 'social capital: a rural youth perspective', youth studies australia, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 21-27. putnam, r. 2000, bowling alone: the collapse and revival of american community, simon and schuster, new york. rheingold, h. 1994, the virtual community, addison-wesley, reading, mass. rheingold, h. 2000, the virtual community: homesteading on the electronic frontier, revised edn, mit press, cambridge, mass. shah, d.v., kwak, n. & holbert, r.l. 2001, '"connecting" and "disconnecting" with civic life: patterns of internet use and the production of social capital', political communication, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 141-162. tönnies, f. 1974, 'gemeinschaft and gesellschaft', in c. bell & h. newby (eds), the sociology of community, frank cass, london. williams, r. 1961, the long revolution, chatto and windus, london. wittel, a. 2001, 'toward a network sociality', theory, culture and society, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 51-76. understanding community: thoughts and experiences of young people online hilary yerbury cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal vol. 15, no. 2 2023 © 2023 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: setiyono, j., natalis, a. 2023. universal values of pancasila in managing the crime of terrorism. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 15:2, 48– 63. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8084 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) universal values of pancasila in managing the crime of terrorism joko setiyono*, aga natalis universitas diponegoro, semarang city, central java, indonesia corresponding author: joko setiyono, universitas diponegoro, jalan dr. antonius suroyo, tembalang, semarang city, central java 50275, indonesia, jokosetiyono@lecturer.undip.ac.id doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8084 article history: received 01/02/2022; revised 31/10/2022; accepted 25/11/2022; published 30/07/2023 abstract using a socio-legal studies approach, this article analyses the primacy of the universal values of pancasila, a decolonizing ideology, in tackling crimes of terrorism in indonesia. in indonesia’s last two decades, radical movements have become more widespread, and the public easily follows their developments. intolerance is the seed for radicalism, and terrorism is the forerunner of the emergence of acts of terrorism. in tackling crimes of terrorism, it is important to apply pancasila as a way of life; ideals and nationalism have an important role in every aspect of the life of the nation and state. the policies for inculcating pancasila values must be carried out in a synergistic and coordinated manner by involving various existing sectors, and the material content of programs of deradicalization must be comprehensive, integral and sustainable by taking into account the condition of the target participants, educational background, experience and age with a dialogical, democratic, and participatory approach. keywords terrorism; transnational crime; radicalism; pancasila universal values; indonesia declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 48 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8084 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8084 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:jokosetiyono@lecturer.undip.ac.id https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8084 introduction indonesia is an archipelagic country formed from ethnic groups that have various languages, religions and cultures (schefold 1998). this country has indigenous tribes who have inhabited their ancestral lands since time immemorial. the tribes are found on the islands of java, madura, sumatra, kalimantan, sulawesi, lesser sunda islands, maluku, and papua. in addition, there are also immigrant ethnic groups such as arabs, chinese, indians and pakistanis. in a sense, indonesia is home to countless races, nationalities, and traditions; this is inextricably linked to the founding fathers’ moral compass, as expressed in pancasila. the pancasila contains five fundamental principles that serve as the moral foundation for the nation and state. these principles govern include the values of justice and humanity, unity and democracy as well as the primacy of religious values, forming the basis of an “indonesia for all” (dewantara 2015). the republic of indonesia is a legal state based on pancasila as the state ideology, and with the principles of pancasila embedded in its 1945 constitution (saraya 2019). the preamble to this constitution contains many dimensions, including humanitarian, social, economic, legal and international relations that must be maintained and developed according to national needs (tutik 2016), and explicitly states that the objective of the indonesian government is to bring together the entire indonesia nation, and eliminate intolerance, whatever its basis (tanamal & siagian 2020a). however, in the last two decades, there have been movements that reject pancasila and seek to replace its principles with religious ideology as the basis of the indonesian state (aristin 2016). even in the name of the religion with the largest number of adherents in indonesia, intolerant groups have contributed to shaking the values in pancasila, especially the first principle, ketuhanan yang maha esa, or ‘belief in the value of divinity’, the second principle, kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab or ‘just and civilised humanity’, and the third principle persatuan indonesia or ‘the unity of indonesia (fenton 2016; yuningsih et al. 2020). this intolerant group, often supported by the local government, deliberately intimidates other religious groups. even more sadly, this group can stop the worship of other religious groups by closing places of worship and withdrawing permits for places of worship after getting support from the community and local government, as happened to the huria kristen batak protestant filadelfia church in bekasi and the yasmin indonesian christian church in bogor (tanamal & siagian 2020a). the existence of indonesia as a multicultural country is also threatened by the issue of acts of terrorism, such as the bali bombings 1 and 2 or other cases, as well as the changing public perception of islam in general. these in turn pose a threat to the country’s security and sustainability, as well as to multiculturalism itself. even though specific groups are the only ones who commit terrorist acts, the acts themselves alter how the general public views islam. as a result of this perspective, indonesia, the largest muslim nation, also suffers negatively. terrorism in indonesia itself grows closely related to ideology, history, and politics which are also directly related to strategic social interactions at the domestic and global levels. the terrorists who have been apprehended thus far exhibit radical religious views and believe that the blood of those they designate “infidels” is halal. additionally, it was discovered that indonesian terrorism is connected to international terrorist organizations. this was demonstrated by the fact that each of the attackers apprehended was coordinated by key members of international terrorist organisations outside of indonesia, particularly isis (pradana & setiyono 2021). according to the lab 45 analyst team’s estimates, there were 552 terrorist actions committed in indonesia between the years 2000 and 2021, or roughly 26.29 acts of terror per year (farisa 2021). according to the report, three distinct categories were the targets of terrorist attacks. the three groups in question are: assets or persons/groups (24%); police groups (17%); and places or figures (15%). terrorist acts are most commonly committed as bombings (51%), armed assaults (30%), attacks on public facilities (8%), murder (5%), kidnapping (4%), and unarmed attacks (1%). in the last 21 years, most acts of terrorism have been carried out by jamaah islamiyah ( ji), affiliated with al qaeda (50%), followed by the east indonesia setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202349 mujahideen (mit) affiliated with the islamic state in iraq and syria (isis) (26%), then jamaah ansharut daulah ( jad) (15%) and the west indonesia mujahideen (mib) (1%) (canu & canu 2020). in 2021, the center for financial transaction reports and analysis noted that suspicious transactions related to terrorism cases had increased by 70%, from 660 transactions to 1,122 transactions, much more than the suspicious transactions related to fraud, corruptions or drug trafficking. somewhat surprisingly, given the emphasis these groups place on adherence to islamic law, these transactions tend to take place through commercial banks, rather than islamic banks (suwiknyo 2021), and constitute one of the many ways that terrorist organizations often earn capital (cnn indonesia 2019) terrorism that threatens multiculturalism and, as a consequence, world peace has shifted towards religious radicalism. as an antidote, deradicalization that restores fundamental religious ideals or divinity, including peace, love, and mutual respect, is required. pancasila offers such an antidote. pancasila is not confined to the ideals listed in the five precepts; it also comprises philosophical ideals. taken as an intellectual philosophy the pancasila precepts are a crystallization of a value system; hence, the pancasila principles are fundamentally a single entity. the fundamental ideals of pancasila, which include divinity, humanity, unity, democracy, and justice, are universal, meaning that they are applicable to all people and are not exclusive to the indonesians. these pancasila values can be utilized by all parties to fight terrorism (harahap 2021). the purpose of this study is to analyse the primacy of the universal values of pancasila in tackling crimes of terrorism in indonesia. research methods this study takes a socio-legal approach. the primary data used was obtained based on observations of several cases of terrorism. the secondary data used are the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia and law no. 15 of 2003 concerning the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism. primary and secondary data were analysed using document studies in the form of legal expert doctrine contained in textbooks in legal theory and philosophy (shidarta 2006). results and discussion terrorism as a transnational crime advances in technologies have brought many benefits to society, but they have also given birth to new forms of crime or conventional crimes with a new modus operandi, transnational crime. according to the regulation of the chief of the police of the republic of indonesia number 7 of 2009 concerning the reporting system for disturbances security and public order, transnational crime is an organised crime, whose area of operation covers several countries, which has an impact on the political, governmental, sociocultural, and economic interests of a country and is global. this concept was first introduced internationally in the 1990s in the eighth united nations congress on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders (wagley 2006) leading to the united nations convention on transnational organized crime (untoc) and the united nations convention against corruption (uncac). in the regional context, transnational organized crime (toc) has become a concern since 1977, especially in southeast asia. this type of crime became a particular challenge for countries in southeast asia during the economic crisis. indonesia provides support for the efforts made by the international community by actively participating in these conventions, and ratifying the results of the convention into law in indonesia. the law of the republic of indonesia number 5 of 2009 concerning ratification of the united nations convention setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202350 against transnational organized crime is the legal basis in indonesia in overcoming toc, and brought together existing legislation as follows (hadiyantina 2020; rasyid 2021; silalahi 2021): 1. the law of the republic of indonesia number 5 of 2009 concerning ratification of the united nations convention against transnational organized crime; 2. law of the republic of indonesia number 1 of 1979 concerning extradition; 3. law of the republic of indonesia number 22 of 1997 concerning narcotics; 4. law of the republic of indonesia number 31 of 1999 concerning eradication of criminal acts of corruption as amended by law number 20 of 2001; 5. law of the republic of indonesia number 41 of 1999 concerning forestry; 6. law of the republic of indonesia number 15 of 2002 concerning the crime of money laundering as amended by law number 25 of 2003; 7. law of the republic of indonesia number 15 of 2003 concerning stipulation of government regulation in lieu of law number 1 of 2002 concerning eradication of criminal acts of terrorism into law; 8. law of the republic of indonesia number 1 of 2006 concerning mutual legal aid in criminal matters; 9. law of the republic of indonesia number 13 of 2006 concerning protection of witnesses and victims; 10. law of the republic of indonesia number 21 of 2007 concerning eradication of the crime of trafficking in persons. the government of the republic of indonesia has the responsibility to protect its citizens from threats both from within the country and from abroad as stated in the preamble to the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia to protect the integrity of the nation’s sovereignty. from the definition written in the law, terrorism is categorised as an extraordinary crime. given this categorisation, it is certainly not possible to deal with terrorism using the same method as dealing with murderers or thefts because of the impact on the surrounding environment, causing tremendous damage and causing high death tolls. judging from the characteristics of terrorism, it does cause not only actual damage but also intangible consequences such as causing massive damage to the environment, social security and disturbing political stability (hikam 2016). terrorism cannot be regarded as a localized crime, and a broader understanding is required in order to combat it. terrorism has evolved into a more complex form so that perceiving terrorism as monolithic will only jeopardize humanity. terrorists have dismantled their financial dependence on state sponsored terrorism, as shown in indonesia where groups have covertly utilized social fundraising to sponsor their acts against humanity. in term of communication, state borders no longer act as barriers to information exchange, facilitating financing of groups. terrorism as a transnational crime can be evaluated based on its coordination and execution; the presence of isis is one indication of a regime change. there is no denying that the existence of terrorist organizations operating internationally has had an impact on the recent emergence of crimes of terrorism. isis claimed responsibility for a number of actions in indonesia, particularly after an extensive investigation revealed that some of the perpetrators had contact with the group (detailed in the next section). the development of ideologies and funding are obviously related to the role of international groups in this context. one could almost argue that modern terrorism is a well-planned, well-organized crime with a predetermined outcome. dynamics of terrorism crimes in indonesia and measures of prevention in societies where terrorists are well organized, like indonesia, terrorism is still prone to occur. they blend in with the neighbourhood where they live so well that it can be challenging to distinguish them at times. setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202351 due to the proliferation of terrorists and their leaders continued use of commandos, it is difficult for the public and the police to track them down. their actions, especially bombings, create tense conditions and a frightened community, with the excuse that they are jihad. the name khawarij, adopted from the history of islam, has evolved into a label for organizations that believe that the islam they practice is the most accurate, leaving them feeling compelled to correct those outside their group, and being willing to use violence to attain their goals. (the literal meaning of khawarij is ‘missing’ or ‘lost’). the following are some examples of terrorism crimes in indonesia (wulandari 2020), with their emphasis on the perpetrators: 1. suicide bombing in kampung melayu (wednesday, may 24, 2017) ahmad sukri and ichwan nurul salam committed the suicide bombings. five people were killed in this atrocity, including the two perpetrators, and 12 others were hurt. isis media, the amaq news agency, claimed that this atrocity was a product of isis. the perpetrators were identified through a police investigation as being jad (mudiriyah jamaah anshar daulah) members in bandung raya. according to the investigation, this group is connected to isis. 2. the thamrin bombing (thursday, january 14, 2016) ahmad muhazan (attacking starbucks) and dian juni kurniadi (attacking the police post) committed these atrocities and died in the suicide bombing. sunakim alias afif and muhamad ali carried out the second wave of attacks on the same occasion. the police and the perpetrators engaged in a shootout during this incident and both perpetrators were killed. according to the investigation, this terror attack was planned and orchestrated by aman abdurrahman, also known as oman rachman, and iwan darmawan muntho, also known as rois, both inmates of the nusakambangan kembang kuning prison. rois and aman share a similar ideology. aman is renowned for being a fervent ideological propagandist. extremists and terror movements frequently reference his “thoughts” in their rhetoric. aman founded the terrorist organization jamaah ansharut daulah ( jad), which regularly conducted war simulations and dispatcheed members to syria. the flow of funds discovered allowed for the identification of the alleged connection between isis and jad. 3. suicide bombing of three churches in surabaya  the perpetrators were members of one family. the bombs were detonated at the immaculate santa maria church, the diponegoro indonesian christian church, and the arjuna street pentecostal church. the family, known to be members of the jad group, were killed in the action. in this incident, three children participated with their parents in carrying out this suicide bombing. 4. bombing in rusunawa wonocolo, sidoarjo the perpetrators of this bombing are known to be from a family that still had ties to the families of the terrorist bombers at the three churches in surabaya. in this incident, three people died: the father, mother, and their eldest child. three more children from the family were injured. 5. bombing at the surabaya city police resort  a husband and wife with three children came to the surabaya police station using two motorbikes. while they were still at the entrance gate of the surabaya police, the bomb exploded. four of the five terrorist bombers died on the spot, but a small daughter survived. four policemen and six civilians were also victims of the attack. these five cases are but a small portion of the terrorism cases that have happened in indonesia. some of these incidents involved both isis and jad, respectively. the terrorists involved in the suicide bombings were not just adults; but their children were also often present. according to the investigations, each of these cases had some connection to isis or, more specifically, to the development of isis ideology in the past. this demonstrates that terrorism can be considered a transnational crime. additionally, they were seen to setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202352 target police stations, government buildings or institutions, and places of worship. they believed that other groups and religions are infidels, and by doing so, they justified violence against them. in addition, they believed that the government and police, whom they hold in high regard, permitted other understandings (other than their own) and so were equally infidel. policies or efforts to combat crime are integral to protecting society (social defence) and achieving the good of society at large. therefore, it can be said that the main goal of criminal politics is the protection of society. according to barda nawawi arief (1996), criminal politics is an integral part of social politics, defined as the policies or efforts to achieve social harmony. efforts to overcome crime need to be taken with a policy approach, so that there is integration between criminal politics and social politics, and there is integration between crime prevention efforts with “penal” and “non-penal” penalties. according to hoefnagels (1973), crime prevention can be achieved by applying criminal law, preventing the creation of new criminals, and influencing public views on crime and punishment through the mass media. the role of the government in efforts to eradicate and overcome acts of terrorism is related to the theory of the national interest (morgenthau 1952). combating terrorism was originally regulated in law no. 15 of 2003 concerning the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism as a legal umbrella, which boiled down to government regulation in lieu of law no. 1 of 2002, a regulation that only provided a basis for implementing repressive acts (eradication) against terrorism. as a result, the victims of terrorist acts were mostly ordinary citizens, and the offenders were only subject to repressive measures. this legislation put terrorism in the context of maintaining security and public order. law number 15 of 2003 concerning the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism was finally revised and ratified in may 2018. according to the provisions of article 6 of law number 15 of 2003 concerning the eradication of criminal acts of terrorism, anyone who intentionally uses violence or threats of violence creates an atmosphere of terror or fear of people widely or causes mass victims by depriving them of their freedom or eliminating them or causes damage or destruction to vital strategic objects or the environment or public facilities or international facilities shall be punished with death or life imprisonment or imprisonment for a minimum of 4 (four) years and a maximum of 20 (twenty) years. the maximum punishment under these clauses is the death penalty, which indicates that terrorist perpetrators face a very serious criminal charge. but ultimately, it all comes down to how serious and acutely conscientious law enforcement is in catching the offenders through lawsuits and penalties that are proportionate to their level of guilt. it is obvious that the community finds cases such as the thamrin bombing to be extremely upsetting, so law enforcement officials and the criminal justice system for terrorism must be open, impartial, and willing to engage with all parties involved. ensnaring outliers under the banner of terrorist organizations is insufficient. the perpetrator or creator of the attack and the source of funding must be disclosed in these exceptional criminal cases. the financial issue is a significant component in determining the smooth running of terrorist groups, especially now that they no longer have access to funding from groups such as isis. several efforts need to be continuously improved, such as identifying in detail the profiles of users of financial services, strict supervision of compliance with financial service users and supervision of money transfer activities through a range of systems. this includes supervising the carrying of cash or other payment instruments into or out of the indonesian customs area. the threat of terrorism to humanity is unquestionably present, but from the standpoint of diversity, the harm posed by this group’s arrogance is no less potent. terrorist organizations are now more challenging to pinpoint because of their ability to blend in with society. as a result, there will always be animosity and suspicion between people, which might heighten societal tension. this is worsened by the designation of particular religious expressions as terrorist groups, such as the use of religious characteristics that differ setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202353 from the local culture. therefore, eliminating terrorism is essential to preserving multiculturalism. in his analysis of the spiral of violence, hélder câmara (1972) stated that one of the expressions of violence is the struggle to uphold ideology. this term is better known in indonesia by hardline religious groups as jihad. terrorist organizations can be regarded to have erred in their interpretation of jihad. they defend using violence and the blood of innocent people to achieve ideals in which they truly believe. a command in any book of scripture cannot be narrowly interpreted; rather, it must be understood in the context of its history and current relevance. for example, in the qur’an, the definition of jihad is not ‘waging war’ to fight against others but rather striving with all your might to obtain divine pleasure. however, it is evident that militant groups, who frequently use the name of religion as a justification, have adopted a lifestyle in which misinterpretations of religious orders have become commonplace. trends of radicalism in indonesia reforms in the legal system result from our decades-long efforts to decolonize the legal field. the law is contextual; if the law is created based on values other than the values prevailing in our society, then the law will be criminogenic, that is, the law itself may lead to situations where criminal behaviours may arise. in the current era of reform that provides space for openness and freedom in indonesian society, several islamic radical movements are called radical because their followers sometimes carry out actions that, according to normal standards, are classified as very violent and destructive, for example, some places of entertainment, were damaged by a group because they were considered as centres of immorality (turmudi & sihbudi 2005). islamic radicalism in indonesia emerged and was triggered by domestic problems and the global political landscape, which was considered to have constrained the socio-political life of muslims (ridha, zainal & andy 2021). in the domestic context, for example, various conflicts have arisen between groups of muslims, starting from the murder of a kiai (spiritual expert) accused of sorcery, and including the poso tragedy that occurred on december 25, 1998, and the ambon tragedy on january 19, 1999, where other muslims were again the target (faiqah & pransiska 2018). these critical events did not necessarily receive adequate handling by the indonesian government at that time, and this motivated moderate islamic organizations to take the initiative to assist their fellow believers. these groups saw the government’s delay in addressing “immorality”,” aside from being a fundamental contradiction, to be highly disturbing. in this situation, the government was charged with acting inconsistently when enforcing the rules and laws that were mutually agreed upon. the inability of islamic organizations like nahdlatul ulama, muhammadiyah, and the indonesian ulema council to both realize moderate islamic goals and resolve issues encountered by muslims in indonesia also contributes to this worry. events happening elsewhere in the world have also raised prejudice against muslims as a group, especially the world trade centre incident in 2001, widely known as the 9/11 act. religious radicalism is a phenomenon that can appear in any religion. radicalism itself will not be a problem if it is only contrary to the thoughts or ideologies of its adherents. but when radicalism, which was once simply an idea, becomes a movement and is translated into action, issues arise. such a situation results in open hostility or violence between two rival factions, although conflicts may not often come out in the open. however, no matter how the dispute manifests, it still has a detrimental effect on multiculturalism. the emergence of radicalism in indonesia, along with changes in the social and political order, has a long history. it dates as far back as the13th century and includes, in the 18th century, the influence of the maliki school of thought, which introduced the ideas of muhammad bin abdul wahab, currently the official ideology of the saudi arabian government, known as wahabism. ideologies brought from outside did not necessarily recognize tolerance of differences, and led to transformations of the muslim population. (thus, setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202354 contemporary radicalism and thus terrorist acts among islamists are rooted in religious understandings that can be traced to the khawarij and then wahabi groups (mufid 2013). actions of intolerance in indonesia are not only carried out by radical islamic groups. in areas where christians are becoming the majority, there are also acts of intolerance against other minority citizens. for example, in manado, north sulawesi, the manguni brigade group was formed in 1999 to maintain security and stability in north sulawesi when riots broke out in poso and ambon. when the conflict in poso and ambon had ended, the manguni brigade remained to carry out security in the manado area. however, they have been accused of committing violence against places of worship and muslims who wanted to build mosques such as the asysyuhada mosque in the aer ujang complex, sub-district girian permai, in the bitung area (‘buntut penolakan pendirian masjid asy syuhada, warga muslim mengungsi’ 2015). this radical group of christians brought its understanding to the community and tried to articulate and implement it by making changes to the socio-religious order, such as the culture of islamization. a part of this attitude can be tolerated and justified in the context of democracy, but this excessive spirit is more destructive and cannot be justified. the group made use of several means to achieve their goal, both through political movements and movements in civil society, including structured community-based education as well as the use of print-based and electronic media (isnawan 2018). in preventing radicalism in the country, the coordinating ministry for political, legal and security affairs developed three important policies, and circulated documentation about them. this was an effort to suppress the spread of radical understanding in the community. by cooperating with the national counterterrorism agency, and coordinating intensively with other agencies, the coordinating ministry for political, legal and security affairs mounted a strong fight against terrorism in the country, using measures from the softest to the toughest. some of the key policies are set out below. the first policy implemented was by issuing a regulation on terrorists across borders which can revoke the citizenship status of indonesian citizens who join terrorist groups based abroad. that way, all their rights as indonesian citizens are immediately lost when they reach the overseas group. however, the regulation provides concessions for children under the age of 10 who are forcibly taken abroad. within this age limit, the individual can return to indonesia as an indonesian citizen. the second policy was carried out with the national counterterrorism agency to combat terrorism and ministry for political, legal, and security affairs by launching a national action plan to prevent and overcome extremist violence. under this policy, the two institutions are responsible for deradicalization programs for domestic communities exposed to terrorism. the method is through dialogues involving religious and community leaders with expertise in their fields. the third policy was to coordinate intensively with relevant government agencies in preventing intolerance. in this case, the national government, together with local governments, religious institutions, ngos, community leaders, and so on, has made efforts to prevent acts of intolerance in the community. intolerance is an attitude that must be prevented as early as possible because it becomes the forerunner of understanding radicalism. therefore, all government agencies must be involved in tackling this matter. the approach used by the indonesian government in these policies has been seen to be overly legalistic, and based on an ignorance of the underlying factors that have led to the emergence of radical and intolerant movements in indonesia. despite the fact that the approach contains three key aspects that can help eradicate terrorism, it is unlikely to be successful. a key reason is that it does not have the principles of pancasila at its core. the role of the universal values of pancasila in overcoming terrorism pancasila was established as the rational will of the nation and as an answer to plurality, pluralism and multiculturalism for the indonesian nation. pancasila is logical, rational, universal, and systematic as setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202355 an ideology and represents a decolonizing statement of values. pancasila is a value that comes from the ancestors, through the struggle process, and reflects local indonesian people’s cultural diversity and wisdom (latif 2016). thus, pancasila is the ideal basis for overcoming the problems of radicalism and terrorism, according to barda nawawi arief (2018). if the effort to eradicate terrorism is seen in the context of legal substance, it can be said that the effort to eradicate crimes of terrorism in indonesia is part of the pancasila legal system, an approach which is already apparent in the constitution. terminologically, pancasila in the preamble to the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia is the basis of the state. pancasila is explained as the source of all sources of law, that is, the source of legal order, in indonesia. thus, pancasila is the spiritual principle of law and order. it provides the standard criteria for validating values in society, nation, and state life as the precepts of pancasila are be reduced to values for society and the state. pancasila consists of five precepts, the essence of which can be expressed as universal values: divine values, human values, values of unity, values of deliberation and consensus, and values of justice. these five values in pancasila are compounds that are very important for the indonesian people in turning the wheels of social, national and state life. pancasila can be understood as the basis of the state at three levels. first, it can be the basis for organising an independent and sovereign state; secondly, it can be the basis for regulating the implementation of a clean and authoritative state apparatus to achieve the national goals as stated in the preamble to the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia, 4th paragraph; and thirdly it can be the basis, direction, and guidance for the activities of the indonesian people in their daily life (suryana 2017). it has been established as a source of national basic law after the reform through the decree of the people’s consultative assembly number iii/2000, which was later amended by the law of the republic of indonesia number 10 of 2004 concerning the establishment of legislations and as noted earlier, it is written into the 1945 constitution. sources of law can also be unwritten: the values of pancasila underpin the way of life of the indonesian people, which implies that all activities of daily life of the indonesian people must be led according to the precepts of pancasila because pancasila is also a crystallisation of values that are owned and sourced from the life of the indonesian nation itself. thus, pancasila permeates all aspects of indonesian life. it is the state ideology, whose goal is realising a just and prosperous society that is materially and spiritually evenly distributed, in a state which is independent, sovereign, and united in the atmosphere life of the nation which in turn is safe, peaceful, orderly, and dynamic, contributing to an independent, friendly, orderly and peaceful world. its general and universal values enable it to accommodate all diversity and to be accepted by all parties. terrorist movements and acts of terrorism specifically contradict the 3 (three) main precepts in pancasila, namely: • the value of divinity; • fair and civilised humanity; and • indonesian unity. in recent times, terrorists in indonesia have focussed on their interpretation of the first precept, mistakenly presuming that their ideas are absolute and condemning the beliefs of other groups. terrorism is considered antithetical to just and civilized humanity since it is not uncommon for radical and terror movements to rationalize the use of violence in defence of their beliefs. ultimately, these violent acts have repercussions for the nation’s unity, which is based on mutual trust, because, as is well known, the presence of radical groups in society breeds animosity and mistrust among its citizens. the implementation of the values at the heart of pancasila can bring a spirit of togetherness to maintain unity from the crimes of radicals and terrorism. the value contained in the first precept is the parent setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202356 of the values of pancasila. currently, indonesia has six beliefs recognised by the state: islam, protestant christianity, catholicism, hinduism, buddhism, and confucianism. however, currently the implementation of the values of this first precept is not going well, because even though the concept itself is predicted to be very flexible, it exists only as a dream, for there is no real implementation. the concept of open ideology is not well implemented in daily life because there are still many disputes, disputes, acts of violence arising from religion and belief. the arrogant attitude of some groups who act in the name of religion by committing acts of violence is one of the reasons for unavoidable disputes. therefore, it is necessary to actualise the understanding of pancasila values in the life of the nation and state before considering possible future approaches to implementation. to understand what this might mean, it is first important to explore the contribution that each of the precepts bring to the ideology of the state. in pancasila, faith is the primary and most important value and serves as the fundamental moral tenet of both state life and social interaction. the second precept, ‘just and civilized humanity’, recognizes the position of equality among humans, who must be able to respect one another regardless of distinctions between people based on their political convictions, social and economic standing, origin, descent, race, skin colour, language, religion, culture, customs, ethnicity, or other differences. this respect for human values must also motivate actions to uphold values of justice. thirdly, the indonesian nation’s uniqueness in the plethora of national socialities around the world is reflected in the major importance of the creation of the principles of the indonesian unity. this principle serves as a counterbalance to the social side of the indonesian country as well as an expression of the existence of the indonesian nation within the association of indonesian countries. the fourth precept of democracy led by wisdom in deliberation reflects the specific democratic characteristics of indonesia. consequently, the essence of this precept is the spirit of democracy which remains connected to specific principles, including accountability to divinity value, the principle of humanity, and the identity of indonesian unity. the pancasila fifth precept defines social justice as justice with broad dimensions. soekarno’s vision of a just society included the political, economic, and social ideals of justice as its three central tenets. pancasila values should be used to fight radicalism and terrorism because these are, of course, contrary to pancasila (winarni 2020). pancasila values can be implemented in various real efforts. efforts that can be made so that radicalism and terrorism do not flourish are as follows: 1. a good quality and level of public education and welfare must be created by the government, the law must be properly enforced, and the government itself must be accepted as authoritative; 2. group cohesiveness and the identity of groups who seek to separate themselves from the community, a significant factor in decision-making leading to jihad, must be reduced, thus becoming a useful first step in reducing the tendency to put intergroup relations at risk; and 3. access to information and other assets that unjustly give rise to a sense of oppression and persecution must be minimised, along the expansion of opportunities to participate in wider social interactions, without ignoring the fulfilment of their need for an integralist muslim identity, a strategy that will be useful in returning those inclined to radical views to a moderate strategy in inter-group relations. acceptance of pancasila as a way of life nation is a form of awareness of the reality of diversity in indonesia. islam in indonesia is not the only religion that exists. thus, the state must provide fair service to all recognised religions. it also means the state must guarantee a harmonious and balanced pattern of association among fellow people. diversity should always be an invaluable asset and pride for the people of indonesia who do not want to be fooled by the ideology of death, which makes them die in vain. the ideological resilience of pancasila will ultimately impact the nation’s national security. therefore, we need setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202357 a policy approach that is comprehensive and integrated into inculcating the values of pancasila and the constitution 1945 so that the results can be more optimal (tanamal & siagian 2020b). this policy must be supported by strategic steps and technical efforts to implement strategy at the operational level. with more concrete policies, strategies and efforts, the government and the community it employs can work together to inculcate the values of pancasila and the constitution 1945 as part of deradicalisation in dealing with radicalism and terrorism. a very significant step was taken when ministers in the government, and other senior officials include the attorney general, the head of the national police and the head of the national counter terrorism agency announced a number of new laws1, regarding the prohibition of activities, use of symbols and attributes as well as termination of the activities of the islamic defenders front december 30, 2020. in addition to overseeing the law enforcement process, the government needs to revitalise the linear connection between three important pillars of society in eradicating terrorism: the police, religious leaders, and the community. the seriousness of the indonesian national police in uncovering terrorist networks, for example, should not be undermined by the issue of human rights violations. this issue risked becoming a shield for the terrorist group to take refuge behind, but the police will not be careless in carrying out their duties because standard operating procedures bind them. terrorism is asserted as a crime against humanity which indonesian government and world community are trying to eradicate. functional violence against terrorists is deemed necessary to a certain extent to break the dangerous links of terrorism. for this reason, the public should be expected to consider the performance of the national police proportionally, not only to think about the rights of terrorists and their families. the suffering of the bomb victims’ families who lost their husbands, children, wives, sources of livelihood, and enthusiasm for life must also be considered. as one of the pillars essential to eradicating terrorism, the community must also increase its role. the mobile security system that was in effect in the new order era needs to be developed by tightening the supervision of citizens from the lower levels. if people are suspicious of the movements and actions of others, they should report them to the authorities. finally, religious leaders have a key role to play. they must provide a correct understanding of the prophetic message of religion (silberman, higgins, & dweck 2005). young people have just learned religion but mistakenly are passionate about jihad (sageman 2011), as if religion is synonymous with war. the paradigm of jihad in religion is seen to always ends violently in a pool of blood; if this simplistic understanding is not straightened out, it will give birth to violence in religion. the pressing need to clarify the meaning of jihad falls to religious leaders. their influence on how to mold the perspectives of their followers cannot be underestimated. giving such responsibility to one or two people is not easy, so to reduce religious group intolerance, all parties must actively participate with religious leaders. conclusion terrorism is an act that can cause an unfavourable security and order situation and cause significant loss and damage within a society. the crime of terrorism is a transnational crime based on international conventions. thus, terrorism is a threat to every country globally, and this requires joint efforts to eradicate it. in indonesia’s last two decades, radicalism movements have tended to be more widespread, and the public easily follows its developments. intolerance is the seed for radicalism, and radicalism is the forerunner to 1 so the government, in this case, the minister of the interior republic of indonesia, minister of law and human rights ri man, minister of communications and informatics of the republic of indonesia, attorney general of the republic of indonesia, head of national police of the republic of indonesia, head of national agency counter-terrorism decided no. 220-4780 of 2020, no. m.hh-14.hh.05.05 of 2020, no. 690 of 2020, no. 264 of 2020, no. kb/3/xii/2020, no. 320 of 2020 setiyono and natalis cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202358 the emergence of acts of terrorism. therefore, to ensure no regeneration in acts of terrorism, it is not enough just to arrest and process the perpetrators through legal channels. eradicating the habitus for the breeding of new jihadists undoubtedly requires a complex program and involves the active role of various parties. building islamic narratives that are friendly, tolerant and caring for others is a challenge that needs to be continuously developed to reduce the bad influence of intolerance and radicalism. as a state ideology, pancasila as a way of life, ideals and nationalism has an important role in every aspect of the life of the nation and state and of the people. although the application and inculcation of the universal values of pancasila can start from the family environment, the surrounding environment, including through formal education or informal education, needs to create the nuances of diversity, a strong sense of indonesianness, unity and integrity among nations. such an approach has the potential to mitigate all forms of action that can cause disturbing acts of terrorism in the community. the government needs to carry out its duties in development properly, fairly, and evenly to create justice and prosperity by the goals and ideals of the state that pancasila encompasses. the policy of the pancasila value inculcation program and the 1945 constitution of the republic of indonesia is considered important and relevant considering the nation’s condition, which is still facing threats from radical terrorist groups. the current development of pancasila values is carried out in an era of democracy that is full of freedom and openness. the aim is not to maintain the state regime but to maintain the nation’s integrity, create conditions for a peaceful, secure, tolerant state, respectful of differences and diversity. the policy of pancasila values inculcation must be balanced in a synergistic and coordinated manner by involving various existing sectors and their material content with a comprehensive, integrated, and sustainable process of 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recyclart. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 14:2, 6–20. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v14i2.8188 issn 1837-5391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) sustaining urban public spaces through everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism: the case of the art center recyclart jingjing li1,*, ching lin pang2 1 katholieke universiteit leuven, leuven, belgium and university of antwerp, antwerp, belgium, jingjing.li@kuleuven.be 2 university of antwerp, antwerp, belgium and katholieke universiteit leuven, leuven, belgium, chinglin.pang@uantwerpen.be 6 corresponding author: jingjing li, katholieke universiteit leuven, oude markt 13, 3000 leuven, belgium, jingjing.li@kuleuven.be doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i2.8188 article history: received 07/03/2022; revised 17/05/2022; accepted 10/06/2022; published 27/07/2022 abstract this article explores how social artistic interventions provide forms of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism – an intellectual and aesthetic openness towards objects, places, experiences, activities that relates to the everyday life of people regardless of identity, occupation, social class, cultural/racial background, and lifestyle – in transforming urban voids into inclusive urban public spaces. through socially engaged art, artists and artistic institutions do not play a leading role but act as facilitators to provide space and context for events to emerge. through participant observations and interviews for the period 20152018 and using concepts of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism, we demonstrate how the art center recyclart, through socially informed artistic interventions, practices, and performances, contributed to transforming urban voids into inclusive urban public spaces. our results indicate that local life, enacted by socalled marginalized residents and their everyday practices in urban central neighborhoods, is critical in citymaking and contributes to everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism. keywords everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism; social artistic intervention; urban voids; urban public spaces; recyclart declaration of conflicting interest ching lin pang is a member of the editorial board of the journal and a guest editor of this special issue but has had no part in editorial or peer review processes associated with this paper. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14i2.8188 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14i2.8188 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:jingjing.li@kuleuven.be mailto:chinglin.pang@uantwerpen.be mailto:jingjing.li@kuleuven.be https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v14.i2.8188 introduction in this article we study the processes of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism through the case of an art center. following robbins (1998), we do not conceive cosmopolitanism as a universal elitist project but rather constituted by transnational experiences and bordercrossings that are localized, particular, plural and unprivileged. in a similar vein, everyday aesthetics (saito 2007; 2019) focuses on the aesthetic potential of everyday mundane life worlds of socalled ordinary people, particularly silenced and unprivileged publics, and thus less concerned with elitecentered aesthetics and cosmopolitanism research. it echoes the social turn in aesthetics (bourriaud 2002) that increasingly has become involved with social events, public and civic engagement since the 1990s (bennett 2012; bishop 2006a; finkelpearl 2000; kester, 2011; korza et al. 2005; lacy, 1995). in studying the role of art, artists, art institutions, and reception of art in urban public spaces and development, we blend the two concepts into everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism. we then apply the new concept to the art center recyclart that is located in marginal innercity neighborhoods of brussels. we explore both the possibilities and vulnerabilities and potential pitfalls in transforming urban voids into inclusive public spaces through socially informed artistic interventions, practices, and performances. based on ethnographic observations and interviews along with literature study we aspire to understand how local life embodied by marginalized residents in their everyday practices is shaping the city and thus contributing to everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism. how do social artistic interventions foster everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism in transforming urban voids into inclusive urban public spaces and thus contributing to city making? how is this process mediated through collaborative initiatives between art centers and local residents, with a special attention to the socalled more vulnerable groups of the neighborhoods? how sustainable and what are the potential pitfalls of these social artistic endeavors? in order to address these questions this article is organized in three parts: literature review, methodology, indepth discussion of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitan activities initiated by the art center recyclart in brussels. in the first part we critically review the academic literature on cosmopolitanism and everyday aesthetics in the context of sustaining urban public spaces when confronted with increasing urban voids. then we proceed to elaborate the research methodologies in studying practices of socially engaged art transforming urban voids into inclusive urban public spaces. in the third part we showcase initiatives on how social artistic interventions provide forms of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism (di paola 2018; guasch 2018; saito 2019) in transforming urban voids into inclusive urban public spaces at the brussels based art center recyclart. we end with a conclusion assessing the outcomes in terms of possibilities and threats. everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism through art in urban voids following early scholars’ inquiry of everyday aesthetics from various perspectives (berleant 1970, 1991, 2005; dewey 1958; mandoki 2007), saito focuses on the rich content of everyday events, settings, activities in mundane life worlds regarding items and qualities that are ordinary, commonplace and routine yet omnipresent in daily life transcending individual and cultural differences (saito 2007; 2019). in other words, saito (2017; 2019) refers to the interaction between the individual and the space, understanding subjectivity as intersubjectivity involving interbody engagements and entanglements at multiple levels of interaction. cosmopolitanism refers to contemporary artistic effort of responsibility and hospitality ‘towards a more global and intercultural dimension’ (di paola 2018, p. 12), of contextualization of social, political, spatial and urban realities, and of acting and effecting a work in progress in exploring transculturation and hybridization (chakrabarty et al. 2002). this is echoed by robbins (1998) arguing that cosmopolitanism should not be conceived as an overarching universal elitist project but rather constituted by transnational experiences and bordercrossings that are localized, particular, plural and unprivileged. li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 20227 these two streams of concepts are inspirational when applied to the role of art, artists and art institutions and the reception of art in urban public spaces. everyday aesthetics cultivates an aesthetic attitude allowing the self and others to have a transcending experience with the (urban) ordinary life and routine and at the same time it rewards any (urban) mundane objects and routine an aesthetic merit (gumbrecht 2006; leddy 2012; tuan 1993; visser 1997). thus, it encourages a poststructural position instead of a fixed attitude to distinguish between familiar and unfamiliar, ordinary and extraordinary (haapala 2017; potgieter 2017). defamiliarizing the familiar and the mundane dimension of ordinary urban life allows for unleashing the aesthetic potential of socalled ordinary people and their interventions in the urban fabric. it opens new possibilities for creating alternative art forms, artistic interventions, and contemporary avantgarde art. in so doing it foregrounds the salience of everyday urban life in the creation of art(s) following the social turn in the art world that has become increasingly entangled with social events, and public and civic engagement since 1990s (bennett 2012; bishop 2006a; finkelpearl 2000; kester 2011; korza et al. 2005; lacy 1995). secondly, everyday aesthetics questions the strict distinction between life and art (potgieter 2017; saito 2019) and thus gives rise to a ‘creative, educable, transformative reciprocity between art and life’ (potgieter 2017, p. 72). in this sense, artists and art institutions that are committed to social engagement with everyday urban (neighborhood) life blur the creator/spectator dichotomy as they foster collaborative projects with the public in locally embedded art projects and events through cocreation. thus, the role of the artist and art institution have evolved from a mere creator to a facilitator providing a context or an occasion for things to emerge, while promoting palpable human interactions both within and beyond the local community. as facilitators, artists/artistic institutions/curators employ actionoriented means of art and artistic production encouraging active engagement and involvement from the public that sustain the publicness of urban space and authenticity as origin and past history as well as creativity and futureoriented possibility (zukin 2010) of the city. thirdly, artists and art institutions create the context of multisensory ambiance for subjects to experience the aesthetics of a vibe (böhme 1993; böhme & thibaud 2018) where a ‘unified atmosphere arises spontaneously when various elements making up the physical environment and human interactions and movements within it happen to congeal’ with ‘objectively identifiable features of the environment and situation’ (saito 2019) in urban public spaces. these multisensory experiences redistribute the senses to the nonvisual such as olfactory, tactile, gustatory, auditory sensations. they also reshuffle the urban sensorium by making visible the unheard voices (instead of noises) of the often silenced and hidden groups (dikeç 2005; rancière 2004) which tend to be eclipsed by the visual orientation and the senses from the established spatial and social order in fields such as urban planning and architectural design. from this perspective the multisensory ambiance provides contexts for encounters of bodily engagement and human interactions including but not limited to openmindedness to diversities, respect and reciprocity (berleant 2005b; 2012; 2017). moreover, these encounters initiate moments of interruption ‘of the “natural” order of domination’ by constituting a common space for those who usually ‘have no part in that order’ (dikeç 2005, p. 172). in this sense, the multisensory encounters with redistributed sensorium in the urban public spaces become political where equality emerges (dikeç 2005). from these premises, we propose the concept of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism in exploring the role of socially engaged art, artist and art institution and reception of art in urban public spaces and relationship between everyday art and the urban space. everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism (di paola 2018; guasch 2018; meskimmon 2011; saito 2019) represents an intellectual and aesthetic openness towards objects, places, experiences and activities that constitutes urban everyday life of people regardless of identity, occupation, social class, cultural background or lifestyle. it is ‘immersed in the routine and mundane’ (olcese & savage 2015, p. 721). it contrasts with the more elite centered airtravelling, globalizing and neoliberal form of fine art aesthetics and cosmopolitanism discourse (olcese & savage 2015; saito 2017, 2019). instead, everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism advocates for the localized, particular, plural and unprivileged li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 20228 (robbins 1998) cosmopolitan experiences. in so doing it attends to the indeterminate, unestablished, mundane and embodied engagement in urban everyday life worlds. it encourages an openness to explore openings and interstices affording shared alternative experiences and perspectives. in addition, this endeavor necessitates collaboration with the general public, especially with socalled marginalized residents, and redistribution of the urban sensorium (dikeç 2005; rancière 2004), which is less concerned by the elite centered aesthetics and cosmopolitanism, promoting encounters with everyday mundane and localized activities in the urban context as presented in the following parts of this paper. as the dynamic and dialectic processes of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism are grounded in socially engaged art, it is useful to briefly discuss this strand of art. the nature of socially engaged art is community oriented and collaborative. these participatory artistic practices engage with a specific group of people living in a specific locality socially, culturally (cartiere 2016) and spatially. it is therefore deeply entrenched in the place with a (growing) understanding of the place’s historical, social, and political context. by working with people in specific sites, socially engaged art has the potential to facilitate a negotiation with topdown urban spatial orderings and provide alternative horizons for urban imagines towards urban public spaces and inclusive citymaking. given this impact, socially engaged art has political potential (olsen 2018) in urban spatial negotiations. through socially engaged artistic interventions in urban voids, artists and art institutions reflect and act upon urban social realities of multiscalar conflicts, offering a theoretical basis for everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism, epistemologically and in real life spaces, to debate about topics including globalization, urbanization, gentrification, migration, identity, authenticity, and inclusion. from a practical perspective, it aims at finding positive, responsible, and sustainable solutions to (re)create relationships between people of various groups, between people and urban space. the theoretical expansion towards social relations (bourriaud 2002) has driven art to develop beyond commercialized and object based ontology (bishop 2006b). however, it has also been subject to criticism. firstly, it fails to examine, measure and compare the quality of relationships produced by socially engaged art (bishop 2004; 2012). secondly, prioritizing social effect might undermining artistic quality and artistic evaluation (bishop 2006b) thus leading to difficulties ‘to determine what…constitutes the aesthetic content’ of socially engaged art (kester 2011, p. 30). moreover, socially engaged art might also raise issues including, but not limited to, gentrification, instrumentalization and vulnerability. the everyday dimension in our proposed concept of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism should be understood in two levels of interpretations. firstly, it refers to the ‘real world encounters’ (bennett 2012; patel 2018) in everyday life aesthetics of urban inhabitants. this orientation provides the context for socially engaged artists to explore possibilities in cocreating artistic projects with urban residents and in line with their authentic and dynamic life worlds. it also explores the complex yet inseparable and interconnected relationship between art and society. the second level indicates the everyday spatial and material domain of urban environment, particularly urban voids and its transformative potential for marginal urban space. on the one hand, empty and underused spaces in the urban context are often associated with undesirable metaphors such as ruins, wasteland and lost space (simon & mseddi 2020; trancik 1986) that should be addressed, prevented or removed. on the other hand, urban voids are considered as containers of the lived history of the city providing welcomed perspectives from the contemporary reality of density disconnected from the past. they become places of possibility and resources for social and ecological transformation, and spaces to be transformed into urban commons, connecting inhabitants from the past with their counterparts at present and in the future (accordino & johnson 2000; chang 2018; di giovanni 2018; németh & langhorst 2014; overmeyer 2007). this recent attention for the material and spatial realm adds a new dimension to the social turn in aesthetics (bourriaud 2002) prioritizing social relations while overlooking the material realm. this may create an opposition between social (the primary focus of relational aesthetics) and the material and by extension the spatial (overlooked in relational aesthetics). such an opposition may also risk regarding material as incapable of changing and evolving. it may also undermine the li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 20229 interdependence of material and social (olsen 2018). therefore, we made the critical choice to connect the dots between the social and the material in understanding everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism in the urban context. we endorse the notion of adaptive reuse (galdini 2019) of the indeterminate urban spatial voids as means of weaving an urban fabric tapestry (haas & locke 2018), replenishing and sustaining public spaces, while tentatively exploring the urban circular paradigm (ghisellini et al. 2016). methodology: the ethnography of scenes empirically the art center recyclart in brussels has become the site of investigation using ethnography across two sites in triangulation with the literature review. as it blends art with music, social economy and reviving marginal urban places we obtain our methodological inspiration from the ethnography of scenes (glass 2012; pfadenhauer 2005) with a particular focus on actions, or ‘doing scene’ (glass 2012) and viewing the urban life world as a process (low 1996). from a temporal perspective, the fieldwork was developed in three stages from early 2015 to the end of 2018, following recyclart’s three stages during the time of our fieldwork, namely stable residence at chapelle station, liminal and unstable exploration due to sudden forced eviction, and rebirth and new beginning at a new site. the first stage was from early 2015 to october 2017. after an initial phase of entering the field through a gatekeeper who introduced us to the recyclart team, we familiarized ourselves through regular and frequent visits coinciding with the daily daytime office routines of the recyclart production team, and regular evening and weekend events at various hosting places including events at the chapelle train station and numerous meeting places in the marol neighborhood. during this period, we were able to collect data reliably by frequent participation and observation in the alternative art scene thanks to the regular nature of the events and hosting places. we regularly attended recyclart’s art exhibitions, concerts, and urban debates on city life and urban design. we also participated in three editions of the annual sixweek summer festival activities including concerts, live wrestling, public pizza and bread baking workshops. moreover, we frequently participated in a wide range of activities at the neighborhood level, joining projects for and from the residents of the marolles. the second stage was from january 2018 to june 2018, a period when recyclart experienced forced eviction from the chapelle station of brussels. due to the unstable and liminal nature of this period, we witnessed and documented the process of the eviction, including recyclart’s negotiation and communication with various urban stakeholders, organizing eviction resistance music events, packing for the eviction, temporary sheltering at an empty office while looking for a new hosting place through visiting various abandoned urban buildings. in addition, we also participated in academic debates about displacement of urban artistic and cultural institutions. furthermore, we collected data on virtual scenes (bennett 2002a; kibby 2000) that primarily occurred on the social media platform facebook where recyclart supporters actively debated and articulated their disagreement on the forced eviction while emphasizing the importance of recyclart to the everyday urban life and urban public spaces of brussels. the third stage we observed was the rebirth of recyclart from june 2018 to december 2018 at the new location, a former printing factory covering approximately 4000 m2 of empty, abandoned building in the municipality of molenbeek, of brussels. during this period, we participated and observed how recyclart has transformed an urban void to an art center and how it was gradually accepted, or not, by longtime and new visitors as well as residents from the new surrounding neighborhood. we also observed drastic change and replacement of recyclart team members impacted from the eviction and the rebirth of the center in another location. during the participant observation, or afterwards given the nightlife nature of most events, we wrote up fieldwork notes. furthermore, we carried out semistructured (sometimes repeated) interviews with recyclart team members, interlocutors from municipal institutions and active residents from surrounding neighborhoods. in addition, we collected data from spontaneous conversations and informal interviews with li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202210 event participants at first hand. at different stages of the fieldwork, we discussed, analyzed and coded the collected data while concurrently proceeding with fieldwork data collection. we developed descriptive and analytical understandings of approaches and possible patterns of the art scenes created by recyclart and presented and discussed our ethnographic findings and conceptual developments derived from data analysis at various academic debates and conferences, which further inspired our subsequent observations and analyses. everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism: the case of recyclart contextualizing recyclart and its surroundings recyclart was created in 1996 as a nonprofit organization combining artistic, cultural and community activities, urban design projects and social economic training programs. from 1996 to 2018, recyclart was primarily resident in the abandoned chapelle train station, a small municipal station on the railway link between the northsouth junction in brussels which has caused a spatial scar, turning this inner city area into a wasteland. many buildings were demolished and as a result the urban fabric of different neighborhoods was deeply disrupted. the railway line was constructed in 1952 to link the previously disconnected north and south station in brussels. the 1960s was a time when intensive urban change and massive development projects were undertaken to meet the fordist model of modernization in brussels. before the arrival of recyclart with a european union subsidy, the area was underused and the surrounding areas were spaces of ‘no man’s land’ with notorious reputations. the subway space and tunnel were fully covered with graffiti sprays and had no lighting during the night. no one wanted to step into this wasteland. with recyclart the neighborhood started to change. the recyclart model of art plus social economy organized art activities, as well as training programs for socially vulnerable groups through social economy. recyclart was divided in three suborganizations: the art center, fabrik and bar recyclart. the art center produces artistic programs including music, photography, architecture and planning, visual art, film and video, graphics, and community projects. fabrik has three workshops, namely wood, metal, and technics, combining urban design and urban furniture production with professional transition programs. it targets former detainees who faced difficulties finding a job in the regular labor market. bar recyclart produces quality food and promoted vegetarian/vegan cuisines hiring longtime lowskilled unemployed people. recyclart engages in underground artisticsocial activities. the property of underground entails both a literal and more figurative dimension. from a physical point of view, it is located under the railway tracks, so that it can hardly be noticed by ‘aboveground’ passengers and trains but also the audience of the venue is constantly reminded of its underground position as the sounds of roaring trains passing above the venue reverberated during activities. from an artistic perspective, the center seeks unnoticed grassroot level artists or those in an early stage of their career affording them the freedom to explore their imaginations before their ‘discovery’ by mainstream cultural institutions. it therefore invites edgy and at times sensitive and controversial performances to attract alternative audiences. although it receives state subsidies recyclart maintains its countercultural position aligning with informal activities. from a social perspective, ‘underground’ aligns with accessibility and low threshold as it provides free entrance to most, if not all, events and activities to the economically underprivileged social groups. real life encounters to better understand how everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism comes into being, we focus on the following two socially engaged art projects initiated by the photographer vincen beeckman. li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202211 background of the art project:tv marol this project refers to a television and live show program coproduced by recyclart’s social artist and photographer, vincen beeckman, and its technical team with local residents of the marol neighborhood. the aim of tv marol was to give a voice and a forum to the residents of the neighborhood to showcase their mundane and embodied way of life in the local community. they call themselves ‘maroliens’ embracing values and habits that resist middleclass neoliberal standards. they cherish their workingclass way of life and the own local aesthetics. they frequent local shops instead of chain stores and support local cafés and bars. they reject standard beauty norms and mainstream sartorial styles. in practice local volunteers and residents coproduced and performed in a live show representing everyday life of the neighborhood in close cooperation with recyclart. these volunteers organized their own meetings in selecting topics, making appointments to interview local residents, matching costumes, inviting local residents to be on the stage, producing theatrical props, and in so doing acquiring a wide range of skills. as amateurs they managed to continue this project from 2008 until the end of 2017. it was a daunting task as they had to overcome innumerable constraints ranging from limited budget, space and time schedule conflicts and miscommunications. in the process of making the films about local everyday mundane life encounters they had the chance to forge closer ties and gain a deeper knowledge of the neighborhood. a platform with multisensory experiences and redistributed urban sensorium (dikeç 2005; rancière 2004) was created in making audible otherwise unheard voices and enabling often less visible groups to share their local way of life with a wider public beyond the neighborhood. all the while they had full freedom and control on what and how to present tv marol. given the background of the linguistic diversity of brussels with the official languages of french and dutch, the show resolutely opted for the local dialect of the neighborhood, a mix of flemish dialect with french and spanish loanwords. a local multilingual couple, named pey (meaning little boy) and mey (little girl, from the dutch word ‘meisje’) acted as tv marol hosts. the show documented local daily life, with particular attention to how the local elderly sustained the specific mood and spirit of this popular quarter and how local meeting places played a key role in nurturing thick social ties. in this way, tv marol created a common space for those who were usually less visible in the dominant social order, therefore demonstrating a sense of social equality (dikeç 2005). with this character, it attracted both longtime and new residents to become linked to and (re)attached to the neighborhood via participating and cocreating tv marol thus sustaining longlasting relationships between people and between people and urban spaces. impact of the art project one member of the production team, mr. a., a french man in his midthirties, decided to extend his stay in the neighborhood because of the show. before residing in this neighborhood, he tended to move to another country every three to five years. besides his regular job as a french teacher, he devoted most if not all his energy to tv marol, participating in the meetings with the production team, making short films about tv marol, handcrafting advertisements for tv marol, and hosting part of the live performance of tv marol. tv marol became an important part of his life and afforded him a special attachment with the residents and the neighborhood. as the female host of tv marol, born and bred in the marol, commented: everybody wanted to show the best of him/herself and be somebody else in the show. when doing tv marol we can be crazy and it works. it’s a fantasy world that i get into and for free. i enjoy myself a lot. i don’t know if they know it but they [recyclart] did a lot to keep the spirit, a kind of spirit [of the neighborhood], to keep people together. [researcher asks, ‘what is this spirit?’] i think it’s about bonding together against the big city and trying to have a good life. this is a little town against the rich city. they did a lot of social work that helps to mix the old and new spirit. tv marol is from marolles…(it’s) for the li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202212 poor and (those from) the brussels, the real ones. (ms. b., belgian female, early forties, freelancer media production, volunteer and host of tv marol from 2008 to 2017). through defamiliarizing the familiar mundane ordinary innercity life in tv marol’s live shows, it unleashed the aesthetic potential of ordinary people, acknowledging and encouraging their interventions in the urban fabric. together the tv marol volunteers created events for the neighborhood and explored the meaning of their own neighborhood. by interviewing residents, visiting different homes, and meeting places of the neighborhood, both indoor and outdoor, they cocreated a deep connection among the members of the production team and with the neighborhood. through producing and interacting with local residents they construed a locally embedded and collective identity. they explored local social world settings, ‘drawing from and influencing nearby’ (glass 2012, p. 697). in this sense, the production, performance, and consumption of tv marol represented a microlevel process of local members creating collectively theatrical and at times voyeuristic scenes of the everyday life of this neighborhood for both local and nonlocal people. in so doing they sustained a local social world of constant becoming (garfinkel 1967) while blurring the distinction between life and art (potgieter 2017; saito 2019) that can be communicated and appreciated by consumers across social classes of cultural activities for it affords audiences a chance to be ‘closer to local life’ (r. british female tourist, midtwenties). ‘it made me laugh with them (the performers and the audiences) although i don’t always understand their language and jokes’ (ms. m., belgian female graphic designer and freelancer, midforties). the socially engaged project tv marol provided a context for social relationships to emerge, evolve and (re)attach while promoting palpable human interactions both within and beyond the local community. background of the art project: photobook of claude and lilly another example of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism is the photographic book project of the couple claude and lilly by the same artist. it narrates the romance of a homeless elderly couple in the marol until the tragic death of lilly in 2018. claude met lilly in july 1995. he saved her from her former violent partner, and they formed a couple for 23 years, during which for more than 10 years they were roaming the streets of brussels as homeless people. after multiple visits, drinking and eating with them, beeckman gradually gained their trust and consent to be part of a book project, for which he took photographs of cherished and important moments of their life together. some of the captured life moments have resulted in the book ‘claude and lilly’ documenting intimate, happy and tragic times together from 2015 until the sorrowful passing away of lilly in 2018. the book shows us a glimpse of a couple deeply in love with each other: snuggling, kissing, exchanging endearing glances, taking care of each other in everyday life. the book and the images of claude and lilly are so strikingly authentic and uncompromising – as it shows the harshness of homelessness blended with intimacy and genuine love – that it triggers an aesthetic experience (gumbrecht 2006; leddy 2012; tuan 1993; visser 1997). the small vignettes of claude and lilly’s togetherness was welcomed by the frequent visitors of recyclart because of the universality of love and tenderness in ordinary life, as is shown in the following comments: focusing on a homeless couple is unusual but genuine. most photos [from nowadays] are about posing, make up, showing perfection. this work is not like that. it gives space and voice to people. [it’s] like a bridge. a friend of mine bought a photo of claude and lilly and she hangs it in her apartment. she loves it. they [the photos] show real life. (ms. c., belgian female, late twenties, frequent visitor to recyclart). the material and visual articulation of this love story of ordinary lessprivileged people that otherwise would not have been noticed let alone thematized, fosters a ‘creative, educable, transformative reciprocity between art and life’ (potgieter 2017, p. 72). the social engagement approach in attending to everyday life and art in everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism encourages an intellectual and aesthetic openness towards places and experiences of people regardless of identity, occupation, social class, cultural background or lifestyle. li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202213 moreover, the gaze is turned towards the localized, particular, unprivileged (robbins 1998) mundane and embodied engagement in urban everyday life worlds of people and places that remain otherwise unnoticed and untold. this may not change the city and the world directly. these worlds may, however, leave a deep imprint on the general public’s perception, attitude and worldview that might gradually impact the perceptions and actions of people when engaging in the city and the world in a longterm perspective. this socially engaged art book project does not prioritize social effect over artistic quality (bishop 2006b). instead, it managed to a high degree to keep a balance between the two properties. this might explain its positive reception in various media, art, and cultural institutions at different scales from the local to the global. as an art book it is not only recognized, appreciated, and widely reported in the national but also in the international press. it was featured on vogue italia april 1st of 2019 as a beautiful love story. more recently it was also highly acclaimed in the art section of the frankfurter allgemeine zeitung of march 4, 2022. moreover, fotomuseum antwerp, also known as fomu, the most important photography museum in flanders belgium, recently purchased some pictures from the claude and lilly series to be included in their permanent collection. both art projects are manifestly socially engaged art that is communityoriented and based on collaboration and cocreation. they also enact the processes of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism as the familiar is being defamiliarized. we are invited to look beyond the blandness, banality and tristesse of the lives of marginalized groups in society. instead, we encounter generosity and humor in tv marol live show and deep human feelings of love and dedication of an ordinary couple as testified in the art book project claude and lilly. in both art projects the boundary between art and social life has been suspended and they elicit in varying degrees a multisensorial experience on the part of the audience. however, one main vulnerability of socially engaged art approach is that it is person driven. when one of the many stakeholders –be it the artist or the disappearance of a local resident or the demise of the art center  is evacuated in the making process of artistic interventions, it abruptly brings an end to the co creation process. one might raise the question of instrumentalization of the life story of claude and lilly by the artist photographer. however, the relationship of trust that the latter had developed with the couple over a long period of time and the careful attention to present them as lovable persons unveils an approach of respect and cocreation rather than an instant commodification of a homeless couple to cater to the insatiable appetites of the high middle class for the raw and the dark sides of society. everyday spatial and material dimensions in an urban environment while mainly conceived as a cocreation between the artist and local residents, everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism may also be expanded to the spatial dimension of the urban environment, with a particular interest for urban voids and its transformative potential in provoking new perspectives on urban public spaces. we focus here on the resistance movement to the eviction of recyclart from its underground premises in a former urban void. the 36hour music event in february 2018 was interspersed with online debates critically rejecting the forced eviction from chapelle station. recyclart was active in this space for 20 years. with the political and cultural policy support from the european union and the city of brussels at the time for brussels competing to be 2000 european cultural capital, a group of activists in brussels submitted to the urban pilot project the creation of the artistic center, recyclart. upon approval, recyclart claimed the deserted space at brussels chapelle railway station in 1997 and transformed the urban voids into a creative, noncommercial and accessibletoall alternative artistic space that offered “democratic parties at democratic prices” (declercq 2018) through a combination of artistic and leisure activities, social economy programs and neighborhood approaches until it was forcefully evicted in march 2018 by the national railway company sncb for fire safety reasons, which can be read as fear for terrorist acts as well as decreasing political support due to a changing urban political landscape in brussels. to symbolically resist this eviction, the art center lunched an urban farewell party, lasting for 36hours of nonstop music between li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202214 february 25 and february 26, 2018. shortly after the announcement on its facebook group page, it received more than 25,000 ‘interests’ and more than 12,000 users signed up for participation. the mobilization through social media yielded success as a massive crowd showed up at the art venue, lining up and waiting to go inside to have a last experience in this specific location. despite the subzero temperature (it was 8°c), with no heating  as the gas supply was cut off after eviction  and the venue’s limited capacity to host maximum 450 people inside, more than 200 individuals were queuing for an entrance ticket outside the venue on feb 25 at 04:00 in the morning. the participants came to show their solidarity to recyclart as well as protesting against the eviction. the indoor rules (such as no smoking and keeping the space clean) were deliberately neglected. people were dancing, drinking, smoking, and talking together. the venue was filled with a penetrating odor of urine, beer, weed and sweat. sadness and anger filled the space as these short comments revealed from the fieldwork: ‘it’s so sad!... i’m angry... like attending a funeral. you know?...it’s a party but it’s more like a funeral!’ ‘ they (the city authority and the railway company sncb) just don’t’ understand! they don’t know recyclart! they don’t know us!’ the multisensory thickness and mixed sentiments of anger and sorrow were triggered by the teaming crowd of bodies, protesting, shouting, and mourning at the same time. the 36hour event was abruptly stopped by the police at 5:00 in the morning, adding even more fuel to dissent and opposition including nonviolent sitins and street parties at the square outside of the station until the next day in the afternoon. on march 2, 2018, a selforganized street party named ‘free party with tears: support for recyclart’ (translated from french and dutch) was coordinated online and facilitated a small group of some 20 individuals (wrapped in heavy winter clothes) having an evening outdoor music gathering in frosty temperature in front of the art center. in addition, a white banner with the subscript ‘we want you to stay!’ was hung next to the logo of the art center and that of the railway station sncb from the following day after the 36hour event. aside from the physical manifestation of resistance, there was also a virtual forum created on reyclart’s facebook page where people actively discussed the eviction and demonstrated their discontent by underlining the importance of recyclart to the city and to their life. prior to the eviction facebook was mainly used as a tool for free and open circulation of information and promotion of its activities. unlike many other group pages with followers throughout the world, the followers of recyclart’s facebook group page were mainly people who had physically visited recyclart. they understood the space, the artistic and cultural approach, and the neighborhood. as a reaction to recyclart’s first open letter of protest, the facebook page of recyclart received more than 1100 sad, angry, and tearful emoji faces, more than 100 comments and about 340 shares, articulating sentiments and resistance to the brutal and abrupt closure of the venue for allegedly security reasons of the railway system: ‘dear recyclart, you are too important for our city and 1000 young people and fewer young people who do not find their (artistic) taste elsewhere. you bonded with the marol (residents) and with the new world movements…’ (translated from recyclart’s facebook page comment, originally in dutch). ‘ those men in the city don’t understand. recyclart is a monument you can’t just move (translated from recyclart’s facebook page comment, originally in dutch). ‘how to explain that there is no plan b pending the work or response of infrabel and sncb. i am very attached to recyclart, a unique project of its kind in brussels and very much appreciated!’ (translated from recyclart’s facebook page comment, originally in french). li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202215 one individual activist after writing a public letter to the city authorities posted it on facebook individual user’s page with the hashtag ‘#wewantyoutostay ’. within hours, it attracted a signing list of more than 550 supporting individuals and groups. the question in the letter reflected on what the art center stands for. it deplored the loss of alternative spaces in the city, protesting further decay of marginal urban neighborhoods under the railway and more generally combatting the norms and logic of capitalistic and commercial urban planning. thus, the social movement triggered by the eviction of recyclart sparked a wider political discussion about reducing growing urban inequality and in support of the need to construct alternative norms and community building for urban residents. the virtual and live scenes of the eviction resistance movement fostered a deep connectedness among members from all walks of life through a locally rooted art center. this connectedness had strengthened the recyclart community. through its diverse programming the art center managed to create a sense of togetherness through a particular juxtaposition of socially engaged art, music, identity and place (bennett 2002b). the second example represents a new beginning with the emplacement of recyclart in a new site. after the eviction in march 2018 the recyclart team was forced to look for a new location. after a strenuous search of more than six months eventually an abandoned printing factory in the municipality of molenbeek was found suitable to resurrect the old venue. in the building process the original structure was maintained as much as possible by only repairing the damaged façade and assigning new functions to existing spaces. the concept of recycling ‘waste’ into ‘resources’ was again applied in the reuse of the venue. many new visitors showed appreciation for this practice of rejuvenating industrial heritage. the site is compelling to youngsters and hipsters with a preference for postmodern grit. we noticed this [the unrepaired hole] when we were walking around upstairs in the exhibition room. it’s covered by a blanket… here they just let it be as how it is. there is a hole and it is visible. they don’t try to hide it. it’s so brussels [his finger pointing to the hole on the ceiling]. it’s not perfect, but i like it, that is so empowering. i also feel a lot of freedom in the air. i don’t have to pretend to be someone else…. no one makes judgments. (mr. d. frequent recyclart visitor and his friend, a student of audiovisual art) the visibility of holes and other imperfections in the façade is not just seen as decay but it accentuates the state of incompleteness, representing an aesthetics towards soulful patina rather than cold newness. this imperfection adds strength and character to the venue, emanating a general vibe of emancipation, generosity and inclusion, thus inviting new beginnings and explorations to, and in, the place. however, the rebirth of recyclart at a new urban environment was not always easily accepted by longtime visitors and residents in the new locality. one neighbor formed a group with a dozen other residents signing a complaint letter to protest the settlement of recyclart in their neighborhood as they saw it as a decadent late night music party organizer. the recyclart team spent significant time to visit neighbors, while explaining the multidisciplinary and socially engaged approach and the willingness to establish a collaborative relationship with the neighborhood to cocreate events for and by the neighborhood. trust relationships take a long time to solidify. the rebirth in a new urban void was equally questioned by longtime visitors and supporters especially at the beginning of a new start, as these two following comments showed: i’m not sure if it’ll work here (at the new site) ... i’m not very optimistic… i think it’s dead…it’s far from the center, on the other side of the canal… not many people want to come here…to this side of the canal. (mr. e. late thirties, belgian, working in the restaurant sector) i don’t like it here… with the door… you can’t see it from outside… it’s more chic and bohemian… you don’t see different kinds of people… like the old place… (ms. f, midtwenties, french, working at media). li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202216 from an everyday aesthetic cosmopolitan perspective, the appreciation for the rough and historic architecture in the first and second sites testifies to the preference for alternative aesthetics that is far removed from elitist art temples and the blurring between art and the built environment that comes to life with social artistic interventions and even more so in critical moments such as the eviction of the art center from its first site at chapelle station. it remains to be seen whether through coproductions and recurrent negotiations based on their experience in the marol the team can replicate the recyclart model in the new location, another urban void but with different characteristics. the story of recyclart holds both the promise of bringing new life to urban voids but at the same time it shows the precarity of alternative art centers facing a wide range of threats ranging from marketdriven forces of gentrification, from the lack of institutional support and the difficulty to include neighborhood residents in the activities of the art venue. conclusion in this article we argued that everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism in engaging everyday urban life has the potential to encourage an aesthetic strategy with alternative aesthetics. in so doing these initiatives resist mainstream standards by criticizing societal oppression towards disabled, gendered, racialized, and aged bodies, and in so doing promote justice and civil discourse (matteucci 2017; nielsen 2003; saito 2017, 2018). in other words, the everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism realized through socially engaged art and actions may also engender a more sustainable rethinking of how to interact with the material urban world, in particular urban voids. we zoomed in on the activities of the art center recyclart that showcases how everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism through socially engaged art can be forged. yet these art projects are highly appreciated and valued in more mainstream art institutions and the media at different scales because of their social authenticity and aesthetic merit. the case study not only discloses the potentials of alternative art practices and art programs but also the vulnerability of the alternative art and art centers. the vulnerability of social artistic interventions refers to the precarity of local residents engaging in the co creation of social artistic interventions as well as gentrification of the neighborhood paradoxically generated by the activities of the art center itself. this means the art center is under threat by neoliberal marketdriven forces such as the generally well documented phenomenon of gentrification in neoliberal cities or changing urban policies leading to eviction. after the eviction the art center had to reinvent itself in another site by embedding itself in the new locality and fostering a constructive dialogue with neighborhood residents in the new location. this is a tortuous and difficult undertaking. nonetheless the case of recyclart offers hope and inspiration for alternative forms of practicing art and giving substance and evidence to the role of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism through social engagement and cocreation practices in remaking urban void vital and vibrant. in terms of contribution to the existing literature on cosmopolitanism, everyday aesthetics, and urban void it is twofold. we propose the new concept of everyday aesthetic cosmopolitanism as a theoretical concept in urban studies applied to an art center. the study has highlighted urgent topics in discussing the relationship between socially engaged art, everyday aesthetics, cosmopolitanism, silenced urban publics, urban spaces, and development. it also contributes to the academic discussion on relational aesthetics by arguing for the possibility in balancing social effect and artistic quality. empirically, it brings an additional case to the existing literature on everyday aesthetics and cosmopolitanism. references accordino, j. & johnson, g. t. 2000, ‘addressing the vacant and abandoned property problem’, journal of urban affairs, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 301–315. https://doi.org/10.1111/07352166.00058 li and pang cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 14, no. 2 202217 https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2166.00058 bennett, a. 2002a, ‘music, media and urban mythscapes: a study of the “canterbury sound”’, media, culture and society, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 87–100. https://doi.org/10.1177/016344370202400105 bennett, a. 2002b, ‘researching youth culture and popular music: a methodological critique’, british journal of sociology, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 451–466. https://doi.org/10.1080/0007131022000000590 bennett, j. 2012, practical aesthetics:events, affects and art after 9/11, i. b. tauris, london. https://doi. org/10.5040/9780755693702 berleant, a. 1970, aesthetic field: a phenomenology of aesthetic experience, charles c. thomas publishers, springfield, il. berleant, a. 1991, art and engagement, temple university press, philadelphia. berleant, a. 2012, aesthetics beyond the arts: new and recent essays, ashgate publishing, aldershot. berleant, a. 2017, ‘objects into persons: the way to social aesthetics’, espes: the slovak journal of aesthetics, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 9–18. https://doi.org/10.17613/m6mc6s berleant, a. 2005, ‘ideas for a social aesthetic’, in: light, a. & smith, j. m. 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revised 02/02/2023; accepted 11/02/2023; published 26/03/2023 abstract how is the oil extractive industry affecting the livelihoods of women in the niger delta? this study explores the nature of the oil extractive industry in nigeria and its impact on the livelihoods of women. the paper further focuses on the role of civil society in reconciling the interest of the oil industry and local economy of women in the niger delta. relying on primary and secondary data as well as feminist theories, the study examines the case of ijaw, ogbia and ogoni women, who have traditionally relied on fishing and farming as major means of income. the paper argues that women are the most affected by the oil industry through frequent spilling of crude oil in creeks, rivers, swamps and farmlands, where their sources of income is derived from. in addition, the civil society with women as active participants has only achieved little in terms of social justice. keywords women; livelihoods; extractive industries; niger delta; civil society 91 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this project was funded by the economic and social research council (esrc), ref: es/s011137/1. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8354 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8354 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:zmb2@leicester.ac.uk https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8354 introduction and context for the study nigeria is ranked among the top 15 oilproducing countries in the world, producing up to 1,258,000 barrels per day (world population review 2022). with a population of over 218 million, it is the most populous country in africa, rich in petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, tin, coal, lead, limestone, and other natural resources (opec 2022). the discovery of oil in oloibiri in 1956 and associated extraction activities in nigeria indicates negative consequences on livelihoods (see for instance helbert & o’brien 2020), in particular, for the women. the extractive industries are central and they account for major revenues accruing to resourcerich countries around the world. however, in these industries men and women are affected differently, which makes a closer attention to the impacts on women important. this article situates the discussion on the importance of gender in contexts of natural resource extraction. although a contested term, reflecting on the masculine and feminine divide (macdonald 2018), gender is used with reference to women in this paper. some scholars have drawn attention to the conflation of the two terms, citing the draw back to the advancements made in achieving gender diversity and gender equality (laplonge 2014, 2016; macdonald 2018; mayes & pini 2014). discussions on the impacts of the extractive industries on women in resource rich areas attract significant attention locally and internationally (macdonald 2018; mukherjee 2014; oluduro & durojaye 2013; omeire et al. 2014). resource extractive processes in the niger delta create complex and repeatedly contradictory socioeconomic varying consequences that result in agitations and conflicts across diverging issues that include the land, destruction of the environment, violence, health and other development issues. the literature reports that natural resource extraction, in particular oil and gas, rather than improve the developmental state of the local communities, has been more of a curse (acosta 2011; gudynas 2020; womin 2013; ye et al. 2020). resource exploitative and destructive activities take away huge amounts of benefits from local communities to the benefit of key actors at the higher levels of management (pereira & tsikata 2021; womin 2013; ye et al. 2020). the ogoni and ijaw ethnic groups have been very vocal on these issues in the niger delta of nigeria (see maibornu 2020). while much has been written on conflicts in nigeria, little is known about women’s roles even though niger delta women have played a key role in mediating nonviolent oil protests (maibornu 2020, 2019), and in the north, they have lived through the boko haram, ethnoreligious and indigene/settler crises. instead, studies on the conflicts in nigeria tend to focus on generations of young men denied social spaces for political participation (aghedo & osumah 2015). most studies have tended to take a ‘topdown’ approach in speaking about women, rather than working with them to research their lived experiences (gasztold 2017). reflecting upon various arguments advanced within the contexts of exploitation, inequalities, marginalisation, and gender brings up questions about whose voices are actually heard and/ or amplified as it relates to resources and livelihoods. the literature concurs that women are victims during conflict and peacebuilding (bias & gurler 2020; mwambari 2017; olaitan & isike 2019; tobach 2008). would the women affected by oil extraction and exploitation activities in the niger delta be among the most fortunate and joyful in the world if injustice had not existed and natural blessings had not been tampered with (abah 2009)? here i am in 2022 reflecting on the key aspects of this insinuation, by simply asking ‘how is the oil extractive industry affecting the livelihoods of women in the niger delta? interviews were conducted in english and pidgin english languages with 49 women between 2018 and 2020 in local communities in bayelsa and rivers states in nigeria, using participatory video. these are ordinary community women, not those with political roles. in my discussions with these women, the issues raised revolve around natural resources and a lack of voice. the sentences have intentionally been interwoven with interview transcripts in order to be faithful to the words of the women. mai-bornu cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202392 the conflation of natural resource extraction and gender approaches tend to overlook the active roles played by women (hofmann & cabrapan duarte 2021) and in particular, the agency of women based on the unquestionable power of patriarchy. furthermore, scholars such as echart & villareal (2019) and leinius (2020) are of the opinion that women’s contribution to local knowledge on extractive industries are important and should be recognised. paying closer attention to empirical studies on the subject, i reflect on what extractive activities mean for women in the oil producing communities in the niger delta and what can be theorised from that. the paper argues that women are the most affected by the oil industry through frequent spilling of crude oil in creeks, rivers, swamps and farmlands, where their sources of income is derived from. and in the process, these push the women who are actually wives, mothers, grandmothers, sisters, girlfriends and most importantly responsible for providing for their families, away from their sources of livelihoods, leading to frustrations and the feeling of impotency. based on the various roles they play in such societies, women do exist as part of civil society (mama 1999; ikelegbe 2005), particularly in terms of their survival in environments where resources are extracted for the benefits of the state. in addition, the civil society with women as active participants has only achieved little in terms of social justice. the objective of this article is to explore the nature of the oil extractive industry in nigeria and its impact on the livelihoods of women. the paper further focuses on the role of civil society in reconciling the interest of the oil industry and local economy of women in the niger delta. i draw on primary and secondary data as well as feminist theories, focusing on the voices of some ijaw, ogbia and ogoni women who have traditionally relied on fishing and farming as major means of income. it is even worse for women with the new extractive practice of oil multinationals migrating to deep offshore investments that leaves only little room for corporate social responsibilities. following this introduction and context for the study, the second section engages with the relevant literature, theory and methods. the third section focuses on what the women have to say; the intention is to give these women a voice to be heard locally and internationally. it speaks with rather than for the women in the niger delta. the paper ends with a reminder of the importance of feminist scholarship, that presents the voices of the marginalised without interpretation, and with a call for those who have power to use it to mitigate the detrimental impacts of the oil extractive industries. literature, theory and methods focusing on whose reality counts, this study uses a participatory research methodology (chambers 1997) as a form of decolonising knowledge production and is therefore an appropriate methodology to use with feminist theories. researching local women’s issues necessitates employing a methodological and theoretical framework that speaks with rather than for the participants. the analysis draws from 49 indepth interviews using participatory video however, only the transcripts were used to support arguments made in this paper, as it is a written not visual piece1. due to ethical issues, the women are not named in this paper. participatory video was used as a documentation tool that brought to the fore real evidence ( jacobs 2015; lemaire & lunch 2012; white 2003). the film documented local women’s experiences, needs and hopes, told from their own perspectives. it showed that women are an untapped resource for their soft influence on how societies and people work to tackle conflict in a more nuanced way. giving a voice to the women can actually develop community capacity to stimulate action, and serve as a medium for conveying and influencing decision making at various levels. as a methodology, it enabled participants (women) involved to actively participate in the research (flicker & macentee 2020; mitchell & de lange2020). four preliminary workshops were held with identified participants in nigeria, during which the project 1 one of the outputs of this research is a 28minute film titled ‘bringing women’s voices back in: gender and oil conflict in the niger delta. mai-bornu cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202393 was discussed and the women were trained to use the video cameras. this opened up opportunities to answer questions the participants had. the women determined what was essential and how they wished to be represented ( johansson et al. 1999; medie & kang 2018; pink 2006). overall, it places emphasis on marginalised groups in the society, as a voice for the voiceless (fairey 2017). the experiences of women interviewed captured an insider view in a lively way (lunch & lunch 2006; schwabcartas 2012) that makes it accessible to diverse audiences (miller & smith 2012). for the civil society, policy makers and international donor organisations, it is a medium for conveying and influencing decision making at various levels (lemaire & lunch 2012; plush 2012; wheeler 2012). qualitative approaches were employed to analyse the data in this research, these were constructed, interpreted and written in this paper. the data are presented in the form of stories (voices) of personal lived experiences of the participants. to illustrate the true picture of the women’s experiences, the narratives, stories and literature are interconnected in the process of knowledge production. as the arguments go in the niger delta, destruction of the environment, inequalities, discrimination and livelihood issues are circumstances that have amplified women’s vulnerability (helbert & o’brien, 2020). the extraction and exploitation of natural resources without their material reproduction sees to the damage and depletion of the environment (pereira & tsikata 2021). scholars argue that extractivism and its associated impacts are gendered (pereira & tsikata 2021) and the literature is generally described as gender blind (see womin 2013; 2015). rather than women’s roles mainly as caregivers in societies, rao (1991) views women as they distinctly act in response to complicated environmental realities. he calls attention to ways in which women build social relationships with men within their resource rich communities (elmhirst & resurreccion 2012). the extractive industry affects women and men differently (macdonald 2018), suggesting that women are more at the receiving ends of the destruction on the environment (ngabiirwe 2014). within the context of africa, asia and the americas, the arguments on extractivism and the strategies of wealth accumulation date back to the colonial legacy of forceful extraction and production of raw materials to the benefit of the colonisers (acosta 2011; rodney 1972). this process as acosta (2011) explains has manifested in various ways. often referred to as neoextractivism as seen in the present day, resource management is now linked to development issues nationally, through social policies and most importantly for the benefit of societies (gudynas 2010, p. 13). while on one hand this should regarded with some positivity as it is about progress and possibly poverty reduction in africa, the other side tells a different story when regarded with a gendered (women) lens. feminism is a critique of male supremacy, formed and offered in light of a will to change it, which in turn assumes a conviction that it is changeable (cott 1986). stories coming from the neoextractivist communities are no different from the purely extractivist economies. feminist scholars stress that these resources’ extraction activities ensure that affected women are living continuously in unsafe environments, some even forced to engage in sordid activities like cultism, kidnap and prostitution in order to survive (helbert & o’brien 2020). the conflicts experienced in the niger delta have gone beyond militancy and resource control agitations. cultism is now on the rise in ogoniland, an area notable for nonviolence agitations, here again it is the women who bear the brunt of these activities. insights from feminist studies provide important contexts for investigating gender in natural resource extraction and exploitation, for example, feminist perspectives have been critical of the incorporation of issues situated within conceptions of relations between men and women (hofmann & cabrapan duarte 2021). these issues have been paired with ‘the perception of political, negotiated and contested elements of social relationships’ (elmhirst & resurreccion 2012, p. 3). in traditional african societies, women are domesticated and socialised into subordinate positions. in the process of holding off these traits, feminist political ecologists encourage us to see gender disparities in the way nature is experienced and even how the environment is inhabited (agarwal 1992; plumwood 1993; rocheleau, thomasslayter & wangari 1996). mai-bornu cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202394 women are seen as the bearers of ‘distinctive’ feminised cultural norms, which puts women in less important positions in societies (de alwis, mertus & sajjad 2013). women have also been associated closely with the environment and nature, ecofeminists (merchant 1980; shiva 1989) stress the womannature link and for a female voice to be heard. oil and gas extractive activities negatively affect the environment and, in the process, they weaken local livelihoods making women in particular unproductive for securing food for the family (rico 1998). it is an established fact that women have engaged handson with the land while striving to provide for their families. a woman in ogbia echoed this sentiment: women do most of the farming here. […] women find it difficult to go to their farmlands. sometimes when compensations are being paid, the men will not consider giving the women part of the money because they believe that they are just women. they don’t have right on land but, they are the ones farming on those land, it is their crops that are on those land, but when money is being paid, they don’t give to those women, these are things that cause family problems (interview 6). findings in this section, the women speak for themselves about how the extractive industries affect their livelihoods. it is important at the stage to clarify that in the niger delta and other resource producing areas, it is not only the women involved in resource related struggles, the men are also involved. in this paper, the women are more central and closer to the environment than the men are. the issues raised in this section are built on very interesting and thoughtprovoking arguments vandana shiva made in her book, staying alive: women, ecology and survival in india (1988). in this book, she talks about women in nature. shiva (1988) calls attention to nature as the feminine principle and the relationship that women have with nature as producers of life. looking at this relationship with nature with a niger delta lens links to discussions on development and progress in the oil rich area, which scholars argue are not commensurate to what is expected in resource producing areas. rather than reap the benefits of being the custodians of the oil, the arguments amplify destruction of nature to the detriment of communities and cultures that depend on the environment for survival. findings suggest the complex relationship between men and women in the region. going back to the argument raised by elmhirst and resurreccion (2012) on the contested elements of social relationships with regards to women’s perceptions of political, negotiated and contested issue, an ogoni woman in the delta affirmed that: in this side of the world, you are like a secondclass citizen and when decisions are being taken, you are seen as a secondary. maybe secondary is patronizing, you are seen as a tertiary, so you are of no consequence in the whole process whereas you are the fore, you are the one affected, you are the one going through the whole experience but you are not considered in the whole process (interview 1). subsistence farming is generally practiced in the niger delta, therefore, anything that affects the land affects the livelihoods of women, which makes extreme, the impacts of oil spills on the food providers (helbert & o’brien 2020). a woman in ogbia opined that: this oil everywhere, the food is not producing again. before, if you put cassava, it will be big stem of cassava but now small, small things, it is the oil (interview 4). another ogoni woman confirmed this view: at the bottom of the line in every conflict is the woman. the niger delta is very prone to conflicts of different kinds, it could be communal crises, this community against the other. sometimes it is politically motivated, sometimes it is actually not political, just the normal crises. even when the females are not the mai-bornu cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202395 ones directly involved in the conflict, you find that they are the caregivers, they are mothers, they are sisters they are daughters and so ultimately, they find themselves at the fore of the conflict. during an interview, an ogoni woman explained that, ‘who do you find at the fore of everything? you find the women are the most affected. how are the women palliated in all of this process, how are the women carried along? nobody wants to hear what the women have to say’ (interview 1) feminist connection to specific viewpoints about women and strategies required to better their livelihoods should be regarded in terms of the affective power of deeply held beliefs about women (cornwall 2008, p. 145). the discovery of oil and gas among other vital natural resources in the niger delta raised many hopes, including the belief that women will live a better life, support their families and possibly substantial job opportunities. it is essential to understand and interpret local women’s experience in the context of extractive processes in this region and the associated impacts on women’s livelihoods. women’s voices from the niger delta a woman interviewed revealed that: if you go to the river, you will see what is happening. we normally go to the river and fetch water to help ourselves. even if you don’t have something to drink, at least we use that one to bath, to wash our clothes, flushing of toilets. now as i am speaking, you cannot use a bucket of water to go and fetch water again because of all the river is flooding with crude oil. our fishes are dying anyhow if you go there, you will see it (interview 2). although shiva (1988) associated nature with the women in india, women in the niger delta also share an intimate relationship with the environment. for the ogoni women for example, the land is blessed, therefore, anything that affects the land affects the ogoni woman. women are affected in various ways by oil extraction activities because they engage primarily in farming, often referred to as production of life (mies 1984). as a woman in the delta explained: the diesel, kerosene and all those kinds of goods that they are using have made the water to spoil, so we can’t make use of the water any longer (interview 3). helbert and o’brien (2020) reveal that the gradual degradation of the environment has led to overwhelming and destructive shocks on women, the caregivers in the society. for instance, acid rain, gas flaring, polluted land and rivers have negatively impacted subsistence farming, which is the main avenue for food production in most of the resource producing areas. a woman from ijaw the community also echoed this sentiment: the oil destroys many of our land, our water and everything, we lack of fish, everything that we get from water is condemn, the land condemn (interview 5). this suggests that women in the niger delta are indeed an intimate part of nature, both in imagination and practices as advanced by (shiva 1988). the livelihood impacts are serious because the socalled producers of life (women) are at the mercy of decision makers who tend to ignore the reality of what affects the vulnerable inhabitants of communities. poverty is on the rise in these areas. the gendered division of labour in these areas sees women primarily responsible for the subsistence of their families. as producers of life, a lot is expected of them. the traditional niger delta women, as in the traditional african society, is central in the running of the family. most of the women in this study were not married, they did not have supporting spouses. they have sole responsibilities for taking care of their mai-bornu cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202396 families, including feeding, housing, education, health and a lot more. in an ideal situation, these are groups that should be considered early when support comes from oil companies operating in the region, but most of these women are not accorded this support. these sentiments were echoed in the following statements: chances are not given to especially the women, like the work that come in from the companies shell and the rest of them, mainly the work is being given to the men, we the women we are left behind. because as full nigerian’s we as women and the men we have equal rights but we are not really given the attention we need in the aspect of work (interview 8). by the time it gets to paying of compensation sometimes they pay this money to wrong people and this thing cause community crises. sometimes, only one or two persons in the family that is being concerned, they will just go and collect the money and sideline the other members of the family, these are issues that bring crises in the community (interview 6). feminist political ecologists underscored ways in which gender inequalities and constructions are deeply rooted in biology, these differences vary (rocheleau, thomasslayter & wangari 1996) and are sometimes context specific. resource extraction activities tend to destroy the environment and, in the process, subject women to unproductive means of securing food for their families. an interesting point raised during one of the interviews was the position of women in resource conflict affected environments. when the crimes in these areas continue to increase, you find that, who are the criminals, they are the sons of women; who are the first targets of these criminals, they are the women, who are seen to be vulnerable without any form of defence (interview 1). an ijaw woman interviewed raised concerns about the inactions of the nigerian state: the question is what is the government doing about it? if you go in kalabari in rivers state, if you go to those places that are in the atlantic ocean you will see these platforms, these oil companies their platforms and you will see the villages. you will see this place shining, light, this place is in darkness and when they are mining or drilling, you are on your bed feeling the vibration, in the night you are in darkness. the government is supposed to make those communities too to be the same way. we expect the government to be disciplined, if you are disciplined you will not be corrupt (interview 9). one important finding is the reliance of families faced with severe economic hardships on very young women and daughters. it is an accepted fact that poverty increases the vulnerability of the poorest, hence the established pattern of women engaging into acts of prostitution for survival. some of the ogbia women i interviewed as part of this project indicated major failures along family lines. as two of the women affirmed: some parents do not even know where their thirteen years old girl is sleeping, they don’t care, they are not ready to take responsibility. as soon as you are up to one stage, they believe you are old enough to take care of yourself. in fact, they are even expecting the child to bring to them even when the child has nothing doing (interview 6). some mothers they don’t have any time for their children. when it is time to go to bed and children are not around, they don’t have time, they will go to bed and the children have been walking around. all those ones you are encouraging the child to go and join bad gang (interview 16). a 2002 study conducted by ukeje at al. highlighted why women in six oil communities in the niger delta engaged in informal prostitution as a result of diminished access to farm land and fishing waters. some of the women i engaged with echoed similar issues. i came across very young mothers sometimes with five or mai-bornu cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202397 more children from different fathers. three young women i interviewed raised concerns about the increase in prostitution in their area: the way we ladies sell our bodies for money for men, is not really good. if we had an opportunity of having job or one thing or the other, we women and ladies will not be selling our bodies for money (interview 13). we niger delta women we are really suffering in the hands of men. you know sometimes as a growing woman you plan, you wish so many things. if i got married, i will be like this, like this with my home but at the end of the day, you see that your husband is a cheater. he will go out, in terms of marriage, let me put it in that way, he will go out sometimes even abandon you and the kids (interview 14). another opined: i don’t have helper, i don’t have anybody. is just recent that i locate my dad’s place so i carried the children to go and stay with their father, because if i carry the children to stay with me it will make me to move from one man to another because no help. if the children stay with you, you will think for the feeding, think of the school fees, think of the clothing of the baby and even your own self. so, i said, the father was insisting to take the children so i decided to give him the children (interview 15). these suggest the dashed hopes and optimism experienced by some of the affected women. rather than improved living conditions and job opportunities for some of the women, the extractive industries do not imply oil as a blessing and a path to development and prosperity. the disappointment of women increases daily because the women feel that the state and the oil companies have neglected them. in a situation where women’s means of livelihoods are corrupted to the extent that it severely affects their capability to provide for their households, this causes more problems in the society. some women tend to take a step back while others lean towards criminal activities. two of the women highlighted these: this crude oil is at the backyard, my backyard but it is government that is taking it, we, we no get anything to do with it. upon that, they are not looking at us, they no turn face look at us, they no dey give us any good position, for even our leaders to fit recognize us (interview 7). the problem the women have is that they feel and have this inferiority complex. they get scared when they see the men gather to come out to speak their mind, to say what they feel is right for them. but few ladies in the community we’ve been trying to break that (interview 6). the correlation of these issues to civil and political rights as well as their social and economic rights shows that they are greatly disadvantaged. the abuse of women as bunch (1995, p. 14) explains is part of the larger socioeconomic and cultural complication that entangles women. these make them more exposed to abuses that cannot be portrayed as exclusively political or solely as a result of the failure of the nigerian state in this case. worthy of note are some additional detrimental impacts coming from the extractives sector that seem to fall disproportionately upon women. a major example that is salient yet ignored is the psychosocial impacts of the extractives on women. a woman leader raised concerns about attacks on women and its implication for health: most of the women lost their husbands, most of them lost their children, we have lack of many things, food to eat, where to sleep and all these things affecting us we women. some of our women just run mad because of all these things (interview 5). mai-bornu cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202398 another interview revealed that: the young ladies here suffer violence in so many ways. a lot of rape cases and people don’t do anything about it, in fact when such cases happen, they blame the ladies for being raped (interview 6). thus, among the factors that affect the livelihoods of women are rape and the culture of silence in the region. in ogoniland as an example, informal discussions revealed that, due to the increased attacks on women by cult members, women became very scared of going to their farms. a mother validated these assertions in the following statement: when they try going out to get water or to go out or to go farm these people will rape them. […] talking about a situation where five persons can enter in a house and rape just one particular person, what will happen to that person? the community is not in peace. as if that is not enough, when we talk about killing, they will come in like that they don’t want to know who they are looking for is not there, what they do direct is to rape you, after raping you they send you to your grave (interview 11). some women groups have achieved a wideranging outlook that are helpful to the women as agents of action and even mobilisation in the niger delta. this could be linked to the description of civil society being more than a formation (ikelegbe 2005). these organisations although informal, comprises the rural, social, communal, ethnic, religious and development organisations (ekeh 1992; ikelegbe 2001, 2003). women’s groups including the federation of ogoni women’s association (fowa) and ijaw women connect (iwc) are engaged in active struggles for justice and access to benefits through associational forms. discussions with some of the key actors of these groups indicate the active roles women play in terms of popular struggles (ikelegbe 2005), civil challenge through traditional forms of resistance, as well as peacebuilding. it is important to state that some of the communities i visited are without any gendered grouping as a network of support seen in the ogoni and ijaw groups. fowa as an example engages in preaching nonviolence to women at the local level. as some of the women explained: first our leader (ken sarowiwa) told us mosop (movement for the survival of the ogoni people) is nonviolent struggle organization. we should use knowledge and biro, not knife and gun. he told us, women organize yourselves because we are the people that will back him. because if women are not at the back of the younger ones they cannot go well. and that was why women were so involved. you can speak to your husband, you can speak to your children, and they will listen to you (interview 18). we have been going from town hall to town hall from various communities to campaign about nonviolence in ogoni (interview 19). we advise women those in the chapters to go home for their meetings and we discuss peace. and they should talk to their children because when your child is going out though many at times when they go out you don’t know what they really do outside until the information will come to you. it is there and then we advise women as you are going make sure that you advise your child, boy or girl (interview 20). in relation to women at the communal and grassroots levels, on the ijaw side, iwc serves a vehicle that ensures that jaw women are treated equally with respect regardless of their gender type. this group works with many broken women in their communities. one of the leaders explained how they engage with affected women in their areas: we to talk to ourselves like friends. we talk to ourselves like women, what are you passing through, what do you think can be done differently. if you give the local women an opportunity, if you go mai-bornu cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202399 down to the locals, give them opportunity to interact with you, bury the fears in you, you will have a lot of revelations (interview 21). no support from the government but sometimes they see you to say that i applaud you. and beside the numerous awards, everybody sees your jobs and everybody wants to identify with you, to give you awards of excellence for being effective, for performing and stuff like that. but that encouragement is not there (interview 21). although these are laudable roles played by women at the local level, we have to note that it is not a one size fits all in the niger delta. i came across organisation referred to as community development committees, each with a woman leader in the community. the women leaders are supposed to be the voices of women thereby protecting their interests against the predominantly male voices. a woman in ogbia explained that: the cdc are the overall of the community, they are the people responsible for the community, development of the community, doing everything in the community, the cdc are the important people to take control of the community (interview 22). however, interviews conducted revealed that most of these women take the back seat during discussions, with the men taking decisions for and on behalf of the women. even though some women are included as part of the leadership, most of their roles are relegated to taking care of catering during meetings and other social activities, not in taking decisions. leadership is one of the challenges facing women in the region. as some women in ogbia affirmed: like my community, they don’t give women that privilege of leading, of leadership like in the cdc (interview 22). women have to be involved in the cdc and also the youth body because when it comes to community sanitation like clearing the rivers, clearing the water side and clearing of the street, they say girls are youth too. they ask us to go with the men and do all this community work but, when it comes to job opportunities and other empowerment programmes the women are not carried along (interview 6). it seems as if there are always missed opportunities for women in this region. the disappointment of these women calls for serious attention. some have accepted the existing situation without thinking of ways to disrupt the norm in terms of how the activities of extractive industries impact the livelihoods of women. rather than confront the leaders in the societies, some prefer to lean towards the church, hoping for some divine intervention. if the women can really open up and tell you what they are going through, a whole lot needs to be done. we bottle up our emotions, express it in our religious activities, and say there is a world hereafter where we shall all be taken care of. a paradise of sort (interview 1). another maintained that: even in the bible, the voice of woman is the voice that god use to hear first. the cry of a woman is very dangerous, so at least if women gathered and cry there will be peace (interview 23). on the other side, some of the women i engaged with are determined to make progress even when the support is not available to them. some have vowed to continue making loud noises until their voices are heard and not based on gender any more. mai-bornu cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 2023100 i don’t have anybody to help me but if you want to do it, if you believe in yourself, you can do it. so, i want them to come up and join hands with us so that we make our state and our community a better place (interview 14). the voices in this section offered very emotive personal insights from various communities into the major issues affecting the livelihoods of women. firstly, it was essential to reflect on the different ways the environment affect men and women (rao 1991) and the gendered division of labour within feminist lenses. secondly, the ecology of women’s lives and the closeness to the land (shiva 1989; merchant 1980) details the insider position of women based on ownership and engagement with their farmlands. for ogoni women in particular, what affects the land bears directly on them. thirdly, being citizens and contributors to the economy of their various communities fails to alleviate their marginalisation in the civil society. the choice of participatory video proved vital to the credibility of this research; this brought a sense of awareness and clarity on similar lived experiences of other women within the same region to these very close but very distinct ethnic groups. conclusion in this paper i demonstrated how the livelihood of the women in the communities i visited are affected by activities of the extractive industries. i argued that women and men are not impacted equally. the women are the most affected by the oil industry through frequent spilling of crude oil in creeks, rivers, swamps and farmlands, where their sources of income are derived from. as key members of the civil society, the women have only achieved little in terms of social justice. i utilised participatory video as a documentation tool that ensured my participants voices are heard as against my own voice as the researcher. feminist insights were used to advance arguments made within the perspectives of the affected women. it is important to restate that in the part of the paper, i focused on the voices of those affected which sits very well within arguments raised in terms of voices that count in the production of knowledge when studying resource related issues in africa in general and nigeria in particular. this was deliberate as the intention was to speak with rather than for the women who participated in the study. it is their stories that are being told so they must be given a voice. the analysis suggests the need for a closer look at the gendered implications of extractive activities. interview evidence indicates the clear connection women have to nature as they depend on the environment for their livelihoods. as producers of life, feminists have argued for women’s agency in the struggles for their basic rights, in particular, the right to food and freedom from violence associated with resource issues. i agree with the observation that extractivism has moved away from affected populations (women in this case), rather than focus on dousing tensions, it reinforces politicalsocioeconomic norms that intensify inequalities and marginalisation of vulnerable groups. a lot needs to be done and can be done on various fronts including, the nigerian state, the multinational oil companies (such as shell) and also at the local level. the nigerian state needs to wake up from the existing slumber and attend to the issues affecting women in the area to avoid more derailing and joining criminal 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https://womin.africa/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/full-collection-women-gender-and-extractivism-in-africa.pdf https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/nigeria-population https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1559834 https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1559834 identity issues and challenges faced by russian immigrants in new zealand cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 103 identity issues and challenges faced by russian immigrants in new zealand elena maydell and marc wilson abstract among the processes cosmopolitan societies undergo at the present moment, is the unprecedented increase in mass migration across cultures. what challenges are faced by both immigrants, who have to settle in novel socio-cultural environments, and by the host populations accepting them? the current qualitative study investigates the nature of identity construction among russian-speaking immigrants in new zealand, applying thematic analysis for the interpretation of the data collected via 23 in-depth interviews. among the most common themes articulated by the participants was the feeling of identity loss. a taken-for-granted sense of identity, brought by the participants from their culture of origin, was not validated by their new society of residence, mostly due to the lack of appropriate cultural resources. the participants were faced with a challenge of re-constructing their old identity, or constructing a new one, utilising the available resources in the community around them. at the same time, there was a sub-group for whom this challenge brought the realisation that the nature of their identity is cosmopolitan, rather than located within any particular culture or geographical space. introduction the end of the previous century has witnessed significant changes in political and social life of different nations across the globe. as many theorists argue, humanity in the beginning of the 21st century has found itself deeply entrenched in the powerful processes often summarized under the term ‘globalization’ (scholte, 2005). within these processes, characterized by new information technologies and increasing flows of goods, people and ideas, such new entities as ‘global space’, ‘global civil society’ and ‘global consciousness’ pave the way to new approaches of understanding and reconstructing the concepts of self, identities and nationhood (chandler, 2005). the constructionist argument, that individuals and society are co-created through multiple connections and discursive practices (gergen, 1991), has been strengthened by new global discourses and current developments in various spheres of political and social life of people in many countries of the world, as the growing interconnectedness of numerous agents around the world erases distances and boundaries between them (chandler, 2005). among recently emerged discourses, the concept of a global or transnational civil society is both the product and the producer of a new kind of morality and global 104 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 consciousness, aimed at re-instating human agency outside of state-based politics. as power inequalities have pervaded not only national but also international relations, the political agenda of global civil society is to present ‘an alternative moral force which can challenge and restrain the amoral world of international relations’ (chandler, 2005, p.111). within this political project, global civil society seeks to articulate universal values and global issues in contrast to the particular state-based interests, bringing to the discussion table the issues of ‘global space’ and ‘global consciousness’ (chandler, 2005). the idea of a new kind of ‘social space’ as a manifestation of globality, as a nonterritorial or sub-territorial concept, transcending borders and geographical locations, may be defined through ideological frames and global values (scholte, 2005). current developments in new information technology create a simultaneous interconnectedness between people around the world and can make ‘local’ events global in an instant, radically transforming ‘people’s consciousness from the national to the global level’ (chandler, 2005, p. 115). shaw (2000) suggests that this new, ‘global’, consciousness is based on new social meanings created by the transformation in the concepts of time and space and it entails ‘an increasing awareness of the totality of human social relations’ (pp.11-12). as the processes of globalization sustain the growing complexity of human experience, the idea of a global civil society reflects the increasing global interconnectedness and promotes ‘a culture of self-awareness about the hybridity and complexity of the world’ (keane, 2003, pp. 15-16). this new concept of ‘globally aware’ people, who present the force behind global civil society and spread the new global consciousness, building up resources for new social meanings, constructs the basis for the re-articulation of human agency on a global level. thus, new global space create new actors, who, in turn, further develop the complexity and diversity of manifestation of these global meanings. for chandler (2005), this new social space is ‘the most inclusive, a space which is shared by every diverse identity’ (p. 117). the process of co-construction between these global actors and global space allows for the emergence of new meanings for such concepts as identity, nationhood and human rights. cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 105 as a result of globalization and decline of nation-states’ influence, the issue of human rights has outgrown the boundaries of states and reached the global or cosmopolitan level (chandler, 2005). therefore, the democracy has to be extended from nationstates to humanity as a whole, as in contrast to the rights of states, it should be the rights of cosmopolitan or global citizens, which can be addressed through global civil society. in this regard, more and more citizens of nation-states demand the rights of global or cosmopolitan citizenship, extended beyond the state boundaries (chandler, 2005). among these global citizens there are numerous immigrants and refugees crossing national borders who represent the new global actors with cosmopolitan demands. as nash, wong and trlin (2006) state, ‘the movement of people (voluntary and forced) across borders is an international phenomenon, an expression of globalization with implications for national, economic and political stability and cultural identity’ (p. 346). the end of the last century and the beginning of this one have witnessed the unprecedented and continuous increase in both voluntary and involuntary mass migrations from different regions of the world, reflected in such metaphors as ‘waves’ or ‘flows’ (markowitz, 2004). the changes have occurred not only in numbers and origins of people moving across the globe; the nature of immigration has changed dramatically, making a huge impact on the whole global community (suarez-orozco, 2005). as one of the impacts of increased migration, new ways of identity production become salient not only for immigrants themselves, but also for the members of host communities affected by the exposure to different cultures and new worldviews (castles & miller, 2003). resnik (2006) suggests that local communities cannot ignore the effects of the global processes of identity production which are introduced by immigrants in their struggle for acknowledgement and social inclusion. she states that, ‘one of the main characteristics of our time is the instability of identities and the continuous invention of new/old identities. traditions and ethnic identities are 106 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 deconstructed and reconstructed. immigrants… participate in the dynamic of identity production’ (resnik, 2006, p. 585). the concept of identity, as understood within this research, is adopted from the constructionist perspective (burr, 1995). gergen (1991) suggests that a person’s identity is constructed in discursive practices, specifically through continuous interactions and relationships with others, as well as with the immediate environment. this particular environment includes not only the people and community around, but also spatial and historic characteristics a person finds herself in. people reflect the histories of their culture(s), enacting them through their identities, and carry their cultural flags and symbols, passed to them by their predecessors, which they pass on later to their successors (liu & hilton, 2005; liu, mccreanor, mcintosh & teaiwa, 2005). in this regard, identity may be conceptualised as a flexible and unstable concept which undergoes continuous deconstruction and reconstruction (resnik, 2006). this becomes very clear in the case of immigrants who learn about how unstable their identities are through personal and direct experiences, as a result of leaving their habitual cultural environment, which provided them with the validation for their sense of being, and through losing this sense in new lands. the new cultural systems of meanings usually lack the same resources which immigrants relied on in their homeland as material for identity construction (maydellstevens, masgoret & ward, 2007). sampson (1989) argues that the ownership over socio-cultural resources, essential for identity construction, lies with the community, which accumulates and continuously re-produces these resources. consequently, immigrants have to go through a learning process of familiarizing themselves with the local socio-cultural environment, in order to be able to construct or re-construct their identities, re-claiming their ownership over the available resources (rapoport, lomsky-feder & heider, 2002). the current research is focused on the process of identity construction among russian-speaking immigrants who have been in their new country of residence, new zealand, for less than 10 years, on the assumption that they are still in the stage of the cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 107 active re-construction of their identity. the participants in the study were recruited in wellington and its suburbs. the russian-speaking community in new zealand may be considered a small cultural group, as there have never been any large-scale migrations of them to new zealand. in contrast, countries such as the usa, canada, israel and some others have received large numbers of russians and other ethnicities from territories of the former soviet union, triggering academic interest in such topics as identity production (e.g., elias, 2005; rapoport et al., 2002; resnik, 2006; vinokurov, birman & trickett, 2000). the 1996 census data show that approximately 3,000 new zealand residents stated russia as their birth place, while 5,600 people were identified as being able to speak the russian language (9% exclusively; statistics new zealand, 2002). though not all would state their ethnicity as russian (but rather as ukrainian, kazakh, jewish, and others), their main language would be russian. this can be explained by the legacy of the soviet union, whose policies aggressively promoted forceful russification of ethnic minorities, and insisting on the supremacy of the russian language and russian culture among its citizens (kononenko & holowinsky, 2001). despite these statistical data, russian-speaking immigrants in new zealand are considered one of the groups whose numbers are rising faster than others. the report on migration trends for the 2005/2006 financial year cited 1,003 russians and 317 ukrainians issued with work or student permits, while 302 russians and 80 ukrainians were granted permanent residence in new zealand (department of labour, 2006). accordingly, the 2006 census showed over 4,800 people self-identified as russians (statistics new zealand, 2008). the more detailed information on the birthplace provided the numbers for those who stated to have been born in russia (4,578) and the ukraine (1,152), showing more than three-fold increase in their numbers during the last decade (from 1,449 and 408 respectively). at the same time, there were 7,893 people who noted speaking the russian language, classified into ethnicity categories as follows: 7,269 fell into a sub-group ‘european’; 259 – into a sub-group ‘asian’; 108 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 231 – ‘new zealander’; 159 – ‘middle eastern/latin american/african’, with smaller numbers in some other sub-groups (statistics new zealand, 2008). due to the small numbers of different ethnicities that can be grouped together under the label of russian speakers (russians, russian jews, ukrainian, byelorussians and others), there are no detailed data related to other aspects of this group, such as employment status, place of residence in new zealand, and others. as illustrated earlier, the census data cannot be fully reliable either, as russian-speaking immigrants can classify themselves as ‘europeans’ or ‘jews’ or ‘new zealanders’, especially after having gained new zealand citizenship as in latter case. for that reason, the numbers of russian-speaking immigrants in wellington can only present a very inaccurate estimate. there is only anecdotal evidence, for example, that there are about 700 families of russian-speaking immigrants living in wellington, not counting singles. but even this figure is confusing, as it is impossible to estimate an average number in a russian family – it may vary between two spouses and three generations, therefore, any estimate is unable to indicate how many russian speakers reside in wellington. method design and data collection the principles of the qualitative paradigm for both the data collection and the data analysis were used in the study (seale, gobo, gubrium & silverman, 2004). it was enlightened by the general principles of ethnographic enquiry (gergen, 1990; merriam, 2002), adapted in order to suit the requirements of collecting data among immigrants who were co-nationals with the first author (colic-peisker, 2004; elias, 2005). the data were collected via in-depth interviews with 23 participants (12 men and 11 women) recruited by word-of-mouth and snowballing among the russian-speaking community in wellington, new zealand. their ages ranged from around 20 to 60 years. they were all ‘recent’ migrants (i.e., they arrived in new zealand within last 10 years), were mostly tertiary educated and many of them spoke english quite well. cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 109 the interviews were conducted either at the participants’ homes or at the university research facility, and lasted from around 30 to 90 minutes. seven questions, with additional prompts within each question, were derived for an interview schedule. the examples of the questions were: ‘how do you feel in new zealand society? how do you position yourself within new zealand society? has immigration made a difference to how you see yourself as a person?’ the interviews were originally conducted and recorded in russian, then transcribed and translated into english by the first author. the english transcripts of the interviews were verified with two research assistants: a native new zealand english speaker (for the purpose of capturing the new zealand specifics of the english language); and a bilingual russian-english interpreter (for the inter-rater reliability in matching the english version of the data with the russian one). conducting interviews in russian was possible due to the bilingualism of the first author, a russian immigrant herself. the advantage of studying behaviour in one’s own culture allows a researcher to have ‘de facto an insider’s cultural perspective’ (greenfield, 2000, p. 233, emphasis in the original). apart from the ability to understand and capture the meanings articulated by the participants in their native language, similar life experience (for example, the same migration history) provides such a researcher with the possibility of gaining trust and forming unique rapport with the participants (colic-peisker, 2004). however, writing the results of the research in english and presenting the main implications to the wider population, as well as the whole research community, ultimately creates an outsider position for the researcher. greenfield (2000) defines such researchers in the following way: ‘more important to the methodology of cultural and cross-cultural psychology is the role of the culturally marginal person; these are people who have had important socializing experiences in more than one culture’ (p. 233). 110 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 data analysis the data were analysed using the rationale of the thematic analysis (braun & clarke, 2006) and engaging the positioning theory as an analytical framework (harré & van langenhove, 1999). according to braun and clarke (2006), thematic analysis aims at identifying and interpreting dominant and important patterns (themes) within data. this method was preferred to other qualitative techniques, due to the translated nature of the data. the theoretical position behind the analysis of the translated data may be grounded in the idea of a double interpretation: ‘the participants are trying to make sense of their world; the researcher is trying to make sense of the participants trying to make sense of their world’ (smith & osborn, 2003, p. 51). therefore, the process of translating the data becomes a part of the analysis, since, in order to translate the ideas, concepts and meanings constructed by the participants during the interviewing process, they already have to be re-interpreted within a different linguistic system. the advantage of using thematic analysis is that it allowed for the conceptual interpretation of broader themes and patterns within the data, rather than coding and interpreting the particular words and phrases. at the same time, the discursive approach was also used to analyse small extracts of the data in cases when the participants referred to some issues in english, or where the direct translation from russian into english was possible. words and phrases given by the participants in english are presented in the text in italics. words presented in capital letters indicate the additional emphasis placed on them by the speaker. for the purpose of identifying the extracts from the interviews, each participant has been given a number, which is preceded by a w for women and an m for men. each quote is followed by a brief demographic note on the participant, including age, gender, marital status, and occupation/employment status. analysis and discussion as a result of the analysis of the data, several themes were identified on the basis of the most common and important issues for the majority of the participants. these themes were: identity loss; inferior labels; normalizing process; grounding in location; re-claiming ownership; and new breed of people. five out of these six cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 111 themes were articulated by the participants with equal importance, however, for the purpose of this paper, the last theme – new breed of people – is examined in more detail as the most relevant to the issue of the impact of global processes on immigration. identity loss one of the most common and salient themes across nearly all interviews was the theme of identity loss, based on the participants’ accounts about the feelings and thoughts they experienced as a result of immigration to new zealand. the issue of identity loss reaches its extreme manifestation in the case of refugees and asylum seekers who sometimes are stripped of any aspects of social identity and are reduced to ‘their physical selves’ (colic-peisker & walker, 2003, p. 341). though the main condition for such feelings of loss is usually the very nature of a refugee status and what is linked to it, these traumatic experiences are not limited to refugees or asylum seekers. many voluntary immigrants may also experience similar sense of the loss of their identity if the new socio-cultural environment fails to reconfirm the aspects of their identity constructed on the basis of their previous professional, cultural and social experience. for example, many participants in this study talked about feeling as ‘strangers’, ‘aliens’, or as ‘a nobody’, as positioned by the host population. though many of them arrived in new zealand after having been granted a permanent residence status on the basis of their qualifications and previous work experience, very soon they found out that those aspects of their professional identity were not recognized by their new society of residence as valid or needed: m9: on arriving here, the first thing that was done… say, the reaction of this society, well, probably, of any society… the first thing is to show you that you are a nobody!.. you are a stranger, you are a nobody! well, that was the first impression, which i felt when i tried to find a job. with all my previous… university degree… it was straight away clear that all your… qualifications go into the rubbish bin. [49, male, married with two children, computer specialist]. 112 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 the previous research on the economic implications of immigration of professionals and their families from the former soviet union to the usa identified an absolute loss of human capital for the majority of the sample (gang & stuart, 2000). consistent with the past research, some participants in this study talked about the mismatch between the way they expected their identity to be recognised by the new zealand society and the actual response of most new zealanders. others, even when they did not expect their professional identity to be validated by the new socio-cultural environment, still reported feelings of identity loss in other social aspects, often referring to the image of a second rank of people: ‘w20: i feel all the time like some sort of unclaimed, second rank, right..? and… absolutely not needed by anyone here and, maybe, even uninteresting…’ [42, female, married with one child, unemployed psychologist]. as a result, the participants’ whole sense of identity as valuable members of society was often undermined, or sometimes became virtually redundant, ‘null and void’. inferior labels this void in immigrants’ identity was filled in by various identity constructions of ‘difference’ between most immigrant groups and the host population. this articulation of difference often manifested in inferior and negative labels reflected upon by the participants, such as ‘alien’, ‘inadequate’, ‘unequal’ and others. these discourses were grouped under the common theme inferior labels. as matheson (2005) suggests, labels are used as a discursive device in order to divide people into separate social categories. ‘the act of labelling a person (or group or thing) defines how members of the society can understand and judge any action done by that person and allows them to generalize about them’ (matheson, 2005, p. 24). through labels, a person or a group of people can be discursively constructed as different, or inferior to the rest of population, which may signify social marginalization for this person or group (matheson, 2005). in the case of immigrants, many negative labels assigned to them by the host population add to the construction of an overall inferior identity of an immigrant, contrasted to the identity of a local. being new to the society, immigrants are often seen as lacking profound knowledge of local customs and traditions, including cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 113 fluency in english or the ‘right’ accent. this ‘lack’ of, or ‘gap’ in, particular local knowledge is sometimes labelled as a ‘deficit’ and may work for the construction of a ‘handicap’ identity, creating a stigma of an intellectual disability. for example, one of the participants commented: w10: but overall it was funny. i mean, people… if i don’t speak english… (they would treat me)… as mental, as brain damaged… they would take me somewhere by my hand and lead me… [35, female, married with one child, unemployed accountant]. the ‘abnormal’ or ‘deviant’ construction of cultural identity may be used by the host society to claim power to dominate and discriminate the ‘inferior’ groups of population, including immigrants (cottle, 2000; yurdakul & bodemann, 2006). language fluency was one of the most salient issues voiced by the participants in this study, as important as the issue of employment and professional identity. the fact that most of them speak with a strong ‘alien’ accent, make grammatical and semantic mistakes, often do not understand jokes or local references, leads them to feel disadvantaged as the society around them makes a conclusion about their intellectual inadequacy as equal to partial illiteracy. their ‘uncultured’ accent becomes a ‘stigma symbol’ (rapoport et al., 2002), identifying them as outsiders. colic-peisker (2002) states that in such multi-ethnic countries as australia, there exists a cultural hierarchy of accents functioning as social markers. some accents that identify speakers as american or french nationals may be considered prestigious, while others become a symbol of otherness, as they ‘may associate the speaker with places commonly perceived as ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilized’ (p. 153). thus, even between different migrant groups there can be a symbolic divide into ‘cultural insiders’ and ‘cultural outsiders’. colic-peisker (2002) notes that for europeanlooking croatian immigrants in australia, coming from a non-english speaking background ‘may be a source of discrimination in employment just as skin colour or religion may be for other migrant groups’ (p. 162). consistent with her research, many participants in this study described the incidents of discrimination towards them which was based on their accent: 114 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 m15: yes, i do have an accent, i will never get rid of it but i know that people understand me… but… many people have… for example, a lady would insist… that she cannot understand me… only for the sake of emphasizing, “you have an accent! i don’t want to understand you! i don’t want to listen to you!” to such an extent: “give me somebody who speaks english…” [44, male, married with one child, bank employee]. overall, many participants in this study mentioned that the host society saw them as inferior and unequal. quite often they tried to explain various negative labels assigned to them by the fact of belonging to the group of immigrants. the mere membership in this category was seen by the participants as an inevitable inferior label, the reason for their exclusion from the wider society and the grounds for prejudice: (q: so, at this present moment… how do you feel here, who do you feel you are here?) w10: well, certainly, an immigrant, i really feel like an immigrant here… probably, because, for example… in conversation… i cannot position myself as an equal. [35, female, married with one child, unemployed accountant]. the participants’ understanding of their inferior status was expressed through the common perception (from their perspective) of an overall negative attitude towards immigrants as a particular amorphous group in new zealand, regardless of ethnicity or culture. similarly, the data from the comparison study on attitudes towards immigrants collected in 2003 and 2006 (gendall, spoonley & trlin, 2007) showed an increase of racist remarks about immigrants within that period, with evidence of a ‘hardening’ of the unspoken requirement for immigrants to adopt new zealand customs and traditions as part of a ‘common culture’. the strongest negative position towards immigrants was held by maori respondents, in comparison to non-maori (gendall et al., 2007). there were no data from the participants in this study on maori versus non-maori attitudes towards them, but their accounts were consistent with the previous research on racist and exclusionary practices among new zealanders which formed the basis for discrimination and inequality. cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 115 this acceptance of an unequal status prescribed for them by the society signifies the powerless position of immigrants and their inability to claim agency in the process of constructing their own identity. for some participants in this study, though, the acceptance of inferior identity constructions was reported as only the beginning of the process of re-construction of their previous identity and the creation of a new one. normalizing process as another way of dealing with the sense of identity loss and the inferior label of an immigrant, or an alien, many of the participants used the strategy of normalization of their negative experiences. as suggested by rapoport et al. (2002), to engage in a normalizing process would entail negotiating unfavourable identity constructions by transferring the blame for this onto self. this strategy may be used by immigrants in order to re-claim their sense of identity as they refuse to accept the power of society to dictate its rules of construction. the inferior identity constructions may be re-framed by immigrants as ‘normal’, on the basis of the taken-for-granted difference between immigrants and the rest of population. these constructions in the participants’ responses were grouped under the theme normalizing process. for example, one of the participants ascribed her feeling of alienation as her own fault: w11: of course, i feel some slight alienation… well, and sometimes it seems to me, though, of course, nobody says anything to my face… but maybe, it’s my lack of confidence… sometimes it seems to me that i am still alien to them… but it is probably normal, i do not stress out due to this… [43, female, married with one child, scientific researcher]. the notions of ‘alien’ and ‘normal’ function as markers for the process through which the participants try to make sense of the ways their identity is constructed by their immediate socio-cultural environment. they accept the status of ‘aliens’ assigned to them by the wider society through re-articulating this ‘alien’ identity as being ‘normal’, or, in other words, as expected by others. this normalizing strategy is used by immigrants to fight the powerless position assigned to them by the host society, by the way of accepting the negative labels and re-framing them into the ‘normal’ ones. engaging this strategy signals their intention to exercise agency in relation to their identity. 116 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 grounding in location at the same time, many immigrants choose to fight various negative identity constructions imposed on them by the host society, refusing to accept them in any manner. another way agency may be claimed by immigrants is illustrated by the theme grounding in location. this theme was constructed on the basis of the participants’ responses to the question often posed to them, ‘where do you come from?’ through this question, even before receiving an answer, the inferior identity of an immigrant – as an alien, a stranger, a foreigner, not belonging to the local community – is constructed. this question is seen by many participants as humiliating and apriori rejecting their loyalty towards the society they now live in. they feel that it immediately constructs their identity as different from ‘normal’, at the same time introducing the reference frame and the ‘rules’ of belonging to this society. the mere act of posing such a question entails the construction of a symbolic border – ‘we are from here, while you are obviously not. so, where are you from?’ colic-peisker, in her research with croatian immigrants in australia (2004), reflects on a similar response of migrants to this question, ‘in australia… i became a person who speaks ‘with an accent’ and was repeatedly asked where i had come from… many migrants… resent being asked, “where do you come from?” they feel that the question defines them as outsiders’ (p. 82). several participants preferred to answer this question in an unconventional way, trying to draw the attention to the fact that they had been living in new zealand as valid residents or citizens for quite a large amount of time. they do this by avoiding naming their country of origin and by giving instead their current address in new zealand in a form of the wellington suburb they reside at present: interviewer: how do you introduce yourself to new zealanders? m8: well, they usually ask… start with… a stupid question, “where are you from?” to this question i always reply, “from miramar”. here, they start thinking, feel lost for a moment and then the most intelligent say, “that’s great cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 117 but i am asking you where your accent comes from.” i say, “well, my accent is from moscow”. [52, male, married with one child, taxi-driver]. one of the participants tries to ridicule the whole idea of investigating cultural origins through constructing his own label in response to this question. his answer rejects the idea of identification through ethnic origin and positions his identity firmly within the geographical location which omits any ethnic or cultural markers: m9: well, a question comes… “where do you come from? where are you from?” well… i have prepared a standard answer, “i am from miramar. i am a miramartian”. [49, male, married with two children, computer specialist]. this metaphor constructs an extreme case of an ‘alien’ identity (as a ‘true extraterrestrial’ – from mars) and illustrates how inappropriate the label of cultural ‘aliens’ can be. by rejecting the ‘alien’ identity through grounding their current position within new zealand territorial space, the participants tried to claim the status of locals and emphasize their loyalty to their new place of residence. through identifying their origin by local places, the participants sought to re-position themselves as insiders, demanding the inclusion and acceptance by the locals on an equal basis. therefore, their grounding in geographical locations emphasised their claim for agency and co-ownership of the same socio-cultural resources with the host population. re-claiming ownership to be able to claim their part in ownership of socio-cultural resources in the society, immigrants face the necessity of adjusting and adapting to the existing systems of meanings around them. the theme re-claiming ownership illustrates the participants’ accounts of their engagement in creating their new sense of identity. the notion of ‘cultural learning’ (ward, bochner, & furnham, 2001), or gaining an insider knowledge of a new cultural environment, was emphasized by many participants as a necessary condition for re-constructing their identity of full members of society: w7: i want to become part of this country, i want to learn about it, to get to know its people, its history, and its culture… i hope that after having lived here, 118 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 maybe, for five more years, at least, and not simply having lived but having learned more… about new zealand, and having got to know new zealand people, maybe, i would like very much… to feel myself as a kiwi. [48, female, married with two children, nanny]. several participants used the metaphors of material construction in articulating the changes they experienced in their sense of self. in this process, some of them admit the power of the immediate environment in shaping their identity, while others stress their own agency: w10: it’s interesting to look at oneself as if from outside… how all these sharp corners flatten… with time. it’s like being sculpted…[35, female, married with one child, unemployed accountant]. m9: i started moulding myself into this society. precisely, i meant gaining this… local tertiary education… and after i got it… ultimately… what many local young people cannot achieve; after i got, eventually, this job… which again many locals cannot get either… then i realised that i am ultimately… not a complete fool. [49, male, married with two children, computer specialist]. as a result of successful re-claiming of the ownership over their identity and the ability to re-construct the desired sense of self, many participants experienced the feeling of personal growth, articulated by them through various constructions, such as notions of ‘self-worth’, ‘self-esteem’, ‘self-respect’ and others: w12: so, it’s like that: you have already proven yourself, you have achieved something, and you already think of yourself, “ah! i can do this”…so, you sort of start to realise what you are worth, and what not… and how you can handle overall all these… difficult situations in life, quite hard ones… [36, female, married with one child, midwife]. one of the illustrations of the participants’ successful cultural learning and their ability to use local socio-cultural resources in re-constructing their identity may be the cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 119 fact that many of them use english words (such as ‘self-esteem’) as discursive constructions of self, in parallel to russian linguistic devices: m9: my self-esteem has risen dramatically…whether they like me or not… if they employ me, ready to pay and… even rejected some local applicants in order to employ exclusively me… it means in general… that was some sort of grounds for self-esteem… in terms of professional criteria, so to say, selfevaluation, right? [49, male, married with two children, computer specialist]. while undergoing this process of re-construction and creation of new identity, many participants attempt to find the explanations for these considerable transformations to their sense of self. they search for meanings behind these processes and try to make sense of their relationship with others and the wider society. the issue of belonging to a particular group of society, be that a community of russian-speaking immigrants, or the wider group of immigrants to new zealand, or the whole new zealand society, is investigated by many participants from different angles. their accounts are presented by an overarching theme new breed of people which illustrates their attempts to make sense of their identity as different from others’. new breed of people madison (2006) in his study on experiences of voluntary migrants suggests the concept of existential migration – the type of migration people engage in when they see it as a necessary condition for their life, or the mere nature of their existence. he argues that among different types of migrants there are some ‘…voluntary migrants [who] are seeking greater possibilities for self-actualising, exploring foreign cultures in order to assess their own identity, and ultimately grappling with issues of home and belonging in the world generally’ (p. 238). madison’s concept of existential migration is echoed in the accounts of the participants in this study for whom the act of immigration signifies more than a necessary adaptation and integration into a new socio-cultural environment. several participants in this study suggested that immigrants are overall different from both the host population, and the majority of the population in their country of origin. the theme new breed of people was based on their accounts about the nature of their 120 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 immigration experiences and the need to find some explanations for their move to another country. these participants constructed themselves, and similar to them other immigrants, first of all, as unique, in terms of the personal qualities they possessed even before immigrating. these qualities were seen by them as an utter necessity for survival and the future success in new environments. for example, one participant talks about the higher motivation and resilience common to the families of migrants in contrast to others: w20: and quite often immigrants are more ambitious… and the children of immigrants who are brought up in families… who are… struggling with… the life conditions… really, the first two-three years… when immigrants arrive here… it is virtually a battle, and… children are taught by their families… to fall and stand up again..! and go further… and they are taught also to achieve things. so, the motivation in immigrant families… is much higher, than… in native families… [42, female, married with one child, unemployed psychologist]. another participant emphasizes the idea that immigrants are above average in their abilities and are active, compared with the rest of population in any country constructed as ‘sitting still’: m23: i am not average. the fact that i managed to get here... and any immigrant is not an average person… and a person who breaks away… is not average anymore. in russia, i am not average. i am above average, and by the way, much above average. and here i am much above average because i am that person who wants to take off somewhere… if you are average, you sit still and don’t stick out… any immigrant is more active… by default. those people who move [away] from their place, as a rule, are more active, more mobile. a person who is running is more active than the one who is sitting… [47, male, married with three children, secondary teacher]. on the basis of such personal qualities, existing prior to immigration, some participants constructed a symbolic representation of a person who differs from the cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 121 rest of society: a challenger, an adventurer, a conqueror. for example, the notion of possessing an adventurous character is articulated by one of the participants as the impossibility of staying in one place: w6: …my friends were telling me, back in russia, “well, you probably will adapt anywhere and make friends even in antarctica… we even wouldn’t go anywhere… what for? … to leave everything and move to god knows where, so to say…” there are just people who… can’t sit still in one place… who seek adventures… [28, female, single, it specialist]. she further develops the image of an adventurer using the metaphor of ‘conquering’, as an antithesis to ‘sitting still’. the concept of migration is framed by her as a desire ‘to conquer’ other countries, where new challenges make life ‘interesting’, while a ‘conquered’ challenge becomes ‘boring’ and unfulfilling: w6: i simply came here to have a look… well, now it’s already boring for me. i mean there is lots of stuff here you can do but… though i had three jobs back home… i did not want anything… everything sort of stopped… so, it was already necessary… to make some movements… here now too… it’s time to move already… to conquer australia, for example, or somewhere else. it’s interesting to go there… even just to have a look. [28, female, single, it specialist]. another participant points out that the phenomenon of taking on challenges is not restricted only to russian immigrants; he gives an example of a new zealander who is guided by the same motives to migrate as other immigrants: m23: i know a kiwi who… works in norway, having learned to speak norwegian… he is active. here you have the example of an immigrant too. he went there, learned norwegian. and now he works for some big company… here, you would think, such a challenge! i mean, he also immigrated, the same stuff… but he feels great, he is active, it’s interesting for him, he is learning something new. [47, male, married with three children, secondary teacher]. 122 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 together with emphasizing the necessary qualities which put these immigrants into a group of people different from the rest of society, and constructing the symbolic representation for this new category, many participants try to find explanations for this difference and articulate their ideas about the underlying processes behind this new identity. one of the participants suggests certain ambivalence, in terms of not having a strong sense of belonging to any of the societies he has been living in. for him, the ties which most people find strong enough to hold them to a particular place or culture, or generate some nostalgia when they have to leave those, are not so important and would not stop him from going to other places: m9: …maybe, after having got all [this]… it is worth to go and work in another country… no specific… sentimental values… have emerged, so that they would hold me to this country. what distinguishes migrants from non-migrants is that they have a weaker link… to sentimental values… a part of me… is left back home. the same thing is possible here… there is already some kiwi part in me, which also exists and which probably later on i will miss too. nevertheless, none of these parts… is strong enough… to stop me from going for something better…[49, male, married with two children, computer specialist]. in explanation of this new identity, some participants use biological, or genetic, discourse. one of the participants, in his attempt to make sense of the difference this type of immigrants presents in comparison to others, uses a genetic framework to articulate his justification for this difference, as well as a metaphor of mathematical dissimilarity: m23: it is a type of a person, it must be some sort of a genetic make-up, probably… let’s say… you cannot compare me with an average kiwi because… we are like different units, mathematically. i am more… onto it… more bold… more trying to… infiltrate everywhere… find out everything… but he doesn’t need this, what for? … he was told what to do and that’s it…[47, male, married with three children, secondary teacher]. the nature of such a difference is assigned by one of the participants to some condition from birth, which makes him feel an outsider in any society in the world, cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 123 including his place of origin. he interlaces the english words outsider and identity into russian while articulating his difference from others. by this, he uses the resources of both socio-cultural milieux in constructing his identity, while at the same time, claiming no strong membership with either of them: m9: i felt as an outside observer even in that society from which i have arrived. i did not identify myself with that society… the same way, i do not identify myself with this society either. so, in some sense, i feel like an outsider. which doesn’t prevent me, in general, from adapting to this society… many immigrants cannot adapt to the full. in my case, it’s also part of me, myself, my identity… that i am not likely to identify myself with anything. (interviewer: is this feeling of an outsider present all the time in your life?) well, it’s a part of me, frankly speaking… or, so to say, i was born like that. [49, male, married with two children, computer specialist]. again, the apriori qualities, articulated here as a condition from birth, are used as a construction of a category which can be re-framed as the theme new breed of people. this theme illustrates that these participants resort to a biological explanation, constructing themselves (as similar others) as some kind of ‘species’, or group, biologically or genetically different from other people. conclusion not all of the participants felt the same way about their immigration experience. through coming to terms with the feeling of loss of their previous identity and the imposed inferior labels of an immigrant constructed for them by others, some participants in this study aimed at re-constructing their identity by either placing it within the community of other immigrants, normalized by them as a valid part of new zealand society, or by grounding it locally and claiming the agency and membership among new zealanders. at the same time, there were participants who constructed themselves differently, as those destined to become migrants, due to their personal qualities or some other factors in their life. madison’s (2006) concept of existential migration resonated with these participants’ feelings and experiences, as they tried to make sense of their 124 cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 difference through the biological (or genetic) explanation for this type or sub-group of immigrants, re-framed by a metaphor of a new breed of people. the notion of an immigrant positioned as ‘an outsider’ or ‘an alien’ by the majority of population was seen by these participants to be equally valid for immigrants across different nations. in this regard, they saw more common features with immigrants from other countries than with people from their culture of origin or the host population. this notion of a different type of people not rooted in any particular culture or community but eager to embrace many of them simultaneously and equally may be grounded in a concept of cosmopolitan thinking, dating back to diogenes’ notion of ‘a citizen of the world’ (cronin, 2006). cosmopolitanism may be seen as a kind of world-view and as a socio-cultural condition and it entails the notion of a complex polyidentity, based on the idea of multiple subjects having ‘a plurality of different loyalties, a multiplicity of different ways in which they can be described or defined’ (cronin, 2006, p. 9). in contrast to a single or hybrid identity, rooted within (a) particular geographic and cultural space(s), cosmopolitan identity may be seen as constituted within the notion of global space, inclusive of multiple identities of equal value. while communitarianism, often promoted in the form of multiculturalism and cultural pluralism, prioritizes some primary identity rooted in a particular community of belonging, cosmopolitan identity is based on multiple affiliation, with an emphasis on ‘the ability to make one’s way into other cultures and to actively engage with those living in or through different cultures, languages or milieux’ (cronin, 2006, p. 10). this very ability, constructed by some participants in this study as an indispensable quality or as a feature from birth, is characteristic of these new actors in global space, the agents of cosmopolitan thinking. the new, global, ways of thinking about the world and interactions between cultures are constructed by these new agents, who by doing this, at the same time increase the availability of the necessary resources for their own identity construction. in view of the projections for the future, current trends indicate that the processes of both globalization and mass migration will only intensify, with an even more cosmopolitan civil societies journal vol.1, no.1, 2009 125 increasing speed and scale. in the conjunction with these processes, the new ways of identity construction can also be projected as becoming more complex, diverse and encompassing, as well as producing novel identities, thus, bringing all of us even more closer to the common identity of ‘a citizen of the world’. the role of global civil society will only be strengthened, with an increasing emphasis on universal rights of cosmopolitan citizens – the new agents of new, global, consciousness. acknowledgements the authors would like to gratefully acknowledge dr deborah laurs and polina kobeleva for their help with the verification of the english version of the transcripts. bibliography braun, v., & clarke, v. 2006, ‘using thematic analysis in psychology’, qualitative research in psychology, 3, pp. 77-101. burr, v. 1995, an introduction to social constructionism, routledge, london. castles, s., & miller, m. j. 2003, the age of migration (3rd ed), guilford press, new york. chandler, d. 2005, constructing global society: morality and power in international relations, palgrave macmillan, new york. colic-peisker, v. 2002, ‘croatians in western australia: 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2023 © 2023 by the author(s). this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution 4.0 international (cc by 4.0) license (https:// creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/), allowing third parties to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license. citation: atta-quayson, a. 2023. new extractivism in ghana’s salt sector. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, 15:1, 19– 32. https://doi. org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8437 issn 18375391 | published by uts epress | https://epress. lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index. php/mcs article (refereed) new extractivism in ghana’s salt sector alhassan attaquayson university of education, winneba, ghana and university of johannesburg, south africa corresponding author: alhassan atta-quayson, university of education, post office box 25, winneba, central region, ghana, aaquayson@uew.edu.gh doi: https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8437 article history: received 02/11/2022; revised 10/02/2023; accepted 11/02/2023; published 26/03/2023 abstract since commercial production of oil and gas started in ghana over a decade ago, the salt sector which has historically been dominated by artisanal and smallscale mining (asm) has seen renewed corporate interest. aided by the state’s preference for large scale mining (lsm) over asm since the days of the economic reform program, several tens of thousands of acres of areas previously operated by artisanal and smallscale miners for salt mining have been leased to largescale salt mining companies. situated in political settlement and infrapolitics theoretical frameworks, with a focus on two key salt producing sites (songor and keta lagoons) and using qualitative research methods through ethnographic engagement with affected regions, the study explores the consequences of this new extractivism in the salt sector to assess the longterm consequences of forced evictions, as well as role of civil society in the retention or otherwise of the now dominant lsm in the salt sector. keywords extractivism; salt; ghana; songor; keta; mining 19 declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding the author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8437 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8437 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:aaquayson@uew.edu.gh https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i1.8437 introduction in november 2020, as ghana was preparing for nationwide general elections amidst a brutal covid19 global pandemic, the government of ghana took an unprecedented decision to grant three restricted salt mining leases covering about 40,000 acres of land and lagoon surface area in and around the songor lagoon basin to electrochem ghana limited. this decision marked a new wave of corporate extractivism at the songor lagoon basin which has the largest salt mining potential in west africa and mirrors similar developments at the same site in the 1970s and 1980s when leases were granted to vacuum salt limited and star chemicals industries limited. related to the grant of these leases was the decision of the government to fully divest itself out of the former songor salt project, a public entity which was created in early 1990s to take over operations of largescale salt production firms whose licenses were cancelled due to persistent mininginduced violent resistance and conflicts that characterized their operations (langdon & larweh 2017). the new wave of corporate extractivism at songor lagoon basin parallels developments at the eastern parts of nearby keta lagoon basin where restricted mining leases covering over 20,000 acres of parts of lagoon surface area and adjoining communities were granted to three largescale salt producing companies between 2010 and 2014. seven seas limited (one of the companies that received three of these leases), like electrochem ghana limited, acquired parts of its concession from west african goldfields limited which had leased out portions of the same concession to about 50 smallscale salt producers (attaquayson & baidoo 2020). both the songor lagoon basin and keta lagoon basin are public commons that have historically supported various livelihoods activities of people living in and around the basins that include fishing, salt winning, farming, game snaring, collection of snails, and gathering of firewood among others largely for personal consumption with the remainder traded for income. consequently, the grant of large scale salt mining licenses almost always triggers bitter and violent resistance and contestation. at songor lagoon basin, the grant of leases in the 1970s and 1980s by traditional authorities and later the government resulted in prolonged and often violent resistance by the indigenes or local people who felt that those leases represented an encroachment on their traditional autonomous production systems, an onslaught on their access to the public commons and dispossession of their lands. the feeling at the keta lagoon basin has not been different following the grant of leases except that more lives have been lost and properties (in terms of value) there than was the case at songor (attaquayson & baidoo 2020; langdon & larweh 2017). further, the environmental consequences of salt extractivism have come to the fore with the earlier resort to underground brine rather than sea brine by one of the operators at keta lagoon basin (seven seas limited) severely impacting water resources and livelihoods. the songor lagoon basin doubles as an important biodiversity site and is a wetland site of importance designated under the ramsar convention, which raises further concerns about ecological impacts. the grant of leases to largescale salt producers covering sites where artisanal and smallscale salt producers previously operated reflects a growing state preference for largescale salt mining following the discovery and production of oil and gas in commercial quantities in ghana since 2010. this posturing is a continuation of a colonial and postcolonial development trajectory in ghana characterized by a long history of extractivist production anchored in extraction of solid minerals (gold, bauxite, manganese and diamond), agriculture (cocoa and timber) and in recent times oil and gas (childs and hearn 2016; aryeetey and ackah 2018; torvikey 2021). unlike in the established traditional mineral sector (gold, bauxite, manganese and diamond) where the state’s claim to ownership of the minerals (which influences the growing preference for largescale operations) is not contested, the situation in the salt sector has been different. there are some communities that contest the state’s inclusion of salt in ‘minerals that occur in their raw state’ and therefore nationalized by the constitution citing how solar salt is produced1. further, and most importantly, the mining law recognizes and 1 solar salt production starts with brine that may be obtained from the sea, kept in a pond created by salt producer for evaporation. highly concentrated brine is later transferred to salination ponds where salt crystals are produced. atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202320 legalizes traditional artisanal salt mining by indigenes who expect the state to protect those activities rather than leasing out the very sites where these activities take place to largescale operators. management of ensuing contention between the largescale salt producers and the government (which historically backs the producers) on the one side and indigenous artisanal and smallscale producers, civil society organizations as well as residents of affected communities on the other hand differ from what transpire in the traditional minerals sector and evolved over the period. for example, in the traditional minerals sector, payment of compensation to land owners and land users which is a major component in the scheme used to manage the contention is respected and adhered to by mining companies (in spite of some residual concerns), thanks to a twopart compensation regime structured by the constitution, the mining law and a tailored regulatory instrument that is heavily influenced by and focused on these traditional minerals. at the start of a project, miners make a oneoff compensation payment to farmers and land owners in lieu of crops found on the land and denial of access to surface rights to the land whether cultivated or otherwise. in addition, mining companies pay annual ground rent to land owners. in the salt sector, however, largescale producers usually do not follow laid down procedures to pay compensation to affected parties for several reasons. most salt production activities take place within the vicinities of lagoons that are public commons and nationalized contrary to exploitation of traditional minerals that take place at areas owned by individuals, families and traditional authorities. largescale salt producers, therefore, often do not appreciate the need to pay compensation in lieu of denial of access to surface rights to land. further, the nature of livelihood activities undertaken in these public commons (for example artisanal salt mining and collection of firewood and snails), as well as the fact that undertaking these activities is open to everyone, introduces some complications in possible assessment and payment of compensation to affected individuals and organizations. consequently, the contention and contestation between largescale salt producers and salt mining communities often become violent as proponents are unable to pay prompt and adequate compensation to local producers whose livelihood are destroyed. in light of the above, this study seeks to explore the evolving growing corporate extractivism in the salt sector in ghana and how civil society is responding to it within a political settlement and infrapolitics theoretical frameworks through ethnographic engagement with affected regions. specifically, the study examines trends in corporate extractivism in the salt sector, assesses approaches by salt mining companies to manage contention and contestation between them and affected communities; gathers responses by affected communities and civil society to corporate extractivism in the salt sector; and asks what chances exist for civil societies in particular to mediate between salt mining companies and affected communities. the next section reviews corporate extractivism in ghana to set a context for the study. this is followed by a framing of the political settlement and infrapolitics theoretical frameworks through an ethnographic engagement with affected regions to ground the methodology adopted for the study. the last two sections present study findings on corporate extractivism in ghana’s salt sector and concluding remarks. overview of extractivism extractivism generally refers to an exploitative mode of production that focuses narrowly on extraction of a wide range of natural resources and exporting them in their raw state outside of the jurisdiction where the extraction takes place to fuel manufacturing and industrialization where the resources are destined, usually centres of global capital (gudynas 2010; acosta 2013; ye et al. 2020). corporate extractivism, therefore, is a form of extractivism which involves largescale (usually multinational) corporate organizations or firms. within the context of africa and the developing world more broadly, pereira and tsikata define extractivism as ‘the longstanding colonial and imperialist phenomenon of accumulating wealth by extracting a wide range of natural resources from countries colonized in africa, asia and the americas, and exporting this wealth to the metropolis’ (2021, p. 1). the link between extractivism and colonization as implied in this atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202321 definition is not hard to establish. the colonial partition of africa (as well as asia and the americas) among european countries in the last quarter of 19th century was driven mainly by competition among these countries to secure sources of raw materials that (would be produced and exported in their raw state to fuel manufacturing and industrialization in those countries. consequently, precolonial patterns of production and consumption of minerals, where these activities were firmly located and integrated in the local economy, were radically altered and replaced by a coloniallyinduced pattern, in which foreignowned mining enclaves dominated most colonial african economies’ (au and uneca p. 12). ghana’s generous natural resource endowments that include but are not limited to minerals, arable lands, water resources and most recently petroleum resources have influenced extractivism and associated economic system over the past couple of centuries. formerly known as the ‘gold coast’ to reflect the country’s rich endowment of gold, ghana is also endowed with several other minerals such as manganese, bauxite, diamonds, salt, iron and limestone just to mention a few. the colonial government contributed to the creation of political and legal security for corporate extractivism by supporting for firms to acquire and control requisite resources and labor, as well as developed necessary infrastructure to support their operations (greenhalgh 1985; lanning and mueller 1979; and au and uneca 2011. in the mining sector, for example, the colonial government actively promoted largescale foreignowned gold mining concerns and when access to labor became a problem for these concerns banned artisanal and smallscale gold mining to free up labor for them. further, the government was instrumental in the search and discovery of manganese in the gold coast in 1914 and under the exigencies of the first world war and russia’s ban on manganese exports, the colony quickly became a major exporter of manganese to the united kingdom and its allies (particularly the united states of america) (au and uneca, 2011). extractivism raises a number of issues among proponents and opponents in both policy circles and academia. for governments that have historically supported extractivism in ghana and around the continent, it is a means of generating foreign exchange earnings, government revenues and employment to facilitate ‘development’. in ghana, for example, three primary commodities that emerge from extractivism (gold, cocoa and timber) have historically contributed the lion’s share of all foreign exchange earnings, government revenues and to a lesser extent employment. in light of this, mining (particularly), cocoa and timber sectors of the ghanaian economy have long been characterized by corporate extractivism with governments designing and implementing policies and regulations to promote the exploitation of these minerals following coloniallycreated enclave production patterns. on the other hand, opponents to extractivism have raised concerns about chronic economic dependency induced by extractivist production and denial of access to raw materials to spur manufacturing and industrialization. further, mckay (2019) notes that the structural logic of extractivist production entails dispossession of land and associated destruction of livelihoods that sustain indigenes and their communities, exploitation and uneven distribution of gains and losses associated with extractivist production. pereira and tsikata (2021) observe that extractivist production activities are characterized by ‘appropriation of land in order to extract natural resources, the dislocation of communities, widening social and economic inequalities, the increasing use of violence to repress resistance, and the destruction of ecosystems and biodiversity’ (p. 16). the trends in extractivism across the developing world, in spite of general deepening, have varied and invited some contestations among scholars and in policy circles. whereas economic globalization and financialization of capital have generally contributed to deepening extractivism (gao 2000; epstein 2005), the seeming return of developmental states in latin america that have reinvested extractive rents in social programs and structural transformation has brought about the socalled ‘neoextractivism’ (gudynas 2010; acosta 2013). even though ‘neoextractivism’ is being presented as postneoliberal, it is characterized by exploitation of workers, dispossession of land and unmitigated environmental destruction (bebbington and humphreys bebbington 2011). along with increasing questioning of the utility of extractivism and the growing needs for inclusive and sustainable development, neoextractivism has influenced a rethink of atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202322 extractivism in africa that reflect in increasing resource nationalism and the adoption of the africa mining vision (amv ) by the african union. the amv seeks to transform the mining sector in africa away from its coloniallycreated enclave features by integrating the sector more coherently and firmly into the continent’s economy and society. though the implementation of the amv has been uncertain, there has been increments in rents collected by governments (aided by modest improvement in fiscal regimes) and an emergence of policies and laws that seek to increase the use of local goods and services requirements for extractivist activities as well as the level of beneficiation prior to exports. in ghana, for example, newly introduced local procurement rules have made some marginal gains in the mining sector (attaquayson 2022). in response to extractivism, varying resistance strategies have been adopted by communities and citizens’ organizations that are affected extractivism. these strategies to seek to either halt extractivist production activities entirely or bring about some changes in the project design and scope to accommodate concerns of communities and citizens’ organizations. resistance strategies are informed and shaped by the nature of the extractivist production activity and the type of material being extracted. they are also influenced by the extent to which the multiple crises induced by the extractivist activities affect people and their livelihoods (hamouchene 2019). in the songor lagoon basin, langdon and larweh (2017) share how mobilizations by artisanal salt producers and community members, guided by the ancient yomo spirit of the area, resisted largescale salt production activities at the songor lagoon basin in the 1980s. at nearby keta lagoon basin, however, efforts by indigenous people to resist largescale salt production at the very area where local producers previously won salt have so far not yielded the desired result despite loss of lives and destruction of properties (attaquayson & baidoo 2020). these two basins continue to be active sites of resistance against extractivism and as time passes by, the evolving strategies adopted by the opposing sides offer opportunities to reassess the civil society dimensions and evolutions in resistance mobilizations. political settlement and infrapolitics this paper adopts and combines mushtaq khan’s theory political settlement and james scott’s theory of infrapolitics (khan 2010, 2017; scott 2005, 2013) to explore increasing corporate extractivism in the salt sector of ghana and civil society mobilizations against this trend. political settlements framework offer explanation to key issues that relate to analysis of institutions and policies, especially in developing countries (khan 2017). it had been observed that while similar institutional and policy frameworks achieve different results under different contexts, different institutional and policy frameworks solved similar problems under different contexts. this was not only contrary to dominant institutional theory, but emphasized the importance of context, shaped by power distribution among key constituents. political settlement has, therefore, emerged as relevant governance theory that has been applied to different sectors such as extractivist production sectors to explain outcomes or performance in those sectors. khan (2017) defines political settlement as ‘a description of power across organizations that are relevant for a specific institutional or policy problem’ (p. 4). the political settlement further demonstrates the likelihood that some organizations (based on the power and resources they hold) can outlast competitors in contestations over power and resources (ibid). in order for a distribution of organizational power to be classified as a political settlement it must be fairly stable and capable of reproducing itself. it must also ‘tend towards an ‘equilibrium’ between the distributions of benefits attributed to particular institutions, and the distribution of power across the affected organizations’ (p. 5). the prevalence of a political settlement and its tendency towards ‘equilibrium’, according to proponents, does not mean that the economy or country is performing well or has no violence or contestations over the distribution of benefits and power. rather, it only suggests that the levels of economic performance and internal violence or contestations produced by the current political settlements or distribution of organizational power are sustainable. atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202323 the political settlement theoretical framework has been applied to the political economy of mining in ghana by abdulai (2017) to explain why a century of mineral exploitation in ghana has failed to translate into inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development. characterizing the key periods over the last century using a typology offered by khan as dominant settlement (18741956), competitive clientelism (19571966), vulnerable authoritarianism (19661981), dominant leader settlement (19821992), and competitive clientelism (19932017), the study demonstrates how elites skew public spending (largely financed by mining rents) towards shortterm objectives of political survival (abdulai 2017). this outcome is contrary to an observation by the study that political elites were committed to utilizing mineral rents on projects and programs in pursuit of inclusive development. this gives a sense that shortterm political survival objectives dominated the pursuit of the relatively longerterm objective of inclusive development. the leverage of traditional authorities and chiefs over mineralrich lands and rural voters underlines their receipt of significant mineral rent from the government that was not necessarily spent on inclusive development, maintaining an ‘unproductive peace’. further to the political settlement framework, the study also relies on james scott’s theory of infrapolitics which describes various forms of resistance strategies and how these forms are informed by the material conditions of those who are exploited and put up resistance (scott 2005). scott (2013) notes that class relations that are influenced by political, social and economic power differences informs the type, scope and breadth of resistance. it is imperative that resort to infrapolitical strategy be guided by caution as open confrontation in the absence of strong mass mobilization can be fatal, especially for less privileged people in the society. torvikey (2021) applied scott’s infrapolitics theory to explore resistance by female farmers to reclaim their land and labor in the face of extractivist agricultural production in southeast ghana. the study found that the farmers combined both evasive and confrontational resistance strategies against the company through demands for new land, land occupation, and absenteeism among others to rescue the local economy from extractivist agricultural production. methodology this study sought to explore new extractivism in the salt sector in ghana over the past decade in order to highlight growing concerns in the sector, contribute to literature on extractivism, and offer recommendations to address these concerns. given the nature of issues identified to be investigated, a qualitative research approach making use of both primary and secondary sources of data was adopted. through field visits, observation and semistructured facetoface interviews within a context of an ethnographic engagement with affected regions, the author engaged 36 participants ranging from local artisanal and smallscale salt producers, representative of largescale producers, representatives of traditional authorities, representatives of producer associations and representatives of relevant state agencies. three focused group discussions were organized to clarify certain issues and triangulate information obtained from interviews. information gathered from the primary data was complemented by information from secondary sources. the secondary sources included journals, print media and news portals. this study is part of a larger project for a doctorate of philosophy degree at the university of johannesburg, south africa. new wave of extractivism in the salt sector: keta and songor until the discovery of oil and gas in large quantities in ghana and subsequent production in 2010, there was relative calm at various sites where salt production take place in ghana. over the past dozen years, however, the relative peaceful environment in which indigenes in these areas previously lived and undertook their livelihood activities (such as fishing, salt mining and farming) have turned into violent atmosphere in which indigenes are engaged in all manner of fights either among themselves or with a largescale salt mining company. this has followed the issuance of salt mining leases by the government of ghana to atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202324 largescale firms to exploit salt at the same sites where several thousands of local people previously produced the same material for subsistence and commercial purposes. this trend is a continuation of entrenched state preference for largescale mining in general in spite of its poor contributions to sustained and inclusive growth and development (bank of ghana 2003; larsen, yankson & fold 2009; attaquayson 2022). in the next two subsections, the evolution of these fights over the past dozen years in the case of keta and over the past two years in the case of songor is presented within a theoretical framing of political settlement and infrapolitics, to illustrate the agency role played by traditional authorities and the dwindling space for civil society engagements and interventions. keta: post 2010 extractivism and evolving consequences in december 2011, seven seas salt ltd (formerly kensington salt industries ltd), obtained salt mining leases covering 7,299.41 acres at the eastern banks of the keta lagoon where indigenes at adina, agavedzi and blekusu among other communities have historically built various livelihood activities such as salt winning, fishing and farming at the same site leased by the state to seven seas ltd (third world network – africa 2017; attaquayson & baidoo 2020). the grant of those leases followed an agreement between the mining company and some traditional authorities in which the latter would receive some benefits for itself and communities to be affected by the operations of the largescale firm. over the past few decades, traditional authorities have shown significant interest and support for largescale mining operations within their jurisdictions, as a means of laying claim on benefit (especially revenue) streams created by the mining activities. the posturing of the traditional authorities reflects evolving political settlements in the salt sector as it serves to increase their benefits and shape elite coalitions relevant for the governance of the sector (khan 2010; attaquayson 2022). the support also reflects the brokerage role that traditional authorities play and the power they hold (even though diminishing). in an interview with a former salt producer at adina, he noted that the support by traditional authorities for a largescale company to take over the lands for the same activities that they conduct is purely influenced by their desire to position themselves to generate greater benefits from salt mining. in response to this change, which economically displaced thousands of indigenes along with other negative consequences for ordinary citizens living in nearby communities, sporadic and planned resistance activities were undertaken by residents and loose organizations of citizens in those areas. between 2013 and 2017, various poorly organized citizens’ groups led demonstration activities (including violent protests and clashes) that led to deaths and destruction of properties belonging to the company (attaquayson & baidoo 2020) as a means of resisting activities of the company. these demonstrations led to suspension of operations by the company on at least two different occasions to address the fundamental issues that fueled the resistance activities. these issues included nonpayment of compensation to indigenes directly affected by activities of seven seas limited, failure on the part of the company to develop some sections of its concession to be used by locals for salt farming activities as agreed and negative environmental impacts associated with the company’s resort to underground brine for salt production as opposed to sea brine. the company claimed that prior to its activities, there were no economic activities in those areas so it is not liable for any compensation to the indigenes. it, however, earmarked a certain area to be developed for the indigenes but delayed its development. the resistance movement against operations of seven seas limited was very strong in the early years, thanks to the support it received from some traditional authorities who had been sidelined in its engagements with key actors as well as former artisanal and smallscale salt producers whose livelihoods were directly impacted without compensation. since 2018, however, there has been an uneasy calm in the areas with the resistance movement remaining inactive. during interviews with residents and former salt producers in the communities affected by operations of seven seas limited, it emerged that three important factors are responsible for the current uncomfortable calm prevailing in the communities. the atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202325 first is the closing of ranks among traditional authorities, especially those at the agbozume and tascona areas. seven seas limited’s early engagements with traditional authorities, a new ‘settlement’ strategy in the new era of corporate extractivism, excluded some chiefs in the aforementioned areas. this enraged them and contributed to their serving as the fulcrum around which people organized to resist operations of seven seas limited through demonstrations. one resident’s statement on this issue is telling: those chiefs who were determined to stop the white man have all changed their minds for reasons best known to them and now do not see anything wrong with their people’s source of livelihood taken away from them without any alternative livelihood arrangements or payment of compensation. people are very angry but are unable to translate that anger into an action against the company. the above remarks demonstrate the importance of the agency role played by the traditional authorities in resistance movement against operations of seven seas limited. the traditional authorities have historically been influential in organizing people in many parts of ghana and were very influential not only in the slave trade during the colonial period but also the sustainability of the colonial project in general (denisova 2020). it is understood from interviews with stakeholders that following the early years of demonstrations and resistance, the company has broadened the scope of traditional authorities engaged. this effectively broadens the elite coalitions and reestablished a new political settlement (khan 2010). the second factor that has contributed to the current calm is the seizure of salt mining by artisanal and smallscale salt producers following the takeover of the same space by seven seas limited. consequently, fledgling artisanal and smallscale salt producer associations in the communities that contributed to the organization people to resist seven seas limited’s operations in the early years also gradually collapsed. thus, the smallscale operators that used to support the resistance have gone into decline due to the concession to seven seas, thus undermining the strength of the resistance. finally, some residents have chosen to encroach on the concession of the company to fish in the tunnel that conveys sea water to the company’s reservoir or collect salt from outskirts of the company’s concession. in an interview with an official of the company, the officer indicated that various efforts have been made to stop all forms of encroachment on their concession but to no avail. this reflects an embedded phenomenon in ghana’s mining industry that has come to be known as ‘live and let live’ (aubynn 2006). the company’s new ‘local settlement’ appears to be centered on the ‘infrapolitics’ of coopting traditional authorities, thus removing leadership from those affected by the large scale operations and also monopolizing access to the concession, but informally enabling access for a small section of the populace on a ‘live and let live’ model to undertake certain livelihood activities that include menial salt production works and fishing in a manner and areas permitted by the company. in this double move the company displaces its conflict with local livelihoods into internal disputes between traditional authorities and those given privileged access by the company on the one hand, and those who are excluded. songor: post 2020 extractivism and evolving consequences unlike the developments at the eastern banks of keta lagoon that have dragged for about a decade, the situation at the songor lagoon dates several decades even though the current wave of extractivism there started a few years ago with the transfer of ownership of songor salt project and grant of three mining leases covering the entire songor lagoon and adjoining lands to electrochem ghana limited. the previous wave took place in the 1970s and 1980s when the state and relevant traditional authorities granted leases to largescale companies (vacuum salts limited and star chemicals industries limited) for salt production at the songor lagoon, driving local artisanal and smallscale salt producers from spaces they historically occupied. the exclusion and dispossession of local salt producers demonstrated insensitivity to the importance of the lagoon to these people and not only brought about disruptions and destruction of their means of livelihoods but ushered in a long period of conflict between local salt producers and largescale salt atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202326 producers (secretaries’ committee of ada songor 1989; langdon & larweh 2017; third world network – africa undated). the ensuing conflict between the companies and people of ada over access to the lagoon resources which has been situated within infrapolitics that occasionally turned violent and resulted in loss of lives and destruction of properties, lingered on till 1985 when margaret kuwornu, a pregnant woman, was killed by police during one of their raids on members of adjoining communities who were frequently accused of trespassing. the death of margaret kuwornu ushered in a period of calm, reflections and investigations into what has become the first wave of corporate extractivism, noted a former salt producer during an interview. subsequently, the government cancelled the leases of the two companies and took over the lagoon through the adasongor lagoon (site for salt industry) (vesting) law, 1992 (provisional national defense council law 287), establishing in its wake the songor salt project (a public entity) to take over the assets of the two companies and manage their operations for and on behalf of the state. further, and more importantly for the people of ada, their historical access to the lagoon to undertake their livelihood activities was restored. for almost three decades, the songor salt project coexisted peacefully with artisanal and smallscale salt producers though some individuals illegally asserted undue or nonexistent rights to spaces in the lagoon where they created pans for salt production (a phenomenon popularly known as atsiakpo). then came the government’s decision during the last quarter of 2020 to grant a monopoly over the salt resources at songor lagoon to electrochem ghana limited, which represented an overhaul of the salt production system at the songor and inaugurated a new wave of corporate extractivism similar in many respects to the earlier wave in the 1970s and 1980s as well as to recent developments at keta lagoon. as is usually the case in granting of salt mining leases to companies by the state, some negotiations between representatives of electrochem ghana limited and traditional authorities at ada took place ahead of, and paved way for, the government’s decision as well as the company’s entry to the site. however, indigenous producers and other stakeholders have raised questions about the legitimacy of these negotiations because they were excluded in these engagements. further, and as is increasingly becoming the norm in the salt sector, the company has not paid compensation to affected artisanal salt producers who have historically been producing salt at the songor lagoon. the exclusion of a wide range of stakeholders in the negotiations as well as dispossession of thousands of artisanal producers of the space they conduct their livelihoods activities have facilitated violent resistance against activities of electrochem ghana limited since their inception. the resistance against electrochem’s project has been heightened by a revelation during a focus group discussion with local salt producers and other stakeholders to the effect that the support for electrochem’s project by traditional authorities was based in part on some representations by electrochem that have turned out to be false. key among these issues is the total size of concession for the project and whether some communities will be subject to resettlement. according to one of the local chiefs interviewed, the project proponent indicated that the project will only cover the then songor salt project concession. however, in the lease agreements made available to the communities by the third world network – africa (a civil society organization which offers a range of support services to mining affected communities), the total size of the three restricted mining leases obtained by electrochem covers 158 square kilometers. this size, according to one of the opinion leaders, is about three times what most traditional authorities were made to believe about the size of concession the company planned to use for its project. consequently, most of the communities and settlements along the lagoon have been found to be within the concession of electrochem and potentially subject to resettlement. the issue of resettlement runs deep among the local people as it reflects the possibility that they could lose out on the common resource that the most important livelihood and economic activities in their communities revolves around. it is against this background and informed by infrapolitics that an evolving conflict, characterized by sporadic and violent demonstrations and clashes, has broken out at the songor area following the entry atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202327 of electrochem to the site. agbove (2022) offers a chronology of clashes that have taken place at songor enclave over the period triggered by the project. given the initial engagements between representatives of electrochem ghana limited and traditional authorities that also led to a memorandum of agreement (moa) between the parties that offer some direct and indirect benefits to the traditional authorities and people of ada, the conflict started off between the company and supporting traditional authorities2 on the one side and affected communities along with a few traditional authorities on the other side. according to third world network – africa (undated), citing the moa, the company has committed itself to the following: • sharing of 10% of the annual proceeds/profit of the company among the land owning clans and the paramountcy; • construction of a chief ’s palace complex for the entire ada state with each of the 10 clans having offices and conference facilities in the complex; • payment of quarterly allowances to the paramountcy and land owning clans; • offering two positions for the traditional authorities on the board of directors of the company to be rotated among the respective clans; • offering two positions in management for qualified persons from ada, especially the four landowning clans; • providing the ada community with majority chance of employment in the company, including supervisory and other leadership positions (if qualified); • guaranteeing royalty payments due to the landowning clans and paramountcy; • supporting the ada sate to enable the clans to participate in the annual asafotufiam festival3; • undertaking corporate social responsibility activities4 when fully operational in the areas of education, including physical structures and scholarships for needy but promising students, on the basis of mutual agreement with the landowning clans and the paramountcy; • providing prior information to clan heads and paramountcy about agreements with any investor and the government of ghana in respect of the project; and • sharing various important reports (environmental social impact assessment, environmental permit, minerals commission report, etc.) with paramountcy and clan heads. further to these commitments and in response to the growing resistance that has greeted the project since its inception, the company has established salt production ponds for some communities, arguing that the project fulfils the master plan prepared in the early 1990s for the development of songor lagoon and opponents to the project as well as affected communities are calling for its implementation. whereas the master plan recommends that an independent body be set up as custodian and to regulate the lagoon as a common brine to be relied on by both largescale firms and artisanal producers that operate legally within the jurisdiction, the current arrangement effectively monopolizes the entire lagoon and its adjoining communities for electrochem which has then established community ponds under uncertain terms and conditions. this unilateral approach of giving out sections of concession either to disgruntled 2 it is important to note that there are some traditional authorities, notably the libi wornor or the traditional custodian of the songor lagoon, who are opposed to the project and openly called for the cancellation of the leases. 3 in respect of this, the company started and completed the construction of an ultramodern astroturf stadium in a few months for the 2022 asafotufiam festival. 4 the company has donated large water tanks to some communities and fills them from time to time for the benefit of these communities. despite acute water problems in these communities, many residents in some of the beneficiary communities do not use the water as a demonstration of their opposition to the project. atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202328 communities and/or traditional authorities (without the consent of the minerals commission which must trigger a revision in the mining lease) is a growing trend which was not only implemented by seven seas limited at keta (see attaquayson & baidoo 2020) but reflects the established order in the gold mining sector where largescale firm quietly allow artisanal miners to operate on parts of their concessions (see aubynn 2006; hilson & yakovleva 2007). the durability and sustainability of this trend, however, has been questionable given the conflicts that follow these arrangements. in the case of ada songor, there have been some traditional authorities (led by the libi wornor, the traditional custodian of the songor lagoon) who are not part of those that engaged and obtained a moa with the company. neither have these traditional authorities expressed interest in the community ponds. having been growing in number according to one of the chiefs interviewed, they represent a pivot around which resistance movements against the project on the ground have formed. in all these developments, the role of civil society organizations has been limited and weak, thanks to electrochem’s approach to engagement which prioritizes engagements with traditional authorities over citizens’ organizations or producer associations, an approach which follows or reflects industry trend. this is in spite of the relatively stronger presence of civil society in ada songor areas compared to the keta lagoon enclave. as noted earlier, the songor lagoon already has experience with extractivism in the 1970s and 1980s. this led an appreciable level of mobilization through the establishment of various cooperatives among local people. though weak in recent times, these cooperatives along with the ada songor advocacy forum (asaf) which operates more as a network of these cooperatives and other allied organizations, have made some efforts to engage with electrochem without much success. nonetheless, asaf and its allied organizations have been instrumental in educating about the consequences of the grant of leases to electrochem and mobilizing local people for the implementation of the master plan. however, the ada songor women’s association (aswa) made up of female artisanal salt producers and traders established in 2014 by asaf and other stakeholders has obtained audience with electrochem, with some of its members having benefited from a microcredit scheme introduced by the company to support artisanal salt producers and traders as part of its approach to the implementation of the master plan. conclusion keta and songor lagoon enclaves have over the past decade represented a new frontier where new extractivism in the salt sector in ghana has emerged. even though the legal regime recognizes indigenous artisanal salt mining as legitimate, salt mining leases covering areas where local artisans have historically produced salt have been granted to a few largescale salt producers whose activities have resulted in the dispossession of thousands of local artisans. whereas the developments at the eastern parts of keta do not have historical antecedent, those of songor are reflection of a previous wave of extractivism that took place there in the 1970s and 1980s. situated within the context of political settlement and infrapolitics theoretical framings, this study presents and discusses the new wave of extractivism impinging on salt production at keta and songor lagoon enclaves. this is informed by the agency role played by traditional authorities in the governance of mineral resources in ghana which has direct and immediate consequences for the role of civil society organizations. the study finds that traditional authorities remain dominant governance institutions in the governance of salt mining at the songor and keta lagoon basins, as largescale companies prioritize engaging with them over civil society organizations in relation to their mining activities. whereas such an approach enables project proponents to engage key stakeholders long held as custodians of land resources, it pays little attention to people who have historically constructed livelihoods on the land resources. clearly, both stakeholders (custodians of land resources and owners of livelihoods constructed on these land resources) are important and deserve to be engaged. the new extractivism in the salt sector, however, prioritizes atta-quayson cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 1 202329 engagement with one over the other. this, therefore, raises questions about the durability and sustainability of this approach. so long as the dispossessed and excluded people and citizens’ organizations remain jobless and struggle to survive, the companies become obvious targets to vent anger. the situation is worsened by the limited job opportunities created by largescale salt mining operations as compared to artisanal salt mining activities. the sporadic demonstrations, some of them violent and fatal, are therefore to be expected to continue to characterize the new extractivism in the salt sector. the study also demonstrates that the terms of ‘political settlement’ in this new era of extractivism highlight the need to understand its ‘infrapolitics’ in order to explain its logic. this is more so in relation to the practice of coopting ‘traditional authorities’ against people who depend heavily on public commons for local salt mining and fishing for their livelihood, and then, as noted, informally offering conditional access to a small section of the populace. this ‘political settlement’ is founded on pervasive dispossession and structural violence and as a regime that relies on ‘divide and rule’, and thereby is associated with ongoing contestation and protest. central in this appears to be the role of the government in granting the concession to accrue benefits for the government itself and shifting responsibility to the company, but also its unavoidable role in maintaining security and threatening forced eviction and relocation: the government is able to distance itself from the logic of corporate extractivism but it is not innocent and may become the target for local opposition. thus, this model of ‘settlement’, characterized by widespread dispossession, cooption of traditional authorities and granting of access to a small section of the populace breeds conflictual relations among stakeholders, is unsustainable and may fail. in light of the importance of the salt industry to the country’s manufacturing sector, especially foods and petrochemical industries, as well as its potential for job creation and foreign exchange earnings, it is recommended that the government takes a second look at the manner in which leases have been granted to largescale companies over the past decade and effectively dispossessing local producers of spaces they have historically undertaken their livelihood activities. given the limited employment opportunities created by the largescale salt producers, it is pertinent that the leases are reviewed to allow local artisanal and small scale producers operate side by side with the largescale producers at both songor and keta 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revised 20/06/2023; accepted 14/07/2023; published 30/07/2023 abstract in 2019, an online survey of 2,015 australian residents examined the extent of trust of various groups and institutions. a latent class analysis (lca) of the results generated a typology of trust in australia. the lca uncovered four classes based on levels of trust as well as associated demographic profiles and attitudes. the four groups were: those that are very distrusting (15%); those that are largely unsure about how much they can trust various groups and institutions (17%); those that are somewhat trusting (42%); and those that are largely trusting (26%). the largely trusting group was differentiated by their holistic trust in institutions and trust in other australians (no matter their background). discomfort with cultural difference was a defining characteristic of the very distrusting class. examination of these four groups helps understand concerns of australians and enable the development of strategies to address institutional and interpersonal distrust. keywords trust; social harmony; latent class analysis; australia; national survey declaration of conflicting interest the author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. funding this research was funded by the special broadcasting service (sbs). https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8595 https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8595 https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs https://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/mcs mailto:a.kamp@westernsydney.edu.au https://doi.org/10.5130/ccs.v15.i2.8595 introduction trust is essential for the successful functioning of society – politically, economically, and socially. for example, trust in institutions and social trust is a key variable in civic and social cooperation and thus economic growth and the performance of society’s institutions (putnam 1993; fukuyama 1995; moesen, van puyenbroeck, & cherchye 2000; zak & knack 2001; fazio et al. 2018). in the words of la porta et al. (1997) trust facilitates ‘a propensity of people in a society to cooperate to produce socially efficient outcomes’ (p. 333). trust (and corresponding cooperation) is also central to wellbeing. personal wellbeing is higher in societies with higher levels of institutional trust and cooperation (putnam 2000; hudson 2006). from a sociological perspective, trust is relational, not purely psychological as it ‘characterises the state of a relationship, not just the actors involved’ (cook & santana 2020, p. 191). from this standpoint, trust is not only ‘a person’s attitude toward others or simply the disposition to be trusting’ but is reliant on the incentives the parties in the mutual relationship have to be trustworthy with respect to one another, and understandings of each other’s competence, integrity, and the commitment to ‘do no harm’ (cook & santana 2020, p. 191; see also cook, hardin, & levi 2005, hardin 2002). the media, and the quality of public information, is key to trust. the world economic forum (2018) called online misinformation ‘a digital wildfire’ and numerous international studies have found a link between conspiracy theory beliefs and distrust of government (georgiou, delfabbro, & balzan 2020; miller, saunders, & farhart 2016; van prooijen & douglas 2017). in recent ‘crisis’ times, the issue of trust has come to the fore regarding the relationship between distrust and conspiratorial thinking during the covid-19 pandemic, particularly distrust in science (agley & xiao 2021) and in government (georgiou, delfabbro, & balzan 2020). there are also indicators that the covid-19 pandemic has seen a bifurcation in trust in public institutions (that is, some public institutions being more trusted than others), across different countries (some countries showing higher levels of trust than others) and by type of institution, for example commercial media versus public media, business and ngos, and different branches of government (kye & hwang 2020; edelman 2021; karić & međedović 2021; scandurra et al. 2021). trust in the media and public information varies across partisanship and demography. a 2019-2020 survey of more than 20,000 usa citizens found that political party affiliation remains the key predictor of attitudes towards and trust in the media, with republican participants (led by trump at the time of research) expressing more negative sentiments on every aspect of media performance compared to democrats and independents (gallup/knight foundation 2020; see also van der linden, panagopoulos, & roozenbeek 2020). while republicans were the most distrusting of the media, the research found that the majority of americans felt the media’s role to inform and hold those in power accountable had been compromised by increasing bias: 46% saw ‘a great deal’ of political bias in news coverage and 37% saw ‘a fair amount’ (p. 5). this is concerning as the majority (81%) of participants also upheld the ideal that the news media is fundamental to a healthy democracy (gallup/knight foundation 2020, p. 14). this relationship between distrust in the media and republican/trump support in the usa is perhaps not surprising given that distrust has been linked to support for populist politics (mudde & kaltwasser 2017). in europe it has been found that the decline in trust, alongside economic precarity and social media narrow casting, has provided what is referred to as a ‘political opportunity structure’ for more extreme politics, generating fear, and a reality, of social division (ernst et al. 2019; koopmans & olzak 2004; meyer 2004). within this context, there is an urgent need for better understandings of the contributing factors to distrust and measures to counter a pivot towards a distrusting society. most of the key studies of trust have favoured what ruelens and nicaise (2020) characterise as ‘variable-centred approaches’. in these approaches, the variables themselves (be they demographic variables or attitudinal variables) are the central conceptual unit and they are analysed via descriptive statistics, correlation, and regression techniques. within the trust literature, focus is placed on the relationship kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202385 between demographic variables (e.g., age groups, educational groups, voting groups) and attitudes on trust variables. this means that any remedies or solutions that emerge are anchored to the action in regard to a variable, rather than a group or class based on trust dispositions. as ruelens and nicaise (2020) argue ‘variable-oriented research has focused too much on attitudes [such as trust] as variables and not enough attention has been given to citizens who hold these attitudes’ (p. 1). a person-centred approach, such as latent class analysis (lca), ‘inherently adopts a multidimensional view of attitudinal phenomena by focusing on a set of attitudes’ (ruelens & nicaise 2020, emphasis added; see also hooghe, marien, & oser 2017). this approach is ‘effective in identifying groups in the population that share a similar response pattern on a series of indicators’ (ruelens & nicaise 2020, p. 2, emphasis added). internationally, the utility of understanding trust (and its impacts on social processes) via lca is increasingly acknowledged. for example, in the italian context, fazio et al. (2018) developed a measure of ‘trust in others’ and a measure of ‘trust in institutions’ via lca which was mapped at the regional level in italy. in the european context more broadly, ruelens and nicaise (2020) used lca to investigate the relationship between institutional trust at the national and supranational (eu) level. also examining the broader european citizenry, hooghe, marien, & oser (2017) utilised lca to investigate the impact of democratic ideals on levels of political trust and developed a typology of distinct groups of respondents characterised by similar combinations of attitudes. suh, chang, and lim (2012) have examined the links between trust in political and non-political institutions in south korea using lca. finally, as mentioned previously, in the us, agley and xiao (2021) have utilised lca to understand the relationship between trust in science, political orientation, religiosity, education and conspiratorial thinking in the covid-19 context. the research presented in this paper responds to the urgent need for better understanding of the contributing factors to ongoing public distrust in institutions and interpersonal contacts with a particular focus on the australian context. more specifically, it builds upon the international literature by contributing a typology of trust, and the development of trust measures, to facilitate a more nuanced person-centred understanding of trust in australia. while the existing research (reviewed in the following section) has provided important insights into demographic variations in australians’ trust, the results of latent class analysis and multinomial logistic regression offers a more advanced and multidimensional approach to existing descriptive, variable focused methods. to our knowledge, our study is the first of its kind to utilise lca to understand trust in the australian context. identifying groups or segments of the population, sorted in part by trust, will enable remedies to be developed that address the specific trust issues for that group. the aim of this paper is to therefore develop and present a typology of trust in australia. the second aim is to examine the demographic and attitudinal variables associated with each class1 to better understand each class. thirdly, we will analyse what distinguishes each class, with a view to identifying the means to prevent australians moving into less trusting classes. trust in australia recent research has identified discontent among the wider australian population regarding trust in government, media, law enforcement agencies and educational institutions. using the edelman trust index (measuring trust in institutions such as ngos, business, government, and media2), australia was ranked the twelfth (of twenty-six) most ‘distrusting’ nations in 2019. in that year, australia was one of the 1 we use the term ‘class’ throughout this paper as a statistical term pertaining to the groups or categories resulting from latent class analysis rather than a term referring to socio-economic class stratification. 2 the edelman trust index represents the average percentage trust in each market/nation (edelman 2020). kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202386 most distrustful nations of the media (behind only russia, uk, france, ireland, and japan), reporting a ‘neutral’ standing in its trust towards ngos, and was also ‘neutral’ in its trust towards business (edelman 2020). in 2019, the edelman trust index also ranked australians as distrusting of government – being five points below the global average. research conducted by stoker, evans, & halupka (2018) and the scanlon foundation (markus 2019a) mirrored such low levels of trust of the australian government. the scanlon foundation has been tracking australians’ trust in government since 2007 and according to their surveys, australians’ trust in government had been low for over a decade (markus 2021). the covid-19 context saw a sharp increase in australians’ trust in government. in 2020, australians’ trust in government became a majority view – rising to 55 percent in november 2020 (markus 2021, p. 34). the edelman trust barometer also reported increases in trust towards the australian government, and other institutions, between 2018 and 2021. australia moved from being a ‘distrusting’ nation that sits around the global average to a ‘trusting’ nation well above the global average (edelman 2021, p. 44). in fact, the 2020 edelman trust barometer saw australians’ trust in all institutional sectors increase (ngos, business, media, and government) (edelman 2021). similarly, in a smaller survey of 500 australians in july 2020, goldfinch, taplin, & gauld (2021) found that australians’ trust in government rose steeply to 80%, up from 49% in 2009 (see goldfinch, gauld, & herbison 2009). this was linked to overall perceptions that the government had managed the covid-19 pandemic well. however, media reports and polling suggested that australians’ trust in government once again degraded as the morrison federal government grappled with the covid-19 vaccination roll-out, the ending of jobkeeper payments, the poor handling of sexual violence and harassment allegations in parliament, and broader calls for workplace reforms to tackle casualisation, real wages decline and the prevalence of sexual harassment in australian workplaces (speers 2021; grattan 2021; murphy 2021). indeed, in 2022, the edelman survey reported that australia’s ‘trust bubble’ had burst (p. 8), with australia among the top three countries showing an annual decline in trust in government, business, ngos, and media (along with germany and the netherlands (p. 5)). the change of federal government in 2022 has not seen a change to the negative trend, in fact, trust in the government has further declined: ‘government [has] join[ed] the media in the realm of ‘distrust for the first time since 2020’ (edelman 2023a). trust in journalists and institutional leaders (ceos and government leaders) has also declined the second year in a row and the media continues to be the most distrusted institution (distrusted by 38% of people and seen as a source of misleading or false information by 48%; edelman 2023b). these trends indicate that the levels of trust are dynamic, and that they can be improved and worsened depending on political settings and structural circumstances. some groups (in australia and internationally as discussed in the previous section) are much more exposed to distrust than others, and these assessments of trust across social categories are useful in contemplating how distrust can be remedied. the edelman trust barometer provides insight into demographic variations in australians’ trust towards key institutions. the barometer divides the sample demographically into two groupings: ‘informed public’ and ‘mass public’. the ‘informed public’ are defined by edelman (2021) as individuals that are: 1) 25-64 years of age; 2) college (or equivalent) educated; 3) in top 25% of household income per age group in each market; and 4) report significant media consumption and engagement in public policy and business news. ‘mass public’ are the remaining participants who do not meet the ‘informed public’ criteria. while the edelman trust barometer has seen australians’ trust in all institutional sectors increase between 2019 and 2020, there is what is termed a ‘trust inequality’ between the ‘informed public’ and ‘mass public’ in australia. in 2020, australia’s ‘informed public’ had an average percentage trust in ngos, business, government, and media of 68% (falling into the ‘trust’ category of the index). in comparison, the average percentage trust among the australian ‘mass public’ was 45% (falling into the ‘distrust’ category of the index). the trust inequality between the two groups was not unique to australia, with record trust inequalities recorded globally (edelman 2020: 8). in the period kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202387 between 2020 and 2021, when trust in australia increased (previously described as ‘the bubble’), the divide worsened (2022, p. 5). edelman examined what would close that gap, and respondents indicated that quality information was key (2022, p. 31). for example, lower income respondents’ trust levels would exceed the average of not well-informed high-income respondents, if they were well-informed (p. 31). similar to the international literature, markus (2019a, 2019b, 2021) has found a strong link between australians’ support for populist politics and lack of trust in key institutions of the state (criminal justice system [police excluded]; government, politicians) and media, as well as their fellow citizens. for example, in 2019, only 9% of one nation party3 voters agreed that the government in canberra can be trusted to do the right thing for australia almost always or most of the time. this was in stark contrast to the rate of agreement among liberal/national party (centre-right) voters (49% agreed that the government can be trusted) and australian labor party (centre-left) voters (22% agreed that the government can be trusted; markus 2019a, p. 42). while these levels of trust increased across all voting groups in 2020, the association between populist politics and distrust in the government remained: 31% one nation party voters agreed that the government in canberra can be trusted to do the right thing for australia almost always or most of the time in 2020, compared to 75% liberal/national and 43% labor (see markus 2021, p. 113). moving away from trust in government, one nation party voters had the lowest level of agreement that ‘most people can be trusted’ (28% in 2020 and 23% in 2018-19; see markus 2021: 72). this distrust in fellow citizens sits alongside one nation party voters’ heightened concerns with immigration, their support for discriminatory immigration policies, and lack of support for multiculturalism (markus 2019a; 2019b). with trust a key ingredient for economic prosperity, individual and collective wellbeing, social harmony in culturally diverse circumstances, and the staving off of populist politics, the extent of the distrust evident amongst one nation party voters (and in the australian population more broadly), is cause for concern. method we utilised a lca of australian national survey data obtained in october 2019 (n: 2,015) to provide deeper understanding of the relationship between respondents’ trust in institutions, and social or interpersonal trust. we adapted the categorisations of ‘institutional trust’ and ‘interpersonal trust’ from suh, chang, and lim (2012) and fazio et al. (2018). for the purposes of our study, ‘institutional trust’ (a term used by both suh, chang, and lim 2012 and fazio et al. 2018) refers to individuals’ trust in public and private institutions including political institutions (governments, government departments, political parties), courts and other institutions relating to law and justice systems such as police, private enterprises, civil associations and media organisations. ‘institutional trust’ variables that were tested in our research included trust in the australian family courts, trust in the australian media, and trust in the police. ‘social’ or ‘interpersonal trust’ (used by suh, chang, & lim 2012 but termed ‘trust in others’ by fazio et al. 2018) refers to individuals’ trust of other groups or individuals. ‘social’ or ‘interpersonal trust’ variables tested in our research included trust in neighbours, family members, friends, and people of different religious or cultural backgrounds. we also measured ‘trust in the science of climate change’ and investigated, via lca, the relationship between this kind of trust and institutional and social/interpersonal trust. trust in the science of climate change does not fall under ‘institutional’ or ‘interpersonal’ trust. a second stage in the methodology (multinomial logistic regression) also enabled us to consider the relationship between individuals’ latent class membership, demographic indicators (e.g., gender and age) and attitudes to other aspects of australian life such as national economic prosperity and job security, quality of healthcare, cultural diversity, and quality of leadership. 3 one nation is an australian political party associated with far-right populist politics (grant, moore, & lynch 2019). kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202388 participants to assess australians’ (dis)trust in various groups and institutions, we drew upon an online national survey conducted in october 2019. the australia-wide online survey comprised a sample of 2,015 respondents (australian residents, 18+ years of age). the sampling frame was provided to the online panel provider dynata, who have a pool of approximately 300,000 australian panellists. dynata employs quality controls, recruits participants in a variety of ways to ensure a diverse sample, and randomly selects panel participants (within the criteria) to participate in the surveys. one agreed and obvious limitation of this survey design is that participants must have access to the internet and be registered panellists of dynata. the demographic characteristics of the sample are provided in table 1. measures the survey included a variety of closed-response questions used to obtain information regarding australians’ attitudes and experiences, identity and culture, community and belonging, trust and anxiety, and contemporary social, economic, and political changes. the majority of questions used a likert-type scale response option, allowing respondents to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with a statement and to what extent. the 18 questions on trust were largely drawn/adapted from the world values survey (2014) and scanlon mapping social cohesion survey (markus 2017). lca indicators there were seven items selected as indicators for the latent class analysis based on prior research (e.g., markus 2017) and sufficient cell sizes, to represent australians’ trust in social groups, issues, or institutions (see table 3). two items asked about the extent to which australians trust their neighbours and people of another religion (all ranging from 1 = do not trust at all to 4 = trust completely). four items asked about trust in the australian family, australian media, police, and the science of climate change (all ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). the final item asked whether “in some circumstances a nondemocratic government can be preferred” (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). covariates there were 15 items used as covariates, and included demographic and background characteristics, attitudes towards australia and diversity, and participants’ future life. these were selected based on a series of chisquare tests to determine whether the participant characteristics and their attitudes were related to the latent classes. these 15 items were used as predictors in the multinomial logistic regression analyses. the demographic and background characteristics consisted of seven variables: age, gender, education, income, religion, location, and country of birth. age was grouped into three age ranges (i.e., 18-34 years; 35-64 years; 65+ years), and gender was grouped into two (females and males). both education (i.e., high school or less; other tertiary/trade/tafe; and university/postgraduate) and income (low, medium, and high) had three categories. religion (no religion and religion), location (metropolitan and non-metropolitan), and country of birth (australia and overseas) were all dichotomous. attitudes towards australia and diversity consisted of eight items. three items asked australians the extent to which they agree that australia has strong leadership, is economically prosperous, and that the australian government can be trusted to do the right thing for australians (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree/disagree to 3 = agree/strongly agree). two items asked about concern regarding the “quality of healthcare” and “employment and job security” (ranging from 1 = not concerned to 3 = very/extremely concerned). attitudes towards diversity included two items: “i would not object to a religious place of worship being built in my own community” and “australia is weakened by people of different ethnic origins kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202389 table 1. demographic characteristics of survey sample, 2019 demographic variable % state of residence new south wales 33 victoria 22 queensland 21 western australia 11 tasmania 2 australian capital territory 2 northern territory 1 metro/non-metro metropolitan 53 non-metropolitan 47 country of birth australia 72 united kingdom 8 india 2 new zealand 2 indigeneity aboriginal and torres strait islander 3 non-indigenous 97 gender female 51 male 49 non-binary/gender fluid <0.5 age 18-34 years of age 41 35-54 years of age 30 55-75 22 75+ years of age 8 education (highest level) university degree or postgraduate qualification 36 other tertiary qualifications including a trade or tafe qualification 34 year 12 or equivalent 23 no formal qualifications. 6 employment employed 48 unemployed 8 retired 23 income $80,000+ 21 $50,000-$79,999 20 $30,000-$49,999 16 <$30,000 31 religion judaism 0.5 buddhism 2 hinduism 2 islam 2 christianity 40 no religion, agnostics and atheists 45 political affiliation labor 31 liberal 32 greens 13 one nation 6 independent 8 other 11 notes: the sample is representative across all states and territories. aboriginal and torres strait islander australians were represented in line with national representation. the high proportion of retirees reflects the older age cohort of the sample. the unemployed were also over-represented [australian bureau of stastistics (abs) 2019a]. buddhism, hinduism, islam and judaism were at representative national levels. no religion, agnostics and atheists were overrepresented. christianity was underrepresented (abs 2017). kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202390 sticking to their old ways” (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree/disagree to 3 = agree/strongly agree). the final item asked participants about their future life: “in five years my life in australia will be much worse” (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree/disagree to 3 = agree/strongly agree). statistical analyses latent class analysis (lca) and multinomial logistic regressions were employed using a structural equation modeling framework (sem) using mplus version 8.3 (muthén & muthén 2017). lca is a person-centred analysis in which relationships among individuals, rather than relationships among variables, are of primary interest. therefore, lca was chosen as the most appropriate statistical approach to identifying a typology of trust in australia. mplus was used to estimate lca (a) estimating model parameters and (b) allowing for the inclusion of all available data through the full information maximum likelihood (fiml) estimation to account for missing data (enders 2010). fiml uses all available data for each case during the estimation process, has been shown in recent simulation studies to be unbiased when data are missing at random and to be robust to non-normal distributions (enders 2010; schafer & graham 2002). lca is a model-based approach in which the population is considered to consist of k latent groups or classes where the number of classes is not known a priori. individuals in the same class share a common joint probability distribution among the observed variables (e.g., levels of trust). in the current study, individuals were assigned to the latent class for which their posterior probability was the highest. to identify the optimum number of classes, a series of lca models of between two and six classes were estimated. given that there is no single indicator reflecting an optimal model fit, the model selection was based on a balance of parsimony, substantive consideration, and used ‘fit and test’ statistics. first, we examined the following fit indices: the akaike’s information criterion (aic; akaike 1987); bayesian information criterion (bic, schwartz 1978); sample size adjusted bic (sbic; sclove 1987); and the lo-mendellrubin likelihood ratio test (lmr; lo, mendell, & rubin 2001). recent simulation studies have indicated that the bic, sbic, and lrt are the most effective for identifying the correct number of classes (diallo, morin & lu 2016a, 2016b, 2017; peugh & fan 2013). second, we examined classification uncertainty using the entropy indicator. entropy measures the probability that person i is a member of a given class. values near zero suggest low certainty in classification and values near one suggest high certainty in classification. third, we examined class size to ensure that each class had at least 1% of the entire sample included (nylund, asparouhov, & muthén 2007; shanahan et al. 2013). fourth, we examined whether the latent class solution made sense with respect to parsimonious coverage and the relevant literature. furthermore, when fitting mixture models like lca, issues such as convergence are important to consider (hipp & bauer 2006). in this study, all lca were conducted using 800 sets of random starting values for 80 iterations each, and then we selected the 40 best sets of random starting values associated with the highest likelihood values for final optimization to minimize the risk of convergence to local maxima, in other words, to make sure the model made sense mathematically (hipp & bauer 2006). using this method, we fitted models with class one through seven to determine the optimal number of classes for the data. table 2 shows the fit statistic for each model specification. all lca models converged. the log-likelihood increased while no minimum was found for the ics as their values decreased across the range of models considered. the lmr pointed to the five-class solution since the test of the four-class model against the five-class model has a p-value less than 0.000, suggesting rejection, whereas the test of the five-class against the six-profile has a p-value of 0.760. further examination of the lca models indicated that the fiveand six-class models each included small classes that seemed to have splintered off from larger classes in the four-class model. the four-class model resulted in a log-likelihood value of -18023.494 with 107 parameters, an aic of 36260.988, a bic of 36865.25, a sbic of 36525.3, and a high entropy value of 0.725. moreover, the four-class solution satisfied the minimum class size required to be useful kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202391 (each comprised at least 1% of individual within the overall sample) and meaningful. the four-class model also made theoretical sense, it had interpretability, and the four classes looked to have utility for making recommendations on improving the trust landscape (muthén 2004). the four-class solution is described below. table 2. fit indices for lca models for trust number of latent classes log likelihood # free parameters aic bic sbic lmr lrt entropy 1 -19443.007 26 38938.015 39084.845 39002.24 na na 2 -18710.865 53 37527.729 37827.037 37658.65 p <.000 0.731 3 -18226.248 80 36612.496 37064.281 36810.113 p <.000 0.732 4 -18023.494 107 36260.988 36865.25 36525.3 p <.000 0.725 5 -17849.572 134 35967.144 36723.883 36298.152 p <.000 0.745 6 -17754.223 161 35830.446 36739.663 36228.15 0.760 0.712 7 -17694.095 188 35764.19 36825.884 36218.589 0.828 0.721 note. # = number; aic = akaike information criterion; bic = bayesian information criterion; sbic = sample size adjusted bic; p lmr = p-values for the lo-mendell-rubin likelihood ratio test for k versus k+1classes. lastly, multinomial logistic regression analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between the 15 covariates and the latent classes. class membership was the dependent variable, and the 15 covariates were the independent variables. multinomial logistic regression analysis was used to investigate the relationship between the covariates and class membership. results and discussion descriptive statistics descriptive statistics (i.e., frequencies, bivariate cross-tabulations) generated a snapshot of current views and attitudes of australians in relation to social trust (trust in people and social groups) and trust in institutions. more particularly, the descriptive statistics were used to examine the extent to which social and institutional trust vary across selected demographic and background characteristics (e.g., age, gender, country of birth). due to the large number of cross-tabulations, only the significant results are presented. social trust overall, australians are trusting of their neighbours (74%) and people of another religion (67%). trust in neighbours is high across all age groups, but there was a positive and significant (although weak) association between age and trust, such that as age increased, so too did the extent of these forms of trust. for example, the proportion of those trusting neighbours completely was 10% for those aged 18-34, while it was 34% among those aged 75 and older. complete trust in people of another religion was lower, but there is a majority with some level of trust. for example, when asked to indicate how much they trust people of another religion, only 8% of participants indicated ‘trust completely’ while 59% indicated ‘trust somewhat’. age was consistently and positively associated with trust in people of another religion. for example, the proportion of those trusting people of another religion completely was 8% for those aged 18-34, while kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202392 it was 17% among those aged 75 and older. this confounds the established research that has found that younger people’s experience of super diversity generates more comfortable views about difference (halafoff et al. 2020). rather, these findings support contact theory which suggests that interpersonal contact between groups (which will expand over a persons’ lifetime) can reduce prejudices (allport 1954), and lead to greater levels of trust between groups. this may indicate an interesting disjuncture between philosophy and practice around difference, in which younger australians are pro-diversity but cautious about actual encounters, whereas older australians a more likely to have an ideological antipathy to diversity but less of a problem with actual cross-cultural encounters. institutional trust three-quarters (74%) of the sample have some level of distrust in key institutions (government, media, political parties). however, trust varies across different types of institutions. trust in the australian media (20%), political parties (20%) and government (29%) is weaker. there were similar levels of trust in institutions like the family court and criminal courts, while 62% of australians have trust in the police. trust in the science of climate change was held by about half of the sample, and only a quarter said they did not trust it. such distrust in key institutions aligns with global trends (edelman 2021). significant patterns in institutional trust are evident across demographic variables. men were more trusting of the police, as were heterosexuals (compared to non-heterosexuals), older people, non-indigenous people, and those who were christians. unlike trust in police, older australians were more likely to be distrusting of the australian family court and media compared to younger australians. similarly, men were more distrusting of the australian family court and political parties compared to women. australianborn participants were more distrusting of the australian family court, political parties, the government, and media compared to participants born overseas. interestingly, there were no observable patterns across age groups for trust in government. these variations in institutional trust have interesting correlations with positions of (more) privilege and (more) power. that is, the results suggest that those with more societal power and privilege (males, heterosexuals, older australians, australian-born, non-indigenous and christians) have greater trust in institutions which regulate the less powerful (e.g., police). in contrast, the less powerful and less privileged (women, those born overseas, younger people), trust more in democratic institutions that protect the more vulnerable (i.e., family court). australians are divided on whether in some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferred, with 28% agreeing, 28% disagreeing, and 44% who neither agree nor disagree. however, younger australians, men, and those born overseas were more likely to agree with this statement as compared to older australians, women, and those born in australia. this is an interesting finding that somewhat contradicts the aforementioned finding that those born overseas, and younger people trust more in democratic institutions. it is perhaps the case, as found in existing australian and international research, that younger people (and males) are more susceptible to ideological and political extremism (nilan et al. 2023; adam-troian, tecmen, & kaya 2021; forscher & kteily 2020), and that those born overseas may have lived-experience of non-democratic governments in their countries of birth. overall, almost half (48%) of the survey sample agreed that they have trust in the science of climate change (23% disagreed). bivariate analysis revealed that younger people were more trusting in this science than were older people. for example, distrusters were about 16% of the young respondents, but were 29% of those aged 55 to 74, and 33% of those aged 75 and over. there were expected variations according to political party affiliations, with green, alp and independent voters more trusting of the science of climate change, while one nation party voters were distrusting. the latter were the most distrusting of all institutions and groups (including neighbours for example). our finding that younger respondents are generally more trusting of key australian institutions aligns with previous research that found that younger australians feel especially reliant on public institutions in kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202393 the age of precarity, dynamism and diversity (wyn & white 2012; harris 2010). as australians get older, their faith in institutions, like the courts and the media degrades. the same is true of trust in the science of climate change. this may be because older people’s greater exposure to or experience of institutions (compared to younger people) has degraded their trust. this may also explain the propensity for australianborn participants to have less trust in key institutions such as the australian family court, political parties, the government, and media compared to overseas-born australians. there is one exception to this trend, with three quarters of older australians agreeing they have faith in policing (74%), with only about half of younger australians agreeing (54%). as noted by sindall, mccarthy, & brunton-smith (2016), ‘it is widely recognized that trust and confidence in the police are more fragile amongst young people than amongst adults’ (see also dwyer 2014; kennelly 2011; flexon, lurigio, & greenleaf 2009; hurst & frank 2000; hinds 2007). explanations for this include young people’s greater use of public space, higher visibility in public space, assumed positionality as being ‘at risk’ or ‘a risk’, and therefore ‘high levels of state surveillance, intervention and regulation’ (fileborn 2019, p. 435) which may amount to ‘heightened contact and conflict with the police’ and/or particularly negative experiences of policing (sindall, mccarthy, & brunton-smith 2016, see also dwyer 2014; kennelly 2011; loader 1996; mcara & mcvie 2005, 2010; carr, napolitano, & keating 2007; fagan & tyler 2005; hinds 2007; piquero et al. 2005). as previous research has shown, trust is key to a well-functioning society. high levels of distrust have negative impacts on economic prosperity and social and civic cooperation, population wellbeing, a robust and critical media, and contributes to political opportunities for extremist politics and conspiracy theories (koopmans & olzak 2004; meyer 2004; mudde & kaltwasser 2017; ernst et al. 2019). trust, particularly in institutions, is a necessary requirement for a strong democracy. given such high overall levels of distrust illustrated in our survey findings, there is urgent need for a better understanding of the contributing factors to distrust and to explore remedies to counter a pivot towards a distrusting society. the latent class analysis results we present in the following section may assist in developing such remedies. four segments of australian trust table 3 presents the lca results for the four-class model. the last two rows represent the proportion based on posterior probabilities and the class count based on the most likely latent class. the proportions refer to the estimated proportions of individuals that belong to a particular latent class: 15% in class 1, 17% in class 2, 42% in class 3, and 26% in class 4 (described next in more detail). the class counts refer to the number of individuals (rather than proportions) that belong to a particular latent class. class 1: ‘very distrusting’ in the four-class solution of the latent class analysis (see table 2), class 1 represents 15% of the sample and was labelled ‘very distrusting’. individuals in this class tend to strongly disagree that they trust the australian family court (72%), the australian media (79%), and the science of climate change (54%). a bare majority in this class still had some level of trust in neighbours (56%), but most did not trust people of another religion very much if at all (55%). this group were also the least trusting of the police (44% distrust), although their trust of the police (36%) was well ahead of other institutions (family court 1%; media 3%). class 2: ‘unsure’ (worried) class 2 represents 17% of the sample and has been labelled ‘unsure’. respondents in this class neither agreed nor disagreed that they have trust in the australian family court (78%), the australian media (79%), the science of climate change (79%), and in the police (54%). they were also unsure as to whether a nonkamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202394 democratic government can be preferred in some circumstances (83%). just under two-thirds (65%) tended to trust neighbours, and just over half trusted people of other faiths (58%), but mostly only somewhat. a third did not have very much trust at all in neighbours (32%) and in individuals of other faiths (37%). class 3: ‘somewhat trusting’ class 3 represents 42% of the sample (the most populous class). this class has been labelled ‘somewhat trusting’. the individuals in this class ‘somewhat’ trust their neighbours (63% plus 13% who trust neighbours completely), and they disagreed that they trust the australian family court (47%) and the australian media (56%), but unlike the group in the ‘very distrusting’ class, they did not hold to this as ‘strongly’. the class has the same variations in trust across neighbours and institutions, with the main difference being the strength of that trust. those in the ‘somewhat trusting’ class do not have the same level of distrust towards people of other religions as the very distrusting, with 65% trusting somewhat people from other religions (and only 4% trusting completely). if we combine class 2 and class 3, we have a significant middle group who comprise the majority of the sample (59%) where there is some level of trust, but where that trust is uneven. class 4: ‘trusting’ class 4 represents 26% of the sample and has been labelled ‘trusting’. these respondents agreed that they have trust in the australian family court (75%), in the australian media (62%), the science of climate change (81%) and the police (91%). they trusted neighbours somewhat (57%) or completely (27%) and people of other faiths somewhat (61%) or completely (19%). the four classes and covariates we used multinomial logistic regression to predict the probabilities of each person belonging to the four latent classes. specifically, we used multinomial logistic regression to test the association between 15 variables (covariates) with the four latent classes (table 4). for example, there is one statistically significant finding for age in the first row (i.e., 65+ years), which is an odds ratio of 2.530. this means that the odds of being in the ‘somewhat trusting’ class as compared to the ‘trusting’ class is 2.530 times higher for those aged 65 years and older as compared to those aged 18-34 years, controlling for all the other variables. due to space constraints, we highlight the significant findings in our interpretation below. one of the most distinguishing results from our analysis is that compared to the trusting class (26% of sample) the very distrusting class of respondents (15% of sample) are especially distrusting of the australian government. the latter variable had a particularly strong effect, as shown in the odds ratio, and was significant at p <.001. another telling variation between the trusting and very distrusting classes were that the latter were more likely to object to a religious place of worship being built in their own community. therefore, individuals in this group are also more likely to be associated with negative dispositions towards minority cultural groups and towards diversity. other significant variations were economic, with less agreement that australia was economically prosperous, yet slightly less concerned about their own job and employment security. the largest class are the somewhat trusting (42%). like the very distrusting class, this class had a higher level of distrust of the australian government than the control group (‘trusting’). there was also a significant effect of age (in particular with those aged 65 and over), education (associated with those with tertiary/trade/tafe education as compared to those with no post-school education) and being australian born (versus those born overseas). being less likely to agree that australia is economically prosperous was also an effect on this class, that also marked them as different from the trusting class. they were also less likely to agree that they would not object to a religious place of worship being built in their own community. kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202395 table 3. lca (trust) four-class model results   c1 very distrusting c2 unsure c3 somewhat trusting c4 trusting whole sample trust your neighbours trust completely 0.13 0.07 0.13 0.27 15.8 trust somewhat 0.43 0.58 0.63 0.57 57.5 do not trust very much 0.22 0.32 0.2 0.13 20.2 do not trust at all 0.23 0.03 0.04 0.04 6.5 trust people of another religion   trust completely 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.19 7.9 trust somewhat 0.4 0.54 0.65 0.61 58.2 do not trust very much 0.32 0.37 0.27 0.16 26.5 do not trust at all 0.23 0.06 0.04 0.04 7.4 i have trust in the australian family courts strongly agree 0 0.01 0 0.16 4.5 agree 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.59 22.7 neither agree nor disagree 0.09 0.78 0.33 0.2 33.9 disagree 0.18 0.06 0.47 0.03 24 strongly disagree 0.72 0.03 0.08 0.02 14.9 i have trust in the australian media strongly agree 0.02 0 0 0.1 3 agree 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.52 17.5 neither agree nor disagree 0.07 0.79 0.23 0.28 31.7 disagree 0.1 0.11 0.56 0.07 28.2 strongly disagree 0.79 0.01 0.16 0.03 19.5 i have trust in the science of climate change strongly agree 0.15 0 0.17 0.28 16.6 agree 0.09 0.19 0.32 0.53 31.8 neither agree nor disagree 0.13 0.79 0.23 0.14 28.5 disagree 0.1 0.02 0.21 0.04 11.4 strongly disagree 0.54 0 0.08 0.01 11.6 i have trust in the police strongly agree 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.32 13.3 agree 0.27 0.37 0.54 0.59 48.4 neither agree nor disagree 0.2 0.54 0.26 0.07 25 disagree 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.02 8.1 strongly disagree 0.28 0.01 0.02 0 5.1 in some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferred strongly agree 0.09 0 0.02 0.11 5.1 agree 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.37 23 neither agree nor disagree 0.35 0.83 0.41 0.27 43.9 disagree 0.07 0.03 0.26 0.14 16 strongly disagree 0.37 0 0.09 0.11 12 proportion based on posterior probabilities 0.15 0.17 0.42 0.26   class count based on most likely latent class 306 355 885 549   n= 1713 kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202396 table 4. demographic and attitude profiles of ‘trust’ classes using multinomial logistic regression estimates and odds ratios, against ‘trusting’ very distrusting unsure somewhat trusting b (se) or b (se) or b (se) or age 18 -34 years 0a 0a 0a 35-64 years -0.064 (0.230) 0.938 -0.016 (0.204) 0.984 0.301 (0.166) 1.351 65+ years 0.248 (0.303) 1.281 -0.353 (0.296) 0.703 0.928 (0.218)*** 2.530 gender male 0a 0a 0a female -0.304 (0.199) 0.738 0.545 (0.192)** 1.725 0.090 (0.146) 1.095 education high school/no-formal 0a 0a 0a other tertiary/trade/ tafe 0.431 (0.243) 1.539 0.264 (0.244) 1.302 0.386 (0.189)* 1.471 postgrad/university -0.309 (0.265) 0.734 -0.109 (0.253) 0.896 -0.179 (0.187) 0.836 income low 0a 0a 0a medium -0.325 (0.232) 0.722 -0.162 (0.219) 0.851 -0.097 (0.173) 0.908 high -0.380 (0.265) 0.688 -0.454 (0.256) 0.635 -0.292 (0.191) 0.747 religion no religion 0a 0a 0a religious -0.091 (0.202) 0.913 0.163 (0.191) 1.117 0.002 (0.147) 1.002 location metropolitan 0a 0a 0a non-metropolitan 0.026 (0.198) 1.026 -0.296 (0.192) 0.744 0.032 (0.146) 1.032 country of birth australia 0a 0a 0a overseas -0.169 (0.220) 0.845 0.292 (0.196) 1.342 -0.308 (0.156)* 0.735 australia has strong leadership neither agree/disagree 0a 0a 0a disagree -0.197 (0.262) 0.821 -0.961 (0.259)*** 0.382 0.072 (0.205) 1.075 agree 0.170 (0.257) 1.186 -0.557 (0.229)* 0.573 -0.255 (0.178) 0.775 australia is economically prosperous neither agree/disagree 0a 0a 0a disagree -0.205 (0.315) 0.814 -0.927 (0.363)* 0.396 -0.286 (0.278) 0.751 agree -0.611 (0.236)* 0.543 -0.984 (0.212)*** 0.374 -0.383 (0.178)* 0.682 quality of healthcare not concerned 0a 0a 0a slightly concerned/ concerned 0.043 (0.404) 1.044 -0.044 (0.351) 0.957 0.331 (0.271) 1.392 very/extremely concerned 0.644 (0.418) 1.905 -0.221 (0.371) 0.802 0.291 (0.292) 1.338 employment and job security not concerned 0a 0a 0a slightly concerned/ concerned -0.854 (0.396)* 0.426 0.100 (0.380) 1.105 0.042 (0.292) 1.043 very/extremely concerned -0.647 (0.417) 0.524 0.032 (0.399) 1.033 0.045 (0.318) 1.046 the australian government can be trusted to do the right thing for australians neither agree/disagree 0a 0a 0a disagree 1.996 (0.277)*** 7.358 -0.434 (0.265) 0.648 0.987 (0.207)*** 2.683 agree -1.683 (0.302)*** 0.186 -1.893 (0.232)*** 0.151 -1.443 (0.174)*** 0.236 in five years my life in australia will be much worse neither agree/disagree 0a 0a 0a disagree -0.345 (0.250) 0.709 -0.642 (0.222)** 0.526 0.035 (0.169) 1.036 agree 0.031 (0.241) 1.031 -0.101 (0.241) 0.904 -0.433 (0.193)* 0.649 i would not object to a religious place of worship being built in my own community neither agree/disagree 0a 0a 0a disagree 1.102 (0.275)*** 3.011 -0.060 (0.285) 0.942 0.282 (0.221) 1.325 agree -0.522 (0.236)* 0.593 -0.779 (0.210)*** 0.459 -0.658 (0.167)*** 0.518 australia is weakened by people of different ethnic origins sticking to their old ways neither agree/disagree 0a 0a 0a disagree 0.089 (0.261) 1.093 -0.614 (0.244)* 0.541 0.170 (0.190) 1.185 agree -0.057 (-.241) 0.945 -0.748 (0.224)** 0.473 -0.096 (0.179) 0.909 note. parameter estimates (b) for each latent class are relative to the reference latent class (trusting), adjusted for all other variables in the model. se: standard error of the estimates. or: odds ratio. odds-ratios are exponentiated parameter estimates. 0a: reference category. the coefficients and or reflects the effects of the predictors on the likelihood of membership in the listed latent class relative to the reference class (trusting). * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202397 this somewhat trusting class were also less likely than the trusting class to agree that their life in australia would be much worse in five years. the unsure class were 17% of the sample. they varied from the trusting class by gender, being more likely to be female. they were also more likely to be unable to agree or disagree (being ‘unsure’) that: 1) the government can be trusted; 2) australia is economically prosperous; 3) australia has strong leadership; 4) australia is weakened by people of different ethnic origins sticking to their own ways; 5) they would not object to a religious place of worship being built in their own community; and 6) that their life in australia will be much worse in five years. this unsure class could be more appropriately characterised as worried, as shown in their uncertainties. finally, the covariate assessments across all of the forms reveal that the trusting class (26%) are marked by their enhanced agreement that the australian government can be trusted to do the right thing for australians. while other classes shared some level of trust across family, neighbours, people of other faiths and various institutions, it was the trusting class alone that had the highest trust in the australian government. this indicates that it is trust in government specifically that is required to move australians from the other classes into this class of trust. in other words, trust in government is a key stone for fortifying general trust and social cohesion. they were also distinct from the other three groups in their embrace of religious diversity (not disposed to oppose local places of worship). this class also looks to institutions for leadership (e.g., on climate change). this is a class of australians whose trust and confidence could be leveraged to influence other australians, for whom contact and confidence could be key. conclusion in the age of global populism and disruption, a new ‘red-button’ issue of public trust has emerged. trust towards institutions is of global concern, but even trust between neighbours is increasingly a matter of concern. our research has identified that distrust of institutions is a key feature in contemporary australian society, however, just like ‘social trust’, ‘institutional trust’ is differentiated across demographic categories. for example, trust in family, close friends and neighbours was higher for older australians. this was also the case for trust in people of other faiths and ethnicities. trust in the science of climate change was a feature of younger australians rather than older australians. older australians, and those born in australia, had lesser levels of trust in the courts, media, political parties and government, but higher trust in their neighbours and people from different cultural backgrounds. moving beyond demographic analyses, a latent class analysis identified four classes of australians regarding their trust levels. the trusting class were about quarter of australians (26%), and were remarkable for trusting institutions, family, neighbours, as well as people of other faiths and ethnicities. this class has relatively high levels of trust, is associated with younger australians and was the only class to show high levels of trust in the government. at the other end of spectrum was the very distrusting class (15%) who were highly distrustful of institutions, family and neighbours and other faiths and ethnicities. the remainder of the sample, a large middle group, comprised two classes whose trust was uneven. the somewhat trusting class (42%) distrust the key institutions, but had trust in their neighbours, and some trust in other faiths and ethnicities. this class was more likely to comprise older australians, and those with higher levels of education. the unsure class (17%) shows concerns or worry across all trust indicators, but was most sceptical around institutions. they are not sure whether they should or can trust institutions, they are unsure about the economic fortunes of australia, they are less committed to democratic forms of government, they were unsure on matters of cultural retention among ethnic minority groups (assimilationist), they were more likely to be unsure about a place of worship being built in their own community, and they were more likely to be women. this would suggest that the unsure class is worried and uncertain, making them a prime target for anti-diversity political forces and tactics. confidence building in kamp, et al. cosmopolitan civil societies: an interdisciplinary journal, vol. 15, no. 2 202398 the public institutions, democracy and their fellow citizenry will help inoculate this large and worried group from cynical dispositions promulgated by populist politics. we argue that by taking a multidimensional view of the attitudinal data of individual respondents, we have been able to identify four classes in the population. the australians within each of those classes share a similar response pattern when it comes to the issues of trust. by segmenting the population in this way, we have developed a typology of trust that facilitates a more nuanced person-centred understanding of australians’ trust. whilst it is a typology of trust in australia at a single, cross-sectional point in time, it can be used as a baseline to address distrust in australia; a key and urgent consideration must be to arrest the high levels of distrust in institutions, and in particular government institutions. our findings indicate that a negative view of religious diversity and assimilationist views is associated with the most distrusting australians (15%), and there is a sense that such a disposition is present among the 17% who are unsure in their trust. building confidence and positivity toward diversity will work to contain the proportion of australians in these two classes. a pressing societal need is to ensure that more australians in the unsure class do not move into the very distrusting class, and trust in the media, courts and science is key here. more generally, our interpretations suggest that confidence is generally associated with trust in institutions, as demonstrated by the demographic variations in which institutions are trusted: police more trusted by male and older australians, and the family court more trusted by women. the background literature suggests that quality information is key in building confidence and therefore trust. the low trust in mainstream media, and the perceptions of its bias and divisiveness (edelman 2022), make quite difficult the project of enhancing the extent to which people feel well-informed. the temporal variations in trust point to its dynamism, reflecting the theorising around political opportunity structures and political tactics (ernst et al., 2019; koopmans & olzak 2004; meyer 2004). this also reminds us of the possibility to enhance and build trust, and this paper provides some data and analysis on the most propitious levers to pull. references adam-troian, j., tecmen, a., & kaya, a. 2021, 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